Reply Obj. 1: Among bodily medicines, some consist in the patient’s only enduring or receiving something, like surgery on a wound or the application of a bandage, while others consist in the patient’s active exertion, like exercises and things like that. In just the same way, among the sacraments some do not require any act from the one who is sanctified for the sacrament’s substance, except incidentally, like removing anything that prevents it, as is seen in baptism and confirmation and the others like them. But some sacraments do require the act of the one who receives the sacrament, essentially and per se, for the essence of the sacrament, as is seen in penance and marriage. Therefore, in those sacraments that are completed without our act, it is the matter that causes and signifies, like a medicine applied from without. But among those sacraments that require our act, there is no matter of this kind, but the acts themselves appearing outwardly do here what the matter does in the other sacraments. Now, how those things that are outwardly performed are the cause of sanctification in penance will be clear from what follows. To be sure, in this definition ‘material element’ must be taken in a general way for the sensible cause, whether it is a certain corporeal matter, or a certain sensible act.

Reply Obj. 2: In this sacrament there are certain things, namely, those external acts themselves, and certain words, namely, the words of the priest absolving, which are the form of this sacrament, in which the act of absolution is expressed. But this sacrament does not require so much determination of the words as in baptism and in the Eucharist, for there is no material to be sanctified by the word of life,¹ as in those sacraments.

Reply Obj. 3: The sacrament of penance is also presented by the ministers of the Church, for the priests absolve those confessing and impose satisfaction on them. But the fact that they have a certain principle in us is from that part by which our act is required in this sacrament, as was said.

Reply Obj. 4: The intention of Dionysius in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy was not to hand down the teaching on the sacraments—which is why he examines certain things that are not sacraments, like monastic final vows and the funeral rites for the dead—but to show that outward rites represent spiritual acts. And since in penance and marriage there is no determined rite, by the fact that they do not have a matter like the other sacraments, as was said, he therefore did not examine these two sacraments. But it does not follow from this that they are not sacraments.

Reply Obj. 1: Penance is not a virtue and a sacrament in the same respect. Inasmuch as the penitent receives the grace that cures the wound of sin by penance, it can be a sacrament. But inasmuch as by an infused habit one is directed to the right act, in this way it is a virtue. And since no right act is essential to baptism, this is why baptism is never called a virtue, nor is confirmation for the same reason.

Reply Obj. 2: Penance is not the same thing as grace in its essence, but it is called grace because it coincides with grace in its proper effect. For grace’s proper effect is to justify, and to render a person pleasing to God; and this is also the effect of penance, as will be said later.

Reply Obj. 3: The passion of repentance is not a virtue, nor is it an act of virtue. But it can accompany virtue, for as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2,¹ virtues are not still and unmoving, as some people say; rather, they have both joy and sadness joined to them according to what kind of passions they are. For an act of penance, according as it is a virtue, does not arise from a passion, but from a due choice.

Reply Obj. 4: That good to which a virtue is directly ordered is its perfect act; and thus there are certain virtues that have their chief act in withdrawing from something, as was said in Book II, Distinction 23, about temperance and modesty and things like this. And in the same way penance’s perfect act is in withdrawing from a certain evil; nor does it follow because of this that it is not a virtue.

Reply Obj. 5: Shame is the fear of what is disgraceful. Now fear has to do with the future, but the future is only feared according as it has a proximate disposition in its cause. And so shame establishes a proximate disposition in someone who is ashamed to commit something disgraceful, as the Philosopher speaks of shame; and therefore, it necessarily includes imperfection in the person that it is in. But penance relates to disgraceful things in the past, which may be succeeded by perfection in the present, and so it is not necessarily the act of someone imperfect.

Reply Obj. 1: Every virtue drives out the sin formally opposed to it as to its first actuality, which is informing the subject. But in the other virtues, the second actuality, which is their operation, is not directed principally to repelling sin, as is the case in penance. And so penance does not expel sin formally, but, as it were, effectively. For it has the expulsion of sin as its matter, and it works against it so that it is expelled. And this is why it is not opposed formally to every sin, but only to a certain one, which is impenitence; and consequently it is not necessary that it be a general virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the act of repentance concerns the matter of all vices, and consequently, of all virtues, nevertheless it considers the specific nature of the object in the matter it operates on, as was said, just as in a certain way magnanimity has the acts of all the other virtues for its object and matter, under the aspect of greatness; for it works great things in all the virtues, as is said in the Ethics 4, Chapter 9.¹ And thus, just as magnanimity is a specific virtue, so is repentance.

Reply Obj. 3: Although it follows from every virtue, according as one has right choice, to absolutely detest evils committed, nevertheless, to detest them for the sake of expiation is the proper matter of a specific virtue.

Reply Obj. 4: This virtue is reducible to a certain cardinal virtue, as will be said. Nevertheless the philosophers made no mention of this virtue for this reason: the remission of sins, or their expiation, pertains to God’s providence over human acts, inasmuch as he is offended by fault, and appeased by penance. Now the philosophers did not consider virtues directive of human acts as they are ordered to God’s providence, but as they are ordered to the human good. And so they made no mention of repentance. But from its likeness to the others that they did examine, we can understand it. For just as it belongs to a certain virtue that a man make amends to someone he has offended by his sin, so also it belongs to a certain virtue that a man make amends to God, whom he has offended by his sin.

Reply Obj. 1: When it is said that penance reconciles one to God, this does not refer to penance’s relation to its object, but rather to its end. But its order to its object is referred to in saying, weeping over sins committed, and so the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 2: There are three ways that infused virtues are related to God. For some of them have God as their object and end, like the theological virtues. Some do not have him as the object in which their act terminates, but for their proximate end: and this is seen in latria, which has as its matter certain professions of service, which are directed at God as their end; and virtues like this are the closest to the theological virtues. And this is why the acts of these virtues are attributed to the theological virtues as the closest ones commanding them. And thus Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith, hope, and charity.¹

Reply Obj. 4: The mean in justice is not found in the same way as in other moral virtues, as was said in Book 3, Distinction 33. For the mean of justice is found by the equalizing of one thing to another. Now this equalizing happens in commutative justice, when something is taken away from the one who has more and given to the one who has less. But someone who offends or injures another, has more, and the one who is injured, has less, inasmuch as for the latter, what was due him was taken away, and the former enjoyed his own will in what was not due to him. And so retributive justice takes away from the one who committed the offense as much more as he had than he should have, and gives it to the one who was injured, when it punishes the other person for his honor and in his satisfaction. And this is how retributive justice establishes a mean in offenses, which are its matter: not by holding to a mean in offenses, as if it retained some and cast away others (as temperance sets a mean in sensual pleasures); but by apportioning the due penalty for every offense. And in the same way penance imposes the due penalty on oneself for any sin committed; although not such that it forgives certain sins and retains others.

Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says in the Ethics, as we have in Book 5, Chapter 8,¹ virtue does not always require an equality, but what is possible suffices, as in honors toward parents and gods. And this is why, just as latria is a part of justice, although it does not render an honor equal to the benefits received, penance is as well, although it cannot render anything equal to the preceding offense.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the act of prudence is united to acts of the other moral virtues, it is also joined to the act of penance in the same way. And the objection proceeds according to this. Or it may be said that the Gloss does not speak about the sorrow of repentance, but the sorrow by which we spurn earthly things when we aspire to heavenly things.

Reply Obj. 3: Penance makes use of temperance for its own end; and the authoritative citation of Gregory and Isidore should be understood in this way, not as though repelling carnal desires were the act elicited by repentance.

Reply Obj. 4: Shame is in a different genus than penance, for shame is a kind of fear, as the Philosopher says,¹ whereas penance is a kind of sorrow; and so they are not the same, although both have the disgraceful deed as their object.

Reply Obj. 5: It belongs to penance to suffer difficulties voluntarily taken on, but patience is properly enduring the difficulties imposed by others; and so they are not the same.

Reply Obj. 1: Since habits are known by their acts, this is the reason that it is usual for authors to define habits by their acts, putting the acts in place of the habits. In the same way accidental differences are sometimes included in definitions in place of essentials because they are less hidden, as the Philosopher says.¹

Reply Obj. 2: What pertains to physical change does not pertain to virtue as its essential act, but it can pertain to virtue as the material that the virtue works on, since even physical passions are the matter of virtue. And according to this it should be said that sensible sorrow or physical weeping can be a certain material of the virtue of penance itself, inasmuch as the penitent person renders these things to God as though due for the offense committed. And therefore if the act of repentance is signified by weeping, then it signifies nothing else but detestation; but if it should name the material of repentance, in this way it can also signify sensible or physical weeping.

Reply Obj. 3: Although sin is past as to its act, nevertheless it remains as to the effect, whether of culpability or of stain or of divine offense. And this is how someone can grieve over sin in the present, for sorrow is about the present. Or it could be said, and this is better, that although the will does not aim at what is impossible, there is nevertheless a certain wishfulness about it, that is, a conditional will: for we would will, if it were possible, that this never have happened. And according to this they also take from the condition mentioned a certain character of the present, so that there can be sorrow, which only concerns present things, about these things as well.

Reply Obj. 4: Although regard for the future does not pertain to repentance as repentance, nevertheless as something that amends for offenses committed against God, it does require a consideration of the future, namely, the aim of avoiding it in the future. And this aim is understood in the passage: not committing again things to be wept over, that is, to have the aim of not committing them. Or it could be understood as to perfect repentance, so that what is added is not of the essence of repentance, but of its perfection, since without this it does not obtain its ultimate fruit; or so that it refers to the same time, as the Master says.

Reply Obj. 5: Ambrose orders the parts of the definition according to their order to penance, for he places first what is more essential to penance. But Augustine orders them by their order to the penitent person, for it happens first that someone withdraws from his intention of sinning, as though removing the impediment to penance.

Reply Obj. 6: It is not unfitting for the same thing to be given different definitions according to the differences that are found in things. Therefore, the definition cited from Gregory and Ambrose, which the Master reduces to the form of a definition, is the most complete one, for it touches on the genus and the act and the object, and each of those things is required to show amends to God. And Augustine’s definition cited in the text amounts to the same thing, namely: repentance is a certain retribution of the sorrowful, etc., except that he expresses more the proximate genus of it, for he places it not only in the genus of virtue, but in the genus of justice, by saying retribution; and he also includes its proper species rather than proximate differences, in adding the notion of punishment to sorrow.

Reply Obj. 1: Although it does not have a cause in the subject, nevertheless, it has its disposition in it; and this is how the origin of penance is assigned here.

Reply Obj. 2: Conception is properly said for the generation of something within the womb. And since the first existence of the act of penance is in the heart, but afterward it extends externally by confession and satisfaction, therefore, so that he might designate its first origin, he said that it is conceived in fear.

Reply Obj. 3: The goodness and glory of God, in themselves, are more of a nature to recall someone from sin; but not on the part of those who are in sin, who do not have the taste for the things mentioned.

Reply Obj. 4: Penance is conceived in servile fear, which has to do with punishment. Nor is it necessary that servile fear and penance exist together: for servile fear is not the cause of the very being of penance, but of its generation, just as taking medicine is a cause of health, but they do not exist at the same time.

Reply Obj. 1: Faith and hope do not have the nature of perfect virtue except insofar as they are informed by charity, and according to this they follow penance; and so in a certain way it is true that it is the first among all the virtues.

Reply Obj. 2: Unformed faith and hope are also had without grace, and so they need not be superadded in justification; and so penance is not their cause.

Reply Obj. 3: The end that is prior in intention is last in execution; and therefore, although in physical movement leaving the starting point comes before advancing to the ending point, nevertheless, in the movement of the will it is just the opposite, since it is because of some good to be obtained that the will withdraws from something contrary or from its impediment.

Reply Obj. 5: Repenting an evil committed, although it may arise from the choice of good, nevertheless also sometimes happens from another reason, namely, flight from the evil of punishment, as was said; and even when it stems from the choice of the good, the first motion of penance does not arise from the formed choice of the good through some habit of another virtue, but through some natural appetite, or even from the good habit of the virtue of penance itself; and so the first movement of penance precedes the motion of the other virtues. But it is not unfitting that the motions of the other virtues sometimes cause certain motions of penance, just as someone, out of love for temperance, has a movement of repenting his previous lust: for also sometimes the movement of a preceding virtue arises from a subsequent virtue, as when someone is moved to the love of God, which demands chastity, from the fact that chastity pleases him.

Reply Obj. 1: The other sacraments do not rescue one from the shipwreck wrought by mortal sin without penance. And so they cannot be called a second plank, like penance, which rescues one after a fall. And this is why although it is not the second sacrament, it is nevertheless the second plank.

Reply Obj. 2: Peter does not speak there of penance the sacrament, but of the repentance that is required in baptism, which does pertain to the first plank.

Reply Obj. 3: The kind of concealment of sin that Jerome mentions there is not contrary to the kind of manifestation of it that happens in penance, but rather to the kind that people make who, shamelessly advancing in sin, glory in having done evil, and boast of their sins. And this kind of concealment pertains to shame; and according to the same likeness it is called a second plank: for the first plank of a favorable voyage is for a man to not commit a sin; the second, that he be ashamed of having committed a sin. But a sufficient remedy is not given by the plank of shame, except to the extent that it leads to the amendment from sin and penance. And so it is not properly called the second plank like penance. Nevertheless, it can be called a second plank: for the second plank in a physical shipwreck does not always free one from danger, even if in some way it does in itself impede the danger.

Reply Obj. 1: Penance does not drive out every sin formally, but effectively, as it were. And this is why it is not necessary that it be in, as its subject, every power where there can be sin, but rather, that those things that are in those powers be subject to it as its material. And penance does have this, since it exists in the reason, to which all the other powers are subordinated as being moved and regulated by it.

Reply Obj. 2: The sorrow that exists in the concupiscible appetite is not the act of the virtue of penance, but the matter of it, as was said. But the sorrow that is a detestation of faults committed is its act; and this belongs to the will, in which justice exists, whose act is to detest preexisting inequality and to reduce it to equality.

Reply Obj. 3: The exercise of redress is the matter in penance, just as it is in retributive justice; for it does not seek to redress from an appetite for vengeance, but for the sake of restitution of equality.

Reply Obj. 4: Although penance is about the past, like memory, nevertheless, it regards the affections, while memory is a purely cognitive power; and so penance cannot exist in it.

Reply Obj. 1: Although they had not committed any sins, nevertheless, they were able to commit them; and so it is fitting for them to have the habit of penance. But nevertheless this habit can never result in an act, except perhaps with regard to venial sins, since mortal sins destroy it. Nor, however, is it in vain, since it is the perfection of a natural power.

Reply Obj. 2: Although they do not actually deserve any punishment, nevertheless it is possible for something to exist in them for which they would have to suffer punishment.

Reply Obj. 3: In the power for sinning that remains, retributive justice would still have a place as a habit, although not as an act, if there were no actual sins.

Reply Obj. 1: That authority proves that they do not have the same act that penance has here; and we concede this.

Reply Obj. 2: Christ could not sin, as was said in Book III, Distinction 12, Question 2, Article 1. And so the matter of this virtue did not pertain to him, neither actually nor potentially. And because of this, it is not the same with him as with other people.

Reply Obj. 3: To repent, properly speaking, as it names an act of penance that exists now, will not exist in heaven; but neither will the habit be in vain, since it will have another act.

Reply Obj. 5: But since the fifth argument argues that the same act of penance will exist in heaven which exists now, it should be said to the fifth that in heaven our will will be entirely conformed to God’s will. And so just as by his antecedent will God wills that all things be good, and as a result that there be no evil, but not by his consequent will, it is also this way with the blessed; and this kind of will is improperly called repentance by that holy father.

Reply Obj. 1: Fear generates in them a certain motion of repentance, but not one that is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: Whatever is natural in them is entirely good, and inclines them to the good; but their free will is fixed in malice. And since the movement of virtue and vice does not follow the inclination of nature, but rather the movement of the free will, for this reason although by nature they are inclined to the good, it is not necessary that the movement of virtue exist in them, or that it is even possible for it to exist there.

Reply Obj. 4: One cannot reason the same way about the holy angels as about the holy souls. For in the holy souls there was or there could have been forgivable sin, but not in the angels. And so although they are alike in their present state, they were not as to their past state, which repentance directly regards.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as the offense possessed infiniteness, so also does a single act of contrition possess a certain infiniteness, both by virtue of the grace that gives an infinite value to its works, namely, so that by these works a man may merit an infinite good, and by the merit of Christ, which works in all the sacraments and in all our merits.

Reply Obj. 2: Neither penance nor any virtue acts out of necessity, but from the freedom of the will. And so although penance is stronger than sin, and can expel sin, nevertheless a man having the virtue of penance can voluntarily subject himself to sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes a man is conquered by someone weaker, who conquers the stronger man because he did not take enough care. And in the same way, a penitent who was freed by penance from the sin he had committed is conquered by a sin not yet committed because of his negligence.

Reply Obj. 1: Sorrow for sins and joy in this sorrow are not contrary affections, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 2: The object of joy is something fitting; but the object of sadness is the harmful opposite. And this is why the sorrow that someone rejoices in is not contrary to the one rejoicing, but fitting. But the joy that someone is sorry for is contrary to the one sorrowing. And so when someone rejoices there cannot be sorrow at the same time about this joy concerning the same thing; but when someone sorrows there can be joy about it at the same time.

The third objection should be answered like the first.

Reply Obj. 2: As the just Lord loves justice supremely, so he hates sin supremely. And so, on his side, he is always prepared to destroy sin, as long as it does not remain on the man’s part, by neglecting or rejecting penance. But nothing prevents some people from taking the occasion for wrongdoing from this, for the opposite would give the occasion of despairing, which would be worse.

Reply Obj. 3: Although it is not written that any sick person was cured by the Lord more than once, nevertheless, it does not explicitly deny that this happened either. And furthermore, we see this illuminated by faith, that men become sick often and they are cured by divine power, which restores all things.

Reply Obj. 1: The priest does not reveal the confession by imposing such a penance, although it may raise suspicion that some atrocious sin has been committed. For the fault cannot be known for certain from the penalty, since sometimes someone does penance for another, as is read in the Lives of the Fathers about a certain man who, in order to prod his companion to penance, would himself do the penance with him.¹ But if there is a public sin, when the penitent himself carries out the penance, he shows that he has been to confession.

Reply Obj. 2: Solemn penance requires a secret forum as to its imposition, for just as a person makes his confession secretly, so also a penance is enjoined on him secretly. But its execution does not require a secret forum, and this is not unfitting.

Reply Obj. 3: Although penance does call back all failings, restoring one to former grace, nevertheless, it does not restore one to former dignity. And so also women, after having done penance for fornication, do not wear a veil, for they do not regain the dignity of virginity; and likewise after public penance a sinner does not return to such dignity that he can be received into the clerical state. And a bishop who ordains someone like that should be deprived of his power of ordaining, unless perhaps the needs of the Church or custom should demand it. For then by a dispensation he is received into minor orders, but not into priestly orders. First, because of the dignity of those orders. Second, because of fear of it recurring. Third, in order to avoid scandal, which could arise in the people from the memory of previous sins. Fourth, since he would not have the nerve to correct others, since his own sin was public.

Reply Obj. 1: In those sacraments in which solemnity is repeated, the repetition is not opposed to the solemnity, as is the case here; and so it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 2: Although in the nature of the crime the same penance may be due to someone, nevertheless, repeating the solemnity is not fitting, for the reasons mentioned.

Reply Obj. 1: The woman’s hair is a sign of being subject, but the man’s is not; and therefore it is not fitting that her hair be cut off in penance like the man.

Reply Obj. 2: A cleric may sin more than a layman in the same kind of sin, but solemn penance is still not enjoined upon him, lest holy orders come under contempt. Therefore, it is not set aside for the sake of the person, but for the sake of holy orders.

Reply Obj. 3: Great sins require greater care to be cured, and so the injunction of solemn penance, which only happens for the gravest of sins, is reserved to the bishop alone.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking here about the victim who was offered universally for the sins of the whole world, namely Christ, who is one and unique. Nor is he offered again to blot out sins, but his unique offering is strong enough that by penance and the other sacraments all sins may be forgiven.

Reply Obj. 2: The reason that Esau, about whom the Apostle speaks (Heb 12:17), did not find a place of forgiveness is that he did not truly repent, even if he shed tears outwardly. And this is evident from the fact that he said: the days of mourning for my father are coming, and I will kill my brother Jacob (Gen 27:41).

Reply Obj. 3: And a similar answer should be given about Antiochus, who did not truly repent inwardly, although he uttered outwardly words of repentance, more because of the ailment of his body than for the sake of avoiding offending God.

Reply Obj. 4: The offense is infinite in regard to what is turned away from but not in regard to what is turned toward; and likewise also the act of repentance has an infinity on the part of grace, which is a likeness to God, and working in virtue of divine mercy, which is infinite, although on the part of our act it is finite. But it also has efficacy by virtue of Christ’s Passion, which has a certain infinite value, since it was the Passion of God and man.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as what is perfect is more effective at acting than the imperfect, so also what is perfect is more difficult to become. And this is why, although good is more effective at working than evil, it is more difficult to establish than evil. Therefore, the action of good appears more effective than the action of evil in this, that the action of evil never ends in an evil that does not have an admixture of good, but the action of good ends in a good in which sometimes there is no admixture of evil. Nevertheless it is not necessary, if some evil is incurred by one bad act, that the opposing goods may be restored by one good act.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher in the Ethics 5,¹ in recompense for an injury, commutative justice does not always impose an absolutely equal quantity in punishment on the one who committed the fault. For if someone struck the prince, it is not enough that he be only struck, but also that he be punished more gravely. Nevertheless, once the person against whom the fault was committed has been taken into consideration, it does impose an equal penalty. And so, since by penance a man does justice from himself to God, it is not enough for there to be as much sorrow in the penalty as there was enjoyment in the fault. For that delight was an injury against God, inasmuch as man, ignoring God, gave himself to delight in sinning.

Reply Obj. 3: Baptism is a spiritual regeneration; and since there cannot be a generation of one thing except by corruption of another, for this reason it is necessary that in baptism whatever belonged to the previous life should be totally abolished, namely, both the guilt and the punishment owed, unless there be a defect on the part of the recipient. But penance is not regeneration, but rather the restoring of the life previously had. And so the argument is not similar.

Reply Obj. 1: Penance is not compared to generation, but rather to healing, because by penance a man is not given a new life, but he is restored to his former life. Now in healing we see this occur, that once health is restored, certain vestiges of illness still remain before perfect health is restored. In the same way the vestiges of actual sin also remain before penance is completed.

Reply Obj. 2: Sin is committed by the act of a power, and that is why in those very powers other defects besides the removal of virtues are also caused by sin; but this does not happen in the essence of the soul, except for the loss of grace. And so if by the advent of grace into the essence of the soul, stains which were nothing but the lack of grace should be taken away, it is still not necessary that all the other defects should be taken away from the powers as well.

Reply Obj. 1: God alone is the per se cause of grace and the virtues infused in us; but nothing prevents our acts from also being incidental causes, as removing what obstacles, just as they are also causes of baptismal grace inasmuch as they prevent deception; and this is the way the virtues are restored by penance.

Reply Obj. 2: An incidental cause is not necessarily more noble than its effect, but only a per se cause. Now, we have considered penance an incidental cause of the virtues, by the fact that it removes obstacles, namely, sins.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as in the same instant when the obstacle to the light is first removed, the light breaks forth, and yet the removal of the obstacle is the cause of illumination, so in the same way, in the same instant that the act of penance happens, sin is removed and virtue is restored, and still nothing prevents the virtues from being restored by penance.

Reply Obj. 4: As was said in Book 3, Distinction 33, Question 1, Article 2, Subquestion 4, infused and acquired virtues are not of the same species, and so although the habit born of frequent acts of sin is contary to acquired virtue, it is not directly contrary to infused virtue, which is opposed to sin in the fact that it is an offense against God. Therefore, it is not necessary that immediately when the infused virtues are restored, the habits of vices be completely taken away, although they are hindered, and even diminished.

Reply Obj. 5: Ease in doing works of virtue can come from two things: namely, from a previous habit, and infused virtue does not immediately bestow this ease in its beginning; or else from strongly clinging to the object of virtue, and this can be found in infused virtue from its beginning.

Reply Obj. 1: As Isidore seems to explain the words of Adamantius in the same text, by salvation is understood the sign of salvation, which even sinners receive in the sacraments. Or it could be said that he grants them salvation in hope but not in fact.

Reply Obj. 2: Natural powers are closer to charity and grace than acts of acquired virtues as to the reality, inasmuch as they are the subject of grace and charity. But as to the resemblance of the species it is clearly just the opposite. And furthermore, natural powers remain, but not the acts of sin. And this is why those who said that the natural things are informed by grace were not thinking of the acts that pass away but of the powers and habits, which do remain.

Reply Obj. 3: The reason that those works are dead is that they were not elicited by charity. And therefore the cause of their being dead is not taken away by repentance, as was said.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as works of sin pass away in act, but remain in guilt, so also good works done out of charity, although they pass away in act, nevertheless remain in merit; and according to this they can be made dead.

Reply Obj. 2: By ingratitude a man deserves to lose the benefits he has received, and so by any mortal sin, no matter how small, by which man becomes ungrateful to God for the benefits received, he loses all the preceding goods, no matter how much they would have resulted in eternal life. Nor does the punishment exceed the guilt because of this.

Reply Obj. 3: What is dead in itself cannot have the act of life with respect to another. But taking ‘living’ metaphorically, as was said, nothing prevents that something living in itself be alive in relation to one thing and dead in relation to another. For with respect to one thing it has its own effect, but with respect to another it does not, because of its own indisposition, as light is disagreeable to ailing eyes, but to the pure it is pleasant.¹

Reply Obj. 1: The words of Hugh are to be understood as to the goods lost, which are never recovered, since time lost is not recovered. And this is why its loss is the most serious, as Seneca says;¹ but he is not speaking about goods that have become dead.

Reply Obj. 2: A work is said to be alive metaphorically, in having its due effect, as was said.

Reply Obj. 3: Although they do not remain in act, nevertheless they remain in merit in the divine reception of them; just as sins also pass away as acts, but remain as guilt.

Reply Obj. 4: As was said, formerly living works do not die in themselves, but they die incidentally in their relation to that one who performed them. And therefore once this incidental thing is removed, they are said to be revived.

Reply Obj. 1: The effects of grace and the effects of virtue do not work in the same way, as was said.

Reply Obj. 2: Not every virtue is informed by grace, nor does every virtue have an act ordered toward restoring the equality mentioned between God and man, as has been said. And therefore it is not necessary that just any virtue remit sins. For this belongs to penance not as it is a virtue simply, but because of the kind of virtue it is.

Reply Obj. 3: Faith is said to purify the heart by the fact that the first movement toward justification is from faith, and it is also the principle of repentance. And that is why what belongs to penance can also be attributed to faith.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as penance is a sacrament and repentance is a virtue under different accounts, so also the effect mentioned applies to penance as a sacrament and to penance as a virtue in different ways, as was said.

Reply Obj. 5: Baptism forgives sin in only one way, which is as a sacrament alone; but penance does in more than one way, since it is both a virtue and a sacrament.

Reply Obj. 1: A good will, which is enough to deserve peace, cannot exist without penitence, because the will is not brought back to an equality; and so the argument proceeds on false grounds.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as among men friendship is not restored after an offense except through some sorrow over the offense, in the same way, neither is charity restored after sin except through penitence.

Reply Obj. 3: In turning away from God, there is always a turning toward some changeable good. And although this turning may not contain any sensual pleasure, nevertheless it always holds a certain pleasantness for the will. And in the same way, in order to turn toward God a displeasure must be added, and this is called the sorrow of penance.

Reply Obj. 4: The movement of faith can only be directed such that it attain grace by including penance.

Reply Obj. 5: Perhaps the last instant of life should not be taken, but rather the first instant of death; otherwise, between the penultimate instant of life and the first instant of death, since they are different instants, there would be a middle time. But supposing that there is a last instant of life, then in that same instant grace will be infused and the man will have the movement of penitence; and such penitence suffices for salvation, as Augustine says in the Book of Ecclesiastical Dogma.¹

Reply Obj. 1: Although making satisfaction in itself is owed, nevertheless, to the extent that the person making satisfaction performs this work voluntarily, it has the nature of something freely done on the part of the doer. And thus the person makes a virtue of the necessity: for paying a debt has merit from the fact that it involves necessity, which is contrary to the will. And so if the will assents to to the necessity, the quality of merit will not be destroyed.

Reply Obj. 2: The voluntary is not required from an act of virtue in the one who suffers, but in the one who does it, since it is his act. And so when the one on whom the judge imposes recompense is related to the satisfaction passively, and not actively, it is not necessary that the satisfaction be voluntary in him, but in the judge making him do it.

Reply Obj. 3: The most important thing in virtue can be considered in two ways. In one way, the chief thing in it as it is a virtue, and so what belongs to its definition or is closer to it is more important in virtue; and in this way choice and interior acts are the most important things in virtue, as virtue. In another way, the chief thing in virtue can be considered according as it is this particular virtue; and in this way the most important thing in it is what gives it its determination. Now interior acts in any virtue are determined through external ones: for choice, which is common to all virtues, becomes specific to this virtue by the fact that it is the choice of this act. And that is how external acts in any virtues are more principal; and this is also how it is in satisfaction.

Reply Obj. 1: Satisfaction, as is clear from what has been said, is a certain recompense for an injury inflicted. And so as the injury inflicted directly brought about an inequality of justice, and as a result, an inequality opposed to friendship, so also satisfaction leads directly to an equality of justice, and consequently to an equality of friendship. And since every act proceeds as elicited by that habit to whose end it is immediately ordered, but it proceeds as commanded by the one to whose end it further tends, this is why satisfaction is elicited by justice, but commanded by charity.

Reply Obj. 2: Although justice is chiefly about activities, nevertheless it is also about passions as a result, inasmuch as they are the causes of activities. But justice restrains anger, so that it does not unjustly impose an injury on another, and concupiscence, so that it does not approach the bed of others. In the same way, too, satisfaction can cut out the causes of sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Any moral virtue takes part in the act of prudence, by the fact that prudence formally completes in them the account of virtue, since it is by prudence that the mean is taken in individual moral virtues, as is clear from the definition of virtue given in the Ethics 2.¹

Reply Obj. 1: The proximate causes of actual sin must be considered here, which are said to be two: namely, lust, whether from the habit left behind by an act of sin or other things left behind by past sins; and outward occasions of sin, like place, bad company, and things like that. And such causes are removed in this life by satisfaction; although the fomes, which is the remote cause of actual sin, is not completely removed by satisfaction in this life, even if it is weakened.

Reply Obj. 2: Since the cause of evil or privation, in the way it has a cause, is only a defect in the good, but good is more easily destroyed than established, therefore it is easier to cut out the causes of privation and evil than to remove evil itself, which is only removed by establishing the good; which is evident in the case of blindness and its causes. And nevertheless the causes of sin mentioned are not sufficient causes, since sin does not necessarily follow from them, but they are certain actions. Nor again is satisfaction made without God’s help, since it cannot exist without charity, as will be said.

Reply Obj. 3: Although penance has to do with the past in its first intention, nevertheless it regards the future as a result, inasmuch as it is a preserving medicine; and so it is also with satisfaction.

Reply Obj. 4: Augustine defines satisfaction according as it is made to God, from whom in the truth of the matter nothing can be taken away, although the sinner, as far as in him lies, does take something away. And thus in such satisfaction amendment in the future is required more chiefly than recompense for the past; and because of this, Augustine defines satisfaction from this side. Nevertheless, the recompense for the acts of the past can be known from one’s guarding against future ones, for it is done about the same things in reverse. For in looking at past deeds, we detest the causes of sin on account of those sins, beginning the motion of detestation from our sins; but in taking care about the future we begin from the causes, so that we may avoid sin more easily once its causes are removed.

Reply Obj. 5: It is not unfitting that several different definitions should be given of the same thing according to the different things that are found in it; and this is the way it is in this case, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 6: The debt is to be understood as what we owe God by reason of a fault committed: for penance regards the debt, as has been said before.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as an offense contains a certain infinity from the infinity of divine majesty, so also satisfaction takes a certain infinity from the infinity of divine mercy, according as it is informed by grace, by which whatever a man can render is made acceptable. Nevertheless, some people say that it contains an infinity in regard to the turning away, and on this side it is forgiven freely; but in regard to what is turned toward it is finite, and so satisfaction can be made for it. But this amounts to nothing, for satisfaction does not correspond to sin except as it is an offense against God, which it does not possess in turning toward something else, but only in the turning away from God. But others say that even as to the turning away satisfaction can be made for sin by virtue of the merits of Christ, which had a certain infinity, as was said in Book 3, Distinction 18, Question 1, Article 6, Subquestion 1. And this amounts to the same thing as was said before, for through faith in the Mediator grace is given to believers. However, if he gave grace in another way, satisfaction would be sufficient in the way described.

Reply Obj. 2: Man, who was made in the image of God, partakes in a certain freedom, inasmuch as he is master of his own acts by his free will. And thus by the fact that he acts through his free will, he can make satisfaction to God. For although he belongs to God, according as it was granted to him by God he has nevertheless handed it over freely, as he is his own master, and this does not apply to a slave.

Reply Obj. 3: That argument concludes that an equivalent satisfaction cannot be made to God; but not that a sufficient satisfaction cannot be made to him. For although man owes all that he can do to God, it is nevertheless not required of him that he necessarily do all that he can, for it is impossible, according to the state of this present life, that he spend all his power on one single thing, since he must be concerned with many things. But a certain measure is applied to a man, which is required of him, namely, fulfilling God’s commands, and he can do something above and beyond these, so that he may make satisfaction.

Reply Obj. 4: Although man cannot recover past time, he can still compensate in the future what he should have done in the past; for he did not have to do for the due precept all that he was able, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 5: Original sin, although it has less of the account of sin than actual sin does, is nevertheless a more serious evil, for it is the infection of human nature itself. And therefore through one mere man’s satisfaction it could not be expiated, like actual sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Since sins are not connected by being all rooted in some one thing, a person may commit one without another. But all sins are forgiven according to one and the same thing; and this is why the remission of different sins is connected, and satisfaction cannot be made for one without the others.

Reply Obj. 2: In the obligation of debt there is only the inequality opposed to justice, because one person has what belongs to another. And that is why for restitution all that is required is that the equality of justice be restored, which can indeed be done about one debt and not another. But where there is offense, there is not only the inequality opposed to justice, but also to friendship. And therefore for offenses to be taken away through satisfaction, it is not only necessary that the equality of justice be restored by the compensation of an equal penalty, but the equality of friendship must also be restored; which cannot be done while there is anything that would impede friendship.

Reply Obj. 3: One sin draws a person into others by its weight, as Gregory says;¹ and so whoever retains one sin does not sufficiently cut out the causes of others.

Reply Obj. 1: Daniel’s counsel is understood as to cease from sin and repent, and that is how he could make satisfaction by almsgiving.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as a man does not know for certain whether he had charity when he did satisfaction, or whether he has it, so also he does not know for certain whether he has made satisfaction. And therefore Sirach 5:5 says: do not be without fear about the atonement for sins. Nevertheless, it is not required that because of this fear a man repeat the satisfaction he has completed, if he has a mortal sin on his conscience. For although he will not expiate the penalty by satisfaction like this, nevertheless, he will not incur the guilt of omission from neglecting to do his satisfaction; just as neither does someone who approaches the Eucharist with a latent mortal sin that he is not conscious of incur the guilt of receiving unworthily.

Reply Obj. 3: That intention was interrupted by the subsequent sin, and therefore it does not give any force to the works done after sin.

Reply Obj. 4: A sufficient equalization cannot be made, whether according to the divine acceptance or according to equivalence; and so this argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 1: It should not be understood that the fruits are counted from the time in which one was first in sin, but from the time when he stopped sinning, namely, when he was last in sin. Or it is understood from the moment he was contrite for sin, and did many good things before having confessed. Or it may be said that the greater his contrition was, the more he diminished his punishment, and the more good things he does while still in sin, the more he disposed himself for the grace of contrition. And so it is probable that he would owe less of a penalty; and because of this it should be considered differently by a priest, and given a lesser penance, since he found him so well disposed.

Reply Obj. 2: Baptism imprints a character on the soul, but satisfaction does not; and so once charity has come, which takes away the pretense and sin, it makes baptism have its own effect. But it does not do this with satisfaction. And furthermore, baptism justifies by the very fact of having been done, for it is not of man, but of God. And so it is not made dead in the same way as satisfaction, which is a work of man.

Reply Obj. 3: Some works of satisfaction leave a certain effect in the one doing them, even after the act of satisfaction passes, as bodily weakness remains from fasting, dimishment of wealth from almsgiving, and so on. And satisfactions like this done for sins do not need to be repeated, because they are accepted by God as penance in what remains from them. But satisfactions that do not leave behind any effect in the one doing them once the act has passed, must be done again, as it is with prayers and the like. Now an interior act, which completely passes, can in no way be made alive again, but must be repeated.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8,¹ by all the things that a son can do, nothing can render him equal to his father for those things that he received from his father, which is why nothing can make a father debtor to his son; and much less can man make God his debtor because of the equivalence of works. And so no work of ours is able to merit anything by the quantity of its own goodness, but from the power of charity, which causes those things that belong to friends to be shared. Hence, however great is the good work done without charity, it does not make it so that the one doing it has a debt of receiving anything from God, properly speaking. But a bad work, by the quantity of its badness, merits punishment according to equivalence, for no bad deeds done are on the part of God to us like good works. And so although a bad deed merits punishment condignly, nevertheless a good work does not merit reward condignly without charity.

To the second and third it should be said that they proceed from congruous merit. But the other arguments proceed from condign merit.

Reply Obj. 1: Although God does not delight in punishments as punishments, he does delight in them as they are just, and in that way they can be satisfactory.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as penalty is considered in satisfaction, so also difficulty is considered in merit. Now the reduction of difficulty on the part of the act itself reduces merit, other things being equal; but the reduction of difficulty from the promptness of the will does not diminish merit, but increases it. And likewise the reduction of penalty from the promptness of the will, which charity does, does not diminish the efficacy of satisfaction but increases it.

Reply Obj. 3: What is due for sin is recompense for the offense, which cannot happen without the punishment of the sinner, and Anselm understands the debt in this way.

Reply Obj. 1: Although those scourges are not at all in our power, nevertheless in this respect they are, namely, that we make patient use of them. And this is how a man makes a virtue out of necessity; and so they can be both meritorious and satisfactory.

Reply Obj. 2: As Gregory says, just as gold glows and chaff smokes in the same fire,¹ so also the good are purified and the wicked are more corrupted by impatience in the same scourges. And so although the scourges are common to both, nevertheless satisfaction only belongs to the good.

Reply Obj. 3: Scourges always have to do with past fault, but not always the fault of a person, but the fault of a nature. For if in human nature no fault preceded, no punishment would have existed. But since fault preceded in the nature, divine punishment is inflicted on a certain person without personal fault, for the merit of virtue and as a guard against subsequent sin. And these two things are also necessary in satisfaction. For it is necessary for there to be a meritorious work, so that honor may be shown to God, and it is necessary virtues be guarded, so that we might be preserved from future sins.

Reply Obj. 1: According to some people, there are two kinds of prayer: one kind which is contemplative, whose conversation is in heaven (Phil 3:20); and this kind, because it is completely pleasurable, is not satisfactory. The other is founded on grieving over sins; and this kind contains pain, and it is the part of satisfaction. Or it may better be said that certain prayer has the nature of satisfaction, because although it has the sweetness of the spirit, it still has the affliction of the flesh, for, as Gregory comments on Ezekiel, when the fortitude of inner love grows in us, the strength of the flesh is doubtless weakened.¹ And this is also why Jacob’s thigh muscle is read to have been withered by his struggle with the angel in Genesis 32:25.

Reply Obj. 2: Fleshly sin is said in two ways. In one way, what is fulfilled in bodily pleasure, such as gluttony and lust. In another way, what is fulfilled in those things that are ordered to the flesh, although not in the pleasure of the flesh, but rather in the pleasure of the soul, like greed. This is why such sins are like a middle ground between spiritual and fleshly sins; and thus it is necessary that a certain satisfaction correspond specifically to them, namely, almsgiving.

Reply Obj. 3: Although some of these acts are individually attributed to individual sins by a certain fittingness, because it is suitable that one is punished through the very things in which he sinned (Wis 11:16), and that the root of the sins committed be pulled up by satisfaction, still, any one of these can satisfy for any sin. This is why for someone who cannot complete one of these, another is enjoined; and almsgiving can particularly take the place of the others, inasmuch as someone can buy himself other works of satisfaction by almsgiving in a certain way among those to whom he gives alms. And so it is not necessary that if almsgiving cleanses all sins, the other satisfactions are therefore superfluous.

Reply Obj. 4: Although there are many sins in species, nevertheless, all can be traced back to these three roots, or to those three kinds of sin that we said all satisfactions correspond to.

Reply Obj. 5: Whatever belongs to bodily affliction comes under the heading of fasting; and whatever is spent on the benefit of one’s neighbor has the nature of almsgiving. And likewise, whatever shows worship to God takes the nature of prayer. And so one single work can hold several notions of making satisfaction.

Reply Obj. 1: Man is not reconciled for an offense against his neighbor by restoring his things to him, but by showing a certain humility to him beyond that; and so it does not follow that restitution is a part of satisfaction.

Reply Obj. 2: Restitution is not contrary to taking or keeping unjustly, but rather it is the negation or absence of it; and so it is not fitting that this suffice for satisfaction, as neither does it make satisfaction for gluttony that someone does not eat immoderately, but that he abstain even from moderate eating.

Reply Obj. 3: Ceasing from sin is said to be a part of penance, not indeed by stopping past sins, except as the preliminary for penance, but by cutting off the causes of future sins, as was said before.

Reply Obj. 1: Someone who exposes the wickedness of another to him who has the authority to correct—or even, if the wicked one be incorrigible, exposes him in the sight of the whole Church, that being put to shame he may desist from sin, or at least that they may depart from his corrupting company, provided the exposer preserve the order of fraternal charity—does not unjustly strip away that other’s good reputation; hence he is not bound to the restitution of his reputation. But if he did it with the intention of defaming, he does take it unjustly, even if what he says is true. And then he is bound to restore the man’s reputation, either by admitting he spoke falsely, if he spoke falsely, or in any other way, by not lying if he spoke truly, yet without saying that he had spoken truly, for he should not restore another’s good reputation with a lie.

Reply Obj. 2: Restitution is chiefly found in losses that were inflicted on matters of fortune, which can be restored. But in those matters that the objection refers to, which cannot be restored to the same good, restitution must be made as it is possible, namely, according to the judgment of good men.

Reply Obj. 3: The person who prevents someone from obtaining a living, if he does this because the man is unworthy, or so that he may be provided for better by another, does not act unjustly; and so he is not bound to restitution. But if it is for the sake of wounding him in the soul, he is bound to restitution, not indeed as much as the living was valued at, for he himself did not obtain it, but having considered the conditions of each according to the judgment of good men.

Reply Obj. 4: Someone who digs under the seed is not bound to as much grain as the field could produce, but as much as the field customarily did produce when sowed this way; for the crop of a field can be impeded by many things. And something similar should be said about someone who did not pay his debt on time, because he is not bound to restore as much as could possibly have been earned with it, but according to the estimation of the profit that typically came from it, having considered the labor, and misfortunes too, that may otherwise happen in profit; for profit does not arise from money alone, but from industry and labor.

Reply Obj. 5: That precept of the law, although it had to do with morals, nevertheless is not a moral precept, but a judicial one. For such precepts were given to that people for their place and time; and so they would not oblige now unless they were newly established by someone who had the power of establishing them. Nevertheless, inasmuch as they contained something of signification through Christ, precepts like these were fulfilled, as also the ceremonial ones.

Reply Obj. 6: Zacchaeus did not say this as if it were a necessary thing, but rather out of abundance.

Reply Obj. 1: When the owner of stolen things is unknown, the poor are his heirs; and so one is not acquitted of the debt of restitution, unless he gives to the poor on behalf of the soul of the one to whom restitution should have been made, after having applied due diligence, of course.

Reply Obj. 2: If a thing is of great value, he should convey it himself, if he can opportunely; nor is it a problem if he suffers a loss in returning it, because he was the cause of its unjust confiscation. But if it cannot be conveyed, or if it is not a thing of great value, he can give it to the owner’s relatives, if he has some, or to some monastery, if he does not have relatives, under the condition that they are bound to render it to him, if he ever requires it, or ever comes for it.

Reply Obj. 3: The man who takes something in this way must make restitution to the poor of that town, or donate toward the other community needs of that state according to the judgment of the bishop, or of those to whom the care of that country belongs.

Reply Obj. 4: Restitution must be made to the Church, so that those things come into the possession of the successor of that prelate: for although he did not deserve to receive them, nevertheless the Church should not lose them.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher in the Ethics 5,¹ everything whose price is usually compared or can be compared with money can come under the notion of giving and receiving. And therefore those acts that are shown in succoring a stranger’s misery are also received as if they were gifts, since they are bestowed without price.

Reply Obj. 2: Habits are distinguished by acts, and acts by their objects; and so sometimes the same name is used equivocally for habit, act, and object, as is clear in the case of faith, which can signify either the habit of faith, or its act, or the very thing believed. And in the same way the name almsgiving sometimes signifies the very thing given, and this is not how it is being defined here; and sometimes the fact of giving, and this is how the definition mentioned is taken.

Reply Obj. 3: Clerics, even if they themselves are not needy, are given alms as ministers of the poor and dispensers of alms; and so what is given to them in alms is passed along to the poor by them.

Reply Obj. 4: As was said in Book 3, Distinction 26, Question 1, Article 5, the names for sensible feelings are sometimes transferred to acts of the will, which exist without emotions. And this is how compassion, which properly denotes the emotion of sadness at another’s misery, is sometimes said about an act of the will, in which a stranger’s misery displeases someone. And without this kind of compassion alms should never be given, for someone does not succor another’s misery without willing him not to be miserable. And this kind of compassion does exist in God, because our evil deeds displease him by his antecedent will, and sometimes also by his consequent will. But sometimes compassion properly speaking is attached in us, because a higher appetite naturally moves a lower appetite; which is why, if there is a strong impression in the higher, it will also be in the lower, unless something opposes it. And according to this mercy and shame and certain other emotions are praiseworthy, to the extent that they proceed from the due choice of the good.

Reply Obj. 5: Although to exist for God’s sake does not give the species to almsgiving as to its own first being, nevertheless it gives its final completion, according to which it is meritorious. And thus it is included last in its definition.

Reply Obj. 2: That argument is based on integral parts. But almsgiving is not that kind of part of satisfaction, but rather a subjective part. And so even without it satisfaction has its complete character in any of its parts by itself, as animal does in any of its species.

Reply Obj. 3: Punishment is called an evil inasmuch as it takes away some good, because this is how evil injures a nature. And just as there is a different character of good in riches, which the concupiscence of the eyes seeks after, and of pleasures, which the concupiscence of the flesh seeks after, and in honors, which the pride of life tends toward, so also there is a different character of punishment in almsgiving, which takes away riches, and in fasting, which takes away tasty things, and in prayer, which brings down a proud spirit’s height by humility. And because of this they are different parts of satisfaction. Nor does it matter whether the goods named are simply good, or considered good, as far as the character of punishment goes, just as neither as regards the character of the appetite; for punishment is contrary to the will, as Anselm says.

Reply Obj. 4: Almsgiving does not only consist in the conferral of money, but also in any services done for one’s neighbor for God’s sake, as was said. And so even if someone lacks money, he still does not lack the ability to give alms. And if he lacked every ability with regard to physical alms, because of total lack of belongings and weakness of body, he would still not lack the ability with regard to spiritual alms, for he could either counsel another, or pray at the very least; and if he lacked even this ability, his total will would suffice.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine in Book 10 of the City of God,¹ the word ‘piety’ is used for mercy itself, in the custom of the common people; and this is how almsgiving is said to relate to piety, and not as piety is one of the gifts. Now the way that the gift of piety differs from mercy, has been said in Book III, Distinction 33, Question 3, Article 4, Subquestion 6.

Reply Obj. 2: Mercy according as it signifies only compassion toward the misery of another, is not a virtue, but an emotion; but as it signifies the choice of the one feeling this compassion, it is a virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: As is clear, almsgiving is reducible to a certain virtue also assigned by the philosophers, for it is directly reducible to mercy, and by means of mercy, to liberality. For although liberality does not generally require neediness, nevertheless nothing prevents a certain species of liberality from being directed at neediness.

Reply Obj. 4: To succor the wretched, as was said in the same place,¹ is not an act of justice by its own notion, but by the notion of its part, according as liberality also can be reduced to justice as a part.

Reply Obj. 1: Doing something good that we are not bound to by a precept of the law belongs to supererogation, which counsels are given about; and thus, since giving something from our excess with regard to the first kind of need, but for what is necessary from the second kind of need, to come to the aid of a greater need, even if it is not an absolute need, is a good thing that we are not obliged to by a precept. And so it is supererogatory, and because of this there is a counsel about it; and that is how this Gloss is to be understood.

Reply Obj. 2: As taking excess and what has been lessened should be considered in giving, so also should they be considered in keeping and receiving, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5;¹ and so someone, by keeping his own things sometimes is acting against virtue, and as a result, against God’s law, which directs sufficiently to every act of virtue, although it does not do this against the law of the secular forum, which cannot perfectly direct to all virtues. And furthermore, when another is in a state of extreme need, all things become common to him; and so even if he should take by violence or theft, he would not sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Almsgiving, as was said, is reducible to the affirmative precept that is, honor your parents. But since every affirmative precept for the time at which it obliges, introduces a sin of omission, but every sin falls under a prohibition, the affirmative precepts have prohibitions, like negative precepts, attached for that moment in which they oblige, just as also any affirmation has a negation joined to it. And accordingly that sin of omission can be the cause or occasion of another sin, which is how we understand what Ambrose says: feed; if you do not feed him, you have killed him.

Reply Obj. 4: The moment in which the precept about giving alms obliges is taken on the part of the receiver, and on the part of the giver. Now on the part of the receiver, when probable signs appear of extreme future need, unless he is helped; as when someone sees others powerless or indifferent to helping, and a poor man needing food and drink and other necessities of life, and unable to do enough for himself. For one should not wait for the last necessity, because then perhaps he could not be helped, if his nature has been consumed by hunger or thirst. For Chrysostom comments on John: it is not fitting for a howling poor man to call the Deceiver. What do you say, O man? Because of one bread someone gets involved in deception? Certainly, you say. Therefore, let him obtain the greatest mercy, so that he may be rescued from the greatest need.¹ On the part of the giver, when a man has many things that he does not need, whether to sustain the lives of himself and his own, or to keep them in a decent state; even if there are no poor men in extreme necessity around. Nor is it necessary to envisage an occasion of future need beyond probable signs of future need, because this is excessive concern, which the Lord prohibits in Matt 6:31: do not be anxious, saying: what will we eat, or what will we drink, or how will we clothe ourselves? etc.

Reply Obj. 1: In whatever way that someone is freed from mortal sin by almsgiving, he is freed from infernal darkness. But almsgiving frees a man from mortal sin while he remains in the state of life in two ways: either by preventing future sin, like other meritorious works, which strengthen a man in grace; or by freeing him from the past inasmuch as they dispose someone who has already fallen into sin to recover grace, like other works that are good in genus and done with a right intention.

Reply Obj. 2: This is understood of slipping into mortal sin. But what is said, he will not perish, is not to be understood according to need, but according to a certain disposition; for by the fact that someone existing in mortal sin is free for works of piety, he disposes himself for grace, and is not easily allowed to go to perdition. Or if it is understood about venial sin, the efficacy of almsgiving is shown in this, that diminishes the punishment of flogging; or it hinders venial sin, lest it draw one into mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Satisfaction is a medicine, both preserving from future sin, and expiating from past sin. And although alms have the force of expiating any past sin, they do not, however, have every force for preserving from future sin: because prayer and fasting preserve from certain sins not only by way of merit, which almsgiving also does, but by way of the contrary of one’s practice; and this is how the Gloss says in the same place that the diseases of the body are healed by fasting, but diseases of the mind by prayer. And this is how it should be understood that certain sins are only healed by prayer or fasting.

Reply Obj. 2: Although punishment is required in satisfaction, nevertheless, the goodness of the act is more important in it than the penalty. And since almsgiving has more of the nature of good than fasting, as it is directly related to charity, and as it is not an individual good of the one doing it, but a good shared by the one doing it and the one receiving it, almsgiving will be more satisfactory than fasting. And similarly, it will be more than prayer, although prayer makes a man more familiar to God than almsgiving, as the contemplative does more than the active; still the multiplication of intercessors by almsgiving is worth more for obtaining the remission of sins than the prayers of one man.

Reply Obj. 1: Although burial does not physically benefit the dead person in himself, nevertheless it benefits him according as he remains in the memory of men; both because it is considered to the shame of the dead man that he lies unburied; and because by his very grave he remains more in memory, and others are inspired to pray for him; and that is why the word ‘monument’ is derived from ‘memory,’ as Augustine says in the book On the Care to Be Given to the Dead.¹

Reply Obj. 2: The Lord enumerated those acts of almsgiving in which the greatest need appears, so that the judge’s justice appears even more evident, when he rewards some for almsgiving and condemns others for the omission. And yet in other places in Scripture alms of the other kind are commended, as is clear from Tobit¹ and Simon Maccabee,² who built solemn tombs for their parents and brothers, and also Joseph [of Arimathea] who buried the body of the Lord, and is praised for this (Matt 27:59–60).

Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes what is for pleasure or adornment turns into need; and this can happen in two ways, either by illness, because the sick are to be sustained with delicate foods and softer clothing, lest their nature should be burdened; or because of long-held custom or even a state of dignity in which someone, even a poor man, cannot use the other things without shame. And thus even Augustine in his Rule commanded those two kinds of men to be aided more richly.¹

Reply Obj. 4: All other necessities are reduced to one of these. For whatever belongs to the care of the sick, all this is contained under visiting the sick.

Reply Obj. 5: Just as money, by the fact that it is a certain measure, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5,¹ contains all the necessities of life in virtue; so also poverty contains all necessities. And thus to aid a poor man is not a special kind of almsgiving distinct from the others, but generally includes all the others.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as giving physical alms does not fall under an obliging precept except at a time of necessity, and so that someone is helped in the necessities of life, so also a man is only obliged to teach another beyond his due office in matter that concern salvation, and when no one else would instruct them, or when one sees another going astray; unless there were another who was bound to do this by his office. Otherwise, however, teaching is counsel, and it is a certain supererogation, just as was said about physical alms.

Reply Obj. 2: Not every question is counsel, but a question that is about things to be done by us. And since this kind of doubt or ignorance is a special kind of defect, inasmuch as knowledge is lacking, which must guide our works, for this reason counsel is considered a special almsgiving besides teaching.

Reply Obj. 3: Inflicting punishment by chastisement happens in two ways: either inasmuch as it afflicts the one on whom it is imposed, and then it pertains to severity, which preserves the equality of justice according as it pays the penalty for fault; or according as it works to the good of him on whom the punishment is imposed; and this can be broadly reduced to liberality, as every benefit granted is, in some way, of liberality.

Reply Obj. 4: Charity is the mother of all virtues. And so it is not unfitting if the acts that are chosen by other virtues are also commanded somehow by charity.

Reply Obj. 1: Although a body has more lacks than a spirit, nevertheless the lacks of the spirit are more to be fled than the lacks of the body, just as spiritual riches are more desirable than physical ones.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not compensation that diminishes the efficacy of almsgiving, but the intention of compensation. And so although by teaching a person also learns himself, nevertheless he does not always do it for this reason, but only to assist another person. And furthermore the intention of acquiring a certain spiritual good does not diminish its character of merit, because we are united to God by this, as frequently happens.

Reply Obj. 3: If someone feels his spiritual defects less, this is because of his defect. But almsgiving is not measured by the recipient’s receiving of it, but according to how he should receive it: otherwise the merit of the giver would depend on the judgment of the recipient, which is false.

Reply Obj. 1: If someone denied himself something necessary, without which he could in no way be or live decently, and he gave it to another, the order of charity would be perverted in the observance of kindness. But this is not true if he gives more to another than to himself of other things, without which those things mentioned can exist; because it belongs to the virtuous man to give such physical goods more to others than to himself, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9.¹

Reply Obj. 2: That argument proceeds concerning things that are necessary according to the first way.

Reply Obj. 3: Those who give away all things for God’s sake change their state of living. Their state’s propriety can be preserved by those things that are supplied by the faithful and devout either daily, or already were furnished in the possessions and revenues.

Reply Obj. 1: This is to be understood as concerning those things that were acquired by an illicit act, but nevertheless can be possessed justly. Or otherwise it may be said that mammon of iniquity is said of riches licitly acquired and possessed, or inasmuch as only iniquity considers those things to be riches, as Augustine explains in Book 21 of the City of God;¹ or inasmuch as they are the occasion of iniquity; or ‘of iniquity,’ that is, inequality, because they are not equally distributed, for the good man needs them and the bad man has them in excess.

Reply Obj. 2: In a case like this, if he can without danger to the poor man, that man who has another’s belongings should inform the one to whom he owes it; and whether he gives permission or not, he must provide for the poor man who is in his last necessity. Nor does he provide something from someone else’s belongings, because such necessity makes all things common. And so he is not bound to restore it, unless the one he owes it to were in similar necessity: for he would be bound to provide for him then, even if he had had nothing of his.

Reply Obj. 1: From such profit an offering should not be made at the altar, particularly in public, because of scandal and reverence for sacred things, or abomination of crime; but these reasons do not prohibit alms from being given from such profit.

Reply Obj. 2: The winnings themselves of gamblers are prohibited by law. But in this a distinction should be made, for something about a just game is prohibited by natural or divine law, as that someone win from those who cannot dispose of their own property, like minors and the mentally ill and the like; and again, that someone draw another in by greed for making money. But according to positive law, all such profit is forbidden. Now, because positive law is abrogated by disuse, but divine law is not, therefore it seems it should be said that if profit is from someone who does not have the power of disposing of his own property, it is bound to be restored to him, and so alms cannot be given from it. But if one has played with someone who has the power to dispose of what is his, if he is drawn into the game and loses, he can seek restitution; if he has won, he is not bound to return the winnings; for the man who has lost, is not worthy to receive, nor can he licitly keep; unless positive law were abrogated anywhere by the opposite custom. But if one has drawn another in and has lost, giving back does not pertain to him; whereas if he has won, he is bound to restore it to the one he won it from, and cannot give alms from it.

Reply Obj. 1: Although a wife is taken into a partnership, and is an equal in the very act of marriage, nevertheless in those things that belong to the management of the household, the husband is the head of the wife; and so there is not the same rationale for both sides of the argument.

Reply Obj. 2: Blessed Lucy was only betrothed at that time, and her marriage had neither been ratified nor consummated. And so she could give alms by the consent of her mother, under whose care she remained.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the son of the family is the heir, nevertheless he is not yet the master of the family’s things; and so he cannot give them away.

Reply Obj. 2: The parents are bound to his bodily nourishment, unless he excludes himself by his own fault; and so he can use his parents’ things for his own needs, but not give them to others.

Reply Obj. 1: We do not need to presume every good about everyone, but that good to which someone is bound and whose omission would be a sin. For we should not believe any evil of anyone, unless his wickedness is clear to us. And thus a servant need not believe that something would please his master, except in that necessity of a poor man, in which the master would be necessarily bound.

Reply Obj. 2: Offerings done through others only benefit the dead to the extent they have merited to benefit from them, while they still lived, as Augustine says.¹ And thus those alms are in some way their own which are done on their behalf. And likewise it is necessary that the alms that are done on behalf of the living must be their own in order to benefit them, and this cannot be if it displeases them. And thus a servant should not give alms on behalf of his master from his master’s belongings, unless he is sure that it pleases him.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not unfitting for a perfect good to be opposed to an imperfect good, not indeed because of any contrariety to it, for good, as good, is not contrary to good, but because of contrariety to its imperfection.

Reply Obj. 2: A monk has not been placed in a worse condition by this, for the total abandonment of possessions is much more acceptable to God than a particular distribution of them, which is done through almsgiving.

Reply Obj. 1: Liberality, as it consists in giving, cannot be toward oneself; but according as it consists in receiving, it can be toward oneself, just as so can illiberality. For some people are illiberal toward themselves, who deny themselves their own needs out of avarice for material things. But justice cannot be toward oneself in any way, for it contains the concept of equality, which must always be toward another.

The answer to the second objection is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 2: A sinner, even if he is God’s enemy as to his fault, is nevertheless not as to his nature: for God hates nothing of the things that he made (Wis 11:25).

Reply Obj. 1: Although the better man is always closer to God, nevertheless he should not always be given more: for the bestowal of alms was divinely established for relieving the need of one’s neighbor. And this is why if the other’s need greatly surpasses, the intention of the one who established almsgiving will be more preserved than if they were given to the better man.

Reply Obj. 2: The efficacy of almsgiving is considered more principally on the part of the giver than the receiver; and so it should be an ordered giving on the part of the giver, which increases the efficacy of almsgiving.

Reply Obj. 3: Although a sinner is more wretched in spiritual matters, nevertheless, not in physical matters; and so he is not always to be more provided for by physical alms.

The response to the first objection is clear from what was said.

Reply Obj. 2: That definition of Jerome is understood about spiritual fasting, and not about physical fasting.

Reply Obj. 3: Fasting, by its very name, directly denotes abstinence in food; and so those observances that we read about the fathers observing when they fasted, are not of the essence of fasting, but pertain to a manner of fasting; and because of this it is not necessary that mention be made of them in the definition of fasting.

Reply Obj. 4: In the definition above it should be understood as an abstinence from food that is otherwise permitted but designated by the Church for those who are fasting; and so the objection ceases.

Reply Obj. 5: The definition given above is not about the fasting by which everyone is said to fast, but the fasting of the Church, as was said.

Reply Obj. 1: The mean of virtue is not a mean as being equidistant from the extremes, but it is taken according to right reason. And so it happens that what is too little for one is enough for another; just as what is too little food for a healthy person is enough for a sick person who must be cured by abstinence. Now the healing of spiritual sickness is more related to virtue than the healing of physical sickness; and so what would otherwise be a little or less than the due amount, to someone wishing to heal the wound of sin, is nevertheless enough. And so fasting does not corrupt the mean of virtue. Still, it should be known that the mean of virtue does not consist in an indivisible point, but has a certain span within which virtue is preserved, although the limits of that span, which may not be ventured beyond while preserving virtue, cannot be captured in a verbal formula. And so someone who gives up something that could licitly be enjoyed does not necessarily immediately depart from the mean of virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: The fast that someone is said to break at breakfast does not name a certain act, but the absence of food beforehand. And so according to this fast a person is not said to be fasting. But the fast of the Church names a certain act in which someone regulates his own consumption of food according to the statutes of the Church; and according to this someone is said to be fasting; and this fast can be an act of virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: What is necessary in food can be understood in two ways. The first is for the preservation of life; and this kind of necessity it is not permissible to deny by fasting, just as neither is it permitted to kill oneself. But this need is extremely small, for nature is content with very little. In another way we call ‘necessary’ what is needed for preserving the strength of the body, which indeed is taken in two different states. First, according to what is sufficient for those things that must be done as incumbent upon someone by his office or the society of those with whom he lives; and this kind of need too should not be denied, for it would be offering a fast from stolen goods if someone were impeded by his fasting from other works to which he was otherwise obligated. And so Jerome says: he offers a holocaust from stolen goods who afflicts his body immoderately, either by the extreme lack of food or by want of sleep or eating.¹ And if there should be so much abstinence that a man is impeded from useful works, although he is not bound to them out of necessity, his fast would show poor discretion, even if it were not illicit. And so Jerome says in the same place quoted above: a rational man loses his dignity, who prefers fasting to charity, or sleeplessness to the integrity of his senses. The second kind of need is taken as the body’s strength according to the body’s optimal condition; and because the flesh abiding in its strength is more difficult to subject to the spirit, therefore what is necessary for this kind of strength, even if it could be taken licitly, can nevertheless be denied laudably. And this kind of denial does not hasten death much, since the human body is more often found to incur deadly illnesses from excess than from lack. This is also why Galen says that the highest medicine is abstinence. Those who abstain are often found to live longer; and so this denial cannot be called the occasion of death, since it is related to both, namely, to lengthening life and to shortening it. However, the denial of what is not necessary either in this way or in the other way necessarily belongs to the virtue of temperance.

Reply Obj. 4: Although a man is weaker after the state of sin as to what his body can suffer, which is the cause of hunger, which is remedied through food, nevertheless on the other side there is a more serious and dangerous infirmity, which is remedied by fasting, namely, the disease of concupiscence, which did not exist in the state of innocence. And so one must attend more to uprooting this disease, just as also doctors are more concerned with treating the more dangerous ailment.

Reply Obj. 1: The act of justice is to render a debt. Now, it is not rendering a debt to give a tithe of one’s time, but rather to tithe in some way one’s possessions. However, a fast is said to be the tithe of the whole year by a certain adaptation, and so it is not necessary that it be an act of justice.

Reply Obj. 2: It belongs to fortitude to endure annoyances inflicted from without; but this is not the case with fasting.

Reply Obj. 3: In all the moral virtues, the act is directed by prudence, as was said in Book III, Distinction 38, Question 2, Article 5. And so the acts of the other virtues are also of prudence.

Reply Obj. 1: The beauty of the Church consists principally in interior things, but external acts also pertain to the same beauty, inasmuch as they proceed from within, and inasmuch as they preserve interior beauty; and in this way fasting is ordered to the beauty of the Church.

Reply Obj. 2: There are two kinds of supererogation. One kind completely surpasses what is necessary for salvation, and this cannot fall under precept but under counsel: but I have no precept from the Lord concerning virgins, but I give counsel (1 Cor 7:25). Another kind is the supererogation that in some way pertains to what is necessary for salvation, although not in this or that way, as is clear from what has been said about fasting, and therefore the determination of the mode in such things can fall under the precept of the Church or her lawgivers.

Reply Obj. 3: The precepts of positive law oblige more by the intention of lawgivers than by the words themselves; and so someone is more to be considered a transgressor of a precept like this who goes against the intention of the lawgiver than who departs in some particular from the ordinance of the law. Now someone goes against the intention of the lawgiver who does not keep the law out of contempt or without another reasonable cause. But if in a certain case someone who can be probably believed does not keep the law, if the lawgiver is present and does not wish to hold him to the law, this person is not considered a transgressor of the precept. And thus it is not necessary that anyone who fails to fast on a certain day established by the Church sins mortally: for this can sometimes happen without any sin at all, sometimes without mortal sin but with venial sin, and sometimes even with mortal sin; and this is according to the different occasions that might lead a man to break his fast.

Reply Obj. 1: Although fasting, as elicited, is an act of temperance, nevertheless, it can be commanded by justice, and then it will be an act of satisfaction; just as also adultery has intemperance mixed in with injustice.

Reply Obj. 2: A precept of the law of nature is only about what is necessary to salvation; and so what falls under one of these precepts is not an act of satisfaction, but required for satisfaction; and it is this way with almsgiving, according as it falls under precept. But the precept of the Church can be ordered to the same things as satisfaction; and so the fasting which falls under Church precept can be an act of satisfaction.

Reply Obj. 3: Neither the body nor the soul sins, properly speaking, but the man; and therefore the one who sins is punished, whether it be by physical punishment or spiritual. Nevertheless, physical punishment also redounds to the soul, which feels it, just as it also enjoyed the illicit pleasure in sin through the body.

Reply Obj. 4: Superabundance of food does not have the character of punishment, and it is disordered; and so it cannot be an act of satisfaction like fasting.

Reply Obj. 5: Physical exercise is to be understood as being little beneficial in comparison with godliness: or because it is beneficial for one thing only, namely for subduing concupiscence.

Reply Obj. 1: The precepts of God are about what is necessary for salvation in itself, and so they must be observed in every case. But the precepts of the Church, although they have the force of obligating by the act of those who established them, nevertheless do not always obligate, because of the matter about which they are decreed.

Reply Obj. 2: Precepts like this are instituted usefully according to the usefulness that is most often the case; but because of necessity arising in a certain case they can be usefully suspended.

Reply Obj. 3: Someone lower-ranking can give a dispensation from the precept of a superior when dispensations have been left to him by those higher-ranking.

Reply Obj. 1: The freedom that the Spirit of God brings is the freedom of justice, which is opposed to the slavery of sin, but united with slavery to God; and so one is obligated to obedience to his commands, and the commands of those who act in his place on earth.

Reply Obj. 2: There are two kinds of fasting, the fast of mourning, and the fast of exultation; and that is called a fast of mourning which is borne with bitterness for our sins or present misery. But it is a fast of exultation when one is lifted out of bodily concerns by spiritual joy, for having once savored the Spirit, all flesh seems insipid to the just. Therefore, the Bridegroom is always spiritually present habitually, but not always actually; in fact, sometimes he is present to them as judge, when they think on their sins, either that they have committed or that they could fall into unless they curb the flesh; and then it is appropriate for them to fast in grief. But sometimes he is present to them actually, as Bridegroom, when they enjoy his sweetness to the full: and then it is appropriate for them to fast in exultation, and not grief.

Reply Obj. 3: Fasting is not introduced solely for past sins, but also to preserve one from future sins; and thus among those who have not sinned, it is applied as a preventive remedy. Yet the present life cannot be lived without any sin at all, however much someone refrains from crimes, as Augustine says in On Penance;¹ and so, just as penance applies to all dwelling in this life, so does fasting.

Reply Obj. 1: He is speaking in that situation when a great tribulation is imminent, so greater affliction should be taken on to placate God.

Reply Obj. 3: Although children have more moisture than their elders, nevertheless, because what is less thick can be consumed by heat faster, for this reason they need refreshment more frequently.

Reply Obj. 1: If the pilgrimage is such that it can be deferred without detriment, one should defer the pilgrimage, if he cannot fast at the same time with it. But if the pilgrimage cannot be conveniently deferred, either because the time of fasting comes upon someone while he is on the road, or because a holy day is soon approaching, until which the person longs to continue out of devotion, or because a delay in his penance has spiritual or physical danger, he can make the pilgrimage and be released from the fast according to the dispensation of his superior, who has weighed all the factors mentioned. However, this is understood about those people who are so afflicted by the trials of the journey that they cannot travel at the same time as fasting. Nor does it matter that the precept should be placed before the counsel, for the intention of the one giving a precept like this is not to exclude other devout and more necessary causes. But it is different with the precepts of natural law, which prohibit what is evil in itself and at all times.

Reply Obj. 2: Poverty does not always excuse one from fasting, but only in that case where one cannot have enough at the hour of eating that the sustenance will suffice for the whole day, as often happens with the needy, who beg alms in a piecemeal fashion; or also when they are so weak from previous famishment that they cannot endure a fast.

Reply Obj. 3: It seems that a distinction must be made about workers; for if while fasting they can have adequate sustenance for their person, and for the family whose care they bear (whether because they are otherwise wealthy or because from what is done with less labor, which can endure the fasting along with it, they can earn enough) they are not excused from fasting. But if they cannot otherwise work so much that they acquire enough to live on, except by breaking their fast, they can be released from fasting by their priest’s dispensation, and work. From this it is clear that the intention of greater earnings that are not necessary does not excuse them from sin, if they break the fast; nor again are they exempt from sin who refuse to hire workers unless they have agreed to break the fast, unless perhaps there is a necessary cause, which requires haste in the work they are doing.

Reply Obj. 1: Almsgiving is ordered to assisting the lacks of others; and so the time for almsgiving cannot be determined, just as neither can the needs that must be assisted. But fasting was instituted to curb the concupiscence of the flesh, and to make satisfaction for past sins; and since fasting curbs concupiscence even after it is done, the effect remains in the one who fasted, and so there can be a time fixed beforehand for fasting.

Reply Obj. 2: Moses was the lawgiver, not as lord of the law, but as servant; but Christ was as the Lord. And so the old law did not lead people to likeness with Moses, as the new law leads to likeness with Christ, for even the intention of the angels, who are not lords but servants, is not to lead people to themselves, but to God, as Dionysius says.¹

Reply Obj. 3: Christ did not fast as though he needed to fast, but so that he might prepare us for receiving his grace by the example of his fasting. And so after his baptism, in which the fullness of his grace was declared by the testimony of the Father and the Holy Spirit, and also John, it was fitting that he set forth the example of his fasting for us. Now fasting is appropriate for us so that we are prepared to receive his grace; and since the sacraments of grace are especially recommended around the feast of Easter, the Lenten fast is fulfilled immediately before the Easter solemnities; and also because the springtime, which begins then, is extremely prone to concupiscence; and because it signifies that we arrive at the glory of the Resurrection by the tribulations of the present life, as Christ did by his Passion.

Reply Obj. 4: According to Jerome, the Jews had special reasons to observe those fasts.¹ For in July, which is the fourth month from April, which was the first month for them, they fasted, because on the seventh day of that month Moses, coming down from the mountain, broke the tablets of the law because of the sin of the molten calf, and in the same month the walls of Jerusalem were destroyed by Nebuchadnezzar. But in the fifth month, that is, August, it is because of the sin of murmuring that arose at the words of the scouts in that month; and because in the same month the temple was burned down by Nebuchadnezzar, and afterward also by Titus. Now in the seventh month it is because of the slaying of Gedaliah, under whom the remnant of the people was kept intact, as is clear from Jeremiah 41. Now in the tenth month it is in memorial of the dead whom the Lord struck in the desert. But besides the Lenten fast, in which we make something like a tithe of all our days, three days of fast in each quarter of the year have been established for us, which are counted like a first-fruits offering, as well as for the expiation of sins from each quarter.

Reply Obj. 5: As Pope Leo says: after the holy days of rejoicing, which we practice in honor of the Lord’s rising and ascension into heaven, and after having received the gift of the Holy Spirit, the custom of fasting has been ordained wholesomely and by necessity, so that if perhaps someone was negligent and presumed a certain immoderate freedom and licence among those joys of festivity, the censure of abstinence may correct this.¹ Nevertheless, there is also the fast of exultation, which belongs to those who have received the Holy Spirit: for bodily affliction is also compatible with spiritual joy, and then a genuflection is not done, and the alleluia is sung, which is not observed in other fasts.

Reply Obj. 6: We fast on the vigils of particular solemnities, so that we may be more prepared for the devotion of the feast, and so that eternal joy, which is signified by temporal solemnities, is shown to follow upon the tribulations of the present life, which the saints have suffered.

Reply Obj. 1: The day of the Resurrection, as was said, is wholly for joy. This is also why it is sung: this is the day that the Lord has made, let us rejoice and be glad in it (Ps 118:24);¹ and thus on that day above all others it is not fitting to show signs of sadness. And since every Sunday a memorial of the Resurrection is enacted, for this reason fasting is not done on Sundays according to the Church’s common custom.

Reply Obj. 2: Since those people had been sunk in great sadness because of the tribulations threatening from every side, therefore, they were withdrawn from those things that can add to the sadness, so that they might rejoice in the hope of divine help.

Reply Obj. 1: The lawgiver establishing a general law considers those things that happen for the most part; but he leaves the adaptation to particular situations to those who are appointed to give dispensations from the law.

Reply Obj. 2: By our fast we are conformed to the New Man, who by his Passion called us back from the old ways and from darkness. And so we are first released from fasting at that time when Christ finished his Passion, namely, the ninth hour. But before this renewal, the evening time was appropriate for those who were fasting to eat, in order to signify that by the old man’s food he was cast into the darkness of sin and death, from which they were not rescued even after the tribulations of the present life, for in death they descended into Limbo, which was the place of shadows.

Reply Obj. 1: Although a drink nourishes in some way, nevertheless it is not ordered in itself to nourishment, but rather to the good disposition of those things that do nourish, so that, namely, they are drawn through the members and not consumed in the stomach. And so the taking of drink is not called eating: and thus someone who drinks outside the time of his one meal, is not said to eat twice; and because of this neither does he break the Church’s law, unless he does some trickery: for anyone who does something to cheat the law violates the law.

Reply Obj. 2: Even if water breaks the fast of nature, for it does nourish in some way, nevertheless it does not break the Church’s fast. For in its statutes the Church does not attend to what can nourish in any way, but to what is principally ordered to nourishment.

Reply Obj. 3: Some people say that if electuaries are taken for the pleasure, they do break the fast; but if they are taken as medicine they do not break the fast. But the statutes of positive law do not attend to the intention of the one observing the fast, but to his act, by the fact that the manner of virtue does not fall under precept, but is the end of the precept, but by someone’s intention he can merit or lose merit. And so it should be said that even if electuaries nourish in some way, nevertheless this is not their principal use; and so neither are they usually consumed in the same place as meals. And thus their consumption does not break the Church’s fast, although a man can completely or partially lose the merit of his fast, or even sin mortally, if there is immoderate desire. Nevertheless, he is not a transgressor of the Church’s precept unless he takes it deceitfully, or if he were using it like other foods to quench his hunger.

Reply Obj. 4: Aromas do not nourish, as is clear from the Philosopher in his book On Sense and Sensibilia,¹ but they strengthen in some way; and so they do not break either the fast of nature or of the Church.

Reply Obj. 1: Wine incites concupiscence by inflaming it by the mode of changing; and such changes do not last long, so that a drink of wine does not work so effectively for inciting concupiscence as eating meat, in which the matter of concupiscence is particularly supplied, and natural heat is strengthened from the root. And on the other hand, taking away wine weakens one’s nature too much because it hampers digestion.

Reply Obj. 2: And the same thing should be said to the second objection about the gas caused by legumes, which is an incidental cause of provoking concupiscence, and passes quickly.

Reply Obj. 3: Fish are naturally colder than meats, nor do they offer nutrients as suited to the body as other meats; and so there was not so great a necessity in forbidding fish as meat.

Reply Obj. 4: The Lenten fast is more strictly observed than other fasts, for in it we imitate the fast of Christ according to our own manner; and so although the use of cheese and eggs in Lent is generally forbidden, nevertheless in other fasts there are different practices of abstinence about these foods among different people.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not permitted to disregard the Church’s precept, but to go beyond it is permitted; and so since delaying the hour increases the penal character of fasting, it is permitted to delay the hour, but not to anticipate it.

Reply Obj. 2: Those things in which a certain measure cannot be taken do not fall under the determination of the lawgiver. And since a certain measure cannot be taken in the amount of food or other conditions mentioned, as it can in the time, for this reason the other four conditions do not fall under the determination of the Church’s precept. So although someone would sin by the disorder surrounding those circumstances, and would lose the merit of fasting either wholly or in part, nevertheless he would not transgress the Church’s statute; and so he does not break the fast.

Reply Obj. 1: To direct the affections of the mind to God happens in two ways. In one way, as toward an object; and in this way the affections directed to God are the love of God; and so this is not what Augustine speaks about here. In another way, the affections are directed toward God as the one in whom the affection of the desiring mind is fulfilled; and this directing of the affections to God is done by reason in the way explained, by attributing to him what the affection longs for. And this very direction of the affections toward God is prayer. And so that definition is material, according as the direction itself is signified by the thing directed; just as also sometimes by faith we mean the thing believed. And a similar way of speaking is when we say that prayer is the desire of the good, as in the Gloss on 1 Thessalonians 5, for this very desire is the thing we pray to be fulfilled.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as in outward petition something can be called a petition in two ways, namely, literally, as when we say, give me this, and by a certain interpretation, as when someone reaches out his hand, or explains his need: so also an interior prayer which is made to God is indeed according to the truth of the matter an act of reason striking God in a certain way, as was said. But reflecting on one’s own needs and raising hope to God are a kind of prayer by a certain interpretation; and so devotion is also called prayer by Hugh of St. Victor, in the definition quoted above.

Reply Obj. 3: Someone who asks or commands or beseeches, calls for something for the obtainment of an end or the pursuit of an intention. But this does not belong to the will, for it is simply and absolutely borne toward its own object, which is its end. Rather this belongs to reason, which orders one thing to another; and so command properly taken does not belong to the will. But there are two ways that the will is said to command. In one way by a certain interpretation or equivalent; for since the person commanding moves another by his command, therefore the act of the soul which is immediately followed by the motion is called command, and since, movement immediately follows in bodily organs if the appetitive act is complete, therefore appetitive powers are said to be the ones commanding the movement. In another way as a principle of command is in the will. For calling for something for one’s end, which pertains to command, presupposes the appetite for the end, and it is a kind of pursuit of it; and because of this powers or operative skills or habits that concern the end are said to command the means to the end; and according to this the will, which has the end for its object, is said to command, inasmuch as command, which is an act of reason, begins in the will, which the desire for the end pertains to.

Reply Obj. 4: A word outwardly uttered is a sign of something in two ways. In one way, immediately, namely, to signify what it was principally brought forth for, like the noun ‘fire’ signifies a certain element. In another way, mediately, namely, when the very thing that is first signified is taken as a sign of another thing, as fire signifies charity because of the aptitude that this thing has for signifying charity by a certain likeness. Therefore, outward vocal prayer signifies immediately the act of reason asking, if also the outward prayer is brought forth by the mode of reason, as when it says, give me wisdom that sits by thy throne (Wis 9:4). But by a mediate signification, it expresses the desire itself, as the principle from which it proceeds, as is clear from what has been said; and this is how the foregoing description of prayer, that prayer is when we display our wishes to God, should be understood.

Reply Obj. 1: Contemplation is sometimes taken strictly as the act of an intellect meditating on divine things. And then contemplation is an act of wisdom. In another way, it is taken more generally as every act in which someone having sequestered himself from outward affairs frees himself for God alone: which indeed happens in two ways; either when a man hears God speaking to him in the Scriptures, which happens by reading; or when he speaks to God, which happens by prayer. Now meditation is related to both as a medium between the two, for by the fact that he speaks to us in the Scriptures, we are presented to him by the meditation of the intellect and affections; and so, presented to him, or holding him present, we can speak to him by prayer; and therefore Hugh, in the definition above, set down three parts of contemplation: first, reading; second, meditation; third, prayer. But it is not necessary that prayer be an act of wisdom elicited by it, although wisdom prepares the path of prayer through meditation.

Reply Obj. 2: There are two varieties of the intellect’s ascent toward God. One in which it ascends to him by understanding; and this kind of ascent pertains to the gift of understanding. But this is not what Damascene is speaking about. The other is an ascent to God as when someone seeks help in him, as it says in Psalm 122:1: to you I have lifted up my eyes, you who dwell in heaven; and this ascent is prayer. And so it does not follow that it is an act of the gift of understanding; but it can presuppose one, as the second ascent presupposes the first.

Reply Obj. 3: Groans or weeping are not prayer by its essence, but like a foundation for prayer. For petition seems superfluous where there is no need; and so the recognition of one’s misery, by which someone sees himself as needy and unable to help himself, which causes groans in his affections, is considered like a prayer to God. And because of this Augustine says that the business of prayer has more to do with groans than with words, and more with tears than speech.¹

Reply Obj. 1: By the fact that something comes from the will, absolute necessity or coercion is excluded, but not the conditional necessity dictated by the end; for love, which is the most voluntary thing, is necessary, if someone wishes to attain the end of salvation. And in this way, too, prayer is necessary, and falls under a precept with regard to those things about which the will falls under the kind of necessity mentioned.

Reply Obj. 2: We are commanded to extend our wishes to God by prayer, not to teach him what we desire, but to direct our mind and affections toward him.

Reply Obj. 3: God receives prayers both about what he wishes to give, and sometimes about what he does not wish to give. Concerning what he wishes to give, indeed, so that we may be capable of receiving from him; which we would not be if we did not hope from him what we desire. Nor should it be hard for man to subject himself to God by prayer, as it is to subject himself to another man by entreaty: for our whole good consists in our being subject to God, but not in being subject to a man. But concerning what he does not wish to give, because he wills lovingly to wish what he justly does not will to give us, as was said in the end of Book I.¹

Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says¹ this is how a good work should be done in public, namely, for edification, so that the intention always remains in secret; and therefore the person who prays publicly, if he is outwardly not seeking man’s glory, but only God’s, his intention remains secret, and he prays to God alone by his intention, even if his prayer becomes known to his neighbor for his edification.

Reply Obj. 2: Acts immediately directed toward God, even if they are external, pertain to the contemplative life and are parts of contemplation, taken broadly; although they are not if contemplation is taken strictly for the meditation of wisdom itself, as was said. And so also reading, which is immediately ordered to meditation on divine things and is sometimes done with the voice, is considered a part of contemplation.

Reply Obj. 3: When two powers are ordered to the same thing, one does not impede the other in its act, but rather helps it, as the senses help the imagination, when both are ordered to the same thing. And so expressing one’s intention by voice does not impede the intellect’s ascent to God, unless it is done with too much care in uttering the words, like those who labor to utter words carefully composed in their prayers.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Augustine in the same text, Let much speech be far from prayer, but let much entreaty not be lacking, if the intention continues to burn; for to speak much in praying is to do something necessary with unnecessary words; but to beseech much is to strike the one whom we beseech with a lengthy and devout exercise of the heart.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in the same book, it is permitted to use other words, namely, to say the same things in essence that we ask for in the Lord’s Prayer when we pray, but it should not be permitted to say other things, in essence, when praying.¹ And so the Lord’s command does not oblige us to those words, but only to asking those things of God, for as Augustine says in the same book, whatever other words we say, which the affections of the one praying either form by preceding so that they are clear, or by following ignite, so that they grow, we say nothing else than what is set down in the Lord’s Prayer, if we pray rightly and appropriately.²

Reply Obj. 3: A petition is made to a man to make known to him the desire of the one asking in order to persuade him with words. But we pour out prayer to God so that we may train our desire; and so it is useful to pray for a long time, if by lengthy practice our desire might grow.

Reply Obj. 1: By the fact that the Lord said that we should pray always, he did not intend that the act of praying should be never interrupted, but that it should not be interrupted as though never to be resumed; which indeed they do who stop praying if they are not heard immediately. For by the length of one’s praying, one obtains what one asks, as the Lord shows by his parable.

Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says, to pray without ceasing is nothing other than desiring the blessed life without ceasing.¹ Or it could be said that the Apostle takes praying without ceasing there as not failing to pray at the established hours; or that by benefits shown to the poor, we make their prayers our own, even when we ourselves stop praying, as some saint explains in the Lives of the Fathers.²

The answer to the third objection is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 1: Gregory’s words are to be understood about when one’s attention is in no way joined to one’s prayer.

Reply Obj. 2: Hugh’s words are to be understood about when someone pulls his mind away from his purpose to other things while praying, for then he is not without fault, particularly if he deliberately occupies himself with other things that distract his mind, like external works. And if the mind should wander to the contrary it will even be a mortal sin. But if without one noticing, the mind wanders to other things, either he will be without fault, or the fault will be extremely small; unless he is said to be in fault from his previous thought out of which the wandering happened.

Reply Obj. 3: The intellect ascends to God when the prayer is directed to God, and the virtue of that ascent remains in the whole prayer.

Reply Obj. 4: In works of virtue it is not necessary that there always be an actual choice, just as it is not necessary that the person who gives alms always think about almsgiving; but it suffices to have thought of it once, when one was disposed to give alms; unless the previous intention is interrupted by an opposite thought.

Reply Obj. 1: When the mind is so caught up in love for God that it forgets its petitions, it is attentive to its prayer, as was said, although not according to the second kind of attention or the first, but the third.

Reply Obj. 2: That argument is based on the first kind of attention, which, if it is too much, makes a clumsy interruption, namely, if a man wants to think about how individual words should be formed; sometimes he will even make a mistake, because the words occur less to someone thinking in this way. But the attention is enough that suffices for the full pronunciation of the words.

Reply Obj. 3: Those things that have an ordering to each other can be understood together as such; for to the extent that they are considered ordered to each other, the intellect in understanding their order makes them one thing. And therefore the intellect can be directed toward prayer and prayer’s end. Nevertheless, whatever it is directed to, due attention to the prayer should not be lacking.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as in an oath the divine truth is taken as something stronger for testifying to the truth spoken by us, so also in an adjuration one takes up a stronger power for obtaining what we cannot obtain by our weakness. And therefore the one adjuring always declares the defect in himself. But sometimes the power we adjure is taken up in order to induce by violence, as when the saints adjure the demons that they depart from the bodies of the possessed. But sometimes it is taken up in order to incline by benevolence, and this is how we adjure God by his Son, or by his saints, who have been more acceptable to him than we ourselves; and so reverence is not diminished by obsecration.

Reply Obj. 2: It is customary that the general name is given to that species that adds nothing in dignity, or less than the other species, above the general name, as the name ‘angels,’ which is common to all the orders of angels, is attributed to the lowest order. And similarly, the name ‘prayer’ is given according to a certain appropriation, to that species that has less dignity, namely, the one that asks for the good of the earthly journey.

Reply Obj. 3: ‘Request’ conveys a certain extending of one’s desire toward what one asks for: and since what is principally and per se desired is the end, for this reason a request properly adds above the commonly said petition something determinate that is asked for, namely, the end.

Reply Obj. 4: Thanksgiving is not listed as a part of prayer like a species of it, and so it is not necessary that the definition of prayer apply to it.

Reply Obj. 1: Praise is taken in a broad way according as it is generally related to praise and honor. Or it could be said that although God is not ordered to anything, nevertheless, he orders all things directly to himself; and this is how the definition of praise applies to him.

Reply Obj. 2: Praise is not included as a subjective part, but an integral part, and as it pertains to the full being of prayer.

Reply Obj. 3: Supplication is not included here in the same way as request and petition, but as to the mode of asking that it conveys. It can also be said that Ambrose’s parts can be reduced to the Apostle’s parts, so that praise of God is thus called obsecration, for we adjure him by those things that pertain to his praise. But supplication is the same as prayer, for both convey a certain reverence; while the other things are the same even in name.

To the first objection, then, the answer is clear from what was said about the second question.

Reply Obj. 2: Insinuation differs from a persuasive preface according to Cicero in the place mentioned above, in that a persuasive preface explicitly seizes the good will or docility or attention; but insinuation does the same thing secretly, and in a certain roundabout way. And therefore insinuation is properly when one thing is said and another thing is intended; and therefore, Hugh calls this mode of prayer in which narration is put forth and petition is intended, insinuation. And so it is not meant for a persuasive preface, but for that mode of petition that bears a resemblance to a certain kind of ingratiating preface.

Reply Obj. 3: As is clear from what has been said, request is a middle ground between insinuation and supplication; and so it is listed in the middle according to its order from the others.

Reply Obj. 4: According to Augustine,¹ these three are distinguished according to what is necessary to wayfarers. First, that they have the strength for walking through health; and as to this it is said, ask and you shall receive. Second, that they have knowledge for guidance, lest they be ignorant of the way; and as to this it is said, seek and you shall find. Third, that they have the ability to arrive, and as to this it is said, knock and the door shall be opened to you. And so it is clear that the different subjective parts of prayer are distinguished according to the diversity of the things asked for; and so the prayer that is listed in the Apostle’s definition includes petition and seeking; but request corresponds to knocking, while thanksgiving and obsecration are not subjective parts in this way according to the distinct differences among the things asked for.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine answered about the same text, the Apostle says this because of temporal tribulations, which are often sent for our progress, and nevertheless we ask to be freed from all of them, for they are evil in themselves, although in a certain respect they are good; but we know well about some things that we must ask for them, as well as desire them.

Reply Obj. 2: A man in doubt about this should cast his care on God, so that if something other than what is asked is more expedient, it will be left to divine judgment. And the Lord gave us this form of praying by his own example when he said, not as I will, but as you will (Matt 26:39). But in those things that God wishes us to want, we must cast our care on him about this so that we may expect his help in obtaining them.

The answer to the third objection is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 1: Temporal goods should be sought neither first nor second, as though principally desired. But they can be sought as desired for the sake of something else: which desire indeed belongs to choice, not properly to the will, for the will has to do with the end.

Reply Obj. 2: Excess concern is forbidden by these words, but not necessary concern.

Reply Obj. 3: Temporal things are not our goods in themselves, but according as they are ordered to other things, and so they take on the character of a useful good. And this is how one can pray for them, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5: it is not necessary to pray for these things, namely temporal goods, but that a man use them well.¹

Reply Obj. 1: The Lord is speaking about the things that were impediments for that people as the reason the prayer of the prophet would not be heard, namely, their uncorrected error, and final unrepentance, as the Gloss says about the same text.¹

Reply Obj. 2: The person who prays does not strive to obtain what he asks for by his own power, but by the power of the one he prays to. And this is why when someone prays for another, he does not usurp to himself the grace of fullness, but he attributes it to the one he prays to, from whom he asks the grace to be given to his neighbor.

Reply Obj. 1: In a definition should be included the things that are per se. Now, although in a certain way prayer can be made to the saints, as to intercessors for us, nevertheless, properly and per se, prayer is directed to God.

Reply Obj. 2: Prayer is an act of worship; however, when the saints are prayed to, worship is not shown to them, but to him by whom the one praying hopes his petition will be fulfilled.

Reply Obj. 3: The saints discern in a word all those things that pertain to their glory. And since it is to their great glory that they can help others, acting as cooperators with God, this is why they see immediately in a word the wishes of those who utter them.

Reply Obj. 4: He teaches us to turn to one of the saints as to a mediator of prayer, not the one to whom the prayer is principally directed.

Reply Obj. 5: Prayer here is taken for its resemblance to a rhetorical oration, as is clear from what has been said, and so just as that is done for a judge alone, although also supplications or some petitions can be made to other people of rank, so also, prayer is directed directly to God alone, but supplication can also be directed directly to others.

Reply Obj. 1: Although saints existing in the world are above us, and can pray for us, nevertheless, they have not attained that state of superiority, namely, beatitude, so that they have what we do not have.

Reply Obj. 2: Although those who are in purgatory are in greater certainty than we are, nevertheless they are in greater affliction. And again, they are not in the state of meriting, and so they need us to pray for them more than they can pray for us.

Reply Obj. 3: The faith and devotion of the one praying is particularly important in miracles. And this is why the Lord also said to the woman whom he healed, your faith has healed you (Matt 9:22). And since that person was believed to be in heaven because of the excellence of his merits he was prayed to for this reason. And this kind of prayer was heard then because of the faith of the ones praying, and so that his life could be approved—not because he would pray for others while still in purgatory.

Reply Obj. 1: Those things that belong to the essence are in the other persons from the Father; and so a certain reduction is made from the other persons back to the Father, as is clear from Hilary.¹ And because of this the Father is also called the principle of the whole deity. And this is why Christ, referring us to the Father as to a principle not from a principle, taught us to direct our prayer to the Father through the Son.

Reply Obj. 2: The Holy Spirit stands as gift by his personal properties; and so it is more fitting that he be asked for than that something be asked for from him; although the Church also directs certain prayers to the Holy Spirit, and hymns, which are recited in the place of prayers in the Church, as is seen in Come Holy Spirit Who Ever One, and Come Holy Spirit, Creator Blest, and the like.

Reply Obj. 1: That receiving in which one Person receives from another is by natural fruitfulness, and not by gratuitous conferral, which prayer is poured out in the hope of obtaining.

Reply Obj. 2: The Son says this about himself, not by reason of his person, but by reason of his assumed nature.

Reply Obj. 3: The Spirit is said to ask inasmuch as he makes us ask.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ, as man, prays for us; but we do not therefore say, Christ, pray for us, for Christ exists as an eternal suppositum, whose role is not to pray, but to help. And so we say, Christ, hear us, or have mercy on us; and in this we also avoid the heresies of Arius and Nestorius.

Reply Obj. 2: What belongs to reason exists even more nobly in an intellect, for what a lower power can do, the higher power can as well. And so angels, in whom there is an intellect, are able to pray.

Reply Obj. 3: Some people say that they are not in the state of meriting as to the essential reward, but as to an incidental reward; and so they can also merit for others. But since merit is only for wayfarers, therefore it should be said that obtaining is one thing, and meriting is another, as will be said. And therefore the saints, if they cannot merit, can nevertheless obtain something for us by their own prayers.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as brute animals, according to Augustine in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis,¹ are said to obey the commands of God not as perceiving his order, but inasmuch as they are moved by it by natural instinct, so also they are said figuratively to invoke God, insofar by a natural desire they desire something which they obtain from God.

Reply Obj. 2: Appetite, as was said, denotes a simple motion toward the appetible. But prayer, or petition, denotes a certain order, which belongs to reason. And so appetite can belong to brute animals, but not petition or prayer.

Reply Obj. 1: Mental and vocal prayer is an act of satisfaction if it is done in charity. Vocal prayer, indeed, since it has an outward work, and thus a certain penalty; and inasmuch as in it the virtue of the previous intention remains, it also has the character of meriting good, which are the two things required for a work of satisfaction. And thus it is clear that the text of Isidore should be answered in a certain way, for the sound of the voice does not in itself reconcile to God, but as the pure efficacy of the intention remains in it. Likewise, mental prayer is also an act of satisfaction: for although it has agreeablenesss, it still has penalty mixed in, for Gregory says, to pray is to resound with bitter groans in remorse,¹ whether for one’s sins, or for the lack of heaven. And furthermore, the very elevation of the mind is an affliction to the flesh, as was said above; and affliction of the flesh overflows into the mind, since they are united, and also into the proud spirit, whose wound prayer heals; and on that account, humble prayer cannot be without penalty.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not unfitting for the act of one virtue to be commanded by a virtue that is divided against it, just as sometimes fortitude commands an act of temperance. And so penance can also command an act of worship, and so it will be satisfactory; just as sacrifices were also done for sins under the old law, and are done now.

Reply Obj. 3: By the fact that someone humbly asks forgiveness from a man, he appeases the soul of the offended man, and much more of the merciful God.

Reply Obj. 1: To have one’s eye on something other than God as principal end removes the character of merit; but not if it regards something like a way to reach God sooner; and in this way prayer has to do with revealing one’s own needs.

Reply Obj. 2: Merit in the acts of the other virtues is from the power of charity. And since charity has for its object what others have for their end, this is why merit in acts of the other virtues is not only the object of those acts, but the end sought by the one who prays. However, what is asked for in prayer is not the end sought by the one praying, but the object of the act; and so it is not necessary that merit be present by reason of that.

Reply Obj. 3: Our works are not sufficient of themselves for obtaining all that we need; and so it is necessary that what is lacking to us be supplied by divine mercy; and this is what prayer knocks at. And so the merit of prayer is required for supplying the lack of all our other merits. And so Gregory says in his Moralia: these things are much fitted to each person by God as most highly necessary to them, so that both operation is supported by prayer, and prayer by operation.¹

Reply Obj. 1: These conditions are not required for efficacy of obtaining as though nothing could be obtained without them (for sometimes someone is also heard when he prays for another); but because when these things are included prayer always has efficacy for obtaining, since the power of obtaining is more from the plan of the one who is prayed to than from the merit of the one praying. And so, too, sometimes sinners are heard, when their prayer agrees with the divine plan. Nevertheless, it should be known that sometimes someone prays piously who does not have the virtue of piety; just as someone sometimes does just things who does not have the habit of justice; and so also sinners can sometimes pray piously.

Reply Obj. 2: The will is more about the end than about what is asked for the sake of the end. And thus when God sees that what is asked does not agree with the end for which someone piously prays, he hears his desire more by not doing what he is asked than if he had done it. And so with respect to the end is how one should take what he says: whatever you wish for, ask, etc. But the end of our asking is our salvation, and the glory of God. However, it would be against the glory of God if he saved unrepentant sinners; and it would be against our salvation if something contrary to one’s salvation were given to one. And so the desire is heard but what is asked for is still not obtained, when someone asks without perseverance, or for another, or for things contrary to salvation.

Reply Obj. 3: Prayer that is made out of charity for another always has the effect of meriting for the one who prays; but now we are speaking about efficacy in obtaining.

Reply Obj. 4: Obtaining means the attainment of what is asked for; but merit does not mean attaining something, but the order of justice toward attainment. And so an impediment that arises from instability takes away the character of obtaining, for it takes away attainment. But it does not take away the order to attainment, and so it does not destroy merit. And therefore someone who does not persevere does merit, but he does not obtain unless he perseveres.

Reply Obj. 5: All men have beatitude as the end of their desires, which they desire the most. And so he hears more those to whom he does not give what they ask, if giving it to them would hinder them from beatitude. Hence the kind of answering prayers that stems from God’s anger is not called obtainment, properly speaking.

Reply Obj. 7: All those conditions that are required on the part of the one praying are included in the word piously, which includes all the circumstances of virtue, by which the acts are ordered on the part of the one doing them.

Therefore, to the first objection it should be said that punishment always precedes sin in nature, but not always in the person being punished. To the second, it should be said that a scourge in itself is always corrective; but by the failings of the recipient sometimes it does not accomplish this effect. To the third it should be said that it would be a wicked thing if punishment were not just. Still, God does not wish his glory to be revealed for his benefit, but for ours. To the fourth it should be said that all the rest can be reduced to these: for testing is for an increased merit, and the example of God’s just judgment is for the glory of God, and so on with the others.

Reply Obj. 1: There is some doubt about that citation, whether it is from Ambrose. But if it be granted, it should be understood that the sacrament is simple by reason of its principal effect, and the simple power that it works. But the material in the sacrament can be composite, as is evident in confirmation and the Eucharist. And so also with regard to our act, which is like the matter in penance, parts are assigned to it.

Reply Obj. 2: Parts are not assigned to penance with regard to sacramental power, but with regard to what is material in it. Now in baptism the mater is an external thing, in which there is only one existing thing to consider. And so parts are not assigned to baptism, for although there is a certain act of ours in baptism, it is not of the essence of baptism, but a disposition to baptism.

Reply Obj. 3: Good, according to Dionysius, is caused by a single and integral cause; but evil arises from individual lacks.¹ And so, for the completeness of sin it is enough for a failing to be found in any step of a human act. And because of this, nothing like integral parts are assigned to sin, as to penance, which repairs the good lost.

Reply Obj. 1: In the sacraments that have for their matter a certain physical thing, the Church’s ministers have two kinds of acts; namely, the sanctification of the matter by the word of God, and the application of the matter to the one who receives the sacrament. But in this sacrament which has for its matter a human act itself, the matter cannot be applied by the ministry of a priest to the person who receives the sacrament, for the acts are not from without. And so the consummation of those very acts pertains to his ministry according to absolution and the imposition of a penalty; which is like a kind of sanctification.

Reply Obj. 2: Even if sin is forgiven before the actual confession, nevertheless it is never forgiven before someone intends to confess; just as also before actually receiving baptism someone obtains the reality of baptism by his intention of being baptized.

Reply Obj. 3: Grace is conferred by the intention of making satisfaction, although actual satisfaction presupposes grace. Or it could be said that by satisfaction the penitent obtains the complete effect of grace blotting out his sin, for he is completely freed from the guilt of sin.

Reply Obj. 4: The last thing in which a thing is consummated is called that thing’s end, as form has the nature of an end. And because satisfaction is the last part in which penance is consummated, this is why it is called the ‘fruit,’ which connotes the character of an end.

Reply Obj. 1: The parts of penance do not respectively correspond to those individual parts of sin in reality, because for any of these sins the three parts of penance are necessary. But they would by a certain adaptation, considering a likeness to medicine for a disease as to the same instrument. For some people say that in every sin these three can be found, for there is an inner mouth and an outward mouth; and an inner act and an outward act; and so also these three were subjective parts of sin. But it is clear that this is not according to the intention of the text, which speaks about the outward mouth and work.

Reply Obj. 2: Among the parts of successive things the whole can be concluded from any part, as: it is the third hour, therefore, the day. But the whole is not predicated of one part: for we do not say that an hour is a day. But nevertheless of all parts taken together in some way the whole is found to be predicated, although improperly. And so also penance is concluded from any part of penance, by the fact that penance does not have its whole being at the same time. Nevertheless, the whole is not predicated of the parts, whether separately or combined, properly speaking.

Reply Obj. 3: The material in penance is our acts; and since acts do not have permanent being, therefore, neither does penance; and so this objection proceeds on false grounds.

Reply Obj. 1: External acts are required for the second perfection of moral virtues; but integral parts must be of the first perfection.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the three things mentioned are acts of the virtue of penance, it still does not follow that they are parts of it; for in any of the acts named all circumstances are found by which the mean of virtue is completed.

Reply Obj. 3: These three things are required for the virtue of penance, but not as parts, but rather as acts, as was said.

Reply Obj. 3: Penance is not required before baptism because of baptism’s insufficiency, but in order to remove any impediment to baptismal grace, so that baptism may have its own effect.

Reply Obj. 1: It is superfluous to use many things principally for bringing about the same effect if any one of them would be sufficient. But no sacrament is used for the remission of venial sins as its principal effect, as was said above in Distinction 2, Question 1, Article 1, Subquestion 4. And so it is not unfitting if remission of venial sin is a consequence of many sacraments.

Reply Obj. 2: Although it is not in our power to avoid all venial sins, it is nevertheless in our power to avoid individual ones.

Reply Obj. 3: Although venial and mortal sin are different diseases, nevertheless they share in the one account of actual sin; and so penance is a medicine against both.

Reply Obj. 1: If someone never does penance for his venial sins, he can attain life, for also after this life venial sins may be remitted, as will be said later.

Reply Obj. 2: Dissent means resistance to future sins, but penitence means displeasure over past sins, and so it is not necessary that dissent pertain to penitence.

Reply Obj. 1: The state of man before baptism is not differentiated by venial and mortal sin as to his being in the Church or not being in the Church; but afterward, it is differentiated by mortal and venial sin, because a person becomes outside the Church in merit by mortal sin committed after baptism, but not by venial; and so the situation is not the same.

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine says that penance has to do with sufferings according as they incline to fault; also, when penitence is taken broadly for displeasure.

Reply Obj. 3: Solemn penance does not cause a different state of the penitent as to what was said; and so no mention is made here of it.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not from a lack of grace that the venial sin in which the will still remains cannot be forgiven, but from a lack in the one who needs forgiveness, in which lack there is an impediment to forgiveness.

Reply Obj. 2: Any mortal sin whatsoever is opposed to any little charity; but not every venial sin is opposed to all fervor of charity. For ‘fervor of charity’ is said by a likeness according as it pours out, bubbling over in a way to the outside. Now from that part in which venial sin is committed, the fervor of charity does not appear, but something outside of charity. And so, although the fervor of charity exists in one respect, there can nevertheless be tepidity in others.

Reply Obj. 3: The will that was fixed on something is only removed from it by actual assent, if it occurs to the memory; otherwise a habitual assent suffices,¹ as also happens with mortal sins that, though forgotten, are forgiven.

Reply Obj. 1: The remission of venial sin is not compared, properly speaking, to healing; for infirmity, which is treated by healing, represents the privation of strength. But there is no privation or weakening of spiritual strength or virtue in venial fault, but only a disposition to have virtue stripped away; and so that argument is not to the point.

Reply Obj. 2: Venial sin is not said to cling more than mortal sin on its side, as though it remained more firmly in the soul, but on our side, for we cannot avoid venial sin as easily as mortal sins, which we are obliged to have forgiven by necessity.

Reply Obj. 3: Mortal sin so displeases God that it even makes the sinner himself displeasing to God, inasmuch as it takes away the beauty of grace, which God loves in him.

Reply Obj. 1: What Augustine there calls venial sins were irregularities that they contracted according to the law.

Reply Obj. 2: Venial sin does not turn away from God, nor does it destroy charity, like mortal sin; and so it does not prevent the remission of mortal sin, as is the case with the reverse.

Reply Obj. 3: Punishment, even of all, does not take away the offense, unless it is accepted by the one against whom the sin was committed. Nor can it be accepted as long as enmity remains toward him; and so while the enmity of man remains toward God by mortal sin, punishment does not purge even the least little venial sin. And that is why the Lord says that their fasts were not acceptable to him when they fasted to quarrel and fight (cf. Isa 58:4).

Reply Obj. 1: A stain can exist in two ways. In one way by the privation of beauty: and this is not how a stain remains in venial sin, for it does not destroy grace, which is the adornment of the soul. In another way by the fact that the beauty present is prevented from appearing outwardly, just as the beauty of a face can be sullied by dust; and this is the kind of stain that exists in venial sin, for it prevents the adornment of grace from being shown in external acts. And so it is not necessary that such a stain be destroyed by an infusion of grace, but by an act that destroys the impediment to grace.

Reply Obj. 2: Venial sin does not consist in a man habitually loving God less, for venial sin does not diminish charity; otherwise it would sometimes take it away entirely. But it consists in the love of God not being shown in all a man’s acts, because of a certain disordering in them.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the fervor of charity can exist while a man is borne toward God by the motion of charity, without him thinking explicitly on an act of venial sin, nevertheless, in that motion displeasure with venial sin, whether one or all, is contained implicitly. For if one is fervently borne toward God, anything that delays one from God will displease him. And so there can be so fervent a motion of charity toward God that it consumes all venial sins even without actual thought about them.

Reply Obj. 2: Mortal sins are in our power, so that not only individual ones may be avoided, but even all of them. Venial sins, however, although individual ones can be avoided, all of them cannot, which arises from the weakness of nature. And so in contrition for venial sins, the resolution to not sin venially is not required, as it was required for contrition for mortal sins, but that both his past sin displeases him and the infirmity by which he tends to venial sin, even though no one can be entirely immune to it.

Reply Obj. 3: The suffering endured for Christ has the force of baptism, as was said above in Distinction 4, Question 3, Article 3, Subquestion 3. And so it purifies one from all venial and mortal sin, unless it finds the will actually resistant: and because of this the venial sin that perhaps one incurs even after a fervent confession does not delay someone from going straight to heaven, and particularly since the very suffering of martyrdom has the force of purification. But concerning others who die in their sleep, it should be said that their venial sin is remitted them after death, even as to guilt.

Reply Obj. 1: Those words of James are a precept as to mortal sins, but as to venial sins they are a counsel.

Reply Obj. 2: That argument proceeds from a false supposition, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 3: In that case, because of the Church’s precept, some people say that a man is bound to confess venial sins. But others say that it suffices that he present himself to the priest and show himself to be free of mortal sin to be admitted to communion. For the Church’s precept is intended to obligate those who have certain things that should be confessed, for the fixing of the time falls more under precept than the act of confession itself. And so if grace were conferred on someone such that he was free from venial sin, as it was conferred on the Blessed Virgin, he or she would not be bound by that precept.

Reply Obj. 1: Our act is required for the remission of venial sin, but these things are said to remit venial sin inasmuch as they arouse our fervor to act.

Reply Obj. 2: These things do not wipe out venial sin without contrition, but they are said to wipe it out inasmuch as they cause contrition.

Reply Obj. 3: The amount of remission is according to the amount of fervor. And so according as these things arouse greater or lesser fervor, whoever has contrition within, at least implicitly, for more or fewer sins, has more or fewer venial sins forgiven accordingly, and not always all.

Reply Obj. 1: A rhetorician’s question regards good and evil according to a certain genus of cause, for in a trial the reward or punishment is expected that are owed to a good or evil act. Now a demonstrative speech seeks the praise or censure of a person, which are owed to good and bad acts; but a deliberative speech asks what is useful to be done, which also requires attention to the character of good and bad. And so from the same things that make moral acts good and bad, rhetoricians take arguments for persuading.

Reply Obj. 2: Anything that is not of the essence of a thing is said to ‘stand around’ something, whether it is in it, like whiteness is in a body, or not in it, like the place where it is located. And so conditions or properties can be said to be circumstances of an act, and particularly by reason of a relation toward the outside.

Reply Obj. 3: There is no accident of an accident, as though it were in itself the subject of another accident; but an accident can have an accident to the extent that one accident adheres to a substance by means of another accident, like color adheres in a body by means of surface. And so, too, something can be a circumstance or a certain quality of the act itself, even though the circumstance is a condition of the person acting.

Reply Obj. 1: Those circumstances that are taken on the part of the agent have more to do with condition of the person as to his properties than with the substance of the person. And the substance of the act varies by conditions like these, because something applies to one that does not apply to another. Furthermore, although the person acting is prior, nevertheless, the proportion inherent in the act from the agent is a circumstance of the act.

Reply Obj. 2: Certain acts are good or bad by their genus, and so the circumstances of a moral act can be taken from the very genus of the act. Now that by which the act is placed in such and such a genus, although it is of the substance of it inasmuch as it is in the genus of the moral, yet it is outside its substance if the very substance of the act is considered absolutely; and so certain acts are the same in natural species that differ in moral species, like fornication and the marital act.

Reply Obj. 3: The end is two-fold, namely, the last end and the proximate end. Now the last end cannot be included as a circumstance, because all circumstances are taken in proportion to it. The proximate end is also two-fold. There is a certain one that is the work’s end, in accord with which the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2¹ that some works are joined to a bad end, and this end gives the act its species. Hence either this is not a circumstance, if the moral genus alone is considered; or in reference to the very substance of the act, it is included in the circumstance what. Now the other end is the end of agent, who sometimes intends good from a bad act, or vice versa; and this end is called the circumstance why. Now, the act does not receive its proper species from this, but something like a common species, according as acts commanded take on the species of the virtue or vice that commands them above the species that they have from the habit eliciting them.

Reply Obj. 4: The mode of a thing is in the thing itself as a result of its substance. And since some circumstances are taken from what is outside a thing, but some from the very species of the act (which two things do not pertain to the mode); for this reason not every other circumstance is included in mode, if mode is taken properly.

Reply Obj. 5: In the Ethics 3,¹ the Philosopher also assigns seven circumstances, but his designation differs from the designation given in two things. First, because the Philosopher includes two circumstances, what and concerning what, which are included as one in Cicero’s designation, because the object called concerning what gives a rationale to the act that is called what. But the Philosopher distinguishes them, for besides the whole account of the object which gives its species to the act, special conditions can be considered in the object which diversify an act in goodness or badness among those acts that do not involve badness in themselves, among which acts they also diversify the amount of badness. Second, because the Philosopher sets down when and where as one circumstance, because both of them are taken from an extrinsic measure; but in the designation above they are distinguished because of the different characters of the measure. However, when the Philosopher says, by what instrument, it is the same as Cicero’s saying, by what means, since all the means are like the instruments of action, which the agent uses for his end.

Reply Obj. 6: Since mode implies a measure, all the things that pertain to a measure either by the mode of continuous quantity or discrete quantity, are implied in how, ‘quomodo.’ Or it could be said that the act’s quantity can be measured by three things. First, by the act’s very intensity, and then this is the same as how; second, from the quantity of the object, and then it is included in what; third, from the time; and then it is included in when: for how many times is also reducible to mode.

Reply Obj. 1: The fact that someone remained a long time in sin regards the condition of the act, or the transgression, if he sinned repeatedly or continuously; or omission, if he delayed repenting the sin committed even once before.

Reply Obj. 2: Although temptation is not in our power, nevertheless, to resist or not resist is in our power; and so in accord with this the circumstances of the sin can be drawn from the foregoing temptation.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the loss of virtues follows sin according to the order of nature, it is nevertheless concomitant with sin according to time; and so it can be included as a circumstance. And furthermore, even certain circumstances, according to Cicero, are taken from what follows the substance of the deed, according as the act varies in goodness and badness by its relationship to it.

Reply Obj. 4: In one way, ingratitude is a special sin; in another way it is a circumstance of sin; and how this is will be said further on in Distinction 22, Question 1, Article 2, Subquestion 1.

Reply Obj. 5: All those circumstances can be reducible to the seven listed above: for ingratitude is reduced to the condition of the person, as is clear from what was said; but prior temptation is reduced to why, because temptation particularly consists in the appetite for something by which a man is incited to sin; but privation of virtue is reduced to what, because the sin itself according to its own species is able to take away virtue. And with the others it is easy to see.

Reply Obj. 1: That argument holds among those things that are increased by addition, for among things in which increase is by intensity, it is not necessary to add something similar in species, just as it is not necessary to add white to whiteness in order to make it more white, as it says in the Physics 4.¹ And likewise it is not necessary for sin to be added to sin to make it a greater sin.

Reply Obj. 2: From turning to a changeable good in a disordered way, an act is rendered unproportioned for turning to the end. And so in sin the foundation of turning away is turning toward, and because of this the circumstances that hold on the part of the turning-toward can increase the badness of a sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Although privations cannot be intensified in themselves, nevertheless they are sometimes said to be intensified by their own causes, as blindness is intensified by getting further from the act of seeing, and likewise, the badness in an act can be intensified by turning to something inordinately.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher does not mean the most important things are those in which the act exists as though in the things that measure it, but as in the things that complete its account.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the will belongs to the agent as to its subject, nevertheless it belongs to the end as to its object. And so it draws its character more from the end than from the condition of the agent, and it is more reducible to the end, for powers and habits are distinguished by their objects.

Reply Obj. 3: Ingratitude as a circumstance does not include actual contempt, but figurative, as it were; and so it is not necessary that it make sin worse than a perverse intention, which causes actual turning away from the due end.

Reply Obj. 4: A sin is said to be worthy of forgiveness when it is venial in its cause, according as the voluntary is taken away or diminished, whether by ignorance or by powerlessness; and so that whole difference is reducible to for the sake of which, because the voluntary has to do with the intention of the end.

Reply Obj. 1: Whatever circumstance causes a certain species of sin in an act pertains to the species of the act insofar as it is a moral act. And so it no longer has the character of a circumstance of sin, although it ‘stands around’ the substance of the act, as was said before.

Reply Obj. 2: Every act according has its species from its object as to its substance; but in its character as evil it has its species from a defect. And therefore different species of evil are caused according to the different things that can be lacking; and species of sin are distinguished from one another in accord with this, and not only by the object. But in acts of virtue it is different, for they are not constituted out of any given individual circumstance, the way an act of sin has its character as sinful from some one defect.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the habit of virtue is not corrupted by anything but mortal sin, nevertheless the act of virtue is corrupted and impeded even by venial sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Pleasure never makes a venial sin mortal, except to the extent that it is clung to as to an end, and consequently it is loved more than God. And so pleasure like this amounts to contempt for God, which has in itself a specific character of sin, and because of this it is a circumstance drawing the act into a different species.

Reply Obj. 3: That argument proceeds concerning the circumstance that draws an act into another species, which, by being of this kind, already loses the nature of a circumstance with regard to a moral act.

Reply Obj. 4: And since the other arguments conclude that circumstances can in no way worsen a sin infinitely, it should be said to the fourth objection that the quantity arising from a circumstance that draws an act into a new species is not accidental quantity, but essential.

Reply Obj. 5: Venial sin and mortal sin differ infinitely on the part of the turning away, but not on the part of what is turned to, for in either case it is a finite pleasure. But sins are divided into species based on what they turn to, because on the side of the turning away they do not differ.

Reply Obj. 1: Although a man cannot leave Sodom, that is, mortal sin, except by confession at least in his intention, nevertheless, a man can leave what surrounds it, that is, venial sin, and the circumstances that amount to venial sins, without confession.

Reply Obj. 2: Specific quantities of sin cannot be made known to the priest, for the sinner himself does not know them. And so it is enough that he be aware of the quantity that arises from the species of the sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Nor is it necessary that the penitent grieve over individual circumstances in contrition, as concerns what is necessary for salvation. But it is necessary that he grieve over individual sins at least in his first contrition, and over the circumstances that changed the species of the sin. But what Augustine says pertains to the perfection of contrition.

Reply Obj. 4: But since the other arguments seem to conclude that circumstances should not be confessed at all, therefore it should be said to the fourth that particular circumstances of carnal sin, which draw the act into another species of mortal sin, must always be confessed. For the grace that is given in the sacrament of penance restores, if by it the inclination to sin from thinking about such things springs up either in the one confessing or in the priest. And so Gregory says in his Pastoral Rule,¹ it happens often that when the soul of the rector learns another’s trials, he himself is also struck by the temptations that he hears. But these by no means should frighten the pastor: for they will be as easily swept away from him, the more mercifully he wearies of the other’s temptation. Still, if someone sees that the priest is lustful and prone to sins like this, he should get permission to confess to another priest; and if it be not given, he should resort to the priest’s superior. But if the circumstances do not worsen the sin infinitely by confering a new species of mortal sin on it, sometimes the circumstances can be praiseworthily left unsaid, applying due discretion, according to the consideration of their baseness and the tendency to incline to sin from its confession in the one confessing or in the priest.

Reply Obj. 5: A man should protect the reputation of others as much as he can, but he should purify his own conscience more. And if a circumstance that leads to the recognition of a person should be necessary to the confession, according to the rule given, then it should be confessed while hiding the identity of the person as much as possible. But if it is not necessary to confess it, it should be omitted, lest it should reveal the sin of another.

Reply Obj. 1: It is one thing to not make a hidden sin known, which belongs to discretion, and is called the second plank in the way discussed above in Distinction 14, Question 1, Article 2, Question 3; and another thing to display a virtue when someone is hiding a sin, which is hypocrisy.

Reply Obj. 2: To keep a sin hidden does enough for avoiding scandal; but to disguise a sin under the appearance of virtue is hypocrisy, and always evil. And by this a person’s reputation is not preserved, but stolen.

Reply Obj. 1: Openness does not carry any specific character of sin, and so open malice is not called a specific sin, like feigning, which does carry a specific character of sin.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not unfitting that some specific sin or specific virtue be materially used in acts of other virtues or vices, as magnanimity uses for all other acts of virtue, so that it works great things in them, as is said in the Ethics 4.¹ And likewise since hypocrisy is a particular species of boasting, for it does not boast of just anything, but of sanctity, it uses all the acts that can display sanctity, and particularly those in which sanctity is most shown, like prayer, fasting, and almsgiving.

Reply Obj. 1: The venial sin that does not impede penance does not impede the remission of mortal sin, which happens through penance. But by some venial sins the work of penance can be impeded so that it does not belong to penance. For venial sin impedes the act of virtue, even though it does not destroy the habit, and so it can impede the forgiveness of sin.

Reply Obj. 2: The words of Jerome are to be understood in a certain respect, and not simply: for one sin can be more serious as to one circumstance than another which is more serious simply. Or it could be said that sinning openly is also not always mortal, but sometimes venial.

Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher is speaking about when faking friendship results in harm to a person.

Reply Obj. 4: He is speaking about the hypocrite orders all the good he does to showing off. Or it could be said that he speaks to the fact that good works done out of hypocrisy do not bring one into God’s sight.

Reply Obj. 2: Vainglory arises sometimes even from works done with the right intention, but hypocrisy always perverts the intention behind deeds, and so it does more to impede the fruit of penance.

Reply Obj. 1: Penance also pares away some useful things, inasmuch as it imposes punishment for past fault. And so in the text it says that something suffices for someone who has not sinned that does not suffice for someone who is doing penance for sin.

Reply Obj. 2: By this kind of sensible show the soul is more drawn away to vanities than by intelligible things; and so this kind is more to be guarded against; although the sin of curiosity should be guarded against by all.

Reply Obj. 3: Those sins seem to proceed especially from foolish celebrating; and since penance has a sadness attached to it, therefore those sins have a special opposition to penance.

To the first it should be said that words have the same position as regards manifestation as does a deed. And so they are included in deeds.

To the second it should be said that what Gregory adds is not in the sinner himself, but in another person; and so Augustine leaves it out.

Reply Obj. 1: All this rectitude is originally from the will, which is the principle of merit and demerit. But it is also in other parts of the soul that are rectified, as in its subject.

Reply Obj. 2: Revelation there is taken materially, namely, for what counsel is revealed in. Now the counsel of divine predestination was about justification; and therefore this counsel is revealed by justification itself, as an effect by its cause; and so the objection ceases.

Reply Obj. 3: Justification can be taken in two ways: either according as it corresponds to being justified, and then it means the movement toward the justice mentioned; or according as it is taken for having been justified; and then it is the formal effect of the justice mentioned, since something was formally justified by it, as something is white by whiteness.

Reply Obj. 4: The consummation of good works can be taken either as the performance of those works—and then the objection holds, but this is not how it is taken here; or in the infusion of habits, from which good works have their perfection; and that is how the consummation of good works is called justification here.

Reply Obj. 1: Calling is placed before justification there, because withdrawing from one term comes before approaching the other.

Reply Obj. 2: The objection proceeds from the first two kinds of justification, not the third.

Reply Obj. 3: That person who is justified is not justified with respect to the term that he is far from, but the term that he is close to; and this fits with what has been said.

Reply Obj. 1: As to the fault, a renewal can happen in this life, but not entirely as to punishment, and it is likewise with healing; and this is how those authorities are speaking.

Reply Obj. 2: Those things also represent, by a similitude, the same thing as impiety, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 1: The difficulty that exists in the justification of the impious is mostly from the lack of congruity between the impious and the reception of justification’s effect. And so when an effect like this is brought about, it indicates mercy more than power. But the effect of creation contains difficulty because of the magnitude of the deed, or because of the manner of doing it, since something is made out of nothing; and therefore it most of all manifests power.

Reply Obj. 2: Justification manifests divine justice as its exemplar cause, but mercy as its efficient cause, while an effect properly corresponds to its efficient cause. But the goodness of creation manifests the divine goodness in both ways, for his goodness moves him to communicate similar goodness. But mercy moves him to justify men more than justice.

Reply Obj. 3: That is not to be understood as though anyone were sufficiently worthy before justification, otherwise grace would not be grace; but rather that there is in a person a certain disposition to justification, by which he is less unworthy than others; and so a worthiness like this is not enough for justice.

Reply Obj. 1: The justification that we are now discussing is always with the cooperation of the will, which is called preparation. But this cooperation, as was said, begins sometimes long before grace is bestowed. But sometimes, because it is perfect, it has justification immediately attached to it. And so it can happen that while someone has the plan and intention of sinning, suddenly his will is converted to God, either taking the occasion from something outside it, as was the case with Paul; or even by some interior impulse, in which the heart of a person is moved by God. And so it does not follow that such a person would have grace without doing what is in him.

Reply Obj. 2: Man is not commanded to do goods to his enemies that they have no capacity for, but goods that they can receive; and God fulfills this the most, for the goods that they have a capacity for, namely, natural ones, he bestows on those who practice enmity against him by sinning. But they do not have a capacity for the good of grace unless their wills consent. And so what he is prepared to give, they do not wish to receive.

Reply Obj. 3: Such a diffusion of good cannot be understood unless someone is susceptible to that perfection of which he¹ is not capable; and so that argument proceeds on false grounds.

Reply Obj. 1: If a meritorious work were called a work acceptable to God, then it is plain that neither Pharaoh nor anyone situated in mortal sin can do a work acceptable to God. But if every work that is good in its genus and done from a good intention were called a work acceptable to God, then Pharaoh is said to have been unable, not because he was unable in any way, but because of fastening his stubborn will on evil, into which, deserted by divine grace, he had fallen.

Reply Obj. 2: Our will follows at the heels of divine grace in every way, and in no way does it go ahead of it. For the will itself, which precedes sanctifying grace, comes to us from God, who calls us to this by the will he has given us, whether by scourges or some inner or outward help. Nevertheless, this will still does not precede, but follows at the heels of sanctifying grace, for it is not its cause, but it prepares its path in another way.

Reply Obj. 3: Without sanctifying grace, life cannot be lived rightly by mortals, according as ‘rightly’ means the rectitude that attains the last end. But even without it something can be done rightly, by the rectitude that an act has from its matter and circumstances and due end, but not without the grace that is called God’s freely-given will.

Reply Obj. 4: Right intention leading specifically to the last end cannot exist without faith; but nevertheless the last end, namely, God, can exist in the intention even of someone who does not have the end, by the general or natural knowledge that he does have of God. And so even someone who does not have faith can prepare himself for having it, and for the grace, if sin displeases him and he directs his affections to God, to the extent of his knowledge.

Reply Obj. 1: Grace is not related to the remission of guilt as an intermediate agent, but as a formal cause, by which sin is remitted; just as fire removes cold, having caused heat in a subject, not as an instrument, but as a contrary form. And in creation there is also a natural form, by which a created thing formally receives being, or even that by which it exists, whatever that may be.

Reply Obj. 2: Although according to the order of the argument the inclusion of grace does not follow from the removal, that is, the negation, of guilt; nevertheless the destruction of pre-existing guilt cannot happen except by grace. For that goodness of innocence, which seems to be a middle between the other two, would not suffice to render someone worthy by an immunity from the infinite offense committed before, although it would suffice to render him immune in whom the sin did not precede. For in someone who has sinned, it requires not only that the sin be gone in act, but also that the sin committed before be expiated, and covered in a certain way; which cannot be done except by someone having an infinite power.

Reply Obj. 1: That drawing that the Lord speaks of does not mean forcing, but leading along and helping to act well.

Reply Obj. 2: Wisdom has more to do with the intellect than the will, but grace more with the will, as was said; and thus, since the intellect can be forced, but not the will, this is why for receiving wisdom and other perfections of the intellect, the consent of the receiver is not required, as it is for the perfection of grace. And so the revelations of those things that pertain to wisdom are made during sleep, as seen in Numbers 12:6; but the infusion of grace is not.

Reply Obj. 3: By baptism even adults can receive grace while asleep, for although an actual disposition is not present by the actual movement of their wills, there is nevertheless a habitual disposition by the previous movement of the free will; which indeed sometimes disposes one sufficiently to receive grace, and then grace is immediately infused, as was said. But sometimes it disposes insufficiently, and then such insufficiency cannot be supplied except by another act of the free will, either through the sacrament, which works dispositively for grace, as was said above in Distinction 1; and because of this without the sacrament no adult can be justified unless by an actually existing movement arising from his free will; but by the sacrament he can, so long as the movement of the free will that prevents a fictive reception came first.

Reply Obj. 1: The movement of the free will, along with which grace is infused, must be taken in its last perfection. Now the act of faith is not complete unless perfected by an act of the affections. For no one believes unless he wills to, as Augustine says;¹ and therefore an act of charity is always joined to the act of faith in justification; and by these two things the soul draws near to God. For there can be no doubt about whether an act of faith is always united to an act of charity, from the fact that the object is presented to charity by faith; just as also we never actually understand except by an imagination actually arising.

Reply Obj. 2: Fear is a remote disposition to grace, for it never attains to grace unless love is joined to it. But we are speaking here of the last disposition to grace, with which grace is given.

Reply Obj. 3: In things that are ordered to each other, it is not necessary for there to be the disposition and the perfection in the same thing. For a disposition arising in what is prior orders toward the perfection accomplished in what comes later, just as the movement of the imagination is a disposition to the perfection of the intellect, and likewise the movement happening in understanding can be a disposition to the movement of the affections.

Reply Obj. 1: The fervor of love necessarily has joined to it the hatred of its opposite. And so the fervor of love does not work to the remission of guilt without detesting sin, which directly corresponds to the remission of guilt.

Reply Obj. 2: Conversion to God suffices for obtaining grace as far as in it lies, just as turning toward a changeable good suffices for guilt; but a turning toward sin is required, as it were, to remove an impediment. Or it could be said that even in sin turning toward does not cause guilt without a turning away; and likewise, two things are necessary in justification.

Reply Obj. 1: That objection holds for an effect proportionate to a cause, which is understood in the cause itself; but it is not this way with the remission of sin, as was said.

Reply Obj. 2: Sin and grace are not related as affirmation and negation, or as privation and habit: for someone can be devoid of grace and nevertheless not have sin, as in the case of Adam, according to those who say he was not created in grace; for sin means that something exists or did exist in the sinner. For once an act of sin has passed, the preceding sin still remains in some way in the sinner himself, according as by it he became guilty before God, just as also meritorious acts remain, as was said above in Distinction 14, and so the argument does not proceed.