I answer that, ‘sacrament,’ according to the proper meaning of the word, seems to convey ‘sanctity’ in an active sense, so that anything that renders something sacred is called a sacrament, just as whatever renders something ornate is called an ornament. But since the actions of the things acting should be proportionate to the condition of the things acted upon, for this reason in the sanctification of man there should be a mode of sanctification befitting man according as he is rational, for this is what makes him a man. But insofar as he is rational, his knowledge arises from his senses. Thus it is necessary that he be sanctified in such a way that his sanctification also becomes known to him through the likenesses of sensible things. And in keeping with this one finds diverse ways of taking the word ‘sacrament.’ For sometimes ‘sacrament’ conveys the thing by which a consecration happens; in this way the Passion of Christ is called a sacrament. And this is the first way of taking the word that the Master mentions.

To the first question, I answer that the sacraments were not necessary by an absolute necessity, as it is necessary that God exist, since they were instituted out of divine goodness alone; but rather they are of the necessity that comes from supposing the end. Yet they are not necessary in such a way that God could not heal man without them, since he has not chained his power to the sacraments, as it says in the text (in the way that food is necessary to human life), but they are necessary because man is more fittingly restored through the sacraments, as a horse is said to be necessary for a journey because man travels more easily on a horse.

I answer that, it is common to all sacraments that they consist in sensible things signifying invisible grace. But this is particular to the sacraments of the New Law, that they have words added to the things, for three reasons. The first is because these sacraments not only signify the work of redemption that was done by Christ, as the other sacraments do, but they also flowed from the Passion of Christ itself. And therefore, as the closest effects, they have the image of their cause as much as possible, so that namely they consist of words and things, as Christ consists of the Word and flesh. The second reason is that they are signs not only of future things, like the sacraments of the Old Law, but of present and past things, as was said before, which can be more explicitly signified than future things, just as they can be known with more certainty. And therefore, the signification of words, which is most explicit, is added to the signification of things. The third reason is that they contain grace by the sanctification that happens through the Word of God, as was said.

The first question I answer by saying that all are forced to consider sacraments of the New Law causes of grace in some way, because of the authorities who expressly say so.

The first question I answer by saying that in a sacrament there are two things to consider: namely, the sacrament itself and the use of the sacrament. The sacrament itself is called by some people a work performed; but the use of the sacrament is its actual performance, which is called by some people a work working. Therefore, when it is called a sacrament, speaking per se, conferring grace or not, justifying or not, is to be referred to the work performed. But about the work performed in the sacraments of the Old Law, there are two opinions. For some people say that in those sacraments the work performed was a sign of the sacraments of the New Law, and of the Passion of Christ, from which they have efficacy; and thus, that work was performed with a certain declaration of faith; and thus, as a result and indirectly they were able to justify, as though our sacraments were in the middle, having been signified by those having a sanctification from God, as Hugh of St. Victor says.¹ But our sacraments justify directly and immediately, since they were instituted directly for this. But this opinion does not seem to fit with the words of the saints: for they say that the law was an occasion of death, inasmuch as it displayed sin, and did not confer a helping grace. Nor does it make any difference however directly or indirectly they might confer grace. And furthermore, according to this view, the preeminence of the sacraments of the New Law over the sacraments of the Old Law would be either extremely little or nothing at all, for even sacraments of the New Law derive their causal efficacy from faith and from their signification, as was said. And thus others say, and better, that in no way did the sacraments of the Old Law, that is, the work performed in them, confer grace, except in circumcision, of which we will speak later.

To the first question, I answer that circumcision first and principally was necessary for a more explicit signification than the preceding sacraments had. For it was necessary that with the passing of time, as faith became more explicit, so the sacramental signs should become more distinct. Now circumcision has an express likeness to the removal of original sin in four ways. First, as regards the member of generation, through which original sin is transmitted. Second, in its circular figure, in which is represented the cycle that is in the process of original infection, according to which a person corrupts a nature, and a nature a person. Third, as to the pain involved in circumcision, which was opposed to the pleasure of concupiscence, in which the power of kindling sin particularly thrives. Fourth, as to the shedding of blood, in which the Passion of Christ is signified, by which satisfaction would be made for original sin. And it is in regard to this benefit that circumcision, which is the seal of the cure from original sin, is defined. But as a consequence, circumcisions had another benefit, namely, the distinction of a faithful nation from unbelievers, on account of the faith for which circumcision was given; and in relation to this Damascene defines circumcision thus: circumcision is the sign determining Israel from the gentiles among whom it dwelt.¹ It also had mystic signification: a moral signification, because it was a sign of the chastity to be kept; an allegorical signification, inasmuch as it signified future purgation by Christ; and an anagogical signification, as it were, inasmuch as it signified the laying aside of corruptible flesh and blood in the resurrection.

To the first question, I answer that just as through Adam sin had passed into all men, so it was necessary that through Christ sanctification from sin should pass into all men; hence, to point out his sanctity’s prerogative, it was necessary that everything pertaining to Christ exert power by a special sanctity. And thus in the nation from which Christ was to be born, it was especially fitting for the worship of God to exist, and for him to be represented among them. And since circumcision is a sign distinguishing the people of God from others, it was fitting that circumcision be given particularly to the nation of Israel—not only as to those who were of the shoot of Jacob, but as to all who belonged to that people in any way.

The first question I answer by saying that circumcision was both a precept and a sacrament. Therefore, the eighth day was a necessary part of it as to the obligation of the precept, so that whoever did not observe that time was guilty of transgression. But it was not of necessity as regards the efficacy of the sacrament: for circumcision done at another time also had its own sacramental effect. Something similar happens with the ministers of our sacraments, who keep the due form and matter, and omit something of the rite instituted by the Church for the solemnity of the sacrament. Now the reason for the determination of this time is both mystical, which is touched upon in the text, and literal, which is touched upon by Rabbi Moses: for a boy before the eighth day is as tender as he was in his mother’s womb; and thus as animals were not offered before the eighth day for the reason given, so neither was a boy circumcised.

The first question I answer by saying that a spiritual character is a certain distinctive sign—distinctive in that it constitutes man in some state of perfection, as in baptism, confirmation, and holy orders, as will be clearer further on. Circumcision, however, was chiefly a sign established for cleansing; and therefore in it man was not placed in any other state, and in this way it did not belong to it to confer a spiritual character.

The first question I answer by saying that when what is perfect has come, what is partial should be discarded, if it is ordered to the same thing: for grace does not accomplish by two things that which can be done by one, just as neither does nature. Now in comparison with baptism, circumcision was imperfect in three ways. First, as to its signification, for it did not signify so explicitly the cleansing of the whole man from the uncleanness of all of original sin, as the washing of baptism does. Second, as to its efficacy, for the grace that was given in circumcision was not so abundant for working virtuously and for repressing the kindling of sin as it is in baptism. Third, as to benefit, for its benefit was not as widespread as baptism’s, since it had a particular people, a particular sex, and a particular time, which does not happen in baptism; and thus, once the time of fullness arrived, circumcision had to end, to be replaced by baptism.

I answer that, original sin is a sin of nature, but nature could not be repaired except through Christ. And thus, someone’s original sin could only be remitted if the one to be cured were brought into relation to Christ and in a certain way joined to him, which happened through faith. And thus, faith in the Mediator was always efficacious for curing original sin—among those who had the use of free will, their own faith; for others, someone else’s faith, so that they would not be lacking the divine remedy entirely.

To the first question, I answer that whenever the perfection of some thing necessitates applying something beyond what the order of its nature requires, considered in itself, this happens to supply some defect of the thing; as when, for the sustenance of the body, it is insufficient to administer food unless some kind of digestives are added, this is a sign of a defect in the power of digestion. But by the order of human nature nothing else is required for its spiritual perfection, except God flowing in, and grace, and the infused virtues. Hence when certain corporeal things are applied for man’s sanctification on which, according to the order of nature, man’s sanctification does not depend, it is a sign that this is for the repairing of some defect in him; and thus, since this is found in all the sacraments, all the sacraments were instituted as a remedy for some spiritual defect.

I answer that, sacraments, considered as sacraments, can be a remedy against a certain defect; but considered as sacraments of the Church, they can be dispensed by the ministers of the Church, and passed on to the members of the Church. And thus the number of the sacraments can be taken properly in two ways.

I answer that, before and after are said in many ways. But in those things that pertain to actions, prior in relation to us is what is prior in the process of generation; and therefore the Master orders the sacraments, which are some kind of sanctification, according to this process. For in the process of generation, the private good comes before the common good, which arises from individual goods, just as a man is prior to a household, and a household to a city. And therefore the sacraments that are ordered to the good of one person are placed first, and among them first is what pertains to those entering, namely, baptism; last is what pertains to those departing, namely, extreme unction; in the middle are what pertain to those progressing, which are ordered in this way. For since being perfected in the good is more essential to virtue, and common to individuals progressing toward virtue; but to rise again from sin happens in this particular progress on the part of the subject who fell (hence it is not common to everyone); and as to the perfecting in the good, in the process of generation perfection in form precedes perfection in attaining the end; hence among the sacraments that pertain to advancement in good, first is placed confirmation, which stands towards perfection as perfection of form; second, the Eucharist, which is for perfection in the end; third, penance, which is for the reparation of lost virtue. But among the sacraments that are allotted to the remedy of the whole Church, holy orders is placed first; for marriage, as marriage, is dispensed by holy orders, according as it is a sacrament.

To the first question, I answer that sacraments are signs of the remedy to which they are directed. Now these signs represent spiritual effects by the likeness of the sensible things used in the sacrament. And thus, since sacraments of the New Law needed to be of greater efficacy because of the perfection of this testament, there also had to be other signs beyond the old ones that more expressly figured grace; and thus it was necessary for new sacraments to be instituted.

The first question I answer by saying that according to Hugh of St. Victor,¹ it was necessary for different sacraments to be instituted at different times according to the passage of time and greater nearness to the time of grace. Hence, since the time of grace began, in a way, in John (for the law and the prophets prophesied until John came, Matt 11:13)—not as if grace were from him, but because he was preparing a way for grace—thus his baptism was a kind of sacrament; because indeed it was a certain initiation of the sacraments of grace, although grace was not conferred in it. Hence, it should be said that the baptism of John was a sacrament in the middle, in a way, between the sacraments of the old and of the New Law, just as the disposition to a form is in the middle, in a way, between privation and form. For in a way it agreed with the sacraments of the Old Law in the fact that it was only a sign, but with the sacraments of the New Law in its matter, and, in a way, in its form.

I answer that, this is granted by all, that nothing was accomplished by the baptism of John that would not be the operation of a man. And because grace cannot be given by a man, it is therefore clear that the baptism of John did not confer grace.

I answer that, Christ wished to be baptized by John for many reasons, three of which are touched upon by the Gloss on Mark 1:¹ for the sake of fulfilling humility, as Christ himself says in Matthew 3; to give John’s baptism his approval; and to consecrate the waters by his touch and so institute his own baptism. Augustine² touches on a fourth cause, namely to show that it makes no difference who is baptized by whom. Augustine gives a fifth reason in his book Questions on the Old and New Testaments,³ namely to give an example of baptism to those who in the future would become children of God by faith. Chrysostom offers a sixth,⁴ namely to refute the error of those who though John greater than Christ by a display of miracles at his baptism.

I answer that, concerning this there are two opinions. For certain people say that the baptism of John was preparatory for receiving Christ; and thus, if someone had received the baptism of John as something self-contained, not referring to Christ, baptism in that person would have been thwarted from achieving its end, and so he would have had to be baptized again with the baptism of Christ. But if he did not fix his hope in the baptism of John, but referred it further to Christ, then a single thing was made, so to speak, out of the grace of Christ and the baptism of John already received; and thus, it was not necessary that he be baptized again with water, but only that he receive the Holy Spirit by the imposition of hands. And this seems to have been the opinion of the Master in the text.

To the first question, I answer that according to the teaching of the Philosopher in Book 2 of the Posterior Analytics, there are three kinds of definition.¹ For some definitions are material, which we call conclusions of demonstration; some are formal, which are principles of demonstration; some are both material and formal, which are demonstrations differing in position: for they have a middle term of demonstration, inasmuch as they contain a formal definition, and a conclusion, inasmuch as they contain a material one; but only the order of terms is lacking. Since, however, everything completive is formal in a certain way with respect to whatever is completed, for this reason not only is the definition that contains the form called a formal definition, but also one that contains what is completive with respect to something else. And since the order among causes is such that matter is completed by form, and form by efficient cause, and efficient cause by final cause, for this reason a definition is sometimes called material, when it includes only the matter of the thing, but it is called formal when it includes the form. As, for example, ‘anger is the blood’s racing around the heart’ is called a material definition; and ‘anger is an appetite for vengeance’ is called a formal one. However, sometimes the material definition includes form and matter, while the formal definition includes the efficient cause, as this is called material: ‘thunder is a continual sound in the clouds’; while this is formal: ‘thunder is the discharge of fire in a cloud.’ But sometimes the material definition includes matter and form and efficient cause, but the formal definition includes the end: as, for example, ‘a house is a covering made from stones and wood in such-and-such a style with such-and-such a skill’ is a material definition in comparison with this one: ‘a house is a covering protecting us from cold and heat.’ And this happens particularly with instruments, for with them almost the entire account of their species is taken from the end.

To the first question, I answer that a completive form is in a certain way a middle thing between the matter that it perfects, and the efficient cause that produces it, so that efficient power is transferred to matter by means of a form. And since a middle in some way embraces both extremes, thus the form of baptism contains both the principal agent, from which baptism has efficacy, and the proximate matter of baptism, which is the act of washing; and thus it is set down: In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, as the principal agent from which baptism has its efficacy; and the material act is set down by the two parties to it, namely, the bestower and the recipient, by saying: I baptize you.

I answer that, by divine institution it is necessary for baptism to be done in water. Now six reasons can be given for this institution. The first is that water, by reason of its transparency, has something of light, and in this way it befits baptism which has illuminative power, inasmuch as grace is conferred in it. The second is that by reason of its wetness it has cleansing power; and that befits baptism, in which the soil of guilt is washed away. The third is that by reason of its coolness it has a refreshing power; and that befits baptism, in which the heat of the kindling [of sin] is mitigated. The fourth is that, as is said in On Animals 17, ¹ water is best suited to generation and the growth of living things; hence, too, at the beginning of the world animals were produced for the first time from water; and thus it befits baptism, in which there is a regeneration to spiritual life. The fifth is that in every part of the world water can be found. The sixth is that it is a thing that can be had easily by anyone without a great cost. And these last two things befit baptism inasmuch as it is a necessary sacrament.

To the first question, I answer that baptism implies cleansing. However, cleansing by water can happen not only by immersion but also by sprinkling or pouring; and thus a baptism can be done in either way. And it seems that the apostles baptized in this way, when it is read in Acts 2 and 3 that five thousand were converted together on one day, and then another three thousand. And thus when the custom of the Church allows, or when necessity compels for want of water, or because of the danger to a child whose death is feared, or even because of the feebleness of the priest rendering him unable to lift the infant, a baptism may be celebrated without immersion.

To the first question, I answer that according to Hugh of St. Victor,¹ it was necessary that as time progressed, signs of spiritual graces be given with more and more obviousness. And thus, it was fitting that baptism be instituted after circumcision, for circumcision signified only by removing something, yet the perfection of sanctification does not consist in removing something but rather in the conferral of grace, whose effect water represents—namely, life, illumination, and the like, of which we have spoken above; and because of this, it signifies washing; and again, there is also perfection as to its use, for it is common to both sexes, which was not the case with circumcision.

I answer that, nowadays all confess there to be a character imprinted in certain sacraments; but as to placing it in the soul, they differ on some things and agree on others. All of them agree in saying that the character brings with it a threefold relation. For a character is a distinctive and configuring sign. Therefore, inasmuch as it is a sign, it conveys a relation to the thing signified; but inasmuch as it is distinctive, it conveys a relation to those things from which it is distinguished; while inasmuch as it is configurative, it carries a relation to those things to which it likens.

To the first question I answer that definition is nowhere found laid down by Dionysius, but it can be taken from the words of his cited above; and it may be taken more fittingly if it were said as follows: character is a sign of communion in a share of divine things and of the sacred ordination of the faithful, given by divine blessedness. And it touches upon the four causes. First, the genus of character as character, namely, sign, which pertains to the formal cause. Second, the final cause, for this sign is given for two things—namely, so that the one receiving it may be configured as inscribed in the sharing of divine sacraments and sacred actions; and with regard to this he says: of the communion in a share of divine things; and so that the one to be added to this order may be configured to the others to whom the same power has been given, which he refers to in saying: and of the sacred ordination of the faithful; which two things excommunication suspends for a time, for it deprives a man of participation in divine things and the communion of the faithful. Third, he includes the matter in which, by saying: given by a priest.¹ Fourth, the efficent cause, namely by divine blessedness.

The first question I answer by saying that nature is laid out as a substratum proportionate to spirituality, as the perfectible is related to perfection. Hence, just as grace, which is the principle of spiritual life, is in the essence of the soul as its subject, so also character, which is a spiritual power, has as its subject the natural power of the soul, and not (as some people say) the essence of the soul, except indirectly through the powers of the soul.

The first question I answer by saying that, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2, virtue works those things from which it is born,¹ speaking of acquired virtue; and it is similar in all virtues that are caused in some way from certain actions. Hence, since a character is a virtue or spiritual power ordered to sacramental actions, if a character should be imprinted from something that is done by us, it has to be imprinted by the sacraments of the New Law, and by them alone, for that power is directly ordered only to those actions.

The first question I answer by saying that in the generation of anything, the introduction of a form drives out all contrary forms, and even the disposition to the contrary form—except sometimes when it remains from an indisposition of the thing receiving the form. Hence, since baptism is a regeneration unto spiritual life, everything that is contrary to spiritual life, i.e., that cannot coexist with grace which is the principle of spiritual life, is removed by baptism; and thus, baptism wipes away both original sin and actual mortal sin, and considered in itself even wipes away venial sin, which disposes to a privation of grace, although sometimes when mortal sin is removed, venial sin may remain after baptism because of an indisposition of the one receiving baptism.

To the first question, I answer that there are several opinions about this. For certain people have said that no virtues at all are given to infants in baptism, but they are only cleansed from original sin; but afterward, when they die or when they arrive at adulthood, virtues are conferred on them, if they have preserved their innocence. But this opinion cannot stand: for wood, when it has been cut, will stay where it falls (Eccl 11:3). And therefore if virtues, as well as operating and cooperating grace, were not conferred on children before they died, neither will they be conferred on them in death, and then they would not be saved, which is false. However, this opinion seems to have come from believing virtues to be only their acts, which is false, as was said in Book II, Distinction 27, Question 1, Article 1.

To the first question, I answer that baptism, in anyone who does not receive it insincerely, universally removes any guilt infecting the person that it finds, as has been said, and in this way it attains an extreme.¹ Now things that are in the extreme cannot receive extension, and therefore as to the removal of guilt, baptism has an equal effect in all; and it is the same with the personal punishment, which corresponds to original sin as it infects the person, namely, the loss of the divine vision. But against any other punishment following upon the principles of corrupted nature, such as concupiscence or the kindling for sin, a remedy is applied in baptism, so that through the grace conferred in baptism they may not dominate. And so it is the same with that punishment as with grace.

To the first question, I answer that different states of the world are compared to the different ages of one man, as Augustine says in the Eighty-Three Questions.¹ Hence as there was no state of the world in which the path of salvation was closed off to the human race, so too there is no state of a man in which the path of salvation is closed off to him. Hence, since there is original sin in infants, by which they are prevented from obtaining eternal salvation, it is necessary that some remedy be applied to them to remove this impediment. But this is baptism. Hence, whoever denies that baptism can be administered to infants speaks against divine mercy; and thus to say this is heresy.

To the first question, I answer that there are two effects of baptism. The first is the reality-and-sacrament, which is the character. And because the character is not imprinted for preparing man’s will so that something might be done well, since it is not a habit, but a power, as has been said, for this reason an indisposition of will does not impede this effect, as long as the will to receive the sacrament exists in some way. The other effect is that which is reality and not sacrament, namely, grace and the things that follow from it, by which man’s will is prepared to cooperate well; and thus, to receive this effect, not just any will to receive the sacrament suffices, but it requires the kind of will from which all indisposition contrary to baptismal grace is removed, for contrary things cannot coexist; hence, while a contrary disposition remains, baptism could not have its final effect.¹

The first question I answer by saying that, properly speaking, there is only one baptism, which is celebrated in water under a determinate form of words, of which the Lord says: teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit (Matt 28:19). The other kinds are called baptisms by their order to this baptism, and this in three ways.

I answer that, there are three kinds of power for absolving from sin in baptism. One is the power of authority, and this pertains to God alone, who forgives sins by his own power, as the principal cause of the remission of sins; hence Christ as man could not forgive sins with that kind of power. Another power is that of the minister, which belongs to those who dispense the sacraments, in which divine power invisibly works our salvation. The third is a mean between these two, which is called the power of excellence; and this Christ had above everyone else.

I answer that, there are four ways that someone may be said to cooperate with any agent. In one way, as someone helping another to whom he offers assistance cooperates with him. In another way, by offering counsel. In a third way, in being the means by which an agent brings about his first effect, as instruments cooperate with the principal agent. In the fourth way, by disposing the matter for receiving the effect of the principal agent.

To the first question, I answer that there are two ways of saying that something cannot be shared with any created thing: either because it can be communicated to no creature, or because it can be communicated to some creature, but not this one. For anything that, once communicated to another, would draw it outside the bounds of its own species, cannot be communicated to it, as it cannot be communicated to a horse that he have reason, although this could be shared with a man. But that which, communicated to something, draws it outside the bounds of creation cannot be shared with any created thing. Therefore, the power of authority communicated to another would draw him beyond the bounds of creation—for it cannot be that a creature be the principal agent with respect to the noblest effect, by which we are joined to the last end, and that is the kind of thing grace is, through which the remission of sins happens. And thus, all say that the power of authority could not be shared with any creature.

To the first question, I answer that baptism is the most necessary of all the sacraments: both because children cannot be rescued any other way, and because neither can even adults as to the remission of all guilt; and thus, those things that are required as necessary for the sacrament must be the most common both on the part of the matter, namely, water, which can be had anywhere, and on the part of the minister, such that any man may baptize. And in this way, the sanctification of the matter and the blessing preceding baptism are not necessary for the sacrament, but only for its solemnity, which, on account of the Church’s institution of it, one is not permitted to omit. Thus, even the ordination of the minister is not necessary for the sacrament, but only for its solemnity; and if, apart from a case of imminent need, someone not ordained baptized, he would sin, yet nevertheless would confer the sacrament.

To the first question, I answer that in the sacraments there is something that belongs to the substance of the sacrament, and something that belongs to its fittingness and solemnity. Therefore, if something were taken away that belonged to the sacrament’s substance, it would not be a valid sacrament; but if something were taken away that was required for the sacrament’s solemnity or fittingness, it would not cease to be a sacrament because of this. Hence since the goodness of the minister does not belong to the sacrament’s substance, for it is not at all certain, but sometimes it is unknown; yet those things that belong to the sacrament’s substance need to be certain; it is clear that if the goodness of the minister is taken away, there is still a sacrament, as long as the other things that belong to the sacrament’s substance are observed.

To the first question, I answer that the devil appearing in the figure of a priest can immerse someone in water, but he cannot confer the sacrament for two reasons. First, because administering the sacraments is only granted to men, who share with the Incarnate Word, from whom the sacraments flowed, in the nature he assumed; and also with the sacraments, in which there is a spiritual power in physical elements, just as men are also composed of a spiritual and physical nature. Second, if he pretended to baptize, it would always be feared that he did not act with the intention of baptizing, which is required for the sacrament, but with the intention of deceiving: for it would not be probable that he would procure so great a good for man as spiritual rebirth.

To the first question, I answer that baptism is a hierarchical act according to Dionysius;¹ hence it must be conferred by the ministers of the Church, or by those who occupy the place of ministers in necessity. However, while a baby exists in the womb of his mother, he cannot be subjected to the operation of the ministers of the Church, nor is he known to people; and thus he cannot be baptized at that time.

To the first question, I answer that since a single effect has a single cause, if a single effect proceeds from several causes, it is necessary that those causes be in some way made one with each other. Now for a sacrament’s effect we see that many things must concur; namely, the minister, the form of the words, and the matter. However, these things cannot be united into one cause except by the intention of the one baptizing, who actually applies the form to the matter, and indeed his own ministry to both, and all this pertains to the conferral of the sacrament. And thus the intention of the one baptizing is required. And likewise, in all the other sacraments also the intention of the minister is required with the due matter and form, not only for bringing about the sacrament’s effect, but for receiving the sacrament.

To the first question, I answer that when it is asked whether faith is required as something necessary for baptism, the question is not understood as dealing with absolute necessity, but the necessity that comes from the condition of the end. But there are two ends in baptism. The first is the reception of the sacrament; the second is the reception of the reality behind the sacrament. Therefore, I say that in adults a personal faith is also required by the necessity arising from the second end: for unless someone believes, he is considered a fake, as was said above in Distinction 4, Question 3, Article 2, Subquestions 1, 2, and 3; and accordingly he does not obtain the reality behind the sacrament. But it is not required for obtaining the first end: for someone can receive the sacrament even if he does not believe. Hence Augustine says that it can absolutely happen that some people have valid baptism who do not have true faith.¹ However, for children the faith of the Church suffices for both ends.

To the first question, I answer that baptism should not be repeated at all, for four reasons. The first is taken from the disease against which baptism is given, namely, original sin, which is not contracted again; hence neither should its medicine be given again. The second is taken from the reality behind the sacrament: for in baptism guilt and punishment are completely wiped away. Hence if it were permitted for someone to receive baptism frequently, it would be a provocation to sin, for the ease of forgiveness would present an incentive for wrongdoing, as Gregory says.¹ The third is taken from its signification: for it configures one to the death of Christ, who only died once. The fourth is taken from the sacrament itself, namely, the character, which remains indelibly; hence injury would be done to the sacrament if baptism were received over and over, as though the first sanctification was not enough; and again, because this sacrament is a certain regeneration, while any given thing is generated only once. But when it is unknown whether something has been done, it is not done again. Hence if it were found for certain that someone had been lacking one of the things that belong to the essence of the sacrament, he must absolutely be baptized again, with the following form: If you are not baptized, I baptize you in the name of the Father, etc.

To the first question, I answer that just as in other sciences and teachings, certain things are common, so that not knowing them means not knowing this art. But others are proper, which can be unknown without ignorance of that teaching. So also in the teaching of the faith certain things are said that are the common rudiments of the faith, which all men are bound to believe explicitly, such as the faith in the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Passion, divine judgment, and the providence of God about the deeds of men; and this kind of instruction is called catechism: but about the other things one should be instructed after baptism over time.

To the first question, I answer that because of man’s sin the devil received power over man, and over all things that come under man’s use, for harming him. And since there is no agreement between Christ and Belial (cf. 2 Cor 6:15), for this reason whenever something is to be sanctified for divine worship, it is first exorcised, so that freed from the devil’s power, by which he could use it to harm man, it may be consecrated to God; and this is evident in the blessing of water, in the consecration of a temple, and in everything like this. Hence since the first sanctification by which man is consecrated to God is in baptism, it is fitting that a man is also exorcised before he is baptized, for a much greater reason than with other things: because in a man himself is the cause by which the devil received power over man and the other things that are for man’s sake (namely, original and actual sin). And this is what the things said in an exorcism signify, as when it is said: depart from him, Satan, and other things like that. And similarly, what is done then: because the blowing symbolizes the expulsion of the demon; moreover, the blessing with the imposition of hands blocks the way for the one who has been cast out, so that he cannot return; while the salt placed in the mouth and the anointing of the nostrils and ears with saliva represents the removal of impediments from that demon with respect to teaching or learning the faith, as was said; but the anointing with oil represents man’s charging into the fight that he has undertaken against the devil, from whose power he has been released.

To the first question, I answer that actions that are ordered to certain proper and determinate effects gain distinction according to their proportion to those effects. Thus if they are ordered to two distinct effects, they will be two distinctly different actions. But if they are ordered to one effect, such that one disposes or removes impediments, and the other perfects, while another adorns what has been perfected, then the whole is counted as one complete action, as is seen in the works of craftsmen. Therefore since the sacraments, according to Dionysius,¹ are certain hierarchical actions ordered to certain effects of salvation, when several sacramental actions are ordered to one effect, one as perfecting, another as disposing or removing impediments, or in some way adorning, then the notion of sacrament essentially subsists in the one that brings about the main effect. But the others are not called sacraments per se, but are a kind of sacramental, like something connected with the sacraments, as is evident from what was said about baptism in regard to exorcism and catechism, and it corresponds to other things like them. But when there are several actions ordered to completely different effects, then there are different sacraments. And therefore since confirmation has an essentially different effect from baptism’s effect, as will be made clear, it is not a sacramental of baptism, but rather it is a main sacrament in itself.

To the first question, I answer that a sacrament’s matter is called the visible reality under cover of which divine power works our salvation in a hidden way; and for this reason matter is necessary to the sacraments, so that for an effect that human power does not bring about at all, whether by working or by cooperating, divine power carries it out by working in a visible thing. And this is why in penance and marriage, whose effects depend in a certain way on human acting, namely, in sorrow for sins and consent to conjugal union, matter such as this is not required. But in baptism, whose effect is completely from outside, with no interior working on the part of the one baptizing nor the one baptized, except in removing impediments, a sensible matter is required. Since therefore the effect of confirmation, which is the fullness of the Holy Spirit, is entirely from outside, not by any human operation, there is no doubt that matter is needed in the sacrament of confirmation.