Reply Obj. 1: The nature of a human being inclines to something in two ways. In one way, because it befits the nature of his genus: and then it is common to all animals. In another way, because it befits the nature of the difference by which the human species surpasses its genus, inasmuch as it is rational; like acts of prudence and temperance. And as the nature of the genus is one among all animals, yet is not in all in the same way, similarly it does not cause inclination in all in the same way, but according to what befits each species. Therefore, the nature of man inclines to marriage on the part of the difference, as to the second reason given; which is why the Philosopher assigns this reason to men above all animals. But as to the first reason, it inclines on the part of the genus; and so he says that the procreation of children is common to all animals. Nevertheless, it does not incline to this in the same way in all animals, for with certain animals, the children are sufficiently able to seek their own food immediately after birth, or the mother suffices for their sustenance; and among these animals there is no determination of male to female. Among those animals whose children need the sustenance of both, but only for a little time, some determination is found corresponding to that time, as is seen among certain birds. But in human beings, since the child needs the care of parents for a long time, there is the greatest determination of male to female, to which the nature of the genus also inclines.

Reply Obj. 2: The words of Cicero can be true as regards some particular people, if we consider that nation’s unique origin by which it is distinct from all other nations. For the effect that natural reason inclines to is not attained by all nations. But Cicero’s statement is not true universally, for from the beginning of the human race Sacred Scripture reports that there were marriages.

Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher in the Ethics 6, human nature is not unmovable like the divine nature. And thus those things that belong to natural law are diversified according to the diverse states and conditions of man; even though in divine matters things do not naturally vary at all.¹

Reply Obj. 4: Nature intends not only the being of the children, but their perfect being, for which marriage is required, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 1: That precept has not been revoked; but neither does it oblige each and every person, for the reason just given, except back in the days when the scarcity of human beings required everyone to be available for generation.

The solutions to the second and third are evident from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 4: Human nature commonly inclines to diverse offices and acts, as was said. But since it exists in diverse ways in different men, according to how it is individuated in this man or that man, one man inclines more to one of those offices, another to another. And from this diversity together with divine providence, which moderates all things, it happens that one man chooses one task, like farming, while another chooses something else. And so it also happens that certain men choose matrimonial life and others choose contemplative life. So no danger threatens.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle did not prohibit the marital act in those words, as neither the possession of things when he said, those who make use of this world, as though not using it (1 Cor 7:31). But in both he prohibits resting in their enjoyment: which is clear from his very manner of speaking: for he did not say, “let them not use,” or, “let them not have,” but as though not using, or not having.

Reply Obj. 2: We are joined to God both by the habit of grace, and by the act of contemplation and love. Therefore, anything that separates the first union is always a sin. But not what separates the second: for any licit occupation dealing with inferior things distracts the soul, so that it is not capable of being joined to God actually. And this particularly happens in carnal union, in which the mind is absorbed because of intense pleasure. And because of this, for those men whose task is to contemplate divine things or to handle sacred things, abstinence from their wives is enjoined for that time. And also according to this it is said that the Holy Spirit did not touch the minds of the prophets with the act of revelation of secrets when they were availing themselves of their marital rights.

Reply Obj. 3: That baseness of concupiscence which always accompanies the marital act is not the baseness of fault, but of punishment, coming from the first sin, namely that the lower powers and members of the body do not obey reason; and because of this the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 4: Something is properly said to be excused which has a resemblance to evil, and yet is not evil, or not as much as it seems; for some things are excused entirely, and some to a certain degree. And since the marital act has likeness to an inordinate act because of the corruption of concupiscence, therefore, for the good of marriage it is excused entirely, so that it is not a sin.

Reply Obj. 5: Although they are the same in natural species, nevertheless they differ in species of moral act, which may differ by one circumstance, for example approaching one’s own wife or someone who is not one’s wife; just as also killing a man by violence or by justice makes different species of moral act, although it is one natural species; and yet one is licit and the other illicit.

Reply Obj. 6: The excess of passion which corrupts virtue not only impedes the act of reason, but takes away the ordering of reason, which the intensity of pleasure in the marital act does not do, for even if man is not ordered at that moment, nevertheless he is pre-ordered by reason.

Reply Obj. 1: The root of meriting as to the substantial prize is charity itself, but as to any incidental prize, the notion of merit consists in the difficulty of the act; and the marital act is not meritorious in this way, but in the first way.

Reply Obj. 2: Man can merit in lesser things and in greater things: and so when someone foregoes a lesser good so that he might do the greater, his abandoning a less meritorious act is to be praised.

Reply Obj. 3: An indulgence sometimes has to do with lesser evils; and thus the marital act is indulged when sexual appetite moves one to it while remaining within the bounds of marriage, for then it is a venial sin. But when virtue moves one to it, so that it is meritorious, it does not require an indulgence except to the extent that there is an indulgence for lesser goods, which is the same as a concession. Nor is it unfitting that someone who takes advantage of this concession should merit: for the good use of the benefits of God is meritorious.

Reply Obj. 4: The difficulty of a work is required to merit a special distinction, but for meriting the essential prize, the difficulty required consists in ordering to the mean, and this also exists in the marital act.

Reply Obj. 5: The first movement, according to which it is called venial sin, is the motion of the appetite toward some unordered delectable, which is not the case in the marital act; and thus the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 1: The words in which the matrimonial consent is expressed are the form of this sacrament, not the blessing of the priest, which is a kind of sacramental.

Reply Obj. 2: The sacrament of matrimony is completed by the act of the person who avails himself of this sacrament, just like penance. And thus, just as penance does not have any matter other than those sensible acts themselves which are in place of a material element, so it is with marriage.

Reply Obj. 3: Although marriage does not conform to the Passion of Christ in suffering, yet it does conform to it in the love by which he suffered for the Church in order that she might be joined to him as bride.

Reply Obj. 4: The union of Christ to the Church is not a reality contained in this sacrament, but a reality signified and not contained; and no sacrament can bring about a thing like this. But it has another reality contained and signified, which it does bring about, as will be said. However, the Master argued that it was a reality not contained; for he was of the opinion that it does not have a reality contained.

Reply Obj. 5: In this sacrament also there are three things: for what is sacrament alone are the external acts appearing; but the reality-and-sacrament is the obligation which a man contracts toward a woman by such acts; while the final reality contained is the effect of this sacrament. However, the reality that the Master describes is not contained.

Reply Obj. 1: Those things that are of natural law in general need an institution as to their determination, which is applicable in different ways to men in different conditions; just as it belongs to natural law that wrongdoing be punished, but how a certain punishment is fitted to a certain crime happens by the determination of positive law.

Reply Obj. 2: Marriage is not only a remedy against sin, but principally it exists as an office of nature. And thus it was instituted before sin, but not as a remedy.

Reply Obj. 3: It is not unfitting for marriage to have diverse institutions according to the different things that need to be determined in it. And so the different institutions are not of the same thing in the same respect.

Reply Obj. 4: Before sin, marriage was instituted by God when he formed the woman for the man from his side as a helper, and he said to them: increase and multiply, etc.; for, although he said this to the other animals, it was not to be fulfilled by them in the same way as by humans. But Adam brought forth those words as one inspired by God to understand that God had instituted marriage.

Reply Obj. 5: Marriage as a sacrament of the New Law was not instituted before Christ, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as the water of baptism is able to touch the body and cleanse the heart by its contact with the flesh of Christ, so marriage has this from the fact that Christ represented it in his Passion, and not principally by some sanctification of the priest.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the water of baptism with the form of words does not bring about grace directly, but rather a character, so the external acts and the words expressing consent directly effect a certain bond of obligation, which is the sacrament of marriage; and a bond of this kind operates dispositively for grace by the power of divine institution.

Reply Obj. 3: That argument would hold unless some more efficacious remedy could be applied against the illness of concupiscence. But a greater remedy is applied by spiritual works and mortification of the flesh by those who do not make use of marriage.

Reply Obj. 4: Against concupiscence a remedy may be applied in two ways. In one way on the part of concupiscence itself, as it is repressed in its root; and thus marriage offers a remedy by the grace which is given in it. In another way, on the part of its act; and this in two ways. In one way as the act that concupiscence inclines to loses baseness externally; and this happens through the goods of marriage, which ennoble carnal concupiscence. In another way, as the act having baseness is impeded, which happens by the very nature of the act; for as long as concupiscence is satisfied in the conjugal act, it is not so incited to other corrupting influences, because of which the Apostle says it is better to marry than to burn (1 Cor 7:9). For although the works corresponding to concupiscence in themselves are bound to increase concupiscence, yet according as they are ordered by reason, they repress it: for repeated acts leave behind habits and dispositions similar to themselves.

Reply Obj. 1: Adam was speaking of the integrity of marriage as regards both perfections, for a thing is recognized by its act.

Reply Obj. 2: The signification of a reality contained is necessary to the sacrament, and physical intercourse does not pertain to this signification, but to the reality not contained, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 3: A thing does not arrive at its end except by its proper act; and so the fact that the end of marriage is not achived without physical intercourse, shows that it belongs to its second integrity, and not to its first.

Reply Obj. 4: Before physical intercourse happens, marriage is a remedy by the grace that is given in it, although not by the act which belongs to its second integrity.

Reply Obj. 1: Marriage is the bond by which they are bound formally, not effectively; and thus it is not necessary that it be anything other than the union.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the relationship itself is not a sensible accident, nevertheless, its causes can be sensible; nor is it required in the sacrament that the reality-and-sacrament be sensible (for this is how the union is related to this sacrament), but the words expressing consent, which are the sacrament alone and the cause of this union, are sensible.

Reply Obj. 3: A relation is founded on something as its cause, as similarity is founded on quality, and in something as its subject, which would be the things themselves that are similar; and in these two aspects one can consider its unity and diversity. Now, in similarity quality is not the same in number in both things, but is the same in species; and the subjects of the similarity are two in number. It is the same way with equality. Thus both equality and similarity are in every way different in number in each of the two similar things or equal things. But the relation that is marriage has unity from one side of each its terms, namely on the side of the cause, because it is ordered to one and the same generation. But on the part of the subject, it has diversity of number. And consequently this relation is both one and multi-sided. The fact that it is multi-sided on the part of the subjects is signified in the names, ‘husband’ and ‘wife,’ while the fact that it is one is signified in the name ‘matrimony.’

Reply Obj. 1: Although the father is nobler than the mother, nevertheless, concerning children the mother is more dutiful than the father. Or since the woman was chiefly made for being a help for the man in the area of offspring, but the man was not made for the sake of this, for this reason ‘mother’ belongs more to the notion of matrimony than ‘father.’

Reply Obj. 2: Sometimes essentials are known by accidentals, and so some things can also be named from accidentals, since the name is given for the sake of knowing the thing.

Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes a species is named from what belongs to the genus, because of an imperfection of the species, namely when it has completely the account of the genus yet it does not add anything that belongs to its dignity, as when the accidental characteristic retains the name of the common characteristic. But sometimes this happens because of a perfection, when the account of the genus is completely found in one species, and not in others; as animal is denominated from anima (soul), which belongs to the animated body, which is the genus of animal; but being animate is not found perfectly in animated things that are not animals. And it is the same way in this argument: for the union of man and woman by matrimony is the greatest union since it is a union of souls and of bodies; and therefore it is named conjugium.

Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes prior things, from which a definition should be given, are not named; and therefore, in the definition of some things certain things are included which are posterior simply speaking, but which are prior with respect to us: as in the definition of quality the Philosopher includes quale (what kind), when he says: quality is that according to which we are said to be of a certain kind.¹ And so also here in the definition of matrimony marital union is included, so that the sense is that marriage is a union for those things that require the office of a husband, which could not be named by one name.

Reply Obj. 2: This difference touches upon the end of the union, as was said; and since, as the Apostle says, the man is not for the sake of the woman, but the woman for the sake of the man (1 Cor 11:9), therefore this difference should be taken rather from the man than from the woman.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as civil life does not convey the singular act of this person or of that person, but those things which pertain to civil community, so conjugal life is nothing other than the companionship belonging to that kind of community; and therefore, the custom of this life is always an indivisible one, however diverse may be the singular acts of each of the two.

Reply Obj. 4: The solution is evident from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 1: The first cause of the sacraments is divine power, which works our salvation in these things, but the secondary, instrumental causes are material actions having efficacy from divine institution; and this is how consent is the cause in matrimony.

Reply Obj. 2: Marriage is not the consent itself, but a union of two people ordered to one thing, as was said, which consent brings about. Nor does consent, properly speaking, signify the union of Christ to the Church, but his will, by which it happened that he was conjoined to the Church.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as marriage is one on the part of that in which the union happens, although it is multiple on the part of the ones united, so also consent is one thing in what is consented to, namely, that union, although it is multiple on the part of the ones consenting. Nor is it consent to the man directly, but to the union of the woman with the man, and likewise, for the man’s part, he consents to his union with the woman.

Reply Obj. 1: In a vow there is no sacramental obligation, but only a spiritual one; and therefore it is not necessary that it be in the mode of material contracts for it to be binding, as it is with marriage.

Reply Obj. 2: Although such people cannot express their own vows to each other in words, they can nevertheless express them by nodding; and such nods are counted as words.

Reply Obj. 3: As Hugh of St. Victor says, those who are united must consent to each other in such a way that they receive each other of their own wills;¹ which is judged to happen in the espousal if they do not speak against it. Therefore in this case the words of the parents are counted as if they were those of the girl, for they are a sufficient sign because they are hers from the fact that she does not contradict them.

Reply Obj. 1: Consent is expressed in words about the present, and the words are present, and in the present consent is given for the same time. But when consent is made in words concerning the future, the words are present, but consent is given for the future; and therefore it is not for the same time, and because of this it is not the same thing.

Reply Obj. 2: Even in other contracts which use future words, one party does not transfer power over his property to the other if he says, I will give to you, but only when he uses words in the present tense.

Reply Obj. 3: In the vow of religious profession, an act of spiritual marriage is expressed in terms of the future, namely, obedience, or observance of the rule, and not the spiritual marriage itself. But if spiritual marriage is vowed in the future, it is not a spiritual vow, for someone is not yet a monk by this fact; but he pledges that he is going to be a monk.

Reply Obj. 1: There are two things here: first, the lack of consent, which one must justify to himself in the court of conscience in order for him not to be bound by the bond of matrimony, although not in the external forum of the Church, in which things are judged according as they are adduced; and second, the deceitful words; and this will stand up neither in the forum of penance nor in the forum of the Church, for in either place it is punished.

Reply Obj. 2: If mental consent is lacking in one party, marriage exists in neither party: for marriage consists in a mutual union, as was said. However, it can be probably believed that there is no deception unless signs of deception appear, since good is presumed of anyone, unless the contrary is proved; and this is why the party in whom there is no deception is excused from sin by ignorance.

Reply Obj. 3: In such a case the Church compels him to stay with his first wife, since it judges based on what appears externally. Nor is it deceived in justice, although it may be deceived in fact. But that man should undergo excommunication rather than be intimate with his first wife, or he should flee to some other distant region.

Reply Obj. 1: Human law considered marriage only as it is an office, but divine law considers it according as it is a sacrament, by which it has absolute indissolubility; and therefore, they are not the same.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not inappropriate for a greater good to be impeded by a lesser good which is contrary to it, just as good is also impeded by evil.

Reply Obj. 3: In every religious community marriage is contracted with one person, namely, Christ, for whose sake someone is pledged to one religious community rather than another in many respects; but material marriage and religious life are not directed toward the same person; therefore, it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 1: Before physical intimacy marriage signifies the union of Christ to the soul by grace; which indeed is dissolved by a contrary spiritual disposition, namely, sin. But by physical intimacy is signified his union with the Church by the assumption of human nature into the unity of his person, which is indivisible in every way.

Reply Obj. 2: Before physical intimacy one person’s body has not been transferred to the power of the other absolutely, but under the condition that in the interim the other spouse does not aspire to the fruits of a better life. But by physical intimacy the aforementioned transfer is completed, for then each person enters into bodily possession of the power handed over to each other. This is also why before sexual intercourse someone is not bound to render the debt immediately after the marriage is contracted in terms of the present, but the time of two months is given to them, for three reasons. First, so that in the meantime he might deliberate about entering religious life. Second, so that the necessary things may be prepared for solemnization of the wedding. Third, lest the husband should hold cheap a wife whom he did not have to pine in wait for.

Reply Obj. 3: The matrimonial union before physical intimacy is something imperfect as regards first being, as was said above, but not consummated as regards second act which is activity; and likewise for bodily possession; and thus it does not have indivisibility in every way.

Reply Obj. 1: When both vow continence by equivalent vows, then neither renounces the conjugal bond, and thus it continues to endure afterward. But when only one makes the vow, then as far as in him lies he renounces the conjugal bond, and that is why the other is loosed from this bond.

Reply Obj. 2: Someone is not considered dead to the world by entrance into religious life until he has made his profession; and thus until that time his wife is bound to wait for him.

Reply Obj. 3: A profession made in this way, before the time determined by law, is judged as if it were a simple vow. Therefore, just as after a man’s simple vow, the woman is not bound to render the debt to him, but she does not have the power to marry another, so it is in this case.

Reply Obj. 1: The betrothal ceremony itself and the giving of sureties is confirmation of the promise. Thus it is named from this as from what is more perfect.

Reply Obj. 2: By such a promising, one person is obliged to contract marriage with another, and he sins mortally who does not keep his promise, unless a legitimate impediment intervenes; and because of this the Church even compels by imposing penance for the sin. However, a person is not compelled in a court of law: for forced marriages tend to end badly; unless perhaps an oath accompanied the promise, for then, certain people say, it must be compelled; although it would not seem so to others, because of the reason mentioned above, particularly if there is a danger of wife-murder.

Reply Obj. 3: Those things are only added for confirming the promise; and so, they are not anything other than the promise.

Reply Obj. 4: A condition that is attached does not remove the freedom of marriage: for if it is dishonorable, it should be rejected; but if it is honorable, either it concerns good things simply, as when someone says, “I will take you, if our parents agree,” and this condition does not remove the freedom of the betrothal, but increases its honorableness; or else it concerns matters of utility, as when one says, “I will contract with you, if you will give me so much money,” and then this is not considered as selling matrimonial consent, but it is understood as a promise of dowry; and from this the marriage does not lose its freedom. Sometimes, however, the condition of money is attached after the manner a penalty, and then, because marriages should be free, such a condition does not stand, nor can that penalty be exacted from someone who does not want to complete the marriage.

Reply Obj. 5: James does not intend to prohibit someone from making any kind of promise concerning the future, but that one should not promise as someone having assurance of his own life. This is why he teaches that the condition should be attached, if God wills; which should be understood in the heart, even if the words are not expressed.

Reply Obj. 6: In marriage one can consider the matrimonial union itself, and its act. From the pledging [sponsio] of the first in the future he is called a spouse [sponsus], from the betrothal contracted in terms of the future; and from the pledging of the second, someone is also called a spouse when marriage is contracted in terms of the present, for in so doing, he pledges the act of matrimony. However, from the first pledging it is properly called betrothal, which is a certain sacramental related to marriage, like the exorcisms in baptism.

Reply Obj. 1: If before the years of puberty a betrothal contract is arranged by other people, both parties or either one may denounce it, for nothing was enacted at that time, as seen by the fact that also no affinity is contracted by this. Therefore a betrothal that is contracted between two parties by other people has strength as long as the ones for whom it is contracted do not denounce it when they reach the due age; and by this they are understood to consent to what was done by others.

Reply Obj. 2: Certain people say that the boy St. Gregory speaks about was not damned, nor did he sin mortally, but that vision was shown to his father to make him sorry, for he had sinned in not correcting the boy in that sin. But this is expressly against the intention of Gregory’s saying that the father, who neglected the soul of his little son previously, did not preserve the little sinner from the fires of Gehenna. And thus it should be said that for mortal sin even present consent is enough; but in a betrothal the consent is to something future. Yet much greater discretion of reason is required to plan for the future than to consent to a single present action; and thus a man is able to sin mortally before he is able to oblige himself to something in the future.

Reply Obj. 3: At the time of a marriage contract, not only is a disposition required as regards the use of reason, but also on the part of the body, so that the time is suited to generation. And since a girl becomes capable of the act of generation at twelve years of age, but a boy at the end of the second seven years, as the Philosopher says in Book 9 of the History of Animals,¹ while they receive the use of discretion at the same time, which is all that is required for a betrothal, this is why one age is determined for both of them in betrothals, but not in marriage.

Reply Obj. 4: That affection which is in boys younger than seven years of age does not proceed from the perfect use of reason, since they are not yet fully susceptible to learning, but it arises more from the movement of nature than from reason; and thus such an affection does not suffice for contracting betrothals.

Reply Obj. 5: Although in this case they do not enact a marriage by the second contract, nevertheless, they show that they have confirmed the prior promise; and therefore the prior contract acquires strength.

Reply Obj. 6: Those rowing a ship act in the mode of a single cause, and thus what one lacks can be supplied by another; but those contracting a betrothal act as distinct persons, for a betrothal can only exist between two people. This is why what is sufficient for contracting is required in both parties, and thus a lack in one person impedes the betrothal, and it cannot be supplied by the other person.

Reply Obj. 7: In a betrothal it is also the same: if the contractants are approaching the age of seven years, the betrothal contract has strength, for according to the Philosopher in Book 2 of the Physics, what only lacks a little seems to lack nothing.¹ Now, some people determine this nearness to the required age to be a space of six months; but it is better that it be determined based on the condition of the ones contracting, for in certain children the use of reason is more advanced than in others.

Reply Obj. 1: Since a promise like that is purely spiritual, it is dissolved by spiritual death, as was said.

Reply Obj. 2: That doubt is resolved by the fact that the other party did not appear in the time established for the completion of the marriage. And so if nothing was lacking for the marriage to be completed on one person’s part, he may marry another without any sin. However, if it was his fault that the marriage was not completed, he must do penance for the sin of a breach of promise (or of oath, if an oath was attached), and if he wishes to contract with another, he may contract only by the judgment of the Church.

Reply Obj. 3: If before the matrimonial contract one of the betrothed incurs some grave infirmity, which extremely debilitates him, such as epilepsy, or paralysis; or which deforms him, such as his nose being cut off, or his eyes put out, or something of this kind; or which is against the good of offspring, as leprosy, which tends to infect the children; then the betrothal can be dissolved, lest the two should displease each other, and the marriage contracted in this way should end badly. Nor is anyone punished for his suffering, but he does incur a loss by his suffering, which is not unusual.

Reply Obj. 4: If the bridegroom has known a relative of his bride, or vice versa, then the betrothal must be dissolved; and for proof, rumor alone is sufficient because of the scandal to be avoided. For causes that have their effects in the future, are impeded from producing their effects not only by what is, but also by what will be. And so, just as if an affinity had existed at the time of the betrothal contract, it would have impeded that contract; in the same way if it should come to be before the marriage, which is a certain effect of a betrothal, the prior contract is impeded from its effect. Nor does this deprive the other party of anything, but rather benefits her; for she is released from someone who has made himself odious to God by fornication.

Reply Obj. 5: Certain people do not accept this case, but against them stand the Decretals, which expressly say, in regard to those who contract an association of fidelity, and afterward remit the same to each other, it can be tolerated in patience, if those who have contracted a betrothal mutually release each other.¹ But in response they say that the Church allows this to prevent a worse thing, rather than that this is de jure. But this does not seem to fit the example that the Decretals give. And thus it should be said that it is not always a sign of inconstancy to retract what previously was affirmed: for our plans are uncertain, as it says in the Book of Wisdom (9:14).

Reply Obj. 6: Although those contracting a betrothal have not yet given to each other the power over their respective bodies, nevertheless, by this act they become suspect of not keeping faith in the future. And thus one party can protect himself against the other by nullifying the betrothal.

Reply Obj. 7: That argument would hold if both contracts had the same nature, but the second contract of marriage is stronger than the first, and thus it dissolves it.

Reply Obj. 8: Although this was not a true betrothal, nevertheless there was a certain mode of betrothal here. And for this reason, so that it does not seem to be acceptable, upon arriving at legal age they should seek dissolution of the betrothal to be made by the judgment of the Church for the sake of a good example.

Reply Obj. 1: A multitude of several wives existing at the same time is a multitude simply speaking; thus such a multitude is completely opposed to the signification of the sacrament, and because of this it destroys the sacrament. But a multitude of wives in succession is a multitude only under a certain aspect, and thus it does not remove the signification of the sacrament completely, nor does it do away with the essence of the sacrament, but rather its perfection, which is required in those who dispense the sacraments.

Reply Obj. 2: Although there is a sign of greater concupiscence in fornicators, yet it is not such an enduring concupiscence; for in fornication one person does not oblige himself to another in perpetuity. And therefore, here there is no defect of sacrament.

Reply Obj. 3: Bigamy causes irregularity inasmuch as it takes away the perfect signification of matrimony, which consists in the union of souls that occurs through consent, and in the union of bodies. And so the bigamy that causes irregularity must arise from both together; which is the Decretals of Innocent abrogate what the Master says in the text, namely that consent in terms of the present suffices by itself for introducing irregularity.

Reply Obj. 1: Although here there is no sacrament, there is nonetheless some likeness to a sacrament, which does not exist in fornication or an adulterous sleeping together; and therefore it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 3: In such a case someone is not considered a bigamist, for the first marriage did not have its perfect signification. Nevertheless, if by the judgment of the Church the man is compelled to return to the first woman, and to know her, he immediately becomes irregular: for irregularity is not caused by sin but by imperfection of signification does.

Reply Obj. 2: In such a case there are diverse opinions: yet it is probable that there is no irregularity, for he did not distribute his own flesh among several women.

Reply Obj. 3: Irregularity is not a punishment inflicted, but a certain defect of the sacrament, and thus it is not necessary that it always be voluntary bigamy that causes irregularity; and thus that man who takes a corrupted wife, whom he believe to be a virgin, is irregular when he knows her.

Reply Obj. 4: If a woman fornicates after having contracted marriage, the man is not made irregular by that fact, unless after her adulterous corruption he should know her again. For otherwise, the corruption of his wife in no way reflects upon the matrimonial act of the man. But even if he should be compelled to render the debt to her by right, or because of his own conscience, if she should ask for the debt before her condemnation as an adulterer, he is rendered irregular; although concerning this there may be various opinions. But what was said is most probable, for here we do not seek what would be a sin, but the signification only.

Reply Obj. 1: In this case, the opinion of Jerome is not upheld; unless perhaps we wish to explain the text such that he speaks about a higher dispensation.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not necessary that whatever does a greater thing should do a lesser thing, unless it is ordered to it, and that is not the case here, for baptism is not ordered to taking away irregularity.

Reply Obj. 3: This is to be understood concerning the punishments which follow upon actual sin as inflicted, not as about to be inflicted; for someone does not recuperate his virginity by baptism, nor similarly does he regain the reservation of his body.

Reply Obj. 4: Baptism conforms one to Christ as concerns the power of the mind, not the state of the flesh, which is considered in virginity, or in distribution of the flesh.

Reply Obj. 5: Those irregularities were contracted by passing causes, not perpetual ones, and thus they could also be removed through those sacraments; and moreover, those sacraments were ordered to that end, but baptism is not.

Reply Obj. 1: By that decretal, the difficulty is shown to be the same in granting a dispensation to those men who have contracted de facto with many women, as if they had contracted de jure; not that the power of the Pope is lessened in such cases simply speaking.

Reply Obj. 2: This is true as regards those things which are of natural law, and as regards those things which are necessary to the sacraments and to the faith; but in other things which are by the institution of the apostles, since the Church has now the same power of establishing and abolishing that it had then, a dispensation can be given by the one who holds supremacy in the Church.

Reply Obj. 3: Not every signification is of the essence of the sacrament, but only that which belongs to the effect of the sacrament; and this is not removed by irregularity.

Reply Obj. 4: In particular things a reason cannot be found that applies equally to all, because of their diversity; and thus what has been universally established by reasonably considering those things which happen in most cases, can also be reasonably removed by a dispensation in a certain determinate case.

Reply Obj. 1: Fulfilling a licit oath belongs to divine law, but not fulfilling an illicit one. And so, if some obligation occurring after an oath should make it to be illicit, when before it had been licit, it does not go against divine law if someone does not keep the oath made previously; and this is how it is in the case proposed. For what is sworn illicitly is promised illicitly, but a promise of what belongs to someone else is illicit. For this reason, the consent resulting from terms of the present, by which someone transfers mastery over his own body to another, makes the preceding oath illicit, which beforehand had been licit.

Reply Obj. 2: Divine truth is most efficacious for strengthening that to which it is applied.

Reply Obj. 4: An oath’s effect is not to make a new obligation, but to confirm the one already made; and thus someone sins more gravely who violates that obligation.

Reply Obj. 1: That man who mingles sexually consents to physical intimacy by his act according to the truth of the matter. But he does not consent to marriage by this fact alone, except according to the interpretation of the law.

Reply Obj. 2: That indicator does not change the truth of the matter, but the judgment which is made of matters externally.

Reply Obj. 3: If a betrothed woman receives her bridegroom, believing that he wants to consummate the marriage, she is excused from sin, unless other signs indicating fraud should appear; if, for example, there are a number of conditions separating them, like nobility of birth, or fortune, or another clear sign that might appear. But the bridegroom, on the other hand, sins both by fornicating and (what is more) by the fraud that he commits.

Reply Obj. 4: In such a case, before the bridegroom has married the other, he is bound to take the first woman as his wife, if they are of equal condition, or if the bride is of a better condition. But if he has married another, he has now become powerless to fulfill what he is bound to; and thus it suffices if he should provide for her marrying. And some people say that the bridegroom is not even bound to this, if he is of a much better condition, or if there was some evident sign of fraud: for it can be probably presumed that the bride was not deceived but pretended that she was deceived.

Reply Obj. 1: A girl is not in the power of her father like a slave-girl, so that she does not have power over her own body, but like a daughter to be educated; and thus in keeping with the fact that she is free, she can give herself into the power of another without the consent of her father, as also any man or woman may enter religious life without the consent of parents, since he or she is a free person.

Reply Obj. 2: Our act in penance, although it is of the essence of the sacrament, is still not sufficient for bringing about the proximate effect of the sacrament, namely, absolution from sins; and thus it is necessary that an act of the priest occur for the perfection of the sacrament. But in marriage our acts are the sufficient cause for bringing about the proximate effect, which is the obligation, for anyone who is his own master can oblige himself to another; and thus the blessing of the priest is not required for marriage as of the essence of the sacrament.

Reply Obj. 3: It is also prohibited that someone receive baptism not from a priest, unless in the case of necessity. But marriage is not a sacrament of necessity; and thus there is no similar reason. But clandestine marriages are prohibited because of the dangers that tend to result from them: for frequently in such matters there is some fraud on the part of one or the other; frequently also, they cross over into other unions, when they repent of what they have done so impetuously, and many other evils happen from this; and moreover, these marriages have an appearance of shame.

Reply Obj. 4: Clandestine marriages are not prohibited as being against the essential components of marriage, as marriages are prohibited between persons legally ineligible, who are improper matter for this sacrament; and thus it is not the same thing.

Reply Obj. 1: Consent to marriage is condemnable after a vow of virginity, because by such consent power is given to what is not permitted; for example, if someone gave someone else the power to take something that had been given to him for safekeeping, he would sin, and not only in actually handing it over to him. Concerning the consent of the Blessed Virgin, however, we will speak in a little while.¹

Reply Obj. 2: Between a brother and sister the power of having each other in physical intimacy cannot exist, as neither can physical intimacy occur licitly; and thus the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3: That condition set forth is opposed not only to the act but also to the power of physical intimacy, and thus it is contrary to marriage.

Reply Obj. 4: The beginning of marriage corresponds to the consummation, as a habit or power corresponds to the act which is its activity.

Reply Obj. 1: The steadfast man, as the Philosopher says of a brave man, is intrepid, not because he fears nothing, but because he does not fear what it is not fitting to fear, or where or when it is not fitting.¹

Reply Obj. 2: Sins are the greatest of evils, and therefore the steadfast man can in no way be forced to them; indeed, a man should rather die than allow such evils, as the Philosopher also says in the Ethics 3.¹ But certain bodily damages are less than others, which are among those particulars that pertain to the person, like death, flogging, rape, and enslavement. And thus by these things, the steadfast man is forced to undergo other bodily damages, and these are contained in this verse: dishonor or status, flogging, or killing. Nor does it matter whether this pertains to one’s own person, or one’s wife, or one’s children, or others like this.

Reply Obj. 3: Disgrace, although it is a great injury, nevertheless can easily happen to someone; and therefore the fear of disgrace is not considered as affecting a steadfast man, according to the laws.

Reply Obj. 4: The steadfast man is not forced to lie, for at that moment he does wish to give; but nevertheless afterward he may wish to seek restitution, or at least to appeal to the court, if he promised that he would not seek restitution. But he cannot promise that he will not appeal to the court, since this would be against the good of justice, to which he cannot be forced—namely, that he should act against justice.

Reply Obj. 1: Intention is not an efficient cause of the sacrament in baptism, but only one that elicits the action of the agent. But consent is the efficient cause in marriage, and therefore it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 2: Not just any voluntary act is sufficient for marriage, but only a completely voluntary act, for marriage must be perpetual. Consequently, it is impeded by mixed violence.

Reply Obj. 3: A person should not always be induced to stay in such a marriage, but only when danger is feared from its dissolution. Otherwise he does not sin, because not keeping a promise that was made unwillingly is not an appearance of evil.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the act of one who loves can go out to someone who does not love, still there cannot be a union between them unless the love is mutual. This is why the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8 that friendship, which consists in a certain union, requires love in return.¹

Reply Obj. 2: A marriage will not arise from the free consent of the one who was formerly compelled, except to the degree that the previous consent remains in the other party in its full strength. Therefore, if he were to dissent, no marriage would occur.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle’s words are not to be understood as applying to matters in which the son is as free as the father; and one of these is marriage, by which the son becomes a father.

Reply Obj. 2: Jacob was bound to do what Isaac commanded for other reasons as well, whether because of the wickedness of those women, or because the seed of Canaan was about to be dispersed from the land which had been promised to the seed of the patriarchs; and this is why Isaac could command.

Reply Obj. 3: They do not swear except under a certain understood condition: that the children will agree; and the parents are obligated in good faith to induce them to agree.

Reply Obj. 4: Some people say that the Pope cannot command someone to accept the episcopate: for consent should be free. But if this were held, the ecclesiastical order would perish. For the Church could not be preserved unless someone could be compelled to undertake ruling the Church, because the men most suited would never want to undertake this unless they were compelled. And thus it should be said that it is not the same thing here, for there is no bodily servitude in spiritual marriage as in corporeal marriage; for the episcopate is a spiritual marriage, like certain office of administering the common welfare: so let a man consider us as ministers of Christ (1 Corinthians 4:1).

Reply Obj. 1: Ignorance differs, simply speaking, from error: for ignorance by its very nature does not imply any act of the intellect, but error indicates a skewed judgment of reason about something. However, where impediments to willing are concerned, it does not matter whether it is called ignorance or error, for no ignorance can impede willing unless it has error attached to it, inasmuch as the act of the will presupposes estimation or judgment of something it is directed toward. Therefore, if there is ignorance, there is necessarily error: and for this reason error is also counted as a proximate cause.

Reply Obj. 2: Although error is not in itself contrary to marriage, it is contrary to marriage as regards its cause.

Reply Obj. 3: The baptismal character is not caused directly by the intention of the one baptizing, but by the material element being outwardly applied. The intention, moreover, works only as directing the material element to the proper effect. But the conjugal bond is caused directly by consent; and therefore it is not similar.

Reply Obj. 4: As the Master says in the text, the marriage that was between Leah and Jacob was not completed by the fact that they slept together through an error, but by the consent that was supplied afterward. However, both parties were excused from sin, as is clear from the text.

Reply Obj. 1: Error does not impede marriage from the nature of its genus, but from the nature of an added difference, namely, according as it is an error concerning something which is of the essence of marriage.

Reply Obj. 2: The error of an unbeliever about marriage has to do with things that follow on marriage, such as whether it is a sacrament, or if it is licit; and therefore this kind of error does not impede marriage, just as neither does an error about baptism impede the reception of the character, provided that someone intends to do or to receive what the Church gives, however much he believes it to be nothing.

Reply Obj. 3: Not all kinds of ignorance of circumstance cause that involuntariness that excuses from sin, as was said above; and because of this, the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 4: A difference of fortune does not change anything that belongs to the essence of marriage, nor does a difference of quality, in the way that the condition of servitude does; and therefore the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 5: An error about nobility as such does not nullify marriage for the same reason that an error about a quality does not. But if the error about nobility or dignity amounts to an error about the person, then it does impede marriage. Thus if the consent of the woman is intended directly to that person, an error about his nobility does not impede the marriage. But if she directly intends to consent to the son of the king, whoever that might be, and then if someone other than the son of the king should be presented to her, it is an error of the person and it would impede the marriage.

Reply Obj. 6: An error concerning those impediments to marriage that make persons ineligible also impedes marriage. But he does not mention errors concerning those things, because they impede marriage whether there be an error or not. For example, if someone contracts with a subdeacon, there is no marriage, whether she knows it or not. But the condition of slavery does not impede, if the slavery is known, and therefore there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 7: Money is received in contracts as the measure of other things, and not as if it were sought for its own sake, as is clear from the Ethics 5.¹ And therefore, if that money which is owed is not given, but rather some equivalent thing, nothing stands in the way of the contract. But if there were an error about something sought for itself, it would impede the contract, as if, for example, a donkey were sold in place of a horse. And it is likewise in the case proposed.

Reply Obj. 8: No matter how long he may have been with her, unless he wants to consent anew, there is no marriage.

Reply Obj. 9: If beforehand she had not consented to his brother, she can keep the one whom she received by error. Nor can she return to his brother, especially if she has been carnally known by the one whom she received. If, however, she had consented to the first man in words of the present, she cannot have the second while the first is living; but she can either leave secular life, or return to the first, and ignorance of the deed excuses the sin, just as it would also be excused after the marriage, if she were fraudulently known by someone related to her husband, since the fraud of another should not prejudice one’s own rights.

Reply Obj. 1: That is true of a per se and principal cause, but what has one per se and principal end can have many secondary per se ends and infinite accidental ends.

Reply Obj. 2: ‘Union’ can be taken for the relation itself which is marriage, and as such it is always from God, and it is good no matter what the reason for which it was made; or it can be taken for the act of those who are joined, and in this way it is sometimes evil, and is not from God, simply speaking. Neither is it unfitting that some effect be from God, of which the cause is evil, like children who are conceived through adultery. For the effect is not from that cause insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it has something of good, according as it is from God, even though it is not from God simply speaking.

Reply Obj. 3: The intention of the Church which intends to give the sacrament is necessary to any sacrament, so that nothing happens in the sacraments when it is not observed; but the intention of the Church which intends the benefit coming from the sacrament has to do with the sacrament being done well and not with what is necessary to it. And so, if this is not observed, there is nevertheless a valid sacrament—but the one neglecting this intention sins, just as if in baptism one did not intend the health of the soul, which the Church intends. Likewise, someone who intends to contract marriage, regardless of whether he directs his marriage to the end that the Church intends, nevertheless contracts a valid marriage.

Reply Obj. 4: That evil intent is not the end of marriage, but of those contracting the marriage.

Reply Obj. 5: The union itself is the sign of the union of Christ and his Church, and not the action of the ones uniting; therefore, the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 1: The Blessed Virgin was the threshold between the Old Law and the New, as dawn is between night and day; and thus in her vow she resembled the New Law, inasmuch as she vowed virginity, as well as the old, inasmuch as she attached conditions to it.

Reply Obj. 2: The perfection of the counsels as regards their consummation had to have been begun by Christ. But as regards a certain inchoation, it was fittingly begun by his mother.

Reply Obj. 1: After the vow of virginity made absolutely, a person cannot consent to marriage without sinning; for if it were solemnly vowed, it would not be a valid marriage. If, however, it were a simple vow, a valid marriage is what would follow, although those contracting it would sin. Yet the vow of the Blessed Virgin was not made solemnly, but simply expressed in her heart; neither was it absolute, but under condition, as is clear from the text; and therefore, she could consent to marriage without sinning by the special counsel of the Holy Spirit, to whose disposition her vow was conditionally subject.

Reply Obj. 2: Before the Blessed Virgin contracted with Joseph, she was assured by divine inspiration that Joseph had intended the same course of action, and therefore she did not expose herself to danger by marrying him. Nor was any of the truth of the marriage lost on this account, since that intention was not added to the consent as a condition, for such a condition, since it would be against one of the goods of matrimony, namely the procreation of children, would invalidate the marriage.

Reply Obj. 3: Physical intimacy was included implicitly in the consent of the Blessed Virgin, just as act is implicitly contained in a power, as is evident from what was said above, in Distinction 28, Question 1, Article 4. The power for physical intimacy, however, is not contrary to virginity, nor does it diminish anything of purity except by reason of the act itself, which was certainly never in the design of the Blessed Virgin, since she was already assured that the act would never occur.

Reply Obj. 1: By his natural understanding, the devil could perceive well the virginity of the Mother of God despite the fact that she had married, unless he was prevented by divine power from the accurate examination of her circumstances.

Reply Obj. 3: Even through the other miracles, he could not manifestly recognize Jesus as the Son of God, since he saw in him signs of weakness and of strength at the same time. Therefore, if sometimes he confessed something of his divinity, it proceeded more from presumption than from certitude. But this virginal birth, because of the preceding prophecy, would have been the most certain sign of the Son of the living God.

Reply Obj. 4: This is to be understood of the stoning of disrepute;¹ or, because she was of priestly lineage on her mother’s side (which is clear from the fact that Elizabeth, who was of the daughters of Aaron, is said to have been related to her, in Luke 1:36), and the daughter of a priest, apprehended in unchastity, even if unmarried, was to be burned, as is clear from Leviticus 21:9.² But on her father’s side, she was of the line of David. For the daughters of Aaron were able to be joined in marriage with those of the royal tribe or also with any of the other tribes, by the fact that they did not receive an inheritance separate from the other tribes, and so from this fact no confusion could have arisen over the inheritance, which was the reason for the prohibition against contracting marriage between members of different tribes.

Reply Obj. 5: The Lord preferred to permit the Jews to be uncertain of his own divinity rather than of the chastity of his mother, for he knew that the reputation of virginity is fragile, as Ambrose says.¹

Reply Obj. 6: Christ did not of necessity have to refuse comfort, since this is more an act of perversity than of humility.

Reply Obj. 1: The Blessed Virgin consented absolutely to marriage, as confirmed by divine inspiration. But while consenting thus to marriage, she had entrusted her virginity to God, as it says in the text.

Reply Obj. 2: Not just any signification pertains to the essence of marriage, but only that signification by which the effect of the sacrament is signified; and therefore the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument proceeds from the second kind of perfection, which is called the consummation of a marriage.

Reply Obj. 4: A child is not called the good of marriage only because he is generated through marriage, but also inasmuch as he is accepted and educated in marriage; and in this way the good of this marriage was a child, but not in the first way. Nor would a child be a good of marriage who is born of adultery, nor an adopted son who is educated in marriage; for marriage is not ordained to the education of those, as this marriage was specially ordained to this child’s being received into it and educated.

Reply Obj. 5: Joseph did not wish to send Mary away so that he could take another wife, or on account of any suspicion, but because he feared to cohabit with such holiness out of reverence; which is why it was said to him, do not fear to take Mary as your wife (Matt 1:20).

Reply Obj. 1: ‘Before’ does not always denote an order to what is in the future according to the truth of the matter, but sometimes it is said regarding what is expected in the future according to the usual course of things—as in, “before he had reached twenty years of age, he was dead.” And so it is in the case at hand. And likewise with ‘until,’ for sometimes it means that what preceded will be terminated by this coming thing that is expected, as when it is said, “Sit here, until I come.” But sometimes not like this, as when it says in 1 Corinthians 15:25: he must reign until he has put all his enemies under his feet—not that the time of his reign will be finished at the subjection of his enemies, but rather, the subjection of the enemies is included in the time of the reign.

Reply Obj. 2: ‘Firstborn’ is said of the one before whom there is no one, notwithstanding there may not be another after him. Otherwise, only-begotten sons would not have had the right of primogeniture, and they would not have had to be offered to God according to the law, which is false.

Reply Obj. 3: The Gospel writers left what is more believable to be understood from what is less believable. It is less believable that a virgin should conceive (which the Gospel writers said), than that after the birth she should have been preserved a virgin; and therefore, they did not take the trouble to say it.

Reply Obj. 4: Joseph is called the ‘foster father’ of Christ, as is evident from Luke 3:23. And again, Christ was made his adopted son, as certain people say. Others, though, were called the ‘brothers’ of Jesus by reason of family relation, since they were of the same family: since neither did Mary have another son, nor did Joseph, who was also a virgin, as it is said.¹

Reply Obj. 5: This is true according to nature; but by a miracle it can happen that two bodies are in the same place at the same time (as will be shown in Distinction 44)—and that birth and conception were entirely miraculous. Indeed, some say that Christ assumed the gift of subtlety at that time; yet the first account is better.

Reply Obj. 6: However good might be the state of consummated marriage, nonetheless the state of virginity is much higher. And this befitted the Mother of God.

Reply Obj. 7: According to Jerome, the more humiliating things he suffered for me, the more I owe him,¹ provided that nothing in these things detracts from the perfection of his virtue. But the privation of virginity would take away from the perfection of his mother as regards the virtue of her soul.

Reply Obj. 1: In the act of eating there is not so intense a pleasure that it eclipses reason, as in this pleasure, both because the generative power, through which original sin is transmitted, is infectious and corrupt, while the nutritive power, by which it is not transmitted, is corrupt but not infectious; and because anyone senses more a lack in himself as an individual than the lack of the species. This is why, to stimulate someone to eat, which remedies a lack in the individual, the feeling of that very lack is enough. But to induce someone to the act that remedies the lack of the species, divine providence has attached pleasure to that act, which also moves other animals that have no infection of original sin. And therefore, it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 2: Those goods that dignify marriage belong to the nature of marriage; and therefore it does not need them like some sort of exterior things that dignify it, but like things within it causing that dignity that arises from its own nature.

Reply Obj. 3: Marriage, by the very fact that it is both office and remedy, has the account of the useful and the dignified; but both of these belong to it because it has goods of some kind, by which it becomes both an office and a remedy against concupiscence.

Reply Obj. 4: An act of virtue is dignified both by virtue as by an inducing principle, and by circumstances as by its formal principles. Now this is how these goods are related to marriage: as circumstances are related to an act of virtue, because of which the act can be an act of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: In the good of offspring not only the procreation of children is understood, but also their education, to which all sharing of work between a man and a woman insofar as they are joined in marriage is ordered as to an end, for fathers naturally store up treasure for their sons, as is evident from 2 Corinthians 12:14. And thus in the procreation of children another end is included, as a secondary end in a principal end.

Reply Obj. 2: Fidelity is not taken here as the theological virtue of faith, but as a part of justice, according to which it is named fidelity from the fact that the things that were said are done in the observation of promises. For since marriage is a kind of contract, there is a promise in it, by which a certain man is determined to a certain woman.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as it is contained in the promise of marriage that neither party may approach the bed of someone else, so also that both must render the debt to each other, and this is even more central, since it follows directly from the mutual power given by each to the other. And thus both matters belong to fidelity, but in the text is stated what is less manifest.

Reply Obj. 4: In the good of sacrament, not only is indissolubility to be understood, but all those things which follow upon marriage being a sign of the union of Christ and the Church. Or it could be said that the unity that the objection touches upon belongs to the good of fidelity in the same way that indissolubility belongs to the sacrament.

Reply Obj. 5: Fidelity is not here taken as a particular virtue, but as a certain condition of virtue, from which fidelity is named, which is counted as a part of justice.

Reply Obj. 6: Just as the due use of a useful good receives the account of ‘noble’, not indeed from the usefulness, but from reason making the right use of it, so also the ordering toward some useful good can make the goodness of nobility by the power of reason ordering it duly. And in this way, by the fact that marriage is ordained to the procreation of children, it is useful; and nonetheless it is noble, inasmuch as it is duly ordered.

Reply Obj. 7: As the Master says in the text, the good of sacrament does not here refer to marriage itself, but to its indissolubility, which is a sign of the same thing of which marriage is the sign. Or it may be said that although marriage is a sacrament, nonetheless, it is one thing for marriage to be marriage, and something else for it to be a sacrament: for it was not only instituted in order to be a sign of a holy thing, but also that it might be an office of nature; and therefore the nature of a sacrament is a certain condition added onto marriage considered in itself, from which it also has dignity; and therefore its sacramentality, as I will say later, is counted among the goods dignifying marriage: and according to this, in the third good of marriage (namely, sacrament) is not only to be understood indissolubility, but also all those things which belong to its signification.

Reply Obj. 1: The end according to intention is first in a thing, but according to attainment, it is last; and this is how children stand among the goods of marriage. Therefore in one way this is the more principal good, and in another way not.

Reply Obj. 2: Sacrament, even considered as the third good of marriage, belongs to marriage in virtue of its difference. For it is called a ‘sacrament’ because of the signification of this determinate sacred thing, which marriage signifies.

Reply Obj. 3: Marriage, according to Augustine, is a good of mortals,¹ which is why in the resurrection they will not marry nor be given in marriage, as is said in Matthew 22:30, and therefore the bond of marriage does not extend beyond the life in which it is contracted. And thus it is called indissoluble, for it cannot be dissolved in this life, but it can be dissolved through death, either a physical death after physical union, or a spiritual death after a spiritual union alone.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the consent that causes marriage is not perpetual materially, i.e., as regards the substance of the act—for the act ceases and a contrary act can succeed it—yet, formally speaking, it is perpetual, for it regards the perpetuity of the bond, otherwise, it would not effect a marriage. For consent to a certain woman for a time does not bring about a marriage. And I say formally, according as the act receives its species from its object, and according to this, marriage receives indissolubility from consent.

Reply Obj. 5: In those sacraments that imprint a character, the power for spiritual acts is transmitted. But in marriage it is a power for physical acts. Thus, by reason of the power that the spouses receive over each other, marriage resembles those sacraments in which a character is imprinted, and from this it takes its indissolubility, as is stated in the text. But it differs from those sacraments insofar as this power is for physical acts, and because of this it does not imprint a spiritual character.

Reply Obj. 1: By the marital act a man does not incur the loss of reason habitually, but only in the act. Nor is it unfitting that sometimes a certain act, better according to its own genus, is interrupted by a certain act of lesser good. For this can be done without sin, as is evident in someone who ceases contemplation so that he may be available for action for a while.

Reply Obj. 2: That argument would hold if the evil that inseparably accompanies intercourse were the evil of guilt. In this case, however, it is not the evil of guilt, but only of punishment, which is the disobedience of concupiscence to reason. And therefore the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3: The overflow of passion that causes vice does not depend on its quantitative intensity, but its relation to reason. This is why passion is only considered immoderate when it exceeds the limits of reason. However, the pleasure that occurs in the marital act, no matter how intense it may be according to quantity, nonetheless does not exceed the limits fixed for it by reason before its beginning, regardless of how incapable reason may be to establish those limits during the pleasure itself.

Reply Obj. 4: That baseness which is always present in the marital act and causes embarrassment is the baseness of punishment, not guilt. For man is naturally embarrassed by any defect.

Reply Obj. 1: Offspring, considered as a good of the sacrament, adds something beyond offspring as the intention of nature. For nature intends children according as the good of the species is preserved in them. But in offspring as a good of the sacrament of matrimony, it is understood that, beyond the preservation of the species, the children received are directed to God. Therefore, it is necessary that nature’s intention, by which she intends children, be referred actually or habitually to the intention of children as a good of the sacrament; otherwise it would be stuck at the level of creation, which cannot happen without sin. Therefore, when nature alone moves someone to the marital act, he is not excused from all sin, except to the extent that the movement of nature is further ordered actually or habitually to children as a good of the sacrament. Though it also does not follow that the impulse of nature is evil, but that it is imperfect, unless ordered further, to some good of matrimony.

Reply Obj. 2: If someone intended by the marital act to avoid fornication in his spouse,¹ this is not a sin; for this is an example of rendering the debt, which belongs to the good of fidelity. But if he intended to avoid fornication in himself, then there is here a certain superfluity, and accordingly it is a venial sin; nor was marriage instituted for this purpose, except according to the forbearance that concerns venial sins.

Reply Obj. 3: One due circumstance does not suffice for an act to be good; and therefore it is not necessary that any use of one’s things be good, but rather, when one uses it as he should, in keeping with all the circumstances.

Reply Obj. 4: Although to intend the conservation of health is not bad in itself, still this intention becomes evil if one intends to conserve health through something which is not of itself ordained to it, for example, if someone sought only bodily well-being from the sacrament of baptism. And it is the same way with the situation proposed regarding the marital act.

Reply Obj. 1: A man seeks a harlot’s pleasures in his own wife whenever he sees nothing else in her than what he might look for in a prostitute.

Reply Obj. 2: Consenting to pleasure in the kind of intercourse that is a mortal sin, is a mortal sin. However, the pleasure of the marital act is not so.

Reply Obj. 3: Although he does not refer this pleasure to God in act, nevertheless, he does not place in it the final end of his will; otherwise he would seek it indifferently wherever he could find it. Therefore, he does not necessarily rest in the enjoyment of a created thing, but in act he uses a created thing for himself—and himself habitually, if not actually, for God’s sake.

Reply Obj. 4: This is not said because a man deserves excommunication for this sin, but because he renders himself unfit for spiritual things, by the fact that in this act a man is made to be entirely flesh.

Reply Obj. 1: Someone fulfilling a certain precept can be rendered incapable of carrying out a certain sacred office, as a judge who condemns a man to death is made irregular by fulfilling a precept. Likewise too that man who, fulfilling a precept, pays the debt, is made unfit for executing the divine office; not because that act is a sin, but by reason of the carnality of the act.¹ Thus, as the Master says, Jerome speaks only about the ministers of the Church, but not about others who are to be left to their own judgment: for they can either forego out of devotion, or consume the body of Christ without sin.

Reply Obj. 2: The wife’s power over the body of the man does not extend to the endangerment of his person, as was said. For this reason if she should make demands beyond this, it is not a requesting of a debt, but an unjust exaction from him, and for this reason, the man is not bound to satisfy her.

Reply Obj. 3: If someone should be rendered incapable of paying the debt because of something following upon marriage, for instance, when the debt is rendered beforehand, and he is incapable of paying it further, the woman does not have the right to ask for it again, and she shows herself to be more of a harlot than a wife in asking for it further. If, though, he is rendered incapable by another cause, and it is a licit one, then again he is not bound, nor can the woman demand it. If it is not licit, then he sins, and the sin of his wife, if she should lapse into sexual sin because of it, in some way would be imputed to him, and therefore he should take pains as much as he can so that his wife may remain in continence.

Reply Obj. 4: Leprosy dissolves a betrothal, but not a marriage; and for this reason, even the wife of a leprous man is bound to render the debt to her husband, though she is not bound to cohabit with him; for one is not so quickly infected by intercourse as by frequent cohabitation, and although a sickly child may be generated, nevertheless it is better for it to exist diseased like this than not to exist at all.

Reply Obj. 1: The time is not only determined by when it is requested, but whenever there are signs of that danger to be feared which rendering the debt is ordered toward avoiding, and which might occur if it is not rendered at that time.

Reply Obj. 2: A man can make this assumption about his wife when he does not see in her signs to the contrary. But when he does see them, it would be a stupid assumption.

Reply Obj. 3: A master is not so embarrassed to ask from a slave what is due from his servitude as a wife is to ask her husband for the conjugal debt. If, however, the master did not ask because of ignorance or another cause, nevertheless the servant would be bound to fulfill it, if danger were imminent: for this would be ‘not to serve the eye,’ which the Apostle commands to slaves.¹

Reply Obj. 4: A man should not turn aside his wife when she requests the debt, unless for some good reason; and then he should not turn her aside with much insistence, on account of the dangers that threaten.

Reply Obj. 1: The flow of semen in a man proceeds from an infirmity, and semen flowing like that is not suitable for generation. Furthermore, such a condition is long-lasting or perpetual, like leprosy; so there is no similar argument.

Reply Obj. 3: As long as a woman undergoes menstruation, one cannot be certain that she is barren. Certain women are barren in their youth, who become fertile by the process of time, and vice versa, as is stated in Book 10 of the History of Animals.¹

Reply Obj. 1: This is to be understood when both consent voluntarily; not, however, if the woman should render the debt involuntarily and, as it were, compelled.

Reply Obj. 2: Since consent only comes from the will, a woman is not understood to consent to the sin of her husband unless she renders the debt voluntarily: for when it is involuntary, she endures it rather than consenting.

Reply Obj. 3: A sword should be given even to an insane man when greater danger is feared if it were not given; and it is similar in this case.

Reply Obj. 1: Although to act is more noble than to be acted upon, nevertheless the proportion of the passive to being acted upon is the same as the proportion of the agent to acting. And according to this there is an equality of proportion.

Reply Obj. 2: This is accidental. For since the man has the nobler part in the conjugal act, naturally he is not so embarrassed to request the debt as his wife; and this is the reason that the wife is not so bound to render the debt to a husband who does not request it, as a husband is to his wife.

Reply Obj. 3: This fact shows that they are not absolute equals, but not that they are not equals according to proportion.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the head is the chief among the members of the body, yet as the members are bound to the head in their functions, so is the head bound to the members in its functions; and that is how an equality of proportion exists here.

Reply Obj. 1: It is probable enough that a wife ought to will continence for a time to assist a need of the general Church. Therefore, in consideration of the trouble that a crusade means, it was established that a man may undertake a crusade without the consent of his wife, just as also he may join the army without the consent of the earthly lord from whom he holds a fief.

Reply Obj. 2: The spouse who dissents from the other’s vow of continence does not dissent in order to impede that person’s good, but so as not to work to his own detriment.

Reply Obj. 3: There are two opinions about this. For some say that one person may vow not to request the debt without the consent of the other, though not that he will not render it, for in the first instance, both spouses are within their rights, but not in the second instance. But if one spouse were never to request the debt, it would make the marriage onerous to the other, who would then always have to undergo the embarrassment of requesting the debt. For this reason, others say more probably that one person cannot vow either thing without the consent of the other.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as the woman receives power over the body of the man, except in what the man owes to his own body, so also is excepted what he owes to another master. Therefore, just as the wife cannot request the debt from her husband against the health of his own body, so neither can she impede what he owes to his lord. But beyond this a master or lord cannot prohibit someone from rendering the debt.

Reply Obj. 1: At such a time, other things can be applied for the repression of concupiscence, like prayer, and many other things like it, which those who are bound to perpetual continence also make use of.

Reply Obj. 2: Although no one is bound to pray at every hour, nonetheless one is bound to keep oneself fit for prayer for the whole day.

Reply Obj. 1: That woman was not punished because she rendered the debt, but because afterward she rashly approached the divine things against her conscience.

Reply Obj. 2: From that text it cannot be proved that this is a mortal sin, but only that it is unfitting. For many more things pertaining to the cleanliness of the flesh were required by necessity of precept in the Old Law, which was given for carnal men, that are not required in the New Law, which is the law of the Spirit.

Reply Obj. 1: That person, as he is in himself, does not consent, but what is required from him he renders reluctantly and with sorrow. For, because of the frailty of the flesh, it is divinely ordained that one may always render the debt to the one asking, so that no occasion of sin will be given.

Reply Obj. 2: There is no determined hour for praying which cannot be compensated for in other hours, and therefore this objection does not compel.

Reply Obj. 1: The celebration of matrimony has something of worldly and carnal rejoicing joined to it, which is present not in the other sacraments. Therefore, it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 2: Such great distraction of souls does not occur in the rendering or requesting of the debt as in the celebration of a wedding, and therefore it is not similar.

Reply Obj. 3: Since time is not of the essence of matrimony, if it is contracted at an improper time, nevertheless it is a valid sacrament; nor are the contractants separated simply, but for a time, that they may do penance for having transgressed the statutes of the Church; and this is how what the Master says should be understood.

Reply Obj. 1: Custom does not overturn the law of nature as far as its first precepts, which are like the general concepts of the mind in speculative things. But custom reinforces and likewise diminishes what is drawn from these precepts as conclusions; and the precept of natural law that there should be one wife is this kind of thing.

Reply Obj. 2: As Cicero says, religion and the strength of laws have sanctioned those things perfected by nature and approved by custom.¹ Thus it is clear that those things that natural law dictates as derived from the first principles of natural law do not have compelling force in the mode of a precept absolutely, unless they have subsequently been sanctioned by divine and human law. And this is how Augustine says that they were not acting against a precept, since it had not been prohibited by any law.

The solution to the third objection is evident from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 4: Natural law is taken many ways. First, indeed, a certain law is called natural from its principle, since it is implanted by nature; and thus Cicero defines it in Book II of his Rhetoric, saying: natural law is what was not born of opinion, but a certain innate power instilled.¹ And also in natural things certain movements are called natural, not because they were from an intrinsic principle, but because they are from a superior moving principle, as the motions that are in the elements because of the influence of heavenly bodies are called natural (as the Commentator says in Book 3 of On Heaven and Earth).² Therefore, those things that are from divine law are said to be from natural law, since they are from the impression and infusion of a superior principle, namely, God. And this is how it is taken by Isidore, who says that natural law is what is contained in the Law and in the Gospel.³ Third, natural law is so called not only from its principle, but from its own nature, since it is about natural things. And since nature is divided against reason, by which man is man, then taking natural law in the strictest sense, those things that belong to men alone, even if they were the dictates of natural reason, are not said to be of natural law, but only those things that natural reason dictates about things that are common to man and others. And thus the definition stated is given, namely: natural law is what nature has taught all animals. Therefore, plurality of wives, although it may not be against natural law taken in the third way, is nevertheless against natural law taken in the second way, since it is prohibited by divine law; and also against natural law taken in the first way, as is clear from what has been said, because nature dictates to any animal according to the mode befitting its species. This is why also certain animals, in which the concern of both male and female is required for the education of the young, preserve by natural instinct the union of one to another, as is evident in the case of the turtledove and the dove, and others.

To the fifth objection the resolution is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 6: But since the reasons adduced to the contrary seem to show that multiple wives are against the first principles of the law of nature, they should therefore be answered. And so it should be said to the sixth objection that human nature was established without any defect; and so there were implanted in it not only those things without which the principal end of marriage cannot be had, but also those things without which the secondary end of marriage cannot be had without difficulty; and in this way it was provided for man in his very creation to have one wife, as was said.

Reply Obj. 7: By marriage a man does not give his wife power over his body in all things, but only those things that marriage requires. However, marriage does not require that at every moment a man should render the debt to a wife who is asking, unless as regards what marriage was chiefly instituted for, namely the good of children, and as much as is necessary for conception. However, inasmuch as marriage was instituted as a remedy, which is its secondary end, it does require that one render the debt at whatever moment one’s spouse asks for it. And thus it is clear that a man taking many wives does not obligate himself to the impossible where the principal end of marriage is considered; and therefore a plurality of wives is not against the first precepts of natural law.

Reply Obj. 8: This precept of the law of nature, what you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another, should be understood when the same relation is preserved. For if a prelate does not wish to be opposed by a subordinate, it is not that he himself must not oppose the subordinate. And therefore, it is not necessary by the force of that precept that if a man does not wish for his own wife to have other husbands, he himself may not have other wives: for one man having several wives is not against the first precepts of the law of nature, as was said. But for one wife to have several husbands is against the first precepts of the law of nature, by the fact that by this the good of children, which is the principal end of marriage, is in a certain respect totally taken away and in a certain respect impeded. For in the good of children is understood not only procreation, but also education, as was said. For the procreation of children itself, even if it is not totally destroyed (since it happens sometimes after the first impregnation that the woman is again impregnated, as it says in Book 7 of the History of Animals),¹ is nevertheless much impeded, for it can scarcely happen without damage happening either to one fetus or to both. But the education of offspring is completely destroyed, for from the fact that one wife has several husbands there would result an incertitude of the children about their father, whose care is necessary in their education. Therefore, by no law or custom is it permitted for one wife to have many husbands, as it is with the reverse.

Reply Obj. 9: Natural inclination in the appetitive power follows the natural concept in cognition; and since it is not so much against the natural concept that a man have many wives as it is that a woman have many husbands, a wife’s feeling does not so oppose the sharing of her husband as in the opposite situation. Therefore, as much among men as among animals a greater jealousy is found in the male for the female than the reverse.

Reply Obj. 1: Natural law has the same power always and everywhere, considered in itself. But in an incidental way it can be varied at certain times and places because of some impediment, as the Philosopher gives examples from other natural things in the same text. For always and everywhere the right hand is better than the left according to nature, but in an incidental way it befits some men to be ambidextrous, since our nature is variable. And it is similar with the naturally just, as the Philosopher says in the same place.

Reply Obj. 2: In the Decretals it says about divorce that it was never permitted to anyone to have several wives without a dispensation received by divine inspiration.¹ Nor is such a dispensation given against the reasons that God instilled in nature, but over and above them. For those reasons are not ordained for always but rather for most cases, as was said, just as also it is not against nature when something miraculous happens among natural things over and above what normally happens.

Reply Obj. 3: However the law is, so should be the dispensation from the law. And since the natural law is not written in letters but impressed in hearts, it was not fitting for the dispensation of those things which belong to natural law to be given through a written law, but rather to be made through interior inspiration.

Reply Obj. 4: With the coming of Christ came the time of the fullness of the grace of Christ, through which the worship of God was diffused in all nations by spiritual propagation; and therefore there is not the same reason for a dispensation that there was before Christ, when the worship of God was increased and preserved through carnal propagation.

Reply Obj. 5: The good of matrimony that is offspring, includes remaining faithful to God. For children are only considered a good of marriage according as they are hoped for in order to be raised to the worship of God. Moreover, remaining faithful to God is more important than remaining faithful to one’s wife, which is another good of matrimony, and more important than the signification that belongs to the sacrament, for this signification is ordered to the understanding of the faith. Therefore, it is not unfitting if, for the sake of the good of offspring, something is taken away from the other two goods. Nor indeed are these goods destroyed entirely, for fidelity can also remain toward several women, and sacrament in a certain way, since although the union of Christ and his Church is not signified in there being one bride, still the distinction of levels of the Church is signified by the plurality of wives. And this distinction indeed not only exists in the Church Militant, but also in the Church Triumphant. Therefore, the marriages of those men signified in a certain way the union of Christ and the Church, not only the Militant Church, as certain people say, but also the Triumphant Church, in which there are many mansions.

Reply Obj. 1: Among the gentiles, the law of nature was obscured regarding many things. For this reason, they did not consider it bad to approach a concubine, but they employed fornication far and wide like something licit, along with other things that were against the ceremonies of the Jews, although they were not against the law of nature. And therefore the apostles included the prohibition of fornication with ceremonials, because of the different judgments that existed about both matters among Jews and gentiles.

Reply Obj. 2: That law arose not from the instinct of the law of nature, but from the darkness into which the gentiles had fallen, not rendering the due glory to God, as it says in Romans 1:21. For this reason, when the Christian religion prevailed, that law was extirpated.

Reply Obj. 3: In some matters, when nothing unfitting follows if someone hands over completely to someone else a certain thing that is in his power, it would also not be unfitting if he handed it over for a time. So neither of these is against the law of nature. However, it is not like that in this matter. Therefore, the reasoning does not follow.

Reply Obj. 4: Injury is opposed to justice. However, natural law does not only prohibit injustice, but also those things opposed to any virtue, just as it is against natural law that someone eat immoderately, even though such a person using his own things does injury to no one. And furthermore, although a slave-girl is the possession of her lord as far as service goes, she is nevertheless not his possession as far as intercourse goes; and again, how someone uses his own belongings is important. Such a person also does injury to the children to be conceived, to whose good such a union is not sufficiently ordered, as was said in the response.

Reply Obj. 5: A woman has power over the body of her husband not simply-speaking with regard to all things, but only regarding the use of matrimony. Therefore, she cannot provide the body of her husband to another woman against the good of matrimony.

Reply Obj. 1: Frequently a man who does not avoid mortal sin avoids some venial sin, toward which he does not have so much incitement; and this is the way that Judah avoided lying, without avoiding fornication, although that lie would have been pernicious, as having injury joined to it, if he had not fulfilled his promise.¹

Reply Obj. 2: A sin is not called ‘mortal’ because it is punished by temporal death, but because it is punished by eternal death. This is also why theft, which is a mortal sin, and many other things are sometimes not punished by temporal death under the laws; and the case is similar with fornication.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as not every movement of pride is a mortal sin, so neither is every movement of lust. For the first movements of lust and what accompanies them are venial sins, even marital intercourse. Sometimes, however, certain acts of lust are mortal sins, while certain movements of pride are venial. For in the words cited from Gregory a comparison is understood between vices according to genus, and not as regards single acts.

Reply Obj. 4: As was said above, in Distinction 16, Question 3, Article 2, Quaestiuncula 2, a circumstance that comes closer to the species of sin does more to make a sin worse. Therefore, although fornication may be mitigated by the amount of incitement, nonetheless, because of the matter that it deals with, it is more serious than inordinate eating, since it deals with fostering the bond of human society, as was said. Therefore, the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 1: To have several wives is not against the law of nature in its first precepts, as to have a concubine is, as is clear from what has been said; therefore, the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 2: By the dispensation through which the patriarchs had many wives, they approached their slave-girls with the affection due to a wife. For they were wives as far as the principal and primary end of matrimony was concerned, but not as concerns that union which has to do with the secondary end, to which the condition of servitude is opposed, since they could not be at the same time partner and slave-girl.

Reply Obj. 3: As in the law of Moses it was permitted by a dispensation to give a writ of divorce in order to avoid wife-murder, as will be said, so by the same dispensation Abraham was permitted to send away Hagar for the signification of that mystery which the Apostle explains in Galatians 4. And also the fact that that son was not an heir belongs to the mystery, as is evident in the same place; just as also it pertains to the mystery that Esau, a free son, was not heir,¹ as is clear from Romans 9. In the same way, because of the mystery it happened that the sons of Jacob born of his slave-girls and of free women were heirs,² as Augustine says: for in baptism they are born in Christ, sons and heirs, both through good ministers, whom the free women signify, as well as through bad ministers, who are signified by the slave-girls.³

Reply Obj. 1: Only the law of Christ brought the human genus to perfection, returning it to the state of newness of nature; for this reason, both in the law of Moses and in human laws what was against natural law could not entirely be erased: for this was reserved to the law of the Spirit and life alone.

Reply Obj. 2: Indissolubility belongs to matrimony both as it is a sign of the perpetual union of Christ and the Church, and as it is ordained in the office of nature for the good of children, as was said. But since the dissolution of a marriage is more directly repugnant to the signification of marriage than to the good of children, to which it is repugnant in its consequences, as was said, indissolubility of marriage is conveyed more by the good of the sacrament than by the good of children, although it can be conveyed by both. And as it belongs to the good of children it will belong to the law of nature; but not as it pertains to the good of sacrament.

The solution to the third objection is evident from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 4: Marriage is principally ordained to the common good by reason of its principal end, which is the good of offspring; although by reason of its secondary end it is ordained to the good of those contracting marriage, as it is per se a remedy for concupiscence. Therefore, marriage laws pay more attention to what will be helpful to all than to what may suit one person. Therefore, although the indissolubility of marriage may impede the good of children for a certain person, nevertheless, it is fitting to the good of offspring simply speaking, and for this reason the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 1: As it belongs to nature’s first intention, the good of offspring means procreation, as well as nourishment and instruction until the children attain their majority. But what may be provided to them afterward through an inheritance and the discharge of other goods seems to belong to the second intention of natural law.

Reply Obj. 2: To have a concubine is against the good of offspring as concerns what nature intends for them by her first intention, namely, their rearing and instruction, which requires that their parents remain together for a long time; this does not occur with a concubine, who is taken up for a time; and therefore it is not the same. Nevertheless, as far as concerns the second dispensation, even to have a concubine can fall under dispensation, as is clear in Hosea 1:2.

Reply Obj. 3: Indissolubility, although it is a secondary aim of matrimony as it exists in the office of nature, nevertheless does relate to its primary aim insofar as it is a sacrament of the Church. And so as an instituted sacrament of the Church it cannot receive a dispensation while it remains such an institution, unless perhaps the second kind of dispensation.

Reply Obj. 1: Someone who is able to prohibit an evil does not sin if he refrains from prohibiting it because he does not hope for any correction but rather judges that that the prohibition will occasion a greater evil. This was the case with Moses; and this is why, relying on divine authority, he did not prohibit the writ of divorce.

Reply Obj. 2: The prophets inspired by the Holy Spirit did not speak of sending away one’s wife as if it were the command of the Holy Spirit, but as being permitted so that greater evils would not happen.

Reply Obj. 3: One should not understand these permissions as similar in every respect, but as having the same cause, since both permissions were given in order to avoid baseness.

Reply Obj. 4: Although hardness of heart would not excuse sin, nonetheless, the permission given due to hardness of heart does excuse. For certain things are prohibited to the healthy which are not prohibited to the sick in body; nor do the sick sin by taking advantage of the permission granted them.

Reply Obj. 5: Something good can be omitted in two ways. In one way, because some greater good will result; and then the omission of that good receives its rectitude by its order to the greater good, as when Jacob justly departed from monogamy for the sake of the good of offspring.¹ In another way, something is omitted in order to avoid a greater evil. And then if it is done by the authority of him who has the ability to give a dispensation, the omission of such a good is not culpable, but neither does it acquire rectitude; and in this way the Law of Moses overlooked the indissolubility of marriage in order to avoid a greater evil, namely, wife-murder: and this is why Chrysostom says, as quoted above, that from the sin he removed the guilt. For even though some disorder remained in divorce, from which it is called a sin, nevertheless, it did not incur liability to a penalty, either temporal or perpetual, since it occurred by divine dispensation, and so guilt was removed from it. And this is why Chrysostom also says in the same place that divorce was allowed, not as an evil, but as something licit. Those who are of the first opinion explain this as meaning that it was only liable to a temporal penalty.

Reply Obj. 1: Therefore, so that we may respond to both arguments, it must be said to the first that a man was permitted many wives at the same time according to a divine dispensation; and therefore, having sent away one wife, even if the marriage were not dissolved, he could take another. But never was a wife permitted to have multiple husbands, and therefore it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 2: In these words of Augustine, mores are not taken as ‘customs,’ but rather as ‘just acts,’ according as from mores one is said to be law-abiding or morigeratus, because he is of good morals, or as from mores moral philosophy is named.¹

Reply Obj. 3: In Matthew 5 the Lord shows that the New Law exceeds the Old by its counsels, not only as concerns those things which the Old Law made licit, but also with respect to the things which were illicit in the Old Law, but were considered licit by many because of the incorrect exposition of the precepts, as is clear in the case of hatred of enemies;¹ and thus it is also with divorce.

Reply Obj. 4: These words of the Lord are understood as regards the time of the New Law in which the permission mentioned was taken away; and in this way also are understood the words of Chrysostom,¹ who says that whoever sends away his wife according to the law, commits four iniquities: for in this he appears as a killer before God, inasmuch as he intends to kill his wife unless he sends her away; and since he sends away someone who is not a fornicator, which is the only case in which the law of the Gospel allows someone to send away his wife; and similarly because he makes of her an adulterer, as well as the man with whom she has relations.

Reply Obj. 5: A certain interlinear gloss on Deuteronomy 24 says, she has been defiled and is abominable, namely, in the judgment of the one who first sent her away as though defiled.¹ And thus it is not necessary that she be defiled simply speaking. Or she is called defiled in the way that someone was called unclean if he touched a corpse or a leper:² not the uncleanliness of guilt, but of a certain legal irregularity; for which reason it was also not permitted for a priest to take a widow or a divorced woman as his wife.³

Reply Obj. 1: In order to impede that evil which a man committed by divorcing his wife, it was ordained that a man could not remarry the wife he had divorced, as is clear from what has been said. And therefore this was divinely ordained.

Reply Obj. 2: It was always permissible to forgive a sinner as far as concerns the bitterness of heart, but not as concerns the penalty divinely exacted.

Reply Obj. 3: In this there are two opinions. For certain people say that it was allowed for a man to be reconciled with the wife he had divorced, unless she had been joined in marriage with another: for then because of the adultery to which the woman had voluntarily subjected herself, she was given the penalty that she could not return to her first husband. But since the Law universally prohibits it, therefore others say that even before she married another, she could not be taken back, because of the fact that she was divorced: for this defilement is not understood as guilt, but as was explained above.

Reply Obj. 3: Sterility and other things of this kind are causes of hatred; and thus they are remote causes.

Reply Obj. 4: No one is worthy of hatred because of his virtue, speaking per se, for goodness is a cause of love; and thus the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 5: That a man could never send away his wife was given to him as punishment, as also in another case when a man had deflowered a girl.¹

Reply Obj. 1: Although after the resurrection, the saints may not have corruption of the flesh, still they will have the nature of the flesh, which was corruptible. This is why virginity will be able to exist in them as in a subject, but not in the angels, who are not such as to suffer the corruption that virginity opposes. And this is enough especially for the notion of virginity, which not only concerns what is present, but what is past. For someone is not a virgin simply by the fact that he is not corrupted, but also by the fact that he never was corrupted.

Reply Obj. 2: Although an act of moral virtue is completed in the will, nonetheless reason puts the form of virtue in it, as is said in the Ethics 6; indeed, this is why the Socratics called all the virtues ‘knowledge.’¹ And Augustine uses this way of speaking here by setting down meditation in place of choice.

Reply Obj. 3: In the act of virtue not only is discernment required on the part of reason, but also a certain firmness from a habit tending toward the act after the manner of nature. And just as natural causes, in and of themselves, are immovably ordained to their proper effects, by reason of which we can say that a stone always descends downward, even though this can sometimes be impeded; so also the habit of virtue, in and of itself, is immovably ordained to its proper act, although sometimes the one having it performs a contrary act. And by reason of this lasting immovability, permanence is usually included in the definitions of virtues, as is stated in the beginning of the Digests, that justice is a constant and perpetual will.¹ And this is also how Augustine includes perpetuity in the definition of virginity, even though sometimes those who have virginity lose it; as also in the definition the discretion of choice, which the act of virginity has as far as it belongs to the genus of morals, is understood by meditation, but immobility is understood from perpetuity.

Reply Obj. 4: There are two kinds of corruption of the mind, as can be gathered from what has been said. One corruption is like a passion of the mind, when the mind is subject to the pleasure which usually occurs in intercourse. And since this pleasure is completed in the release of semen, such a corruption of mind cannot happen without a corruption of the flesh, which is said to occur by the release of semen. However, there is another corruption of mind, which is its act: namely, the consent to or the choice of the corruption described above. But since the inferior powers follow the movement of the superior ones, it sometimes happens that by the act of the mind thinking about the corruption of the flesh, and intending to experience its pleasure, heat is excited in the body, semen is released, and pleasure is caused in which the mind is suffocated just as in intercourse. And then, without a doubt, virginity is lost. If, though, the corruption remains in the mind’s act of consenting, virginity is indeed lost according to what is formally held in the mind, but not by reason of what is materially in it. For this reason such a person can only be called a virgin materially. And therefore, this loss of virginity can be restored, but not that loss of virginity in which also what is material is taken away. For virginity on the part of its act has to do only with the present or the future, as it is in any other virtue. For choice has to do with the present or the future, but not past. But on the part of the matter, it does not just have to do with the present, but also the past. For someone is called a virgin who has chosen incorruption, which is the matter in virginity, which he has never lost and does possess and intends to preserve. But it is not required that he had never made the opposite choice, but that he never had the opposite corruption. For this reason, lost virginity can never be restored, since what transpired in the past cannot be recovered.

Reply Obj. 5: As for those who corrupt themselves without sleeping together, there is no doubt that they lose their virginity, even as concerns what is material in it. For even if sleeping together does not take place, still the pleasure is present that causes the corruption of virginity in sleeping together. If, however, lust contrary to nature occurs before adulthood is reached, since there is no release of semen, and as a result neither does complete pleasure suffocate the mind, virginity is not lost as to what is material in it.

Reply Obj. 6: The passions of the sensitive part cannot be the matter of virtue unless according as they are ordered by reason establishing a mean in them, just as the concupiscible appetite and the irascible appetite obey reason. And therefore the pleasure that occurs during sleep with the release of semen is not a matter of virtue, and because of this neither does such corruption destroy the incorruption that is the matter of virginity; and therefore such pollution does not cause the loss of virginity. And the same reasoning holds true of women who, while sleeping and drunk or senseless, are known by men, unless perhaps they went to sleep with this intention, that they should be known by a man.

Reply Obj. 7: Something whose principle is completely outside it is not orderable by reason; and thus, by the same token, neither do those women lose their virginity who are corrupted through violence either by a man, or by an incubus, if they resist as much as they can, so that they keep their bodies free from corruption, or at least their minds opposed to consenting. Nonetheless, because the fact that something external is done matters more in the signification of the sacraments than that something happens interiorly, a man who took a violently deflowered virgin as his wife would incur that irregularity caused by a defect in the signification of the sacrament. And this is particularly the case because it is most difficult to dissent from such pleasure in that state, because reason is suffocated due to the extreme pleasure of that act; and therefore the presumption seems to be that she consented.

Reply Obj. 1: Among theologians, some say that virtue is not always a mean. But those saying this do not know what the mean of virtue is. For since the mean of virtue is taken according to right reason, if something is not in the mean, it is not according to right reason. And thus it can be neither praiseworthy nor virtuous. And therefore it is to be said that virginity is in the mean of right reason, because indeed the mean is not always taken according to the quantity of whatever the virtue deals with, which quantity is between too much and too little. For certain virtues exist which attain the maximum quantity in their proper matter, as, for example, no one dignifies himself in greater ways than the magnanimous man, nor does anyone make greater expenditures than the magnificent man, as is evident from the Ethics 4.¹ But it is taken according to the proportion of all circumstances attending the act. And thus that man who gives the most gifts attains the mean by preserving moderation in giving to whom he should and what he should and for the correct reason; and there is excess in what is given where it should not be or for a reason for which it should not be, even if greater things were given. It is the same way also with virginity: although it lies at the extreme as far as what it deals with, since it abstains from every corrupting pleasure, yet it is in the mean inasmuch as it observes the other due circumstances in a moderate way; and it would be excess if someone wanted virginity when he should not, as in the time of the law of Moses, or for a reason for which he should not, as with the vestal virgins; and similarly according to the other circumstances.

Reply Obj. 2: As was said, the mean of virtue is taken according to the relation of circumstances to right reason. And since time is one of the circumstances, it is not unfitting that something is not allowed at one time, which is permitted or virtuous if it is done at another time. And therefore, if at the time when God wished men to pursue the increase of the human race or of divine worship by the conjugal act, someone preserved incorruption by his own idea, he would have been at the extreme of defect, for he would have abstained from pleasurable things when he should not have. But afterward, once the multiplication of the human race or of those worshiping God was sufficiently completed, he would not have sinned by keeping his virginity even under the law of Moses, or in the state of unfallen nature, if man had not sinned. Nor would he have acted against a precept, but above a precept, since multiplication could have occurred through others.

Reply Obj. 3: That state of a virtue in which a virtue can issue in its act can be lost, never to be recovered by penance, with or without sin indifferently. For example, the richest, most generous person can give all his belongings to the poor, and thus without any sin of his own, it happens to him that he will not be able to continue in an external act of this virtue. If, however, he consumes his own resources in base uses, this will involve sin; nor will he recover the first state by penance. And likewise virginity, which names that state of the virtue in which virtue can issue in its act, is lost both by sin in fornication, and without sin in the marital act; nor is it ever recovered by penance.

Reply Obj. 4: The matter of virginity can exist in those people who have no habit of virtue, as in children before baptism, in whom there is the first level of virginity which nature has given; and also in those who wish to preserve the aforesaid incorruption for a time, but with the design of marrying in its own time, who have the second level of virginity, though they are only called virgins materially. But the complete account of virginity, insofar as it is a virtue, only exists in those who have made a choice of preserving the integrity guarded thus far until the end, either with a vow or without a vow. And this choice cannot be perfect without a habit informing it. But if it be unformed, then it will be the kind of act of virtue that precedes virtue, just as also happens with other acts of virtue.

Reply Obj. 5: Temperance, as was stated in Book III, Distinction 33, Question 3, Article 2, Quaestiuncula 1, consists chiefly in controlling pleasures, for which reason it has as its principal intention a certain interior act, namely the choice of restraining concupiscence. But it does not have an external act as concerns what is principal in it, except incidentally and as a result, namely in the fact that it employs certain external acts to control pleasures, like turning away from the sight of concupiscible things, and these acts it commands more than it elicits. For enjoying pleasures according to the measure of reason belongs to the secondary intention of temperance. And since virginity is the chief virtue in temperance, it does not have an external act except as a consequence, but it restrains any use whatsoever of concupiscence.

Reply Obj. 6: That man who has one virtue has all of them in a certain way, but not as regards everything that is in a virtue; for example, someone who has liberality sometimes does not have magnificence as regards that state which could result in an external act. And likewise, not everyone who has temperance has the state that virginity signifies, because of an imperfection, although he may have what establishes the character of virtue in virginity; just as, on the other hand, because of his perfection, Christ has charity, but not faith, because of the state of imperfection that faith carries with it, even though he has whatever belongs to perfection and virtuousness in faith.

Reply Obj. 7: Someone can employ badly the matter of virginity (which the foolish virgins can possess), but not virginity considered under its full account.

Reply Obj. 8: Widowhood and matrimony do not imply another level in the matter of temperance, as virginity does; and so the account is not similar.

Reply Obj. 1: Those pleasures that temperance is concerned with are the basest because they are shared by us and animals, as is clear in the Ethics 7.¹ This is why temperance, which controls them, especially assumes that beauty which is shared by all the virtues, as fortitude assumes difficulty, and justice rectitude. And because of this, virginity, which is the highest level of temperance, earns for itself the highest beauty; though it does not follow that it is the noblest virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: All the words of Cyprian cited above, which display the excellence of virginity, pertain to its beauty; thus they must be answered in the same way as the first objection. Or they should be addressed by saying that virgins have other virtues with virginity: but other people do not have virginity along with other virtues; and therefore there is not the same basis for comparing virginity and other virtues, and virgins and other people.

Reply Obj. 3: The crown of special distinction is an accidental prize, and so is the fruit. But an essential prize is nobler than an accidental one; therefore, simply speaking, those virtues are more powerful to which the greater essential prize is due. Yet the accidental prize does not have as much to do with the root of virtue as the state of virtue. And furthermore, the crown of distinction is not only due to virgins, but also to martyrs and doctors; but the fruit is only due to continence, in which virginity holds the highest place, because through continence those pleasures are repressed which most greatly impede the taste of spiritual sweetness, which the fruit implies by its name.

Reply Obj. 4: Incorruption makes something close to God in whom there is no corruption, by a certain resemblance of imitation. And since we are more able to be like God in our minds than in our flesh, therefore incorruption of the mind, which is opposed to all sin and exists through every virtue, makes someone to be like God. But virginity has both kinds of incorruption; and therefore with regard to many things, it makes us like God, namely in body and soul, by which reason it is said that it follows the Lamb wherever he may go; and Ambrose says that nothing is lacking from it. Nonetheless, it does not follow that virginity makes someone more like God than other virtues do, but like him according to more things.

Reply Obj. 5: In the text the marriage of Abraham is equated with the celibacy of John as far as personal merit is concerned, since Abraham merited as much in marital union as John did in virginity. For he served God with the same promptness according to the state of his time; and this comparison is made through things accidental to virtue.

Reply Obj. 6: Humility seems to be most closely related to the virtues, since by it man subjects himself to God out of reverence, and as a result, to others because of God. Therefore, simply speaking, humility surpasses virginity.

Reply Obj. 1: Other sacraments can also be impeded, if something that is of the essence or of the solemnity of the sacrament is taken away, as was said.¹ But nevertheless, more impediments are assigned to marriage than to the other sacraments, for three reasons. First, because marriage exists in two persons, and therefore it can be impeded in more ways than other sacraments, which only involve one person individually. Second, because marriage has its cause in us, but the other sacraments only in God; for which reason the Master also assigned to penance, which has its cause in us in a certain way, certain impediments, like hypocrisy, joking, and things of this kind.² Third, because there are precepts or counsels about the other sacraments, as concerning more perfect goods, but about marriage there is indulgence, as concerning a less perfect good; and therefore, that an occasion might be given for progressing to better things, more impediments are assigned to marriage than to the other sacraments.

Reply Obj. 2: More perfect things can be impeded in many ways, inasmuch as many things are required for them. If however, there were something imperfect for which many things were required, that thing would also have many impediments, and this is the way with marriage.

Reply Obj. 3: That argument would hold if there were not other remedies by which also the sickness of concupiscence could be relieved more effectively, which is false.

Reply Obj. 4: Those persons ineligible for contracting marriage are so named from the fact that they are against the law by which marriage is constituted. But marriage, inasmuch as it is an office of nature, is founded on natural law; inasmuch as it is a sacrament, it is founded on divine law; inasmuch as it is an office of the community, it is founded on civil law; and therefore, by any one of the laws named a certain person can be made ineligible for marriage. Nor is it similar with the other sacraments, which are only sacraments. And because natural law received diverse determinations according to diverse states, and positive law is also varied according to the diverse conditions of men in diverse times, therefore the Master counts different persons to have been ineligible in different times.¹

Reply Obj. 5: Law can prohibit something either universally or in part with regard to certain cases; and therefore, between being completely legal and being completely against the law, which are opposed as contraries and not according to negation and affirmation, there falls the mean of being in a certain way according to the law and in a certain way against it. And for this reason, certain persons are counted a mean between simply eligible and simply ineligible.

Reply Obj. 6: The impediments mentioned are not said to destroy the marriage contract as though dissolving a valid marriage that has been contracted properly, but because they dissolve that marriage that has been contracted de facto and not de jure. This is why if an impediment arises in some marriage properly contracted it is not enough to dissolve it.

Reply Obj. 7: Those impediments that do not dissolve the marriage contract sometimes impede the contracting of the marriage, not so that it does not happen, but so that a valid marriage is not made licitly. And nonetheless, if it is made, the marriage is a valid contract, although those contracting it sin; just as if someone consecrated the Host without fasting, he would sin, acting against the statutes of the Church. Nevertheless, a valid sacrament would be performed, since the fast of the consecrator is not of necessity to the sacrament.

Reply Obj. 8: There are infinite impediments by which a certain good is impeded per accidens, as is the case with all incidental causes. But the causes that corrupt a certain good per se are determinate, as is the case with constituent causes; for causes of construction and destruction are from things that are opposed, or from the same thing taken in opposite modes.

Reply Obj. 9: The conditions of particular persons as individuals are infinite, but in general they can be reduced to a certain number, as is evident in medicine, and in all the practical arts, which consider conditions of the particulars, for actions are about particulars.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the act of physical intimacy is not of the essence of matrimony, nevertheless the power for it belongs to marriage’s essence. For through marriage the power over the body of the other is given to both of the spouses with respect to physical intimacy.

Reply Obj. 2: An excessive heat can scarcely be a perpetual impediment. Yet if it were found that for three years it impeded physical intimacy, it would be judged perpetual. Still, since frigidity impedes in a greater way and more frequently (for it takes away not only the commingling of seeds but also the rigidity of the member by which the union of bodies occurs), for this reason frigidity is considered more of an impediment than excessive heat, since every natural defect may be traced back to frigidity.

Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes the elderly, although they may not have sufficient heat for generation, nevertheless have sufficient heat for sexual intimacy; and therefore marriage is granted to them, according as it is a remedy, although it is not their duty as an office of nature.

Reply Obj. 4: In any contract whatsoever, this is universally binding, that the person who is unable to fulfill something is not considered fit for the contract by which he obliges himself to its fulfillment. Yet someone can be incapable in three ways. In one way, if he cannot do something de jure. And in this way such an incapacity makes the contract null in every way, whether the one with whom the contract is made knows about this incapacity or not. In another way, when he cannot do it de facto; and then if the one with whom the contract is made should know about this incapability, and nevertheless agree to the contract, it reveals that in this contract the other party is seeking different end, and therefore the contract stands. However, if the other party does not know, then the contract is null. Therefore, impotence, which causes such an incapacity that a man cannot acquit his obligation de facto, and the condition of slavery, by which a man cannot render it freely de facto, both impede marriage when one spouse is ignorant that the other cannot render the debt. Yet the impediment by which someone cannot render the debt de jure, such as consanguinity, annuls the marital contract whether the other party knows or not; and because of this the Master¹ counts these two as impediments which make persons entirely ineligible.²

Reply Obj. 5: There cannot be a perpetual natural impediment in the man with respect to one person and not to another; but if he were unable to complete the sexual act with a virgin, but he could with a woman who is not, then the hymen could be broken medically by some instrument, and they could be united. Nor would this be against matrimony, since it would not be done for the purpose of pleasure, but for a medical reason. However, loathing the woman is not a natural cause, but an extrinsic, accidental cause, and therefore it is adjudged the same as a curse, which will be discussed later.¹

Reply Obj. 6: The male is the active principle in generation, but the female is the passive principle; and therefore, greater heat is required in the man than in the woman for the work of generation. This is why impotence makes a man incapable, but frigidity would not make a woman incapable. But in the woman there can be a natural impediment from another cause, namely, extreme tightness; and then the judgment of tightness in the woman is the same as that of impotence in the man.

Reply Obj. 1: Since the first corruption of sin, by which man was made slave to the devil, is passed on to us by the generative act, this is why the power of sorcery is permitted to the devil by God in this act more than in others; just as the power of witchcraft is displayed more in serpents than in other animals, as is said,¹ since through the serpent the devil tempted the woman.

Reply Obj. 2: The work of God can be impeded by the work of the devil by divine permission; not that the devil could be stronger than God such that he could destroy God’s work through violence.

Reply Obj. 3: Witchcraft is so enduring that it may not have a remedy in human action, although God may furnish the remedy by forcing out the demon, or the demon might even stop. For it is not always the case that what was done by one spell could be destroyed by another spell, as sorcerers themselves admit. But if the remedy could be applied by witchcraft, nevertheless it would be considered perpetual, since in no way should someone invoke the help of a demon through witchcraft. Likewise, it is not necessary that if because of some sin power was given to the devil over someone, this power should end when the sin ends: for sometimes punishment remains once guilt has passed away. Likewise also, the exorcisms of the Church are not strong enough to repress demons all the time as regards all corporeal troubles, when divine judgment requires this; but they are always strong enough against those infestations of demons that they were principally instituted against.

Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes witchcraft can establish an impediment with everyone, sometimes with just one person, since the devil is a voluntary cause, not acting from the necessity of nature. And furthermore the impediment of witchcraft can occur from the impression of a demon on the imagination of a man, removing the concupiscence that moves him toward a certain woman but not the concupiscence moving him toward another.

Reply Obj. 1: The use of reason is not required for baptism as its cause, as it is required for matrimony. Therefore, there is no similarity. But concerning baptism of the insane, see above, Distinction 6.¹

Reply Obj. 2: Insanity impedes marriage in its cause, which is consent, although not in its act, as is the case with impotence. But nevertheless the Master considers it at the same time as impotence because both arise from defects of nature.

Reply Obj. 3: A temporary impediment that impedes the cause of marriage, namely, consent, completely voids matrimony. But an impediment that impedes the act must be perpetual in order to void matrimony.

Reply Obj. 4: This impediment is reduced to that of error: for on both sides there is a defect of consent on the part of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: The man sins if he dismisses his fornicating wife for revenge in spite; but if he does it to guard against disgrace falling upon himself, lest he seem a participant in the offense, or for the sake of correcting the vice of his wife, or for avoiding uncertainty about his children, he does not sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Separation because of fornication occurs by one party accusing the other; and since no one can accuse who is guilty of the same offense,¹ when both are fornicators, separation cannot be enforced, regardless of whether the marriage was more sinned against by one party who fornicated than by the other.

Reply Obj. 3: Fornication is directly against the goods of matrimony; for the certitude of the children’s paternity is ruined by it, and faith is broken, and the signification is not preserved when one spouse divides his own flesh among many. This is why other misdeeds do not cause a separation, even though they are worse than fornication. But since unbelief, which is called spiritual fornication, is also against a good of matrimony, i.e., raising children to the worship of God, this too can cause a separation, but nevertheless in another way than fornication does. For it is possible to move for a separation because of one act of carnal fornication, but not because of one act of unbelief, but only for a habit that is shown to be obstinate, in which unbelief is the result.¹

Reply Obj. 4: A separation can be sought also because of a vice against nature; but mention is not made of it in this way, both because it is an unnameable passion, and because it occurs more rarely, and because it does not cause such incertitude about the children.

Reply Obj. 1: The sin of fornication in a wife can be corrected not only by such a penalty, but also by words and by blows. And therefore, if she were provided with correction in some other way, the husband would not be bound to apply this penalty for her correction.

Reply Obj. 2: The man seems to consent to his wife when he does not restrain her to refrain from her past sin; but if she has amended, he does not consent to her sin.

Reply Obj. 3: By the fact that she has repented of the sin of fornication, she cannot be called a harlot; and therefore, the man uniting himself with her does not become the member of a harlot. Or it may be said that he is not joined to her as harlot, but as wife.

Reply Obj. 4: It is not the same, for consanguinity makes it so that there will be no marriage bond between them, and for this reason physical intimacy would be illicit. But fornication does not remove the bond mentioned above; and for this reason the act remains licit in itself, unless it should become illicit by some added circumstance—if, for example, it should seem that the man consents to the disgrace of his wife.

Reply Obj. 5: That permission is to be gathered from the lack of a prohibition, and thus it is not divided against a precept; for what falls under a precept is also not prohibited.

Reply Obj. 6: The wife does not only sin against her husband, but against herself, and against God; and for this reason the man cannot totally forego a penalty unless amendment should follow.

Reply Obj. 1: A sentence is the application of a general law to a particular fact; and thus the Lord promulgated the law, according to which the sentence should be rendered in the court.

Reply Obj. 2: Joseph did not want to send away the Virgin as though he suspected her of fornication, but out of reverence for her holiness, fearing to cohabit with her, as was said above; nor is it similar, for at that time the crime of adultery did not lead simply to separation, but rather to stoning;¹ however, that is not what happens in the judgment of the Church today.

The answer to the third objection is evident from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 3: Sometimes a man, having suspicions about his wife, may lie in wait for her, and he can apprehend her in the crime of fornication in front of witnesses, and in this way he can proceed to the accusation. And furthermore, if he cannot establish the fact, there can be forceful suspicions of fornication, which, when they are proved, it seems that fornication is proved, for example, if a man and a woman are found alone together at suspect times and places, and if they are found naked together.¹

Reply Obj. 5: A husband can accuse his wife of adultery in two ways. In one way, for a separation from the bed before an ecclesiastical judge, and then charges should be brought without obligation to the law of damages. For the husband attains his aim, as the objection proves. In another way, for the punishment of the crime in the secular court; and for this it is necessary that charges be brought first, by which the man obliges himself to the payment of damages if he should lose the trial.

Reply Obj. 6: As a decretal says, in criminal matters things can proceed in three ways. First, by inquiry, which must be preceded by public infamy, which takes the place of accusation. Second, by accusation, which must be preceded by filing suit. Third, by denunciation, which must be preceded by fraternal admonition. Thus the word of the Lord is understood as concerning the way of denunciation, not the way of accusation; for in that case, it is not only a question of correcting the delinquent, but of punishing him for the sake of preserving the common good, which perishes when justice is lacking.

Reply Obj. 1: Divorce was only permitted for the sake of avoiding homicide; and since there was greater danger of this in men than in women, this is why it was permitted for a man to send away his wife, not vice versa.

Reply Obj. 2 & 3: These arguments proceed from the fact that in comparison to the good of offspring there may be a greater reason for separation in an adulterous wife than in an adulterous husband. But it does not follow that they should not be judged as equals, as is clear from what was said above.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the man is the head of his wife, he is head as governor, not as if he were the judge of her, just as neither is she the judge of him. Therefore, in those things which must be done by a judgment, the man has no more power over his wife than she over him.

Reply Obj. 5: The same character of sin is found in adultery as in simple fornication, and even more, because it is made worse by the wound to marriage. If, therefore, what is common to adultery and fornication is considered, the sin of a man and the sin of a woman are related as things that go too far and things that have been pushed too far. For in women there is more of the humors, and therefore they are more able to be drawn by their desires; but in the man there is more heat, which excites concupiscence. But even simply speaking, with all other things equal, the man sins more in simple fornication than the woman does, for he has more of the good of reason, which is stronger than any movements of bodily passions. But as concerns the wound to marriage which adultery adds to fornication, for which reason separation is sought, the woman sins more than the man, as is clear from what has been said. And since this is graver than simple fornication, therefore, simply speaking, the adulterous woman sins more than the adulterous man, all other things being equal.

Reply Obj. 6: Although the rule over the woman which the man receives may be an aggravating circumstance, nonetheless, by the circumstance of wounding marriage, which changes the species of the act, the sin is made much more serious, for it turns it into a species of injustice in which someone else’s children may secretly be passed off as one’s own.

Reply Obj. 1: Although per se no one is obliged to continence, nevertheless per accidens it can happen that someone is obliged; for example, if one’s wife should contract some incurable illness, which could not allow physical intimacy. And likewise, too, if she should suffer incorrigibly from some spiritual infirmity, like fornication.

Reply Obj. 2: The very embarrassment which is the result of separation should restrain such a person from sin. For if it cannot restrain her, it is a lesser evil if she alone should sin, than if her husband should be a participant in her sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Although after their separation the wife is not bound to render the debt to and to cohabit with an adulterous husband, nevertheless the matrimonial bond, by which she was bound to this, remains even after. Therefore, she may not pass over to another union while her husband lives. Yet she can take a vow of continence against her husband’s will, unless the Church seems to have been deceived by false witnesses when it was granting the separation: for in such a case, even if she had made a vow of religious profession, she would be restored to her husband, and bound to render him the debt. But she would not be allowed to demand it of him.¹

Reply Obj. 4: That exception which is in the words of the Lord refers to the dismissal of the wife: and therefore the objection proceeds from a false understanding.

Reply Obj. 1: The sentence of the Church granting a separation did not compel a separation, but only granted permission. Therefore, without retraction of this sentence a reconciliation can take place.

Reply Obj. 2: The repentance of the wife should induce the husband not to accuse or to send away the wife who fornicated. But nevertheless, he cannot be forced to this,¹ nor can the wife through her repentance prevent him from making the accusation: for in the person who withdraws from sin as regards both the act of sin and the stain, something still remains of the culpability. And even someone having no more culpability before God may remain liable to penalty under human judgment. For man does not see the heart as God does.

Reply Obj. 3: What is introduced in someone’s favor does not prejudice any of his rights;¹ therefore, when separation is granted in the husband’s favor, it does not take away his right to ask for the marital debt, or to take back his wife. For this reason the wife is bound to render it to him, and to return to him if she is invited, unless with his permission she has taken a vow of continence.

Reply Obj. 4: According to the strict interpretation of the law, a formerly innocent husband should not be forced to take back his adulterous wife because of the adultery which he committed after the separation.¹ But in the interest of justice, the judge by reason of his office should urge him to be careful of the danger to his soul and the scandal to others, although the wife cannot request a reconciliation.

Reply Obj. 5: If the adultery of the husband is hidden, it does not remove the adulterous wife’s right of bringing it as a defense against the accusation of the husband, although the proof may be lacking to her. Therefore, the husband sins by requesting a separation; and if after the granting of separation the wife should request the debt or a reconciliation, the husband is bound to both.

Reply Obj. 1: Slavery is contrary to marriage as concerns its act, for which someone is obliged to another in marriage, since this act cannot be accomplished freely; and also as concerns the good of offspring, who are given a worse condition by the slavery of their parents. But since anyone is able of his own accord to submit to some loss in what is due to him, if one spouse knows the other’s condition of slavery, the marriage would hold nevertheless. In the same way, since in marriage there is an equal obligation on both parties for the rendering of the debt, someone cannot require a greater obligation on the part of another than he can fulfill himself; and because of this, the marriage is not impeded if a slave should contract with a slave-girl whom he believes to be free. Thus it is clear that slavery does not impede marriage unless it is without the knowledge of one of the spouses, even if it be that party who is of a free condition;¹ and therefore, nothing prohibits marriage between slaves, or between a free man and a slave-girl.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents something from being against nature as concerns nature’s primary intention, but not against nature as concerns its secondary intention. For example, all corruption and defect and decay is against nature, as is stated in Book 2 of On the Heavens,¹ for nature intends being and perfection; but it is not against the second intention of nature, for by the fact that nature cannot preserve being in one, it preserves it in another, which is generated by the corruption of the first; and when nature cannot bring something to a greater perfection, it leads it to a lesser one; as when it cannot make a male, it makes a female, which is a defective male, as it says in Book 2 of On the Generation of Animals.² Likewise also, I say that slavery is against the first intention of nature, but not against the second; for natural reason inclines to this, and nature seeks this, namely that any given thing be good; but from the fact that someone sins, it is also nature’s inclination that he incur punishment for his sin; and thus slavery was introduced as a punishment for sin. Nor is it unfitting for something natural to be impeded by something that is unnatural in this way; for in the same way marriage is impeded by impotence in intercourse, which is against nature in the way stated.

Reply Obj. 3: Natural law dictates that punishment be inflicted for fault, and that nothing without fault should be punished. But to determine the punishment according to the condition of the person and the fault is for positive law; and therefore, slavery, which is a certain determinate penalty, belongs to positive law, and proceeds from natural law as the determined from the undetermined; and with the same positive law determining, it has happened that unknown slavery may impede marriage,¹ lest someone without fault be penalized: for it is a certain penalty for a wife that her husband be a slave, and vice versa.

Reply Obj. 4: There are some impediments which make marriage illicit. And since our wills do not make something to be illicit or licit, but rather the law, to which our wills should be subject, therefore ignorance of such an impediment, even though it removes willing or knowledge, does nothing for the validity of the marriage. And such an impediment is affinity, or a vow, or others like these. However, there are some impediments which make marriage incapable of rendering what is owed; and since it is within the power of our wills to release a debt that is owed to us, therefore, this kind of impediment, if it be known, does not take away matrimony, but only when ignorance makes willingness impossible. And slavery is an impediment of this kind, as is impotence in intercourse. And since they also have in themselves a certain character of impediment, they are counted as specific impediments beyond the impediment of error. But a change in the person is not considered a specific impediment beyond error, for the substitution of another person does not have the character of impediment, except from the intention of the one contracting marriage.

Reply Obj. 5: Liberty does not impede the marital act; and so an unknown free condition does not impede marriage.

Reply Obj. 6: Leprosy does not impede marriage as concerns its first act, by the fact that lepers can freely render the marital debt, although they impose certain difficulties on the marriage as concerns its second effects; and therefore, it does not impede matrimony in the same way that slavery does.

Reply Obj. 1: A slave is his master’s belonging as regards those things which are superadded to nature; but as to natural things they are equals. For this reason, in those things that pertain to natural acts, a slave can furnish to another the power over his own body in marriage, against the will of his master.

Reply Obj. 2: A slave is bound to obey his master in those things that the master can licitly command. But just as the master cannot licitly command his servant not to eat or sleep, neither can he command that the slave abstain from contracting marriage. For how someone uses what is his own does not concern the legislator; therefore, if the master commands his slave not to contract marriage, the slave is not bound to obey.

Reply Obj. 3: If a slave contracts marriage with his master’s permission, then he should leave undone the service that his master commands, and render the debt to his wife: for by the fact that the master allowed the slave to contract matrimony, it is understood that he conceded all the things that marriage requires. But if the marriage was contracted without the master’s knowledge or permission, the slave is not bound to render the debt but rather to obey his master, if both cannot be done at the same time.¹ But nevertheless, in these things many particulars should be considered, as in all human acts; for example, the imminent danger to the chastity of the wife, and the impediment that it will generate to the service commanded if he renders the debt, and other things like this. By thinking through these things properly, it could be decided whom the slave would be bound to obey, his master or his wife.

Reply Obj. 4: In such cases it says that the master should be compelled not to sell his slave such that he places too heavy a burden on the marriage, especially when he does not lack the possibility of selling his slave at a just price somewhere else.

Reply Obj. 5: Through religious life and holy orders someone is obliged to undertake divine service all the time; but a man is not bound to render the debt to his wife at all times, but at suitable times; and therefore it is not the same. Furthermore, someone who enters religious life and receives holy orders obliges himself to works that exceed those natural things to which a master’s power extends. But this is not the case in those natural things to which one obliges himself in marriage; for which reason one could vow continence without the consent of one’s master.

Reply Obj. 1: Fraud can easily injure the one who commits it, but it cannot generate prejudice of another’s rights; and therefore, if a man defrauds his wife by giving himself as a slave, he himself will reap the blame, losing the inestimable good of freedom. But by this he can do nothing to prejudice the rights of his wife, since he is bound to render the debt to her when she asks, and to all those things which marriage requires: for his master’s command cannot withdraw him from these things.

Reply Obj. 2: To the degree that slavery is contrary to matrimony, matrimony takes precedence over servitude: for then the slave is bound to render the debt to his wife, even against the will of his master.

Reply Obj. 3: Although in the marital act and those things that have to do with nature, the husband and wife are judged equals, the condition of slavery does not extend to this. Nonetheless, as regards the management of the home, and other things like this added on to the marriage, the man is the head of the woman, and should correct her, but not the reverse; and therefore, the wife cannot give herself as a slave against the will of her husband.

Reply Obj. 4: This argument follows as regards corruptible things, in which many things also impede generation which are not enough to destroy the thing generated. But among things that endure perpetually, an impediment can prevail to the extent preventing such a thing from beginning to exist, but not so far as to stop its being once it exists, as is clear in the case of the rational soul; and it is also the same way with marriage, which is a bond remaining perpetually during the present life.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the father is a nobler principle, the mother gives corporeal substance, and the condition of slavery is applied from this side.

Reply Obj. 2: In those things which belong to the account of the species, a son is more like his father than his mother, but in material conditions he should be more like his mother than his father, for a thing has specific being from its form, but material conditions from its matter.

Reply Obj. 3: A son resembles his father by reason of the form which fills out his perfection, as his father does too; and therefore this argument does not address the issue.

Reply Obj. 4: Since the honor of the son is more from his father than from his mother, therefore in genealogies in Scripture and according to the common custom sons are named from their father rather than from their mother; nevertheless, in those things which regard slavery, they follow their mother more.

Reply Obj. 1: Those things to which nature inclines do not require as much strength of reason for deliberating as is needed in other things. And therefore, someone considering marriage can consent sufficiently before he would be able to manage his own affairs in other contracts.

Reply Obj. 3: A woman arrives at the age of puberty sooner than a man does, as is stated in Book 4 of On the Generation of Animals,¹ and as was said above, in Distinction 37, Question 2, Article 2, reply to the third objection. And therefore it is not the same for both.

Reply Obj. 4: In this instance, there is not only an impediment because of the inability to have intercourse, but because of a defect of reason, which until then is not sufficient for properly making that consent which could endure perpetually.

Reply Obj. 5: Just as the impediment of insanity is reduced to the impediment of error, so also is the impediment of insufficient age, since a person does not have full use of his free will.

Reply Obj. 1: Although holy orders may not be contrary to marriage as a sacrament, it does have a certain opposition to it by reason of its act, which impedes spiritual acts.

Reply Obj. 2: Now it is clear that this objection proceeds from false premises. For in both churches holy orders impede marriage from being contracted, although both do not have the vow attached to them.

Reply Obj. 3: Those who are established in holy orders signify Christ by nobler acts than those who are joined in marriage, as was evident in the treatise on holy orders.¹ And therefore the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 4: Those who have had minor orders conferred on them are not prohibited from contracting matrimony by virtue of orders, for although those orders are deputed to certain spiritual things, they do not, however, have direct access to handling sacred things, as do those who are in the order of priesthood. But according to the statutes of the Western church, the use of matrimony does impede the exercise of lower orders for the sake of conserving a greater rectitude in the duties of the Church.¹ And since someone is bound by his benefice to the exercise of orders, and by this very fact enjoys clerical privilege, therefore these things, among the Roman rite, are taken away from married clerics.

Reply Obj. 1: The bond of orders overrules the bond of matrimony as regards the rendering of the debt, by reason of which it creates a certain tension with marriage on the part of the one who receives orders. For he cannot request the debt, nor is his wife bound to render it to him. But nevertheless the marriage is not overrulled on the part of the other spouse, for the husband is bound to render the debt to his wife, if he cannot induce her to remain continent.

Reply Obj. 2: If the wife should know, and the man should receive holy orders with her consent, she is bound to vow perpetual continence. But she is not bound to enter religious life, if she does not fear for her own chastity because of the fact that her husband has taken a solemn vow, although it would be otherwise if he had taken a simple vow. If, however, he has received holy orders without her consent, she is not bound; for by this fact none of her rights are prejudiced.

Reply Obj. 3: It seems more probable (although certain people have said the contrary) that even the Greeks do not undertake holy orders without the consent of their wives, since at least at the time of their ministry, their wives would be cheated of the rendering of the debt,¹ and they are not able to be cheated of this according to the order of the law, if their husbands received orders without their consent or knowledge.

Reply Obj. 4: As is said,¹ among the Greeks, by the very fact that the woman consents that her husband receives orders, she obliges herself never to marry another for the rest of her life; for the signification of marriage would not be preserved, which is particularly required in the marriage of a priest. If, however, he is ordained without her consent, she does not seem to be bound by this.

Reply Obj. 5: Marriage has our consent as its cause; however, orders does not, but it rather has a sacramental cause determined by God. And therefore marriage can be impeded by pre-existing orders, such that it is not a valid marriage; but orders cannot be impeded by marriage such that it is not a true ordination; for the power of the sacraments is immutable, but the act of a man may be impeded.

Reply Obj. 1: The law has not committed the infliction of that penalty to private persons, but to public persons, who hold the office deputed for this; moreover, a husband is not the judge of his wife, and therefore he cannot kill her, but only accuse her before the judge.

Reply Obj. 2: Civil law has not committed the execution of a wife to her husband as though commanding it (for if it were so, he would not be sinning, as neither does the minister of the court sin by executing a thief condemned to death), but it has permitted it, by not applying the penalty; for which reason civil law has also set forth certain obstacles by which men might be deterred from uxoricide.¹

Reply Obj. 3: From this fact it is not proved that it is allowed simply speaking, but only as regards immunity from a particular penalty; for excommunication is also a certain penalty.

Reply Obj. 4: There are two kinds of community. One is the domestic, like a family, and another is the political, like a city or kingdom. Therefore, the man who rules the second kind of community, such as a king or judge, can inflict a penalty both in order to correct a person and to expel for the purification of the community that he cares for. But that man who rules in the first kind of community, like the father of a family, can only inflict corrective punishment, which does not extend beyond the boundaries of reform, whereas the death penalty does cross these limits. And therefore, a husband, who is set over his wife in this way, cannot kill her, but only chastise her in other ways.

Reply Obj. 1: Homicide and adultery in certain cases impede marriage from being contracted and void the contract, as is here said of uxoricide, and as was said of adultery above in Distinction 35. Or it may be said that uxoricide is against the substance of the union, but adultery is against the good of fidelity owed it. And thus adultery is not more against marriage than uxoricide; and so the argument proceeds from false premises.

Reply Obj. 2: Simply speaking, it is a graver sin to kill one’s mother than one’s wife, and more against nature; for a man naturally reveres his mother, and therefore, he is less inclined to kill her, and more prone to killing his wife; and for the repression of this proneness the marriage of a wife-killer is forbidden by the Church.

Reply Obj. 3: Such a person does not sin against marriage as the man does who kills his wife; therefore, it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 4: It is not necessary that when guilt is blotted out, all penalty is blotted out as well, as is evident from the case of irregularity. For penance has not restored one to one’s original dignity, although it may restore one to a pristine state of grace, as was said above in Distinction 14.

Reply Obj. 1: To will something is not to vow, and therefore, an intention is not a vow, but only the announcement of that intention in the mode of a promise; and since an interior announcement is called the conception of the heart, consequently that definition includes that a vow is the conception of a good intended. If a vow were said to be an intention simply speaking, though, this would be to name it from its cause, since an intention is the principle of the vow; just as sometimes a desire itself is called a prayer, as was said above in Distinction 15.

Reply Obj. 2: A promise is sometimes made by the mouth and not by the heart, and such a thing is not a vow to God; and for this reason, it is fitting to add of one’s own will. And furthermore, although nothing is sufficient to compel a man to make a promise, simply speaking, he can nevertheless be compelled to make the external promise by a certain subtle pressure, just as he can be compelled to other external works of the will; but he cannot be compelled to make the interior promise, just as no one can be forced to faith. However, the Master is defining the vow that is pronounced externally, because it can impede marriage. For this is the vow he means here; and this vow is the evidence of an interior promise, not the interior promise itself.

Reply Obj. 4: A vow is only made to saints according as they are the mediators between us and God by their intercession, in the same way in which prayer is made to the saints; and therefore every vow is principally directed to God, even as is prayer.

Reply Obj. 5: That definition of the jurists is to be understood not as referring to any good whatsoever, but to that good which belongs to the religious life of piety; and this is of God, whether it be done toward one’s neighbor, as the closest matter, or toward oneself, or toward God.

Reply Obj. 6: Deliberation is included in bearing witness, as was said.

Reply Obj. 1: That promise of Jacob was more a certain recognition of an obligation rather than the cause of the obligation; and therefore it cannot be called a vow properly, but only in a broad sense. Or it could be said that the vow of Jacob was not concerning something that was of necessity, but rather it concerned worship in a special way by the construction of an altar;¹ and therefore, it had to do with a better good.

Reply Obj. 2: These kinds of promises made by women are more superstitions than vows, for they are a certain relic of idolatry, in the way that days and months were observed. And therefore they are not to be taken for vows, and the people vowing such things sin by doing so, since, as Jerome says, we should not even have words in common with infidels.¹

Reply Obj. 3: A vow, if it be about something that is simply evil, is only a vow equivocally speaking, and thus in no way does it bind. However, if it concerns something which could turn out good in one case and evil in another, if the vow is intended no matter what the outcome then it is imprudent; if, however, the one vowing intends it only as regards a good outcome, then it is prudent, and it would not oblige if there were an evil outcome. Thus, the vow of Jephthah was about something that in a certain case could have turned out well, namely if he were to encounter an animal for the sacrifice, and in another case it would not have been good, namely if he encountered an animal that was not for sacrificing. And since he vowed to do it in any event, the vow lacked discretion. Therefore, in his vow, as far as the taking of the vow goes, there is something praiseworthy, namely devotion, and faith by which he hoped for victory from God, and in this way it is said to be motivated by the Holy Spirit; but the specification of the vow was imprudent, and as for its execution, that deed was cruel, though it was a figure of something laudable. And thus, although the vow was in one way praiseworthy, the man himself is not excused from sin, since he was stupid in vowing it, and wicked in fulfilling it, as Jerome says.¹ Nevertheless, he is counted in the canon of saints because of the victory that he obtained from God, as is the case with other saints.

Reply Obj. 4: A vow which endangers the person is not a vow to be kept, since no one can vow something that endangers his own person, and therefore it is safer that in such matters the dispensation of the superior is sought; and if he should not give it, and the danger is imminent, a person should break the vow without compunction. Now a danger could be imminent either from infirmity or from poverty, as when someone does not have enough to eat except what he has vowed to abstain from.

Reply Obj. 1: By the very fact that a man serves his carnal lord, he serve his spiritual Lord; for which reason the Apostle teaches them to continue to serve for conscience’s sake.¹ And since this is of necessity, it cannot be impeded by what is not of necessity, just as neither can what falls under a command be removed by what falls under counsel.

Reply Obj. 2: By the fact that a man attains the age of puberty, he is not under the power of another as concerns what regards his own person, if he be of free condition. And therefore, just as such a person can contract marriage against his parents’ will, so also can he make a religious profession against their wishes; but as concerns domestic matters he cannot vow anything without the consent of his father.

Reply Obj. 3: Although a religious is not bound to obedience in all things that may be commanded of him, nevertheless he is bound to obedience at all times concerning those things that can be commanded of him, just as a slave is not exempt at any time from the service of his master; and therefore, they have no free time in which they may do whatever they like. And since every vow is to be completed in some amount of time, therefore just as a slave cannot take any vow, so neither may a religious take a vow without the consent of his superior.

Reply Obj. 4: In those matters in which a wife is bound to her husband, and vice versa, neither can make a vow without mutual consent, as is evident with the vow of continence. But since in the management of the household and in the management of daily life the wife is subject to the husband and not vice versa, the man can vow certain things without the consent of the wife, but not the reverse.

Reply Obj. 1: That argument follows concerning a division of the univocal; and this is not such a division.

Reply Obj. 2: A common vow is a certain singular act, and made by a singular person, and this is why it could not fittingly be called universal; but it is called common because of those things that it deals with, to which all men are bound.

Reply Obj. 3: The transgression of a common vow does not constitute a special sin, but it adds a special deformity to a sin: for a baptized person sins more greatly than a non-baptized in the same kind of sin, as is evident in Hebrews 10:29: how much worse punishment do you think will be deserved by the man who has spurned the Son of God, and profaned the blood of the covenant by which he was sanctified, and outraged the Spirit of grace? And therefore, it is not taken without reason, since it adds a certain obligation, as the written law adds a certain obligation above that of the natural law; and thus it does not constitute another sin, but it adds a new deformity.

Reply Obj. 4: That reasoning proceeds from vows about things that not all men are bound to. But by the fact that on behalf of the child the godfather takes a common vow, nothing is lost by the child, since he would be obliged to the same thing otherwise; nor is it a problem that it is a major obligation, since for him it is outweighed by the magnitude of benefits that it brings with it. For a child is caused no injury by someone accepting a benefit for him from another, to whom the child is afterward bound in service or in thanks when he himself arrives at the years of discretion.

Reply Obj. 1: A vow can be said to be public in two ways. In one way, per se, if it involves something that should come out in public, as for example when someone receives holy orders, through which he is constituted a minister of the Church for the public service of God. In another way, a vow can be public per accidens, as for example when it comes to the attention of many people. And since the judgment of a thing does not vary according to what is accidental to it, but according to what is per se, a vow that is public in the second way is considered the same as a private vow. But a vow that is public in the first way is distinguished from private vows; and this is a solemn vow.

Reply Obj. 2: The division described is taken from those things that are essential to a vow. For what is essential to a vow is what gives it the power of obligating. Therefore, it is not true that they oblige equally in every way, neither before God, nor before men; but they do oblige equally in a certain way, as will be said.

Reply Obj. 3: The progress from imperfect to perfect is a natural order, for which reason a progress is also made from one part to another in potestative wholes, as an embryo has a vegetative soul in a certain way before the sensible soul, and a sensible soul before a rational one; and similarly, it is not unfitting that the same vow should be first private, and public afterwards.

Reply Obj. 4: Marriage and the other sacraments have their full effect even when those things that pertain to the solemnity of the sacrament are omitted, because they have efficacy from divine power, not human institution. But because a vow obligates through that which is from man, it does not have the perfect force of obligating unless the due solemnity is employed. Therefore, a vow is distinguished as solemn and not solemn, but this is not true of marriage or any other sacrament.

Reply Obj. 1: Since the solemnity of the vow comes from the fact that the thing itself is given, by which the promise is fulfilled, when something to be accomplished temporally is promised it cannot be a solemn vow, like the vow to make a pilgrimage or something like this. Nor is it a problem that solemnity is considered a difference of vows taken commonly; for the rational soul, in which the account of life exists perfectly, is not in every living thing, even though ‘rational’ is considered a difference of ‘animal’ simply speaking.

Reply Obj. 2: There are two kinds of religious habits: one kind is given to unprofessed religious, and another is given to professed religious. And if in certain religious orders the same habit is given to both, nevertheless it is customary for the habit to be blessed in formal profession; and a habit blessed in this way is considered as if it were a different thing altogether. Therefore, the first habit does not suffice for solemnizing the vow, even a vow already taken; but the reception of the second habit solemnizes the vow, since there is a certain profession presumed; against which presumption no evidence is admitted, if the due circumstances are observed (e.g., the habit is given by someone who may give it, and before a multitude of brethren). For if someone in his own house received such a habit, he would not because of that be presumed to have solemnized his vow; and therefore, the reception of the habit should not be considered another cause of solemnity, since it does not solemnize a vow except insofar as his profession is presumed with certainty.

Reply Obj. 3: Before those rules that now exist, there was some mode of living approved by the Church, by which some people obligated themselves to those things which are supererogatory; and in those days the obligation of living in another way for a certain time was made in the same way as now the obligation is made according to a certain rule.

Reply Obj. 4: That vow is called private not because it comes under the notice of few people, but because it does not involve anything that would necessitate its being brought out in public. But if a person who makes his profession in secret, for example, makes his vow in his own home to the one who could receive his profession, then he does make a vow that must be brought out in public since he must leave his secular life and live in the cloister with the others of his order.

Reply Obj. 1: Anything that would impede a vow from being made if it were present, also removes the obligation from a vow that has been made. So, since there cannot be a vow concerning the impossible, as was said, if something which previously had been possible becomes impossible after the vow has been made, the obligation of the vow is removed as far as that thing is concerned. For example, if someone rich vowed to build a church, which afterward he could not accomplish because he fell into poverty, he would not be obliged to fulfill this vow. But nonetheless, in this matter two distinctions must be made. In one way, since either he has become unable to fulfill the vow at all, and then he is simply not bound to what he vowed; or else he has become unable to complete it in its entirety, but not incapable of completing a part of it; and then he remains obliged to do what he can. In another way it must be distinguished whether he incurred this incapacity by his own fault, for then it would be necessary for him to make up for it by penance; or if not by his own fault, and then he is not bound to any reparation. Therefore, if a woman who vowed virginity loses her virginity, although she cannot offer her virginity, yet she can offer continence; and she remains obliged to this, and beyond this, to grieving in penance, by which she atones to God for her lost virginity: because, indeed, even if it is not worth the same, simply speaking, it is nevertheless equivalent according to the consideration of God, who does not demand from anyone beyond what he can do.

Reply Obj. 2: Although deliberation may be a variable cause, nonetheless the rectitude of the natural law, which dictates that what is promised to God must be kept, is invariable; and this gives to the vow the necessary obligation.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as an oath which tends toward a worse result is not to be kept, so neither is a vow. For this reason Isidore says: in a base vow change your resolution;¹ for a vow does not extend to illicit things, or even to less good things, as has been said. Nor does it matter whether it was illicit when the vow was taken, or whether it became so afterward.

Reply Obj. 4: What is vowed under a certain condition is not vowed simply; and therefore it does not oblige unless that condition stands.

Reply Obj. 5: An implicit vow obliges just as a spoken vow does. Therefore if someone remained in a monastery after a trial period, he would be obliged by an implicit vow; unless perhaps for some reason it was extended a year for him, or they were accustomed to extend it for others. For then he does not make an implicit vow beyond the current year; and such a person who made an implicit vow is bound to the three principal vows of religious life in every case. But as to the other observances, whose transgression is caused by the dissembling of prelates, who seem to give permission when they see but do not correct, the one who made an implicit vow does not seem to be obliged, and particularly if he is a simple person, who does not know how to discern such things adequately.

Reply Obj. 6: The obligation of a vow is caused by one’s own will; and so, if in vowing one has first thought about entering religious life, and afterward he has chosen this religious order or that place, he is obliged to religious life, simply. Therefore, if he is unable to be received into those places that he has chosen, he should seek another. If though, first and principally, he thought about this order or that place, then this condition of whether they want to receive him is understood in his vow, otherwise it would be an imprudent vow. Then if the condition is not fulfilled, he is not obliged. If, however, he is unsure of how he stands with vowing, then he should choose the safer way, lest he commit himself to his own peril.

Reply Obj. 7: When someone has vowed, for example, that he would enter religious life, if he intended to oblige himself to it immediately, or to the judgment of another, he cannot longer defer even because of outstanding debts; but the one who receives him is bound to settle them. However, if in vowing he was thinking about his debts, it can be probably presumed that he did not intend to oblige himself before he had disposed of his affairs. However, when he has a reasonable fear that the impediment will be perpetual, he is not bound to defer further.

Reply Obj. 1: A vow is a stronger bond than marriage in both the one to whom it is made and what it binds to, since by marriage a man is bound to his wife for the rendering of the debt, but by a vow he is bound to God in continence. However, as to the mode of binding, marriage is a stronger bond than a simple vow, since in marriage a man is actually handed over to the power of his wife, but not in a simple vow, as was said. For the claim of the one in possession is always stronger.¹ But as far as the manner of binding is concerned, a simple vow obligates in a similar way as a betrothal, which is why a betrothal is invalidated by a simple vow.

Reply Obj. 2: The impediment of consanguinity does not have the effect of invalidating marriage from the fact that it is a command of God or of the Church, but from the fact that the body of one blood relative cannot pass into the power of another. However, the command prohibiting marriage after a simple vow does not do this, as is clear from what has been said; and therefore, the argument does not follow, for it cites as the cause what is not a cause.

Reply Obj. 3: The person who contracts marriage by words of the present after taking a simple vow cannot know his wife carnally without mortal sin; for the possibility of fulfilling his vow of continence still remains to him before the consummation of the marriage, as is clear from what has been said above, Distinction 27, Question 2, Article 3, Quaestiuncula 2. But after the marriage has already been consummated, it becomes illicit for him not to render the debt to his wife when she demands it, although by his own fault; and therefore the obligation of the vow does not extend to this, as is clear from what was said above; nevertheless, grieving in repentance should make up for the continence that was not preserved.

Reply Obj. 4: When someone has not been rendered unable to preserve his vow of continence, he is obliged to observe it even after the marriage contract; on account of which he is bound to be totally continent at the death of his wife; and since he is not obliged by the marriage bond to request the debt, therefore he cannot request the debt without sin, although he could render the debt to a spouse who demands it without sin, after he is obliged to this by the preceding physical intimacy. However, one must take into account whether the wife requests expressly or implicitly, as when the woman is bashful, and the man senses her wish for the rendering of the debt, for then he can render the debt without sin, and particularly if he fears a danger to her chastity. Nor is it a problem that they are not then equals in the matrimonial act, for anyone can renounce what is his own. Nevertheless, certain people say that he can both request and render, lest a marriage be made exceedingly burdensome for the wife who is always having to demand the debt. But if it is looked at correctly, this is to demand implicitly.

Reply Obj. 1: With respect to God a simple vow is said to obligate one not less than a solemn vow in those matters which regard God, as separation from God is mortal sin; for he sins mortally who breaks a simple vow, just as he who breaks a solemn one, although it may be a more serious sin to break a solemn one, so that in this way the comparison is taken generically, not by a specific amount of culpability (reatus). But as concerns marriage, through which a human is obliged to a human, it is not fitting that there be equal obligation also generically; for a solemn vow obliges one to certain things, not a simple one.

Reply Obj. 2: An oath obliges more than a vow on the part of the one by whom the obligation is made; but a solemn vow obliges more as concerns the mode of obligating, inasmuch as it actually hands over what is promised, which is not done through an oath; and therefore the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3: A solemn vow carries the actual handing over of one’s own body, which a simple vow does not carry, as is clear from what has been said; and therefore this argument proceeds on insufficient grounds.

Reply Obj. 1: A person is obliged to those things that fall under a common vow not only by the vow, but also by natural law, and by divine precept; and consequently in this regard it cannot have a dispensation like other vows.

Reply Obj. 2: To keep a vow while the obligation of the vow endures belongs to natural law; but when the obligation of the vow ceases, keeping it is not of natural law. But this obligation ceases either on its own, as when keeping it tends toward a worse outcome, and then if there is an opportunity to ask a superior then by his declaration the observance of the vow should be foregone; or else the obligation ceases by the authority of a superior, who judges something else more necessary, and gives a dispensation from the vow. Nor in this is a man guilty of lying who does not keep a vow in such a case: for a man should have worthy conditions added concerning the future, either explicitly or implicitly, as is evident from James 5.¹

Reply Obj. 3: Concerning the vow of continence there are two opinions.¹

Reply Obj. 4: But since the reasons given to the contrary do not proceed rightly, therefore it should be said to the fourth objection that the good of continence is much nobler than bodily health; and therefore the danger of bodily death is not a sufficient reason for giving a dispensation from a vow of continence. And this is also why a person does not sin who finds himself in such a case that his vowed continence endangers his person, especially when he could avoid that danger by other remedies; just as he does not sin who because of some work of virtue exposes himself to the danger of death.

Reply Obj. 5: With those who are promoted from the state of religious life to the state of the prelature a dispensation is not given from the principal vows of religious life: for those things which they are said to possess, they possess not in their own name but in the name of the Church, so nothing in their vow of poverty is prejudiced by this. Likewise also not in the vow of obedience, since obedience is directed to the state of prelature in another whom one is bound to obey. And therefore, if the man who ceases to be under a prelate is not bound to obey anyone, it is not because the obligation of the vow is lacking on his part, but because there is no longer any prelate for him to obey. Thus if a monk who promises obedience to an abbot is himself made abbot, he is not bound to obey another abbot, since he no longer has an abbot.

Reply Obj. 1: Not everything that is beneficial to a subject can be applied to him by any prelate, but the greater things are reserved to the greater ones; just as not every doctor can cure every sickness, but in the more dangerous illnesses, more experienced doctors are required.

Reply Obj. 2: Although all are dispensers of the mysteries of God, yet they are not all equally so; and therefore it is not fitting that all should be able to give dispensations in all things.

Reply Obj. 1: The animal of sacrifice was designated by the vow itself for the worship of God; and therefore it was somehow already sacred, and because of this it could not be reduced to common uses. And likewise, if someone now vows to enter religious life, he cannot put someone else into religious life in his place; and similarly, if he vows to go to the Holy Land, he cannot send someone else in his place, except by the dispensation of his superior. However, it is otherwise in other vows, in which a specific person is not designated for a special act of worship of God.

Reply Obj. 2: Bernard speaks as one giving counsel: since sometimes because of the lightness of their souls certain people pass into another state under the appearance of a life of greater strictness; and therefore it is safer that it be done by counsel and permission of the superior prelate—particularly if he does not believe that his superior would unreasonably present an impediment.

Reply Obj. 1: The vow to go to the Holy Land obliges a man to the service of God temporally, and concerns a determined time; but the vow of religious life concerns all things, and according to all time, and therefore it is in a certain way more an enlargement of the vow rather than a commutation.

Reply Obj. 2: Since by entering religious life a man dies to his prior life, he is not bound to discharge those unfulfilled vows that he vowed in secular life, by the fact that he enters religion, and particularly since singularity among religious is dangerous, and the burden of religious life makes it more difficult to keep the vow than when he was in secular life. However, certain people say that he should explain to his prelate, and the prelate could give a dispensation once he has considered the conditions of the person and of the vow. But according to others this is not required, since by the very force of the vow of religious life he is absolved from his prior vows, for the reasons stated.

Reply Obj. 3: A perpetual vow regards all time, and therefore there does not remain some time after its fulfillment in which another temporal vow could be completed, as time remains for fulfilling a vow of greater duration after a vow of lesser duration; and because of this, it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 1: The Church stands in the spiritual marriage as a bride, but Christ as the Bridegroom; yet by the vow of continence the soul is espoused to Christ, and this is why it is not fitting that this espousal be signified in a man, but only in a woman.

Reply Obj. 2: In the consecration of virgins, as in the anointing of kings and in other benedictions of this kind, grace is given, unless there be an impediment on the part of the one receiving; but nevertheless things of this kind are not said to be sacraments, since they were not instituted for curing the disease of sin, like the other sacraments.

Reply Obj. 3: In the reception of Holy Orders someone is not consecrated as a bridegroom, but as the minister of the bridegroom; and so virginity is not required for signifying the integrity of spiritual matrimony, as it is required in the veiling of the woman who is consecrated as the bride.

Reply Obj. 4: Those women who are corrupted through violence, if they do not consent in any way, do not lose the glory of virginity in the sight of God. But since it is extremely difficult that in such pleasure some impulse of enjoyment does not surge forth, therefore the Church, which cannot judge interior matters, does not veil a woman among virgins when she has been externally corrupted. For which reason Pope Leo says: those servants of God who have lost the integrity of their chastity by barbaric oppression will be more greatly praiseworthy in their humility and modesty, if they do not dare to unite themselves with uncontaminated virgins.¹

Reply Obj. 5: Those women who have been corrupted secretly, whether by men, or in another way, are in no way to be veiled; for the sacraments or sacramentals of the Church should not be changed for the sake of avoiding scandal. But as some people say, some caution can be employed for avoiding scandal, that namely those things may be done which are not of the substance of virginal veiling (like the lighting of candles, and other things like this), with those things that are of the substance of virginal veiling being secretly changed, for instance, the word ‘virginity’ being changed into ‘chastity.’

Reply Obj. 1: In a corporeal stumbling there are two things to consider, namely, the very stumbling of the one who falls or of the one who is disposed to fall, and the thing on which he stumbles, which is called a stumbling-block. So it is also in spiritual matters. And both of these things are called ‘scandal,’ but not univocally, just as faith is said of both the very thing believed and of the act of believing. Therefore, the spiritual stumbling by which someone is disposed to fall is called passive scandal. But the spiritual stumbling-block which occasions the stumbling is called active scandal. And this is the way scandal is defined here, for by a word or a deed that is not quite right, someone is disposed to ruin.

Reply Obj. 2: A person commits a certain sin, speaking per se, when he acts intentionally, and not when a sin happens without his intention, as is clear in accidental homicide; and therefore a person commits scandal, properly speaking, when he intends to bring about the ruin of his neighbor. But whoever is led into sinning is deceived: for every wicked man is ignorant, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3.¹ And therefore wherever there is scandal, speaking per se, the word or deed that is not quite right is a kind of deception, which is put before someone walking, for his ruin. Or it may be said that it is called a deception inasmuch as it is the occasion or the cause of deception: for everyone sinning is deceived, as was said.

Reply Obj. 3: A spiritual stumbling block, which is called scandal, must be thrown into the path of the one walking, which happens when it comes to his notice. However, the sin of the heart can only come to the notice of another by some sign, which is reducible to a sin of mouth or of deed; and thus in the definition of scandal is included only saying or doing something not quite right, and no mention is made of the sin of the heart.

Reply Obj. 4: ‘Occasion’ does not always mean cause, but sometimes it means a cause that is insufficient in itself; and this is how it is taken in the foregoing definition. For a sin, because it is voluntary, cannot have any sufficient cause from outside. But it can have some inducing cause: and this cause indeed is sometimes per se such as to incline to sin either by its own genus or by the intention of the one who sets it forth in order to induce someone to sin; and then it is said to give an occasion of ruin. But when a person is inclined to sin by something incidental, which in itself is not such as to incline to it, as it also happens in physical things that someone stumbles on a flat road and falls; then that person is said to have taken up an occasion of ruin, though no occasion was given to him from outside. But such a cause of ruin cannot be named scandal; for although the names of a cause are sometimes allotted by its essential effects, they are never customarily taken from things that result accidentally.

Reply Obj. 5: Christ is not said to be a rock of scandal as though he were per se a cause of scandal, for he himself did not give anyone an occasion of scandal; but he is said to be a rock of scandal in such a way that the proposition conveys not an order of causality but a consequence; for from the things that Christ did, the scandalizing of the Jews did result.

Reply Obj. 1: There are two kinds of necessity. One necessity is absolute: either something is necessary in itself, as it is necessary for God to exist; or by the force of some external cause, as something violent is called necessary, and in this way it is not necessary that scandals happen. The other is conditional necessity, which is not opposed to the voluntary; and in this way it is necessary for scandals to come by conditional necessity, for three reasons. First, by divine foreknowledge and predestination itself, as we say, “It is necessary for this to be, if God foresaw it.” And such necessity is not opposed to the freedom of the will. Therefore Chrysostom says about that text, although it is called ‘necessary,’ it does not destroy the spontaneity of the power, nor the freedom of choosing. His prediction does not therefore introduce scandals, nor does this happen because he predicted it; but he predicted it because it was to be.¹ Second, by the inclination of the fomes, as also we say that sinning venially is necessary, although it may be possible to avoid each particular venial sin. Third, by consequent usefulness, which God draws out of scandals, as all useful things are called necessary.

Reply Obj. 2: According to that Gloss it seems that Peter did not sin in wanting to prevent the Passion of Christ: for it was possible for someone to be laudibly pleased and displeased by the Passion of Christ according to different aspects; and there scandal is taken broadly for any impediment presented to someone on any path that he intends to follow.

Reply Obj. 3: Speaking per se, active scandal is a greater sin than passive, for in any genus, a cause is more powerful than its effect. Nevertheless, sometimes the passive thing can be greater than the active, when someone takes more occasion for ruin than is given to him; just as also sometimes there is passive sin without the sin of an agent. But what Jerome says is to be understood as to the genus of sin, and not as to the amount of culpability. And yet the other proposition is false, that passive scandal is not a sin: for that spiritual stumbling itself is a certain sin, inasmuch as it is a holding back from the way of God; and although it may be called passive scandal, nevertheless it is not passive in every way, but somewhat active. For a sufficient cause for sinning cannot be given to another from outside, as though forcing him to sin; the one who is scandalized cooperates with the one acting, and thus he sins.

Reply Obj. 1: The sin of active scandal is found sometimes separate from every other species of sin, because it consists in an external act; so that when an external act would not be a sin in itself, except, inasmuch as it has a certain likeness to a sin, it is bound to give the occasion of ruin if it is done publicly, like eating the food of idols.¹ And for this reason it does not also say in the definition of scandal, saying or doing something evil, but rather not quite right. And thus it is clear that the objection proceeds from false premises.

Reply Obj. 2: That argument arises from the side of the habits eliciting, not the habit commanding.

Reply Obj. 3: This circumstance in the presence of another does not add to a sin a new species by its own nature, but by the end to which it is orderable by such a circumstance. Therefore also, to sin in secret does not draw the sin into another species, since by this it does not receive an order to another end.

Reply Obj. 4: The one who is scandalized both acts and is acted upon, but his action does not pertain to the genus of scandal, but to some other genus; only his being acted upon pertains to the genus of scandal. And since no one sins in what he suffers, but only in what he does, for this reason passive scandal is not counted as a specific sin, like active scandal, which belongs to the genus of scandal by the action itself.

Reply Obj. 1: The Lord speaks of active scandal, which is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 2: The one who gives scandal does not always take away spiritual life, for sometimes his deed is not in itself such as to lead anyone into mortal sin, even if someone happens to tumble into mortal sin from it by his own fault. And furthermore, whoever takes away bodily life gives sufficient cause of natural death, but someone who gives scandal does not give sufficient cause for spiritual death, as was said.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ said to Peter: you are a stumbling-block to me, not because he had been scandalized by his deed, but because Peter, as far as in him lay, gave scandal to him in some way.

Reply Obj. 2: Speaking grammatically, every active corresponds to a passive, for the grammarian does not consider the substance of the action, but its mode of signifying. And every active verb signifies an action as crossing over into something else. But considering the substance of the action, sometimes the action goes out from the agent, and does not extend to a ‘patient’—because it has the ability to receive the effect of the agent or not to receive it, or because of some impediment interfering. Therefore, speaking with regard to reality, the active does not correspond to a passive in all actions that terminate in something outside the agent, such as are striking, killing, scandalizing, and such things. But to love and to know are interior acts of the soul, which do not go out to an outside reality except as it exists somehow within the agent himself; and thus in such things, even speaking with regard to reality, the active does always correspond to a passive.

Reply Obj. 3: Although a perfect man sometimes may commit some venial sin even by choice, or deliberately; nevertheless, he does not choose to follow someone into even venial sin, for that is an extremely light reason for sinning. But sometimes, moved by another cause, he commits a venial sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Because some people took the occasion of ruin from the deeds or sayings of Christ, he is said to be for their ruin and scandal, not because he gave any even slight occasion of ruin; and this is why we do not read that Christ scandalized others, but that some people were scandalized by his deeds and words.

Reply Obj. 2: According to Augustine, in the truth of the matter Peter was to be blamed for that deed, not because he acted wickedly, but because he acted unwisely; and thus according to this view it is not unfitting to say that he sinned venially in scandalizing.¹ But how Jerome excuses Peter even from venial sin was said above.²

Reply Obj. 1: In perfect men there is some disposition preventing passive scandal in themselves, but in imperfect men there is nothing to prevent active scandal. And therefore the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 2: Active scandal does not consist only in provoking another to sin by example, but in giving an occasion of ruin to another in any way. But it is evident that any imperfect person can give the occasion of ruin to another either by persuasive words or by provoking him to impatience by unjust persecutions. And thus there is no doubt that an imperfect man can scandalize. But the claim that an imperfect man does not scandalize by the mode of example is also false: for God has committed to each man the care of his neighbor, as is clear from Sirach 17:12; and thus everyone is obliged to edify his neighbor by his example. Also, we know from experience that many are enticed to sin by the example of those who are not in the state of perfection: for not only the examples of the great, but even those of one’s equals and lessers are apt to move one.