Quodlibet X
Disputed Questions
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Quodlibet X
Quodlibetal Questions X
QXDe Deo, angelo et anima
On God, an Angel, and the Soul
De Deo
On God
Q. 1On GodDe Deo
Quaesitum est de Deo, angelo et anima.
There were questions concerning God,1 angels,2 and the soul.3
QX.Q1De Deo quaesita sunt tria:
Concerning God, there were three questions:
primo de eius unitate;
first, concerning his unity;
QX.Q1secundo de eius iudicio;
second, concerning his judgment;
QX.Q1tertio de eius sacramento.
third, concerning his sacrament.
QX.Q1A. 1On his unityDe eius unitate
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unitas aliquid positive dicat in divinis, et non remotive tantum secundum opinionem Magistri.
To the first we proceed thus. As the Master says, it seems that unity names something positive, not only negative, in divine matters.1
QX.Q1.A1.arg1Ex privationibus enim non constituitur res aliqua; sed ex unitatibus constituitur numerus, qui est res aliqua cum sit species quantitatis; ergo unitas non dicitur secundum privationem tantum.
Obj. 1: For nothing is constituted out of privations. But out of unities1 is constituted number, which is something since it is a species of quantity.2 Therefore, unity is not said only of privation.
QX.Q1.A1.arg2Praeterea. Numerus sequitur distinctionem; si igitur unitas et numerus in divinis non dicerent rem aliquam, non esset in divinis realis distinctio, quod est heresis Sabellianae.
Obj. 2: Number follows distinction. If, therefore, unity and number in divine matters were not to name anything, there would not be real distinction in divine matters, which belongs to the Sabellian heresy.1
QX.Q1.A1.arg3Praeterea. Si unitas et numerus in divinis dicuntur solummodo remotive, per unitatem autem nihil aliud videtur removeri quam numerus nec per numerum aliud quam unitas, sequetur quod utrumque istorum in divinis dicatur secundum negationem negationis; sed negatio negationis non est nisi secundum rationem tantum; ergo unitas et numerus non essent realiter in divinis, quod est inconveniens; et sic unum et numerus aliquid positive dicunt in divinis.
Obj. 3: If unity and number in divine matters were said only negatively, yet through unity nothing else seems to be removed than number, nor through number anything else than unity, it follows that both of those in divine matters are said according to the negation of a negation. But the negation of a negation only exists in the mind. Therefore, unity and number would not be really in divine matters, which is unfitting. And thus, one and number name something positive in divine matters.
QX.Q1.A1.arg4Sed contra. Omne quod praedicatur de aliquo, praedicatur de eo secundum propriam rationem; sed ratio unius in negatione consistit: est enim unum quod non dividitur, secundum Philosophum; ergo de Deo praedicatur per remotionem tantum.
On the contrary (1): Everything which is predicated of something is predicated of it with its own meaning; but the meaning of one consists in negation: for one is that which is not divided, according to the Philosopher.1 Therefore, of God it is predicated through removal only.
QX.Q1.A1.scPraeterea. Secundum Philosophum in X Metaphysicae, unum et multa opponuntur sicut privatio et habitus; privatio autem dicitur per remotionem tantum; ergo unum, quod inter praedicta duo tenet locum privationis, dicitur per remotionem tantum.
Furthermore (2): According to the Philosopher in the tenth book of the Metaphysics, one and many are opposed just as privation and having.1 Yet privation is only through removal. Therefore, one, which between the aforesaid two holds the place of privation, is only through removal.
QX.Q1.A1.arg5Praeterea. Unum supra ens non addit aliquid secundum rem, quia sic res non esset una per suam essentiam; addit igitur aliquid secundum rationem tantum; sed quod est secundum rationem tantum vel est negatio vel relatio; cum igitur unum supra ens non addat aliquam relationem, quia ad aliquid non dicitur, videtur quod addat negationem.
Furthermore (3): One does not add over being anything according to the thing, because thus the thing would not be one through its essence. Therefore, it adds something according to the mind only. But that which is according to the mind only is either a negation or a relation. Since, therefore, one does not add some relation over being, because it is not said unto something, it seems that it adds negation.
QX.Q1.A1.arg6Responsio. Dicendum quod unum quod est principium numeri de necessitate aliquid positive dicit in eo cui attribuitur, quia, cum ex unitatibus numerus constituatur, nisi unitas res aliqua esset, numerus res esse non posset, et sic non posset poni in aliquo genere tanquam species.
I answer that the “one” which is a principle of number necessarily says something positively about that to which it is attributed, because, since number is constituted out of unities, unless unity were something, number could not be a thing, and thus it could not be put in any genus as a species.
QX.Q1.A1.coSi ergo unum quod convertitur cum ente sit idem quod unum quod est principium numeri, oportet quod etiam unum quod convertitur cum ente aliquid positive superaddat enti. Et hoc concedit Avicenna; unde vult quod unum quod convertitur cum ente addat supra ens aliquid quod ad genus mensurae pertineat. Sed hoc non potest esse, quia, cum unum quod convertitur cum ente de qualibet re dicatur, oportet quod etiam res illa quam addit unum supra ens sit una, et sic vel erit una per aliquam unitatem additam et ita erit processus in infinitum, vel erit una per essentiam suam, quod si est, standum est in primo, ut scilicet ens ipsum dicamus unum per essentiam suam, non per aliquam rem additam.
Therefore, if the one which is interchangeable with being is the same as the one which is a principle of number, it is necessary also for the one which is interchangeable with being to add something positively over being. And Avicenna concedes this; hence he says that the one which is interchangeable with being adds over being something which pertains to the genus of measure.1 But this cannot be, because, since the one which is interchangeable with being is said of whatever thing, it is necessary also for the thing which adds one over being to be one. And thus, either it will be one through some added unity, and thus there will be a progression into the infinite, or it will be one through its essence, which if it is, must stand in the first place, namely, so that we call being itself one through its essence, not through something added.2
QX.Q1.A1Sic ergo intelligendum est, secundum opinionem Aristotilis et Commentatoris eius, quod unum quod convertitur cum ente non superaddit enti rem aliquam, sed solum negationem divisionis, et sic huiusmodi unum et ponit aliquid in quantum in suo intellectu includit ens, et dicitur remotive tantum, quantum ad id quod superaddit enti. Unum vero quod est principium numeri, quod superaddit enti aliquid de genere mensurae, et similiter numerus cuius est principium, inveniuntur tantum in rebus habentibus dimensionem, quia talis numerus causatur ex divisione continui; et hic numerus, scilicet ex divisione continui causatus, est subiectum arithmeticae, etiam secundum Avicennam.
Thus, therefore, it must be understood, according to the opinion of Aristotle and his Commentator,1 that the one which is interchangeable with being does not add anything over being, but only a negation of division, and thus a one of this sort both posits something inasmuch as it includes being in its understanding, and is said negatively only, as regards that which it adds over being. Whereas the one which is a principle of number, which adds over being something from the genus of measure, and similarly the number of which it is a principle, are found only in things having dimension, because such number is caused from the division of a continuous thing;2 and this number, that which is caused from the division of a continuous thing, is the subject of arithmetic, according to Avicenna.
QX.Q1.A1Nulla autem conditio propria rei corporali potest dici de Deo aut de aliqua substantia spirituali. Unde, secundum hoc, unum et numerus quae continentur in genere quantitatis non dicuntur de Deo et aliis substantiis incorporeis, sed solum unum quod convertitur cum ente et multitudo ei opposita. Et ideo unitas in divinis non dicitur nisi remotive, quantum ad id quod superaddit enti, quamvis ponat aliquid, secundum quod includit ens: est enim unum ens indivisum.
Yet no proper condition of a bodily thing can be said of God or of any spiritual substance. Hence, according to this, the one and number which are contained in the genus of quantity are not said of God and other incorporeal substances, but only the one which is interchangeable with being and the multitude opposed to it. And for this reason, unity in divine matters is only said negatively, as regards that which it adds over being, although it posits something insofar as it includes being: for one is being undivided.
QX.Q1.A1Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de uno quod est principium numeri.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that that objection proceeds from the one which is a principle of number.
QX.Q1.A1.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectio illa procederet, si nullo modo unum et numerus aliquid ponerent realiter in divinis, ponunt autem rem distinctam vel indistinctam quantum ad hoc quod ens includitur in ratione unius, ut dictum est.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that that objection would proceed if in no way one and number were to posit something really in divine matters. Yet they do posit a thing distinct or indistinct as far as this: that being is included in the meaning of one, as has been said.
QX.Q1.A1.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod in ratione multitudinis includitur negatio rei, sed in ratione unius negatio negationis et rei simul. Quod sic patet. Unum enim est quod non dividitur; divisio autem quae negatur per unum quod convertitur cum ente, oportet quod sit talis quod in omni divisione salvetur; haec autem est divisio per affirmationem et negationem; et ideo huius divisionis negatio constituit rationem unius: est enim unum quod non dividitur tali divisione quod sit in eo accipere hoc et non hoc; et sic unum, in quantum negat affirmationem et negationem simul <esse>, est negatio rei et negationis simul. Praedicta vero divisio includitur in ratione multitudinis, et sic includitur ibi negatio rei, quia “multa” sunt quae sic dividuntur quod eorum unum non est alterum.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that the meaning of multitude includes the negation of a thing, but the meaning of one includes the negation of a negation and of a thing simultaneously. The following makes this clear. For one is that which is not divided. Yet it is necessary for the division which is negated through the one which is interchangeable with being to be such that it is saved in every division; yet this is division through affirmation and negation. And for this reason, a negation of this division constitutes the meaning of one: for one is that which is not divided by such a division that there can be in it to receive this and not this. And thus one, inasmuch as it denies that an affirmation and a negation simultaneously exist, is a negation of a thing and of a negation simultaneously. Whereas the aforesaid division is included in the meaning of multitude, and thus the negation of a thing is included there because “many” are those which are so divided that one of them is not another.1
QX.Q1.A1.ad3A. 2On his judgmentDe eius iudicio
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus non sit descensurus in terram ad iudicium.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that Christ will not descend to the earth at the judgment.
QX.Q1.A2.arg1Quia super illud Psalmi: Dominus in templo sancto suo etc., dicit Glossa quod Deus in caelo sedens de bonis et malis iudicat; ergo iudicium non erit futurum in terra, sed in caelo.
Obj. 1: Because on that line of the Psalm: the Lord in his holy temple (Ps 11:4 [10:5]), the Gloss says that God sitting in heaven judges concerning good men and bad.1 Therefore, judgment will not be on earth, but in heaven.
QX.Q1.A2.arg2Praeterea. Ad dignitatem iudicis pertinet quod iudicandi ad eum accedant et non e converso; sed Christus est dignissimus index, cuius locus est caelum; ergo homines in caelum ascendent ut ibi iudicentur, non autem ipse in terram descendet homines iudicaturus.
Obj. 2: It pertains to the dignity of a judge for those to be judged to approach unto him and not conversely. But Christ is the worthiest judge, whose place is heaven. Therefore, men will ascend into heaven to be judged there, and he will not descend to the earth to judge men.
QX.Q1.A2.arg3Praeterea. Si iudicium sit in terra futurum, praecipue videtur quod sit futurum in valle Iosaphat, ut habetur Ioelis III; sed locus ille non posset tantam multitudinem hominum capere, et sic non est ibi futurum iudicium; ergo in nullo loco terrae futurum est.
Obj. 3: If judgment will be on earth, it especially seems that it will be in the valley of Josaphat, as is said in Joel 3:2. But that place could not hold so great a multitude of men,1 and thus judgment will not be there. Therefore, it will be in no place of earth.
QX.Q1.A2.arg4Sed contra est quod dicitur I Thessalonicensium IV: ipse Dominus in iussu et in voce archangeli et in tuba Dei descendet de caelo; et ita videtur quod iudicium in terra non in caelo sit futurum.
On the contrary (1): It is said in 1 Thessalonians 4:16: the Lord himself at the command and at the voice of an archangel and at the trumpet of God shall descend from heaven. And thus, it seems that judgment will be on earth, not in heaven.
QX.Q1.A2.scPreterea. In iudicio comparebunt non solum electi, sed etiam reprobi, qui habebunt corpora grossa et gravia, et sic non competet eis locus caelestis, sed terrestris; ergo iudicium non est futurum in caelo, sed in terra.
Furthermore (2): In judgment there will be compared not only the elect, but also the reprobate, who will have gross and heavy bodies, and thus a heavenly place would not be fit for them, but an earthly one.1 Therefore, judgment will not be in heaven, but on earth.
QX.Q1.A2Responsio. Dicendum quod iudicium ordinatur ad retributionem praemiorum, unde secundum duplex praemium, scilicet animae et corporis, est duplex Dei iudicium: unum quo beatificat vel damnat homines quo ad animam, et hoc iudicium per totum tempus agitur; aliud est iudicium quo praemiabuntur vel punientur homines etiam quantum ad corpora, et istud iudicium fiet post resurrectionem in fine temporis. Primum autem iudicium convenit Christo ratione divinitatis, sed secundum ratione humanitatis, quia, sicut dicit Augustinus super Iohannem, Verbum Dei vivificat animas, sed Verbum caro factum vivificat corpora; unde etiam Iohannis V dicitur: potestatem dedit ei iudicium facere, quia Filius hominis est. Sic ergo ultimum iudicium est futurum in loco qui Christo competit ratione suae humanitatis, scilicet circa terram illam ubi natus est et passus et reliqua humanitatis complevit officia. Propter quod dicitur quod in valle Iosaphat iudicium est futurum, quia vallis illa subiacet monti Oliveti, unde Christus ascendit in caelum, ut sic ostendatur idem esse qui ascendit regnaturus et qui descendet iudicaturus, secundum illud Actuum I: quemadmodum vidistis eum ascendentem in caelum, ita veniet.
I answer that judgment is ordered to the retribution of rewards. Hence there is a twofold judgment of God according to a twofold reward, namely, of soul and of body. One is that by which he beatifies or damns men in regard to the soul, and this judgment is done through the whole of time. The other is the judgment by which men will be rewarded or punished even as regards their bodies, and that judgment will be made after the resurrection at the end of time. The first judgment befits Christ by reason of divinity, but the second by reason of humanity, because, just as Augustine says in his commentary on John, the Word of God vivifies souls, but the Word made flesh vivifies bodies;1 hence also in John 5:27 it is said: he gave power to him to make judgment, because he is the Son of man. Thus, therefore, the last judgment will be in the place which fits Christ by reason of his humanity, namely, around that land where he was born and suffered and completed the rest of the offices of humanity. On account of this it is said that the judgment will be in the valley of Josaphat, because that valley lies under Mount Olivet, where Christ ascended into heaven, so that it thus will be shown that he who ascended to reign is the same as he who will descend to judge, according to Acts 1:11: in which way you have seen him ascending into heaven, so he shall come.2
QX.Q1.A2.coAd primum ergo dicendum quod Glossa illa loquitur de primo iudicio, quod competit Christo ratione divinitatis, ratione cuius etiam caelum ei pro loco assignatur, non quod divinitas loco claudatur, sed quia in caelo praecipue inter ceteras corporeas creaturas apparent indicia maiestatis divinae; unde caelum locus Dei dicitur et sanctorum qui Deo fruuntur.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the Gloss speaks about the first judgment, which applies to Christ by reason of divinity, by reason of which heaven also is assigned to it for a place. It is not that the divinity is enclosed by place, but that in heaven especially among the other bodily creatures there will appear the judgments of divine majesty. Hence heaven is called the place of God and of the saints who enjoy God.
QX.Q1.A2.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod accessus ad locum iudicis, id est ascensus in caelum, est praemium quod ex iudicio reportatur, unde debet iudicium sequi, non autem praecedere. Non autem ita se habet ad iudicium humanum accessus ad locum iudicis, et ideo non est simile.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that approach to the place of the judge, that is, ascent into heaven, is a reward which is obtained from judgment, hence it ought to follow judgment, not to precede. Yet approach to the place of the judge is not a reward in the case of human judgment, and for this reason, it is not similar.
QX.Q1.A2.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod in iudicio neque Christus neque electi erunt in terra, sed solum reprobi; Christus enim et electi erunt in aere, secundum illud I Thessalonicensium IV: rapiemur in nubibus obviam Christo in aera; reprobi autem erunt non solum in valle illa, sed in regione circumquaque, unde Christum et electos videre poterunt, tum ratione altitudinis tum ratione claritatis.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that in judgment neither Christ nor the elect will be on earth, but only the reprobate. For Christ and the elect will be in the air, according to 1 Thessalonians 4:17: we shall be snatched in the clouds to meet Christ in the air. Yet the reprobate will be not only in that valley, but in the region all around, hence they will be able to see Christ and the elect, both by reason of altitude and by reason of clarity.1
QX.Q1.A2.ad3A. 3On his sacramentDe eius sacramento
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod species vini, quae remanet in sacramento post consecrationem, alii liquori admisceri non possit.
To the third we proceed thus. It seems that the appearance of wine, which remains in the sacrament after consecration, cannot be mixed with another liquid.
QX.Q1.A3.arg1Quia, secundum Philosophum in I De generatione, miscibilia sunt in mixto potentia, non actu; si ergo illa species vini alteri liquori misceatur, post mixtionem non remanebit illa species in actu; sed, deficiente specie, deficit esse corpus vel sanguis Christi in sacramento; ergo post mixtionem non remanebit ibi sanguis Christi;
Obj. 1: Because, according to the Philosopher in the first book of On Generation, mixable things are in a mixture potentially, not actually.1 If, therefore, that appearance of wine is mixed with another liquid, after the mixing that appearance will not remain in act. But, with the appearance ceasing, the body and blood of Christ ceases to be in the sacrament. Therefore, the blood of Christ will not remain there after the mixing.
QX.Q1.A3.arg2sed hoc est inconveniens, quia, secundum Philosophum, quae sunt miscibilia sunt etiam separabilia, et sic illa species alteri liquori admixta poterit iterum separari, qua separatione facta, erit ibi iterum corpus Christi vel sanguis, cum tandiu corpus vel sanguis Christi sit sub specie quandiu species est, et sic sanguis Christi de novo incipiet esse sub specie vini alio modo quam per consecrationem, quod est inconveniens; ergo et illud ex quo sequitur, scilicet quod species vini post consecrationem alteri liquori misceatur, est inconveniens.
But this is unfitting because, according to the Philosopher, those things which are mixable are also separable, and thus that appearance mixed with another liquid will be able to be separated again, and with that separation having been made, the body of Christ or the blood will be there again, since the body or blood of Christ is under the appearance for as long as the appearance is, and thus the blood of Christ newly will begin to be under the appearance of wine in a way other than through consecration, which is unfitting. Therefore, that also from which it follows is unfitting, namely, for the appearance of wine after consecration to be mixed with another liquid.
QX.Q1.A3Sed contra. Forma mixti est forma accidentalis; sed accidens superveniens non corrumpit subiectum; ergo post mixtionem speciei cum alio liquore, adhuc manet ipsa species; et sic non sequitur inconveniens praedictum.
On the contrary (2): The form of a mixture is an accidental form. But a supervening accident does not corrupt a subject. Therefore, after the mixing of the appearance with another liquid, the appearance itself still remains there. And thus, the aforesaid unfitting thing does not follow.
QX.Q1.A3.scResponsio. Dicendum quod quidam dicunt illis speciebus nullo modo posse admisceri aliquem liquorem quin statim sub totis illis speciebus desinat esse sanguis Christi, et hoc ideo quia mutatis speciebus non remanet ibi veritas sanguinis Christi, per additionem autem cuiuscumque liquoris fit alia quantitas, quae substat in illo sacramento aliis accidentibus: fit enim maior quantitas; et sic non remanet ibi sanguis Christi.
I answer that certain men say that in no way can any liquid be mixed with those appearances without the blood of Christ immediately ceasing to be under the whole of those appearances,1 for with the species changed the truth of the blood of Christ does not remain there. Yet through the addition of any liquid another quantity is made, which stands under the other accidents in that sacrament: for there is made a greater quantity. And thus, the blood of Christ does not remain there.
QX.Q1.A3.coSed hoc non videtur verum, quia species quae in sacramento post consecrationem remanent, eodem modo corrumpuntur et non aliter quam accidisset de substantiis praeexistentibus quarum species manent, sicut ad sensum patet quod incinerantur et aliis modis transmutantur, omnino sicut accidisset de substantiis panis ac vini ante consecrationem; constat autem quod per admixtionem unius guttae aquae non fuisset totum vinum destructum; unde nec propter hoc tota species vini corrumpitur post consecrationem.—Nec oportet, si augetur quantitas, quod propter hoc sit ibi alia species: nam ipsa additio non tollit essentiam dimensionis, sed variat terminationem eius, quae quidem variatur non solum per additionem, sed etiam per divisionem; unde, si talis variatio sufficeret ad hoc quod desineret esse sub speciebus corpus vel sanguis Christi, sequeretur quod per divisionem specierum similiter esse desineret, quod patet esse falsum.
But this does not seem true, because the appearances which remain in the sacrament after consecration are corrupted in the same way and not otherwise than would have happened with the preexisting substances whose appearances remain, just as it is clear to the senses that they are incinerated and otherwise changed precisely as it would have happened for the substances of bread and wine before consecration. Yet it is agreed that through the admixture of one drop of water the whole of the wine would not be destroyed.1 Hence neither on account of this is the whole appearance of wine corrupted after consecration. Nor is it necessary, if quantity is increased, that on account of this there should be another appearance there: for addition itself does not remove the essence of dimension, but varies its termination, which indeed is varied not only through addition, but also through division. Hence, if such a variation would suffice such that the body or blood of Christ would cease to be under the appearance, it would follow that similarly it would cease to be through division of the appearance, which is clearly false.
QX.Q1.A3Et ideo dicendum quod aliqua admixtio alterius liquoris facit ut totaliter desinat esse sanguis Christi sub speciebus, et aliqua quod non, sed solum sub parte specierum. Si enim esset ibi substantia vini, si alius liquor in magna quantitate admisceretur, totaliter illud vinum corrumperet ut desineret esse vinum, si liquor admixtus esset alterius speciei, vel desineret esse hoc vinum, si esset eiusdem speciei. Si autem alius liquor in parva quantitate admisceretur, non posset illius liquoris permixtio ad totum vinum pervenire, sed ad aliquam partem eius, quam variaret vel secundum speciem, si esset alterius speciei quam per mixtionem non totaliter amitteret, vel secundum numerum, si esset eiusdem speciei; vel speciem suam per mixtionem totaliter amitteret, sicut gutta aquae proiecta in amphoram vini.
And for this reason, it must be said that sometimes a mixing of another liquid makes it that the blood of Christ totally ceases to be under all the appearances, and sometimes not, but only under part of the appearances. For if the substance of wine were there, if another liquid were to be admixed in great quantity, that wine would corrupt totally so that it would cease to be wine, if the admixed liquid were of different appearances; or there would cease to be this wine, if it were of the same appearances. Yet if another liquid were to be admixed in small quantity, the mixing of that liquid could not arrive to the whole of the wine, but to some part of it, which would change either according to the appearances, if it were of different appearances which it would not lose totally through the mixing, or according to number, if it were of the same species. Or it would lose its appearances totally through the mixing, just as a drop of water cast into a pitcher of wine.1
QX.Q1.A3Sic ergo si speciei post consecrationem fiat tanta extranei liquoris permixtio quae sufficeret ad totam substantiam vini corrumpendam, si ibi esset, desinet esse sanguis Christi sub totis speciebus. Si autem non sit tanta permixtio, desinet esse sub parte: nam dato quod ille liquor permixtus in speciem vini mutetur, non tamen convertetur in sanguinem Christi.
Thus, therefore, if so great a mixing of a foreign liquid is made after the consecration which would suffice for corrupting the whole substance of wine, if it were there, there would cease to be the blood of Christ under the whole of the appearances. Yet if there is not so great a mixing, it would cease to be under a part: for given that that liquid mixed into the appearances of wine would be changed, nevertheless it would not be changed into the blood of Christ.
QX.Q1.A3Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, facta permixtione speciei cum alio liquore, non remanet species eadem vel secundum speciem vel secundum numerum, vel secundum totum vel secundum partem; et sic sub toto vel sub parte non remanebit sanguis Christi, sed substantia vini. Nec etiam facta separatione denuo erit ibi sanguis Christi, quia miscibilia cum separantur a mixto non redeunt eadem numero, sed eadem specie.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, with a mixing of appearance made with another liquid, the same appearance does not remain either according to appearance or according to number, whether according to the whole or according to a part. And thus, under the whole or under a part the blood of Christ will not remain, but the substance of wine. Nor also with a separation made will the blood of Christ newly be there, because mixable things, when they are separated from a mixture, do not return the same in number, but the same in appearances.
QX.Q1.A3.ad1Ad secundum quod in contrarium obicitur, dicendum quod forma mixtionis dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo forma per quam corpus mixtum in specie collocatur, et sic est forma substantialis: per hunc enim modum forma lapidis dicitur forma mixti; alio modo potest dici forma mixti qualitas quaedam media resultans ex qualitatibus commixtis.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the form of a mixture can be understood in two ways. One way is the form through which a mixed body is established in appearances, and thus it is substantial form, for through this way the form of a stone is called the form of a mixture. In another way, the form of a mixture can be called a certain middle quality resulting from the qualities mixed together.
QX.Q1.A3.ad2Cum ergo dicitur quod forma accidentalis subiectum non destruit, posset dici quod verum est, tamen destruit accidentia; et sic species sacramentales, quae sunt accidentia, post commixtionem non manent.
When, therefore, it is said that accidental form does not destroy a subject, it could be said that this is true, nevertheless it destroys accidents. And thus, the sacramental appearances, which are accidents, do not remain after the mixing together.
QX.Q1.A3Sed haec solutio non est secundum veritatem: nam forma mixtionis, cum sit quaedam qualitas media, non permutat nisi simplices qualitates ex quibus componitur, species autem sacramentales non destruuntur quibuscumque qualitatibus variatis, quia, si odor vini vel color mutaretur, non propter hoc desineret ibi esse sanguis Christi, nisi dimensiones, quae ceteris accidentibus subsunt, vicem substantiae gerentes, secundum essentiam destruerentur, quod aliter accidere non potest quam accideret de substantia vini, si ibi esset.
But this solution is not true: for the form of a mixture, since it is a certain middle quality, can only replace the simple qualities from which it is composed. Yet the sacramental appearances are not destroyed by any varied qualities, because, if the odor of wine or its color were changed, not on account of this would the blood of Christ cease to be there, unless the dimensions, which stand under the other accidents, taking the place of substance, were to be destroyed according to essence, which cannot happen otherwise than would happen concerning the substance of wine, if it were there.
QX.Q1.A3Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod accidens non corrumpit subiectum effective, sed dispositive: posita enim qualitate quae est necessaria dispositio ad formam ignis, scilicet calore in summo, removetur forma aeris; et similiter posita media qualitate quae est necessitas ad formam mixti, aufertur forma simplicis corporis.
And for this reason, it must be said rather that an accident does not corrupt a subject as an efficient cause, but as a disposing cause. For the form of air is removed when there is posited a quality which is a necessary disposition for the form of fire, namely, heat in the highest degree. And similarly, the form of a simple body is removed when there is posited a middle quality which is necessary for the form of a mixture.1
QX.Q1.A3De angelo
On an Angel
Q. 2On an angelDe angelo
Articulus unicus
Article 1
QX.Q2Utrum duratio angeli habeat prius et posterius
Whether the duration of an angel has before and after
Deinde quaeritur de angelo, utrum duratio angeli habeat prius et posterius? Et videtur quod sic.
Then there is a question concerning an angel, whether the duration of an angel has before and after. And it seems that it does.
QX.Q2In eo enim cuius duratio non habet prius et posterius, idem est esse et fuisse; si ergo in duratione angeli non est prius et posterius, idem erit angelo esse et fuisse; sed hoc est impossibile, quia Deus non posset facere quod angelus non esset, cum non possit facere quod non fuerit; ergo inconveniens est dicere quod in duratione angeli non sit prius et posterius.
Obj. 1: For in that whose duration does not have before and after, it is the same to be and to have been. If, therefore, in the duration of an angel there were not before and after, it will be the same for an angel to be and to have been. But this is impossible because God could not have made it that an angel is not, since he cannot make it that it was not. Therefore, it is unfitting to say that in the duration of an angel there is not before and after.1
QX.Q2.arg1Praetera. Nullum creatum est infinitum in actu; sed duratio angeli est infinita ex parte post; ergo non est tota simul in actu, et ita est ibi prius et posterius.
Obj. 2: Nothing created is infinite in act. But the duration of an angel is infinite on the part of thereafter. Therefore, it is not whole simultaneously in act, and thus there is before and after there.1
QX.Q2.arg2Preterea. Mensura debet esse proportionata mensurato; sed esse angeli est finitum in actu; ergo aevum, quod est eius mensura, est finitum; et sic idem quod prius.
Obj. 3: A measure ought to be proportionate to the thing measured.1 But the being of an angel is finite in act. Therefore, the aevum, which is its measure, is finite; and thus the same holds as before.
QX.Q2.arg3Praeterea. Ratio aeternitatis in hoc perficitur quod est tota simul, quia, secundum Boetium in V De consolatione, aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul ac perfecta possessio; si igitur aevum, quod est angeli duratio, non habeat prius et posterius, non videtur ab aeternitate differre.
Obj. 4: The account of eternity is perfected in this: that it is whole simultaneously because, according to Boethius in the fifth book of On Consolation, eternity is the whole and perfect possession of interminable life simultaneously.1 If, therefore, the aevum, which is the duration of an angel, does not have before and after, it does not seem to differ from eternity.
QX.Q2.arg4Sed contra. Secundum Philosophum in IV Physicorum, propter prius et posterius in motu, est prius et posterius in tempore, quod mensurat motum; sed in esse angeli non est aliquis motus, nec illud esse aliquo modo motui subiacet; ergo in aevo, quod est eius mensura, non est prius et posterius.
On the contrary (1): According to the Philosopher in the fourth book of the Physics, on account of before and after in motion, there is before and after in time, which measures motion.1 But there is not any motion in the being of an angel, nor is that being subject to any mode of motion. Therefore, in the aevum, which is its measure, there is not before and after.
QX.Q2.scPraeterea. Tempus nihil aliud est quam numerus prioris et posterioris; si ergo in aevo sit numerare prius et posterius, aevum nihil differt a tempore.
Furthermore (2): Time is nothing else than the number of before and after.1 If, therefore, in the aevum there is to number before and after, the aevum would differ nothing from time.
QX.Q2.arg5Responsio. Dicendum quod de re aliqua dupliciter loqui possumus: uno modo secundum quod est in rerum natura, alio modo secundum quod est in consideratione nostra; primo modo accipitur substantia rei cum omnibus suis dispositionibus et operationibus, quia sine his substantia non invenitur in rerum natura; sed secundo modo potest accipi substantia absque suis dispositionibus, quia consideratio substantiae non dependet a consideratione suarum dispositionum.
I answer that we can speak about anything in two ways. One way is according to how it is in the nature of things. Another way is according to how it is in our consideration. In the first way a substance of a thing is understood with all its dispositions and activities, because without these a substance is not found in the nature of things. But in the second way a substance can be understood without its dispositions, because the consideration of a substance does not depend upon the consideration of its dispositions.
QX.Q2.coAttribuendo igitur mensuram durationis rei secundum primum modum, sic soli Deo competit duratio quae sit tota simul, non autem alicui creaturae, eo quod solus Deus est immutabilis quantum ad essentiam et quantum ad omnia quae circa essentiam considerari possunt, quaelibet autem creatura est variabilis vel secundum substantiam vel secundum aliquam suam dispositionem aut operationem. Et secundum hoc Augustinus, XXI quaestione ad Orosium, ponit omnes creaturas esse in tempore, etiam angelos.
Therefore, by attributing the measure of the duration of a thing according to the first way, thus duration which is whole simultaneously applies to God alone, yet not to any creature, by this: that God alone is immutable as regards essence and as regards all things which can be considered around essence. Yet every creature is variable either according to substance or according to some disposition or activity of it. And according to this, Augustine, in the twenty-first question to Orosius, posits that all creatures are in time, even angels.1
QX.Q2Sed attribuendo mensuram durationis angelo modo secundo, prout scilicet consideratur eius substantia absolute, sic ponitur eius mensura aevum et non tempus.
But by attributing the measure of duration to an angel in the second way, namely, such that its substance is considered absolutely, thus its measure is posited as the aevum and not time.
QX.Q2De quo quidem aevo est duplex opinio.
Concerning this aevum there is a twofold opinion.
Quidam enim dicunt quod in aevo est prius et posterius, sed non sicut in tempore: in tempore namque est prius et posterius cum innovatione, in aevo autem sine innovatione.
For certain men say that in the aevum there is before and after, but not just as in time:1 for in time there is before and after with innovation, yet in the aevum without innovation.
QX.Q2Sed hoc non est intelligibile. Impossibile enim est esse alicuius durationis duas partes simul, quarum una alteram non includat, sicut mensis includit diem, unde simul est aliquid in die et in mense, sed duo dies et duo menses simul esse non possunt. Unde quandocunque in aliqua duratione ponuntur duae partes quarum una est prior et altera posterior, oportet quod una transeunte, alia de novo adveniat; et sic oportet quod in omni duratione in qua est prius et posterius sit innovatio. Mensura autem durationis innovationem habere non potest, nisi id quod per durationem mensuratur innovationem recipere possit; esse autem angeli est absque omni innovatione, quia ex quo esse coepit, immutabile perseverat, cum nec in eo sit motus nec sit alicui motui subiectum, sicut esse rerum corruptibilium est subiectum motui caelesti.
But this is not intelligible. For it is impossible for two parts of some duration to be simultaneously, one of which does not include the other, for example, as month includes day. Hence simultaneously something is in a day and in a month, but two days and two months cannot be simultaneously. Hence whenever there are posited two parts in some duration, one of which is before and the other after, it is necessary that with the one passing, the other newly arrives. And thus, it is necessary for there to be innovation in every duration in which there is before and after. Yet the measure of a duration cannot have innovation; only that which is measured through the duration can receive innovation. Yet the being of an angel is without all innovation because that out of which it begins to be perseveres immutable, since in it neither is there motion nor is there the subject of any motion, just as the being of corruptible things is the subject of celestial motion.
QX.Q2Sic ergo si attribuatur mensura <durationis> angelo quantum ad substantiam tantum, illa non habet prius et posterius: sic enim mensuratur eorum esse aevo. Et similiter si attribuatur eis mensura durationis quantum ad essentialem operationem beatitudinis; sic enim sunt in participatione aeternitatis. Si vero attribuatur eis mensura durationis ratione aliarum operationum vel affectionum, sic eorum mensura habet prius et posterius: ita enim mensurantur tempore, secundum quod dicit Augustinus, VIII Super Genesim ad litteram, quod Deus movet creaturam spiritualem per tempus.
Thus, therefore, if the measure of “duration” is attributed to an angel as regards substance only, that does not have before and after, for thus their being is measured by the aevum. And the same goes if the measure of duration is attributed to them as regards the essential activity of beatitude, for thus they are participants of eternity. Whereas if the measure of duration is attributed to them by reason of other activities or affections,1 thus their measure has before and after: for thus they are measured by time, according to what Augustine says in the eighth book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, that God moves a spiritual creature through time.2
QX.Q2Ad primum ergo dicendum quod rei aeternae vel aeviternae aliquid potest attribui dupliciter. Uno modo ratione sui ipsius; et sic non attribuitur ei nec fuisse nec futurum esse, sed solum esse, quia in praeterito et futuro implicatur prius et posterius, non autem in praesenti. Alio modo ratione mensurae adiacentis vel subiacentis, id est ratione temporis; et sic attribuitur ei fuisse per concomitantiam ad tempus praeteritum, et futurum esse per concomitantiam ad futurum: ipsum enim momentum aeternitatis adest toti tempori, unde dicit Augustinus de Deo quod fuit, quia nunquam defuit, erit, quia nunquam deerit. Sic igitur Deus non potest facere angelum non fuisse, quia non potest facere quin tempus praeteritum simul cum esse angeli fuerit; potest autem facere angelum non esse, quia potest facere ut esse angeli non sit simul cum tempore quod praesens est nunc vel erit in futuro. Et sic ista diversitas magis pendet ex modo locutionis quam ex natura rei.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that something can be attributed to an eternal or aeviternal thing in two ways. One way is by reason of itself. And in this way, there is not attributed to it either to have been nor to be in the future, but only to be, because before and after is implied in the past and the future, yet not in the present. Another way is by reason of what lies beside or beneath it, that is, by reason of time. And thus, there is attributed to it to have been through concomitance unto past time, and to be in the future through concomitance unto future time: for this very moment of eternity1 is present to the whole of time. Hence Augustine says of God that he was, because he never was lacking, he shall be, because he never shall be lacking.2 Thus, therefore, God cannot make an angel not to have been because he cannot make it except that past time was simultaneously with the being of an angel; yet he can make an angel not to be because he can make it for the being of an angel to not be simultaneously with the time which is present now or will be in the future. And thus, that diversity depends rather on the way of speaking than on the nature of the thing.
QX.Q2.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod infinitum dicitur aliquid dupliciter.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that something is called infinite in two ways.
QX.Q2.ad2Uno modo privative; et sic non attribuitur nisi his quae habent extensionem vel quantitatem: hoc enim solum natum est habere finem; et ita aevum nullo modo habet infinitatem, quia non habet aliquam extensionem, nisi quatenus extensio in eo consideratur ex comparatione mensurae subiacentis, scilicet temporis; et ita nullum creatum est infinitum actu.
One way is privatively, and thus it is only attributed to things which have extension or quantity: for only this has an end by nature. And thus, the aevum in no way has infinity, because it does not have any extension, except insofar as extension in it is considered by comparison with the measure of what lies beneath it, namely, with time. And thus, no created thing is actually infinite.
QX.Q2Alio modo dicitur infinitum negative, id est quia non habet finem; et sic etiam indivisibilia infinita dicuntur, ut punctus et unitas, quia non sunt finita; et hoc modo aevum est infinitum, quia scilicet non finitur; sic autem aliquod creatum esse secundum aliquid infinitum actu, nihil prohibet.
In another way, it is called infinite negatively, that is, because it does not have an end; and thus, even indivisible things are called infinite, such as a point and unity, because they are not ended. And in this way the aevum is infinite, namely, because it is not ended. Yet thus nothing prohibits some created thing to be actually infinite in some respect.
QX.Q2Ad tertium dicendum quod per eundem modum est infinitum esse angeli et aevum.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that there is the infinite being of an angel and the aevum in the same manner.
QX.Q2.ad3Ad quartum dicendum quod inter aeternitatem et aevum potest assignari triplex differentia. Quarum una potest sumi ex praedictis: nam aeternitas mensurat ipsam substantiam aeterni secundum quod est in rerum natura, id est cum omnibus quae ei attribuuntur, non autem aevum, ut dictum est. Alia sumitur ex hoc quod aeternitas mensurat esse per se stans, unde aeternitas est idem cum substantia aeterni; aevum autem mensurat esse creatum, quod non est per se stans, quia est aliud a substantia entis creati. Tertia potest sumi ex hoc quod aevum, quamvis sit interminabile ex parte finis, non tamen ex parte principii, aeternitas vero ex parte utriusque.
Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that between eternity and the aevum a threefold difference can be assigned. One of these differences can be understood from what has been said above: for eternity measures the very substance of the eternal thing insofar as it is in the nature of things, that is, with all things which are attributed to it, yet not the aevum, as was said. Another is understood from this: that eternity measures being standing on its own, hence eternity is the same as the substance of an eternal thing. Yet the aevum measures created being, which is not standing on its own, because it is something from the substance of a created being. The third can be understood from this: that the aevum, although it may be interminable on the part of the end, nevertheless is not on the part of the principle, whereas eternity is on the part of both.
QX.Q2.ad4De anima
On the Soul
On the nature of the soul
QX.Q2Q. 3On the substance of the soulDe eius substantia
Deinde quaeritur de anima.
Then there were questions concerning the soul:
QX.Q3Et primo quantum ad naturam;
and first, regarding nature;1
QX.Q3secundo quantum ad gratiam;
second, regarding grace;1
QX.Q3tertio quantum ad culpam;
third, regarding fault;1
QX.Q3quarto quantum ad gloriam.
fourth, regarding glory.1
QX.Q3Circa naturalia animae quaesitum est de eius substantia et de eius operatione. Circa substantiam quaesita sunt duo:
About natural matters of the soul there was a question concerning its substance and concerning its activity. About the substance there were two questions:
QX.Q3primo, utrum anima sit suae potentiae;
first, whether the soul is its own powers;
QX.Q3secundo, utrum anima secundum suam substantiam sit incorruptibilis.
second, whether the soul is incorruptible according to its substance.
QX.Q3A. 1Whether the soul is its own powersUtrum anima sit suae potentiae
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima sit suae potentiae.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the soul is its own powers.
QX.Q3.A1.arg1Quia in libro De spiritu et anima dicitur quod anima est quaedam sua, scilicet potentiae, quaedam vero sua non est, scilicet virtutes.
Obj. 1: Because in the book On Spirit and Soul it is said that the soul is certain things of its own, namely, powers, whereas it is not certain things of its own, namely, virtues.1
QX.Q3.A1.arg2Praeterea. Augustinus dicit in libro De Trinitate quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una vita, una essentia; sed haec tria, secundum Magistrum in tertia distinctione I libri Sententiarum, sunt tres anime vires; ergo vires animae sunt ipsa eius essentia.
Obj. 2: Augustine says in the book On the Trinity that memory, intelligence, and will are one life, one essence.1 But these three, according to the Master in the third distinction of the first book of the Sentences, are three abilities of the soul. Therefore, the abilities of the soul are its very essence.2
QX.Q3.A1.arg3Sed contra est quod Dionysius XI capitulo Caelestis hierarchiae distinguit superiores substantias, scilicet angelos, in tria, scilicet substantiam, virtutem et operationem; sed angelus non est minoris simplicitatis quam anima; ergo etiam in anima sua substantia non est sua virtus sive potentia.
On the contrary (1): Dionysius in the eleventh chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy distinguishes superior substances, namely, angels, into three, namely, substance, virtue, and activity.1 But an angel is not of less simplicity than the soul. Therefore, also in the soul its own substance is not its virtue or power.
QX.Q3.A1.scPraeterea. Eorum quae sunt idem, si unum multiplicetur, et reliquum; si ergo anima sit idem quod suae potentiae, videtur quod, cum potentiae sint multae, quod essentia animae una esse non possit.
Furthermore (2): Of those things which are the same, if one is multiplied, the rest also. If, therefore, the soul is the same as its powers, it seems that, since the powers are many, the essence of the soul could not be one.
QX.Q3.A1.arg4Responsio. Dicendum quod de anima dupliciter loqui possumus.
I answer that we can speak in two ways about the soul.
QX.Q3.A1.coUno modo, secundum quod est quaedam substantia; et sic impossibile est quod anima sit suae potentiae, duplici ratione.
One way is according to how it is a certain substance; and thus, it is impossible for the soul to be its own powers, for two reasons.
QX.Q3.A1Quarum una sumitur ex eo quod est animae proprium, quia scilicet impossibile est ut idem secundum idem sit naturaliter principium plurium et diversorum, immo quasi oppositorum; anima autem secundum diversas potentias invenitur esse principium actuum diversorum secundum speciem et quasi oppositorum; unde impossibile est quod ipsa essentia animae, quae est una, sit immediate horum principium; et ideo oportet ponere in anima, praeter eius substantiam, potentias naturales, quae sunt horum actuum immediata principia.
One of these is understood from that which is proper to the soul, namely, that it is impossible for the same thing to be in the same way naturally the principle of many and diverse, or rather, opposite, things. Yet the soul according to diverse powers is found to be the principle of diverse acts according to species and as though of opposites. Hence it is impossible for the very essence of the soul, which is one, to be immediately the principle of these. And for this reason, it is necessary to posit in the soul, besides its substance, natural powers, which are the immediate principles of these acts.
QX.Q3.A1Alia ratio sumitur ex eo quod est commune animae et omni substantiae creatae: in nulla enim substantia creata est idem esse et operatio, hoc enim solius Dei est; essentia autem est essendi principium, potentia vero operationis; unde, cum, ab uno naturaliter non sit nisi unum, nulla substantia, nisi divina, est sua potentia. Nec esset instantia de potentia materiae, etiam dato quod sit sua essentia, quia talis potentia non est ad operationem, sed ad esse.
The other reason is understood from that which is common to the soul and to every created substance: for in no created substance are being and activity the same, since this pertains to God alone. Yet essence is the principle of being, whereas power is the principle of activity. Hence, since from one naturally there is not but one,1 no substance except the divine is its own power. Nor would there be instance from the potency of matter, even given that it is its essence, because such potency is not unto activity but unto being.
QX.Q3.A1Alio modo possumus loqui de anima secundum quod est quoddam totum potentiale; et sic diversae potentiae sunt partes eius, et ita anima praedicatur de potentiis vel e converso, abusiva praedicatione, sicut totum integrale de suis partibus vel e converso, quamvis minor sit abusio in toto potentiali quam integrali, quia totum potentiale secundum suam substantiam adest cuilibet parti, non autem integrale.
In another way, we can speak concerning the soul according to how it is a certain potential whole.1 And thus, the diverse powers are its parts, and thus the soul is predicated of the powers or conversely, by abusive predication, just as an integral whole of its parts or conversely, although there is less abuse in a potential whole than in an integral whole because a potential whole is present to each part according to its own substance, yet not an integral whole.
QX.Q3.A1Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.
Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
QX.Q3.A1.ad1A. 2Whether the soul according to its substance is incorruptibleUtrum anima secundum suam substantiam sit incorruptibilis
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima rationalis sit corruptibilis.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that the rational soul is corruptible.
QX.Q3.A2.arg1Quia, secundum Damascenum, nulla substantia potest esse sine propria operatione; propria autem operatio animae rationalis est intelligere, quae indiget corpore, cum non sit intelligere sine phantasmate, ut patet per Philosophum in III De anima; ergo destructo corpore substantia animae rationalis non manet.
Obj. 1: Because, according to Damascene, no substance can be without a proper activity.1 Yet the proper activity of a rational soul is to understand, which requires a body, since to understand is not without phantasm, as is clear through the Philosopher in the third book of On the Soul.2 Therefore, the substance of the rational soul does not remain when the body is destroyed.
QX.Q3.A2.arg2Praeterea. Id quod habet virtutem ut sit semper, non invenitur quandoque esse et quandoque non esse (tamdiu enim res est quamdiu virtus rei exposcit); ergo quod invenitur quandoque esse, quandoque non esse, non habet virtutem ut sit semper; sed omne quod incoepit esse, invenitur quandoque esse et quandoque non esse; ergo nihil quod incoepit esse habet virtutem ut sit semper. Et ita nihil quod incoepit esse potest esse incorruptibile; sed anima rationalis incoepit esse; ergo non potest esse incorruptible.
Obj. 2: That which has the power to exist always1 is not found at some time to be and at some time not to be (for a thing exists for as long as the power of the thing demands).2 Therefore, that which is found at some time to be, at some time not to be, does not have the power to exist always. But everything which begins to be is found at some time to be and at some time not to be. Therefore, nothing which begins to be has the power to exist always.3 And thus, nothing which begins to be can be incorruptible. But the rational soul begins to be. Therefore, it cannot be incorruptible.
QX.Q3.A2.arg3Praeterea. Hominis compositi ex anima et corpore est quoddam esse; aut ergo praeter hoc esse, anima habet aliud esse, aut non; si habet aliud esse, ergo compositio supervenit animae post esse completum; ergo huiusmodi compositio est animae accidentalis, et sic homo non erit ens per se, sed ens per accidens, quod est inconveniens; si autem non habet aliud esse anima praeter esse compositi, ergo postquam deficit esse compositi, anima esse non potest; sed in morte corporali deficit esse compositi; ergo anima post mortem corporis non remanet.
Obj. 3: Of man composed out of soul and body there is a certain being. Therefore, either the soul has another being besides this being, or not. If it has another being, then the composition supervenes on the soul after complete being. Therefore, composition of this sort is accidental to the soul, and thus man will not be a being essentially, but a being incidentally, which is unfitting. Yet if the soul does not have another being besides the being of the composite, the soul cannot exist after the being of the composite fails. But in bodily death the being of the composite fails. Therefore, the soul does not remain after the death of the body.
QX.Q3.A2.arg4Praeterea. Anima est forma corporis; aut ergo per essentiam suam, aut per aliquod accidens; si per accidens, sequetur quod compositio animae et corporis sit accidentalis, sicut hominis ad indumentum; si per essentiam, cum forma in quantum est forma non possit esse sine materia, videtur quod anima post mortem corporis remanere non possit.
Obj. 4: The soul is the form of the body;1 therefore, this is either through its essence or through some accident. If through an accident, it will follow that the composition of soul and body is accidental, like a man with a garment. If it is through essence, since form inasmuch as it is form cannot be without matter, it seems that the soul cannot remain after the death of the body.
QX.Q3.A2.arg5Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in II De anima, quod rationale separatur ab aliis sicut perpetuum a corruptibili.
On the contrary (1): The Philosopher says in the second book of On the Soul that the rational is separated from other things just as the perpetual from the corruptible.1
QX.Q3.A2.scPraeterea. Philosophus in X Ethicorum ostendit felicitatem contemplativam praeminere civili eo quod est diuturnior; sed civilis durat usque ad mortem; ergo contemplativa est etiam post mortem, et sic etiam anima post mortem corporis manet.
Furthermore (2): The Philosopher in the tenth book of the Ethics shows that contemplative happiness is preeminent over civil by this: that it is more long-lasting. But the civil endures even unto death.1 Therefore, the contemplative is also after death, and thus the soul also remains after the death of the body.
QX.Q3.A2.arg6Responsio. Dicendum quod necesse est ponere substantiam animae rationalis esse incorruptibilem.
I answer that it is necessary to posit that the substance of the rational soul is incorruptible.
QX.Q3.A2.coSi enim corrumpitur, aut corrumpitur per se aut per accidens. Per se quidem corrumpi non posset nisi esset composita ex materia et forma contrarietatem habente, quod esse non potest nisi esset elementum aut ex elementis, ut antiqui philosophi posuerunt, quorum positiones in I De anima reprobantur. Per accidens autem corrumpi non potest, nisi poneretur quod non habet esse per se, sed solum esse cum alio, sicut est de aliis formis materialibus, quae proprie non habent esse subsistens, sed sunt per esse compositorum subsistentium quorum sunt partes, et sic per accidens corrumpuntur compositis corruptis. Hoc autem de anima rationali dici non potest: nam quod non habet per se esse, impossibile est quod per se operetur; unde etiam aliae formae non operantur, sed composita per formas; anima autem rationalis habet per se operationem, quam exercet nullo organo corporeo mediante, scilicet intelligere, ut probat Philosophus in III De anima. Non enim posset omnium sensibilium formas cognoscere, nisi ab omnibus formis sensibilibus esset denudata (vel nisi esset actus omnium), cum nihil recipiat quod iam habet; oporteret igitur, si anima per aliquod organum intelligeret, quod suum organum careret omni forma sensibili, cum omnes formas sensibiles sit nata intelligere, sicut pupilla caret omni colore ad hoc quod visus possit omnes colores cognoscere; impossibile est autem esse aliquod organum corporale carens omni forma sensibili.
For if it is corrupted, either it is corrupted essentially or incidentally.1 Indeed, it could not be corrupted essentially unless it were composed out of matter and form having contrariety, which cannot be unless it were an element or out of elements, as the ancient philosophers posited, whose positions are disproven in the first book of On the Soul.2 Yet it cannot be corrupted incidentally unless it were posited that it does not have being essentially, but only being with another, just as it is concerning other material forms,3 which do not properly have subsisting being, but are through the being of composite substances of which they are parts, and thus they are corrupted incidentally with the composites being corrupted. Yet this cannot be said concerning the rational soul: for it is impossible for that which does not have being essentially to act essentially. Hence also other forms do not act, but composites through forms; yet the rational soul has activity essentially, which it exercises with no bodily organ mediating, namely, the activity of understanding, as the Philosopher proves in the third book of On the Soul.4 For it could not know the forms of all sensible things unless it were denuded of all sensible forms (or unless it were the act of all), since nothing receives that which it already has. Therefore, it would be necessary, if the soul were to understand through some organ, for its organ to lack every sensible form, since it is born to understand all sensible forms. So too the pupil lacks all color so that sight can know all colors.5 Yet it is impossible for any bodily organ to be lacking every sensible form.
QX.Q3.A2Relinquitur ergo substantiam animae intellectivae esse incorruptibilem. Unde etiam Philosophus dicit in I De anima quod intellectus videtur esse substantia quaedam, et non corrumpi.
Therefore, it remains that the substance of the intellective soul is incorruptible. Hence also the Philosopher says in the first book of On the Soul that intellect seems to be a certain substance, and not to be corrupted.1
QX.Q3.A2Hunc autem incorruptibilem intellectum quidam ponunt extra homines esse, ponentes animam quae est pars hominis corruptibilem fore, cui ponunt intellectum separatum continuari dupliciter. Uno modo, per illustrationem, secundum eos qui ponunt intellectum agentem separatum et incorruptibilem, intellectum vero possibilem coniunctum et corruptibilem. Alio modo, per continuationem intellectus ad phantasmata, secundum eos qui ponunt etiam intellectum possibilem esse separatum et incorruptibilem.
Yet certain men posit that this incorruptible intellect is outside of men, positing that the soul which is part of man will be corruptible, to which they posit that the separated intellect is connected in two ways. One way is through illustration, according to those who posit an agent intellect separated and incorruptible,1 whereas a potential intellect conjoined and corruptible. Another way is through continuation of the intellect unto phantasms, according to those who posit that even the potential intellect is separate and incorruptible.2
QX.Q3.A2Sed primum horum esse non potest, quia, si in nobis non est aliqua virtus nisi materialis, lumen intellectus agentis non poterit in nobis recipi nisi materialiter, cum receptum sit in recipiente per modum recipientis, et ita non recipietur modo intelligibili, et sic nos non poterimus esse intelligentes. Similiter secundum esse non potest: nam phantasmata sunt in nobis per nostram operationem, quae sequitur esse substantiale, et sic homo non haberet esse specificum ex hoc quod est rationalis, cum non sit rationalis nisi ex hoc quod intellectui coniungitur.
But the first of these cannot be, because, if in us there is not any power unless material, the light of the agent intellect could only be received in us materially, since the received is in the recipient in the manner of the recipient, and so it will not be received in an intelligible mode, and thus we will not be able to be intelligent. Similarly, the second cannot be: for phantasms are in us through our activity, which follows substantial being, and thus man would not have being specified out of this: that he is rational, since he is only rational by being conjoined to an intellect.
QX.Q3.A2Restat igitur quod ipsa anima humana quae est forma corporis sit intellectus incorruptibilis.
It remains, therefore, that the human soul itself, which is the form of the body, is an incorruptible intellect.
QX.Q3.A2Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima indiget aliquo corporali ad suam operationem dupliciter. Uno modo sicut organo per quod operatur, sicut indiget oculo ad videndum; et sic ad intelligendum non indiget aliquo organo, ut probatum est; si autem sic indigeret organo ad intelligendum, esset corruptibilis, utpote non potens per se operari. Alio modo anima ad operandum indiget aliquo corporali sicut obiecto, sicut ad videndum indiget corpore colorato; et sic anima rationalis indiget ad intelligendum phantasmate, quia phantasmata sunt ut sensibilia intellectivae animae, ut dicitur in III De anima. Operatio autem quae sic indiget corporali, a principio non potest esse sine corporali illo, potest autem postea; sicut anima sensitiva nullam operationem habere potest nisi prius moveatur a sensibilibus quae sunt extra animam, sed postea remanet actus imaginationis, etiam sensibilibus abeuntibus; et similiter destructis phantasmatibus, operatio intellectiva in anima remanere potest.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the soul requires something bodily for its activity in two ways. One way is like an organ through which it acts, just as it needs an eye to see. And thus, for understanding it does not need any organ, as has been proven. Yet if it would thus need an organ for understanding, it would be corruptible, as not capable of acting by itself. In another way, the soul requires something bodily as an object for its activity, just as for seeing it requires a colored body. And thus, the rational soul requires a phantasm for understanding because phantasms are as sensible things to the intellective soul, as is said in the third book of the On the Soul.1 Yet the activity which thus requires a bodily thing cannot be without that bodily thing from the beginning, yet it can be afterwards; just as the sensitive soul can have no activity unless it is first moved by sensible things which are outside the soul, but afterwards there remains the act of the imagination, even with sensible things departing. And similarly, with phantasms being destroyed, the intellective activity can remain in the soul.
QX.Q3.A2.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod illa ratio est probatio Philosophi in I Caeli et mundi, qua ostendit quod omne generatum est corruptibile, et habet locum in illis quae fiunt et corrumpuntur naturaliter, in quibus ex defectu virtutis est quod non possunt nec semper fuisse nec semper fore. Non autem habet locum in his quae per creationem fiunt, quae accipiunt a Deo virtutem ut sint semper, per quam esse non possunt ante quam eam accipiant.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that that argument is the proof of the Philosopher in the first book in Of Heaven and Earth,1 by which he shows that everything generated is corruptible, and has a place among those things which are made and corrupted naturally, which from a defect of power can neither always have been nor always be in the future. Yet it does not have a place among these things which are made through creation, which receive from God the power that they might always exist, through which they cannot exist before they receive it.2
QX.Q3.A2.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod anima esse suum communicat corpori, quod quidem ita acquiritur animae in corpore ut secundum ipsum subsistere possit, quod non est de aliis formis; et sic ipsum esse animae fit esse compositi, et tamen manet, composito destructo.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that the soul communicates its being to the body, which thing of the soul indeed is acquired in the body such that according to this it can subsist. This is not the case concerning other forms. And thus, this being of the soul is made to be of the composite, and nevertheless remains, with the composite having been destroyed.
QX.Q3.A2.ad3Ad quartum dicendum quod anima secundum suam essentiam est forma corporis, nec destructo corpore destruitur in anima id secundum quod est forma, sed solum desinit esse forma in actu.
Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that the soul according to its essence is the form of the body,1 nor with the body destroyed is there destroyed in the soul that according to which it is form; it only ceases to act as a form.
QX.Q3.A2.ad4Q. 4On the activity of the soulDe eius operatione
Deinde quaeritur de operatione animae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo:
Then there were questions concerning the activity of the soul. And about this, there were two questions:
QX.Q4primo, utrum anima intellectiva omnia quae cognoscit cognoscat in prima veritate;
first, whether the intellective soul knows in the first truth all the things which it knows;
QX.Q4secundo, utrum anima separata a corpore habeat actus sensitivarum potentiarum.
second, whether a soul separated from the body has acts of the sensitive powers.
QX.Q4A. 1Whether the intellective soul knows in the first truth all the things which it knowsUtrum anima intellectiva omnia quae cognoscit cognoscat in prima veritate
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima quicquid intelligit, intelligat in prima veritate.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the soul understands in the first truth whatever it understands.
QX.Q4.A1.arg1Augustinus enim dicit, XII Confessionum: si ambo videmus id verum esse quod dicis, si ambo videmus id verum esse quod dico, ubi, quaeso, id videmus? Non ego in te nec tu in me, sed ambo in ea quae supra nos est incommutabili veritate; et sic omne verum quod anima cognoscit, in prima veritate videt.
Obj. 1: For Augustine says, in the twelfth book of the Confessions: if we see both that what you say is true, if we see also that what I say is true, where, I ask, do we see it? Not I in you nor you in me, but both in what is above us by immutable truth.1 And thus, every true thing which the soul knows, it sees in the first truth.
QX.Q4.A1.arg2Praeterea. Verum addit supra ens manifestationem; ergo prima veritas est per quam omnia manifestantur; sed id quo aliud manifestatur oportet esse maxime manifestum, sicut patet de principiis demonstrativis et de luce corporali, per quam visus corpora videt; ergo prima veritas est maxime omnibus mentibus manifesta; et sic non solum per eam, sed in ea omnia cognoscuntur.
Obj. 2: True makes what exists manifest. Therefore, the first truth is that through which all things are manifested.1 But it is necessary for that by which something else is manifested to be maximally manifest, just as is clear concerning demonstrative principles and concerning bodily light,2 through which sight sees bodies. Therefore, the first truth is maximally manifest to all minds. And thus, not only through it, but in it all things are known.
QX.Q4.A1.arg3Sed contra. Multi de conclusionibus demonstrativis veram cognitionem habent qui de prima veritate nihil considerant; ergo non omne verum in prima veritate cognoscitur.
On the contrary (1): Many have true knowledge concerning demonstrative conclusions who consider nothing concerning the first truth. Therefore, not every true thing is known in the first truth.
QX.Q4.A1.scPraeterea. Augustinus dicit in libro De libero arbitrio quod nullus de prima veritate iudicat et nullus sine ea recte iudicat; et ita, si de ea non iudicatur, non cognoscitur, nec alia in ea.
Furthermore (2): Augustine says in the book On Free Will that no one judges concerning the first truth and no one without it judges rightly.1 And thus, if the first truth is not judged, it is not known, nor other things in it.
QX.Q4.A1.arg4Responsio. Dicendum quod, sicut dicit quaedam glossa super illud Psalmi: diminutae sunt veritates etc., ab una prima veritate multae veritates in mentibus hominum resultant, sicut ab una facie hominis resultant multae facies in speculo fracto. Haec autem resultatio veritatis est quantum ad duo, scilicet quantum ad lumen intellectuale, de quo in Psalmo dicitur: signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine, et quantum ad prima principia naturaliter nota, sive sint complexa sive incomplexa. Nihil autem possumus veritatis cognoscere nisi ex primis principiis et ex lumine intellectuali, quae veritatem manifestare non possunt nisi secundum quod sunt similitudo illius primae veritatis, quia ex hoc etiam habent quandam immutabilitatem et infallibilitatem. Sic igitur in prima veritate secundum suam essentiam non omnia videntur a nobis in statu viae, cum nec ipsa per suam essentiam a viatoribus videatur; sed in ipsa, ratione suae imaginis, scilicet veritatis ab ea exemplatae, omnis veritas a nobis cognoscitur.
I answer that, just as a certain gloss says on that Psalm: truths have been diminished (Ps 12:1 [11:2]), from one first truth there result many truths in the minds of men, just as from one face1 of a man there result many faces in a broken mirror. Yet this manifestation of truth is in respect to two things, namely, in respect to intellectual light, concerning which in the Psalm it is said: the light of your face has been marked upon us, Lord (Ps 4:6 [7]), and in respect to the first principles naturally known, whether they be complex or simple. Yet we know nothing of truth except from first principles and from intellectual light, which cannot manifest the truth except according to how they are a likeness of that first truth, because from this they also have a certain immutability and infallibility. Thus, therefore, in the first truth according to its essence not all things are seen by us in the state of the way, since neither are those things seen through their essence by wayfarers. But in this first truth, by reason of its image, namely, of the truth that is patterned from it, every truth is known by us.
QX.Q4.A1.coEt exinde est quod duo idem verum vident, in quantum ab eadem prima veritate resultat exemplata veritas in mente utriusque, et ita intelligendum est dictum Augustini.
And hence it is that two men see the same truth, inasmuch as from the same first truth there results a truth patterned from it in the mind of each, and the saying of Augustine is understood in that way.
QX.Q4.A1Et sic patet solutio ad primum.
Reply Obj. 1: And thus, the solution to the first is clear.
QX.Q4.A1.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod operari aliquo sive movere dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo sicut principio formali operationis vel motus, et sic non oportet quod motio moventis vel operatio operantis terminetur ad id quo operatur; non enim ignis calefacit calorem quo calefacit. Alio modo sicut instrumento, et sic motio moventis terminatur ad id quo movet, sicut manus baculo movet lapidem et baculum movet. Id igitur quo cognoscimus sicut instrumento, oportet esse nobis primo notum, et sic cognoscimus conclusiones per principia naturaliter nota, ad quae comparatur intellectus agens sicut ad instrumenta, ut dicit Commentator in III De anima. Sed id quo cognoscimus sicut forma cognoscentis, non oportet esse notum, quia nec oculus videt lucem quae est de oculi compositione, nec speciem per quam videt; et ita etiam non est necessarium ut quicumque intelligit aliquid, intelligat intellectum suum quo intelligit vel lumen intelligibile.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that to act or to move something is said in two ways. One way is as by a formal principle of activity or of motion, and thus it is not necessary for the motion of the mover or the activity of the thing acting to be terminated unto that by which it acts; for fire does not heat the heat by which it heats. Another way is as an instrument, and thus the motion of the mover is terminated unto that by which it moves, just as a hand moves a rock by a staff and moves the staff.1 Therefore, it is necessary for that by which we know as by an instrument to be first known to us, and thus we know conclusions through principles naturally known, unto which the agent intellect is compared as unto an instrument, as the Commentator says on the third book of On the Soul.2 But it is not necessary for that by which we know as a form of a knower to be known, because neither does the eye see the light which is of the composition of the eye,3 nor the species through which it sees. And thus, also, it is not necessary for whoever understands something to understand his intellect by which he understands or the intelligible light.
QX.Q4.A1.ad2Sic igitur veritas a prima veritate in mentibus nostris exemplata a nobis partim cognoscitur de necessitate ad hoc quod alia in ea cognoscantur, scilicet quantum ad ipsa principia, et partim non de necessitate cognoscitur, scilicet quantum ad ipsum intellectuale lumen. Ipsa vero exemplaris veritas a nobis per suam essentiam <non> videtur.
Thus, therefore, the truth in our minds, which is patterned from the first truth, is known by us partly of necessity so that other things are known in it, namely, as regards the principles themselves, and it is known partly not of necessity, namely, as regards the intellectual light itself. Whereas the exemplar truth itself is not seen by us through its essence.
QX.Q4.A1A. 2Whether a soul separated from the body has acts of the sensitive powersUtrum anima separata a corpore habeat actus sensitivarum potentiarum
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima separata actum sensitivarum potentiarum habere possit.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a separated soul can have an act of the sensitive powers.
QX.Q4.A2.arg1Cassiodorus enim dicit in libro De anima quod anima sine corpore videt, audit, tangit, et reliquis sensibus viget.
Obj. 1: For Cassiodorus says in the book On the Soul that a soul without a body sees, hears, touches, and thrives by the remaining senses.1
QX.Q4.A2.arg2Praeterea. Lucae XVI quaedam dicuntur de divite in infernum sepulto quae sine actu sensuum esse non possunt; sed constat quod ibi erat tantum anima divitis sine corpora; ergo anima sine corpora operationem sensuum habere potest.
Obj. 2: In Luke 16:23–25, certain things are said concerning the rich man buried into hell which could not take place without an act of the senses. But it is agreed that only the soul of the rich man without the body was there. Therefore, a soul can have activity of the senses without a body.
QX.Q4.A2.arg3Praeterea. Frustra est potentia quae non reducitur ad actum; sed in anima post mortem remanent potentiae sensitivae; ergo et actus sensuum.
Obj. 3: A power which is not reduced to act is in vain.1 But in a soul the sensitive powers remain after death; therefore, the acts of the senses also remain.
QX.Q4.A2.arg4Sed contra. Sentire est operatio coniuncti; ergo destructo coniuncto, in anima separata remanere non potest.
On the contrary: To sense is an activity of a composite.1 Therefore, with the composite destroyed, to sense cannot remain in the separated soul.
QX.Q4.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod impossibile est in anima separata alicuius potentiae sensitivae actum esse.
I answer that it is impossible for there to be an act of any sensitive power in a separated soul.
QX.Q4.A2.coQuod sic patet: operatio namque sensitivae potentiae eodem modo perficitur in homine et in bruto, eodem enim modo videt homo per oculum quo equus; actus autem sensitivae potentiae in bruto non est ipsius animae sensitivae per se, sed mediante organo: si enim per se haberet operationem anima sensitiva in bruto, per se haberet subsistentiam, et sic esset incorruptibilis, ut de anima rationali probatum est; unde, cum hoc sit inconveniens, impossibile est quod in bruto vel in homine potentia sensitiva habeat aliquem actum proprium, sed omnis actus eius est coniuncti; unde in anima separata remanere non potest.
This is clear since the activity of a sensitive power is perfected in the same way in a man as in a brute. for a man sees through an eye in the same way as a horse. Yet the act of the sensitive power in a brute is not of the sensitive soul itself essentially, but with an organ mediating. For if the sensitive soul in a brute were to have activity essentially, it would have subsistence essentially, and thus it would be incorruptible, as has been proven concerning the rational soul.1 Hence, since this is unfitting, it is impossible for the sensitive power to have some proper act in a brute or in a man, but every act of it is of the composite. Hence it cannot remain in a separated soul.
QX.Q4.A2Quidam tamen dicunt animam sensitivam habere duos actus: unum quem exercet organo mediante, qui post mortem non manet; alium quem per se ipsam agit, et hic manet post mortem. Hoc autem videtur attestari opinioni Platonis de anima, qui ponebat animam sensitivam movere se ipsam et sic movere corpus, et sic illa operatio qua movebat se ipsam erat sibi propria, alia vero qua movebat corpus erat coniuncti; et propter hoc Plato ponebat animas etiam brutorum esse incorruptibiles: hoc enim de necessitate sequitur. Quod tamen isti non concedunt.
Nevertheless, certain men say that the sensitive soul has two acts:1 one which it exercises with an organ mediating, which after death does not remain, and another which it does by itself, and this does remain after death. Yet this seems to attest to the opinion of Plato concerning the soul,2 who posited that the sensitive soul moves itself and thus moves the body, and thus that activity by which it moved itself was proper to it, whereas that by which it moved the body was of the composite. And on account of this Plato posited that even the souls of brutes are incorruptible:3 for this necessarily follows. Nevertheless, those men do not concede this.
QX.Q4.A2Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut operationes voluntatis propter quandam similitudinem nominantur nominibus passionum quae sunt in appetitu sensitivo, ita etiam intellectus operationes nominantur ab operationibus sensuum propter similitudinem. Et sic loquitur Cassiodorus.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, just as activities of the will on account of a certain likeness are named by the names of the passions which are in the sensitive appetite, so also the activities of the intellect are named from the activities of the senses on account of likeness. And Cassiodorus speaks thus.
QX.Q4.A2.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod illa verba quae dicuntur de divite, oportet metaphorice intelligi, vel secundum rerum similitudines et non secundum res ipsas, ut Augustinus dicit.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that it is necessary for those words about the rich man to be understood metaphorically, or according to the likenesses of things and not according to the things themselves, as Augustine says.1
QX.Q4.A2.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod, secundum quosdam, in anima separata non manent potentiae sensitivae actu, sed in radice tantum. Si tamen actu maneant, non frustra erunt, quamvis actibus careant: manent enim ad naturae integritatem, sicut membra generationis in corporibus resurgentium.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that, according to certain men, sensitive powers do not remain actually in a separated soul, but only in root. If, nevertheless, they remain actually, they will not be in vain even though they lack acts: for they remain unto the integrity of nature,1 just as the members of generation remain in the bodies of the risen.2
QX.Q4.A2.ad3On grace
QX.Q4.A2Q. 5Regarding grace
Quantum ad gratiam
Regarding grace
QX.Q5Deinde quaeritur de his quae pertinent ad gratiam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria:
Then there were questions concerning what pertains to grace. And about this there were three questions:
QX.Q5primo de praecepto honorationis parentum;
first, concerning the precept of the honoring of parents;
QX.Q5secundo de consilio quantum ad votum obedientiae;
second, concerning counsel regarding the vow of obedience;
QX.Q5tertio, quantum ad votum continentiae.
third, regarding the vow of continence.
QX.Q5A. 1On the precept of honoring parentsDe praecepto honorationis parentum
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille cuius pater non potest sustentari a filio nisi contrahendo accipiat dotem unde patrem nutrire possit, non teneatur contrahere ut patrem sustentet.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a son, whose father cannot be supported by him unless the son by contracting marriage receives a dowry whereby he could nourish his father, is not held to contract in order to support his father.
QX.Q5.A1.arg1Cum enim caritas sit ordinata, plus aliquis tenetur sibi quam patri: sed laudabile esset, si aliquis propter virginitatem servandam se morti exponeret; ergo non tenetur aliquis pro servanda vita patris matrimonium contrahere.
Obj. 1: Charity is ordered, and thus someone is held to love himself more than his father. But it would be laudable if someone on account of conserving his virginity were to expose himself to death. Therefore, someone is not held to contract matrimony to conserve the life of his father.
QX.Q5.A1.arg2Praeterea. Praeceptum non contrariatur consilio; sed de virginitate servanda est consilium, ut patet I Corinthiorum VII; ergo per praeceptum de honoratione parentum non obligatur aliquis ad hoc unde virginitatem perdat.
Obj. 2: A precept does not oppose a counsel.1 But concerning the preservation of virginity there is a counsel, as is clear in 1 Corinthians 7.2 Therefore, unto that whereby he would lose his virginity someone is not obligated by the precept about the honoring of parents.3
QX.Q5.A1.arg3Sed contra. Praeceptum affirmativum obligat pro loco et tempore; sed tempus observandi praeceptum de honoratione parentum est quando parentes indigent; ergo tunc obligatur aliquis ex tali praecepto, et ita videtur quod teneatur matrimonium contrahere, si alias patri subvenire non possit.
On the contrary: An affirmative precept obligates for a place and time. But the time of observing the precept concerning the honoring of parents is when the parents are in need. Therefore, someone is then obligated by such a precept, and thus it seems that he is held to contract matrimony if otherwise he could not help his father.
QX.Q5.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod casus propositus non videtur esse de facili possibilis: vix enim contingere potest quin parentes aliquis sustentare possit absque matrimonii contractu, saltem manibus operando vel mendicando. Si tamen hoc contingeret, esset idem iudicium de virginitate servanda in isto articulo, et de aliis perfectionis operibus sicut est introitus in religionem. De quo quidam varie opinantur.
I answer that the proposed case does not seem to be easily possible: for scarcely can it happen that someone cannot sustain his parents without contracting matrimony, if only by working with his hands or by begging. If, nevertheless, this were to happen, there would be the same judgment concerning the preservation of virginity at that moment as concerning the other works of perfection, such as the entrance into religion. Certain men have different opinions about this.
QX.Q5.A1.coDicunt enim aliqui quod, si aliquis habet patrem indigentem, debet ei dimittere, si quid habet, ad eius sustentationem, et sic potest licite religionem intrare, parentum curam Patri celesti committens, qui etiam aves pascit.
For some1 say that if someone has a father in need he ought to give to him, if he has anything, for his sustenance, and thus he can enter religion licitly, committing the care of his parents to the heavenly Father,2 who feeds even the birds.
QX.Q5.A1Sed quia haec opinio nimis videtur aspera, ideo melius videtur dicendum quod aut iste qui habet propositum intrandi religionem videt se in saeculo posse vivere sine peccato mortali, vel non de facili. Si timet sibi periculum peccati mortalis, cum magis teneatur saluti anime sue providere quam corporali necessitati parentum, non debet retardari ab ingressu religionis propter provisionem parentum. Si autem videt se posse in saeculo conversari absque peccato, distinguendum videtur, quia, si sine eius obsequio parentes nullo modo vivere possunt, sic tenetur eis servire et alia opera perfectionis pretermittere, et peccaret eos dimittens; si vero sine eius obsequio possunt parentes aliqualiter sustentari, non autem honorifice, non propter hoc tenetur opera perfectionis dimittere.
But because this opinion seems too harsh, for this reason, it seems better said that either he who has the intention of entering religion sees that he can live in the world without mortal sin, or not easily. If he fears for himself the danger of mortal sin, since he is held to provide for the salvation of his own soul more than for the bodily necessity of his parents, he ought not to be delayed from the entrance of religion on account of the provision of his parents.1 Yet if he sees that he can dwell in the world without sin, it seems that a distinction must be made because, if without his service his parents can in no way live, thus he is held to serve them and to pass over the other works of perfection, and he would sin in dismissing his parents. Whereas if without his service his parents can be supported somehow, yet not honorably, not on account of this is he held to dismiss the works of perfection.
QX.Q5.A1Secus autem est de illo qui iam religionem intravit, quia, cum iam sit mortuus mundo per professionem, solutus est a lege qua in mundanis obsequiis parentibus tenebatur, secundum doctrinam Apostoli, Romanorum VII; in aliis autem spiritualibus, puta orationibus et huiusmodi, eis tenetur servire.
Yet it is otherwise concerning him who has entered religion already, because, since he has already died to the world through profession, he is loosed from the law by which he was held in worldly services to his parents, according to the doctrine of the Apostle, in Romans 7.1 Yet in other spiritual matters, for example prayers and things of this sort, he is held to serve them.
QX.Q5.A1Et hoc quod dictum est de introitu religionis, potest etiam de observantia virginitatis et de aliis operibus perfectionis dici.
What has been said concerning the entrance of religion can be said also concerning the observance of virginity and concerning the other works of perfection.
QX.Q5.A1Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si aliquis non esset virginitatem professus, non deberet mori fame ante quam matrimonium contraheret.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, if someone has not professed virginity, he should not die of hunger before contracting matrimony.
QX.Q5.A1.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod praeceptum contraire consilio, nihil prohibet in casu.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that for a precept to oppose a counsel hinders nothing in this case.
QX.Q5.A1.ad2A. 2On the counsel regarding the vow of obedienceDe consilio quantum ad votum obedientiae
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religiosus qui emisit votum obedientiae teneatur in omnibus praelato obedire, etiam in indifferentibus.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a religious who has made a vow of obedience is held to obey his prelate in all things, even in indifferent ones.
QX.Q5.A2.arg1Quia per votum castitatis religiosus omni concubitui abrenunciat; ergo per votum obedientiae abrenunciat proprie voluntati quantum ad omnia.
Obj. 1: Through the vow of chastity a religious renounces all sexual intercourse. Therefore, through the vow of obedience he renounces his own will as regards all things.1
QX.Q5.A2.arg2Praeterea. Beatus Benedictus dicit in Regula quod etiam si praelatus impossibile iubeat, temptandum est; ergo multo magis in indifferentibus obedire tenetur.
Obj. 2: Blessed Benedict says in his Rule that even if a prelate commands something impossible, it must be attempted.1 Therefore, much more is he held to obey in indifferent matters.
QX.Q5.A2.arg3Praeterea. Votum obedientiae ad statum perfectionis pertinet; hoc autem non esset, si non teneretur obedire nisi de his quae in regula continentur, quia quilibet subditus, etiam saecularis, tenetur suo praelato obedire in aliquibus quae pertinent ad ius praelationis; ergo videtur quod religiosus teneatur simpliciter in omnibus obedire.
Obj. 3: The vow of obedience pertains to the state of perfection. Yet this would not be if he were only held to obey those things contained in the rule, for any subject, even a secular one, is held to obey his prelate in things which pertain to the right of the prelacy. Therefore, it seems that a religious is held simply to obey in all things.
QX.Q5.A2.arg4Sed contra. Religiosus non tenetur ad plura quam saecularis, nisi quatenus se per votum obligavit; sed per votum professionis non se obligavit ad obediendum nisi secundum regulam; ergo in pluribus obedire non tenetur quam quae sunt secundum regulam.
On the contrary (1): A religious is not held to more things than a secular, except as far as he has obligated himself through a vow. But through the vow of profession he has not obligated himself to obey except according to the rule. Therefore, he is not held to obey in more things than those which are according to the rule.
QX.Q5.A2.scPraeterea. Bernardus dicit in libro De dispensatione et praecepto: nihil praecipiat mihi praelatus eorum quae non promisi; nihil prohibeat eorum quae promisi.
Furthermore (2): Bernard says in the book On Dispensation and Precept: let the prelate command nothing for me of those things which I have not promised; let him prohibit nothing of those things which I have promised.1
QX.Q5.A2.arg5Responsio. Dicendum quod circa hoc partim omnes conveniunt et partim ad invicem dissentiunt.
I answer that about this all partly agree and partly dissent from one another.
QX.Q5.A2.coQuod enim religiosus non teneatur praelato obedire in his quae sunt contra Deum, vel contra regulam (quantum ad ea in quibus praelato dispensatio non committitur), omnes communiter dicunt. Quod etiam in his quae sunt artiora quam regula, obedire non teneatur, sed obedire sit obedientiae perfectae, etiam ab omnibus dicitur.
For all say commonly that a religious is not held to obey his prelate in these things which are against God, or against the rule (as regards those things in which dispensation is not committed to the prelate).1 So too, in these things which are stricter than the rule, he is not held to obey. But to obey belongs to perfect obedience, as is also said by all.
QX.Q5.A2Sed circa indifferentia vel ea quae sunt infra artitudinem regulae aut aequalia regulae, sunt duae opiniones, quibusdam dicentibus quod obedire in huiusmodi est de necessitate obedientiae, aliis autem quod non est de neccessitate obedientiae, sed de perfectione. Quae quidem duae opiniones, etsi multum differre videantur quantum ad vocem, tamen quantum ad rem parum vel nihil differre inveniantur. Nam ad regulam pertinere intelligenda sunt non solum ea quae sunt expresse scripta in regula, sed <etiam> illa quae quocumque modo ad regulam reducuntur, utpote quae pertinent ad obsequium fraternae societatis et ad punitionem culparum, ad quae duo fere omnia huiusmodi indifferentia possunt reduci. Si tamen aliqua sunt quae nullatenus ad regulam reducuntur, videtur esse verior opinio quod obedire in huiusmodi non sit de necessitate obedientiae, sed de perfectione, ut Bernardus manifeste dicit in libro De dispensatione et praecepto; et hoc ideo quia obedientia non se extendit ultra potestatem vel ius praelationis, quae quidem secundum regulam limitatur.
But about indifferent things or those which are below the strictness of the rule or equal to the rule, there are two opinions. Certain men say that to obey in things of this sort is necessary obedience, yet others that it is not necessary obedience, but that of perfection. These two opinions, although they seem to differ much as regards the voice, nevertheless as regards the thing are found to differ little or none. For what pertains to the rule is not only those things written expressly in the rule, but also whatever somehow is led back unto the rule, such as those things which pertain to the service of fraternal society and to the punishment of faults, unto which two almost all indifferent things of this sort can be led back. If, nevertheless, there are some things which in no way are led back unto the rule, it seems to be the truer opinion that to obey in things of this sort is not necessary obedience, but for perfection, as Bernard manifestly says in the book On Dispensation and Precept.1 This is because obedience does not extend itself beyond the power or right of the prelacy, which indeed is limited according to the rule.
QX.Q5.A2Ad primum ergo dicendum quod votum continentiae respicit speciale genus actus, sed votum obedientiae respicit generaliter omnes actus; unde, nisi determinaretur eius generalitas, esset religionum confusio, quia omnes ad idem tenerentur.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the vow of continence regards a special genus of act, but the vow of obedience regards generally all acts. Hence, unless its generality were determined, there would be confusion of religious, because all would be held to the same thing.
QX.Q5.A2.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod loquitur quantum ad perfectionem obedientiae.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that he speaks about the perfection of obedience.
QX.Q5.A2.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod per votum obedientiae supponitur religiosus suo praelato quantum ad generalem dispositionem vitae suae, licet non quantum ad omnes actus particulares; saecularis autem suo praelato obedire tenetur quantum ad aliquos actus speciales, non quantum ad generalem vitae suae dispositionem.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that through the vow of obedience a religious is placed under his prelate in regard to the general disposition of his life, although not in regard to all particular acts. Yet a secular is held to obey his prelate in regard to some special acts, not in regard to the general disposition of his life.
QX.Q5.A2.ad3A. 3On the counsel regarding the vow of continenceDe consilio quantum ad votum continentiae
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod post votum simplex castitatis matrimonium contrahens debitum nec reddere nec exigere possit.
To the third we proceed thus. It seems that after a simple vow of chastity someone contracting marriage can neither render nor demand the debt.
QX.Q5.A3.arg1Quia apud Deum non minus obligat votum simplex quam solemne, ut canon dicit; sed post votum solemne emissum aliquis debitum nec reddere nec petere potest; ergo nec post emissionem simplicis voti.
Obj. 1: Because before God a simple vow obliges no less than a solemn,1 as the canon says. But after a solemn vow is made someone can neither render nor ask for the debt; therefore, neither can they after the making of a simple vow.
QX.Q5.A3.arg2Praeterea. Per peccatum nullus excusatur a peccato; sed iste qui contrahit post votum simplex, peccat quando primo debitum reddit, quia adhuc potest votum implere religionem intrando; ergo postquam semel reddidit, adhuc peccat vel reddendo vel exigendo.
Obj. 2: Through sin no one is excused from sin. But that man who contracts after a simple vow sins when he first renders the debt because he still can fulfill his vow by entering religion. Therefore, after he has rendered it once, he still sins either by rendering or by demanding.
QX.Q5.A3.arg3Sed contra. Ecclesia non cogit aliquem ad peccandum; cogit autem reddere debitum etiam post votum simplex castitatis; ergo reddendo debitum non peccat.
On the contrary: The Church does not force anyone to sin. Yet she forces him to render the debt even after a simple vow of chastity. Therefore, he does not sin by rendering the debt.
QX.Q5.A3.scResponsio. Dicendum quod quantum ad redditionem debiti omnes conveniunt quod post votum simplex continentiae tenetur reddere debitum, quia votum simplex matrimonium contractum non dirimit, et ex quo matrimonium est contractum, vir non habet potestatem sui corporis, sed mulier, unde tenetur mulieri petenti debitum reddere. Sed circa petitionem debiti quidam dicunt quod, cum quantum ad hoc sit in sua libertate, tenetur adhuc votum implere, et ita peccat debitum petendo. Alii vero dicunt quod, si per signa appareat quod mulier debitum sibi reddi velit, quamvis ipsa petere erubescat, quod vir petere debet, etiam post votum simplex, et praecipue si timeat uxori de lapsu. Sed hoc in idem redit cum primo: nam hoc est ex parte uxoris quaedam interpretativa petitio, et sic vir petendo reddit; unde nec efficitur ex parte uxoris gravius matrimonium, quod esset si semper eam expresse petere oporteret.
I answer that regarding the rendering of the debt all agree that after a simple vow of continence he is held to render the debt because a simple vow does not break a contracted matrimony,1 and from the time matrimony was contracted, a man does not have the power of his body, but the woman (1 Cor 7:4), hence he is held to render the debt to the woman asking. But about the petition of the debt certain men say that,2 since as regards this he is free, he is held still to fulfill the vow, and thus he sins by asking for the debt. Whereas other men say that, if through a sign it appears that the woman wishes for the debt to be rendered to her, although she blushes to ask, that the man ought to ask, even after a simple vow, and especially if he fears his wife might fall.3 But this returns unto the same as the first: for this is on the part of the wife a certain interpretative petition, and thus a man renders by asking. Hence neither is the matrimony made more burdensome on the part of the wife, which would be if it were necessary that she always ask expressly.
QX.Q5.A3.coAd primum ergo dicendum quod, ex hoc quod utriusque voti transgressio inducit reatum peccati mortalis, dicitur quod utrumque aequaliter obligat apud Deum; sed quantum ad impedimentum matrimonii, non habet utrumque aequalem efficaciam. Nam per votum solemne transfert se vovens quasi in corporale obsequium ipsius Dei per susceptionem ordinis vel introitum religionis; quod autem aliquis semel uni dedit, non potest postmodum alteri dare, et ideo post votum solemne non potest aliquis se tradere in potestatem uxoris matrimonium contrahendo. Sed in voto simplici est sola promissio; qui autem aliquid alicui promittit, potest idem alteri dare, licet fidem promissionis non servet; et ideo ille qui simplex votum emittit, potest postmodum matrimonium contrahere, licet peccet quia priorem fidem irritam fecit.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, since the transgression of either vow induces the guilt of mortal sin, it is said that both equally obligate before God. But as regards the impediment of matrimony, both do not have equal efficacy. For through a solemn vow he transfers himself vowing as though into the bodily service of God himself through the reception of order or the entrance of religion. Yet that which someone has given once to one, he cannot afterwards give to another; and for this reason, after a solemn vow someone cannot hand himself over to the power of a wife by contracting matrimony. But in a simple vow there is only a promise. Yet he who promises something to someone can give the same to another, even though he does not preserve the faith of the promise. And for this reason, he who makes a simple vow can afterwards contract matrimony,1 although he sins because he has made his prior faith vain.2
QX.Q5.A3.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod primus concubitus non excusat sequentes, quibus debitum reddit, a peccato, in quantum est peccatum, sed in quantum est actus quidam matrimonii consummativus.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the first act of sexual intercourse does not excuse the following ones, by which he renders the debt, from sin, inasmuch as it is sin, but inasmuch as it is a certain act consummative of matrimony.
QX.Q5.A3.ad2On fault
QX.Q5.A3Q. 6Regarding fault which is opposed to right action
Quantum ad culpam quae contrariatur rectae actioni
Regarding fault which is opposed to right action
QX.Q6Deinde quaeritur de his quae pertinent ad culpam.
Then there were questions concerning what pertains to fault:
QX.Q6Et primo quantum ad culpam quae contrariatur recte actioni;
and first, regarding fault which is opposed to right action;
QX.Q6secundo quantum ad culpam quae contrariatur recte fidei.
second, regarding fault which is opposed to right faith.
QX.Q6Circa primum quaeruntur tria:
About the first, there were three questions:
QX.Q6primo de acceptione personarum, utrum qui honorat divitem propter divitias peccet;
first, concerning the reception of persons, whether he who honors a rich man on account of his riches sins;
QX.Q6secundo de contemptu famae, utrum aliquis non repellendo infamiam peccet;
second, concerning the contempt of reputation, whether someone sins by not repelling infamy;
QX.Q6tertio de pretiositate vestium, utrum semper sit peccatum.
third, concerning the preciousness of garments, whether it always is a sin.
QX.Q6A. 1On the acceptance of personsDe acceptione personarum
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod qui honorat divitem propter divitias peccet.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that he who honors a rich man on account of his riches sins.
QX.Q6.A1.arg1Ita enim dicit Glossa Iacobi II, super illud: si introierit in conventu vestro etc.: mundus pauperem abicit, divitem colit, fides Christi e contra facit; sed facere contra fidem Christi est peccatum; ergo honorare divites propter divitias est peccatum.
Obj. 1: For thus the Gloss on James 2:2: if there shall enter into your assembly, says: the world rejects the pauper, cherishes the rich man, the faith of Christ does conversely.1 But to act against the faith of Christ is sin. Therefore, to honor rich men on account of their riches is sin.
QX.Q6.A1.arg2Praeterea. Honor, secundum Philosophum in I Ethicorum, debetur rebus divinis; sed in divite non est propter divitias aliquid divinum; ergo non debetur ei honor propter divitias.
Obj. 2: Honor, according to the Philosopher in the first book of the Ethics, is due to divine things.1 But there is not anything divine in a rich man on account of his riches. Therefore, honor is not due to him on account of his riches.
QX.Q6.A1.arg3Praetera. Ex verbis Philosophi in I Ethicorum colligitur quod honor est exhibitio reverentiae in testimonium virtutis; sed aliquando dives non est virtuosus; cum ergo falsum testimonium dicere sit peccatum, quod non debet fieri propter scandalum vitandum, videtur quod nec etiam causa vitandi scandali dives debeat propter divitias honorari.
Obj. 3: From the words of the Philosopher in the first book of the Ethics it is gathered that honor is an exhibition of reverence unto the testimony of virtue.1 But sometimes a rich man is not virtuous. Since, therefore, to speak false testimony is sin,2 which ought not be done to avoid scandal, it seems that neither to avoid scandal ought rich men to be honored for their riches.3
QX.Q6.A1.arg4Sed contra est quod Glossa Augustini dicit Iacobi II, super illud: si introierit: si de consessibus cotidianis loquitur, quis non hic peccat? Non tamen peccat, nisi apud semet ipsum eum intus iudicet ut tanto sit melior quanto ditior; sed non semper aliquis huiusmodi exterioribus honoribus divitem honorans, eum propter hoc iudicat meliorem; ergo non semper peccat.
On the contrary: The Gloss of Augustine on James 2:2: if there shall enter, says: if he speaks concerning everyday meetings, who does not sin here? Nevertheless, he does not sin, unless before himself inwardly he should judge him that he is so much better as he is richer.1 But not always does someone of this sort, who honors a rich man with exterior honors, judge him better on account of this. Therefore, he does not always sin.
QX.Q6.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod accipere personam dividitur contra accipere causam: accipere enim causam est iudicium informare ex aliquo quod facit ad causam, quod laudabile est; accipere vero personam est informare iudicium ex aliqua conditione personae quae non facit ad causam, quod vitiosum est. Unde contingit quod ex eadem conditione personae considerata quandoque fit iudicium iustum, quandoque est acceptio personarum; sicut si in aliqua controversia detur sententia pro aliquo quia est litteratior, erit acceptio personarum; si autem ex hac consideratione in licentiando ad magisterium alteri preferatur, non erit personarum acceptio.
I answer that to receive the person is divided against to receive the cause: for to receive the cause is to form a judgment out of something which acts unto the cause, which is laudable. Whereas to receive the person is to form a judgment out of some condition of the person which does not act unto the cause, which is vicious. Hence it happens that, from the same consideration of a person’s condition, sometimes a just judgment is made, and sometimes there is receiving of persons. So too, if in some controversy there is given a sentence for someone because he is more lettered, there will be receiving of persons; yet if from this consideration he is preferred to another in licensing unto teaching, there will not be receiving of persons.
QX.Q6.A1.coSi igitur aliquis honor diviti exhibeatur propter divitias, ad quem divitiae aliquid faciant, non erit acceptio personarum; erit autem, si ad hoc nihil divitiae operentur. Est autem duplex honor. Unus qui debetur alicui ratione sui ipsius propter propriam virtutem, sicut est commendatio, imitatio et alia huiusmodi; et ad hunc honorem divitiae nihil faciunt, unde si talis honor alicui propter divitias exhibeatur, erit acceptio personarum; unde dicit Maximus Valerius quod honores qui virtuti debentur, sicut triumphi et alia huiusmodi, apud Romanos antiquos nulla pecunia emi poterant. Alius honor alicui debetur secundum statum quem habet in re publica: sic enim in persona res publica honoratur, et propter hoc reges et principes et huiusmodi personae honorantur, secundum illud I Petri II: regem honorificate. Et quia in terrena re publica divites statum obtinent altiorem, ideo cives caelestis Ierusalem, quasi in Babylonia peregrinantes, debent eis inter quos conversantur morem gerere (ut Augustinus dicit in libro De civitate Dei) in his que non sunt contra Deum, et sic etiam divites honorare, illis dumtaxat honoribus qui ad exteriorem convictum pertinent.
If, therefore, some honor is exhibited to a rich man on account of his riches, namely, because his riches could do something, there will not be receiving of persons. Yet there will be if there is nothing his riches could do. Yet there is a twofold honor.1 One is due to someone by reason of himself on account of his proper virtue, just as is commendation, imitation,2 and other things of this sort. To this honor riches do nothing, hence if such honor is exhibited to someone on account of riches, there will be receiving of persons. Hence Maximus Valerius says that honors which are due to virtue, such as triumphs and other things of this sort, among the ancient Romans could be bought by no money.3 Another honor is due to someone according to the state which he has in the republic: for thus in his person the republic is honored, and on account of this kings and princes and persons of this sort are honored, according to 1 Peter 2:17: honor the king. And because in the earthly republic the rich obtain a higher state, for this reason, the citizens of the heavenly Jerusalem, as though pilgrimaging in Babylon, ought to follow the custom of those among whom they dwell (as Augustine says in the book On the City of God)4 in these things which are not against God, and thus also to honor rich men, though only by those honors which pertain to exterior society.
QX.Q6.A1Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in his quae ad fidem Christi pertinent, peccatum esset divites pauperibus praeferre, sicut sunt ministrationes sacramentorum et alia huiusmodi; sed in his quae mundi convictus requirit, oportet mundo genere morem.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that in what pertains to the faith of Christ, it would be a sin to prefer the rich to the poor, such as with the administration of the sacraments and other things of this sort. But in what the society of the world requires, it is necessary to follow the custom of the world.
QX.Q6.A1.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam divitiae, in quantum sunt quoddam bonum, sunt aliquid divinum, et praecipue in quantum praebent facultatem ad multa bene agendum.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that even riches, inasmuch as they are a certain good, are something divine, and especially inasmuch as they grant the faculty to do many things well.
QX.Q6.A1.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de honore qui exhibetur alicui ratione sui ipsius.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that that argument proceeds concerning the honor which is given to someone by reason of himself.
QX.Q6.A1.ad3A. 2On the contempt of reputationDe contemptu fame
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis peccet infamiam non repellendo.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that someone sins by not repelling infamy.
QX.Q6.A2.arg1Crudelis enim esse dicitur qui famam suam negligit; sed crudelitas peccatum est; ergo peccatum est infamiae non resistere.
Obj. 1: For he is said to be cruel who neglects his reputation;1 but cruelty is a sin. Therefore, it is a sin not to resist infamy.
QX.Q6.A2.arg2Praeterea. Ecclesiastici XVII dicitur: unicuique mandavit de proximo suo, ut scilicet ei prosit exemplo et verbo; sed hoc impeditur per infamiam; ergo quilibet infamiam repellere tenetur.
Obj. 2: In Sirach 17:12 it is said: to each man it has been mandated concerning his neighbor, namely, to benefit him by example and word. But this is impeded through infamy. Therefore, everyone is held to repel infamy.
QX.Q6.A2.arg3Sed contra est quod contemnere infamiam videtur esse actus humilitatis, unde in Vitis patrum legitur de multis sanctis patribus quod proprias infamias sustinebant non repellentes; ergo non est peccatum.
On the contrary: To contemn infamy seems to be an act of humility, hence in the Lives of the fathers it is read concerning many holy fathers that they endured their own infamies, not repelling them.1 Therefore, it is not a sin.
QX.Q6.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod utrumque, scilicet et contemptus famae et appetitus, potest esse laudabile et viciosum: fama enim non est necessaria homini propter se ipsum, sed propter proximum aedificandum; appetere igitur famam propter proximum, caritatis est, appetere vero propter seipsum ad inanem gloriam pertinet; et e contrario contemptus famae ratione sui ipsius humilitatis est, ratione vero proximi, ignaviae et crudelitatis. Illi igitur quibus incumbit ex officio vel ex statu perfectionis aliorum saluti providere, peccant nisi infamiam propriam iuxta posse repellant; alii vero quibus magis custodia suae propriae salutis imminet, possunt, suae humilitati providentes, famam vel infamiam contemnere. Sed, cum infamia dupliciter repellatur, scilicet occasionem subtrahendo et linguas detrahentium compescendo, primo modo omnes tenentur infamiam vitare, alias sine scandalo activo transiri non posset, quod semper est peccatum; sed secundo modo non tenentur, nisi quatenus debet aliquis saluti proximorum providere.
I answer that each, namely, both contempt of reputation and desire for it, can be laudable and vicious: for reputation is not necessary to man for himself, but for edifying his neighbor. Therefore, to desire reputation on account of his neighbor is of charity, whereas to desire it on account of himself pertains to vainglory. And conversely, contempt of reputation by reason of himself is of humility, whereas by reason of his neighbor it is of idleness and cruelty. Therefore, they sin, those upon whom it is incumbent out of their office, or out of the state of perfection, to provide for the salvation of others, if they do not repel their own infamy as they are able. Whereas others for whom rather custody of their own salvation is imminent can, providing for their humility, contemn reputation or infamy. But, since infamy is repelled in two ways, namely, by removing the occasion and by restraining the tongues of detractors, in the first way all are held to avoid infamy; otherwise, they could not be passed by without active scandal, which always is a sin. But in the second way they are only held to the extent that someone should provide for the salvation of his neighbors.
QX.Q6.A2.coEt hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, IX homelia super Ezechielem: linguas detrahentium sicut nostro studio non debemus excitare ne ipsi pereant, ita per suam malitiam excitatas debemus equanimiter tolerare, ut nobis meritum crescat; aliquando etiam compescere, ne, dum de nobis mala disseminant, eorum qui nos ad bona audire poterant corda innocentium corrumpant; et infra: hi etenim quorum vita in exemplum imitationis est posita debent, si possunt, detrahentium sibi verba compescere, ne eorum praedicationem non audiant qui audire poterant, et, in pravis moribus remanentes, bene vivere contemnant.
And this is what Gregory says, in his ninth homily on Ezekiel: just as we ought to excite the tongues of detractors by our zeal lest they perish, so through their malice we ought to tolerate them equally when they are excited, so that merit may increase for us; sometimes also we ought to restrain them, lest, while they disseminate evil things concerning us, they corrupt the hearts of those innocent men who could have heard us unto good things; and below: for these men whose life is placed as an example of imitation, if they are able, ought to restrain the words of their detractors, lest those who could have heard should not hear their preaching, and, remaining in their depraved customs, should contemn to live well.1
QX.Q6.A2Et ex his patet solutio ad obiecta.
Reply Obj. 1–2: And out of these things the solution to the objections is clear.
QX.Q6.A2.ad1A. 3On the use of precious garmentsDe pretiositate vestium
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod uti pretiosis vestibus semper sit peccatum.
To the third we proceed thus. It seems that to use precious garments is always a sin.
QX.Q6.A3.arg1Omne enim quod fit propter vanam gloriam, peccatum est; sed pretiosa vestimenta non portantur nisi ad inanem gloriam, unde Gregorius dicit in homelia de divite epulone: nemo quippe vestimenta praecipua nisi ad inanem gloriam quaerit, videlicet ut honorabilior ceteris esse videatur. Nam quia pro sola inani gloria pretiosum vestimentum quaeritur, ipsa res testatur, quod nemo vult ibi pretiosis vestibus indui, ubi ab aliis non possit videri; ergo usus pretiosarum vestium semper est peccatum.
Obj. 1: Everything which is done for vainglory is a sin. But precious garments are only worn for vainglory, hence Gregory says in a homily on the rich feaster: surely no one seeks precious garments unless unto vainglory, namely, so that he may seem to be more honorable than the rest. For because a precious garment is sought for vainglory alone, the thing itself testifies that no one wishes to be clothed with precious garments where he cannot be seen by others.1 Therefore, using precious garments is always a sin.
QX.Q6.A3.arg2Praeterea. I Timothaei VI: habentes alimenta et quibus tegamur, his contenti simus, Glossa: quod amplius est, a malo est; sed pretiositas vestium est amplius; ergo est peccatum.
Obj. 2: The Gloss on 1 Timothy 6:8: having nourishment and things by which we are covered, let us be content with these, says: what is greater, is from evil.1 But preciousness of garment is greater; therefore, it is sin.
QX.Q6.A3.arg3Sed contra est quod Seneca dicit ad quandam reginam: indue te delicate, non propter te, sed ne dignitas regia vilescat.
On the contrary (1): Seneca says to a certain queen: clothe yourself delicately, not on your own account, but lest the royal dignity become vile.1
QX.Q6.A3.scPraeterea. I Timothaei II: non in tortis crinibus aut auro aut margaritis vel veste pretiosa, Glossa: ultra modum suum; et ita si aliquis pretiosis vestibus secundum modum suum utatur, non peccat.
Furthermore (2): The Gloss on 1 Timothy 2:9: not in braided hair or gold or pearls or a precious garment, says: beyond her mode.1 And thus, if someone uses precious garments according to his state, he does not sin.
QX.Q6.A3.arg4Responsio. Dicendum quod aliter est hic loquendum de persona publica et de persona privata.
I answer that in this case there is a difference when speaking of a public person and of a private person.
QX.Q6.A3.coNam in persona publica consideratur et status dignitatis et propriae personae conditio, circa quae duo ita se debet habere ne dignitatis auctoritas veniat in contemptum et ne ipse in superbiam efferatur. Utrumque igitur ei potest esse laudabile, et quod pretiosis utatur ad reverentiam auctoritatis inducendam, et quod vilibus utatur ratione propriae humilitatis, ita dumtaxat ne quae ad auctoritatem conservandam fiunt, in superbiam degenerent, et ne dum nimium servatur humilitas, regendi frangatur auctoritas, sicut dicit Augustinus. Et hac ratione laudabiliter sacerdos in divino officio pretiosis utitur indumentis ad reverentiam divini cultus, et laudabiliter ab huiusmodi propter humilitatem in quibusdam religionibus abstinetur.
For in a public person there is considered both the state of dignity and the condition of his own person. Regarding these, he ought to conduct himself such that the authority of dignity does not come into contempt, and lest he be carried away into pride. Therefore, both can be laudable for him: both that he use precious things for inducing the reverence of authority, and that he use cheap things by reason of his proper humility, yet only to the extent that those things which are for conserving authority do not degenerate into pride, and lest while humility is served, the authority of ruling should be broken, just as Augustine says.1 And for this reason, a priest laudably uses precious vestments in the divine office for the reverence of the divine cult, and laudably is this abstained from out of humility by a man of this sort in certain religious orders.2
QX.Q6.A3In eo autem qui est privata persona, virtuosum est si propter propriam humilitatem abiectioribus indumentis utatur etiam quam status proprius requirit; unde Gregorius dicit in homelia praedicta: si abiectio vilis indumenti virtus non esset, Evangelista de Iohanne vigilanter non diceret: erat indutus pilis camelorum. Licitum est autem ut secundum modum propriae personae pretiosis utatur, peccatum autem si proprium modum excedat. Sed, quia pretiosum dicitur relative sicut et magnum, cum id quod est uni pretiosum, alteri pretiosum non sit, pretiositas vestium semper sonat in excessum proprii modi, et secundum hoc semper est peccatum pretiosis vestibus uti, et sic loquitur Gregorius.
Yet in him who is a private person, it is virtuous if for his own humility he uses abject garments lowlier even than his own state requires. Hence Gregory says in the aforesaid homily: if the lowliness of cheap clothing were not a virtue, the Gospel of John would not vigilantly say: he had been clothed with the hair of camels.1 Yet it is licit for anyone to use garments according to the state of his own person, yet a sin if he exceeds his own state. But, because precious is said relatively just as also great,2 since that which is precious to one, to another is not precious, preciousness of garments always expresses the excess of one’s own state. In this way, it is always a sin to use precious garments, and Gregory is speaking in that manner.
QX.Q6.A3Unde patet solutio ad primum.
Reply Obj. 1: Hence the solution to the first is clear.
QX.Q6.A3.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod in alimento et tegumento intelliguntur omnia quae nobis sunt necessaria secundum convenientiam nostri status.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that in nourishment and covering are understood all things which are necessary for us according to the fittingness of our state.
QX.Q6.A3.ad2Q. 7Regarding fault which is opposed to right faith
Quantum ad culpam quae contrariatur rectae fidei
Regarding fault which is opposed to right faith
QX.Q7Deinde quaeritur de culpa quae contrariatur rectae fidei. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo:
Then there were questions concerning fault which is opposed to right faith. And about this there were two questions:
QX.Q7primo, utrum hereticis sit communicandum;
first, whether we may communicate with heretics;
QX.Q7secundo, utrum redeuntes ad Ecclesiam sint recipiendi.
second, whether heretics returning to the Church should be received.
QX.Q7A. 1Whether we may communicate with hereticsUtrum hereticis sit communicandum
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod hereticis sit communicandum.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems we may communicate with heretics.
QX.Q7.A1.arg1Dicitur enim Matthaei XIII in parabola de zizaniis, quod paterfamilias dixit messoribus: sinite utraque crescere usque ad messem; messis autem est consummatio saeculi, ut ibidem dicitur; cum ergo per zizania intelligantur heretici, videtur quod heretici non sint a communione fidelium separandi ante diem iudicii.
Obj. 1: For it is said in Matthew 13 in the parable of the tares that the master of the house said to the harvesters: allow both to grow even unto the harvest (Matt 13:30). Yet the harvest is the consummation of the age (Matt 13:39), as is said in the same place. Since, therefore, the tares are understood as heretics, it seems that heretics must not be separated from the communion of the faithful before the day of judgment.
QX.Q7.A1.arg2Praeterea. Videntur contra hoc Domini praeceptum facere principes hereticos interficientes.
Obj. 2: Rulers who kill heretics seem to act against this precept of the Lord.
QX.Q7.A1.arg3Sed contra est quod dicitur II Corinthiorum VI: exite de medio eorum et separamini, et loquitur de infidelibus, quod patet ex hoc quod praemiserat: nolite iugum ducere cum infidelibus; ergo hereticis non est communicandum.
On the contrary: It is said in 2 Corinthians 6:17: go out from their midst and be separated. And he speaks about infidels, which is clear from this: that he had said before: do not bear the yoke with infidels (2 Cor 6:14). Therefore, we may not communicate with heretics.
QX.Q7.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod hereticis communicandum non est, duplici ratione.
I answer that we may not communicate with heretics for two reasons.
QX.Q7.A1.coUna est, ratione excommunicationis: nam, cum sint excommunicati, non est cum eis communicandum, sicut nec cum aliis excommunicatis.
The first is by reason of excommunication: for, since they have been excommunicated, we may not communicate with them, just as neither with other excommunicates.
QX.Q7.A1Alia est, specialiter ratione heresis. Primo, propter periculum, ne eorum conversatio nos corrumpat, secundum illud, I Corinthiorum XV: corrumpunt bonos mores colloquia prava. Secundo, etiam ne videamur eorum perversae doctrinae aliquem consensum praestare; unde dicitur in II canonica Iohannis: si quis veniat ad vos et hanc doctrinam non habet, nolite eum recipere in domum, nec ave ei dixeritis. Qui enim dicit illi ave, communicat operibus eius malignis; ubi dicit Glossa: secundum quod vox est instituta, communionem esse ostendit cum illo; alioquin simulatio est, quae in Christianis esse non debet. Tertio, ne ex nostra familiaritate aliis detur occasio erroris; unde ibidem dicit alia glossa: etsi vos decepti forte non estis, alii forsitan per talem vestram familiaritatem possent decipi, qui crederent illos placere vobis, et sic crederent illis. Unde alia glossa ibidem dicit: tanta apostoli atque eorum discipuli in religione cautela utebantur, ut nec verbi quidem communionem cum aliquo eorum qui a veritate declinaverant habere paterentur. Hoc tamen intelligendum est, nisi cum aliquo loqueremur propter eius salutem.
The other is specially by reason of heresy. This is first on account of danger, lest their acquaintance corrupt us, according to 1 Corinthians 15:33: depraved conversations corrupt good customs.1 The second is lest we seem to grant any consent to their perverse teaching. Hence it is said in 2 John 1:10–11: if anyone should come unto you and does not have this doctrine, do not receive him into your house, nor shall you say hello to him. For he who says hello to him, communicates in his wicked works. As a gloss says: according as the voice has been instituted, it shows that there is communion with him; otherwise, it is simulation, which ought not to be in Christians.2 The third is lest by our familiarity the occasion of error is given to others. Hence in the same place another gloss says: although perhaps you have not been deceived, perhaps others could be deceived through such familiarity of yours, who would believe that they are pleasing you, and thus would believe them.3 Hence another gloss in the same place says: the apostles and their disciples used such great caution in religion, that neither indeed did they suffer to have communion of word with anyone of those who had declined from the truth.4 Nevertheless, this must be understood as except when we are speaking with someone for his salvation.
QX.Q7.A1Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in illo praecepto patrisfamilias duplex conditio intelligitur.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that in that precept of the master of the house there is understood a twofold condition.
QX.Q7.A1.ad1Una est ut exponatur praeceptum de universali separatione malorum a bonis, et hoc accipitur ex ipsa quaestione messorum, qui dicunt: vis imus et colligimus ea?; hoc enim non erit usque ad diem iudicii.
One is such that the precept is expounded concerning the universal separation of the evil from the good, and this is understood from the very question of the harvesters, who say: do you want us to go and collect them? (Matt 13:28); for this will not be until the day of judgment.
QX.Q7.A1Secunda conditio est ut intelligatur praeceptum quando mali sine periculo bonorum extirpari non possunt, et hoc patet ex responsione patrisfamilias, qui dixit: non, ne forte colligentes zizania, eradicetis simul cum eis et triticum. Quod quidem tribus modis contingere posset: uno modo, si aliquis praecideretur ante quam de eius malitia constaret, unde dicit Glossa quod monet Dominus ne ambigue iudicemus; secundo, si non esset in malitia obstinatus, unde nullus excommunicatur nisi propter contumaciam, unde dicit Glossa ibidem: monemur non cito amputare, quia qui hodie errat, forsan cras defendet veritatem; et ideo Titi ultimo dicitur: hereticum hominem post primam et secundam correptionem devita; tertio, si simul boni cum malis involvantur, propter quod dicit ibi Glossa Augustini quod multitudo non est excommunicanda nec principes populi.
The second condition is such that the precept is understood when the evil cannot be extirpated without danger to the good, and this is clear from the response of the master of the house, who said: no, lest perhaps collecting the tares, you eradicate simultaneously with them also the wheat (Matt 13:29). This could happen in three ways. One way is if someone were to cut it away before its malice were determined, hence the Gloss says that the Lord admonishes us lest we should judge ambiguously.1 The second is if he were not obstinate in malice, for no one is excommunicated except for contumacy. Hence the Gloss says in the same place: we are admonished not to cut away quickly, because he who errs today, perhaps tomorrow will defend the truth.2 And for this reason, it is said at the end to Titus: avoid a heretical man after the first and second correction (Titus 3:10). The third is if simultaneously the good are involved with the bad, on account of which the Gloss of Augustine says there that the multitude must not be excommunicated nor the princes of the people.3
QX.Q7.A1Istis autem remotis, debent mali praecidi, secundum illud I Corinthiorum V: auferte malum ex vobis ipsis.
Yet apart from those exceptions, the evil ought to be cut away, according to 1 Corinthians 5:13: remove the evil man from yourselves.
QX.Q7.A1Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum.
Reply Obj. 2: And through this the solution to the second is clear.
QX.Q7.A1.ad2A. 2Whether heretics returning to the Church should be receivedUtrum redeuntes ad Ecclesiam sint recipiendi
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod heretici redeuntes ad Ecclesiam non sint recipiendi.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that heretics returning to the Church should not be received.
QX.Q7.A2.arg1Quia peccaverunt contra fidem, quae est Ecclesiae fundamentum, et ideo in aedificio Ecclesiae non debent superaedificari; ergo non debent ab Ecclesia recipi.
Obj. 1: For they have sinned against the faith, which is the foundation of the Church, and for this reason, they should not be built upon the edifice of the Church.1 Therefore, they should not be received by the Church.
QX.Q7.A2.arg2Sed contra est quod Ecclesia nulli debet claudere gremium, sicut Christus qui de se dicit: eum qui venit ad me, non eiciam foras, Iohannis VI.
On the contrary: The Church should close off her bosom to no one, just as Christ who says of himself: him who comes unto me, I shall not cast away outside (John 6:37).
QX.Q7.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod, quandiu huius vitae status durat, homo non potest esse totaliter in peccato obstinatus: hoc enim erit in damnatis post mortem; et ideo, quandiu in hac vita vivitur, cuilibet relinquitur locus poenitentiae, et quilibet, quantumcumque deliquerit vel in moribus vel in fide, est ab Ecclesia recipiendus ad poenitentiam, et contrarium dicere est heresis Novatianorum. Sed tamen non est necessarium quod semper ad dignitatem recipiantur, nisi cum aliquibus misericorditer dispensetur, praecipue propter bonum pacis vel propter fructum alium qui inde speretur.
I answer that, as long as the state of this life endures, man cannot be totally obstinate in sin: for this will be among the damned after death. And for this reason, as long as this life continues, there is left for whatever man a place of repentance,1 and anyone, as often as he fails either in customs or in faith, should be received by the Church unto repentance, and to say the contrary is the heresy of the Novatians.2 But, nevertheless, it is not necessary for him to always be received unto dignity, unless there is a merciful dispensation with a particular man, especially on account of the good of peace or on account of another fruit which is hoped for thence.
QX.Q7.A2.coAd primum dicendum quod, quandiu fundamentum fidei non habet, ab Ecclesia recipi non debet; sed, postquam conversus incipit habere, recipiendus est.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, as long as he does not have the foundation of faith, he should not be received by the Church. But when he begins to have it after conversion, he should be received.
QX.Q7.A2.ad1On glory
QX.Q7.A2Q. 8Regarding glory
Quantum ad gloriam
Regarding glory
QX.Q8Articulus unicus
Article 1
QX.Q8Utrum aliquis intellectus creatus possit videre Deum per essentiam
Whether any created intellect can see God through his essence
Deinde quaeritur de hoc quod pertinet ad gloriam, scilicet de visione Dei in patria, scilicet utrum aliquis intellectus creatus possit videre Deum per essentiam? Et videtur quod non.
Then there is a question concerning what pertains to glory, namely, concerning the vision of God in the fatherland, namely, whether any created intellect can see God through his essence.1 And it seems that none can.
QX.Q8Quia intellectus ad intelligibile est aliqua proportio; sed intellectus creati ad divinam essentiam nulla est proportio, cum in infinitum distent; ergo intellectus creatus divinam essentiam videre non potest.
Obj. 1: For there is some proportion of intellect to the intelligible. But of a created intellect to the divine essence there is no proportion since they are infinitely distant.1 Therefore, a created intellect cannot see the divine essence.
QX.Q8.arg1Praeterea. Plus distat spiritus increatus ab intellectu creato quam spiritus creatus a sensu; sed sensus non potest cognoscere spiritum creatum; ergo nec intellectus creatus spiritum increatum.
Obj. 2: An uncreated spirit is more distant from a created intellect than a created spirit from sense. But sense cannot know a created spirit. Therefore, neither can a created intellect know an uncreated spirit.
QX.Q8.arg2Sed contra est quod Exodi XXXIII, super illud: non videbit me homo et vivet, dicit Glossa Gregorii: fuere nonnulli qui Deum dicerent etiam in illa regione beatitudinis in claritate sua conspici, sed in natura minime videri. Quos nimirum minor inquisitionis subtilitas fefellit. Neque enim illi simplici et incommutabili essentiae aliud est claritas, aliud est natura, sed ipsa ei natura claritas, ipsa claritas natura est; et ita essentia videbitur a beatis.
On the contrary: On Exodus 33:20: man shall not see me and live, the Gloss of Gregory says: there have been some who said that even in that region of beatitude God is beheld in his clarity, but seen in his nature very little. Whom no doubt a lesser subtlety of inquisition has deceived. For neither for that simple and immutable essence is clarity one thing, and nature something else, but for him nature itself is clarity, clarity itself is nature.1 And thus, his essence will be seen by the blessed.
QX.Q8.scResponsio. Dicendum quod necesse est ponere divinam essentiam a beatis videri.
I answer that it is necessary to posit that the divine essence is seen by the blessed.
QX.Q8.coBeatitudo enim est ultima perfectio rationalis naturae; nihil autem est finaliter perfectum nisi attingat ad suum principium secundum modum suum. Quod ideo dico quia ad principium quod est Deus attingit aliquid dupliciter: uno modo per similitudinem, quod est commune omni creaturae, quae in tantum habet de perfectione quantum consequitur de divina similitudine; alio modo per operationem (ut praetermittatur ille modus qui est Christo singularis, scilicet in unitate persone), dico autem per operationem, in quantum rationalis creatura cognoscit et amat Deum. Et quia anima immediate facta est a Deo, ideo beata esse non poterit nisi immediate videat Deum, id est absque medio quod sit similitudo rei cognitae sicut species visibilis in pupilla vel in speculo, non autem absque medio quod est lumen confortans intellectum, quod est lumen gloriae, de quo in Psalmo dicitur: in lumine tuo videbimus lumen; hoc autem est per essentiam Deum videre.
For beatitude is the ultimate perfection of rational nature. Yet nothing is finally perfect unless it attains in its way unto its principle. For this reason, I say that something attains in two ways unto the principle which is God: one way is through likeness, which is common to every creature, which has of perfection as much as it obtains of divine likeness; another way is through activity (passing over that mode which is singular to Christ, that is, in unity of person), yet I say this is through activity inasmuch as a rational creature knows and loves God. And because the soul is made immediately by God, for this reason, it could not be blessed unless it sees God immediately, that is, without the medium which is a likeness of a thing known just as visible species in the pupil or in a mirror, yet not without the medium which is light strengthening the intellect, which is the light of glory, concerning which it is said in the Psalm: in your light we shall see light (Ps 36:9 [35:10]); yet this is to see God through his essence.
QX.Q8Unde in hoc ponimus beatitudinem rationalis creaturae quod Deum per essentiam videbit, sicut philosophi qui posuerunt animas nostras fluere ab intelligentia agente posuerunt ultimam felicitatem hominis in continuatione intellectus nostri ad ipsam.
Hence in this we posit as the beatitude of a rational creature that it will see God through his essence, just as the philosophers who posited that our souls flow from agent intellect posited the ultimate happiness of man in the continuation of our intellect unto it.1
QX.Q8Ad primum ergo dicendum quod proportio dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo proprie, secundum quod importat quendam determinatum excessum; et sic proportio requiritur inter intellectum et intelligibile ad hoc quod sit cognitio cum comprehensione, qualiter divina essentia nunquam videbitur ab intellectu creato. Alio modo dicitur communiter, pro qualibet habitudine; et sic infinitum potest habere proportionem ad finitum, si sit perfectio eius, vel aliam huiusmodi habitudinem habeat ad ipsum. Et talis proportio sufficit ad hoc quod intellectus noster videat divinam essentiam, attingendo, non comprehendendo.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that proportion is said in two ways.1 One way is properly, insofar as it implies a certain determinate excess. And thus, proportion is required between the intellect and the intelligible so that there may be knowledge with comprehension, in which way the divine essence never will be seen by a created intellect. In another way, it is said commonly for whatever condition. And thus, the infinite can have a proportion to the finite, if it is its perfection, or if it has another condition of this sort unto it. And such a proportion suffices for our intellect to see the divine essence, by touching, not by comprehending.2
QX.Q8.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de distantia secundum proprietatem naturae, non secundum rationem cognitionis; nam spiritus creatus non est sensibilis, sed spiritus increatus est intelligibilis.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that that objection proceeds concerning distance according to the propriety of nature, not according to the nature of knowledge. For a created spirit is not sensible, but an uncreated spirit is intelligible.
QX.Q8.ad2