Quodlibet XI
Disputed Questions
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Quodlibet XI
Quodlibetal Questions XI
QXIDe Deo, de angelis et de hominibus
On God, Angels, and Men
De Deo
On God
Q. 1On the immensity of GodDe immensitate ipsius
Quaesitum fuit de Deo, de angelis et de hominibus.
There were questions concerning God,1 angels,2 and men.3
QXI.Q1De Deo quaesitum fuit de immensitate ipsius, de cognitione eius et de praedestinatione?
Concerning God, there were questions concerning his immensity, knowledge, and predestination.
QXI.Q1Articulus unicus
Article 1
QXI.Q1Utram solius Dei sit proprium esse ubique
Whether it is proper to God alone to be everywhere
QXI.Q1Circa immensitatem vero Dei quaesitum fuit utrum solius Dei sit proprium esse ubique. Ostendebatur quod non.
Whereas about the immensity of God there was a question whether it is proper to God alone to be everywhere. It was shown that it is not.
QXI.Q1Numerus enim est in rebus numeratis; sed constat quod omnes partes universi sunt numeratae; ergo numerus est in omnibus partibus universi, et sic videtur quod sit ubique; non est igitur solius Dei proprium esse ubique.
Obj. 1: For number is in the things numbered. But it is agreed that all the parts of the universe are numbered. Therefore, number is in all the parts of the universe, and thus it seems that it is everywhere. Therefore, it is not proper to God alone to be everywhere.1
QXI.Q1.arg1Praeterea. Universale est quod est ubique et semper; sed universale non est hoc quod Deus; ergo non est proprium solius Dei esse ubique et semper.
Obj. 2: A universal is that which is everywhere and always.1 But God is not a universal. Therefore, it is not proper to God alone to be everywhere and always.
QXI.Q1.arg2Praeterea. Substantia spiritualis excedit corporalem; sed hoc quod dicitur “esse ubique” pertinet ad substantiam corporalem, quia in solis corporalibus est proprie assignare locum; ergo multo magis “esse ubique” pertinet ad substantias spirituales, et sic videtur quod non sit solius Dei proprium.
Obj. 3: Spiritual substance exceeds bodily substance. But what is called “to be everywhere” pertains to bodily substance because to assign place properly is in bodily things only. Therefore, much more does “to be everywhere” pertain to spiritual substances, and thus it seems that it is not proper to God alone.
QXI.Q1.arg3Praeterea. Ad commendationem terreni regis pertinet quod possit gubernare etiam in absentia sua regnum; sed Deus est commendabilior omni rege; ergo videtur quod etiam competat sibi ad commendationem quod gubernet totum universum vel aliquas partes in absentia sua; et sic non videtur quod sit Dei proprium esse ubique.
Obj. 4: For the commendation of an earthly king he needs to be able to govern the kingdom even in his absence. But God is more commendable than every king. Therefore, it seems that it also applies to him for commendation to govern the whole universe or any of its parts in his absence. And thus, it does not seem that it is proper to God to be everywhere.1
QXI.Q1.arg4Praeterea. Constat quod quaedam dicuntur Deo esse propinqua et quaedam remota, et quanto magis sunt remota, tanto magis sunt corruptibilia; non autem possent dici aliqua propinqua et aliqua remota Deo si Deus esset ubique; ergo videtur quod Deus non sit ubique.
Obj. 5: It is agreed that certain things are said to be near to God and certain things remote from him, and as much more as they are remote, so much more are they corruptible.1 Yet some things could not be called near to God and some remote from him if God were everywhere. Therefore, it seems that God is not everywhere.
QXI.Q1.arg5Praeterea. Dato quod tota machina mundialis esset unum corpus continuum, constat quod illud corpus esset ubique; non igitur est solius Dei proprium esse ubique.
Obj. 6: Given that the whole worldly machine1 were one continuous body, it is agreed that that body would be everywhere. Therefore, it is not proper to God alone to be everywhere.2
QXI.Q1.arg6Contra. Ambrosius probat Spiritum Sanctum esse Deum quia est ubique; sed, si esse ubique non esset solius Dei proprium, ratio Ambrosii non valeret; cum ergo ratio huiusmodi valeat, videtur quod sit solius Dei proprium esse ubique.
On the contrary: Ambrose proves that the Holy Spirit is God because he is everywhere.1 But, if to be everywhere were not proper to God alone, the argument of Ambrose would not prevail. Since, therefore, an argument of this sort does prevail, it seems that it is proper to God alone to be everywhere.
QXI.Q1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod spiritualia dicuntur esse in loco non quidem per contactum magnitudinis, sed virtutis, et ideo secundum rationem virtutis cuiuslibet rei spiritualis oportet nos loqui de loco in quo est. Virtus autem Dei est infinita, quae quidem infinitas apparet quantum ad duo: primo, quia non solum excedit creaturas quae sunt, fuerunt et erunt, sed etiam omnes quae possunt imaginari, ergo Deus non solum est in illis quae sunt, fuerunt et erunt, sed etiam in illis quae possunt imaginari esse; secundo, quia virtus Dei simul et semel in omnibus operatur, simul et in singulis secundum proprium modum rerum, et ideo esse ubique proprie acceptum soli Deo competit, aliis autem rebus competit esse ubique improprie.
I answer that spiritual things are said to be in a place not indeed through contact of magnitude, but of power; and for this reason, according to the nature of the power of any spiritual thing, we necessarily speak concerning the place in which it is. Yet the power of God is infinite, which infinity indeed appears in regard to two things. The first is because not only does it exceed creatures which are, were, and will be, but also all things which can be imagined. Therefore, God not only is in those things which are, were, and will be, but also in those which can be imagined to be. Second, because the power of God simultaneously works once in all things, and in each thing according to the proper mode of the thing, and for this reason, to be everywhere, properly understood, applies to God alone, yet to other things, to be everywhere applies improperly.
QXI.Q1.coUnde distinguitur modus quo Deus est ubique, et quo aliae res quibus aliquo modo competit esse ubique. Nam huiusmodi dicuntur esse ubique quia sunt tantum in his quae sunt et praesentia sunt, Deus autem non solum in his quae sunt, sed etiam in imaginatis et in praeteritis et futuris. Item, aliae res non sunt ubique sicut in uno loco, sed sicut in diversis locis, sed Deus ita est ubique quod est in quolibet et in toto, quia eius virtus habet efficatiam non solum in id quod est commune universo, sed etiam in id quod est proprium unicuique rei particulare, et ideo est in omnibus sicut in uno loco et sicut in pluribus, quod est proprie esse ubique.
Hence there is a distinction regarding the way God is everywhere, and the way being everywhere applies somehow to other things. For things of this sort are said to be everywhere because they are only in things which are and are present, yet God is not only in these things which are, but also in imagined things and in past and future things. Likewise, other things are not everywhere as in one place, but as in diverse places. But God is everywhere such that he is in every place and in the whole, because his power has efficacy not only in that which is common to the universe, but also in that which is proper to each particular thing. For this reason, he is in all things as in one place and as in many, which is properly to be everywhere.
QXI.Q1Unde, cum hoc modo solus Deus sit ubique, solius Dei est proprium esse ubique.
Hence, since in this way God alone is everywhere, to God alone is it proper to be everywhere.
QXI.Q1Ad primum ergo dicendum quod numerus non est in rebus numeratis sicut in loco, sed sicut accidens in subiecto. Praeterea, unus numerus, licet sit in omnibus numeratis sicut unica existentia, non tamen est in qualibet parte, quia non quaelibet pars numeratur eodem numero. Item, numerus non est omnino unus, sed multitudo quaedam; Deus autem est in rebus per virtutem suam et in singulis operatur, ut dictum est.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that number is not in numbered things as in a place, but as an accident in a subject. Besides, one number, granted it is in all numbered things as a single existence,1 nevertheless is not in every part, because every part is not numbered by the same number. Likewise, number is not altogether one, but a certain multitude.2 Yet God is in things through his power and he works in each thing, as has been said.
QXI.Q1.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod universale dicitur esse ubique et semper magis per remotionem quam per positionem: non enim dicitur esse ubique et semper eo quod sit in omni loco et in omni tempore, sed quia abstrahit ab his quae determinant locum et tempus determinatum. Et praeterea, universalia non sunt subsistentia.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that a universal is said to be everywhere and always more through removal than through position: for it is not said to be everywhere and always by this: that it is in every place and in every time, but because it abstracts from these things which determine place and determinate time. And besides, universals are not subsistent things.
QXI.Q1.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod substantia spiritualis excedit corporalem excessu dignitatis naturae, sed non in virtute agendi, immo videmus quod multae substantiae spirituales habent determinata corpora in quibus agant, sicut anima rationalis corpus humanum. Et ideo non tenet.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that spiritual substance exceeds bodily substance by excess of dignity of nature, but not in power of acting; nay, rather, we see that many spiritual substances have determinate bodies in which they act, just as the rational soul acts in the human body. And for this reason, the objection does not hold.
QXI.Q1.ad3Ad quartum dicendum quod non esse ubique per regnum est ad defectum regis terreni, propter circumscriptionem suae substantiae; Deus autem cum sit incircumscriptus, est ubique; et tamen, si non esset ubique, nihilominus gubernaret omnia sua iustitia. Unde in rege terreno non esse praesens est ad defectum, sed quod gubernet in absentia est ad commendationem; Deus autem et ubique est et omnia gubernat.
Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that to be everywhere through royal power is a defect of an earthly king, on account of the limitations of his substance. Yet God, since he is not limited, is everywhere; and nevertheless, if he were not everywhere, nonetheless he would govern all things by his justice.1 Hence in an earthly king not to be present is a defect, but to govern in his absence is commendable. Yet God both is everywhere and governs all things.
QXI.Q1.ad4Ad quintum dicendum quod huiusmodi distantia et propinquitas creaturarum ad Deum non est secundum locum, sed secundum similitudinem et dissimilitudinem: nam illa quae magis assimilantur Deo dicuntur esse sibi propinquiora, quae vero magis recedunt a similitudine ipsius dicuntur esse sibi remotiora.
Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that the distance and proximity of creatures of this sort to God is not according to place, but according to likeness and unlikeness: for those things which are more assimilated to God are said to be nearer to him, whereas those which more recede from his likeness are said to be more remote from him.1
QXI.Q1.ad5Ad sextum dicendum quod, dato quod tota machina mundialis esset unum corpus continuum, non tamen propter hoc posset imaginari quod esset ubique, sed in uno loco tantum, quia tunc illud in quo esset acciperetur pro uno loco, et sic non attingeret quodlibet particulare, quod esse ubique complectitur in sua ratione.
Reply Obj. 6: It must be said that, given that the whole worldly machine were one continuous body, nevertheless not for this could it be imagined that it were everywhere, but in one place only, because then1 that in which it is would be counted as one place, and thus it would not touch any particular thing whose nature involves being everywhere.
QXI.Q1.ad6Q. 2On the knowledge of GodDe cognitione eius
Articulus unicus
Article 1
QXI.Q2Utrum Deus cognoscat malum per bonum
Whether God knows evil through good
Circa cognitionem vero Dei quaerebatur utrum Deus cognoscat malum per bonum? Et videtur quod non.
Whereas about the knowledge of God there was a question whether God knows evil through good. And it seems that he does not.
QXI.Q2Quia cognoscere unum per aliud pertinet ad defectum cognitionis; sed in divina cognitione nullus defectus esse potest; ergo videtur quod Deus non cognoscat malum per bonum.
Obj. 1: Because to know one thing through another pertains to a defect of knowledge. But in divine knowledge there can be no defect. Therefore, it seems that God does not know evil through good.1
QXI.Q2.arg1Praeterea. Cognoscere unum per aliud est in cognoscendo discurrere; sed in divina cognitione non est discursus; ergo, cum cognoscere malum per bonum sit cognoscere unum per aliud, videtur quod Deus non cognoscat malum per bonum.
Obj. 2: To know one thing through another is to roam in knowing. But in divine knowledge there is no roaming. Therefore, since to know evil through good is to know one thing through another, it seems that God does not know evil through good.
QXI.Q2.arg2Praeterea. Quicquid Deus cognoscit, cognoscit per essentiam suam; sed malum non est effectus essentiae divinae; nec est ei oppositum, ut dicit Augustinus; ergo videtur quod Deus non cognoscat malum per bonum.
Obj. 3: Whatever God knows, he knows through his essence. But evil is not an effect of the divine essence; nor is it opposed to it, as Augustine says.1 Therefore, it seems that God does not know evil through good.
QXI.Q2.arg3Praeterea. Philosophus dicit in III De anima quod intellectus qui est semper in actu non cognoscet privationem; sed intellectus divinus est semper in actu; ergo etc.
Obj. 4: The Philosopher says in the third book of On the Soul that an intellect which is always in act shall not know privation. But the divine intellect is always in act. Therefore, it seems that God does not know evil through good.
QXI.Q2.arg4Praeterea. Omne quod cognoscitur, cognoscitur per aliquam similitudinem in ipso cognoscente existentem; sed malum non habet aliquam similitudinem in Deo; ergo Deus non cognoscit malum per aliquod bonum quod in ipso existit.
Obj. 5: Everything which is known, is known through some likeness existing in the knower himself. But evil does not have any likeness in God. Therefore, God does not know evil through something good which exists in him.
QXI.Q2.arg5Contra est quod dicit Augustinus quod malum cognoscitur secundum quod a bonitate discordat.
On the contrary: Augustine says that evil is known according to how it is discordant with good.1
QXI.Q2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod propria cognitio uniuscuiusque rei est secundum quod cognoscitur per propriam rationem. In cognoscibilibus autem quaedam sunt quae habent propriam rationem absolutam, ut homo et lapis, quorum propria ratio non dependet ex alio; quaedam vero sunt quae non habent propriam rationem absolutam, sed ex alio dependentem, sicut est in relativis et privativis et negativis, quorum ratio dependet ex ordine quem habent ad alia: nam ratio caecitatis non est absoluta, sed dependens, in quantum habet ordinem ad visum, cuius est privativa. Cum ergo Deus omnia cognoscat secundum proprias rationes, dico quod illa quorum ratio est absoluta cognoscit absolute et non per aliquid aliud; illa vero quorum propria ratio est dependens et in ordine ad alia, cognoscit secundum ordinem ad illa ex quibus dependent.
I answer that the proper knowledge of each thing is according to how it is known through its proper notion. Yet among knowable things there are certain ones which have an absolute proper notion, such as man and stone, and the proper notion of these does not depend upon something else. Whereas there are certain ones which do not have an absolute proper notion, but one that depends upon something else, such as relatives and privatives and negatives, whose notion depends upon the order which they have to other things: for the notion of blindness is not absolute,1 but dependent, inasmuch as it has an order to sight, of which it is privative. Since, therefore, God knows all things according to their proper notions, I say that those things whose notion is absolute he knows absolutely and not through something else. Whereas those things whose proper notion is dependent and in an order to other things, he knows according to the order to those things upon which they depend.
QXI.Q2.coCum ergo ratio mali non sit absoluta, sed dependens, in quantum scilicet discordat a bono creato, cognoscit malum secundum ordinem ad bonum, secundum scilicet quod discordat ab ipso bono.
Since, therefore, the notion of evil is not absolute but dependent, namely, inasmuch as it is discordant with created good, he knows evil according to the order to the good, namely, according to how it is discordant from the good itself.
QXI.Q2Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in illis quae habent rationem absolutam, est ad defectum cognitionis cognoscere unum per aliud, sed non in illis quorum ratio est ad aliud, ut dictum est.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that it is a defect of knowledge to know one thing through another for those things which have an absolute notion, but not in those things whose notion is unto another, as has been said.
QXI.Q2.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod cognitio discursiva est cognoscere unum cognitum per aliud cognitum absolute; sed cognoscere unum cognitum per aliud cognitum ad quod ordinatur, non est discurrere cognoscendo, et hoc modo cognoscitur malum.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that discursive knowledge is to know one known thing through another known thing absolutely. But to know one known thing through the other known thing unto which it is ordered is not to roam in knowing. And evil is known in this way.1
QXI.Q2.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet malum non sit oppositum divinae essentiae, tamen est oppositum effectui divinae essentiae: nam bonum increatum non habet malum oppositum, sed bonis effectibus qui causantur a bono increato, opponitur malum; et in quantum discordat ab his effectibus cognoscitur.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that, granted that evil is not opposed to the divine essence,1 nevertheless it is opposed to an effect of the divine essence: for uncreated good does not have evil opposed, but evil is opposed to the good effects which are caused by the uncreated good. And it is known inasmuch as it is discordant with these effects.
QXI.Q2.ad3Ad quartum dicendum quod illud habet locum in illo intellectu qui cognoscit res per adaequationem et species suas, et iste modus cognoscendi non est in Deo, qui cognoscit omnia per essentiam suam.
Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that that has a place in that intellect which knows things through adequation and their species, and this way of knowing is not in God, who knows all things through his essence.
QXI.Q2.ad4Ad quintum dicendum quod, licet malum non habeat aliquam similitudinem in Deo, tamen oppositum mali, scilicet bonum creatum, habet similitudinem in Deo sicut in causa sua, et ita bonum cognoscit per se ipsum, malum vero per bonum.
Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that, although evil does not have any likeness in God, nevertheless the opposite of evil, namely, created good, has a likeness in God just as in its cause, and thus he knows good through himself, whereas evil through good.
QXI.Q2.ad5Q. 3On predestinationDe predestinatione
Articulus unicus
Article 1
QXI.Q3Utrum praedestinatio imponat necessitatem
Whether predestination imposes necessity
Circa praedestinationem quaerebatur utrum praedestinatio imponat necessitatem? Et ostendebatur quod sic.
About predestination there was a question whether predestination imposes necessity. And it was shown that it does.
QXI.Q3Constat enim quod praedestinatus omnino salvatur; sed hoc non esset nisi necessarium esset praedestinatum salvari; ergo videtur quod praedestinatio necessitatem imponat.
Obj. 1: For it is agreed that someone predestined is saved entirely. But this would not be unless it were necessary for the predestined to be saved. Therefore, it seems that predestination imposes necessity.
QXI.Q3.arg1Praeterea. Romanorum IX dicit Apostolus: non est volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis Dei; ergo videtur quod quicquid homo habet de salute sit ex sola praedestinatione divina et ex nullo alio, et sic videtur necessitatem imponere.
Obj. 2: In Romans 9:16 the Apostle says: it is not of one willing nor of one running, but of God having mercy. Therefore, it seems that whatever a man has concerning salvation is from divine predestination alone and nothing else, and thus it seems to impose necessity.
QXI.Q3.arg2Contra. Augustinus dicit: qui creavit te sine te, non iustificabit te sine te.
On the contrary: Augustine says: he who created you without you, shall not justify you without you.1
QXI.Q3.scResponsio. Dicendum quod praedestinatio certitudinem habet, et tamen necessitatem non imponit. In praedestinatione autem tria considerare oportet, quorum duo praesupponit ipsa praedestinatio, scilicet praescientiam Dei et dilectionem, id est voluntatem qua vult praedestinatum salvare, et tertium est ipsa praedestinatio, quae nihil aliud est quam directio in finem quem vult Deus rei dilectae. Quodlibet autem horum trium certitudinem habet, et tamen necessitatem non imponit.
I answer that predestination has certitude, and, nevertheless, does not impose necessity. Yet in predestination it is necessary to consider three things. Two of these predestination itself presupposes, namely, the foreknowledge of God and his love, that is, his will by which he wills to save one predestined. The third is predestination itself, which is nothing else than the direction unto the end1 which God wills for the beloved thing. Yet each of these three has certitude and, nevertheless, does not impose necessity.
QXI.Q3.coEt quod praescientia divina certitudinem habeat, patet. Deus enim cognoscit res nobiliori modo quam nos cognoscamus. Nam cognitio nostra est in tempore, et ideo intuitus noster respicit res secundum rationem temporis, scilicet praesentis, praeteriti et futuri, ut scilicet cognoscat praeterita ut praeterita, praesentia ut praesentia, futura ut futura, et naturaliter. Cognitio vero divina est supra tempus et mensuratur aeternitate solum, et ideo non cognoscit <res> prout sunt in tempore, sed prout sunt in aeternitate, scilicet prout sunt praesentia ei, tam necessaria quam contingentia; unde omnia cognoscit tanquam praesentia in sua praesentialitate. Cum ergo intellectus noster certitudinaliter cognoscat praesentia, multo magis Deus omnia sibi praesentia certitudinaliter cognoscit. Ex quo nulla necessitas rebus cognitis inducitur, sicut videmus quod aliquis existens in loco eminenti videt certitudinaliter ordinem aliquorum euntium per vias et non videntium nisi quae sunt sibi praesentia; et tamen ex hoc hominibus illis nulla necessitas imponitur: nam hoc non est nisi ex eo quod in alto existens intuetur omnia ut praesentia, quae eunti in plano sunt praeterita, scilicet illa quae retro sunt, praesentia, illa scilicet quae sunt iuxta se, et futura, illa scilicet quae anteriora sunt.
That divine foreknowledge has certitude is clear. For God knows things in a nobler mode than we know. For our knowledge is in time, and for this reason, our looking regards things according to the nature of time, namely, of the present, the past, and the future, namely, so that one knows past things as past, present things as present, future things as future, and naturally. Whereas divine knowledge is above time and is measured only by eternity, and for this reason, he does not know things as they are in time, but as they are in eternity, namely, as they are present to him, both necessary things and contingent ones. Hence he knows all things as though present in his own present.1 Since, therefore, our intellect knows present things certainly, much more does God know with certainty all things present to him. From this no necessity is induced for the things known, just as we see that someone standing in a high place sees certainly the order of some men who are going through the ways and who are not seeing anything but the things which are present to them. And, nevertheless, no necessity is imposed from this for those men: for this is not unless he, standing in a high place, looks at all things as present, which to one going on level ground are past, namely, those things which are behind; present, namely, those which are near him; and future, namely, those which are in front.2
QXI.Q3Quod autem voluntas divina certitudinem habeat, et tamen necessitatem non imponat, sic patet. Voluntas enim Dei est efficax et perfecta causa omnium rerum, quia omnia quaecumque voluit Dominus, fecit. Cuius perfectio et efficacia apparet ex hoc quod non solum movet et causat res, sed etiam dat eis talem modum causandi, in quantum cuilibet rei determinatum modum contulit quo suos effectus produceret. Unde, quia ipse voluit quaedam esse in universo necessaria et quaedam contingentia, constituit quasdam causas quibus contulit ut contingenter causarent et quasdam quibus contulit ut necessario causarent effectus. Unde voluit istum vel illum effectum non solum esse, sed etiam tali modo esse, scilicet vel contingenter vel necessario, sicut quod voluit Petrum non solum currere, sed etiam contingenter currere. Et similiter voluit istum vel illum hominem salvare, sed eo modo ut arbitrii libertatem non perderet, et sic quod Petrus vel Martinus salvetur, habet duas causas, unam scilicet voluntatem divinam, et haec habet certitudinem, aliam liberum arbitrium, et haec habet contingentiam. Et sic est in aliis rebus, quia quod sint contingentia provenit eis ex causa proxima, quod vero sint certa et necessaria provenit eis ex causa prima. Unde prima causa rerum, scilicet voluntas divina, etiam de contingentibus certitudinem habet, ex qua quidem certitudine non imponitur ipsis rebus aliqua necessitas, quia non solum vult ea esse, sed tali modo esse, scilicet necessario vel contingenter, ut dictum est.
That the divine will has certitude and, nevertheless, does not impose necessity, is clear in this way. For the will of God is the efficacious and perfect cause of all things because all things whatsoever God has willed, he has made (Ps 115:3 [113:11]). The perfection and efficacy of which appears from the fact that he not only moves and causes things, but also gives to them such a mode of causing, inasmuch as upon whatever thing he confers a determinate mode by which it produces its own effects. Hence, because he willed for certain things in the universe to be necessary and certain things contingent, he constituted certain causes, upon which he conferred that they would cause their effects contingently, and certain ones upon which he conferred that they would cause their effects necessarily. Hence he willed this or that effect not only to be, but also to be in such a mode, namely, either contingently or necessarily, just as that he willed Peter not only to run, but also contingently to run. And similarly, he willed to save this or that man, but in a way that he would not destroy freedom of choice. Thus, that Peter or Martin should be saved has two causes: one, namely, the divine will, and this has certitude; and free choice, and this has contingency. And thus it is in other things, because for them to be contingent comes to them from the first cause. Hence the first cause of things, namely, the divine will, also has certitude concerning contingent things, out of which certitude, indeed, there is not imposed upon things themselves any necessity, because not only does he will them to be, but to be in such a mode, namely, necessarily or contingently, as has been said.
QXI.Q3Quod vero praedestinatio certitudinem habeat et necessitatem non imponat, similiter patet. Motus enim vel directio vel propositum dirigendi in finem, quod est ipsa praedestinatio, est secundum conditionem et ordinem causarum a Deo constitutarum. Constat autem quod, quando sunt duae causae ordinatae quarum una est necessaria et alia contingens, effectus semper est contingens. In praedestinatione autem sunt duae causae quarum una est necessaria, scilicet ipse Deus, et alia est contingens, scilicet liberum arbitrium, et ideo oportet effectum praedestinationis contingentem esse. Unde, quia Deus scit et vult istum vel illum consequi talem finem, praedestinatio certitudinem habet; quia vero Deus vult ut secundum libertatem arbitrii in talem finem dirigatur, propter hoc huiusmodi certitudo nullam praedestinationi necessitatem imponit.
Whereas, that predestination has certitude and does not impose necessity is similarly clear. For motion or direction or intention of directing unto the end, which is predestination itself, is according to the condition and order of causes constituted by God. Yet it is agreed that, when there are two ordered causes, one of which is necessary and the other contingent, the effect is always contingent. Yet in predestination there are two causes, one of which is necessary, namely, God himself, and the other is contingent, namely, free choice, and for this reason, it is necessary for the effect of predestination to be contingent. Hence, because God knows and wills this or that will obtain such an end, predestination has certitude; whereas because God wills that according to freedom of choice it should be directed unto such an end, on account of this the certitude of this sort imposes no necessity upon predestination.
QXI.Q3Ad primum ergo dicendum quod <quod> hic praedestinatus omnino salvatur, est ex certitudine divinae praedestinationis; non tamen est ibi necessitas absoluta, sed conditionalis, quia, si talis est praedestinatus, necessario salvatur; non autem est necessarium simpliciter.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the fact that this predestined man is saved entirely is from the certitude of divine predestination. Nevertheless, there is not absolute necessity there, but conditional, because, if such a man is predestined, he is saved necessarily. Yet this is not necessary absolutely.
QXI.Q3.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Apostoli non est sic intelligendum quin sit necessarium velle et currere ex parte nostra, sed quia principium primum bene operandi non est a nobis, sed ex misericordia divina infundente gratiam; nihilominus tamen oportet quod ex parte nostra sit aliquod principium.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the saying of the Apostle is not to be understood such that it is necessary to will and to run on our part, but that the first principle of operating well is not from us, but from the divine mercy infusing grace. Still, nevertheless, it is necessary for there to be some principle on our part.
QXI.Q3.ad2De angelis
On Angels
Q. 4On angelsDe angelis
Articulus unicus
Article 1
QXI.Q4De motu angeli
On the motion of an angel
Circa angelos quaesitum fuit de motu angeli, utrum scilicet motus eius sit in instanti? Et videtur quod sic.
About angels there was a question concerning the motion of an angel, namely, whether its motion is in an instant. And it seems that it is.
QXI.Q4Constat enim quod mutatio angeli simplicior est omni mutatione corporali; sed invenitur aliqua mutatio corporalis in instanti, sicut illuminatio et huiusmodi; ergo multo magis motus angeli est in instanti.
Obj. 1: For it is agreed that the change of an angel is simpler than every bodily change. But there is found some bodily change in an instant, such as illumination and things of this sort. Therefore, much more is the motion of an angel in an instant.1
QXI.Q4.arg1Praeterea. Nobilissimae creaturae competit nobilissimus motus; nobilissimus autem motus est ille qui fit in instanti; ergo competit nobilissimae creaturae, scilicet angelo.
Obj. 2: There applies to the noblest creature the noblest motion. Yet the noblest motion is that which is made in an instant. Therefore, it applies to the noblest creature, namely, an angel.
QXI.Q4.arg2Contra. Omnis motus habet prius et posterius; prius autem et posterius in motu est numerus temporis; ergo in omni motu est tempus; nullus ergo motus, etiam angeli, est in instanti.
On the contrary: Every motion has before and after. Yet before and after in motion is the number of time. Therefore, in every motion there is time. Therefore, no motion, even of an angel, is in an instant.1
QXI.Q4.scResponsio. Dicendum quod omnis mutatio habet duos terminos, quos non contingit simul esse; unde impossibile est quod aliquis motus vel mutatio sit in instanti hoc modo quod idem instans ambos terminos complectatur.
I answer that every change has two terms, which do not exist simultaneously.1 Hence it is impossible for some motion or change to be in an instant such that the same instant embraces both terms.
QXI.Q4.coSciendum <tamen> quod in rebus corporalibus duo termini motus vel mutationis dupliciter se possunt habere.
Nevertheless, it must be known that in bodily things the two terms of motion or of change can relate in two ways.
QXI.Q4Uno modo quod sit assignare instans in quo terminus ad quem primo est, et aliud instans in quo terminus a quo ultimo est; et sic, cum inter quaelibet duo instantia sit tempus medium, sequitur quod ab uno termino motus in alium fiat transitus per tempus, et sic talis mutatio est in tempore et non in instanti. Hoc autem contingit quandocumque inter duos terminos motus est aliquod medium accipere, sicut inter album et nigrum et inter esse hic et esse ibi.
One way is such that there can be assigned an instant in which the term-to-which first exists, and another instant in which the term-from-which last exists. And thus, since between any two instants there is a middle time,1 it follows that from one term of motion into another a crossing through time is made. And thus, such a change is in time and not in an instant. Yet this happens whenever between two terms of motion there is some midpoint, such as between white and black, and between to be here and to be there.
QXI.Q4Sed aliqui termini mutationis sunt inter quos non est accipere medium, sicut inter album et non album, inter ignem et non ignem, inter tenebrosum et luminosum, quia affirmatio et negatio sunt secundum se inmediata; et similiter privatio et forma in subiecto determinato; et in talibus, licet, sit accipere instans in quo primo est terminus ad quem, non tamen est accipere instans in quo ultimo est terminus a quo: cum enim inter quaelibet duo instantia sit tempus medium, sequeretur quod in illo tempore medio in neutro extremorum esset, quod est impossibile, cum sint extrema omnino immediata. Oportet igitur dicere quod, cum illud instans in quo primo est terminus ad quem sit terminus alicuius temporis, quod in toto tempore praecedenti duret terminus a quo; et sic, cum inter tempus et instans quod est terminus temporis, non sit tempus medium, non fit transitus de una extremitate in aliam in tempore, sed in instanti primo desinit esse terminus a quo et incipit esse terminus ad quem. Et huiusmodi mutationes dicuntur esse instantaneae, sicut illuminatio, generatio et corruptio. Sed oportet quod istae mutationes sint termini motuum continuorum et in tempore existentium, quia tempus in quo ultimo est terminus a quo mensurat aliquem motum, secundum quem subiectum accedit ad terminum ad quem, sicut per alterationem materia disponitur ad formam et per motum localem corpus luminosum accedit ad situm in quo illuminat. Et secundum hoc dicitur quod generatio et corruptio sunt termini alterationis, et illuminatio motus localis.
But some terms of change are those between which there is no midpoint, such as between white and not white, between fire and not fire, between dark and light, because affirmation and negation are, according to themselves, unmediated, and so too for privation and form in a determinate subject. And in such things, granted, there is a first instant in which there is a term-to-which, but, nevertheless, there is not a last instant in which there is a term-from-which. For since between any two instants there is a middle time,1 it would follow that in that middle time it would be in neither of the extremes, which is impossible, since they are extremes altogether unmediated. Therefore, it is necessary to say that, since the first instant in which there is the term-to-which is the term of some time, in the whole preceding time there endures the term-from-which. And thus, since between time and the instant which is the term of time, there is not a middle time, there is no crossing from one extremity to the other in time. Rather, in an instant there first ceases to be the term-from-which and the term-to-which begins to exist. Changes of this sort are said to be instantaneous, such as illumination, generation, and corruption. But it is necessary for these changes to be the terms of continuous motions and of things existing in time because the time in which there last is the term-from-which measures some motion, according to which a subject approaches to the term-to-which, just as through alteration matter is disposed to form and through local motion a luminous body approaches unto the site in which it illumines. And according to this, it is said that generation and corruption are terms of alteration, and illumination of local motion.2
QXI.Q4Sic igitur duae sunt dispositiones mutationum corporalium, sed neutrum horum potest esse in motu angeli. Cum enim motus angeli attendatur secundum diversos contactus virtuales angeli ad diversa loca, qui quidem contactus non sunt continui, sequitur quod motus angeli non sit continuus, et ita tempus quod proprie mensurat motum angeli non est continuum, cum continuitas temporis sit ex continuitate motus, ut dicitur in IV Physicorum (non enim potest dici quod motus angeli mensuretur tempore continuo quod est numerus motus caeli, quia motus angeli non dependet ex motu caeli). Et sic sequitur quod motus angeli mensuretur quodam tempore in quo sunt instantia sibi succedentia sine continuitate, quia tempus ex hoc quod est numerus non est continuum, sed ex hoc quod est numerus motus continui. Sic igitur in motu angeli duo extrema motus non sunt in duobus instantibus inter quae sit tempus medium, neque iterum unum extremorum est in tempore et aliud in instanti quod terminat tempus, sed duo extrema sunt in duobus instantibus, inter quae non est tempus medium. Et sic oportet dicere quod motus angeli sit in tempore, licet alio modo quam motus corporales sint in tempore.
Thus, therefore, there are two dispositions of bodily changes, but neither of these can be in the motion of an angel. For since the motion of an angel is attended according to diverse virtual contacts of an angel to diverse places, which contacts indeed are not continuous, it follows that the motion of an angel is not continuous. Thus, the time which properly measures the motion of an angel is not continuous, since continuity of time is from continuity of motion, as is said in the fourth book of the Physics1 (for it cannot be said that the motion of an angel is measured by the continuous time which is the number of the motion of heaven, because the motion of an angel does not depend upon the motion of heaven).2 And thus, it follows that the motion of an angel is measured by a certain time in which there are instants for it succeeding without continuity, because time is not continuous from being a number, but from being the number of a continuous motion. Thus, therefore, in the motion of an angel the two extremes of motion are not in two instants between which there is a middle time, nor again is one of the extremes in time and the other in the instant which terminates time. Rather, the two extremes are in two instants, between which there is not a middle time. And thus, it is necessary for the motion of an angel to be in time, granted in another way than bodily motions are in time.
QXI.Q4Ad primum ergo dicendum quod mutatio angeli secundum praedicta ostenditur esse simplicior quam aliqua mutatio corporalis: est enim simplicior quam illa mutatio cuius duo extrema sunt in duobus instantibus inter quae cadit tempus medium, cum inter duo instantia motus angeli non cadat tempus medium. Similiter etiam simplicior est quam illa cuius unum extremum est in toto tempore continuo, cum hic unum extremum sit in instanti indivisibili, et tamen non intercidit tempus medium sicut nec ibi. Et quia est simplicior, ideo etiam sequitur quod sit nobilior.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the change of an angel according to the things said above is shown to be simpler than any bodily change: for it is simpler than that change of which the two extremes are in two instants between which there falls a middle time, since between the two instants of the motion of an angel there does not fall a middle time. Similarly, it is simpler than that of which one extreme is in the whole continuous time, since here one extreme is in an indivisible instant, and, nevertheless, a middle time does not fall between, just as neither there. And because it is simpler, for this reason, it also follows that it is nobler.
QXI.Q4.ad1Unde patet solutio ad secundum.
Reply Obj. 2: Hence the solution to the second is clear.
QXI.Q4.ad2De homine
On Man
De partibus naturae humanae
On the parts of human nature
Q. 5On the soulDe anima
Deinde quaesitum est de homine. Et circa hominem quaesitum est
Then there were questions concerning man. And about man it was asked:
QXI.Q5de partibus naturae humanae,
concerning the parts of human nature,
de sacramentis gratiae et
concerning the sacraments of grace,
de conversatione humanae vitae.
and concerning the intercourse of human life.
Circa primum quaerebantur duo:
About the first, there were two questions:
QXI.Q5primo de anima,
first, concerning the soul,1
QXI.Q5secundo de corpore.
second, concerning the body.1
QXI.Q5Articulus unicus
Article 1
QXI.Q5Utrum sint eiusdem substantiae anima sensitiva et intellectiva
Whether sensitive and intellective souls are of the same substance
De anima quaesitum fuit utrum sint eiusdem substantiae anima sensitiva et intellectiva? Et ostendebatur quod non.
Concerning the soul, there was a question whether sensitive and intellective souls are of the same substance. And it was shown that they are not.
QXI.Q5Nam anima sensitiva educitur de potentia materiae, intellectiva vero est per creationem; non est igitur eadem substantia utriusque.
Obj. 1: For the sensitive soul is drawn out of the potency of matter, whereas the intellective is through creation. Therefore, there is not the same substance of each.
QXI.Q5.arg1Praeterea. In nulla substantia quae sit una et eadem, est eodem tempore motus ad opposita; sed sensus et ratio eodem tempore moventur ad opposita, sicut dicit Apostolus: video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem etc.; ergo sensitiva et rationalis non sunt unius substantiae.
Obj. 2: In no substance which is one and the same is there at the same time motion unto opposites. But sense and reason are moved unto opposites at the same time, just as the Apostle says: I see another law in my members repugnant (Rom 7:23). Therefore, the sensitive and the rational are not of one substance.
QXI.Q5.arg2Praeterea. Constat quod corruptibile et incorruptibile non sunt eiusdem generis; ergo nec eiusdem numeri; sed anima sensitiva est corruptibilis, intellectiva vero incorruptibilis; ergo sensitiva et intellectiva non sunt eadem numero, et sic nec eiusdem substantiae.
Obj. 3: It is agreed that the corruptible and the incorruptible are not of the same genus.1 Therefore, neither are they of the same number. But the sensitive soul is corruptible, whereas the intellective incorruptible. Therefore, the sensitive and the intellective are not the same in number, and thus neither of the same substance.
QXI.Q5.arg3Praeterea. Anima sensitiva est communis nobis et brutis; sed in brutis educitur de potentia materiae; ergo et in nobis; non est igitur eadem cum intellectiva, quae est per creationem.
Obj. 4: The sensitive soul is common to us and to brutes. But in brutes it is drawn from the potency of matter. Therefore, the same happens in us. Therefore, it is not the same as the intellective, which is through creation.
QXI.Q5.arg4Contra. Unius perfectibilis una est perfectio; sed corpus humanum est unum perfectibile; ergo anima, quae est eius perfectio, non est nisi una.
On the contrary: Of one perfectible there is one perfection.1 But the body of men is one perfectible thing. Therefore, the soul, which is its perfection, is not but one.
QXI.Q5.scResponsio. Dicendum quod circa ordinem formarum est duplex opinio.
I answer that about the order of forms there is a twofold opinion.
QXI.Q5.coUna est Avicebron et quorundam sequatium eius, qui dicunt quod secundum ordinem generum et specierum sunt diversae formae substantiales sibi invicem advenientes, sicut est substantia, et est corpus, et est animatum corpus, et est animal; dicunt ergo quod quaedam forma substantialis est per quam est substantia tantum, et postea est quaedam alia per quam est corpus, deinde est et alia per quam est animatum, et alia per quam est animal, similiter etiam et alia per quam est homo; et sic dicunt de aliis formis rerum substantialibus.
One is that of Avicebron and certain of his followers,1 who say that according to the order of genera and species there are diverse substantial forms coming2 upon one another, just as there is substance, and there is body, and there is animate body, and there is animal.3 Therefore, they say that a certain substantial form is that through which it is substance only, and afterwards there is another certain one through which it is body, then there is also another through which it is animate, and another through which it is animal, similarly also another through which it is man. They say the same for other substantial forms of things.
QXI.Q5Sed haec positio stare non potest, quia, cum forma substantialis sit quae facit hoc aliquid, et det esse substantiale rei, tunc sola prima forma esset substantialis, cum ipsa sola daret esse substantiale rei et faceret hoc aliquid; omnes autem aliae post primam essent accidentaliter advenientes nec darent esse simpliciter rei, sed esse tale; et sic in amissione vel in acquisitione ipsarum non esset generatio et corruptio, sed alteratio tantum; unde patet hoc non esse verum. Simile etiam esset in potentiis animae: nam sola prima, scilicet vegetabilis, esset forma substantialis et faceret hoc aliquid, aliae vero essent advenientes, quod est omnino falsum.
But this position cannot stand, because, since the substantial form is that which makes this something,1 and gives to a thing substantial existence, then only the first form would be substantial, since this alone would give to a thing substantial existence and would make this something. Yet all the others after the first would be accidentally coming upon it, nor would they give to a thing existence absolutely, but existence in such and such a way. And thus, in the loss or in the acquisition of these there would not be generation and corruption, but only alteration. Hence it is clear that this is not true. It would be similar also in the powers of the soul: for only the first, namely, the vegetative, would be a substantial form and would make this something, whereas the others would be coming upon this, which is entirely false.
QXI.Q5Et ideo dicendum est quod huiusmodi formae differunt secundum perfectum et inperfectum: est enim aliqua forma quae non dat nisi esse corpus tantum, aliqua est magis perfecta quae et dat esse et vivere quocumque modo vivendi, aliquaque cum his dat etiam sensum; unde patet quod semper ultima est perfectior primis et habet se ad priores sicut perfectissimum ad imperfectissimum, et ideo quicquid continetur in ipsis, totum est virtute in ultima. Unde dicendum est quod una et eadem essentia est animae sensitivae et intellectivae, sed intellectiva se habet ad sensitivam sicut perfectum ad imperfectum. Quod autem specialiter anima sensitiva et intellectiva sunt unius essentiae, signum est quia, nisi vires animae radicarentur in una essentia, nunquam una impediretur ab alia, nec etiam virtus unius redundaret in aliam. Item, cum intellectus non habeat determinatum organum in corpore quo mediante exerceat operationes suas, ad quid uniretur corpori, nisi esset eiusdem essentiae cum anima sensitiva?
And for this reason, it must be said that forms of this sort differ according to the perfect and the imperfect: for there is one form which only makes a body exist, one which is more perfect and gives both existence and life in whatever mode of living, and one which gives these and also sense. Hence it is clear that the last always is more perfect than the first ones, and relates to the prior ones just as the most perfect to the most imperfect, and for this reason, whatever is contained in those, the whole is in the last by power. Hence it must be said that one and the same essence is of the sensitive soul and the intellective, but the intellective relates to the sensitive just as the perfect to the imperfect. Yet a sign of the fact that the sensitive soul and the intellective specifically are of one essence is that, if the powers of the soul were not rooted in one essence, never would one be impeded by another, nor also would the power of one redound unto another. Likewise, since the intellect does not have a determinate organ in the body by whose mediation it exercises its activities, why would it be united to the body unless it were of the same essence with the sensitive soul?
QXI.Q5Sic ergo patet quod una essentia est animae sensitivae et intellectivae, sed differunt secundum perfectum et imperfectum, ut dictum est.
Thus, therefore, it is clear that one essence is of the sensitive soul and of the intellective, but they differ according to the perfect and the imperfect, as has been said.
QXI.Q5Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima sensitiva educitur de potentia materiae in brutis, in nobis vero non, sed est per creationem, cum eius essentia sit essentia animae rationalis, quae est per creationem.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the sensitive soul is drawn from the potency of matter in brutes, whereas in us it is not, but it is through creation, since its essence is the essence of the rational soul, which is through creation.
QXI.Q5.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod non est inconveniens aliquid idem existens, secundum diversas vires vel partes moveri ad opposita; et ideo, licet substantia animae humanae sit eadem sensitivae et intellectivae, tamen potest secundum diversas partes vel vires moveri ad opposita, ut scilicet sensus moveatur ad ea quae sunt sibi propria et ratio ad ea ad quae ordinatur.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that it is not unfitting for the same existing something, according to diverse powers or parts to be moved unto opposites. And for this reason, granted that the substance of the human soul is the same for the sensitive and for the intellective, nevertheless according to diverse parts or powers it can be moved unto opposites, namely, such that sense is moved unto those things which are proper to it and reason unto those unto which it is ordered.
QXI.Q5.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet incorruptibile non sit idem cum corruptibili, tamen invenitur aliquid incorruptibile quod habet aliquam proprietatem communem corruptibili; et sic est in anima rationali: nam ipsa substantia animae est incorruptibilis, nihilominus tamen habet aliquid in se, scilicet sensitivam, quae est communis etiam corruptibili.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that, granted that the incorruptible is not the same as the corruptible, nevertheless there is found something incorruptible which has some propriety common to the corruptible. And thus, it is in the rational soul: for the very substance of the soul is incorruptible. Still, nevertheless, it has something in itself, namely, the sensitive, which is common also to the corruptible.
QXI.Q5.ad3Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet sensitiva sit communis nobis et brutis quantum ad rationem generis, tamen quantum ad rationem speciei alia est in homine sensitiva et alia in brutis; et similiter alia in asino et alia in equo et in bove, quia secundum quod differunt animalia specie, ita etiam differt in eis sensitiva. Et ideo non sequitur quod, si in brutis educatur de potentia materiae, quod etiam in homine, quia in homine est altioris speciei et est per creationem, ut dictum est.
Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that, granted that the sensitive is common to us and to brutes as regards the nature of genus, nevertheless as regards the nature of species it is one thing in sensitive man and another in brutes. Similarly, it is one thing in an ass and another in a horse and in an ox, because according as animals differ by species, so also the sensitive differs in them. And for this reason, it does not follow that, if in brutes it is drawn from the potency of matter, it is also drawn in man, because in man it is of a higher species and through creation, as has been said.
QXI.Q5.ad4Q. 6On the bodyDe corpore
Articulus unicus
Article 1
QXI.Q6Utrum resurgat idem numero
Whether the body rises the same in number
Deinde de corpore quaesitum est utrum resurgat idem numero? Et ostendebatur quod non.
Then concerning the body there was a question whether it rises the same in number. And it was shown that it does not.
QXI.Q6Quia, secundum Philosophum in Topicis, illud dicitur idem numero quod est idem proprio, accidente et diffinitione; sed corporum in resurrectione non erunt eadem propria, quia nunc risibile, tunc non; non eadem accidentia, quia nunc albus, crispus, musicus et huiusmodi, quae tunc non erunt; non etiam eadem diffinitio, quia nunc diffinitur per mortale, tunc non mortale erit; ergo videtur quod non resurgat idem numero.
Obj. 1: Because, according to the Philosopher in the Topics, something is called the same in number which is the same in property, in accident, and in definition.1 But of bodies in the resurrection there will not be the same properties, because they are now risible, then not; nor the same accidents, because now they are white, curled,2 musical,3 and things of this sort, which then shall not be; and nor even the same definition, because now a body is defined as being mortal, then it will not be mortal. Therefore, it seems that it does not rise the same in number.
QXI.Q6.arg1Praeterea. Identitas materiae facit idem numero; sed materia corporis resurgentis non erit eadem cum corpore quod nunc est, cum multae formae reiterentur in ea; ergo corpus non resurget idem numero.
Obj. 2: Identity of matter makes the same in number.1 But the matter of a body rising will not be the same as the body which now is, since many forms are reiterated in it.2 Therefore, the body will not rise the same in number.
QXI.Q6.arg2Praeterea. Philosophus dicit in libro De anima quod non est eadem statua numero quae destruitur et de eodem aere reficitur; pari ergo ratione corpus quod nunc corrumpitur, non erit idem numero cum eo quod resurget.
Obj. 3: The Philosopher says in the book On the Soul that it is not the same statue in number which is destroyed and refashioned from the same bronze.1 For the same reason, therefore, the body which now is corrupted will not be the same in number as that which will rise.
QXI.Q6.arg3Praeterea. Constat quod homo humanitate est homo et una humanitate unus homo; sed in corpore quod nunc est et quod resurget erunt duae humanitates, quia per mortem destruitur forma totius; ergo erunt duo homines, et sic videtur quod corpora non resurgent eadem numero.
Obj. 4: It is agreed that man by humanity is man and by one humanity is one man. But in the body which now is and which will rise there will be two humanities, because through death there is destroyed the form of the whole.1 Therefore, there will be two men, and thus it seems that bodies will not rise the same in number.2
QXI.Q6.arg4Contra. Iob: quem visurus sum ego ipse etc.
On the contrary: Whom I myself shall have seen (Job 19:27).1
QXI.Q6.scResponsio. Dicendum quod, ad hoc quod aliquid sit idem numero, requiritur identitas principiorum essentialium; unde, quodcumque principiorum essentialium etiam in ipso individuo variatur, necesse est etiam identitatem variari. Illud autem est essentiale cuiuslibet individui quod est de ratione ipsius individui, sicut cuiuslibet rei sunt essentialia materia et forma; unde, si accidentia varientur et mutentur, remanentibus principiis essentialibus individui, ipsum individuum remanet idem. Cum ergo principia essentialia hominis sint anima et corpus, et haec remaneant, quia resurgent eadem anima et idem corpus, dicendum est quod corpora hominum resurgent eadem numero.
I answer that, for something to be the same in number, identity of essential principles is required. Hence, whatever of essential principles is varied in an individual thing, it is necessary for identity to be also varied. Yet the essential thing of an individual is of the nature of that individual, just as matter and form are essentials of a thing. Hence, if accidents are varied and changed, with the essential principles of an individual remaining, the individual itself remains the same. Since, therefore, the essential principles of man are soul and body, and both these remain, because the same soul and the same body will rise, it must be said that the bodies of men will rise the same in number.
QXI.Q6.coAd primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit ex falso intellectu litterae. Non enim dicitur idem numero illud quod habet idem accidens nunc et postea et idem proprium; sed illud est idem numero quod est idem cum accidente et idem cum proprio, sicut cum subiectum est idem cum accidente, proprio et diffinitione, et non illa quae habent idem accidens, idem proprium et unam diffinitionem. Unde patet quod obiciens falso intellexit textum.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that that objection proceeds from a false understanding of the letter.1 For something is not called the same in number which has the same accident now and afterwards and the same property. But something is the same in number which is the same with accident and the same with property, just as when a subject is the same with accident, property, and definition, and not those things which have the same accident, the same property, and one definition. Hence it is clear that the objection understood the text falsely.
QXI.Q6.ad1Dato autem quod secundum illum intellectum procedat obiectio, dicendum quod intelligitur de accidentibus individuantibus, scilicet de dimensionibus, et haec erunt in corporibus glorificatis; item erit ibi idem proprium, scilicet risus: Iob: implebitur os tuum risu et labia tua iubilo; de diffinitione vero dicendum est quod, licet resurgat immortale, tamen natura mortalitatis non tolletur ab eo, quia natura humana erit ibi, quae ex se habet quod sit mortalis.
Yet given that the objection proceeds according to that understanding, it must be said that it is understood concerning individuating accidents, namely, concerning dimensions, and these will be in glorified bodies. Likewise, there will be there the same property, namely, laughter: your mouth shall be filled with laughter and your lips with a joyful cry (Job 8:21). Whereas concerning definition it must be said that, granted it may rise immortal, nevertheless the nature of mortality will not be removed from it because human nature will be there, which from itself is mortal.
QXI.Q6Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet eadem materia faciat idem numero, non tamen materia nuda nec quae facit principium in numero, sed una materia, secundum quod est sub dimensionibus terminantibus ipsam, facit idem numero; unde, licet multae formae reiterentur in materia corporis resurgentis, tamen resurget corpus sub eisdem dimensionibus et cum eisdem principiis essentialibus.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, granted that the same matter makes the same in number, nevertheless it is not naked matter nor that which makes the principle in number,1 but one matter, according as it is under the dimensions terminating it, that makes one in number. Hence, granted that many forms are reiterated in the matter of a rising body, nevertheless the body will rise under the same dimensions and with the same essential principles.
QXI.Q6.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod Augustinus dicit contrarium: ipse enim vult, si statua reficiatur ex eodem aere, quod sit eadem numero. Nihilominus tamen dicendum quod omnia artificialia ponuntur dupliciter in genere vel specie, quia vel per materiam suam vel per formam suam, naturalia autem ponuntur in genere vel specie tantum per formam suam; formae autem artificiales, quia sunt accidentia, ideo oportet quod collocentur in genere vel specie per materiam, naturales vero non, quia sunt substantiales. Dico ergo quod, si consideretur statua prout ponitur in genere vel specie per materiam suam, sic reficitur eadem statua; si vero consideretur prout ponitur in genere vel specie per formam, sic dico quod non reficitur eadem, sed alia, quia alia est forma huius et illius. In corpore autem non est sic, quia in corpore erit eadem forma.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that Augustine says the contrary:1 for he says, if a statue is refashioned out of the same bronze, then it is the same in number. Still, nevertheless, it must be said that all artificial things are placed in a genus or species in two ways, because this is either through their matter or through their form. Yet natural things are placed in a genus or species only through their form; yet artificial forms, because they are accidents, are necessarily collected in a genus or species through matter, whereas natural things not, because they are substantial. Therefore, I say that if a statue were considered as it is placed in a genus or species through its matter, thus there is refashioned the same statue. Whereas if it were considered as placed in a genus or species through form, thus I say that there is not refashioned the same, but another, because other is the form of this and of that. Yet in a body it is not thus, because in a body there will be the same form.
QXI.Q6.ad3Ad quartum dicendum quod non sunt duae humanitates in corpore quod corrumpitur et quod resurget, sed una, quia principia essentialia non mutantur, sed eadem manent.
Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that there are not two humanities in a body which is corrupted and which shall rise, but one, because essential principles are not changed, but remain the same.
QXI.Q6.ad4De sacramentis gratiae
On the sacraments of grace
Q. 7On the sacrament of confirmationDe sacramento confirmationis
De sacramentis gratiae quaesita sunt tria:
Concerning the sacraments of grace there were three questions:
primo de sacramento confirmationis;
first, concerning the sacrament of confirmation;1
QXI.Q7secundo de sacramento eucharistiae;
second, concerning the sacrament of the Eucharist;1
QXI.Q7tertio de sacramento matrimonii.
third, concerning the sacrament of matrimony.1
QXI.Q7Articulus unicus
Article 1
QXI.Q7Utrum solus episcopus debeat conferre sacramentum confirmationis vel etiam alius
Whether only a bishop ought to confer the sacrament of confirmation, or also another person
Circa primum quaesitum est utrum solus episcopus debeat conferre sacramentum confirmationis, vel etiam alius? Et videtur quod non solum episcopus potest ipsum sacramentum conferre, sed etiam quilibet sacerdos.
About the first there was a question whether only a bishop ought to confer the sacrament of confirmation, or also another person. And it seems that not only a bishop can confer this sacrament, but also any priest.
QXI.Q7Constat enim quod in confirmatione confertur gratia spiritualis; sed huiusmodi gratiae collatio sic est ordinanda ut non possit impediri; constat autem quod per absentiam episcoporum multotiens impeditur, quia non sunt ubique praesentes; ergo debet conferri per ministerium sacerdotum, qui sunt ubique praesentes.
Obj. 1: For it is agreed that spiritual grace is conferred in confirmation. But the bestowal of grace of this sort is ordered such that it cannot be impeded. Yet it is agreed that it is impeded often through the absence of bishops because they are not present everywhere. Therefore, it ought to be conferred through the ministry of priests, who are present everywhere.
QXI.Q7.arg1Praeterea. Sacramenta instituta sunt propter utilitatem, ergo debent eo modo conferri quo competit utilitati omnium; non autem omnium utilitati competeret si solus episcopus conferret hoc sacramentum in quo datur robur Spiritus Sancti, quia non omnes habent oportunitatem episcopi; ergo debet fieri per sacerdotes, per quos omnes consequi possunt huiusmodi utilitatem.
Obj. 2: The sacraments were instituted on account of utility.1 Therefore, they ought to be conferred in a way which applies to the utility of all. Yet it would not apply to the utility of all if only a bishop conferred this sacrament in which there is given the strength of the Holy Spirit,2 because not all have access to a bishop. Therefore, it ought to be done through priests, through whom all can obtain utility of this sort.
QXI.Q7.arg2Praeterea. Constat quod sacramentum baptismi est maius quam sacramentum confirmationis; sed baptismus potest conferri per quoslibet sacerdotes; ergo multo magis confirmatio.
Obj. 3: It is agreed that the sacrament of baptism is greater than the sacrament of confirmation. But baptism can be conferred through any priests; therefore, much more can confirmation.1
QXI.Q7.arg3In contrarium est consuetudo Ecclesiae.
On the contrary: There is the custom of the Church.
QXI.Q7.scResponsio. Dicendum quod proprius minister sacramenti confirmationis est episcopus. Et hoc probatur ratione et auctoritate.
I answer that the proper minister of the sacrament of confirmation is a bishop. And this is proven by reason and by authority.
QXI.Q7.coRatione quidem, quia confirmatio ad hoc fit ut homo in quadam perfectione constituatur, cum detur ad robur Spiritus Sancti, ut scilicet homo ex hoc fiat fortis et robustus ad confitendum et proponendum fidem coram regibus et principibus; unde et propter hoc fit in fronte, ut non pertimescat nec confundatur proponere fidem coram omnibus et defendere. Sicut autem Dionysius dicit, tres sunt actiones hierarchicae, scilicet purgare, illuminare et perficere: purgare est proprium diaconorum, illuminare vero presbyterorum (et hoc maxime consistit in eucharistia), perficere vero est episcoporum; et ideo omnia sacramenta quae ad perfectionem conferuntur pertinent ad collationem episcopi, quae sunt collatio ordinum, consecratio virginum et vasorum, et confirmationis <sacramentum>. Non ergo potest alius sacramentum confirmationis conferre quam episcopus.
It is proved by reason, indeed, because confirmation is done so that man might be constituted in a certain perfection, since he is given unto the strength of the Holy Spirit,1 namely, so that man out of this might be made strong and robust unto confessing and proposing the faith before kings and princes.2 Hence, for this reason, it is done on the forehead, so that he might not be terrified nor confounded to propose the faith before all and to defend it.3 Yet, as Dionysius says, there are three actions of the hierarchy, namely, to purge, to illumine, and to perfect: to purge is proper to deacons, whereas to illumine to priests (and this especially consists in the Eucharist), whereas to perfect belongs to bishops.4 And for this reason, all the sacraments which are conferred for perfection pertain to the bestowal of the bishop, which are the bestowal of orders, the consecration of virgins and vessels, and the sacrament of confirmation. Therefore, someone other than a bishop cannot confer the sacrament of confirmation.
QXI.Q7Hoc etiam patet auctoritate Sacrae Scripturae. Confirmatio enim cedit in locum impositionis manuum; hoc autem non poterat fieri nisi per solos Apostolos; unde et per Philippum, qui praedicaverat verbum Domini in Samaria, non imponebantur manus, sed apostoli, qui erant Ierosolimis, audito quod recepit Samaria verbum Domini, miserunt ad illos Petrum et Iohannem; et postea sequitur: tunc imponebant manus super illos etc.; unde, cum episcopi succedant in locum Apostolorum, solis episcopis debetur collatio sacramenti confirmationis.
This also is clear by the authority of Sacred Scripture. For confirmation takes the place of the imposition of hands.1 Yet this could only be done by the Apostles. Hence hands were not imposed by Philip, who had preached the word of the Lord in Samaria, but the Apostles, who were in Jerusalem, since it had been heard that Samaria received the word of the Lord, they sent unto them Peter and John (Acts 8:14); and afterwards there follows: then they imposed hands upon them (Acts 8:17). Hence, since bishops take the place of the Apostles, to bishops alone is due the bestowal of the sacrament of confirmation.2
QXI.Q7Invenimus tamen quod aliqua, quae in quadam perfectione constituunt, ex dispensatione committuntur simplicibus sacerdotibus, sicut collatio minorum ordinum et huiusmodi; quod etiam de confirmatione fieri posset cum dispensatione; sine dispensatione vero nullus debet conferre huiusmodi sacramentum nisi solus episcopus.
Nevertheless, we find that some things, which bestow a certain perfection, are committed to simple priests out of dispensation, such as the bestowal of the minor orders and things of this sort. This also could be done for confirmation with a dispensation. Whereas without a dispensation only a bishop should confer a sacrament of this sort.
QXI.Q7Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non omnia sacramenta in quibus confertur gratia spiritualis potest sacerdos conferre. Unde, licet in sacramento confirmationis conferatur gratia spiritualis, non tamen competit sacerdoti, quia eodem modo et in sacramento ordinis confertur gratia spiritualis, quod reservatur solis episcopis propter perfectionem in qua constituit; et eodem modo confirmatio. Nec obstat de impedimento, quia possunt recurrere ad civitates in quibus sunt episcopi praesentes.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that a priest cannot confer all the sacraments in which spiritual grace is conferred. Hence, granted that in the sacrament of confirmation spiritual grace is conferred, nevertheless it does not apply to the priest, because spiritual grace is conferred in the same way as in the sacrament of order, which is reserved to bishops only, on account of the perfection in which it is constituted; and in the same way confirmation. Nor does impediment hinder this, because they can have recourse to cities in which bishops are present.
QXI.Q7.ad1Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum.
Reply Obj. 2: And through this the solution to the second is clear.
QXI.Q7.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod sacramentum baptismi est maius necessitate, non perfectione. Et ideo, propter eius necessitatem, non solum sacerdotes, sed quilibet christianus potest baptizare in articulo necessitatis, et ubi non habetur copia sacerdotis, servata nihilominus forma sacramenti. Confirmatio vero, quia non est adeo necessaria et constituit in quadam perfectione, ut dictum est, maiori reservatur, scilicet episcopis.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that the sacrament of baptism is greater by necessity, not by perfection. And for this reason, on account of its necessity, not only priests, but any Christian can baptize in a case of necessity and where there is not had an abundance of priests, but still with the form of the sacrament preserved. Whereas confirmation, because it is not necessary to such a degree and was constituted in a certain perfection, as has been said, is reserved to the greater, namely, to bishops.1
QXI.Q7.ad3Q. 8On the sacrament of the EucharistDe sacramento eucharistiae
Circa sacramentum eucharistiae quaesita sunt duo:
About the sacrament of the Eucharist there were two questions:
QXI.Q8primo de illis qui excluduntur a consecratione per fornicationes;
first, concerning those who are excluded from consecration through fornications;
QXI.Q8secundo vero de illis qui excluduntur a participatione ipsius sacramenti per excommunicationem.
second, concerning those who are excluded from participation of this sacrament through excommunication.
QXI.Q8A. 1Whether someone can hear the Mass of a fornicator priest without sinning mortallyUtrum aliquis possit audire missam sacerdotis fornicarii quin peccet mortaliter
Circa primum quaesitum est utrum aliquis possit audire missam sacerdotis fornicarii quin peccet mortaliter? Et videtur quod non possit audire missam ab eo sine peccato mortali.
About the first there was a question whether someone can hear the Mass of a fornicator priest without sinning mortally. And it seems that he cannot.
QXI.Q8.A1Ecclesia enim praecepit sub anathemate quod nullus audiret missam a sacerdote fornicario; sed facere contra huiusmodi mandatum Ecclesiae est peccare mortaliter; ergo quicumque audit a tali sacerdote missam peccat mortaliter.
Obj. 1: For the Church has commanded under anathema that no one should hear Mass by a fornicator priest.1 But to act against a mandate of the Church of this sort is to sin mortally. Therefore, whoever hears Mass by such a priest sins mortally.
QXI.Q8.A1.arg1Contra est quod in multis locis per mundum, sustinetur.
On the contrary: In many places throughout the world, this is endured.
QXI.Q8.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod circa hoc est considerandum quod aliquid quantum ad ius naturale est per se malum, et aliquid est malum quantum ad ius positivum.
I answer that about this one must consider that something is essentially evil as regards natural law, and something is evil as regards positive law.1
QXI.Q8.A1.coQuicumque enim sacerdos in peccato mortali existens celebrat, peccat mortaliter; unde, si constaret mihi eum esse in peccato mortali, si inducerem eum ad celebrandum, peccarem mortaliter. Et hoc est propter ipsum ius naturale, quia hoc est provocare eum ad peccatum mortale.
For any priest who celebrates while in mortal sin, sins mortally. Hence, if it were certain to me that he was in mortal sin, I would sin mortally if I were to induce him to celebrate. And this is on account of the natural law itself, because this is to provoke him to mortal sin.
QXI.Q8.A1Ius autem positivum addit plus, quod non solum si inducerem ad celebrandum, sed etiam si audiam eius missam, pecco mortaliter; quod quidem institutum est in poenam sacerdotis fornicarii. Attendendum tamen est quod hoc non intelligitur de quolibet sacerdote fornicario, sed de publicis fornicariis; et proprie illi dicuntur esse publici qui iudicio Ecclesiae per sententiam vocantur publici.
Yet positive law adds more: that not only if I were to lead him to celebrate, but also if I hear his Mass, I sin mortally. This indeed has been instituted for the punishment of the fornicator priest.1 Nevertheless, it must be noted that this is not understood concerning any fornicator priest, but concerning public fornicators. And they are said properly to be public who by the judgment of the Church through her sentence2 are called public.
QXI.Q8.A1Unde, quandocumque aliquis iudicio Ecclesiae vocatus est publicus fornicator, nullus debet audire missam suam, alias peccat mortaliter.
Hence, whenever someone by the judgment of the Church is called a public fornicator, no one ought to hear his Mass, otherwise he sins mortally.
QXI.Q8.A1Ad illud quod obicitur dicendum quod, si sustinetur a praelatis, non propter hoc excusatur, quia hoc est vel propter negligentiam, vel propter miseriam et defectum ipsorum praelatorum, qui non sunt ausi corrigere alios cum ipsi multa corrigenda committant, vel etiam aliquando propter timorem; unde non excusantur propter hoc.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, if it is endured by prelates, it is not excused on account of this, because this is either on account of negligence, or on account of the wretchedness and defect of those prelates, who do not dare to correct others even though they commit many deeds needing to be corrected, or even sometimes on account of fear. Hence they are not excused on account of this.
QXI.Q8.A1.ad1A. 2Whether someone sins mortally by speaking, eating, or standing with excommunicated personsUtrum aliquis loquendo, comedendo seu stando cum excommunicatis peccet mortaliter
Circa secundum quaesitum fuit utrum aliquis loquendo, comedendo seu stando cum excommunicatis peccet mortaliter? Et videtur quod sic.
Concerning the second there was a question whether someone sins mortally by speaking, eating, or standing1 with excommunicated persons. And it seems that he does.
QXI.Q8.A2Quia multi magistri decretorum et magni hoc dicunt.
Obj. 1: Because many masters of the decretals and great men say this.1
QXI.Q8.A2.arg1Preterea. Facere contra praeceptum Ecclesiae est peccatum mortale; sed Ecclesia mandat quod nullus loquatur nec comedat cum excommunicatis; ergo qui hoc facit, peccat mortaliter.
Obj. 2: To act against a precept of the Church is mortal sin. But the Church mandates that no one should speak nor eat with excommunicates. Therefore, he who does this sins mortally.1
QXI.Q8.A2.arg2Praeterea. Quaedam decretalis dicit, ubi consulebatur summus pontifex utrum possit participari excommunicatis, quod hoc etiam pro vitando dispendio mortis non debet facere; et huiusmodi assignat causam, quia est peccatum mortale; ergo videtur quod quicumque in aliquo participat cum eis, peccat mortaliter.
Obj. 3: A certain decretal says, where the supreme pontiff was consulted as to whether one could participate with excommunicates, that he ought not to do this even for avoiding the evil of death. And he assigns a cause of this sort: that it is mortal sin. Therefore, it seems that whoever participates with them in anything sins mortally.1
QXI.Q8.A2.arg3Contra est quod nos videmus multos perfectos viros hoc facientes, qui nullo modo hoc facerent si esset peccatum mortale.
On the contrary: We see many perfect men doing this, who in no way would do this if it were mortal sin.
QXI.Q8.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod quis per excommunicationem separatur a communione fidelium, non autem hominum, nisi per accidens, quia in tantum separatur a communione hominum in quantum contingit separari a communione fidelium. Dico ergo quod quis potest communicare seu participare cum excommunicato directe et indirecte.
I answer that someone through excommunication is separated from the communion of the faithful, yet not of men, unless incidentally. For he is separated from the communion of men inasmuch as he happens to be separated from the communion of the faithful. Therefore, I say that someone can communicate or participate with an excommunicate directly and indirectly.
QXI.Q8.A2.coDirecte quidem in his quae sunt fidelis, et sic ille qui hoc modo communicat sibi, peccat mortaliter; et hoc contingit tripliciter, quia si communico secum in divinis, sicut si orem pro eo vel audiam missam cum eo, et in aliis spiritualibus; item si ex contemptu, et hoc in quocumque communicat quis cum eo quasi contemnens mandatum Ecclesiae, peccat mortaliter; item quicumque participat secum in crimine et causa.
One communicates directly in things which belong to the faithful. He who communicates with him in this way sins mortally. And this happens in three ways: one way is if I communicate with him in divine things, such as if I pray for him or I hear Mass with him, and in other spiritual things; another way is from contempt, namely, when someone sins mortally by communicating anywhere with him in contempt of the mandate of the Church; another way is when someone participates with him in crime and cause.
QXI.Q8.A2Indirecte vero communicat quis cum eo in his quae sunt hominis, sicut in verbo, in cibo et in his quae sunt simpliciter humanae conversationis; et secundum hoc non peccat mortaliter, sed venialiter, nisi faciat ex contemptu, ut dictum est.
Someone communicates indirectly with him in these things which belong to man, such as in word, in food, and in these things which belong simply to human intercourse. And according to this he does not sin mortally, but venially, unless he acts out of contempt, as has been said.
QXI.Q8.A2Ad primum ergo dicendum quod opinio decretistarum non est vera, quia ipsi plus assentiunt in his et secuntur ius humanum quam divinum, cum plus sit assentiendum divino quam humano; et ideo melior est opinio eorum qui dicunt contrarium.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the opinion of the decretalists is not true, because in these matters they assent and follow more the human law than the divine, although the divine law is more to be assented to than the human. And for this reason, the opinion of those who say the contrary is better.1
QXI.Q8.A2.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod communicare excommunicatis directe, est contra praeceptum Ecclesiae et est peccatum mortale, sed indirecte, non est contra, sed praeter praeceptum Ecclesiae, et hoc non est peccatum mortale, sed veniale. Unde sciendum est quod quaedam sunt per se mala, et haec non possunt sine peccato fieri, sicut est communicare excommunicato in his quae sunt excommunicati et ideo non potest fieri sine peccato; quaedam vero sunt occasiones malorum tantum, et ista possunt fieri sine peccato mortali, et sic est loqui vel comedere cum excommunicatis.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that to communicate directly with excommunicates is contrary to the precept of the Church and is mortal sin. But if indirectly, it is not contrary but beyond the precept of the Church, and this is not mortal sin, but venial. Hence it must be known that certain things are evil essentially, and these cannot be done without sin, such as to communicate with an excommunicate in these things which are of an excommunicate, and for this reason, it cannot be done without sin. Whereas certain things are occasions of evils only, and those can be done without mortal sin, such as to speak or to eat with excommunicates.
QXI.Q8.A2.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod non solum quis debet subire mortem ante quam peccet mortaliter, sed etiam ante quam peccet venialiter, quia peccatum in quantum peccatum nunquam est eligibile; si enim esset eligibile, nunquam esset peccatum, et sic non peccarem si facerem. Et ideo propter hoc non concluditur quod ideo non sit participandum eis quia est peccatum mortale et qui hoc facit peccat mortaliter, quia etiam si esset veniale, non esset participandum eis, et tamen non peccaret mortaliter si participaret.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that not only ought someone to undergo death before sinning mortally, but even before sinning venially, because sin, inasmuch as it is sin, is never desirable. For if it were desirable, it would never be sin, and thus I would not sin if I were to do it. And for this reason, it is not concluded on account of this that we must not participate with them because it is mortal sin and that he who does this sins mortally. For even if it were venial, we must not participate with them, and, nevertheless, he would not sin mortally if he were to participate.
QXI.Q8.A2.ad3Vel dicendum est quod decretalis illa intelligitur de illis qui directe communicant excommunicatis.
Or it must be said that that decretal is understood concerning those who communicate directly with excommunicates.1
QXI.Q8.A2Q. 9On the sacrament of matrimonyDe sacramento matrimonii
Circa sacramentum matrimonii quaesita sunt duo:
About the sacrament of matrimony there were two questions:
QXI.Q9primo de maleficiatis;
first, concerning those rendered impotent by spells;
QXI.Q9secundo de frigidis.
second, concerning the feeble.
QXI.Q9A. 1On those rendered impotent by spellsDe maleficiatis
Circa primum quaesitum est utrum maleficia impediant matrimonium? Et ostendebatur quod non.
About the first there was a question whether being rendered impotent by spells impedes matrimony. And it was shown that it does not.
QXI.Q9.A1Quia opus Dei est fortius quam opus diaboli; sed matrimonium est opus Dei, maleficium vero opus diaboli; ergo matrimonium est fortius maleficio; non ergo impeditur per ipsum.
Obj. 1: Because the work of God is stronger than the work of the devil. But matrimony is a work of God, whereas bewitchment a work of the devil. Therefore, matrimony is stronger than bewitchment. Therefore, marriage is not impeded through it.1
QXI.Q9.A1.arg1Contra. Maior est potestas demonis quam potestas hominis; sed homo potest matrimonium impedire; ergo et demon.
On the contrary: Greater is the power of a demon than the power of man.1 But man can impede matrimony.2 Therefore, so too can a demon.
QXI.Q9.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod matrimonium est quasi quoddam pactum, nam per matrimonium unus tradit potestatem sui corporis alteri ad copulam carnalem; constat autem quod pactum de impossibili nullum est, cum nullus possit se obligare ad impossibile; et ideo, quando aliquis obligat per matrimonium se ad copulam carnalem, si hoc sit ei impossibile, matrimonium nullum est. Sed notandum est quod impossibilitas copulae carnalis ex aliquo impedimento proveniens potest dupliciter considerari, quia vel illud impedimentum est superveniens matrimonio iam consummato, vel praecedens; si quidem est superveniens, tunc matrimonium iam consummatum nunquam solvitur; si vero impedimentum praecedat, tunc matrimonium nondum consummatum solvitur. Item circa hoc sciendum quod impedimenta huiusmodi vel sunt perpetua vel ad tempus; si quidem perpetua sint, tunc matrimonium illud simpliciter impeditur; si vero sunt temporalia, tunc matrimonium non impeditur simpliciter, sed ad tempus, ita tamen quod impedimentum utriusque praecedat.
I answer that matrimony is as it were a certain pact,1 for through matrimony one hands over the power of his body to another unto carnal union. Yet it is agreed that a pact concerning the impossible is null, since no one can obligate himself unto the impossible. For this reason, when someone obligates himself through matrimony unto carnal union, the matrimony is null if this is impossible for him. But it must be noted that impossibility of carnal union arising from some impediment can be considered in two ways, because either that impediment is supervening on a matrimony already consummated, or preceding. If, indeed, it is supervening, then an already consummated matrimony is never dissolved. Whereas if the impediment precedes, then a matrimony not yet consummated is dissolved. Likewise, note that impediments of this sort are either perpetual or for a time. If, indeed, they are perpetual, then that matrimony is impeded absolutely; whereas if they are temporary, then the matrimony is not impeded absolutely, but for a time, provided that the impediment of either person preceded.
QXI.Q9.A1.coDe maleficiis autem sciendum est quod quidam dixerunt quod maleficium nihil est; et hoc proveniebat ex infidelitate, quia volebant quod demones nihil sunt nisi in imaginatione hominum, in quantum scilicet homines imaginabantur eos, et ex ista imaginatione territi laedebantur. Fides autem Catholica vult quod demones sint aliquid et possint nocere eorum operationibus et impedire carnalem copulam.
Yet concerning bewitchment it must be known that certain men say that bewitchment is nothing.1 But this is because of their infidelity, since these men believe that demons are only in the imagination of men, namely, inasmuch as men imagined them, they were struck, terrified by this imagination.2 Yet the Catholic faith believes that demons are something and can harm their activities and impede carnal union.
QXI.Q9.A1Et ideo huiusmodi impedimenta si praecedant et sunt perpetua, ut dictum est, simpliciter impediunt matrimonium.
And for this reason, impediments of this sort, if they precede and are perpetual, as has been said, impede matrimony absolutely.
QXI.Q9.A1Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etiam diabolus est opus Dei, non solum matrimonium, et inter opera Dei unum est fortius alio et unum impeditur per aliud magis forte; unde, cum diabolus sit fortior quam matrimonium, nihil prohibet per ipsum matrimonium impediri.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that even the devil is a work of God, not only matrimony, and among the works of God one is stronger than another and one is impeded through another more strong. Hence, since the devil is stronger than matrimony, nothing prohibits matrimony from being impeded through him.
QXI.Q9.A1.ad1A. 2On the feebleDe frigidis
Circa secundum quaesitum est utrum frigiditas impediat matrimonium? Et videtur quod non.
About the second there was a question whether feebleness impedes matrimony. And it seems that not.
QXI.Q9.A2Quia senes sunt frigidi, et tamen contrahunt matrimonium.
Obj. 1: Because the elderly are feeble, and, nevertheless, they contract matrimony.1
QXI.Q9.A2.arg1In contrarium est quod nullus obligat se ad impossibile; sed impossibile est frigidis carnaliter alicui copulari; ergo, si ad hoc obligant se, huiusmodi pactum nullum erit.
On the contrary: No one obligates himself to the impossible. But it is impossible for the feeble to unite carnally with someone. Therefore, if they obligate themselves to this, a pact of this sort is null.1
QXI.Q9.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod frigiditas eadem ratione impedit matrimonium sicut maleficium, cum sit eadem impossibilitas in utroque. Nihilominus tamen differt frigidus et maleficiatus: frigidus est impotens simpliciter et quantum ad omnes, maleficiatus vero est quidem impotens, non tamen quo ad omnes, sed quo ad unam tantum. Nam maleficium consistit in imaginatione viri respectu unius mulieris, in quantum scilicet ex operatione demonis fit sibi horror et abominatio alicuius mulieris, quam propter horrorem refugit et respuit.
I answer that feebleness impedes matrimony for the same reason as bewitchment, since there is the same impossibility in each. Still, nevertheless, the feeble and those rendered impotent by spells differ: the feeble person is completely impotent and as regards all persons, whereas the one rendered impotent by spells is indeed impotent, nevertheless not as regards all, but as regards one woman only. For bewitchment consists in the imagination of a man with respect to one woman, namely, inasmuch as from the activity of a demon there is made for him the horror and abomination of some woman, whom on account of horror he flees and rejects.
QXI.Q9.A2.coEt ideo aliter impedit frigiditas et aliter maleficium. Nam frigiditas impedit aliquem ita quod oportet quod remaneat absque omni spe contrahendi, si ab una impediatur (unde, si aliquando efficitur potens, oportet reintegrare primum matrimonium); unde frigiditas solvit contractum et dirimit contrahendum. Maleficiatus vero impeditur quantum ad istam tantum (unde datur ei licentia nubendi alteri, et mulieri similiter); unde maleficium solvit contractum, sed non dirimit contrahendum, ut supra dictum est.
And for this reason, feebleness impedes in one way and bewitchment in another way. For feebleness impedes someone such that it is necessary for him to remain without any hope of contracting,1 if he is impeded from one (hence, if at some time he is made potent, it is necessary to reintegrate the first matrimony).2 Hence feebleness dissolves what has been contracted and destroys what may yet be contracted. Whereas the one rendered impotent by spells is impeded as regards this woman only (hence he has permission to marry another, and similarly does the woman). Hence bewitchment dissolves what has been contracted, but does not destroy what may yet be contracted,3 as has been said above.4
QXI.Q9.A2Ad primum ergo dicendum quod senes sunt frigidi non quidem ad actum generationis, sed ad generationem prolis, et ideo, cum possint carnaliter copulari, non solvitur matrimonium; frigiditas vero, quae omnino carnalem copulam impedit, solvit matrimonium, ut dictum est.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the elderly are feeble not indeed unto the act of generation, but unto the generation of offspring, and for this reason, since they can be united carnally, the matrimony is not dissolved.1 Whereas the feebleness which entirely impedes carnal union dissolves the matrimony, as has been said.
QXI.Q9.A2.ad1Circa conversationem humanae vitae
About the manner of human life
QXI.Q9.A2Q. 10Regarding the relationship to a neighbor
Per comparationem ad proximum
Regarding the relationship to a neighbor
QXI.Q10Circa conversationem humanae vitae quaesita sunt
About the manner of human life there were asked:
QXI.Q10quaedam per comparationem ad proximum,
certain things about the relationship to a neighbor;1
QXI.Q10quaedam per comparationem ad res quae in usum hominum veniunt.
certain things about the relationship to the things that men use.1
QXI.Q10Per comparationem autem ad proximum quaesitum est de correctione fraterna. Circa quam duo quaesita sunt.
Yet about the relationship to a neighbor, there was an inquiry concerning fraternal correction. About this, there were two questions.
QXI.Q10A. 1Whether someone ought to correct his neighbor or brother in public or in privateUtrum debeat aliquis in publico vel in privato corrigere proximum seu fratrem suum
Primo, utrum debeat aliquis in publico vel in privato corrigere proximum seu fratrem suum? Et videtur quod occulte.
First, should someone correct his neighbor or his brother in public or in private? And it seems that he should do so secretly.
QXI.Q10.A1Matthaei XVIII: si peccaverit in te frater tuus, vade et corripe eum inter te et ipsum solum; videtur ergo quod occulte sit corrigendus frater delinquens.
Obj. 1: Matthew 18:15: if your brother has sinned against you, go and correct him between you and him only. Therefore, it seems that a delinquent brother must be corrected secretly.
QXI.Q10.A1.arg1Contra. Timothaei V: peccantem coram omnibus argue.
On the contrary (2): Accuse the one sinning before all (1 Tim 5:20).1
QXI.Q10.A1.scPraeterea. Aliquae constitutiones hoc habent, ut scilicet publice corrigantur.
Furthermore (3): Some constitutions require them to be corrected publicly.1
QXI.Q10.A1.arg2Responsio. Dicendum quod huiusmodi correctio ex caritate debet procedere, et inde est quod dicitur fraterna correctio; et ideo oportet ordinem fraternae correctionis sumere secundum ordinem caritatis. Ordo autem caritatis est ut quis bono proximi preferat bonum commune, item ut velit bonum proximi et conscientiae et famae, et in his magis velit bonum conscientiae, quando utrumque haberi non potest.
I answer that correction of this sort ought to proceed out of charity,1 and hence it is called fraternal correction. For this reason, it is necessary to assume the order of fraternal correction according to the order of charity. Yet the order of charity is for someone to prefer the common good to the good of his neighbor, likewise for him to will the good of his neighbor both of conscience and of reputation, and in these he wills more the good of conscience when both cannot be had.
QXI.Q10.A1.coEt ideo, his consideratis, credo quod, si esset aliquod peccatum carnale seu spirituale quod in multitudinis vergeret detrimentum, statim est revelandum, cum praeponderet bonum commune in ordine caritatis, ut dictum est, bono proximi, sive sit famae sive conscientiae. Quando vero non timetur multitudinis detrimentum, tunc debet quis utrumque custodire, bonum scilicet famae et conscientiae, corrigendo occulte inter se et ipsum. Si autem ex hoc correctio non sequatur, tunc secundum ordinem Evangelii debet secum adhibere alium vel etiam referre Ecclesiae. Nihilominus tamen et in hoc servandus est ordo, ut si peccatum sit publicum, publice corrigatur, si vero occultum, occulte. Et ideo dicitur: si peccaverit in te frater tuus, id est sciente te solo, etc., quantum ad occultum; quantum vero ad publicum dicitur: peccantem, scilicet publice, coram omnibus argue.
And for this reason, with these things considered, I believe that, if there were some sin, whether carnal or spiritual, which would incline to the detriment of the multitude, it must be revealed at once, since in the order of charity, as has been said, the common good outweighs the good of a neighbor, whether it be of reputation or of conscience. Whereas when the detriment of the multitude is not feared, then someone ought to guard both, namely, the good of reputation and of conscience, by correcting secretly between himself and him. Yet if correction does not follow from this, then according to the order of the Gospel he ought to bring with himself another or even refer it to the Church. Still, nevertheless, even in this the order must be preserved, such that if the sin be public, it may be corrected publicly, whereas if secret, secretly. And for this reason, it is said:1 if your brother has sinned against you, that is, with only you knowing,2 namely, as regards a secret sin. Whereas regarding a public sin, it is said: accuse the one sinning, namely, publicly, before all.
QXI.Q10.A1Et sic patet solutio ad primum utriusque partis.
Replies 1–2: And thus, the solution to the first of both parts is clear.
QXI.Q10.A1Ad aliud vero dicendum quod illud de constitutionibus ordinatum est et servari debet in his quae vergunt in periculum et detrimentum societatis et collegii.
Reply 3: Whereas to the other it must be said that what is from the constitutions is ordered and ought to be preserved in these things which incline to the danger and detriment of the society and company.1
QXI.Q10.A1A. 2Whether, if someone knows a sin of his neighbor, he sins mortally by referring that at once to his prelateUtrum si aliquis sciat peccatum proximi peccet mortaliter referendo illud statim praelato suo
Secundo quaerebatur utrum, si aliquis sciat peccatum proximi, peccet mortaliter referendo illud statim praelato suo. Et videtur quod sic.
Second there was a question whether, if someone knows a sin of his neighbor, he sins mortally by referring that at once to his prelate. And it seems that he does.
QXI.Q10.A2Quia facere contra ordinem Evangelii est peccatum mortale; sed statim referre praelato est contra ordinem Evangelii; ergo peccat mortaliter.
Obj. 1: Because to act against the order of the Gospel is mortal sin.1 But to refer at once to a prelate is against the order of the Gospel. Therefore, he sins mortally.
QXI.Q10.A2.arg1Contra est quod hoc faciunt multi perfecti viri, qui nullo modo hoc facerent si esset peccatum mortale.
On the contrary (2): Many perfect men do this who in no way would do this if it were mortal sin.
QXI.Q10.A2.scPraeterea. Praelati possunt non solum de praeteritis, sed etiam de futuro praebere cautelam; et ideo, si eis referatur, non videtur quod sit peccatum mortale.
Furthermore (3): Prelates can exercise caution not only concerning past things, but also concerning the future.1 And for this reason, if it is referred to them, it does not seem that it is mortal sin.
QXI.Q10.A2.arg2Responsio. Dicendum quod verba Domini quae dicit Matthaei XVIII de correctione fraterna, sunt intelligenda sicut alia verba quae dicit pertinentia ad humanos actus, et servari debent secundum quod dependent a caritate; et ideo dico quod semper cum debitis circumstantiis intelligenda sunt, sicut alia.
I answer that the words of the Lord which he says in Matthew 18:15–17 concerning fraternal correction must be understood just as the other words which he says pertaining to human acts, and should be preserved according to how they depend upon charity. And for this reason, I say that they must be understood always with their due circumstances, just as others.
QXI.Q10.A2.coSciendum autem quod in criminibus tripliciter proceditur secundum iura, quia per inquisitionem, et hoc est in peccatis publicis, et huiusmodi non debet fieri nisi praecedat clamor congregationis; item, per denunciationem et per accusationem, et hoc est in privatis. Si autem procedatur per accusationem, tunc debet fieri inscriptio qua obligatur accusans ad talionem; et in hoc intenditur ut finis bonum rei publicae, unde hoc potest fieri secundum voluntatem sive publice sive privatim. Si autem procedatur per denunciationem, tunc debet praecedere fraterna admonitio, quia finis huius est emendatio proximi, et ideo debet servari ordo fraternae correctionis.
Yet it must be known that in crimes there are three ways of proceeding according to the laws: through inquisition, and this is for public sins, and this sort of thing ought not to be done unless the clamor of the congregation should precede;1 likewise, there is through denunciation and through accusation, and this is in private matters. Yet if it proceeds through accusation, then a record ought to be made by which the one accusing is obligated to make recompense.2 And the good of the republic is intended as the end, hence this can be done, according to will, either publicly or privately. Yet if it proceeds through denunciation, then fraternal admonition ought to precede, because the end of this is the amendment of a neighbor, and for this reason, the order of fraternal correction ought to be preserved.3
QXI.Q10.A2Utrum autem statim cum quis scit fratrem suum peccasse, debeat denunciare praelato, dico quod in his est distinguendum de conditionibus, subditi et praelati. Nam si ego scio quod frater per me corrigatur, tunc non debeo denunciare hoc praelato. Si autem video quod hoc melius fiat per praelatum, et praelatum nihilominus sit pius, discretus et spiritualis, non habens rancorem seu odium adversus illum subditum, tunc licite potest hoc denunciare sibi; et tunc non dicit Ecclesiae, quia non dicit ei sicut praelato, sed sicut personae proficienti ad correctionem proximi et emendam.
Yet whether, when someone knows that his brother has sinned, he ought to denounce him to the prelate at once, I say that in these things a distinction must be made about the conditions of the subject and of the prelate. For if I know that a brother may be corrected through me, then I ought not to denounce this to the prelate. Yet if I see that this would be done better through the prelate and that the prelate, moreover, is pious, discrete, and spiritual, not having rancor1 or hatred against that subject, then licitly can he denounce this to him. Then he does not tell it to the Church, because he does not tell it to him as prelate, but as a person proficient for the correction and amendment of a neighbor.2
QXI.Q10.A2Sed, quia propter conditiones diversas et praelati et subditorum, non potest in hoc dari generale iudicium, quia aliquando praelatus vel movetur ad odium adversus subditum vel subditus non bene ferret verba praelati, ideo hoc tenendum est pro regula quod in omnibus istis semper servanda est caritas et quod melius et magis expedire videtur; et, si hoc intendat, scilicet emendam proximi, et servet quantum potest bonum caritatis, tunc denunciando non peccat; si vero denuntiet cuicumque personae hoc ex malitia, et ut proximus confundatur vel deprimatur, tunc denuntians sive accusans peccat mortaliter.
But, because on account of diverse conditions both of the prelate and of subjects, a general judgment in this matter cannot be given, because sometimes either a prelate is moved to hatred against a subject or a subject does not bear well the words of a prelate. For this reason, this must be held as a rule: that in all these matters charity must be preserved, and that which seems to be better and more expedient. And, if he intends this, namely, the amendment of his neighbor, and he preserves as much as he can the good of charity, then by denouncing he does not sin. Whereas if he denounces this to any person out of malice, and so that his neighbor might be confounded or oppressed, then the one denouncing or accusing sins mortally.
QXI.Q10.A2Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si aliquis statim referat praelato, adhibens debitas circumstantias et considerans magis expedire, non facit contra praeceptum Evangelii, quia non dicit hoc Ecclesiae, sed personae proficienti, ut dictum est; et ideo non peccat mortaliter.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, if someone at once refers it to a prelate, applying due circumstances and considering this to be more expedient, he does not act against a precept of the Gospel, because he does not say this to the Church but to a proficient person, as has been said. And for this reason, he does not sin mortally.
QXI.Q10.A2.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam perfecti viri peccarent mortaliter, si denuntiando praelato vel alicui personae, intenderent aliquid quod est contra intentionem praecepti.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that even perfect men would sin mortally if by denouncing to the prelate or to any person they would intend something which is against the intention of a precept.
QXI.Q10.A2.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod, si aliquis referat praelato culpam proximi, intendens vel cautelam in futurum vel aliquid huiusmodi quod ad emendam proximi viderit expedire, non peccat. Si autem hoc dixerit sive praelato sive alicui amico suo ex malitia, tunc peccat mortaliter. Quod si ex incautela alicui dixerit hoc, ita tamen quod non proveniat inde aliud vel infamiae vel vituperii proximo delinquenti, tunc non peccat mortaliter, etsi incaute agat.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that, if someone refers the fault of his neighbor to the prelate, intending either caution unto the future or something of this sort which he sees to be expedient for the amending of his neighbor,1 he does not sin. Yet if he says this, whether to the prelate or to some friend of his, out of malice, then he sins mortally. But if he says this out of some incaution, nevertheless such that there might not come forth from thence something either of infamy or of blame for his delinquent neighbor, then he does not sin mortally, although he acts incautiously.
QXI.Q10.A2.ad3Q. 11Regarding the relationship to things men use <missing text>
Per comparationem ad res quae in usum hominum veniunt
Regarding the relationship to things men use <missing text>
QXI.Q11<Quaestio 11 per comparationem ad res quae in usum hominum veniunt deest.>
<Question 11, regarding the relationship to the things which men use, is missing.>
QXI.Q11