Quodlibet XII
Disputed Questions
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Quodlibet XII
Quodlibetal Questions XII
QXIIDe rebus quae sunt supra hominem et de rebus humanis
On Things above Man and on Human Things
De rebus quae sunt supra hominem
On Things above Man
De Deo
On God
Q. 1Regarding the existence of God
Quantum ad suum esse
Regarding the existence of God
QXII.Q1Quaesitum est de rebus quae sunt supra hominem et de rebus humanis.
There were questions concerning things which are above man1 and concerning human things.2
QXII.Q1Circa primum quaesitum est de Deo, de angelis et de caelo.
About the first, there were questions concerning God,1 angels,2 and heaven.3
QXII.Q1Circa primum quaesitum est de Deo quantum ad suum esse, quantum ad suam potentiam, quantum ad eius praedestinationem.
About the first, there was a question concerning God in regard to his existence,1 his power,2 and his predestination.3
QXII.Q1Articulus unicus
Article 1
QXII.Q1Utrum in Deo sit tantum unum esse, scilicet essentiale, aut praeter illud sit etiam in Deo esse personale
Whether in God there is only one existence, namely, essential, or besides that there is also in God personal existence
Circa primum quaesitum est utrum in Deo sit tantum unum esse, scilicet essentiale, vel praeter illud sit etiam in Deo esse personale. Et videtur quod sic.
About the first there was a question whether in God there is only one existence, namely, essential, or besides that there is also in God personal existence. And it seems that there is.
QXII.Q1Quia aliud est Patrem esse, aliud Filium esse et aliud Spiritum Sanctum esse; sed esse essentiale non est aliud et aliud; ergo etc.
Obj. 1: For the Father is one existence, the Son another existence, and the Holy Spirit another existence. But essential existence is not one thing and another. Therefore, there is more than one existence in God.
QXII.Q1.arg1Praeterea. Proprium formae est quod det esse; sed in divinis sunt tres proprietates personales, quae optinent vicem formae; ergo etc.
Obj. 2: It is proper to form for it to give existence.1 But in divine matters there are three personal properties, which occupy the place of form. Therefore, there is more than one existence in God.
QXII.Q1.arg2Contra. Augustinus dicit: in divinis tantum unum esse.
On the contrary, Augustine says there is only one existence in divine matters.1
QXII.Q1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod veritas fidei habet quod in divinis solum est distinctio quae est secundum relationes oppositas; relatio autem, sicut et quaelibet forma, habet esse ex comparatione ad illud cui inest; unde esse filiationis est per comparationem ad subiectum cui inest. Relatio autem in divinis non distinguitur ab eo cui inest vel in quo est, quia est ipsa res quae refertur; sed distinguitur solum ex parte eius cui opponitur, et ex hac parte non consideratur esse relationis, sed distinctio et oppositi eius. Et ideo est in Deo unum tantum esse, scilicet essentiale.
I answer that the truth of the faith holds that in divine matters the only distinction is that which is according to opposed relations. Yet relation, just as also any form, has existence out of comparison unto that in which it is. Hence the existence of sonship is through comparison to the subject in which it is. Yet relation in divine matters is not distinguished by that in which it exists or in which it is, because it is this very thing which is related. But it is distinguished only on the part of that to which it is opposed, and on the part of this there is not considered an existence of relation, but distinction and its opposites. And for this reason, there is in God only one existence, namely, essential.
QXII.Q1.coAd primum ergo dicendum quod esse dupliciter dicitur: quandoque enim esse idem est quod actus entis; quandoque autem significat compositionem enunciationis et sic significat actum intellectus; quo modo intelligitur quando dicitur quod aliud est esse Patris et aliud Filii, non primo modo.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that existence is said in two ways: for sometimes existence is the same as the act of a being. Yet sometimes it signifies the composition of an enunciation, and thus it signifies the act of an intellect. It is understood in this way, not the first way, when it is said that there is one existence of the Father and another of the Son.
QXII.Q1.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut et quaelibet forma, paternitas facit esse, scilicet Patrem, qui est divinum esse, et facit tantum unum esse in quantum paternitas facit esse.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that paternity, like any form, makes existence, namely, makes the Father, who is the divine existence, and makes only one existence inasmuch as paternity makes existence.
QXII.Q1.ad2Q. 2Regarding the power of God
Quantum ad suam potentiam
Regarding the power of God
QXII.Q2Deinde quaesitum est de potentia Dei.
Then there were questions concerning the power of God:
QXII.Q2Et primo, utrum Deus possit facere contradictoria esse simul;
and first, whether God can make contradictories exist simultaneously;
QXII.Q2secundo, utrum possit facere infinita in actu.
second, whether he can make things infinite in act.
QXII.Q2A. 1Whether God can make contradictories exist simultaneouslyUtrum Deus possit facere contradictoria esse simul
Responsio. Ad primum dicendum quod non. Et hoc non importat in Deo imperfectionem potentiae, sed quia hoc non habet rationem possibilis. Nam omnis virtus activa producit effectum similem sibi; omne autem quod agit, agit inquantum est ens actu; ergo effectus agentis est ens actu; quicquid ergo repugnat ei quod est esse actu, repugnat potentiae activae. Quod esset, si contradictoria simul essent.
I answer that to the first it must be said no. And this does not imply an imperfection of power in God, but because this does not have the nature of the possible. For every active power produces an effect similar to itself;1 yet everything which acts, acts inasmuch as it is a being in act.2 Therefore, the effect of an agent is a being in act. Therefore, whatever is repugnant to that which exists in act is repugnant to active power: which would be, if contradictories were to exist simultaneously.
QXII.Q2.A1.coA. 2Whether he can make things infinite in actUtrum possit facere infinita in actu
Ad secundum dicendum quod esse aliquid infinitum actu posset suspicari ex primo aspectu quod esset impossibile, quia sequeretur illud esse aequale Deo. Sed hoc non sequitur, quia ei quod est infinitum omnibus modis non adaequatur illud quod est infinitum uno modo: dato enim quod esset ignis infinitus secundum magnitudinem, non adaequabitur Deo, quia, etsi sit infinitus ignis in quantitate, tamen est quid finitum specie, Deus autem omnibus modis est infinitus.
To the second it must be said that at first glance it could be suspected that it would be impossible for something to be infinite in act, because it would follow that such a thing is equal to God. But this does not follow, because something infinite in all ways is not equated with something infinite in one way. Supposing that there was fire infinite in magnitude, it would not be equal to God, because, although the fire is infinite in quantity, nevertheless it is something finite in species, while God is infinite in all ways.
QXII.Q2.A2.ad1Cum ergo quaeritur utrum sit possibile Deo facere aliquod infinitum in actu, dicendum quod non. Potentiae enim agentis per intellectum aliquid repugnat dupliciter: uno modo quia repugnat potentiae eius; alio modo quia repugnat modo quo agit. Primo modo non repugnat potentiae Dei absolute, quia non implicat contradictionem. Sed, si consideretur modus quo Deus agit, non est possibile: Deus enim agit per suum intellectum et per Verbum, quod est formativum omnium; unde oportet quod omnia quae agit sint formata. Infinitum autem accipitur sicut materia sine forma, nam infinitum se tenet ex parte materiae. Si ergo Deus hoc ageret, sequeretur quod opus Dei esset aliquid informe, et hoc repugnat ei per quod agit et modo agendi, quia per Verbum suum omnia agit, quo omnia formantur.
When, therefore, it is asked whether it is possible for God to make something infinite in act, it must be said that it is not. For something is repugnant to the power of an intelligent agent in two ways. One way is because it is repugnant to its power. Another way is because it is repugnant to the way it acts. In the first way it is not repugnant to the power of God absolutely, because it does not involve a contradiction. But, if the way by which God acts is considered, it is not possible: for God acts through his intellect and through the Word, which is formative of all things. Hence it is necessary for all things which he does to be formed. Yet the infinite is understood as matter without form, for the infinite maintains itself on the part of matter.1 If, therefore, God were to do this, it would follow that the work of God would be something unformed, and this is repugnant to that through which he acts and to his way of acting, because he does all things through his Word, by which all things are formed.
QXII.Q2.A2Q. 3Regarding predestination
Quantum ad eius praedestinationem
Regarding predestination
QXII.Q3A. 1Whether predestination is certainUtrum sit certa
Deinde quaesitum est de praedestinatione, utrum sit certa. Et videtur quod non.
Then there was a question concerning whether predestination is certain. And it seems that it is not.
QXII.Q3.A1Quia possibile est praedestinatum damnari, sicut Petrum, si fuisset statim mortuus quando peccavit Christum negando.
Obj. 1: Because it is possible for one predestined to be damned, such as Peter if he had died at once when he sinned by denying Christ.
QXII.Q3.A1.arg1Si vero dicas quod praedicta locutio est de dicto vera, de re vero non, contra: quia hoc habet locum in formis separabilibus; sed haec forma quae est praedestinatio est inseparabilis.
Obj. 2: Whereas if you say that the aforesaid saying is true of what is said, whereas not of reality,1 then to the contrary: that holds places amongst separable forms; but predestination is an inseparable form.2
QXII.Q3.A1.arg2Responsio. Dicendum quod praedestinatio est quaedam pars divinae providentiae; providentia autem dicit directionem aliquorum in finem, et hoc praesupponit scientiam et voluntatem. Sic ergo praedestinatio habet certitudinem ex parte scientiae Dei, quae non potest falli, et ex parte voluntatis divinae, cui non potest aliquis resistere, et ex parte providentiae, quae certissimo modo ducit ad finem, cum Deus sit sapientissimus.
I answer that predestination is a certain part of divine providence. Yet providence means the direction of some things unto the end,1 and this presupposes knowledge and will. Thus, therefore, predestination has certitude on the part of the knowledge of God, which cannot be deceived, and on the part of the will of God, which something cannot resist, and on the part of providence, which by a most certain mode leads unto the end, since God is most wise.
QXII.Q3.A1.coAd primum ergo dicendum quod praedestinatio habet certitudinem, et tamen non est necessarium praedestinatum salvari, sed remanet contingens. Dictum est enim quod habet certitudinem ex scientia, voluntate et providentia, et nullum istorum contingentiam impedit. Scientia non, quia scientia Dei est futurorum prout sunt in praesenti, et secundum hoc sunt determinata. Voluntas non, quia voluntas Dei est principium totius entis, ergo non cadit sub ratione contingentiae vel necessitatis, sed haec effluunt et ordinantur ex Dei voluntate, et sic ipsa Dei voluntas facit quaedam esse contingentia, praeparando causas contingentes illis rebus quas vult esse contingentes (et similiter necessarias causas rebus et effectibus necessariis); et sic voluntas Dei semper impletur, non tamen aliqua necessario eveniunt, sed eo modo quo vult ea esse, et vult quod sint contingenter. Providentia non, quia non tollit contingentiam.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that predestination has certitude, yet, nevertheless, it is not necessary for one predestined to be saved, rather it remains contingent. For it has been said that predestination has certitude from knowledge, will, and providence, but none of those impedes contingency: not knowledge, because the knowledge of God is of future things just as in the present, and according to this they are determinate; not will, because the will of God is the principle of the whole of being. Therefore, it does not fall under the nature of contingency or necessity, but these flow out and are ordered from the will of God, and thus the will of God itself makes certain things to be contingent by preparing contingent causes for those things which he wills to be contingent (and, similarly, necessary causes for necessary things and effects). And thus, the will of God is always fulfilled. Nevertheless, some things do not happen by necessity, but by that mode by which he wills them to be, and he wills that they should be contingently. Nor does providence impede contingency, because it does not remove contingency.1
QXII.Q3.A1.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod bona est distinctio. Sed ad obiectum de formis, dicendum quod aliter est de formis realibus et aliter de praedicatis, quae important aliquid pertinens ad actum rationis; quia in primis, scilicet realibus, si in eis debeat habere locum talis distinctio, oportet ibi esse separationem in re et in consideratione; in secundis non requiritur, sed oportet quod res illa cadat sub hac consideratione. Et sic dico quod iste praedestinatus potest considerari vel ut in se vel ut divinae cognitioni relatus, et sic uno modo attribuitur ei quod possit damnari, alio modo non.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the distinction is good.1 But unto the objection concerning forms, it must be said that it is otherwise concerning real forms and concerning predicates, which imply something pertaining to the act of reason. Because in the first, namely, real forms, if in them such a distinction ought to have a place, it is necessary for separation to be there between the thing and the consideration; in the second ones this is not required, but it is necessary for that thing to fall under this consideration.2 And thus, I say that that predestined one can be considered either as in himself or as related to the divine knowledge,3 and thus in one way there is attributed to him that he can be damned, and in the other way, not.
QXII.Q3.A1.ad2A. 2On fateDe fato
Deinde quaesitum est de fato, utrum omnia subsint fato.
Then there was a question concerning fate, whether all things are subject to fate.
QXII.Q3.A2Responsio. Dicendum quod primo oportet scire quid sit fatum, et sic postea faciliter patebit propositum.
I answer that it is necessary to know first what fate is, and thus afterwards the proposition will be obvious.
QXII.Q3.A2.coVidemus autem multa contingenter evenire, et ideo fuit olim dubium utrum ista quae variabiliter et inordinate contingunt, reducantur in aliquam causam ordinantem.
We see that many things happen contingently,1 and for this reason, it was at one time doubtful whether those things which happen variably and inordinately are reduced to some ordering cause.
QXII.Q3.A2Et qui dicunt quod non, dicunt fatum nihil esse, ut Tullius.
And those who say they are not, say that fate is nothing, as does Cicero.1
QXII.Q3.A2Quidam dicunt quod in aliquam causam superiorem et notitiam <reducuntur>, et isti nominaverunt fatum a for, faris, quasi haec omnia sint praefata a quadam superiori causa.
Certain men say that they are reduced to some superior cause and notion, and those named it fate from for, faris, (“I speak,” “you speak”),1 as though all these things should be pre-spoken by a certain superior cause.
QXII.Q3.A2Sed horum est triplex opinio.
But of these there is a threefold opinion.
QXII.Q3.A2Quidam enim reduxerunt haec in quandam seriem causarum quam dicunt fatum, sicut Stoici, qui dicunt quod nihil est quod non habeat causam, et posita causa necesse est ponere effectum; si ergo evenit vel est talis vel talis effectus, habuit causam, et haec causa aliam causam, et sic inde; sicut aliquis est occisus de nocte, quia exivit domum; quare exivit domum? quia sitivit; quare hoc? quia salsa comedit; et sic, quia comedit salsa, ex necessitate moritur.
For certain men reduced these things unto a certain series of causes which they call fate, such as the Stoics, who say there is nothing which does not have a cause, and with a cause posited it is necessary to posit an effect.1 If, therefore, such or such an effect comes to be or is, it has a cause, and this cause has another cause, and so on from thence. For instance, someone was killed at night because he left his house. Why did he leave his house? Because he was thirsty. Why this? Because he ate salty things. And thus, because he ate salty things, out of necessity he died.
QXII.Q3.A2Aristotiles respondet negans duo prima: primo, quod non quicquid fit, habet causam, sed tantum quod fit per se: quod autem ego occidar me exeunte, est per accidens; secundo dicit quod non, posita causa, ponitur effectus, quia potest impediri, et ideo non sequitur vel non stat series causarum.
Aristotle responds by denying the first two things: first, that not everything done has a cause, but only that which is done essentially. For that I should be killed when I go out is incidental. Second, he says that not always, with a cause posited, is an effect posited, because it can be impeded, and for this reason, a series of causes does not follow nor does it stand.
QXII.Q3.A2Alii reducunt haec in aliam causam, scilicet in corpora caelestia, ex quorum necessitate dicunt omnia accidere; unde dicunt quod fatum nihil aliud est quam vis positionis siderum. Haec autem opinio dupliciter est falsa. Primo quantum ad res humanas, quae proveniunt ab intellectu qui, cum sit virtus incorporea, non subiacet actioni alicuius corporis; et ponere animam subiacere virtuti corporum caelestium, nihil aliud est quam ponere intellectum non differre a sensu, ut dicit Philosophus in II De anima, in fine; tamen per accidens et occasionaliter subditur anima caelo, in quantum intellectus afficitur per passionem corporis, non tamen ex necessitate movetur ab ea. Secundo, quia multa in rebus naturalibus contingunt quae non accidunt ex necessitate caeli, sed per accidens, et non habent causam.
Other men reduce these things unto another cause, namely, the incorporeal heavens, from whose necessity they say that all things happen. Hence they say that fate is nothing else than the power of the position of the stars.1 Yet this opinion is doubly false: first as regards human things, which come forth by the intellect which, since it is an incorporeal power, does not lie under the action of some body. And to posit that the soul lies under the power of the heavenly bodies is nothing else than to posit that intellect does not differ from sense, as the Philosopher says in the second book of the On the Soul, at the end.2 Nevertheless, incidentally and occasionally the soul is subject to heaven, inasmuch as the intellect is affected through the passion of the body, nevertheless not out of necessity is it moved by it. The second is because many things in natural things happen which do not happen out of the necessity of heaven, but incidentally, and do not have a cause.
QXII.Q3.A2Alii reducunt omnia haec in causam supercaelestem, scilicet in providentiam Dei, a qua omnia sunt praedeterminata et ordinata. Et secundum istos, fatum erit quidam effectus providentiae, quia providentia nihil aliud est quam ratio ordinis rerum prout est in mente divina, fatum vero est explicatio illius ordinis prout est in rebus; unde Boetius: fatum est immobilis dispositio rebus mobilibus inherens.
Other men reduce all these things unto a super-celestial cause,1 namely, unto the providence of God, by which all things are predetermined and ordered. And according to those men, fate will be a certain effect of providence because providence is nothing else than the account of the order of things as it is in the divine mind, whereas fate is the explication of that order as it is in things. Hence Boethius: fate is an immobile disposition inhering in mobile things.2
QXII.Q3.A2Sic ergo accipiendo fatum, potest dici quod omnia subiciuntur fato. Unde dicitur Osee II, super illud: non vocabit me ultra Baalim, sed vir meus, quod idem est utrumque, sed Deus noluit hoc, quia Baalim nomen erat cuiusdam dei gentium. Et ideo sunt vitanda nomina gentilium, cum quibus nec nomina convenit habere communia. Et ideo Augustinus dicit: si quis hoc modo intelligat fatum, sententiam teneat, linguam corrigat; ut non dicat fatum, sed providentiam Dei.
Therefore, by understanding fate thus, it can be said that all things are subject to fate. Hence it is said on Hosea 2:16: he shall not call me Baalim any longer, but my husband, that both are the same, but God refuses this because Baalim was the name of a certain god of the Gentiles.1 And for this reason, the names of the Gentiles must be avoided, with whom it is not fitting to have common names.2 And for this reason, Augustine says: if anyone in this way should understand fate, let him keep his opinion, let him correct his tongue,3 so that he might not say fate, but the providence of God.
QXII.Q3.A2On angels
QXII.Q3.A2Q. 4On angelsDe angelis
Deinde quaesitum est de angelis. Et circa hoc quaesita sunt duo.
Then there were questions concerning angels. And about this two things were asked.
QXII.Q4A. 1Whether the existence of an angel is an accident of itUtrum esse angeli sit accidens eius
Primo, utrum esse angeli sit accidens eius. Et videtur quod non.
First, whether the existence of an angel is an accident of it. And it seems that it is not.
QXII.Q4.A1Quia accidens intelligitur in esse alicui praeexistenti; angelus autem non praeexistit ipsi esse.
Obj. 1: Because accident is understood in the existence of something preexisting. Yet an angel does not preexist existence itself.
QXII.Q4.A1.arg1Contra. Hilarius dicit etc.
On the contrary: Hilary says thus.1
QXII.Q4.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod opinio Avicennae fuit quod unum et ens semper praedicant accidens. Hoc autem non est verum, quia unum, prout convertitur cum ente, significat substantiam rei, et similiter ipsum ens; sed unum, prout est principium numeri, significat accidens.
I answer that the opinion of Avicenna was that one and being are always accidental predicates.1 Yet this is not true, because one, according to how it is interchangeable with being,2 signifies the substance of a thing, and similarly being itself. But one, according to how it is the principle of number, signifies an accident.
QXII.Q4.A1.coSciendum ergo quod unumquodque quod est in potentia et in actu, fit actu per hoc quod participat actum superiorem; per hoc autem aliquid maxime fit actu, quod participat per similitudinem primum et purum actum; primus autem actus est esse subsistens per se; unde completionem unumquodque recipit per hoc quod participat esse. Unde esse est completivum omnis formae, quia per hoc completur quod habet esse, et habet esse cum est actu; et sic nulla forma est nisi per esse.
Therefore, it must be known that each thing which is in potency and in act is made actual through this: that it participates in a superior act. Yet something is made maximally actual by participating in the first likeness and pure act. Yet the first act is to subsist in itself. Hence each thing receives completion by participating in existence. Hence existence is the completion of every form because it is completed through having existence, and it has existence when it is actual. And thus, no form exists unless through existence.
QXII.Q4.A1Et sic dico quod esse substantiale rei non est accidens, sed actualitas cuiuslibet formae existentis, sive sine materia sive cum materia. Et quia est completio omnium, inde est quod proprius effectus Dei est esse, et nulla causa dat esse nisi inquantum participat operationem divinam. Et sic proprie loquendo non est accidens.
And thus, I say that the substantial existence of a thing is not an accident, but the actuality of every existing form, whether without matter or with matter. And because it is the completion of all things, hence it is that the proper effect of God is existence, and no cause gives existence unless inasmuch as it participates in the divine activity. And thus, properly speaking, it is not an accident.
QXII.Q4.A1Et ad id quod Hilarius dicit, dico quod accidens dicitur large omne quod non est pars essentiae, et sic est esse in rebus creatis, quia in solo Deo esse est eius essentia.
Reply Sed Contra: And unto that which Hilary says, I say that accident is said broadly as everything which is not a part of the essence, and thus is existence in created things because in God alone is existence his essence.
QXII.Q4.A1A. 2Whether the devil knows the thoughts of menUtrum diabolus cognoscat cogitationes hominum
Secundo quaesitum est utrum diabolus cognoscat cogitationes hominum.
Second it was asked whether the devil knows the thoughts of men.
QXII.Q4.A2Responsio. Dicendum quod cognoscere cogitationes cordis potest contingere dupliciter: in se et per se, et in aliquo effectu.
I answer that to know the thoughts of the heart can happen in two ways: in and of themselves, and by some effect.
QXII.Q4.A2.coPrimo modo, solius Dei est; Ieremiae XV: pravum est cor hominis et inscrutabile; unde nec angeli sic eas cognoscunt. Cuius ratio est triplex.
In the first way, this belongs to God alone: Jeremiah 17:9: depraved is the heart of man and inscrutable. Hence neither do angels know them thus. The reason for this is threefold.
QXII.Q4.A2Una, propter debilitatem esse quod habent, eo quod <vix> supra gradum quo aliquid est ens in potentia, est gradus quo res sunt in anima.
One is on account of the debility of being which thoughts have, since the grade in which things are in the mind is scarcely above the grade in which something exists in potency.1
QXII.Q4.A2Alia ratio est quia quod est in virtute causae alicuius non potest cognosci nisi a causa quae nata est movere illam; voluntatem autem movet solus Deus; cum ergo omnes cogitationes dependeant a voluntate sicut a sua causa, solus Deus eas cognoscet.
Another reason is because that which is in the power of some cause cannot be known unless by a cause which is born to move it. Yet God alone moves the will. Since, therefore, all thoughts depend upon the will just as upon their cause, God alone knows them.
QXII.Q4.A2Alia ratio est quia angeli, illa quae cognoscunt naturaliter, cognoscunt per species naturaliter inditas, et hae sunt species rerum naturalium, non autem cogitationum, quia hae non reducuntur ad causam naturalem, vel non pertinent ad cognitionem naturalium.
Another reason is because angels know those things which they know naturally through species naturally introduced, and these are the species of natural things, yet not of thoughts, because these are not reduced unto a natural cause or do not pertain to the knowledge of natural things.
QXII.Q4.A2Tamen per effectus cogitationum cognoscunt cogitationes, sicut et homo facit. Tamen ipsi subtilius cognoscunt effectus qui causantur ex cogitationibus: nam secundum cogitationes homo afficitur aliqua passione et per has movetur cor, et hos motus subtilius ipsi cognoscunt quam nos; et sic aliquid cognoscunt de cogitationibus cordis. Et hoc Augustinus dicit in libro De divinationibus daemonum, licet alibi dicat quod determinare in eis talem cognitionem sit praesumptuosum.
Nevertheless, they know thoughts through the effects of thoughts, just as man also does. Nevertheless, they know effects more subtly which are caused out of thoughts: for according to thoughts man is affected by some passion and through these the heart is moved, and angels know those motions more subtly than we. And thus, they know something concerning the thoughts of the heart. And Augustine says this in the book On the Divinations of Demons,1 granted elsewhere he says that to determine2 such knowledge in them would be presumptuous.
QXII.Q4.A2On heaven
QXII.Q4.A2Q. 5On heavenDe caelo
Deinde quaesitum est de caelo. Et circa hoc duo quaesita fuerunt.
Then there were questions concerning heaven. And about this two things were asked.
QXII.Q5A. 1Whether heaven or the world is eternalUtrum caelum vel mundus sit aeternus
Primo, utrum caelum vel mundus sit aeternus.
First, whether heaven or the world is eternal.
QXII.Q5.A1Responsio. Dicendum quod non, sed mundum incepisse est de numero eorum quae cadunt sub fide, non sub demonstratione. Nam quae dependent ex simplici voluntate Dei possunt esse et non esse; et ad hoc quod sint, non inducit aliqua necessitas ex parte Dei; divina autem bonitas, quae est finis rerum, potest esse ita si non sit mundus sicut si sit.
I answer that it is not, but that the world began is of the number of those things which fall under faith, not under demonstration. For those things which depend upon the simple will of God can be and not be. And unto this: that they exist, there is no necessity on the part of God. Yet the divine goodness, which is the end of things, can be thus if the world should not be just as if it should be.
QXII.Q5.A1.coA. 2Whether heaven is animateUtrum caelum sit animatum
Secundo quaesitum est utrum caelum sit animatum.
Second it was asked whether heaven is animate.
QXII.Q5.A2Responsio. Dicendum quod de hoc diversimode senserunt doctores Ecclesiae: Ieronimus enim super Ecclesiastes dicit quod sol est animatus; Damascenus hoc negat. Et haec differenda etiam est apud philosophos: Plato enim et Aristotiles ponunt corpora caelestia animata esse; Anaxagoras non, et ideo legitur fuisse occisus.
I answer that the doctors of the Church have thought diversely about this: for Jerome in his commentary on Ecclesiastes says that the sun is animate;1 Damascene denies this.2 And this difference in opinion exists also among the philosophers: for Plato3 and Aristotle4 posit that the celestial bodies are animate; Anaxagoras did not, and for this reason, it is read that he was killed.5
QXII.Q5.A2.coEgo autem dico, secundum Augustinum, II Super Genesim ad litteram, quod non refert ad fidem utrum sic vel aliter sit. Unde hoc non determinat in Enchiridion, addens quod, si ponamus corpora celestia esse animata, non ideo erunt in iudicio tres ordines iudicandorum, scilicet angelorum et hominum et animarum <caelorum>, quia illae animae computabuntur cum angelis. Et hoc sensisse videtur ille qui fecit praefationem, cum dicit: caeli caelorumque virtutes.
Yet I say, according to Augustine, in the second book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, that it does not matter for the faith whether it is thus or otherwise.1 Hence he does not determine this in the Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, adding that,2 if we posit that the celestial bodies are animate, not for this reason will there be in judgment three orders of those to be judged, namely, of angels and of men and of the souls of the heavens, because those souls are computed with the angels.3 And it seems that he who made the preface had thought this, when he says: heavens and the powers of the heavens.4
QXII.Q5.A2Et ideo patet . . .
And for this reason, it is clear . . .
QXII.Q5.A2De rebus humanis
On Human Things
De homine quantum ad naturam
On man, as regards nature
Q. 6Regarding the soul
Quantum ad animam
Regarding the soul
QXII.Q6Deinde quaesitum est de homine, quantum ad naturam et quantum ad gratiam et quantum ad culpam.
Then there were questions concerning man, regarding nature,1 grace,2 and fault.3
QXII.Q6Circa primum quaesita sunt tria:
About the first, there were three questions:
QXII.Q6primo quantum ad animam;
first, regarding the soul;1
QXII.Q6secundo de cognitione animae;
second, concerning the knowledge of the soul;1
QXII.Q6tertio de effectu cognitionis.
third, concerning the effect of knowledge.1
QXII.Q6Circa animam quaesita sunt duo.
About the soul, there were two questions.
QXII.Q6A. 1Whether the soul perfects the body immediately or with corporeity mediatingUtrum anima perficiat corpus immediate vel mediante corporeitate
Primo, utrum anima perficiat corpus immediate, vel mediante corporeitate.
First, whether the soul perfects the body immediately, or with corporeity mediating.
QXII.Q6.A1Responsio. Dicendum quod in nullo corpore est nisi forma substantialis.
I answer that in no body is there another form of the body besides the substantial form.
QXII.Q6.A1.coCuius ratio est triplex. Prima est quia, si plures, sequens non erit forma substantialis, quae facit esse simpliciter, sed solum accidentalis, quae facit esse hoc.
The reason for this is threefold. The first is because, if there are many forms, there will not be substantial form following, which makes it exist simply, but only accidental form, which makes it exist particularly.
QXII.Q6.A1Item, si sic, acquisitio formae substantialis non erit generatio simpliciter.
Likewise, if thus, the acquisition of substantial form will not be generation simply.
QXII.Q6.A1Item, quia non esset compositum ex anima et corpore unum simpliciter, sed duo simpliciter et unum per accidens.
Likewise, because a composition of soul and body would not be one thing simply, but two things simply and one incidentally.
QXII.Q6.A1Si dicatur corporeitas forma corporis, corporeitas dicitur dupliciter; quandoque tres dimensiones, et hoc non est forma substantialis, sed accidens; aliquando dicitur quaedam forma ex qua provenit trina dimensio, et haec non est alia a forma specifica.
If corporeity is said to be the form of a body, corporeity is said in two ways: sometimes as three dimensions, and this is not substantial form, but an accident; sometimes it is said as a certain form from which there comes forth the triple dimension, and this is not other than specific form.
QXII.Q6.A1A. 2Whether the soul is from the parentUtrum anima sit ex traduce
Secundo, utrum anima sit ex traduce.
Second, whether the soul is from the parent.
QXII.Q6.A2Responsio. Dicendum quod Augustinus hanc quaestionem non determinat, sed indeterminatam relinquit (<determinatur> libro De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, sed ille liber non est Augustini, sed Gennadii); Gregorius etiam non vult determinare.
I answer that Augustine does not determine this question, but leaves it indeterminate (it is determined by the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, but that book is not Augustine’s, but Gennadius’s);1 Gregory also does not wish to determine it.2
QXII.Q6.A2.coTamen credendum est quod non.
Nevertheless, it must be believed that it is not.
QXII.Q6.A2Et est una ratio Philosophi, libro De animalibus, quod impossibile est quod virtus corporea producat id quod excedit corpus; virtus autem seminis est virtus corporea.
And there is the one reason of the Philosopher, in the book On Animals, namely, that it is impossible for a bodily power to produce that which exceeds the body.1 Yet the power of seed is a bodily power.
QXII.Q6.A2Alia ratio est, VII Metaphysicae; quia enim quidam posuerunt quod formae naturales sunt ex creatione; cum enim materia aeris recipit formam ignis, aut inerat, et sic est latitatio, aut non, ergo fit de novo, non ex aliquo, sed ex nihilo, ergo creatur;—solvit Philosophus, quod forma non fit, sicut nec <est> ens vel esse habens, per se, sed fit compositum, quia habet esse subsistens.
There is another reason in the seventh book of the Metaphysics, for certain men have posited that natural forms are out of creation. For when the matter of air receives the form of fire, either it was in it, and thus there it is hiding; or not, and therefore it is made newly, not out of something, but out of nothing, and therefore it is created. The Philosopher solves this,1 since form is not made, just as neither is being nor having existence made in themselves, but rather, the composite is made, because it has subsisting existence.
QXII.Q6.A2Si ergo est aliqua forma quae per se subsistat, illa habet per se fieri; anima autem habet esse per se subsistens, et remanet corrupto corpore; et ita oportet quod habeat suum fieri.
If, therefore, there is some form which subsists in itself, such a thing is made in itself. Yet the soul has existence in itself subsisting, and it remains when the body has corrupted. And thus, it is necessary for it to have its own being made.
QXII.Q6.A2Q. 7On the knowledge of manDe cognitione hominis
Articulus unicus
Article 1
QXII.Q7Utrum intellectus humanus cognoscat singularia
Whether the human intellect knows singulars
Deinde quaesitum est de cognitione hominis, utrum intellectus humanus cognoscat singularia.
Then there was a question concerning the knowledge of man, whether the human intellect knows singulars.
QXII.Q7Responsio. Dicendum quod aliquid cognoscitur dupliciter, directe et indirecte, scilicet per reflexionem.
I answer that something is known in two ways: directly and indirectly, namely, reflexively.
QXII.Q7.coDiffert autem inter intellectum humanum et divinum, quia humanus non cognoscit directe singulare, divinus sic. Quia cognitio fit per similitudinem cogniti in cognoscente, et haec est in intellectu nostro per abstractionem a conditionibus individuantibus et a materia, et ideo, cum recta cognitio sit per speciem, ideo non cognoscit directe nisi universale. Intellectus autem divinus cognoscit non per similitudinem a re acceptam, sed per extensionem suae essentiae ad res, et haec similitudo, scilicet divina essentia, in Deo est omnium quae sunt in re expressa similitudo, et ideo directe cognoscit quicquid est in re, etiam quod pertinet ad materiam individualem.
Yet there is a difference between the human intellect and the divine intellect because the human does not know the singular directly, but the divine does. For knowledge is made through a likeness of the thing known in the one knowing, and this is in our intellect through abstraction from individuating conditions and from matter. And for this reason, since right knowledge is through the species, it only knows the universal directly. Yet the divine intellect knows not through a likeness received from a thing, but through extension of its own essence unto things, and this likeness, namely, the divine essence, is in God an express likeness of all which is in the thing. And for this reason, it knows directly whatever is in the thing, even that which pertains to individual matter.
QXII.Q7Sed quaerens Philosophus, si separatus est intellectus, quomodo cognoscit quae sunt in materia, dicit quod oportet quod haec cognoscat aut alio, sicut forma separata cognoscitur intellectu et coniuncta materiae per imaginationem, aut alio modo, scilicet per extensionem, in quantum coniungitur phantasiae, quae representat sibi phantasma, et sic indirecte cognoscit.
But the Philosopher asks: if the intellect is separated, how does it know those things which are in matter? He says that it is necessary that it knows these either in the one way, just as separate form is known by the intellect and conjoined to matter through the imagination, or in the other way, namely, through extension, inasmuch as it is conjoined to an image, which represents phantasms to it, and thus it knows indirectly.1
QXII.Q7Q. 8On the effect of knowledgeDe effectu cognitionis
Deinde quaesitum est de effectu cognitionis.
Then there were questions concerning the effect of knowledge.
QXII.Q8A. 1Whether the habits of acquired knowledge remain after this lifeUtrum habitus scientiae acquisitae remaneant post hanc vitam
Et primo utrum habitus scientiae acquisitae remaneant post hanc vitam.
And first whether the habits of acquired knowledge remain after this life.
QXII.Q8.A1Responsio. Dicendum quod circa hoc est duplex opinio.
I answer that there is a double opinion about this.
QXII.Q8.A1.coQuidam dicunt quod non, sequentes Avicennam in VI Naturalium, <qui ponit> quod species acquisitae non remanent in intellectu possibili nisi quandiu intelligit. Quod est falsum. Nam intellectus possibilis recipit species et retinet secundum modum suum; unde, cum ipse sit immobilis, utpote immaterialis et incorruptibilis, recipit species intelligibiles secundum modum suum, et nunquam inde recedunt. Et quod sint ibi etiam dum actu non intelligit, patet III De anima, ubi dicitur quod sunt in anima aliter quam dum actu intelligit, scilicet habitu.
Certain men say that they do not, following Avicenna, in the sixth book in Of Natural Things, who posits that acquired species only remain in the potential intellect as long as it understands.1 This is false. For the potential intellect receives and retains species according to its own mode. Hence, since it is immobile, as it is immaterial and incorruptible, it receives intelligible species according to its own mode, and they never recede from thence. And that they are there even while it does not understand actually is clear in the third book of On the Soul, where it is said that they are in the soul otherwise than while it understands actually, namely, by habit.2
QXII.Q8.A1Et sic dico quod remanent, sive in damnatis sive in beatis, sed destruuntur hii habitus scientiarum quantum ad modum scientiae, quia hic semper intelligit convertendo se ad phantasmata, propter corpus, et non solum propter hoc phantasmatibus indigemus, sed ad utendum huiusmodi speciebus. Et iste modus non erit tunc, quia non convertet se ad phantasmata.
And thus, I say that they remain, whether in the damned or in the blessed, but these habits of knowledge are destroyed as regards the mode of knowledge, because here it always understands by turning to phantasms, on account of the body. And not only on account of this do we need phantasms, but unto using species of this sort. And that mode will not be there, because it will not turn to phantasms.
QXII.Q8.A1A. 2Whether human words have power to move brutes such as serpentsUtrum verba humana habeant vim ad movendum bruta, puta serpentes
Secundo, utrum verba humana habeant vim ad movendum bruta, puta serpentes.
Second, whether human words have power to move brutes such as serpents.1
QXII.Q8.A2Responsio. Dicendum quod aliquid potest habere virtutem aliquam et secundum propriam naturam et secundum virtutem superioris causae. Verbi gratia, commixtum ex elementis habet virtutem ex natura elementorum secundum motum praedominantis elementi; aliam habet ex corpore caelesti, sicut quod adamas trahit ferrum, quod non reducitur in virtutem elementarem.
I answer that something can have some power both according to its proper nature and according to the power of a superior cause. For example, a mixture composed of elements has power from the nature of the elements according to the motion of the predominant element;1 it has another power from the heavenly body, just as that steel attracts iron, which is not reducible to an elemental power.
QXII.Q8.A2.coAliqui igitur dicunt quod non solum naturalia corpora, sed et artificialia sortiuntur virtutes aliquas ex impressione corporum caelestium, puta imagines vel figurae sub certa constellatione factae. Et, si hoc est verum, scilicet quod super artificialia sit huiusmodi virtus impressa, potest etiam dici quod verba prolata in certo tempore habeant efficaciam movendi.
Some men,1 therefore, say that not only natural bodies, but also artificial ones obtain some powers from the impression of the heavenly bodies, for example images or figures made under a fixed constellation. And, if this is true, namely, that over artificial things there is a power of this sort impressed, it can also be said that words uttered in a fixed time have the efficacy of moving.
QXII.Q8.A2Sed hoc non est verum. Nam in rebus naturalibus omnia quae habent aliquam virtutem ex corpore caelesti, habent illam consequentem aliquam formam, unde nihil agit ad speciem nisi ex virtute corporis caelestis; et sic forma est prius in unoquoque quam virtus ad talia; remoto ergo priori, removetur posterius. Si igitur huiusmodi virtutes attribuuntur aliquibus, oportet quod radicentur super formam aliquam; formae autem artificiales non sunt nisi figurae quaedam; et ideo falsum est quod verba et huiusmodi virtutem aliquam habeant ex corpore caelesti.
But this is not true. For in natural things, all things which have some power from a heavenly body have that as a result of some form, hence nothing acts unto a species unless by the power of a heavenly body.1 And thus, form is in each thing before the power unto such things. Therefore, with the former removed, the latter is removed. If, therefore, powers of this sort are attributed to some things, it is necessary for them to be rooted in some form. Yet artificial forms are only certain figures. And for this reason, it is false that words also have some power of this sort from a heavenly body.
QXII.Q8.A2Sed, si habent aliquam, hoc habent ex spiritu immundo, qui immiscet se verbis hominum ut decipiat, secundum Augustinum. Unde aliquando utuntur verbis fabulosis et falsis et vanis, quibus ad illudendum homines se immiscent. Unde omnia ista frivola et superstitiosa sunt, et imagines astronomicae, in quibus, etsi non assit aliqua expressa invocatio daemonum, tamen est ibi quidam tacitus consensus.
But if they have any, they have this from an unclean spirit, which mixes itself with the words of men in order to deceive, according to Augustine.1 Hence sometimes they use fabulous and false and vain words, in which they mix themselves unto fooling men. Hence are all those frivolous and superstitious things, and astronomical images, in which, although there is not present any express invocation of demons, nevertheless there is a certain tacit consent there.
QXII.Q8.A2Tamen, si aliquis dicat verba Dei et sacra sine immutatione et fraude, sed bona et divina intentione, non est incantatio, sed oratio. Chrysostomus tamen super Matthaeum, ibi: dilatant phylacteria etc., reprehendit illos qui collo verba Evangelii suspendunt, cum virtus Evangelii non sit in figuris litterarum, sed in fide. Non tamen damno illos qui super se gerunt Evangelium ex devotione, quia Caecilia Evangelium Christi semper gerebat in pectore; sine tamen aliqua additione vel verborum vel caracterum vel ceterorum suspectorum.
Nevertheless, if someone says the words of God and holy words without change and fraud, but with a good and divine intention, this is not an incantation but a prayer. Nevertheless, Chrysostom in his commentary on Matthew, at there:1 they widen the phylacteries, reproves those who hang the words of the Gospel on their neck, since the power of the Gospel is not in figures of letters, but in faith. Nevertheless, I do not damn those who wear the Gospel upon themselves out of devotion, because Cecilia wore the Gospel of Christ always on her breast.2 Nevertheless, this was without some addition either of words or of characters or of other suspect things.
QXII.Q8.A2De homine quantum ad gratiam
On man, as regards grace
De sacramentis
On sacraments
De sacramentis gratiae
On the sacraments of grace
Q. 9On baptismDe baptismo
Deinde quaesitum est de homine quantum ad gratiam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria:
Then there were questions concerning man as regards grace. And about this there were three questions:
QXII.Q9primo de sacramentis;
first, concerning sacraments;1
QXII.Q9secundo de virtutibus;
second, concerning virtues;1
QXII.Q9tertio de officiis.
third, concerning offices.1
QXII.Q9De primo tria sunt quaesita:
Concerning the first, there were three questions:
primo de sacramentis gratiae;
first, concerning the sacraments of grace;1
QXII.Q9secundo de effectu sacramentorum;
second, concerning the effect of the sacraments;1
QXII.Q9tertio de unitate Ecclesiae.
third, concerning the unity of the Church.1
QXII.Q9De sacramentis gratiae quaerebantur duo:
Concerning the sacraments of grace, there were two questions:
primo de baptismo;
first, concerning baptism;1
QXII.Q9secundo de poenitencia.
second, concerning penance.1
QXII.Q9Articulus unicus
Article 1
QXII.Q9Utrum aqua habeat virtutem ad emundationem
Whether water has power to cleanse
De primo quaeritur utrum aqua habeat virtutem ad emundationem, id est utrum propria virtute mundet, vel virtute concomitante.
Concerning the first, there is a question whether water has power to cleanse, that is, whether it cleanses by its own power, or by concomitant power.
QXII.Q9Responsio. Dicendum quod duplex est opinio in huiusmodi, non solum de aqua, sed de omnibus Ecclesiae sacramentis.
I answer that the opinion in things of this sort is twofold, not only concerning water, but also concerning all the sacraments of the Church.
QXII.Q9.coQuidam enim dicunt quod sacramenta non habent virtutem vel vim operandi in anima, sed tantum extra, et divina virtus concomitans facit illum effectum; et inducunt exemplum Bernardi: sit aliquis episcopus qui investiat aliquem de praebenda per anulum, anulus non est causa praebendae, sed signum.
For certain men1 say that the sacraments do not have power or strength of operating in the soul, but only outside, and concomitant divine power makes that effect. And they introduce the example of Bernard:2 when there is some bishop who invests someone with a prebend through a ring, the ring is not the cause of the prebend, but a sign.
QXII.Q9Sed hoc non est sane dictum, quia sic non esset aliqua praerogativa sacramentorum Novae Legis ad Vetera, quia etiam in illis virtus coassistens fidei credentium in Christum venturum iustificabat.
But this is not well said, because thus there would not be any prerogative of the sacraments of the New Law over the Old, because even in those a power, co-assisting the faith of believers in Christ to come, justified.
QXII.Q9Et ideo dicendum quod sacramenta habent in se virtutem iustificandi, et ad alios effectus ad quos ordinantur, et non solum quod sint signum. Unde Augustinus: quae tanta vis aquae, ut corpus tangat et cor abluat?
And for this reason, it must be said that the sacraments have in themselves the power of justifying, and producing the other effects unto which they are ordered, and they are not simply a sign. Hence Augustine: what is so great of the power of water, that it should touch the body and wash the heart?1
QXII.Q9Sciendum tamen quod duplex est virtus, scilicet propria et instrumentalis, sicut patet in serra. Sic et sacramenta habent virtutem instrumentalem ad spiritualem effectum, quia cum sacramentum adhibetur cum invocatione divina, efficit hunc effectum. Et hoc est conveniens, quia Verbum, per quod omnia sacramenta virtutem habent, habuit carnem et fuit Verbum Dei, et, sicut caro Christi habuit virtutem instrumentalem ad faciendum miracula propter continuationem ad Verbum, ita sacramenta per continuationem ad Christum crucifixum et passum . . .
Nevertheless, it must be known that power is twofold, namely, proper and instrumental, just as is clear in a saw. Thus also the sacraments have instrumental power for a spiritual effect because when a sacrament is presented with divine invocation, it effects this effect. And this is fitting because the Word, through which all the sacraments have power, had flesh and was the Word of God, and, just as the flesh of Christ had instrumental power unto making miracles on account of its continuation unto the Word, so too the sacraments through continuation unto Christ crucified and having suffered . . .
QXII.Q9Q. 10On penanceDe poenitentia
Deinde quaesitum est de poenitentia.
Then there were questions concerning penance.
QXII.Q10A. 1Whether one not having the care of souls can absolve in the forum of confessionUtrum non habens curam animarum possit absolvere in foro confessionis
Et primo, utrum non habens curam animarum possit absolvere in foro confessionis.
And first, whether one not having the care of souls can absolve in the forum of confession.
QXII.Q10.A1Responsio. Dicendum quod aliter est in sacramento poenitentiae et aliter in quibusdam aliis sacramentis. Nam in quibusdam qui habet ordinem potest ex hoc ipso inducere effectum sacramenti in omni casu, scilicet in illis in quibus quod est effectus sacramentorum est res existens extra sacramentum; unde sacerdos degradatus et excommunicatus, licet peccet, tamen consecrat et baptizat, et similiter episcopus consecrat <ordinandos>, quia confert characterem. In poenitentia autem non imprimitur character nec effectus nisi iustificatio poenitentis, quod non potest fieri nisi per potestatem iudicativam; non habens autem curam animarum non habet hanc potestatem.
I answer that it is otherwise in the sacrament of penance than in certain other sacraments. For in certain ones he who has been ordained can thereby induce the effect of the sacrament in every case, namely, in those where the effect of the sacraments is a thing existing outside the sacrament. Hence a degraded priest and an excommunicated one, even if he sins, nevertheless consecrates and baptizes, and similarly a bishop consecrates ordinands, because he confers the character. Yet in penance there is not impressed a character nor an effect besides the justification of the penitent, which can only be done through judiciary power. Yet one not having the care of souls does not have this power.
QXII.Q10.A1.coA. 2Whether it is licit in any circumstance to reveal a confessionUtrum liceat in aliquo casu revelare confessionem
Secundo, utrum liceat in aliquo casu revelare confessionem.
Second, whether it is licit in any circumstance to reveal a confession.
QXII.Q10.A2Responsio. Dicendum quod non, nec verbo nec situ nec nutu nec aliquo signo, et facere contra est sacrilegium. Nam ita est in sacramentis Novae Legis quod efficiunt quod figurant; effectus autem poenitentiae est occultatio peccatorum ab oculis Dei punientis, et haec occultatio significatur per secretum confessionis; et ideo, sicut profanaret sacramentum qui conficeret corpus et sanguinem Christi de alio quam de pane et vino, ita esset revelans sacrilegus.
I answer that it is not, neither by word nor by situation nor by nod nor by some sign,1 and to act against this is sacrilege. For thus there is in the sacraments of the New Law that they effect what they figure.2 Yet the effect of penance is the hiding of sins from the eyes of God punishing, and this hiding is signified through the secret of confession. And for this reason, just as he would profane the sacrament who would attempt to confect the body and blood of Christ from something other than bread and wine, so would one be sacrilegious who reveals sins.
QXII.Q10.A2.coA. 3Whether it is licit to desire the episcopacyUtrum liceat appetere episcopatum
Tertio, utrum liceat appetere episcopatum.
Third, whether it is licit to desire the episcopacy.
QXII.Q10.A3Responsio. Dicendum quod contingit appetere praelationem dupliciter: aut propter necessitatem urgentem, aut non urgentem.
I answer that to desire the prelacy happens in two ways: either on account of necessity urging, or not urging.
QXII.Q10.A3.coPrimo modo dupliciter, vel quando imponitur a superiori, vel quando non invenitur aliquis qui velit onus praelationis subire. Tali necessitate existente, meritorium est appetere. Unde Isaiae VI: quem mittam et quis ibit nobis?, respondit: ecce ego, mitte me; tamen ante dixit se indignum.
In the first way, it happens in two ways, either when it is imposed by a superior, or when someone is not found who wishes to undergo the burden of the prelacy. With such necessity existing, it is meritorious to desire. Hence in Isaiah 6:8: whom shall I send and who shall go for us?, he responds: behold, I, send me. Nevertheless, he called himself unworthy before.
QXII.Q10.A3Secundo modo, scilicet quando non urget necessitas, sic non licet, quia non potest carere aut vitio iniusticie, si velit se minorem praeferre maioribus, aut vitio praesumptionis, si reputet se sufficientem praeferre aliis. <Unde> Crysostomus: primatus ecclesiasticos concupiscere nec iustum nec utile; super illud: reges gentium etc.
In the second way, namely, when necessity does not urge, it is not licit, because he cannot lack either the vice of injustice, if he prefers himself, although lesser, to those greater than him, or the vice of presumption, if he considers himself sufficient to be preferred to others. Hence Chrysostom says that to desire ecclesiastical primacies is neither just nor useful,1 commenting upon that: kings of the Gentiles (Luke 22:25).
QXII.Q10.A3On the effect of the sacraments
QXII.Q10.A3Q. 11On the effect of the sacramentsDe effectu sacramentorum
Articulus unicus
Article 1
QXII.Q11Utrum compaternitas causetur ex praeambulis ad sacramenta, puta ex catechismo et huiusmodi
Whether compaternity is caused by the preambles to the sacraments
Deinde quaesitum est de effectu sacramentorum, utrum compaternitas causetur ex praeambulis ad sacramenta, puta ex catechismo et huiusmodi. Et videtur quod sic.
Then there was a question concerning the effect of the sacraments, whether compaternity1 is caused by the preambles to the sacraments, for example by catechesis and things of this sort. And it seems that it is.
QXII.Q11Dicit enim quaedam decretalis quod a primo pabulo salis non potest fieri uxor; ergo contrahitur ibi compaternitas.
Obj. 1: For a certain decretal says that from the first nourishment of salt1 she cannot be made a wife. Therefore, compaternity is contracted there.
QXII.Q11.arg1Praeterea. Catechumenus censetur christianus; sed qui dat christianismum, efficitur compater; ergo etc.
Obj. 2: A catechumen is reckoned a Christian. But he who gives Christianity is made a compater; therefore, compaternity is contracted there.
QXII.Q11.arg2Responsio. Quidam dicunt quod omnia illa sacramentalia sufficiunt ad causandum compaternitatem. Quidam dicunt quod solum contrahitur quantum ad tria, scilicet in cathecismo, baptismo et confirmatione. Sed mihi videtur quod solum contrahitur in duobus, scilicet in baptismo et confirmatione, quia compaternitas similitudo quaedam est paternitatis, paternitas autem non fit nisi in generatione, et ideo solum in illis sacramentis in quibus est quaedam generatio spiritualis contrahitur compaternitas, quae matrimonium impedit.
I answer that certain men says that all those sacramentals suffice to cause compaternity.1 Certain men say it is only contracted by three things, namely, catechesis, baptism, and confirmation.2 But to me it seems that it is only contracted in two, namely, in baptism and confirmation,3 because compaternity is a certain likeness of paternity, yet paternity is only made in generation, and for this reason, only in those sacraments in which there is a certain spiritual generation is compaternity contracted, which impedes matrimony.
QXII.Q11.coAd primum ergo dicendum quod illa non sunt intelligenda singillatim, sed sunt accipienda collective et simul, quia qui in omnibus istis adest efficitur compater.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that those things are not to be understood separately, but are to be understood collectively and simultaneously, because he who is present in all of those is made a comparent.
QXII.Q11.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod catechumenus dicitur christianus per fidem, non per baptismum, quem nondum suscepit, et ille dat christianismum qui dat sacramentum baptismi.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that a catechumen is called a Christian through faith, not through baptism, which he has not yet received, and the person gives Christianity who gives the sacrament of baptism.
QXII.Q11.ad2On the unity of the Church
QXII.Q11Q. 12On the unity of the ChurchDe unitate Ecclesiae
Articulus unicus
Article 1
QXII.Q12Utrum sit una Ecclesia quae fuit in principio tempore Apostolorum et quae est modo
Whether there is one Church which was in the beginning at the time of the Apostles and which is now
Deinde quaesitum fuit utrum sit una Ecclesia quae fuit in principio tempore Apostolorum et quae est modo. Et videtur quod non.
Then there was a question whether there is one Church which was in the beginning at the time of the Apostles and which is now. And it seems that there is not.
QXII.Q12Quia nunc non utitur eisdem regulis: tunc enim praelati erant sine auro et argento in zonis suis; ergo etc.
Obj. 1: Because now it does not use the same rules: for then prelates were without gold and silver in their money belts.1
QXII.Q12.arg1Praeterea. Non legitur quod Christus et Apostoli habuerint castra; modo autem Ecclesia habet; ergo etc.
Obj. 2: It is not read that Christ and the Apostles had fortresses. Yet now the Church has them.
QXII.Q12.arg2Contra. Matthaei ultimo: ecce ego vobiscum sum usque ad consummationem saeculi; hoc autem non intelligitur tantum de Apostolis, quia omnes mortui sunt et adhuc saeculum non est consummatum; ergo etc.
On the contrary: The last chapter of Matthew: behold I am with you even unto the consummation of the world (Matt 28:20). Yet this is not understood just about the Apostles, because they all have died and still the world is not consummated.
QXII.Q12.scResponsio. Dicendum quod eadem est numero Ecclesia quae tunc et quae nunc, quia eadem est fides et eadem fidei sacramenta, eadem auctoritas et eadem professio. Unde dicit Apostolus: divisus est Christus? Absit.
I answer that the Church which was then and which is now is the same in number, because there is the same faith and the same sacraments of faith, the same authority, and the same profession. Hence the Apostle says: is Christ divided? (1 Cor 1:13). Surely he is not.
QXII.Q12.coAd primum dicendum quod verba Matthaei tripliciter exponuntur.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the words of Matthew are expounded in three ways.1
QXII.Q12.ad1Hilarius et Ambrosius exponunt secundum sensum mysticum, dicentes: nolite portare aurum etc., id est nihil in spiritualibus ministeriis auro vendatis; non duas tunicas, id est non duplicem animum habeatis.
Hilary and Ambrose expound according to the mystical sense, saying: do not carry gold (Matt 10:9),1 that is, may you sell nothing in spiritual ministries for gold;2 not two tunics (Matt 10:10), that is, may you not have a double mind.3
QXII.Q12Alii exponunt ad litteram. Et una expositio est Augustini, qui dicit quod illa verba non dicuntur per modum praecepti, sed permissionis, ita quod qui non servat non peccat et qui servat melius facit; ut sit sensus: nolite portare, id est quando itis ad praedicandum non sollicitemini de expensis, quia debentur vobis a populo, dignus est enim operarius etc.; quasi diceret: ideo permitto quod non portetis, quia digni estis accipere ab aliis, quibus praedicatis; Paulus hoc non servavit, et tamen contra regulam hanc non fecit, sed supererogavit.
Others expound according to the letter. And one exposition is Augustine’s, who says that those words are not said as a precept, but as permission, such that he who does not observe it does not sin and he who observes it does better;1 thus, the sense is: do not carry, that is, when you go unto preaching may you not be solicitous concerning expenses, because they are due to you from the people, for worthy is the laborer (Matt 10:10); as if he were to say: for this reason, I permit you not to carry, because you are worthy to receive from others, to whom you preach. Paul did not observe it, and, nevertheless, he did not act against this rule, but went above and beyond.
QXII.Q12Alia expositio est aliorum sanctorum, qui dicunt quod haec dicta sunt praeceptive, sed hoc praeceptum datum est non ad semper servandum, sed ad primam missionem; bis enim eos misit, scilicet ante passionem Iudaeis, et post resurrectionem Gentibus; in prima dixit eis: in viam gentium ne abieritis, in secunda dixit: docete omnes gentes; in prima mandavit quod praedicta servarent, non autem in secunda.
Another exposition is of other saints,1 who say that these things were said as a precept, but this precept was given not to be always observed, but only during the first mission. For he sent them twice, namely, before the Passion to the Jews, and after the Resurrection to the Gentiles. In the first he said to them: into the way of the Gentiles may you not depart (Matt 10:5), in the second he said: teach all nations (Matt 28:19);2 in the first he mandated that they observe the aforesaid things, yet not in the second.
QXII.Q12Et ratio huius est quia in prima solum mittebantur ad Iudaeos, apud quos consuetum erat quod magistri eorum ab eis sustentarentur et ideo sine scandalo poterant accipere et uti potestate sibi concessa; apud Gentiles vero non erat huiusmodi consuetudo, quia apud eos non erant huiusmodi praedicatores, et ideo fuisset eis scandalum et visum fuisset eis quod pro quaestu Apostoli praedicarent, et ideo Paulus hoc praeceptum non servavit in Gentibus; et ideo Dominus in secunda missione dixit: nunc qui habet sacculum, tollat similiter et peram.
And the reason for this is that in the first they are sent only to the Jews, among whom the custom was that their teachers were sustained by them1 and for this reason, without scandal they could receive and use the power conceded to them. Whereas amongst the Gentiles there was not a custom of this sort, because among them there were not preachers of this sort, and for this reason, it would have been a scandal for them and it would have seemed to them that the Apostles were preaching for profit.2 And for this reason, Paul did not observe this precept among the Gentiles. And for this reason, the Lord in the second mission said: now he who has a money bag, let him take it and likewise his satchel (Luke 22:36).
QXII.Q12Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus respondet in epistola contra Donatistas, et habetur super illud Psalmi: quare fremuerunt gentes; distinguit enim diversa tempora Ecclesiae: fuit enim tempus quando astiterunt reges adversus Christum, et in illo tempore non solum non dabant fidelibus, sed etiam eos occidebant; aliud vero tempus est nunc, quo reges intelligunt et eruditi serviunt Domino Iesu Christo in timore etc. Et ideo in isto tempore reges sunt vassalli Ecclesiae. Et ideo est alius status Ecclesiae nunc et tunc, non tamen est alia Ecclesia.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that Augustine responds in an epistle against the Donatists, and it is said upon that Psalm: why do the nations rage (Ps 2:1).1 For he distinguishes the diverse times of the Church: for there was the time when kings stood against Christ (Ps 2:2), and in that time not only did they not give to the faithful, but they even killed them. Whereas another time is now, when the kings understand and educated serve the Lord Jesus Christ in fear (Ps 2:11). And for this reason, in that time the kings are vassals of the Church. And for this reason, there is another state of the Church now and then. Nevertheless, there is not another Church.
QXII.Q12.ad2De virtutibus
On the virtues
On truth
QXII.Q12Q. 13On truthDe veritate
Deinde quaesitum est de virtutibus;
Then there were questions concerning virtues:
QXII.Q13et primo de quadam virtute intellectuali, scilicet de veritate;
and first, concerning a certain intellectual virtue, namely, truth;1
QXII.Q13secundo de virtutibus moralibus.
second, concerning the moral virtues.1
QXII.Q13De veritate quaesita sunt duo:
Concerning truth, there were two questions:
primo de fortitudine veritatis;
first, concerning the fortitude of truth;
QXII.Q13secundo de confirmatione veritatis quae est per iuramentum.
second, concerning the confirmation of truth which is through oath.
QXII.Q13A. 1Whether truth is stronger than wine, king, and womanUtrum veritas sit fortior inter vinum, regem et mulierem
Circa primum quaesitum est utrum veritas sit fortior inter vinum, regem et mulierem.
About the first, there was a question whether truth is stronger than wine, king, and woman.
QXII.Q13.A1Et videtur quod vinum, quia immutat maxime hominem.
Obj. 1: And it seems that wine is stronger, because it changes man most greatly.
QXII.Q13.A1.arg1Item, quod rex, quia pellit hominem ad id quod est difficillimum, scilicet ad hoc quod se exponat homo periculo mortis.
Obj. 2: Likewise, it seems that the king is stronger, because he compels man to do what is most difficult, namely, that a man expose himself to the danger of death.
QXII.Q13.A1.arg2Item, quod mulier, quia dominatur etiam regibus.
Obj. 3: Likewise, it seems that it is woman, because she dominates even kings.
QXII.Q13.A1.arg3Contra. Esdrae: fortior est veritas.
On the contrary: Esdras 3:12: truth is stronger.
QXII.Q13.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod haec est quaestio proposita iuvenibus dissolvenda in Esdra.
I answer that this is the question debated by the youths in Esdras.
QXII.Q13.A1.coSciendum igitur quod, si consideremus ista quatuor secundum se, scilicet vinum, regem et mulierem et veritatem, non sunt comparabilia, quia non sunt unius generis. Tamen, si considerentur per comparationem ad aliquem effectum, concurrunt in unum, et sic possunt comparari. Hic autem effectus in quem concurrunt et conveniunt et possunt, est immutatio cordis humani. Quid ergo inter ista magis immutet cor hominis, videndum est.
Therefore, it must be known that, if we were to consider those four according to themselves, namely, wine, king, woman, and truth, they are not comparable, because they are not of one genus. Nevertheless, if they were considered in comparison to some effect, they would assemble unto one genus, and thus they can be compared. Yet this effect in which they come together and can be compared is the change of the human heart. Therefore, we must see which of these more changes the heart of man.
QXII.Q13.A1Sciendum est igitur quod immutativum hominis quoddam est corporale, et aliud est animale; et hoc est duplex, scilicet sensibile et intelligibile; intelligibile etiam est duplex, scilicet practicum et speculativum. Inter ea autem quae pertinent ad immutativa naturaliter secundum dispositionem corporis habet excellentiam vinum, quod facit per talenta loqui; inter ea quae pertinent ad immutandum appetitum sensitivum, excellentius est delectatio, praecipue circa venerea, et sic mulier est fortior; item in practicis et in rebus humanis quae potest homo facere, maximam potestatem habet rex; in speculativis summum et potentissimum est veritas. Nunc autem vires corporales subiiciuntur viribus animalibus, vires animales intellectualibus, et inter intellectuales practicae speculativis, et ideo simpliciter veritas dignior est et excellentior et fortior.
It must be known, therefore, that a certain changeable thing of man is bodily, and another is animal; and this is twofold, namely, sensitive and intellective. The intellective also is twofold, namely, practical and speculative. Yet amongst those which pertain to things naturally changeable according to a disposition of the body, wine has excellence, which makes through talents to speak.1 Among those which pertain to changing the sensitive appetite, delight is more excellent, especially about sexual intercourse, and thus woman is stronger. Likewise, in practical matters and in human things which man can make, a king has the greatest power. In speculative matters truth is highest and most powerful. Now, however, bodily powers are subjected to animal powers, animal powers to intellectual ones, and amongst intellectual the practical to the speculative, and for this reason, truth is, simply speaking, worthier and more excellent and stronger.
QXII.Q13.A1A. 2Whether one who learns of a remedy, under oath of not communicating it, is held to observe the oathUtrum accipiens doctrinam alicuius experimenti sub iuramento non communicandi, teneatur servare iuramentum
Secundo quaeritur utrum accipiens doctrinam alicuius experimenti sub iuramento non communicandi teneatur servare iuramentum. Et videtur quod sic.
Second, there is a question whether one who learns of a remedy,1 under oath of not communicating it, is held to observe the oath. And it seems that he is.
QXII.Q13.A2Quia sic obligatus non debet facere aliquid quod vergat in detrimentum illius qui dedit vel qui docuit; hoc autem esset si aliis communicaret; ergo etc.
Obj. 1: Because one thus obligated ought not to do anything which inclines1 unto the detriment of the one who gave or taught. Yet this would be if he were to communicate to others.
QXII.Q13.A2.arg1Praeterea. Non communicare tale experimentum non vergit in detrimentum salutis aeternae alicuius; ergo, cum non teneatur alteri communicare, non debet sic obligatus communicare.
Obj. 2: Not to communicate such a remedy does not incline unto the detriment of anyone’s eternal salvation. Therefore, since he is not held to communicate it to another, one thus obligated ought not to communicate it.
QXII.Q13.A2.arg2Contra. Non communicare salubre remedium seu quodcumque bonum, est contra caritatem; ergo etc.
On the contrary: Not to communicate a healthful remedy or any good thing is against charity.
QXII.Q13.A2.scResponsio. Aliter dicendum est hic simpliciter, et aliter in casu.
I answer that it must be said one way here simply speaking, and otherwise in a particular case.
QXII.Q13.A2.coSimpliciter loquendo non tenetur, sed male facit iurando: iuramentum enim non solum amittit vim quando iuramentum est illicitum, sed iurando deierat. Quia iuramentum obligans debet habere iudicium, iustitiam et veritatem; sed, si iuro quandoque aliquid quod licet mihi non facere, puta non ire ad ecclesiam, non licet iurare; quia, licet sit mihi licitum pro aliquo tempore non facere vel dimittere huiusmodi bonum quod est ad ecclesiam ire, non tamen licet mihi iuramentum interponere et animum obfirmare ad aliquod bonum non faciendum, quia hoc est facere contra Spiritum Sanctum. Et ideo iuramentum contra omne id quod est de genere bonorum, est illicitum et non est servandum.
Simply speaking, he is not held, but he acts badly by swearing: for an oath not only loses power when the oath is illicit, but he swears an oath by swearing. For an oath obligating ought to have judgment, justice, and truth (Jer 4:2).1 But if at some time I swear something which is licit for me not to do, for example not to go to church, it is not licit to swear. For, granted that it is licit for me at some time not to do or to dismiss a good of the sort such as to go to church, nevertheless it is not licit for me to introduce an oath and to secure my mind unto not doing some good, because this is to act against the Holy Spirit. And for this reason, an oath against everything which is of the genus of good things is illicit and must not be observed.
QXII.Q13.A2Tamen in casu servare tenetur, puta si ille sufficiens medicus praesens esset et paratus esset curare et uti illo experimento in salutem corporalem aliorum.
Nevertheless, in a particular case he is held to observe it: for example, if a qualified doctor were present and were prepared to use that remedy for the bodily health of others.
QXII.Q13.A2Et sic patet solutio ad obiecta.
Reply Obj. 1–2: And thus, the solution to the objections is clear.
QXII.Q13.A2.ad1De virtutibus moralibus
On the moral virtues
Q. 14On the virtues themselvesDe virtutibus secundum se
Deinde quaesitum est de virtutibus moralibus;
Then there were questions concerning the moral virtues:
QXII.Q14et primo de virtutibus secundum se;
and first, concerning the virtues themselves;1
QXII.Q14secundo specialiter de quodam actu iustitiae, scilicet de restitutione.
second, specially concerning a certain act of justice, namely, restitution.1
QXII.Q14Articulus unicus
Article 1
QXII.Q14Utrum virtutes morales sint connexae
Whether the moral virtues are connected
Circa primum quaesitum est utrum virtutes morales sint connexae. Et videtur quod non.
About the first there was a question whether the moral virtues are connected. And it seems that they are not.
QXII.Q14Quia acquiruntur ex actibus, qui sunt divisi et distincti; ergo potest acquiri una virtus sine alia.
Obj. 1: Because they are acquired through acts, which are divided and distinct.1 Therefore, one virtue can be acquired without the others.
QXII.Q14.arg1Praeterea. Augustinus dicit: nihil contra divinam essentiam dicit, qui dicit quod qui habet unam non habet omnes.
Obj. 2: Augustine says: he says nothing against the divine essence, who says that he who has one does not have all.1
QXII.Q14.arg2Praeterea. Virtutes habentur ex consuetudine, quae requirit tempus.
Obj. 3: Virtues are had out of custom, which requires time.
QXII.Q14.arg3Responsio. Dicendum secundum omnes sanctos et philosophos, quod sic.
I answer that, according to all the saints and philosophers, yes they are.1
QXII.Q14.coEt, loquendo de virtutibus in communi, duplex ratio assignatur a diversis, secundum quod diversimode locuti sunt de virtutibus: virtutes enim cardinales dupliciter accipiuntur ab aliquibus.
And, speaking about virtues in common, a twofold reason is given by diverse men, according to how they speak diversely concerning the virtues: for the cardinal virtues are understood in two ways by some men.
QXII.Q14Quidam enim dicunt virtutes esse quosdam modos generales qui requiruntur in omni virtute, puta quod fortitudo est quaecumque firmitas animi in quibuscumque rebus, temperantia est moderantia animi in omnibus rebus, et sic de aliis. Et secundum istos necesse est quod virtutes sint connexae, quia isti modi generales requiruntur in omni virtute et, si aliquod horum defuerit, non est virtus aliqua, quia, si temperantia rectitudinem non habeat, quae est iustitia, vel non habeat animi firmitatem, quae est fortitudo, et sic de aliis, non est virtus. Et hunc modum Augustinus ponit III De Trinitate, et in III Sententiarum Magister.
For certain men1 say that the virtues are certain general modes which are required in every virtue, for example that fortitude is any firmness of mind in any matters, temperance is moderation of mind in all matters, and thus concerning the others. And according to those men it is necessary that the virtues be connected, because those general modes are required in every virtue. As well, if something of these is lacking, there is not any virtue: for if temperance does not have rectitude, which is justice, or does not have firmness of mind, which is fortitude, and so on for the others, there is no virtue. And Augustine explains this mode in the third book of On the Trinity,2 and the Master in the third book of the Sentences.3
QXII.Q14Alii autem accipiunt distinctionem harum virtutum secundum determinatam materiam, sicut Aristoteles et Peripatetici. Unde prudentia secundum Philosophum non est recta ratio in omnibus, sed solum in agibilibus; similiter iustitia non dicit rectitudinem animi circa adaequationem omnium rerum, sed tantum circa commutationes et distributiones et actiones humanas quae sunt ad alterum; fortitudo etiam dicit firmitatem animi non circa omnia, sed circa ea in quibus est difficillimum animum fortem habere, scilicet circa pericula quae sunt in bellis; temperantia vero est circa ea in quibus difficillimum est animum moderare, scilicet circa delectationes gustus et tactus, quae sunt maximae delectationes, non in quibuscumque aliis concupiscentiis, sicut scientiae vel pecuniae. Et sic etiam loquendo de virtutibus, virtutes morales sunt connexae. Cuius connexionis ratio accipitur secundum Philosophum ex parte prudentiae, quia nulla virtus potest haberi sine prudentia et impossibile est habere prudentiam sine virtutibus moralibus. Cuius ratio est quia prudentia nihil aliud est quam recta ratio agibilium, impossibile est autem rectam rationem habere circa aliquid nisi ex recta ratione circa principia, principia autem agibilium sunt fines virtutum, et circa fines virtutum nullus bene se habet nisi per habitum illius virtutis; et sic necesse est quod prudentia habeat secum alias virtutes morales. Similiter aliae non possunt haberi sine prudentia: potest enim aliquis habere inclinationem naturalem ad actus alicuius virtutis sine prudentia, et quanto habet maiorem inclinationem sine habitu virtutis, tanto peius est et plus impingere potest sine prudentia, sicut patet de illo qui habet fortitudinem naturalem sine discretione et prudentia. Et ideo dicit Gregorius: ceterae virtutes, nisi ea quae agunt prudenter agant etc.
Yet other men understand the distinction of these virtues according to determinate matter, such as Aristotle and the Peripatetics.1 Hence prudence according to the Philosopher is not right reason in all things, but only in doable things. Similarly, justice does not name rectitude of mind about the adequation of all things,2 but only about exchanges and distributions and human actions which are unto another. Fortitude also names firmness of mind not about all things, but about those things in which it is most difficult to have a strong mind, namely, about the dangers which are in wars; whereas temperance is about those things in which it is most difficult to moderate the mind, namely, about delights of taste and touch, which are the greatest delights, not in any other desires such as of knowledge or of money. Yet speaking in that way about the virtues, the moral virtues are also connected. The reason for this connection is understood according to the Philosopher on the part of prudence,3 because no virtue can be had without prudence and it is impossible to have prudence without the moral virtues. The reason for this is that prudence is nothing other than right reason of doable things. It is impossible to have right reason about something unless out of right reason about the principles. Yet the principles of doable things are the ends of the virtues, and about the ends of the virtues no one conducts himself well unless through the habit of that virtue. And thus, it is necessary for prudence to have with it the other moral virtues. Similarly, the others cannot be had without prudence: someone can have a natural inclination unto the act of some virtue without prudence, and as much as he has a greater inclination without the habit of virtue, so much worse is he and so much more can he stumble without prudence,4 just as is clear concerning a man who has natural fortitude without discretion and prudence. And for this reason, Gregory says: the other virtues, unless they should do those things which they do prudently, and so on.5
QXII.Q14Est et alia ratio connexionis in virtutibus gratuitis, scilicet propter caritatem, in qua connectuntur, quia qui habet caritatem, habet omnes gratuitas, et similiter qui habet unam, habet caritatem.
There is also another reason of connection in the gratuitous virtues, namely, on account of charity, in which they are connected, because he who has charity has all the gracious virtues, and, similarly, he who has one, has charity.
QXII.Q14Ad primum dicendum quod actus non sunt divisi secundum Stoicos, quia non potest esse actus temperantiae sine actu fortitudinis nec actus fortitudinis nisi cum actu temperantiae etc.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that acts are not divided according to the Stoics,1 because there cannot be an act of temperance without an act of fortitude, nor an act of fortitude unless with an act of temperance.
QXII.Q14.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc dicitur quia non probatur per auctoritatem Bibliae.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that this is said because it is not proven through the authority of the Bible.
QXII.Q14.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod non dicuntur morales a consuetudine, sed a more. Et, dato quod indigeant tempore, tamen non habebis virtutem nisi sis prudens.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that they are not called moral from custom, but from behavior.1 And, given that they lack time, nevertheless you will not have virtue unless you are prudent.
QXII.Q14.ad3Q. 15On restitutionDe restitutione
Deinde quaesitum est de restitutione, quae est actus iustitiae. Et circa hoc quaesita sunt tria:
Then there were questions concerning restitution, which is an act of justice. And about this, there were three questions:
QXII.Q15primo, de illis qui propter partes sunt extra civitates;
first, concerning those men who on account of factions are in exile from cities;
QXII.Q15secundo, de eo qui mala fide longo praescripsit tempore;
second, concerning him who acquires something by prescription for a long time in bad faith;
QXII.Q15tertio, de eo qui aliena consumpsit.
third, concerning him who consumes another’s property.
QXII.Q15A. 1Whether those expelled on account of their factions can demand their goods from those who remain in the cityUtrum expulsi propter partes, possint expetere bona sua ab illis qui sunt in civitate manentes
Circa primum quaeritur utrum expulsi propter partes possint repetere bona sua ab illis qui sunt in civitate manentes. Et videtur quod non.
About the first there is a question whether those expelled on account of their factions can demand back their goods from those who remain in the city. And it seems that they cannot.
QXII.Q15.A1Quia multi de his qui sunt in civitate culpam non habuerunt ad eorum expulsionem, et sic punirentur aliqui pro culpa alterius.
Obj. 1: Because many of those in the city were not at fault for their expulsion, and thus some would be punished for the fault of another.
QXII.Q15.A1.arg1Praeterea. Expulsi fuerunt contra partem Ecclesiae, et sic iustum bellum: ergo actio est contra eos, et sic damna eis non sunt restituenda.
Obj. 2: The expelled were against the faction of the Church, and thus it was a just war. Therefore, the action is against them, and thus their losses must not be restored to them.
QXII.Q15.A1.arg2Praeterea. Secundum Philosophum, cum mutatur ordo civitatis, non remanet eadem civitas; sed cum mutatur dominium et principatus, mutatur ordo, et sic non est eadem civitas; ergo expulsi non pertinent amodo ad civitatem quae prius erat; ergo cives non tenentur eis ad restitutionem.
Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher,1 when the order of a city is changed, there does not remain the same city. But when dominion and leadership are changed, the order is changed, and thus there is not the same city. Therefore, the expelled do not belong henceforth to the city which was there before. Therefore, the citizens are not held unto restitution.
QXII.Q15.A1.arg3Contra. Qui spoliatur a raptore potest repetere et accipere ea quae sunt sibi ablata; ergo et isti expulsi.
On the contrary: He who is despoiled by a robber can demand back and receive those things taken from him; therefore, the same applies to those expelled.
QXII.Q15.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod aut sunt expulsi iuste, scilicet propter eorum culpam, et sic non possunt repetere amissa; aut iniuste, id est sine culpa et sine debito ordine iustitiae, et sic possunt repetere. Si autem habent superiorem, debent per superiorem petere sibi restitui; si autem non habent superiorem, ipsimet possunt, si possunt, recuperare.
I answer that either they were expelled justly, namely, on account of their fault, and thus they cannot demand back what was lost; or they were expelled unjustly, that is, without fault and without the due order of justice, and thus they can demand back. Yet if they have a superior, they should ask through the superior to have these things restored to them; yet if they do not have a superior, they themselves can, if they are able, regain them.
QXII.Q15.A1.coAd primum dicendum quod non punitur sic aliquis pro peccato alterius, sed pro suo, quia maiores omnia faciunt auctoritate et favore populi, et sic populus in favendo maioribus fuit in culpa. Praeterea, illud intelligitur de poena spirituali, qua nullus punitur sine propria culpa, non de temporali vel corporali, qua frequenter unus pro alio punitur.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that someone is not punished thus for the sin of another, but for his own, because the leaders do all things by the authority and the favor of the people, and thus the people in favoring the leaders were at fault. Besides, that is understood concerning spiritual punishment, by which no one is punished without his own proper fault. It is not concerning temporal or bodily punishment, by which one is frequently punished for another.
QXII.Q15.A1.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod in quantum iuste agunt, sunt pro Ecclesia, in quantum iniuste, sunt contra Ecclesiam.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that inasmuch as they act justly, they are for the Church; inasmuch as unjustly, they are against the Church.
QXII.Q15.A1.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod, si sunt eaedem personae, manifestum est quod tenentur; si aliae, omnino non tenentur.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that, if they are the same persons, it is clear that they are held; if others, they are altogether not held.
QXII.Q15.A1.ad3A. 2Whether he who acquires by prescription in bad faith is held to restitutionUtrum ille qui mala fide praescripsit teneatur ad restitutionem
Secundo quaeritur utrum ille qui mala fide praescribit teneatur ad restitutionem. Et videtur quod non.
Second, there is a question whether he who acquires by prescription in bad faith is held unto restitution. And it seems that he is not.
QXII.Q15.A2Quia lex dicit quod qui etiam mala fide praescribit, acquirit dominium.
Obj. 1: Because the law says that even he who prescribes in bad faith acquires dominion.
QXII.Q15.A2.arg1Contra. Decretalis dicit quod tenetur nec acquirit dominium.
On the contrary: A decretal says that he is held, and he does not acquire dominion.1
QXII.Q15.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod circa hoc est contrarietas civilis et canonici iuris, quia secundum ius civile talis praescriptio tenet, secundum ius canonicum talis praescribere non potest. Et ratio huius contrarietatis est quia alius est finis quem intendit civilis legislator, scilicet pacem servare et facere inter cives, quae impediretur si praescriptio non curreret: quicumque enim vellet, posset venire et dicere: “istud fuit meum,” quocumque tempore. Finis autem iuris canonici tendit ad quietem Ecclesiae et salutem animarum; nullus autem in peccato salvari potest nec poenitere de damno alieno nisi recompenset.
I answer that about this there is contrariety of civil and canon law,1 because according to civil law such prescription holds; according to canon law such a prescription cannot. And the reason for this contrariety is that the end which the civil legislator intends is one thing, namely, to preserve and make peace amongst citizens, which would be impeded if the prescription were not to run: for whoever would wish, could come and say: “that was mine,” at whatever time. Yet the end of canon law tends unto the quiet of the Church and the salvation of souls; yet no one in sin can be saved nor repent concerning another’s loss unless he makes recompense.
QXII.Q15.A2.coEt ideo dicendum quod, si quis praescribat bona fide possidendo, non tenetur ad restitutionem, etiam si sciat alienum fuisse post praescriptionem, quia lex potest aliquem pro peccato et negligentia punire in re sua et illam alteri dare et concedere. Sed qui mala fide praescribit, tenetur emendare et satisfacere reddendo damnum quod alii intulit.
And for this reason, it must be said that, if someone acquires by prescription and possesses in good faith, he is not held unto restitution, even if he knows that it was another’s after the prescription,1 because the law can punish someone for sin and negligence in its matter and give and concede that to another. But he who acquires by prescription in bad faith is held to amend and make satisfaction by restoring the loss which he inflicted upon another.
QXII.Q15.A2Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verum est quod omnia sunt principum, ad gubernandum, non ad retinendum sibi vel ad dandum aliis; et, si quae leges tales sunt, tyrannicae sunt et non absolvunt a conscientia, sed a iudiciali foro et violentia.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that it is true that all things belong to the princes for governing, not for retaining for themselves or for giving to others. And, if any laws are such, they are tyrannical and do not absolve from conscience, but from the judicial forum and violence.
QXII.Q15.A2.ad1A. 3Whether he who consumes another’s property is held to restitutionUtrum ille qui rem alienam consumpsit teneatur ad restitutionem
Tertio quaeritur utrum ille qui rem alienam consumpsit teneatur ad restitutionem. Et videtur quod non.
Third there is a question whether he who consumes another’s property is held unto restitution. And it seems that he is not.
QXII.Q15.A3Quia ille cuius res fuerat non habet actionem in consumptorem, intellige: si ius habet casum in praescriptione.
Obj. 1: Because he whose property it had been has an action against the consumer,1 understand: if the law has a case in prescription.
QXII.Q15.A3.arg1Contra. Iste mala fide possedit alienum, quod consumpsit.
On the contrary: That man possessed another’s property in bad faith, which he consumed.
QXII.Q15.A3.scResponsio. Dicendum quod tenetur. Cuius ratio est quia quilibet tenetur ad faciendum iustitiam alteri; consistit autem iustitia in quadam aequalitate, unde nisi reintegretur aequalitas, non potest aliquis esse iustus; inaequalitas autem fuit quod consumpsit rem non suam; et ideo oportet quod reddat.
I answer that he is held. The reason for this is that any man is held to do justice to another. Yet justice consists in a certain equality, hence unless equality is reintegrated, someone cannot be just. Yet it was inequality that he consumed property not his own; and for this reason, it is necessary for him to restore it.
QXII.Q15.A3.coAd primum dicendum quod, licet non habeat actionem in eum qui consumpsit secundum ius civile, habet tamen secundum ius divinum, cuius finis est salus animarum, et ideo ei repugnat.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, although he does not have an action against him who consumed according to civil law, nevertheless he has one according to divine law,1 the end of which is the salvation of souls, and for this reason, it is repugnant to it.
QXII.Q15.A3.ad1De officiis
On offices
Q. 16On the office of expositors of Sacred ScriptureDe officio expositorum sacrae Scripturae
Deinde quaesitum est de officiis, quatuor:
Then there are four questions concerning offices:
QXII.Q16primo, de officio expositorum Sacrae Scripturae;
first, concerning the office of expositors of Sacred Scripture;1
QXII.Q16secundo, de officio praedicatorum;
second, concerning the office of preachers;1
QXII.Q16tertio, de officio confessorum;
third, concerning the office of confessors;1
QXII.Q16quarto, de officio vicariorum.
fourth, concerning the office of vicars.1
QXII.Q16Articulus unicus
Article 1
QXII.Q16Utrum omnia quae doctores sancti dixerunt, sint a Spiritu Sancto
Whether all things which the holy teachers have said are from the Holy Spirit
Circa primum quaesitum est utrum omnia quae doctores sancti dixerunt sint a Spiritu Sancto. Et videtur quod non.
About the first, there was a question whether all things which the holy teachers have said are from the Holy Spirit. And it seems that they are not.
QXII.Q16Quia in suis dictis sunt aliqua falsa: nam in suis expositionibus quandoque dissonant; non potest autem esse verum quod dissimile vel dissonum est, quia utraque pars contradictionis non potest esse vera.
Obj. 1: Because in their sayings there are some false things: for they are sometimes discordant in their expositions. Yet what is dissimilar or dissonant cannot be true, because both parts of a contradiction cannot be true.
QXII.Q16.arg1Contra. Ad eumdem pertinet facere aliquid propter finem et perducere ad illum finem; sed finis Scripturae, quae est a Spiritu Sancto, est eruditio hominum; haec autem eruditio hominum ex Scripturis non potest esse nisi per expositiones sanctorum; ergo expositiones sanctorum sunt a Spiritu Sancto.
On the contrary: The same thing makes something for an end and leads through to that end. But the end of Scripture, which is from the Holy Spirit, is the education of men. Yet this education of men from the Scriptures can only be through the expositions of the saints. Therefore, the expositions of the saints are from the Holy Spirit.
QXII.Q16.scResponsio. Dicendum quod ab eodem Spiritu Scripturae sunt expositae et editae. Unde dicitur, I Corinthiorum II: animalis homo non percipit ea quae Dei sunt . . . , spiritualis autem etc.; et praecipue quantum ad ea quae sunt fidei, quia fides donum Dei est. Et ideo interpretatio sermonum numeratur inter alia dona Spiritus Sancti, Corinthiorum XII.
I answer that by the same Spirit the Scriptures are exposited and interpreted. Hence it is said in 1 Corinthians 2:14–15: animal man does not perceive those things which are of God . . . , yet spiritual; and especially as regards those things which are of faith, because faith is a gift of God. And for this reason, the interpretation of speeches is numbered among the other gifts of the Holy Spirit in 1 Corinthians 12:10.
QXII.Q16.coAd primum ergo dicendum quod gratiae gratis datae non sunt habitus, sed sunt quidam motus a Spiritu Sancto; alias, si essent habitus, propheta quando vellet per donum prophetiae revelationem haberet, quod falsum est. Et ideo de aliquibus occultis revelandis aliquando tangitur mens a Spiritu Sancto et aliquando non, sed aliqua eis occultantur. Unde dixit Eliseus, IV Regum III: et dominus celavit a me. Aliquando etiam aliqua dicunt a se ipsis, sicut patet de Nathan, qui consuluit David quod aedificaret templum, postea autem a Domino reprehensus et quasi retractans prohibuit hoc ipsi David ex parte Dei. Hoc tamen tenendum est quod quidquid in Sacra Scriptura continetur verum est; alias qui contra hoc sentiret, esset haereticus. Expositores autem in aliis, quae non sunt fidei, multa ex suo sensu dixerunt, et ideo in his potuerunt errare. Tamen dicta expositorum necessitatem non inducunt ut necesse sit eis credere, sed solum Scriptura canonica, quae in Veteri et in Novo Testamento est.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that graces freely given are not habits, but are certain motions from the Holy Spirit. Otherwise, if they were habits, a prophet would have a revelation whenever he wished through the gift of prophecy, which is false. And for this reason, concerning some occult revelations, sometimes the mind is touched by the Holy Spirit and sometimes not, but somehow they are hidden from them. Hence Elisha said, in 2 Kings 4:27: and the Lord concealed from me. Sometimes also they say certain things from their own selves, just as is clear concerning Nathan, who counseled David that he would build a temple, yet afterwards, was reproved by the Lord and as though retracting, he prohibited this for David on the part of God. Nevertheless, this must be held: that whatever is contained in Sacred Scripture is true; he who would think otherwise against this would be a heretic. Yet the expositors on other things, which are not of faith, have said many things out of their own speech, and for this reason, in these they could have erred. Nevertheless, the sayings of the expositors do not induce necessity so that it is necessary to believe them, but only canonical Scripture, which is in the Old and the New Testament.
QXII.Q16.ad1Q. 17On the office of preachersDe officio praedicatorum
Deinde quaesitum est de praedicatoribus. Et circa hoc quaesita sunt duo.
Then there were questions concerning preachers. And about this two things were asked.
QXII.Q17A. 1Whether someone can preach by his own authority, such that it would be licit to preach without the license of the prelateUtrum aliquis possit praedicare propria auctoritate, ita ut liceat praedicare sine licentia praelati
Primo, utrum aliquis possit praedicare propria auctoritate, ita ut liceat praedicare sine licentia praelati. Et videtur quod sic.
First, whether someone can preach by his own authority, such that it would be licit to preach without the license of the prelate. And it seems that he can.
QXII.Q17.A1Quia praedicare est bonum alii facere; sed debemus bonum operari ad omnes, Galatarum VI; ergo etc.
Obj. 1: Because to preach is to do the good of another; but we ought to work good unto all (Gal 6:10).
QXII.Q17.A1.arg1Praeterea. Dicitur Ecclesiastici <XVII>: unicuique mandavit Deus de proximo suo; ergo etc.
Obj. 2: It is said in Sirach 17:12: God mandated to each one concerning his neighbor.
QXII.Q17.A1.arg2Contra. Romanorum X: quomodo praedicabunt, nisi mittantur?; ergo etc.
On the contrary: Romans 10:15: how shall they preach, unless they are sent?
QXII.Q17.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod nullus, quantumcumque scientiae magnae vel quantumcumque sanctitatis, nisi missus a Deo vel a praelato, praedicare potest, quia nullum agens natum est agere nisi supra debitam materiam ministratam; praedicatio autem est exhortatio et doctrina, si sit publica, respiciens totam Ecclesiam; tota autem Ecclesia et cura publica Ecclesiae commissa est praelatis; et ideo nullus debet aliquid exercere quod requirat auctoritatem publicam nisi auctoritate praelati.
I answer that no one, however great his knowledge or however great his holiness, can preach unless sent by God or by a prelate, because an agent is raised to act only over the due matter supplied.1 Yet preaching is exhortation and doctrine, and if it be public, this is to the whole Church. Yet the whole Church and the public care of the Church is committed to prelates. And for this reason, no one ought to exercise some function which requires public authority unless by the authority of a prelate.
QXII.Q17.A1.coAd primum dicendum quod cuilibet licet facere bonum sibi proportionatum, non autem quodcumque bonum.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that for any man it is licit to do good proportionate to himself, yet not any good whatsoever.
QXII.Q17.A1.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod mandavit Deus monere proximum privata monitione et familiari.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that God commanded a neighbor to be admonished by a private and familiar admonition.1
QXII.Q17.A1.ad2A. 2Whether someone prohibited by a secular prince should abandon preachingUtrum aliquis prohibitus a principe saeculari debeat dimittere praedicationem
Secundo, utrum aliquis prohibitus a principe saeculari debeat dimittere praedicationem. Et videtur quod non.
Second, whether someone prohibited by a secular prince should abandon preaching. And it seems that he should not.
QXII.Q17.A2Matthaei X: nolite timere eos qui occidunt corpus, dicitur praedicatoribus; ergo timore principium non debent dimittere.
Obj. 1: Matthew 10:28: do not fear those who kill the body, which is said to preachers. Therefore, they should not abandon preaching from fear of princes.
QXII.Q17.A2.arg1Praeterea. Actuum IV: Deo oportet magis obedire quam hominibus; sed Deus praecipit praecipue praelatis quod praedicent, II Timothaei IV: praedica verbum; ergo etc.
Obj. 2: Acts 5:29: it is necessary to obey God rather than men. But God commands prelates especially that they should preach: preach the word (2 Tim 4:2).
QXII.Q17.A2.arg2Praeterea. Nullus debet obedire alicui in eo in quo peccat praecipiens; sed princeps peccat prohibendo hoc; ergo etc.
Obj. 3: No one should obey another in that in which the one commanding sins. But a prince sins by prohibiting this.
QXII.Q17.A2.arg3Contra. Actuum: quia repulistis regnum Dei etc.
On the contrary (1): Because you have rejected the kingdom of God (Acts 13:46).
QXII.Q17.A2.scPraeterea. Matthaei <X>: si vos persecuti fuerint in una civitate, fugite in aliam.
Furthermore (2): If you should be persecuted in one city, flee into another (Matt 10:23).
QXII.Q17.A2.arg4Responsio. Dicendum quod hic est opus duplici distinctione.
I answer that here there is needed a twofold distinction.
QXII.Q17.A2.coQuia, quando aliquis prohibetur praedicare, vel prohibetur solum a tyranno, aut simul a tyranno et populo. Si primo modo, sic, cum de multitudine sint aliqui qui audire volunt, non est dimittenda praedicatio, quamvis sit sic moderanda quo ad tempora et loca ut ex timore ad tyrannum non impediatur; et quandoque etiam tunc liceret praedicare occulte per domos, sicut ab Apostolos legitur factum. Si secundo modo, tunc debet cedere praedicator et fugere ad alia loca, secundum mandatum Domini. Et hoc etiam Gregorius dicit in Dialogo, quod, quando omnes sunt mali et indurati, debet eis dicere illud Apostoli: quia repulistis a vobis regnum Dei etc.
Because, when someone is prohibited to preach, either he is prohibited only by a tyrant, or simultaneously by a tyrant and the people. If in the first way, since there are some of the multitude who wish to hear, preaching must not be abandoned. However, it must be moderated as to time and place such that a preacher is not impeded for fear of the tyrant. And at any time even then it would be licit to preach secretly through homes, just as is read to have been done by the Apostles.1 If in the second way, then the preacher ought to cede and flee unto other places, according to the mandate of the Lord. And this also Gregory says in the Dialogue:2 that, when all are evil and hardened, he ought to say to them that saying of the Apostle: because you have rejected from yourselves the kingdom of God (Acts 13:46).
QXII.Q17.A2Alia distinctio est hic habenda, quia praedicator aut habet curam animarum aut non, id est aut praedicat ex necessitate officii aut propria sponte. Si primo modo, sic non debet dimittere gregem etiam propter periculum mortis, dummodo possit aliquod bonum facere remanendo cum grege. Si secundo modo, sic, etiam si posset ibi inter tales fructificare, non tenetur instare, nec ad ponendum animam suam, nisi in casu, puta si aliquis vellet corrumpere fidem; et tunc ubi fides periclitaretur, teneretur animam pro fratribus ponere, quia hoc est in praecepto in tali casu. Si autem non imminet talis casus, sic est in consilio, quia omnia consilia in casu sunt in praecepto.
Another distinction must be had here, because a preacher either has the care of souls or not, that is, either he preaches out of necessity of office or by his own will. If in the first way, he should not abandon the flock even on account of danger of death, provided that he can do something good by remaining with the flock. If thus in the second way, even if he could bear fruit there among such men, he is not held to pursue this, nor to lay down his soul, unless in a certain case, for example if someone would wish to corrupt the faith. And then where the faith would be endangered, he is held to lay down his soul for his brothers, because this is in a precept in such a case. Yet if such a case is not imminent, thus it is in a counsel, because all counsels in a certain case are in a precept.
QXII.Q17.A2Ad primum dicendum quod Deus praecipit praedicare, tamen ordinate et eo modo quo utile sit saluti animarum.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that God commands preaching, nevertheless ordinately and in that way in which it is useful for the salvation of souls.
QXII.Q17.A2.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod non est aliquid dimittendum quod sit secundum Deum, timore mortis; sed si aliquis sine causa et sine necessitate se ingerat ad periculum, non fit sapienter.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that what is according to God should not be abandoned from fear of death. Rather, it is not wise for someone to put himself in danger without cause and necessity.
QXII.Q17.A2.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod falsum est. Nam, secundum Augustinum, aliquando imperator peccat praecipiendo quod devotus miles non peccat obediendo, maxime si militi non constet illud esse peccatum.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that it is false. For, according to Augustine, sometimes the general sins by commanding that which a devoted soldier does not sin by obeying, especially if it is not clear to the soldier that it is a sin.1
QXII.Q17.A2.ad3A. 3Whether it is licit for preachers to receive alms from usurersUtrum liceat praedicatoribus accipere eleemosynas ab usurariis
Tertio, utrum liceat praedicatoribus recipere eleemosynas ab usurariis. Et videtur quod sic.
Third, whether it is licit for preachers to receive alms from usurers. And it seems that it is.
QXII.Q17.A3Corinthiorum IX: si nos vobis spiritualia seminamus etc.
Obj. 1: 1 Corinthians 9:11:1 if we sow spiritual things in you.
QXII.Q17.A3.arg1Praeterea. Ius naturale habet quod homo vivat de labore suo: dignus est enim operarius etc.; hoc enim concessum est homini a creatore: in sudore etc., Genesis III.
Obj. 2: Natural law holds that man lives from his own labor: for worthy is the worker (Matt 10:10);1 for this is conceded to man by the Creator: in the sweat of your face (Gen 3:19).
QXII.Q17.A3.arg2Contra. Usurarii nihil habent nisi quod est alienum.
On the contrary: Usurers have nothing except what is another’s.
QXII.Q17.A3.scResponsio. Dicendum quod de rapina, usura et huiusmodi, in generali loquendo, non potest fieri eleemosyna. Isaiae LXI: odio habens rapinam in holocaustum. Tamen, in speciali casu, praedicatoribus qui praedicant usurariis et monent eos restituere, licitum est accipere; et haec est una ratio. Alia est, quando non habent alias unde vivant, et in extrema necessitate omnia sunt communia, et ab omnibus licit accipere ad sustentationem et necessitatem.
I answer that, speaking in general, alms cannot be made from robbery, usury, and things of this sort. Isaiah 61:8 says: I hate robbery as a holocaust. Nevertheless, it is licit in a special case for preachers who preach to receive from usurers and admonish them to make restitution; and this is one reason. Another is when they do not have other means whence they may live, and in extreme necessity all things are common,1 and it is licit to receive from all for sustenance and necessity.
QXII.Q17.A3.coQ. 18On the office of confessorsDe officio confessorum
Articulus unicus
Article 1
QXII.Q18Utrum aliquis possit confessiones audire de indulgentia domini papae sine voluntate proprii praelati
Whether someone can hear confessions from an indulgence of the lord pope without the permission of his own prelate
Deinde quaesitum fuit de officio confessorum, utrum aliquis possit confessionem audire de indulgentia domini papae sine voluntate proprii praelati. Et videtur quod non.
Then there was a question concerning the office of confessors, whether someone can hear confession from an indulgence of the lord pope without the permission of his own prelate. And it seems that he cannot.
QXII.Q18Quia quilibet tenetur confiteri proprio sacerdoti; ergo etc.
Obj. 1: Because everyone is held to confess to his proper priest; therefore, he cannot hear the confession.1
QXII.Q18.arg1Praeterea. Papa nulli praeiudicat propter aliquam indulgentiam.
Obj. 2: The pope prejudices no one on account of any indulgence.1
QXII.Q18.arg2Contra. Papa est super omnes; ergo cui vult et quid et quantum vult potest committere et indulgere.
On the contrary: The pope is over all. Therefore, to whom he wills, and what and how much as he wills, he can commit and indulge.
QXII.Q18.scResponsio. Dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod quilibet sacerdos potest absolvere quemlibet a quocumque peccato, et, licet non bene faciat absolvendo, tamen absolutus est. Et ratio horum fuit quia simul datur presbytero in sua ordinatione potestas consecrandi corpus Christi et potestas clavium, et ideo, sicut potest consecrare quamlibet hostiam, ita potest absolvere quemlibet.
I answer that certain men say that every priest can absolve whomever from whatever sin, and, although he does not do well by absolving, nevertheless the man is absolved.1 And the reasoning of these men was that there is given to the priest in his ordination simultaneously the power of consecrating the body of Christ and the power of the keys, and for this reason, just as he can consecrate any host, so he can absolve whomever.
QXII.Q18.coSed hoc est erroneum, quia nullus potest absolvere propria auctoritate nisi eum qui est aliquo modo sibi subditus, quia actus fiunt in propria materia, et absolutio sacramentalis habet iudicium annexum, et hoc, scilicet iudicium, non est nisi in subditos et inferiores; qui ergo non habet subditum non potest absolvere. Et sic iurisdictio dat materiam sacerdoti determinatam. Secus autem est de hostia, quae est materia determinata. Cui ergo nulla cura committitur, habet clavem ligatam, ut iuristae dicunt, scilicet quia non habet omnino materiam.
But this is erroneous because no one can absolve by his own proper authority except him who is subject to himself in some way, because acts are done in their proper matter,1 and sacramental absolution has judgment annexed. And this, namely, judgment, is only in subjects and inferiors. Therefore, he who does not have a subject cannot absolve. And thus, jurisdiction gives the matter determined to the priest.2 Yet it is otherwise concerning a host, which is determinate matter. Therefore, he to whom no care is committed has the key bound, as the jurists says,3 namely, because he does not have matter at all.
QXII.Q18Alii dicunt quod nullus potest, etiam auctoritate superioris praelati, absolvere subditum inferioris praelati contra voluntatem ipsius, puta non potest auctoritate episcopi contra voluntatem parochialis aliquem absolvere.
Other men say that no one can, even by the authority of a superior prelate, absolve the subject of an inferior prelate against that one’s will: for example, he cannot absolve someone by the authority of the bishop against the will of the parish priest.
QXII.Q18Hoc etiam est erroneum, quia ad absolvendum requiritur potestas sacerdotalis et iurisdictio, episcopus autem habet immediatam iurisdictionem in omnes; unde episcopus potest omnium confessiones audire, etiam contra voluntatem presbyteri parochialis, et similiter etiam ille cui episcopus committit, et multo magis si papa committit. Tamen archiepiscopus, quia non habet immediatam iurisdictionem in omnes sui archiepiscopatus nisi ex appellatione, non posset alicui dare licentiam vel auctoritatem audiendi confessiones contra voluntatem episcopi et dioecesani suffraganei.
This also is erroneous because for absolving there is required sacerdotal power and jurisdiction. Yet the bishop has immediate jurisdiction over all. Hence a bishop can hear the confessions of all, even against the will of a parish priest, and similarly also he to whom the bishop commits this, and much more if the pope commits it. Nevertheless, an archbishop, because he does not have immediate jurisdiction over all of his arch-episcopacy except out of appeal, cannot give to someone the license or authority of hearing confessions against the will of the bishop and of the diocesan suffragan.
QXII.Q18Ad primum patet per ea quae dicta sunt, quia episcopus et papa plus potest quam sacerdos.
Reply Obj. 1: It is clear through those things which have been said, because the bishop and the pope are more powerful than a priest.
QXII.Q18.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc non est in praeiudicium, sed in auxilium, quia audire confessiones non est statutum in favorem sacerdotum, alias multum essent fideles servi, si propter honorem sacerdotum confiteri peccata esset necessarium; sed hoc est introductum ad salutem animarum.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that this is not unto prejudice, but unto help, because to hear confessions was not established unto the favor of priests; otherwise, the faithful really would be servants, if on account of the honor of priests it were necessary to confess sins. Rather, this was introduced for the salvation of souls.
QXII.Q18.ad2Q. 19On the office of vicarsDe officio vicariorum
Articulus unicus
Article 1
QXII.Q19Utrum vicarius alicuius possit vices suas committere alteri
Whether a vicar of some place can commit his power to another
Deinde quaesitum fuit de officio vicariorum, utrum vicarius alicuius possit vices suas committere alteri. Et videtur quod sic.
Then there was a question concerning the office of vicars, whether a vicar of some place can commit his power to another. And it seems that he can.
QXII.Q19Quia effectus habens virtutem causae potest in ea in quae potest causa.
Obj. 1: Because an effect which has the power of the cause can do whatever the cause can do.
QXII.Q19.arg1Contra. Quia hoc videtur esse contrarium illi Proverbiorum XXVII: diligenter agnosce vultum pecoris tui.
On the contrary (2): This seems contrary to that saying of Proverbs 27:23: diligently recognize the face of your cattle.
QXII.Q19.scResponsio. Dicendum quod ille qui constituitur vicarius non potest totam suam potestatem committere, sed potest partem, quia intentio committentis est ut exequatur secundum quod potest ille cui committit, et forte talis non potest totum facere quod sibi committitur, et ideo potest aliquid alteri committere.
I answer that he who is constituted as vicar cannot commit his whole power, but he can commit a part, because the intention of the one committing is so that it may be accomplished according to how that one to whom he commits it is able, and perhaps such a man cannot do the whole which is committed to him, and for this reason, he can commit something to another.
QXII.Q19.coAd primum dicendum quod effectus non habet semper totam virtutem causae, nisi esset < . . . > episcopus.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that an effect does not always have the whole power of the cause, unless he were < . . . > a bishop.
QXII.Q19.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc ipsum facit ut cognoscat vultum pecoris.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that he does this very thing in order that he might know the face of the cattle.
QXII.Q19.ad2De homine quantum ad culpam
On man, as regards fault
De peccatis
On sins
On original sin
QXII.Q19Q. 20On original sinDe peccato originali
Deinde quaerebatur de pertinentibus ad culpam;
Then there were questions concerning what pertains to fault:
QXII.Q20et primo, de peccatis;
and first, concerning sins;1
QXII.Q20secundo, de poenis.
second, concerning punishments.1
QXII.Q20De primo quaesita fuerunt duo:
Concerning the first, there were two questions:
primo, de pertinentibus ad culpam originalem;
first, concerning what pertains to the original fault;1
QXII.Q20secundo, ad culpam actualem.
second, to actual fault.1
QXII.Q20Articulus unicus
Article 1
QXII.Q20Utrum traducatur per traductionem seminis
Whether it is transferred through the transfer of seed
De peccato originali quaesitum fuit utrum traducatur per traductionem seminis.
Concerning original sin there was a question whether it is transferred through the transfer of seed.
QXII.Q20Responsio. Dicendum quod sic, quia originale est peccatum naturae et non attingit personam nisi in quantum est in tali natura; tota autem humana natura est sicut unus homo; ubicumque ergo illa natura reperitur, ibi est peccatum naturae, quod est originale.
I answer that it is, because original sin is the sin of nature and it only touches a person inasmuch as it is in such a nature. Yet the whole human nature is just as one man;1 therefore, wherever that nature is discovered, there is the sin of nature, which is original sin.
QXII.Q20.co(Nota quod percussio habet rationem culpae non in quantum ipsius manus, sed in quantum fit a principio voluntatis.)
(Note that striking has the character of fault not inasmuch as it is of this hand, but inasmuch as it is done by a principle of the will.)1
QXII.Q20De culpa actuali
On actual sin
Q. 21On the sin of thoughtDe peccato cogitationis
Deinde quaesitum fuit de culpa actuali. Et primo de peccato cogitationis duo fuerunt quaesita.
Then there was a question concerning actual sin. And first, there were two questions concerning the sin of thought.
QXII.Q21A. 1Whether consent to pleasure is mortal sinUtrum consensus in delectationem sit peccatum mortale
Primo, utrum consensus in delectationem sit peccatum mortale.
First, whether consent to pleasure is mortal sin.
QXII.Q21.A1Responsio. Dicendum quod hic non quaeritur de consensu in delectationem actus, quia hoc plane mortale est, sed de consensu in actum cogitationis tantum, sicut cum aliquis cogitat delectationem fornicationis et delectatur et placet sibi haec cogitatio. Est igitur duplex cogitatio delectationis: vel propter ipsam cogitationem, vel propter rem cogitatam; prima est cum quis cogitat de triangulo vel de bellis regis non propter regem, sed propter ipsam cogitationem; secunda est cum delector cogitans de amico propter ipsum, qui fit mihi per cogitationem et in cogitatione praesens. Sic ergo cogitatio potest cogitari ut delectans prout est cogitatio, et sic non est peccatum, sicut si debeo narrare de fornicatione et occurrunt pulchrae viae et delector. Si autem cogitatio est delectans propter rem cogitatam, impossibile est quod hoc procedat nisi ex amore fornicationis, et ideo consentire in eam est consentire in amorem et in usum rei illicitae, et ideo est peccatum mortale.
I answer that this is not asked about consent to the pleasure of an act, because this plainly is mortal, but concerning consent to an act of thought only, such as when someone thinks about the pleasure of fornication and is delighted and this thought pleases him. There is, therefore, a twofold thought of pleasure: either on account of that very thought, or on account of the thing thought of. The first is when someone thinks about a triangle or about the wars of the king, not on account of the king, but on account of that thought. The second is when I am delighted thinking about a friend on his own account, who is made present for me through thought and in thought. Thus, therefore, thought can be thought as delighting precisely as it is thought, and thus it is not sin, such as if I ought to tell about fornication and there occur beautiful ways and I am delighted. Yet if thought is delighting on account of the thing thought, it is impossible for this to be except for love of fornication, and for this reason, to consent to it is to consent to the love and to the use of an illicit thing, and for this reason, it is mortal sin.
QXII.Q21.A1.coA. 2On suspicionDe suspicione
Secundo, de suspicione, utrum sit peccatum mortale. Videtur quod sic.
Second, concerning suspicion, whether it is mortal sin. It seems that it is.
QXII.Q21.A2Talibus enim comminatur Dominus, Isaiae V: vae qui dicitis etc.
Obj. 1: For such men the Lord threatens, in Isaiah 5:20: woe to you who call evil good, and good evil.
QXII.Q21.A2.arg1Contra. Super illud: nolite ante tempus iudicare, dicit Glossa quod est veniale peccatum.
On the contrary: Upon that verse: do not judge before the time (1 Cor 4:5), the Gloss says that it is venial sin.1
QXII.Q21.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod in illis quae sunt mortalia peccata ex genere, motus imperfecti non sunt peccata mortalia, sed venialia: adulterium enim est mortale, scilicet quando est completa voluntas, non autem quando est incompleta; non enim quilibet motus concupiscentiae est peccatum mortale. Iudicium autem est duplex, scilicet de rebus et de personis. Iudicium de rebus semper est mortale peccatum, puta dicere quod dare eleemosynam sit malum. Iudicium autem de personis, licet quandoque sit falsum, non tamen semper est peccatum, nisi quando est omnino temerarium. Unde Augustinus in sermone Domini in monte: si erramus in iudicio personarum, non erremus in iudicio rerum. Sed quando ex levi re iudicium procedit firmum in corde, aliquando est mortale, quia est cum contemptu proximi.
I answer that in those things which are mortal sin out of their genus, imperfect motions are not mortal sin, but venial. For adultery is mortal, namely, when there is complete will, yet not when it is incomplete; for not every motion of concupiscence is mortal sin. Yet judgment is twofold, namely, concerning things and concerning persons. Judgment concerning things is always mortal sin: for example, to say that to give alms is evil. Yet judgment concerning persons, although sometimes it may be false, nevertheless is not always sin, unless when it is altogether rash. Hence Augustine on the sermon of the Lord on the mount: if we err in judgment of persons, let us not err in judgment of things.1 But when out of a light matter judgment proceeds firm in heart, sometimes it is mortal, because it is with contempt of neighbor.
QXII.Q21.A2.coSuspicio autem est quid imperfectum in genere iudicii, et ideo est imperfectus motus, et ideo non est mortale ex genere, quamvis si fiat ex odio erit aliquando mortale.
Yet suspicion is something imperfect in the genus of judgment,1 and for this reason, it is an imperfect motion, and for this reason, it is not mortal out of its genus, although if it is done out of hatred it will be mortal sometimes.
QXII.Q21.A2Ad primum dicendum quod qui dicit bonum malum etc., non suspicatur, sed iudicat, et ideo peccat <mortaliter>.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that he who calls good evil, and so on, does not suspect, but judges, and for this reason, he sins mortally.
QXII.Q21.A2.ad1Q. 22On the sin of deedDe peccato operis
Deinde quaesita fuerunt de peccato operis tria.
Then there were three questions concerning the sin of deed.
QXII.Q22A. 1Whether it is licit to use lots, especially in the opening of booksUtrum liceat uti sortibus, maxime in apertione librorum
Primo, utrum liceat uti sortibus, maxime in apertionibus librorum.
First, whether it is licit to use lots, especially in the openings of books.
QXII.Q22.A1Responsio. Dicendum quod sors proprie est iudicium quod exquiritur ex aliquo ab homine facto ad inquirendum occultum. Dico autem “ab homine facto” (quia quaerere de factis ab aliis non est sors, sed aut augurium aut aliquid aliud), ut quando aliquis facit sicut geomantici et cum taxillis et de festucis et in apertione librorum.
I answer that a lot properly is a judgment which is sought out of something done by a man for inquiring into the occult. Yet I say, “done by a man” (because to seek from things done by others is not a lot, but either augury or something else), as when someone acts as the geomantics1 and with small dice and concerning straws and in the opening of books.
QXII.Q22.A1.coHaec autem fiunt ad tria: aut ad inquirendum voluntatem aut ad consultandum dubium aut ad divinandum; et sic sumitur triplex sors, scilicet divisoria, consultoria et divinativa.
Yet these things are done for three ends: either for inquiring into the will, or for consulting about the doubtful, or for divining. And thus, there are three kinds of lots: namely, lots for the sake of distribution, lots for consultation, and lots of divination.
QXII.Q22.A1Aliqui faciunt has quasi committentes fortunae, sicut cum quilibet non videtur debere ire, sortem ponamus quis debeat ire; et hoc aliquando est vanum. Aliqui intentione exquirendi iudicium alicuius rei, sicut quidam, ad inquirendum iudicium astrorum, < . . . >, sicut geomantici, qui dicunt quod secundum motum caeli manus movetur; et sic est peccatum. Aliqui intendunt scire iudicium diaboli, sicut Nabuchodonosor, et hoc est sacrilegium. Aliqui iudicium divinum; et sic non semper est peccatum.
Some men do these things as though committing to fortune, such as when it does not seem that someone ought to go,1 we place a lot as to who ought to go; and this sometimes is vain. Some men do so with the intention of seeking out the judgment of some matter, such as certain men who inquire into the judgment of the stars, < . . . >, such as geomantics, who say that according to the motion of heaven the hand is moved; and thus, it is sin. Some men intend to know the judgment of the devil,2 such as Nebuchadnezzar,3 and this is sacrilege. Some men intend to know divine judgment; and thus, it is not always sin.
QXII.Q22.A1Et sic sors divinatoria quatuor habet gradus; et primo modo aliquando est leve peccatum vel non est peccatum; secundo modo est peccatum, et tertio; sed quarto non semper peccatum est, sed quando quis non est necessitate facit, quia sic est tentare Deum (II Paralipomenon XX: cum ignoremus quid agere etc.); vel quando sine debita devotione, sicut Beda dicit, Actuum I; <vel> quando aliquis res sacras convertit in res temporales, sicut cum aperit libros pro temporalibus; vel quando de eo quod est supra nos, sicut quando aliqui non concordant <in electionibus ecclesiasticis et ideo utuntur sortibus>, quia hoc est facere iniuriam Spiritui Sancto, qui creditur firmiter esse in Ecclesia vel in collegiis; tamen in electione potestatum saecularium nihil prohibet sortibus uti.
And thus, a lot of divination has four grades; and in the first mode sometimes there is light sin or no sin; in the second mode there is sin, and also in the third. But in the fourth there is not always sin, except when someone does this not by necessity, because thus it is to tempt God (2 Chron 20:12: since we are ignorant what to do); or it is when done without due devotion, as Bede says;1 or when someone converts sacred things into temporal things, such as when he opens books for temporal things; or when it concerns that which is above us, such as when some men do not agree in ecclesiastical elections, and for this reason, they use lots, because this is to do injury to the Holy Spirit, who is believed firmly to be in the Church or in colleges. Nevertheless, in the election of secular powers nothing prohibits using lots.
QXII.Q22.A1A. 2On the retention of superfluitiesDe retentione superfluorum
Secundo, de retentione superfluorum, utrum ille qui non dat superfluum quod habet, pro Deo, peccet.
Second, concerning the retention of superfluities, whether he sins who does not give for God what he has as superfluous.
QXII.Q22.A2Dicit enim Augustinus quod qui retinet etc.
Obj. 1: For Augustine says that he who retains.1
QXII.Q22.A2.arg1< . . . >
< . . . >
QXII.Q22.A2A. 3On perplexityDe perplexitate
Tertio, de perplexitate, utrum aliquis possit esse perplexus.
Third, concerning perplexity, whether someone can be perplexed.
QXII.Q22.A3< . . . >
< . . . >
QXII.Q22.A3On punishments
QXII.Q22.A3Q. 23On punishmentsDe poenis
Deinde quaesitum est de poenis.
Then there were questions concerning punishments.
QXII.Q23A. 1On temporal punishmentDe poena temporali
Et primo de poena temporali, utrum aliquis religiosus expelli debeat propter peccatum de religione, si sit paratus corrigi et sustinere poenam.
And first, concerning temporal punishment, whether any religious ought to be expelled for a sin concerning religion, if he is prepared to be corrected and to undergo punishment.
QXII.Q23.A1Responsio. Dicendum quod Apostolus dicit: auferte malum ex vobis; modicum fermentum etc.
I answer that the Apostle says: remove evil from yourselves (1 Cor 5:13); a little leaven corrupts (1 Cor 5:6).1
QXII.Q23.A1.coAufertur autem aliquis aut per poenam corporalem, et per hoc manifestum est quod aufertur etiam ille qui vellet poenitere quantumcumque, sicut homicida suspenditur quantumcumque poeniteat; vel per poenam spiritualem, et hoc Ecclesia non facit, nisi si quis esset contumax. Et ratio huius est quia per poenam corporalem aufertur quid temporale, quod potest recompensari per aliud maius bonum; sed bonum spirituale quod adimitur non potest recompensari, et ideo non debet religio infligere talem poenam, quamdiu vult corrigi; et sicut est excommunicatio in Ecclesia, ita est expulsio a religione. Et ideo dicendum quod nullus est nisi propter contumaciam expellendus, sed alio modo est sequestrandus, in carcere vel alio modo.
Someone may be removed through bodily punishment, and thus even someone who wishes to repent however much is clearly removed, just as a murderer is hanged however much he may repent. Or, someone may be removed through spiritual punishment, and this the Church only does if someone is obstinate. And the reason for this is that through bodily punishment there is removed something temporal, which can be recompensed through something else more good. But a spiritual good which is lost cannot be recompensed, and for this reason, religion ought not to inflict such a punishment, as long as he wills to be corrected; and just as there is excommunication in the Church, so there is expulsion from religion. And for this reason, it must be said that no one is to be expelled except for obstinacy, but is to be sequestered in another way, in prison or another way.
QXII.Q23.A1A. 2On eternal punishmentDe poena aeterna
Secundo, de poena aeterna, utrum anima separata a corpore naturaliter patiatur ab igne corporeo.
Second, concerning eternal punishment, whether a soul separated from the body naturally suffers from bodily fire.
QXII.Q23.A2< . . . >
< . . . >
QXII.Q23.A2