Sed Contra (2): If it is said that they are predicated of one another on account of this: that they share in one person, yet not in one supposit or one hypostasis, then to the contrary: person does not add anything over hypostasis or supposit unless something accidental, namely, propriety pertaining to dignity.¹ Therefore, if in Christ there were one person and not one supposit and hypostasis, the divine nature and the human would be united in him only by accident, which is false.

For it is necessary according to the doctrine of the faith that we posit one thing subsisting in two natures, namely, the divine and the human. Otherwise, it could not be said that the Lord Jesus Christ is one, according to the sentence of the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 8:6. Hence also Nestorius was damned on account of this: that he presumed to divide Christ, introducing two persons.

Yet that which subsists in a nature is something undivided or singular. Hence the unity of Christ, in which two natures are united, must be attributed to some name through which singularity is designated. Yet of names which designate singularity, certain ones signify the singular in any genus of being, just as this name “singular” and “particular” and “individual,” because this whiteness is something singular and individual and particular: for universal and particular encircle every genus. Whereas certain ones signify singularity in the genus of substance, such as this name “hypostasis” which signifies individual substance, and this name “person,” which signifies an individual substance of a rational nature;¹ and similarly, this name “supposit” or “thing of nature.” None of these can be predicated of this whiteness, even though this whiteness is singular, because each of those signifies something essentially subsisting, whereas accidents do not subsist. Whereas the parts of substances, even though they are from the nature of subsisting things, nevertheless do not subsist essentially, but they are in another. Hence also the aforesaid names are not said of the parts of substances: for we do not say that this hand is a hypostasis or a person or a supposit or a thing of nature, even though it can be said that it is a certain individual or particular or singular thing, which names also were said of accidents.

Yet it cannot be said that the human nature in Christ or some part of it subsists essentially: for this would be repugnant to union, unless we were to posit union in a qualified sense and not absolutely, just as stones in a heap are united, or two men through the affect of love or through some similitude of imitation, all of which we say in a qualified sense are one and not absolutely. For something absolutely one that subsists in itself contains nothing subsisting in itself actually, but perhaps in potency. Hence, to conserve the truth of the union of natures in Christ, it is necessary to posit, just as one person, so one hypostasis and one supposit and one thing of two natures. But nothing prohibits saying that the human nature itself in Christ is a certain individual or singular or particular. The same applies to parts of human nature, such as hands and feet and bones, whatever is a particular thing. For such a thing is not predicated of the whole because none of those is an individual subsisting in itself. But the individual subsisting in itself, or the singular or particular which is predicated of Christ, is one only. Hence we can say that there are many individuals or singulars or particulars in Christ, yet we cannot say that Christ is many individuals or singulars or particulars. But we cannot say that in Christ there are many hypostases or supposits.

Therefore, according to the second aforesaid opinion, regarding the union of human nature to the divine there is presupposed the union of soul and body insofar as it constitutes humanity, not insofar as it constitutes man. For that which in Christ is constituted out of soul and body only, which is presupposed to union, is not a whole which subsists in itself. Rather, it is something of it, and for this reason, it cannot be signified as man, but as humanity. Hence it is necessary to say that in this very union of human nature to the divine, as though in the term of assumption, there must be understood for the first time in Christ the nature of man, because then for the first time it is understood as a complete thing existing in itself. And in this it differs from the two other opinions.

For the first opinion posits the assumption of human nature presupposes the union of soul to flesh, not only insofar as it constitutes humanity, but also insofar as it constitutes man:¹ for it says that a man was assumed.

Whereas the third opinion posits that not even in the term of assumption is there understood a soul united to a body, neither unto constituting man nor unto constituting human nature;¹ for it says that human nature is assumed materially, that is, for its parts, namely, soul and body, when we say that human nature was assumed by the Word. Hence it is clear that neither truly posits that Christ is man nor truly posits human nature in him, and for this reason, each is condemned as heretical.²

But this existence is attributed to something in two ways. One way is as to that which properly and truly has existence or exists; and thus, it is attributed only to substance essentially subsisting. Hence what truly is, is called substance in the first book of the Physics.¹ Whereas for all things which do not subsist essentially but in another or with another, whether they are accidents or substantial forms or any parts, they do not have existence such that they themselves truly exist, but existence is attributed to them in another way, that is, as that by which something exists, just as whiteness is said to exist not because it itself may subsist in existence, but because by it something is white. Therefore, existence properly and truly is only attributed to a thing subsisting essentially.

Yet existence is attributed to this in a twofold way. That is, there is one existence which results from these things out of which its unity is integrated, which is the proper substantial existence of a supposit. Another existence is attributed to a supposit beyond those things which integrate it, which is superadded existence, namely, accidental existence. For example, to be white is attributed to Socrates when we say: Socrates is white.

Because, therefore, in Christ we posit only one subsisting thing, for the integrity of which there concurs also the humanity itself, since one supposit is of both natures, for this reason, it is necessary to say that substantial existence, which properly is attributed to the supposit, is in Christ one only, yet has unity out of the supposit itself and not out of the natures. If, nevertheless, the humanity is posited to be separated from the divinity, then the humanity will have its own existence other than from the divine existence. For nothing impeded it from having its own existence except this: that it was not subsisting essentially. This is just as if an ark were a certain individual natural thing, the whole itself only has one existence, nevertheless any of its parts separated from the ark will have its own existence.

And thus, it is clear that, according to the second opinion, it is necessary to say that in Christ there is one substantial existence, insofar as existence properly is of the supposit, although there be manifold accidental existence.

To show this, it must be known that “to another”¹ differs from the other categories in this: that the other categories from their own proper nature are something. For example, quantity, from the fact it is a quantity, posits something, and so too for the other categories. But “to another” does not, from the proper nature of its own category, posit something, but “to something.” Hence there are found certain “to anothers” which are nothing in the nature of things, but are in the mind only, which does not happen in the other categories.

And, although “to another” does not posit something from the nature of its own category, nevertheless it is not from the very nature of its category that it posits nothing either, because thus relation would not be something in the nature of things, hence “to another” would not be one of the ten categories.

Yet relation is something real from this: that it causes relation. For since in something there is found something through which it depends upon and is compared to another, then we say that it really is compared or depends or is related, just as equality is posited as a real relation out of the unity of quantity, which causes equality.

Whereas because a thing has being and unity from the same thing, for this reason, a real unity of relation must be considered from the very foundation or cause of the relation. For instance, because there is one quantity through which I am equal to many things, in me there is only one real relation of equality relating me to many things.¹ Similarly, because by one nativity I am begotten out of father and mother, by one real sonship I am called the son of each, even though the relationships are multiplied.²

But in Christ we cannot say that there is one cause of sonship whereby he is related to Father and mother, since there are two utterly disparate nativities. Hence, if there were something which could receive the temporal sonship as though as a subject, it would be necessary to posit in Christ many sonships. But sonship is such a relation that cannot have for its subject anything except the supposit itself. Yet in Christ there is only the eternal supposit, which indeed cannot be the subject of some temporal relation: for any temporal relations attributed to something eternal are relations of the mind and not of reality. Hence the sonship by which Christ is related to his mother is not a real relation but of the mind only, just as also other relations that are said concerning God to creatures. For it cannot be said that the subject of sonship is the eternal supposit by reason of human nature or of some part of it, just as the supposit is said of the death or the Passion, because thus the human nature itself or its part would be the first subject of sonship and would be denominated through itself, as happens with the other accidents which are attributed to Christ by reason of his human nature. Whereas sonship never denominates anything but the supposit itself, nor can it have something else for a subject. Nevertheless, nothing prohibits there being other real relations in Christ to the Virgin, just as when we say, “the body of Christ is originated out of the Virgin.” But that relation does not have the nature of sonship, unless we were to posit, according to the first opinion,¹ that there is a created supposit in Christ other from the uncreated.

But this seems repugnant to their nature, on account of two things which are found in them.

The first, indeed, is because they are intellectual. For if angels were to have matter from their composition, it would be necessary for everything in them to be there in a way befitting matter, since everything which is in another is in it in the way of the receiver, as is said in the Book of Causes.¹ Yet any form is in matter in that it has particular and material being.² Hence, if angels were to be composed out of matter, the forms by which they understand, whatever they are, must be in them according to material being. And thus, this impossible thing would follow: namely, that an angel never would know anything except a particular, because a form particularly received in something could not be a principle of universal knowledge, as is clear in sense.

Nor can this be avoided by positing that an angel is composed out of matter of another nature than this corporeal matter.¹ For whatever that matter would be, it is agreed that it would receive the substantial form of angel particularly. Otherwise, an angel would not be a particular thing, and thus that matter would be like this matter in this: that forms would be received in it through a particular mode. Hence it is impossible for an angel or any intellectual substance to be composed out of matter, since the reception by which the intellect receives forms is of one mode, and that by which prime matter receives is of another, as has been said and as the Commentator says on the third book of On the Soul.² Hence the sentence of the philosophers is that intellectuality follows immunity from matter.³

Second, it is repugnant to them because they are incorporeal. For whatever is composed out of matter must be like matter in the following way. Considered in itself, anything received out of matter, since it lacks form, does not have in itself any character of distinction. Yet the unity of matter being supposed, it is only possible for one matter to receive contrary and disparate forms in different parts. For the same matter according to the same thing cannot receive the form of angel and the form of rock. Yet difference of parts cannot be understood in matter that is not divided, nor division in that which does not have dimensions, because, with quantity taken away, substance remains indivisible, as is said in the first book of the Physics.¹ Hence it is necessary for everything composed out of matter to have dimensions; and for this reason, nothing incorporeal can be composed out of matter.

But because the substance of an angel is not its own being, since this applies only to God to whom being is due out from himself and not from another, we find in an angel both its substance, or quiddity, which subsists, and its being, by which it subsists, namely, by which it is said to be by the act of being,¹ just as we are said to run by the act of running. And thus, we² say that an angel is composed out of that by which it is and that which it is, or, according to the word of Boethius,³ out of being and that which it is. And because the very substance of an angel in itself is considered in potency unto being, since it has being from another, and this being itself is its act, for this reason, there is composition of act and potency in it. And thus, it could be conceded that there are matter and form in it, if it is that every act ought to be called form and every potency matter. But it does not apply in the case proposed, because being is not an act which is part of essence as form. Also, the very quiddity or substance of an angel is subsisting in itself, which does not apply to matter.

And this answer can be gathered expressly from Augustine in the fourth book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, where he says that those days, and the evening and morning in them, are not ordained according to succession, but only by the order of nature.¹ Hence there is simultaneously the first day with the second, and morning with evening, and thus simultaneously the vision of things in the Word and in their proper nature.

As to how this is possible, it must be seen thus. Notice that to act is not properly attributed to potency but to the subsisting thing which acts through potency. This is such that the potency itself of the intellect is not acting in understanding, but rather the principle of activity is. Yet just as intellective potency is made a principle of understanding for substance itself, so the intelligible species is made a principle of understanding for potency itself. Hence, just as one substance can have diverse acts simultaneously according to diverse potencies, for example, how the soul simultaneously wills and understands, so out of one intellective potency diverse acts can go forth simultaneously, if simultaneously it is perfectly united by diverse intelligible species. For Al-Ghazali assigns the cause as to why it is not possible to understand many things simultaneously to it not being possible for the intellect to be informed simultaneously by many species perfectly in act, just as neither is it possible for the same body to be configured simultaneously to diverse figures.¹

Yet the vision by which an angel sees things in their proper nature is made through con-created intelligible species or infused inhering species, while the vision of things in the Word is made through the very species or essence of the Word, which is not inhering, but the intellect is united to it as to an intelligible. Yet the inhering con-created species is not repugnant to the union of the angelic intellect with the Word, since it is not of one reason. And the species itself and whatever is of perfection in the angelic intellect is as though a material disposition unto that blessed union. Hence a double activity proceeds simultaneously out of the intellect of an angel: one by reason of union with the Word, namely, by which it sees things in the Word, another by reason of the intelligible species informing it, by which it sees things in their proper nature. Nor also in one of these activities is it debilitated through attention to the other, but rather strengthened, since one is the reason of the other, just as the imagination of a thing seen is strengthened when it is seen in act by the exterior eye: for the action of beatitude in the blessed is the reason of every other action found in them.

For certain men have posited that an angel in the first instant of its creation would have been blessed. But this does not seem fitting, because by the same reason the others in the first instant would have been wretched, which certain men also say, but this is absurd and condemned.¹

Whereas others say that all had been fashioned in grace, and certain ones persevering in it merited beatitude, whereas the others acting against it were made wretched.¹ And this opinion has nothing of difficulty, hence it pleases me more than the others.

Whereas the third group says that the angels were created in pure natural conditions, and for some who converted unto the Word, there was conferred simultaneously grace and beatitude.¹

And these are divided into three ways.

For certain men say that angels never merited beatitude. But to have the inheritance of divine enjoyment without merit only seems to apply to Christ alone, who is the natural Son.

Whereas others say that they merit it from works which they do among us.¹ But it also does not seem fitting for merit to follow reward, since merit is rather a disposition to a reward.

The third group say that in the first instant the angels merited beatitude by being converted unto the Word. And among these three, this is the more probable.

To show this¹ it must be known that merit relates to reward just as motion to a term and just as becoming to having been made.² Yet in these things which become successively, becoming is before having been made; whereas in these which become at once, becoming and having been made are simultaneous, just as air is simultaneously illuminated and has been illuminated, and just as a thing is created and has been created.

The reason for this is that the instant in which something has been made for the first time is the term of the preceding time in which it was not, and thus it retains something of the propriety of that time, inasmuch as it can be said that before this instant the thing was not. And, although becoming is attributed to the preceding time in these things which become through a successive mode, nevertheless in instantaneous makings, becoming can only be attributed to that first instant itself which divides between the being and non-being of the thing.¹ Hence, although in all other instants it can be said that this has been made, nevertheless it can only be said in the first that it becomes and has been made.

Similarly, I say that in the first instant when the mind of an angel has converted unto the enjoyment of the Word, it both was blessed indeed by the perfect nature of enjoyment as though existing in having been made, and merited beatitude in this: that it converted to the Word, not with the perfection of beatitude preexisting, but as though existing in the very becoming of beatitude. But afterwards the mind of the angel is only blessed, and does not merit beatitude. It is similar concerning contrition because in the same instant there is the term of preparation for grace and the infusion of grace.

But to cross from one term to the other in moving bodies happens in two ways.

One way is just as from an instant into an instant. Yet this can only be when there are such terms of motion between which a medium is received in some way, just as between two instants is a middle time,¹ as is clear in change of place and alteration, augmentation and diminution. And these motions are called continuous on account of the continuity of that over which the motion crosses,² to which it pertains to receive continuously more and less.

In another way, it crosses from one term of motion into the other just as from time into an instant. And this happens in motions whose terms are privation and form, between which it is agreed that there is no medium, hence it cannot so be crossed from one extreme into the other that at some time it is in neither of the extremes, just as it is crossed from instant into instant such that it is in neither of the instants, but in a middle time. And motions of this sort are generation, corruption, illumination, and things of this sort, in which it is necessary to say that one term was in the whole preceding time and the other in the instant at which the time is terminated. For changes of this sort are terms of certain motions, just as the illumination of day is the term of the local motion of the sun. Hence in the whole preceding time when the sun was being moved unto the point directly of opposition, there was darkness, whereas in the very instant when the sun arrives unto the aforesaid point, there is light. And it is similar concerning generation and corruption, which are the terms of alteration. And because between time and instant there does not fall some medium, nor is there some instant to receive immediately preceding the last instant of time, thence it is that in changes of this sort it is crossed without a medium from one extreme into the other, nor does it pertain to this to receive a last instant in which it was in the term-from-which, but a last time, which is terminated unto the instant in which it is in the term-to-which. And for this reason, changes of this sort are called instantaneous.¹

Yet this cannot be said for the motion of an angel, since it has no order unto some continuous motion, so that it could be called its term. Hence it is necessary to posit that to cross from term of motion into term of motion should be understood just as it is crossed from instant into instant, and not just as it is crossed from time into instant, since time cannot be understood without motion. Hence, since the being of an angel in the term-from-which depends upon no motion, it cannot be said that it is there in time, but in a certain now, and similarly in the term-to-which in another now. But nows of this sort are not terms of this time which is the number of the motion of heaven, since the motion of an angel in no way depends upon the motion of heaven, such that it is measured by its number. Nor is it necessary for them to be continued through the medium of time: for continuity of time follows continuity of motion, and continuity of motion follows continuity of magnitude, over which motion crosses, as is said in the fourth book of the Physics.¹ But in these activities of an angel, by reason of which it is said to be moved through diverse places, there is not found any continuity. But they relate to one another consequently. Hence also the nows which measure the motion of an angel are instants relating consequently, and there is not something continuing between them, and that plurality of nows consequent upon one another is a certain time, in which we say that an angel is moved.

And this accords with the sayings of the Philosopher in the sixth book of the Physics, where he says that it is of the same reasoning that an indivisible thing is moved and that time is composed out of nows.¹

Whereas Avicenna says, in his Metaphysics and in the sixth book of On Natural Things,¹ that they impress upon lower bodies in a twofold way. One way is through the motion of the spheres, and another way is immediately through command, because the forms of their intellect are productive, according to him, and sensible matter obeys their conceptions more than active and passive qualities.² And hence it is, according to him, that sometimes there are changes in those lower things from the conceptions of superior substances, beyond the whole order of natural causes.

But this second opinion is repugnant to the sayings of Augustine in the third book of On the Trinity, where he says that bodily matter does not serve angels at a nod.¹ For it is repugnant to reason because, although that which is potency in matter is actually in spiritual substances much more nobly, nevertheless bodily matter is not a potency proportionate in respect to that act by which spiritual substances are in act. Yet it is necessary for the agent which leads out potency into act to be proportionate to matter. Hence it cannot be that the power of a created spiritual substance extends itself, changing matter immediately, but with some natural agent mediating.

For even though bodily matter may not obey it unto formal change immediately, nevertheless it obeys it naturally unto local motion, and through this power angels can gather and place certain natural agents to accomplish some effect. Whereas those unto which no natural power extends itself are made by divine power alone, which alone can change the natural order.

But because our minds are proportionate and near enough to receive the action of angels, for this reason, they can act in our minds in a twofold way. One way is by strengthening our intellect, just as in bodily things a less hot body is strengthened through a hotter one. Another way is through the natural agent of the intellect itself, just as also it acts upon bodies, and this is inasmuch as by angelic light phantasms are illumined for expressing some nobler conceptions than can be expressed by the light of the agent intellect.

Proof of the minor premise: everything which properly has being, if it did not always exist, properly is said to be made. But the sensitive soul properly and truly has being, since it is an acting substance (for it moves a body), yet nothing has a proper activity unless it has proper being. Therefore, since the sensitive soul of this animal did not always exist, to be made properly applies to it. And thus, it remains that it is created.

And this diversity amongst the philosophers is found not only concerning those souls, but also concerning substantial forms: for certain men, as Plato and Avicenna, have posited that all forms are from something extrinsic.¹ They were convinced of this for two reasons especially: the first reason is that, since forms do not have matter as a part of them, they can only be made out of nothing. Hence it is necessary for them to be made by someone creating. The second reason is that in inferior things they did not see principles of action except active and passive qualities, which they judged insufficient for the production of substantial forms, since nothing acts beyond its species.²

But they seem to have been deceived in that they attributed to be made properly to these forms, although nevertheless to be made belongs to nothing except a composite, to which being also properly belongs. For forms are said to be not as subsisting things, but as those by which they are composed, hence also to be made is said not by proper making, but through the making of composites, which are made through transmutation of matter from potency into act. Hence, just as composites are made through natural agents, so also forms which are not subsisting. Yet active and passive qualities act unto substantial forms in virtue of the substantial forms, whose instruments they are, just as the heat of fire acts as an instrument of the nutritive soul, as is said in the second book of On the Soul.¹

Yet the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul are not subsisting forms, otherwise they would remain after bodies. Hence it is necessary for them to be made by one generating through the making of composites, just as also the other material forms. Yet the intellective soul alone, which has subsisting being, since it remains after the body, is from without through creation.¹

Yet if the vegetative and sensitive and intellective are rooted in man in diverse substances of the soul, then also the vegetative and the sensitive of man will be by one generating. But, because this opinion is repugnant both to the sayings of the philosophers, who in one animate thing posit only one soul to which all activities of the soul pertain, and also against the sayings of the saints disproving the duality of souls, as is clear in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas,¹ for this reason, with it proved that in man there is only one substance of soul, whose powers are vegetative and sensitive and intellective, we say that the soul of man, which sustains all of these powers, is created by God, although it happens through the activity of a natural agent that a body furnished with organs is actually perfected through the powers which are the acts of the bodily parts.

Reply Sed Contra 1–3: The other contrary objections we concede, except insofar as they pertain to man, in whose seed although the sensitive and vegetative soul precede imperfectly, nevertheless with those ceasing the rational soul is introduced through creation, which perfectly contains that which was in them imperfectly. For according to Avicenna, many generations and corruptions intervene in the generation of an animal out of seed.¹

The first is because he denied the faith of Christ in the place where he was tried and his confession was required: for confession by the mouth is made unto salvation, as is said in Romans 10:10. It seems necessary for salvation for there to be a confession of faith in the aforesaid case. As well, a lie in matters of faith is especially most pernicious, according to Augustine in the book On Lying.¹

The second is because to his defection of confession and lying he added perjury and blasphemy since, as is said in Matthew 26:74: he began to detest and to swear that he did not know the man, which it is agreed are grave sins. Hence the Gloss says in the same place: a third time he began to detest and to swear that he did not know the man, because to persevere in sin gives increase of crimes, and he who spurns the smallest things, falls into greater ones.¹

Proof of the minor premise: in Distinction 70 it is said in a certain decretal of Pope Urban, which begins “Of the holy canons”: let it not be permitted in any way for someone to be titled in two churches, but let each man be in the one in which he is titled, in which alone he is considered a canon. For although by the dispensation of a bishop one can be over diverse churches, nevertheless he ought to be a cleric provided with a prebend only of the one church in which he is conscripted.¹

This is especially dangerous where the truth is ambiguous, which happens in this question. For since this question pertains both to theologians, inasmuch as it depends upon divine law or upon natural law, and to jurists, inasmuch as it depends upon positive law,¹ there are found for this question theologians opining things contrary to theologians and jurists things contrary to jurists.

For in the divine law it is not expressly determined, since in Sacred Scripture no express mention is made concerning it, although arguments from some authorities of Scripture perhaps can be adduced unto it, which nevertheless do not show the truth lucidly. Whereas by considering it according to natural law, thus it seems at present that of human actions the difference is manifold. For there are certain things which have deformity inseparably annexed, such as fornication, adultery, and other things of this sort, which in no way can be done well.¹ And to have many prebends does not belong to such things, otherwise in no case could someone receive a dispensation, which no one says. Whereas there are certain actions which of themselves are indifferent unto good or evil, such as to lift a straw from the earth or something of this sort,² among which certain men reckon to have many prebends, saying that thus it is licit to have many prebends just as to have many apples. But this does not seem to be true, since to have many prebends contains very many disorders in itself, inasmuch as it is not possible for someone to serve in the many churches in which he has a prebend, since prebends seem to be ordained as certain stipends of those ministering to God in the same place. There follows also the diminution of divine cult when one is instituted instead of many. There follows also in some cases the defrauding of the wills of testators, who conferred some goods upon the churches so that there would be a settled number of men serving God there. There follows also both inequality, while one abounds in many benefices and another cannot have one, and many other things of this sort, which it is easy to consider. Hence it cannot be contained among the indifferent actions. And much less can it be contained among those which are good according to themselves, such as to give alms and things of this sort.

Whereas there are certain other actions which, absolutely considered, involve a certain deformity or disorder, which, nevertheless, are made good in some circumstances, just as to kill a man or to beat him in itself implies a certain deformity, but if there is added to kill a malefactor on account of justice or to beat a delinquent for the sake of discipline, there will not be sin, but a virtuous act. And to have many prebends seems to be among the number of these actions: for although it contains some disorders, nevertheless other circumstances can supervene adorning the act with honor such that the aforesaid disorders are completely evacuated, as for example if there is necessity in many churches for his services and he could serve the church more or just as much as another who is present, even though he be absent, and if there are other things of this sort in some way. And then with those conditions supervening with right intention, there will not be sin, even with no dispensation intervening, if it were considered only according to natural law, because dispensation does not pertain to natural law, but only to positive. Whereas if someone has many benefices with the intention of becoming richer, of living more elegantly, of being promoted to the episcopacy more easily after having been elected in some of the churches where he has a prebend, then the aforesaid deformities are not removed, but increased. For to have such an intention even for one benefice, which of itself implies no disorder, would be illicit. And it would have to be said likewise according to natural law, even with no positive law supervening.

Yet it is now established through ancient laws that this is prohibited. It is also clear that a custom is contrary to this prohibition, through which certain men say that those laws are abrogated, since human laws are abrogated through contrary custom. Whereas certain men say that through this custom the ancient laws are not derogated, since a certain decretal says: many things are endured through patience which, if they are drawn into judgment, with justice¹ compelling, would be annulled. And this controversy must be left to the jurists. Although, it seems to be probable that, insofar as those ancient laws contain natural law, they cannot be abrogated through contrary custom, since this would be irrational. Insofar as they contain only something of positive law, they can be abrogated, especially if those dissimulating this contrary custom, in whose power it is to change the positive law, intend through such dissimulation to change the ancient laws. If, therefore, the ancient laws, which prohibit this, remain in their own strength, with a contrary custom opposing, it is certain that someone cannot have many prebends without a dispensation, even with those circumstances supervening which according to a consideration of natural law could have adorned the act with honor. Yet if the ancient laws are abrogated through custom, then with the aforesaid circumstances supervening, it is licit to have many prebends even without a dispensation, without which circumstances it is not licit, however much a dispensation intervenes, by this: that human dispensation does not remove the bond of natural law but only the bond of positive law, which is established through man, and through man can be dispensed.