Quodlibet VIII
Disputed Questions
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Quodlibet VIII
Quodlibetal Questions VIII
QVIIICirca ea quae pertinent ad naturam, ad culpam et gratiam, ad poenam et gloriam
About Things Pertaining to Nature, to Fault and Grace, to Punishment and Glory
QVIIIDe pertinentibus ad naturam
On Things Pertaining to Nature
On things pertaining to uncreated nature
QVIIIQ. 1On things pertaining to uncreated nature
Ad naturam increatam
On things pertaining to uncreated nature
QVIII.Q1Quaestio nostra circa tria versatur;
Our inquiry concerns three things:
QVIII.Q1primo, circa ea quae pertinent ad naturam;
first, about what pertains to nature;1
QVIII.Q1secundo, circa ea quae pertinent ad culpam et gratiam;
second, about what pertains to fault and grace;1
QVIII.Q1tertio, circa ea quae pertinent ad poenam et gloriam.
third, about what pertains to punishment and glory.1
QVIII.Q1Circa primum quaerebatur
About the first it was asked:
QVIII.Q1primo de pertinentibus ad naturam increatam;
first, concerning what pertains to uncreated nature;1
QVIII.Q1secundo de pertinentibus ad naturam creatam.
second, concerning what pertains to created nature.1
QVIII.Q1Circa naturam increatam duo quaerebantur:
About uncreated nature there were two questions:
QVIII.Q1primo an senarius numerus, secundum quem omnes creaturae dicuntur esse perfectae, sit creator vel creatura;
first, whether the number six, according to which all creatures are said to be perfect, is creator or creature;
QVIII.Q1secundo de rationibus idealibus quae sunt in mente divina, utrum per prius respiciant exemplata, scilicet creaturas, ratione suae singularitatis vel ratione naturae specialis.
second, concerning the ideal notions which are in the divine mind, whether they apply what they exemplify, namely, creatures, first by reason of their own individuality or by reason of their specific nature.
QVIII.Q1A. 1Whether the number six, according to which all creatures are said to be perfect, is creator or creature
An senarius numerus, secundum quem omnes creaturae dicuntur esse perfectae, sit creator vel creatura
Whether the number six, according to which all creatures are said to be perfect, is creator or creature
QVIII.Q1.A1Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praedictus senarius sit creator.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the aforesaid six is creator.
QVIII.Q1.A1.arg1Remota enim omni creatura, perfectio non remanet nisi in creatore; sed remota omni creatura facta in operibus sex dierum, remanet perfectio in numero senario; unde dicit Augustinus IV Super Genesim ad litteram: itaque, si ista non essent, scilicet opera sex dierum, perfectus ille esset, scilicet senarius; nisi autem ille perfectus esset, ista secundum eum perfecta non fierent; ergo senarius numerus est creator.
Obj. 1: If every creature were removed, perfection would only remain in the creator. But if every creature made during the works of the six days were removed, the perfection in the number six would remain. Hence Augustine says in the fourth book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis:1 therefore, if those were not, namely, the works of the six days, that would be perfect, namely, six; yet unless that were perfect, those would not be made perfect according to it. Therefore, the number six is creator.
QVIII.Q1.A1.arg2Sed dices quod Augustinus loquitur de senario quantum ad ideam senarii, quae est in mente divina.
Obj. 2: But you will say that Augustine speaks about six in regard to the idea of six, which is in the divine mind.
QVIII.Q1.A1.arg3Sed contra: sicut remotis omnibus creaturis, remanet perfectio in idea senarii numeri, ita etiam et in idea lapidis in mente divina; ergo in hoc non haberet numerus senarius aliquam praeeminentiam ad lapidem, quod tamen videtur esse contra intentionem Augustini.
On the contrary: just as, with all creatures removed, perfection remains in the idea of the number six, so also does this apply with the idea of a stone in the divine mind. Therefore, in this the number six would not have some preeminence over the stone, which nevertheless seems to be against Augustine’s intention.
QVIII.Q1.A1.scPraeterea. Quidquid est permanentius omni creatura, non est creatum, sed creator; senarius autem numerus est permanentior caelo et terra, quae tamen videntur esse permanentissimae creaturae; unde dicit Augustinus, IV Super Genesim: facilius est caelum et terram transire, quae secundum senarium numerum fabricata sunt, quam effici posse ut senarius numerus non suis partibus compleatur; ergo senarius numerus non est creatura, sed creator.
Obj. 3: Whatever is more permanent than every creature is not created, but creator. Yet the number six is more permanent than heaven and earth, which, nevertheless, seem to be the most permanent creatures. Hence Augustine says in the fourth book of On Genesis: it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away, which were fashioned according to the number six, than for it to be that the number six is not the sum of its parts.1 Therefore, the number six is not creature, but creator.
QVIII.Q1.A1.arg4Sed contra. Creatoris perfectio non consistit ex aliquis partibus, nec est in eo aliquid habens partes; sed, sicut dicit Augustinus in eodem libro: invenimus senarium numerum esse perfectum ea ratione quod suis partibus compleatur; ergo senarius numerus non est creator, sed creatura.
On the contrary: The perfection of the creator does not consist of some parts, nor is there in him anything having parts. But, as Augustine says in the same book: we find that the number six is perfect because it is the sum of its parts.1 Therefore, the number six is not creator, but creature.
QVIII.Q1.A1.scRespondeo. Dicendum quod, secundum Avicennam in sua Metaphysica, triplex est alicuius naturae consideratio: una, prout consideratur secundum esse quod habet in singularibus, sicut natura lapidis in hoc et in illo lapide; alia vero est consideratio alicuius naturae secundum esse suum intelligibile, sicut natura lapidis prout est in intellectu; tertia vero est consideratio naturae absoluta, prout abstrahit ab utroque esse, secundum quam considerationem consideratur natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque alterius, quantum ad ea tantum quae per se competunt tali naturae.
I answer that, according to Avicenna in his Metaphysics,1 there is a threefold consideration of any nature. One is when considering the being which it has in singulars, such as the nature of a stone in this and that stone. Whereas another is when considering some nature according to its own intelligible being, such as the nature of a stone as it is in the intellect. Whereas the third is the absolute consideration of a nature, in abstraction from either being. Considered thus, the nature of a stone or anything else is considered only with regard to those things which belong essentially to such a nature.
QVIII.Q1.A1.coHarum quidem trium considerationum duae semper uniformiter eumdem ordinem servant; prior enim est consideratio alicuius naturae absoluta quam consideratio eius secundum esse quod habet in singularibus. Sed tertia consideratio naturae, quae est secundum esse quod habet in intellectu, non semper habet eumdem ordinem ad alias considerationes: consideratio enim naturae secundum esse quod habet in intellectu qui accipit a rebus, sequitur utramque aliarum considerationum: hoc enim ordine scibile praecedit scientiam et sensibile sensum, sicut movens motum et causa causatum; sed consideratio naturae secundum esse quod habet in intellectu causante rem, praecedit alias duas considerationes: cum enim intellectus artificis adinvenit aliquam formam artificiati, ipsa natura seu forma artificiati in se considerata est posterior intellectu artificis, et per consequens etiam arca sensibilis quae talem formam vel speciem habet.
Of these three considerations, two always uniformly preserve the same order. For the absolute consideration of a nature is prior to the consideration of it with regard to the being which it has in singulars. But the third consideration of a nature, which is that according to the being which it has in an intellect, does not always have the same order to the other considerations. For the consideration of a nature, according to the being which it has in an intellect that receives things, follows either of the other considerations: for by this knowable order it precedes knowledge and sensible sense,1 just as a mover precedes something moved and a cause precedes something caused. But the consideration of a nature according to the being which it has in an intellect causing the thing precedes the other two considerations: for when the intellect of an artist invents some form of an artifact, the nature itself, or the form of the artifact considered in itself, is posterior to the intellect of the artist, and consequently also the sensible ark which has such a form or species.2
QVIII.Q1.A1Sicut autem se habet intellectus artificis ad artificiata, ita se habet intellectus divinus ad omnes creaturas. Unde uniuscuiusque naturae creatae prima consideratio est secundum quod est in intellectu divino; secunda vero consideratio est ipsius naturae absolute; tertia secundum quod est in rebus ipsis vel in mente angelica; quarta secundum esse quod habet in intellectu humano. Et ideo Dionysius XI capitulo De divinis nominibus hunc ordinem assignat quod primo super omnia est ipse substantificator rerum Deus, postea vero ipsa dona Dei quae creaturis exhibentur, et universaliter et particulariter considerata, ut per se pulcritudinem, per se vitam, quam dicit esse donum ex Deo proveniens, id est ipsam naturam vitae, deinde ipsa participantia universaliter et particulariter considerata, quae sunt res in quibus natura esse habet.
Yet just as the intellect of an artist relates to artifacts, so the divine intellect relates to all creatures.1 Hence the first consideration of each created nature is with regard to how it is in the divine intellect; whereas the second consideration is of the nature itself absolutely; the third is with regard to how it is in things themselves or in an angelic mind; the fourth is with regard to the being which it has in the human intellect. And for this reason, Dionysius in the eleventh chapter of On the Divine Names assigns this order:2 that first over all things is God, the very “substantificator” (“creator of the substance”) of things, whereas afterwards are the gifts themselves of God. These are presented to creatures, both universally and particularly considered, as beauty essentially, life essentially, which he says is a gift coming forth out of God, that is, the very nature of life. Then the participants themselves are considered universally and particularly, which are the things in which a nature has being.
QVIII.Q1.A1In his igitur semper id quod est prius est posterioris ratio, et remoto posteriori remanet prius, non autem e conuerso; et inde est quod hoc quod aliquid competit naturae secundum absolutam considerationem, est ratio quare competat naturae alicui secundum esse quod habet in singularibus, et non e converso: ideo enim Socrates est rationalis quia homo est rationalis, et non e conuerso; unde, dato quod Socrates et Plato non essent, adhuc naturae humanae rationalitas competeret. Similiter etiam intellectus divinus est ratio naturae absolute consideratae vel in singularibus, et ipsa natura absolute considerata et in singularibus est ratio intellectus humani et quodam modo mensura ipsius.
In these, therefore, that which is prior is always the account of the posterior. If the posterior is removed, the prior remains, yet not conversely. And hence the fact that something belongs to a nature according to an absolute consideration is the reason why it belongs to some nature according to the being which it has in singulars, and not conversely. Hence, even if Socrates and Plato did not exist, still rationality would belong to human nature. Similarly, the divine intellect is the account of a nature considered absolutely or in singulars, and a nature itself considered absolutely and in singulars is the account of the human intellect and in a certain way its measure.1
QVIII.Q1.A1Possunt ergo verba Augustini intelligi de senario dupliciter. Uno modo ut per senarium intelligatur ipsa natura senarii absolute, cui primo et per se competit perfectio, quae quidem est ratio perfectionis eorum quae senarium participant; unde, remotis omnibus quae in senario perficiuntur, adhuc perfectio naturae senarii competet. Et hoc modo senarius nominat naturam creatam. Alio modo potest intelligi senarius secundum esse quod habet in intellectu divino, et sic eius perfectio est ratio perfectionis in creaturis inventae, quae secundum senarium sunt conditae, quibus etiam remotis, in praedicto senario perfectio remaneret. Sic autem senarius non erit creatura, sed ratio creaturae in creatore, que est idea senarii et est idem secundum rem quod divina essentia, ratione tantum differens.
The words of Augustine, therefore, can be understood concerning the number six in two ways. One way is that through six the very nature of six is understood absolutely, to which perfection belongs first and essentially, which indeed is the account of the perfection of those things which participate in six. Hence, with all things which are perfected in six removed, perfection still belongs to the nature of six. And in this way, six names a created nature. In another way, six can be understood according to the being which it has in the divine intellect, and thus its perfection is the account of the perfection found in creatures, which have been fashioned according to six, and even if these were removed, perfection would remain in the aforesaid six. Yet thus six will not be a creature, but the account of a creature in the creator, which is the idea of six and is the same as the divine essence according to the thing, differing only by the type.
QVIII.Q1.A1Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, remotis omnibus creaturis quae sunt factae in senario dierum, non dicitur quod perfectio remaneat in senario numero quasi senarius numerus aliquod esse habeat in rerum natura nulla creatura existente, sed quia, remoto omni esse creato, remanet absoluta consideratio naturae senarii prout abstrahit a quolibet esse, et sic attribuetur sibi perfectio, sicut, remotis omnibus singularibus hominibus, adhuc remaneret rationalitas attribuibilis humanae naturae.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, with all creatures removed which were made in the six days, it is not said that perfection remains in the number six in the sense that the number six has some being in the nature of things with no creature existing, but rather that, with every created removed, there remains the absolute consideration of the nature of six abstracted from any being, and thus perfection will be attributed to it, just as, with all singular men removed, rationality still would remain attributable to human nature.
QVIII.Q1.A1.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut in rebus creatis quaedam sunt magis communes et quaedam magis contractae, ita etiam rationes rerum in Deo magis communium ad plura se extendunt, minus vero communium ad pauciora; et quia unitas et multitudo sunt omnibus creatis communia, ideo etiam ratio idealis numeri ad omnes creaturas se extendit. Unde dicit Boetius in principio Arithmeticae: omnia quaecumque a primaeva rerum natura constructa sunt, numerorum uidentur ratione esse formata. Hoc enim fuit principale in animo conditoris exemplar. Lapidis autem idea non se extendit ad omnes creaturas, et ideo, si senarius accipiatur pro idea senarii, quantum ad hoc adhuc senarius erit eminentior lapide, id est quam idea lapidis, prout scilicet ad plura se extendit. Et iterum prout perfectio competit senario secundum naturam senarii, non autem lapidi.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, just as in created things some are more common and some more contracted, so also the types of more common things in God extend themselves to more, whereas those of less common things to fewer. And because unity and multitude are common to all created things, for this reason also, the ideal account of number extends itself to all creatures. Hence Boethius says in the beginning of the Arithmetic: all things whatsoever which were constructed from the primeval nature of things, seem to be formed by the account of numbers. For this exemplar was principal in the mind of the fashioner.1 Yet the idea of a stone does not extend itself to all creatures. For this reason, if six is understood as the idea of six, regarding this, six still will be more eminent than a stone, that is, than the idea of a stone, namely, in regard to how it extends itself to more things, and so too in regard to how perfection belongs to six according to the nature of six, yet not to a stone.
QVIII.Q1.A1.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod non est intentio Augustini dicere quod, si caelum et terra transeant et ceterae creaturae, quod senarius maneat secundum aliquod esse creatum, sed quia, si omnes creaturae ab esse deficiant, remanebit adhuc natura senarii (prout abstrahit a quolibet esse) huiusmodi quod ei perfectio competat, sicut et natura humana manebit talis quod ei competat rationalitas.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that it is not Augustine’s intention to say that, if heaven and earth and the rest of creatures pass away, six would remain according to some created being, but that, if all creatures fall from being, still the nature of six (as it is abstracted from any being) will remain of the sort to which perfection belongs, just as also human nature will remain such that rationality belongs to it.
QVIII.Q1.A1.ad3Ad illud vero quod in contrarium obicitur, dicendum quod, quamvis in Deo non possit esse aliquid habens partes, tamen potest esse in eo ratio rei habentis partes, et sic est in eo ratio senarii ex partibus constituti et ratio suarum partium.
Reply Sed Contra: It must be said that, although in God there cannot be something having parts, nevertheless there can be in him the account of a thing having parts, and thus there is in him the account of six constituted out of parts and the account of its parts.
QVIII.Q1.A1A. 2On the ideal notions which are in the divine mindDe rationibus idealibus quae sunt in mente divina
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ideae quae sunt in mente divina, per prius respiciant res quantum ad naturam singularem quam quantum ad naturam speciei.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that the ideas in the divine mind first apply things in their singular nature before the nature of their species.
QVIII.Q1.A2.arg1Quia, ut Augustinus dicit in libro LXXXIII quaestionum: ideae sunt quaedam formae vel rationes rerum stabiles, quae divina intelligentia continentur; et cum ipse neque oriantur neque intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest et omne quod oritur et interit; sed solum singulare est quod oritur et interit, id est quod generatur et corrumpitur; ergo ideae per prius respiciunt singulare.
Obj. 1: Because, as Augustine says in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions: ideas are certain forms or stable reasons of things which are contained by the divine intelligence; and although one neither comes to be nor perishes, nevertheless everything is said to be formed according to these which can come to be and perish, and everything which comes to be and perishes.1 But a singular is that which comes to be and perishes, that is, which is generated and corrupted. Therefore, the ideas first apply the singular.
QVIII.Q1.A2.arg2Sed contra. Cum ideae sint formae exemplares, requiritur ad rationem ideae assimilatio ideati ad ipsam; sed ideatum, id est res creata, magis assimilatur divino exemplari secundum formam, a qua est ratio speciei, quam secundum materiam, quae est individuationis principium; ergo idea per prius respicit naturam speciei quam singularitatem individui.
On the contrary (2): Since the ideas are exemplar forms,1 the form of an idea requires its object to be similar to it. But the similar thing, that is, the created thing, is more similar to the divine exemplar in its form, the source of its species, than in its matter, which is the principle of its individuation. Therefore, the idea first applies the individual nature of the species rather than its singularity.
QVIII.Q1.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod, cum in mente divina sint omnium creaturarum forme exemplares, quae ideae dicuntur, sicut in mente artificis forme artificiatorum, hoc tamen interest inter formas exemplares quae sunt in mente divina et in mente artificis creati: creatus enim artifex agit ex praesupposita materia, unde forme exemplares quae sunt in mente eius non sunt factivae materiae, quae est individuationis principium, sed solius formae, a qua est species artificiati, et ideo huiusmodi formae exemplares non respiciunt directe artificiatum quantum ad individuum, sed quantum ad speciem solum; forme autem exemplares intellectus divini sunt factivae totius rei sive quanum ad formam sive quantum ad materiam, et ideo respiciunt creaturam non solum quantum ad naturam speciei, sed etiam quantum ad singularitatem individui, per prius tamen quantum ad naturam speciei.
I answer that, although the exemplar forms of all creatures, which are called ideas, are in the divine mind just like the forms of artifacts are in the mind of an artist, nevertheless there is this difference between exemplar forms in the divine mind and those in the mind of a created artist: for the created artist works with presupposed matter. Hence the exemplar forms in his mind do not produce matter, which is the principle of individuation. They only produce form, from which comes the species of the artifact. For this reason, exemplar forms of this sort do not directly apply an artifact as individuals, but as species only. Yet the exemplar forms of the divine intellect produce the whole thing, both form and matter, and for this reason, they apply not only the nature of the creature’s species, but also its singularity. Nevertheless, they first apply the nature of the species.
QVIII.Q1.A2.coQuod ex hinc patet. Exemplar enim est ad cuius imitationem fit aliud, unde ad rationem exemplaris requiritur quod ipsa assimilatio operis ad exemplar sit intenta ab agente, alias talis assimilatio casu accideret et non secundum viam exemplaritatis; sic ergo in ratione exemplaris includitur intentio agentis, ad hoc ergo per prius exemplar respicit quod agens primo intendit in opere. Agens autem quilibet praecipue intendit in opere id quod perfectius est; natura autem speciei est perfectissimum in unoquoque individuo: per ipsam enim duplex imperfectio perficitur, imperfectio scilicet materiae, quae est singularitatis principium, quae, cum sit in potentia ad formam speciei, perficitur quando naturam speciei consequitur; et iterum imperfectio formae generalis, quae se habet ad differentias specificas in potencia ut materia ad formam. Unde species specialissima est primo de intentione naturae, ut patet per Avicennam in principio suae sufficientiae: non enim natura intendit principaliter generare Socratem, alias destructo Socratae, ordo et intentio nature periret; intendit autem in Socrate generare hominem; similiter non intendit principaliter generare animal, alioquin quiesceret eius actio quando ad naturam animalis perduxisset (cum tamen in individuo generato prius compleatur natura animalis quam natura hominis, ut patet in XVI De animalibus; non autem prius est homo quam hic homo).
The following makes this clear. For an exemplar is that which others things are made to imitate. Hence the exemplar’s nature requires the maker to intend the other thing to be like its exemplar, otherwise the imitation would happen by chance rather than by exemplarity. Thus, the intention of the agent is included in the exemplar’s nature, such that the exemplar first applies what the agent first intends in the work. Yet every agent especially intends in a work what is more perfect. Yet the nature of the species is the most perfect thing in each individual. For through this a double imperfection is perfected. The first is the imperfection of matter, which is the principle of singularity. Since it is in potency to the form of a species, it is perfected when it attains the nature of the species. The second is the imperfection of general form, which relates in potency to specific differences as matter to form. Hence the most specific species is first from the intention of nature, as is clear through Avicenna in principle of its sufficiency. For nature does not intend to generate Socrates principally, or else, with Socrates destroyed, the order and intention of nature would perish; rather, it intends in Socrates to generate man. Similarly, it does not intend principally to generate animal, otherwise its action would rest when it had produced the nature of animal1 (even though, nevertheless, the nature of animal is completed before the nature of man in an individual generated, as is clear in the sixteenth book of On Animals;2 yet man is not completed before this man is generated).
QVIII.Q1.A2Unde et exemplar quod est in mente divina primo naturam speciei respicit in qualibet creatura.
Hence also an exemplar which is in the divine mind first applies the nature of the species in whatever creature.
QVIII.Q1.A2Ad primum ergo dicendum quod id quod est primum in intentione est ultimum in executione; unde, quamvis natura prime intendat generare hominem, per prius tamen generatur hic homo: non enim homo generatur nisi per hoc quod hic homo generatur. Et propter hoc etiam in diffinitione ideae dicitur quod secundum eas oritur omne quod oritur, quantum ad viam executionis, in qua singularia sunt primum.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that what is first in intention is last in execution.1 Hence, although nature first intends to generate man, nevertheless first there is generated this man: for man is not generated except through this man being generated. And on account of this it is also said in the definition of idea that according to those there comes to be everything which comes to be,2 as regards the way of execution, in which singulars are first.
QVIII.Q1.A2.ad1Secundum, quod est in contrarium, concedimus.
Reply Obj. 2: We concede the second argument to the contrary.
QVIII.Q1.A2.ad2Ad naturam creatam
On things pertaining to created nature
QVIII.Q1.A2Q. 2Regarding the human soul
Ad animam humanam
Regarding the human soul
QVIII.Q2Deinde quaeritur de his quae pertinent ad naturam creatam;
Then there were questions about what pertains to created nature:
QVIII.Q2et primo de his quae pertinent ad animam humanam;
and first concerning what pertains to the human soul;1
QVIII.Q2secundo de his quae pertinent ad corpus.
second, concerning what pertains to the body.1
QVIII.Q2Circa primum quaeruntur duo:
About the first, there were two questions:
QVIII.Q2primo, utrum anima accipiat species quibus cognoscit a rebus quae sunt extra animam;
first, whether the soul receives the species by which it knows from things outside the soul;
QVIII.Q2secundo, quomodo caritas aut aliquis alius habitus a non habente cognoscatur?
second, how charity or any other habit is known by someone who does not have it.
QVIII.Q2A. 1Whether the soul receives the species by which it knows from things outside the soulUtrum anima accipiat species quibus cognoscit a rebus quae sunt extra animam
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima non accipiat species a rebus quae sunt extra animam.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the soul does not receive species from things outside the soul.1
QVIII.Q2.A1.arg1Dicit enim Augustinus, XII Super Genesim ad litteram: imaginem corporis non corpus in spiritu, sed ipse spiritus in se ipso facit celeritate mirabili; non autem eam in se ipso faceret si a rebus exterioribus eam acciperet; ergo anima non accipit a rebus species quibus cognoscit.
Obj. 1: For Augustine says, in the twelfth book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis: not a body in the spirit, but the spirit itself makes an image of a body in its own self with wondrous quickness.1 Yet it would not make this in its own self if it received it from exterior things. Therefore, the soul does not receive the species by which it knows from things.
QVIII.Q2.A1.arg2Praeterea. Eius solius est dimensiones a re dimensionata abstrahere, cuius est dimensiones corporibus dare, quod est solius creatoris; sed ad hoc quod species a rebus recipiatur in anima, oportet quod ab ipsa specie dimensiones separentur, quia in rebus extra animam habet esse dimensionale, non autem in anima, maxime quantum ad intellectum; ergo anima non potest recipere species a rebus sensibilibus.
Obj. 2: To abstract dimensions from a dimensioned thing belongs only to the one who gives dimensions to bodies, and this belongs only to the creator. But in order for the soul to receive species from things, it is necessary that the dimensions be separated from that species itself. For species have dimensional being in things outside the soul,1 yet not in the soul, especially as regards the intellect. Therefore, the soul cannot receive species from sensible things.
QVIII.Q2.A1.arg3In contrarium videtur esse tota philosophorum doctrina, quae sensum a sensibilibus, imaginationem a sensu, intellectum a phantasmatibus accipere fatetur.
To the contrary: There seems to be the whole doctrine of the philosophers, which confesses that sense receives from sensible things, imagination from sense, understanding from phantasms.1
QVIII.Q2.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod anima humana similitudines rerum, quibus cognoscit, a rebus accipit illo modo accipiendi quo patiens accipit ab agente. Quod non est ita intelligendum quasi agens influat in patiens eandem numero speciem quam habet in se ipso, sed generat sui similem, educendo de potentia in actum. Et per hunc modum dicitur species coloris deferri a corpore colorato ad visum.
I answer that the human soul receives the likenesses of things, by which it knows, from things in the way a patient receives from an agent. This must not be understood as if an agent poured into a patient a species the same in number which it has in itself, but it generates a likeness of itself by leading out from potency unto act. And it is said that the species of color is transferred in this way from a colored body to vision.
QVIII.Q2.A1.coSed in agentibus et patientibus distinguendum est. Est enim quoddam agens quod de se sufficiens est ad inducendum formam suam in patiens, sicut ignis sufficiens est de se ad calefaciendum. Quoddam vero agens est quod non sufficit de se ad inducendum formam suam in patiens nisi superveniat aliud agens, sicut calor ignis non sufficit ad complendum actionem nutritionis nisi per virtutem animae nutritivae, unde virtus animae nutritivae est principaliter agens, calor vero igneus instrumentaliter.
But a distinction must be made between agents and patients. For there are some agents sufficient by themselves to induce their form into a patient, just as fire is sufficient by itself for heating. Whereas there are some agents not sufficient by themselves to induce their form into a patient unless another agent supervenes, just as the heat of fire does not suffice to complete the action of nutrition. Hence the power of the nutritive soul is the primary agent, whereas fiery heat is an instrumental one.1
QVIII.Q2.A1Similiter etiam est diversitas ex parte patientium. Quodam enim est patiens quod in nullo cooperatur agenti, sicut lapis cum sursum proicitur vel lignum cum ex eo fit scamnum. Quoddam vero patiens est quod agenti cooperatur, sicut lapis cum deorsum proicitur et corpus hominis cum sanatur per artem.
Similarly, there is diversity on the part of patients. For there are certain patients which in no way cooperate with an agent, such as a stone when it is thrown up or wood when a stool is made from it. Whereas there are certain patients which cooperate with an agent, such as a stone when it is thrown down and the body of a man when it is healed through art.
QVIII.Q2.A1Et secundum hoc, res quae sunt extra animam tripliciter se habent ad diversas animae potentias.
And according to this, things which are outside the soul relate to the diverse powers of the soul in three ways.
QVIII.Q2.A1Ad sensus enim exteriores se habent sicut agentia sufficientia, quibus patientia non cooperantur, sed recipiunt tantum. Quod autem color per se non possit movere visum nisi lux superveniat, non est contra hoc quod dictum est, quia tam color quam lux inter ea quae sunt extra animam computantur. Sensus autem exteriores suscipiunt tantum a rebus per modum patiendi, sine hoc quod aliquid operentur ad sui formationem, quamvis iam formati habeant propriam operationem, quae est iudicium de propriis obiectis.
To the exterior senses they relate as sufficient agents, with which patients do not cooperate, but receive only. Yet that color by itself cannot move sight unless light supervenes, is not contrary to what has been said, because both color and light are counted among those things which are outside the soul. Yet the exterior senses only receive from things by experiencing, without working toward their own formation, although granted they have their proper activity once formed, which is judgment about their proper objects.
QVIII.Q2.A1Sed ad imaginationem res quae sunt extra animam comparantur ut agentia sufficientia: actio enim rei sensibilis non sistit in sensu, sed exinde pertingit usque ad phantasiam sive imaginationem; tamen imaginatio est patiens quod cooperatur agenti: ipsa enim imaginatio format sibi aliquarum rerum similitudines quas nunquam sensus percepit, ex his tamen quae sensu percipiuntur, componendo ea et dividendo, sicut imaginamur montes aureos quos nunquam vidimus, ex hoc quod vidimus aurum et montes.
But things outside the soul relate to the imagination as sufficient agents: for the action of a sensible thing does not stop in sense, but from there extends even to the image or imagination. Nevertheless, the imagination is a patient which cooperates with an agent: for while the imagination itself forms for itself likenesses of some things which sense has never perceived, nevertheless it forms them out of these things which are perceived by sense, by combining and dividing them, just as we imagine golden mountains which we have never seen, from the gold and mountains we do see.1
QVIII.Q2.A1Sed ad intellectum possibilem comparantur res exteriores sicut agencia insufficientia: actio enim ipsarum rerum sensibilium nec etiam in imaginatione sistit, sed phantasmata ulterius movent intellectum possibilem; non autem ad hoc ex se ipsis sufficiunt, cum sint in potentia intelligibilia, intellectus autem non moveatur nisi ab intelligibili in actu; unde oportet quod superveniat actio intellectus agentis, cuius illustratione phantasmata fiunt intelligibilia in actu, sicut illustratione lucis corporalis fiunt colores visibiles actu. Et sic patet quod intellectus agens est principale agens quod agit rerum similitudines in intellectu possibili, fantasmata autem quae a rebus exterioribus accipiuntur sunt quasi agentia instrumentalia. Intellectus etiam possibilis comparatur ad res quarum notitiam recipit sicut patiens quod cooperatur agenti: multo enim magis potest intellectus formare quidditatem rei quae non cecidit sub sensu, quam imaginatio.
But exterior things relate to the potential intellect as insufficient agents: for the action of the sensible things themselves does not even stop in the imagination, but beyond this the phantasms move the potential intellect. Yet they do not suffice for this by themselves, since they are intelligible in potency. Yet the intellect is only moved by the intelligible in act. Hence it is necessary for the action of the agent intellect to supervene, by whose illumination phantasms are made intelligible in act, just as colors are made visible in act by the illumination of bodily light. And thus, it is clear that the agent intellect is the principal agent which effects the likenesses of things in the potential intellect, yet the phantasms received from exterior things are, as it were, instrumental agents.1 The potential intellect also is compared to things whose notion it receives as a patient which cooperates with an agent: for the intellect can form the quiddity of a thing which does not fall under sense much more than the imagination can.
QVIII.Q2.A1Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, si verbum Augustini referatur ad intellectum, sic planum est quod res non faciunt sui similitudinem in intellectu possibili principaliter, sed intellectus agens. Si autem referatur ad imaginationem, faciunt quidem, sed non solum, quia etiam ipsa imaginatio cooperatur, ut dictum est. In sensu autem facit corpus sui similitudinem sufficienter et solum, sed de hoc non loquitur Augustinus, quia sensum contra spiritum dividit sive corporalem visionem contra spiritualem.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, if the remark of Augustine refers to the intellect, it is plain that the things do not make a likeness of themselves in the potential intellect principally, but that the agent intellect does this. Yet if it refers to the imagination, the things indeed are makers, but they do not make alone, because the imagination itself also cooperates, as has been said. A body makes in the senses a likeness of itself sufficiently and alone, but Augustine is not speaking about this, because he distinguishes sense from spirit or bodily vision from spiritual.1
QVIII.Q2.A1.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ac si illa eadem species numero quae est in rebus vel in imaginatione postmodum fieret in intellectu (sic enim oporteret quod auferrentur ab ea dimensiones); et hoc patet esse falsum.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that that argument proceeds as if that species, the same in number which is in things or in the imagination, is made afterwards in the intellect (for thus it would be necessary for the dimensions to be removed from it); and it is clear that this is false.
QVIII.Q2.A1.ad2A. 2How charity or any other habit is known by someone who does not have it
Quomodo caritas vel aliquis alius habitus a non habente cognoscatur
How charity or any other habit is known by someone who does not have it
QVIII.Q2.A2Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non habens caritatem, eam cognoscat per speciem.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that someone who does not have charity knows it through species.
QVIII.Q2.A2.arg1Omne enim quod cognoscitur, cognoscitur vel per essentiam vel per sui similitudinem; sed caritas a non habente non cognoscitur per sui essentiam, quia non est essentialiter in eo; ergo, si cognoscitur a non habente, cognoscitur per sui similitudinem.
Obj. 1: For everything which is known is known either through its essence or through a likeness of it. But someone without charity does not know it through its essence, because it is not essentially in him. Therefore, if it is known by someone without it, it is known through a likeness of it.
QVIII.Q2.A2.arg2Praeterea. Aliquis habens caritatem aliquo modo cognoscit se eam habere, ad minus per coniecturas vel revelationem, et similiter, postquam eam amiserit, potest recordari se caritatem habuisse; quod esse non potest nisi per eius speciem in memoria reservatam; ergo caritas a non habente qui prius habuit, per sui similitudinem cognoscitur, et eadem ratione a quolibet alio non habente.
Obj. 2: Anyone who has charity knows himself to have it in some way, at least through conjectures or revelation. And similarly, after he has lost it, he can recall that he had had charity, which cannot be except through its species reserved in memory. Therefore, charity is known through a likeness of it by someone without it who had it before, and the same reason applies to anyone else not having it.
QVIII.Q2.A2.arg3Praeterea. Dicit Augustinus, X Confessionum, hoc modo se habet memoria ad intelligenciam sicut venter animalis ruminantis ad os, quia, sicut id quod est in ventre animalis ruminantis reducitur ad os, ita quod est in memoria reducitur ad intelligentiam; si ergo in memoria conservatur caritas per sui similitudinem, et ab intelligencia capietur per sui similitudinem.
Obj. 3: Augustine says, in the tenth book of the Confessions, that memory relates to intelligence in this way:1 just as the stomach of a ruminating animal to the mouth, because, just as that which is in the stomach of the ruminating animal is led back to the mouth, so that which is in the memory is led back to the intelligence. If, therefore, charity is preserved in memory through its likeness, it also will be grasped by the intelligence through its likeness.
QVIII.Q2.A2.arg4Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XII Super Genesim ad litteram, et habetur in Glossa, II Corinthiorum XII, quod intellectualis visio est earum rerum quae non habent species sui similes quae non sunt quod ipsae, et inter huiusmodi ponit caritatem; ergo caritas non potest cognosci per sui similitudinem, sed solum per essentiam.
On the contrary: Augustine says, in the twelfth book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, and as is said in the Gloss on 2 Corinthians 12, that intellectual vision is of those things which do not have species like themselves which are not themselves,1 and among things of this sort he posits charity.2 Therefore, charity cannot be known through a likeness of it, but only through its essence.
QVIII.Q2.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod duplex est cognitio caritatis: una qua cognoscitur quid est caritas, alia qua caritas percipitur, ut cum aliquis cognoscit se habere caritatem, quod pertinet ad cognitionem an est.
I answer that knowledge of charity is twofold: one is that by which it is known what charity is; the other is that by which charity is perceived, such as when someone knows himself to have charity, which pertains to knowing whether it exists.1
QVIII.Q2.A2.coPrima quidem cognitio caritatis eodem modo competit habenti et non habenti caritatem, prout scilicet intellectus humanus natus est rerum quidditates comprehendere, in quibus cognoscendis quasi similiter procedit sicut in cognoscendis conclusionibus complexis.
The first knowledge of charity applies in the same way both to one having charity and to one not having it, namely, just as the human intellect was born to comprehend the quiddities of things,1 and proceeds to know them similar to how it knows complex conclusions.
QVIII.Q2.A2Insunt enim nobis naturaliter quaedam prima principia complexa ab omnibus nota, ex quibus ratio procedit ad cognoscendum in actu conclusiones quae in praedictis principiis potentialiter cognoscuntur, sive per inventionem propriam sive per doctrinam alienam sive per revelationem divinam. In quibus omnibus modis cognoscendi homo iuvatur ex principiis naturaliter cognitis, vel ita quod ipsa principia ad cognitionem acquirendam sufficiant, adminiculantibus sensu et imaginatione, sicut cum aliquam cognitionem acquirimus per inventionem vel doctrinam; vel ita quod principia praedicta ad cognitionem acquirendam non sufficiant, nihilominus tamen in huiusmodi cognoscendis principia dirigunt in quantum inveniuntur non repugnare principlis naturaliter cognitis, quod si esset, nullo modo intellectus eis assentiret, sicut non potest dissentire principiis.
For there are naturally in us certain first complex principles known by all,1 from which reason proceeds to know in act conclusions which are known potentially in the aforesaid principles, whether through its own proper discovery or through another’s teaching or through divine revelation.2 In all these modes of knowing man is helped by principles naturally known, either such that the principles themselves suffice to acquire knowledge, with sense and imagination supporting,3 such as when we acquire some knowledge through discovery or through teaching; or such that the aforesaid principles do not suffice to acquire knowledge. Still, nevertheless, in knowing of this sort, the principles direct inasmuch as they are found not to oppose the principles naturally known, which if it were the case, in no way would the intellect assent to them, just as it cannot dissent from the principles.
QVIII.Q2.A2Et similiter etiam in intellectu insunt nobis naturaliter quaedam conceptiones ab omnibus notae, ut entis, unius, boni et huiusmodi, a quibus eodem modo procedit intellectus ad cognoscendum quidditatem uniuscuiusque rei per quem procedit a principiis per se notis ad cognoscendas conclusiones.
Similarly, in the intellect there are for us naturally certain conceptions known by all, as of being, of one, of the good, and of things of this sort,1 from which the intellect proceeds to knowing the quiddity of each thing in the same way through which it proceeds from principles known essentially to knowing conclusions.
QVIII.Q2.A2Et hoc vel per ea quae quis sensu percipit, sicut cum per sensibiles proprietates alicuius rei concipio illius rei quidditatem;
And this happens either through those things which someone perceives by sense, just as when I conceive the quiddity of a thing through the sensible properties of that thing;
QVIII.Q2.A2vel per ea quae ab aliis quis audit, ut cum laicus qui nescit quid sit musica, cum audit aliquam artem esse per quam scit canere vel psallere, concipit quidditatem musicae, cum ipse praesciat quid sit ars et quid sit canere;
or, it happens through those things which someone hears from others, just as when a layman who does not know what music is, when he hears that it is some art through which one knows how to sing or to play the strings, he conceives the quiddity of music, since he himself knew beforehand what art is and what it is to sing;1
QVIII.Q2.A2aut etiam per ea quae ex revelatione habentur, ut est in his quae fidei sunt; cum enim credimus aliquid esse in nobis divinitus datum quo affectus noster Deo unitur, concipimus caritatis quidditatem, intelligentes caritatem esse donum Dei quo affectus Deo unitur, praecognoscentes tamen quid sit donum et quid affectus et quid unio, de quibus etiam quid sint scire non possumus nisi resolvendo in aliqua prius nota, et sic quo usque perveniamus ad primas conceptiones humani intellectus, quae sunt omnibus naturaliter notae.
or, it even happens through what is had from revelation, as is the case in matters of faith. For when we believe that something in us is given from heaven by which our affect is united to God, we conceive the quiddity of charity. We understand that charity is a gift of God1 by which the affect is united to God,2 but we still know beforehand what a gift is and what affect is and what union is, concerning which we cannot even know what they are unless by resolving them into something previously known. And thus, by this we might even arrive at the first conceptions of the human intellect, which are known naturally by all.
QVIII.Q2.A2Et quia naturalis cognitio est quaedam similitudo divinae veritatis menti nostrae impressa, secundum illud Psalmi: signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine, ideo dicit Augustinus, X De Trinitate, quod huiusmodi habitus cognoscuntur in prima veritate.
And because natural knowledge is a certain likeness of the divine truth impressed upon our mind, according to Psalm 4:6 [7]: the light of your face has been signed upon us, O Lord; for this reason, Augustine says, in the tenth book of On the Trinity, that habits of this sort are known in the first truth.1
QVIII.Q2.A2Ipsa autem conceptio caritatis quam intellectus format modo praedicto non est solum similitudo caritatis, sicut species rerum in sensu vel in imaginatione, quia sensus et imaginatio nunquam pertingunt ad cognoscendum naturam rei, sed solum modo accidentia quae circumstant rem, et ideo species quae sunt in sensu vel imaginatione non representant naturam rei, sed accidentia eius tantum, sicut statua representat hominem quantum ad accidentalia. Sed intellectus cognoscit ipsam naturam et substantiam rei, unde species intelligibilis est similitudo ipsius essentiae rei et est quodam modo ipsa quidditas et natura rei secundum esse intelligibile, non secundum esse naturale prout est in rebus; et ideo omnia quae non cadunt sub sensu et imaginatione, sed sub solo intellectu, cognoscuntur per hoc quod essentiae vel quidditates eorum sunt aliquo modo in intellectu.
Yet that conception of charity which the intellect forms in the aforesaid way is not only a likeness of charity, like the species of things in sense or in imagination. For sense and imagination never reach to knowing the nature of a thing, but only merely the accidents which surround the thing. And for this reason, the species which are in sense or imagination do not represent the nature of the thing, but only its accidents, just as a statue represents a man as to accidentals. But the intellect knows the very nature and substance of a thing, hence the intelligible species is a likeness of the very essence of the thing and is in a certain way the very quiddity and nature of the thing according to intelligible being, not according to natural being as it is in things. And for this reason, all things which do not fall under sense and imagination, but under intellect alone, are known through this: that their essences or quiddities are in some way in the intellect.1
QVIII.Q2.A2Et hic est modus quo caritas cognoscitur cognitione “quid est,” tam ab habente quam a non habente caritatem.
And this is the way whereby charity is known by the knowledge “what it is,” both by someone who has charity and by someone who does not have it.
QVIII.Q2.A2Sed secundum alium modum cognoscendi caritatem, neque caritas neque aliquis habitus sive potentia percipitur a nostro intellectu nisi per hoc quod actus percipiuntur, ut patet per Philosophum in II Ethicorum; actus autem caritatis vel alterius habitus eliciuntur ab ipsa caritate vel ab alio habitu per propriam essentiam caritatis vel alterius habitus; et per hunc modum dicitur aliquis se cognoscere habere caritatem vel alium habitum per ipsam essentiam habitus secundum esse quod habet in rerum natura et non solum in intellectu. Sic autem nullus potest cognoscere caritatem nisi caritatem habens, quia actus caritatis et aliarum virtutum praecipue consistunt in motibus interioribus, qui non possunt esse cogniti nisi operanti, nisi quatenus manifestantur ex actibus exterioribus, et sic per quandam coniecturam aliquis non habens caritatem potest percipere alium caritatem habere.
But according to another way of knowing charity, neither charity nor any habit or power is perceived by our intellect unless through this: that its acts are perceived, as is clear from the Philosopher in the second book of the Ethics.1 Yet the acts of charity or of any other habit are elicited by the essence of charity itself or of that other habit. And in this way, someone is said to know that he has charity or some other habit through the very essence of the habit according to the being which it has in the nature of things and not only in the intellect. Yet no one can know charity thus except one who has charity, because the acts of charity and of the other virtues especially consist in interior motions, which cannot be known except by one doing them, except insofar as they are manifested by exterior acts. And thus, through a certain conjecture someone not having charity can perceive that another has charity.
QVIII.Q2.A2Hoc autem dico supponendo quod aliquis possit scire se habere caritatem, quod tamen non puto esse verum, quia in actibus ipsis caritatis non possumus sufficienter percipere quod sint a caritate eliciti, propter similitudinem dilectionis naturalis ad dilectionem gratuitam.
Yet I say this by supposing that someone can know that he has charity, which, nevertheless, I do not think is true, because in the very acts of charity we cannot perceive sufficiently that they are elicited by charity, on account of the likeness of natural love to gratuitous love.
QVIII.Q2.A2Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in non habente caritatem, non secundum esse naturae, sed secundum esse intelligibile est essentia caritatis.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that in one who does not have charity, the essence of charity is not there according to the being of nature, but according to intelligible being.
QVIII.Q2.A2.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod, postquam aliquis desinit habere caritatem secundum esse naturae caritatis, adhuc caritas manet in ipso secundum esse intelligibile, et sic potest scire quid est caritas. Manent etiam in memoria eius actus caritatis quos fecit, etiam in memoria sensibili propter actus sensibiles caritatis, qui utique manent secundum sui similitudines, sicut et cetera sensibilia, et ex his aliquis memoratur se habuisse caritatem.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, after someone ceases to have charity according to the being of the nature of charity, charity still remains in him according to intelligible being, and thus he can know what charity is. There also remain in his memory the acts of charity which he has done, even in sensible memory on account of the sensible acts of charity, which certainly remain according to their likenesses, just as other sensible things, and from these someone remembers that he had had charity.
QVIII.Q2.A2.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod illud quod est in memoria redit ad intelligentiam, non ita quod eadem species numero quae est in memoria postmodum fiat in intellectu, sed per illum modum loquendi quo phantasmata dicuntur fieri in intellectu, ut prius dictum est.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that that which is in memory returns to the understanding, not such that the species, the same in number which is in the memory, afterwards is made in the intellect, but in that manner of speaking by which phantasms are said to be made in the intellect, as has been said before.1
QVIII.Q2.A2.ad3Q. 3Regarding the human body
Ad corpus humanum
Regarding the human body
QVIII.Q3Articulus unicus
Article 1
QVIII.Q3Utrum alimentum convertatur in veritatem humanae naturae
Whether food is converted into true human nature
Deinde quaeritur quantum pertinet ad corpus humanum, utrum alimentum convertatur in veritatem humanae naturae? Et videtur quod non.
Then there was a question regarding the human body: whether food is converted into true human nature?1 And it seems that it is not.
QVIII.Q3Quia in corpore humano illud quod est de veritate humanae naturae est caro vel os secundum speciem; sed alimentum non convertitur in id quod est secundum speciem, sed in id quod est secundum materiam, ut videtur dicere Philosophus in I De generatione; ergo alimentum non convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae.
Obj. 1: Because in the human body, true human nature is flesh or bone according to species. But food is not converted into that which is according to species, but into that which is according to matter, as the Philosopher seems to say in the first book of On Generation.1 Therefore, food is not converted into true human nature.
QVIII.Q3.arg1Preterea. Id quod est de veritate humanae naturae oportet quod semper in homine maneat, alias non remaneret homo idem numero; sed id quod generatur ex alimento non semper manet, immo fluit et refluit, ut patet ex I De generatione; ergo id quod generatur ex alimento non est de veritate humanae naturae.
Obj. 2: That which is true human nature requires it to remain always in man, otherwise man would not remain the same in number. But that which is generated from food does not always remain, nay rather it flows in and flows out, as is clear from the first book of On Generation.1 Therefore, that which is generated from food is not true human nature.
QVIII.Q3.arg2Praeterea. Augustinus dicit quod nos fuimus in Adam dupliciter, scilicet secundum seminalem rationem et secundum corpulentam substantiam, Christus autem fuit in eo secundum corpulentam substantiam et non secundum seminalem rationem; id autem quod ex alimento aggeneratur nobis non fuit in Adam; ergo id quod est de veritate corpulente substantiae nostrae, non est ex alimento generatum.
Obj. 3: Augustine says that we were in Adam in two ways, namely, according to seed-like principle and according to fleshy substance, yet Christ was in him according to fleshy substance and not according to seed-like principle.1 Yet that which is generated2 from food for us was not in Adam. Therefore, the fleshy truth of our substances has not been generated from food.
QVIII.Q3.arg3Sed dices quod corpulenta substantia nostra fuit in Adam originaliter et non essentialiter.
Obj. 4: But you will say that our fleshy substance was in Adam originally and not essentially.
QVIII.Q3.arg4Sed contra: semen originem rei importat; si ergo dicimur in Adam fuisse secundum corpulentam substantiam originaliter tantum, idem erit esse secundum corpulentam substantiam et secundum seminalem rationem, quod est falsum; ergo idem quod prius.
On the contrary: semen refers to the origin of a thing. If, therefore, we are said to have been in Adam according to fleshy substance only originally, then it is the same to be according to fleshy substance and according to seed-like principle, which is false. Therefore, the same holds as before.
QVIII.Q3.scSed contra. Ut dicitur in II De anima, alimentum est potentia tale quale est id quod nutritur; sed quod est potentia aliquale, in illud converti potest; ergo alimentum potest converti in id quod nutritur; sed id quod nutritur est id quod est de veritate humanae naturae; ergo alimentum convertitur in id quod est de veritate humanae naturae.
On the contrary (1): As is said in the second book of the De Anima, food is such by potency as that which it nourishes.1 But that which is somehow potentially something can be converted into that thing. Therefore, food can be converted into that which it nourishes. But that which it nourishes is that which is true human nature. Therefore, food is converted into that which is true human nature.
QVIII.Q3.scPraeterea. Semen ex quo fit generatio, maxime videtur ad veritatem humanae naturae pertinere; sed semen, secundum Philosophum in XV De animalibus, est ex superfluo alimenti; ergo alimentum convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae.
Furthermore (2): Semen from which generation comes especially seems to pertain to true human nature. But semen, according to the Philosopher in the fifteenth book of On Animals, comes from superfluous food.1 Therefore, food is converted into true human nature.
QVIII.Q3.arg5Responsio. Dicendum quod ad huius quaestionis evidentiam oportet primo videre quid sit veritas humanae naturae. Veritas autem uniuscuiusque rei, ut Avicenna dicit in sua Metaphysica, nihil est aliud quam proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei; sicut illud quod proprie habet esse aurum, attingens ad terminos stabilitos naturae auri, dicitur vere esse aurum. Unumquodque autem proprie habet esse in aliqua natura per hoc quod substat completae formae propriae illius naturae, a qua est esse et ratio speciei in natura illa. Unde illud pertinet ad veritatem uniuscuiusque rei quod est completum per formam illius rei et pertinet directe et per se ad completionem illius rei. Tam enim in naturalibus quam in artificialibus inveniuntur quaedam in quibus consistit principaliter ratio rei, alia autem quae sunt ordinata ad horum conservationem vel meliorationem. Sicut stipes et fructus per se pertinent ad complementum arboris, unde sunt de veritate naturae ipsius; folia autem quodam modo sunt ordinata ad fructuum conservationem, et quantum ad hoc non videntur esse de veritate naturae arboris principaliter. Similiter ratio gladii consistit in ferro et acumine eius, vagina autem est ad gladii conservationem; unde, si gladius esset res naturalis, ferrum esset de veritate naturae eius, non autem vagina. Sic autem de veritate humanae naturae esse dicimus illud quod per se pertinet ad perfectionem humanae naturae, complete participans formam speciei; illud autem non est de veritate humanae naturae in homine quod est ordinatum solummodo ad horum conservationem vel meliorationem quamcunque.
I answer that to address this question it is necessary first to see what true human nature is. Yet the truth of each thing, as Avicenna says in his Metaphysics, is nothing other than its property to be what has been established for it.1 For example, that which properly exists as gold, reaching the established ends of the nature of gold, is said truly to be gold. Yet each thing properly exists in some nature through standing under the completed form of that proper nature, by which it has being and the character of the species in that nature. Hence something pertains to the truth of each thing which is complete through the form of that thing, and which pertains directly and essentially to the completion of that thing. For in natural things as in artificial things there are found certain things wherein the character of the thing principally consists, yet others which are ordered to the conservation or melioration of these. For example, a trunk and fruits pertain essentially to the completing of a tree, hence they are its true nature. Yet leaves in some way are ordered to the conservation of the fruits,2 and as regards this they do not seem to be of the true nature of a tree principally. Similarly, the character of a sword consists in iron and its sharpness, yet a sheath is for the conservation of a sword. Hence, if a sword were a natural thing, iron would be of the truth of its nature, yet not a sheath. Yet thus we say something is true human nature which essentially pertains to the perfection of human nature, completely participating the form of the species. Yet that which is ordered only to the conservation or melioration of these is not true human nature in man.
QVIII.Q3.coSciendum est ergo quod natura humana potest dupliciter considerari: vel secundum totam speciem humanam, vel secundum esse quod habet in hoc individuo. Et secundum hoc in presenti quaestione inveniuntur tres opiniones.
It must be said, therefore, that human nature can be considered in two ways: either according to the whole human species, or according to its existence in an individual. Accordingly, on the present question there are found three opinions.
QVIII.Q3Quidam enim dicunt quod alimentum non convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae neque secundum speciem neque secundum individuum. Dicunt enim quod tota materia quae nata est esse unquam vere sub specie humanae naturae, fuit in corpore Adae, nec aliqua alia materia potest fieri vere substans humane speciei; et ex illa materia ex qua corpus primi hominis constabat, fuit aliqua pars decisa, quae quidem per multiplicationem quandam sine additione exterioris materiae augmentata est in tantum quod pervenit usque ad completam quantitatem in corpore Seth; ex quo iterum aliquid decisum est in formationem corporis filii sui et praedicto modo multiplicatum; et sic totum humanum genus multiplicatum est ex illa materia quae fuit in corpore primi hominis, sine alicuius extrinseci additione. Id autem quod ex alimento generatur est necessarium nobis ad conservationem illius humiditatis quae est de veritate humanae naturae, ut scilicet calor naturalis habens aliquid aliud quod consumat, scilicet humiditatem ex alimento generatam quasi accidentalem, non consumat humiditatem quae est de veritate humanae naturae; sicut artifices apponunt plumbum argento, ut videlicet in conflatorio consumatur plumbum et argentum non deperdatur. Unde in resurrectione, quando veritas humanae naturae erit inconsumptibilis, alimento non indigebimus, nec resurget in nobis aliquid quod ex alimento sit generatum, sed solum id quod fuit in Adam.
For certain men1 say that food is not converted into true human nature either according to the species or according to the individual. For they say that all the matter which was born to be ever truly under the species of human nature was in the body of Adam, nor can any other matter truly become the subject of the human species. And from that matter out of which the body of the first man was composed, there was some part detached, which indeed through a certain multiplication, without addition of exterior matter, was augmented into so much as reached even to the complete quantity in the body of Seth;2 from this body, something again was detached for the formation of the body of his son and multiplied in the aforesaid way. And thus, the whole human genus was multiplied from that matter in the body of the first man, without the addition of anything extrinsic. Yet that which is generated from food is necessary for us to conserve that humidity which is true human nature, namely, so that natural heat, having something else to consume, namely, the accidental humidity generated out of food, so to speak, will not consume the humidity which is true human nature. Likewise do artists apply lead to silver, namely, so that in the furnace the lead might be consumed and the silver might not be destroyed.3 Hence in the resurrection, when the truth of human nature will be inconsumable, we will not require food, nor will there rise in us something which has been generated out of food, but only that which was in Adam.
QVIII.Q3Sed inconveniens videtur huiusmodi positio, propter duo, quantum ad praesens pertinet. <Primo>, quia eiusdem rationis est formam aliquam nihil amittere de materia subiecta et nihil de novo acquirere, cuius substantiae et naturae nihil accrescit nec deperit; constat autem quod aliqua materia quae erat substans verae humanae naturae, desinit esse humanae naturae substans, sicut patet in morte uniuscuiusque hominis; unde, nisi aliqua materia de novo adderetur naturae humanae, sequeretur quod minus esset modo id quod est de veritate humanae naturae in actu quam tempore Adae; et sic natura speciei non perfecte salvaretur per generationem.—Secundo, quia ista mutatio quam multiplicationem dicunt, nullo modo est secundum essentiam ipsius materiae, sed solummodo secundum quantitatem vel dimensiones ei accidentes; non enim dicunt ut aliquid materiae per essentiam de novo creatur vel aliunde addatur, sed quod illa eadem materia quae prius erat minor, postea fit maior; nihil autem est aliud rarefieri et condensari quam mutari eandem materiam de magnis dimensionibus in parvas et e conuerso; unde sequeretur secundum praedictam positionem quod id quod est de veritate humanae naturae semper raresceret per continuam generationem et augmentationem, et tantum quantum natura sustinere non potest: esset enim iam id quod est de veritate humanae naturae innumerabiliter magis rarum quam ignis, quod patet esse falsum.
But as far as pertains to the present question, a position of this sort seems unfitting for two reasons. The first reason is because it is the same thing for some form to lose nothing of its subject matter and to acquire nothing newly, for whose substance and nature nothing increases nor perishes. Yet it is agreed that some matter which was the substance of true human nature ceases to be the substance of human nature, as is clear in the death of each man. Hence, unless some matter would be newly added to human nature, it would follow that that which is true human nature in act would be less now than in the time of Adam. And thus, the nature of the species would not be saved perfectly through generation. The second reason is because that mutation which they call multiplication is in no way according to the essence of matter itself, but only according to quantity or the dimensions befalling it. For they do not say that something of matter through its essence is created newly or otherwise added, but that that same matter which was less before, afterwards becomes greater. Yet to be rarefied and condensed is nothing else than for the same matter to be changed from great dimensions into small ones and conversely. Hence it would follow according to the aforesaid position that that which is true human nature always would be rarefied through continuous generation and augmentation, and so much as nature cannot sustain: for that which is true human nature already would be innumerably more rare than fire,1 which is clearly false.
QVIII.Q3Et ideo alia opinio dicit quod alimentum convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae <primo> et principaliter secundum speciem, non autem secundum individuum, nisi secundario. Dicunt enim quod in unoquoque individuo humanae speciei illud primo et principaliter est de veritate humanae naturae quod a parentibus traxit, et hoc vocatur a Philosopho caro et os secundum speciem, quae semper manent; sed, quia istud, cum sit modicum, non sufficeret ad perfectam quantitatem debitam humanae naturae sine additione, adiungitur id quod ex alimento generatur, non solum ad hoc quod conservetur illud quod fuit a primis parentibus acceptum, ut dicebat prima opinio, sed ad hoc quod compleatur ex huiusmodi addito perfecta quantitas; et sic id quod ex alimento generatur non est de veritate humanae naturae in hoc individuo principaliter, sed tantum secundario in quantum est necessarium ad quantitatem debitam; et hoc nominat Philosophus carnem et os secundum materiam, quae fluit et refluit. Sed tamen ex hoc aliqua pars seminaliter transit in generationem prolis et efficietur, principaliter de veritate humanae naturae in ipso, cum admixtione alicuius quod fuit principaliter de veritate humanae naturae in patre, ut quidam volunt, vel sine admixtione eius, ut alii dicunt, quod est magis consonum dictis Philosophi in XV De animalibus, qui vult sperma esse totaliter ex superfluo alimenti. Et sic id quod generatur ex alimento non potest esse quod sit principaliter de veritate humanae naturae in ipso qui nutritur, sed potest esse de veritate humanae naturae principaliter in alio eiusdem speciei, scilicet in filio ipsius. Et secundum hanc opinionem dicunt quod id quod est principaliter de veritate humanae naturae in unoquoque, totum in ipso resurget, non autem totum quod ex alimento aggeneratur, sed solum quantum sufficit ad completionem quantitatis, cum propter completionem quantitatis tantum modo ad veritatem humanae naturae aliqualiter pertineat. Et haec opinio consonat sententiae Alexandri commentatoris, qui exposuit carnem secundum speciem quam Philosophus dicit semper manere, esse id quod a parentibus trahitur, carnem vero secundum materiam id quod ex alimento generatur, quae fluit et refluit.
And for this reason, another opinion1 says that food is converted into true human nature “first” and principally according to the species, yet not according to the individual, except secondarily. For they say that, in each individual of the human species, what is first and principally true human nature is that which he has derived from his parents,2 and this is called by the Philosopher flesh and bone according to species,3 which always remain. But because that, since it is scant, would not suffice for the complete quantity due to human nature without addition, there is added that which is generated out of food. This is not only for it to conserve what was received from the first parents, as the first opinion said, but that a perfect quantity would be completed from an addition of this sort. And thus, that which is generated out of food is not true human nature in this individual principally, but only secondarily inasmuch as it is necessary for due quantity; and the Philosopher names this flesh and bone according to matter, which flows in and flows out.4 But nevertheless, out of this some part seminally crosses into the generation of offspring, and there is effected in it what is principally true human nature, with an admixture of this which was principally of the truth of human nature in the father, as certain men wish, or without its admixture, as others say,5 which is more consonant with the sayings of the Philosopher in the fifteenth book of On Animals, who says the sperm is totally from superfluous food.6 And thus, that which is generated from food cannot be that which is principally true human nature in him who is nourished, but it can be true human nature principally in another of the same species, namely, in his son. And according to this opinion, they say that that which is principally true human nature in each will rise whole in him, yet not the whole which is generated out of food, but only as much as suffices for the completion of quantity,7 since on account of the completion of quantity only a certain amount pertains somehow to true human nature. And this opinion accords with the opinion of the commentator Alexander, who explained how the flesh according to species, which the Philosopher says always remains, is that which is derived from the parents, whereas flesh according to matter is that which is generated out of food, which flows in and flows out.8
QVIII.Q3Sed hanc opinionem commentator Averrois reprobat in tractatu quem fecit super librum De generatione: cum enim id quod ex alimento generatur nutriat in quantum est potentia caro, augeat in quantum est potentia quanta caro, ut dicitur in II De anima, id quod generatur ex alimento, postquam receperit speciem carnis, efficitur unum cum illo quod prius inerat, quia in fine conversum iam est simile; unde non videtur esse aliqua ratio quare calor naturalis aliquid possit consumere de illa humiditate carnis ex alimento generate et non de humiditate quae a parentibus trahitur, nec posset aliquo necessario modo id probari; et ideo tam illud quod est a parentibus acceptum quam illud quod est ex alimento aggeneratum, aequaliter se habet ad hoc quod maneat vel consumatur per calorem naturalem et ad hoc quod restauretur per nutrimentum, quod est fluere et refluere; et sic aequaliter pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae quod generatur ex alimento et quod a parentibus trahitur.
But this opinion the commentator Averroes reproves in the treatise which he wrote on the book On Generation:1 for since that which is generated out of food nourishes inasmuch as it is flesh in potency, the flesh increases by as much as there is potency, as is said in the second book of the De Anima.2 That which is generated out of food, after it has received the species of flesh, is made one with that which was in it before, because in the end that which has been converted is like it. Hence there does not seem to be any reason why natural heat should be able to consume something of that humidity of the flesh generated out of food and not something of the humidity which is derived from the parents, nor would it be able to be proved in some necessary way.3 And for this reason, that which is received from the parents, as that which is generated out of food, relates equally to this: that it remains or is consumed through natural heat, and to this: that it is restored through nourishment, which is to flow in and flow out. And thus, what is generated out of food and what is derived from the parents equally pertain to the truth of human nature.
QVIII.Q3Et secundum hoc est tertia opinio, quod alimentum convertitur in id quod est principaliter de veritate humanae naturae et quantum ad speciem et quantum ad individuum. Ponit enim haec opinio quod utrumque, scilicet quod ex alimento generatur et quod a parentibus trahitur, indifferenter et aequaliter forma humana perficitur, et utrumque indifferenter manet vel consumitur: manet quidem secundum speciem, consumitur autem et restauratur secundum materiam. Sicut enim in aliqua re publica diversi homines numero ad communitatem pertinent, quibusdam morientibus et aliis in locum eorum succedentibus, et sic non manet una res publica secundum materiam, quia sunt alii et alii homines, manet tamen una numero quantum ad speciem sive formam propter ordinis unitatem in officiis distinctis, ita etiam in corpore humano manet caro et os et unaquaeque partium eadem numero quantum ad speciem vel formam, quae consideratur in determinato situ et virtute et figura; non autem manet quantum ad materiam, quia illa materia carnis in qua talis forma prius erat, consumpta est et alia in locum eius successit; sicut patet de igne, qui continuatur secundum eandem formam vel modum per hoc quod, consumptis quibusdam lignis, alia supponuntur quae ignem sustinent. Et secundum hanc opinionem, de utroque praedictorum indifferenter, scilicet generato ex alimento et a parentibus tracto, tantum resurget quantum est necessarium ad speciem et quantitatem debitam humani corporis.
And according to this there is a third opinion: that food is converted into that which is principally true of human nature both as far as the species and as far as the individual. For this opinion posits that each of these, namely, that which is generated out of food and that which is derived from the parents, is indifferently and equally perfected by the human form, and each indifferently remains or is consumed: indeed, it remains according to species, yet it is consumed and restored according to matter. For just as in some republic, men diverse in number pertain to the community, as certain men die and others succeed them in their place, and thus there does not remain one republic according to matter, because there are some men and then others, nevertheless it remains one in number as far as species or form on account of the unity of order in its distinct offices,1 so also in the human body there remains flesh and bone and each of the parts2 the same in number as far as species or form, which is considered in a determinate site and power and figure; yet it does not remain as far as matter, because that matter of the flesh in which such a form was before has been consumed and another has succeeded it in its place, just as is clear with fire,3 which is continued according to the same form or mode through this: that, when certain logs are consumed, others are substituted which sustain the fire. And according to this opinion, both of the aforesaid, namely, that generated out of food and that derived from the parents, will rise without distinction in the amount necessary for the species and the due quantity of the human body.
QVIII.Q3Et haec opinio videtur ceteris probabilior.
And this opinion seems more probable than the others.
QVIII.Q3Secundum hanc ergo, ad primum dicendum quod distinctio Philosophi, qua distinguit carnem secundum speciem et secundum materiam, non est sic accipienda quod alia sit caro quae dicitur secundum speciem, scilicet a parentibus tracta, et alia quae sit secundum materiam, scilicet ex alimento generata; sed una et eadem caro signata potest considerari et secundum speciem quam habet et secundum materiam. Et quod hic sit intellectus Philosophi, patet ex hoc quod ipse dicit ibidem quod hoc modo distinguitur caro secundum speciem et secundum materiam sicut unumquodque habentium speciem in materia: in aliis autem habentibus speciem in materia, sicut est lapis et ferrum et huiusmodi, non habet locum prima distinctio, sed secunda, ut per se patet. Et ideo dicendum est quod alimentum convertitur in carnem quae est secundum speciem, id est quae habet speciem, non tamen ita quod alimentum fiat species carnis, sed fit carnis materia, ratione cuius potest dici quod convertitur in carnem quantum ad materiam et non quantum ad speciem.
Reply Obj. 1: According to this, therefore, to the first it must be said that the distinction of the Philosopher, by which he distinguished flesh according to species and according to matter, is not to be understood such that the flesh which is called according to species, namely, that derived from the parents, and that which is according to matter, namely, that generated out of food, are different. Rather, one and the same signate flesh can be considered both according to the species which it has and according to matter. And that this is the understanding of the Philosopher is clear from this: that he says in the same place that flesh according to species and according to matter are distinguished in the same way as each one of those things having species in matter.1 Yet in other things having species in matter, just as stone and iron and things of this sort, the first distinction does not have a place, but the second does, as is clear through itself. And for this reason, it must be said that food is converted into the flesh which is according to species, that is, which has species, nevertheless not such that food becomes the species of flesh, but it becomes the matter of flesh, by the reason of which it can be said that it is converted into flesh as far as the matter and not as far as the species.
QVIII.Q3.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod veritas humanae naturae et cuiuslibet alterius rei est a specie, et ideo, cum id quod est in homine manet secundum speciem quamvis non maneat secundum materiam, nihilominus veritas humanae naturae manere dicitur, nec desinit homo esse idem numero propter permutationem quae est secundum materiam, quia non tota materia simul a forma abstrahitur ut alia tota simul formam accipiat (hoc enim esset generatio et corruptio, sicut si totus unus ignis extingueretur et alius totus accenderetur); sed aliqua pars materiae consumitur et alia in eius locum subrogatur, quae efficitur una materia cum praecedenti per hoc quod ei adiungitur ad sustinendam eandem formam humani corporis, sicut si unum lignum ignis consumatur et aliud loco eius apponatur, erit idem ignis numero.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that true human nature, and anything else, derives from species. This is because that which is in man remains according to species even if it does not remain according to matter. Nonetheless, the truth of human nature is said to remain, nor does man cease to be the same in number on account of a permutation which is according to matter. For the whole matter is not drawn away from the form simultaneously so that another whole matter simultaneously receives the form (for this would be generation and corruption, just as if one whole fire were to be extinguished and another whole fire were to be lit). But some part of the matter is consumed and another is substituted into its place, which is made one matter with the preceding through this: that it is added to it to sustain the same form of the human body, just as, if one log of fire is consumed and another is set in its place, the fire will be the same in number.1
QVIII.Q3.ad2Ad tertium dicendum quod ad conceptionem humani corporis duo concurrunt, scilicet materia ex qua formatur conceptum, et iterum vis formativa quae conceptum format, quorum primum Augustinus vocat corpulentam substantiam, secundum vero seminalem rationem. Dicimur ergo secundum utrumque istorum fuisse in Adam originaliter, in quantum scilicet materia conceptus praeparata est per virtutem generativam matris, vis autem formativa est in semine patris, et utrumque istorum reducitur in Adam sicut in primam originem a qua naturam humanam traxerunt et virtutes consequentes. Corpus autem Christi formatum fuit per virtutem Spiritus Sancti activam, sed materiam ministravit mater, quia ex purissimis sanguinibus Virginis conceptus est, ut Damascenus dicit; et ideo non fuit in Adam secundum seminalem rationem, sed secundum corpulentam substantiam, non tamen ita quod eadem numero quae est in nobis et fuit in Christo, fuerit in Adam.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that for the conception of the human body two things concur, namely, the matter out of which the conceived is formed, and again the formative power which forms the conceived, which Augustine calls the first fleshy substance. The second is seed-like principle.1 Therefore, we are said according to both of those to have been in Adam originally, namely, inasmuch as the matter of the conceived was prepared through the generative power of the mother, yet the formative power is in the seed of the father, and both of these are led back to Adam as to a first origin from which they derived human nature and its consequent powers. Yet the body of Christ had been formed through the active power of the Holy Spirit, but the mother ministered the matter, because out of the most pure blood of the Virgin he was conceived, as Damascene says.2 And for this reason, he was not in Adam according to seed-like principle, but according to fleshy substance, nevertheless not such that a fleshy substance the same in number which is in us and was in Christ, was in Adam.
QVIII.Q3.ad3Et ex hoc etiam patet responsio ad sequens.
Reply Obj. 4: And from this also the response to what follows is clear.
QVIII.Q3.ad4De his quae pertinent ad gratiam et culpam
On Things Pertaining to Grace and Fault
On things pertaining to grace
QVIII.Q3Q. 4Regarding prelates
Quantum ad praelates
Regarding prelates
QVIII.Q4Deinde quaeritur de his quae pertinent ad culpam vel gratiam.
Then there were questions concerning what pertains to fault and grace.
QVIII.Q4Et primo quaeritur de his quae pertinent ad gratiam;
And first, there were questions concerning what pertains to grace;1
QVIII.Q4secundo de his quae pertinent ad culpam.
second, concerning what pertains to fault.1
QVIII.Q4Quantum ad pertinentia ad gratiam quaeritur
Regarding what pertains to grace, it was asked:
QVIII.Q4primo de his quae pertinent ad praelatos tantum;
first, concerning what pertains to prelates only;1
QVIII.Q4secundo de his quae pertinent ad omnes communiter.
second, concerning what pertains to all commonly.1
QVIII.Q4Quantum ad praelatos quaeruntur duo:
Regarding prelates, there were two questions:
QVIII.Q4primo de electione praelatorum, utrum scilicet necesse sit semper eligere meliorem, vel sufficiat eligere bonum;
first, concerning the election of prelates, namely, whether it is always necessary to elect the better man, or does it suffice to elect a good man;
QVIII.Q4secundo de honore praelatis exhibendo, utrum scilicet mali praelati sint honorandi vel non?
second, concerning the honor which must be given to prelates, namely, whether bad prelates must be honored or not.
QVIII.Q4A. 1Whether it is always necessary to elect the better man, or does it suffice to elect a good manUtrum necesse sit semper eligere meliorem vel sufficiat eligere bonum
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod necesse sit semper eligere meliorem.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that it is always necessary to elect the better man.
QVIII.Q4.A1.arg1Dicitur enim IV Regum X: eligite meliorem . . . et eum ponite super solium patris sui; ergo multo fortius in spiritualibus officiis meliores praeeligendi sunt.
Obj. 1: For it is said in 2 Kings 10:3: elect the better man . . . and place him upon the throne of his father. Therefore, much more in spiritual offices must the better men be preferred.
QVIII.Q4.A1.arg2Praeterea. I Timothaei III, super illud: oportet episcopum irreprehensibilem esse, dicit Glossa: talis eligatur pontifex cuius comparatione ceteri grex dicantur; ergo oportet in episcopatu semper eligere meliorem.
Obj. 2: On 1 Timothy 3:2: it is necessary for a bishop to be irreprehensible, the Gloss says: let such a man be elected pontiff by comparison with whom the rest are called a flock.1 Therefore, it is always necessary in the episcopate to elect the better man.
QVIII.Q4.A1.arg3Praeterea. Leo papa dicit: ille qui melior est in presbyteris et diaconibus in episcopum eligatur.
Obj. 3: Pope Leo says: let him who is better among priests and deacons be elected1 as the bishop.
QVIII.Q4.A1.arg4Praeterea. Ille qui est propinquior, ad hereditatem possidendam debet preferri; sed Christo, cuius patrimonium possident praelati et clerici, est propinquior qui est melior; ergo ad praelationem et beneficia ecclesiastica semper sunt meliores praeferendi.
Obj. 4: He who is nearer ought to be preferred for possessing an inheritance. But to Christ, whose patrimony prelates and clerics possess, he who is better is nearer. Therefore, for the prelacy and ecclesiastical benefices the better men always must be preferred.
QVIII.Q4.A1.arg5Praeterea. Si alicui commissum esset a domino suo ut ei fidelem et idoneum ministrum quaereret, non ageret fideliter erga dominum suum, si praetermisso magis idoneo, minus idoneum acciperet; ergo multo magis peccat ille cui commissum est eligere aliquem in ministrum Dei si, praetermisso meliore, minus bonum eligat.
Obj. 5: If someone were commissioned by his lord to seek for the lord a faithful and suitable minister, he would not act faithfully towards his lord if, passing over a more suitable man, he received a less suitable one. Therefore, much more does he sin who is commissioned to elect someone as a minister of God if, passing over a better man, he elects someone less good.
QVIII.Q4.A1.arg6Sed contra est quod decretalis dicit, quod sufficit eligere bonum nec requiritur quod melior eligatur.
On the contrary: A decretal says that it suffices to elect a good man, nor is it required that the better man be elected.1
QVIII.Q4.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod aliquis homo potest dici bonus vel melior altero dupliciter: uno modo simpliciter, et sic melior est qui est in caritate perfectior; alio modo secundum quid, et sic dicitur aliquis esse melior altero vel ad militiam vel ad magisterium vel ad praelationem vel ad aliquid huiusmodi, qui non est melior simpliciter; eo quod in singulis officiis tam spiritualibus quam corporalibus requiruntur aliqua praeter bonitatem moralem ad hoc quod aliquis sit idoneus ad illud officium exequendum.
I answer that any man can be called good or better than another in two ways: one way is absolutely, and thus he is better who is more perfect in charity; another way is according to a particular thing. And thus, someone is said to be better than another either for the military or for a magistracy or for a prelacy or for something of this sort, who is not better absolutely. For in each office, whether spiritual or bodily, some things are required besides moral goodness for someone to be suitable for discharging that office.1
QVIII.Q4.A1.coDicendum ergo quod oportet eligere ad praelationem vel ad quodcumque officium ecclesiasticum aliquem qui sit bonus simpliciter, eo quod per quodlibet peccatum mortale aliquis redditur indignus ad quodlibet spirituale exequendum; unde dicit Dionysius in epistola ad Demophilum monachum, loquens de sacerdote qui non est gratia illuminatus: non est iste sacerdos, non est iste, sed inimicus, dolosus, delusor sui ipsius, et lupus supra divinum populum pelle ovina armatus. Non tamen oportet quod semper eligatur ille qui est melior simpliciter: possibile est enim quod illi qui est in caritate perfectior deficiant multa quae requiruntur ad hoc quod sit praelatus idoneus, quae in alio qui est minoris caritatis inveniuntur, utpote scientia, industria, potentia et alia huiusmodi. Unde non oportet semper eligere meliorem simpliciter, sed eum qui sit melior ad officium.
Therefore, it must be said that it is necessary to elect to the prelacy, or to any ecclesiastical office, someone who is good absolutely, for someone is rendered unworthy by mortal sin for discharging anything spiritual. Hence Dionysius says in the letter to the monk Demophilos, speaking about a priest who was not illuminated by grace: that man is not a priest, he is not, but an enemy, a deceitful one, a deceiver of his very self, and a wolf above the divine people clad with the skin of a sheep.1 Nevertheless, it is not necessary for that one always to be elected who is better absolutely: for it is possible that to him who is more perfect in charity there may be lacking many things which are required for him to be a suitable prelate, which are found in another man who is of lesser charity, such as knowledge, industry, power, and other things of this sort. Hence it is not always necessary to elect the better man absolutely, but him who is better for the office.
QVIII.Q4.A1Si autem eligat quis eum quem reputat minus idoneum ad tale officium, peccat. Non enim potest esse quod de duobus unus alteri praeeligatur nisi propter aliquid in ipso consideratum; illud autem quod consideratur in eo qui est minus idoneus ad hoc quod magis idoneo praeferatur, est aliqua conditio indebite movens, utpote familiaritas vel consanguinitas vel aliquid huiusmodi: non enim potest esse aliqua conditio pertinens ad praelati idoneitatem, ex quo alter simpliciter magis idoneus reputatur; et sic indebite movet et ita in tali electione erit acceptio personarum, quae sine peccato esse non potest.
Yet if one elects someone whom he reckons less suitable for such an office, he sins. For it cannot be that of two one should be preferred to the other except on account of something considered in him. Yet the thing that is considered in the less suitable man so that he is preferred to the more suitable one is a condition that moves someone improperly, such as familiarity or consanguinity or something of this sort: for it cannot be a condition pertaining to the suitability of a prelate, from which the other is reckoned more suitable absolutely. And thus, it moves improperly, and so in such an election there is the receiving of persons, which cannot be without sin.
QVIII.Q4.A1Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicitur: eligite meliorem, intelligitur de meliori ad talem dignitatem ad quam erat eligendus.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, when it is said: elect the better man (2 Kgs 10:3), this must be understood concerning the man better for the dignity to which he was elected.
QVIII.Q4.A1.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod in comparatione praelati debent ceteri esse quasi grex, non considerata sola sanctitate morum, sed discretione et strenuitate et aliis huiusmodi quae in pastore exiguntur ad gregem regendum.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the rest ought to be like a flock in comparison with the prelate, not considering only the sanctity of his customs, but his discretion and vivacity and other things of this sort which are exigent in a pastor for ruling a flock.
QVIII.Q4.A1.ad2Ad tertium dicendum sicut ad primum.
Reply Obj. 3: The reply is the same as to the first.
QVIII.Q4.A1.ad3Ad quartum dicendum quod ille qui eligitur in praelatum, non eligitur quasi ad hereditatem possidendam, quia hereditas christianorum non est in terra, sed in caelo, scilicet ipse Deus, secundum illud Psalmi: Dominus pars hereditatis meae; eligitur autem velut dispensator in familia domini alicuius, secundum illud I Corinthiorum IV: sic nos existimet homo ut ministros Christi etc.; dispensator autem non semper eligitur qui est propinquior, sed qui est magis idoneus.
Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that he who is elected to the prelacy is not elected as though for possessing an inheritance, because the inheritance of Christians is not on earth, but in heaven, namely, God himself, according to Psalm 16 [15]:5: the Lord is the portion of my inheritance. Yet he is elected as if a steward in the family of some lord, according to 1 Corinthians 4:1: thus let man reckon us as ministers of Christ. Yet he who is nearer is not always elected as a steward, but he who is more suitable.
QVIII.Q4.A1.ad4Ad quintum dicendum quod similiter etiam contingeret in procuratione servi alicuius domini temporalis, quod non oporteret quaerere meliorem simpliciter, sed meliorem hominem ad serviendum.
Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that it would happen similarly also in the procuring of some servant of a temporal lord, that it would not be necessary to seek the better man absolutely, but the better man for serving.
QVIII.Q4.A1.ad5Ad illud quod in contrarium oblicitur dicendum quod decretalis intelligenda est quantum ad hoc quod non oportet eligere semper meliorem simpliciter, sed sufficit eligere bonum.
Reply Sed Contra: To the contrary objection it must be said that the decretal must be understood as far as this: that it is not always necessary to elect the better man absolutely, but it suffices to elect a good man.
QVIII.Q4.A1Vel dicendum quod non loquitur quantum ad forum conscientiae, sed quantum ad forum contentiosum, in quo non reprobatur electio ex hoc quod potest aliquis alius magis idoneum inveniri, dummodo ille qui eligitur idoneus sit; alias omnis electio calumniae pateret.
Or it must be said that it does not speak as regards the forum of conscience, but as regards the contentious forum, in which an election is not rejected from someone else being found more suitable when he who is elected is suitable. Otherwise, every election would be open to calumny.
QVIII.Q4.A1A. 2Whether bad prelates must be honored or notUtrum mali praelati sint honorandi vel non
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod malis praelatis non sit honor exhibendus.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that honor does not have to be given to bad prelates.
QVIII.Q4.A2.arg1Sicut enim dicit Boethius in libro De consolatione: non possumus ob honores reverendos iudicare quos ipsis honoribus reputamus indignos; sed mali praelati non sunt honoribus digni; ergo non possunt iudicari esse reverendi a suis subditis.
Obj. 1: For just as Boethius says in the book On Consolation: we cannot on account of honors judge that those must be revered whom we reckon unworthy of these honors.1 But bad prelates are not worthy of honors. Therefore, they cannot be judged as having to be revered by their subjects.
QVIII.Q4.A2.arg2Praeterea. Honor non debetur praelatis malis nisi ratione praelationis; cum ergo sint praelatione indigni, sunt et per consequens indigni ad honores et ad omnia alia quae praelationi sunt propria.
Obj. 2: Honor is not due to bad prelates unless by the character of the prelacy. Since, therefore, they are unworthy of the prelacy, they are also consequently unworthy for honors and for all other things which are proper to the prelacy.
QVIII.Q4.A2.arg3Sed contra est quod dicitur Exodi XX: honora patrem, Glossa: id est praelatos; cum ergo indistincte loquatur, videtur quod omnes praelati tam boni quam mali sint honorandi.
On the contrary: It is said in Exodus 20:12: honor your father; the Gloss:1 that is, prelates. Since, therefore, it speaks indistinctly, it seems that all prelates both good and bad must be honored.
QVIII.Q4.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod in praelato duo possumus considerare, scilicet propriam personam et dignitatem, secundum quam est quaedam persona publica. Si ergo praelatus sit malus, ratione personae suae non est honorandus, quia, cum honor sit reverentia alicui exhibita in testimonium virtutis, falsum testimonium de eo proferret, si quis eum obtentu propriae personae honoraret, contra id quod dicitur Exodi XX: non loqueris contra proximum tuum falsum testimonium. Sed in quantum est persona publica, sic gerit typum et locum non sui ipsius, sed alterius, scilicet Christi, in Ecclesia, vel rei publicae totius, ut in saecularibus dignitatibus; et sic valor eius non computatur secundum personam suam, sed secundum eum cuius locum possidet. Sicut est de lapillo qui in computationibus ponitur loco centum marcharum, cum in se nihil valeat, ut dicitur Proverbiorum XXVI: sicut qui mittit lapidem in aceruum Mercurii, ita qui tribuit insipienti honorem; Mercurius enim dicebatur deus ratiocinii et mercationis. Et ita est honor ei exhibendus non propter se, sed propter eum cuius locum optinet, sicut adoratio imaginum refertur ad prototipum, ut dicit Damascenus. Unde et malus praelatus idolo comparatur, Zachariae XI: O pastor et idolum derelinquens gregem.
I answer that in a prelate we can consider two things, namely, his own person and his dignity, according to which there is a certain public person. If, therefore, the prelate is bad, his person must not be honored because, since honor is reverence exhibited to someone unto the testimony of virtue,1 someone would proffer false testimony concerning him if he honored his own person, against that which is said in Exodus 20:16: you shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor.2 But as far as he is a public person, thus he bears the type and place not of himself, but of another, namely, of Christ, in the Church, or of the whole republic, as in secular dignities. And thus, his value is not computed according to his own person, but according to him whose place he possesses, just as it is concerning a little stone which is placed in computations in place of one hundred marks, since in itself it prevails nothing, as is said in Proverbs 26:8: just as he who sends a stone into the heap of Mercury, so he who grants honor to a fool; for Mercury was called the god of accounting and trade. And thus, honor must be given to him not on account of himself, but on account of him whose place he obtains, just as the adoration of images is referred to the prototype, as Damascene says.3 Hence also an evil prelate is compared to an idol in Zechariah 11:17: O pastor and idol forsaking the flock.
QVIII.Q4.A2.coAd primum ergo dicendum quod intentio Boetii est dicere quod mali homines non iudicantur ut reverendi in propriis personis, quamvis exhibeantur eis honores propter officia in quibus sunt constituti.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the intention of Boethius is to say that bad men are not judged as having to be revered in their own persons, although honors must be given to them on account of the offices in which they are constituted.
QVIII.Q4.A2.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod malus praelatus et indignus est praelatione et honoribus qui praelato debentur; sed ille cuius vicem gerit, dignus est ut eius vicario talis honor exhibeatur; sicut Beata Virgo digna est ut eius imaginem in pariete depictam veneremur, quamvis tali reverentia ipsa imago digna non sit.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that a bad prelate is unworthy both of the prelacy and of the honors which are due to a prelate. But he whose turn he bears is worthy of such honor being given to his vicar, just as the blessed Virgin is worthy of us venerating her image depicted on a wall, even though the image itself is not worthy of such reverence.
QVIII.Q4.A2.ad2Q. 5Regarding all men
Quantum ad omnes
Regarding all men
QVIII.Q5Deinde quaeritur de pertinentibus ad gratiam communibus omni statui. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria:
Then there were questions about what pertains to grace common to every state. And about this there were three questions:
QVIII.Q5primo de orationibus, utrum oratio tantum valeat facta pro alio sicut facta pro se;
first, concerning prayers, whether prayer made for another prevails as much as prayer made for oneself;
QVIII.Q5secundo de suffragiis, utrum magis prosint pauperi magis digno quam diviti pro quo specialiter fiunt;
second, concerning suffrages, whether they benefit more a pauper who is more worthy than the rich man for whom they specially are made;
QVIII.Q5tertio de votis, utrum votum simplex dirimat matrimonium contractum.
third, concerning vows, whether a simple vow breaks off a contracted marriage.
QVIII.Q5A. 1On prayersDe orationibus
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod oratio plus valeat pro se facta quam pro alio.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that prayer made for oneself prevails more than prayer made for another.
QVIII.Q5.A1.arg1Ita enim dicitur in quadam glossa, quod speciales orationes plus valent; sed illa est maxime specialis qua quis pro se orat; ergo plus valet oratio pro se facta quam pro alio.
Obj. 1: For thus it is said in a certain gloss, that special prayers prevail more.1 But that is most special by which someone prays for himself. Therefore, prayer made for oneself prevails more than prayer made for another.
QVIII.Q5.A1.arg2Praeterea. Ut dicitur in libro De spiritu et anima, oratio nihil aliud est quam devotio mentis in Deum; sed magis devote aliquis orat pro se quam pro alio; ergo plus valet oratio pro se facta quam pro alio.
Obj. 2: As it is said in the book On Spirit and Soul, prayer is nothing other than devotion of the mind unto God.1 But someone prays more devoutly for himself than for another. Therefore, prayer made for oneself prevails more than prayer made for another.
QVIII.Q5.A1.arg3Sed contra. Oratio tanto amplius valet quanto magis est devota; sed quandoque quis devotius orat pro alio quam pro se ipso; ergo plus valet oratio facta pro alio quam pro se ipso.
On the contrary (3): Prayer prevails so much more as it is more devout. But sometimes someone prays more devoutly for another than for himself. Therefore, prayer made for another prevails more than prayer made for one’s own self.
QVIII.Q5.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod duplex est valor orationis: unus qui est orationis proprius, secundum quem dicitur oratio valere ad impetrandum id quod petitur, sicut oratio Petri valuit ad suscitationem Tabite; alius valor est communis orationi et aliis operibus virtutum, secundum quod oratio valere dicitur ad merendum aliquid ipsi oranti prout caritate informatur, sicut oratio Petri qua suscitationem Tabitae impetravit fuit meritoria Petro vitae aeternae, in quantum erat actus caritate informatus.
I answer that the value of prayer is twofold: one which is proper to prayer, according to which prayer is said to prevail for obtaining what is asked for, just as the prayer of Peter prevailed to resurrect Tabitha (Acts 9:36–43). The other value is common to prayer and to other works of virtue, according to which prayer is said to prevail for meriting something for the one himself praying insofar as it is informed by charity, just as the prayer of Peter by which he obtained the resurrection of Tabitha was meritorious of eternal life for Peter, inasmuch as it was an act informed by charity.
QVIII.Q5.A1.coLoquendo igitur de primo valore, ceteris paribus plus valet oratio facta pro se quam facta pro alio, quia efficatia orationis in impetrando potest amittere suum effectum quando pro alio fit, ex aliquo impedimento quod invenitur in eo pro quo oratur; unde una de conditionibus orationis quae faciunt eam efficatem ad impetrandum ponitur ut aliquis pro se oret.—Quantum autem ad secundum valorem, oratio magis valet quae ex maiori caritate procedit, sive pro se sive pro alio fiat.
Speaking, therefore, about the first value, prayer made for oneself, all else being equal, prevails more than prayer made for another because the efficacy of prayer in obtaining can lose its effect when it is made for another from some impediment which is found in him for whom it is prayed. Hence as one of the conditions of prayer which make it efficacious for obtaining, it is posited for someone to pray for himself.1 Yet as regards the second value, a prayer prevails more which proceeds out of greater charity, whether it be made for oneself or for another.
QVIII.Q5.A1Si autem de interiori caritate per exteriora opera debeat iudicari, tunc ista comparatio dupliciter potest intelligi.
Yet if we speak about interior charity, which ought to be judged through exterior works, then that comparison can be understood in two ways.
QVIII.Q5.A1Uno modo ut aliquis ita oret pro alio quod etiam pro se; et tunc maioris meriti est pro alio orare et pro se ipso quam pro se tantum: maioris enim meriti est amicum benivolum et beneficum esse sibi et alii quam sibi tantum.
One way is such that someone prays for another in such a way that he prays also for himself. And then to pray for another and for one’s own self is of greater merit than to pray for oneself only: for it is of greater merit for a friend to be benevolent and beneficent to himself and to another than to himself only.
QVIII.Q5.A1Alio modo potest intelligi ut aliquis oret pro alio et non pro se; et sic ostenderetur esse alteri benivolus magis quam sibi, et ita peccaret in ordine caritatis, magis alium quam se diligens; et hoc modo intelligendo comparationem, melius est pro se orare quam pro alio.
In another way, it can be understood such that someone prays for another and not for himself. And thus, he would be shown to be more benevolent towards another than towards himself, and thus he would sin in the order of charity,1 loving another more than himself. And understanding the comparison in this way, it is better to pray for oneself than for another.
QVIII.Q5.A1Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa non est ad propositum, quia specialis oratio dicitur in glossa illa, pro quocumque specialiter fiat, sive pro se sive pro alio.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that that argument is not to the point, because special prayer is said in that gloss for any prayer done specially, whether for oneself or for another.
QVIII.Q5.A1.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod, licet ut pluries homo pro se ipso devotius oret, tamen quandoque devotius orat pro alio; et ita secundum hoc non potest sumi universale indicium quae oratio plus valeat.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, although often a man prays for himself more devoutly, nevertheless sometimes he prays more devoutly for another. And accordingly, a universal indication as to which prayer prevails more cannot be made.
QVIII.Q5.A1.ad2Et similiter dicendum ad tertium quod in contrarium obicitur.
Reply Obj. 3: And the same is said about the third contrary objection.
QVIII.Q5.A1.ad3A. 2On suffragesDe suffragiis
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod suffragia ecclesiae specialiter facta pro aliquo divite, equaliter valeant pauperi pro quo non fiunt, si sit equalis meriti.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that the suffrages of a church specially made for some rich man avail equally for a pauper for whom they are not made, if he is of equal merit.
QVIII.Q5.A2.arg1Ut enim dicit Augustinus, huiusmodi suffragia tantum valent unicuique post mortem quantum meruit vivens ut sibi prodessent; sed praedicti duo equaliter meruerunt; ergo equaliter eis praedicta suffragia prosunt.
Obj. 1: For as Augustine says, suffrages of this sort only prevail for each man after death as much as he merited their benefit while living.1 But the aforesaid two merited equally. Therefore, equally do the aforesaid suffrages benefit them.
QVIII.Q5.A2.arg2Praeterea. Passio Christi semper plus prodest ei qui maioris est meriti; sed in missa, quod est praecipuum suffragiorum, est memoria passionis dominicae; ergo equaliter prosunt eis qui sunt equalis meriti.
Obj. 2: The Passion of Christ always more benefits him who is of greater merit. But in the Mass, which is the foremost of suffrages, there is the memorial of the dominical Passion. Therefore, they benefit equally those who are of equal merit.
QVIII.Q5.A2.arg3Sed contra. Deus accipit huiusmodi suffragia secundum intentionem facientis; sed faciens intendit quod plus prosint diviti pro quo facit; ergo plus ei prosunt.
On the contrary (1): God receives suffrages of this sort according to the intention of the one making them. But the one making them intends that they benefit more the rich man for whom he makes them. Therefore, they benefit him more.
QVIII.Q5.A2.scPraeterea. Non est dicendum quod frustretur pia intentio eorum qui pro suis caris specialia suffragia faciunt; frustraretur autem si eis specialius non prodessent; ergo magis prosunt eis pro quibus fiunt.
Furthermore (2): It must not be said that the pious intention of those who make special suffrages for their dear ones is frustrated. Yet it would be frustrated if they would not benefit them more specially. Therefore, they benefit more those for whom they are made.
QVIII.Q5.A2.arg4Responsio. Dicendum quod circa hoc est duplex opinio.
I answer that about this there is a twofold opinion.
QVIII.Q5.A2.coQuidam enim dicunt quod suffragia ecclesiae specialiter pro aliquo facta valent omnibus qui sunt in purgatorio, equaliter quidem his qui sunt equalis meriti, plus vero his qui sunt maioris, minus his qui sunt minoris; sicut candela accensa pro aliquo divite in aliqua domo ubi sunt multi alii, equaliter prodest aliis qui sunt equalis visus, plus vero his qui sunt melioris, minus his qui sunt peioris, quamvis sit diviti magis ad quemdam honorem; et sicut etiam lectio quae legitur specialiter pro aliquo clerico, multis simul audientibus, equaliter valet his qui sunt equalis capacitatis, plus his qui sunt maioris, minus his qui minoris.
For certain men say that the suffrages of a church specially made for someone prevail for all who are in purgatory,1 equally indeed for these who are of equal merit, whereas more for these who are of greater merit, less for these who are of lesser. So too a candle lit for some rich man in some house where there are many others equally benefits the others who are of equal sight, whereas more these who are of better sight, less these who are of worse, even though there is for the rich man more unto a certain honor. So too a reading which is read specially for some cleric, with many hearing it simultaneously, equally prevails for those who are of equal capacity, more for these who are of greater, less for these who are of lesser.
QVIII.Q5.A2Alii vero dicunt quod suffragia plus valent his pro quibus specialiter fiunt.
Whereas others say that suffrages prevail more for these for whom they specially are made.1
QVIII.Q5.A2Utraque autem opinio secundum aliquid vera est. Ad cuius evidenciam sciendum est quod opera unius non valent alteri quantum ad praemium essentiale, quia sic unusquisque ex propriis actibus iudicatur, sed solum quantum ad aliquod accidentale gaudium vel quantum ad remissionem alicuius poenae temporalis; et sic suffragia vivorum possunt prodesse defunctis. Huiusmodi autem communicatio operum contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, ex unione caritatis, qua omnes Christi fideles efficiuntur unum corpus, et sic actus unius quodam modo redundat in iuvamentum alterius, sicut et in membris naturalis corporis videmus; et sic iuvatur aliquis ex actu alterius in quantum quilibet existens in caritate gaudet de quolibet bono opere, et quanto est maioris caritatis, tanto amplius gaudet, sive sit in purgatorio sive in paradiso sive etiam in mundo. Et quantum ad hoc est vera prima opinio.—Alio modo actus unius fit communis alteri per intentionem facientis, quia facit pro illo vel vice illius, quod valet praecipue in debitis solvendis, et sic suffragia ecclesiae valent defunctis in quantum vivus solvit Deo satisfactionem quam mortuus solvere tenebatur; et sic valor suffragii sequitur intentionem facientis. Et quantum ad hoc secunda opinio vera est.
Yet each opinion is true according to something. To explain this, it must be known that the works of one do not prevail for another as regards essential reward, because everyone is judged by his own acts, but only as regards some accidental joy or as regards the remission of some temporal punishment. And thus, the suffrages of the living can benefit the dead. Yet a communication of works of this sort happens in two ways. One way is from a union of charity, by which all the faithful of Christ are made to be one body. And thus, the act of one redounds in a certain way to the aid of another, just as we also see in members of a natural body. And thus, someone is aided out of the act of another inasmuch as any man existing in charity rejoices concerning whatever good work. And as much as he is of greater charity, so much more does he rejoice, whether he is in purgatory or in paradise or even in the world. And as regards this, the first opinion is true. In another way, one’s act is made common to another through the intention of the one making it, because he makes it for that one or in that one’s place, which prevails especially in paying off debts, and thus the suffrages of a church prevail for the dead inasmuch as a living man has paid to God a satisfaction which the dead is held to pay. And thus, the value of the suffrage follows the intention of the one making it. And as regards this, the second opinion is true.
QVIII.Q5.A2Ad primum ergo dicendum quod meritum illud de quo loquitur Augustinus, est meritum conditionatum: meretur enim aliquis vivens ut sibi suffragia post mortem valeant, si pro eo fiant; quae quidem conditio extat in uno et non extat in alio, et ideo non equaliter prosunt utrique.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that that merit concerning which Augustine speaks is conditioned merit: for someone while living merits suffrages to prevail for himself after death if they are made for him. This condition indeed exists in one and does not exist in the other, and for this reason, they do not benefit both equally.
QVIII.Q5.A2.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod passio Christi fuit exhibita pro omnibus, sacrificium autem missae specialiter pro aliquibus offertur, et ideo non est simile.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the Passion of Christ has been given for all, yet the sacrifice of the Mass specially is offered for some, and for this reason, it is not alike.
QVIII.Q5.A2.ad2Alia duo concedimus.
Reply Sed Contra 1–2: We concede the other two.
QVIII.Q5.A2A. 3On vowsDe votis
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod votum simplex continentiae dirimat matrimonium contractum.
To the third we proceed thus. It seems that a simple vow of continence breaks off a contracted marriage.
QVIII.Q5.A3.arg1Si enim aliquis det alicui quod prius alteri dederat, secunda datio nulla est; sed ille qui emittit votum simplex continentiae dat corpus suum Deo; ergo, cum postea contrahendo matrimonium det corpus suum uxori, contractus iste matrimonii nihil valere videtur; et sic votum simplex matrimonium contractum dirimit.
Obj. 1: For if anyone gives to someone what he had previously given to another, the second giving is null. But he who utters a simple vow of continence gives his body to God. Therefore, since afterwards by contracting marriage he gives his body to a wife, that contract of marriage seems to prevail nothing. And thus, a simple vow breaks off a contracted marriage.
QVIII.Q5.A3.arg2Sed contra est quod decretalis dicit quod votum simplex matrimonium impedit contrahendum, sed non dirimit iam contractum.
On the contrary: A decretal says that a simple vow impedes contracting marriage, but it does not break off one already contracted. 1
QVIII.Q5.A3.scResponsio. Dicendum quod votum simplex non dirimit matrimonium contractum, sed solum solemne.
I answer that a simple vow does not break off a contracted marriage. Only a solemn vow does.
QVIII.Q5.A3.coCuius ratio patet si differentia utriusque voti inspiciatur.
The reason for this is clear if the difference between the two vows is inspected.
QVIII.Q5.A3In voto enim simplici est sola promissio, qua quis promittit Deo se continentiam servaturum; ex sola autem promissione non transfertur dominium, unde si aliquis promittat rem aliquam alicui et postea det eandem alteri, huiusmodi donatio non potest rescindi per priorem promissionem, quamvis male faciat dando; et sic ille qui emisit votum simplex continentiae potest postmodum corpus suum tradere uxori et, quamvis peccet hoc faciendo, tamen matrimonium non dirimitur propter votum precedens.
For in a simple vow there is only a promise, wherein someone promises to God that he will preserve continence. Yet dominion is not transferred by only a promise,1 hence if someone promises something to someone and afterwards gives the same thing to another, a donation of this sort cannot be rescinded through the prior promise, although he does badly by giving. And thus, he who has uttered a simple vow of continence can afterwards hand over his body to a wife, and although he sins by doing this, nevertheless the marriage is not broken off on account of the preceding vow.
QVIII.Q5.A3In voto autem solemni est simul promissio et collatio; tunc enim est votum solemne quando simul cum voto aliquis consecratur Deo et ponitur in aliquo statu sanctitatis vel per susceptionem ordinis vel per professionem certae regulae; et sic non potest ulterius corpus suum tradere uxori et, si tradat, contractus nullus est.
Yet in a solemn vow there is simultaneously a promise and bestowal. For there is a solemn vow when simultaneous with the vow someone is consecrated to God and placed in some state of sanctity either through the reception of an order or through the profession of a sure rule.1 And thus, he cannot any longer hand over his body to a wife, and if he does hand it over, the contract is null.2
QVIII.Q5.A3Et sic matrimonium dirimitur per votum sollemne, non autem per simplex.
Reply Obj. 1: And thus, marriage is broken off through a solemn vow, yet not through a simple vow.
QVIII.Q5.A3.ad1Ratio autem in contrarium adducta falsum supponebat, scilicet quod per votum simplex aliquis det corpus suum Deo: non enim dat, sed promittit.
Reply Sed Contra: Yet the argument brought to the contrary supposed something false, namely, that through a simple vow someone gives his body to God: for he does not give but promises.
QVIII.Q5.A3On things pertaining to fault
QVIII.Q5.A3Q. 6On things pertaining to faultDe his quae pertinent ad culpam
Deinde quaeritur de his quae pertinent ad culpam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque;
Then there were questions concerning what pertains to fault. And about this there were five questions:
QVIII.Q6primo, utrum peccet qui ad ecclesiam vadit propter distributiones, alias non iturus, quamvis a principio praebendam acceperit ut Deo serviret;
first, whether he sins who goes to a church on account of the stipends, when otherwise he would not go, even though in the beginning he accepted the prebend so that he would serve God;
QVIII.Q6secundo, utrum aliquis habens de superfluo peccet si non det pauperi petenti;
second, whether someone sins if, having a surplus, he does not give to a begging pauper;
QVIII.Q6tertio, utrum, quando sunt diverse opiniones de aliquo facto, ille qui sequitur minus tutam peccet, sicut de pluralitate praebendarum;
third, whether, when there are diverse opinions concerning some fact, he who follows a less safe one sins, such as concerning a plurality of prebends;
QVIII.Q6quarto, utrum mendatium semper sit peccatum;
fourth, whether a lie is always a sin;
QVIII.Q6quinto, utrum quantum aliquis intendit peccare, tantum peccet.
fifth, whether as much as someone intends to sin, he sins.
QVIII.Q6A. 1Whether he sins who goes to a church on account of the stipends, when otherwise he would not go, even though in the beginning he accepted the prebend so that he would serve GodUtrum peccet qui ad ecclesiam vadit propter distributiones, alias non iturus, quamvis a principio praebendam acceperit u
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui vadit ad ecclesiam propter distributionem, alias non iturus, peccat.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that he who goes to a church on account of the stipend, when otherwise he would not go, sins.
QVIII.Q6.A1.arg1Ipse enim videtur ponere obsequium divinum, quod est impretiabile, sub pretio rei temporalis; ergo committit symoniam et ita videtur quod mortaliter peccet.
Obj. 1: For he seems to place divine submission, which is without price, under the price of a temporal thing. Therefore, he commits simony, and thus it seems that he sins mortally.
QVIII.Q6.A1.arg2Sed contra. Ille qui facit votum bona intentione, si postmodum in prosecutione voti mutetur eius voluntas, ut invitus faciat quod volens promisit, non evacuatur meritum voti, ut videtur Anselmus dicere in libro De similitudinibus; ergo eadem ratione qui accipit praebendam ut Deo serviat, non peccabit quamvis postea mutetur eius intentio.
On the contrary: He who makes a vow by a good intention, if afterwards in the pursuit of the vow his will is changed so that reluctantly he does what willingly he promised, the merit of the vow is not evacuated, as Anselm is seen to say in the book On Likenesses.1 Therefore, for the same reason, he who receives a prebend to serve God does not sin even if afterwards his intention changes.
QVIII.Q6.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod ad evidentiam huius quaestionis notandum est quod aliquis actus dicitur esse spiritualis dupliciter. Uno modo ex parte principii, quando scilicet actus competit alicui personae propter aliquid spirituale quod in ipso est, sicut episcopo consecrare basilicas et diacono legere Evangelium; et in talibus actibus committitur symonia si aliquis intendat suum actum vendere. Alio modo est aliquis actus spiritualis non ex parte principii, sed ex parte finis tantum, sicut docere liberales artes, quarum veritas spiritualis est, sed huiusmodi doctrina non competit alicui propter aliquod spirituale officium, cum etiam Gentilibus liceat huiusmodi artes docere; et in his actibus committitur symonia si vendatur finis, qui spiritualis est, scilicet ipsa veritas, non autem si aliquis sua opera locet. Celebrare autem divinum officium in ecclesia est actus spiritualis primo modo: competit enim alicui ex hoc quod est clericus; et ideo symoniam committit qui huiusmodi actum vendere intendit: in qualibet enim venditione pretium accipitur quasi finis.
I answer that to answer this question it must be noted that an act is said to be spiritual in two ways. One way is on the part of the principle, namely, when the act applies to some person on account of something spiritual which is in him, such as to a bishop to consecrate basilicas and to a deacon to read the Gospel. And simony is committed in such acts if someone intends to sell his act. In another way, an act is spiritual not on the part of the principle, but on the part of the end only, such as to teach the liberal arts, to which belongs spiritual truth. But teaching of this sort does not apply to someone on account of some spiritual office, since it is permitted even to the Gentiles to teach arts of this sort. And in these acts simony is committed if the end, which is spiritual, is sold, namely, the truth itself, yet not if someone contracts for his works. Yet to celebrate the divine office in a church is a spiritual act in the first way: for it applies to someone by the fact he is a cleric. And for this reason, someone commits simony who intends to sell an act of this sort: for in any sale a price is received as an end.
QVIII.Q6.A1.coEt ideo in praedicto casu distinguendum est. Si enim huiusmodi distributiones recipit quasi finem sui operis principaliter intentum, symoniam committit, et ita mortaliter peccat. Si autem habet principalem finem Deum in tali actu, ad huiusmodi autem distributiones respicit secundario, non quasi in finem, sed sicut in id quod est necessarium ad suam sustentationem, constat quod non vendit actum spiritualem, et ita symoniam non committit nec peccat. Sic enim acceptio distributionum non erit causa quare ad ecclesiam vadat, sed proprie huius determinationis quare nunc vadat et non alia vice.
And for this reason, in the aforesaid case a distinction must be made. For if he receives stipends of this sort as the end of his work principally intended, he commits simony, and thus he sins mortally. Yet if he has God as his principal end in such an act, yet secondarily regards stipends of this sort, not as an end, but just as for what is necessary for his sustenance, it is agreed that he does not sell a spiritual act, and thus he neither commits simony nor sins. For in that way the reception of stipends will not be the cause why he goes to a church, but it determines why he goes now and not at another turn.
QVIII.Q6.A1Et sic patet responsio ad primum, quia non ponit impretiabile sub pretio.
Reply Obj. 1: And thus, the response to the first is clear, because he does not place that which is without price below price.
QVIII.Q6.A1.ad1Ad illud vero quod in contrarium obicitur, dicendum quod tunc in vovente non evacuatur meritum voti quando intentio voventis fertur super licitum, ut cum aliquis vellet non facere id quod vovit si non vovisset; si autem feratur directe super illicitum, tunc evacuatur meritum voti, ut cum aliquis vult absolute non facere id quod vovit. Ille autem qui vult ire ad ecclesiam pro pecunia sicut pro fine principali, habet voluntatem delatam super illicitum, et ideo peccat.
Reply Sed Contra: Whereas to the contrary objection, it must be said that in then vowing, the merit of the vow is not emptied when the intention of the one vowing is borne upon what is just, such as when someone wishes not to do what he has vowed provided he had not vowed it. Yet if it is borne directly upon what is illicit, then the merit of the vow is emptied, as when someone wishes absolutely not to do what he has vowed. Yet he who wishes to go to a church for money just as for a principal end has a will borne down upon what is illicit, and for this reason, he sins.
QVIII.Q6.A1A. 2Whether someone sins if, having a surplus, he does not give to a begging pauperUtrum aliquis habens de superfluo, peccet si non det pauperi petenti
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui non dat pauperi petenti, si habeat de superfluo, peccet.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that he who does not give to a begging pauper, if he has a surplus, sins.
QVIII.Q6.A2.arg1Facere enim eleemosynam de superfluo est in praecepto. Lucae XI: verum tamen quod superest date eleemosynam; ergo peccat si petenti non tribuat.
Obj. 1: For to give alms from a surplus is in a precept. Luke 11:41: but nevertheless give what is superfluous as alms. Therefore, he sins if he does not grant this to one begging.
QVIII.Q6.A2.arg2Praeterea. Aliquis tenetur inquirere de his quae sunt necessaria ad salutem; sed necessarium est ad salutem ut aliquis subveniat existenti in extrema necessitate; ergo tenetur quilibet inquirere utrum pauper sit in extrema necessitate, vel statim ei dare.
Obj. 2: Someone is held to inquire concerning what is necessary for salvation. But it is necessary for salvation for someone to come to help one living in extreme necessity. Therefore, every man is held to inquire whether the pauper is in extreme necessity, or to give to him at once.
QVIII.Q6.A2.arg3In contrarium est quia sic videretur quod omnes essent damnati.
On the contrary: Thus it would seem that all would be damned.
QVIII.Q6.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod circa hoc distinguendum est. Supposito enim quod aliquis habeat de superfluo, et respectu individui et respectu personae, quod tenetur pauperibus erogare, aut videt in paupere petente evidentia signa extremae necessitatis, aut non. Si videt, certum est quod tenetur dare, et peccat non dando; in hoc enim casu loquitur Ambrosius: pasce fame morientem . . . si non paveris, occidisti. Si vero non apparent, tunc non tenetur pauperi petenti dare, quia, quamvis teneatur dare superfluum pauperibus, non tamen tenetur omnibus dare, nec etiam huic dare, sed distribuere secundum quod videtur sibi oportunum. Nec tenetur inquirere, quia hoc esset nimis grave quod de omnibus pauperibus inquireret, et praecipue cum ad eum qui necessitatem patitur pertineat ut necessitatem suam exponat.
I answer that a distinction must be made about this. For supposing that someone has a surplus, both with respect to the individual and with respect to the person,1 which he is held to pay out to the poor, either he sees in the begging pauper evident signs of extreme necessity, or not. If he sees these signs, it is certain that he is held to give, and he sins by not giving. For in this case Ambrose speaks: feed the one dying of hunger . . . if you do not feed him, you have killed him.2 Whereas if they do not appear, then he is not held to give to the begging pauper, because, although he is held to give what is superfluous to the poor, nevertheless he is not held to give to all, nor even to give to this one, but to distribute according to how it seems opportune to him. Nor is he held to inquire, because it would be too burdensome to inquire concerning all the poor, and especially since it belongs to the one suffering to make clear his necessity.
QVIII.Q6.A2.coEt per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.
Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
QVIII.Q6.A2.ad1A. 3Whether when there are diverse opinions concerning something, he who follows a less safe one sins, such as concerning a plurality of prebendsUtrum quando sunt diverse opiniones de aliquo facto, ille qui sequitur minus tutam peccet, sicut de pluralitate praebend
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui habet plures praebendas peccet, ex hoc ipso quod opiniones magistrorum sunt in contrarium.
To the third we proceed thus. It seems that he who has many prebends sins by the very fact that the opinions of the masters are contrary to one another.1
QVIII.Q6.A3.arg1Quicumque enim committit se discrimini in his quae sunt ad salutem, peccat; sed iste committit se discrimini, ut videtur, cum faciat contra multorum peritorum sentenciam; ergo videtur quod peccet.
Obj. 1: For whoever commits himself to risk in something regarding salvation, sins. But that person commits himself to risk, as it seems, since he acts against the sentence of many experts. Therefore, it seems that he sins.1
QVIII.Q6.A3.arg2Sed contra. Potest esse quod in tali casu aliquis adhibet diligentiam, inquirens an habere plures praebendas sit licitum, nec invenit aliquid quod eum moveat ad hoc quod sit illicitum; ergo videtur quod sine peccato possit plures praebendas habere.
On the contrary: It can be that someone employs diligence in such a case, inquiring whether to have many prebends is licit, and does not find something which convinces him it is illicit. Therefore, it seems that he can have many prebends without sin.
QVIII.Q6.A3.scResponsio. Dicendum quod duobus modis aliquis ad peccatum obligatur: uno modo faciendo contra legem, ut cum quis fornicatur; alio modo faciendo contra conscientiam, etiam si non sit contra legem, ut si conscientia dictet alicui quod levare festucam de terra sit peccatum mortale. Ex conscientia autem obligatur aliquis ad peccatum sive habeat certam fidem de contrario eius quod agit, sive etiam habeat opinionem cum aliqua dubitatione. Illud ergo quod agitur contra legem, semper est malum, nec excusatur per hoc quod est secundum conscientiam. Et similiter quod est contra conscientiam est malum, quamvis non sit contra legem. Quod autem nec contra conscientiam nec contra legem est, non potest esse peccatum.
I answer that someone commits sin in two ways: one way is by acting against the law, such as when someone fornicates; another way is by acting against his conscience, even if it is not against the law, such as if someone’s conscience tells him that to lift a straw from the earth is a mortal sin.1 Yet out of conscience someone commits sin when he has sure faith concerning the contrary of that which he does, or even when he has an opinion with some doubt. Therefore, that which is done against the law is always evil, nor is it excused through this: that it is according to conscience. And similarly, that which is against conscience is evil, even though it is not against the law. Yet that which is neither against conscience nor against the law cannot be sin.2
QVIII.Q6.A3.coDicendum est ergo quod quando sunt duae opiniones contrariae de eodem, oportet alteram esse veram et alteram esse falsam. Aut ergo ille qui facit contra opinionem magistrorum, utpote habendo plures praebendas, facit contra veram opinionem, et sic [cum faciat contra legem Dei] non excusatur a peccato, quamvis non faciat contra conscientiam: sic enim contra legem Dei faciet. Aut illa opinio non est vera, sed magis contraria, quam iste sequitur, ita quod vere liceat plures praebendas habere; et sic distinguendum est, quia aut talis habet conscientiam de contrario, et sic iterum peccat, utpote contra conscientiam faciens, quamvis non contra legem; aut non habet conscientiam de contrario secundum certitudinem, sed tamen in quandam dubitationem inducitur ex contrarietate opinionum, et sic, si manente tali dubitatione plures praebendas habet, periculo se committit, et sic procul dubio peccat, utpote magis amans beneficium temporale quam propriam salutem; aut ex contrariis opinionibus in nullam dubitationem adducitur, et sic non committit se discrimini nec peccat.
Therefore, it must be said that when there are two contrary opinions concerning the same thing, it is necessary that one is true and the other is false. Therefore, either he who acts against the opinion of the masters, such as by having many prebends, acts contrary to the true opinion, and thus (since he acts against the law of God) he is not excused from sin, even though he does not act against his conscience: for thus he is acting against the law of God. Or that opinion which it follows is not true, but rather the contrary, such that truly it is licit to have many prebends. And thus, it must be distinguished, because either such a man has a conscience concerning the contrary, and thus again he sins by acting against conscience, although not against the law; or he does not have a certain conscience about the contrary, but, nevertheless, he is led into a certain doubt by the contrariety of the opinions. And thus, if with such a doubt remaining he has many prebends, he commits himself to danger, and thus beyond doubt he sins, as loving a temporal benefice more than his own salvation. Or, he is led by the contrary opinions into no doubt, and thus he neither commits himself to risk nor sins.
QVIII.Q6.A3Unde patet solutio ad obiecta.
Reply Obj. 1: Hence the solution to the objections is clear.
QVIII.Q6.A3.ad1A. 4Whether a lie is always a sinUtrum mendacium semper sit peccatum
Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omne mendacium sit peccatum.
To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that not every lie is a sin.
QVIII.Q6.A4.arg1Maius enim peccatum est homicidium quam mendacium; sed homicidium potest licite fieri, utpote cum iudex occidit latronem; ergo et mendacium.
Obj. 1: For homicide is a greater sin than lying. But homicide can be done licitly, such as when a judge kills a thief.1 Therefore, lying also can be done licitly.
QVIII.Q6.A4.arg2Praeterea. In Sacra Scriptura quidam laudantur qui tamen mentiti esse intelliguntur, ut obstetrices, Iacob et Iudith; ergo mendacium non semper est peccatum.
Obj. 2: In Sacred Scripture certain men are praised who nevertheless are understood to have lied, such as the midwives,1 Jacob,2 and Judith.3 Therefore, lying is not always a sin.
QVIII.Q6.A4.arg3Sed contra est quod Augustinus determinat in libro De mendacio.
On the contrary: There is that which Augustine determines in the book On Lying.1
QVIII.Q6.A4.scResponsio. Dicendum quod quandocumque aliquis actus habet aliquam inordinationem inseparabiliter annexam, nunquam potest bene fieri, quia ipsa inordinatio est aliquid superfluum vel diminutum, et ita non potest in tali actu medium accipi, in quo virtus consistit, ut etiam patet per Philosophum in II Ethicorum. Huiusmodi autem actus est mendacium: ad hoc enim inventa sunt verba vel voces ut sint signa intellectuum, ut dicitur in principio Peryermenias, et ideo quando aliquis voce enunciat quod non habet in mente, quod importatur in nomine mendacii, est ibi inordinatio per abusum vocis. Et ideo concedimus quod mendacium semper est peccatum.
I answer that whenever some act has some disorder inseparably annexed to it, it can never be done well, because this very disorder is something superfluous or diminished. And thus, in such an act a mean, in which virtue consists, cannot be reached, such as is also clear through the Philosopher in Ethics II.1 Yet lying is an act of this sort: for unto this there are found words or voices: so that they might be signs of understandings, as is said in the beginning of On Interpretation,2 and for this reason, when someone enunciates with their voice what they do not have in their mind, which is involved by the definition of lying, there is disorder there through abuse of the voice. And for this reason, we concede that lying is always a sin.
QVIII.Q6.A4.coAd primum ergo dicendum quod homicidium etiam semper est peccatum, quia habet inordinationem inseparabiliter annexam: homicidium enim plus importat quam occisio hominis (composita enim nomina frequenter plus important quam componentia): importat enim homicidium occisionem hominis indebitam. Et ideo homicidium nunquam est licitum, quamvis occidere hominem aliquando liceat.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that homicide also is always a sin1 because it has disorder inseparably annexed to it: for homicide involves more than the killing of a man (for a composed term frequently implies more than the components):2 for homicide involves the undue killing of a man.3 And for this reason, homicide is never licit, although to kill a man is sometimes licit.
QVIII.Q6.A4.ad1Ad secundum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro De mendacio (et habetur in Glossa super illud Psalmi: perdes omnes qui loqunntur mendacium), dupliciter aliquis laudatur in Scriptura; quidam propter perfectum statum virtutis, et horum facta proponuntur omnibus in exemplum, et de talibus non legitur quod mentiti sint; vel, si aliqua dixerunt quae mendacia videntur, secundum intentionem quam ex instinctu Spiritus Sancti conceperunt, mendacia non sunt; quidam vero laudantur propter virtutis indolem, et sic in aliquibus mendacium legitur, maxime officiosum, sicut patet de obstetricibus: non enim commendantur propter hoc quod mentitae sunt, sed propter misericordiam ex qua in mendatium inciderunt; et sic apparet in eis quaedam indoles, id est profectus, virtutis, non autem perfectio.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as Augustine says in the book On Lying (and as is said in a Gloss on Psalm 5:7: you shall destroy all who speak a lie),1 someone is praised in Scripture in two ways: certain men on account of the perfect state of virtue, and their deeds are proposed for all as an example, and concerning such men it is not read that they lied. Or, if they said some things which seem to be lies, they are not lies according to the intention which they conceived in the Holy Spirit. Whereas certain men are praised on account of the innate disposition of virtue, and thus in some a lie is read to have been said, especially a dutiful lie, as is clear concerning the midwives: for they are not commended because they lied, but on account of their mercy whereby they fell into lying; and thus there appears in them a certain innate disposition, that is, progress, of virtue, yet not perfection.2
QVIII.Q6.A4.ad2A. 5Whether as much as someone intends to sin, so much he sinsUtrum quantum aliquis intendit peccare, tantum peccet
Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non oportet quod, si aliquis intendat peccare mortaliter, quod peccet mortaliter.
To the fifth we proceed thus. It seems that it is not necessary that, if someone intends to sin mortally, he sins mortally.
QVIII.Q6.A5.arg1Deus enim pronior est ad miserendum quam ad puniendum, ut habetur ex Glossa in principio Ieremiae; sed, si aliquis intendit peccare venialiter, non sequitur propter hoc quod venialiter peccet; ergo nec oportet quod qui intendit peccare mortaliter peccet mortaliter.
Obj. 1: For God is more prone to have mercy than to punish,1 as is said in a Gloss on the beginning of Jeremiah.2 But, if someone intends to sin venially, it does not follow on account of that that he sins venially. Therefore, neither is it necessary that he who intends to sin mortally sins mortally.
QVIII.Q6.A5.arg2Sed contra. Quicumque intendit peccare mortaliter, facit contra conscientiam; sed omnis talis peccat mortaliter; ergo etc.
On the contrary: Whoever intends to sin mortally acts against conscience. But every such man sins mortally. Therefore, if someone intends to sin mortally, he does sin mortally.
QVIII.Q6.A5.scResponsio. Dicendum quod improprie dicitur quod aliquis intendat peccare mortaliter vel venialiter: malum enim est praeter intentionem et voluntatem, ut Dionysius dicit, IV capitulo De divinis nominibus; sed aliquis intendit facere aliquid quod credit esse peccatum mortale, et ex hoc dicitur quod intendit peccare mortaliter. Praedicta ergo quaestio nihil aliud quaerit nisi quare aliquis credens esse peccatum mortale quod facit, peccat mortaliter, non autem est necesse quod sit veniale, si credat veniale esse, utpote si fornicationem credat esse veniale peccatum.
I answer that it is said improperly that someone intends to sin mortally or venially: for evil is beyond intention and will, as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names.1 But someone intends to do something which he believes to be mortal sin, and from this it is said that he intends to sin mortally. Therefore, the aforesaid question seeks nothing except why someone believing what he does to be mortal sin, sins mortally. Yet it is not necessary that it be venial if he believes it to be venial, such as if he believes fornication to be a venial sin.
QVIII.Q6.A5.coCuius quaestionis de facili patet responsio, quia, cum conscientia etiam erronea habeat vim ligandi, ex hoc ipso quod contra conscientiam facit, mortaliter peccat. Error autem conscientiae quandoque habet vim absolvendi sive excusandi, quando scilicet procedit ex ignorantia eius quod quis scire non potest vel scire non tenetur; et in tali casu, quamvis factum de se sit mortale, tamen intendens peccare venialiter, peccaret venialiter, sicut si aliquis intenderet accedere ad uxorem suam causa delectationis et ita intenderet peccare venialiter, si alia ei supponeretur, eo nesciente, nihilominus venialiter peccaret. Quandoque vero error conscientiae non habet vim absolvendi vel excusandi, quando scilicet ipse error peccatum est, ut cum procedit ex ignorantia eius quod quis scire potest et scire tenetur, sicut si crederet fornicationem simplicem esse peccatum veniale; et tunc, quamvis crederet peccare venialiter, non tamen peccaret venialiter, sed mortaliter.
The response to this question is obvious because, since even an erroneous conscience has the power of binding, from the very fact that he acts against conscience, he sins mortally.1 Yet error of conscience sometimes has the power of loosing or excusing, namely, when it proceeds from ignorance of that which someone cannot know or is not held to know. And in such a case, even though the deed is mortal concerning itself, nevertheless if he intends to sin venially, he sins venially. So too, if someone were to intend to come to his wife for the sake of delight and thus intends to sin venially, and if another woman were substituted for her, with him not knowing, nonetheless he would sin venially. Whereas sometimes the error of conscience does not have the power of loosing or of excusing, namely, when the error itself is a sin, such as when it proceeds out of ignorance of that which someone can know or is held to know, just as if he were to believe that simple fornication is a venial sin. And then, although he would believe himself to sin venially, nevertheless he would not sin venially, but mortally.2
QVIII.Q6.A5Et per hoc patet solutio ad obiecta.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this the solution to the objections is clear.
QVIII.Q6.A5.ad1De his quae pertinent ad poenam et gloriam
On Things Pertaining to Punishment and Glory
On things pertaining to punishment
QVIII.Q6.A5Q. 7On the spiritual punishment of the damnedDe poena spirituali damnatorum
Deinde quaeritur de his quae pertinent ad poenam et gloriam.
Then there were questions about what pertains to punishment and glory;
QVIII.Q7Et primo de his quae pertinent ad poenam;
and first, concerning what pertains to punishment;1
QVIII.Q7secundo de his quae pertinent ad gloriam.
second, concerning what pertains to glory.1
QVIII.Q7Circa poenam autem quaeritur
Yet about punishment it was asked:
QVIII.Q7primo de poena spirituali;
first, concerning the spiritual punishment;1
QVIII.Q7secundo de poena corporali damnatorum.
second, concerning the bodily punishment of the damned.1
QVIII.Q7Circa primum quaeruntur duo:
About the first, there were two questions:
QVIII.Q7primo, utrum damnati videant gloriam sanctorum, maxime post diem iudicii;
first, whether the damned see the glory of the saints, especially after the day of judgment;
QVIII.Q7secundo, utrum damnati velint suos propinquos esse damnatos.
second, whether the damned wish their neighbors to be damned.
QVIII.Q7A. 1Whether the damned see the glory of the saints, especially after the day of judgmentUtrum damnati videant gloriam sanctorum maxime post diem iudicii
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod damnati post diem iudicii videant gloriam sanctorum.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the damned after the day of judgment see the glory of the saints.
QVIII.Q7.A1.arg1Sicut enim se habet gloria ad miseriam, ita miseria ad gloriam; sed de perfectione gloriae sanctorum est ut videant miseriam damnatorum, ut habetur Isaiae ultimo: egredientur et videbunt cadavera impiorum; ergo et de perfectione miseriae damnatorum est ut videant gloriam sanctorum, et sic post diem iudicii, quando erunt in perfecta miseria, damnati videbunt gloriam sanctorum.
Obj. 1: For just as glory relates to misery, so misery to glory. But the perfection of the glory of the saints is for them to see the misery of the damned, as is said at the end of Isaiah (66:24): they shall go out and see the cadavers of the impious. Therefore, the perfection of the misery of the damned is also for them to see the glory of the saints, and thus after the day of judgment, when they will be in perfect misery, the damned will see the glory of the saints.
QVIII.Q7.A1.arg2Praeterea. Post diem iudicii nulla afflictio a damnatis subtrahetur; sed nunc affliguntur damnati de hoc quod vident gloriam sanctorum, secundum illud Isaiae XXVI: videant et confundantur velantes populi; ergo et post die iudicii gloriam sanctorum videbunt.
Obj. 2: After the day of judgment no affliction is subtracted from the damned.1 But the damned are afflicted now from seeing the glory of the saints, according to Isaiah 26:11: let the envious people see, and be confounded. Therefore, after the day of judgment they also will see the glory of the saints.
QVIII.Q7.A1.arg3Sed contra. Omnis delectationis materia damnatis post diem iudicii subtrahetur; sed videre sanctorum gloriam est quaedam delectationis materia; ergo tali visione damnati post diem iudicii carebunt.
On the contrary: The matter of every delight will be subtracted from the damned after the day of judgment. But to see the glory of the saints is a certain matter of delight. Therefore, the damned will lack such a vision after the day of judgment.
QVIII.Q7.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod videre gloriam beatorum dupliciter contingit. Uno modo, ut capiatur quid sit ipsa gloria et qualis et quanta, et sic nullus potest videre gloriam nisi qui est in gloria: superat enim et desiderium et intellectum eorum qui eam non experiuntur, hoc enim est manna absconditum et nomen novum scriptum in calculo, quod nemo novit nisi qui accipit, ut habetur Apocalypsis II. Alio modo contingit videre gloriam beatorum, ut videantur ipsi beati esse in quadam gloria inenarrabili et excedente intellectum, et sic damnati ante diem iudicii vident gloriam sanctorum, non autem post diem iudicii, eo quod tunc poenitus erunt a sanctorum consortio alienati, utpote qui iam ad summum miseriae pervenerunt, et ideo nec etiam sanctorum visione digni habebuntur: nam videns aliquod consortium habet cum eo quod videt.
I answer that to see the glory of the blessed happens in two ways. One way is such that one grasps what this glory is itself, both how and how much, and thus no one can see this glory except he who is in glory. For it surpasses both the desire and the understanding of those who do not experience it, since this is hidden manna and a new name written on a pebble, which no one knows except he who receives it, as is said in Revelation 2:17. In another way, to see the glory of the blessed happens such that the blessed themselves are seen in a certain indescribable and exceeding understanding, and thus the damned see the glory of the saints before the day of judgment, yet not after the day of judgment, for then they will be alienated utterly from the saints, as those who already have arrived at the greatest misery, and for this reason, they will not be held worthy even of the vision of the saints: for one seeing something has a share with that which he sees.
QVIII.Q7.A1.coAd primum ergo dicendum quod videre miseriam damnatorum omnino erit sanctis ad gloriam: gaudebunt enim de Dei iustitia et de sua evasione, secundum illud Psalmi: laetabitur iustus cum viderit vindictam. Sed videre sanctorum gloriam aliquid perfectionis importat, qua post diem iudicii damnati privabuntur.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that to see the misery of the damned will belong altogether to the saints unto glory: for they will rejoice concerning the justice of God and concerning their own evasion, according to Psalm 57:11: the just man shall be made happy when he will see vengeance. But to see the glory of the saints involves something of perfection, of which after the day of judgment the damned will be deprived.
QVIII.Q7.A1.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod damnati in inferno existentes, post diem iudicii memores erunt gloriae sanctorum, quam ante iudicium et in iudicio viderant; et sic cognoscent eos esse in maxima gloria, quamvis non videant ipsos beatos nec eorum gloriam, et ita invidia torquebuntur; et sic afflictio quae in eis nunc est ex tali visione, manebit, visione sublata; de quo etiam magis dolebunt, videntes se etiam sanctorum visione indignos reputatos.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the damned existing in hell, after the day of judgment will be mindful of the glory of the saints, which before judgment and in judgment they had seen. Thus, they will recognize that they are in greatest glory, although they will not see the blessed themselves nor their glory, and thus they will be tortured by envy. And thus, the affliction which is now in them from such a vision will remain, even with the vision removed: concerning which also they will grieve the more, seeing themselves deemed unworthy even of the vision of the saints.
QVIII.Q7.A1.ad2Ad illud vero quod in contrarium obicitur, dicendum quod videre sanctorum gloriam non est materia delectationis nisi secundum primum modum videatur, qualiter nec etiam ante iudicium a damnatis videtur; secundo autem modo videre, et non habere, est magis afflictionis causa, propter invidiam.
Reply Sed Contra: Whereas to the contrary objection, it must be said that to see the glory of the saints is not a matter of delight unless it is seen in the first way, which is not how it is seen by the damned even before judgment. Yet to see in the second way, and not to have, is the cause of more affliction on account of envy.
QVIII.Q7.A1A. 2Whether the damned wish their neighbors to be damnedUtrum damnati velint suos propinquos esse damnatos
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod damnati non vellent suos propinquos esse damnatos.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that the damned would not wish their neighbors to be damned.
QVIII.Q7.A2.arg1Dicitur enim Lucae XVI quod dives in inferno damnatus petebat Lazarum mitti ad fratres suos ut testaretur illis ne venirent in locum tormentorum; petitio autem est voluntatis designatio; ergo damnati non volunt suos propinquos damnari.
Obj. 1: For it is said in Luke 16:27–28 that the rich man damned in hell begged for Lazarus to be sent to his brothers so that he would testify to them lest they come into the place of torments. Yet petition is the designation of the will.1 Therefore, the damned do not wish their neighbors to be damned.
QVIII.Q7.A2.arg2Sed contra est quod Isaiae XIV super illud: surrexerunt de soliis suis, dicit Glossa: solatium est damnatis socios habere suae miseriae; ergo ipsi vellent omnes esse damnatos.
On the contrary: On Isaiah 14:9: they have risen from their thrones, the Gloss says: it is a solace for the damned to have comrades of their misery.1 Therefore, they would wish all to be damned.
QVIII.Q7.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod vicia spiritualia in damnatis consummantur, quod significatur Ezechielis XXXIII, ubi dicitur de impiis quod cum armis suis ad infernum descenderunt; et ideo in eis perfecta invidia est, ad quam pertinet dolere de bono alterius quod ipse non habet, et sic etiam velle omnes pati malum quod ipse patitur: liberari enim a malo quoddam bonum est. Quae quidem invidia in aliquibus etiam in hac vita tantum invalescit ut suis propinquissimis invideant de bonis quae ipsi non habent.
I answer that spiritual vices are consummated in the damned, which is signified in Ezekiel 32:27, where it is said concerning the impious that with their arms they have descended to hell. And for this reason, perfect envy is in them, which involves grieving over the good of another which he himself does not have, and thus even to wish for everyone to suffer the evil which he himself suffers: for to be freed from a certain evil is a good. Indeed, in some this envy grows to such great strength even in this life that they envy their closest neighbors the goods which they themselves do not have.
QVIII.Q7.A2.coUnde multo amplius damnati, invidia stimulante, vellent propinquos suos cum omnibus aliis esse damnatos, et dolebunt si sciant aliquos esse salvatos. Sed tamen, si non omnes debent damnari, sed aliqui salvari, mallent suos propinquos quam alios a damnatione liberari, quia in hoc etiam invidia torquebuntur, si videant alios salvari et suos damnari. Et per hunc modum dives damnatus nolebat suorum damnationem.
Hence much more would the damned, with envy stimulating them, wish their neighbors to be damned with all others, and they will grieve if they know that some are saved. But nevertheless, if not all ought to be damned, but some to be saved, they would prefer for their neighbors rather than others to be saved from damnation, because in this also they will be tortured by envy if they see that others are saved and their own are damned. And in this way, the damned rich man did not wish for the damnation of his own.
QVIII.Q7.A2Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
QVIII.Q7.A2.ad1Q. 8On the bodily punishment of the damnedDe poena corporali damnatorum
Articulus unicus
Article 1
QVIII.Q8Utrum scilicet sit ibi tantum poena ignis, vel etiam poena aquae
Whether there is only punishment of fire there, or also punishment of water
Deinde quaeritur de poena corporali damnatorum, utrum scilicet sit ibi tantum poena ignis vel etiam poena aquae?
Then there were questions concerning the bodily punishment of the damned, namely, whether there is only punishment of fire, or also punishment of water?
QVIII.Q8Et videtur quod sic, per id quod habetur Iob XXIV de impiis: transibunt ab aquis nivium ad calorem nimium.
Obj. 1: And it seems that there is, through that said in Job 24:19 concerning the impious: they shall pass from the waters of snows to the excessive heat.1
QVIII.Q8.arg1Sed contra. Omnis delectatio et refrigerium damnatis aufertur; sed non potest esse sine quodam refrigerio quod aliquis afflictus calore ad frigus aquae transeat vel e converso; ergo talis poenarum alternatio non erit in damnatis.
On the contrary: Every delight and refreshment is removed from the damned. But it cannot be without a certain refreshment for someone afflicted by heat to pass to the cold of water or conversely. Therefore, such an alternation of punishments will not be in the damned.1
QVIII.Q8.scResponsio. Dicendum quod, sicut dicit Basilius exponens illud Psalmi: vox Domini intercidentis flammam ignis, in fine mundi ignis dividetur et alia elementa, et quicquid est in eis pulchrum et clarum remanebit superius ad gloriam electorum, quod vero est in eis feculentum et poenosum descendet in infernum ad poenam damnatorum. Et ita fex totius creaturae in infernum colligetur et erit damnatis in poenam, et non solum patientur poenam ignis: iustum est enim ut qui Creatorem offenderunt, ab omni creatura puniantur. Unde dicitur Sapientiae V quod orbis terrarum pugnabit contra insensatos.
I answer that, just as Basil says expounding Psalm 28:7: the voice of the Lord cuts through the flame of fire, at the end of the world fire will be divided and the other elements, and whatever in them is beautiful and clear will remain higher for the glory of the elect, whereas that which in them is dreggy and punishing will descend into hell for the punishment of the damned.1 And thus, the dregs of the whole creation will be collected into hell and will be for the damned as punishment. And they will not suffer the punishment of fire only, for it is of justice for those who have offended the Creator to be punished by every creature. Hence it is said in Wisdom 5:21 that the whole world shall fight against the senseless.2
QVIII.Q8.coAd illud quod in contrarium obicitur dicendum quod ex huiusmodi varietate poenarum nullum erit in damnatis refrigerium. Ignis enim et aqua et huiusmodi non agent in corpora damnatorum actione naturae, ita quod relinquant suas qualitates in corporibus damnatorum secundum esse naturae, sicut ignis relinquit calorem in lignis quae facit esse calida; alioquin, cum contraria non possint esse simul in eodem, oporteret corpora damnatorum suas qualitates perdere, et sic, transmutata natura organorum, fieret poena minus sensibilis.
Reply Sed Contra: To the contrary objection, it must be said that there will be no refreshment in the damned from a variety of punishments of this sort. For fire and water and things of this sort do not act upon the bodies of the damned by the action of nature, such that they leave their qualities in the bodies of the damned according to the being of nature, just as fire leaves heat in wood which it makes to be hot. Otherwise, since contraries cannot be in the same thing simultaneously,1 it would be necessary for the bodies of the damned to lose their qualities. And thus, with the natures of their organs being changed, the punishment would become less sensible.
QVIII.Q8Sed agunt in corpora damnatorum actione spirituali, imprimendo scilicet suas qualitates in corporibus damnatorum secundum esse spirituale, per modum quo species colorum est in aere et pupilla, non ita quod fiant colorata; unde corpora damnatorum sentient afflictionem ignis sine hoc quod convertantur in naturam ignis.
But they act upon the bodies of the damned by spiritual action, namely, by impressing their qualities in the bodies of the damned according to spiritual being,1 in the way the species of colors is in the air and the pupil, not such that the air and pupil become colored. Hence the bodies of the damned will sense the affliction of fire without being converted into the nature of fire.
QVIII.Q8Et ideo varietas poenarum non facit eis aliquod refrigerium: refrigerium enim nunc ex alternatione poenarum proveniens causatur ex transmutatione naturae, in quantum per frigus aquae superfluitas calefactionis remittitur et sic ad medium venitur, quod est delectabile.
And for this reason, the variety of punishments does not refresh them. For refreshment now coming forth from the alternation of punishments is caused by the transmutation of nature, inasmuch as through the cold of water an excess of heating is remitted and thus it is come unto a medium, which is delightful.
QVIII.Q8On things pertaining to glory
QVIII.Q8Q. 9On the glory of the saintsDe gloria sanctorum
Deinde quaeritur de gloria beatorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo:
Then there were questions about the glory of the blessed. And about this two things were asked:
QVIII.Q9primo, utrum beatitudo sanctorum per prius consistat in intellectu quam in affectu vel e converso;
first, whether the beatitude of the saints first consists in intellect before it consists in affect, or conversely;
QVIII.Q9secundo, utrum per prius beati ferantur ad videndam humanitatem Christi quam eius divinitatem.
second, whether the blessed first see the humanity of Christ before his divinity.
QVIII.Q9A. 1Whether the beatitude of the saints first consists in intellect before it consists in affect, or converselyUtrum beatitudo sanctorum per prius consistat in intellectu quam in affectu, vel e converso
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo sanctorum praecipue consistat in intellectu.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the beatitude of the saints especially consists in intellect.
QVIII.Q9.A1.arg1Sicut enim dicit Augustinus, X Confessionum, beatitudo est gaudium de veritate; sed veritas pertinet principaliter ad intellectum; ergo et beatitudo.
Obj. 1: For just as Augustine says, in the tenth book of the Confessions, beatitude is joy concerning truth.1 But truth pertains principally to the intellect. Therefore, so does beatitude.
QVIII.Q9.A1.arg2Praeterea. Iohannis XVII dicitur: haec est vita aeterna ut cognoscant te Deum verum et quem misisti Iesum Christum; cognitio autem ad intellectum pertinet; ergo et vita aeterna sive beatitudo.
Obj. 2: It is said in John 17:3: this is eternal life: that they may recognize you the true God and Christ Jesus whom you have sent. Yet recognition pertains to the intellect. Therefore, so does eternal life or beatitude.
QVIII.Q9.A1.arg3Praeterea. Augustinus dicit in I De Trinitate quod visio est tota merces; merces autem est beatitudo; ergo pertinet principaliter ad visionem intellectus.
Obj. 3: Augustine says in the first book of On the Trinity that vision is the whole reward.1 Yet the reward is beatitude. Therefore, it pertains principally to the vision of the intellect.
QVIII.Q9.A1.arg4Sed contra. Praemium respondet merito; sed meritum praecipue consistit in voluntate; ergo et beatitude, quae est praemium.
On the contrary: A prize responds to merit. But merit especially consists in the will. Therefore, so does beatitude, which is the prize.
QVIII.Q9.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod felicitas sive beatitudo in operatione consistit et non in habitu, ut Philosophus probat in I Ethicorum. Unde beatitudo hominis potest comparari ad aliquam potentiam animae dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut obiectum potentiae, et sic beatitudo praecipue comparatur ad voluntatem: nominat enim beatitudo ultimum finem hominis et summum bonum ipsius, finis autem et bonum sunt obiectum voluntatis. Alio modo, sicut actus ad potentiam, et sic beatitudo originaliter et substantialiter consistit in actu intellectus, formaliter autem et completive in actu voluntatis, quia impossibile est ipsum actum voluntatis esse ultimum finem hominis: ultimus enim finis hominis est id quod est primo desideratum, non autem potest esse quod primo votum sit actus voluntatis. Prius enim est potentiam ferri in aliquod obiectum quam quod feratur super actum suum: prius enim intelligitur actus alicuius potentiae quam reflexio eius super actum illum; actus autem terminatur ad obiectum, et ita quaelibet potentia prius fertur in obiectum quam in actum suum, sicut visus prius videt colorem quam videat se videre colorem. Et ita etiam voluntas prius vult aliquod bonum quam velit se velle, et sic actus voluntatis non potest esse primo volitum, et per consequens nec ultimus finis.
I answer that happiness or beatitude consists in activity and not in habit, as the Philosopher proves in the first book of the Ethics.1 Hence the beatitude of man can be compared to some power of the soul in two ways. One way is as the object of a power, and thus beatitude especially is compared to the will: for beatitude names the last end of man and his highest good, yet end and good are the object of the will. Another way is as the act of a power, and thus beatitude originally and substantially consists in an act of the intellect. Yet in its form and completeness it consists in an act of the will, because it is impossible for the act itself of the will to be the last end of man. For the last end of man is that which is first desired, yet it cannot be for the first thing wanted to be an act of the will. For a power is first borne unto some object before it is borne upon its own act: for first the act of some power is understood before its reflex upon that act.2 Yet an act is terminated at an object, and thus any power is borne first unto an object before it is borne unto its own act, just as sight first sees color before it sees that it sees color. And thus also the will first wants some good before it wants that it should want, and thus an act of the will cannot be the first willed, and consequently neither can the last end.
QVIII.Q9.A1.coSed quotienscumque aliquod bonum exterius est desideratum quasi finis, ille actus noster est nobis quasi finis interior quo primo perfecte attingimus ad ipsum, sicut dicimus quod comestio est finis et beatitudo eius qui ponit finem suum cibum, et possessio eius qui ponit finem suum pecuniam; finis autem nostri desiderii Deus est; unde actus quo primo ei coniungimur est originaliter et substantialiter nostra beatitudo; primo autem Deo coniungimur per actum intellectus, et ideo ipsa Dei visio, quae est actus intellectus, est substantialiter et originaliter nostra beatitudo.
But whenever some more exterior good is desired as an end, that act of ours is for us as though an interior end by which first we attain to it perfectly, just as we say that consuming is the end and beatitude of him who places food as his end, and possession of him who places money as his end. Yet the end of our desire is God. Hence the act by which first we are conjoined to him is originally and substantially our beatitude. Yet we are first conjoined to God through an act of the intellect, and for this reason, the vision itself of God, which is an act of the intellect, is substantially and originally our beatitude.
QVIII.Q9.A1Sed, quia haec operatio perfectissima est et obiectum convenientissimum, ideo consequitur maxima delectatio, quae quidem decorat ipsam operationem et perficit eam sicut pulcritudo iuventutem, ut dicit Philosophus in X Ethicorum; unde ipsa delectatio, quae voluntatis est, est formaliter complens beatitudinem.
But, because this is a most perfect activity and a most fitting object, for this reason, there follows the greatest delight, which indeed adorns the activity itself and perfects it just as beauty does with youth, as the Philosopher says in the tenth book of the Ethics.1 Hence that delight itself, which is of the will, is formally completing beatitude.
QVIII.Q9.A1Et ita beatitudinis ultimae origo est in visione, complementum autem in fruitione.
And thus, the origin of ultimate beatitude is in vision, yet its completion is in enjoyment.1
QVIII.Q9.A1Tres ergo primae rationes concedende sunt, quia hoc ostendunt quod beatitudo substantialiter consistit in actu intellectus.
Reply Obj. 1–3: The first three arguments, therefore, must be conceded because they show that beatitude substantially consists in an act of the intellect.
QVIII.Q9.A1.ad1Ad illud vero quod in contrarium obicitur, dicendum quod meritum consistit in agendo, praemium vero in recipiendo; actio autem primo pertinet ad voluntatem, eo quod ipsa movet omnes alias vires, sed receptio primo pertinet ad intellectum quam ad voluntatem; unde praemium per prius attribuitur intellectui, meritum autem voluntati.
Reply Sed Contra: Whereas to that objected to the contrary, it must be said that merit consists in acting, whereas reward in receiving. Yet action first pertains to the will by moving all the other powers, but reception first pertains to the intellect before the will. Hence reward is attributed first to the intellect, yet merit to the will.
QVIII.Q9.A1A. 2Whether the blessed first see the humanity of Christ before his divinityUtrum per prius beati ferantur ad videndum humanitatem Christi quam eius divinitatem
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beati in gloria prius ferantur ad contemplandam Christi divinitatem quam eius humanitatem.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that the blessed in glory first contemplate the divinity of Christ before his humanity.
QVIII.Q9.A2.arg1Altissimo enim statui altissimus actus principaliter et primo competit; sed beati sunt in statu altissimo; cum igitur actus intelligentiae, quae est potentia altissima, cuius est ferri in Deum, sit actus nobilissimus, videtur quod hic actus primo beatis competat ut Deum contemplentur.
Obj. 1: For the highest act principally and first applies to the highest state. But the blessed are in the highest state. Since, therefore, the act of the intellect, which is the highest power, and to which it pertains to be borne unto God, is the most noble act, it seems that for the blessed this act first applies to their contemplating God.
QVIII.Q9.A2.arg2Praeterea. Hoc ad imperfectionem viae pertinet quod oportet nos ab inferioribus ad superiora contemplanda conscendere; sed in beatis erit perfectio contraria imperfectioni viae; ergo ipsi e converso per prius altiora contemplabuntur, et sic primo Christi divinitatem quam eius humanitatem.
Obj. 2: This pertains to the imperfection of the way: that it is necessary that we should ascend from lower things to contemplating higher ones. But in the blessed there shall be perfection contrary to the imperfection of the way. Therefore, conversely they first shall contemplate higher things, and thus first the divinity of Christ before his humanity.
QVIII.Q9.A2.arg3Sed contra. Ad extremum non pervenitur nisi per medium; sed medium inter Deum et homines est Christi humanitas, I Timothaei II: mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Iesus; ergo sancti non pervenient ad contemplationem divinitatis Christi, nisi prius contemplando humanitatem eius.
On the contrary: The extreme is only reached through a medium. But the medium between God and men is the humanity of Christ, as 1 Timothy 2:5 says: the mediator of God and men the man Christ Jesus. Therefore, the saints will not reach to the contemplation of the divinity of Christ except by first contemplating his humanity.
QVIII.Q9.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod unusquisque prius considerat id quod est ratio alicuius quam id cuius est ratio, sicut artifex prius considerat regulam operis quam secundum regulam operetur; beati autem adeo sunt Deo coniuncti ut ipse sit eis ratio cuiuslibet cognitionis et operis: aliter enim actus beatitudinis per alias cognitiones et operationes sanctorum impediretur; et ideo id ad quod primo beati attendunt est ipse Deus, et eum habent medium cuiuslibet cognitionis et regulam cuiuslibet operationis. Et sic per prius contemplantur Christi divinitatem quam eius humanitatem.
I answer that each one first considers the reason of a thing before that of which it is the reason, just as an artist first considers a rule of work before he works according to the rule. Yet the blessed are conjoined to God to such an extent that he is for them the reason of every knowing and activity: for otherwise the act of beatitude would be impeded through other acts of knowing and activities of the saints. And for this reason, that unto which the blessed first attend is God himself, and they have him as the medium of every knowing and as the rule of every work. And thus, they first contemplate the divinity of Christ before his humanity.
QVIII.Q9.A2.coIn utraque tamen contemplanda delectationem inveniunt. Unde dicitur Iohannis X: ingredientur, scilicet beati, ad contemplandam divinitatem Christi, et egredientur ad contemplandam eius humanitatem, et utrobique pascua invenient, id est delectationem, ut exponitur in libro De spiritu et anima.
In contemplating both, nevertheless, they find delight. Hence it is said on John 10:9: they, namely, the blessed, shall go in to contemplate the divinity of Christ, and shall go out to contemplate his humanity, and in both they shall find pastures, that is, delight, as it is expounded in the book On the Spirit and the Soul.1
QVIII.Q9.A2Primas duas ergo rationes concedimus.
Reply Obj. 1–2: Therefore, we concede the first two arguments.
QVIII.Q9.A2.ad1Ad illud vero quod in contrarium obicitur, dicendum quod ratio illa procedit quantum ad statum viae, in qua nondum sumus Deo perfecte coniuncti, sed oportet nos ad eum per Christum accedere; sed cum iam Deo in beatitudine coniuncti erimus, per prius intendemus Christi divinitati quam humanitati.
Reply Sed Contra: Whereas to the contrary objection, it must be said that that argument proceeds as regards the state of the way, in which we are not yet perfectly conjoined to God, but it is necessary for us to approach him through Christ. But when we will be conjoined to God already in beatitude, we will attend to the divinity of Christ before his humanity.
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