I answer that it must be held without a doubt that the divine essence in the fatherland is seen immediately by the glorified intellect.

I answer that the intellect understands something in two ways, namely, primarily and consequently. Consequently, indeed, it can understand many things simultaneously inasmuch as they are related to one primary intelligible thing. And this happens in two ways. One way is from the unity of that which is understood, as when many intelligible things are understood by means of one species. For a divine intellect sees all things simultaneously through its own one essence, and in like manner a created intellect seeing the divine essence can see all things simultaneously which it sees through the divine essence. Another way is from the unity of that which is understood, namely, when many things are understood as one: for then that one is first understood and those many are understood consequently in it, just as when the intellect understands a line, it understands simultaneously the parts of the line, as is said in the third book of On the Soul.¹ And similarly, when it understands a proposition, it understands simultaneously the predicate and the subject. And when it understands the likeness and difference of any things, it simultaneously understands those things of which it is the likeness or difference. But it is impossible for the intellect to understand simultaneously many intelligible things first and principally.

I answer that an angel without a doubt knows singulars.

I answer that knowledge can be understood in four ways: first, as the knowing nature itself; second, as the knowing power; third, as the knowing habit; fourth, as the very act of knowing. So, too, the name “sense” sometimes names the sensitive nature, namely, as it is a principle of this difference which is sensible,¹ whereas sometimes it names the very power, and sometimes the act. By speaking of knowledge, therefore, understood in the first way, it is agreed that it is not in the substance of the mind as an accident in a subject, but essentially and substantially, just as it is said that rational is in living and living in being. Yet if we speak of “knowledge” understood in the other three modes, thus it can be considered in two ways. It can be considered either with respect to the knower, and thus it is in the knower as an accident in a subject, and thus it does not exceed the subject, because it is never found to be in anything except the mind. Or it can be considered with respect to the knowable, and in this case it does not exist within, but it relates to another. Yet this relation to another does not have the character of an accident from this: that it is related to another, but only from this: that it exists within. Hence only relation with respect to the character of its genus remains with substance in the divine persons, nor, nevertheless, is it there as an accident. And thus, knowledge according to this consideration is not in the soul as in a subject, and according to this comparison it exceeds the mind inasmuch as other things are known by the mind through the knowledge. According to this consideration there is also posited an image of the Trinity, because even the divine persons are distinguished according as they relate to each another. Thus there is also a certain equality of knowledge to mind, inasmuch as it extends itself to all things to which the mind can extend itself.

I answer that immeasurability does not exclude plurality except insofar as it destroys determination, which is the principle of plurality. Yet as was said before,¹ determination is twofold, namely, of limitation and of distinction. Yet in divine things, determination of limitation in no way occurs, yet determination of distinction occurs there in two ways: one way is according to how it is distinguished through its essence from all created things as not limited from limited; another way is according to how a person is distinguished from another person through relation of origin, which distinction, indeed, is not on account of some limitation, but by reason of the opposition which is in relation. Hence the divine immeasurability does not exclude this immensity, and consequently neither plurality of persons.

I answer that something is receptive of substantial or accidental form from having some potentiality, since having some potency means that it underlies act, which is called form. Yet concerning angels diverse men think diverse things: for certain men say that they are composed of matter and form; others say they are composed of being and what is, as Boethius says.¹ Either way, it is necessary to posit potentiality in an angel. Concerning the first way this is clear; similarly, it can be made clear concerning the second, because everything which is not its own being requires it to have being received from another which is the cause of being for itself. And thus, considered in itself it is in potency in respect of that being which it receives from another. And in this way, at least, it is necessary to posit potentiality in an angel, because an angel is not its own being, for this belongs to God alone. And thus, it remains that an angel can be the subject of accidental form.

I answer that under those species without a doubt there is contained the whole body of Christ and all its quantity.

I answer that in no way is the body of Christ and the substance of bread there in the same instant, nor is it possible to assign the last instant in which there is bread there, but the last time, which is continued unto that instant in which the body of Christ is first there.

I answer that to divine power, by reason of its immensurability, must be attributed whatever does not suggest a defect. Nevertheless, there are some things which created nature does not allow to happen on account of some repugnance implied by an implicit contradiction. And concerning such things certain men often say that God can do them,¹ even though they cannot be done.

I answer that the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible, although passible. Yet the first and principal cause of incorruption is divine justice, which will conserve the bodies of the damned in perpetual punishments. But the secondary, and as it were contributory, cause will be the resting of the motion of heaven, by which no action or passion pertaining to the changing of nature will be able to be in bodies. Hence also the bodies of the damned will not suffer from fire by the passion of nature, by which the nature of the human body would be changed from its nature, but will suffer by the passion of the soul, just as an organ of sense suffers by receiving a likeness of a sensible quality from a sensible thing.

I answer that bodily deformity can be from two sources. One way is from the defect of some member, and such deformity, as it is commonly said, will not be in the bodies of the damned, because all will rise incorrupt (1 Cor 15:52),¹ that is, without the defect of any member, so that thus the whole body may be punished in the reprobate and rewarded in the elect. Another way there can be deformity or defect of the body is from the undue proportion of the parts, just as fever happens from the undue proportion of the humors, and as bulging² happens from a superabundance of flesh in some part. There is a double opinion about such deformity or defect. For certain men,³ speaking about the damnation of the reprobate, say they will not lack such deformities, so that nothing of evil would be lacking for them. Whereas others,⁴ speaking about the power of the one rousing them, who, just as he founded nature in the work of creation, so he will repair nature in the resurrection, say that the author of nature will remove all the defects which have happened from the vice of nature, such as fever and things of this sort. (But defects which have proceeded from a depraved will shall remain in the reprobate, as stains also are charges of sins). Yet which of these is the more true, Augustine in the Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity has left in doubt, saying that there ought to be no question concerning the beauty of those whose damnation is certain.⁵

I answer that about this Augustine in the twentieth book of On the City of God posits diverse opinions, saying thus: in the punishments of the wicked both the inextinguishable fire and the most lively worm have been explained differently by different men. Some surely have referred both to the mind, others both to the body, others fire to the body and worm to the mind by a figure of speech, which seems to be the more credible.¹ Hence, following Augustine, we say that that worm will be spiritual, so that the interior remorse of conscience itself corroding the soul might be called a worm, and similarly the weeping will be spiritual, so that the pain itself might be called weeping. Nevertheless, in some way it can be called bodily weeping even without the emission of tears, so that not only the pain of the soul might be called weeping, but the disposition by which the body is disposed by the soul in pain.

I answer that Sacred Scripture has been handed over from heaven so that through it the truth necessary for salvation might be manifested to us. Yet the manifestation or expression of some truth can happen in two ways: by things and by words, namely, inasmuch as words signify things and one thing can be a figure of another. Yet the author of Scripture, namely, the Holy Spirit, is not only the author of words but also of things. Hence not only can he accommodate words to signify something, but also he can arrange things to be the figure of something else. And according to this, truth is manifested in two ways in Sacred Scripture: one way is how things are signified through words, and in this consists the literal sense; another way is how things are figures of other things, and the spiritual sense consists in this. And thus, many senses apply to Sacred Scripture.

I answer that the distinction of these four senses should be understood in this way. For as has been said, Sacred Scripture manifests the truth which it hands over in a twofold way: through words and through the figures of things.¹ Yet the manifestation through words makes the historical or literal sense, hence the whole of that pertains to the literal sense which can be understood rightly from the signification itself of the words. But the spiritual sense, as has been said,² consists in that certain things are expressed through the figure of other things. And because visible things tend to be figures of invisible, as Dionysius says,³ hence it is that the sense which is understood from figures is called spiritual.

I answer that the spiritual senses of Sacred Scripture are understood from this: that the things running their course signify something else, which is understood through a spiritual sense. Yet to order things in their course that from them such a signification can be understood belongs to him alone who by his providence governs things, who alone is God. For just as man can present some voices or some made-up likenesses to signify something, so God presents the course itself of things subject to his providence to signify something. Yet to signify something through words or through made-up likenesses ordered only to signifying does not constitute anything but a literal sense, as is clear from what has been said.¹ Hence in no human science discovered by human industry, properly speaking, can there be found any sense but the literal, but only in that Scripture of which the Holy Spirit is author, whereas man is only an instrument, according to that line of the Psalmist: my tongue the reed-pen of a scribe (Ps 45:1 [44:2]).

I answer that judgment concerning each matter must be done with regard to the end to which it is ordered.¹ For labor of the hands is found to be useful for three things.

I answer that the truth of this question appears from that said in the question above.¹ For it was said above that only those are obligated to observe this precept, namely, concerning work of the hands, who do not have another source whereby they can live licitly. And for this reason, those who exercise spiritual works, and can live licitly otherwise than from labor of the hands, are not held to labor with their hands.