I answer that every action of every thing is through the form of that thing’s nature. For although some accidental forms are the principles of the actions of some things, it is necessary for actions of this sort to be reduced, as to a first principle, to the specific form of that acting thing, just as the action of the heat of fire is reduced, as to a first principle, to its substantial form, which is also the principle of all proper accidents of fire. And thus, it is necessary that it relate differently to actions of things having a simple nature and to actions of those having a composite nature: for if there is something having a simple nature, its every act will be according to the property and mode of its nature, which does not happen if it has a composite nature. For every action of fire is according to the property of the nature of fire, yet in a fire-heated knife there is a certain action not pertaining to the property of fire, namely, incision.

I answer that, to address this question, amongst the ancients there were two most probable opinions concerning place. One¹ was that place is a certain space or dimensions existing through themselves. And indeed, if this opinion were true, place would be due to body from the very fact that a body is a thing having dimensions, since it is necessary that these occupy some dimensions. But this opinion concerning place was reproved by the Philosopher in book four of the Physics.² Hence the other opinion is his, that place is the surface of a containing body. This is not, indeed, inasmuch as it is of the body which immediately contains it; otherwise, it would follow that a resting body would not always be in the same place: for example, if a man were standing in a river through whose flow the diverse surfaces of the water around him were renewed continuously.³ Rather, the surface of the body immediately containing it is a place in relation to the first container. Hence the same place is understood according to the same site to the first container,⁴ and on account of this, place is immobile, according to the Philosopher.⁵

I answer that from that damnation which the human race has incurred on account of the sin of the first parent, no one can be freed unless through Christ, who alone is found immune from that damnation, namely, such that he should be incorporated to him as a member to its head.

I answer that spiritual kinship impedes contracting matrimony and dissolves that already contracted.¹ Yet it is clear that, because the Christian man baptized the Jewish woman, spiritual kinship is contracted between them because she is made his spiritual daughter. Hence subsequent matrimony is null, even if he contracts it expressly through words of the present, and even if carnal union should follow.

I answer that here two questions are introduced, one principal and another related one which it is necessary to determine first, namely, whether the Blessed Virgin was conceived with original sin.

I answer that¹ a cleric, from the very fact that he is a cleric, and especially one constituted in sacred orders, is held to say the canonical hours: for such men seem specially charged unto divine praise, according to that saying of Isaiah: everyone who invokes my name, I have created him unto my praise (Isa 43:7). But inasmuch as he is a cleric beneficed in this church, he is held to say the office according to the manner of that church. It must be considered, therefore, that sometimes the office of the dead is said in a church as something that ordinarily pertains to the office of that church. An example is when on the day of souls the office for the dead is said in the whole Church, and such as when in any church there is some special custom about this office: for example, that the office of the dead is said ordinarily once a week or however else according to a certain time. A cleric, even one living in the schools, is held to the offices of the dead of this sort if he is beneficed in such a church, and through this he makes satisfaction for the dead whose goods he receives. Whereas sometimes the office of the dead is said in a church extraordinarily, on account of some cause specially emerging, for example, for the prayers of some person or on account of something of this sort. A cleric living in the schools is not held to an office of the dead of this sort.

I answer that someone can be called better in two ways. One way is absolutely, namely, because he is holier, having more charity. In another way, someone is called better in regard to something. Yet sometimes it happens that someone is better absolutely who, nevertheless, is not better in regard to what the benefice gains. For someone else, perhaps, can help the Church more either through counsel of wisdom, or through assistance of power, or because he has served in the Church. Therefore, a bishop is not held always to give to the better man absolutely, but he is held to give to the better man in regard to this. For it cannot be that he prefers one to another unless for some cause. If this cause pertains to the honor of God and the utility of the Church, then in regard to this he is better. Yet if that cause does not pertain to this, there will be the receiving of persons, which is so much the more grave as it is committed in divine matters. Hence the gloss of Augustine on the text: you sit here well (Jas 2:3), says: if we refer this difference of sitting and standing to ecclesiastical honors, it must not be thought to be a light sin in the receiving of persons to have the faith of the Lord of glory. For who would bear that a rich man be elected to a see of honor of the Church, while a holier and more learned pauper is scorned?¹

I answer that, as the Philosopher teaches in the fifth book of the Ethics,¹ the mean of justice is understood not only in reference to us, as in the other virtues, but also according to the thing, namely, because in other virtues the diverse conditions of persons are attended to, according to which the mean is diversified, such as about food which is much for one and little or moderate for another.² But in justice the mean is not varied according to the diverse conditions of the person, but it is attended to only as to the quantity of the thing: for he who buys something ought to pay as much as he is able, whether he buys from a pauper or from a rich man. Yet to render what is due is an act of justice, and thus in this case rendering what is due to someone does not depend on whether he be rich or poor.

I answer that this requires a double distinction.

I answer that in a delay of a short time there does not seem to be great danger. Hence, if an executor defers alms for a short time so that, with the possessions of the deceased better sold, he can give more alms, he does this laudably. Whereas if, conversely, he defers distributing alms for a long time such that he gives not many more alms, this does not seem to be without fault because perhaps the deceased would have been liberated from purgatory, where the remedy of suffrages was most necessary for him. Yet this requires the examination of a prudent executor, namely, so that, having considered the interval of time and the condition of the person who is believed to be liberated more quickly or slowly, and also the quantity of the increase of alms, he might do what seems expedient for the deceased.

I answer that sin which is derived originally from the transgression of the first parents unto all their descendants is not destroyed except through the grace of Christ, who from sin has damned sin in the flesh (Rom 8:3). But this is accomplished in a certain order: for original sin is removed first in the state of the present life through the sacraments of the grace of Christ in regard to the pollution of the soul, namely, so that it is not imputed to man unto fault. Nevertheless, it remains meanwhile in regard to the corruption of the spark of desire in the flesh. Hence the Apostle said: I myself serve the law of God by my mind, yet the law of sin by my flesh (Rom 7:25), namely, inasmuch as flesh desires against spirit (Gal 5:17). Hence a man baptized according to the mind lives in newness of spirit (Rom 7:6), but according to the flesh still retains the oldness of Adam.¹ And for this reason, just as he produces sons in Christ without sin through spiritual generation, namely, by which he generates others through the Gospel, so also according to carnal generation he produces sons in the oldness of Adam with original sin.

I answer that sin principally consists in willing, as Augustine says.¹ Yet as regards willing, what is principally intended is prior. And for this reason, in sins where the enjoyment of a mutable good is principally intended, such as lust, avarice, and similar things, turning towards is naturally prior to aversion, which is not intended principally, but it follows from the inordinate turning together with the intention. Yet in sins in which aversion from God is intended directly, such as infidelity, despair, and others of this sort, aversion from the immutable good is prior, and afterwards there is turning towards a mutable good, as is clear in those who, despairing, hand over themselves to impurity (Eph 4:19).

I answer that, as Ambrose says in a certain sermon, not only in false words, but also in feigned works there is lying.¹ Yet the sin of lying consists principally in the intention of deceiving. Hence he who speaks a falsehood which he thinks to be true does not lie, yet he is more guilty of lying who speaks a truth which he thinks to be false, as made clear by Augustine in the book On Lying.² Hence, since the same intention of deceiving is in him who lies by word and in him who lies by deed, both equally sin. For word and deed are used as instruments of deceiving. Hence it does not matter to the sin of lying whether someone lies by word or by writing or by nod or by whatever deed, just as it does not matter to the sin of homicide whether someone kills a man by sword or by axe.