Quodlibet V
Disputed Questions
j/k navigate paragraphs
· n/p next/prev article
· e expand all
· c collapse all
Quodlibet V
Quodlibetal Questions V
QVDe Deo et angelis et hominibus
On God, Angels, and Men
De Deo
On God
Quantum ad naturam divinam
Regarding his divine nature
QVQ. 1On the knowledge of GodDe scientia Dei
Quaesitum est de Deo et angelis et hominibus.
There were questions concerning God,1 angels,2 and men.3
QV.Q1De Deo quaesitum est et quantum ad naturam divinam et quantum ad naturam assumptam.
Concerning God, there were questions regarding both the divine nature and the assumed nature.
QV.Q1Quantum ad naturam divinam quaesitum est et de scientia et de potentia Dei.
Regarding the divine nature, there were questions concerning his knowledge1 and his power.2
QV.Q1Circa scientiam Dei quaesita sunt duo:
About the knowledge of God there were two questions:
QV.Q1primo, utrum Deus sciat primum instans in quo potuit creare mundum;
first, whether God knows the first instant in which he could have created the world;
QV.Q1secundo, utrum praesciti a Deo possint demereri.
second, whether those foreknown by God can merit punishment.
QV.Q1A. 1Whether God knows the first instant in which he could have created the worldUtrum Deus sciat primum instans in quo potuit creare mundum
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sciat primum instans in quo potuit mundum creare.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that God knows the first instant in which he could have created the world.
QV.Q1.A1.arg1Deus enim potuit creare mundum ante quam creaverit; non autem potuit creare ipsum in infinitum ante, quia sic esset ei coaeternus; ergo est dare aliquod instans in quo primo potuit creare mundum; sed Deus sua scientia totum comprehendit; ergo Deus scit primum instans in quo potuit creare mundum.
Obj. 1: For God could have created the world before he created it; yet he could not have created it infinitely before, because thus it would be coeternal with him. Therefore, there must be some instant in which he could have first created the world. But God knows everything. Therefore, God knows the first instant in which he could have created the world.
QV.Q1.A1.arg2Sed contra. Deus nihil scit quod eius omnipotentiae praeiudicet; praeiudicaret autem eius omnipotentiae si esset aliquod instans in quo primo potuit creare mundum, quia sic eius potentia ad illud instans limitaretur; ergo Deus nescit primum instans in quo potuit creare mundum.
On the contrary: God knows nothing which prejudices his omnipotence. Yet it would prejudice his omnipotence if there were some instant in which first he could have created the world, because thus his power would be limited to that instant. Therefore, God does not know the first instant in which he could have created the world.
QV.Q1.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod dupliciter dicitur aliquid fieri in aliqua mensura loci vel temporis. Uno modo, praesupposita ipsa mensura; et sic particulares effectus producuntur a Deo vel ab aliis agentibus in loco vel tempore. Alio modo, ut simul cum eo quod fit producatur mensura loci vel temporis; et hoc modo mundus a Deo in esse producitur, non quidem quasi in aliquo loco vel tempore praeexistente, sed quia simul cum mundo et locus et tempus producitur.
I answer that something is said to be made in some measure of place or of time in two ways. One way is with the measure itself presupposed; and thus, particular effects are produced by God or by other agents in place or time. Another way is such that the measure of place or of time is simultaneously produced with that which is made. And in this way, the world is produced in being by God, not indeed as though in some preexisting place or time, but because both place and time are produced simultaneously with the world.
QV.Q1.A1.coUnde aliter est intelligendum cum dicitur quod Deus potuit facere aliquem particularem effectum, puta equum vel hominem, ante quam fecerit vel etiam alibi quam fecerit, et aliter cum hoc de mundo dicitur. Nam cum de homine vel equo hoc dicitur, significatur aliquod tempus vel locus aliquis esse in quo homo a Deo fieri potuerit, sed cum hoc de mundo dicitur, non significatur quod sit aliquod tempus ante mundum nec aliquis locus extra ipsum, sed significatur quod Deus potuit mensuram loci et temporis mundi facere maiorem.
Hence it must be understood in one way when it is said that God could have made some particular effect, for example a horse or a man, before he made it or even elsewhere than he made it. It must be understood in a different way when this is said concerning the world. For when this is said about a man or a horse, some time or some place is signified in which a man could be made by God. But when this is said about the world, it is not signified that there is some time before the world nor some place outside of it, but it is signified that God could have made a greater measure of the place or of the time of the world.
QV.Q1.A1Si igitur quaeratur utrum potuerit mundum facere in infinitum ante quam fecerit, si hoc quidem referatur ad potentiam facientis, manifestum est quod in infinitum ante facere potuit: Dei enim potentia est aeterna, cui nihil accrescere potuit ut inciperet quandoque facere mundum cum prius non potuerit. Si vero referatur ad ipsum mundum, sic non potuit fieri ut esset semper, supposita Catholicae fidei veritate, quae habet mundum quandoque non fuisse: sicut enim Deus non potest facere ut quod fuit non fuerit, ut infra dicetur, ita non potest facere ut quod non fuit quandoque, nunquam non fuerit. Secundum hunc ergo sensum dicitur quod Deus non potuit mundum facere in infinitum antequam faceret.
If, therefore, it is asked whether he could have made the world infinitely before he made it, if this indeed refers to the power of making, it is clear that he could have made it infinitely before: for the power of God is eternal, to which nothing could be added such that at some time he could begin to make the world when before he could not have made it. Whereas, if it refers to the world itself, it could not be made such that it would always be, with the truth of the Catholic faith supposed, which holds that at some time the world was not: for just as God cannot make it that something which was should not have been, as will be said below,1 so he cannot make it that something which was not at some time never should have been. According to this understanding, therefore, it is said that God could not make the world infinitely before he made it.
QV.Q1.A1Sed adhuc intelligendum est quod infinitum dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, in actu; et sic dicitur secundum modum praedictum quod Deus non potuit facere mundum in infinitum ante quam fecerit, id est quod duratio mundi in infinitum ante praecesserit. Alio modo dicitur infinitum secundum potentiam; et sic potuit Deus in infinitum mundum facere ante quam fecerit, quia quantumcumque ante detur eum fecisse, adhuc potuit eum prius facere.
But still, it must be understood that infinite is understood in two ways. One way is in act, and thus it is said according to the aforesaid manner that God could not have made the world infinitely before he made it: that is, for the duration of the world to have preceded infinitely before. Another way is when infinite is said according to potency, and thus God could have made the world infinitely before he made it, because however much before it is given that he made it, he could have made it still prior.
QV.Q1.A1Et sic non est dare primum instans in quo Deus potuit facere mundum, est autem dare primum instans in quo fecerit, sicut etiam est dare suppremum ubi usque quo Deus mundum fecerit, non tamen est dare suppremum ultra quod facere non potuerit.
And thus, there is not necessarily a first instant in which God could have made the world, yet there is necessarily a first instant in which he made it, just as also there is necessarily a supreme up-to-where where God made the world, nevertheless there is not necessarily a supreme beyond which he could not have made it.
QV.Q1.A1Et sic patet quod quaestio cessat.
Reply Obj. 1: And thus, it is clear that the question ceases.
QV.Q1.A1.ad1A. 2Whether those foreknown by God can merit punishmentUtrum praesciti a Deo possint demereri
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praesciti a Deo non possint demereri.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that those foreknown by God cannot merit punishment.
QV.Q1.A2.arg1Sicut enim aliqui sunt electi a Deo ab aeterno ad gratiam habendam, ita etiam aliqui sunt praesciti a Deo ad hoc quod suae naturae relinquantur; sed naturalibus non meremur neque demeremur; ergo praesciti a Deo non demerentur.
Obj. 1: For just as some men are chosen by God from eternity to have grace, so also some men are foreknown by God to be abandoned to their nature. But by natural things we do not merit reward nor punishment.1 Therefore, those foreknown by God cannot merit punishment.
QV.Q1.A2.arg2Sed contra. Nullus damnatur a Deo nisi propter demeritum, cum Deus sit iudex iustus; sed praesciti damnantur a Deo; ergo demerentur.
On the contrary: No one is damned by God unless on account of meriting punishment since God is a just judge. But those foreknown are damned by God. Therefore, they merit punishment.
QV.Q1.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod scientia Dei comparatur ad res creatas sicut ars ad artificiata; unde, sicut ars non solum est cognoscitiva, sed factiva eorum quae secundum artem fiunt, peccatorum vero quibus ab artis regulis deviatur est cognoscitiva tantum, ita etiam scientia Dei est factiva et cognoscitiva omnium bonorum, malorum vero sive peccatorum, quae sunt deviationes quaedam ab aeterna lege ipsius, scientia Dei est cognoscitiva, non autem causativa. Et sic patet quod boni, qui per gratiam iustificantur, non solum sunt a Deo ab aeterno praecogniti, sed etiam electi ad gratiam habendam, peccatores autem, qui non iustificantur per gratiam, non sunt electi vel praeordinati a Deo ad culpam, sed solum praesciti quod non sint gratiam habituri, sed suae naturae sint relinquendi.
I answer that the knowledge of God is compared to created things just as art to artificial things.1 Hence, just as art not only knows, but makes those things which are done according to art, whereas it only knows those transgressions which deviate from the rules of art, so also the knowledge of God makes and knows all good things, whereas it only knows, and does not cause, those evil things or transgressions which deviate from his eternal law. And thus, it is clear that good men, who are justified through grace, not only are foreknown by God from eternity, but also are chosen to have grace. Yet sinners, who are not justified through grace, are not chosen or preordained by God unto fault, but only foreknown that they are not going to have grace, and are to be left to their nature.
QV.Q1.A2.coQuia vero omne agens potest in id quod est infra se, non autem in id quod est supra se, natura sibi relicta non potest in actum meritorium, qui est supra facultatem naturae, potest autem in actum peccati, qui est demeritorius, sicut in aliquid infra naturam humanam existens: homo enim peccando decidit a dignitate suae naturae. Et sic patet quod praesciti possunt demereri.
Whereas, because every agent is able in that which is below himself, yet not in that which is above himself, nature left to itself is not capable of a meritorious act, which is above the ability of nature, yet it is capable of an act of sin, which merits punishment, as something existing below human nature: for man by sinning falls from the dignity of his nature.1 And thus, it is clear that those foreknown can merit punishment.
QV.Q1.A2Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod dicitur quod naturalibus non meremur neque demeremur, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo sic quod ipsa naturalia non sint merita vel demerita; et sic verum est, quia merita sunt supra naturam et demerita sunt contra naturam. Alio modo potest intelligi sic quod naturalia non sint principia merendi vel demerendi; et sic falsum est: naturalia enim adiuta per gratiam sunt principia merendi, sibi autem relicta possunt esse principia demerendi, ut dictum est.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that what is said: that by natural things we merit neither reward nor punishment, can be understood in two ways. One way is such that natural things themselves do not merit reward nor punishment; and thus it is true, because things that merit reward are above nature and things that merit punishment are against nature. It can be understood another way such that natural things are not the principles of meriting reward or punishment; and thus it is false: for natural things aided through grace are principles of meriting reward, yet left to themselves they can be principles of meriting punishment, as has been said.1
QV.Q1.A2.ad1Q. 2On the power of GodDe potentia Dei
Deinde circa potentiam Dei quaesita sunt duo:
Then there were two questions about the power of God:
QV.Q2primo, utrum Deus possit virginem corruptam reparare;
first, whether God can repair a corrupted virgin;
QV.Q2secundo, utrum Deus possit peccare, si vult.
second, whether God can sin, if he wills.
QV.Q2A. 1Whether God can repair a corrupted virginUtrum Deus possit virginem corruptam reparare
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus possit virginem reparare.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that God can repair a virgin.
QV.Q2.A1.arg1Ad omnipotentiam enim Dei pertinet quod non sit impossibile apud eum omne verbum, ut dicitur Lucae I; sed hoc est quoddam verbum, virginem reparare post lapsum; ergo Deus potest virginem reparare post lapsum.
Obj. 1: For to the omnipotence of God it pertains that every word should not be impossible before him (Luke 1:37). But this is a certain word: to repair a virgin after a lapse. Therefore, God can repair a virgin after a lapse.
QV.Q2.A1.arg2Sed contra est quod Ieronimus dicit: cum Deus cetera possit, non potest reparare virginem post ruinam; et habetur in Decretis, XXXII, q. V.
On the contrary: Jerome says: although God otherwise is able, he is not able to repair a virgin after ruin;1 and this is contained in the Decretum (C. 32, q. 5).2
QV.Q2.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod in virginitate duo possumus considerare. Quorum unum est ipsa integritas mentis et corporis; et sic Deus virginem potest reparare post ruinam: potest enim et mentem reintegrare per gratiam et corpus consolidate per miraculum. Aliud autem est causa integritatis praedictae, quia scilicet mulier virgo non fuit cognita <a> viro; et quantum ad hoc, Deus non potest virginem post ruinam reparare; non enim potest facere ut ea quae iam est cognita a viro non fuerit cognita, sicut nec de aliquo quod factum est, potest facere quod factum non fuerit. Potentia enim Dei se extendit ad totum ens, unde solum id a Dei potentia excluditur quod repugnat rationi entis; et hoc est simul esse et non esse, et eiusdem rationis est quod fuit non fuisse. Unde Augustinus dicit XXVI Contra Faustum: quisque dicit: si omnipotens est Deus, faciat ut ea quae facta sunt, facta non fuerint, non videt se hoc dicere: . . . faciat ut ea quae vera sunt, eo ipso quo vera sunt, falsa sint.
I answer that in virginity we can consider two things. One is the integrity itself of mind and body; and thus, God can repair a virgin after ruin: for he can both reintegrate the mind through grace and consolidate the body through a miracle. Yet the cause of the aforesaid integrity is another thing, namely, because a virgin woman has not been known by a man. Regarding this, God cannot repair a virgin after ruin, for he cannot make it that she who already has been known by a man was not known, just as neither concerning anything done can he make it that it was not done. For the power of God extends itself unto the whole of being. Hence there is excluded from the power of God only that which is repugnant to the character of being: and this is to be and not to be simultaneously. And that something which was and was not, is of this same character. Hence Augustine says in the twenty-sixth book of Against Faustus: someone says: if God is omnipotent, let him make it that those things which have been done, should not have been done, and he does not see that he says this: . . . let him make it that those things which are true, by this very thing by which they are true, should be false.1
QV.Q2.A1.coAd primum ergo dicendum quod, cum verbum sit conceptus mentis, nihil quod contradictionem implicat verbum dici potest, quia non cadit in conceptu mentis, ut probatur in IV Metaphysicae.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that since a word is a concept of the mind, nothing which involves a contradiction can be called a word because it does not fall in a concept of the mind,1 as is proven in the fourth book of the Metaphysics.2
QV.Q2.A1.ad1A. 2Whether God can sin, if he willsUtrum Deus possit peccare, si vult
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod haec sit falsa: Deus potest peccare, si vult.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that this is false: God can sin, if he wills.
QV.Q2.A2.arg1De quocumque enim possum dicere quod homo potest facere illud si vult, potest etiam dici simpliciter quod homo potest facere illud; si igitur haec propositio est vera: Deus potest peccare, si vult, sequitur quod haec sit vera: Deus potest peccare; sed hoc est erroneum; ergo et primum.
Obj. 1: For about anything that I can say a man can do if he wills, it can also be said absolutely that a man can do that thing. If, therefore, this proposition is true: God can sin, if he wills, it follows that this is true: God can sin. But this is erroneous; therefore, the first is also erroneous.
QV.Q2.A2.arg2Sed contra. Quicumque vult peccare, peccat; sed sequitur: si Deus peccat, potest peccare; ergo sequitur: si vult, potest peccare.
On the contrary: Whoever wills to sin, sins. But it follows: if God sins, he can sin. Therefore, it follows: if he wills, he can sin.
QV.Q2.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod haec coniunctio “si” ordinem quemdam importat. Potest autem in proposito duplicem ordinem importare.
I answer that this conjunction “if” implies a certain order. And for the question at hand, it can imply a twofold order.
QV.Q2.A2.coUno quidem modo ordinem causae sive principii; et hoc modo propositio falsa est. Voluntas enim Dei est principium et causa respectu creaturarum, non autem respectu eorum quae pertinent ad divinam naturam; unde non dicimus quod Pater genuerit Filium voluntate, sed naturaliter, ut patet per Hilarium in libro De synodis. Potentia autem Dei ad ipsam naturam divinam pertinet; unde hoc ipsum quod est posse peccare, non est subiectum divinae voluntati, alioquin voluntas Dei esset principium immutationis divinae naturae, quod est impossibile.
In one way, indeed, it implies an order of cause or of principle; and in this way, the proposition is false. For the will of God is principle and cause in regard to creatures, yet not in regard to those things which pertain to the divine nature. Hence we do not say that the Father generated the Son by will, but naturally, as is clear through Hilary in the book On Synods.1 Yet the power of God pertains to the divine nature itself. Hence the very ability to sin is not subject to the divine will. Otherwise, the will of God would be the principle of a change of the divine nature, which is impossible.
QV.Q2.A2Alio modo potest importare ordinem consequentiae; et sic haec locutio est vera: si Deus vult peccare, potest peccare. Sequitur enim sine conditione, si argumentamur ex impossibili posito: Deus vult peccare, ergo potest peccare; omnia enim quae vult, potest, sed non e converso.
In another way, it can imply an order of consequence; and thus this speech is true: if God wills to sin, he can sin. For it follows without condition if we argue from an impossible thing posited: God wills to sin, therefore he can sin. For all things which he wills, he can do, but not conversely.
QV.Q2.A2Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum dicitur: si homo vult currere, potest currere, antecedens est possibile, et ideo consequens est simpliciter possibile; <sed> cum dicitur sic: si Deus vult peccare, potest peccare, antecedens est impossibile, unde nihil prohibet conditionalem esse veram, consequente existente impossibili.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that, when it is said: if a man wills to run, he can run, the antecedent is possible, and for this reason, the consequent is possible absolutely. But when it is said thus: if God wills to sin, he can sin, the antecedent is impossible, hence nothing prohibits that the conditional should be true, with the consequent existing as impossible.
QV.Q2.A2.ad1Regarding the assumed nature
QV.Q2.A2Q. 3Regarding the assumed nature
Quantum ad naturam assumptam
Regarding the assumed nature
QV.Q3Deinde quantum ad naturam assumptam quaesita sunt duo:
Then there were two questions regarding the assumed nature:
QV.Q3primo, utrum totus sanguis quem Christus in sua passione effudit, in resurrectione ad corpus eius redierit;
first, whether all the blood Christ poured out in his Passion returned to his body in the Resurrection;
QV.Q3secundo, in quo Christus nobis magis signum dilectionis exhibuerit, utrum in hoc quod passus est pro nobis vel in hoc quod corpus suum dedit nobis sub sacramento in cibum.
second, whether Christ exhibited a sign of love for us more in that he suffered for us, or in that he gave his body as food for us in the sacrament.
QV.Q3A. 1Whether all the blood which Christ poured out in his Passion returned to his body in the ResurrectionUtrum totus sanguis quem Christus in sua passione effudit, in resurrectione ad corpus eius redierit
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod totus sanguis Christi qui est in passione eius effusus, ad corpus eius in resurrectione redierit.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that all the blood of Christ poured out in his Passion returned to his body in the Resurrection.
QV.Q3.A1.arg1Resurrectio enim nostra conformis erit resurrectioni Christi, secundum illud Philippensium III: reformabit corpus humilitatis nostrae configuratum corpori claritatis suae; sed ad corpus nostrum in resurrectione redibit totum quod fuit de veritate humanae naturae; sanguis autem Christi in passione effusus fuit de veritate humanae naturae, et sacer dicitur secundum illud: quem sacer cruor perunxit fusus agni corpore; ergo videtur quod ille sanguis Christi in passione effusus, in resurrectione ad corpus eius redierit.
Obj. 1: For our resurrection shall be conformed to the Resurrection of Christ, according to Philippians 3:21: he shall re-form the body of our humility configured to the body of his clarity, but to our body there shall return in the resurrection the whole which was truly human nature.1 Yet the blood of Christ poured out in his Passion was truly human nature, and it is called sacred according to that line: whom the sacred blood has anointed, fused to the body of the lamb.2 Therefore, it seems that the blood of Christ poured out in the Passion returned to his body in the Resurrection.
QV.Q3.A1.arg2Praeterea. Verbum Dei nunquam deposuit quod in nostra natura assumpsit, partibus humanae naturae ab invicem in passione separatis; sed Verbum Dei assumpsit in natura nostra non solum corpus, sed etiam sanguinem; ergo sanguis ille nunquam fuit a Verbo depositus; rediit ergo ad ipsum in resurrectione.
Obj. 2: The Word of God never laid aside that which he assumed in our nature, with the parts of human nature separated from one another in the Passion. But the Word of God assumed in our nature not only a body, but also blood. Therefore, that blood never was laid aside by the Word. Therefore, it returned unto him in the Resurrection.
QV.Q3.A1.arg3Sed contra est quod in aliquibus ecclesiis sanguis Christi usque hodie dicitur servari.
On the contrary: In some churches the blood of Christ even unto today is said to be preserved.1
QV.Q3.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod in resurrectione tam Christi quam nostra, totum quod fuit de veritate humanae naturae reparabitur, non autem illa quae de veritate humanae naturae non fuerunt. Et quamvis circa ea quae sunt de veritate humanae naturae sit diversa diversorum opinio, secundum quamlibet opinionem non totus sanguis nutrimentalis, id est qui ex cibis generatur, pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae. Cum ergo Christus ante passionem comederit et biberit, nihil prohibet in eo fuisse aliquem sanguinem nutrimentalem, qui ad veritatem humanae naturae non pertineret et quem non oporteret ad corpus eius in resurrectione redire.
I answer that in the Resurrection, both Christ’s and ours, the whole which was truly human nature will be repaired, yet not those things which were not truly human nature. And although there are diverse opinions of diverse men about those things which are truly human nature,1 according to any opinion it is not the whole nourishing blood, that is, that which is generated out of food, that pertains to true human nature. Therefore, since Christ ate and drank before the Passion, nothing prohibits that in him there was some nourishing blood, which would not pertain to true human nature and which it is not necessary would return to his body in the Resurrection.2
QV.Q3.A1.coSed quia specialiter fit quaestio de sanguine in passione effuso pro redemptione humani generis, de hoc magis dicendum videtur quod totus in resurrectione ad corpus Christi redierit, triplici ratione. Quarum prima accipi potest ex aetate Christi patientis: passus est enim in perfectissima aetate, in qua maxime ea quae in homine inveniuntur, ad veritatem humanae naturae pertinere videntur, tamquam ad maximam perfectionem adducta. Secunda sumitur ex merito passionis: si enim sanctorum martyrum illae partes in quibus passionem pro Christo sustinuerunt quemdam privilegiatum fulgorem in resurrectione habebunt, ut Augustinus dicit XXI De civitate Dei, multo magis sanguis Christi, quem pro salute humani generis effudit, ad gloriosam resurrectionem reparatus est. Tertia ratio potest sumi ex ipsa virtute passionis: sanguis enim ille in passione effusus humanum genus sanctificavit, secundum illud ad Hebraeos, ultimo: Iesus, ut sanctificaret per sanguinem suum populum, extra portam passus est; humanitas autem Christi salutiferam virtutem habuit ex virtute Verbi sibi uniti, ut Damascenus dicit in III libro; unde manifestum est quod sanguis in passione effusus, qui maxime fuit saluber, fuit divinitati unitus, et ideo oportuit quod in resurrectione iungeretur aliis humanitatis partibus.
But because the question is made specially about the blood poured out in the Passion for the redemption of the human race, concerning this it seems that it must rather be said that in the Resurrection the whole returned to the body of Christ for a threefold reason. The first of which can be taken from the age of the suffering Christ: for he suffered at the most perfect age, at which most of all those things which are found in man seem to pertain to true human nature, as led unto maximum perfection. The second is taken from the merit of the Passion: for if those parts of the holy martyrs in which they endured passion for Christ will have a certain privileged brilliance in the resurrection, as Augustine says in the twenty-first book of On the City of God, much more was the blood of Christ, which he poured out for the salvation of the human race, repaired unto a glorious Resurrection.1 The third reason can be taken from the power itself of the Passion: for that blood poured out in the Passion sanctified the human race, according to Hebrews 13:12: Jesus, in order that he would sanctify his people through blood, suffered outside the gate. Yet the humanity of Christ had salvific virtue from the power of the Word united to it, as Damascene says in the third book.2 Hence it is clear that the blood poured out in the Passion, which most of all was salvific, was united to the divinity, and for this reason, it was necessary that in the Resurrection it would be joined to the other parts of his humanity.
QV.Q3.A1Sanguis autem Christi qui in quibusdam ecclesiis ostenditur, dicitur ex quadam imagine Christi percussa miraculose fluxisse, vel etiam alias ex corpore Christi.
Yet the blood of Christ which is shown in certain churches is said miraculously to have flown out of a certain image of Christ struck, or otherwise out of the body of Christ.1
QV.Q3.A1Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.
Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
QV.Q3.A1.ad1A. 2Whether Christ exhibited a sign of love for us more in that he suffered for us or in that he gave his body as food for us in the sacrament
In quo Christus nobis magis signum dilectionis exhibuerit, utrum in hoc quod Christus passus est pro nobis, vel in hoc quod corpus suum dedit nobis sub sacramento in cibo
Whether Christ exhibited a sign of love for us more in that he suffered for us or in that he gave his body as food for us in the sacrament
QV.Q3.A2Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Christus maius dilectionis signum nobis ostendit tradendo corpus suum in cibum quam patiendo pro nobis.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that Christ showed for us a sign of greater love by handing over his body as food than by suffering for us.
QV.Q3.A2.arg1Caritas enim patriae perfectior est quam caritas viae; sed beneficium illud quod nobis Christus contulit corpus suum dans nobis in cibum, magis assimulatur patriae caritati, in qua plene fruemur Deo; passio autem quam pro nobis subiit, magis assimilatur caritati viae, in qua nobis pro Christo imminet patiendum; ergo maius est dilectionis signum quod Christus corpus suum tradidit nobis in cibum quam quod passus est pro nobis.
Obj. 1: For the charity of the fatherland is more perfect than the charity of the journey. But the benefit which Christ conferred upon us by giving his body to us as food is better compared to the charity of the fatherland, in which we will enjoy God fully. Yet the Passion which he underwent for us is better compared to the charity of the journey, during which we are warned that we must suffer for Christ. Therefore, it is a greater sign of love that Christ handed over his body to us as food than that he suffered for us.
QV.Q3.A2.arg2Sed contra est quod dicitur Iohannis XV: maiorem caritatem nemo habet quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis.
On the contrary: It is said in John 15:13: greater charity no one has than that he should lay down his soul for his friends.
QV.Q3.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod illud quod est potissimum in unoquoque genere, est mensura omnium eorum quae sunt illius generis, ut patet per Philosophum in X Metaphysicae; potissimum autem in genere amoris hominum est amor quo quis amat se ipsum; et ideo ex hoc amore necesse est mensuram accipere omnis amoris quo quis alium amat. Unde et in IX Ethicorum Philosophus dicit quod amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum venerunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt ad se ipsum. Pertinet autem ad amorem quo quis amat se ipsum ut velit sibi bonum; unde tanto aliquis alium magis amare probatur, quanto magis bonum quod sibi vult, propter amicum praetermittit, secundum illud Proverbiorum XII: qui negligit damnum propter amicum, iustus est. Vult autem homo sibi triplex bonum particulare, quae sunt anima, corpus et res exteriores; est igitur aliquod signum amoris quod aliquis in rebus exterioribus propter alium detrimentum patiatur; maius autem est amoris signum, si etiam corporis proprii detrimentum patiatur, vel labores vel verbera pro amico sustinendo; maximum autem est dilectionis signum, si etiam animam suam deponere velit, pro amico moriendo.
I answer that that which is most in each genus is the measure of all of those which are of that genus, as is clear through the Philosopher in the tenth book of the Metaphysics.1 Yet the most in the genus of love of men is the love by which anyone loves himself. And thus, from this love it is necessary to receive the measure of every love by which anyone loves another. Hence also, in the ninth book of the Ethics the Philosopher says that amicable things which are unto another have come out of amicable things which are unto one’s own self.2 Yet it pertains to the love by which anyone loves himself that he wills good to himself. Hence someone is proven to love another according to how much he omits on account of a friend the good which he wills for himself, according to Proverbs 12:26: he who disregards financial loss on account of a friend, is just. Yet a man wills for himself a threefold particular good, which are the soul, the body, and exterior things. Therefore, it is a sign of love for someone to suffer detriment in exterior things on account of another; yet it is a greater sign of love if he suffers the detriment even of his own body by sustaining either labors or lashes for a friend; yet it is the greatest sign of love if he wills to lay down even his own soul by dying for a friend.
QV.Q3.A2.coQuod igitur Christus pro nobis patiendo animam suam posuit, maximum fuit dilectionis signum; quod autem corpus suum dedit nobis in cibum sub sacramento, ad nullum detrimentum ipsius pertinet; unde patet quod primum est maius dilectionis signum. Unde et hoc sacramentum est memoriale quoddam et figura passionis Christi; veritas autem praeminet figurae et res memoriali.
Therefore, that Christ laid down his soul by suffering for us was the greatest sign of love. Yet that he gave his body to us as food in the sacrament pertains to no detriment of this. Hence it is clear that the first sign is of greater love. Hence also, this sacrament is a certain memorial and figure of the Passion of Christ. Yet the truth excels the figure, and the thing itself excels the memorial.
QV.Q3.A2Ad primum ergo dicendum quod exhibitio corporis Christi in sacramento habet quidem figuram quandam caritatis qua diligit nos Deus in patria, sed passio eius pertinet ad ipsam Dei dilectionem, nos a perditione ad patriam revocantem; dilectio autem Dei non est maior in patria quam in praesenti.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the presentation of the body of Christ in the sacrament has, indeed, a certain figure of the charity by which God loves us in the fatherland, but his Passion pertains to the very love of God, calling us back from perdition to the fatherland. Yet the love of God is not greater in the fatherland than in the present.
QV.Q3.A2.ad1De angelis
On Angels
Q. 4On angelsDe angelis
Articulus unicus
Article 1
QV.Q4Utrum Lucifer sit subiectum aevi
Whether Lucifer is the subject of the aevum
Deinde circa angelos quaesitum est unum, scilicet utrum Lucifer sit subiectum aevi. Et videtur quod sic.
Then about angels there was asked one thing, namely, whether Lucifer is the subject of the aevum. And it seems that he is.
QV.Q4Sicut enim subiectum temporis est primum temporale simplicissimum, ita subiectum aevi videtur esse simplicissimum aeviternum; hoc autem est Lucifer, qui inter angelos supremus fuit secundum suam naturam creatus; aevum autem non respondet gratiae, sed naturae, alioquin corpora caelestia, quae non sunt susceptiva gratiae, aevo mensurari non possent; cum ergo dona naturalia integra remanserint in demonibus post peccatum, sicut Dionysius dicit IV capitulo De divinis nominibus, videtur quod aevum sit in Lucifero sicut in subiecto.
Obj. 1: For just as the subject of time is the first simplest temporal thing, so the subject of the aevum seems to be the simplest aeviternal thing. Yet this is Lucifer, who amongst the angels was created supreme according to his nature. Yet the aevum does not respond to grace but to nature; otherwise, the celestial bodies, which are not receptive of grace, could not be measured by the aevum. Since, therefore, natural gifts remained intact in demons after sin, as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names,1 it seems that the aevum is in Lucifer just as in a subject.
QV.Q4.arg1Sed contra. Aevum est quaedam aeternitatis participatio; sed angeli beati magis sunt in participatione aeternitatis quam Lucifer, qui est beatitudinis expers; ergo Lucifer non est subiectum aevi, sed magis supremus bonorum angelorum.
On the contrary: The aevum is a certain participation of eternity. But the blessed angels participate more of eternity than Lucifer, who is deprived of beatitude. Therefore, not Lucifer, but rather the supreme of the good angels, is the subject of the aevum.1
QV.Q4.scResponsio. Dicendum quod ex ignorantia linguae Graecae provenit quod communiter apud multos aevum ab aeternitate distinguitur, ac si distingueretur “antropos” ab “homine”; quod enim in Graeco dicitur aevon, in Latino dicitur aeternitas; et sic etiam Dionysius, X capitulo De divinis nominibus, pro eodem utitur aeternitate et aevo. Sed quia nominibus utendum est ut plures, si utrumque distinguamus ab invicem, aevum nihil aliud erit quam aeternitatis participatio, ut scilicet essentialis aeternitas ipsi Deo attribuatur, aevum autem quasi participata aeternitas substantiis spiritualibus, quae sunt supra tempus. Quia vero id quod per essentiam dicitur, semper est mensura ipsius quod dicitur per participationem, potest dici quod prima mensura omnium aeviternorum est ipsa Dei aeternitas, sicut etiam substantia Dei est mensura omnis substantiae, ut dicit Commentator in X Metaphysicae.
I answer that from ignorance of the Greek language it commonly happens among many that the aevum is distinguished from eternity, as if “anthropos” were to be distinguished from “homo” (“man”). For that which is called “aevon” in Greek, in Latin is called “aeternitas” (“eternity”).1 And thus, even Dionysius in the tenth chapter of On the Divine Names uses “eternity“ and “aevum” for the same thing.2 But because names must be used as many,3 if we distinguish one from the other, aevum will be nothing other than the participation of eternity, in order that essential eternity might of course be attributed to God himself, but aevum will be as participated eternity to spiritual substances, which are above time.4 Whereas because that which is said through its essence is always a measure of what is said through participation, it can be said that the first measure of all aeviternal things is the very eternity of God, just as also the substance of God is the measure of every substance, as the Commentator says on the tenth book of the Metaphysics.5
QV.Q4.coSi quis tamen velit accipere mensuram homogeneam, id est eiusdem generis, dicunt quidam quod non est una mensura communis, sed <quod> quodlibet aeviternum habet suum aevum. Sed hi propriam vocem ignorant: sic enim esset verum quod dicunt, si omnia aeviterna essent aequalia: sic enim unum eorum non esset mensura alterius. Hoc autem non est verum, quia in angelis est accipere primum, medium et ultimum, non solum secundum diversas hierarchias et ordines, sed etiam secundum diversos angelos in eodem ordine, ut patet per Dionysium, X capitulo Caelestis hierarchiae. Et quia semper id quod est simplicissimum est mensura in quolibet genere, sicut dicitur in X Metaphysicae, ideo necesse est ut duratio simplicissimi aeviterni sit aevum omnium aeviternorum, et ita simplicissimum aeviternum est subiectum aevi.
Nevertheless, if anyone desires to receive a homogenous measure, that is, of the same genus, certain men say that there is not a common measure, but that every aeviternal thing has its own aevum.1 But these men are ignorant of their own words:2 for what they say would be true if all aeviternal things were equal: for thus one of them would not be the measure of another. Yet this is not true, because in angels there is understood a first, a middle, and a last, not only according to diverse hierarchies and orders, but also according to diverse angels in the same order, as is clear through Dionysius in the tenth chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy.3 And because that which is simplest is always the measure in any genus, just as is said in the tenth book of the Metaphysics,4 for this reason, it is necessary for the duration of the simplest aeviternal thing to be the aevum of all aeviternal things; and thus, the simplest aeviternal thing is the subject of the aevum.
QV.Q4Sed attendendum est quod substantiae spirituales mensurantur aevo non solum quantum ad earum substantiam, sed etiam quantum ad earum propriam operationem. Unde in Libro de causis dicitur quod sunt in momenta aeternitatis secundum substantiam et operationem. Et sic oportet quod ille angelus qui est subiectum aevi, sit simplicissimus non solum quantum ad essentiam, sed etiam quantum ad operationem. Talis autem est supremus bonorum angelorum, cuius operatio maxime est in uno, quod est Deus, unita. Unde supremus bonorum angelorum est subiectum aevi, non autem Lucifer.
But it must be noted that spiritual substances are measured by the aevum not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their own activity. Hence in the Book of Causes it is said that they are in the moment of eternity1 according to substance and activity. And thus, it is necessary for that angel who is the subject of the aevum to be simplest not only as regards his essence, but also as regards his activity. Yet such is the supreme of the good angels, whose activity most of all is united in one, which is God. Hence the supreme of the good angels is the subject of the aevum, and not Lucifer.
QV.Q4Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliqui posuerunt Luciferum non fuisse supremum angelorum, sed, sicut Damascenus dicit, fuit primus eorum qui praeerant ordini terrestri. Si vero concedamus, secundum Gregorium, quod fuerit supremus omnium, tunc dicendum est quod sua operatio aversa est ab uno primo et conversa ad multitudinem inferiorum rerum, quarum primatum appetiit; et secundum hoc daemones decidunt a summa simplicitate aevi. Unde Dionysius dicit, IV capitulo De divinis nominibus, quod daemones dicuntur mali propter hoc quod infirmantur circa operationem naturalem.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that some men have posited that Lucifer was not the supreme of the angels, but, just as Damascene says, was first of those who were over the earthly order.1 Whereas if we should concede, according to Gregory, that he was the supreme of all, then it must be said that his activity was averted from the first one and converted to the multitude of inferior things, whose primacy he desires.2 And according to this, demons are cut off from the highest simplicity of the aevum. Hence Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names that demons are called evil on account of this: that they are weakened about their natural activity.3
QV.Q4.ad1De hominibus
On Men
De ea quae possunt omnibus esse communia
On things which can be common to all
On things pertaining to the nature of man
QV.Q4Q. 5On things pertaining to the nature of manDe his quae pertinent ad naturam
Deinde quaesitum est de hominibus.
Then there were questions concerning men.
QV.Q5Et primo, quantum ad ea quae possunt omnibus esse communia;
And first, regarding what can be common to all;1
QV.Q5secundo, quantum ad ea quae pertinent ad quosdam hominum status.
second, regarding what pertains to certain states of men.1
QV.Q5Circa communia vero quaesitum est quadrupliciter:
About common things there were four questions:
QV.Q5primo quidem de his quae pertinent ad naturam hominis;
first, indeed, concerning what pertains to the nature of man;1
QV.Q5secundo, de his quae pertinent ad sacramenta;
second, concerning what pertains to the sacraments;1
QV.Q5tertio de his quae pertinent ad virtutes;
third, concerning what pertains to the virtues;1
QV.Q5quarto de his quae pertinent ad praecepta.
fourth, concerning what pertains to the precepts.1
QV.Q5Circa primum quaesita sunt tria:
About the first, there were three questions:
QV.Q5primo, quantum ad personas hominum, utrum scilicet, si Adam non peccasset, idem homines salvarentur qui nunc salvantur;
first, regarding the persons of men, namely, whether, if Adam had not sinned, the same men would have been saved who now are saved;
QV.Q5secundo, quantum ad intellectum, utrum scilicet verbum cordis sit species intelligibilis;
second, regarding the intellect, namely, whether a word of the heart is an intelligible species;
QV.Q5tertio, quantum ad voluntatem, utrum scilicet ea quae per timorem fiunt sint voluntaria.
third, regarding the will, namely, whether those things done through fear are voluntary.
QV.Q5A. 1Regarding persons
Quantum ad personas
Regarding persons
QV.Q5.A1Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod, si Adam non peccasset, non idem homines salvarentur qui nunc salvantur.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that, if Adam had not sinned, not the same men would have been saved who now are saved.
QV.Q5.A1.arg1Si enim Adam non peccasset, soli electi nascerentur; ergo non fuissent nati illi peccatores qui finaliter sunt reprobati, et per consequens nec eorum filii, quia, si non sunt idem parentes, consequens est neque filios esse eosdem; multi autem nunc salvantur etiam ex reprobis parentibus nati; ergo, si Adam non peccasset, non idem salvarentur qui nunc salvantur.
Obj. 1: For if Adam had not sinned, only the elect would have been born. Therefore, those sinners would not have been born who are reprobated in the end, and consequently neither their sons, because, if there are not the same parents, the consequence is that neither are there the same sons. Yet many now are saved even born from reprobate parents. Therefore, if Adam had not sinned, not the same men would have been saved who now are saved.
QV.Q5.A1.arg2Praeterea. Secundum Philosophum, semen est superfluum alimenti; sed aliis cibis homo usus fuisset in Paradiso, si non peccasset, ab his quibus nunc utitur; ergo aliud fuisset semen, et per consequens alii filii.
Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher, seed is the surplus of food.1 But man would have used other foods in Paradise if he had not sinned than those which we use now. Therefore, his seed would have been other, and consequently other sons.
QV.Q5.A1.arg3Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, IV Moralium: si parentem primum nulla putredo peccati corrumperet, nequaquam ex se filios gehenne generaret, sed hi qui nunc per Redemptorem salvandi sunt soli ab eo electi nascerentur.
On the contrary: Gregory says in the fourth book of Morals on the Book of Job: if no rot of sin had corrupted the first parent, in no way out of himself would he have generated sons of Gehenna, but only these elect who now through the Redeemer are to be saved would be born from him.1
QV.Q5.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod, cum in generatione hominis sicut et aliorum animalium semen patris sit agens, materia vero a matre ministrata sit sicut patiens ex quo corpus humanum formatur, impossibile est eundem filium nasci sive sit alius pater sive sit alia mater; sicut etiam non est idem numero sigillum sive sit alia cera sive sit aliud corpus sigilli ex cuius impressione cera sigillatur. Et quamvis superfluum alimenti sit semen, secundum Philosophum, diversitas tamen alimentorum non sufficeret ad diversificandum filios qui ex semine nascuntur, quia ex illis cibis non sumitur semen nisi quatenus aliqualiter in substantiam parentum convertuntur.
I answer that, since in the generation of man, just as also of other animals, the seed of the father is the agent, whereas the matter is ministered by the mother, like a patient out of which the human body is formed,1 it is impossible for there to be born the same son whether there is another father or another mother. So too a seal is not the same in number whether there be other wax or another body of the seal out of whose impression the wax is sealed. And although the surplus of food is seed, according to the Philosopher,2 nevertheless the diversity of foods would not suffice to diversify the sons who are born from the seed, because out of those foods there is not taken seed except inasmuch as somehow they are converted into the substance of the parents.
QV.Q5.A1.coDicunt autem quidam sequentes Anselmum quod si homo non peccasset in illa prima temptatione, statim confirmatus fuisset et ipse et omnes qui ab eo nascerentur, ita quod omnes qui nascerentur fuissent electi. Unde, cum nunc multi qui salvantur, ex peccatoribus nascantur, sicut in obiciendo tangebatur, consequens est quod essent alii parentes salvandorum, et per consequens alii filii.
Yet certain men following Anselm say that if man had not sinned in the first temptation, both he himself and all born from him would have been confirmed at once, such that all who would be born would have been elect.1 Hence, since now many who are saved are born from sinners, as touched upon in the objection, the consequence is that there would be other parents of those to be saved, and consequently other sons.
QV.Q5.A1Sed haec positio non videtur esse vera, quia, secundum Augustinum, XIV De civitate Dei, status corporis in homine proportionaliter respondet statui animae: quam diu ergo homo habuit corpus animale, potens mori et non mori, indigens alimentis, tam diu habuit animam potentem peccare et non peccare. Habuit autem corpus animale quam diu fuit in statu generandi, quod etiam fuisset si post illam primam temptationem non peccasset; et ideo possibile fuisset, si primus homo tunc non peccasset, quod etiam ipse vel eius posteri post modum peccarent, ut Hugo de Sancto Victore dicit. Unde ex hoc non sequitur parentum diversitas quod nunc sunt aliqui peccatores, tunc autem non essent.
But this position does not seem to be true because, according to Augustine in the fourteenth book of On the City of God, the state of the body in man responds proportionally to the state of the soul: therefore, as long as man had an animal body, being able to die and not to die, lacking food, so long did he have a soul being able to sin and not to sin.1 Yet he had an animal body as long as he was in the state of generating, which also would have been if after that first temptation he had not sinned. And for this reason, it would have been possible, if the first man had not sinned then, that still he or his posterity would have sinned afterwards, as Hugh of St. Victor says.2 Hence diversity of parents does not follow out of this: that now there are some sinners, yet then there would not have been.
QV.Q5.A1Sed est aliud unde necesse est ponere diversitatem parentum, quia in primo statu unus homo non habuisset plures uxores nec etiam aliqui ex fornicatione vel adulterio nascerentur, quod nunc contingit etiam in his qui salvantur: multi enim filii unius patris ex pluribus uxoribus nati salvantur, sicut patet de filiis Iacob; multi etiam ex fornicatione vel adulterio nati, alioquin eis frustra sacramenta salutis adhiberentur. Unde relinquitur quod aliqui nunc salvantur qui, si primus homo non peccasset, non nascerentur et per consequens non salvarentur, nec tamen Dei praedestinatio falleretur, quia Deus praedestinavit homines habens scientiam futuri eventus.
But there is another reason why it is necessary to posit diversity of parents, because in the first state one man would not have had many wives nor also would any men have been born from fornication or adultery, which now happens even in these men who are saved: for many sons of one father born from many wives are saved, as is clear concerning the sons of Jacob;1 many saved are also born from fornication or adultery, otherwise to them the sacraments of salvation would be applied in vain. Hence it remains that some men now are saved who, if the first man had not sinned, would not have been born and consequently would not have been saved, nor, nevertheless, would the predestination of God have been deceived because God predestined men having knowledge of the future event.
QV.Q5.A1Quod vero Gregorius dicit, quod si primus homo non peccasset, nequaquam ex se filios iehenne genenaret, indubitanter verum est: non enim in filios transfunderet peccatum originale, secundum quod homines filii irae nascuntur. Quod autem subdit, quod hi soli qui nunc salvandi sunt nascerentur, intelligendum est quod pronomen facit simplicem demonstrationem, quia scilicet soli electi nascerentur, quantum est de ratione originis, non autem demonstrationem personalem, quia aliae personae essent hominum qui salvarentur.
Whereas that which Gregory says, that if the first man had not sinned, in no way out of himself would he have generated sons of Gehenna,1 undoubtedly is true: for original sin would not have poured from him into his sons, according to which men are born sons of wrath.2 Yet that which he adds, that only these who now are to be saved would have been born, must be understood such that the pronoun makes a simple demonstration, namely, because only the elect would have been born,3 as much as concerns the reason of origin, yet not a personal demonstration, because there would be other persons of men who would be saved.4
QV.Q5.A1Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.
Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
QV.Q5.A1.ad1A. 2Regarding the intellect
Quantum ad intellectum
Regarding the intellect
QV.Q5.A2Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod verbum cordis sit species intelligibilis.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a word of the heart1 is an intelligible species.
QV.Q5.A2.arg1Verbum enim cordis est quo intellectus videt; hoc autem est species intelligibilis; ergo verbum cordis est species intelligibilis.
Obj. 1: For a word of the heart is that by which the intellect sees. Yet this is an intelligible species. Therefore, a word of the heart is an intelligible species.
QV.Q5.A2.arg2Praeterea. Cognitio intellectiva a sensu oritur; sed illud quo sensus sentit est species sensibilis; ergo verbum cordis quo intellectus intelligit est species intelligibilis.
Obj. 2: Intellective knowledge arises from sense. But that by which sense senses is a sensible species. Therefore, a word of the heart by which the intellect understands is an intelligible species.
QV.Q5.A2.arg3Sed contra. Verbum cordis interius est quod exteriori verbo significatur; sed verbum exterius non significat speciem intelligibilem; ergo verbum interius non est ipsa species intelligibilis.
On the contrary: An interior word of the heart is that which is signified by an exterior word. But an exterior word does not signify an intelligible species. Therefore, an interior word is not an intelligible species itself.
QV.Q5.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod secundum Augustinum, XV De Trinitate, verbum cordis importat quiddam procedens a mente sive ab intellectu. Procedit autem aliquid ab intellectu in quantum est constitutum per operationem ipsius. Est autem duplex operatio intellectus, secundum Philosophum in III De anima: una quidem quae vocatur indivisibilium intelligentia, per quam intellectus format in se ipso diffinitionem vel conceptum alicuius incomplexi; alia autem operatio est intellectus componentis et dividentis, secundum quam format enunciationem. Et utrumque istorum per operationem intellectus constitutorum vocatur verbum cordis, quorum primum significatur per terminum incomplexum, secundum vero significatur per orationem.
I answer that according to Augustine, in the fifteenth book of On the Trinity, a word of the heart implies a certain thing proceeding from the mind or from the intellect.1 Yet something proceeds from the intellect inasmuch as it is constituted through its activity. Yet there is a twofold activity of the intellect, according to the Philosopher in the third book of On the Soul: one indeed which is called intelligence of indivisible things,2 through which the intellect forms in its very self a definition or concept of some uncomplex thing; yet another activity is of the intellect composing and dividing, according to which it forms a statement. And both of those constituted through the activity of the intellect are called a word of the heart: the first is signified through a simple term, whereas the second is signified through a statement.
QV.Q5.A2.coManifestum est autem quod omnis operatio intellectus procedit ab eo secundum quod est factus in actu per speciem intelligibilem, quia nihil operatur nisi secundum quod est actu. Unde necesse est quod species intelligibilis, quae est principium operationis intellectualis, differat a verbo cordis, quod per operationem intellectus formatur. Quamvis et ipsum verbum possit dici forma vel species intelligibilis, sed sicut per intellectum constituta, prout forma artis, quam intellectus adinvenit, dicitur quaedam species intelligibilis.
Yet it is clear that every activity of the intellect proceeds from that according to which it is made in act through an intelligible species because nothing works unless according as it is in act.1 Hence it is necessary that an intelligible species, which is the principle of intellectual activity, differs from a word of the heart, which is formed through the activity of the intellect. Although that word also can be called form or intelligible species, but just as it is constituted through the intellect, as a form of art which the intellect invents, it is called a certain intelligible species.
QV.Q5.A2Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus intelligit aliquo dupliciter: uno modo formaliter, et sic intelligit specie intelligibili qua fit in actu; alio modo sicut instrumento quo utitur ad aliud intelligendum, et hoc modo intellectus verbo intelligit, quia format verbum ad hoc quod intelligat rem.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the intellect understands by something in two ways: in one way, formally, and thus it understands by the intelligible species by which it is made in act; another way is just as by an instrument which it uses to understand something, and in this way, the intellect understands by a word because it forms a word so that it should understand a thing.
QV.Q5.A2.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod cognitio sensus exterioris perficitur per solam immutationem sensus a sensibili, unde per formam quae sibi a sensibili imprimitur, sentit. Non autem ipse sensus exterior format sibi aliquam formam sensibilem, sed hoc facit virtus imaginativa, cuius formae quodam modo simile est verbum intellectus.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the knowledge of exterior sense is perfected only through the change of sense by the sensible; hence it senses through the form which is impressed on it by the sensible. Yet the exterior sense itself does not form for itself some sensible form, but the imaginative power does this, to whose form in a certain way the word of the intellect is similar.
QV.Q5.A2.ad2A. 3Regarding the will
Quantum ad voluntatem
Regarding the will
QV.Q5.A3Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae fiunt ex timore non sint voluntaria.
To the third we proceed thus. It seems that those things done out of fear are not voluntary.
QV.Q5.A3.arg1Necessitas enim voluntati contrariatur, ut dicitur in V Metaphysicae; sed quae fiunt ex timore, dicuntur ex necessitate fieri; non ergo sunt voluntaria.
Obj. 1: For necessity is contrary to will, as is said in the fifth book of the Metaphysics.1 But those things done out of fear are said to be done out of necessity. Therefore, they are not voluntary.
QV.Q5.A3.arg2Sed contra. Omne quod quis operatur propter finem, est voluntarium; sed ea quae quis operatur ex timore, operatur propter finem, scilicet ad vitandum malum quod timet, sicut qui proicit merces in mari, vitat submersionem navis; ergo huiusmodi sunt voluntaria.
On the contrary: Everything which anyone works on account of an end is voluntary. But those things which anyone works out of fear, he works on account of an end, namely, to avoid the evil which he fears, just as he who throws his goods in the sea avoids the submersion of the boat.1 Therefore, things of this sort are voluntary.
QV.Q5.A3.scResponsio. Dicendum quod, cum bonum sit voluntatis obiectum, hoc modo se habet aliquid ad hoc quod sit voluntarium quo modo se habet ad hoc quod sit bonum. Contingit autem aliquid in universali consideratum esse bonum, quod tamen secundum aliquas particulares circumstantias redditur malum, sicut generare filios est bonum, sed generare filios ex non sua est malum. Et similiter contingit aliquid in universali consideratum esse malum, quod tamen secundum aliquas particulares circumstantias fit bonum, sicut occidere hominem secundum se est malum, sed occidere hominem perniciosum multitudini est bonum. Et quia actiones sunt circa singularia, iudicantur bonae vel malae et per consequens voluntariae vel involuntariae simpliciter quidem consideratis singularibus circumstantiis, secundum quid autem secundum quod in universali considerantur.
I answer that, since good is the object of the will, something relates to what is voluntary in the way it relates to what is good. Yet it happens that something is considered good in the universal which, nevertheless, according to some particular circumstances is rendered evil, just as to generate sons is good, but to generate sons from a woman who is not one’s wife is evil. And similarly, it happens that something is considered evil in the universal which, nevertheless, according to some particular circumstances is made good, just as to kill a man according to itself is evil, but to kill a man pernicious to the multitude is good. And because actions are about singulars,1 they are judged absolutely good or evil and consequently voluntary or involuntary with, indeed, the singular circumstances having been considered; yet they are judged relatively according as they are considered in the universal.
QV.Q5.A3.coEa vero quae ex timore fiunt, in universali quidem considerata sunt mala et involuntaria; sed, si considerentur secundum singularia quae circumstant, sic sunt bona et voluntaria; sicut proicere merces in mari, secundum se consideratum est malum et non voluntarium; sed in tali casu est bonum et voluntarium. Unde et Philosophus dicit in III Ethicorum quod huiusmodi mixta sunt ex voluntario et involuntario, simpliciter autem sunt voluntaria, secundum quid autem involuntaria et ex necessitate facta.
Whereas those things which are done out of fear, in the universal are considered evil and involuntary. But, if they were to be considered according to the singulars which stand around them, thus they are good and voluntary: just as to throw goods in the sea according to itself is considered evil and not voluntary, but in a particular case it is good and voluntary. Hence the Philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics that things of this sort are mixed out of the voluntary and the involuntary: there are things voluntary absolutely, and there are things involuntary relatively and done out of necessity.1
QV.Q5.A3Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
QV.Q5.A3.ad1De his quae pertinent ad sacramenta
On things pertaining to the sacraments
Q. 6On the sacrament of the EucharistDe sacramento Eucharistiae
Deinde circa sacramenta quaesitum est;
Then there were questions about the sacraments:
QV.Q6primo, de sacramento eucharistiae;
first, concerning the sacrament of the Eucharist;1
QV.Q6secundo, de sacramento poenitentiae;
second, concerning the sacrament of penance;1
QV.Q6tertio, de sacramento matrimonii.
third, concerning the sacrament of matrimony.1
QV.Q6Circa eucharistiam quaesita sunt duo:
About the Eucharist there were two questions:
QV.Q6primo, utrum forma panis adnihiletur;
first, whether the form of bread is annihilated;
QV.Q6secundo, utrum sacerdos dare debeat hostiam non consecratam peccatori occulto, hoc petenti.
second, whether a priest should give an unconsecrated host to a secret sinner if he seeks to receive.
QV.Q6A. 1Whether the form of bread is annihilatedUtrum forma panis adnihiletur
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod forma panis in sacramento eucharistiae adnihiletur.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the form of bread in the sacrament of the Eucharist is annihilated.
QV.Q6.A1.arg1Illud enim adnihilari videtur quod desinit esse et in nihil convertitur; sed forma panis, facta consecratione, desinit esse, nec est dare in quid convertatur; non enim convertitur in materiam corporis Christi, nec etiam in formam eius, quae est anima, alioquin anima esset ibi ex vi sacramenti; ergo forma panis adnihilatur.
Obj. 1: For that seems to be annihilated which ceases to be and is converted into nothing. But the form of bread, with consecration having been made, ceases to be, nor is there anything to which the converted bread can belong. For it is not converted into the matter of the body of Christ, nor even into its form, which is the soul; otherwise, the soul would be there out of the power of the sacrament. Therefore, the form of bread is annihilated.
QV.Q6.A1.arg2Praeterea. Augustinus dicit super illud Iohannis XVII: clarifica me Pater etc. Si humana natura convertatur in Verbum, si diligentius cogitamus, homo periret in Deo; sed illud adnihilari dicitur quod perit; ergo si panis convertitur in corpus Christi, videtur quod adnihiletur.
Obj. 2: Augustine says in his commentary on John 17:5, glorify me, Father, that if human nature should be converted into the Word, if we should consider diligently, man would perish in God.1 But what perishes is said to be annihilated. Therefore, if bread is converted into the body of Christ, it seems that it is annihilated.
QV.Q6.A1.arg3Sed contra est quia, sicut Augustinus dicit libro octoginta trium quaestionum; Deus non est actor tendendi in non esse; est autem actor sacramenti eucharistiae; ergo in illo sacramento nihil adnihilatur.
On the contrary: Just as Augustine says in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions, God is not the agent of tending into non-being.1 Yet he is the agent of the sacrament of the Eucharist. Therefore, in that sacrament nothing is annihilated.
QV.Q6.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod adnihilatio quendam motum importat; omnis autem motus denominatur a termino ad quem; unde terminus adnihilationis est nihil. Consecratio autem panis in sacramento eucharistiae non terminatur ad nihil, sed ad corpus Christi; alioquin non esset dare quo modo corpus Christi incipiat esse sub sacramento: non enim incipit ibi esse per motum localem, alioquin desineret esse in caelo. Relinquitur ergo quod in consecratione panis non est aliqua adnihilatio, sed transubstantiatio panis in corpus Christi.
I answer that annihilation implies a certain motion. Yet every motion is denominated from the terminus-to-which. Hence the term of annihilation is nothing. Yet the consecration of bread in the sacrament of the Eucharist is not terminated unto nothing, but unto the body of Christ. Otherwise, there would be no means whereby the body of Christ begins to be under the sacrament: for it does not begin to be there through a local movement, otherwise it would cease to be in heaven. It remains, therefore, that in the consecration of bread there is not any annihilation, but transubstantiation of bread into the body of Christ.
QV.Q6.A1.coAd primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut in generatione naturali neque forma neque materia generatur aut corrumpitur, sed totum compositum, ita etiam in sacramento altaris non est quaerendum seorsum de forma aut materia in quid convertatur, sed totus panis convertitur in totum corpus Christi, in quantum est corpus. Quare, si in triduo mortis Christi fuisset consecratio facta, non fuisset ibi anima, sed corpus exanime, sicut in sepulcro iacebat.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, just as in natural generation neither form nor matter is generated or corrupted,1 but the composite whole, so also in the sacrament of the altar it must not be sought separately concerning form or matter into what it is converted, but the whole bread is converted into the whole body of Christ, inasmuch as it is a body. For which reason, if consecration had been made during the Triduum of the death of Christ, the soul would not have been there, but the soulless body, just as was lying in the sepulcher.2
QV.Q6.A1.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod perire diceretur natura humana si converteretur in Verbum, in quantum esse desineret, quod pertinet ad terminum a quo; non autem adnihilaretur, quantum ad terminum ad quem.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that human nature would be said to perish if it were to be converted into the Word, inasmuch as it would cease to be, which pertains to the terminus-from-which; yet it would not be annihilated, as regards the terminus-to-which.
QV.Q6.A1.ad2A. 2Whether a priest should give an unconsecrated host to a secret sinner if he attempts to receiveUtrum sacerdos dare debeat hostiam non consecratam peccatori occulto, hoc petenti
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sacerdos non debeat dare hostiam non consecratam peccatori occulto, hoc petenti.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a priest should not give an unconsecrated host to a secret sinner who attempts to receive.
QV.Q6.A2.arg1Non enim debet sacerdos peccatum occultum publicare; publicaret autem, si ei daret hostiam non consecratam, cum aliis sociis daret consecratam; ergo sacerdos non debet dare hostiam non consecratam peccatori occulto, hoc petenti.
Obj. 1: For the priest should not publicize secret sin. Yet he would publicize it if he were to give him an unconsecrated host, since to his other comrades he would give a consecrated one. Therefore, a priest should not give an unconsecrated host to secret sinner who seeks to receive.
QV.Q6.A2.arg2Praeterea. Hostia consecrata a sacerdote alicui fideli porrecta, a circumstantibus adoratur; si ergo exhibeat alicui hostiam non consecratam loco consecratae, quantum est in se faciet populum idolatrare, quod est grave peccatum; non ergo sacerdos debet peccatori occulto petenti dare hostiam non consecratam.
Obj. 2: A consecrated host offered by the priest to any faithful is adored by those standing around. If, therefore, he presents to someone an unconsecrated host in place of a consecrated one, as much as is in him he will make the people commit idolatry, which is grave sin. Therefore, a priest should not give an unconsecrated host to secret sinner seeking to receive.
QV.Q6.A2.arg3Sed contra est quod sacerdos est medicus animarum; sapiens autem medicus vitat quantum potest periculum infirmi quem accepit in cura; peccatori autem cuius curam habet imminet magnum periculum si cum conscientia mortalis peccati corpus Christi accipiat, quia qui manducat bibit indigne, iudicium sibi manducat et bibit, ut dicitur I ad Corinthios XI; ergo sacerdos bene facit, si eius periculum evitet, porrigens ei hostiam non consecratam.
On the contrary (3): A priest is a medic of souls;1 yet a wise medic avoids as much as he can the danger of the infirm whom he receives in his care. Yet great danger threatens a sinner whose care he has if with a conscience of mortal sin he receives the body of Christ, because he who eats and drinks unworthily, eats and drinks judgment upon himself (1 Cor 11:29). Therefore, the priest does well if he avoids this danger, offering to him an unconsecrated host.
QV.Q6.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod veritati non est aliqua fictio adiungenda, quia nulla est conventio lucis ad tenebras, ut Apostolus dicit II ad Corinthios VI; et propter hoc Augustinus probat in libro octoginta trium quaestionum quod corpus Christi non fuit fantasticum, quia veritas, quae est Christus, non potuit fallere. Et ideo in sacramentis Ecclesiae nihil est per fictionem agendum, et praecipue in sacramento altaris, in quo totus Christus continetur; esset autem quaedam fictio si hostia non consecrata loco consecratae daretur.
I answer that fiction must not be joined to the truth because there is no coming together of light unto darkness, as the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 6:14. And on account of this Augustine proves in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions that the body of Christ was not fantastic because the truth, which is Christ, could not deceive.1 And for this reason, in the sacraments of the Church, no fiction should be made, and especially in the sacrament of the altar, in which the whole Christ is contained. Yet there would be a certain fiction if an unconsecrated host were to be given in place of a consecrated one.
QV.Q6.A2.coEt cum hoc etiam sacerdos, quantum in se est, populo fieret idolatrandi occasio, qui quamvis peccatum idolatriae non incurreret, aestimans probabiliter hostiam esse consecratam, tamen sacerdos in hoc ipso quod hostiam non consecratam populo exhiberet adorandam, idolatriae crimen incurreret.
And thereby also a priest, as much as is in him, would be made an occasion of idolatry for the people. Although they would not incur the sin of idolatry, reckoning probably that the host is consecrated, nevertheless the priest in giving an unconsecrated host to the people to be adored would incur the crime of idolatry.
QV.Q6.A2Unde hoc in nullo casu est faciendum ut hostia non consecrata exhibeatur uni vel pluribus tanquam consecrata.
Hence in no case must an unconsecrated host be presented to one or to many as though it were consecrated.
QV.Q6.A2Debet ergo sacerdos peccatorem occultum primo quidem monere ut poenitentiam agat, et sic ad sacramentum accedat; quod si poenitere noluerit, debet ei occulte inhibere ne aliis communicantibus in publico se immisceat; quod si se immiscuerit, debet ei dare hostiam consecratam.
Therefore, the priest should first, indeed, admonish the secret sinner to do penance, and then approach the sacrament. But if he refuses to repent, the priest should prevent him secretly lest he mix himself in with the other communicants in public. But if he mixes himself in, he should give to him a consecrated host.
QV.Q6.A2Unde prima duo concedimus.
Reply Obj. 1–2: Hence the first two we concede.
QV.Q6.A2.ad1Ad tertium dicendum quod stultus esset medicus qui cum maiori suo periculo minus periculum infirmi vellet impedire, puta si vellet ipse venenum bibere ne infirmus biberet vinum; multo autem magis peccat sacerdos fictionem faciens in sacramento Christi quam peccator indigne sumens; unde stultus esset sacerdos si, ut vitaret peccatum subditi, ipse gravius peccaret, fictionem faciens in sacramento veritatis.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that it would be a stupid medic who at his own greater danger would want to impede the lesser danger of the infirm: for example, if he were to want to drink poison himself lest the infirm drink wine. Yet much more does the priest sin making a fiction in the sacrament of Christ than a sinner receiving unworthily. Hence he would be a stupid priest if, in order to avoid the sin of a subject, he himself would sin more gravely, making a fiction in the sacrament of truth.
QV.Q6.A2.ad2Q. 7On the sacrament of penanceDe sacramento poenitentiae
Deinde circa sacramentum poenitentiae quaesita sunt duo:
Then there were two questions about the sacrament of penance:
QV.Q7primo, utrum praelatus debeat subditum suum ab administratione removere propter aliquid quod ab eo in confessione audivit;
first, whether a prelate should remove his subject from ministry on account of something he heard from him in confession;
QV.Q7secundo, utrum in meliori statu moriatur ille qui moritur in via eundi ultra mare quam ille qui moritur in redeundo.
second, whether a man who dies on the way while going beyond the sea dies in a better state than a man who dies while returning.
QV.Q7A. 1Whether a prelate should remove his subject from ministry on account of something he heard from him in confessionUtrum prelatus debeat subditum suum ab administratione removere propter aliquid quod ab eo in confessione audivit
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praelatus possit subditum suum ab administratione removere propter aliquid quod ab eo in confessione audivit.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a prelate can remove his subject from ministry on account of something he heard from him in confession.
QV.Q7.A1.arg1Quia quod institutum est pro caritate, contra caritatem non militat; sed sigillum confessionis institutum est pro caritate; non ergo militat contra caritatem, ex qua tenetur praelatus saluti subditorum providere. Est autem quandoque contra salutem subditi, si ei administratio dimittatur, ut puta si habeat occasionem recidivandi in peccatum. Ergo, non obstante sigillo confessionis, praelatus debet eum ab administratione removere.
Obj. 1: Because that which is instituted for charity does not militate against charity.1 But the seal of confession is instituted for charity. Therefore, it does not militate against charity, from which a prelate is held to provide for the salvation of his subjects. Yet sometimes it is against the salvation of a subject if the ministry is dismissed from him, as, for example, if he would have an occasion of falling back into sin. Therefore, with the seal of confession notwithstanding, a prelate should remove him from ministry.
QV.Q7.A1.arg2Sed contra est quia nihil est faciendum in praeiudicium confessionis; esset autem in praeiudicium confessionis si subditus ab administratione removeretur propter crimen quod suo praelato confessus est, quia per hoc alii retraherentur a confitendo; non ergo debet praelatus subditum ab administratione removere propter peccatum quod ei confessus est.
On the contrary: Nothing must be done to the prejudice of confession. Yet it would be to the prejudice of confession if a subject were to be removed from ministry on account of a crime which he confessed to his prelate, because through this others would be drawn back from confessing. Therefore, a prelate should not remove a subject from ministry on account of a sin he confessed to him.
QV.Q7.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod id quod per confessionem auditur, nullo modo est manifestandum, nec verbo nec signo nec nutu, nec etiam aliquid est faciendum unde in suspicionem peccati aliquis possit devenire.
I answer that what is heard through confession in no way must be manifested, neither by word nor by sign nor by nod,1 nor even may something be done whence someone can come into suspicion of sin.
QV.Q7.A1.coSi igitur amotio subditi ab administratione possit inducere ad manifestandum peccatum in confessione auditum, vel ad aliquam probabilem suspicionem habendam de ipso, nullo modo praelatus deberet subditum ab administratione removere; puta, si in aliquo monasterio esset consuetum quod priores non amoverentur de suis prioratibus nisi propter culpam, manifestaretur peccatum confitentis per remotionem ab administratione, unde, si abbas hoc faceret, graviter peccaret tamquam confessionem revelans; posset tamen eum secreto caritative admonere ut cum instantia peteret cessionem, si hoc videret saluti eius expedire.
If, therefore, the removal of a subject from ministry might induce a manifestation of the sin heard in confession, or some probable suspicion concerning it, in no way should a prelate remove his subject from ministry. For example, if in some monastery it were the custom that priors are not removed from their priorates except for fault, the removal from ministry would manifest the sin of one confessing. Hence, if an abbot were to do this, he would sin gravely as though revealing a confession. Nevertheless, he could admonish him by a loving secret that with urgency he seek to give up the ministry, if he were to see that this was expeditious for his salvation.
QV.Q7.A1Si vero per amotionem ab administratione peccatum nullatenus manifestaretur, puta, si in aliquo monasterio esset consuetum quod abbas pro suo libitu de facili aliquos ab administratione removeret, tunc alia occasione accepta posset subditum sibi confessum ab administratione removere, et deberet hoc facere, cum debita tamen cautela, si talis administratio esset subdito periculosa in posterum; quamvis etiam et in hoc casu melius esset quod eum induceret ad cessionem petendam.
Whereas if through removal from ministry the sin would in no way be manifested, for example, if in some monastery it were the custom that the abbot for his pleasure would remove any men from ministry easily, then on another occasion he could remove from ministry a subject who confessed to him; and he ought to do this, albeit with due caution, if such ministry would be dangerous to the subject in the future. Although, also, even in this case it would be better if he induced him to seek to give up the ministry.
QV.Q7.A1Si vero periculum in posterum non timeretur, non oporteret quod pro peccato praeterito per poenitentiam deleto eum ab administratione removeret, sicut et Augustinus dicit in libro De adulterinis coniugiis: cur adhuc deputamus adulteros quos . . . credimus poenitentia esse sanatos? Quandoque enim poenitentes innocentibus meliores sunt.
Whereas if danger were not feared in the future, it would not be necessary that, for a past sin deleted through penance, he remove him from ministry, just as also Augustine says in the book On Adulterous Marriages: why do we still reckon adulterers those whom we believe to be healed by penance?1 For sometimes penitents are better than the innocent.
QV.Q7.A1Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
QV.Q7.A1.ad1A. 2Whether a man who dies on the way while going beyond the sea dies in a better state than a man who dies while returningUtrum in meliori statu moriatur ille qui moritur in via eundi ultra mare quam ille qui moritur in redeundo
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod melius moriatur cruce signatus qui moritur in via eundi ultra mare quam ille qui moritur redeundo.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a man signed with the cross who dies on the way while going beyond the sea dies better than a man who dies while returning.
QV.Q7.A2.arg1Qui enim moritur eundo est quasi prosequendo votum suum ut se exponat morti pro Christo, et ita moritur tanquam martyr; qui autem moritur redeundo non moritur in proposito exponendi se pro Christo, et ita moritur quasi confessor; sed maior est status martyrum quam confessorum; ergo in meliori statu moritur qui moritur in eundo quam qui moritur in redeundo.
Obj. 1: For he who dies while going is as though pursuing his vow to expose himself to death for Christ, and thus he dies as though a martyr. Yet he who dies while returning does not die in the intention of exposing himself for Christ, and thus he dies as though a confessor. But the state of martyrs is greater than that of confessors. Therefore, he who dies while going dies in a better state than he who dies while returning.
QV.Q7.A2.arg2Sed contra. Qui moritur in redeundo iam consummavit votum suum; qui autem moritur in eundo nondum consummavit, sed est quasi in principio; perfectum autem melius est inperfecto et finis principio; ergo melius moritur qui moritur in redeundo quam qui moritur in eundo.
On the contrary: He who dies while returning has consummated his vow already. Yet he who dies while going has not yet consummated it, but is as though in the beginning. Yet the perfect is better than the imperfect and the end than the beginning. Therefore, he who dies while returning dies better than he who dies while going.
QV.Q7.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod quanto aliquis cum pluribus meritis moritur, tanto melius moritur; merita autem manent homini, non solum illa quae actu agit, sed etiam illa quae iam fecit, quasi apud Deum deposita, secundum illud II Timothaei II: scio cui credidi et certus sum quia potens est depositum meum servare. Manifestum est autem quod ille qui moritur in redeundo de ultra mare, ceteris paribus, cum pluribus meritis moritur quam ille qui moritur in eundo: habet enim meritum ex assumptione itineris et ulterius ex prosecutione, in qua forte multa gravia est passus. Et ideo, ceteris paribus, melius moritur qui moritur redeundo, quamvis ire sit magis meritorium quam redire, genus operis considerando.
I answer that as much as someone dies with more merits, so much does he die better. Yet merits remain for a man, not only those which he actually is doing, but also those which already he has done, as though deposited before the Lord, according to 2 Timothy 1:12: I know whom I have believed and I am certain that he is mighty to preserve my deposit. Yet it is clear that that man who dies while returning from beyond the sea, with other things being equal, dies with more merits than that man who dies while going; for he has merit from taking the journey and more out of its accomplishment, during which perhaps he suffered many grave things. And for this reason, with other things being equal, he dies better who dies while returning, although to go is more meritorious than to return, considering the genus of the work.
QV.Q7.A2.coAd primum ergo dicendum quod illud propositum exponendi se morti propter Christum habuit etiam iste in eundo, nec hoc meritum perdidit, si se a peccato immunem custodivit.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the man had the intention of exposing himself to death on account of Christ even while going, and he did not lose this merit if he kept himself safe from sin.
QV.Q7.A2.ad1Q. 8On the sacrament of matrimonyDe sacramento matrimonii
Deinde circa matrimonium quaesita sunt duo:
Then there were two questions about matrimony:
QV.Q8primo, si aliquis despondeat aliquam per verba de futuro et postea eam carnaliter cognoscat, non quidem quasi consentiens in matrimonium, sed solummodo volens fraudulenter subripere copulam carnalem, si postmodum contrahat cum alia per verba de presenti, utrum secunda sit uxor eius;
first, if someone betroths a woman through words of the future and afterwards knows her carnally, not, indeed, as though consenting unto matrimony, but only wanting fraudulently to snatch carnal union, if afterwards he contracts with another woman through words of the present, whether the second is his wife;
QV.Q8secundo, si vir accuset uxorem de adulterio occulto, utrum mulier teneatur in iudicio suum peccatum confiteri.
second, if a man accuses his wife of a secret adultery, whether the woman is held to confess her sin in judgment.
QV.Q8A. 1If someone betroths a woman through words of the future and knows her carnally, not as consenting unto matrimony, if afterwards he contracts with another woman through words of the present, whether the second is his wife
Si aliquis despondeat aliquam per verba de futuro et postea eam carnaliter cognoscat, non quidem quasi consentiens in matrimonium, sed solummodo volens fraudulenter subripere copulam carnalem, si postmodum contrahat cum alia per verba de praesenti, utrum secunda sit uxor eius
If someone betroths a woman through words of the future and knows her carnally, not as consenting unto matrimony, if afterwards he contracts with another woman through words of the present, whether the second is his wife
QV.Q8.A1Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui cognovit carnaliter mulierem quam desponderat per verba de futuro, non possit habere uxorem illam cum qua postea contrahit per verba de praesenti.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a man who has known a woman carnally whom he betrothed through words of the future cannot have another woman as wife with whom afterwards he contracts through words of the present.
QV.Q8.A1.arg1Iudicio enim Ecclesiae compellitur stare cum prima quam carnaliter cognovit; sed Ecclesia potest facere personas illegitimas ad contrahendum; ergo videtur quod talis non possit cum alia muliere contrahere matrimonium, et ita illa cum qua secundo contraxit per verba de praesenti, non erit uxor sua.
Obj. 1: For the judgment of the Church is compelled to stand with the first whom he knew carnally.1 But the Church can make persons illegitimate unto contracting. Therefore, it seems that such a man cannot contract matrimony with another woman. And thus, the woman with whom he contracted second through words of the present will not be his wife.
QV.Q8.A1.arg2Sed contra est quod error hominis non preiudicat veritati matrimonii; sed ex errore hominis praesumentis esse consensum ubi fuit carnalis copula, contingit quod per iudicium Ecclesiae compellitur aliquis illam habere quam cognovit carnaliter post contractum per verba de futuro; ergo hoc non preiudicat veritati secundi matrimonii, quod est rite contractum per verba de praesenti.
On the contrary: The error of a man does not prejudice the truth of matrimony. But from the error of someone presuming there was consent where there was carnal union, it happens that through the judgment of the Church a man is compelled to have that woman whom he knew carnally after a contract through words of the future. Therefore, this does not prejudice the truth of the second matrimony, which is contracted rightly through words of the present.
QV.Q8.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod, sicut Nicholaus papa dicit, causa matrimonii est consensus per verba de praesenti expressus, sine quo cetera etiam cum coitu subsecuta frustrantur.
I answer that, just as Pope Nicholas says, the cause of matrimony is consent expressed through words of the present, without which, other words, even followed with intercourse, are frustrated.1
QV.Q8.A1.coRemota autem causa removetur effectus; unde, cum in primo matrimonio ponatur non fuisse consensus, manifestum est quod non fuit matrimonium; et quia posita causa ponitur effectus, consequens est ut secundum fuerit matrimonium, in quo ponitur fuisse mutuus consensus per verba de praesenti expressus inter personas a matrimonio solutas.
Yet with the cause removed, the effect is removed. Hence, since in the first matrimony it is posited that there was not consent, it is clear that there was not matrimony. And because with a cause posited, the effect is posited,1 the consequence is that the second was matrimony, in which there is posited to have been mutual consent expressed through words of the present between persons unbound by matrimony.
QV.Q8.A1Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Ecclesia in his quae ad matrimonium pertinent tripliciter se habet.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the Church conducts herself in three ways in these things pertaining to matrimony.
QV.Q8.A1.ad1Uno quidem modo per modum iudicantis. Et quia homines vident ea quae apparent, secundum quod dicitur I Regum XVI, oportet quod iudex ecclesiasticus iudicet secundum ea quae sibi apparent per confessionem partium et per idoneos testes et per alia legitima documenta, quibus tamen omnibus adhibitis contingit quandoque veritatem latere, et praecipue in his quae pertinent ad interiora cordis, quae humano testimonio probari non possunt, etsi per aliqua signa exteriora de his possit aliqua coniectura haberi. Et ideo iudicium Ecclesiae circa ea quae ad matrimonium pertinent, si veritas lateat, non impedit sequens matrimonium contrahendum nec dirimit iam contractum.
One way, indeed, is in the manner of one judging. And because men see those things which are apparent (1 Sam 16:7), it is necessary for an ecclesiastical judge to judge according to what is apparent to him through the confession of the parties, and through suitable witnesses, and through other legitimate proofs.1 With all of these presented, nevertheless, it happens that sometimes the truth is hidden, and especially in what pertains to the interior things of the heart, which cannot be proven by human testimony, even though through some exterior signs some conjecture can be made concerning these things. And for this reason, the judgment of the Church about those things which pertain to matrimony, if the truth is hidden, does not impede a subsequent contracting of matrimony, nor does it break off one already contracted.
QV.Q8.A1Alio modo se habet per modum prohibentis vel punientis. Et hoc quidem impedit matrimonium contrahendum, sed non dirimit iam contractum; puta, uxoricidae Ecclesia penam imponit ut ulterius a matrimonio abstineat; si tamen contraxerit, matrimonium non dirimitur.
In another way, the Church conducts herself in the manner of one prohibiting or punishing. And this indeed impedes the contracting of matrimony but does not break off one already contracted; for example, the Church imposes as a penalty of uxoricide that one should abstain from further matrimony.1 If, nevertheless, he will have contracted, the matrimony is not broken off.
QV.Q8.A1Tertio modo se habet per modum statuentis, quod fit solum auctoritate summi pontificis. Et secundum hoc personae aliquae redduntur illegitimae ad contrahendum, ita quod si etiam contrahant, matrimonium dirimitur, ut patet in quibusdam gradibus consanguinitatis et affinitatis, vel etiam de adultera, cum quis dedit ei fidem de contrahendo vel cum machinatus est in mortem uxoris.
In a third way the Church conducts herself in the manner of one establishing, which is done only by the authority of the supreme pontiff. And according to this any persons are rendered illegitimate unto contracting, such that even if they do contract, the matrimony is broken off, as is clear in certain grades of consanguinity and affinity, or even concerning adultery when someone has given faith to her that he will contract matrimony, or when he has plotted for the death of his wife.1
QV.Q8.A1A. 2If a man accuses his wife of a secret adultery, whether the woman is held to confess her sin in judgment
Si vir accuset uxorem de adulterio occulto, utrum mulier teneatur in iudicio suum peccatum confiteri
If a man accuses his wife of a secret adultery, whether the woman is held to confess her sin in judgment
QV.Q8.A2Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mulier accusata de adulterio non teneatur suum peccatum in iudicio confiteri.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a woman accused of adultery is not held to confess her sin in judgment.
QV.Q8.A2.arg1Nullus enim tenetur suum peccatum occultum publicare; sed adulterium mulieris ponitur esse occultum, si autem in iudicio confiteretur ipsum, veniret in publicum; non igitur tenetur mulier accusata de adulterio suum peccatum in iudicio confiteri.
Obj. 1: For no one is held to publicize one’s secret sin. But the adultery of the woman is posited to be secret, yet if she were to confess it in judgment, it would come into the public. Therefore, the woman accused of adultery is not held to confess her sin in judgment.
QV.Q8.A2.arg2Sed contra est quia debet praestare iuramentum de veritate dicenda; sed nullo modo debet deierare; ergo debet veritatem confiteri de suo peccato.
On the contrary: She should fulfill an oath about telling the truth. But in no way should she swear an oath. Therefore, she should confess the truth about her sin.
QV.Q8.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod circa hoc est distinguendum. Si enim adulterium sit omnino occultum, non debet peccatum suum in iudicio confiteri, nec debet ab ea exigi iuramentum de veritate dicenda, quia occulta soli divino iudicio reservantur, secundum illud I ad Corinthios IV: nolite ante tempus iudicare, quousque veniat Dominus qui illuminabit abscondita tenebrarum. Sed quando de adulterio praecessit infamia vel aliqua signa evidentia apparent quae vehementem suspicionem facere possunt, vel quando est semiplene probatum, tunc debet ab ea exigi iuramentum de veritate dicenda, et ipsa tenetur confiteri veritatem.
I answer that, about this, a distinction must be made. For if the adultery is altogether secret, she should not confess her sin in judgment, nor should an oath be demanded from her concerning telling the truth, because secret judgment is reserved to the divine alone,1 according to 1 Corinthians 4:5: do not judge before the time, until the Lord should come who shall illumine the hidden things of darkness. But when infamy concerning the adultery precedes or any evident signs are apparent which can make a vehement suspicion, or when it is halfway proven, then there should be demanded from her an oath concerning telling the truth, and she is held to confess the truth.2
QV.Q8.A2.coEt per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
QV.Q8.A2.ad1On things pertaining to the virtues
QV.Q8.A2Q. 9On things pertaining to the virtuesDe his quae pertinent ad virtutes
Deinde circa virtutes quaesita sunt duo:
Then there were two questions about the virtues:
QV.Q9primo, circa iustitiam, scilicet si aliquis incidens in latrones promittat eis pecuniam pro sua liberatione, si mutuo eam accipiat ab aliquo suo amico, utrum restituere teneatur;
first, about justice, namely, if someone falling in amongst thieves promises them money for his liberation, whether he is held to restore it if he receives it on loan from some friend of his;
QV.Q9secundo, circa abstinentiam, utrum aliquis peccare possit nimis ieiunando vel vigilando.
second, about abstinence, whether someone can sin by fasting or by keeping vigil too much.
QV.Q9A. 1About justice
Circa iustitiam
About justice
QV.Q9.A1Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui pecuniam accepit mutuo ut redimeret se a latronibus, non teneatur eam restituere.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a man who has received money on loan to redeem himself from thieves is not held to restore it.
QV.Q9.A1.arg1Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, tempore necessitatis sunt omnia communia; sed nullus debet quasi proprium petere id quod est commune, ut Ambrosius dicit, et habetur in Decretis, d. XLVII; cum ergo ille qui in latrones incidit fuerit in maxima necessitate constitutus, utpote in periculo mortis existens, videtur quod factum sit sibi commune id quod erat alterius et ita non teneatur ei restituere qui mutuavit, ac si esset proprium eius.
Obj. 1: Because, as Augustine says, in time of necessity all things are common.1 But no one ought to demand as though proper that which is common, as Ambrose says, and is had in the Decretum (D. 47).2 Since, therefore, that man who fell in amongst thieves was constituted in greatest necessity, namely, in danger of death, it seems that there is made common to him that which was another’s, and thus he is not held to restore to him who loaned, as if it were his property.
QV.Q9.A1.arg2Praeterea. Nullus tenetur facere recompensationem alicui pro eo quod ille facere tenebatur; sed iste qui mutuavit pecuniam, tenebatur proximum suum a mortis periculo liberare, secundum illud Proverbiorum XXIV: erue eos qui ducuntur ad mortem; ergo videtur quod ille qui est liberatus non teneatur ei restituere pecuniam mutuatam.
Obj. 2: No one is held to make recompense to someone for what that man was held to do. But that man who loaned money was held to liberate his neighbor from the danger of death, according to Proverbs 24:11: rescue those who are led unto death. Therefore, it seems that the man who was liberated is not held to restore to him the money loaned.
QV.Q9.A1.arg3Sed contra est quod Dominus dicit Matthaei VII: omnia quae vultis ut faciant vobis homines, et vos facite illis; sed ille qui liberatus est a latronibus vellet sibi restitui, si quid mutuasset; ergo etiam ipse debet restituere quod mutuo accepit.
On the contrary: The Lord says in Matthew 7:12: all things which you will that men should do unto you, you also, do unto those. But that man who was liberated from the thieves would wish it to be restored to him if he had loaned anything. Therefore, he also ought to restore that which he received on loan.
QV.Q9.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod iustitiae actus est unicuique reddere quod sibi debetur. Unde, cum ratione contractus bonae fidei qui fuit inter mutuantem et mutuo accipientem restitutio debeatur, ex iustitiae praecepto tenetur ille qui mutuo accepit pecuniam, eam reddere creditori, et tanto magis quanto in maiori necessitate creditor sibi subvenit.
I answer that the act of justice is to render to each that which is due to him.1 Hence, since by reason of the contract of good faith which was between the one loaning and the one receiving on loan, restitution is due out of a precept of justice, that man who received money on loan is held to return it to his creditor, and so much more as the creditor has helped him in greater necessity.
QV.Q9.A1.coAd primum ergo dicendum quod tunc in necessitate fiunt omnia communia cum homo non potest sibi de suo subvenire; ridiculum enim esset, si quis famem patiens nollet accipere panem quem haberet in archa, et diceret se accipere panem alienum quasi communem. Quae autem per amicos possumus, per nos aliqualiter possumus, ut Philosophus dicit in III Ethicorum. Iste autem qui in latrones incidit potest se per amicos liberare mutuum accipiendo, et ideo non fiunt ei omnia communia.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that then in necessity all things are made common when a man cannot help himself from his own property. For it would be ridiculous if anyone suffering hunger refuses to receive bread which he has in his chest and says that he is receiving another’s bread as though it were common. Yet those things which we can do through friends, we can do somehow through ourselves, as the Philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics.1 Yet that man who falls in amongst thieves can liberate himself through friends by receiving a loan, and for this reason, all things are not made common for him.
QV.Q9.A1.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod unusquisque tenetur ad liberandum proximum a morte secundum suam conditionem et modum, et hoc quidem convenienter implevit ille qui pecuniam mutuavit: non enim tenebatur eam donare in casu quo ille poterat per mutuum liberari.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that each one is held to liberate his neighbor from death according to his condition and mode, and that man indeed fittingly fulfilled this who loaned money: for he was not held to donate it in a case where that man could have been liberated through a loan.
QV.Q9.A1.ad2A. 2About abstinence
Circa abstinentiam
About abstinence
QV.Q9.A2Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non possit peccare nimis ieiunando vel vigilando.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a man cannot sin by fasting or by keeping vigil too much.
QV.Q9.A2.arg1Deus enim non potest nimis ab homine diligi; sed probatio dilectionis est exhibitio operis, ut Gregorius dicit in homelia quadam; ergo videtur quod non possit aliquis peccare nimis ieiunando vel vigilando propter Deum.
Obj. 1: For God cannot be loved by man too much. But the proof of love is the presentation of work, as Gregory says in a certain homily.1 Therefore, it seems that someone cannot sin by fasting or by keeping vigil too much on account of God.
QV.Q9.A2.arg2Sed contra est quod Bernardus confitetur se peccasse de hoc quod nimis corpus suum ieiunio et vigiliis debilitavit.
On the contrary: Bernard confesses that he had sinned in debilitating his body by fasting and by keeping vigil too much.1
QV.Q9.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod, secundum Philosophum in I Politicae, aliter est iudicandum de fine, aliter de his quae sunt ad finem: illud enim quod quaeritur tanquam finis, absque mensura quaerendum est, in his autem quae sunt ad finem est adhibenda mensura secundum proportionem ad finem; sicut medicus sanitatem, quae est finis eius, facit quantumcumque potest perfectiorem, medicinam autem non dat quantumcumque potest maiorem, sed secundum quod convenit ad sanitatem faciendam.
I answer that, according to the Philosopher in the first book of the Politics,1 it must be judged one way concerning the end, and another way concerning what is for the end: for that which is sought as an end must be sought without measure, yet in what is for the end there must be applied a measure according to their proportion unto the end. For example, a medic makes health, which is his end, as however perfect as he can, yet he does not give the most powerful medicine as he can, but according as it accords unto making health.
QV.Q9.A2.coEst igitur considerandum quod in spirituali vita dilectio Dei est sicut finis, ieiunia autem et vigiliae et alia exercitia corporalia non quaeruntur tanquam finis, quia, sicut dicitur Romanorum XIV: non est regnum Dei esca et potus, sed adhibentur tamquam necessaria ad finem, id est ad domandas concupiscentias carnis, secundum illud Apostoli, I ad Corinthios IX: castigo corpus meum et in servitutem redigo etc.; et ideo huiusmodi sunt adhibenda cum quadam mensura rationis, ut scilicet concupiscentia dometur et natura non extinguatur, secundum illud Romanorum XII: exhibeatis corpora vestra hostiam viventem, et postea subdit: rationabile obsequium vestrum.
Therefore, it must be considered that in the spiritual life the love of God is just as the end, yet fasting and vigils and other bodily exercises are not sought just as the end because, as is said in Romans 14:17: the kingdom of God is not food and drink, but they are applied as necessary unto the end, that is, unto mastering the concupiscences of the flesh, according to that saying of the Apostle: I castigate my body and drive it back unto servitude, lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become a castaway (1 Cor 9:27). And for this reason, things of this sort must be applied with a certain measure of reason, namely, in order that concupiscence might be mastered and nature might not be extinguished, according to Romans 12:1: may you present your bodies as a living host, and afterwards he adds: your reasonable service.
QV.Q9.A2Si vero aliquis in tantum virtutem naturae debilitet per ieiunia et vigilias et alia huiusmodi, quod non sufficiat debita opera exequi, puta praedicator praedicare, doctor docere, cantor cantare, et sic de aliis, absque dubio peccat, sicut etiam peccaret vir qui nimia abstinentia se impotentem redderet ad debitum uxori reddendum. Unde Ieronimus dicit: de rapina holocaustum offert qui vel ciborum nimia egestate vel somni penuria inmoderate corpus affligit; et iterum: rationalis homo dignitatem amittit qui ieiunium caritati vel vigilias sensus integritati praefert.
Whereas if someone debilitated the virtue of nature to such an extent through fasting and vigils and other things of this sort that he was unable to pursue due works, for example a preacher to preach, a teacher to teach, a cantor to sing, and thus concerning others, without a doubt he sins, just as also a man would sin who would render himself impotent by too much abstinence unto rendering the debt to his wife. Hence Jerome says: from robbery he offers a holocaust who either by excessive lack of food or by immoderate scarcity of sleep afflicts the body; and again: a reasonable man loses dignity who prefers fasting to charity or vigils to integrity of sense.1
QV.Q9.A2Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
QV.Q9.A2.ad1On things pertaining to precepts
QV.Q9.A2Q. 10On things pertaining to preceptsDe his quae pertinent ad precepta
Deinde circa praecepta quaesita sunt duo:
Then there were two questions about the precepts:
QV.Q10primo, utrum praecepta ordine naturae praecedant consilia;
first, whether the precepts precede the counsels in the order of nature;
QV.Q10secundo, utrum peccata quae fiunt contra praecepta secundae tabulae sint graviora peccatis quae hunt contra praecepta primae tabulae.
second, whether sins which are against the precepts of the second tablet are graver than sins which are against the precepts of the first tablet.
QV.Q10A. 1Whether the precepts precede the counsels in the order of natureUtrum precepta ordine nature precedant consilia
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta ordine nature praecedant consilia.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the precepts precede the counsels in the order of nature.
QV.Q10.A1.arg1Illud enim est prius ordine naturae ad quod natura primo instigat; sed praecepta sunt de primo instinctu naturae, quia sunt de dictamine rationis naturalis, non autem consilia; ergo praecepta sunt priora ordine naturae quam consilia.
Obj. 1: For that to which nature first urges is prior in the order of nature. But the precepts concern the first instinct of nature because they concern a dictum of natural reason, yet not the counsels. Therefore, the precepts are prior in the order of nature to the counsels.
QV.Q10.A1.arg2Sed contra est quia prius natura dicitur aliquid tripliciter. Uno modo, sicut imperfectum est prius perfecto; et hoc modo praecepta non sunt priora consiliis, quia in praeceptis caritatis praecipue consistit perfectio. Secundo, per modum causae tempore praecedentis effectum; et sic etiam non sunt priora, quia non est necessarium quod aliquis prius impleat praecepta quam consilia. Tertio, per modum originis, quando principium est simul tempore, sicut lux solis et radius; sed nec hoc modo praecepta sunt priora, quia non est necesse quod quicumque servat praecepta, servet consilia. Ergo nullo modo praecepta ordine naturae praecedunt consilia.
On the contrary: Something is called prior in nature in three ways. One way is just as the imperfect is prior to the perfect; and in this way, the precepts are not prior to the counsels because perfection consists especially in the precepts of charity. The second way is through the mode of the time of the cause preceding the effect; and thus also they are not prior, because it is not necessary that someone first should fulfill the precepts before the counsels. The third way is through the mode of origin, when the principle is simultaneous in time just as the light of the sun and a ray; but neither in this way are the precepts prior, because it is not necessary for whoever observes the precepts to observe the counsels. Therefore, in no way do the precepts precede the counsels in the order of nature.
QV.Q10.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod circa hoc necesse est duo considerare: primo, quid sit esse prius ordine naturae; secundo, quid sit praeceptum et quid consilium; quibus manifestatis, evidenter apparebit quod quaeritur.
I answer that about this it is necessary to consider two things: first, what it is to be prior in the order of nature; second, what is a precept and what is a counsel. With these made clear, that which is sought will be evidently apparent.
QV.Q10.A1.coDe primo ergo sciendum est quod, secundum Philosophum in V Metaphysicae, prius et posterius dicuntur in quolibet ordine per comparationem ad principium illius ordinis, sicut in loco per comparationem ad principium loci et in disciplinis per comparationem ad principium disciplinae. Sic igitur et in ordine naturae dicitur aliquid esse prius per comparationem ad naturae principia. Quae quidem sunt quatuor causae, unde secundum unumquodque genus causae prius in ordine naturae est quod propinquius est causae. Quamvis autem causae sint quatuor, tres tamen earum, scilicet efficiens, formalis et finalis, concurrunt in idem. Unde relinquitur quod ordo naturae sit duplex: unus quidem secundum rationem causae materialis, secundum quem imperfectum est prius perfecto et potentia actus; alius autem ordo naturae est secundum rationem aliarum trium causarum, secundum quam perfectum est prius imperfecto et actus potentia. Unde et Philosophus dicit in V Metaphysicae quod alia sunt potestate priora, alia perfectione. Et quia forma est magis natura quam materia, ut probatur in II Physicorum, convenientius dicitur esse prius natura actus, qui est prior substantia et specie, ut dicitur in IX Metaphysicae, quam potentia, quae in uno et eodem est prior generatione et tempore. Unde et Philosophus dicit in II Peryermenias quod in his quae contingit esse actu et potestate, ea quae sunt actu, sunt natura priora, tempore posteriora.
Concerning the first, therefore, it must be known that, according to the Philosopher in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, before and after are said in any order through comparison to the principle of that order, just as in place through comparison to the principle of place and in the disciplines through comparison to the principle of the discipline.1 Thus, therefore, also in the order of nature something is said to be prior through comparison to the principles of nature. These, indeed, are the four causes, hence according to each genus of cause what is nearer to the cause is prior in the order of nature. Yet although the causes are four, nevertheless three of these, namely, efficient, formal, and final, concur unto the same.2 Hence it remains that the order of nature is twofold: one, indeed, according to the character of material cause, according to which the imperfect is prior to the perfect and potency to act; yet the other order of nature is according to the character of the other three causes, according to which the perfect is prior to the imperfect and act to potency. Hence also the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the Metaphysics that some things are prior in power, others in perfection.3 And because form is more nature than matter, as is proven in the second book of the Physics,4 more fittingly is act said to be prior in nature which is prior in substance and species, as is said in the ninth book of the Metaphysics,5 to potency, which in one and the same thing is prior in generation and in time. Hence also the Philosopher says in the second book of On Interpretation that in these things which happen to be by act and potency, those which are in act are prior in nature, posterior in time.6
QV.Q10.A1Circa secundum vero, id est circa rationem consilii et praecepti, considerandum est quod praeceptum importat rationem debiti. Debitum autem est aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum se; et hoc modo finis est debitus in unoquoque negotio: medicus enim propter se debet quaerere sanitatem. Alio modo est aliquid debitum propter aliud, scilicet id sine quo non potest perveniri ad finem, sicut medicus debet indicere dietam infirmo sine qua non potest sanari. Illud vero quod ordinatur in finem ut melius aut facilius aliquis finem consequatur, si sine hoc possit aliqualiter haberi finis, non habet rationem debiti.
Whereas about the second, that is, about the character of counsel and of precept, it must be considered that precept implies the character of something due. Yet something is due in two ways. One way is according to itself; and in this way, what is due is the end in each business; for a doctor on account of himself ought to seek health. Another way something is due is on account of another, namely, that without which it could not arrive at the end, just as a medic ought to indicate the treatment for the infirm without which he cannot be healed. Whereas, concerning that which is ordered unto the end, that someone might attain the end better or more easily, if without this the end could be had in some way, this does not have the character of something due.
QV.Q10.A1Finis autem spiritualis vitae, quae lege divina ordinatur, est duplex: unus quidem principalis, scilicet adherere Deo per caritatem, unde dicitur I ad Timothaeum I: finis praecepti caritas est; alius autem est finis secundarius quasi dispositivus, scilicet puritas et rectitudo cordis, quae consistit in interioribus actibus aliarum virtutum, unde Apostolus dicit ad Romanos VI: habetis fructum vestrum in sanctificatione. Sicut et in generatione naturali finis est et ipsa forma substantialis et ultima dispositio ad formam.
Yet the end of the spiritual life, which is ordered by divine law, is twofold: one, indeed, is principal, namely, to adhere to God through charity. Hence it is said in 1 Timothy 1:5: the end of the precept is charity. Yet the other end is secondary as though dispositive, namely, purity and rectitude of heart, which consists in the interior acts of the other virtues, hence the Apostle says in Romans 6:22: you have your fruit in sanctification. Just as also in natural generation the end is both the substantial form itself and the ultimate disposition unto form.
QV.Q10.A1Unde manifestum est quod principalia praecepta divina sunt quidem de dilectione Dei et proximi, ut patet Matthaei XXII, secundaria vero de interiori sanctificatione, secundum illud I ad Thessalonicenses IV: haec est voluntas Dei, sanctificatio vestra. Omnia vero alia quae sunt spiritualis vitae ordinantur ad praedicta sicut in finem, sed dupliciter: quaedam enim sunt talia sine quibus praedicti fines esse non possunt, et haec cadunt sub praecepto, sicut: non habebis deos alienos, non furtum facies, etc.; quaedam autem sunt sine quibus ad praedictos fines perveniri potest, unde non cadunt sub praecepto, sed, quia per huiusmodi facilius et melius pervenitur ad fines praedictos, dantur de eis consilia, sicut de paupertate, virginitate et aliis huiusmodi. Et est simile sicut si aliquis deberet ex praecepto esse Romae certo die: teneretur etiam ex debito praecepti Romam ire, non autem teneretur ex praecepto ire eques, quia sine hoc posset Romam pervenire, tamen caderet hoc sub consilio, in quantum equitando facilius et melius perveniret ad finem.
Hence it is clear that the principal divine precepts indeed concern love of God and neighbor, as is clear in Matthew 22:37–40, whereas the secondary concern interior sanctification, according to 1 Thessalonians 4:3: this is the will of God, your sanctification. Whereas all other things of the spiritual life are ordered to the aforesaid things just as unto the end, but in two ways: for certain things are such without which the aforesaid ends cannot be, and these fall under precept, such as: thou shalt not have alien gods, thou shalt not steal, and so on.1 Yet there are certain others without which it can arrive at the aforesaid ends. Hence they do not fall under precept, but, because through things of this sort it arrives at the aforesaid ends more easily and better, counsels are given concerning them just as concerning poverty, virginity, and other things of this sort. And it is similar to how if someone were due by a precept to be in Rome on a fixed day: he would be held to go to Rome also by the debt of a precept, yet he would not be held by a precept to go as a horseman, because without this he could arrive at Rome. Nevertheless, this would fall under counsel inasmuch as by riding he would arrive at the end more easily and better.2
QV.Q10.A1His igitur visis, patet de facili id quod quaerebatur.
Therefore, with these things having been seen, that which was sought is easily clear.
QV.Q10.A1Si enim comparemus consilia ad praecepta finalia, quae sunt de dilectione Dei et proximi et de interiori cordis puritate, manifestum est quod praecepta sunt priora consiliis naturaliter ordine perfectionis, sicut actus naturaliter prior potentia et finis his quae sunt ad finem; sed consilia erant priora naturaliter ordine generationis <et> temporis, in quantum scilicet per consilia ad puritatem perfectam cordis et perfectam dilectionem Dei et proximi pervenimus.
For if we compare the counsels to the final precepts, which concern love of God and neighbor and interior purity of heart, it is clear that the precepts are prior to the counsels naturally in the order of perfection, just as act naturally is prior to potency, and the end to these things which are under the end. But the counsels naturally were prior in the order of generation and of time, namely, inasmuch as through the counsels we arrive unto perfect purity of heart and perfect love of God and neighbor.
QV.Q10.A1Si autem comparemus consilia ad alia praecepta quae ordinantur ex necessitate in praedictos fines, sic erit duplex consideratio: nam in consiliis necesse est ut includantur praecepta, qui enim omnia dimittit, non rapit aliena, et qui virginitatem servat, non moechatur; sicut etiam qui equitat vadit, sed non convertitur.
Yet if we compare the counsels to the other precepts which are ordered out of necessity unto the aforesaid ends, thus there will be a twofold consideration: for in the counsels it is necessary for the precepts to be included, for he who dismisses all things does not steal another’s things, and he who preserves virginity does not commit adultery. So too he who rides a horse goes, but the converse does not hold.
QV.Q10.A1Erit ergo una comparatio consiliorum ad praecepta absolute considerata; et sic hoc modo praecepta erunt ordine naturae priora consiliis, sicut genus est naturaliter prius specie; consilia autem e converso posteriora naturaliter praeceptis, sicut species sunt posteriora secundum naturam quam genera, ut patet per Philosophum in I Physicorum: comparatur enim genus ad speciem sicut potentia ad actum, praecepta autem absolute sumpta se habent per modum generis ad observantiam praeceptorum cum consiliis et sine consiliis, sicut non moechari ad non moechari cum virginitate et ad non moechari cum matrimonio, et ire commune est ad ire equitem et ad ire peditem.
Therefore, there will be one comparison of counsels to precepts considered absolutely, and in this way, the precepts will be prior to the counsels in the order of nature, just as genus naturally is prior to species. Yet the counsels, conversely, will be naturally posterior to the precepts, just as species are naturally posterior to genera. This is clear from the Philosopher in the first book of the Physics:1 for genus is compared to species just as potency to act, yet the precepts taken absolutely relate like a genus to the observance of the precepts, with the counsels or without the counsels. This is how not committing adultery relates to not committing adultery as a virgin or as married, and to go, commonly speaking, relates to going on horseback and unto going on foot.
QV.Q10.A1Alia vero comparatio est consiliorum ad praecepta sine consiliis observata, sicut si comparemus euntem in equo ad eum qui vadit pedibus: similis enim est comparatio virginis seu continentis ad matrimonio utentem, et pauperis propter Christum ad eum qui in saeculo suis contentus est; et sic simpliciter ordine naturae consilia sunt priora praeceptis tamquam perfecta imperfectis. Nec oportet quod praecepta sic accepta praecedant naturaliter ordine generationis et temporis consilia: non enim oportet quod ille qui vult continentiam vel virginitatem servare, prius matrimonio iungatur, neque etiam oportet quod ille qui vult esse pauper propter Christum, prius saecularem vitam agat in qua suis divitiis sit contentus, sicut etiam non oportet quod ille qui vult ire eques Romam prius vadat pedes et postea eques, sed melius est si a principio eques vadat.
Whereas the other comparison is of counsels to precepts without the counsels observed, just as if we compare one going on horse to him who goes on foot: for it is similar to the comparison of a virgin or a continent man to one using matrimony, and of a pauper on account of Christ to him who is content with his own things in the world. And in this way, the counsels are prior to the precepts absolutely in the order of nature just as the perfect to the imperfect. Nor is it necessary for the precepts thus received naturally to precede the counsels in the order of generation and of time: for it is not necessary that that man who wills to preserve continence or virginity first should be joined in matrimony, nor also is it necessary that that man who wills to be a pauper on account of Christ should live first a secular life in which he is content with his own riches, just as also it is not necessary that that man who wills to go on horseback to Rome should go first on foot and afterwards on horseback, but it is better if from the beginning he goes on horseback.
QV.Q10.A1Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
QV.Q10.A1.ad1A. 2Whether sins which are done against the precepts of the second tablet are graver than sins which are done against the precepts of the first tabletUtrum peccata quae fiunt contra precepta secundae tabulae sint graviora peccatis quae fiunt contra precepta primae tabul
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata quae sunt contra praecepta secundae tabulae sint graviora peccatis quae sunt contra praecepta primae tabulae.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that sins which are against the precepts of the second tablet are graver than sins which are against the precepts of the first tablet.
QV.Q10.A2.arg1Peccatum enim contra praecepta secundae tabulae est, contempto bono incommutabili, commutabili bono adherere, sicut patet in furto et adulterio et aliis huiusmodi; sed contemptus incommutabilis boni est peccatum contra praecepta primae tabulae, quibus ordinamur ad exhibendam reverentiam Deo; ergo peccata quae sunt contra praecepta secundae tabulae includunt peccata quae sunt contra praecepta primae tabulae, et aliquid addunt; ergo sunt graviora.
Obj. 1: For, with the immutable good spurned, it is a sin against the precepts of the second tablet to adhere to a mutable good, just as is clear in theft and adultery and other things of this sort. But contempt of the immutable good is sin against the precepts of the first tablet, by which we are ordered to give reverence to God. Therefore, sins which are against the precepts of the second tablet include sins which are against the precepts of the first tablet, and which add something. Therefore, they are graver.
QV.Q10.A2.arg2Praeterea. Symonia est maximum peccatum; sed symonia, cum sit species avaritiae, est contra praecepta secundae tabulae; ergo peccata quae sunt contra praecepta secundae tabulae sunt graviora.
Obj. 2: Simony is the greatest sin;1 but simony, since it is a species of avarice, is against the precepts of the second tablet. Therefore, the sins which are against the precepts of the second tablet are graver.
QV.Q10.A2.arg3Sed contra est quod peccata contra praecepta primae tabulae sunt infidelitas, desperatio et alia huiusmodi, quae sunt gravisssima peccata; ergo peccata quae sunt contra praecepta primae tabulae sunt graviora.
On the contrary: Infidelity, despair, and other things of this sort, which are the gravest sins, are sins against the precepts of the first tablet. Therefore, sins which are against the precepts of the first tablet are graver.
QV.Q10.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod formalis ratio peccati mortalis consistit in aversione a Deo: si enim esset inordinata conversio ad bonum commutabile sine aversione a Deo, non esset peccatum mortale. Praecepta autem primae tabulae secundum se ordinant directe hominem in Deum, unde dicuntur ad dilectionem Dei pertinere; et ideo peccata quae sunt contra praecepta primae tabulae directe et per se important aversionem a Deo. Peccata autem quae sunt contra praecepta secundae tabulae, per se quidem deordinant nos principaliter circa bona commutabilia, circa quae ordinamur per praecepta secundae tabulae, ex consequenti autem deordinant nos a Deo. In unoquoque autem genere potissimum est id quod est per se, unde peccata quae sunt contra praecepta primae tabulae, secundum suum genus sunt gravissima in genere peccatorum.
I answer that the formal character of mortal sin consists in aversion from God:1 for if there were inordinate turning to a mutable good without aversion from God, it would not be mortal sin. Yet the precepts of the first tablet according to themselves order man directly unto God, hence they are said to pertain to love of God. And for this reason, sins which are against the precepts of the first tablet directly and through themselves involve aversion from God. Yet sins which are against the precepts of the second tablet through themselves disorder us principally about mutable goods (about which we are ordered through the precepts of the second tablet), yet consequently they disorder us from God. Yet in each genus that which is according to itself is foremost, hence sins which are against the precepts of the first tablet, according to their genus, are gravest in the genus of sins.
QV.Q10.A2.coAd primum ergo dicendum quod contemptus Dei per se intentus est in peccatis quae sunt contra praecepta primae tabulae. Sic autem non ex necessitate includitur in peccatis quae sunt contra praecepta secundae tabulae: non enim ille qui fornicatur, intendit hoc agere in contemptum Dei, sed intendit principaliter delectari, ad quod consequitur quod Deum contemnat, praeter principalem intentionem mandata eius transgrediens.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that contempt of God itself is intended in sins which are against the precepts of the first tablet. Yet this is not by necessity included in sins which are against the precepts of the second tablet: for a man who fornicates does not intend to do so in contempt of God, but he intends principally to be delighted, upon which it follows that he spurns God, transgressing his mandates beyond his principal intention.
QV.Q10.A2.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod symonia non est maximum peccatum simpliciter, sed maximum inter illa quae committuntur circa contractus pecuniarios, et hoc etiam est ex hoc quod inreverenter se habet homo ad res sacras, in quo attingit peccata quae sunt contra praecepta primae tabulae.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that simony is not the greatest sin absolutely, but greatest amongst those which are committed about pecuniary contracts, and this because such a man conducts himself irreverently towards sacred things, in which he touches sins which are against the precepts of the first tablet.
QV.Q10.A2.ad2Quantum ad ea quae pertinent ad quosdam hominum status
Regarding things pertaining to certain states of men
QV.Q10.A2Q. 11Regarding prelates
Ad praelatos
Regarding prelates
QV.Q11Deinde quaesitum est de his quae pertinent specialiter ad quosdam hominum status;
Then there were questions concerning what pertains especially to certain states of men:
QV.Q11et primo de his quae pertinent ad praelatos;
and first, concerning what pertains to prelates;1
QV.Q11secundo de his quae pertinent ad doctores;
second, concerning what pertains to teachers;1
QV.Q11tertio de his quae pertinent ad religiosos;
third, concerning what pertains to religious;1
QV.Q11quarto de pertinentibus ad clericos.
fourth, concerning what pertains to clerics.1
QV.Q11Circa primum quaesita sunt tria:
About the first, there were three questions:
QV.Q11primo, utrum beatus Matthaeus vocatus sit statim de theloneo ad statum apostolatus et perfectionis;
first, whether blessed Matthew was called at once from the customs post to the state of the apostolate and of perfection;
QV.Q11secundo, utrum ille qui eligitur canonice in episcopum melius faciat consentiendo electioni de se factae vel eam recusando;
second, whether a man canonically elected to the episcopacy does better by consenting to his election or by refusing it;
QV.Q11tertio, utrum praelatus qui dat beneficium ecclesiasticum alicui suo consanguineo, sperans per hoc suum genus exaltari et ditari, committat symoniam.
third, whether a prelate who gives an ecclesiastical benefice to some relative of his, hoping through this that his family will be exalted and enriched, commits simony.
QV.Q11A. 1Whether blessed Matthew was called at once from the customs post to the state of the apostolate and of perfectionUtrum beatus Matthaeus vocatus sit statim de theloneo ad statum apostolatus et perfectionis
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatus Matthaeus non fuerit vocatus statim de theloneo ad statum apostolatus et perfectionis.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems blessed Matthew was not called at once from the customs post to the state of the apostolate and of perfection.
QV.Q11.A1.arg1Dicit enim Gregorius super Ezechielem: nemo repente fit summus; sed status apostolatus et perfectionis evangelicae est summus status humanae vitae; ergo Matthaeus non fuit statim vocatus ad statum perfectionis et apostolatus.
Obj. 1: For Gregory says in his commentary on Ezekiel: no one is made highest at once.1 But the state of the apostolate and of evangelical perfection is the highest state of human life. Therefore, Matthew was not called at once to the state of perfection and of the apostolate.
QV.Q11.A1.arg2Sed contra est quod Ieronimus dicit super Matthaeum, quod de publicano repente fit apostolus; et Beda dicit super Lucam quod de publicano in apostolum, de theloneario in evangelistam est mutatus; et quaedam glossa dicit Lucae V quod nullam prorsus cogitationem vel respectum huius vitae sibi reservavit, quod est perfectionis evangelicae; ergo statim vocatus est ad statum apostolatus et perfectionis.
On the contrary: Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew that from a publican immediately he was made an Apostle;1 and Bede says in his commentary on Luke that from a publican to an apostle, from a customs official to an evangelist he was changed;2 and a certain gloss on Luke 5 says that straightaway, he reserved for himself no thought or respect of this life,3 which is of evangelical perfection. Therefore, at once he was called to the state of the apostolate and of perfection.
QV.Q11.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod quaestio ista ex verbis Evangelii determinari potest.
I answer that the question can be determined by the words of the Gospel.
QV.Q11.A1.coSi enim loquamur de apostolatu, manifestum est secundum narrationem Matthaei, Marci et Lucae, quod Dominus post vocationem Matthaei aliquanto spatio temporis interiecto ex suis discipulis duodecim apostolos elegit, inter quos unus fuit Matthaeus. Et sic patet quod statim a principio fuit vocatus ad discipulatum Christi, non autem ad apostolatum. Nisi secundum praeordinationem Christi, qui eum in apostolum sumendum disponebat: et secundum hoc intelligenda sunt verba Ieronimi et Bedae.
For if we speak concerning the apostolate, it is clear according to the narrative of Matthew, Mark, and Luke1 that the Lord after the call of Matthew, with some space of time interjected, elected twelve Apostles out of his disciples, amongst whom one was Matthew. And thus, it is clear that at once from the beginning he was called to the discipleship of Christ, yet not to the apostolate: unless this is meant according to the predestination of Christ, who disposed him to assume the apostolate. And the words of Jerome and Bede must be understood in this way.
QV.Q11.A1Si autem loquamur de perfectione evangelica, sic manifestum est quod statim a principio vocatus est ad statum perfectionis: dicitur enim Lucae V quod surgens, relictis omnibus, secutus est eum, quod etiam ad discipulatum Christi pertinebat, secundum illud quod dicitur Lucae XIV: nisi quis renuntiaverit omnibus quae possidet, non potest meus esse discipulus.
Yet if we speak concerning evangelical perfection, it is clear that at once from the beginning he was called to the state of perfection: for it is said in Luke 5:28 that rising, with all things forsaken, he followed him, which also pertained to the discipleship of Christ, according to what is said in Luke 14:33: unless anyone should have renounced all things which he possesses, he cannot be my disciple.
QV.Q11.A1Ad primum ergo dicendum quod summum in vita humana potest accipi dupliciter.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the highest in human life can be understood in two ways.
QV.Q11.A1.ad1Uno modo secundum comparationem status ad statum, secundum quod in humana vita unus status est maior alio et aliquis est summus; et sic nihil prohibet aliquem fieri repente summum, id est attingere ad statum summum.
One way is according to the comparison of state to state, since in human life one state is greater than another, and another is highest. And thus, nothing prohibits someone from becoming highest immediately, that is, from reaching the highest state.
QV.Q11.A1Et hoc apparet tam in spirituali vita quam in saeculari. Inveniuntur enim aliqui statim a pueritia ad statum religionis, qui est perfectissimus, convolasse, vel proprio arbitrio, sicut beatus Iohannes Baptista et beatus Benedictus, vel etiam devotione parentum, sicut illi qui monasteriis traduntur a parentibus: sic enim non oportet ut aliquis in saeculari vita exerceatur ante quam ad religionem transeat, sicut non oportet quod aliquis exerceatur in laicali vita ante quam clericus fiat.
And this is apparent both in the spiritual life and in the secular. For certain men are found at once from boyhood to have flocked together to the state of religion, which is most perfect, either by their own proper will, just as blessed John the Baptist and blessed Benedict, or even by the devotion of their parents, just as those men who are handed over to monasteries by their parents: for in this way it is not necessary for anyone to be practiced in the secular life before he crosses over to religion, just as it is not necessary for someone to be practiced in a lay life before he becomes a cleric.
QV.Q11.A1Similiter etiam aliqui repente assumuntur ad regnum, vel ab ipsa pueritia, sicut Salomon et Ioas, reges Iuda, vel etiam ex ultimo statu, sicut Saul; et Ecclesiastes VI dicitur: quod de carcere catenisque interdum quis ad regnum egreditur.
Similarly, some men immediately are assumed unto the kingship, either from boyhood itself, just as Solomon1 and Joash,2 the kings of Judah, or even out of the last state, just as Saul;3 and in Ecclesiastes 4:14 it is said: because out of prison and chains sometimes someone comes forth unto the kingship.
QV.Q11.A1Alio modo potest accipi summum secundum comparationem graduum quibus proficit perfectio unius hominis; et sic intelligit Gregorius quod nemo repente fit summus. Dicit enim Augustinus super canonica Iohannis quod caritas non mox ut nascitur . . . perfecta est: nam ut perficiatur, nascitur; cum fuerit nata, nutritur; cum fuerit nutrita, roboratur; cum fuerit roborata, perficitur. Contingit tamen quandoque quod unus homo repente incipit ab altiori gradu sanctitatis quam sit summum ad quod pertingit profectus alterius hominis, ut patet de beato Benedicto de quo Gregorius dicit in II Dialogorum quod presentes et secuturi omnes agnoscant, Benedictus puer conversationis gratiam a tanta perfectione cepisset.
In another way, the highest can be understood according to the comparison of grades by which the perfection of one man advances. And in this way, Gregory understands that no one immediately is made highest.1 For Augustine says in his commentary on the canonical epistles of John that charity is not perfect . . . as soon as it is born: for in order that it might be perfected, it is born; when it has been born, it is nourished; when it has been nourished, it is strengthened; when it has been strengthened, it is perfected.2 Nevertheless, it happens sometimes that one man immediately begins from a grade of sanctity that is higher than the highest advancement which another man reaches, as is clear concerning blessed Benedict, concerning whom Gregory says in the second book of the Dialogues that all men, present and to follow, recognize the boy Benedict had grasped the grace of living from such great perfection.3
QV.Q11.A1A. 2Whether a man elected canonically to the episcopacy does better by consenting to his election or by refusing itUtrum ille qui eligitur canonice in episcopum melius faciat consentiendo electioni de se factae vel eam recusando
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod melius faciat qui consentit electioni canonice de se factae quam qui eam recusat.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that one does better who consents to his canonical election than one who refuses it.
QV.Q11.A2.arg1Dicit enim Gregorius, XXII Moralium: potestas cum percipitur non ex libidine, amanda est; sed quando aliquis per canonicam electionem episcopalem dignitatem adipiscitur, non percipit eam ex libidine; ergo debet eam amare; non ergo debet eam recusare.
Obj. 1: For Gregory says in the twenty-second book of Morals on the Book of Job: power when it is secured not out of lust, must be loved.1 But when someone through canonical election obtains the episcopal dignity, he does not secure it out of lust. Therefore, he should love it. Therefore, he should not refuse it.
QV.Q11.A2.arg2Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, XVIII Moralium, quod praelatio per meliorem intentionem fugienda est.
On the contrary: Gregory says in the eighteenth book of Morals on the Book of Job that the prelacy through better intention1 must be fled.
QV.Q11.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod in eo qui electioni canonicae de se factae consentit, considerari praecipue debet quid intendit. Si enim intendit aliquid temporale, puta honorem, divitias, excutere se a iugo religionis, aut aliquid huiusmodi, manifestum est quod est prava intentio; unde melius faceret si non assentiret. Si autem intendit profectum Ecclesiae, sic planum est quod est bona intentio; unde Augustinus dicit XIX De civitate Dei: in actione non amandus est honor in hac vita sive potentia . . . sed opus ipsum . . . , si recte atque utiliter fit, id est ut valeat ad salutem subditorum; et inducit illud Apostoli quod habetur I ad Timotheum III: si quis episcopatum desiderat, bonum opus desiderat.
I answer that he who consents to his canonical election should especially consider what he intends. For if he intends something temporal, for example honor, riches, to shake himself off from the yoke of religion, or something of this sort, it is clear that it is a depraved intention; hence he would do better to not assent. Yet if he intends the advancement of the Church, thus it is plain that it is a good intention; hence Augustine says in the nineteenth book of On the City of God: in action honor or power must not be loved in this life . . . but the work itself . . . , if it is done rightly and usefully, that is, in order that it might prevail unto the salvation of one’s subjects,1 and he introduces that saying of the Apostle: if anyone should desire the episcopacy, he desires a good work (1 Tim 3:1).
QV.Q11.A2.coSed tamen sciendum est quod ad hoc opus maxima requiritur idoneitas, quia, ut Gregorius dicit in Pastorali: tantum actionem populi debet actio transcendere praesulis, quantum distare solet a grege vita pastoris; ad quod humana fragilitas secundum proprias vires sufficiens non est, secundum illud Apostoli, II ad Corinthios II: et ad haec quis tam idoneus? Sed tamen ex auxilio gratiae divinae homines idonei et sufficientes redduntur, sicut ipse postmodum subdit: idoneos nos fecit ministros Novi Testamenti.
But nevertheless, it must be known that for this work the greatest suitability is required, as Gregory says in the Book of Pastoral Rule: so much ought the action of a prelate to transcend the action of the people, as much as the life of a pastor is accustomed to be distant from the flock.1 Human fragility, according to its own powers, is not sufficient for this, according to that saying of the Apostle: and unto these things is anyone so suitable? (2 Cor 2:16). But nevertheless, men are rendered suitable and sufficient by the aid of divine grace, just as he himself adds afterwards: he has made us suitable ministers of the New Testament (2 Cor 3:6).
QV.Q11.A2Potest ergo aliquis laudabiliter, considerans proprium defectum, ex humilitate officium praelationis recusare, sicut Ieremias dixit: nescio loqui, quia puer ego sum; potest etiam laudabiliter consentire ex caritate fraterna, ut salutem proximorum procuret, sicut Isaias qui dixit: ecce ego, mitte me. Sed, sicut Gregorius dicit in Pastorali: in utroque est subtiliter intuendum, quia et is qui recusavit plene non restitit; et is qui mitti voluit, ante se per altaris calculum purgatum vidit; ne aut non purgatus adire quisque sacra ministeria audeat, aut quem superna gratia elegit, sub humilitatis specie supernae dispositioni contradicat. Quia ergo valde difficile est purgatum se quemlibet posse cognoscere, praelationis officium tutius declinatur, non tamen pertinaciter, cum ad suscipiendum hoc superna voluntas agnoscitur.
Therefore, someone laudably, with consideration of his own defect, can refuse the office of the prelacy out of humility, just as Jeremiah says: I do not know how to speak, because I am a boy.1 He also can consent laudably out of fraternal charity in order to procure the salvation of his neighbors, just as Isaiah who said: behold me, send me.2 But, just as Gregory says in the Book of Pastoral Rule: in both it must be considered subtly, because both he who has refused does not resist fully; and he who willed to be sent, before himself sees a purged coal of the altar; lest either not purged anyone should dare to go unto the sacred ministries, or he whom heavenly grace elects, under the appearance of humility should contradict a heavenly disposition.3 Because therefore it is very difficult that whoever should be able to know himself purged, the office of the prelacy more safely is declined, nevertheless not pertinaciously, when the heavenly will is recognized unto receiving this.4
QV.Q11.A2Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud verbum Gregorii non debet sic intelligi: potestas, cum non ex libidine percipitur, amanda est, sed ita: potestas, cum percipitur, non est amanda ex libidine; subdit enim: sed ex longanimitate toleranda.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that that word of Gregory should not be understood thus: power, when it is not secured out of lust, must be loved, but thus: power, when it is secured, must not be loved out of lust; for he adds: but out of longsuffering to be tolerated.1
QV.Q11.A2.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod melior est intentio praelationem fugientium secundum proprium desiderium, dummodo non assit necessitas ex parte imponentis hoc onus. Unde Augustinus dicit XIX De civitate Dei: superior locus, sine quo regi populus non potest, etsi ita teneatur . . . ut decet, tamen indecenter appetitur; otium enim sanctum quaerit caritas veritatis, negotium iustum suscipit necessitas caritatis.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the intention of those fleeing the prelacy is better according to their own desire, provided that necessity is not present on the part of the one imposing this burden. Hence Augustine says in the nineteenth book of On the City of God: the superior place, without which the people cannot be ruled, although let it be held thus . . . as is befitting, nevertheless is desired indecently; for the charity of truth seeks holy leisure, the necessity of charity receives just business.1
QV.Q11.A2.ad2A. 3Whether a prelate who gives an ecclesiastical benefice to some relative of his, hoping through this that his family will be exalted and enriched, commits simonyUtrum praelatus qui dat beneficium ecclesiasticum alicui suo consanguineo sperans per hoc suum genus exaltari et ditari,
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod praelatus qui dat beneficium ecclesiasticum alicui suo consanguineo vel amico, ut alii eius consanguinei exaltentur, symoniam committat.
To the third we proceed thus. It seems that a prelate who gives an ecclesiastical benefice to some relative or friend of his, in order that other relatives of his might be exalted, commits simony.
QV.Q11.A3.arg1Est enim symonia studiosa voluntas emendi vel vendendi aliquid spirituale aut spirituali annexum; sed in casu praedicto videtur esse emptio vel venditio rei spiritualis, quia in his potest esse emptio et venditio in quibus est liberalitas, hic autem hoc speratur ut liberaliter recompenset; ergo est ibi symonia.
Obj. 1: For simony is an intentional will of buying or selling something spiritual or annexed to the spiritual.1 But in the aforesaid case there seems to be the buying or selling of a spiritual thing because there can be buying and selling in these things in which there is liberality,2 yet here he hopes to be recompensed liberally. Therefore, there is simony here.
QV.Q11.A3.arg2Sed contra est quod super illud Isaiae XXXIII: beatus qui excutit manus suas ab omni munere, dicit Gregorius quod triplex est munus, a manu, a lingua, ab obsequio, quorum nullum est in proposito casu; ergo non est ibi symonia.
On the contrary: Commenting on Isaiah 33:15, blessed is he who shakes his hands off from every gift, Gregory says that a gift is threefold, from the hand, from the tongue, from service,1 none of which is in the proposed case.2 Therefore, there is not simony there.
QV.Q11.A3.scResponsio. Dicendum quod, cum symonia circa emptionem et venditionem consistat, hic distinguendum videtur, quia, si praelatus intendit obligare eum cui dat beneficium ecclesiasticum ad aliquam recompensationem temporalem faciendam sibi vel suis consanguineis, intentio symoniaca est: intendit enim quandam tacitam venditionem. Si vero non intendat ad hoc eum obligare, sed intendat quod ille sibi vel suis propria sponte temporaliter recompenset, est quidem prava intentio et carnalis, sed non symoniaca.
I answer that, since simony consists of buying and selling, a distinction seems to be needed because, if a prelate intends to obligate someone to whom he gives an ecclesiastical benefice with making some temporal recompense to himself or to his relatives, the intention is simoniacal: for he intends a certain tacit selling. Whereas if he does not intend to obligate him to this, but intends for that man to recompense himself or his own temporally by his own free will, there is a certain depraved and carnal intention, but not a simoniacal one.
QV.Q11.A3.coAd primum ergo dicendum quod secundum Philosophum in IV Ethicorum, liberalitas non est circa quemlibet usum pecuniae, sed circa dationes et sumptus; symonia autem est circa emptionem et venditionem.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that according to the Philosopher in the fourth book of the Ethics, liberality is not about any use of money, but about givings and takings.1 Yet simony is about buying and selling.
QV.Q11.A3.ad1Q. 12Regarding teachers
Ad doctores
Regarding teachers
QV.Q12Deinde circa doctores quaesita sunt duo:
Then about teachers, there were two questions:
QV.Q12primo, si doctor semper praedicavit aut docuit principaliter propter inanem gloriam, utrum habeat aureolam, si in morte poeniteat;
first, if a teacher always preached or taught principally out of vainglory, whether he should have a halo if he repents at death;
QV.Q12secundo, utrum, si ex doctrina alicuius doctoris aliqui revocentur a meliori bono, utrum ille doctor teneatur illam doctrinam revocare?
second, if by the teaching of some teacher, some men are called back from a better good, whether that teacher is held to revoke that teaching.
QV.Q12A. 1If a teacher always preached or taught principally out of vainglory, whether he should have a halo if he repents at death
Si doctor semper praedicavit aut docuit principaliter propter inanem gloriam, utrum habeat aureolam, si in morte poeniteat
If a teacher always preached or taught principally out of vainglory, whether he should have a halo if he repents at death
QV.Q12.A1Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui semper propter inanem gloriam docuit, per poenitentiam aureolam recuperet.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a man who always taught out of vainglory would regain a halo through penance.
QV.Q12.A1.arg1Aureola enim doctrinae debetur fructui, scilicet conversioni fidelium, secundum illud Philippensium IV: gaudium meum et corona mea; sed potuit contingere quod ex praedicatione eius qui propter inanem gloriam principaliter praedicavit, secutus est fructus conversionis fidelium; ergo, si poeniteat, debetur ei aureola.
Obj. 1: For the halo of doctrine is due to fruit, namely, to the conversion of the faithful, according to Philippians 4:1: my joy and my crown. But it could be that from the preaching of someone who preached principally from vainglory there followed the fruit of the conversion of the faithful. Therefore, if he repents, a halo is due to him.
QV.Q12.A1.arg2Praeterea. Sicut virginitati debetur aureola, ita et doctrinae; sed, si illa quae, cum virgo sit carne, mente tamen est corrupta, poenitentiam agat, recuperat aureolam; ergo pari ratione et doctor qui propter inanem gloriam praedicavit.
Obj. 2: Just as a halo is due to virginity, so also to doctrine. But, if that woman who, although she is a virgin in the flesh, nevertheless is corrupt in mind, does penance, she regains her halo. Therefore, for the same reason this applies to a teacher who preached out of vainglory.
QV.Q12.A1.arg3Sed contra est quod opera mortua per poenitentiam non reviviscunt; sed opera istius doctoris propter inanem gloriam praedicantis fuerunt mortua, id est cum peccato facta; ergo non reviviscunt per poenitentiam ad proemium consequendum.
On the contrary: Dead works do not revive through repentance.1 But the works of that teacher were dead on account of vainglory, that is, since they were done in sin. Therefore, they do not revive through repentance so as to attain a reward.
QV.Q12.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod, cum aureola importet quandam singularem excellentiam proemii, necesse est quod praesupponat auream, sicut comparativum praesupponit positivum; et hoc significatur Exodi XXV, ubi dicitur: facies . . . super coronam auream alteram . . . aureolam; et ideo qui non meretur auream, id est premium essentiale, non meretur aureolam. Qui autem propter inanem gloriam operantur, non merentur proemium essentiale, quia receperunt mercedem suam, ut dicitur Matthaei VI; unde nec merentur aureolam. Poenitentia autem restituit homini merita prius habita, non autem confert ei ea quae non habuit, nisi in quantum ipse motus poenitentiae est meritorius. Unde talis non meretur aureolam.
I answer that, since a halo implies a certain singular excellence of reward, it is necessary that it presupposes gold just as the comparative presupposes the positive;1 and this is signified in Exodus 25, where it is said: you shall make . . . upon the golden crown, another . . . halo.2 And for this reason, he who does not merit gold, that is, essential reward, does not merit a halo. Yet those who work out of vainglory do not merit essential reward because they have received their reward (Matt 6:2). Hence neither do they merit a halo. While repentance restores to man merits had before, it does not confer upon him those which he did not have, unless inasmuch as the movement itself of repentance is meritorious. Hence such a man does not merit a halo.
QV.Q12.A1.coAd primum ergo dicendum quod conversioni fidelium debetur aureola, praesupposito merito essentialis proemii in eo qui praedicavit; alioquin locum habet quod dicitur Matthaei XVI: quid prodest homini, si universum mundum lucretur, animae vero suae detrimentum patiatur?
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that a halo is due to the conversion of the faithful, with the merit of essential reward presupposed in him who preached. Otherwise, it has the place which is said in Matthew 16:26: what does it profit a man, if he should gain the whole world, but suffer the detriment of his soul?
QV.Q12.A1.ad1Ad secundum dicendum quod aureola virginitatis debetur integritati carnis, quae manet post poenitentiam, et ideo debetur virgini poenitenti aureola; sed aureola doctrinae debetur actui doctoris, qui transit, et ideo post poenitentiam non debetur aureola doctori, nisi actus reiteretur.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the halo of virginity is due to the integrity of the flesh, which remains after repentance, and for this reason, a halo is due to the penitent virgin. But the halo of doctrine is due to the act of a teacher, which is passing, and for this reason, after repentance a halo is not due to the teacher unless the act is repeated.
QV.Q12.A1.ad2A. 2Whether, if by the teaching of some teacher some men are called back from a better good, that teacher is held to revoke that teachingUtrum, si ex doctrina alicuius doctoris aliqui revocentur a meliori bono, utrum ille doctor teneatur illam doctrinam rev
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod, si per doctrinam alicuius aliqui retrahantur a meliori bono, quod ille teneatur suam doctrinam revocare.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that, if through someone’s teaching some men are drawn back from a better good, that man is held to revoke his teaching.
QV.Q12.A2.arg1Talis enim doctor in sua doctrina facit scandalum activum, quia doctor informat intellectum, intellectus autem informat affectum et per consequens actum; sed scandalum activum tenetur quilibet removere; ergo talis doctor tenetur suam doctrinam revocare.
Obj. 1: For in his teaching such a teacher causes active scandal, because the teacher informs the intellect, and the intellect informs the affection and consequently the act. But everyone is held to remove active scandal. Therefore, such a teacher is held to revoke his teaching.
QV.Q12.A2.arg2Praeterea. Spiritualia sunt temporalibus potiora; sed in temporalibus, ut Augustinus dicit, non dimittitur peccatum nisi restituatur ablatum; ergo multo magis doctori qui facit damnum in spiritualibus, non dimittitur peccatum nisi restituatur ablatum, quod fit per revocationem doctrinae.
Obj. 2: Spiritual things are more powerful than temporal ones. But in temporal things, as Augustine says, sin is not dismissed unless what was taken is restored.1 Therefore, much more for a teacher who causes spiritual loss, sin is not dismissed unless what was taken is restored, which is done through the revocation of that teaching.
QV.Q12.A2.arg3Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit: veritas non est dimittenda propter scandalum.
On the contrary: Gregory says: truth is not to be dismissed on account of scandal.1
QV.Q12.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod hic distinguendum videtur.
I answer that it seems necessary to make a distinction.
QV.Q12.A2.coSi enim doctor doceat falsam doctrinam, tenetur eam modis omnibus revocare, et maxime si ex ea spirituale damnum sequatur. [Puta, si aliqui, docendo aliqua erronea, inducerent homines ad aliquam religionem, utpote si dicerent quod quicumque intrat talem religionem, statim erit equalis meriti sicut beatus Petrus. Intrare enim religionem propter errorem non est bonum.]
For if a teacher teaches false teaching, he is held to revoke it in all ways, and most of all if spiritual loss follows from it. For example, if some men, by teaching some erroneous things, were to induce men unto some religion, as, for example, he were to say that whoever enters such a religion shall be at once of equal merit as blessed Peter.1 For to enter religion on account of an error is not good.
QV.Q12.A2Si vero doceat veram doctrinam, potest ex ea sequi detrimentum spirituale in auditoribus dupliciter.
Whereas, if he teaches true teaching, from this spiritual detriment can follow in the hearers in two ways.
QV.Q12.A2Uno modo ex defectu ipsius qui docet. <Et hoc dupliciter.> Uno modo quia doctrinam subtilem et altam proponeret rudibus, qui non essent illius doctrinae capaces, qui ex hoc detrimentum salutis incurrerent; contra exemplum Apostoli, qui dicit, I ad Corinthios III: tamquam parvulis in Christo lac potum dedi vobis, non escam.
One way is out of a defect of this one who teaches. And this in two ways. One way is because he would propose a subtle and high teaching to the unlearned, who would not be capable of that teaching, and who from this would incur a detriment of salvation. This is against the example of the Apostle, who says: I gave you as little ones in Christ milk as drink, not food (1 Cor 3:1–2).
QV.Q12.A2Alio modo, quia confuse et inordinate proponit, non preferens maiora minoribus, contra id quod Gregorius dicit in Pastorali: sic laudanda sunt bona summa ne desperentur ultima, sic nutrienda sunt bona ultima ne, dum sufficere creduntur, nequaquam tendatur ad summa.
Another way is because he proposes confusedly and inordinately, not preferring greater things to lesser ones, against that which Gregory says in the Book of Pastoral Rule: thus the highest goods must be praised lest the ultimate things be despaired of; thus the last goods must be nourished lest, while they are believed to suffice, in no way do they tend to the highest.1
QV.Q12.A2Et in his casibus tenetur doctor ex cuius doctrina damnum spirituale accidit, contra hoc damnum remedium ponere in quantum potest, exponendo saltem doctrinam suam. [Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit in Pastorali: sicut incauta locutio in errorem pertrahit, ita indiscretum silentium eos qui erudiri poterant, in errore derelinquit.]
And in these cases, a teacher, from whose teaching there happens a spiritual loss, is held, against this loss, to posit a remedy inasmuch as he can, at least by expounding his teaching. And this is that which Gregory says in the Book of Pastoral Rule: just as incautious speech draws into error, so indiscrete silence has abandoned in error those who could have been educated.1
QV.Q12.A2Alio modo potest contingere ex defectu aliorum < . . . >. [Unde sic non retrahit homines a meliori bono talis doctor.] Et in hoc casu non tenetur cessare a sua doctrina.
In another way, it can happen from a defect of other things < . . . >. Hence such a teacher does not thus draw men back from a better good. And in this case, he is not held to cease from his teaching.
QV.Q12.A2Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.
Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
QV.Q12.A2.ad1Q. 13Regarding religious
Ad religiosos
Regarding religious
QV.Q13Deinde circa religiosos quaesita sunt duo:
Then about religious there were two questions:
QV.Q13primo, utrum religiosi teneantur patienter tolerare iniurias sibi factas;
first, whether religious are held to tolerate patiently injuries done to them;
QV.Q13secundo, utrum ille qui iurat se non intraturum religionem possit licite religionem intrare.
second, whether a man who swears he will not enter religion can enter religion licitly.
QV.Q13A. 1Whether religious are held to tolerate patiently injuries done to themUtrum religiosi teneantur patienter tolerare iniurias sibi factas
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod religiosi non debeant tolerare suos impugnatores.
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that religious should not tolerate their attackers.
QV.Q13.A1.arg1In impugnatione enim perfectorum virorum Deus impugnatur, unde Dominus Saulo persequenti discipulos Christi dixit, Actuum IX: Saule, Saule, quid me persequeris? Sed perfecti viri non debent impugnatores Dei tolerare; ergo neque impugnationes proprias.
Obj. 1: For in the attacking of perfect men God is attacked, hence the Lord said to Saul persecuting the disciples of Christ: Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me? (Acts 9:4). But perfect men should not tolerate the attackers of God. Therefore, neither should they tolerate attacks upon themselves.
QV.Q13.A1.arg2Praeterea. Quilibet perfectus debet obviare his quae statui perfectionis praeiudicant, unde Apostolus dicit II ad Corinthios VI: ut non vituperetur ministerium nostrum; sed per hoc quod perfecti impugnantur, statui perfectionis derogatur; ergo perfecti viri non debent tolerare suos impugnatores.
Obj. 2: Any perfect man should oppose what prejudices the state of perfection, hence the Apostle says: in order that our ministry might not be reproached (2 Cor 6:3). But through the perfect being attacked, harm is done to the state of perfection. Therefore, perfect men should not tolerate their attackers.
QV.Q13.A1.arg3Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit: non sumus perfecti, si aliorum inordinationes ferre non possumus.
On the contrary: Gregory says: we are not perfect if we cannot bear the misconducts of others.1
QV.Q13.A1.scResponsio. Dicendum quod perfecti viri dupliciter impugnari possunt: uno quidem modo quantum ad personas proprias, utpote cum inferuntur eis iniuriae personales; alio modo possunt impugnari quantum ad statum eorum, ut puta cum aliqui verbis vel factis perfectionis statui derogant. Et haec duo tanguntur Iacobi II: nonne divites opprimunt vos per potentiam?, quod pertinet ad personales iniurias; nonne ipsi blasphemant bonum nomen quod invocatum est super vos?, quod pertinet ad religionem vel statum.
I answer that perfect men can be attacked in two ways. One way is with regard to their own persons, as when personal injuries are inflicted upon them; in another way, they can be attacked as regards their state, as for example when some men by words or deeds cause harm to the state of perfection. And these two are touched upon in James 2:6–7: do not the rich oppress you through power?, which pertains to personal injuries; do not those blaspheme the good name which is invoked over us?, which pertains to religion or state.
QV.Q13.A1.coIn iniuriis igitur personalibus decet perfectos viros esse maxime patientes, ut sint etiam parati plura sufferre, secundum illud Matthaei V: si quis percusserit te in dextra maxilla, prebe ei et alteram. Statum vero suum impugnari non debent pati, quantum resistere possunt: hoc enim vergeret in iniuriam Dei. Unde contra quosdam dicitur, Ezechielis XIII: non ascendistis ex adverso, nec opposuistis vos murum pro domo Israel.
Therefore, in personal injuries it is befitting for perfect men to be most patient in order to be prepared to suffer even more, according to Matthew 5:39: if anyone should strike you on the right cheek, grant to him also the other. Whereas their state should not be suffered to be attacked, as much as they can resist: for this would incline to the injury of God. Hence against certain men it is said: you have not ascended out of the opposing side, nor have you set opposite a wall for the house of Israel (Ezek 13:5).
QV.Q13.A1Et ideo Dominus iniurias quae contra humanitatem eius inferebantur, patienter toleravit, sicut cum Iudaei dicebant: ecce homo vorax et potator vini, ut habetur Matthaei XI; et sicut cum diabolus ei dixit: mitte te deorsum, quod videbatur ad propriam iniuriam pertinere. Sed iniurias Dei non tolerabat. Unde Phariseos dure redarguit, Matthaei XII, quia dicebant quod in Belzebuth eiceret demonia, quod pertinebat ad iniurias Spiritus Sancti. Et similiter cum diabolus ei dixit: haec omnia tibi dabo, si cadens adoraveris me, quod ad iniuriam Dei pertinebat; statim enim eum repulit, dicens: vade retro Satana, ut habetur Matthaei IV. Ubi Crysostomus dicit: illius discamus exemplo nostras quidem iniurias . . . magnanimiter sustinere, Dei autem iniurias . . . nec usque ad auditum sufferre, quoniam in propriis iniuriis esse quemlibet patientem laudabile est, iniurias autem Dei dissimulare, nimis est impium.
And for this reason, the Lord patiently tolerated injuries which were inflicted against his humanity, such as when the Jews said: behold a ravenous man and a drinker of wine (Matt 11:19); and such as when the devil said to him: send yourself down (Matt 4:6), which seems to pertain to his own injury. But the injuries of God he did not tolerate. Hence he refuted harshly the Pharisees (Matt 12:24–32) because they were saying he was casting out demons by Beelzebub, which pertained to the injuries of the Holy Spirit. And so too when the devil said to him: all these things I shall give to you, if falling down you should adore me (Matt 4:9), which pertained to the injury of God; for at once he repelled him, saying: go back, Satan (Matt 4:10). This is where Chrysostom says: let us learn by his example to endure our injuries . . . magnanimously, yet the injuries of God . . . not even to suffer unto hearing, because for anyone to be patient in our proper injuries is laudable, yet to ignore the injuries of God is exceedingly impious.1
QV.Q13.A1Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.
Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
QV.Q13.A1.ad1A. 2Whether a man who swears an oath to not enter religion can enter religion licitlyUtrum ille qui iurat se non intraturum religionem possit licite religionem intrare
Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui iuravit se non intraturum religionem, non possit licite intrare.
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a man who has sworn to not enter religion cannot enter licitly.
QV.Q13.A2.arg1Omnis enim obligatio licita est adimplenda; sed licitum erat isti non intrare religionem; ergo cum ad hoc se iuramento obligaverit, videtur quod teneatur non intrare.
Obj. 1: For every licit obligation must be fulfilled. But it was licit for that man not to enter religion. Therefore, since he has obligated himself to this by oath, it seems that he is held not to enter.
QV.Q13.A2.arg2Sed contra est quia nullum impedimentum spiritualis profectus est ex Deo; sed iuramentum est ex Deo; ergo per iuramentum non impeditur spiritualis profectus intrandi religionem.
On the contrary: No impediment of spiritual advancement is from God. But an oath is from God. Therefore, the spiritual advancement of entering religion is not impeded through an oath.
QV.Q13.A2.scResponsio. Dicendum quod obligatio iuramenti tripliciter se potest habere. Quandoque enim est illicita obligatio et de re illicita, puta cum aliquis iurat se fornicaturum; et tale iuramentum non tenetur homo implere, nec etiam est licitum impleri. Quandoque vero est obligatio licita et de re licita, puta cum aliquis iurat se eleemosynam daturum; et tale iuramentum praeterire non licet. Quandoque vero est obligatio illicita sed de re licita, puta cum aliquis iurat se non facturum aliquod maius bonum, quod tamen facere non tenetur, puta non ieiunare, vel non dare aliquam eleemosynam, vel religionem non intrare: tunc enim id ad quod se iuramento obligat, licitum est, sed tamen obligatio est illicita, quia per hoc homo, quantum in se est, obfirmat se contra gratiam Spiritus Sancti, quae facit hominem in suo corde ascensiones disponere. Unde tale iuramentum licite potest homo implere, abstinendo ab illo bono quod facere non tenetur. Non tamen cogitur ex illo iuramento, ad hoc quod impleat quod iuravit, quia iuramentum, ad hoc quod sit obligatorium, debet habere tres comites, iudicium, iustitiam et veritatem, ut habetur Ieremiae IV; huic autem iuramento deest iudicium discretionis, quia vergit in deteriorem exitum, retrahendo a meliori bono.
I answer that the obligation of an oath can exist in three ways. For sometimes there is an illicit obligation that concerns an illicit thing, for example, when someone swears that he will fornicate, and such an oath a man is not held to fulfill, nor even is it licit to be fulfilled. Whereas sometimes there is a licit obligation that concerns a licit thing, for example, when someone swears that he will give alms, and it is not licit to neglect such an oath. Whereas sometimes there is an illicit obligation that concerns a licit thing, for example, when someone swears that he will not do something more good which, nevertheless, he is not held to do, for example, not to fast, or not to give some alms, or not to enter religion. For then what he obligates himself to by oath is licit, but, nevertheless, the obligation is illicit because through this a man, inasmuch as is in him, fixes himself against the grace of the Holy Spirit, which makes a man to dispose ascents in his heart.1 Hence such an oath a man can licitly fulfill by abstaining from that good which he is not held to do. Nevertheless, he is not compelled by this oath to fulfilling that which he has sworn, because an oath, to be obligatory, ought to have three comrades: judgment, justice, and truth (Jer 4:2).2 Yet to this oath the judgment of discretion is lacking because it inclines to an inferior end3 by drawing back from a better good.
QV.Q13.A2.coEt per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
QV.Q13.A2.ad1Q. 14Regarding clerics
Ad clericos
Regarding clerics
QV.Q14Articulus unicus
Article 1
QV.Q14Utrum scilicet liceat clerico qui tenetur ad horas canonicas, dicere matutinas sequentis diei de sero
Whether it is licit for a cleric who is held unto the canonical hours to say Matins of the following day in the evening
Deinde circa clericos quaesitum est unum, utrum scilicet liceat clerico qui tenetur ad horas canonicas, dicere matutinas sequentis diei de sero. Et videtur quod non.
Then about clerics there was asked one thing, namely, whether it is licit for a cleric who is held unto the canonical hours to say Matins of the following day in the evening. And it seems that it is not.
QV.Q14Dicitur enim Ecclesiastici XXI: lascivus et inprudens non servabit tempus; sed iste in dicendo Matutinas non observat tempus: cum enim dies incipiat a media nocte, videtur quod Matutinas sequentis diei dicat in die praecedenti; ergo videtur hoc ad lasciviam et inprudentiam pertinere et ita videtur esse peccatum.
Obj. 1: For it is said in Sirach 20:7: the lascivious and imprudent man shall not observe the time. But that man in saying Matins does not observe the time: for since the day begins at midnight, it seems that he says Matins of the following day on the day preceding. Therefore, this seems to pertain to the lascivious and imprudent man and thus seems to be sin.
QV.Q14.arg1Sed contra. Deus clementior est quolibet homine; sed homo non imputat debitori in culpam, si debitum reddat sibi ante tempus; ergo multo minus Deus.
On the contrary: God is more clement than any man. But a man does not fault a debtor if he renders the debt to him before the time. Therefore, much less does God.
QV.Q14.scResponsio. Dicendum quod hic consideranda est intentio eius qui praevenit tempus in Matutinis dicendis, vel in quibuscumque horis canonicis. Si enim hoc facit propter lasciviam, ut scilicet quietius somnolentiae et voluptati vacet, non est absque peccato. Si vero hoc faciat propter necessitatem licitarum et honestarum occupationum, puta si clericus aut magister debet videre lectiones suas de nocte, vel propter aliquid aliud huiusmodi, licite potest de sero dicereMatutinas, et in aliis horis canonicis tempus praevenire, sicut etiam hoc in solemnibus ecclesiis fit, quia melius est Deo utrumque reddere, scilicet et debitas laudes et alia honesta officia, quam quod per unum aliud impediatur.
I answer that here the intention of him who anticipates the time in saying Matins, or in saying any canonical hours, must be considered. For if he does this on account of lasciviousness, namely, in order that more restfully he might be at leisure for slumber and pleasure, this is not without sin. Whereas if he does this on account of the necessity of licit and honest occupations, for example, if a cleric or teacher ought to do his readings at night, or on account of something else of this sort, he can say Matins licitly in the evening and anticipate the time in the other canonical hours, just as this is done also in solemn churches, because it is better to render both to God, namely, both the due praises and the other honest offices, than that through the one the other should be impeded.
QV.Q14.coAd primum ergo dicendum quod, quantum ad contractus et alia huiusmodi, dies incipit a media nocte; sed quantum ad ecclesiasticum officium et solemnitatum celebritates, incipit dies a Vesperis; unde, si aliquis post dictas Vesperas et Completorium, dicat Matutinas, iam hoc pertinet ad diem sequentem.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, as regards contracts and other things of this sort, the day begins at midnight.1 But as regards the ecclesiastical office and celebrations of solemnities, the day begins at Vespers. Hence, if anyone says Matins after Vespers and Compline have been said, this already pertains to the following day.
QV.Q14.ad1