But, just as Augustine in the first book of the same work says: too ugly and pernicious and especially to beware of is that any infidel should hear that a Christian is mad speaking concerning these things (namely, natural things) as though according to Christian letters, such that, in whatever way it is said, he can scarcely contain his laughter observing him to err about the whole heaven. And it is not so disturbing that an erring man is derided, but that our authors are believed by those who are outside, to have thought such things and that with their great destruction, concerning whose salvation we busy ourselves, they are blamed and rejected as though unlearned.¹ And for this reason, just as he adds,² he posited manifold expositions on the words of Genesis in order for thus there to be received one exposition which would not be prejudiced against another exposition, which perhaps is better.

Thus, therefore, that which is said concerning the waters existing above the heavens can be understood in many ways.

One way is that by “firmament” or “heavens” we do not understand the firmament or heaven in which there are stars, but this air in which birds are said to fly,¹ above which air waters are elevated as vapors and then rains are generated.² And concerning this exposition Augustine says in the second book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis: I judge this consideration . . . most worthy; for that which is said is not against the faith, and with promptness can be believed with the teaching posited.³

Yet if by “firmament” or “heavens” there is understood the firmament where stars are placed, thus it must be known that about this firmament there have been diverse opinions.

For certain men have posited that that firmament is composed of the four elements; which seems to have been posited by Empedocles.¹ And according to this, nothing prohibits saying that elemental waters are above this starry heaven, as more simple things, and over these also fire from which it is called the empyrean heaven.

Yet the position of other men is that heaven either is of a fiery nature, just as Plato posited,¹ or it is not of the nature of the four elements, but having a higher nature, just as Aristotle posited.² With either of these supposed, it seems unfitting for elementary water naturally to be disposed above that firmament. For now, just as Augustine says in the second book of On Genesis, it befits us to seek in what way God has instituted the natures of things, not what in them or out of them he wills to work unto a miracle of his power.³ But nevertheless, we can posit some kind of waters above a firmament of this sort.

In one way, we can posit that by waters we should understand the whole of bodily matter, such as is understood in the beginning of Genesis,¹ according to the exposition of Augustine. And for this reason, according to this understanding, that there are waters above the starry heavens is to say nothing else than that something of bodily matter exists above these heavens (and this also is not discordant with the sayings of modern philosophers, who posit above the eighth sphere, in which there are stars, another sphere, in which there is no star);² and Augustine posits this exposition in On Genesis against the Manichees.³

In another way, it can be said that, just as the empyrean heaven is called fiery not because it has the species of fire, but on account of its splendor,¹ so also the waters above the heavens are called that not because they have the species of water, but because they have diaphaneity like unto water, so that thus the supreme heaven, which is called empyrean, is a splendid whole, and the second, which is called watery, is a diaphanous whole, and the third heaven, which is called starry, is partly lucid, partly diaphanous.

Thus, therefore, the truth of Sacred Scripture can be preserved in diverse ways according to whatever opinion. Hence the sense of Sacred Scripture must not be narrowed to any one of these.

Therefore, speaking absolutely of the power of God, thus God can reduce all creation into nothing. The reason for this is that creation is not only produced into being by God acting, but also is conserved in being through the action of God, according to Hebrews 1:3: carrying all things by the word of his power. Hence Augustine says, in the fourth book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, that if the power of God at some time were to cease from ruling those things which have been created, simultaneously also their species would cease, and every nature would perish.¹ Yet just as God acts by his own will and not by necessity of nature for the production of things, so also for their conservation. And for this reason, he can subtract his action from conserving them, and by this very thing all things would fall into nothing.²

Whereas if we speak concerning the power of God in regard to his wisdom and foreknowledge, thus it cannot happen for things to be reduced to nothing, since the divine wisdom does not have this. For God created in order that all things would be (Wis 1:14), not in order that they would fall into nothing.

One way is out of its proper intention, such as when someone by subtracting light causes darkness;¹ and in this way, it is not necessary for it to be a defective cause which causes the defect. Yet thus God can be the cause of some defect, either of blindness or of obduration,² or even of annihilation, if he were to will.

In another way, something is a cause of a defect outside of intention, and thus it is always necessary for the cause of a defect to be defective, because from a defect of the agent it does not introduce the intended perfection in its effect; and thus, God in no way can be the cause of a defect or of something tending into non-being.¹

If something were reduced to nothing, whether God could restore it the same in number

For there are certain things whose unity has continuity of duration in its character, just as is clear in motion and time,¹ and for this reason, the interruption of such things is directly contrary to their unity according to number. Whereas those things which imply a contradiction are not contained under the number of possible things for God, because they lack the character of being. And for this reason, if things of this sort are reduced to nothing, God cannot restore them the same in number: for this would be to make contradictories simultaneously to be true: for example, if an interrupted motion were one.

Whereas there are other things whose unity does not have continuity of duration in its character, such as the unity of permanent things, unless incidentally, inasmuch as their being is subject to motion. For thus also things of this sort are measured by time, and their being is one and continuous according to the unity and continuity of time. And because a natural agent cannot produce those things without motion, a natural agent cannot restore things of this sort the same in number if they are reduced to nothing or if their substance is corrupted. But God can restore things of this sort without motion because it is in his power to produce effects without mediating causes, and for this reason, he can restore those things the same in number even if they have collapsed to nothing.

And thus, it is necessary for the Word by which he speaks his own self and by which he speaks creation to be the same.

Yet in natural things something is distinguished through its form from another in two ways.

In one way, this is according to the direct opposition of form to form, and in this way, each natural thing is distinguished from all species of its genus which do not have opposite forms, according to how a genus is divided by opposite differences; just as sapphire is distinguished by its form from all other species of stones.

In another way, a natural thing is distinguished through its form according to having and not having, and in this way, that which has some natural form is distinguished from all things not having that form; just as sapphire through its natural form is distinguished not only from other genera of stones, but from the species of animals and of plants.

Thus, therefore, it must be said that the Son is indeed distinguished from the Father according to the relative opposition of sonship to paternity, but from the Holy Spirit he is distinguished by sonship through this: that the Holy Spirit does not have sonship which the Son has.

This is clear in baptism: for a catechumen, if he is an adult and desires baptism, already has attained the effect of baptism as regards the cleansing from sin and the attainment of grace, which is the proper effect of God. But when he receives baptism actually, he attains certain fuller sacramental effects because he receives the character and the remission of the whole punishment. Nevertheless, if there were anyone who had not desired baptism before he was actually baptized, such as is clear especially in children, simultaneously he receives through baptism grace remitting fault and every other effect of the sacrament. And this also would happen in an adult if simultaneously when he was baptized he were to begin to desire baptism.

And it is the same also in the sacrament of penance, which is consummated in the dispensation of the minister absolving. For when someone actually is absolved, he attains fully the effect of the sacrament. But, if before he is absolved, he desires this sacrament, namely, when he proposes to subject himself to the keys of the Church, the power of the keys is already working in him, and he attains the remission of fault. Nevertheless, if someone during absolution itself begins to be crushed and to desire the keys of the Church, in the absolution of the priest itself fault would be dismissed for him through grace, which is infused in this sacrament just as in the other sacraments of the New Law. Hence sometimes it happens that some men not perfectly contrite attain the grace of contrition by the power of the keys while they do not now place an obstacle to the Holy Spirit. And it is the same with the other sacraments of the New Law, in which grace is conferred.

Nevertheless, there seems to be a difference between baptism and penance because the sacrament of penance is always administered to adults, in whom contrition generally precedes the time of confession and absolution, yet baptism many times is conferred on children, in whom the intention of baptism does not precede. Yet it would appear altogether similar if baptism were also always administered to adults.

On human acts pertaining to prelates

One way is absolutely, namely, such that it in no way comes to the notice of many, and such a sin harms only the one doing it. And for this reason, he who knows such a hidden sin of a brother should intend only this: that he should procure the salvation of his sinning brother. Hence the order of fraternal correction is instituted by the Lord,¹ so that first, indeed, someone should correct a brother sinning hiddenly between himself and him only, afterwards he should summon two or three witnesses, and then finally, if he is not corrected, he should tell the Church. If a prelate commands against this order that the hidden sin of a brother should be told to him, the prelate must not be obeyed, and he sins by commanding because it is necessary to obey God rather than men (Acts 5:29).

Yet if the sin of a brother is not hidden to such a degree that through some suspicions it would not come to the notice of the multitude, and hence the scandal of many would arise, now the sin harms not only him, but many. And because the good of the multitude is preferred to the good of the one, for this reason, the prelate should investigate the truth concerning the deed so that he might assuage the scandal of the multitude either through the punishment of the sinner or through his excuse. And for this reason, in such a case, he can command one knowing the crime of a brother that he should tell it, and the one commanded is held to obey the prelate. For since it is not an entirely hidden crime, it pertains to the judgment of the prelate. And about this situation the decretal speaks, yet not the first.

About dispensation

Yet it is clear that for a bigamist not to be promoted neither is of the law of nature nor pertains to the articles of faith nor also is of necessity of sacrament (which is clear out of this: that if a bigamist is ordained, he receives the sacrament of orders), but this pertains to the determination of divine cult. Hence the pope can dispense this, although he should not dispense unless for a great and evident cause, just as also he could dispense that some priest not dressed in sacred vestments would consecrate the body of Christ. And the same reasoning applies to all other things of this sort which have proceeded out of human institution.

About excommunication

If it precedes, for example when it has not yet been declared through the consensus of the judges that they are excommunicated, they must not be avoided until it should be terminated by a settled judgment. For in this case it is true that we ought to interpret in the best way. Hence also in Deuteronomy 17:8–10 it is said: if you should observe that a judgment before you is difficult and ambiguous . . . and of the judges within your gates you should see that words vary . . . you shall come unto the priests . . . and unto the judge . . . and you shall ask from them . . . and you shall do whatever they should say.

But, if it is ambiguous after the concurring determination of the judges, the sentence of the judges must stand, for two reasons. First, indeed, because judges more solicitously sifting the case can perceive the truth more fully, even if they are less expert than others who are consulted perfunctorily and extraordinarily. Second, because it would be to the great harm of the common utility of the man’s state if the sentence were not to stand, and any man for his pleasure would wish to heap calumny upon a sentence since then the litigations would be interminable. And for this reason, in such a case, the sentence of the judges must stand, unless perhaps it is suspended through appeal.

About the distribution of benefices

For if he is equally suitable, the prelate can prefer his relative (unless, perhaps, scandal would arise from this, or some men would thence receive a bad example, such that it could be presumed that probably other prelates would be led by this example to give to their relatives, even those less worthy). And this is because nothing thereby is lost for the utility of a church when provision is made for one equally suitable, granted that this provision is of this sort to satisfy a natural love, one which is not contrary to charity but rather is informed by charity. And this is signified in Genesis 47:6 where Pharaoh says to Joseph concerning his brothers: if you know industrious men amongst these, constitute them as masters of my cattle.

Whereas if the relative of a prelate is less suitable, he should not put him in charge of the care of a church with a better man passed over, for a twofold reason. First, indeed, because this seems to be against the fidelity which the Lord requires in a good dispenser:¹ for he would not do the business of some lord faithfully who could make his lot better if he were to neglect this in order to satisfy his relatives. Second, because this seems to pertain to the receiving of persons, which consists in this: that someone receives for a cause the condition of a person which does not apply to the business, just as if someone were to give a sentence for someone because he is rich and not because he has justice, which is a condition applying to the business. Yet to be a relative is not some condition pertaining to the care of a church, which is not obtained by the right of blood but by divine gift. Yet it would be a condition applying to the business of the dispensation of patrimonial goods. Hence, if a bishop concerning patrimonial goods provides more to his less suitable relative, this is not the receiving of persons. But if by reason of consanguinity he should provide more for him in the patrimony of the Crucified, he would not lack the vice of the reception of persons. Augustine says this must be dispensed in ecclesiastical grades, expounding that which is had in James 2:1: do not have the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ in the receiving of persons.² Jerome also says, and there is had in c. 8, q. 1: an outsider out of another tribe is elected by Moses . . . in order that it might signify that the leadership over the people must not be deferred to blood, but to life. And now we discern that many do this thing for a benefice, that they should not seek to erect those as columns in the Church whom they know to be more beneficial to the Church, but whom either they love, or whose allegiances are enticed.³

Regarding the intellective power

From its genus, it is said to be a good act from this: that it deals with due matter. Yet the due matter of the appetite is the good. Hence to desire any good is good in genus. Yet every science or whatever knowledge is something good (otherwise God, in whom there is nothing of evil, would not have every science, both of good things and of evil). Hence to desire any science or the knowledge of any things, whether good or evil, is good in genus.

But nevertheless, it can be good or evil according to various additional circumstances. And the intended end especially makes a difference. For if someone desires to know the magic sciences in order that he might use them, it is evil. Yet if someone desires to know them in order to confound and reprove them, thus it is good and licit. Similarly, the condition of a person makes a difference, or even the manner of desiring: for if someone so desires to know sciences of this sort that he prefers their knowledge to other more useful things, the desire is inordinate; and similarly, if there is such a person to whom it does not pertain to know this, he desires this inordinately.

To prove this, it must be known that according to the Philosopher in the first book of On Interpretation, three certain things are found through an order: for voices are signs of understandings, yet understandings are likenesses of things.¹ Yet it is clear that unity or diversity of significative voice does not depend upon the unity or diversity of the thing signified, otherwise there would not be any equivocal name. For according to this, if there are diverse things, there would be diverse names and not the same name. Therefore, unity or diversity of significative voice, whether complex or not, depends upon the unity or diversity of the voice or understanding, one of which, namely, the voice, is a sign and not signified only, yet the understanding is sign and signified just as the thing. Therefore, a name or statement can be distinct, either on account of diversity of voice only, just as there is in synonyms in which there is a diverse voice but altogether the same signified, or also with diversity of voice there can be diversity of understandings, whether on account of diversity of the thing understood, or on account of diversity of the mode of understanding. And this happens whenever there is diversity of connotation, which follows the diverse mode of understanding one and the same thing. This is especially apparent in time, which through itself is mixed with the activity of the human intellect of compounding and dividing, as is said in the third book of On the Soul.²

And for this reason, it must be said that it is not the same statement that Socrates is sitting and Socrates sat or shall sit. But that Socrates is sitting is the same statement because it is the same voice and the same mode of signifying. And for this reason, it is clear that the same statement can sometimes be true, sometimes false.

For a certain disputation is ordered to removing a doubt whether it be so, and in such a theological disputation especially, authorities must be used which those disputing accept. For example, if disputing with Jews, it is necessary to introduce authorities of the Old Testament; if with Manichees, who reject the Old Testament, it is necessary to use only the authorities of the New Testament; yet if with schismatics, who accept the Old and the New Testament, yet not the doctrine of our holy ones, such as are the Greeks, it is necessary to dispute with them out of the authorities of the New and the Old Testament and of those teachers whom they accept; yet if they accept no authority, it is necessary to flee to natural reasons to convince them.

Whereas a certain disputation is in the magisterial schools, not for removing error, but for instructing the hearers in order that they might be led to the understanding of the truth which they believe,¹ and then it is necessary to lean on reasons investigating the root of the truth and making one know how what is said is true. Otherwise, if a master determines a question with bare authorities, a certain hearer will be made certain that it is such, but will acquire nothing of science or understanding but will depart empty.

Regarding the appetitive power

Thus, therefore, it must be said that not only perfect charity, but even imperfect can do this work of offering oneself to martyrdom or even to suffer martyrdom. What is more, this can be done even by that man who lacks charity, according to that saying of the Apostle: if I should hand over my body such that I should burn, yet I should not have charity, it profits me nothing (1 Cor 13:3). But perfect charity does this promptly and delightfully, just as is clear concerning Lawrence and Vincent, who in torments showed hilarity.¹ Yet imperfect charity, or also he who lacks charity, cannot do this.

And through this mode to endure martyrdom on account of Christ falls under a precept, namely, because a man ought to have a mind prepared to permit himself to be killed before denying Christ or sinning mortally. And thus, to forsake one’s own goods also falls under a precept because the mind of a Christian ought to be prepared more to endure the robbery of his goods than to deny Christ or to sin mortally.¹

Yet sin which has the character of fault, concerning which we now speak, cannot be except in a voluntary act, namely, one which is somehow in the power of the one sinning.

Yet an act of the natural appetite is not subject to the command of reason, just as neither an act of the other potencies of the vegetative soul, and for this reason, fault cannot consist in an act of such an appetite, just as there is not fault in man’s hunger or thirst. And the same must be said in other things of this sort.

But an act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason because reason coming before it can command it or even impede it, and thus such a motion can already have the character of fault. And, if there follows a judgment of reason, it could also be mortal sin, just as also the movement of the exterior members commanded by reason. Yet if a judgment of reason comes before, it is indeed sin if it tends to something illicit because it was in the power of man to contain it; nevertheless, it is venial sin and most light, as is clear through Augustine, in the twelfth book of On the Trinity.¹ And this is called a first movement of sin.

Yet the movement of the superior appetite, that is, of the will, following a judgment of reason, already can be mortal sin.

And for this reason, it must be said that the first movements of infidels are not mortal sins, but venial.

That this, indeed, somehow must be understood is apparent from the progression of the Apostle. For he had said before that in these who are in Christ Jesus the reparation of grace is begun as regards the mind, although not as regards the flesh. For he had said before: therefore I myself with my mind indeed serve the law of God, yet with my flesh the law of sin (Rom 7:25), namely, on account of the law of the stimulant to sin (fomes), which still remains in the members of the body. Therefore, lest these who are in Christ Jesus would seem still to be subject to the former damnation on account of the movements of the stimulant, the Apostle concludes that there is nothing of damnation for these who are in Christ Jesus if they do not walk according to the flesh, because the damnation of original sin is absolved through the grace of Christ although the stimulant of sin remain in act. Whereas they do not incur the damnation of actual sin because they do not walk according to the flesh. Yet in infidels original sin remains not only in act, but also in guilt, and for this reason, there is for them something of damnation on the part of original sin, yet not on the part of actual sin if they should not consent to the concupiscences. From this, therefore, it does not follow that in infidels the first movement induces the damnation of mortal sin, but there follows that it should have the damnation of original sin annexed.

On precepts

The question is whether boys not practiced in keeping the precepts should be received, or obligated by vow or by oath, or allured by benefices to the entrance of religion. And it seems they should not.

Therefore, this manner should be observed so that the truth clearly and as though palpably will be shown, and if any things are said to the contrary which do not have any weight, they should be spurned, lest it always be necessary to replicate the same things uselessly. But if anyone wishes to say the contrary, let him write what he says¹ in order that other intelligent men might be able to judge whether he teaches the truth.

First, therefore, in order to strike down each objection about the proposed question, it must be considered that for boys, even below the age of puberty, to be received into religion is not evil according to itself; nay, rather, it is expedient and fruitful because that which we are accustomed to from boyhood we always hold more perfectly and more firmly, according to Proverbs 22:6: an adolescent on the way, even when he should grow old, shall not withdraw from it.¹ And for this reason, the Apostles instituted that boys, even infants, would be received into the Christian religion in order that, nourished in it, they would adhere to it more firmly and more perfectly. And this is what Dionysius says in the last chapter of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy: according to holy law infants consummated unto a holy habit shall have a custom, removed from every error and free from an unclean life; this came unto mind for our divine leaders, that is, the Apostles, and it was seen to receive infants.² Yet much more does the Christian life exceed the life of infidels than the life of religious the life of seculars, especially since in the primitive Church all Christians possessed the most perfect state of religion, according to Acts 4:32: of the multitude of believers there was one heart and one soul, nor did any of them say that the things which he possessed were his own, but all things were common for those, unto whose example of life all religions are instituted. And for this reason, the institutors of religions were moved to receive infants in religion, for the same reason for which the Apostles did likewise, as is clear concerning blessed Benedict who, as is read in the second book of the Dialogues, received the twelve-year-old Maurus and the seven-year-old Placidus to be nourished in religion.³

And nevertheless, a certain difference must be noted. For boys before the years of puberty out of natural law are under the care of their parents, on account of this:¹ that they suffer a defect of discretion, according to which discretion they might be able to rule their own selves well.

And for this reason, they can indeed be handed over to religion at this age if they are offered by their parents, and there shall be a ratified tradition, especially if, when they should reach the years of puberty, they have a ratified paternal oblation. Hence Gregory says,¹ as is found in the Decretum: you have added: if father or mother should have handed over son or daughter within the enclosure of a monastery in the years of infancy under regular discipline, whether it is licit for them, after they should have fulfilled the years of puberty, to leave and be coupled in matrimony. We altogether shun this, because it is unspeakable that the reins of the will should be relaxed for those sons offered by their parents to God (C. 20, q. 1).²

Yet if in this proper age they hand themselves over to religion freely, this can be ratified through the assent or dissimulation of their parents. Hence it is said in the Decretum: if in whatever minor age either one or both parents gives to their children of either sex either the tonsure of religion or the due clothing of religion or perhaps with them unwilling or unknowing, namely, the parents, they should abdicate from themselves the religion undertaken not soon seen in their sons, but either before themselves or the bishop and plainly in the convent they should permit those same sons to have such things, it shall be utterly illicit for these sons to revert unto the secular habit at any time (C. 20, q. 1).¹

Whereas if boys pass the years of puberty, they can cross over into religion even with their parents unwilling, nor must they be repelled; nay, rather, they must be called in: for as Gregory says in a certain homily: one is led unto the good life in boyhood, another in adolescence, another in youth, another in old age, another in decrepit age.¹ And thus, although at no age must they be repelled, nevertheless they must be repelled less in boyhood. For Chrysostom says in his commentary on Matthew: who merits with Christ approaching, if there should be repelled from him simple infancy? . . . For if they are going to be saints, why do you forbid the sons to come unto the father? Yet if they are going to be sinners, unto what do you proffer a sentence of condemnation before you should see fault?² Which sentence of damnation indeed some men proffer when they say that boys must not be received into religion because they will leave and be made worse.³

But that which certain men adduce, that it is necessary for boys to be practiced first in keeping the precepts and afterwards to cross over to observing the counsels in religion,¹ proceeds from a false understanding. For they reckon that the precepts prepare the way to the counsels, yet it is not so. Nay, rather, the counsels prepare the way to observing the precepts because through the counsels man is removed from things of the world, and it is difficult for him to preserve innocence when occupied with the world. Hence Hilary says in his commentary on Matthew: innocence submits to a heavy burden occupied with increases of works; for the service of God does not pursue a thing of the world without the . . . vices of the world.²

And for this reason, the Lord says in Matthew 19:23 that it is difficult for those who have riches to enter into the kingdom of heaven because it is difficult for a man to observe the precepts, by which one enters into the kingdom, unless when following the counsels he forsakes his riches. And for this reason, boys must be prepared and in a certain way fortified in the exercise of the counsels so that they might be able to preserve innocence in observing the mandates. Nor must they be repelled even though they seem uneducated in the precepts. For Origen says in his commentary on Matthew: certain men having boyish speech . . . offer to the Savior boys and infants. . . . Yet those who seem to be more perfect . . . before they should learn the character of justice . . . blame those who . . . offer boys and infants still less educated to Christ. Yet the Lord exhorts his disciples to condescend to the utilities of boys. . . . Therefore, we ought to attend to these things, lest by an estimation of more excellent wisdom we as great should spurn the little ones of the Church . . . prohibiting boys to come unto Jesus.¹

But that which is asked further, whether before the entrance of religion they should be obligated by vow or by oath unto religion, it is manifestly clear that they should. For just as in evil, the more the will is affirmed towards evil, the worse it is, as is clear in the obstinate and those who sin out of malice,¹ so also in good things so much is the will better as it is more confirmed and bound towards the good. Since, therefore, it is good for boys to come to religion, much more is it good for their will to be confirmed to this, and this is done by a vow or by an oath. Hence also David said: I swore and established to guard the judgments of your justice.² And Augustine says in an epistle to Paulinus and Armentarius: happy the necessity which compels unto better things.³

Yet it remains to be considered last whether they should be allured by benefices. And if indeed by compact or bargain a price is given to someone, or any earthly benefice, in order that he might enter religion, this is illicit. Yet if anyone confers upon him any temporal benefices in order that he might remove the impediments which impede his entrance into religion, or even in order to nourish him and make him to be taught so that he should be apt for religion, this is not illicit but is laudable. Similarly also, if by temporal benefices anyone allures someone in order to render him favorable to himself, not intending his own glory, but the glory of God and the salvation of his neighbor, it is laudable, just as also the Apostle says concerning his own self: I please all through all things (1 Cor 10:33). Even God allures some men by temporal benefices unto acting well. Also, in certain churches some men are allured by the distributions of temporal things unto serving the Church. It is not that they should receive a reward, as it were, but there are certain things secondarily alluring unto serving God, just as also the Lord says in Matthew 6:33: seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things, namely, the necessities of life, shall be added unto you.

In another way, diverse ranks can apply in the same state or condition, and in this way, Gregory says that in any good way of life¹ the beginning must be from lesser things in order that one may arrive at greater ones: for just as soldiers begin from the rudiments of the military and clerics from the rudiments of the clerical state, so also religious begin from the rudiments of religion in order that they might advance even unto the summit.

Then, indeed, someone gives an occasion to someone of being ruined or of falling into a cistern when he makes something or says something less right, from which an occasion of ruin is given to a neighbor; and then the ruin of a neighbor is imputed to the one giving the occasion.

Yet sometimes occasion is not given, but taken: for example, when someone induces someone to the good and from this he is made more degenerate, the good admonition must not be forsaken on account of this: that he takes thence an occasion of ruin. Hence also the Lord did not dismiss the preaching of the truth on account of the scandal of the Pharisees, as is contained in Matthew 15:12–15. And Augustine says in an epistle to Boniface,¹ as is found in the Decretum (C. 23, q. 4, canon “Piety itself,” and below): but if many were going to be ruined in a house and thence at least one could be freed and, because we would try to do it, the others would kill themselves with inconsiderate haste, we would grieve concerning the rest, but concerning the salvation of at least one we would be consoled.²

First, indeed, because that man who enters religion is not chosen for this in order to bear more care of himself or of another than before, but rather in order to be under obedience and the care of another.

Second, because it is not conceded by all that it is necessary to elect a better man for the rule of the prelacy, but, according to certain men, it suffices to elect a good man.¹

Third, because, if it is necessary to elect a better man unto the prelacy, it is indeed not necessary to elect a better man absolutely, but better, that is more suitable, for it. Yet boys, although they are not better absolutely than adults, nevertheless are more suitable to be nourished in religion. Hence Anselm in the book On Likenesses compares to angels those who are nourished in religion from boyhood, yet the others to men, because angels arrive unto eternal life from the beginning, men by the procession of time.¹

Fourth, because only one is elected to the episcopacy, and for this reason, there is a greater necessity for a better man to be assumed than for those entering religion, who can be received as many.

And because the bronze serpent, although it was good according to itself from its institution, nevertheless has the appearance of evil on account of the likeness of idolatry, for this reason, it was not to be sent amongst those who were prone to idolatry, but laudably was taken away. Yet the entrance of religion neither is evil according to itself nor does it have the appearance of evil.

Yet for a blessing, although it is good from its genus, nevertheless to be an act of a virtue it is necessary for it to be clothed with due circumstances, that is, that it is fitting to person and to place and to time. Yet it is not fitting to person when a lesser blesses with a greater present, because, as is said in Hebrews 7:7: without any contradiction, what is lesser is blessed by a greater.

Second, it was asked whether the counsels are directed to the precepts. And it seems that they are not.

But to be separated from milk is, with easier things having been dismissed, to cross over unto the more difficult. Since, therefore, the counsels are more difficult than the precepts, it seems that they expose themselves to the danger of extinction who approach unto the counsels unless first educated in the precepts. Therefore, the precepts are directed to the counsels, and not conversely.

Therefore, the counsels are directed to the precepts both as they concern interior acts of the virtues and as they concern exterior acts, but in different ways.

For unto interior acts of the virtues they are directed as to an end: for all interior acts of the moral virtues pertain to purity of mind, namely, in order that the mind of man might be free from inordinate passions and from every exterior desire of things. And most of all, all the virtues both moral and theological are directed to love of God and neighbor. And unto these two all the counsels are directed as to an end, namely, unto the charity of God and neighbor, and unto purity of mind. Hence it is said in the Collations of the Fathers: whatever can direct us unto . . . purity of heart, must be followed with the whole of virtue, yet whatever draws us back from this, must be shunned as pernicious and vicious. For we do and tolerate all things for this: for this is spurned parents, fatherland, dignities, riches, delights of this world, and the whole will, namely, in order that perpetual purity of heart might be retained;¹ and afterwards it adds: for this we know that we ought to undertake the abstinence of fasting, vigils, labors, nudity of the body, reading, and the other virtues, in order that through those we might be able to prepare and conserve our heart uninjured from all noxious passions and to ascend unto the perfection of charity by resting upon those grades.² And Augustine says this same thing in the book On the Customs of the Church: kinds of foods, he says, must not be thrown away as though polluted, but every intention must keep vigil over taming concupiscence and retaining love of the brethren;³ and in the same place it is said: charity especially is guarded, nourishment is applied to charity, speech to charity, habit to charity, appearance to charity.⁴ Hence also the Apostle teaches that the counsel of virginity is directed to this: that an unmarried woman thinks about those things which are of God, how to please God (1 Cor 7:34). And the Lord, in Matthew 19, orders the counsel of poverty unto this:⁵ that a man should follow him, which is done through rectitude and purity of interior affect. Thus, therefore, the counsels are directed to the precepts as unto an end, insofar as they concern interior acts.

But insofar as they concern exterior acts, for example: thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal, and so on,¹ the counsels are directed to the precepts, not as unto an end,—for a man does not preserve virginity in order to abstain from adultery, nor with this as the end does anyone renounce his things: in order to not steal others’ things, since the exterior works of the counsels are greater than the exterior works of the precepts,—nevertheless they are directed to those things inasmuch as they make them preserved more safely and more firmly: for he who dismisses his own things abstains much more from plundering the things of others.

Hence also Augustine says in the nineteenth book of Against Faustus: all things commemorated out of the law of the Hebrews the Lord has commended, in order that whatever he would say in addition out of his own person, either would prevail unto commending the exposition, if that law had posited anything obscure, or unto conserving more safely what that law had willed;¹ and in the book On the Sermon on the Mount he says that while there are done . . . those things which are added unto perfection, much more are there done those things which had been given before unto the beginning.²

Thus, therefore, it is clear that the counsels are directed to the precepts as to an end insofar as they concern interior acts of the virtues; but insofar as they concern exterior acts of the virtues, the counsels are directed to the precepts that they should be preserved more safely and more firmly by means of removing obstacles. And the first of these is the cause of the second: for the firm observance of exterior acts is caused from the interior affect of a well-disposed mind.

But because Chrysostom and other expositors say that that adolescent did not lie, either interpretation can be salvaged.¹ For this precept: you shall love your neighbor just as your own self, can be observed in two ways. In one way, it can be observed imperfectly, namely, that someone does not do against his neighbor that which he does not will to be done to himself, and that without his own detriment he should help his neighbor. In another way, it can be observed perfectly, namely, so that he disposes himself to helping with his neighbors’ bodily necessities just as to helping with his own personal necessities. For in this way someone does not fulfill this precept who, when he has many riches, reserves them for himself, permitting his neighbors to be in need. Yet the counsels are directed to this: that the precepts might be guarded more perfectly, and for this reason, the Lord, to one observing the precepts imperfectly, adds on top of them the counsels, through which the precepts might be observed more perfectly.