Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that an accident according to its own being depends upon a subject just as upon the cause sustaining it. And because God can produce all effects of secondary causes without those secondary causes,¹ he can conserve an accident in being without a subject. But matter according to its actual being depends upon form inasmuch as form is its very act. Hence it is not similar.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that it is more difficult for one accident to be changed into another accident than for one substance to be changed into another substance. This is both because two substances share the same material subject, which is an essential part of each substance, and because a substance has individuation through its very self, whereas an accident is not able to be individual through itself but through a subject. Hence it cannot accord with it for this accident to be converted into this accident. Nevertheless, given that one dimension is converted into another dimension, it would not follow that that body would be in two places simultaneously, but in one only. For, just as after the substance of bread has been converted into the substance of the body of Christ there are now not two substances, but one only, so also if one dimension of this body is converted into another dimension of another body, now there will not be two dimensions, but one only, and thus it would not be commensurate with diverse places, but with one only.

Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the response to the objections is clear. For the first two arguments proceed concerning the knowledge of infinite things absolutely.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that the will of the soul of Christ is a finite power absolutely, just as also his intellect. Yet the merit of Christ has infinity out of dignity of person, namely, inasmuch as it is the merit of God and man.¹

Reply Obj. 1: Therefore, it must be said that substance is said in two ways. For sometimes it is understood as hypostasis, and thus it is true that the body of Christ remains sustained through the hypostasis of God the Word: for the union of the Word was not dissolved through death either unto the soul or unto the body. And thus, it remains absolutely the same body in number according to hypostasis or supposit, which is the person of the Word. In another way, substance is understood as essence or nature, and thus the body of Christ is sustained through the soul just as through its form, yet not through the Word since the Word is not united to the body as its form—for this is heretical, according to the heresy of Arius and Apollinaris, which posited that the Word is in Christ in place of the soul.¹ It would follow also that the union of God and man would be made in nature, which pertains to the heresy of Eutyches.² Thus, therefore, the body of Christ after death is absolutely the same according to the substance which is hypostasis, yet not the same according to the substance which is essence or nature. Yet univocation and equivocation do not apply to the supposit but the essence or nature, which the definition entails.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, although Christ is not pure man, nevertheless, he is true man, and his death was true death. Hence whatever is true concerning man inasmuch as he is man, and concerning the death of man, the whole is true concerning Christ and concerning his death.

Reply Obj. 1: Hence the response to the objections is clear.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the first proposition introduced seems to include opposites: for if the soul and an angel are made equal in nature, an angel is not prior to the soul according to the order of nature, unless they are said to be made equal in nature because they accord in nature, not indeed of species, but of genus.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the solution to the objections is clear.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Reply Obj. 1–2: Through this, therefore, the response to the first two arguments is clear.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that whoever does not fear dangers seems to spurn that whose detriment the dangers can induce. And because it is laudable for a man to spurn bodily goods on account of spiritual goods, it is laudable for someone to expose himself to bodily dangers on account of spiritual goods. But to spurn spiritual goods is greatly vicious, and for this reason, for someone to expose himself to spiritual dangers must be greatly reproached. Yet spiritual dangers threaten these men who have the place of master. But a pastoral man avoids the dangers of the magisterial chair through knowledge with charity, which a man does not know himself with certitude to have; yet a magisterial man avoids the dangers of the magisterial chair through knowledge, which a man can know himself to have. Hence there is not a similar reason concerning each.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that for this reason, it says first: upon the seat of Moses sat the scribes and Pharisees,¹ such that afterwards it adds: observe and do all the things which they say to you;² this should be understood concerning what pertains to the seat, and to this seat what is against faith or good customs does not pertain.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that Innocent, in certain letters directed to religious which begin: not only in favor, thus says: to you from the counsel of our brothers, in the power of obedience under pain of excommunication by the authority of those present we restrain most strictly lest before the year of probation has elapsed, which is especially instituted regularly unto the help of human fragility, you should presume to receive anyone unto the profession of your order or unto the renunciation of the world.¹ Yet that youths should not be received into a probationary period, or that they should not be obligated to enter by vow or oath, without prejudice to the time of probation, is never found prohibited.²

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that legitimate age is judged by the time of puberty, as is clear through the introduced chapter:¹ for then especially man begins to have the free use of reason concerning what pertains to his salvation. Yet it must be known that there is a twofold necessity: one which excludes the will, namely, necessity of coercion, and another which is caused by a voluntary obligation and does not exclude the will, and of this sort is the obligation of an oath or vow. Hence men must not be drawn through coercion either to faith or to religion; but nothing prohibits obligating them to this by vow or oath. And concerning this necessity, Augustine speaks: happy the necessity which compels unto better things.²

Reply Obj. 3: And through this the solution to the third is clear.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that, in voluntary matters just as in natural things, what happens in fewer cases must not be judged easily, but rather that which happens in most cases. Yet it happens in fewer cases that those entering religion leave: for many more of those entering remain than leave, as is proven by experience.

Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that, when it is said, “good things must not be done that evil things may come,” if the “that” is held causally, it is altogether true. For anyone would sin if he were to induce someone to enter religion in order that he would apostatize afterwards. Whereas if the “that” is held consecutively, thus one would have to abstain from all good things because scarcely are there any human goods from which occasionally there cannot follow some evils. Hence it is said: he who observes the wind, does not sow, and he who considers the clouds, never reaps (Eccl 11:4). Yet some good would have to be omitted on account of a consequent evil only when the consequent evil would be much more than the good and would happen as frequently.¹ Yet the Lord did not omit to elect twelve disciples from which one was to be a devil (John 6:71), nor did the Apostles omit to elect seven deacons on account of Nicholas, who perished from them. Much less, therefore, should religious omit the salvation of many on account of a few who are found to apostatize.²

Reply Obj. 6: It must be said that those who enter religion obligated by oath or vow do not act against a prohibition of the Church, as has been shown.¹ Hence they are not made sons of Gehenna by entering, but sons of eternal life, which the Lord promises in Matthew 19² to those forsaking temporal things on account of him. But that they are made sons of Gehenna by leaving after profession does not prejudice those receiving them, unless they were perverted by their evil examples. Hence the Lord significantly says: you make him a son of Gehenna twice as much as yourselves,³ because, as Chrysostom says, provoked by the example of evil masters, he was made worse than his masters.⁴

Reply Obj. 7: It must be said that that objection tastes of the heresy of the Manichees, who lead this objection to two erroneous conclusions. First, indeed, it leads to this: that all corruptible bodies are not from God; for if, they say, they were from God, they would not be dissolved. Second, it leads to this: that charity once had is never lost, such that he who sins mortally never had grace. For if, they say, they had had grace, this would have been the work of God, and thus it would not have been dissolved. This is what the objection also intends, namely, that if anyone does not persevere in religion, that the intention concerning entering religion was not from God.¹ It must be known, therefore, that those words are not said to show that those things which are from God remain unto perpetuity and cannot be corrupted, but unto showing the infallibility of divine providence. For it cannot be that divine providence is deceived. Hence significantly he does not say that the “work” of God is indissoluble, but the “counsel.” Therefore, to certain men there is given a gift of grace unto present justice according to divine providence, and nevertheless there is not given to them the gift of perseverance. Yet to certain men there is given also the gift of perseverance, as is clear through Augustine in the book On the Gift of Perseverance.²

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that necessity of vow or oath does not exclude the will, as was said above.¹ For just as anyone is obligated by common law to observe the precepts of God, which, nevertheless, he observes voluntarily (hence also the Lord says: if you will to enter unto life, observe the mandates),² thus that man who has uttered an oath or a vow is obligated by a certain private obligation, and he fulfills the oath and the vow voluntarily, but such that before the oath or the vow it is licit for him to make it or not to make it (hence also the Lord said: if you will to be perfect,³ and Paul gives counsel concerning virginity). But after the oath or vow, it is illicit not to fulfill it.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that that reason contains a condemned heresy, namely, that it is better to remain in the world and to be at leisure for works of piety than to enter religion. For this is contained amongst the errors of Vigilantius, against which Jerome in his writing says that man attempts to ally the venoms of treachery to the Catholic faith, to impugn virginity, to hate purity, to declaim in the assembly of secular men against the fasting of the saints.¹ And afterwards disputing against the particular articles proposed by Vigilantius, he comes to that article, saying: yet that which he asserts, that they do better who use their things and gradually divide the fruits of their possessions to the poor, than those who, with their possessions sold, lavish all their things all at once, not to them by me, but by God it shall be responded: if you will to be perfect, go and sell all things which you have and give to the poor, and come, follow me. . . . He whom you praise is the second or third grade, whom we also receive, provided that we know that the first things must be preferred to the seconds and thirds.² And for this reason, in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, that one also is condemned with other errors when it is said: it is good to expend faculties to the poor with dispensation; it is better for the intention of following the Lord together to give and, absolved of solicitude, to be needy with Christ. ³ Not only is the state of religion preferred to the alms which anyone gives in the world, but also to virginity observed in the world. For Augustine says in the book On Virginity: no one, as far as I think, would be bold to prefer virginity⁴ to a monastery.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that the same work done out of a vow is more laudable and more meritorious than if it is done without a vow. This is clear since every act in itself is so much more laudable and meritorious as it proceeds from a worthier virtue, just as a work of justice, if it is done out of charity, will be more laudable. Yet it is clear that, when someone fasts without a vow, he does an act of the virtue which is abstinence, yet when he fasts fulfilling a vow, he does an act of abstinence and of latria which, since it orders us unto God, is a nobler virtue than abstinence or whatever other virtue which orders us in regard to created goods. On account of this Augustine says in the book On Virginity that nor is virginity, because it is virginity, honored, but because it is dedicated to God . . . , which he vows and observes by the continence of piety.¹ Therefore, that which Prosper says: we ought so to abstain or to fast that we do not place ourselves under the necessity of fasting or abstaining,² must be understood concerning the necessity of coercion, which excludes the will. Hence he adds: lest already not devoted, but reluctant, we should do a voluntary thing. Yet the necessity of vow and oath does not exclude the will, as has been said.³ Yet it must be said further that, if fasting does not please that man who fasts out of a vow, but, nevertheless, the fulfillment of the vow pleases him, he merits more, other things being equal, than that man fasting whom fasting pleases according to itself, since it is more meritorious to delight in an act of latria than in an act of abstinence.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that difficulty is twofold: there is one which is from the arduousness of the work, for example to observe virginity and things of this sort, and such difficulty makes for an increase of virtue; another difficulty is from threatening impediments and dangers < . . . >,¹ and such a difficulty does not make for an increase of virtue, but for its diminution, since he does not seem to be prudent nor to love the good of virtue much who does not fear dangers. And such a difficulty to living well threatens those remaining in the world.

Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that that was the reason of the heretic Vigilantius, as is clear through Jerome, who says in the book Against Vigilantius: monks must not be deterred from their zeal, although by you they suffer the most savage bites of viperous tongues, against whom you argue, and you say: if all should enclose themselves and should be in solitude, who shall celebrate in the churches? Who shall profit secular men? Who shall be able to exhort sinners unto virtues? For in this way if all should be fools with you, who shall be able to be wise? And virginity must not be approved. For if all should be virgins, nuptials shall not be, the human race shall perish. . . . Rare is virtue nor is it desired by many.¹ Therefore, fear of this sort is stupid since the good of religion is so difficult and arduous that scarcely a few enter religion in comparison of the multitude remaining in the world, just as if someone were to fear to draw water lest the river be dried up.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that that argument proceeds both against the character of evangelical doctrine and against the character of philosophy. Against evangelical doctrine indeed, because the evangelical counsels are given so that through them man might attain salvation more easily; hence the state of seculars is said to be more dangerous than the state of religion. Yet it is stupid to say that anyone who is weaker on account of sins which he has committed must not flee to the more secure way. It is also against philosophical doctrine, which teaches that those who are prone to vice ought to turn back to the contrary, just as those do who direct tortuous wooden beams.¹

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, although it is licit to abstain from some good work, nevertheless it is illicit to place an impediment either for oneself or for another that prevents someone from proceeding in that good work, just as it is licit not to give alms to this pauper, but, nevertheless, it is illicit to bind oneself or another by an oath to not give alms to anyone.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that a religious is held to fulfill that which pertains to religion, not only by human tradition, but also by divine precept: for he is obligated by the vow uttered to the obedience of his prelate, yet the fulfillment of a vow falls under divine precept.

Reply Obj. 1–3: It must be said, therefore, that all those authorities of Chrysostom could be answered briefly by saying he does not speak about a parish priest, but a bishop, who is called a priest by antonomasia, as high priest, and this manner of speaking is generally customary, namely, that bishops are called priests.¹ This response seems to harmonize according to the intention of the work, in which Chrysostom consoles Basil concerning his promotion: for both were elected to the episcopacy.²

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, if anyone were to consider the circumstances of the words, they do not apply to the question at hand. For he says before: if those who dwell in secret places are not moved by the sermons of the many, worthy of praise indeed is their patience, nevertheless not a suitable argument of true art. Whereas since he was in the midst of waves and he was able to free the ship from the storm, then justly did he deserve the testimony of the perfect helmsman from all;¹ and then he concludes: thus, therefore, also now if you should lead to me some such monk as, in order that I might speak according to exaggeration, was Elijah, nevertheless inasmuch as he is alone if he was not perturbed nor sins gravely, who surely does not have any by whom he is incited or exasperated, nevertheless he must not be compared to that man who, handed over to the peoples and compelled to bear the sins of the many, persevered unmoved and strong, because just as in tranquility, so in a storm did he steer his very self.² It is clear that he does not compare state to state, but impeccability to impeccability: for that a monk dwelling in a cloister does not sin is not such an evident argument of virtue as if a priest or bishop or any rector of the people abstains from sin in the midst of perturbations, just as it is not an argument of such great industry if a helmsman navigates without danger in a tranquil sea, as if he were to navigate in a tempestuous sea—nevertheless, it pertains to the industry of a sailor to avoid a tempestuous sea. Thus, therefore, from the aforesaid words nothing else can be shown except that the state of one having the care of souls is more dangerous than that of the monk, and to preserve himself innocent in greater danger is an argument of greater virtue. Hence greater virtue is required for someone to preserve himself from sin immune amongst the people than in religion. But it is of greater virtue to avoid the dangers by entering religion than not to avoid the dangers: for as much as someone more loves his own salvation, so much more does he avoid the dangers of his salvation.

Reply Obj. 2: And through this the response to the second is also clear. For he does not say that he would prefer to be in the priestly office rather than in the solitude of monks,¹ but that he would prefer to please in this than in that. For what wise man would wish more to have such great virtue through which he could even exist secure amongst dangers than such virtue by which he could be saved outside of dangers? But, because it is presumptuous for someone to presume himself to have such virtue through which he would be safe even amongst dangers, it is virtuous that he place himself outside of dangers. Hence he adds: that which I was praising with such great zeal and was pronouncing blessed, namely, the office of the administration of the Church, certainly I would not flee, if I were to see myself suitable unto its governance.² Prudently, therefore, did he take refuge, because he did not proudly ascribe to himself such great virtue through which he would be suitable.

Reply Obj. 3: Similarly, the response to the third is also clear. For if someone placed in the company of the many can preserve unperturbed that brightness of full sanctity, and the splendor of continence, and other monastic good things, incorrupt and unshaken, he must be preferred to all.¹ For it is an indication of greater virtue for someone to preserve perfect purity even amongst dangers of purity than if he were to preserve it outside of dangers. But nevertheless, he is convicted of loving his purity little who does not avoid the dangers of purity, amongst which it is difficult and most rare to preserve every sort of purity. Just as the greatest purity was that of blessed Agnes, who even when placed in a brothel preserved her virginal purity, and nevertheless, because she was a lover of purity, never did she choose to show her virtue in the brothel, but as much more as she had a pure mind, so much more did she avoid the brothel by her own will.² And it is similar in all such persons.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that that authority does not pertain to perfection of life but to difference of dignity, for a private person is distant from a king in the same way as a person not having a prelature from one having one. Yet it is not considered in the question whether whoever has the care of souls is greater by dignity of the prelature than a religious who does not have the care of souls.

Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that the reason is different for bishops and for parish priests. For bishops have the principal care of the people, yet parish priests and archdeacons are their sub-ministers and coadjutors. Hence it is said (C. 16, q. 1): all priests and deacons and the rest of clerics must take care that they should do nothing without the license of their proper bishop; certainly let none of the priests have masses without his command in their parish, let none baptize, nor do whatever without his permission.¹ And on 1 Corinthians 7 it is said in the Gloss that assistants are those who bear help to those greater than them, as Titus to the Apostle or archdeacons to bishops,² whereas governors are governors of lesser persons, as are priests. Hence, if anyone rightly were to consider, in this way archdeacons and parish priests are compared to the bishop in the government of the Church just as in a temporal government commanders and bailiffs are compared to the king. The reason is that just as a king is crowned and anointed in his kingship, yet not commanders and bailiffs, so also the bishop in the Church, yet not archdeacons and parish priests. And on account of this, the episcopacy is an order in comparison to the mystical body, yet not the parish priesthood or the archidiaconate, which are an office only. Therefore, archdeacons and parish priests are similar to bishops just as coadjutors and ministers, but religious are similar to bishops in perpetual obligation, which makes a state of perfection.

Reply Obj. 6: It must be said that any two works either in good or in evil can be compared to one another in many ways.

Reply Obj. 7: It must be said that to administer something well is both more and less. Hence, if the administration of that one to whom more is committed is as much greater as that which is committed to him is greater, without doubt he merits more. Whereas if that one to whom less is committed does much more than that one to whom more is committed, nevertheless the former merits more, even if the latter should do it well. This also is apparent in human matters: he who receives less benefit, if he serves more, should be accepted more. Yet although to one having the care of souls there is committed more as regards dignity, nevertheless, because a religious does more works, as has been said, he merits more.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that a woman who has uttered a vow of continence, when she contracts in the face of the Church does not receive from the authority of the Church the power that she should enjoy carnal union, because if the uttered vow were known to the Church, the Church would impede the matrimony. Yet if the Church were to know and were to dispense by apostolic authority the simple vow of continence, the woman would not sin after the dispensation either by demanding or by rendering the debt.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the same reason applies to a vow of continence and to a vow of abstinence. For just as a person who, after uttering a simple vow of continence, hands over the power of himself to a spouse, he enjoys carnal union without sin when rendering the debt. Thus, if after a vow of abstinence, he hands over the power of himself to another by entering religion, he can break the fast without sin according to the obedience of the prelate and the observance of religion, through which solemnized vow he is absolved from other vows.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that usurious money does not exist in the way of a root for the gain made from it, but only through the way of a material. For a root somehow has the power of an active cause, inasmuch as it ministers nourishment to the whole plant. Hence in human acts the will and intention are compared to the root, by which, if it is perverse, the work will be perverse. Yet this is not necessary in that which is material: for sometimes someone can use evil well.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the first is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the Philosopher speaks of remembering and reminiscing, which is an act of a certain sensitive power using a bodily organ, at whose corruption such an act of power ceases.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that God wills many things to be thus hidden for us, as we cannot acquire the knowledge of them by our own powers or justly, which, nevertheless, he wills to be revealed to those seeking humbly and piously, according to Matthew 11:25: you have hidden these things from the wise and prudent and have revealed them to little ones. Hence it is no marvel if to the proud brothers of the proud rich man God refused for some things to be revealed, which, nevertheless, he willed to be revealed to the faithful piously and humbly seeking them.¹

Reply Obj. 1: Hence the response is clear to that objected to the contrary, which concerns the action of fire through alteration.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that particular principles have the power of concluding out of the first universal premises. Hence a conclusion principally is attributed to the first principles just as an effect to the first cause. And by the same reason, because the power of conscience principally depends upon the principles of the natural law just as upon things known first and through themselves, principally conscience is called the natural law or even the natural court of justice.

Reply Obj. 2: Hence the solution to the second is clear.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, although a heretic who swears an oath, with an erring conscience contradicting, materially speaking does not act against the law of God, nevertheless formally speaking he acts against the law of God, as has been shown.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, if conscience dictates to anyone that he should do what is against the law of God, he sins if he does not do it, and similarly he sins if he does it, because ignorance of the law does not excuse from sin unless, perhaps, it is invincible ignorance, just as with the mad and insane, which altogether excuses. Nor, nevertheless, does it follow that he is perplexed absolutely, but in a certain way, for he can put aside his erroneous conscience, and then he does not sin in acting according to the law of God. Yet it is not unfitting that, with something posited, some man should be perplexed, such as a priest who is held to sing, sins by singing and by not singing if he is in sin; nor, nevertheless, is he perplexed absolutely, because he can repent and sing without sin, just as also in syllogistics, with one unfitting thing given, the others follow, as is said in the first book of the Physics.¹

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that with the due time of the office passing by, he is now incapable of resolving at the due time, and for this reason, because he cannot do this, another penance must be enjoined upon him.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that a rainbow proceeds naturally out of such causes which are repugnant to a flood, and for this reason, a rainbow fittingly is said to be a sign of no future flood.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that a rainbow can signify rains, but not superabundant ones such that they make a flood.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that a rainbow appearing once signifies that there will not be a flood for so long as the sun and vapors consist in the same disposition, and for this reason, it is not superfluous for it to appear frequently.

Reply Obj. 1: What he introduces first concerning the paschal candle does not have force except through authority. Yet to prove through authority is not to prove demonstratively, but to make faith or opinion; and nevertheless, the authority of Sacred Scripture would be much mightier than of the paschal candle, especially since the paschal candle can be blessed without the inscription of the years of the world. For such an inscription of the paschal candle is not of necessity. Hence in many lands there is not the custom for something to be inscribed in the candle.

Reply Obj. 2: That which is opposed second also is derisible. For the growth of the years of the moon unto the sun are not computed from the beginning of the world but from some determinate root, for example, from some opposition of sun and moon, or from some conjunction, or from something of this sort, just as there is in all other astronomical computations.