For this reason, during the three days of death we can speak of Christ in two ways.

In one way, we can speak regarding the hypostasis or person, and thus he is the same in number absolutely as he was.

Or, we can speak regarding the human nature, and this in two ways.

In one way, we can speak regarding the whole nature, which is called humanity, and thus Christ was not a man during the three days of death; hence he was neither the same man nor another man, but the same hypostasis.

Or we can speak regarding the parts of human nature, and thus the soul indeed was altogether the same in number since it was not transmuted according to substance, whereas the body was the same in number according to matter, but not according to substantial form, which is the soul. Hence it cannot be said that he was absolutely the same in number, because any substantial difference excludes absolute identity. However, being animate is a substantial difference, and for this reason, to die is to be corrupted, not just to be altered. Nor again can it be said that he is absolutely not the same or other, because he is not non-identical or other according to the whole substance. It must be said, therefore, that in one respect he is the same, and in another respect not the same: for according to matter he is the same, whereas according to form not the same.

If, therefore, we speak concerning the redemption of the human race in regard to quantity of price, thus any suffering of Christ, even without death, would have sufficed for the redemption of the human race on account of the infinite dignity of his person. And thus, the last two objections hold.

Yet if we speak about allotment of price, thus it must be said that other passions of Christ have not been allotted without death for the redemption of the human race by God the Father and Christ. And this is for a threefold reason. The first, indeed, is so that the price of the redemption of the human race not only would be infinite in strength, but also would be of the same genus, namely, that it would redeem us from death through death. The second is so that the death of Christ not only would be the price of redemption, but also an example of virtue, namely, so that men would not fear to die for truth. And the Apostle assigns these two causes in Hebrews 2:14–15, saying: so that through death he would destroy him who had command of death, as regards the first, and would free those who were subject to servitude by fear of death through their whole life, as regards the second. The third is so that the death of Christ would be also a sacrament of salvation, while by the power of the death of Christ we die to sin and to carnal desires and to our own inclinations. And this cause is assigned in 1 Peter 3:18: Christ died once for our sins, the just for the unjust, so that he might offer us to God, us indeed having been made dead to the flesh, yet made alive to the spirit.¹ And for this reason, the human race was not redeemed through another suffering without the death of Christ.

But it must be known that there are two ways to participate in something. One way is to participate in it as something included in the substance of thing, just as a species participates in a genus. Yet a creature does not participate in existence in this way. For the substance of a thing includes that which is in its definition. But existence is not in the definition of a creature, since existence is neither genus nor difference. Hence a creature participates in existence as something not arising from the essence of a thing. And for this reason, “whether it is” is one question and “what it is” is another. Hence, since everything which is outside the essence of a thing is called an accident, existence, which pertains to the question “whether it is,” is an accident.

And for this reason, the Commentator says in the fifth book of the Metaphysics that that proposition, “Socrates is,” concerns accidental predication, according to how it indicates the entity of a thing or the truth of a proposition; but it is true that this name “being,” according to how it indicates the thing to which existence of this sort applies, thus signifies the essence of the thing, and it is divided through ten genera.¹ Nevertheless, not univocally, because existence does not apply to all by the same intelligible notion, but indeed to substance through itself, while to others otherwise.

Thus, therefore, in an angel there is composition of essence and existence. Nevertheless, there is not composition as though from the parts of substance, but from substance and that which adheres to substance.

And, because sensible substances composed of matter and form are more known to us, for this reason, let us first see how essence or nature is related to supposit in them.

Certain men say that the form of a part is the same as the form of the whole,¹ which is called essence or nature according to the thing, but that it differs by conception only. For the form of a part is said inasmuch as it makes matter to be in act, yet the form of the whole inasmuch as it constitutes species, just as the form of man is called the soul inasmuch as it perfects the body, yet inasmuch as it constitutes the human species it is called humanity. And according to this, in things composed of matter and form, nature is part of supposit: for a supposit is an individual composed of matter and form, as has been said.²

But the aforesaid position does not seem to be true¹ because, as has been said,² something is called nature or essence, which the definition signifies; yet definition in natural things not only signifies form, but also matter, as is said in the sixth book of the Metaphysics.³ Nor can it be said that matter is placed in the definition of a natural thing just as a non-existing thing concerning its essence: for it is the property of an accident for it to be defined through something which is not of its essence, namely, through its subject, and for this reason, accidents have an incomplete essence, as is said in the sixth book of the Metaphysics.⁴ Therefore, it remains that in things composed of matter and form, essence or nature is not form alone, but that composed of matter and form.⁵

It remains to be considered, therefore, since a natural supposit or individual is composed of matter and form, whether it is the same as essence or nature. And the Philosopher raises this question in the seventh book of the Metaphysics, where he inquires whether each thing is the same as its what-it-is.¹ And he determines that in these things which are said essentially, a thing is the same as the what-it-is of the thing, yet in these things which are said incidentally, it is not the same: for man is nothing else than what is of a man, since “man” signifies nothing else than biped animal that can walk upright.² But a white thing is not altogether the same as that which is what-white-is, namely, that which is signified by the name of white:³ for white signifies nothing except a quality, as is said in the Categories,⁴ while a white thing is a substance having a quality.

According to this, therefore, whatever can apply to something which is not of the character of its nature, in that lies the difference between the thing and what it is, or between supposit and nature: for the signification of nature includes not only that which is of the character of the species, while a supposit not only has these things which pertain to the character of the species, but also other things which apply to it. And for this reason, supposit is signified as a whole, yet nature or quiddity as a formal part. Yet in God alone there is not found any accident beyond his essence because his existence is his essence, as has been said,¹ and for this reason, in God supposit and nature are altogether the same. Yet in an angel they are not altogether the same, because something applies to it beyond that which is of the character of its species, because both the existence itself of an angel is beyond its essence or nature, and because certain other things apply to it, all of which pertain to the supposit, yet not to the nature.²

Nevertheless, this happens differently in each. For something is understood as an accident beyond the character of a thing in two ways. One way is because it does not fall in the definition signifying the essence of the thing, but nevertheless is designative or determinative of any of the essential principles, just as rational applies to animal, as arising beyond its definition, and nevertheless, it is determinative of the essence of animal. Hence this is made essential for man and arising from his character. Another way is that something applies to something because it is neither in its definition nor is it determinative of any of its essential principles, just as whiteness applies to man.

Therefore, for things composed of matter and form, something applies arising beyond the character of the species in each way. For although it is the character of the human species that it is composed of soul and body, the determination of body and soul is beyond the character of the species, and there it applies to a man, inasmuch as he is a man, for him to be of this particular soul and body.¹ But this applies essentially to this man, from whose character it would be, if it were to be defined, that he is this particular soul and body, just as it is of the character of common man for him to be of soul and body. Many other things beyond the character of the species which are not determinative of the essential principles are also accidental to things composed of matter and form.

For immaterial created substances there applies, indeed, some things beyond the character of the species which are not determinative of essential principles, as has been said. Nevertheless, there do not apply to any things which are determinative of the essence of the species, because the nature itself of the species is not individuated through matter but through itself only, from this: that such a form is not born to be received in some matter. Hence through itself only it is not able to be multiplied nor is it predicable of many. But because it is not its own existence, something applies to it beyond the character of its species, namely, existence itself, and certain other things which are attributed to the supposit and not to the nature. On account of this, supposit in them is not altogether the same as nature.

Reply Sed Contra: It must be said that nature is said to constitute a supposit even in things composed of matter and form, not because nature is one thing and supposit another thing (for this would be according to the opinion of those who say the nature of a species is only formed,¹ which constitutes the supposit as a whole), but because according to the mode of signifying, nature is signified as a part, for the reason said above, whereas supposit as a whole: nature is signified as constituting, and supposit as constituted.

About faith

Yet someone is helped by God to believe in three ways. The first way, indeed, is through an interior calling, concerning which it is said in John 6:45: everyone who hears from the Father and learns, comes unto me; and in Romans 8:30: whom he predestined, these he called. The second way is through exterior doctrine and preaching, according to that saying of the Apostle in Romans 10:17: faith out of hearing, yet hearing through the word of Christ. The third way is through exterior miracles; hence it is said in 1 Corinthians 14:22 that the signs were given for infidels,¹ namely, so that through them they would be provoked to faith.

Yet if Christ had not done visible miracles, still there remained other means of attracting to faith by which men would be held to acquiesce. For men were held to believe the authority of the Law and the Prophets. They were held also not to resist an interior calling, just as Isaiah said concerning himself: yet the Lord has opened my ear, and I do not resist; I have not gone back (Isa 50:5); conversely, concerning certain men it is said in Acts 7:51: you always resist the Holy Spirit.

About the sacrament of faith

One, indeed, is on account of the danger to the faith. For if the children who do not yet have the use of reason were to receive baptism, afterwards when they would arrive unto perfect age, they could be induced easily by their parents to forsake what they received ignorantly, which would tend to the detriment the faith.

Whereas the other reason is that it is repugnant to natural justice. For a son is naturally something of the father;¹ and at first, indeed, he is not distinguished from his parent according to body as long as he is contained in the womb of his mother. Whereas afterwards, after he has gone forth from the womb, before he has the use of free will, he is contained under the care of the parents just as under a certain spiritual womb.²

For as long as a boy does not have the use of reason, he does not differ, regarding what he does, from an irrational animal. Hence just as an ox or a horse by the law of the nations or by civil law belongs to its possessor so that he might use it when he wants just as his proper instrument, so natural law holds that a son,¹ before he has the use of reason, is under the care of his father. Hence it would be against natural justice if for a boy before he has the use of free will to be carried off from the care of his parents, or for something to be ordained concerning him with his parents unwilling.

Yet after he begins to have the use of free will, already he begins to be his own and can, regarding those things which are of divine or natural law, provide for himself, and then he must be induced unto faith, not by coercion, but by persuasion. And he can, even with his parents unwilling, consent to the faith and be baptized. Yet this should not be before he has the use of reason. Hence concerning the children of the ancient fathers it is said that they were saved in the faith of their parents,¹ through which it is understood that it pertains to parents to provide for their sons concerning their salvation, especially before they have the use of reason.

About tithes which are due to the ministers of the sacraments

The divine law is contained in the New Testament and the Old Testament. And indeed, there is not apparent in the New Testament any precept given for paying tithes, by which I mean in evangelical or apostolic doctrine: for that said in Matthew 23:23 concerning the paying of tithes: it was necessary to do these things, and not to omit those, and which the Pharisee says in Luke 18:12: I give tithes of all the things which I possess, seems to pertain more to the state of the Old Testament than to impose a form of observance of the New Testament. Yet in the Old Testament there were three kinds of precepts: for certain ones were moral precepts, certain judicial, certain ceremonial. Moral precepts are those which are implanted by natural reason, to which men are obligated in every time, such as honor thy father and mother; thou shalt not commit adultery; thou shalt not steal,¹ and similar things.

Yet judicial precepts are those according to which judgments are exercised: for example, that if someone steals one sheep, he should render four.¹ And precepts of this sort are not implanted by natural reason: for natural reason does not hold that a man who steals a sheep should render four rather than three or five. But, nevertheless, a moral precept is determined through precepts of this sort: for natural reason holds that a man who steals should be punished. But that he should be punished by a particular punishment is determined through a judicial precept.

Yet ceremonial precepts of the Old Law are those which pertain to the observance of the divine cult, and they are established to symbolize some future thing, just as the immolation of the paschal lamb symbolized the slaughter of Christ.

It must be considered, therefore, whether the precept concerning paying tithes is moral or judicial or ceremonial.¹ For if it is moral, all men are held to it at every time, with contrary custom notwithstanding. But this does not seem to be, because natural reason does not dictate that man should give a tithe to the ministers of God rather than an eleventh or a ninth part of his fruits.

Yet if it is a judicial precept, not all would be held to give tithes, just as not all are held to judge according to the judgments written in the Old Law since those judicial precepts are specially given to that people with their conditions considered: for not all things are expedient for all men.

Yet if it is a ceremonial precept, not only would it not oblige, but if observed it would even induce unto sin: for anyone would sin if he were to immolate a paschal lamb, since, after the coming of the truth, the symbols ceased.

Therefore, it must be said, just as the ancient masters said,¹ that certain precepts of the Law are purely moral, such as thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal;² yet certain ones are purely ceremonial, such as the immolation of the paschal lamb and circumcision. Yet certain ones are in the middle, moral according to something and ceremonial according to something, just as the precept concerning the observation of the sabbath is moral regarding this:³ that some time should be assigned to rest for the sake of being at leisure for divine things, since natural reason supports this. But that the seventh day in particular should be assigned, this is from the determination of God on account of some symbol, and hence this is ceremonial. So too, therefore, the precept concerning paying tithes is indeed moral according to something, namely, so that those who for the whole people are at leisure for divine service are sustained by the stipends of the people, just as also those who serve the republic in other offices are sustained by the people. And this precept is proposed in the New Testament according to this manner, for the Lord says: the worker is worthy of his food (Matt 10:10), and the Apostle says, that the Lord ordained that those who announce the Gospel, should live from the Gospel, and those who serve the altar, should live from the altar (1 Cor 9:14).⁴ But regarding the determinate number of a tithe, it is not from natural law nor is it a moral precept, but it is ceremonial, inasmuch as it symbolizes something about Christ. Or it is even judicial,⁵ according to its fittingness for that people, in which, since there were a multitude of ministers, there was need of such taxation for the sustenance of the ministers of God.

Thus, therefore, this common thing which is to provide for the ministers of God in the necessities of life is from divine law as a moral precept, and it is from natural law. Yet it pertains to any prince who can establish laws to determine the natural common law through positive law:¹ for positive law is nothing else than a determination of natural law. For example, natural law holds that an evildoer should be punished. But that he should be punished by a particular punishment is determined through positive law. Therefore, because the Church has the power of establishing law in things which pertain to the cult of God, through a statute of the Church a quantity could be taxed of those things which must be given to the ministers of God by the people, and, so that there would be a certain consonance of the New Testament and the Old Testament, the Church established that the taxation of the Old Testament would be observed even in the New. Hence everyone is held to tithes, whether they like it or not. Yet, if there were cause, the Church could decide either on a greater or lesser number: for example, that an eighth would be given or a twelfth, just as also that a tenth should be given.

It is clear, therefore, that no contrary custom absolves man from the obligation of rendering tithes, because this obligation is founded upon divine law and upon natural law. Hence men always are held to render tithes if the Church compels, with a contrary custom notwithstanding. And in lands in which there is a custom that tithes should be paid, the custom itself, as it were, demands the tithes. Hence he would sin who would not render. But in lands in which there is not a common custom for tithes to be given, and the Church does not ask, the Church seems to renounce them while she ignores them.¹ And for this reason, men in those lands do not sin by not giving tithes: for it would be hard to say that all the men of Italy and of the oriental parts would be damned² who do not pay tithes. And we can prove this from the Apostle, to whom when the necessities of food were due from these to whom he was preaching, nevertheless he did not receive; nor, nevertheless, did those men sin who did not give to him, otherwise he would have done evil with them by not receiving, especially since he himself says: for I have not evaded to announce to you every counsel of God (Acts 20:27). But for this reason, the Apostle did not compel what was due to himself lest there should be given some obstacle to the Gospel (1 Cor 9:12), as he himself says. Hence the rectors of churches would not do well if they were to compel tithes in those lands in which there is not a custom that they be given if they were to believe that scandal probably would arise from this.

Reply Sed Contra 1: It must be said that that must be understood when the illness of cattle makes the cattle worth less than that for which they are sold.¹

Regarding sins

The reason for this is that he who desires rulership is either proud or unjust. For it is an injustice for someone to want to receive for himself more honor, power, or other good things of this sort unless he is worthy of greater things, as is said in the fifth book of the Ethics.¹ Yet for someone to reckon himself more worthy of rulership than all those over whom he receives rulership belongs to pride and presumption. Hence it is clear that whoever desires rulership is either unjust or proud.

And for this reason, no one should acquire rulership by his own desire, but only by the judgment of God, according to that line of the Apostle in Hebrews 5:4: no one assumes honor for himself, but he who is called by God, just as Aaron. Nevertheless, someone licitly can desire to be worthy of rulership, or the works of a good ruler,¹ to which honor is due.

Reply Sed Contra: Hence the response to the last is clear.

Regarding punishments

In another way, to be acted upon is properly said to be a contrariety of agent to patient, namely, as we are said to be acted upon when something comes to us which is contrary either to our nature or to our will. Infirmity and sadness are ways of being acted upon according to this.

And this being acted upon, indeed, can occur in two ways. In one way, it occurs through the reception of a contrary form, just as water is acted upon by fire inasmuch as it is heated, and consequently its natural quality is diminished. A separated soul cannot be acted upon by bodily fire in this way because it can be neither heated nor dried up nor changed according to form or any quality of bodily fire.

In another way, everything is said to be acted upon which is impeded in any way from its proper impetus or inclination, just as if we say that a falling stone is acted upon when it is impeded lest it arrive down below, and just as we say that a man is acted upon when he is detained or bound lest he go where he wills. And in this way, the soul is acted upon by bodily fire through the mode of a certain binding, as Augustine says in the twenty-first book of On the City of God.¹

For it is not contrary to nature for a spirit to be bound to a body, since we see that the soul naturally is bound to the body unto vivifying it; even demons through nigromancy are bound by the power of superior demons to some images or other things.¹ Hence so much the more can spirits be bound by divine power to bodily fire, not in order to give it life, but in order to receive punishment, just as Augustine says.²

But because what is of lesser power cannot by its power bind something of greater power, hence it is that no body can bind a spirit which is of greater power except by some superior power. And on account of this it is said that bodily fire acts unto the separated soul not by its proper power, but inasmuch as it is an instrument of vindicating divine justice.¹

About this, some men have said that they prevail no more for that man than for others;¹ nay, rather, perhaps they prevail more for others if they are better disposed to receiving the power of suffrages. And these men posit an example, just as if wax is set aflame in a house for some rich man, it illumines all dwelling in the house, and perhaps others more if they have clearer sight. And according to this opinion, of two who on account of equal faults are detained in purgatory, one cannot be liberated more quickly than the other.

But I do not think this opinion is true. The reason for this is that the suffrage of one prevails for another on account of two things: in one way, on account of unity of charity, because all who are in charity are as though one body, and so the good of one redounds unto all, just as a hand serves the whole body and similarly any member of the body, and according to this whatever good is done by another prevails for whomever exists in charity, according to Psalm 119 [118]:63: I am a partaker of all those fearing you and of those guarding your commandments.

It prevails in another way if through someone’s intention his act is transferred to another: for example, if someone pays some debt for another, since it is considered the same result as though that one were to have paid it for himself. Therefore, in the first way a good work prevails through the mode of merit, the root of which is charity. But in the second way the work of one prevails for another through the manner of satisfaction, just as one can satisfy for another, if he should intend this, and such valor is involved in suffrages, which are made so that men would be liberated through these from the debt of punishment.

And for this reason, it must be said that suffrages made in that way do not prevail except for those for whom they are made. And according to this, if many suffrages are made for someone, he is liberated more quickly from the punishment of purgatory than the others for whom they are not made, even if they have borne equal sins. Nevertheless, it must be granted that suffrages made for one prevail for all, namely, inasmuch as all who know rejoice out of charity over the good things which are done out of charity. And according to this it is true that for those for whom they are not made, suffrages prevail more if they are of greater charity.

For the teachers before Augustine understood the sin against the Holy Spirit to be blasphemy that is said against the Holy Spirit or his works, or even against the divinity of God the Father or the Son, because the Father and the Son are also spirit, according to how the name “spirit” is commonly taken: God is spirit (John 4:24).¹ Yet they understood the sin against the Son of man as blasphemy against Christ according to his human nature. And in both ways the Jews sinned against Christ: for in the first way they sinned against him by attributing his miracles to the prince of demons, which he did through the Holy Spirit and by the power of his divinity. Yet in the second way they sinned against him by saying: behold a ravenous man, a drinker of wine, and a friend of publicans (Matt 11:19). Therefore, he calls this second blasphemy remissible because they had some excuse on account of the infirmity of the flesh which they saw in Christ. Whereas they call the other blasphemy irremissible because they had no excuse, seeing clear indications of the Holy Spirit and of divinity. And on account of this, according to Chrysostom,² for those persevering in this blasphemy there was no remission either in this age or in the future age, because both in this age they were punished for it through the Romans, and in the future age they are tormented in hell.

Whereas according to Augustine, the remission of sins is attributed to the Holy Spirit, who is the charity of the Father and the Son.¹ Therefore, a man sins or blasphemes or says a word against the Holy Spirit by heart, mouth, or work, who does this through impenitence all the way until the end of his life, such that there can be for him no remission of sins. And then it is plain that this sin against the Holy Spirit is not remitted either in this age or in the future age.

Whereas the modern teachers said that, because power is attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit, sin out of weakness is the sin against the Father, sin out of ignorance is the sin against the Son, sin out of a settled malice is the sin against the Holy Spirit.¹ Because, therefore, ignorance or weakness excuses sin either in whole or in part, they say that the sin against the Father or against the Son is remitted because either fault is totally lacking or fault is diminished. Yet malice does not excuse sin, but aggravates it, and for this reason, the sin against the Holy Spirit is not remitted either in whole or in part because it does not have in itself any aspect of pardon through which fault is diminished. And, if sometimes it is remitted, this is rather out of the mercy of God remitting, who cures even incurable sicknesses, than out of the remissibility of the sin.

Therefore, three things are required for an indulgence to prevail for someone: first, a cause pertaining to the honor of God or to the necessity or utility of the Church; second, the authority in him who acts: for the pope can do so principally, whereas others can do so inasmuch as they receive from him power either ordinary or else committed or delegated; third, there is required for that man who wishes to receive the indulgence to be in a state of charity. And these three things are designated in the papal letter:¹ for a fitting cause is designated in this: that there is mentioned concerning the relief of the Holy Land; whereas authority in this: that there is made mention of the authority of the apostles Peter and Paul and of the pope himself; yet the charity of the receiver in this: that it is said: to all truly penitent and having confessed. It does not say: “and to those satisfying,” because an indulgence does not excuse from contrition and confession, but takes the place of satisfaction.

It must be said, therefore, in the question proposed that, if according to the form of the papal letter an indulgence is granted to those receiving the cross for the relief of the Holy Land, the crusader at once has the indulgence even if he dies before taking the journey because thus the cause of the indulgence will not be the journey, but the vow of the journey. Yet if the form of the letter contains that the indulgence should be given to these men who have crossed beyond the sea, that man who dies before he crosses does not have the indulgence because he does not have the cause of the indulgence.