Yet something has being and unity from the same thing, and thus it happens that there is only one real relation because of the unity of the cause. This is clear in the case of equality: for since there is only one quantity in one body, there is only one equality, even though there are many references according to which it is said to be equal to different bodies. But if real relations in one body were multiplied according to all those references, it would follow that there would be infinite or indeterminate accidents in one thing. Similarly, a teacher is by a single relation the teacher of everyone he teaches even though there are many references. So also, one man is the son of his father and his mother according to a single real relation, because by one birth he received one nature from both.

By following this reasoning, it seems we must say there is a real sonship in Christ by which he is related to his Father, and another by which he is related to his mother, for he is born from each by a different generation, and the nature which he has from his Father is one thing while that from his mother is something else.

But another reason alters this determination.

For it must be held universally that there is no relation between God and a creature that really exists in God. Rather, it is a relation only of the mind, since God is above every order of creatures and is the measure of every creature. Every creature depends on this relation but not conversely. Even more does this apply to a knowable thing in relation to knowledge, since in the knowable thing there is no real relation to knowledge because of these reasons.

Nevertheless, we must consider that the subject of sonship is not a nature or some part of a nature: for we do not say that humanity is a daughter or a head or an eye. Yet in Christ we say there is only one supposit and one hypostasis, just as also only one person—which is the eternal supposit—in which there cannot be any real relation to a creature, as has been said already. And thus, it stands that the sonship by which Christ is related to his mother is a relation only of the mind. Nor on account of this does it follow that Christ is not really the son of the Virgin: for just as God really is Lord on account of the real power by which he sustains a creature, so he is really the son of the Virgin on account of the real nature which he received from his mother. If there were many supposits in Christ, however, it would be necessary to say there were two sonships in Christ, but I consider this erroneous, and it is found condemned in the councils.

Hence I say that in Christ there is only one real sonship, that by which he is related to his Father.

Reply Sed Contra: What is objected to the contrary does not hold necessarily. For sometimes a thing is said to be one such thing on account of the substantial unity of the subject even though there are many qualities, such as color and taste in an apple.

But to see the cause of his death, we must consider that, since Christ was God and man, whatever pertains to human nature in him was under his power, which is not the case for others who are purely men, since things which are natural are not subject to their will. Hence this is the cause assigned as to why the soul of Christ simultaneously suffered and rejoiced, namely, because with him willing, death happened in such a way that an overflow was not made from the higher powers unto the lower ones, nor were the higher powers impeded from their act on account of the suffering of the lower ones. In other men this cannot happen due to the natural conjunction of powers with one another.

This also must be said to apply to the question at hand: for violent death happens because nature gives way to the inflicted harm, and as long as nature can resist, so long is death delayed. Hence, for the same reason, those in whom nature is stronger die more slowly. Yet it was subject to the will of Christ how much nature would resist when harm was inflicted and when it would give way. Hence with him willing, nature resisted the inflicted harm even unto the end more than can be in other men, such that in the end, after much shedding of blood, as though whole in his powers, he cried out with a great voice,¹ and immediately, with him willing, nature gave way and he handed over his spirit so that he would show himself the lord of nature and of life and of death. Hence, marveling at this, the centurion said: truly this man was the Son of God (Mark 15:39).

Thus, both the Jews inflicting deadly harm killed Christ, and, nevertheless, he laid down his own soul and handed over his spirit¹ because when he willed, nature totally gave way to the harm inflicted. Nevertheless, he must not be blamed as a murderer of himself: for the body exists for the sake of the soul and not conversely. Hence injury is done to the soul when on account of a harm inflicted on the body it is expelled from the body against the natural appetite of the soul, although perhaps not against the depraved will of one killing himself. But, if the soul were to have its own power to recede from the body when it willed and to return again, it would not be of greater fault if it deserted the body² than if a dweller left his house. Nevertheless, it is a matter of fault for the soul to be expelled from there unwilling.

Yet if anyone wishes to call contact of power “action,” since to act is the proper effect of a power, let it be said that an angel is in a place through action. Nevertheless, this is said such that not only is motion understood through action, but whatever unity by which it unites itself to a body by its power, whether by presiding or containing or by any other mode.

The reason for this is that a body is in a place by being contained by it, and thus it is necessary that when moving it should follow the condition of the place, namely, so that it passes through media before it arrives at another place. But since an angel is in a place through contact of power, it is not subject to a place by being contained by it. Rather, it contains the place by its power, supereminent in the place. Hence it is not necessary for it to follow in its motion the conditions of the place. Rather, it is subject to its own will to apply itself through contact of power to this and that place, and, if it wills, without a medium. So too the intellect can be applied by understanding to one thing, for example to white and afterwards to black, indifferently, either thinking or not thinking about the mediating colors, even though a body subject to color cannot be moved from white to black except through media.

Reply Sed Contra: It must be said that an angel is not in a place through commensuration but through application of its power to a place, which, indeed, can be indifferently both unto a divisible and an indivisible place. Hence it can be moved continuously, just as something existing in a divisible place, by continuously interrupting space. Whereas, according to how it is in an indivisible place, its motion cannot be continuous, nor can it pass through all media.

Regarding the good of nature

But it must be said that substantial forms relate to one another just as numbers do, as is said in the eighth book of the Metaphysics,¹ or also just as figures do, as the Philosopher says concerning the parts of the soul in the second book of the De Anima.² For the greater number or figure virtually contains in itself the lesser, just as the quintuple contains the quadruple and a pentagon a quadrangle. Similarly, the more perfect form virtually contains in itself the more imperfect, as is clear especially in animals: for the intellective soul has the power to confer on the human body whatever the sensitive confers in brutes, and similarly the sensitive makes in animals whatever the nutritive makes in plants, and still more.

In vain, therefore, would there be in man another sensitive soul besides the intellective, since the intellective soul virtually contains the sensitive, and still more, just as in vain would there be added the quadruple with the quintuple posited. The same reasoning holds concerning all substantial forms even unto prime matter, such that there are not to be found diverse substantial forms in man. These are only according to our reasoning, just as we consider him as living through a nutritive soul and as sentient through a sensitive soul, and thus concerning the others.

Yet it is clear that, with the perfect form arriving, the imperfect form is always removed, just as also with the figure of a pentagon arriving, the figure of a square is removed. Hence I say that, with the human soul arriving, the substantial form which was in it before is removed. Otherwise, the generation of one would be without the corruption of another, which is impossible. But the accidental forms which were in it before, disposing it for the soul, are not indeed corrupted through itself, but accidentally unto the corruption of the subject. Hence they remain the same in species, but not the same in number, just as also happens with the dispositions of the elementary forms, which seem to come to matter first.

Yet Averroes in the third book of the De caelo says that the forms of the elements are middles between accidental and substantial forms, and that they receive more and less. And thus, with the forms of the elements remitted and in a certain way reduced to equilibrium, there is made a mixture in a certain way.¹ But this is even less possible than the first: for substantial form is a certain terminus of specific being, hence in an indivisible thing there is the idea of form just as the idea of number and of figure. Nor is it possible for it to be increased or lessened; rather, every addition or subtraction makes another species.

And for this reason, it must be said otherwise, according to the Philosopher in the first book of On Generation,¹ that the forms of mixable things do not remain in the mixture in act, but in power, namely, just as the power of substantial form remains in the elemental quality although remitted and, as it were, reduced unto the middle: for elemental quality acts in virtue of substantial form, otherwise the action which is through the heat of fire would not be terminated in a substantial form.

Therefore, it must be said that man needs the help of grace not only to merit, but even to prepare himself for grace, nevertheless in different ways. For man merits through the act of virtue when he not only does good, but well, for which a habit is required, as is said in the second book of the Ethics.¹ And for this reason, habitual grace is required to merit. But a man does not need another habit to prepare himself to attain a habit, because this would in that way proceed to infinity. Yet he needs divine help not only regarding exterior movements, namely, just as the occasions of salvation are procured for man from divine providence, for example preaching, examples, and sometimes sicknesses and scourges, but also regarding interior motion, just as God moves the interior heart of man to good, according to Proverbs 21:1: the heart of kings in the hand of God, and wherever he should will, he turns it.

And the Philosopher proves this is necessary in a certain chapter of Concerning Good Fortune:¹ for man acts by will. Yet the principle of will is choice, and of choice counsel. If it were asked why he begins to take counsel, it cannot be said that from counsel he will have begun to take counsel, because thus it would proceed unto the infinite. Hence it is necessary for there to be some exterior principle which moves the human mind to taking counsel concerning things to be done. Yet it is necessary for this to be something better than the human mind. Therefore, it is not a heavenly body, which is below intellectual power, but God, as the Philosopher concludes in the same place. Therefore, just as the principle of every motion of inferior bodies which are not always moved is the motion of heaven, so the principle of every motion of inferior minds is by God moving.

Thus, no one can prepare himself for grace nor do anything good except through divine help.

But because it was possible for God to make man in pure natural conditions, it is useful to consider how far natural love can extend itself.

Certain men have said, therefore, that a man or an angel existing in pure natural conditions loves God more than himself by natural love according to the love of concupiscence,¹ namely, because he desires more to enjoy the divine good as greater and more pleasant. But according to the love of friendship, man naturally loves himself more than God: for the love of concupiscence is that by which we are said to love what we want to use or enjoy, such as wine or something of this sort. Yet the love of friendship is that by which we are said to love a friend to whom we will good.

But that position cannot stand. For natural love is a certain natural inclination put into nature by God. Yet (by God) nothing is perverse. Therefore, it is impossible for some natural inclination or love to be perverse. Yet it is a perverse love for someone by the love of friendship to love himself more than God. Therefore, it cannot be that such a love is natural.

Therefore, it must be said that to love God over all things, more than one’s own self, is natural not only to an angel and to man, but even to any creature, according to how it loves either sensitively or naturally. For natural inclinations especially can be known in these things which are done naturally without the deliberation of reason: for thus each thing is done in nature just as it was naturally apt to be done.¹ Yet we see that each part works by a certain natural inclination for the good of the whole,² even with danger or detriment to itself, as is clear when someone exposes his hand to the sword for the defense of the head, upon which depends the health of the whole body. Hence it is natural for every part in its own way to love the whole more than itself. Hence, according to natural inclination and political virtue, the good citizen exposes himself to the danger of death for the common good. Yet it is clear that God is the common good of the whole universe and of all its parts. Hence any creature in its own way naturally loves God more than itself: insensible things indeed naturally, whereas brute animals sensitively, whereas the rational creature through intellectual love, which is called delight.

Regarding the good of grace

On what pertains to the good of grace itself

But it is not necessary to the sacrament for the manifestation to be made by word. Otherwise, by no necessity could someone receive the effect of this sacrament unless by confessing with the mouth, which is clearly false: since for mutes or whoever cannot confess by word, it suffices to confess by writing or nods. Yet by no necessity can someone be baptized unless by water, since water is necessary to the sacrament.

But from the institution of the Church,¹ a man who can is held to confess by word, not only because the one confessing by the mouth might be, by confessing, more ashamed² (so that he who has sinned by the mouth might be purged by the mouth),³ but also because in all the sacraments there is always used that whose use is more common, just as, in the sacramental washing of baptism, water, which men use commonly for washing, is used; and in the Eucharist, bread, which is a more common food, is used. Hence also, in the sacramental manifestation of sins, it is fitting to use words, by which men more commonly and more expressly are accustomed to signify their concepts.

And it must be observed that in this sacrament there is not imprinted an indelible mark as in baptism, but only grace is conferred for the remission of sin, which remission no one obtains by sinning. Yet someone sins who omits an ordinance of the Church. Hence, in baptism, he who observes those things which are necessary to the sacrament, omitting the statutes of the Church, obtains the indelible mark of the sacrament, but not the effect of the sacrament; yet here, nothing follows.

Replies: The arguments made on both sides do not force much: for manifestation cannot be made so expressly by writing as by word, nor is that which is said: confession by the mouth is made unto salvation, understood concerning the confession of sins, but concerning the confession of faith.

Whether someone is held to confess at once when the opportunity is had, or can he wait until Lent

Yet certain men have said that he is held to confess as quickly as the opportunity presents itself, such that, if he defers, he sins.¹

But this is against the reasoning of an affirmative precept, which, although it obliges always, nevertheless does not oblige unto always, but for a place and time: yet the time of fulfilling the precept about confession seems to be when some occasion is imminent, in which it is necessary for a man to confess. An example is if the danger of death threatens him, or the necessity of receiving the Eucharist, or a sacred order, or something of this sort for which it is necessary for man, purged through confession, to be prepared. Hence, if something of these threatens, and someone neglects to confess, he sins, provided that a due opportunity is present. And, because from a precept of the Church all the faithful are held to receive holy communion at least once a year, especially on the feast of Easter, for this reason, the Church has ordained that once a year, when the time of receiving the Eucharist is imminent, all the faithful are to confess.

Therefore, I say that to defer confession even until this time, speaking essentially, is licit. But it can become illicit incidentally: for example, if some danger threatens in which confession is required or if someone defers confession on account of contempt. And, similarly, such a delay can be incidentally meritorious, such as if he deferred in order to confess to a more prudent man or more devoutly on account of the sacred time.

Reply Sed Contra: It must be said that bodily sickness, unless it is destroyed through the remedy of medicine, always grows worse, unless perhaps it is destroyed also by the power of nature. Yet the sickness of sin is destroyed through contrition. Hence it is not similar.

On things pertaining to clerics

Those things which pertain to the church are subject to the dispensation of the prelates of the church, and for this reason, he should discharge this debt which is due to the church according to what was established, either through himself, if the prebend is one which requires residence, or through a vicar, if this suffices according to the statute and custom of the church.

But the debt which he owes to God he should discharge through himself. Yet it does not matter as regards God with which Psalms or hymns he praises God, for example, whether he should say at Vespers: the Lord said (Ps 110 [109]), or: praise, oh servants, the Lord (Ps 113 [112]), except as regards this: that man should follow the traditions of the elders.¹ And because he owes praises to God as though one man, it suffices for him to say the office once according to the custom of any of the churches of which he is a cleric.

Regarding the choice of office, it seems reasonable for him say the office of the church in which he has the greater grade. For example, if in one he is dean and in another a simple canon, he should say the office of the church in which he is dean. But if in both churches he is a simple canon, he should say the office of the more worthy church, even though perhaps in the lesser church he has the more opulent prebend, since temporal things are unimportant compared to spiritual things. Whereas if both churches are of equal dignity, he can choose for himself whichever office he desires more if he is absent from both churches. Yet if he is present in either of them, he should conform himself to those with whom he dwells.

Yet it must be considered that in any art, someone is better absolutely who designs the art, and is called the architect,¹ than some manual worker who executes works according to how it is designed for him by another. Hence in constructing buildings he who designs the building is hired with greater pay, even though he works nothing with his hands, than the manual builders who chop the wood² and cut the stones.³ Yet in the spiritual building there are as though manual workers who particularly pursue the care of souls, for example by administering the sacraments or by doing particular things of this sort. But the bishops are as though the principal builders, who command and designate how the abovementioned men should execute their office; on account of this they are called “bishops,” that is, superintendents.⁴

Similarly, teachers of theology are as though principal builders, who inquire and teach how others should procure the salvation of souls. Therefore, it is better absolutely to teach sacred doctrine, and it is more meritorious if it is done with a good intention, than to devote particular care for the salvation of souls. Hence the Apostle concerning himself says in 1 Corinthians 1:17: for Christ did not send me to baptize, but to evangelize, although to baptize especially is a work conducive to the salvation of souls; and in 2 Timothy 2:2, the Apostle says: commend these things to faithful men, who shall be suitable also to teach others. Reason itself also demonstrates that it is better to educate, regarding what pertains to salvation, those who can accomplish it both in themselves and in others, rather than the simple, who can only accomplish it in themselves.

Nevertheless, in some cases, with necessity looming, both bishops and teachers, although their proper duty is interrupted, should attend in a special manner to the salvation of souls.

In one way, it is annexed as the preamble and preparation to perfection, such as poverty, chastity, and things of this sort, by which man is drawn back from the cares of secular things so that he might be more freely at leisure for these things which are of God. Hence things of this sort are more certain instruments of perfection. On account of this Jerome, expounding those words of Peter saying: behold we have left all things and have followed you (Matt 19:27), says that it does not suffice for Peter to say: behold we have left all things, but he adds that which is perfect: and have followed you.¹ Therefore, any men who observe either voluntary poverty or chastity have indeed the preparation of perfection, but they are not said to have the state of perfection, except those who oblige themselves by a solemn profession to things of this sort: for someone is said to have a state according to something solemn and perpetual, just as is clear in the state of liberty or of matrimony and of similar things.

Whereas, in another way, something is annexed to the perfection of charity as an effect, namely, such as if someone receives the care of souls. For it belongs to perfect charity that someone for love of God would omit the sweetness of the contemplative life, which he loves more, and receive instead the occupations of the active life for the sake of procuring the salvation of his neighbors. Therefore, whoever in this way attends to the salvation of his neighbors has indeed some effect of perfection, but he does not have the state of perfection. The exception to this is a bishop, who receives the care of souls with a certain solemn consecration. Archdeacons and parish priests, however, have certain offices committed to them, but they are not placed in some state of perfection through this. Therefore, only religious and bishops are called perfect as though having the state of perfection. Hence religious become bishops, but not archdeacons or rural deans.

When, therefore, it is said that perfect men are held to what is better, this is true, if it be understood concerning these men who are called perfect on account of the perfection of charity. For men of this sort are obliged out of an interior law, which obliges by inclining. Hence they are obliged to fulfill this according to the measure of their perfection. Yet if it is understood concerning these men who are called perfect on account of their state, such as bishops and religious, it is not true: for bishops are only held to what the care of their received dominion extends itself, and religious are only held to what they are obliged by the vow of their profession. Otherwise, there would be obligation unto the infinite, although, nevertheless, both nature and art and every law has certain ends.¹

Nevertheless, even if the perfect were always held to what is better, that would not be relevant to this question, as is clear from the things said above.¹

On things pertaining to religious

About this a distinction must be made about secrets. For there are some secrets which are illicit to keep, according to how much they verge upon the danger of others over whom someone is held to be watchful. Hence an oath of fidelity also holds that secrets of this sort should be revealed to lords. Therefore, a religious is held at the command of his prelate to reveal such a secret even though he promised that he would not reveal it, with Isidore saying: in evil promises, faith is rescinded¹ (unless, perhaps, he heard it in confession, because then in no way is it to be revealed).

Yet there are other secrets which of themselves can be kept without sin, and such a secret a religious should in no way reveal to a prelate commanding him if it is committed to his trust: for he would sin by breaking the faith of the trust.¹

Therefore, it must be known that in crimes the mode of proceeding is threefold:¹ one through denunciation, another through inquisition, another through accusation.

In the way of denunciation, therefore, the correction of the delinquent is intended. And for this reason, according to the precept of the Lord in Matthew 18:15–17, fraternal correction should precede, namely, that you should rebuke him between himself and you alone; and if he should not have heard, then you should rebuke him before two or three witnesses; and lastly, it should be said to the Church. For it belongs to charity for someone to spare his brother as much as he can. Hence he should strive first to correct the conscience of his brother, with his reputation preserved, by admonishing him in private, and then before two or three, and finally his reputation must be neglected in order that his conscience may be emended, and it must be said to the Church. During this process there is regard also for the conscience: for a sinner, if he were to see himself made public from the beginning, would lose shame and would become more obstinate in sinning.¹

An inquisition, however, should be preceded by infamy. An accusation, however, should be preceded by an inscription, through which he obliges himself unto retaliation.¹ For with inquisition and accusation the punishment of the sinner is intended for the sake of the good of the multitude.

If, therefore, an accuser who obliges himself to retaliation appears in the chapter, the prelate can demand a confession of the truth by command, just as also an ecclesiastical judge by oath. Similarly, if infamy precedes, the prelate can seek out the truth by command, and his subjects are held to obey.

Yet if it should proceed through the way of simple denunciation, a religious is not held to reveal the fault of a brother to his prelate commanding him, unless with an admonition preceding he sees him uncorrected. Nay, rather, he would sin more if he were to reveal at the precept of the prelate, since he is held more to obey the Gospel than the prelate. And much more would the prelate sin if he were to induce his subject to pervert the order of the Gospel.

Regarding fault

Reply Sed Contra: It must be said that in human judgment the quantity of punishment does not always correspond to the quantity of fault: for sometimes a greater punishment is inflicted for a lesser fault when a graver harm threatens men from the lesser fault. But according to the judgment of God the graver fault is punished by the graver punishment. Hence, so that there might be shown the gravity of idolatry and perjury, after he had said in the first precept: thou shalt not adore those nor shalt thou worship them (Exod 20:5), there is added: I am the Lord thy God, visiting the iniquities of fathers upon sons (Exod 20:5); and, after he had said: thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain (Exod 20:7), there is added: for neither shall the Lord have as faultless him who takes the name of his Lord in vain (Exod 20:7).

Therefore, it must be considered to what a religious binds himself by the vow of profession. And if, indeed, a religious by professing were to vow himself to observe a rule, it would seem that he obliges himself by vow to each of the things contained in the rule. And thus, by acting against any of them, he would sin mortally; and from this it would follow that the state of religion would be a trap of mortal sin for religious men, which they scarcely or never would be able to avoid. Therefore, the holy fathers who instituted the orders, not wanting to lay a trap of damnation for men but rather a way of salvation, ordained such a form of profession in which there could not be danger.

Just as there is in the Order of Friars Preachers a most cautious and secure form of professing by which one does not promise to observe the rule, but obedience according to the rule,¹ hence a monk is obliged through a vow to observe those things which are placed in the rule as precepts, and those which the prelate, according to the meaning of the rule, wills to command for him. The rest of the things, however, which are not contained in the rule under precept do not fall directly under the vow, hence he does not sin mortally in omitting those things.

Blessed Benedict established that a monk should profess not, indeed, to observe the rule, but that the one professing promises a conversion of his customs¹ according to the rule, which is to say that he directs his customs according to the rule. He acts against this if either those things which are precepts in the rule are transgressed, or if he even despises the rule, altogether refusing to direct his acts according to it. Yet not all things which are contained in the rule are precepts: for certain ones are admonitions or counsels, whereas certain ones are ordinances or certain statutes, such as that after Compline no one should speak.² Yet statutes of this sort contained in the rule do not have the power of precept, just as neither does a prelate establishing something always intend to oblige unto mortal sin through precept. Yet the prelate is as though a certain animate rule.³ Hence it would be stupid to think that a monk breaking silence after Compline sins mortally, unless perhaps he were to do this against a precept of the prelate or out of contempt of the rule.

Yet to abstain from meat is not placed in the rule of blessed Benedict as a precept, but as a certain statute. Hence a monk eating meat does not sin mortally by this, unless in a case of disobedience or contempt.

Reply Sed Contra: That which is objected to the contrary is ineffective: for the reasoning proceeds concerning things which are evil according to themselves, such as homicide, adultery, and things of this sort, which are illicit for all, both healthy and infirm.¹ Yet it does not proceed concerning these things which are evil because they are prohibited: for something can be prohibited for a healthy man which is not prohibited for an infirm one.

Regarding the good of glory

And therefore, it must be considered what is the prohibiting thing of this sort.

Yet certain men say that this is bigness or a certain corpulence,¹ which will be removed through the dowry of glory, which they name subtlety.

But this is not intelligible. For what is corpulence or bigness of this sort is not found: for it is not some quality, because no quality can be given by the removal of which a body can be with another body in the same place. Similarly, it cannot be either form or matter, which are parts of the essence, because then the whole essence of the human body would not remain with glory, which is heretical.¹

And for this reason, it must be said that the thing prohibiting is nothing else than dimensions, under which bodily matter stands.¹ For it is necessary for that which is of itself to be the cause in each genus. Yet distinction according to place first and of itself applies to dimensive quantity, which is defined to be quantity having position.² Hence also parts in a subject have distinction according to place from being subject to dimension. And just as there is distinction of diverse parts of one body according to the diverse parts of one place through dimensions, so on account of dimensions diverse bodies are distinguished according to diverse places: for an actual division of bodily matter makes two bodies, yet potential divisibility makes two parts of one body. Hence also the Philosopher says in the fourth book of the Physics that, just as with a wooden cube entering into water or air, it is necessary for a certain amount of water or air to yield there, so it would be necessary for separate dimensions to yield if a vacuum were posited.³

Therefore, since glory does not remove bodily dimensions, I say that a glorious body cannot naturally be with another body in the same place on account of some property put therein.

Yet the reason which is objected to the contrary is posited amongst the sophistic reasons by the Philosopher in the sixth book of the Physics:¹ for place is not due to a point and a line and a surface, but to a body. Hence it does not follow that, if the ends of tangential bodies are simultaneous to one another, on account of this many bodies can be in the same place.