Unfinished Work in Answer to Julian
Against Pelagianism
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Praefatio
Preface
JulianImpAdversus haereticos Pelagianos, qui dicunt Adam, etiamsi non peccasset, fuisse corpore moriturum, nec in illo humanum genus esse vitiatum (unde sequitur eos, ut mortes, et mortiferos morbos, et omnia mala quae videmus et parvulos perpeti, etiam in paradiso futura fuisse contendant, etiamsi nemo peccasset), scripsi librum ad comitem Valerium, cuius libri titulus est: De nuptiis et concupiscentia; eo quod ad illum pervenisse cognoveram dicere Pelagianos damnatores nos esse nuptiarum. Denique in illo opere, nuptiarum bonum a concupiscentiae carnalis malo, quo bene utitur pudicitia coniugalis, quali potui disputatione, discrevi. Quo libro accepto, memoratus vir illustris misit mihi in cartula nonnullas sententias decerptas ex opere Iuliani haeretici Pelagiani (in quo opere libris quattuor respondisse sibi visus est illi uni meo, quem De nuptiis et concupiscentia me scripsisse memoravi), missas sibi a nescio quo, qui eas, ut voluit, ex primo Iuliani libro decerpendas curavit; quibus ut quantocius responderem, idem Valerius poposcit. Et factum est ut sub eodem titulo etiam secundum librum scriberem, contra quem Iulianus alios octo nimia loquacitate conscripsit. His nunc respondeo, eius verba proponens, eisdemque subiungens responsionem meam ad loca singula, sicut refutatio eorum visa est esse reddenda; cum iam priores quattuor eius libros, posteaquam in manus meas venerunt, sex libris satis aperteque refellerim.
Against the Pelagian heretics, who say that Adam, even if he had not sinned, would have died in body, and that the human race was not corrupted in him (from which it follows that they contend that deaths, deadly diseases, and all the evils that we see even little ones suffer would have existed in paradise too, even if no one had sinned), I wrote a book to Count Valerius, the title of which book is Marriage and Desire; this was because I had learned that it had reached him that the Pelagians were saying that we condemn marriage. And so in that work I distinguished, with such argument as I could, the good of marriage from the evil of carnal desire, which conjugal chastity uses well. When he had received that book, the illustrious man I have mentioned sent me on a small sheet some statements excerpted from a work of Julian, the Pelagian heretic (in which work he thought he had answered, in four books, that one book of mine which I have recalled writing under the title Marriage and Desire), statements that had been sent to him by some person or other who arranged, as he wished, to have them excerpted from Julian's first book; and Valerius asked me to answer them as quickly as possible. And so it came about that I wrote a second book also under the same title, against which Julian, with excessive loquacity, composed eight more. To these I now reply, setting out his words and adding to them my response at each individual point, as the refutation of them seemed best to be supplied; for I had already, after they came into my hands, refuted his earlier four books clearly enough in six books.
JulianImpLiber Primus
Book One
JulianImpI. 1. Iulianus. Magnis licet impeditus angoribus, quos intuenti mihi hac tempestate Ecclesiarum statum, partim indignatio ingerit, partim miseratio; non abieceram tamen promissionis meae fidem, videlicet ut qui fueram factus debitor promittendo, solvendo quoque esse curarem. Nam in libris quos ad fratrem nostrum Turbantium episcopum, virum magno virtutum fulgore conspicuum, contra Augustini scripta dictavi, pollicitus sum, si nihil quod studiis obsisteret, eveniret incommodi, occursurum me protinus eorum argumentis omnibus, qui ex sententia Manichaeorum traducem peccati, id est malum naturale defenderent; a quo sum hactenus munere varia et indissimulabili necessitate suspensus.
I. 1. Julian. Although I have been hindered by great anguish, which the present state of the Churches inspires in me as I look upon it, partly by indignation, partly by pity, I had not yet abandoned the pledge of my promise, namely that, having become a debtor by promising, I should take care also to discharge the debt by paying it. For in the books that I dictated against the writings of Augustine, addressed to our brother Bishop Turbantius, a man conspicuous for the great splendor of his virtues, I promised that, if no setback should arise to obstruct my efforts, I would at once confront all the arguments of those who, following the opinion of the Manichees, defend a transmission of sin, that is, a natural evil; from which task I have hitherto been held back by various and undisguisable necessity.
JulianImp.1.1Augustinus. Utinam imiteris Turbantium post illa tua scripta, et post has tuas laudes, quibus eum dicis virum magno virtutum fulgore conspicuum, a vestro errore liberatum! Responsum est autem illis tuis libris, et demonstratum tibi, quae catholica lumina in sanctarum Scripturarum tractatione clarissima hoc opprobrio, id est Manichaeorum appellatione, offuscare coneris.
Augustine. Would that you might imitate Turbantius, after those writings of yours and after these praises of yours, in which you call him a man conspicuous for the great splendor of his virtues, by being set free from your error! But an answer was given to those books of yours, and it was shown to you what catholic lights, most brilliant in their treatment of the holy Scriptures, you are trying to obscure with this reproach, that is, with the name of Manichees.
JulianImp.1.1I. 2. Iulianus. Verum, ut primum respirare licuit, consilium erat, quantum maxime tulisset ipsius rei natura, breviter promissa complere, nisi me actuosiorem denuo ingredi provinciam, beatissime pater Flore, voluisses; qui, quoniam tantum vales reverentia sanctitatis, ut praeceptis tuis segniter oboedire irreligiosum iudicem, obtinuisti facile ut in longiores vias compendium illius, quam elegeram, brevitatis extenderem. Favebis itaque operi tua auctoritate suscepto, cuius ob hoc potissimum nomen inserui, ut stilus securior et hilarior graderetur sub tantae patrocinio iussionis. Fuit igitur concepta animo non importuna ratio brevitatis; quia in illis quattuor libris cuncta fere, quae inventa a Manichaeis Augustini contra nos fuerant ore prolata, catholicae fidei veritas, pro qua et cum qua labentis mundi odia promeremur, tam disputationibus invictis, quam sacrae Legis testimoniis armata, protriverat, nec quidquam pene reliquum erat, si aequis iudicibus uteremur.
I. 2. Julian. But as soon as I was allowed to draw breath, my plan was, as far as the very nature of the matter would permit, to fulfill my promises briefly, had you not wished me, most blessed father Florus, to enter once again upon a more laborious field; and since you have such power through the reverence due to your holiness that I would judge it irreligious to obey your commands sluggishly, you easily prevailed upon me to extend the conciseness I had chosen into longer paths. You will therefore favor with your authority the work you have undertaken, whose name I have for this very reason inserted, so that my pen might proceed more securely and more cheerfully under the patronage of so great a command. There was, then, conceived in my mind a not unseasonable plan of brevity; because in those four books the truth of the catholic faith—for which and with which we earn the hatred of a falling world—armed both with unconquerable arguments and with the testimonies of the sacred Law, had ground to pieces nearly everything that the Manichees had invented and that Augustine had uttered against us, and scarcely anything was left, if we had fair judges to deal with.
JulianImp.1.2Augustinus. Contra tuos illos quattuor libros sex libri a me scripti sunt. Post commemorationem quippe doctorum catholicorum (quos Manichaeos facis, mihi sub hoc crimine obiciendo quod illi in catholica Ecclesia didicerunt atque docuerunt), quam duobus prioribus voluminibus explicavi, sequentes quattuor singulos tuis singulis reddidi; redarguens tenebras haeresis vestrae luce catholicae veritatis, quam deserendo caecatus insanis, et rei, de qua nulla umquam in Ecclesia Christi controversia fuit, sicut novus haereticus, aequos iudices quaeris; quasi tibi videri aequi iudices possint, nisi quos vestro errore deceperis. Quem vero iudicem poteris Ambrosio reperire meliorem? De quo magister tuus Pelagius ait, quod eius fidem et purissimum in Scripturis sensum ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere? Numquid ergo iste sensu in Scripturis purissimo impurissimi Manichaei dogma retineret, dicens: Omnes sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est ? Tu ergo iam iudica quam non puro sensu hoc catholicum dogma reprehendas, teque corrigere Ambrosio iudicante ne differas.
Augustine. Against those four books of yours six books were written by me. For after the mention of the catholic teachers (whom you make out to be Manichees, charging me with this crime, that they learned and taught in the catholic Church), which I set forth in the first two volumes, I rendered the following four, one against each of yours; refuting the darkness of your heresy with the light of catholic truth, which by deserting you have gone blind and rave, and, like a new heretic, you seek fair judges in a matter about which there has never been any controversy in the Church of Christ; as though any could seem fair judges to you except those whom you have deceived with your error. But what judge will you be able to find better than Ambrose? Of whom your master Pelagius says that not even an enemy has dared to find fault with his faith and his most pure understanding in the Scriptures? Would this man, then, with a most pure understanding in the Scriptures, retain the teaching of the most impure Manichee, saying: We are all born under sin, and our very origin is in fault? Now you yourself judge how impure is the understanding with which you find fault with this catholic teaching, and do not delay to correct yourself with Ambrose as judge.
JulianImp.1.2I. 3. Iulianus. Testimonia tamen Scripturarum, quibus contra nos agi aliquid posse existimant, nonnulla praeterieram, quae me explanatum ire pollicitus eram, ut docerem ambigua quaeque Legis verba, quae ab inimicis nostris assumi solent, nec veritati praeiudicare perspicuae, et secundum hoc esse intellegenda, quod absolutissimis Scripturae sanctae auctoritatibus et insuperabili ratione firmatur. Siquidem hoc ipso, quam sit divinae Legis imperitus interpres et profanus apparet, quisquis putat eius sanctione defendi, quod iustitia non potest vindicari.
I. 3. Julian. Yet I had passed over some testimonies of the Scriptures by which they think something can be argued against us, which I had promised I would go on to explain, so that I might teach that whatever ambiguous words of the Law are wont to be taken up by our enemies neither prejudge what is clearly true and are to be understood in accordance with what is established by the most absolute authorities of holy Scripture and by unconquerable reasoning. For indeed by this very thing he shows how unskilled and profane an interpreter of the divine Law he is, whoever thinks that what justice cannot vindicate is defended by its sanction.
JulianImp.1.3Augustinus. Vos quod dicitis, potius non potest ulla iustitiae ratione defendi. Quia miseria generis humani, a qua nullum hominum ab exortu usque ad obitum videmus alienum, non pertinet ad Omnipotentis iustum iudicium, si non est originale peccatum.
Augustine. Rather, what you say cannot be defended by any reasoning of justice. For the misery of the human race, from which we see no human being exempt from birth to death, does not pertain to the just judgment of the Almighty, if there is no original sin.
JulianImp.1.3I. 4. Iulianus. Nam si Lex Dei fons est ac magistra iustitiae, auxiliis quoque eius, Dei aequitas adiuvari potest, impugnari non potest. Nullum ergo adminiculum iniquitati de illius Scripturae viribus comparari natura rerum sinit, quae hanc unam promulgationis causam habuit, ut eius testimoniis, remediis, minis, ultionibus iniquitas deleretur.
I. 4. Julian. For if the Law of God is the source and teacher of justice, then by its aids too the equity of God can be assisted, it cannot be assailed. The nature of things therefore allows no support for iniquity to be obtained from the strength of that Scripture, which had this one cause of its promulgation, that by its testimonies, remedies, threats, and punishments iniquity might be destroyed.
JulianImp.1.4Augustinus. Eius testimoniis declaratur, quod: Homo vanitati similis factus est, dies eius velut umbra praetereunt . Cum qua eum vanitate nasci, non solum veridica Scriptura qua plangitur, verum etiam laboriosa et aerumnosa cura qua eruditur, ostendit. In eius remediis legitur, etiam cum parvulus natus fuerit, offerendum esse sacrificium pro peccato . In eius minis legitur, interituram fuisse animam parvuli, si die non circumcideretur octavo . In eius ultionibus legitur, iussos interimi etiam parvulos, quorum parentes ad iracundiam provocaverunt Deum, ut internitione bellica delerentur .
Augustine. By its testimonies it is declared that man is made like to vanity, his days pass away like a shadow (Ps 144:4 (143:4)). And that he is born with this vanity is shown not only by the truthful Scripture in which it is lamented, but also by the laborious and toilsome care by which he is educated. In its remedies it is read that, even when a little one has been born, a sacrifice is to be offered for sin (See Lev 12:6-8). In its threats it is read that the soul of a little one would perish if it were not circumcised on the eighth day (See Gen 17:14). In its punishments it is read that even little ones were ordered to be slain, whose parents had provoked God to anger, so that they might be destroyed in the slaughter of war (See Num 16:27-33).
JulianImp.1.4I. 5. Iulianus. Nihil ergo per Legem Dei agi potest contra Deum Legis auctorem. Quo uno compendio excluditur quidem quidquid ab errantibus consuevit obici; sed nos ad docendum quam sit veritas locuples cui credimus, illis quoque Scripturarum locis, quae intellectum sententiae elocutionum perplexitate velarunt, expositionis lucem solemus afferre; ut originis suae dignitatem reserata possideant, nec ab stemmate sacro velut notha aut degenerantia separentur.
I. 5. Julian. Nothing, then, can be done through the Law of God against God the author of the Law. By this one summary there is indeed excluded whatever those in error are accustomed to object; but in order to teach how rich in truth is the one in whom we believe, we are accustomed to bring the light of exposition also to those passages of the Scriptures that have veiled the understanding of their meaning by an intricacy of expression; so that, once unlocked, they may possess the dignity of their origin and not be separated from the sacred lineage as though illegitimate or degenerate.
JulianImp.1.5Augustinus. Immo vero Scripturarum sanctarum lumina certa veritate fulgentia vos pravarum disputationum perplexitate obscurare conamini. Quid enim lucidius, quam id quod modo dixi: Homo vanitati similis factus est, dies eius velut umbra praetereunt ? Quod utique non fieret, si ad Dei similitudinem in qua est conditus permaneret. Quid lucidius, quam id quod dictum est: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur ? Quid lucidius, quam id quod dictum est: Quis enim est mundus a sorde? Nec infans, cuius est unius diei vita super terram ; et alia plurima, quae vestris tenebris involvere, et in vestrum perversum sensum molimini vana loquacitate convertere?
Augustine. On the contrary, the lights of the holy Scriptures, shining with sure truth, you are trying to obscure with the intricacy of your crooked arguments. For what is clearer than what I just said: man is made like to vanity, his days pass away like a shadow (Ps 144:4 (143:4))? This certainly would not happen if he remained in the likeness of God in which he was created. What is clearer than what was said: As in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive (1 Cor 15:22)? What is clearer than what was said: Who is clean from filth? Not even an infant whose life upon the earth is of one day (Job 14:4-5 LXX); and very many other passages, which you contrive to wrap up in your darkness and to twist with empty loquacity into your perverse meaning?
JulianImp.1.5I. 6. Iulianus. Hoc ergo ex nostro more adhuc solum exsequi cogitabam, id est ut a Traducianorum interpretationibus membra divinae Legis, quae subiacebant contumeliae, liberarem; quae erant scilicet divina, quod essent iusta monstrando.
I. 6. Julian. This, then, after my custom, was the only thing I was still planning to carry out, namely to free from the interpretations of the Traducianists those members of the divine Law that lay subject to insult; that is, to show that they were divine by showing that they were just.
JulianImp.1.6Augustinus. Contumelioso ore Traducianos vocas, Cyprianum, Ambrosium, Gregorium, ceterosque socios eorum confitentes originale peccatum. Sed non est mirum quod novi haeretici Catholicis, a quibus exeunt, novum nomen imponunt; hoc et alii fecerunt, quando similiter exierunt.
Augustine. With an insulting mouth you call Cyprian, Ambrose, Gregory, and their other associates who confess original sin Traducianists. But it is no wonder that new heretics impose a new name on the Catholics from whom they go out; others too have done this, when they went out in like manner.
JulianImp.1.6I. 7. Iulianus. Verum quia id impendio poposcisti, immo indixisti auctoritate patria, ut libro tractatoris Poeni, quem ad Valerium comitem vernula peccatorum eius Alypius nuper detulit, obviarem, hinc mihi est longior facta responsio.
I. 7. Julian. But because you urgently demanded it, or rather enjoined it by a father's authority, that I should confront the book of the Punic preacher, which Alypius, a home-bred slave of his sins, recently brought to Count Valerius, from this my response has been made longer.
JulianImp.1.7Augustinus. Magna tibi poena est disputator hic Poenus; et longe antequam nasceremini, magna poena haeresis vestrae Poenus praeparatus est Cyprianus.
Augustine. This Punic disputant is a great punishment to you; and long before you were born, Cyprian the Punic was prepared as a great punishment for your heresy.
JulianImp.1.7I. 8. Iulianus. Dedit enim ingenii sui denuo fideique monumenta, quae intellegantur aegerrime, exponantur difficillime, vix sine horrore audiantur; convincantur autem facillime, confodiantur acerrime, et propter honestatis reverentiam oblivioni exterminata mandentur.
I. 8. Julian. For he has once again given monuments of his talent and his faith, which are understood with the greatest difficulty, expounded with the greatest hardship, scarcely heard without horror; but are refuted most easily, transfixed most sharply, and, for the sake of respect for decency, consigned to oblivion and banished.
JulianImp.1.8Augustinus. Non quomodo vis iudicant qui legunt.
Augustine. Those who read do not judge as you wish.
JulianImp.1.8I. 9. Iulianus. Primus igitur eius liber, qui ante hunc solus est editus, novos nos esse haereticos criminatur ; quia repugnemus opinioni, quae dealbati instar sepulcri, quod secundum Evangelii sententiam, mundo extrinsecus colore vestitum, spurcitia est et iniquitate confertum , sub laude Baptismatis eructat Manichaeorum sordes ac naturale peccatum, ut Ecclesiae catholicae pura hactenus Sacramenta contaminet.
I. 9. Julian. His first book, then, which alone was published before this one, charges that we are new heretics, because we oppose an opinion which, like a whitewashed sepulcher—which, according to the saying of the Gospel, is clothed on the outside with color but within is full of filth and iniquity (See Matt 23:27)—belches forth, under the praise of Baptism, the Manichees' filth and a natural sin, so as to contaminate the hitherto pure Sacraments of the catholic Church.
JulianImp.1.9Augustinus. Novos haereticos vos antiqua catholica fides, quam modo oppugnare coepistis, a praeclarissimis, qui fuerunt ante nos, doctoribus praedicata demonstrat. Non autem omnibus respondendum est conviciis potius quam accusationibus tuis, quae non in me, sed etiam in Ambrosium, Hilarium, Gregorium, Cyprianum, aliosque praedicatissimos Ecclesiae doctores, fronte impudentissima et lingua procacissima iacularis.
Augustine. The ancient catholic faith, which you have just now begun to attack, shows that you are new heretics, since it was proclaimed by the most renowned teachers who lived before us. But not everything need be answered—reproaches rather than accusations of yours—which you hurl, with a most shameless brow and a most insolent tongue, not against me only, but also against Ambrose, Hilary, Gregory, Cyprian, and the other most celebrated teachers of the Church.
JulianImp.1.9I. 10. Iulianus. Laudat etiam potentem hominem, quod nostris petitionibus, qui nihil aliud quam dari tanto negotio iudices vociferabamur, ut ea quae subreptionibus acta constabat, emendarentur potius, quam punirentur examine, mole suae dignitatis obstiterit, nec disceptationi tempus aut locum permiserit impetrare. Quod utrum ille ad quem scribitur, tam nequiter fecerit, quam testatur ista laudatio, ipse viderit. Nos tamen in quantum de eo melius aestimaverimus, nominis illius commemoratio opusculo meo honorifice inserta patefecit. Verum liber ille de patrono suo falsa fortasse contineat. Porro fideliter quid scriptor eius cupiat ostendit; videlicet, ut contra rationem, contra fidem, contra omnem morum et dogmatum sanctitatem, vi fera et caeca impotentia dimicetur.
I. 10. Julian. He also praises a powerful man, because, against our petitions—we who were clamoring for nothing other than that judges be granted for so great a business, so that what was clearly done by underhanded means might be corrected rather than punished by an examination—he stood in the way with the weight of his rank and did not allow time or place for a hearing to be obtained. Whether the man to whom he writes acted so wickedly as that praise testifies, let him see to it himself. We, however, in proportion as we have thought better of him, the mention of his name, inserted honorably into my little work, has made clear. But that book may perhaps contain false things about its patron. Furthermore, it faithfully shows what its writer desires; namely, that contrary to reason, contrary to faith, contrary to all holiness of morals and of doctrines, the fight be waged with savage force and blind violence.
JulianImp.1.10Augustinus. Absit a christianis potestatibus terrenae reipublicae, ut de antiqua catholica fide dubitent, et ob hoc oppugnatoribus eius locum et tempus examinis praebeant; ac non potius in ea certi atque fundati, talibus, quales vos estis, inimicis eius disciplinam coercitionis imponant. Quod enim propter Donatistas factum est, eorum violentissimae turbae fieri coegerunt, ignorantes quid ante sit gestum, quod eis fuerat ostendendum; quales vos turbas Deus avertat ut habeatis; Deo tamen propitio non habetis.
Augustine. Far be it from the Christian powers of the earthly commonwealth to doubt about the ancient catholic faith and on this account to grant place and time of examination to its assailants; rather than, being certain and grounded in it, to impose the discipline of correction on such enemies of it as you are. For what was done on account of the Donatists, their most violent mobs compelled to be done, not knowing what had been transacted before, which ought to have been shown to them; may God turn away from you that you should have such mobs; yet, God being favorable, you do not have them.
JulianImp.1.10I. 11. Iulianus. Quibus gestis inter voluminis primas partes, progressus est ad distinctionem nuptiarum et concupiscentiae, sicut fuerat tituli inscriptione pollicitus; deditque toto deinceps opere documentum artis et virtutis suae. Inter negationem enim confessorum et negatorum confessionem ultima necessitate vexatus, quid aerumnarum pateretur foeda conscientia publicavit.
I. 11. Julian. After these proceedings, among the first parts of his volume, he advanced to the distinction between marriage and desire, as he had promised by the inscription of the title; and thereafter throughout the whole work he gave proof of his skill and his strength. For, tormented by the utmost necessity between the denial of those who confess and the confession of those who deny, he made public what miseries his foul conscience was suffering.
JulianImp.1.11Augustinus. Conviciare quantum potes; quis enim conviciosus hoc non potest?
Augustine. Revile as much as you can; for what reviler cannot do this?
JulianImp.1.11I. 12. Iulianus. Priori ergo operi quattuor libellis ea, quam suppeditavit veritas, facultate respondi; praefatus sane praeteriturum me, quae et pro dogmate illius nihil habere ponderis apparebat, et me possent arguere multiloquii, si fuissem imbecilla quaeque et inania persecutus. Quamquam, si hanc regulam, ut decuit, servare licuisset, id est ut nec oppugnationem ex professione inepta mererentur, pene omnia eius inventa publico fuerant spernenda silentio. Sed quoniam, rebus in peiorem partem properantibus (quod mundi fini suo incumbentis indicium est), in Ecclesia quoque Dei adepta est stultitia et turpitudo dominatum; pro Christo legatione fungimur , et pro virili portione quantum valemus opis, ad defensionem catholicae religionis afferimus; nec piget mandare litteris remedia, quae contra errorum venena conficimus. aug. Stultitia et turpitudo vos peperit; sed si in Ecclesia dominatum adepta esset, ibi vos utique tenuisset.
I. 12. Julian. To his earlier work, then, I replied in four little books with such ability as the truth supplied; having stated beforehand, of course, that I would pass over what both appeared to have no weight for his teaching and could convict me of verbosity, had I pursued everything weak and empty. And yet, if it had been permitted to keep this rule, as was fitting—that is, that things should not earn even an attack by their inept presentation—nearly all his inventions would have had to be spurned with public silence. But since, with affairs hastening to the worse (which is a sign of the world bearing down toward its end), folly and baseness have gained mastery even in the Church of God, we discharge an embassy for Christ (2 Cor 5:20), and according to our manly share we bring such help as we can to the defense of the catholic religion; nor does it irk us to commit to writing the remedies that we prepare against the poisons of errors. Augustine: Folly and baseness brought you forth; but if it had gained mastery in the Church, it would certainly have kept you there.
JulianImp.1.12I. 13. Iulianus. Testatus utique, ut dixi, fueram, nec contra omnes me species defendendae traducis in primo disserturum opere, nec cuncta, quae ille liber tenebat, replicaturum; sed cum his conflicturum, in quibus summam et vim sui dogmatis collocasset. Hoc autem me spopondisse fideliter, quicumque vel obliquus sit, tantum diligens utriusque operis lector, agnoscet. Ego autem conscientiae honestate securus inimicum nostrum et adhortor, et stimulo, ut si aliquod a se prolatum, a me praetermissum aestimat argumentum, quod cuiuspiam momenti vel ipse iudicet, in medium proferat, et me timoris dolique convincat.
I. 13. Julian. I had certainly testified, as I said, that in the first work I would neither dispute against all the kinds of transmission to be defended, nor repeat everything that book contained; but that I would grapple with those points in which he had placed the sum and force of his teaching. And that I faithfully pledged this, anyone who is a diligent reader of both works—however biased he may be—will recognize. But I, secure in the honesty of my conscience, both exhort and goad our enemy, that if he thinks any argument brought forward by him has been passed over by me, which he himself judges to be of any moment, he should bring it into the open and convict me of fear and deceit.
JulianImp.1.13Augustinus. Non credo quod ea quae praetermisisti, nullius momenti esse putaveris; quamvis et si hoc te putasse concedam; non tamen ita esse, catholicus et intellegens, si et unum illum meum et tuos quattuor habuerit, diligentiamque adhibuerit, lector inveniet.
Augustine. I do not believe that you thought the things you passed over to be of no moment; though even if I grant that you thought this, yet a catholic and intelligent reader, if he has both that one book of mine and your four, and applies diligence, will find that it is not so.
JulianImp.1.13I. 14. Iulianus. Scripturarum sane testimonia quaedam latius exposui, quaedam brevius; quia me plene id secuturo opere facturum spopondi. Nihil itaque ibi de omnibus Augustini argumentis et propositionibus non explosum remansit, nihil a me impletum est aliter quam promissum; multa in inventis eius falsa, multa stolida, sacrilega multa convici.
I. 14. Julian. Certain testimonies of the Scriptures I expounded at greater length, certain ones more briefly; because I pledged that I would do this fully in the work that was to follow. And so nothing there of all Augustine's arguments and propositions remained without being exploded, nothing was fulfilled by me otherwise than promised; many things among his inventions I convicted as false, many as stupid, many as sacrilegious.
JulianImp.1.14Augustinus. Hoc quidem dicis, sed tu dicis; qui autem legit et intellegit, si non Pelagianus est, non hoc dicit.
Augustine. This indeed you say, but it is you who say it; whoever, however, reads and understands, if he is not a Pelagian, does not say this.
JulianImp.1.14I. 15. Iulianus. Qua professione non est nobis arrogantiae fama metuenda; quia non ingenio meo veritatem defensam, sed imbecillitatem nostri ingenii veritatis viribus confitemur adiutam.
I. 15. Julian. By this profession we have no reputation for arrogance to fear; because we confess that the truth was defended not by my talent, but that the weakness of our talent was helped by the strength of the truth.
JulianImp.1.15Augustinus. Elisam dixisses, si verum dicere voluisses.
Augustine. You would have said "crushed," if you had wished to speak the truth.
JulianImp.1.15I. 16. Iulianus. Cum haec itaque haud aliter quam dixi, constet impleta; mirari satis nequeo hominis impudentiam, qui in hoc recenti opere suo libros meos falsitatis accusat, quos tamen necdum in manus suas venisse testatur . Durum quidem, quod consuetudo peccandi amorem delicti facit; sed nihil durius, quam quod exstinguit pudorem; quod licet ex improbitatis usu esse constaret, tamen amplius praesentia pericula docuerunt, quam quisquam nostrum poterat autumare. Quando enim crederem eo usque Numidae induruisse frontem, ut in uno opere et uno versu utrumque fateretur, et me falsa dixisse, et se non legisse quid dixerim.
I. 16. Julian. Since, then, these things, just as I have said, stand accomplished, I cannot sufficiently marvel at the man's shamelessness, who in this recent work of his accuses my books of falsity, which nevertheless he testifies have not yet come into his hands. It is hard indeed that the habit of sinning produces love of the offense; but nothing is harder than that it extinguishes shame; which, although it was established by the practice of wickedness, yet the present dangers have taught more than any of us could have surmised. For when would I have believed that the Numidian's brow had hardened to such a degree that in one work and one line he would confess both that I had spoken false things and that he had not read what I said?
JulianImp.1.16Augustinus. Si hoc non fecisti, ille fecit qui de libris tuis ea, quae comiti Valerio putavit mittenda esse, decerpsit. Quod eum non credens ego fecisse mendaciter, auctori tribui quod decerptori debui. Tuos quippe libros nondum legeram, sed quae ille ex eis decerpserat, legeram. Si te hominem cogitares, hoc fieri potuisse cum cerneres, nequaquam tam invidiosam quaereres homini hac occasione calumniam.
Augustine. If you did not do this, he did it who excerpted from your books the things he thought ought to be sent to Count Valerius. And because I, not believing that he had done so, falsely attributed to the author what I owed to the excerptor. For I had not yet read your books, but I had read what he had excerpted from them. If you considered yourself a human being, when you discerned that this could happen, you would by no means seek so spiteful a calumny against a man on this occasion.
JulianImp.1.16I. 17. Iulianus. Nam scribens ad eum, quem miratur studiosum esse librorum suorum, cum sit militiae sudoribus occupatus, indicat ab Alypio chartulas ad se fuisse delatas, quae ita superscriptae essent: Capitula de libro Augustini quem scripsit, contra quae de libris pauca decerpsi. Hic video eum, qui tuae Praestantiae ista scripta direxit, de nescio quibus libris ea, causa, quantum existimo, celerioris responsionis, ne tuam differret instantiam, voluisse decerpere. Qui autem sint isti libri cum cogitarem, eos esse arbitratus sum, quorum mentionem Iulianus facit in epistola quam Romam misit, cuius exemplum simul ad me usque pervenit. Ibi quippe ait: Dicunt etiam istas, quae modo aguntur, nuptias a Deo institutas non fuisse, quod in libro Augustini legitur, contra quem ego modo quattuor libellis respondi. Et post haec verba infert iterum suis sermonibus: Credo ex his libellis ista decerpta sunt; unde melius fortasse fuerat, ut universo ipsi operi eius, quod quattuor voluminibus explicavit, refellendo et redarguendo nostra elaboraret intentio; nisi et ego responsionem differre noluissem; sicut nec tu transmissionem scriptorum, quibus respondendum est, distulisti . Ostendit ergo hic apertissime excerpta illa suspicari se de opere meo tumultuarie fuisse collecta; integros autem ignorare libros, quibus tamen audet se dicere respondere potuisse.
I. 17. Julian. For writing to the one whom he marvels at as being a student of his books, although he is occupied with the toils of military service, he indicates that little sheets were brought to him by Alypius, which were thus superscribed: Chapters from a book of Augustine which he wrote, against which I have excerpted a few things from his books. Here I see that the one who directed those writings to your Excellency wished to excerpt them from I know not what books, for the sake, as I think, of a quicker response, lest he delay your insistence. But when I considered who these books might be, I judged them to be those of which Julian makes mention in the letter that he sent to Rome, a copy of which reached me at the same time. For there he says: They say too that these present marriages were not instituted by God, which is read in the book of Augustine, against which I have just now replied in four little books. And after these words he again adds in his own words: I believe these things were excerpted from these little books; so that it might perhaps have been better for our purpose to labor at refuting and confuting his whole work, which he set forth in four volumes; had not I too been unwilling to delay my response, just as you did not delay the transmission of the writings to which a reply must be made. He shows here, then, most plainly, that he suspects those excerpts to have been gathered hastily from my work, but is ignorant of the whole books, to which nevertheless he dares to say he has been able to reply.
JulianImp.1.17Augustinus. Cur non auderem, qui te in eis vana dixisse dubitare utique non deberem? Non enim contra vera posses loqui nisi vana. Neque meus animus me fefellit; eos namque libros tuos tales inveni, cum legerem, quales praesumpseram esse, antequam legerem.
Augustine. Why should I not have dared, when I certainly ought not to have doubted that you had said empty things in them? For you could not speak against true things except empty ones. Nor did my judgment deceive me; for I found those books of yours, when I read them, to be such as I had presumed them to be before I read them.
JulianImp.1.17I. 18. Iulianus. Facit quoque epistolae mentionem, quam a me ait Romam fuisse directam; sed per verba quae posuit, nequivimus quo de scripto loqueretur, agnoscere . Nam ad Zosimum quondam illius civitatis episcopum super his quaestionibus duas epistolas destinavi; verum eo tempore, quo adhuc libros exorsus non eram.
I. 18. Julian. He also makes mention of a letter which he says was directed by me to Rome; but from the words he set down, we have been unable to recognize what writing he was speaking of. For to Zosimus, once bishop of that city, I sent two letters on these questions; but at that time, when I had not yet begun the books.
JulianImp.1.18Augustinus. Haec epistola non est ad Zosimum; sed ad eos seducendos qui Romae possent tali suasione seduci. Sed si eam non agnoscis, ecce, non sit tua. Utinam et illi libri non essent tui, sed alieni; ne per eos tu longe a veritate fieres alienus.
Augustine. This letter is not to Zosimus; but for seducing those who at Rome could be seduced by such persuasion. But if you do not acknowledge it, behold, let it not be yours. Would that those books too were not yours, but another's; lest through them you become far estranged from the truth.
JulianImp.1.18I. 19. Iulianus. Porro utatur indicio epistolae, qua aut accepit, aut finxit me responsionem contra novos Manichaeos (quia vetus dedignatur videri) quattuor voluminibus explicasse; cur non curavit ea quae obiecissemus addiscere? Cur non studuit, qui cum esset congressurus, agnoscere; sed levitate turpissima concitatus in certamen maximum luminibus involutis, Andabatarum more, processit? Quod factum eiusmodi allegatione defendit, ut dicat se patroni sui festinationem, quam ille in transmittendis schedis habuit, imitari praecipiti responsione voluisse; quasi non honestissime potuerit intimare tempus sibi aliquod debere concedi, quo ad lectionem editi operis perveniret; flagitium esse inter eruditos in scribendi gravitate delinquere, et impatientia deliberandi impugnare, quod nescias. Huc accedit, quod nobis calliditatis moliturus invidiam, quae dictorum eius seriem curtaverit, his excerptis fidem accommodavit, quae verisimilius falsitate eius et malignitate, quam cuiusquam nostrum imperita simplicitate videntur esse composita. Verum id quovis animo, quovis auctore contigerit; nobis tamen duobus suffragatur modis; quia simul patuit et quanta sit levitas, et quanta imbecillitas in veritatis inimico, qui se approbavit, et cum loqui non debeat, tacere non posse, et paucis semiplenis discerptisque magis quam aggregatis sententiis, de primo tamen solum libro meo ita cessisse fractum, ut vulgi in nos femineis admodum vocibus pectora commoveret; quod disputationis nostrae processibus apparebit.
I. 19. Julian. Further, let him make use of the evidence of the letter, by which he either received or fabricated that I had set forth in four volumes a response against the new Manichees (since the old one disdains to be seen). Why did he not take care to learn the things we had objected? Why did he not, since he was about to engage, strive to recognize them; but, stirred by most shameful frivolity, advanced into a very great contest with his eyes covered, after the manner of the Andabatae? This deed he defends by such an allegation that he says he wished to imitate, by a headlong response, the haste his patron had in transmitting the documents; as though he could not most honorably have intimated that some time ought to be granted him in which to arrive at reading the published work; that it is a disgrace among the learned to fail in the gravity of writing and, through impatience of deliberation, to attack what one does not know. To this is added that, intending to contrive against us an odium of cunning—as though it had curtailed the sequence of his words—he lent credit to these excerpts, which seem more plausibly to have been composed by his own falsity and malice than by the inexperienced simplicity of any of us. But by whatever mind, by whatever author this came about, it nevertheless supports us in two ways; because it became clear at once how great is the frivolity, and how great the weakness, in the enemy of truth, who showed himself both unable, though he ought not to speak, to keep silent, and, with a few half-full and torn-apart rather than gathered statements, drawn from my first book alone, to have so given way, broken, as to stir up against us the breasts of the common folk with quite womanish cries; which will appear in the course of our disputation.
JulianImp.1.19Augustinus. Quid mihi irasceris, quod ad me libri tui pervenire tardius potuerunt; vel quod eos quaerens non potui celeriter invenire? Tamen potui et omnino debui, ea quae mihi missa chartula continebat, cuiuscumque et qualiacumque essent, ne putarentur invicta, plane apertis, non involutis oculis inspicere, et sine dilatione refellere; quia etsi numquam libros tuos reperire possem, oportuit ut ea, quae alicuius momenti esse credidit, qui tanto viro arbitratus est esse mittenda, quantum valerem, ne quisquam legens eis deciperetur, arguerem. Non ergo mihi quod obiecisti obiceres, nisi tu potius ista, ut non dicam exstinctis, certe clausis oculis loquereris. Nullo modo autem diceres, vulgi a nobis in vos pectora commoveri, nisi scires multitudinem christianam in utroque sexu fidem catholicam non latere, quam conaris evertere.
Augustine. Why are you angry with me, because your books could reach me only rather late; or because, seeking them, I could not quickly find them? Yet I could, and altogether ought, to inspect with plainly open, not covered, eyes the things contained in the little sheet sent to me, whoever's and of whatever sort they were, lest they be thought unconquered, and to refute them without delay; because even if I could never have found your books, it was fitting that I should, as far as I was able, argue against the things which he believed to be of some moment, who judged that they ought to be sent to so great a man, lest anyone reading them be deceived by them. You would not, then, object to me what you objected, unless you were rather speaking, I will not say with extinguished, but at least with closed eyes. But in no way would you say that the breasts of the common folk are stirred by us against you, unless you knew that the catholic faith, which you are trying to overturn, is not hidden from the Christian multitude in both sexes.
JulianImp.1.19I. 20. Iulianus. Admoneo tamen hic quoque, sicut priore a nobis opere factum est, non me omnia examussim eius verba positurum; sed ea capita, quibus destructis, naturalis mali opinio conteratur.
I. 20. Julian. Yet here too I give warning, as was done by us in the earlier work, that I will not set down all his words exactly; but those chief points which, once destroyed, the opinion of a natural evil is crushed.
JulianImp.1.20Augustinus. Ea quae praetermittis, colligentur fortasse vel a nobis vel ab aliis, ut appareat cur praetermiseris.
Augustine. The things you pass over will perhaps be gathered up, either by us or by others, so that it may appear why you passed them over.
JulianImp.1.20I. 21. Iulianus. Quod licet plene primo opere constet effectum; tamen quoniam nunc nonnulla de uno dumtaxat libro meo sibi refellenda proposuit, meque, ut praelocutus sum, arguit, quod capita dictorum eius quae inserui, magna ex parte truncaverim; ostendam primo, id quod reprehendit, nec a me esse factum, et ab illo impudentissime in hoc eodem opere frequentatum. Tunc probabo, illis ipsis concisis brevibusque sententiis, quas de scriptis meis, quibus fuerat impugnatus, interserit, ita nullis eum solidis responsionibus obstitisse, ut et illa invexata permaneant, et hic planius detestanda fateatur, quam nostra operatio laboraverat explicare.
I. 21. Julian. Although this stands fully accomplished in the first work; yet because he has now proposed for himself certain things from one book of mine only to be refuted, and, as I said before, charges me with having for the most part truncated the chief points of his sayings which I inserted; I will first show that what he reprehends was not done by me, and was practiced most shamelessly by him in this very work. Then I will prove that, by those very concise and brief statements which he interposes from my writings, by which he had been assailed, he has so withstood them with no solid responses that both those things remain unshaken, and here he confesses, more plainly than our work had labored to set forth, things deserving to be detested.
JulianImp.1.21Augustinus. Iam superius ad ista respondi.
Augustine. I have already answered these things above.
JulianImp.1.21I. 22. Iulianus. Attoniti ergo, quid contra me scripserit, audiamus. Verba - inquit - de libro meo tibi a me misso tibique notissimo ista posuit, quae refutare conatus est: "damnatores nos esse nuptiarum, operisque divini, quo ex maribus et feminis Deus homines creat, invidiosissime clamitant; quoniam dicimus, eos qui de tali commixtione nascuntur, trahere originale peccatum; eosque, de qualibuscumque parentibus nascantur, non negamus adhuc esse sub diabolo, nisi renascantur in Christo " . In his verbis meis testimonium Apostoli, quod interposui praetermisit, cuius se premi magna mole sentiebat. Ego enim cum dixissem, homines trahere originale peccatum, mox adiunxi: De quo Apostolus ait: "r unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt " ; quo testimonio, ut diximus, praetermisso, cetera illa contexuit quae supra commemorata sunt. Novit enim quemadmodum soleant haec verba apostolica, quae praetermisit, accipere catholicorum corda fidelium; quae verba tam recta et tanta luce fulgentia, tenebrosis et tortuosis interpretationibus novi haeretici obscurare et depravare moliuntur. Deinde alia mea verba subtexuit, ubi dixi: "c advertunt, quod ita nuptiarum bonum malo originali quod inde trahitur non potest accusari, sicut adulteriorum et fornicationum malum bono naturali, quod inde nascitur, non potest excusari. Nam, sicut peccatum, sive hinc sive inde a parvulis trahatur, opus est diaboli, sic homo, sive hinc sive inde nascatur, opus est Dei ". Etiam hic ea praetermisit, in quibus aures catholicas timuit. Nam ut ad haec verba veniretur, supra dictum erat a nobis: "c ergo quia dicimus, quod antiquissima atque firmissima catholicae fidei regula continetur, isti novelli et perversi dogmatis assertores, qui nihil peccati esse in parvulis dicunt quod lavacro regenerationis abluatur, tamquam damnemus nuptias, et tamquam opus Dei, hoc est hominem qui ex illis nascitur, opus diaboli esse dicamus, infideliter vel imperite calumniantur " . His ergo nostris praetermissis sequuntur illa nostra quae posuit, sicut supra scriptum est . Quousque simplicitati, qui haec loqueris, religiosorum pectorum et imperitis auribus perstabis illudere? Quem ad finem sese impudentia effrenata iactabit? Nihil te, cum haec scriberes, censura doctorum virorum, nihil reverentia futuri iudicii, nihil ipsa litterarum monumenta moverunt? Patere iam fallaciam tuam, et deprehensam teneri non vides? Quid in primo, quid in secundo opere conscripseris, quem nostrum ignorare arbitraris? Libuit enim prorsus, et decuit, his te compellare modis, quibus in parricidam publicum eloquens consul infremuit .
I. 22. Julian. Astonished, then, let us hear what he has written against me. The words—he says—from my book sent to you by me and most well known to you, these he set down, which he tried to refute: "they most spitefully cry out that we are condemners of marriage and of the divine work by which God creates human beings from males and females; because we say that those who are born from such union draw original sin, and that those, from whatever parents they are born, are still under the devil, we do not deny, unless they are reborn in Christ". In these words of mine he passed over the testimony of the Apostle, which I had inserted, by whose great weight he felt himself pressed. For when I had said that human beings draw original sin, I soon added: of which the Apostle says: "through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned" (Rom 5:12); which testimony, as we have said, being passed over, he wove together those other things which were recalled above. For he knows how the faithful hearts of catholics are accustomed to take these apostolic words, which he passed over; which words, so right and shining with such great light, the new heretics contrive to obscure and to deprave with dark and tortuous interpretations. Then he subjoined other words of mine, where I said: "they do not consider that the good of marriage cannot be accused on account of the original evil that is drawn from it, just as the evil of adulteries and fornications cannot be excused on account of the natural good that is born from it. For, as sin, whether drawn by little ones from this side or from that, is the work of the devil, so a human being, whether born from this side or from that, is the work of God." Here too he passed over the things in which he feared catholic ears. For, that one might come to these words, it had been said above by us: "because, therefore, we say what is contained in the most ancient and most firm rule of the catholic faith, these assertors of a novel and perverse teaching, who say there is no sin in little ones that is washed away by the laver of regeneration, calumniate, faithlessly or unskillfully, as though we condemn marriage, and as though we say that the work of God, that is, the human being who is born from them, is the work of the devil". These things of ours, then, being passed over, there follow those words of ours which he set down, as is written above. How long will you, who speak these things, persist in mocking the simplicity of religious hearts and inexperienced ears? To what end will unbridled shamelessness vaunt itself? Did nothing, when you wrote these things, move you—neither the censure of learned men, nor reverence for the future judgment, nor the very monuments of letters? Are you now open to your own deceit, and do you not see that, once detected, it is held fast? What you wrote in the first work, what in the second, whom of us do you think ignorant of it? For it pleased me utterly, and it was fitting, to assail you with those manners in which the eloquent consul roared against the public parricide.
JulianImp.1.22Augustinus. Bene facis, indicare nobis, ne forte non agnosceremus, de invectivis Ciceronis te ista sumpsisse atque vertisse, sed non timemus Iulianum, cum videmus factum esse Tullianum; immo potius dolemus insanum, cum videmus sensum perdidisse christianum. Quid enim insanius, quam prohibere a parvulis medicum Christum, dicendo non esse in eis quod venit ille sanare? Cicero invectus in patriae parricidam, eam defendebat civitatem quam rex eius Romulus, congregatis undecumque peccatoribus condidit; tu autem tot parvulos, qui sine sacro Baptismate moriuntur, et clamas peccatum nullum habere, et ad civitatem Regis, ad cuius imaginem facti sunt, non permittis accedere.
Augustine. You do well to indicate to us, lest perhaps we should not recognize it, that you took these things from the invectives of Cicero and turned them about; but we do not fear Julian, when we see that he has become Tullian; rather, we grieve that he is mad, when we see that he has lost his Christian sense. For what is more mad than to forbid the physician Christ to little ones, by saying that there is not in them what he came to heal? Cicero, inveighing against the parricide of his fatherland, was defending that city which its king Romulus founded by gathering sinners from everywhere; but you, so many little ones who die without holy Baptism both cry out that they have no sin, and do not permit them to approach the city of the King, to whose image they were made.
JulianImp.1.22I. 23. Iulianus. Apostoli me testimonium praetermisisse confingis, quod nec tibi opitulari potest, et a me praetermissum non est; sed eo insertum ordine, quo a te fuerat collocatum; utque in primo fideliter commemoratum, ita enim in quarto operis mei libro, licet cursim et breviter, explanatum est . Commemorationem quoque catholicae Ecclesiae, quam tu ad hoc feceras, ut catholicam fidem desererent a te decepti, et catholica miserabiles appellatione gauderent, non praetermisi. Et quamvis nulla argumentorum vis in eiusmodi verbis esset, tamen a me haud aliter dictorum tuorum caput propositum est, quam a te fuerat ordinatum. Lege editos libros meos responsionisque fidem, quam tu arguis fraudis, aspiciens, me interim pronuntia vera dicere; tu vero, si consuetudo tua permiserit, erubesce. Sed iam ostensa inexcusabili falsitate, quae semper quidem turpis, fit tamen turpior cum locum censoris invadit, et deformitatem suam decori exprobrat alieno; responde, quid Manichaeis sensibus aut nomen Ecclesiae aut Apostoli verba conducant, ut ea cum tam magna invidia praetermissa causeris?
I. 23. Julian. You falsely pretend that I passed over the testimony of the Apostle, which can neither help you, and was not passed over by me; but it was inserted in the order in which it had been placed by you; and as it was faithfully recalled in the first, so it was explained—although cursorily and briefly—in the fourth book of my work. The mention too of the catholic Church, which you had made for this purpose, that those deceived by you might desert the catholic faith and, wretched, rejoice in the catholic name, I did not pass over. And although there was no force of argument in words of this kind, yet the chief point of your sayings was set forth by me no otherwise than it had been arranged by you. Read my published books and, looking at the fidelity of the response which you charge with fraud, pronounce me meanwhile to speak true things; but you, if your custom permits, blush. But now that the inexcusable falsity has been shown—which, though always base, becomes baser when it invades the place of the censor and reproaches its own deformity to another's comeliness—answer: what do either the name of the Church or the words of the Apostle profit the Manichaean meanings, that you should allege them to have been passed over with so great a spite?
JulianImp.1.23Augustinus. Iam superius respondi huic calumniae tuae, qua mihi verborum tuorum minus integre positorum obicis falsitatem. Sed quod fecit ille decerptor, tu mihi tam libenter non tribueres, si eorum qui haec legunt, nolles esse deceptor.
Augustine. I have already answered above this calumny of yours, by which you charge me with the falsity of having set down your words less than completely. But what that excerptor did, you would not so gladly attribute to me, if you were not willing to be a deceiver of those who read these things.
JulianImp.1.23I. 24. Iulianus. Hoc semper fuit maximum inter Manichaeos Catholicosque discrimen, et limes quidam latissimus, quo a se mutuo piorum et impiorum dogmata separantur, immo magna moles sententias nostras quasi coeli a terra profunditate disiungens, quod nos omne peccatum voluntati malae, illi vero malae conscribunt naturae; qui cum diversos sequuntur errores, sed velut de capite fontis istius effluentes consequenter ad sacrilegia flagitiaque perveniunt; sicut Catholici e regione, a bono inchoantes exordio, bonis aucti processibus, ad religionis summam, quam ratio munit et pietas, pervehuntur. Tu igitur malum naturale conatus asserere profano quidem voto, sed inefficaci intentione usurpasti Apostoli testimonium, quem hac eadem perscriptione ostendo nihil tale sensisse, quale tu persuadere conaris, quod repugnantibus modis et illum catholicum confiteris, et dicta eius Manichaeo aestimas suffragari.
I. 24. Julian. This has always been the greatest difference between the Manichees and the Catholics, and a certain very wide boundary by which the teachings of the pious and the impious are mutually separated from each other—rather, a great mass dividing our opinions, as it were, like the heavens from the earth, by its depth—namely, that we ascribe every sin to an evil will, but they to an evil nature; and they, although they follow diverse errors, yet, as though flowing out from the head of this spring, arrive consequently at sacrileges and disgraceful deeds; just as the Catholics, on the opposite side, beginning from a good start, increased by good advances, are carried to the summit of religion, which reason and piety fortify. You, therefore, attempting to assert a natural evil with profane wish but ineffectual intention, have usurped the testimony of the Apostle, whom by this same writing-out I show to have meant nothing such as you try to persuade, since you both, in self-contradictory ways, confess him to be catholic and judge his sayings to support the Manichee.
JulianImp.1.24Augustinus. Quos doctores catholicos Manichaeo asseras suffragari, qui in verbis apostolicis intellexerunt trahere parvulos originale peccatum, nec vestro more insano velut sanam laudare naturam, sed ei sanandae adhibuerunt medicinam potius christianam, si christiano corde cogitares, erubesceres, contremisceres, obmutesceres.
Augustine. The catholic teachers whom you assert to support the Manichee, who understood in the apostolic words that little ones draw original sin, and did not, in your insane fashion, praise nature as though sound, but rather applied to it, to be healed, the Christian medicine—if you thought with a Christian heart, you would blush, you would tremble, you would fall silent.
JulianImp.1.24I. 25. Iulianus. Numquid non idem, Adimantus et Faustus (quem in libris Confessionis tuae praeceptorem tuum loqueris ), haeresiarchae sui traditione fecerunt, obscuriores quasque vel de Evangelio, vel de Apostolorum Epistolis sententias rapientes et corro ntes, ut profanum dogma nominum auctoritate tuerentur? Quamquam quid dico de Manichaeis? Omnes prorsus haereses inventa sua, quibus a pietate et fide exorbitaverunt, Scripturarum elocutionibus sententiisque communiunt.
I. 25. Julian. Did not the same, Adimantus and Faustus (whom in the books of your Confessions you call your teacher), do this by the tradition of their heresiarch, snatching and corrupting the more obscure statements, whether from the Gospel or from the Epistles of the Apostles, in order to defend a profane teaching by the authority of those names? Yet why do I speak of the Manichees? Absolutely all heresies fortify their inventions, by which they have strayed from piety and faith, with the expressions and statements of the Scriptures.
JulianImp.1.25Augustinus. Illi obscuras sententias in suum dogma convertere; vos apertas ipso vestro dogmate obscurare conamini. Quid enim apertius quam quod ait Apostolus: Peccatum in hunc mundum per unum hominem intrasse, et per peccatum mortem, et ita in omnes homines pertransisse ? Quod si probare idem cogeretur Apostolus, ipsam generis humani miseriam testem daret, quae incipit a vagitibus parvulorum, et usque ad decrepitorum gemitus pervenit. Nullo enim modo sub cura omnipotentis et iusti eadem tam magna miseria naturae irrogaretur humanae, nisi in duobus hominibus tota de paradisi felicitate in hanc infelicitatem peccati merito pelleretur.
Augustine. They turned obscure statements to their teaching; you try to obscure clear ones by your very teaching. For what is clearer than what the Apostle says: that sin entered this world through one man, and through sin death, and so it passed into all human beings (See Rom 5:12)? And if the same Apostle were compelled to prove this, he would give as witness the very misery of the human race, which begins from the wailing of little ones and reaches all the way to the groans of the decrepit. For in no way, under the Almighty and just one, would so great a misery be inflicted on human nature, unless in two human beings it had been driven, by the deserving of sin, from all the happiness of paradise into this unhappiness.
JulianImp.1.25I. 26. Iulianus. Num igitur ideo aut Libri sacri auctores probabuntur errorum, aut crimina pereuntium, Scripturarum dignitas expiabit?
I. 26. Julian. Will, then, either the authors of the sacred Book be proved to be authors of errors, or will the dignity of the Scriptures expiate the crimes of those who perish?
JulianImp.1.26Augustinus. Hoc vobis dicite.
Augustine. Say this to yourselves.
JulianImp.1.26I. 27. Iulianus. Exstinguatur itaque indisciplinatarum expositionum libido; nihil agere contra manifestam Dei iustitiam verba credantur; quae si eius personae sunt, quam venerari necesse est, defendantur explanationibus divinae congruentibus aequitati; sin autem non metuendo sunt auctore prolata, etiam ineliquata pellantur. Igitur nunc Dei iudicio disputatur, de quo scribitur : Deus fidelis, in quo non est iniquitas; iustus et sanctus Dominus Deus . Et iterum: Iustus Dominus, et iustitiam dilexit, aequitatem vidit vultus eius . Et iterum: Omnia iudicia tua aequitas . Innumera sunt testimonia, quibus aequitas divina in sacris Voluminibus praedicatur; de qua nemo tamen vel Gentilium, vel haereticorum, praeter Manichaeos Traducianosque dubitavit.
I. 27. Julian. Let the lust for undisciplined expositions therefore be extinguished; let the words be believed to do nothing against the manifest justice of God; which words, if they belong to that Person whom it is necessary to venerate, let them be defended by explanations agreeing with the divine equity; but if they were uttered by an author not to be feared, let them be expelled even unrefined. Now, therefore, we are disputing about the judgment of God, of whom it is written: God is faithful, in whom there is no iniquity; just and holy is the Lord God (See Deut 32:4). And again: The Lord is just, and he loved justice, his face beheld equity (Ps 11:7 (10:8)). And again: All your judgments are equity (See Ps 119:160 (118:160)). Numberless are the testimonies by which the divine equity is proclaimed in the sacred Volumes; about which, nevertheless, no one, whether of the Gentiles or of the heretics, except the Manichees and the Traducianists, has doubted.
JulianImp.1.27Augustinus. Ex hac aequitate grave iugum est super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum ; quod omnino esse asserit iniquum, qui negat originale peccatum.
Augustine. From this equity there is a heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam from the day of their going out from their mother's womb (Sir 40:1); which whoever denies original sin asserts to be altogether unjust.
JulianImp.1.27I. 28. Iulianus. Ita enim omnibus generaliter, edocente natura, inculcatum est, Deum iustum esse, ut manifestum sit, Deum non esse quem constiterit iustum non esse. Potest igitur et homo iustus esse; Deus vero esse nisi iustus non potest.
I. 28. Julian. For it has been so instilled in all generally, by nature's teaching, that God is just, that it is manifest that he is not God who has been established not to be just. A human being, therefore, can also be just; but God cannot be anything but just.
JulianImp.1.28Augustinus. Tibi dic.
Augustine. Say it to yourself.
JulianImp.1.28I. 29. Iulianus. Qui cum est hic unus verus cui credimus, et quem in Trinitate veneramur, dubio procul in omnes iudicii est ratione iustissimus.
I. 29. Julian. Since he is the one true God in whom we believe, and whom we venerate in the Trinity, he is beyond doubt the most just toward all in his manner of judgment.
JulianImp.1.29Augustinus. Tibi dic: et ostende iustum esse, ut cum tam manifesta miseria, vel ad tam manifestam miseriam nascatur, a quo peccatum originale non trahitur.
Augustine. Say it to yourself: and show that he is just, who is born with so manifest a misery, or unto so manifest a misery, by whom no original sin is drawn.
JulianImp.1.29I. 30. Iulianus. De huius itaque legibus ita probari et vindicari non potest, quod esse constat iniustum, ut si hoc fieri posset, illius divinitas tota vilesceret. Ab eo igitur probabitur de Scripturis sanctis iniustitiae dogma firmari, a quo approbari quiverit Trinitatem, cui credimus, divinitatis gloria posse privari.
I. 30. Julian. By his laws, then, what is established to be unjust can in no way be proved and vindicated, so that, if this could happen, his whole divinity would become worthless. By the same one, therefore, will it be proved that a teaching of injustice is established from the holy Scriptures, by whom it could be approved that the Trinity, in which we believe, can be deprived of the glory of its divinity.
JulianImp.1.30Augustinus. Verum dicis: sed vobis dicite, qui gloriam Christo, qua parvulos sanat, molimini auferre.
Augustine. You speak the truth: but say it to yourselves, who endeavor to take away from Christ the glory by which he heals little ones.
JulianImp.1.30I. 31. Iulianus. Quod quoniam nec ratio sustinet ulla, nec pietas; aut doce, vel posse esse, vel iustum esse, imputari cuiquam naturale peccatum; aut a Scripturarum sanctarum contaminatione discedito, quarum sententiis sanciri aestimas quod iniquum cogeris confiteri.
I. 31. Julian. And since neither any reason nor any piety sustains this, either teach that a natural sin can either exist or be just to be imputed to anyone; or else depart from the contamination of the holy Scriptures, by whose statements you judge to be sanctioned what you are compelled to confess to be unjust.
JulianImp.1.31Augustinus. Erratis: vos potius iniquum cogimini confiteri grave super parvulos iugum; si quemadmodum nullum habent proprium, ita nullum trahunt originale peccatum.
Augustine. You are in error: it is rather you who are compelled to confess as unjust the heavy yoke upon little ones; if, just as they have no sin of their own, so they draw no original sin.
JulianImp.1.31I. 32. Iulianus. Quod si neutrum horum quae diximus, facies; et huic Deo te asseris credere, cuius institutis iniustitiam communiri aestimas; cognosce, multo te novum antiquo Manichaeo esse peiorem, qui talem Deum habeas, qualem Manichaeus Dei sui est commentus inimicum.
I. 32. Julian. But if you will do neither of the two things we have spoken of, and assert that you believe in this God, by whose institutions you judge injustice to be fortified, know that you, the new one, are far worse than the ancient Manichee, in that you have such a God as the Manichee imagined the enemy of his God to be.
JulianImp.1.32Augustinus. Vos peius quam Manichaei saevitis in parvulos. Illi quippe animam saltem, quam partem Dei putant, sanari per Christum in parvulo volunt; vos autem, quem nec in anima, nec in carne ullum malum habere dicitis, per Christum sanari nulla ex parte permittitis. Et praeclari praedicatores sic praedicatis Iesum, ut eum negetis parvulorum esse Iesum. Unde namque hoc nomen acceperit, in Evangelio legite , et nolite Salvatorem non salvis parvulis denegare.
Augustine. You rage against little ones worse than the Manichees. For they at least wish the soul, which they think a part of God, to be healed through Christ in the little one; but you do not permit the one whom you say has no evil either in soul or in flesh to be healed through Christ in any part. And you, illustrious preachers, so preach Jesus that you deny him to be the Jesus of little ones. For from where he received this name, read in the Gospel (See Matt 1:21), and do not deny the Savior to little ones who are not saved.
JulianImp.1.32I. 33. Iulianus. Quas mihi ergo tu hic ambages, quae cervicalia, mendaciorum et ineptiarum, quae Hierusalem fornicanti Ezechiel propheta imputat ; admovebis, in quibus muliebres animae cubent, nomina mysteriorum tenentes, cum in ipsam divinitatem retecta profanitate commiserint. Remotis omnibus praestigiis et advocatarum saepe a te plebicularum catervis, doce iustum esse quod per Scripturas sanctas affirmare conaris.
I. 33. Julian. What windings, then, what pillows of lies and follies—which the prophet Ezekiel imputes to fornicating Jerusalem (See Ezek 13:18)—will you here apply to me, on which womanish souls may recline, holding the names of the mysteries, while in their uncovered profanity they have offended against divinity itself? With all the conjurer's tricks removed, and the throngs of the little common folk so often summoned by you, teach that what you try to affirm through the holy Scriptures is just.
JulianImp.1.33Augustinus. Plebicularum, quas irrides, catervae, noverunt catholicam fidem, quae a Salvatore salvari confitentur infantes; et ideo Pelagianorum, qui hoc negant, detestantur errorem.
Augustine. The throngs of the little common folk, whom you mock, know the catholic faith, which confesses that infants are saved by the Savior; and therefore they detest the error of the Pelagians, who deny this.
JulianImp.1.33I. 34. Iulianus. Ne ergo in infinita volumina extendatur oratio, hic, hic harum de quibus agimus, rerum genus, species, differentia, modus, qualitasque cernatur; immo sollicitius utrum sint, unde sint, ubi sint, quid etiam mereantur, et a quo. Hoc enim modo nec diu per disputationum anfractus errabitur, et certum quod teneri debeat, apparebit.
I. 34. Julian. Lest, then, my speech be extended into infinite volumes, here, here let the genus, species, difference, mode, and quality of these things we are dealing with be discerned; rather, more anxiously, whether they exist, whence they exist, where they exist, what too they deserve, and from whom. For in this way there will be no long wandering through the windings of disputations, and what ought to be held as certain will appear.
JulianImp.1.34Augustinus. Ideo contra unum librum meum libros octo scripsisti, quia per tua compendia dialectica diu disputare noluisti.
Augustine. You wrote eight books against one book of mine for this reason: that, through your dialectical summaries, you were unwilling to dispute at length.
JulianImp.1.34I. 35. Iulianus. Creatoris his igitur et creaturae ratio vertitur, id est Dei et hominis; iudicat ille, iudicatur iste; itaque iustitiae et culpae quae sit natura, videatur. Iustitia est, et ut ab eruditis definiri solet, et ut nos intellegere possumus, virtus (si per Stoicos liceat alteri alteram praeferre) virtutum omnium maxima, fungens diligenter officio ad restituendum sua unicuique sine fraude, sine gratia.
I. 35. Julian. Here, then, the account of Creator and creature is at issue, that is, of God and the human being; the one judges, the other is judged; and so let it be seen what the nature of justice and of fault is. Justice is—both as it is wont to be defined by the learned, and as we can understand it—the virtue (if it may be permitted, against the Stoics, to prefer one to another) greatest of all virtues, diligently discharging its office to restore to each his own without fraud, without favor.
JulianImp.1.35Augustinus. Dic ergo qua iustitia retributum sit parvulis grave iugum tam magnae manifestaeque miseriae; dic qua iustitia ille parvulus adoptetur in Baptismo, ille sine hac adoptione moriatur; cur non sit ambobus honor iste communis, aut ab isto honore alienatio, cum sit ambobus seu bona seu mala causa communis. Non dicis, quia nec Dei gratiam, nec Dei iustitiam homo magis Pelagianus quam Christianus sapis.
Augustine. Say, then, by what justice the heavy yoke of so great and manifest a misery has been repaid to little ones; say by what justice that little one is adopted in Baptism, and that one dies without this adoption; why this honor, or estrangement from this honor, is not common to both, when their case, whether good or evil, is common to both. You do not say, because, a Pelagian more than a Christian, you understand neither the grace of God nor the justice of God.
JulianImp.1.35I. 36. Iulianus. Quod si eam maximam dici Zeno non siverit, qui tantam virtutum copulam unitatemque confirmat, ut ubi fuerit una, omnes dicat adesse virtutes et, ubi una non fuerit, omnes deesse; atque illam veram esse virtutem, quae hac quadrua iugalitate perficitur; tunc quoque nobis plurimum praebebit auxilii, cum docuerit, nec prudentiam, nec fortitudinem, nec temperantiam posse sine iustitia contineri; secundum quam veritatem et Ecclesiastes pronuntiat: Qui in uno peccaverit, multa bona perdet .
I. 36. Julian. But if Zeno would not allow it to be called the greatest—he who affirms so great a bond and unity of the virtues that, where one has been present, he says all the virtues are present, and where one has not been present, all are absent; and that that is true virtue which is perfected by this fourfold yoking—then too he will furnish us with very great help, when he has taught that neither prudence nor fortitude nor temperance can be maintained without justice; in accordance with which truth Ecclesiastes too declares: he who sins in one thing will lose many good things (Eccl 9:18).
JulianImp.1.36Augustinus. Audi eumdem Ecclesiasten dicentem: Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas; quae abundantia hominis in omni labore suo, quem ipse laborat sub sole etc.? Et dic mihi, quare homo etiam vanitati similis factus est , qui factus fuerat similis veritati. An hinc excipis parvulos, quos videmus crescendo et, si bene erudiantur, proficiendo, tam magnam minuere, cum qua nati sunt, vanitatem; nec ea tota carere, nisi omnes dies vanitatis velut umbra transierint ?
Augustine. Hear the same Ecclesiastes saying: Vanity of vanities, and all is vanity; what abundance has a man in all his labor with which he labors under the sun? (Eccl 1:2-3) And tell me, why is man too made like to vanity (Ps 144:4 (143:4)), who had been made like to truth. Or do you here except little ones, whom we see, by growing and, if they are well educated, by advancing, diminish the great vanity with which they were born; nor are they wholly free of it, until all their days have passed away like a shadow in vanity (See Ps 144:4 (143:4))?
JulianImp.1.36I. 37. Iulianus. Haec igitur augusta virtus, expunctrix uniuscuiusque meritorum, in operibus quidem imaginis Dei, id est humanae animae, pro creaturae ipsius modo et viribus intermicat; in ipso vero Deo, omnium quae sunt ex nihilo conditore, immenso et claro per aeternum orbe resplendet. Origo eius divinitas est, aetas eius aeternitas, et aeternitas ultro citro nescia vel desinere vel coepisse. Ut ergo genus eius (quo nomine nihil aliud quam originem intellegi volo) Deus est; ita species eius in legum promulgatione iudiciorumque apparet effectibus.
I. 37. Julian. This august virtue, then, the assessor of each one's deserts, shines forth in the works of the image of God, that is, of the human soul, according to the measure and powers of the creature itself; but in God himself, the founder out of nothing of all things that are, it shines back through a measureless and bright orb forever. Its origin is divinity, its age is eternity, and an eternity that knows not, on either side, either to cease or to have begun. As, then, its genus (by which name I wish nothing else to be understood than its origin) is God; so its species appears in the promulgation of laws and in the effects of judgments.
JulianImp.1.37Augustinus. Si origo iustitiae Deus est, ut fateris, cur homini ab ipso dari iustitiam non fateris, et potius humanae voluntatis arbitrium, quam Dei donum, vis esse iustitiam; ut sis in eis de quibus dictum est: Ignorantes Dei iustitiam, et suam volentes constituere, iustitiae Dei non sunt subiecti ? Erubescite tandem, obsecro, et ab illo iustitiam poscite, qui est, ut fateri compulsi estis, origo iustitiae.
Augustine. If the origin of justice is God, as you confess, why do you not confess that justice is given to a human being by him, and would rather have justice be the choice of the human will than the gift of God; so that you are among those of whom it is said: Being ignorant of the justice of God, and wishing to establish their own, they did not submit to the justice of God (Rom 10:3)? Blush at last, I beseech you, and ask justice from him who is, as you have been compelled to confess, the origin of justice.
JulianImp.1.37I. 38. Iulianus. Differentiam vero eius non absurde intellegere possumus, variam pro opportunitate temporum dispensationem. Verbi gratia, hostiae de pecoribus in Vetere Testamento fuerant imperatae. Id tunc implere pertinebat ad reverentiam iussionis; nunc vero indicta eorum dissimulatio ita servit iustitiae praecipienti, ut tunc oblatio serviebat. Modus vero eius est vel status, quod nec cuiquam amplius quam vires patiuntur indicit, vel quod misericordiam non retundit. Qualitas autem eius intellegitur, per quam piis mentibus sapit dulciter. Est igitur procul dubio iustitia, sine qua deitas non est; quae si non esset, Deus non esset; est autem Deus, est itaque sine ambiguitate iustitia. Non est autem aliud quam virtus omnia continens, et restituens suum unicuique, sine fraude, sine gratia. Consistit autem maxime in divinitatis profundo.
I. 38. Julian. Its difference, indeed, we can not absurdly understand to be the varying dispensation according to the opportuneness of the times. For example, in the Old Testament sacrifices of cattle had been commanded. To fulfill that then belonged to reverence for the command; but now the disregard of them, once they have been abolished, serves justice's precept just as the offering then served it. Its mode is its very steadiness, in that it neither enjoins on anyone more than his powers can bear, nor blunts mercy. Its quality, moreover, is understood to be that by which it is sweetly savored by pious minds. There is, then, beyond doubt, a justice without which there is no deity; which, if it did not exist, God would not exist; but God exists, and so without ambiguity justice exists. And it is nothing other than the virtue containing all things and restoring to each his own, without fraud, without favor. And it consists chiefly in the depth of divinity.
JulianImp.1.38Augustinus. Definisti esse iustitiam virtutem omnia continentem, et restituentem suum unicuique, sine fraude, sine gratia. Proinde videmus eam sine fraude restituisse denarium eis, qui per totum diem in opere vineae laboraverant; hoc enim placuerat, hoc convenerat, ad hanc mercedem se fuisse conductos negare non poterant . Sed dic mihi, quaeso te, quomodo eis sine gratia tantumdem dedit, qui una hora in illo opere fuerunt? An amiserat fortasse iustitiam? Cohibe itaque te potius. Neminem quippe fraudat divina iustitia, sed multa donat non merentibus gratia. Cur autem huic sic, illi autem sic, aspice quod secutus adiungis. Verissime quippe dicis, eam consistere maxime in divinitatis profundo. In hoc profundo est, quod neque volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei . In hoc profundo est, quod ille parvulus in honorem adoptatur per regenerationis lavacrum, ille in contumelia relinquitur, non admittendus ad Regnum; cum amborum in neutram partem sit meritum per voluntatis arbitrium.
Augustine. You defined justice to be the virtue containing all things and restoring to each his own, without fraud, without favor. Accordingly, we see that it restored without fraud the denarius to those who had labored the whole day in the work of the vineyard; for this had been agreed, this had been settled, and they could not deny that they had been hired for this wage (See Matt 20:1-13). But tell me, I beg you, how, without favor, it gave just as much to those who were in that work for one hour? Or had it perhaps lost its justice? Restrain yourself, then, rather. For the divine justice defrauds no one, but grace bestows many things on the undeserving. But why to this one thus, and to that one thus, look at what you go on to add. For you most truly say that it consists chiefly in the depth of divinity. In this depth is the fact that it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy (Rom 9:16). In this depth is the fact that that little one is adopted into honor through the laver of regeneration, and that one is left in dishonor, not to be admitted to the Kingdom; though neither of them has any deserving, in either direction, through the choice of the will.
JulianImp.1.38I. 39. Iulianus. Testimonium vero, ut ab auctore suo, ita etiam vel a probis, vel a improbis meretur, quod et illos iure provexerit, et istos iure damnaverit. Cum vero per se nec boni quidquam nec mali merentibus misericordiam liberalem esse permittit, nihil sentit iniuriae; quia et hoc ipsum, ut sit clemens operi suo Deus, cum in severitatem non cogitur, pars magna iustitiae est.
I. 39. Julian. Its testimony, indeed, just as it deserves from its author, so it deserves also either from the upright or from the wicked, in that it has both rightly advanced the former and rightly condemned the latter. But when, of itself, it permits liberal mercy to those who deserve neither anything good nor anything evil, it feels no injury; because this very thing, that God should be merciful to his own work when he is not driven to severity, is a great part of justice.
JulianImp.1.39Augustinus. Saltem misericordiae nomen attende, et unde dicta sit, respice. Quid igitur opus est misericordia, ubi nulla est miseria? Miseriam porro in parvulis si nullam esse dicitis, eis misericordiam praebendam negatis; si ullam esse dicitis, malum meritum ostenditis. Neque enim sub Deo iusto miser esse quisquam, nisi mereatur, potest. Ecce duo parvuli iacent: unus eorum baptizatus, alter non baptizatus exspirat; cui eorum dicis Deum fuisse clementem? Si uni, ostende alterius malum meritum, qui negas esse originale peccatum; si ambobus, ostende baptizati ullum bonum meritum, qui negas gratiam, ubi nulla est acceptio personarum; et dic, si potes, cur ambos adoptare noluerit, qui certe ambos ad imaginem suam condidit. An ita iustus est, ut non sit omnipotens, si voluit et non potuit? Ubi certe illorum nullus noluit, ne impedimentum potestatis divinae referatis ad meritum voluntatis humanae; hic certe nulli eorum dicere potest Deus: Volui, et noluisti. Aut si propterea non vult infans, quia plorat cum baptizatur, ambo ergo relinquantur, ambo enim nolunt; et tamen unus assumitur et alter relinquitur, quia magna est gratia Dei, et verax iustitia Dei. Sed quare ille potius quam ille: Inscrutabilia sunt iudicia Dei .
Augustine. At least heed the name of mercy, and look at whence it is named. What need, then, is there of mercy where there is no misery? But if you say there is no misery in little ones, you deny that mercy is to be shown them; if you say there is any, you show an evil deserving. For under a just God no one can be wretched unless he deserves it. Behold, two little ones lie here: one of them dies baptized, the other unbaptized; to which of them do you say God was merciful? If to the one, show the evil deserving of the other, you who deny that there is original sin; if to both, show any good deserving of the baptized one, you who deny grace, where there is no respect of persons; and say, if you can, why he was unwilling to adopt both, who certainly created both to his own image. Or is he so just that he is not almighty, if he willed and could not? Where certainly neither of them was unwilling, lest you refer the hindering of the divine power to the deserving of the human will; here certainly God can say to neither of them: I willed, and you were unwilling. Or if the infant is unwilling for the reason that he weeps when he is baptized, then let both be left, for both are unwilling; and yet one is taken up and the other left, because great is the grace of God, and true is the justice of God. But why this one rather than that one: The judgments of God are unsearchable (See Rom 11:33).
JulianImp.1.39I. 40. Iulianus. Quos enim fecit quia voluit, nec condemnat nisi spretus; si cum non spernitur, faciat consecratione meliores; nec detrimentum iustitiae patitur, et munificentia miserationis ornatur.
I. 40. Julian. For those whom he made because he willed, he does not condemn unless he is spurned; if, when he is not spurned, he should make them better by consecration; he both suffers no detriment to justice and is adorned by the munificence of mercy.
JulianImp.1.40Augustinus. Qui non condemnat nisi spretus, dic, utrum spernat suam imaginem nisi spretus. Quod si non audes, dic unde spernat eos quos parvulos non adoptat, a quibus eum spretum non invenies, nisi eos invenias in Adam. Ubi simul invenies, ut spernantur, deberi omnibus per iustitiam, nec tamen sperni omnes propter ineffabilem et inscrutabilem gratiam.
Augustine. You who condemn no one unless spurned, say whether he spurns his own image unless he is spurned. But if you dare not, say whence he spurns those little ones whom he does not adopt, by whom you will not find him spurned, unless you find them in Adam. There you will at once find both that, in order that they be spurned, it is owed to all through justice, and yet that not all are spurned because of ineffable and unsearchable grace.
JulianImp.1.40I. 41. Iulianus. His igitur iustitiae, quas praemisimus, divisionibus explicatis, discutiamus quae sit definitio peccati. Equidem affatim mihi tam philosophantium quam eorum qui catholici fuerunt, quod quaerimus, scripta suppeditant; sed vereor ne refrageris et, si philosophorum ego senatum advocavero, tu continuo sellularios opifices omneque in nos vulgus accendas.
I. 41. Julian. With these divisions of justice, then, which we have set forth, expounded, let us examine what the definition of sin is. Indeed, the writings both of those who philosophize and of those who were catholics supply me abundantly with what we are seeking; but I fear that you may refuse, and that, if I summon the senate of the philosophers, you will at once inflame against us the workshop laborers and all the common crowd.
JulianImp.1.41Augustinus. Contumeliosus es in infirma mundi, quae Deus elegit ut confunderet fortia . Denique ipsi confundunt eos qui confidunt in virtute sua . Ubi quid dicam: Vos estis? Prorsus me tacente apparetis, cum vos non tacetis.
Augustine. You are insulting toward the weak things of the world, which God chose in order to confound the strong (See 1 Cor 1:27). Indeed, they themselves confound those who trust in their own strength (See Ps 49:6 (48:7)). Here what shall I say: It is you? Plainly, while I am silent, you appear, since you are not silent.
JulianImp.1.41I. 42. Iulianus. Vociferans cum feminis, cunctisque canibus et tribunis, quibus octoginta aut amplius equos tota Africa saginatos collega tuus nuper adduxit Alypius.
I. 42. Julian. Crying out with the women, and with all the dogs and tribunes, for whom your colleague Alypius recently brought eighty or more horses fattened from all Africa.
JulianImp.1.42Augustinus. Aut calumniaris, aut nescis quid loquaris; et ideo, aut mendax, aut temerarius, ista loqueris. Quid te autem nequius, si haec ipse finxisti? Quid stolidius, si fingentibus credidisti? Iam vero quod etiam scribere ausus es, neque veritus ne ad ea loca libri pervenirent tui, quae terra marique transeuntem seu venientem collegam meum Alypium susceperunt, ubi legi apertissime tua falsiloquia sine tua irrisione vel potius detestatione non possunt; cui, non dico impudentiae, sed dementiae comparatur?
Augustine. Either you calumniate, or you do not know what you are saying; and therefore you say these things either as a liar or as a reckless man. But what is more worthless than you, if you yourself fabricated these things? What more stupid, if you believed those who fabricated them? And now, that you even dared to write it, not fearing that your books might reach those places which received my colleague Alypius as he passed or came by land and sea, where your falsehoods cannot be read most plainly without derision of you, or rather detestation; to what—I will not say shamelessness, but madness—is this to be compared?
JulianImp.1.42I. 43. Iulianus. Nequaquam te acquiescere eruditorum sententiis, ut addas, secundum quod intellectui tuo congruit dixisse Apostolum, quia stultam fecit Deus sapientiam mundi ; disputatores vero nostros sine metu a te posse despici, quod nulla auctoritate talium premaris.
I. 43. Julian. That you in no way acquiesce in the opinions of the learned, so that you add that, according to what agrees with your understanding, the Apostle said that God made foolish the wisdom of the world (See 1 Cor 1:20); but that our disputants can be despised by you without fear, because you are pressed by no authority of such men.
JulianImp.1.43Augustinus. Tu eos despicis, qui eis docentibus originale peccatum ita resistis, ut tamquam Manichaeos insuper crimineris, me nominans, illos significans.
Augustine. It is you who despise those who, when they teach original sin, you so resist that you moreover charge them as Manichees, naming me, meaning them.
JulianImp.1.43I. 44. Iulianus. Quid ergo? Acquiescam prorsus tibi, faciamque in hoc loco iacturam omnium, quorum adminiculo uti possem, contentusque ero definitione, quae ad indicium bonae naturae post Manichaeorum secretum de ore tuae honestatis effugit. In eo igitur libro cui titulus est, vel De duabus animabus, vel Contra duas animas, ita loqueris: Exspecta, sine prius peccatum definiamus. Peccatum est voluntas admittendi vel retinendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. Quamquam si liberum non est, nec voluntas dici potest; sed malui grossius, quam scrupulosius definire .
I. 44. Julian. What, then? Shall I acquiesce in you entirely, and in this place make a loss of all those whose support I could use, and be content with the definition that escaped from the mouth of your honesty, as a sign of a good nature, after the secret of the Manichees? In that book, then, whose title is either The Two Souls or Against the Two Souls, you speak thus: Wait, allow us first to define sin. Sin is the will to commit or to retain what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. Although, if one is not free, it cannot even be called a will; but I preferred to define it more coarsely than too scrupulously (The Two Souls 11.15).
JulianImp.1.44Augustinus. Hic peccatum definitum est quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod etiam poena peccati. De hoc quippe agendum fuit, quando mali origo quaerebatur, quale commissum est a primo homine ante omne hominis malum. Sed tu aut non potes intellegere, aut non vis.
Augustine. Here sin was defined that is sin only, not that which is also the punishment of sin. For this had to be dealt with, when the origin of evil was being sought, such as was committed by the first man before any evil of man. But you either cannot understand, or will not.
JulianImp.1.44I. 45. Iulianus. O lucens aurum in stercore! Quid verius, quid plenius dici a quoquam vel orthodoxo potuisset? Peccatum est, inquis, voluntas admittendi vel retinendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere . Ostendit hoc Ecclesiasticus: Deus, inquit, fecit hominem, et dimisit eum in manibus consilii sui; posuit ante eum vitam et mortem, aquam et ignem; quod placuerit ei, dabitur illi . Et per Isaiam Deus: Si volueritis, inquit, et audieritis me, quae bona sunt terrae edetis. Si nolueritis, nec audieritis, gladius vos comedet . Et Apo olus: Resipiscite iuste, et nolite peccare ; atque iterum: Nolite errare; Deus non irridetur; quae enim seminaverit homo, illa et metet .
I. 45. Julian. O gold shining in dung! What truer, what fuller could have been said by anyone even orthodox? Sin is, you say, the will to commit or to retain what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. Ecclesiasticus shows this: God, he says, made man, and left him in the hand of his own counsel; he set before him life and death, water and fire; whatever shall please him will be given to him (Sir 15:14-17). And through Isaiah God says: If you are willing, he says, and listen to me, you shall eat the good things of the land. If you are unwilling, and do not listen, the sword shall devour you (Isa 1:19-20). And the Apostle: Come to your senses justly, and do not sin (1 Cor 15:34); and again: Do not err; God is not mocked; for whatever a man shall sow, that also shall he reap (Gal 6:7).
JulianImp.1.45Augustinus. Haec testimonia propter illam voluntatem dicta sunt, in qua quisque id quod vult agit; ut si non habetur, ab eo poscatur qui in nobis operatur et velle ; si autem habetur, fiant opera iustitiae, et ei, qui illam operatus est, agantur gratiae.
Augustine. These testimonies were spoken on account of that will by which each person does what he wills; so that, if it is not had, it may be asked from him who works in us even to will (See Phil 2:13); but if it is had, let the works of justice be done, and to him who worked it let thanks be given.
JulianImp.1.45I. 46. Iulianus. Voluntas itaque motus est animi, in iure suo habentis utrum sinisterior ad prava decurrat, an dexterior ad celsa contendat.
I. 46. Julian. The will, then, is a motion of the mind, having in its own power whether it should run, more to the left, toward depraved things, or strive, more to the right, toward lofty things.
JulianImp.1.46Augustinus. Quid est ergo: Ne declines in dexteram, neque in sinistram ?
Augustine. What, then, is the meaning of: Do not turn aside to the right, nor to the left (See Prov 4:27)?
JulianImp.1.46I. 47. Iulianus. Motus autem animi eius, qui iam per aetatem iudicio rationis uti potest; cui cum poena monstratur et gloria, aut contra commodum vel voluptas, adiutorium et velut occasio offertur, non necessitas imponitur partis alterutrae. Haec igitur voluntas, quae alternatur, originem possibilitatis in libero accepit arbitrio; ipsius vero operis existentiam a se suscipit, nec est prorsus voluntas antequam velit, nec potest velle antequam potuerit et nolle; nec utrumque habet in parte peccati, id est, velle et nolle, antequam usum rationis adipiscitur. Quibus collectis, apparet te verissime definisse: Peccatum est voluntas retinendi vel admittendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere . Hoc ergo peccatum, quod claruit nihil esse praeter voluntatem, constat genus, id est ipsam originem, ab appetitu proprio suscepisse. Huius species iam in unoquoque, qui dicuntur atomi, reperitur. Differentia vero et in varietate culparum, et in rationibus temporum. Modus est ipsa immoderatio; nam si modus est servire cui debeas, qui hoc praetermittit, veri modi transgressione delinquit. Hic tamen dici subtiliter potest, modum esse peccati, quia nemo plus quam potest delinquit; nam si supra vires, inefficaci voluntate peccatur; hoc ipsum fieri vel sola potuit voluntate. Qualitas autem ascribatur vitio, per quam ostenditur quid amaritudinis, vel dedecore convehat vel dolore. Est ergo peccatum, quia si non esset, nec tu sequereris errores; nihil est autem aliud, praeter voluntatem excedentem ab eo calle, cui debet insistere, et unde liberum est non deflectere. Fit autem de appetitu inconcessorum; et nusquam est nisi in eo homine, qui et habuit voluntatem malam, et potuit non habere.
I. 47. Julian. But the motion of the mind of one who, by reason of age, can now use the judgment of reason; to whom, when punishment and glory are shown, or, on the contrary, advantage or pleasure, a help and, as it were, an occasion is offered, not a necessity imposed, of one side or the other. This will, then, which alternates, received the origin of its possibility in free choice; but the existence of the act itself it takes upon itself from itself, nor is it at all a will before it wills, nor can it will before it has also been able not to will; nor does it have both in the realm of sin, that is, to will and not to will, before it attains the use of reason. From which things gathered together, it appears that you defined most truly: Sin is the will to retain or to commit what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. This sin, then, which has become clear to be nothing but the will, is established to have received its genus, that is, its very origin, from one's own appetite. Its species is found in each of those who are called individuals. Its difference, indeed, is both in the variety of faults and in the conditions of the times. Its mode is the very immoderation; for if the mode is to serve him whom you ought, whoever neglects this offends by transgression of the true mode. Here, however, it can be subtly said that there is a mode of sin, because no one offends more than he can; for if one sins beyond his strength, it is sinned with an ineffectual will; this very thing could come about even by the will alone. But quality is ascribed to the fault, by which it is shown what bitterness it carries with it, whether by disgrace or by pain. There is, then, sin, because if there were not, you would not pursue errors; but it is nothing other than the will departing from that path on which it ought to keep, and from which it is free not to swerve. And it comes about from the appetite for forbidden things; and it is nowhere except in that human being who both had an evil will and could have not had it.
JulianImp.1.47Augustinus. Ipse est Adam, quem nostra illa definitio, quae tibi placuit, intuebatur, cum dicerem: Peccatum est voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere . Adam quippe omnino, quando peccavit, nihil in se habebat mali, quo nolens urgeretur ad operandum malum, et propter quod diceret: Non quod volo facio bonum, sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago . Ac per hoc id egit peccando, quod iustitia vetabat, et unde liberum illi fuerat abstinere. Nam ei qui dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago, abstinere inde, liberum non est. Ac per hoc, si tria ista discernas, et scias aliud esse peccatum, aliud poenam peccati, aliud utrumque, id est ita peccatum, ut ipsum sit etiam poena peccati, intellegis quid horum trium pertineat ad illam definitionem, ubi voluntas est agendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. Peccatum namque isto modo definitum est, non peccati poena, non utrumque. Habent autem tria ista genera etiam species suas, de quibus nunc longum est disputare. Horum sane trium generum si requirantur exempla, primi generis in Adam sine ullo nodo quaestionis occurrit. Multa quippe sunt quae agunt homines mala, a quibus eis liberum est abstinere; sed nulli tam liberum est, quam illi fuit, qui Deo suo, a quo erat conditus rectus, nullo prorsus vitio depravatus adstabat. Secundi autem generis, ubi tantummodo est poena peccati, exemplum in eo malo est, quod quisque ex nulla parte agit, sed tantummodo patitur; velut cum pro suo scelere, qui peccavit, occiditur, sive alia corporis poena quacumque cruciatur. Tertium vero genus, ubi peccatum ipsum est et poena peccati, potest intellegi in eo qui dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago. Ad hoc pertinent etiam omnia quae per ignorantiam, cum aguntur mala, non putantur mala, vel etiam putantur bona. Caecitas enim cordis, si peccatum non esset, iniuste argueretur; arguitur autem iuste, ubi dicitur: Pharisaee caece! ; et aliis plurimis divinorum eloquiorum locis. Eademque rursus caecitas, si peccati poena non esset, non diceretur: Excaecavit enim illos malitia illorum ; quod si de Dei iudicio non veniret, non legeremus: Obscurentur oculi eorum ne videant, et dorsum eorum semper incurva . Quis porro volens caecus est corde, cum velit nemo caecus esse vel corpore? Proinde originale peccatum nec ad illud pertinet quod primo loco posuimus, ubi est voluntas malum operandi, unde liberum est abstinere; alioquin non esset in parvulis, qui nondum voluntatis utuntur arbitrio; nec ad illud quod secundo commemoravimus. De peccato enim nunc agimus, non de poena, quae non est peccatum, quamvis peccati merito subsequatur; quam quidem patiuntur et parvuli, quia inest eis corpus mortuum propter peccatum . Non tamen mors corporis ipsa peccatum est, vel corporales quicumque cruciatus; sed pertinet originale peccatum ad hoc genus tertium, ubi sic peccatum est, ut ipsum sit et poena peccati; quod inest quidem nascentibus, sed in eis crescentibus incipit apparere, quando est insipientibus necessaria sapientia, et mala concupi entibus continentia; origo tamen etiam huius peccati descendit a voluntate peccantis. Fuit enim Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam, et in illo omnes perierunt .
Augustine. It is Adam himself whom that definition of ours, which pleased you, had in view, when I said: Sin is the will to retain or to obtain what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. For Adam, when he sinned, had absolutely nothing of evil in himself by which, unwilling, he was driven to work evil, and on account of which he might say: I do not do the good that I will, but the evil that I will not, this I do (See Rom 7:19). And through this, in sinning he did what justice forbade, and from which he had been free to abstain. For to him who says: The evil that I will not, this I do, it is not free to abstain from it. And through this, if you distinguish these three things, and know that sin is one thing, the punishment of sin another, and both another—that is, sin in such a way that it is itself also the punishment of sin—you understand which of these three pertains to that definition, where there is the will to do what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. For sin was defined in this way, not the punishment of sin, not both. But these three genera also have their species, about which it is now too long to dispute. If, however, examples of these three genera are sought, the example of the first genus occurs in Adam without any knot of difficulty. For there are many evils that human beings do, from which they are free to abstain; but to none is it so free as it was to him, who stood before his God, by whom he was created upright, depraved by absolutely no fault. But the example of the second genus, where there is only the punishment of sin, is in that evil which one in no part does, but only suffers; as when he who has sinned is, for his crime, killed, or is tortured by any other bodily punishment whatsoever. But the third genus, where it is both sin and the punishment of sin, can be understood in him who says: The evil that I will not, this I do. To this pertain also all the evils that, when they are done through ignorance, are not thought evils, or are even thought goods. For the blindness of the heart, if it were not sin, would be unjustly censured; but it is justly censured, where it is said: Blind Pharisee! (Matt 23:26); and in very many other places of the divine words. And again this same blindness, if it were not the punishment of sin, it would not be said: For their malice blinded them (Wis 2:21); and if it did not come from the judgment of God, we would not read: Let their eyes be darkened that they may not see, and bend down their back always (Ps 69:23 (68:24); Rom 11:10). Now who is blind in heart willingly, since no one wishes to be blind even in body? Accordingly, original sin pertains neither to that which we put in the first place, where there is the will to do evil, from which one is free to abstain; otherwise it would not be in little ones, who do not yet use the choice of the will; nor to that which we mentioned in the second place. For we are now dealing with sin, not with punishment, which is not sin, although it follows by the deserving of sin; which indeed little ones too suffer, because there is in them a body dead because of sin (See Rom 8:10). Yet the death of the body itself is not sin, nor any bodily torments whatsoever; but original sin pertains to this third genus, where it is so sin that it is itself also the punishment of sin; which is indeed in those being born, but begins to appear in them as they grow, when wisdom is necessary to the foolish, and continence to those who desire evil; yet the origin even of this sin descends from the will of the one sinning. For there was Adam, and in him we all were; Adam perished, and in him all perished.
JulianImp.1.47I. 48. Iulianus. Meretur autem et ab honestis exsecrationem, et ab illa iustitia, cuius hic tota causa vertitur, legitimam condemnationem. Omnibus itaque aulaeis reductis profer aliquando luce palam, per quid doceas naturale esse peccatum. Certe nihil superius falso vel de divinae laude iustitiae, vel de culpae definitione collectum est. Ostende ergo, haec duo in parvulis posse constare: si nullum est sine voluntate peccatum, si nulla voluntas, ubi non est explicata libertas, si non est libertas, ubi non est facultas per rationem electionis; quo monstro peccatum in infantibus invenitur, qui rationis usum non habent? Igitur nec eligendi facultatem, ac per hoc nec voluntatem; atque his irrefutabiliter concessis, nec aliquod omnino peccatum. His igitur molibus pressus, videamus quo eruperis. Nullo, inquis, peccato parvuli premuntur suo, sed premuntur alieno . Necdum claruit quid mali sentias. Suspicamur enim te ad invidiam cuiuspiam hominis, cuius iniquitatem ut Poenus orator exprimeres, haec in medium protulisse. Apud quem igitur impollutam innocentiam scelus gravavit externum? Quis ille fuit, qui hos adiudicaret reos, tam excors, tam trux, tam oblitus Dei et aequitatis, barbarus perduellis? Laudamus prorsus ingenium tuum; apparet eruditio, non potuisti aliter, dignam generis humani odio, iudicis nescio cuius, immo tyranni allegare personam, quam iurando non solum eum non pepercisse his qui nihil peccavissent, verum etiam his qui nec peccare potuissent. Solet quippe apud suspiciosum animum bona conscientia laborare pro defensione sui, ne forte deliquerit, quia delinquere vel potuit; absolute autem vindicatur a crimine, qui ipsa rei impossibilitate defenditur. Pande igitur quis est iste innocentium addictor. Respondens: Deus; percussisti quidem animum, sed quoniam vix tantum sacrilegium fidem meretur, quid dixeris ambigamus. Scimus enim homonyme usurpari nomen hoc posse: Sunt quippe dii multi et domini multi; nobis tamen unus est Deus Pater ex quo omnia, et unus est Dominus Iesus Christus per quem omnia . Quem igitur Deum in crimen vocas? Hic tu, sacerdos religiosissime, rhetorque doctissime, exhalas tristius et horridius aliquid, quam vel Amsancti vallis, vel puteus Averni, immo scelestius quam ipsa in his locis idolorum cultura commiserat . Deus, ais, ipse qui commendat suam caritatem in nobis , qui dilexit nos, et Filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis illum tradidit , ipse sic iudicat, ipse est nascentium persecutor, ipse pro mala voluntate aeternis ignibus parvulos tradit, quos nec bonam, nec malam voluntatem scit habere potuisse. Post hanc ergo sententiam, tam immanem, tam sacrilegam, tam funestam, si sanis iudicibus uteremur, nihil praeter exsecrationem tui referre deberem. Iusta enim, et probabili gravitate, indignum te disputatione censerem, qui eo usque a religione, ab eruditione, a communibus postremo sensibus aufugisses ut, quod vix ulla barbaries, Dominum tuum criminosum putares.
I. 48. Julian. But it deserves both execration from the upright and lawful condemnation from that justice, in which the whole case here is at issue. With all the curtains drawn back, then, bring forth at last openly into the light by what you teach that sin is natural. Surely nothing has been gathered above falsely, either concerning the praise of the divine justice or concerning the definition of fault. Show, then, that these two things can stand in little ones: if there is no sin without the will, if there is no will where liberty has not been unfolded, if there is no liberty where there is no faculty of choice through reason; by what monster is sin found in infants, who do not have the use of reason? Therefore neither the faculty of choosing, and through this neither the will; and these things being irrefutably conceded, neither any sin at all. Pressed, then, by these masses, let us see whither you have burst out. By no sin, you say, are little ones pressed of their own, but they are pressed by another's. It has not yet become clear what evil you hold. For we suspect that you brought these things into the open for the purpose of incurring odium against some human being, whose iniquity, as a Punic orator, you might express. With whom, then, did an external crime burden unpolluted innocence? Who was that one, who would adjudge these guilty—so senseless, so savage, so forgetful of God and of equity, a barbarous foe? We praise your talent entirely; the erudition is apparent; you could not otherwise allege a person worthy of the hatred of the human race, of some judge or other, or rather a tyrant, than by swearing that he not only did not spare those who had sinned in nothing, but even those who could not even have sinned. For with a suspicious mind a good conscience is wont to labor for its own defense, lest perhaps it has offended, because it even could offend; but he is absolutely acquitted of crime who is defended by the very impossibility of the matter. Reveal, then, who is this condemner of the innocent. Answering: God; you have indeed struck the mind, but since so great a sacrilege scarcely deserves belief, let us be in doubt about what you have said. For we know that this name can be used homonymously: For there are many gods and many lords; yet to us there is one God the Father, from whom are all things, and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things (1 Cor 8:5-6). Which God, then, do you call into accusation? Here you, most religious priest and most learned rhetorician, exhale something more dismal and more dreadful than either the valley of Amsanctus or the pit of Avernus, rather more wicked than the very worship of idols had committed in these places. God, you say, the very one who commends his love in us, who loved us, and did not spare his own Son, but handed him over for us (Rom 5:8; 8:32), he himself thus judges, he himself is the persecutor of those being born, he himself, for an evil will, hands over to eternal fires little ones whom he knows could have had neither a good nor an evil will. After this opinion, then, so monstrous, so sacrilegious, so deadly, if we had sound judges, I ought to report nothing but execration of you. For with just and probable gravity I would judge you unworthy of disputation, who had fled so far from religion, from erudition, from common sense, finally, that, what scarcely any barbarity would, you should think your Lord a criminal.
JulianImp.1.48Augustinus. Non est magnum, quod vides non habere parvulos propriam voluntatem ad eligendum bonum, vel malum. Illud vellem videres, quod vidit qui scribens ad Hebraeos dixit, filium Israel Levi in lumbis Abraham patris sui fuisse, quando est ille decimatus, et ideo etiam istum in illo fuisse decimatum . Ad hoc si haberes oculum christianum, fide cerneres, si intellegentia non valeres, in lumbis Adam fuisse omnes, qui ex illo fuerant per concupiscentiam carnis orituri; quam, post peccatum, quo illi sua nuditas nuntiata est, sensit, aspexit, erubuit, operuit. Unde Ambrosius doctor meus, tui quoque doctoris excellenter ore laudatus: Quod igitur gravius est, inquit, hac se Adam interpretatione succinxit, eo loci, ubi fructu magis castitatis se succingere debuisset. In lumbis enim quibus praecingimur, quaedam semina generationis esse dicuntur. Et ideo male ibi succinctus Adam foliis inutilibus, ubi futurae generationis non fructum futurum, sed quaedam peccata signaret . Merito etiam dicit, quod paulo ante memoravi: Fuit Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam, et in illo omnes perierunt . Hoc tu non videns, mihi caecus oblatras; sed in me, quidquid dicis, profecto et in ipsum dicis. Utinam ergo ita mihi cum illo commune sit praemium, sicut abs te audio cum illo commune convicium. Quid est quod clamas, et dicis: Si sanis iudicibus uteremur, nihil praeter exsecrationem tui referre deberem? Possumne tecum largius, beneficentius, liberalius agere, quam ut ipsum inter nos constituam iudicem, de quo tui doctoris Pelagii iudicium iam tenemus? En adest ille, qui inter latinae linguae scriptores, flos quidam speciosus enituit, cuius fidem, et purissimum in Scripturis sensum ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere . Hoc Pelagius de Ambrosio iudicavit. Quid ergo de hoc quod inter nos agitur, iudicavit Ambrosius? Dixi superius eius de peccato originali sine ulla obscuritate vel ambiguitate sententias; sed si parum est, adhuc audi: Om s, inquit, sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est . Quid ad ista respondes? Illa de Ambrosio dixit praeclara Pelagius; ista pro me contra te manifesta pronuntiavit Ambrosius; istum reprehende de quo dicit magister tuus, quod eum ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere; et qui sanos iudices quaeris, istum nega sanum, ut te plane profitearis insanum. Sed indignaris homo piissimus, quod parvuli non renati, si moriantur ante propriae voluntatis arbitrium, propter aliena dicantur peccata damnari ab eo, qui commendat caritatem suam in nobis , qui dilexit nos, et Filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis illum tradidit ; quasi non de illo gravius conquerantur stulti et indocti similes tui, qui dicunt: Utquid creat, quos impios futuros et damnandos esse praescivit? Utquid eos postremo, donec ad impietatem damnabilem perveniant, facit vivere, quos antequam tales fierent, ex hac vita posset auferre; si animas amat, si commendat caritatem suam in nobis, si Filio suo non pepercit; sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit eum? Quibus si dicatur: O homo, tu qui es qui respondeas Deo? Inscrutabilia sunt iudicia eius ; irascuntur potius, quam mitescunt. Sed novit Dominus qui sunt eius . Si ergo sanis iudicibus uti cupis, audi iudicem sanum singulariter a tuo doctore laudatum. Fuit, inquit, Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam, et in illo omnes perierunt . Sed peccatis, inquis, alienis non utique perire debuerunt. Aliena sunt, sed paterna sunt; ac per hoc iure seminationis atque germinationis et nostra sunt. Quis ab hac perditione liberat, nisi qui venit quaerere quod perierat ? In eis ergo quos liberat, amplectamur misericordiam; in eis autem quos non liberat, agnoscamus iudicium occultissimum quidem, sed sine ulla dubitatione iustissimum.
Augustine. It is no great thing that you see that little ones do not have their own will for choosing good or evil. I would wish you saw what he saw who, writing to the Hebrews, said that the son of Israel, Levi, was in the loins of his father Abraham when the latter was tithed, and that therefore he too was tithed in him (See Heb 7:9-10). To this, if you had a Christian eye, you would discern by faith—if you were not strong in understanding—that in the loins of Adam were all who were going to arise from him through the concupiscence of the flesh; which, after the sin by which his nakedness was announced to him, he felt, beheld, blushed at, covered. Whence Ambrose, my teacher, praised excellently also by the mouth of your teacher, says: What is more serious, then, Adam girded himself with this interpretation, in that place where he ought rather to have girded himself with the fruit of chastity. For in the loins, with which we are girded, certain seeds of generation are said to be. And therefore Adam was ill girded there with useless leaves, where he signified not the future fruit of the generation to come, but certain sins. Deservedly too he says what I mentioned a little before: There was Adam, and in him we all were; Adam perished, and in him all perished. Not seeing this, you, blind, bark at me; but in me, whatever you say, you assuredly say also against him. Would, then, that my reward might be in common with him, just as I hear from you the reviling I have in common with him. What is it that you cry out, and say: If we had sound judges, I ought to report nothing but execration of you? Can I deal with you more generously, more beneficently, more liberally, than to set up between us as judge the very one about whom we already hold the judgment of your teacher Pelagius? Behold, here is present he who, among the writers of the Latin tongue, shone forth as a certain beautiful flower, whose faith and most pure understanding in the Scriptures not even an enemy has dared to find fault with. This Pelagius judged about Ambrose. What, then, did Ambrose judge about this which is at issue between us? I quoted above his statements about original sin, without any obscurity or ambiguity; but if that is too little, hear further: We are all born under sin, and our very origin is in fault. What do you answer to these things? Pelagius said those splendid things about Ambrose; these manifest things Ambrose declared for me against you; find fault with him about whom your master says that not even an enemy has dared to find fault with him; and you who seek sound judges, deny that this man is sound, so that you plainly profess yourself insane. But you, a most pious man, are indignant that little ones not reborn, if they die before the choice of their own will, are said, on account of another's sins, to be condemned by him who commends his love in us, who loved us, and did not spare his own Son, but handed him over for us; as though the foolish and unlearned like you did not complain more seriously about him, who say: Why does he create those whom he foreknew would be impious and to be condemned? Why, finally, does he make those live, until they arrive at damnable impiety, whom, before they became such, he could take from this life; if he loves souls, if he commends his love in us, if he did not spare his own Son, but handed him over for us all? To whom, if it be said: O man, who are you to answer back to God? (Rom 9:20) His judgments are unsearchable (See Rom 11:33); they grow angry rather than gentle. But the Lord knows who are his (2 Tim 2:19). If, then, you wish to use sound judges, hear a sound judge praised singularly by your teacher. There was Adam, he says, and in him we all were; Adam perished, and in him all perished. But, you say, they certainly ought not to have perished by another's sins. They are another's, but they are a father's; and through this, by the right of sowing and germinating, they are ours too. Who frees from this perdition, except him who came to seek what had perished (See Luke 19:10)? In those, then, whom he frees, let us embrace mercy; but in those whom he does not free, let us acknowledge a judgment most hidden indeed, but without any doubt most just.
JulianImp.1.48I. 49. Iulianus. Pugnasse quidem cum principe tenebrarum deum lucis, Manichaeus finxit, et credidit, addiditque eius captivam teneri in hoc orbe substantiam; sed tantam infelicitatem colore pietatis nititur excusare, affirmans eum quasi bonum pro patria dimicasse civem, atque ideo obiecisse membra, ne perderet regna. Tu qui haec didiceras, quantum ea vel ad tempus deserendo profeceris intuere; dicis, Deum necessitatem non pertulisse belli, sed iniquitatem admisisse iudicii; nec tenebrosis hostibus, sed perspicuis subiacere criminibus; non impertisse postremo substantiam suam, sed aeternam violasse iustitiam. Quo quis vestrum peior sit, aliis aestimandum relinquo. Illud tamen liquet, ad unum vos opinionis nefas redire. Nam et Manichaeus subscribit iniquitatem Deo suo, cum eum allegat damnaturum, in ultimo die membra quae tradidit; et tu per hoc illum asseris infelicem, per quod corrumpit gloriam qua cluebat, et persequendo innocentiam quam creavit, perdidit iustitiam qua sacerrimus fuit. Tantum igitur huic, quem tu inducis Deo ille, quem magister tuus commentus fuerat, antecellit, quantum excusabilius est praelio superatum esse quam vitio.
I. 49. Julian. That the god of light fought with the prince of darkness, the Manichee imagined and believed, and added that his substance is held captive in this world; but he strives to excuse so great an unhappiness with the color of piety, affirming that he fought, as it were, like a good citizen for his fatherland, and therefore exposed his members, lest he lose his kingdoms. You, who had learned these things, see how much you have profited by deserting them even for a time; you say that God did not endure the necessity of war, but admitted the iniquity of judgment; and that he is subject not to dark enemies, but to conspicuous crimes; that finally he did not impart his own substance, but violated eternal justice. Which of you is the worse, I leave to be judged by others. Yet this is clear, that you come back to one and the same wickedness of opinion. For the Manichee too subscribes injustice to his god, when he alleges that he will condemn, on the last day, the members he handed over; and you assert him to be unhappy through this, that he corrupts the glory by which he was renowned, and, by persecuting the innocence he created, lost the justice by which he was most holy. By so much, then, does the god whom your master had imagined excel this God whom you bring forward, as it is more excusable to have been overcome in battle than by fault.
JulianImp.1.49Augustinus. Si tibi placet innocentia parvulorum, remove ab eis, si potes, grave iugum quod est super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum . Sed puto quod Scriptura, quae hoc dixit, melius te noverat quid esset innocentia creaturae, et quid iustitia Creatoris. Quis autem non videat, si habent parvuli, qualem praedicas, innocentiam, in gravi iugo eorum Dei non esse iustitiam? Porro, quia in iugo gravi eorum divina iustitia est; non est in eis talis, qualem praedicas, innocentia. Nisi forte tibi in hac quaestione laboranti, Deus iustus quidem, sed infirmus quodam modo subvenire poterit, quia suis imaginibus, ne innocentes gravis iugi miseria premerentur, subvenire non potuit; ut eum dicas voluisse quidem, quia iustus est, sed non potuisse quia omnipotens non est; atque ita de his angustiis exeas, ut fidei caput perdas, qua fide primitus in Symbolo confitemur credere nos in Deum Patrem omnipotentem. Deus igitur tuus, in tot et tantis malis quae parvuli patiuntur, aut iustitiam, aut omnipotentiam, aut ipsam curam rerum humanarum est perditurus; quodlibet autem istorum dixeris, vide quid eris.
Augustine. If the innocence of little ones pleases you, remove from them, if you can, the heavy yoke that is upon the sons of Adam from the day of their going out from their mother's womb (Sir 40:1). But I think that the Scripture which said this knew better than you what the innocence of the creature was, and what the justice of the Creator. Who, moreover, does not see that, if little ones have such innocence as you preach, there is no justice of God in their heavy yoke? Furthermore, since the divine justice is in their heavy yoke, there is not in them such innocence as you preach. Unless perhaps, for you laboring in this question, a God who is just indeed, but in some way weak, will be able to come to your aid, because he could not aid his own images, lest the innocent be pressed by the misery of a heavy yoke; so that you say he willed indeed, because he is just, but could not, because he is not almighty; and thus you escape from these straits in such a way as to lose the head of the faith, by which faith we first confess in the Creed that we believe in God the Father almighty. Your God, then, in so many and so great evils which little ones suffer, will lose either his justice, or his omnipotence, or his very care for human affairs; but whichever of these you say, see what you will be.
JulianImp.1.49I. 50. Iulianus. Amolire te itaque cum tali Deo tuo de Ecclesiarum medio; non est ipse, cui Patriarchae, cui Prophetae, cui Apostoli crediderunt, in quo speravit et sperat Ecclesia primitivorum, quae conscripta est in caelis ; non est ipse quem credit iudicem rationabilis creatura; quem Spiritus Sanctus iuste iudicaturum esse denuntiat. Nemo prudentium, pro tali Domino suum umquam sanguinem fudisset; nec enim merebatur dilectionis affectum, ut suscipiendae pro se onus imponeret passionis. Postremo iste quem inducis, si esset uspiam, reus convinceretur esse, non deus; iudicandus a vero Deo meo, non iudicaturus pro Deo. Ut igitur prima fidei fundamenta cognoscas: noster Deus, Ecclesiae catholicae Deus, substantia nobis ignotus est, et ab aspectu similiter remotus; quem vidit nemo hominum, nec videre potest ; ut aeternus sine principio, ita sanctus iustusque sine vitio; omnipotentissimus, aequissimus, misericordissimus, innotescens solo splendore virtutum; factor omnium quae non erant, dispensator eorum quae sunt, examinator cunctorum qui et sunt et futuri sunt et fuerunt, in ultimo die; terram, caelum, et cuncta simul elementa moturus; excitator cinerum, et corporum restitutor; sed propter solam iustitiam, haec quae diximus, cuncta facturus.
I. 50. Julian. Take yourself away, then, with such a God of yours, from the midst of the Churches; he is not the one in whom the Patriarchs, in whom the Prophets, in whom the Apostles believed, in whom the Church of the firstborn, which is enrolled in the heavens (See Heb 12:23), has hoped and hopes; he is not the one whom the rational creature believes to be its judge; whom the Holy Spirit announces will judge justly. No one of the prudent would ever have poured out his own blood for such a Lord; for he would not have deserved the affection of love, that he should impose the burden of a Passion to be undergone for him. Finally, this one whom you bring forward, if he existed anywhere, would be convicted of being a defendant, not a god; to be judged by my true God, not to judge in God's place. That you may, then, recognize the first foundations of the faith: our God, the God of the catholic Church, is unknown to us in substance, and likewise removed from sight; whom no one of men has seen, nor can see (1 Tim 6:16); as he is eternal without beginning, so he is holy and just without fault; most almighty, most equitable, most merciful, made known by the splendor of his virtues alone; the maker of all things that were not, the dispenser of those that are, the examiner of all who both are and will be and have been, on the last day; about to move the earth, the heaven, and all the elements together; the rouser of ashes, and the restorer of bodies; but for the sake of justice alone he will do all these things which we have said.
JulianImp.1.50Augustinus. Si Deum Patriarcharum colis, quare non credis circumcisionem octavi diei, quae praecepta est Abrahae, prefigurationem fuisse regenerationis in Christo? Hoc enim, si crederes, videres non potuisse iuste animam parvuli exterminari de populo suo, si die non circumcideretur octavo , nisi alicui fuisset obligata peccato? Si Deum Prophetarum colis, cur non credis quod per eos totiens Deus dixerit: Reddam peccata patrum in filios ? Si Deum Apostolorum colis, cur non credis, corpus mortuum propter peccatum ? Si Deum colis in quo speravit et sperat Ecclesia primitivorum, quae conscripta est in caelis , cur non credis baptizandos parvulos erui de potestate tenebrarum , cum eos propter hoc exsufflet atque exorcizet Ecclesia, ut ab eis potestas tenebrarum mittatur foras? Ille vero quem sperat iudicem rationalis creatura, quae in sanctis eius est et fidelibus, lege nobis, praeter regnum bonis et supplicium malis, quem tertium locum praeparaverit et promiserit non regeneratis innocentibus tuis. Quomodo autem dicis, neminem prudentum pro Domino, quem colimus, sanguinem fundere; cum eum coluerit et pro eo sanguinem fuderit gloriosissimus Cyprianus, qui vos in ista quaestione suffocat, dicens parvulum ex Adam carnaliter natum, contagium mortis antiquae prima nativitate contrahere ? Videsne te potius reum, qui blasphemas istum sanctorum martyrum Deum? Dicis te colere omnipotentissimum, aequissimum, misericordissimum Deum; sed ipse est omnipotentissimus, qui iugum grave, quo premuntur filii Adam ex die nativitatis suae , procul dubio ab eis posset auferre, immo ne ullo tali iugo prorsus gravarentur efficere; sed ipse est aequissimus, qui nullo modo illud imponeret, imponive permitteret, nisi peccata in eis, cum quibus nati sunt, inveniret, quorum reatum renatis idem ipse misericordissimus solveret. Si ergo te delectaret divina iustitia, videres profecto quod ex ipsa veniat, non utique iniuste a parvulis incipiens, nota omnibus humana miseria, qua peragitur haec vita, a primis fletibus nascentium, usque ad extremos halitus morientium; sanctis tantum et fidelibus, sed in alia vita, felicitate promissa.
Augustine. If you worship the God of the Patriarchs, why do you not believe that the circumcision of the eighth day, which was commanded to Abraham, was a prefiguration of regeneration in Christ? For if you believed this, you would see that the soul of a little one could not justly be exterminated from his people, if he were not circumcised on the eighth day (See Gen 17:14), unless it had been bound by some sin? If you worship the God of the Prophets, why do you not believe that God so often said through them: I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the sons (See Exod 20:5)? If you worship the God of the Apostles, why do you not believe that the body is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10)? If you worship the God in whom the Church of the firstborn, which is enrolled in the heavens, has hoped and hopes, why do you not believe that little ones to be baptized are rescued from the power of darkness (See Col 1:13), since for this reason the Church breathes upon them and exorcizes them, that the power of darkness may be sent out from them? But as for him whom the rational creature, which is in his saints and faithful, hopes will be its judge, read to us what third place, besides the kingdom for the good and punishment for the wicked, he has prepared and promised for your unregenerate innocents. But how do you say that no one of the prudent pours out blood for the Lord whom we worship, when the most glorious Cyprian both worshiped him and poured out his blood for him—Cyprian, who chokes you in this question, saying that a little one born carnally from Adam contracts, at his first birth, the contagion of the ancient death? Do you not see that you are rather the defendant, who blaspheme this God of the holy martyrs? You say that you worship a most almighty, most equitable, most merciful God; but he is most almighty who could beyond doubt take away from the sons of Adam the heavy yoke by which they are pressed from the day of their birth, or rather bring it about that they be weighed down by no such yoke at all; but he is most equitable, who would in no way impose it, or permit it to be imposed, unless he found in them sins with which they were born, the guilt of which the same most merciful one would loose for the reborn. If, then, the divine justice delighted you, you would surely see that it comes from that justice—not unjustly, of course—the human misery known to all, with which this life is carried through, beginning from the first weeping of those being born, all the way to the last breath of those dying; with happiness promised only to the saints and faithful, but in another life.
JulianImp.1.50I. 51. Iulianus. Pro hoc igitur Deo meo, quem mihi qualem credo omnis creatura et sancta Scriptura denuntiat, rectius dixi facerem, si nec librorum te concertatione dignum putarem. Verum quoniam mihi potissimum hoc a sanctis viris, nostri temporis confessoribus, munus impositum est, ut dicta tua quid habeant ponderis rationisque discutiam, opportunum fuit ostendere prius, non a te credi ei Deo, qui in Catholicorum semper Ecclesia praedicatus est et usque ad finem ubi illa fuerit praedicabitur.
I. 51. Julian. For this my God, then, whom every creature and the holy Scripture announce to me to be such as I believe, I said I would do more rightly if I did not even think you worthy of contention by books. But since this office has been imposed on me above all by holy men, the confessors of our time, that I should examine what weight and reason your sayings have, it was opportune to show first that you do not believe in that God who has always been preached in the Church of the Catholics and will be preached until the end wherever she shall be.
JulianImp.1.51Augustinus. Ego potius non te ostendisse, quod te ostendisse dicis, ostendi; et ei me Deo credere, qui a Catholicorum semper Ecclesia praedicatus est, si nimium caecus non sis, edocui.
Augustine. I have rather shown that you have not shown what you say you have shown; and I have taught, if you are not too blind, that I believe in that God who has always been preached by the Church of the Catholics.
JulianImp.1.51I. 52. Iulianus. Nunc vero consequenter inspiciam, quibus hoc, quod expugnat fides piorum, testimoniis affirmare coneris. Sed quoniam institui libro tuo secundo, quem Alypius detulit, obviare, ne confunderetur rescripti series, paucis adhuc, usque dum ad testimonium Apostoli, quo plurimum tibi videris muniri, sermo perveniat, respondendum est. Illis ergo, quae supra posui, verbis tuis haec, quae sequuntur, adiungis: In his itaque quae praetermisit, hoc timuit, quia cuncta Ecclesiae catholicae pectora convenit, fidemque ipsam antiquitus traditam atque fundatam, clara quodam modo voce compellat, et adversus eos vehementissime permovet quod diximus, quia "nihil peccati esse in parvulis dicunt, quod lavacro regenerationis abluatur" . Omnes enim ad Ecclesiam non propter aliud cum parvulis currunt, nisi ut in eis originale peccatum generatione primae nativitatis attractum regeneratione secundae nativitatis expietur. Deinde ad nostra superiora verba revertitur, quae nescio cur repetat: "Eos autem qui de tali commixtione nascuntur, dicimus trahere originale peccatum; eosque, de parentibus qualibuscumque nascantur, non negamus adhuc esse sub diabolo, nisi renascantur in Christo" . Haec verba nostra et paulo ante dixerat. Deinde subiunxit quod de Christo diximus: "Qui de eadem sexus utriusque commixtione nasci noluit". Sed etiam hic praetermisit quod ego posui: "Ut per eius gratiam eruti de potestate tenebrarum in regnum illius, qui de eadem sexus utriusque commixtione nasci noluit, transferantur". Vide, obsecro te, quae nostra verba vitavit, tamquam inimicus omnino gratiae Dei, quae venit per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum. Scit enim ab illa Apostoli sententia, qua dixit de Deo Patre: "i nos eruit de potestate tenebrarum, et transtulit in regnum Filii caritatis suae " ; improbissime et impiissime parvulos separari; ideo procul dubio verba ista praetermittere quam ponere maluit . Egone sum inimicus gratiae Dei, homo omnium impudentissime, qui in primo libro meo, unde tu ista a contextu suo avulsa rapuisti, ut aliquid sine ratione garrires, professione pura et plena os tuum mysteriis Manichaeorum madens tuorumque damnavi?
I. 52. Julian. But now I will consequently examine by what testimonies you try to affirm this which the faith of the pious assails. But since I have set out to confront your second book, which Alypius brought, lest the sequence of my rejoinder be confused, a few things must still be answered, until the discourse reaches the testimony of the Apostle, by which you seem to yourself to be very much fortified. To those words of yours, then, which I set down above, you add these which follow: In the things, then, which he passed over, he feared this, because it appeals to all the hearts of the catholic Church, and addresses, in a clear voice as it were, the very faith handed down and founded from of old, and most vehemently moves them against those who, as we said, "say there is no sin in little ones that is washed away by the laver of regeneration". For all run to the Church with little ones for no other reason than that the original sin contracted in them by the generation of the first birth may be expiated by the regeneration of the second birth. Then he returns to our earlier words, which I do not know why he repeats: "But those who are born from such union we say draw original sin; and those, from whatever parents they are born, we do not deny are still under the devil, unless they are reborn in Christ". These words of ours he had said a little before too. Then he subjoined what we said about Christ: "Who was unwilling to be born from the same union of both sexes." But here too he passed over what I set down: "That through his grace, rescued from the power of darkness, they may be transferred into the kingdom of him who was unwilling to be born from the same union of both sexes." See, I beseech you, what words of ours he avoided, as an enemy altogether of the grace of God, which came through Jesus Christ our Lord. For he knows that from that statement of the Apostle, in which he said of God the Father: "He rescued us from the power of darkness, and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love "; little ones are most wickedly and impiously separated; therefore, beyond doubt, he preferred to pass over these words rather than to set them down. Am I an enemy of the grace of God, you most shameless of all men, who in my first book, from which you snatched these things torn from their context, in order to chatter something without reason, condemned with a pure and full profession your mouth dripping with the mysteries of the Manichees and your own?
JulianImp.1.52Augustinus. Numquid ut habeas causam bonam conviciando facturus es? Dic quorum meorum os, sicut meum damnasse te iactas. Dicturus es: Manichaeorum; sed ut maledicus, non ut veridicus. Ego enim et Manichaeos detestor, et adiutores eorum, in quibus appetis principatum, et utrosque adiuvante ac subve ente Domino Deo nostro catholica veritate redarguo. Sed ostendam meos, quos in me tanto nequius quanto astutius criminaris. In hac enim causa, ubi originalis peccati vertitur quaestio, propter quod me nomine Manichaeorum atrocissimis dignum arbitraris opprobriis, meus est Cyprianus, qui cum peccasse nihil dixerit parvulum, non tamen tacuit, eum contraxisse peccati ex Adam prima nativitate contagium . Meus est Hilarius, qui cum exponeret quod in Psalmo legitur: Vivet anima mea et laudabit te . Vivere se, inquit, in hac vita non reputat; quippe qui dixerat: "ce in iniquitatibus conceptum sum, et in delictis peperit me mater mea " , scit sub peccati origine, et sub peccati lege se natum . Meus est a tuo doctore excellentissime laudatus Ambrosius, qui dixit: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est; sicut habes lectum, dicente David: "ce enim in iniquitatibus conceptus sum, et in delictis peperit me mater mea ". Ideo Pauli caro, corpus mortis erat . Meus est Gregorius, qui cum de Baptismo loqueretur: Venerare, inquit, nativitatem, per quam terrenae nativitatis vinculis liberatus es . Meus est Basilius, qui cum ageret de ieiunio: Quia non ieiunavimus, inquit, decidimus de paradiso; ieiunemus ut ad eum redeamus . Meus est Ioannes Constantinopolitanus, dicens: Adam peccavit illud grande peccatum, et omne hominum genus in commune damnavit . Hi omnes, et alii socii eorum eadem sentientes, quos commemorare longum est, mei sunt; si agnoscis, et tui sunt; sed mei doctores, improbatores tui. Quomodo igitur os meum meorumque damnasti; cum istorum, quos esse conspicis meos, concordissimo et veracissimo potius ore ipse damneris? Istisne tu luminibus civitatis Dei, mente tenebrosissima, fronte impudentissima, lingua procacissima audes crimen obicere Manichaei? Si autem non audes, cur mihi non ob aliud audes, nisi quia hoc dico, quod dicunt quibus non audes?
Augustine. Will you make your case good by reviling? Say whose mouth, like mine, you boast that you have condemned. You will say: the Manichees'; but as a slanderer, not as a truth-teller. For I both detest the Manichees and their helpers, among whom you seek the chief place, and I refute both, with the Lord our God aiding and assisting, by catholic truth. But I will show you who are mine, whom you accuse in me, the more wickedly the more craftily. For in this case, where the question of original sin is at issue, on account of which you think me worthy of the most atrocious reproaches under the name of the Manichees, mine is Cyprian, who, though he said the little one had committed no sin, yet did not keep silent that he had contracted from Adam, at his first birth, the contagion of sin. Mine is Hilary, who, when he expounded what is read in the Psalm: My soul shall live and shall praise you (Ps 119:175 (118:175)): He does not reckon, he says, that he lives in this life; since he had said: "Behold, I was conceived in iniquities, and in offenses my mother bore me " (Ps 51:5 (50:7)), he knows that he was born under the origin of sin, and under the law of sin. Mine is Ambrose, praised most excellently by your teacher, who said: We are all human beings born under sin, and our very origin is in fault; as you have read, David saying: "For behold, I was conceived in iniquities, and in offenses my mother bore me ". Therefore the flesh of Paul was a body of death. Mine is Gregory, who, when he was speaking about Baptism, says: Venerate the birth through which you have been freed from the bonds of earthly birth. Mine is Basil, who, when he was treating of fasting, says: Because we did not fast, we fell from paradise; let us fast that we may return to it. Mine is John of Constantinople, saying: Adam committed that great sin, and condemned the whole human race in common. All these, and their other associates who think the same, whom it is long to recall, are mine; if you acknowledge it, they are yours too; but they are my teachers, your disapprovers. How, then, did you condemn my mouth and that of mine, when you are rather condemned by the most concordant and most truthful mouth of those whom you behold to be mine? Do you dare, against these lights of the city of God, with a most darkened mind, a most shameless brow, a most insolent tongue, to cast the charge of being a Manichee? But if you do not dare, why do you dare it against me for no other reason than that I say what they say against whom you do not dare it?
JulianImp.1.52I. 53. Iulianus. Ibi namque hic est a me collatus ordo verborum, cum dixissem auctorem Deum caeli et terrae, omniumque quae in eis sunt, ac per hoc et hominum propter quos cuncta facta sunt. Non autem me fugit - inquio - cum haec dicimus, illud de nobis disseminandum esse, quia gratiam Christi necessariam parvulis non putemus. Quod christianos populos laudabiliter et vehementer offendit; si tamen dicti per se nefarii non nos arbitrarentur auctores; eo enim modo nec de fratribus suis falsa credendo crimen incurrerent, et studiosos se circa amorem fidei comprobarent. Munienda igitur nobis ista pars est contra impetum vanitatis, et confessione brevi os obloquentium consuendum. Nos igitur in tantum gratiam Baptismatis omnibus utilem aetatibus confitemur, ut cunctos, qui illam non necessariam etiam parvulis putant, aeterno feriamus anathemate. Sed hanc gratiam locupletem spiritalibus donis credimus, quae multis opima muneribus ac reverenda virtutibus, pro infirmitatum generibus et humanorum statuum diversitatibus, una, tam remediorum collatrice quam munerum, virtute medicatur. Quae cum admovetur, non est mutanda pro causis; iam enim ipsa dona sua pro accedentium capacitate dispensat. Sicut enim artes omnes non pro diversitate materiarum, quas arripiunt excolendas, ipsae quoque aut detrimenta aut augmenta patiuntur, sed idem semper atque uno modo se habentes multiplici decorantur effectu; ita et secundum Apostolum: "a fides, unum Baptisma " . Et multiplicantur et dilatantur in donis, nec tamen in mysteriorum mutantur ordinibus. Sed haec gratia non adversatur iustitiae, quae maculas eluit iniquitatis; nec facit peccata, sed purgat; quae absolvit reos, non calumniatur innocuos. Christus enim, qui est sui operis redemptor, auget circa imaginem suam continua largitate beneficia; et quos fecerat condendo bonos, facit innovando adoptandoque meliores . Hanc igitur gratiam, per quam reis venia, illuminatio spiritalis, adoptio filiorum Dei, municipatus Hierusalem caelestis, sanctificatio atque in Christi membra translatio, et possessio Regni caelorum mortalibus datur, qui aliquibus negandam putat, omnium bonorum exsecrationem meretur.
I. 53. Julian. For there this order of words was set down by me, when I had said that God is the author of heaven and earth, and of all things that are in them, and through this also of human beings, for whose sake all things were made. But it does not escape me—I say—that, when we say these things, this will be spread abroad about us, that we do not think the grace of Christ necessary for little ones. Which laudably and vehemently offends the Christian peoples; if, however, they did not consider us the authors of a saying in itself impious; for in that way they would neither incur a crime by believing false things about their brothers, and would prove themselves zealous about the love of the faith. This part, then, must be fortified by us against the assault of vanity, and the mouth of those who speak against us must be sewn up by a brief confession. We, then, confess the grace of Baptism to be useful to all ages so far that we strike with eternal anathema all those who think it not necessary even for little ones. But this grace we believe to be rich in spiritual gifts, which, fertile with many gifts and venerable for its virtues, according to the kinds of weaknesses and the diversity of human conditions, heals by one and the same power, the bestower both of remedies and of gifts. When it is applied, it is not to be changed according to the cases; for it dispenses its own gifts according to the capacity of those who approach. For just as all the arts, not according to the diversity of the materials which they take up to be worked, themselves also suffer either losses or increases, but, holding themselves always and in one way, are adorned with manifold effect; so too, according to the Apostle: "one faith, one Baptism " (Eph 4:5). And they are multiplied and extended in gifts, nor yet are they changed in the orders of the mysteries. But this grace is not opposed to justice, which washes away the stains of iniquity; nor does it make sins, but purifies them; which absolves the guilty, does not calumniate the innocent. For Christ, who is the redeemer of his own work, increases his benefits toward his own image by continual liberality; and those whom he had made good by founding them, he makes better by renewing and adopting them. This grace, then, through which pardon for the guilty, spiritual illumination, the adoption of the sons of God, citizenship in the heavenly Jerusalem, sanctification, and transfer into the members of Christ, and possession of the Kingdom of heaven are given to mortals, whoever thinks must be denied to any, deserves the execration of all good men.
JulianImp.1.53Augustinus. In his omnibus quae commemorasti gratiae Dei muneribus illud, quod prius posuisti, dari per illam reis veniam, non vis ad parvulos pertinere, quos ullum reatum negas ex Adam trahere. Cur ergo cetera multis negat Deus parvulis, qui sine hac gratia in illa aetate moriuntur? Cur, inquam, non eis datur illuminatio spiritalis, adoptio filiorum Dei, municipatus Hierusalem caelestis, sanctificatio atque in Christi membra translatio, et possessio regni caelorum? Haeccine tot munera tam necessaria, tot imaginibus suis nullum secundum vos peccatum habentibus negaret Deus, penes quem summa potestas est, cum hoc beneficium non a se prohibeat voluntas contraria parvulorum? Tu certe ut hanc a vobis amolireris invidiam, qua dicimini parvulis Baptismi gratiam denegare, dixisti quod eam gratiam, qui aliquibus negandam putat, omnium bonorum exsecrationem meretur. Non igitur eam Dei omnipotentis aequitas negaret innumerabilibus parvulis, qui sine hac sub eius omnipotentia moriuntur, si mali nihil in eius occulto iudicio mererentur. A quo iudicio de stirpe Adam venientibus omnibus debito, quicumque secundum gratiam, non secundum debitum liberantur, non in suis meritis, sed in Domino glorientur. Vos ergo si carere vultis opprobrio, quo Ecclesiae catholicae detestabiles facti estis, sinite Christum parvulis esse Iesum. Quod omnino non erit, si non eis conferet propter quod hoc nomen accepit, id est, si non eos salvos faciet a peccatis eorum . Hoc igitur de ista gratia dicite, ut offensione Christianorum, de qua conquerimini careatis, quod dixit catholicus doctus doctorque Gregorius: Venerare nativitatem, per quam terrenae nativitatis vinculis liberatus es . Nullo itaque modo ad istam gratiam pertinere parvulos confitemini, quamdiu negatis eos nativitate caelesti a terrenae nativitatis vinculis liberari.
Augustine. In all these gifts of God's grace which you mentioned, that which you put first—that pardon for the guilty is given through it—you do not want to pertain to little ones, who, you deny, draw any guilt from Adam. Why, then, does God deny the rest to many little ones, who die without this grace at that age? Why, I say, is spiritual illumination not given to them, the adoption of the sons of God, citizenship in the heavenly Jerusalem, sanctification, and transfer into the members of Christ, and possession of the kingdom of heaven? Would God, in whom is the supreme power, deny these so many gifts, so necessary, to so many of his own images that, according to you, have no sin, when no contrary will of the little ones forbids this benefit from him? You certainly, in order to remove from yourselves this odium, by which you are said to deny the grace of Baptism to little ones, said that whoever thinks that grace must be denied to any deserves the execration of all good men. The equity of God almighty would not, then, deny it to the innumerable little ones who die without it under his omnipotence, if they deserved nothing evil in his hidden judgment. By which judgment, owed to all who come from the stock of Adam, whoever are freed according to grace, not according to debt, let them glory not in their own merits, but in the Lord. You, then, if you wish to be free of the reproach by which you have become detestable to the catholic Church, let Christ be Jesus to little ones. Which will not be at all, if he does not confer on them that for which he received this name, that is, if he does not save them from their sins (See Matt 1:21). Say this, then, about this grace, so that you may be free of the offense to Christians of which you complain, what the learned catholic and teacher Gregory said: Venerate the birth through which you have been freed from the bonds of earthly birth. In no way, then, do you confess that little ones pertain to this grace, as long as you deny that they are freed by the heavenly birth from the bonds of earthly birth.
JulianImp.1.53I. 54. Iulianus. Quae quoniam, ut locus interim hic patiebatur, munivi, revertamur illo unde digressi sumus; de hoc ipso, ubicumque opportunum fuerit, plenius locuturi. Ecce quanta confessionis luce, et eos qui Baptisma parvulis denegarent, et vos qui eius praeiudicio iustitiam Dei audetis maculare, reprobavi; protestans aliud me non tenere, quam instituta mysteria iisdem, quibus tradita sunt verbis, in omni prorsus aetate esse tractanda, nec pro causarum varietate debere mutari; verum fieri peccatorem ex malo perfecte bonum; innocentem autem, qui nullum habet malum propriae voluntatis, ex bono fieri meliorem, id est, optimum; ut ambo quidem in Christi membra transeant consecrati; sed unus deprehensus in mala vita, alter in bona natura. Ille enim innocentiam, quam exortus acceperat, prava actione corrupit; hic vero sine laude, sine crimine voluntatis, hoc solum habet, quod a Deo conditore suscepit, qui infucata primaevitate felicior, bonum simplicitatis suae vitiare non potuit, nullum habens de actibus meritum, sed hoc solum retinens, quod tanti opificis dignatione possedit.
I. 54. Julian. Since I have fortified these things, as this place meanwhile allowed, let us return to the point from which we digressed; intending to speak more fully about this very matter wherever it shall be opportune. Behold, with how great a light of confession I have reproved both those who would deny Baptism to little ones, and you who, by its prejudgment, dare to stain the justice of God; protesting that I hold nothing other than that the instituted mysteries are to be treated, with the very words in which they were handed down, in absolutely every age, nor ought to be changed according to the variety of cases; but that a sinner is made from evil perfectly good; while the innocent one, who has no evil of his own will, is made from good better, that is, best; so that both indeed pass, consecrated, into the members of Christ; but the one caught in an evil life, the other in a good nature. For the former corrupted by depraved action the innocence which his origin had received; but the latter, without praise, without crime of the will, has this alone, which he received from God his founder, who, happier in his unfeigned newness, could not vitiate the good of his own simplicity, having no merit from his acts, but retaining this alone, which he possessed by the gracious favor of so great a workman.
JulianImp.1.54Augustinus. Quare ergo grave iugum super eum a die exitus de ventre matris eius ? Cur tanta corruptibilitas corporis, ut hac aggravetur anima eius ? Cur tanta mentis obtunsio, ut etiam plagis erudiatur tarditas eius? Quousque, Iuliane, gravis es corde? Quousque diligis vanitatem, et quaeris mendacium , quo vestra haeresis fulciatur? Numquid si nemo peccasset, si natura humana in ea qua condita est bonitate mansisset, etiam in paradiso ad istas homo miserias, ut alia taceam, nasceretur?
Augustine. Why, then, is there a heavy yoke upon him from the day of his going out from his mother's womb (See Sir 40:1)? Why so great a corruptibility of the body, that his soul is weighed down by it (See Wis 9:15)? Why so great a dullness of mind, that his slowness is educated even by blows? How long, Julian, are you heavy of heart? How long do you love vanity, and seek a lie (Ps 4:2 (4:3)), by which your heresy may be propped up? Surely, if no one had sinned, if human nature had remained in the goodness in which it was created, would a human being, even in paradise, be born to these miseries, to be silent about others?
JulianImp.1.54I. 55. Iulianus. Aetas igitur illa sicut misericordiam Christi praedicat innovata, id est, innovantis mysterii virtute provecta; ita iniquitatem iudicis, infamiam iustitiae, aut accusata, aut aggravata convincit.
I. 55. Julian. That age, then, just as, renewed, it proclaims the mercy of Christ, that is, advanced by the power of the renewing mystery; so, whether accused or weighed down, it convicts the iniquity of the judge, the infamy of justice.
JulianImp.1.55Augustinus. Ex qua vetustate aetas illa dicitur innovata, cum sit ortu nova? Labia dolosa sunt ista; si vis agnoscere vetustatem, ex qua parvuli christiana gratia renovantur, audi fideliter quod ait homo Dei Reticius ab Augustoduno episcopus, qui cum Melchiade Romano Episcopo quondam iudex sedit, Donatumque damnavit haereticum. Hic enim cum de christiano Baptismate loqueretur: Hanc igitur, inquit, principalem esse in Ecclesia indulgentiam, neminem praeterit, in qua antiqui criminis omne pondus exponimus, et ignorantiae nostrae facinora prisca delemus; ubi et veterem hominem cum ingenitis sceleribus exuimus . Audisne non postea perpetrata, sed etiam ingenita scelera veteris hominis? Numquid Manichaeus fuit iste Reticius? Quomodo ergo non dolose innovari parvulos dicitis in christiana regeneratione, qui mala, quae ingeneravit antiqui criminis pondus, in vetere homine non vultis agnoscere? Deinde, si aggravata aetas illa iniquitatem iudicis convincit, ut dicis, itane non est aggravata gravi iugo super filios Adam? Et tamen non est hinc iniquus Deus; ac per hoc merito est aggravata. Nullum est autem huius aetatis meritum malum, si non est originale peccatum.
Augustine. From what oldness is that age said to be renewed, since it is new in its origin? These are deceitful lips; if you wish to recognize the oldness from which little ones are renewed by Christian grace, hear faithfully what the man of God, Reticius, bishop of Autun, says, who once sat as judge with Melchiades, the Roman bishop, and condemned Donatus the heretic. For when he was speaking about Christian Baptism: This, then, he says, that it is the principal indulgence in the Church, escapes no one, in which we lay aside the whole weight of the ancient crime, and blot out the old wicked deeds of our ignorance; where we also put off the old man with his inborn crimes. Do you hear: not the deeds perpetrated afterward, but even the inborn crimes of the old man? Was this Reticius a Manichee? How, then, do you not deceitfully say that little ones are renewed in Christian regeneration, you who will not acknowledge in the old man the evils which the weight of the ancient crime engendered? Then, if that age, weighed down, convicts the iniquity of the judge, as you say, is it not so weighed down by the heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam? And yet God is not from this unjust; and through this it is deservedly weighed down. But there is no evil merit of this age, if there is no original sin.
JulianImp.1.55I. 56. Iulianus. Non ergo unitate sacramenti rea monstratur infantia, sed veritate iudicii nihil aliud quam innocens approbatur.
I. 56. Julian. Infancy, then, is shown to be guilty not by the unity of the sacrament, but is approved, by the truth of judgment, to be nothing other than innocent.
JulianImp.1.56Augustinus. Invenisse te putas quare baptizetur; dic quare exsuffletur. Certe Pelagii auctoris vestri magna et invicta est putata sententia, ubi ait: Si Adae peccatum etiam non peccantibus nocuit, ergo et Christi iustitia etiam non credentibus prodest . Quid ergo de parvulis dicitis quando baptizantur? Credunt, an non credunt? Si dixeritis: Non credunt, quomodo non eis Christi iustitia etiam non credentibus prodest, ut Regnum caelorum possideant? Aut si prodest, ut cogimini confiteri; sic igitur eis nocuit Adae peccatum nondum peccandi habentibus voluntatem, quomodo eis prodest iustitia Christi nondum credendi habentibus voluntatem? Si autem dixeritis: Per alios credunt, sic etiam per alium peccaverunt. Et quoniam verum est quod per alios credunt (propter hoc enim et fideles per totam Ecclesiam nuncupantur), profecto pertinent ad illud quod ait Dominus: Qui autem non crediderit, condemnabitur . Condemnabuntur ergo si per alios non credant, cum per se ipsos non valent credere; condemnari autem iuste nullo modo possent, si non sub peccato, ac per hoc et sub peccati principe nascerentur. Propter hoc ergo et exsufflantur. Removete ab eis deceptoriam vanitatem vestram; sinite parvulos venire ad Iesum , qui salvum facit populum suum (in quo utique et ipsi sunt) a peccatis eorum .
Augustine. You think you have found why he is baptized; say why he is breathed upon. Surely the statement of Pelagius, your author, was thought great and unconquerable, where he says: If Adam's sin harmed even those who do not sin, then the justice of Christ too profits even those who do not believe. What, then, do you say about little ones when they are baptized? Do they believe, or do they not believe? If you say: They do not believe, how does the justice of Christ not profit them even though they do not believe, so that they possess the Kingdom of heaven? Or if it profits them, as you are compelled to confess; then Adam's sin so harmed them, who did not yet have a will to sin, as the justice of Christ profits them, who do not yet have a will to believe? But if you say: They believe through others, then they also sinned through another. And since it is true that they believe through others (for on this account they are called faithful throughout the whole Church), they surely pertain to that which the Lord said: But he who will not believe shall be condemned (Mark 16:16). They will, then, be condemned if they do not believe through others, since they cannot believe through themselves; but they could in no way be justly condemned, if they were not born under sin, and through this also under the prince of sin. For this reason, then, they are also breathed upon. Remove from them your deceptive vanity; let the little ones come to Jesus (See Matt 19:14), who saves his people (among whom they certainly are too) from their sins (See Matt 1:21).
JulianImp.1.56I. 57. Iulianus. Quamquam mihi, ut de statu explicando immorer parvulorum, consequentia rationis indicit, quae res sua lege coniunctas dividi non sinit. Ceterum facilior esset iactura nascentium, si non eis compericlitaretur ipsa maiestas. Excusa igitur Deum, et accusa parvulum; iustum doceatur ille quod facit, qui sine iustitia Deus esse non potest; et quaevis suscipiat persona supplicium. Ceterum nunc extra sacrilegium res, quas putas esse consertas, mutuo sibi vehementer repugnant. Dicis enim, quoniam unis mysteriis, idololatrae ac parricidae, imbuuntur et parvuli, omnes scelestos posse convinci; et addis rem multo absurdiorem, a Sacramenti huius, de quo agimus, auctore aliena peccata innocentibus imputari. Hoc est quod pugnare dixi, quia non capit rerum natura ut uno tempore et adeo sit misericors Deus, ut propria unicuique confitenti peccata condonet; et adeo crudelis, ut innocenti impingat aliena. Horum prorsus cum alterum dederis, alterum sustulisti; si donat veniam reis, non calumniatur innoxiis; si calumniatur innocuis, numquam parcit obnoxiis.
I. 57. Julian. Although the sequence of reasoning bids me to linger over explaining the state of little ones—which sequence does not allow things joined by their own law to be divided. Moreover, the loss of those being born would be easier to bear, if majesty itself were not endangered along with them. Excuse God, then, and accuse the little one; let him be taught to do what is just, who without justice cannot be God; and let whatever person you please undergo the punishment. But now, apart from sacrilege, the things you think to be joined together vehemently contend with one another. For you say that, since little ones too are imbued with the same mysteries as idolaters and parricides, all can be convicted as wicked; and you add a thing much more absurd, that by the author of this Sacrament, with which we are dealing, another's sins are imputed to the innocent. This is what I said is at odds, because the nature of things does not admit that at one and the same time God should be both so merciful as to forgive each one confessing his own sins, and so cruel as to charge against the innocent another's. Of these, when you have granted one, you have taken away the other; if he grants pardon to the guilty, he does not calumniate the innocent; if he calumniates the innocent, he never spares the guilty.
JulianImp.1.57Augustinus. Tu potius facis iniustum Deum, cum tibi videtur iniustum peccata patrum reddere in filios, quod se ille facere et verbis saepe testatur et rebus ostendit. Tu, inquam, facis iniustum Deum, sub cuius omnipotentis cura, cum videas gravi iugo miseriae parvulos premi, nullum eos peccatum habere contendis, simul accusans et Deum, et Ecclesiam; Deum quidem, si gravantur et affliguntur immeriti; Ecclesiam vero, si exsufflantur a iure diabolicae potestatis alieni. Ubi autem somniasti, idololatris et parricidis originalia parvulorum nos aequare peccata? Verum tamen mysteriis indita remissio peccatorum, in peccatis, et maioribus, et minoribus, et pluribus, et paucioribus, et singulis, vera est; in nullis vero peccatis, sicut esse parvulorum dicitis, falsa est. Sic autem aliena sunt originalia peccata propter nullum in eis nostrae voluntatis arbitrium, ut tamen propter originis contagium esse inveniantur et nostra. Quid est ergo quod clamas, et dicis non posse Deum et dimittere peccata maioribus propria, et imputare parvulis aliena; nec vis attendere, quod nonnisi in Christo renatis utraque; non renatis autem in Christo, neutra dimittat? Ipsa sunt enim christianae gratiae sacramenta abscondita sapientibus et prudentibus, et revelata parvulis . In quibus o si esses, nec quasi magnus in tua virtute confideres, profecto intellegeres, sic imputari generatis parvulis iniustitiam primi hominis ad subeundum supplicium, quemadmodum imputatur parvulis regeneratis iustitia secundi hominis ad obtinendum Regnum caelorum; quamvis voluntate atque opere proprio nec illum in malo, nec istum in bono reperiantur imitati.
Augustine. It is rather you who make God unjust, since it seems to you unjust to repay the sins of the fathers upon the sons, which he both often testifies in words that he does and shows by deeds. You, I say, make God unjust, under whose almighty care, when you see little ones pressed by the heavy yoke of misery, you contend that they have no sin, accusing at once both God and the Church; God indeed, if the undeserving are weighed down and afflicted; but the Church, if those free from the rule of diabolical power are breathed upon. But where did you dream that we equate the original sins of little ones to those of idolaters and parricides? Yet the remission of sins put into the mysteries, in sins both greater and lesser, and more and fewer, and single, is true; but in no sins, such as you say is the case with little ones, it is false. But original sins are another's, on account of no choice of our will in them, in such a way that nevertheless, on account of the contagion of origin, they are found to be ours too. What is it, then, that you cry out, and say that God cannot both forgive their own sins to adults and impute another's to little ones; and you will not attend to this, that he forgives both only to those reborn in Christ, but neither to those not reborn in Christ? For the very sacraments of Christian grace are hidden from the wise and prudent, and revealed to little ones (See Matt 11:25). Among whom, oh, if you were, and did not trust as a great man in your own strength, you would surely understand that the injustice of the first man is so imputed to little ones who are begotten, to undergo punishment, as the justice of the second man is imputed to little ones who are reborn, to obtain the Kingdom of heaven; although by their own will and act neither are they found to have imitated the former in evil, nor the latter in good.
JulianImp.1.57I. 58. Iulianus. Nihil itaque in verbis tuis, coactus, ut dicis, timore praeterii. Quid enim in tam elegantis ingenii possem pavere monumentis, nisi forte hoc solum, quod horrorem de obscaenitatis tuae impugnatione perpetior?
I. 58. Julian. Thus I passed over nothing in your words, compelled, as you say, by fear. For what could I dread in the monuments of so elegant a talent, unless perhaps this alone, that I endure horror at the assault of your obscenity?
JulianImp.1.58Augustinus. Si emeres ista convicia, prodigum te dicerem; gratis tibi adiacent; cur non eis fruaris, quibus maledicum animum pascis?
Augustine. If you were buying these revilings, I would call you a spendthrift; they lie at hand for you free; why do you not enjoy them, with which you feed your slanderous mind?
JulianImp.1.58I. 59. Iulianus. Audi igitur, contra ea quae dixisti, breviter: non sunt Ecclesiae catholicae pectora, quae sermo tuus convenit, si a pietate et ratione discordant. Quod utrumque committunt, cum nec de Dei aequitate bene aestimant, nec mysteriorum, quae criminantur, sapientiam et divitias intellegunt. Non est haec fides antiquitus tradita atque fundata, nisi in conciliis malignantium, inspirata a diabolo, prolata a Manichaeo, celebrata a Marcione, Fausto, Adimanto, omnibusque eorum satellitibus, et nunc a te in Italiam, quod graviter gemimus, eructata.
I. 59. Julian. Hear, then, against what you have said, briefly: they are not hearts of the catholic Church, which your discourse addresses, if they are at odds with piety and reason. Which both they commit, when they neither think well about the equity of God, nor understand the wisdom and riches of the mysteries which they accuse. This is not the faith handed down and founded from of old, except in the councils of the malignant, inspired by the devil, brought forth by the Manichee, celebrated by Marcion, Faustus, Adimantus, and all their satellites, and now belched forth by you into Italy, which we grievously bemoan.
JulianImp.1.59Augustinus. Quo ore, qua fronte concilium malignantium dicis, consensionem tot catholicorum, qui doctores Ecclesiarum fuerunt ante nos? Quasi vero, si in concilio episcoporum, quod non salubriter, sed iactanter, propter vestras quaestiones debere dicitis congregari, sederent episcopi, quos supra memoravi, ut alios omittam, Cyprianus, Hilarius, Ambrosius, Gregorius, Basilius, Ioannes Constantinopolitanus, aliquos eorum qui nunc manent facile inveniretis, quos eis in doctrina ecclesiastica antiquitus tradita aequare, nedum praeferre possetis. Cum ergo ipsi contra vos de peccato originali proferant apertas clarasque sententias, et quas paulo ante posui, et alias plurimas; horumne in catholica veritate consensum audetis malignantium appellare concilium? Et cogitatis, quid istis contradicatis, ac non potius quo fugiatis, si eis consentire non vultis? Sed quoniam me dixisti eructasse in Italiam quod gematis, eumdem illum episcopum Italiae a tuo doctore laudatum in tuam frontem replico Ambrosium. Omnes homines, inquit, sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est; sicut habes lectum, dicente David: "ce in iniquitatibus conceptus sum, et in delictis peperit me mater mea " . Ideo Pauli caro corpus mortis erat, sicut ipse ait: "is me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? " . Christi autem caro damnavit peccatum, quod nascendo non sensit, quod moriendo crucifixit, ut in carne nostra esset iustificatio per gratiam, ubi erat ante colluvio per culpam . Hanc ergo fidem antiquitus traditam dico atque fundatam; tu renuis, et cui relucteris, non respicis. Numquid huic eam a diabolo dicere poteris inspiratam? Numquid iste Manichaeus est? Numquid Marcion, Faustus, Adimantus? Non utique, sed longe his dissimilis, longeque contrarius. Pelagius certe dicat quis iste sit. Ille, ille est, cuius fidem, et purissimum in Scripturis sensum ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere. Quid est, Iuliane? Ubi te vides? Ille, cuius ne inimicus quidem reprehendere ausus est fidem, hanc habebat fidem, quam tu ita reprehendis, ut eam tribuas conciliis malignantium. Ecce non est eorum, sed est Ambrosii; quia vera est, quia sana est, quia ut dixi, antiquitus tradita atque fundata est, haec et mea est. Non ergo hanc in Italiam (quod vos gemere dicitis) eructavi; sed potius ab isto episcopo Italiae hanc praedicante et docente lavacrum regenerationis accepi. Quoniam fides ista catholica est, et tamen tua non est; tu ergo ubi es? Vide, obsecro, et redi. Videre tibi expedit, non invidere; redire cupimus, non perire.
Augustine. With what mouth, with what brow do you call a council of the malignant the agreement of so many catholics who were teachers of the Churches before us? As though, indeed, if there sat, in a council of bishops which you say ought to be gathered—not wholesomely, but boastfully, on account of your questions—the bishops whom I mentioned above, to omit others, Cyprian, Hilary, Ambrose, Gregory, Basil, John of Constantinople, you would easily find any of those who now remain whom you could equal to them, let alone prefer, in the ecclesiastical doctrine handed down from of old. Since, then, they themselves bring forth against you, concerning original sin, open and clear statements, both those which I set down a little before, and very many others; do you dare to call the agreement of these in catholic truth a council of the malignant? And do you consider what you contradict in them, and not rather where you may flee, if you are unwilling to agree with them? But since you said that I belched forth into Italy what you bemoan, I throw back upon your brow that same bishop of Italy, Ambrose, praised by your teacher. We are all human beings, he says, born under sin, and our very origin is in fault; as you have read, David saying: "Behold, I was conceived in iniquities, and in offenses my mother bore me ". Therefore the flesh of Paul was a body of death, as he himself says: "Who will free me from the body of this death? ". But the flesh of Christ condemned sin, which it did not feel by being born, which it crucified by dying, that there might be in our flesh justification through grace, where before there was foulness through fault. This faith, then, I say is handed down and founded from of old; you refuse it, and do not look at whom you struggle against. Will you be able to say that it was inspired in this man by the devil? Is this man a Manichee? Is he Marcion, Faustus, Adimantus? Certainly not, but far unlike them, and far contrary. Let Pelagius at least say who this man is. He, he is the one, whose faith and most pure understanding in the Scriptures not even an enemy has dared to find fault with. What is it, Julian? Where do you see yourself? He whose faith not even an enemy has dared to find fault with had this faith, which you so find fault with that you attribute it to councils of the malignant. Behold, it is not theirs, but it is Ambrose's; because it is true, because it is sound, because, as I said, it is handed down and founded from of old, this faith is mine too. I did not, then, belch this forth into Italy (which you say you bemoan); but rather I received the laver of regeneration from this bishop of Italy who preached and taught it. Since this faith is catholic, and yet is not yours; where, then, are you? See, I beseech you, and return. It is to your advantage to see, not to envy; we desire that you return, not perish.
JulianImp.1.59I. 60. Iulianus. Nihil est peccati in homine, si nihil est propriae voluntatis vel assensionis; hoc mihi hominum genus, quod vel leviter sapit, sine dubitatione consentit. Tu autem concedis nihil fuisse in parvulis propriae voluntatis; non ego, sed ratio concludit: nihil igitur in eis esse peccati. Nequaquam ergo propter hoc ad Ecclesiam deferuntur, ut infamentur, immo ut infament Deum: sed deferuntur, ut laudent Deum, quem et bonorum naturalium et donorum spiritalium protestantur auctorem.
I. 60. Julian. There is no sin in a human being, if there is nothing of his own will or assent; this race of men, which has even a little understanding, agrees with me without doubt. But you concede that there was nothing of their own will in little ones; not I, but reason concludes: there is, then, no sin in them. In no way, then, are they brought to the Church for this, that they may be defamed, or rather that they may defame God: but they are brought that they may praise God, whom they declare the author both of natural goods and of spiritual gifts.
JulianImp.1.60Augustinus. Non infamantur, cum exsufflantur, sed eruuntur de potestate tenebrarum; nec infamant Deum, sed quo creatore nati sunt, hoc indigent salvatore; et ideo renascendo, ex Adam transferuntur ad Christum. Ubi autem dixisti: Nihil est peccati in homine, si nihil est propriae voluntatis, vel assensionis, plenius verum diceres, si adderes: Vel contagionis.
Augustine. They are not defamed, when they are breathed upon, but are rescued from the power of darkness; nor do they defame God, but by the Creator by whom they were born, by him they need a Savior; and therefore, by being reborn, they are transferred from Adam to Christ. But where you said: There is no sin in a human being, if there is nothing of his own will or assent, you would speak more fully the truth if you added: Or of contagion.
JulianImp.1.60I. 61. Iulianus. Originale autem peccatum, si generatione primae nativitatis attrahitur, nuptias quidem a Deo institutas damnare potest, ceterum auferri a parvulis non potest; quoniam quod innascitur, usque ad finem eius, cui a principiorum causis inhaeserit, perseverat.
I. 61. Julian. But original sin, if it is contracted by the generation of the first birth, can indeed condemn the marriages instituted by God, but cannot be taken away from little ones; since what is born in remains, until the end of him to whom it has clung from the causes of his beginnings.
JulianImp.1.61Augustinus. Nec nuptias damnat, quia non ipsae sunt causa eius; et aufertur ab Omnipotente illo, qui et homo nasci potuit sine illo.
Augustine. It neither condemns marriages, because they themselves are not its cause; and it is taken away by that Almighty one, who could even be born a man without it.
JulianImp.1.61I. 62. Iulianus. Nullam itaque tibi calumniam commovemus, quasi damnes nuptias, et quasi hominem, qui ex illis nascitur, opus diaboli esse dicas; nec infideliter hoc obicimus, nec imperite colligimus; sed qui sit consequentium sententiarum effectus, sollicite et simpliciter intuemur. Numquam sunt enim sine commixtione nuptiae corporales. Tu dicis, quicumque ex illa commixtione nascuntur, ad diabolum pertinere; dubio procul pronuntias nuptias ad ius daemonis pertinere.
I. 62. Julian. We stir up no calumny against you, then, as though you condemn marriage, and as though you say that the human being who is born from it is the work of the devil; nor do we object this faithlessly, nor gather it unskillfully; but we examine carefully and simply what is the effect of the consequent statements. For corporeal marriages are never without union. You say that whoever are born from that union pertain to the devil; beyond doubt you declare that marriages pertain to the right of the demon.
JulianImp.1.62Augustinus. Numquid nos dicimus, sine commixtione corporis nuptias in paradiso esse potuisse, si nemo peccasset? Sed non ibi esset malum, quo nunc bene utitur pudicitia coniugalis. Illud autem malum est a vulnere, quod diabolica inflixit astutia. Hinc rea tenetur propago mortalium; hinc est qui nascitur sub principe peccatorum, donec renascatur in Christo, qui nullum habuit omnino peccatum; a quo solo vinculum solvitur mortis, quia solus fuit liber in mortuis.
Augustine. Do we say that marriages could have existed in paradise without union of body, if no one had sinned? But there would not be there the evil which conjugal chastity now uses well. But that evil is from the wound which diabolical cunning inflicted. From this the offspring of mortals is held guilty; from this it is that whoever is born is born under the prince of sinners, until he is reborn in Christ, who had absolutely no sin; by whom alone the bond of death is loosed, because he alone was free among the dead (See Ps 88:5 (87:6)).
JulianImp.1.62I. 63. Iulianus. Dicis trahi naturae conditione peccatum, qui vis hoc malum a voluntate primi hominis accidisse. Differo hic responsionem, qua convincendus es quod sine verecundia mentiaris. Sed quod ad praesentem locum spectat, colligo, et sapientiae ratiocinanti credo, quod naturam videlicet diabolicam sine ambiguitate definias. Nam si in ea vel per eam est, propter quod homo a diabolo possidetur; irrefutabiliter diaboli est, per quod Dei imaginem sibi potuit vindicare. Immo nec imago Dei est, quae per exortum suum in regno diaboli est.
I. 63. Julian. You say that sin is drawn by the condition of nature, you who want this evil to have come about from the will of the first man. I defer here the response by which you must be convicted of lying without shame. But as for what concerns the present place, I gather, and believe the reasoning of wisdom, that you plainly define nature, without ambiguity, to be diabolical. For if in it or through it is that on account of which a human being is possessed by the devil; it is irrefutably the devil's, that through which he could claim for himself the image of God. Or rather, it is not even the image of God, which through its origin is in the kingdom of the devil.
JulianImp.1.63Augustinus. Credis, sed opinanti stultitiae, non ratiocinanti sapientiae. Sine parvulos erui de potestate tenebrarum, ut Christi transferantur in regnum. Nam dicendo eos veteris delicti non habere contagium, et sic removendo a misericordia Salvatoris, qui salvum facit populum suum a peccatis eorum , unde vocatus est Iesus; nihil agis, nisi ut ira Dei maneat super eos, de qua locutus est Iob, dicens: Homo natus ex muliere, brevis vitae, et plenus irae, et sicut flos feni decidit, fugit autem sicut umbra, et non stabit; nonne et huius curam fecisti, et hunc fecisti intrare in conspectu in iudicium? Quis enim erit mundus a sordibus? Ne unus quidem, etiamsi unius fuerit diei vita eius super terram . Sed videlicet, homo misericors, miseraris imaginem Dei, ne dicas eam sub peccato carnaliter nasci. O quam crudelis est ista vana misericordia tua, quae parvulis negat misericordiam Salvatoris sui; qui venit quaerere quod perierat ! Per illas igitur sordes, sine quibus homo Dei dicit esse neminem, etsi unius diei sit vita eius super terram, sibi vindicat diabolus imaginem Dei, non per substantiam, quam creavit Deus. Vitiata est enim natura, non vitium est. Sed tu: Nec imago Dei est, inquis, quae per exortum suum in regno diaboli est. Quid, si tibi alius dicat: Non est imago Dei, quae nullo rea peccato, non tamen intrat in regnum Dei? Nonne, quid respondeas non habebis, si vana respondere nolueris? Et certe propterea est homo imago Dei, quia factus est ad similitudinem Dei . Cur ergo et vanitati similis factus est, propter quod dies eius velut umbra praetereunt ? Non enim ab hac vanitate separaturus es parvulos, cum dies eorum velut umbra praetereant. Postremo numquid eos et a viventibus separabis? Audi ergo eum qui dicit in Psalmo: Ecce veteres posuisti dies meos, et substantia mea tamquam nihil ante te; verumtamen universa vanitas, omnis homo vivens . Cum ergo sit imago Dei omnis homo vivens, dic unde sit etiam vanitas omnis homo vivens. Sed quid dicturus es, qui non vis agnoscere, aliud horum esse ex conditione Dei, aliud accidisse ex conditione peccati? Permittite, quaesumus, ut homo vivens, qui ad Dei similitudinem factus est, eruatur a potestate tenebrarum, sub qua vanitati similis factus est; eruatur autem nunc interim a reatus obligatione; post hanc vero corruptibilem vitam, ab omni etiam vanitate.
Augustine. You believe, but with opining folly, not with reasoning wisdom. Allow little ones to be rescued from the power of darkness, that they may be transferred into the kingdom of Christ. For by saying that they do not have the contagion of the ancient offense, and so removing them from the mercy of the Savior, who saves his people from their sins (Matt 1:21), whence he was called Jesus; you accomplish nothing except that the wrath of God remains upon them, of which Job spoke, saying: Man born of woman, of short life, and full of wrath, and like the flower of the field he falls, but flees like a shadow, and does not stand; have you not made account of him too, and made him enter into judgment in your sight? For who will be clean from filth? Not even one, even if his life upon the earth be of one day (Job 14:1-5 LXX). But of course, merciful man that you are, you pity the image of God, that you may not say it is born carnally under sin. O how cruel is this vain mercy of yours, which denies to little ones the mercy of their Savior; who came to seek what had perished (See Luke 19:10)! Through that filth, then, without which the man of God says there is no one, even if his life upon the earth be of one day, the devil claims for himself the image of God, not through the substance which God created. For the nature is vitiated, it is not the vice. But you: It is not even the image of God, you say, which through its origin is in the kingdom of the devil. What if another should say to you: It is not the image of God, which, guilty of no sin, nevertheless does not enter into the kingdom of God? Will you not have what to answer, if you are unwilling to answer empty things? And certainly a human being is the image of God for this reason, that he was made to the likeness of God (See Gen 1:26-27). Why, then, is he also made like to vanity, on account of which his days pass away like a shadow (Ps 144:4 (143:4))? For you will not separate little ones from this vanity, since their days pass away like a shadow. Finally, will you separate them even from the living? Hear, then, him who says in the Psalm: Behold, you have made my days old, and my substance is as nothing before you; yet all is vanity, every living man (Ps 39:5-6 (38:6-7)). Since, then, every living man is the image of God, say whence every living man is also vanity. But what will you say, you who will not acknowledge that one of these is from the condition of God, the other came about from the condition of sin? Permit, we beseech you, that the living man, who was made to the likeness of God, be rescued from the power of darkness, under which he was made like to vanity; let him be rescued now, meanwhile, from the obligation of guilt; but after this corruptible life, from all vanity too.
JulianImp.1.63I. 64. Iulianus. Si igitur legas opus meum, desines mirari, cur ad verba tua, quae supra posueram, reverterim. Promiseram quippe me de scriptis tuis probaturum, quoniam tu inter impietatem quam biberas, et eius invidiam quam time s, pariter utrumque dixisses, et quod a Catholicis, et quod a Manichaeis asseri solet. Est itaque ibi talis ordo verborum admotus tuo capiti, quod nunc fronte sycophantae interpolatum fuisse mentitus es. Scio me magna pollicitum, id est, ut de adversarii sermonibus approbarem et eos, qui homines opus Dei negant, iure damnari, et istum ipsum, qui hoc confitetur, nihil aliud agere, quam ut peculium diaboli confirmet esse quidquid de nuptiarum fecunditate procedit. Hoc enim genere, patrocinii sui quoque legibus, Manichaeorum opinio destruetur. Verum id tota libri eius exordia publicarunt. Ait enim opus esse divinum homines, qui ex nuptiis, id est, ex maribus nascuntur et feminis; qua sententia omne quod erat acturus evertit, nobisque assentitur dicentibus esse impios, qui haec audeant denegare. Absoluta igitur iam una pars est: superest ut ostendam id eum, quod nuper impugnarat, astruere. Quibus dictis partem tui capitis retractavi, in qua dixeras: Eos, qui de tali commixtione nascuntur, dicimus trahere originale peccatum, eosque de parentibus qualibuscumque nascantur, non negamus adhuc esse sub diabolo, nisi renascantur in Christo, et per eius gratiam de potestate eruti tenebrarum, in regnum illius qui ex eadem sexus utriusque commixtione nasci noluit, transferantur . Cur ergo putes hinc te excusari posse ab errore Manichaeorum, quia ausus es sententiam, cum qua omnibus ingenii tui viribus luctabaris, inserere; cum hoc non patrocinium erroris tui, sed testimonium sit stultitiae singularis, qui putas Calliphontis more virtutem et vitia, iustitiam et iniquitatem oratione tua posse in foedera convenire? Quod autem ait Apostolus: Qui eruit nos de potestate tenebrarum, et transtulit in regnum Filii dilectionis suae ; lege quartum operis mei librum, et tunc tibi quid Magister Gentium senserit, innotescet.
I. 64. Julian. If, then, you read my work, you will cease to wonder why I returned to your words, which I had set down above. For I had promised that I would prove from your writings that you, between the impiety you had drunk and the odium of it which you fear, had said both alike, both what is wont to be asserted by Catholics and what by Manichees. And so there is set down at your chapter such an order of words, which now, with the brow of a sycophant, you have lyingly said was interpolated. I know I promised great things, that is, that I would approve, from the discourses of my adversary, both that those who deny that human beings are the work of God are justly condemned, and that this same man, who confesses this, does nothing else than confirm that whatever proceeds from the fecundity of marriage is the property of the devil. For by this kind, by the very laws of his own defense, the opinion of the Manichees will be destroyed. But the very openings of his book made this public. For he says that human beings, who are born from marriages, that is, from males and females, are a divine work; by which statement he overturns all that he was going to do, and assents to us who say that those are impious who dare to deny these things. One part, then, is now settled: it remains that I show that he establishes what he had just now assailed. With these things said, I took up part of your chapter, in which you had said: Those who are born from such union we say draw original sin, and those, from whatever parents they are born, we do not deny are still under the devil, unless they are reborn in Christ, and, rescued through his grace from the power of darkness, are transferred into the kingdom of him who was unwilling to be born from the same union of both sexes. Why, then, do you think you can be excused from the error of the Manichees by this, that you dared to insert a statement with which you were struggling with all the powers of your talent; when this is not a defense of your error, but a testimony of singular stupidity, you who think that, in the manner of Calliphon, virtue and vices, justice and iniquity, can be brought into a covenant by your discourse? But as for what the Apostle says: Who rescued us from the power of darkness, and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love (Col 1:13); read the fourth book of my work, and then what the Teacher of the Gentiles meant will become known to you.
JulianImp.1.64Augustinus. Sexto nostro responsum est quarto tuo, et nunc ego magis admoneo ut illa tua et mea legant, qui volunt scire quantum ibi fueris a veritate devius, et quanta sis veritate convictus. De hac autem chartula, in qua ex tuis libris quaedam decerpta conscripta sunt, liberum tibi est mihi imputare quod ille fecit, qui eam misit homini, a quo missa est mihi. Ille quippe quod voluit, in ea posuit ex opere tuo, et quod voluit praetermisit; unde tibi iam supra breviter satisque respondi. Quid te obscuris tuis adversus Apostoli manifesta conaris involvere? Ille Deum praedicans ait: Qui eruit nos de potestate tenebrarum, et transtulit in regnum Filii caritatis suae ; et tu dicis hoc ab illo, exceptis parvulis, dictum. Si ergo non eruuntur parvuli de potestate tenebrarum, non sunt mortui; si non sunt mortui, non pro eis mortuus est Christus; tu autem etiam pro ipsis Christum mortuum confiteris; et idem Apostolus dicit: Unus pro omnibus mortuus est; ergo omnes mortui sunt . Conclusio haec Apostoli invicta est; ac per hoc quia et pro parvulis mortuus est, profecto etiam parvuli mortui sunt. Mortuus est porro Christus, ut evacuaret eum qui potestatem habebat mortis, id est, diabolum . Sine igitur parvulos, ut vivant, de potestate erui tenebrarum. Quid est autem, quod mihi Calliphontis morem obicis, vel errorem, in eo quod me putare dicis virtutem et vitia, iustitiam et iniquitatem oratione mea posse in foedera convenire? Ego quidem absit ut hoc vel corde teneam, vel sermone suadeam; sed tam bene te intellexisse istum philosophum gratulor . Etenim cum ille putaverit in virtute animi et in voluptate corporis esse hominis bonum; tu eum dicis virtutes et vitia voluisse coniungere; ac per hoc, sicut decuit, vitium iudicasti esse corporalis appetentiam voluptatis; vitium est igitur libido, quam laudas. Subrepsit itaque undecumque tuis sensibus veritas, ut susceptae tuae causam paululum deserens, quod dicimus diceres.
Augustine. Our sixth answered your fourth, and now I rather urge that those who wish to know how far you were there astray from the truth, and by how great a truth you are convicted, should read those books of yours and mine. But about this little sheet, in which certain things excerpted from your books were written out, you are free to impute to me what he did who sent it to the man by whom it was sent to me. For he put in it from your work what he wished, and passed over what he wished; about which I have already answered you above briefly and sufficiently. Why do you try to wrap yourself in your obscurities against the manifest things of the Apostle? He, proclaiming God, says: Who rescued us from the power of darkness, and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love; and you say this was said by him with little ones excepted. If, then, little ones are not rescued from the power of darkness, they are not dead; if they are not dead, Christ did not die for them; but you confess that Christ died even for them; and the same Apostle says: One died for all; therefore all are dead (2 Cor 5:14). This conclusion of the Apostle is unconquerable; and through this, since he died also for little ones, surely little ones too are dead. Christ, moreover, died, that he might destroy him who had the power of death, that is, the devil (Heb 2:14). Allow, then, little ones to be rescued from the power of darkness, that they may live. But what is it, that you object to me the manner, or the error, of Calliphon, in this, that you say I think virtue and vices, justice and iniquity, can be brought into a covenant by my discourse? Far be it from me that I should either hold this in my heart or persuade it in speech; but I congratulate you that you have understood this philosopher so well. For since he thought the good of a human being to be in the virtue of the mind and in the pleasure of the body; you say he wished to join virtues and vices; and through this, as was fitting, you have judged the appetite for bodily pleasure to be a vice; lust, then, which you praise, is a vice. The truth, then, crept somehow into your understanding, so that, deserting a little the cause you had taken up, you said what we say.
JulianImp.1.64I. 65. Iulianus. Argui ergo, et iure argui, deiectam et debilem varietatem, qua fuerat effectum ut et nuptias te non damnare praemitteres, et diceres, ob viri et feminae commixtionem, quam de nuptiarum conditione et natura venire perspicuum est, immo in qua sola (quantum ad conflictum nostrum respicit) nuptiarum veritas est, homines in diaboli iura transcribi.
I. 65. Julian. I argued, then, and rightly argued, the dejected and feeble variation, by which it had been brought about that you both premised that you do not condemn marriage, and said that, on account of the union of man and woman—which it is clear comes from the condition and nature of marriage, or rather in which alone (so far as concerns our conflict) the truth of marriage is—human beings are transcribed into the rights of the devil.
JulianImp.1.65Augustinus. Si in sola viri et feminae commixtione est veritas nuptiarum; eadem ergo est veritas adulteriorum quae nuptiarum, quia in utrisque est ista sexus utriusque commixtio. Quod si absurdissimum est; non in sola, ut deliras, commixtione maris et feminae nuptiarum veritas est, quamvis sine illa nuptiae filios propagare non possint; sed alia sunt ad nuptias proprie pertinentia, quibus ab adulteriis nuptiae discernuntur, sicut est thori coniugalis fides, et cura ordinate filios procreandi et, quae maxima differentia est, bonus usus mali, hoc est, bonus usus concupiscentiae carnis, quo malo adulteri utuntur male.
Augustine. If the truth of marriage is in the union of man and woman alone; then the truth of adulteries is the same as that of marriages, because in both there is this union of both sexes. But if that is most absurd; the truth of marriage is not in the union of male and female alone, as you rave, although without it marriages cannot propagate children; but there are other things properly pertaining to marriage, by which marriages are distinguished from adulteries, such as the fidelity of the conjugal bed, and the care of procreating children in an orderly way, and—which is the greatest difference—the good use of an evil, that is, the good use of the concupiscence of the flesh, which evil adulterers use badly.
JulianImp.1.65I. 66. Iulianus. Quam commixtionem ita exsecrabilem persuadere conatus es, ut velis intellegi Christum, non propter signi splendorem, sed propter damnandam sexuum coniunctionem nasci de virgine matre voluisse. Quid ergo umquam a quoquam dici improbius aut impudentius potuit, quam hoc, quod duos velut reges de humanitatis possessione certantes his signis, et duo eorum regna separasti, ut diceres, dia li esse quidquid nuptiae protulissent, Dei vero solum quod Virgo peperisset? Quid est aliud, Virginis fecundatorem et egentissimum ostendere inopia portionis suae, et eumdem negare eorum qui prodeunt de nuptiis hominum conditorem? Teneat igitur verbi tui lector diligens chirographum, sciatque te, discipulum fidelem Manichaeorum et Traducianae nationis primatem, nihil aliud quam commixtionem legitimi damnasse coniugii.
I. 66. Julian. Which union you have tried to persuade us is so execrable that you would have it understood that Christ wished to be born of a virgin mother, not on account of the splendor of the sign, but on account of the union of the sexes to be condemned. What, then, could ever have been said by anyone more wickedly or more shamelessly than this, that you separated two kings, as it were, contending for the possession of humanity, by these signs, and their two kingdoms, so as to say that whatever marriage had brought forth was the devil's, but God's only what the Virgin had borne? What is it else than to show the one who made the Virgin fruitful as most destitute by the poverty of his portion, and to deny that he is the founder of those who come forth from the marriages of human beings? Let the diligent reader, then, hold the handwriting of your word, and know that you, the faithful disciple of the Manichees and the chief of the Traducian nation, have condemned nothing other than the union of lawful marriage.
JulianImp.1.66Augustinus. Non habes exercitatos sensus ad separandum bonum a malo. Et hominum et Angelorum natura atque substantia vel bonorum vel malorum Deo creatore subsistit; sed vitia naturarum atque substantiarum, quae Manichaei naturas dicunt esse atque substantias, veritas autem negat, Deus iustus atque omnipotens ordinatione iudiciaria esse permittit; et ipsa sunt mala, quae nisi ex bonis et in bonis naturis inesse non possunt. Sic sunt autem in diaboli potestate quaecumque illi, Deo iudicante, subduntur, ut a Dei potestate, sub qua et ipse diabolus constitutus est, aliena esse non possint. Cum igitur omnes Angeli et omnes homines sub Dei sint potestate, inanis est loquacitas tua, qua dicis Deum et diabolum divisisse inter se, quis eorum quos habeat sub propria potestate. In quem vero crudo pectore evomas istas, quibus pasceris, contumelias, paulisper attende. En adest ille Ambrosius; de hoc in quod inveheris, quid dicat vide: Quomodo solus, inquit, potuit iustus esse, cum generatio omnis erraret, nisi natus ex Virgine generationis obnoxiae privilegio minime teneretur? Audi adhuc, audi, et protervam linguam frontis elisione compesce: Non enim virilis coitus, inquit, vulvae virginalis secreta reseravit; sed immaculatum semen inviolabili utero Spiritus Sanctus infudit; solus enim per omnia ex natis de femina sanctus Dominus Iesus, qui terrenae contagia corruptelae, immaculati partus novitate non senserit, et caelesti maiestate depulerit . Cernis nempe, quod dico, quis dixerit? Cernis, quidquid contra me dicis, contra quem dicas? Si enim ego hinc sum discipulus Manichaei, hoc est et ille. Non est autem hoc ille, qui haec ante nos dixit. Non est hoc igitur, quisquis haec dicit; sed haereticus manifestus est, quisquis huic antiquo catholico dogmati contradicit.
Augustine. You do not have senses exercised to separate good from evil. The nature and substance both of men and of Angels, whether good or evil, subsists with God as Creator; but the vices of natures and substances, which the Manichees say are natures and substances, but which the truth denies, the just and almighty God permits to exist by a judicial ordering; and these are evils, which cannot exist except from good and in good natures. But whatever things are subjected to him, by God's judging, are so in the power of the devil that they cannot be foreign to the power of God, under which the devil himself too has been placed. Since, then, all Angels and all human beings are under the power of God, vain is your loquacity, by which you say that God and the devil have divided between themselves which of them has whom under his own power. But against whom, with a raw breast, you vomit forth these revilings on which you feed, attend a little. Behold, here is Ambrose; about this which you inveigh against, see what he says: How could he alone be just, when all generation went astray, unless, born of a Virgin, he were held least of all by the privilege of a generation subject to guilt? Hear still, hear, and check your insolent tongue by striking your brow: For no virile coition, he says, unsealed the secrets of the virginal womb; but the Holy Spirit poured an immaculate seed into the inviolable womb; for alone among those born of woman, the Lord Jesus is holy in all things, who, by the newness of his immaculate birth, did not feel the contagions of earthly corruption, and by his heavenly majesty drove them away. You see indeed, do you not, who said what I say? You see, whatever you say against me, against whom you say it? For if I am from this a disciple of the Manichee, so too is he. But he who said these things before us is not this; this man, then, is not it, whoever says these things; but whoever contradicts this ancient catholic teaching is a manifest heretic.
JulianImp.1.66I. 67. Iulianus. Sed iam pergamus ad cetera. De me itaque scribens, post illa quae supra texui verba tua, haec quae sequuntur adiungis: Post haec illud nostrum posuit, ubi diximus: Haec enim quae ab impudentibus impudenter laudatur, pudenda concupiscentia, nulla esset, nisi homo ante peccasset; nuptiae vero essent, etiamsi nemo peccasset; fieret quippe sine isto morbo seminatio filiorum. Huc usque ille verba mea posuit. Timuit enim quod adiunxi: Potest in corpore vitae illius, sine quo nunc fieri non potest in corpore mortis huius. Et hic ut meam sententiam non finiret, sed eam quodam modo detruncaret, illud Apostoli testimonium formidavit, ubi ait: "ser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum " . Non enim erat corpus mortis huius in paradiso ante peccatum, propter quod diximus: In corpore vitae illius, quae ibi erat, sine isto morbo seminationem fieri potuisse filiorum, sine quo in corpore mortis huius fieri non potest . Tenes tu quidem consuetudinem tuam, equidem in hoc potissimum opere consequenter, ut qui contra veritatem agis, nihil verum loquaris; sed numerosis eruditionis tuae peccatis correptionum multitudo vix sufficit. Ideo hic iam breviter annotabo, te fallere; me autem, vel post hoc opus intelleges, insolentem esse mendacii. Tibi ergo huius vitii vindica totam possessionem, ut ab Evangelio, nec sane iniuria audire possis, quia ab initio mendax es, sicut et pater tuus , vel ille ad cuius te dicis dominium pertinuisse nascentem, vel alter secundarius, qui te elegantibus, quae tamen inter honestos nominari non queant, imbuit sacramentis. Totum ergo hoc protuli in opere meo priore, quod tu praetermissum esse confingis; quod quanta sit disputationis veritate ac luce convictum, si prope ultimas primi voluminis mei partes legas, etiam ipse poteris confiteri. Non ergo tua detruncata sententia, sed integra valenti est responsione destructa. Nunc autem audi breviter Apostolus hoc quod ait: Miser ergo homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum; non ad mortalitatem nostri corporis rettulit, quam caro animalium de naturae institutione suscepit, sed ad consuetudinem delinquendi; a quo reatu post incarnationem Christi, per Testamentum Novum, quisquis ad virtutis studia migraverit, liberatur. Ibi ergo sub persona Iudaeorum loquens, illecebrarum cupiditate etiam post interdictum sacrae legis errantium, ostendit unicum esse in illa tempestate subsidium, si crederent Christo; qui sic indicebat cautiones de futuris, ut veniam condonaret peractis; nec insistebat reis in tentatione supplicii, sed currentes liberalissimo gremio confovebat; non exanimans terrore depressos, sed reparans benignitate correctos. Quam benignitatem ipse iam senserat, qui dicebat: Humanus sermo, quoniam Christus Iesus venit in hunc mundum peccatores salvos facere, quorum primus sum ego; sed ideo misericordiam consecutus sum, ut in me ostenderet Christus Iesus omnem patientiam, ad exemplum eorum, qui credituri sunt illi in vitam aeternam . Quod ut intellegeres ad vitam malam, non ad naturam hominum pertinere; ne per adventus Christi causam, putares ab eo etiam parvulos peccatores pronuntiatos, ait: In me ostendit omnem patientiam. Patientia autem Dei illa est, de qua ad Romanos loquitur: An ignoras quoniam bonitas Dei ad paenitentiam te adducit? Se ndum autem duritiam tuam et cor impaenitens thesaurizas tibi iram in die irae . Exercetur ergo patientia Dei, cum non exiguo tempore exspectatur humana conversio. In parvulis autem non potest apparere patientia. Si enim essent peccata naturae, quae eis Salvator adscriberet; patiens quidem falso, saevus vero certissime diceretur. Non potest autem Deus nisi pius et iustus esse, quod est Deus meus Iesus Christus; cuius patientiam, vel Paulus diu persecutor, vel alii sub quorum persona loquitur, experti sunt; quia diu exspectati sunt, licet sero liberati. Ac per hoc ab Apostolo vita hominum, non natura damnatur. Commendans ergo hanc gratiam Iudaeis, quia lex punit scelestos, nec habet illam efficientiam misericordiae, quam Baptisma, in quo confessione brevi actuum delicta purgantur, ostendit debere illos currere ad Christum, implorare opem huius indulgentiae; et advertere quod lex morum vulneribus comminetur, gratia vero efficaciter celeriterque medeatur. Corpus itaque mortis, peccata dixit esse, non carnem; nam si de membrorum miseria pronuntiasset, quam peccato aestimas contigisse, rectius mortem corporis, quam corpus mortis vocasset. Verum ut scias, secundum consuetudinem Scripturarum peccata membra dici; lege ad Colossenses, ubi ipse Apostolus ait: Mortificate membra vestra, quae sunt super terram; fornicationem, immunditiam et avaritiam, quae est simulacrorum servitus; propter quae venit ira Dei in filios incredulitatis, in quibus et vos aliquando ambulastis, cum viveretis in illis . Ecce quomodo membra appellat, quae peccata pronuntiat. Corpus autem peccati hic ipsum ad Romanos: Vetus homo noster, inquit, simul confixus est cruci, ut destruatur corpus peccati, ut ultra non serviamus peccato . Hoc itaque more et hic exclamavit sub persona, ut diximus, Iudaeorum: Miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? id est: Quis me liberabit a reatu peccatorum meorum, quae commisi, cum vitare potuissem? Quae legis severitas non donat, sed ulciscitur? Quis me ab his membris, id est a vitiis, quae improborum imitatione collegi, ut peccati plenum corpus exstruerem, poterit vindicare? Quis, inquam? Et respondit, quasi rerum ipsarum voce commonitus: Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum . Gratia Dei, quae acceptam fert iustitiam fidelium sine operibus, secundum quod David dicit: Beati quorum remissae sunt iniquitates, et quorum tecta sunt peccata; beatus vir cui non imputavit Dominus peccatum . Qui ergo facit hominem beatum, etiam ipse beatus est, iustitia sempiterna, per quam non donat peccatum, nisi quod iure potuit imputare. Non autem iure potuit imputare, si non illud cui imputatur, potuit et cavere. Nemo autem potest cavere naturalia. Igitur nullus prorsus habere potest de naturae necessitate peccatum. Haec breviter dixisse sufficiat.
I. 67. Julian. But let us now proceed to the rest. Writing about me, then, after those words of yours which I wove in above, you add these which follow: After these things he set down that statement of ours, where we said: For this shameful concupiscence, which is shamelessly praised by the shameless, would be none, unless a human being had first sinned; but marriages would exist, even if no one had sinned; for the sowing of children would come about without this disease. Thus far he set down my words. For he feared what I added: It could come about in the body of that life, without which it now cannot come about in the body of this death. And here, that he might not finish my statement, but as it were lop it off, he dreaded that testimony of the Apostle, where he says: "Wretched man that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord " (Rom 7:24-25). For there was no body of this death in paradise before sin, on account of which we said: In the body of that life, which was there, the sowing of children could come about without this disease, without which it cannot come about in the body of this death. You indeed keep your custom—and consistently in this work especially—that, since you act against the truth, you say nothing true; but a multitude of corrections scarcely suffices for the numerous sins of your erudition. Therefore here I will now briefly note that you deceive; but me—you will understand, even after this work—to be unaccustomed to lying. To yourself, then, claim the whole possession of this vice, so that you can hear from the Gospel, and not unjustly indeed, that you are from the beginning a liar, like your father (See John 8:44)—whether the one to whose dominion you say you pertained at your birth, or the other, a secondary one, who imbued you with elegant mysteries, which nevertheless cannot be named among honest men. I brought forth, then, all this in my earlier work, which you pretend was passed over; with how great a truth and light of disputation it was refuted, if you read nearly the last parts of my first volume, even you yourself will be able to confess. Not, then, your statement lopped off, but your whole one, was destroyed by a strong response. But now hear briefly: this which the Apostle says: Wretched man that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord; he referred not to the mortality of our body, which the flesh of animals received from the institution of nature, but to the habit of sinning; from which guilt, after the incarnation of Christ, through the New Testament, whoever migrates to the pursuits of virtue is freed. There, then, speaking under the person of the Jews, who err by the desire of allurements even after the prohibition of the sacred law, he shows that there was one sole help in that time, if they believed in Christ; who so enjoined cautions about the future as to forgive pardon for what was done; nor did he press the guilty under the temptation of punishment, but cherished those who ran with a most liberal bosom; not dismaying those cast down by terror, but restoring those corrected by kindness. Which kindness he himself had already felt, who said: It is a human saying, that Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners, of whom I am the first; but therefore I obtained mercy, that in me Christ Jesus might show all patience, for the example of those who shall believe in him unto eternal life (1 Tim 1:15-16). That you might understand this to pertain to an evil life, not to the nature of human beings; lest, through the cause of Christ's coming, you should think that even little ones were declared by him to be sinners, he says: In me he showed all patience. But the patience of God is that of which he speaks to the Romans: Or are you ignorant that the goodness of God leads you to repentance? But according to your hardness and impenitent heart you treasure up for yourself wrath in the day of wrath (Rom 2:4-5). The patience of God is exercised, then, when a human conversion is awaited for no small time. But in little ones patience cannot appear. For if there were sins of nature, which the Savior would ascribe to them; he would falsely indeed be called patient, but most certainly savage. But God cannot be anything but pious and just, which my God Jesus Christ is; whose patience either Paul, long a persecutor, or others under whose person he speaks, experienced; because they were long awaited, though freed late. And through this, by the Apostle the life of human beings, not their nature, is condemned. Commending, then, this grace to the Jews, because the law punishes the wicked, and does not have that efficacy of mercy which Baptism has, in which the offenses of one's acts are purified by a brief confession, he shows that they ought to run to Christ, to implore the help of this indulgence; and to notice that the law of morals threatens by the wounds of vices, but grace heals efficaciously and quickly. He called sins, then, the body of death, not the flesh; for if he had declared this of the misery of the members, which you reckon befell on account of sin, he would more rightly have called it the death of the body than the body of death. But that you may know that, according to the custom of the Scriptures, sins are called members; read to the Colossians, where the same Apostle says: Mortify your members, which are upon the earth; fornication, uncleanness, and avarice, which is the service of idols; on account of which the wrath of God comes upon the sons of unbelief, among whom you too once walked, when you lived in them (Col 3:5-7). Behold how he calls members what he declares to be sins. But the body of sin, here the same to the Romans: Our old man, he says, is crucified together with him, that the body of sin may be destroyed, that we may no longer serve sin (Rom 6:6). In this manner, then, here too he exclaimed, under the person, as we said, of the Jews: Wretched man that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? that is: Who will free me from the guilt of my sins, which I committed when I could have avoided them? Which the severity of the law does not forgive, but avenges? Who will be able to vindicate me from these members, that is, from the vices which I gathered by imitating the wicked, so as to build up a body full of sin? Who, I say? And he answered, as if admonished by the very voice of the things: The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord. The grace of God, which credits the justice of the faithful without works, according to what David says: Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered; blessed the man to whom the Lord has not imputed sin (Ps 32:1-2 (31:1-2); Rom 4:7-8). He, then, who makes a human being blessed, is himself also blessed, the eternal justice, through which he does not forgive sin, except what he could by right have imputed. But he could not by right have imputed, if the one to whom it is imputed could not also have avoided it. But no one can avoid natural things. Therefore no one at all can have sin by the necessity of nature. Let it suffice to have said these things briefly.
JulianImp.1.67Augustinus. Conatus es quidem quod ait Apostolus: Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? in sensum vestrum disputando convertere; sed hoc te non posse, ille melius vidit, qui viro illustri chartulam misit; et ideo verba mea commemorans id praetermisit, ne tua rideretur exspectata et prolata responsio. Quis enim non rideat quod nescio utrum vobis persuadere potueritis, et tamen aliis persuadendum putastis, Iudaei Apostolum induxisse personam, nondum sub Christi gratia constituti, atque dicentis: Miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum . Itane vero Iudaeus, nondumque Christianus est, qui dicit: Dei gratia me liberabit per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum? Verum hoc omitto; illud autem quis ferat, de praeteritis suis peccatis putare hominem dicere: Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? ut ei per ignoscentis Christi gratiam remittantur; cum dilucide appareat, unde ad ista verba pervenerit? Ecce verba eius sunt in auribus nostris; videamus ergo, utrum ex eo quod egit volens, an ex eo quod agit nolens, miserum se esse fateatur. Clamat homo: Non quod volo, ago; sed quod odi, illud facio . Clamat: Iam non ego operor illud, sed id quod habitat in me peccatum. Scio enim quia non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum; velle enim adiacet mihi; perficere autem bonum, non invenio. Non enim quod volo, facio bonum; se quod nolo malum, hoc ago . Non ait: Feci, sed: facio; non ait: Operatus sum, sed: operor; non ait: Egi, sed: ago; et hoc: Non quod volo, sed: quod nolo. Postremo, condelectatur legi Dei secundum interiorem hominem; videt autem aliam legem in membris suis, repugnantem legi mentis suae; qua lege utique compellitur, non quod vult, facere bonum, sed quod non vult malum, hoc agere. Propter hoc exclamat: Miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Et tu contra clarissimam veritatem oculos claudis, gemitumque eius exponis, non ut omnibus patet, sed ut tibi placet, dicens: Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? hoc est: Quis me liberabit a reatu peccatorum meorum quae commisi? Ille dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago; et tu dicis: Quae commisi. Usque adeone desperas de hominibus qui haec legunt, ut non ipsum malint audire quam te, et ipsi potius quam tibi credere? Sine hominem gratiam Dei, non solum quia peccavit, ut absolvatur, verum etiam ne peccet, ut adiuvetur, exposcere: quod isto loco agitur. Qui enim dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago, non est locus ut dicat: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, sed: Ne nos inferas in tentationem . Unusquisque autem tentatur, sicut ait apostolus Iacobus, a concupiscentia sua attractus et illectus . Hoc malum est de quo ait: Scio quia non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum . Hoc malum est in corpo mortis huius. Hoc malum non fuit in paradiso ante peccatum; quia nondum erat haec caro corpus mortis huius; cui dicetur in fine: Ubi est, mors, contentio tua? Sed tunc dicetur, cum corruptibile hoc induerit incorruptionem, et mortale hoc induerit immortalitatem ; nunc autem corpus est mortis; quia idem ipse dixit Apostolus: Corpus mortuum est propter peccatum . Audi catholicos intellectores Apostoli; accipe eorum verba, non mea, cum quibus accipio convicia tua; audi non Pelagium, sed Ambrosium. Etiam Pauli caro, inquit, corpus mortis erat, sicut ipse ait: "Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?" . Audi non Caelestium, sed Gregorium: Intra nosmetipsos, inquit, propriis vitiis ac passionibus impugnamur, et die noctuque ignitis stimulis corporis humilitatis huius et corporis mortis urgemur, nunc latenter, nunc etiam palam, provocantibus ubique et irritantibus rerum visibilium illecebris, luto hoc faecis, cui inhaesimus, caeni sui fetorem venis capacioribus exhalante; sed et lege peccati, quae est in membris nostris, legi spiritus repugnante . His tu luminibus caelestis civitatis oblatrans: Corpus mortis, inquis, peccata dixit esse, non carnem; negans Apostolum hoc ad mortalitatem nostri corporis retulisse: Quam caro, inquis, animalium de naturae institutione suscepit. Hoc enim sapis, quod Pelagius in iudicio Palaestino ficto corde damnavit, Adam scilicet mortalem factum, ita ut sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset. Ac sic resistens his viris, et aliis eorum sociis fidei sanae, tot tantisque doctoribus, cogeris implere paradisum, etiamsi nemo peccasset, dolore parturientium, labore nascentium, gemitibus languentium, funeribus morientium, maerore lugentium. Quid igitur mirum, si et de isto paradiso, quod est Ecclesia, foras istis; qui paradisum illum, de quo foras ierunt, qui nos in istas miserias peccando miserunt, talem facitis, qualem non dico Christianorum nullus, sed nec hominum quisquam suspicari audet, si non sit insanus?
Augustine. You have tried indeed to turn, by disputing, this which the Apostle says: Who will free me from the body of this death? into your meaning; but that you could not do this, he saw better who sent the little sheet to the illustrious man; and therefore, mentioning my words, he passed this over, lest your awaited and brought-forth response be laughed at. For who would not laugh that—I know not whether you could persuade yourselves of it, and yet you thought it should be persuaded to others—the Apostle introduced the person of a Jew, not yet placed under the grace of Christ, and saying: Wretched man that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord. Is it really a Jew, and not yet a Christian, who says: The grace of God will free me through Jesus Christ our Lord? But this I pass over; but who could bear that a man should be thought to say, about his past sins: Who will free me from the body of this death? so that they may be remitted to him through the grace of the pardoning Christ; when it appears clearly whence he came to these words? Behold, his words are in our ears; let us see, then, whether he confesses himself wretched from what he does willing, or from what he does unwilling. The man cries out: I do not do what I will, but what I hate, that I do. He cries out: It is now no longer I who work it, but the sin that dwells in me. For I know that there does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh, the good; for to will is present to me, but to accomplish the good I do not find. For I do not do the good that I will, but the evil that I will not, this I do (Rom 7:15-19). He does not say: I did, but: I do; he does not say: I worked, but: I work; he does not say: I acted, but: I do; and this: Not what I will, but: what I will not. Finally, he is delighted together with the law of God according to the inner man; but he sees another law in his members, fighting against the law of his mind; by which law certainly he is compelled, not to do the good that he wills, but the evil that he wills not, this to do. On account of this he exclaims: Wretched man that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? (See Rom 7:22-24) And you, against the clearest truth, close your eyes, and expound his groan, not as it is plain to all, but as it pleases you, saying: Who will free me from the body of this death? that is: Who will free me from the guilt of my sins which I committed? He says: The evil that I will not, this I do; and you say: Which I committed. Do you so despair of the men who read these things that they would not rather hear him than you, and believe him rather than you? Allow a human being to ask for the grace of God, not only because he has sinned, that he may be absolved, but also that he may not sin, that he may be helped: which is dealt with in this place. For he who says: The evil that I will not, this I do, has no occasion to say: Forgive us our debts, but: Lead us not into temptation (Matt 6:12-13). But each one is tempted, as the apostle James says, drawn and enticed by his own concupiscence (Jas 1:14). This is the evil about which he says: I know that there does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh, the good. This is the evil in the body of this death. This evil was not in paradise before sin; because this flesh was not yet the body of this death; to which it will be said in the end: Where, O death, is your contention? (See 1 Cor 15:55) But it will be said then, when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality (See 1 Cor 15:53-54); but now it is a body of death; because the same Apostle said: The body is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10). Hear the catholic interpreters of the Apostle; receive their words, not mine, with which I receive your revilings; hear not Pelagius, but Ambrose. The flesh of Paul too, he says, was a body of death, as he himself says: "Who will free me from the body of this death?". Hear not Caelestius, but Gregory: Within ourselves, he says, we are assailed by our own vices and passions, and day and night we are pressed by the fiery goads of this body of lowliness and body of death, now secretly, now even openly, with the allurements of visible things provoking and irritating us everywhere, this mire of dregs, to which we have clung, exhaling the stench of its own filth through more capacious veins; but also with the law of sin, which is in our members, fighting against the law of the spirit. Barking against these lights of the heavenly city, you say: The body of death he called sins, not the flesh; denying that the Apostle referred this to the mortality of our body: Which the flesh, you say, of animals received from the institution of nature. For you hold this opinion, which Pelagius in the judgment of Palestine condemned with a feigned heart, namely that Adam was made mortal, so that whether he sinned or did not sin, he would die. And so, resisting these men, and other associates of theirs in the sound faith, so many and so great teachers, you are compelled to fill paradise, even if no one had sinned, with the pain of those giving birth, the labor of those being born, the groans of those languishing, the funerals of those dying, the grief of those mourning. What wonder, then, if you are also outside this paradise, which is the Church, you who make that paradise, from which they went out who sent us by sinning into these miseries, such as—I do not say no Christian, but not even any human being—dares to suspect, unless he be insane?
JulianImp.1.67I. 68. Iulianus. In primo enim opere latius disputata sunt. Quamvis nec tu dilucide loquaris, quam mortem intellegi velis, cuius corpus dicis in paradiso non fuisse ante peccatum; quia in libris, quos ad Marcellini nomen edidisti, mortalem Adam factum fuisse professus es . Quod vero adiungis morbum esse negotium nuptiarum, leniter audiri potest, si hoc solum de tuis parentibus dicas. Conscius enim forte esse potes matris tuae morbi alicuius occulti, quam in libris Confessionis, ut ipso verbo utar, meribibulam vocatam esse signasti . Ceterum in sanctorum connubio, et in omnium honestorum, nullus omnino morbus est. Quia nec Apostolus morbum pro remedio concessit, cum per reverentiam nuptia m a morbo fornicationis, Ecclesiae homines muniebat; qui sensus quomodo et frontem tuam et dogma penitus eraserit, primi voluminis mei prope ultima parte monstratur; quod et in toto ipsius responsionis corpore, prout locorum opportunitas attulit, explicatum est.
I. 68. Julian. For in the first work these things were disputed at greater length. Although you do not even speak clearly what death you wish to be understood, whose body you say was not in paradise before sin; because in the books which you published to the name of Marcellinus, you professed that Adam was made mortal. But as for what you add, that the business of marriage is a disease, it can be tolerably heard, if you say this only about your own parents. For you can perhaps be conscious of some hidden disease of your mother, whom in the books of your Confessions, to use the very word, you noted to have been called a tippler. But in the wedlock of the saints, and of all honest men, there is absolutely no disease. Because the Apostle did not grant a disease as a remedy, when, through reverence for marriage, he was fortifying the men of the Church against the disease of fornication; which sense, how it has utterly erased both your brow and your teaching, is shown near the last part of my first volume; which has also been explained in the whole body of the response itself, as the opportuneness of the places afforded.
JulianImp.1.68Augustinus. Nusquam sic apparuit dolus tuus, et per scientiam damnata conscientia. Scis enim, scis omnino; tam quippe apertum est, ut qui libros illos legit, hoc nescire non possit; scis, inquam, in libris quos ad Marcellinum edidi, me vehementer egisse contra incipientem surgere iam tunc haeresim vestram, ne crederetur Adam, etiamsi non peccasset, fuisse moriturus. Sed quoniam mortalem hactenus dixi, quia poterat mori, poterat namque peccare; tu eis qui libros illos non legerunt, nec fortasse lecturi sunt, fuco insidioso, si haec tua legerent, subripere voluisti; quasi ego ita dixerim, Adam mortalem factum, ut sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset. Hoc enim vobiscum agitur, hinc tota de hac re inter nos et vos vertitur quaestio, quod nos dicimus, Adam si non peccasset, nec corporis mortem fuisse passurum; vos autem, sive peccasset, sive non peccasset, corpore fuisse moriturum. Quid est ergo quod ignorare te fingis, quam mortem intellegi velim, cuius corpus dico in paradiso non fuisse ante peccatum; cum scias, in libris illis quid egerim, quamque aperte dilucideque egerim, non fuisse Deum puniendo dicturum peccatori: Terra es, et in terram ibis (quod de morte corporis dictum quis non intellegit?), si Adam etiam nulla iniquitate commissa iturus esset in terram, id est, vel corpore moriturus? Quod autem etiam matrem meam, quae te nihil laesit, nec contra te aliquid disputavit, convicio lacerandam putasti, victus es maledicendi libidine, non timens quod scriptum est: Neque maledici regnum Dei possidebunt . Sed quid mirum est quod te inimicum etiam eius ostendis, cum sis inimicus gratiae Dei, qua eam dixi ab illo puellari vitio liberatam? Ego vero parentes tuos tamquam catholicos christianos honorabiles habeo, eisque gratulor quod ante defuncti sunt, quam haereticum te viderent. Non autem dicimus, morbum esse negotium nuptiarum, quod est liberorum procreandorum causa concumbere, non satiandae libidinis; quam tu negas morbum, cum fatearis adversus eam provisum fuisse coniugale remedium. Nam utique ne fornicatio perpetretur, libidini, quam laudas, contradicitur, obsistitur, repugnatur. Ut si eum, qui procreandis filiis constitutus est, transgreditur limitem; saltem qui ei cedit, in coniuge venialiter peccet; coniugibus enim loquebatur Apostolus, ubi cum dixisset: Nolite fraudare invicem, nisi ex consensu ad tempus, ut vacetis orationi; et iterum ad id ipsum estote, ne vos tentet Sa nas propter intemperantiam vestram; continuo subiecit, atque ait: Hoc autem dico secundum veniam, non secundum imperium . Hoc itaque malo sola bene utitur intentione propagandae prolis pudicitia coniugalis; huic malo venialiter in coniuge ceditur, non causa prolis, sed carnalis tantummodo voluptatis; huic malo resistitur, ne appetitus damnabilis voluptatis expleatur. Hoc malum habitat in corpore mortis huius; propter cuius motum, etiam mente non consentiente importunum, dicitur: Scio quia non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum . Hoc malum non erat in corpore vitae illius, ubi aut voluntati servientibus etiam genitalibus membris, libido nulla erat, aut omnino se umquam contra voluntatis arbitrium non movebat. Huius mali repente exorti puduit eos , qui priusquam peccarent nudi erant, et non pudebat eos . Huius mali laudes impudenter sparsisti etiam quattuor illis libris tuis, quibus coactus sum respondere sex meis.
Augustine. Nowhere has your guile so appeared, and your conscience condemned through knowledge. For you know, you know altogether; for it is so open that whoever reads those books cannot fail to know it; you know, I say, that in the books I published to Marcellinus, I argued vehemently against your heresy, already beginning then to rise, that no one should believe that Adam, even if he had not sinned, would have died. But since I have hitherto said that he was mortal, because he could die—for he could sin—you wished, by an insidious deception, if those who have not read those books, and perhaps will not read them, should read these things of yours, to filch from them; as though I had said that Adam was made mortal in such a way that whether he sinned or did not sin, he would die. For this is what is dealt with between us and you, on this the whole question about this matter turns between us, that we say Adam, if he had not sinned, would not have suffered the death of the body; but you say that, whether he had sinned or not sinned, he would die in body. What is it, then, that you pretend not to know, what death I wish to be understood, whose body I say was not in paradise before sin; when you know what I argued in those books, and how openly and clearly I argued, that God would not have said in punishment to the sinner: You are earth, and into earth you shall go (Gen 3:19) (which who does not understand to be said of the death of the body?), if Adam, even with no iniquity committed, were going to go into the earth, that is, to die in body? But as for the fact that you thought even my mother, who has in no way harmed you, nor disputed anything against you, ought to be torn at with reviling, you were overcome by the lust of slandering, not fearing what is written: Nor shall slanderers possess the kingdom of God (See 1 Cor 6:10). But what wonder is it that you show yourself an enemy even of her, when you are an enemy of the grace of God, by which I said she was freed from that girlish vice? But I hold your parents in honor as catholic Christians, and congratulate them that they died before they saw you a heretic. But we do not say that the business of marriage is a disease, which is to lie together for the cause of procreating children, not of sating lust; which lust you deny to be a disease, though you confess that the conjugal remedy was provided against it. For certainly, lest fornication be perpetrated, the lust which you praise is contradicted, resisted, fought against. So that, if it transgresses that limit which is established for procreating children; at least he who yields to it in a spouse sins venially; for the Apostle was speaking to spouses, where, when he had said: Do not defraud one another, except by consent for a time, that you may be free for prayer; and again return to the same, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence; he immediately added, and said: But this I say by way of indulgence, not by way of command (1 Cor 7:5-6). Conjugal chastity, then, uses this evil well by the sole intention of propagating offspring; one yields to this evil venially in a spouse, not for the cause of offspring, but only of carnal pleasure; this evil is resisted, lest the damnable appetite of pleasure be satisfied. This evil dwells in the body of this death; on account of whose motion, importunate even when the mind does not consent, it is said: I know that there does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh, the good. This evil was not in the body of that life, where either, with the genital members too serving the will, there was no lust, or it never moved itself at all against the choice of the will. They were ashamed of this evil suddenly arising (See Gen 3:7), who before they sinned were naked, and were not ashamed (See Gen 2:25). You scattered the praises of this evil shamelessly even in those four books of yours, to which I was compelled to reply in my six.
JulianImp.1.68I. 69. Iulianus. Ut autem ad istam commemorationem humanae miseriae et divinae gratiae veniret Apostolus supra dixerat: Video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captivantem me in lege peccati ; post haec verba exclamavit: Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum . Constat quidem praemissis illis quae posuisti, subdidisse Apostolum: Miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum. Sed non quaerimus impraesentiarum, utrum hoc Apostolus dixerit; verum qua fide, quo sensu, qua ratione dixerit quaerimus. Ille enim in membris legem per flagitiorum usum sanctis consiliis inter principia tamen emendationis rebellem, consuetudinem malam vocabat, quae ab eruditis etiam saeculi dici solet secunda natura. Ante pauca enim eos, ad quos loquitur, cum exprobratione conveniens dixerat: Humanum est quod dico, propter infirmitatem carnis vestrae; sicut enim exhibuistis membra vestra servire immunditiae et iniquitati ad iniquitatem; ita nunc exhibete membra vestra servire iustitiae in sanctificationem . Utque ostenderet quia carnem, non hoc corpus quod causas in seminibus habet, sed vitia abusive vocaret; post duo capita fortasse subiungit: Cum essemus in carne, passiones peccatorum quae per legem ostenduntur, operabantur in membris nostris, ut fructificarent morti . Sic dixit: Cum essemus in carne, quasi eo tempore cum disputaret, in carne non esset; sed qui Scripturas novit, genus hoc elocutionis agnoscit. Et ideo, ubi verborum communitas ingerit quaestionem, adhibeatur regula rationis, ad cuius aequalitatem, quae putabantur deflexisse, tendantur. Ceterum Faustus, Manichaeorum episcopus, praeceptor tuus, hoc vel maxime Apostoli testimonio contra nos nititur, dicens ab eo nihil aliud his sermonibus, legis videlicet quae repugnans consilio in membris habitet, quam naturam malam significatam fuisse. Unde nihil minus a te fieri debuit, quam hic locus sic intellegi, quomodo ab illis exponitur, ne, cum per easdem lineas, quas Faustus torsit, ingrederis, non disputasse, sed praeterita reddidisse videaris.
I. 69. Julian. But that the Apostle might come to this mention of human misery and divine grace, he had said above: I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and taking me captive in the law of sin (Rom 7:23); after these words he exclaimed: Who will free me from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord. It is established, indeed, that after those premises which you set down, the Apostle subjoined: Wretched man that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord. But we are not asking at present whether the Apostle said this; rather we ask by what faith, in what sense, by what reasoning he said it. For he called the law in the members, rebellious to holy counsels through the practice of disgraceful deeds—yet in the midst of the beginnings of amendment—an evil habit, which is wont to be called by the learned even of the age a second nature. For a little before he had said, addressing those to whom he speaks with reproach: It is a human thing that I say, on account of the weakness of your flesh; for as you presented your members to serve uncleanness and iniquity unto iniquity, so now present your members to serve justice unto sanctification (Rom 6:19). And that he might show that he called flesh abusively, not this body which has its causes in seeds, but vices; after two chapters perhaps he subjoins: When we were in the flesh, the passions of sins which are shown through the law worked in our members, that they might bear fruit unto death (Rom 7:5). He said thus: When we were in the flesh, as if at that time when he was disputing, he were not in the flesh; but whoever knows the Scriptures recognizes this kind of expression. And therefore, where the commonness of words introduces a question, let the rule of reason be applied, to whose level the things that were thought to have deviated may be brought. But Faustus, the bishop of the Manichees, your teacher, relies on this testimony of the Apostle above all against us, saying that by these words—of the law, namely, which dwells in the members fighting against counsel—nothing else than an evil nature was signified by him. Whence nothing ought less to have been done by you than that this passage be understood as it is expounded by them, lest, when you go in along the same lines which Faustus twisted, you seem not to have disputed, but to have repeated what is past.
JulianImp.1.69Augustinus. Respondeat tibi non Faustus Manichaeus, sed catholicus doctus doctorque Gregorius, qui non inter principia, ut dicis, emendationis, in membris legem per flagitiorum usum sanctis consiliis rebellem, consuetudinem malam vocabat, quae ab eruditis etiam dici solet secunda natura; sed legem peccati quae est in membris nostris repugnans legi mentis, mortali huic terrenoque corpori nostro plane aperteque tribuebat dicens: Legem peccati quae est in membris nostris, legi spiritus repugnare, dum imaginem regiam quae intra nos est, captivam ducere studet, ut spoliis eius cedat, quidquid illud est quod in nos beneficio divinae ac primae illius conditionis influxit. Unde vix aliquis, inquit, fortasse longa se et districta regens philosophia, et paulatim animae suae nobilitatem recolens, naturam lucis, quae in se est, humili huic et tenebroso luto coniuncta, revocet ac reflectat ad Deum. Vel si certe propitio Deo agat, utrumque pariter revocabit; si tamen longa et assidua meditatione insuescat sursum semper aspicere, et deorsum male trahentem ac degravantem materiam sibimet astrictam frenis arctioribus sublevare . Haec dicebat beatus Gregorius, non inter principia emendationis suae, sed iam episcopus, volens exponere, vel potius quae nota sunt, admonere, in quali quantoque certamine cum vitiis interioribus, propter corpus quod aggravat animam, constituti sint sancti. Quod certamen utique non fuisset in illo beatae pacis loco, id est, paradiso deliciarum sanctarum, si nemo peccasset. Non enim corpus mortis huius ibi esset, cuius corruptibilitate anima gravaretur; sed corpus vitae illius, ubi non caro concupisceret adversus spiritum, ut necesse esset spiritui concupiscere adversus carnem ; sed felici utriusque concordia natura laetaretur humana. Si ergo Manichaeos introducentes aliam naturam mali atque substantiam expugnare velles, non adiuvare; profecto istas omnibus apertas a parvulis incipientes humanae vitae miserias cum tuis deceptoribus non negares; sed unde in eas collapsa sit nostra natura, quae beata est primitus instituta, cum catholicis fidelibus et praeclarissimis doctoribus diceres.
Augustine. Let there answer you, not Faustus the Manichee, but the learned catholic and teacher Gregory, who did not, in the midst of the beginnings, as you say, of amendment, call the law in the members rebellious to holy counsels through the practice of disgraceful deeds, an evil habit, which is wont to be called by the learned even a second nature; but plainly and openly attributed the law of sin which is in our members fighting against the law of the mind to this mortal and earthly body of ours, saying: That the law of sin which is in our members fights against the law of the spirit, while it strives to lead captive the royal image which is within us, so that there may yield to its spoils whatever it is that flowed into us by the benefit of the divine and primal creation. Whence scarcely anyone, he says, perhaps, governing himself by long and strict philosophy, and little by little recalling the nobility of his soul, calls back and turns to God the nature of the light which is in him, joined to this lowly and dark mire. Or if at least, God being favorable, he acts, he will call both back together; if, however, by long and assiduous meditation he accustoms himself always to look upward, and to lift up by tighter reins the matter that drags downward badly and weighs down, bound to himself. These things the blessed Gregory said, not in the midst of the beginnings of his amendment, but already a bishop, wishing to expound, or rather to admonish of what is known, in how great and what kind of a contest with the interior vices, on account of the body that weighs down the soul, the saints are placed. Which contest certainly would not have been in that place of blessed peace, that is, paradise of holy delights, if no one had sinned. For the body of this death would not be there, by whose corruptibility the soul would be weighed down; but the body of that life, where the flesh would not lust against the spirit, so that it would be necessary for the spirit to lust against the flesh (See Gal 5:17); but by the happy concord of both human nature would rejoice. If, then, you wished to assail, not to assist, the Manichees who introduce another nature and substance of evil; you would surely not deny, with your deceivers, these miseries of human life open to all and beginning from little ones; but you would say, with the catholic faithful and the most illustrious teachers, whence our nature, which was first instituted blessed, has fallen into them.
JulianImp.1.69I. 70. Iulianus. Ut igitur quod egimus colligatur, nec ego dictis tuis fraudem intuli, nec tu attulisti aliquid, quod vel dilutiore pietatis colore perfunderes, nedum Scripturis testibus approbares. Nec hoc quod tu putas, intellexit Apostolus; nec alia prorsus in paradiso fuit conditio commixtionis, quam qualis nunc in coniugiis agitur quae a se instituta Deus, tam ipsorum conditione sexuum et qualitate membrorum, quam frequentata benedictione perdocuit. Quibus absolutis claret, cunctos qui a te decipiuntur, ira esse quam misericordia digniores, quoniam in excusationem criminum suorum, quae mala voluntate committunt, te auctore infamant nativitatem, ne corrigant actionem.
I. 70. Julian. That what we have done may, then, be gathered: neither did I bring fraud into your sayings, nor did you bring anything that you could either suffuse with even a paler color of piety, much less approve with the Scriptures as witnesses. Neither did the Apostle understand this which you think; nor was there at all in paradise any other condition of union than such as is now carried on in marriages, which God, having instituted them himself, taught thoroughly both by the very condition of the sexes and the quality of the members, and by the blessing he repeated. With these things settled, it is clear that all who are deceived by you are more worthy of wrath than of mercy, since, for the excusing of their crimes, which they commit by an evil will, they defame birth, with you as author, that they may not correct their action.
JulianImp.1.70Augustinus. Actio pia est in hac vita Deum colere, et eius gratia contra vitia interna pugnare, eisque ad illicita instigantibus cogentibusve non cedere; et ubi ceditur indulgentiam, atque ut non cedatur adiutorium Dei affectu religiosae pietatis exposcere. In paradiso autem, si nemo peccasset, non esset actio pietatis expugnare vitia; quoniam permansio felicitatis esset vitia non habere. Sed non est indicium hominum contra vitia veraciter dimicantium, ea quae impudenter frequentatur a vobis laudatio vitiorum. Itane vero, Iuliane, quando dicebat Ambrosius: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est ; aut me dicebat auctore, aut infamabat nativitatem, ne corrigeret actionem? Itane vero Gregorius, quando dicebat: Venerare nativitatem, per quam terrenae nativitatis vinculis liberatus es ; aut quando dicebat de Christo loquens, vel de Spiritu Sancto: Per hunc primae nativitatis maculae purgantur, per quas in iniquitatibus concipimur, et in delictis genuerunt nos matres nostrae ; aut quando dicebat Hilarius de rege David: Scit sub peccati origine, et sub lege peccati esse se natum ; infamabant isti viri nativitatem, ne corrigerent actionem? Audebisne persuadere cordi tuo, quod Pelagianorum actio actioni praeferatur istorum? Date veniam, numquam vos vitam melius illis agere crederemus, nec si non sic amaretis concupiscentiam carnis, ut eam, qualis nunc est contra spiritum concupiscens, etiam in paradiso ante peccatum collocare velletis. Nam si, ut dicis: Non alia fuit in paradiso conditio commixtionis, quam qualis nunc in coniugiis agitur; erat ibi et ante peccatum libido carnalis, sine qua non potest nunc sexus uterque misceri. Si ergo non vultis, in illa beatitudine membra genitalia nondum pudenda, ad opus suum peragendum, quo proles seminaretur, voluntati hominum sine libidine potuisse servire; adhuc quaero eamdem libidinem qualem tunc fuisse credatis. Voluntatem certe quando esset necessaria, sequebatur; an etiam quando non erat propter propagandos filios necessaria, stimulabat tamen animum, et propellebat in concubitus vel quosque damnabiles, vel cum coniuge veniales? Si enim talis erat, qualis nunc est; hoc sine dubitatione faciebat, sive illi resisteretur per temperantiam, sive per intemperantiam cederetur. Ac sic, homo libidini aut peccando servire cogeretur, aut bello intimo repugnare; quorum alterum honestati, alterum paci felicitatis illius, si humanum sensum habetis, non convenire sentitis. Remanet igitur, ut si libido ibi esset, ita esset subdita voluntati, ut rectam quietamque mentem, nec ad delictum traheret, nec ad proelium provocaret; et spiritum oboedientem Deo, ac fruentem Deo, nec peccare nec pugnare compelleret. Quae quoniam nunc talis non est, sed ipsa licita inhianter, non obtemperanter appetit; in illicitis autem aut spiritum deicit, aut contra spiritum concupiscit; agnoscite malum vitiata naturae integritate contractum; quo malo bene utitur propagandi officio castitas coniugum, et de quo malo ducitur generationis obnoxiae vinculum, regeneratione solvendum.
Augustine. The pious action in this life is to worship God, and by his grace to fight against the interior vices, and not to yield to them when they instigate or compel to unlawful things; and where one yields, to ask for pardon, and, that one may not yield, for the help of God, with the affection of religious piety. But in paradise, if no one had sinned, there would be no action of piety to assail vices; since the persistence of happiness would be to have no vices. But the praise of vices which is shamelessly repeated by you is not a sign of men truly fighting against vices. Was it really so, Julian, that when Ambrose said: We are all human beings born under sin, and our very origin is in fault; he either said it with me as author, or defamed birth, that he might not correct action? Was it really so, that Gregory, when he said: Venerate the birth through which you have been freed from the bonds of earthly birth; or when, speaking of Christ, or of the Holy Spirit, he said: Through him the stains of the first birth are purified, through which we are conceived in iniquities, and in offenses our mothers bore us; or when Hilary said about King David: He knows that he was born under the origin of sin, and under the law of sin; did these men defame birth, that they might not correct action? Will you dare to persuade your heart that the action of the Pelagians is to be preferred to the action of these men? Forgive me—we would never believe that you live a better life than they, not even if you did not so love the concupiscence of the flesh that you wish to place it, such as it now is, lusting against the spirit, even in paradise before sin. For if, as you say: There was no other condition of union in paradise than such as is now carried on in marriages; there was there, even before sin, carnal lust, without which now neither sex can be joined. If, then, you are unwilling that in that blessedness the genital members, not yet shameful, could, to perform their work by which offspring would be sown, serve the will of human beings without lust; I ask still what kind of lust you believe it then to be. Did it certainly follow the will when it was necessary; or even when it was not necessary for propagating children, did it nevertheless goad the mind, and drive it into intercourse either damnable, or venial with a spouse? For if it was such as it now is; it did this without doubt, whether it was resisted through temperance, or yielded to through intemperance. And thus a human being would be compelled either to serve lust by sinning, or to fight against it by an inner war; of which the one you perceive, if you have human sense, does not befit honesty, the other the peace of that happiness. It remains, then, that if lust were there, it was so subject to the will that it would neither draw the upright and quiet mind to offense, nor provoke it to battle; and would compel the spirit, obedient to God and enjoying God, neither to sin nor to fight. Since now it is not such, but itself gapingly, not obediently, desires lawful things; and in unlawful things either casts down the spirit, or lusts against the spirit; acknowledge the evil contracted by the vitiating of nature's integrity; which evil the chastity of spouses uses well in the office of propagating, and from which evil is derived the bond of a generation subject to guilt, to be loosed by regeneration.
JulianImp.1.70I. 71. Iulianus. Se de hoc satis sit, nunc quae sequuntur arripiam. In corpore igitur mortis huius, quale in paradiso ante peccatum, profecto non erat, alia lex in membris nostris repugnat legi mentis; quia et quando nolumus, et quando non consentimus, nec ei membra nostra ut impleat quod appetit exhibemus; habitat tamen in eis, et mentem resistentem repugnantemque sollicitat; ut ipse conflictus etiamsi non sit damnabilis, quia non perficit iniquitatem; sit tamen misera lis, quia non habet pacem . Naturalem esse omnium sensuum voluptatem, testimonio universitatis docemus. Hanc autem voluptatem et concupiscentiam ante peccatum in paradiso fuisse, res illa declarat, quia ad delictum via per concupiscentiam fuit, quae cum pomi decore oculos incitasset, spem etiam iucundi irritavit saporis. Non ergo potuit haec concupiscentia, quae cum modum non tenet, peccat; cum vero intra limitem concessorum tenetur, affectio naturalis et innocens est; non, inquam, potuit fructus esse peccati, quae docetur, non suo quidem vitio, sed voluntatis, occasio fuisse peccati. Lege et de hoc secundum librum meum: invenies hoc quod dicimus etiam tuo posse animo persuaderi. Quod vero quasi acutule posuisti, legem quidem peccati esse in membris nostris; sed tunc habere peccatum, quando ei consentimus; tunc vero solum proelium suscitare, quando non consentimus, et indicere miseriam pace turbata; quis non prudens pugnare perspiciat? Nam si lex peccati, id est, peccatum, et necessitas peccati membris est inserta naturaliter; quid prodest non ei praebere consensum, cum propter hoc ipsum quod est, necesse sit subire supplicium? Aut si est lex quidem peccati, sed quando ei non consentio non peccat; inaestimabilis potentia voluntatis humanae, quae (si dici permittat absurditas) cogit ipsum non peccare peccatum. Sed revertitur eo, ut quod dicis asystaton sit; nam si non peccat, nec lex peccati est; si lex peccati est, peccat; si vero peccat, solum quia est, quomodo ei obsisti potest ut non peccetur, quae repelli non potest ut a peccati opere desinatur?
I. 71. Julian. But let this be enough about this; now I will seize on what follows. In the body of this death, then, such as certainly was not in paradise before sin, another law in our members fights against the law of the mind; because both when we are unwilling, and when we do not consent, nor present our members to it that it may fulfill what it desires; yet it dwells in them, and solicits the resisting and fighting mind; so that the conflict itself, even if it is not damnable, because it does not accomplish iniquity, is yet wretched, because it does not have peace. That the pleasure of all the senses is natural, we teach by the testimony of the whole world. But that this pleasure and concupiscence was in paradise before sin, that very thing declares, because the way to the offense was through concupiscence, which, when it had incited the eyes with the beauty of the apple, also stirred up the hope of a pleasant taste. This concupiscence could not, then—which, when it does not keep its measure, sins; but when it is kept within the limit of permitted things, is a natural and innocent affection—it could not, I say, be the fruit of sin, which is taught to have been the occasion of sin, not indeed by its own fault, but by that of the will. Read also about this my second book: you will find that this which we say can be persuaded even to your mind. But as for what you set down, somewhat cleverly, that the law of sin is indeed in our members; but that it then has sin, when we consent to it; but that it then only stirs up battle, when we do not consent, and announces misery with peace disturbed; who that is prudent would not perceive that you fight against yourself? For if the law of sin, that is, sin, and the necessity of sin, is inserted in the members naturally; what does it profit not to give consent to it, when, on account of this very thing that it exists, it is necessary to undergo punishment? Or if there is indeed a law of sin, but when I do not consent to it, it does not sin; inestimable is the power of the human will, which (if the absurdity permit it to be said) compels the sin itself not to sin. But it returns to this, that what you say is inconsistent; for if it does not sin, neither is it the law of sin; if it is the law of sin, it sins; but if it sins, solely because it exists, how can it be resisted so that one not sin, which cannot be repelled so that one cease from the work of sin?
JulianImp.1.71Augustinus. Secundo libro tuo iam respondi quarto meo, teque inania dixisse convici; sed videant qui legunt, utrum respondendum sit homini, qui in tantam progreditur insaniam, ut cum fateatur malum esse peccatum, bonam esse dicat concupiscentiam peccatorum. Et tamen respondere compellimur, nolentes deserere hominum ingenia tardiora, ad quos istae litterae potuerint pervenire. Quid est ergo quod loqueris, nesciens quid loquaris? Ergone et in paradiso ante malesuadi venena serpentis, ante corruptam sermone sacrilego voluntatem, illiciti cibi libido iam fuit? Et, quod intolerabilius dicitur, ad malum provocabat, et mala non fuit? Et videbant illi homines fructum ligni prohibiti, et concupiscebat, sed ut non manducarent, concupiscentia spiritus carnis concupiscentiae repugnabat; et vivebant in loco illo tantae beatitudinis non habentes in se ipsis pacem mentis et corporis? Non usque adeo dementes estis, ut ista credatis; non usque adeo impudentes, ut ista dicatis. Ergo intellegite, vel intellegentibus obstrepere vana loquacitate nolite. Praecessit mala voluntas, qua serpenti subdolo crederetur; et secuta est mala concupiscentia, qua cibo inhiaretur illicito. Non itaque ibi qualiscumque cupiditas qualicumque reluctata est voluntati; sed ei potius depravatae depravata servivit. Ac per hoc quamvis iam utraque mala esset, tamen voluntas cupiditatem, non voluntatem cupiditas duxit; non praecessit voluntatem, nec restitit voluntati. Denique si ante peccati consummationem ab opere illicito averteretur voluntas, sine labore ullo cupiditas illicita sedaretur. Hinc loquens beatus Ambrosius: Caro, inquit, in naturam regressa vigoris sui, agnoscit altricem; atque ausu deposito contumaciae, moderationis animae coniugatur arbitrio; qualis fuit, cum inhabitanda paradisi secreta suscepit, antequam veneno pestiferi serpentis infecta sacrilegam famem sciret, divinorumque memo am praeceptorum animae sensibus inhaerentem edacitatis studio praeteriret. Hinc peccatum manasse proditur, tamquam corpore animaque genitoribus; dum corporis natura tentatur, anima male sana compatitur; quae si appetentiam corporis refrenasset, in ipso ortu esset exstincta origo peccati . Videsne quemadmodum doctor catholicus, et christiana sapientia praeditus, ipsam cibi illiciti concupiscentiam, quam tu, si non permittatur implere quod appetit, asseris innocentem, iam famem sacrilegam nuncupavit? Et tamen si anima utique voluntate correcta, hanc appetentiam corporis refrenasset, in ipso, ut ait, exortu exstincta esset origo peccati; sed quoniam non represso appetitu illiciti cibi, ad peccati consummationem perventum est; non exstincta est origo peccati, sed etiam manavit in posteros; et tanta est carnis et spiritus dissensio subsecuta, ut in naturam, sicut idem doctor alio loco dicit, per praevaricationem primi hominis verteretur . Sed tu adversus haec: Naturalem esse omnium sensuum voluptatem testimonio universitatis docere te dicis; quasi non posset in corpore, non mortis huius, sed vitae illius, ita esse omnium sensuum voluptas naturae sufficiens, ut summa in iura virtutis animi carnisque concordia, nulla concupiscerentur illicita. O quam multum erras, qui ex ista, quae nunc est, corruptibilitate atque infirmitate naturae sanctas paradisi delicias atque illam beatitudinem conicis! Alia erat illa immortalitas, ubi homo poterat non mori; alia est ista mortalitas, ubi homo non potest nisi mori; alia erit summa immortalitas, ubi homo non poterit mori. Quid litigas de concupiscentia litigante, hoc est, de lege in membris repugnante legi mentis? Lex peccati dicitur, quia suadet peccata atque, ut ita dixerim, iubet; et si ei mente serviatur, sine excusatione peccatur. Peccatum dicitur, quia peccato facta est, appetitque peccare. Reatus eius regeneratione solutus est, conflictus eius ad agonem relictus est. Malum est, clarum est. Non viribus nostrae voluntatis, ut putas, huic obsistimus, nisi divinitus adiuvemur. Debellandum hoc malum est, non negandum; vincendum est, non defendendum. Postremo, si ei consentis, malum agnosce peccando; si ei resistis, malum agnosce pugnando.
Augustine. I have already answered your second book in my fourth, and convicted you of having said empty things; but let those who read see whether one must answer a man who advances into such great insanity that, while he confesses sin to be an evil, he says the concupiscence of sins is good. And yet we are compelled to answer, unwilling to desert the slower talents of men, to whom these writings may have been able to reach. What is it, then, that you say, not knowing what you say? Was there, then, even in paradise, before the poisons of the evilly persuading serpent, before the will was corrupted by sacrilegious speech, already a lust for unlawful food? And—what is said more intolerably—did it provoke to evil, and was not evil? And did those human beings see the fruit of the forbidden tree, and did it desire, but, so that they should not eat, did the concupiscence of the spirit fight against the concupiscence of the flesh; and did they live in that place of so great blessedness not having in themselves the peace of mind and body? You are not so demented as to believe these things; you are not so shameless as to say these things. Understand, then, or do not, with empty loquacity, clamor against those who understand. The evil will went before, by which the cunning serpent was believed; and the evil concupiscence followed, by which the unlawful food was gaped at. Not, then, did some sort of desire there struggle against some sort of will; but rather, depraved, it served the depraved will. And through this, although both were now evil, yet the will led the desire, not the desire the will; it did not go before the will, nor resist the will. Finally, if before the consummation of the sin the will had been turned away from the unlawful work, the unlawful desire would have been quieted without any labor. Speaking of this, the blessed Ambrose says: The flesh, he says, returned to the nature of its own vigor, recognizes its nurse; and, the daring of its obstinacy laid aside, is joined to the moderating choice of the soul; such as it was when it took up the secret places of paradise to be inhabited, before, infected by the poison of the pestiferous serpent, it knew sacrilegious hunger, and, by the zeal of greediness, passed over the memory of the divine precepts that clung to the senses of the soul. From this it is shown that sin flowed, as it were from begetting parents, body and soul; while the nature of the body is tempted, the unsound soul suffers along with it; which, if it had bridled the appetite of the body, the origin of sin would have been extinguished in its very rising. Do you see how the catholic teacher, endowed with Christian wisdom, called the very concupiscence of unlawful food—which you assert to be innocent, if it is not permitted to fulfill what it desires—already a sacrilegious hunger? And yet, if the soul, with the will certainly corrected, had bridled this appetite of the body, the origin of sin, as he says, would have been extinguished in its very rising; but since, the appetite for unlawful food not being repressed, it came to the consummation of sin; the origin of sin was not extinguished, but even flowed into posterity; and so great a dissension of flesh and spirit followed, that, as the same teacher says in another place, it turned into nature through the transgression of the first man. But you, against these things, say that you teach by the testimony of the whole world that the pleasure of all the senses is natural; as if there could not be in the body, not of this death, but of that life, the pleasure of all the senses sufficient for nature in such a way that, with the supreme concord of the virtue of the mind and of the flesh, nothing unlawful would be desired. O how greatly you err, who conjecture the holy delights of paradise and that blessedness from this corruptibility and infirmity of nature which now exists! That immortality was one thing, where a human being could not die; this mortality is another, where a human being cannot but die; the supreme immortality will be another, where a human being will not be able to die. Why do you contend about the contending concupiscence, that is, about the law in the members fighting against the law of the mind? It is called the law of sin, because it persuades sins and, so to speak, commands them; and if it is served by the mind, one sins without excuse. It is called sin, because it was made by sin, and desires to sin. Its guilt has been loosed by regeneration, its conflict has been left for the struggle. It is an evil, that is clear. We resist it not, as you think, by the powers of our will, unless we are divinely helped. This evil must be warred down, not denied; conquered, not defended. Finally, if you consent to it, acknowledge the evil by sinning; if you resist it, acknowledge the evil by fighting.
JulianImp.1.71I. 72. Iulianus. Vel quid prodest eius rei modestia, cuius accusat se ipsa praesentia? Vide ergo quo tua acumina provehantur. Primo, quia peccat natura sine voluntate; quod non potest. Secundo, quia est peccatum, et non peccat, id est, una res est, et non est. Deinde, quando turbat pacem, miserabilis est, nec pro tanto crimine plectitur dissipatae quietis; quando autem perficit iniquitatem, damnabilis est. Sed lex peccati sicut meretur ipsa tormentum, ita excusat hominis voluntatem. Quia lex et cogens, et naturalis, et numquam recedens, superari utique a voluntate non potest; et nemo propter hoc reus est, quod vitare non potuit. Sed nec ipsa lex peccat, quia aliud facere non potuit. Deus autem inevitabilia reatui adscribit; nec ut hoc tantum mali faciat, ab ullo cogitur; omnibus igitur absolutis, hic solus in crimine reperitur, qui mira fronte imputat aliis necessitatem, cum ipse sine necessitate delinquat. Macte virtute prudentiae, nobilissime disputator, qui gradibus Punicae dialexeos, ut commendares dona, evertisti iudicia; ut simulares gratiam, subruisti iustitiam; ut infamares naturam, criminatus es hominum Conditorem; et ita criminatus es, ut non solum aliquo peccatore, sed ipsa lege peccati Deus tuus nocentior appareret. Et post haec profanissime catholicis sacerdotibus convicium facis, ut dicas eos negare gratiam Christi, cuius aequitatem tuentur; cum nos laudemus quidem clementiam remediorum, sed legum manente iustitia.
I. 72. Julian. Or what does the modesty of a thing profit, whose very presence accuses itself? See, then, whither your subtleties are carried. First, that nature sins without the will; which it cannot. Second, that it is sin, and does not sin, that is, it is one thing, and is not. Then, when it disturbs peace, it is wretched, nor is it punished for so great a crime of dissipated quiet; but when it accomplishes iniquity, it is damnable. But the law of sin, as it deserves torment itself, so it excuses the will of the human being. For a law that is both compelling, and natural, and never receding, certainly cannot be overcome by the will; and no one is guilty for this, that he could not avoid it. But neither does the law itself sin, because it could do nothing else. But God ascribes unavoidable things to guilt; nor is he compelled by anyone to do only this much evil; with all, then, absolved, this one alone is found in crime, who with a marvelous brow imputes necessity to others, while he himself offends without necessity. Bravo for your virtue of prudence, most noble disputant, who by the steps of Punic dialectic, in order to commend gifts, overturned judgments; in order to feign grace, undermined justice; in order to defame nature, accused the Founder of human beings; and so accused him that not only by some sinner, but by the very law of sin, your God appears more harmful. And after these things you most profanely revile the catholic priests, so as to say that they deny the grace of Christ, whose equity they uphold; while we indeed praise the clemency of the remedies, but with the justice of the laws remaining.
JulianImp.1.72Augustinus. Utinam catholicos agnosceres sacerdotes, qui longe priusquam esse coepistis, dixerunt concupiscentiam carnis, quae concupiscit adversus spiritum, quamvis adversus eam etiam spiritus concupiscat, quae lex intellegitur esse peccati, resistens legi mentis post peccatum quod in paradiso perpetratum est, humanam vitiasse naturam; unde sine illa modo nascitur nemo; eique spiritus adversatur in sanctis, ut iuste vivant, pugnando contra illam, donec perfecta hominis salute, et carne cum spiritu plenissime concordante iam non sit. Dicit Ambrosius, per praevaricationem primi hominis in naturam vertisse dissensionem carnis et spiritus ; eamque dissensionem sic Cyprianus ostendit, in quo Poeno Punicam dialexim, ut puto, irridere non audes, quod facere in me ausus es: Est, inquit, inter carnem et spiritum colluctatio, et discordantibus adversum se invicem quotidiana congressio, ut non quae volumus ipsa faciamus, dum spiritus caelestia et divina quaerit, caro terrena et saecularia concupiscit; et ideo petimus inter duo ista, ope et auxilio Dei concordiam fieri, ut dum et in spiritu et in carne voluntas Dei geritur, quae per eum renata est anima servetur. Quod aperte atque manifeste Apostolus sua voce declarat: "caro, inquit, concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem; haec enim invicem adversantur sibi; ut non ea quae vultis, ipsa faciatis " . Hanc tu concordiam carnis et spiritus, quam nos optare, et a Domino dicit orare Cyprianus, nec in paradiso ante peccatum fuisse concedis; aut si fuit, cur non fateris eam per praevaricationem primi hominis vitiata periisse natura, beataeque paci animae et corporis miseram successisse discordiam? Et indignaris nobis, quod velut catholicis sacerdotibus, id est vobis, faciamus nostro sermone convicium, quia dicimus vos negare gratiam Christi; cum vos istis vere catholicis sacerdotibus impudentissime ac profanissime conviciemini his verbis, quae in me, qui eorum fidem sequor et tueor, indigesto furore ructatis. Apostolus dicit: Spiritu ambulate, et concupiscentias carnis ne perfeceritis . Rogo cur eas appellat, si nullae sunt? Cur eas perfici vetat, si bonae sunt? Sed adhuc quales sint, ostendit et dicit: Caro enim concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem; haec enim invicem adversantur; ut non ea quae vultis faciatis . Quibus dicebat: Ut non ea quae vultis faciatis? Numquid Iudaeis, secundum mirabilem vestram intellegentiam, nondum sub Christi gratia constitutis; et non eis quibus dixerat: Ex operibus legis Spiritum accepistis, an ex auditu fidei? Fideles itaque christianos dicebat non ea quae vellent facere, concupiscente adversus spiritum carne. Quid ita, nisi quia volebant inferiorem partem suam consentire superiori, id est, carnem spiritui, nec valebant perficere quod volebant; eisque restabat non consentire illi vitio, sed adversum carnem spiritui concupiscere? Verum et si hoc in eis erat, quod vos putatis, ut propter consuetudinem malam etiam nolentes male viverent; quid est ergo quod dicis, naturam sine voluntate peccare non posse, cum istos non volentes peccare fatearis? Cur autem dicta sit concupiscentia carnis peccatum, lexve peccati, iam supra diximus ; cui si bonum est non consentire ad illicita, profecto ipsa malum est, qua concupiscuntur illicita, etsi nulla consensione, nulloque opere perpetrantur. Iudicia Dei porro vos evertitis, qui generis humani miserias incipientes a parvulis, sine ullo peccati merito fieri dicitis; nec donum Dei poscitis, ne intretis in tentationem , hoc est, ne peccetis; in vestra enim virtute confiditis, et vos in Psalmo sancto notatos esse atque damnatos , vel non videtis caeci, vel stolidi non doletis.
Augustine. Would that you acknowledged the catholic priests, who, long before you began to exist, said that the concupiscence of the flesh, which lusts against the spirit, although the spirit too lusts against it, which is understood to be the law of sin, resisting the law of the mind after the sin which was perpetrated in paradise, has vitiated human nature; whence now no one is born without it; and the spirit is opposed to it in the saints, that they may live justly, by fighting against it, until, with the salvation of a human being made perfect, and the flesh fully concordant with the spirit, it is no more. Ambrose says that through the transgression of the first man the dissension of flesh and spirit turned into nature; and that dissension Cyprian shows—in whom, a Punic, you do not dare, I think, to mock Punic dialectic, which you dared to do in me: There is, he says, between flesh and spirit a wrestling, and a daily encounter of those disagreeing against each other in turn, so that we do not do the very things we wish, while the spirit seeks heavenly and divine things, the flesh desires earthly and worldly things; and therefore we ask that between these two, by the help and aid of God, concord be made, so that, while the will of God is carried on both in spirit and in flesh, the soul which has been reborn through him may be preserved. Which the Apostle openly and manifestly declares with his own voice: "the flesh, he says, lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are opposed to each other in turn; so that you do not do the things you wish " (Gal 5:17). This concord of flesh and spirit, which Cyprian says we desire and pray for from the Lord, you do not concede to have been even in paradise before sin; or if it was, why do you not confess that it perished through the transgression of the first man, with nature vitiated, and that wretched discord succeeded the blessed peace of soul and body? And you are indignant at us, that we, as it were, revile by our discourse catholic priests, that is, you, because we say that you deny the grace of Christ; when you most shamelessly and most profanely revile those truly catholic priests with these words, which against me, who follow and uphold their faith, you belch forth with undigested fury. The Apostle says: Walk in the spirit, and you will not accomplish the concupiscences of the flesh (Gal 5:16). I ask, why does he name them, if they are none? Why does he forbid them to be accomplished, if they are good? But he goes on to show what kind they are, and says: For the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are opposed to each other; so that you do not do the things you wish. To whom was he saying: So that you do not do the things you wish? Surely not to the Jews, according to your wonderful understanding, not yet placed under the grace of Christ; and not to those to whom he had said: From the works of the law did you receive the Spirit, or from the hearing of faith? (Gal 3:2) To faithful Christians, then, he was saying that they do not do the things they wish, with the flesh lusting against the spirit. Why so, unless because they wished their lower part to consent to the higher, that is, the flesh to the spirit, and were not able to accomplish what they wished; and it remained for them not to consent to that vice, but to lust, against the flesh, with the spirit? But even if there was in them what you think, that on account of an evil habit they lived badly even though unwilling; what is it, then, that you say, that nature cannot sin without the will, when you confess that these men sin unwilling? But why the concupiscence of the flesh is called sin, or the law of sin, we have already said above; to which, if it is good not to consent unto unlawful things, surely it is itself an evil, by which unlawful things are desired, even if they are perpetrated by no consent, and by no work. Moreover, you overturn the judgments of God, who say that the miseries of the human race, beginning from little ones, come about without any deserving of sin; nor do you ask the gift of God, that you may not enter into temptation (See Matt 26:41), that is, that you may not sin; for you trust in your own strength, and that you have been noted and condemned in the holy Psalm (See Ps 49:6 (48:7)), either you, being blind, do not see, or, being stupid, you do not grieve.
JulianImp.1.72I. 73. Iulianus. Verum iam pergamus et ad verba mea, quae de praefatione sublata, sibi impugnanda proposuit: Satis igitur admonuerim, sic istum verba mea quasi refellenda sibi proponere voluisse, ut alibi mediis detractis, sententias interrumperet; alibi extremis non additis decurtaret; et cur hoc fecerit, sufficienter ostenderim. Nunc ad ea quae sicut voluit, nostra proposuit, quae sua posuerit, videamus. Sequuntur enim iam verba eius, et sicut iste insinuavit, qui tibi chartulam misit, prius aliquid de praefatione conscripsit, procul dubio librorum eorum, de quibus pauca decerpsit. Id autem ita sese habet: Doctores, inquit, nostri temporis, frater beatissime, et nefariae, quae adhuc fervet, seditionis auctores, ad hominum, quorum sanctis studiis uruntur, contumelias, et exitium decreverunt per ruinam totius Ecclesiae pervenire; non intellegentes, quantum his contulerint honoris, quorum ostenderunt gloriam nisi cum catholica religione non potuisse convelli. Nam si quis aut liberum in hominibus arbitrium, aut Deum esse nascentium conditorem dixerit, Caelestianus et Pelagianus vocatur. Ne igitur vocentur haeretici, fiunt Manichaei; et dum falsam verentur infamiam, verum crimen incurrunt; instar ferarum, quae circumdantur pinnis, ut cogantur in retia; quibus quoniam deest ratio, in verum exitium vana formidine contruduntur . Cognosco dicta mea, sed non a te cum integritate prolata; et licet non in his certaminis summa consistat, quia de praefatione sunt; tamen, ut levitas tua liqueat, frater beatissime, in eo loco positum non est, sed in primo statim versu libri. Item cum dixissem: Ad hominum quorum sanctis studiis uruntur, contumelias et exitium; addidi: quoniam iter aliud non patebat, decreverunt per ruinam totius Ecclesiae pervenire. Post quod etiam dixi: Quia liberi confessor arbitrii et Dei conditoris, Caelestianus et Pelagianus vocatur, quo simplices iniquo sermone perterriti, ut ab invidia nominis exuantur, etiam sanam fidem deserunt; credituri procul dubio, nec liberum esse in hominibus arbitrium, nec Deum nascentium conditorem, quando illud, quod prius affirmaverant, utrumque deseruerint. Hoc autem totum a te praetermissum est. Post quod sunt illa quae posuisti, quam sane vera, et quam inexpugnabilia, haud difficilis erit opera comprobare. Nec ego igitur quidquam de tuis dictis minus, nec tu vel primum caput, ita ut a me ordinatum fuerat, rettulisti. Quod ideo inculco, ut gravitas Poeni scriptoris emineat.
I. 73. Julian. But let us now proceed to my words too, which, taken from the preface, he proposed for himself to assail: I have, then, sufficiently warned that this man wished so to propose my words to himself as if to be refuted, that in one place, with the middle parts removed, he interrupted statements; in another, by not adding the final parts, he cut them short; and I have shown sufficiently why he did this. Now let us see, in the things which, as he wished, he proposed as ours, what he set down as his own. For his words now follow, and, as this man indicated, who sent you the little sheet, he first wrote out something from the preface, beyond doubt of those books from which he excerpted a few things. But it stands thus: The teachers, he says, of our time, most blessed brother, and the authors of the wicked sedition that still rages, have decreed to arrive, through the ruin of the whole Church, at insults and destruction of the men by whose holy zeal they are burned; not understanding how much honor they have conferred on those whose glory they have shown could not be torn away except along with the catholic religion. For if anyone says that there is either free choice in human beings, or that God is the founder of those being born, he is called a Caelestian and a Pelagian. Lest, then, they be called heretics, they become Manichees; and while they fear a false infamy, they incur a true crime; like wild beasts, which are surrounded with feathers, that they may be driven into nets; into which, since they lack reason, they are thrust by a vain dread into true destruction. I recognize my own sayings, but not brought forth by you with integrity; and although the sum of the contest does not consist in these, because they are from the preface; yet, that your levity may be clear, most blessed brother, was not placed in that spot, but in the very first line of the book. Likewise, when I had said: To the insults and destruction of the men by whose holy zeal they are burned; I added: since no other way lay open, they decreed to arrive through the ruin of the whole Church. After which I also said: Because the confessor of free choice and of God the founder is called a Caelestian and a Pelagian, by which the simple, terrified by an iniquitous speech, in order to be stripped of the odium of the name, desert even the sound faith; about to believe, beyond doubt, that there is neither free choice in human beings, nor that God is the founder of those being born, when they have deserted both of those things, which they had previously affirmed. But all this was passed over by you. After which are those things which you set down, how true indeed, and how impregnable, it will be no difficult work to prove. Neither did I, then, say anything less of your sayings, nor did you report even the first chapter as it had been arranged by me. Which I therefore drive home, that the gravity of the Punic writer may stand out.
JulianImp.1.73Augustinus. Qui de libris tuis, quae voluit decerpta, cui voluit, legenda transmisit, ipse quod mihi imputas fecit; nec aliud etiam te ipsum existimo credere. Neque enim in eodem libro meo, contra quem latras, non sum praelocutus, cui sim chartulae respondere compulsus; sed quaeris conviciando quid dicas, sentiens te nihil validum dicere disputando. Quamquam et in his meis verbis, quae mox tibi quasi refellenda proponis, id quod dico advertere potuisti; non enim dicerem: Non est ita ut loqueris, quicumque ista dixisti ; si certus essem te illa dixisse, non eum qui qualem voluit, et cui voluit scripturam misit, quam mihi missam refutare susceperam. Sed Deo gratias, quod universo ipsi operi tuo, unde quae voluit, sicut ei placuit, iste decerpsit, ita Domino adiuvante respondi, ut omnia tua, quae contra antiquissimam catholicam fidem novus haereticus erexeras, machinamenta subverterem.
Augustine. He who transmitted from your books the things he wished excerpted, to be read by whom he wished, himself did what you impute to me; nor do I think that even you yourself believe otherwise. For in that same book of mine, against which you bark, I did not fail to state beforehand to what little sheet I was compelled to respond; but you seek by reviling what to say, feeling that you say nothing strong by disputing. Although even in these words of mine, which you presently propose to yourself as if to be refuted, you could have noticed what I say; for I would not say: It is not so as you say, whoever you are who said these things; if I were certain that you had said them, not he who sent the writing such as he wished, and to whom he wished, which, sent to me, I had undertaken to refute. But thanks be to God, that I so answered, with the Lord helping, your whole work, from which this man excerpted what he wished, as it pleased him, that I subverted all your contrivances, which, as a new heretic, you had erected against the most ancient catholic faith.
JulianImp.1.73I. 74. Iulianus. Contra haec ergo verba mea, quae rescripseris audiamus: Non est ita ut loqueris, quicumque ista dixisti, non est ita; multum falleris, vel fallere meditaris; non liberum negamus arbitrium; sed: " vos Filius liberaverit - ait Veritas - tunc vere liberi eritis " . Hunc vos invidetis liberatorem, quibus captivis vanam tribuitis libertatem. " A quo enim quis devictus est - sicut dicit Scriptura - huic et servus addictus est " ; nec quisquam nisi per gratiam Liberatoris isto solvitur vinculo servitutis, a quo est hominum nullus immunis. "r unum quippe hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt " . Amplissimam esse nostri negotii dignitatem, ut ipsa rerum consideratio et appensio indicat, quas tuemur, ita etiam vester pavor; qui contra nostrorum sanguinem, pecuniarum effusione, haereditatum largitate, equorum transmissione, populorum seditione, potestatum corruptione pugnantes, et fidem vestram quae a nobis impugnatur, erubescitis profiteri, et ad nostrae sententiae, a qua deviastis, verba confugitis.
I. 74. Julian. Let us hear, then, what you have written back against these words of mine: It is not so as you say, whoever you are who said these things, it is not so; you are greatly deceived, or you plan to deceive; we do not deny free choice; but: "if the Son shall free you—says the Truth—then you will be truly free " (John 8:36). This Liberator you envy, you who attribute a vain freedom to captives. "For by whom anyone has been overcome—as the Scripture says—to him also he is assigned as a slave " (2 Pet 2:19); nor is anyone loosed from this bond of slavery except through the grace of the Liberator, from which bond no human being is free. "For through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned " (Rom 5:12). That the dignity of our business is very great, as the very consideration and weighing of the things which we uphold shows, so too does your terror; you who, fighting against the blood of our people by the pouring out of moneys, by the largesse of inheritances, by the sending of horses, by the sedition of peoples, by the corruption of the powers, both blush to profess your faith, which is assailed by us, and flee for refuge to the words of our statement, from which you have deviated.
JulianImp.1.74Augustinus. Aut sciens calumniaris, si tu ista mentiris; aut nescis quid loquaris, cum mentientibus credis; sed iam satis sit quod superius tuae vanitati, vel etiam malignitati ad ista respondi .
Augustine. Either you calumniate knowingly, if you yourself lie these things; or you do not know what you say, since you believe those who lie; but let it now be enough that I have answered these things above to your vanity, or even malice.
JulianImp.1.74I. 75. Iulianus. Tam enim scelestum est, quod suscepit praevaricatio pudenda Babylonis, ut cum a nobis obicitur, a vobis negetur; et tam sanctum est, quod a nobis creditur, ut sub umbra eius delitescere, licet adversaria mente, cupiatis. Nam cum ego quidquid disputationis vestrae sparsim membris tenebatur exprimerem, et summam quaestionis in brevitatem cogerem, ut ecclesiasticae dissensionis causa, quanta et qualis esset, sine fumo et nebulis proderetur, dixi liberum a vobis arbitrium negari, et Deum nascentium conditorem; porro a nobis id utrumque defendi, et ob hoc vos imperitis auribus de nominibus catholicorum virorum, qui propter fidem apostolicam quam tuemur, nobiscum laborant, ciere inanem fragorem, ut qui timuissent Caelestiani a vobis dici, amitterent caelestis fidei dignitatem; et qui expavissent ne a vobis Pelagiani dicerentur, in Manichaeorum pelagus praecipitarentur; putarentque se imperiti quique non posse Christianos appellari, si eos Traduciani Pelagianos vocassent; cum e regione prudentes statuerent, quamvis nominum invidiam sibi et iniuriam sustinendam magis, quam fidem catholicam relinquendam. Sed ne vel hoc ipsum convicii genus vestro inventum ingenio glorieris; recordamini, ab omnibus quidem haereticis diversa nos vocabula solere suscipere; sed in Synodo Ariminensi vehementius claruisse, quid apud plumbeos animos vel ambiguitas verbi, vel comminatio novi vocabuli possit sceleris obtinere. Nam cum sub Ariano principe, vir magnae constantiae, fidei sanissimae, Athanasius Alexandrinus episcopus, dilapso a fide Apostolorum omni pene mundo, et impiatis temporibus obstitisset, atque ob hoc in exsilia coactus esset; de sescentis et quinquaginta, ut fertur, episcopis, vix septem inventi sunt, quibus cariora essent Dei praecepta quam regis; videlicet ut nec in Athanasii damnationem convenirent, nec Trinitatis confessionem negarent. Illa vero omnis deiectorum pectorum multitudo, extra iniuriarum metum, hac est potissimum vel nominis comminatione, ne Athanasiana vocaretur, vel interrogationis calliditate decepta.
I. 75. Julian. For so wicked is that which the shameful transgression of Babylon has undertaken, that when it is objected by us, it is denied by you; and so holy is that which is believed by us, that you desire to hide under its shadow, though with an adverse mind. For when I was expressing whatever of your disputation was held scattered piecemeal, and was forcing the sum of the question into brevity, so that the cause of the ecclesiastical dissension, how great and of what kind it was, might be set forth without smoke and clouds, I said that free choice is denied by you, and that God is the founder of those being born; furthermore, that both of these are defended by us, and that on this account you stir up an empty din to inexperienced ears about the names of the catholic men who, on account of the apostolic faith which we uphold, labor with us, so that those who feared to be called Caelestians by you might lose the dignity of the heavenly faith; and those who dreaded lest they be called Pelagians by you might be hurled headlong into the sea of the Manichees; and the inexperienced might think that they could not be called Christians, if the Traducianists called them Pelagians; while, on the contrary, the prudent decided that the odium and injury of the names was rather to be borne by themselves than the catholic faith to be abandoned. But lest you should glory that this very kind of reviling was invented by your talent; remember that we are wont to receive diverse names from all heretics indeed; but that in the Synod of Rimini it became more vehemently clear what, among leaden minds, either the ambiguity of a word or the threat of a new name for wickedness can obtain. For when, under an Arian prince, a man of great constancy, of the soundest faith, Athanasius bishop of Alexandria, had withstood the times, with nearly the whole world fallen away from the faith of the Apostles and made impious, and on this account had been driven into exile; of six hundred and fifty bishops, as is reported, scarcely seven were found to whom the precepts of God were dearer than those of the king; namely, that they should neither agree to the condemnation of Athanasius, nor deny the confession of the Trinity. But all that multitude of cast-down hearts, apart from the fear of injuries, was deceived chiefly by this threat of a name, lest it be called Athanasian, or by the cunning of the questioning.
JulianImp.1.75Augustinus. Athanasianos vel Homousianos Ariani Catholicos vocant, non et alii haeretici. Vos autem non solum a Catholicis, sed etiam ab haereticis, vobis similibus et a vobis dissentientibus, Pelagiani vocamini; quemadmodum non tantum a Catholica, sed ab haeresibus etiam vocantur Ariani. Vos vero soli nos appellatis Traducianos, sicut illi Homousianos, sicut Donatistae Macarianos, sicut Manichaei Pharisaeos, et ceteri haeretici diversis nominibus.
Augustine. The Arians call the Athanasians, or Homoousians, Catholics, but not other heretics too. But you are called Pelagians not only by the Catholics, but even by heretics, those like you and those dissenting from you; just as the Arians are called Arians not only by the Catholic Church, but by the heresies too. But you alone call us Traducianists, as those call us Homoousians, as the Donatists call us Macarians, as the Manichees call us Pharisees, and the other heretics by diverse names.
JulianImp.1.75I. 76. Iulianus. Nam cum proponerent Ariani, qui rerum ea tempestate potiebantur, Homousion sequi vultis, aut Christum? Responderunt continuo, quasi in nomen religiosi, Christum se sequi; homousion repudiavere; atque ita exeunt gestientes, velut qui Christo crederent, quem iam negaverant, homousion, id est unius cum Patre substantiae, denegando. Ita ergo et nunc vos fabricatores doli, imperitas terretis aures, ut si nolunt laborantium pro fide virorum appellatione respergi, et liberum arbitrium negent, et Deum hominum conditorem. Hoc igitur a me in illo loco constat obiectum; et quam non falso, praesens disputatio palam faciet. Respondisti ergo hoc modo: Non negamus liberum arbitrium; et nihil aliud subiunxisti de tuo. Consequens enim fuerat, ut impleres sine tergiversatione sententiam; cumque praemisisses non te negare arbitrii libertatem, adderes: Sed confitemur datam a Deo libertatem arbitrii in hominum permanere natura.
I. 76. Julian. For when the Arians, who at that time were masters of affairs, proposed: Do you wish to follow the Homoousion, or Christ? they answered at once, as if religious in name, that they followed Christ; they repudiated the homoousion; and so they go out exulting, as those who believed in Christ, whom they had already denied, by denying the homoousion, that is, that he is of one substance with the Father. So, then, even now you fabricators of deceit terrify inexperienced ears, so that, if they are unwilling to be bespattered with the name of the men laboring for the faith, they should deny both free choice and God the founder of human beings. This, then, is established to have been objected by me in that place; and how not falsely, the present disputation will make plain. You answered, then, in this way: We do not deny free choice; and you subjoined nothing else of your own. For it would have been consequent that you fulfill the statement without evasion; and when you had premised that you do not deny the freedom of choice, you should add: But we confess that the freedom of choice given by God remains in the nature of human beings.
JulianImp.1.76Augustinus. Quomodo manet libertas in eis, qui ut liberentur a servitute, qua victori peccato addicti sunt, divina indigent gratia, nisi quia liberi sunt et ipsi, sed iustitiae? Unde dicit Apostolus: Cum essetis servi peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae .
Augustine. How does freedom remain in those who, in order to be freed from the slavery by which they are assigned to the conqueror sin, need divine grace, except because they are themselves free too, but free of justice? Whence the Apostle says: When you were slaves of sin, you were free of justice (Rom 6:20).
JulianImp.1.76I. 77. Iulianus. Impleveras enim hoc sermone aliquid, contra quod si fuisses locutus ulterius, nimium impudens; sin autem omnia continenter, vel tarde posses apparere correctior. Nunc vero me dicis fallere, qui quod obieci, per te probo; et tu statim in eo, quod te putas consequenter instruxisse, mentiris. Ais quippe: Non liberum negamus arbitrium; et subiungis testimonium Evangelii, sed " vos Filius li raverit - ait Veritas - tunc vere liberi eritis " . Cum hoc in illo loco a Domino nostro Iesu constet in liberum arbitrium non fuisse prolatum, cuius expositionem sententiae paululum differentes, definitionibus et divisionibus, quid nostrum alteruter sentiat, explicemus. Debet quippe, secundum omnium doctorum disciplinam, inchoatio disputationis a definitione sumi.
I. 77. Julian. For you had fulfilled something by this discourse, against which, if you had spoken further, you would have been too shameless; but if you had said it all together, you could appear, even if tardily, more corrected. But now you say that I deceive, who prove what I objected through yourself; and you straightway, in that which you think you have consequently set forth, lie. For you say: We do not deny free choice; and you subjoin the testimony of the Gospel: but "if the Son shall free you—says the Truth—then you will be truly free " (John 8:36). Since it is established that in that place this was not brought forth by our Lord Jesus with respect to free choice, deferring the exposition of which statement a little, let us explain, by definitions and divisions, what each of us thinks. For, according to the discipline of all teachers, the beginning of a disputation ought to be taken from a definition.
JulianImp.1.77Augustinus. Apostoli ergo, qui disputationum suarum inchoationes non a definitione sumpserunt, non erant docti? Et tamen erant doctores Gentium, et contemptores doctorum talium, de quibus te delectat inflari. Quod autem ait Dominus: Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis, conaberis quidem in tuam detorquere sententiam; sed quam te non sequatur, cum conari coeperis, apparebit.
Augustine. The Apostles, then, who did not take the beginnings of their disputations from a definition, were not learned? And yet they were teachers of the Gentiles, and despisers of such learned men as you are pleased to be puffed up about. But as for what the Lord says: If the Son shall free you, then you will be truly free, you will try indeed to twist it to your meaning; but how it does not follow you, when you have begun to try, will appear.
JulianImp.1.77I. 78. Iulianus. Omnis quippe, ut ait ille, quae ratione suscipitur de aliqua re disputatio, debet a definitione proficisci, ut intellegatur quid sit id de quo disputatur . Ita ergo et nos, sicut supra de iustitiae et peccati definitione disseruimus, nunc quoque videamus quae libertati arbitrii definitio competat ut planum sit, quis ei nostrum consentiat, quis repugnet. Libertas arbitrii, qua a Deo emancipatus homo est, in admittendi peccati et abstinendi a peccato possibilitate consistit.
I. 78. Julian. For every disputation about some matter that is undertaken by reason, as that one says, ought to set out from a definition, that it may be understood what that is about which it is disputed. So, then, we too, just as we discoursed above about the definition of justice and of sin, let us now also see what definition befits freedom of choice, so that it may be plain which of us agrees with it, which opposes it. The freedom of choice, by which a human being has been emancipated by God, consists in the possibility of committing sin and of abstaining from sin.
JulianImp.1.78Augustinus. Emancipatum hominem dicis a Deo: nec attendis hoc cum emancipato agi, ut in familia patris non sit.
Augustine. You say a human being has been emancipated by God: and you do not attend to the fact that this is done to the emancipated one, that he be not in the family of the father.
JulianImp.1.78I. 79. Iulianus. Factum est enim animal rationale, mortale, capax virtutis et vitii, quod posset ex concessa sibi possibilitate vel servare Dei mandata, vel transgredi, vel magisterio naturali conservare ius humanae societatis, liberumque haberet alterutram velle partem, in quo peccati et iustitiae summa est. Nam cum aliquid secundum virtutem indigentibus, aut de misericordiae fontibus, aut de iustitiae immulget uberibus; hoc operatur foris iam ipsa iustitia, quam intus voluntas sancta concepit et peperit.
I. 79. Julian. For he was made a rational animal, mortal, capable of virtue and vice, who could, from the possibility granted to him, either keep the commandments of God, or transgress them, or by natural teaching preserve the right of human society, and have it free to will either part, in which the sum of sin and of justice is. For when one bestows something according to virtue on those in need, either from the founts of mercy, or from the udders of justice; this justice itself now works outwardly, which the holy will within conceived and bore.
JulianImp.1.79Augustinus. Utrum de suo iustitiam conceperit, hoc vobiscum agitur, qui ignorantes Dei iustitiam, vestram vultis constituere ; cum voluntas sancta utique iustitiam sancta cogitatione concipiat, de qua scriptum est: Cogitatio sancta servabit te ; dicit autem Apostolus: Non quia idonei sumus cogitare aliquid quasi ex nobismetipsis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est . Hoc si intellegatis, non aliud intellegetis esse arbitrium laudabiliter liberum, nisi quod fuerit Dei gratia liberatum.
Augustine. Whether it conceived justice of its own, this is what is dealt with between us and you, who, being ignorant of the justice of God, wish to establish your own (See Rom 10:3); since the holy will certainly conceives justice by a holy thought, about which it is written: A holy thought will preserve you (See Prov 2:11); but the Apostle says: Not that we are sufficient to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God (2 Cor 3:5). If you understand this, you will understand that a choice praiseworthily free is nothing other than what has been freed by the grace of God.
JulianImp.1.79I. 80. Iulianus. Sic et cum e diverso statuens prave agere in aliorum iniuriam, vel iniquus quis fuerit, vel crudelis; operatio qua nocet aliis, a nequitia foras proficiscitur, quam intus mala voluntas seminavit et genuit; cum vero deest facultas, per quam in proximos vis secretae voluntatis erumpat, in ipsa tamen sola voluntate, quae aliquid vel boni, vel mali, non impetu brevi, sed cogitatione appetituque patraverit, vel benignitatis est ratio impleta, vel malignitatis.
I. 80. Julian. So too when, on the contrary, one decides to act perversely to another's injury, whether one is unjust or cruel; the activity by which he harms others proceeds outwardly from the wickedness which the evil will within sowed and begot; but when the faculty is lacking, through which the force of the secret will may burst out upon one's neighbors, yet in that will alone, which has accomplished something either of good or of evil, not by a brief impulse, but by thought and appetite, the account either of benignity or of malignity is fulfilled.
JulianImp.1.80Augustinus. Sicut intellegitis voluntatem etiam sola cogitatione rationem vel benignitatis vel malignitatis implere, si eo modo intellegas, quod de bona et sancta cogitatione loquens Apostolus ait, non esse nos idoneos cogitare aliquid quasi ex nobismetipsis, sed sufficientiam nostram ex Deo esse; poteris corrigi, et humilis suscipere gratiam, cui te superbia fecit inimicum, dum vis in eis esse, qui confidunt in virtute sua ; non in eis qui dicunt: Diligam te, Domine, virtus mea .
Augustine. Just as you understand the will to fulfill, even by thought alone, the account either of benignity or of malignity, if you understand in that way what the Apostle says, speaking of the good and holy thought, that we are not sufficient to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God; you will be able to be corrected, and humble, to receive grace, to which pride made you an enemy, while you wish to be among those who trust in their own strength (See Ps 49:6 (48:7)); not among those who say: I will love you, O Lord, my strength (Ps 18:1 (17:2)).
JulianImp.1.80I. 81. Iulianus. Et boni igitur possibilitas, et mali, bona est; quoniam posse bonum facere, aula virtutis est; posse malum facere, testimonium libertatis est.
I. 81. Julian. Both the possibility of good, then, and of evil, is good; since to be able to do good is the hall of virtue; to be able to do evil is the testimony of liberty.
JulianImp.1.81Augustinus. Non est ergo liber Deus, de quo dictum est: Negare se ipsum non potest ; et de quo etiam ipse dixisti: Deus esse nisi iustus non potest; et alio loco: Non potest autem Deus, inquis, nisi iustus et pius esse .
Augustine. God, then, is not free, of whom it was said: He cannot deny himself (2 Tim 2:13); and of whom you yourself also said: God cannot be anything but just; and in another place: But God cannot, you say, be anything but just and pious.
JulianImp.1.81I. 82. Iulianus. Per hoc igitur suppetit homini habere proprium bonum, per quod ei subest posse facere malum. Tota ergo divini plenitudo iudicii tam iunctum habet negotium cum hac libertate hominum, ut harum qui unam agnoverit, ambas noverit. Unde fit ut harum unam qui violaverit, ambas violet. Sic igitur et libertas humani custodiatur arbitrii, quemadmodum divina aequitas custoditur. Hic intellectus liberi arbitrii est, qui et fatorum opinionem, et Chaldaeorum supputationem, et Manichaeorum phantasias, veritati ecclesiasticae subiugavit. Hic intellectus est, qui cum illis, quos enumeravimus, vos etiam a Christo monstrat alienos. Libertas igitur arbitrii, possibilitas est vel admittendi, vel vitandi peccati, expers cogentis necessitatis, quae in suo utpote iure habet, utrum surgentium partem sequatur, id est, vel ardua asperaque virtutum, vel demersa et palustria voluptatum.
I. 82. Julian. Through this, then, it is granted to a human being to have his own good, through that by which it is in his power to be able to do evil. The whole fullness of the divine judgment, then, has its business so joined with this liberty of human beings that whoever has recognized one of these has known both. Whence it comes about that whoever violates one of these violates both. So, then, let the liberty of human choice be guarded, just as the divine equity is guarded. This is the understanding of free choice, which has subjected to the ecclesiastical truth both the opinion of fates, and the calculation of the Chaldeans, and the phantasies of the Manichees. This is the understanding which, along with those whom we have enumerated, shows that you too are estranged from Christ. The freedom of choice, then, is the possibility either of committing or of avoiding sin, free of compelling necessity, which has it in its own right, as it were, which of the rising parts it should follow, that is, either the steep and rough things of the virtues, or the sunken and marshy things of pleasures.
JulianImp.1.82Augustinus. Homo quamdiu stetit in bona voluntate liberi arbitrii, non opus habebat ea gratia, qua levaretur, cum surgere ipse non posset; nunc vero in ruina sua, liber est iustitiae, servusque peccati, nec potest servus esse iustitiae, et liber a dominante peccato, nisi eum Filius liberaverit.
Augustine. As long as a human being stood in the good will of free choice, he had no need of that grace by which he would be lifted up, when he could not himself rise; but now in his ruin he is free of justice, and a slave of sin, nor can he be a slave of justice, and free from the dominating sin, unless the Son shall free him.
JulianImp.1.82I. 83. Iulianus. Quod ut breviter absolvatur, possibilitas est ad hoc solum excubans, ne homo vel in peccatum a quoquam impellatur, vel a peccato abstrahatur, voluntate captiva; quam non posse capi, si dedi ipsa noluerit, testatur fortitudo, cuius lacerti in contemptu dolorum et per Gentiles et per Christianos assidue claruerunt.
I. 83. Julian. That this may be briefly settled, it is a possibility keeping watch for this alone, that a human being be neither driven into sin by anyone, nor drawn away from sin, with the will captive; which cannot be captured, if it has not itself wished to surrender, fortitude testifies, whose arms in the contempt of pains have shone forth assiduously both through Gentiles and through Christians.
JulianImp.1.83Augustinus. Hoc est utique, quod agit haeresis vestra; ad hoc enim additis et Gentiles, ne piae fortitudinis opus Dei gratia Christiani facere potuisse, aut fecisse credantur; quae Christianis est propria, non Christianis Gentilibusque communis. Audite ergo, et intellegite: fortitudinem Gentilium mundana cupiditas, fortitudinem autem Christianorum Dei caritas facit; quae diffusa est in cordibus nostris, non per voluntatis arbitrium, quod est a nobis, sed per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis .
Augustine. This is certainly what your heresy does; for you add the Gentiles for this purpose, lest the work of pious fortitude be believed to have been able to be done, or to have been done, by Christians through the grace of God; which is proper to Christians, not common to Christians and Gentiles. Hear, then, and understand: worldly desire makes the fortitude of the Gentiles, but the love of God makes the fortitude of Christians; which is poured out in our hearts, not through the choice of the will, which is from us, but through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (Rom 5:5).
JulianImp.1.83I. 84. Iulianus. Si ergo est, ut ratio prodidit, arbitrii libertas propulsatrix necessitatum, ut nemo sit vel bonus vel malus, cui non sit liberum esse contrarium; quemadmodum tu aut confessus es liberum arbitrium usurus tali testimonio, quod captivis convenit, aut tale testimonium subdidisti, postquam liberum fueras confessus arbitrium? Ais enim: Non negamus arbitrium liberum; sed: " vos Filius liberaverit - ait Veritas - tunc vere liberi eritis " . Manifestum est Christum in illo loco ad captivam conscientiam verba fecisse; quam liberam non esse prodebat; sed obnoxiam ei ultioni, quae condemnat peccata, libera voluntate commissa. Quam sententiam tu male intellegens, id est, non intellegens, aut forte in te intellegens, et huc natura sua repugnante trahens, in eo posuisti loco, ubi a tuis sermonibus tota sui proprietate discordat. Ut enim ipsa verba iungamus: Quod liberatur, captivum est; quod captivum est, liberum non est; quod liberum est, captivum non est.
I. 84. Julian. If, then, the freedom of choice is, as reason has shown, the repeller of necessities, so that no one is either good or evil to whom it is not free to be the contrary; how is it that you either confessed free choice, about to use such a testimony as befits captives, or subjoined such a testimony, after you had confessed free choice? For you say: We do not deny free choice; but: "if the Son shall free you—says the Truth—then you will be truly free ". It is manifest that Christ in that place addressed his words to a captive conscience; which he was showing was not free, but liable to that vengeance which condemns sins committed by a free will. Which statement, understanding it badly, that is, not understanding it, or perhaps understanding it in yourself, and dragging it here, its own nature resisting, you placed in that spot where it disagrees, in all its own propriety, from your discourses. For, that we may join the words themselves: What is freed is captive; what is captive is not free; what is free is not captive.
JulianImp.1.84Augustinus. Alia est remissio peccatorum, in eis quae male facta sunt; alia caritas, quae facit liberum ad ea quae bona facienda sunt. Utroque modo liberat Christus; quia et iniquitatem ignoscendo aufert, et inspirando tribuit caritatem.
Augustine. One thing is the remission of sins, in those things which have been done badly; another is love, which makes one free for those things which are to be done well. In both ways Christ frees; because he both takes away iniquity by forgiving, and bestows love by inspiring.
JulianImp.1.84I. 85. Iulianus. Tu utrumvis hic simpliciter confitere, et cavillari desine; aut dic nobiscum liberum esse arbitrium; et remove testimonium, quod suo tempore congrue prolatum est; aut, sicut in his libris, quos nunc per Alypium ad Bonifacium misisti, dic captivum esse arbitrium, quod nos liberum dicimus, et desine te negare Manichaeum.
I. 85. Julian. Confess here simply whichever you wish, and cease to quibble; either say with us that choice is free, and remove the testimony, which was brought forth fittingly in its own time; or, as in these books which you have now sent through Alypius to Boniface, say that choice is captive, which we say is free, and cease to deny that you are a Manichee.
JulianImp.1.85Augustinus. Manichaeus immutabilem substantiam mali naturae Dei sui miscet insanus, et eamdem naturam Dei potius corruptibilem facit, et sub aliena natura vult esse captivam; fides autem catholica, bonam, sed tamen mutabilem, creaturam in deterius voluntate mutatam; ac per hoc, depravata sua vitiataque natura, non sub aliena substantia, sed sub peccato suo ream dicit serviliter detineri. Ac per hoc, et de ipso liberatore multum ab eo nostra diversa sententia est. Manichaeus enim dicit opus esse liberatore, ut a nobis naturam separet alienam; nos autem, ut sanet et vivificet nostram. Tu ergo adiutorem Manichaei te non esse ostende, si potes, qui miserias hominum, cum quibus eos nasci, quoniam sine dubio sentit, sine dubio consentit genus humanum, nolens tribuere peccato vitiatae naturae nostrae facis, ut eas ille permixtae nobis naturae tribuat alienae.
Augustine. The Manichee, insane, mixes an immutable substance of evil into the nature of his God, and rather makes the same nature of God corruptible, and wants it to be captive under another nature; but the catholic faith says that the creature, good, but yet mutable, was changed for the worse by its will; and through this, with its own nature depraved and vitiated, it is guilty and held in slavery, not under another substance, but under its own sin. And through this, our opinion about the Liberator himself is much different from his. For the Manichee says there is need of a liberator, that he may separate from us another nature; but we, that he may heal and vivify our own. Show, then, that you are not a helper of the Manichee, if you can, you who, since the human race without doubt feels and without doubt agrees that they are born with the miseries of human beings, refuse to attribute these to the sin of our vitiated nature, and so bring it about that he attributes them to another nature mingled with us.
JulianImp.1.85I. 86. Iulianus. Ceterum duo ista quae iungis, liberum et non liberum, id est liberum et captivum, illi quidem rei de qua agitur, convenire non possunt; tibi vero stultitiam singularem, impudentiam novam, impietatem veterem inesse testantur.
I. 86. Julian. But these two things which you join, free and not free, that is, free and captive, cannot indeed befit the matter about which we are dealing; but they testify that in you there is singular stupidity, new shamelessness, old impiety.
JulianImp.1.86Augustinus. Liberos dicimus ad facienda opera pietatis eos, quibus dicit Apostolus: Nunc autem liberati a peccato, servi autem facti Deo, habetis fructum vestrum in sanctificationem, finem vero vitam aeternam . Hunc in sanctificationem fructum, qui fructus procul dubio caritas est, atque opera eius, nullo modo habere possumus a nobis; sed habemus per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis . De ipso quippe fructu loquebatur magister Deus, quando palmitibus in se manentibus dicebat: Sine me nihil potestis facere . Sed stultitiam singularem nobis inesse conviciaris, quia Deus nobis virtus est, nec in nostra virtute confidimus; et impudentiam novam, quia concupiscentiam carnis, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, non tua fronte laudamus; et impietatem veterem, quoniam dogmata antiqua catholica, quae docuerunt qui Ecclesiam Christi ante nos in eius gratia vera pietate rexerunt, contra perversitatem vestram novitiam quantulocumque labore defendimus. In te igitur agnosce stultitiam, in te impudentiam, in te impietatem, non veterem sane, sed novam.
Augustine. We call free, for doing the works of piety, those to whom the Apostle says: But now, freed from sin, and made servants to God, you have your fruit unto sanctification, but the end eternal life (Rom 6:22). This fruit unto sanctification, which fruit beyond doubt is love, and its works, we can in no way have from ourselves; but we have it through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us. For about this very fruit the Teacher, God, was speaking, when he said to the branches abiding in him: Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5). But you revile us as having singular stupidity, because God is our strength, and we do not trust in our own strength; and new shamelessness, because we do not praise, with your brow, the concupiscence of the flesh, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit; and old impiety, because we defend, with whatever small labor, the ancient catholic teachings, which those taught who ruled the Church of Christ before us in true piety in his grace, against your novel perversity. In yourself, then, acknowledge the stupidity, in yourself the shamelessness, in yourself the impiety, not old indeed, but new.
JulianImp.1.86I. 87. Iulianus. Sed iam tempus est, ut de Evangelii sententia disseratur. Dicebat, inquit evangelista Ioannes, Iesus ad Iudaeos eos qui crediderunt ei: Si vos manseritis in sermone meo, vere discipuli mei eritis; et cognoscetis veritatem, et veritas liberabit vos . Id est, Dominus noster Iesus loquebatur ad credentes sibi, ut de nulla saeculi nobilitate gaudentes, nec de Abrahae sibi semine gloriam vindicantes, niterentur et studerent virtutibus, et nullis post agnitio m Christi servire peccatis, ut veram libertatem conscientia gaudente retinerent, et spe certorum, id est aeternorum, vindicarentur a cupiditate aliorum omnium, quae propter fragilitatem sui, vana frequenter et falsa dicuntur. Tunc responderunt ei Iudaei, non intellegentes de qua Iesus libertate dixisset: Semen Abrahae sumus, et nemini servivimus umquam; quomodo tu dicis: Liberi eritis? Multis enim modis libertas appellari solet, ut in hoc loco sanctitas, ut resurrectio in Apostolo, ubi dicit creaturam liberari a servitute corruptionis in libertatem gloriae filiorum Dei ; ut libertas quae notior est, ad distinctionem dicitur servitutis. Eo autem nomine et libertas nuncupatur arbitrii. Dividantur ergo causae, ne res multum distantes confundantur nominis communione. Hic ergo non arbitrii libertatem Dominus dicit esse liberandam; sed illa integra permanente, convenit Iudaeos, ut accipientes indulgentiam liberentur a reatibus, et eam quae apud Deum maxima est, libertatem occupent, ut incipiant nihil debere criminibus. Denique sequitur Evangelista: Respondit eis Iesus: Amen, amen dico vobis, quoniam omnis qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Servus autem non manet in domo in aeternum; filius autem manet in aeternum. Si ergo Filius vos liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis .
I. 87. Julian. But it is now time that the statement of the Gospel be discoursed upon. Jesus was saying, says the evangelist John, to the Jews who believed in him: If you abide in my word, you will truly be my disciples; and you will know the truth, and the truth will free you (John 8:31-32). That is, our Lord Jesus was speaking to those who believed in him, that, rejoicing in no nobility of the age, nor claiming glory for themselves from the seed of Abraham, they should strive and be zealous for the virtues, and serve no sins after the knowledge of Christ, so that they might retain true liberty with a rejoicing conscience, and by the hope of sure things, that is, eternal ones, be vindicated from the desire of all the others, which, on account of their fragility, are frequently called vain and false. Then the Jews answered him, not understanding of what liberty Jesus had spoken: We are the seed of Abraham, and we have never served anyone; how do you say: You will be free? (John 8:33) For liberty is wont to be named in many ways, as in this place holiness, as resurrection in the Apostle, where he says the creature is freed from the slavery of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the sons of God (Rom 8:21); as the liberty which is better known is said for the distinction from slavery. But by this name the freedom of choice too is named. Let the cases, then, be divided, lest things very distant be confused by the commonness of a name. Here, then, the Lord does not say that the freedom of choice is to be freed; but, with it remaining whole, he addresses the Jews, that, receiving indulgence, they may be freed from their guilt, and may occupy that liberty which is greatest in God's sight, that they may begin to owe nothing to crimes. Finally, the Evangelist continues: Jesus answered them: Amen, amen I say to you, that everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin. But the slave does not abide in the house forever; the son, however, abides forever. If, then, the Son shall free you, then you will be truly free (John 8:34-36).
JulianImp.1.87Augustinus. Attende quod dictum est: Omnis qui facit peccatum. Non enim ait: Qui fecit; sed: qui facit. Et non vis eum ab hoc malo liberare homines; non vis eum hoc loco talem promittere libertatem, qua peccatum non faciamus; sed ideo tantummodo liberare, quia fecimus.
Augustine. Attend to what was said: Everyone who commits sin. For he does not say: Who has committed; but: who commits. And you are unwilling that he free human beings from this evil; you are unwilling that he promise in this place such a liberty by which we may not commit sin; but that he free only for this reason, because we have committed it.
JulianImp.1.87I. 88. Iulianus. Aperuit, de qua hic servitute loqueretur. Omnis, inquit, qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati . Hoc autem ipsum quam vehemens est contra errorem vestrum, quia dicit, servum non esse peccati, nisi eum qui fecerit ipse peccatum; nec posse cuiquam adhaerere peccatum, quod non is de quo agitur, per se, aut actione, aut vel sola commiserit voluntate? Quam etiam ostendit universitatem humani generis non posse iam a diabolo possideri, cum distinctionem facit inter servum et filium, id est, iustum et iniustum? Hic enim, ut se Christus, ita etiam unumquemque sanctorum a servorum conditione separabat: sicut fuerunt et ante Vetus, et in Vetere Testamento, quos in domo Patris sui manere, et in mensa eius denuntiat iucundari . Totum hoc autem exhortationis genus inepte prolatum esset, si non liberi arbitrii homines conveniret.
I. 88. Julian. He disclosed of what slavery he was here speaking. Everyone, he says, who commits sin is a slave of sin. But how vehement is this very thing against your error, because he says that no one is a slave of sin except him who has himself committed sin; nor can any sin cling to anyone which the one in question has not committed by himself, either by action, or even by will alone? And how does he show that the whole of the human race cannot now be possessed by the devil, since he makes a distinction between slave and son, that is, just and unjust? For here Christ separated, as himself, so also each of the saints, from the condition of slaves: as there were both before the Old, and in the Old Testament, those whom he declares to abide in the house of his Father, and to rejoice at his table (See Luke 22:30). But this whole kind of exhortation would have been ineptly brought forth, if it did not befit human beings of free choice.
JulianImp.1.88Augustinus. Convenit plane ideo facientes peccatum, quia servi sunt peccati, ut accepta libertate quam promittit, desinant facere peccatum. Regnabat namque peccatum in eorum mortali corpore, ita ut oboedirent concupiscentiis eius, et exhiberent membra arma iniquitatis peccato . Contra hoc ergo malum, quo peccatum faciebant, libertate indigebant, quam promittebat: Omnis enim, inquit, non qui fecit, sed qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Quid verba lucida caliginosis disputationibus obscurare conaris? Erumpunt omnino, et te licet obsistente fulgore suo vincunt tenebras tuas. Omnis, ait, qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Audis: qui facit; et tu non exponere sed supponere vis: Qui fecit. Audiant ergo, quibus ipse aperit sensum, ut intellegant Scripturas; audiant: Omnis qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Et quaerant accipere libertatem, ut non faciant peccatum, clamantes ad eum, cui dicitur: Itinera mea dirige secundum verbum tuum, et ne dominetur mihi omnis iniquitas . Cur autem illudis sensibus tardis, et ita insinuas verba Domini, quasi dixerit servum non esse peccati, nisi eum qui fecerit ipse peccatum? Fraude agis, non hoc dixit; non enim ait: Nemo est servus peccati, nisi qui facit peccatum; sed ait: Omnis qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Sunt enim servi peccati originalis, qui peccatum ipsi nondum faciunt; et ab hoc vinculo servitutis regeneratione solvuntur. Non igitur omnis qui servus est peccati, facit peccatum; sed omnis qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati; sicut non omne animal equus est; sed tamen omnis equus animal est. Ubi est dialectica tua, qua te inflare consuesti? Tam doctum et acutum quare te ista fugiunt? Aut quare insidiaris indoctis et tardis, si te ista non fugiunt? Quis autem nostrum dicit, universitatem hominum a diabolo possideri; cum sanctorum tanta sint millia, quae non possidentur a diabolo? Sed dicimus, eos solos a diabolo non possideri, quos Christi liberat gratia; cuius gratiae vos estis inimici. Si enim hanc gratiam non oppugnaretis, sed intellegeretis; procul dubio etiam ante Vetus Testamentum, et tempore Veteris Testamenti, omnes sanctos, a servorum conditione separatos, eadem liberatos Christi gratia videretis.
Augustine. It plainly befits those committing sin for this reason, because they are slaves of sin, that, having received the liberty which he promises, they may cease to commit sin. For sin was reigning in their mortal body, so that they obeyed its concupiscences, and presented their members as weapons of iniquity to sin (See Rom 6:12-13). Against this evil, then, by which they committed sin, they needed the liberty which he was promising: For everyone, he says, not who has committed, but who commits sin, is a slave of sin. Why do you try to obscure lucid words with foggy disputations? They break forth altogether, and, though you resist, by their splendor conquer your darkness. Everyone, he says, who commits sin is a slave of sin. You hear: who commits; and you wish not to expound but to substitute: Who has committed. Let those, then, hear to whom he himself opens the sense, that they may understand the Scriptures; let them hear: Everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin. And let them seek to receive liberty, that they may not commit sin, crying out to him to whom it is said: Direct my steps according to your word, and let no iniquity have dominion over me (Ps 119:133 (118:133)). But why do you mock the slow understandings, and so insinuate the words of the Lord, as if he had said that no one is a slave of sin except him who has himself committed sin? You act by fraud, he did not say this; for he does not say: No one is a slave of sin except him who commits sin; but he says: Everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin. For there are slaves of original sin who do not yet themselves commit sin; and from this bond of slavery they are loosed by regeneration. Not everyone, then, who is a slave of sin commits sin; but everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin; just as not every animal is a horse; but yet every horse is an animal. Where is your dialectic, with which you are wont to puff yourself up? Why do these things escape you, so learned and acute? Or why do you lie in wait for the unlearned and slow, if these things do not escape you? But who of us says that the whole of human beings is possessed by the devil; when there are so many thousands of saints who are not possessed by the devil? But we say that those alone are not possessed by the devil whom the grace of Christ frees; of which grace you are enemies. For if you did not assail this grace, but understood it; without doubt you would see that even before the Old Testament, and in the time of the Old Testament, all the saints, separated from the condition of slaves, were freed by the same grace of Christ.
JulianImp.1.88I. 89. Iulianus. Denique ut intellegas, non eum naturae eorum exprobrare, sed vitae; sequitur: Scio quia filii Abrahae estis . Ecce de qua illi se liberos dixerant originis dignitate; nunc cui servituti obnoxii sint demonstrat, dicens: Quaeritis me interficere, quia sermo meus non capit in vobis. Ego quod audivi apud Patrem meum, loquor; et vos quae vidistis apud patrem vestrum, facitis .
I. 89. Julian. Finally, that you may understand that he reproaches not their nature, but their life; there follows: I know that you are the sons of Abraham. Behold, of what dignity of origin those men had said they were free; now he shows to what slavery they are liable, saying: You seek to kill me, because my word does not take hold in you. I speak what I have heard with my Father; and you do the things which you have seen with your father (John 8:37-38).
JulianImp.1.89Augustinus. Quid est: Sermo meus non capit in vobis, si natura etiam talis, qualis nunc indiget liberante, iam capax est sermonis eius, etiamsi sensum non aperiat gratia eius, sicut aperuit Apostolis, ut intellegerent Scripturas ; sicut illi purpurariae Thyatirenorum, ut intenderet in ea, quae a Paulo di bantur ?
Augustine. What is: My word does not take hold in you, if nature, even such as now needs one who frees it, is already capable of his word, even if his grace does not open the understanding, as it opened it to the Apostles, that they might understand the Scriptures (See Luke 24:45); as it opened it to that woman of Thyatira, a seller of purple, that she might attend to the things which were said by Paul (See Acts 16:14)?
JulianImp.1.89I. 90. Iulianus. Vide quam diversa sit naturae ratio et voluntatis. Non negavit Iesus, carnem eorum pertinere ad semen Abrahae, sed inculcat eis, quod ad diabolum patrem voluntatis iniquitate migraverint; qui ideo genitor eorum dicitur, quod criminum arguitur eruditor. Responderunt, inquit, et dixerunt ei Iudaei: Pater noster Abraham est. Dicit eis Iesus: Si filii Abrahae essetis, opera Abrahae faceretis; nunc autem quaeritis me interficere, hominem qui veritatem locutus sum vobis, quam audivi a Deo; hoc Abraham non fecit, vos autem facitis opera patris vestri . Aspicisne quas faciat verborum divisiones Sapientia? Negat eos Abrahae filios esse, quos supra dixerat esse filios Abrahae; sed quoniam diversus est de natura ac voluntate tractatus, ostendit alterum esse prosatorem carnis innocuae, alterum seductorem miserae voluntatis.
I. 90. Julian. See how diverse is the account of nature and of will. Jesus did not deny that their flesh pertained to the seed of Abraham, but drives home to them that they had migrated to the devil, the father of their will, by the iniquity of their will; who is therefore called their begetter, because he is convicted to be the instructor of their crimes. They answered, he says, and said to him, the Jews: Our father is Abraham. Jesus says to them: If you were the sons of Abraham, you would do the works of Abraham; but now you seek to kill me, a man who has spoken to you the truth, which I heard from God; this Abraham did not do, but you do the works of your father (John 8:39-41). Do you see what divisions of words Wisdom makes? He denies that those are sons of Abraham whom above he had said were sons of Abraham; but since the treatment of nature and of will is diverse, he shows that one is the begetter of innocent flesh, the other the seducer of a wretched will.
JulianImp.1.90Augustinus. Verum dicis incautus. In paradiso enim diabolus seductor beatae voluntatis fuit, quam seducendo miseram fecit; nunc autem, sicut fateris, seductor est miserae voluntatis. Ab hac ergo miseria (ne per illam nunc facilius, quam tunc ad illam seducta est, adhuc seducatur a diabolo) non eam liberat, nisi ille ad quem quotidie tota clamat Ecclesia: Ne nos inferas in tentationem, sed libera nos a malo .
Augustine. You speak the truth, unwarily. For in paradise the devil was the seducer of a blessed will, which by seducing he made wretched; but now, as you confess, he is the seducer of a wretched will. From this wretchedness, then (lest through it the will, now seduced more easily than it was then seduced into it, be still seduced by the devil), no one frees it except him to whom daily the whole Church cries out: Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil (Matt 6:13).
JulianImp.1.90I. 91. Iulianus. Hic ergo ubi dixit Dominus: Si vos Filius liberaverit, vere liberi eritis , promisit indulgentiam reis, qui peccantes non arbitrii libertatem, sed conscientiam iustitiae perdiderunt. Liberum autem arbitrium et post peccata tam plenum est, quam fuit ante peccata; siquidem ipsius opera fiat ut abdicent plerique occulta dedecoris , et flagitiorum abiectis sordibus, virtutum comantur insignibus.
I. 91. Julian. Here, then, where the Lord said: If the Son shall free you, you will be truly free, he promised indulgence to the guilty, who by sinning lost, not the freedom of choice, but the conscience of justice. But free choice even after sins is as full as it was before sins; since by its own work it comes about that very many renounce the hidden things of disgrace (See 2 Cor 4:2), and, with the filth of disgraceful deeds cast off, are adorned with the insignia of the virtues.
JulianImp.1.91Augustinus. Te audi saltem, ubi dicis propter consuetudinem peccatorum scriptum esse: Non quod volo, ago; sed quod odi, hoc facio . Quomodo ergo post peccata liberum est, quorum etsi non propagine, quia non vultis, certe tamen consuetudine, quam solam huic necessitati victi contortique conceditis, sic perdidit libertatem, ut gemitus eius feriat aures vestras, frontemque collidat, cum auditis: Non quod volo ago; et: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago ?
Augustine. Hear yourself at least, where you say that, on account of the habit of sins, it was written: I do not do what I will, but what I hate, this I do (See Rom 7:15). How, then, is it free after sins, when, even if not by propagation, because you are unwilling, yet certainly by habit—which alone you concede to this necessity of the overcome and twisted—it has so lost liberty that its groan strikes your ears, and dashes your brow, when you hear: I do not do what I will; and: I do not do the good that I will, but the evil that I will not, this I do (Rom 7:19)?
JulianImp.1.91I. 92. Iulianus. Desine itaque impiare te (si tamen ullum tibi fas aut nefas restat), Christi verba sic exponendo, ut ille arbitrium negasse liberum videatur, sine cuius integritate aequitas ei proprii non potest constare iudicii.
I. 92. Julian. Cease, then, to make yourself impious (if, however, any right or wrong remains to you), by so expounding the words of Christ that he may seem to have denied free choice, without whose integrity the equity of his own judgment cannot stand.
JulianImp.1.92Augustinus. Immo, ideo grave iugum est super filios Adam, a die exitus de ventre matris eorum , quia ei constat aequitas iudicii; quod omnino iniquum esset, si non traherent originale peccatum, per quod homo vanitati similis factus est .
Augustine. Rather, for this reason there is a heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam, from the day of their going out from their mother's womb (Sir 40:1), because the equity of judgment stands; which would be altogether unjust, if they did not draw original sin, through which man is made like to vanity (Ps 144:4 (143:4)).
JulianImp.1.92I. 93. Iulianus. Audi sane ubi vim humanae libertatis ostendit: Ego veni in nomine Patris mei, et non suscepistis me; si alius venerit in nomine suo, illum accipietis . Et item: Aut facite arborem bonam, et fructum eius bonum; aut facite arborem malam, et fructum eius malum . Et item: Si mihi non vultis credere, operibus credite . Atque omnibus vehementius, quod dicit intentionem suam humana voluntate impeditam fuisse: Hierusalem, inquit, Hierusalem, quoties volui congregare filios tuos, sicut gallina pullos suos sub alas suas, et noluisti! Post quod non sequitur: Sed te nolente collegi; verum: Relinquetur vobis domus vestra deserta ; ut illos ostendat pro malo quidem opere iure puniri, sed ab intentione propria non debuisse ulla necessitate revocari. Sic enim et per Prophetam locutus erat: Si volueritis, et audieritis me, quae bona sunt terrae comeditis; si nolueritis, et non audieritis, gladius vos comedet . Quomodo ergo tu liberum arbitrium non negas, quod non quidem sermone tuo, sed Evangelii testimonio, sensu autem tuo, non liberum pronuntiasti?
I. 93. Julian. Hear indeed where he shows the force of human liberty: I came in the name of my Father, and you did not receive me; if another shall come in his own name, him you will receive (John 5:43). And likewise: Either make the tree good, and its fruit good; or make the tree evil, and its fruit evil (Matt 12:33). And likewise: If you will not believe me, believe the works (See John 10:38). And, more vehemently than all, that he says his intention was hindered by the human will: Jerusalem, he says, Jerusalem, how often I wished to gather your children, as a hen her chicks under her wings, and you would not! (Matt 23:37) After which there does not follow: But, with you unwilling, I gathered; but: Your house will be left to you desolate (Matt 23:38); that he may show that those were indeed justly punished for their evil work, but ought not to have been recalled by any necessity from their own intention. For thus he had spoken also through the Prophet: If you are willing, and listen to me, you will eat the good things of the land; if you are unwilling, and do not listen, the sword will devour you (Isa 1:19-20). How, then, do you not deny free choice, which—not indeed by your discourse, but by the testimony of the Gospel, but by your sense—you have declared not free?
JulianImp.1.93Augustinus. Ignoscendum est, quia in re multum abdita ut homo falleris. Absit ut impediatur ab homine omnipotentis et cuncta praescientis intentio. Parum de re tanta cogitant, vel ei excogitandae non sufficiunt, qui putant Deum omnipotentem aliquid velle, et homine infirmo impediente, non posse. Sicut certum est Hierusalem filios suos ab illo colligi noluisse, ita certum est eum etiam ipsa nolente quoscumque eorum voluit collegisse. Deus enim, sicut homo eius dixit Ambrosius, quos dignatur vocat, et quem vult religiosum facit . Convenit autem Scriptura plerumque hominis voluntatem, ut quod non habet, vel non potest, admonitus sentiat; et ab eo a quo sunt bona omnia, indigens poscat. Si enim exauditus fuerit in eo, quod dicere iussi sumus: Ne nos inferas in tentationem ; procul dubio nulla decipietur inscitia, nulla cupiditate vincetur. Propterea ergo per Prophetam dictum est: Si nolueritis, et non audieritis me, gladius vos comedet ; et cetera huiusmodi; ut cum invenissent in se ipsis victrices cupiditates, ad propellendum malum scirent a quo deberent poscere auxilium. Ideo autem dictum est: Ecce relinquetur vobis domus vestra deserta ; quia plures ibi erant, quos obduratione et desertione iudicaverat dignos, occulto iudicio, iusto tamen. Nam si, ut dicis: Ab intentione propria, utique mala, non debet homo ulla necessitate revocari, cur apostolus Paulus adhuc Saulus, caedem spirans et sanguinem sitiens, violenta corporis caecitate, et terribili desuper voce, a sua pessima intentione revocatur; et ex persecutore prostrato, illius Evangelii, quod oppugnabat, laboriosior ceteris futurus praedicator erigitur ? Agnosce gratiam; alium sic, alium autem sic Deus, quem dignatur, vocat; et: Spiritus ubi vult spirat .
Augustine. You must be forgiven, because in a matter very hidden you, as a human being, are deceived. Far be it that the intention of the Almighty and one who foreknows all things be hindered by a human being. They think too little about so great a matter, or are not sufficient to think it out, who think that almighty God wills something, and, with a weak human being hindering, cannot do it. Just as it is certain that Jerusalem was unwilling that her children be gathered by him, so it is certain that, even with her unwilling, he gathered whomever of them he willed. For God, as his man Ambrose said, calls those whom he deigns, and makes religious whom he wills. But Scripture frequently addresses the will of a human being, that, admonished, he may feel what he does not have, or cannot do; and, being in need, may ask from him from whom are all good things. For if he is heard in that which we have been commanded to say: Lead us not into temptation (Matt 6:13); without doubt he will be deceived by no ignorance, overcome by no desire. For this reason, then, it was said through the Prophet: If you are unwilling, and do not listen to me, the sword will devour you; and other things of this kind; that, when they had found in themselves victorious desires, they might know from whom they ought to ask help to repel the evil. But for this reason it was said: Behold, your house will be left to you desolate; because there were there very many whom he had judged worthy of hardening and desertion, by a hidden judgment, yet a just one. For if, as you say: A human being ought not to be recalled by any necessity from his own intention—certainly an evil one—why was the apostle Paul, still Saul, breathing slaughter and thirsting for blood, recalled from his most wicked intention by a violent blindness of the body, and a terrible voice from above; and, from a prostrated persecutor, raised up to be a more laborious preacher than the rest of that Gospel which he was assailing (See Acts 9:1-22)? Acknowledge grace; God calls one in this way, another in that, whom he deigns; and: The Spirit breathes where it wills (John 3:8).
JulianImp.1.93I. 94. Iulianus. Nam in illo opere, quod te supra dixi nuper Romam misisse, audacius quid sentires aperuisti. In primo enim libro, cum tibi similiter proposuisses quod nos obicimus, arbitrium vos liberum denegare, ita disseris constantissimus et subtilissimus disputator. Quis autem nostrum dicat, quod primi hominis peccato perierit liberum arbitrium de genere humano? Libertas quidem periit per peccatum, sed illa quae in paradiso fuit, habendi plenam cum immortalitate iustitiam; propter quod natura humana divina indiget gratia, dicente Domino in Evangelio suo: " vos Filius liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis " , utique liberi ad bene iusteque vivendum. Nam liberum arbitrium usque adeo in peccatore non periit, ut per ipsum peccent, maxime omnes qui cum delectatione peccant et amore peccati, et eis placet quod eos libet. Unde Apostolus: "m essetis - inquit <197> servi peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae " . Ecce ostenduntur etiam peccato minime potuisse, nisi alia libertate, servire. Liberi ergo a iustitia non sunt, nisi arbitrio libertatis; liberi autem a peccato non fiunt, nisi gratia Salvatoris. Propter quod admirabilis Doctor etiam verba ipsa discrevit: "m enim servi essetis - inquit <197> peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae. Quem ergo tunc fructum habuistis in his, in quibus nunc erubescitis? Nam finis illorum mors est; nunc autem liberati a peccato, servi autem facti Dei, habetis fructum vestrum in sanctificationem, finem vero vitam aeternam " . Liberos dixit iustitiae, non liberatos; a peccato autem non liberos, ne sibi hoc tribuerent, sed vigilantissime maluit dicere liberatos; referens hoc ad illam Domini sententiam: " vos Filius liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis ". Cum itaque non vivant bene filii hominum, nisi effecti filii Dei, quid est quod iste libero arbitrio vult bene vivendi tribuere potestatem; cum enim haec potestas non detur nisi "atia Dei, per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum " , dicente Evangelio: "Quotquot autem receperunt eum, dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri " . Et item post modicum: Datur ergo, inquis, potestas ut filii Dei fiant, qui credunt in eum. Quae potestas, nisi detur a Deo, nulla esse potest ex libero arbitrio; quia nec liberum in bono erit, quod liberator non liberaverit; sed in malum liberum habet arbitrium, cui delectationem malitiae vel occultus vel manifestus deceptor insevit, vel sibi ipse persuasit. Non itaque, sicut dicunt nos quidam dicere, et iste audet insuper scribere, omnes in peccatum, velut inviti, carnis suae necessitate coguntur; sed si iam in ea aetate sunt, ut propriae mentis utantur arbitrio, et in peccato sua voluntate retinentur, et a peccato in peccatum sua voluntate praecipitantur. Sed haec voluntas, quae libera est in malis, quia delectatur malis, ideo libera in bonis non est, quia liberata non est. Nec potest homo boni aliquid velle, nisi adiuvetur ab eo qui malum non potest velle . In his omnibus verbis tuis, quae posui, ita video gratiae nomen cum liberi arbitrii negatione consertum, ut non tam mala sensus tui appellationum bonis vindicari queant, quam dignitas nominum dogmatum tuorum adhaesione vilescat. Non ergo te his sermonibus honestasti, sed ornamenta ipsa turpasti. Nos tamen ea quae a te iuncta sunt, separamus, ut gratiae divinitas ab scaevis colligationibus enodata, nec responsione quatiatur; et gravitate Catholicorum, non Manichaeorum adulatione laudetur. Gratiam ergo Christi multiplicem confitemur. Primum munus eius est, quod facti ex nihilo sumus. Secundum, quod ut viventibus sensu, ita sentientibus ratione praestamus; quae impressa est animo, ut Conditoris imago doceretur: ad cuius aeque respicit dignitatem arbitrii concessa libertas. Ipsi etiam gratiae beneficiorum quae nobis praestare non desinit, augmenta reputamus. Ipsa gratia legem in adiutorium misit ; ad eius spectabat officium, ut rationis lumen, quod pravitatis exempla hebetabant et consuetudo vitiorum, multimodis eruditionibus excitaret, atque invitatu suo foveret. Ad istius ergo gratiae, id est, divinae benevolentiae, quae rebus causam dedit, plenitudinem spectavit, ut Verbum caro fieret, et habitaret in nobis . Reposcens enim Deus ab imagine sua amoris vicem, palam fecit quam totum in nos inaestimabili egisset affectu, ut vel sero redamaremus eum, qui commendans caritatem suam nobis , Filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis illum tradidit ; pollicens quia si voluissemus deinceps voluntati eius oboedire, Unigeniti sui praestaret nos esse cohaeredes .
I. 94. Julian. For in that work which I said above you recently sent to Rome, you have disclosed more boldly what you think. For in the first book, when you had likewise proposed to yourself what we object, that you deny free choice, you discourse thus, a most constant and most subtle disputant. But who of us would say that by the sin of the first man free choice perished from the human race? Liberty indeed perished through sin, but that liberty which was in paradise, of having full justice with immortality; on account of which human nature needs divine grace, the Lord saying in his Gospel: "if the Son shall free you, then you will be truly free ", truly free for living well and justly. For free choice has so far not perished in the sinner, that through it they sin, especially all who sin with delight and love of sin, and to whom what they enjoy is pleasing. Whence the Apostle: "when you were—he says—slaves of sin, you were free of justice ". Behold, it is shown that they could not even sin, except by another liberty. They are not, then, free of justice except by the choice of liberty; but they are not made free of sin except by the grace of the Savior. On account of which the admirable Teacher distinguished even the words themselves: "for when you were—he says—slaves of sin, you were free of justice. What fruit, then, did you have then in those things in which you now blush? For the end of them is death; but now, freed from sin, and made servants of God, you have your fruit unto sanctification, but the end eternal life " (Rom 6:20-22). He said free of justice, not freed; but of sin not free, lest they attribute this to themselves, but most vigilantly he preferred to say freed; referring this to that statement of the Lord: "if the Son shall free you, then you will be truly free ". Since, then, the sons of men do not live well, except made sons of God, what is it that this man wishes to attribute to free choice the power of living well; since this power is not given except by "the grace of God, through Jesus Christ our Lord ", the Gospel saying: "But as many as received him, he gave them power to become sons of God " (John 1:12). And likewise after a little: Power is given, then, you say, that they may become sons of God, who believe in him. Which power, unless it be given by God, can be none from free choice; because that will not be free in good which the Liberator has not freed; but he has free choice for evil, in whom either the hidden or the manifest deceiver has planted the delight of malice, or to whom he has himself persuaded it. Not, then, as some say that we say, and this man dares moreover to write, are all driven into sin, as if unwilling, by the necessity of their flesh; but if they are now at that age that they use the choice of their own mind, both they are held in sin by their own will, and from sin into sin they are hurled headlong by their own will. But this will, which is free in evils, because it is delighted by evils, is therefore not free in goods, because it has not been freed. Nor can a human being will anything good, unless he is helped by him who cannot will evil. In all these words of yours which I have set down, I so see the name of grace woven together with the denial of free choice that the evils of your sense cannot so be vindicated by good names, as the dignity of the names is cheapened by adherence to your teachings. You did not, then, honor yourself by these discourses, but befouled the very ornaments. Yet we separate the things that have been joined by you, so that the divinity of grace, disentangled from your distorted bindings, may neither be shaken by a response, and may be praised with the gravity of Catholics, not with the flattery of Manichees. We confess, then, the grace of Christ to be manifold. His first gift is that we have been made out of nothing. The second, that we excel by sense those that live, so by reason those that have sense; which is impressed on the mind, that the image of the Founder might be taught: to whose dignity the freedom of choice granted equally looks back. To grace itself too we reckon the increases of the benefits which it does not cease to bestow on us. Grace itself sent the law as a help (See Isa 8:20 LXX); it belonged to its office to rouse, by manifold instructions, the light of reason, which the examples of depravity and the habit of vices were blunting, and to cherish it by its own invitation. To the fullness, then, of this grace, that is, of the divine benevolence, which gave a cause to things, it looked that the Word should be made flesh, and dwell among us (See John 1:14). For God, requiring back from his image the return of love, made plain how wholly he had acted toward us with inestimable affection, that even late we might love in return him who, commending his love to us (See Rom 5:8), did not spare his own Son, but handed him over for us (Rom 8:32); promising that, if we should henceforth be willing to obey his will, he would grant us to be coheirs of his Only-begotten (See Rom 8:17).
JulianImp.1.94Augustinus. Homo Pelagiane, caritas vult bonum, et caritas ex Deo est; non per legis litteram, sed per spiritum gratiae. In hoc est praedestinatis adiutorium littera, quia iubendo et non iuvando, admonet infirmos confugere ad spiritum gratiae. Sic lege legitime utuntur, quibus bona est , id est, utilis; alioquin per se ipsam littera occidit ; quia iubendo bonum, et non largiendo caritatem, quae sola vult bonum, reos praevaricationis facit.
Augustine. Pelagian man, love wills the good, and love is from God; not through the letter of the law, but through the spirit of grace. In this the letter is a help to the predestined, because, by commanding and not helping, it admonishes the weak to flee to the spirit of grace. Thus those use the law lawfully to whom it is good (See 1 Tim 1:8), that is, useful; otherwise, by itself the letter kills (See 2 Cor 3:6); because, by commanding the good and not bestowing love, which alone wills the good, it makes them guilty of transgression.
JulianImp.1.94I. 95. Iulianus. Haec ergo gratia, quae in Baptismate non solum peccata condonat, sed cum hoc indulgentiae beneficio, et provehit, et adoptat, et consecrat; haec, inquam, gratia, meritum mutat reorum, non liberum condit arbitrium; quod eo accipimus tempore, quo creamur; utimur autem, quo valentiam inter bonum et malum discretionis adipiscimur. Bonae itaque voluntati innumeras adiutorii divini adesse species non negamus; sed ita ut non per adiutorii genera aut fabricetur, quae fuerit arbitrii destructa libertas, aut aliquando ea exclusa, vel boni vel mali cuiquam necessitas credatur incumbere; verum arbitrio libero omne adiutorium cooperatur.
I. 95. Julian. This grace, then, which in Baptism not only forgives sins, but, along with this benefit of indulgence, both advances, and adopts, and consecrates; this grace, I say, changes the deserving of the guilty, it does not found free choice; which we receive at the time when we are created, but use at the time when we attain the strength of discernment between good and evil. We do not deny, then, that innumerable kinds of divine help are present to a good will; but in such a way that not through the kinds of help is fabricated the freedom of choice that was destroyed, nor, with it ever excluded, is the necessity either of good or of evil to be believed to lie upon anyone; but all help cooperates with free choice.
JulianImp.1.95Augustinus. Si non praevenit, ut operetur eam, sed prius exsistenti voluntati gratia cooperatur, quomodo verum est: Deus in vobis operatur et velle ? Quomodo: Praeparatur voluntas a Domino ? Quomodo: Caritas ex Deo est , quae sola vult beatificum bonum? Aut si scientia legis et eloquiorum Dei caritatem operatur in nobis, ut non per donum Dei, sed per nostrae voluntatis arbitrium diligamus, quod esse diligendum Deo docente cognoscimus; quomodo res minor ex Deo nobis est, et maior ex nobis? Quia sine Deo donante scientiam, hoc est docente, nosse non possumus; illo autem caritatem quae supereminet scientiae , non donante, diligere possumus. Sic non sapiunt, nisi novi haeretici et gratiae Dei nimis inimici.
Augustine. If grace does not go before, that it may work it, but cooperates with a will already existing first, how is it true: God works in you even to will (See Phil 2:13)? How: The will is prepared by the Lord (See Prov 8:35 LXX)? How: Love is from God (1 John 4:7), which alone wills the beatific good? Or if the knowledge of the law and of the words of God works love in us, so that not through the gift of God, but through the choice of our will we love what we recognize, with God teaching, ought to be loved; how is the lesser thing from God for us, and the greater from ourselves? Because without God giving the knowledge, that is, teaching, we cannot know; but without him giving the love which surpasses knowledge (See Eph 3:19), we can love. Thus none think but the new heretics and enemies, far too much, of the grace of God.
JulianImp.1.95I. 96. Iulianus. Hoc ergo arbitrium liberum, propter quod solum nos manifestari ante tribunal Christi, Magister Gentium scribit, ut reportet unusquisque propria corporis prout gessit, sive bonum, sive malum , sicut Catholici quidem confitentur; ita vos non solum cum Manichaeo, sed etiam cum Ioviniano, quem nobis audes impingere, diverso quidem genere, sed impietate simili denegatis. Quod ut planius fiat, divisionum adhibeatur examen. Nos dicimus peccato hominis, non naturae statum mutari, sed meriti qualitatem; id est, et in peccante hanc esse liberi arbitrii naturam, per quam potest a peccato desinere, quae fuit in eo ut posset a iustitia deviare.
I. 96. Julian. This free choice, then, on account of which alone the Teacher of the Gentiles writes that we are made manifest before the tribunal of Christ, that each one may carry back the proper things of the body according as he has done, whether good or evil (See 2 Cor 5:10), just as the Catholics indeed confess; so you deny, not only with the Manichee, but even with Jovinian, whom you dare to thrust upon us, by a diverse kind indeed, but by a similar impiety. That this may be made plainer, let the examination of divisions be applied. We say that by the sin of a human being not the state of nature is changed, but the quality of deserving; that is, that even in the sinner there is this nature of free choice, through which he can cease from sin, which was in him that he could deviate from justice.
JulianImp.1.96Augustinus. Scimus vos ideo dicere, peccato hominis naturae statum non mutari, quia deseruistis fidem catholicam, quae dicit primum hominem sic factum, ut non haberet moriendi necessitatem; peccato autem ita hunc statum naturae fuisse mutatum, ut hominem necesse sit mori, usque adeo ut etiam spiritu iam regeneratis atque vivificatis Apostolus dicat: Si Christus in vobis est, corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum, spiritus autem vita est propter iustitiam; si ergo spiritus eius, qui suscitavit Iesum ex mortuis, habitat in vobis; qui suscitavit Iesum Christum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra per inhabitantem spiritum eius in vobis . Ideo utique dixit: Vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra, quod in carnis resurrectione speramus, quia dixerat: Corpus mortuum est propter peccatum; et vos non vultis peccato statum mutatum esse naturae. Verumtamen Pelagio cum in Palaestino iudicio fuisset obiectum, quod diceret infantes nuper natos in eo statu esse, in quo Adam fuit ante peccatum, negavit se dicere, idque damnavit . Quod si fecisset corde veraci, iam fortasse vestra haeresis interisset; postremo ipse saltem fuisset ab illa peste sanatus. Deinde quaero utrum vitio careat natura peccatrix; quod si absurdissimum est, habet ergo vitium; si habet vitium, procul dubio vitiata est. Quomodo ergo mutata non est, quae cum fuisset sana, vitiata est? Ac per hoc, etiam excepto peccato illo, de quo Ioannes Constantinopolitanus ait: Adam peccavit illud grande peccatum, et omnes in commune damnavit ; et illo ergo excepto, de quo damnationem humana natura originaliter trahit, quomodo sobrie dici potest, statum naturae in homine non fuisse mutatum, qui dicit: Lex spiritalis est, ego autem carnalis sum, venundatus sub peccato; quod enim operor, ignoro; non enim quod volo, ago , et cetera huiusmodi; etiam si hanc mutationem non in eo nascendi traxit conditio, sed, ut vultis, contraxit consuetudo peccandi? Cernitisne, vanum esse quod dicitis, peccato hominis non naturae statum mutari, sed meriti qualitatem? Nisi forte dicatis, non naturam peccato mutari, sed hominem. Et quid est hoc, nisi hominem negare esse naturam? Quando ista diceretis, si cogitaretis sana mente quod dicitis?
Augustine. We know that you say for this reason that by the sin of a human being the state of nature is not changed, because you have deserted the catholic faith, which says that the first man was so made that he did not have the necessity of dying; but that by sin this state of nature was so changed that it is necessary for a human being to die, so far that the Apostle says even to those already regenerated and vivified in spirit: If Christ is in you, the body indeed is dead because of sin, but the spirit is life because of justice; if, then, the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you; he who raised Jesus Christ from the dead will vivify even your mortal bodies through his Spirit dwelling in you (Rom 8:10-11). For this reason certainly he said: He will vivify even your mortal bodies, which we hope for in the resurrection of the flesh, because he had said: The body is dead because of sin; and you are unwilling that the state of nature was changed by sin. Yet when it had been objected to Pelagius in the Palestinian judgment that he said newly born infants are in the state in which Adam was before sin, he denied that he said it, and condemned it (See The Deeds of Pelagius 11.23). And if he had done this with a truthful heart, perhaps your heresy would already have perished; finally, he himself at least would have been healed of that plague. Then I ask whether a sinful nature is free of vice; but if that is most absurd, it has, then, a vice; if it has a vice, without doubt it has been vitiated. How, then, has it not been changed, which, when it had been sound, was vitiated? And through this, even apart from that sin, about which John of Constantinople says: Adam committed that great sin, and condemned all in common; even apart from that, then, from which human nature draws condemnation originally, how can it soberly be said that the state of nature was not changed in a human being who says: The law is spiritual, but I am carnal, sold under sin; for what I work, I do not understand; for I do not do what I will (Rom 7:14-15), and other things of this kind; even if he drew this change not in the condition of being born, but, as you wish, contracted it by the habit of sinning? Do you see that it is vain, what you say, that by the sin of a human being not the state of nature is changed, but the quality of deserving? Unless perhaps you say that not nature is changed by sin, but the human being. And what is this, but to deny that a human being is a nature? When would you say these things, if you considered with a sound mind what you say?
JulianImp.1.96I. 97. Iulianus. Manichaeus dicit, voluntatem malam ab ea inspirari natura, quae bonum velle non potest; voluntatem vero bonam ab ea infundi natura, quae malum velle non potest; ita utique naturis singularum rerum imponit necessitatem, ut propriae voluntates non possint velle contraria. Inter nos et illum certe grande chaos est; videamus nunc quantum ab eo tu recesseris. Dicis esse liberam voluntatem, sed ut malum tantummodo faciat, non autem esse in hoc liberam, ut malum desistat operari, nisi ei fuerit imposita necessitas volendi bonum, ab ea natura, quae, ut tuis utar sermonibus: malum non potest velle . Definis ergo genus hominum per liberum arbitrium nihil aliud quam peccare, nec aliud posse facere. Per quod absolute pronuntias, humanam naturam unum semper cupere quod malum est, et velle non posse contrarium; naturam autem Dei malum non posse velle; et ideo, nisi necessitatis suae participem fecerit malam hominum naturam, bonum in ea actionis esse non posse. Post haec itaque utrum non multum ames Manichaeum, in cordis tui secreto Deus viderit; quantum tamen ex dogmatum germanitate monstratur, nihil aliud prorsus egisti, quam ut ordine commutato idem quod ille affirmarat adstrueres.
I. 97. Julian. The Manichee says that an evil will is inspired by that nature which cannot will good; but a good will is infused by that nature which cannot will evil; thus he certainly imposes a necessity on the natures of individual things, so that their own wills cannot will contrary things. Between us and him there is certainly a great chasm; let us now see how much you have receded from him. You say the will is free, but only to do evil, but that it is not free in this, to cease working evil, unless a necessity of willing good has been imposed on it by that nature which, to use your discourses: cannot will evil. You define, then, the race of human beings, through free choice, to do nothing other than sin, nor to be able to do anything else. By which you absolutely declare that human nature always desires one thing which is evil, and cannot will the contrary; but that the nature of God cannot will evil; and therefore, unless it makes the evil nature of human beings a partaker of its own necessity, there can be no good of action in it. After these things, then, whether you do not love the Manichee much, God will have seen in the secret of your heart; yet, so far as is shown by the kinship of the teachings, you have done absolutely nothing else than that, with the order changed, you establish the same thing which he had affirmed.
JulianImp.1.97Augustinus. Utinam Manichaeum fortiter destrueres, non turpiter adiuvares! Ille namque nimia perversus insania non dicit naturam mali cogi bene facere ab alia natura boni, quae malum non potest velle; sed naturam boni cogi male facere ab ea natura mali, quae bonum non potest velle; ac per hoc mirabiliter demens naturam mali vult esse immutabilem, mutabilem vero naturam boni. Proinde, voluntatem malam ab ea inspirari natura, quae bonum velle non potest, certum est dicere Manichaeum; voluntatem vero bonam ab ea infundi natura, quae malum velle non potest, non dicit Manichaeus, sicut tu de illo mitius suspicaris; quoniam boni naturam nullo modo immutabilem credit, quae malum velle non possit, cui credit inspirari voluntatem malam ab ea natura, quae bonum non potest velle; itaque fieri per mali naturam, ut malum velit boni natura, quam nihil vult esse aliud quam naturam Dei. Tu ergo hunc adiuvas, negando humanam peccato primi hominis vitiatam esse naturam, ut naturae mali, quam fingit, attribuat, quidquid malorum in manifestissima invenit miseria parvulorum. Deinde cum displicet tibi, hominem non posse bonum velle, nisi adiuvetur ab eo qui malum non potest velle, nonne respicis ei te contradicere, qui dixit: Sine me nihil potestis facere ; et Scripturae, ubi legitur: Paratur voluntas a Domino ; et ubi legitur: Deus est enim qui operatur in nobis et velle ; et ubi legitur: A Domino gressus hominis dirigentur, et viam eius volet ? Ubi nihil miror, nisi unde te Christianum dicas, cum his divinis tot et tam claris vocibus contradicas.
Augustine. Would that you destroyed the Manichee strongly, not helped him basely! For he, perverted by too much insanity, does not say that the nature of evil is compelled to do good by another nature of good, which cannot will evil; but that the nature of good is compelled to do evil by that nature of evil, which cannot will good; and through this, marvelously demented, he wants the nature of evil to be immutable, but the nature of good mutable. Accordingly, it is certain that the Manichee says that an evil will is inspired by that nature which cannot will good; but the Manichee does not say that a good will is infused by that nature which cannot will evil, as you more mildly suspect of him; since he in no way believes the nature of good to be immutable, which cannot will evil—the nature into which he believes an evil will is inspired by that nature which cannot will good; and so that it comes about through the nature of evil that the nature of good wills evil, which he wants to be nothing other than the nature of God. You, then, help him, by denying that human nature was vitiated by the sin of the first man, so that he may attribute to the nature of evil, which he invents, whatever of evils he finds in the most manifest misery of little ones. Then, when it displeases you that a human being cannot will good unless he is helped by him who cannot will evil, do you not see that you contradict him who said: Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5); and the Scripture, where it is read: The will is prepared by the Lord (See Prov 8:35 LXX); and where it is read: For it is God who works in us even to will (See Phil 2:13); and where it is read: By the Lord the steps of a man will be directed, and he will will his way (See Ps 37:23 (36:23))? Wherein I wonder at nothing, except why you call yourself a Christian, when you contradict these so many and so clear divine voices.
JulianImp.1.97I. 98. Iulianus. Ioviniano autem in una parte coniungeris; nam dicit in secundo operis sui libro, baptizatum hominem non posse peccare; ante Baptisma autem et peccare et non peccare posse. Tecum ergo putat, a tempore Baptismatis imponi hominibus necessitatem boni; quod aeque falsum est, quam quod tu putas, ante Baptisma inesse hominibus necessitatem faciendi mali. Nam cum dicis tu: Non potest homo boni aliquid velle, nisi adiuvetur ab eo, qui malum non potest velle ; participatione utique gratiae et naturae bonae vis hominem possibilitatem consequi faciendi boni; quod dicis tamen a tempore Baptismatis posse contingere. Inter impietatem igitur medius et timorem, ad Ioviniani consortium confugisti, sed Manichaei lupanar necdum reliquisti. Verumtamen tanto te innocentior Iovinianus, quanto Ioviniano profanior Manichaeus. Ut enim adhuc brevius quod egimus colligatur, Manichaeus dicit: In omnibus hominibus inspiratrix malae voluntatis tenebrarum natura delinquit, et aliud facere non potest. Tu dicis: In cunctis hominibus primi peccati tenebris infecta, et per hoc malae voluntatis auctor natura delinquit, et bonum velle non potest. Iovinianus dicit: Voluntas quidem hominum, sed usque ad Baptisma delinquit; postea autem nisi bonum velle non potest. Catholici, id est nos, dicimus, quod ab initio usque ad finem sine aliquo naturalium coactu, voluntas et ante Baptisma in unoquoque delinquit, quae illo ipso tempore quo peccat, potestatem habet recedere a malo, et facere bonum, ut constet ratio libertatis. Vestrum itaque nulli quidem veritas dogmatum constat; tamen cum ab uno principio erroris fueritis egressi, vel minus inhonestum erat, si quae consequuntur admitteres, et quia cum Manichaeo dicis, natura mala, id est, manca libertate delinqui, diceres cum eodem, nullo illam pacto posse mundari; quod quidem alibi affirmas; sed quod necessario consequebatur, adiungeres ideo ei opus non esse baptismatis sacramentis. Aut si cum Ioviniano, a tempore susceptae fidei imprimi asseris bonas cupiditates; diceres cum eodem, bonam et ante Baptisma fuisse naturam, quae licet haberet possibilitatem mali, non tamen habuerit necessitatem, ac per hoc ad indissimulabile bonum consecrata pervenerit. Hoc enim modo, etsi rationi, nequaquam tamen eorum, quos sequeris, dogmatibus contravenires.
I. 98. Julian. But with Jovinian you are joined in one part; for he says in the second book of his work that a baptized human being cannot sin; but before Baptism he can both sin and not sin. With you, then, he thinks that from the time of Baptism a necessity of good is imposed on human beings; which is equally false as what you think, that before Baptism there is in human beings a necessity of doing evil. For when you say: A human being cannot will anything good, unless he is helped by him who cannot will evil, you certainly want a human being to attain the possibility of doing good by participation in grace and in a good nature; which you say, however, can happen from the time of Baptism. Midway, then, between impiety and fear, you have fled for refuge to the consortium of Jovinian, but you have not yet left the brothel of the Manichee. Yet Jovinian is more innocent than you, by as much as the Manichee is more profane than Jovinian. For, that what we have done may be gathered still more briefly, the Manichee says: In all human beings the nature of darkness, the inspirer of an evil will, offends, and can do nothing else. You say: In all human beings the nature, infected by the darkness of the first sin, and through this the author of an evil will, offends, and cannot will good. Jovinian says: The will indeed of human beings offends, but up to Baptism; but afterward it cannot will anything but good. The Catholics, that is, we, say that from the beginning to the end, without any compulsion of natural things, the will offends, even before Baptism, in each one—a will which, at that very time when it sins, has the power to recede from evil, and to do good, so that the account of liberty may stand. The truth of the teachings, then, stands for none of you; yet, since you have all gone out from one beginning of error, it would have been less dishonorable, if you admitted what follows, and, because you say with the Manichee that one offends by an evil, that is, maimed, liberty, you should say with the same that it can in no way be cleansed (which indeed you affirm elsewhere); but that you should add what necessarily followed, that therefore there is no need for it of the sacraments of baptism. Or if, with Jovinian, you assert that from the time of receiving the faith good desires are impressed; you should say with the same that nature was good even before Baptism, which, although it had the possibility of evil, yet did not have the necessity, and through this, consecrated, arrived at an undisguisable good. For in this way, although you would contravene reason, yet you would in no way contravene the teachings of those whom you follow.
JulianImp.1.98Augustinus. Oblitus es quid dicamus: recordare, quaeso. Nos sumus qui vobis reclamantibus dicimus, etiam iustis, quamdiu sunt in hac vita, non deesse, unde in oratione sua de se ipsis veraciter dicant: Dimitte nobis debita nostra . Quoniam si dixerint se non habere peccatum, se ipsos decipiunt, et veritas in eis non est . Quid est ergo quod inaniter loqueris, me Ioviniano in ea parte coniungi, qua dicit baptizatum hominem non posse peccare? Absit ut tam simus surdi et muti, ut non audiamus eorum qui baptizati sunt vocem, vel non cum eis dicamus: Dimitte nobis debita nostra. Ex quo autem homo incipit uti voluntatis arbitrio, et peccare et non peccare potest; sed alterum horum non facit, nisi adiutus ab eo qui dixit: Sine me nihil potestis facere ; alterum vero propria voluntate, sive a se ipso, sive ab alio deceptore seductus, vel peccato sicut servus addictus. Adiutos autem homines novimus Dei spiritu, ut ea vellent quae Dei sunt, et ante Baptismum, sicut Cornelium ; quosdam vero nec post Baptismum, sicut Simonem Magum . Iudicia enim Dei sicut multa abyssus ; et gratia eius non ex operibus; alioquin gratia iam non est gratia . Desine igitur conviciari nobis de Manichaeo et Ioviniano; quibus enim convicieris in nobis, quos subsecuti negare non possumus originale peccatum, videres, si oculos haberes, et taceres, si frontem haberes. Sic autem calumniosus es, tu alibi affirmasse me dicas, a peccatis hominem non posse mundari; cum ita dicam posse, ut eo quoque perducatur, ubi beatissimus peccare non possit.
Augustine. You have forgotten what we say: recall it, I beg you. We are those who say, with you crying out against it, that even to the just, as long as they are in this life, there is not lacking that on account of which in their prayer they may say truthfully of themselves: Forgive us our debts (Matt 6:12). Since, if they say they have no sin, they deceive themselves, and the truth is not in them (See 1 John 1:8). What is it, then, that you vainly say, that I am joined with Jovinian in that part in which he says a baptized human being cannot sin? Far be it that we be so deaf and dumb that we do not hear the voice of those who are baptized, or do not say with them: Forgive us our debts. But from the time a human being begins to use the choice of the will, he can both sin and not sin; but one of these he does not do, unless helped by him who said: Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5); but the other by his own will, whether deceived by himself or seduced by another deceiver, or assigned as a slave to sin. But we know that human beings were helped by the Spirit of God, that they might will the things that are God's, even before Baptism, like Cornelius (See Acts 10); but certain ones not even after Baptism, like Simon Magus (See Acts 8:9-24). For the judgments of God are like a great abyss (Ps 36:6 (35:7)); and his grace is not from works; otherwise grace is now not grace (Rom 11:6). Cease, then, to revile us about the Manichee and Jovinian; for the things for which you revile us, who, following those whom we cannot deny, hold original sin, you would see, if you had eyes, and would be silent, if you had a brow. But you are so calumnious that you say I affirmed elsewhere that a human being cannot be cleansed from sins; when I so say that he can, that he is even led to where, most blessed, he cannot sin.
JulianImp.1.98I. 99. Iulianus. Nunc autem omnibus perfidus, dicis factam in natura carnis peccati necessitatem.
I. 99. Julian. But now, faithless toward all, you say that a necessity has been made in the nature of the flesh of sin.
JulianImp.1.99Augustinus. Tu nega dixisse Apostolum: Cum essetis servi peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae . Aut si hoc ab eo dictum esse non negas, non eum recte dixisse redargue. Si autem non audes, nega, si potes, eos quibus hoc dixit, habuisse in malis liberam voluntatem, quando fuerunt liberi iustitiae; aut habuisse liberam in bonis, quando fuerunt servi peccati; et ab hac servitute eos aude dicere per se ipsos, non per Dei gratiam liberatos, quibus dicitur: Nunc autem liberati a peccato, servi facti estis iustitiae . Si autem dicis, a reatu praeteritorum malorum, non a dominatu peccati, quo quisque iustus esse non sinitur, eos fuisse Dei gratia liberatos; ut autem eis non dominaretur peccatum, ipsos facere potuisse si vellent, neque ad hoc indiguisse gratia Salvatoris; ubi ponis eum qui dicit: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago ? Si enim sub lege, non sub gratia constitutus haec loquitur; istum nega sub gravi necessitatis pondere ingemere; hunc ad bene vivendum et ad recte agendum per voluntatis arbitrium assere liberum, clamantem tibi: Mentiris, aut falleris; non quod volo, ago. Si autem, sicut melius sensit Ambrosius, hoc etiam de se ipso dicit Apostolus; nec iustorum est in hac vita ad perficiendum bonum tanta libertas propriae voluntatis, quanta erit in illa vita, ubi non dicetur: Non quod volo, ago.
Augustine. Deny that the Apostle said: When you were slaves of sin, you were free of justice (Rom 6:20). Or, if you do not deny that this was said by him, refute that he said it rightly. But if you do not dare, deny, if you can, that those to whom he said this had a free will in evils, when they were free of justice; or that they had a free will in goods, when they were slaves of sin; and dare to say that they were freed from this slavery by themselves, not by the grace of God, to whom it is said: But now, freed from sin, you have been made servants of justice (Rom 6:18). But if you say that they were freed by the grace of God from the guilt of past evils, not from the dominion of sin, by which one is not permitted to be just; but that, in order that sin might not have dominion over them, they could do this themselves if they willed, and did not for this need the grace of the Savior; where do you place him who says: I do not do the good that I will, but the evil that I will not, this I do (Rom 7:19)? For if he speaks these things placed under the law, not under grace; deny that he groans under the heavy weight of necessity; assert that he is free, by the choice of the will, to live well and to act rightly, while he cries out to you: You lie, or you are deceived; I do not do what I will. But if, as Ambrose better understood, the Apostle says this even of himself; then the just do not have in this life, for accomplishing the good, so great a freedom of their own will as there will be in that life, where it will not be said: I do not do what I will.
JulianImp.1.99I. 100. Iulianus. Ut possessione aeternitatis amissa (quam quidem numquam eam per exortum sui constat habuisse), voluntas appetendae iugiter pravitatis incumberet. Et adiungis: Voluntas quae libera est in malis, libera in bonis non est; non minore plane stultitiae professione, quam profanitatis, liberum vocas, quod dicis nisi unum velle non posse.
I. 100. Julian. So that, with the possession of eternity lost (which indeed it is established it never had by its origin), the will leaned perpetually toward desiring depravity. And you add: The will which is free in evils is not free in goods; with no smaller a profession of stupidity, plainly, than of profanity, you call free that which you say can will nothing but one thing.
JulianImp.1.100Augustinus. Si liberum non est, nisi quod duo potest velle, id est, et bonum et malum; liber Deus non est, qui malum non potest velle, de quo etiam ipse dixisti, verumque dixisti: Deus esse nisi iustus non potest . Siccine Deum laudas, ut ei auferas libertatem? An potius intellegere debes esse quamdam beatam necessitatem, qua Deus iniustus non potest esse?
Augustine. If nothing is free except what can will two things, that is, both good and evil; God is not free, who cannot will evil, of whom you yourself also said, and said truly: God cannot be anything but just. Do you so praise God as to take from him liberty? Or ought you rather to understand that there is a certain blessed necessity, by which God cannot be unjust?
JulianImp.1.100I. 101. Iulianus. Sed licet nulla ex parte constes, tamen quid attuleris prudens lector attendat. Consentiamus voluntatem liberam dici posse, quae bonum velle non potest; hanc autem voluntatem in Baptismate asseris liberari. Interrogo, ad quem modum liberatur? Ut bonum semper velle cogatur, et malum velle non possit? An ut utrumque possit appetere? Hic tu si responderis: Ut bonum semper velle cogatur; quam sis Iovinianista, etiam ipse cognoscis. Si autem dixeris: Quomodo potest esse voluntas libera, si bonum semper velle cogatur? Respondeo: Quomodo dicebatur ante voluntas libera, si malum velle tantummodo cogebatur? Si ergo responderis, sic fieri post Baptisma liberam voluntatem, ut et peccare et non peccare possit; hoc ipso pronuntiabis liberum arbitrium non fuisse, cum utrumque non poterat. Clauderis undique disputationis tuae laqueis; arbitrium ante Baptisma liberum fuit; facultatem habuit faciendi boni, sicut facultatem habuit faciendi mali; et omnis dogmatis tui, quo malum naturale persuades, scena collabitur.
I. 101. Julian. But although you stand on no side, yet let the prudent reader attend to what you have brought forward. Let us agree that a will can be called free which cannot will good; but this will, you assert, is freed in Baptism. I ask, in what manner is it freed? So that it is compelled always to will good, and cannot will evil? Or so that it can desire either? Here, if you answer: So that it is compelled always to will good; how much of a Jovinianist you are, you yourself even recognize. But if you say: How can a will be free, if it is compelled always to will good? I answer: How was the will called free before, if it was compelled only to will evil? If, then, you answer that after Baptism the will is made free in such a way that it can both sin and not sin; by this very thing you will declare that there was no free choice, when it could not do both. You are shut in on every side by the snares of your own disputation: choice was free before Baptism; it had the faculty of doing good, just as it had the faculty of doing evil; and the whole stage-set of your teaching, by which you persuade a natural evil, collapses.
JulianImp.1.101Augustinus. De Manichaeo et Ioviniano iam me tibi supe us inveniet respondisse qui legerit; quomodo autem dicas eum, cuius voluntatem nos dicimus a Domino praeparari, ita fieri bonae voluntatis, ut bonum velle cogatur (quod absit ut dicatur a nobis), viderit praeclara intellegentia tua. Si enim cogitur, non vult; et quid absurdius, quam ut dicatur nolens velle quod bonum est? De natura etiam Dei vide quid sentias, homo qui dicis cogi hominem ut bonum velit, si malum velle non possit. Numquid enim Deus cogitur velle bonum, quia velle non potest malum, quoniam est omnino immutabilis? Natura vero humana quamvis mutabilis, quantum ad id pertinet quod condita est, bona est; quae non solum sine vitio facta est, verum etiam cum per vitium mala est, capax est boni, quo bona sit. Haec vera sententia fallacem Manichaeorum evertit insaniam. In Baptismo autem ita peccata omnia dimittuntur in Dei gratia, qua et ad ipsum Baptismum homo praeparata ab illo voluntate perducitur, ut deinceps quamvis concupiscat spiritus eius adversus carnem ne consentiat iniquitati, tamen et caro concupiscat adversus spiritum, ut non faciat et ille quod vult. Vult enim et istam carnis concupiscentiam non habere, sed non potest nunc; propter quod adhuc in se ipso ingemiscit, adoptionem exspectans redemptionem corporis sui , ubi sic habeat carnem, ut iam peccare non possit. Nunc ergo, non solum potest peccare post Baptismum, verum etiam quia et bene reluctans concupiscentiae carnis aliquando ab ea trahitur ad consensionem; et quamvis venialia, tamen aliqua peccata committit; habet cur semper hic dicat: Dimitte nobis debita nostra . Haec quoque catholica veritas Ioviniani redarguit vanitatem. Utrumque autem, id est, et quod contra Manichaeum, et quod contra Iovinianum dicimus, haeresim vestram calumniasque subvertit.
Augustine. Whoever reads will find that I have already answered you above about the Manichee and Jovinian; but how you say that he, whose will we say is prepared by the Lord, is so made of good will that he is compelled to will good (which far be it that it be said by us), let your splendid understanding have seen. For if he is compelled, he does not will; and what is more absurd than that one should be said to will, unwilling, what is good? See, too, what you hold about the nature of God, you who say that a human being is compelled to will good, if he cannot will evil. For is God compelled to will good, because he cannot will evil, since he is altogether immutable? But human nature, although mutable, is good as far as concerns the fact that it was created; which was not only made without vice, but even when by vice it is evil, is capable of the good by which it may be good. This true opinion overturns the fallacious insanity of the Manichees. But in Baptism all sins are so forgiven in the grace of God—by which a human being is led even to Baptism itself with his will prepared by him—that thereafter, although his spirit lusts against the flesh that it may not consent to iniquity, yet the flesh too lusts against the spirit, so that he too does not do what he wills. For he wills also not to have this concupiscence of the flesh, but he cannot now; on account of which he still groans in himself, awaiting the adoption, the redemption of his body (See Rom 8:23), where he will have flesh in such a way that he can no longer sin. Now, then, not only can he sin after Baptism, but also, because, even fighting well against the concupiscence of the flesh, he is sometimes drawn by it to consent; and, although venial, he commits some sins; he has cause always here to say: Forgive us our debts (Matt 6:12). This too the catholic truth refutes the vanity of Jovinian. But both—that is, both what we say against the Manichee, and what against Jovinian—subverts your heresy and your calumnies.
JulianImp.1.101I. 102. Iulianus. Sin autem liberum ante ad bonum non fuit, et factum est post Baptisma ita liberum, ut malum facere non possit; numquam quidem ei adfuit arbitrii libertas, et probatur sine reatu antea peccasse, et postea sine cura sanctitatis gloriam possidere.
I. 102. Julian. But if it was not free for good before, and was made so free after Baptism that it cannot do evil; the freedom of choice was indeed never present to it, and it is proved both to have sinned before without guilt, and afterward to possess the glory of holiness without care.
JulianImp.1.102Augustinus. Ergo nec in Deo est arbitrii libertas, quia malum facere non potest, sicut negare se ipsum non potest , qui et nobis summo illo praemio largiturus est, ut non quidem ipsi Deo, sed tamen Angelis eius aequales, nec nos peccare possimus. Hoc enim eis post lapsum diaboli pro merito bonae voluntatis, qua in veritate steterunt, donasse credendus est, ut postea nullus per liberum arbitrium novus diabolus fieret.
Augustine. Then there is not in God either the freedom of choice, because he cannot do evil, as he cannot deny himself (2 Tim 2:13)—who is going to bestow on us too, by that supreme reward, that we, equal indeed not to God himself, but yet to his Angels, can no longer sin. For this is to be believed to have been granted to them, after the fall of the devil, for the deserving of the good will by which they stood in the truth, that afterward no one should become a new devil through free choice.
JulianImp.1.102I. 103. Iulianus. Quo collecto convinceris inficiari prorsus dogmati tuo; ut promittas te liberum arbitrium non negare, quod antea mali, postea boni necessitate subvertis.
I. 103. Julian. From which gathered conclusion you are convicted of utterly contradicting your own teaching; so that you promise that you do not deny free choice, which before by the necessity of evil, afterward by the necessity of good, you overturn.
JulianImp.1.103Augustinus. Dicturus es, ut video, Deum necessitate premi, ut peccare non possit; qui utique nec potest velle, nec vult posse peccare. Immo vero, si necessitas dicenda est, qua necesse est aliquid vel esse, vel fieri; beatissima est ista omnino necessitas, qua necesse est feliciter vivere, et in eadem vita necesse est non mori, necesse est in deterius non mutari. Hac necessitate, si necessitas etiam ipsa dicenda est, non premuntur sancti Angeli, sed fruuntur; nobis autem est futura, non praesens.
Augustine. You are going to say, as I see, that God is pressed by necessity, so that he cannot sin; who certainly neither can will, nor wills to be able, to sin. Rather, if it is to be called necessity, by which it is necessary that something either be or come about; this is altogether a most blessed necessity, by which it is necessary to live happily, and in that same life it is necessary not to die, it is necessary not to be changed for the worse. By this necessity, if it is even itself to be called necessity, the holy Angels are not pressed, but enjoy it; but for us it is to come, not present.
JulianImp.1.103I. 104. Iulianus. Verumtamen, ad destructionem totam dogmatis tui proficit, ut etiam recordemur definitionum superiorum. Si peccatum non est nisi voluntas retinendi et admittendi, quod iustitia vetat et unde liberum est abstinere, nullum peccatum in rebus penitus invenitur.
I. 104. Julian. Yet it profits the whole destruction of your teaching that we recall also the earlier definitions. If sin is nothing but the will to retain and to commit what justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain, no sin at all is found in things.
JulianImp.1.104Augustinus. Ista definitio peccati eius est, quod peccatum tantummodo est, non quod etiam poena peccati, qua periit libertas non peccandi; a quo malo non liberat, nisi ille cui non tantum dicimus: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, verum etiam: Ne nos inferas in tentationem, sed libera nos a malo .
Augustine. That definition is of the sin which is only sin, not of that which is also the punishment of sin, by which the liberty of not sinning perished; from which evil no one frees us except him to whom we say not only: Forgive us our debts, but also: Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil (Matt 6:12-13).
JulianImp.1.104I. 105. Iulianus. Nam si non imputat iustitia, nisi unde liberum est abstinere; et ante Baptisma necessitas mali est, quoniam voluntas, sicut dixisti, ad faciendum bonum non est libera, perque hoc aliud agere non potest nisi malum; ab infamia mali ipsa quam patitur necessitate defenditur; quoniam apud eam iustitiam gravari operibus suis non potest, quae non imputat malum, nisi a quo liberum est abstinere. Post Baptisma autem, si necessitas boni est, nullum utique potest esse peccatum. Vide igitur quam illud quod esse peccatum ratio demonstrat, inveniri nequeat in seminibus, quando secundum definitiones tuas iam nec in moribus invenitur.
I. 105. Julian. For if justice does not impute except that from which one is free to abstain; and before Baptism there is a necessity of evil, since the will, as you said, is not free for doing good, and through this can do nothing other than evil; it is defended from the infamy of evil by the very necessity which it suffers; since with that justice it cannot be weighed down by its own works, which does not impute evil, except that from which one is free to abstain. But after Baptism, if there is a necessity of good, there can certainly be no sin. See, then, how that which reason demonstrates to be sin cannot be found in the seeds, when, according to your definitions, it is now not even found in morals.
JulianImp.1.105Augustinus. Multum erras, qui vel necessitatem nullam putas esse peccandi, vel eam non intellegis illius peccati esse poenam, quod nulla necessitate commissum est. Si enim necessitas nulla peccandi est (ut omittam vim mali eius quod originaliter trahitur; hoc enim nullum esse vos vultis) quid patiebatur, quaeso, qui secundum vestrum sensum, tanta mole malae consuetudinis premebatur, ut diceret: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago ? Deinde cogitare te existimo, quid appetendum, quid vitandum sit in agenda vita, quanto labore discatur. Qui autem hoc nesciunt, ipsa boni appetendi malique vitandi ignorantia patiuntur peccandi necessitatem. Necesse est enim ut peccet, qui nesciendo quid facere debeat, quod non debet facit. De quo genere malorum Deus rogatur, ubi dicitur: Delicta iuventutis et ignorantiae meae ne memineris . Quod genus delictorum si non imputaret Deus iustus, non ea sibi dimitti posceret homo fidelis. Unde dicit et Dei famulus Iob: Signasti peccata mea in sacculo, et annotasti si quid invitus commisi . Tu quoque ipse in libro novissimo tuo eorum, quos contra unum meum quattuor edidisti, ex affectionibus atque passionibus animi dicis: Evenire hominibus affectionalem qualitatem atque ita inhaerescere, ut aut magnis molitionibus, aut nullis separetur omnino . Quisquis ergo ea timiditate peccaverit, quae ab illo non potest separari, quid aliud quam necessitate peccabit? Sed vos ista peccata ex illis venire peccatis, quae nulla necessitate commissa sunt, in illo saltem conceditis, qui dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago. Qui enim, ut istam patiatur necessitatem, non nisi peccandi consuetudine premitur; procul dubio priusquam peccaret, nondum necessitate consuetudinis premebatur. Ac per hoc, etiam secundum vos, peccandi necessitas unde abstinere liberum non est, illius peccati poena est, a quo abstinere liberum fuit, quando nullum pondus necessitatis urgebat. Cur ergo non creditis tantum saltem valuisse illud primi hominis ineffabiliter grande peccatum, ut eo vitiaretur humana natura universa, quantum valet nunc in homine uno secunda natura? Sic enim a doctis appellari consuetudinem nos commemorandos putasti . Cum igitur et illa fateamur in hominibus esse peccata, quae committuntur, non necessitate, sed voluntate, quae tantummodo peccata sunt, unde ab eis liberum est abstinere; et peccatis de ignorantiae vel affectionum necessitate venientibus, quae iam non solum peccata, verum etiam poenae sunt peccatorum, plenum sit genus humanum; quomodo dicis definitionibus nostris peccatum nec in moribus inveniri? Sed quod non vultis, audite. A peccatis omnibus sive originalibus, sive moralibus, vel quae facta sunt, vel ne fiant, non liberat nisi gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum, in quo regenerati sumus, et a quo didicimus orando dicere, non solum: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, id est, quia peccavimus; verum etiam: Ne nos inferas in tentationem , id est, ne peccemus.
Augustine. You greatly err, who either think there is no necessity of sinning, or do not understand it to be the punishment of that sin which was committed by no necessity. For if there is no necessity of sinning (to omit the force of that evil which is drawn originally; for you want this to be nothing), what, I ask, was he suffering who, according to your understanding, was pressed by so great a mass of evil habit that he said: I do not do the good that I will, but the evil that I will not, this I do (Rom 7:19)? Then I judge that you consider with what labor it is learned what is to be desired, what to be avoided in the conduct of life. But those who do not know this suffer the necessity of sinning by the very ignorance of desiring good and avoiding evil. For it is necessary that he sin who, not knowing what he ought to do, does what he ought not. About which kind of evils God is asked, where it is said: Remember not the offenses of my youth and of my ignorance (Ps 25:7 (24:7)). Which kind of offenses, if the just God did not impute, the faithful man would not ask that they be forgiven him. Whence the servant of God, Job, also says: You have sealed up my sins in a bag, and noted if I have committed anything unwillingly (Job 14:17 LXX). You too yourself, in the last book of those four which you published against my one, say, from the affections and passions of the mind: That an affectional quality befalls human beings and so inheres that it is separated either by great efforts, or by none at all. Whoever, then, sins by that fearfulness which cannot be separated from him, what else does he do than sin by necessity? But you concede that these sins come from those sins which were committed by no necessity—at least in him who says: The evil that I will not, this I do. For he who, in order to suffer this necessity, is pressed only by the habit of sinning; without doubt before he sinned, he was not yet pressed by the necessity of habit. And through this, even according to you, the necessity of sinning, from which one is not free to abstain, is the punishment of that sin from which one was free to abstain, when no weight of necessity pressed. Why, then, do you not believe that that ineffably great sin of the first man availed at least so much that by it the whole of human nature was vitiated, as much as a second nature now avails in one human being? For you thought we should be reminded that habit is thus called by the learned. Since, then, we both confess that there are in human beings those sins which are committed not by necessity, but by will, which are only sins, from which they are free to abstain; and that the human race is full of sins coming from the necessity of ignorance or of the affections, which are now not only sins, but also punishments of sins; how do you say that, by our definitions, sin is not found even in morals? But hear what you are unwilling to hear. From all sins, whether original or moral, whether they have been committed, or that they may not be committed, no one frees except the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, in whom we have been regenerated, and from whom we have learned to say in prayer, not only: Forgive us our debts, that is, because we have sinned; but also: Lead us not into temptation (Matt 6:13), that is, that we may not sin.
JulianImp.1.105I. 106. Iulianus. Verum consignata hac disputationis summa prudentis animo lectoris, excutiamus quid Baptisma tuum, quod propter solam genitalium commotionem dicis fuisse provisum, crediti sibi muneris exsequatur. Profitetur se a peccatis homines expiare, sed cum apud iustitiam causa agitur voluntatis, non pronuntiatur rea, quae aliud velle non potuit. Evanescente autem invidia reatus, etiam pompa indulgentis evanuit; quia non potest ignoscere, quod iure non potest imputare. Ac per hoc, promissionis suae frustratur effectibus; quoniam nec invenit crimina, quorum remissione laudetur; nec habet huius beneficii debitores, quo peccatorum vincula solvuntur; quia in necessitatis asylo collocatos non potest malae convincere voluntatis; per quae omnia supervacuum de ehenditur. Verum quia gratia quae a Christo provisa est, supervacua non est; rationabilis eius munificentia teneatur, per quod rea voluntas convincitur peccatoris, quae potuit utique tam bonum velle, quam malum voluit. Totum ergo figmentum necessitatis evanuit; ac per hoc, nullum est de naturae conditione peccatum; sed liberum arbitrium in natura hominum perseverat; quod ut tu cum Manichaeis negas, ita nos cum Apostolis et omnibus Catholicis confitemur.
I. 106. Julian. But with this sum of the disputation sealed in the mind of the prudent reader, let us examine what your Baptism—which you say was provided on account of the mere stirring of the genitals—carries out of the office entrusted to it. It professes that it expiates human beings from sins, but when the case of the will is tried before justice, that is not pronounced guilty which could not will otherwise. But with the odium of guilt vanishing, the pomp of the one indulging vanishes too; because it cannot forgive what it cannot by right impute. And through this, it is frustrated of the effects of its promise; since it neither finds crimes by whose remission it may be praised; nor has it debtors of this benefit, by which the bonds of sins are loosed; because it cannot convict of an evil will those placed in the asylum of necessity; by all of which it is caught out as superfluous. But because the grace which was provided by Christ is not superfluous; let its reasonable munificence be held, through which the guilty will of the sinner is convicted, which certainly could will good as much as it willed evil. The whole fiction of necessity, then, has vanished; and through this, there is no sin from the condition of nature; but free choice perseveres in the nature of human beings; which, as you with the Manichees deny, so we with the Apostles and all Catholics confess.
JulianImp.1.106Augustinus. Necesse est ut peccet, a quo ignoratur iustitia; numquid ideo cum iustitiam cognoverit, non sunt ei remittenda peccata, quae ignorantiae necessitate commisit? Aut quia iam cognovit quemadmodum vivere debeat, de se ipso ei praesumendum est ut iuste vivat, non de illo cui dicitur: Ne nos inferas in tentationem ? Non est igitur impunitatis securitas in necessitate peccandi, sed ut non obsit ista necessitas, donat ille cui dicitur: De necessitatibus meis erue me . Donat autem duobus modis: et praeteritam dimittendo iniquitatem, et opitulando ne intremus in tentationem. Unusquisque vero tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus . Quae suscepta tua tam tibi grata est ut, cum ab illa in consensionem quisque non trahitur, ipsam putes esse laudandam; quasi malum non sit res quae impellit in malum, si non ei cedat, sed resistat ille qui impellitur. Quamvis tu, etiamsi si consentiatur, illum qui cecidit, non ipsam quae impulit; illum qui attractus est, non ipsam quae attraxit; illum qui illectus est, non ipsam quae illexit; magno vaniloquio contendas esse culpandum; quia scilicet, ut definis, male usus est bono; habes quippe tam malum spiritum, ut concupiscentia bona tibi videatur, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. Sed eleganter te existimas irrisisse de Baptismo sententiam nostram, mendacissime affirmans quod propter solam genitalium commotionem Baptismum dicamus esse provisum. Non hoc dicimus, sed illud, quod vos nova et haeretica perversitate subvertere conamini, dicimus, ideo divinitus esse provisum secundae spiritalis nativitatis auxilium, quam fieri in se ipso Christus instituit, quoniam secundum Adam carnaliter nati contrahunt mortis antiquae prima nativitate contagium . Ecce verbis usus sum Poeni episcopi Cypriani, contra quem tu etiam martyrem latras, cum Ecclesiae fundatissimam fidem, pro qua Ecclesia fusus est eius sanguis, oppugnas. Sicut enim Paulus apostolus dixit: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt ; ita et Cyprianus episcopus, intellector huius Apostoli confessus est, secundum Adam carnaliter natos contagium mortis antiquae prima nativitate contrahere. Quid est ergo quod te Apostolis et omnibus Catholicis fallaciter iungis; quandoquidem Apostolo fraudulenter, catholico au m episcopo et martyri, in eo quod sensit cum orientali et occidentali catholica Ecclesia, apertissime contradicis?
Augustine. It is necessary that he sin by whom justice is not known; is it for that reason that, when he has come to know justice, the sins are not to be remitted to him which he committed by the necessity of ignorance? Or, because he has now come to know how he ought to live, is he to presume of himself that he live justly, not of him to whom it is said: Lead us not into temptation (Matt 6:13)? There is not, then, a security of impunity in the necessity of sinning, but, that this necessity may not harm, he grants it to whom it is said: Rescue me from my necessities (See Ps 25:17 (24:17)). But he grants it in two ways: both by forgiving past iniquity, and by helping that we may not enter into temptation. But each one is tempted, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence (Jas 1:14). Which concupiscence, as you have taken it up, is so pleasing to you that, when anyone is not drawn by it into consent, you think it is to be praised; as though the thing which impels into evil were not an evil, if the one who is impelled does not yield to it, but resists. Although you, even if it is consented to, contend with great empty talk that he who fell, not the thing which impelled; he who was drawn away, not the thing which drew away; he who was enticed, not the thing which enticed, is to be blamed; because, namely, as you define, he used a good badly; for you have so evil a spirit that the concupiscence by which the flesh lusts against the spirit seems to you good. But you think you have elegantly mocked our opinion about Baptism, most lyingly affirming that we say Baptism was provided on account of the mere stirring of the genitals. We do not say this, but we say that—which you try to subvert by a new and heretical perversity—the help of the second spiritual birth was divinely provided, which Christ instituted to come about in himself, because those born carnally according to Adam contract, at the first birth, the contagion of the ancient death. Behold, I have used the words of the Punic bishop Cyprian, against whom you bark even though he is a martyr, when you assail the most firmly founded faith of the Church, for which Church his blood was shed. For just as the apostle Paul said: Through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12); so too the bishop Cyprian, an interpreter of this Apostle, confessed that those born carnally according to Adam contract, at the first birth, the contagion of the ancient death. What is it, then, that you fallaciously join yourself to the Apostles and all Catholics; since you most plainly contradict the Apostle fraudulently, and the catholic bishop and martyr, in what he understood with the Eastern and Western catholic Church?
JulianImp.1.106I. 107. Iulianus. Expositio sane, quam Pauli apostoli sermonibus admovisti, cum risu esset praetereunda, nisi Scripturarum terreret ignaros. Cum essetis, inquit Apostolus, servi peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae . Dicere utique non poterat: Liberatos; quoniam hic sermo liberationis tunc decenter infertur et proprie, cum homo a noxiis liberatur; liberi autem a virtutibus dici possunt, qui decernunt nihil debere virtutibus. Liber ergo et a bono et a malo dici potest, qui alteri serviens, alteri studet nihil debere; liberatus autem nisi a malo dici non potest; quia verbum hoc liberationis in se habet indicium illius qui propulsatur angoris. Quae igitur hic quaestio Apostolo de verbis suis fieri potuit, cum ille more generis humani, a bono liberos, a malo dixerit liberatos? Cum ergo, inquit, servi essetis peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae; quem fructum habuistis tunc in his, in quibus nunc erubescitis? Sed ne tu aestimares servos nos peccato fieri per naturam, audi ipsum Apostolum in iisdem locis loquentem: An nescitis, quoniam cui exhibetis vosmetipsos servos ad oboediendum, servi estis eius cui oboeditis, sive peccati, sive obauditionis iustitiae? Vosmetipsos, inquit, exhibuistis peccato servos; ut intellegeres eum voluntati, non nativitati imputare peccatum. Ob hoc ergo solum eos dixit liberos fuisse iustitiae, quia detrectassent eius praecepta servare.
I. 107. Julian. The exposition, indeed, which you applied to the words of the apostle Paul, would have to be passed over with laughter, did it not terrify those ignorant of the Scriptures. When you were, says the Apostle, slaves of sin, you were free of justice. He certainly could not say: Freed; since this word of liberation is then fittingly and properly introduced, when a human being is freed from harmful things; but those can be called free of the virtues who decide they owe nothing to the virtues. He can, then, be called free both of good and of evil, who, serving one, is zealous to owe nothing to the other; but he cannot be called freed except from evil; because this word of liberation has in itself the indication of that anguish which is repelled. What question, then, could here be made to the Apostle about his words, when he, in the manner of the human race, called those free of good, freed of evil? When, then, he says, you were slaves of sin, you were free of justice; what fruit did you have then in those things in which you now blush? (Rom 6:20-21) But lest you should reckon that we become slaves to sin by nature, hear the Apostle himself speaking in the same passages: Or do you not know that to whom you present yourselves as slaves for obeying, you are slaves of him whom you obey, whether of sin, or of the obedience of justice? (Rom 6:16) You presented yourselves, he says, as slaves to sin; that you might understand that he imputes sin to the will, not to birth. For this reason alone, then, he said they had been free of justice, because they had refused to keep its precepts.
JulianImp.1.107Augustinus. Si ob hoc solum dicti sunt homines liberi fuisse iustitiae, quod detrectassent eius praecepta servare; ergo antequam acciperent praecepta iustitiae, quae detractarent servare, non erant liberi iustitiae, servique peccati? Quis hoc dixerit? Ab hac ergo necessitate servitutis ille liberat, qui non solum dat praecepta per legem; verum etiam donat per spiritum caritatem, cuius delectatione vincatur delectatio peccati; alioquin perseverat invicta, et servum suum tenet. A quo enim quis devictus est, huic et servus addictus est .
Augustine. If for this reason alone human beings were said to have been free of justice, because they had refused to keep its precepts; then before they received the precepts of justice, which they refused to keep, were they not free of justice, and slaves of sin? Who would say this? From this necessity of slavery, then, he frees who not only gives precepts through the law; but also bestows, through the spirit, love, by whose delight the delight of sin may be conquered; otherwise it perseveres unconquered, and holds its slave. For by whom anyone has been overcome, to him also he is assigned as a slave (2 Pet 2:19).
JulianImp.1.107I. 108. Iulianus. Denique statim addit, ita eos servos esse iustitiae, sicut fuerant servi ante peccati. Per quod potes eos iam tu, si placet, liberos dicere peccato, cum serviunt iustitiae; sicut ab illo dicti sunt a iustitia liberi, cum servirent delicto. Ineptissime itaque simplicitati apostolicae voluisti calumniam commovere. Neque enim ille, ut putas, vigilantissime hoc quod aestimas intimavit; sed tu somniculosissime quod ille protulit intueris. Argumentaris quippe, ideo illum liberatos dicere maluisse, quam liberos, ut intellegeremus arbitrii libertate male quidem posse, bene autem fieri non posse. Verum ipse tibi verborum eius ordo renititur. Nam si hoc, quod tu, putasset, quia libertate solum peccaretur, debuit dicere: Liberi fuistis peccato; non: Liberi fuistis iustitiae , ut ille diceretur esse liber, cui operabatur ipsa libertas. Si enim placet etiam casuum pensare momenta, huic illos iustitiae dixit esse liberos, non ab hac iustitia liberos. Consequentius ergo hac elocutione nos adiuvaremur, si etiam tam leves res premere vellemus. Sed absit hoc: sensum intellegimus Apostoli, et elocutionum simpliciter prolatarum officio contenti sumus. Nihil aliud dixit Magister Gentium, nisi: Liberi fuistis, non servistis, iustitiae; liberati estis, peccatorum veniam suscepistis, manente arbitrii libertate; per quam potuerunt et ante peccato, et postea oboedire iustitiae.
I. 108. Julian. Finally, he immediately adds that they are slaves of justice, just as they had been slaves before of sin. Through which you can now, if you please, call them free of sin, when they serve justice; just as they were said by him to be free of justice, when they served the offense. Most ineptly, then, you wished to stir up a calumny against the apostolic simplicity. For he did not, as you think, most vigilantly intimate this which you reckon; but you most drowsily look at what he brought forth. For you argue that he preferred to say freed rather than free, that we might understand that by the liberty of choice one can indeed do evil, but that good cannot be done. But the very order of his words struggles against you. For if he had thought this which you do, that one sins only by liberty, he ought to have said: You were free of sin; not: You were free of justice, so that he might be said to be free for whom liberty itself was working. For if it pleases even to weigh the moments of the cases, he said they were free to this justice, not free from this justice. More consistently, then, we would be helped by this expression, if we too wished to press even such slight matters. But far be it: we understand the sense of the Apostle, and we are content with the office of expressions simply brought forth. The Teacher of the Gentiles said nothing other than: You were free, you did not serve, justice; you were freed, you received the pardon of sins, with the liberty of choice remaining; through which they could both before obey sin, and afterward obey justice.
JulianImp.1.108Augustinus. Ex isto haeretico sensu, quo dicitis non fieri per gratiam liberationem a peccato, nisi cum de praeterito accipitur venia; non autem etiam ne dominetur peccatum, cum quisque a concupiscentia sua trahitur in eius assensum; etiam sanctorum orationibus contradicitis. Utquid enim Deo dicitur: Ne nos inferas in tentationem ; si, ut hoc non fiat, in liberi arbitrii nostri est potestate, quod nobis naturaliter insitum est? Utquid dicit Apostolus: Oramus autem ad Deum, ne quid faciatis mali ; si Deus non liberat a peccatis, nisi veniam dando praeteritis?
Augustine. From this heretical sense, by which you say that liberation from sin does not come about through grace, except when pardon is received for the past; but not also that sin may not have dominion, when one is drawn by his own concupiscence into consent to it; you contradict even the prayers of the saints. For why is it said to God: Lead us not into temptation; if, that this may not come about, it is in the power of our free choice, which is naturally implanted in us? Why does the Apostle say: But we pray to God, that you do no evil (2 Cor 13:7); if God does not free from sins, except by giving pardon for past ones?
JulianImp.1.108I. 109. Iulianus. Denique quid exhortatio ipsius teneret, ostendit, praemittens: Humanum est quod dico, propter infirmitatem carnis vestrae; sicut enim exhibuistis membra vestra servire immunditiae et iniquitati ad iniquitatem; ita nunc exhibete membra vestra servire iustitiae in sanctificationem; cum enim servi essetis peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae . Ordinatissime prorsus ipsos dicit liberos fuisse iustitiae, quos convenerat, ut membra sua in omni sanctificatione retinerent. Verum, quia non parum hic immorati sumus, ut ostenderemus certissimum esse quod dixeram , quia negarent liberum arbitrium homines qui vestro fuissent sermone deterriti, et in verum exitium vana formidine truderentur; atque te esse praecipuum arbitrii liberi negatorem; revertamur ad illum librum, qui est ad Valerium destinatus, ut probemus primo te negasse conditorem Deum; nunc autem, alibi quidem negare, alibi scelestius multo quam negaveras confiteri. Et quidem, quam in illo libro tuo priore absolute Deum negaveris conditorem hominum, satis cum discuteretur apparuit; dixisti quippe, quod genus humanum diabolus quasi plantati a se fruticis fructum iure decerperet ; multaque alia quae loco a te argumentorum posita huic cooperantur errori. In hoc vero secundo libro, etsi universitate dogmatis tui idem agas, tamen perniciosius niteris emendare sententiam, quam ante protulisti.
I. 109. Julian. Finally, he showed what his exhortation held, premising: It is a human thing that I say, on account of the weakness of your flesh; for as you presented your members to serve uncleanness and iniquity unto iniquity, so now present your members to serve justice unto sanctification; for when you were slaves of sin, you were free of justice (Rom 6:19-20). Most orderly, indeed, he says that those were free of justice whom he had addressed, that they should keep their members in all sanctification. But, since we have lingered here not a little, in order to show that it is most certain what I had said—that human beings would deny free choice who had been frightened by your speech, and would be thrust by a vain dread into true destruction; and that you are the chief denier of free choice—let us return to that book which was directed to Valerius, that we may prove first that you denied God the founder; but now, that you deny it in one place, and in another confess it much more wickedly than you had denied it. And indeed, how absolutely you denied in that earlier book of yours that God is the founder of human beings, appeared sufficiently when it was examined; for you said that the devil rightly plucked the human race as the fruit of a shrub, as it were, planted by himself; and many other things which were placed by you in the place of arguments cooperate with this error. But in this second book, although by the whole of your teaching you do the same, yet you strive more perniciously to amend the opinion which you brought forth before.
JulianImp.1.109Augustinus. Si tibi parum est Apostolus, qui dicit: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt ; Ambrosius utique, non ut Manichaeus, quo nomine tales, qualis ille fuerat fidei, criminaris; sed ut Catholicus intellexit Apostolum, eumque intellegens ait: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est . Ecce de quo tamquam de suo frutice diabolus fructum iure decerpsit; non de natura quam Deus condidit, sed de vitio quod ipse plantavit. Neque enim qui nascuntur sub peccato, possunt nisi sub auctore esse peccati, si non renascantur in Christo.
Augustine. If the Apostle is too little for you, who says: Through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned; Ambrose certainly—not as a Manichee, by which name you accuse those of such a faith as he was; but as a Catholic—understood the Apostle, and, understanding him, said: We are all human beings born under sin, and our very origin is in fault. Behold from what, as from his own shrub, the devil rightly plucked the fruit; not from the nature which God created, but from the vice which he himself planted. For those who are born under sin cannot be except under the author of sin, if they are not reborn in Christ.
JulianImp.1.109I. 110. Iulianus. Verum suppleamus breviter responsionem, quae capiti tuo, quod supra posuimus , debetur. Constanter itaque fideliterque respondeo, quia non invideamus liberatorem hominibus Dominum Iesum Christum; quos convenimus, ne vobis credentes, emendationis desperatione frangantur, et recedant ab eruditione Christi, quasi ea praecipientis, quae capere mortalium natura non possit, quippe malo aggravata congenito.
I. 110. Julian. But let us supply briefly the response which is owed to your chapter, which we set down above. Constantly and faithfully, then, I respond that we do not envy human beings the Liberator, the Lord Jesus Christ; whom we address, lest, believing you, they be broken by despair of amendment, and recede from the instruction of Christ, as though commanding things which the nature of mortals cannot grasp, being weighed down, of course, by a congenital evil.
JulianImp.1.110Augustinus. Sed et mors congenita est; et tamen ab ea liberat, qui quos vult vivificat ; ad quem debent confugere, qui volunt a malo congenito liberari; quod ut faciant, quis attrahat, in Evangelio lege .
Augustine. But death too is congenital; and yet he frees from it who vivifies whom he wills (John 5:21); to whom they ought to flee who wish to be freed from the congenital evil; and that they may do this, read in the Gospel who draws them.
JulianImp.1.110I. 111. Iulianus. Sed currant ad eum qui clamat: Iugum meum suave est, et onus meum leve est ; qui et malae voluntati veniam pro inaestimabili liberalitate largitur, et innocentiam, quam creat bonam, facit innovando adoptandoque meliorem.
I. 111. Julian. But let them run to him who cries out: My yoke is sweet, and my burden is light (Matt 11:30); who both bestows pardon on the evil will by inestimable liberality, and makes the innocence which he creates good better by renewing and adopting.
JulianImp.1.111Augustinus. Ipsi sunt homines, quibus invides liberatorem, quos habere malum, a quo liberentur, negas. Quomodo ergo constanter fideliterque respondes, quod non invideatis liberatorem hominibus Dominum Iesum Christum; cum potius pertinaciter et infideliter agas, ne ab illo salvi fieri credantur parvuli, sicut salvum facit populum suum a peccatis eorum ; propter quod eum, Evangelio loquente, didicimus appellatum esse Iesum ? Non igitur docere poteritis liberatorem Christum vos hominibus non invidere, quia parvulos non esse homines nullo modo potestis ostendere.
Augustine. These are the very human beings whom you envy the Liberator, whom you deny to have an evil from which they may be freed. How, then, do you constantly and faithfully respond that you do not envy human beings the Liberator, the Lord Jesus Christ; when you rather act pertinaciously and faithlessly, that little ones be not believed to be saved by him, just as he saves his people from their sins (See Matt 1:21); on account of which we have learned, the Gospel speaking, that he was called Jesus? You will not, then, be able to teach that you do not envy human beings the Liberator Christ, because you can in no way show that little ones are not human beings.
JulianImp.1.111I. 112. Iulianus. Demiror itaque ausum te fuisse ponere testimonium, quo dicitur: A quo enim quis devictus est, huic et servus addictus est . Quod manifestissime pro nobis facit, asserentibus non posse quemquam obnoxium esse diabolo, nisi qui fuerit post certamen voluntatis degeneri deditione superatus. A te autem usurpari non debuit, cui vehementer repugnat, persuadenti in regno diaboli esse nascentes, qui sine voluntate propria nec vinci utique, nec peccare potuerunt.
I. 112. Julian. I marvel, then, that you dared to set down the testimony by which it is said: For by whom anyone has been overcome, to him also he is assigned as a slave (2 Pet 2:19). Which most manifestly makes for us, who assert that no one can be liable to the devil except him who, after the contest of the will, has been overcome by a degenerate surrender. But it ought not to have been used by you, against whom it vehemently fights, persuading that those being born are in the kingdom of the devil, who without their own will certainly could neither be overcome, nor sin.
JulianImp.1.112Augustinus. Quos dicis nascentes nec vinci, nec certare potuisse, ab illo originem ducunt, in quo omnes peccaverunt; qui homo, quod est peius, sine certamine victus est. Fuit enim Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam, et in illo omnes perierunt . Sinite ergo parvulos inveniri ab eo, qui venit quaerere quod perierat ; alioquin liberatorem Iesum, quoniam et ipsi homines sunt, prorsus hominibus invidetis, quantacumque loquacitate crudelitatem vestri huius erroris obtegendam esse credatis.
Augustine. Those whom you say, being born, could neither be overcome nor contend, draw their origin from him in whom all sinned; who, the man—what is worse—was overcome without a contest. For there was Adam, and in him we all were; Adam perished, and in him all perished. Allow, then, little ones to be found by him who came to seek what had perished (See Luke 19:10); otherwise you utterly envy human beings the Liberator Jesus, since they too are human beings, however much loquacity you believe should be used to cover the cruelty of this your error.
JulianImp.1.112I. 113. Iulianus. Quod quidem videns contra te valere plurimum, quasi ipso testimonio interrogatus: Per quid ergo parvuli in regno sunt adversariae potestatis, si Scripturae creditur unumquemque, cum vincitur, tunc servum esse victoris, et constat infantiam sine usu rationis et voluntatis nec confligere potuisse, nec cedere?, addis: "r unum quippe hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt " . Sic est autem Deus nascentium conditor, ut omnes ex uno eant in condemnationem, quorum non fuerit renascentium liberator. Ipse quippe dictus est "gulus ex eadem massa faciens vas, aliud in honorem secundum misericordiam, aliud in contumeliam secundum iudicium " , cui cantat Ecclesia: "Misericordiam et iudicium " . Hoc quod dicis, per unum hominem intrasse peccatum, quo testimonio Apostoli plurimorum ineruditorum tamen pectora commovistis, licet in quarto libro breviter quomodo intellegendum esset ostenderim , tamen adiuvante Christo, in hoc opere plenius exponemus, ita ut in secundo libro, praetermissis aliis, locus ipse apostolicus contextu suo plenissime disseratur.
I. 113. Julian. And indeed, seeing that this avails very much against you, as if questioned by the very testimony: Through what, then, are little ones in the kingdom of the adverse power, if the Scripture is believed that each one, when he is overcome, is then a slave of the conqueror, and it is established that infancy, without the use of reason and will, could neither fight nor yield?, you add: "For through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned " (Rom 5:12). But God is the founder of those being born in such a way that all from one go into condemnation, of whom he has not been the liberator of those reborn. For he himself was called "a potter, making from the same lump one vessel unto honor according to mercy, another unto dishonor according to judgment " (See Rom 9:21), to whom the Church sings: "Mercy and judgment " (Ps 101:1 (100:1)). This which you say, that through one man sin entered, by which testimony of the Apostle you have nevertheless stirred the breasts of very many of the unlearned, although in the fourth book I have briefly shown how it was to be understood, yet, with Christ helping, we will expound more fully in this work, so that in the second book, with other things passed over, the apostolic passage itself may be discoursed upon most fully in its own context.
JulianImp.1.113Augustinus. Ad id quod in quarto libro tuo breviter ostendisse te dicis, in sexto nostro tibi responsum est ; quod autem in hoc opere polliceris, cum reddere coeperis, ibi quam sis vaniloquus apparebit.
Augustine. To that which you say you briefly showed in your fourth book, you have been answered in our sixth; but what you promise in this work, when you have begun to render it, there it will appear how empty a talker you are.
JulianImp.1.113I. 114. Iulianus. Hic autem breviter admonuerim, quoniam suffragari tibi non potest ad eius sententiae confirmationem, quam omnis eruditio, omnis ratio, et lex Dei convincit iniquissimam. Diligens ergo lector intendat quod pronuntiasti, Deum esse factorem malorum; et tales eum condere, qui sine aliquo propriae merito voluntatis eant in condemnationem prorsus omnes.
I. 114. Julian. But here I would briefly admonish, since it cannot support you toward the confirmation of that opinion which all erudition, all reason, and the law of God convict as most unjust. Let the diligent reader, then, attend to what you have declared, that God is the maker of evils; and creates such beings as, without any deserving of their own will, all go absolutely into condemnation.
JulianImp.1.114Augustinus. Hoc dixi: quia facit hominum naturam, qui vitio mali sunt, quod ipse non fecit; et de quo ipse bene facit, etiam cum mali sunt homines quos facit; quia in quantum homines sunt, non in quantum mali sunt, eos facit. Neque enim vasa in contumeliam fierent, nisi mali essent; qui tamen per naturam quam facit Deus, utique boni sunt; mali autem secundum vitium, quod contra naturam quidem, sed tamen naturae insevit inimicus; ut ex hoc esset natura mala, hoc est, malus homo. Non enim potest esse ullum malum nisi in aliquo bono; quia non potest esse nisi in aliqua natura; omnis autem natura, in quantum natura est, bonum est . Diligenter attendite, quomodo dicantur, quae velut contraria inter se dici videntur, et non sunt; si tamen non penitus fumo superbae contentionis oculos perdidistis.
Augustine. This I said: because he makes the nature of human beings, who by the vice of evil are evil, which he himself did not make; and from which he himself does good, even when the human beings whom he makes are evil; because in so far as they are human beings, not in so far as they are evil, he makes them. For they would not become vessels unto dishonor, unless they were evil; who nevertheless, by the nature which God makes, are certainly good; but evil according to the vice which the enemy planted, against nature indeed, but yet in nature; so that from this nature was evil, that is, an evil human being. For there can be no evil except in some good; because there can be none except in some nature; but every nature, in so far as it is a nature, is a good. Attend diligently how those things are said which seem to be said as if contrary to each other, and are not; if, however, you have not utterly lost your eyes in the smoke of proud contention.
JulianImp.1.114I. 115. Iulianus. Ac ne nesciremus de quo tempore loquereris; ab Adam, quem ais unum omnes fuisse, usque ad finem, qui baptizati non sunt, damnationi et diabolo obnoxios pronuntias inveniri. In qua sententia multo te perniciosius curare niteris, quam antea vulnerasti. Nam ut removeres invidiam, quae in te ruebat, quod diceres diabolum conditorem hominum; correctus confiteris Deum conditorem, sed talium, quales ascribit Manichaeus principi tenebrarum.
I. 115. Julian. And lest we should not know of what time you were speaking; from Adam, whom you say all were as one, to the end, those who are not baptized you declare to be found liable to condemnation and to the devil. In which opinion you strive to heal yourself much more perniciously than you had before wounded yourself. For, in order to remove the odium which was rushing upon you, that you said the devil is the founder of human beings; corrected, you confess God to be the founder, but of such beings as the Manichee ascribes to the prince of darkness.
JulianImp.1.115Augustinus. Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est . Hoc non dixit haereticus immundus Manichaeus, sed catholicus sanctus Ambrosius. Porro autem Manichaeus nec omnem naturam, in quantum natura est, dicit bonam; nec eam, quam dicit naturam malam, ullo modo dicit sanari posse ac fieri bonam; quod catholica fides dicit de natura humana pusillorum atque magnorum, et contra Manichaeos et contra Pelagianos, utrosque diversis morbis, sed pariter insanos.
Augustine. We are all human beings born under sin, and our very origin is in fault. This was said not by the unclean heretic the Manichee, but by the catholic saint Ambrose. Furthermore, the Manichee neither says that every nature, in so far as it is a nature, is good; nor does he say that the nature which he calls evil can in any way be healed and made good; which the catholic faith says about the human nature of the little and the great, both against the Manichees and against the Pelagians, both insane by diverse diseases, but equally.
JulianImp.1.115I. 116. Iulianus. Enimvero credens malos esse homines conditione nascendi, illum eis deputavit auctorem, per quem mali operis crimen a Deo bono separaretur; et quoniam erraverat in definitione peccati, ut putaret naturale esse, quod nisi voluntarium esse non potest; consequenter deinceps malae originis malum est commentus artificem; hic religiosior in Deum, contumacior in naturam. Tu vero dicis, malos quidem nasci, sed Deum esse auctorem malorum; contumacior tu in Deum, honorificentior in naturam; haec quippe auctoris maiestate defenditur, auctor autem foeditate operis accusatur.
I. 116. Julian. Indeed, believing human beings to be evil by the condition of being born, he assigned to them that author through whom the crime of the evil work might be separated from the good God; and since he had erred in the definition of sin, so as to think that to be natural which cannot be except voluntary; he consequently thereafter invented an evil artificer of an evil origin; here more religious toward God, more obstinate toward nature. But you say that human beings are indeed born evil, but that God is the author of the evils; you, more obstinate toward God, more honoring toward nature; for nature is defended by the majesty of its author, but the author is accused by the foulness of the work.
JulianImp.1.116Augustinus. Accusa ergo Deum, si placet, operis foeditate; quandoquidem aliqua corpora tam foeda nascuntur, ut nonnulla in eis nimia deformitate etiam monstra dicantur. Non enim alius deus, sicut Manichaeus fingit, aut dii minores, sicut Plato errat, sunt corporum conditores; sed utique Deus bonus et iustus operatur etiam corpora talia; quae si referas ad grave iugum super filios Adam , invenies eum nec malum, qualem Manichaeus fabricandis corporibus adhibet; nec victum malisque implicatum atque commixtum, quod Manichaeus de Deo bono credere non timet; sed plane iustum propter originale peccatum, qualem fides catholica novit, a qua vester error exorbitavit. Neque enim, si nemo peccasset, foeda atque monstrosa etiam in paradiso corpora nascerentur.
Augustine. Accuse God, then, if you please, by the foulness of the work; since some bodies are born so foul that some of them, by their excessive deformity, are even called monsters. For it is not another god, as the Manichee invents, nor lesser gods, as Plato errs, that are the founders of bodies; but certainly the good and just God works even such bodies; which, if you refer them to the heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam (See Sir 40:1), you will find him neither evil, such as the Manichee employs for fabricating bodies; nor overcome and entangled and mingled with evils, which the Manichee does not fear to believe about the good God; but plainly just on account of original sin, such as the catholic faith knows, from which your error has strayed. For if no one had sinned, foul and monstrous bodies would not be born even in paradise.
JulianImp.1.116I. 117. Iulianus. Non timuisti, scelestissime, hoc applicare Deo, quod ne ei admoveret Manichaeus, commentus est alium conditorem; ambo quidem estis veritatis inimici, sed putabatur ante te non posse ille impietate superari.
I. 117. Julian. You did not fear, most wicked one, to apply to God this which the Manichee, lest he apply it to him, invented another founder; both of you indeed are enemies of truth, but it was thought before you that he could not be surpassed in impiety.
JulianImp.1.117Augustinus. Ante me erat Ambrosius, qui non erat Manichaeus; ante ipsum Hilarius, Gregorius; ante hos Cyprianus, et ceteri, quos commemorare longum est, qui non erant Manichaei. Et tamen Ecclesiam docuerunt, quod in Ecclesia didicerunt, trahere parvulos originale peccatum, et exsufflandos in exorcismis, ut eruantur de potestate tenebrarum, et in regnum sui Salvatoris et Domini transferantur . Quoniam Christus si etiam pro ipsis mortuus est, quod et tu coactus es confiteri, ergo omnes mortui sunt; et pro omnibus mortuus est , quod ait Apostolus; qui profecto si secundum verba tua etiam ipse Manichaeus erit, iam tu quid eris?
Augustine. Before me was Ambrose, who was not a Manichee; before him Hilary, Gregory; before these Cyprian, and the rest, whom it is long to recall, who were not Manichees. And yet they taught the Church what they learned in the Church, that little ones draw original sin, and are to be breathed upon in the exorcisms, that they may be rescued from the power of darkness, and transferred into the kingdom of their Savior and Lord (See Col 1:13). Since, if Christ died even for them, which you too have been compelled to confess, then all are dead; and he died for all (2 Cor 5:14-15), which the Apostle says; who certainly, if according to your words he too will be a Manichee, what then will you be?
JulianImp.1.117I. 118. Iulianus. Tu vero iustificasti, ut Propheta ait, sororem tuam Sodomam ; absolvi putabitur Manichaeus, si tuis blasphemiis comparetur. Gloriatus in primo operis mei libro fueram, quod eo ore lacerarer, quo et Apostoli iniuriam pertulissent; nunc vero expavesco magnitudinem felicitatis meae; ab eo vituperor, qui criminatur Deum.
I. 118. Julian. But you have justified, as the Prophet says, your sister Sodom (See Ezek 16:51-52); the Manichee will be thought acquitted, if he is compared with your blasphemies. I had gloried in the first book of my work that I was torn by that mouth by which the Apostles too had endured injury; but now I am terrified at the greatness of my felicity; I am reviled by one who accuses God.
JulianImp.1.118Augustinus. Ab eo vituperaris, qui cum Ambrosio et ceteris sociis eius, etiam parvulorum liberatorem praedicat Christum; quem tu non solum criminaris tamquam mentientem, ubi dicit se venisse salvare et quaerere quod perierat ; verum etiam contradicis ei, ne salvandos parvulos quaerat.
Augustine. You are reviled by one who, with Ambrose and the rest of his associates, proclaims Christ the Liberator even of little ones; whom you not only accuse as a liar, where he says he came to save and to seek what had perished (See Luke 19:10); but even contradict him, that he should not seek little ones to be saved.
JulianImp.1.118I. 119. Iulianus. Unde mihi accidit tantae contumeliae dignitas? Nihil in me tale conferre laudando potuisses. Sensa mea dicis esse reprobanda, sed Dei opera damnanda; me male disputare; sed Deum nequiter creare pronuntias, me errare clamas; illum saevire, me asseris nescire legem; Deum vero nescire iustitiam; me vociferaris catholicum non esse, quod dicam Christum provocare quos salvet; Deum vero iuras creare quos damnet, nec ob aliud condere, nisi ut eant omnes in condemnationem.
I. 119. Julian. Whence did so great a dignity of insult befall me? You could have conferred nothing such upon me by praising. You say that my thoughts are to be reproved, but that the works of God are to be condemned; that I dispute badly; but you declare that God creates wickedly; you cry out that I err; that he rages; you assert that I do not know the law; but that God does not know justice; you proclaim that I am not a Catholic, because I say that Christ summons those whom he saves; but you swear that God creates those whom he condemns, and founds them for no other reason than that all may go into condemnation.
JulianImp.1.119Augustinus. Hoc et de praescientia Dei dici potest, quae tamen a fidelibus negari non potest, et puto quod nec a vobis. Aut negate Deum praescium multos se damnaturum esse quos creat, ne videatur creare quos damnet; et quod est mirabilius et inscrutabilius, multos, ne malitia mutet eorum intellectum, de hac vita non rapere , quos malos futuros non potest ignorare. Date honorem Deo: altitudini iudiciorum eius cedat vestrorum crepula ruina verborum, quasi nitida et acuta, sed vitrea.
Augustine. This can be said also about the foreknowledge of God, which nevertheless cannot be denied by the faithful, and, I think, not even by you. Either deny that God foreknows that he will condemn many whom he creates, lest he seem to create those whom he condemns; and—what is more marvelous and more unsearchable—that he does not snatch from this life many, lest malice change their understanding (See Wis 4:11), whom he cannot be ignorant will be evil. Give honor to God: let the noisy ruin of your words—as if polished and sharp, but glass—yield to the height of his judgments.
JulianImp.1.119I. 120. Iulianus. Inter te igitur et Manichaeum prosatorem sensuum tuorum, video per profectum eruditionis tuae magnam factam esse distantiam. Ille enim licet duos induxisset auctores, tamen spem salutis ex ea reliquit parte, qua dixit bonum Deum esse alienissimum ab iniquitate, et a crudelitate; tu vero unum bonum quidem Deum, sed eumdem malorum conditorem loquens, ut reverentiam divinitatis, ita spem salutis funditus sustulisti.
I. 120. Julian. Between you, then, and the Manichee, the begetter of your thoughts, I see that, by the progress of your erudition, a great distance has been made. For he, although he had introduced two authors, yet left a hope of salvation from that part by which he said that the good God is most foreign to iniquity and to cruelty; but you, saying that there is one God indeed, but the same the founder of evils, have utterly taken away both the reverence of divinity and the hope of salvation.
JulianImp.1.120Augustinus. Manichaei fingunt Deum crudeliter infirmum, qui partem suam, substantiam suam, membra naturae suae dilanianda et contaminanda hostibus tradidit, a quibus vastitatem sibi imminere cernebat; vos autem, qui Deum omnipotentissimum non negatis, in gravi iugo parvulorum credi vultis iniustum, negando originale peccatum.
Augustine. The Manichees invent a God cruelly weak, who handed over his own part, his own substance, the members of his own nature to be torn apart and contaminated by enemies, from whom he discerned that devastation threatened him; but you, who do not deny God to be most almighty, wish him to be believed unjust in the heavy yoke of little ones, by denying original sin.
JulianImp.1.120I. 121. Iulianus. Non est enim qui subveniat reis, quando ipse, qui est unus, desiderio creandarum miseriarum etiam eos punit, in quibus nihil aliud quam hoc, quod ipse fecit, agnoscit.
I. 121. Julian. For there is no one to come to the aid of the guilty, when he himself, who is one, by a desire of creating miseries punishes even those in whom he recognizes nothing other than this which he himself made.
JulianImp.1.121Augustinus. Agnoscit ibi etiam quod ipse non fecit; peccatum quippe ipse non fecit. Alius autem similiter ut vos vanus posset dicere Deum desiderio creandarum miseriarum etiam eos creare, quos damnaturum se esse ignorare non potuit, incomparabiliter plures, quam eos quos liberaturum se esse praescivit.
Augustine. He recognizes there also what he himself did not make; for sin he himself did not make. But another, vain like you, could say that God, by a desire of creating miseries, creates even those whom he could not be ignorant that he would condemn—incomparably more than those whom he foreknew he would free.
JulianImp.1.121I. 122. Iulianus. Perspecta igitur abysso impietatis tuae, licet numquam quidquam possit profanius inveniri; tamen quam hoc nihil habeat virium, et quid de illis quae annexueras colligatur, brevi disputatione monstrabitur. Deus qui hoc appellari nomine voluit, ut omnipotentissimus, ita etiam iustissimus creditur; quorum si unum defuerit, neutrum aderit; ut conditor benignissimus hominum, ita meritorum expunctor aequissimus; omne quod facit, bonum valde est . Ac per hoc, nemo naturaliter malus est, sed quicumque reus est, moribus, non exordiis accusatur.
I. 122. Julian. With the abyss of your impiety, then, examined, although nothing more profane could ever be found; yet how this has no force, and what is to be gathered about those things which you had appended, will be shown by a brief disputation. God, who wished to be called by this name, is believed both most almighty and most just; of which, if one is lacking, neither will be present; as he is the most benign founder of human beings, so the most equitable assessor of deservings; everything that he makes is very good (See Gen 1:31). And through this, no one is naturally evil, but whoever is guilty is accused by morals, not by origins.
JulianImp.1.122Augustinus. Cur ergo grave iugum super exordia parvulorum sub Deo potentissimo atque iustissimo?
Augustine. Why, then, is there a heavy yoke upon the origins of little ones, under a God most powerful and most just?
JulianImp.1.122I. 123. Iulianus. Nec malum itaque naturale est, nec Deus creare reos potest, nec in regno diaboli collocare. Quibus collectis et tu Manichaeus, immo Manichaeo peior ostenderis; et sine peccato in hunc mundum humanitatis ingressus, et sub iure Dei, non diaboli, fructus fecunditatis, et naturalis innocentia claruerunt.
I. 123. Julian. And so evil is not natural, nor can God create the guilty, nor place them in the kingdom of the devil. With these things gathered, both you are shown to be a Manichee, or rather worse than the Manichee; and the entrance of humanity into this world without sin, and the fruit of fecundity under the right of God, not of the devil, and natural innocence have become clear.
JulianImp.1.123Augustinus. Ergo et Ambrosius, qui dixit: In primordia naturae suae, qui baptizati fuerint parvuli, a malitia reformantur , Manichaeus, aut Manichaeo peior ostenditur, sicut conviciaris, aut furis.
Augustine. Then Ambrose too, who said: The little ones who have been baptized are reformed from malice to the beginnings of their nature, is shown to be a Manichee, or worse than the Manichee, as you revile, or you rave.
JulianImp.1.123I. 124. Iulianus. Hoc igitur consignato, quid processum tuum consequatur attende. Prophetas et Patriarchas, omnesque sanctos Veteris Testamenti constat Baptismatis expertes fuisse, sed a Deo conditos propriis deinceps fulsisse virtutibus; sub diaboli ergo regno, contra testimonium legis, esse credentur aeternis suppliciis mancipandi; quia ex Adam omnes pronuntiantur a te in condemnationem creati.
I. 124. Julian. With this sealed, then, attend to what follows from your progress. It is established that the Prophets and Patriarchs, and all the saints of the Old Testament, were without Baptism, but, founded by God, thereafter shone with their own virtues; under the kingdom of the devil, then, against the testimony of the law, they will be believed to be handed over to eternal punishments; because all from Adam are declared by you to be created unto condemnation.
JulianImp.1.124Augustinus. Et ipsos antiquos iustos eadem gratia liberavit, cui vos bellum indixistis; quamvis diversis usi fuerint pro tempore sacramentis. Quoniam quod de Christo credimus, hoc credebant. Unus enim Deus, unus et Mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Iesus , cuius illis praenuntiatus est, nobis autem annuntiatus est humilitatis adventus; claritatis vero, qui in fine futurus est, et illis est praenuntiatus et nobis. Et illorum ergo et nostra in isto uno Mediatore una fides est, et idem spiritus fidei et in illis et in nobis; unde dicit Apostolus: Habentes autem eumdem spiritum fidei, secundum quod scriptum est: Credidi, propter quod locutus sum; et nos credimus, propter quod et loquimur . Unde autem sit haec fides, ne ita gloriemur tamquam ex nobis sit, eumdem audiamus Apostolum: Gratia, inquit, salvi facti estis per fidem, et hoc non ex vobis, sed Dei donum est . Et alio loco: Pax, inquit, fratribus et caritas cum fide a Deo Patre et Domino Iesu Christo .
Augustine. The same grace, against which you have declared war, freed those ancient just ones too; although they used different sacraments according to the time. Since what we believe about Christ, this they believed. For there is one God, and one Mediator of God and human beings, the man Christ Jesus (1 Tim 2:5), whose coming in humility was foretold to them, but to us announced; but his coming in glory, which will be at the end, was both foretold to them and to us. Both their faith, then, and ours, in this one Mediator, is one, and the same spirit of faith is both in them and in us; whence the Apostle says: But having the same spirit of faith, according to what is written: I believed, on which account I have spoken; we too believe, on which account we also speak (2 Cor 4:13). But whence this faith is, lest we glory as though it were from ourselves, let us hear the same Apostle: By grace, he says, you have been saved through faith, and this not from yourselves, but it is the gift of God (Eph 2:8). And in another place: Peace, he says, to the brothers, and love with faith from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ (Eph 6:23).
JulianImp.1.124I. 125. Iulianus. Quod si dixeris, quam sis aperte Manichaeus, etiam patroni tui poterunt confiteri. Si vero intellexeris tantum veri Regis exercitum contra tuam dimicare sententiam, nec illis te afferre posse praeiudicium; acquiesce destructum esse quod extruxeras, et per hoc non ire omnes ex uno in condemnationem ; sed eos tantum, qui rebelles voluntati Dei, sine paenitentia, sine correctione, ultimo fuerint fine deprehensi.
I. 125. Julian. But if you say it, even your patrons will be able to confess how openly you are a Manichee. But if you understand that so great an army of the true King fights against your opinion, and that you can bring no prejudgment against them; acquiesce that what you had built up has been destroyed, and through this that not all go from one into condemnation (See Rom 5:18); but only those who, rebellious to the will of God, without penitence, without correction, are caught at the last end.
JulianImp.1.125Augustinus. Adde et generatos, si non fuerint regenerati; quia in uno omnes peccaverunt .
Augustine. Add also those begotten, if they have not been regenerated; because in one all sinned (See Rom 5:12).
JulianImp.1.125I. 126. Iulianus. Quod autem Deus dictus est: Figulus ex eadem massa faciens aliud vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam , a te commemorari omnino non debuit; quia ut a nobis consequenter exponitur, ita tibi totum repugnat; nam cum alii in honorem, alii in contumeliam fieri dicuntur, iuvatur sensus Catholicorum, quo secundum diversitatem voluntatis humanae, diversus etiam vasorum exitus praedicatur.
I. 126. Julian. But as for the fact that God was called a potter, making from the same lump one vessel unto honor, another unto dishonor (See Rom 9:21), it ought not to have been mentioned by you at all; because, as it is consistently expounded by us, so it wholly fights against you; for when some are said to be made unto honor, others unto dishonor, the sense of the Catholics is helped, by which, according to the diversity of the human will, a diverse outcome of the vessels too is proclaimed.
JulianImp.1.126Augustinus. Ambrosium audi, qui dicit: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est . Sic quippe intellexit cum ceteris condiscipulis et condoctoribus suis, sine ulla dubitatione catholicis, quod scriptum est de peccato et morte, quod per unum intraverit, et in omnes homines pertransierit . Et intellege hanc esse massam de qua fiunt vasa, sive illa, sive ista. Nam si inscrutabilis quaestionis huius ista esset solutio, quam tu sapis, secundum merita voluntatum; tam manifesta esset, ut nulla eius difficultate compelleretur Apostolus dicere: O homo, tu quis es qui respondeas Deo? De nondum natis enim agebatur, quorum non ex operibus, sed secundum propositum suum Deus unum dilexit, alterum odio habuit; unde ad haec verba perventum est, ut de eadem massa et diversis vasis, et de potestate figuli diceretur.
Augustine. Hear Ambrose, who says: We are all human beings born under sin, and our very origin is in fault. For thus he understood, with the rest of his fellow disciples and fellow teachers, without any doubt catholics, what is written about sin and death, that it entered through one, and passed into all human beings (See Rom 5:12). And understand that this is the lump from which the vessels are made, whether those or these. For if the solution of this unsearchable question were that which you hold, according to the deservings of wills; it would be so manifest that the Apostle would be compelled by no difficulty of it to say: O man, who are you to answer back to God? (Rom 9:20) For it was about those not yet born, of whom, not from works, but according to his own purpose, God loved one, hated the other (See Rom 9:11-13); whence it came to these words, that about the same lump and diverse vessels, and about the power of the potter, it was said.
JulianImp.1.126I. 127. Iulianus. Tu autem qui supra dixeras, omnes ire in condemnationem, qua testimonium fronte posuisti, quo pronuntiatur ire alius in honorem, alius in contumeliam?
I. 127. Julian. But you, who said above that all go into condemnation, with what brow did you set down a testimony by which it is declared that one goes unto honor, another unto dishonor?
JulianImp.1.127Augustinus. Sed gratia liberat a totius massae damnatione quos liberat; quam vos negando, estis haeretici. Quantum enim pertinet ad originis meritum, ex uno omnes in condemnationem ; quantum autem ad gratiam, quae non secundum merita datur, quicumque ab ista condemnatione liberantur, dicuntur vasa misericordiae; qui vero non liberantur ira Dei manet super eos , veniens de iusto iudicio Dei; quod non ideo vituperabile, quia inscrutabile est; et propterea vasa irae nuncupantur, quia et his bene utitur Deus, ut notas faciat divitias gloriae suae, in vasa misericordiae . Quod enim Deo iudicante a ceteris exigitur, hoc istis eo miserante donatur; quas investigabiles vias Domini si aestimas improbandas, audi: O homo, tu quis es qui respondeas Deo?
Augustine. But grace frees, from the condemnation of the whole lump, those whom it frees; which, by denying, you are heretics. For as far as concerns the deserving of origin, from one all go into condemnation; but as far as concerns grace, which is given not according to deservings, whoever are freed from this condemnation are called vessels of mercy; but those who are not freed, the wrath of God remains upon them (See John 3:36), coming from the just judgment of God; which is not for that reason blameworthy, because it is unsearchable; and therefore they are called vessels of wrath, because God uses these too well, that he may make known the riches of his glory, upon the vessels of mercy (Rom 9:23). For what, with God judging, is exacted from the rest, this, with him having mercy, is granted to these; which unsearchable ways of the Lord, if you reckon they should be disapproved, hear: O man, who are you to answer back to God? (Rom 9:20)
JulianImp.1.127I. 128. Iulianus. Nihil enim ita pugnat, quam dicere, omnes, et non omnes. Tu dicis, a figulo Deo omnes fieri in condemnationem; Apostolus dicit, non omnes in condemnationem, nec omnes in honorem; quod in loco suo, quid habeat dignitatis absolvam. In ipsa tamen pronuntiatione sententiae, constat inter vos magnam esse discordiam, nec eumdem esse figulum in condemnationem cuncta fingentem, quem Paulus dicat in honorem alios fabricantem; nec te illi credere, qui a magistro admirabili praedicatur; quoniam tuus figulus omnes in condemnationem fingit, Apostoli figulus plurimos fingit in gloriam.
I. 128. Julian. For nothing is so at odds as to say all, and not all. You say that all are made by God the potter unto condemnation; the Apostle says, not all unto condemnation, nor all unto honor; what dignity it has, I will settle in its own place. Yet in the very pronouncing of the opinion, it is established that there is great discord between you, and that the potter who fashions all things unto condemnation is not the same whom Paul says fabricates others unto honor; nor that you believe him who is proclaimed by the admirable teacher; since your potter fashions all unto condemnation, the Apostle's potter fashions very many unto glory.
JulianImp.1.128Augustinus. Cum dicuntur omnes ex uno in condemnationem, ipsa massa significatur, ex qua fiunt a figulo alia vasa in honorem, id est, quae assumuntur in gratiam, alia in contumeliam, id est, quae ad luendum debitum relinquuntur; ut filii gratiae id sibi donari sciant, quod si exigeretur, non esset iniustum; ac sic non in se ipsis, sed in Domino glorientur .
Augustine. When all are said to go from one into condemnation, the lump itself is signified, from which the potter makes some vessels unto honor, that is, those taken up into grace, others unto dishonor, that is, those left to pay the debt; so that the sons of grace may know that this is granted to them which, if it were exacted, would not be unjust; and so they may glory not in themselves, but in the Lord (See 1 Cor 1:31).
JulianImp.1.128I. 129. Iulianus. Et haec quidem dixerim, ut statim appareret, te esse aut imperitiae aut impudentiae singularis, qui tuorum vice, contrariis utereris; ceterum pietas explanabit et ratio, Deum meum neminem in contumeliam formare.
I. 129. Julian. And these things I would say, that it might at once appear that you are of singular inexperience or shamelessness, who, in place of your own, use contrary things; but piety and reason will explain that my God forms no one unto dishonor.
JulianImp.1.129Augustinus. Si Deus tuus in contumeliam neminem format, non est ipse Pauli apostoli Deus; ille quippe de Deo vero dicebat: O homo, tu quis es qui respondeas Deo? Numquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit: Quid me fecisti sic? An non habet potestatem figulus luti, ex eadem massa facere aliud vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam? Sed tu videlicet artifex magnus profers ex officina Pelagiana meliorem deum, qui nullum vas facit in contumeliam.
Augustine. If your God forms no one unto dishonor, he is not the God of the apostle Paul; for he said about the true God: O man, who are you to answer back to God? Does the thing formed say to him who formed it: Why have you made me thus? Or does the potter of the clay not have power, from the same lump, to make one vessel unto honor, another unto dishonor? (Rom 9:20-21) But you, of course, a great craftsman, bring forth from the Pelagian workshop a better god, who makes no vessel unto dishonor.
JulianImp.1.129I. 130. Iulianus. Sed imaginem suam, id est, omnes homines bonos condere, qui etiam demolitos studiorum pravitate, reformare remediorum desiderat largitate. Ipsi quidem cantat Ecclesia misericordiam et iudicium ; quia et illis est benignus qui nihil deliquerunt, et iusto punit iudicio eos qui boni a Deo conditi suapte voluntate peccarunt, ac misericordiae subsidia respuerunt. Hanc igitur misericordiam, et hoc iudicium cantat Ecclesia Catholicorum; ceterum in vestra nihil potest tale resonare, quae dicit sine iustitia, sine iudicio, sine misericordia, Deum conditorem malorum, formare quos puniat; atque ob hoc punire, quod eos ex Adam ipse formaverit.
I. 130. Julian. But he founds his own image, that is, all human beings, good, who desires even to reform, by the largesse of remedies, those demolished by the depravity of their pursuits. To him indeed the Church sings mercy and judgment (Ps 101:1 (100:1)); because he is both benign to those who have offended in nothing, and punishes by a just judgment those who, founded good by God, sinned by their own will, and spurned the supports of mercy. This mercy, then, and this judgment the Church of the Catholics sings; but in yours nothing such can resound, which says that God, the founder of evils, without justice, without judgment, without mercy, forms those whom he punishes; and punishes for this, that he himself formed them from Adam.
JulianImp.1.130Augustinus. Iam quidem tibi superius ad omnia ista responsum est; tamen et hic breviter audi. Non abstinet Deus bonum formationis suae etiam ab stirpe damnata; sed si tibi displicet, Deum creare quos damnet; contradic ei, si potes, ne creet eos, quos malos futuros, et in malignitate usque in finem perseveraturos, et ob hoc sine dubitatione damnandos esse praescivit; aut ei suggere, si videtur, ut tot millia parvulorum non baptizatorum, quos novit perdite esse victuros, et in aeternum ignem, damnante ipso, cum diabolo ituros, rapiat ex hac vita, dum sunt innocentes et boni; ut si non in regno eius, certe in loco aliquo secundae felicitatis, quem talibus aedificavit haeresis vestra, vitam teneant sempiternam. Habes adhuc quod suggeras consiliarius Dei, pro filiis eius quos regeneravit, quos adoptavit, et tamen malos atque damnandos futuros esse praevidit; ut antequam veniant in ream vitam, vitae ipsius productione priventur, et ad regnum eius, non ad supplicia aeterna pertineant. Cum enim te invidiose dicere putaveris, Deum creare quos damnet; cogita quanto invidiosius possit dicere alius similiter vanus, Deum regenerare quos damnet; cum sit in eius omnipotentiae potestate, antequam damnabiles fiant, eos de tentationibus mortalis vitae huius auferre. Si autem non potes ista dicere, nec Deo contradicere, nec illi sapientiae tuum praebere consilium; quis enim cognovit sensum Domini, aut quis consiliarius eius fuit? , desine nobis introducere alterum figulum, qui non facit vasa in contumeliam; et ab isto qui ea facit reprehendendo cohibe te, et agnosce te; quia ut non te implices hoc sacrilegio, ideo tibi dicit Apostolus: O homo, tu quis es qui respondeas Deo?
Augustine. You have already been answered above to all these things; yet hear here too briefly. God does not withhold the good of his forming even from a damned stock; but if it displeases you that God creates those whom he condemns; contradict him, if you can, that he should not create those whom he foreknew would be evil, and would persevere in malignity to the end, and on this account, without doubt, were to be condemned; or suggest to him, if it seems good, that so many thousands of unbaptized little ones, whom he knows will live in ruin, and will go, with him condemning, into eternal fire with the devil, he should snatch from this life, while they are innocent and good; that, if not in his kingdom, at least in some place of a second happiness, which your heresy has built for such, they may hold everlasting life. You have still something to suggest, as a counselor of God, for his sons whom he regenerated, whom he adopted, and yet foresaw would be evil and to be condemned; that, before they come into a guilty life, they be deprived of life itself by being cut short, and pertain to his kingdom, not to eternal punishments. For when you think you say spitefully that God creates those whom he condemns; consider how much more spitefully another, vain in like manner, could say that God regenerates those whom he condemns; since it is in the power of his omnipotence, before they become damnable, to take them away from the temptations of this mortal life. But if you cannot say these things, nor contradict God, nor offer your counsel to that wisdom; for who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor? (Rom 11:34), cease to introduce to us another potter, who does not make vessels unto dishonor; and restrain yourself from reprehending this one who makes them, and acknowledge yourself; because, that you may not entangle yourself in this sacrilege, the Apostle says to you: O man, who are you to answer back to God? (Rom 9:20)
JulianImp.1.130I. 131. Iulianus. Sed iam apostolicae sententiae dignitas asseratur, ne putetur vel de aliquibus hoc sensisse, quod tu de omnibus aestimasti. Apostolus itaque Paulus disputans cum quaestionibus Iudaeorum, qui generis sui dignitate turgentes, dedignabantur coaequari sibi ex Gentibus fideles, et iustitiam Dei commendat et gratiam, disputans ad earum munificentiam pertinere, quod et primo Iudaeos nobilitaverat legis agnitio, et quod deinceps etiam Gentes adsciverat Christi praedicatio. Unus enim utriusque populi conditor iudicaturus et illos per legem, et istos sine lege, et istos in lege ; quia non erat Iudaeorum Deus tantum, sed etiam Gentium, reddens suum unicuique sine fraude, sine gratia , id est sine cuiusquam acceptione personae (quod exprimit nomen gratiae in definitione iustitiae), ita de semine venientes Abraham, cum nequiter vivunt, iure condemnat, ac de sua haereditate proturbat, sicut etiam Gentiles in simili operatione deprehensos; et e regione, utriusque populi bonas voluntates et veram fidem probitatemque actionum donat gaudiis sempiternis. Comprimit igitur Gentium Magister Iudaeorum tumorem, et ostendit non in seminibus humani generis, sed in moribus esse distantiam; ut se illi agnoscerent, nisi fideles esse curassent, nulla praerogativa circumcisi generis vindicandos; siquidem Iacob et Esau una seminis exceptione concepti, et una vi parientis effusi, diversos nimium exitus pro meritorum diversitate pertulerint.
I. 131. Julian. But now let the dignity of the apostolic statement be asserted, lest he be thought to have held about some what you reckoned about all. The apostle Paul, then, disputing with the questions of the Jews, who, swelling with the dignity of their race, disdained that the faithful from the Gentiles be made equal to them, commends both the justice of God and his grace, disputing that it pertained to their munificence, both that first the knowledge of the law had ennobled the Jews, and that thereafter the preaching of Christ had adopted the Gentiles too. For there is one founder of both peoples, about to judge both the latter through the law, and the former without law, and the latter in the law (See Rom 2:12); because he was not the God of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles, restoring to each his own without fraud, without favor, that is, without respect of anyone's person (which the name of favor expresses in the definition of justice), so that those coming from the seed of Abraham, when they live wickedly, he justly condemns, and drives out from his inheritance, just as also the Gentiles caught in a like working; and, on the other side, the good wills of both peoples and true faith and uprightness of actions he grants everlasting joys. The Teacher of the Gentiles, then, represses the swelling of the Jews, and shows that the distance is not in the seeds of the human race, but in morals; that they might recognize that, unless they had taken care to be faithful, they were to be vindicated by no prerogative of their circumcised race; since Jacob and Esau, conceived from one seed-emission, and poured forth by one force of the one giving birth, bore very diverse outcomes according to the diversity of their deservings.
JulianImp.1.131Augustinus. Si secundum Apostolum saperes, non commemorares hoc loco merita Iacob, ubi eum dicit ille non ex operibus fuisse dilectum; ut gratiam commendet, quae non secundum merita nostra datur; alioquin merces non imputatur, sicut ipse dicit, secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum . Quibus verbis quid ostendit, nisi gratiam non esse debitam, sed gratuitam? Hanc itaque commendabat, ubi dicebat: Cum enim nondum nati essent, neque egissent aliquid boni aut mali, ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est: Quia maior serviet minori . Clara sunt, quae obscurare conaris; fumos tolle, Scripturarum lumen attende. Gratia quippe hominem praevenit, ut diligat Deum, qua dilectione operetur bona. Quod et Ioannes apostolus apertissime ostendit, ubi ait: Nos diligamus, quoniam prior dilexit nos . Non ergo diligimur, quia dileximus; sed quia dilecti sumus, diligamus.
Augustine. If you understood according to the Apostle, you would not mention in this place the deservings of Jacob, where he says that Jacob was loved not from works; that he may commend grace, which is given not according to our deservings; otherwise the reward is not imputed, as he himself says, according to grace, but according to debt (Rom 4:4). By which words what does he show, except that grace is not owed, but gratuitous? This, then, he was commending, where he said: For when they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might remain, not from works, but from him who calls, it was said: The elder shall serve the younger (Rom 9:11-12). They are clear, the things you try to obscure; take away the smoke, attend to the light of the Scriptures. For grace goes before a human being, that he may love God, by which love he may work good things. Which the apostle John too most plainly shows, where he says: Let us love, because he first loved us (1 John 4:19). We are not, then, loved because we have loved; but, because we have been loved, let us love.
JulianImp.1.131I. 132. Iulianus. Esau enim profanus et fornicator, propter unam escam vendens primitiva sua, quaesivit benedictionem quam spreverat, nec adeptus est, quamquam eam cum lacrymis poposcisset. Iacob autem quietus et mitis, oboediens parentum praeceptis, et sanctificationum appetentissimus, ad hoc usque provectus est, ut sicut Abrahae et Isaac, ita etiam et Iacob Deus in sancto populo diceretur . Cum igitur omnibus constaret exemplis, Deum iusto iudicio bonis mentibus in quacumque gente suam misericordiam non negare, malas vero mentes nulla sinere stirpis nobilitate defendi; intellegerent Iudaei Gentium fidem a se despici non debere; quia sicut non patrocinatur Israelitarum stemma criminibus, ita etiam nullo impedimento est Gentium origo virtutibus. Hoc ergo totum agens conflictu illo Apostolus; in quibusdam tamen locis, ad incurvandam circumcisorum arrogantiam, sub nomine gratiae de sola Dei praeiudicat potestate.
I. 132. Julian. For Esau, profane and a fornicator, selling his birthright for one meal, sought the blessing which he had spurned, and did not obtain it, although he had asked for it with tears (See Heb 12:16-17). But Jacob, quiet and mild, obedient to the precepts of his parents, and most desirous of sanctifications, was advanced so far that, as God is called the God of Abraham and Isaac, so also of Jacob, among the holy people (See Exod 3:6). Since, then, it was established by all examples that God, by a just judgment, does not deny his mercy to good minds in whatever nation, but allows evil minds to be defended by no nobility of stock; the Jews should understand that the faith of the Gentiles ought not to be despised by them; because, just as the lineage of the Israelites does not patronize crimes, so also the origin of the Gentiles is no hindrance to virtues. Doing all this, then, in that conflict, the Apostle yet, in certain places, to bend down the arrogance of the circumcised, under the name of grace prejudges only about the power of God.
JulianImp.1.132Augustinus. Ergo ad incurvandam circumcisorum arrogantiam, sub nomine gratiae mentitur Apostolus, nam Deus ex operibus eligit, non ex gratia. Quis ita sapiat, nisi haereticus inimicus gratiae, amicus superbiae? Clamat Vas electionis, et gratiae, qua talis factus est, praedicator, non ex operibus dilectum esse Iacob, et tu commemoras opera Iacob, ex quibus eum dilectum esse contendis; et hoc faciens, mihi te existimas contradicere, cum sis novus Antichristus, eique apertissime contradicas in quo locutus est Christus .
Augustine. Then, to bend down the arrogance of the circumcised, under the name of grace the Apostle lies, for God chooses from works, not from grace. Who would so think, except a heretic, an enemy of grace, a friend of pride? The Vessel of election cries out, and the preacher of the grace by which he was made such, that Jacob was loved not from works, and you mention the works of Jacob, from which you contend that he was loved; and doing this, you reckon that you contradict me, when you are a new Antichrist, and most plainly contradict him in whom Christ spoke (See 2 Cor 13:3).
JulianImp.1.132I. 133. Iulianus. Ut illis in cerimoniarum et hostiarum observatione gloriantibus, perque hoc aestimantibus alias nationes nullis legis ritibus consecratas ad consortium sui nec posse admitti subito, nec debere, diceret, quia etsi in illis observationibus fuisset summa iustitiae, haberet tamen in potestate sua Deus, quamdam facere populorum commutationem, ut reiceret quos vellet, et quos vellet assumeret. Cui sensui respondet sub persona Iudaeorum, nihil debere iam exigi ab hominis voluntate; quandoquidem Deus, cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult obdurat . Ad quod refert Apostolus: O homo, tu quis es qui respondeas Deo? Et infert testimonium prophe e Isaiae: Numquid dicit, inquit, figmentum ei qui se finxit: Utquid me fecisti sic? Additque de suo: Aut non habet potestatem figulus luti ex eadem massa facere aliud vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam? Et est sensus eiusmodi: Quia ego commendavi voluntatem Dei, auctoritatemque gratiae eius exposui, dicens quod misericordiam praestaret, cuiuscumque misertus fuisset; tu mihi, o Iudaee, calumniam concitasti, quasi commendatio prolata a me voluntatis et potestatis divinae ad excidium iustitiae illius pertineret; et quia dixi: Facit quod vult; argumentatus es nihil iam reposci ab hominis voluntate debere, si Deus totum pro sua faceret voluntate; cum personae dignitas locum excluserit quaestionis. Nam si dixissem: Facit Deus quod debet secundum iustitiae suae leges quae de meritis iudicat singulorum; nihil quale nunc obicis, utique rettulisses; nunc vero quia dixi: Facit Deus quod vult, putasti me aliquid furatum esse de iustitiae dignitate. Utrumque igitur idem est. Nam cum de Deo dico: Facit quod vult, nihil aliud dico, quam: Facit quod debet; quia scio eum nihil aliud velle quam debet. Ubi ergo inseparabiliter voluntas cohaeret aequitati quamcumque de illis nominavero, utramque signavi.
I. 133. Julian. So that to those glorying in the observance of ceremonies and sacrifices, and through this reckoning that other nations, consecrated by no rites of the law, could neither suddenly nor ought to be admitted to fellowship with them, he might say that, even if in those observances were the sum of justice, yet God would have in his power to make a certain exchange of peoples, so as to reject whom he would, and take up whom he would. To which sense he answers under the person of the Jews, that nothing ought now to be exacted from the will of a human being; since God has mercy on whom he wills, and hardens whom he wills (Rom 9:18). To which the Apostle replies: O man, who are you to answer back to God? (Rom 9:20) And he brings in the testimony of the prophet Isaiah: Does the thing formed say, he says, to him who formed it: Why have you made me thus? And he adds of his own: Or does the potter of the clay not have power, from the same lump, to make one vessel unto honor, another unto dishonor? And the sense is of this kind: Because I commended the will of God, and set forth the authority of his grace, saying that he would show mercy on whomever he had had mercy; you, O Jew, stirred up against me a calumny, as though the commendation brought forth by me of the divine will and power pertained to the destruction of that justice; and because I said: He does what he wills; you argued that nothing now ought to be required of the will of a human being, if God did everything by his own will; whereas the dignity of the person had excluded the place of the question. For if I had said: God does what he owes according to the laws of his justice, which judges about the deservings of individuals; you would certainly not have replied anything such as you now object; but now, because I said: God does what he wills, you thought I had stolen something from the dignity of justice. Both, then, are the same. For when I say of God: He does what he wills, I say nothing other than: He does what he owes; because I know he wills nothing other than he owes. Where, then, the will clings inseparably to equity, whichever of them I shall have named, I have marked both.
JulianImp.1.133Augustinus. Quomodolibet dicas Deum facere quod debet; gratiam nemini debet, multisque non reddit supplicium, quod malis eorum operibus debet, et largitur gratiam, quam nullis eorum bonis operibus debet. Quid enim debebat eidem ipsi Paulo, cum adhuc Saulus persequeretur Ecclesiam? Nonne supplicium? Quod ergo eum emissa voce de caelo prostravit, quod excaecavit, quod ad fidem percipiendam quam vastabat, tam violenter attraxit , procul dubio secundum gratiam, non secundum debitum fecit, ut in eis esset reliquiis populi Israel, de quibus dicit: Sic ergo et in hoc tempore reliquiae per electionem gratiae factae sunt; si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus; alioquin gratia iam non est gratia . Quid debebat etiam illis nisi supplicium quibus dicit: Non propter vos ego facio, domus Israel, sed propter nomen meum sanctum, quod profanastis in Gentibus ? Facere ergo se dicit bona eorum in ipsis, sed propter nomen suum quod profanaverunt, non propter ipsos qui profanaverunt; nam propter ipsos si facere vellet, supplicium illis debitum redderet, non gratiam donaret indebitam. Quod enim se facturum dicit, ad hoc pertinet, ut bona faciant, non quia boni erant, qui profanaverunt nomen sanctum eius. Denique apertissime dicit eos bona esse facturos; sed se faciente ut ea faciant; ait quippe inter cetera: Et faciam ut in iustificationibus meis ambuletis, et iudicia mea observetis et faciatis . His certe operibus merces imputatur secundum debitum; debetur enim merces, si fiant; sed gratia quae non debetur, praecedit ut fiant. Debetur, inquam, bona merces operibus hominum bonis; sed non debetur gratia, quae ipsos homines bonos operatur ex malis. Postremo, qui facere Deum dixisti quod debet, et alta cervice humana merita ventilasti, dic quaeso, quibus meritis parvulorum debeat regnum caelorum. Dicturus es forte, debere hoc eum gratiae suae, qua opitulante renati sunt. Propter hanc enim acceptam iam venire in eius regnum merentur; sed ipsam gratiam, quam regenerandis exhibet, nullis eorum omnino meritis debet. Propterea Pelagius vester in episcopali iudicio Palaestino, eos qui dicunt gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra dari, ne ipse damnaretur, damnare compulsus est; ubi et te ipsum, et se ipsum, qui hoc dicere non desistitis, sine dubitatione damnavit . Istam gratiam, vere gratiam, id est, gratuitam, nullisque meritis praecedentibus debitam, commendabat Apostolus, quando dicebat: Cum enim nondum nati essent, nec aliquid egissent boni aut mali, ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret . Haec est electio, de qua et illud dicitur: Reliquiae per electionem gratiae factae sunt, si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus; alioquin gratia iam non est gratia . Unde et hic, cum dixisset: Ut per electionem propositum Dei maneret; continuo subdidit: Non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est: Quia maior serviet minori . Contra istam veritatis tubam reclamas, et dicis: Ad incurvandam circumcisorum arrogantiam, sub nomine gratiae Paulus apostolus de sola Dei praeiudicat potestate. Ubi quid dicis aliud, nisi: Ad incurvandam circumcisorum arrogantiam mentitur Apostolus, dicens non ex operibus dilectum esse Iacob; cum ex operibus sit dilectus, quia erat quietus, et mitis, oboediens parentum praeceptis, et sanctificationum appetentissimus ? Nec intellegis, non ideo quia talis erat, vel talis futurus erat, fuisse dilectum; sed talem, quia dilectus est, factum. Erubesce: non mentitur Apostolus; non ex operibus Iacob dilectus est; si enim gratia, iam non ex operibus , sed gratia dilectus, eadem gratia faciente bonis oportuit ut polleret operibus. Parce animae tuae, noli esse inimicus huic gratiae.
Augustine. In whatever way you say that God does what he owes; he owes grace to no one, and to many he does not render the punishment which he owes for their evil works, and bestows the grace which he owes for none of their good works. For what did he owe to that same Paul, when, still Saul, he was persecuting the Church? Was it not punishment? That, then, he prostrated him by a voice sent from heaven, that he blinded him, that he so violently drew him to receive the faith which he was laying waste (See Acts 9:1-22), without doubt he did according to grace, not according to debt, so that he might be among those remnants of the people of Israel, of whom he says: So then, even at this time, a remnant has been made according to the election of grace; but if by grace, then no longer from works; otherwise grace is now not grace (Rom 11:5-6). What did he owe also to those to whom he says: Not for your sake do I do this, house of Israel, but for the sake of my holy name, which you have profaned among the Gentiles (See Ezek 36:22), except punishment? He says, then, that he does their good things in them, but for the sake of his name which they profaned, not for the sake of those who profaned it; for if he wished to do it for their sake, he would render them the punishment owed, not bestow grace unowed. For what he says he will do pertains to this, that they may do good things, not because they were good who profaned his holy name. Finally, he says most plainly that they will do good things; but with him bringing it about that they do them; for he says among other things: And I will bring it about that you walk in my justifications, and observe and do my judgments (See Ezek 36:27). To these works certainly the reward is imputed according to debt; for the reward is owed, if they are done; but grace, which is not owed, goes before, that they may be done. The good reward, I say, is owed to the good works of human beings; but grace is not owed, which works the human beings themselves good from evil. Finally, you who said that God does what he owes, and with high neck have aired human deservings, say, I beg you, by what deservings of little ones the kingdom of heaven is owed. You will perhaps say that he owes this to his grace, by whose help they were reborn. For having received this, they now deserve to come into his kingdom; but that very grace, which he shows to those to be regenerated, he owes to none of their deservings at all. For this reason your Pelagius, in the episcopal judgment of Palestine, was compelled, lest he himself be condemned, to condemn those who say that the grace of God is given according to our deservings; where he condemned, without doubt, both yourself and himself, who do not cease to say this (See The Deeds of Pelagius 14.30). This grace, truly grace, that is, gratuitous, and owed to no preceding deservings, the Apostle was commending, when he said: For when they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might remain. This is the election of which that too is said: A remnant has been made according to the election of grace, but if by grace, then no longer from works; otherwise grace is now not grace. Whence here too, when he had said: That the purpose of God might remain according to election; he immediately added: Not from works, but from him who calls, it was said: The elder shall serve the younger. Against this trumpet of truth you cry out, and say: To bend down the arrogance of the circumcised, under the name of grace the apostle Paul prejudges only about the power of God. Where what do you say other than: To bend down the arrogance of the circumcised, the Apostle lies, saying that Jacob was loved not from works; when he was loved from works, because he was quiet, and mild, obedient to the precepts of his parents, and most desirous of sanctifications? Nor do you understand that he was loved not for the reason that he was such, or was going to be such; but was made such, because he was loved. Blush: the Apostle does not lie; Jacob was loved not from works; for if by grace, then no longer from works, but loved by grace, and it was fitting that, by that same grace bringing it about, he should be strong in good works. Spare your soul, do not be an enemy of this grace.
JulianImp.1.133I. 134. Iulianus. Ergo superbia illa, quae volebat otiari, et desidiam suam ob id colore necessitatis obnubere, ut in susceptione Gentium reclamaret Evangelio; audit quoniam etsi sic esset quomodo tu commentaris, tamen supplicare Deo, non seditionem excitare deberes; quibus verbis nequitiam retundit hominis, qui diversitatem meritorum ex voluntatis qualitate venientem, aucupans elocutionis ambiguum, ideo necessitati divinae conabatur adscribere, ut assereret necesse esse alterum de duobus, id est, aut Gentes ad promissionis non venire consortium aut, si hoc liceret Deo, exstingui officia liberae voluntatis. Verum quia id non sufficiebat negotio; neque enim a tali magistro, sicut commendabatur auctoritas Dei, ita erat indefensa relinquenda iustitia; subdit consequentissime vasa, quae in contumelia et quae in honore fiunt, habere hoc de propriae stipendio voluntatis. Si enim Deus volens ostendere iram, et notam facere potentiam suam in multa patientia, in vasis irae, consummatis in perditionem; et ut notas faceret, inquit, divitias gloriae suae in vasis misericordiae, quae praeparavit in gloriam, quos et vocavit nos, non solum ex Iudaeis, sed etiam ex Gentibus . Certe hic absolvit, quod superior conflictus operuerat, non inferri a Deo iram nisi his vasis, quae ad perditionem consummata fuerint; gloriam autem dari his, quae ad hoc fuerint praeparata. A quo autem vasa huiusmodi in susceptionem horum quae diximus praeparentur, ipsius Apostoli sermo patefecit. In magna, inquit, domo, non sunt tantummodo vasa aurea et argentea, sed et lignea et fictilia; alia quidem in honorem, alia in contumeliam. Si ergo mundaverit quis semetipsum ab his, erit vas in honorem sanctificatum, utile Domino, ad omne opus bonum paratum .
I. 134. Julian. Therefore that pride, which wished to be idle, and to cloak its sloth on that account with the color of necessity, so as to cry out against the Gospel in the reception of the Gentiles; hears that, even if it were so as you contrive, yet you ought to supplicate God, not to stir up sedition; by which words he beats back the wickedness of the man who, hunting for the ambiguity of an expression, was trying to ascribe to divine necessity the diversity of deservings coming from the quality of the will, so as to assert that one of two things was necessary, that is, either that the Gentiles should not come to fellowship with the promise, or, if this were permitted to God, that the offices of free will should be extinguished. But because that did not suffice for the business; for by such a teacher, as the authority of God was commended, so justice was not to be left undefended; he adds most consequently that the vessels which are made in dishonor and those in honor have this from the wages of their own will. For if God, willing to show wrath, and to make known his power, in much patience, in vessels of wrath, consummated unto perdition; and that he might make known, he says, the riches of his glory in vessels of mercy, which he prepared unto glory, whom also he called, namely us, not only from the Jews, but also from the Gentiles (Rom 9:22-24). Certainly here he settles what the earlier conflict had covered, that wrath is not brought by God except upon those vessels which have been consummated unto perdition; but that glory is given to those which have been prepared for this. But by whom vessels of this kind are prepared for the reception of those things which we have said, the discourse of the Apostle himself made plain. In a great house, he says, there are not only golden and silver vessels, but also wooden and earthen; some indeed unto honor, others unto dishonor. If, then, anyone shall cleanse himself from these, he will be a vessel unto honor, sanctified, useful to the Lord, prepared for every good work (2 Tim 2:20-21).
JulianImp.1.134Augustinus. Ergo ipsa vasa ita se praeparant, ut frustra de Deo dictum sit: Quae praeparavit in gloriam? Hoc enim apertissime dicis; nec intellegis ita dictum esse: Si quis mundaverit semetipsum, ut ostenderetur et opus hominis per voluntatem; sed, ingrate homo, praeparatur voluntas a Domino ; ideo utrumque verum est, et quia Deus praeparat vasa in gloriam, et quia ipsa se praeparant. Ut enim faciat homo, Deus facit; quia ut diligat homo, Deus prior diligit. Lege Ezechielem prophetam, unde quod satis visum est supra commemoravi ; ista etiam verba reperies, id est, Deum facere ut praecepta eius homines faciant, quorum miseretur, non propter merita eorum, quae mala ibi esse commemorat, sed propter nomen suum; ut Deo sine meritis eorum faciente ut faciant praecepta eius, incipiant merita bonorum habere factorum. Haec est gratia quam negatis, non ex operibus quae fiunt, sed ut fiant.
Augustine. Then the vessels themselves so prepare themselves, that it was said in vain about God: Which he prepared unto glory? For you say this most plainly; nor do you understand that it was said: If anyone shall cleanse himself, so that the work of the human being too through the will might be shown; but, ungrateful man, the will is prepared by the Lord (See Prov 8:35 LXX); therefore both are true, both that God prepares vessels unto glory, and that they prepare themselves. For that a human being may do, God does; because that a human being may love, God first loves. Read the prophet Ezekiel, whence I mentioned above what seemed enough; you will find these words too, that is, that God brings it about that human beings do his precepts, on whom he has mercy, not on account of their deservings, which he mentions there to be evil, but on account of his name; so that, with God bringing it about, without their deservings, that they do his precepts, they may begin to have the deservings of good deeds. This is the grace which you deny—not from works which are done, but that they may be done.
JulianImp.1.134I. 135. Iulianus. Ecce officium liberae voluntatis: Si, inquit, mundaverit quis semetipsum a societate vasorum vilium (quo nomine vitia denotantur), erit vas in honorem sanctificatum, utile Domino, ad omne opus bonum paratum . Haec igitur vasa, studiis propriis, aut ad iram, aut ad gloriam praeparantur; Deus autem notam facit potentiam suam in utroque, vel severitatem in impios exserendo, vel benedictionem fidelibus largiendo. Apparuit itaque hanc sententiam egregii praeceptoris, nec Manichaeis opem sensibus attulisse, et e diverso nos consequenter armasse.
I. 135. Julian. Behold the office of free will: If, he says, anyone shall cleanse himself from the society of base vessels (by which name vices are denoted), he will be a vessel unto honor, sanctified, useful to the Lord, prepared for every good work. These vessels, then, by their own pursuits, are prepared either for wrath or for glory; but God makes known his power in both, either by exerting severity upon the impious, or by bestowing blessing upon the faithful. It appeared, then, that this statement of the excellent teacher both brought no help to Manichaean meanings, and, on the contrary, consistently armed us.
JulianImp.1.135Augustinus. Quid calumniaris, quid falso crimineris, nec quos et quales Ecclesiae doctores crimineris attendis? Non cuiusquam Manichaei, sed sancti Ambrosii verbis tibi respondeo: Deus quos dignatur vocat, et quem vult religiosum facit . Hoc in veritate facit, hoc in veritate Scripturarum divinarum intellexit Ambrosius; sed iudicium, cum alios facit, et alios non facit, occultum est. Propter quod dicitur homini per hominem, sed non ab homine: O homo, tu quis es, qui respondeas Deo? Numquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit: Quid me fecisti sic? An non habet potestatem figulus luti, ex eadem massa facere aliud vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam? Aufer tuas nebulas ab istorum serenitate verborum, quibus Dei quidem iudicium significatur occultum; sed ipsa tam clara sunt, ut se tua caligine obumbrari obscurarique non sinant.
Augustine. Why do you calumniate, why do you falsely accuse, and do not attend to whom, and what kind of teachers of the Church, you accuse? Not with the words of any Manichee, but of holy Ambrose, I answer you: God calls those whom he deigns, and makes religious whom he wills. This he does in truth, this Ambrose understood in the truth of the divine Scriptures; but the judgment, when he makes some, and does not make others, is hidden. On account of which it is said to a human being through a human being, but not from a human being: O man, who are you to answer back to God? Does the thing formed say to him who formed it: Why have you made me thus? Or does the potter of the clay not have power, from the same lump, to make one vessel unto honor, another unto dishonor? (Rom 9:20-21) Take away your fogs from the serenity of these words, by which the judgment of God indeed is signified as hidden; but they are themselves so clear that they do not allow themselves to be overshadowed and obscured by your mist.
JulianImp.1.135I. 136. Iulianus. Ac per hoc et tibi vehementer obnixa est, dicens, non omnes fingi in condemnationem, in quam tu omnes ire pronuntias. Absurdissime autem argumentari soles, ut dicas: Sed hi non finguntur in condemnationem, qui postea liberantur; cum nec sic possit sermonis apostolici tibi vel superficies convenire. Nam cum dicis tu: Omnes in condemnationem creantur lege nascendi, sed aliqui inde, licet perexigui, mysteriis liberantur; non hoc asseris quod ille, qui non solum de condemnatis liberari praedicat, verum non omnes in condemnationem fingi, sed alios in contumeliam, alios in honorem.
I. 136. Julian. And through this it is vehemently set against you too, saying that not all are fashioned unto condemnation, into which you declare all go. But you are wont to argue most absurdly, so as to say: But these are not fashioned unto condemnation, who are afterward freed; whereas not even thus can even the surface of the apostolic discourse befit you. For when you say: All are created unto condemnation by the law of being born, but some thence, though very few, are freed by the mysteries; you do not assert this which he does, who proclaims not only that some are freed of the condemned, but that not all are fashioned unto condemnation, but some unto dishonor, others unto honor.
JulianImp.1.136Augustinus. Ubi dixit Apostolus: Ex uno omnes in condemnationem ; ipsam massam demonstravit, quae tota vitiata ex Adam fluxit; ubi autem dicit, ex illa fieri vasa in honorem, gratiam commendat, qua homines quos creat, etiam liberat; ubi vero, ex illa fieri vasa in contumeliam, iudicium ostendit, quo homines, quamvis creet, non tamen liberat. Quod etiam vos de parvulis cogimini confiteri, quorum certe omnium unam esse massam non potestis negare, qualemlibet eam putetis; ex qua tamen alios in Dei regnum adoptari fatemini, quos procul dubio vasa in honorem facta conceditis; alios vero non adoptari, quos facta vasa in contumeliam, nisi intellegenter consentiatis, impudenter negatis. Neque enim, si non est ista poena damnationis, sicut vultis, non erit saltem contumelia imaginis Dei, separari a regno Dei. Sed vos si illam perseveranter negabitis gratiam, ad hoc iudicium vos pertinere monstrabitis; quod utique in parvulis iniustum esset, si peccatum originale non esset.
Augustine. Where the Apostle said: From one all unto condemnation; he showed that very lump, which flowed wholly vitiated from Adam; but where he says that from it are made vessels unto honor, he commends grace, by which God even frees the human beings whom he creates; but where he says that from it are made vessels unto dishonor, he shows the judgment, by which, although he creates human beings, he yet does not free them. Which even you are compelled to confess about little ones, of all of whom you certainly cannot deny that there is one lump, of whatever kind you think it; from which, however, you confess that some are adopted into the kingdom of God, whom without doubt you concede to be vessels made unto honor; but that others are not adopted, whom, made vessels unto dishonor, unless you intelligently consent, you shamelessly deny. For even if this is not the punishment of damnation, as you wish, will it not at least be a dishonor of the image of God, to be separated from the kingdom of God? But if you perseveringly deny that grace, you will show that you pertain to this judgment; which certainly would be unjust in little ones, if there were no original sin.
JulianImp.1.136I. 137. Iulianus. Quod ut claruit Apostolum dixisse de moribus, ita apparet quanta testimoniorum Legis inopia labores, qui ab his sententiis contra fulmina rationis opem petis, quae tibi dedignantur, immo natura sui subvenire non possunt.
I. 137. Julian. And as it became clear that the Apostle spoke about morals, so it appears with how great a lack of testimonies of the Law you labor, who from these statements seek help against the thunderbolts of reason—statements which disdain, or rather by their own nature cannot, come to your aid.
JulianImp.1.137Augustinus. Contra Apostolum dicentem, ex eadem massa aliud vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam Deum facere; nec dicentem, aliud nec in honorem, nec in contumeliam, quod utique diceret, si hoc quod vos de parvulis crederet; contra hunc ergo divinitus intonantem non est fulminea ratio vestra, sed fumea.
Augustine. Against the Apostle saying that from the same lump God makes one vessel unto honor, another unto dishonor; and not saying, another neither unto honor nor unto dishonor, which he would certainly say, if he believed this about little ones which you do; against him, then, divinely thundering, your reason is not thunderous, but smoky.
JulianImp.1.137I. 138. Iulianus. Et haec quidem quantum spectat ad testimonium Apostoli disputata sunt. Ceterum in Isaia, unde ipsam sententiam Paulus assumpsit, in tantum non deterret Deus rationabilem creaturam a sui consideratione iudicii, ut sicut per eumdem Prophetam dixerat: Quiescite agere perverse, discite bene facere, subvenite oppresso; et venite, arguite me, dicit Dominus ; ita etiam hic, ne quid potestate sola, non iustitia videretur fecisse, dispensationum suarum dignatur aperire rationem. Afflicto enim in captivitate populo Iudaeorum redemptionis appropiare tempus, quo ad terram suam reverterentur, annuntiat; et causam vel praecedentium angorum reserat, vel instantium gaudiorum. Epuletur, inquit, caelum desuper, et nubes spargant iustitiam; oriatur ex terra misericordia, et iustitia oriatur simul. Ego sum Dominus Deus qui creavi te, faciens meliorem, praeparavi te sicut lutum figuli. Numquid qui arat, arabit terram per omnem diem? Numquid dicit lutum figulo: Quid facis, quia non operaris, quia non habes manus? Numquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit: Sapienter me finxisti? Vel qui dicit patri: Quid generabis? Et matri: Quid parturies? Quia sic dicit Dominus Deus Israel sanctus, qui fecit futura: Interrogate me pro filiis meis et filiabus, et pro operibus manuum mearum mandate mihi. Ego feci terram et hominem super eam; ego manu mea firmavi caelum; ego omnibus sideribus mandavi; ego levavi cum iustitia regem, et omnes viae eius rectae; hic aedificabit civitatem meam, et captivitatem populi mei reducet, non cum praemio, nec cum muneribus, dixit Dominus Sabaoth .
I. 138. Julian. And these things indeed have been disputed as far as concerns the testimony of the Apostle. But in Isaiah, whence Paul took the statement itself, so far is God from deterring the rational creature from the consideration of his judgment, that, just as through the same Prophet he had said: Cease to act perversely, learn to do well, come to the aid of the oppressed; and come, accuse me, says the Lord (See Isa 1:16-18); so also here, lest he seem to have done anything by power alone, not justice, he deigns to open the reason of his dispensations. For he announces to the people of the Jews afflicted in captivity that the time of redemption is drawing near, in which they would return to their own land; and he discloses the cause both of the preceding anguish and of the imminent joys. Let the heaven feast from above, and let the clouds scatter justice; let mercy arise from the earth, and let justice arise together. I am the Lord God who created you, making you better; I prepared you like the clay of the potter. Will he who plows, plow the earth all day? Does the clay say to the potter: What are you doing, because you do not work, because you have no hands? Does the thing formed say to him who formed it: You have formed me wisely? Or who says to a father: What will you beget? And to a mother: What will you bring forth? Because thus says the Lord, the holy God of Israel, who made the things to come: Ask me concerning my sons and daughters, and concerning the works of my hands give command to me. I made the earth and the man upon it; I with my hand established the heaven; I gave command to all the stars; I raised up a king with justice, and all his ways are right; he will build my city, and will lead back the captivity of my people, not with reward, nor with gifts, said the Lord of Hosts (Isa 45:8-13 LXX).
JulianImp.1.138Augustinus. Si intellegeres verba Prophetae, intellegeres ibi regem, de quo dictum est: Ego levavi cum iustitia regem, et omnes viae eius rectae , hunc esse Mediatorem Dei et hominum hominem Christum Iesum; sed intellegeres ut intellegendus est. Neque enim audebis eum dire praecedentibus operum meritis Filium Dei factum ab initio, id est, a Virginis utero. Qua ergo gratia homo ille ab initio factus est bonus, eadem gratia homines qui sunt membra eius ex malis fiunt boni. Quid enim dicatis de Christo secundum hominem, non invenitis, id est, secundum id quod Verbum caro factum est; quod ille qui Deus erat, et Deus mansit et homo factus est; quod ipse homo numquam ita fuit homo, ut non esset unigenitus Dei Filius, propter unigenitum Verbum. Neque enim ut hoc esset, morum suorum de propria voluntate venientium meritis comparavit; sed, sicut verum dixit Ambrosius, quasi de Spiritu natus abstinuit a delicto . Alioquin secundum vos, multi essent tales, si esse voluissent; atque ut ille talis nonnisi unus esset, in potestate hominum fuit, qui tales esse noluerunt; quae si attenditis quanta impietate dicantur, vel tacita cogitatione credantur; sicut agnoscitis Unigeniti naturam, quod in principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum ; agnoscite et gratiam, quod Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis . Ille igitur quos dignatur vocat, et quem vult religiosum facit , qui hominem quem voluit, unum sine ullis humanae voluntatis praecedentibus meritis Mediatorem Dei et hominum fecit.
Augustine. If you understood the words of the Prophet, you would understand that the king there, of whom it was said: I raised up a king with justice, and all his ways are right, is the Mediator of God and human beings, the man Christ Jesus; but you would understand as he is to be understood. For you will not dare to say that he was made the Son of God by preceding deservings of works, from the beginning, that is, from the Virgin's womb. By what grace, then, that man was made good from the beginning, by the same grace human beings who are his members are made good from evil. For you do not find what you may say about Christ according to the man, that is, according to that by which the Word was made flesh; that he who was God both remained God and was made man; that that man himself never was man in such a way that he was not the only-begotten Son of God, on account of the only-begotten Word. For he did not acquire this by the deservings of his own morals coming from his own will; but, as Ambrose truly said, as though born of the Spirit, he abstained from offense. Otherwise, according to you, many would be such, if they had wished to be; and that he was the only such one, was in the power of human beings who were unwilling to be such; which, if you attend with how great impiety they are said, or even believed by silent thought; just as you acknowledge the nature of the Only-begotten, that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God (John 1:1); acknowledge also the grace, that the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us (John 1:14). He, then, calls those whom he deigns, and makes religious whom he wills, who made the man whom he willed, one, without any preceding deservings of human will, the Mediator of God and human beings.
JulianImp.1.138I. 139. Iulianus. In hoc igitur loco hic sensus, quantum spectat ad historiam continetur, ut Deus loquatur ad populum: Quia nec odio vos in captivitatem tradidi, nec nunc oblivione iudicii de vinculis Babylonicae captivitatis exemi; sed ego, quantum in me est, paratus iugi vos benevolentia confovere, iustitiae meae tamen debui, ut et delinquentes hostibus traderem, et recrearem liberaremque vexatos. Sicut enim rusticandi gnarus non semper uno imminet operi, ut solis findat arva dentalibus; sed diverso genere votivae fertilitati rura componit; ita etiam ego dispensationum vices vario, ut tum pressuris, tum consolationibus voluntatem vestram frugibus possim aptare iustitiae. Denique, ut intellegatis quanta aequitate agam vobiscum, possem mussitationes vestras pro potestate despicere, ut sicut figulo figmentum suum dicere non potest: Quid fecisti? Ita etiam vobis silentii pondus imponerem; tamen contra haec exempla provoco vos, ut pro filiis meis et filiabus, id est, pro vobis et operibus manuum mearum me interrogetis, et discatis, totum me iuste, nec quidquam umquam fecisse crudeliter.
I. 139. Julian. In this place, then, this sense, as far as concerns the history, is contained, that God speaks to the people: Because I neither handed you over into captivity out of hatred, nor now have taken you from the bonds of the Babylonian captivity out of forgetfulness of judgment; but I, as far as is in me, ready to cherish you with continual benevolence, owed it nevertheless to my justice both to hand over the offenders to enemies, and to refresh and free the vexed. For just as one skilled in farming does not always press upon one work, so as to cleave the fields only with plowshares; but composes the lands by a diverse kind for the wished-for fertility; so I too vary the turns of my dispensations, that, now by pressures, now by consolations, I may be able to fit your will to the crops of justice. Finally, that you may understand with how great equity I act with you, I could by my power despise your mutterings, so that, as the thing formed cannot say to the potter: What have you done? so I too might impose on you the weight of silence; yet, against these examples I summon you, that you may ask me concerning my sons and daughters, that is, concerning yourselves and the works of my hands, and learn that I did everything justly, and never did anything cruelly.
JulianImp.1.139Augustinus. Quod vis dicis, non quod dixit Isaias; ille gratiam loquitur, contra quam tu loqueris.
Augustine. You say what you wish, not what Isaiah said; he speaks of grace, against which you speak.
JulianImp.1.139I. 140. Iulianus. Et a Propheta ergo, et ab Apostolo, in exemplum adductus est figulus, nihil aliud praebiturus, quam comparationis officium; non tamen ut tam viles apud Deum esse homines indicentur, quam argilla est in fornace et orbe figulorum. Absoluta hac expositione quam praemisimus, admonemus secundum interpretationem recentem in eodem loco aliud relucere. Rorate, inquit, caeli, desuper, et nubes pluant iustum; aperiatur terra, et germinet Salvatorem, et iustitia oriatur simul; ego Dominus creavi eum. Vae qui contradicit fictori suo, testa de samiis terrae; numquid dicit lutum figulo suo: Quid facis? Et opus tuum absque manibus est? Quibus verbis etsi secundum historiam Cyrus rex, secundum prophetiam tamen incarnatio Salvatoris exprimitur; qui quoniam erat de Virgine nasciturus, Iudaeorum et omnium infidelium obstinatio convenitur, ne sint signis fidelibus perduelles. Cum enim praemisisset: Aperiatur terra, et germinet Salvatorem, et iustitia oriatur simul. Ego Dominus, inquit, creavi eum.
I. 140. Julian. Both by the Prophet, then, and by the Apostle, the potter was brought forward as an example, about to furnish nothing other than the office of comparison; not, however, that human beings be shown to be as cheap in God's sight as clay is in the furnace and on the wheel of potters. With this exposition which we premised settled, we note that, according to the recent interpretation, in the same place something else shines out. Drop down dew, you heavens, from above, and let the clouds rain the just one; let the earth be opened, and let it bring forth the Savior, and let justice arise together; I the Lord have created him. Woe to him who contradicts his fashioner, a potsherd of the earthen vessels of Samos; does the clay say to its potter: What are you doing? And your work is without hands? (Isa 45:8-9) By which words, although according to the history King Cyrus, yet according to the prophecy the incarnation of the Savior is expressed; who, since he was to be born of a Virgin, the obstinacy of the Jews and of all unbelievers is addressed, lest they be foes to the faithful signs. For when he had premised: Let the earth be opened, and let it bring forth the Savior, and let justice arise together. I the Lord, he says, have created him.
JulianImp.1.140Augustinus. Dic mihi quibus operibus hoc meruit homo Christus Iesus; et qua iustitia Dei solus hoc meruerit, aude garrire; aut si non audes, tandem gratiam sine meritis confitere, non solum remittentem peccata homini, verum etiam in natura humana iustitiam Sancto Spiritu facientem. Non enim et homini Christo gratia peccata dimisit, aut non eum gratia talem fecit, ut ab initio semper esset bonus, sicut ab initio semper Dei Filius? Prorsus, sicut admoniti sunt, qui in eremo serpentum morsibus lethaliter vexabantur, ut illum qui in signo exaltatus fuerat, attenderent, ne perirent ; ita sunt admonendi, qui vestris disputationibus venenantur, ut Christum attendant, et in illius hominis mediatoris iustitia gratiam sine meritis videant, unde a se vestri oris virus excludant. Denique in verbis Prophetae, etiam secundum recentem interpretationem quam commemorasti ubi evidentius prophetatus est Christus, non inde assumpsisti unde disputares, nisi quod ex Virgine natus est, quia dictum est: Aperiatur terra, et germinet Salvatorem; de iustitia vero eius, quae hic pariter praenuntiata est, nihil dicere voluisti; cum tu verba ipsa prophetica proposueris, ubi ait: Rorate, caeli, desuper, et nubes pluant iustum; aperiatur terra, et germinet Salvatorem, et iustitia oriatur simul. Dic mihi quem iustum nubes pluerunt, nisi quia Prophetae et Apostoli Christum praedicaverunt, qui ex ipso Virginis utero cum iustitia natus est? Unde cum dictum esset: Aperiatur terra, et germinet Salvatorem; mox additum est: et iustitia oriatur simul. Ac per hoc, ea gratia fiunt iusti homines, qui renascuntur in Christo, qua gratia iustus homo natus est Christus. Sicut ergo exemplum est vitae, ut eum imitando iuste agamus; ita est etiam exemplum gratiae, ut in eum credendo inde nos fieri speremus iustos per ipsum, unde factus est ipse, qui factus est nobis sapientia a Deo, et iustitia et sanctificatio et redemptio; ut quemadmodum scriptum est: Qui gloriatur, in Domino glorietur . Quoscumque itaque dente mortifero momordistis, hunc iustum intueantur, et sanabuntur; hoc est, inde se credant accipere iustitiam, unde Christo est innata iustitia; et ideo non in suo arbitrio, nec in suo merito, sed in Domino glorientur.
Augustine. Tell me by what works the man Christ Jesus deserved this; and by what justice of God he alone deserved this, dare to chatter; or if you do not dare, at last confess grace without deservings, not only remitting sins to a human being, but also working justice in human nature by the Holy Spirit. For did grace either dismiss sins to the man Christ too, or did grace not make him such that from the beginning he was always good, as from the beginning he was always the Son of God? Plainly, just as those who in the desert were being lethally vexed by the bites of serpents were admonished to attend to him who had been lifted up on the standard, lest they perish (See Num 21:8-9; John 3:14-15); so are those to be admonished who are poisoned by your disputations, that they attend to Christ, and in the justice of that man, the mediator, see grace without deservings, whence they may shut out from themselves the venom of your mouth. Finally, in the words of the Prophet, even according to the recent interpretation which you mentioned, where Christ was more evidently prophesied, you took thence nothing to dispute from, except that he was born of a Virgin, because it was said: Let the earth be opened, and let it bring forth the Savior; but about his justice, which here was likewise foretold, you wished to say nothing; although you yourself set down the prophetic words, where he says: Drop down dew, you heavens, from above, and let the clouds rain the just one; let the earth be opened, and let it bring forth the Savior, and let justice arise together. Tell me what just one the clouds rained, except that the Prophets and Apostles proclaimed Christ, who was born with justice from the very womb of the Virgin? Whence, when it had been said: Let the earth be opened, and let it bring forth the Savior; it was soon added: and let justice arise together. And through this, by that grace human beings who are reborn in Christ become just, by which grace Christ was born a just man. As, then, he is an example of life, that by imitating him we may act justly; so he is also an example of grace, that by believing in him we may hope to be made just thence by him, whence he himself was made, who was made for us wisdom from God, and justice and sanctification and redemption; that, as it is written: He who glories, let him glory in the Lord (1 Cor 1:30-31). Whomever, then, you have bitten with your deadly tooth, let them gaze upon this just one, and they will be healed; that is, let them believe that they receive justice thence, whence justice was inborn to Christ; and therefore let them glory not in their own choice, nor in their own deserving, but in the Lord.
JulianImp.1.140I. 141. Iulianus. Ante terra aperitur in germen, quam opera colentis semen accipiat; quod in puerperio virginis approbatur, quae munere matris officium praevenit et exclusit uxoris. Quod ergo in usu non erat, id facturum se Deus omnipotens pollicetur; et addit, praevidens infidelium multitudinem: Vae qui contradicit fictori suo, testa de samiis terrae . Id est: Vae his qui, Deo promittente, fetam fieri virginem non potuisse contendunt; cumque ipsi totidem licet de seminibus a Deo institutis, tamen interveniente Dei potentia, in visceribus fingantur maternis, obstipo studio affirmant, nequivisse carnem sine ministerio viri ex carne virginis fabricari. Tale est igitur quod vos, o pervicaces, non putatis me id facere potuisse, ac mihi de rei difficultate praescribitis, cum vos ipsos manibus meis constet effectos; quale, si lutum figulo suo, cum ab eo tractatur, diceret: Non habes manus; quibus tunc in vas aliquod formabatur. Ita ergo et vos, qui inquiritis quis filium virgini dederit sine viri semine, cognoscite eumdem esse qui vos fecit ex semine. Sed iam quoniam Scripturis sanctis expositio varia licet, utraque tamen pia et religiosa concinuit, primus terminetur liber; suo tamen fine commonens, ut opifex nascentium Deus credatur, innocentium tutor, Catholicorum remunerator, Manichaeorumque damnator.
I. 141. Julian. The earth is opened into a sprout before the work of the cultivator receives the seed; which is approved in the childbearing of the virgin, who by the gift of a mother forestalled and shut out the office of a wife. What, then, was not in use, that almighty God promises he will do; and adds, foreseeing the multitude of unbelievers: Woe to him who contradicts his fashioner, a potsherd of the earthen vessels of Samos. That is: Woe to those who, with God promising, contend that a virgin could not become pregnant; and although they themselves, though from seeds instituted by God, yet with the power of God intervening, are fashioned in the maternal viscera, with stubborn zeal affirm that flesh could not be fabricated from the flesh of a virgin without the ministry of a man. Such, then, is it that you, O obstinate ones, do not think that I could do this, and prescribe to me from the difficulty of the matter, when it is established that you yourselves were made by my hands; as if the clay should say to its potter, when it is handled by him: You have no hands; by which it was then being formed into some vessel. So, then, you too, who inquire who gave a son to the virgin without the seed of a man, recognize that he is the same who made you from seed. But now, since the exposition of the holy Scriptures may be various, yet each one is pious and religious in harmony, let the first book be ended; yet warning by its very ending that God be believed the maker of those being born, the guardian of the innocent, the rewarder of Catholics, and the condemner of the Manichees.
JulianImp.1.141Augustinus. Ut sciant, qui intellegenter legunt, quemadmodum conatus fueris verba apostolica obnubilare clara, et recta pervertere, huic disputationi tuae ex eadem oportet Apostoli disputatione respondeam. Volens igitur beatus Paulus ostendere, quod ea quae promisit Deus, potens est et facere; ubi maxime gratia commendatur, cuius estis inimici; neque enim in potestate hominum est, ut Deus impleat quae promisit, et non in ipsius qui promisit; volens ergo id ostendere: Non potest, inquit, excidere verbum Dei; non enim omnes qui ex Israel, hi sunt Israel; neque quia sunt semen Abraham, omnes filii; sed in Isaac vocabitur tibi semen; hoc est, non hi qui filii carnis, hi filii Dei; sed filii promissionis deputantur in semen. Promissionis enim verbum hoc est: Ad hoc tempus veniam, et erit Sarrae filius . Tene in mente filios promissionis, quoniam qui promisit potens est et facere . Non solum autem, inquit, sed et Rebecca ex uno concubitu habens Isaac, patris nostri. Cum enim nondum nati fuissent, aut aliquid egissent boni vel mali, ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est: Quia maior serviet minori . Et hic tene in mente electionem non ex operibus, quam quodam modo exposuit Propheta posterior; quod subiungens Apostolus ait: Sicut scriptum est: Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui . Hic occurrit quaestio, quae perturbare posset non intellegentes altitudinem gratiae; eamque sibi ipse proponens, ait: Quid ergo dicemus? Numquid iniquitas est apud Deum? Absit! Et ut doceret quod dixit: Absit! Moyses, enim, inquit, dicit: Miserebor cui misertus ero, et misericordiam praestabo cui misericors fuero. Igitur non volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei . Hoc si attenderes, non extolleres contra gratiam merita voluntatis; ubi audis: Non volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei. Non ergo ideo misertus est Deus, quia voluit et cucurrit Iacob; sed ideo voluit et cucurrit Iacob, quia misertus est Deus. Paratur enim voluntas a Domino ; et a Domino gressus hominis diriguntur, et viam eius volet . Deinde, quia propter Iacob dicta est ista sententia generalis: Non volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei; datur etiam exemplum de Pharaone, propter id quod dictum est: Esau autem odio habui; et subicitur: Dicit enim Scriptura Pharaoni: Quia ad hoc te excitavi, ut ostendam in te virtutem meam, et ut annuntietur nomen meum in universa terra . Post haec ad utrumque concluditur: Ergo cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult obdurat ; sed miseretur utique secundum gratiam, quae gratis datur, non meritis redditur; obdurat autem secundum iudicium, quod meritis redditur. De massa quippe damnata facere vas in honorem, manifesta est gratia; facere autem inde vas in contumeliam, iustum iudicium est. Hinc iam subiciens verba eorum, quibus hoc displicet, ait: Dicis itaque mihi: Quid adhuc conqueritur? Nam voluntati eius quis resistit? Eosque cohibens: O homo, inquit, tu quis es qui respondeas Deo? Numquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit: Quid me fecisti sic? An non habet potestatem figulus luti, ex eadem massa facere aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam? Vide si non consonat superioribus suis, et dissentit a tuis; qui putas hoc dictum secundum merita voluntatum, contra id quod ipse ait: Cum enim nondum nati essent, nec aliquid egissent boni vel mali, ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est: Quia maior serviet minori; et contra id quod ipse ait: Igitur non volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei. Nec solum contra haec quae praecesserunt, verum etiam contra illa quae subsequuntur. Vasa quippe irae dicit, quae sunt perfecta in perditionem; quod iniustum esset, nisi omnibus ex uno in condemnationem venientibus iam damnata massa esset; et vasa dicit misericordiae, quae praeparavit in gloriam; ad misericordiam quippe gratuitam, non debitam, pertinet de massa damnata vasa in gloriam praeparare: Non solum ex Iudaeis, sicut dicit, sed etiam ex Gentibus, propter quod ponit testimonium de Osee propheta: Vocavi non plebem meam, plebem meam ; et de Isaia: Propter Israel reliquiae salvae fient . Ut autem essent istae reliquiae, gratia Dei factum esse testimonio sequente docet, per eumdem Prophetam dicentem: Nisi Dominus Sabaoth reliquisset nobis semen . Deinde ostendit Gentes ex fide apprehendisse iustitiam; Israel autem ideo non apprehendisse, quia non ex fide, sed tamquam ex operibus. Fides enim habet, quod aliquando post dicit: Quoniam omnis qui invocaverit nomen Domini, salvus erit . Ad quam salutem pertinet, ut opera bona sint et iustitia nobis ex Deo sit, non ex nobis. Propter quod de illis, qui non ex fide, sed tamquam ex operibus offenderunt in lapidem offensionis, sequitur, et dicit: Fratres, bona voluntas quidem cordis mei, et deprecatio ad Deum pro illis in salutem; testimonium enim perhibeo illis quia zelum Dei habent, sed non secundum scientiam. Ignorantes enim Dei iustitiam et suam iustitiam quaerentes constituere, iustitiae Dei non sunt subiecti . Quod omnino et vos facitis; iustitiam quippe vestram vultis constituere, cui Deus secundum merita retribuat gratiam; nec vultis gratiam Dei praecedere, quae vos faciat habere iustitiam. Deinde connexa sibimet serie disputationis, ad illud pervenit, ubi ait: Dico ergo: Numquid repulit Deus plebem suam? Absit! Nam et ego Israelita sum, ex semine Abraham, ex tribu Beniamin; non repulit Deus plebem suam, quam praescivit. An nescitis in Elia quid dicit Scriptura, quemadmodum interpellat Deum adversus Israel? Domine, prophetas tuos occiderunt, et altaria tua suffoderunt, et ego relictus sum solus, et quaerunt animam meam. Sed quid dicit illi responsum divinum? Reliqui mihi septem millia virorum, qui non curvaverunt genu ante Baal. Sic ergo et in hoc tempore reliquiae per electionem gratiae factae sunt. Si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus; alioquin gratia iam non est gratia . Deinde vide quid adiungat. Quid ergo? inquit, quod quaerebat Israel, hoc non est consecutus; electio autem consecuta est . Sed superius respice qualis electio, ubi ait: Reliquiae per electionem gratiae factae sunt; si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus. Et hoc refert ad illud, unde disputatio ista profecta est: Cum enim nondum nati essent, neque aliquid egissent boni aut mali, ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret; non ex operibus . Haec est electio gratiae, non ex operibus, qua fiunt vasa in honorem, ut bona opera faciant; quia bona opera subsequuntur gratiam, non praecedunt; quoniam gratia Dei facit ut ea faciamus; nec constituamus iustitiam nostram, sed Dei iustitia sit in nobis, id est, quam donat Deus nobis. Ceteri vero excaecati sunt ; hoc est iudicium, quo fiunt vasa in contumeliam; ex quo iudicio dictum est: Esau autem odio habui. Ex quo iudicio dictum est etiam Pharaoni: Ad hoc te excitavi. Unde apparet vos sic intellegentes, vel potius non intellegentes Apostolum, ex operibus contra gratiam velle gloriari, et vestram iustitiam volentes constituere, iustitiae Dei non esse subiectos. Nos vero Deum quidem parvulorum opificem praedicamus; sed ex eadem massa medium locum vasis, ubi nec in honorem fiant, nec in contumeliam, quem non dedit Apostolus, non damus; quod vos faciendo evaderetis iudicium Dei, si eum tantummodo Manichaeorum, et non omnium haereticorum damnatorem demonstrare possetis.
Augustine. That those who read intelligently may know how you tried to becloud the clear apostolic words, and to pervert the right ones, I must answer this disputation of yours from that same disputation of the Apostle. The blessed Paul, then, wishing to show that the things which God promised, he is able also to do; where grace is especially commended, of which you are enemies; for it is not in the power of human beings that God fulfill what he promised, and not in the power of him who promised; wishing, then, to show this: The word of God cannot fail, he says; for not all who are from Israel are Israel; nor because they are the seed of Abraham are all his sons; but in Isaac shall a seed be called for you; that is, not those who are sons of the flesh, these are the sons of God; but the sons of the promise are reckoned as seed. For the word of the promise is this: At this time I will come, and Sarah shall have a son (Rom 9:6-9). Hold in mind the sons of the promise, since he who promised is able also to do (See Rom 4:21). And not only this, he says, but also Rebecca, having Isaac of one intercourse, our father. For when they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might remain, not from works, but from him who calls, it was said: The elder shall serve the younger (Rom 9:10-12). And here hold in mind the election not from works, which the later Prophet in a certain way expounded; which the Apostle, subjoining, says: As it is written: Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated (Rom 9:13). Here occurs a question, which could disturb those not understanding the height of grace; and proposing it to himself, he says: What then shall we say? Is there injustice with God? Far be it! (Rom 9:14) And to teach what he said: Far be it! For Moses, he says, says: I will have mercy on whom I have had mercy, and I will show mercy to whom I have been merciful. Therefore it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy (Rom 9:15-16). If you attended to this, you would not exalt against grace the deservings of the will; where you hear: It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy. God, then, did not have mercy because Jacob willed and ran; but Jacob willed and ran because God had mercy. For the will is prepared by the Lord (See Prov 8:35 LXX); and by the Lord the steps of a man are directed, and he will will his way (See Ps 37:23 (36:23)). Then, because this general statement was said on account of Jacob: It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy; an example is given also about Pharaoh, on account of what was said: But Esau I hated; and it is subjoined: For the Scripture says to Pharaoh: For this I have raised you up, that I may show in you my power, and that my name may be announced in all the earth (Rom 9:17). After these things it is concluded as to both: Therefore he has mercy on whom he wills, and hardens whom he wills (Rom 9:18); but he has mercy certainly according to grace, which is given freely, not rendered to deservings; but he hardens according to judgment, which is rendered to deservings. For from a damned lump to make a vessel unto honor is manifest grace; but to make from it a vessel unto dishonor is just judgment. Hence now, subjoining the words of those to whom this displeases, he says: You say, then, to me: Why does he still complain? For who resists his will? And restraining them: O man, he says, who are you to answer back to God? Does the thing formed say to him who formed it: Why have you made me thus? Or does the potter of the clay not have power, from the same lump, to make one vessel indeed unto honor, another unto dishonor? (Rom 9:19-21) See whether it does not accord with his earlier words, and dissents from yours; you who think this was said according to the deservings of wills, against what he himself says: For when they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might remain, not from works, but from him who calls it was said: The elder shall serve the younger; and against what he himself says: Therefore it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy. And not only against these things which preceded, but also against those which follow. For he calls vessels of wrath those which are perfected unto perdition; which would be unjust, unless the lump were already damned, with all coming from one into condemnation; and he calls vessels of mercy those which he prepared unto glory; for it pertains to gratuitous, not owed mercy, to prepare from a damned lump vessels unto glory: Not only from the Jews, as he says, but also from the Gentiles, on account of which he sets down the testimony from the prophet Hosea: I have called not my people, my people (Rom 9:25; Hos 2:23); and from Isaiah: On account of Israel a remnant shall be saved (Rom 9:27; Isa 10:22). But that there should be these remnants, he teaches, by the testimony following, came about by the grace of God, through the same Prophet saying: Unless the Lord of Hosts had left us a seed (Rom 9:29; Isa 1:9). Then he shows that the Gentiles laid hold of justice from faith; but that Israel for this reason did not lay hold of it, because it was not from faith, but as it were from works. For faith holds what he afterward says at some point: That everyone who calls upon the name of the Lord shall be saved (Rom 10:13; Joel 2:32). To which salvation it pertains that works should be good and that justice should be for us from God, not from ourselves. On account of which, about those who, not from faith, but as it were from works, stumbled on the stone of stumbling, he continues and says: Brothers, the good will indeed of my heart, and my prayer to God for them, is for their salvation; for I bear them witness that they have a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge. For, being ignorant of the justice of God and seeking to establish their own justice, they did not submit to the justice of God (Rom 10:1-3). Which you too altogether do; for you wish to establish your own justice, to which God renders grace according to deservings; nor do you wish the grace of God to go before, which makes you have justice. Then, with the series of disputation connected with itself, he arrives at that where he says: I say, then: Has God rejected his people? Far be it! For I too am an Israelite, of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Benjamin; God has not rejected his people whom he foreknew. Or do you not know what the Scripture says in Elijah, how he appeals to God against Israel? Lord, they have killed your prophets, and dug up your altars, and I am left alone, and they seek my soul. But what does the divine response say to him? I have left myself seven thousand men, who have not bent the knee before Baal. So, then, even at this time a remnant has been made according to the election of grace. But if by grace, then no longer from works; otherwise grace is now not grace (Rom 11:1-6). Then see what he adds. What then? he says, that which Israel was seeking, this it did not obtain; but the election obtained it (Rom 11:7). But look above what kind of election, where he says: A remnant has been made according to the election of grace; but if by grace, then no longer from works. And he refers this to that from which this disputation set out: For when they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might remain; not from works. This is the election of grace, not from works, by which vessels are made unto honor, that they may do good works; because good works follow grace, do not precede it; since the grace of God brings it about that we do them; and that we do not establish our own justice, but that the justice of God be in us, that is, which God grants us. But the rest were blinded (Rom 11:7); this is the judgment, by which vessels are made unto dishonor; from which judgment it was said: But Esau I hated. From which judgment it was said also to Pharaoh: For this I have raised you up. Whence it appears that you, so understanding, or rather not understanding the Apostle, wish to glory from works against grace, and, wishing to establish your own justice, are not subject to the justice of God. But we indeed proclaim God the maker of little ones; but from the same lump a middle place for vessels, where they are made neither unto honor nor unto dishonor, which the Apostle did not give, we do not give; which, by doing, you would escape the judgment of God, if you could show him the condemner only of the Manichees, and not of all heretics.
JulianImp.1.141Liber Secundus
Book Two
JulianImp.1.141II. 1. Iulianus. Commode nobiscum ageretur, si aut apud eruditos iudices negotium veritatis tueri daretur facultas aut, quia hoc interim negatur, vel nullo imperitorum obverberaremur tumultu.
II. 1. Julian. It would be dealt with conveniently for us, if either the faculty were given to defend the cause of truth before learned judges, or, because this is meanwhile denied, we were at least beaten by no tumult of the inexperienced.
JulianImp.2.1Augustinus. Tales certe eruditos iudices quaeris, qui nisi fuerint exculti et ornati liberalibus disciplinis, neque ignoraverint, quid senserint etiam huius mundi philosophi, de tuis dictis iudicare non possint. Talis hic erat Ambrosius, quem iudicem si non refugis, dubitare non debes iustissime te esse damnatum. Ille enim dixit: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est ; ut his verbis suis, Christum Salvatorem, hoc est Iesum ostenderet parvulis necessarium; cui tu cum contradicis, fatendum tibi est, ita te habere velle iudices eruditos, ut nolis habere iudices catholicos christianos.
Augustine. You certainly seek such learned judges that, unless they have been cultivated and adorned with the liberal disciplines, and have not been ignorant of what even the philosophers of this world thought, they cannot judge about your sayings. Such a one here was Ambrose, whom, if you do not flee as judge, you ought not to doubt that you have been most justly condemned. For he said: We are all human beings born under sin, and our very origin is in fault; that by these words of his he might show the Savior Christ, that is, Jesus, necessary to little ones; whom, since you contradict, you must confess that you so wish to have learned judges that you are unwilling to have catholic Christian judges.
JulianImp.2.1II. 2. Iulianus. Et quia obtollendi in Ecclesiarum salutem tropaei damna perpetimur, quod bonae causae prudentia cognitorum miris erat delatura suffragiis; vel nihil aliud ad contumelias nostras vulgi valeret assensio. De his ergo, quas dixi, hominum partibus una nobis prodesset, altera nihil noceret, si aut illa potestatem obtineret, aut ista verecundiam. Verum quia rerum est magna confusio, et stolidorum maxima multitudo; eripiuntur Ecclesiae gubernacula rationis, ut erecto cornu velificet dogma populare.
II. 2. Julian. And because we endure the losses of a trophy to be raised for the salvation of the Churches—which the prudence of those examining would have conferred on a good cause by marvelous votes; or at least the assent of the crowd would avail nothing toward our insults. Of these parts of men, then, which I have mentioned, one would profit us, the other would do no harm, if either that one obtained power, or this one shame. But because there is great confusion of affairs, and the greatest multitude of the stupid; the helms of reason are snatched from the Church, so that, with horn raised, popular teaching sails.
JulianImp.2.2Augustinus. Si hoc quod asserimus, dogma populare est, non est ergo dogma Manichaeorum hoc, quod in populis christianis mente perdita oppugnas. Manichaeorum quippe dementiam in paucis merito contemnis, sed habes et tuam, qua nomine Manichaeorum, eos populos, quos iudices refugis, reddere nobis conaris infestos; quasi possint populi tua loquacitate decepti Manichaeum dicere Ambrosium, Manichaeum dicere Cyprianum, qui propter salutem etiam parvulorum docuerunt esse originale peccatum. Tales autem populos non fecit, sed invenit Ambrosius; non fecit, sed invenit etiam ipse Cyprianus; tales populos in Ecclesia invenit etiam pater tuus, quando baptizatus es, ut dicitur, parvulus ; tales postremo populos catholicos invenistis et vos. Compescite vos; fatemur dogma nostrum esse populare; quia populus eius sumus, qui propterea est appellatus Iesus, quia salvum facit populum suum a peccatis eorum ; a quo populo cum separare parvulos vultis, vos ipsos potius separatis.
Augustine. If this which we assert is popular teaching, then this which you assail among the Christian peoples with a ruined mind is not the teaching of the Manichees. For you deservedly despise the dementia of the Manichees in their few; but you have your own too, by which, under the name of the Manichees, you try to render hostile to us those peoples whom you flee as judges; as if peoples deceived by your loquacity could call Ambrose a Manichee, call Cyprian a Manichee, who, for the salvation even of little ones, taught that there is original sin. But Ambrose did not make, but found such peoples; he did not make, but Cyprian himself too found them; such peoples your father too found in the Church, when you were baptized, as is said, a little one; such catholic peoples, finally, you too found. Check yourselves; we confess that our teaching is popular; because we are the people of him who was for this reason called Jesus, because he saves his people from their sins (See Matt 1:21); from which people, when you wish to separate little ones, you rather separate yourselves.
JulianImp.2.2II. 3. Iulianus. Ita cum prudentibus parum licet, vilibus autem quod libet etiam licet seditionum decreto exclusa est de Ecclesiis censura virtutum; nobisque hoc apud homines vulgi officit, quod accessio erroris esse renuimus; vulgi, inquam, qui sententiae meritum de prosperitatibus ponderans, eam veriorem aestimat quam pluribus placere conspexerit.
II. 3. Julian. So, since with the prudent little is permitted, but with the base whatever pleases is even permitted, the censure of the virtues has been excluded from the Churches by a decree of seditions; and this hinders us among the men of the crowd, that we refuse to be an accession to error; of the crowd, I say, who, weighing the merit of an opinion by prosperities, reckon that truer which they have seen please more.
JulianImp.2.3Augustinus. Numquid Manichaeus pluribus placet? Nonne sicut parricidae, et pauci, et pessimi sunt? Nolite ergo de paucitate gloriari et, quod est vanius, dicere, quod pluribus placeat dogma nostrum, et obicere nobis detestabilium dogma paucorum.
Augustine. Does the Manichee please more? Are they not, like parricides, both few and most wicked? Do not, then, glory in fewness, and—what is more vain—say that our teaching pleases more, and object to us the teaching of a detestable few.
JulianImp.2.3II. 4. Iulianus. Quodque ait, in Epicurum Tullius, manifesto argumento non dici illa subtiliter, quod cuiuscemodi homines passim sibi ea profitentur placere . Id isti, sicut omnia, more perverso, ad sapientiae putant testimonium pertinere.
II. 4. Julian. And what Tullius says against Epicurus, that it is a manifest argument that those things are not said subtly, because men of every kind everywhere profess that they are pleased by them. This these men, as in all things, by their perverse manner, think pertains to the testimony of wisdom.
JulianImp.2.4Augustinus. Sed Tullium vicit atque convicit in hac sententia ille qui dicit: Laudate Dominum, omnes gentes; laudate eum, omnes populi . Quos tu quaeris, non veraciter docere, sed subtiliter fallere aliquos eorum, et vestrae addere paucitati, subtilitatem paucorum philosophorum saecularium praedicando, et nos reprehendendo quod non dicantur nostra subtiliter, et ideo cuiuscemodi homines passim sibi ea profiteantur placere. Me tamen aliquoties dixisti, nihil magis agere, quam ut non intellegar; quomodo ergo id quod defendo, multitudini placet, nisi quia multitudo ista catholica est, cui merito vestra haeresis displicet?
Augustine. But Tullius was overcome and refuted in this opinion by him who says: Praise the Lord, all you nations; praise him, all you peoples (Ps 117:1 (116:1)). Whom you seek, not to teach truthfully, but to deceive subtly some of them, and add to your fewness, by proclaiming the subtlety of a few secular philosophers, and reprehending us because our things are not said subtly, and therefore men of every kind everywhere profess that they are pleased by them. Yet you said several times that I do nothing more than make myself not understood; how, then, does what I defend please the multitude, except because this multitude is catholic, to which your heresy deservedly displeases?
JulianImp.2.4II. 5. Iulianus. Delectat enim prorsus subantes animas infamare, quidquid umquam et usquam sanctorum fuit, ne clarorum operum castigentur exemplis.
II. 5. Julian. For it delights utterly to defame the rutting souls, whatever of the saints there ever and anywhere was, lest they be chastised by the examples of illustrious works.
JulianImp.2.5Augustinus. Subantes ergo animae post te potius currunt, qui libidinem laudas; nam castae animae vituperando arguunt, quod expugnando laudantur.
Augustine. Rutting souls, then, run rather after you, who praise lust; for chaste souls, by blaming, accuse what, by being assailed, you praise.
JulianImp.2.5II. 6. Iulianus. Delectat prorsus et penitus afficit, causari imbecillitatem naturae, dicere carnem congenitis obnoxiam esse peccatis, nec in voluntate hominis emendationis effectum locare, sed studiorum crimina officia vocare membrorum; catholicam hanc fidem esse, ut liberum confiteatur arbitrium, sed per quod homo malum facere cogatur, bonum velle non possit.
II. 6. Julian. It delights utterly and affects deeply to plead the weakness of nature, to say that the flesh is subject to congenital sins, and to place the effect of amendment not in the will of a human being, but to call the crimes of pursuits the offices of the members; that this is the catholic faith, to confess free choice, but that through which a human being is compelled to do evil, and cannot will good.
JulianImp.2.6Augustinus. Quid nobis irasceris, qui emendationis effectum tanto certius appetimus, quanto fidelius eum a Domino petimus? Frustra inflatam linguam voce superbiente dilatas; nolumus prorsus, nolumus eis annumerari qui confidunt in virtute sua . Anima nostra Deo sitit , cui dicit: Diligam te, Domine, virtus mea . Potest enim homo bonum velle; sed praeparatur voluntas a Domino ; in malum vero libens vergit vitiata, propter quod est sananda natura.
Augustine. Why are you angry with us, who seek the effect of amendment so much the more surely, the more faithfully we ask it from the Lord? In vain you spread your inflated tongue with a proud voice; we are utterly unwilling, unwilling to be numbered among those who trust in their own strength (See Ps 49:6 (48:7)). Our soul thirsts for God (See Ps 42:2 (41:3)), to whom it says: I will love you, O Lord, my strength (Ps 18:1 (17:2)). For a human being can will good; but the will is prepared by the Lord (See Prov 8:35 LXX); but toward evil, vitiated, it willingly inclines, on account of which nature is to be healed.
JulianImp.2.6II. 7. Iulianus. Vanos vero hominum haereticosque sermones, qui asserant Deum iustum ad bonum opus liberum hominem condidisse, et esse in uniuscuiusque potestate recedere a malo, ac studiis splendere virtutis, ut his qui flagitia in necessitatem carnis refundunt, sollicitudinum et timorum aculeus infigatur.
II. 7. Julian. But that the discourses of men, and heretical ones, which assert that the just God founded a human being free for good work, and that it is in the power of each one to recede from evil, and to shine with the pursuits of virtue, so that into those who refer disgraceful deeds to the necessity of the flesh the goad of anxieties and fears may be driven.
JulianImp.2.7Augustinus. Non dicimus hominum vanos haereticosque sermones, qui asserunt Deum iustum ad bonum opus liberum hominem condidisse. Talem quippe Adam condidit, in quo fuimus omnes; sed peccando perdidit se, et omnes in se. Unde nunc non est in potestate filiorum hominis a malo liberari, nisi gratia Dei det potestatem filios Dei fieri . Propter hoc, non his qui flagitia, sicut dicis, in necessitatem carnis refundunt; sed his qui ut in tentationes flagitiorum non inferantur, preces Deo fundunt, figitur aculeus sollicitudinis et timoris, ne consentiant superbissimis et Deo ingratissimis disputationibus vestris.
Augustine. We do not say that the discourses of men, and heretical ones, are those which assert that the just God founded a human being free for good work. For such he founded Adam, in whom we all were; but by sinning he ruined himself, and all in himself. Whence now it is not in the power of the sons of man to be freed from evil, unless the grace of God give the power to become sons of God (See John 1:12). On account of this, not into those who, as you say, refer disgraceful deeds to the necessity of the flesh; but into those who pour out prayers to God that they may not be led into the temptations of disgraceful deeds, the goad of anxiety and fear is driven, lest they consent to your most proud and most ungrateful-to-God disputations.
JulianImp.2.7II. 8. Iulianus. Postremo, in Ecclesiis quae magnum honorem et magnum populum possideant, praedicari tantam vim esse peccati, ut ante membrorum formam, ante initium adventumque animae, iactis seminibus supervolans, in secretum matris invadat, et reos faciat nascituros, ortuque ipso antiquior exspectet culpa substantiam; quae lex peccati habitans deinceps in membris, captivum hominem cogat servire criminibus, non castigatione in turpitudinibus, sed misericordia digniorem; quandoquidem quod nos vitia pravae voluntatis esse dicimus, id in Ecclesia a viris et feminis magnisque pontificibus originalis passio nuncupatur.
II. 8. Julian. Finally, that in the Churches which possess great honor and a great people, it is preached that there is so great a force of sin that, before the form of the members, before the beginning and the coming of the soul, hovering over the seeds once cast, it invades the secret place of the mother, and makes guilty those about to be born, and the fault, older than the very origin, awaits the substance; which law of sin, dwelling thereafter in the members, compels the captive human being to serve crimes, more worthy, in his disgraceful deeds, not of chastisement but of mercy; since what we say to be the vices of a depraved will, this in the Church is named, by men and women and great pontiffs, an original passion.
JulianImp.2.8Augustinus. Respondet tibi Ambrosius pontifex magnus, haeresiarchae vestri excellenter ore laudatus, et dicit: Male Eva parturivit, ut partus relinqueret mulieribus haereditatem, atque unusquisque concupiscentiae voluptate concretus, et genitalibus visceribus infusus, et coagulatus in sanguine, in pannis involutus, prius subiret delictorum contagium, quam vitalis spiritus munus hauriret . Sananda est itaque, Iuliane, humana, Deo miserante, natura; non, te inaniter declamante, tamquam sana laudanda.
Augustine. The great pontiff Ambrose, praised excellently by the mouth of your heresiarch, answers you, and says: Eve gave birth badly, so that the birth might leave to women an inheritance, and each one, concreted by the pleasure of concupiscence, and poured into the genital viscera, and curdled in blood, wrapped in swaddling clothes, would undergo the contagion of offenses before he drew the gift of the life-giving spirit. Human nature, then, Julian, is to be healed, with God having mercy; not, while you vainly declaim, to be praised as though sound.
JulianImp.2.8II. 9. Iulianus. Haec ergo Manichaeorum scorta dogmatum impurissimorum lenocinantur auribus.
II. 9. Julian. These harlots of the Manichees, then, pander to the ears with their most impure teachings.
JulianImp.2.9Augustinus. Ambrosium, si audes, criminare Manichaeum. Attende in quem dicas, quod vis videri tamquam in me dicere; et si ullus tibi vel Dei timor, vel humanus pudor est, conticesce. Me oportet cum talibus tua convicia, non solum patienter, verum etiam gratulanter audire; sed tu debes in talibus lacerandis et humana erubescere et divina iudicia formidare.
Augustine. Accuse Ambrose, if you dare, of being a Manichee. Attend to whom you say what you wish to seem to say against me; and if you have any fear of God, or human shame, be silent. It befits me to hear your revilings, along with such men, not only patiently, but even gladly; but you ought, in tearing at such men, both to blush at human judgments and to dread the divine.
JulianImp.2.9II. 10. Iulianus. Haec in utroque sexu positos inimicos nostros urtica commovit, quae olim quidem vitio malae consuetudinis mordax, tamen exhortationum salutarium velut quibusdam curabatur unguentis.
II. 10. Julian. This nettle has stirred up our enemies placed in both sexes, which, once indeed biting by the vice of an evil habit, was nevertheless cured, as by certain ointments, by salutary exhortations.
JulianImp.2.10Augustinus. Urtica pungente prurit, sed qui libidinem laudat. Si autem propter malam consuetudinem, sicut sapis, clamat homo: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago ; certe vel in isto fatemini humanam voluntatem vires bonorum operum perdidisse, cui nisi divinae gratiae subveniat adiutorium, quid ei prodest copiosum et ornatum cuiuslibet exhortantis eloquium?
Augustine. He itches at the stinging nettle who praises lust. But if, on account of an evil habit, as you hold, a human being cries out: I do not do the good that I will, but the evil that I will not, this I do (See Rom 7:19); certainly even in this one you confess that the human will has lost the strength for good works, to whom, unless the help of divine grace come to his aid, what does the copious and adorned eloquence of any exhorter profit?
JulianImp.2.10II. 11. Iulianus. At nunc, postquam pro medicamine coepit offerri, et delectationi accessit auctoritas, ut consensu pene mundi, membripotens regina mentium, expugnatrix honestatis, et invicta animorum omnium captivatrix turpitudo baccharetur; nobis quanto honestior, tanto durior tuendae veritatis causa facta est. Quia contra praecipites populos et suis remediis infensos, non multum valet raritas oratione medicantium. Quid igitur? Horumne intuitu, receptui canere debebimus, et contumelias nostras ultum ire silentio, ac de conscientiae portu aliorum ridere naufragia? Verum contradicit huic odio, primo benignitas quam generi debemus humano; deinceps spes et fides, quam habemus in Deum, qui extra id quod frequenter desperatas temporum levavit ruinas; constantiam tamen quam usque ad mortis horam exerceri voluit, etiamsi nullus in praesentiarum sequeretur effectus, aeterna remuneratione donavit.
II. 11. Julian. But now, after it began to be offered in place of a medicine, and authority was added to delight, so that, by the consent of nearly the world, that member-mighty queen of minds, the assailer of honesty, and the unconquered captivator of all souls, baseness, runs riot; the cause of defending the truth has become, the more honorable, the harder for us. Because against headlong peoples, hostile to their own remedies, the rarity of those healing by speech does not avail much. What then? In view of these, ought we to sound the retreat, and avenge our insults by silence, and from the harbor of conscience laugh at the shipwrecks of others? But against this hatred there contradicts, first, the benignity which we owe to the human race; then the hope and faith which we have in God, who, besides that he has frequently lifted up the despaired ruins of the times, has yet, by an eternal reward, granted the constancy which he wished to be exercised up to the hour of death, even if no result followed at present.
JulianImp.2.11Augustinus. Quomodo levat Deus ruinas malarum voluntatum (per quas utique tempora vituperantur, quando recte vituperantur), nisi bonas voluntates operando in cordibus hominum? Aut si possunt, ipsae se levent, sicut dementissime sentiendo, magna ruina facti estis. Unde pro vobis ipsum rogamus, atque utinam sic etiam de te, quemadmodum de fratre Turbantio, nos exaudire dignetur .
Augustine. How does God lift up the ruins of evil wills (by which certainly the times are blamed, when they are rightly blamed), except by working good wills in the hearts of human beings? Or if they can, let them lift themselves up, as you, by holding a most demented opinion, have become a great ruin. Whence we pray for you to him, and would that he might deign to hear us about you as well, just as about your brother Turbantius.
JulianImp.2.11II. 12. Iulianus. Hac igitur fidei consolatione gaudentes immineamus coepto operi, et disputationum promissa reddamus; non ambigentes hoc ipsum maximam esse praemii partem, quia in eius dogmatis arce constitimus, quod cum tam multorum livor, sed plurium error oppugnet; tamen ita supra casus evasit ancipites, ut invincibilis cluat possessione victoriae.
II. 12. Julian. Rejoicing, then, in this consolation of faith, let us press on with the work begun, and render the promises of our disputations; not doubting that this very thing is the greatest part of the reward, that we have stood firm in the citadel of that teaching which, although the envy of so many, but the error of more, assails it; yet has so escaped above the doubtful chances that it is renowned by the possession of an invincible victory.
JulianImp.2.12Augustinus. Ipse tibi das palmam contra tot antistites Dei, qui ante nos, ea quae oppugnas, in Ecclesia Christi didicerunt, atque docuerunt, bibentes et ministrantes de fontibus Israel . Hoc ergo quod facis, non est victoriae possessione cluere, sed in odiosae arrogantiae cloacam deformiter fluere. Cluere quippe, pollere est; quomodo autem potes victoriae possessione pollere, qui conaris catholica dogmata, antiqua et invicta polluere?
Augustine. You give yourself the palm against so many bishops of God, who, before us, learned and taught in the Church of Christ the things you assail, drinking and ministering from the founts of Israel (See Ps 68:26 (67:27)). This which you do, then, is not to be renowned by the possession of victory, but to flow deformedly into the sewer of hateful arrogance. For to be renowned is to be strong; but how can you be strong by the possession of victory, who try to pollute catholic teachings, ancient and unconquered?
JulianImp.2.12II. 13. Iulianus. Nam si, ut et superior sermo patefecit, et secuturus docebit, quidquid ratio est, quidquid eruditio, quidquid iustitia, quidquid pietas, quidquid testimoniorum sacrorum, huic quod tuemur dogmati suffragatur; nihil aliud inimici nostri toto adipiscuntur conatu, quam ut doctis quibusque impudentissimi, sanctis contumacissimi, in Deum profanissimi comprobentur.
II. 13. Julian. For if, as both the earlier discourse made plain, and the one to follow will teach, whatever is reason, whatever erudition, whatever justice, whatever piety, whatever of the sacred testimonies, supports this teaching which we uphold; our enemies obtain by their whole effort nothing other than that they be proved, to all the learned, most shameless; to the saints, most obstinate; toward God, most profane.
JulianImp.2.13Augustinus. Sed falsa loqueris: nam neque ratio, neque sana eruditio, neque iustitia, neque pietas, neque sacra Testimonia vestro dogmati suffragantur; immo, haec omnia, sicut hi qui recte intellegunt iudicant, vestrum dogma subvertunt. Ratio quippe cernit vix ad aliquid veri se posse pervenire, tarditate impediente naturae; eruditio poenam laboris habet in eadem tarditate naturae; iustitia clamat non ad se pertinere, ut Adam filii gravi iugo premantur a die exitus de ventre matris suae , sine ullo merito peccatorum; pietas adversus hoc malum, divinum poscit auxilium; sacra Testimonia, ut hoc fiat, humanum admonent animum.
Augustine. But you speak false things: for neither reason, nor sound erudition, nor justice, nor piety, nor the sacred Testimonies support your teaching; rather, all these, as those who understand rightly judge, subvert your teaching. For reason discerns that it can scarcely arrive at anything true, with the slowness of nature hindering; erudition has the punishment of labor in that same slowness of nature; justice cries out that it does not pertain to it that the sons of Adam be pressed by a heavy yoke from the day of their going out from their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1), without any deserving of sins; piety asks the divine help against this evil; the sacred Testimonies admonish the human mind that this may come about.
JulianImp.2.13II. 14. Iulianus. Et quidem quam nihil habeant Traduciani, quod vi qua proteruntur, rationis opponant, ut alia eorum scripta, ita hi, contra quos agimus, testantur libelli, qui directi ad militarem virum (quod etiam ipse profiteri potest), aliis magis negotiis quam litteris occupatum, impotentiae contra nos precantur auxilium, ac pro se sursum deorsum plebicularum, aut ruralium, aut theatralium scita commendant, quae quo sint promulgata consilio, historia nulla commemorat.
II. 14. Julian. And indeed, how nothing the Traducianists have to oppose to the force by which they are crushed, the force of reason, both their other writings testify, and so do these little books against which we are dealing, which, directed to a military man (which he himself too can profess), occupied with other affairs rather than with letters, beg the help of violence against us, and on their own behalf commend up and down the decrees of the little common folk, or the rural, or the theatrical people, by what counsel they were promulgated no history records.
JulianImp.2.14Augustinus. Non impotentiae contra vos precamur auxilium; sed pro vobis potius, ut ab ausu sacrilego cohibeamini, christianae potentiae laudamus officium. Vide sane quemadmodum rurales et theatrales dicas, Cyprianum, et Ambrosium, et tot eruditos in regno Dei scribas, socios eorum.
Augustine. We do not beg the help of violence against you; but rather, on your behalf, that you may be restrained from your sacrilegious daring, we praise the office of Christian power. See indeed how you call rural and theatrical men Cyprian, and Ambrose, and so many scribes learned in the kingdom of God, their associates.
JulianImp.2.14II. 15. Iulianus. Illud tamen nequaquam inficiari possumus, quod plurimum, ut dixi, turbis placeat, luteis tamen delicta voluntatis imputare naturae, et infamatione seminum morum petulantiam vindicare; ut numquam quis emendare conetur, quod sperat in se ipso alterum perpetrare.
II. 15. Julian. Yet this we can in no way deny, that it pleases the crowds very much, as I said, to impute to nature the offenses of the will of muddy men, and to vindicate the petulance of morals by defaming the seeds; so that no one ever tries to amend what he hopes another perpetrates in himself.
JulianImp.2.15Augustinus. Quis tibi dixit, quod alter perpetret peccatum cuiusquam? Quandoquidem etiam ille qui dicit: Iam non ego operor illud, sed id quod in me habitat peccatum; continuo subiciens: Scio enim quia non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum ; ostendit suum esse, quidquid illud est; quia et ipsa caro ad eum pertinet, qui ex carne constat et spiritu. Et tamen non vis cum Ambrosio sapere, quod hoc malum quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, praevaricatione primi hominis in naturam verterit . Sed et tu cum dicere soleas in his apostolicis verbis violentiam malae consuetudinis exprimi, quid est, quod modo dicere voluisti: Ut numquam quis emendare conetur, quod scit in se alterum perpetrare? Cum velis utique se ipsum emendare eum qui dicit: Non ego operor illud; et hoc velis fieri viribus propriae voluntatis; cum videas quam sit voluntas eius infirma qui dicit: Non quod volo, ago . Istum saltem, quaeso, permittite divinum poscere auxilium, in quo defecisse cernitis suae voluntatis arbitrium.
Augustine. Who told you that another perpetrates anyone's sin? Since even he who says: It is now no longer I who work it, but the sin that dwells in me; immediately subjoining: For I know that there does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh, the good (Rom 7:17-18); shows that, whatever it is, it is his own; because the flesh itself too pertains to him who consists of flesh and spirit. And yet you are unwilling to think with Ambrose that this evil, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, turned into nature through the transgression of the first man. But you too, since you are wont to say that in these apostolic words the violence of an evil habit is expressed, what is it that you just now wished to say: So that no one ever tries to amend what he knows another perpetrates in himself? When you certainly wish him to amend himself who says: It is not I who work it; and wish this to be done by the powers of his own will; when you see how weak is the will of him who says: I do not do what I will (Rom 7:15). This one at least, I beg, allow to ask the divine help, in whom you discern that the choice of his own will has failed.
JulianImp.2.15II. 16. Iulianus. Verum imbecillum caecae opinionis patrocinium multiplicat peccata, non minuit. Hic igitur miserorum pruritus et sponte aegrescentium, nullum contra ipsam rationem valebit pondus afferre; sed quia nonnullis Scripturarum locis, et maxime apostoli Pauli sermonibus confirmari asserunt naturale peccatum, quorum expositionem in secundum volumen distuli, eiusque reddendae tempus est; breviter prius (ut fiat lector instructior), et quae sint acta, et quae sint agenda distinguam. Ostensum est ergo, nihil posse per sanctas Scripturas probari, quod iustitia non possit tueri; quia si in lege Dei est perfecta forma iustitiae, nihil per eam adversaria eius, id est, iniustitia sinitur virtutis acquirere; ac per hoc, quod ratio arguit, non potest auctoritas vindicare. Deinde probatum est, Deum nobis notum esse virtutibus; huius ergo iustitiam ut omnipotentiam confitendam; cuius si admittatur excidium, maiestas incipiet tota nutare; quia ita Deus iustus est, ut si probaretur iustus non esse, convinceretur Deus non esse; conclusumque est, nos Deum aequissimum in Trinitate venerari; et irrefutabiliter apparuit, non posse ab eo peccatum alienum parvulis imputari.
II. 16. Julian. But the feeble patronage of a blind opinion multiplies sins, does not lessen them. This itch, then, of the wretched and of those falling sick of their own accord, will be able to bring no weight against reason itself; but because they assert that natural sin is confirmed by some passages of the Scriptures, and especially by the discourses of the apostle Paul, the exposition of which I deferred to the second volume, and the time has come for rendering it; first I will briefly distinguish (that the reader may be made more instructed) both what has been done and what is to be done. It has been shown, then, that nothing can be proved through the holy Scriptures which justice cannot uphold; because if in the law of God is the perfect form of justice, nothing is allowed through it to its adversary, that is, injustice, to acquire of virtue; and through this, what reason convicts, authority cannot vindicate. Then it has been proved that God is known to us by his virtues; that his justice, then, like his omnipotence, must be confessed; whose destruction, if it be admitted, the whole majesty will begin to totter; because God is so just that, if he were proved not to be just, he would be convicted not to be God; and it was concluded that we venerate a most equitable God in the Trinity; and it appeared irrefutably that another's sin cannot be imputed by him to little ones.
JulianImp.2.16Augustinus. Quare non fateris ab omnipotente iusto grave iugum super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum, sine ullo peccati merito non potuisse constitui?
Augustine. Why do you not confess that a heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam from the day of their going out from their mother's womb could not have been established by the almighty just one without any deserving of sin?
JulianImp.2.16II. 17. Iulianus. Sed ut de definitione iustitiae, ita etiam de peccati conditione dissertum est, quod peccatum apparuit nihil esse aliud quam malam voluntatem, cui esset liberum ab eo, quod prave appetiverat, abstinere.
II. 17. Julian. But as about the definition of justice, so also about the condition of sin it was discoursed, that sin appeared to be nothing other than an evil will, to which it was free to abstain from that which it had depravedly desired.
JulianImp.2.17Augustinus. Hoc est omnino peccatum primi hominis, unde in homines mali origo descendit. Ei quippe valde liberum fuit, ab eo quod prave appetiverat abstinere; quia nondum erat vitium, quo caro concupisceret adversus spiritum; nondum dicebat: Non quod volo, ago ; nondum positus in carne peccati ullum necessarium habebat auxilium de similitudine carnis peccati.
Augustine. This is altogether the sin of the first man, whence the origin of evil descended into human beings. For to him it was very free to abstain from that which he had depravedly desired; because there was not yet the vice by which the flesh lusts against the spirit; he did not yet say: I do not do what I will (Rom 7:15); not yet placed in the flesh of sin, he had no necessary help from the likeness of the flesh of sin.
JulianImp.2.17II. 18. Iulianus. Ac per hoc illustrissimo testimonio perdoctum est, in nascentibus non esse peccatum, quod in his usus voluntatis non poterat inveniri.
II. 18. Julian. And through this it was thoroughly taught, by a most illustrious testimony, that in those being born there is no sin, since the use of the will could not be found in them.
JulianImp.2.18Augustinus. Et unde grave iugum, nisi quia ita non habent voluntatis usum, ut obnoxiae tamen habeant originis vinculum?
Augustine. And whence the heavy yoke, except because they so do not have the use of the will that they nevertheless have the bond of a guilty origin?
JulianImp.2.18II. 19. Iulianus. Liberum autem arbitrium negari ab his, qui dicunt peccata esse naturalia, lucida est disputatione monstratum. Quod quidem Poenus, non suo sermone, ne minus ponderis haberet, sed Evangelii testimonio, quasi auctoratius, denegavit, quod nos exponendo, evangelicae reddidimus dignitati. Apostoli quoque Pauli testimonium laqueis calumniatoris exemimus, et bonorum vasorum figulum Deum nostrum esse omnium conditorem, Propheta teste monstravimus.
II. 19. Julian. But that free choice is denied by those who say that sins are natural, was shown by a lucid disputation. Which indeed the Punic man denied, not by his own discourse, lest it have less weight, but by the testimony of the Gospel, as if more authoritatively; which we, by expounding, restored to evangelical dignity. The testimony of the apostle Paul too we took from the snares of the calumniator, and showed, with the Prophet as witness, that our God, the potter of good vessels, is the founder of all.
JulianImp.2.19Augustinus. Illic tibi responsum est, et quantum aberraveris a veritate monstratum.
Augustine. There you were answered, and it was shown how far you wandered from the truth.
JulianImp.2.19II. 20. Iulianus. His igitur maxime actis in primo libro, quorum unum aliquod abunde sufficit ad victoriam veritatis; ex abundanti quidem, superest tamen, ut Magistri Gentium, qua per unum hominem peccatum dixit intrasse in mundum , sententiam disputemus; et definitionibus, quas praemisimus, cum necesse fuerit, adiuvandi; et probaturi nihil rationem fuisse mentitam; sed iniustitiae esse crimen, aliorum studia aliorum ortibus imputare; hocque ipsum quod iniquum est, quamvis nemo hinc dubitare debuerit, tamen Deo displicere, et ab eodem prohiberi, testimoniis legis, vel in hoc libro, vel in sequenti docebimus. Ex quibus necessario conficitur, et nos rectissime defendere, neminem cum peccato nasci, et Deum reos non posse iudicare nascentes; ac per hoc, tam integrum esse liberum arbitrium, quam ante voluntatis propriae usum innoxiam in unoquoque naturam.
II. 20. Julian. These things, then, having been chiefly done in the first book—of which any one alone abundantly suffices for the victory of truth—out of abundance indeed, it yet remains that we dispute the statement of the Teacher of the Gentiles, by which he said that through one man sin entered the world (See Rom 5:12); both to be helped by the definitions which we premised, when it shall be necessary; and about to prove that reason lied in nothing; but that it is a crime of injustice to impute the pursuits of some to the origins of others; and that this very thing which is unjust—although no one ought to doubt about it—yet displeases God, and is forbidden by him, we will teach by the testimonies of the law, either in this book or in the following. From which it is necessarily concluded both that we most rightly defend that no one is born with sin, and that God cannot judge those being born guilty; and through this, that free choice is as whole as the nature, harmless in each one before the use of his own will.
JulianImp.2.20Augustinus. Dic, videamus, quod de Apostoli testimonio dicturus es, tam inaniter, quam superiora dixisti.
Augustine. Say, let us see, what you are going to say about the testimony of the Apostle, as emptily as you have said the earlier things.
JulianImp.2.20II. 21. Iulianus. Manichaeos autem et pietati et rationi rebelles, qui putent et ante tempus voluntatis esse peccatum, quod rerum natura non sinit; et Deum esse, quem argumentantur iniustum; et infamare sanctas Paginas, quarum monumentis probari allegant crimen divinitatis; quod cum ex tribus nihil queat ratione monstrari, id est, nec sine voluntate peccatum, nec in Deo iniquitas, nec in lege perversitas; soli illi stulti, impudentes et impii demonstrentur.
II. 21. Julian. But the Manichees, rebels both to piety and to reason, who think both that there is sin before the time of the will, which the nature of things does not allow; and that God, whom they argue against, is unjust; and to defame the holy Pages, by whose monuments they allege the crime of divinity is proved; since of these three nothing can be shown by reason, that is, neither sin without will, nor injustice in God, nor perversity in the law—let them alone be shown stupid, shameless, and impious.
JulianImp.2.21Augustinus. Erubesce: non fuit Ambrosius Manichaeus, cum diceret hominem prius subire delictorum contagium, quam vitalis spiritus munus haurire , sed nec ista delicta, nisi ex voluntate exstiterunt, unde originem trahunt; et ideo nec in Deo est iniquitas, qui propter hoc posuit nascentibus grave iugum; nec in lege perversitas, in qua hoc discitur esse verissimum; quod et ipsi videretis, nisi vos potius perversos oculos haberetis.
Augustine. Blush: Ambrose was not a Manichee, when he said that a human being undergoes the contagion of offenses before he draws the gift of the life-giving spirit; but these offenses too came forth only from the will, whence they draw their origin; and therefore there is neither injustice in God, who on account of this set a heavy yoke upon those being born; nor perversity in the law, in which this is learned to be most true; which you yourselves too would see, unless you rather had perverse eyes.
JulianImp.2.21II. 22. Iulianus. Haereat igitur hoc maxime prudentis animo lectoris, omnibus Scripturis sacris solum illud, quod in honorem Dei Catholici sapiunt, contineri, sicut frequentium sententiarum luce illustratur; et sicubi durior elocutio moverit quaestionem, certum quidem esse, non ibi id, quod iniustum est, loci illius auctorem sapuisse; secundum id autem debere intellegi, quod et ratio perspicua, et aliorum locorum, in quibus non est ambiguitas, splendor aperuerit. Iam igitur eius cum quo agimus verba ponamus. Equidem in illo capite dictorum suorum, quod usque ad figulum peccatorum Deum suum adduxerat, contra quod libro superiore confliximus, tenuiter dixit, per unum hominem peccatum intrasse in mundum; non est autem in expositione loci ipsius immoratus. Postquam vero multis verbis contra illa excerpta, quae ad se confirmat missa, disseruit, pervenit ad aliquem dictorum meorum locum, quem sibi quasi oppugnaturus obiecit; sed nihil secundum id quod fuerat pulsatus referens, ad hanc Apostoli sententiam convolavit, in qua dicit, per unum hominem peccatum intrasse in mundum; et secundum dogma suum, contextum loci ipsius exponere molitus est; propter quod ego, praetermissis aliis, ad eam properavi partem, ut quia me promiseram hanc esse quaestionem in secundo volumine soluturum , et fidem promissionis implerem, et argumentatio illius quae esset ostenderem, ne putarer fecisse fraudem, si illius expositione suppressa, eam quam catholicam fatemur inferrem.
II. 22. Julian. Let this, then, cling especially to the mind of the prudent reader, that in all the sacred Scriptures only that is contained which the Catholics understand to the honor of God, as is illustrated by the light of frequent statements; and if anywhere a harder expression has raised a question, it is indeed certain that the author of that passage did not there understand that which is unjust; but that it ought to be understood according to that which both clear reason, and the splendor of other passages, in which there is no ambiguity, has disclosed. Now, then, let us set down the words of him with whom we are dealing. Indeed, in that chapter of his sayings, which he had carried as far as the potter, God of sinners, against which we contended in the earlier book, he said slightly that through one man sin entered the world; but he did not linger over the exposition of the passage itself. But after he had discoursed in many words against those excerpts which he asserts were sent to him, he came to some passage of my sayings, which he objected to himself as if about to assail it; but, replying nothing according to that by which he had been struck, he flew to this statement of the Apostle, in which he says that through one man sin entered the world; and according to his own teaching he tried to expound the context of the passage itself; on account of which I, with other things passed over, hastened to that part, so that, because I had promised that I would solve this question in the second volume, I might both fulfill the faith of the promise and show what his argumentation was, lest I be thought to have committed fraud, if, with his exposition suppressed, I introduced that which we confess to be catholic.
JulianImp.2.22Augustinus. Pelagianam illaturus es, non catholicam. Catholica illa est, quae ostendit iustum Deum in tot ac tantis poenis et cruciatibus parvulorum; quos in paradiso ullus eorum nulla aequitate sentiret, si natura humana vitiata peccato, et merito damnata non esset.
Augustine. You are about to introduce the Pelagian, not the catholic. The catholic is that which shows God just in so many and so great punishments and torments of little ones; which none of them would feel in paradise by any equity, if human nature were not vitiated by sin, and deservedly damned.
JulianImp.2.22II. 23. Iulianus. Retractans igitur in primo opere meo sententiam eius, qua dixerat: Nam sicut peccatum, sive hinc, sive inde trahatur a parvulis, opus est diaboli; sic homo, sive hinc, sive inde nascatur, opus est Dei ; ita autem a me nunc hic refertur, sicut in meo opere continetur, unde maximam partem fuerat iste furatus.
II. 23. Julian. Treating, then, in my first work, of his statement, by which he had said: For as sin, whether drawn from this side or from that by little ones, is the work of the devil; so a human being, whether born from this side or from that, is the work of God; it is here reported by me now thus, as it is contained in my work, from which this man had stolen the greatest part.
JulianImp.2.23Augustinus. Sic vera disputas, quomodo verum est quod ego illa furatus sim; cum potius ille cuius chartula mihi missa est, quod voluit atque ut voluit, ex opere tuo, arbitrio suo iudicioque transtulerit.
Augustine. You dispute as truly as it is true that I stole those things; when rather he to whom the little sheet was sent to me transferred what he wished and as he wished, from your work, by his own choice and judgment.
JulianImp.2.23II. 24. Iulianus. Respondi ergo ibi: Tu quidem (pace magisterii tui dixerim) tergiversaris, sed intellege quod ademerit tibi veritas licentiam pervagandi. Ecce enim et nos acquiescimus, quia peccatum opus est malae voluntatis, vel opus est diaboli; sed per quid hoc peccatum invenitur in parvulo? Per voluntatem? At nulla in eo fuit. Per formam corporis? Sed hanc Deus tribuit. Per ingressum animae? Sed nihil debet semini corporali, quae nova a Deo conditur. Per nuptias? Sed hae pertinent ad opus parentum, quos in hoc actu non peccasse praemiseras; quod si non vere id concesseras, sicut processus tui sermonis indicat, ipsae sunt exsecrandae, quae causam fecerunt mali. Verum illae substantiam propriam non habent; sed nomine suo personarum opus indicant; parentes igitur, qui conventu suo causam fecere peccato, iure damnabiles. Ambigi ergo iam non potest, coniuges aeterno supplicio mancipari, quorum labore actum est, ut ad dominatum exercendum in homines diabolus perveniret. Quod si concesseris; illud totum quod antea tenuisse videbaris, amittes, id est, quod hominem Dei opus dixeras. Necessario quippe sequitur, quia per commixtionem corporum origo progenitis est, si per originem malum in hominibus, per malum ius diaboli in homines, diabolum esse auctorem hominum, a quo est origo nascentium . Post quae ipsius denuo verba repetivi: Nam sicut peccatum, sive hinc, sive inde trahatur, opus est diaboli; sic homo, sive hinc, sive inde nascatur, opus est Dei. Ac protinus insurrexi hoc modo: Cum illam vocem timoris tui cogito, qua dicis nuptias malum non esse, istos alios sermones tuos sine risu considerare non possum. Si enim credis a Deo homines fieri, et esse coniuges innocentes, vide quam stare non possit, trahi ex his originale peccatum. Certe non peccat iste qui nascitur, non peccat ille qui genuit, non peccat ille qui condidit; per quas rimas, inter tot praesidia innocentiae, peccatum fingis ingressum?
II. 24. Julian. I answered, then, there: You indeed (I will say it with the peace of your magisterium) shuffle, but understand that the truth has taken from you the license to roam about. For behold, we too agree that sin is the work of an evil will, or is the work of the devil; but through what is this sin found in a little one? Through the will? But there was none in him. Through the form of the body? But this God bestowed. Through the entrance of the soul? But it owes nothing to the corporeal seed, which is created new by God. Through marriage? But this pertains to the work of the parents, whom you had premised did not sin in this act; but if you had not truly conceded this, as the course of your discourse indicates, they themselves are to be execrated, who made the cause of the evil. But they have no substance of their own; but by their name indicate the work of persons; the parents, then, who by their union made the cause of sin, are by right damnable. It can, then, no longer be doubted that spouses are handed over to eternal punishment, by whose labor it was brought about that the devil came to exercise dominion over human beings. But if you concede this; you will lose all that you seemed before to have held, that is, that you had said a human being is the work of God. For it necessarily follows that, since through the union of bodies there is an origin for those begotten, if through origin there is evil in human beings, through evil the right of the devil over human beings, the devil is the author of human beings, by whom is the origin of those being born. After which I again repeated his words: For as sin, whether drawn from this side or from that, is the work of the devil; so a human being, whether born from this side or from that, is the work of God. And straightway I rose up in this manner: When I consider that voice of your fear, by which you say that marriage is not an evil, I cannot consider these other discourses of yours without laughter. For if you believe that human beings are made by God, and that spouses are innocent, see how it cannot stand that original sin is drawn from them. Certainly this one who is born does not sin, that one who begot does not sin, that one who founded does not sin; through what cracks, among so many defenses of innocence, do you imagine sin has entered?
JulianImp.2.24Augustinus. Iam his verbis tuis, etiam cum ipsos libros tuos legissem, respondisse me sufficit . Verum et hic admoneo, Apostolum potius audiendum esse, quam te, qui non occultam rimam, sed apertissimam ianuam demonstravit, qua peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt ; quae verba eius, cum secundum vos, non secundum ipsum, exponere coeperis, tunc apparebit cui rectitudini veritatis loquacitate tortuosissima relucteris.
Augustine. It is enough that I have already answered these words of yours, even when I had read your very books. But here too I admonish that the Apostle is rather to be heard than you, who showed not a hidden crack, but a most open door, by which sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12); which words of his, when you have begun to expound according to yourselves, not according to him, then it will appear against what rectitude of truth you struggle with most tortuous loquacity.
JulianImp.2.24II. 25. Iulianus. Hunc ergo de opere meo priore contextum, in hoc secundo libro suo sibi, licet cum interpolatione, proposuit . Nam et commemoratam a me formationem corporis, et ingressum animae, quam novam in unoquoque a Deo conditam, tam ratio, quam legis sacrae Ecclesiaeque catholicae confirmat auctoritas, ut spero, arte praeteriit.
II. 25. Julian. This context, then, from my earlier work, he proposed to himself in this second book of his, though with interpolation. For both the formation of the body mentioned by me, and the entrance of the soul—which both reason and the authority of the sacred law and of the catholic Church confirms to be created new in each one by God—he passed over, as I hope, by artifice.
JulianImp.2.25Augustinus. Qui legit sex libros meos, quibus refutavi quattuor tuos, de quorum primo quae voluit, et sicut voluit, ille decerpsit, cui respondi in libro isto, quem nunc frustra redarguere loquacissima vanitate conaris; sic me tibi in tertio meo respondisse reperiet, ut videat, non me arte praeterisse quod dicis; sed illum potius, cuius chartulae respondebam, hoc de opere tuo noluisse transferre, sive studio brevitatis, sive quia pertinere non putavit ad causam.
Augustine. Whoever reads my six books, by which I refuted your four—from the first of which that man excerpted what he wished, and as he wished, to whom I responded in this book, which you now try in vain to refute with most loquacious vanity—will find that I so answered you in my third that he may see that I did not by artifice pass over what you say; but rather that he, to whose little sheet I was responding, was unwilling to transfer this from your work, either out of zeal for brevity, or because he did not think it pertained to the case.
JulianImp.2.25II. 26. Iulianus. Iam reliqua, licet aliquibus sermonibus variata, contexuit. Contra has ergo obiectiones meas nihil quo repercuterer excogitavit; sed verum me collegisse, argumentandi inopia confessus, dicit mihi ad haec omnia Apostolum respondere debere, qui pronuntiet, per unum hominem peccatum intrasse in hunc mundum. In quo loco, quis eum eruditus sanum habuisse caput aestimet, qui non intellexerit aut praetereunda sibi esse, contra quae nihil poterat invenire, aut quaecumque excogitanda, quae referret obiectis, ad quorum confirmationem Apostoli verba coniungeret?
II. 26. Julian. Now the rest, though varied by some discourses, he wove together. Against these objections of mine, then, he devised nothing by which he might strike me back; but, confessing by his lack of arguing that I had gathered the truth, he says that to all these things the Apostle ought to answer me, who declares that through one man sin entered this world. In which place, what learned man would think that he had a sound head, who did not understand that he must either pass over the things against which he could find nothing, or devise whatever things he might reply to my objections, to whose confirmation he might join the words of the Apostle?
JulianImp.2.26Augustinus. Sed melius verbis apostolicis refelleris quam meis, nec tamen et apostolicis cedis; sed mavis etiam ipsa pervertere, quam te corrigere.
Augustine. But you are better refuted by the apostolic words than by mine, nor yet do you yield even to the apostolic ones; but you prefer to pervert these too, rather than correct yourself.
JulianImp.2.26II. 27. Iulianus. Quaesivi ergo consequentissime, ut omnis mecum eruditio recognoscat, peccatum quod opus est malae voluntatis, et opus diaboli dicitur, per quid inveniretur in parvulo, si per voluntatem; at nullam in eo fuisse, etiam hic, cum quo agimus, confitetur, si per nuptias; sed has pertinere ad opus parentum, nemo qui dubitet, quos in hac commixtione non peccasse praemiserat ; aut si concessionis huius paeniteret disputatorem, sicut processus operis indicabat; profiteretur esse reos parentes, quorum conventu regnum in imaginem Dei diabolo pararetur; et addidi necessariis disputationum gradibus, per originale peccatum auctorem corporum diabolum definiri; quia si per originem malum in hominibus, per malum ius diaboli in homines; diabolus est auctor hominum, a quo est origo nascentium. Quae quoniam in antro Manichaeorum Traducianos esse clusura deprehenderat; verti clavem, ut praeberem captis effugium, admonuique ut, si vere a Deo crederet homines fieri, pureque confiteretur esse coniuges innocentes, intellegeret trahi non posse ex his originale peccatum. Certe non peccat, inquam, iste qui nascitur, non peccat ille qui genuit, non peccat iste qui condidit; per quas rimas, inter tot praesidia innocentiae, peccatum fingis ingressum? Quid potuit, rogo, sanctius, quid verius, quid lucidius, quid brevius firmiusque componi, quam post tria sumpta quae inimico concedente susceperam, inferrem quartum, in quo erat summa conclusio? Nam cum uno nonnumquam, aut duobus sumptis, tertium necessario colligatur, qua lege mihi post tria concessa, quartum quod his adhaeret, non liceret inferre? Et hoc quidem in secunda disputatione; caeterum in priore, quinque mihi aut amplius conceduntur, post quae fit legitima invictaque conclusio.
II. 27. Julian. I asked, then, most consistently, that all erudition might recognize it with me, through what the sin—which is called the work of an evil will, and the work of the devil—was found in a little one: if through the will; but that there was none in him, even this man with whom we deal confesses; if through marriage; but that this pertains to the work of the parents, no one doubts, whom he had premised did not sin in this union; or, if the disputant repented of this concession, as the course of the work indicated; he should profess that the parents are guilty, by whose union a kingdom over the image of God was being prepared for the devil; and I added, by the necessary steps of disputations, that through original sin the devil is defined as the author of bodies; because if through origin there is evil in human beings, through evil the right of the devil over human beings; the devil is the author of human beings, by whom is the origin of those being born. Which, since it had caught the Traducianists to be shut up in the cave of the Manichees; I turned the key, that I might furnish an escape to the captives, and I admonished that, if he truly believed that human beings are made by God, and purely confessed that spouses are innocent, he should understand that original sin cannot be drawn from them. Certainly, I said, this one who is born does not sin, that one who begot does not sin, that one who founded does not sin; through what cracks, among so many defenses of innocence, do you imagine sin has entered? What, I ask, could be composed more holy, what more true, what more lucid, what more brief and firm, than that, after the three premises which I had taken up, with my enemy conceding, I should infer a fourth, in which was the sum conclusion? For since sometimes, with one or two premises, a third is necessarily gathered, by what law would it not be permitted me, after three conceded, to infer a fourth which clings to these? And this indeed in the second disputation; but in the earlier, five or more are conceded to me, after which the lawful and unconquered conclusion is made.
JulianImp.2.27Augustinus. Vide quam per multa vageris, timens ne Apostoli verba sine tuis praeiudiciis audita te damnent, sicut iam Ecclesia catholica iudicante damnarunt. Sed excurre quo volueris, remorare quantum volueris, multiplica gyros tuos quaquaversum volueris; quandocumque ad eadem verba veritatis navis fallaciarum tuarum pervenerit, sine dubio naufragabis.
Augustine. See how through how many things you wander, fearing lest the words of the Apostle, heard without your prejudgments, condemn you, as they have already condemned you with the catholic Church judging. But run wherever you will, delay as much as you will, multiply your circlings whithersoever you will; whenever the ship of your fallacies arrives at the same words of truth, without doubt you will be shipwrecked.
JulianImp.2.27II. 28. Iulianus. Iam igitur ad eum convertamur. Dederas mihi peccatum opus esse voluntatis; potui statim dicere consequenter: Voluntas autem, quae peccet, in parvulis nulla est; peccatum igitur in parvulis non est. Verum ut pluribus premereris testibus, interrogavi sensim, per quid hoc peccatum inveniretur in parvulo; ne forte per voluntatem? Post quod, te connivente, suscepi nullam in eo fuisse conscientiam voluntatis; adiunxi, ne per primam culpam membrorum lineamenta traxisset. Sed haec a Deo informari, et per hoc bona esse concesseras. Petivi tertium, utrum per ingressum animae, reatum advectum putares. Sed hanc esse novam, ne quidquam seminibus debere constabat. Intuli deinceps, ne (quia nihil tibi de his remanserat arguendum) nuptias, id est commixtionem corporum, diaboli opus vocares? Sed has pertinere ad parentum operam, te quoque annuente, monstravi. Illis igitur omnibus quae supra diximus absolutis, coniuges qui fuerant causa peccati, tradux tua diabolo mancipabat. Post quae omnia, quod tibi propinquabat impegi, ut dicerem credere te diabolum auctorem corporum, cui commixtionis operam, sine qua origo corporum esse non poterat, deputasses. Et haec quidem disputatio, quo morbo oppressus esses, ostendit; illa autem secunda, et te miserabilem cum eiusmodi sensibus, et Catholicos etiam timoris tui suffragio invictos probavit. Te enim dante, a Deo fieri homines, et esse coniuges innocentes, ac parvulos per se nihil operari; his tribus sumptis, irrefutabiliter illatum est, cum non peccat ille qui nascitur, non peccat ille qui genuit, non peccat iste qui condidit, nullam remansisse rimam, per quam peccatum doceatur ingressum. Tibi ergo si displicet quod collectum est; abnue quod dedisti, et dic aut illum peccasse qui genuit, aut illum qui condidit, aut istum qui natus est; ex quibus unum insanum est, aliud Manichaeum, tertium supra Manichaeos; insanum, si dixeris delinquere parvulos; Manichaeum, si accusaveris coniuges, supra Manichaeos, si peccati Deum aestimaris auctorem. Quod si haec omnia tam aliena sunt a vero, ut adhuc ea metuas libere confiteri; qua impudentia, homo omnium amentissime, hoc quod a nobis illatum est, persistis negare?
II. 28. Julian. Now, then, let us turn to him. You had granted me that sin is the work of the will; I could at once say consequently: But there is no will in little ones that may sin; sin, then, is not in little ones. But that you might be pressed by more witnesses, I asked step by step, through what this sin was found in a little one; perhaps through the will? After which, with you conniving, I took it that there was in him no consciousness of will; I added, lest he had drawn the lineaments of the members through the first fault. But you had conceded that these are formed by God, and through this are good. I asked, third, whether you thought guilt was brought in through the entrance of the soul. But it was established that this is new, that it owes nothing to the seeds. I brought in thereafter (because nothing remained for you to be accused of from these), lest you should call marriage, that is, the union of bodies, the work of the devil? But I showed, with you too assenting, that this pertains to the work of the parents. With all those things, then, which we said above, settled, your transmission handed over to the devil the spouses who had been the cause of sin. After all which, I drove home what was near to you, so as to say that you believe the devil to be the author of bodies, to whom you had ascribed the work of the union, without which the origin of bodies could not be. And this disputation indeed showed by what disease you were oppressed; but that second one proved both you wretched with such opinions, and the Catholics unconquered even by the support of your fear. For, you granting that human beings are made by God, and that spouses are innocent, and that little ones do nothing of themselves; with these three taken up, it was irrefutably inferred that, since he who is born does not sin, he who begot does not sin, he who founded does not sin, no crack remained through which sin may be taught to have entered. To you, then, if what was gathered displeases; deny what you granted, and say either that he who begot sinned, or he who founded, or he who was born; of which one is insane, another Manichaean, the third beyond the Manichees; insane, if you say little ones offend; Manichaean, if you accuse spouses; beyond the Manichees, if you reckon God the author of sin. But if all these are so foreign to the truth that you still fear to confess them freely; with what shamelessness, most senseless of all men, do you persist in denying this which was inferred by us?
JulianImp.2.28Augustinus. Cum ad verba Apostoli veneris, ibi non rimam invenies, sed apertissimam ianuam, qua peccatum intravit in mundum; quam conaberis quidem claudere, sed ex ore infantium atque lactentium, salvatorem potius Christum, quam te laudatorem quaerentium, et non anfractuosis disputationibus, sed mutis fletibus miseriam suam multo certius contestantium (quam profecto, si primi hominis rectitudo et beatitudo mansisset, nullo modo in paradiso habere potuissent) cum tua tota loquacitate vinceris.
Augustine. When you have come to the words of the Apostle, there you will find not a crack, but a most open door, by which sin entered the world; which you will try indeed to close, but, out of the mouth of infants and sucklings, who seek the Savior Christ rather than you, their praiser, and attest their misery much more surely, not by tortuous disputations, but by mute weepings (which they certainly could in no way have had in paradise, if the rectitude and blessedness of the first man had remained), you will be conquered with all your loquacity.
JulianImp.2.28II. 29. Iulianus. Quattuor hic personarum causa vertitur: Dei opificis, duorum parentum de quibus materia praestatur operanti, et parvuli qui nascitur. Dicis tu in hoc choro habitare peccatum; interrogo ego, a quo fiat, utrum a Deo? Negas: A patre? Totidem negas: A matre? Idem negas: A parvulo? Negas; et adhuc non putas fuisse conclusum, quia non possit esse inter hos quattuor, quod ab his quattuor nullus admittit?
II. 29. Julian. Here the case of four persons is at issue: of God the maker, of the two parents from whom material is furnished to the worker, and of the little one who is born. You say that sin dwells in this choir; I ask, by whom it is made: is it by God? You deny it: By the father? Just as much you deny it: By the mother? The same you deny: By the little one? You deny it; and do you still not think it has been concluded, that what none of these four admits cannot be among these four?
JulianImp.2.29Augustinus. Quidquid vis dicas: ad verba Apostoli aliquando venturus es; et quisquis ea per istarum argumentationum tuarum loca singula recordatur, quae nos assidue propter lectoris fastidium repetere nolumus, ipsa sua tibi recordatione respondet.
Augustine. Whatever you wish to say: you will at some point come to the words of the Apostle; and whoever recalls them through each of these argumentations of yours, which we are unwilling to repeat assiduously on account of the reader's distaste, by his very recalling answers you.
JulianImp.2.29II. 30. Iulianus. Ad quid ergo persuadendum aut Scripturas releges, aut conscios nominabis, qui adhuc quod sentis non potes definire? Quid te iuvat, ut Adam doceas deliquisse, quod ego penitus non refello? Quaerimus, Adam ante tot saecula mortuo, peccatum, quo in diaboli ius Dei imago transcribitur, per quid inveniatur in parvulo.
II. 30. Julian. For persuading what, then, will you reread the Scriptures, or name witnesses, you who cannot yet define what you hold? What does it profit you to teach that Adam offended, which I do not at all refute? We ask, with Adam dead so many ages ago, through what the sin, by which the image of God is transcribed into the right of the devil, is found in a little one.
JulianImp.2.30Augustinus. Cur nec tu admittis in regnum Dei, nullum habentem secundum te meritum peccati, imaginem Dei? Cur ministratur sanguis, qui de similitudine carnis peccati in remissionem fusus est peccatorum, quem bibat parvulus, ut habere possit vitam, si de nullius peccati origine venit in mortem? Si hoc tibi displicet, aperte nega parvulum Christum, aperte nega pro parvulis mortuum, qui unus pro omnibus mortuus est; unde colligitur quod dicit Apostolus: Ergo omnes mortui sunt, et pro omnibus mortuus est . Dic aperte: Mortui parvuli non sunt, qui peccatum nullum habent; morte pro se Christi, in qua baptizentur, non opus habent. Iam dic evidenter, quod latenter sentis, quoniam satis prodis tua disputatione quod sentis; dic, inquam, parvulos frustra fieri Christianos; sed vide, utrum te ipsum debeas dicere Christianum.
Augustine. Why do you too not admit into the kingdom of God the image of God, having, according to you, no deserving of sin? Why is blood ministered, which was poured out from the likeness of the flesh of sin unto the remission of sins, that the little one may drink it, so that he can have life, if he came to death from the origin of no sin? If this displeases you, openly deny the little ones' Christ, openly deny that he died for little ones, who one died for all; whence it is gathered what the Apostle says: Therefore all are dead, and he died for all (2 Cor 5:14-15). Say openly: Little ones are not dead, who have no sin; they have no need of the death of Christ for themselves, in which they may be baptized. Now say evidently what you secretly think, since you sufficiently betray by your disputation what you think; say, I say, that little ones are made Christians in vain; but see whether you ought to say that you yourself are a Christian.
JulianImp.2.30II. 31. Iulianus. Si per commixtionem parentum, damna nuptias professione, quas argumentatione condemnas; et deme nobis laborem, quo te convicimus esse Manichaeum. Sin autem tu non id audes dicere, ac ratione contumax concumbentibus inclinaris, ut per argumentorum hactenus inaudita portenta, dicas libidinem diabolicam esse, eamque in sensu coeuntium positam, ad voluptatem parentum, ad reatum pertinere nascentium; tuam quidem amentiam et turpitudinem prodis; sed precor ne tibi tantum arroges, ut putes nobis liberum non esse cum honore Dei nascentium innocentiam contueri; cum tibi liceat et libeat, cum accusatione Dei a reatu, quem dicis libidinis, libidinantium membra purgare.
II. 31. Julian. If through the union of the parents, condemn by profession the marriages which you condemn by argumentation; and take from us the labor by which we have convicted you of being a Manichee. But if you do not dare to say this, and, obstinate against reason, you incline toward those lying together, so as to say, through portents of arguments hitherto unheard, that lust is diabolical, and that it, placed in the sense of those copulating, pertains to the pleasure of the parents, to the guilt of those being born; you indeed betray your senselessness and baseness; but I pray that you not arrogate so much to yourself as to think that it is not free for us to behold, with the honor of God, the innocence of those being born; when it is permitted and pleasing to you, with the accusation of God, to purify the members of those lusting from the guilt which you say is of lust.
JulianImp.2.31Augustinus. Quolibet pruritu libidinem, id est, concupiscentiam carnis laudes, dicit eam Ioannes apostolus a Patre non esse, sed ex mundo esse ; propter quam recte dicitur diabolus princeps mundi esse . Nam scimus quod mundum Deus fecerit. Hoc ergo malo concupiscentiae carnis bene utitur pudicitia coniugalis; eiusque mali reatum a nascentibus tractum solvit regeneratio spiritalis. Hoc quamdiu non sapis, non Catholicus, sed Pelagianus futurus es; et Scripturis sanctis, quantumlibet eas defendere tibi videaris, contradicturus es. Me autem quoties propter hoc cui contradicis, Manichaeum dicis; profecto et illum dicis, qui hominem membris genitalibus infusum, et concupiscentiae voluptate concretum, ante dicit excipere delictorum contagium, quam vitalis spiritus munus haurire . Ambrosius est iste, Iuliane, Ambrosium Manichaeum dicis, insane!
Augustine. With whatever itch you praise lust, that is, the concupiscence of the flesh, the apostle John says that it is not from the Father, but is from the world (See 1 John 2:16); on account of which the devil is rightly called the prince of the world (See John 12:31). For we know that God made the world. This evil of the concupiscence of the flesh, then, conjugal chastity uses well; and the guilt of this evil, drawn from those being born, spiritual regeneration looses. As long as you do not understand this, you will be, not a Catholic, but a Pelagian; and you will contradict the holy Scriptures, however much you seem to yourself to defend them. But as often as you call me, on account of this which you contradict, a Manichee; you certainly call him too a Manichee, who says that a human being, poured into the genital members, and concreted by the pleasure of concupiscence, takes up the contagion of offenses before he draws the gift of the life-giving spirit. This is Ambrose, Julian; you call Ambrose a Manichee, insane man!
JulianImp.2.31II. 32. Iulianus. Nam cum pronuntias, concupiscentiam carnis a principe tenebrarum in homine fuisse plantatam, eamque esse diaboli fruticem, ex se humanum genus quasi poma propria proferentem; absolute quidem proderis, quod non Deum, sed diabolum dicas hominum conditorem; quo dogmate impiissimo, et coniugiorum negotium, id est, genitalium admixtio, et caro cuncta damnatur.
II. 32. Julian. For when you declare that the concupiscence of the flesh was planted in a human being by the prince of darkness, and that it is the shrub of the devil, bringing forth from itself the human race as its own apples; you indeed absolutely betray that you say, not God, but the devil, is the founder of human beings; by which most impious teaching both the business of marriages, that is, the genital union, and all flesh is condemned.
JulianImp.2.32Augustinus. Non damnatur: sed non a te quasi sana laudetur, ut etiam te confitente, a suo Conditore ac Salvatore sanetur. Nam hoc in quibus non fit, sine ulla dubitatione damnabitur.
Augustine. It is not condemned: but it is not to be praised by you as though sound, so that, even with you confessing, it may be healed by its own Founder and Savior. For in those in whom this does not come about, it will without any doubt be condemned.
JulianImp.2.32II. 33. Iulianus. Cum vero post hoc sacrilegium adiungis, et dicis, profiteri te diabolicam quidem esse gignentium coniugum voluptatem, diabolicam genitalium commotionem; sed tamen et ipsa membra quae moventur, et coniuges qui voluptate afficiuntur, reos non esse; verum pro his omnibus novos homines, id est, rude opus in nascentibus deitatis accusas; nihil quidem de Manichaeorum impietate deponis; sed tam immanem moti capitis ostendis furorem, ut consequentius fovendum, quam amputandum iudicaretur, nisi voluntatem ac studium in hac re tuum, et multorum eversio, et tua obstinatio, et Scripturarum multiplicatio loqueretur.
II. 33. Julian. But when after this sacrilege you add, and say, that you profess that the pleasure of the begetting spouses is indeed diabolical, the stirring of the genitals diabolical; but yet that the members themselves which are moved, and the spouses who are affected by pleasure, are not guilty; but that, in place of all these, you accuse the new human beings, that is, the raw work of the deity in those being born; you indeed lay aside nothing of the impiety of the Manichees; but you show so monstrous a fury of a deranged head that it would more consistently be judged to be cherished than amputated, did not your will and zeal in this matter, and the overthrow of many, and your obstinacy, and the multiplying of Scriptures, speak.
JulianImp.2.33Augustinus. Has contumelias non indignanter audire debeo, cum his Ecclesiae doctoribus, qui per unum hominem in mundum introisse peccatum, sic intellegunt, ut rectus Apostolus loquitur, non ut Iulianus perversissimus opinatur. In his sunt, ut alios taceam, Afer Cyprianus, Gallus Hilarius, Italus Ambrosius, Graecus Gregorius; a quibus eruditissimis prudentissimisque iudicibus, quales te non invenire vana praesumptione conquereris, haeresis vestra prius est damnata quam nata.
Augustine. I ought not to hear these revilings with indignation, since I hear them along with those teachers of the Church who understand that through one man sin entered the world as the right Apostle speaks, not as Julian most perversely opines. Among these are, to be silent about others, the African Cyprian, the Gaul Hilary, the Italian Ambrose, the Greek Gregory; by which most learned and most prudent judges—such as you complain, by vain presumption, that you cannot find—your heresy was condemned before it was born.
JulianImp.2.33II. 34. Iulianus. Lege et de hoc quartum operis mei librum: et quantum diabolo, quem patrem tuum dicis, ac libidini matri tuae, sub criminandi specie blandiaris, intelleges.
II. 34. Julian. Read about this too the fourth book of my work: and you will understand how much you flatter the devil, whom you call your father, and lust, your mother, under the appearance of accusing.
JulianImp.2.34Augustinus. Legi etiam quartum tuum, et meo sexto ad eius tibi cuncta respondi; quis autem nostrum vicerit, iudicet pius lector amborum.
Augustine. I read your fourth too, and answered all of it for you in my sixth; but which of us has conquered, let the pious reader of both judge.
JulianImp.2.34II. 35. Iulianus. Verum iam Apostoli verba videamus, quem mihi ad omnia, quae supra posui, respondere dixisti: Ad omnia ista huic respondit Apostolus, qui neque voluntatem arguit parvuli, quae propria in illo nondum est ad peccandum; neque nuptias, in quantum nuptiae sunt, quae habent a Deo non solum institutionem, verum etiam benedictionem; neque parentes, in quantum parentes sunt, invicem licite atque legitime ad procreandos filios coniugati; sed: " Per unum - inquit - hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt " . Quod isti si catholicis auribus mentibusque perciperent, adversum fidem gratiamque Christi rebelles animos non haberent, neque conarentur inaniter, ad suum proprium et haereticum sensum haec apostolica verba tam dilucida et tam manifesta convertere, asserentes hoc ideo dictum esse, quod Adam peccaverit primum, in quo de cetero, quisquis peccare voluit, peccandi invenit exemplum; ut peccatum scilicet non generatione ab illo uno in omnes homines, sed illius unius imitatione transire, cum profecto, si Apostolus hic imitationem intellegi voluisset, non per unum hominem, sed per diabolum potius, in hunc mundum peccatum intrasse, et per omnes homines pertransisse dixisset. De diabolo quippe scriptum est: " Imitantur eum, qui sunt ex parte ipsius " . Sed ideo " per unum hominem " - dixit - a quo generatio utique hominum coepit, ut per generationem doceret isse per omnes originale peccatum .
II. 35. Julian. But now let us see the words of the Apostle, who you said answers me to all the things which I set down above: To all these the Apostle answers this man, who neither accuses the will of the little one, which is not yet his own for sinning; nor marriages, in so far as they are marriages, which have from God not only institution, but also blessing; nor parents, in so far as they are parents, lawfully and legitimately joined to each other for procreating children; but: "Through one man—he says—sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned " (Rom 5:12). Which, if these men perceived with catholic ears and minds, they would not have minds rebellious against the faith and grace of Christ, nor would they try in vain to turn these so lucid and so manifest apostolic words to their own heretical sense, asserting that this was said for the reason that Adam sinned first, in whom thereafter, whoever wished to sin, found an example of sinning; so that sin, namely, passed from that one to all human beings not by generation, but by the imitation of that one; whereas certainly, if the Apostle had wished imitation to be understood here, he would have said that sin entered this world, and passed through all human beings, not through one man, but rather through the devil. For about the devil it is written: "They imitate him, who are of his part " (Wis 2:24-25). But for this reason he said "through one man "—from whom certainly the generation of human beings began—that through generation he might teach that original sin went through all.
JulianImp.2.35Augustinus. Dixisti verba libri mei, dic iam quemadmodum accipienda sint quae ibi posui verba Apostoli; ut magis magisque manifesteris haereticus, laudatorem te supponendo, ut auferas parvulis Salvatorem.
Augustine. You have said the words of my book; say now how those words of the Apostle which I set down there are to be received; that you may more and more be made manifest a heretic, by substituting yourself as a praiser, in order to take from little ones the Savior.
JulianImp.2.35II. 36. Iulianus. Abuti te imperitia faventium tibi, et delitescere sub ambiguitate verborum, quicumque ille fuerit operum nostrorum eruditus lector, intellegit. Reliquum vero vulgus, de quo Propheta loquitur ad Deum: Aestimasti homines sicut pisces maris ; mutua praegressione decipitur, ac salutiferae discretionis ignarum, totum putat coniungi posse rebus, quod viderit vocibus esse sociatum. Quid vero sit consequens, quid repugnans, quibusque concessis quid lex inexpugnabilis et veneranda orationis cogat inferri, nisi doctissimus attentissimusque non iudicat.
II. 36. Julian. That you abuse the inexperience of those who favor you, and lurk under the ambiguity of words, whoever shall have been a learned reader of our works understands. But the rest of the crowd, about which the Prophet speaks to God: You have reckoned human beings like the fishes of the sea (See Hab 1:14); is deceived by a mutual precedence, and, ignorant of salutary distinction, thinks that everything can be joined in things which it has seen to be associated in words. But what is consequent, what is contradictory, and, with which things conceded, what the impregnable and venerable law of discourse compels to be inferred, none but a most learned and most attentive man judges.
JulianImp.2.36Augustinus. Adhuc circuis quaerendo dialecticos, et vitando ecclesiasticos iudices. Dic iam quomodo accipiendum sit: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum; melius videlicet hoc intellegens, quam ille qui dixit: Omnes in Adam moriuntur, quia " per unum hominem peccatum intravit in hunc mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt " . Illius igitur culpa mors omnium est . Et idem ipse alibi: Fuit Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam et in illo omnes perierunt . Ambrosius est ille, non quicumque de vulgo, cuius imperitam multitudinem non valentem de tuis disputationibus iudicare, nimis alta cervice et proterva fronte contemnis; Ambrosius est, inquam, cui nulla ex parte in ipsis litteris saecularibus, de quibus multum inflaris, aequaris; in ecclesiasticis vero quis ille sit, audi vel lege Pelagium doctorem tuum, et noli amare sensum a sensu tanti huius doctoris alienum.
Augustine. You still go around seeking dialecticians, and avoiding ecclesiastical judges. Say now how it is to be received: Through one man sin entered the world; understanding this better, of course, than he who said: All die in Adam, because "through one man sin entered this world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned ". His fault, then, is the death of all. And the same man elsewhere: There was Adam, and in him we all were; Adam perished, and in him all perished. This is Ambrose, not anyone of the crowd, whose inexperienced multitude, not able to judge of your disputations, you despise with too high a neck and an insolent brow; it is Ambrose, I say, whom you in no part equal even in those secular letters about which you are much inflated; but in ecclesiastical matters who he is, hear or read your teacher Pelagius, and do not love an understanding foreign to the understanding of this so great a teacher.
JulianImp.2.36II. 37. Iulianus. Et hoc est propter quod maxime, miserantes Ecclesiarum ruinas, ad virorum prudentia illustrium provocamus examen, ut non quid dicatur, sed quid consequenter dicatur appareat. Si enim sub tali concilio disceptaretur, tibi utique non liceret, aut quod negaveras inferre, aut quod affirmaveras denegare; in libro vero tuo, quem nulla pudoris censura castigat, et quod Catholici dicunt, et quod Manichaei, confidenter agglomeras, hac sola opinione contentus, si respondisse dicaris; quid autem habeat ponderis oratio tua, quid constantiae, cogitare etiam ineptum putas.
II. 37. Julian. And this is on account of which especially, pitying the ruins of the Churches, we appeal to the examination of men illustrious in prudence, that not what is said, but what is consequently said, may appear. For if it were disputed under such a council, it would certainly not be permitted you either to infer what you had denied, or to deny what you had affirmed; but in your book, which no censure of shame chastises, you confidently heap together both what the Catholics say and what the Manichees, content with this opinion alone, if you are said to have answered; but what weight your discourse has, what consistency, you think it inept even to consider.
JulianImp.2.37Augustinus. Rogo, dic iam quomodo intellegendum sit: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum ; quid adhuc calumniaris, conviciaris, tergiversaris? Si in concilio, cuius videris desiderare iudicium, sederent Cyprianus, Hilarius, Ambrosius, Gregorius, Basilius, Ioannes Constantinopolitanus, ut alios taceam; numquid doctiores, prudentiores, veraciores iudices quaerere auderes? Ipsi contra dogmata vestra clamant, ipsi scriptis suis vestra scripta condemnant; quid quaeris amplius? Hoc iam in primo et secundo librorum meorum satis docui, quos contra tuos quattuor ego sex edidi; sed ecce adhuc te audire paratus sum; dic iam quomodo sit accipiendum, quod per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum.
Augustine. I ask, say now how it is to be understood: Through one man sin entered the world; why do you still calumniate, revile, shuffle? If in the council whose judgment you seem to desire there sat Cyprian, Hilary, Ambrose, Gregory, Basil, John of Constantinople, to be silent about others; would you dare to seek more learned, more prudent, more truthful judges? They themselves cry out against your teachings, they themselves condemn your writings by their writings; what more do you seek? This I have already taught sufficiently in the first and second of my books, which I, against your four, published as six; but behold, I am still prepared to hear you; say now how it is to be received, that through one man sin entered the world.
JulianImp.2.37II. 38. Iulianus. Denique sine cunctatione tribuens quae poposci, quidque ex his confectum esset aspiciens, profiteris te ad hoc quod exstruximus, imbecillum esse; apostolum Paulum illis omnibus quae diximus, obviare; quem tamen inducis eadem quae tu dederas, concedentem. Ais enim: Apostolus neque voluntatem arguit parvuli, quae propria in illo nondum est ad peccandum ; quo dato iam convictum est, nec posse in illo quodpiam esse peccatum, cuius nulla alia conditio est, secundum definitionem quoque tuam, quam voluntas admittendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere.
II. 38. Julian. Finally, granting without delay what I asked, and looking at what was made up from these, you profess that you are too weak for that which we have built up; that the apostle Paul confronts all those things which we said; whom yet you introduce conceding the same things which you had granted. For you say: The Apostle neither accuses the will of the little one, which is not yet his own for sinning; which being granted, it is now convicted both that there cannot be in him any sin, of which there is no other condition, even according to your definition, than the will to commit what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain.
JulianImp.2.38Augustinus. Haec definitio peccati est eius, quod non est etiam poena peccati. Nam ubi malae consuetudinis voces esse contenditis, atque ita voces vestri dogmatis suffocatis, dic, si audes, quomodo voluntati hominis liberum sit abstinere a malo, ubi audis. Non quod volo ago , aut nega esse malum, ubi audis: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago . Sed utique agnoscimus, hoc peccatum poenam esse peccati; et ideo discernendum ab illa definitione peccati, ubi voluntas hoc committit, unde liberum est abstinere. Intellege quod dico; et dic iam, quaeso, quomodo sit accipiendum: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum .
Augustine. This is the definition of the sin which is not also the punishment of sin. For where you contend that these are the words of an evil habit, and so choke the words of your teaching, say, if you dare, how it is free to the will of a human being to abstain from evil, where you hear: I do not do what I will, or deny that it is an evil, where you hear: I do not do the good that I will, but the evil that I will not, this I do (Rom 7:19). But we certainly acknowledge that this sin is the punishment of sin; and therefore it is to be distinguished from that definition of sin, where the will commits this from which it is free to abstain. Understand what I say; and say now, I beg, how it is to be received: Through one man sin entered the world.
JulianImp.2.38II. 39. Iulianus. Ergo si Apostolus non arguit in illo propriam voluntatem, quam intellegit nec esse potuisse; pronuntiat utique, nec signum in eo criminis apparere, ea maxime iudicante iustitia, quae non imputat peccatum, nisi a quo liberum est abstinere. Verum non hoc solum tribuisse contentus, addis: Neque nuptias arguit Apostolus, in quantum nuptiae sunt, quae habent a Deo non solum institutionem, verum etiam benedictionem . Quod per se solum aeque posset ad expugnandum peccatum naturale sufficere; quia, si scit Apostolus, ut scit, non esse nuptias arguendas, ad quarum conciliationem et ministerium et instrumentum pertinet a Deo instituta et benedicta sexuum cum voluptate commixtio; non potest de his diabolica germinare possessio, nec fructus earum reus est, apud eam maxime iustitiam, quae peccatum non imputat, nisi unde liberum est abstinere.
II. 39. Julian. Therefore, if the Apostle does not accuse in him his own will, which he understands could not even have been; he certainly declares that not even a sign of crime appears in him, with that justice especially judging, which does not impute sin, except that from which one is free to abstain. But not content to have granted this alone, you add: Neither does the Apostle accuse marriages, in so far as marriages are, which have from God not only institution, but also blessing. Which by itself alone could equally suffice to assail natural sin; because, if the Apostle knows, as he knows, that marriages are not to be accused, to whose conciliation and ministry and instrument belongs the union of the sexes with pleasure, instituted and blessed by God; from these no diabolical possession can sprout, nor is their fruit guilty, especially with that justice which does not impute sin, except that from which one is free to abstain.
JulianImp.2.39Augustinus. Noli, obsecro, cum tali voluptate commixtionem coniugum in paradiso suspicari, qualem nunc facit libido, quae non ad nutum voluntatis exsurgit, quae mentes etiam sanctorum, cohibenda quidem, sed tamen importuna sollicitat. Absit ut a fidelibus et prudentibus talis voluptas paradisi, talis illa pax et felicitas cogitetur.
Augustine. Do not, I beseech you, imagine the union of spouses in paradise with such pleasure as lust now makes, which does not rise at the nod of the will, which solicits even the minds of the saints—to be restrained indeed, but yet importunate. Far be it that such a pleasure of paradise, such a peace and happiness, be conceived by the faithful and prudent.
JulianImp.2.39II. 40. Iulianus. Consideremus et tertium, quo benignitas tua in acquiescendi facilitate cernatur. Neque parentes, in quantum parentes sunt invicem licite atque legitime ad procreandos filios coniugati, Apostolus arguit . Expende quid dixeris, non argui ab Apostolo parentes, in quantum parentes sunt. Ideo ergo eos, in quantum parentes sunt, non posse diabolo fructificare, nec de his aliquid, in quantum parentes sunt, ad diabolum pertinere pronuntiat; filii autem in tantum pertinent ad parentes, in quantum parentes sunt; igitur nec rei, nec sub regno diaboli, nec arguendi a diabolo comprobantur. Ut enim hoc quod diximus, repetitione clarescat: In tantum sexuum coniunctio suboli participat, in quantum qui coniuges sunt, fiunt parentes; si autem aliquid inter se voluerint agere petulantius, vel per illicitos adulteriorum aberrare concubitus, hoc ad filios non potest attinere, qui de vi seminum, non de vitiorum obscaenitate nascuntur.
II. 40. Julian. Let us consider the third also, by which your benignity may be discerned in the ease of acquiescing. Neither does the Apostle accuse parents, in so far as they are parents, lawfully and legitimately joined to each other for procreating children. Weigh what you have said, that parents are not accused by the Apostle, in so far as they are parents. Therefore he declares that they, in so far as they are parents, cannot bear fruit for the devil, nor that anything of them, in so far as they are parents, pertains to the devil; but children pertain to parents only in so far as they are parents; therefore they are proved neither guilty, nor under the kingdom of the devil, nor to be accused by the devil. For, that what we have said may become clear by repetition: the union of the sexes shares in offspring only in so far as those who are spouses become parents; but if they wish to do something more petulant between themselves, or to stray through the unlawful intercourse of adulteries, this cannot attain to the children, who are born from the force of the seeds, not from the obscenity of vices.
JulianImp.2.40Augustinus. Iamne confiteris etiam inter coniuges esse posse petulantiam commixtionis? Ecce quod facit tua illa pulchra suscepta; hoc enim nisi cum ei ceditur non fit, quando ad petulantiam, quam tu quoque reprehendis, etiam coniuges liberorum procreandorum causa copulatos, nulla necessitate serendae prolis impellit; cuius tantus laudator esse voluisti, ut nemo credat quod etiam oppugnator esse audeas; quippe quam sic laudare non erubuisti, ut eam te liberet, nec puderet, etiam in paradisi beatitudine collocare.
Augustine. Do you now confess that even among spouses there can be a petulance of union? Behold what that beautiful thing you have taken up does; for this does not happen except when it is yielded to, when it impels even spouses joined for the cause of procreating children to a petulance—which you too reprehend—by no necessity of sowing offspring; of which you wished to be so great a praiser that no one believes you would dare to be even its assailer; since you did not blush so to praise it that it should be free to you, nor would you be ashamed, to place it even in the blessedness of paradise.
JulianImp.2.40II. 41. Iulianus. Igitur ad nascentes generantium, non flagitia, sed semina pervehuntur; vim autem seminum Deus instituit, et sicut confiteri cogeris, benedixit.
II. 41. Julian. Therefore to those being born are conveyed, not the disgraceful deeds, but the seeds of those begetting; but the force of the seeds God instituted, and, as you are compelled to confess, blessed.
JulianImp.2.41Augustinus. Semina Deus instituit, sed qui possunt in natura vitiata bonum eius a malo eius ita discernere, ut neque putent naturam malum esse, neque vitium naturam esse, ipsi possunt discernere quid horum duorum ad Deum creare pertineat, quid sanare. Sed hoc vos non potestis, quamdiu Pelagiani, non Catholici estis. Dic iam, rogo, dic iam, quomodo sit accipiendum, quod per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum .
Augustine. God instituted the seeds, but those who can in a vitiated nature so distinguish his good from its evil that they neither think nature an evil, nor the vice a nature, they themselves can distinguish which of these two pertains to God to create, which to heal. But this you cannot, as long as you are Pelagians, not Catholics. Say now, I ask, say now, how it is to be received, that through one man sin entered the world.
JulianImp.2.41II. 42. Iulianus. Filii igitur nec tunc rei sunt, quando in eorum generatione peccant parentes; quia in tantum ad liberos suos pertinent, in quantum parentes sunt; igitur et tantum filii ad parentes pertinent, in quantum filii sunt. Naturae quippe generantium constat germina communicare, non culpae. Quod si, ut ratio demonstrat, ita etiam Apostolum confirmare pronuntias; merito nos, eo docente, defendimus peccata parentum ad filios pertinere non posse; quandoquidem et Apostolus Spiritu Sancto clarus, et nos instructi luce rationis, et tu pondere impugnatae a te veritatis oppressus, communiter vereque fateamur, parentes in quantum parentes sunt, reos non esse; in tantum autem ad filios pertinere, in quantum parentes sunt; igitur filios in quantum filii sunt, id est, antequam aliquid per voluntatem propriam operentur, reos esse non posse.
II. 42. Julian. Children, then, are not guilty even when their parents sin in their generation; because they pertain to their children only in so far as they are parents; therefore children too pertain to parents only in so far as they are children. For it is established that those begetting communicate the germs of nature, not of fault. But if, as reason demonstrates, you declare that the Apostle too confirms thus; deservedly we, with him teaching, defend that the sins of parents cannot pertain to children; since both the Apostle, bright with the Holy Spirit, and we, instructed by the light of reason, and you, oppressed by the weight of the truth assailed by you, may commonly and truly confess that parents, in so far as they are parents, are not guilty; but pertain to children only in so far as they are parents; therefore children, in so far as they are children, that is, before they do anything by their own will, cannot be guilty.
JulianImp.2.42Augustinus. Parentes quidem gignendo parentes sunt, et filii nascendo filii sunt; nec gignere autem, nec nasci malum est, quod pertinet ad institutionem Dei, et utrumque sine pudenda libidine posset in paradiso fieri, si nemo peccasset. Pudenda enim libido nisi aut peccato exorta, aut peccato vitiata esset, pudenda non esset; et aut nulla esset omnino, et sine illa ita servirent genitalia membra gignentibus, ut manus serviunt operantibus; aut ita esset subsequens voluntatem, ut numquam posset sollicitare nolentem; qualem nunc eam non esse, castitas docet, quae tales motus eius expugnat, et in coniugatis, ne vel inter se indecenter lasciviant, vel in adulteria prolabantur, et in quibusque continentibus, ne huic consentiendo, deiciantur. Ecce de qua trahitur originale peccatum; ecce per quam nasci noluit, qui venit, non suum ferre, sed nostrum auferre peccatum.
Augustine. Parents indeed are parents by begetting, and children are children by being born; but neither to beget nor to be born is an evil, which pertains to the institution of God, and both could come about in paradise without shameful lust, if no one had sinned. For shameful lust, unless it had either arisen from sin or been vitiated by sin, would not be shameful; and either it would be none at all, and without it the genital members would so serve those begetting as the hands serve those working; or it would so follow the will that it could never solicit one who is unwilling; that it is not now such, chastity teaches, which assails such motions of it, both in the married, lest they either lasciviate indecently between themselves, or slip into adulteries, and in any continent persons, lest, by consenting to it, they be cast down. Behold from what original sin is drawn; behold through what he was unwilling to be born, who came not to bear his own, but to take away our sin.
JulianImp.2.42II. 43. Iulianus. Eant nunc, et omnia quidquid possunt, Manichaeae rationis moliantur ingenia, quam volunt longas patiantur cogitationum aerumnas; non arroganter, sed religiose polliceor, numquam hanc instructuram posse quassari.
II. 43. Julian. Let the talents of Manichaean reasoning now go, and contrive everything they can, let them suffer as long toils of thoughts as they wish; not arrogantly, but religiously I promise that this structure can never be shaken.
JulianImp.2.43Augustinus. Quam instructuram vocas, tibi ruina est, quae te ita pressit, ut laudare cogeret quod expugnas; si tamen est in te qualiscumque castitas, quae te faciat expugnare quod laudas.
Augustine. What you call a structure is a ruin to you, which so pressed you that it compelled you to praise what you assail; if, however, there is in you any chastity of whatever kind, which makes you assail what you praise.
JulianImp.2.43II. 44. Iulianus. Qua igitur fronte subiungis: Sed " per unum hominem peccatum in mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt "? Quod interpretaris hoc modo, ut peccatum ab illo dicat Apostolus generatione in posteros fuisse transmissum . Supra concesseras Magistrum Gentium nuptias, quibus Deus benedixerat, nihil accusare; voluntatem ad peccandum in nascente non esse; parentes autem, in quantum parentes sunt, licite sibi legitimeque ad procreandos filios coniugari; et addis illico, quasi dormiens priora dixisses, crimen ad posteros generatione transmitti. Si enim in tantum generant, in quantum parentes sunt; in quantum autem parentes sunt, licite sibi et legitime iunguntur; et haec coniunctio ab Apostolo non improbatur, quia a Deo non solum instituta, verum etiam benedicta est; quo ore, qua lege, qua fronte, hanc generationem reatus causam, radice criminum, servam diaboli, esse confirmas?
II. 44. Julian. With what brow, then, do you subjoin: But "through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned "? Which you interpret in this way, that the Apostle says sin was transmitted by that one to posterity by generation. Above you had conceded that the Teacher of the Gentiles accuses in nothing the marriages which God had blessed; that there is no will for sinning in the one being born; that parents, in so far as they are parents, are joined to each other lawfully and legitimately for procreating children; and you add at once, as if asleep when you said the earlier things, that the crime is transmitted to posterity by generation. For if they beget only in so far as they are parents; but in so far as they are parents they are joined to each other lawfully and legitimately; and this union is not disapproved by the Apostle, because it is by God not only instituted but also blessed; with what mouth, by what law, with what brow do you confirm that this generation is a cause of guilt, the root of crimes, a slave of the devil?
JulianImp.2.44Augustinus. Iam nescio quoties haec dicta sunt, eisque responsum est. Multiloquio tibi excitas caliginem, quae te non permittit malitiam vitiorum a naturae bonitate discernere; et usque ad odiosum fastidium eadem per eadem repetens, nondum dicis quomodo sit accipiendum, quod per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum .
Augustine. I no longer know how many times these things have been said, and answered. By your verbosity you stir up for yourself a fog, which does not permit you to distinguish the malice of the vices from the goodness of nature; and, repeating the same things through the same to a hateful tedium, you do not yet say how it is to be received, that through one man sin entered the world.
JulianImp.2.44II. 45. Iulianus. Non ergo argui meretur ab Apostolo et a diabolo possidetur; a Deo instituitur, et criminum fons est; a Deo postremo, ut confiteris, benedicitur, et a te frutex diabolicus accusatur.
II. 45. Julian. It does not, then, deserve to be accused by the Apostle and is possessed by the devil; it is instituted by God, and is the fount of crimes; it is finally, as you confess, blessed by God, and is accused by you as a diabolical shrub.
JulianImp.2.45Augustinus. Nuptias benedixit Deus, non resistentem spiritui concupiscentiam carnis, quae non fuit ante peccatum; peccatum autem, sicut nec illam concupiscentiam quae resistit spiritui, non benedixit Deus. Nuptiae porro, quas benedixit, si peccatum non fuisset admissum, quo natura vitiata est, aut sic uterentur genitalibus membris, quemadmodum aliis utimur, sine ulla libidine oboedientibus voluntati; aut pudenda ibi libido non esset, quoniam numquam resisteret voluntati, qualis nunc utique non est; quod profecto etiam tu sentis, quando ab ea sollicitante atque illiciente dissentis. Nuptiae tamen, etiam nunc laudabiles sunt; quia neque instituunt hoc malum in hominibus, sed inveniunt; et eo malo bene utuntur intentione generandi, quamvis trahant inde qui generantur originale peccatum, propter quod sunt regenerandi.
Augustine. God blessed marriages, not the concupiscence of the flesh resisting the spirit, which was not before sin; but God did not bless sin, just as neither that concupiscence which resists the spirit. But the marriages which he blessed, if the sin had not been committed by which nature was vitiated, would either so use the genital members as we use the others, with no lust, obedient to the will; or shameful lust would not be there, since it would never resist the will, such as it certainly is not now; which surely even you perceive, when you dissent from it as it solicits and entices. Yet marriages are praiseworthy even now; because they neither institute this evil in human beings, but find it; and use that evil well by the intention of begetting, although those who are begotten draw thence original sin, on account of which they are to be regenerated.
JulianImp.2.45II. 46. Iulianus. Quam mecum nihil egeris, litterarum omnium testatur eruditio; quam vero contra Apostolum nitaris, et contra Deum insanias, sententiarum tuarum pugna demonstrat. Sed ostenso iam, non posse haec coniungi, quae rerum natura dissociat; interrogemus et Apostolum, ne illius putetur inesse sensibus, quae in tuis est sententiis probata barbaries.
II. 46. Julian. How you have accomplished nothing with me, the erudition of all letters testifies; but how you struggle against the Apostle, and rave against God, the conflict of your own statements demonstrates. But now that it has been shown that these things cannot be joined which the nature of things dissociates; let us ask the Apostle too, lest that barbarity be thought to be in his senses which has been proved to be in your statements.
JulianImp.2.46Augustinus. Dic iam nunc saltem, quod tantis anfractibus differebas.
Augustine. Say now at last what you were deferring by so many windings.
JulianImp.2.46II. 47. Iulianus. Audio itaque Paulum pronuntiantem, quia: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt . Quod tu, non propter exemplum peccati, sed propter generationem dictum esse confirmas; nosque haereticos vocas, qui id ad exempla referamus; illoque te iuvari aestimas argumento: Profecto si Apostolus imitationem, inquis, intellegi voluisset, non " per unum hominem ", sed per diabolum peccatum intrasse, et per omnes homines pertransisse dixisset. De diabolo quippe scriptum est: " Imitantur autem eum, qui sunt ex parte ipsius " . Sed ideo " per unum hominem " dixit, a quo generatio utique hominum coepit, ut per generationem doceret isse per omnes originale peccatum . At ego video Apostolum nihil quod ad infamationem generationis spectaret humanae, nihil quod ad condemnationem innocentiae naturalis, nihil quod ad crimen divini operis, protulisse.
II. 47. Julian. I hear, then, Paul declaring that: Through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned. Which you confirm was said not on account of the example of sin, but on account of generation; and you call us heretics, who refer it to examples; and you reckon that you are helped by this argument: Certainly if the Apostle, you say, had wished imitation to be understood, he would have said that sin entered, and passed through all human beings, not "through one man ", but through the devil. For about the devil it is written: "But they imitate him, who are of his part ". But for this reason he said "through one man "—from whom certainly the generation of human beings began—that through generation he might teach that original sin went through all. But I see that the Apostle brought forth nothing that would look to the defaming of human generation, nothing that would look to the condemnation of natural innocence, nothing that would look to the crime of the divine work.
JulianImp.2.47Augustinus. Diu dicis: Nihil, et cum hoc verbum repetere destiteris, dicturus es nihil. Quis enim non te rideat persuadere conantem, non pertinere ad generationem quod ait Apostolus: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum; cum ipse homo non sit genitus ab aliquo, de quo ceteri gignerentur; sed pertinere dicitis ad exemplum, cum exemplum peccati, quod posteriores imitarentur, non intrarit in mundum, nisi per eum, qui nullum imitando peccavit? Primus namque peccavit. Hunc autem non Adam, sed diabolum esse, quis Christianus ignorat? Quid est ergo, quod te libet, nisi et non tacere, et nihil dicere?
Augustine. For a long time you say: Nothing, and when you have ceased to repeat this word, you are going to say nothing. For who would not laugh at you trying to persuade that what the Apostle says: Through one man sin entered the world does not pertain to generation; when that man himself was not begotten by anyone, from whom the rest would be begotten; but you say it pertains to example, when the example of sin, which the later would imitate, did not enter the world, except through him who sinned by imitating no one? For he sinned first. But that this is not Adam, but the devil, what Christian is ignorant? What is it, then, that pleases you, except both not to be silent, and to say nothing?
JulianImp.2.47II. 48. Iulianus. Denique id, quod ipsa verba non indicaverant, tu colligere argumentatione conatus, subdis, quia si de imitatione loqueretur, diabolum commemorare debuerat; sed quia de generatione voluisset intellegi, hominem dicere maluisse, quam daemonem. Interrogo ergo, quae fuerit tibi huius opinionis occasio. Quid enim? Negas tu hominum imitatione delinqui? Et licet res absoluta Scripturarum attestatione non egeat, tamen audi David: Noli aemulari inter malignantes, neque zelatus fueris facientes iniquitatem ; ne aemulatus fueris eum qui prosperatur in via sua . Deinde omnes Scripturae Veteris Testamenti commonent Israelem, ne ritum profanae gentis imitetur. Quae igitur necessitas id cogebat, ut Apostolus, si imitationem vellet intellegi, diabolum magis quam hominem nominaret, cum et hominum et diaboli nosset imitatione delinqui? Aut ergo tu proba, non posse hominum imitatione peccari, nec hoc in lege uspiam contineri, et sic assere suspicioni tuae locum paratum; aut certe si manifestum est, nulla magis re quam imitatione vitiorum invaluisse peccata, grandi imperitia collegisti Apostolum de diabolo profecto dicturum fuisse, si imitationem voluisset intellegi.
II. 48. Julian. Finally, that which the words themselves had not indicated, you, trying to gather it by argumentation, subjoin, that if he were speaking about imitation, he ought to have mentioned the devil; but because he wished it to be understood about generation, he preferred to say a man rather than a demon. I ask, then, what was the occasion of this opinion for you. For what? Do you deny that one offends by the imitation of human beings? And although the matter, being settled, needs no attestation of the Scriptures, yet hear David: Do not emulate among the malignant, nor be envious of those doing iniquity; do not emulate him who prospers in his way (Ps 37:1, 7 (36:1, 7)). Then all the Scriptures of the Old Testament admonish Israel not to imitate the rite of a profane nation. What necessity, then, compelled this, that the Apostle, if he wished imitation to be understood, should name the devil rather than a man, since he knew that one offends by the imitation both of human beings and of the devil? Either, then, prove that one cannot sin by the imitation of human beings, and that this is nowhere contained in the law, and so assert that a place is prepared for your suspicion; or certainly, if it is manifest that by nothing more than the imitation of vices have sins grown strong, you have gathered, with great inexperience, that the Apostle would certainly have spoken about the devil, if he had wished imitation to be understood.
JulianImp.2.48Augustinus. Nonne ante dixi nihil te esse dicturum, homo nihil loquendo loquacissime? Sunt quidem peccata imitationis in mundo, cum homines peccantium hominum exempla sectantur, non tamen per eos homines, quos quilibet imitantur, peccatum quod peccantes imitarentur, intravit in mundum; sed per eum qui primus nullum imitando, peccavit; hic est diabolus, quem imitantur omnes qui sunt ex parte ipsius . Sic et peccatum, quod non imitando committitur, sed nascendo trahitur, per hunc intravit in mundum, qui primus hominem genuit. Nihil ergo dixisti, et nonnisi ad quosdam decipiendos, quosdam fatigandos lectores, tacere noluisti.
Augustine. Did I not say before that you would say nothing, you who most loquaciously speak by saying nothing? There are indeed sins of imitation in the world, when human beings follow the examples of sinning human beings, yet not through those human beings whom anyone imitates did the sin which the sinning imitate enter the world; but through him who first sinned by imitating no one; this is the devil, whom all imitate who are of his part. So too the sin which is committed not by imitating, but is drawn by being born, entered the world through him who first begot a human being. You have said nothing, then, and only to deceive certain readers, to weary certain readers, you were unwilling to be silent.
JulianImp.2.48II. 49. Iulianus. Quia ergo claret, imitationem malorum hominum non solum consequenter, sed et necessario dici; hoc interim argumentum tuum iacere perspicuum est. Quod vero addis, de diabolo esse scriptum: Imitantur eum, qui sunt ex parte ipsius ; et ego assentior dictum esse prudenter ab eo, quicumque libri ipsius auctor est; sed tibi non prodest, quod scribuntur quidam diaboli imitatione peccare, nisi docueris non posse hominum imitatione delinqui.
II. 49. Julian. Since, then, it is clear that the imitation of evil human beings is said not only consequently, but also necessarily; it is meanwhile evident that this argument of yours lies prostrate. But as for what you add, that it is written about the devil: They imitate him, who are of his part; I too assent that it was said prudently by him, whoever is the author of that book; but it does not profit you that some are written to sin by the imitation of the devil, unless you teach that one cannot offend by the imitation of human beings.
JulianImp.2.49Augustinus. Non hic quaeritur utrum hominum imitatione peccetur; quis enim nesciat, etiam hominum imitatione peccari? Sed quaeritur, quale peccatum per unum hominem intrarit in mundum; utrum quod imitando committeretur, an quod nascendo traheretur. Quia illud primum, id est, quod imitando committeretur, nonnisi per eum intravit in mundum, qui primus neminem imitatus ceteris imitaturis peccandi introduxit exemplum, hoc est, diabolus; hoc autem alterum, id est, quod nascendo traheretur, nonnisi per eum intravit in mundum, qui primus a nemine generatus, generandis ceteris originis ingessit initium; hic est Adam. De imitatione igitur Angelorum et hominum intellege te nihil ad causam pertinens dicere; sed tantum tacere noluisse. Disputamus enim, non de quocumque peccatore, qui quandocumque peccavit in mundo, sed de illo per quem peccatum intravit in mundum; ubi si quaeratur exemplum imitationis, diabolus invenitur; si contagium generationis, Adam. Proinde, dicens Apostolus: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum , peccatum generationis intellegi voluit. Imitationis enim peccatum, non per unum hominem, sed per diabolum intravit in mundum.
Augustine. The question here is not whether one sins by the imitation of human beings; for who does not know that one sins even by the imitation of human beings? But the question is, what kind of sin entered the world through one man; whether that which would be committed by imitating, or that which would be drawn by being born. Because that first one, that is, that which would be committed by imitating, entered the world only through him who first, imitating no one, introduced to the rest who would imitate the example of sinning, that is, the devil; but this other, that is, that which would be drawn by being born, entered the world only through him who first, begotten by no one, brought in the beginning of origin to the rest who would be begotten; this is Adam. About the imitation of Angels and human beings, then, understand that you say nothing pertaining to the case; but only that you were unwilling to be silent. For we are disputing, not about any sinner whatsoever, who at any time sinned in the world, but about him through whom sin entered the world; where, if the example of imitation is sought, the devil is found; if the contagion of generation, Adam. Accordingly, the Apostle, saying: Through one man sin entered the world, wished the sin of generation to be understood. For the sin of imitation entered the world not through one man, but through the devil.
JulianImp.2.49II. 50. Iulianus. Nam cum utrumque ex more dicatur, aliquando quod diabolum quis imitatus, invideat; aliquando quod hominem aemulatus, aut invidia, aut flagitiosorum sordibus oblinatur; hoc quoque imitationis nomen utrique possit convenire personae, id est, et cum de homine, et cum de diabolo dicitur; tu perridicule ineptire voluisti, per imitationis intellectum Adam non potuisse monstrari.
II. 50. Julian. For since both are said by custom—sometimes that one, imitating the devil, envies; sometimes that one, emulating a man, is smeared either with envy or with the filth of the disgraceful—this name of imitation too can befit either person, that is, both when it is said of a man, and when it is said of the devil; you wished, most ridiculously, to play the fool, that Adam could not be shown through the understanding of imitation.
JulianImp.2.50Augustinus. Numquid per quemcumque hominem, quem peccando alius imitatur, peccatum intravit in mundum? Dic, si potes, quid sit: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit , sive mors, sive peccatum, sive potius cum morte peccatum. Nam peccatum, cuius imitatione peccatur, nonnisi per diabolum intravit in mundum, qui primus non imitando fecit, quod alii facerent imitando.
Augustine. Did sin enter the world through any human being whom another imitates by sinning? Say, if you can, what it is: Through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, whether death, or sin, or rather sin with death. For the sin by whose imitation one sins entered the world only through the devil, who first, by not imitating, did what others would do by imitating.
JulianImp.2.50II. 51. Iulianus. Ad reliqua festinat oratio, sed premendus adhuc locus est, ut divisionibus quam possumus brevibus, lectori et intellegentia rei et memoria suggeratur. In omnibus quidem pene rebus homonymorum, quae aequivoca appellamus, conditio reperitur.
II. 51. Julian. The discourse hastens to the rest, but the passage must still be pressed, that, by divisions as brief as we can, both the understanding of the matter and its memory may be furnished to the reader. In almost all things indeed the condition of homonyms, which we call equivocals, is found.
JulianImp.2.51Augustinus. Promiseras te intellegentiam suggesturum esse lectori, et loqueris de homonymis et aequivocis; quomodo ergo te ipsi saltem Pelagiani intellecturi sunt, nisi prius ad scholas dialecticorum, ubicumque terrarum potuerint inveniri, propter haec discenda mittantur? An forte et categorias Aristotelis, antequam tuos libros legant, eis exponens ipse lecturus es? Cur non et hoc facias, homo ingeniosissimus, quandoquidem a deceptis miseris pasceris otiosus?
Augustine. You had promised that you would furnish understanding to the reader, and you speak of homonyms and equivocals; how, then, will even the Pelagians themselves understand you, unless they are first sent to the schools of the dialecticians, wherever in the world they can be found, to learn these things? Or will you perhaps yourself read out to them even the Categories of Aristotle, before they read your books, expounding it to them? Why do you not do this too, most ingenious man, since you are fed in idleness by deceived wretches?
JulianImp.2.51II. 52. Iulianus. Sed ut nunc nobis sermo de praesentibus sit, generatio proprie sexibus imputatur, imitatio autem semper animorum est. Hic ergo affectus animi, quod possibiliter voluerit imitantis, hominem pro diversitate causarum aut accusat, aut provehit; ita fit ut in bono et Deum, et Angelos, et Apostolos dicatur imitari; Deum: Estote perfecti, sicut Pater vester perfectus est ; Angelos: Fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra ; Apostolos: Imitatores mei estote, sicut et ego Christi . In malo vero imitatur diabolum, sicut dicitur: Imitantur eum, qui sunt ex parte ipsius ; imitantur homines: Nolite esse tristes sicut hypocritae, exterminantes facies suas , imitantur animalia, cum mandatur: Nolite fieri sicut equus et mulus, quibus non est intellectus . His ergo verbis, tam adhortantibus quam deterrentibus, ostenditur imitationis affectus, qui utique si esse non posset, non indiceretur cavendus.
II. 52. Julian. But that our discourse may now be about present matters, generation is properly imputed to the sexes, but imitation is always of minds. This affection of the mind, then, which the one imitating could possibly have willed, either accuses or advances a human being according to the diversity of causes; so it comes about that in good one is said to imitate both God, and the Angels, and the Apostles; God: Be perfect, as your Father is perfect (Matt 5:48); the Angels: Your will be done, as in heaven and on earth (Matt 6:10); the Apostles: Be imitators of me, as I too am of Christ (1 Cor 11:1). But in evil one imitates the devil, as it is said: They imitate him, who are of his part; one imitates human beings: Do not be sad like the hypocrites, who disfigure their faces (See Matt 6:16); one imitates animals, when it is commanded: Do not become like the horse and the mule, in which there is no understanding (Ps 32:9 (31:9)). By these words, then, both exhorting and deterring, the affection of imitation is shown, which certainly, if it could not be, would not be enjoined to be guarded against.
JulianImp.2.52Augustinus. Sed peccatum imitationis, id est, quod imitatione fieret, non intravit in mundum, nisi per eum, qui ut imitatione peccaretur, sine imitatione peccavit; et non est Adam certe iste, sed diabolus. Qui enim dixit: Intravit in mundum , initium peccati huius ostendit; quod initium manifestum est, non esse factum per hominem, sed per diabolum; si peccatum quod imitarentur peccantes, velimus attendere. Restat igitur ut peccatum quod per unum hominem intravit in mundum, non imitationi, sed generationi recte possit attribui. Agimus sane Deo gratias, quoniam contra vestrum locutus errorem, voluntatem bonam, qua imitamur bonos, non viribus nostri liberi arbitrii, sed auxilio Dei esse tribuendam, velut coruscante tibi veritate confessus es; quandoquidem ut Angelos imitemur, non praesumendum a nobis, sed a Domino demonstrasti esse poscendum, sic exponens quod oramus et dicimus: Fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra .
Augustine. But the sin of imitation, that is, that which is done by imitation, entered the world only through him who, that there might be sin by imitation, sinned without imitation; and this certainly is not Adam, but the devil. For he who said: It entered the world, showed the beginning of this sin; which beginning is manifest to have been made not through a man, but through the devil; if we wish to attend to the sin which the sinning imitate. It remains, then, that the sin which entered the world through one man can rightly be attributed not to imitation, but to generation. We give thanks indeed to God, since, speaking against your error, you have confessed, as though the truth flashed upon you, that the good will, by which we imitate the good, is to be attributed not to the powers of our free choice, but to the help of God; since you showed that, in order that we may imitate the Angels, it is not to be presumed by us, but to be asked from the Lord, thus expounding what we pray and say: Your will be done, as in heaven and on earth.
JulianImp.2.52II. 53. Iulianus. Sed ut imitationis vocabulum rebus diversis manifestum est communiter convenire; ita generatio vere et proprie generantem substantiam indicat; non proprie autem, sed abusive studiis applicatur. Et tamen quia hic est iam usus loquendi et quod indicarit agnoscitur, et proprietatibus praeiudicium afferre non sinitur. Dicitur ergo diabolus generare peccantes, secundum quod Dominus in Evangelio: Vos, ait, ex patre diabolo estis . Quo sermone, eum dixit criminosorum patrem, cuius malignitatem convincebantur imitari; et tamen in absoluto est intellegentia, quia per hoc nomen, videlicet patris, nec diabolo sexus, nec hominibus illis aeria sit adscripta substantia. Iam igitur quid confici hinc voluerimus appareat. Si proprie numquam hominem homo iudicaretur imitari, et Apostolus per Adam omnes peccasse dixisset; ego libere praescriberem usu Scripturarum esse Apostolum vindicandum, ut quomodo Dominus diabolum dixerat patrem, qui substantia generare non poterat; ita Apostolus hominem scripsisset imitabilem, ne quid docuisse contra rationem perspicuam crederetur.
II. 53. Julian. But as the word of imitation is manifest to befit commonly diverse things; so generation truly and properly indicates the begetting substance; but not properly, but abusively, it is applied to pursuits. And yet, because this is now the usage of speaking, both what it indicates is recognized, and it is not allowed to bring prejudgment to the proper meanings. The devil, then, is said to beget those sinning, according to what the Lord says in the Gospel: You, he says, are from the devil your father (John 8:44). By which discourse he called him the father of the criminal, whose malignity they were convicted of imitating; and yet the understanding is settled, that by this name, namely of father, neither a sex is ascribed to the devil, nor an airy substance to those human beings. Now, then, let what we wished to be made up here appear. If a man were never properly judged to imitate a man, and the Apostle had said that all sinned through Adam; I would freely prescribe that the Apostle is to be vindicated by the usage of the Scriptures, so that, as the Lord had called the devil a father, who could not beget by substance; so the Apostle had written a man imitable, lest he be believed to have taught anything against clear reason.
JulianImp.2.53Augustinus. Numquid Adam prior in peccato imitabilis fuit, ut merito per illum hoc peccati genus intrasse diceretur in mundum? Nonne diabolus prior imitabilis in peccato exstitit? Per illum ergo intrasse in mundum peccatum, Apostolus diceret, si peccatum, quod imitando alii facerent, eo loco vellet intellegi.
Augustine. Was Adam imitable in sin earlier, so that it might deservedly be said that through him this kind of sin entered the world? Was not the devil earlier imitable in sin? Through him, then, the Apostle would say sin entered the world, if he wished the sin which others would do by imitating to be understood in that place.
JulianImp.2.53II. 54. Iulianus. Nunc vero si colligam, quae sunt in Evangelio abusive prolata, non sustinent; multo magis apostolus Paulus nullam errori occasionem praebuit, qui nihil dixit improprium, si pronuntiavit, peccatorem primum hominem sequentibus peccantibus exemplum fuisse.
II. 54. Julian. But now, if I gather the things which are brought forth abusively in the Gospel, they do not bear it; much more the apostle Paul offered no occasion for error, who said nothing improper, if he declared that the first man, a sinner, was an example to the sinners following.
JulianImp.2.54Augustinus. Non ergo debuit istos duos proponere, unum ad peccatum, alterum ad iustitiam, Adam scilicet, et Christum. Si enim primum peccatorem, propter peccatum quod imitati sunt ceteri, posuisset Adam; profecto primum iustum, propter iustitiam ceteris imitandum, non Christum poneret, sed Abel; primus quippe Abel, nullum hominum imitans, sed ceteris imitandus, iustus fuit. Sciens autem quod loqueretur, Apostolus Adam posuit ad peccatum, Christum ad iustitiam; quia illum noverat generationis, istum regenerationis auctorem.
Augustine. He ought not, then, to have proposed these two, one for sin, the other for justice, namely Adam and Christ. For if he had set down Adam as the first sinner, on account of the sin which the rest imitated; he would certainly set down as the first just one, on account of the justice to be imitated by the rest, not Christ, but Abel; for Abel first, imitating no human being, but to be imitated by the rest, was just. But knowing what he was speaking, the Apostle set down Adam for sin, Christ for justice; because he knew the former the author of generation, the latter of regeneration.
JulianImp.2.54II. 55. Iulianus. Ac per hoc bardissime argumentatus es, quod si apostolus Paulus per imitationem transisse peccatum voluisset intellegi, diabolum magis quam Adam nominasset; cum clareat, et hominis et diaboli malum non nisi imitatione transire potuisse. Verum disiecto quod tu exstruxeras, non tam meis quam ipsius rationis manibus, quid nunc a nobis afferatur attende.
II. 55. Julian. And through this you have argued most dully, that if the apostle Paul had wished it to be understood that sin passed through imitation, he would have named the devil rather than Adam; when it is clear that the evil both of a man and of the devil could pass only by imitation. But now that what you had built up is scattered, not so much by my hands as by the hands of reason itself, attend to what is now brought forward by us.
JulianImp.2.55Augustinus. Non te disiecisse quod struxeram, nec sanae rationis, sed vanae tuae opinionis manus te frustra intulisse structurae nostrae, utriusque nostrum verba qui legerint iudicabunt.
Augustine. That you did not scatter what I had built, and that you brought in upon our structure, in vain, the hands not of sound reason, but of your vain opinion, those who read the words of each of us will judge.
JulianImp.2.55II. 56. Iulianus. Ostendit Apostolus non a se dictum esse, peccatum generatione transisse, quando nominans hominem, adiecit: unum; unus enim numeri principium est; et ille explicans per quem diceret intrasse peccatum, non solum eum nominavit, verum etiam numeravit: Per unum, inquit, hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit . Hic autem unus praebendae imitationi sufficit, generationi implendae non sufficit. Peccatum autem transiit, sed per unum. Manifestum est, imitationem hic, non generationem coargui, quae nisi per duos fieri non potest. Aut igitur ostende, per Adam solum sine muliere generationem exstitisse; nec hoc enim ab elegantia tui abhorret ingenii; aut certe quoniam vides generationem nisi per duos constare non posse, assentire vel sero, accusatum non esse per unum numerum opus duorum. Per unum, inquit, hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, qui dixit: per unum, intellegi per duos noluit. Quid rogo, quaerebat inter haec dogmata numerus, ut Apostolus tanta cura, non solum hominem, sed unum hominem nominaret? Verum apparet cautus augusti sermo consilii, qui revelante Spiritu Sancto, temporum nostrorum praecavit et exarmavit errores; ne in infamationem quippe aliquid instituti a Deo coniugii vel benedictae fecunditatis dixisse putaretur; cum causa posceret ut peccati replicaret exordia, per eum dixit numerum transisse peccatum, qui fetibus non poterat convenire. Et certe primi homines ambo deliquerant, qui ambo merito vocantur forma posteris fuisse peccati; cur non igitur Apostolus per duos ait transisse peccatum; quod et ad fidem magis historiae congruebat? Verum nihil potuit ab eo prudentius fieri; vidit enim, si duos nominasset, qui praevaricationi initium exemplumque praestiterant, et per eos affirmasset transisse peccatum, errori occasionem patere, ut putaretur per duorum nomina coniunctionem fecunditatemque damnasse. Ideoque prudentissime unum maluit nominare, qui non sufficiens ad generationis indicium, ad signum abundaret exempli; atque imitationem accusatus gravaret, nec fecunditatem numeratus argueret. Et ut breviter quod egimus colligatur, fecunditas in primis hominibus instituta, nisi per duos agi non potest; peccatum autem Apostolus intrasse pronuntiat, sed per unum.
II. 56. Julian. The Apostle showed that it was not said by him that sin passed by generation, when, naming a man, he added: one; for one is the beginning of number; and he, explaining through whom he said sin entered, not only named him, but even numbered him: Through one, he says, man sin entered this world. But this one suffices for furnishing imitation, but does not suffice for fulfilling generation. But sin passed, but through one. It is manifest that imitation here, not generation, is convicted, which cannot come about except through two. Either, then, show that generation came about through Adam alone without the woman; for not even this is foreign to the elegance of your talent; or certainly, since you see that generation cannot stand except through two, assent at least late, that the work of two was not accused by the number one. Through one, he says, man sin entered the world; he who said through one was unwilling that it be understood through two. What, I ask, was the number seeking among these teachings, that the Apostle with so great care should name not only a man, but one man? But the cautious discourse of an august counsel appears, which, with the Holy Spirit revealing, forestalled and disarmed the errors of our times; for, lest he be thought to have said anything to the defaming either of marriage instituted by God or of blessed fecundity; when the case demanded that he repeat the beginnings of sin, he said that sin passed through that number which could not befit offspring. And certainly the first human beings had both offended, who both are deservedly called to have been a form of sin to posterity; why, then, did the Apostle not say that sin passed through two; which would also accord more with the faith of the history? But nothing could be done by him more prudently; for he saw that, if he had named two, who had furnished the beginning and example to the transgression, and had affirmed that through them sin passed, an occasion would lie open for error, that he might be thought to have condemned, through the names of two, union and fecundity. And therefore most prudently he preferred to name one, who, not sufficing for the indication of generation, would abound for the sign of an example; and, being accused, would burden imitation, but, being numbered, would not accuse fecundity. And that what we have done may be gathered briefly, the fecundity instituted in the first human beings cannot be carried on except through two; but the Apostle declares that sin entered, but through one.
JulianImp.2.56Augustinus. Praedixeram te nihil esse dicturum; et ita esse, cuivis tardissimo clarum est. Numquid enim Evam non imitantur peccantes, aut peccatum generis humani non magis ex ipsa sumpsit initium? A muliere initium factum est peccati, et propter illam, sicut scriptum est, morimur omnes . Cur ergo non vis attendere, propterea potius Apostolum unum dixisse hominem, per quem peccatum intravit in mundum, quia non imitationem, sed generationem volebat intellegi? Sicut enim a muliere initium peccati fuit, sic initium generationis a viro est; prior enim vir seminat, ut femina pariat; ideo per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum , quia per semen generationis intravit, quod a viro excipiens concepit femina; quo more nasci noluit, qui solus sine peccato est natus ex femina.
Augustine. I had foretold that you would say nothing; and that it is so is clear to anyone, however slow. For do not the sinning imitate Eve, or did not the sin of the human race rather take its beginning from her? From a woman was the beginning of sin, and on account of her, as it is written, we all die (Sir 25:24). Why, then, do you not wish to attend that the Apostle for this reason rather said one man, through whom sin entered the world, because he wished not imitation, but generation, to be understood? For just as from a woman was the beginning of sin, so the beginning of generation is from the man; for the man first sows, that the woman may bear; therefore through one man sin entered the world, because it entered through the seed of generation, which the woman, receiving from the man, conceived; in which manner he was unwilling to be born, who alone was born of a woman without sin.
JulianImp.2.56II. 57. Iulianus. Irrefutabiliter confectum est, peccatum illud ostendi ab Apostolo moribus ad posteros, non seminibus fuisse devectum. Quanta ergo de ore tuo effluxerit falsitas, intuere: Sed ideo " per unum hominem " Apostolus dixit, a quo generatio utique hominum coepit, ut per generationem doceret isse per omnes originale peccatum ; cum ideo Apostolus per unum hominem dixerit, ne putaretur isse per omnes originale peccatum. Ineptis ita, ut vix teneam cachinnum, qui dicis generationem ab uno homine coepisse; cum et diversitas sexuum, et lectio divina testetur, generationem non esse potuisse, nisi duo prius homines, id est vir et mulier, exstitissent.
II. 57. Julian. It has been irrefutably made up, that that sin is shown by the Apostle to have been conveyed to posterity by morals, not by seeds. Behold, then, how great a falsity has flowed from your mouth: But for this reason the Apostle said "through one man "—from whom certainly the generation of human beings began—that through generation he might teach that original sin went through all; when for this reason the Apostle said through one man, lest original sin be thought to have gone through all. You play the fool so that I can scarcely hold back a laugh, you who say that generation began from one man; when both the diversity of the sexes and the divine reading testify that generation could not have been, unless two human beings, that is, a man and a woman, had first existed.
JulianImp.2.57Augustinus. Qui hoc legunt, legant iterum superiorem responsionem meam; aut, si eius bene meminerunt, deliramenta huius irrideant. Quamvis possem dicere, ideo non duos, sed unum hominem dixisse Apostolum, per quem peccatum intravit in mundum, quia scriptum est: Erunt duo in carne una ; unde Dominus ait: Igitur iam non sunt duo, sed una caro ; maxime quando vir adhaeret uxori, et initur concubitus. De concubitu autem proles gignitur, trahens originale peccatum, vitio propagante vitium, Deo creante naturam; quam naturam coniuges, etiam bene utentes vitio, non possunt tamen ita generare, ut possit esse sine vitio; quod ille qui sine ipso natus est vitio, evacuat in parvulis, etiam nolente Iuliano.
Augustine. Those who read this, let them read again my earlier response; or, if they remember it well, let them laugh at the ravings of this man. Although I could say that for this reason the Apostle said not two, but one man, through whom sin entered the world, because it is written: They shall be two in one flesh (Gen 2:24); whence the Lord says: Therefore they are now no longer two, but one flesh (Matt 19:6); especially when the man clings to his wife, and intercourse is entered upon. But from intercourse offspring is begotten, drawing original sin, with vice propagating vice, with God creating the nature; which nature spouses, even using the vice well, cannot nevertheless so beget that it can be without the vice; which he who was born without that vice empties out in little ones, even with Julian unwilling.
JulianImp.2.57II. 58. Iulianus. Aut si forte (quoniam aliter dogma tuum stare non potest) Adam ex se concepisse et peperisse responderis; Apostolum quidem non hoc sensisse nulli dubium; tu vero, quid sexui tuo volueris evenire, monstrabis.
II. 58. Julian. Or if perhaps (since your teaching cannot otherwise stand) you answer that Adam conceived and gave birth from himself; that the Apostle did not mean this, no one doubts; but you will show what you wished to happen to your own sex.
JulianImp.2.58Augustinus. Non expavescis quod scriptum est: Neque maledici regnum Dei possidebunt ? Neque enim tam foeda convicia nihil te adiuvantia, nisi maledicendi libidine loquereris.
Augustine. Do you not dread what is written: Nor shall slanderers possess the kingdom of God (See 1 Cor 6:10)? For you would not speak such foul revilings, which help you nothing, except by the lust of slandering.
JulianImp.2.58II. 59. Iulianus. Verum haec omissa faciamus, et illud, quod a vobis apparet posse in hoc loco referri, rationis viribus deteramus. Si ergo dixeris, scriptum esse de hac commixtione, quod fiant duo in carne una, et secundum hunc modum, Apostolum per unum hominem dixisse, ut adhaerentia sibi generantium membra signaret; respondebo hoc quoque contra vestram impietatem valere. Non enim dictum est: Erunt duo homines in uno homine; sed: Erunt duo in carne una ; quo unitionis nomine voluptas illa coeuntium et libido, quae sensum afficiens membra consternat ac, sicut ille prudens intellexit, unam carnem gestit efficere, a Deo instituta et corporibus ante peccatum doceretur inserta.
II. 59. Julian. But let us pass these things over, and grind down by the powers of reason that which appears can be brought forward by you in this place. If, then, you say that it is written about this union that two become one flesh, and that according to this manner the Apostle said through one man, so as to signify the clinging members of those begetting; I will answer that this too avails against your impiety. For it was not said: There will be two human beings in one human being; but: They will be two in one flesh (Gen 2:24); by which name of union that pleasure of those copulating, and the lust which, affecting the sense, prostrates the members and, as that prudent man understood, strives to make one flesh, would be taught to have been instituted by God and inserted into bodies before sin.
JulianImp.2.59Augustinus. Si ut essent duo in carne una, facere nisi libido non posset (quam susceptam tuam talem prorsus, qualis nunc a te et laudatur et expugnatur, quam pudendam confiteris et sine pudore sic diligis, audes etiam paradisi possessione dotare); nullo modo etiam in Christo et in Ecclesia posset intellegi: Erunt duo in carne una. Neque enim tam longe exorbitas a veritatis via, ut etiam coniunctioni Christi et Ecclesiae, hanc audeas importare libidinem. Porro, si possunt sine ista esse duo in carne una Christus et Ecclesia, potuerunt etiam vir et uxor, si nemo peccasset, non pudenda libidine, de qua erubescit et qui eam laudare non erubescit, sed merito laudanda caritate coniungi, et filiorum procreandorum causa esse duo in carne una. Unde Dominus cum dicit: Igitur iam non sunt duo, sed una caro ; non utique dicit: Non sunt duae, sed una caro. Quid ergo non sunt duo, nisi homines? Sicut Christus et Ecclesia simul non duo Christi, sed unus est Christus; unde et nobis dictum est: Ergo Abrahae semen estis ; cum de illo dictum sit Abraham: Et semini tuo, quod est Christus .
Augustine. If only lust could bring it about that there be two in one flesh (which, as you have taken it up, is exactly such as is now both praised and assailed by you, which you confess to be shameful and yet without shame so love that you dare even to endow it with the possession of paradise); it could in no way be understood also of Christ and the Church: They will be two in one flesh. For you do not stray so far from the way of truth that you would dare to bring this lust even into the union of Christ and the Church. Furthermore, if Christ and the Church can be two in one flesh without it, the man and the wife too could, if no one had sinned, be joined not by shameful lust—at which even he blushes who does not blush to praise it—but by deservedly praiseworthy love, and for the cause of procreating children be two in one flesh. Whence the Lord, when he says: Therefore they are now no longer two, but one flesh (Matt 19:6); does not say: There are not two, but one flesh. What, then, are they not two, except human beings? Just as Christ and the Church together are not two Christs, but one Christ; whence it was said to us too: Therefore you are the seed of Abraham (Gal 3:29); since it was said about Abraham: And to your seed, which is Christ (Gal 3:16).
JulianImp.2.59II. 60. Iulianus. Ac per hoc nihil sibi vel de iucunditate eius, vel de verecundia potest diabolus vindicare.
II. 60. Julian. And through this the devil can claim nothing for himself either of its pleasantness or of its shame.
JulianImp.2.60Augustinus. Quid est quod dicis: de verecundia? An confusionem nominare confunderis? Et tamen pudendam libidinem, et ante peccatum fuisse dicis in eis, de quibus dicit Scriptura: Nudi erant, et non confundebantur .
Augustine. What is it that you say: of its shame? Or are you ashamed to name confusion? And yet you say that shameful lust existed even before sin in those of whom Scripture says: They were naked, and were not confounded (Gen 2:25).
JulianImp.2.60II. 61. Iulianus. Verumtamen hic Apostolus si quid tale sensisset, per unam carnem, non per unum hominem peccatum intrasse dixisset. Per generationem vero substantia carnis soboli sola participat; quia non anima de anima, sed caro de carne trahitur; in nomine autem hominis, et animus proprie iudicatur et corpus, ac per hoc Apostolus unum hominem nominando, nec negotium fecunditatis ostendit, in quo nihil praeter substantiam carnis impertiri noverat; nec duos intellegi voluit, qui unum inculcavit, ut doceret imitatione transisse, non generatione peccatum.
II. 61. Julian. Yet here, if the Apostle had meant anything such, he would have said that sin entered through one flesh, not through one man. But by generation only the substance of the flesh shares in the offspring; because not soul is drawn from soul, but flesh from flesh; but in the name of man both the mind properly is judged and the body, and through this the Apostle, by naming one man, neither showed the business of fecundity, in which he knew that nothing but the substance of the flesh is imparted; nor wished two to be understood, who drove home one, that he might teach that sin passed by imitation, not by generation.
JulianImp.2.61Augustinus. Quid est ergo: Iam non sunt duo, sed una caro , nisi: Non sunt duo homines, propter unam carnem? Cum et ipsa caro possit dici homo, a parte totum; sicut: Verbum caro factum est ; quia homo factus est, de quo dictum est. Apostolus etiam quod ait: Exterior homo corrumpitur ; puto quod carnem intellegi voluit. Propter quod recte loquimur, cum dicimus: Hominis sepulchrum; quamvis caro ibi sola sepulta sit. Nec erravit quae dixit: Tulerunt Dominum meum de monumento ; quamvis sola caro ibi posita fuerit. Manente ergo de anima obscurissima quaestione, potuit dici: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum ; etiamsi ad propaginem sola caro pertineat. Haec itaque attende, et quam nihil dixeris vide.
Augustine. What is it, then: They are now no longer two, but one flesh, except: They are not two human beings, on account of the one flesh? Since flesh itself too can be called a man, the whole from a part; just as: The Word was made flesh (John 1:14); because he was made a man, of whom it was said. The Apostle too, where he says: The outer man is corrupted (2 Cor 4:16); I think wished the flesh to be understood. On account of which we rightly speak, when we say: A man's tomb; although only the flesh is buried there. Nor did she err who said: They have taken away my Lord from the monument (John 20:13); although only the flesh had been placed there. With the most obscure question about the soul remaining, then, it could be said: Through one man sin entered the world; even if only the flesh pertains to the propagation. Attend, then, to these things, and see how you have said nothing.
JulianImp.2.61II. 62. Iulianus. Hic iam licet egerit partes suas veritas, tamen ut sit intentus lector, admoneo. Plurimum igitur in hoc conflictu de meo iure deposui, secutusque quo adversarii temeritas provocaverat, adeo sanae fidei scita defendi, ut etiamsi Magistri Gentium verba essent, quibus illum usum Traducianus putavit; liqueret tamen eum nihil de naturali sensisse peccato, qui nominando hominem, sed unum, non utique generationem criminis, sed exempla culpasset.
II. 62. Julian. Here, although truth has now played its part, yet, that the reader may be attentive, I give warning. I have, then, laid down very much of my own right in this conflict, and, following whither the rashness of my adversary had provoked, I so defended the decrees of the sound faith that, even if they were the words of the Teacher of the Gentiles which the Traducianist thought he used; it would yet be clear that he meant nothing about natural sin, who, by naming a man, but one, certainly blamed not the generation of crime, but examples.
JulianImp.2.62Augustinus. Exemplum dedisti, sed vanitatis in te ipso, quia, si exemplum peccati a primo peccatore homine Apostolus poneret, id est, Adam; profecto exemplum iustitiae a primo homine iusto poneret, id est, Abel.
Augustine. You have given an example, but of vanity in yourself, because, if the Apostle set down an example of sin from the first sinner man, that is, Adam; he would certainly set down an example of justice from the first just man, that is, Abel.
JulianImp.2.62II. 63. Iulianus. Constat autem non esse apostolicorum verborum eum ordinem, quem inimicus noster putavit. Argumentatur quippe hoc modo: Si Apostolus imitationem, inquit, voluisset intellegi, non " per unum hominem " , sed per diabolum peccatum intrasse, et per omnes homines pertransisse dixisset. De diabolo quippe scriptum est: " Imitantur eum, qui sunt ex parte eius " . Sed ideo " per unum hominem " dixit, a quo generatio utique hominum coepit ut per generationem doceret isse per omnes originale peccatum . In hoc ergo mentitur, quod affirmat beatum Paulum pronuntiasse, quia per unum hominem peccatum intraverit in mundum, atque ita in omnes homines pertransierit; hoc, inquam, in Magistri Gentium sermonibus non tenetur; ille quippe non dixit peccatum transisse, sed mortem. Est ergo ordo verborum: Sicut per unum hominem peccatum in mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt . Sublimis informator Ecclesiae, quid sibi dicendum esset expendit: Per unum, inquit, hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit. Iam nominaverat mortem, atque peccatum; quid fuit necesse ut in eo quod pertransisse dicebat, mortem a peccati communione separaret, ut signanter ostenderet, in hunc quidem mundum per unum hominem intrasse peccatum, et per peccatum mortem; in omnes vero homines non peccatum transisse, sed mortem, utique iudicii illatam severitate, praevaricationis ultricem, non corporum semina, sed morum vitia persequentem; nisi quia commendare et praemunire curavit, ne vestro dogmati opitulatus aliquid putaretur?
II. 63. Julian. But it is established that the order of the apostolic words is not that which our enemy thought. For he argues in this way: If the Apostle, he says, had wished imitation to be understood, he would have said that sin entered, and passed through all human beings, not "through one man ", but through the devil. For about the devil it is written: "They imitate him, who are of his part ". But for this reason he said "through one man "—from whom certainly the generation of human beings began—that through generation he might teach that original sin went through all. In this, then, he lies, that he affirms the blessed Paul declared that through one man sin entered the world, and so passed into all human beings; this, I say, is not held in the discourses of the Teacher of the Gentiles; for he did not say that sin passed, but death. The order of the words, then, is: As through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12). The sublime instructor of the Church weighed what was to be said by him: Through one, he says, man sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings. He had already named death and sin; what was the need that, in that which he said passed, he should separate death from the fellowship of sin, so as significantly to show that into this world indeed through one man sin entered, and through sin death; but that into all human beings not sin passed, but death, certainly brought in by the severity of judgment, the avenger of transgression, pursuing not the seeds of bodies, but the vices of morals; unless because he took care to commend and forearm, lest he be thought to have aided your teaching in anything?
JulianImp.2.63Augustinus. In eo quidem loco, ubi dictum est: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit; utrum peccatum, an mors, an utrumque per omnes homines pertransisse dictum sit, videtur ambiguum; sed quid horum sit, res ipsa tam aperta demonstrat. Nam si peccatum non pertransisset, non omnis homo cum lege peccati, quae in membris est, nasceretur; si mors non pertransisset, non omnes homines, quantum ad istam conditionem mortalium pertinet, morerentur. Quod autem dicit Apostolus: In quo omnes peccaverunt; in quo, non intellegitur nisi in Adam, in quo eos dicit et mori; quia non erat iustum, sine crimine transire supplicium. Quacumque te vertas, nullo modo catholicae fidei fundamenta subvertes; praesertim quia et tu ipse tibi adversaris, qui nunc dicis non peccatum transisse, sed mortem; cum superius dixeris, Apostolum ideo non duos homines, sed unum inculcasse, ut doceret imitatione transisse, non generatione peccatum . Transiit ergo cum morte peccatum; quid est quod nunc dicis, non peccatum transisse, sed mortem?
Augustine. In that place indeed, where it was said: Through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings; whether sin, or death, or both, is said to have passed into all human beings, seems ambiguous; but which of these it is, the matter itself, so open, demonstrates. For if sin had not passed, not every human being would be born with the law of sin which is in the members; if death had not passed, not all human beings, as far as concerns this condition of mortals, would die. But as for what the Apostle says: In whom all sinned; in whom, is understood as none other than in Adam, in whom he says they also die; because it was not just that punishment pass without crime. Wherever you turn, in no way will you subvert the foundations of the catholic faith; especially because you yourself too are at odds with yourself, who now say that not sin passed, but death; when above you said that the Apostle for this reason drove home not two human beings, but one, that he might teach that sin passed by imitation, not by generation. Sin passed, then, with death; what is it that you now say, that not sin passed, but death?
JulianImp.2.63II. 64. Iulianus. Quantum igitur inter te et Paulum distet, intende. Ille dicit: Per unum hominem , tu: Per duos, id est, per generationem. Ille pronuntiat, in primo homine et peccatum et mortem fuisse, ad posteros vero solam transisse mortem; tu contra asseris, et peccatum ad omnes et interitum cucurrisse.
II. 64. Julian. See, then, how far you stand from Paul. He says: Through one man; you: Through two, that is, through generation. He declares that in the first man there were both sin and death, but that to posterity death alone passed; you assert, on the contrary, that both sin and destruction ran to all.
JulianImp.2.64Augustinus. Iam responsum est: relegant qui volunt, quae supra diximus, ne superfluo eadem iterum iterumque repetamus.
Augustine. It has already been answered: let those who wish reread the things we said above, lest we superfluously repeat the same things again and again.
JulianImp.2.64II. 65. Iulianus. Impudenter igitur sub umbra eius nominis delitescis, cum nimis diversa contrariaque dicatis. Ille enim arguit opus hominum, tu opus Dei; ille studia delinquentium, tu innocentiam vitamque nascentium; ille voluntatem hominum, tu naturam.
II. 65. Julian. Shamelessly, then, do you lurk under the shadow of his name, since you say things too diverse and contrary. For he accuses the work of human beings, you the work of God; he the pursuits of offenders, you the innocence and life of those being born; he the will of human beings, you nature.
JulianImp.2.65Augustinus. Superius ad omnia ista responsum est; unde iam te irridet qui meminit; qui vero non meminit, si illa relegerit, profecto ista tua vana cum irriserit, te dolebit.
Augustine. Above, to all these things it has been answered; whence now he who remembers laughs at you; but he who does not remember, if he rereads those things, will surely, when he has laughed at these vain things of yours, grieve over you.
JulianImp.2.65II. 66. Iulianus. Intravit igitur, secundum Apostolum, per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum et per peccatum mors, quoniam illum et reum et damnationi mortis perpetuae destinatum mundus aspexit. In omnes autem homines mors pertransiit, quia una forma iudicii praevaricatores quosque etiam reliquae comprehendit aetatis; quae tamen mors nec in sanctos nec in innocentes ullos saevire permittitur, sed in eos pervadit, quos praevaricationem viderit aemulatos .
II. 66. Julian. Through one man, then, according to the Apostle, sin entered this world, and through sin death, since the world beheld him both guilty and destined to the condemnation of perpetual death. But into all human beings death passed, because one form of judgment comprehended any transgressors even of the remaining age; which death, however, is not permitted to rage either against the saints or against any innocent ones, but invades those whom it has seen to have emulated the transgression.
JulianImp.2.66Augustinus. Hoc loqueris, quod obiectum est haeresiarchae vestro Pelagio in episcopali iudicio Palaestino, quod ita factus fuerit Adam ut, sive peccaret sive non peccaret, moriturus esset. Hanc enim mortem, qua omnes morimur, de qua dictum est: A muliere initium factum est peccati et propter illam omnes morimur , non vis ex peccato in omnes fecisse originaliter transitum, ne cogaris fateri simul etiam originaliter transisse peccatum; sentis quippe, quam iniquum sit sine merito transisse supplicium. Verumtamen tam catholicum est, quod expugnare conaris, ut hoc ille, cui sicut dixi, obiectum est, nisi damnasset, profecto ex illo iudicio damnatus exisset. Mors ergo et ista, qua spiritus a corpore separatur, et illa, quae dicitur secunda, qua spiritus cum corpore cruciabitur, quantum attinet ad meritum generis humani, in omnes homines pertransiit; sed gratia Dei per eum, qui venit, ut moriendo regnum mortis auferret, ea resurrectione, cuius in illo praecessit exemplum, mortem regnare non sivit. Hoc tenet catholica fides, hoc tenent iudices, quos Pelagius formidavit, hoc non tenent haeretici, quos Pelagius seminavit.
Augustine. You speak that which was objected to your heresiarch Pelagius in the episcopal judgment of Palestine, that Adam was so made that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he would die. For this death, by which we all die, of which it was said: From a woman was the beginning of sin, and on account of her we all die (Sir 25:24), you are unwilling that it made its passage from sin into all originally, lest you be compelled to confess that sin too passed originally at the same time; for you perceive how unjust it is that punishment passed without deserving. Yet so catholic is that which you try to assail, that, unless that man to whom, as I said, it was objected had condemned it, he would certainly have gone out condemned from that judgment. Death, then, both this by which the spirit is separated from the body, and that which is called the second, by which the spirit will be tormented with the body, as far as concerns the deserving of the human race, passed into all human beings; but the grace of God, through him who came that by dying he might take away the kingdom of death, by that resurrection, the example of which went before in him, did not allow death to reign. This the catholic faith holds, this the judges hold whom Pelagius dreaded, this the heretics do not hold whom Pelagius sowed.
JulianImp.2.66II. 67. Iulianus. Quae praevaricatio licet non sit facta naturalis, fuit tamen forma peccati atque ob hoc licet non aggravet nascentes, tamen accusat imitantes.
II. 67. Julian. Which transgression, although it did not become natural, was yet a form of sin, and on this account, although it does not weigh down those being born, yet accuses those imitating.
JulianImp.2.67Augustinus. Et si tu oblitus es grave iugum, quod aggravat nascentes, nos te non desistimus commonere.
Augustine. And if you have forgotten the heavy yoke which weighs down those being born, we do not cease to remind you of it.
JulianImp.2.67II. 68. Iulianus. Mors autem iudicialis transiit in eo, in quo peccaverunt omnes, sed libera voluntate; quo verbo, id est omnes Scripturarum more multitudo, non universitas indicatur.
II. 68. Julian. But judicial death passed in him in whom all sinned, but by free will; by which word, that is, all, according to the custom of the Scriptures, a multitude, not the totality, is indicated.
JulianImp.2.68Augustinus. Frustra recta verba torquere et clara obscurare conaris: in eo peccaverunt omnes, in quo moriuntur omnes. Ipse est Adam, in quo si parvuli non moriuntur, profecto nec in Christo vivificabuntur; sed quoniam, sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur , ideo qui volunt haec verba pervertere, ipsi eis manentibus evertuntur.
Augustine. In vain you try to twist right words and obscure clear ones: in him all sinned, in whom all die. It is Adam himself, in whom, if little ones do not die, surely neither will they be vivified in Christ; but since, as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive (1 Cor 15:22), therefore those who wish to pervert these words are themselves overturned, while they remain.
JulianImp.2.68II. 69. Iulianus. Sed iam pergamus ad reliqua, ut, cui dogmati Apostolus concinat, sicut ex multa parte claruit, processibus sacri sermonis ostendat. Quid autem aliud indicant etiam sequentia verba apostolica? Cum enim hoc dixisset, adiunxit: " Usque ad legem peccatum in mundo fuit ", id est quia nec lex potuit auferre peccatum; " peccatum autem non deputabatur, cum lex non esset " . Erat ergo, sed non deputabatur, quia non ostendebatur, quod deputaretur; sicut enim alibi dicit: " Per legem cognitio peccati , sed regnavit - inquit - mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen ", hoc est, quod supra dixerat:" usque ad legem "; non usque ad Moysen, ut deinceps non esset peccatum, sed quia nec lex per Moysen data regnum potuit mortis auferre, quae non regnat utique nisi per peccatum. Regnum porro eius est, ut hominem mortalem in secundam etiam, quae sempiterna est, praecipitet mortem. " Regnavit autem ". In quibus? " Etiam in his - inquit - qui non peccaverunt in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, qui est forma futuri " . Cuius futuri nisi Christi? Et qualis forma nisi a contrario? Quod alibi etiam dicit: " Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita in Christo omnes vivificabuntur " . Sicut in illo illud, ita in isto istud; ipsa est forma. Sed haec forma non omni ex parte conformis est; unde hic Apostolus secutus adiunxit: " Sed non sicut delictum ita et donatio; si enim ob unius delictum multi mortui sunt, multo magis gratia Dei et donum in gratia unius hominis Iesu Christi in multos abundavit " . Quid est: " multo magis abundavit "? Quia omnes, qui per Christum liberantur, temporaliter propter Adam moriuntur, propter ipsum autem Christum sine fine victuri sunt . Nihil aliud consequentibus Apostoli sermonibus indicari professus es quam originale peccatum; quod nos approbavimus ipso sui exordio non ab eo ostensum fuisse, quia per unum, non per duos peccatum transisse signaverat.
II. 69. Julian. But let us now proceed to the rest, that, with what teaching the Apostle is in harmony, as has become clear in great part, he may show by the progress of the sacred discourse. But what else do the following apostolic words too indicate? For when he had said this, he added: "Until the law sin was in the world ", that is, because not even the law could take away sin; "but sin was not imputed, when there was no law " (Rom 5:13). It was, then, but was not imputed, because it was not shown that it might be imputed; for, as he says elsewhere: "Through the law the knowledge of sin " (Rom 3:20), but death—he says—reigned from Adam until Moses " (Rom 5:14), that is, what he had said above: "until the law "; not until Moses, that thereafter there should be no sin, but because not even the law given through Moses could take away the kingdom of death, which certainly reigns only through sin. But its reign is to hurl mortal man even into the second death, which is everlasting. "But it reigned ". In whom? "Even in those—he says—who did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, who is a form of the future one " (Rom 5:14). Of what future one except Christ? And what kind of form except from the contrary? Which he says elsewhere too: "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive " (1 Cor 15:22). As in the one that, so in the other this; this is the form. But this form is not in every part conformable; whence the Apostle here, continuing, added: "But not as the offense, so also the gift; for if by the offense of one many have died, much more the grace of God and the gift in the grace of the one man Jesus Christ has abounded unto many " (Rom 5:15). What is: "much more it abounded "? Because all who are freed through Christ die temporally on account of Adam, but on account of Christ himself will live without end. You professed that nothing else is indicated by the Apostle's following discourses than original sin; which we have shown was not shown by him at its very beginning, because he had signified that sin passed through one, not through two.
JulianImp.2.69Augustinus. Iam responsum est et adhuc tu vana loqueris, neque hoc mirum est; adhuc enim, quid responderim, nescis. Tunc eris impudentior, quando scieris, si vanis relictis vera tenere nolueris.
Augustine. It has already been answered, and still you speak vain things, nor is this a wonder; for you do not yet know what I have answered. Then you will be more shameless, when you have known, if, leaving the vain things, you are unwilling to hold the true.
JulianImp.2.69II. 70. Iulianus. Verumtamen utrum id, quod praeterierat, vel nunc intimet, expendendum est. Usque ad legem - inquit - peccatum in mundo . Tu dicis, quia hoc peccatum Apostolus naturale voluerit intellegi; quaero ergo, si usque ad legem fuit, cur desierit esse post legem. Neque enim acquiesco, ut usque ad legem usque ad finem eius potius quam usque ad exortum intellegam; mecum facit verbi proprietas: quod dicit usque ad legem fuisse, ostendit non esse post legem et, quodcumque tempore ablatum est, naturale non fuit. Quod ergo infregit censura legis et infringendo ex multa parte restinxit, imitatione apparet, non generatione susceptum.
II. 70. Julian. Yet whether it intimates even now that which it had passed over, must be weighed. Until the law—he says—sin was in the world. You say that the Apostle wished this sin to be understood as natural; I ask, then, if it was until the law, why did it cease to be after the law. For I do not acquiesce that I should understand until the law as until its end rather than until its beginning; the propriety of the word makes with me: what he says, that it was until the law, shows that it is not after the law; and whatever is taken away in time was not natural. What, then, the censure of the law broke and, by breaking, in great part extinguished, appears to have been taken up by imitation, not by generation.
JulianImp.2.70Augustinus. O intellectum, quid aliud dicam quam haereticum! Si ergo lex abstulit peccatum, quia sic vis intellegi usque ad legem, fuit ergo per legem iustitia. Si per legem iustitia, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est . Si autem peccatum lex non abstulit, ut non esset, quod prius eam fecisse dixeras et mox te paenituit, sed tamen peccatum lex infregit, ut postea correxisti, et ex multa parte restinxit, mentitus est qui ait: Lex subintravit, ut abundaret delictum ; sed quia ille verum dixit, tu nihil dicis et tamen nihil dicendo haeretica pertinacia contradicis.
Augustine. O what an understanding—what else shall I call it than heretical! If, then, the law took away sin, because you want until the law so to be understood, then justice was through the law. If justice through the law, then Christ died for nothing (Gal 2:21). But if the law did not take away sin, so that it should not be—which you had said before it did, and soon repented—but yet the law broke sin, as you afterward corrected, and in great part extinguished it, he lied who said: The law entered in, that the offense might abound (Rom 5:20); but because he spoke the truth, you say nothing, and yet, by saying nothing, with heretical pertinacity you contradict.
JulianImp.2.70II. 71. Iulianus. Verum ne videar hic nimis tecum agere tenaciter, acquiescamus, quod usque ad legem usque ad Christum possit intellegi; concedis ergo peccatum hoc, quod dicis originale, non esse post Christum. Et quomodo et in Apostolorum membris et in omnibus baptizatis et usque hodie post tot saecula adventus Christi opus diaboli, fruticem adversariae potestatis, legemque peccati manere, vigere, vivere dicis?
II. 71. Julian. But lest I seem here to deal too tenaciously with you, let us acquiesce that until the law can be understood as until Christ; you concede, then, that this sin which you call original is not after Christ. And how do you say that in the members of the Apostles, and in all the baptized, and even today, after so many ages of the coming of Christ, the work of the devil, the shrub of the adverse power, and the law of sin remains, flourishes, lives?
JulianImp.2.71Augustinus. Non hoc dico; nihil dicis. Aliud est peccatum, aliud concupiscentia peccati, cui non consentit, qui per gratiam Dei non peccat, quamvis et ipsa concupiscentia peccati vocetur peccatum, quia peccato facta est, sicut scriptura quaelibet manus eius dicitur, cuius manu facta est. De quo autem dictum est: Ecce Agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccata mundi , ipse reatum peccati, quod generatione trahitur, regeneratione dissolvit; ipse spiritum donans facit non regnare peccatum in nostro mortali corpore ad oboediendum concupiscentiis eius ; ipse quotidiana indulgentia, propter quam quotidie dicimus: Dimitte nobis debita nostra , si quid concupiscentia peccati etiam bene resistendo certantibus male persuaserit, misericors delet; ipse gravi ruina elisos erigit paenitentes; ipse, ubi non possit omnino peccari, perducet constituetque regnantes, quando dicetur : Ubi est, mors, contentio tua? Ubi est, mors, aculeus tuus? Aculeus autem mortis est peccatum . Ecce quomodo peccatum mundi Agnus ille Dei tollit, quod lex auferre non potuit.
Augustine. I do not say this; you say nothing. Sin is one thing, the concupiscence of sin another, to which he does not consent who through the grace of God does not sin, although the concupiscence of sin itself too is called sin, because it was made by sin, just as any writing is called the hand of him by whose hand it was made. But about him of whom it was said: Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who takes away the sins of the world (John 1:29), he himself dissolves by regeneration the guilt of the sin which is drawn by generation; he himself, by giving the spirit, brings it about that sin does not reign in our mortal body to obey its concupiscences (See Rom 6:12); he himself, by daily indulgence, on account of which we daily say: Forgive us our debts (Matt 6:12), mercifully blots out whatever the concupiscence of sin has ill-persuaded even those striving and resisting well; he himself raises up, repenting, those dashed down by a grave ruin; he himself, where one cannot sin at all, will lead and establish those reigning, when it will be said: Where, O death, is your contention? Where, O death, is your sting? But the sting of death is sin (1 Cor 15:55-56). Behold how that Lamb of God takes away the sin of the world, which the law could not take away.
JulianImp.2.71II. 72. Iulianus. Verum videamus et reliqua. Peccatum autem non deputabatur, ait Apostolus, cum lex non esset ; post quod tu subdis: Erat ergo, sed non deputabatur, sicut alibi dicit: " Per legem cognitio peccati " . Si ergo per legem peccati est facta cognitio et peccatum traducis ante legem non imputabatur, ostende hoc imputatum fuisse sub lege. Nam si per legem peccati cognitio, ante legem ignoratio peccati, ambigi non potest hanc fuisse causam maximam promulgandae legis, ut proderetur et caveretur, quod prius latebat.
II. 72. Julian. But let us see the rest too. But sin was not imputed, says the Apostle, when there was no law; after which you subjoin: It was, then, but was not imputed, as he says elsewhere: "Through the law the knowledge of sin ". If, then, through the law the knowledge of sin was made, and the sin of your transmission was not imputed before the law, show that this was imputed under the law. For if through the law there is the knowledge of sin, before the law the ignorance of sin, it cannot be doubted that this was the greatest cause of promulgating the law, that what before lay hidden might be brought forth and guarded against.
JulianImp.2.72Augustinus. Ut proderetur, verum dicis, hoc et nos dicimus; ut autem caveretur, non lex sed gratia, non littera sed spiritus fecit; lex enim subintravit, non ut caveretur, sed ut abundaret peccatum et superabundaret gratia, qua peccatum et deleretur factum et, ne fieret, caveretur.
Augustine. That it might be brought forth, you speak the truth, this we too say; but that it might be guarded against, not the law but grace, not the letter but the spirit brought about; for the law entered in, not that it might be guarded against, but that sin might abound and grace superabound, by which both the sin done might be blotted out and, that it might not be done, guarded against.
JulianImp.2.72II. 73. Iulianus. Hic sit ergo summa certaminis: aut ostende imputatum sub lege fuisse cuiquam originale peccatum, ostende fuisse monstratum, et consentiam de hoc peccato Apostolum locutum fuisse.
II. 73. Julian. Let this, then, be the sum of the contest: either show that original sin was imputed to anyone under the law, show that it was shown, and I will agree that the Apostle spoke about this sin.
JulianImp.2.73Augustinus. Ostendo quidem, quod provocas ut ostendam; sed si oculos operiatis ad ea, quae videre non vultis, et ne ab aliis videantur, nebulas contentionis offunditis? Circumcisio carnis lege praecepta est , qua non posset melius significari per Christum, regenerationis auctorem, tolli originale peccatum. Cum praeputio quippe omnis homo nascitur, quemadmodum cum originali peccato, et octavo die lex circumcidi carnem praecepit, quia Christus die dominico resurrexit, qui post septimum sabbati octavus est; et circumcisus praeputiatum gignit traiciens in illum, quo ipse iam caruit, sicut baptizatus in filium, quem generat carne, reatum tamen traicit originis, quo absolutus est ipse. Postremo in lege scriptus est Psalmus: Ego in iniquitatibus conceptus sum et in peccatis mater mea in utero me aluit . Quod videretis profecto nec auderetis aliquid contradicere, si Cypriano et Ambrosio ceterisque talibus Ecclesiae Doctoribus fidei oculos similes haberetis.
Augustine. I show indeed what you challenge me to show; but what if you close your eyes to the things which you are unwilling to see, and, lest they be seen by others, spread fogs of contention? Circumcision of the flesh was commanded by the law (See Gen 17:10-14), by which it could not better be signified that original sin is taken away through Christ, the author of regeneration. For every human being is born with a foreskin, just as with original sin, and the law commanded the flesh to be circumcised on the eighth day, because Christ rose on the Lord's day, which is the eighth after the seventh of the sabbath; and the circumcised begets one with a foreskin, transmitting into him that which he himself now lacks, just as the baptized transmits into the son whom he begets in the flesh the guilt of origin, from which he himself has been absolved. Finally, in the law is written the Psalm: I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins my mother nourished me in the womb (Ps 51:5 (50:7)). Which you would surely see, nor would you dare to contradict anything, if you had eyes of faith like those of Cyprian and Ambrose and the rest of such teachers of the Church.
JulianImp.2.73II. 74. Iulianus. Aut certe, quia hoc in lege non potest inveniri, acquiesce, impudentissime, de eo peccato loqui Apostolum, quod imitatione trahitur, voluntate committitur, ratione arguitur, lege ostenditur, aequitate punitur.
II. 74. Julian. Or certainly, because this cannot be found in the law, acquiesce, most shameless one, that the Apostle speaks about that sin which is drawn by imitation, committed by will, convicted by reason, shown by the law, punished by equity.
JulianImp.2.74Augustinus. De omni peccato, quod per Christum tollitur, dictum est: Usque ad legem peccatum in mundo fuit , quoniam lege non tollitur sive originale sive additum, sive quod erat et ante legem, sive quod etiam lege subintrante abundavit. Cum autem ais de eo peccato loqui Apostolum, quod aequitate punitur, expergiscere et vide ibi esse et originale peccatum; non enim aliter aequitas Dei grave iugum imponeret ipsis quoque exordiis parvulorum, quod iugum cura nostra saepe commemorat, ut cervicem tuam, si non inflexerit, frangat. Nam hoc peccatum etiam lege monstrari praecepto circumcisionis ostendi; quod si negas tu, doce, quo peccato proprio, si non circumcideretur, interibat anima parvuli de populo suo . Scio, non doces, sed volens nos fatigare nec taces.
Augustine. About every sin which is taken away through Christ it was said: Until the law sin was in the world, since by the law it is not taken away, whether original or added, whether that which was even before the law, or that which even with the law entering in abounded. But when you say that the Apostle speaks about that sin which is punished by equity, wake up and see that there too is original sin; for otherwise the equity of God would not impose a heavy yoke on the very beginnings of little ones too, which yoke our care often mentions, that it may, if it does not bend your neck, break it. For I have shown that this sin too is shown by the law in the precept of circumcision; which if you deny, teach by what sin of his own, if he were not circumcised, the soul of a little one would perish from his people (See Gen 17:14). I know, you do not teach, but, wishing to weary us, you are not silent either.
JulianImp.2.74II. 75. Iulianus. Ceterum, quod fingitis, originale peccatum nec per unum transmitti potest, quoniam generatio per duos agitur.
II. 75. Julian. But, as for what you invent, original sin cannot even be transmitted through one, since generation is carried on through two.
JulianImp.2.75Augustinus. Iam responsum est: lege, quae hinc a me dicta sunt, et invenies te vana dixisse.
Augustine. It has already been answered: read the things which have been said by me on this, and you will find that you have said vain things.
JulianImp.2.75II. 76. Iulianus. Nec potuit aliquando esse, si potest aliquando non esse, quia naturalia ab initio substantiae usque ad terminum illius perseverant.
II. 76. Julian. Nor could it ever have been, if it can at some time not be, because natural things persevere from the beginning of the substance to its end.
JulianImp.2.76Augustinus. Hoc et de morte posses dicere, nam etiam cum ipsa nascimur. Corpus enim mortuum est propter peccatum ; sed et si non propter peccatum, sicut desipitis, nascimur tamen sine dubitatione mortales, et tamen mors atque mortalitas non erit immortaliter viventibus nobis. Sicut ergo mors originalis est et tamen potuit esse, potest non esse melius nostra manente natura, sic et originale peccatum et potuit esse generatione tractum et potest non esse regeneratione detractum.
Augustine. This you could say also about death, for we are born even with it. For the body is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10); but even if not because of sin, as you foolishly hold, we are yet born without doubt mortal, and yet death and mortality will not be there when we live immortally. As, then, death is original and yet could be, it can not be, with our nature better remaining, so original sin both could be, drawn by generation, and can not be, taken away by regeneration.
JulianImp.2.76II. 77. Iulianus. Nec a lege ostensum est vel ostendi potuit, quia numquam legislator usque ad hanc veniret amentiam, ut praeciperet cuiquam: Noli ita vel ita nasci; et quod admoneri non decuit, ut corrigatur, iustum esse non potest, ut puniatur.
II. 77. Julian. Nor was it shown by the law, or could be shown, because never would a legislator come to such madness as to command anyone: Do not be born thus or thus; and what it was not fitting to be admonished of, that it might be corrected, it cannot be just that it be punished.
JulianImp.2.77Augustinus. Non praecipitur homini, quomodo nascatur, sed praeceptum est, quomodo ille viveret, praeceptumque violavit; a quo parente peccatum originale deducitur. Praecipitur etiam, ut infans circumcidatur, damnandus nisi circumcidatur, cui tamen non solum aliquid aliud, sed nec saltem circumcisio ipsa praecipitur; ac per hoc non quidem praecipitur homini, quo modo nascatur, mundus tamen non est a sorde peccati nec infans, cuius est unius diei vita super terram . Lege verba sancti Iob et invenies te esse mendacem loquente illo, quem Deus dixit esse veracem.
Augustine. It is not commanded a human being how he should be born, but it was commanded how that one should live, and he violated the precept; from which parent original sin is derived. It is also commanded that the infant be circumcised, to be condemned unless he is circumcised, to whom yet not only is something else not commanded, but not even circumcision itself; and through this, it is not indeed commanded a human being how he should be born, yet not even an infant, whose life upon the earth is of one day (See Job 14:4-5 LXX), is clean from the filth of sin. Read the words of holy Job, and you will find that you are a liar, with him speaking whom God said to be truthful.
JulianImp.2.77II. 78. Iulianus. Et quod usque ad legem est, ostenditur non esse post legem, ostenditur postremo non esse post Christum.
II. 78. Julian. And what is until the law is shown not to be after the law, is shown finally not to be after Christ.
JulianImp.2.78Augustinus. Ita reatus huius peccati ostenditur non esse post peccatorum abolitionem, sicut mors post carnis resurrectionem.
Augustine. Thus the guilt of this sin is shown not to be after the abolition of sins, as death after the resurrection of the flesh.
JulianImp.2.78II. 79. Iulianus. Ac per hoc secundum argumentationem quoque tuam olim non est, secundum testimonium veritatis numquam fuit.
II. 79. Julian. And through this, according to your argumentation too, it does not exist at some time; according to the testimony of truth, it never existed.
JulianImp.2.79Augustinus. O si vos non essetis, qui contra testimonium veritatis falsum testimonium vestrum et dicitis et insuper scribitis!
Augustine. O if only you did not exist, who against the testimony of truth both speak and moreover write your false testimony!
JulianImp.2.79II. 80. Iulianus. Et ut, quod egimus, inculcetur memoriae lectoris: definisti quondam peccatum et optime nihil esse aliud quam voluntatem admittendi, quod iustitia vetat et unde liberum est abstinere.
II. 80. Julian. And that what we have done may be driven home to the reader's memory: you once defined sin, and most excellently, to be nothing other than the will to commit what justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain.
JulianImp.2.80Augustinus. Iam responsum est, quod peccati sit ista definitio, non eius, quod sit et poena peccati .
Augustine. It has already been answered, that this is the definition of the sin which is not also the punishment of sin.
JulianImp.2.80II. 81. Iulianus. Quae definitio ad intellegendam quoque iustitiam Dei aperuit viam, ut censeremus aequitatem divini neutiquam stare iudicii, nisi illud imputasset in peccatum, a quo nosset liberum fuisse ei, qui propter hoc affligitur, abstinere.
II. 81. Julian. Which definition opened the way also to understanding the justice of God, so that we judged that the equity of the divine judgment in no way stands, unless it had imputed as sin that from which it knew it was free for him, who on account of this is afflicted, to abstain.
JulianImp.2.81Augustinus. Propter quid ergo affliguntur parvuli, si nullum habent omnino peccatum? An omnipotens et iustus Deus iniustas poenas a tot innocentibus prohibere non potuit?
Augustine. On account of what, then, are little ones afflicted, if they have no sin at all? Or could the almighty and just God not forbid unjust punishments from so many innocents?
JulianImp.2.81II. 82. Iulianus. Magistrum vero Gentium rationem privilegio auctoritatis armantem pronuntiasse, quia per unum hominem in hunc mundum culpa transierit, quo nomine separavit opera nuptiarum, quae sine duorum negotio esse non possunt, commendavimusque ob hoc ab illo unum fuisse nominatum, ne quis duos intellegere auderet.
II. 82. Julian. But that the Teacher of the Gentiles, arming reason with the privilege of authority, declared that through one man fault passed into this world, by which name he separated the works of marriage, which cannot be without the business of two, and we commended that for this reason one was named by him, lest anyone dare to understand two.
JulianImp.2.82Augustinus. Iam responsum est; assidue te delectat vana garrire.
Augustine. It has already been answered; you are assiduously delighted to chatter vain things.
JulianImp.2.82II. 83. Iulianus. Et re vera multo ego consequentius unum, quem Apostolus dicit, unum assero, ut doceam vitium imitationis, non generationis fuisse, quam Traducianus unius nomine, qui dicitur peccati fuisse vestibulum, seminibus rem admovet voluntatis, quod rerum natura non recipit.
II. 83. Julian. And in truth, much more consistently do I assert the one, whom the Apostle calls one, as one, to teach that it was a vice of imitation, not of generation, than the Traducianist who, by the name of the one, who is said to have been the vestibule of sin, applies to the seeds a matter of the will, which the nature of things does not admit.
JulianImp.2.83Augustinus. Desine, quod iam refellimus, iterare. Quid nos cogis adhuc eadem atque eadem dicere contra tantam sapientiam tuam, qua putas ideo non significari generationem, ubi dictum est: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum , quia, per duos fit generatio, non per unum, quasi peccatum illud, quod non vultis generatione, sed imitatione transisse, unus admiserit? Cum ergo et ipsum fuerit a duobus admissum, cur per unum hominem dictum est peccatum intravit in mundum, nisi quia non a femina concipiente atque pariente, sed a viro seminante est generationis exordium aut quia iam non sunt duo, quando per coitum una fit caro?
Augustine. Cease to repeat what we have already refuted. Why do you compel us still to say the same things again and again against so great a wisdom of yours, by which you think that for this reason generation is not signified, where it was said: Through one man sin entered the world, because generation comes about through two, not through one, as if that sin, which you wish to have passed not by generation but by imitation, one man committed? Since, then, it too was committed by two, why was it said: Through one man sin entered the world, except because the beginning of generation is not from the woman conceiving and bearing, but from the man sowing; or because they are now no longer two, when through intercourse one flesh is made?
JulianImp.2.83II. 84. Iulianus. Postea quoque ad legem ventum est, ad cuius usque tempus perscripsit Apostolus non ostensum viguisse peccatum; quod tu tempus usque ad finem legis protelare conatus es non intellegens nequidquam te argumentatum, quandoquidem constringendus a nobis esses, ut probares hoc peccatum, de quo mentiris Paulum locutum et quod asseris usque ad abolitionem regnasse Veteris Testamenti, vel imputatum fuisse vel imputari potuisse sub lege, vel certe acquiesceres non regnare post Christum, ut sensibus tuis saltem inflexa violenter Apostoli sententia consonaret. Horum autem nihil reddi a te potest; fidei ergo nostrae in solido est puritas collocata, cui et rationis instituta et iustitiae dignitas et Apostoli per omnia scita conveniunt.
II. 84. Julian. Afterward too the discourse came to the law, up to whose time the Apostle wrote that sin flourished, unshown; which time you tried to prolong up to the end of the law, not understanding that you argued to no purpose, since you would be bound by us to prove that this sin, about which you lie that Paul spoke, and which you assert reigned up to the abolition of the Old Testament, was either imputed or could have been imputed under the law; or certainly you would acquiesce that it does not reign after Christ, so that the statement of the Apostle, violently bent, might at least be in harmony with your senses. But none of these can be rendered by you; the purity of our faith, then, is placed on solid ground, with which both the institutions of reason and the dignity of justice and the decrees of the Apostle in all things agree.
JulianImp.2.84Augustinus. Nihil te dicere et, quod respondimus, monstrat et tu ipse; Apostolus quod ait: Usque ad legem peccatum in mundo fuit , non originale tantum, sed omne peccatum intellegi voluit, et ideo usque ad legem fuit, quia nec lex potuit auferre peccatum. Usque ad legem quippe dictum est, ut etiam ipsam legem sententia ista concluderet, quomodo dictum est in Evangelio: Omnes ergo ab Abraham usque ad David generationes quattuordecim ; non enim excepto David, sed ipso etiam computato numerus iste completur. Sicut ergo cum audimus quattuordecim generationes usque ad David, non excipimus David, sed ipsum etiam computamus, ita cum audimus: Usque ad legem peccatum in mundo fuit, non excipere legem, sed etiam ipsam computare debemus, quia, sicut David non est extra numerum, qui dictus est usque ad ipsum, sic lex non est extra permansionem peccati, quod fuisse dictum est usque ad ipsam, ac per hoc nemo tollit peccatum, quod nec lex, quamvis sancta et iusta et bona, potuit auferre, nisi ille de quo dictum est: Ecce Agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccata mundi . Tollit autem et dimittendo, quae facta sunt, ubi et originale comprehenditur, et adiuvando ne fiant, et perducendo ad vitam, ubi fieri omnino non possint.
Augustine. That you say nothing, both what we have answered shows, and you yourself. As for what the Apostle says: Until the law sin was in the world (Rom 5:13), he wished not only original, but every sin to be understood, and therefore it was until the law, because not even the law could take away sin. For until the law was said so that this statement might include even the law itself, just as it was said in the Gospel: All the generations, then, from Abraham until David are fourteen (See Matt 1:17); for not with David excepted, but with him too counted, is this number completed. As, then, when we hear fourteen generations until David, we do not except David, but count him too, so when we hear: Until the law sin was in the world, we ought not to except the law, but to count even it, because, just as David is not outside the number which was said up to him, so the law is not outside the persistence of sin, which was said to have been up to it; and through this no one takes away the sin which not even the law, although holy and just and good, could take away, except him of whom it was said: Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who takes away the sins of the world (John 1:29). But he takes it away both by forgiving what has been done, where the original is included too, and by helping that they not be done, and by leading to the life where they can in no way be done.
JulianImp.2.84II. 85. Iulianus. Sed videamus et reliqua. Postquam ergo dixisti: Haec forma non omni ex parte conformis est, adiungis: Unde hic Apostolus secutus adiunxit: " Sed non sicut delictum ita et donatio; si enim ob unius delictum multi mortui sunt, multo magis gratia Dei et donum in gratia unius hominis Iesu Christi in plures abundavit " . Quam sententiam hoc modo exponis: Quid est: " multo magis abundavit ", nisi quia omnes, qui per Christum liberantur, temporaliter propter Adam moriuntur, propter ipsum autem Christum sine fine victuri sunt? Pronuntiavit certe Apostolus, de cuius nobis est opinione certamen, efficacius operari ad collationem salutis et copiosius gratiam Salvatoris quam peccatum Adae, ut ostenderet multo vehementius profuisse Christum et pluribus profuisse, cuius gratia, ut ipso eius verbo utar: abundavit in plures, quam praevaricationem primi hominis nocuisse, quem tu dicis seminibus illigasse peccatum.
II. 85. Julian. But let us see the rest too. After you said, then: This form is not in every part conformable, you add: Whence the Apostle here, continuing, added: "But not as the offense, so also the gift; for if by the offense of one many have died, much more the grace of God and the gift in the grace of the one man Jesus Christ has abounded unto more " (Rom 5:15). Which statement you expound in this way: What is: "much more it abounded ", except that all who are freed through Christ die temporally on account of Adam, but on account of Christ himself will live without end? The Apostle certainly declared—about whose opinion is our contest—that the grace of the Savior works more efficaciously and more copiously toward the bestowal of salvation than the sin of Adam, that he might show that Christ profited much more vehemently, and profited more men, whose grace, to use his very word: abounded unto more, than the transgression of the first man harmed, whom you say bound sin to the seeds.
JulianImp.2.85Augustinus. Multo magis abundavit dixit, non: In magis multos, id est non: In plures. Quis enim non videat plures esse in genere humano, in quos non abundavit, ut ex pluribus ostenderetur, quid universae massae iusto iudicio deberetur, nisi, ubi vellet Spiritus spiraret et Deus quos dignaretur vocaret et quem vellet religiosum faceret ?
Augustine. Much more it abounded he said, not: Into more many, that is, not: Into more men. For who does not see that there are more men in the human race into whom it did not abound, that from the more it might be shown what was owed to the whole lump by a just judgment, unless the Spirit breathed where it would, and God called those whom he deigned, and made religious whom he would?
JulianImp.2.85II. 86. Iulianus. Proba igitur hoc, quod intellexit Apostolus, vestris cohaerere dogmatibus.
II. 86. Julian. Prove, then, that this which the Apostle understood coheres with your teachings.
JulianImp.2.86Augustinus. Legantur verba eius sine perversitate legentium, qualis est in vobis, et nulla alia probatio requiretur.
Augustine. Let his words be read without the perversity of those reading, such as is in you, and no other proof will be required.
JulianImp.2.86II. 87. Iulianus. Si enim Adam, ut dicitis, peccato naturali generavit omnes in condemnationem tantumque de suis visceribus in sobolem virus effudit, ut in natura hominis cuncta Dei instituta turbaret.
II. 87. Julian. For if Adam, as you say, by natural sin begot all unto condemnation, and poured forth so great a venom from his viscera into his offspring that he disturbed in the nature of man all the institutions of God.
JulianImp.2.87Augustinus. Quando parvulum spiritus vexat immundus animamque eius et corpus affligit, sensus sanitatemque pervertit, nonne universa eius quam Deus instituit natura turbatur? Nec invenitis omnino tanti huius mali meritum negantes originale peccatum. Cur enim non hic attendis in natura hominis per diaboli virus cuncta Dei instituta turbari? Dic causam parvuli, dic reatum eius, cui recens nato ista contingunt, qui non vis verba Apostolica sic accipere, quemadmodum accipit, ex quo est instituta, catholica Ecclesia et quemadmodum suis tam perspicuis malis confitetur ipsa natura. Et tamen, si bene consideremus, Dei nullo modo instituta turbantur, quoniam praescius futurorum cuncta constituit nec totum, quod meretur apostatica creatura, singulis reddit, sed in mensura et numero et pondere disponens omnia neminem sinit mali aliquid perpeti quod non meretur, quamvis non tantum, quantum massae debetur universae, singulus quisque patiatur.
Augustine. When an unclean spirit vexes a little one and afflicts his soul and body, perverts his sense and health, is not the whole nature of him which God instituted disturbed? Nor do you, denying original sin, find any deserving at all for so great an evil. For why do you not here attend that in the nature of man, through the venom of the devil, all the institutions of God are disturbed? Say the cause of the little one, say his guilt, to whom, newly born, these things befall, you who are unwilling so to receive the apostolic words as the catholic Church, from the time it was instituted, receives them, and as nature itself confesses by its own so manifest evils. And yet, if we consider well, the institutions of God are in no way disturbed, since, foreknowing things to come, he established all things, nor does he render to individuals the whole that the apostate creature deserves, but, disposing all things in measure and number and weight (See Wis 11:20), he allows no one to suffer any evil which he does not deserve, although each individual does not suffer as much as is owed to the whole lump.
JulianImp.2.87II. 88. Iulianus. Ut sine dono diaboli, ad quod dicis libidinem sexuum pertinere, nuptiae, quas Deus creaverat, esse non possent; immo illis, quas ordinaverat, institutionis suae honore avolantibus, has, quarum ordo permansit, cum motione genitalium, cum pudore coeuntium, cum calore et consternatione membrorum, cum iucunditate sensuum, cum iniquitate nascentium, diaboli, non Dei opus esse cogeret atque convinceret.
II. 88. Julian. So that without the gift of the devil, to which you say the lust of the sexes pertains, the marriages which God had created could not exist; rather, with those which he had ordained flying away from the honor of his institution, these, whose order remained, with the stirring of the genitals, with the shame of those copulating, with the heat and prostration of the members, with the pleasantness of the senses, with the iniquity of those being born, he would compel and convince to be the work of the devil, not of God.
JulianImp.2.88Augustinus. Si malum vitiorum, quod nisi in aliquo bono esse non potest, a naturarum bonitate discernas, nec excusabis diabolum nec accusabis Deum, nec excusabis libidinis malum nec accusabis nuptiarum bonum.
Augustine. If you distinguished the evil of the vices, which cannot be except in some good, from the goodness of the natures, you would neither excuse the devil nor accuse God, nor excuse the evil of lust nor accuse the good of marriage.
JulianImp.2.88II. 89. Iulianus. Ipsam postremo arbitrii libertatem unius peccati impulsione subrueret, ut nemo deinceps in potestate haberet vetera crimina virtutis electione respuere, sed uno omnes in condemnationem eversae humanitatis torrente raperentur.
II. 89. Julian. He would finally undermine the very freedom of choice by the impulse of one sin, so that no one thereafter would have it in his power to spurn old crimes by the choice of virtue, but all would be snatched into condemnation by one torrent of overthrown humanity.
JulianImp.2.89Augustinus. Cur non potius miraris universi generis humani ab exordio nativitatis tantam miseriam, ut nemo beatus nisi ex misero fiat neque nisi post hanc vitam malis omnibus careat, cui per Dei gratiam praestatur, ut careat? Hoc mirando te corriges et iustum Dei iudicium, quoniam per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, in generis humani non iniusta afflictione cognosces.
Augustine. Why do you not rather marvel at so great a misery of the whole human race from the beginning of birth, that no one becomes blessed except from being wretched, nor lacks all evils except after this life, to whom, through the grace of God, it is granted that he lack them? By marveling at this you will correct yourself, and will recognize the just judgment of God, since through one man sin entered the world, in the not unjust affliction of the human race.
JulianImp.2.89II. 90. Iulianus. Si haec, inquam, cuncta in Dei imaginem primi hominis invexit iniquitas, manifestum est nimis esse imbecillam Christi gratiam in suis muneri bus, quae nihil, quod his tot trabalibus malis mederetur, invenit; aut si invenit, affirma. Singula enim nunc singulis conferamus. Si Adam praeter voluntatis opera ipsius naturae instituta subvertit, nihil debuit magis Christus quam ea, quae ab illo fuerant elisa, reparare his videlicet vestigiis, quibus ille subruerat.
II. 90. Julian. If, I say, the iniquity of the first man brought all these things into the image of God, it is manifest that the grace of Christ is too feeble in its gifts, which found nothing to heal these so many beam-like evils; or, if it found, affirm it. For let us now compare individual things with individual things. If Adam, besides the works of his will, subverted the institutions of nature itself, Christ ought to owe nothing more than to repair the things which had been shattered by him, by those very footsteps, namely, by which he had undermined them.
JulianImp.2.90Augustinus. Hoc facit, sed non quomodo tu vis. Quis enim cognovit mentem Domini aut quis consiliarius eius fuit?
Augustine. This he does, but not in the way you wish. For who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor? (Rom 11:34)
JulianImp.2.90II. 91. Iulianus. Id est ut in nuptiis baptizatorum neutiquam sentiretur libido nec eodem modo, quo etiam ceterarum Gentium, genitalia moverentur.
II. 91. Julian. That is, that in the marriages of the baptized lust would in no way be felt, nor would the genitals be moved in the same way as in the rest of the nations too.
JulianImp.2.91Augustinus. Non ergo debuerunt baptizatae cum gemitu parere, quoniam hoc, quod negare non potes, poena est feminae peccatricis.
Augustine. The baptized women ought not, then, to give birth with groaning, since this—which you cannot deny—is the punishment of the sinning woman.
JulianImp.2.91II. 92. Iulianus. Recederet postremo post donum gratiae coeuntium pudor nec iret per membra quietis imitatio nec paterentur sensus onera dulcedinis, liberum postremo baptizatis redderetur arbitrium, ut per correctionem naturae expulsa lege peccati tam possibile confitereris esse mortalibus nitere splendore virtutum quam sordibus horrere vitiorum, immo penitus nec mortales, qui sacramentis imbuuntur, esse deberent.
II. 92. Julian. Finally, after the gift of grace the shame of those copulating would recede, nor would the imitation of quiet go through the members, nor would the senses suffer the burdens of sweetness, and finally free choice would be restored to the baptized, so that, by the correction of nature, with the law of sin expelled, you would confess it as possible for mortals to gleam with the splendor of the virtues as to shudder at the filth of vices; or rather, those who are imbued with the sacraments ought not to be mortal at all.
JulianImp.2.92Augustinus. Et tamen, Iuliane, tales nuptias in paradiso constituere non te pudet, ubi coeuntium confiteris pudorem. Ergone aliquid pudendum erat, ubi nihil nisi laudandum, qui super cuncta laudandus est, conditor instituerat? Sed quis potest hoc sapere et dicere, nisi quem non pudet id laudare quod pudet?
Augustine. And yet, Julian, you are not ashamed to set up such marriages in paradise, where you confess the shame of those copulating. Was there, then, anything to be ashamed of, where the Founder, who is to be praised above all things, had instituted nothing but what is to be praised? But who can think this and say it, except one who is not ashamed to praise that of which he is ashamed?
JulianImp.2.92II. 93. Iulianus. Si enim pugnat medicina cum vulnere et mors peccato dicitur accidisse, ablationem mortis amotio peccati debet operari.
II. 93. Julian. For if medicine fights with the wound, and death is said to have befallen on account of sin, the removal of sin ought to work the removal of death.
JulianImp.2.93Augustinus. Adhuc quidem dicitis Adam sic fuisse factum, ut, sive peccaret sive non peccaret, moriturus esset; sed ista dicentes iam vos magister vester in episcopali iudicio Palaestino nec sine se ipso, quia non se correxit, Pelagius ipse damnavit . Deus autem non in isto saeculo maligno beatificat suos, quibus hic peccata dimittit, et spiritus gratiae pignus impertit. Ideo eis, qui etiam malis saeculi huius vel delectabilibus vel saevis atque asperis partim non utuntur, partim bene utuntur, futurum promisit saeculum, in quo mala nulla patiantur, ubi tales essent et nuptiae, quales in illo paradiso, si nemo peccasset, esse potuissent, in quibus nihil pudendum esset; sed nec tales erunt, quoniam beatorum numero impleto, cui sint nuptiae necessariae, generatio ipsa non erit.
Augustine. You still say that Adam was so made that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he would die; but in saying these things you have already been condemned by your teacher Pelagius himself in the episcopal judgment of Palestine—and not without himself, because he did not correct himself. But God does not make his own blessed in this evil age, to whom he here forgives sins, and imparts the pledge of the spirit of grace. Therefore to those who, even with the evils of this age, whether delightful or savage and harsh, partly do not use them, partly use them well, he has promised a future age, in which they will suffer no evils, where marriages would be such as in that paradise, if no one had sinned, they could have been, in which there would be nothing to be ashamed of; but they will not even be such, since, with the number of the blessed completed, for whom marriages would be necessary, generation itself will not be.
JulianImp.2.93II. 94. Iulianus. Verum cum nihil horum quae diximus baptizatorum constet evenire corporibus, non potuisse autem aliter, id est non debuisse, quam his medicinae modis totum fieri veritas clarior sole monstraverit, confitendum tibi est aut illa, quae prius enumeravimus, non accidisse peccato et ideo nec vulnera fuisse naturae, ut constet ratio gratiae, per quam manifestum est illa de suis ordinibus mota non esse, aut certe negandum in mysteriis Christi quidquam esse medicinae, quae de tot secundum te morbis ne unum quidem sanare potuerunt.
II. 94. Julian. But since it is established that none of these things which we have said befall the bodies of the baptized, but that the whole could not have been done otherwise, that is, ought not to have been done, than by these modes of medicine, truth clearer than the sun shows; you must confess either that those things which we enumerated before did not befall by sin, and therefore there were no wounds of nature, that the account of grace may stand, through which it is manifest that those things were not moved from their orders; or certainly you must deny that there is anything of medicine in the mysteries of Christ, which, of so many diseases, according to you, could not heal even one.
JulianImp.2.94Augustinus. Immo vero hinc deberetis agnoscere, si mente sobria viveretis, quam magnum illud peccatum fuerit, quod per unum hominem intravit in mundum et cum morte in omnes homines pertransiit, quandoquidem malis huius saeculi, cum quibus homines oriuntur, nec baptizati iam reatu ablato omnibus eruuntur nisi post hanc vitam, in qua nos oportet etiam promissis bonis exerceri adhuc malis. Nam si merces fidei continuo redderetur, iam nec fides ipsa esset, quae mala praesentia videns ideo pie tolerat, quia bona promissa non videns fideliter et patienter exspectat.
Augustine. Rather, from this you ought to acknowledge, if you lived with a sober mind, how great that sin was which entered the world through one man and with death passed into all human beings, since from the evils of this age, with which human beings are born, not even the baptized, now with their guilt taken away, are all rescued except after this life, in which it behooves us to be exercised, even with goods promised, still by evils. For if the reward of faith were rendered immediately, faith itself would no longer be, which, seeing present evils, for that reason piously bears them, because, not seeing the goods promised, it faithfully and patiently awaits them.
JulianImp.2.94II. 95. Iulianus. Sic egi hactenus, quasi vim donorum et vulnerum, in contrariis licet effectibus, aequalem tamen Apostolus aestimasset; crescit autem dubio procul sublimitas sanae fidei quam tuemur, cum consideratur Paulus non solum remediis gratiae aegritudinem non praetulisse culparum, verum etiam copiosiora beneficia iudicasse dispendiis.
II. 95. Julian. Thus far I have acted as if the Apostle had reckoned the force of the gifts and of the wounds, though in contrary effects, yet equal; but the sublimity of the sound faith which we uphold grows beyond doubt, when it is considered that Paul not only did not prefer the sickness of faults to the remedies of grace, but even judged the benefits more copious than the losses.
JulianImp.2.95Augustinus. Verum est; temporalia quippe sunt dispendia regeneratorum, beneficia vero erunt sine dubio sempiterna; sed dispendia, quae nascentes flendo testantur, dicite, quo merito sub iustissimo et omnipotentissimo iudice eis, si nullum peccatum attrahunt, irrogentur.
Augustine. It is true; for the losses of the regenerated are temporal, but the benefits will without doubt be everlasting; but the losses which those being born attest by weeping, say by what deserving, under a most just and most almighty judge, they are inflicted on them, if they draw no sin.
JulianImp.2.95II. 96. Iulianus. Quid ergo etiam haec disputatio collegerit, prudens lector attendat. Apostolus dixit in plures abundasse donationem Christi ad salutem, quam Adae culpa nocuisset.
II. 96. Julian. What, then, this disputation too has gathered, let the prudent reader attend. The Apostle said that the gift of Christ abounded unto more men, unto salvation, than the fault of Adam had harmed.
JulianImp.2.96Augustinus. Non hoc dixit, sed: Multo magis abundavit gratia in multos , hoc est: Magis abundavit, non in magis multos, id est non in plures, sicut iam responsum est .
Augustine. He did not say this, but: Much more grace abounded unto many (See Rom 5:15), that is: It abounded more, not into more many, that is, not into more men, as has already been answered.
JulianImp.2.96II. 97. Iulianus. Qua culpa tu illas clades, quas supra enumeravimus, dicis accidisse naturae, ex quibus nec unam in his, qui ad Christi perveniunt sacramenta, constat sanari, ac per hoc multo plus iniquitatem primi hominis ad nocendum asseris habuisse virtutis, quam gratia Christi obtinet ad medendum, quo collecto ostensum est, quantam inter Catholicos et Manichaeos, tantam inter te et apostolum Paulum esse discordiam.
II. 97. Julian. By which fault you say those disasters befell nature which we enumerated above, of which it is established that not even one is healed in those who arrive at the sacraments of Christ; and through this you assert that the iniquity of the first man had much more force for harming than the grace of Christ obtains for healing; from which gathered conclusion it is shown that there is as great a discord between you and the apostle Paul as between the Catholics and the Manichees.
JulianImp.2.97Augustinus. Tollit gratia Christi originalis peccati reatum, sed rem invisibilem invisibiliter tollit; dimittit etiam cuncta peccata, quae homines male vivendo insuper addiderunt. Iudicium quippe ex uno delicto in condemnationem, quia et unum illud, quod a nascentibus trahitur, trahit ad aeternam condemnationem, si non remittatur; nec tamen hoc solum gratia dimittit, alioquin tantum valeret, sed cum ipso dimittit et cetera; ergo plus valet, propter quod dictum est: Iudicium quidem ex uno in condemnationem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem . Donat etiam gratia, ut contra concupiscentiam carnis spiritus concupiscat; et, si quando fidelis homo in hoc certamine venialiter vincitur, debita dimittit oranti et, quando damnabiliter vincitur, dat humiliorem paenitentiam, cui tribuat indulgentiam; donat postremo vitam aeternam et animae et corpori, ubi, qualia et quanta bona sint, cogitare quis possit? Quomodo ergo plus nocuit primi hominis iniquitas, quam profuit secundi hominis, hoc est Christi bonitas, cum ille temporaliter nocuerit, Christus autem et temporaliter adiuvet et liberet ac beatificet in aeternum? Quae cum ita sint, sententia nostra Catholica, non Manichaea est et ideo nec Pelagiana est, quia Catholica est.
Augustine. The grace of Christ takes away the guilt of original sin, but takes away an invisible thing invisibly; it also forgives all the sins which human beings have moreover added by living badly. For judgment is from one offense unto condemnation, because even that one which is drawn by those being born draws unto eternal condemnation, if it be not remitted; nor yet does grace forgive this alone, otherwise it would avail only as much, but with it forgives the rest too; therefore it avails more, on account of which it was said: Judgment indeed from one unto condemnation, but grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16). Grace also grants that against the concupiscence of the flesh the spirit may lust; and, if ever a faithful human being is venially overcome in this contest, it forgives his debts as he prays, and, when he is damnably overcome, it gives a humbler penitence, to which it may grant indulgence; it grants finally eternal life both to soul and to body, where what kind and how great the goods are, who could think? How, then, did the iniquity of the first man harm more than the goodness of the second man, that is, Christ, profited, since he harmed temporally, but Christ both temporally helps and frees and beatifies eternally? Since these things are so, our opinion is catholic, not Manichaean, and therefore is not Pelagian either, because it is catholic.
JulianImp.2.97II. 98. Iulianus. Frivolam sane expositionem in hoc loco tuam optimo iure despicerem et irrepercussam praeterirem, quasi nimis humo cohaerentem, nisi vererer, ne pellaciae magis quam constantiae crederetur. Loqueris ergo hoc modo: Quid est: " Multo magis abundavit " , nisi quia omnes, qui per Christum liberantur, temporaliter propter Adam moriuntur, propter ipsum autem Christum sine fine victuri sunt? Quo sermone si, quid consequenter diceretur, attenderes, omnem arcem tuam id est traducem cecidisse faterere; dicis enim ideo multo magis abundasse Christi gratiam, quia per eam vita conferatur aeterna, cum per Adae peccatum subeunda sit corruptio temporalis. Si ergo nihil aliud intulit Adam praeter corporis mortem, contra quem Christus copiosiore beneficio vitam contulit sine fine durantem, apparet non peccatum Adae ad posteros transisse, sed mortem.
II. 98. Julian. I would indeed by best right despise your frivolous exposition in this place, and pass it by unstruck, as too clinging to the ground, did I not fear that it would be credited to cunning rather than to constancy. You speak, then, in this way: What is: "Much more it abounded ", except that all who are freed through Christ die temporally on account of Adam, but on account of Christ himself will live without end? By which discourse, if you attended what was consequently said, you would confess that your whole citadel, that is, transmission, has fallen; for you say that the grace of Christ abounded much more because through it eternal life is conferred, while through the sin of Adam temporal corruption must be undergone. If, then, Adam brought in nothing else than the death of the body, against whom Christ conferred, by a more copious benefit, life enduring without end, it appears that not the sin of Adam passed to posterity, but death.
JulianImp.2.98Augustinus. Apparet te propterea irrisisse quod dixi, vel potius te irridere finxisse, ut his, qui te non intellegunt, videreris dicere aliquid, cum diceres nihil; primum quia eis dixi Adam temporali morte nocuisse, quos Christi liberat gratia; quos enim occulti quidem, sed iusti iudicii veritate non liberat, etiamsi parvuli moriantur, aeterna morte plectuntur. Quomodo ergo hinc apparet non peccatum Adae ad posteros transisse, sed mortem, nisi quia hoc vis putari, quod perstrepunt verba tua, non quod sequitur verba mea? Nos enim dicimus utrumque transisse et a Christo utrumque clamamus auferri, reatum scilicet peccati plenissima remissione peccatorum, mortem vero beatissima resurrectione sanctorum, quae propterea non statim regeneratis datur, ut exerceatur fides, qua id quod non videtur speratur; hoc enim et in se ipsis et in parvulis suis cum sperant fideles, utique sunt fideles. Ecce quod dicimus, ecce cui Catholicae veritati contradicitis; sed magis contra vos quam contra illam dicitis, quidquid haereticis disputationibus dicitis.
Augustine. It appears that you mocked what I said, or rather feigned to mock, for this reason, that you might seem, to those who do not understand you, to say something, when you said nothing; first because I said that Adam harmed by temporal death those whom the grace of Christ frees; for those whom by the truth of a hidden indeed, but just judgment he does not free, even if they die as little ones, are punished by eternal death. How, then, from this does it appear that not the sin of Adam passed to posterity, but death, except because you wish that to be thought which your words clamor, not that which follows my words? For we say that both passed, and we cry out that both are taken away by Christ, namely the guilt of sin by the most full remission of sins, but death by the most blessed resurrection of the saints, which for this reason is not given immediately to the regenerated, that faith may be exercised, by which what is not seen is hoped for; for the faithful, when they hope this both in themselves and in their little ones, are certainly faithful. Behold what we say, behold which catholic truth you contradict; but you speak more against yourselves than against it, whatever you say in heretical disputations.
JulianImp.2.98II. 99. Iulianus. Constabit autem consequentissime mortem perpetuam, id est poenam sempiternam, ad nos non fuisse transmissam ac per hoc peccatum traducis esse non posse. Ut enim breviter, quid tenendum constet, appareat; ab Apostolo dona Christi peccato primi hominis praeferuntur; tu per hoc peccatum tuum id est traducis unam dicis an duas transisse mortes? Si unam et corporalem, ut hic confessus es, constat gratiam Christi antecellere peccato primi hominis et iam nascitur nemo peccator, quia, si ut supra dixisti, regnum peccati est, ut in secundam homo mortem id est in poenam perpetuam praecipitetur, et per Adam mortem corporis solum advectam dicis, nec peccatum per Adam ad posteros nec mors aeterna transmittitur.
II. 99. Julian. But it will be established most consistently that perpetual death, that is, everlasting punishment, was not transmitted to us, and through this that there cannot be a sin of transmission. For that it may briefly appear what is established to be held; by the Apostle the gifts of Christ are preferred to the sin of the first man; do you, through this sin of yours, that is, of transmission, say that one death or two passed? If one, and corporeal, as here you have confessed, it is established that the grace of Christ excels the sin of the first man, and now no one is born a sinner, because, if, as you said above, the reign of sin is that a human being be hurled into the second death, that is, into perpetual punishment, and you say that through Adam only the death of the body was conveyed, neither sin through Adam nor eternal death is transmitted to posterity.
JulianImp.2.99Augustinus. Iam responsum est: nihil dicis. Regnum enim peccati etiam in aeternam praecipitat mortem, nisi per Christi gratiam remittatur; verumtamen ista quoque mors temporalis nulla esset, nisi Adam non moriendi possibilitatem peccati merito perdidisset; hanc enim peccatori denuntiavit Deus dicens: Terra es et in terram ibis . Hanc sine merito peccati suscipere dignatus est Christus, ut per illam quidem moriendo iret in terram, sed resurgendo terram levaret in caelum ac sic aeterna morte destructa temporalem fidelibus ideo non auferret, ut adversus eam resurrectionis fides in huius vitae agone certaret.
Augustine. It has already been answered: you say nothing. For the reign of sin hurls even into eternal death, unless it be remitted through the grace of Christ; yet this temporal death too would be none, unless Adam had lost the possibility of not dying by the deserving of sin; for this God announced to the sinner, saying: You are earth, and into earth you shall go (Gen 3:19). This, without the deserving of sin, Christ deigned to undergo, that through it indeed, by dying, he might go into the earth, but, by rising, might lift the earth into heaven, and so, with eternal death destroyed, might for this reason not take away the temporal from the faithful, that against it the faith of resurrection might contend in the struggle of this life.
JulianImp.2.99II. 100. Iulianus. Sin autem dixeris per peccatum Adae naturalem factam esse iniquitatem duasque accidisse mortes, unam aeternam, alteram temporalem, per Christi autem gratiam unam interim auferri a persona, non a natura, id est perpetuam, temporalem vero remanere, Apostolus convincitur falsitatis, qui dixit multo magis profuisse gratiam quam nocuisse peccatum ; Apostolus autem argui non potest, tu igitur iure reprobaris.
II. 100. Julian. But if you say that through the sin of Adam iniquity became natural, and that two deaths befell, one eternal, the other temporal, but that through the grace of Christ one is meanwhile taken away from the person, not from the nature, that is, the perpetual, but the temporal remains, the Apostle is convicted of falsity, who said that grace profited much more than sin harmed; but the Apostle cannot be accused; you, then, are by right reproved.
JulianImp.2.100Augustinus. Ego dixi una resurrectione beatorum ambas mortes tolli, et istam, ne sit anima sine corpore suo, et illam, ne aggravetur vel affligatur anima etiam corpore suo. Sic autem ista fidelibus ad tempus relinquitur, ut habeat per illam fides adiumentum, quemadmodum postea reis tollitur, ut, quod de suo corpore non recedunt, miseriae sit incrementum. Ac per hoc eis qui regenerantur in Christo et de isto saeculo maligno electi eius exeunt, manifestum est plus prodesse gratiam quam nocuisse peccatum, quod per unum hominem in mundum intravit et cum morte per omnes homines pertransiit. Apostolus itaque redargui non potest, quia verum dixit; sed tu non intellegis aut contra id, quod intellegis, asserere, quod falsum est, haeretica contentione conaris.
Augustine. I said that by the one resurrection of the blessed both deaths are taken away, both this one, that the soul be not without its body, and that one, that the soul be not weighed down or afflicted even by its body. But this is so left to the faithful for a time that faith may have a help through it, just as it is afterward taken away from the guilty, so that, in that they do not depart from their body, it may be an increase of misery. And through this, to those who are regenerated in Christ and go out from this evil age as his elect, it is manifest that grace profits more than sin harmed, which entered the world through one man and with death passed through all human beings. The Apostle, then, cannot be refuted, because he spoke the truth; but you either do not understand, or, against what you understand, try with heretical contention to assert what is false.
JulianImp.2.100II. 101. Iulianus. Apostolus dixit magis gratiam Christi quam Adae abundasse culpam; non igitur natura ab eo, non generatio, non fecunditas, sed voluntas, electio mali, morum pravitas accusatur.
II. 101. Julian. The Apostle said that the grace of Christ abounded more than the fault of Adam; not, then, is nature accused by him, not generation, not fecundity, but the will, the choice of evil, the depravity of morals.
JulianImp.2.101Augustinus. Si nihil nocuit generatio, nihil praestat regeneratio; si non est natura vitiata, non habent Christum parvuli salvatorem; si malum et bonum meritum singulorum in eorum propria est voluntate, quo merito Christus regnum Dei parvulis confert, qui in neutram partem sua usi sunt voluntate? Postremo, quoniam duos posuit Apostolus, unum ad peccatum, non diabolum sed Adam, et unum ad iustitiam, non Abel sed Christum, ut non exemplis imitatio, sed generationi regeneratio referretur, si non traicit peccatum in homines generatos Adam, non donat Christus parvulis regeneratis iustitiam, quia nec generati nec regenerati parvuli usi sunt propria libertate. Ite nunc, si vultis, et clamate, si audetis, iustitiam parvulis non donari nec eos habituros esse iustitiam, quando habitabunt in illo regno, ubi erunt, sicut scriptum est, caeli novi et terra nova, in quibus iustitia inhabitat ; aut ex vestro quo inebriati estis meracissimo dogmate delirate in illo regno iustitiam parvulos habituros quidem, sed propriae voluntatis meritis, non divinae gratiae largitate. Quod si dicere non audetis (hic enim merita comparari, ibi autem praemia reddi fatemini), cur fateri dubitatis sive non vultis sic eos ex Adam potuisse habere peccatum sine meritis propriae voluntatis malae, quemadmodum a Christo percepturi sunt iustitiam sine suis meritis praecedentibus voluntatis bonae?
Augustine. If generation harmed nothing, regeneration bestows nothing; if nature is not vitiated, little ones do not have Christ as Savior; if the evil and good deserving of individuals is in their own will, by what deserving does Christ confer the kingdom of God on little ones, who have used their will in neither direction? Finally, since the Apostle set down two, one for sin, not the devil but Adam, and one for justice, not Abel but Christ, that not imitation might be referred to examples, but regeneration to generation, if Adam does not transmit sin into the human beings begotten, Christ does not grant justice to the little ones regenerated, because neither the begotten nor the regenerated little ones have used their own liberty. Go now, if you wish, and cry out, if you dare, that justice is not granted to little ones, nor will they have justice, when they will dwell in that kingdom where there will be, as it is written, new heavens and a new earth, in which justice dwells (See 2 Pet 3:13); or, from your most undiluted teaching, with which you are inebriated, rave that in that kingdom little ones will indeed have justice, but by the deservings of their own will, not by the largesse of divine grace. But if you dare not say this (for you confess that here deservings are gained, but there rewards are rendered), why do you doubt, or are unwilling, to confess that they could so have sin from Adam without the deservings of their own evil will, just as they will receive justice from Christ without their own preceding deservings of a good will?
JulianImp.2.101II. 102. Iulianus. Ac per hoc, si quem in rebus adhuc humanis locum veritas habet et non strepitu iniquitatis totus omnino mundus obsurduit, ratione, disputatione et Apostoli fide atque ipsa eius sententia teste perdoctum esse fatebitur inter Traducianos et Catholicos tantum esse discrimen, quantum inter Paulum et Manichaeum, quantum inter sapientiam et stultitiam, quantum inter rationem et insaniam, quantum inter constantiam dictorum et eam fluctuationem, quam nova foeditate perpeteris, ut in iisdem pene versibus quod dixeris neges, quod negaveris asseveres.
II. 102. Julian. And through this, if truth has any place in matters still human, and the whole world has not been utterly deafened by the din of iniquity, anyone will confess, having been thoroughly taught by reason, disputation, and the faith of the Apostle and his very statement as witness, that there is as great a difference between the Traducianists and the Catholics as between Paul and the Manichee, as between wisdom and folly, as between reason and insanity, as between consistency of words and that fluctuation which you endure with a new foulness, so that in almost the same lines you deny what you have said, you affirm what you have denied.
JulianImp.2.102Augustinus. Iam responsum est. Rogo te, si aliquid dicere non potes, tace, si potes; sed quod peius est, nec hoc potes.
Augustine. It has already been answered. I ask you, if you cannot say anything, be silent, if you can; but, what is worse, you cannot even do this.
JulianImp.2.102II. 103. Iulianus. Et non - inquit - sicut per unum peccantem ita est et donum; nam iudicium ex uno in condemnationem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem . Quibus Apostoli verbis admoves expositionem tuam ita se habentem: " Ex uno " ergo quid - inquis - nisi delicto? Quia sequitur: " Gratia autem ex multis delictis ". Dicant isti, quomodo ex uno delicto in condemnationem, nisi quia sufficit ad condemnationem etiam unum originale peccatum, quod in omnes homines pertransiit; gratia vero ideo ex multis delictis in iustificationem, quia non solum unum illud solvit, quod originaliter trahitur, sed etiam cetera, quae in unoquoque homine motu propriae voluntatis adduntur. " Si enim ob unius delictum mors regnavit per unum, multo magis qui abundantiam gratiae et iustitiae accipiunt, in vita regnabunt per unum Iesum Christum. Itaque sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines ad condemnationem, ita et per unius iustitiam in omnes homines ad iustificationem vitae " . Post quae Apostoli verba, quasi aliquid confeceris, insultando de nobis loqueris: Adhuc permaneant in vanitate mentis suae et dicant unum hominem non propaginem traiecisse, sed exemplum praebuisse peccati. Quomodo ergo " per unius delictum in omnes homines ad condemnationem " et non potius per multa sua cuiusque delicta, nisi quia, etiamsi illud unum sit tantum, idoneum est perducere ad condemnationem etiam nullis additis ceteris, sicut perducit parvulos morientes, qui ex Adam nascuntur, si in Christo non renascantur? Quid ergo a nobis quaerit iste quod non vult ab Apostolo audire, per quid peccatum inveniatur in parvulo; utrum per voluntatem an per nuptias an per parentes? Ecce, audiat per quid, audiat et taceat, per quid peccatum inveniatur in parvulo. Apostolus: " Per unius delictum - inquit - in omnes homines ad condemnationem " . Nihil te quidem magis timere quam interrogationem perscrutatricem animi tui et dogmatis novimus; inde est quippe quod omnibus opibus negationem examinis a mundi potestatibus comparatis; intellegitis enim agendum vobis vi esse, cum deserimini rationis auxilio.
II. 103. Julian. And not—he says—as through one sinning, so also is the gift; for judgment is from one unto condemnation, but grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16). To which words of the Apostle you apply your exposition standing thus: "From one ", then, what—you say—except offense? Because there follows: "But grace from many offenses ". Let these men say how it is from one offense unto condemnation, except because even one original sin, which passed into all human beings, suffices for condemnation; but grace is for this reason from many offenses unto justification, because it looses not only that one which is drawn originally, but also the rest, which are added in each human being by the motion of his own will. "For if by the offense of one death reigned through one, much more those who receive the abundance of grace and of justice will reign in life through one Jesus Christ. And so, as through the offense of one unto all human beings unto condemnation, so also through the justice of one unto all human beings unto justification of life " (Rom 5:17-18). After which words of the Apostle, as if you had accomplished something, you speak about us by insulting: Let these still remain in the vanity of their mind, and say that one man did not transmit propagation, but furnished an example of sin. How, then: "through the offense of one unto all human beings unto condemnation ", and not rather through the many offenses of each one, except because, even if that one alone exists, it is fit to lead unto condemnation even with none of the rest added, just as it leads the dying little ones who are born of Adam, if they be not reborn in Christ? What, then, does this man ask of us which he is unwilling to hear from the Apostle, through what sin is found in a little one; whether through the will or through marriage or through the parents? Behold, let him hear through what, let him hear and be silent, through what sin is found in a little one. The Apostle: "Through the offense of one—he says—unto all human beings unto condemnation ". We know that you fear nothing more than a questioning that searches out your mind and your teaching; thence it is that with all your resources you procure from the powers of the world the denial of an examination; for you understand that you must act by force, when you are abandoned by the help of reason.
JulianImp.2.103Augustinus. Vis non timere potestatem? Bonum fac . Non est autem bonum contra apostolicum sensum exserere et asserere haereticum sensum. Quid adhuc quaeris examen, quod iam factum est apud Apostolicam Sedem, quod denique iam factum est in episcopali iudicio Palaestino, ubi Pelagius, vestri auctor erroris, procul dubio damnatus esset, nisi ista quae tu defendis dogmata vestra damnasset? Damnata ergo haeresis ab episcopis non adhuc examinanda, sed cohercenda est a potestatibus christianis.
Augustine. Do you wish not to fear the power? Do good (Rom 13:3). But it is not good to put forth against the apostolic sense, and to assert, a heretical sense. Why do you still seek an examination, which has already been made before the Apostolic See, which finally has already been made in the episcopal judgment of Palestine, where Pelagius, the author of your error, would without doubt have been condemned, had he not condemned those teachings of yours which you defend? A heresy condemned by the bishops, then, is not still to be examined, but to be restrained by the Christian powers.
JulianImp.2.103II. 104. Iulianus. Sed non tua opinio apud prudentes tantum valebit, ut, cum tu sis caput horum et causa malorum , de conflictu medio Apostoli te obiectione subducas et putes illum pro te esse feriendum, quo potissimum contra vos praeceptore armamur ac principe. Ut ergo, quid tibi dicendum sit, consequenter agnoscas; si mihi et tibi super hoc esset nulla dissensio, quod Apostolus naturali peccato Manichaeorum dogma firmaret, tunc tuum caput petenti illum constanter opponeres; nunc vero, cum inviolabilis apud me Magistri Gentium dignitas perseveret eiusque verba tua laedi expositione non patiar, quae secundum regulam prolatam rationis stulto, impuro et impio assero dogmati repugnare nihilque eum pro peccato naturali dixisse convinco, qua tu impudentia ingeris, ut vel pro te mihi ille respondeat, qui non interrogatur, quoniam nec de eius sapientia dubitatur, vel me vociferaris nolle audire ab Apostolo, quod in te ab Apostolo nobis tradita intellegentiae sanitate detestor?
II. 104. Julian. But your opinion will not avail so much among the prudent that, since you are the head of these and the cause of evils, you should withdraw yourself from the midst of the conflict by the objection of the Apostle, and think that he must be struck on your behalf, by whom especially we are armed against you as our teacher and chief. That you may, then, consequently recognize what is to be said to you; if between me and you there were no dissension over this, that the Apostle confirmed the teaching of the Manichees by natural sin, then you would constantly set him against me as I sought your head; but now, since the dignity of the Teacher of the Gentiles remains inviolable with me, and I will not allow his words to be harmed by your exposition—which words, according to the rule of reason brought forth, I assert to fight against your stupid, impure, and impious teaching, and convict that he said nothing in favor of natural sin—with what shamelessness do you press that he should answer me even on your behalf, who is not questioned, since neither is his wisdom doubted; or you cry out that I am unwilling to hear from the Apostle what, in you, by the soundness of understanding handed down to us by the Apostle, I detest?
JulianImp.2.104Augustinus. Numquid non post Apostoli verba a me interposita nihil aliud quam tacere debuisti? Et tamen contra illa nihil dicens nec secundum illa aliquid dicens mihi non taces et iactas inter cetera, quod ego sim caput horum et causa malorum, quasi ego prior vel crediderim vel esse disputaverim originale peccatum. Tam quippe imperitos haec tua credis esse lecturos, qui nesciant, quam multi ante nos Ecclesiae clarique Doctores sic ista Apostoli verba intellexerint et exposuerint, quemadmodum tota ex ipso initio sui catholica intellegit vel credit Ecclesia; quae Doctorum verba si mala sunt, sicut vos dicere non timetis, quomodo ego sum, quaeso te, caput horum et causa malorum, nisi quia tu es caput harum, quas mihi rabiosus ingeris, calumniarum? Nam si sano cerebro considerares humanae vitae miserias a primis fletibus infantium usque ad extremos gemitus morientium, videres profecto, quod nec ego nec tu, sed ille Adam fuerit caput horum et causa malorum; quod nolens videre clausis oculis clamas et iustum Dei esse iudicium et non esse originale peccatum. Quae duo inter se quam sint contraria procul dubio cerneres, non dico, si horum malorum caput non esses, quia utique non es, sed si sanum caput haberes, quod habere posses, si Doctores sequendo catholicos caput Pelagium non haberes.
Augustine. After the words of the Apostle interposed by me, ought you not to have done anything other than be silent? And yet, saying nothing against them and saying nothing according to them, you are not silent with me, and you boast among other things that I am the head of these and the cause of evils, as if I first either believed or disputed that there is original sin. For you believe that those will read these things of yours who are so inexperienced that they do not know how many teachers of the Church, illustrious and before us, so understood and expounded these words of the Apostle as the whole catholic Church, from its very beginning, understands or believes; whose words of the teachers, if they are evil, as you do not fear to say, how am I, I ask you, the head of these and the cause of evils, except because you are the head of these calumnies which, raging, you press upon me? For if with a sound brain you considered the miseries of human life from the first weeping of infants to the last groans of the dying, you would surely see that neither I nor you, but that Adam was the head of these and the cause of evils; which, unwilling to see, with closed eyes you cry out both that the judgment of God is just and that there is no original sin. How contrary these two are to each other you would without doubt discern—I do not say if you were not the head of these evils, because you certainly are not, but if you had a sound head, which you could have, if, by following the catholic teachers, you did not have Pelagius as your head.
JulianImp.2.104II. 105. Iulianus. Exprimatur igitur vis argumentorum tuorum. Postquam dixit Paulus, quia multo magis abundasset gratia Salvatoris ad medendum quam praevaricatio primi hominis ad nocendum, sequitur: Et non sicut per unum peccantem ita est et donum; nam iudicium ex uno in condemnationem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem . Quod tu delictum unum ad condemnationem sufficiens originale esse contendis in omnes videlicet homines pertransiens, gratiam autem ideo ex multis delictis in iustificationem dici, quia non solum illud unum solvit, quod originaliter trahitur, sed etiam cetera, quae in unoquoque homine motu propriae voluntatis adduntur . Ad quod confirmandum paulo post argumentaris, quia, si hoc unum delictum ad condemnationem sufficiens Apostolus dixisset imitatione susceptum, addere debuisset omnes homines ad condemnationem non per unum ire delictum, sed per multa sua quaeque voluntate commissa. In quibus locis quoniam elaqueandus est Apostoli sermo a cassibus Manichaeorum, ut sit attentus lector admoneo. Ais ergo secundum nostrum sensum, quo asseritur prima culpa formam praebuisse peccantibus, debuisse Apostolum, sicut gratiam ex multis delictis iustificationem dixit operari, ita ex multis peccatis dicere regnasse mortem. Porro hoc argumento contra te omnino luctaris; convinco enim secundum dogma tuum inconsequenter Apostolum pronuntiare: Gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem, qui dixerat: Ex uno peccato iudicium in condemnationem. Ut enim egredientes de nostris finibus in vestra regione versemur: si libertas arbitrii primo est eversa peccato et in omni deinceps hominum genere manca adeo remansit, ut non sit ei possibile nisi tantummodo malum facere, non autem habeat in facultate electionem partis alterius, id est recedere a malo et facere bonum, sed iniquitatis necessitate depressa appetentiae criminum parere compellitur; si perrupta omni lege iustitiae facta sunt naturalia, quae fuerant voluntaria; si lex peccati habitat in membris, quae tyrannidem in imaginem et opus Dei nuptiarum verecundia et iucunditate sortita est; si frutex diaboli in visceribus pangitur ante animam et cum incrementis naturalibus adolescit, frondescit et pestifera fruge ingravescit; si haec, inquam, ut dicitis, una primi hominis culpa progenuit, consequentius dicitur ex uno delicto in condemnationem genus ire mortalium quam ex multis delictis gratiam liberare, ut magis proprie intellegatur dici posse haec gratia ex uno delicto liberare quos liberat. Nulla enim alia motu propriae voluntatis adduntur, si omne malum fracta arbitrii libertate, exclusa honestate desiderii infectrix seminum culpa primi genitoris operatur.
II. 105. Julian. Let the force of your arguments, then, be expressed. After Paul said that the grace of the Savior abounded much more for healing than the transgression of the first man for harming, there follows: And not as through one sinning, so also is the gift; for judgment is from one unto condemnation, but grace from many offenses unto justification. Which one offense, sufficient for condemnation, you contend is original, passing namely into all human beings; but that grace is for this reason said to be from many offenses unto justification, because it looses not only that one which is drawn originally, but also the rest which are added in each human being by the motion of his own will. To confirm which you argue a little after that, if the Apostle had said this one offense, sufficient for condemnation, was taken up by imitation, he ought to have added that all human beings go unto condemnation not through one offense, but through their many offenses committed by their own will. In which places, since the discourse of the Apostle must be unsnared from the nets of the Manichees, I admonish that the reader be attentive. You say, then, according to our sense, by which it is asserted that the first fault furnished a form to those sinning, that the Apostle ought, just as he said grace works justification from many offenses, so to say that death reigned from many sins. But by this argument you struggle altogether against yourself; for I convict the Apostle of declaring, according to your teaching, inconsistently: But grace from many offenses unto justification, who had said: From one sin judgment unto condemnation. For, that going out from our boundaries we may dwell in your region: if the freedom of choice was first overthrown by sin and thereafter remained in the whole race of human beings so maimed that it is not possible for it to do anything but evil, but it does not have in its faculty the choice of the other part, that is, to recede from evil and do good, but, oppressed by the necessity of iniquity, is compelled to obey the appetite of crimes; if, with every law of justice broken through, those things became natural which had been voluntary; if the law of sin dwells in the members, which has obtained tyranny over the image and work of God by the shame and pleasantness of marriage; if the shrub of the devil is planted in the viscera before the soul, and grows up with the natural increments, puts forth leaves, and grows heavy with a pestiferous fruit; if, I say, one fault of the first man begot these things, as you say, it is more consistently said that the race of mortals goes from one offense unto condemnation than that grace frees from many offenses, so that it may more properly be understood that this grace can be said to free from one offense those whom it frees. For no others are added by the motion of one's own will, if the seed-infecting fault of the first begetter works every evil, with the freedom of choice broken, with the honesty of desire excluded.
JulianImp.2.105Augustinus. Unde fieri potest, ut homo, qui conaris apostolica verba pervertere, possis loqui nisi perverse? Nam utique, cum ad illud delictum, quod generatio trahit, usus voluntatis accesserit, quem non habent parvuli, in multas et varias cupiditates arbor multorum pullulat peccatorum, quod antequam fieret, etiam ipsum unum trahebat ad damnationem, si ante voluntatis usum parvulus finiret hanc vitam. Neque enim, quia maior damnatio debetur iam magno et multiplicato malo, ideo nulla parvo et nondum multiplicato debebatur. Quomodo ergo regeneratio, quae multiplicatum per usum voluntatis malum tollit, non plus praestat quam nocuit generatio, quae huius quamvis magni et multiplicis mali nondum tamen auctum et nondum multiplicatum traxit initium, quod solum sine ulla pullulatione remaneret, si nullus voluntatis usus, quo augeretur et multiplicaretur, accederet? Voluntas autem antequam bonae libertati ad operandam veram iustitiam gratia Dei subveniente reddatur, multis aliis etiam causis praeter originis vitium movetur ad peccandum vel non movetur, unde fit, ut ipsi impii, quibus vel nondum subvenit vel numquam subventura est gratia, quae iustificat impium, alii magis, alii minus peccent. Iudicium ergo ex uno in condemnationem , quia damnantur et hi qui unum illud generatione traxerunt; gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem, quia non solum illud, cum quo nascitur homo, sed quidquid aliud delictorum voluntatis usus illi malo addidit, tollit. Haec est apostolicorum verborum catholica veritas, quam nulla haeretica loquacitate depravas, quantalibet nos prolixitate vanitatis et loquacitatis exerceas.
Augustine. Whence can it come about that you, a man who try to pervert apostolic words, can speak except perversely? For certainly, when the use of the will, which little ones do not have, has been added to that offense which generation draws, the tree of many sins sprouts into many and various desires; which, before it came about, even that one was drawing unto damnation, if the little one ended this life before the use of the will. For not because a greater damnation is owed to an evil now great and multiplied, was therefore none owed to one small and not yet multiplied. How, then, does regeneration, which takes away the evil multiplied through the use of the will, not bestow more than generation harmed, which drew the beginning—not yet increased and not yet multiplied—of this evil, however great and manifold, which alone would remain without any sprouting, if no use of the will, by which it might be increased and multiplied, were added? But the will, before it is restored to good liberty for working true justice, with the grace of God coming to its aid, is moved to sinning, or is not moved, also by many other causes besides the vice of origin; whence it comes about that the impious themselves, to whom either grace has not yet come to aid, or never will come, which justifies the impious, sin some more, some less. Judgment, then, from one unto condemnation, because even those are damned who drew that one by generation; but grace from many offenses unto justification, because it takes away not only that with which a human being is born, but whatever else of offenses the use of the will has added to that evil. This is the catholic truth of the apostolic words, which you deprave by no heretical loquacity, however great a prolixity of vanity and loquacity you exercise us with.
JulianImp.2.105II. 106. Iulianus. Ac per hoc, si est naturale peccatum tantorum auctor malorum, gratia Christi nequaquam multa delicta donando iustificationem operatur, sed uni peccato indulgendo negotium benignitatis exsequitur; quod cum se spondet acturam, fidem faciet promissis, si haec quae dicuntur per peccati vulnus invecta curaverit; ceterum si et post remedia quae detulit eadem tamen diabolicorum morborum series perseverat, voto eius gratificatio, praesumptioni venia debetur, quia ad curandum innatas pestes virtus ei defuit, non voluntas.
II. 106. Julian. And through this, if natural sin is the author of so great evils, the grace of Christ in no way works justification by forgiving many offenses, but carries out the business of benignity by indulging one sin; which, when it promises that it will do, it will make good its promises, if it has healed these things which are said to be brought in by the wound of sin; but if even after the remedies which it brought the same series of diabolical diseases nevertheless perseveres, gratitude is owed to its wish, pardon to its presumption, because for healing the inborn plagues power, not will, was lacking to it.
JulianImp.2.106Augustinus. Iam responsum est; intellege et tace. Aliter gratia certantem facit atque adiuvat, aliter victorem sine hoste ullo vel externo vel interno in aeterna pace conservat; ista laboriosa militia est in praesenti saeculo, illa beata requies in futuro. Sed si tu cum vitiis carnalibus in te ipso bellum non geris, erubesce; si geris, obmutesce.
Augustine. It has already been answered; understand and be silent. In one way grace makes one contend and helps him, in another way it keeps the victor, without any enemy either external or internal, in eternal peace; this is the laborious warfare in the present age, that the blessed rest in the future. But if you do not wage war against the carnal vices in yourself, blush; if you do, fall silent.
JulianImp.2.106II. 107. Iulianus. Quid igitur hac disputatione confectum est? Sensui videlicet tuo et Apostolo non convenire. Apostolus enim ait multa delicta gratiae liberalitate donari; dogma vero tuum asserit unum peccatum naturale, quod legem peccati vocas, in cunctis hominibus desideria iniquitatis effingere. In absoluto itaque est a te naturam, quae est opus Dei, ab illo argui voluntatem. Non autem aliter prorsus eloqui debuit quam elocutus est, id est ex uno condemnationem fieri posse peccato, quia et primus ille homo per unum peccatum delinquendi praebuit exemplum et, sicut illi ipsi ad condemnationem una praevaricatio abundavit, sic etiam ceteris ad reatum una potest culpa sufficere. Propter quod Ecclesiastes: Qui in uno peccaverit, multa bona perdit ; et Iacobus: Si totam legem observaveris, offendas autem in uno, factus es omnium reus .
II. 107. Julian. What, then, has been accomplished by this disputation? That your sense and the Apostle, namely, do not agree. For the Apostle says that many offenses are forgiven by the liberality of grace; but your teaching asserts that one natural sin, which you call the law of sin, fashions the desires of iniquity in all human beings. It is settled, then, that by you nature, which is the work of God, but by him the will, is accused. But he ought to have spoken in no other way at all than he spoke, that is, that condemnation can come about from one sin, because both that first man furnished, by one sin, an example of offending, and, just as for him one transgression abounded unto condemnation, so also for the rest one fault can suffice unto guilt. On account of which Ecclesiastes: He who sins in one thing will lose many good things (Eccl 9:18); and James: If you observe the whole law, but offend in one, you have become guilty of all (Jas 2:10).
JulianImp.2.107Augustinus. Ergo peccatum Adae ipsum solum laesit, non et genus humanum? Non enim in tantum eris absurdus, ut dicas peccato eius laesos esse vel laedi homines nescientes vel non credentes, utrum fuerit et quid egerit, quia, etsi nescientes homines aliquid imitantur, eo tamen peccato laedi et fieri peccatores, quod ante annorum millia factum esse nesciunt, nimis insipienter dicis, nisi hoc peccatum ad omnes generationes transisse fatearis. Dicentes autem quod Adae peccatum ipsum solum laeserit et non genus humanum, nisi damnaret Pelagius, damnaretur ab eis iudicibus, qui Manichaei utique non sunt.
Augustine. Then did the sin of Adam harm only himself, and not the human race too? For you will not be so absurd as to say that human beings were harmed or are harmed by his sin while not knowing or not believing whether it happened and what it did; because, even if human beings imitate something while not knowing it, yet to be harmed by that sin, and to be made sinners, which they do not know happened thousands of years ago, you say too foolishly, unless you confess that this sin passed to all generations. But those saying that the sin of Adam harmed only himself and not the human race—unless Pelagius condemned this, he would be condemned by those judges who certainly are not Manichees.
JulianImp.2.107II. 108. Iulianus. Gratia vero Domini Iesu Christi non est ita data, ut per singula peccata, quasi per singula vulnera, singula quoque indulgentiae remedia provideret diversisque baptismatibus peccatis variis veniam praeberet, sed pro efficacissimae potestate medicinae, quae criminibus id est malae voluntatis operibus admovetur, ita communiter subvenit, ut diversas species reatuum unius vi consecrationis abstergat.
II. 108. Julian. But the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ was not given in such a way that it would provide individual remedies of forgiveness for individual sins, as if for individual wounds, and grant pardon for the various sins through various baptisms; rather, in accord with the power of a most efficacious medicine, which is applied to crimes—that is, to the works of an evil will—it comes to our aid in a common way, so that it washes away the different kinds of guilt by the single force of a consecration.
JulianImp.2.108Augustinus. Quomodocumque dicas datam gratiam Domini Iesu Christi, separas ab ea parvulos, quos ea salvos fieri negas, ut scilicet vobis ipsa vocabula pro vestro arbitrio dividentibus Christus ad parvulos pertinere videatur propter regnum Dei, quo non nisi baptizatos posse pervenire conceditis, Iesum autem sit ab eis prorsus alienus, quoniam non in illis operatur, unde hoc vocatur. Scriptum est enim: Vocabis nomen eius Iesum, continuoque causam subiciens quare Iesum: Ipse enim salvum faciet - inquit - populum suum a peccatis eorum . Quod in parvulis fieri negantes et a nomine Iesu illos et ab eius populo separatis et audetis indignari, quod vos potius ab eodem populo separamini. Quantum autem attinet ad delicta voluntaria, sicut ex multis iudicium mittit in condemnationem sic ex multis gratia in iustificationem. Quare ergo dictum est: Iudicium ex uno in condemnationem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem , nisi quia hoc loco non est opposita voluntati voluntas aut imitationi imitatio, sed generationi regeneratio? Sicut enim generatio iudicium habet ex uno in condemnationem, ita regeneratio gratiam ex multis delictis in iustificationem. Clarum est, quod voluit intellegi Apostolus; vos si subditas aures aperiatis, contentiosa ora claudetis.
Augustine. However you may describe the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ as given, you separate the little ones from it, for you deny that they are saved by it. The result is that, since you divide the very names as you please, Christ seems to pertain to the little ones on account of the kingdom of God, which you grant that only the baptized can enter, while Jesus is utterly foreign to them, since he does not work in them that for which he is so named. For it is written, You shall call his name Jesus (Matt 1:21), and immediately the cause is added why he is called Jesus: for he will save, it says, his people from their sins (Matt 1:21). Denying that this happens in the little ones, you separate them both from the name of Jesus and from his people, and you dare to be indignant that you yourselves are rather separated from that same people. Now as far as voluntary offenses are concerned, just as judgment comes from many unto condemnation, so grace comes from many unto justification. Why, then, was it said, The judgment came from one offense unto condemnation, but grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16), unless because in this passage it is not will that is set against will, nor imitation against imitation, but regeneration against generation? For just as generation has judgment from one unto condemnation, so regeneration has grace from many offenses unto justification. What the Apostle meant to be understood is clear; if you would open submissive ears, you would close your contentious mouths.
JulianImp.2.108II. 109. Iulianus. Prudenter ergo, cum de Adam loqueretur, nominavit unum peccatum, quod voluit intellegi formam praevaricationis fuisse; ideo, inquam, unum et non multa memoravit, quia sciebat unum tantum Adae peccatum in legis historia contineri. Gratiam vero ex multis delictis in iustificationem imbutos a se laudavit emittere, ne beneficii pauperis suspicio nasceretur; et si dixisset: Gratia ex uno in iustificationem, non tam omnia videretur abolere quam singula. Quod ergo praemisit unum peccatum, fidem servavit historiae; quod subdidit: Ex multis gratia in iustificationem, munificentiam mysterii commendavit et copiam.
II. 109. Julian. Prudently, then, when he spoke of Adam, he named the one sin, which he wanted understood to have been the pattern of transgression; he mentioned one, I say, and not many, because he knew that only one sin of Adam is contained in the history of the law. But he praised those imbued with grace for sending it forth from many offenses unto justification, lest the suspicion arise of a meager benefit; and if he had said, 'Grace from one unto justification,' he would not seem so much to abolish everything as to abolish individual things. So in setting down one sin first, he kept faith with history; in adding, 'From many offenses grace unto justification,' he commended the bountifulness and abundance of the mystery.
JulianImp.2.109Augustinus. Quid autem opus erat, ut de Adam loqueretur, cum Christi gratiam commendaret, nisi quia per illum generatio, per istum regeneratio est?
Augustine. But what need was there for him to speak of Adam when he was commending the grace of Christ, unless because through the one comes generation and through the other regeneration?
JulianImp.2.109II. 110. Iulianus. Quae expositio ut rationi concinit, ita vos destruit; hoc enim ipso confiteri tibi necesse est in omnibus superioribus verbis Apostolum de peccato Manichaeae traducis non locutum, quando in commemoratione gratiae multa absolvi peccata monstravit.
II. 110. Julian. This exposition, just as it agrees with reason, so it destroys you; for by this very point you are forced to admit that in all the preceding words the Apostle was not speaking of the sin of your Manichean transmission, since in his account of grace he showed that many sins are absolved.
JulianImp.2.110Augustinus. Manichaeos tu adiuvas, quibus inducendi aliam naturam malam das locum negando in originali malo esse causam miseriae parvulorum, quam miseriam in paradiso utique non haberent, si perseverante ibi naturae humanae rectitudine ac beatitudine nascerentur.
Augustine. You are the one who helps the Manicheans, to whom you give occasion for bringing in another, evil nature by denying that in original evil there is a cause for the misery of little ones—a misery they would surely not have in paradise, if they were born there with the uprightness and happiness of human nature continuing.
JulianImp.2.110II. 111. Iulianus. De istorum enim peccatorum genere, quae multa esse et dimitti omnia per gratiam commendavit, ostendit se etiam illud unum superius dixisse peccatum; tu autem haec multa ea consentis esse, quae committuntur ab unoquoque homine motu propriae voluntatis; et illud ergo unum de eodem genere est.
II. 111. Julian. For it is from the class of these sins, which he commended as being many and as all being forgiven through grace, that he showed he had spoken above of that one sin as well; and you agree that these many sins are the ones committed by each individual person by a movement of his own will; therefore that one sin too belongs to the same class.
JulianImp.2.111Augustinus. Simul cum illo uno dico esse multa, non praeter illud; potest autem et hoc recte dici de eodem genere esse, si ad originem referatur, quia et ipsum ex primi hominis voluntate manavit, quando illius peccatum intravit in mundum et per omnes homines pertransiit.
Augustine. I say that there are many together with that one, not apart from that one; and it can also rightly be said to be of the same class, if it is referred to its origin, because it too flowed from the will of the first man, when his sin entered into the world and passed through all human beings.
JulianImp.2.111II. 112. Iulianus. Ut intellegatur ab unoquoque motu propriae voluntatis attractum; et iam non fecunditas seminum, sed studiorum pravitas arguetur. Ceterum si illud unum originale voluisset intellegi, non utique in sequentibus peccata multa dixisset, quae per gratiam dimissa testatur.
II. 112. Julian. So that it may be understood to have been drawn in by each one through a movement of his own will; and now it is not the fruitfulness of the seeds but the depravity of pursuits that will be charged. Otherwise, if he had wanted that one original sin understood, he would surely not have spoken in what follows of many sins, which he attests are forgiven through grace.
JulianImp.2.112Augustinus. Quare non dixisset, nisi quia hoc volunt Pelagiani? Sed non vult veritas, qua Pelagiana redarguitur novitas et vincitur vanitas. Multa enim delicta, ex quibus gratia mittit in iustificationem, simul cum illo uno multa sunt; ex quo uno iudicium, etiamsi alia non addantur, mittit in condemnationem. Sic ergo Adam unum delictum potuit generatis inserere, Christus autem regeneratis multa dimittere, quoniam plus iste profuisse quam ille nocuisse monstratur.
Augustine. Why would he not have spoken so, unless because this is what the Pelagians want? But the truth does not want it—the truth by which Pelagian novelty is refuted and its emptiness overcome. For the many offenses from which grace leads unto justification are many together with that one; and from that one offense, even if no others are added, judgment leads unto condemnation. Thus, then, Adam was able to implant one offense in those generated, while Christ was able to forgive many to those regenerated, since the latter is shown to have helped more than the former harmed.
JulianImp.2.112II. 113. Iulianus. Et quamvis quae acta sunt, ad defensionem veritatis exuberent, tamen ad ea, quae inferimus, ut sit lector intentus, admoneo. Apparebit enim irrefutabiliter nihil in his locis apostolum Paulum de natura, sed de conversatione mortalium disputasse; vim nempe gratiae Christi et peccati primi e regione constituens comparansque effectus utriusque laboravit ostendere magis Christi profuisse mysterium quam primi hominis nocuisse peccatum. Id autem docuimus in sensu traducis non posse constare; ut ergo multa quae enumeravit, ita hoc peculiariter ad laudem voluit gratiae pertinere, quod ait: Iudicium ex uno in condemnationem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem vitae . Quod hoc modo naturalis mali assertor exposuit: Ideo - inquit - " ex uno in condemnationem ", quia sufficiens est illud unum peccatum, quod originaliter trahitur, ad condemnationem ducere, sicut ducit parvulos, qui ex Adam nascuntur, si in Christo non renascantur, etiamsi alia peccata nulla sint. " Gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem ", quia non solum illud dimittit, quod originaliter trahitur, sed etiam cetera, quae ab unoquoque motu propriae voluntatis adduntur . Ecce professus es, licet impietate Manichaea, esse quidem naturale peccatum, verumtamen unum, ob quod ais nascentes debere damnari.
II. 113. Julian. And although what has been done abounds for the defense of the truth, nevertheless I urge that the reader be attentive to what we bring forward. For it will appear irrefutably that in these passages the apostle Paul argued nothing about nature, but about the conduct of mortals; for setting the force of the grace of Christ and of the first sin over against each other and comparing the effects of both, he labored to show that the mystery of Christ profited more than the sin of the first man harmed. But we have taught that this cannot stand in the sense of transmission; so, just as he wanted the many sins he enumerated to pertain to the praise of grace, so he especially wanted this to do so, where he says: The judgment from one unto condemnation, but grace from many offenses unto justification of life (Rom 5:16, 18). This the assertor of natural evil expounded in this way: Therefore, he says, "from one unto condemnation," because that one sin, which is drawn in by origin, is sufficient to lead unto condemnation, as it leads the little ones who are born of Adam, if they are not reborn in Christ, even if there are no other sins. "But grace from many offenses unto justification," because it forgives not only that which is drawn in by origin, but also the rest, which are added by each one through a movement of his own will. See, you have professed—albeit with Manichean impiety—that there is indeed a natural sin, yet one only, on account of which you say the newborn must be condemned.
JulianImp.2.113Augustinus. Quid dixit: Omnes sub peccato nascimur , Manichaeus non erat, sed vos, responde, quid sitis, qui tot imagines Dei sine ullius peccati merito separatis a regno Dei, negatis damnari iudicio Dei et facitis duas aeternas felicitates, unam, quae sit in regno Dei, alteram, quae sit extra regnum Dei; dicite, obsecro, in ea felicitate, quae extra Dei regnum erit, ullusne regnabit an nullus? Si nullus, liberior erit procul dubio sine ullo rege illa felicitas; si vero ullus in ea regnabit, quis erit rex imaginum Dei, qui non erit Deus? Porro si Deus erit, vos introducitis alterum deum et me dicitis Manichaeum? Quod si Deus ipse ibi regnabit, cuius illae imagines sunt, etiam ipsae imagines eius in veri Dei sui regno felices erunt. Et ubi erit: Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu, non potest introire in regnum Dei ? At tandem aliquando extra regnum Dei infelices futuros fatemini parvulos non renatos. Dicite ergo huius infelicitatis meritum, verbosi et contentiosi, qui negatis originale peccatum.
Augustine. He who said, We are all born under sin, was not a Manichean; but you—answer, what are you, who separate so many images of God from the kingdom of God without the merit of any sin, who deny that they are condemned by the judgment of God, and who make two eternal happinesses, one within the kingdom of God, the other outside the kingdom of God? Tell me, I beg you: in that happiness which will be outside the kingdom of God, will anyone reign, or no one? If no one, then that happiness will doubtless be freer, without any king; but if anyone will reign in it, who will be the king of the images of God, who will not be God? Further, if he will be God, then you are bringing in another god—and you call me a Manichean? But if God himself, whose images they are, will reign there, then those images of his will also be happy in the kingdom of their true God. And where then will be the saying, Unless one is born again of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God (John 3:5)? Yet at last you admit that unborn little ones will be unhappy outside the kingdom of God. Tell us, then, the desert of this unhappiness, you wordy and contentious men who deny original sin.
JulianImp.2.113II. 114. Iulianus. Proba ergo hoc in eis, quod gratiae Christi apostolus Paulus ascripsit, impleri, videlicet ut ex multis delictis iustificationem operetur, id est ut iustitiam peccatorum plurium una semel remissione contribuat; aut ergo doce parvulos multis obnoxios esse criminibus, ut eis quoque illud persuadeas convenire, in quo laudem munificentiae Christi Apostolus collocavit, ut ex multis eos constet liberatos esse peccatis; aut confitere Paulum nihil in his locis de parvulis, nihil de hominum disputasse natura, quando ea dimitti gratiae liberalitate testatus est, quae te quoque annuente nequeunt in nascentibus inveniri.
II. 114. Julian. Prove, then, that in them is fulfilled what the apostle Paul ascribed to the grace of Christ, namely that it works justification from many offenses—that is, that it bestows the righteousness of many sins by one single remission. Either, then, teach that the little ones are liable to many crimes, so that you may persuade us that this too applies to them, in which the Apostle placed the praise of Christ's bountifulness, namely that it is established they have been freed from many sins; or confess that Paul argued nothing in these passages about little ones, nothing about the nature of human beings, when he attested that those things are forgiven by the liberality of grace which—with your agreement too—cannot be found in the newborn.
JulianImp.2.114Augustinus. Quid est, quod loqueris, quid est, quod tibi obstrepit loquacissima vanitas, ne intret in aures tuas mani festissima veritas? Utique Iesus, qui ex multis delictis salvum facit populum suum, non praetermittit etiam originalia singula parvulorum, quia in eisdem multis et ipsa sunt.
Augustine. What is it you are saying, what is this most garrulous emptiness that clamors against you, so that the most manifest truth may not enter your ears? Surely Jesus, who saves his people from many offenses, does not pass over even the individual original sins of little ones, because in those same 'many' these too are included.
JulianImp.2.114II. 115. Iulianus. Gratia - inquit - ex multis delictis in iustificationem ; tu parvulos non plus quam uni obnoxios dicis esse peccato. Vides ergo in eorum persona laudem gratiae claudicantem, quia non invenit multa peccata, quorum remissione laudetur; quod dixit itaque apostolus Paulus: Gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem , falsissimum esse in parvulorum statu proditur. Quo hinc tu igitur conaberis exsilire? Procul dubio dicturus es, hunc enim sensum tuum superior sermo patefecit, hoc, quod ait Apostolus: Gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem , apud homines perfectae aetatis impleri, qui multis delictis per motum propriae voluntatis convincantur obnoxii, in parvulis autem non ex multis, sed ex uno delicto fieri iustificationem.
II. 115. Julian. Grace, he says, from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16); but you say the little ones are liable to no more than one sin. You see, then, that in their case the praise of grace limps, because it does not find the many sins by whose remission it might be praised; and so what the apostle Paul said, But grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16), is shown to be utterly false in the condition of little ones. Where, then, will you try to leap out from here? Doubtless you will say—for your earlier discourse has laid bare this view of yours—that what the Apostle says, But grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16), is fulfilled in people of mature age, who are convicted of being liable to many offenses through a movement of their own will, but that in little ones justification comes not from many but from one offense.
JulianImp.2.115Augustinus. Non erat magnum, ut intellegeres ab hac iustificatione, quam Salvator ex multorum delictorum dimissione suis confert, vos potius subtrahere parvulos, quibus nullum peccatum remitti posse contenditis, non autem nos, qui, cum dicimus per unum peccantem missos omnes in condemnationem, nullam excipimus aetatem, quia hoc delictum etiam maioris aetatis homines habent; itemque, cum dicimus ex multis delictis iustificare gratiam, nullam nihilominus excipimus aetatem, quoniam, qui multa peccata dimittit, quo multorum nomine utique omnia intelleguntur, profecto ulla non praetermittit, hoc est nec pessimorum plura nec aliquorum pauciora nec singula parvulorum. Hoc ergo ut videretis, non erat magnum, nisi invideretis parvulis medicum Christum eumque illis Iesum prorsus esse nolletis horrenda impietate, mira caecitate, blasphema loquacitate. Quid est autem insanius quam velle gratiam Christi ad eos tantummodo pertinere, quorum sunt multa peccata? Hac quippe ratione vel potius mentis excaecatione non solos huic gratiae subducitis parvulos, quos nullum ex origine reatum trahere existimatis, sed omnes omnino, qui multa peccata non habent, quoniam sic putatis intellegendum, quod ait Apostolus: Gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem , ut ad istam gratiam nemo pertineat, nisi cui dimittit multa peccata. Ac per hoc, quoniam nullum peccatum, sicut opinamini, parvulus habet, profecto, cum creverit et peccare iam coeperit, non dico si pauca peccata, sed si adhuc unum forte commiserit et ad Christum baptismum venerit, nullo modo ad istam gratiam pertinebit, quia non ex multis delictis in iustificationem mittitur, sed ex uno. Puto, quod non usque adeo cordis in vobis praevalet surditas, ut vos haec tanta erubescere non compellat absurditas. Porro si pertinet ad istam gratiam etiam, cui unum peccatum dimiserit, sic dixit Apostolus: Gratia ex multis delictis in iustificationem, ut totius populi peccata voluerit, qui per illam iustificatur, intellegi, aliis illic habentibus plura, aliis pauciora, aliis etiam singula, quae utique multa sunt omnia.
Augustine. It would not have been difficult for you to understand that it is rather you who withdraw the little ones from this justification, which the Savior confers on his own from the remission of many offenses—you who contend that no sin can be forgiven them—and not we, who, when we say that through one sinner all were sent into condemnation, exclude no age, because even people of greater age have this offense; and likewise, when we say that grace justifies from many offenses, we nonetheless exclude no age, since he who forgives many sins—and under the name of 'many' all are certainly understood—surely passes over none, that is, neither the more numerous sins of the worst, nor the fewer sins of some, nor the single sins of little ones. To see this, then, would not have been difficult, were it not that you begrudge the little ones Christ their physician and absolutely refuse that he should be Jesus to them, with horrible impiety, astonishing blindness, and blasphemous garrulity. And what is more insane than to want the grace of Christ to pertain only to those whose sins are many? For by this reasoning, or rather by this blinding of the mind, you withdraw from this grace not only the little ones, whom you suppose to draw no guilt from their origin, but absolutely everyone who does not have many sins, since you think the Apostle's saying, But grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16), is to be so understood that no one pertains to this grace except one to whom many sins are forgiven. And on this account, since (as you suppose) a little one has no sin, surely when he has grown up and has already begun to sin—I do not say if he has committed few sins, but even if he should perhaps have committed but one—and has come to Christ for baptism, he will in no way pertain to this grace, because he is not sent unto justification from many offenses, but from one. I think the deafness of heart does not so far prevail in you that this great absurdity does not force you to blush. Furthermore, if even one to whom one sin has been forgiven does pertain to this grace, then the Apostle said, Grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16), in such a way that he wanted the sins of the whole people who are justified through it to be understood—some there having more, some fewer, some even single sins, all of which are certainly many.
JulianImp.2.115II. 116. Iulianus. Verum tali expositione, qua quidem nec pervertere sensum nec suffugere valebis, tamen non solum praestigias tuas, sed etiam illius, quam in nos inflammabas, figmentum invidiae perdidisti. Graviter quippe nos in fidem commisisse iactabas, qui dicimus gratiam quidem Christi uniformiter esse tradendam nec debere verba eius et instituta concuti, sed aequaliter cunctis a se imbutis adoptionis et sanctificationis promotionisque dona conferre, verum non omnes accedentes in unis reatibus invenire, sed eos quidem, qui propria voluntate peccaverint, sine cuius opere nullum potest esse peccatum, liberare de reatu et de malis facere bonos, innocentes autem infucata primaevitate felices pro nullo opere malae voluntatis arguere, cuius apud eos novit experientiam non fuisse.
II. 116. Julian. But by such an exposition—by which you will be able neither to pervert the sense nor to escape—you have nevertheless destroyed not only your tricks but also the figment of that envy which you were inflaming against us. For you boasted that we had grievously offended against the faith, we who say that the grace of Christ must indeed be handed on uniformly, and that his words and institutions must not be shaken, but that it confers equally on all who are imbued by it the gifts of adoption, sanctification, and advancement—yet that it does not find all who approach it in the same state of guilt, but frees from guilt and makes good out of evil those indeed who have sinned by their own will (without whose working there can be no sin), while it pronounces the innocent, happy in their undefiled first beginning, guilty for no work of an evil will, of which it knows there has been no experience in them.
JulianImp.2.116Augustinus. O dementiam singularem! Hoc disputare est an insanire? Cum miseria se natos esse parvuli flendo testantur, quos non vis Christum habere Iesum et felices eos dicis, quos tamen eius non admittis in regnum; quod regnum si christiana caritate diligeres, ab illo separari magnam esse miseriam iudicares.
Augustine. O singular madness! Is this to argue, or to rave? When the little ones bear witness by their weeping that they are born into misery—the little ones whom you do not want to have Christ as Jesus—you even call them happy, though you do not admit them into his kingdom; and if you loved that kingdom with Christian love, you would judge it a great misery to be separated from it.
JulianImp.2.116II. 117. Iulianus. Sed de bono facere meliores; atque ad unum quidem collem omnes, quos susceperit, sanctificationis evehere, sed non omnes in eadem vitiorum palude deprehendere, verum alios invenire in statu innocentium, alios in studiis noxiorum. Hoc ergo quia dicimus, quod fidei sanitate, praesidio rationis atque intellegentiae pietate munitur, per quod et Christi gratia iure laudatur nec Deo applicatur ullus reatus, tu dicis auctoritatem nutare sacramenti atque acumine pistillo omni obtunsiore asseris auferri auctoritatem gratiae, nisi ei calumniandi flagitium adscribatur, nisi iustitiae instituta perverterit, nisi his, qui scientiam non habent, alienae conscientiae crimen impegerit, postremo nihil eam efficere, si non in omnibus uniformiter praedicetur operari.
II. 117. Julian. But it makes better out of the good; and it raises all whom it receives to one and the same hill of sanctification, yet does not find all in the same swamp of vices, but finds some in the state of the innocent, others in the pursuits of the guilty. Since, then, we say this—which is fortified by soundness of faith, by the safeguard of reason, and by the dutifulness of understanding, through which the grace of Christ is rightly praised and no guilt is attributed to God—you say that the authority of the sacrament wavers, and with a pestle blunter than any bluntness you assert that the authority of grace is taken away unless the disgrace of calumny is ascribed to it, unless it has perverted the institutions of justice, unless it has fastened the crime of another's conscience on those who have no knowledge of it—in short, that it accomplishes nothing unless it is proclaimed to work uniformly in all.
JulianImp.2.117Augustinus. Quid est, quod acumen non meum, sed omnium catholicorum disputatorum, cum quibus inconcussum teneo, quod frustra labefactare conamini, pistillo comparandum putasti? An, quod vos fragiles conterat, sentire coepisti? Et tamen, qui velut defensione iustitiae Dei niteris, ut evertas, quod de parvulorum non regeneratorum damnatione tota Christi sentit Ecclesia, numquam dicturus es, grave iugum super parvulos unde sit iustum, si non trahunt originale peccatum, nec advertis vos potius pervertere instituta iustitiae et hoc omnipotentis Dei, a quo vel sub quo istam poenam sine ullo merito innumerabilibus omnium hominum millibus, hoc est imaginum Dei, a die exitus de ventre matris eorum dicitis irrogari. Postremo numquam dicturus es, unde sit iustum, ut parvuli nulla sua, nulla plerumque etiam suorum culpa sine baptismate mortui a parentibus et propinquis fidelibus separentur et ad Dei regnum non admittantur nec inter vasa facta in honorem, sicut alii parvuli baptizati, sed inter vasa facta in contumeliam, quia nullum est tertium genus vasorum, sine ullis malis meritis deputentur. Displicet enim haereticae prudentiae vestrae, quod catholica fides credit, posteaquam ierunt omnes ex uno in condemnationem, in aliis fieri misericordiam gratiae, in aliis iudicium veritatis manere per in vestigabiles Domini vias, quae universae sunt misericordia et veritas .
Augustine. Why have you thought that the acumen—not mine, but that of all the catholic disputants with whom I hold, unshaken, what you try in vain to overthrow—must be compared to a pestle? Or have you begun to feel that it grinds you fragile men to pieces? And yet you, who strive as it were in defense of the justice of God to overthrow what the whole Church of Christ holds concerning the condemnation of unregenerate little ones, will never be able to say why the heavy yoke (See Sir 40:1) upon the little ones is just, if they do not draw original sin; nor do you notice that it is rather you who pervert the institutions of justice—and this of almighty God, by whom or under whom you say this punishment is inflicted, without any merit, on countless thousands of all human beings, that is, of images of God, from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb. Finally, you will never be able to say why it is just that little ones who die without baptism—through no fault of their own, and very often through no fault even of their own people—should be separated by faithful parents and kinsfolk and not admitted to the kingdom of God, nor counted among the vessels made for honor, like other baptized little ones, but among the vessels made for dishonor (since there is no third kind of vessel (See Rom 9:21)), without any evil merits. For it displeases your heretical prudence that the catholic faith believes that, after all went from the one into condemnation, in some the mercy of grace is shown, and in others the judgment of truth abides, through the unsearchable ways of the Lord, which are all mercy and truth (See Ps 25:10 (24:10)).
JulianImp.2.117II. 118. Iulianus. Id ergo totum, per quod stultitia sordentes decipiebas animos, tua expositione evanuisse manifestum est.
II. 118. Julian. All of this, then, by which you were deceiving minds sordid with folly, is manifestly shown to have vanished by your own exposition.
JulianImp.2.118Augustinus. Evanuisti, sed tu, qui videre vel confiteri non vis remissionem peccatorum etiam ad illos pertinere, qui unum habent; ad quam medicinalem gratiam non pertinent parvuli, si nullum habent; quos impie necatis, quia eis Salvatorem negatis.
Augustine. It is you who have vanished—you who are unwilling to see or to confess that the remission of sins pertains also to those who have one sin; the little ones do not pertain to this medicinal grace if they have none, the little ones whom you impiously kill, because you deny them the Savior.
JulianImp.2.118II. 119. Iulianus. Nam cum Apostolus pronuntiat: Gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem , et hoc tu dicis in parvulis quidem non posse constare, in illis autem, qui iam perfectae aetatis sunt, solis ideo impleri, quia ad unum illud alia quoque motu propriae voluntatis addiderint, confiteris sine dubio diversam esse operationem gratiae pro diversitate venientium. In his quippe, qui motu propriae voluntatis utuntur, suppetit ei materia gloriandi, quia ex multis criminibus in iustificationem, quos adoptarit, educit; in parvulis autem secundum te ieiunius, angustius, exilius nec virtute magna nec medicina idonea nec honestate salva nec pudore securo unum illud peccatum se promittit auferre, quod nec debuit imputare, et ex hoc uno, quos liberat, in iustificationem conatur emittere.
II. 119. Julian. For when the Apostle declares, But grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16), and you say that this cannot hold in little ones, but is fulfilled only in those who are already of mature age, because they have added to that one others as well through a movement of their own will, you confess without doubt that the working of grace is different according to the difference of those who come. For in those who use a movement of their own will, it has matter for glorying, because it leads those it has adopted from many crimes unto justification; but in little ones, according to you, more meagerly, more narrowly, more thinly—with no great power, no suitable medicine, no integrity preserved, no security of honor—it promises to take away that one sin, which it ought not even to have imputed, and from this one it tries to send forth unto justification those whom it frees.
JulianImp.2.119Augustinus. Iam responsum est; eadem multum dicis non inveniendo quid dicas. Cum dicitis nullum peccatum parvulis imputandum, iniustum facitis Deum, qui eis grave iugum a die exitus de ventre matris imposuit ; quod etsi Scriptura non diceret, quis tam caecus est mente, qui non videat miseriam generis humani a fletibus incipere parvulorum? Iniustam facitis etiam Dei legem, quae octavo die non circumcisi animam damnat infantis ; vanum quoque iudicatis esse praeceptum, ubi sacrificium pro peccato infante nato iubetur offerri . Si autem reatus iste originis et Scriptura sancta proditur, et ipse se prodit; etiam hoc peccatum inter illa est multa peccata, ex quibus iustificat gratia, quae parvulos quoque ex hac miseria beatificat, et hoc non isto in saeculo, quod universum Deus hominibus voluit esse poenale, ex quo primos homines foras de paradisi felicitate dimisit, sed in futuro aeterno, unde nunc Christus membris suis Sancti Spiritus pignus impertit .
Augustine. It has already been answered; you say the same things at length because you cannot find anything to say. When you say that no sin is to be imputed to little ones, you make God unjust, who has laid a heavy yoke upon them from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1); and even if Scripture did not say this, who is so blind in mind that he does not see that the misery of the human race begins with the weeping of little ones? You also make unjust the law of God, which condemns the soul of an infant not circumcised on the eighth day (See Gen 17:14); and you judge to be vain the precept where a sacrifice for sin is commanded to be offered for a newborn infant (See Lev 12:6-8). But if this guilt of origin is both revealed by holy Scripture and reveals itself, then this sin too is among those many sins from which grace justifies—grace which makes even little ones blessed from this misery, and this not in this present age, which God willed to be wholly penal for human beings ever since he sent the first human beings forth from the happiness of paradise, but in the eternity to come, whence Christ now imparts to his members the pledge of the Holy Spirit (See 2 Cor 1:22).
JulianImp.2.119II. 120. Iulianus. Confessus es ergo aliter operari gratiam in maioribus, aliter in minoribus. Nec quidquam putes responsioni tuae relictum loci, si inferas magnam quidem, sed in remissione peccatorum esse distantiam, ut, etsi unum peccatum, tamen inveniat, quod remittat. Verum nihil hac argumentatione promoves; neque enim refert, in qua specie varios unius gratiae fatearis effectus, dummodo varios posse esse fateare.
II. 120. Julian. You have confessed, then, that grace works one way in the greater, another way in the lesser. And do not think any room is left for your reply if you bring in that there is indeed a great difference, but a difference in the remission of sins, so that, even if there is one sin, it nevertheless finds something to remit. But you accomplish nothing by this argument; for it makes no difference in what manner you confess the various effects of one grace, provided you confess that they can be various.
JulianImp.2.120Augustinus. Aliud est varios effectus gratiae dicere, quia et Scriptura sancta multiformem dicit gratiam Dei , et aliud est gratiam remissionis peccatorum parvulis denegare eosque in Ecclesia veritatis, si non eruuntur de potestate tenebrarum, mendaciter exorcizari exsufflarique contendere cum magna iniuria Creatoris, si non indigent auxilio Salvatoris, ut de potestate eruantur deceptoris.
Augustine. It is one thing to speak of the various effects of grace, because holy Scripture too calls the grace of God manifold (See 1 Pet 4:10), and another thing to deny to little ones the grace of the remission of sins, and to contend that in the Church of truth they are exorcized and breathed upon falsely—if they are not rescued from the power of darkness—with great injury to the Creator, if they have no need of the help of the Savior to be rescued from the power of the deceiver.
JulianImp.2.120II. 121. Iulianus. Ego enim hoc contentus sum, quod mihi es tu dare compulsus, quia, quod praedicavit Apostolus in liberalitate gratiae non possit cunctis aequaliter aetatibus convenire; tu si quid attuleris, quod et in prima nascentium aetate remissionem confirmes exsequi, illud tamen non admovisti, quia non compleatur in parvulis, unde Apostolus gratiam Christi pronuntiavit esse laudabilem. Nam cum medicinam mysterii peccato primi hominis, quem formam fuisse docebat sequentibus, anteferret, ait: Iudicium ex uno delicto in condemnationem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem . Illud ergo, per quod praetulit gratiam, quia ex multis videlicet delictis iustificationem operatur, nec secundum te constat in parvulis; atque ad hoc, quamvis reluctareris, attractus es, ut non aequaliter in diversis aetatibus gratiam faterere versari.
II. 121. Julian. For I am content with this, which you have been compelled to grant me: that what the Apostle proclaimed in the liberality of grace cannot apply equally to all ages. If you bring forward anything by which you would confirm that remission carries through even in the first age of the newborn, you have nevertheless not adduced this—that there is not fulfilled in little ones that for which the Apostle proclaimed the grace of Christ to be praiseworthy. For when he set the medicine of the mystery before the sin of the first man, whom he taught to be a pattern for those who followed, he said: The judgment from one offense unto condemnation, but grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16). That, then, by which he preferred grace—namely that it works justification from many offenses—does not, even according to you, hold in little ones; and to this, however you resisted, you were drawn: to confess that grace operates unequally in the different ages.
JulianImp.2.121Augustinus. Iam responsum est; vana loqueris. Gloriosa est gratia Dei, etiam cum dimittit singula quorumque peccata, quia et ipsa singula ad eam multitudinem pertinent peccatorum, ex qua iustificat homines, qui salvum facit populum suum a peccatis eorum ; ad quem populum dignissime non pertinetis, quia parvulos ad eum pertinere non vultis.
Augustine. It has already been answered; you speak empty things. The grace of God is glorious even when it forgives the single sins of any persons, because those single sins too belong to that multitude of sins from which it justifies people—the grace which saves his people from their sins (Matt 1:21); and you most deservedly do not belong to that people, because you are unwilling that the little ones should belong to it.
JulianImp.2.121II. 122. Iulianus. Quod cum receptum est a te, apparuit nullam fuisse necessitatem naturae humanae calumniam concitandi ob hoc solum, ne baptismatis magis gratia varios habere pro aetatibus diceretur effectus. Quo persuasionis colore sublato, si quid nervorum habes, si quid ingenii, si quid virtutis, annitere probare naturale peccatum, quod vides ratione, auctoritate, aequitate destructum. Quo enim es deceptus intuitu, ut commixtionem corporum, quae Deus instituit, et conciliatricem ipsius commixtionis, voluptatem sexuum, quae tam in hominibus quam in pecoribus vigens auctorem suum eum, quem corporum indicat conditorem, diaboli opus et fruticem vocares?
II. 122. Julian. And when this was accepted by you, it became apparent that there was no necessity to stir up a calumny against human nature solely for this reason—lest the grace of baptism should rather be said to have various effects according to ages. With this pretext of persuasion removed, if you have any sinews, any talent, any virtue, strive to prove a natural sin, which you see destroyed by reason, by authority, and by equity. For by what view were you deceived, so that you would call the joining of bodies, which God instituted, and the procurer of that very joining—the pleasure of the sexes, which flourishes in human beings as much as in cattle and points to its author as him whom it shows to be the founder of bodies—a work and offshoot of the devil?
JulianImp.2.122Augustinus. Erubesce; tu es ille laudator libidinis. Erubesce, inquam. Libido ista, quae tibi multum placet, contra quam necesse est ut pugnet, qui non vult ei sollicitanti consentiendo perpetrare peccatum, non erat in paradiso ante peccatum; aut ergo nulla ibi erat aut voluntatem mentis nec praecedebat nec excedebat. Non est talis modo; hoc in se ipso sentit omnis homo et tu homo es; cohibe renitendi studium et agnosce vitium, unde trahitur originale peccatum. Hoc in hominibus propagatis invenerunt nuptiae, non fecerunt; hoc necessitate utuntur, castitate bene utuntur, idcirco nulla ratione culpantur; hoc in pecoribus ideo non est malum, quia non in eis caro concupiscit adversus spiritum , quod malum in hominibus sanandum est bonitate divina, non humana vanitate laudandum.
Augustine. Blush! You are that praiser of lust. Blush, I say. This lust, which pleases you so much, against which one must fight who does not want, by consenting to its enticement, to commit sin, was not in paradise before sin; either, then, it was not there at all, or it neither preceded nor exceeded the will of the mind. It is not such now; every human being feels this in himself, and you are a human being. Restrain your zeal for resisting and acknowledge the defect from which original sin is drawn. Marriage found this in human beings who are propagated; it did not make it; it uses this by necessity, it uses it well by chastity, and therefore marriages are by no means to be blamed; in cattle this is not an evil, because in them the flesh does not lust against the spirit (See Gal 5:17)—this evil which in human beings must be healed by divine goodness, not praised by human vanity.
JulianImp.2.122II. 123. Iulianus. Quae autem ratio fuit, ut primo innocentiam crimine sauciares alieno, dehinc rem studiorum miscere seminibus conareris ?
II. 123. Julian. But what reason was there for you first to wound innocence with another's crime, and then to try to mingle a matter of pursuits with the seeds?
JulianImp.2.123Augustinus. Eadem per eadem dicis; sed procul dubio sunt vana, quae dicis. Natura bona sunt semina, sed vitiantur et semina eisque vitiatis propagantur et vitia. Saltem species te corporum doceat, quorum cum sit opifex summe bonus et nullo vitio depravatus, vitiosa tamen multa nascuntur; et utique, si nemo peccasset, nulla in paradiso talia nascerentur.
Augustine. You say the same things by the same things; but without doubt the things you say are empty. The seeds are good by nature, but the seeds too are corrupted, and when they are corrupted, the defects are propagated along with them. Let the form of bodies at least teach you: though their maker is supremely good and corrupted by no defect, nevertheless many defective things are born; and surely, if no one had sinned, no such things would be born in paradise.
JulianImp.2.123II. 124. Iulianus. Ut baptismati veritatem propriae operationis auferres? Ut Deo, qui totus aequitas est, qui sine iustitia Deus esse non potest, perspicuae iniquitatis crimen ascriberes?
II. 124. Julian. Was it to take away from baptism the truth of its proper operation? Was it to ascribe to God, who is wholly equity, who cannot be God without justice, the crime of manifest iniquity?
JulianImp.2.124Augustinus. Vos hoc potius facitis, quoniam, si parvuli sine ullius peccati merito premuntur gravi iugo, iniquus est Deus; sed quia ille non est iniquus, tu es calumniosus et caecus.
Augustine. It is rather you who do this, since, if little ones are weighed down by a heavy yoke without the merit of any sin, God is unjust; but because he is not unjust, you are slanderous and blind.
JulianImp.2.124II. 125. Iulianus. Tam, inquam, perspicuae, ut ipse hanc iniustitiae speciem, quam eius mentiris adhaerere iudiciis, legis suae auctoritate damnaverit.
II. 125. Julian. So manifest, I say, that he himself has condemned by the authority of his own law this very form of injustice which you falsely allege clings to his judgments.
JulianImp.2.125Augustinus. In eius lege scriptum est animam parvuli, si die octavo non circumcidatur, interituram de populo suo ; quo merito? Dic, si potes; sed omnino non potes et tamen originale peccatum negando non taces.
Augustine. In his law it is written that the soul of a little one, if it is not circumcised on the eighth day, shall perish from its people (See Gen 17:14); by what merit? Say, if you can; but you cannot at all, and yet by denying original sin you do not keep silent.
JulianImp.2.125II. 126. Iulianus. Quae ergo tot blasphemiarum necessitas fuit, si nec ista, quam amplexabaris, fuit? Quae quidem nihil habens momenti, tamen velut quaedam tabula videbatur, quam in tanto naufragio contineres, quam victis remisisti, sero licet, lacertis. Ut enim res repetitione clarescat: ideo Manichaeus credebaris ab ineptis quibusque tolerandus, ne gratiae Christi non in omnibus una efficientia videretur, ad hoc tu nunc sine adactu nostro expositionis tuae processibus intulisti dicens Apostoli sententiam, quae ait: Gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem , in hominibus quidem maioris aetatis posse, in parvulis vero non posse compleri, sed esse in parvulis aliud brevius exilius egentius, quod licet tu excogites, tamen nequaquam dixisse Apostolum confiteris.
II. 126. Julian. What necessity was there, then, for so many blasphemies, if even that which you were embracing did not exist? For though it had no weight, it nevertheless seemed like a kind of plank to which you might cling in so great a shipwreck—a plank you have let go from your defeated arms, late though it be. For (that the matter may grow clear by repetition) you were believed to be a Manichean to be tolerated by certain foolish people, lest the grace of Christ should not seem to have one efficacy in all; to this end you have now, without any compulsion from us, in the course of your own exposition, brought in the claim that the Apostle's sentence, which says, But grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16), can be fulfilled in people of greater age but cannot be fulfilled in little ones, but that there is in little ones something else, briefer, thinner, more needy—which, though you devise it, you nevertheless confess the Apostle by no means said.
JulianImp.2.126Augustinus. Relegatur, quod tibi responsum est , ut intellegatur te nihil dicere et tamen tacere non posse, homo linguose. Gratia ex multis delictis in iustificationem mittit, cum salvum facit Iesus populum suum a peccatis eorum. In eisdem multis invenit etiam singula parvulorum, quemadmodum, etiamsi peccata originalia nulla essent, in eisdem multis inveniret peccare incipientium etiam singula grandiorum, quibus ad Christi baptisma venientibus nullo modo diceretur: Non potestis modo baptizari, quia nondum habetis multa delicta; gratia enim ex multis delictis mittit in iustificationem. Verissime quippe responderent: In multitudine delictorum, ex quibus iustificat gratia, etiam nostra delicta sunt singula, ubi habent aliqui plura, aliqui pauciora, quae simul cum singulis nostris multa sunt omnia.
Augustine. Let what has been answered to you be read again, that it may be understood that you say nothing and yet cannot keep silent, you glib-tongued man. Grace sends from many offenses unto justification when Jesus saves his people from their sins (See Matt 1:21). In those same 'many' it finds also the single sins of little ones, just as, even if there were no original sins, in those same 'many' it would find also the single sins of older people beginning to sin—to whom, when they come to the baptism of Christ, it would in no way be said: You cannot now be baptized, because you do not yet have many offenses; for grace sends from many offenses unto justification. For they would most truly answer: In the multitude of offenses from which grace justifies, our single offenses too are included, where some have more, some fewer, which together with our single ones are all many.
JulianImp.2.126II. 127. Iulianus. Igitur et secundum te in adoptione quidem per omnes aetates gratiae est aequalis effectus; in remissione vero peccatorum non in omnibus est una taxatio. Sed egi hactenus parce nimis atque patienter.
II. 127. Julian. Therefore, even according to you, in adoption the effect of grace is indeed equal through all ages; but in the remission of sins there is not one and the same measure in all. But thus far I have acted all too sparingly and patiently.
JulianImp.2.127Augustinus. Si tam multa loqueris parce loquens, ut unum meum librum nec ipsum totum tuis octo libris insecteris, nimium profusa et luxuriosa est parsimonia tua. Sed si hactenus parce egisti, quare in tam multis contra veritatem clamans animae tuae non pepercisti?
Augustine. If you speak so many things while speaking sparingly—so that you pursue one book of mine, and not even the whole of it, with your eight books—then your sparingness is exceedingly lavish and luxuriant. But if thus far you have acted sparingly, why, in crying out so much against the truth, have you not spared your own soul?
JulianImp.2.127II. 128. Iulianus. Praemissa scilicet disputatione probare contentus te quoque, qui nobis seditionem per hoc maximam concitabas, dicere remissionis peccatorum non in cunctis unam constare rationem, ut etiamsi unum hoc naturale peccatum persuadere possis, tamen liqueret necessario dici non semper accedentium ad gratiam unum statum esse et hoc Apostoli dictum: Ex multis delictis in iustificationem in adulta solum, non autem etiam in prima aetate compleri.
II. 128. Julian. Having sent ahead my argument, that is, content to prove that you too—you who were stirring up the greatest sedition against us by this means—say that the remission of sins does not have one and the same account in all; so that, even if you could persuade us of this one natural sin, it would nevertheless necessarily be clear that the state of those approaching grace is not always one, and that this saying of the Apostle, From many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16), is fulfilled only in the adult age and not also in the first age.
JulianImp.2.128Augustinus. Secundum tua vaniloquia nec in adulta aetate completur, quoniam multi adulti habent singula, etiamsi secundum vos non habent originalia, quibus contigit venire ad baptismum, quando peccare coeperunt; aliqui habent etiam paucissima, non tamen multa, non ergo pertinebunt ad hanc gratiam Christi, quoniam ex multis delictis illa iustificat, quae non habent isti; quod si quisquis sapit, ineffabiliter desipit. Agnosce Christum ex multis delictis iustificantem salvumque facientem populum suum et in eisdem multis intellegens posse quorumlibet et pauca et singula computari noli ab hoc populo sortem subtrahere parvulorum; etiam ipsis crede necessarium esse Iesum, qui hoc non vocatur, nisi quia salvum facit populum suum , in quo utique sunt et parvuli, a peccatis eorum.
Augustine. According to your empty talk it is not fulfilled even in the adult age, since many adults have single sins—even if, according to you, they do not have original ones—who happen to come to baptism when they have begun to sin; and some have even very few, yet not many; therefore they will not pertain to this grace of Christ, since it justifies from many offenses, which these do not have. And if anyone holds this view, he is ineffably out of his mind. Acknowledge Christ justifying from many offenses and saving his people, and understanding that in those same 'many' the few and the single sins of any persons can be reckoned, do not withdraw the lot of the little ones from this people; believe that Jesus is necessary even to them—he who is not so called except because he saves his people (See Matt 1:21), among whom certainly are the little ones too, from their sins.
JulianImp.2.128II. 129. Iulianus. Nunc vero assero consequenter nihil Apostolum de Manichaea traduce suspicatum; ostendit quippe ad gravem iniuriam pertinere mysteriorum, si compararentur per cuncta peccatis, id est si non efficacius prodesset gratia, quam culpae forma nocuisset. Maximam ergo christianae fidei dignitatem in eo Magister Gentium collocavit, quod eam affirmavit antestare delictis; ob hoc illi curae fuit, ut morbis veteribus medicinae praeferret effectum.
II. 129. Julian. But now I assert, in consequence, that the Apostle suspected nothing of the Manichean transmission; for he showed that it would amount to a grave injury to the mysteries if they were compared in every respect to sins—that is, if grace did not profit more efficaciously than the pattern of fault had harmed. The Teacher of the Gentiles, then, placed the greatest dignity of the Christian faith in this, that he affirmed it surpasses offenses; for this reason it was his concern to set the effect of the medicine before the old diseases.
JulianImp.2.129Augustinus. Hanc medicinam negatis parvulis, quos falsa et inimica defensione salvos esse contenditis, sed Deus eorum, qui ex ore infantium atque lactantium medicinae suae perficit laudem, profecto et vos destruit, qui eis adhibetis inimicam defensionem, cum destruit inimicum et defensorem.
Augustine. This medicine you deny to little ones, whom by a false and hostile defense you contend to be saved; but their God, who out of the mouth of infants and sucklings perfects the praise (See Ps 8:2 (8:3); Matt 21:16) of his medicine, surely destroys you as well, who apply to them a hostile defense, since he destroys the enemy and the defender (See Ps 8:2 (8:3)).
JulianImp.2.129II. 130. Iulianus. Inde gratiam ostendit esse laudabilem, si ei per omnia conveniret, quod dixit: Iudicium ex uno in condemnationem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem . Qua tu ergo licentia gratiam Christi ea laudatione fraudabis, qua illam Apostolus voluit praedicari; ut deicias titulum dignitatis, per quem solum honorem eius vas electionis voluit agnosci?
II. 130. Julian. Thence he showed grace to be praiseworthy, if there agreed with it in every respect what he said: The judgment from one unto condemnation, but grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16). By what license, then, will you defraud the grace of Christ of that praise by which the Apostle wanted it proclaimed, so as to cast down the title of dignity by which alone the vessel of election (See Acts 9:15) wanted his honor to be acknowledged?
JulianImp.2.130Augustinus. Haec ad parvulos non pervenit, si nullo delicto secundum vos obligati sunt; sed quia obligati sunt, profecto gratia ex multis delictis multitudinem fidelium suorum iustificans etiam ad unum delictum sanandum pervenit eorum, ut ex ore infantium destruat ora fallentium inimicorum et defensorum.
Augustine. This does not reach the little ones, if according to you they are bound by no offense; but because they are bound, surely grace—justifying the multitude of its faithful from many offenses—reaches also to the healing of their one offense, so that out of the mouth of infants it may destroy the mouths of the deceiving enemies and defenders.
JulianImp.2.130II. 131. Iulianus. Ille dixit: Gratia ex multis delictis in iustificationem ; ille peccati efficientiae medicinae copiam praetulit; qui sensus catholicorum dogmati congruit intellegentium in his remissionem peccatorum fieri, in quibus possunt multa deprehendi, id est motu propriae voluntatis attracta, in quibus autem non sit hic motus propriae voluntatis, id est in parvulis, non minus nulla esse quam multa.
II. 131. Julian. He said, Grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16); he set the abundance of the medicine before the efficacy of sin; and this sense agrees with the teaching of the catholics, who understand that in those the remission of sins takes place in whom many sins can be detected—that is, sins drawn in by a movement of their own will—but in those in whom this movement of their own will does not exist, that is, in little ones, there are no fewer sins than there are many.
JulianImp.2.131Augustinus. Nulla ergo ad eos Salvatoris pertinet medicina et Christus non est eis Iesus; et tu, qui hoc dicis, audes vocari Christianus. Deinde, si, ut definis, in his fit remissio peccatorum, in quibus possunt multa deprehendi, quoniam sic accipis, quod ait Apostolus: Gratia ex multis delictis in iustificationem, non pertinent ad remissionem peccatorum, qui secundum vos non habentes originale peccatum ad lavacrum regenerationis cum singulis veniunt paucisve peccatis? Videte, quae dicitis, et non erubescitis, non expavescitis, non tacetis? Si autem homines peccare incipientes et nondum habentes multa delicta percipiunt tamen gratiam ex multis iustificantem delictis, cur in eisdem multis etiam singula quorumlibet computare non vultis non ob aliud, nisi ut ab ea parvulos impie separetis vobisque pernicies pessimae iniquitatis incumbat, ut ab illa etiam grandiores primum peccare incipientes nondumque habentes multa, sed singula vel pauca peccata alienos esse dicatis?
Augustine. No medicine of the Savior, then, pertains to them, and Christ is not Jesus to them; and you, who say this, dare to be called a Christian. Then, if (as you define it) the remission of sins takes place in those in whom many sins can be detected—since you so understand what the Apostle says, Grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16)—do those not pertain to the remission of sins who, according to you, not having original sin, come to the washing of regeneration with single or few sins? See what you say, and do you not blush, do you not shudder, do you not keep silent? But if people who are beginning to sin and do not yet have many offenses nevertheless receive grace that justifies from many offenses, why are you unwilling to reckon in those same 'many' also the single sins of any persons—for no other reason than to separate the little ones impiously from it, so that the ruin of the worst iniquity falls upon you, since you say that even older people, first beginning to sin and not yet having many but only single or few sins, are estranged from it?
JulianImp.2.131II. 132. Iulianus. Apostolus ergo ubi praetulit gratiam peccato, nostrum dogma communit.
II. 132. Julian. The Apostle, then, where he set grace before sin, fortifies our teaching.
JulianImp.2.132Augustinus. Immo vestrum dogma subvertit, quia ista gratia, quam peccato praetulit, ex multis delictis iustificat et ideo pertinens ad pusillos cum magnis, nec ullum praeterit pusillorum, qui remittit omnia omnium suorum, id est pusillorum atque magnorum.
Augustine. On the contrary, he overturns your teaching, because this grace, which he set before sin, justifies from many offenses and therefore, pertaining to the little ones along with the great, passes over none of the little ones, since it forgives all the sins of all its own—that is, of the little ones and the great.
JulianImp.2.132II. 133. Iulianus. Nunc tu ede, ubi aequaverit peccato gratiam, ut, quoniam fides tua non capit remedia praelata vulneribus, saltem capiat in angustum non excedentia comparationem redacta; quod si scriptum uspiam reppereris, Paulum tamen ab hac constabit abhorrere sententia; et ut compendio totus Apostoli sensus eluceat, ait: Gratia ex multis delictis in iustificationem . Multa autem delicta nec secundum te parvuli habent, qui secundum Apostolum nullum habent.
II. 133. Julian. Now you produce the place where he made grace equal to sin, so that, since your faith cannot grasp the remedies as set before the wounds, it may at least grasp them reduced within the narrow limits of a comparison they do not exceed; but if you should find this written anywhere, it will nevertheless be established that Paul shrinks from such a view; and, that the Apostle's whole meaning may shine forth in brief, he says: Grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16). But not even according to you do the little ones have many offenses, who according to the Apostle have none.
JulianImp.2.133Augustinus. Multa delicta nec secundum te habent, qui primum peccare coeperunt; et tamen eos negare non potes ad hanc ex multis delictis iustificantem gratiam, cum ad baptisma veniunt, pertinere. Multa ergo delicta sunt totius populi, in quo sunt et parvuli; ad quem populum civitatis Dei cum pervenit gratia ex multis delictis iustificans, invenit ibi et multa delicta aliquorum et pauca aliorum et singula parvulorum; quae simul utique multa sunt omnia et multitudine sua redarguunt multa et inania verba tua. Si autem secundum Apostolum, sicut putas, nullum delictum habent parvuli, unde ergo secundum Apostolum mortui sunt? Quia et secundum te etiam pro ipsis mortuus est Christus: Unus enim pro omnibus mortuus est; ergo omnes mortui sunt et pro omnibus mortuus est . Iuliane, non hoc Augustinus, sed Apostolus dixit; immo ipse per suum Apostolum Christus; cohibe te a vaniloquio, cede Deo.
Augustine. Not even according to you do those have many offenses who have just begun to sin; and yet you cannot deny that they pertain to this grace, which justifies from many offenses, when they come to baptism. The many offenses, then, are those of the whole people, among whom are the little ones too; and when grace, justifying from many offenses, comes to this people of the city of God, it finds there both the many offenses of some, and the few of others, and the single offenses of the little ones—which together are certainly all many, and by their multitude refute your many and empty words. But if, according to the Apostle (as you suppose), the little ones have no offense, whence then are they, according to the Apostle, dead? For even according to you Christ died for them too: For one died for all; therefore all have died, and he died for all (2 Cor 5:14-15). Julian, it is not Augustine who said this, but the Apostle—nay, Christ himself through his Apostle; restrain yourself from empty talk, yield to God.
JulianImp.2.133II. 134. Iulianus. Constat hic igitur Magistrum Gentium non de nascentibus disputasse, sed de his, qui iam motu propriae voluntatis utuntur.
II. 134. Julian. It is established here, therefore, that the Teacher of the Gentiles was not arguing about the newborn, but about those who already use a movement of their own will.
JulianImp.2.134Augustinus. Digere crapulam contentionis et expergiscere et intellege delictum et unius et unum, de quo dictum est: Si enim ob unius delictum multi mortui sunt ; multi quippe isti ipsi sunt omnes, de quibus alio loco dicit: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur ; et ibi videbis et parvulos, quia et pro ipsis etiam te confitente mortuus est Christus. Utique cum dixisset Apostolus quia unus pro omnibus mortuus est, continuo, quid necessario sequeretur, ostendit dicens: Ergo omnes mortui sunt et pro omnibus mortuus est .
Augustine. Sleep off the drunkenness of contention, wake up, and understand both the offense of one and the one offense, of which it is said, For if by the offense of one many have died (Rom 5:15); for these 'many' are the very 'all' of whom he says in another place, As in Adam all die (1 Cor 15:22); and there you will see the little ones too, because, even by your own confession, Christ died for them as well. Surely, when the Apostle had said that one died for all, he immediately showed what necessarily followed, saying: Therefore all have died, and he died for all (2 Cor 5:14-15).
JulianImp.2.134II. 135. Iulianus. Iam vero quod addidit Apostolus: Sicut per unius delictum in omnes ad condemnationem, ita et per unius iustitiam in omnes homines ad iustificationem , tantum opis impertit nobis, quantum in dogma tuum movet fragoris. Ponens quippe in contrariis partibus omnes, quibus verbis non potest ulla esse coniunctio, ad Scripturarum nos morem remittit, ut intellegamus omnes dici solere pro " multis ". Nam in ipsa fronte verborum magna barbaries est; qui enim omnes ad iustificationem veniunt, si perrexerunt omnes ad condemnationem? Aut qui omnes ad poenam, si omnes rapiuntur ad gloriam? Generalitas unius partis locum excludit alterius.
II. 135. Julian. And now what the Apostle added—As through the offense of one upon all unto condemnation, so also through the righteousness of one upon all human beings unto justification (Rom 5:18)—bestows as much help on us as it works crashing ruin on your teaching. For setting all on opposite sides, between which words there can be no conjunction, he refers us to the custom of the Scriptures, so that we may understand that all is wont to be said for 'many.' For at the very front of the words there is a great barbarity; for how do all come unto justification, if all have gone on unto condemnation? Or how all unto punishment, if all are caught up unto glory? The universality of one side excludes the place of the other.
JulianImp.2.135Augustinus. Ergo et ubi dictum est: In quo omnes peccaverunt , multi sunt intellegendi: " non omnes "? Quod si ita est, cogeris dicere non omnes peccatores unius illius hominis imitatione peccasse, sed multos; quod si dixeris ideo non omnes, sed multos eius imitatione peccasse, quia multi, non omnes peccaverunt, volens eos, qui non peccaverunt, intellegi parvulos, respondebitur tibi, quia nec mortui sunt in illo parvuli ac per hoc non pro illis Christus mortuus est, quia non nisi pro mortuis ille mortuus est, sicut Apostolus clamat; atque ita et contra te ipsum venies et a gratia Christi penitus parvulos separabis pro quibus Christum mortuum non esse dicturus es. Consequenter etiam baptizandos negabis in Christo. Quicumque enim baptizati sumus in Christo, sicuti ait idem Apostolus, in morte ipsius baptizati sumus ; illi autem baptizantur in morte Christi, pro quibus mortuus est Christus. Nullo modo igitur ab originali peccato alienabis parvulos, nisi eos simul a gratia baptismatis Christi feceris alienos. In eo vero, quod tibi videtur duo ista inter se esse contraria, ut omnes eant in condemnationem per Adam et omnes rursus in iustificationem per Christum, omnino erras; nullus enim hominum nisi per Adam trahitur ad damnationem, de qua per lavacrum regenerationis homines liberantur, et nullus hominum nisi per Christum ab hac damnatione liberatur; ideo ex utraque parte dicti sunt omnes, quia nemo ad damnationem generationis nisi per istum, nemo ad vitam regenerationis nisi per illum. Ac per hoc non generalitas unius partis locum excludit alterius, quia ex his ipsis, qui generaliter moriuntur in Adam, quos vult, vivificat Christus. Non ergo tibi videbuntur inter se ista contraria, si non sis tibi ipse contrarius.
Augustine. Then where it is said, in whom all have sinned (Rom 5:12), are 'many' to be understood: 'not all'? But if this is so, you are forced to say that not all sinners sinned by imitating that one man, but many; and if you say that for this reason not all but many sinned by imitating him—because many, not all, sinned—wishing those who did not sin to be understood as the little ones, you will be answered that then neither did the little ones die in him, and on this account Christ did not die for them, because he died only for the dead, as the Apostle proclaims; and so you will both come against your own self and utterly separate from the grace of Christ the little ones for whom you are going to say Christ did not die. Consequently you will also deny that they are to be baptized in Christ. For whoever of us have been baptized in Christ, as the same Apostle says, have been baptized in his death (Rom 6:3); but those are baptized in the death of Christ for whom Christ died. In no way, then, will you estrange the little ones from original sin, unless you at the same time make them estranged from the grace of the baptism of Christ. But in that these two things seem to you to be contrary to each other—that all go into condemnation through Adam and all again into justification through Christ—you are altogether mistaken; for no human being is drawn to the damnation from which men are freed through the washing of regeneration except through Adam, and no human being is freed from this damnation except through Christ; therefore on both sides all are spoken of, because no one comes to the damnation of generation except through the one, and no one to the life of regeneration except through the other. And on this account the universality of one side does not exclude the place of the other, because from those very ones who die universally in Adam, Christ gives life to whom he wills. These things, then, will not seem to you contrary to each other, if you are not contrary to yourself.
JulianImp.2.135II. 136. Iulianus. Verum ut hic quoque quantum muniamur advertas, a loco medicantis locum intellege vulnerantis. Si Christus salvavit universos, Adam quoque universis nocuisse fingatur.
II. 136. Julian. But that here too you may notice how strongly we are fortified, understand the place of the one who wounds from the place of the one who heals. If Christ saved all, let Adam too be supposed to have harmed all.
JulianImp.2.136Augustinus. Numquid ideo non mittuntur omnes in damnationem per Adam, quoniam quos vult ab hac damnatione liberat Christus? Qui propterea omnes liberare dictus est etiam ipse, quoniam non liberat quemquam nisi ipse, sicut dictus est illuminare omnem hominem , quia nemo quemquam illuminat, si non ipse.
Augustine. Surely it is not the case that, because Christ frees from this damnation whom he wills, therefore not all are sent into damnation through Adam? Christ too is said to free all for this reason, because no one frees anyone except him, just as he is said to enlighten every human being (See John 1:9), because no one enlightens anyone if he does not.
JulianImp.2.136II. 137. Iulianus. Si Christus mutavit officia genitalium, Adam ea pervertisse credatur; si Christus aliquid correxit in sensibus carnis, aestimetur eos Adae culpa turbasse; si Christus fecit medicinam ire per propaginem, dicatur Adam per generationem transmisisse delictum.
II. 137. Julian. If Christ changed the functions of the genitals, let Adam be believed to have perverted them; if Christ corrected anything in the senses of the flesh, let it be reckoned that Adam's fault disturbed them; if Christ made his medicine pass through the line of descent, let it be said that Adam transmitted the offense through generation.
JulianImp.2.137Augustinus. Iam ad ista responsum est; sed audi breviter etiam nunc. Si Christianus catholicus esses, appareret tibi et Adam delictum generando transmittens et Christus regenerando dimittens; carnaliter autem generat Adam, spiritaliter regenerat Christus; noli ergo quaerere in utroque propaginem carnis, quam propaginem non pertinere ad regenerationem spiritalem, si non contendis, attendis. Contra infirmitatem vero carnis nunc Christi gratia certamen instituit, postea eius perficiet sanitatem, cuius sanitatis futurae atque perpetuae nunc pignus Spiritum Sanctum dedit , per quem diffunditur in nostris cordibus caritas , ut nos ad agonem interim relicta carnis non vincat infirmitas.
Augustine. This has already been answered; but hear briefly even now. If you were a catholic Christian, it would be apparent to you both that Adam transmits the offense by generating and that Christ forgives it by regenerating; Adam generates carnally, Christ regenerates spiritually; do not, then, look in both for a line of descent of the flesh—a line of descent which, if you do not contend but attend, does not pertain to spiritual regeneration. Against the weakness of the flesh the grace of Christ now establishes a contest; afterward it will perfect its healing, of which future and perpetual healing it has now given the Holy Spirit as a pledge (See 2 Cor 1:22), through whom love is poured out in our hearts (See Rom 5:5), so that meanwhile the weakness of the flesh left for the struggle may not conquer us.
JulianImp.2.137II. 138. Iulianus. Sin autem his omnibus in eo, quem suscipiunt a natura, ordine permanentibus adhortationibus, signis, exemplis, promissione vel munerum vel poenarum ad fidem voluntas sine inductione necessitatis allicitur et haec per instituta, per mysteria, per dona non oppressa, sed exspectata, sed libera, sed provocata curatur, apparet, etsi uno spiritu totus mundus vel rugiens vel rabiens refragetur, voluntatem uniuscuiusque, non nativitatem tinctam imitatione fuisse peccati.
II. 138. Julian. But if, with all these things abiding in that order which they receive from nature, the will is drawn to faith by exhortations, signs, examples, and the promise of rewards or punishments, without the inducement of necessity, and is healed through institutions, through mysteries, through gifts—not oppressed but awaited, but free, but called forth—then it is apparent, even if the whole world with one spirit, whether roaring or raging, resists, that it was the will of each individual, not his birth, that was stained by the imitation of sin.
JulianImp.2.138Augustinus. Quacumque te vertas, ab originali peccato non alienabis parvulos, nisi eos negaveris mortuos; quod si feceris, mortuum pro eis Christum simul negabis; si autem, ne hoc neges, mortuos parvulos confiteris, profecto in Adam mortuos non negabis, aut si non ibi, dic ubi.
Augustine. Whichever way you turn, you will not estrange the little ones from original sin unless you deny that they are dead; and if you do this, you will at the same time deny that Christ died for them; but if, lest you deny this, you confess that the little ones are dead, then surely you will not deny that they died in Adam—or if not there, say where.
JulianImp.2.138II. 139. Iulianus. Quamvis nimis molliter egerim; etsi enim Christus ex eo quo venit tempore universis hominibus doceretur et iter interclusisse mortis et vitam donasse perpetuam, ut nemo prorsus ex eo die, quo Verbum caro factum est , aut in peccatum laberetur aut pro peccato poenam timeret, non tamen ea condicio primae iniquitatis, quae liberalitatis doceretur extremae, quoniam subvenire non merentibus potest et solet Deus cum laude clementiae, punire autem non peccantes non potest sine eversione iustitiae.
II. 139. Julian. Although I have dealt all too gently; for even if, from the time he came, Christ were teaching all human beings that he had both blocked the road of death and bestowed perpetual life, so that absolutely no one, from the day on which the Word was made flesh (John 1:14), would either slip into sin or fear punishment for sin, nevertheless that condition of the first iniquity would not be one that the liberality of the latest age would teach, since God can and is wont to come to the aid of those who do not deserve it, with the praise of his clemency, but cannot punish those who do not sin without the overthrow of justice.
JulianImp.2.139Augustinus. Quia ergo gravi iugo a die exitus de ventre matris puniti sunt parvuli, agnosce iudicem iustum et confitere originale peccatum. Punire enim nullius peccati meritum habentes, sicut etiam ipse confiteris, non potest sine eversione iustitiae.
Augustine. Because, then, the little ones are punished with a heavy yoke from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1), acknowledge the just judge and confess original sin. For to punish those who have the merit of no sin, as you yourself confess, cannot be done without the overthrow of justice.
JulianImp.2.139II. 140. Iulianus. Attende igitur, quid disputatio tota confecerit. Si gratia Christi et Adae culpa in diversis effectibus aequaliter censerentur, ut vel numero operationum pares essent, quae operationum genere dissidebant, docendum erat tantis profuisse gratiam, quantis culpa nocuisset, ut appensionis illius, qua trutinabantur, aequitas et momenta constarent. Subvenire ergo debuit etiam illis omnino locis illisque partibus medicina, quibus insederat aegritudo, id est si aliquid in motibus genitalium, in sensibus coeuntium, in obscaenitate membrorum, in infelicitate nascentium antiquum crimen effecerat, immutatione horum, quae diximus, remedia contulisset; alioquin grande testimonium imbecillae artis nihilque profuturae nec locum aegritudinis invenisse et languentibus eversisque naturalibus inertia fomenta voluntatibus admovisse.
II. 140. Julian. Consider, then, what the whole argument has accomplished. If the grace of Christ and the fault of Adam were to be reckoned equal in their diverse effects, so that they were at least equal in the number of their operations though they differed in the kind of operation, it would have to be taught that grace profited as many as the fault had harmed, so that the equity and the weights of that balancing by which they were weighed might hold. The medicine, then, ought to have come to the aid of absolutely those very places and those very parts in which the disease had lodged—that is, if the ancient crime had brought about anything in the movements of the genitals, in the senses of those who couple, in the obscenity of the members, in the unhappiness of the newborn, it should have conferred its remedies by the alteration of these things we have named; otherwise it is a great proof of a feeble art, profiting nothing, both not to have found the seat of the disease and to have applied inert poultices to wills that were languishing and to natural powers that were overthrown.
JulianImp.2.140Augustinus. Iam responsum est, cum de distantia praesentis et futuri saeculi locuti sumus . Hic enim accipimus per pignus spiritus et certandi et vincendi vires; ibi autem sine hoste ullo externo et interno ineffabili ac sempiterna pace perfruemur. Quisquis ergo omnia, quae ibi habenda sunt, hic vult habere, fidem se indicat non habere.
Augustine. It has already been answered, when we spoke of the distinction between the present age and the age to come. For here we receive, through the pledge of the Spirit, the strength both to fight and to conquer; but there we will enjoy ineffable and everlasting peace, without any enemy external or internal. Whoever, then, wants to have here all the things that are to be had there, shows that he does not have faith.
JulianImp.2.140II. 141. Iulianus. Ostendit autem inter haec veritas, quia, etsi prodesset effusa generaliter medicina motibus atque mortalibus, illis quoque, qui eam nullo studio nec ulla intentione meruissent, non tamen continuo noceret culpa nascentibus, qui nihil ad eam assensionis admovere potuissent. Ac per hoc, etsi aequalis esset gratiae peccatique taxatio, clarebat tamen ne tum quidem eiusmodi appensionem eo usque constare, ut quisquam nasci probaretur reus.
II. 141. Julian. But the truth has shown amid these things that, even if the medicine poured out in a general way profited movements and mortals—even those who had merited it by no zeal and no intention—nevertheless fault would not forthwith harm the newborn, who could bring no assent to it. And on this account, even if the reckoning of grace and of sin were equal, it was nevertheless clear that not even then would a balancing of this kind hold to the point that anyone should be proved guilty by being born.
JulianImp.2.141Augustinus. In illo gravi iugo, quo etiam parvuli premuntur, quomodo est iustus Deus, si nullus nascitur reus?
Augustine. In that heavy yoke by which even the little ones are weighed down, how is God just, if no one is born guilty?
JulianImp.2.141II. 142. Iulianus. Nunc autem, cum Apostolus non solum non postposuerit culpae gratiam, verum etiam praeposuerit dicens multo in plures abundasse beneficia quam irrepsisse dispendia, per opinionem autem traducis multo magis constet nocuisse peccata quam profuisse gratiam, irrefutabiliter approbatum est apostolum Paulum nihil sensisse de traduce, sed eius sententia Traducianos cum Manichaeis magistris suis pariter fuisse destructos.
II. 142. Julian. But now, since the Apostle not only did not set grace after fault but even set it before, saying that the benefits abounded unto far more than the losses crept in upon, while according to the opinion of transmission it would be established that the sins harmed far more than grace profited, it has been irrefutably proved that the apostle Paul thought nothing of transmission, but that by his sentence the Traducianists, along with the Manichean masters, were equally destroyed.
JulianImp.2.142Augustinus. Non dixit apostolus Paulus: " Multo in plures abundasse beneficia quam irrepsisse dispendia ", non hoc dixit; prorsus falleris, si ipse non fallis. Multo magis enim abundasse gratiam dixit in multos, non in magis multos, sed magis abundasse. In comparatione namque pereuntium pauci sunt, qui salvantur; sine comparatione autem pereuntium et ipsi multi sunt. Sed quare sint illi plures quam illi, consilium Dei velle nosse multorum est, nosse autem vel paucissimorum hominum vel omnino nullorum. Posset enim omnipotens non creare, quos omnium rerum praescius malos futuros ignorare non posset, nisi uti etiam malis pluribus optime optimus posset; unde nos aliquid Apostolus docuit, id est ut iram suam potentiamque monstraret in eis, quae attulit in multa patientia vasa irae, et ut notas faceret divitias gloriae suae in vasa misericordiae . Sed nolunt credere Pelagiani, quod in uno homine tota est massa vitiata et tota damnata; a quo vitio et damnatione sola sanat et liberat gratia. Quare enim iustus vix salvus erit ? Numquid liberare iustum labor est Deo? Absit! Sed ut ostendatur, quo merito fuerit damnata natura, non vult facile de tanto malo nec ipse omnipotens liberare; propter quod et peccata proclivia sunt et laboriosa iustitia nisi amantibus; sed caritas, quae hos amantes facit, ex Deo est .
Augustine. The apostle Paul did not say, 'The benefits abounded unto far more than the losses crept in upon'; he did not say this; you are utterly deceived, if you yourself do not deceive. For he said that grace abounded far more unto many—not unto more, but abounded more. For in comparison with those who perish, few are those who are saved; but without comparison with those who perish, even these few are many. But why those should be more than these is something the counsel of God wills to be known by many, yet to be known by only very few human beings, or by none at all. For the Almighty could refrain from creating those whom, as foreknowing all things, he could not be ignorant would be evil, were it not that the supremely good one could make the best use even of the many evil; whereby the Apostle taught us something, namely, that he might show his wrath and his power in those whom, in much patience, he brought as vessels of wrath, and that he might make known the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy (See Rom 9:22-23). But the Pelagians are unwilling to believe that in one man the whole mass was corrupted and the whole condemned; from which corruption and condemnation grace alone heals and frees. For why will the righteous man scarcely be saved (See 1 Pet 4:18)? Is it labor for God to free the righteous? God forbid! But that it may be shown by what merit the nature was condemned, not even the Almighty himself wills to free easily from so great an evil; on which account both sins are downhill and righteousness laborious, except to those who love; but the love that makes these to be lovers is from God (See 1 John 4:7).
JulianImp.2.142II. 143. Iulianus. Verum, quia hic fui longior, pergamus ad reliqua.
II. 143. Julian. But, because I have been rather long here, let us proceed to the rest.
JulianImp.2.143Augustinus. Ita hoc dicis, quasi alibi brevior sis futurus, cum loquacissime inquiras, quemadmodum Apostoli manifestissimis verbis nebulas ingeras vanitatis.
Augustine. You say this as though you were going to be shorter elsewhere, when most garrulously you inquire how you may heap clouds of emptiness upon the most manifest words of the Apostle.
JulianImp.2.143II. 144. Iulianus. Omnes autem dixit ad condemnationem per Adam et omnes ad iustificationem vitae per Iesum Christum, cum utique non omnes eos, qui moriuntur in Adam, transferat Christus ad vitam, sed omnes dixit atque omnes, quia sicut sine Adam nullus ad mortem, ita sine Christo nullus ad vitam. Sicut dicimus de litterarum magistro, si in civitate solus est: omnes iste hic litteras docet, non quia omnes discunt, sed quia nemo nisi ab ipso. Quos autem omnes dixerat, multos postea dixit, eosdem tamen omnes multosque significans. " Sicut enim per unius inoboedientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi, ita et per unius oboedientiam iusti constituentur multi " . Adhuc quaerat, per quid peccatum inveniatur in parvulo; respondent ei Paginae sanctae: " Per unum hominem peccatum in mundum intravit " . Sanctas quidem Apostoli esse paginas confitemur non ob aliud, nisi quia rationi pietati fidei congruentes erudiunt nos et Deum credere inviolabilis aequitatis et opera eius bona honestaque defendere et praeceptis eius moderationem prudentiam iustitiam vindicare.
II. 144. Julian. But he said all unto condemnation through Adam, and all unto justification of life through Jesus Christ, although Christ certainly does not transfer to life all those who die in Adam, but he said 'all' and 'all' because, just as without Adam none come to death, so without Christ none come to life. As we say of a teacher of letters, if he is the only one in a city: 'This man teaches all here their letters'—not because all learn, but because none learn except from him. And those whom he had called 'all' he afterward called 'many,' signifying nevertheless the same ones as both all and many. For just as through the disobedience of one many were made sinners, so also through the obedience of one many will be made righteous (Rom 5:19). Let him still ask through what sin is found in a little one; the holy Pages answer him: Through one man sin entered into the world (Rom 5:12). We confess indeed that the pages of the Apostle are holy, for no other reason than because, agreeing with reason, piety, and faith, they instruct us both to believe God to be of inviolable equity, and to defend his works as good and honorable, and to vindicate for his precepts moderation, prudence, and justice.
JulianImp.2.144Augustinus. Ipsa te convincit in parvulis aequitas Dei, quoniam magna est iniquitas, si iugo gravi premuntur et parvuli sine ullo merito vinculoque peccati.
Augustine. The very equity of God in the little ones convicts you, since it is a great iniquity if even the little ones are weighed down by a heavy yoke without any merit and bond of sin.
JulianImp.2.144II. 145. Iulianus. Ac per hoc negare quemquam pro alterius peccato posse damnari, negare ullum peccatum ad posteros naturae condicione transire atque credere atque asserere hominem de instituta a Deo fecunditate genitum liberi arbitrii iustis legibus conveniri, ut vitet omne, quod malum est, exerceat omne, quod bonum est, nec secundum vos aestimet amorem et necessitatem criminum substantiae suae causis, id est ipsis adhaesisse seminibus nec recipiat tam stultam, tam insanam, tam impiam sententiam in contumeliam videlicet naturae rationis Dei Apostoli volumine contineri, quia dixerit per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intrasse et in omnes homines transisse mortem , cum hoc diu caligare non siverit, addens eos, quos omnes dixerat, debere multos intellegi, qui imitatione, non generatione peccassent .
II. 145. Julian. And on this account, to deny that anyone can be condemned for another's sin, to deny that any sin passes to posterity by the condition of nature, and to believe and assert that a human being, begotten of the fruitfulness instituted by God, is dealt with by the just laws of free choice, so that he may avoid all that is evil and practice all that is good, and not (as you suppose) reckon that the love and necessity of crimes have clung to the causes of his substance, that is, to the seeds themselves, and not accept that so foolish, so insane, so impious a sentence is contained—to the disgrace, that is, of nature, of reason, and of God—in the volume of the Apostle, because he said that through one man sin entered into this world and death passed to all human beings (Rom 5:12), since he did not let this remain long in darkness, adding that those whom he had called 'all' must be understood as 'many,' who had sinned by imitation, not by generation (See Rom 5:19).
JulianImp.2.145Augustinus. Potes dicere non omnes gentes semini Abrahae fuisse promissas, ubi dictum est: In semine tuo benedicentur omnes gentes , quia easdem dixit et multas, ubi legitur: Patrem multarum gentium posui te ? Potes, inquam, hoc dicere et in eo quoque loco Scripturae praenuntianti, quod rebus ipsis videmus impleri, tuo vaniloquio contradicere et prohibere nos intellegere omnes gentes, ubi promissae sunt quid aliud quam omnes gentes? Quia per tuam dialecticam omnes non pro " omnibus ",sed pro " multis ", quae omnes non sunt, positas atque intellegendas doces. Si autem possunt quidem, ubi dicuntur multi, non omnes intellegi, sed tamen, ubi dicuntur omnes vereque sunt omnes, recte dicuntur et multi, ne ipsi omnes pauci intellegantur, sicut illi sancti, quos ignis ardens urere est vetitus, omnes inter innoxias flammas laudabant Deum et tamen ipsi omnes pauci erant, quoniam tres erant , quid habet virium argumentatio tua, qua propterea omnes non vis omnes intellegi, quoniam idem ipsi dicti sunt multi? Quandoquidem, qui vere sunt omnes, ideo nonnumquam dicuntur et multi, ut discernantur ab eis, quicumque ita sunt omnes, ut sint tamen pauci. Capilli quippe hominis omnes etiam multi sunt, digiti vero etiam omnes pauci sunt.
Augustine. Can you say that not all the nations were promised to the seed of Abraham, where it is said, In your seed shall all the nations be blessed (Gen 22:18), because he called the same nations also 'many,' where it is read, I have made you a father of many nations (Gen 17:5)? Can you, I say, say this, and even in that passage of Scripture foretelling what we see fulfilled in the facts themselves, contradict it with your empty talk and forbid us to understand, where all the nations are promised, anything other than all the nations? For by your dialectic you teach that all is set down and to be understood not for 'all' but for 'many,' which are not all. But if, where 'many' are spoken of, not all can indeed be understood, yet, where 'all' are spoken of and truly are all, they are rightly also called 'many,' lest those very 'all' be understood as few—as those holy men whom the burning fire was forbidden to scorch were 'all' praising God amid the harmless flames, and yet those very 'all' were few, since they were three (See Dan 3:23-24)—what force has your argument, by which you are unwilling for 'all' to be understood as all, because those same ones are called 'many'? Since those who truly are all are sometimes called 'many' as well, so that they may be distinguished from those who are 'all' in such a way that they are nevertheless few. For a person's hairs, being all, are also many; but his fingers, even being all, are few.
JulianImp.2.145II. 146. Iulianus. Totum denique, quod egerat, enodavit dicens: Sicut enim per inoboedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi, ita et per unius oboedientiam iusti constituentur multi , ut, sicut nemo praemia virtutis meretur, nisi qui ad ea post incarnationem tamen Christi sanctitatis eius imitatione contenderit, ita in Adam praevaricator nemo teneatur, nisi qui in transgressione legis, qua peccati est facta cognitio, primi hominis imitatione deliquerit.
II. 146. Julian. Finally he unraveled the whole of what he had done, saying: For just as through the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so also through the obedience of one many will be made righteous (Rom 5:19), so that, just as no one merits the rewards of virtue except one who has striven after them—after the incarnation of Christ, however—by imitation of his holiness, so no one is held a transgressor in Adam except one who has offended, by imitation of the first man, in the transgression of the law, by which the knowledge of sin was made.
JulianImp.2.146Augustinus. Hoc est occultum et horrendum virus haeresis vestrae, ut velitis gratiam Christi in exemplo eius esse, non in dono eius dicentes, quia per eius imitationem fiunt iusti, non per sumministrationem Spiritus Sancti, ut eum imitentur, adducti, quem Spiritum super suos ditissime effudit ; et quasi vigilanter additis: Post incarnationem tamen eius propter antiquos videlicet, quos sine gratia eius fuisse dicitis iustos, eo quod non habuerint eius exemplum. Quid si ergo et post incarnationem Christi nondum audito Evangelio proposuerint sibi aliqui homines superiorum exempla iustorum iusteque vixerint ? Quid agitis? Ubi vos videtis? Itane vero isti virtutis praemia non merentur? Si ergo ex iustorum imitatione iustitia, Christus gratis mortuus est , quia fuerunt iusti et ante ipsum, quos imitari possent, qui iusti esse voluissent. Quid est etiam quod Apostolus non ait: Imitatores estote Christi, sicut et ego; sed ait: Imitatores mei estote, sicut et ego Christi ? Ergo se illis voluit esse pro Christo? Videtisne, quae mala vos consequantur, quando Adam et Christum Apostolo proponente vos imitationem imitationi, non regenerationem generationi vultis opponere?
Augustine. This is the hidden and horrible venom of your heresy, that you want the grace of Christ to be in his example, not in his gift, saying that people become righteous by imitating him, not by being drawn, through the supply of the Holy Spirit, to imitate him—the Spirit whom he most richly poured out upon his own; and, as if watchfully, you add, after his incarnation, however, on account, that is, of the ancients, whom you say were righteous without his grace, for the reason that they did not have his example. What, then, if even after the incarnation of Christ some people, not yet having heard the Gospel, set before themselves the examples of earlier righteous men and lived righteously? What do you do? Where do you find yourselves? Do these, then, really not merit the rewards of virtue? If, then, righteousness comes from the imitation of the righteous, Christ died in vain (See Gal 2:21), because there were righteous men even before him whom those who wished to be righteous could imitate. And what of the fact that the Apostle does not say, 'Be imitators of Christ, as I also am,' but says, Be imitators of me, as I also am of Christ (1 Cor 11:1)? Did he, then, want himself to be to them in place of Christ? Do you see what evils follow you, when, the Apostle setting forth Adam and Christ, you want to oppose imitation to imitation, not regeneration to generation?
JulianImp.2.146II. 147. Iulianus. Pervenire autem et ad innocentes gratiam Christi, ad quos Adae culpa non pervenit, propter quod vigilanter inculcavit: Multo magis gratia Dei et donum unius hominis Iesu Christi in plures abundavit , ut illa superior coaequatio eius aetatis, quae ratione utitur, in contrariis studiis indicet imitationem, haec autem in gratiae largitate praelatio consecratos et provectos approbet innocentes. Quae cum ita sint, tibi, non mihi Apostolum obviare senti, contra te eum arma ferre cognoscito, qui dogma tuum praeceptorisque tui Fausti, a quo es velut prima manu tinctus, hoc uno, si cetera deessent, vehementer everteret, quia dicit per unius inoboedientiam multos, non omnes peccatores constitutos fuisse et per unius oboedientiam iustos non omnes constitutos fuisse, sed multos. Ut enim diligenter, quam tibi sermo hic repugnet, lectoris intellegentiae suggeratur, Apostolus pronuntiat non omnes per Adam peccatores constitutos fuisse, tu dicis omnes omnino per Adam peccato naturali ad ius diaboli pertinere; ambigi non potest inter te et Apostolum magnam esse pugnam.
II. 147. Julian. But the grace of Christ reaches even to the innocent, to whom the fault of Adam did not reach, on account of which he watchfully impressed: Much more the grace of God and the gift of one man, Jesus Christ, abounded unto more (Rom 5:15), so that that earlier equating may indicate imitation in the opposing pursuits of that age which uses reason, while this preferring, in the bounty of grace, may approve the innocent as consecrated and advanced. Since this is so, perceive that the Apostle stands in your way, not mine; recognize that he bears arms against you, the Apostle who, by this one point alone, if the rest were lacking, would vehemently overturn your teaching and that of your teacher Faustus, by whom you were dyed as if by a first hand, because he says that through the disobedience of one many, not all, were made sinners, and that through the obedience of one not all but many were made righteous. For, that it may be diligently suggested to the reader's understanding how this saying opposes you, the Apostle declares that not all were made sinners through Adam; you say that absolutely all pertain through Adam, by natural sin, to the right of the devil; it cannot be doubted that there is a great battle between you and the Apostle.
JulianImp.2.147Augustinus. Omnes dicit eosdemque multos; non multos dicendo negat omnes, ne sibi sit ipse contrarius, sicut vestra aut fallit improbitas aut fallitur caecitas. Quia enim utrumque dixit Apostolus, et omnes et multos, ostendi ego non inter se duo ista pugnare, quia ipsi omnes ideo etiam multi sunt dicti, quia omnes aliquando dicuntur et pauci, tu autem dicendo non omnes, quos omnes dixit Apostolus, procul dubio convinceris Apostolo esse contrarius.
Augustine. He says 'all' and the same 'many'; in saying 'many' he does not deny 'all,' lest he be contrary to himself, as either your wickedness deceives or your blindness is deceived. For since the Apostle said both, both 'all' and 'many,' I have shown that these two do not battle each other, because those very 'all' are for that reason also called 'many,' since 'all' are sometimes also called 'few'; but you, by saying 'not all' of those whom the Apostle called 'all,' are without doubt convicted of being contrary to the Apostle.
JulianImp.2.147II. 148. Iulianus. Nam cum tu et Manichaeus dicitis: Omnes sunt naturaliter peccatores, Apostolus autem dicit: Multi sunt, non omnes peccatores, removet accusationem a seminibus, quae armatur in mores, et destruit originale peccatum. Utque hoc ipsum, quod egimus, urgeamus: praescribit Apostolus multos debere intellegi per Adae inoboedientiam peccatores, multos autem per Christi oboedientiam iustos eos utique, qui iusti sunt, ostendens ab illis, qui criminosi sunt, esse discretos; tu quia impudentia argumentari niteris, ut ex his sermonibus probes naturale peccatum? Nam cum dicis omnes nasci criminosos per Adam et propter hoc ad diabolum pertinere, sed aliquos inde per Christum postea liberari, non hoc sentis, quod Apostolus, qui dicit non omnes per Adam peccatores constitutos esse, sed multos.
II. 148. Julian. For when you and Mani say, 'All are by nature sinners,' while the Apostle says, 'Many, not all, are sinners,' he removes the accusation from the seeds—an accusation that is armed against morals—and destroys original sin. And, to press this very point we have made: the Apostle prescribes that 'many' must be understood as made sinners through the disobedience of Adam, and 'many' made righteous through the obedience of Christ, showing surely that those who are righteous are distinguished from those who are guilty; do you, because with shamelessness you strive to argue, prove a natural sin from these sayings? For when you say that all are born guilty through Adam and on this account pertain to the devil, but that afterward some are freed from there through Christ, you do not hold what the Apostle holds, who says that not all were made sinners through Adam, but many.
JulianImp.2.148Augustinus. Quoniam non est contrarium, sicut iam ostendimus, ut idem sint multi, qui sunt omnes, ideo quos multos, eosdem omnes Apostolus dicit; non omnes autem non Apostolus, sed tu dicis ac per hoc Apostolo contradicis. Verum est autem, quod Apostolus dicit; falsum ergo, quod tu dicis. Et quod superius dixisti vigilanter inculcasse Apostolum: Multo magis gratia Dei et donum unius hominis Iesu Christi in plures abundavit volens intellegi ideo plures dictos, quia pervenit gratia eius ad parvulos, ad quos imitatio primi hominis non pertinet, aut mendosus codex tibi mentitus est aut ipse mentiris aut ab aliquo falso sive fallente aut oblivione deceptus es. Non enim ait Apostolus " plures " sed multos. Graecum attende codicem et invenies pollous, non " pleisous ". Dixit ergo multo magis abundasse gra tiam in multos, non in magis multos, hoc est non in plures, sicut iam ostendimus, quoniam, si plures dixisset, propter parvulos, quos tenet gratia, cum primi hominis non teneat imitatio, falsum dixisset et esset similis vobis. Si enim omnes imitatores Christi post eius incarnationem regeneratis parvulis additis conferantur cum peccatoribus, quos omnes vultis propter arbitrium libertatis ad imitationem primi hominis pertinere ab ipso Adam usque in finem saeculi voluntate peccantes, qui eorum multo plures sint, evidenter apparet, ut et vestra falsitate vincamini.
Augustine. Since it is not contrary, as we have already shown, that the same be 'many' who are 'all,' therefore the Apostle calls those whom he calls 'many' the same as 'all'; but it is not the Apostle who says 'not all,' but you, and on this account you contradict the Apostle. But what the Apostle says is true; therefore what you say is false. And as to what you said above—that the Apostle watchfully impressed, Much more the grace of God and the gift of one man, Jesus Christ, abounded unto more, wanting it understood that 'more' was said for the reason that his grace reaches to the little ones, to whom the imitation of the first man does not pertain—either a faulty manuscript has lied to you, or you yourself are lying, or you have been deceived by some false or deceiving man, or by forgetfulness. For the Apostle does not say 'more' but many (Rom 5:15). Look at the Greek manuscript and you will find pollous, not pleionas. He said, then, that grace abounded much more unto many—not unto more, that is, not unto more numerous, as we have already shown—since, if he had said 'more,' on account of the little ones whom grace holds though the imitation of the first man does not hold them, he would have said something false and would be like you. For if all the imitators of Christ after his incarnation, with the regenerated little ones added, are compared with the sinners whom you want all, on account of free choice, to pertain to the imitation of the first man—sinning by will from Adam himself to the end of the age—it plainly appears which of them are the more numerous by far, so that you are conquered even by your own falsehood.
JulianImp.2.148II. 149. Iulianus. Si enim, quale tu, tale aliquid ille sensisset, debuit utique dicere: Per unius inoboedientiam peccatores constituti sunt omnes, sed per oboedientiam Christi ex his aliqui ad iustitiam reverterunt. Ita enim prorsus ei loquendum fuerat, si hoc, quod tu fingis, voluisset intellegi. Verumtamen cum hac sententia illud aliud nequivisset asserere multo magis profuisse Christi gratiam, quam Adae laesisset iniquitas. Etsi ergo penitus nesciremus, qui mos esset, quo per inoboedientiam unius hominis multi peccatores constitui dicerentur, tamen maneret in solido non hoc pertinere ad originale peccatum, quod Apostolus inculcaverat multis, non omnibus convenire.
II. 149. Julian. For if he had thought anything such as you, he ought surely to have said: Through the disobedience of one all were made sinners, but through the obedience of Christ some of these returned to righteousness. For he would have had to speak in just this way, if he had wanted understood what you invent. Yet with this sentence he could not have asserted that other thing—that the grace of Christ profited far more than the iniquity of Adam had injured. Even, therefore, if we were utterly ignorant of the custom by which through the disobedience of one man many were said to be made sinners, it would nevertheless remain firm that this does not pertain to original sin, which the Apostle had impressed as applying to many, not to all.
JulianImp.2.149Augustinus. De multis et omnibus iam responsum est. Nec sic locutum fuisse Apostolum, quemadmodum dicis eum loqui debuisse, si hoc diceret, quod nos dicimus, quid mirum est? Quandoquidem etiamsi secundum vos Apostolus per unius delictum ita multos peccatores constitutos esse dixisset, ut idem multi non possent omnes intellegi, sed hi tantum qui ex imitatione primi hominis propria voluntate peccarunt, non dixit per oboedientiam Christi ex his aliquos iustificatos, quod tamen verum est. Quid est ergo, quod dicis, si tale aliquid, quale nos, sensisset Apostolus, eum dicere debuisse: Per unius inoboedientiam peccatores constituti sunt omnes, sed per oboedientiam Christi ex his aliqui ad iustitiam reverterunt? Quasi vos negetis ex praevaricatoribus legis, quales tantummodo peccatores ad similitudinem praevaricationis Adae pertinere contenditis, aliquos per oboedientiam Christi ad iustitiam fuisse conversos. Possumus ergo et nos vobis dicere: Si tale aliquid, quale vos, sensisset Apostolus, debuit utique dicere: Per unius inoboedientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi quidem, non omnes, sed etiam ex his per oboedientiam Christi aliqui ad iustitiam reverterunt; aut etiam multo apertius ita loqueretur, si aliquid tale sensisset, ut diceret: Multi quidem Iudaeorum per inoboedientiam unius hominis peccatores sunt constituti, qui lege accepta simili praevaricatione peccarunt, sed etiam ex his aliquos iustificavit Christi oboedientia. Quod si tibi non praeiudicavit non ita loquendo, sicut dixi eum loqui debuisse, si hoc sentiret, quod tu, nec mihi utique praeiudicare debet, quia non ita locutus est, quomodo eum dicis loqui debuisse, si hoc sentiret, quod ego. Cum ergo Apostolus ita sit locutus, sicut loquendum esse arbitratus est, videndum est, quis ei nostrum consentiat, utrum ego, qui dico verum esse quod ait: Per unius delictum in omnes homines ad condemnationem , et verum esse quod ait: Per unius inoboedientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi , quoniam non repugnat, ut qui multi sunt, omnes sint et, qui omnes sunt, multi sint, an tu, qui dicis: Ubi ait multos, multi sunt, ubi ait omnes, non omnes sunt.
Augustine. About 'many' and 'all' it has already been answered. And what wonder is it that the Apostle did not speak in the way you say he ought to have spoken if he were saying what we say? Since even, according to you, if the Apostle had said that through the offense of one so many were made sinners that those same 'many' could not be understood as all, but only those who sinned by their own will in imitation of the first man, he did not say that through the obedience of Christ some of these were justified—which, however, is true. What, then, is this that you say—that if the Apostle had thought anything such as we do, he ought to have said: Through the disobedience of one all were made sinners, but through the obedience of Christ some of these returned to righteousness? As though you denied that some of the transgressors of the law—and you contend that only such sinners pertain to the likeness of Adam's transgression—were converted to righteousness through the obedience of Christ. We too, then, can say to you: If the Apostle had thought anything such as you, he ought surely to have said: Through the disobedience of one many indeed, not all, were made sinners, but even of these some returned to righteousness through the obedience of Christ; or he would speak even much more openly, if he had thought anything such, so as to say: Many indeed of the Jews were made sinners through the disobedience of one man, who, having received the law, sinned by a like transgression, but even some of these the obedience of Christ justified. But if his not speaking thus—as I said he ought to have spoken if he thought what you do—did not prejudice your case, then surely it ought not to prejudice mine either that he did not speak in the way you say he ought to have spoken if he thought what I do. Since, then, the Apostle spoke as he judged he ought to speak, it must be seen which of us agrees with him: whether I, who say that what he says is true—Through the offense of one upon all human beings unto condemnation (Rom 5:18)—and that what he says is true—Through the disobedience of one many were made sinners (Rom 5:19)—since it is not contradictory that those who are many should be all, and those who are all should be many; or you, who say: Where he says 'many,' they are many; where he says 'all,' they are not all.
JulianImp.2.149II. 150. Iulianus. Patefacta igitur vel imperitia vel impudentia tua, quae aut non curat aut non valet, quid dicatur, exponere, ostensoque veritatis ipsius, quam se esse Christus appellavit , lumine nihil de apostoli Pauli sermonibus Manichaeae id est vestrae cohaerere dementiae, nunc expositioni operam demus, ut, sicut ostensum est, qualiter non possit, ita clareat, qualiter et debeat Paulus et possit intellegi.
II. 150. Julian. Your inexperience or your shamelessness, then, being laid bare—which either does not care or is not able to set forth what is said—and it being shown, by the light of that very truth which Christ called himself to be (See John 14:6), that nothing of the apostle Paul's sayings coheres with the Manichean, that is, your, madness, let us now give our effort to the exposition, so that, as it has been shown how Paul cannot be understood, so it may become clear how he both ought and can be understood.
JulianImp.2.150Augustinus. Ita desereris veritate et contra manifesta Apostoli verba non potes invenire quid dicas, ut, quod in eis intellexerunt tot sancti clarique Doctores, qui hoc in Ecclesia catholica didicerunt atque docuerunt (non enim sanum sensum habentes in tam manifestis verbis aliud intellegere potuerunt), tu Manichaeorum esse dicas, quod illos non fuisse cogeris confiteri, quantolibet veneno Pelagianae pestis insanias.
Augustine. So forsaken are you by the truth, and so unable to find what to say against the manifest words of the Apostle, that what so many holy and illustrious Doctors understood in them—who learned and taught this in the catholic Church (for, having a sound understanding, they could not understand anything else in such manifest words)—you say is the Manicheans', which you are forced to confess those men were not, however much you rave with the venom of the Pelagian plague.
JulianImp.2.150II. 151. Iulianus. Scribens itaque ad Romanos eo iam tempore, quo Gentium coeperat esse permixtio atque ideo tam ex Iudaeis quam ex Gentibus complebantur Ecclesiae, tumultus populi utriusque componit inculcans, quoniam nec Gentes impietatem suam, qua mutaverant gloriam Dei in similitudine imaginis hominis et volucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium, legis possint ignoratione diluere, quae per vim rationis ingenitae, etsi non ritum cerimoniarum Iudaicarum, tamen Deum innotescentem operibus, substantiae vero profunditate secretum, potuerint ex his, ab eo quae sunt facta, cognoscere. Legis autem normam, quantum ad vitae probitatem respicit, proprius unicuique suggerebat affectus, videlicet ut nihil tale inferret proximo, quale perpeti noluisset; atque ideo profanitatem Gentium iure optimo argui posse convincit, etsi non per legem, per eam tamen iustitiam, quae condidit legem, et qua iudicante hi, qui sine lege peccaverunt, sine lege et peribunt. Iudaeos vero, quorum magis intererat, quia in despectum Gentium maxime tumescebant, honorem sibi de legis purificationibus vindicantes ac per hoc aestimantes non sibi ita ut Gentibus profuisse Christi gratiam peccata donantem, quandoquidem legis ea institutione vitassent, magna disputationum virtute confringit allegans eis tanto amplius per indulgentiam fuisse collatum, quanto post legis admonitionem sine ulla ignoratione peccassent; per quod approbat eos reos fuisse et vehementer potuisse damnari in iustitiae examine, apud quem qui in lege peccaverunt, per legem iudicabuntur: Non enim auditores legis iusti sunt apud Deum, sed factores legis iustificabuntur . Hoc ergo proposito per totum librum disputans tum superbiam reprimit Iudaeorum, tum excusationem vanitatis Gentibus demit, ut doceat aequaliter ambobus populis Christi profuisse medicinam.
II. 151. Julian. And so, writing to the Romans at that time when the intermingling of the Gentiles had begun and therefore the Churches were being filled both from Jews and from Gentiles, he composes the disturbance of both peoples, impressing that the Gentiles cannot wash away their impiety—by which they had changed the glory of God into the likeness of the image of man and of birds and of four-footed beasts and of serpents—by ignorance of the law, since by the force of inborn reason they could, even if not the rite of the Jewish ceremonies, yet recognize God, who becomes known by his works though secret in the depth of his substance, from the things that were made by him. The standard of the law, moreover, as far as it regards uprightness of life, each one's own affection suggested to him, namely that he should bring nothing of such a kind upon his neighbor as he would not wish to suffer; and therefore he convicts the profanity of the Gentiles of being able to be charged by the best right, even if not through the law, yet through that justice which founded the law, and by whose judgment those who sinned without the law will also perish without the law. But the Jews, whose concern it was the more, since they were swelling most of all in contempt of the Gentiles—claiming for themselves honor from the purifications of the law and on this account reckoning that the grace of Christ, forgiving sins, had not profited them as it had the Gentiles, since they had avoided those sins by that institution of the law—he shatters with the great force of his disputations, alleging that so much the more was conferred on them through forgiveness, the more they had sinned after the admonition of the law without any ignorance; whereby he proves that they were guilty and could vehemently have been condemned in the examination of justice, before whom those who sinned in the law will be judged through the law: For it is not the hearers of the law who are righteous before God, but the doers of the law will be justified (Rom 2:13). Setting forth this purpose, then, and disputing throughout the whole book, he both represses the pride of the Jews and takes away from the Gentiles the excuse of vanity, so as to teach that the medicine of Christ profited both peoples equally.
JulianImp.2.151Augustinus. Hanc medicinam parvulis vos negatis, quos lex ipsa circumcidi octavo die iussit eius gratiam praefigurans, cuius resurrectionem dominicus, id est post septimum sabbati dies octavus ostendit; nec valetis ac vultis attendere ita parvulum morientem sine Christi gratia periturum, quemadmodum dictum est incircumcisi animam parvuli interire de populo suo , cuius interitus invenire meritum non potestis, quamdiu non trahere peccatum originis parvulos dicitis.
Augustine. This medicine you deny to the little ones, whom the law itself commanded to be circumcised on the eighth day, prefiguring his grace, whose resurrection the Lord's day—that is, the eighth day after the seventh, the Sabbath—displayed; and you are neither able nor willing to attend to the fact that a little one dying without the grace of Christ will perish in just the way it was said that the soul of an uncircumcised little one perishes from its people (See Gen 17:14)—a perishing whose merit you cannot find, so long as you say that the little ones do not draw the sin of origin.
JulianImp.2.151II. 152. Iulianus. Qui et crimina voluntatis ignovit, a quibus liberum fuerat abstinere, et sui imitatione, qui erat virtutum forma et norma, correctis gloriam beatae aeternitatis indulsit. Cum ergo utramque nationem pro voluminis sui tempore et iure conveniat, in his tamen locis, de quibus quaestio est, cum Israelitis omnino manum conserit, qui audebant de praeputiorum stirpe venientes eo usque despicere ut affirmarent eos nec suffragio fidei ad consortium suum transire potuisse; contra quod supercilium replicat Iudaeae gentis exordia et in ipsa radice circumcisionis ostendit non tanti esse praeputium, ut aut iniustos eius relictio aut iustos faciat eius ablatio.
II. 152. Julian. He both forgave the crimes of the will, from which they had been free to abstain, and bestowed the glory of blessed eternity on those corrected by the imitation of himself, who was the pattern and standard of the virtues. Since, then, he addresses both nations according to the occasion and right of his volume, nevertheless in these passages of which the question treats he engages hand to hand altogether with the Israelites, who dared so far to despise those coming from the stock of the uncircumcised as to affirm that they could not, even by the suffrage of faith, pass over into their fellowship; against which haughtiness he unfolds the beginnings of the Jewish people and, in the very root of circumcision, shows that the foreskin is not of such moment that either its retention makes men unjust or its removal makes them just.
JulianImp.2.152Augustinus. Quando ista dicebat Apostolus, non de circumcisione vel praeputio, sed de praeceptis legis , in quibus est etiam: Non concupisces , agebat, quod et ipse commemoravit. Quid tergiversamini? Priores peritis, dum caliginem offunditis imperitis.
Augustine. When the Apostle was saying these things, he was treating not of circumcision or the foreskin, but of the precepts of the law, among which is also You shall not covet (Rom 7:7; Exod 20:17), which he himself also recalled. Why do you turn your back? You ruin the skilled while you spread darkness over the unskilled.
JulianImp.2.152II. 153. Iulianus. Non ergo per legem promissio Abrahae, ut haeres esset mundi, sed per iustitiam fidei. Si enim qui sunt ex lege, haeredes sunt, evacuata est fides, destructa est promissio. Lex enim iram operatur; ubi autem non est lex, nec praevaricatio. Ideo ex fide, ut secundum gratiam firma sit promissio omni semini, non ei tantum, quod ex lege est, sed quod ex fide est Abrahae, qui est pater omnium nostrum, sicut scriptum est: Quia patrem multarum gentium posui te, ante Deum cui credidit, qui vivificat mortuos et vocat ea, quae non sunt, tamquam quae sunt; qui praeter spem in spem credidit, ut fieret pater multarum gentium secundum id, quod dictum est: Sic erit semen tuum, et non infirmatus in fide consideravit corpus suum iam emortuum, cum fere centum annorum esset, et emortuam vulvam Sarrae; in repromissione autem Dei non haesitavit diffidentia, sed confirmatus est fide dans gloriam Deo plenissime sciens, quia quaecumque promisit potens est et facere, propter quod et reputatum est illi ad iustitiam .
II. 153. Julian. Not through the law, therefore, was the promise to Abraham, that he should be heir of the world, but through the righteousness of faith. For if they who are of the law are heirs, faith is made void, the promise is destroyed. For the law works wrath; but where there is no law, neither is there transgression. Therefore it is of faith, that according to grace the promise may be firm to all the seed, not to that only which is of the law, but to that which is of the faith of Abraham, who is the father of us all, as it is written: For I have made you a father of many nations, before God whom he believed, who gives life to the dead and calls those things which are not, as those which are; who against hope believed in hope, that he might become the father of many nations, according to that which was said: So shall your seed be; and being not weak in faith, he did not consider his own body now dead, when he was nearly a hundred years old, nor the dead womb of Sarah; in the promise of God also he did not hesitate through distrust, but was strengthened in faith, giving glory to God, most fully knowing that whatever he has promised he is able also to do; on which account it was also reckoned to him unto righteousness (Rom 4:13-22).
JulianImp.2.153Augustinus. Haec te commemorare non pudet, qui oppugnas gratiam, qua ista promissa complentur? Contra Deum enim loquimini dicendo: Nos facimus, quod ille se facturum esse promisit. In Isaac quippe, qui Abrahae promissus est filius, hi praefigurati sunt, non qui se ipsos iustos, sed quos Deus fuerat ipse facturus. Unde universae per Prophetam dicit Ecclesiae: Ego enim sum Dominus qui facio te . Propter quod et filii promissionis vocantur apertissime dicente Apostolo: Non potest autem excidere verbum Dei; non enim omnes qui ex Israel hi sunt Israel neque quia semen Abrahae omnes filii, sed in Isaac vocabitur tibi semen; hoc est: Non hi qui filii carnis hi filii Dei, sed filii promissionis deputantur in semine . Quod itaque Deus promisit, Deus facit. Hoc ergo totum sicut aedificat eos, quorum spes in Deo est, sicut evertit eos, qui confidunt in virtute sua ; ac per hoc sicut catholicam fidem aedificat, sic Pelagianum evertit errorem.
Augustine. Are you not ashamed to recall these things, you who attack the grace by which these promises are fulfilled? For you speak against God when you say: We do what he promised he himself would do. For in Isaac, who was promised to Abraham as a son, those were prefigured—not those who make themselves righteous, but those whom God himself was going to make. Whence he says to the whole Church through the Prophet: For I am the Lord who makes you (See Isa 43:15). On which account they are also called sons of the promise, the Apostle saying most openly: But the word of God cannot fail; for not all who are of Israel, these are Israel, nor because they are the seed of Abraham are all sons, but: In Isaac shall your seed be called; that is: Not they who are the sons of the flesh, these are the sons of God, but the sons of the promise are reckoned as the seed (Rom 9:6-8). What, therefore, God promised, God does. This whole matter, then, just as it builds up those whose hope is in God, so it overthrows those who trust in their own power (See Ps 49:6 (48:7)); and on this account, just as it builds up the catholic faith, so it overthrows the Pelagian error.
JulianImp.2.153II. 154. Iulianus. Qui locus quam sit opinioni vestrae totus infestus, et primo opere disputatum est et, si quid hinc recoli oportuerit, disseretur. Nunc autem advertatur promissionem, quae facta est ad Abraham ob remunerationem fidei eius, in qua dicitur, quia pater multarum gentium constitueretur, ostendisse nec unius illum populi genitorem debere defendi, qui multarum gentium sit pater praedictus, nec ita solum credulitatis recepisse mercedem, ut alios similiter credentes a praemii consortio putetur excludere. Non est autem scriptum - inquit - tantummodo propter ipsum, quia reputatum est illi, sed et propter nos, quibus reputabitur credentibus in eum, qui suscitavit Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum a mortuis, qui traditus est propter delicta nostra et resurrexit propter iustificationem nostram .
II. 154. Julian. How wholly hostile this passage is to your opinion was both argued in the first work and, if anything must be recalled from there, will be discussed. But now let it be noticed that the promise which was made to Abraham on account of the reward of his faith—in which it is said that he was made the father of many nations—showed that he must not be defended as the begetter of one people only, who is foretold as the father of many nations, and that he did not so receive the reward of his belief that he should be thought to exclude others who likewise believe from the fellowship of the reward. It is not written, he says, only on account of him, that it was reckoned to him, but also on account of us, to whom it will be reckoned, who believe in him who raised Jesus Christ our Lord from the dead, who was handed over on account of our offenses and rose again on account of our justification (Rom 4:23-25).
JulianImp.2.154Augustinus. Dicite nobis, o vani, non defensores, sed inflatores liberi arbitrii, qui ignorantes Dei iustitiam et vestram iustitiam volentes constituere iustitiae Dei non estis subiecti ; dicite, inquam, nobis: Si noluissent gentes credere iusteque vivere, evacuaretur promissio, quae facta est ad Abraham? Non, inquies. Ergo ut Abraham ob stipendium fidei consequeretur dilatationem seminis, praeparata est gentium voluntas a Domino, et ut vellent, quod et nolle potuissent, ab illo factum est, qui ea, quae promisit, potens est facere.
Augustine. Tell us, O empty men—not defenders, but inflaters, of free choice—you who, being ignorant of the righteousness of God and wishing to establish your own, have not been subject to the righteousness of God (See Rom 10:3); tell us, I say: If the nations had been unwilling to believe and to live righteously, would the promise that was made to Abraham have been made void? No, you will say. Therefore, that Abraham might obtain the enlargement of his seed as the wage of his faith, the will of the nations was prepared by the Lord, and that they should be willing—what they could also have been unwilling—was brought about by him who is able to do what he promised.
JulianImp.2.154II. 155. Iulianus. Cum ergo ille adhuc in praeputio testis sit fidei pronuntiatus et ob eius stipendium dilatationem fuerit seminis consecutus qua, inquit, regula tu, Iudaee, non putas ad consortium iustitiae pertinere gentiles, qui fidem Abrahae paria de Dei virtutibus credendo restituunt?
II. 155. Julian. Since, then, he was declared a witness of faith while still in the foreskin, and on account of his wage obtained the enlargement of his seed, by what rule, he says, do you, O Jew, think that the Gentiles do not pertain to the fellowship of righteousness, who restore the faith of Abraham by believing the like things concerning the powers of God?
JulianImp.2.155Augustinus. Bene contra vos loqueris, quia utique, si de Dei virtutibus credunt, non sicut vos confidunt in virtute sua, ut iustificentur, id est ut iusti fiant, sed in illius, qui iustificat impium.
Augustine. You speak well against yourselves, because surely, if they believe concerning the powers of God, they do not, like you, trust in their own power to be justified—that is, to be made righteous—but in the power of him who justifies the ungodly (See Rom 4:5).
JulianImp.2.155II. 156. Iulianus. Cur putes, inquit, sine consecrationibus legis ad Abrahae stemma nationes non posse perduci, cum constet promissionem, quae facta est ad Abraham, anteriorem fuisse quam legem nec eam ablutionibus tributam fuisse, sed moribus?
II. 156. Julian. Why do you think, he says, that the nations cannot be led to the lineage of Abraham without the consecrations of the law, since it is established that the promise which was made to Abraham was earlier than the law, and that it was bestowed not by ablutions but by morals?
JulianImp.2.156Augustinus. Hos mores, quos procul dubio bonos vis intellegi, si, ut putatis, homo sibi facit, praedicere ista debuit Deus praescius, non promittere, ut non de illo in hac causa diceretur: Quae promisit potens est et facere , sed: Quae praescivit, potens est et praenuntiare, aut: Potens est et ostendere. Quando autem dicunt homines: Quod Deus promisit, nos facimus, se ipsos faciunt instantia potentes, illum arrogantia mentientem.
Augustine. These morals, which without doubt you want understood as good—if, as you suppose, a man makes them for himself—God, foreknowing, ought to have foretold, not promised, so that it should not be said of him in this matter, What he has promised he is able also to do, but: What he foreknew, he is able also to foretell, or: He is able also to show. But when men say, 'What God promised, we do,' they make themselves powerful by their importunity, and him a liar by their arrogance.
JulianImp.2.156II. 157. Iulianus. Si enim qui sunt ex lege, haeredes sunt, evacuata est fides, destructa est repromissio . Qui sermo nisi intellegatur, ingerit maximam quaestionem; dubio enim procul dicit eos esse ex lege, quos supra dixerat ex circumcisione, quos sibi tantum noverat arrogare, ut putarent praeter se neminem assumi ad Abrahae seminis dignitatem; atque hoc disputatione collegerat, ut quia non solum hi, qui ex circumcisione, sed et illi, qui ex praeputio sectari voluissent vestigia fidei Abrahae, non immerito Abrahae filii censerentur.
II. 157. Julian. For if they who are of the law are heirs, faith is made void, the promise is destroyed (Rom 4:14). This saying, unless it is understood, raises the greatest question; for without doubt he says that those are 'of the law' whom he had above called 'of circumcision,' who, he knew, so arrogated to themselves that they thought no one besides themselves was taken up to the dignity of Abraham's seed; and this he had gathered by his disputation, namely that, since not only those of the circumcision but also those of the foreskin who wished to follow the footsteps of Abraham's faith were not undeservedly reckoned sons of Abraham.
JulianImp.2.157Augustinus. Quid si noluissent, evacuaretur promissio? Admoneo, ut intellegatis, cui gratiae sitis inimici negando operari Deum voluntates in mentibus hominum, non ut nolentes credant, quod absurdissime dicitur, sed ut volentes ex nolentibus fiant, non sicut facit doctor homo docendo et hortando, minando et promittendo in sermone Dei, quod frustra fit, nisi Deus intus operetur et velle per investigabiles vias suas. Cum enim verbis doctor plantat et rigat, possumus dicere: Forte credit, forte non credit auditor; cum vero dat incrementum Deus , sine dubio credit et proficit. Ecce quod interest inter legem et promissionem, inter litteram et spiritum.
Augustine. What if they had been unwilling—would the promise be made void? I urge that you understand to what grace you are enemies by denying that God works the wills in the minds of human beings—not so that those who are unwilling believe, which is most absurdly said, but so that from unwilling they become willing—not as a human teacher does, by teaching and exhorting, by threatening and promising in the word of God, which is done in vain unless God works within and to will, by his unsearchable ways. For when a teacher plants and waters with words, we can say: Perhaps the hearer believes, perhaps he does not believe; but when God gives the increase (See 1 Cor 3:6-7), without doubt he believes and makes progress. See what difference there is between the law and the promise, between the letter and the spirit.
JulianImp.2.157II. 158. Iulianus. Cum ergo superius id egisset, ut intellegeremus a consortio iustitiae non potuisse excludi gentes, sed per eamdem fidem cum filiis circumcisionis in Abrahae stirpe numerari, nunc intulit neminem de circumcisione ad eam promissionem, quae Abrahae data est, pertinere; hoc autem omnino nisi intellegatur, repugnat. Quod itaque ait: Si enim qui sunt ex lege, haeredes sunt, evacuata est fides et destructa est promissio , non hoc pronuntiavit, ut videlicet nemo de Iudaeis per fidem fieri credatur haeres promissionis antiquae, sed deest sermo, cuius vicem implet intellegentia, non solos haeredes esse, qui ex lege sunt, ut si hoc modo dictum esset: Si enim qui sunt ex lege, soli haeredes sunt, evacuata est fides. Vere enim praeputium videretur excludi, si ad nullos praeter eos, qui ex circumcisione erant, benedictionis haereditas perveniret. Intellegenda igitur consuetudo Scripturarum est, quia non continuo, quod non dicitur, denegatur, ut intellegentiae opere verborum dispendia suppleantur.
II. 158. Julian. Since, then, he had above accomplished this—that we should understand the Gentiles could not be excluded from the fellowship of righteousness, but are numbered, through the same faith, with the sons of circumcision in the stock of Abraham—he now brought in that no one of the circumcision pertains to that promise which was given to Abraham; but this, unless it is rightly understood, is self-contradictory. So when he says, For if they who are of the law are heirs, faith is made void and the promise is destroyed (Rom 4:14), he did not declare this so as to mean that no one of the Jews is believed to become an heir of the ancient promise through faith; rather, a word is lacking whose place understanding fills—that those who are of the law are not the only heirs—as if it had been said in this way: For if they who are of the law are the only heirs, faith is made void. For the foreskin would truly seem to be excluded, if the inheritance of blessing reached none except those who were of the circumcision. The custom of the Scriptures, therefore, must be understood, that what is not said is not thereby straightway denied, so that by the work of understanding the gaps in the words are filled in.
JulianImp.2.158Augustinus. Sic intellegunt, qui non intellegunt. Cur non attenditis, rogo, ideo non esse haeredes ex lege, quia lex iram operatur, ubi enim non est lex, nec praevaricatio , ideo autem ex promissione, quia Deus, quod promittit, ipse facit? Qui enim praecepta legis implere se putat per arbitrium propriae voluntatis sine spiritu gratiae, suam iustitiam vult constituere, non iustitiam Dei sumere. Nam unde dicit idem Apostolus: Ut inveniar in illo non habens meam iustitiam, quae ex lege / CSEL 281/ est, sed iustitiam, quae ex fide, iustitiam ex Deo ? Quare suam dicit iustitiam, quae ex lege est, eamque iustitiam reprobat, non autem suam, sed ex Deo iustitiam, quae est ex fide? Numquid lex non est ex Deo? Quis nisi infidelis hoc dixerit? Sed ex lege dicit iustitiam suam, in qua homo putat sufficere sibi legem ad facienda divina mandata confidens in virtute sua. Ex fide autem iustitiam ideo dicit esse ex Deo, quia Deus unicuique partitur mensuram fidei ; et ad fidem pertinet credere, quod in nobis Deus operetur et velle , sicut operabatur in illa purpuraria, cuius aperuerat sensum, ut intenderet in ea, quae a Paulo dicebantur . Ac per hoc nec ipsi Iudaei, qui crediderunt in Christum, in quibus et Paulus fuit, ex lege haeredes omnino dicendi sunt, sed potius ex promissione. Ideo enim dictum est: In Isaac vocabitur tibi semen, quia non qui filii carnis, hi filii Dei, sed filii promissionis deputantur in semine .
Augustine. Thus do those understand who do not understand. Why do you not attend, I ask, to the fact that they are not heirs from the law for this reason—because the law works wrath, but where there is no law, neither is there transgression (Rom 4:15)—but heirs from the promise for this reason, because what God promises, he himself does? For one who thinks he fulfills the precepts of the law by the choice of his own will, without the spirit of grace, wants to establish his own righteousness, not to receive the righteousness of God. For why does the same Apostle say, That I may be found in him, not having my own righteousness, which is of the law, but the righteousness which is of faith, the righteousness which is from God (Phil 3:9)? Why does he call his own the righteousness which is of the law, and reprove that righteousness, but call not his own, but from God, the righteousness which is of faith? Is the law not from God? Who but an unbeliever would say this? But he calls his own that righteousness of the law in which a man thinks the law sufficient for himself to do the divine commands, trusting in his own power. But he says that the righteousness of faith is from God for this reason, because God apportions to each one a measure of faith (See Rom 12:3); and it pertains to faith to believe that God works in us both to will (See Phil 2:13), as he was working in that seller of purple, whose understanding he had opened so that she might attend to the things spoken by Paul (See Acts 16:14). And on this account not even the Jews themselves who believed in Christ—among whom Paul too was—are to be called heirs from the law at all, but rather from the promise. For it was said for this reason, In Isaac shall your seed be called, because not they who are the sons of the flesh, these are the sons of God, but the sons of the promise are reckoned as the seed (Rom 9:7-8).
JulianImp.2.158II. 159. Iulianus. Collegit itaque Apostolus argumentum hoc modo: Si nulli essent haeredes benedictionis, nisi qui ex lege sunt, ut praeputium constabat exclusum, ita consequens erat neminem, qui fuisset ex lege, benedictione privari, id est, si circumcisio tantum valeret, ut sine ea fides nihil valeret, sicut gentes liquebat repulsas, ita probabatur de Iudaeis ad perditionem numquam quisquam ire potuisse.
II. 159. Julian. And so the Apostle gathered his argument in this way: If there were no heirs of the blessing except those who are of the law, so that the foreskin was established as excluded, then it followed that no one who was of the law would be deprived of the blessing—that is, if circumcision were of such force that without it faith would be of no force, then, just as it was clear the Gentiles were rejected, so it was proved that no one of the Jews could ever go to perdition.
JulianImp.2.159Augustinus. Quomodo erat consequens, o grosse dialectice? Quomodo erat consequens, si nulli essent haeredes benedictionis, nisi qui ex lege sunt, neminem, qui fuisset ex lege, benedictione privari? Numquid, quia nemo est haeres, nisi baptizetur, propterea qui baptizantur, omnes haeredes sunt? Sed hoc dixerim , non quia ibi est, quae inter nos vertitur quaestio, verum ut ostenderem, quam sis ipse acutus, qui me obtunsiorem dicis esse pistillo.
Augustine. How did it follow, O gross dialectician? How did it follow, if there were no heirs of the blessing except those who are of the law, that no one who was of the law would be deprived of the blessing? Surely, because no one is an heir unless he is baptized, are all who are baptized therefore heirs? But I have said this not because the question debated between us lies there, but to show how acute you yourself are, who say that I am blunter than a pestle.
JulianImp.2.159II. 160. Iulianus. Nunc autem, cum confiteamini praevaricatores in lege non esse benedictionis haeredes, quia talibus lex iram operatur, constat promissionem illam non circumcisioni convenire, sed fidei. Destrueretur autem promissio, si praeter legem nemo iustus esset, quandoquidem post quadringentos et triginta annos promissionis allata lex , et ipsum Abraham et Isaac et Iacob et omnes in medietate sanctos expertes benedictionis ostenderet, quae non potuisset cuiquam sine lege conferri.
II. 160. Julian. But now, since you confess that transgressors in the law are not heirs of the blessing, because the law works wrath for such, it is established that that promise applies not to circumcision but to faith. The promise, moreover, would be destroyed if no one were righteous apart from the law, since the law, brought in four hundred and thirty years after the promise (See Gal 3:17), would show that Abraham himself, and Isaac, and Jacob, and all the saints in the interval were without the blessing, which could not have been conferred on anyone apart from the law.
JulianImp.2.160Augustinus. Immo destrueretur promissio, si ex lege quisquam iustus esset. Si enim qui ex lege, haeredes sunt, exinanita est fides, evacuata est promissio; lex enim iram operatur ad hoc utique, ut ad iram evadendam Dei gratia requiratur.
Augustine. On the contrary, the promise would be destroyed if anyone were righteous from the law. For if they who are of the law are heirs, faith is emptied, the promise is made void; for the law works wrath (Rom 4:14-15)—to this end, surely, that the grace of God may be sought to escape his wrath.
JulianImp.2.160II. 161. Iulianus. Quod quia manifeste falsum est, et sub lege quippe peccatores poenam merebantur et ante legem iustitia et fides remunerationis suae fructibus privatae non sunt, constat non ad truncatas ferro carnes, sed ad illustres probitate mentes promissionis illius gloriam pertinere; sequitur autem fulminea contra traducem sententia: Lex enim - inquit - iram operatur; ubi autem non est lex, nec praevaricatio . Per suade ergo legem datam esse conceptis, legem posse dari nascentibus, ut eos praevaricationis reos possit arguere. Ceterum nos cum Apostolo credimus, quem nihil contra rationem sensisse defendimus, non esse in ea aetate praevaricationem, in qua lex esse non potuit, quia ubi non est lex, nec praevaricatio, quae lex iram operatur, non vitio suo, sed eorum iniquitate, qui peccata virtutibus anteponunt.
II. 161. Julian. Since this is manifestly false—for under the law sinners merited punishment, and before the law righteousness and faith were not deprived of the fruits of their reward—it is established that the glory of that promise pertains not to flesh cut by the knife but to minds illustrious by uprightness; and there follows a sentence like lightning against transmission: For the law, he says, works wrath; but where there is no law, neither is there transgression (Rom 4:15). Persuade us, then, that the law was given to those conceived, that the law can be given to the newborn, so that it can convict them as guilty of transgression. But we believe with the Apostle, whom we defend as having thought nothing against reason, that there is no transgression in that age in which the law could not exist, because where there is no law, neither is there transgression—the law which works wrath not by its own fault, but by the iniquity of those who set sins before virtues.
JulianImp.2.161Augustinus. Non est ergo lex Christi: Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu, non potest intrare in regnum Dei ? Quam legem vides etiam ad parvulos pertinere. Verum tu dic potius: parvulus, cuius anima interibat de genere eius, si die non circumcideretur octavo , cuius praevaricationis arguebatur, ut tali supplicio plecteretur? Nisi quia ipse in se ipso nihil peccans tenebatur reus in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, in quo omnes peccaverunt . Quae verba apostolica tam clara obscurare, tam recta curvare ingenti quidem, sed inani labore conaris.
Augustine. Is not this the law of Christ: Unless one is born again of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God (John 3:5)? This law you see pertains even to the little ones. But you, rather, say: a little one whose soul perished from its people if it was not circumcised on the eighth day (See Gen 17:14)—of what transgression was it convicted, that it should be punished with such a penalty? Unless, sinning nothing in himself, he was held guilty in the likeness of Adam's transgression, in whom all have sinned (Rom 5:14, 12). These apostolic words, so clear, you try to obscure; these, so straight, you try to bend, with great but empty labor.
JulianImp.2.161II. 162. Iulianus. Approbavit ergo Apostolus, quia non sit tantummodo scriptum propter Abraham, quod reputatum est illi ad iustitiam , sed et propter nos, quibus sine dubio reputatur, cum in Deum credimus, qui Iesum Christum ex mortuis excitavit, qui traditus est - inquit - propter delicta nostra et resurrexit propter iustificationem nostram .
II. 162. Julian. The Apostle, then, proved that it was written not only on account of Abraham, that it was reckoned to him unto righteousness, but also on account of us, to whom without doubt it is reckoned when we believe in God, who raised Jesus Christ from the dead, who was handed over, he says, on account of our offenses and rose again on account of our justification (Rom 4:24-25).
JulianImp.2.162Augustinus. Ab hac gratia separatis parvulos, quos nullum delictum ex origine tractum habere contenditis; unde fit consequens, ut non ad eos pertineat beneficium, quo propter delicta nostra est traditus Christus; et haec sentientes et dogmatizantes Christianos catholicos vos dicere audetis!
Augustine. From this grace you separate the little ones, whom you contend to have no offense drawn from their origin; whence it follows that the benefit by which Christ was handed over on account of our offenses does not pertain to them; and, holding and teaching these things, you dare to call yourselves catholic Christians!
JulianImp.2.162II. 163. Iulianus. Quam vehementer inculcat apud iustum iudicem Deum aliena peccata aliis non nocere, qui commendans mortem Christi vigilanter enuntiat propter nostra illum delicta, quae et plura erant et nostra erant, non propter unum et alienum et olim defuncti hominis mortem oppetiisse?
II. 163. Julian. How vehemently he impresses that before God the just judge the sins of others do not harm others—he who, commending the death of Christ, watchfully declares that Christ underwent death on account of our offenses, which were both many and ours, not on account of one and another's, the death of a man long since dead?
JulianImp.2.163Augustinus. Inoboedientia quidem unius hominis non absurde utique delictum dicitur alienum, quia nondum nati nondum egeramus aliquid proprium sive bonum sive malum; sed quia in illo, qui hoc egit, quando id egit, omnes eramus tantumque fuit ac tale delictum, ut eo natura universa vitiaretur humana, quod satis indicat etiam ipsa generis humani tam manifesta miseria, hoc delictum alienum obnoxia successione fit nostrum; propter quod dictum est a Doctore catholico, qui recte intellexit Apostolum: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est . Cuius intellectum et aliorum eius in catholica veritate sociorum si sequi volueritis, non cogemini alienare parvulos a beneficio mortis eius, qui traditus est propter delicta nostra et unus pro omnibus mortuus est ; ubi quod sequitur clamat Apostolus: Ergo omnes mortui sunt et pro omnibus mortuus est , et vos reclamatis: Non sunt mortui parvuli; clamate et quod sequitur: Ergo non pro ipsis mortuus est, et videte, utrum vos non mortui iaceatis, qui mortuis, ne vivificentur, Christi mortem negatis; quia non eis, sicut putatis, peccatum debet unius et olim defuncti hominis imputari. Nec attenditis primum hominem Adam sic olim fuisse defunctum, ut tamen post illum secundus homo sit Christus, cum tot hominum millia inter illum et hunc orta sint. Et ideo manifestum est ad illum pertinere omnem, qui ex illo successione propaginis nascitur, sicut ad istum pertinet omnis, qui in illo gratiae largitate renascitur; unde fit, ut totum genus humanum quodammodo sint homines duo, primus et secundus.
Augustine. The disobedience of one man is indeed, not absurdly, called another's offense, because not yet born we had not yet done anything of our own, whether good or evil; but because in him who did this, when he did it, we all were, and so great and such was the offense that by it the whole of human nature was corrupted—which the very misery of the human race, so manifest, sufficiently indicates—this other's offense becomes ours by liable succession. On which account it was said by a catholic Doctor who rightly understood the Apostle: We are all born under sin, whose very origin is in fault (See Ambrose, Defense of the Prophet David 11.56). If you are willing to follow his understanding, and that of the others, his associates in catholic truth, you will not be forced to estrange the little ones from the benefit of his death, who was handed over on account of our offenses (Rom 4:25) and one died for all; where the Apostle cries out what follows: Therefore all have died, and he died for all (2 Cor 5:14-15)—and you cry back: The little ones have not died; cry out also what follows: Therefore he did not die for them, and see whether you yourselves do not lie dead, who deny the death of Christ to the dead, lest they be given life; because, as you suppose, the sin of one man, long since dead, ought not to be imputed to them. Nor do you attend that the first man Adam was so long since dead that nevertheless after him the second man is Christ, although so many thousands of human beings were born between that one and this one. And therefore it is manifest that to that one pertains everyone who is born of him by the succession of descent, just as to this one pertains everyone who is reborn in him by the bounty of grace; whence it comes about that the whole human race is, in a manner, two men, the first and the second.
JulianImp.2.163II. 164. Iulianus. Qui ergo dicit multa delicta, nihil de uno Manichaeorum id est traducis suspicatur.
II. 164. Julian. He, then, who says 'many offenses' suspects nothing of the one offense of the Manicheans, that is, of transmission.
JulianImp.2.164Augustinus. Sed utique, homo contentiose, multa delicta essent, quae multi haberent, etiam singula singuli, propriae voluntatis, si ad lavacrum regenerationis venirent, cum primum peccare coepissent; quos omnes secundum istam non rationem, sed distortionem tuam ab hac gratia, quae ex multis delictis iustificat, facitis alienos, quoniam non vultis eius esse participes quoslibet homines, quorum delicta sunt singula; quanto magis ergo multa sunt eis additis, quae habent alii plura, alii pauciora. A quibus tamen omnibus liberat ista gratia, de qua dictum est: Ex multis delictis in iustificationem . Fuit enim Adam et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam et in illo omnes perierunt . Ambrosius hoc dixit; calumniose, non erat Manichaeus. Parvulos contagium mortis antiquae prima nativitate contrahere Cyprianus dixit ; calumniose, non erat Manichaeus. Omnes in uno Adam peccasse Hilarius dixit ; calumniose, non erat Manichaeus; in qua Ecclesia ista didicerunt, calumniose, non erat Manichaea; et quia catholica erat atque catholica perseverat, ideo vos contra ista sentientes et contendentes ferre non potuit; et ut catholica permaneret, infirmitatem parvulorum suorum vestra damnatione munivit.
Augustine. But surely, you contentious man, there would be many offenses, which many would have—even single offenses of single persons, offenses of their own will—if they came to the washing of regeneration when they had just begun to sin; and all of these, according to that distortion of yours (not reason), you make estranged from this grace, which justifies from many offenses, since you are unwilling that any persons whose offenses are single should be partakers of it. How much more, then, are they 'many' when there are added those that others have, some more, some fewer—from all of which, nevertheless, this grace frees, of which it is said, From many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16). For there was Adam, and in him we all were; Adam perished, and in him all perished (See Ambrose, On Death as a Good 2.6). Ambrose said this; you slanderously call him a Manichean—he was not a Manichean. Cyprian said that the little ones contract the contagion of the ancient death by their first birth (See Cyprian, Letter 64.5); slanderously—he was not a Manichean. Hilary said that all sinned in the one Adam (See Hilary, Commentary on Matthew 18.6); slanderously—he was not a Manichean; the Church in which these men learned these things, slanderously—it was not Manichean; and because it was catholic and perseveres as catholic, therefore it could not bear you who think and contend against these things; and that it might remain catholic, it fortified the weakness of its little ones by your condemnation.
JulianImp.2.164II. 165. Iulianus. Iustificati itaque ex fide pacem habeamus ad Deum per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, per quem et accessum habemus in gratiam istam, in qua stamus, et gloriamur in spe gloriae Dei . Qui vobis videtis, inquit, iustificationem per peccatorum veniam fuisse collatam, firmam tenete concordiam et paribus animis Mediatoris dona laudate, cuius munere collatum nobis est, ut in hanc gratiam haberemus introitum; et eos, quos iustitia reos tenebat, quia reos nos non natura fecerat, sed voluntas, libertati reddidit et eripuit ultioni praestititque, ut, qui sperabamus aeterna supplicia, modo gloriemur in spe gloriae Dei.
II. 165. Julian. Being justified, therefore, by faith, let us have peace toward God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we also have access into this grace in which we stand, and we glory in the hope of the glory of God (Rom 5:1-2). You who see, he says, that justification has been conferred through the pardon of sins, hold firm concord and with equal minds praise the gifts of the Mediator, by whose gift it has been conferred on us that we should have entrance into this grace; and those whom justice held guilty—since it was not nature that made us guilty, but will—he restored to freedom and snatched from vengeance, and granted that we who were hoping for eternal punishments should now glory in the hope of the glory of God.
JulianImp.2.165Augustinus. Non per solam peccatorum dimissionem iustificatio ista confertur nisi auctoribus vobis. Iustificat quippe impium Deus non solum dimittendo, quae mala facit, sed etiam donando caritatem, ut declinet a malo et faciat bonum per Spiritum Sanctum , cuius sumministrationem iugem poscebat Apostolus eis, quibus dicebat: Oramus autem ad Deum, ne quid faciatis mali . Contra istam gratiam geritis bellum, ut liberum non sermone defendatis, sed praesumptione decipiatis voluntatis arbitrium.
Augustine. This justification is not conferred through the remission of sins alone, except on your account. For God justifies the ungodly not only by forgiving the evils he does, but also by giving love, so that he may turn away from evil and do good through the Holy Spirit (See Rom 5:5; Ps 34:14 (33:15)), whose continual supply the Apostle asked for those to whom he said: But we pray to God that you may do no evil (2 Cor 13:7). Against this grace you wage war, so that you may not defend free choice of the will by your discourse, but deceive it by presumption.
JulianImp.2.165II. 166. Iulianus. Verum ut magis exprimeretur virtus istius securitasque doctrinae, quid conferat fidelibus philosophia christiana, persequitur: Non solum autem, sed et gloriamur in pressuris scientes, quoniam tribulatio patientiam operatur, patientia autem probationem, probatio autem spem, spes autem non confundit, quia caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis . Id est: Non solum nobis haec beneficia contulerunt, ut amplitudine quandoque munerum gaudeamus, sed iam impraesentiarum in mediis angorum aestibus constituti alacres sumus ipsius possessione virtutis et de persequentium furore ridemus impiorum crudelitatem, eruditionem patientiae magis quam perturbationem laetitiae iudicantes, ut non solum propter praemia non peccemus, sed hoc ipsum non peccare praemium censeamus.
II. 166. Julian. But that the power and security of this teaching might be the more expressed—what Christian philosophy confers on the faithful—he continues: And not only so, but we also glory in tribulations, knowing that tribulation works patience, and patience trial, and trial hope, and hope does not confound, because the love of God is poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (Rom 5:3-5). That is: They have not only conferred these benefits on us, so that we may someday rejoice in the abundance of the gifts, but already at present, set in the midst of the heats of anguish, we are lively in the possession of virtue itself, and we laugh at the cruelty of the impious from the fury of our persecutors, judging it an instruction in patience rather than a disturbance of joy, so that we not only do not sin on account of rewards, but reckon this very not-sinning to be a reward.
JulianImp.2.166Augustinus. Si praemium est non peccare, quis dat hoc praemium? Puto, quia non dicturus es: Ipse sibi homo, quamvis hoc te cogat dicere perversitas haeresis vestrae. Si ergo Deus dat hoc praemium, ut homo non peccet, donum potius video dicendum esse quam praemium, ne aliqua merita praecessisse videantur, cum eos, qui dicunt gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra dari, Pelagius quoque ipse damnaverit . Quomodo autem detur hoc donum id est non peccare, et tu paulo ante dixisti Apostoli verba commemorans: Quoniam caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis . Ac per hoc in philosophia christiana ut gloriemur in tribulationibus, non est nostrum, quia et hoc accepimus; alioquin tamquam de suo a se sibi parto glorianti homini dicitur: Quid enim habes, quod non accepisti? Si autem et accepisti, quid gloriaris, quasi non acceperis? Et tamen gloriamur, non sic, quasi non acceperimus, sed gloriamur in illo, qui hoc dedit, ut qui gloriatur, in Domino glorietur . Haec est gratia, quam catholica fides praedicat; utquid eam, quaeso, vester error oppugnat, cum etiam vestro vos ore convincat?
Augustine. If not to sin is a reward, who gives this reward? I think you are not going to say: A man gives it to himself—although the perversity of your heresy forces you to say this. If, then, God gives this reward, that a man should not sin, I see it must be called a gift rather than a reward, lest any merits seem to have gone before, since even Pelagius himself condemned those who say that the grace of God is given according to our merits (See The Proceedings of Pelagius 14.30). And how this gift—that is, not to sin—is given, you yourself said a little before, recalling the words of the Apostle: Because the love of God is poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (Rom 5:5). And on this account, in Christian philosophy, that we should glory in tribulations is not from ourselves, because this too we have received; otherwise to a man glorying as of something gained by himself from himself for himself it is said: For what have you that you have not received? But if you have also received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it? (1 Cor 4:7) And yet we glory, not as if we had not received, but we glory in him who gave it, that he who glories may glory in the Lord (1 Cor 1:31). This is the grace which the catholic faith proclaims; why, I ask, does your error attack it, when it convicts you even by your own mouth?
JulianImp.2.166II. 167. Iulianus. Deinde cum in Testamentis agi ea, quae sunt promissa, conspicimus, praesentis vitae inter ludicra omnino omnia bona malaque numeramus fidem pollicitationis Dei de magnitudine in nos caritatis illius aestimantes. Neque enim confutabit spem nostram aeternorum frustratio commodorum, quandoquidem vadem beatitudinis futurae Dei caritatem tenemus, quae effusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis , id est per dona Sancti Spiritus amorem suum Deus circa genus probavit humanum.
II. 167. Julian. Then, since in the Testaments we see those things being done which were promised, we count all the goods and evils of the present life altogether among trifles, estimating the faith of God's promise from the greatness of his love toward us. For the frustration of eternal advantages will not refute our hope, since we hold the love of God as the surety of future blessedness, which has been poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (Rom 5:5)—that is, through the gifts of the Holy Spirit God has proved his love toward the human race.
JulianImp.2.167Augustinus. Non vis esse inter haec dona etiam non peccare, sed confidens in virtute tua hoc tibi tu ipse vis dare. Noli irasci, obsecro; maledictus omnis, qui spem habet in homine .
Augustine. You are unwilling that not-sinning should be among these gifts; but, trusting in your own power (See Ps 49:6 (48:7)), you want to give this to yourself by yourself. Do not be angry, I beg; cursed is everyone who has hope in man (Jer 17:5).
JulianImp.2.167II. 168. Iulianus. Restituet ergo totum fideliter, quod fidelibus repromisit.
II. 168. Julian. He will, then, faithfully restore the whole that he promised to the faithful.
JulianImp.2.168Augustinus. Restituet plane etiam hoc ipsum, ut fideles sint, quia fidem gentium promisit Abrahae, et quidam magnus fidelis dicit: Misericordiam consecutus sum, ut fidelis essem .
Augustine. He will plainly restore even this very thing—that they be faithful—because he promised Abraham the faith of the nations, and a certain great faithful man says: I obtained mercy, that I might be faithful (1 Cor 7:25).
JulianImp.2.168II. 169. Iulianus. Qui enim Filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit eum, per quem nos operatione Sancti Spiritus consecravit, procul dubio cum illo omnia nobis donavit . Utquid enim Christus, cum adhuc infirmi essemus, secundum tempus pro impiis mortuus est?
II. 169. Julian. For he who did not spare his own Son, but handed him over for us all, through whom he consecrated us by the working of the Holy Spirit, without doubt gave us all things with him (Rom 8:32). For why, when we were yet weak, did Christ, according to the time, die for the ungodly? (Rom 5:6)
JulianImp.2.169Augustinus. Testimonia divina commemoras, quibus vester error evertitur; non enim dictum est: Christum etiam pro impiis, sed: pro impiis - inquit - mortuus est. Ut autem et ipse alibi confessus es, etiam pro parvulis mortuus est et tamen, qua fronte nescio, transisse in eos originaliter impietatem primi hominis negas . Quomodo ergo pertinent ad eum, qui pro impiis mortuus est?
Augustine. You recall divine testimonies by which your error is overturned; for it was not said: Christ died even for the ungodly, but: he died, he says, for the ungodly (Rom 5:6). But as you yourself confessed elsewhere, he died for the little ones too; and yet—with what face I do not know—you deny that the impiety of the first man passed into them by origin. How, then, do they pertain to him who died for the ungodly?
JulianImp.2.169II. 170. Iulianus. Vix enim pro iusto quis moritur; nam pro bono forsitan quis audeat mori. Commendat autem Deus caritatem suam in nobis, quoniam si, cum adhuc peccatores essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est, multo magis iustificati nunc in sanguine ipsius salvi erimus per eum ab ira. Si enim cum inimici essemus, reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem Filii eius, multo magis reconciliati salvi erimus in vita eius. Non solum autem hoc, sed et gloriantes in Deo per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, per quem nunc reconciliationem accepimus . Aperuit, quanta totum Christus pietate gessisset, qui mori dignatus est pro nihil boni merentibus.
II. 170. Julian. For scarcely for a righteous man does one die; for perhaps for a good man one might dare to die. But God commends his love in us, because if, when we were yet sinners, Christ died for us, much more, being now justified in his blood, shall we be saved through him from wrath. For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved in his life. And not only so, but we also glory in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have now received reconciliation (Rom 5:7-11). He disclosed with how great love Christ had done the whole—he who deigned to die for those who merited no good.
JulianImp.2.170Augustinus. Haec verba tua sic temperata sunt, ut etiam parvulos tangere videantur, quoniam et ipsos nihil boni meruisse conceditis, quos nihil boni egisse fatemini; sed Apostolus non ita locutus est, qui dixit Christum pro impiis et peccatoribus mortuum fuisse. Frustra ergo tu magnam Christi misericordiam extenuandam putasti; ille enim pro male merentibus mortuus est, a quo tanto beneficio Salvatoris parvulos separatis, quoniam salvos eos dicitis; ille autem dicit: Non est opus sanis medicus ; non est ergo opus parvulis Christus, quibus utique secundum vos non est Iesus; quibus autem opus est, his procul dubio est Iesus. Sed discedite, maligni; opus est parvulis. Et ipsos ergo a peccatis eorum salvos facit, quoniam propterea tale nomen accepit, ubi angelus dixit: Vocabis nomen eius Iesum; ipse enim salvum faciet populum suum a peccatis eorum .
Augustine. These words of yours are so framed that they seem to touch even the little ones, since you grant that they too merited no good, whom you confess to have done no good; but the Apostle did not speak thus, who said that Christ died for the ungodly and for sinners. In vain, then, did you think the great mercy of Christ should be diminished; for he died for the ill-deserving, from which great benefit of the Savior you separate the little ones, since you call them saved; but he says: The healthy have no need of a physician (Matt 9:12); the little ones, then, have no need of Christ, to whom, according to you, he is surely not Jesus; but those who have need of him, to these without doubt he is Jesus. But depart, you malignant ones; the little ones have need. He, then, saves them too from their sins, since for that reason he received such a name, when the angel said: You shall call his name Jesus; for he will save his people from their sins (Matt 1:21).
JulianImp.2.170II. 171. Iulianus. Quippe qui rationem et legem criminum amore calcaverant euntes post desideria sua, quae ipsa conscientia, cuius vis est maxima, castigabat. Verum quia constabat etiam Prophetas propter iustitiam crebro mortis enituisse contemptu et plurimos pro magnis quibusque rebus dignitatisque insitae fulgore rutilantibus securo ad interitum animo cucurrisse, ne non singularitas virtutis Christi dilucidior eiusmodi esset exemplis, intulit Apostolus, per quod ostenderet caritatem et fortitudinem illius unico eminere fastigio. Assentior et ego, licet raro, licet vix, tamen pro rebus iustis et bonis mori elegisse nonnullos. Sed illis negotiorum dignitas, id est ipsarum rerum, pro quibus dimicaverant, claritudo periculorum temperavit dolorem; Christus autem nihil habuit, quod amaret in studiis impiorum, et pro his, qui erant propria voluntate deformes, non est aspernatus impendi; apparet illum omnium virtutibus antecellere, quia, etsi in tolerantia paucos, in causa tamen nullos potest habere consortes. Nihil igitur de eius munificentia desperemus, quia, si pro nobis mortuus est, cum adhuc essemus peccatores, multo magis iustificati nunc in sanguine ipsius salvi erimus per eum ab ira.
II. 171. Julian. Namely those who had trampled reason and the law by their love of crimes, going after their own desires, which conscience itself, whose force is greatest, was chastising. But since it was established that the Prophets too had often shone forth in contempt of death on account of righteousness, and that very many had run to destruction with untroubled mind for various great matters and for the brilliance of an inborn dignity glittering, lest the singularity of Christ's virtue should not be the more clearly distinguished by such examples, the Apostle brought in something by which he might show that his love and fortitude tower at a unique height. I too assent that, though rarely, though scarcely, some have nevertheless chosen to die for just and good causes. But for those, the dignity of the affairs—that is, the renown of the very matters for which they had contended—tempered the pain of their perils; but Christ had nothing he could love in the pursuits of the impious, and he did not disdain to be spent for those who were deformed by their own will; it appears that he excels all in virtue, because, even if in endurance he can have few partners, in cause he can have none. Let us, therefore, despair of nothing concerning his bountifulness, because, if he died for us when we were yet sinners, much more, being now justified in his blood, shall we be saved through him from wrath.
JulianImp.2.171Augustinus. Nolite ergo eximere parvulos de numero peccatorum, quia et pro ipsis mortuum fatemini Christum.
Augustine. Do not, then, take the little ones out of the number of sinners, because you confess that Christ died for them too.
JulianImp.2.171II. 172. Iulianus. Et post reconciliationem, quam cum Deo habere promeruimus per opera videlicet Mediatoris, debemus percipere animo sempiterna gaudia et non solum salutem sperare, sed etiam gloriam.
II. 172. Julian. And after the reconciliation which we have merited to have with God—through the works, that is, of the Mediator—we ought to receive in our mind everlasting joys, and not only to hope for salvation, but also for glory.
JulianImp.2.172Augustinus. Rogo te, attende, quod dicit Apostolus, propter quod factum est, ut de primo homine loqueretur; de reconciliatione agebat, quam tu quoque per mediatorem Christum ex inimicitiis, quas cum Deo habuimus, factam esse concedis. Ecce, vide verba Apostoli: Iustificati igitur ex fide - inquit - pacem habeamus ad Deum per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum ; et paulo post: Si enim Christus, cum infirmi essemus, adhuc iuxta tempus pro impiis mortuus est ; item paulo post: Commendat autem - inquit - caritatem suam Deus in nobis, quoniam, cum adhuc peccatores essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est; multo magis nunc iustificati in sanguine ipsius salvi erimus ab ira per ipsum . Adhuc attende: Si enim, cum inimici essemus - inquit - reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem Filii eius, multo magis reconciliati salvi erimus in vita ipsius . Hanc reconciliationem, quam totiens commendavit, etiam in novissimo posuit dicens: Per quem et nunc reconciliationem accepimus ; ac deinde intulit: Propter hoc, sicut per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum . Sicut ergo per hunc unum inimicitiae, sic per unum Christum reconciliatio. Quisquis igitur a peccato, in quo inimicitiae factae sunt, liberos esse parvulos dicit, profecto eos negat ad hanc reconciliationem, propter quam Christus mediator factus est, pertinere; proinde separat eos et a iustificatione, quae fit in Christi sanguine, cuius fundendi causa, quando eum bibendum commendavit, nulla nisi in remissionem dicta est peccatorum . Unde fit consequens, ut parvulis peccata non habentibus mors Christi nihil prosit omnino; per hanc enim reconciliati sumus Deo, cum inimici essemus, quod parvuli secundum vos non fuerunt. Ut enim propter hanc reconciliationem moreremur peccato, in quo inimicitiae fuerunt, quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo, sicut idem dicit Apostolus, in mortem illius baptizati sumus . Ad haec autem verba ut perveniret: Si enim mortui sumus - inquit - peccato, quomodo vivemus in eo? Statimque ut ostenderet mortuos nos esse peccato: An ignoratis - inquit - quoniam quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in mortem ipsius baptizati sumus? Ubi est libertas et fortitudo animi vestri? Quare timetis dicere, quod credere non timetis, parvulos in Christo baptizari non oportere, quos peccatum, cui moriantur, dicitis non habere?
Augustine. I ask you, attend to what the Apostle says, on account of which it came about that he spoke of the first man. He was treating of the reconciliation which you too grant was made through the mediator Christ, out of the enmities we had with God. See, look at the words of the Apostle: Being justified, therefore, by faith, he says, let us have peace toward God through our Lord Jesus Christ (Rom 5:1); and a little after: For if Christ, when we were weak, according to the time died for the ungodly (Rom 5:6); again a little after: But God commends his love in us, he says, because, when we were yet sinners, Christ died for us; much more now, being justified in his blood, shall we be saved from wrath through him (Rom 5:8-9). Attend still: For if, when we were enemies, he says, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved in his life (Rom 5:10). This reconciliation, which he so often commended, he set down even at the last, saying: through whom we have now received reconciliation (Rom 5:11); and then he brought in: For this reason, as through one man sin entered into the world (Rom 5:12). As, then, through this one came the enmities, so through the one Christ came the reconciliation. Whoever, then, says that the little ones are free from the sin in which the enmities were made, surely denies that they pertain to this reconciliation on account of which Christ was made mediator; accordingly he separates them also from the justification which takes place in the blood of Christ—for the shedding of which, when he commended it to be drunk, no cause was stated except for the remission of sins (See Matt 26:28). Whence it follows that to little ones not having sins the death of Christ profits nothing at all; for through this we were reconciled to God when we were enemies, which the little ones, according to you, were not. For that we might die, on account of this reconciliation, to the sin in which the enmities were, whoever of us have been baptized in Christ, as the same Apostle says, have been baptized into his death (Rom 6:3). And that he might come to these words: For if we have died, he says, to sin, how shall we yet live in it? (Rom 6:2); and at once, to show that we have died to sin: Or do you not know, he says, that whoever of us have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death? (Rom 6:3) Where is the freedom and fortitude of your mind? Why do you fear to say what you do not fear to believe—that the little ones ought not to be baptized in Christ, who, you say, have no sin to which they may die?
JulianImp.2.172II. 173. Iulianus. Propterea sicut per unum hominem in hunc mundum peccatum intravit et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt . Ad edomandam superbiam Iudaeorum, qui sibi necessariam pecca torum veniam non tantum quantum Gentilibus aestimabant, praerogativa legis sanctitatem suo generi vindicantes, in morbum humanae conversationis invadit et multitudinem delinquentium retro petit, ut quantum dominationis in hoc mundo iniquitas occupaverit, antiquitatis ipsius prodat auctoritas, quamque multa et veternosa crimina ab obscenitate praecedentium per manus mutuae imitationis posteris tradita Christi gratia sustulisset, ostenderet. Atque ob hoc recordationem facit primi hominis, non a quo peccatum coeperat, constat enim prius mulierem deliquisse, sed qui per privilegium sexus magisterium occupasset delicti: Per hunc ergo intravit peccatum et per peccatum mors, sine dubio illa quae peccatoribus id est aeterna promittitur, et ita - inquit - in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt. Aperuit prorsus, qualiter haec mors transisset ad posteros, ob imitationem scilicet, non generationem.
II. 173. Julian. Therefore, as through one man sin entered into this world, and through sin death, and so death passed to all human beings, in whom all have sinned (Rom 5:12). To tame the pride of the Jews, who reckoned that the pardon of sins was not as necessary for themselves as for the Gentiles—vindicating sanctity to their own race by the prerogative of the law—he attacks the disease of human conduct and seeks back the multitude of offenders, so that, however much dominion iniquity has seized in this world, the authority of antiquity itself may betray it, and that he might show how many and inveterate crimes, handed down from the obscenity of those who went before to posterity by the hands of mutual imitation, the grace of Christ had taken away. And on this account he makes mention of the first man—not the one with whom sin had begun, for it is established that the woman first offended, but the one who, by the privilege of his sex, had seized the mastery of the offense. Through this one, then, sin entered, and through sin death—without doubt that death which is promised to sinners, that is, eternal death—and so, he says, death passed to all human beings, in whom all have sinned. He disclosed plainly how this death had passed to posterity, namely by imitation, not by generation.
JulianImp.2.173Augustinus. Iam quidem responsum est tibi, cur non mulierem nominaverit, ex qua fuit initium peccati, sed unum hominem; aut ut ipsa quoque in illo intellegeretur propter unam carnem aut quod a viro incipit generatio, per quam volebat ostendere in mundum intrasse peccatum. Sed, homines, qui dicitis mortem, quae in peccato est, ob imitationem, non generationem ad posteros transisse, cur non aperte dicitis baptizari in Christo Iesu parvulos non debere? Si enim baptizandi sunt in Christo, quoniam quicumque baptizantur in Christo, in morte ipsius baptizantur, procul dubio peccato et ipsi moriuntur. Hinc quippe probavit Apostolus peccato nos esse mortuos, quia in morte Christi baptizati sumus; cum enim dixisset: Si mortui sumus peccato, quomodo vivemus in eo? Mox ut ostenderet mortuos nos esse peccato: An ignoratis - inquit - quoniam quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in morte illius baptizati sumus? Quisquis igitur peccatum non habet, non est, cui moriatur in baptismo; quisquis autem, cum baptizatur, non peccato moritur, non baptizatur in morte Christi ac per hoc non baptizatur in Christo. Quid tergiversamini? Libere aperite inferos vestros, libere ad vos intrent, qui nolunt in delicto mortuos in baptismo vivificari parvulos suos.
Augustine. It has already indeed been answered to you why he did not name the woman, from whom was the beginning of sin, but one man: either that she too might be understood in him on account of the one flesh, or because generation begins from the man, through whom he wanted to show that sin entered into the world. But, you men who say that the death which is in sin passed to posterity by imitation, not by generation, why do you not openly say that the little ones ought not to be baptized in Christ Jesus? For if they are to be baptized in Christ, since whoever are baptized in Christ are baptized into his death, then without doubt they too die to sin. For from this the Apostle proved that we are dead to sin—because we have been baptized into the death of Christ; for when he had said, If we have died to sin, how shall we yet live in it? (Rom 6:2), then, to show that we are dead to sin: Or do you not know, he says, that whoever of us have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death? (Rom 6:3) Whoever, then, has no sin, has nothing to which he may die in baptism; but whoever, when he is baptized, does not die to sin, is not baptized into the death of Christ, and on this account is not baptized in Christ. Why do you turn your back? Freely open your nether world, freely let them enter to you who are unwilling that their little ones, dead in offense, be given life in baptism.
JulianImp.2.173II. 174. Iulianus. Postquam enim dixerat: In omnes homines pertransiit, subdidit statim: in quo omnes peccaverunt; hoc: in quo omnes peccaverunt, nihil aliud indicat quam: Quia omnes peccaverunt secundum illud Davidicum: In quo corrigit adulescentior viam suam? Id est: Quomodo corrigit viam suam? In custodiendo sermones tuos . Io eo ergo corrigi dicitur, per quod et corrigitur. Ita et Apostolus in eo dixit pertransisse mortem, in quo omnes propria voluntate peccaverunt, non ut hoc: in quo aut Adam aut peccatum videatur ostendere, sed in quo omnes peccantes intellegatur exprimere.
II. 174. Julian. For after he had said, It passed to all human beings, he at once added, in whom all have sinned; this, in whom all have sinned, indicates nothing other than: Because all have sinned, according to that saying of David: In what does the younger man correct his way? That is: How does he correct his way? By keeping your words (Ps 119:9 (118:9)). He is said, then, to be corrected 'in' that by which he is also corrected. So too the Apostle said that death passed 'in' that—in the sense that in it all sinned by their own will—not that this in whom should seem to point to either Adam or sin, but should be understood to express in that, all sinning.
JulianImp.2.174Augustinus. Aperi oculos: in Adam omnes moriuntur, in quo si non sunt mortui parvuli, nec in Christo vivificantur, utquid cum eis ad baptismum vivificatoris et salvatoris simulatione damnabili curritis, quos vivos sanosque clamando vivificari sanarique non vultis?
Augustine. Open your eyes: in Adam all die (See 1 Cor 15:22); and if the little ones have not died in him, neither are they given life in Christ. Why then do you run with them to the baptism of the giver of life and the savior, with a damnable pretense—the little ones whom, while crying out that they are alive and healthy, you are unwilling to have given life and healed?
JulianImp.2.174II. 175. Iulianus. Omnes autem pro multis poni innumera Scripturarum exempla testantur secundum illud: Omnes declinaverunt, simul inutiles facti sunt, et post pauca: Qui devorant - inquit - plebem meam sicut cibum panis , ostendens ab illis omnibus, quos malum pronuntiaverat operari, hanc plebem fuisse discretam. In Evangelio refertur: Et clamabat omnis populus: Crucifige! Crucifige! Et tamen generalitate verbi huius nequaquam aut Apostoli aut Nicodemus aut sanctae mulieres includuntur. Hic ipse Apostolus, quos nunc dixit omnes, paulo post multos nominat.
II. 175. Julian. That 'all' is put for 'many' countless examples of the Scriptures attest, according to that saying: All have turned aside, together they have become unprofitable (Ps 14:3 (13:3)), and a little after: Who devour, he says, my people as the food of bread (Ps 14:4 (13:4)), showing that this people was distinguished from all those whom he had declared to work evil. In the Gospel it is reported: And all the people cried out: Crucify, crucify! (See Luke 23:21; John 19:6) And yet by the universality of this word the Apostles, or Nicodemus, or the holy women are by no means included. This very Apostle calls those whom he now called 'all' a little after 'many.'
JulianImp.2.175Augustinus. Ad hoc iam responsum est non repugnare omnibus multos, quia ipsi omnes non pauci, sed multi sunt; et quod de Psalmo commemorasti: Omnes declinaverunt, simul inutiles facti sunt, prorsus verum est; filios quippe hominum, qui declinaverunt omnes, discrevit a filiis Dei, quos non declinantes devorabant; Deus enim respexit super filios hominum; hi omnes declinaverunt, ab eis quippe excepti sunt filii Dei. Ex his ergo declinantibus omnibus filiis hominum erat etiam ille omnis populus, qui clamabat: Crucifige! Crucifige! Ad hunc quippe populum nullo modo illi, qui iam in Christum crediderant, pertinebant. Hinc te exue, si potes, quod unus pro omnibus mortuus est, et aude dicere, non omnes esse mortuos, pro quibus mortuus est Christus, cum statim Apostolus tibi fauces premat et opprimat audacissimam vocem, quid sequeretur, ostendens et dicens: Ergo omnes mortui sunt. Noli sic laudare Apostolum; noli sic exponere, ut nolis audire: Si unus pro omnibus mortuus est, ergo omnes mortui sunt . In hos omnes cum peccato mors pertransiit per illum, in quo omnes moriuntur. Ibi sunt et parvuli, quia et pro ipsis Christus mortuus est, qui propterea pro omnibus mortuus est, quia omnes mortui sunt. Quidquid argumenteris, quidquid tergiverseris, quidquid apostolicorum verborum coneris evertere sive pervertere, a morte, quae in peccato est, parvulos non ostendis immunes, quia et pro eis Christum mortuum negare non audes.
Augustine. To this it has already been answered that 'many' is not contrary to 'all,' because those very 'all' are not few but many; and what you recalled from the Psalm, All have turned aside, together they have become unprofitable, is wholly true; for he distinguished the sons of men, who all turned aside, from the sons of God, whom, not turning aside, they were devouring; for God looked down upon the sons of men (See Ps 14:2 (13:2)); these all turned aside, for from them the sons of God were excepted. From these turning-aside sons of men, then, was also that whole people who cried out: Crucify, crucify! For to this people those who had already believed in Christ in no way belonged. From this extricate yourself, if you can—that one died for all—and dare to say that not all are dead for whom Christ died, when at once the Apostle grips your throat and stifles your most audacious utterance, showing what followed and saying: Therefore all have died. Do not praise the Apostle in such a way; do not expound in such a way, as to be unwilling to hear: If one died for all, therefore all have died (2 Cor 5:14). Upon these all, death with sin passed through that one in whom all die. There the little ones too are, because Christ died for them too—who for that reason died for all, because all have died. Whatever you may argue, whatever you may evade, whatever apostolic words you may try to overthrow or pervert, you do not show the little ones to be immune from the death which is in sin, because you dare not deny that Christ died for them too.
JulianImp.2.175II. 176. Iulianus. Quid ergo egerimus appareat: omnes plurimos Apostolus dixit, quos ideo ait obnoxios morti, quoniam voluntate propria peccaverunt. Non igitur originale, sed voluntarium crimen accusat; et re vera nihil aliud indicant verba, si eorum fides et proprietas expendatur. Nam si peccatum crederet ad posteros generatione transisse, id est ad eos, qui ibi non fuerant, ab illo fuisse iaculatum, falsissime omnes peccasse pronuntiaret.
II. 176. Julian. Let what we have accomplished appear: the Apostle said 'all' for 'very many,' whom he says are liable to death for this reason—because they sinned by their own will. He accuses, therefore, not an original but a voluntary crime; and in truth the words indicate nothing else, if their good faith and proper sense be weighed. For if he believed that sin had passed to posterity by generation—that is, that it had been hurled by that one upon those who had not been there—he would most falsely declare that all had sinned.
JulianImp.2.176Augustinus. Possem tibi dicere: Quomodo secuti sunt posteri Adam peccantis exemplum, qui non ibi fuerunt nec ipsum peccatum vel viderunt, vel audierunt vel crediderunt? Sed non hoc dico. Fuit enim Adam et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam et in illo omnes perierunt , propter quod in illo omnes moriuntur. Apostolum audi apertissime loquentem, non te tortuosissime garrientem.
Augustine. I could say to you: How did posterity follow the example of the sinning Adam, who were not there and neither saw nor heard nor believed the sin itself? But I do not say this. For there was Adam, and in him we all were; Adam perished, and in him all perished (See Ambrose, On Death as a Good 2.6), on which account in him all die. Hear the Apostle speaking most openly, not yourself chattering most tortuously.
JulianImp.2.176II. 177. Iulianus. Quod enim unus facit et ad alios dirigit, non vere hoc omnes fecisse dicuntur; aut enim pertransiit ad eos et ipsi non peccaverunt aut ipsi peccaverunt, quo sermone negotium operationis exprimitur, et ad eos non pertransiit nisi imitatione sola.
II. 177. Julian. For what one does and directs toward others, all are not truly said to have done; for either it passed to them and they did not sin, or they themselves sinned, by which word the matter of an operation is expressed, and it did not pass to them except by imitation alone.
JulianImp.2.177Augustinus. Si quis intemperantia sibi podagram faciat eamque transmittat in filios, quod saepe contingit, nonne recte dicitur in eos illud vitium de parente transisse, ipsos quoque hoc in parente fecisse, quoniam, quando ipse fecit, in illo fuerunt? Ac sic ipsi atque ille adhuc unus fuerunt; fecerunt ergo non actione hominum, sed ratione iam seminum. Quod ergo aliquoties invenitur in corporis morbis, hoc in illo unius primi genitoris antiquo magnoque peccato, quo natura humana universa vitiata est, factum esse noverat, qui lucidissima locutione, quam vos conamini tenebrare, dicebat: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt . Gratiam quippe Christi commendare intenderat a contrario formam constituens et regenerationis principem principi generationis opponens.
Augustine. If someone by intemperance brings gout upon himself and transmits it to his children, which often happens, is it not rightly said both that this defect passed into them from the parent, and that they too made this in the parent, since, when he made it, they were in him? And thus they and he were as yet one; they made it, then, not by the action of men, but already by the ratio of the seeds. What, therefore, is sometimes found in diseases of the body, this he knew had been done in that ancient and great sin of the one first begetter, by which the whole of human nature was corrupted—he who, in that most luminous utterance which you try to darken, said: Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death, and so it passed to all human beings, in whom all have sinned (Rom 5:12). For he had intended to commend the grace of Christ, setting up a pattern from the contrary and opposing the prince of regeneration to the prince of generation.
JulianImp.2.177II. 178. Iulianus. Illud autem, quod te opponere credidisti vel in isto libro, cui nunc respondeo, vel in his, quos ad Marcellinum scripseras, tunc transisse peccatum, quando omnes homines, ut tuis verbis utar, ille unus fuerunt , sine difficultate veritas deterit et irrisioni cuiusce prudentis exponit. Nam tali argumento praeter impietatem tuam nihil aliud indicatur, impietatem inquam, qua credis ita esse animarum traducem in Tertulliani olim et Manichaei profanitate damnatam, sicut est etiam corporum tradux, quod tam nefarium est, ut, cum a nobis in ea epistula, quam ad Orientem misimus, vobis fuisset obiectum, tu in his libris, quos nuper ad Bonifacium misisti, negando a te propulsare coneris. Ais enim: Dicunt nos autem animarum traducem confiteri, quod in cuius libris legerint, nescio , ut a te videlicet nihil dici tale deieres. Porro, ut falsitas tua tuorum verborum collatione prodatur, quomodo traducem animarum, profanam re vera opinionem, tuis dicis sensibus non teneri, cum profitearis omnes homines illum unum fuisse? Si enim non credis partem animae seminibus illigatam, quo ore scribis omnes homines Adam solum fuisse, cum homo utique nisi anima et corpus simul esse non possit?
II. 178. Julian. But that which you believed you could set against us—whether in this book to which I now reply, or in those you had written to Marcellinus—that sin passed at the time when all human beings, to use your words, were that one (See The Punishment and Forgiveness of Sins 1.10.11), the truth wears away without difficulty and exposes to the mockery of any prudent man. For by such an argument nothing else is indicated than your impiety—an impiety, I say, by which you believe there is a transmission of souls, condemned long ago in the profanity of Tertullian and of Mani, just as there is also a transmission of bodies; which is so nefarious that, when it was objected against you by us in that letter we sent to the East, you, in those books you recently sent to Boniface, try to fend it off from yourself by denying it. For you say: They say that we confess a transmission of souls; in whose books they have read this, I do not know (See Answer to the Two Letters of the Pelagians 4.4.5), so as to swear that nothing of the kind is said by you. Furthermore, that your falsehood may be betrayed by the comparison of your own words, how do you say that the transmission of souls—an opinion in truth profane—is not held by your views, when you profess that all human beings were that one? For if you do not believe a part of the soul to be bound up with the seeds, with what mouth do you write that all human beings were Adam alone, since a man surely cannot exist except as soul and body together?
JulianImp.2.178Augustinus. Putas hominem non posse dici solum hominis corpus, cum scias ipsum Filium Dei unicum, Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, sub Pontio Pilato crucifixum et sepultum, sicut tota eius Ecclesia confitetur et haereses multae, in quibus et vestra est; et tamen solum corpus Christi sepultum est. Debuit ergo secundum te Iesus Christus Filius Dei unicus, Dominus noster, non dici sepultus, quoniam non ex solo corpore, sed ex Verbo Dei et anima rationali et corpore est Christus Dei Filius unicus, Dominus noster, sed cum venisset ad haec verba confessio: Sub Pontio Pilato crucifixus est, subici debuit: et corpus eius sepultum. Nec de ipso primo homine, de quo agitur, dicere Scriptura debuit: Finxit Deus hominem pulverem terrae , quia solum hominis corpus ex terra est. Ipsum denique Deum errasse clamate, qui mortem minando dixit homini: Terra es et in terram ibis , cum potius ex tua doctrina debuerit dicere: Terra est corpus tuum et in terram ibit. Quia ergo fuit Adam et in illo fuimus omnes , quod ante nos catholici Doctores secundum Scripturas sanctas in sancta Ecclesia didicerunt atque docuerunt, ideo dixi: Omnes ille unus fuerunt, quia et illi duo, masculus et femina, non iam duo erant, sed una caro . Et ego de omnibus genitis dixi, quoniam, quando peccatum est, omnes ille unus fuerunt; nondum quippe inde fuerat ullus in matrem seminatione transfusus, et utique filii a viris transfunduntur in feminas. Ex qualibet ergo et quantalibet parte omnes, qui ex illo nati sunt, ille unus fuerunt sive secundum solum corpus sive secundum utramque hominis partem, quod me nescire confiteor nec me pudet, ut vos, fateri nescire quod nescio, nec ideo tamen nescio de omni homine scriptum esse: Homo vanitati similis factus est, dies eius velut umbra praetereunt , quia et alibi eadem sancta Scriptura dicit: Verum tamen universa vanitas omnis homo vivens , quod iusto Deo creante non fieret, si peccatum originale non esset.
Augustine. Do you think a man's body alone cannot be called a man, when you know that the only Son of God himself, our Lord Jesus Christ, was crucified under Pontius Pilate and buried, as his whole Church confesses, and many heresies, among which is yours too; and yet only the body of Christ was buried? Then, according to you, Jesus Christ the only Son of God, our Lord, ought not to be said to have been buried, since Christ the only Son of God, our Lord, is not from the body alone, but from the Word of God and a rational soul and a body; but when the confession had come to these words, 'He was crucified under Pontius Pilate,' there ought to have been added: and his body was buried. Nor, concerning the first man himself, of whom we treat, ought Scripture to have said: God formed man, the dust of the earth (Gen 2:7), because only man's body is from the earth. Finally, cry out that God himself erred, who, threatening death, said to man: You are earth, and into the earth you shall go (Gen 3:19), when rather, according to your teaching, he ought to have said: Your body is earth, and into the earth it shall go. Because, then, there was Adam, and in him we all were—which the catholic Doctors before us learned and taught according to the holy Scriptures in the holy Church—therefore I said, All were that one, because those two also, male and female, were no longer two, but one flesh (See Gen 2:24). And I spoke of all who are begotten, since, when the sin was committed, all were that one; for not yet had anyone thence been transfused into a mother by sowing, and surely children are transfused from men into women. From whatever part, then, and however great a part, all who were born of him were that one—whether according to the body alone or according to both parts of man, which I confess I do not know, nor am I ashamed, as you are, to confess that I do not know what I do not know; nor yet do I therefore not know that it is written of every man: Man has been made like unto vanity; his days pass away like a shadow (Ps 144:4 (143:4)), since the same holy Scripture also says elsewhere: Yet truly every living man is wholly vanity (Ps 39:5 (38:6)), which, with a just God creating, would not happen if there were no original sin.
JulianImp.2.178II. 179. Iulianus. Deinde etiamsi hoc solum ad carnem referas, nec sic potest haec intellegentiae tuae fatuitas excusari, qua dicis: Omnes ille unus fuerunt, cum eo tempore, quo peccavit Adam, iam duo essent homines, non unus, id est ipse et uxor eius, de quorum substantia, non culpa genus hominum, secundum quod Deus instituerat, pullulavit.
II. 179. Julian. Then, even if you refer this only to the flesh, not even thus can this fatuity of your understanding be excused, by which you say, All were that one, when at the time Adam sinned there were already two human beings, not one—that is, himself and his wife—from whose substance, not fault, the human race, according as God had instituted, sprang up.
JulianImp.2.179Augustinus. Iam dixi et ecce iterum dico: Ego de his dixi: Omnes ille unus fuerunt, quos fuerat seminaturus, id est generaturus Adam; ex illo ergo uno principaliter erant tracturi nascentes originale peccatum, qui genuit; illa autem, qua coniuncta duo fuerunt, quod excepit concepit peperitque posterior, quamvis peccaverit prior. Unde et sancta Scriptura in lumbis patris Abraham dicit fuisse filios Levi et in illo a sacerdote Melchisedech fuisse decimatos . Ad Hebraeos Epistulam lege et linguam corrige.
Augustine. I have already said it, and behold I say it again: I spoke of those All were that one whom Adam was going to sow, that is, to generate; from that one, then, who begot, the newborn were going principally to draw original sin; but she, with whom, joined, the two were, conceived afterward what she received and bore, although the prior one had sinned. Whence holy Scripture also says that the sons of Levi were in the loins of their father Abraham, and that in him they were tithed by the priest Melchizedek (See Heb 7:9-10). Read the Epistle to the Hebrews and correct your tongue.
JulianImp.2.179II. 180. Iulianus. Denique Abeli filio parentum peccatum nihil nocuisse sanctitas eius Scripturis omnibus celebrata testatur.
II. 180. Julian. Finally, that his parents' sin harmed Abel the son nothing, his sanctity, celebrated in all the Scriptures, attests.
JulianImp.2.180Augustinus. Cur ergo non ipsum posuit Apostolus imitandum, qui primus iustus fuit, sed cum de duobus hominibus ageret, quorum unus in condemnationem mitteret, alter in iustificationem, Adam dixit et Christum? Si autem Abel legem non habebat in membris repugnantem legi mentis , quam sicut iustus debellabat interiore certamine, et si caro eius non concupiscebat adversus spiritum , nihil ei nocuerat peccatum parentum. Sed quisquis talem dicit fuisse Abel, dicat eum carnem non habuisse peccati, cum procul dubio Dominus Christus non habuisset similitudinem carnis peccati, nisi aliorum omnium hominum esset caro peccati.
Augustine. Why, then, did the Apostle not set him forth to be imitated, who was the first righteous man, but, when he was treating of two men—one of whom would send into condemnation, the other into justification—did he name Adam and Christ? But if Abel did not have a law in his members fighting against the law of his mind (See Rom 7:23), which, as a righteous man, he was warring down by an inner contest, and if his flesh did not lust against the spirit (See Gal 5:17), then his parents' sin harmed him nothing. But whoever says that Abel was such, let him say that he did not have flesh of sin, since without doubt the Lord Christ would not have had the likeness of the flesh of sin (See Rom 8:3), unless the flesh of all other human beings were flesh of sin.
JulianImp.2.180II. 181. Iulianus. E regione Cain, invidus, parricida, de eadem natura progenitus, non eadem voluntate provectus, excarnificante animum tremore vastatur. Ergo in hunc mundum peccatum intrasse per unum Apostolus dixit et per peccatum mortem et ita in omnes homines mortem pertransisse, qui peccaverunt. Quae sententia catholico dogmati conveniens nihil vobis impertit auxilii.
II. 181. Julian. On the opposite side Cain, envious, a parricide, begotten of the same nature, advanced by not the same will, is laid waste by a trembling that tortures his mind. The Apostle, therefore, said that sin entered into this world through one, and through sin death, and so death passed to all human beings, who sinned. This sentence, agreeing with catholic teaching, lends you no help.
JulianImp.2.181Augustinus. Mortem cum peccato pertransisse ostendit Apostolus dicendo: Et ita in omnes homines pertransiit . Propter hoc et infantes, cum baptizantur, eruuntur de potestate tenebrarum; alioquin cum magna iniuria Dei, sicut iam diximus et saepe dicendum est, exorcizatur et exsufflatur imago Dei, si non ille ibi exorcizatur et exsufflatur princeps mundi, qui mittitur foras, ut sit illic habitatio Spiritus Sancti . Scelus autem, quod fecit Cain, ad originis causam non pertinet, quoniam voluntate commissum est.
Augustine. The Apostle showed that death passed with sin by saying: And so it passed to all human beings (Rom 5:12). On account of this, infants too, when they are baptized, are rescued from the power of darkness; otherwise, with great injury to God, as we have already said and must often say, the image of God is exorcized and breathed upon, if there is not exorcized and breathed upon in him the prince of the world (See John 12:31), who is cast out, that there may be there the dwelling of the Holy Spirit. But the crime that Cain committed does not pertain to the cause of origin, since it was committed by will.
JulianImp.2.181II. 182. Iulianus. His enim est ordinata verbis, quibus exemplum praecedens et studium sequens imitantis ostenditur.
II. 182. Julian. For it is ordered with these words, by which the preceding example and the following zeal of the imitator are shown.
JulianImp.2.182Augustinus. Iam tibi dictum est: Abel ergo ei debuit opponi a contraria parte, non Christus.
Augustine. It has already been said to you: Abel, then, ought to have been set against him on the contrary side, not Christ.
JulianImp.2.182II. 183. Iulianus. Ceterum si generationem peccato aut infectam aut obnoxiam voluisset ostendere, non dixisset per unum hominem intrasse peccatum, sed per duos.
II. 183. Julian. But if he had wanted to show that generation was either infected with sin or liable to it, he would not have said that sin entered through one man, but through two.
JulianImp.2.183Augustinus. Iam responsum est. Nihil dicis et tamen dicis et dicis, quoniam rectum non potes invenire, quod dicas.
Augustine. It has already been answered. You say nothing, and yet you say it and say it, since you cannot find anything right to say.
JulianImp.2.183II. 184. Iulianus. Nec dixisset: In eo transiit mors, in quo omnes peccaverunt , sed: In eo, quod de primi hominis et de primae mulieris diabolica voluptate et carne fluxerunt; quod si pronuntiavisset, non vestrum dogma firmasset, sed omnes suas sententias subruisset Apostolus. Ergo peccantium voluntatem et peccati accusat exemplum ac per hoc vos et ratio deproeliatur et Paulus.
II. 184. Julian. Nor would he have said, In that one death passed, in whom all have sinned (Rom 5:12), but: In that they flowed from the diabolical pleasure and flesh of the first man and the first woman; and if he had declared this, the Apostle would not have confirmed your teaching but would have undermined all his own sentences. Therefore he accuses the will of those who sin and the example of sin; and on this account both reason and Paul battle against you.
JulianImp.2.184Augustinus. Ergo in Abel primo iusto ponere debuit iustificationis exemplum, sicut in Adam primo peccatore positum putatis esse peccati. Cur enim nos pigeat eadem tibi respondere, cum te non pudeat eadem totiens frustra repetere?
Augustine. Therefore he ought to have set in Abel, the first righteous man, the example of justification, just as you suppose the example of sin is set in Adam, the first sinner. For why should it irk me to answer you the same things, when you are not ashamed to repeat the same things so many times in vain?
JulianImp.2.184II. 185. Iulianus. Usque ad legem enim peccatum in hoc mundo; peccatum autem non imputabatur, cum lex non esset, sed regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen etiam in eos, qui non peccaverunt in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, qui est forma futuri . Qualitatem peccati appellationum varietate discernit, ut aliud ostendat esse peccatum, aliud praevaricationem; vultque in hoc dumtaxat loco omnem quidem praevaricationem peccatum videri, non omne autem peccatum praevaricationem, ut per vocabulum praevaricationis peccato crescat invidia magisque rei esse videantur, qui fuerint praecepta transgressi, quam qui sine legis admonitione rationis ingenitae dissimulatione deliquerint. Ante eam ergo legem, quae per Moysen data est et consignata litteris, cuius sanctione actuum forma praescripta est, quam ignorare populo sub ea degenti non licuit, medium illud tempus inter Adam et Moysen, mortales varia studiorum pravitate pollutos, peccati Apostolus, non praevaricationis accusat.
II. 185. Julian. For until the law sin was in this world; but sin was not imputed when there was no law; yet death reigned from Adam until Moses even over those who did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, who is the pattern of him who was to come (Rom 5:13-14). He distinguishes the quality of sin by a variety of appellations, so that he may show that sin is one thing and transgression another; and in this passage at least he wants every transgression to be seen as sin, but not every sin as transgression, so that through the word 'transgression' the odium of sin may grow, and those may seem more guilty who have transgressed precepts than those who have offended without the admonition of the law, by dissimulation of inborn reason. Before that law, then, which was given through Moses and consigned to letters—by whose sanction a pattern of acts was prescribed, which it was not permitted for the people living under it to be ignorant of—the Apostle accuses the mortals of that middle time, between Adam and Moses, polluted by the varied depravity of their pursuits, of sin, not of transgression.
JulianImp.2.185Augustinus. Quid est ergo: Regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen et in eos, qui non peccaverunt in similitudine praevaricationis Adae? Quomodolibet enim distinguatis, contra vos dixisse Apostolus invenitur. Nam si: Regnavit mors et in eos, qui non peccaverunt, distinxeritis; quo modo sit iustum nisi propter originale peccatum, et ideo, tamquam quaereretur, quare regnaverit et in eos, qui non peccaverunt, responsio reddita est: In similitudinem praevaricationis Adae, id est non propter sua propria peccata, sed quoniam sui similes genuit praevaricator Adam, sicut exposuerunt haec verba etiam qui ante nos catholici Doctores fuerunt. Quamvis enim peccatum illud primum atque unum, quod per unum hominem intravit in mundum, commune sit omnium, propter quod dictum est: In quo omnes peccaverunt, tamen sua propria parvuli peccata non habent. Et ideo de illis etiam hoc veraciter dici potuit, quod non peccaverunt, sed regnavit in eos mors in similitudine, ut dictum est, praevaricationis Adae. Si autem: Regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen et in eos, qui non peccaverunt in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, id est et in eos, qui peccaverunt quidem, sed non in similitudine praevaricationis Adae peccaverunt, neminem secundum vos invenitis, quia omnes, qui peccaverunt, in similitudine eius peccasse, id est exemplum eius secutos esse contenditis. Fovea igitur vulpeculae ex utraque parte conclusa est; non est, qua intret, ut lateat, aut si iam ibi latebat, non est, qua exeat, ut evadat.
Augustine. What, then, is this: Death reigned from Adam until Moses even over those who did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam? For however you may punctuate it, the Apostle is found to have spoken against you. For if you punctuate it, Death reigned even over those who did not sin—how is this just except on account of original sin? And therefore, as though it were asked why death reigned even over those who did not sin, the answer is given: in the likeness of the transgression of Adam—that is, not on account of their own proper sins, but because the transgressor Adam begot those like himself, as even the catholic Doctors who were before us expounded these words. For although that first and one sin, which through one man entered into the world, is common to all—on account of which it is said, in whom all have sinned—nevertheless the little ones do not have their own proper sins. And therefore even of them it could truly be said that they did not sin, but death reigned over them in the likeness, as it is said, of the transgression of Adam. But if you punctuate it, Death reigned from Adam until Moses even over those who did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam—that is, even over those who did indeed sin, but did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam—you find no one, according to you, because you contend that all who sinned sinned in his likeness, that is, followed his example. The fox's den, then, is closed on both sides; there is no way for it to enter and hide, or, if it was already hiding there, no way for it to go out and escape.
JulianImp.2.185II. 186. Iulianus. Ut quibus lex data non est, intellegantur non esse praecepta transgressi, rei autem convincantur, quoniam neglegentes rationem, quam proprii in unoquoque protestantur affectus, vel humanae societatis vel pudoris iura temeraverint; atque ideo mutua quidem imitatione, non tamen legis, quae necdum lata erat, dicuntur transgressione peccasse, usque ad legem ergo peccatum fuit, non praevaricatio, post legem autem non solum peccatum, sed etiam praevaricatio. Regnavit autem mors aeterna, quam Adae, si peccasset, ascripturum se Deus spoponderat. Igitur illa mors peccato debita, mors poenalis, regnavit et ante legem in eos, qui peccaverunt, sicut in Sodomitis et in his, qui diluvii tempore propter iniquitatem, voluntariam tamen, vel varia sunt aetate consumpti, regnavit et post legem in his, quos reos praevaricationis invenit.
II. 186. Julian. So that those to whom the law was not given may be understood not to have transgressed precepts, yet may be convicted as guilty, since, neglecting the reason which each one's own affections proclaim within him, they violated the rights either of human society or of decency; and therefore they are said to have sinned indeed by mutual imitation, yet not by transgression of the law, which had not yet been promulgated. Until the law, then, there was sin, not transgression; but after the law, not only sin but also transgression. But eternal death reigned, which God had promised he would charge to Adam if he sinned. Therefore that death due to sin, the penal death, reigned both before the law over those who sinned—as over the Sodomites and over those who in the time of the flood were consumed on account of iniquity, voluntary nonetheless, or were of various ages—and reigned after the law over those whom it found guilty of transgression.
JulianImp.2.186Augustinus. Quoniam mortem nisi aeternam non vis esse poenalem; si mors poenalis non est, quae a corpore animam separat, cur eam timet natura, quam sic laudas, ut neges esse vitiatam? Quid causae est, ut infans, ubi paululum ab infantia progredi coeperit, iam formidet occidi? Cur non ita, ut in somnum, sensus est proclivis in mortem? Cur magni habentur, qui mortem non metuunt, hique tam rari sunt? Cur etiam ipse, qui cuncupiscentiam se habere dixit dissolvi et esse cum Christo , non vult tamen spoliari, sed supervestiri, ut absorbeatur mortale a vita ? Utquid Petro dictum est de ipso glorioso fine: Alter te cinget et feret, quo tu non vis ? Si ergo frustra mors timetur, ipse timor eius est poena; si autem anima separari a corpore naturaliter non vult, ipsa mors poena est, quamvis eam in usum bonum gratia divina convertat.
Augustine. Since you are unwilling that any death but eternal death be penal: if the death which separates the soul from the body is not penal, why does nature fear it—nature which you so praise that you deny it is corrupted? What is the reason that an infant, when it has begun to advance a little out of infancy, already dreads being killed? Why is the sense not as inclined to death as to sleep? Why are those who do not fear death held to be great, and these so rare? Why does even the very man who said he had a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ (See Phil 1:23) nevertheless not want to be stripped, but to be further clothed, that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life (See 2 Cor 5:4)? Why was it said to Peter, of his very glorious end, Another will gird you and carry you where you do not wish (John 21:18)? If, then, death is feared in vain, the fear of it is itself a punishment; but if the soul naturally does not wish to be separated from the body, death itself is a punishment, although divine grace turns it to a good use.
JulianImp.2.186II. 187. Iulianus. Quoniam ea iudicante iustitia, quae non imputat peccatum, nisi a quo liberum est abstinere, hi, qui sine lege peccaverunt, sine lege iudicabuntur , et hi qui in lege peccaverunt, per legem iudicabuntur. Quod autem ait Apostolus: Sed regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen etiam in eos, qui non peccaverunt in similitudine praevaricationis Adae , fecit translucere, quod senserat, id est Iudaeos sub lege peccantes similiter ut Adam praevaricatos fuisse definiens, quia et illi primo homini, licet non libris, auribus tamen commendata lex fuerat abstinendi a gustu arboris, in quo oboedientiae exploratio fuit, de qua contra praeceptum edendo praevaricationis crimen incurrit. Ergo et post datam legem ministerio Moysi peccans populus in similitudine praevaricationis Adae deliquisse convincitur, quia ita ut ille legis transgressione peccabat; in media autem aetate duarum legum, primae datae, non scriptae, secundae vero et latae et litteris traditae, qui peccaverunt, non a peccato ostenduntur alieni, sed non in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, quia legem non acceperant, perhibentur errasse.
II. 187. Julian. Since, by the judgment of that justice which does not impute sin except to one who is free to abstain from it, those who sinned without the law will be judged without the law, and those who sinned in the law will be judged through the law (See Rom 2:12). But as for what the Apostle says, But death reigned from Adam until Moses even over those who did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam (Rom 5:14), he made shine through what he had thought, that is, defining that the Jews sinning under the law had transgressed in like manner as Adam, because to the first man too the law of abstaining from the taste of the tree had been commended—if not by books, yet by his ears—in which there was a test of obedience, by eating against which precept he incurred the crime of transgression. Therefore even after the law was given through the ministry of Moses, the sinning people is convicted of having offended in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, because they sinned just as he did, by transgression of the law; but those who sinned in the middle age of the two laws—the first given, not written, the second both promulgated and handed down in letters—are shown not to be free of sin, but are reported to have erred not in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, because they had not received the law.
JulianImp.2.187Augustinus. Ubi negas similitudinem praevaricationis Adae, te ipse convincis, quod hi, qui sine lege peccaverunt, non primi hominis exemplo sunt rei; non est igitur imitatio, sed generatio, qua per peccatum mors in omnes homines pertransiit. Neque enim, si tam prolixa tempora, quae ante legem fuerunt, transiluisset haec mors, quae per peccatum primi hominis intravit in mundum, et a Iudaeis serpere inciperet, qui praevaricatores legis effecti sunt, ut servaret similitudinem praevaricationis Adae, diceretur de illa: Per unum hominem intravit et per omnes homines pertransiit . Cui enim, non dico stulto, sed fatuo, persuadebitis mortem per unum hominem intrasse et per omnes homines pertransisse, quam dicitis tot gentes et tot saecula praetermisisse et ad eos, qui legem acceperant, intactis ceteris pervenisse, cum et in eos mortem regnasse dicatis, qui non in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, sed sine praevaricatione, quia sine lege, peccaverunt? Prorsus non est, unde vestrum corrigatis errorem, nisi redeatis ad catholicam fidem, quae homini primo, principi generationis, hominem secundum, principem regenerationis, opponit.
Augustine. Where you deny the likeness of the transgression of Adam, you convict yourself, namely that those who sinned without the law are not guilty by the example of the first man; it is not imitation, then, but generation, by which through sin death passed to all human beings. For if this death, which through the sin of the first man entered into the world, had leaped over the long times before the law, and began to creep from the Jews, who were made transgressors of the law, so as to preserve the likeness of the transgression of Adam, it would not be said of it: Through one man it entered and passed to all human beings (Rom 5:12). For whom—I do not say foolish, but fatuous—will you persuade that death entered through one man and passed to all human beings, when you say that it passed over so many nations and so many ages and reached those who had received the law, the rest untouched, while you also say that death reigned even over those who sinned not in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, but without transgression, because without law? There is plainly nothing from which you may correct your error, unless you return to the catholic faith, which opposes to the first man, the prince of generation, the second man, the prince of regeneration.
JulianImp.2.187II. 188. Iulianus. Qui Adam forma dicitur futuri, id est Christi, verum forma a contrario, ut, sicut ille peccati, ita hic iustitiae forma credatur; sed sicut incarnatio Christi iustitiae fuit forma, non prima, sed maxima, quia et, antequam Verbum caro fieret, ex ea fide, quae in Deum erat, et in Prophetis et in multis aliis sanctis fulsere virtutes, veniente autem temporum plenitudine exacta in Christo iustitiae norma resplenduit et, qui praedictus fuerat pater futuri saeculi, tam praecedentium sanctorum quam etiam sequentium remunerator eminuit.
II. 188. Julian. Adam is called the pattern of him who was to come, that is, of Christ—but a pattern by contrast, so that, just as he is believed to be the pattern of sin, so the other is the pattern of righteousness; but just as the incarnation of Christ was the pattern of righteousness—not the first, but the greatest, because even before the Word became flesh, virtues shone forth, from that faith which was in God, both in the Prophets and in many other saints—yet when the fullness of times came, the perfected standard of righteousness shone again in Christ, and he who had been foretold as the father of the age to come stood forth as the rewarder both of the saints who preceded and of those who followed.
JulianImp.2.188Augustinus. Agnoscimus haeresim vestram; definivit enim Pelagius, quod non ex fide incarnationis Christi antiqui vixerint iusti, quia videlicet nondum in carne venerat Christus, cum profecto id futurum non praenuntiassent, nisi priores utique credidissent; sed in hanc absurditatem cecidistis, dum defenditis esse potuisse per naturam legemque iustitiam, utrumlibet autem si verum est, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est .
Augustine. We recognize your heresy; for Pelagius defined that the ancient righteous men did not live from faith in the incarnation of Christ, since (he says) Christ had not yet come in the flesh—when surely they would not have foretold that this would be unless they had first indeed believed; but you fell into this absurdity while defending that there could be righteousness through nature and the law; and whichever of these is true, then Christ died in vain (Gal 2:21).
JulianImp.2.188II. 189. Iulianus. Ita etiam in parte contraria Adam dicitur forma peccati non prima, sed maxima.
II. 189. Julian. So too on the contrary side Adam is called the pattern of sin, not the first, but the greatest.
JulianImp.2.189Augustinus. Unde ergo non prima, sed maxima? Quandoquidem propter exordium generis humani non negas primam nec / CSEL 307/ invenis, cur dicas maximam, nisi fatearis tanto gravius Adam peccasse, quanto ibi maior non peccandi facilitas erat, ubi vitiata natura nondum erat nec lex peccati in membris repugnabat legi mentis. Cum qua poena omnis homo nascitur periturus in aeternum, si non renascatur, et perditus, nisi ab eo quaesitus inveniatur, qui venit quaerere quod perierat .
Augustine. Whence, then, not the first, but the greatest? Since, on account of the beginning of the human race, you do not deny that he was the first, nor do you find why you should call him the greatest, unless you confess that Adam sinned the more gravely the greater there was the ease of not sinning, where nature was not yet corrupted nor did the law of sin in the members fight against the law of the mind. With which punishment every human being is born, to perish eternally unless he is reborn, and lost unless he is found by being sought by him who came to seek what had perished (See Luke 19:10).
JulianImp.2.189II. 190. Iulianus. Maximam autem dico, non quia diabolum magis reum fuisse diffitear, sed quia, cum institutionis ratio peteretur, accommodatius Apostolus hominis, quem plurimum successio humanitatis aspexit, quam aeriae substantiae fecerit mentionem. Verum in ipsa humanitate primam mulierem deliquisse constabat; sed quia patrum in omnibus efficacior est et maior auctoritas, eum dixit formam fuisse peccati, non a quo coepit delictum, sed qui per potestatem sexus virilis magis fuisse probatur imitabilis. Vides nempe, ut consequentia intellectus veritatem sibi inesse testetur.
II. 190. Julian. But I say 'greatest' not because I deny that the devil was more guilty, but because, when the reason of the institution was sought, the Apostle more fittingly made mention of the man, on whom the succession of humanity chiefly looked, than of the airy substance. But in humanity itself it was established that the first woman offended; yet because in all things the authority of fathers is more efficacious and greater, he said that he was the pattern of sin—not the one with whom the offense began, but the one who, by the power of the male sex, is proved to have been the more imitable. You see surely how the consequence of the sense attests that truth is in it.
JulianImp.2.190Augustinus. Non imitationem imitationi, sed regenerationem generationi opposuisse Apostolum ipsa Christi forma demonstrat, qui homini primo homo secundus opponitur. Si ergo non pertinent ad iustitiam Christi, qui renascuntur, non pertinent ad peccatum Adae, qui nascuntur, et non est Christus forma a contrario, sed quia forma est, procul dubio, sicut renati ad iustitiam Christi transeunt etiam parvuli, quamvis operari iustitiam non valentes, ita cum transitu peccati ex Adam nati sunt sive nascuntur, quamvis nec peccatum adhuc valeant operari. Agnosce formam et noli esse contradictione deformis.
Augustine. The very pattern of Christ demonstrates that the Apostle opposed not imitation to imitation, but regeneration to generation—Christ who, as the second man, is opposed to the first man. If, then, those who are reborn do not pertain to the righteousness of Christ, those who are born do not pertain to the sin of Adam, and Christ is not a pattern by contrast; but because he is a pattern, then without doubt, just as the reborn pass to the righteousness of Christ—even the little ones, though unable to work righteousness—so with the passing of sin they were born or are born of Adam, though they are not yet able to work sin either. Acknowledge the pattern, and do not be deformed by contradiction.
JulianImp.2.190II. 191. Iulianus. Nunc intuere, quantum a tua expositione discordent ut cetera eiusdem loci ita illa verba, quibus Apostolus pronuntiat etiam in eos regnasse mortem, qui non peccaverunt in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, qui est forma futuri . Si enim de naturali peccato ageret, de quo dixerat, ut videtur tibi: In quo omnes peccaverunt , qui essent hi, quos statim pronuntiat non solum in praevaricatione Adae, sed ne in similitudine quidem culpae illius obnoxios deprehendi?
II. 191. Julian. Now consider how much—as the rest of the same passage, so those words—differ from your exposition, by which the Apostle declares that death reigned even over those who did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, who is the pattern of him who was to come (Rom 5:14). For if he were treating of natural sin, of which (as it seems to you) he had said, in whom all have sinned, who would those be whom he at once declares to be found liable not only to the transgression of Adam, but not even to the likeness of that fault?
JulianImp.2.191Augustinus. Sed tu sic intellegis, qui non intellegis; Apostolus autem rationem reddidit, quare mors regnaverit et in eos, qui non peccaverunt, addendo et dicendo: In similitudinem praevaricationis Adae, id est propterea regnasse ostendens mortem et in eos, qui non peccaverunt, quoniam quamdam similitudinis formam ex Adae praevaricatione traxerunt. Adam quippe induunt, qui nascuntur, sicut Christum induunt, qui renascuntur.
Augustine. But so do you understand, who do not understand; the Apostle, however, gave the reason why death reigned even over those who did not sin, by adding and saying, in the likeness of the transgression of Adam—that is, showing that death reigned even over those who did not sin for this reason, because they drew a certain pattern of likeness from the transgression of Adam. For those who are born put on Adam, just as those who are reborn put on Christ.
JulianImp.2.191II. 192. Iulianus. Regnavit - inquit - mors etiam in eos, qui non peccaverunt in similitudine praevaricationis Adae . Vides eum distinctionem fecisse perspicuam inter eos, qui similiter ut Adam, et eos, qui dissimiliter erraverant.
II. 192. Julian. Death, he says, reigned even over those who did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam. You see that he made a clear distinction between those who had erred in like manner as Adam and those who had erred in unlike manner.
JulianImp.2.192Augustinus. Si dissimiliter erraverant, ubi est ergo imitationis exemplum? Regenerationem redde generationi, non imitationem imitationi, et invenies formam, quam commendavit Apostolus veritatis, non quam finxit Pelagius, vestri auctor erroris.
Augustine. If they had erred in unlike manner, where then is the example of imitation? Render regeneration to generation, not imitation to imitation, and you will find the pattern which the Apostle of truth commended, not the one which Pelagius invented, the author of your error.
JulianImp.2.192II. 193. Iulianus. Quae divisio naturali peccato non potest convenire, quod si esset, omnes prorsus aequaliter colligaret; nemo ergo esset, cui malum hoc non inesset, et nullus inveniretur, de quo vere posset dici, quia in similitudine peccati illius non deliquisset, in cuius omnes veritate peccassent.
II. 193. Julian. This division cannot fit natural sin, which, if it existed, would bind absolutely all equally; there would then be no one in whom this evil was not, and none would be found of whom it could truly be said that he had not offended in the likeness of that sin in whose reality all had sinned.
JulianImp.2.193Augustinus. Quod renitendo clamas, hoc verum est et contra vos est: omnes prorsus originale peccatum aequaliter colligavit; nemo esset, cui malum hoc non inesset, nisi per Christum gratia divina prodesset. In eos enim, qui non peccaverunt, id est qui sua peccata propria non fecerunt, ut mors regnaret, similitudo meruit praevaricationis Adae, qui est forma futuri, id est Christi; sicut enim primo homine, qui nascuntur, ita secundo homine, qui renascuntur, induuntur.
Augustine. What you cry out in resisting is true and is against you: original sin has bound absolutely all equally; there would be no one in whom this evil was not, unless divine grace profited through Christ. For over those who did not sin—that is, who did not make their own proper sins—the likeness of the transgression of Adam, who is the pattern of him who was to come, that is, of Christ, merited that death should reign; for as those who are born are clothed with the first man, so those who are reborn are clothed with the second man.
JulianImp.2.193II. 194. Iulianus. Colligit autem Apostolus et pronuntiat esse alios, qui peccaverint sicut Adam, alios, quos nec similitudo antiquae praevaricationis asperserit; absolute ergo claret morum crimina esse, non seminum. Atque ut breviter quae sunt acta repetamus, ait Apostolus per unum hominem intrasse peccatum. Hoc ratio ostendit imitationi, non generationi congruere, quae est opus duorum.
II. 194. Julian. But the Apostle gathers and declares that there are some who sinned like Adam, and others whom not even the likeness of the ancient transgression sprinkled; absolutely, then, it is clear that the crimes are of morals, not of seeds. And to repeat briefly what has been done: the Apostle says that sin entered through one man. Reason shows that this agrees with imitation, not with generation, which is the work of two.
JulianImp.2.194Augustinus. Quam multum eadem dicis et nihil dicis nec vides, quia, si peccatum imitationis a genere humano coeptum isto significaretur loco, per unam potius quam per unum in mundum diceretur intrasse, quae ita prima peccavit, ut eam vir quoque ipsius fuerit imitatus. Sed quia generationem, non imitationem volebat intellegi: Per unum - inquit - hominem peccatum intravit in mundum , aut ambos singulari numero includens, propter quod dictum est: Igitur iam non sunt duo , aut eum potissimum commemorans, a quo est principium generandi, cum seminatio exorditur, ut conceptio subsequatur. Haec saepe iam diximus, sed iterationibus tuis nostras quoque vel rarius, tamen iterando non cedimus.
Augustine. How much you say the same things and say nothing, nor do you see that, if the sin of imitation begun by the human race were signified in this passage, it would rather be said to have entered into the world through one woman than through one man—she who so first sinned that her husband too imitated her. But because he wanted generation understood, not imitation, Through one, he says, man sin entered into the world (Rom 5:12), either including both in the singular number—on account of which it is said, Therefore they are now no longer two (Matt 19:6)—or recalling especially the one from whom is the beginning of begetting, when the sowing starts, that conception may follow. These things we have already often said, but to your repetitions we too, though more rarely, nevertheless by repeating do not yield.
JulianImp.2.194II. 195. Iulianus. Secutus est: Et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit .
II. 195. Julian. He continued: And so death passed to all human beings (Rom 5:12).
JulianImp.2.195Augustinus. Quid est: ita pertransiit, nisi quomodo intravit, id est, cum peccato sive per peccatum?
Augustine. What is so it passed, except in the way it entered—that is, with sin, or through sin?
JulianImp.2.195II. 196. Iulianus. Fecit distinctionem, ne quis putaret transisse peccatum, ut mors, quae praecucurrit, iudicante iustitia secuta probaretur materias ultionis, quas in unoquoque peccatore de studio malae voluntatis invenerat. Ostendit igitur non naturam accusandam esse, sed studia.
II. 196. Julian. He made the distinction lest anyone should think that sin had passed, so that death, which ran ahead, might be proved—by the judgment of justice—to have followed the materials of vengeance which it had found in each sinner from the pursuit of an evil will. He showed, therefore, that not nature is to be accused, but pursuits.
JulianImp.2.196Augustinus. Frustra te versas et reversas. Adam respice et Christum: ille formam est futuri, non est ergo a contrario iste conformis, qui iustitiam suam in renascentes parvulos traicit, si peccatum in nascentes ille non traicit.
Augustine. In vain do you turn yourself this way and that. Look at Adam and Christ: that one is the pattern of him who was to come; therefore this one is not conformed by contrast, who passes his righteousness into the reborn little ones, if that one does not pass sin into the born.
JulianImp.2.196II. 197. Iulianus. Subiunxit in eo regnasse mortem, in quo omnes peccaverunt , quo sermone non nascentis ruina, sed opera agentis expressa est. Approbavit se itaque pravitatem arguere nec innocentiam sauciare.
II. 197. Julian. He added that death reigned in that one, in whom all have sinned, by which word not the ruin of one being born, but the works of one acting, were expressed. He proved, therefore, that he was charging depravity and not wounding innocence.
JulianImp.2.197Augustinus. In illo peccaverunt omnes, in quo moriuntur omnes; cuius a contrario forma est, in quo vivificantur omnes. Sicut autem in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic in Christo omnes vivificabuntur . Quod ideo dictum est, quia, sicut nemo nisi per Adam vergit in mortem, ita nemo nisi per Christum surgit in vitam. O homo, qui nihil potes dicere, posses saltem tacere?
Augustine. In that one all have sinned, in whom all die; whose pattern by contrast is the one in whom all are given life. For as in Adam all die, so in Christ all will be made alive (1 Cor 15:22). Which was said for this reason, because, as no one inclines to death except through Adam, so no one rises to life except through Christ. O man, who can say nothing, could you at least keep silent?
JulianImp.2.197II. 198. Iulianus. Post hoc autem intulit usque ad legem regnasse peccatum ostendens regnum peccati lata lege cecidisse.
II. 198. Julian. But after this he brought in that sin reigned until the law, showing that the reign of sin fell when the law was promulgated.
JulianImp.2.198Augustinus. Si lata lege cecidit regnum peccati, ergo per legem iustitia est. Si per legem iustitia est, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est . Apostoli est vox ista, non mea. Iam erumpite in apertum, inimici crucis Christi. Quid timetis magnum populum Christi et Christi magnum iudicium non timetis? Aperte dicite: Iustificari natura, iustificari lege possemus; gratis mortuus est Christus. Sed formidantes multitudinem christianam Pelagianum verbum supponitis et quaerentibus a vobis, quare mortuus sit Christus, si natura vel lex efficit iustos, respondetis: Ut hoc ipsum facilius fieret, quasi posset, quamvis difficilius, fieri tamen sive per naturam sive per legem. Christe, responde, vince atque convince; clama: Sine me nihil potestis facere , ut taceant, qui clamant: Etsi difficilius, tamen possemus et sine te facere. Aut si tacere non possunt, se ipsos in latebras aliquas ducant, ut alios non seducant. Cur ergo ait Apostolus: Usque enim ad legem peccatum in mundo fuit , nisi, quia peccatum auferre nec lata lex potuit, sed ille, de quo dictum est: Ecce Agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccata mundi ?
Augustine. If the reign of sin fell when the law was promulgated, then righteousness is through the law. If righteousness is through the law, then Christ died in vain (Gal 2:21). That is the Apostle's utterance, not mine. Now break out into the open, you enemies of the cross of Christ. Why do you fear the great people of Christ and not fear the great judgment of Christ? Say openly: We could be justified by nature, we could be justified by the law; Christ died in vain. But, dreading the Christian multitude, you substitute the Pelagian word, and to those who ask you why Christ died, if nature or the law makes men righteous, you answer: That this very thing might be done more easily—as though it could be done, though more difficultly, yet done, whether through nature or through the law. O Christ, answer, conquer, and convict; cry out, Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5), that those may be silent who cry: Even if more difficultly, yet we could do it even without you. Or if they cannot be silent, let them lead themselves into some hiding places, that they may not seduce others. Why, then, does the Apostle say, For until the law sin was in the world (Rom 5:13), except because not even the promulgated law could take away sin, but he of whom it is said: Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who takes away the sins of the world (John 1:29)?
JulianImp.2.198II. 199. Iulianus. Generatio autem, quae coepit ab Adam, et post legem permanet; quae si esset fons peccatorum et frutex diaboli, sicut tu argumentaris, non utique usque ad legem, sed et post legem et post Christum hoc crimen vigeret. Peccatum itaque, de quo Apostolus pronuntiat, quia usque ad legem fuerit nec potuerit manere post legem, actionis, non nativitatis esse convincitur.
II. 199. Julian. But generation, which began from Adam, remains even after the law; and if it were the fount of sins and the offshoot of the devil, as you argue, this crime would surely flourish not only until the law, but also after the law and after Christ. And so the sin of which the Apostle declares that it was until the law and could not remain after the law is convicted of being of action, not of birth.
JulianImp.2.199Augustinus. Ecce aperte dicis non ideo dixisse Apostolum: Usque ad legem peccatum in mundo fuit , quia nec lex potuit auferre peccatum, sed quia peccatum non potuit manere post legem. Nec expavescis vocem Dei per hominem Dei intendentem in Christum atque dicentem: Ecce Agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccatum mundi ? Quid desipis? Quid insanis? Non natura, non lex, sed ecce qui tollit peccatum mundi. Et audes dicere peccati regnum lata lege cecidisse, et post legem non potuisse manere peccatum? Cum dicat Apostolus: Si per legem iustitia, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est ; cum dicat Apostolus: Quia in lege nemo iustificatur ; cum dicat Apostolus: Lex subintravit, ut abundaret delictum ; cum dicat Apostolus: Si data esset lex, quae posset vivificare, omnino ex lege esset iustitia; sed conclusit Scriptura omnia sub peccato, ut promissio ex fide Iesu Christi daretur credentibus . Si aures habetis, ora iam claudite; si recte aperire ora vultis, prius aures divinis vocibus aperite. Sane memineris te dixisse generationem coepisse ab Adam, qui soles dicere generationem non nisi a duobus incipere et ideo non eam voluisse intellegi Apostolum in eo peccato, quod per unum hominem intrasse dixit in mundum. Quis te posse crederet oblivisci, quod totiens dixeras falsum? Sed tamen oblitus es, ut aliquando diceres verum. Expergiscere, audi vel te ipsum: ab Adam coepit generatio ac per hoc per generationem intravit peccatum, quod per unum hominem intravit in mundum. Etenim tu dixisti: Generatio autem, quae coepit ab Adam, et post legem permanet. Convenienter igitur Apostolus unum hominem posuit, a quo peccatum intravit in mundum, quod generatione traheretur, non diabolum, a quo illud peccatum intravit in mundum, quod imitatio sequeretur.
Augustine. See, you openly say that the Apostle said, Until the law sin was in the world, not because the law could not take away sin, but because sin could not remain after the law. And do you not shudder at the voice of God, through the man of God, pointing to Christ and saying: Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who takes away the sin of the world (John 1:29)? Why are you out of your senses? Why do you rave? Not nature, not the law, but behold him who takes away the sin of the world. And do you dare to say that the reign of sin fell when the law was promulgated, and that after the law sin could not remain? When the Apostle says: If righteousness is through the law, then Christ died in vain (Gal 2:21); when the Apostle says: Because in the law no one is justified (Gal 3:11); when the Apostle says: The law entered in, that the offense might abound (Rom 5:20); when the Apostle says: If a law had been given which could give life, righteousness would be wholly from the law; but the Scripture has shut up all things under sin, that the promise, by faith in Jesus Christ, might be given to those who believe (Gal 3:21-22). If you have ears, now close your mouths; if you want to open your mouths rightly, first open your ears to the divine words. Be sure to remember that you said generation began from Adam—you who are wont to say that generation begins only from two, and that therefore the Apostle did not want it understood in that sin which he said entered into the world through one man. Who would believe you could forget what you had so often said falsely? But yet you forgot, so that for once you might say what is true. Wake up, hear even yourself: from Adam generation began, and on this account through generation entered the sin which through one man entered into the world. For you yourself said: But generation, which began from Adam, remains even after the law. Fittingly, therefore, the Apostle set down one man, from whom sin entered into the world, which would be drawn by generation—not the devil, from whom entered into the world that sin which imitation would follow.
JulianImp.2.199II. 200. Iulianus. Peccatum autem - inquit - non imputatur, cum lex non est ; qua sententia sicut et omnibus dictis suis opinionem traducis interemit.
II. 200. Julian. But sin, he says, is not imputed when there is no law (Rom 5:13); by which sentence, as by all his other sayings, he destroyed the opinion of transmission.
JulianImp.2.200Augustinus. Plane cum lex non est, non imputatur peccatum, sed ab hominibus, qui inscrutabilia iudicia Dei nesciunt. Nam si Deus peccatum non imputat, cum lex non est, qua tandem iustitia Dei, qui sine lege peccaverunt, sine lege peribunt ?
Augustine. Plainly, when there is no law, sin is not imputed—but by men, who do not know the unsearchable judgments of God. For if God does not impute sin when there is no law, then by what justice of God will those who sinned without the law perish without the law (Rom 2:12)?
JulianImp.2.200II. 201. Iulianus. Nam si ante legem non imputata est peccati tradux, post legem autem non fuit, numquam omnino, quo noceret humano generi, virus obtinuit. Ante legem enim imputatum non est naturale peccatum, sub lege imputatum non est, quia in nullo umquam loco legis vel monstratum hoc vel imputatum docetur. Apparet ergo Apostolum peccatum ante legem liberae voluntatis, post legem autem praevaricationem totidem liberae voluntatis arguere.
II. 201. Julian. For if before the law the transmission of sin was not imputed, but after the law it did not exist, then the venom never at all gained the means by which it might harm the human race. For before the law natural sin was not imputed; under the law it was not imputed, because in no place of the law is it taught either to be shown or to be imputed. It appears, therefore, that the Apostle charges sin before the law to free will, and after the law transgression likewise to free will.
JulianImp.2.201Augustinus. Si in lege non ostenditur originale peccatum, cur ergo in lege anima parvuli octavo die non circumcisi de genere suo dicta est interire ? Cur infante nato offerebatur sacrificium pro peccato ? Iam, quaeso, tace; attende infantem et imitare non fantem.
Augustine. If in the law original sin is not shown, why then is the soul of a little one not circumcised on the eighth day said in the law to perish from its people (See Gen 17:14)? Why was a sacrifice for sin offered for a newborn infant (See Lev 12:6-8)? Now, I beg, keep silent; attend to the infant, and imitate the one who does not speak.
JulianImp.2.201II. 202. Iulianus. Ac per hoc constat nihil eum de peccato traducis elocutum, quae quamvis copiosa essent, ad probandum nihil Apostolum de naturali, quod esse non potest et a Manichaeis fingitur, sensisse peccato; ex abundantia tamen etiam distinctionem inculcavit non omnes omnino Adae praevaricatione pollutos, quandoquidem etiam de his, in quibus pro iniquitate regnaret interitus, invenirentur plurimi, qui a praevaricatione Adae docerentur alieni.
II. 202. Julian. And on this account it is established that he said nothing of the sin of transmission; and although these arguments were copious for proving that the Apostle thought nothing of a natural sin—which cannot exist and is invented by the Manicheans—nevertheless out of abundance he impressed also a distinction: that not absolutely all were polluted by the transgression of Adam, since even among those over whom destruction reigned for their iniquity, very many would be found who are taught to be free of the transgression of Adam.
JulianImp.2.202Augustinus. Calumniose, linguose: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est , qui dixit, Manichaeus non fuit, sed sicut vestri doctoris ore laudatur, inter scriptores ecclesiasticos flos quidam speciosus enituit. Quomodo autem dicis non omnes Adae praevaricatione pollutos et, quod peius est, Apostolo imputas, quod tu insipienter sapis? Cum ille dicat: Regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen et in eos, qui non peccaverunt, volens intellegi parvulos, qui nulla propria peccata fecerunt, et addat: in similitudine praevaricationis Adae ostendens, cur in eos regnaverit mors, quod iam superius satis egimus. Quomodo enim per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors , si in aliquos ad hoc unius hominis peccatum non pertinentes regnavit tamen mors? In quos enim mors regnavit, pertinent ad peccatum, per quod intravit; qui vero ad peccatum, per quod mors intravit, non pertinent, quo iusto iudicio ad mortem pertinent? Non autem pertinent ad peccatum, quod per unum hominem intravit in mundum, qui non in praevaricationis / CSEL 315/ illius similitudine peccaverunt, sicut ipse dixisti; non igitur in eos regnavit mors. Quid est ergo: Regnavit mors etiam in eos, qui non peccaverunt in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, nisi quia regnavit mors et in eos, qui non peccaverunt, quoniam nulla peccata propria commiserunt? Regnavit autem in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, quia licet nulla ipsi propria peccata commiserint, pertinent tamen ad peccatum, per quod mors intravit in mundum, trahentes similitudinem praevaricationis, non praevaricationem peccato proprio perpetrando, sed de praevaricatore, per quem natura humana tota est vitiata, nascendo.
Augustine. Slanderously, glib-tongued one: he who said, We are all born under sin, whose very origin is in fault (See Ambrose, Defense of the Prophet David 11.56), was not a Manichean, but, as he is praised by the mouth of your own teacher, shone forth among the ecclesiastical writers as a kind of beautiful flower. But how do you say that not all were polluted by the transgression of Adam and—what is worse—impute to the Apostle what you unwisely think you know? When he says: Death reigned from Adam until Moses even over those who did not sin—wanting the little ones understood, who made no proper sins—and adds: in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, showing why death reigned over them, which we have already sufficiently dealt with above. For how did through one man sin enter into the world and through sin death (Rom 5:12), if death nevertheless reigned over some not pertaining to the sin of this one man? For those over whom death reigned pertain to the sin through which it entered; but those who do not pertain to the sin through which death entered—by what just judgment do they pertain to death? Now those who did not sin in the likeness of that transgression, as you yourself said, do not pertain to the sin which through one man entered into the world; therefore death did not reign over them. What, then, is this: Death reigned even over those who did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, except that death reigned even over those who did not sin, since they committed no proper sins? But it reigned in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, because, although they themselves committed no proper sins, they nevertheless pertain to the sin through which death entered into the world, drawing the likeness of the transgression—not by perpetrating transgression by a proper sin, but by being born of the transgressor, through whom the whole of human nature was corrupted.
JulianImp.2.202II. 203. Iulianus. Vide ergo, utrum adhuc dubium vel tibi debeat esse, quod dicimus innocentes videlicet ante propriae voluntatis usum, rude opus Dei, non peccasse in Adam, quando Apostolo teste etiam de iniquis, qui in similitudine praevaricationis Adae non deliquerint, plurimi esse doceantur.
II. 203. Julian. See, then, whether what we say ought still to be doubtful even to you—namely, that the innocent, before the use of their own will, the raw work of God, did not sin in Adam—when, on the Apostle's testimony, even among the wicked very many are taught to be those who did not offend in the likeness of the transgression of Adam.
JulianImp.2.203Augustinus. Iam responsum est. Opus est ut taceas; nam non potes nisi perversa dicere conando Apostoli verba pervertere. Ille enim et in eos, qui non peccaverunt, id est parvulos peccata propria non habentes, dixit tamen regnasse mortem in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, qui est forma futuri, quia ita Christus traicit in eos iustitiam, sicut Adam peccatum; ita Christus vitam, sicut Adam mortem. Alioquin a forma Christi alieni erunt et Christiani non erunt; quod quidem sentitis, sed aperte dicere formidatis.
Augustine. It has already been answered. It is necessary that you keep silent; for you can say nothing but perverse things in trying to pervert the words of the Apostle. For he said that death reigned even over those who did not sin—that is, the little ones not having proper sins—nevertheless in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, who is the pattern of him who was to come, because Christ so passes righteousness into them as Adam passes sin; so Christ passes life, as Adam death. Otherwise they will be foreign to the pattern of Christ and will not be Christians; which indeed you hold, but you dread to say it openly.
JulianImp.2.203II. 204. Iulianus. Sed videamus et cetera. Sed non sicut delictum ita gratia; si enim in unius delicto multi mortui sunt, multo magis gratia Dei et donum in gratia unius hominis Iesu Christi in plures abundavit . Superari dicit malum delicti copia gratiae et eorum qui salvantur numerum illis, quos praevaricatione perisse asserit, anteponit.
II. 204. Julian. But let us see the rest as well. But the gift is not as the offense; for if by the offense of one many have died, much more the grace of God and the gift, in the grace of one man, Jesus Christ, has abounded unto many (Rom 5:15). He says that the evil of the offense is overcome by the abundance of grace, and he sets the number of those who are saved before those whom he asserts to have perished by transgression.
JulianImp.2.204Augustinus. Iam saepe diximus: non ait plures, sed multos, nec magis multos, sed magis abundavit, quoniam in aeternum victuri sunt, in quos transiit vita Christi, quibus ad tempus nocuit mors in eos transiens per Adam; ecce quomodo multo magis in eos abundavit gratia quam peccatum.
Augustine. We have already often said: he does not say 'more,' but many, nor 'more numerous,' but has abounded more, since those into whom the life of Christ has passed are going to live for eternity, while the death passing into them through Adam harmed them for a time; see how grace abounded over them much more than sin.
JulianImp.2.204II. 205. Iulianus. Si veritatem Apostoli verbis vindicas nec eum impudenter putas fuisse mentitum, doce, quemadmodum de naturali peccato dicenti haec sententia non incutiat publicae falsitatis pudorem. Nam si esset originale peccatum, quod omnem omnino naturam hominum ad ius diaboli faceret pertinere, qui erat locus ad aequiparandum partium numerum, eorum videlicet qui salvantur, et illorum qui intereunt? In Evangelio Dominus, cum beatorum ostenderet raritatem: Quam arta et angusta - inquit - via, quae ducit ad vitam, et pauci sunt, qui inveniunt eam! Quam lata et spatiosa via, quae ducit ad perditionem, et multi sunt, qui intrant per eam!
II. 205. Julian. If you vindicate truth for the words of the Apostle, and do not think that he shamelessly lied, teach how, when he is speaking of natural sin, this sentence does not strike him with the shame of public falsehood. For if there were an original sin which made absolutely all the nature of human beings pertain to the right of the devil, what room was there for matching the number of the parts—namely of those who are saved and of those who perish? In the Gospel the Lord, when he showed the rarity of the blessed, said: How strait and narrow is the way that leads to life, and few are those who find it! How broad and spacious is the way that leads to perdition, and many are those who enter through it! (Matt 7:13-14)
JulianImp.2.205Augustinus. Hoc est, quo sensus iste vester evertitur, quoniam pauci sunt, qui salvantur, in eorum comparatione, qui pereunt ; nam sine illorum comparatione per se ipsos etiam ipsi multi sunt; eorum quippe multitudinem dicit Apocalypsis numerare neminem posse . Ideo Paulus si eos non multos, sed plures dixisset, non possemus eos dicere pauciores; verbum enim comparationis est plures, quod verbum vos supponitis, non Apostolus ponit. Sed nec sic vobis ratio constabit; vestra quippe illa imitatio, quam vobis videmini velut acute invenisse contra verborum apostolicorum clarissimam veritatem, ut non per generationem, sed per imitationem peccatores omnes ad peccatum primi hominis pertinere credantur, multo plures unius delicto vel ob unius delictum perire affirmat quam gratia unius hominis Iesu Christi liberari. Quis enim non videat peccatores plures esse quam iustos? Quos peccatores non aliquos, sed omnes, non quidem per generationem, sed tamen per imitationem ad unius delictum dicitis pertinere. Sed etsi non omnes peccatores, sed tantum praevaricatores legis peccato primi hominis per imitationis vinculum dicatis obstrictos, etiam sic, ex quo lex Dei per multas gentes praedicatur, quam lata et spatiosa via est, quae ducit in interitum, et multi praevaricatores ingrediuntur per illam! Quam arta et angusta via est, quae ducit ad vitam, et pauci sunt, qui inveniunt eam, in comparatione utique multorum, qui pereunt, etiamsi paucis, qui liberantur, et parvuli, qui baptizati moriuntur, addantur. Quomodo ergo Apostolus diceret: Multo magis gratia Dei in plures abundavit? Quod vos dicitis, ille non dixit; sed ille dixit: Multo magis abundavit in multos, quia etiam, qui salvantur, ut iam dictum est, in comparatione pereuntium pauci, sine comparatione autem illorum tam multi sunt, ut eos quisquam numerare non possit. Multo magis autem in eos abundat gratia, quia temporaliter per Adam misere atque mortaliter vivunt, per Christum vero beatissime et sine fine victuri sunt. Turbata est vestra inventio, iam tandem intentio corrigatur.
Augustine. This is the very thing by which that view of yours is overturned, since few are those who are saved in comparison with those who perish; for without comparison with those, even these themselves are many; for the Apocalypse says that no one can number their multitude (See Rev 7:9). Therefore, if Paul had said not 'many' but 'more,' we could not call them fewer; for 'more' is a word of comparison, which word you substitute, not the Apostle. But not even so will your reasoning hold; for that imitation of yours, which you seem to yourselves to have cleverly invented against the most clear truth of the apostolic words—so that all sinners are believed to pertain to the sin of the first man not by generation but by imitation—affirms that far more perish by the offense of one, or on account of the offense of one, than are freed by the grace of the one man Jesus Christ. For who does not see that sinners are more numerous than the righteous? Whom—not some sinners, but all—you say pertain to the offense of the one, not indeed by generation, but yet by imitation. But even if you say that not all sinners, but only the transgressors of the law, are bound to the sin of the first man by the bond of imitation, even so, from the time the law of God is preached among many nations, how broad and spacious is the way that leads to destruction, and many transgressors enter through it! How strait and narrow is the way that leads to life, and few are those who find it (Matt 7:13-14)—in comparison surely with the many who perish, even if to the few who are freed are added the little ones who die baptized. How, then, would the Apostle say: Much more the grace of God has abounded unto more? What you say, he did not say; but he said: Much more it has abounded unto many, because even those who are saved, as has already been said, are few in comparison with those who perish, but without comparison with them are so many that no one can number them. But grace abounds over them much more, because temporally they live miserably and mortally through Adam, but through Christ they are going to live most blessedly and without end. Your invention is in confusion; let your intention at last be corrected.
JulianImp.2.205II. 206. Iulianus. Hoc nempe, quod dicitis multos et paucos, ad quantitatem infinitam pertinet, quoniam in comparatione mutua aut multitudo invenitur aut paucitas; conferens itaque Dominus multitudini pereuntium eos qui salvandi sunt, paucos eos vocavit; et hic Apostolus conferens his, qui ita peccassent ut Adam, illos, quos salvat Christi gratia, multo plures esse pronuntiat.
II. 206. Julian. This very thing, which you call 'many' and 'few,' pertains to infinite quantity, since in mutual comparison either a multitude or a fewness is found; and so the Lord, comparing those who are to be saved with the multitude of those who perish, called them few; and here the Apostle, comparing those whom the grace of Christ saves with those who had sinned like Adam, declares them to be far more numerous.
JulianImp.2.206Augustinus. Non pronuntiat " plures ", sed " multos ". Graece locutus est: polloùs dixit, non " pleisous "; lege et tace.
Augustine. He does not declare them 'more,' but 'many.' He spoke in Greek: he said pollous, not pleionas; read, and keep silent.
JulianImp.2.206II. 207. Iulianus. Assere ergo hoc peccato Manichaeorum id est traducis convenire.
II. 207. Julian. Assert, then, that this fits the sin of the Manicheans, that is, transmission.
JulianImp.2.207Augustinus. Doctores catholici, non Manichaei deceptores dixerunt omnes in Adam peccasse; illi hoc dixerunt, qui intellexerunt Apostolum, quod vos negatis contra Apostolum. Ergo et vos deceptores estis; et vos enim sicut Manichaei, sed diverso morbo, insanitis.
Augustine. It was the catholic Doctors, not the Manichean deceivers, who said that all sinned in Adam; those said this who understood the Apostle, which you deny against the Apostle. Therefore you too are deceivers; for you too, like the Manicheans, though with a different disease, are insane.
JulianImp.2.207II. 208. Iulianus. Nam si universitatem, quam fecunditas humana protulit, regno diaboli peccatum naturale transcripsit et inde in extrema aetate mundi aliqui liberati per Christum putantur, quae veritas est aut quae auctoritas eius Magistri, qui contra tam clarum testimonium totius mundi dicit in plures iustitiam abundasse quam culpam? Quid ergo ei creditur de involutis dogmatibus disserenti, si de rebus tam perspicuis mentiatur? Quod quia sentire sacrilegium est, id autem dici dogma tuum compulit, honore Apostoli Manichaeorum vilitas conteratur.
II. 208. Julian. For if natural sin transferred to the reign of the devil the whole that human fruitfulness brought forth, and thence, in the last age of the world, some are thought to be freed through Christ, what truth is there, or what authority of that Teacher, who against so clear a testimony of the whole world says that righteousness abounded unto more than fault did? What, then, is believed of him when he discourses on involved doctrines, if he lies about things so plain? And since to hold this is sacrilege, but your teaching has compelled this to be said, let the vileness of the Manicheans be crushed by the honor of the Apostle.
JulianImp.2.208Augustinus. Vos potius perspicua nubilare contenditis non solum non intellegendo, quod Apostolus dixit, verum etiam mutando et supponendo, quod ille non dixit; plures enim non dixit ille, sed multos, qui tamen multi pauci inveniuntur, quando pereuntibus comparantur. Calumniose, frontose, verbose, hoc dixit Apostolus, quod intellexit Ambrosius, qui non erat Manichaeus: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est . Audi, sicut eum laudavit magister tuus, florem speciosum, et de tuo corde istam spinarum deformitatem hoc est foeda acumina improbae contentionis evelle.
Augustine. It is rather you who contend to cloud over the plain things, not only by not understanding what the Apostle said, but even by changing and substituting what he did not say; for he did not say 'more,' but 'many,' who nevertheless, though many, are found to be few when they are compared with those who perish. Slanderously, brazenly, wordily—the Apostle said what Ambrose understood, who was not a Manichean: We are all born under sin, whose very origin is in fault (See Ambrose, Defense of the Prophet David 11.56). Hear—as your teacher praised him—the beautiful flower, and pluck out of your heart that deformity of thorns, that is, the foul sharp points of wicked contention.
JulianImp.2.208II. 209. Iulianus. Non mentitur Apostolus; ergo in plures abundavit Christi gratia quam Adae culpa, cuius imitatione dicuntur peccasse, qui sub lege peccaverunt; sub lege autem usque ad Christum Iudaei tantummodo deliquerunt. Confer ergo Iudaicam nationem solam perfectae dumtaxat aetatis sub lege positam et per hoc in similitudine praevaricationis Adae peccantem, qui accepta lege peccavit, ac de multitudine vocatarum Gentium per praedicationem Evangelii eorum millia, qui gratiae sunt liberalitate salvati, tuncque intelleges apostolum Paulum vere pronuntiasse ad plures gratiam Dei et donum Iesu Christi pervenisse quam societatem praevaricationis antiquae.
II. 209. Julian. The Apostle does not lie; therefore the grace of Christ abounded unto more than the fault of Adam, by whose imitation those are said to have sinned who sinned under the law; but under the law, until Christ, only the Jews offended. Compare, then, the Jewish nation alone—set under the law at least at the age of maturity, and thereby sinning in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, who sinned having received a law—with the thousands, out of the multitude of the called Gentiles, who through the preaching of the Gospel are saved by the liberality of grace, and then you will understand that the apostle Paul truly declared that the grace of God and the gift of Jesus Christ reached more than the fellowship of the ancient transgression did.
JulianImp.2.209Augustinus. Cum Apostolus invenitur non " plures " dixisse, sed " multos ", tui huius argumenti machina tota subvertitur, quamvis non soli Iudaei, sicut tibi placet, sed omnes praevaricatores esse reperiantur, qui legem cum ipso Evangelio praedicatam praevaricando damnabiliores fiunt; qualibus praevaricatoribus simul cum Iudaeis ita plenus est mundus, ut in omnium comparatione sint pauci, qui parvulis quoque baptizatis additis liberantur; quod et responsione superiore comprehendi. Evidenter contra vos clamat Doctor Gentium: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita in Christo omnes vivificabuntur , qui omnes non pauci, sed multi sunt. Ac per hoc multi moriuntur in Adam, multi vivificabuntur in Christo, sed plures moriuntur in Adam, quam in Christo vivificabuntur; plures itaque ad illius mortem, ad huius vero vitam comparatione illorum pertinent pauciores, sed etiam ipsorum per se ipsos ea est multitudo, quam numerare nemo possit . Quid est ergo: Omnes in Christo vivificabuntur, nisi quia nemo vivificabitur nisi in illo? Cuius rei similitudinem de magistro posui litterarum, si unus sit in civitate, a quo ibi dicantur omnes litteras discere, non quia omnes discunt, sed quia nemo nisi ab ipso . Quam locutionem nec tentasti refellere, quia vidisti esse rectissimam et omnibus notam.
Augustine. Since the Apostle is found to have said not 'more' but 'many,' the whole machine of this argument of yours is overthrown—although not the Jews alone, as it pleases you, but all are found to be transgressors who, by transgressing the law that is preached together with the Gospel itself, become the more damnable; with such transgressors, along with the Jews, the world is so full that, in comparison with them all, few are those who are freed, even when the baptized little ones too are added—which I also covered in my earlier reply. The Teacher of the Gentiles plainly cries out against you: As in Adam all die, so in Christ all will be made alive (1 Cor 15:22)—which 'all' are not few, but many. And on this account many die in Adam, many will be made alive in Christ, but more die in Adam than will be made alive in Christ; more therefore pertain to the death of the former, while to the life of the latter pertain fewer in comparison with them—but even of these themselves there is, in themselves, such a multitude that no one can number them. What, then, is all will be made alive in Christ, except that no one will be made alive except in him? A likeness of which thing I set forth from a teacher of letters: if there be one in a city, all there are said to learn their letters from him, not because all learn, but because none learn except from him. Which manner of speaking you did not even try to refute, because you saw it was most correct and known to all.
JulianImp.2.209II. 210. Iulianus. Exposita liberalitate gratiae in hominum salvatorum copia comparat donum atque peccatum et eruditissime ad laudem doni applicat, quod multis vulneribus una virtute medicetur: Et non sicut per unum - inquit - peccatum ita et donum.
II. 210. Julian. Having set forth the liberality of grace in the abundance of the men who are saved, he compares the gift and the sin, and most learnedly applies to the praise of the gift the fact that it heals many wounds by one power: And not as through one, he says, sin, so also is the gift.
JulianImp.2.210Augustinus. Per unum peccantem dixit, non: Per unum peccatum, ut quod deinde dicit: Iudicium ex uno delicto in condemnationem , nonnisi illius unius peccantis hoc delictum possit intellegi, quod quidem vos non vultis; sed quid facturi estis, quandoquidem hoc dixit Apostolus etiam nolentibus vobis? Corrigimini ergo; non enim habetis hic aliud, quod facere debeatis.
Augustine. He said through one who sinned, not: Through one sin, so that what he then says, The judgment from one offense unto condemnation (Rom 5:16), can be understood only of the offense of that one who sinned—which indeed you do not want; but what will you do, since the Apostle said this even against your will? Be corrected, then; for here you have nothing else that you ought to do.
JulianImp.2.210II. 211. Iulianus. Nam iudicium ex uno in condemnationem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem , id est: peccata quidem, quae gravia sunt, etiam singula possunt sufficere ad accusationem et ad damnationem reorum.
II. 211. Julian. For the judgment from one unto condemnation, but grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16)—that is: sins indeed which are grave, even single ones, can suffice for the accusation and condemnation of the guilty.
JulianImp.2.211Augustinus. Quare dixisti gravia, quod non dixit Apostolus, nisi quia vidisti, si unum delictum leve sit, non sufficere ad damnationem, de qua loquebatur? Non ergo ex quocumque uno cuiuscumque delicto est hoc iudicium, sed ex uno illo delicto, quod factum est per unum peccantem, id est Adam, iudicium est in condemnationem. Et adhuc pervertere recta verba Apostoli vultis, ne vestra, quae perversa sunt, corrigatis?
Augustine. Why did you say 'grave,' which the Apostle did not say, except because you saw that, if one offense were light, it would not suffice for the condemnation of which he was speaking? This judgment, then, is not from any one offense whatever of anyone whatever, but from that one offense which was committed through one who sinned, that is, Adam—the judgment is unto condemnation. And do you still want to pervert the straight words of the Apostle, rather than correct your own, which are perverse?
JulianImp.2.211II. 212. Iulianus. Gratia autem non eodem confertur modo, ut peccatis aeque admota singulis crebro repetatur; sed infusa semel uno virtutis suae impetu atque compendio diversa et plurima delet crimina. Ideo ait: Ex multis delictis in iustificationem , id est ex multis delictis liberatos homines ad gloriam perducit iustificationis indultae. Non ergo hic unum Adae peccatum, ut suspicaris, intellegit, sed ad hoc solum numerum admovit unius et plurium, ut ad laudem gratiae respiceret, quia non quoties peccatum ab unoquoque mortalium fuerat, totiens etiam frequentaretur gratia, quasi baptismata singula nisi peccatis singulis non possint mederi.
II. 212. Julian. But grace is not conferred in the same way, so as to be often repeated, applied equally to single sins; rather, poured in once, it wipes out diverse and very many crimes by one impetus and compendium of its power. Therefore he says: From many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16)—that is, it leads men, freed from many offenses, to the glory of the justification granted. He does not, then, here understand the one sin of Adam, as you suspect, but applied the number of one and of more only to this end—that he might look to the praise of grace, because grace was not repeated as often as sin had been committed by each mortal, as though single baptisms could heal nothing but single sins.
JulianImp.2.212Augustinus. Ita hoc loqueris, quasi dixerit Apostolus: Gratia autem semel ex multis delictis in iustificationem; non hoc dixit. Attende quod dixit, et corrige quod dixisti. Gratia - inquit - ex multis delictis in iustificationem. Quid huc pertinet, quod semel et simul unicuique omnia dimittuntur in baptismo? Nonne et illa condemnatio, ad quam iudicium perducit extremum, procul dubio semel fit omnium quae remissa non fuerint peccatorum? Et magis ipsa damnatio semel quam remissio peccatorum per gratiam Christi semel fit, quoniam, si post baptismum quisque peccaverit, non eadem sunt peccata, sed per eamdem gratiam peccantibus remittuntur, non semel nec septies, sed etiam septuagies septies . Eadem gratia quotidie dimittit orantibus etiam quotidiana peccata, cum dicunt: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, veraciter addentes: sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris . Gratia ergo ex multis delictis sive singula in singulis sive in quibusdam pauca, in quibusdam plurima invenerit, sive quae ante baptismum, sive quae postea committuntur et paenitendo orando eleemosynas dando sanantur, in iustificationem mittit, quos a damnatione liberat; haec enim omnia ipsa sunt multa, ex quibus multis iustificat gratia. Quae si non subveniat, profecto etiam ex uno delicto, non quod proprium quisque committit, hoc enim loco non inde loquebatur Apostolus, sed quod per unum peccantem intravit in mundum, itur in damnationem; hoc enim Apostolus evidentissime expressit. Neque enim ait sicut tu: Non sicut per unum peccatum, tamquam singulum cuiusque volens intellegi, sed ait: Non sicut per unum peccantem . Aperi oculos et lege et noli tamquam caecis aliud pro alio velle supponere.
Augustine. You speak this as though the Apostle had said: But grace once from many offenses unto justification; he did not say this. Attend to what he said, and correct what you said. Grace, he says, from many offenses unto justification. What does it pertain to this, that all sins are forgiven to each one at once and together in baptism? Is not that condemnation too, to which the last judgment leads, without doubt done once, of all the sins that have not been remitted? And that very damnation is done once rather than the remission of sins through the grace of Christ is done once, since, if anyone sins after baptism, they are not the same sins, but are remitted to those who sin through the same grace—not once nor seven times, but even seventy times seven (See Matt 18:22). The same grace daily forgives to those who pray even their daily sins, when they say, Forgive us our debts, truly adding, as we also forgive our debtors (Matt 6:12). Grace, then, from many offenses—whether it finds single sins in single persons, or in some few, in others very many, whether those committed before baptism or those committed afterward and healed by repenting, praying, and giving alms—sends unto justification those whom it frees from damnation; for all these are themselves the 'many' from which grace justifies. And if this grace does not come to the aid, then surely even from the one offense—not the one each commits as his own, for in this passage the Apostle was not speaking of that, but the one which through one who sinned entered into the world—one goes into damnation; for this the Apostle most evidently expressed. For he does not say, as you do: Not as through one sin, as if wanting the single sin of each understood, but he says: Not as through one who sinned. Open your eyes and read, and do not, as though to the blind, want to substitute one thing for another.
JulianImp.2.212II. 213. Iulianus. Sed hoc curavit exprimere: Cum, inquit, peccata singula reos suos lethaliter vulnerassent, innumerabiliter confossos homines haec gratia singulari et semel tradita virtute salvavit.
II. 213. Julian. But he took care to express this: When, he says, single sins had wounded their own guilty ones mortally, this grace, by one power handed on once, saved men pierced through innumerable times.
JulianImp.2.213Augustinus. Per unum peccantem , dixit, ubi Adam intellegitur, non per unum peccatum, ubi tu verbo mutato atque supposito vis intellegi singula singulorum.
Augustine. He said through one who sinned, where Adam is understood, not through one sin, where you, with the word changed and substituted, want the single sins of single persons understood.
JulianImp.2.213II. 214. Iulianus. Si enim ob unius delictum mors regnavit per unum, multo magis, qui abundantiam gratiae et donum iustitiae accipiunt, in vita regnabunt per unum Iesum Christum . Consequenter, quod coepit, affirmat; duas enim posuit sententias utrique volens convenire, quod in fine subiunxit. Per unum enim, qui fuit forma peccati et in cuius similitudine praevaricantur sub lege peccantes, pronuntiat regnare mortem, et per unum regnare in vita abundantiam quosque gratiae consecutos, quae gratia virtutem imitantibus prodest. Non remansit ergo de uno quaestio, quia hoc, quod subditum est eos videlicet in vita regnare, qui abundantiam gratiae perceperint, etiam primum illud absolvit, ut nemo videlicet cogatur in mortem, nisi qui exemplum peccantis adamaverit.
II. 214. Julian. For if by the offense of one death reigned through one, much more those who receive the abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness will reign in life through the one Jesus Christ (Rom 5:17). He consequently affirms what he began; for he set down two sentences, wanting what he subjoined at the end to fit both. For he declares that through one—who was the pattern of sin and in whose likeness those sinning under the law transgress—death reigns, and that through one all who have obtained the abundance of grace reign in life, which grace profits those who imitate virtue. There remained, then, no question about the 'one,' because what is subjoined—namely, that those reign in life who have received the abundance of grace—settles also that first point, namely, that no one is forced into death except one who has fallen in love with the example of the one who sinned.
JulianImp.2.214Augustinus. Cuius exemplum peccantis adamaverit? Nempe primi hominis; hunc enim formam dicis esse peccati propter imitationem, non propter generationem; proinde sicut dicis: Nemo in mortem cogitur, nisi qui exemplum peccantis huius adamaverit, non ergo coguntur in mortem, qui non in similitudine praevaricationis eius, sicut existimas, peccaverunt. Quomodo ergo dicis mortem regnasse et in eos, qui peccaverunt quidem per liberum arbitrium, sed non in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, quia sine lege peccaverunt? Non itaque peccaverunt eius exemplo, quoniam non peccantes in similitudine praevaricationis eius non exemplum peccantis amaverunt; quantum enim ab hac similitudine peccantis huius, tantum ab imitatione exempli huius alieni sunt. Cum igitur et in eos regnaverit mors, quid est quod dicis: Ut nemo cogatur in mortem, nisi qui exemplum peccantis adamaverit, eius videlicet, quem propter imitationem formam vis fuisse peccati? Ecce non amaverunt peccantis exemplum, qui non in praevaricationis eius similitudinem peccaverunt, et tamen etiam in eos regnavit mors. An vis redire ad catholicam veritatem, ut in eos quoque mortem regnasse fatearis, qui non peccaverunt propria non faciendo peccata, sed regnum mortis in similitudine praevaricationis eius, de cuius stirpe sunt nati, tamquam haereditario miseriae iure subierunt? Sic quippe intellexerunt haec apostolica verba Doctores Ecclesiae, qui viderunt ea non posse recte intellegi, nisi in eis intellegatur obnoxiae successionis origo peccati; propter quod dixerunt parvulos secundum Adam carnaliter natos contagium mortis antiquae prima nativitate contrahere , nec Manichaei fuerunt, sed vos Pelagianos Dei spiritu, qui per eos locutus est, damnaverunt.
Augustine. Whose example, the example of which sinner, has he fallen in love with? Surely the first man's; for you say this man is the pattern of sin on account of imitation, not on account of generation; accordingly, just as you say, No one is forced into death except one who has fallen in love with the example of this sinner, then those are not forced into death who did not sin in the likeness of his transgression, as you reckon. How, then, do you say that death reigned even over those who sinned indeed by free choice, but not in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, because they sinned without the law? They did not sin, then, by his example, since those not sinning in the likeness of his transgression did not love the example of the one who sinned; for as far as they are foreign from this likeness of this sinner, so far are they foreign from the imitation of this example. Since, then, death reigned even over them, what is this that you say: That no one is forced into death except one who has fallen in love with the example of the one who sinned—of him, namely, whom on account of imitation you want to have been the pattern of sin? See, those who did not sin in the likeness of his transgression did not love the example of the one who sinned, and yet death reigned even over them. Or do you want to return to catholic truth, so as to confess that death reigned even over those who did not sin by not making proper sins, but underwent the reign of death in the likeness of the transgression of him from whose stock they are born, as if by a hereditary right of misery? For thus did the Doctors of the Church understand these apostolic words, who saw that they cannot be rightly understood unless in them the origin of sin by liable succession is understood; on which account they said that the little ones, born carnally according to Adam, contract by their first birth the contagion of the ancient death—nor were they Manicheans, but they condemned you Pelagians by the Spirit of God, who spoke through them.
JulianImp.2.214II. 215. Iulianus. Vita autem, in qua regnaturi sunt sancti, aeterna monstratur; ergo et mors, quae iniquitatem voluntariam sequitur, aeterna credatur. Itaque sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines in condemnationem, sic et per unius iustitiam in omnes homines in iustificationem vitae. Sicut enim per unius inoboedientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi, ita et per unius oboedientiam iusti constituentur multi . Omnis est soluta perplexitas, impudenter de universitate calumnia concitatur, ineptissime in scirpo nodus quaeritur. Pronuntiat Apostolus non omnes esse, sed multos, qui per inoboedientiam primi hominis peccata didicissent, et multos esse, non omnes, qui per alterius oboedientiam iustitiam essent adepti. Nihil hic de exortu humanitatis agitur, mores in diversis studiis publicantur; inoboedientia et oboedientia studiorum operam, non generationis ostendit. Certe ubi opportunius, si quid secundum te saperet Apostolus, pronuntiaret omnes ad condemnationem ire nascendo, paucos autem ad vitam credendo quam in hoc loco, ubi summa disputationis complenda erat? Debuit enim dicere: Sicut per inoboedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt omnes, immo non per inoboedientiam, sed sicut per generationem primi hominis peccatores nati sunt omnes, ita et per unius oboedientiam iusti constituentur multi.
II. 215. Julian. But the life in which the saints are to reign is shown to be eternal; therefore let the death too, which follows voluntary iniquity, be believed eternal. And so, as through the offense of one upon all human beings unto condemnation, so also through the righteousness of one upon all human beings unto justification of life. For as through the disobedience of one many were made sinners, so also through the obedience of one many will be made righteous (Rom 5:18-19). All the perplexity is solved; the calumny about universality is shamelessly stirred up; most ineptly is a knot sought in a bulrush. The Apostle declares that they are not all, but many, who had learned sins through the disobedience of the first man, and that they are many, not all, who had attained righteousness through the obedience of the other. Nothing here is treated of the rise of humanity; morals are made public in their diverse pursuits; disobedience and obedience show the work of pursuits, not of generation. Surely, where would the Apostle more opportunely declare—if he thought anything according to you—that all go to condemnation by being born, but few to life by believing, than in this passage, where the summit of the disputation was to be completed? For he ought to have said: As through the disobedience of one man all were made sinners—nay, not through disobedience, but as through the generation of the first man all were born sinners, so also through the obedience of one many will be made righteous.
JulianImp.2.215Augustinus. Immo debuit dicere: Sicut per inoboedientiam suam peccatores constituti sunt multi, ita per oboedientiam suam iusti constituentur multi, aut si imitationem, quam vos in magnis angustiis constituti et persequente veritate coartati invenisse vos putatis, qua exire possetis, hoc loco ille commendare voluisset, debuit dicere: Sicut per imitationem inoboedientiae unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi, ita et per imitationem oboedientiae unius hominis iusti constituentur multi. Ecce et ego dixi, quomodo debuerit Apostolus loqui, si hoc vellet dicere, quod vos dicitis; ne putes aliquid magnum esse pro voluntate nostra verba componere, non auctoris voluntatem in verbis eius exponere. Dixit ergo per inoboedientiam unius hominis, quem generationis principem noverat, peccatores constitutos esse multos, quoniam illa inoboedientia est natura humana vitiata, et per oboedientiam unius hominis, qui regenerationis est princeps, iustos constituti multos, quia illius oboedientia natura humana sanatur, qui factus est oboediens usque ad mortem crucis, ut iusti constituantur per eius gratiam, etiam qui non hic per suam conversationem iusti esse potuerunt sicut hi, qui continuo post lavacrum regenerationis exspirant sive grandioris sive infantilis aetatis . Unde maluit verbum futuri temporis ponere et constituentur dicere, non " constituti sunt ", quoniam iusti illa iustitia, quae sine ullo peccato erit, in futuri saeculi aeternitate victuri sunt. Cum autem de peccatoribus non dixit " constituentur ", sed constituti sunt, saeculum hoc, quod praeterit, ubi iam vitiata est humana natura, verbo temporis praeteriti expressit. Iam vero de multis, quia ipsi sunt omnes, satis tibi responsum est; tu autem, quos Apostolus dixit omnes, non potuisti nisi contradicendo exponere et dicendo: Non sunt omnes; ad quod te nulla necessitas cogeret, si catholicum quam Pelagianum sensum tenere maluisses; omnes enim propterea dicuntur et multi, ut discernantur ab eis, qui cum sint omnes, sunt tamen pauci.
Augustine. Rather he ought to have said: As through his own disobedience many were made sinners, so through his own obedience many will be made righteous; or, if he had wanted to commend in this passage that imitation which you—set in great straits and hemmed in by the pursuing truth—think you have invented as a way out, he ought to have said: As through the imitation of the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so also through the imitation of the obedience of one man many will be made righteous. See, I too have said how the Apostle ought to have spoken if he wanted to say what you say; lest you think it any great thing to compose words according to our own will, instead of setting forth the author's will in his words. He said, then, that through the disobedience of one man, whom he knew to be the prince of generation, many were made sinners, since by that disobedience human nature was corrupted, and that through the obedience of one man, who is the prince of regeneration, many were made righteous, because by his obedience human nature is healed—he who was made obedient unto the death of the cross (See Phil 2:8)—so that they may be made righteous through his grace, even those who could not be righteous here by their own conduct, like those who breathe their last immediately after the washing of regeneration, whether of greater or of infant age. Whence he chose rather to set down a verb of the future tense and to say will be made, not 'have been made,' since they are going to live, by that righteousness which will be without any sin, in the eternity of the age to come. But when, concerning sinners, he did not say 'will be made' but have been made, he expressed by a verb of the past tense this age, which passes away, where human nature is already corrupted. Now indeed, about the 'many,' because they themselves are all, you have been answered enough; but you could not expound those whom the Apostle called 'all' except by contradicting and saying: They are not all—to which no necessity would force you, if you had preferred to hold the catholic sense rather than the Pelagian; for 'all' are also for this reason called 'many,' that they may be distinguished from those who, though they are all, are nevertheless few.
JulianImp.2.215II. 216. Iulianus. Quod si ita intulisset, non minus docebatur impia esse quam inepta sententia, qua et comparatio ipsa in diverso proposito personarum stolidissima doceretur, cum res non similes ad collationem venirent, natura videlicet et voluntas, ut in parte mali seminum necessitas poneretur, in parte vero boni studii sola libertas, immo iam non libertas, quoniam non suppetebat facultas eligendi boni et cavendi mali, si naturalis reatus fuisset. Dicit ergo Apostolus, sapiens et eruditus Ecclesiae Doctor, per inoboedientiam exstitisse transisseque peccatum multiplicarique iustitiam.
II. 216. Julian. But if he had brought it in thus, the sentence would be shown to be no less impious than inept, by which the very comparison, in the diverse proposing of persons, would be shown most stupid, since unlike things would come to be compared—namely nature and will—so that on the side of evil the necessity of seeds would be set, but on the side of good only the freedom of pursuit—nay, no longer freedom, since the faculty of choosing the good and avoiding the evil would not be at hand, if there were a natural guilt. The Apostle, then—a wise and learned Doctor of the Church—says that through disobedience sin came into being and passed over, and that righteousness is multiplied.
JulianImp.2.216Augustinus. Ubi est, quod dixeras non peccatum transisse sed mortem ? Ecce nunc dicis per inoboedientiam, quae unius hominis commemorata est, non solum exstitisse, verum etiam transisse peccatum; an quid prius dixeris, fortassis oblitus es? Gratulandum est oblivioni tuae, qua verum compelleris dicere. Nam quod tibi videtur in collatione contrariarum partium non debere ex una parte poni necessitatem seminis et ex altera studium voluntatis, stolidum esse reperires, si videres sic in mala parte illos, qui pertinent ad hominem primum, connexione generationis sine studio suae voluntatis peccati traxisse contagium, quemadmodum illi parvuli, qui pertinent ad hominem secundum, sine studio propriae voluntatis per pacem regenerationis iustitiae participes fiunt. Si autem semen ex utraque parte deposcis, sicut per Adam semen carnale vitiatum est, sic viget spiritale per Christum; quod semen insinuavit nobis Ioannes apostolus dicens: Et non potest peccare, quia semen eius in ipso manet . Quod in futuro saeculo bono potius apparebit, ubi qui erunt, peccare non poterunt, non in hoc saeculo maligno, ubi et hi, qui pertinent ad saeculum peccata non habiturum, habent unde quotidie petant a Patre veniam peccatorum.
Augustine. Where is what you had said, that not sin but death passed over? See, now you say that through disobedience, which was recalled as the disobedience of one man, sin not only came into being but also passed over; or have you perhaps forgotten what you said before? We must be thankful for your forgetfulness, by which you are compelled to say what is true. For as to what seems to you—that in the comparison of contrary sides the necessity of seed ought not to be set on one side and the pursuit of the will on the other—you would find it stupid if you saw that on the evil side those who pertain to the first man drew the contagion of sin by the connection of generation, without the pursuit of their own will, in just the way that those little ones who pertain to the second man are made partakers of righteousness, without the pursuit of their own will, through the peace of regeneration. But if you demand seed on both sides—just as through Adam the carnal seed was corrupted, so through Christ the spiritual seed flourishes; which seed the apostle John intimated to us, saying: And he cannot sin, because his seed remains in him (1 John 3:9). Which will rather appear in the good age to come, where those who will be there will not be able to sin—not in this malignant age, where even those who pertain to the age that will have no sins have something for which they daily beg pardon of their sins from the Father.
JulianImp.2.216II. 217. Iulianus. Ac per hoc destruit opinionem peccati naturalis et docet alias esse causas substantiae, alias voluntatis; ac ne intellegentia haec nostro magis imputetur ingenio quam apostolico dogmati, ea, quae huic loco addidit, audiamus: Lex autem subintravit - inquit - ut abundaret delictum, ubi autem abundavit peccatum, superabundavit gratia, ut sicut regnavit peccatum in mortem, ita gratia regnet per iustitiam in vitam aeternam per Iesum Christum, Dominum nostrum . Assere igitur, quemadmodum peccatum tuum id est traducis coeperit abundare post legem, quae post ministerium Moysi incrementa susceperit.
II. 217. Julian. And on this account he destroys the opinion of a natural sin and teaches that the causes of substance are one thing, those of will another; and lest this understanding be imputed to our own talent rather than to apostolic teaching, let us hear what he added to this passage: But the law entered in, he says, that the offense might abound; but where sin abounded, grace superabounded, so that, as sin reigned unto death, so grace might reign through righteousness unto eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 5:20-21). Assert, then, how your sin—that is, the sin of transmission—began to abound after the law, which received increases after the ministry of Moses.
JulianImp.2.217Augustinus. Immo tu assere, quomodo, sicut superius dixisti , regnum peccati lata lege ceciderit, cum dicat Apostolus lata lege abundasse peccatum. Ego autem quod dixi assero, quia, etsi non asseram, clarum est. Peccatum quippe originale fuit et ante legem, quia per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et cum illo mors per omnes homines pertransiit . Erat et voluntarium, quoniam qui sine lege peccaverunt, sine lege peribunt . Subintravit autem lex, ut abundaret peccatum , quia his generibus peccatorum, quae ante legem fuerunt, etiam illud accessit, quod praevaricatio nuncupatur. Ubi enim lex non est, nec praevaricatio . Ubi ergo his omnibus generibus peccatorum abundavit peccatum, superabundavit gratia , quia in his, qui ad eam pertinent, omnium istorum generum reatum delet et insuper donat, ut delectatio peccati iustitiae delectatione vincatur atque ad eam postea perveniatur vitam, ubi nullum erit omnino peccatum. Quomodo ergo res non similes in collationem venire non debent, sicut paulo ante dixisti, cum ex contrariis fiat ista collatio et ex una parte generatio ponatur et ex altera regeneratio, ex una regnum mortis, ex altera regnum vitae, ex una abundantia, ex altera remissio peccatorum, ex una delectatio peccati per naturae vitium usque ad consuetudinis malum, ex altera proelium contra concupiscentiam carnis per Sancti Spiritus adiutorium usque ad victoriae pacem, quae nullum intrinsecus, nullum extrinsecus patietur inimicum? Haec tene, si vis sanus esse, et noli contra haec, quae ad sanam doctrinam pertinent, insanire.
Augustine. Rather, you assert how—as you said above—the reign of sin fell when the law was promulgated, when the Apostle says that when the law was promulgated sin abounded. But I assert what I said, because, even if I did not assert it, it is clear. For original sin existed even before the law, because through one man sin entered into the world, and with it death passed to all human beings (Rom 5:12). There was voluntary sin too, since those who sinned without the law will perish without the law (Rom 2:12). But the law entered in, that sin might abound (Rom 5:20), because to those kinds of sins which existed before the law there was added also that which is named transgression. For where there is no law, neither is there transgression (Rom 4:15). Where, then, in all these kinds of sins sin abounded, grace superabounded, because in those who pertain to it, it wipes out the guilt of all these kinds and furthermore gives the gift that the delight of sin may be conquered by the delight of righteousness, and that afterward one may come to that life where there will be no sin at all. How, then, ought unlike things not to come into comparison, as you said a little before, when this comparison is made from contraries—and on one side generation is set, on the other regeneration; on one the reign of death, on the other the reign of life; on one abundance of sins, on the other the remission of sins; on one the delight of sin, through the defect of nature, even unto the evil of habit; on the other the battle against the concupiscence of the flesh, through the help of the Holy Spirit, even unto the peace of victory, which will suffer no enemy within and none without? Hold these things, if you want to be sound, and do not rave against these things which pertain to sound doctrine.
JulianImp.2.217II. 218. Iulianus. Certe in his locis Apostolum de peccato naturali disseruisse contendis. Ad hoc supra dixerat usque ad legem fuisse, ut intellegeretur post legem esse desisse; nunc autem de eodem dicit, quod coeperit crescere et abundare post legem. Catholico intellectui, quem sequimur, utrumque hoc convenire monstravimus; tuo vero dogmati qua impudentia vindicatur, ut unum idemque peccatum lege lata superius quidem defecisse, nunc autem crevisse dicatur? Quomodo ergo post legem abundavit naturale peccatum? Acriusne coeperunt genitalia commoveri, ut de augmentis et novitate motuum peccato tuo virtus videatur adiuncta? An lex data nascentibus est, ut qui de libidine, quam dicis diabolicam esse et radicem fructumque peccati, geniti erant, admonerentur emendare quod facti erant, et gestum corrigere quem habuerant, cum eos generarent parentes? Cogerent postremo, quae facta erant, infecta esse, quod illi audire videlicet renuentes inoboedientiae crimen incurrerent? At hoc a nullo stultorum, nedum a lege, quam Deus dedit, poterat imputari.
II. 218. Julian. Surely in these passages you contend that the Apostle discoursed of a natural sin. To this end he had said above that it was until the law, so that it might be understood to have ceased after the law; but now he says of the same sin that it began to grow and abound after the law. We have shown that both of these fit the catholic understanding which we follow; but with what shamelessness is it vindicated for your teaching, that one and the same sin should be said both to have failed above when the law was promulgated and now to have grown? How, then, did natural sin abound after the law? Did the genitals begin to be stirred more sharply, so that from the increases and novelty of the movements power might seem added to your sin? Or was a law given to the newborn, so that those who had been begotten of the lust which you say is diabolical and the root and fruit of sin might be admonished to amend what they had been made, and to correct the act they had had when their parents begot them? Should, finally, what had been done be compelled to be undone—so that they, refusing, namely, to hear this, might incur the crime of disobedience? But this could be imputed by none of the foolish, much less by the law which God gave.
JulianImp.2.218Augustinus. Numquid alicubi diximus peccatum originale crevisse post legem? Aut hoc intellegi volumus in eo, quod ait Apostolus: Lex subintravit, ut abundaret delictum ? Abundavit enim, non quia illud genus crevit, quod ante iam fuerat, sed quia genus aliud peccati accessit, quod sine lege non erat, id est praevaricatio, sicut paulo ante monstravimus. Cuncupiscentia est autem carnis et libido genitalium, contra quam sanctorum castitas pugnat; hanc tibi multum placentem quoniam cum ipsa sua pugna, cui repugnat etiam pudicitia coniugalis nonnisi ad filios procreandos ea bene utens, aliis autem motibus eius obsistens, hanc ergo cum ista sua pugna quia etiam in paradisi pacem conaris admittere vel immittere, ipse in paradisum non disponis intrare. Quantalibet autem abs te defensione muniatur et laudibus adornetur, aut vitium est aut vitiata est nec immerito militibus Christi, a quibus debellatur, odiosa est; cum qua ipse colludis, ut eam et expugnare te dicas et laudare non erubescas. Per hanc humana, quae nascitur, caro peccati est; propter quod per illam nasci noluit ille, qui natus est in similitudine carnis peccati ac per hoc, quamvis in carne vera, non tamen in carne peccati; ex hac concupiscentia suscepta tua, tibi quidem pulchra nimis, sed foeda omnibus sanctis, generatione trahitur originalis peccati vinculum sola regeneratione solvendum. Illud factum est per Adam, hoc fit per Christum; illud, per quem peccatum intravit in mundum, hoc per eum, qui tollit peccatum mundi. Sic agnoscit Adam et Christum, qui ex Adam transiit ad Christum.
Augustine. Did we anywhere say that original sin grew after the law? Or do we want this understood in what the Apostle says: The law entered in, that the offense might abound (Rom 5:20)? For it abounded, not because that kind grew which had already existed before, but because another kind of sin was added, which did not exist without the law, that is, transgression, as we showed a little before. But the concupiscence of the flesh and the lust of the genitals, against which the chastity of the saints fights—this lust, which pleases you so much, since with its very own battle (which even conjugal modesty resists, using it well only for begetting children, but resisting its other movements)—this lust, then, with this battle of its own, because you try to admit or to introduce it even into the peace of paradise, you yourself do not dispose to enter paradise. But with however great a defense it may be fortified by you, and adorned with praises, it is either a defect or has been corrupted, and not undeservedly is it hateful to the soldiers of Christ, by whom it is warred down; with which you yourself play, so that you both say you fight it and are not ashamed to praise it. Through this, the human flesh that is born is the flesh of sin; on account of which he, who was born in the likeness of the flesh of sin (See Rom 8:3), did not want to be born through it; and on this account, though in true flesh, yet not in the flesh of sin. From this concupiscence of yours, received indeed as too beautiful to you, but foul to all the saints, the bond of original sin is drawn by generation, to be loosed only by regeneration. That was done through Adam, this is done through Christ; that through him by whom sin entered into the world, this through him who takes away the sin of the world (See John 1:29). So does he acknowledge Adam and Christ who has passed from Adam to Christ.
JulianImp.2.218II. 219. Iulianus. Quid ergo additum post legem est peccato naturali, quod quidem non solum prohibitum aut condemnatum, verum etiam nec leviter vituperatum aut tenuiter ostensum probatur in lege?
II. 219. Julian. What, then, was added after the law to natural sin, which indeed is proved in the law neither to be prohibited or condemned, nor even lightly censured or faintly shown?
JulianImp.2.219Augustinus. Ostenditur et in lege, sed si vobis auferatur velamen ; quid enim aliud ostenditur damnatione animae illius, qui octavo die non circumciditur ? Quid aliud ostenditur, quando infante nato sacrificium pro peccato iubetur offerri , quod iam supra memoravi?
Augustine. It is shown even in the law—but only if the veil is taken away from you (See 2 Cor 3:14-16); for what else is shown by the condemnation of the soul of him who is not circumcised on the eighth day (See Gen 17:14)? What else is shown when a sacrifice for sin is commanded to be offered for a newborn infant (See Lev 12:6-8), which I have already recalled above?
JulianImp.2.219II. 220. Iulianus. Certe ne tu quidem adeo desipis, ut dicas peccati traducem post circumcisionem factam esse maiorem; quomodo ergo abundavit post legem, quae nec arguitur in lege nec proditur? At hoc vide, quam sanae intellegentiae concinat, quae peccatum in sola delinquentis voluntate constituit. Usque ad legem dicit Apostolus fuisse peccatum, ut post legem intellegatur fuisse praevaricatio , promulgata videlicet praecepta transgrediens; atque hoc genere abundavit lege subintroeunte peccatum, quoniam reatui eius de praevaricatione crevit invidia, et opus malae voluntatis, sicut ante legem peccatum erat, ita post legem coepit esse transgressio, quamvis non eo proposito legem Deus tulerit, ut mortales fierent eius sanctione peiores. Neque enim lex peccatum aut causa peccati, sed mandatum sanctum et iustum et bonum . Verum quia delinquentium pravitas eo se ferro, quo curari debuit, vulneravit obstititque consilio Dei, ut inde periclitaretur, unde debuerat sanari, dicit Apostolus de effectu rerum opinionem divini consilii, quo data lex fuerat, iniuriam pertulisse; et quia non fuit is proventus emendationis humanae, in quem lator legis intenderat, sed in plurimis evenere contraria, eo usque ait profecisse studia peccantium, ut non ob aliud videretur data lex esse, quam ut improbi improbiores fierent et ad peccatum praevaricatio iungeretur.
II. 220. Julian. Surely not even you are so out of your senses as to say that the transmission of sin was made greater after circumcision was instituted; how, then, did it abound after the law, when it is neither charged in the law nor betrayed? But see how this agrees with the sound understanding which sets sin in the will of the offender alone. The Apostle says that until the law there was sin, so that after the law there might be understood to be transgression, namely transgressing the precepts now promulgated; and by this kind sin abounded when the law entered in, since the odium of its guilt grew from transgression, and the work of an evil will—as before the law it was sin, so after the law it began to be transgression—although God did not bring the law with this purpose, that mortals should be made worse by its sanction. For the law is not sin, nor the cause of sin, but a commandment holy and just and good (Rom 7:12). But because the depravity of offenders wounded itself with that very iron by which it ought to have been cured, and resisted the counsel of God, so that it was endangered by that from which it ought to have been healed, the Apostle says that, by the outcome of things, the estimate of the divine counsel by which the law had been given suffered injury; and because the outcome of human amendment was not such as the giver of the law had intended, but in very many the contraries befell, he says that the pursuits of sinners so far advanced that the law seemed to be given for no other reason than that the wicked should become more wicked and transgression should be joined to sin.
JulianImp.2.220Augustinus. Tu dicis ista, qui consilium Dei in danda lege non ipsum sapis, quod apostolus Paulus ostendit, et ad eas blasphemias ipse te impingis, ut dicas opinionem divini consilii, quo data lex fuerat, iniuriam pertulisse, tamquam aliud factum sit, quam Deus futurum fuerat opinatus, neque hoc provenerit lata lege, quod lator legis intenderat. Deum igitur omnium praescium futurorum secundum tuam sapientiam sua fefellit intentio; nonne attendis quod scriptum est: Multae cogitationes in corde viri, consilium autem Domini manet in aeternum ? Si ergo vis nosse, quantum homini fas est, quo consilio Dei omnipotentis et omnia praescientis lex data fuerit, intuere, quod dicit Apostolus: Si enim data esset lex, quae posset vivificare, omnino ex lege esset iustitia . Et tamquam diceremus: Cur ergo data est? Sed conclusit - inquit - Scriptura omnia sub peccato, ut promissio ex fide Iesu Christi daretur credentibus . Ecce quod est consilium datae legis. Quis autem nescit non legis, sed hominum vitio lege subintrante abundasse peccatum? Sed hoc vitium, quo prohibita plus delectant et fit virtus peccati lex , non sanat nisi vivificans spiritus, non littera occidens; quae tamen ad hoc utilis fuit, quia, cum ipsa occideret per praevaricationem crescente per prohibitionem cupiditate peccandi, vivificantem Spiritum fecit inquiri et hominem de sua virtute lethaliter confidentem adiutorium gratiae Dei compulit poscere, sub lege, quamvis sancta et iusta et bona, tamen deficientem atque ad operanda, quae sancta quae iusta quae bona sunt, sibi subvenire propriis viribus non valentem.
Augustine. You say these things, you who do not yourself savor the counsel of God in giving the law, which the apostle Paul showed, and who dash yourself against these blasphemies, so as to say that the estimate of the divine counsel by which the law had been given suffered injury, as though something other was done than God had reckoned would be, and that, when the law was promulgated, the outcome the giver of the law had intended did not come about. According to your wisdom, then, his intention deceived God, who foreknows all future things; do you not attend to what is written: Many are the thoughts in the heart of a man, but the counsel of the Lord abides forever (Prov 19:21)? If, then, you want to know—as far as is permitted to man—with what counsel of God almighty and foreknowing all things the law was given, look at what the Apostle says: For if a law had been given which could give life, righteousness would be wholly from the law (Gal 3:21). And, as though we said: Why then was it given? But the Scripture, he says, has shut up all things under sin, that the promise, by faith in Jesus Christ, might be given to those who believe (Gal 3:22). Behold what is the counsel of the law being given. But who does not know that sin abounded when the law entered in, by the fault not of the law but of men? But this fault—by which prohibited things give more delight, and the law is made the power of sin (See 1 Cor 15:56)—is healed only by the life-giving spirit, not the letter that kills; which letter was nevertheless useful for this, that, while it killed by transgression, with the desire of sinning growing through the prohibition, it made the life-giving Spirit be sought, and compelled man, trusting mortally in his own power, to ask the help of the grace of God—man being, under the law (though holy and just and good), nevertheless deficient and unable to come to his own aid by his own powers to work the things that are holy, just, and good.
JulianImp.2.220II. 221. Iulianus. Iure igitur hoc genere dicitur abundasse delictum, quod et ante legem et post legem uniuscuiusque committebat voluntas; sed ante legem peccatrix, post legem autem etiam praevaricatrix. Tunc ergo crescit et abundat aliquid, cum in genere suo colligit incrementa, sicut peccato liberae voluntatis post Moysen cumulus transgressionis accessit; de eodem enim genere fuit, licet in tempore diverso, id est de mala voluntate, quae et ante legem et post legem non coactu insuperabili, sed studio vituperabili deliquit. Quae cum ita sint, tibi nihil potest de apostolicis convenire verbis; neque enim subintroeunte lege peccatum traducis aut copiosius factum docetur aut grandius; nec peccatis voluntatis illud abundare iure dicitur, quod ad nascentium voluntatem nequaquam attinere monstratur. Non ergo abundavit post legem, quod lex nec prohibere potuit nec punire. Ubi autem abundavit peccatum, superabundavit gratia, ut sicut regnavit peccatum in mortem, ita gratia regnet per iustitiam in vitam aeternam .
II. 221. Julian. Rightly, therefore, the offense is said to have abounded by this kind, which the will of each one committed both before the law and after the law—but before the law a sinner, after the law also a transgressor. Then, therefore, something grows and abounds when it gathers increases in its own kind, just as to the sin of free will a heap of transgression was added after Moses; for it was of the same kind, though at a different time—that is, of the evil will, which both before the law and after the law offended not by insuperable compulsion but by blameworthy pursuit. Since this is so, nothing of the apostolic words can fit you; for it is not taught that the sin of transmission was made either more copious or greater when the law entered in; nor is that rightly said to abound by sins of the will which is shown in no way to pertain to the will of the newborn. It did not abound after the law, then, what the law could neither prohibit nor punish. But where sin abounded, grace superabounded, so that, as sin reigned unto death, so grace might reign through righteousness unto eternal life (Rom 5:20-21).
JulianImp.2.221Augustinus. Originale peccatum non quidem post legem crevit, sed tamen lex etiam ipsum, cuius abolitionem circumcisione infantis significaret, invenit, sicut invenit etiam peccata ignorantiae, quae nec ipsa data lege creverunt, quandoquidem potius ipsa ignorantia deminuta est, quia scientia legis accessit; sed peccatum, sine quo nemo nascitur, crevit voluntatis accessu originali concupiscentia trahente peccantis assensum. Abundavit autem peccatum, id est nimis crevit, posteaquam per legem facta est cognitio peccati et coepit etiam praevaricatione peccari . Quod si velitis advertere et acquiescere veritati, nulla necessitate cogemini aperte Apostolo contradicere clamanti: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines pertransiit ; illo enim dicente: pertransiit per omnes, cum vos non per omnes pertransisse dicitis, quid aliud quam Apostolo contradicitis? Et si Apostolo, utique Christo. Quid ergo miramini, quod abominatur vos Ecclesia Christi, qui sententiis lethalibus vestris infirmos parvulos subtrahere conamini medicamentis salubribus Christi?
Augustine. Original sin did not indeed grow after the law, but nevertheless the law found even it—whose abolition it would signify by the circumcision of the infant—just as it also found the sins of ignorance, which did not themselves grow when the law was given, since rather that ignorance was diminished, because the knowledge of the law was added; but the sin without which no one is born grew by the addition of will, with original concupiscence drawing the assent of the sinner. But sin abounded—that is, grew too much—after, through the law, the knowledge of sin was made and one began to sin even by transgression (See Rom 7:7; 3:20). And if you would be willing to notice this and to acquiesce in the truth, you would be forced by no necessity openly to contradict the Apostle crying out: Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death, and so it passed to all human beings (Rom 5:12); for when he says it passed to all, while you say it did not pass to all, what else do you do but contradict the Apostle? And if the Apostle, then surely Christ. Why, then, do you wonder that the Church of Christ abominates you, who try by your deadly sentences to withdraw the weak little ones from the healthful medicines of Christ?
JulianImp.2.221II. 222. Iulianus. Aperit se Apostolus clarius in processu et docet in perditione salutis humanae Deum copia suae miserationis admonitum desperatis rebus efficaciorem solito medicinam tulisse, ut quos praeceptis non correxerat, beneficiis obligaret et ita devotionem exigeret in futurum, ut non imputaret peracta, studerentque deinceps custodire iustitiam homines, quam compendio credulitatis fuerant assecuti. Abundantia ergo praecedentium peccatorum tam abundantis misericordiae exegit auxilium, quoniam, nisi tanta copia indulgentis fuisset, nulla alia disciplina morbis tam gravibus subveniret. Verum in hac divini commendatione beneficii vidit Apostolus obiectioni locum patere eorum, qui dicere poterant: Si rite merita causarum de effectibus aestimamus, et peccatorum copia, ut misericordia Dei afflueret, impetravit; insistendum peccatis est, ut gratiae non desit ubertas. Occurrens itaque opinioni eiusmodi: Quid ergo dicemus? - inquit - permanebimus in peccato, ut gratia abundet? Absit! Qui enim mortui sumus peccato, quemadmodum adhuc vivemus in eo? An ignoratis, quoniam quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in mortem illius baptizati sumus? Consepulti ergo sumus illi per baptismum in mortem, ut quemadmodum surrexit Christus in gloria Patris, ita et nos in novitate vitae ambulemus .
II. 222. Julian. The Apostle discloses himself more clearly as he proceeds, and teaches that, in the perdition of human salvation, God, admonished by the abundance of his own compassion, brought to desperate affairs a medicine more efficacious than usual, so that those whom he had not corrected by precepts he might bind by benefits, and so exact devotion for the future, so as not to impute what was done; and that men might thereafter be zealous to keep the righteousness which they had attained by the compendium of belief. The abundance, therefore, of preceding sins exacted the help of so abounding a mercy, since, unless there had been so great an abundance of the one forgiving, no other discipline would come to the aid of such grave diseases. But in this commendation of the divine benefit the Apostle saw that room lay open for the objection of those who could say: If we rightly estimate the merits of causes from their effects, then the abundance of sins obtained that the mercy of God should overflow; we must persist in sins, that the richness of grace may not be lacking. Meeting, then, an opinion of this kind: What then shall we say?, he says; shall we remain in sin, that grace may abound? God forbid! For we who have died to sin, how shall we yet live in it? Or do you not know that whoever of us have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death? We have been buried, then, with him through baptism into death, so that, as Christ rose in the glory of the Father, so we too may walk in newness of life (Rom 6:1-4).
JulianImp.2.222Augustinus. Numquid ideo non vos apostolica ista verba suffocant, quia et vos ea commemoratis, ne obliviscamur, quam firma conemini domus Dei fundamenta convellere? Insane, cum dixisset Apostolus: Si mortui sumus peccato, quomodo vivemus in eo?, ideo subiecit: An ignoratis, quoniam quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in mortem ipsius baptizati sumus? ut baptizatos in Christo mortuos probaret esse peccato. Usque adeone surdus es, ut ista non audias? Usque adeo caecus, ut ista non videas? Confitere ergo peccato mortuos parvulos baptizatos, confitere tandem originale peccatum; non enim aliud, cui morerentur, habuerunt; aut dic aperte baptizari eos non oportere aut, cum baptizantur, non eos in Christo Iesu baptizari aut non in mortem ipsius baptizari et dele, si potes, Apostoli verba dicentis: Quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in mortem ipsius baptizati sumus. Porro si haec verba delere non potes, sicut non potes, cum ergo audis: quicumque, noli velle inde parvulos separare, permitte Christum etiam parvulis esse Iesum, quoniam non exceptis ipsis, sed cum ipsis salvum facit populum suum a peccatis eorum, propter quod dictum est ab angelo: Vocabis nomen eius Iesum .
Augustine. Do these apostolic words not choke you for this reason—because you too recall them—lest we forget how firm the foundations of the house of God are that you try to tear down? Insane man, when the Apostle had said, If we have died to sin, how shall we live in it?, for this reason he added, Or do you not know that whoever of us have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death?, that he might prove those baptized in Christ to be dead to sin. Are you so deaf that you do not hear these things? So blind that you do not see them? Confess, then, that the baptized little ones are dead to sin; confess at last original sin; for they had nothing else to which they might die; or say openly that they ought not to be baptized, or that, when they are baptized, they are not baptized in Christ Jesus, or are not baptized into his death—and erase, if you can, the words of the Apostle saying: Whoever of us have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death. Furthermore, if you cannot erase these words, as you cannot, then, when you hear whoever, do not wish to separate the little ones from it; permit Christ to be Jesus to the little ones too, since he saves his people from their sins not with them excepted, but with them included, on account of which it was said by the angel: You shall call his name Jesus (Matt 1:21).
JulianImp.2.222II. 223. Iulianus. Dicit nos mortuos esse peccato eo iam tempore, quo, ut acciperemus indulgentiae donum, renuntiare nos mundo omnibusque peccatis professi sumus, atque ideo muneris memores debere sic vivere, ut Christo consepulti esse doceamur atque resurrectionem eius conspicua sanctitate gestemus et, quomodo ille, postquam resurrexit a mortuis, nullas infirmitates corporis, nulla flagella perpetitur, ita etiam et nos esse invulnerabiles peccatis omnibus et vitiis annitamur. Si enim complantati sumus similitudini mortis eius, simul et resurrectionis erimus hoc scientes, quoniam vetus homo noster simul confixus est cruci, ut destruatur corpus peccati, ut ultra non serviamus peccato; qui enim mortuus est, iustificatus est a peccato . Clara fideles ratione constringit; si vultis, inquit, resurrectionis eius fieri participes, virtutem quoque mortis imitamini, ut mortui vitiis in virtute vivatis; tunc enim eritis in illa felicitate consortes, si mortis eius imaginem tuleritis moriendo peccatis; vetus enim homo noster debet cruci eius affixus doceri, ut destruat corpus peccati fortitudine videlicet passionis. Corpus autem peccati consuetudine sua Paulus vitia, non substantiam carnis appellat; sic enim sequitur: Ut destruatur corpus peccati, ut ultra non serviamus peccato; qui enim mortuus est, iustificatus est a peccato.
II. 223. Julian. He says we are dead to sin at that time when, in order to receive the gift of forgiveness, we professed to renounce the world and all sins, and that therefore, mindful of the gift, we ought so to live that we may be taught to have been buried with Christ, and may bear his resurrection by a conspicuous holiness, and that, as he, after he rose from the dead, suffers no infirmities of the body, no scourges, so we too may strive to be invulnerable to all sins and vices. For if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall be also in that of his resurrection, knowing this, that our old man has been at the same time fastened to the cross, that the body of sin may be destroyed, that we may no longer be slaves to sin; for he who has died has been justified from sin (Rom 6:5-7). He binds the faithful by a clear reasoning: if you wish, he says, to become partakers of his resurrection, imitate also the power of his death, so that, dead to vices, you may live in virtue; for then you will be consorts in that happiness, if you bear the image of his death by dying to sins; for our old man ought to be fastened to his cross, to be taught to destroy the body of sin, namely by the fortitude of the passion. But by 'the body of sin' Paul, by his custom, calls vices, not the substance of the flesh; for so it follows: That the body of sin may be destroyed, that we may no longer be slaves to sin; for he who has died has been justified from sin.
JulianImp.2.223Augustinus. Quomodolibet interpreteris corpus peccati, non negabis parvulos in Christo Iesu baptizatos mortuos esse peccato, ne apertissime neges eos baptizatos in mortem Christi Iesu ac per hoc neges baptizatos in Christo Iesu. Quicumque enim baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in mortem ipsius baptizati sumus . Dic ergo, cui peccato moriuntur, cum parvuli baptizantur in Christo Iesu? Sed quid dicas, penitus non habebis, nisi cum tota Ecclesia Christi intellegas atque respondeas: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt . Ecce cui peccato moriuntur, cum in mortem Christi Iesu parvuli baptizantur. Rogo: Nolite esse sicut equus et mulus non habentes intellectum . Audite: Si mortui sumus peccato, quomodo vivemus in eo? An ignoratis, quoniam quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in mortem ipsius baptizati sumus? Quicumque igitur baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, peccato mortui sumus, quia in mortem ipsius baptizati sumus. Audite: Quicumque baptizati sumus; neque enim parvuli et non maiores aut vero maiores et non parvuli, sed quicumque, id est sive parvuli sive maiores baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in mortem illius baptizati sumus ac per hoc peccato mortui sumus. Aut ergo aperte dicite non esse baptismum Christi parvulis necessarium aut peccatum, cui moriuntur, quando in Christo baptizantur, dicite parvulorum aut, quia nullum potestis aliud invenire, tandem aliquando agnoscite originale peccatum.
Augustine. However you interpret the body of sin, you will not deny that the little ones baptized in Christ Jesus are dead to sin, lest you most openly deny that they are baptized into the death of Christ Jesus, and on this account deny that they are baptized in Christ Jesus. For whoever of us have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death (Rom 6:3). Say, then, to what sin they die when the little ones are baptized in Christ Jesus? But you will utterly have nothing to say, unless you understand and answer with the whole Church of Christ: Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death, and so it passed to all human beings, in whom all have sinned (Rom 5:12). Behold the sin to which they die when the little ones are baptized into the death of Christ Jesus. I beg you: Do not be like the horse and the mule, which have no understanding (Ps 32:9 (31:9)). Hear: If we have died to sin, how shall we live in it? Or do you not know that whoever of us have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death? (Rom 6:2-3) Whoever of us, then, have been baptized in Christ Jesus are dead to sin, because we have been baptized into his death. Hear: Whoever of us have been baptized; for it is not the little ones and not the older, or indeed the older and not the little ones, but whoever—that is, whether little ones or older—have been baptized in Christ Jesus, have been baptized into his death, and on this account are dead to sin. Either, then, say openly that the baptism of Christ is not necessary for the little ones, or say what is the sin to which they die when they are baptized in Christ—the sin of the little ones—or, because you can find no other, at last at some time acknowledge original sin.
JulianImp.2.223II. 224. Iulianus. Nempe cum viventibus loquebatur et his dicebat iustitiam per mysteria fuisse collatam. Quomodo ergo ait eum iustificatum esse, quem mortuum, nisi quia sine aliquo ostendit ambiguo mortem hic abrenuntiationem vocare et ideo a se nomen mortis assumi, ut ostendat ita fideles a peccatis sicut mortuos ab actibus debere cessare?
II. 224. Julian. Surely he was speaking with the living, and saying to these that righteousness had been conferred through the mysteries. How, then, does he say that one was justified whom he called dead, except because he shows, without any ambiguity, that here he calls death 'renunciation,' and that for this reason the name of death is assumed by him, that he may show that the faithful ought to cease from sins just as the dead from acts?
JulianImp.2.224Augustinus. Homo contentiose, si hoc loco apostolicorum verborum mors abrenuntiatio vocatur, ut qui peccato abrenuntiat, peccato moriatur, recole, quemadmodum in Ecclesia Christi, in qua baptizatus es, baptismatis mysteria celebrentur, et invenies, quod abrenuntient et parvuli per ora gestantium, sicut credunt per ora gestantium, quod apud vos iam forsitan non fit; sic enim profecistis in peius ipsi errantes et alios in errorem mittentes, qui vobis consenserint non debere abrenuntiare parvulum baptizandum, quia non traxit originale peccatum , aut si debet abrenuntiare peccato, dicite cui et errorem vestrum aliquando corrigite.
Augustine. Contentious man, if in this passage of the apostolic words death is called 'renunciation,' so that one who renounces sin dies to sin, recall how in the Church of Christ, in which you were baptized, the mysteries of baptism are celebrated, and you will find that even the little ones renounce through the mouths of those who carry them, just as they believe through the mouths of those who carry them—which among you perhaps no longer happens; for you have so advanced for the worse, yourselves erring and sending others into error, that those who agree with you say a little one to be baptized ought not to renounce, because he has not drawn original sin; or, if he ought to renounce sin, say what sin, and at some time correct your error.
JulianImp.2.224II. 225. Iulianus. Si enim mortui sumus cum Christo, credimus, quia vivemus cum Christo scientes, quia Christus suscitatus a mortuis iam non moritur, mors in eum iam non dominabitur; quod enim mortuus est peccato, mortuus est semel, quod autem vivit, vivit Deo. Ita et vos deputate vos mortuos esse peccato, viventes autem Deo in Christo Iesu . Quomodo Christus, inquit, qui peccato mortuus est semel, id est propter peccata nostra mortuus est semel, ultra non moritur, sed vivit in gloria Dei, ita et vos, deputate vos peccato mortuos solis vivere et servire virtutibus.
II. 225. Julian. For if we have died with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with Christ, knowing that Christ, raised from the dead, dies now no more; death will no longer have dominion over him; for in that he died to sin, he died once; but in that he lives, he lives to God. So also do you reckon yourselves to be dead to sin, but living to God in Christ Jesus (Rom 6:8-11). As Christ, he says, who died to sin once—that is, died once on account of our sins—dies no more, but lives in the glory of God, so do you too reckon yourselves dead to sin, to live and to be slaves to the virtues alone.
JulianImp.2.225Augustinus. O mira expositio! Apostolus dicit Christum peccato mortuum et tu dicis, id est propter peccata nostra; ergo quod dicit ille: Sic et vos existimate vos mortuos esse peccato, hoc putandus est dicere: Existimate vos mortuos esse propter peccata vestra? Non utique hoc dicit isto loco nec tu sic intellegis, sed peccato mortuos, ne peccato viverent, confiteris. Ostende ergo et Christum mortuum fuisse peccato, ne inconvenienter Apostolus dixerit: sic et vos; propter auferenda enim nostra peccata, sed tamen peccato mortuus est, et hoc quomodo, qui nullum habuit omnino peccatum nec originale nec proprium, nisi quia similitudo, cuius rei similitudo erat, eius nomen accepit? Novimus enim Christum in similitudine venisse carnis peccati , quoniam in vera carne venit, sed non sicut alii homines in carne peccati; mortuus est ergo ille similitudini peccati, quam gerebat in carne mortali, ac sic mysterium nostrae salutis implevit, ut nos peccato moreremur, cuius ille similitudinem gessit. Ideo in mortem ipsius baptizamur, quia sicut in illo vera mors facta est, ita in nobis vera fit remissio peccatorum. Sed hic sunt et parvuli: Quicumque enim baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in mortem ipsius baptizati sumus . Non enim sic homines baptizantur in Christo, ut aliqui in mortem ipsius, aliqui non in mortem ipsius baptizentur, sed, sicut ait, in quo loquebatur ipse Christus: Quicumque baptizantur in Christo Iesu, in mortem ipsius baptizantur, ac per hoc, quicumque baptizantur in Christo Iesu, peccato moriuntur; si quicumque, utique et parvuli. Sed cui peccato parvuli moriuntur? Iam tandem quaeso confiteatur generatio, ne mentiatur regeneratio; confiteatur in parvulis caro peccati, ut non negetur etiam pro parvulis mortua similitudo carnis peccati.
Augustine. O wondrous exposition! The Apostle says Christ died to sin, and you say, that is, on account of our sins; therefore what he says, So also do you reckon yourselves to be dead to sin, is he to be thought to say: Reckon yourselves to be dead on account of your sins? Surely he does not say this in this passage, nor do you so understand it, but you confess that they are dead to sin, that they might not live to sin. Show, then, that Christ too died to sin, lest the Apostle have unfittingly said so also do you; for he died to take away our sins, but nevertheless he died to sin—and this how, since he had no sin at all, neither original nor proper, except because the likeness, of which thing it was the likeness, received its name? For we know that Christ came in the likeness of the flesh of sin (See Rom 8:3), since he came in true flesh, but not, like other men, in the flesh of sin; he died, then, to the likeness of sin, which he bore in his mortal flesh, and so fulfilled the mystery of our salvation, that we might die to sin, of which he bore the likeness. Therefore we are baptized into his death, because, just as in him a true death was made, so in us a true remission of sins is made. But here the little ones too are: for whoever of us have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death (Rom 6:3). For men are not so baptized in Christ that some are baptized into his death and some not into his death; but, as he says, in whom Christ himself was speaking: Whoever are baptized in Christ Jesus are baptized into his death, and on this account, whoever are baptized in Christ Jesus die to sin; if whoever, then surely the little ones too. But to what sin do the little ones die? At last, I beg, let generation confess, lest regeneration lie; let the flesh of sin in the little ones be confessed, that the likeness of the flesh of sin, dead even for the little ones, may not be denied.
JulianImp.2.225II. 226. Iulianus. Ubi hic ergo accusatur natura? Ubi humanae substantiae culpantur exordia? Ubi motus generantis arguitur? Luce clarius est, quod sola a Magistro Gentium conveniatur voluntas, ut abdicet occulta dedecoris et in meliorem vitam actuum correctione proficiat. Sed iam accipiat expositio nostra compendium nec interpretari in his locis dicta Apostoli perseveret; ipsum de suis disserentem sensibus audiamus. In fine disputationis eius apparebit, cuius dogmati fideique consentiat. Nos nempe dicimus de peccato Apostolum voluntatis humanae, quae in unoquoque peccante est, locutum fuisse; tu vero de eo, quod Fausto credis generatione transmissum et a cunctis sine voluntate susceptum. Concertationes itaque nostrae, si placet, facessant et, ut mediocriter agam, dissimulemus Apostoli dignitatem, qua praescribi posset, etiamsi vobis per omnia eius verba concinerent, tamen illum pro officii sui splendore nihil tam deforme sensisse, ambiguitatem esse elocutionum, non sensuum pravitatem; hoc solum ei in praesenti negotio concedatur, ut vir non perturbatae mentis magis scripta sua quam tu intellexisse credatur. Non ergo regnet - inquit - peccatum in vestro mortali corpore ad oboediendum ei . Possem iam hic dicere exhortationis testimonio probatum esse de peccatis eum agere voluntatis, quia mala, si essent naturalia, per iustitiam defendi possent, per misericordiam postremo defleri, nullo autem pacto admonerentur cavenda. Quovis enim naturali malo, si ullum esse posset, hoc malum erat maius insaniae, qua tenebatur, quicumque devotionem in cavendis rebus naturalibus exigebat. Apostolus autem nihil sanxit, quod possit iure reprehendi; peccatum itaque voluntatis ostendit, quod inculcat debere vitari.
II. 226. Julian. Where here, then, is nature accused? Where are the beginnings of human substance blamed? Where is the movement of the one begetting charged? It is clearer than light that the will alone is addressed by the Teacher of the Gentiles, that it may renounce the hidden things of shame (See 2 Cor 4:2) and advance to a better life by the correction of acts. But now let our exposition take a compendium, and not persist in interpreting the sayings of the Apostle in these passages; let us hear him discoursing on his own meanings. At the end of his disputation it will appear to whose teaching and faith he assents. We, indeed, say that the Apostle spoke of the sin of the human will, which is in each one who sins; but you, of that which you believe, with Faustus, to be transmitted by generation and received by all without will. Let our contentions, then, if you please, cease; and, to deal moderately, let us pass over the dignity of the Apostle, by which it could be prescribed that, even if his words agreed with you in everything, nevertheless he, for the splendor of his office, thought nothing so deformed—that there is an ambiguity of expressions, not a depravity of meanings; let this alone be granted to him in the present matter, that a man of an undisturbed mind is to be believed to have understood his own writings better than you. Let not sin, then, he says, reign in your mortal body, to obey it (Rom 6:12). I could now say here that, by the testimony of exhortation, it is proved that he is treating of sins of the will, because evils, if they were natural, could be defended by justice, or at last lamented by mercy, but in no way would they be admonished to be avoided. For greater than any natural evil—if any could exist—was this evil of the madness with which anyone was held who exacted devotion in avoiding natural things. But the Apostle sanctioned nothing that could rightly be reproved; therefore he showed a sin of the will, which he impresses ought to be avoided.
JulianImp.2.226Augustinus. Quis ignorat non loqui Apostolum parvulis, sed eis, qui possunt intellegere verba dicentis et adiuvante Dei gratia oboedire praeceptis? Sed utique agunt etiam cum filiis suis, ut, quemadmodum in eis crescit rationis usus, ita exseratur oboedientiae fructus, ne in vacuum gratiam Dei susceperint, quando regenerati sunt nescientes. Verumtamen illam pulchram susceptam tuam, quae deformis est omnibus debellatoribus suis, concupiscentiam carnis dico, per quam nascitur et cum qua nascitur homo, hanc ergo concupiscentiam carnis cohiberi Apostolus praecipit nec regnare permittit eamque peccati nomine appellat, quia et de primo peccato originem ducit et, quisquis eius motibus ad illicita consenserit, peccat, quae tunc nulla erit in nobis, quando immortale corpus habebimus; ideoque cum posset dicere: Non regnet peccatum in vestro corpore, cur addidit verbum et ait: in vestro mortali corpore , nisi ut tunc speraremus istam, quam peccatum vocat, concupiscentiam non futuram, quando mortale non habebimus corpus? Nam tu dic nobis, cur non ait: Non sit peccatum in vestro mortali corpore, sed ait: Non regnet, nisi quia ista concupiscentia, quae non potest nisi esse in carne mortali, in eis regnat, qui desideriis eius ad mala perpetranda consentiunt et ab ea, quocumque illexerit, victi pertrahuntur maiore impetu, quia lege prohibentur, si gratia non iuvantur; in eis autem, qui Deo donante faciunt, quod praeceptum est, id est commotae atque instanti non oboediunt nec ei arma exhibent membra, inest quidem, sed non regnat. Probatur autem inesse, dum concupiscuntur mala, et probatur non regnare, dum iustitiae delectatione vincente non fiunt. Quomodo enim praecipimur ei non oboedire nisi iubenti sive suadenti? Quomodo autem facere hoc potest, si non inest?
Augustine. Who is ignorant that the Apostle does not speak to the little ones, but to those who can understand the words of the speaker and, with the grace of God helping, obey the precepts? But surely they deal even with their own children, so that, as the use of reason grows in them, so the fruit of obedience may be put forth, lest they receive the grace of God in vain, when they were regenerated without knowing it. Nevertheless, that beautiful received thing of yours, which is deformed to all who war it down—I mean the concupiscence of the flesh, through which and with which man is born—this concupiscence of the flesh, then, the Apostle commands to be restrained (See Rom 6:12) and does not permit to reign, and he calls it by the name of sin, because it both draws its origin from the first sin and because whoever consents to its movements toward illicit things sins—which will then be no longer in us when we have an immortal body; and therefore, when he could say, Let not sin reign in your body, why did he add a word and say, in your mortal body (Rom 6:12), except that we might hope that this concupiscence, which he calls sin, will not exist when we no longer have a mortal body? For you, tell us, why he did not say, Let not sin be in your mortal body, but said, Let it not reign—except because this concupiscence, which cannot but be in mortal flesh, reigns in those who consent to its desires for perpetrating evils, and are dragged off by it, conquered, wherever it entices, with greater impetus, because they are prohibited by the law if they are not helped by grace; but in those who, by God's gift, do what is commanded—that is, do not obey it when it is stirred and pressing, nor furnish their members to it as arms—it is indeed present, but does not reign. And it is proved to be present, while evils are coveted, and proved not to reign, while, with the delight of righteousness conquering, they are not done. For how are we commanded not to obey it, except as commanding or persuading? And how can it do this, if it is not present?
JulianImp.2.226II. 227. Iulianus. Neque exhibeatis membra vestra arma iniquitatis peccato, sed exhibete vos Deo, tamquam ex mortuis viventes, et membra vestra arma iustitiae Deo. Peccatum enim in vobis non dominatur; non enim sub lege estis, sed sub gratia . Eo, inquit, debetis servire Deo fidelius, quo etiam liberalius; peccatum quippe dominabatur vobis, cum reatuum impendebat ultio; postea autem quam gratia Dei beneficia consecuti estis et depositis reatuum ponderibus respirastis, ingenuo pudore commoniti debetis gratiam referre medicanti.
II. 227. Julian. Neither present your members as arms of iniquity unto sin, but present yourselves to God, as those living from the dead, and your members as arms of righteousness unto God. For sin will not have dominion in you; for you are not under the law, but under grace (Rom 6:13-14). You ought, he says, to serve God the more faithfully the more liberally too; for sin had dominion over you when the vengeance of guilt was impending; but after you obtained the benefits of the grace of God and, the weights of guilt laid aside, drew breath again, you ought, admonished by an honorable shame, to return thanks to the one who heals.
JulianImp.2.227Augustinus. Tu vestro more, qui de vestro descendit errore, non agnoscis gratiam nisi in dimissione peccatorum, ut iam de cetero per liberum arbitrium ipse homo se ipsum fabricet iustum. Sed non hoc dicit Ecclesia, quae clamat tota, quod didicit a Magistro bono: Ne nos inferas in tentationem ; non hoc dicit qui dicit: Oramus autem ad Deum, ne quid faciatis mali ; non hoc dicit qui dicit: Rogavi pro te, Petre, ne deficiat fides tua . Isto enim modo gratia, ut non peccemus, facit, non quae peccavimus diluit; utroque enim modo adiuvat gratia, et dimittendo, quae male fecimus, et opitulando, ut declinemus a malis et bona faciamus.
Augustine. You, in your manner, which descends from your error, do not acknowledge grace except in the remission of sins, so that thereafter, by free choice, the man himself may fashion himself righteous. But the Church does not say this, which cries out, whole, what it learned from the good Teacher: Bring us not into temptation (Matt 6:13); this is not said by him who says: But we pray to God that you may do no evil (2 Cor 13:7); this is not said by him who says: I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail (Luke 22:32). For in this way grace brings it about that we do not sin; it does not wash away only the sins we have committed; for in both ways grace helps, both by forgiving the evils we have done and by aiding us to turn away from evils and do good.
JulianImp.2.227II. 228. Iulianus. Verum quia eiusdem quam supra exposuerat quaestionis incurrebat occasio, ut opponeretur videlicet liberatos a lege, quae intendebat iram, securos posse sub gratiae Dei benignitate peccare, subdidit protinus: Quid ergo? Peccabimus, quoniam non sumus sub lege, sed sub gratia? Absit! An ignoratis, quoniam cui exhibetis vos servos ad oboediendum, servi estis eius, cui oboedistis, sive peccati sive oboeditionis iustitiae? Iamne ei credimus, de cuius disseruerit hactenus conditione peccati? Cui, inquit, exhibetis vos servos ad oboediendum, eius servi estis, sive peccati, sive iustitiae. Ubi hic ergo indicatur ab Apostolo peccatum illud, quod ante voluntatis tempora, ante oboedientium studium, ante scientiae et conscientiae aetatem ipsis fingitur supervolasse seminibus? Quod certe nisi in Manichaeorum libris inveniri non potest.
II. 228. Julian. But because the occasion of the same question he had expounded above arose—namely, that it might be objected that those freed from the law, which threatened wrath, could safely sin under the kindness of God's grace—he at once subjoined: What then? Shall we sin, because we are not under the law, but under grace? God forbid! Or do you not know that to whom you present yourselves as slaves to obey, you are the slaves of him whom you obey, whether of sin or of the obedience of righteousness? (Rom 6:15-16) Do we now believe him, of whose condition of sin he has thus far discoursed? To whom, he says, you present yourselves as slaves to obey, you are the slaves of him, whether of sin or of righteousness. Where here, then, is that sin indicated by the Apostle which is feigned to have flown over upon the seeds themselves, before the times of the will, before the pursuit of the obedient, before the age of knowledge and conscience? Which surely can be found nowhere except in the books of the Manicheans.
JulianImp.2.228Augustinus. Non sunt Manichaeorum libri, ubi legitur: Fuimus enim et nos natura filii irae sicut et ceteri , quod vos novo more, sed impudentissimo ore interpretamini ex Graeco, ut Apostolus dixisse videatur non natura, sed prorsus, hoc est: Fuimus prorsus filii irae; et forte hoc emendare audebitis in codicibus vestris, non enim vultis acquiescere, quod, nisi haec quanto verior, tanto antiquior fides esset, hoc omnes Latini codices non haberent. Nec ideo tamen Apostolus monere non debuit oboediendum esse iustitiae, non peccato, quia omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est . Cum enim generationis reatus regenerationis indulgentia fuerit absolutus, oboediendum est iustitiae spiritui, cui consentire, nec oboediendum est concupiscentiae carnis, contra quam certare debemus, ita sane, ut ipsam quoque oboedientiam piam donum Dei esse meminerimus, quod promisit per Prophetam dicens: Dabo eis cor cognoscendi me et aures audientes ; quod quid est aliud quam oboedientes?
Augustine. They are not the books of the Manicheans where it is read: For we too were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest (Eph 2:3)—which you, in a novel manner but with a most shameless mouth, interpret from the Greek, so that the Apostle may seem to have said not by nature but 'utterly,' that is: We were utterly children of wrath; and perhaps you will dare to emend this in your manuscripts, for you are unwilling to acquiesce in the fact that, unless this faith were as true as it is ancient, all the Latin manuscripts would not have it. Nor yet for that reason ought the Apostle not to have admonished that we must obey righteousness, not sin, because we are all born under sin, whose very origin is in fault (See Ambrose, Defense of the Prophet David 11.56). For when the guilt of generation has been absolved by the indulgence of regeneration, we must obey the spirit of righteousness, to which we must consent, and not obey the concupiscence of the flesh, against which we must contend—yet so, indeed, that we remember that the pious obedience itself too is a gift of God, which he promised through the Prophet, saying: I will give them a heart to know me, and ears to hear (See Jer 24:7; Deut 29:4); which is nothing other than obedient.
JulianImp.2.228II. 229. Iulianus. Ceterum Apostolus ostendit, si tamen aliquam ab hominibus hac tempestate fidem impetrat, servos se non dicere peccati nisi eos, quos constat voluntate propria oboedisse peccato, cuius mutatione id est voluntatis coeperunt servire iustitiae; oboedientiam ergo in medio collocavit et ei imputavit, quod vel vitiis prius vel postea studuerunt parere virtutibus.
II. 229. Julian. Furthermore, the Apostle shows—if at any rate he obtains any belief from men in this storm—that he calls no one slaves of sin except those who, it is established, obeyed sin by their own will, by the change of which—that is, of the will—they began to serve righteousness; he set obedience, then, in the middle, and imputed to it the fact that they were zealous either to obey vices first or afterward virtues.
JulianImp.2.229Augustinus. Qui confidunt in virtute sua , vani sunt sicut vos et destruentur sicut vos.
Augustine. Those who trust in their own power (See Ps 49:6 (48:7)) are empty, like you, and will be destroyed, like you.
JulianImp.2.229II. 230. Iulianus. Gratias autem Deo, quod fuistis - inquit - servi peccati; sed oboedistis ex corde in eam formam doctrinae, in quam traditi estis; liberati autem a peccato servi estis facti iustitiae .
II. 230. Julian. But thanks be to God, he says, that you were slaves of sin; but you have obeyed from the heart that form of teaching into which you were handed over; and, being freed from sin, you have been made slaves of righteousness (Rom 6:17-18).
JulianImp.2.230Augustinus. Surde, audi Apostolum gratias agentem Deo, quod eius doctrinae ex corde oboedierunt, quandoquidem non dixit: Gratias Deo, quia praedicata est vobis doctrina eius, sed: quia oboedistis. Non enim omnes obaudiunt Evangelio , sed quibus datum est, ut obaudiant, sicut: Nosse mysterium regni caelorum vobis datum est, ait Dominus, illis autem non est datum . Non ergo ex corde, hoc est ex voluntate oboedissent, si non praepararetur voluntas a Domino; alioquin mendaciter ei de hac re Apostolus gratias agit, si hoc ipse non fecit.
Augustine. Deaf man, hear the Apostle giving thanks to God that they obeyed his teaching from the heart, since he did not say: Thanks to God because his teaching was preached to you, but: because you obeyed. For not all obey the Gospel (Rom 10:16), but those to whom it is given to obey, just as: To you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of heaven, says the Lord, but to them it is not given (Matt 13:11). They would not, then, have obeyed from the heart—that is, from the will—if the will were not prepared by the Lord; otherwise the Apostle gives him thanks falsely about this matter, if he himself did not do it.
JulianImp.2.230II. 231. Iulianus. Ex corde, inquit, oboedientiae facta mutatio, liberavit vos a peccato et sanctitati fecit adhaerere.
II. 231. Julian. The change of obedience made from the heart, he says, freed you from sin and made you cleave to holiness.
JulianImp.2.231Augustinus. Sed haec mutatio dexterae Excelsi est; audi hominem Dei hanc in Psalmo gratiam confitentem et disce, quis mutet in melius hominis voluntatem: Et dixi - inquit - nunc coepi; haec est immutatio dexterae Excelsi .
Augustine. But this change is of the right hand of the Most High; hear the man of God confessing this grace in the Psalm, and learn who changes the will of man for the better: And I said, he says, Now I have begun; this is the change of the right hand of the Most High (Ps 77:10 (76:11)).
JulianImp.2.231II. 232. Iulianus. Humanum est, quod dico propter infirmitatem carnis vestrae; sicut enim exhibuistis membra vestra servire immunditiae et iniquitati ad iniquitatem, ita nunc exhibete membra vestra servire iustitiae in sanctificationem . O praeceptorem Spiritu Dei plenum, vere vas aureum et tubam non concisis stridoribus, sed absolutis vocibus increpantem! Auctoritatem sermoni suo de exhortationis humanitate conciliat.
II. 232. Julian. I speak after the manner of men, on account of the infirmity of your flesh; for as you presented your members to serve uncleanness and iniquity unto iniquity, so now present your members to serve righteousness unto sanctification (Rom 6:19). O teacher full of the Spirit of God, truly a golden vessel and a trumpet sounding not with broken shrieks but with clear utterances! He wins authority for his discourse by the kindness of exhortation.
JulianImp.2.232Augustinus. O te deceptorem spiritu haeretico plenum, totum dantem hominis voluntati contra eum qui dicit: Quid enim habes, quod non accepisti? Homo Pelagiane, plantando et rigando ista dicebat Apostolus; sciens autem quod neque qui plantat est aliquid neque qui rigat, sed qui incrementum dat, Deus , non praecipiebat tantum, sed etiam orabat ad Deum, ut malum non facerent, quibus eius eloquia praedicabat. Aperte quippe alibi dicit: Oramus autem ad Deum, ne quid faciatis mali .
Augustine. O you deceiver, full of a heretical spirit, giving the whole to the will of man against him who says: For what have you that you have not received? (1 Cor 4:7) Pelagian man, the Apostle was saying these things by planting and watering; but, knowing that neither he who plants is anything nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase (1 Cor 3:7), he not only commanded but also prayed to God that those to whom he preached his words might not do evil. For he openly says elsewhere: But we pray to God that you may do no evil (2 Cor 13:7).
JulianImp.2.232II. 233. Iulianus. Ne quid enim arduum et inaccessum homini praecipere videretur, verbum de consuetudine usurpavit, ut humanum diceret, id est facile tractabile, et quod causarum comparatione mitescat. Non a vobis, inquit, reposco parem augustis rebus intentionem nec, quam magnae sunt virtutum opes, tam nova vobis, quibus eas capessatis, praecepta constituo, nihil ferum ingero, nihil quod vix portari possit indico, ne, si pro splendore iustitiae tale aliquid imperarem, de carnis infirmitate conquesti allegaretis iugem vos laborem ferre non posse. Nunc itaque hac moderatione convenio, ut tale studium virtutibus adhibeatis, quale adhibuistis ante criminibus; cumque iniuria sit honestarum rerum, si tali appetantur proposito, quale est deformibus impensum rebus, tamen disciplinae huic, in qua estis, sufficit, si vel tali intentione iustitiam sectemini, quali iniquitatem estis immunditiamque sectati.
II. 233. Julian. For lest he seem to command man anything arduous and inaccessible, he borrowed a word from common usage, so as to say human, that is, easily manageable and something that grows mild by the comparison of causes. I do not, he says, demand of you an intensity equal to lofty matters, nor do I set down for you precepts as novel as the resources of the virtues are great, so that you may take hold of them; I bring in nothing fierce, I command nothing that can scarcely be borne—lest, if for the splendor of righteousness I should command anything of the sort, you, complaining of the infirmity of the flesh, should allege that you cannot bear continual labor. Now, therefore, I meet you with this moderation, that you apply to the virtues such zeal as you applied before to crimes; and although it is an injury to honorable things if they are sought with such a purpose as is spent on deformed things, nevertheless for this discipline in which you are, it suffices if you pursue righteousness with at least such intensity as you pursued iniquity and uncleanness.
JulianImp.2.233Augustinus. Hoc tamen non facient, nisi illi formosae susceptae tuae concupiscentiae carnis repugnent robore caritatis; cum qua lege membrorum repugnatura legi mentis omnis homo nascitur et cuius obligatione reus est, si non renascatur; quam mortales non vincunt suo spiritu, si non aguntur Dei Spiritu: Quotquot enim Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii sunt Dei . Ite nunc et contra istam christianam atque apostolicam veritatem extollendo praecipitate liberum arbitrium et in vestra virtute non assurgendo, sed cadendo confidite.
Augustine. Yet they will not do this unless they resist, by the strength of love, that beautiful received concupiscence of the flesh of yours; with which law of the members, going to fight against the law of the mind, every human being is born, and by the bond of which he is guilty if he is not reborn—which mortals do not conquer by their own spirit, if they are not led by the Spirit of God: For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God (Rom 8:14). Go now, and against this Christian and apostolic truth cast down free choice by exalting it, and trust in your own power, not by rising up but by falling.
JulianImp.2.233II. 234. Iulianus. Credamus itaque Magistro Gentium et reddamus ei testimonium veritatis suae. Vere enim, sicut dixit, humanum est, quod praecepit, ut voluntatis correctio emendaret vitia voluntatis.
II. 234. Julian. Let us, then, believe the Teacher of the Gentiles and render him the testimony of his own truth. For truly, as he said, what he commanded is human, that the correction of the will might amend the defects of the will.
JulianImp.2.234Augustinus. Sed correctio haec humana non fit nisi opitulatione divina. Quis enim hominis corrigit voluntatem nisi ille cui dicitur: Deus virtutum, converte nos , et: Deus, tu convertens vivificabis nos ? A Domino enim gressus hominis diriguntur et viam eius volet . Si autem non ab illo dirigantur, homo viam Dei non volet, etsi iubeat lex, ut velit.
Augustine. But this human correction does not come about except by divine help. For who corrects the will of a man except him to whom it is said, God of hosts, convert us (Ps 80:7 (79:8)), and, O God, you will convert us and give us life (Ps 85:6 (84:7))? For by the Lord are the steps of a man directed, and he will will his way (Ps 37:23 (36:23)). But if they are not directed by him, a man will not will the way of God, even if the law commands him to will it.
JulianImp.2.234II. 235. Iulianus. Sed ut hoc humanum, sic illud aliud, si putasset, non solum inhumanum, non solum ferum, verum etiam iniustum, non solum iniustum, verum etiam insanum, ut peccatum si nosset innasci, exprobraret suae aetatis hominibus vitia partus antiqui et ab his praeciperet abstinendum, quae innata credebat, atque cum interminatione praescriberet debere me ea deponere, quae ante habere coeperam, quam anima in corpus meum, in hunc vero mundum corpus intraret.
II. 235. Julian. But just as this is human, so that other thing—if he had supposed it—would be not only inhuman, not only fierce, but even unjust; not only unjust, but even insane: namely, that if he knew sin to be inborn, he should reproach the men of his own age with the vices of an ancient birth and command them to abstain from what he believed to be inborn, and with a threat prescribe that I ought to lay aside what I had begun to have before the soul entered into my body, and the body into this world.
JulianImp.2.235Augustinus. Ergo carnis concupiscentia non est innata aut non ab ea praecipit abstinendum, qui dicit: Contine te ipsum , et: Desideria iuvenilia fuge . Cur non dixit: Voluntaria desideria fuge? Iuventus utique nomen aetatis est, aetates autem natura, non voluntas habet et ea concupiscentia de iuvenili aetate maxime accenditur, cuius utique vis in infante sopita est sicut rationis, sicut ipsius voluntatis. Sed discernit oculus christianus, non Pelagianus, quid de Creatoris institutione, quid de vitii contaminatione vel sumat natura vel contrahat, Conditorem suo bono praedicans eodemque propter malum, quo vitiata est, indigens Salvatore; de reatu enim, cum quo homo nascitur, non est, quod ei praecipiatur, nisi ut renascatur.
Augustine. Then either the concupiscence of the flesh is not inborn, or it is not from this that he commands abstinence, who says: Restrain yourself (See Sir 18:30), and: Flee youthful desires (2 Tim 2:22). Why did he not say: Flee voluntary desires? Youth, surely, is the name of an age, and ages nature has, not will; and that concupiscence is kindled most of all from the youthful age, whose force in the infant is surely dormant, like that of reason, like that of the will itself. But the Christian eye, not the Pelagian, discerns what nature takes up or contracts from the institution of the Creator, and what from the contamination of defect—proclaiming its Founder by its good, and by the same, on account of the evil with which it is corrupted, needing a Savior; for concerning the guilt with which a man is born, there is nothing that can be commanded him except that he be reborn.
JulianImp.2.235II. 236. Iulianus. Iustius admoneretur ab his, quos emendare studebat, ut, quantum imperaret, expenderet et sciret primum esse consilii constantis gradum imperii modum tenere; exauctorata quippe doctrina est, quam non tuetur aequitas, et plena auctoritatis, quam iustitiae libra commendat. Ac per hoc constat Apostolum, reverendum ecclesiarum informatorem, rationem magisterii sui consilio aequitate humanitate reddentem nihil de naturali sensisse peccato, sed inculcasse, ut res erat, et vitiorum nos servos nonnisi per voluntatem fuisse et iustitiae nos eadem posse, si corrigatur, voluntate servire. Verum quoniam in expositione loci huius fui hactenus occupatus, ut ostenderem per apostoli Pauli verba Manichaeos nihil posse defendi, patuitque contextu orationis eius veritas, quam per omne dictorum suorum corpus exsequitur, hic sit secundi finis libelli, quo tamen necessario commonemus nihil Traducianis praeter impudentiam remansisse, quia, cum se confiterentur nullum in ratione habere praesidium, de Apostoli dictis, quae exposita sunt, totum sibi solacium vindicabant; et quoniam claruit nihil in his deforme, nihil non sanctitati et rationi consentiens fuisse praescriptum, apparet cecidisse sententiam, quam et ratio cum multis auctoritatibus Scripturarum et, quae in Deo est, religio catholicorum proruit et iam loci istius opinio non tuetur.
II. 236. Julian. He would more justly be admonished by those whom he was zealous to amend, to weigh how much he commanded and to know that the first step of constant counsel is to keep measure in commanding; for that teaching is stripped of authority which equity does not protect, and that is full of authority which the scale of justice commends. And on this account it is established that the Apostle, the venerable instructor of the churches, rendering the reason of his teaching by counsel, equity, and humanity, thought nothing of a natural sin, but impressed, as the matter was, both that we were slaves of vices only through the will, and that we can serve righteousness by the same will, if it is corrected. But since I have thus far been occupied in the exposition of this passage, to show that through the words of the apostle Paul the Manicheans can defend nothing, and the truth has lain open by the context of his discourse, which he pursues through the whole body of his sayings, let this be the end of the second book—by which, however, we necessarily admonish that nothing has remained to the Traducianists but shamelessness, since, while they confessed that they had no support in reason, they vindicated for themselves all their solace from the sayings of the Apostle which have been expounded; and since it has become clear that nothing deformed, nothing not agreeing with holiness and reason, was prescribed in these, it appears that the opinion has fallen which both reason, with many authorities of the Scriptures, and the religion of the catholics, which is in God, have cast down, and which the meaning of this passage no longer protects.
JulianImp.2.236Augustinus. Apparet omnibus, qui sano capite atque intellegenter haec legunt, cum contra verba non magis mea quam beati Apostoli multa tua diceres, nihil te invenisse quod diceres, et tortuoso strepitu loquacitatis egisse, ut eis, qui non intellegunt, dixisse aliquid videreris. Velitis nolitis: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines pertransiit . Quid est ita nisi per peccatum, non sine peccato? Neque enim pertransiret mors nisi ducente peccato; mors enim peccatum sequitur, non praecedit. Hinc sunt omnes miseriae mortalium a die exitus de ventre matris eorum , sicut scriptum est. Quas miserias vos cum sine ullo peccato accidere dicitis parvulis, iniustum Deum vere vos facitis, Manichaeos autem horribiliter adiuvatis. Illi enim, ne faciant iniustum Deum, istas miserias a nativitate mortalium immutabili naturae mali et ab alio principio venienti substantiae tribuunt tenebrarum. Quos impios simul et vos ipsos vincit catholica fides, quae ista omnia peccato illi tribuit, quod ex primi hominis voluntate intravit in mundum, quos secuta est mors etiam ista, quae fugans animam corpus interimit, quam vos homini, etiamsi non peccasset, dicitis naturaliter fuisse venturam. Unde sequitur, ut non solum illam imperiosam libidinem, qua nimium delectamini, verum etiam molestissimam febrem ceterosque innumerabiles morbos, quibus videmus afflictos parvulos emori, in paradiso futuros fuisse dicatis, etiamsi nemo peccasset, quia sine ullius peccati merito haec perpeti parvulos dicitis. Cohibete vos, quaeso, cum falsis et noxiis laudibus vestris, cohibete vos ab infantibus et lactantibus, quos tamquam nihil mali habentes crudeli errore laudatis, ad Christum liberatorem venire liberandos parvulos sinite, miseram naturam, quam vitiavit homo primus, ut sanet homo secundus, victi correctique permittite.
Augustine. It appears to all who read these things with a sound head and intelligently that, while you said many things of yours against the words—not so much mine as the blessed Apostle's—you found nothing to say, and acted with the tortuous din of garrulity, so that to those who do not understand you might seem to have said something. Whether you will or not: Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death, and so it passed to all human beings (Rom 5:12). What is so, except through sin, not without sin? For death would not pass except with sin leading; for death follows sin, it does not precede it. Hence are all the miseries of mortals from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1), as it is written. Which miseries, when you say they befall the little ones without any sin, you truly make God unjust, and you horribly help the Manicheans. For they, lest they make God unjust, attribute these miseries, from the birth of mortals, to an immutable nature of evil and to a substance of darkness coming from another principle. Both these impious men and you yourselves the catholic faith conquers, which attributes all these things to that sin which entered into the world from the will of the first man—which sin even this death followed, the death which, putting the soul to flight, destroys the body, and which you say would have come naturally to man even if he had not sinned. Whence it follows that you say that not only that imperious lust, in which you delight too much, but even the most troublesome fever and the other innumerable diseases by which we see the little ones afflicted and dying, would have existed in paradise even if no one had sinned, because you say the little ones suffer these things without the merit of any sin. Restrain yourselves, I beg, with your false and harmful praises; restrain yourselves from the infants and sucklings, whom by a cruel error you praise as having nothing evil; let the little ones come to Christ the liberator to be freed; conquered and corrected, permit the second man to heal the wretched nature which the first man corrupted.
JulianImp.2.236Liber Tertius
Book Three
JulianImp.2.236III. 1. Iulianus. Oportuerat quidem apud humanum genus reverentiam omnium.vigere virtutum; oportuerat resisti sapienti semper mente criminibus et demereri bonis studiis Conditoris favorem; dignum erat postremo, ut quia hic continuae devotionis prior et felicior gradus cum rarus tum arduus etiam nimis videtur, vel diu fota vitia respui et ad emendationis ac paenitentiae praesidium rediri. Oportuerat certe vel in hoc inviolabilem Dei manere reverentiam, ut non nobis esset necesse divinam legem tanto vindicare certamine, verum, quia eo usque peccantium furore perventum est, ut summis laboribus Deum iustum esse doceamus, ipsius iustitiae, cuius causa agitur, praesumentes auxilium, quae libro promisimus praecedente, reddamus.
III. 1. Julian. It ought indeed to have been the case that among the human race a reverence for all the virtues should flourish; it ought to have been the case that crimes should always be resisted by a wise mind, and the favor of the Creator earned by good pursuits; finally, it was worthy that—since here the first and happier step of continual devotion seems both rare and exceedingly arduous—at least vices long cherished should be spat out, and a return made to the safeguard of amendment and penance. It ought certainly, at least in this, that an inviolable reverence for God should remain, that it should not be necessary for us to vindicate the divine law with so great a contest; but because the fury of sinners has reached the point that with the greatest labors we must teach that God is just, presuming on the help of that very justice whose cause is pleaded, let us render what we promised in the preceding book.
JulianImp.3.1Augustinus. Auxilium Dei quaeris, ut impleantur vani libri tui, et non quaeris, ut corrigantur perversi sensus tui. Vellem tamen diceres, propter quid in hoc opere auxilium Dei poscas, cum sit in tuo libero arbitrio sive facere hoc sive non facere. An ut ea tibi praesto sint, quae in potestate tua non sunt et sine quibus hoc effici non potest, sicut sunt, ut alia omittam, ipse victus atque otium? At haec pene semper Deus per voluntates nobis subministrat aliorum. Vides ergo id te poscere ab omnipotente Deo, cum propter implendos tuos libros poscis auxilium, ut in voluntatibus hominum, quod te adiuvet et quod te non impediat, operetur. Nam si nolint homines victum tibi subministrare sumptusque congruentes, si nolint postremo a te inquietando impediendoque cessare, scribere vel dictare ista non poteris. Speras ergo auxilio Dei sic agi hominum voluntates, inter quos vivis, ut tibi necessarium nihil desit. Paratur enim, quod non creditis, voluntas a Domino . Aut igitur tuum dogma iam corrige aut ad hoc defendendum desine divinum auxilium postulare.
Augustine. You seek the help of God that your empty books may be completed, and you do not seek that your perverse meanings may be corrected. Yet I could wish you would say for what you ask the help of God in this work, since it is in your free choice either to do this or not to do it. Or is it that those things may be at hand for you which are not in your power and without which this cannot be accomplished—as are, to omit others, food itself and leisure? But these God supplies to us almost always through the wills of others. You see, then, that what you ask of almighty God, when you ask help in order to complete your books, is that he work in the wills of men what helps you and what does not hinder you. For if men should be unwilling to supply you food and fitting means, if finally they should be unwilling to cease from disquieting and hindering you, you will not be able to write or dictate these things. You hope, then, that by the help of God the wills of the men among whom you live are so dealt with that nothing necessary is lacking to you. For—what you do not believe—the will is prepared by the Lord (See Prov 8:35 (LXX)). Either, then, now correct your teaching, or cease to ask divine help for defending it.
JulianImp.3.1III. 2. Iulianus. Cum in primo volumine perspicuis definitionibus constitisset Deum ita iustum esse, ut, si probari posset iustus non esse, convinceretur Deus non esse, cumque super hoc remansisset nulla dubitatio, claruit etiam iustitiam nihil esse aliud quam virtutem numquam quidquam inique iudicantem, nihil inique facientem, sed reddentem sua unicuique sine fraude sine gratia, id est sine personarum acceptione.
III. 2. Julian. Since in the first volume it had been established by clear definitions that God is so just that, if it could be proved that he is not just, it would be proved that he is not God, and since on this no doubt had remained, it became clear also that justice is nothing other than the virtue that never judges anything iniquitously, does nothing iniquitously, but renders to each his own without fraud, without favor—that is, without partiality of persons.
JulianImp.3.2Augustinus. Sine fraude verum dicis, ne puniatur immeritus; sine gratia vero si iustitia Dei esset, numquam Christus pro impiis, id est pro nihil boni et multum mali merentibus, mortuus fuisset, numquam postremo parvulos, quorum nulla bona opera voluntasque praecessit, in suum regnum adoptasset nec in eadem causa alios parvulos eiusdem regni participatione fraudasset, qui numquam inique iudicat, nihil inique facit et sua unicuique sine fraude reddit. Agnosce ergo parvulos vasa in honorem per gratiam, qui assumuntur in Dei regnum, et alios parvulos, qui in illum honorem non assumuntur, vasa in contumeliam per iudicium et tandem aliquando, ne iniquum facias Deum, confitere originale peccatum.
Augustine. Without fraud you say truly, lest the undeserving be punished; but without favor—if this were the justice of God, Christ would never have died for the ungodly, that is, for those who merited nothing good and much evil; finally, he would never have adopted into his kingdom the little ones, whose good works and will did not go before, nor, in the same case, would he have defrauded other little ones of participation in the same kingdom—he who never judges iniquitously, does nothing iniquitously, and renders to each his own without fraud. Acknowledge, then, the little ones who are taken up into the kingdom of God to be vessels for honor through grace, and the other little ones who are not taken up into that honor to be vessels for dishonor through judgment, and at last at some time, lest you make God unjust, confess original sin.
JulianImp.3.2III. 3. Iulianus. Eius autem virtutis tunc constare rationem, si nullum subditorum puniret nisi pro his delictis, quae constabat libera voluntate commissa.
III. 3. Julian. But the reason of that virtue holds then, if he punished none of his subjects except for those offenses which it was established were committed by free will.
JulianImp.3.3Augustinus. Et illud libera voluntate commissum est eius, in quo natura humana damnata est, ex qua homines damnationi nascuntur obnoxii, nisi renascantur in eo, qui non est natus obnoxius. Hoc dogma christianum vultis everti, sed illo stante vos evertimini.
Augustine. That too was committed by free will—the will of him in whom human nature was condemned, from which men are born liable to condemnation, unless they are reborn in him who was not born liable. This Christian teaching you want overthrown, but, while it stands, you are overthrown.
JulianImp.3.3III. 4. Iulianus. Nec ea hominibus praeciperet, quae per naturam eorum sciret non posse servari, nec pro rebus naturalibus reum quempiam iudicaret.
III. 4. Julian. Nor would he command men things which he knew could not be kept through their nature, nor would he judge anyone guilty for natural things.
JulianImp.3.4Augustinus. Sed fuit Adam et in illo fuimus omnes , quando ita peccavit, ut per deret in se omnes, nisi quos vellet inde liberaret, qui venit quaerere quod perierat .
Augustine. But there was Adam, and in him we all were, when he so sinned as to ruin in himself all, except those whom he would free from there—he who came to seek what had perished (See Luke 19:10).
JulianImp.3.4III. 5. Iulianus. Nec aliena peccata aliis imputaret ac per hoc nec propter parentum iniquitates innocentes eorum filios, qui per se nihil operati essent vel boni vel mali, per quod parentum suorum crimina docerentur imitati, aeternis adiudicaret suppliciis . Quibus collectis Deum et esse et iustum esse constat, quem claruerat, si aliquid operetur iniustum, tantum subire in divinitate, quantum pertulisset in aequitate dispendium.
III. 5. Julian. Nor would he impute the sins of some to others, and on this account would not adjudge to eternal punishments innocent children on account of their parents' iniquities—children who had done nothing of themselves, whether good or evil, by which they could be taught to have imitated their parents' crimes. From which gathered points it is established that God both is and is just—whom it had become clear would, if he did anything unjust, undergo in his divinity as great a loss as he had suffered in equity.
JulianImp.3.5Augustinus. Verum dicis, ac per hoc nihil operatur iniustum, cum gravi iugo premit filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum, quod utique iniustum esset, si peccatum originale non esset.
Augustine. You say truly, and on this account he does nothing unjust when he weighs down the sons of Adam with a heavy yoke from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1)—which would surely be unjust if there were no original sin.
JulianImp.3.5III. 6. Iulianus. Quamquam, o infelicitas erroris humani, nimio quippe perpendens ipsam conflictus nostri rationem dolore concutior, potuissene hoc in dubitationem venire atque assertione hanc eguisse causam; potuisse, inquam, in ecclesiis, quae Christo se credere faterentur, dubitari, utrum Deus iuste id est rationabiliter iudicaret!
III. 6. Julian. And yet—O the unhappiness of human error! For weighing the very reason of our conflict, I am shaken with excessive grief—could this have come into doubt, and could this cause have needed assertion? Could it, I say, be doubted in the churches which professed to believe in Christ, whether God judges justly, that is, reasonably!
JulianImp.3.6Augustinus. Quia hoc non dubitatur, ideo scriptum est grave iugum esse super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum ; neque enim melior est Pelagiana quam ecclesiastica sapientia.
Augustine. Because this is not doubted, therefore it is written that there is a heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1); for Pelagian wisdom is not better than ecclesiastical wisdom.
JulianImp.3.6III. 7. Iulianus. Sed nimis sum ipsa rerum reverentia eius qua de agitur contentionis oblitus. Miror enim ambigi de Dei aequitate potuisse, cum constet in Traducianorum synagogis nihil de eius iniquitate dubitari.
III. 7. Julian. But I have too much forgotten, in my very reverence for the matters, the contention that is at issue. For I wonder that it could be in doubt concerning the equity of God, when it is established that in the synagogues of the Traducianists nothing is doubted concerning his iniquity.
JulianImp.3.7Augustinus. Quia de Dei aequitate non ambigitur, ideo grave iugum super parvulum iustum esse creditur et, quia hoc iustum esse creditur, ideo parvulus sine originali peccato esse non creditur. Proinde in Ecclesia catholica, unde Pelagiani ex nobis exierunt, non, sicut dicis, nihil de iniquitate Dei, sed potius nihil de eius aequitate dubitatur, ubi nec infans, cuius est unius diei vita super terram, sine sorde peccati esse docetur et dicitur , et ideo in malis, quae patitur, non iniustus Deus, sed iustus agnoscitur.
Augustine. Because there is no doubt concerning the equity of God, therefore the heavy yoke upon the little one is believed to be just; and because this is believed to be just, therefore the little one is not believed to be without original sin. Accordingly, in the catholic Church, from which the Pelagians went out from us, it is not, as you say, nothing concerning the iniquity of God, but rather nothing concerning his equity that is doubted—where even an infant, whose life upon the earth is of one day, is taught and said not to be without the stain of sin (See Job 14:4-5 (LXX)), and therefore in the evils which he suffers, God is acknowledged not unjust, but just.
JulianImp.3.7III. 8. Iulianus. Quod certe tanto peius est, quanto gravius est studium malorum quam neglectus bonorum, quanto perniciosior intentio profanitatis quam dubitatio veritatis, quanto postremo scelestius est audere criminari Deum quam nolle venerari.
III. 8. Julian. Which is certainly so much the worse, by how much the pursuit of evils is graver than the neglect of goods, by how much an intention toward profanity is more pernicious than a doubting of the truth, by how much, finally, it is more wicked to dare to accuse God than to be unwilling to venerate him.
JulianImp.3.8Augustinus. Sed vos criminamini Deum, dum parvulos, quos iudicio eius gravi iugo premi cernitis, ullum tamen negatis habere peccatum.
Augustine. But it is you who accuse God, while you deny that the little ones, whom you discern to be weighed down by his judgment with a heavy yoke, have any sin at all.
JulianImp.3.8III. 9. Iulianus. Dixerat quidem, ut David propheta testis est, insipiens in corde suo, quia non esset Deus , non tamen dixerat, quia esset quidem, sed tamen iniustus Deus; ita concinenter totius naturae voce resonabat inseparabiliter Deo adhaerere iustitiam, ut facilius inveniretur, qui substantiam eius quam qui aequitatem negaret; potuit exsistere, qui putaret non esse, quod non videbat, non fuerat tamen inventus, qui diceret iniquum, quod divinum esse credebat.
III. 9. Julian. The fool indeed had said, as the prophet David is witness, in his heart, that there is no God (Ps 14:1 (13:1)); yet he had not said: There is indeed a God, but nevertheless an unjust one; so harmoniously did the voice of all nature resound that justice cleaves inseparably to God, that one would more easily be found who denied his substance than one who denied his equity; there could exist one who thought that not to be which he did not see, but none had been found who called iniquitous what he believed to be divine.
JulianImp.3.9Augustinus. Et ipse inventus es; nam cui nisi tali dicit: Suspicatus es iniquitatem, quod ero tibi similis? Sed quoniam Christiani catholici et esse Deum et iustum esse sciunt, ideo natos homines, si non renati in parvula aetate moriuntur, cum sint imagines Dei, non iniuste tamen, sed peccati originalis merito in regnum Dei non suscipi dubitare non possunt.
Augustine. And you yourself have been found; for to whom, except such a one, does he say: You suspected iniquity, that I would be like you? (Ps 50:21 (49:21)) But since catholic Christians know both that God exists and that he is just, therefore they cannot doubt that men who are born, if they die in their little age without being reborn, although they are images of God, are nevertheless not unjustly—but by the merit of original sin—not received into the kingdom of God.
JulianImp.3.9III. 10. Iulianus. Insipiens ergo ille negando Deum stetisse in extimo criminum videbatur. At inventa est natio Manichaeorum et Traducianorum, cuius profanitatibus vinceretur.
III. 10. Julian. That fool, then, by denying God, seemed to have stood at the outermost edge of crimes. But the nation of the Manicheans and Traducianists has been found, by whose profanities he is outdone.
JulianImp.3.10Augustinus. Sciens, quam clari probatique Doctores Ecclesiae Christi de originali peccato et de iustitia Dei quod credo crediderint, quod doceo docuerint, quod defendo defenderint, sic audire debeo contumelias tuas quomodo laudes meas.
Augustine. Knowing how clear and approved Doctors of the Church of Christ believed concerning original sin and the justice of God what I believe, taught what I teach, defended what I defend, I ought to hear your insults just as I hear my own praises.
JulianImp.3.10III. 11. Iulianus. Sed ut revertamur, unde digressi sumus, liquerat ab eo, quem fateremur verum Deum, nihil in iudicio posse fieri, quod iustitiae repugnaret, ac per hoc nec pro alienis peccatis quosquam reos teneri atque ideo nascentium innocentiam nequaquam damnari ob iniquitatem parentum, quia iniustum esset, ut reatus per semina traderetur.
III. 11. Julian. But to return whence we digressed: it had become clear that by him whom we confess to be the true God nothing can be done in judgment that would conflict with justice, and on this account that no one is held guilty for the sins of others, and therefore that the innocence of the newborn is by no means condemned for the iniquity of their parents, because it would be unjust that guilt should be handed down through the seeds.
JulianImp.3.11Augustinus. Cur ergo dictum esset: Semen eorum maledictum ab initio ? Non enim sic dictum est quomodo: Semen Chanaan et non Iuda , ubi demonstratum est, quibus similes facti erant et a quibus degeneraverant, sed eorum ipsorum semen dixit maledictum, quos naturaliter malos volebat intellegi, sicut sunt omnes filii Adam, ex quibus gratia fiunt filii Dei. Ubi enim dicitur: Non ignorans, quoniam nequam est natio illorum et naturalis malitia ipsorum et quoniam non poterat mutari cogitatio illorum in perpetuum, semen enim illorum maledictum ab initio , puto, quod natura, non imitatio redarguitur; et quomodo natura nisi vitiata peccato, non in primo homine sic creata? A quo ergo initio maledictum semen, nisi ex quo per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum? A se ipsis autem mutari non poterant, non ab omnipotente Deo, qui tamen eos utique iustissimo, quamvis occultissimo iudicio non mutabat. Ab hac enim massa non arbitrio, sed Dei gratia se mutatum esse sciebat Apostolus, quando dicebat: Fuimus et nos natura filii irae sicut et ceteri .
Augustine. Why, then, was it said: Their seed is accursed from the beginning (Wis 12:11)? For it was not said as: The seed of Canaan and not of Judah (See Dan 13:56 (Susanna)), where it was shown to whom they had been made like and from whom they had degenerated; but he said that the seed of those very ones was accursed whom he wanted understood to be naturally evil, as are all the sons of Adam, of whom by grace they become sons of God. For where it is said: Not being ignorant that their nation is wicked and their malice natural, and that their thought could not be changed forever, for their seed was accursed from the beginning (Wis 12:10-11), I think it is nature, not imitation, that is convicted; and how nature, except corrupted by sin, not created so in the first man? From what beginning, then, was the seed accursed, except from that in which through one man sin entered into the world? By themselves they could not be changed—not by almighty God, who nevertheless surely did not change them by a most just, though most hidden, judgment. For the Apostle knew that he had been changed from this mass not by free choice but by the grace of God, when he said: We too were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest (Eph 2:3).
JulianImp.3.11III. 12. Iulianus. Quod licet in tanta luce consistat, ut nihil aut absolutius inveniatur aut verius, tamen pollicitus eram hoc ipsum divinae me legis testimonio comprobare, id est iniquissimum esse, si generantium scelera nascentibus eorum liberis imputentur, sicque id adversari Deum, ut etiam in sua lege praescripserit, ne tale quidquam iudicantium deformitas perpetraret. Hoc me ergo spoponderam redditurum, sed, quoniam secundus liber apostoli Pauli exponen dis est sententiis occupatus, huius voluminis primis partibus fidem congruit promissionis impleri. Legimus ergo in Deuteronomio in catalogo praeceptorum, quibus vita et conversatio populi illius ordinatur, etiam hoc apertissime a Deo fuisse mandatum; nam ut de praecedentibus et de sequentibus, inter quae sit collocatum, possit intellegi: Non fraudabis - inquit - mercedem pauperis et egentis ex fratribus tuis aut ex proselytis, qui sunt in civitatibus tuis; quotidianam reddes mercedem illius, non occidat sol super eam, quia pauper est et in ea habet spem; et non proclamabit contra te ad Dominum et erit in te peccatum. Non morientur patres pro filiis et filii non morientur pro patribus; unusquisque in suo peccato morietur .
III. 12. Julian. Although this stands in so great a light that nothing is found either more absolute or more true, nevertheless I had promised to prove this very thing by the testimony of the divine law—that is, that it is most iniquitous if the crimes of those who beget should be imputed to the children who are born, and that God so opposes this that he prescribed even in his own law that the deformity of judges should perpetrate nothing of the kind. This, then, I had pledged myself to render; but since the second book is occupied in expounding the sentences of the apostle Paul, it is fitting that faith with the promise be fulfilled in the first parts of this volume. We read, then, in Deuteronomy, in the catalogue of precepts by which the life and conduct of that people is ordered, that this too was most openly commanded by God; for, that it may be understood from the preceding and following things among which it is placed: You shall not defraud the wage of the poor and needy, of your brethren or of the proselytes who are in your cities; you shall render his wage daily, let not the sun set upon it, because he is poor and has his hope in it; and let him not cry out against you to the Lord, and it be a sin in you. The fathers shall not die for the children, and the children shall not die for the fathers; each one shall die in his own sin (Deut 24:14-16).
JulianImp.3.12Augustinus. De filiis hoc dixit iam natis, non in primo parente damnatis, in quo omnes peccaverunt et in quo omnes moriuntur. Et hoc quidem praeceptum dedit hominibus iudicantibus, ne pater pro filio vel filius pro patre moreretur, cum reus tantummodo pater esset inventus aut filius. Ceterum iudicia sua Deus, sive cum per se ipsum sive cum per homines iudicat, quibus dat propheticum spiritum, non alligavit hac lege. Neque enim, quando excepto Noe cum suis ceteros omnes diluvio perdidit, separavit infantes, qui nondum fuerant imitati parentes suos, aut sine suis parvulis Sodomitas ille ignis assumpsit ; quod si voluisset, utique potuisset Omnipotens. Et ille Achar praecepti transgressor unus inventus et tamen cum suis filiis et filiabus occisus est . Quid de tot civitatibus debellatis eodem duce Iesu Nave, homine Dei? Nonne ita omnes interfecti sunt, ut spirans nullus relinqueretur ? Parvuli igitur quid mali fecerant? Nonne per suorum parentum peccata, quorum nec conscii nec imitatores esse adhuc poterant, divino iudicio poenam subiere communem? Aliter ergo iudicat Deus, aliter homini praecipit ut iudicet, cum Deus homine sine ulla dubitatione sit iustior. Haec debuisti ante cogitare, ne ad causam non pertinentibus immorareris exemplis.
Augustine. He said this of children already born, not of those condemned in the first parent, in whom all have sinned and in whom all die. And this precept indeed he gave to men judging, that a father should not die for a son or a son for a father, when only the father or the son was found guilty. But God did not bind his own judgments—whether when he judges by himself or when he judges through men to whom he gives the prophetic spirit—by this law. For when, except Noah with his own, he destroyed all the rest by the flood, he did not set apart the infants, who had not yet imitated their parents; nor did that fire take up the Sodomites without their little ones (See Gen 19:24-25)—which, if he had wished, the Almighty surely could have done. And that Achan, found the one transgressor of the precept, was nevertheless killed along with his sons and daughters (See Josh 7:24-25). What of so many cities conquered under the same leader Joshua, the man of God? Were they not all so slain that no one breathing was left (See Josh 10:40)? What evil, then, had the little ones done? Did they not, through the sins of their parents, of which they could not yet be either conscious or imitators, undergo by divine judgment the common penalty? God judges, then, in one way, and commands man to judge in another, since God is without any doubt more just than man. These things you ought to have thought of beforehand, lest you should dwell on examples not pertaining to the case.
JulianImp.3.12III. 13. Iulianus. Non declinabis iudicium proselyti et orphani et viduae, non accipies pignus vestimentum viduae, quia famulus eras in terra Aegypti et liberavit te Dominus Deus tuus inde; propter hoc ego tibi praecipio facere verbum hoc . Cum institueret Deus iudicandi formam, hoc statim sancire curavit, ne aut parentes in filiorum aut filii in parentum scelere ferirentur. Principium ergo et ingressum iustitiae, quam servari in iudicatione mandabat, ostendit istud esse, ne affinitas gravaret innoxios et in ipsum genus excurreret odium, quod persona meruisset. In causa ergo actuum discernit iustitia, quos necessitudo coniungit; quod utique non faceret, si una esset ratio voluntatis et seminis aut si opus arbitrii ad posteros fecunditate transiret. Satis ergo superque docuimus hoc uno testimonio taeterrimam istam iudicii pravitatem, quam novus error ample ctitur, antiqua latae legis auctoritate contritam. Quae certe sententia ita est in causam prolata, ut nullum locum reliquerit ambigendi.
III. 13. Julian. You shall not turn aside the judgment of the proselyte and the orphan and the widow; you shall not take the widow's garment as a pledge, because you were a servant in the land of Egypt and the Lord your God freed you from there; on account of this I command you to do this word (Deut 24:17-18). When God instituted the form of judging, he took care at once to sanction this, that neither should parents be struck in the crime of their children nor children in the crime of their parents. The beginning, then, and the entrance of the justice which he commanded to be kept in judging, he showed to be this: that kinship should not burden the innocent, and that the hatred which a person had merited should not run out into his very lineage. In the case of acts, then, justice distinguishes those whom relationship joins; which it surely would not do, if there were one reason for will and seed, or if the work of choice passed to posterity by fruitfulness. We have, then, sufficiently and more than sufficiently taught, by this one testimony, that that most foul depravity of judgment, which the new error embraces, is crushed by the ancient authority of the promulgated law. Which sentence is certainly so brought forward into the case that it has left no room for doubting.
JulianImp.3.13Augustinus. Resistit tibi Deus, qui dixit in libro Levitico: Et qui remanserint ex vobis, disperibunt propter peccata sua et propter peccata patrum suorum .
Augustine. God, who said in the book of Leviticus, resists you: And those who remain of you shall perish for their own sins and for the sins of their fathers (Lev 26:39).
JulianImp.3.13III. 14. Iulianus. Instituens quippe Deus, quae in examinibus deberet forma servari, praescripsit ne innocentia necessitudinis suae periculis iungeretur, atque ut patrem a supplicio peccantis filii, ita filium a patris condemnatione separavit, ostendens profecto simili exitu utriusque personae tam non posse parentum ad filios peccata transire, quam nec filiorum transeunt ad parentes.
III. 14. Julian. For God, instituting what form ought to be kept in examinations, prescribed that innocence should not be joined to the perils of its own kinship, and, as he separated the father from the punishment of a sinning son, so he separated the son from the condemnation of the father, showing surely, by the like outcome of each person, that the sins of parents can no more pass to the children than the children's pass to the parents.
JulianImp.3.14Augustinus. Suffocant te parvuli, qui non etiam propter sua, sed propter sola parentum peccata totiens leguntur occisi.
Augustine. The little ones choke you, who are read to have been so often slain not even for their own sins, but for the sins of their parents alone.
JulianImp.3.14III. 15. Iulianus. Qui ergo contra hanc sententiam dicit traducem esse peccati, dicat quoque recursum esse peccati ut, si a parentibus ad filios peccata descendunt, ascendant a filiis ad parentes, quoniam divinae legis ostendit auctoritas ita parentum crimina filiis non nocere sicut nec parentibus filiorum.
III. 15. Julian. He, then, who against this sentence says that there is a transmission of sin, let him also say that there is a return of sin, so that, if sins descend from parents to children, they may ascend from children to parents, since the authority of the divine law has shown that the crimes of parents harm children just as little as the children's harm the parents.
JulianImp.3.15Augustinus. Divinae legis auctoritas in iudiciis humanis noluit filios pendere pro parentibus poenas, non in divinis, ubi Deus dicit: Reddam peccata patrum in filios . Sic debes legere legis verba quae vis, ut cogites te auditurum esse quae non vis.
Augustine. The authority of the divine law was unwilling, in human judgments, that children should pay penalties for parents—not in divine judgments, where God says: I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Exod 20:5). You ought so to read the words of the law you want, that you consider you are going to hear the things you do not want.
JulianImp.3.15III. 16. Iulianus. Ergo contra hanc nitens ire sententiam pariter fieri asserat, quod pariter ne fieret imperatum est. Facilius quippe lex Dei negari quam emendari potest et, licet sit profana negatio, profanior tamen absurdiorque correctio est. Si enim de duobus eius decretis unum venereris, alterum exsecreris, ingratus ab eius parte, quod suscipis, et illi cogeris oboedire, quod respuis, quoniam unius quod tibi carum est dignitate, etiam id, quod adversabare, defenditur atque absurdissime ea se quisquam credit praecepta venerari, quorum partem audet incessere. Unde consequentius potest negari lex universa quam corrigi; nemo autem eam corrigere nisi impius quisque tentabit; a religiosis ergo et prudentibus tota suscipitur, tota laudatur. Nec sane quemquam moveat, quod ritum sacrificiorum veterum Novi Testamenti videat aetate cessasse. Non est una ratio virtutum et hostiarum: alia est praeceptorum perennitas, alia sacrificiorum temporalitas. Veniente tamen Christo, qui hostiis figurabatur antiquis, impleta sunt, non condemnata, quae fuerant instituta; neque enim suis temporibus praedicuntur exercita, sed succedente perfectione, quae promissa officiis eorum fuerant, quieverunt.
III. 16. Julian. Therefore, striving to go against this sentence, let him assert that the thing happens alike which was commanded alike not to happen. For the law of God can more easily be denied than emended; and, although the denial is profane, the correction is nevertheless more profane and more absurd. For if of his two decrees you should venerate one and execrate the other, ungrateful in the part you accept, you are compelled to obey even that which you reject, since by the dignity of the one that is dear to you, even that which you opposed is defended; and most absurdly does anyone believe that he venerates those precepts, part of which he dares to assail. Whence the whole law can more consequently be denied than corrected; but no one will attempt to correct it except the impious; by the religious and prudent, therefore, the whole is accepted, the whole is praised. Nor indeed let it move anyone that he sees the rite of the old sacrifices have ceased in the age of the New Testament. There is not one reason for virtues and for victims: the perennity of precepts is one thing, the temporality of sacrifices another. Yet with Christ coming, who was figured by the ancient victims, the things that had been instituted were fulfilled, not condemned; for they are not foretold as practiced in their own times, but, with the perfection succeeding which had been promised by their offices, they came to rest.
JulianImp.3.16Augustinus. Hoc quid ad rem? Peccata patrum se dixit Deus in filios redditurum, non sacrificia, et cum possint etiam parentes imitari malos filios, numquam ta men Deus dixit: Reddam peccata filiorum in patres, sed ubicumque hoc dixit, cum saepe hoc dixerit , patrum dixit in filios, ubi utique generationis, non imitationis se ostendit vitia persequentem.
Augustine. What does this matter to the case? God said he would repay the sins of fathers upon children, not sacrifices; and although parents can even imitate evil children, God nevertheless never said: I will repay the sins of children upon fathers, but wherever he said this—and he said it often—he said of fathers upon children, where surely he shows himself prosecuting the defects of generation, not of imitation.
JulianImp.3.16III. 17. Iulianus. Praecepta autem, quibus pietas fides iustitia sanctitas continetur, non solum non cessaverunt, verum etiam cumulata sunt. Et haec lex iustitiae in iudiciis custodiendae, quam de Deuteronomio protulimus, non ad cerimoniarum aetatem, sed ad praeceptorum perennitatem respicit nec cum circumcisione discessit, sed cum iustitia perseverat.
III. 17. Julian. But the precepts in which piety, faith, justice, and holiness are contained not only have not ceased but have even been heaped up. And this law of justice to be kept in judgments, which we brought forth from Deuteronomy, looks not to the age of ceremonies but to the perennity of precepts, and did not depart with circumcision, but perseveres with justice.
JulianImp.3.17Augustinus. Iam tibi dictum est hominibus haec imperata esse iudicia, non Deo posita praeiudicia. Denique si homo iudicans dicat: Reddam peccata patrum in filios, iniustissime dicit et divino imperio contradicit, nec ideo tamen Deus aut mendax aut iniustus est, cum hoc dicit.
Augustine. It has already been said to you that these are judgments commanded to men, not prejudgments laid down for God. Finally, if a man judging should say: I will repay the sins of fathers upon children, he says it most unjustly and contradicts the divine command; nor yet for that reason is God either a liar or unjust when he says this.
JulianImp.3.17III. 18. Iulianus. In absoluto est igitur, si Moysi creditur magis, per quem Deus loquitur, quam Augustino, per quem Manichaeus, parentum peccatis reos per naturam filios non teneri.
III. 18. Julian. It is settled, then—if Moses, through whom God speaks, is believed rather than Augustine, through whom Mani speaks—that children are not held guilty by nature for the sins of their parents.
JulianImp.3.18Augustinus. Eam fidem me defendere adversus te, quam catholici sancti clarique Doctores, qui fuerunt ante nos, in Ecclesia catholica didicerunt atque docuerunt, etiam ipse nosti; sed quoniam, illos si lacerare audeas, nec tui te ferunt, ideo unum me elegisti, quem convitio falsi criminis appetitum quasi fugiendum persuadeas, ut fides illa fugiatur, quae defensa vos damnat. Iam et superius tibi dixi; quando pro defensione catholicae fidei ab haereticis contumelias audio, pro laudibus habeo. Quid laboras nobis praedicare quod scimus? Moyses verum dixit, sed tu nihil dicis. Reddam peccata patrum in filios non ait homo sed Deus; neque, ut homo id faciat, Deus praecepit hoc loco, sed quid ipse faciat, indicavit.
Augustine. That I defend against you the faith which the catholic, holy, and illustrious Doctors who were before us learned and taught in the catholic Church, you yourself know; but since, if you should dare to tear them, not even your own people bear with you, therefore you have chosen me alone, whom, assailed with the reproach of a false charge, you may persuade men to flee as one to be shunned, so that that faith may be fled which, when defended, condemns you. I have already said to you above too: when, for the defense of the catholic faith, I hear insults from heretics, I count them as praises. Why do you labor to proclaim to us what we know? Moses said the truth, but you say nothing. I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Exod 20:5)—it is not a man who says this, but God; nor did God command in this passage that a man should do this, but he indicated what he himself does.
JulianImp.3.18III. 19. Iulianus. Atque ita non transire ad posteros crimina generantium, quamvis ex eis nati sint, sicut nec filiorum ad parentes, qui de filiis suis nequaquam potuere generari. Ita igitur innocentiae nativitas sua officere non potest, sicut non potest obesse, cum non est.
III. 19. Julian. And so the crimes of those who beget do not pass to posterity, although they are born of them, just as neither do the crimes of children pass to parents, who could by no means have been begotten of their own children. Thus, then, one's birth can no more stand in the way of innocence than it can be a hindrance, since it does not exist.
JulianImp.3.19Augustinus. Negare tamen non potes posse parentes imitari filios suos nec umquam Deum dixisse: Reddam peccata filiorum in patres. Cum ergo dicit: patrum in filios, non imitationem, sed generationem redarguit, non quomodo ex illo uno, in quo ipsa in deterius natura mutata est, ut propter hoc etiam mori necesse sit homini, sed tamen aliquo modo nonnulla quorumque patrum peccata redduntur in filios non imitatione, sed generatione punita; ideo non dicit: in tertiam et quartam imitationem, sed: generationem vobis quidem nolentibus, verumtamen et vobis velitis nolitis audientibus.
Augustine. Yet you cannot deny that parents can imitate their own children, nor that God ever said: I will repay the sins of children upon fathers. When, therefore, he says of fathers upon children, he convicts not imitation but generation—not in the way that, from that one in whom nature itself was changed for the worse (so that on this account it is even necessary for man to die), but yet in some way, certain sins of various fathers are repaid upon the children, punished not by imitation but by generation; therefore he does not say unto the third and fourth imitation, but: generation (Exod 20:5)—you indeed being unwilling, but nevertheless you too, whether you will or not, hearing it.
JulianImp.3.19III. 20. Iulianus. Acta quidem res est; sed tamen, ut ad id quod affero sit intentus lector, admoneo. Si quispiam exsisteret, qui hoc profiteretur libertate verborum, quod argumentando Traducianus conficere conatur, id est ut pugnam indiceret legi Dei et sententiam, quam protulimus, sine aliquo timore despiceret assereretque, quibus posset modis, falsum hoc utrumque esse, quod Deus servari voluit, et sententiam, de qua loquimur, ex utraque, quantum in se erat, parte subrueret, prorsus putasset parentes propter filiorum et filios propter parentum peccata tam solere quam debere damnari, nec hic tamen talis peccati traducem, vel secundum opiniones suas quiret asserere. Cur? Videlicet quia, etsi constaret falsam legis esse sententiam, quae testificaretur eiusmodi necessitudines respergi mutuis non posse criminibus, tamen inconcussum manebat traducem non esse peccati. Hoc enim ipso, quo et parentum reatus ad filios et filiorum ad parentes redibat, constabat non fuisse generationis, quod ad filios gignentium peccata pervenerant, quoniam et a filiis ad parentes, ubi generatio non poterat causa esse, remeaverant. Quid igitur hic confecerim appareat, inviolabilem quidem esse auctoritatem legis divinae et quam nulla queant impietatum argumenta proruere, eius autem sanctione signantissime atque absolutissime fuisse praescriptum foedam esse opinionem perversitatemque iudicii, quam mandaverat vehementer cavendam, si rei filii pro peccato pronuntiarentur parentum, quo fulmine traducis structura dissiluit, verumtamen tantis esse veritatis praesidiis munitam quam tuemur fidem, ut nec ab ea profanitate, quae potest Dei legem negare, quatiatur.
III. 20. Julian. The matter is indeed done; but yet, that the reader may be attentive to what I bring forward, I give warning. If anyone should exist who professed with freedom of words what the Traducianist tries to accomplish by arguing—that is, that he should declare war on the law of God, and despise without any fear the sentence we brought forward, and assert in whatever ways he could that both of these things are false which God willed to be kept, and undermine the sentence of which we speak from both sides, as far as in him lay, reckoning utterly that parents are wont, as well as ought, to be condemned for the sins of their children, and children for the sins of their parents—not even such a man could assert a transmission of sin, even according to his own opinions. Why? Namely, because, even if it were established that the sentence of the law is false which testifies that such kinships cannot be sprinkled with mutual crimes, nevertheless it remained unshaken that there is no transmission of sin. For by the very fact that the guilt both of parents returned to children and of children to parents, it was established that it was not of generation that the sins of those begetting reached the children, since they had also returned from children to parents, where generation could not be the cause. Let it appear, then, what I have accomplished here: that the authority of the divine law is inviolable and such that no arguments of impieties can overthrow it, but that by its sanction it was most signally and most absolutely prescribed that it is a foul opinion and a perversity of judgment—which he had commanded to be vehemently guarded against—if children should be pronounced guilty for the sin of their parents; by which thunderbolt the structure of transmission has burst asunder; but yet that the faith we maintain is fortified by such safeguards of truth that it is not shaken even by that profanity which can deny the law of God.
JulianImp.3.20Augustinus. Quaeris, ubi spatieris, vagabunda loquacitate non copiosus, sed odiosus eis, qui rebus inhaerentes superflua verba contemnunt. Vinceris quippe ab adversariis, quos habes, et vincendos proponis tibi, quos non habes. Quis enim tibi dicit falsum esse, quod Deus servare voluit in iudiciis humanis, cum iam patres et filii suas proprias causas habent ad suam cuiusque vitam, quae separatim ducitur, pertinentes, ut nec filii pro patribus nec patres pro filiis puniantur? Nemo vel legi vel tibi haec dicenti adversatur. Tu noli obsurdescere adversus Deum dicentem: Reddam peccata patrum in filios et, cum hoc assidue dicat, nusquam dicentem peccata filiorum se reddere in patres, ut intellegas non qui eorum quos imitentur, sed qui ex quibus generentur attendi.
Augustine. You seek where you may range about, with wandering garrulity—not copious, but odious to those who, clinging to the matters, despise superfluous words. For you are conquered by the adversaries you have, and you set before yourself, to be conquered, adversaries you do not have. For who tells you that what God willed to be kept in human judgments is false, since now fathers and children have their own proper cases, pertaining to the life of each, which is led separately, so that neither children for fathers nor fathers for children are punished? No one opposes either the law or you when you say these things. But do not grow deaf against God saying: I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Exod 20:5)—and, while he says this constantly, nowhere saying that he repays the sins of children upon fathers—so that you may understand that it is regarded not whom they imitate, but from whom they are begotten.
JulianImp.3.20III. 21. Iulianus. Nunc igitur ad eum, quicum agimus, sermo respiciat. Acquiescis legi Dei (professione interim, ceterum, quid facias argumentando, novimus), an resistis? Si acquiescis, sublata contentio est, si resistis, sublata consensio est; si acquiescis, exstincta Traducianorum, si resistis, Manichaeorum revelata perfidia est, dummodo constet opinioni vestrae et legi Dei neutiquam convenire.
III. 21. Julian. Now, therefore, let the discourse look back to him with whom we deal. Do you acquiesce in the law of God (in profession for the time being—but what you do by arguing, we know), or do you resist it? If you acquiesce, the contention is removed; if you resist, the consent is removed; if you acquiesce, the perfidy of the Traducianists is extinguished; if you resist, that of the Manicheans is revealed—provided only it is established that it by no means agrees with your opinion and the law of God.
JulianImp.3.21Augustinus. Ego acquiesco legi Dei, sed tu non acquiescis. Ego non nego nec filium pro patre nec patrem pro filio, quando suas separatas causas habent, debere damnari; sed tu audire non vis in Levitico: Disperibunt propter peccata patrum suorum , et in libro Numerorum: Reddens peccata patrum in filios usque in tertiam et quartam generationem , et apud Ieremiam: Reddens peccata patrum in sinu filiorum eorum post eos . Haec et alia similia tu non audis, his ac talibus legis testimoniis tu non acquiescis et tamen loqui et Manichaeos catholicis obicere non quiescis.
Augustine. I acquiesce in the law of God, but you do not acquiesce. I do not deny that neither a son for a father nor a father for a son ought to be condemned, when they have their own separate cases; but you are unwilling to hear in Leviticus: They shall perish for the sins of their fathers (Lev 26:39), and in the book of Numbers: Repaying the sins of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation (Num 14:18), and in Jeremiah: Repaying the sins of the fathers into the bosom of their children after them (Jer 32:18). These and other like things you do not hear; in these and such testimonies of the law you do not acquiesce, and yet you do not cease to speak and to charge catholics with being Manicheans.
JulianImp.3.21III. 22. Iulianus. Nisi forte dicas Deum quidem hoc imperasse, sed non facere, quod praecepit, immo contraria agere his, quae agenda mandaverit.
III. 22. Julian. Unless perhaps you say that God indeed commanded this, but does not do what he commanded—nay, does things contrary to those he commanded to be done.
JulianImp.3.22Augustinus. Et hoc quam insipienter cogites, cur non attendis? Facit enim Deus aliquando contra quam facienda mandavit. Nec opus est, ut multa commemorem, ne sit longum. Ecce quod notum est omnibus dico; mandavit homini Scriptura divina dicens: Non te laudet os tuum , nec tamen Deus dicendus est arrogans aut superbus, cum se innumerabiliter laudare non desinit; et unde agitur, iam superius demonstravi, quemadmodum Deus sine ulla iniquitate pro peccatis parentum simul cum eis interemerit parvulos, quamvis mandaverit homini, ne filios pro peccatis patrum, cum iudicat, damnet. Haec si adverteres, ista non diceres; aut si et haec advertis et tamen ista dicis, adverte etiam vana esse quae dicis.
Augustine. And how unwisely you think this, why do you not attend? For God sometimes does the contrary of what he commanded to be done. Nor is there need that I recall many things, lest it be long. Behold, I say what is known to all: divine Scripture commanded man, saying: Let not your own mouth praise you (Prov 27:2); nor yet is God to be called arrogant or proud, when he does not cease to praise himself innumerable times; and as to the matter at issue, I have already shown above how God, without any iniquity, for the sins of the parents slew the little ones along with them, although he commanded man not to condemn children for the sins of fathers when he judges. If you would notice these things, you would not say those things; or if you do notice these things and yet say those things, notice also that what you say is empty.
JulianImp.3.22III. 23. Iulianus. Quod licet, quantae sit profanitatis, vix indicatum iam vehementer appareat, tamen pace ipsius divinitatis, cuius aequitatem tuemur, quale sit hoc, vel levi discus sione videamus. Ut ipse itaque fiat legis suae praevaricator, rerum necessitate, quae eum premunt, an sua imbecillitate compellitur? An, quia horum neutrum est, sola libidine delinquendi? At hoc nec Manichaeus dicere potuit et ideo commentus est Deum vestrum grave proelium pertulisse.
III. 23. Julian. Although how great a profanity this is now vehemently appears, though scarcely indicated, nevertheless—with the leave of that very divinity whose equity we maintain—let us see, by even a light discussion, what kind of thing this is. That he himself, then, should become a transgressor of his own law: is he compelled by the necessity of affairs that press upon him, or by his own weakness? Or, because neither of these is the case, by the mere lust of offending? But this not even Mani could say, and therefore he invented that your God endured a grave battle.
JulianImp.3.23Augustinus. Verba iactas, cum rebus urgearis; non est legis suae praevaricator, quando aliud Deus facit ut Deus, aliud imperat homini ut homini.
Augustine. You toss out words when you are pressed by the matters; he is not a transgressor of his own law when God, as God, does one thing, and commands man, as man, another.
JulianImp.3.23III. 24. Iulianus. Si ergo nec calamitas nec imbecillitas nec libido ei praevaricationis incumbit, qui fieri potest, ut eam iustitiae formam, quam commendavit iubendo, destruat iudicando, immo non in istam iustitiam, sed in reverentiam suam saeviat (tanta est quippe aequitatis potentia, ut et deviantes arguat et nulla fugientium a se auctoritate minuatur) postremo ut quae sunt iusta a nobis fieri velit et ipse faciat quod iniustum est? Iustiores nos, quam ipse est, cupit videri, immo non iustiores, sed nos aequos et se iniquum?
III. 24. Julian. If, then, neither calamity nor weakness nor lust of transgression presses upon him, how can it be that he should destroy by judging that form of justice which he commended by commanding—nay, that he should rage not against this justice but against his own reverence (for so great is the power of equity that it both convicts those who deviate and is diminished by no authority of those who flee from it)—finally, that he should will just things to be done by us, and himself do what is unjust? Does he wish us to seem more just than he is himself—nay, not more just, but us equitable and himself iniquitous?
JulianImp.3.24Augustinus. Quid est quod dicis, homo, qui multum desipis? Quanto excelsior, tanto inscrutabilior divina quam hu mana iustitia tantoque ab hac illa distantior. Quis enim homo iustus sinit perpetrari scelus, quod habet in potestate non sinere? Et tamen sinit haec Deus incomparabiliter iustis omnibus iustior et cuius potestas est incomparabiliter omnibus potestatibus maior. Haec cogita et noli iudicem Deum iudicibus hominibus comparare, quem non dubitandum est esse iustum, etiam quando facit, quod hominibus videtur iniustum et quod homo si faceret esset iniustus.
Augustine. What is this that you say, man, who are very unwise? By how much loftier, by so much more unsearchable is divine justice than human, and by so much more distant from this. For what just man permits a crime to be perpetrated which he has it in his power not to permit? And yet God permits these things—God, incomparably more just than all the just, and whose power is incomparably greater than all powers. Think on these things, and do not compare God the judge to men the judges—God, who is not to be doubted to be just even when he does what seems unjust to men, and what, if a man did it, he would be unjust.
JulianImp.3.24III. 25. Iulianus. An illud quidem iustum est, quod ipse facit, id est aliena peccata aliis imputando, et nobis praecipit, quod iniustum est, ut unumquemque pro voluntatis suae delictis reum pronuntiemus?
III. 25. Julian. Or is that indeed just which he himself does—that is, imputing the sins of some to others—while he commands us what is unjust, namely, that we should pronounce each one guilty for the offenses of his own will?
JulianImp.3.25Augustinus. Lege quod superius tibi responsum est, et disce, si potes, quemadmodum peccata originalia et aliena intellegantur et nostra, non eadem causa aliena qua nostra; aliena enim, quia non ea in sua vita quisque commisit, nostra vero, quia fuit Adam et in illo fuimus omnes .
Augustine. Read what was answered to you above, and learn, if you can, how original sins are understood to be both another's and ours—not another's for the same reason as ours; for they are another's because no one committed them in his own life, but ours because there was Adam, and in him we all were.
JulianImp.3.25III. 26. Iulianus. Et unde ei aut tanta invidia aut tanta malignitas? Invidia est enim, si ad hoc decepit praecipiendo creaturam suam, ne virtutes eius, in quantum poterat, conaretur imitari; malignitas autem, immo crudelitas, si puniat propter iniusta opera mortales, quae, cum legi eius oboediunt, perpetrarunt.
III. 26. Julian. And whence in him either so great envy or so great malignity? For it is envy, if by commanding he deceived his creature to this end—that it should not try, as far as it could, to imitate his virtues; but malignity, nay cruelty, if he punishes mortals for unjust works which they perpetrated when obeying his law.
JulianImp.3.26Augustinus. Iam superius demonstravi quaedam Deum iuste facere, quae si homo faciat, iniuste facit. Nam et iniurias suas Deus ulciscitur iuste; hominibus autem dicitur: Non vos ipsos vindicantes, carissimi, sed date locum irae; scriptum est enim: Mihi vindictam, ego retribuam, dicit Dominus .
Augustine. I have already shown above that God does justly certain things which, if a man does them, he does unjustly. For God avenges even his own injuries justly; but to men it is said: Not avenging yourselves, dearly beloved, but give place to wrath; for it is written: Vengeance is mine, I will repay, says the Lord (Rom 12:19).
JulianImp.3.26III. 27. Iulianus. An forte non punit, quod quidem facit prudenter, sed etiam remuneratur famulos praeceptis suis, licet iniustitiam docentibus, obsecutos? Et quid ei profuit invidere, si et iniustas res faciendo eo pervenerunt mortales, quo etiam iustitiam servando venissent? Cumque illis, quos circumvenit, de felicitate nihil pereat, hic tamen benignitatis ac iustitiae conscientia simul et honore privatur. Quanto erat tolerabilius a religionis professione colla subducere quam per tam praerupta, tam exitialia orbitas ducere?
III. 27. Julian. Or perhaps he does not punish—which indeed he does prudently—but even rewards servants who have obeyed his precepts, though they teach injustice? And what did it profit him to envy, if even by doing unjust things mortals arrived where they would have arrived also by keeping justice? And since, for those whom he circumvents, nothing of happiness perishes, he himself is nevertheless deprived at once of the conscience of kindness and justice and of his honor. How much more tolerable it would be to withdraw one's neck from the profession of religion than to lead one's bereavement through such precipitous, such deadly ways?
JulianImp.3.27Augustinus. Sequeris te nihil dicens. Ab humana iustitia discerne divinam et videbis iuste Deum peccata patrum reddere in filios, quod tamen in iudicio suo si homo sibi usurpet iniustus est. Ne tu exorbites a via iusta, ut, cum audis peccata patrum in filios vindicari, aut Deum nolis id facere aut hominem velis vel testimoniis vel mandatis resistendo divinis.
Augustine. You follow yourself, saying nothing. Distinguish divine justice from human, and you will see that God justly repays the sins of fathers upon children—which, however, if a man should usurp it for himself in his own judgment, he is unjust. Do not you stray from the just way, so that, when you hear that the sins of fathers are avenged upon children, you either want God not to do it, or want a man to do it, by resisting either the divine testimonies or commands.
JulianImp.3.27III. 28. Iulianus. Igitur quoniam vel a servis suis nihil tale committi Deus sinit, quale tu ab ipso asseris perpetrari, manifestum est non minus te ab honore eius quam ab humana ratione fugisse; ac per hoc non Pelagiano, sicut dicis, errore decipimur, sed Dei lege dirigimur, ut asseramus iniquum esse pa rentum crimina filiis imputari.
III. 28. Julian. Therefore, since God does not allow even his servants to commit any such thing as you assert is perpetrated by him, it is manifest that you have fled no less from his honor than from human reason; and on this account we are not, as you say, deceived by a Pelagian error, but directed by the law of God, so as to assert that it is iniquitous for the crimes of parents to be imputed to children.
JulianImp.3.28Augustinus. Non semel, sed saepius dixit Deus peccata patrum se reddere in filios, ubi utique non dixit in patres se reddere peccata filiorum aut in fratres fratrum aut in amicos amicorum aut in cives civium aut aliquid eiusmodi, ut sciremus, quando illud dicitur, generationem redargui, non imitationem; quod et tu posses in divinis eloquiis intellegere, si non Pelagiano impedireris errore.
Augustine. Not once but often God said that he repays the sins of fathers upon children, where surely he did not say that he repays the sins of children upon fathers, or of brothers upon brothers, or of friends upon friends, or of citizens upon citizens, or anything of the kind, that we might know, when that is said, that generation is convicted, not imitation; which you too could understand in the divine words, if you were not hindered by the Pelagian error.
JulianImp.3.28III. 29. Iulianus. Quod tradux peccati, Manichaeorum filia, vestra mater, hac tempestate prodigialiter peperisse defletur.
III. 29. Julian. Which transmission of sin—the daughter of the Manicheans, your mother—it is lamented to have given birth to prodigiously in this storm.
JulianImp.3.29Augustinus. Non ratiocinaris, sed convitiaris et calumniaris. Relege antiquos divini eloquii tractatores et vide non hac tempestate, sed longe ante nos in verbis Apostoli hoc intellectum esse, quod apertissime dixit, id est quod per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines pertransiit , ad generationem pertinere, quam regeneratio sanat, non ad imitationem, quam vos potius hac tempestate peperistis. Unde vos tempestas novitii dogmatis vestri a facie catholicae proiecit Ecclesiae tamquam pulverem, quem proicit ventus a facie terrae .
Augustine. You do not reason, but you revile and slander. Reread the ancient expounders of the divine word and see that not in this storm, but long before us, in the words of the Apostle, this was understood—what he most openly said, that is, that through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death, and so it passed to all human beings (Rom 5:12)—to pertain to generation, which regeneration heals, not to imitation, which it is rather you who have given birth to in this storm. Whence the storm of your novel teaching has cast you out from the face of the catholic Church like dust, which the wind casts out from the face of the earth (See Ps 1:4).
JulianImp.3.29III. 30. Iulianus. Esse igitur hoc a Deo imperatum, quod asserimus, claruit; et quamvis sententiae ipsius aperta et intellectui omnium conciliata germanitas nullius in se naevum obscuritatis admiserit, tamen, ne tu ad ingenii nostri confugias tarditatem et dicas non nos intellegere quod praeceptum est, alio quoque testimonio non iam praecepti, sed operis secundum praeceptum exerciti, quemadmodum sit lex intellecta, doceamus. Legimus in libro quarto Regnorum de Amessia, filio Ioas, regis Iuda: Factum est, inquit, postquam stabilitum est regnum in manibus eius, occidit pueros suos, qui occiderant patrem suum; sed filios eorum non occidit secundum testamentum legis Domini, quo praeceptum est: Non morientur patres pro filiis nec filii pro patribus . Vides, quemadmodum historiae fides iustitiam regis iudicantis ostenderit, qui quamvis fuisset devotus, tamen, quoniam claudicasse animo in nonnullis refertur, ad iudicii eius confirmationem commemoratae legis Dei accessit auctoritas; ne enim parum haberet ponderis factum hoc consideratione facientis, secundum legem et testamentum Dei commendatur impletum.
III. 30. Julian. That this which we assert was commanded by God has become clear; and although the open kinship of his sentence, conciliated to the understanding of all, admits in itself the blemish of no obscurity, nevertheless, lest you take refuge in the slowness of our talent and say that we do not understand what was commanded, let us teach also by another testimony—not now of a precept, but of a work carried out according to the precept—how the law was understood. We read in the fourth book of Kings concerning Amaziah, son of Joash, king of Judah: It came to pass, it says, after the kingdom was established in his hands, he killed his servants who had killed his father; but their sons he did not kill, according to the covenant of the law of the Lord, in which it is commanded: The fathers shall not die for the children, nor the children for the fathers (2 Kgs 14:5-6). You see how the faith of history has shown the justice of the king judging, who, although he had been devout, nevertheless—since he is reported to have halted in mind in some matters—for the confirmation of his judgment the authority of the cited law of God came in; for lest this deed have too little weight from the consideration of the doer, it is commended as fulfilled according to the law and covenant of God.
JulianImp.3.30Augustinus. Hoc iudicium Deus hominum voluit esse, non suum, qui dixit: Reddam peccata patrum in filios . Quod etiam per hominem fecit, quando per Iesum Nave non solum Achar, sed etiam filios eius occidit , vel per eumdem populi sui ducem filios Chananaeorum etiam parvulos nondum parentum peccata suis moribus imitatos cum eisdem tamen parentibus, ut perirent, non iniusta utique severitate damnavit . Noli ergo loquaciter ac inaniter multiplicare tua scripta, sed Scripturam Dei diligenter attende ne, quod in una eius parte aperuisse te putas, clausum contra te in altera invenias.
Augustine. This judgment God willed to be of men, not his own—he who said: I will repay the sins of fathers upon children (Exod 20:5). Which he did even through a man, when through Joshua son of Nun he killed not only Achan but also his sons (See Josh 7:24-25); or when through the same leader of his people he condemned the sons of the Canaanites—even the little ones who had not yet imitated their parents' sins by their own conduct—to perish along with those same parents, by a severity surely not unjust (See Josh 10:40). Do not, then, garrulously and emptily multiply your writings, but attend diligently to the Scripture of God, lest what you think you have opened in one part of it you find closed against you in another.
JulianImp.3.30III. 31. Iulianus. Duobus et tribus testibus etiam contra sanguinem hominis credi solet; quanto magis duobus sacris testibus, legi, quae in Deuteronomio continetur, et historiae, quae regum facta complectitur, pro Dei honore crederetur! Quomodo iudicari vellet, ipse praescripsit; quomodo, quod mandaverat, accipi deberet, secundum legem eius iudicia prolata testantur; et dubitatur adhuc traducem peccati Scripturarum probari auctoritate non posse? Certe sunt ista contraria, pro quibus tam longis conflictibus dimicatur, id est unum quod a vobis, aliud quod a nobis defenditur, et ita contraria atque repugnantia, ut vos persequendo, nos disputando, vos furore, nos ratione certemus. Utraque ergo pars distare sibi haec et repugnare consentit, id est propter parentum peccata puniri filios et propter parentum peccata filios non puniri; crimen naturale esse et crimen naturale non esse; ut parentum peccata filiis imputentur, Dei lege praescribi et, ut non imputentur parentum peccata filiis, Dei lege praescribi. Has opiniones contra semet sententiasque bellantes pariter veras non posse esse manifestum est. Nam et disputationis eruditae regulis indicatur, cum de rebus incertis opinio duplex nascitur, utramque falsam esse posse, utramque veram esse non posse; quod quidem in speciebus diversis et quae medium habere dicuntur, non tamen in his, quae contraria sunt, sed medio carent, evenire potest. Notae dialecticis res sunt, sed propter lectorem disciplinae huius expertem aliquo id reseremus exemplo.
III. 31. Julian. By two and three witnesses it is wont to be believed even against the blood of a man; how much more, by two sacred witnesses—the law contained in Deuteronomy and the history that embraces the deeds of the kings—should it be believed, for the honor of God! How he willed to be judged, he himself prescribed; how what he had commanded ought to be received, the judgments brought forth according to his law attest; and is it still doubted that a transmission of sin cannot be proved by the authority of the Scriptures? Surely these are contraries for which we contend in such long conflicts—that is, one thing defended by you, another by us, and so contrary and conflicting that you contend by persecuting, we by disputing; you by fury, we by reason. Both sides, then, agree that these things differ from each other and conflict—that is, that children are punished for the sins of parents, and that children are not punished for the sins of parents; that there is a natural crime, and that there is no natural crime; that it is prescribed by the law of God that the sins of parents be imputed to children, and that it is prescribed by the law of God that the sins of parents not be imputed to children. That these opinions and sentences, warring against themselves, cannot be alike true is manifest. For even by the rules of learned disputation it is shown that, when a twofold opinion arises concerning uncertain matters, both can be false, but both cannot be true—which indeed can happen in diverse species and in things said to have a mean, yet not in those which are contrary but lack a mean. These matters are known to dialecticians; but for the reader inexperienced in this discipline, let us unlock it by some example.
JulianImp.3.31Augustinus. Ita quaeris, unde libros loquacissimos impleas, ut etiam dialecticam, ubi non opus est, lectores eorum docere coneris non cogitans, quomodo abiciat Christi Ecclesia dialecticum, quem cernit haereticum. Quis enim te id agere non intellegat, ut in sapientia verbi evacues crucem Christi , qui pro omnibus, pro quibus mortuus est, in quibus et te confitente sunt parvuli, in remissionem peccatorum sanguinem fudit?
Augustine. You so seek how to fill your most garrulous books that you try even to teach dialectic, where there is no need, to their readers—not considering how the Church of Christ casts out the dialectician whom it perceives to be a heretic. For who does not understand that you are doing this—that in the wisdom of word you may empty the cross of Christ (See 1 Cor 1:17), who shed his blood for the remission of sins, for all for whom he died, among whom, by your own confession, are the little ones?
JulianImp.3.31III. 32. Iulianus. Veniat verbi gratia in quaestionem Golias quo fuerit affectus colore, et unus eum nigrum, alter candidum fuisse confirmet ; diversa haec opinio potest utraque falsa, utraque autem vera esse non potest. Non enim potest verum esse nigrum illum fuisse, si candidus fuit semper, aut candidum fuisse, si niger omni aetate permansit. Haec ergo utraque opinio, quae simul vera esse non potest, simul falsa esse hoc modo potest, si nec candidus nec niger, sed flavus eius color fuit vel infracto candore nec tamen infusa nigredine ex contrariis mediocriter temperatus. Facilius ergo res diversae et contrariae negari possunt pariter quam pariter approbari. Ista autem contraria, quae medium non habent, ut puta bonum et malum, iustum et iniustum, innocentia et reatus, ut uno tempore in unum atque idem convenire non possunt, ita necesse est, ut altero eorum posito alterum denegetur, id est, ut vel praeceptum vel consilium vel adiumentum non potest simul in uno tempore et iustum et iniustum esse, ita et homo non potest uno eodemque tempore et reus et innocens et bonus et malus esse.
III. 32. Julian. Let Goliath, for example, come into question—of what color his complexion was—and let one affirm that he was black, another that he was white; this diverse opinion can be both false, but cannot be both true. For it cannot be true that he was black, if he was always white, or that he was white, if he remained black at every age. Both these opinions, then, which cannot be true at the same time, can be false at the same time in this way: if he was neither white nor black, but his color was tawny, or moderately tempered from the contraries, with whiteness broken yet without blackness infused. More easily, then, can diverse and contrary things be alike denied than alike affirmed. But these contraries which have no mean—as, for instance, good and evil, just and unjust, innocence and guilt—as they cannot meet at one time in one and the same thing, so it is necessary that, when one of them is posited, the other be denied—that is, as a precept or a counsel or a help cannot at one and the same time be both just and unjust, so too a man cannot at one and the same time be both guilty and innocent, and both good and evil.
JulianImp.3.32Augustinus. Nemo quaerit cuius fuerit coloris Golias; sed tu quaeris, ut insidieris, quibus te coloribus versipellis involvas. Si dialectica ista, quae te non aedificat, sed inflat et ridiculum, quoniam iactanticulum facit, si haec, inquam, dialectica, quae asserit unumquemque bonum et malum simul esse non posse, ad leges christianae disputationis admittitur, non potest esse unus homo simul et natura bonus et vitio malus, quod tamen esse posse clamat veritas nec tu negas; et contra dialecticam tuam testis etiam ipse produceris, cum, sicut se res habet, horum duorum, quae contraria esse non ambigis, alterum tribuis Conditori hominis, alterum voluntati. Erubescat ergo dialectica tua et sicut tu de communione, ita et ipsa de catholicorum disputatione discedat; si autem, quod optamus, tu redire volueris, foris ipsa remaneat.
Augustine. No one asks of what color Goliath was; but you ask, in order to lie in wait, with what colors you, a shape-shifter, may wrap yourself. If this dialectic of yours, which does not build you up but puffs you up and makes you ridiculous (since it makes you a little boaster)—if this dialectic, I say, which asserts that each one cannot be good and evil at the same time, is admitted to the laws of Christian disputation, then one man cannot at the same time be both good by nature and evil by defect—which, however, the truth cries out can be, and you do not deny; and you are yourself produced even as a witness against your own dialectic, since, as the matter stands, of these two things which you do not doubt to be contrary, you attribute one to the Founder of man, the other to the will. Let your dialectic, then, blush, and, just as you withdrew from communion, so let it too withdraw from the disputation of catholics; but if—what we desire—you should be willing to return, let it remain outside.
JulianImp.3.32III. 33. Iulianus. Ad causam itaque referantur exempla. Ut parentum peccata filiis imputentur et parentum peccata filiis non imputentur, non potest hoc utrumque contrarium pariter iustum probari; sed si iustitia est generantium subolem ream teneri, necesse est, ut iniustitia sit, si propter eadem peccata rea non esse dicatur; et sicut bonum est iuste praecipere, ita malum est iniuste quidquam iubere; et quamvis res perspicua argumentando levior fiat, tamen, quoniam causam in absoluto positam iuvat etiam legis divinae confirmare suffragiis, inhaereamus huic loco, in quo, quicumque sana mente constiterit, per praerupta quaestionum praesentium errare non sinitur. Acquiescis igitur, annuntiator naturalis mali, praescriptum esse lege Dei, ne filii puniantur in peccatis parentum; agnoscis etiam non aliter hoc praeceptum ab illo populo intellectum fuisse, quam a nobis nunc observandum defenditur. Et ideo regem Amessiam praeceptis Dei oboedientem indignationem, quam de patris sui internecione conceperat, laudabili moderatione frenasse atque occisis parentis sui percussoribus eorum tamen filiis non per ignaviam, sed per iustitiam pepercisse. Laudatur quidem Amessias et hoc secundum Dei refertur fecisse legem commendaturque oboedisse voluntati Domini, sed tamen infuscatus vanitatis reliquiis non tacetur et ostenditur devotionem David patris sui imitatus non esse . Hic tamen ab illa generis sui sanctitate degenerans tenuit in iudicio commendatam divina lege iustitiam; tantum reverentia perspicuae aequitatis valebat. Quid ergo mali fides tua complectatur, expende: hanc iniquitatem Deo admoves, quem aeternum et pium et iustum fatemur, quam nec superbia purpurati nec dolor commisit orbati.
III. 33. Julian. Let the examples, then, be referred to the case. That the sins of parents be imputed to children, and that the sins of parents not be imputed to children—both these contraries cannot alike be proved just; but if it is justice that the offspring of those who beget be held guilty, it is necessary that it be injustice if it is said not to be guilty for those same sins; and as it is good to command justly, so it is evil to command anything unjustly; and although a plain matter becomes lighter by arguing, nevertheless, since it helps to confirm even by the suffrages of the divine law a case set in the absolute, let us cling to this passage, in which whoever stands with a sound mind is not allowed to wander through the precipices of the present questions. Do you acquiesce, then, announcer of natural evil, that it is prescribed by the law of God that children not be punished for the sins of parents? Do you also acknowledge that this precept was understood by that people no otherwise than as we now defend that it must be observed? And therefore that King Amaziah, obedient to the precepts of God, bridled with praiseworthy moderation the indignation he had conceived over the murder of his father, and, the slayers of his father being killed, nevertheless spared their sons not through cowardice but through justice. Amaziah is indeed praised, and is reported to have done this according to the law of God, and is commended for having obeyed the will of the Lord; but yet, darkened with the remnants of vanity, it is not passed over in silence, and it is shown that he did not imitate the devotion of his father David (See 2 Kgs 14:3-4). Yet here, degenerating from that holiness of his lineage, he held in judgment the justice commended by the divine law; so great was the weight of manifest equity. Weigh, then, what evil your faith embraces: you apply to God—whom we confess to be eternal and pious and just—that iniquity which neither the pride of the man in purple nor the grief of the bereaved committed.
JulianImp.3.33Augustinus. Amessias homo fuit, cui non licebat iudicare de occultis, quae nosse non poterat; ideo praeceptum, quod datum est homini, in iudicio suo tenuit, ut pro peccato parentum non occideret filios. Peccatum autem tam magnum, ut verteret in naturam, quod per unum hominem intravit in mundum, sine quo nullus homo nascitur, quomodo posset ab hominibus vindicari, quandoquidem ita in omnes homines cum morte pertransiit, ut ei sua poena sit comes usque ad interitum sempiternum, nisi ubi gratia divina generationem regeneratione sanaverit? Hoc ergo ad Dei iudicium, non ad hominum pertinet, sicut alia multa, de quibus homines omnino iudicare non possunt. Et ideo aliter mandavit homini parentes et filios iudicandos iam separatim proprias vitas agentes, aliter autem iudicavit ipse, quando praevaricatricem naturam, quam noverat in radice, quamvis nondum pullulasset in germine, secundum inscrutabilem iustitiam suam cum stirpe damnavit, liberaturus ab hac damnatione quos vellet, per gratiam nihilominus inscrutabilem, quamvis et separatim iam viventibus filiis peccata separatim viventium reddidit patrum, quod licere iudicanti homini noluit, quia novit ipse, cur hoc iuste faciat, quando facit, id autem humana infirmitas nescit.
Augustine. Amaziah was a man, to whom it was not permitted to judge concerning hidden things, which he could not know; therefore the precept that was given to man he held in his own judgment, that he should not kill the sons for the sin of the parents. But a sin so great that it turned into nature—which through one man entered into the world, without which no man is born—how could it be avenged by men, since it passed with death to all human beings in such a way that its own penalty is its companion even unto everlasting destruction, except where divine grace has healed generation by regeneration? This, then, pertains to the judgment of God, not of men, like many other things concerning which men cannot judge at all. And therefore God commanded man in one way to judge parents and children now leading their own lives separately, but he himself judged in another way, when, according to his unsearchable justice, he condemned the transgressing nature, which he knew in the root though it had not yet sprung up in the seed, along with its stock—being going to free from this condemnation whom he willed, by a grace likewise unsearchable; although even to children now living separately he repaid the sins of fathers living separately, which he was unwilling to be permitted to the man judging, because he himself knows why he justly does this when he does it, but human weakness does not know it.
JulianImp.3.33III. 34. Iulianus. Verum ut urgeamus locum: constitit nempe iniustitiam Deo adhaerere non posse, constitit etiam ab ipso esse praescriptum, ne obsint filiis peccata generantium; asseruit quidem ipsa praecipientis dignitas iniustum id esse quod prohibet. Porro, ut agamus tecum liberalius, respondendi tribuo facultatem de his duabus opinionibus, quas supra comminus posui, id est ut imputentur peccata parentum filiis vel non imputentur; quam putas credi iustitiam debere? Si dixeris tuam quam vis etiam ultimo convenire iudicio, refero, utrum illam, quae remansit, nostram iustam an iniustam putes: sine dubio iniquam pronuntiabis; at haec legis auctoritate custodienda mandatur. Vides ergo unum remanere necessario de tribus: ut aut legem Dei fatearis iniustam, immo per legem Deum ipsum iniquitatis accuses aut certe ad vocem confugias magistrorum tuorum et dicas legem, quae per Moysen data est, a Deo tuo non fuisse mandatam, aut, si hoc utrumque proferre non audes, traducem peccati asseri contra legis documenta et praecepta fatearis. Neque enim adeo te desipere posse credendum est, ut dicas Deum iustitiam quidem in praeceptis, in iudiciis vero iniquitatem tenere aut certe secundum dogma vestrum in iudiciis quidem servare iustitiam, praeceptis autem iniquitatem do cere; quod licet superius egerimus, nunc tamen necessario repetivimus.
III. 34. Julian. But to press the passage: it has been established that injustice cannot cleave to God; it has been established also that it was prescribed by him that the sins of those who beget should not harm the children; the very dignity of the one commanding asserted that what he prohibits is unjust. Furthermore, to deal more liberally with you, I grant you the faculty of answering concerning those two opinions which I set hand to hand above—that is, that the sins of parents be imputed to children, or not be imputed; which do you think ought to be believed justice? If you say that yours fits even the last judgment, I report back: do you think that the remaining one—ours—is just or unjust? Without doubt you will pronounce it iniquitous; but this is commanded to be kept by the authority of the law. You see, then, that one thing necessarily remains of three: that you either confess the law of God to be unjust—nay, through the law accuse God himself of iniquity—or certainly take refuge in the voice of your teachers and say that the law which was given through Moses was not commanded by your God, or, if you dare to bring forth neither of these, confess that a transmission of sin is asserted against the documents and precepts of the law. For it is not to be believed that you can be so unwise as to say that God holds justice indeed in his precepts, but iniquity in his judgments, or certainly, according to your teaching, that he keeps justice in his judgments but teaches iniquity in his precepts; which, although we dealt with above, we have nevertheless now necessarily repeated.
JulianImp.3.34Augustinus. Odiose repetis, quod otiose loqueris; vacat enim tibi easdem res loquacitate revolvere, quas non potes asserere veritate, et dicere sine modo, quae astruere non vales ullo modo. Vis enim videri inter se esse duo ista contraria: reddi in filios peccata patrum et pro peccatis patrum filios non esse puniendos, quasi ego unum horum dicam, alterum Deus. Surde, utrumque Deus dixit; ergo utrumque iustum est, quia iustus hoc dixit. Sed quod inter se contraria Deus non sit locutus, ut intellegas, Dei iudicis et hominis iudicis pro diversitate causarum discerne personas; ita nec Deum, quamvis in filios patrum peccata reddentem, reum facies nec hominem sic iudicare compelles, sed tu duo ista velut inter se contraria tanta prolixitate et perplexitate disputationis non ob aliud mihi obicis, nisi quia multum loqueris et parum sapis.
Augustine. Odiously you repeat what you say idly; for you have leisure to roll out again by garrulity the same things which you cannot assert by truth, and to say without measure what you are unable to build up in any way. For you want these two things to seem contrary to each other: that the sins of fathers are repaid upon children, and that children are not to be punished for the sins of fathers—as if I said one of these, and God the other. Deaf man, God said both; therefore both are just, because the just one said this. But that you may understand that God did not speak things contrary to each other, distinguish the persons of God the judge and of man the judge according to the diversity of cases; thus you will neither make God guilty, though repaying the sins of fathers upon children, nor compel a man to judge so; but you set these two before me as if contrary to each other, with so great a prolixity and perplexity of disputation, for no other reason than because you say much and savor little.
JulianImp.3.34III. 35. Iulianus. Si autem dixeris utrumque iustum esse, et quod nos dicimus et quod vos, id est et quod lex Dei sanxit et quod Manichaeus Traducianusque confinxit, hic sane rationis perspicuae potentiam cohibentes benignius te convenimus et mitius. Cur ergo, si creditis et hoc bonum esse quod dicimus, et illud bonum esse quod dicitis, tantis totam Italiam factionibus commovistis? Cur seditiones Romae conductis populis excitastis? Cur de sumptibus pauperum saginastis per totam pene Africam equorum greges, quos prosequente Alypio tribunis et centurionibus destinastis? Cur matronarum oblatis haereditatibus potestates saeculi corrupistis, ut in nos stipula publici furoris arderet? Cur dissipastis ecclesiarum quietem? Cur religiosi principis tempora persecutionum impietate maculastis, si a nobis nihil aliud dicitur, quam quod etiam tu bonum cogeris confiteri?
III. 35. Julian. But if you say that both are just—both what we say and what you say, that is, both what the law of God sanctioned and what Mani and the Traducianist feigned—here indeed, restraining the power of manifest reason, we meet you more kindly and more mildly. Why, then, if you believe both this to be good which we say and that to be good which you say, did you stir up all Italy with such factions? Why did you excite seditions at Rome with hired peoples? Why, from the expenses of the poor, did you fatten through almost all Africa droves of horses, which, with Alypius escorting, you dispatched to tribunes and centurions? Why, by offering the inheritances of matrons, did you corrupt the powers of this world, that the stubble of public fury might burn against us? Why did you scatter the quiet of the churches? Why did you stain the times of a religious prince with the impiety of persecutions, if nothing else is said by us than what you too are forced to confess good?
JulianImp.3.35Augustinus. Sicut falsa sunt crimina, quae obicis nobis, ita falsa sunt dogmata, quae fingitis vobis; sed dicite, quantum potestis, omne malum adversus nos mentientes, nos tantummodo adversus vos fidem christianam et catholicam defendemus. Et quid opus est vobis reddere similia maledicta et non potius Evangelio credere atque gaudere, quod ex istis falsissimis maledictis vestris nobis merces augeatur in caelis ? Quomodo autem in hac re, de qua nunc agimus, et illud quod dicitis, et illud quod dicimus, bonum esse possumus credere, cum dicamus nos Deum dixisse: Reddam peccata patrum in filios , vos autem, quod praecepit homini iudicanti, ne peccata patrum reddat in filios, ita laudetis, ut, quod ipse se dixit reddere, tamquam nostrum arguatis et, tamquam falsum iniustumque sit, improbetis nec in eo vos non nobis, sed Deo refragari calumniarique sentiatis?
Augustine. Just as the charges you bring against us are false, so the teachings you feign for yourselves are false; but say, as much as you can, every evil against us, lying; we will only defend against you the Christian and catholic faith. And what need is there for us to return like curses, and not rather to believe the Gospel and rejoice that, from these most false curses of yours, our reward is increased in heaven (See Matt 5:11-12)? But how, in this matter of which we now treat, can we believe both that to be good which you say and that to be good which we say, when we say that God said: I will repay the sins of fathers upon children (Exod 20:5), but you so praise what he commanded the man who judges—that he not repay the sins of fathers upon children—that what he himself said he repays, you charge as if it were ours, and disapprove of it as if it were false and unjust, and do not perceive that in this you are resisting and slandering not us, but God?
JulianImp.3.35III. 36. Iulianus. Verum hactenus mitiore sim functus eloquio, nunc autem splendor flammeae rationis ostendit malis et bonis, profanis et sacris, piis et impiis, iustis et iniquis nullum esse consortium atque ideo inter praecepta et iudicia Dei nihil esse pugnarum, contrarium autem esse aliena peccata aliis imputare et, eadem ne imputentur, iubere, quoniam de his duobus necesse est uno concesso alterum summoveri, id est uno iusto alterum iniquum doceri, in legem autem Dei praescriptum esse, ne parentum peccata filiis imputentur , ac per hoc eadem auctoritate contrarium eius id est opinionem traducis cum Manichaeis funditus corruisse.
III. 36. Julian. But thus far I have used a milder eloquence; now, however, the splendor of flaming reason shows that there is no fellowship between evil and good, profane and sacred, pious and impious, just and iniquitous, and that therefore there are no battles between the precepts and the judgments of God, but that it is contrary to impute the sins of some to others and to command that those same sins not be imputed—since of these two it is necessary that, one being granted, the other be removed, that is, one being shown just, the other iniquitous—and that in the law of God it is prescribed that the sins of parents not be imputed to children, and on this account that, by the same authority, the contrary of it—that is, the opinion of transmission—has utterly collapsed along with the Manicheans.
JulianImp.3.36Augustinus. Totiens dicere vera me piget, cum totiens te dicere vana non pudeat. Peccata patrum se reddere in filios Deus dicit; peccata patrum ne reddat in filios Deus quidem, sed homini dicit. Utrumque approbandum est, quia utrumque Deus dicit.
Augustine. It irks me to say true things so often, when it does not shame you to say empty things so often. God says that he repays the sins of fathers upon children; that he not repay the sins of fathers upon children, God indeed says, but to man. Both are to be approved, because God says both.
JulianImp.3.36III. 37. Iulianus. Ostendi certe non nos aliud defendere, quam quod primo ratio signat aequissimum, tum etiam Deus sua lege confirmat, tertio non aliter quam asserimus, id quod fuerat praeceptum, cum operis laude completum. Inculcatum est quoque hanc veram esse iustitiam, quam placere sibi Deus etiam praecipiendo monstravit. Ac per hoc constitit nihil adminiculi Manichaeam traducem aut in ratione aut in legis testimoniis invenire.
III. 37. Julian. I have surely shown that we defend nothing other than what, first, reason marks as most equitable; then also God confirms by his law; thirdly, that what had been commanded was, no otherwise than we assert, fulfilled with the praise of the work. It has also been impressed that this is the true justice which God showed, even by commanding, to please him. And on this account it is established that the Manichean transmission finds no support either in reason or in the testimonies of the law.
JulianImp.3.37Augustinus. Manichaei naturam dicunt sine initio semper malam, unde omne malum esse contendunt, catholici autem, quod esse noluistis, conditam bonam peccatoque vitiatam medico Christo indigere a parvulis usque ad senes, quoniam pro omnibus mortuus est, ergo omnes mortui sunt . Unde Manichaei separandum a bono malum sic opinantur, ut extra sit; nos vero, quamvis malum a bono intellegentia separemus nec id, quod malum dicitur, aliquam substantiam esse credamus, tamen ab eis, qui liberantur, non ita separandum malum putamus, ut extra sit, sed in eis sanandum esse scimus, ut non sit. Illi enim malum substantiam malam dicunt, nos vitium substantiae bonae nullamque substantiam. Quantum intersit, attende et desine medicum Christum sanandis parvulis invidere, ne ira Dei maneat super eos dicentis: Reddam peccata patrum in filios . Illum aspice qui hoc dixit: Deus est, non Manichaeus; illum aspice qui dixit: Per hominem mors et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum; sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur ; Apostolus Christi est, non discipulus Manichaei. Illum aspice qui dixit: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur ; episcopus est Catholicus, non Manichaeus aut Pelagius aut Pelagianus haereticus. Quapropter, quoniam peccatum operis punit et homo, peccatum autem originis nonnisi Deus, ideo Deus, cum se dicat peccata patrum reddere in filios, praecipit tamen homini, ne pro peccatis patrum damnet et filios. Discerne divina et humana iudicia et invenies inter se duo ista non esse contraria.
Augustine. The Manicheans say that nature, without beginning, is always evil, whence they contend that all evil comes; but the catholics say—what you have been unwilling to say—that it was created good and corrupted by sin, and needs Christ the physician from the little ones to the old, since for all he died, therefore all have died (See 2 Cor 5:14-15). Whence the Manicheans think that evil is to be separated from good in such a way that it is outside; but we, although we separate evil from good by our understanding, and do not believe that what is called evil is any substance, nevertheless do not think that evil is to be separated from those who are freed in such a way that it is outside, but we know that it is to be healed in them, so that it may not be. For they say that evil is an evil substance, but we, a defect of a good substance and no substance. Notice how great the difference is, and cease to begrudge Christ the physician to the little ones who are to be healed, lest the wrath of God remain upon them, of him who says: I will repay the sins of fathers upon children (Exod 20:5). Look at him who said this: it is God, not Mani; look at him who said: Through a man death, and through a man the resurrection of the dead; for as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive (1 Cor 15:21-22): he is the Apostle of Christ, not the disciple of Mani; look at him who said: We are all born under sin (See Ambrose, Defense of the Prophet David 11.56): he is a catholic bishop, not Mani or Pelagius or a Pelagian heretic. Wherefore, since man too punishes the sin of act, but only God the sin of origin, therefore God, although he says that he repays the sins of fathers upon children, nevertheless commands man not to condemn the children too for the sins of fathers. Distinguish divine and human judgments, and you will find that these two are not contrary to each other.
JulianImp.3.37III. 38. Iulianus. Sed ne forte exsistat quis usque adeo obstipus, ut perspicuis sibi velit sententiis approbari Deum videlicet non aliter iudicare quam iudicari imperavit, quod quidem est contentionis nefandae, tamen, quoniam veritati arma suppeditant ad omnem documentorum satietatem, in id ipsum ostendere testes acerrimos non pigebit. Impletus itaque Sancto Spiritu loquitur Ezechiel propheta: Factus est sermo Domini ad me dicens: Fili hominis, quid vobis parabolam istam, in terra Israel dicentium: Patres manducaverunt uvam acerbam et dentes filiorum obstupuerunt? Vivo ego, dicit Adonai Dominus, si amplius dicetur parabola haec in Israel, quoniam omnes animae meae sunt, quemadmodum anima patris, ita et anima filii; omnes animae meae sunt. Anima, quae peccat, ipsa morietur, homo autem, qui fuerit iustus, qui faciet iudicium et iustitiam, in montibus non manducabit et oculos suos non extollet ad desideria domus Israel et uxorem proximi sui non contaminabit et ad mulierem menstruatam non accedet et hominem non deprimet et pignus debitori reddet et rapinam non rapuerit, panem suum esurienti dabit et nudum operiet vestimento et pecuniam suam in usuram non dabit et superabundantiam non accipiet et ab iniustitia avertet manum suam et iudicium iustum faciet inter virum et proximum eius et in praeceptis meis ambulavit et iustificationes meas custodivit, ut faceret eas, iustus est iste, vita vivet, dicit Adonai Dominus. Et si genuerit filium pestilentem, effundentem sanguinem et facientem peccata, in via patris sui iusti non ambulavit; sed qui in montibus manducavit et uxorem proximi sui contaminavit et mendicum et pauperem depressit et rapinam rapuit et pignus non reddidit et in simulacra posuit oculos suos et iniquitatem fecit, cum usura dedit et superabundantiam accepit, hic vita non vivet; omnes iniquitates istas fecit, morte morietur, sanguis eius super ipsum erit. Si autem genuerit filium et viderit omnia peccata patris sui, quae fecit, et timuerit et non fecerit secundum ista, in montibus non manducavit et oculos suos non laevavit ad desideria domus Israel et uxorem proximi sui non contaminavit et hominem non depressit et pignus non pigneravit et rapinam non rapuit, panem suum esurienti dedit et nudum operuit vestimento et ab iniquitate avertit manum suam, usuram et superabundantiam non accepit, iustitiam fecit et in praeceptis meis ambulavit, iste non morietur in patris sui iniquitatibus, vita vivet, pater autem eius, quia tribulatione tribulavit et rapinam rapuit, contraria fecit in medio populo meo et mortuus est in sua iniquitate. Et dixistis: Quid est, quod non accepit iniquitatem patris sui filius? Quia filius iustitiam et iudicium et misericordiam fecit, omnia legitima mea conservavit et fecit ea, vita vivet, anima autem, quae peccat, ipsa morietur. Filius non accipiet iniustitiam patris sui neque pater accipiet iniustitiam filii sui, iustitia iusti super ipsum erit et iniquitas iniqui super ipsum erit. Et iniquus, si convertat se ab omnibus iniquitatibus suis, quas fecit, et custodiat omnia mandata mea et faciat iudicium et iustitiam et misericordiam, vita vivet et non morietur, omnia delicta eius, quaecumque fecit, non erunt in memoria, in sua iustitia, quam fecit, vita vivet. Numquid voluntate volo mortem iniusti, dicit Adonai Dominus, quantum ut avertat se a via sua mala et vivat? Cum se autem converterit iustus a sua iustitia et fecerit iniquitates secundum omnes iniquitates, quas fecit iniquus, si fecerit, non vivet, omnes iustitiae eius, quas fecit, non erunt in memoria, in delicto eius quo excidit, et in peccatis suis quibus peccavit, in ipsis morietur. Et dixistis: Non dirigit via Domini. Audite nunc, domus Israel: numquid via mea non dirigit? Nunc via vestra non est aequa. Cum convertit se iustus a sua iustitia et facit delictum, morietur in eo delicto, quod fecit, in ipso morietur; et cum averterit se iniquus ab iniquitate sua, quam fecit, et fecerit iudicium et iustitiam, hic animam suam custodivit et vivit, ut averteret se ab omnibus iniquitatibus suis, quas fecit, vita vivet et non morietur. Et dicit domus Israel: Non corrigit via Domini. Numquid via mea non corrigit, domus Israel? Nonne magis via vestra non corrigit? Ideo unumquemque vestrum secundum vias ipsius iudicabo vos, domus Israel, dicit Adonai Dominus .
III. 38. Julian. But lest perhaps someone exist so dull as to want it proved to himself by clear sentences that God, namely, does not judge otherwise than he commanded judgment to be made—which indeed is the mark of a nefarious contentiousness—nevertheless, since arms supply the truth unto every fullness of documents, it will not irk me to show most keen witnesses to this very point. And so, filled with the Holy Spirit, the prophet Ezekiel speaks: The word of the Lord came to me, saying: Son of man, what is this parable to you, of those saying in the land of Israel: The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the teeth of the children are set on edge? As I live, says Adonai the Lord, this parable shall no more be said in Israel; for all souls are mine, as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son; all souls are mine. The soul that sins, it shall die. But the man who is just, who shall do judgment and justice, who shall not eat upon the mountains and shall not lift up his eyes to the desires of the house of Israel, and shall not defile his neighbor's wife, and shall not approach a menstruous woman, and shall not oppress a man, and shall return the pledge to the debtor, and shall not seize plunder, who shall give his bread to the hungry and cover the naked with a garment, and shall not give his money for usury, and shall not take overabundance, and shall turn away his hand from injustice, and shall do just judgment between a man and his neighbor, and has walked in my precepts and kept my ordinances to do them: this man is just; he shall surely live, says Adonai the Lord. But if he begets a pestilent son, shedding blood and committing sins, who has not walked in the way of his just father, but who has eaten upon the mountains, and has defiled his neighbor's wife, and has oppressed the beggar and the poor, and has seized plunder, and has not returned the pledge, and has set his eyes upon idols, and has done iniquity, has given with usury and taken overabundance: this man shall not live; he has done all these iniquities; he shall surely die; his blood shall be upon himself. But if he begets a son, and the son sees all the sins of his father which he did, and fears, and does not do according to these things—who has not eaten upon the mountains, and has not lifted up his eyes to the desires of the house of Israel, and has not defiled his neighbor's wife, and has not oppressed a man, and has not taken a pledge, and has not seized plunder, who has given his bread to the hungry and covered the naked with a garment, and has turned away his hand from iniquity, has not taken usury and overabundance, has done justice and walked in my precepts: this man shall not die in his father's iniquities; he shall surely live; but his father, because he afflicted with affliction and seized plunder, did contrary things in the midst of my people, and he died in his iniquity. And you said: Why is it that the son has not borne the iniquity of his father? Because the son has done justice and judgment and mercy, has kept all my statutes and done them, he shall surely live; but the soul that sins, it shall die. The son shall not bear the injustice of his father, nor shall the father bear the injustice of his son; the justice of the just shall be upon himself, and the iniquity of the iniquitous shall be upon himself. And the iniquitous, if he turns himself away from all his iniquities which he did, and keeps all my commandments and does judgment and justice and mercy, he shall surely live and shall not die; all his offenses, whatever he did, shall not be in remembrance; in his justice which he did he shall surely live. Do I will with will the death of the unjust, says Adonai the Lord, rather than that he turn himself away from his evil way and live? But when the just turns himself away from his justice and does iniquities according to all the iniquities which the iniquitous did, if he does them, he shall not live; all his justices which he did shall not be in remembrance; in his offense by which he fell away, and in his sins by which he sinned, in these he shall die. And you said: The way of the Lord is not right. Hear now, O house of Israel: is my way not right? Now it is your way that is not equitable. When the just turns himself away from his justice and does an offense, he shall die in that offense which he did; in it he shall die; and when the iniquitous turns himself away from his iniquity which he did, and does judgment and justice, this man has guarded his soul and lives, in that he turned himself away from all his iniquities which he did; he shall surely live and shall not die. And the house of Israel says: The way of the Lord is not right. Is my way not right, O house of Israel? Is it not rather your way that is not right? Therefore I will judge each one of you according to his ways, O house of Israel, says Adonai the Lord (Ezek 18:1-30).
JulianImp.3.38Augustinus. Haec per Ezechielem prophetam promissio est Novi Testamenti, quam non intellegis, ubi Deus regeneratos a generatis, si iam in maioribus aetatibus sunt, secundum propria facta discernit; de quibus enim dicitur: Anima patris mea est et anima filii mea est , separatim procul dubio suas vitas agunt. Si autem filius adhuc esset in lumbis patris sui, sicut scriptum est de Levi, quod in lumbis fuit Abrahae, quando decimatus est a Melchisedech Abraham , non posset tunc dici: Anima patris mea est et anima filii mea est, quando una utique anima erat. Velans autem Propheta mysterium suo tempore revelandum regenerationem non nominavit, per quam quisque filius hominis ex Adam transit ad Christum, sed quod non dixit illo tempore, intellegi voluit isto tempore, quo fuerat ad Christum transeuntibus auferendum velamen. Nam quoniam profiteris te esse Christianum, quamvis ostendas antichristum id efficere moliens, ut Christus gratis mortuus sit, quaero abs te, utrum, si homo faciat opera illa cuncta iustitiae, quae propheta Ezechiel totiens repetendo commemorat, etiam non regeneratus vita vivat. Si dicis eum vita vivere, contradicit Christus antichristo et dicit: Nisi manduca veritis carnem meam et biberitis sanguinem meum, non habebitis vitam in vobis ; quem cibum et potum ad regeneratos pertinere velis nolis cogeris confiteri. Si autem tanta mole auctoritatis obtritus responderis eum, qui omnia illa bona fecerit, si non fuerit regeneratus, vita non vivere, responde, quae causa sit, et vide generationi regenerationem, non imitationi imitationem in eo, quod Apostolus Adam ex parte peccati et Christum ex parte iustitiae proponit, opponi. Evidentius autem tibi ostendam ad Novum Testamentum pertinere, in quo regeneratorum haereditas est, quod Ezechielem prophetam dixisse commemoras, non quidem nunc, sed cum dixeris omnia, quae de ipsis verbis eius tuae loquacitatis more dicturus es.
Augustine. This, through the prophet Ezekiel, is the promise of the New Testament, which you do not understand—where God distinguishes the regenerated from the begotten, if they are now of greater age, according to their proper deeds; for those of whom it is said, The soul of the father is mine and the soul of the son is mine, without doubt lead their own lives separately. But if the son were still in the loins of his father—as it is written of Levi, that he was in the loins of Abraham when Abraham was tithed by Melchizedek (See Heb 7:9-10)—it could not then be said, The soul of the father is mine and the soul of the son is mine, when there was surely one soul. But the Prophet, veiling a mystery to be revealed in its own time, did not name regeneration, through which each son of man passes from Adam to Christ; but what he did not say at that time, he wanted understood at this time, in which the veil was to be taken away from those passing over to Christ. For since you profess to be a Christian—although you show that you are an antichrist, striving to bring it about that Christ died in vain—I ask you whether, if a man does all those works of justice which the prophet Ezekiel recalls by so often repeating them, he shall surely live even if not regenerated. If you say that he shall surely live, Christ contradicts the antichrist and says: Unless you eat my flesh and drink my blood, you will not have life in you (John 6:53); which food and drink, whether you will or not, you are forced to confess pertain to the regenerated. But if, crushed by so great a mass of authority, you answer that he who has done all those good things, if he has not been regenerated, shall not live, answer what the reason is, and see that regeneration is opposed to generation, not imitation to imitation, in the Apostle's setting forth Adam on the side of sin and Christ on the side of justice. But I will show you more evidently that it pertains to the New Testament, in which is the inheritance of the regenerated, what you recall the prophet Ezekiel to have said—not indeed now, but when you have said all that, in the manner of your garrulity, you are going to say about his very words.
JulianImp.3.38III. 39. Iulianus. Videturne assertor locuples iudiciorum suorum Deus, qui tam multis capitibus de hac quaestione non solum iudicavit, sed etiam disputavit? Plane, qui temporum nostrorum praevideret errores, tanta verborum suorum vel luce vel copia duo est iuste operatus et provide: unum, ne quis ulla quaestionum ambiguitate moveretur, aliud, ne apud eos, qui se immersissent sponte naufragiis, excusationis tabula ulla remaneret. Loquitur ad Iudaeos, qui captivitatem sceleribus exigentes ad revelandam propriae praevaricationis invidiam parentibus, non moribus suis debitam eam fuisse iactabant, et convenit eos auctoritate patria: Utquid vobis, inquit, istam parabolam, ut dicatis: Parentes manducaverunt uvas acerbas et filiorum dentes obstupuerunt? Vivo ego, dicit Adonai Dominus, si dicetur amplius parabola haec in Israel, quoniam omnes animae meae sunt, quemadmodum anima patris, ita anima filii; omnes animae meae sunt. Anima, quae peccat, ipsa morietur .
III. 39. Julian. Does not God appear a wealthy assertor of his own judgments, who in so many headings not only judged but even disputed concerning this question? Plainly, foreseeing the errors of our times, he worked two things justly and providently by so great a light or abundance of his words: one, that no one should be moved by any ambiguity of questions; the other, that among those who had plunged themselves of their own accord into shipwrecks no plank of excuse should remain. He speaks to the Jews, who—suffering captivity as their crimes demanded—boasted, to reveal the odium of their own transgression, that it was owed to their parents, not to their own conduct, and he addresses them with paternal authority: Why, he says, this parable to you, that you should say: The parents have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge? As I live, says Adonai the Lord, this parable shall no more be said in Israel; for all souls are mine, as the soul of the father, so the soul of the son; all souls are mine. The soul that sins, it shall die (Ezek 18:2-4).
JulianImp.3.39Augustinus. Cum ait: Si dicetur amplius parabola haec in Israel, ostendit solere dici: Patres manducaverunt uvam acerbam et dentes filiorum obstupuerunt, nec arguit, quia dicebatur, sed promittit, ubi non dicatur. Unde autem hoc dicebant, nisi quia reddam peccata patrum in filios Deum dixisse sciebant?
Augustine. When he says, If this parable shall be said any more in Israel, he shows that it was wont to be said: The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the teeth of the children are set on edge; nor does he convict the fact that it was said, but promises a place where it shall not be said. But whence did they say this, except because they knew that God had said, I will repay the sins of fathers upon children (Exod 20:5)?
JulianImp.3.39III. 40. Iulianus. Ad exemplandam et confirmandam iudicii sui aequitatem iuramento Deus utitur et auctoritatem constituti obtestatione cumulat. Intellexit hoc genus loquendi Apostolus, qui ad Hebraeos ita disseruit: Volens, inquit, Deus ostendere, promissionis haeredibus immobilitatem consilii sui interposuit iusiurandum, ut per duas res immobiles, quibus impossibile est mentiri Deum, fortissimum solacium habeamus .
III. 40. Julian. To exemplify and confirm the equity of his judgment, God uses an oath, and heaps the authority of his decree with an attestation. The Apostle understood this kind of speaking, who discoursed thus to the Hebrews: God, he says, willing to show to the heirs of the promise the immutability of his counsel, interposed an oath, that by two immutable things, by which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have the strongest consolation (Heb 6:17-18).
JulianImp.3.40Augustinus. Et ibi Novum Testamentum promittebatur.
Augustine. And there too the New Testament was being promised.
JulianImp.3.40III. 41. Iulianus. Duobus ergo his ostendi dicit Deum non posse mentiri, hoc ipso, quia promisit atque id, quod promisit, quia se testatur implere. Non quod Deus sine attestatione tali imbecillum atque dubium soleat habere sermonem, sed ut veritatem suam documentis grandibus oneraret, eo genere elocutionis abusus est, quod hominibus etiam fallere solitis credi faciat. Hoc ergo pondere in praesenti quoque causa admonet Deus atque praescribit, ut et nullus hoc, quod Traduciani asserunt, de populo suspicetur et Deum non posse eo quem detestatur modo iudicare cognoscat: Vivo ego, dicit Adonai Dominus, si amplius dicetur parabola haec in Israel .
III. 41. Julian. By these two things, then, he says God is shown not to be able to lie: by this very fact, that he promised, and that what he promised he testifies that he fulfills. Not that God, without such attestation, is wont to have a feeble and doubtful discourse, but that he might load his truth with grand documents, he made use of that kind of expression which makes even men accustomed to deceive be believed. By this weight, therefore, in the present case too, God admonishes and prescribes, both that no one of his people should suspect this which the Traducianists assert, and that he may know that God cannot judge in the way that he detests: As I live, says Adonai the Lord, this parable shall no more be said in Israel (Ezek 18:3).
JulianImp.3.41Augustinus. Non dicetur in Israel recte diceres, si veros Israelitas regeneratos videres, in quibus hoc non dicetur. Nam in his, qui non regenerantur, merito dicitur, quoniam non sunt Israel secundum id, quod ait ad Romanos Apostolus: Non enim omnes, qui ex Israel, hi sunt Israel , ubi sine dubio filios Novi Testamenti, hoc est filios promissionis volebat intellegi. Denique sequitur: Sed in Isaac vocabitur tibi semen, hoc est non, qui filii carnis, hi filii Dei, sed filii promissionis deputantur in semine .
Augustine. It shall not be said in Israel—you would say rightly, if you saw the true Israelites to be the regenerated, in whom this shall not be said. For in those who are not regenerated it is deservedly said, since they are not Israel, according to what the Apostle says to the Romans: For not all who are of Israel, these are Israel (Rom 9:6)—where without doubt he wanted the sons of the New Testament, that is, the sons of the promise, understood. Finally it follows: But in Isaac shall your seed be called; that is, not they who are the sons of the flesh, these are the sons of God, but the sons of the promise are reckoned as the seed (Rom 9:7-8).
JulianImp.3.41III. 42. Iulianus. Quid est hoc: Amplius non dicetur, cum hoc usque hodie tantis Manichaeorum conatibus asseratur? Sed hoc est quod indicat, quoniam nemo, qui est de populo Israel vel qui huius Scripturae auctoritatem suscipit, post definitionem meam tale quid audebit accredere. Porro omnis, qui in illa opinione perstiterit nec his oboedit litteris, nec in eo, qui est verus Israel, enumerabitur.
III. 42. Julian. What is this: It shall no more be said, when this is asserted even today by such great efforts of the Manicheans? But this is what he indicates: that no one who is of the people of Israel, or who accepts the authority of this Scripture, will, after my definition, dare to credit any such thing. Furthermore, everyone who persists in that opinion and does not obey these letters will not be numbered among him who is the true Israel.
JulianImp.3.42Augustinus. Si ergo post definitionem suam vult intellegi Deus hoc neminem crediturum, quaerendum est, cur ante hanc non improbe credebatur peccata patrum etiam in filios esse reddenda. Et si bene quaeratur, invenietur propter obnoxiam generationem dictum: Reddam peccata patrum in filios , unde natum est illud proverbium de uvis acerbis. Propter liberam vero regenerationem promissum est Testamentum Novum, ubi hoc amplius non dicatur, quia haereditati damnosae, quae venit ex Adam, per Christi gratiam renuntiatur, quando renuntiatur huic saeculo, ubi necesse est premi gravi iugo filios Adam, non utique iniuste, a die exitus de ventre matris eorum usque in diem sepulturae in matre omnium ; unde sacra mysteria etiam parvulis renuntiantibus satis quid agatur ostendunt.
Augustine. If, then, God wants it understood that after his definition no one will believe this, it must be asked why before this it was not improperly believed that the sins of fathers were to be repaid even upon children. And if it be well asked, it will be found that on account of liable generation it was said: I will repay the sins of fathers upon children (Exod 20:5), whence that proverb about sour grapes arose. But on account of free regeneration the New Testament was promised, where this shall no more be said, because the ruinous inheritance which comes from Adam is renounced through the grace of Christ, when this age is renounced—where it is necessary that the sons of Adam be weighed down by a heavy yoke, surely not unjustly, from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb until the day of their burial in the mother of all (See Sir 40:1); whence the sacred mysteries, with even the little ones renouncing, sufficiently show what is being done.
JulianImp.3.42III. 43. Iulianus. Postquam parabolae illius vanitate reprehensa sanxit sententiam promulgatione atque obtestatione divina, etiam iustitiae suae dignatur aperire rationem, cur necessitudines peccatis non graventur alternis. Quoniam omnes animae - inquit - meae sunt, quemadmodum anima patris, ita et anima filii; omnes animae meae sunt; anima, quae peccat, ipsa morietur . Quare ergo esset aequissima sententiae ista moderatio, proprietate quoque ostendit animarum.
III. 43. Julian. After he had reproved the vanity of that parable, he sanctioned the sentence by divine promulgation and attestation, and even deigns to open the reason of his justice, why kinships are not burdened by mutual sins. For all souls, he says, are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son; all souls are mine; the soul that sins, it shall die (Ezek 18:4). Why, then, this moderation of the sentence should be most equitable, he shows also by the propriety of souls.
JulianImp.3.43Augustinus. Ista proprietas animarum ad vitas pertinet separatas; non enim renasci aliquis nisi natus potest. Quare autem decimatus est Levi, cum esset in lumbis Abrahae, nisi quia nondum in eis fuerat suarum proprietas animarum?
Augustine. This propriety of souls pertains to separate lives; for no one can be reborn unless he is born. But why was Levi tithed when he was in the loins of Abraham, except because the propriety of their own souls was not yet in them?
JulianImp.3.43III. 44. Iulianus. Cum anima, inquit, patris mea sit et anima filii mea sit, quo testimonio ut multis aliis docetur animam nihil debere seminibus, quam Deus iuri suo vindicat, iniquissimum, inquit, et stolidum est, ut mea res, mea imago alienis gravetur operibus.
III. 44. Julian. Since, he says, the soul of the father is mine and the soul of the son is mine—by which testimony, as by many others, it is taught that the soul, which God vindicates to his own right, owes nothing to the seeds—it is, he says, most iniquitous and stupid that my thing, my image, should be burdened with another's works.
JulianImp.3.44Augustinus. Separas ergo carnem a iure Dei, quem putas animam solam iuri proprio vindicare, et oblitus es quod scriptum est: Sicut enim mulier ex viro, ita et vir per mulierem, omnia autem ex Deo . Quod certe aut secundum carnem dictum est aut secundum utrumque, non tamen secundum animam solam. Quod autem tibi placet, ut dicat Deus: Iniquissimum et stolidum est, ut mea res, mea imago alienis gravetur operibus, cur non quaeris, unde sit iustum, ut anima carne de parentibus tracta et ipsius Dei gravetur operibus? Corpus enim corruptibile aggravat animam . Et puto te agnoscere Dei opus esse etiam corruptibile corpus. Quid igitur meruit imago Dei, ut ad impedimentum rerum sciendarum corruptibili corpore gravetur, si nullum est originale peccatum? Cur autem non etiam hoc facis Deum dicere: Iniquissimum et stolidum est, ut mea res, mea imago per infidelitatem vel neglegentiam parentum vel quorumlibet, inter quos vivit, vel per quamcumque necessitatem sine baptismo de corpore exeat et ad regnum meum non admittatur nec vita vivat, quia carnem sanctam non manducavit nec sanguinem bibit ? An et contra istam Christi sententiam disputabis atque clamabis dicens: Prorsus, etiamsi non manducaverit carnem Christi neque biberit eius sanguinem, vita vivet? O vocem cuius nisi antichristi! Vade, dic ista, doce ista, audiant te christiani viri et feminae, audiant homines mente corrupti, reprobi circa fidem, audiant te, ament te, honorent te, pascant, vestiant, ornent te, et perditum sequendo perdant et se. Sed novit Dominus, qui sunt eius , nec desperandum est et de vobis, quamdiu patientia eius impenditur vobis.
Augustine. You separate, then, the flesh from the right of God, whom you think to vindicate the soul alone to his own right, and you have forgotten what is written: For as the woman is from the man, so also the man is through the woman, but all things are from God (1 Cor 11:12). Which surely was said either according to the flesh or according to both, yet not according to the soul alone. But as to what pleases you, that God should say, It is most iniquitous and stupid that my thing, my image, should be burdened with another's works—why do you not ask whence it is just that the soul should be burdened with the flesh drawn from the parents, and with the works of God himself? For the corruptible body weighs down the soul (Wis 9:15). And I think you acknowledge that even the corruptible body is the work of God. What, then, did the image of God merit, that it should be weighed down by a corruptible body, to the hindrance of the things to be known, if there is no original sin? But why do you not also make God say this: It is most iniquitous and stupid that my thing, my image, through the unbelief or negligence of parents, or of any among whom it lives, or through any necessity, should go out of the body without baptism and not be admitted to my kingdom nor live the life, because it has not eaten the holy flesh nor drunk the blood (See John 6:53)? Or will you dispute even against this sentence of Christ, and cry out, saying: Plainly, even if he has not eaten the flesh of Christ nor drunk his blood, he shall surely live? O voice of none but the antichrist! Go, say these things, teach these things; let Christian men and women hear you, let men of corrupted mind, reprobate concerning the faith, hear you; let them hear you, love you, honor you, feed, clothe, adorn you, and by following you, lost, lose themselves too. But the Lord knows who are his (2 Tim 2:19), nor must we despair even of you, so long as his patience is bestowed upon you.
JulianImp.3.44III. 45. Iulianus. Cui hunc statum dedi, ut ei nolenti nemo noceret externus, sed sponte capesseret vel peccatum vel iustitiam vel praemium vel reatum.
III. 45. Julian. To whom I gave this condition, that no external one should harm him against his will, but that he should of his own accord take hold either of sin or of justice, either of reward or of guilt.
JulianImp.3.45Augustinus. De prima natura hominis hoc dici potest, non de ista vitiata atque damnata. Neque enim et in paradiso ante peccatum aggravabat animam corpus corruptibile; aut vero usque adeo vos mente corrupti estis, ut etiam hoc dicere audeatis? Si autem non audetis, dicite, quare corruptibili corpore imago Dei meruerit aggravari, qui non vultis cum catholica Ecclesia peccati originem confiteri.
Augustine. This can be said of the first nature of man, not of this corrupted and condemned nature. For neither in paradise, before sin, did the corruptible body weigh down the soul; or are you indeed so corrupted in mind that you dare to say even this? But if you do not dare, say why the image of God merited to be weighed down by a corruptible body, you who are unwilling to confess, with the catholic Church, the origin of sin.
JulianImp.3.45III. 46. Iulianus. Indignaris itaque mihi, cur iuranti magis Deo credam quam Manichaeo somnianti, qui nulla praesertim si non sanae fidei testimonia vel argumenta promit vigilantis ingenii, quae, licet numquam tanta inveniri queant, ut veritatis valeant fundamenta convellere, tamen quae vel impraesentiarum contra stoliditatis pudorem solacii quippiam, si apte dicerentur, afferrent. Persistit Deus id, quod sacrum fecerat praecipiendo, communire iurando. Pergit planum facere etiam per exempla quod sancit, et dicit, quia, si fuerit homo omnes iustitiae species impolluta devotione custodiens et hic genuerit filium, qui pestilentibus moribus adhaerescat atque ab itineribus deflectat paternis, nihil ei prosit tanta patris cura iustitiae comparata nobilitas; atque item e regione huius peccatoris filium statuit patris sui vias consilio meliore fugientem ostenditque nihil ei nocere iniquitatem parentis. Paremque condicionem iustitiae facit atque peccati, asserens vitia generantium ita non ire per semina, sicut non queunt ire virtutes, sed ad ius suum omnes animas pertinere, per quod et illud ostenditur profanum, quod dicis nascentium et animas et corpora a iure diaboli possideri.
III. 46. Julian. You are indignant with me, then, why I believe God swearing rather than Mani dreaming—who especially brings forth no testimonies of sound faith or arguments of a watchful talent, which, although they can never be found so great as to avail to overturn the foundations of truth, would nevertheless at present bring some consolation against the shame of stupidity, if they were aptly said. God persists in fortifying by swearing what he had made sacred by commanding. He proceeds to make plain even by examples what he sanctions, and says that if a man should be one keeping all the species of justice with unpolluted devotion, and should here beget a son who cleaves to pestilent morals and turns aside from his father's paths, the nobility acquired by the father's so great care of justice should profit him nothing; and again, on the opposite side, he sets the son of this sinner fleeing his father's ways by a better counsel, and shows that the iniquity of the parent harms him nothing. And he makes the condition of justice and of sin equal, asserting that the vices of those who beget so do not go through the seeds, just as the virtues cannot go, but that all souls pertain to his own right—through which that too is shown profane which you say, that both the souls and the bodies of the newborn are possessed by the right of the devil.
JulianImp.3.46Augustinus. Iam tibi responsum est: inaniter verbosaris. Totus homo, hoc est et anima et corpus, per substantiam suam ad ius pertinet Creatoris; per vitium vero, quod nulla substantia est, diabolo est mancipatus, sub eadem tamen potestate Creatoris, sub qua et ipse est diabolus constitutus.
Augustine. It has already been answered to you: you are emptily wordy. The whole man—that is, both soul and body—pertains by his substance to the right of the Creator; but through defect, which is no substance, he has been made over to the devil—yet under the same power of the Creator, under which the devil himself too is set.
JulianImp.3.46III. 47. Iulianus. Asserta examinis sui libra iam tunc opinionem vestram in his, qui similia arbitrabantur, accusat. Et dixistis: Quid est quod non accepit iniquitatem patris sui filius? Quoniam anima - inquit - quae peccat, ipsa morietur; filius autem non accipit iniustitiam patris sui neque pater accipit iniustitiam filii sui; iustitia iusti super ipsum erit et iniquitas iniqui super ipsum erit . Quis nostrum hinc cum tanta diligentia umquam disputare potuisset, cum quanta Deus per os Prophetae sui dividendo, comparando repetendoque disseruit?
III. 47. Julian. Having asserted the balance of his examination, he then accuses your opinion in those who thought like things. And you said: Why is it that the son has not borne the iniquity of his father? Because the soul, he says, that sins, it shall die; but the son does not bear the injustice of his father, nor does the father bear the injustice of his son; the justice of the just shall be upon himself, and the iniquity of the iniquitous shall be upon himself (Ezek 18:19-20). Which of us could ever have disputed on this point with as great diligence as God discoursed through the mouth of his Prophet, by dividing, comparing, and repeating?
JulianImp.3.47Augustinus. Et tamen, cum hoc fecerit Deus, tantae perspicuitati verborum eius misces loquacitatem tuam sciens bonam non esse causam tuam.
Augustine. And yet, when God has done this, you mix your garrulity with so great a clarity of his words, knowing your case to be not good.
JulianImp.3.47III. 48. Iulianus. Verum non hoc solum explanasse contentus aliud quoque ad confirmationem iustitiae huius a misericordiae operibus admovet argumentum et pronuntiat illis ipsis personis, quae sponte peccaverunt, si ad paenitentiam emendationemque confugerint, errores praeteritos non nocere. Iniquus - inquit - si convertat se ab iniquitatibus suis, quas fecit, et custodiat mandata mea, omnia delicta eius, quaecumque fecit, non erunt in memoria; in sua iustitia, quam fecit, vita vivet . Id est cum in hoc sim proposito clementiae, ut etiam propria indulgeam peccata correctis, qui potest fieri, ut imputem aliena nascentibus? Aut sinunt res, ut sit apud me rea innocentia, cum conditur, apud quem est efficax, si vel interpolata repetatur?
III. 48. Julian. But not content to have explained this alone, he applies also another argument, from the works of mercy, for the confirmation of this justice, and declares that even those very persons who sinned of their own accord, if they take refuge in penance and amendment, are not harmed by their past errors. The iniquitous, he says, if he turns himself away from his iniquities which he did, and keeps my commandments, all his offenses, whatever he did, shall not be in remembrance; in his justice which he did he shall surely live (Ezek 18:21-22). That is: Since I am in this purpose of clemency, that I forgive even their proper sins to those who are corrected, how can it be that I impute another's to those who are born? Or do circumstances allow that innocence should be guilty before me when it is created, before whom it is effective even if it is taken up again after being interrupted?
JulianImp.3.48Augustinus. Alia est causa paenitentium, alia nascentium. Nam prorsus, quomodo iustum ostendatis Deum, non invenitis, si et in nascentibus peccata nulla invenit et eos tamen corruptibili corpore et tot tantisque insuper calamitatibus aggravat. Non enim numerari possunt mala, quae patiuntur infantes: febrem, tussim, scabiem, dolores quorumque membrorum, ventris fluxum, lumbricos et alia innumerabilia ex ipsa carne exsistentia et ipsarum curationum quam morborum plura tormenta et extrinsecus ictus vulnerum, plagas verberum, incursus daemonum. Vos autem sapientes haeretici, ne fateamini originale pecca tum, parati estis talibus floribus implere paradisum. Si enim haec ibi futura fuisse non dicitis, quaero, cur sint in parvulis nullum habentibus, ut contenditis, omnino peccatum. Si autem et ista ibi futura fuisse non erubescitis dicere, quales Christiani sitis, quid nos opus est dicere?
Augustine. The case of those who repent is one thing, of those who are born another. For you utterly fail to find how you may show God just, if he both finds no sins in the newborn and yet weighs them down with a corruptible body and, furthermore, with so many and so great calamities. For the evils which infants suffer cannot be numbered: fever, cough, scab, pains of various members, flux of the bowels, worms, and other innumerable things arising from the flesh itself, and the torments of the very treatments, more numerous than those of the diseases, and from without the blows of wounds, the strokes of beatings, the assaults of demons. But you wise heretics, lest you confess original sin, are prepared to fill paradise with such flowers. For if you say these things would not have been there, I ask why they are in the little ones who have, as you contend, no sin at all. But if you are not ashamed to say that these things too would have been there, what kind of Christians you are, what need is there for us to say?
JulianImp.3.48III. 49. Iulianus. Displicuit hoc cultoribus idolorum, displicet et vobis fides nostra, quam videtis hac lege formatam. Dixerunt ergo profani: Non est recta via Domini. Audite ergo - inquit - domus Israel. Numquid non est via mea recta? Nonne via vestra non est aequa? Ideo unumquemque vestrum secundum viam vestram iudicabo vos, dicit Adonai Dominus . Perspicisne quibus testimoniis muniamur? Num aliqua sectamur ambigua? Num aucupamur verba generalia? Num aut debilibus aut involutis argumentis fidem tuemur? Exsecramur quod exsecratur Deus, intellegimus quod exponit Deus, disserimus quod disputavit Deus, credimus propter quod iuravit Deus: Non accipiet iniquitatem patris sui filius neque pater accipiet iniustitiam filii sui; iustitia iusti super ipsum erit et iniquitas iniqui super ipsum erit . Quomodo se Deus iudicaturum promittat, relucet, id est nec peccata parentum imputare filiis nec filiorum parentibus; ac per hoc constitit etiam testimoniis Scripturarum, de quo ambigi ratio non sinebat, eam videlicet iustitiam Deum tenere in iudiciis suis, quam tenuit in praeceptis.
III. 49. Julian. This displeased the worshipers of idols; our faith too, which you see formed by this law, displeases you. The profane, then, said: The way of the Lord is not right. Hear, then, he says, O house of Israel. Is my way not right? Is it not your way that is not equitable? Therefore I will judge each one of you according to your way, says Adonai the Lord (Ezek 18:25, 30). Do you perceive by what testimonies we are fortified? Do we pursue anything ambiguous? Do we hunt for general words? Do we maintain our faith by weak or involved arguments? We execrate what God execrates, we understand what God expounds, we discourse what God disputed, we believe that on account of which God swore: The son shall not bear the iniquity of his father, nor shall the father bear the injustice of his son; the justice of the just shall be upon himself, and the iniquity of the iniquitous shall be upon himself (Ezek 18:20). How God promises he will judge shines forth—that is, neither to impute the sins of parents to children, nor of children to parents; and on this account it is established, even by the testimonies of the Scriptures (concerning which reason did not allow doubt), that God holds in his judgments the same justice which he held in his precepts.
JulianImp.3.49Augustinus. Hinc saltem intellege de his ista locutum Deum patribus et filiis, qui separatim iam viverent, quia, cum dixisset: Non accipiet iniquitatem patris sui filius neque pater accipiet iniustitiam filii sui, mox addidit: Iustitia iusti super ipsum erit. Numquid enim in hoc saeculo dici de parvulo potest, quod iustitia eius super ipsum sit, quandoquidem per vitam propriam nec iuste nec inique adhuc potest vivere? Quidquid igitur poenarum in hac aetate patitur, quo merito patitur, si nullum ex parentibus traxit? Cum iustissimus Deus poenas immeritas nec infligat alicui nec infligi sinat, nec dici possit ad exercendam virtutem parvuli, quae adhuc in eo nulla est, haec mala eum perpeti. Porro, si futurum saeculum cogites, quod pertinet ad haereditatem Testamenti Novi, etiam de parvulis rectissime dicitur, qui in ipsa aetate moriuntur: Iustitia iusti super ipsum erit et iniquitas iniqui super ipsum erit. Sic enim discernetur a regenerato generatus, ut in eo regno iste vita vivat, in quo iustitia inhabitat, in eo autem supplicio ille morte moriatur, ubi cruciatur iniquitas. Sed quae istius iustitia, nisi quae in illum transit a Christo, in quo omnes vivificabuntur? Et quae huius iniquitas, nisi quae in illum transit ex Adam, in quo omnes moriuntur?
Augustine. From this at least understand that God spoke these things of those fathers and children who already lived separately, because, when he had said, The son shall not bear the iniquity of his father, nor shall the father bear the injustice of his son, he at once added: The justice of the just shall be upon himself. For can it be said of a little one in this age that his justice is upon him, since by his own life he cannot yet live either justly or iniquitously? Whatever penalties, then, he suffers in this age, by what merit does he suffer them, if he drew none from his parents? Since the most just God neither inflicts undeserved penalties on anyone nor allows them to be inflicted, nor can it be said that the little one suffers these evils for the exercise of a virtue which as yet is none in him. Furthermore, if you consider the age to come, which pertains to the inheritance of the New Testament, even of the little ones who die in that very age it is most correctly said: The justice of the just shall be upon himself, and the iniquity of the iniquitous shall be upon himself. For thus shall the begotten be distinguished from the regenerated, so that the latter shall surely live in that kingdom in which justice dwells, but the former shall surely die in that punishment where iniquity is tormented. But what is the justice of the latter, except that which passes into him from Christ, in whom all will be made alive? And what is the iniquity of the former, except that which passes into him from Adam, in whom all die?
JulianImp.3.49III. 50. Iulianus. Sed ne forte simpliciorum auribus tali cavillo coneris illudere, ut dicas Deum hic de his, qui perfectae sunt aetatis, locutum, id est ut illis filiis parentum crimina diceret non nocere, qui naturale malum operum suorum sanctitate vacuassent, osten dendum est nihil hanc promovere fraudem. Quamvis enim absolute praescripserit Deus, quoniam iniquitas parentum non addicat filios innocentes, sed unusquisque propriis iniquitatibus arguatur nec hinc fidelis animus possit ambigere, tamen, ut opinionis tuae confossum tot fulminibus legis retractemus cadaver, quatenus accipiendam hanc Dei disputationem putabis, videlicet ut parentum sicut nec adultis ita nec nascentibus filiis obsint delicta? An, ut tantummodo iam grandioris aetatis et iustitiam operantibus non sinantur nocere, parvulos autem, antequam per propriam iustitiam naturale virus exhauriant, scelere generantium gravari, sicque fiat quod per Prophetam Deus futurum negavit?
III. 50. Julian. But lest perhaps you try to mock the ears of the simpler by such a cavil, so as to say that God here spoke of those who are of mature age—that is, that he said the crimes of parents do not harm those children who had emptied the natural evil by the holiness of their own works—it must be shown that this fraud accomplishes nothing. For although God prescribed absolutely that the iniquity of parents does not condemn innocent children, but each one is convicted by his own iniquities, and a faithful mind cannot doubt of this, nevertheless, that we may handle again the corpse of your opinion, pierced by so many thunderbolts of the law: in what sense will you think this disputation of God must be received—namely, that the offenses of parents harm the newborn children no more than they harm the adult? Or that they are only not allowed to harm those of greater age and working justice, but that the little ones, before they exhaust the natural venom by their own justice, are burdened by the crime of those who beget—and so that comes about which God denied through the Prophet would be?
JulianImp.3.50Augustinus. Immo sic fit, quod alio loco Deus dicit: Reddam peccata patrum in filios . Cum enim utrumque ipse dicat, id est et patrum ad filios non pertinere peccata et reddere se in filios patrum peccata, non potest utique sibi esse contrarius; et ideo recte quaerentibus, quomodo utrumque sit verum, unum horum generationi, alterum regenerationi intellegitur convenire. Tu, qui pervertis cor tuum, cave illum et, quod verum audis, non vocabis cavillum.
Augustine. Rather, that comes about which God says in another place: I will repay the sins of fathers upon children (Exod 20:5). For since he himself says both—that is, both that the sins of fathers do not pertain to children, and that he repays the sins of fathers upon children—he cannot surely be contrary to himself; and therefore, to those who rightly ask how both are true, one of these is understood to fit generation, the other regeneration. You, who pervert your own heart, beware of him, and what you hear to be true, you will not call a cavil.
JulianImp.3.50III. 51. Iulianus. Sed ad hoc nos referimus. Et illud ergo aliud, quod paribus momentis appenditur fieri profitere, id est ut iustitiae parentum filiis suis prosint eosque sanctificent atque illis tantummodo non dicantur prodesse, qui grandioris iam aevi natales iustitias propriis attrivere criminibus, ut, quia utrumque a Deo negatum et alterum alterius exemplo dissertum atque inculcatum est, quam tu negationem rationibus tuis videns esse contrariam in parvulis mentitam esse contendis, ambas eius partes nascentium conditione confutes. Quod cum feceris, duo mala pariter perpetrabis, unum, quod oppugnat sententiam Dei, aliud quoniam nasci de iusto iustum et de criminoso asseris criminosum.
III. 51. Julian. But to this we refer. Profess, then, that that other thing also which is weighed in equal balance comes about—that is, that the justices of parents profit their children and sanctify them, and that they are only said not to profit those who, of greater age, have worn away the justices of their birth by their own crimes; so that, since both were denied by God, and the one discoursed and impressed by the example of the other, you—seeing that denial to be contrary to your reasonings—contend that it lied in the case of the little ones, and refute both its parts by the condition of the newborn. And when you have done this, you will perpetrate two evils alike: one, that it opposes the sentence of God; the other, that you assert a just man is born of a just man and a criminal of a criminal.
JulianImp.3.51Augustinus. Negationem Prophetae non dico mentitam, sed a te non intellectam. Ille quippe regenerationem prophetavit, quae a peccatis parentum ad Dei, non ad hominum iudicium pertinentibus sola filios esse praestat alienos; tu autem dum negas generationem contagium mortis antiquae de patribus trahere, ipsam regenerationis causam conaris extinguere. Quamvis enim lavacrum regenerationis, quidquid peccatorum invenerit, diluat, tamen alia peccata possent et paenitendo sanari, sicut possunt in eis, quos iterum regenerare fas non est; illud vero, quod generatione contrahitur, nisi regeneratione non solvitur. Iustus ergo ex Deo, non ex homine nascitur, quoniam renascendo, non nascendo fit iustus; unde etiam tales filii Dei vocantur. Lege Evangelium: Non ex sanguinibus neque ex voluntate carnis neque ex voluntate viri, sed ex Deo nati sunt . Quid quaeris rerum genera multum diversa coniungere? Homines hominum carne nascuntur, Dei Spiritu renascuntur. Quid ergo mirum, si quemadmodum de Spiritu iustitiae sumit homo iustitiam, ita de carne peccati trahit originale peccatum? Neque enim venisset homo unus ad liberandos nos in similitudine carnis peccati, nisi omnium nostrum esset caro peccati. Cum igitur huic gratiae christianae sit inimica haeresis vestra, adhuc mirari et conqueri audetis, quod vos Christi detestetur Ecclesia?
Augustine. I do not say that the Prophet's denial lied, but that it was not understood by you. For he prophesied regeneration, which alone makes the children foreign to the sins of parents that pertain to the judgment of God, not of men; but you, while you deny that generation draws the contagion of the ancient death from the fathers, try to extinguish the very cause of regeneration. For although the washing of regeneration washes away whatever sins it finds, nevertheless other sins could be healed even by repenting, as they can in those whom it is not lawful to regenerate again; but that which is contracted by generation is not loosed except by regeneration. The just man, then, is born of God, not of man, since by being reborn, not by being born, he becomes just; whence too such are called sons of God. Read the Gospel: Not of bloods, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God they were born (John 1:13). Why do you seek to join kinds of things very diverse? Men are born of the flesh of men, are reborn of the Spirit of God. What wonder, then, if, just as a man takes justice from the Spirit of justice, so he draws original sin from the flesh of sin? For one man would not have come to free us in the likeness of the flesh of sin (See Rom 8:3), unless the flesh of us all were the flesh of sin. Since, then, your heresy is hostile to this Christian grace, do you still dare to wonder and complain that the Church of Christ detests you?
JulianImp.3.51III. 52. Iulianus. Si autem non sustinens reclamantis strepitum veritatis alio tentaris effugere, in plagas incides fortiores. Nam si dicas: Vera quidem est sententia Prophetae, sed in personis grandioribus, quae dicit necessitudines culpis mutuis non gravari, in parvulis autem ab una sui parte mentitur, qua dicit eos reos non esse ob scelera generantium, in alia autem non mentitur, in qua asserit eos nullis parentum virtutibus sublevari, tunc plane foedissimam non disputandi sed confingendi, non eloquendi sed loquendi, non postremo sani hominis, sed excidentis sensu Manichaei libidinem publicabis, si tibi putes contra perspicuam rationem, contra honorem Dei, contra exempla, contra testimonia praeceptorum, contra expositionem iudiciorum, quod libuerit, licere respuere et, quod delectarit, assumere.
III. 52. Julian. But if, not bearing the din of the truth crying out against you, you try to escape elsewhere, you will fall into stronger snares. For if you say: The sentence of the Prophet is indeed true, but in the case of older persons, where he says that kinships are not burdened by mutual faults, yet in the case of the little ones it lies in one part of itself, where it says they are not guilty for the crimes of those who beget, but does not lie in the other, where it asserts that they are lifted up by none of the virtues of their parents—then you will plainly make public a most foul lust not of disputing but of feigning, not of speaking eloquently but of mere talking, not, finally, of a sound man, but of a Manichean falling away in his senses, if you think it permitted you, against perspicuous reason, against the honor of God, against the examples, against the testimonies of the precepts, against the exposition of the judgments, to reject what you please and assume what delights you.
JulianImp.3.52Augustinus. Sententia Prophetae ex nulla parte mentitur. Sed tu non intellegens, quod per illam prophetatur, ut non dicam mentiris, certe, quod sine iniuria tua dixerim, nescis, quid loquaris. Nam et hoc, quod dicis asserere Prophetam nullis parentum virtutibus filios sublevari, quomodo et quatenus accipiatur, interest plurimum. Numquid enim vos negatis fide parentum regenerandos offerri filios Ecclesiae matri et baptizandos ministris Dei? Quomodo ergo nullis parentum virtutibus filii sublevantur? An christianam fidem dicere audebis nullam esse virtutem? An non sublevantur, cum in Dei regnum non aliter quam eadem regeneratione mittuntur? In ipsis quoque beneficiis temporalibus quare dicitur ad Isaac: Faciam tibi propter Abraham, patrem tuum ? Quare etiam Loth, filius fratris Abrahae, patrui sui meritis adiuvatur, si nullis parentum virtutibus filii sublevantur ? Quare postremo et propter peccata Salomonis filio eius regnum minuitur et propter bona merita David non totum tollitur, si nullis peccatis parentum filii gravantur aut nullis virtutibus sublevantur ? Homo linguate, non cordate, ista discerne, hic vide, si potes, quid per Ezechielem fuerit prophetatum . In aperto est enim nec patrem non regeneratum obesse filio regenerato ad capessendam vitam aeternam, de qua dictum est: vita vivet, nec patrem regeneratum prodesse ad hoc ipsum filio non regenerato nec vicissim filium patri aut prodesse regeneratum non regenerato aut obesse non regeneratum regenerato, ut ille vita vivat vel iste morte moriatur. Si autem ista non potes videre, cur nec tacere?
Augustine. The sentence of the Prophet lies in no part. But you, not understanding what is prophesied through it—not to say you lie—certainly (which I may say without injury to you) do not know what you are saying. For even this, which you say the Prophet asserts, that the children are lifted up by none of the virtues of the parents, makes very much difference how and in what sense it is taken. For do you deny that children are offered to be regenerated to the Church their mother, and to be baptized by the ministers of God, by the faith of their parents? How, then, are the children lifted up by none of the virtues of their parents? Or will you dare to say that the Christian faith is no virtue? Or are they not lifted up, when they are sent into the kingdom of God in no other way than by that same regeneration? In temporal benefits too, why is it said to Isaac: I will do it for you on account of Abraham your father (Gen 26:24)? Why is Lot too, the son of Abraham's brother, helped by the merits of his uncle, if children are lifted up by none of the virtues of their parents (See Gen 19:29)? Why, finally, both for the sins of Solomon is the kingdom diminished for his son, and for the good merits of David is not wholly taken away (See 1 Kgs 11:11-13), if children are burdened by no sins of parents or lifted up by no virtues? You glib man, not wise of heart, distinguish these things; here see, if you can, what was prophesied through Ezekiel. For it is plain both that an unregenerate father is no hindrance to a regenerate son for taking hold of the eternal life of which it is said, he shall surely live, and that a regenerate father is no help to this very thing for an unregenerate son, and in turn that a son is neither a help, as regenerate to an unregenerate father, nor a hindrance, as unregenerate to a regenerate father, so that the one shall surely live or the other shall surely die. But if you cannot see these things, why can you not be silent either?
JulianImp.3.52III. 53. Iulianus. Quis tu es, qui oestro Marcionis concitatus in excidium aequitatis irrumpas? Qui sub censuram linguae tuae mysteriis adhuc Manichaeorum lubricae Dei tam iudicia quam praecepta compellas? Nemo hoc umquam facere, nisi qui prius ea negavit, aggressus est. Tu testamentum Dei, quod ratio aequitas pietas veritas fide scribentibus Prophetis quasi quidam sacrorum testium ordo signavit, audebis Manichaeo auctore perrumpere. Olim et intellegentiae sanctitatem et religionis speciem perdidisti, si hac sententia, quae apud Ezechielem est, traducis tuae putes aut auxilium reperiri aut exitium non teneri.
III. 53. Julian. Who are you, who, goaded by the madness of Marcion, burst out to the destruction of equity? Who drag both the judgments and the precepts of God, while still slippery with the mysteries of the Manicheans, under the censure of your tongue? No one ever attempted to do this except one who first denied them. Will you dare, with Mani as your author, to break through the testament of God, which reason, equity, piety, truth—with the Prophets writing in faith, as a kind of order of sacred witnesses—sealed? You lost long ago both the holiness of understanding and the appearance of religion, if you think that by this sentence which is in Ezekiel either help is found for your transmission, or that destruction is not held.
JulianImp.3.53Augustinus. Spatiatur loquacitas inopiae copiosa, ubi non cernitur vel etiam, si cernitur, spernitur veritas, ubi est non verborum vanissima, sed rerum certissima copia. Aliud est directus veridicus, aliud disertus maledicus. Propheta filiis et patribus suas vitas separatim ducentibus vera dicit, tu Manichaeorum nomine catholicis Prophetam recte intellegentibus Pelagiana rabie maledicis.
Augustine. Garrulity, copious in poverty, ranges about where truth is not discerned, or even, if discerned, is spurned—where there is an abundance not most empty of words, but most certain of things. It is one thing to be straight and truth-telling, another to be eloquent and slanderous. The Prophet says true things to children and fathers leading their own lives separately; you, under the name of the Manicheans, slander with Pelagian rage the catholics who rightly understand the Prophet.
JulianImp.3.53III. 54. Iulianus. Iniquitas iniqui - inquit - super caput eius; unumquemque vestrum secundum vias suas iudicabo . Non morientur patres pro filiis neque filii pro parentibus; anima - inquit - quae peccat, ipsa morietur; quoniam omnes animae meae sunt, unumquemque pro suis iniquitatibus iudicabo .
III. 54. Julian. The iniquity of the iniquitous, he says, upon his own head; I will judge each one of you according to his ways (Ezek 18:30). The fathers shall not die for the children, nor the children for the parents; the soul, he says, that sins, it shall die; for all souls are mine; I will judge each one for his own iniquities (See Ezek 18:4, 30; Deut 24:16).
JulianImp.3.54Augustinus. Deus, qui haec dicit, ipse Deus est, qui dicit: Reddam peccata patrum in filios . Nisi intellexeris, quomodo utrumque sit verum, nullo modo credas Prophetam te intellexisse veridicum, quantalibet te patiar loquacitate maledicum.
Augustine. God, who says these things, is the same God who says: I will repay the sins of fathers upon children (Exod 20:5). Unless you understand how both are true, by no means believe that you have understood the truth-telling Prophet, however much I bear with you as slanderous in your garrulity.
JulianImp.3.54III. 55. Iulianus. En cui luci, cui populo sententiarum, cui dignitati iudiciorum tradux tua et convitium facere non timet et conatur inferre praeiudicium. Hic dubium non est, quia non te pudeat illud dicere, quod videtur reliquum, id est ut respondeas veram Prophetae, immo Dei per Prophetam esse sententiam, insuperabilem prudentum rationem, qua docetur iniquissimum, ut peccata parentum filiis imputentur.
III. 55. Julian. Behold to what light, to what people of sentences, to what dignity of judgments your transmission both does not fear to do insult and tries to bring prejudice. Here there is no doubt that you are not ashamed to say what seems to remain—that is, that you answer that the sentence of the Prophet, nay of God through the Prophet, is true, the insuperable reason of the prudent, by which it is taught most iniquitous that the sins of parents be imputed to children.
JulianImp.3.55Augustinus. Erubesce, tu es iniquissimus; nam qui dixit: Reddam peccata patrum in filios , non est iniquus.
Augustine. Blush; it is you who are most iniquitous; for he who said: I will repay the sins of fathers upon children (Exod 20:5), is not iniquitous.
JulianImp.3.55III. 56. Iulianus. Nec te hoc putare, quia reatu voluntatis semina omnium hominum polluantur, sed tamen hanc iustitiam in Adae solius crimine non valere, ipsius unum esse peccatum, quod omnibus imputetur. Ad quod ego quid prius facere debeam nescio: rideamne, quod ineptiae exigunt singulares? Sed multorum perditio, quos decipitis, miserationem expectat et lacrimas. Serio ergo maerore conficiar? Sed argumentorum tuorum prodigia incutiunt, quamvis maesto animo, cachinnum.
III. 56. Julian. Nor that you think this—that the seeds of all human beings are polluted by the guilt of the will, but yet that this justice does not hold in the crime of Adam alone, that his one sin is what is imputed to all. To which I do not know what I ought first to do: should I laugh, as singular absurdities demand? But the perdition of the many whom you deceive awaits compassion and tears. Should I, then, be consumed with serious grief? But the prodigies of your arguments strike out laughter, though from a mournful mind.
JulianImp.3.56Augustinus. Dic, quod dicturus es, egregie corrector. Quo auctore deceptor est credendus Ambrosius, de quo ait Pelagius , magister tuus, quod eius fidem et purissimum in Scripturis sensum ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere. Tu eum reprehende; fortior enim es atque potentior inimicus crucis Christi, quam si esses inimicus Ambrosii; audacius invides gratiae Dei, quam si invideres illi homini Dei. Reprehende, inquam, irride exagitando, defle dolendo; potes enim vi magna eloquentiae in urbanitatem ducere vanitatem tuam et in misericordiam transfigurare vecordiam. Dic ergo illum virum errasse deformiter, desipuisse infeliciter affirmando discordiam concupiscentiae carnis et spiritus in naturam ex primi hominis praevaricatione vertisse . Quis enim sine illa nascitur, ex quo coeperunt homines nasci nascendo utique in carne peccati? Sed tu, homo acutissimus, non credens tale ac tantum illud fuisse peccatum, ut posset in hoc malum tunc ipsam mutare naturam eamque ineffabilis apostasiae merito facere cum stirpe damnandam, hoc, quod omnes sobrii malum sentiunt, malum iudicant, ebrius Pelagiano dogmate asseris bonum. Mirabili enim facundia potes eam, quam sancti accusant gemitibus, tu laudibus ornare libidinem et talem prorsus, qualis et nunc est, se scilicet nolentibus ingerentem et ad certamen provocantem corda castorum tamquam formosum et amoenum lignum, etiamsi nemo ibi peccasset, inter paradisi nemora collocare. Erubesce, beatitudo Pelagianorum, et vide quo fugias, quia casti te fugiunt.
Augustine. Say what you are going to say, excellent corrector. On whose authority is Ambrose to be believed a deceiver—Ambrose, of whom Pelagius, your teacher, says that not even an enemy dared to reprove his faith and most pure sense in the Scriptures? Reprove him; for you are a stronger and more powerful enemy of the cross of Christ than if you were an enemy of Ambrose; you more audaciously begrudge the grace of God than if you begrudged that man of God. Reprove him, I say, mock him by attacking, lament him by grieving; for you can, by the great force of your eloquence, lead your vanity into urbanity and transform your madness into mercy. Say, then, that that man erred deformedly, that he was unhappily out of his senses in affirming that the discord of the concupiscence of the flesh and the spirit turned into nature from the transgression of the first man (See Ambrose, Defense of the Prophet David 11.56). For who is born without it, from the time men began to be born—being surely born in the flesh of sin? But you, most acute man, not believing that that sin was so great and such that it could then change nature itself into this evil and, by the merit of an ineffable apostasy, make it to be condemned along with its stock, assert—drunk with the Pelagian teaching—that this, which all the sober feel to be an evil and judge to be an evil, is a good. For by a wondrous eloquence you can adorn with praises the lust which the saints accuse with groans, and place such a lust as it even now is—namely, forcing itself on those unwilling and provoking to combat the hearts of the chaste—among the groves of paradise, as a beautiful and pleasant tree, even if no one had sinned there. Blush, you blessedness of the Pelagians, and see where you may flee, for the chaste flee from you.
JulianImp.3.56III. 57. Iulianus. Quis enim hoc, si quid saeculo huic superfuerit aetatis, monumentis credere poterit litterarum exstitisse videlicet hominem, qui crederet et iuraret non esse naturale, quod esset naturale, non esse generationis, quod esset generationis, non pertinere ad condicionem parentum, quod ad aliquos non ob aliud pertineret, nisi quia fuissent parentes? Puto, quod conficta haec magis quam ab ullis defensa mortalibus arbitretur secutura generatio. Hos enim natatus et has nauseas atque hos vomitus vestra natio fidesque perpetitur, qui dicitis: Non possunt parentum peccata ad filios decurrere per naturam, quia res arbitrii seminibus non ligatur, sed peccatum Adae, quod de voluntate conceptum est, transit in omnes homines per naturam, quia res arbitrii seminibus illigata est; non damnat etiam Deus filios pro peccatis parentum, quia summae iniquitatis est, sed damnat Adae posteros propter peccatum parentum, quod nulla potest iustitia vindicari. Non pertinet postremo ad condicionem generationis, quia hi, qui coniuges sunt, fiunt parentes, quod non ob aliud pertinuit ad Adam, nisi quia coniugii lege generavit. Hoccine cursum gubernare est an natare? Hoccine est conficere an nauseare? Hoccine est sumere aliquid solidum an semper evomere? Isdem sermonibus quod negaveris, affirmas, isdem lineis quod affirmaveris, denegas, et irasceris, cur non acquiescamus homini, qui gravi morbo ruptus non potest tenere, quod suscipit.
III. 57. Julian. For who, if any age survive into this world, will be able to believe by the monuments of letters that there existed a man who believed and swore that what was natural was not natural, that what was of generation was not of generation, that what pertained to the condition of parents did not pertain to some for any other reason than because they had had parents? I think the following generation will reckon these things rather as feigned than as defended by any mortals. For these swimmings and these nauseas and these vomitings your nation and faith suffer, who say: The sins of parents cannot run down to children through nature, because a thing of choice is not bound to the seeds; but the sin of Adam, which was conceived of the will, passes into all human beings through nature, because a thing of choice is bound to the seeds; God does not condemn children too for the sins of parents, because it is of the highest iniquity, but he condemns the posterity of Adam on account of the sin of the parent, which can be avenged by no justice. Finally, it does not pertain to the condition of generation, because those who are spouses become parents—which pertained to Adam for no other reason than because he begot by the law of marriage. Is this to govern one's course, or to flounder? Is this to digest, or to be nauseated? Is this to take in something solid, or to keep vomiting? By the same words you affirm what you denied, by the same lines you deny what you affirmed, and you are angry that we do not acquiesce in a man who, ruptured by a grave disease, cannot hold down what he takes in.
JulianImp.3.57Augustinus. Absit, ut dicamus aliorum patrum in filios Deum peccata non reddere, cum Scriptura divina totiens nominatimque testetur, pro quibus patrum peccatis in quos eorum filios vindicta processerit usque adeo, ut quoddam peccatum grave regis Achab parcens ei Deus in eius filium vindicare distulerit . Sed quis modus et quae sit divinae ratio atque mensura iustitiae de aliorum patrum peccatis, ut reddantur in filios, indagare quis potest? Propter quod Deus sibi tenuit ista iudicia, hominem vero iudicantem sic vindicare prohibuit. Sed apostasia primi hominis, in quo summa erat et nullo impediebatur vitio libertas propriae voluntatis, tam magnum peccatum fuit, ut ruina eius natura humana esset tota collapsa, quod indicat humani generis tanta miseria, quae a primis ploratibus vagientium usque ad exspirantium novissimos halitus omnibus nota est ita, ut, qui eam negant, maiorem partem sibi vindicent humanae miseriae tam horribili et incredibili caecitate, sicut vos facitis, qui mortalem Adam ita factum ut, sive peccaret sive non peccaret, moriturus esset, etiam post iudicium Palaestinum, ubi vos ista dicentes Pelagius ipse damnavit , adhuc dicere non timetis. Sed perge, ut tibi placet, atque ipsos etiam tot Palaestinos episcopos criminare Manichaeos; clama Pelagium ad horam cessisse Manichaeis, ne damnaretur ab eis. Imple paradisum pomis libidinum et tot ac tanta mala, quae perpeti videmus infantes, tamquam non sint poenales dolores, sed vernales odores, per illa felicia prata diffunde. Et me irride quasi natantem, cum tu in haec profunda demersus intereas; me irride quasi nauseantem ac vomentem, cum tu mortuus iaceas et tamquam vermescente putredine sic inquieta loquacitate putescas; me argue quasi affirmantem, quod negaverim, et, quod affirmaverim, denegantem, cum tu potius hoc feceris, sicut in tuo volumine superiore monstravi, et me hoc non fecisse possint, qui legunt, attendere et, quam fallaciter hoc me fecisse dixeris, invenire; me dic gravi morbo ruptum, quod suscipio, tenere non posse, cum tu spiritu vitae penitus amisso non saltem valeas ingesta suscipere.
Augustine. Far be it from us to say that God does not repay the sins of other fathers upon children, since divine Scripture so often and by name testifies for which sins of which fathers vengeance went forth upon which of their children—to the point that God, sparing King Ahab, deferred avenging a certain grave sin of his upon his son (See 1 Kgs 21:29). But who can investigate what measure and what reason and limit there is of divine justice concerning the sins of other fathers, that they be repaid upon children? On account of which God reserved these judgments to himself, but forbade the man who judges so to avenge. But the apostasy of the first man—in whom the liberty of his own will was supreme and impeded by no defect—was so great a sin that by his ruin the whole of human nature collapsed, which the so great misery of the human race indicates—a misery which, from the first wailings of those crying to the last breaths of those expiring, is known to all, so that those who deny it claim for themselves the greater part of human misery by so horrible and incredible a blindness, as you do, who do not fear to say still that Adam was so made mortal that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he would die—even after the council of Palestine, where Pelagius himself condemned you who say these things (See The Proceedings of Pelagius 11.23-24). But go on, as it pleases you, and accuse even those so many Palestinian bishops too of being Manicheans; cry out that Pelagius yielded to the Manicheans for the hour, lest he be condemned by them. Fill paradise with the fruits of lusts, and spread through those happy meadows so many and so great evils, which we see infants suffer, as if they were not penal pains but vernal scents. And mock me as swimming, while you yourself, plunged into these depths, perish; mock me as nauseating and vomiting, while you yourself lie dead and, as if with a worm-breeding rottenness, so rot with restless garrulity; charge me as affirming what I denied and denying what I affirmed, when it is rather you who have done this, as I showed in your earlier volume, and those who read can notice that I have not done this, and find how falsely you said I had done it; say that I, ruptured by a grave disease, cannot hold down what I take in, when you, having utterly lost the spirit of life, cannot even take in what is brought to you.
JulianImp.3.57III. 58. Iulianus. Vides quidem etiam ipse rem dignam conflictatione non esse; tamen, ut mentibus subveniatur incautis, quae crassiores quasque opiniones et malis moribus blandientes in solacium assumunt conscientiae sauciatae, interrogamus, utrum tantae stoliditatis inventum de aliqua Scripturarum occasione compereris. Si dixeris: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum , admonemus te, ut relegas praesentis operis superiorem libellum, cuius si memor fueris, Apostoli testimonium usurpare non poteris.
III. 58. Julian. You yourself indeed see that the matter is not worthy of conflict; nevertheless, that the incautious minds may be helped, which take up, as a consolation of a wounded conscience, the grosser opinions and those flattering to evil morals, we ask whether you have found the invention of so great stupidity from any occasion of the Scriptures. If you say: Through one man sin entered into the world (Rom 5:12), we admonish you to reread the earlier book of the present work, which, if you remember it, you will not be able to usurp the testimony of the Apostle.
JulianImp.3.58Augustinus. Nos te potius admonemus, ut ipsum Apostolum legas et videas pauca ipsa, de quibus agimus, verba eius tam manifesta esse contra te, ut non libello, sed plane longissimo et loquacissimo libro frustra ea fueris in haereticam vestram sententiam non vertere sed pervertere, non exponere sed obscurare conatus.
Augustine. We rather admonish you to read the Apostle himself and to see that those very few words of his, of which we treat, are so manifest against you that not in a little book but plainly in a most long and most garrulous book you have labored in vain not to turn but to pervert them into your heretical sense, not to expound but to obscure them.
JulianImp.3.58III. 59. Iulianus. Si autem dixeris, quia una est forma baptismatis, qua diversae aetatis homines consecrantur, fateberis etiam me tacente commemorationem ibi nec generationis infectae nec carnis diabolicae nec Adae aliquam contineri; ad quod tamen suo loco, quamvis ad traducem non spectet, plene responsuri sumus.
III. 59. Julian. But if you say that there is one form of baptism by which men of different age are consecrated, you will confess, even with me silent, that there is contained there no mention either of an infected generation or of a diabolical flesh or of any Adam; to which, however, in its own place, although it does not look to transmission, we shall fully answer.
JulianImp.3.59Augustinus. Ubi respondere coeperis, quid ibi nisi ut soles haereticus apparebis?
Augustine. When you begin to answer, what will you there appear except, as is your wont, a heretic?
JulianImp.3.59III. 60. Iulianus. Unam ergo saltem contra tantam a nobis productorum testium dignitatem, contra iustitiam manifestam, contra perspicuam rationem legis ede sententiam, per quam te ostendas fuisse deceptum; quod ideo addidi, quia, etiamsi esset, quae tale aliquid ambiguitate verborum putaretur ostendere, aliarum tamen sententiarum splendore et magisterio ita, ut iustitiae congruebat, cogebatur exponi.
III. 60. Julian. Produce, then, against so great a dignity of the witnesses brought forward by us, against manifest justice, against the perspicuous reason of the law, at least one sentence by which you may show that you have been deceived; which I have added for this reason, because, even if there were one that might be thought to show some such thing by the ambiguity of words, it would nevertheless be compelled, by the splendor and mastery of the other sentences, to be expounded as accorded with justice.
JulianImp.3.60Augustinus. Certa, non ambigua contra vos divina testimonia proferuntur, sicut a nobis iam multa prolata sunt ; sed quia tenebras vestras redarguunt, vobis lucida non videntur et, quaecumque vobis sua radiante luce molesta sunt, contra illa cor clauditis, ne inde nox fugetur erroris.
Augustine. Certain, not ambiguous, divine testimonies are brought forward against you, as many have already been brought forward by us; but because they convict your darkness, they do not seem clear to you, and against whatever things are troublesome to you by their radiant light, you close your heart, lest from there the night of error be put to flight.
JulianImp.3.60III. 61. Iulianus. Nunc autem, cum nec exigua opinionis huius in Scripturis sanctis inveniatur occasio et e regione fides, quam tuemur, non minus rationibus suis quam exemplis et testimoniis muniatur, funesta es prorsus obstinatione pervasus, qui putas damno legis, damno rationis, damno prudentiae damnoque iustitiae Manichaeorum somniis annuendum.
III. 61. Julian. But now, since not even a slight occasion for this opinion is found in the holy Scriptures, and, on the contrary, the faith we maintain is fortified no less by its reasonings than by examples and testimonies, you are utterly possessed by a deadly obstinacy, you who think that, with loss of the law, loss of reason, loss of prudence, and loss of justice, the dreams of the Manicheans must be agreed to.
JulianImp.3.61Augustinus. Damno legis non audis: Reddam in filios peccata patrum ; damno rationis non vides mala, quae parvuli patiuntur, qui propria peccata in hac vita nulla fecerunt, nonnisi ex peccatis originis causas iustas habere apud Deum; damno prudentiae non caves, contra antiquissimum fidei catholicae fundamentum dogma proferre vel defensare novitium, quo negatur originale peccatum; damno iustitiae sic iniquus es, ut sub meo nomine tot viris sanctis, Ecclesiae Christi filiis et patribus, discipulis atque doctoribus, qui ante nos fuerunt, atque ipsi matri omnium, catholicae Ecclesiae, non timeas Manichaeae pestis obiectare contagium.
Augustine. With loss of the law, you do not hear: I will repay upon children the sins of fathers; with loss of reason, you do not see that the evils which the little ones suffer—who made no proper sins in this life—have just causes before God only from the sins of origin; with loss of prudence, you do not beware of bringing forth or defending, against the most ancient foundation of the catholic faith, a novel teaching by which original sin is denied; with loss of justice, you are so iniquitous that, under my name, you do not fear to fling the contagion of the Manichean plague at so many holy men—sons and fathers, disciples and doctors of the Church of Christ, who were before us—and at the very mother of all, the catholic Church.
JulianImp.3.61III. 62. Iulianus. Quid tamen in hunc sensum afferamus attende. Etiamsi posses probare Adae peccatum filiis imputari, assentireris tamen aliorum parentum suboli eorum crimina non nocere.
III. 62. Julian. Attend, however, to what we bring forward to this sense. Even if you could prove that Adam's sin is imputed to children, you would nevertheless assent that the crimes of other parents do not harm their offspring.
JulianImp.3.62Augustinus. Quis huic errori assentiatur, nisi qui non credit Deo dicenti: Reddam peccata patrum in filios?
Augustine. Who would assent to this error, except one who does not believe God saying: I will repay the sins of fathers upon children?
JulianImp.3.62III. 63. Iulianus. Manifestum erat non generationis, sed alterius cuiuscumque fuisse causae, quod unius generantis peccato apud iniquum tamen iudicem filii videbantur obnoxii.
III. 63. Julian. It was manifest that it was not of generation, but of some other cause whatever, that the children seemed liable—before an iniquitous judge, however—to the sin of the one who begot.
JulianImp.3.63Augustinus. Apertissime dicis iniquum Deum, qui peccata patrum apertissime dicit se in filios redditurum.
Augustine. You say most openly that God is iniquitous, who most openly says that he will repay the sins of fathers upon children.
JulianImp.3.63III. 64. Iulianus. Fiebatque, ut sicut iudicis aestimatio innocentibus maculabatur addictis, ita generationis status aliorum parentum vindicaretur exemplis. Si enim tramitis, si criminis causa in fecunditatis opere constitisset, omnem fecunditatem condicio ista pollueret.
III. 64. Julian. And it came about that, as the judgment of the judge was stained by the innocent being condemned, so the state of generation was vindicated by the examples of other parents. For if the cause of the path, if the cause of the crime had stood in the work of fruitfulness, this condition would pollute all fruitfulness.
JulianImp.3.64Augustinus. Reddam peccata patrum in filios Deus clamat; ergo quia ille verax est, tu ab itinere veritatis exorbitas.
Augustine. I will repay the sins of fathers upon children (Exod 20:5), God cries out; therefore, because he is truthful, you stray from the path of truth.
JulianImp.3.64III. 65. Iulianus. Cum vero non diversae generationis diversus tamen appareret status, relucebat prorsus etiam in illo coniugio, cuius reatui suboles sua communicaverat, generationem non fuisse vitiatam.
III. 65. Julian. But since, though the generation was not diverse, the state nevertheless appeared diverse, it shone forth plainly, even in that marriage whose guilt its offspring had shared, that generation had not been corrupted.
JulianImp.3.65Augustinus. Etsi diversa generatio non est, cum morituri ex morituris nascuntur, tamen, quod dicit Apostolus: Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum , non ad alios patres, sed ad illum pertinet, qui tanta impietate peccavit, quantam nos metiri atque aestimare non possumus. Sed quantam illam iudicaverit Deus, satis idoneis didicimus testibus et divina scilicet Scriptura et ipsa generis humani miseria, quantam pro peccato eius propagini eius non iniusto utique iudicio Dei redditam cernimus, qui, non dico aeternam et animae et corporis, sed nec temporalem corporis mortem nec tot ac tanta mala, quae videmus parvulos perpeti, etiam in paradiso, si nemo peccasset, futura fuisse dicimus, quoniam Christiani sumus. Alii vero patres etiamsi multa peccant, tamen, quia et anima infirma et in corpore corruptibili, quod aggravat animam, peccant, nec peccatis eorum fit natura moritura et peccata eorum in filios supplicio longe diverso et longe minore redduntur eius occulto iustoque iudicio, qui in mensura et numero et pondere cuncta disponit , et: Reddam peccata patrum in filios non mendaciter dicit.
Augustine. Even if the generation is not diverse—since those who will die are born of those who will die—nevertheless what the Apostle says, The body indeed is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10), pertains not to other fathers, but to that one who sinned with so great an impiety as we cannot measure and estimate. But how great God judged it, we have learned by witnesses sufficiently fit—namely, both divine Scripture and the very misery of the human race—and we discern how great a misery was repaid for his sin to his offspring by a judgment of God surely not unjust, we who say—because we are Christians—that not, I say, the eternal death of both soul and body, but not even the temporal death of the body, nor so many and so great evils which we see the little ones suffer, would have existed even in paradise if no one had sinned. But other fathers, although they sin much, nevertheless, because they sin with a soul that is weak and in a corruptible body which weighs down the soul, nature is not thereby made to die by their sins, and their sins are repaid upon their children by a punishment far diverse and far less, by the hidden and just judgment of him who arranges all things in measure and number and weight (See Wis 11:20), and who does not say falsely: I will repay the sins of fathers upon children.
JulianImp.3.65III. 66. Iulianus. Quid igitur actum est? Videlicet tam certum esse traducem non esse peccati ut, etiamsi doceres propter Adae peccatum filios puniri, constaret tamen innasci peccata non posse nec crimen ire cum semine, quando non hoc in omni fecunditate esse faterere; ac per hoc, etsi traderentur personis vitia, non tamen conceptibus miscerentur. Nunc au tem cum inter me et te conveniat parentum peccatum ad filios nisi vitio et reatu generationis non potuisse transire, rationi autem, exemplis legique convenerit generationis statum nullo pacto potuisse vitiari, quod ex tua etiam concessione firmatur, qui dicis nullorum parentum peccata praeter duorum ad liberos permeare, invictissime confectum est nec fecunditatem primorum hominum a diabolo fuisse corruptam nec nasci ullum posse peccatum.
III. 66. Julian. What, then, was accomplished? Namely, that it is so certain that there is no transmission of sin that, even if you taught that children are punished on account of Adam's sin, it would nevertheless be established that sins cannot be inborn nor crime go with the seed, since you would confess that this is not in all fruitfulness; and on this account, even if the vices were handed on to the persons, they would nevertheless not be mingled with the conceptions. But now, since it is agreed between me and you that the sin of parents could not pass to children except by a defect and guilt of generation, while it accorded with reason, with examples, and with the law that the state of generation could by no means be corrupted—which is confirmed even by your own concession, you who say that the sins of no parents except two pass over to their offspring—it has been most invincibly accomplished that neither was the fruitfulness of the first human beings corrupted by the devil, nor can any sin be born.
JulianImp.3.66Augustinus. Non hoc tibi dicitur; ipse tibi, quod non dicimus, dicis. Et aliorum patrum in filios peccata redduntur divina iustitia, non humana; scit enim Deus, quando et quomodo id iustissime faciat, homo autem nescit et secundum cognitionem suam debet ferre iudicium. Potest enim scire, cum iudicat, quamvis et hoc non semper, factum cuiusque personae; unde autem novit, quibus et qualibus vinculis connexa sit, de qua orta est, natura naturae? Sed illud unum, quo in mortis necessitatem mutata est humana natura, etiamsi alia nulla sint, sufficere ad damnationem, nisi generationis obligatio regeneratione solvatur, hoc dicimus, etsi audire non vultis; hoc veritate non vincitis, etsi oppugnare loquacitate persistitis.
Augustine. This is not said to you; you yourself say to yourself what we do not say. The sins of other fathers too are repaid upon children by divine justice, not human; for God knows when and how he most justly does this, but man does not know, and according to his own knowledge he ought to bring judgment. For he can know, when he judges—though not even this always—the deed of each person; but whence does he know with what and what kind of bonds the nature from which it arose is connected to the nature? But that one thing by which human nature was changed into the necessity of death—even if there are no others—suffices for condemnation, unless the bond of generation be loosed by regeneration; this we say, even if you are unwilling to hear; this you do not overcome by truth, even if you persist in attacking it by garrulity.
JulianImp.3.66III. 67. Iulianus. Quaeritur ergo a nobis, cur non assentiamur naturale esse peccatum. Respondemus: Quia nullum habet verisimilitudinis necdum veritatis, nullum iustitiae, nullum pietatis colorem, quia diabolum conditorem hominum facit videri.
III. 67. Julian. It is asked of us, then, why we do not assent that sin is natural. We answer: Because it has no color of verisimilitude, much less of truth, none of justice, none of piety, because it makes the devil seem the founder of human beings.
JulianImp.3.67Augustinus. Facit plane videri, sed vobis, non eis, qui noverunt a natura discernere vitium, quamvis in natura sit vitium. Lege ad Hebraeos et vide eorum esse solidum cibum, qui exercitatos habent sensus ad separandum bonum a malo, quod vos non habetis . Ideo quando dicimus: Nascitur homo cum vitio, diabolum eius conditorem dici putatis ita caeci vel contentiosi, ut nec corporum vitia, cum quibus quidam nascuntur, possitis aut velitis attendere; quorum vitiorum merita si quaerantur a vobis, quo confugiatis nisi ad praecipitium, non invenitis, quamdiu ad catholicae solidam petram redire non vultis.
Augustine. It plainly makes him seem so—but to you, not to those who know how to distinguish defect from nature, although the defect is in the nature. Read the Epistle to the Hebrews and see that solid food is theirs who have their senses exercised to separate good from evil (See Heb 5:14), which you do not have. Therefore, when we say: Man is born with a defect, you think the devil is being called his founder—being so blind or contentious that you can neither attend to, nor are willing to attend to, even the defects of bodies with which some are born; the merits of which defects, if they be sought of you, you find nowhere to take refuge except a precipice, so long as you are unwilling to return to the solid rock of the catholic faith.
JulianImp.3.67III. 68. Iulianus. Quia Deo iudici iniquitatis crimen affigit.
III. 68. Julian. Because it fastens the crime of iniquity upon God the judge.
JulianImp.3.68Augustinus. Vos hoc facitis, quia iniquum est grave super parvulos iugum, si nullum est originale peccatum.
Augustine. It is you who do this, because the heavy yoke upon the little ones is iniquitous, if there is no original sin.
JulianImp.3.68III. 69. Iulianus. Quia liberum arbitrium, quo potissimum praesidio contra diversos Ecclesia Christi munitur errores, infringit et destruit.
III. 69. Julian. Because it breaks and destroys free choice, by which safeguard especially the Church of Christ is fortified against the various errors.
JulianImp.3.69Augustinus. Liberum arbitrium vos opprimitis, cui reddendo vel adiuvando Dei gratiam denegatis.
Augustine. It is you who oppress free choice, to whom—for restoring or helping it—you deny the grace of God.
JulianImp.3.69III. 70. Iulianus. Dicens omnes homines adeo capaces nullius esse virtutis, ut in ipsis matrum visceribus antiquis criminibus impleantur.
III. 70. Julian. Saying that all human beings are so incapable of any virtue that in their very mothers' wombs they are filled with ancient crimes.
JulianImp.3.70Augustinus. Quomodo diceremus gratia iustificari, id est iustos fieri, si capaces virtutis homines negaremus?
Augustine. How would we say that men are justified by grace—that is, made just—if we denied that men are capable of virtue?
JulianImp.3.70III. 71. Iulianus. Quorum tamen scelerum vim non solum expultricem innocentiae naturalis commentaris, verum etiam deinceps per totam vitam in universa vitia coactricem.
III. 71. Julian. Yet you contrive the force of these crimes to be not only the expeller of natural innocence, but also thereafter, through the whole of life, the compeller into all vices.
JulianImp.3.71Augustinus. Per Dei gratiam minuitur, per Dei gratiam finitur necessitas nostra; non hic habet, quod agat, loquacitas vestra.
Augustine. By the grace of God our necessity is diminished, by the grace of God it is ended; here your garrulity has nothing to do.
JulianImp.3.71III. 72. Iulianus. Quam legem etiam peccati in Prophetis et Apostolis iam magno morum et signorum fulgore conspicuis et post illam gratiam mysteriorum Christi, quam tu his omnibus dogmatis tui flagitiis opitulari putas, mansisse et viguisse deiuras.
III. 72. Julian. Which law of sin you swear remained and flourished even in the Prophets and Apostles, who were already conspicuous by the great splendor of their morals and signs, and even after that grace of the mysteries of Christ, which you think aids all these disgraces of your teaching.
JulianImp.3.72Augustinus. Susceptam tuam libidinem, hoc est concupiscentiam carnis concupiscentiae spiritus repugnantem, Prophetae et Apostoli fideliter expugnabant, quia non laudabant.
Augustine. The Prophets and Apostles faithfully fought down that received lust of yours—that is, the concupiscence of the flesh fighting against the concupiscence of the spirit—because they did not praise it.
JulianImp.3.72III. 73. Iulianus. Quoniam conatus omnimodae honestatis exstinguit, quoniam morum obscaenitatem operum Dei, id est naturae humanae, consolatur et auget infamia, quoniam omnia mandata legis reatui impossibilitatis id est iniquitatis addicit.
III. 73. Julian. Since it extinguishes the effort of every kind of honor, since it consoles and increases with infamy the obscenity of the morals of the works of God—that is, of human nature—since it condemns all the commandments of the law to the guilt of impossibility, that is, of iniquity.
JulianImp.3.73Augustinus. Qui dicit: Non quod volo ago, sed quod odio illud facio , possibilitatem perfectionis suae in Dei gratia ponit contra vos; non in sua virtute confidit, ne sit vanus ut in vos.
Augustine. He who says, Not what I will do I do, but what I hate, that I do (Rom 7:15), places the possibility of his own perfection in the grace of God against you; he does not trust in his own power, lest he be empty as you are.
JulianImp.3.73III. 74. Iulianus. Quoniam non minus habet turpitudinis quam profanitatis, cum pro summis assertionis suae testimoniis genitalium amplexatur pudorem.
III. 74. Julian. Since it has no less of foulness than of profanity, when, for the highest testimonies of its assertion, it embraces the shame of the genitals.
JulianImp.3.74Augustinus. Non amplexamur genitalium pudorem, sed potius, pudor iste unde sit, quod vos non vultis, agnoscimus. Audimus enim Scripturae manifestissimum testimonium , contra quod vos obsurdescitis, cum obmutescere deberetis. Quis enim audiens, quod illi primi homines nudi erant et non pudebat eos, non videat, unde sit factum, ut post peccatum puderet eos nudos esse et ea membra, quorum puderet, festinarent succinctoriis qualibuscumque velare ? Sed inventus est homo, qui etiam talem libidinem, cui repugnandum est, ne peccetur, et cuius etiam impudentes pudet, in paradiso constitueret, etiamsi nemo ibi peccasset, nec eum ista dicentem tantae ac tam sacrilegae deformitatis puderet. Rogo te, si libido ista, ut credimus, solam tibi ingerit resistendi molestiam, nullam vero exhibet voluntatem, cur ei, quamvis falsae, tam magnam laudis persolvendam putas esse mercedem?
Augustine. We do not embrace the shame of the genitals, but rather acknowledge whence this shame comes—which you are unwilling to do. For we hear the most manifest testimony of Scripture, against which you grow deaf when you ought to grow dumb. For who, hearing that those first human beings were naked and were not ashamed, does not see whence it came about that after sin they were ashamed to be naked, and hastened to veil with girdles of whatever kind those members of which they were ashamed (See Gen 2:25; 3:7)? But a man has been found who would set even such a lust—which must be resisted lest one sin, and of which even the shameless are ashamed—in paradise, even if no one had sinned there, and is not ashamed to say these things of so great and so sacrilegious a deformity. I ask you, if this lust, as we believe, brings you only the trouble of resisting, but exhibits no good will, why do you think so great a wage of praise must be paid to it, false though it be?
JulianImp.3.74III. 75. Iulianus. Et pro auctoritatibus sacris Dei criminationibus intumescit.
III. 75. Julian. And, in place of the sacred authorities, it swells up with accusations of God.
JulianImp.3.75Augustinus. Itane vero sacra auctoritas non est: Corpus mortuum est propter peccatum ? Et Dei criminatio, non laudatio est: Vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra ? Puto, quod non criminator, sed ipso Deo plenus Dei praedicator haec dixit, ubi ostendit Adam non sic esse factum, quemadmodum dicitis, ut, sive peccaret sive non peccaret, moriturus esset.
Augustine. Is it not, then, a sacred authority: The body is dead because of sin? And is it an accusation of God, not a praise: He will give life also to your mortal bodies (Rom 8:10-11)? I think that not an accuser, but one full of God himself, a preacher of God, said these things, where he shows that Adam was not so made, as you say, that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he would die.
JulianImp.3.75III. 76. Iulianus. In cuius praeceptis immoderationem tyrannicam.
III. 76. Julian. In his precepts a tyrannical immoderation.
JulianImp.3.76Augustinus. Praeceptum Dei tyrannicum non est, sed, ut impleatur, ipse rogandus est; hoc vos non vultis, quia in vestra virtute confiditis.
Augustine. The precept of God is not tyrannical, but, that it may be fulfilled, he himself must be asked; this you are unwilling to do, because you trust in your own power.
JulianImp.3.76III. 77. Iulianus. In iudiciis iniquitatem barbaram.
III. 77. Julian. In his judgments a barbarous iniquity.
JulianImp.3.77Augustinus. Quoniam Dei non est iniquum iudicium, ideo in miseria generis humani, quae incipit a fletibus parvulorum, agnoscendum est originale peccatum.
Augustine. Since the judgment of God is not iniquitous, therefore in the misery of the human race, which begins from the weeping of the little ones, original sin must be acknowledged.
JulianImp.3.77III. 78. Iulianus. In iuramentis falsitatem punicam inesse confirmat.
III. 78. Julian. In his oaths it affirms that there is a Punic falsity.
JulianImp.3.78Augustinus. Numquid quando Deus dicit: Reddam peccata patrum in filios , punice loquitur?
Augustine. When God says, I will repay the sins of fathers upon children (Exod 20:5), does he speak in Punic?
JulianImp.3.78III. 79. Iulianus. Quoniam pro disputationibus et pro omnibus syllogismis Manichaei innititur somniis et furori.
III. 79. Julian. Since, in place of disputations and all syllogisms, it leans on the dreams and fury of Mani.
JulianImp.3.79Augustinus. Nec Manichaeus erat nec somniabat nec furebat, sive qui dixit: Fuimus et nos natura filii irae sicut et ceteri , sive qui dixit: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est .
Augustine. He was neither a Manichean nor dreaming nor raving—whether he who said, We too were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest (Eph 2:3), or he who said, We are all born under sin, whose very origin is in fault (See Ambrose, Defense of the Prophet David 11.56).
JulianImp.3.79III. 80. Iulianus. Istae sunt ergo causae, quae nos in impugnationem mali naturalis accendunt, quae dedignari et despicere faciunt consortia perditorum.
III. 80. Julian. These, then, are the causes which kindle us to the assault on natural evil, which make us disdain and despise the fellowships of the lost.
JulianImp.3.80Augustinus. Tot tantorumque Doctorum catholicorum pium consensum nullo modo, nisi perditus, diceres consortium perditorum.
Augustine. The pious consensus of so many and so great catholic Doctors you would in no way, except as one lost, call a fellowship of the lost.
JulianImp.3.80III. 81. Iulianus. Quae praestant nihilo magis nos totius mundi fragore terreri, quam si videremus tristis lupini silvam sonantem vel immundis suibus vel ventis irruentibus commoveri .
III. 81. Julian. Which causes grant that we are no more terrified by the crash of the whole world than if we saw a wood of bitter lupine resounding, stirred either by unclean swine or by rushing winds.
JulianImp.3.81Augustinus. Diffusa toto orbe catholica Ecclesia, quae prudenter exhorruit ora vestra, non est lupini silva, sed esse voluit a lupinis morsibus tuta.
Augustine. The catholic Church, spread through the whole world, which prudently shuddered at your mouths, is not a wood of lupine, but willed to be safe from lupine bites.
JulianImp.3.81III. 82. Iulianus. Ergo Deum et iustum et pium credimus et veracem ac per hoc nihil impossibile mandasse legem eius tenemus, nihil falsum confirmare testimonia, nihil iniquum pronuntiare iudicia, sed ipsum esse hominum conditorem, quos nullo crimini obnoxios creat, verum plenos quidem innocentia naturali, voluntariarum autem virtutum capaces.
III. 82. Julian. Therefore we believe God to be both just and pious and truthful, and on this account we hold that his law commanded nothing impossible, that his testimonies affirm nothing false, that his judgments pronounce nothing iniquitous, but that he himself is the founder of human beings, whom he creates liable to no crime, but full indeed of natural innocence, and capable of voluntary virtues.
JulianImp.3.82Augustinus. Unde ergo non exsufflatam, non exorcizatam, non baptizatam imaginem suam non admittit ad vitam suam? Siccine merces innocentiae redditur? An potius generatione reatus attractus neque regeneratione dimissus iuste negata vita, morte consequente punitur? Aliena tos quippe a vita Dei detestatus Apostolus non fuisset , si poena nulla esset.
Augustine. Whence, then, does he not admit his own image, unbreathed-upon, unexorcized, unbaptized, to his own life? Is this how the wage of innocence is repaid? Or rather, having drawn guilt by generation and not having it remitted by regeneration, is it justly, with life denied, punished by death following? For the Apostle would not have detested those estranged from the life of God (See Eph 4:18), if there were no penalty.
JulianImp.3.82III. 83. Iulianus. Quibus collectis alterum teneatur necesse est ex duobus: videlicet ut aut talis credatur Deus, qualem confingit Traducianus Manichaeus, aut talis intellegaris cum omnibus, qui in traducis scita concedunt, qualem deproeliatur honoratus Deus. Non autem potest esse Deus talis, qualem Manichaeus somniat, sed est pius et iustus et verus Deus, qualem omnis sancta Scriptura, omnis lex et fides nostra veneratur. Ac per hoc, hoc est tuum dogma, quod ut cum Dei iniuria suscipitur, ita cum eius honore destruitur.
III. 83. Julian. From which gathered points it is necessary that one of two be held: namely, that either God be believed such as the Traducianist Manichean feigns, or that you, with all who concede to the decrees of transmission, be understood such as God, honored, battles against. But God cannot be such as Mani dreams, but he is the pious and just and true God, such as all holy Scripture, all law, and our faith venerates. And on this account, this is your teaching, which, as it is taken up with injury to God, so it is destroyed with honor to him.
JulianImp.3.83Augustinus. Si pium Deum sentitis, quare salvatorem, hoc est Iesum a parvulis impie prohibetis? Si iustum, quare grave super parvulos iugum sine ullius peccati meritis creditis? Si verum, quare dicenti: Reddam in filios patrum peccata non creditis?
Augustine. If you hold God to be pious, why do you impiously prohibit the Savior—that is, Jesus—from the little ones? If just, why do you believe in a heavy yoke upon the little ones without the merits of any sin? If true, why do you not believe him who says: I will repay upon children the sins of fathers (Exod 20:5)?
JulianImp.3.83III. 84. Iulianus. Tempus est, ut ad alia transeamus; sed reposcit a nobis causae dignitas, ut etiam ea, quae superiore libro putamus praetermissa, reddamus. Quod quidem prudens lector supervacaneum forsitan iudicabit; tamen, quoniam compertum est rerum periculis depositam causam etiam levibus inhaerere, opera est, quibus praesidia sustuleris, auferre solacia.
III. 84. Julian. It is time for us to pass on to other things; but the dignity of the case demands of us that we render even those things which we think were omitted in the earlier book. Which indeed a prudent reader will perhaps judge superfluous; yet, since it has been found that a case laid down to the perils of affairs clings even to slight supports, it is worth the effort to take away the consolations of one from whom you have removed the safeguards.
JulianImp.3.84Augustinus. Quoniam in alia transire coepisti, iam, quod superius promisimus, debemus ostendere, prophetiam scilicet Ezechielis, qua dicitur patrum in filios peccata non reddi, sicut filiorum non redduntur in patres, ad praenuntiationem pertinere revelationis Testamenti Novi. Dicit enim tale aliquid etiam propheta Ieremias et ibi, unde hoc dicatur, illustrat. Nam inter cetera: Convertere -, inquit - virgo Israel, revertere in civitates tuas lugens; usque quo averteris, filia inhonorata, quoniam creavit Dominus salutem in plantationem novam, in qua salute circuibunt homines? Sic dixit Dominus: Adhuc dicent verbum hoc in terra Iuda et in civitatibus eius, cum revocabo captivitatem eius: Benedictus Dominus super iustum montem sanctum suum, et qui inhabitant in Iudaea et in omni civitate eius, simul cum agricola et tolletur in grege, quoniam inebriavi omnem animam sitientem et omnem animam esurientem satiavi. Propter hoc exsurrexi et vidi et somnus meus dulcis mihi factus est. Propterea ecce dies veniunt, dicit Dominus, et seminabo Israel et Iuda semen hominis et semen pecoris. Et erit: sicut vigilabam super eos deponere et affligere, ita vigilabo super eos aedificare et complantare, dicit Dominus. In diebus illis non dicent: Patres manducaverunt uvam acerbam et dentes filiorum obstupuerunt; sed unusquisque in suo peccato morietur et eius, qui manducaverit uvam acerbam, obstupebunt dentes ipsius . Nempe manifestum est hoc ad dies pertinere plantationis novae, de qua, ut hoc diceret, loquebatur. Ubi et illud semen hominis et semen pecoris, quod se Deus seminaturum esse promisit, spiritaliter intellectum eos, qui praesunt, et eos, qui reguntur, facit agnosci. Sed quia inveteratum erat in cordibus populi scriptum esse in Veteri Testamento: Reddam peccata patrum in filios , ne quisquam Scripturam Dei repugnare sibi arbitraretur, ut apertius ostenderet illud Veteri, hoc Novo congruere Testamento, continuo subiunxit: Ecce dies veniunt, dicit Dominus, et consummabo domui Israel et domui Iuda Testamentum Novum, non secundum Testamentum, quod disposui patribus eorum in die, qua apprehendi manum eorum, ut educerem eos de terra Aegypti , et cetera. Ad illud igitur Testamentum generatio pertinet, ad hoc autem regeneratio; unde ibi peccata patrum redduntur in filios, hic vero generationis vinculo per regenerationem soluto non dicitur: Patres manducaverunt uvam acerbam et dentes filiorum obstupuerunt, sed: eius, qui manducaverit uvam acerbam, obstupebunt dentes , quia non in patris, sed in suo peccato, si commiserit, quisque morietur. Tu autem cum prophetia, ubi dicitur: Non accipiet filius peccatum patris sui , non ostendisti, quemadmodum Scriptura concordet, ubi dicitur: Reddam peccata patrum in filios. Haec quippe inter se contraria remanebunt, nisi horum duorum singula ad Testamenta singula referantur, quod evidentissime Ieremias propheta monstravit.
Augustine. Since you have begun to pass on to other things, we now ought to show what we promised above—namely, that the prophecy of Ezekiel, by which it is said that the sins of fathers are not repaid upon children, as the sins of children are not repaid upon fathers, pertains to the foretelling of the revelation of the New Testament. For the prophet Jeremiah too says something of the kind, and there he makes clear whence this is said. For among other things: Turn back, he says, O virgin Israel, return to your cities, mourning; how long will you turn away, O dishonored daughter, since the Lord has created salvation for a new planting, in which salvation men shall go about? Thus said the Lord: They shall yet say this word in the land of Judah and in its cities, when I shall recall its captivity: Blessed be the Lord upon his just holy mountain, and those who dwell in Judea and in every city of it, together with the husbandman, and he shall be lifted up in the flock, because I have made drunk every thirsty soul and have satisfied every hungry soul. On account of this I rose up and saw, and my sleep was made sweet to me. Therefore behold, the days are coming, says the Lord, and I will sow Israel and Judah with the seed of man and the seed of beast. And it shall be: as I watched over them to pull down and to afflict, so will I watch over them to build and to plant, says the Lord. In those days they shall not say: The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge; but each one shall die in his own sin, and the teeth of him who eats the sour grape shall be set on edge (Jer 31:21-30). Surely it is manifest that this pertains to the days of the new planting, of which he was speaking that he might say this. Where both that seed of man and seed of beast, which God promised he would sow, understood spiritually, make those who preside and those who are ruled to be recognized. But because it was ingrained in the hearts of the people that it is written in the Old Testament, I will repay the sins of fathers upon children (Exod 20:5), lest anyone reckon the Scripture of God to be contrary to itself, that he might show more openly that that fits the Old, this the New Testament, he at once subjoined: Behold, the days are coming, says the Lord, and I will accomplish for the house of Israel and for the house of Judah a New Testament, not according to the Testament which I disposed for their fathers in the day in which I took their hand to lead them out of the land of Egypt (Jer 31:31-32), and the rest. To that Testament, then, generation pertains, but to this regeneration; whence there the sins of fathers are repaid upon children, but here, with the bond of generation loosed through regeneration, it is not said: The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge, but: the teeth of him who eats the sour grape shall be set on edge, because each one shall die not in his father's but in his own sin, if he commits it. But you, where the prophecy says, The son shall not bear the sin of his father, did not show how the Scripture agrees, where it is said, I will repay the sins of fathers upon children. For these will remain contrary to each other, unless each of these two be referred to its own Testament, which the prophet Jeremiah most evidently showed.
JulianImp.3.84III. 85. Iulianus. Igitur, cum venissemus ad apostoli Pauli sententiam , quam Scripturarum expertibus Traducianus venditare solitus erat, id est: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum , ostendi primitus ipsius sermonis testimonio a loci illius adytis Traducianos fuisse summotos, quando Gentium Magister peccati antiquitatem revolvens ad generationis custodiam quasi fortissimum stipatorem finitum numerum collocasset, ut dicens per unum hominem peccatum intrasse in mundum praescriberet nihil se de generatione sensisse, quae nisi per duos non posset exsistere. Atque assignavi distinctum esse inter commixtionem et peccatum parentum, cum diceretur intrasse peccatum quidem in mundum, sed per eum numerum, qui fetibus non poterat convenire. Actumque est sufficienter per totum libellum peccati ibi non naturam indicatam esse, sed formam, quod a praevaricatoribus post secutis imitatione constaret, non generatione susceptum. Verum quia scriptum legimus in Epistula ad Hebraeos de Iudaeis: Ex uno orti sunt et hoc emortuo , id est de Abraham, superius quoque in eadem epistula de Christo legitur: Qui sanctificat, et sanctificantur ex uno omnes , ne horum aliquid vel similium, si inveniri poterit, Traducianus arripiat atque argumentetur quidquam de responsione nostra ponderis fuisse discussum, qua affirmavimus ideo dictum esse unum, per quem transierit peccatum, ne generatio sineretur intellegi, cum inventum sit in hac epistula nomine unius generationem indicatam, ideo, inquam, id retractandum putavi. Ut igitur sit intentus lector, admoneo; multiplici enim haec oppositio genere destruetur. Ibi itaque, ubi commemoratio Abrahae fit et Sarra, eius uxor, inseritur; talis est quippe ordo verborum: Fide qui vocatur Abraham oboedivit in locum exire, quem accepturus erat in haereditatem, et exiit nesciens quo iret. Fide demoratus est in terra promissionis tamquam in aliena in casulis habitando cum Isaac et Iacob, cohaeredibus repromissionis eiusdem; exspectabat enim fundamenta habentem civitatem, cuius artifex et conditor Deus. Fide et ipsa Sarra sterilis virtutem in conceptione seminis accepit etiam praeter tempus aetatis, quoniam fidelem credidit esse qui promiserat. Propter quod ab uno orti sunt et hoc emortuo tamquam sidera caeli in multitudine et sicut harena, quae est ad oram maris innumerabilis . Cum ergo utrumque commemorasset, id est et Abraham et Sarram, eamque dixisset lege senectutis effetam, sed fide virtutem concipiendi seminis accepisse, secure subdidit ab uno ortos tot populos, qui multitudini conferrentur astrorum. Ut ergo copula exponeretur parentum, tam fidelium praedicatio quam rei gestae veritas imperavit; ut autem de ipsis duobus in commendatione propagatae multitudinis non utrumque, sed alterum diceret, ars laudantis admonuit. Volebat quippe ostendere, certa fides quam magna meruisset; dicens virtute Dei excedentem numeros multitudinem propagatam accomodatius ad laudem operis eius esse perpendens, si ex uno eos quam ex duobus diceret procreatos, maxime cum in laudis augmento, quam ultimus sermo cumulabat, nullum esset historiae dispendium, quam supra utriusque personae commemoratione suppleverat.
III. 85. Julian. Therefore, when we had come to the sentence of the apostle Paul which the Traducianist was wont to peddle to those inexperienced in the Scriptures—that is, Through one man sin entered into the world (Rom 5:12)—I first showed, by the testimony of his own discourse, that the Traducianists had been removed from the inner sanctuaries of that passage, since the Teacher of the Gentiles, recalling the antiquity of sin, had set a fixed number, as the strongest bodyguard, for the keeping of generation, so that, saying that through one man sin entered into the world, he prescribed that he thought nothing of generation, which could not exist except through two. And I assigned that a distinction was made between the intercourse and the sin of parents, since it was said that sin indeed entered into the world, but through that number which could not fit offspring. And it was dealt with sufficiently throughout the whole book that there not the nature of sin was indicated, but the pattern, since it was established to have been taken up by the transgressors who followed afterward by imitation, not by generation. But because we read it written in the Epistle to the Hebrews concerning the Jews: They arose from one, and that one as good as dead (Heb 11:12)—that is, from Abraham—and higher up in the same epistle it is read concerning Christ: He who sanctifies, and they who are sanctified, are all of one (Heb 2:11)—lest the Traducianist seize any of these or like things, if it can be found, and argue that something of the weight of our reply was shaken, by which we affirmed that 'one' was said, through whom sin passed, for this reason, lest generation be allowed to be understood, since in this epistle generation is found indicated by the name of 'one'—therefore, I say, I thought this must be handled again. That the reader, then, may be attentive, I give warning; for this objection will be destroyed by a manifold kind. There, then, where mention of Abraham is made, his wife Sarah is also inserted; for such is the order of the words: By faith he who is called Abraham obeyed to go out into a place which he was to receive as an inheritance, and he went out not knowing where he was going. By faith he sojourned in the land of promise as in a foreign land, dwelling in little huts with Isaac and Jacob, coheirs of the same promise; for he awaited the city having foundations, whose maker and founder is God. By faith Sarah too, being barren, received power for the conception of seed even beyond the time of her age, since she believed him faithful who had promised. On account of which from one arose, and that one as good as dead, as the stars of heaven in multitude and as the sand which is on the seashore innumerable (Heb 11:8-12). When, therefore, he had recalled both—that is, both Abraham and Sarah—and had said that she was made unfruitful by the law of old age, but by faith received the power of conceiving seed, he securely subjoined that from one arose so many peoples, who might be compared to the multitude of the stars. That the joining of the parents, then, might be set forth, both the proclamation of such faithful ones and the truth of the deed required; but that, of those two themselves, in commending the propagated multitude, he should say not both but one, the art of one praising admonished. For he wished to show how much sure faith had merited; reckoning that, in saying that a multitude exceeding numbers was propagated by the power of God, it was more fittingly suited to the praise of his work if he said they were procreated from one rather than from two—especially since, in the increase of praise which the last clause heaped up, there was no loss of history, which above he had supplied by the mention of each person.
JulianImp.3.85Augustinus. Qui te nihil dicere non intellegit, quid intellegat nescio. Dixeras Apostolum propterea dixisse: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum , quia exemplum peccandi homo ille ceteris praebuit. Nam si generationem - inquis - eo loco vellet intellegi, per duos diceret, non " per unum " , cum potius, si exemplum vellet intellegi, per unam diceret non per unum, quam constat etiam ipsi viro suo exemplum praebuisse peccandi. Sed quia generatione peccatum intravit in mundum sola regeneratione sanandum, ideo dixit: per unum, quia sicut humani exemplum peccati coepit a femina, sic generatio coepit a viro; conceptionem quippe, quae ad feminam pertinet, seminatio, quae ad virum pertinet, nullo dubitante praecedit. Sed ecce inventum est evidentissimum testimonium sive a te ipso sive ab alio, qui hoc tibi fortassis obiecit, ubi sine ulla ambiguitate ab uno orti dicti sunt innumerabiles, cum virum et feminam, duos utique parentes, ut orerentur, habuerint; sed dictum est rectissime propter exordium generationis, quod a semine viri est. Denique cum laudabilia fidei exempla proponeret, ab ipso Abel coepit et commemorato Abraham pervenit ad Sarram. Iam utique ab illo transierat et de eius coniuge loquebatur et tamen, cum ad commemorandam generationem immensi populi ventum esset, ad illum reversus est, quia ille genuit, quod illa peperit. Quod si, ut debueras, cogitares, non blasphemares fidelem fidei praedicatorem, qui scripsit epistulam, et diceres eum: arte laudis admonitum. Quid admonitum, quaeso? An ut mentiretur ab uno asserens ortos, qui orti sunt a duobus? Accommodatius videlicet, ut existimas, id esse perpendens ad laudem operis Dei. Multum erras; non delectat Deum falsa laudatio. Soles eam tu quidem libenter exhibere libidini; sed valde displicet falsitas veritati. Nam et ipsi libidini te cur praebeas non laudatorem, sed adulatorem nescio. Numquid ideo te plus amabit? Prorsus falleris; illa non amat hominem, sed plane stimulat, ut amet quod amare non debet. Si autem potest quocumque locutionis modo non mendaciter, sed veraciter dici ex uno esse ortos, qui orti sunt ex duobus, cur putas ideo generationem non potuisse insinuari, ubi dictum est: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, quia generatio per duos fit, non per unum? Cum sit omnibus notum aut eum potius aut prius generare qui seminat, feminam vero aut non generare, sed parere aut, si et ipse partus recte generatio dici potest, prius eam de viro generante concipere et postea fetum, quem conceperat, generare. Proinde Apostolus, cum peccatum in mundum, quod Christus regeneratione dilueret, generatione intrasse vellet intellegi, per unum hominem dixit, qui tunc vel prius vel potius generavit, praesertim quia, ut iam diximus et tibi inculcandum est, si hoc propter exempli diceret principatum, per unam diceret, ex qua primum in genere humano peccandi processit exemplum, et magis praetermitteret virum, quem mulieris exemplum, ut etiam ipse peccaret imitando, noverat subsecutum.
Augustine. He who does not understand that you say nothing, I do not know what he understands. You had said that the Apostle said, Through one man sin entered into the world, for this reason: because that man gave the rest an example of sinning. For if, you say, he wished generation understood in that passage, he would say "through two," not "through one"—when rather, if he wished an example understood, he would say 'through one woman,' not through one man, since it is established that she gave even her own husband an example of sinning. But because by generation sin entered into the world, to be healed only by regeneration, therefore he said: through one, because, as the example of human sin began from the woman, so generation began from the man; for the sowing, which pertains to the man, without anyone doubting, precedes the conception, which pertains to the woman. But behold, a most evident testimony has been found—whether by yourself or by another who perhaps objected this to you—where without any ambiguity innumerable men are said to have arisen from one, although they had a man and a woman, surely two parents, in order to arise; but it was said most correctly on account of the beginning of generation, which is from the seed of the man. Finally, when he set forth praiseworthy examples of faith, he began from Abel himself, and, having recalled Abraham, he came to Sarah. By now he had surely passed from him and was speaking of his wife, and yet, when it came to recalling the generation of the immense people, he returned to him, because he begot what she bore. And if you considered this, as you ought, you would not blaspheme the faithful preacher of faith who wrote the epistle, nor say that he was admonished by the art of praise. Admonished to what, I ask? That he should lie, asserting that those arose from one who arose from two? More fittingly, namely, as you reckon, weighing this to be suited to the praise of the work of God. You err greatly; a false praise does not delight God. You indeed are wont to offer it gladly to lust; but falsity greatly displeases truth. For why you should offer yourself to lust itself as not a praiser but a flatterer, I do not know. Will it for that reason love you more? You are utterly deceived; it does not love the man, but plainly goads him to love what he ought not to love. But if it can be said in any manner of speech, not falsely but truly, that those arose from one who arose from two, why do you think generation could not be intimated where it was said, Through one man sin entered into the world, because generation is done through two, not through one? Since it is known to all that either he rather, or first, generates who sows, but the woman either does not generate but bears, or, if even the bearing itself can rightly be called generation, first conceives from the generating man and afterward generates the offspring she had conceived. Accordingly the Apostle, since he wished it understood that sin entered into the world by generation—which Christ would wash away by regeneration—said through one man, who then either first or rather generated; especially because, as we have already said and must be impressed on you, if he said this on account of the primacy of the example, he would say 'through one woman,' from whom first in the human race the example of sinning proceeded, and would rather pass over the man, whom he knew to have followed the woman's example, so as to sin himself by imitating.
JulianImp.3.85III. 86. Iulianus. Ad Hebraeos ergo, ubi de generatione sermo est, ex uno dicuntur multi exstitisse, ad Romanos autem, ubi de peccato Apostolus loquitur, per unum hominem ait intrasse peccatum, quo numero absolutissime se nihil de generatione sensisse perdocuit.
III. 86. Julian. To the Hebrews, then, where the discourse is of generation, many are said to have come from one; but to the Romans, where the Apostle speaks of sin, he says that through one man sin entered—by which number he most absolutely taught that he thought nothing of generation.
JulianImp.3.86Augustinus. Contra res apertas sic loqui non est, ut putas, eloquentia laudabilis, sed incredibilis impudentia.
Augustine. To speak thus against open facts is not, as you think, praiseworthy eloquence, but incredible shamelessness.
JulianImp.3.86III. 87. Iulianus. Ubi autem de Christo dicitur: Qui sanctificat, et sanctificatur ex uno omnes , non de Adam, sed de Deo accipi potest, cuius virtute Christus secundum carnem factus est et omne humanum genus; ac per hoc ad labefactandam intellegentiam Apostoli, qua dixit per unum hominem peccatum intrasse in mundum, aliorum similitudo verborum nihil quivit afferre momenti. Haereat tamen id, quod sequitur, maxime prudentis animo lectoris, ut intellegat me hactenus multo remissius, quam res postulabat, egisse. Patiamur quippe, ut plurimis testimoniis doceatur generationem, quae nisi per duos fieri non potest, agi tamen etiam per unum solere dici. Verum nihil opinio traducis promovebit: cur? Videlicet quia alia sunt, quae abusive, alia, quae proprie dicimus. Ergo ea, quae sunt propria, appellationes suas sine dispendio largiuntur; ea vero, quae per usurpationem dicuntur, principalibus rebus videlicet propriis definitionum suarum praeiudicia non sinuntur invehere; fitque hoc totum inculpabiliter, cum rebus, de quibus non est ulla dubitatio, per abusionem vocabula impertimur aliena.
III. 87. Julian. But where it is said of Christ: He who sanctifies, and they who are sanctified, are all of one (Heb 2:11), it can be taken not of Adam, but of God, by whose power Christ was made according to the flesh, and the whole human race; and on this account, to undermine the understanding of the Apostle, by which he said that through one man sin entered into the world, the likeness of other words could bring no weight. Yet let this, which follows, cleave above all to the mind of the prudent reader, that he may understand that I have thus far acted much more remissly than the matter demanded. For let us allow that by very many testimonies it is taught that generation, which cannot be done except through two, is nevertheless wont to be said to be done even through one. But the opinion of transmission will accomplish nothing: why? Namely, because some things we say abusively, others properly. Therefore those which are proper bestow their appellations without loss; but those which are said by usurpation are not allowed to bring prejudices of their definitions upon the principal, properly so-called things; and this is all done blamelessly, when to things about which there is no doubt we impart, by abuse, alien terms.
JulianImp.3.87Augustinus. Sed tu dubitationem apertis etiam rebus, quae contra te fuerint, illaturus es.
Augustine. But you are about to bring doubt even to open facts which are against you.
JulianImp.3.87III. 88. Iulianus. Ceterum cum res aliqua contra opinionem omnium eo sermone inducitur, in cuius sono habet omne praesidium, graviter peccatur, si proprio eius nomine ad manum posito emendicata abusivi appellatione signetur. Cum ergo de fetibus sermo est, quoniam nullus dubitat, quin natus quisque duos habeat parentes, nec hoc astipulatione indiget, non incommodabit intellectui, si dicam ex uno illum esse generatum; neminem quippe sermo meus adeo permovebit, ut putet illum nasci aut sine patre aut sine matre potuisse.
III. 88. Julian. Furthermore, when some matter is brought in against the opinion of all by that word in whose sound it has all its support, it is gravely sinned against if, with its proper name ready at hand, it is marked by the begged appellation of an abusive term. When, therefore, the discourse is of offspring, since no one doubts that each one born has two parents, nor does this need confirmation, it will not inconvenience the understanding if I say that he was generated from one; for my speech will move no one so far as to think that he could be born either without a father or without a mother.
JulianImp.3.88Augustinus. Natus quidem duos parentes habet; sed ut nascatur, unus eum serendo gignit, altera edendo parit. Unde satis apparet, cui sit potissimum vel cui primum generatio tribuenda, ut desinas rebus in luce positis nebulas loquacitatis offundere. Quis autem sic loquitur, ut dicat quemquam ex uno generatum? Cum omnis, qui hoc audit, non cogitet nisi patrem nec hominem seminando generet nisi unus pater; sed ex uno generati duo vel plures recte dici solent, qui non habere unum patrem possent existimari. Ubi autem pater et mater sunt cogitandi, quis ex uno natus nisi mendaciter dicitur? Numquid enim, si manifestum sit duos simul ambulasse aut aliquid simul egisse, ideo sine mendacio dicis unum ambulasse aut unum hoc egisse, quia manifestum est duos fuisse? Nonne mendacium tuum tanto erit impudentius, quanto illud apertius? Ponitur quidem et singularis numerus pro plurali tropica locutione sicut in plagis, quibus percussa est Aegyptus, ubi dicitur rana vel locusta numero utique singulari, cum multae fuerint ; si autem diceretur rana una vel locusta una, quis dubitaret tanto esse hoc mendacium vanius, quanto est illa veritas clarior? Desine igitur istos fumos hominibus harum rerum imperitissimis vendere et per unum hominem in mundum intrasse peccatum, non sicut tu, sed sicut Apostolus dicit, intellege. Per unum quippe hominem non exemplo praecedentem, nam hoc de femina diceretur, sed principio generantem, quia prior sevit, quod illa conciperet, et ipse genuit, quod illa pareret, peccatum intravit in mundum , sicut scriptum est: Abraham genuit Isaac, Isaac genuit Iacob et per ceteras subsequentes generationes ista locutio perseverat nec dictum est: Abraham et Sarra genuerunt Isaac aut Isaac et Rebecca genuerunt Iacob; et ubi matres commemorari necessarium fuit, non ait Evan gelista: Iudas et Thamar genuerunt Phares et Zaram, sed ait: Iudas genuit de Thamar , et ubicumque adiunxit et matres, generationem tamen patribus dedit, non dicens: Ille et illa genuerunt illum, sed: Ille genuit illum de illa. Unde intellegas eo modo dictum ex uno Abraham genitos esse innumerabiles, quia ipse illos genuit unus ex Sarra. Ideoque dictum: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum , ut intellegeretur ibi generationis initium, quod ex viro est, non imitationis exemplum, quod in genere humano per unam potius quam per unum intravit in mundum.
Augustine. One born has indeed two parents; but that he be born, one begets him by sowing, the other bears him by bringing forth. Whence it sufficiently appears to whom generation is chiefly, or to whom first, to be attributed—so that you may cease to spread the clouds of garrulity over things set in the light. But who speaks so as to say that anyone is generated from one? Since everyone who hears this thinks of nothing but the father, nor does anyone but one father generate a man by sowing; but two or more generated from one are rightly wont to be said who might be thought to have one father. But where a father and mother are to be thought of, who is said to be born from one except falsely? For if it be manifest that two walked together or did something together, do you for that reason say without lying that one walked or that one did this, because it is manifest that there were two? Will not your lie be the more shameless the more manifest that is? The singular number is indeed put for the plural by a tropical manner of speech, as in the plagues with which Egypt was struck, where 'frog' or 'locust' is said in the singular number, when there were many (See Exod 8:6; 10:14); but if one said 'one frog' or 'one locust,' who would doubt that this lie would be the more empty the more clear that truth is? Cease, then, to sell these vapors to men most inexperienced in these matters, and understand that through one man sin entered into the world—not as you, but as the Apostle says. Through one man—not preceding by example, for this would be said of the woman, but generating by the beginning, because he first sowed what she conceived, and he himself begot what she bore—sin entered into the world (Rom 5:12), as it is written: Abraham begot Isaac, Isaac begot Jacob (Matt 1:2), and through the other following generations this manner of speech persists, nor was it said: Abraham and Sarah begot Isaac, or Isaac and Rebecca begot Jacob; and where it was necessary to recall the mothers, the Evangelist did not say: Judah and Tamar begot Perez and Zerah, but said: Judah begot of Tamar (Matt 1:3), and wherever he added the mothers too, he nevertheless gave the generation to the fathers, not saying: He and she begot him, but: He begot him of her. Whence you may understand that innumerable men were said to be generated from the one Abraham in this way, because he, one, begot them of Sarah. And therefore it was said, Through one man sin entered into the world, that there might be understood the beginning of generation, which is from the man, not the example of imitation, which in the human race entered into the world through one woman rather than through one man.
JulianImp.3.88III. 89. Iulianus. Cum vero de peccato agitur, quod contra omnium opinionem omnemque rationem simulatur ingenitum.
III. 89. Julian. But when sin is treated of, which against the opinion of all and all reason is feigned to be inborn.
JulianImp.3.89Augustinus. Non contra omnium opinionem omnemque rationem simulatur, sed contra vestrum errorem teste Scriptura et ipsa generis humani miseria peccatum originale monstratur.
Augustine. It is not feigned against the opinion of all and all reason, but against your error original sin is shown, with Scripture and the very misery of the human race as witness.
JulianImp.3.89III. 90. Iulianus. Et hoc peccatum transisse per unum proprie dicitur, si exemplum delinquendi praebuit, inconvenientissime autem, si peccatum istud ingenuit, quod ad posteros nisi per duos transire non potuit.
III. 90. Julian. And this sin is properly said to have passed through one, if he gave an example of offending, but most unfittingly if he engendered this sin, which could not pass to posterity except through two.
JulianImp.3.90Augustinus. Immo per unum intravit, a quo seminatum est, quod peperit illa; exemplum autem in illa praecessit, quod secutus est ille.
Augustine. Rather, it entered through one, by whom was sown what she bore; but the example went before in her, which he followed.
JulianImp.3.90III. 91. Iulianus. Commendaveritque Apostolus transisse peccatum, sed per unum, ostenderitque hoc veritas ad exemplum proprie pertinere, intolerabili impudentia Traducianus facit, ut dicat et ad se illum numerum inflexum abusione pertingere.
III. 91. Julian. And the Apostle commended that sin passed, but through one, and the truth showed that this pertains properly to the example, the Traducianist acts with intolerable shamelessness, so as to say that that number too reaches him, bent by abuse.
JulianImp.3.91Augustinus. Quid est, quod tam saepe novo nomine quasi contumelioso agere te putas, ut fugiatur veritas antiquissimi catholici dogmatis, dum novitas expavescitur nominis? Quid non potest isto modo derideri? Sed vanitate, non urbanitate. Apostolus enim dicit: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines pertransiit ; haec verba utrique suscipimus. Si ergo nos Traduciani sumus propter peccatum, quod generatione traductum est, ut in omnes homines pertransiret, vos Traduciani estis propter peccatum, quod imitatione traductum esse fingitis, ut in omnes homines pertransiret; et prior Apostolus Traducianus apparuit, qui sive hoc, quod eum sensisse clarum est, sive illud, quod errando dicitis, senserit, peccatum tamen in mundum per unum hominem intrasse et in omnes homines pertransisse dicendo huius occasionem nominis praebuit. Si autem traducis nomen his verbis non convenit, ubi dicitur per unum hominem intrasse et in omnes homines pertransisse peccatum, nec nobis hoc nomen nec vobis nec Apostolo convenit, sed plane hoc dicere, hoc obicere, hoc assidue odioseque repetere ineptiae vestrae satis convenit.
Augustine. What is it that, so often, by a new and as it were insulting name, you think you accomplish—that the truth of the most ancient catholic teaching may be fled while the novelty of the name is dreaded? What cannot be derided in this way? But by vanity, not by urbanity. For the Apostle says: Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death, and so it passed to all human beings (Rom 5:12); these words we both accept. If, then, we are Traducianists on account of the sin which was transmitted by generation, so that it passed to all human beings, you are Traducianists on account of the sin which you feign to have been transmitted by imitation, so that it passed to all human beings; and the Apostle appeared first a Traducianist, who—whether he thought this, which it is clear he thought, or that, which by erring you say—nevertheless, by saying that sin entered into the world through one man and passed to all human beings, gave the occasion of this name. But if the name of transmission does not fit these words, where it is said that sin entered through one man and passed to all human beings, then this name fits neither us nor you nor the Apostle; but plainly to say this, to object this, to repeat this constantly and odiously, fits your ineptitude well enough.
JulianImp.3.91III. 92. Iulianus. Nam cum inauditum monstrum sit, si dogma etiam tolerabile, novum tamen, aliquis relin quens propria abusivis verbis condere ambiguisque conetur, tum istud infinite deformius est, quod res obscaenas et Dei iustitiam criminantes tam ancipitibus Augustinus nititur confirmare sententiis, ut eas contra se proprie, pro se autem precario sonare fateatur. Quisquamne eruditorum illi argumento fidat, quod, cum in ius venerit, ab inimico eius quasi vernaculum, ab illo vero quasi fugitivum plagiatumque pensetur?
III. 92. Julian. For while it is an unheard-of monstrosity if anyone, leaving the proper words, should try to build up even a tolerable teaching—a new one, however—by abusive and ambiguous words, then this is infinitely more deformed: that Augustine strives to confirm matters obscene and accusing the justice of God by such doubtful sentences that he confesses they sound, against himself, properly, but for himself, only by sufferance. Would any learned man trust that argument which, when it comes into court, is weighed by his enemy as a home-born slave, but by him as a fugitive and a kidnapped one?
JulianImp.3.92Augustinus. De verbis abusivis et propriis ea loqueris, ut hominum paucitate contempta, qui te intellegunt et inveniunt delirantem, eligas multis, qui te non intellegunt, videri dicere aliquid, cum dicas nihil. Melius ergo paucis doctis te relinquo, qui et me non demonstrante facillime intellegunt te nihil dicere, quam te refellendo, quamvis vera dicam, ea, quae multi non intellegunt, dico. Verumtamen, ubi dictum est: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum , propter generationis auctorem, ideo formam futuri, propter regenerationis auctorem, non verba sunt abusiva, sed propria.
Augustine. Of abusive and proper words you speak in such a way that, despising the fewness of the men who understand you and find you raving, you choose to seem to the many who do not understand you to say something, when you say nothing. Better, then, do I leave you to the few learned, who, even without my showing it, most easily understand that you say nothing, than that, in refuting you, although I say true things, I say things which the many do not understand. Nevertheless, where it was said, Through one man sin entered into the world, on account of the author of generation, and therefore the pattern of him who was to come, on account of the author of regeneration, the words are not abusive, but proper.
JulianImp.3.92III. 93. Iulianus. Quod igitur ad Hebraeos positum est: Ex uno omnes, exigit laus Dei, post commemorationem tamen parentum; quod autem dicitur de Christo: Qui sanctificat et sanctificantur ex uno omnes , ad Deum relatum est.
III. 93. Julian. What, then, is set down to the Hebrews, From one all, the praise of God demands—after the mention of the parents, however; but what is said of Christ, He who sanctifies, and they who are sanctified, are all of one, is referred to God.
JulianImp.3.93Augustinus. Magis post commemorationem parentum, praesertim quia iam transierat a patre et de matre loquebatur, praeteriri non debuit ipsa mater, sed dici debuit: Ex duobus orti sunt, qui non ex uno, sed ex duobus orti erant, ut laus Dei esset vera, non falsa, nisi quia et hoc verum est, quod ex uno orti sunt, nec abusive dictum est, sed proprie propter auctorem seminis patrem, non propter augendam mendacio, sicut tu existimas, Dei laudem. Dicere quippe: Homo fecit, quod homines duo pluresve fecerunt, potest tropica esse locutio; si quis autem dicit unum hominem fecisse, quod duo fecerunt, nisi eorum duorum auctor facti sit unus, aut mentitur aut fallitur, sicut de locusta et rana paulo ante iam diximus.
Augustine. Rather, after the mention of the parents—especially since he had already passed from the father and was speaking of the mother—the mother herself ought not to have been passed over, but it ought to have been said: They arose from two, who arose not from one but from two, that the praise of God might be true, not false—unless because this too is true, that they arose from one, nor was it said abusively, but properly, on account of the father, the author of the seed, not to increase the praise of God by a lie, as you reckon. For to say: A man did what two or more men did, can be a tropical manner of speech; but if anyone says that one man did what two did, unless one be the author of the deed of those two, he either lies or is deceived, as we already said a little before about the locust and the frog.
JulianImp.3.93III. 94. Iulianus. Sic enim Apostolus ad Corinthios: Nam sicut mulier - inquit - ex viro, ita et vir per mulierem, omnia autem ex Deo . Tertio vero ostendit ratio, quoniam, etsi neutrum horum, quod nobis amminiculatur, fuisset, tamen illam sententiam, qua per unum hominem intrasse peccatum in hunc mundum Paulus disputat, nullum cum Manichaeis inisse foedus.
III. 94. Julian. For so the Apostle to the Corinthians: For as the woman, he says, is from the man, so also the man is through the woman, but all things are from God (1 Cor 11:12). Thirdly, reason has shown that, even if neither of these things which support us had existed, nevertheless that sentence by which Paul argues that through one man sin entered into this world entered into no covenant with the Manicheans.
JulianImp.3.94Augustinus. Tu potius ista dicendo ostenderis foedus. Nam quod foedus est Apostolo cum Manichaeo, cum Apostolus dicat: Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum , quod evertit haeresim vestram, Manichaeus autem dicat: Corpus immutabiliter malum est propter coaeternam bono mali naturam? Itemque in eo loco, ubi dictum est: Corpus mortuum est propter peccatum, Apostolus dicat: Qui suscitavit Christum a mor tuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra , Manichaeus autem dicat carnis corpora non pertinere ad boni Dei creaturam, sed ad mali naturam nec Christum a mortuis suscitatum, sed non esse mortuum? Vos ergo, qui Manichaei non estis, sed diversa peste nec vos sani estis, dicite, quomodo sit corpus mortuum propter peccatum, qui corporis mortem non per peccatum illius hominis, sed lege naturae intrasse asseveratis in mundum.
Augustine. It is you rather who, by saying these things, are shown to be in covenant. For what covenant has the Apostle with the Manichean, when the Apostle says: The body indeed is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10)—which overturns your heresy—but the Manichean says: The body is immutably evil on account of a nature of evil coeternal with the good? And likewise in that passage where it was said, The body is dead because of sin, the Apostle says: He who raised Christ from the dead will give life also to your mortal bodies (Rom 8:11), but the Manichean says that the bodies of the flesh do not pertain to the creation of the good God but to the nature of evil, and that Christ was not raised from the dead, but did not die? You, then, who are not Manicheans, but, by a different plague, are not sound either, say how the body is dead because of sin, you who assert that the death of the body entered into the world not through the sin of that man, but by the law of nature.
JulianImp.3.94III. 95. Iulianus. Ac per hoc inconcussa manet nostra responsio, quae ostendit per unum hominem non generatione vitiatam atque corruptam, sed integra permanente natura vitiosam solummodo allegari ab Apostolo peccantium voluntatem.
III. 95. Julian. And on this account our reply remains unshaken, which shows that, through one man, nature was not corrupted and vitiated by generation, but, nature remaining whole, the Apostle alleges only the vitiated will of those who sin.
JulianImp.3.95Augustinus. Numquid usque adeo caeci estis aut homines excaecatis caliginosis disputationibus vestris, ut negare audeatis nasci corpora vitiosa? Numquid ad hominum naturam non pertinent corpora? Aut quod Manichaei dicunt, quorum dementiam nescientes quidem, sed, quantum adiuvetis, advertere et cogitare non vultis, gentis tenebrarum corporibus anima bona tenetur admixta? Dicite ergo vitiosorum corporum merita, qui negatis parvulos ex parentibus trahere ulla peccata. Ecce Manichaei dicunt: Usque adeo caro ista mortalis non ad opificium Dei, sed ad gentis pertinet tenebrarum, ut etiam hominum corpora, quos ad imaginem Dei factos esse perhibetis, non solum corruptibilia et condicioni mortis obnoxia, verum etiam vitiosa saepe nascantur. Quid eis respondebit haeresis vestra nisi humanam, quamvis sub Deo creatore et artifice, hanc tamen esse naturam, ut etsi nemo peccasset, etiam in paradiso talia hominum corpora nascerentur? O abominabilem et damnabilem vocem! Nos autem, quoniam hominum corpora non solum corruptibilia et necessitati mortis obstricta, verum etiam multa in eis innumerabili vitiositate languida distorta deformia nullo parentum praecedente peccato in paradiso exortura fuisse non dicimus et eos, qui dicunt, dignissimos anathemate iudicamus, non ab initio sic institutae naturae, sed iniquitatis merito postea vitiatae ista tribuimus, ut et vos et Manichaeos inconcussa et antiqua fidei catholicae stabilitate destruamus.
Augustine. Are you so blind, or do you so blind men by your dark disputations, that you dare to deny that bodies are born defective? Do bodies not pertain to the nature of man? Or—what the Manicheans say, whose madness, though you do not know it, you are unwilling to notice and consider how much you aid—is a good soul held mixed with the bodies of the nation of darkness? Say, then, the merits of defective bodies, you who deny that the little ones draw any sins from their parents. Behold, the Manicheans say: This mortal flesh so pertains not to the workmanship of God but to the nation of darkness, that even the bodies of men, whom you hold to have been made in the image of God, are often born not only corruptible and liable to the condition of death, but even defective. What will your heresy answer them, except that human nature—though under God the creator and maker—is nevertheless such that, even if no one had sinned, even in paradise such bodies of men would be born? O abominable and damnable utterance! But we, since we do not say that the bodies of men—not only corruptible and bound to the necessity of death, but many of them languid, distorted, deformed in them by innumerable defectiveness—would have arisen in paradise with no preceding sin of parents, and judge those who say so most worthy of anathema, attribute these things not to a nature so instituted from the beginning, but to one afterward vitiated by the merit of iniquity, so that we destroy both you and the Manicheans by the unshaken and ancient stability of the catholic faith.
JulianImp.3.95III. 96. Iulianus. Sed revertamur ad librum illum, quem ad Valerium destinavit, in quo decerptas de libro meo uno dumtaxat sententias sibi discutiendas refellendasque proposuit. Et quidem in primo operis praesentis libello usque ad ea Augustini dicta perveneram, quibus retecta impudentia, qua opinionis illius fugiebat invidiam, ne diabolum videretur asserere hominum conditorem, pronuntiavit Deum esse auctorem malorum atque ipsum talis meriti creare substantiam, quae reatum, antequam usum rationis, accipiat et quae in regno diaboli conditoris sui manibus collocetur.
III. 96. Julian. But let us return to that book which he addressed to Valerius, in which he set before himself, to be discussed and refuted, sentences plucked from one book of mine only. And indeed, in the first book of the present work I had come as far as those sayings of Augustine by which, his shamelessness uncovered—by which he fled the odium of that opinion, lest he seem to assert the devil to be the founder of human beings—he declared God to be the author of evils, and to create a substance of such desert as receives guilt before the use of reason, and as is placed in the kingdom of the devil by the hands of its own founder.
JulianImp.3.96Augustinus. Qui naturam discernit a vitio, non dicit quod dicis; qui intellegenter legit quod dico, non me putat dicere quod non dico.
Augustine. He who distinguishes nature from defect does not say what you say; he who reads intelligently what I say does not think that I say what I do not say.
JulianImp.3.96III. 97. Iulianus. Eumque esse figulum irae et perditionis vasa fingentem .
III. 97. Julian. And that he is a potter of wrath, fashioning vessels of perdition (See Rom 9:21-22).
JulianImp.3.97Augustinus. Quantumlibet non intellegas, quomodo Deus faciat ex eadem massa aliud vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam , ita facit tamen, ut non faciat tertium genus vasorum nec in honorem nec in contumeliam, quales vos esse parvulos vultis et in regnum Dei non intrare imaginem Dei nullam esse contumeliam deputatis. Ipsum enim regnum sic amatis, ut non ibi esse non saltem levem poenam credatis hominis esse, sed nullam.
Augustine. However much you do not understand how God makes from the same mass one vessel for honor, another for dishonor (See Rom 9:21), he nevertheless so makes them that he does not make a third kind of vessel, neither for honor nor for dishonor—such as you want the little ones to be; and that the image of God should not enter into the kingdom of God you reckon to be no dishonor. For you so love the kingdom itself that you believe it to be not even a slight penalty for a man not to be there, but none at all.
JulianImp.3.97III. 98. Iulianus. Sed quae in perditionem non processu liberae voluntatis, verum informatoris sui potestate cogantur.
III. 98. Julian. But which are forced into perdition not by the advance of free will, but by the power of their own framer.
JulianImp.3.98Augustinus. Potes dicere non quoslibet homines, sed iam regeneratos filios suos Deum in perditionem cogere faciendo eos vivere, quos a fide praevidet recessuros, cum posset eos hinc rapere, antequam malitia mutarentur.
Augustine. You can say that God forces into perdition not any men whatever, but already his regenerated sons, by making them live whom he foresees will fall away from the faith, when he could have snatched them from here before they were changed by malice.
JulianImp.3.98III. 99. Iulianus. Tantumque hoc prodigialis dogmatis nefas apostoli Pauli molitus est roborare sententiis, quas contextu totius lectionis exposui; et ostendi prophetam Isaiam, de quo hanc comparationem figuli constabat assumptam, iustitiae divinae plenissime causam tueri.
III. 99. Julian. And so great a wickedness of this prodigious teaching he labored to strengthen by the sentences of the apostle Paul, which I expounded by the context of the whole reading; and I showed that the prophet Isaiah, from whom it is established that this comparison of the potter was taken, most fully defends the cause of divine justice.
JulianImp.3.99Augustinus. Quid ostendisti legentibus et intellegentibus nisi te verba apostolica nimia loquacitate conatum, non tamen potuisse pervertere?
Augustine. What did you show to those who read and understand, except that you tried, by excessive garrulity, yet were unable, to pervert the apostolic words?
JulianImp.3.99III. 100. Iulianus. Secundum autem librum expositione Apostoli argumentis Augustini ex adverso positis pro ea, quam suppeditavit veritas, facultate complevi; atque ideo nunc ad libri eius ordinem revertamur.
III. 100. Julian. And I completed the second book—with the Apostle's exposition, with Augustine's arguments set over against it, by the faculty which the truth supplied for that exposition; and therefore let us now return to the order of his book.
JulianImp.3.100Augustinus. Secundum librum non expositione Apostoli, sed sub expositionis professione, inani oppugnatione complesti vanitate tibi, non veritate suppeditante, quae diceres.
Augustine. You completed the second book not with an exposition of the Apostle, but under the profession of an exposition, by an empty assault, with vanity supplying you, not truth, what you might say.
JulianImp.3.100III. 101. Iulianus. Igitur postquam sibi unum de praefatiuncola prioris operis mei caput, quod quasi impugnaret, obiecit illudque de figulo peccatorum Deo suo subdidit, me arguit; quam sane constanter et pure ipsius eloquiis publicetur: Non itaque, sicut te atque alios fallens loqueris, si quis aut liberum in hominibus arbitrium aut Deum esse nascentium conditorem dixerit, Caelestianus et Pelagianus vocatur, ista quippe et catholica fides dicit. Sed si quis ad colendum recte Deum sine ipsius adiutorio dicit esse in hominibus liberum arbitrium et quisquis ita dicit Deum nascentium conditorem, ut parvulorum neget a potestate diaboli redemptorem, ipse Caelestianus et Pelagianus vocatur. Liberum itaque arbitrium esse in hominibus et Deum esse nascentium conditorem utrique dicimus; non hinc estis Caelestiani et Pelagiani. Liberum autem esse quemquam ad agendum bonum sine adiutorio Dei et non erui parvulos a potestate tenebrarum, et sic transferri in regnum Dei hoc vos dicitis; hinc estis Caelestiani et Pelagiani . Natare te quidem in impietatis tuae et formidinis palude frequenter ostendi nec super hoc dubitaturum prudentem constat esse lectorem.
III. 101. Julian. Therefore, after he had objected to himself one heading from the little preface of my earlier work, as if to assail it, and had subjoined that point about the potter of sinners as his God's, he charges me—with what constancy and purity let it be made public by his own words: It is not, then, as you, deceiving yourself and others, say, that if anyone says there is free choice in men, or that God is the founder of the newborn, he is called a Caelestian and a Pelagian; for the catholic faith too says these things. But if anyone says that there is in men free choice for rightly worshiping God without his help, and whoever so says that God is the founder of the newborn that he denies him to be the redeemer of the little ones from the power of the devil, this man is called a Caelestian and a Pelagian. That there is free choice in men, and that God is the founder of the newborn, we both say; you are not Caelestians and Pelagians from this. But that anyone is free to do good without the help of God, and that the little ones are not rescued from the power of darkness and so transferred into the kingdom of God—this you say; from this you are Caelestians and Pelagians (See Answer to Julian 1.8.36). That you swim in the swamp of your impiety and dread, I have frequently shown, and it is established that a prudent reader will not doubt of this.
JulianImp.3.101Augustinus. Nec natare te posse, sed mergi alii noverunt, qui haereticum te esse cognoscunt; nam tu eadem submersione sensum etiam perdidisti.
Augustine. That you cannot swim, but are sunk, others know who recognize you to be a heretic; for by that same submersion you have lost even your sense.
JulianImp.3.101III. 102. Iulianus. Atque ideo in primo libro nec me fuisse mentitum, qui scripseram omnes, qui fugissent nostrae societatis invidiam, in Manichaeorum praerupta corruere liberum arbitrium denegantium et Deum hominum conditorem teque id, quod fueras propulsare conatus, statim absolutis arripuisse sermonibus etiam illorum scriptorum, quae ad Bonifatium miseras, insertione patefeci . Verumtamen hoc etiam haec, quam nunc posui, tua responsio confitetur; dixisti enim catholicam fidem esse, quae et liberum credit arbitrium et Deum nascentium conditorem, quod utrumque omnium haereticorum Manichaeos certum est vobiscum negare.
III. 102. Julian. And therefore, in the first book, that I had not lied who had written that all who fled the odium of our society rush down into the precipices of the Manicheans, who deny free choice and that God is the founder of men, and that you—what you had tried to fend off—at once, in the words now made plain, seized upon it, I disclosed by the insertion of even those writings which you had sent to Boniface (See Answer to the Two Letters of the Pelagians). Nevertheless this your reply too, which I have now set down, confesses this; for you said that it is the catholic faith which believes both free choice and that God is the founder of the newborn—both of which it is certain that the Manicheans, of all heretics, deny along with you.
JulianImp.3.102Augustinus. Manichaei, quod videre non vultis, a vobis potius adiuvantur, qui tot et tanta mala, quae pati parvulos cernimus, non meritis peccatorum, sed genti tribuunt tenebrarum; non enim habetis, quo fugiatis, quando a vobis, mala ista unde sint, percunctantur. Sed nobis ad liberum arbitrium hominis, quo natura humana, cum bona fuerit instituta, vitiata est, haec omnia referentibus catholica vobiscum veritate vincuntur.
Augustine. The Manicheans—what you are unwilling to see—are rather helped by you, who attribute the so many and so great evils which we discern the little ones to suffer not to the merits of sins, but to the nation of darkness; for you have no way to flee, when you are asked by them whence these evils come. But when we refer all these things to the free choice of man, by which human nature, though it was instituted good, was corrupted, they are conquered, along with you, by the catholic truth.
JulianImp.3.102III. 103. Iulianus. Verum quia fidei catholicae, cuius solido nudatus es, quasi amiculum tenue, solum nomen assumis, vis nos credere etiam a te hoc teneri, quod catholici confitentur, id est et liberum arbitrium esse in hominibus et Deum nascentium conditorem. Sed si hoc a te simpliciter fideliterque prolatum est, finem certamini impone silentio; fama ad nos criminantium recurrat, qui id obiecerimus tibi, quod secura negatione deleveris. Hoc solum huic adde sententiae, si qua inventa fuerit secta, si qua disputatio, quae hanc duplicem confessionem, quam catholicam esse professus es, aliqua conetur argumentatione convellere, aut tuam non esse aut a te ulterius non defendi. Si autem iuvat ea, quae dicturus es negasse, locupleti etiam disputatione defendere, explica definitiones liberi arbitrii et fines eius distinctionibus absolutis quasi quibusdam cinge limitibus.
III. 103. Julian. But because you assume the name alone of the catholic faith, of whose substance you are stripped, as a thin little cloak, you want us to believe that this too is held by you which the catholics confess—that is, both that there is free choice in men and that God is the founder of the newborn. But if this was brought forth by you simply and faithfully, put an end to the conflict by silence; let the report of those who slander run back to us, who objected to you what you have wiped out by a secure denial. Add only this to this sentence: that if any sect be found, any disputation, which tries by any argument to tear down this double confession which you professed to be catholic, it is either not yours or no longer defended by you. But if it helps to defend by a rich disputation those things which you are going to say you denied, unfold the definitions of free choice, and gird its bounds, by absolute distinctions, with certain limits, as it were.
JulianImp.3.103Augustinus. Inimici et defensores, liberum arbitrium defendendo premitis, quod ad suos limites revocari omnipotentis et veri defensoris bonitate non vultis.
Augustine. Enemies and defenders, by defending free choice you oppress it, which you are unwilling to be recalled to its own bounds by the goodness of the almighty and true defender.
JulianImp.3.103III. 104. Iulianus. Deum quoque talium hominum assere conditorem, quales manibus eius iustitiaeque conveniunt.
III. 104. Julian. Assert also that God is the founder of such men as befit his hands and his justice.
JulianImp.3.104Augustinus. O stulti haeretici novi! Si manibus Dei non conveniunt opera vitiosa, numquid manibus Dei subtrahere ulla hominum corpora audebitis, quae videtis saepe nasci nonnulla vitiosa? Cur non ergo naturam primario peccantis hominis arbitrio vitiatam cum catholica veritate fatemini, de qua Deus facit, quod non solum artifici bono, sed etiam iudici convenit iusto, ne Manichaei vos cogant humana corpora tribuere artifici maligno et iniusto?
Augustine. O foolish new heretics! If defective works do not befit the hands of God, will you dare to withdraw from the hands of God any bodies of men which you see often born somewhat defective? Why, then, do you not confess, with the catholic truth, that nature was corrupted by the choice of the man who first sinned—a nature from which God makes what befits not only a good maker but also a just judge—lest the Manicheans force you to attribute human bodies to a malignant and unjust maker?
JulianImp.3.104III. 105. Iulianus. Quorum certe nihil a te actum est; sed postquam respondisti catholicos liberum arbitrium confiteri, de quorum te numero esse confingis, statim definitionem admovisti, quae id, quod dedisse videbaris, eriperet. Ais enim: Sed si quis ad colendum recte Deum sine ipsius adiutorio dicit esse in hominibus liberum arbitrium, hic Pelagianus vocatur; et item: Liberum arbitrium esse in hominibus dicimus, liberum autem quemquam esse ad agendum bonum vos dicitis .
III. 105. Julian. Of which surely none was done by you; but after you answered that the catholics confess free choice, of whose number you feign yourself to be, you at once applied a definition which would snatch away what you seemed to have granted. For you say: But if anyone says that there is in men free choice for rightly worshiping God without his help, this man is called a Pelagian; and likewise: That there is free choice in men, we say; but that anyone is free to do good, you say.
JulianImp.3.105Augustinus. Ibi si adiunxisses: haeretici dicunt, quamvis ego verba ista non dixerim, a mea tamen sententia non recessisses. Verum est enim haereticos dicere, id est vos ipsos, liberum esse quemquam ad agendum bonum sine adiutorio Dei. Sed cur ibi non legerim sine adiutorio Dei, quae in hac sententia verba mea etiam ipse paulo ante posuisti, quamdiu possum, mendoso potius codici tribuo quam tibi. Dic ergo cetera.
Augustine. If you had there added: the heretics say—although I did not say those words—you would nevertheless not have departed from my sentence. For it is true that the heretics say, that is, you yourselves, that anyone is free to do good without the help of God. But why I did not read there without the help of God—words of mine which you yourself set down a little before in this sentence—as long as I can, I attribute rather to a faulty manuscript than to you. Say, then, the rest.
JulianImp.3.105III. 106. Iulianus. Quod enim ais ad colendum recte Deum sine ipsius adiutorio dici a nobis sufficere unicuique libertatem arbitrii, omnino mentiris. Cum enim cultus Dei multis intellegatur modis et in custodia mandatorum et in exsecratione vitiorum et in simplicitate conversationis et in ordine mysteriorum et in profunditate dogmatum, quae de Trinitate vel de resurrectione multisque aliis similibus fides christiana consequitur, qui fieri potest, ut nos inconfuso dicamus sine adiutorio Dei liberum arbitrium sufficiens ad eius esse culturam, cum legamus in Evangelio dicentem Dominum: Confiteor tibi, Pater, Domine caeli et terrae, qui abscondisti haec a sapientibus et prudentibus et revelasti ea parvulis; ita, Pater, quoniam sic fuit beneplacitum ante te ? Cum utique ista omnia, tam quae dogmatibus quam quae mysteriis continentur, libertas arbitrii per se non potuerit invenire, quamvis, ut nec idola colerentur nec Deus, qui innotescebat mundi ipsius Conditor, sperneretur, Magistro Gentium teste docere potuerit ratio naturalis . Non ergo hoc, quod fingis, aut nos aut quisquam dicit prudentium, sed affirmamus a Deo fieri hominem liberi arbitrii eumque innumeris divinae gratiae speciebus iuvari, cui possibile sit vel servare Dei mandata vel transgredi. Et hoc est, ubi liberum arbitrium esse defendimus, ut, cum Deus tam multis modis benignitatem suam asserat, id est praecipiendo benedicendo sanctificando cohercendo provocando illuminando, unusquisque eorum, qui iam ratione utitur, liberum habeat voluntatem Dei vel servare vel spernere.
III. 106. Julian. For as to what you say—that we say the liberty of choice suffices for each one to worship God rightly without his help—you lie altogether. For since the worship of God is understood in many ways—both in the keeping of the commandments and in the execration of vices and in the simplicity of conduct and in the order of the mysteries and in the profundity of the teachings which the Christian faith attains concerning the Trinity or the resurrection and many other like things—how can it be that we say, unconfused, that free choice suffices without the help of God for his worship, when we read the Lord saying in the Gospel: I confess to you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, who have hidden these things from the wise and prudent and revealed them to little ones; yes, Father, since so it was well-pleasing before you (Matt 11:25-26)? Since surely all these things, both those contained in the teachings and those in the mysteries, the liberty of choice could not by itself have found out—although, that idols should not be worshiped, nor God, who was becoming known as the Founder of the world itself, despised, natural reason could, as the Teacher of the Gentiles is witness, teach (See Rom 1:19-20). Not, then, this which you feign do we or any of the prudent say, but we affirm that a man of free choice is made by God, and helped by innumerable species of divine grace, to whom it is possible either to keep the commands of God or to transgress them. And this is where we defend that there is free choice: that, since God asserts his kindness in so many ways—that is, by commanding, blessing, sanctifying, restraining, provoking, illuminating—each one of those who already use reason may have a free will either to keep or to despise the will of God.
JulianImp.3.106Augustinus. Tam multa dicis, quibus nos adiuvat Deus, id est praecipiendo benedicendo sanctificando cohercendo provocando illuminando, et non dicis caritatem dando, cum dicat Ioannes apostolus: Caritas ex Deo est . Unde item dicit: Ecce, qualem caritatem dedit nobis Pater, ut filii Dei vocemur et simus . In hac caritate, quae cordi humano spiritu, non littera datur, etiam potestas illa intellegitur, de qua idem ipse in Evangelio suo: Dedit eis - inquit - potestatem filios Dei fieri . Hanc vos ab homine esse dicitis homini per liberum arbitrium, spiritum habentes huius mundi, non eum, qui ex Deo est, propter quod nescitis, quae a Deo donata sint nobis . Ideo nec pacem habetis cum Ecclesia, de qua existis, nec caritatem, quam Dei esse donum negatis, nec fidem, quia haeretici estis, quoniam pax fratribus et caritas cum fide non ab humano libero arbitrio, sed a Deo Patre et Domino Iesu Christo . Si agnoscis in his verbis dogma apostolicum, et in verbis tuis agnosce te haereticum.
Augustine. You say so many things by which God helps us—that is, by commanding, blessing, sanctifying, restraining, provoking, illuminating—and you do not say, by giving love, although the apostle John says: Love is from God (1 John 4:7). Whence he likewise says: Behold, what manner of love the Father has given us, that we should be called and be sons of God (1 John 3:1). In this love, which is given to the human heart by the spirit, not the letter, is also understood that power of which the same John, in his Gospel: He gave them, he says, the power to become sons of God (John 1:12). This you say is from man to man through free choice, having the spirit of this world, not him who is from God, on account of which you do not know what things have been given us by God (See 1 Cor 2:12). Therefore you have neither peace with the Church from which you went out, nor love, which you deny to be the gift of God, nor faith, because you are heretics, since peace to the brethren and love with faith is not from human free choice, but from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ (Eph 6:23). If you acknowledge in these words the apostolic teaching, acknowledge also in your own words that you are a heretic.
JulianImp.3.106III. 107. Iulianus. Non ergo sine adiutorio Dei ad cultum eius, qualem exhibent initiati mysteriis, liberum arbitrium idoneum credimus, sed divinae aequitatis locupletem testem libertatem arbitrii confitemur, ut eo tempore, quo nos manifestari oportet ante tribunal Christi et recipere unumquemque propria corporis sicut gessit, sive bonum sive malum, nihil Deus iniuste iudicare doceatur, qui nulli imputat peccatum, nisi quod is, qui propter illud ponitur, potuit et cavere.
III. 107. Julian. We do not, then, believe free choice fit for his worship—such as those initiated in the mysteries exhibit—without the help of God; but we confess the liberty of choice to be a rich witness of divine equity, so that, at that time when we must be manifested before the tribunal of Christ and each one receive his own according to what he did through the body, whether good or evil, God may be taught to judge nothing unjustly—he who imputes to no one a sin except what the one set for it could also have avoided.
JulianImp.3.107Augustinus. Bene me commones, quid contra te dicam. Omnes nos certe, sicut dicit Apostolus, manifestari oportet ante tribunal Christi, ut ferat unusquisque secundum ea, quae per corpus gessit, sive bonum sive malum . Numquid ab hac universitate parvulos separabis? Dic ergo, quid boni per corpus gesserint proprio libero arbitrio, ut recipiant regnum Dei tam magnum bonum, aut quid mali egerint propria voluntate, qui parvuli abalienabuntur ab hac vita Dei. Quod si necesse est fatearis sine ullis operibus liberae voluntatis, quae gerit quisque per corpus, illos in Christo vivificari, cur non fateris istos in Adam mori, cum scias Adam Christo e contrario esse formam futuri? An clausis oculis os aperies et dices illis, in quo renati sunt, spiritum profuisse iustitiae et istis, in qua nati sunt, carnem non obfuisse peccati? Quis nisi vos hoc dicere audebit? Maioris vero aetatis homines, quando audiunt vel legunt unumquemque recepturum secundum ea, quae per corpus gessit, non debent in suae voluntatis virtute confidere, sed orare potius talem sibi praeparari a Domino voluntatem, ut non intrent in tentationem. Praeparatur enim voluntas a Domino ; et: Orate, inquit ipse Dominus, ne intretis in tentationem ; et: Oramus ad Deum, ait Apostolus, ne quid faciatis mali .
Augustine. You admonish me well what to say against you. We all, surely, as the Apostle says, must be manifested before the tribunal of Christ, that each one may bear according to the things which he did through the body, whether good or evil (2 Cor 5:10). Will you separate the little ones from this universality? Say, then, what good they did through the body by their own free choice, that they should receive the kingdom of God, so great a good; or what evil they did by their own will, the little ones who shall be estranged from this life of God. But if it is necessary that you confess that, without any works of free choice which each does through the body, they are made alive in Christ, why do you not confess that those die in Adam, since you know that Adam is, by contrast, the pattern of him who was to come? Or will you, with closed eyes, open your mouth and say that to the former, in whom they were reborn, the spirit of justice profited, but to the latter, in which they were born, the flesh of sin did not harm? Who but you will dare to say this? But men of greater age, when they hear or read that each one will receive according to the things which he did through the body, ought not to trust in the power of their own will, but rather to pray that such a will be prepared for them by the Lord, that they may not enter into temptation. For the will is prepared by the Lord (See Prov 8:35 (LXX)); and: Pray, the Lord himself says, that you enter not into temptation (Matt 26:41); and: We pray to God, says the Apostle, that you may do no evil (2 Cor 13:7).
JulianImp.3.107III. 108. Iulianus. Prior ergo sententia tua nihil obscuritate promovebit; secunda vero, qua repetis, quoniam liberum quidem confiteris arbitrium, non tamen ut quisquam homo liber ad agendum bonum credatur, viscera tua tota nudavit.
III. 108. Julian. Your former sentence, then, will accomplish nothing by obscurity; but the second, in which you repeat that you confess free choice indeed, yet not so that any man is believed free to do good, has laid bare your whole inward parts.
JulianImp.3.108Augustinus. Cogis me iam tibi tribuere, quod codici paulo ante tribuebam. Ecce enim sic repetis sententiam meam, ut eam non impleas verbis meis, quae valde sunt necessaria vobisque contraria. Ego enim dixi non esse liberum quemquam ad agendum bonum sine adiutorio Dei, tu autem dicis fateri me quidem liberum arbitrium, non tamen ut quisquam homo liber ad agendum bonum credatur, nec addis, quod ego addidi: sine adiutorio Dei. Non accuso furem, ablata civiliter repeto: redde verba mea et nihil valebunt tua.
Augustine. You now force me to attribute to you what a little before I attributed to the manuscript. For behold, you so repeat my sentence that you do not complete it with my words, which are very necessary and contrary to you. For I said that no one is free to do good without the help of God, but you say that I confess free choice indeed, yet not so that any man is believed free to do good—and you do not add what I added: without the help of God. I do not accuse the thief; I civilly reclaim what was taken away: render back my words, and yours will be of no force.
JulianImp.3.108III. 109. Iulianus. Ecce enim nos, sicut primo libro fecimus, ita nunc presse cogimus, ut ostendas quemadmodum liberum arbitrium non negaris. Insidat autem hoc lectori nostro te videlicet confessum esse liberum arbitrium et Deum nascentium conditorem catholicis praedicare, quae duo numquam nisi Manichaeus negavit; sed cum haec communiter ambo dederimus nec tibi autem nec dogmati tuo libertas constet arbitrii, conficitur omnino te et dogma tuum de fide catholica nihil tenere. Interrogo ergo, quae vis sit quaeve definitio liberi arbitrii. Certe in eius potestate naturalium nulla conversio est. Nemo enim sensuum in se umquam mutavit officia, verbi gratia ut voces naribus aut auribus susciperet odores, nemo sexus sui convertit proprietatem, nemo in formam transire animantis alterius, nemo per liberum arbitrium pilos corporis sui innatis potuit mutare velleribus, nemo sibi pro ingenio aut qualitatem aut quantitatem corporis vindicavit. His exemplis licet omnia, quae ad hanc condicionem respiciunt, pervagari. Transeamus igitur a naturalibus ad externorum discussionem. Cui agrorum fecunditas, cui prosperitas navigationum, cui nobilitas et opes, cui constantia ipsius nobilitatis in iure constitit voluntatis, ut vel ad horum vel ad similium sibi conquisitionem voluntate se libera a Deo effectum esse fateretur? Naturalia ergo inconcussis ordinibus, externa vero casibus semper feruntur incertis. In quibus igitur liberum consistit arbitrium, propter quod homines bestiis antecellunt, propter quod ad Dei imaginem facti sunt et quo solo divini examinis iustitia continetur? In quo est hoc, inquam, arbitrium liberum, quod ut Manichaeos negare certum est, ita catholicos asserere etiam tu fateris? Sine dubio in eo, ut possibile sit homini voluntatem suam sine aliquo inevitabili naturalium coactu vel immittere in crimen vel a crimine cohibere.
III. 109. Julian. For behold, as we did in the first book, so now we closely press you to show how you did not deny free choice. Let this sink into our reader: that you confessed that the catholics proclaim free choice and that God is the founder of the newborn—the two things which none but a Manichean ever denied; but since we have both granted these in common, while neither to you nor to your teaching does the liberty of choice stand firm, it is altogether accomplished that you and your teaching hold nothing of the catholic faith. I ask, then, what is the force or what the definition of free choice. Surely no change of natural things is in its power. For no one ever changed in himself the offices of the senses—for instance, so as to receive voices by the nostrils or odors by the ears; no one changed the propriety of his own sex; no one was able, by free choice, to pass into the form of another animal; no one was able to change the hairs of his body into inborn fleeces; no one vindicated to himself, according to his talent, either the quality or the quantity of his body. By these examples one may range over all things which look to this condition. Let us, then, pass from natural things to the discussion of external things. To whom did the fruitfulness of fields, to whom the prosperity of voyages, to whom nobility and wealth, to whom the constancy of nobility itself stand in the right of his will, so that he might confess himself to have been made by God, by his free will, for the acquisition of these or like things? Natural things, then, are always borne by unshaken orders, but external things by uncertain chances. In what things, then, does free choice consist, on account of which men excel the beasts, on account of which they were made in the image of God, and by which alone the justice of the divine examination is upheld? In what, I say, is this free choice, which it is certain the Manicheans deny, just as you too confess the catholics assert it? Without doubt in this: that it is possible for a man, without any inevitable compulsion of natural things, either to send his will into crime or to restrain it from crime.
JulianImp.3.109Augustinus. Cohibere a crimine voluntatem hoc ipsum est nec aliud quidquam non intrare in tentationem. Sed si hoc haberemus in potestate propriae voluntatis, non moneremur, ut id orando a Domino posceremus. Cui ergo dicitur: Declina a malo , hoc utique dicitur, ut a crimine suam cohibeat volun tatem. Et tamen Apostolus, cum posset etiam hoc recte dicere: Praecipimus vobis, ne quid faciatis mali: Oramus - inquit - ad Deum, ne quid faciatis mali . Ecce quare dixi, non sicut tu dixisse me dicis, neminem liberum ad agendum bonum sine adiutorio Dei; hoc quippe adiutorium fidelibus orabat Apostolus, non ex natura hominis liberum auferebat arbitrium. Homines elati et inflati, nolite in vestra virtute confidere, Deo vos subdite atque, ut voluntatem cohibeatis a crimine et in tentationem non intretis, orate; nec existimetis non vos intrare in tentationem, quando ab opere aliquo malo concupiscentiam carnis forti voluntate cohibetis. Ignoratis versutias tentatoris; in maiorem tentationem, quando haec voluntati vestrae sine adiutorio Dei deputatis, intratis. Vellem sane, quomodo dixeris, nos doceres, quod ea, quae in bonis vel in malis hominum appellantur externa, sicut divitiae vel paupertas et cetera, casibus ferantur incertis. Etiam haec enim catholica fides ita demit humanae, ut divinae tribuat potestati. Hoc autem dico, quia timeo vobis, ne forte id quoque vestro addideritis errori, ut quidquid homines patiuntur vel adipiscuntur sive in corporibus suis sive in rebus externis, ad divinam negetis providentiam pertinere ac per hoc, quidquid malorum perpetiuntur et parvuli, ita incertis casibus deputetis, ut a iudicio eius, sine cuius voluntate, ut ipse Dominus dicit, nec passer cadit in terram, haec alienare conemini, quoniam videtis haeresim vestram in hac parvulorum miseria naufragare, quae sub Deo iusto nulla esset, nisi eam natura humana primi peccati magnitudine vitiata et damnata meruisset .
Augustine. To restrain the will from crime—this very thing is nothing other than not to enter into temptation. But if we had this in the power of our own will, we would not be admonished to ask it of the Lord by praying. To whom, then, it is said, Turn away from evil (Ps 37:27 (36:27)), this surely is said, that he restrain his will from crime. And yet the Apostle, when he could rightly say even this: We command you to do no evil, says: We pray to God that you may do no evil (2 Cor 13:7). Behold why I said—not as you say I said—that no one is free to do good without the help of God; for this help the Apostle prayed for the faithful, he did not take away free choice from the nature of man. Lifted-up and inflated men, do not trust in your own power; subject yourselves to God, and, that you may restrain your will from crime and not enter into temptation, pray; and do not reckon that you do not enter into temptation when, by a strong will, you restrain the concupiscence of the flesh from some evil work. You do not know the wiles of the tempter; you enter into a greater temptation when you attribute these things to your own will without the help of God. I would indeed wish you would teach us how you said that those things which are called external among the goods or evils of men—such as riches or poverty and the rest—are borne by uncertain chances. For the catholic faith too so takes these away from human power that it attributes them to divine power. But I say this because I fear for you, lest perhaps you have added this too to your error—that whatever men suffer or attain, whether in their own bodies or in external things, you deny to pertain to divine providence, and on this account that whatever evils even the little ones suffer, you so assign to uncertain chances that you try to estrange these from the judgment of him without whose will, as the Lord himself says, not even a sparrow falls to the ground (See Matt 10:29)—since you see your heresy shipwrecked in this misery of the little ones, which under a just God would be none, unless human nature, corrupted and condemned by the magnitude of the first sin, had merited it.
JulianImp.3.109III. 110. Iulianus. Et ut res absoluta paucis illuminetur exemplis, ut tam liberum sit homini sacrilegium facere velle quam nolle, tam liberum sit parricidium velle perpetrare quam nolle, tam liberum sit adulterium committere velle quam nolle, tam possibile sit verum testimonium perhibere quam falsum, tam liberum Deo oboedire imperanti quam diabolo persuadenti.
III. 110. Julian. And, that the matter may be illuminated in few by examples: so that it may be as free for a man to want to commit sacrilege as not to want it, as free to want to perpetrate parricide as not to want it, as free to want to commit adultery as not to want it, as possible to bear true testimony as false, as free to obey God commanding as the devil persuading.
JulianImp.3.110Augustinus. Verum dicis; hoc est liberum arbitrium, tale omnino accepit Adam, sed quod datum est a conditore et a deceptore vitiatum, utique a Salvatore sanandum est. Hoc vos non vultis cum Ecclesia confiteri; hinc estis haeretici. Homo, qui non cogitas ubi sis et in diebus malis tamquam in bonis caecus extolleris, quando erat tale, quale describis, liberum arbitrium, nondum homo vanitati similis factus erat, ut dies eius sicut umbra praeterirent ; non enim vanitas Deus, ad cuius similitudinem factus erat, quae per eius gratiam renovatur de die in diem. Nondum dicebatur: Ego in iniquitatibus conceptus sum ; nondum dicebatur: Quis enim est mundus a sorde? Nec infans, cuius est diei unius vita super terram ; postremo non dicebatur: Non quod volo, sed quod odio illud facio ; et: Scio, quia non habitat in me hoc est in carne mea bonum; velle enim adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non invenio , et: Video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae . Hoc malum in Adam, quando rectus creatus est, non erat, quia natura humana depravata nondum erat; rectorem habebat, quem libero reliquit arbitrio, non liberatorem quaerebat, per quem fieret liber a vitio. Nam et si verba illa: Non quod volo ago et cetera talia hominis sunt, ut dicitis, nondum sub Christi gratia constituti, ergo etiam hinc convincimini, quod tam infirmae voluntatis ad agendum bonum homines Christus invenit et quod arbitrii liberi infirmitatem ad agendum bonum nonnisi per Christi gratiam potest humana reparare natura. Ac per hoc verum est, quod dixi neminem esse liberum ad agendum bonum sine adiutorio Dei, et propterea tu subtraxisti sine adiutorio Dei, ut tibi campus aperiretur, ubi te loquacius quam eloquentius per multa iactares, quibus non delectares legentem, sed intellegere volentem, quantum posses, potius impedires. Subdimini Deo, ut corrigamini. Nemo est liber ad agendum bonum sine adiutorio Dei. Quid, ut praecipitetis, humanam extollitis voluntatem? Orate potius, ne intretis in tentationem.
Augustine. You say truly; this is free choice, and just such Adam received; but what was given by the founder and vitiated by the deceiver must surely be healed by the Savior. This you are unwilling to confess with the Church; from this you are heretics. Man, who do not consider where you are, and in evil days, as though in good ones, are lifted up, blind—when free choice was such as you describe, man was not yet made like unto vanity, that his days should pass away like a shadow (See Ps 144:4 (143:4)); for God is not vanity, in whose likeness he had been made—which is renewed by his grace from day to day. It was not yet said: I was conceived in iniquities (Ps 51:5 (50:7)); it was not yet said: For who is clean from filth? Not even the infant whose life upon the earth is of one day (See Job 14:4-5 (LXX)); finally, it was not said: Not what I will, but what I hate, that I do (Rom 7:15); and: I know that there does not dwell in me—that is, in my flesh—good; for to will lies near me, but to accomplish the good I do not find (Rom 7:18), and: I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind (Rom 7:23). This evil was not in Adam when he was created upright, because human nature had not yet been depraved; he had a ruler, whom he left by free choice; he was not seeking a liberator, through whom he might be made free from defect. For even if those words, Not what I will do I do (Rom 7:15), and other such, are the words of a man—as you say—not yet set under the grace of Christ, then even from this you are convicted, both that Christ found men of so weak a will to do good, and that human nature cannot repair the weakness of free choice to do good except through the grace of Christ. And on this account it is true, what I said, that no one is free to do good without the help of God; and therefore you took away without the help of God, that a field might be opened for you in which you might display yourself more garrulously than eloquently through many things, by which you would not delight the reader, but rather, as far as you could, hinder one who wished to understand. Subject yourselves to God, that you may be corrected. No one is free to do good without the help of God. Why, in order to cast yourselves down, do you lift up the human will? Pray rather that you enter not into temptation.
JulianImp.3.110III. 111. Iulianus. Propterea autem in superioribus voluntatem perfectam magis quam rerum effectus locavi, quoniam et parricidium et sacrilegium et adulterium vel horum similia facilius est cavere quam facere; neque enim semper voluntati malae perpetrandi quod vult adest facultas, at e regione horum abstinentia in summa quiete consistit, nisi forte hoc ipsum a vobis labor dicatur, laborare nolle. Omitto ea, quae tam Scripturae sanctae, quas Prophetae, quas Evangelistae, quas Apostoli protulerunt, quam disputatores catholica sanitate fulgentes, Ioannes, Basilius, Theodorus et horum similes, commendaverunt, multo esse maiorem laborem committere crimina quam cavere.
III. 111. Julian. But for this reason in the foregoing I placed the perfected will rather than the effect of things, since both parricide and sacrilege and adultery or things like these are easier to avoid than to do; for the faculty of perpetrating what it wills is not always at hand for an evil will, but, on the contrary, abstinence from these consists in the greatest quiet—unless perhaps this very thing be called labor by you, to be unwilling to labor. I pass over the things which both the holy Scriptures—which the Prophets, the Evangelists, the Apostles brought forth—and the disputants shining with catholic soundness, John, Basil, Theodore, and those like them, commended: that it is much greater labor to commit crimes than to avoid them.
JulianImp.3.111Augustinus. Utinam horum fidem teneres, peccatum originale in parvulis non negares.
Augustine. Would that you held their faith, you would not deny original sin in the little ones.
JulianImp.3.111III. 112. Iulianus. Interim, quod ad praesens negotium spectat, inculco liberum arbitrium nec ob aliud datum esse nec intellegi in alio posse, quam ut nec ad iustitiam nec ad iniquitatem captiva aliquis voluntate rapiatur.
III. 112. Julian. Meanwhile, as far as the present business looks, I impress that free choice was given for no other reason, nor can be understood in any other thing, than that no one be carried off, with a captive will, either to justice or to iniquity.
JulianImp.3.112Augustinus. Qui per legem, quam videt in membris suis repugnantem legi mentis suae et captivantem se sub lege peccati, clamat: Non quod volo facio bonum, sed quod odio malum hoc ago , debes utique dicere, quomodo non rapiatur ad malum voluntate captiva. Ut enim secundum vos interim loquar, si sub mala iste consuetudine gemit nondum, sicut dicitis, sub Christi gratia constitutus, habet iste an non habet liberum voluntatis arbitrium? Si habet, quare non facit bonum quod vult, sed malum quod odit hoc agit? Si autem propterea non habet, quia sub gratia Christi nondum est, ecce, quod iam dixi, iterum dico et vobis video saepe dicendum: Nemo nisi per gratiam Christi ad bonum quod vult agendum et ad malum quod odit non agendum potest habere liberum voluntatis arbitrium, non ut voluntas eius ad bonum sicut ad malum captiva rapiatur, sed ut a captivitate liberata ad liberatorem suum liberali suavitate amoris, non servili amaritudine timoris attrahatur.
Augustine. He who, through the law which he sees in his members fighting against the law of his mind and taking him captive under the law of sin, cries out: Not the good which I will do I do, but the evil which I hate, that I do (Rom 7:23, 19)—you surely ought to say how he is not carried off to evil by a captive will. For, to speak according to you for the meantime, if this man groans under an evil habit, not yet, as you say, set under the grace of Christ, does this man have or not have free choice of will? If he has it, why does he not do the good which he wills, but does the evil which he hates? But if he does not have it for this reason, because he is not yet under the grace of Christ, behold, what I have already said, I say again and see must often be said to you: No one, except through the grace of Christ, can have free choice of will to do the good which he wills and not to do the evil which he hates—not so that his will be carried off to good as to evil, but so that, freed from captivity, it be drawn to its liberator by the liberal sweetness of love, not by the servile bitterness of fear.
JulianImp.3.112III. 113. Iulianus. Sunt quidem dulcia incitamenta vitiorum, amara etiam frequenter, quae a persecutoribus excitantur, tormenta poenarum, sed et illa censura honestatis everberat et ista consumit magnitudo patientiae.
III. 113. Julian. There are indeed sweet incitements of vices, and often bitter torments of penalties, which are stirred up by persecutors; but both the censure of honor beats back the former, and the greatness of patience consumes the latter.
JulianImp.3.113Augustinus. Inter illos declamas: Qui confidunt in virtute sua ; attende tibi, ne inter illos clames, qui torquebuntur de superbia sua.
Augustine. You declaim among those who trust in their own power (See Ps 49:6 (48:7)); attend to yourself, lest you cry out among those who will be tormented for their own pride.
JulianImp.3.113III. 114. Iulianus. Verumtamen nec virtutum est aerumnosa possessio, quae extra regnum quoddam bonae conscientiae promissa aeternae beatitudinis sublimitate fruitur; adsunt tamen adiutoria gratiae Dei, quae in parte virtutis numquam destituunt voluntatem, cuius licet innumerae species, tali tamen, semper moderatione adhibentur, ut numquam liberum arbitrium loco pellant, sed praebeant amminicula, quamdiu eis voluerit inniti, cum tamen non opprimant reluctantem animum. Inde quippe est, quod ut alii ad virtutes a vitiis ascendunt, ita etiam alii ad vitia a virtutibus relabuntur.
III. 114. Julian. Nevertheless the possession of the virtues is not toilsome, which enjoys, outside a certain kingdom of a good conscience, the promised sublimity of eternal blessedness; yet the helps of the grace of God are present, which never abandon the will in the part of virtue—of which grace, though there are innumerable species, they are nevertheless always applied with such moderation that they never drive free choice from its place, but offer supports as long as one wishes to lean on them, while yet they do not oppress a reluctant soul. From this indeed it is that, as some ascend from vices to virtues, so others also relapse from virtues to vices.
JulianImp.3.114Augustinus. Unde fieri potest, ut adiutoria gratiae Dei liberum arbitrium loco pellant, quod potius vitiis pulsum et nequitiae subiugatum, ut in locum suum redeat, liberant? Sed cum quaeritur a vobis, quae sint ista adiutoria gratiae Dei, ea edicitis, quae supra commemorasti, Deum adiuvare praecipiendo benedicendo sanctificando cohercendo provocando illuminando, quae omnia etiam per homines fiunt secundum Scripturas. Nam et praecipiunt homines et benedicunt et per divina sacramenta sanctificant et corripiendo cohercent et exhortando provocant et docendo illuminant; non tamen qui plantat est aliquid neque qui rigat, sed qui incrementum dat Deus . Hoc est autem incrementum, ut unusquisque oboediat praeceptis Dei, quod non fit, quando vere fit, nisi caritate. Unde Ecclesia incrementum corporis facit in aedificationem sui in caritate . Istam caritatem non dat nisi Deus; caritas enim ex Deo est . Hanc vos inter adiutoria gratiae, quae commemoratis, nominare non vultis, ne hoc ipsum, quod oboedimus Deo, eius esse gratiae concedatis. Putatis quippe isto modo auferri voluntatis arbitrium, cum hoc quisquam facere nisi voluntate non possit, sed, quod vos non vultis, praeparatur voluntas a Domino non forinsecus sonantibus verbis, sed sicut orante exauditaque regina convertit Deus et transtulit indignationem regis in lenitatem ; sicut enim hoc divino et occulto modo egit in hominis corde, sic operatur in nobis et velle et operari pro bona voluntate .
Augustine. How can it be that the helps of the grace of God drive free choice from its place, which rather, when it has been driven by vices and subjugated to wickedness, they free, that it may return to its own place? But when it is asked of you what these helps of the grace of God are, you proclaim those which you recalled above—that God helps by commanding, blessing, sanctifying, restraining, provoking, illuminating—all of which are done even through men according to the Scriptures. For men too command, and bless, and through the divine sacraments sanctify, and by rebuking restrain, and by exhorting provoke, and by teaching illuminate; nevertheless neither he who plants is anything nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase (1 Cor 3:7). But this is the increase, that each one obey the precepts of God—which is not done, when it is truly done, except by love. Whence the Church makes the increase of the body unto its own building up in love (Eph 4:16). This love none but God gives; for love is from God (See 1 John 4:7). This you are unwilling to name among the helps of grace which you recall, lest you grant that this very thing, that we obey God, is of his grace. For you think that in this way free choice is taken away, since no one can do this except by will; but—what you are unwilling to admit—the will is prepared by the Lord (See Prov 8:35 (LXX)), not by words sounding from without, but as, with the queen praying and being heard, God turned and transferred the indignation of the king into mildness (See Esth 5:1-2 (LXX); Prov 21:1); for as he wrought this in the man's heart by this divine and hidden manner, so he works in us both to will and to work for the good will (Phil 2:13).
JulianImp.3.114III. 115. Iulianus. Tu ergo quomodo liberum arbitrium confiteris, cui unum tantummodo dicis esse possibile, id est facere malum, non autem esse possibile deflectere a malo et facere bonum ?
III. 115. Julian. How, then, do you confess free choice, to which you say only one thing is possible—that is, to do evil—but it is not possible to turn aside from evil and do good?
JulianImp.3.115Augustinus. Dico esse possibile voluntati hominis deflectere a malo et facere bonum, sed ei voluntati, quam Deus adiuvat gratis, non quam Iulianus inflat ingratus.
Augustine. I say it is possible for the will of man to turn aside from evil and do good—but for that will which God helps freely, not which Julian, ungrateful, puffs up.
JulianImp.3.115III. 116. Iulianus. Taceo interim, qua rabie in totam legem fremas, quam credis ea imperasse mortalibus, quorum apud eos nullam facultatem videret.
III. 116. Julian. I pass over for the meantime with what rage you rave against the whole law, which you believe commanded mortals those things of which it saw no faculty in them.
JulianImp.3.116Augustinus. Non est verum, quod dicis. Haec imperat Deus, quae fieri possunt, sed ipse dedit, ut faciant, eis, qui facere possunt et faciunt, et eos, qui non possunt, imperando admonet a se poscere, ut possint. Et quod non omnia ab unoquoque sanctorum fiunt, novit Deus, quemadmodum eis ad humilitatem consulat, quibus quotidie dicentibus: Dimitte nobis debita nostra , sic opitulatur ad habendam oboedientiam, ut sit, unde etiam veniam largiatur.
Augustine. What you say is not true. God commands these things which can be done, but he himself gave the ability to do them to those who can do them and do them, and those who cannot, by commanding he admonishes to ask of him that they may be able. And that not all things are done by each of the saints, God knows how he provides for their humility, to whom, daily saying, Forgive us our debts (Matt 6:12), he so gives aid for having obedience that there is something whence he may also grant pardon.
JulianImp.3.116III. 117. Iulianus. Sed quaero, cum quibus poetis in talem incurreris Ippocrenem, ut bimembrem bestiam fingeres non quidem carminando, sed blasphemando, cuius corpus de mala necessitate formares et solam faciem nomine libertatis obduceres.
III. 117. Julian. But I ask, with what poets you ran into such a Hippocrene, that you feigned a two-membered beast—not indeed by versifying, but by blaspheming—whose body you would form of an evil necessity and whose face alone you would overlay with the name of liberty.
JulianImp.3.117Augustinus. Pingis tibi ipse, quod placet, cui vacat inani corde inania volutare phantasmata. Cur enim tu amminicula gratiae supponis voluntati bonae, cum voluntas mala nullo innitatur amminiculo, ut mala sit vel mala esse persistat? An hic libra tua, quam conaris ex utraque parte per aequalia momenta suspendere, ut voluntas, quantum est ad malum, tantum sit etiam ad bonum libera, vergendo in unam partem te indicat delirantem?
Augustine. You paint for yourself what pleases you, you who have leisure, with an empty heart, to revolve empty phantasms. For why do you set the supports of grace under the good will, when the evil will leans on no support, that it may be evil or persist in being evil? Or here does your balance—which you try to suspend on both sides by equal weights, so that the will may be as free to good as to evil—by inclining to one side, betray you as raving?
JulianImp.3.117III. 118. Iulianus. Sic enim et in illo opere, quod Romam misisti, disputas: Voluntas, quae libera in malis est, libera in bonis non est .
III. 118. Julian. For so you argue even in that work which you sent to Rome: The will, which is free in evils, is not free in goods.
JulianImp.3.118Augustinus. Cur non addis, quod ibi legisti: Si liberata non est? Aut quid est, quod ait Dominus, cum de fructibus palmitum hoc est de bonis actibus loqueretur: Sine me nihil potestis facere , nisi quia nemo ad bene agendum, quem non ipse liberat, liber est?
Augustine. Why do you not add what you read there: if it has not been freed? Or what is it that the Lord says, when he was speaking of the fruits of the branches—that is, of good acts: Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5)—except because no one is free to do good whom he himself does not free?
JulianImp.3.118III. 119. Iulianus. Et hic Caelestianum dicis, qui putat liberum esse quemquam ad agendum bonum; liberum ergo dicis, quod nisi malum facere non posse contendis. Inveni, si potes, alteram definitionem rei non liberae et hoc liberum vindicato, si adeo sensu excideras, ut definitionem liberi in suo corpore non videres, vel de contrario eius non debuisti intellegere, quae esset libertatis essentia. Fac enim te similiter ambigere potuisse, quid esset, quod visus diceretur oculorum, idque tu definires hoc modo: visus est vel effossos habere oculos vel impedimentis quibusque videndi tempore nihil posse conspicere, atque hanc definitionem putares visui convenire, referres te autem, ut contrarii eius id est caecitatis quae explicatio esset assereres, cumque nullam aliam invenires, quam si in eo animali, cuius naturae adesset visus oculorum, vel effossio luminum vel crassi humoris obsaeptio videndi eripiens facultatem, resipisceres procul dubio et videres rebus contrariis definitionem unam non posse competere. Sicque fiebat, ut, si caecitas nihil dici aliud poterat quam in animalis oculo eo tempore, quo videre deberet, privatio cernendi, visus quoque definitio per negationem illorum, quibus caecitatem exposueras, redderetur, ut videlicet nihil esset aliud visus quam nec effossis nec obseratis oculis opportuno tempore facultas congrua conspicandi. Quibus tu ostensis, si obstipe reluctareris, nihil obtineres aliud, quam ut aut contra conscientiam tuam pervicacia pudenda niti te crederent audientes aut, si eis fidem faceres tibi ita prorsus videri, non te minus effossos habere mentis oculos iudicarent quam illum, qui a te visum habens fuerat definitus.
III. 119. Julian. And here you call him a Caelestian who thinks that anyone is free to do good; you call free, then, that which you contend cannot do anything but evil. Find, if you can, another definition of a thing not free, and claim this as free—if you had so fallen out of your senses that you did not see the definition of the free in its own body, or you ought at least to have understood from its contrary what the essence of liberty was. For suppose you could likewise have doubted what that was which is called the sight of the eyes, and you defined it in this manner: sight is either to have one's eyes gouged out, or, at the time of seeing, to be able to perceive nothing because of any hindrances—and you thought this definition fit sight—but you betook yourself to assert what would be the explanation of its contrary, that is, of blindness, and when you found no other than that, in the animal to whose nature the sight of the eyes belonged, either the gouging out of the lights or the obstruction of a thick humor depriving it of the faculty of seeing, you would without doubt come to your senses and see that one definition cannot suit contrary things. And so it would come about that, if blindness could be called nothing other than, in an animal's eye at the time when it ought to see, the privation of discerning, the definition of sight too would be rendered by the negation of those things by which you had explained blindness—namely, that sight is nothing other than the fitting faculty of discerning, at a suitable time, with eyes neither gouged out nor obstructed. Which things being shown to you, if you resisted obstinately, you would obtain nothing else than that your hearers would either believe you to strive, by a shameful pertinacity, against your own conscience, or, if you made them believe that it utterly seemed so to you, would judge you to have the eyes of your mind no less gouged out than him who had been defined by you as having sight.
JulianImp.3.119Augustinus. Nolo, ut definias, sed ut finias caecitatem et videas recte dici a Christo non potuisse: Sine me nihil potestis facere , si ad bene agendum sine gratia Christi liberi esse potuissent.
Augustine. I do not want you to define, but to make an end of blindness and see that it could not rightly be said by Christ, Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5), if men could have been free to do good without the grace of Christ.
JulianImp.3.119III. 120. Iulianus. Ita ergo ut ad causam referamus exemplum, intellegere potuisti vel definitione non liberi, quid deberes liberum nuncupare. Nam etsi in liberi arbitrii definitione intellegentia caligasset, ut id dici liberum posse arbitrareris, quod inter duo contraria uni doceretur adhaerere, respicere debuisti exponi aliter non posse captivum, id est non liberum, quam ut inter duo contraria uni vindicaretur addictum, et ideo nomen libertati captivitatis negatione tribuendum, ut, quoniam id, quod liberum non erat, alteri de contrariis cogeretur adhaerere, illud adversum ei id est liberum neutro sineretur addici.
III. 120. Julian. So, then, to refer the example to the case, you could have understood, even from the definition of the not-free, what you ought to call free. For even if your understanding had been darkened in the definition of free choice, so that you reckoned that could be called free which was taught to cleave to one of two contraries, you ought to have considered that the captive—that is, the not-free—can be explained no otherwise than as one vindicated as bound to one of two contraries, and therefore that the name must be given to liberty by the negation of captivity; so that, since that which was not free was compelled to cleave to one of the contraries, its opposite—that is, the free—should be allowed to be bound to neither.
JulianImp.3.120Augustinus. Quid aperta implicas loquacitate perplexa? Ad malum liber est, qui voluntate agit mala aut opere aut sermone aut sola certe cogitatione; hoc autem grandioris aetatis quis hominum non potest? Ad bonum autem liber est, qui voluntate bona agit bona etiam ipse aut opere aut sermone aut certe sola cogitatione; sed hoc sine Dei gratia nullus hominum potest. Quod si dicis aliquem posse, contradicis ei qui dixit: Sine me nihil potestis facere , contradicis etiam illi qui dixit: Non quia idonei sumus cogitare aliquid quasi ex nobismetipsis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est . Puto, quod aliquid boni, non mali non se dixit ex semetipso cogitare idoneum, sed ex Deo; de cogitatione autem bona et sermo bonus est et opus bonum. Ac per hoc qui co gitare boni aliquid idoneus non est ex semetipso, profecto nec loqui est idoneus nec agere aliquid boni ex semetipso, sed, si est sub gratia, sufficientia eius ex Deo est; unde dictum est: Non enim vos estis, qui loquimini, sed Spiritus Patris vestri, qui loquitur in vobis , et: Quotquot Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii sunt Dei . Haec ego intuens neminem esse liberum ad agendum bonum sine adiutorio Dei dixi; haec tu metuens neminem esse liberum ad agendum bonum me dixisse dixisti et sine adiutorio Dei, quod addidi, sustulisti. Unde non dubito, quod victum te esse iam scias, sed prolixo vaniloquio id agas, ne victus appareas, qui sic definis liberam voluntatem, ut, nisi utrumque, id est, et bene et male agere possit, libera esse non posset. Ac per hoc necesse tibi est auferre libertatem Deo, qui tantummodo bonam potest, malam vero habere non potest voluntatem.
Augustine. Why do you entangle plain things with perplexed garrulity? To evil he is free who does evil things by will, either by act or by word or certainly by thought alone; and what man of greater age cannot do this? But to good he is free who, by a good will, does good things himself too, either by act or by word or certainly by thought alone; but this no man can do without the grace of God. And if you say anyone can, you contradict him who said, Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5); you contradict also him who said, Not that we are sufficient to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God (2 Cor 3:5). I think he did not say that he was sufficient to think of himself something good, not evil, but from God; and of a good thought there is both a good word and a good work. And on this account he who is not sufficient of himself to think anything good is surely neither sufficient to speak nor to do anything good of himself, but, if he is under grace, his sufficiency is from God; whence it was said: For it is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you (Matt 10:20), and: As many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God (Rom 8:14). Considering these things, I said that no one is free to do good without the help of God; fearing these things, you said that I said no one is free to do good, and you took away without the help of God, which I added. Whence I do not doubt that you already know you have been conquered, but by prolix empty talk you act lest you appear conquered, you who so define free will that, unless it can do both—that is, both act well and act ill—it could not be free. And on this account it is necessary for you to take away liberty from God, who can have only a good will, but cannot have an evil one.
JulianImp.3.120III. 121. Iulianus. Quod cum ita sit atque huic tu loco miserrime obnitaris, incertum est, quid magis de te aestimari conveniat, utrum contra conscientiam tuam falsa defendas an, quod falsum est, esse verum putes ac per hoc sit incertum, utrum oculos rationis amiseris, dum certum sit oculos te fidei perdidisse.
III. 121. Julian. Since this is so, and you struggle most wretchedly against this passage, it is uncertain what ought rather to be reckoned of you: whether you defend false things against your own conscience, or whether you think that which is false to be true; and on this account it is uncertain whether you have lost the eyes of reason, while it is certain that you have lost the eyes of faith.
JulianImp.3.121Augustinus. Numquid ideo te victum consolaris, quia convitiaris?
Augustine. Do you really console yourself for being defeated by hurling insults?
JulianImp.3.121III. 122. Iulianus. Ut autem quae sunt acta, breviter repetamus, arbitrium liberum, quod in mali parte vitiorum voluptatibus vel diaboli persuasionibus, in boni autem parte virtutum dogmatibus et variis gratiae divinae speciebus iuvatur, non potest aliter constare, nisi ut et iustitiae ab eo et peccati necessitas auferatur.
III. 122. Julian. But, to recapitulate briefly what has been argued, free choice—which, on the side of evil, is helped by the pleasures of the vices or the persuasions of the devil, and, on the side of good, by the teachings of the virtues and the various kinds of divine grace—cannot stand at all unless the necessity both of righteousness and of sin is taken away from it.
JulianImp.3.122Augustinus. Inter divinae gratiae species si poneretis dilectionem, quam non ex nobis, sed ex Deo esse eamque Deum dare filiis suis apertissime legitis, sine qua nemo pie vivit et cum qua nemo nisi pie vivit, sine qua nullius est bona voluntas et cum qua nullius est nisi bona voluntas, vere liberum defenderetis, non inflaretis arbitrium. Necessitatem porro si eam dicis, qua quisque invitus opprimitur, iustitiae nulla est, quia nemo est iustus invitus, sed gratia Dei ex nolente volentem facit. Si autem nullus peccaret invitus, non esset scriptum: Signasti peccata mea in sacculo et annotasti, si quid invitus admisi .
Augustine. If you placed among the kinds of divine grace that love which—as you read most plainly—is not from ourselves but from God, and which God gives to his children, without which no one lives devoutly and with which no one lives otherwise than devoutly, without which no one has a good will and with which no one has anything but a good will, then you would truly be defending free choice and not puffing it up. As for necessity, if you mean that by which one is crushed against one's will, there is no such necessity of righteousness, because no one is righteous against his will; rather, the grace of God makes a willing person out of an unwilling one. But if no one sinned against his will, it would not have been written, You have sealed up my sins in a bag, and you have noted whatever I have admitted against my will (See Job 14:16-17).
JulianImp.3.122III. 123. Iulianus. Huius autem veritatem catholici confitentur, Traduciani autem cum Manichaeis, magistris suis, negant.
III. 123. Julian. The Catholics confess the truth of this, but the Traducianists, along with their masters the Manicheans, deny it.
JulianImp.3.123Augustinus. Convitia sunt ista, non iudicia; vellem ut iudicare posses, conviciari autem quis improbus non potest?
Augustine. These are insults, not judgments. I wish you could judge; but who, however worthless, cannot hurl insults?
JulianImp.3.123III. 124. Iulianus. Nos igitur verum diximus, quoniam qui a vobis decipiuntur, ne vocentur haeretici, fiunt Manichaei et, dum falsam verentur infamiam, verum crimen incurrunt instar ferarum, quae circumdantur pinnis, ut cogantur in retia et in verum exitium vana formidine contrudantur. Deum vero nascentium conditorem ita dicimus, ut quoniam certum est Deum catholicorum, qui verus est, nihil facere posse, quod malum est, ipsius opificis dignitate homines, qui ab eo fiunt, ante voluntatis usum de manibus eius iniqui et rei nullo modo exire credantur; quorum vos cum alterum negatis, utrumque subruitis. Ais quippe credere te quidem conditorem Deum, sed malorum hominum, ac per hoc infitiaris dogmati tuo, cum negas te asserere diabolum hominum conditorem.
III. 124. Julian. We, then, have spoken the truth, since those who are deceived by you become Manicheans in order not to be called heretics, and, while they fear a false disgrace, they incur a true crime, like wild beasts that are hemmed in by feathers so that they may be driven into the nets and forced, by an empty terror, into real destruction. But we say that God is the maker of those who are born in this way: since it is certain that the God of the Catholics, who is the true God, can do nothing that is evil, by the dignity of the maker himself men who are made by him are in no way to be believed to come forth from his hands, before any use of the will, as wicked and guilty. When you deny the one of these, you undermine both. For you say that you indeed believe God to be the maker, but the maker of evil men, and by this you contradict your own teaching, since you deny that you assert the devil to be the maker of men.
JulianImp.3.124Augustinus. Quidquid in hominibus, qui cum vitio nascuntur, ad Deum creatorem pertinet, bonum est, quia et, quod iustum est, bonum est, naturarum autem, non vitiorum auctor est Deus. Ad illud iam veni: videamus, quid inde dicturus es, quomodo non eruantur parvuli de potestate tenebrarum, quando in Christi regnum per sacramenta Ecclesiae transferuntur; quantislibet enim tegminibus te multiplicis loquacitatis involvas, ubi ad hoc veneris, nudus haereticus apparebis.
Augustine. Whatever in human beings, who are born with a defect, pertains to God the creator is good, because even what is just is good; but God is the author of natures, not of defects. Now I come to that point: let us see what you are going to say about it, how it is that little ones are not rescued from the power of darkness when they are transferred into the kingdom of Christ through the sacraments of the Church. For however many wrappings of manifold loquacity you envelop yourself in, when you come to this, you will appear a naked heretic.
JulianImp.3.124III. 125. Iulianus. Nam cum tales ascribis operi Dei, quales facere non potest, ostendis nihil ad Deum, id quod ab eo dixeras fieri, pertinere.
III. 125. Julian. For when you ascribe to the work of God such people as he cannot make, you show that what you had said was made by him pertains in no way to God.
JulianImp.3.125Augustinus. Homines nisi Deus facere non potest. Dic potius, quomodo non eruantur parvuli de potestate tenebrarum, quando per divina sacramenta regenerantur.
Augustine. None but God can make human beings. Say rather how it is that little ones are not rescued from the power of darkness when they are reborn through the divine sacraments.
JulianImp.3.125III. 126. Iulianus. Quod licet in primo libro uberius actum sit , tamen et hic vel breviter, quid sentias, exprimamus. Times operi diaboli aliquam deputare substantiam, verum non times Deo non aliquod, sed magnum crimen impingere. Maiorem apud te habet reverentiam natura carnis humanae quam iustitia Dei; quasi enim magnum aliquid, ita substantiam hominis diabolo deputare metuisti et quasi rei non magnae id est iustitiae et sanctitati Dei informationem sceleris appulisti, quasi non tolerabilius fuerit inter duas opiniones, sed utrasque falsas, diaboli operibus deputare carnem quam Dei operibus iniquitatem.
III. 126. Julian. Although this has been dealt with more fully in the first book, let us nonetheless express here, even if briefly, what you hold. You are afraid to assign any substance to the work of the devil, but you are not afraid to fasten upon God a charge that is not slight but grave. With you the nature of human flesh commands more reverence than the righteousness of God; for it is as though it were something great that you were afraid to assign the substance of man to the devil, and as though it were something of no great importance—namely, the righteousness and holiness of God—that you brought a charge of wickedness against. As if it would not have been more bearable, between two opinions, both of them false, to assign the flesh to the works of the devil than to assign iniquity to the works of God.
JulianImp.3.126Augustinus. Vos potius Dei iustitiam blasphematis, sub cuius omnipotentia sine ullis malis meritis tanta mala perpeti parvulos dicitis. Sed iam dic, quemadmodum eos separatis ab eis, quos Deus de potestate eruit tenebrarum, ut transferat in regnum Filii caritatis suae .
Augustine. You rather are the ones who blaspheme the righteousness of God, when you say that under his omnipotence little ones, without any evil merits, suffer such great evils. But now tell me how you separate them from those whom God has rescued from the power of darkness, that he might transfer them into the kingdom of the Son of his love (Col 1:13).
JulianImp.3.126III. 127. Iulianus. Ut enim hic in potestate diaboli parvulos a Deo reos formari dixisti, ita in inferioribus libri tui partibus taetrius aliquid, quam sunt Manichaeorum sacramenta, vomuisti dicens de Deo: Sic creat malos, quomodo pascit et nutrit malos .
III. 127. Julian. For just as here you said that, in the power of the devil, little ones are formed by God as guilty, so in the later parts of your book you vomited up something fouler than the rites of the Manicheans, saying of God, He creates the evil in the same way that he feeds and nourishes the evil.
JulianImp.3.127Augustinus. Cum veneris ad easdem partes libri mei, ibi quemadmodum dictum fuerit, quod hic obicis, apparebit. Nunc iam dic, quaeso, quomodo cum regenerantur parvuli et transferuntur ad regnum Christi, de tenebrarum potestate non eruantur.
Augustine. When you come to those same parts of my book, it will be clear there in what sense the words you here object to were said. Now then, tell me, I beg you, how, when little ones are reborn and transferred to the kingdom of Christ, they are not rescued from the power of darkness.
JulianImp.3.127III. 128. Iulianus. Creat igitur malum Deus.
III. 128. Julian. Therefore God creates evil.
JulianImp.3.128Augustinus. Non intellegis, quemadmodum dicat apud Prophetam: Ego creo mala .
Augustine. You do not understand in what sense he says through the Prophet, I create evils (Isa 45:7).
JulianImp.3.128III. 129. Iulianus. Et puniuntur innocentes, propter quod facit Deus.
III. 129. Julian. And the innocent are punished on account of what God does.
JulianImp.3.129Augustinus. Nec innocentes origine nec propter quod facit Deus.
Augustine. They are neither innocent in their origin nor punished on account of what God does.
JulianImp.3.129III. 130. Iulianus. Et a diabolo possidentur, quia hoc facit Deus.
III. 130. Julian. And they are possessed by the devil, because God does this.
JulianImp.3.130Augustinus. Et Apostolus tradidit hominem satanae, sed iustitia, non malitia , et Deus tradidit quosdam in reprobum sensum , atque utinam non ibi essetis et vos.
Augustine. The Apostle too handed a man over to Satan, but by righteousness, not by malice (See 1 Cor 5:5), and God handed certain people over to a reprobate mind (See Rom 1:28)—and would that you too were not among them!
JulianImp.3.130III. 131. Iulianus. Et imputat hominibus crimen manuum suarum Deus.
III. 131. Julian. And God imputes to human beings the crime of his own hands.
JulianImp.3.131Augustinus. Non est crimen manuum Dei, quod de vitiata origine sua trahunt parvuli.
Augustine. What little ones draw from their corrupted origin is not the crime of the hands of God.
JulianImp.3.131III. 132. Iulianus. Et quod persuasit diabolus tenuiter, sollerter et perseveranter fingit et protegit et custodit et format Deus.
III. 132. Julian. And what the devil has subtly suggested, God skillfully and persistently forms and protects and guards and shapes.
JulianImp.3.132Augustinus. Non quod persuasit diabolus, format Deus, sed ex natura, quam vitiavit diabolus, bene format, quod format Deus.
Augustine. God does not form what the devil has suggested; rather, out of the nature that the devil has corrupted, God well forms what he forms.
JulianImp.3.132III. 133. Iulianus. Et fructum ab homine bonitatis reposcit, cui malum ingenuit Deus.
III. 133. Julian. And God demands from man the fruit of goodness, though it was God who engendered evil in him.
JulianImp.3.133Augustinus. Non malum ingenuit Deus, sed malum, quod generatio vitiata ingenuit, regeneratione purgat Deus.
Augustine. God did not engender evil; rather, the evil that corrupted generation engendered, God purifies through regeneration.
JulianImp.3.133III. 134. Iulianus. Et postea tota lege mentitur, quia iustus sit Dominus.
III. 134. Julian. And then he lies throughout the whole law, since the Lord is righteous.
JulianImp.3.134Augustinus. Mentiris, sed tu, qui negas habere peccatum gravi iugo dignum filios Adam ; quid conaris ostendere, nisi quod iniustus sit Deus?
Augustine. You lie—you who deny that the children of Adam have a sin worthy of the heavy yoke (See Sir 40:1). What are you trying to show, except that God is unrighteous?
JulianImp.3.134III. 135. Iulianus. Et qui tot crimina capit, adhuc vocatur Deus?
III. 135. Julian. And one who takes on so many crimes is still called God?
JulianImp.3.135Augustinus. Quoniam nulla crimina capit Deus, ideo nec hoc, quod ei vos impingitis, capit, ut sine ullius originalis peccati merito mala parvuli tot et tanta ipso vel faciente vel permittente patiantur.
Augustine. Since God takes on no crimes, he does not take on this one either that you fasten upon him—namely, that, without the merit of any original sin, little ones suffer so many and such great evils, with him either causing or permitting it.
JulianImp.3.135III. 136. Iulianus. Interibit Manichaeorum memoria cum strepitu, quia Dominus in aeternum permanet, qui paravit in iudicio sedem suam et ipse iudicabit orbem terrarum in aequitate . Nullum est in Deo crimen. Non igitur creat malos, quoniam, si mali essent natura, Deus eos creare non posset; ac per hoc, ut catholicorum est confiteri Deum conditorem bonorum, ita Manichaeorum proprie Deum credere conditorem malorum.
III. 136. Julian. The memory of the Manicheans will perish with a crash, for the Lord remains forever (See Ps 9:6-7 (9:7-8)), who has prepared his throne for judgment, and he himself will judge the world in equity (Ps 9:7-8 (9:8-9)). There is no crime in God. Therefore he does not create the evil, since, if they were evil by nature, God could not create them; and so, just as it belongs to the Catholics to confess that God is the maker of the good, so it belongs properly to the Manicheans to believe that God is the maker of the evil.
JulianImp.3.136Augustinus. Si adversum divina eloquia, ubi dicitur: Iudicabit orbem terrarum in aequitate, non surdi essetis, aequitatem Dei etiam in poenis infantium disceretis; natura enim boni sunt, quod illos creat Deus, sed vitio mali sunt, propter quod illos sanat Deus. In qua catholica sententia non solum Manichaeorum memoria perit, verum etiam Pelagianorum cum strepitu loquacitatis illorum.
Augustine. If you were not deaf to the divine words, where it is said, He will judge the world in equity (Ps 9:8 (9:9)), you would learn the equity of God even in the punishments of infants; for by nature they are good, in that God creates them, but by their defect they are evil, on account of which God heals them. By this Catholic sentence not only does the memory of the Manicheans perish, but so too does that of the Pelagians, along with the crash of their loquacity.
JulianImp.3.136III. 137. Iulianus. Sed videamus et reliqua.
III. 137. Julian. But let us look at the rest as well.
JulianImp.3.137Augustinus. Ecce ad alia libri mei verba iam transis et adversus illud, quod tibi quasi refellendum ex praecedentibus proposueras, nihil dicis. Ego enim, ut vos auctoritate apostolica urgerem, dixi vos dicere non erui parvulos a potestate tenebrarum et sic transferri in regnum Dei ; contra quod nihil dicens apparuisti quidem, sicut supra praedixi, nudus haereticus, sed in te expoliando non laboravi, quia contra apostolicam fidem antiquissimae matris Ecclesiae nullo verborum tuorum vaniloquio tegmine te ausus es operire.
Augustine. See how you proceed, so that the reader may withdraw far from what I have said and think you have answered, while he forgets the things you had set out as though to be refuted. For I, in order to press you with apostolic authority, said that you say that little ones are not rescued from the power of darkness and so transferred into the kingdom of God; and since you say nothing against this, you have indeed appeared, as I said above, a naked heretic—but I did not labor to strip you, because against the apostolic faith of the most ancient mother, the Church, you have dared to cover yourself with no wrapping of your empty verbiage.
JulianImp.3.137III. 138. Iulianus. Audi ergo breviter, quid ista quaestione versetur. Catholici dicunt humanam a creatore Deo bono conditam bonam, sed peccato vitiatam medico Christo indigere naturam. Manichaei dicunt humanam naturam non a Deo conditam bonam peccatoque vitiatam, sed ab aeternarum principe tenebrarum de commixtione duarum naturarum, quae semper fuerunt, una bona et una mala, hominem creatum. Caelestiani et Pelagiani dicunt naturam humanam a Deo bono conditam bonam, sed ita esse in nascentibus parvulis sanam, ut Christi non habeant necessariam in illa aetate medicinam. Agnosce igitur in tuo dogmate nomen tuum et catholicis, a quibus confutaris, desine obicere et dogma et nomen alienum; nam veritas utrosque redarguit, et Manichaeos et vos. Manichaeis enim dicit: " Non legistis, quia, qui ab initio fecit hominem, masculum et feminam fecit eos? Propter hoc relinquet homo patrem et matrem et adhaerebit uxori suae et erunt duo in carne una, itaque iam non sunt duo, sed una caro. Quod ergo Deus coniunxit, homo non separet " . Ita quippe ostendit et hominum conditorem et coniugum copulatorem Deum adversus Manichaeos, qui utrumque horum negant. Vobis autem dicit: " Venit Filius hominis quaerere et salvare, quod perierat " . Sed vos, egregii Christiani, respondete Christo: Si quod perierat quaerere et salvare venisti, ad parvulos non venisti; isti nec perierant et salvi nati sunt, vade ad maiores; de verbis tuis tibi praescribimus: " Non est opus sanis medicus, sed male habentibus " . Ita fit, ut Manichaeus, qui homini commixtam dicit esse naturam malam, velit inde saltem salvari a Christo animam bonam; tu vero in parvulis, cum salvi sunt corpore, nihil a Christo salvandum esse contendis. Ac per hoc Manichaeus quidem naturam humanam detestabiliter vituperat, sed tu crudeliter laudas. Quicumque enim tibi crediderint laudatori, infantes suos non offerent Salvatori . Commendavi quidem etiam in primo opere nihil te magis agere, quam ut parum intellegaris.
III. 138. Julian. Hear, then, briefly what this question turns on. The Catholics say that human nature was founded good by God the good creator, but that, corrupted by sin, it needs Christ the physician. The Manicheans say that human nature was not founded good by God and corrupted by sin, but that man was created by the prince of the eternal darkness out of the mingling of two natures that have always existed, one good and one evil. The Caelestians and Pelagians say that human nature was founded good by God who is good, but that it is so healthy in the little ones who are born that at that age they do not need the medicine of Christ. Recognize, then, your own name in your teaching, and stop fastening upon the Catholics—by whom you are refuted—a teaching and a name that are not theirs; for the truth refutes both, both the Manicheans and you. For to the Manicheans it says: "Have you not read that he who made man from the beginning made them male and female? For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and shall cling to his wife, and the two shall be one flesh; and so they are no longer two, but one flesh. What therefore God has joined together, let no man put asunder" (Matt 19:4-6). For in this way it shows, against the Manicheans, who deny both of these, that God is both the maker of human beings and the joiner of spouses. But to you it says: "The Son of man came to seek and to save what was lost" (Luke 19:10). But you, you excellent Christians, answer Christ: If you came to seek and to save what was lost, you did not come for the little ones; they were not lost and they were born saved; go to the older ones. From your own words we set down our case against you: "Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick" (Matt 9:12). And so it comes about that the Manichean, who says that an evil nature has been mingled into man, at least wants the good soul to be saved from there by Christ; but you, in the little ones, when they are saved in body, contend that there is nothing for Christ to save. And by this the Manichean indeed reviles human nature detestably, but you praise it cruelly. For whoever believes you, the praiser, will not offer his infants to the Savior. I noted indeed, even in the first work, that you do nothing more than try to be little understood.
JulianImp.3.138Augustinus. Prorsus intellegor, velis nolis; sed tu nihil contra ista dicturus vis non intellegi, quod ego verissimum atque firmissimum dixi; denique res ipsa indicavit haec a te non potuisse redargui.
Augustine. I am thoroughly understood, like it or not; but you, who are going to say nothing against these things, do not wish to be understood as having said what I said, which is most true and most firm; and finally the matter itself has shown that these things could not be refuted by you.
JulianImp.3.138III. 139. Iulianus. Ostendique maiorem pene partem commentorum tuorum grandiore intellegi labore quam vinci.
III. 139. Julian. And I have shown that almost the greater part of your fictions is understood with more labor than it is refuted.
JulianImp.3.139Augustinus. Et laboras, quod tibi est peius, et vinceris; non tamen laboras, ut me intellegas, quod facillime potes, sed laboras, ut me refellas, quod non potes.
Augustine. You both labor—which is worse for you—and are defeated; yet you do not labor to understand me, which you could do most easily, but you labor to refute me, which you cannot do.
JulianImp.3.139III. 140. Iulianus. Sed si id per singula facere velim, et eadem repetendo superfluus et cuncta persequendo longus videbor.
III. 140. Julian. But if I wished to do this point by point, I would seem both superfluous, by repeating the same things, and long-winded, by pursuing everything.
JulianImp.3.140Augustinus. Ecce quomodo agis, ut longe recedat lector ab his, quae dixi, et te respondisse arbitretur, dum ea, quae tibi quasi refellenda proposueras, obliviscitur.
Augustine. See how you act, so that the reader may withdraw far from what I said and think that you have answered, while he forgets those things that you had set out as though to be refuted.
JulianImp.3.140III. 141. Iulianus. Unde quamvis omnia, quae contra nos edidisti, scripta ad unum finem properent, videlicet ut naturalia mala esse persuadeas et aut diabolum hominum aut Deum criminum conditorem, tamen puto aliquid procedere ad studium brevitatis, si ea potissimum argumenta, quibus totam opinionem tuam tueri te, cum obumbraris, putas, de diversis in unum partibus congregavero eaque prius admota expositione iuvero, ut, quid conentur, appareat, post vero non sparsa, sed collecta, non involuta, sed explicata proruero.
III. 141. Julian. Hence, although all the writings you have published against us hasten toward one end—namely, to persuade us that evils are natural and that the devil is the maker of human beings or God the maker of crimes—nonetheless I think it serves the aim of brevity if I gather into one, from the various parts, those arguments above all by which you think you defend your whole opinion when you take cover, and if I help them first by setting forth an explanation, so that what they attempt may appear, and then bring them forth not scattered but collected, not tangled but unfolded.
JulianImp.3.141Augustinus. Mirabili studio brevitatis octo libros uni meo reddis, quem nec tanta multiloquii prolixitate convellis. Dic nunc, si potes, quomodo non dicere cogamini Christo, etsi non verbis, certe ipsis perversis sensibus vestris: Si quod perierat, quaerere et salvare venisti, ad parvulos non venisti; isti nec perierant et salvi nati sunt, vade ad maiores; de verbis tuis tibi praescribimus: " Non est opus sanis medicus, sed male habentibus " . Ad ista responde. Quid vanis vera involvere et occultare conaris?
Augustine. With a wondrous zeal for brevity you give eight books in return for my one, which you do not overturn even with such a length of much talking. Now say, if you can, how you can avoid being forced to say to Christ—if not in words, at least by your very perverse meanings: If you came to seek and to save what was lost, you did not come for the little ones; they were not lost and they were born saved; go to the older ones. From your own words we set down our case against you: "Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick" (Matt 9:12). Answer that. Why do you try to wrap up and hide truths in empty things?
JulianImp.3.141III. 142. Iulianus. In inferioribus itaque libri tui partibus postquam dixisti: Sic creat malos Deus, quomodo pascit et nutrit malos, addis: Quia, quod eis creando tribuit, ad naturae pertinet bonitatem et, quod eis pascendo et nutriendo dat incrementum, non utique malitiae eorum, sed eidem bonae naturae, quam creavit bonus, bonum tribuit adiumentum. In quantum enim homines sunt, bonum est naturae, cuius auctor est Deus; in quantum autem cum peccato nascuntur perituri, qui non renascuntur, ad semen pertinet maledictum ab initio illius antiquae inoboedientiae vitio . Quo tamen bene utitur factor etiam vasorum irae, ut notas faciat divitias gloriae suae in vasis misericordiae, ut non meritis suis tribuat, si ad eamdem massam quisque pertinens gratia liberetur, sed " qui gloriatur, in Domino glorietur " . Ab hac fide iste discedens non vult nascentes esse sub diabolo, ne parvuli portentur ad Christum, ut eruantur a potestate tenebrarum et in regnum ipsius transferantur . Et sic Ecclesiam accusat toto orbe diffusam, in qua ubique omnes baptizandi infantuli non ob aliud exsufflantur, nisi ut ab eis mundi princeps mittatur foras . Item deorsum de libidine loquens, sine qua coniugum non potest esse commixtio, quam nos naturalem et ad Dei operam pertinentem non ut magnum aliquod bonum, sed ut sensum corporum, quae sunt a Deo facta, defendimus, quam tu inditam visceribus humanis a diabolo atque in eius verecundia dogma tuum collocans tam multis scriptis conaris asserere, de ipsa ergo libidine, sicut frequenter, ita etiam in inferiore parte libri tui loqueris: Quocirca - inquis - commixtionem quoque honestam coniugum non reprehendimus propter pudendam libidinem corporum. Illa enim posset esse nulla praecedente perpetratione peccati, de qua non erubescerent coniugati; haec autem exorta est post peccatum, quam coacti sunt velare confusi . Unde remansit posterioribus coniugatis, quamvis hoc malo bene et licite utentibus, in eiusmodi opere humanum vitare conspectum atque ita confiteri, quod pudendum est, cum debeat neminem pudere, quod bonum est. Proinde pudenda libidine, qui licite concumbit, malo bene utitur; qui autem illicite, malo male utitur .
III. 142. Julian. And so, in the later parts of your book, after you had said, God creates the evil in the same way that he feeds and nourishes the evil, you add: Because what he grants them in creating pertains to the goodness of nature, and the increase he gives them in feeding and nourishing he gives as a good help, not indeed to their malice, but to that same good nature which he, who is good, created. For insofar as they are human beings, it is a good of nature, of which God is the author; but insofar as they are born with sin, to perish if they are not reborn, they pertain to the seed cursed from the beginning by the defect of that ancient disobedience. Yet the maker uses even the vessels of wrath well, so as to make known the riches of his glory in the vessels of mercy, so that whoever, belonging to the same mass, is set free by grace may not ascribe it to his own merits, but "let him who glories, glory in the Lord" (1 Cor 1:31; see Rom 9:21-23). Departing from this faith, that fellow does not want those who are born to be under the devil, lest the little ones be carried to Christ to be rescued from the power of darkness and transferred into his kingdom. And thus he accuses the Church spread through the whole world, in which everywhere all the infants to be baptized are exsufflated for no other reason than that the prince of this world may be cast out of them. Likewise, lower down, speaking of the disordered desire without which there can be no mingling of spouses—a desire which we defend as natural and as pertaining to the work of God, not as some great good, but as a sensation of bodies that were made by God, while you, locating your teaching in its shame, try in so many writings to assert that it was placed in human inmost parts by the devil—speaking, then, of this disordered desire, you say, as you frequently do, so too in the later part of your book: And so—you say—we do not censure the honorable mingling of spouses on account of the shameful disordered desire of bodies. For that mingling could be without any preceding commission of sin, and the married would not blush for it; but this disordered desire arose after sin, and in confusion they were compelled to veil it. Hence it has remained for later married people, even though they use this evil well and lawfully, to avoid the human gaze in this kind of work, and so to confess that what is shameful, when no one ought to be ashamed of what is good. Accordingly, whoever lies with his wife lawfully uses an evil well by the shameful disordered desire; but whoever does so unlawfully uses an evil badly.
JulianImp.3.142Augustinus. Quare est interrupta sententia et quibusdam praetermissis, tamquam hoc sequeretur, adiunctum est: Proinde pudenda libidine et cetera praetermissa sunt autem verba mea, ubi dictum est: Sic insinuantur haec duo, et bonum laudandae coniunctionis, unde filii generantur, et malum pudendae libidinis, unde qui generantur, regenerandi sunt, ne damnentur . Quare ista verba mea de media sententia mea subtrahis eisque subtractis alia mea, quasi ipsa sequantur, adiungis? Quid est quod facis? Cur hoc facis? Parum est, quod ea, quae tibi ex eodem libro meo ex ordine proposueras refellenda, dimittis et in alia pergis, ut ordo turbetur et, quod a te propositum fuerat, de lectoris memoria dilabatur. Insuper et ea, quae praeter ordinem, ut tibi libitum est, interponis, non tota et integra fideliter ponis, sed concidis ubi vis, tollis quod vis, iungis quomodo vis. Sed fac quidquid vis; convictus et victus apparebis, ut non vis.
Augustine. Why has the sentence been interrupted and, with certain things omitted, this added as though it followed: Accordingly, by the shameful disordered desire, and the rest? But there have been omitted my words where it was said: Thus these two are bound together, both the good of the praiseworthy union, from which children are begotten, and the evil of the shameful disordered desire, from which those who are begotten must be regenerated, lest they be condemned. Why do you remove these words of mine from the middle of my sentence and, with them removed, join other words of mine as though they followed? What is this you are doing? Why do you do this? It is not enough that you let go of those things you had set out in order from this very book of mine to be refuted, and pass on to others, so that the order is disturbed and what you had proposed slips from the reader's memory. On top of that, even the things that you insert out of order, as it pleased you, you do not set down faithfully whole and entire, but you cut them where you wish, take away what you wish, join them how you wish. But do whatever you wish; you will appear convicted and defeated, as you do not wish.
JulianImp.3.142III. 143. Iulianus. Rectius enim accipit nomen mali quam boni, unde erubescunt mali et boni, meliusque credimus Apostolo, qui dicit: " Quia non habitat in carne mea bonum " , quam huic, qui hoc dicit bonum.
III. 143. Julian. For it more rightly takes the name of an evil than of a good, since both the evil and the good blush at it, and we more rightly believe the Apostle, who says, "For good does not dwell in my flesh" (Rom 7:18), than this fellow, who says that it is a good.
JulianImp.3.143Augustinus. Non erat magnum et istam de libro meo implere sententiam. Ego enim dixi: Quam huic, qui hoc dixit bonum, unde si confunditur, confitetur malum; si autem non confunditur, addit impudentiae peius malum . Sed nescio, cur hoc non posueris, cum similiter eis posses non respondere sicut aliis, quae tamquam refellenda posuisti nec attingere voluisti.
Augustine. It would have been no great matter to fill this sentence out from my book as well. For I said: than this fellow, who says that it is a good—at which, if he is confounded, he confesses it an evil; but if he is not confounded, he adds the worse evil of shamelessness. But I do not know why you have not set this down, since you could have left it unanswered, as you did the others, which you set out as though to be refuted and yet were unwilling even to touch.
JulianImp.3.143III. 144. Iulianus. Et post modicum addis: Quoniam natura humana, quae nascitur vel de coniugio vel de adulterio, Dei opus est. Quae, si malum esset, non esset generanda, si malum non haberet, non esset regeneranda; atque ut ad unum verbum utrumque concludam, natura humana, si malum esset, salvanda non esset; si ei mali nihil inesset, salvanda non esset. Qui ergo dicit eam bonum non esse, bonum negat conditae Creatorem; qui vero negat ei malum inesse, misericordem vitiatae invidet Salvatorem. Quapropter in hominibus nascentibus nec excusanda sunt adulteria per bonum, quod inde a Conditore bono creatum est, nec accusanda coniugia per malum, quod ibi a misericordi Salvatore sanandum est . Haec tam multa, quae de tuis scriptis posui, quoniam grandem in his aerumnam cogitationis pertuleras, ut acute aliquid dicere videreris, et ex more nostro, quo versute nihil agimus, et ex veritatis securitate, quoniam tuis sermonibus vix intellegi queunt, nostra oportet repetitione distingui. Dixisti ergo Manichaeos carnis vituperare naturam atque asserere hominem factum ex commixtione duarum naturarum, unius bonae, alterius malae, nos autem, quos haereticos vocas, dicere a bono Deo conditam humanam naturam testimonio auctoris sui bonam in infantibus ita esse sanam, ut Christi non habeant necessariam medicinam, te autem dicere bonam quidem a Deo bono conditam aliquando Adae fuisse naturam, sed tamen peccato esse vitiatam et ideo Christi indigere medicina. In primo quidem libro praesentis operis, quam nullo distaret fides vestra a Manichaeorum profanitate, quippe ex qua eam natam esse manifestum est, iunctis amborum opinionibus indicavi, ubi apparuit Ioviniano te per timorem copulari, Manichaeo autem omnino per amorem. Hoc ergo etiam in praesenti nobis genere disserendum est, sed prius nostra, post vestra distinguo. Verum ergo dixisti nos dicere a bono Deo naturam humanam bonam conditam, sed huc usque nostrum est; unam enim partem, qua suppletur nostra sententia, aut non vidisti aut suppressisti, aliam autem de tuo, cum non sit nostra, posuisti; nos enim non solum dicimus naturam hominis bonam a Deo esse conditam in Adam, sed in omnibus parvulis bonam ab eo Deo condi, qui primi illius auctor fuit, propter quod illum omnium hominum asserimus conditorem.
III. 144. Julian. And a little later you add: Since human nature, which is born either of marriage or of adultery, is the work of God. If it were evil, it would not be something to be generated; if it had no evil, it would not be something to be regenerated; and, to conclude both in a single word, human nature, if it were evil, would not be something to be saved; if there were no evil in it, it would not be something to be saved. Therefore whoever says that it is not good denies the Creator of what was founded good; but whoever denies that there is evil in it begrudges the merciful Savior of what was corrupted. Wherefore, in human beings who are born, adulteries are not to be excused on account of the good which is created there by the good Founder, nor are marriages to be accused on account of the evil which is there to be healed by the merciful Savior. These many things, which I have set down from your writings, since you bore a great toil of thought in them, so as to seem to say something acute—both from our custom, by which we do nothing cunningly, and from the security of truth, since they can scarcely be understood from your discourses—must be distinguished by our restatement. You said, then, that the Manicheans disparage the nature of the flesh and assert that man was made from the mingling of two natures, one good, the other evil; while we, whom you call heretics, say that human nature was founded by the good God—on the testimony of its author—good, and that in infants it is so healthy that they do not need the medicine of Christ; and that you say that the nature of Adam was indeed once founded good by God who is good, but nonetheless was corrupted by sin and therefore needs the medicine of Christ. In the first book of the present work I have shown, by joining the opinions of both, how your faith differs in no way from the profanity of the Manicheans—from which it is manifest that it was born—where it appeared that you are joined to Jovinian through fear, but to the Manichean wholly through love. This, then, must be discussed by us in the present manner of treatment as well; but I distinguish our position first, then yours. You said truly, then, that we say that human nature was founded good by the good God, but only up to this point is it ours; for you either did not see or suppressed the one part by which our position is completed, while you set down another part as from your own, since it is not ours. For we say not only that the nature of man was founded good by God in Adam, but that in all the little ones it is founded good by that same God who was the author of that first man, on account of which we assert that he is the founder of all human beings.
JulianImp.3.144Augustinus. Quid enim aliud et nos dicimus de Domino Deo, omnium hominum conditore? Sed, quod absit a nobis, salvatorem Deum parvulis necessarium vos negatis, sic eorum naturam bonam esse asserendo, ut ei mali nihil inesse dicatis, propter quod indigeat medico Christo. Ad hoc responde; quod tibi redarguendum proposueras, primo redargue; cur exsufflentur baptizandi parvuli ostende aut universae antiquissimae Ecclesiae bellum apertissimum indicens exsufflari eos non debere contende. Hoc age, hic insiste, huic firmamento, si potes, aliquid, unde cuncutiatur, impinge. Quid fugis sub pelles loquacitatis tuae? Quid fumos vanissimos subicis, quibus haec obtecta et obscura ita lector obliviscatur, ut te respondere nihil valentem dicere aliquid arbitretur?
Augustine. For what else do we too say about the Lord God, the founder of all human beings? But—far be it from us!—you deny that God the Savior is necessary to the little ones, by asserting their nature to be so good that you say there is no evil in it on account of which it would need Christ the physician. Answer this; refute first what you had set out to be refuted; show why the little ones to be baptized are exsufflated, or, by declaring open war on the whole most ancient Church, contend that they ought not to be exsufflated. Do this, press on here; against this firm foundation, if you can, drive something by which it may be shaken. Why do you flee beneath the hides of your loquacity? Why do you raise up your most empty smoke, by which, with these things covered over and obscured, the reader may so forget them that he thinks you, who can say nothing, are saying something?
JulianImp.3.144III. 145. Iulianus. Hanc ergo partem sententiae non solum a nostra definitione removisti, sed pro hac etiam intulisti tuam, quae prima fronte aliquid haberet invidiae, sed tamen discussa vanesceret. Posuisti enim nos dicere bonam a Deo bono conditam naturam, sed ita esse sanam, ut necessariam Christi non habeat medicinam. Intuere ergo, quanta penuria veritatis labores, qui et in ipsis verbis, quae dicuntur YYYY, furtum tam perspicuum facere non vereris; nam cum supra proposuisses: bonam naturam, subdidisti: ita esse sanam. Numquid YYYY boni sanum est? Certe cum dicimus bonum, nihil contra hoc proprie ponimus nisi malum; si autem causa poscit, ut sanum dicamus, ex adverso debile vel aegrum locamus ut, si sanum est, non utique debile, si debile, sanum non esse dicatur; cum autem dicimus: Bonum est hoc, a contrario eius non sani nomen, sed mali vocabulum sistimus. Tibi ergo dicendum fuit, quia definiremus nos bonam a Deo conditam naturam hominum, sed ita esse in parvulis bonam, ut institutionis suae nullum quaereret emendatorem, aut si ea, quae bona erant, alieno vocabulo, id est sanitatis indicare malebas, consonanti totum elocutione signasses. Nunc autem quasi murenula inter definitionum saxa prolaberis; cum enim te veritas compulisset, ut nos confitereris bonam hominum dicere naturam a Deo bono conditam atque in ea parte sententiae ut multam rationem, ita invidiam nullam videres, ad alia continuo verba migrasti subiciens: sed ita nos eam sanam defendere, ut medicinam Christi ei necessariam non esse credamus. Quodsi totum tu per imperitiam incurris, bardissimus, sin autem id astu facis, vaferrimus inveniris.
III. 145. Julian. Therefore you not only removed this part of the statement from our definition, but in its place you also brought in your own, which at first glance might carry some hatefulness, but which, once examined, would vanish. For you set down that we say that nature was founded good by the good God, but that it is so healthy that it has no need of the medicine of Christ. See, then, what great poverty of truth you labor under, you who, even in the very words that are said—good—do not fear to commit so plain a theft; for when you had set out above "good nature," you added: "it is so healthy." Is the opposite of good "healthy"? Surely, when we say good, we properly set nothing against it but evil; but if the case demands that we say healthy, we place on the opposite side "weak" or "sick," so that if it is healthy, it is by no means weak, and if weak, it is said not to be healthy; but when we say, "This is good," we set against it not the term "unhealthy" but the word "evil." It was therefore for you to say that we define human nature to have been founded good by God, but to be so good in the little ones that it would seek no corrector of its constitution—or, if you preferred to indicate by another word, that is, by "health," the things that were good, you should have marked the whole with a consonant phrasing. But as it is, you slip between the rocks of definitions like a little eel; for when truth had compelled you to confess that we say the nature of human beings is good, founded by the good God, and you saw in that part of the statement much reason but no hatefulness, you immediately migrated to other words, adding: but that we so defend it as healthy that we believe the medicine of Christ to be unnecessary to it. But if you fall into all this through inexperience, you are found most dull; but if you do it by cunning, most crafty.
JulianImp.3.145Augustinus. Quando ista diceres, nisi non habendo quod diceres? Non enim debuimus, ut putas, ita sanam, quam diximus bonam, ne sibi non vera opponerentur antitheta; quod imperitia quanta dicas, si ostendere velim, rebus non necessariis tui similis immorabor. De medio tolle superflua et omnino, etiamsi vera essent, tibi minime profutura et dic, si potes, quomodo medicum Christum parvulis non negetis; cum enim coeperis dicere, ibi apparebit, quare ista vana et ad rem, quae agitur, non pertinentia tamen interponenda putaveris.
Augustine. When would you say such things, except by having nothing to say? For we ought not, as you suppose, to have said "so healthy" of what we called good, lest false antitheses be set against it—and how great the inexperience is with which you say this, if I wished to show it, I would dwell, like you, on matters not necessary. Take away the superfluous things from the midst—things which, even if they were true, would profit you not at all—and say, if you can, how you do not deny Christ the physician to the little ones; for when you begin to say it, then it will appear why you thought these empty things, which do not pertain to the matter at issue, should nonetheless be inserted.
JulianImp.3.145III. 146. Iulianus. Ecce enim breviter respondeo adeo nos Christi medicinam parvulis, quos innocentes novimus, non negare, ut illos potissimum copiosiore ea indigere fateamur. Nascuntur enim exigui, debiles, qui non solum ali proprio labore non possint, verum nec implorare queant opem parentum, qui tam multis casibus obnoxii sunt, ut eis etiam lac densius et lactantium plerumque somnus exitio sit.
III. 146. Julian. For see, I answer briefly that we so far from denying the medicine of Christ to the little ones, whom we know to be innocent, that we confess that they above all have need of it in greater abundance. For they are born tiny and weak, who not only cannot be fed by their own labor, but cannot even implore the help of their parents—who are subject to so many mishaps that even thicker milk, and very often the sleep of nursing mothers, is fatal to them.
JulianImp.3.146Augustinus. Ecce, quare memoriae lectoris interponendo res superfluas obstrepas. Medicum Christum non negatis parvulis necessarium propter mala corporis, cuius imbecillitate vitiantur invalidi vel necantur, et negatis eis necessarium medicum Christum, propter quod sub diaboli potestate sunt, unde, ut liberentur, baptizandi exsufflantur; ut hoc tibi obiectum non intellegaris ob aliud proposuisse quasi refellendum nisi, ne hoc timuisse deprehendereris, ideo autem non tentasse refellere, quoniam de firmissimo et tamquam adamantino fundamento in te potius perimen dum tua iacula resilirent, et ideo de antithetis disputationem interposuisse superfluam, ut illud invictum lector oblitus sineret te in eis, quaecumque inferres vanissima, respirare tamquam respondentem aliquid et dicentem nihil. Sic quippe imbecillitatem corporis infantilis multis obnoxiam casibus intulisti, quasi vel in ipsa cruciarentur vel in eius tanta infirmitate premerentur vel eis accidere in illa aetate mali aliquid posset, si natura humana, sicut instituta fuerat, permaneret. Cur exsufflet baptizandos parvulos Christi Ecclesia, ostende, si potes, aut eos exsufflandos non esse contende, si potes, aut obmutesce, si non potes; immo obmutesce, quia non potes.
Augustine. See why you drown out the reader's memory by inserting superfluous matters. You do not deny that Christ the physician is necessary to the little ones on account of the evils of the body, by whose weakness the feeble are harmed or killed, and you deny that Christ the physician is necessary to them on account of the fact that they are under the power of the devil, from which they are exsufflated to be baptized so that they may be set free; so that you may not be understood to have set out this objection to yourself as though to be refuted for any other reason than that, lest you be caught having feared it, and to have not attempted to refute it precisely because your darts, against a most firm and as it were adamantine foundation, would rebound back upon yourself, to your own ruin—and that for this reason you inserted a superfluous disputation about antitheses, so that the reader, forgetting that unconquered point, might let you, in whatever most empty things you brought in, catch your breath as though answering something while saying nothing. For you brought in the weakness of the infant body, subject to many mishaps, as though they were tortured by it, or were oppressed by its great infirmity, or as though any evil could befall them at that age, if human nature remained as it had been established. Show, if you can, why the Church of Christ exsufflates the little ones to be baptized, or contend, if you can, that they ought not be exsufflated, or be silent, if you cannot; rather, be silent, because you cannot.
JulianImp.3.146III. 147. Iulianus. Pro condicione mortalis corporis incurrunt et aegritudinum aerumnas et dolorum poenas et pericula morborum. Non solum ergo parvulis necessariam Christi, a quo et facti sunt, medicinam fatemur, sed etiam omnium mortalium naturae.
III. 147. Julian. By the condition of their mortal body they incur both the hardships of illnesses and the pains of sufferings and the dangers of diseases. We confess, then, that the medicine of Christ, by whom they were also made, is necessary not only to the little ones, but to the nature of all mortals.
JulianImp.3.147Augustinus. Ergo et in paradiso omnia ista mala futura fuisse creditis, si nemo peccasset, et mortes illic hominum tamquam pecorum cogitatis, quia omnibus ibi communem mortalitatem corporum creditis. O miseri, si beatitudinem loci illius christiano cogitaretis affectu nec bestias ibi morituras fuisse crederetis sicut nec saevituras, sed hominibus mirabili mansuetudine subditas nec pastum de alternis mortibus quaesituras, sed communia, sicut scriptum est, cum hominibus alimenta sumpturas . Aut si istas ultima senecta dissolveret, ut sola ibi natura humana vitam possideret aeternam, cur non credamus, quod auferrentur de paradiso moriturae vel inde sensu imminentis mortis exirent, ne mors cuiquam viventi in loco vitae illius eveniret? Nam neque ipsi, qui peccaverant, homines, mori potuissent, si non de habitatione tantae felicitatis merito iniquitatis exissent.
Augustine. Therefore you believe that all these evils would have existed even in paradise, if no one had sinned, and you imagine that human beings would have died there like cattle, because you believe that a mortality of bodies common to all would have been there. O wretched men—if only you thought of the blessedness of that place with a Christian feeling, and did not believe that even the beasts would have died there, just as they would not have raged, but would have been subject to human beings with a wondrous gentleness, and would not have sought their food from one another's deaths, but, as it is written, would have taken food in common with human beings (See Gen 1:30)! Or if extreme old age dissolved these, so that only human nature there possessed eternal life, why should we not believe that they would be taken away from paradise to die, or would go forth from there at the perception of imminent death, lest death should befall anyone living in that place of life? For not even those very human beings who had sinned could have died, had they not gone forth, by the merit of their iniquity, from the dwelling of such great happiness.
JulianImp.3.147III. 148. Iulianus. Cuius infirmitates ut in praesenti vita diverso remediorum genere mitescunt, ita etiam plene in iustorum tamen corporibus resurrectionis evacuabuntur adventu.
III. 148. Julian. Whose infirmities, just as in the present life they are softened by various kinds of remedies, so too will be fully emptied out—yet only in the bodies of the righteous—at the coming of the resurrection.
JulianImp.3.148Augustinus. In his iustis et parvulos ponis, qui nihil egerunt propria voluntate sive boni sive mali? An separas eos a iustis, quos tamen a carnis felici resurrectione non separas? Quare ergo iustorum corpora excepisti, in quibus haec mala resurrectionis evacuantur adventu? Si autem parvuli propter iustitiam secundi hominis, qui regenerationis est auctor, deputantur iusti, cur non propter peccatum primi hominis, qui generationis est auctor, deputantur iniusti?
Augustine. Among these righteous do you place also the little ones, who have done nothing by their own will, either good or evil? Or do you separate them from the righteous, whom nonetheless you do not separate from the happy resurrection of the flesh? Why then did you make an exception of the bodies of the righteous, in which these evils are emptied out at the coming of the resurrection? But if the little ones are counted righteous on account of the righteousness of the second man, who is the author of regeneration, why are they not counted unrighteous on account of the sin of the first man, who is the author of generation?
JulianImp.3.148III. 149. Iulianus. Ecce ergo, in quantis humanae naturae necessariam Christi medicinam fatemur. At scio te vociferaturum cavillo tecum agi, non enim hanc te medicinam, qua corporibus subvenitur, sed nomine medicinae significasse Christi gratiam, quam a nobis affirmabas negari. Ad quod responderi potest tibi hoc ascribendum esse, qui rem, quam volebas intellegi, propriis noluisses signare nominibus. Sed quia vel tarde intellectum est, quam diceres medicinam, quam confuse nos negare mentitus eras, respondeamus et ad hoc, quod secundo intulisti, sicut et primo opere protestati sumus nos gratiam Christi, id est baptisma, ex quo ritum eius Christus instituit, ita necessariam omnibus in commune aetatibus confiteri, ut, quicumque eam utilem etiam parvulis negat, aeterno feriamus anathemate.
III. 149. Julian. See, then, in how many ways we confess that the medicine of Christ is necessary to human nature. But I know you will cry out that you are being dealt with by a quibble; for it was not this medicine, by which bodies are aided, but the grace of Christ that you signified by the name of medicine, which you affirmed is denied by us. To this it can be answered that this is to be ascribed to you, who were unwilling to mark by their proper names the thing you wanted understood. But because it has been understood, even if belatedly, what medicine you were speaking of, which you falsely claimed we deny in a confused way, let us answer this too which you brought in, in the second place: just as in the first work we protested that we confess the grace of Christ, that is, baptism, from which Christ instituted his rite, to be so necessary to all ages in common, that whoever denies it to be useful even to the little ones we strike with an eternal anathema.
JulianImp.3.149Augustinus. De medicina agimus, quo nomine Christus gratiam suam vocari voluit, ubi ait de se ipso: Non est opus sanis medicus, sed male habentibus . Vos autem gratiam Christi non propter sanandos parvulos, sed propter adoptandos in regnum Dei tantummodo eis dicitis necessariam; noli ergo te respondentem facere, ubi te vides respondere non posse.
Augustine. We are dealing with medicine, by which name Christ wished his grace to be called, when he said of himself, Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick (Matt 9:12). But you say that the grace of Christ is necessary to the little ones not on account of their being healed, but only on account of their being adopted into the kingdom of God; do not, then, make yourself out to be answering, where you see that you cannot answer.
JulianImp.3.149III. 150. Iulianus. Quod cum lucida professione inculcemus, convictus es tu publicae falsitatis, qui scribis adeo a nobis bonam defendi hominum naturam, ut sanae in infantibus negemus Christi necessariam medicinam.
III. 150. Julian. And since we drive this home with a clear profession, you are convicted of public falsehood, you who write that human nature is so defended as good by us that we deny that the medicine of Christ is necessary for the infants, who are healthy.
JulianImp.3.150Augustinus. Verum dixi; medicinam quippe christianae gratiae, quae non confertur nisi christianis, non autem omnibus hominibus etiam infidelibus et insuper catellis atque porcellis, pisciculis atque vermiculis omnique generi qualiumcumque animantium, sine dubio parvulis denegatis, quos utique sine ullo originis reatu, qui regeneratione sanatur, generatos esse contenditis. Unde tu modo magnas passus angustias detraxisti medicinae nomen et supposuisti gratiae, quia gratiam propter adoptionem parvulis necessariam dicere potestis, medicinam vero eis, quibus aeternam salutem, etiamsi christiani non fiant, promittere audetis, per sacramenta Christi necesariam dicere non potestis. Christum quippe illis non vultis esse Iesum, quod ideo vocatur teste angelo, teste Evangelio, quia salvum facit populum suum non a morbis atque vulneribus carnis, a quibus quoslibet homines et quaelibet volatilia atque reptilia sanat, sed a peccatis eorum .
Augustine. I spoke the truth; for you without doubt deny to the little ones the medicine of Christian grace—which is not conferred except on Christians, and not on all human beings, even unbelievers, and moreover not on puppies and piglets, little fish and little worms, and every kind of living things whatever—those little ones whom you contend were generated without any guilt of origin, which is healed by regeneration. Hence you just now, having suffered great straits, withdrew the name of medicine and substituted that of grace, because you can say that grace is necessary to the little ones on account of adoption, but you cannot say that medicine is necessary, through the sacraments of Christ, to those to whom you dare to promise eternal salvation even if they do not become Christians. For you do not want Christ to be Jesus to them—and he is called this, on the testimony of the angel, on the testimony of the Gospel, because he saves his people (See Matt 1:21) not from the diseases and wounds of the flesh, from which he heals any human beings whatever and any winged creatures and creeping things, but from their sins.
JulianImp.3.150III. 151. Iulianus. Quae tamen gratia, quoniam etiam medicina dicitur, salva lege iustitiae facit alios ex malis bonos, parvulos autem, quos creat condendo bonos, reddit innovando adoptandoque meliores.
III. 151. Julian. Yet this grace, since it is also called medicine, makes—the law of righteousness being preserved—others good out of evil, but it makes the little ones, whom it creates good by founding, better by renewing and adopting them.
JulianImp.3.151Augustinus. Ergo quod ait ipse Iesus: Non est opus sanis medicus, sed aegrotantibus , quantum attinet ad medicinam, quae solis Christianis praebetur a Christo, in parvulis falsum est, quos et sanos esse et eis, ut devitetis invidiam, medicinam christianam dicitis necessariam. Quomodo autem innovat Christus, quos novos, a nativitate recentissimos invenit, si nihil trahunt de vetustate peccati? An dicturus es etiam non vetus aliquid innovari, cum legas ad Hebraeos: Quando hoc dicit novum, vetus fecit primum ? Dic ergo, unde sint veteres modo nati, quos dicis sanos a vetustate peccati; et tamen ad indignationem verorum Christianorum cavendam, a Christo eos simulas innovari. Postremo aliud est sanari, aliud innovari; propter sanandos curatio, propter innovandos instauratio necessaria est. Manifestum est igitur haeresim vestram parvulis prorsus christianam negare medicinam.
Augustine. Therefore what Jesus himself says, Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick (Matt 9:12)—as far as it pertains to the medicine that is offered by Christ to Christians alone—is false in the little ones, whom you say to be both healthy and to need the medicine of Christ, so that you may avoid the hatefulness. But how does Christ renew those whom he finds new, most recent from their birth, if they draw nothing from the oldness of sin? Or will you say that even something not old is renewed, when you read in Hebrews, When he says "new," he has made the first old (Heb 8:13)? Say, then, whence the newly born are old, whom you say are healthy from the oldness of sin; and yet, to avoid the indignation of true Christians, you pretend that they are renewed by Christ. Finally, it is one thing to be healed, another to be renewed; for healing, a cure is necessary; for renewal, a restoration. It is manifest, then, that your heresy utterly denies Christian medicine to the little ones.
JulianImp.3.151III. 152. Iulianus. Ecce ergo planum est nos Christi gratiam utilem parvulis non negare. Quid igitur controversiae remansit, propter quod nos Traducianus erroris insimulat, videlicet quia non annuimus Adae quidem bonam, sed omnium hominum malam factam esse naturam? Hoc sane non solum nos non annuere, verum etiam et summis viribus impugnare profiteor. Remotis igitur illis figmentorum tuorum distortis pueriliter retibus et vulgaribus maniis, quibus susurrabas nos Christi gratiam negare cunabulis, super hoc congrediamur, in quo est summa certaminis. Eo igitur ordine, quem promisi, quia iam nostra defendi, Manichaei, cui te adversari simulabas, et vestra sensa pensemus.
III. 152. Julian. See, then, it is plain that we do not deny that the grace of Christ is useful to the little ones. What controversy, then, remains, on account of which the Traducianist charges us with error—namely, because we do not grant that the nature of Adam was made good, but the nature of all human beings made evil? This indeed I profess not only not to grant, but even to attack with all my might. Therefore, with those nets of your fictions—childishly distorted—and those vulgar madnesses removed, by which you whispered that we deny the grace of Christ to cradles, let us join battle on this, in which the sum of the contest lies. In the order, then, that I promised, since our own position has now been defended, let us weigh both the views of the Manichean, whom you pretended to oppose, and your own.
JulianImp.3.152Augustinus. Vestra non defendisti, sed defendi non posse monstrasti.
Augustine. You have not defended your views, but have shown that they cannot be defended.
JulianImp.3.152III. 153. Iulianus. Ille ergo dicit a principe tenebrarum, id est auctore mali, de duarum commixtione naturarum, bonae et malae, hominem creatum fuisse. Tu quid dicis? A Deo quidem bono, sed omnes homines malos creari.
III. 153. Julian. He, then, says that man was created by the prince of darkness, that is, the author of evil, out of the mingling of two natures, good and evil. What do you say? That man is created by the good God indeed, but that all human beings are created evil.
JulianImp.3.153Augustinus. In homine nato et natura est, quam non negas bonum, de quo laudamus creatorem Deum, et vitium, quod non negas malum, si vel pressus confiteris necessarium parvulis medicum Christum, quoniam non est necessarius sanis medicus eumdem de se ipso dixisse negare non potes Christum.
Augustine. In a human being who is born there is both the nature, which you do not deny is good, for which we praise God the creator, and the defect, which you do not deny is evil—if at least, under pressure, you confess that Christ the physician is necessary to the little ones, since you cannot deny that Christ said of himself, the healthy have no need of a physician (See Matt 9:12).
JulianImp.3.153III. 154. Iulianus. Inter te et Manichaeum itaque nulla de qualitate naturae, sed de solo est auctore dissensio; hoc enim malum tu Deo reputas, quem parvulorum creatorem fateris, quod Manichaeus principi tenebrarum, quem naturae humanae conditorem putavit. Ad instaurandum igitur foedus non grande vobis remansit obstaculum. Mox tamen docebo, apud utrumque vestrum etsi veritatis vestigia nulla videantur, illius tamen magis quam tua sibimet dicta concinere. Nos porro quid dicimus? Sine dubio, quod utrique vestrum repugnet, id est nec a bono Deo malam nec a principe tenebrarum aliam vel factam vel commixtam esse naturam, sed unum Deum, auctorem rerum omnium, bonam hominum non solum fecisse primum, sed etiam facere in unoquoque nascente naturam, cui tamen creatoris sui opitulationem ut multis modis utilem, ita etiam necessariam profitemur. Quamquam alia est conditionum ratio, alia donorum; nec hic maior operis quam opificis aestimatio vertitur. Ambo igitur, tu et Manichaeus, pariter malum naturale firmatis, id est ambo malam naturam hominum aeque dicitis, sed ille fidelius, tu fraudulentius. Huic enim malo, quod inspiratum a diabolo visceribus humanis pariter arbitramini, nullius ortum ille subducit, tu autem, ut videaris aliquo distare, quod nullum est, solos ab eo duos homines conaris eximere, quorum non tamen personas a peccato liberas, sed provectu eruditioris ingenii dicis in illis non fuisse naturale, quod per illos tamen naturale factum esse persuades. Ita, ne vel istic fraus impunita remaneret, furtum, quod magistro tuo feceras, stultitiae castigavit adiectio; nam credere naturale, quod fatearis de voluntate susceptum, non dico ineruditae, sed ebriae mentis inventum est. Verum hinc alias, nunc interim rem premamus. Affirmat ergo Manichaeus malum esse naturale, tu annuis; dicit peccata nasci, tu ita esse consentis; dicit malam naturam hominum, hoc quoque confirmas; dicit omnium prorsus, hic resistis atque illam primam duorum hominum copulam sequestrari petis, sane quod nec ipsos vindices a reatu, quin immo affirmes mali naturalis auctores. Id si et nos tibi indulgere possimus, tamen tuus non dabit magister, quin forte etiam ferulis in tardum animadvertet ingenium, ita ut tibi necesse sit aut auctoritati acquiescere aut scolas eius omni ex parte deserere. Colligit autem ad extremum et dicit naturae malae bonum auctorem esse non posse ac per hoc principis tenebrarum id est diaboli opus esse hominem, quem naturaliter malum ambo fatemini.
III. 154. Julian. And so between you and the Manichean there is no disagreement about the quality of the nature, but only about its author; for you reckon this evil to God, whom you confess to be the creator of the little ones, which the Manichean reckoned to the prince of darkness, whom he supposed to be the founder of human nature. To restore the pact, then, no great obstacle remained for you. Yet I will soon teach that, although in each of you no traces of the truth are to be seen, his statements nonetheless agree with one another more than yours do. What, then, do we say? Without doubt, what is at odds with each of you: namely, that nature was neither made evil by the good God nor made or mingled otherwise by the prince of darkness, but that one God, the author of all things, not only made the nature of human beings good in the first man, but also makes it in each one who is born; to which nature, nonetheless, we profess that the help of its creator is, as useful in many ways, so also necessary. Although the account of the conditions is one thing, of the gifts another; nor is the maker here esteemed more highly than the work. Both of you, then, you and the Manichean, equally affirm a natural evil, that is, both of you alike say that the nature of human beings is evil—but he more faithfully, you more fraudulently. For from this evil, which you both judge to be breathed by the devil into the human inmost parts alike, he withdraws the origin of no one, whereas you, in order to seem to differ in something which is nothing, try to except from it two men alone, whose persons you nonetheless do not free from sin, but say that by the advance of a more educated mind there was not in them the natural thing which, nonetheless, you persuade us was made natural through them. Thus, lest fraud should remain unpunished even here, the theft you had committed against your master was chastised by the addition of folly; for to believe natural what you confess was taken on from the will is the invention not, I say, of an unlearned, but of a drunken mind. But of this elsewhere; now, for the moment, let us press the matter. The Manichean, then, affirms that evil is natural; you assent. He says that sins are born; you agree that it is so. He says that the nature of human beings is evil; this too you confirm. He says, of absolutely all; here you resist and ask that that first pairing of two men be set apart—though indeed you do not vindicate them from guilt, but rather affirm them to be the authors of the natural evil. Even if we could grant you this, your master will not allow it, but perhaps will even punish your slow wit with the rod, so that it is necessary for you either to acquiesce in his authority or to desert his schools altogether. But finally he gathers and says that the good cannot be the author of an evil nature, and that therefore man, whom you both confess to be naturally evil, is the work of the prince of darkness, that is, of the devil.
JulianImp.3.154Augustinus. Naturam humanam a Deo bono conditam bonam magno inoboedientiae peccato ita fuisse vitiatam, ut etiam posteritas inde traheret mortis meritum atque supplicium, cui tamen posteritati non negat Deus bonus opificium bonum, et contra vos et contra Manichaeos catholica fides dicit. Sed vos, qui hoc negatis, quaeso, paulisper paradisum cogitate. Placetne vobis, ut ponamus ibi castos et castas contra libidinem dimicantes, gravidas nauseantes, fastidiantes, pallentes, alias in abortu puerperia immatura fundentes, alias in partu gementes et ululantes natosque ipsos omnes flentes, sero ridentes, serius loquentes et hoc balbutientes, in scholas postea duci, ut litteras discant, sub loris, ferulis virgisque plorantes, pro varietatibus ingeniorum distributa varietate poenarum, insuper innumerabiles morbos et daemonum incursus et ferarum morsus, quibus quidam cruciarentur, quidam et absumerentur; qui vero sani essent, sub incertis eorum casibus misera parentum sollicitudine nutrirentur; essent ibi etiam utique orbitates et luctus et amissorum carissimorum desideria cum doloribus cordis. Longum est persequi omnia, quibus malis abundat haec vita, nec sunt tamen ista ulla peccata. Haec ergo si futura erant in paradiso nullo ibi, cuius merito exsisterent, praecedente peccato, quaerite, ista quibus non plane fidelibus, sed irrisoribus praedicetis. Certe, si talis paradisus pingeretur, nullus diceret esse paradisum, nec si supra legisset hoc nomen inscriptum, nec diceret errasse pictorem, sed plane agnosceret irrisorem. Verumtamen eorum qui vos noverunt nemo miraretur, si adderetur ad titulum nomen vestrum et scriberetur paradisus Pelagia norum. Si autem hinc erubescitis (neque enim re vera pudoris ullum putandum est in vobis remansisse vestigium, si non hinc erubescitis), perversam, quaeso, tandem mutate sententiam et humanam credite in has miserias peccato illo magno mutatam fuisse naturam neque ullo modo ista in paradiso esse potuisse, propterea inde exisse illos, quorum etiam propago digna erat talia sustinere transeunte in omnes contagione peccati cum conditione supplicii. Hoc dogma catholicum et iustitiam Dei defendit, quia non immerito vitam mortalium voluisset esse poenalem, et vos Manichaeosque subvertit, vos quidem, quia malis talibus horribilem paradiso tribuitis infelicitatem, Manichaeos autem, quia malis talibus naturam Dei sui ac per hoc quid aliud quam Deum suum asserunt infelicem. Proinde me movere non debet, quod mihi magistrum Manichaeum, qui ferulis in meum tardum ingenium animadvertat, opponis, sed te obsecro moveat, quod secundum erroris vestri infandum horrendumque portentum erudireris ferulis, etiamsi in paradisi populis nascereris. Quam deformissimam absurditatem si nobiscum horrescitis, ut debetis, unde est, rogo vos, etiam ista miseria puerorum, quae procul dubio non est ex natura mali, quam desipiunt Manichaei, nisi quia illo peccato magno et nobis inaestimabili sic vitiata est humana natura et poenis iustissimis implicata, ut ex ea non solum corruptibilitas corporum tot aerumnosis casibus subdita, verum etiam tarditas ingeniorum obnoxia ferulis aliisque verberibus oreretur, atque ita hoc malignum saeculum per malos dies usque ad suum terminum curreret, ut etiam sancti ab aeterno supplicio eruti per divinam indulgentiam pignore incorruptibilis salutis accepto poenas tamen vitae huius in bono uso earum tolerare iuberentur cum mer cede patientiae, potius quam illis mererentur etiam post remissionem peccatorum carere?
Augustine. That human nature, founded good by the good God, was so corrupted by the great sin of disobedience that even its posterity drew thence the deserving of death and punishment—to which posterity, nonetheless, the good God does not deny his good handiwork—this the Catholic faith says, both against you and against the Manicheans. But you, who deny this, I beg you, consider paradise for a little while. Does it please you that we set there chaste men and women struggling against disordered desire, pregnant women nauseating, loathing food, growing pale, some pouring forth premature births in miscarriage, others groaning and howling in childbirth, and all the children themselves weeping, laughing late, speaking later and that with a stammer; then being led to schools to learn their letters, weeping under thongs, rods, and switches, with a variety of punishments distributed according to the variety of their abilities; and on top of this, innumerable diseases and assaults of demons and bites of beasts, by which some would be tortured, some even consumed; while those who were healthy would be reared, amid uncertain mishaps, with the wretched anxiety of their parents; there would be there too bereavements and griefs and the longings, with sorrows of heart, for dearest ones lost? It is long to pursue all the evils with which this life abounds—and yet these are no sins at all. If, then, these things were going to be in paradise, with no sin preceding by whose merit they would arise, look for those, not faithful at all but mockers, to whom you may preach them. Surely, if such a paradise were painted, no one would say that it was paradise—not even if he had read this name inscribed above it; nor would he say the painter had erred, but he would plainly recognize a mocker. Nonetheless, of those who know you, no one would be surprised if your name were added to the title and it were written: The Paradise of the Pelagians. But if you blush at this (for truly there must be thought to remain in you no vestige of shame, if you do not blush at this), then change, I beg you, at last your perverse opinion and believe that human nature was changed into these miseries by that great sin, and that these things could in no way have been in paradise—and that for this reason those went forth from there whose very offspring deserved to bear such things, as the contagion of sin, together with the condition of punishment, passed into all. This Catholic teaching both defends the righteousness of God, since not without merit would he have willed the life of mortals to be penal, and overthrows both you and the Manicheans: you indeed, because by such evils you attribute a horrible unhappiness to paradise, but the Manicheans, because by such evils they assert the nature of their God—and through this, what else than their God himself—to be unhappy. Accordingly, it ought not move me that you set against me a Manichean master, to chastise my slow wit with the rod; but I beseech you, let it move you that, according to the unspeakable and dreadful monstrosity of your error, you would be educated with the rod even if you were born among the peoples of paradise. If you shudder at this most deformed absurdity together with us, as you ought, whence comes, I ask you, even this misery of children—which without doubt is not from a nature of evil, of which the Manicheans rave—unless because by that great sin, inestimable also to us, human nature was so corrupted and entangled in most just punishments, that from it arose not only the corruptibility of bodies subject to so many wretched mishaps, but also a slowness of abilities liable to rods and other beatings; and so this malignant world runs, through evil days, even to its end, in such a way that even the saints, rescued from eternal punishment through divine indulgence and having received the pledge of incorruptible salvation, are nonetheless commanded to bear the punishments of this life, using them well, with the reward of patience, rather than to deserve to be free of them even after the remission of sins?
JulianImp.3.154III. 155. Iulianus. At tu contra hoc ultimum totus insurgis et, cum in unam navem cum Manichaeo ascenderis cumque idem cursum vestrum spiritus direxerit, transmissio, iam freto putasti tibi tamen in litus aliud exeundum. Verum forte dilectu utilitatis proximae tolerabilior fiat licet tarda cunctatio. In quem igitur portum navigium dirigis? Dico - inquis - bonum quidem Deum esse, eumdem tamen conditorem malorum. O periculi fugam in scopulos actam, totam Manichaei sentinam super eum effundere voluisse, quem Deum putaris!
III. 155. Julian. But against this last point you rise up entirely, and, when you have boarded the same ship with the Manichean, and the same spirit has directed your course—the crossing made—you have now thought, in mid-sea, that you must nonetheless go ashore on another coast. But perhaps, through choice of nearby advantage, even a slow lingering may become more bearable. Into what harbor, then, do you steer your ship? I say—you say—that God is indeed good, but that the same is the founder of the evil. O flight from danger driven onto the rocks—to have wished to pour the whole bilge of the Manichean over him whom you supposed to be God!
JulianImp.3.155Augustinus. Numquid tu negas etiam in malis hominibus bonam esse naturam et animi et corporis? Huius boni est conditor Deus; quod Manichaeus malum dicit et huic bono, quod malum dicit, malum assignat auctorem. Non enim saltem animae parcit; sed sicut suam quandam dicit esse animam carnis, ita malam naturam Deo bono coaeternam, ut bona omnino esse non possit, alteram vero animam bonam in eodem homine non a Deo factam, sed substantiam Dei atque naturam in huius commixtionis miserias nulla sua iniquitate, sed Dei mala necessitate contrusam. Hoc autem totum opificium, quod est homo, et malum et mali esse dicit auctoris. Videsne, quam diversa ille sapiat et ob hoc insanissime nefarieque desipiat? Tu autem, qui propterea malos nasci posse non putas, quia Deus bonus eos creat, contende, si potes, nec corpora nasci posse vitiosa, quia et ipsa Deus integer creat, contende postremo sicut malos, quia bonus eos creat, ita nec tardos ingenio nec fatuos homines nasci, quia sapiens eos creat. An non est malum fatuitas, cum Scriptura dicat incomparabiliter amplius fatuum lugendum esse quam mortuum ? Sicut ergo nobiscum non dicitis Deum fatuitatis auctorem, cum tamen nasci fatuos homines Deo creante fateamini, sic nos auctorem malitiae non dicimus Deum et tamen originalis obligatione peccati malos homines nasci non nisi creante ipso, quia non creat homines nisi ipse, recte possumus dicere.
Augustine. Do you really deny that even in evil human beings there is a good nature, both of mind and of body? Of this good God is the founder; and the Manichean calls it evil, and to this good which he calls evil he assigns an evil author. For he does not spare even the soul; but just as he says there is a certain soul of the flesh that is his own, so he says there is an evil nature coeternal with the good God, so that it cannot be good at all; but the other soul, the good one in the same man, was not made by God but is the substance and nature of God, thrust into the miseries of this mingling by no iniquity of its own, but by an evil necessity of God. But this whole handiwork, which is man, he says is both evil and belongs to an evil author. Do you see how different are his views, and how, on account of this, he is most insanely and wickedly out of his senses? But you, who therefore think that the evil cannot be born, because the good God creates them, contend, if you can, that bodies cannot be born defective either, because God whole and entire creates them as well; contend, finally, that just as the evil cannot be born, because he who is good creates them, so neither can men slow of ability or foolish be born, because he who is wise creates them. Or is foolishness not an evil, when Scripture says that the foolish man is incomparably more to be lamented than the dead (See Sir 22:11)? As, then, you do not, with us, call God the author of foolishness, though you confess that foolish men are born with God creating them, so we do not call God the author of malice, and yet we can rightly say that, by the obligation of original sin, evil human beings are born only with him creating them—because none but he creates human beings.
JulianImp.3.155III. 156. Iulianus. Absolute igitur claret opinionem illius consequentiae plus habere: si malum aliquid naturaliter conderetur, consimilem sui indicaret auctorem.
III. 156. Julian. It is therefore absolutely clear that the opinion of that man has more of consistency: that if anything evil were founded naturally, it would point to an author like itself.
JulianImp.3.156Augustinus. Sic sapiant qui nisi haeretici Pelagiani? Ergo quia mortalis homo secundum te non poenaliter, sed naturaliter conditur, consimilem sui mortalem ostendit auctorem; et ut fatuitas tua saltem fatuis erubescat, quia fatuus homo naturaliter conditur, consimilem sui fatuum ostendit auctorem.
Augustine. Who would hold such views but the Pelagian heretics? Therefore, since according to you mortal man is founded not penally but naturally, he points to an author like himself, mortal; and—so that your foolishness may at least blush before the foolish—since a foolish man is founded naturally, he points to an author like himself, foolish.
JulianImp.3.156III. 157. Iulianus. Praescribit autem veritas primo malum id est peccatum dici non posse, quod ita est, ut eius natura compulerit, peccatumque nihil esse aliud quam exorbitantem a calle iustitiae liberam voluntatem.
III. 157. Julian. But truth prescribes, first, that it cannot be called evil, that is, sin, which is such because its nature has compelled it; and that sin is nothing other than a free will deviating from the path of righteousness.
JulianImp.3.157Augustinus. Sed hoc quoque originale peccatum ex voluntate peccantis originem ducit atque ita nullum est nisi voluntate peccatum.
Augustine. But this original sin too draws its origin from the will of the one who sinned, and so there is no sin except by the will.
JulianImp.3.157III. 158. Iulianus. Quibus praesidiis innocens rerum omnium natura defenditur, quae ita manens, ut condita est, nulli crimini probatur obnoxia.
III. 158. Julian. By which defenses the nature of all things is proved innocent, which, remaining as it was founded, is proved liable to no crime.
JulianImp.3.158Augustinus. Non autem ita mansit, ut condita est. Ideo crimini probatur obnoxia suamque stirpem suo crimini tamquam haereditario fecit obnoxiam; quae tamen etiam ipsa, in quantum a Deo conditur, bona est.
Augustine. But it did not remain as it was founded. Therefore it is proved liable to a crime, and it made its own stock liable to its own crime as though by inheritance; which nonetheless, insofar as it is founded by God, is itself also good.
JulianImp.3.158III. 159. Iulianus. Malum igitur naturale esse non potest ac per hoc nec rea ulla naturaliter creatura nec malus auctor. Malum quippe non exstantis invenitur naturae, sed sicut omnis creatura, in quantum conditur, bona est, ita et Deus, naturarum auctor bonarum, nullo operis sui crimine maculatus per omnia bonus probatur. Totum igitur, quidquid Manichaeus attulerat, hac una catholicorum ratione subversum est.
III. 159. Julian. Evil, therefore, cannot be natural, and through this no creature is guilty naturally, nor is the author evil. For evil is found not of an existing nature, but, just as every creature, insofar as it is founded, is good, so too God, the author of good natures, stained by no crime of his work, is proved good through all things. Therefore the whole of whatever the Manichean had brought forward has been overthrown by this single reasoning of the Catholics.
JulianImp.3.159Augustinus. Hoc verum dicis. Prorsus omnis creatura, in quantum conditur, bona est; et ideo sicut hoc ita et, quod sequitur, utrique dicimus, quoniam Deus, naturarum auctor bonarum, nullo operis sui crimine maculatus, per omnia bonus probatur. Hoc enim totum illic connectitur, quod omnis creatura, in quantum conditur, bona est. Ac per hoc et homo, in quantum conditur, bonus est, in quantum autem de vitiata origine generatur, bonus non est, ideo regenerandus est.
Augustine. This you say truly. Absolutely every creature, insofar as it is founded, is good; and therefore, as we say this, so we both say also what follows, that God, the author of good natures, stained by no crime of his work, is proved good through all things. For this whole thing is bound up there, that every creature, insofar as it is founded, is good. And through this, man too, insofar as he is founded, is good; but insofar as he is generated from a corrupted origin, he is not good, and therefore he must be regenerated.
JulianImp.3.159III. 160. Iulianus. Sed tamen ille, qui fulmine tam perspicuae veritatis interiit, ex parte aliqua videtur spirare, cum confertur tibi; illi enim tota dogmatis sui fundamento eius tantummodo nutante structura collabitur, tibi autem tria similiter vacillant ut illi unum. Ac per hoc vide, utrum aedificii tui quidquam possit assurgere. Mani ergo putans naturale esse peccatum, quod nisi voluntarium esse non potest, in vacuo fundamenta locavit; reliqua vero iuxta se consequenter imposuit dicens, quoniam est naturale peccatum, malam esse naturam, malae autem rei auctorem bonum non esse ac per hoc omne humanum genus reputandum principi tenebrarum. Quod totum utique stare potuisset, nisi illud primum eius suffodisset veritas, id est peccatum opus liberae voluntatis doceri naturale non posse et, quidquid fuisset naturale, peccatum esse non posse.
III. 160. Julian. But nonetheless that man, who perished by the thunderbolt of so manifest a truth, seems in some part to breathe, when he is compared with you; for in him the structure of his whole teaching collapses when only that single foundation totters, whereas in you three things likewise totter, as one in him. And through this, see whether anything of your building can rise up. Mani, then, supposing that to be natural which can only be voluntary—namely, sin—laid his foundations on emptiness; the rest he placed consequently beside it, saying that, since sin is natural, the nature is evil, and the author of an evil thing is not good, and through this the whole human race must be reckoned to the prince of darkness. All of which could certainly have stood, had not truth dug away that first point of his, namely, that sin, the work of free will, cannot be taught to be natural, and that whatever was natural cannot be sin.
JulianImp.3.160Augustinus. Similiter contra te potest ratiocinatio ista contexi; quia non ita fatuus es, ut ingenia fatua id est homines fatuos nasci neges, ergo audi tua fatuitate quantum adiuveris dementiam Manichaei. Dicit enim doctus a te ipso, quoniam est naturalis fatuitas, eamdem fatuam esse naturam, quomodo tu dixisti: Quoniam est naturale peccatum, malum esse naturam; deinde ille addit fatuae autem rei auctorem sapientem non esse, sicut tu dixisti: Malae autem rei auctorem bonum non esse; postremo ille concludit: ac per hoc fatuorum hominum genus reputandum principi tenebrarum; sic enim et tu conclusisti dicens: Ac per hoc omne humanum genus reputandum principi tenebrarum. Ecce Manichaeus ore tuo te vicit, tuo te gladio iugulavit. Quid est acturus? Neque enim te adversus eum potest aliquid adiuvare ac non etiam plus premere atque confodere, quod adiungis et dicis: Totum hoc utique stare potuisse, nisi illud primum eius suffodisset veritas, id est peccatum opus liberae voluntatis doceri naturale non posse et, quidquid fuisset naturale, peccatum esse non posse. Quid te hoc adiuvat et quomodo non magis magisque suffocat? Numquid enim potes dicere fatuitatem naturalem esse non posse? Stat ergo adversus te, quod in simili ratiocinatione primum posuit Manichaeus, quoniam est naturalis fatuitas; cui velut fundamento cetera eius putasti consequenter astructa usque ad culmen, ubi dicit tale hominum genus reputandum principi tenebrarum. Nos autem primum illud fundamentum eius evertimus, qui naturalem fatuitatem ideo dicimus, quia nascuntur homines fatui ex accidenti scilicet vitio, ex quo huiusmodi origo merito traheretur, non quia prava est primitus humana instituta natura, sicut desipit Manichaeus. Ac per hoc etiam, quod consequenter adiungit eamdem fatuam esse naturam, nos propter vitium, cum quo natus est fatuus homo, non propter quod in illo est opificium conditoris boni, verum esse concedimus; natus est enim fatuus accidente vitio, homo autem creatus est operante Deo. Deinde quod addit fatuae autem rei auctorem non esse sapientem, ut res ipsa homo intellegatur, non esse consequens dicimus; eius quippe hominis, qui fatuus natus est, Deum dicimus, quamvis non dicamus ipsius fatuitatis, auctorem. Quae fatuitas non est natura atque substantia, quae non nascitur nisi creante Deo, sed eiusdem naturae vitium, quod accidit sinente Deo; iusto autem iudicio Deum ista sinere non utique dubitamus. Ita destruimus et Manichaeos, malos ruinae suae structores, et Pelagianos, Manichaeorum fatuos adiutores.
Augustine. A similar reasoning can be woven against you; for since you are not so foolish as to deny that foolish abilities—that is, foolish men—are born, hear, then, how much by your folly you aid the madness of the Manichean. For one taught by you himself says that, since foolishness is natural, the same nature is foolish—just as you said, Since sin is natural, the nature is evil; then he adds that the author of a foolish thing is not wise, just as you said, But the author of an evil thing is not good; finally he concludes: and through this the race of foolish men must be reckoned to the prince of darkness—for so you too concluded, saying, And through this the whole human race must be reckoned to the prince of darkness. See, the Manichean has conquered you with your own mouth, has cut your throat with your own sword. What will he do? For nothing can aid you against him without pressing and stabbing you still more—namely, what you add and say: All this could certainly have stood, had not truth dug away that first point of his, namely, that sin, the work of free will, cannot be taught to be natural, and that whatever was natural cannot be sin. How does this aid you, and how does it not rather choke you more and more? For can you say that foolishness cannot be natural? It stands against you, then, what the Manichean placed first in his similar reasoning—namely, that foolishness is natural; to which, as a foundation, you thought the rest of his points were consequently built up to the very summit, where he says that such a race of men must be reckoned to the prince of darkness. But we overturn that first foundation of his, we who say that foolishness is natural for this reason, that men are born foolish from an incidental defect, from which an origin of this kind would be deservedly drawn—not because human nature was depraved when first established, as the Manichean raves. And through this also, what he consequently adds, that the same nature is foolish, we concede to be true on account of the defect with which a foolish man is born, not on account of what is in him the handiwork of the good founder; for he was born foolish by an incidental defect, but man was created with God operating. Then, what he adds, that the author of a foolish thing is not wise—if the thing itself, man, is understood—we say is not consequent; for we say that God is the author of that man who was born foolish, although we do not say he is the author of foolishness itself. This foolishness is not a nature and substance, which is not born except with God creating, but a defect of that same nature, which befell with God permitting; and that God permits these things by a just judgment we certainly do not doubt. Thus we destroy both the Manicheans, the evil builders of their own ruin, and the Pelagians, the foolish helpers of the Manicheans.
JulianImp.3.160III. 161. Iulianus. Primae igitur definitionis eversu culmina eius in solum cuneus rationis effudit. Quid igitur de te speras, cuius tria sunt ita in lubrico sicut illius unum? Dicis enim primo naturale esse peccatum, secundo bonum Deum, qui mala id est peccata condat informet extendat, tertio vero rem voluntatis immixtam esse seminibus. Haec ergo tria definitionum tuarum capita singula apud semet vacillant; vacillant, inquio, immo ut funes e sabulo dilabuntur, ante quam coeant. Unum ergo id est naturale peccatum iam in Manichaeo ex directo quidem destructum iacet; alia autem duo quae opinionis vestrae sunt propria, Manichaeo totidem intereunte sed consueta ceciderunt. Nam si ille reos nasci homines nec per malam naturam nec per principem tenebrarum potuit vindicare, quanto magis vos stulti, qui ad ostendenda nascentium crimina iunxistis accusationem Dei? Ac per hoc, sicut non potest natura esse peccatum, quo fulmine Manichaei dogma dissiluit, ita recurrit, ut, quod peccatum est, naturale esse non possit; res enim voluntatis non transit in conditionem substantiae, quod tu factum arbitraris. Multo autem magis constat Deum bonum malos numquam creare, apparuit itaque peccatum in nascente, quem Deus creat, esse non posse.
III. 161. Julian. By the overthrow, then, of his first definition, the wedge of reason poured his summits to the ground. What, then, do you hope for yourself, whose three points are as much on the slippery slope as his one? For you say, first, that sin is natural; second, that God is good, who founds, forms, and extends the evil, that is, sins; and third, that a matter of the will has been mingled into the seeds. These three heads of your definitions, then, each totter by themselves—they totter, I say; nay, like ropes they slip apart from sand before they can come together. The one, then—that is, natural sin—already lies destroyed straightway in the Manichean; but the other two, which are proper to your opinion, fall together with the Manichean, who likewise perishes, but in their accustomed manner. For if he could not vindicate human beings born guilty, neither through an evil nature nor through the prince of darkness, how much more cannot you fools, who, to display the crimes of those who are born, have joined to it an accusation of God? And through this, just as sin cannot be a nature—by which thunderbolt the teaching of the Manichean burst apart—so it recurs that what is sin cannot be natural; for a matter of the will does not pass over into the condition of a substance, which you think has happened. But much more does it stand firm that the good God never creates the evil; and so it appeared that there cannot be sin in one who is born, whom God creates.
JulianImp.3.161Augustinus. Ita constat Deum bonum malos non creare, quemadmodum constat Deum sapientem fatuos non creare. Si enim dixeris: Creat sapiens fatuos, respondebitur tibi: Cur non ergo et bonus malos? Unde factus intentus, cum quaesieris, unde nascantur fatui, quos tamen homines Deus creat, ibi forte invenies originis vitium, qui fateri non vis originale peccatum. An vero paratus es dicere nullo ullius praecedente peccato etiam fatuos nasci in illa paradisi felicitate potuisse, qui erudiri, non dico ferulis, sed nec fustibus possent? Quod si non dicis, ne omnem fatuitatem haec transcendat absurditas, dic, quo merito imago Dei cum tanta mentis deformitate nascatur, ut nullo robore aetatis, nulla prolixitate temporis, nullo labore studiorum, nulla industria magistrorum, nullis poenis verberum possit, non dico ad sapientiam, sed ad qualemcumque doctrinam utilem pervenire, qui non vis credere Deum iustum ideo de paradiso, hoc est felicitatis loco, vitiatam atque damnatam humanam dimisisse naturam, ne mors illic ulla contingeret, id est nec temporalis corporis nec totius hominis sempiterna, nec ista tot ac tanta, quae in genere humano cernimus, ingeniorum et corporum mala, quae de radice depravata atque punita et massa perdita nasci oportebat, in regione beatitudinis illius nascerentur, sed potius in his terris miseriae mortalium, quae iustissime inflicta est, deputatis, reatu persequente nascentes neque a renascentibus labore recedente aerumnoso usque ad corporis mortem.
Augustine. It stands firm that the good God does not create the evil, in just the way that it stands firm that the wise God does not create the foolish. For if you say, "The wise creates the foolish," it will be answered you: "Why, then, does not the good also create the evil?" Hence, having become intent, when you ask whence the foolish are born—whom nonetheless God creates as men—there perhaps you will find the defect of origin, you who do not wish to confess original sin. Or are you prepared to say that, with no one's sin preceding, even foolish men could have been born in that happiness of paradise—men who could be educated not, I say, by rods, but not even by cudgels? But if you do not say this, lest this absurdity transcend all foolishness, say by what merit the image of God is born with such great deformity of mind, that by no strength of age, no length of time, no labor of studies, no diligence of teachers, no punishments of beatings, he can attain—I do not say to wisdom, but to any useful learning whatever—you who do not wish to believe that the just God, therefore, dismissed from paradise, that is, from the place of happiness, human nature corrupted and condemned, lest any death befall there—that is, neither the temporal death of the body nor the eternal death of the whole man—nor those evils, so many and so great, of abilities and bodies which we discern in the human race, which had to be born from a depraved and punished root and a lost mass, should be born in that region of happiness, but rather in these lands of the misery of mortals, which was most justly inflicted on those assigned to it, with guilt pursuing those who are born and toilsome hardship not departing from those who are reborn, even to the death of the body.
JulianImp.3.161III. 162. Iulianus. Res clara est et iam in primo opere sufficienter impleta; verum quoniam tu adeo pellax esse voluisti, ut aliquam inter te et Manichaeum distinctionem facere nitereris, ideo necesse mihi nunc est urgere causam, ut non solum praeteritis dictis tuis, sed etiam, si qua deinceps inferre tentaveris, clareat obviatum. Dicimus itaque tam bonum esse opus Dei in nascente, ut ea quae substantiae eius sunt naturalia opus emendatore non habeant, quoniam, quicumque censuerit, id quod a Deo factum confitetur, aliter fieri debuisse, illum sine dubio reprehendit, quem corrigendae in alteram formam creaturae confitetur artificem.
III. 162. Julian. The matter is clear and already sufficiently treated in the first work; but since you wished to be so deceitful as to strive to make some distinction between yourself and the Manichean, I am now obliged to press the case, so that it may be clear that not only your past statements but also anything you may henceforth attempt to bring in have been countered. We say, then, that the work of God in one who is born is so good that the things which are natural to his substance need no corrector; since whoever judges that what he confesses was made by God ought to have been made otherwise, without doubt censures the one whom he confesses to be the craftsman of a creature to be corrected into another form.
JulianImp.3.162Augustinus. Tace, obsecro; quid loquaris, ignoras. Nonnulli clausis oribus nati sunt et eis a medicis sunt aperta. Erat apud nos Acatius quidam honesto apud suos ortus loco; clausis oculis natum se esse dicebat, sed quia intus sani palpebris cohaerentibus non patebant, medicum eos ferro aperire voluisse neque hoc permisisse religiosam matrem suam, sed id effecisse imposito ex eucharistia cataplasmate, cum iam puer quinque fere aut amplius esset annorum, unde hoc se satis meminisse narrabat. Omitto illum evangelicum caecum natum, cui lumina, quae propter commendanda mirabilia sua minus fecerat, ipse artifex reddidit; ibi enim, cur caecus natus fuerit, causa non tacita est, non scilicet propter peccatum suum vel parentum, sed ut manifestarentur opera Dei in illo . Verumtamen interroga medicos et dicant tibi, quam multis, ubi possunt, opitulentur, ne vitia corporibus innata permaneant vel etiam natos necent; nam quidam, sicut alii oribus, ita clausis inferioribus meatibus oriuntur, quae utique vitia, si maneant, non eos sinunt vivere. Neque enim, cum his medicinali peritia subvenitur hominibus, Dei opera culpata emendantur. Quis enim verax Dei cultor ignorat, quod tales sic nasci oportebat, ut nati sunt? Sed etiam hoc pertinet ad aerumnas generis humani, in quibus aguntur hi dies mali, iusto iudicio Dei laboribus doloribus timoribus periculis pleni; quae omnia mala absit ut essent in illa felicitate paradisi, ac per hoc non pullulaverunt nisi de radice peccati. Quid? Ipsa ingenia, si dimittantur, ut nata sunt, nec doctrinis sollertibus excolantur labore magno docentium atque discentium, nonne apparet, qualia remanebunt? Sed vos hominibus et corpore et animo vitioso natis vestrum implete paradisum, ut infeliciter oculis clausis et impudenter ore aperto negetis originale peccatum.
Augustine. Be silent, I beg you; you do not know what you are saying. Some are born with closed mouths, and these are opened by physicians. There was among us a certain Acatius, born in an honorable place among his own people; he used to say that he was born with closed eyes, but, because they were healthy within, though they were not open with the eyelids stuck together, the physician wished to open them with a knife, and his devout mother did not permit this, but accomplished it by applying a poultice from the Eucharist, when the boy was already nearly five years old or more—whence he used to relate that he remembered this well enough. I pass over that man blind from birth in the Gospel, to whom the craftsman himself restored the eyes, which, for the sake of commending his marvels, he had made less than whole; for there the cause why he was born blind is not passed over in silence: namely, not on account of his own sin or his parents', but that the works of God might be manifested in him (See John 9:1-3). Yet ask the physicians, and let them tell you to how many people, where they can, they bring help, lest defects inborn in their bodies should remain or even kill those who are born; for some are born—just as others with their mouths, so these with their lower passages closed—which defects, if they remain, do not let them live. For when help is brought to such people by medical skill, the works of God are not corrected as faulty. For what true worshiper of God does not know that such people had to be born in the way they were born? But this too pertains to the hardships of the human race, in which these evil days are passed, full, by the just judgment of God, of labors, sorrows, fears, and dangers; all of which evils—far be it that they should have existed in that happiness of paradise—and through this they have not sprouted except from the root of sin. What of this? The very abilities, if they are left as they were born and not cultivated by skillful teaching, with great labor of teachers and learners—is it not plain what they will remain? But you, fill your paradise with human beings born defective in both body and mind, so that, with your eyes unhappily closed and your mouth shamelessly open, you may deny original sin.
JulianImp.3.162III. 163. Iulianus. Probabilitate itaque et ea mediocritate laudum, quae naturis debetur, etiam in nascentibus quibusque servata, augmenta beneficiorum divinorum utilia esse et necessaria omnibus in commune aetatibus dicimus, ita tamen, ut nec virtus nec peccatum sine propria cuiquam voluntate tribuatur.
III. 163. Julian. And so, with probability and that moderation of praise which is owed to natures preserved even in any who are born, we say that the increases of divine benefits are useful and necessary to all ages in common, yet in such a way that neither virtue nor sin is ascribed to anyone without his own will.
JulianImp.3.163Augustinus. Non tribuitur cuiquam virtus sine propria voluntate, sed praeparatur voluntas a Domino , sicut regis illius, propter quod oravit Esther .
Augustine. Virtue is not ascribed to anyone without his own will, but the will is prepared by the Lord (See Prov 8:35 (LXX)), as that of the king for which Esther prayed (See Esth 14:13; 15:8).
JulianImp.3.163III. 164. Iulianus. Quamvis in hoc quoque clementia Dei uberior approbetur, quoniam sanctificat parvulos nescientes; ad laudem quippe misericordiae respicit, cum eos nescientes culpa non inquinet; ad leges enim id pertinet aequitatis.
III. 164. Julian. Although in this too the more abundant clemency of God is proved, since he sanctifies the little ones who do not know it; for it pertains to the praise of his mercy, since guilt does not stain them while they do not know it; this indeed belongs to the laws of equity.
JulianImp.3.164Augustinus. Si eos nulla culpa inquinat, cur non omnes sanctificantur? Et cur omnes, qui sanctificantur, exsufflantur?
Augustine. If no guilt stains them, why are not all sanctified? And why are all who are sanctified exsufflated?
JulianImp.3.164III. 165. Iulianus. Sed de illis ego virtutibus dico, quas usu iam perfectae rationis adipiscimur. Ac per hoc, quia id etiam hic sicut frequenter inculcari nobis fuit necesse, ad ea, quae inferimus, ut sit attentus lector, admoneo; videbit enim ita in nullo Traducianos differre a Manichaeis, ut non alia nobis obiciant argumentorum vice, quam quae in illorum libris tenentur. Feci id quidem etiam in primi operis mei libro quarto.
III. 165. Julian. But I am speaking of those virtues which we acquire by the use of reason now perfected. And through this, because it was necessary that this too be driven home here, as so often, I admonish the reader to be attentive to the things we bring in; for he will see that the Traducianists differ in nothing from the Manicheans, so that they object to us nothing in the way of arguments other than what is contained in their books. I did this indeed in the fourth book of my first work too.
JulianImp.3.165Augustinus. Et respondi tibi libro meo sexto.
Augustine. And I answered you in my sixth book.
JulianImp.3.165III. 166. Iulianus. Sed quia post editionem illorum oratu tuo, beatissime pater Flore, apud Constantinopolim Manichaei epistula inventa est atque ad has directa partes, opera est aliqua eius inserere, ut intellegant omnes, unde haec pro traduce argumenta descendant.
III. 166. Julian. But because, after the publication of those books, by your prayer, most blessed father Florus, a letter of the Manichean was found at Constantinople and sent to these parts, it is worthwhile to insert some of it, so that all may understand whence these arguments for traduction descend.
JulianImp.3.166Augustinus. Quomodo cuiusquam oratu inventam dicis epistulam atque directam, si Deus non operatur in cordibus hominum voluntates? Utique homo, qui invenit, epistulam voluntate quaesivit aut voluntate aliquid quaerebat eo loco, ubi eam potuit invenire, aut, cum de rebus talibus voluntate homines loquerentur, voluntate, apud quem fuerat, indicavit eam se habere, quam posset ostendere et volenti tradere, quam volens ad has partes et ille dirigeret; et vel quocumque alio modo prorsus voluntate hominis vel hominum factum est, ut illa inveniretur et dirigeretur epistula. Et tamen orante homine dicis hoc factum. Cur ergo non confiteris sine ulla forinsecus sonante iussione Deum occulto instinctu, ad quod voluerit efficacissime implendum, praeparare atque excitare hominum voluntates, qui liberum non defendis intellegendum, sed praecipitandum extollis arbitrium?
Augustine. How do you say that the letter was found and sent by someone's prayer, if God does not work the wills in the hearts of human beings? Surely the man who found it sought the letter by his will, or by his will was seeking something in the place where he could find it, or, when human beings were speaking by their will about such matters, he indicated by his will to the one with whom it had been that he had it, which he could show and hand over to one willing, which the other too, willing, would direct to these parts; and in whatever other way it may have been, it was absolutely by the will of a human being or human beings that that letter was found and directed. And yet you say this was done with a human being praying. Why, then, do you not confess that, without any command sounding from without, God, by a hidden prompting, prepares and rouses the wills of human beings most effectively to fulfill what he has willed—you who do not defend free choice to be understood, but exalt it to be precipitated?
JulianImp.3.166III. 167. Iulianus. Et quamvis iam pro concupiscentia vel voluptate carnis, quae etiam libido dicitur, quae sexibus ob virilitatem propagationis inserta est, primo illo opusculo eatenus disputaverim, ut docerem illam nihil aliud esse quam unam de instrumentis corporis rationabilibus et irrationabilibus aeque inditam ad Dei operam pertinentem, qui carnem nostram in sensibus affecisset, tamen, quia ei vehementer Augustinus incumbit eamque dicit malam, id est peccatum esse naturale atque omnium peccatorum parentem, quod pudore eius potissimum persuadere conatur meque irridet, qui eam erubescam nominare directim.
III. 167. Julian. And although I have already disputed, in that first little work, concerning the concupiscence or pleasure of the flesh, which is also called disordered desire, which has been implanted in the sexes for the sake of manly propagation—disputed to the point of teaching that it is nothing other than one of the instruments of the body, implanted alike in rational and irrational creatures, pertaining to the work of God, who affected our flesh in its senses—nonetheless, because Augustine presses upon it vehemently and says that it is evil, that is, natural sin and the parent of all sins, which he tries to prove above all by its shame, and mocks me because I blush to name it outright—
JulianImp.3.167Augustinus. Ego concupiscentiam carnis, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et quae libido etiam nuncupatur, malam esse dico, nunc in hac carne frenandam et bona consuetudine minuendam, in aeterna vero vita omni ex parte sanandam, non, quasi addita vel commixta nobis fuerit aliqua mala substantia, sicut Manichaei desipiunt, separandam; sed, quodlibet de illa sentias, talem te illam, qualis nunc est, ut ad illicita perpetranda etiam castorum sive coniugatorum sive continentium corda sollicitet et, nisi ei robustiore voluntate resistatur, evertat, in paradiso constituere posse non crederem, nisi in istis tuis libris vana et insana loquacitate plenissimis invenirem.
Augustine. I say that the concupiscence of the flesh, by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit and which is also called disordered desire, is evil—now in this flesh to be reined in and to be lessened by good habit, but in eternal life to be healed in every part—not, as the Manicheans rave, to be separated as though some evil substance had been added or mingled into us; but, whatever you may think about it, that it is such as it now is, so that it solicits to the perpetration of unlawful things even the hearts of the chaste, whether married or continent, and, unless it is resisted by a stronger will, overturns them—such a thing I would not believe could be set up in paradise, had I not found it in these books of yours, most full of empty and insane loquacity.
JulianImp.3.167III. 168. Iulianus. Ideo et ego qualitatem rei, quam prioribus scriptis distinguendo a Manichaei ore defendi, nunc quoque breviter criminatorum eius, qui tamen se ei servire profitentur invitos, proditu vindicabo.
III. 168. Julian. Therefore I too will now also briefly vindicate, by exposing it, the quality of the thing which I defended from the mouth of the Manichean by distinguishing it in my earlier writings—against the accusers of it, who nonetheless profess that they serve it against their will.
JulianImp.3.168Augustinus. Vos potestis congruenter servire laudatae libidini, nos autem in adiutorio Domini oppugnamus et vincimus accusatam.
Augustine. You can fittingly serve the praised disordered desire, but we, with the help of the Lord, attack and conquer the accused one.
JulianImp.3.168III. 169. Iulianus. Quod igitur libris tuis, senex Augustine, retinetur: Libido exorta est post peccatum, quam coacti sunt velare confusi .
III. 169. Julian. What, then, is retained in your books, old man Augustine: Disordered desire arose after sin, and in confusion they were compelled to veil it.
JulianImp.3.169Augustinus. Quod igitur libris tuis, iuvenis Iuliane, retinetur, apparet te contra libros meos non invenire quid dicas et quaerere calumnias, quas nobis loquaciter et inaniter ingeras.
Augustine. What, then, is retained in your books, young man Julian, makes it appear that you can find nothing to say against my books, and that you seek out slanders to heap upon us loquaciously and emptily.
JulianImp.3.169III. 170. Iulianus. Et item: Pudenda libidine, qui licite concumbit, malo bene utitur, qui autem illicite, malo male utitur; rectius enim accipit nomen mali quam boni, unde erubescunt et mali et boni, meliusque credimus Apostolo, qui dicit: " Quia non habitat in carne mea bonum " ; et alibi: Non est libido nuptiarum bonum, sed obscaenitas peccantium, necessitas generantium, lasciviarum ardor, nuptiarum pudor ; et illud: Quod postea propagatione fecerunt, hoc est connubii bonum, quod vero prius confusione texerunt, hoc est concupiscentiae malum, quod vitat ubique conspectum et quaerit pu dendo secretum , vel alia, quibus ad hoc argumentum uti soles, memoria tua magis quam ingenio prolata sunt. Manichaeus ergo afflictus est, ut ea, quae putabat acuta, componeret, tu vero frustratus, qui putasti latere posse, quod legeras et tenebas.
III. 170. Julian. And again: Whoever lies lawfully uses an evil well by the shameful disordered desire; but whoever does so unlawfully uses an evil badly; for it more rightly takes the name of an evil than of a good, at which both the evil and the good blush, and we more rightly believe the Apostle, who says, "For good does not dwell in my flesh" (Rom 7:18); and elsewhere: The disordered desire of marriage is not a good, but the obscenity of those who sin, the necessity of those who generate, the burning of wantonness, the shame of marriage; and that: What they afterward did by propagation, this is the good of marriage; but what they first covered in confusion, this is the evil of concupiscence, which everywhere avoids the gaze and seeks shameful secrecy—or other things you are accustomed to use for this argument, brought forth more by your memory than by your wit. The Manichean, then, was hard pressed, so that he composed what he thought acute, but you were frustrated, you who thought you could hide what you had read and held.
JulianImp.3.170Augustinus. Quis enim est, qui vel tenuiter Manichaeorum dogma cognovit et lateat eum Manichaeos dicere malam esse concupiscentiam carnis? Sed non est hoc proprium dogmatis eorum; nam quid aliud dicit etiam ille, qui dicit: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, spiritus autem adversus carnem; haec enim invicem adversantur, ut non ea quae vultis faciatis ? Quid aliud etiam ille, qui dicit: Quisquis dilexerit mundum, non est caritas Patris in illo, quia omnia, quae in mundo sunt, concupiscentia carnis est et concupiscentia oculorum et ambitio saeculi, quae non est ex Patre, sed ex mundo est ? Malam ergo esse concupiscentiam carnis non proprio dogmate Manichaei dicunt, quod vident, qui caeci non sunt, et Apostolos dicere, sed Manichaeorum propriam virosamque sententiam error adiuvat vester, qui concupiscentiam carnis, cui, velitis nolitis, ad illicita perpetranda sollicitanti castitas reluctatur, negatis de peccato accidisse naturae, quam Deus condidit bonam. Ac sic agitis, ut eam Manichaei, quam conflictatione castorum et Apostolorum testimonio convincunt malam de gente tenebrarum et de mala substantia Deo coaeterna etiam ipsam non malam qualitatem sanandam, sed malam substantiam separandam, nec bonae naturae accidisset, sed bonae naturae commixtam fuisse concludant. Sed pergite et nobis calumnias de Manichaeorum peste molimini, quos ita adiuvatis, ut faciatis invictos, nisi et vos cum illis ea, quae vere invicta est, catholica veritate vincamini.
Augustine. For who is there who has even slightly come to know the teaching of the Manicheans, and to whom it is hidden that the Manicheans say the concupiscence of the flesh is evil? But this is not proper to their teaching; for what else does even he say who says, The flesh has desires opposed to the spirit, and the spirit opposed to the flesh; for these are opposed to one another, so that you do not do the things you want (Gal 5:17)? What else does even he say who says, Whoever loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him, because all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh and the concupiscence of the eyes and the ambition of this age, which is not from the Father, but is from the world (See 1 John 2:15-16)? Therefore that the concupiscence of the flesh is evil the Manicheans do not say by their own teaching—which those who are not blind see that the Apostles too say—but it is your error that aids the proper and venomous opinion of the Manicheans, you who deny that the concupiscence of the flesh, which, like it or not, solicits to the perpetration of unlawful things and to which chastity is opposed, befell nature from sin, the nature which God founded good. And so you act in such a way that the Manicheans conclude that what they convict—by the struggle of the chaste and the testimony of the Apostles—to be an evil from the race of darkness and from an evil substance coeternal with God, is not an evil quality to be healed, but an evil substance to be separated, and that it did not befall a good nature, but was mingled into a good nature. But go on and contrive slanders against us out of the plague of the Manicheans, whom you so aid as to make them unconquered—unless both you with them are conquered by us, by that Catholic truth which is truly unconquered.
JulianImp.3.170III. 171. Iulianus. Audi igitur nunc atque cognosce, quid parens tuus ad quamdam filiam suam, vestram scribat sororem.
III. 171. Julian. Hear, then, now, and learn what your parent writes to a certain daughter of his, your sister.
JulianImp.3.171Augustinus. Convitia sunt ista nec urbana, sed vana.
Augustine. These are insults, and not even witty ones, but empty.
JulianImp.3.171III. 172. Iulianus. Mani apostolus Iesu Christi filiae Menoch. Gratia tibi et salus a Deo nostro, qui est re vera verus Deus, tribuatur ipseque tuam mentem illustret et iustitiam suam tibimet revelet, quia es divinae stirpis fructus. Et post pauca: Per quos et tu splendida - inquit - reddita es agnoscendo, qualiter prius fueris, ex quo genere animarum emanaveris, quod est confusum omnibus corporibus et saporibus et speciebus variis cohaeret. Nam sicut animae gignuntur ab animabus, ita figmentum corporis a corporis natura digeritur. " Quod, ergo, nascitur de carne, caro est et, quod de spiritu, spiritus est " ; spiritum autem animam intellege, anima de anima, caro de carne .
III. 172. Julian. Mani, an apostle of Jesus Christ, to his daughter Menoch. May grace and salvation be granted you from our God, who is truly the true God, and may he enlighten your mind and reveal his righteousness to you, since you are a fruit of the divine stock. And after a little: Through whom you too—he says—have been made splendid by recognizing what you formerly were, from what kind of souls you flowed, which is confounded with all bodies and clings to various flavors and appearances. For just as souls are begotten from souls, so the fashioning of the body is digested from the nature of the body. "What, therefore, is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of the spirit is spirit" (John 3:6); but understand the spirit as the soul: soul from soul, flesh from flesh.
JulianImp.3.172Augustinus. Si dicam tibi istam Manichaei epistulam me omnino nescire, quamvis verum dicam, omnino non credes et mecum vana, ut soles, loquacitate conten des; sed si hoc dixit Manichaeus, quid mirum est, quod se ipse destruxit? Si enim sicut hominis caro, etiam hominis anima nascitur sive mala sive bona, duas enim simul animas in homine uno esse delirant, unam malam, alteram bonam, de suis diversis principiis emanantes, si ergo nascitur anima, quando nascitur caro, profecto nec mala illa est Deo coaeterna nec contra principes tenebrarum bona, sicut eius secta desipit, ab aeterno Patre prolata est. Sed quoquo modo dicat Manichaeus animas nasci, ad nos quid pertinet, qui verba illa Domini: Quod natum est ex carne, caro est et, quod natum est de spiritu, spiritus est non, cum homo ex homine nascitur, sed cum ex Dei Spiritu renascitur, fieri novimus et tenemus? Non enim evangelicus ipse totus locus aliud permittit intellegi. Quaere ergo ibi, quibus possis Manichaei has fabulas vendere, et potius propter illa, quae superius dixi, quomodo Manichaeorum non sis adiutor, ostende.
Augustine. If I should tell you that I am entirely ignorant of this letter of the Manichean—though I would be telling the truth—you would not believe me at all and would contend with me, as you are accustomed, with empty loquacity; but if the Manichean said this, what wonder is it that he destroyed himself? For if the soul of a man is born just as the flesh of a man, whether evil or good—for they rave that there are two souls at once in one man, one evil, the other good, flowing from their different principles—if, then, the soul is born when the flesh is born, surely that evil one is not coeternal with God, nor was the good one, against the princes of darkness, brought forth from the eternal Father, as his sect raves. But in whatever way the Manichean says souls are born, what does it pertain to us, who know and hold that those words of the Lord, What is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of the spirit is spirit (John 3:6), come about not when a man is born of a man, but when he is reborn of the Spirit of God? For the whole Gospel passage itself allows no other understanding. Seek there, then, those to whom you can sell these fables of the Manichean, and rather, on account of those things I said above, show how you are not a helper of the Manicheans.
JulianImp.3.172III. 173. Iulianus. Cognoscis nempe, quomodo signatissime Manichaeus traducem confirmet animarum et quo testimonio utatur ad vituperationem carnis, illo videlicet, quod in vestro ore versatur, id est: Quod nascitur de carne, caro est et, quod de spiritu, spiritus est .
III. 173. Julian. You recognize, surely, how most expressly the Manichean confirms the traduction of souls, and by what testimony he uses for the disparagement of the flesh—namely, that which is bandied about in your mouth, that is: What is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of the spirit is spirit (John 3:6).
JulianImp.3.173Augustinus. Iam dixi, quomodo nos accipiamus haec verba evangelica, quoniam non generationem, sed regenerationem docent. Tu dic, si potes, quomodo non adiuves Manichaei verba sacrilega de concupiscentia carnis, quam propterea tu negas de natura primi hominis praevaricatione vitiata in nostram naturam propagatione descendere, ut eam putetur ille Deo coaeternae tenebrarum genti rectissime deputare. Insipientissime quippe et impudentissime abs te negatur malum, quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et contra quod geruntur interiora bella castorum.
Augustine. I have already said how we take these words of the Gospel, since they teach not generation but regeneration. You say, if you can, how you do not aid the sacrilegious words of the Manichean about the concupiscence of the flesh, which for this reason you deny descends into our nature by propagation from the nature of the first man corrupted by his transgression: namely, so that he may be supposed most rightly to reckon it to the race of darkness coeternal with God. For most foolishly and most shamelessly you deny the evil by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit, and against which the inner wars of the chaste are waged.
JulianImp.3.173III. 174. Iulianus. Ideo non solum eloquendo, sed etiam repetendo inculcat dogmatis sui esse proprium traducem animarum putare, quod etiam per similitudinem generantium corporum approbare conatur. Sicut animae - inquit - gignuntur ab animabus, ita figmentum corporis a corporis natura digeritur et sicut caro de carne, ita anima de anima. Sed pergamus ad reliqua: Sicut ergo auctor animarum Deus est, ita corporum auctor per concupiscentiam diabolus est, ut in viscatorio diaboli per concupiscentiam mulieris, unde diabolus aucupatur non animas, sed corpora.
III. 174. Julian. Therefore not only by stating it but also by repeating it he drives home that it is proper to his teaching to suppose a traduction of souls, which he tries to prove also by the likeness of generating bodies. Just as souls—he says—are begotten from souls, so the fashioning of the body is digested from the nature of the body, and just as flesh from flesh, so soul from soul. But let us proceed to the rest: Just as, then, God is the author of souls, so the devil is the author of bodies through concupiscence, so that in the lime-twig of the devil, through the concupiscence of the woman, the devil hunts not souls but bodies.
JulianImp.3.174Augustinus. Non corpora, sed animas aucupari diabolum potuit dicere Manichaeus; corpora enim dicit ad gentis tenebrarum naturam, unde est et diabolus, pertinere. Proinde secundum Manichaeum non corpora, quae ipsius sunt, sed animas bonas, quae ipsius non sunt, dicitur diabolus aucupari; sed fides nostra bonum Deum creatorem et animarum et corporum novit.
Augustine. The Manichean could not say that the devil hunts bodies but souls; for he says that bodies pertain to the nature of the race of darkness, from which the devil too comes. Accordingly, according to the Manichean, the devil is said to hunt not bodies, which are his own, but the good souls, which are not his own; but our faith knows the good God to be the creator both of souls and of bodies.
JulianImp.3.174III. 175. Iulianus. Sive per visum sive per tactum sive per auditum sive per odoratum sive per gus tum. Tolle denique malignae huius stirpis radicem et statim te ipsam spiritalem contemplaris. " Radix enim - ait Scriptura - omnium malorum concupiscentia " . Vides, quo spiritu et propter quod dogma Manichaeus concupiscentiam carnis incessat hanc dicens legem esse peccati, quae si a corporibus auferretur, spiritalem se filia eius, ad quam scribit, factam videret. Quam opinionem quibus Apostoli nitatur confirmare sententiis audiamus: " Caro enim adversatur spiritui ", quia filia concupiscentiae est, " et spiritus carni " , quia filius animae est.
III. 175. Julian. Whether through sight or through touch or through hearing or through smell or through taste. Take away, then, the root of this malignant stock, and at once you contemplate yourself as spiritual. "For the root"—Scripture says—"of all evils is concupiscence" (See 1 Tim 6:10). You see by what spirit and on account of what teaching the Manichean attacks the concupiscence of the flesh, calling it the law of sin, which, if it were taken away from bodies, his daughter, to whom he writes, would see herself made spiritual. By what sentences of the Apostle he strives to confirm this opinion, let us hear: "For the flesh is opposed to the spirit," because it is the daughter of concupiscence, "and the spirit to the flesh" (See Gal 5:17), because it is the son of the soul.
JulianImp.3.175Augustinus. Duas substantias in verbis Apostoli Manichaeus opinatur, unam bonam, alteram malam, non unam bonam substantiam et alteram bonae substantiae vitium ex primi hominis peccato generatione contractum, secundi hominis iustitia regeneratione sanandum, quod et contra Manichaeos et contra vos tamquam invictissimum telum catholica fides fortiter iacit et utrosque prosternit.
Augustine. The Manichean supposes two substances in the words of the Apostle, one good, the other evil—not one good substance and another a defect of a good substance, contracted by generation from the sin of the first man, to be healed by regeneration through the righteousness of the second man—which, both against the Manicheans and against you, the Catholic faith hurls as a most invincible weapon and lays both of you low.
JulianImp.3.175III. 176. Iulianus. Intellegis retectas esse Manichaei dogmatis medullas, quibus fides vestra concrescit. Iam vero nos id est catholicos pergit arguere: Quare vide, quam stulti sunt, qui dicunt hoc figmentum a Deo bono esse conditum, quod certi sunt ab spiritu concupiscentiae gigni.
III. 176. Julian. You understand that the marrow of the Manichean's teaching, with which your faith grows together, has been laid bare. And now he proceeds to accuse us, that is, the Catholics: Therefore see how foolish are those who say that this fashioning was founded by the good God, which they are sure is begotten by the spirit of concupiscence.
JulianImp.3.176Augustinus. In hoc a Manichaeis simul arguimur et nos et vos, quoniam figmentum carnis a Deo bono utrique conditum dicimus, spiritum vero concupiscentiae Manichaei substantiam esse dicunt malam, non vitium substantiae bonae, quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, quod ad eos redarguendos dicimus nos et ad eos adiuvandos negatis vos. Nam quia concupiscentiam, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, etiam vobis resistentibus malum esse convincunt, si non est, ut putatis, bonae substantiae vitium, mala substantia deputabitur; quod est dogma Manichaeorum catholicae fidei vobis adiutoribus inimicum.
Augustine. In this we are accused by the Manicheans, both we and you alike, since we both say that the fashioning of the flesh was founded by the good God, but the Manicheans say that the spirit of concupiscence is an evil substance, not a defect of a good substance, by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit—which we say in order to refute them and which you deny in order to aid them. For because they convict, even with you resisting, that the concupiscence by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit is an evil, then, if it is not, as you suppose, a defect of a good substance, it will be reckoned an evil substance; which is the teaching of the Manicheans, hostile to the Catholic faith with you as their helpers.
JulianImp.3.176III. 177. Iulianus. Cum animo nolente coeunt et secretis pudoribus gerunt, quo tempore odio habent lucem, uti ne manifestentur opera eorum; cuius rei gratia ait Apostolus: " Non est volentis " , ut subaudiatur: hoc opus. Sive enim bonum geramus, non est carnis, quia " manifesta sunt opera carnis, quae sunt fornicatio " et cetera, sive malum geramus, non est animae, quia " fructus spiritus pax gaudium est " . Denique clamat et ad Romanos Apostolus: " Non bonum quod volo ago, sed malum operor quod exhorreo " . Videtis vocem animae contumacis contra concupiscentiam defendentem libertatem animae. Dolebat enim, quia peccatum id est diabolus operaretur in se omnem concupiscentiam. Legalis auctoritas indicat malum eius, cum omnes eius usus vituperat, quos caro miratur et laudat; omnis enim amaritudo concupiscentiae suavis est animae, per quam nutritur anima et ad vigorem accitur. Denique cohercentis se ab omni usu concupiscentiae animus vigilat, ditatur et cre scit, per usum autem concupiscentiae consuevit decrescere. Intellegisne vel sero deprehendisse nos, unde non solum saperes, sed etiam loquereris? Tanto enim magistrum tuum amore complecteris, ut non solum itineribus eius, sed etiam vestigiis insistas, quod tu omnibus scriptis asseris, sicut et illi, quos ad Marcellini nomen edidisti, libri et isti testantur, quos ad Valerium destinasti, istam videlicet concupiscentiam carnis, quam etiam pudendam vocas, per diabolum admixtam humanis esse corporibus.
III. 177. Julian. They come together with the mind unwilling and act in secret shames, at which time they hate the light, that their works may not be made manifest; for which reason the Apostle says: "It is not of one who wills" (See Rom 9:16), so that it may be understood: this work. For whether we do good, it is not of the flesh, because "the works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication" (See Gal 5:19) and the rest; or whether we do evil, it is not of the soul, because "the fruit of the spirit is peace, joy" (See Gal 5:22). Finally the Apostle cries out also to the Romans: "I do not the good that I will, but I work the evil that I abhor" (See Rom 7:15, 19). You see the voice of the rebellious soul defending the liberty of the soul against concupiscence. For it grieved that sin, that is, the devil, was working in it all concupiscence. The authority of the law indicates its evil, when it censures all its uses, which the flesh admires and praises; for all the bitterness of concupiscence is sweet to the soul, by which the soul is nourished and roused to vigor. Finally, the mind that restrains itself from all use of concupiscence keeps vigil, grows rich, and increases, but by the use of concupiscence it is accustomed to decrease. Do you understand that we have caught you out at last as to whence you not only get your wisdom but even your words? For you embrace your master with so great a love that you stand not only in his paths but even in his footprints—as you assert in all your writings, just as both those books which you published addressed to the name of Marcellinus and these which you have destined for Valerius bear witness: namely, that this concupiscence of the flesh, which you also call shameful, was mingled by the devil into human bodies.
JulianImp.3.177Augustinus. Tu enim qua impudentia pudendam negas, contra quam nunc, quandoquidem illam libenter laudas, miror si fideliter dimicas? Quando autem miscebaris uxori, quamvis nihil timendo usui concessae voluptatis inhiabas, secretum tamen erubescendo quaerebas. Proinde ista tua suscepta, si hominum in paradiso felicitas permaneret, aut nulla ibi esset aut nullos suos motus contra nutum voluntatis exsereret, quibus necesse esset obsistere, ut illi felicitati honestas congrua redderetur. Sed quoniam in eius laudibus eo usque progressus es, ut libidinem, qualem nunc esse sentimus, talem in paradiso futuram fuisse contendas sibi reluctantium sollicitantem corda castorum, quis non videat, quod non sapientia, non eloquentia, sed impudentia mihi resistis, quia tu victum confiteri perverso pudore prohiberis? Nos ergo carnis concupiscentiam nec substantiam naturae malae esse dicimus, quod dicunt Manichaei, nec omnis eius usus reprobatur a nobis sicut a Manichaeis; nec eam rursus bonam dicimus, quod dicunt Pelagiani, nec eius contra spiritum motus laudatur a nobis sicut a Pelagianis, sed dicimus eam vitium esse substantiae bonae, quod in nostram naturam per praevaricationem primi hominis versum est, quod dicunt catholici Christiani; eiusque mali usus licitus et honestus liberorum procreandorum causa approbatur a nobis sicut a catholicis Christianis. Ita et Manichaeos et Pelagianos superamus atque vitamus, quorum sic errores utrorumque diversi sunt, ut, qui videtur minor, ipse illius, qui videtur maior, demonstretur adiutor. Quod enim malum esse satis evidenter apparet, dum Pelagiani negant esse vitium bonae substantiae, Manichaeos adiuvant, qui vitium ipsum malam dicunt esse substantiam boni Dei substantiae coaeternam.
Augustine. For with what shamelessness do you deny it shameful, against which—seeing that you gladly praise it—I wonder whether you fight faithfully? But when you used to lie with your wife, although, fearing nothing, you panted for the use of the pleasure granted you, you nonetheless, blushing, sought secrecy. Accordingly this thing you have taken up to defend, if the happiness of human beings in paradise had remained, would either be none at all there, or would exert no movements of its own against the bidding of the will, against which it would be necessary to resist, so that an honor fitting to that happiness might be rendered to it. But since you have advanced so far in its praises that you contend that disordered desire, such as we now perceive it to be, was going to be such in paradise, soliciting the hearts of the chaste who resist it, who does not see that it is not by wisdom, not by eloquence, but by shamelessness that you resist me, because by a perverse modesty you are prevented from confessing yourself defeated? We, then, say that the concupiscence of the flesh is neither a substance of an evil nature, which the Manicheans say, nor is its every use condemned by us as by the Manicheans; nor, on the other hand, do we call it good, which the Pelagians say, nor is its movement against the spirit praised by us as by the Pelagians; but we say that it is a defect of a good substance, which was turned into our nature through the transgression of the first man—which the Catholic Christians say; and the lawful and honorable use of this evil, for the sake of procreating children, is approved by us as by the Catholic Christians. Thus we overcome and avoid both the Manicheans and the Pelagians, whose errors are diverse from each other in such a way that the one who seems lesser is shown to be the helper of the one who seems greater. For what evidently enough appears to be evil, while the Pelagians deny it to be a defect of a good substance, they aid the Manicheans, who say that this defect is an evil substance coeternal with the substance of the good God.
JulianImp.3.177III. 178. Iulianus. Hanc esse peccati filiam et aliorum peccatorum matrem atque de ea conqueri apostolum Paulum, cum dicit: Scio, quia non habitat in carne mea bonum ; et: Non quod volo bonum hoc ago, sed quod odio illud facio , quod semper a catholicis ita expositum est, ut non ad naturae infamiam, sed ad consuetudinis referretur invidiam.
III. 178. Julian. That this is the daughter of sin and the mother of other sins, and that the Apostle Paul complains of it, when he says, I know that good does not dwell in my flesh (See Rom 7:18); and: I do not the good I will, but I do the evil I hate (See Rom 7:19)—which has always been so expounded by the Catholics that it referred not to the disgrace of nature, but to the odium of habit.
JulianImp.3.178Augustinus. Ita vero catholicus tu es et Ambrosius catholicus non est? Non usque adeo evanuerunt homines vestrae contagio vanitatis, quoscumque decipere potuistis, ut hoc audeant in animum inducere. Proinde paulisper attende; discordiam carnis et spiritus, de qua scriptum est: Scio, quia non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea bonum; velle enim adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non , et cetera huiusmodi atque illud multo manifestius: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, spiritus autem adversus carnem; haec enim invicem adversantur, ut non ea quae vultis faciatis , esse in hominibus nec nos dubitamus nec vos nec Manichaei; sed unde sit in homine uno ista discordia, inde dissensio est et tres proferuntur in hac dissensione sententiae, una nostra, vestra altera, tertia Manichaeorum. Sed ne arroganter vel fallaciter vobis dicere videamur nostram esse catholicam, ille eam proferat, cuius fidem et purissimum in Scripturis sensum, sicut eum praedicat vester ipse Pelagius, ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere . Dicit ergo Ambrosius hanc discordiam carnis et spiritus per praevaricationem primi hominis nostrae accidisse naturae ; vos autem dicitis ex vi consuetudinis; Manichaei dicunt ex commixtione duarum naturarum coaeternarum, boni scilicet et mali. Poteram iam dicere, ut eligat horum trium quod voluerit, qui vult catholicus permanere; neque enim timere debeo, ne Manichaeos quisque fugiens vos praeponat Ambrosio. Sed vestram sententiam, qua dicitis hoc malum vi consuetudinis inolescere, esse vanissimam iudicat, qui videt sine hoc malo neminem nasci. Mox enim, ut quisque ratione uti coeperit, si concupiverit castitatem, concupiscentiam carnis, quae fuerat aetate sopita, velut evigilantem repugnantemque iam sentit et aut victus abstrahitur aut, ne in eius labatur assensum, adversus eam, si pius est, Domino adiuvante confligit. Quod si non vultis accipere, quid in me saevitis? Manichaeos Ambrosiumque committite atque in spectaculo huius certaminis, si catholici estis, cui parti faveatis, eligite. Puto, quod a vobis victor Ambrosius iudicatur; sed quia catholici non estis, etiam sic securi spectamus; et vos enim et Manichaeos sine dubio vincit Ambrosius.
Augustine. So you are a Catholic, and Ambrose is not a Catholic? Human beings, whomever you have been able to deceive, have not so far vanished away by the contagion of your vanity that they would dare to take this into their minds. Accordingly, attend a little. The discord of flesh and spirit, of which it is written, I know that good does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh; for to will is present to me, but to accomplish the good is not (Rom 7:18), and the rest of this kind, and that much more manifest one, The flesh has desires opposed to the spirit, and the spirit opposed to the flesh; for these are opposed to one another, so that you do not do the things you want (Gal 5:17)—that this is in human beings neither we doubt, nor you, nor the Manicheans; but whence this discord is in one human being, thence comes the disagreement, and three opinions are put forth in this disagreement: one ours, the second yours, the third the Manicheans'. But lest we seem to say arrogantly or deceitfully that ours is the Catholic one, let him put it forth whose faith and most pure sense in the Scriptures even an enemy did not dare to censure—as your own Pelagius proclaims of him. Ambrose, then, says that this discord of flesh and spirit befell our nature through the transgression of the first man; but you say it is from the force of habit; the Manicheans say it is from the mingling of two coeternal natures, namely, of good and of evil. I could already say, let him who wishes to remain a Catholic choose which of these three he wishes; for I need not fear that anyone fleeing the Manicheans would prefer you to Ambrose. But your opinion, by which you say that this evil grows up by the force of habit, he judges most empty who sees that no one is born without this evil. For as soon as anyone begins to use reason, if he desires chastity, he now perceives the concupiscence of the flesh—which had been lulled to sleep by age—as if waking and resisting; and either, conquered, he is dragged off, or, lest he slip into consenting to it, he, if he is devout, fights against it with the Lord's help. But if you are unwilling to accept this, why do you rage against me? Pit the Manicheans and Ambrose against each other, and in the spectacle of this contest choose, if you are Catholics, which side you favor. I think that Ambrose is judged the victor by you; but because you are not Catholics, even so we look on secure; for without doubt Ambrose conquers both you and the Manicheans.
JulianImp.3.178III. 179. Iulianus. Tu tamen argumentando et testimonia Scripturarum usurpando de hac illum concupiscentia, quam legem peccati vocas, et omnes sanctos tam pollutos quam conquestos fuisse confirmas.
III. 179. Julian. You, however, by arguing and by usurping the testimonies of the Scriptures, affirm that all the saints were as defiled by this concupiscence, which you call the law of sin, as they complained of it.
JulianImp.3.179Augustinus. Non polluuntur hoc malo sancti, quos constat esse vel fuisse fortissimos huius mali debellatores; sed ne isto malo inexpiabiliter polluantur, timeant potius eius impudentissimi laudatores.
Augustine. The saints are not defiled by this evil, who are known to be or to have been the strongest vanquishers of this evil; but lest they be inexpiably defiled by this evil, let its most shameless praisers rather be afraid.
JulianImp.3.179III. 180. Iulianus. Quid Manichaeus dicit? Per concupiscentiam corporum auctor diabolus est; per hanc diabolus corpora, non animas aucupatur; tolle - inquit - malignae stirpis radicem et spiritalis fies; de hac Apostolus clamat ad Romanos: " Non bonum quod volo, sed malum operor quod exhorreo " . Nos etiam stultos vocat, qui dicamus figmentum hoc corporis ad Deum pertinere, quod per con cupiscentiam generatum esse fateamur. Vides ergo, quanta tibi sit et Manichaeo in nostri impugnatione concordia; eius dimicas verbis, eius niteris argumentis et nos mentiri dicis, qui te discipulum illius non solum fuisse, ut ipse scribis, sed etiam esse dicamus. Et in hoc tamen ille prudentior, qui, cum hanc concupiscentiam carnis a diabolo credidisset immissam, collegit confitendum esse ad Dei operam non pertinere, quidquid de diabolica concupiscentia appareret prolatum.
III. 180. Julian. What does the Manichean say? Through concupiscence the devil is the author of bodies; through this the devil hunts bodies, not souls; take away—he says—the root of the malignant stock, and you become spiritual; of this the Apostle cries out to the Romans: "I do not the good I will, but I work the evil I abhor" (See Rom 7:19). He also calls us fools, who say that this fashioning of the body pertains to God, while we confess that it was generated through concupiscence. You see, then, how great a concord there is between you and the Manichean in attacking us; you fight with his words, you rely on his arguments, and you say that we lie, who say that you not only were, as you yourself write, but even are his disciple. And yet in this he is the more prudent, who, since he had believed that this concupiscence of the flesh was sent in by the devil, gathered that one must confess that whatever appeared to be brought forth from a diabolical concupiscence does not pertain to the work of God.
JulianImp.3.180Augustinus. Contra hoc totum valet superior nostra responsio et cum hac aliae superiores, quas legat qui volet.
Augustine. Against all this our earlier answer holds good, and along with it the others above, which whoever wishes may read.
JulianImp.3.180III. 181. Iulianus. Tu autem hebetior, qui fructum concupiscentiae diabolicae hominem dicens, Dei tamen eum ascribis operibus, non quasi de malo bonum factum, sed malum et de mala radice prolatum, habere tamen auctorem bonum, quem fructum radicis suae diabolus sibi vindicet.
III. 181. Julian. But you are duller, who, saying that man is the fruit of diabolical concupiscence, nonetheless ascribe him to the works of God—not as though good were made from evil, but evil, and brought forth from an evil root, yet having a good author, which fruit of his own root the devil claims for himself.
JulianImp.3.181Augustinus. Bonum aliquod est homo, etiam quisquis maioris aetatis est malus homo. Non enim, quod malus homo est, aufert ei, quod bonum aliquod est, quia homo est, cuius naturae id est boni huius auctor est Deus, quaecumque mala vel originis attrahat vel voluntatis adiciat; non enim substantiae naturaeque sunt vitia, ab eo salvatore sananda, quo creatore condita est isdem vitiis vitiata natura. Hoc est, quod et Manichaeos evertit et vos, qui non mecum, sed cum Ambrosio certatis, quem Manichaeis in hoc certamine opposui, in quo et ipsos vincit et vos.
Augustine. Man is some good, even any man who, at a greater age, is an evil man. For the fact that he is an evil man does not take from him the fact that he is some good, because he is a man, of which nature—that is, of this good—God is the author, whatever evils he may either draw from his origin or add from his will; for the defects are not of the substance and nature, to be healed by that Savior by whose work as creator the nature was founded which was corrupted by those same defects. This is what overthrows both the Manicheans and you, who contend not with me but with Ambrose, whom I have set against the Manicheans in this contest, in which he conquers both them and you.
JulianImp.3.181III. 182. Iulianus. Tuis enim sermonibus omnes de concupiscentia natos diabolus quasi suae arboris fructus iure decerpit ; aeque igitur blasphemas ut Manichaeus, qui concupiscentiam carnis a Deo conditam vindicemus.
III. 182. Julian. For by your discourses the devil rightly plucks all who are born of concupiscence as though they were the fruits of his own tree; and so you blaspheme equally with the Manichean, we who vindicate the concupiscence of the flesh as founded by God.
JulianImp.3.182Augustinus. Si ad causam venire voluisses, cur baptizandi et exsufflentur et exorcismo mundentur infantes, ibi apertissime non solum eruditis, verum etiam idiotis Christianis catholicis novus haereticus appareres. Sed quia id ex libro meo tibi quidem proposuisti quasi refellendum, sed pertractare ita timuisti, ut fallaci loquacitate vitares et multa dicendo, quid tacueris, operires, Apostolum tibi replico, velis nolis, et inculco dicentem de Deo Patre: Qui eruit nos de potestate tenebrarum et transtulit in regnum filii caritatis suae . Hinc parvulos, si potestis, excipite et audete dicere eos in regnum quidem Christi regeneratione transferri, sed de tenebrarum potestate non erui. Verumtamen parate vos in facies vestras easdem exsufflationes dignissime excipere, quae in Ecclesia Christi et maioribus adhibentur et parvulis; talibus quippe exsufflationibus exsufflandi estis, qualibus apertissime verum esse ostenditur, quod negatis.
Augustine. If you had been willing to come to the case—why infants to be baptized are both exsufflated and cleansed by exorcism—there you would appear most plainly, not only to learned Catholic Christians but even to unlearned ones, a new heretic. But because you set this out to yourself from my book as though to be refuted, yet were so afraid to treat it that you avoided it with deceitful loquacity, and by saying many things covered over what you were silent about, I repeat to you the Apostle, like it or not, and drive him home, saying of God the Father, Who has rescued us from the power of darkness and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love (Col 1:13). From here make an exception of the little ones, if you can, and dare to say that they are indeed transferred into the kingdom of Christ by regeneration, but not rescued from the power of darkness. Yet prepare yourselves to receive most worthily upon your faces those same exsufflations which in the Church of Christ are applied both to the older ones and to the little ones; for you must be exsufflated by such exsufflations, by which it is most plainly shown to be true what you deny.
JulianImp.3.182III. 183. Iulianus. Iam vero illud tuum, quod priore opere ventilavi, ubi dicis: Aliquando non facit libido animo volente, cum aliquando faciat et nolente , atque hanc eius superbiam, qua nolente animo commovetur, accusas, Manichaei non solum sensibus, sed etiam eloquiis explicatum est. Nam cum nos arguisset, quia diceremus a Deo fieri homines, quos seminari fateremur per coeuntium voluptatem: Stulti - inquit - dicunt a Deo esse conditum, quod certi sunt a concupiscentia gigni, cum animo nolente coeunt.
III. 183. Julian. But now that statement of yours, which I sifted in my earlier work, where you say, Sometimes disordered desire does not act when the mind wills, while sometimes it acts even when the mind is unwilling, and you accuse this pride of it, by which it is moved when the mind is unwilling—this was set forth by the Manichean not only in his meanings but even in his words. For when he had accused us, because we said that human beings are made by God whom we confessed are sown through the pleasure of those coming together: Fools—he says—say that what they are sure is begotten by concupiscence was founded by God, when they come together with the mind unwilling.
JulianImp.3.183Augustinus. Sed Manichaeus non intellegit etiam de hominis malo posse Deum creare, quod bonum est, et hominem ipsum malo bene uti per pudicitiam coniugalem, cui malo reluctatur illicienti ad damnabilem turpitudinem. Sed tu, qui hoc, quod malum est, malum esse negas, cur ei repugnas, ne turpiter vivas, et cur ei si consentias, necesse est ut turpiter vivas?
Augustine. But the Manichean does not understand that even from the evil of a human being God can create what is good, and that the human being himself can use the evil well through conjugal modesty, an evil which entices him resisting to a damnable shamefulness. But you, who deny that this evil is an evil, why do you fight against it, lest you live shamefully, and why, if you consent to it, is it necessary that you live shamefully?
JulianImp.3.183III. 184. Iulianus. Quod vero tu posuisti: Concupiscentiae malum est, quod vitat ubique conspectum et quaerit pudendo secretum ; ita et Manichaeus: Secretis - inquit - pudoribus agunt, quo tempore odio habent lucem, uti ne manifestentur opera eorum.
III. 184. Julian. But what you set down: It is the evil of concupiscence that everywhere avoids the gaze and seeks shameful secrecy; so too the Manichean: In secret shames they act—he says—at which time they hate the light, that their works may not be made manifest.
JulianImp.3.184Augustinus. Sicut Manichaeus nescit, quid boni agatur per carnalis concupiscentiae malum, sic et tu nescis, cui malo pudor quaerat secretum etiam in bono opere nuptiarum.
Augustine. Just as the Manichean does not know what good is done through the evil of carnal concupiscence, so you too do not know for what evil shame seeks secrecy even in the good work of marriage.
JulianImp.3.184III. 185. Iulianus. Quod vero ais: Quia concupiscentia qui licite commiscetur, malo bene utitur , ut magis credi Apostolo commemores, qui dixisset quia non habitat in carne sua bonum, et hoc non bonum, id est malum in carne Apostoli habitans, vis concupiscentiam carnis videri , Manichaeus non aliter quam tu posuit. Nam postquam dixit: Ne manifestentur opera eorum; propter quod Apostolus - inquit - clamat ad Romanos: " Non bonum quod volo ago, sed malum operor quod exhorreo " . Dolebat enim - inquit - quia peccatum id est diabolus operabatur in eo omnem concupiscentiam, legalis auctoritas indicat malum concupiscentiae, cum omnem eius usum vituperat, quem caro miratur et laudat.
III. 185. Julian. But what you say: Because whoever lawfully comes together with concupiscence uses an evil well, so that you recall the more that the Apostle is to be believed, who said that good did not dwell in his flesh, and you want this "not good," that is, this evil dwelling in the flesh of the Apostle, to be seen as the concupiscence of the flesh—the Manichean set it down in no other way than you. For after he said: That their works may not be made manifest; for which reason the Apostle—he says—cries out to the Romans: "I do not the good I will, but I work the evil I abhor" (See Rom 7:19). For he grieved—he says—that sin, that is, the devil, was working in him all concupiscence; the authority of the law indicates the evil of concupiscence, when it censures all its use, which the flesh admires and praises.
JulianImp.3.185Augustinus. Numquid Apostolus omnem concupiscentiae carnalis usum vituperat qui dicit: Et si acceperis uxorem, non peccasti et, si nupserit virgo, non peccat ? Ergo Manichaeus, quid loquatur, ignorat. Sed nec tu, quid loquaris, intellegis, qui putas aliud significasse Apostolum quam carnis concupiscentiam, de qua alius Apostolus, quod non sit a Patre, sed ex mundo sit, dicit; qua ut caro concupiscat adversus spiritum, ex primi hominis praevaricatione descendere catholicus doctus et doctor et didicit in Catholica et docuit .
Augustine. Does the Apostle censure all use of carnal concupiscence, he who says, And if you take a wife, you have not sinned, and if a virgin marries, she does not sin (1 Cor 7:28)? Therefore the Manichean does not know what he is saying. But neither do you understand what you are saying, you who think the Apostle signified something other than the concupiscence of the flesh, of which another Apostle says that it is not from the Father but from the world (See 1 John 2:16); and that this descends, so that the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit, from the transgression of the first man, a learned and teaching Catholic both learned in the Catholic Church and taught.
JulianImp.3.185III. 186. Iulianus. Quod autem multum ad distinctionem inter te et Manichaeum tenendam valere exi stimasti, ut diceres bonam quidem, sed primorum hominum tantum factam naturam, omnem autem deinceps per concupiscentiam fuisse subversam, etiam Manichaeus ita disseruit: Operae - inquit - pretium est advertere, quia prima anima, quae a Deo luminis manavit, accepit fabricam istam corporis, ut eam freno suo regeret. Venit mandatum, peccatum revixit, quod videbatur captivum, invenit articulos suos diabolus, materiam concupiscentiae in eam seduxit et per illam occidit. Lex quidem sancta, sed sancta sanctae, et mandatum et iustum et bonum, sed iustae et bonae. Sic etiam in illa ad Patricium epistula: Quasi de primae factum flore substantiae meliorem - dicit - secutis. Non ergo magnum est nec aliquid ad defensionem tui promovet, quod a criminatione naturae humanae Adam sequestrandum putasti, super cuius statu mox plenius disseremus. Hic monstrasse sufficiat nihil ita rude in tuis sensibus inveniri, ut non sit iam Manichaei volutatione detritum.
III. 186. Julian. But what you thought availed much to hold the distinction between you and the Manichean—that you said nature was indeed made good, but made so only in the first human beings, while afterward the whole was overthrown through concupiscence—even the Manichean disputed thus: It is worthwhile—he says—to note that the first soul, which flowed from the God of light, received this fabric of the body to rule it with its own rein. The commandment came, sin revived; what had seemed captive, the devil found its joints, seduced into it the matter of concupiscence, and through it killed it. The law indeed is holy, but holy for the holy; and the commandment both just and good, but for the just and the good (See Rom 7:9-12). So too in that letter to Patricius: As though made from the flower of the first substance—he says—better than those that followed. It is therefore no great matter, nor does it advance anything for your defense, that you thought Adam should be set apart from the disparagement of human nature—concerning whose state we shall presently dispute more fully. Here let it suffice to have shown that nothing so crude is found in your views that it has not already been worn smooth by the Manichean's rolling of it.
JulianImp.3.186Augustinus. Manichaeus ex commixtione duarum naturarum coaeternarum, boni scilicet et mali, non solum hominem, sed universum mundum constare dicit et ad eum omnia pertinentia ita sane, ut ipsam fabricam mundi, quamvis ex commixtione boni et mali, Deo bono artifici tribuat, animalia vero et cuncta, quae nascuntur e terra, et ipsum hominem opera esse dicat malignae mentis, quam genti attribuit tenebrarum . Hinc est, quod " animam primam " dicit " a Deo lucis manasse et accepisse istam fabricam corporis, ut eam freno suo regeret ". Non enim hoc de homine, sed de anima bona dicit, quam Dei partem atque naturam universo mundo et omnibus, quae in eo sunt, opinatur esse permixtam, in homine autem per concupiscentiam decipi. Quam concupiscentiam, quod saepe inculcandum est, non vitium substantiae bonae, sed malam vult esse substantiam. Mala non vacuum fuisse dicit Adam, se eius minus habuisse multoque plus lucis. Videsne huic dementiae, quae Dei naturam corruptibilem dicit eamque malae naturae commixtione corrumpit, quantum fides catholica adversa sit, quae omnia mala generis humani, quorum non parvam partem parvulos etiam cernimus perpeti, et ipsam concupiscentiam, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, quibus malis omnibus paradisus a vobis, sed vester impletur, non dicit esse nisi ex natura bona et a Deo bono bene instituta, sed propria voluntate et primi hominis praevaricatione vitiata? Quod vos negantes quid agitis, nisi ut haec omnia mala, quae de peccato naturae bonae in parvulos venire non vultis, commixtioni malae naturae tribuantur, quam Manichaeorum furiosus error inducit? Videtis igitur, etsi videre nolitis, insanos et perditos Manichaeos, ne vobis adiuvantibus vincant, vobiscum esse vincendos, immo adiuvante Domino vobiscum esse iam victos.
Augustine. The Manichean says that not only man but the whole world consists of the mingling of two coeternal natures, namely, of good and of evil, and everything pertaining to it—in such a way, indeed, that he attributes the very fabric of the world, though from the mingling of good and evil, to the good God as craftsman, but says that the animals and all things born from the earth, and man himself, are the works of a malignant mind, which he attributes to the race of darkness. Hence it is that he says the first soul "flowed from the God of light and received this fabric of the body to rule it with its own rein." For he says this not of man but of the good soul, which he supposes to be a part and nature of God mingled into the whole world and all things that are in it, but in man to be deceived through concupiscence. This concupiscence—which must often be driven home—he wants to be not a defect of a good substance, but an evil substance. He says that Adam was not empty of evil, but had less of it and much more of light. Do you see how opposed the Catholic faith is to this madness, which says that the nature of God is corruptible and corrupts it by mingling with an evil nature—the Catholic faith, which says that all the evils of the human race (no small part of which we see even the little ones suffering), and concupiscence itself, by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit—all of which evils your paradise, but yours, is filled with—are not except from a good nature, well established by the good God, but corrupted by its own will and the transgression of the first man? And in denying this, what do you do but cause all these evils—which you do not want to come into the little ones from the sin of the good nature—to be attributed to the mingling of the evil nature which the furious error of the Manicheans introduces? You see, then, even if you do not wish to see, that the insane and lost Manicheans, lest they conquer with you aiding them, are to be conquered together with you—nay, with the Lord's help, are already conquered together with you.
JulianImp.3.186III. 187. Iulianus. Persistit sane invehi in nos et adiungit: Hi autem, qui concupiscentiam istam contra evangelicos et apostolicos libros, quos vacuo lectitant, bonum ausi sunt dicere, videas - inquit - sanctos eorum nunc cum filiabus dormisse, nunc cum pluribus et concubinis et uxoribus miscuisse negotium, nec hoc Apostoli vident: " Quae societas luci et tenebris, fideli et infideli, Christo et Belial? " . Errant glomerati nubilo concupiscentiae, cuius veneno ita fruuntur, ut amentia capti, cum hoc gerunt, a Deo id concessum putent, quasi ignorent Apostolum dixisse: " Quae geruntur ab eis in tenebris, turpe est etiam dicere " . Vides nempe, quomodo negotium vexat pudoris atque id contra nos valere plurimum putat, qui non malum dicere audeamus, quod velandum tamen pudore fateamur. Nullum vestimentum igitur texuisti, quo deformitatem tui dogmatis operires, praeter pannos, quibus in parentis tui et magistri haereditate crevisti. Persistit igitur erigi in nos faciensque apostrophen: Age tu - inquit - defensor concupiscentiae, aperto sermone narra fructus et opera eius. Ecce ego contra eam non timeo lucem, quam illa trepidat, quam illa odit. " Omnis enim, qui male agit, odit lucem et non venit ad lucem, ne manifestentur opera eius " . Videsne concupiscentiam mali esse originem, per quam miserae animae libidini serviunt, non sponte, quia hoc est, quod nolente animo gerimus solum ? Hinc est, quod et tu: Nam quid est - inquis - quod labia, lingua, manus, inflexiones dorsi, cervicis et laterum ut ad opera congrua moveantur, positum in potestate est, cum vero ventum fuerit, ut filii seminentur, membra in hoc opus creata non serviunt, sed exspectatur, ut ea velut sui iuris libido commoveat et aliquando non faciat animo volente, cum aliquando faciat et nolente? Enumerasti tu nempe omnia officia membrorum eaque commendans servire voluntatis imperio libidinis negotium dicis, quod hoc solum animo nolente faciamus. Quid Manichaeus? Videsne - inquit - concupiscentiam mali esse originem, per quam miserae animae libidini serviunt, non sponte, quia hoc est, quod nolente animo gerimus solum? Sed videamus, quid aliud adiungat: Denique omne peccatum extra corpus est, quia actuale est; qui autem fornicatur, in corpus suum peccat ; omne enim peccatum, antequam fiat, non est et post factum memoria sola eius operis, non ipsa species manet. Malum autem concupiscentiae, quia naturale est, antequam fiat, est, cum fit, augetur, post factum et videtur et permanet. Quid igitur nobiscum iurgas, quia te Manichaeum vocemus, cum nec in illius scriptis aliud, quam quod tu dicis, nec in tuis aliud, quam quod ille vult persuadere, teneatur? Iam vero illud, quod per plebeia, a vobis tamen infusum, ora discurrit, in eadem Manichaei epistula continetur, id est: Si peccatum naturale non est, quare baptizantur infantes, quos nihil per se mali egisse constat? Ideo autem dixi illud per multorum volitare linguas, quia vulgarius argumentum etiam a tardis quibusque comprehensum est. Ceterum tu in libris tuis in eo spem totam reponis; et hoc ergo ipsum hoc modo tuus praeceptor exsequitur: Qui his verbis mihi interrogandi sunt: Si omne malum actuale est, antequam malum quispiam agat, quare accipit purificationem aquae, cum nullum malum egerit per se? Aut si necdum egit et purificandus est, licet eos naturaliter malae stirpis pullulationem ostendere, illos ipsos, quos amentia non sinit intellegere, neque quae dicunt neque de quibus affirmant. Audis, quomodo convitiatur nobis? Amentes vocat nec intellegentes, vel quae dicamus vel quae affirmemus, qui malae stirpis pullulationem negemus, cum baptizemus etiam eos purificante aqua, qui malum nullum egerint, id est parvulos. Posita sunt nempe de eius multa sententiis; sed nisi Menoch filiam et Manichaeum, qui se Christi Apostolum nominat, titulus indicaret, te omnino suum pollicerentur auctorem . Cum ergo nihil aliud dicas quam quod Mani docente didicisti, putas te in aestimatione Catholicorum aliter habendum quam illum, per quem talium dogmatum sacramenta potasti?
III. 187. Julian. He persists, indeed, in inveighing against us and adds: But these, who against the evangelical and apostolic books, which they read in vain, have dared to call this concupiscence a good—you may see—he says—that their saints sometimes slept with their daughters, sometimes did business mingling with many concubines and wives, nor do they see this of the Apostle: "What fellowship has light with darkness, the faithful with the unfaithful, Christ with Belial (See 2 Cor 6:14-15)?" They wander, massed in the cloud of concupiscence, whose poison they so enjoy that, seized with madness, when they do this, they suppose it granted by God, as if they did not know that the Apostle said: "What is done by them in darkness is shameful even to speak of" (See Eph 5:12). You see, surely, how he troubles the business of shame and thinks it avails very much against us, who do not dare to call evil what we nonetheless confess must be veiled by shame. You have therefore woven no garment with which to cover the deformity of your teaching, except the rags in which you grew up, in the inheritance of your parent and master. He persists, then, in raising himself up against us, and, making an apostrophe: Come now, you—he says—defender of concupiscence, narrate openly its fruits and works. Behold, against it I do not fear the light, which it dreads, which it hates. "For everyone who does evil hates the light and does not come to the light, that his works may not be made manifest" (John 3:20). Do you see that concupiscence is the origin of evil, through which wretched souls serve disordered desire, not of their own accord, since this is the only thing we do with the mind unwilling? Hence it is that you too: For what is it—you say—that the lips, the tongue, the hands, the bendings of the back, the neck, and the sides are placed in our power to be moved to their proper works, but when it comes to the sowing of children, the members created for this work do not serve, but it is waited for that disordered desire, as though of its own right, should move them, and sometimes it does not act when the mind wills, while sometimes it acts even when the mind is unwilling? You enumerated, surely, all the offices of the members, and, commending them as serving the command of the will, you call the business of disordered desire that which alone we do with the mind unwilling. What does the Manichean say? Do you see—he says—that concupiscence is the origin of evil, through which wretched souls serve disordered desire, not of their own accord, since this is the only thing we do with the mind unwilling? But let us see what else he adds: Finally, every sin is outside the body, because it is actual; but he who fornicates sins against his own body (See 1 Cor 6:18); for every sin, before it is done, is not, and after it is done only the memory of that work, not the appearance itself, remains. But the evil of concupiscence, because it is natural, is before it is done, when it is done is increased, and after it is done both is seen and remains. Why, then, do you quarrel with us, because we call you a Manichean, when neither in his writings is anything held other than what you say, nor in yours anything other than what he wishes to persuade? But now that which runs about through the common mouths, instilled nonetheless by you—that is, If sin is not natural, why are infants baptized, who it is established have done nothing evil of themselves?—is contained in that same letter of the Manichean. But I said that this flits about on the tongues of many, because it is a vulgar argument grasped even by the slowest. For the rest, in your books you place your whole hope in it; and this very thing, then, your preceptor pursues in this way: These are to be questioned by me in these words: If every evil is actual, before anyone does evil, why does he receive purification by water, since he has done no evil of himself? Or if he has not yet done it and is to be purified, they may indeed show a sprouting of an evil stock naturally—those very people whom madness does not allow to understand either what they say or about what they affirm. You hear how he reviles us? He calls us mad and not understanding either what we say or what we affirm, who deny the sprouting of an evil stock, since we baptize even those, with the water purifying, who have done no evil—that is, the little ones. Many things are set down from his opinions; but unless the title indicated his daughter Menoch and the Manichean who calls himself an apostle of Christ, they would promise you outright as their author. Since, then, you say nothing other than what you learned with Mani teaching, do you suppose that, in the estimation of the Catholics, you are to be held otherwise than he, through whom you drank the sacraments of such teachings?
JulianImp.3.187Augustinus. Finisti tandem, quae de Manichaei epistula, quam tui collegae Flori orationibus adiutus te invenisse laetaris, contra nos putasti esse dicenda, ubi certe Manichaeus concupiscentiam carnis accusat, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, hanc autem Catholicis obiciendam sic arbitratur, tamquam eam bonam esse dicant, quia nuptiarum bonum doctrinae dominicae atque apostolicae sanitate commendant. Quando enim posset Manichaeus malum concupiscentiae carnalis a bono discernere coniugali, cum ad Hebraeos epistula non nisi eorum dicat esse solidum cibum, qui exercitatos habent sensus ad separandum bonum a malo ? Sed plane tu in huius Manichaei morsum inevitabiliter incidisti, tantus laudator concupiscentiae carnis, ut eam, non qualis ibi esse potuisset, si esse debuisset, sed omnino, qualis nunc est, etiam in paradiso, id est in loco tam magnae beatitudinis, collocares, ut scilicet illius loci habitatores ita beata pace fruerentur, ut in se ipsis intestino bello, ne in consensus illius illiciti vel inhonesti concubitus laberentur, contra motus concupiscentiae dimicarent. Hoc malum in paradiso esse non posset nisi forte illo picto, de quo superius locuti sumus , qui haberet titulum suprascriptum: Paradisus Pelagianorum, ubi etsi ipsa concupiscentia occultis motibus casta corda sollicitans non posset ulla exprimi arte pictoris, pingi tamen possent gravidae feminae, cibos utiles fastidio repellentes, foeda delectatione noxios appetentes, nauseantes, vomentes, pallentes, immaturos fetus abortu aliquando fundentes, in ipso etiam partu poenam, quam mater Eva suscepit, sua miseria protestantes, etsi non sonante pictura, tamen facies tristium gementium plorantium sicut poterat, imitante, natosque ipsos omnes flentes communi sorte nascentium et diversarum varietate poenarum et multi postea etiam sub verberibus magistrorum. Hanc picturam nesciens quisquis aspiceret et titulum legeret causamque requireret, haec ei videlicet, sed a vobis, egregia ratio redderetur, qua diceretis: Talis esset omnino etiam ibi condicio generis humani, quia talis est hic, ubi similiter a fetibus hominum nulla trahitur origo peccati. Si acquiesceret, fieret Pelagianus; si vero irrisae huic insipientiae nollet acquiescere, argueretur a vobis ut Manichaeus. Sed huic contentioni, Dei sancte antistes Ambrosi, docte in Ecclesia et Doctor Ecclesiae , dic istis concupiscentiam, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et de qua Manichaeus nesciens, quid loquitur, tendit muscipulas imperitis, non ex alienae commixtione naturae, sicut ille desipit, sed naturae nostrae bonae a bono conditae ex prae varicatione primi hominis accidisse. Sed vos fortasse impudentissima pervicacia eligitis adiumenta praebere impurissimo Manichaeo quam sancto acquiescere Ambrosio. Agite, ut placet, sed non gaudebit vel vobis adiutoribus Manichaeus, quoniam catholica fide in Christi nomine atque virtute utrosque vincit Ambrosius. Si enim talis esset ista concupiscentia, quae carnali suo motu nec praecederet nec excederet hominis voluntatem, sed eius semper sequeretur arbitrium, profecto nec Manichaeus, quid in ea iuste reprehenderet, inveniret; nec eam quispiam nostrum in paradiso coniugatos habere non potuisse contenderet; nec Ambrosius de praevaricatione primi hominis eam traxisse nos diceret, quia concupiscere contra spiritum non videret. Nunc vero, quia talis est, ut contra spiritum concupiscat, etiamsi spiritu resistente non vincat, et ideo esse non posset pace illa magna in paradiso fruentium beatorum, nec fas est credere commixtione malae naturae corruptibilem Deum, restat, ut et vos et Manichaeos fides vincat Ambrosii de primi contagione peccati.
Augustine. You have at last finished what you thought should be said against us from the letter of the Manichean—which, aided by the prayers of your colleague Florus, you rejoice to have found—where indeed the Manichean accuses the concupiscence of the flesh, by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit, but supposes that it must be objected to the Catholics in such a way as though they said it is good, because they commend, with the soundness of the Lord's and the apostolic teaching, the good of marriage. For when could the Manichean discern the evil of carnal concupiscence from the good of marriage, when the Letter to the Hebrews says that solid food is only for those who have their senses exercised to separate good from evil (See Heb 5:14)? But plainly you have fallen inescapably into the bite of this Manichean—you, so great a praiser of the concupiscence of the flesh, that you would place it, not such as it could have been there, if it had been right for it to be, but altogether such as it now is, even in paradise, that is, in a place of so great blessedness, that its inhabitants would so enjoy a blessed peace that within themselves, by an internal war, they would fight against the movements of concupiscence lest they slip into consent to that unlawful or dishonorable lying together. This evil could not be in paradise, except perhaps in that painted one of which we spoke above, which would have the title inscribed above it: The Paradise of the Pelagians, where, even if concupiscence itself, soliciting chaste hearts with its hidden movements, could not be expressed by any art of the painter, there could nonetheless be painted pregnant women repelling useful foods with loathing, craving harmful ones with foul delight, nauseating, vomiting, growing pale, sometimes pouring forth immature offspring in miscarriage, even in childbirth itself protesting by their misery the punishment which mother Eve received, and—though by no sounding picture, yet by imitating, as it could, the faces of the sad, the groaning, the weeping—all the children themselves weeping by the common lot of those born, and by the variety of various punishments, and many afterward even under the beatings of teachers. Whoever, not knowing, looked at this picture and read the title and sought the cause, this excellent reasoning—but yours—would be rendered to him: in which you would say: Such would altogether be the condition of the human race even there, because such it is here, where likewise from the offspring of human beings no origin of sin is drawn. If he acquiesced, he would become a Pelagian; but if he were unwilling to acquiesce in this mocked folly, he would be accused by you as a Manichean. But to this contention, O holy bishop of God, Ambrose—learned in the Church and a Teacher of the Church—say to these people that the concupiscence by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit, and concerning which the Manichean, not knowing what he is saying, stretches out his mousetraps for the unskilled, befell not from the mingling of another nature, as he raves, but from the transgression of the first man, our good nature founded good by the good God. But you perhaps, with a most shameless obstinacy, choose to lend aids to the most impure Manichean rather than to acquiesce in the holy Ambrose. Do as you please; but the Manichean will not rejoice even with you as his helpers, since by the Catholic faith, in the name and power of Christ, Ambrose conquers both. For if this concupiscence were such that by its carnal movement it neither preceded nor exceeded the will of man, but always followed his choice, surely neither would the Manichean find what to censure justly in it, nor would any of us contend that the married could not have had it in paradise, nor would Ambrose say that we drew it from the transgression of the first man, because he would not see it have desires opposed to the spirit. But now, because it is such that it has desires opposed to the spirit, even if, with the spirit resisting, it does not conquer—and therefore could not be in that great peace of the blessed enjoying paradise, nor is it right to believe God corruptible by the mingling of an evil nature—it remains that the faith of Ambrose, concerning the contagion of the first sin, conquers both you and the Manicheans.
JulianImp.3.187III. 188. Iulianus. Superest, ut examinemus illam sententiam tuam, quam tu te ad unum sermonem revocare pollicitus breviter, ut non est negandum, et acutule collegisti: Natura humana, si malum esset, non esset generanda; si malum non haberet, non esset regeneranda; atque ut ad unum verbum utrumque concludam, natura humana, si malum esset, salvanda non esset, si ei mali nihil inesset, salvanda non esset . In hoc loco non es a nobis ingenii tui laude fraudandus; pro tua enim prorsus dici melius ratione non potuit, sed tamen rerum natura non sinit, ut promoveat quidquam exacta calliditas. Durum tibi est omnino contra stimulum calcitrare; quidquid enim compegeris, non minus quam glacies admotae veritatis igne dissolvitur. Denique nunc quid a nobis referatur, attende. Conclusisti hoc modo: Certe natura humana si malum esset, salvanda non esset. Assentimur, prorsus verum dixisti: Si malum esset, salvanda non esset, quia res mala et naturaliter mala nec mereretur nec caperet salutem. Cur non caperet? Quia aliud quam facta erat fieri non posset; non autem mereretur, quia nihil in ea erat, quod Dei dignaretur liberare clementia. Cum autem dicimus: si esset, quod certe esse non potest, non illi spem negati conciliamus effectus, sed ad destructionem alterius opinionis, quae incidit, de rebus impossibilibus dicere solemus. Si hoc vel illud verbi gratia esset, illud sine dubio sequeretur, ut, cum illud esse non potest, etiam hoc, propter cuius amolitionem illatum fuerat, multo magis negetur. Iam igitur frequenter ostendimus malum aliquid per naturam esse non posse, sed tamen nunc sine praeiudicio istius constituti sententiae tuae partem probamus, qua dixisti: Natura humana si malum esset, salvanda non esset. Salutem in baptismate collocasti et argumentatus es consequenter, quoniam, si verum dicerent Manichaei, qui malam dicunt naturam, desiperent Christiani, qui malae naturae remedium baptismatis crederent admovendum; et ideo, qui malam confirmat hominum naturam, gratiam negare compellitur, quod ita recurrit, ut, qui gratiam confirmat, hominum laudet naturam, cuius saluti eam intellegit fuisse provisam.
III. 188. Julian. It remains that we examine that statement of yours, which you, having promised to reduce it to a single sentence, gathered briefly—as is not to be denied—and rather cleverly: Human nature, if it were evil, would not be something to be generated; if it had no evil, it would not be something to be regenerated; and, to conclude both in a single word, human nature, if it were evil, would not be something to be saved; if there were no evil in it, it would not be something to be saved. In this place you are not to be defrauded by us of the praise of your wit; for it could not, in fact, have been said better according to your reasoning—but nonetheless the nature of things does not allow that exact cleverness should advance anything. It is hard for you altogether to kick against the goad; for whatever you assemble is dissolved no less than ice by the fire of truth applied to it. In short, attend now to what is brought forward by us. You concluded in this way: Surely human nature, if it were evil, would not be something to be saved. We assent; you said it altogether truly: If it were evil, it would not be something to be saved, because a thing evil and naturally evil would neither deserve nor receive salvation. Why would it not receive it? Because it could not be made other than it was made; but it would not deserve it, because there would be nothing in it that the clemency of God would deign to set free. But when we say, if it were, which surely it cannot be, we do not grant it hope of the denied effect, but, for the destruction of another opinion which arises, we are accustomed to speak about impossible things. If this or that, for example, were so, that without doubt would follow, so that, since that cannot be, this too, for the removing of which it had been brought in, is much more denied. Already, then, we have often shown that something cannot be evil by nature; but nonetheless now, without prejudice to this established point, we approve that part of your statement in which you said: Human nature, if it were evil, would not be something to be saved. You located salvation in baptism and argued consequently that, if the Manicheans, who say that nature is evil, spoke the truth, the Christians would be out of their senses who believed that the remedy of baptism must be applied to an evil nature; and therefore one who affirms that the nature of human beings is evil is compelled to deny grace—which recurs thus, that one who affirms grace praises the nature of human beings, for whose salvation he understands it to have been provided.
JulianImp.3.188Augustinus. Non est verum, quod dicis; fallis aut falleris. Non enim qui malam, sed qui malum confirmat hominum esse naturam, id est non, qui eam malam esse, sed qui eam malum esse confirmat, gratiam negare compellitur; nam ubi mala est, ibi magis indiget gratia. Mala est quippe natura malus homo, quoniam homo sine dubitatione natura est; sic mala natura est mala mulier, quoniam mulier utique natura est. Quomodo ergo, qui hoc dicit, gratiam negare compellitur, cum gratia naturis malis, id est hominibus malis, ut mali esse desinant, opituletur? Sed aliter dicimus: Malus est iste homo, aliter: Malum est iste homo; illud verum esse potest, hoc non potest. Sicut: Vitiosus est iste homo, si dicimus, verum esse potest; si autem dicimus: Vitium est iste homo, verum non potest esse. Proinde noli errare vel mittere homines in errorem et sic me dixisse intellege: Natura humana, si malum esset, non esset generanda; si malum non haberet, non esset regeneranda, ac si dixissem: Natura humana, si vitium esset, non esset generanda; si vitium non haberet, non esset regeneranda. Item quod sequitur, ubi me ad unum verbum dixi utrumque concludere, ita dixi: Natura humana, si malum esset, salvanda non esset; si ei mali nihil inesset, salvanda non esset, tamquam dicerem: Natura humana, si vitium esset, salvanda non esset; si ei vitii nihil inesset, salvanda non esset. Ecce feci verba mea planiora, non ut invenires, quod contra diceres, sed ut intellegereris non potuisse invenire, quod diceres.
Augustine. What you say is not true; you deceive or are deceived. For it is not one who affirms that the nature of human beings is evil, but one who affirms that it is an evil, that is, not one who affirms that it is evil, but one who affirms that it is an evil, that is compelled to deny grace; for where it is evil, there it the more needs grace. For an evil man is indeed an evil nature, since a man without doubt is a nature; so an evil woman is an evil nature, since a woman certainly is a nature. How, then, is one who says this compelled to deny grace, when grace brings help to evil natures, that is, to evil men, that they may cease to be evil? But we say one thing when we say, "That man is evil," another when we say, "That man is an evil"; the former can be true, the latter cannot. Just as if we say, "That man is defective," it can be true; but if we say, "That man is a defect," it cannot be true. Accordingly, do not err or send human beings into error, and understand me to have said it thus: Human nature, if it were evil, would not be something to be generated; if it had no evil, it would not be something to be regenerated, as if I had said: Human nature, if it were a defect, would not be something to be generated; if it had no defect, it would not be something to be regenerated. Likewise what follows, where I said I conclude both in a single word, I said thus: Human nature, if it were evil, would not be something to be saved; if there were no evil in it, it would not be something to be saved, as if I were saying: Human nature, if it were a defect, would not be something to be saved; if there were no defect in it, it would not be something to be saved. Behold, I have made my words plainer—not so that you might find what to say against them, but so that you might be understood to have been unable to find what to say.
JulianImp.3.188III. 189. Iulianus. Quid igitur hinc conficiatur, adverte; non adhaerere negationem gratiae laudi humanae naturae, quin immo haec quattuor ita esse coniuncta, ut alterum sine altero teneri nequeat, sed infamia naturae pariat negationem gratiae et laus gratiae pariat praedicationem naturae; ista enim in quamvis sibi partem reciprocari possunt. Bene ergo dixisti: Natura humana, si malum esset, salvanda non esset ; hoc enim dicunt utrumque Manichaei, malam videlicet carnis naturam nec posse salvari per gratiam nec debere.
III. 189. Julian. Mark, then, what is gathered from this: that the denial of grace does not cling to the praise of human nature; rather, that these four things are so joined that one cannot be held without the other—but the disgrace of nature begets the denial of grace, and the praise of grace begets the proclamation of nature; for these can be turned about in whichever direction you please. You said well, then: Human nature, if it were evil, would not be something to be saved; for the Manicheans say both of these, namely, that the nature of the flesh is evil and that it can neither be saved by grace nor ought to be.
JulianImp.3.189Augustinus. Sed illi sic dicunt malam carnis naturam, ut eam malum esse dicant, non malum habere, quia ipsum vitium non substantiae accidens, sed substantiam putant esse.
Augustine. But they say that the nature of the flesh is evil in such a way that they say it is an evil, not that it has an evil, because they suppose the defect itself to be not an accident of a substance, but a substance.
JulianImp.3.189III. 190. Iulianus. Sed post haec admoves sententiam tibi caram et dicis: Si autem naturae humanae mali nihil inesset, salvanda non esset. Qui ergo dicit eam bonum non esse, bonum negat conditae Creatorem; qui vero negat ei malum inesse, misericordem vitiatae invidet Salvatorem . Sit igitur lector intentus, videbit nihil te dixisse aliud, quam quod dicendum negaras; pronuntiasti enim ei rei malum inesse naturaliter, quam dixeras malam non esse naturaliter.
III. 190. Julian. But after this you bring in a sentence dear to you and say: But if there were no evil in human nature, it would not be something to be saved. Whoever, then, says that it is not good denies the Creator of what was founded good; but whoever denies that there is evil in it begrudges the merciful Savior of what was corrupted. Let the reader, then, be attentive; he will see that you said nothing other than what you had denied must be said; for you declared that there is evil naturally in the thing which you had said was not evil naturally.
JulianImp.3.190Augustinus. Non dixeram malam non esse, sed malum non esse, hoc est, ut planius loquar, non dixeram vitiatam non esse, sed vitium non esse; relege et intellege.
Augustine. I had not said that it is not evil, but that it is not an evil—that is, to speak more plainly, I had not said that it is not corrupted, but that it is not a corruption; reread and understand.
JulianImp.3.190III. 191. Iulianus. Sed intellegi non potest aliud mala natura quam id, quod malum est habere congenitum.
III. 191. Julian. But an evil nature cannot be understood as anything other than to have something evil congenital with it.
JulianImp.3.191Augustinus. Sive congenitum sit malum sicut ingenii fatuitas sive voluntate assumptum sicut homicidium, potest dici malus homo etiam mala natura, quia et homo natura est, sicut malus equus potest et malum animal dici, quia et equus animal est.
Augustine. Whether the evil is congenital, like foolishness of mind, or taken on by the will, like homicide, a man can be called an evil man, even an evil nature, because a man too is a nature, just as an evil horse can also be called an evil animal, because a horse too is an animal.
JulianImp.3.191III. 192. Iulianus. Et ut fiat brevis ac pura conclusio: si naturae inest ita malum, ut nascatur ex ea cum ipsis seminibus malum, mala sine dubitatione convincitur.
III. 192. Julian. And, to make a brief and clean conclusion: if there is in a nature an evil such that an evil is born from it together with the very seeds, it is without doubt convicted of being evil.
JulianImp.3.192Augustinus. Etsi mala convincitur, non tamen malum est, quia etsi vitiata convincitur, non tamen vitium est.
Augustine. Even if it is convicted of being evil, it is nonetheless not an evil, because, even if it is convicted of being corrupted, it is nonetheless not a corruption.
JulianImp.3.192III. 193. Iulianus. Si autem vindicatur a malis et bona defenditur, nec nasci ex ea malum nec ei inesse potest naturaliter. Evanuit igitur conclusio tua, quia sententia, quam secundo loco intulisti, non distinxit, sed geminavit priorem.
III. 193. Julian. But if it is vindicated from evils and defended as good, neither can an evil be born from it nor be in it naturally. Your conclusion, then, has vanished, because the sentence you brought in second did not distinguish the first, but doubled it.
JulianImp.3.193Augustinus. Non continuo, si bona defenditur, vindicatur a malis. Eadem quippe natura et bona est, in quantum natura est, et mala est, si vitiata est; non est tamen malum ulla omnino natura. Non igitur evanuit conclusio mea qua dixi: Natura humana, si malum esset, salvanda non esset; si ei mali nihil inesset, salvanda non esset . Sed si vis verum dicere, dic potius evanuisse argumentationem tuam, qua voluisti refellere conclusionem meam.
Augustine. It does not at once follow, if it is defended as good, that it is vindicated from evils. For the same nature is both good, insofar as it is a nature, and evil, if it is corrupted; yet no nature at all is an evil. My conclusion, then, has not vanished, by which I said: Human nature, if it were evil, would not be something to be saved; if there were no evil in it, it would not be something to be saved. But if you wish to speak the truth, say rather that your argumentation has vanished, by which you wished to refute my conclusion.
JulianImp.3.193III. 194. Iulianus. Natura - inquis - humana, si malum esset, salvanda non esset; si ei mali nihil inesset, salvanda non esset . Quid aliud ostendisti quam unam rem propter id debere salvari, propter quod illam negaveras debere salvari?
III. 194. Julian. Human nature—you say—if it were evil, would not be something to be saved; if there were no evil in it, it would not be something to be saved. What else have you shown than that one and the same thing must be saved on account of that on account of which you had denied it must be saved?
JulianImp.3.194Augustinus. Salvanda est, quia mala est, non quia malum est; si autem malum esset, salvanda non esset. Non enim, quia malum est, sed quia malum habet, mala est, sicut non, quia vitium est, sed quia vitium habet, vitiosa est. Quia vitiosa est ergo, salvanda est; si autem ipsa natura hoc est ipsa substantia vitium esset, salvanda non esset. Quomodo ergo unam rem propter hoc dixi debere salvari, propter quod illam negaveram debere salvari, cum aliud sit vitium habere, aliud vitium esse? Salvanda est ergo, quia vitium habet, non quia vitium est; si autem vitium esset, salvanda non esset. Vides, quam non hoc sit respondere, quod est non tacere, quandoquidem vides nihil te respondisse et tamen tacere noluisse.
Augustine. It must be saved because it is evil, not because it is an evil; but if it were an evil, it would not be something to be saved. For not because it is an evil, but because it has an evil, is it evil—just as not because it is a defect, but because it has a defect, is it defective. Because it is defective, then, it must be saved; but if the nature itself, that is, the substance itself, were a defect, it would not be something to be saved. How, then, did I say that one thing must be saved on account of that on account of which I had denied it must be saved, when it is one thing to have a defect, another to be a defect? It must be saved, then, because it has a defect, not because it is a defect; but if it were a defect, it would not be something to be saved. You see how this is not to answer, which is not to be silent—since you see that you have answered nothing, and yet have been unwilling to be silent.
JulianImp.3.194III. 195. Iulianus. Ac per hoc eo revolutus es, ut Manichaeum, quem professione contempseras, argumentatione reparares. Nam dicendo: Si mala esset, salvanda non esset speciem pugnandi indueras; subdendo autem: sed si nihil in ea mali esset, salvanda non esset , ipsi te fideliter militare docuisti. Cum ergo apparuerit hoc tua quod Manichaei sententia contineri, id est malam esse hominum naturam, cui ille et tu pariter inesse malum dicitis, tuque pronuntiaveris malam naturam non esse salvandam, absolutissime confectus est fidem vestram iunctis omnino turmis tam naturam impugnare quam gratiam.
III. 195. Julian. And through this you have turned back to repairing, by your argumentation, the Manichean, whom by your profession you had despised. For by saying, If it were evil, it would not be something to be saved, you had put on the appearance of fighting; but by adding, but if there were no evil in it, it would not be something to be saved, you taught that you serve him faithfully. Since, then, it has appeared that this opinion of yours is contained in that of the Manichean—namely, that the nature of human beings is evil, in which both he and you alike say there is an evil, and you have declared that an evil nature is not to be saved—it has been most absolutely established that your faith, with its forces wholly joined, attacks both nature and grace.
JulianImp.3.195Augustinus. Numquid, quoniam verba mea mutas, ut aliquid respondisse videaris, ideo difficile aut impossibile facis legentibus vel recolere animo vel certe in hoc ipso tuo libro paulo superius relegere et videre, quid dixerim, ubi et ipse illa, sicut a me sunt dicta, posuisti? Ego enim non dixi: Si mala esset, salvanda non esset, cum ideo salvanda sit ut non sit mala; sed dixi: Si malum esset, salvanda non esset. Habendo quippe vitium mala est, quo consumpto sine dubitatione fit salva; non ipsa vitium est, alioquin ipsa consumeretur, cum consumitur vitium. Cum vero salute vitium consumatur, quid isto modo nisi natura salvatur? Cum itaque dicitur sanari vitium, non ipsum vitium, sed illa, cui hoc inerat, natura salvatur, quae si vitium esset, non salvaretur, sed finiretur potius sanitate; immo sanitas hoc modo fieri ulla non posset, quoniam, si fieret, maneret natura sanata consumpto vitio, quo non erat sana; si autem natura vitium esset, non utique consumpto vitio sanaretur, sed ipsa consumeretur. Ac per hoc natura humana non, si mala esset, sed si malum esset, hoc est si vitium esset, salvanda non esset; si ei nihil mali inesset, id est si vitio mala non esset, salvanda non esset. Ecce quod dixi; noli mutatis abs te verbis meis velle facere locum non responsionibus, sed contentionibus tuis.
Augustine. Just because you change my words so as to seem to have answered something, do you therefore make it difficult or impossible for readers either to recall to mind, or at least, in this very book of yours a little above, to reread and see what I said, where you yourself set down those words as they were said by me? For I did not say, "If it were evil, it would not be something to be saved"—since for this reason it must be saved, that it may not be evil; but I said, If it were an evil, it would not be something to be saved. For by having a defect it is evil, and when this is consumed it without doubt becomes saved; it is not itself a defect, otherwise it would itself be consumed when the defect is consumed. But when the defect is consumed together with the salvation, what in this way is saved but the nature? When, therefore, the defect is said to be healed, not the defect itself but that nature in which it was inhering is saved—which, if it were a defect, would not be saved, but would rather be ended by the healing; nay, no health could come about in this way, since, if it did come about, the saved nature would remain when the defect was consumed, by which it was not healthy; but if the nature were a defect, it would surely not be healed when the defect was consumed, but would itself be consumed. And through this human nature would not be something to be saved—not if it were evil, but if it were an evil, that is, if it were a defect; if there were no evil in it, that is, if it were not evil by a defect, it would not be something to be saved. Behold what I said; do not, by changing my words, wish to make room not for your answers but for your contentions.
JulianImp.3.195III. 196. Iulianus. Sequiturque, ut nemo possit laudare gratiam Christi, nisi qui in natura bonum opus laudaverit Conditoris.
III. 196. Julian. And it follows that no one can praise the grace of Christ unless he has praised in nature the good work of the Founder.
JulianImp.3.196Augustinus. Hoc verum dixisti, et ideo etiam in mala natura opus laudabile est Conditoris, quia et natura mala, in quantum natura est, bonum est atque, ut hoc bonum liberetur a malo, gratia necessaria est.
Augustine. This you said truly, and therefore even in an evil nature there is the praiseworthy work of the Founder, because an evil nature too, insofar as it is a nature, is a good, and, so that this good may be set free from the evil, grace is necessary.
JulianImp.3.196III. 197. Iulianus. Certe nulla hic de studiis adultorum hominum quaestio, sed de sola nascentium qualitate versatur, in quibus naturae examinatur status. Hanc tu itaque naturam sine aliquo propriae voluntatis admixtu ream, damnatam, malis id est criminibus plenam cum Manichaeo tamen asseris, quam nos sine scelere, sine peccati malo innoxiam et capacem virtutis tuemur.
III. 197. Julian. Surely here there is no question about the pursuits of grown men, but the matter turns solely on the quality of those who are born, in whom the status of nature is examined. This nature, then, you assert—together with the Manichean—to be, without any admixture of its own will, guilty, condemned, full of evils, that is, of crimes, which we maintain to be, without crime, without the evil of sin, harmless and capable of virtue.
JulianImp.3.197Augustinus. Agnoscimus te, agnoscimus magnum tutorem, qui parvulis, quos tueris, non sinis succurrere Salvatorem. Si autem sinis, dic, quaeso, quando salvi corpore baptizantur, ex quo malo, ex quo vitio, ex qua parte salventur. Sed quid dicturus es, homo, qui facis tibi paradisum tuum, quem non erubescis implere poenis immeritis parvulorum?
Augustine. We recognize you, we recognize the great guardian, who do not allow the Savior to come to the rescue of the little ones whom you guard. But if you do allow it, tell me, I beg, when they are baptized healthy in body, from what evil, from what defect, from what part they are saved. But what will you say, you who make for yourself your paradise, which you do not blush to fill with the undeserved punishments of little ones?
JulianImp.3.197III. 198. Iulianus. Hanc ergo tu in parvulis criminosam, vitiosam et damnatam voluntate sua arguis an conditione nascendi? Si propria voluntate, ut videlicet illi parvuli suis studiis peccasse dicantur, monstrum quidem opinionis exoritur, peccati tamen tradux negatur, non enim accepit ab alio, quod potuit ipse committere; sin autem tot mala non actione sua, sed conditione sortitur, naturaliter iniqua convincitur.
III. 198. Julian. Do you then accuse this nature in the little ones as criminal, defective, and condemned by its own will or by the condition of being born? If by its own will—so that those little ones would be said to have sinned by their own pursuits—a monstrous opinion indeed arises, yet the traduction of sin is denied, for one did not receive from another what he himself was able to commit; but if it obtains so many evils not by its own action but by its condition, it is convicted of being unjustly iniquitous.
JulianImp.3.198Augustinus. Nec sua voluntate arguo naturam parvulorum, nemo enim, quia vult, nascitur, nec conditione nascendi, nisi quia miseri nascuntur, non quia nascuntur. Nasceretur enim etiam in paradiso natura humana ex Dei benedictione fecunda, etiamsi nemo peccasset, donec Deo praecognitus sanctorum numerus compleretur. Sed illi parvuli nec flerent in paradiso nec muti essent nec aliquando uti ratione non possent nec sine usu membrorum infirmi et inertes iacerent nec morbis affligerentur nec a bestiis laederentur nec venenis necarentur nec aliquo casu vulnerarentur, vel ullo sensu aut ulla parte corporis privarentur nec a daemonibus vexarentur nec surgentes in pueritiam domarentur verberibus aut erudirentur laboribus nec ulli eorum tam vano et obtunso nascerentur ingenio, ut nec labore nec dolore ullo emendarentur, sed excepta propter incapaces uteros matrum sui corporis quantitate, tales omnino, qualis Adam factus est, gignerentur. Nunc autem nec tales essent, quales videmus, nec talia paterentur nisi peccato illo magno natura humana in has miserias mutata atque damnata. Non ergo ita se habent conditione nascendi, sed contagione peccati et conditione supplicii.
Augustine. I accuse the nature of the little ones neither by their own will—for no one is born because he wills—nor by the condition of being born, except that they are born wretched, not that they are born. For human nature, fruitful by the blessing of God, would be born even in paradise, even if no one had sinned, until the number of saints foreknown by God should be completed. But those little ones would neither weep in paradise nor be mute, nor would they ever be unable to use reason, nor would they lie feeble and helpless without the use of their members, nor be afflicted with diseases, nor harmed by beasts, nor killed by poisons, nor wounded by any mishap, nor deprived of any sense or any part of the body, nor be vexed by demons, nor, rising into boyhood, be tamed by beatings or trained by labors; nor would any of them be born with so empty and dull an ability that he could be corrected by no labor or pain; but, except for the size of their own body on account of the incapable wombs of mothers, they would be begotten altogether such as Adam was made. But now they would neither be such as we see, nor suffer such things, had not human nature, by that great sin, been changed and condemned into these miseries. They are not, then, in this state by the condition of being born, but by the contagion of sin and the condition of punishment.
JulianImp.3.198III. 199. Iulianus. Quo ergo super naturae iudicio Manichaeus tuque distatis? Quia ille, inquis, malam eam fatetur. Tu ergo si id abnuis, bonam eam esse pronuntia et sublata contentio est; capieris statim veritatis retibus in salutem. Sed reclamas. Audiamus ergo, quid parias, Aristoteles Poenorum. Tantum - inquis - malum ei inest, ut possideatur a diabolo atque aeternum mereatur incendium.
III. 199. Julian. In what, then, concerning the judgment of nature, do you and the Manichean differ? Because he, you say, confesses it evil. If, then, you deny this, declare it to be good, and the contention is removed; you will at once be caught in the nets of truth unto salvation. But you cry out against this. Let us hear, then, what you bring forth, Aristotle of the Carthaginians. So great an evil—you say—is in it, that it is possessed by the devil and deserves eternal fire.
JulianImp.3.199Augustinus. Tu autem, qui eam negas a diabolo possideri, procul dubio negas a potestate erui tenebrarum, cum in Christi regnum regeneratione transfertur, et accusas universam catholicam Ecclesiam magno crimine maiestatis. Non enim legibus huius mundi alio crimine tenetur reus, quisquis imaginem, quamvis non vivam, tamen imperatoris exsufflat. Exsufflantur autem parvuli in exorcismo, priusquam baptizentur; exsufflantur igitur vivae imagines, non regis cuiuscumque, sed Dei; immo vero exsufflatur, sed diabolus, qui contagione peccati tenet parvulum reum, ut illo foras misso parvulus transferatur ad Christum . Exsuffletur itaque Iuliani amentia, ne maiestatis rea in parvulorum mundatione et exsufflatione dicatur Ecclesia. Si autem non eruitur a potestate tenebrarum et illic remanet parvulus, quid miraris in igne aeterno cum diabolo futurum, qui in Dei regnum intrare non sinitur? An quia Pelagiani nescio quem parvulis non baptizatis praeter Dei regnum quietis et vitae aeternae locum praeparant, ideo Christi erit falsa sententia: Qui crediderit et baptizatus fuerit, salvus erit; qui autem non crediderit, condemnabitur ? Quisquis autem negat parvulos credere per ora gestantium, neget eos et accipere baptismum, quia in manibus gestantium reluctantur.
Augustine. But you, who deny that it is possessed by the devil, without doubt deny that it is rescued from the power of darkness when it is transferred into the kingdom of Christ by regeneration, and you accuse the whole Catholic Church of the great crime of treason. For by no other crime is a person held guilty under the laws of this world than whoever exsufflates the image—though not a living one—of the emperor. But the little ones are exsufflated in the exorcism before they are baptized; therefore living images are exsufflated—not of any king, but of God; nay rather, what is exsufflated is the devil, who, by the contagion of sin, holds the little one guilty, so that, when he has been cast out, the little one may be transferred to Christ. Let the madness of Julian, then, be exsufflated, lest the Church be said to be guilty of treason in the cleansing and exsufflation of the little ones. But if it is not rescued from the power of darkness, and the little one remains there, why do you wonder that he who is not allowed to enter into the kingdom of God will be in the eternal fire with the devil? Or because the Pelagians prepare for unbaptized little ones some I-know-not-what place of rest and eternal life apart from the kingdom of God, will the sentence of Christ therefore be false: Whoever believes and is baptized will be saved; but whoever does not believe will be condemned (Mark 16:16)? But whoever denies that the little ones believe through the mouths of those who carry them, let him deny that they receive baptism too, because they struggle in the hands of those who carry them.
JulianImp.3.199III. 200. Iulianus. Sed adeo mala non est, ut nisi Manichaeus eam accusare non possit.
III. 200. Julian. But it is so far from evil that none but a Manichean could accuse it.
JulianImp.3.200Augustinus. Manichaeus ergo dixit: Omnes sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est ? Sed quia hoc dixit doctus et Doctor catholicus, quid es nisi deceptus et deceptor haereticus?
Augustine. Did the Manichean, then, say, We are all born under sin, whose very origin is in defect? But since a learned man and a Catholic Teacher said this, what are you but a deceived and deceiving heretic?
JulianImp.3.200III. 201. Iulianus. Ego, inquit, tamen non sum Manichaeus, qui eam absolvo verbis et condemno iudiciis.
III. 201. Julian. I, however—he says—am not a Manichean, since I absolve it in words and condemn it in my judgments.
JulianImp.3.201Augustinus. Tu eam condemnas iudicio et hoc iniquo, quam mala tanta vis perpeti sine merito malo.
Augustine. You condemn it by a judgment—and that an unjust one—which you want to suffer such great evils without any evil merit.
JulianImp.3.201III. 202. Iulianus. Quid igitur hic primum accusem, impudentiam mentientis, libidinem disputantis an profanitatem tam prava credentis? Nobis tamen intellego utendum Prophetae esse verbis: Beati sumus, Israel, quoniam quae Deo placent, nobis nota sunt .
III. 202. Julian. What, then, shall I here first accuse—the shamelessness of the liar, the licentiousness of the disputant, or the profanity of one who believes such depraved things? Yet I understand that we must use the words of the Prophet: Blessed are we, O Israel, because the things that please God are known to us (See Bar 4:4).
JulianImp.3.202Augustinus. Itane vero, quae Deo placent, vobis nota sunt? Insulse, ut sine ulla contagione peccati premantur parvuli gravi iugo, non placet Deo. Trahunt ergo contagium de illo primo magnoque peccato, quod vos nolentes fateri quid nisi iniustum iudicium datis Deo?
Augustine. So then, the things that please God are known to you? Foolish man—that little ones should be oppressed by a heavy yoke without any contagion of sin does not please God. They therefore draw a contagion from that first and great sin, which you, unwilling to confess, what do you give to God but an unjust judgment?
JulianImp.3.202III. 203. Iulianus. Sed invectionum officium legentium censura supplebit; nos pergamus ad reliqua. Certe nullum est in rebus aliud malum, quod vere malum est, nisi quod peccatum vocamus.
III. 203. Julian. But the office of invectives the censure of the readers will supply; let us proceed to the rest. Surely there is in things no other evil that is truly evil except what we call sin.
JulianImp.3.203Augustinus. Si non sunt mala etiam supplicia peccatorum, non est, quomodo defendas verum dixisse Deum, qui dixit creare se mala ; non enim dicendus est creare peccata.
Augustine. If the punishments of sins are not also evils, there is no way for you to defend as true what God said, who said that he creates evils (See Isa 45:7); for he is not to be said to create sins.
JulianImp.3.203III. 204. Iulianus. Ex quo peccato gignitur in unoquoque, ut dicis, naturale malum; nihil est igitur aliud vere malum quam meritum malum.
III. 204. Julian. From which sin is begotten in each one, as you say, a natural evil; there is therefore nothing else truly evil than a deserved evil.
JulianImp.3.204Augustinus. Non tantum meritum malum, verum etiam poena, quae malo merito redditur, malum est; non enim vere malum est peccatum et non est vere malum poena peccati. Si ergo nullum esset in parvulis ex origine malum meritum, quidquid mali patiuntur, esset iniustum. Et ideo ista mala in paradiso esse non possent, quia nullum ibi esset meritum malum, si felix oboedientia permaneret. Ac per hoc, quia hic sunt in parvulis mala, quae ibi non essent, habent etiam meritum malum, quod nisi originaliter non haberent.
Augustine. Not only a deserved evil, but also the punishment which is rendered for an evil merit is an evil; for it is not that sin is truly evil and the punishment of sin not truly evil. If, then, there were no deserved evil in the little ones from their origin, whatever evil they suffer would be unjust. And therefore these evils could not be in paradise, because there would be there no deserved evil, if a happy obedience remained. And through this, because here there are in the little ones evils that would not be there, they have also a deserved evil, which they would not have except originally.
JulianImp.3.204III. 205. Iulianus. Si ergo et Manichaeus non ob aliud dicit malam naturam, quam quod eam mali meriti arbitratur, cui putat inferenda supplicia, et tu naturae humanae malum inesse confirmas nec aliud malum quam quod Manichaeus, id est concupiscentiam carnis, quam a diabolo contionaris infusam; eamque sic mali meriti esse dicis, ut aeternis eam persistas adiudicare tormentis, non aliter sine dubio quam Manichaeus pessimam illam damnatamque pronuntias.
III. 205. Julian. If, then, the Manichean too calls nature evil for no other reason than that he judges it to be of an evil merit, on which he thinks punishments must be inflicted, and you affirm that there is an evil in human nature, and no other evil than what the Manichean says, that is, the concupiscence of the flesh, which you preach was breathed in by the devil; and you say that it is so of an evil merit that you persist in adjudging it to eternal torments, then without doubt you, no otherwise than the Manichean, pronounce it most wicked and condemned.
JulianImp.3.205Augustinus. Iam erubesce. Concupiscentia carnis non est a Patre, sed ex mundo est, id est ex hominibus, quorum fetibus impletus est mundus; hanc autem Manichaei genti tribuunt tenebrarum adiuvantibus vobis, qui hoc malum nobis per praevaricationem primi hominis secundum Ambrosianam hoc est catholicam fidem in naturam vertisse non vultis .
Augustine. Blush now at last. The concupiscence of the flesh is not from the Father, but is from the world (See 1 John 2:16), that is, from human beings, with whose offspring the world is filled; but this the Manicheans attribute to the race of darkness, with you helping, who do not want this evil to have turned into nature through the transgression of the first man, according to the Ambrosian—that is, the Catholic—faith.
JulianImp.3.205III. 206. Iulianus. Videamus ergo, quomodo huc redeat etiam pars tuae secunda sententiae. Dixisti enim: Qui dicit naturam humanam bonum non esse, bonum negat conditae Creatorem; qui vero negat ei malum inesse, misericordem vitiatae invidet Salvatorem . Si ergo, ut tu profiteri coactus es, qui negat eam bonum esse, bonum etiam Conditorem eius id est Deum negat, et nihil aliud est malam esse naturam quam malum meritum habere naturaliter; veritati nostrae amminiculatur etiam vestra confessio negare vos videlicet Deum bonum hominum conditorem, quorum malam esse naturam et vitiis eius iuratis et poenis.
III. 206. Julian. Let us see, then, how the second part of your statement comes back here too. For you said: Whoever says that human nature is not good denies the Creator of what was founded good; but whoever denies that there is evil in it begrudges the merciful Savior of what was corrupted. If, then, as you were compelled to profess, whoever denies that it is good denies also its Founder, that is, God; and to be an evil nature is nothing other than to have an evil merit naturally—then your own confession too lends support to our truth: namely, that you deny that the good God is the founder of the human beings whose nature you swear to be evil, both by its defects and by its punishments.
JulianImp.3.206Augustinus. Natura humana, etsi mala est, quia vitiata est, non tamen malum est, quia natura est. Nulla enim natura, in quantum natura est, malum est, sed prorsus bonum, sine quo bono ullum esse non potest malum, quia nisi in aliqua natura ullum esse non potest vitium, quamvis sine vitio possit esse vel numquam vitiata vel sanata natura; quod Manichaei si intellegerent, Manichaei omnino non essent, duas ex contra riis partibus boni et mali introducendo naturas. Si ergo vides, quid inter nos et Manichaeos intersit, tace; si non vides, tace.
Augustine. Human nature, even if it is evil because it is corrupted, is nonetheless not an evil, because it is a nature. For no nature, insofar as it is a nature, is an evil, but altogether a good, without which good no evil can be, since no defect can be except in some nature, although there can be without defect either a never-corrupted or a healed nature; which, if the Manicheans understood, they would not be Manicheans at all, introducing two natures from contrary parts of good and evil. If, then, you see what is between us and the Manicheans, be silent; if you do not see, be silent.
JulianImp.3.206III. 207. Iulianus. Non ergo invidemus Salvatorem illi, quam Conditoris sui dignitate defendimus; sed malum eam negamus esse, ne efficiamur Manichaei, malum ei negamus inesse, ne mutatis nominibus simus totidem Manichaei.
III. 207. Julian. We do not, then, begrudge the Savior to that nature which we defend by the dignity of its Founder; but we deny that it is an evil, lest we become Manicheans, and we deny that there is an evil in it, lest, with the names changed, we be just as many Manicheans.
JulianImp.3.207Augustinus. Prorsus contra Manichaeos estis, cum dicitis naturam malam non esse; sed Pelagiani estis, cum ei malum dicitis non inesse, et nescientes suffragamini Manichaeis dicendo malum, quod ei manifestum est inesse, ex primi hominis praevaricatione non esse, ut concludant illi aliam substantiam naturamque mali esse.
Augustine. You are altogether against the Manicheans when you say that nature is not an evil; but you are Pelagians when you say there is no evil in it, and unknowingly you give support to the Manicheans by saying that the evil which manifestly is in it is not from the transgression of the first man, so that they may conclude that there is another substance and nature of evil.
JulianImp.3.207III. 208. Iulianus. Vitiari autem in unoquoque iam suo arbitratu vel bonum agente vel malum personae meritum dicimus, non naturae. Et ideo per gratiam Christi id sanari asserimus, quod vitiari potest, quoniam nec aliud sauciatum ostenditur, quam quod sanatum docetur.
III. 208. Julian. But that it is corrupted in each one, by his own choice, whether doing good or evil, we say is a merit of the person, not of nature. And therefore we assert that through the grace of Christ that is healed which can be corrupted, since nothing else is shown to be wounded than what is taught to be healed.
JulianImp.3.208Augustinus. Certe vos invidetis parvulis Salvatorem, exsufflandi sicut ipsi, si hoc vobis prodesse crederetur, ut erueremini de potestate tenebrarum et in regnum transferremini Christi.
Augustine. Surely you begrudge the Savior to the little ones—they too to be exsufflated like the others, if it were believed to profit you that you should be rescued from the power of darkness and transferred into the kingdom of Christ.
JulianImp.3.208III. 209. Iulianus. In baptizatis autem non concupiscentia carnis, quae naturalis est, sed concupiscentiae malae aufertur reatus.
III. 209. Julian. But in the baptized it is not the concupiscence of the flesh, which is natural, but the guilt of evil concupiscence that is taken away.
JulianImp.3.209Augustinus. Iohannes apostolus concupiscentiam carnis dixit a Patre non esse, sed ex mundo , hoc modo eam malam faciens intellegi; tu autem non concupiscentiam carnis, quae naturalis est, sed concupiscentiam malam reatum habere dicis. Apud te quippe nec, quando concupiscitur fornicatio, concupiscentia carnis mala est, quia, ut dicis, bono male utitur, qui ea sic utitur. Bonum est ergo ipsa semper, ut vis, sive quis ea coniugium sive adulterium concupiscat, quoniam, si coniugium, bono bene utitur, si adulterium, bono male utitur. Pugna igitur cum apostolo Ioanne, non mecum; non enim consentis ei dicenti eam malam, quam dicit, concupiscentiam carnis a Patre non esse, sed ex mundo, quamdiu tu dicis concupiscentiam carnis, etiam quando ea malum concupiscitur, esse bonam ac per hoc numquam malam. Sed, crede mihi, nemo Christianus est, qui non malit apostolo Ioanni consentire quam tibi.
Augustine. The apostle John said that the concupiscence of the flesh is not from the Father, but from the world (See 1 John 2:16), making it in this way to be understood as evil; but you say that not the concupiscence of the flesh, which is natural, but evil concupiscence has guilt. For with you, not even when fornication is desired is the concupiscence of the flesh evil, because, as you say, one who uses it thus uses a good badly. It is therefore always itself a good, as you would have it, whether one desires marriage or adultery by it, since, if marriage, one uses a good well, if adultery, one uses a good badly. Fight, then, with the apostle John, not with me; for you do not agree with him when he says that it is evil—the concupiscence of the flesh, which he says is not from the Father, but from the world—as long as you say that the concupiscence of the flesh, even when an evil is desired by it, is good, and through this is never evil. But, believe me, no one is a Christian who would not rather agree with the apostle John than with you.
JulianImp.3.209III. 210. Iulianus. Ac per hoc, nec aliquod peccatum [naturae in] esse, tam Conditoris humani generis quam Redemptoris testimonio comprobatur.
III. 210. Julian. And through this, that there is no sin [in] nature is proved by the testimony both of the Founder and of the Redeemer of the human race.
JulianImp.3.210Augustinus. Quid est, quod dicis nimis inconsiderate: Nec aliquod peccatum naturae inesse? Quasi peccatum possit omnino inesse nisi naturae, etiamsi non sit origine attractum, sed voluntate commissum. Sive quippe angeli sive hominis peccatum, manifestum est vel angelo inesse vel homini; quis autem sic exorbitet a rerum natura, ut hominem vel angelum neget esse naturam? Quid est item, quod clausis oculis loqueris? Quid est, rogo, quod dicis: Nec concupiscentiam peccatum esse? Itane contra Apostolum te disputare non vides? Ille namque peccatum esse concupiscentiam satis omnino monstravit, ubi ait: Peccatum non cognovi nisi per legem; nam concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: Non concupisces . Quid hoc testimonio clarius, quid tua sententia vanius dici potest?
Augustine. What is this you say, too inconsiderately: That there is no sin in nature? As though sin could be at all except in a nature, even if it is not drawn from origin, but committed by the will. For whether it be the sin of an angel or of a man, it is manifest that it is either in an angel or in a man; but who would so deviate from the nature of things as to deny that a man or an angel is a nature? What is it, again, that you speak with closed eyes? What is it, I ask, that you say: That concupiscence is not sin? Do you not see that you dispute against the Apostle? For he showed plainly enough that concupiscence is sin, where he says, I did not know sin except through the law; for I did not know concupiscence unless the law said: You shall not covet (Rom 7:7). What can be said clearer than this testimony, what emptier than your opinion?
JulianImp.3.210III. 211. Iulianus. Et ut, quae sunt acta, repetamus: inimicam esse iustitiae Dei opinionem traducis, tam praeceptorum Dei quam iudiciorum eius attestatione monstravi.
III. 211. Julian. And, to recapitulate what has been argued: that the opinion of traduction is hostile to the righteousness of God, I have shown by the attestation both of the commandments of God and of his judgments.
JulianImp.3.211Augustinus. Inimicos vos potius esse iustitiae Dei, quem facitis super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum iniuste posuisse grave iugum, dum negatis originale peccatum, et testimonio Scripturarum et ipsis calamitatibus parvulorum, quae in paradiso nisi vestro non possent esse, monstratum est .
Augustine. That you rather are hostile to the righteousness of God—whom you make to have unjustly placed a heavy yoke upon the children of Adam from the day of their going forth from their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1), while you deny original sin—has been shown both by the testimony of the Scriptures and by the very calamities of the little ones, which could not be in paradise except in yours.
JulianImp.3.211III. 212. Iulianus. Concupiscentiam autem carnis ad conciliandum sexibus fecunditatis negotium a Deo inditam, creatore corporum, non nisi a Manichaeo accusari scriptorum eius insertione perdocui.
III. 212. Julian. But that the concupiscence of the flesh, implanted by God, the creator of bodies, for accomplishing the business of fruitfulness in the sexes, is accused by none but the Manichean, I have thoroughly taught by the insertion of his writings.
JulianImp.3.212Augustinus. Concupiscentiam carnis, quam malam docet esse Scriptura divina, per illam quippe caro concupiscit adversus spiritum ; vos autem adiuvantes Manichaeos Deo coaeternae genti tribuere tenebrarum, dum non vultis eam pertinere ad originale peccatum et in Dei paradiso audetis insuper collocare, evidentissimis documentis et divinae auctoritatis et sobriae rationis ostendimus.
Augustine. That the concupiscence of the flesh, which the divine Scripture teaches to be evil—for through it the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit (See Gal 5:17)—and which you, helping the Manicheans to attribute it to the race of darkness coeternal with God (since you do not want it to pertain to original sin and dare moreover to place it in the paradise of God), we have shown by the most evident documents both of divine authority and of sober reason.
JulianImp.3.212III. 213. Iulianus. Nec alia apud vos argumenta esse pro traduce, quam quae Manichaeus tribuisset, ostendi.
III. 213. Julian. And that there are no other arguments with you for traduction than those the Manichean had furnished, I have shown.
JulianImp.3.213Augustinus. Non esse Ambrosium Manichaeum, qui fidei catholicae invictissimus et Manichaeos prostravit et vos, qui dixit discordiam carnis et spiritus , ubi per tuam susceptam caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, per primi hominis praevaricationem in nostram vertisse naturam, etiam testimonio tui principis eumdem laudantis episcopum convictus atque contortus cogeris confiteri .
Augustine. That Ambrose is not a Manichean, who as a most invincible champion of the Catholic faith laid low both the Manicheans and you—he who said that there is a discord of flesh and spirit, where, through this thing you have taken up, the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit—and that through the transgression of the first man it turned into our nature, you are compelled to confess, convicted and confounded even by the testimony of your own prince, who praises that same bishop.
JulianImp.3.213III. 214. Iulianus. Te autem liberi arbitrii negatorem et Dei, nascentium conditoris, sententiae tuae discussione patefeci.
III. 214. Julian. But that you are a denier of free choice and of God, the founder of those who are born, I have laid open by the examination of your own statement.
JulianImp.3.214Augustinus. Me non esse liberi arbitrii, quod tu extollendo praecipitas, negatorem, sed potius defensorem Dei gratiam confitendo, quod arbitrium tu decipis in tua virtute fidendo, innumerabilia testimonia sacra proclamant; nosque non negare Deum nascentium conditorem, sed vos negare Deum nascentium salvatorem ea, quae utrique diximus, legentibus indicabunt.
Augustine. That I am not a denier of free choice—which you, by exalting it, precipitate—but rather a defender of it, by confessing the grace of God (which choice you deceive by trusting in your own power), innumerable holy testimonies proclaim; and that we do not deny that God is the founder of those who are born, but that you deny that God is the Savior of those who are born, the things we have both said will show to those who read.
JulianImp.3.214III. 215. Iulianus. Malam autem a vobis pronuntiari naturam eius sententiae, quam tu uno verbo conclusu rum te promiseras, explicatione convici.
III. 215. Julian. But that an evil nature is pronounced by you—the statement which you had promised to conclude in a single word—I have convicted by its unfolding.
JulianImp.3.215Augustinus. Naturam humanam non malum esse, sed ei malum inesse monstravi unum horum docens per eiusdem naturae substantiam et eius substantiae conditorem Deum, alterum per eiusdem naturae miseriam et ab eadem miseria salvatorem Deum. Te autem ratiocinationem meam non potuisse dissolvere, etsi non tibi respondissem, lector posset diligens et intellegens invenire.
Augustine. That human nature is not an evil, but that there is an evil in it, I have shown—teaching the one through the substance of that same nature and God the founder of that substance, the other through the misery of that same nature and God the Savior from that same misery. But that you could not dissolve my reasoning, even if I had not answered you, a diligent and understanding reader could find out.
JulianImp.3.215III. 216. Iulianus. Atque ideo etiam tardissimis ad intellegendum vel tuo favore deceptis liquere confido te Manichaei solum aversari nomen, ceterum ex omni fide cum cunctis traducis sectatoribus non minus spurcis quam stolidis eius inhaerere dogmatibus.
III. 216. Julian. And therefore I trust that it is clear, even to those slowest to understand or deceived by their favor toward you, that you shun only the name of the Manichean, but for the rest, in all faith, you cling to his teachings, together with all the followers of traduction, no less foul than dull.
JulianImp.3.216Augustinus. Aliud et contra est omnino quam putas, quod liquere etiam tardissimis dicis. Illud namque potius etiam tardissimis liquet, si legendis utriusque nostrum scriptis intentam curam non graventur impendere, me demonstrasse non solum, quod ego sim Manichaeorum inimicus errori eorumque nefaria dogmata Deo veritatis opitulante subverterim, sed etiam quod vos Manichaeorum tantum adiuvetis insaniam, ut se omnino gloriarentur invictos, nisi catholica fides, quam Deo miserante defendimus, non per vos vel a vobis, sed vobiscum potius vincerentur. Te autem ideo me unum elegisse, cui Manichaeorum nomine et crimine, quanto crebrius, tanto convitiareris odiosius, quia eo modo putasti catholicam, quae vos arguit, fundatissimam fidem et clarorum atque sanctorum defensorum eius notissimam multitudinem, qui ea, quae didicimus et docemus, didicerunt atque docuerunt, sine invidia te posse destruere horrore nefandi nominis, non obiecti criminis veritate. Sed firmum fundamentum Dei stat: novit enim Dominus qui sunt eius . Verba vero libri mei, quae tibi quasi refellenda proposueras, quomodo quibusdam paucissimis quasi ad speciem pugnae qualiscumque tentatis, multo plura cetera diffusa atque interfusa tua nebulosa loquacitate vitaveris, interim, quia longum est hic ostendere, ut per se ipsum advertat et inveniat, dimitto lectori.
Augustine. The matter is altogether otherwise and the contrary of what you suppose, which you say is clear even to the slowest. For this rather is clear even to the slowest, if they will not refuse to spend attentive care on reading the writings of both of us: that I have shown not only that I am the enemy of the error of the Manicheans and have overthrown their nefarious teachings with the God of truth helping, but also that you so aid the madness of the Manicheans that they would altogether glory in being unconquered, unless the Catholic faith, which we defend with God's mercy, conquered them—not through you or by you, but rather together with you. But that you chose me alone, against whom—the more frequently, the more hatefully—you might hurl the name and crime of the Manichean, was because in that way you thought you could destroy, without odium, the most firmly founded Catholic faith which accuses you, and the most well-known multitude of its illustrious and holy defenders, who learned and taught what we have learned and teach—destroy them, I say, by the horror of an abominable name, not by the truth of the charge objected. But the firm foundation of God stands: for the Lord knows who are his (2 Tim 2:19). But how, with a few of the words of my book, which you had set out as though to be refuted, attempted as though for the appearance of some sort of fight, you have avoided much else, far more diffuse and interspersed, by your cloudy loquacity—because it is long to show this here, I leave it for the reader to notice and find out for himself.
JulianImp.3.216Liber Quartus
Book Four
JulianImp.3.216IV. 1. Iulianus. Existimo ego sollicitum lectorem posse mirari, cur cum opusculum meum certo librorum numero, ex scribentium sollemnitate distinxerim, tamen libri alterius solvam in altero quaestiones; unde est illud quod in tertio volumine disputavi, Apostoli sensus, qui per unum hominem peccatum in mundo intrasse dixit (quo numero opinionem mali originalis oppressit), illud quod ex uno Abraham generatio Iudaeorum descendisse perhibetur , nihil vel exigui intulisse concussus. Id autem putet lector iste, cui nunc satisfacere instituo, in secundo debuisse volumine collocari. Norit igitur, hanc responsionis fidem, qua etiam illa quae putantur intermissa, vel in libro sequenti supplentur, nec quidquam incommodare certamini, nec de ulla festinationis perturbatione, sed tam de causarum necessitate, quam de consilii ratione contingere. Suppetit vero magnorum ingeniorum copia, quorum exemplis talis stili consequentia vindicetur; sed inepta iactatio est, ad defensionem simplicis negotii sonantia priscorum nominum advocare suffragia, et securitatem facti reddere defensione suspectam. Secundum ergo librum, quem asserendis Apostoli sententiis destinaram, ne in nimiam longitudinem levium quaestionum proferret adiectio, disputatione necessaria terminavi. Verum quia munere seriae dissertationis impleto, libuit etiam ineptis quaestionibus obviare, et tardissimorum quorumque, qui et frigidis possunt obiectionibus permoveri, placuit habere respectum, tertio libro qualiter ex uno multi nati dicerentur ostendi. Est tamen etiam decentissimum, si volumen sequens prioris debitum luat, ut et magna inter libros videatur esse concordia, et ad cognitionem totius operis invitentur legentes; cum et si dilata in primis aliqua aestimaverint, intellegunt praetermissa non esse. Ostenso igitur fidei et industriae operis convenire quod fecimus, congrediamur cum Manichaeis pro Dei operibus et legibus; ab illis naturalis mali deformitatem, ab istis iniquitatem iudiciorum feralium repellentes; docentes in istarum praeceptis nihil de bono suo perdidisse iustitiam, in illorum seminibus nihil de malo suo diabolum miscuisse; haec postremo digna esse Deo rectore, illa Deo dignissima conditore.
IV. 1. Julian. I think that an attentive reader may wonder why, although I have divided my little work into a definite number of books, in accordance with the customary practice of writers, I nonetheless resolve the questions of one book in another; whence it is that the meaning of the Apostle, who said that through one man sin entered into the world (See Rom 5:12) (by which number he crushed the opinion of original evil), which I disputed in the third volume—and that the generation of the Jews is reported to have descended from the one Abraham (See Matt 1:1-2)—contributed nothing, even slight, to that shaken position. But let that reader, whom I now set out to satisfy, suppose that this ought to have been placed in the second volume. Let him know, then, that this fidelity of response, by which even those things which are thought to have been omitted are supplied in a later book, neither hampers the contest in any way, nor arises from any disturbance of haste, but as much from the necessity of the causes as from the reasoning of design. There is, indeed, an abundance of great talents whose examples would vindicate such consistency of style; but it is an inept boastfulness, for the defense of a simple business, to summon the resounding endorsements of ancient names, and to render the security of a deed suspect by a defense. The second book, then, which I had destined for asserting the opinions of the Apostle, I terminated, by a necessary disputation, lest the addition of light questions should draw it out to too great a length. But because, the duty of a serious treatise having been fulfilled, it pleased me to meet even inept questions, and to have regard for any of the slowest who can be moved even by frigid objections, I showed in the third book in what manner many are said to have been born from one. Yet it is also most fitting, if the following volume pays the debt of the prior, that there may both seem to be a great concord among the books, and the readers be invited to the knowledge of the whole work; since, even if at first they have judged some things deferred, they understand that they have not been passed over. Having shown, then, that what we have done agrees with the faith and diligence of the work, let us join battle with the Manicheans on behalf of the works and laws of God—repelling from the former the deformity of natural evil, from the latter the iniquity of cruel judgments—teaching that in the precepts of the latter justice has lost nothing of its good, that in the seeds of the former the devil has mingled nothing of his evil; that these things, finally, are worthy of God the ruler, those most worthy of God the founder.
JulianImp.4.1Augustinus. Congressionem tuam Manichaei, ne in nostra congressione superarentur, pro auxilio magno sumerent, nisi et vos cum eis fides catholica superaret; quandoquidem discordiam concupiscentiarum carnis et spiritus, et miserias generis humani, quibus plena est natura mortalium, incipientes a fletibus et calamitatibus parvulorum, propterea non sinuntur duarum, quas inducunt, naturarum commixtioni tribuere; quia haec omnia naturae peccato vitiatae, quam Deus bonam condidit, nec vitiatam fecunditatis munere et bono opificio suo deserit, auctoritate divina et verissima ratione tribuuntur. Quod vos negantes, arma quidem quibus vincuntur, conamini infringere; sed tam sunt firma et invicta, ut sive illis ad vos, sive vobis ad illos transfixis et peremptis perveniant, utrosque prosternant.
Augustine. The Manicheans would take your joining of battle as a great help, lest they be overcome in our joining of battle, were not the Catholic faith overcoming you too together with them; since, when you begin from the weepings and calamities of little ones, you are not permitted to attribute the discord of the concupiscences of flesh and spirit, and the miseries of the human race, of which the nature of mortals is full, to the mingling of the two natures which they introduce—because all these things are attributed, by divine authority and most true reason, to a nature corrupted by sin, which God founded good and, though corrupted, does not desert with the gift of fruitfulness and his good handiwork. And in denying this, you indeed try to break the arms by which they are conquered; but they are so firm and unconquered that, whether, fixed in them and pierced through, they reach you, or, fixed in them, they reach the Manicheans, they lay both of you low.
JulianImp.4.1IV. 2. Iulianus. Quibus duobus si creditis, id est Dei nec opera mala esse, nec iniqua iudicia; totum traducis dogma conteritur: sicut e regione, traducis impietate suscepta, haec duo, conditio Dei atque iudicatio, per quae solum Deus potest intellegi, destruuntur.
IV. 2. Julian. If you believe these two things—namely, that the works of God are not evil, nor his judgments unjust—the whole teaching of traduction is crushed; just as, on the other side, when the impiety of traduction is taken up, these two, the founding by God and the judging, through which alone God can be understood, are destroyed.
JulianImp.4.2Augustinus. Nec opera mala sunt Dei, quando et de malis quibuscumque bene operatur, et parvulis, quod de massa per primi hominis praevaricationem perdita bene operatus est, etiam sanandis benigne opitulatur; nec iniqua iudicia, quando gravi iugo super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum , nonnisi peccatorum merita ulciscitur. Haec cum creduntur atque intelleguntur, et Manichaeorum et Pelagianorum error exstinguitur; Manichaeorum scilicet, quia mala ista generis humani volunt deputari nescio cui mali principio aeternitati Dei coaeterno; Pelagianorum autem, quia nolunt imputare peccato.
Augustine. The works of God are not evil, when even out of any evils whatever he works good, and to the little ones—what he has well worked out of the mass lost through the transgression of the first man—he kindly brings help, even to those to be healed; nor are his judgments unjust, when by a heavy yoke upon the children of Adam from the day of their going forth from their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1) he avenges nothing but the deserts of sins. When these things are believed and understood, both the error of the Manicheans and that of the Pelagians is extinguished: that of the Manicheans, namely, because they want these evils of the human race to be attributed to some I-know-not-what principle of evil coeternal with the eternity of God; but that of the Pelagians, because they do not wish to impute them to sin.
JulianImp.4.2IV. 3. Iulianus. Iam ergo ea quae contexuit lacerator naturalium, ponderemus; sed ut rerum, quae mutua sunt responsione perplexae, lectori nostro tam intellegentia quam discretio suggeratur, quo genere obluctetur, admoneo. Profitetur scriptis obviare nostris, quae ad se ait in brevi chartula destinata, et ponit aliquas sententiarum mearum particulas atque suggillat, quae in meo opere non tenentur.
IV. 3. Julian. Now, then, let us weigh those things which the lacerator of natural things has woven together; but, so that for our reader both understanding and discernment may be supplied of matters that are entangled by mutual response, I admonish him by what manner of thing he struggles. He professes to oppose our writings, which he says were sent to him on a short paper, and he sets down some particles of my sentences and pricks them—things which are not held in my work.
JulianImp.4.3Augustinus. Deo gratias, quod ipsis quattuor libris tuis, unde ille quod voluit, sicut voluit, excerpsit, cuius ad me chartula missa pervenit, sex libris meis ad cuncta respondi. Puto quod ibi non es dicturus, aliqua me redarguere voluisse, quae in tuo opere non tenentur; quod et si dixeris, idque probaveris; etiam gratulari debeo, non te dixisse, quae dicere non deberes; atque utinam quaecumque verba tua rectissime reprehenduntur, nulla omnino dixisses.
Augustine. Thanks be to God that to those very four books of yours, from which that man, whose paper reached me, excerpted what he wished, as he wished, I have answered all things in my six books. I think that you are not going to say there that I wished to refute some things which are not held in your work; and even if you do say it, and prove it, I ought even to be grateful that you did not say things you ought not to have said; and would that, whatever words of yours are most rightly censured, you had said none of them at all.
JulianImp.4.3IV. 4. Iulianus. Loquitur ergo ad Valerium: Attende quibus se existimat adversum nos huic praemisso titulo consonare; Deus - inquit - qui Adam ex limo fuerat fabricatus, Evam construxit e costa, et dixit: " Haec vocabitur Vita, quoniam mater est omnium viventium " . Non quidem ita scriptum est, sed quid ad nos? Solet memoria falli in verbis, dum tamen sententia teneatur. Nec Evae nomen ut appellaretur Vita, Deus imposuit, sed maritus. Sic enim loquitur: " Et vocavit Adam nomen uxoris suae "Vita", quoniam mater est omnium viventium " . Stupenda doctoris eruditio, qui ne paululum quidem a Scripturarum sinit sermone deflecti. Imperitiam nostram arguit; sed oblivioni veniam dare dignatur, qua factum erat ut ego dicerem nomine Vitae a Deo mulierem nuncupatam; ita per occasionem brevem, et eruditus apparere studuit, et benignus. Sed ut non est admiranda diligentia, nominatorem feminae comperisse; ita impudentia non ferenda est, velle ignoscere quod culpare non possis. Non enim ita in meo opere legitur, sicut in commentis huius tenetur. Ego quippe posito legis testimonio, quod dixisse rerum Creator ostenditur: " Non est bonum solum esse hominem; faciamus ei adiutorium simile sui " . Quid est hoc - inquio - " Non est bonum esse solum hominem "? Numquid Deus aliquid fecerat, quod non bonum iure dici posset; maxime qui omnia non solum bona, sed etiam bona valde fecerat? Quomodo ergo ait: " Non est bonum solum esse hominem "? quo sermone non reprehenditur creaturae status, sed ostenditur humano generi perniciosam unionem esse potuisse, nisi ministerio diversi sexus successio germinasset. Nam si etiam Adam speretur potuisse immortalis fieri, nisi deliquisset; tamen manifestum est, patrem eum numquam fieri potuisse, nisi reperisset uxorem, quae de latere dormientis assumpta, prima compellatione cui operi parata esset audivit: " Haec vocabitur Vita, quoniam mater est omnium viventium ". Quo sermone monstratum est, neminem deinceps hominum vel esse posse, vel vivere, qui non conceptus beneficio substitisset . Cum ergo clareat, in re quidem non magni ponderis, tamen nihil a me ita fuisse prolatum, ut illud praeter impudentiam singularem quisquam possit arguere; inusta est nota publicae falsitatis egentissimo omnium, qui cum vult donare quod non tenet, uno tempore pariter delinquit, et penuria iuris, et ambitu largitatis.
IV. 4. Julian. He speaks, then, to Valerius: Attend to the things by which he supposes himself to agree with us against this title set before him: God—he says—who had fashioned Adam from the mud, built Eve from a rib, and said: "She shall be called Life, because she is the mother of all the living" (See Gen 3:20). It is not indeed so written, but what is that to us? The memory is wont to fail in words, provided the meaning is held. Nor did God impose the name Life upon Eve so that she should be called Life, but her husband did. For thus it speaks: "And Adam called the name of his wife Life, because she is the mother of all the living" (See Gen 3:20). Stupendous erudition of the teacher, who does not allow even a little departure from the wording of the Scriptures! He charges us with unskillfulness, but deigns to pardon the forgetfulness by which it happened that I said the woman was named Life by God; and so, by a brief occasion, he was eager to appear both learned and kindly. But just as the diligence is not to be admired in having found out the namer of the woman, so the shamelessness is not to be borne—to want to pardon what you could not blame. For it is not so read in my work as is held in this man's fabrications. For I, having set down the testimony of the law, by which the Creator of things is shown to have said: "It is not good for man to be alone; let us make for him a helper like himself" (See Gen 2:18). What is this—I say—"It is not good for man to be alone"? Had God made anything that could not rightly be called good—especially he who had made all things not only good but even very good? How, then, does he say: "It is not good for man to be alone"? By which words the status of the creature is not censured, but it is shown that the union could have been ruinous to the human race, unless succession had budded forth by the ministry of a different sex. For although Adam too is hoped to have been able to become immortal, had he not transgressed, yet it is manifest that he could never have become a father, unless he had found a wife, who, taken from the side of the sleeping man, heard at the first address for what work she had been prepared: "She shall be called Life, because she is the mother of all the living". By which words it was shown that thereafter no one of human beings could either be or live who had not subsisted by the benefit of conception. Since, then, it is clear that in a matter indeed of no great weight, nothing was nonetheless brought forth by me in such a way that anyone, except by a singular shamelessness, could accuse it, the mark of public falsehood has been branded upon the most destitute of all men, who, when he wishes to give what he does not hold, at one and the same time offends both by poverty of right and by ambition of largess.
JulianImp.4.4Augustinus. Si non tu ita posuisti Libri verba divini, sicut ego in illa chartula inveni; non tibi, sed ei qui sic scripsit, ignovi; cui ambo debemus ignoscere. Si autem me putas non hoc invenisse in chartula, sed tamquam hoc invenerim, ideo mendaciter illa verba posuisse, ut esset quod tribuerem quasi errori tuo; nunc tibi certe, quod tam male ac falso de me fueris opinatus, ignosco.
Augustine. If you did not set down the words of the divine Book as I found them in that paper, I have pardoned not you, but the one who so wrote; whom we both ought to pardon. But if you suppose that I did not find this in the paper, but, as though I had found it, set down those words mendaciously, so that there might be something I could ascribe as though to your error, now certainly I pardon you for having thought so badly and falsely of me.
JulianImp.4.4IV. 5. Iulianus. Postquam ergo hoc tali gravitate reprehendit, pergit ad reliqua, ac patronum suum commonet, ut his quae sequuntur attendat. Deus igitur - inquit - maris creator et feminae, convenientia generationibus membra formavit. Sed hoc tantum de capite dictorum meorum inserens, praetermissis plurimis omnino versibus, quibus novitas potissimum inculcatur animarum nihil aut carni aut semini debentium, subdit illum meum: Ita gigni corpora de corporibus ordinavit; quorum tamen efficientiae potentia operationis intervenit, omne quod est, ea administrans virtute, qua condidit. Si igitur non nisi per sexum fetus, non nisi per corpus sexus, non nisi per Deum corpus; quis ambigat fecunditatem Deo iure reputari? Postquam haec itaque de meo posuit, commendat quoniam catholice ea dicta etiam ipse fateatur. Quis non ergo putaret hominem fuisse mutatum? Verum non fit immemor sui; sed similem conditionem arbitratur pravi dogmatis et pudoris, ut etiam illud perspicuo reparetur exitio, sicut hic assiduo durescit attritu. Probat ergo sententiam meam, et ferrum praeiudicii in fidem suam spontaneo defigit amplexu; sed post haec quasi integer virium, autumat superesse quo dimicet. Sic enim sequitur: Post haec quae veraciter et catholice dicta sunt, immo in divinis Libris veraciter scripta, non autem ab isto catholice dicta sunt, quia non intentione catholici pectoris dicta sunt; iam propter quod ea dixit, Pelagiana et Caelestiana haeresis incipit introduci. Namque attende quid sequitur. Hic denuo nostra dicta subiungit: Quid ergo suum diabolus cognoscit in sexibus, per quod fructum eorum iure possideat? Diversitatem? Sed haec in corporibus est, quae Deus fecit. Commixtionem? Sed non minus benedictionis quam institutionis privilegio vindicatur. Vox enim Dei est: " Relinquet homo patrem et matrem, et adhaerebit uxori, et erunt duo in carne una " ; vox Dei est: "Crescite et multiplicamini, et replete terram " . An forte ipsam fecunditatem? Sed ipsa est instituti causa coniugii . Ad quod respondit, quia nec diversitatem sexuum, nec commixtionem, nec fecunditatem diabolus cognoscat in sexibus, per quod fructum eorum iure possideat; sed his omnibus absolutis invenit quod diabolo deputaret, nostramque honestatem nomine timoris incessit, qui inter tot corporum sexuumque munera, veriti simus carnis concupiscentiam nominare. Sic ergo adversum me patrono suo loquitur: Sed iste in his omnibus noluit nominare concupiscentiam carnis, quae non est a Patre, sed ex mundo est ; cuius mundi princeps dictus est diabolus; qui eam in Domino non invenit, quia Dominus homo non per ipsam ad homines venit. Unde dicit etiam ipse: " Ecce venit princeps mundi huius, et in me nihil inveniet " ; nihil utique peccati, nec quod a nascente trahitur, nec quod a vivente additur. Hanc iste noluit nominare in his omnibus, quae commemoravit, naturalibus bonis, de qua etiam nuptiae confunduntur, quae de his omnibus gloriantur. Nam quare illud opus coniugatorum subtrahitur et absconditur etiam oculis filiorum, nisi quia non possunt esse in laudanda commixtione sine pudenda libidine? De hac erubuerunt etiam qui primi pudenda texerunt ; quae prius pudenda non fuerunt, sed tamquam Dei opera praedicanda atque glorianda . Egi quidem, beatissime pater Flore, in primi operis quattuor libellis causam nuptiarum, causam commixtionis, causam corporum, causam sexuum, causam operis Dei, causam postremo aestimationis Dei, quae necessario, ut operum suorum probitate laudatur, ita eorum sauciatur infamia; ac per totum scriptorum opus, nec formationi corporis aliquid diabolum addidisse nec sensui, inobumbrabilis omnino veritas approbavit; et ideo opinionem traducis de Manichaei luto haustam esse, perdoctum est.
IV. 5. Julian. After he has censured this with such gravity, he proceeds to the rest and warns his patron to attend to what follows. God, then—he says—the creator of male and female, formed members suited to generation. But inserting only this much of the head of my words, with very many lines passed over entirely—by which is especially driven home the newness of souls owing nothing to flesh or seed—he subjoins that word of mine: So he ordained that bodies be begotten from bodies; in whose efficiency, however, the power of his operation intervenes, administering all that is by that power by which he founded it. If, then, there is no offspring except through sex, no sex except through body, no body except through God, who can doubt that fruitfulness is rightly reckoned to God? After he had thus set down these things from mine, he commends that he too confesses them to be said in a Catholic sense. Who, then, would not think the man had changed? But he does not become unmindful of himself; rather, he judges the condition of a depraved teaching and of shame to be alike, so that even the latter is restored to a manifest ruin, just as here it hardens by constant attrition. He approves, then, my opinion, and fixes the iron of prejudgment into his own faith with a spontaneous embrace; but after this, as though whole in strength, he reckons that there remains something to fight with. For thus it follows: After these things which were said truly and in a Catholic sense—nay, truly written in the divine Books, yet not said by this man in a Catholic sense, because they were not said with the intention of a Catholic heart—now, on account of what he said them, the Pelagian and Caelestian heresy begins to be introduced. For attend to what follows. Here again he subjoins our words: What, then, does the devil recognize as his own in the sexes, by which he may rightly possess their fruit? Diversity? But this is in bodies, which God made. Mingling? But it is vindicated no less by the privilege of blessing than of establishment. For it is the voice of God: "A man shall leave father and mother and cling to his wife, and the two shall be one flesh" (Gen 2:24); it is the voice of God: "Increase and multiply and fill the earth" (Gen 1:28). Or perhaps fruitfulness itself? But this is the very cause of the institution of marriage. To which he answered that the devil recognizes neither the diversity of the sexes, nor the mingling, nor the fruitfulness in the sexes, by which he might rightly possess their fruit; but, all these being absolved, he found what to assign to the devil, and assailed our honorableness under the name of fear—us who, among so many gifts of bodies and sexes, were afraid to name the concupiscence of the flesh. Thus, then, he speaks against me to his patron: But this man, in all these, was unwilling to name the concupiscence of the flesh, which is not from the Father, but is from the world (See 1 John 2:16); of which world the devil is called the prince; who did not find it in the Lord, because the Lord, as man, did not come to men through it. Hence he himself says: "Behold, the prince of this world comes, and in me he will find nothing" (John 14:30); nothing, surely, of sin—neither what is drawn by one who is born, nor what is added by one who lives. This man was unwilling to name it, among all these natural goods which he recounted—it, on account of which even marriages are confounded, which glory in all these. For why is that work of the married withdrawn and hidden even from the eyes of their children, except that they cannot be in the praiseworthy mingling without shameful disordered desire? At this even those first blushed who first covered the shameful parts; which were not shameful before, but were to be proclaimed and gloried in as the works of God. I treated indeed, most blessed father Florus, in the four little books of my first work, the cause of marriage, the cause of mingling, the cause of bodies, the cause of the sexes, the cause of the work of God, the cause, finally, of the esteem of God—which necessarily, just as it is praised by the goodness of his works, so is wounded by their disgrace; and through the whole work of my writings, an utterly unobscurable truth approved that the devil added nothing either to the formation of the body or to its sensation; and therefore it was thoroughly taught that the opinion of traduction was drawn from the mud of the Manichean.
JulianImp.4.5Augustinus. Quomodo egeris in illis quattuor libris tuis, et quomodo nostra responsione fueris confutatus, ut te nihil egisse clareret, qui et meos et tuos legunt, non difficulter intellegunt. Quamquam et cum tui non leguntur, sed tantummodo mei, apparet in eis vestrum haereticum dogma destructum. Sed cum meo uni, quattuor illis tuis sic responderis, ut eius vix partem attingeres tertiam, nullamque refelleres; tantum de illis praesumpsisti, ut contra unum alterum meum in eadem causa, istos tuos octo conscripseris, quasi me non vincendum firmamento disputationum, sed numero voluminum putaveris esse terrendum; usque adeo quippe quadrupla illa responsione nihil te profecisse sensisti, ut haec tibi octupla necessaria videretur. Si ergo talibus incrementis loquacitas tua promovetur; quem non terreat, non veritas, sed numerositas librorum tuorum, quam computare me piget? Homo enim stupenda ubertate facundus, qui prius uni meo tuos quattuor, et alteri meo tuos octo putasti esse reddendos; quis non timeat ne forte sex libris meis amplius quam mille tuos reddere mediteris, si uni eorum qui prior est, iam sexdecim reddas, atque ita singulos quosque sequentium duplicato praecedente numero persequaris, ostendens nobis quam multum loquaris non intellegendo quae loqueris?
Augustine. How you acted in those four books of yours, and how you were confuted by our response, so that it became clear that you accomplished nothing, those who read both mine and yours understand without difficulty. And although even when yours are not read, but only mine, it appears in them that your heretical teaching is destroyed; yet when, to my one book, you had so answered those four of yours that you scarcely touched a third part of it, and refuted none of it, you presumed so much from them that against my one book, against another of mine in the same cause, you composed these eight of yours—as though you supposed that I must be terrified not by the firm foundation of disputations, but by the number of volumes; for so far did you perceive that you accomplished nothing by that fourfold response, that this eightfold one seemed necessary to you. If, then, your loquacity advances by such increments, whom would the number—not the truth—of your books not terrify, which it wearies me to count? For you, a man eloquent with stupendous abundance, who first thought four of yours should be rendered to my one, and eight to another of mine—who would not fear that perhaps you are meditating to render more than a thousand of yours to my six books, if to the one which is first you now render sixteen, and so pursue each of the following ones with the preceding number doubled, showing us how much you talk by not understanding what you say?
JulianImp.4.5IV. 6. Iulianus. Tamen cum hoc ibi satiatissime constet effectum, breviter licet, in praesenti quoque disputatione repetetur. Convertamur ergo ad ipsum, cuius cum eruditione decertamus. Annuis nempe, a nobis recte fuisse collectum, quia si fetus non nisi per sexum, si sexus non nisi per corpus, si corpus non nisi per Deum exstitisset, ambigi non posset fecunditatem ad Dei opera pertinere, nihilque suum in sexibus agnoscere principem tenebrarum, propter quod fructus eorum iuris sui assertione retineret; quia et diversitas pertinebat ad sexum, et commixtio ad membrorum diversitatem, et fructus fecunditatis ad Deum, qui etiam generantium fuerat institutor; ac per hoc nihil remanserat propter quod diabolo esset commixtionis adiudicanda fertilitas. Quod ergo tibi putas vel solatium vel praesidium a sermonis mei honestate conferri, quia nolui in hoc loco carnis concupiscentiam nominare? Quod etsi in omni opere silentio praeterissem, nihil tamen vituperationis aut iniuriae res illa susciperet, quae honestioribus signata nominibus vindicabatur, et clarissimis quidem intellegentiae vocibus. Fac igitur me prudentius, quam suscepti negotii ratio petebat, tegere voluisse silentio nomen eius rei, quam tegimus amictu; num ideo totius rationis, totius veritatis iactura facienda est? Num ideo negotiorum arbiter intellectus iacebit, quia est aliquid, quod ut ante oculos, ita ad aures non semper decore possit adduci? Verumtamen quid deformitatis habet, carnis concupiscentiam nominare; quam et ego appellavi, cum poposcit locus; et tu licet indomabilem te eam sentire confirmes, tamen crebro commemoras?
IV. 6. Julian. Yet, since it is established that this was most fully accomplished there, it shall be repeated, though briefly, in the present disputation too. Let us turn, then, to the man himself, with whose erudition we contend. You grant, surely, that it was rightly gathered by us that if offspring exists only through sex, if sex only through body, if body only through God, it could not be doubted that fruitfulness pertains to the works of God, and that the prince of darkness recognizes nothing of his own in the sexes, by which he might retain their fruit by the assertion of his own right; since both diversity pertained to sex, and mingling to the diversity of members, and the fruit of fruitfulness to God, who was also the institutor of those who generate; and through this nothing remained on account of which the fertility of mingling should be adjudged to the devil. As for what you think is conferred upon you, whether as solace or as defense, by the honorableness of my discourse—because I was unwilling in this place to name the concupiscence of the flesh? Even if I had passed it over in silence throughout the whole work, that matter would suffer no censure or injury, which was vindicated by more honorable names and indeed by the clearest expressions of understanding. Grant, then, that I wished, more prudently than the reasoning of the business I had undertaken demanded, to cover with silence the name of that thing which we cover with a garment; is the loss of all reasoning, of all truth, therefore to be made? Will the intellect, the arbiter of affairs, therefore lie prostrate, because there is something which, just as it can be brought before the eyes, so cannot always be decently brought to the ears? Yet what deformity is there in naming the concupiscence of the flesh, which I too have named when the place required it, and which you, although you affirm that you perceive it to be untamable, nonetheless frequently mention?
JulianImp.4.6Augustinus. Domabilem dico, id est, carnem, sed expugnatoribus, non laudatoribus eius.
Augustine. I call the flesh tamable, that is, but by those who war against it, not by those who praise it.
JulianImp.4.6IV. 7. Iulianus. Porro hinc post modicum: Per quid igitur sunt sub diabolo parvuli, qui de corporibus nascuntur quae fecit Deus, de commixtione sexus quem distinxit formando, sed benedicendo coniunxit, et fecunditatem inserendo multiplicavit Deus, et ipsos parvulos de materia seminis fecit Deus? Si per Deum materiam corporum, per Deum genitalia corporum, per Deum commixtionem genitalium, per Deum etiam vim seminum, per Deum quoque omnium nascentium formam atque vitam existere confiteris; quid putas remansisse, propter quod diabolo tot Dei opera transcribas? Ergo haeresim vocas alterius disputationis corpus, cuius membra omnia recta atque catholica confiteris.
IV. 7. Julian. Then, a little after this: Through what, then, are little ones under the devil, who are born of bodies that God made, of the mingling of a sex which he distinguished by forming, but joined by blessing, and multiplied by implanting fruitfulness—and the little ones themselves God made from the matter of the seed? If you confess that the matter of bodies exists through God, the genitals of bodies through God, the mingling of the genitals through God, the very force of the seeds through God, and through God too the form and life of all that is born; what do you think remains, on account of which you transcribe so many works of God to the devil? Therefore you call the body of another disputation a heresy, all of whose members you confess to be upright and Catholic.
JulianImp.4.7Augustinus. Novatianos, Arianos, Eunomianos, aliosque nonnullos, nonne etiam cum totum Symbolum confessi fuerint, vocamus haereticos? Ut ergo alia taceam pertinentia ad haeresim vestram; quomodo vos non vis vocemus haereticos, qui negatis parvulos erui de potestate tenebrarum, quando transferuntur ad Christum, in quibus accepturis Spiritum Sanctum tota antiquitus Ecclesia, quae laudat nomen Domini a solis ortu usque ad occasum, exsufflat et exorcizat spiritum immundum?
Augustine. The Novatians, the Arians, the Eunomians, and several others—do we not call them heretics even when they have confessed the whole Creed? So then, to be silent about other things pertaining to your heresy, how do you not want us to call you heretics, who deny that little ones are rescued from the power of darkness when they are transferred to Christ—little ones in whom, as they are about to receive the Holy Spirit, the whole Church from of old, which praises the name of the Lord from the rising of the sun to its setting, exsufflates and exorcizes the unclean spirit?
JulianImp.4.7IV. 8. Iulianus. Nam postquam collectionem nostram, quae tanta est veritate munita, ut in te tota ferretur, nec convicio eam temerare quiveris, Deo adigente laudasti, effectum tamen eius accusas.
IV. 8. Julian. For after you praised our gathering—which is fortified by so great a truth that it was carried wholly against you, nor could you violate it even with an insult—with God compelling you, you nonetheless accuse its effect.
JulianImp.4.8Augustinus. Quem dicis eius effectum, non intellegis esse vestrum defectum. Ex his enim veris quae dicitis, quasi catholici, non efficitur illud quo estis haeretici. Namque ut catholici dicitis quod per sexum sit fetus, per corpus sexus, per Deum corpus, unde fecunditas Deo iure deputatur. Sed numquid ideo non inde talis nascitur homo, qui non sit sine sorde peccati, etiamsi unius diei sit vita eius super terram ? Non igitur illa vera dicendo, sed hoc quod itidem verum est negando, estis haeretici. Quia utique Deus non est auctor fatuitatis, et tamen auctor est fetus, et quando nascitur fatuus. Sic intellege, si potes, innasci homini ex origine vitium, cuius non sit auctor Deus, cum creator ipsius hominis non sit nisi Deus. Memento sane exorbitasse te a tuo dogmate, quo negatis operari Deum in hominum mentibus voluntatem. Nam ego verba tua, quae confiteor et a Catholicis dici, voluntate laudavi, quae me tamen dicis Deo adigente laudasse. Ecce quomodo Deus in nobis operatur et velle , quod soletis et contra Apostolum vos negare.
Augustine. What you call its effect, you do not understand to be your defect. For from these true things which you say, as though Catholics, that thing is not effected by which you are heretics. For as Catholics you say that offspring is through sex, sex through body, body through God, whence fruitfulness is rightly reckoned to God. But is it therefore not the case that there is born thence such a man as is not without the filth of sin, even if his life upon earth be of one day (See Job 14:4-5 (LXX))? Not, therefore, by saying those true things, but by denying this, which is likewise true, are you heretics. For surely God is not the author of foolishness, and yet he is the author of offspring, even when a foolish one is born. Understand thus, if you can, that there is born in man, from his origin, a defect of which God is not the author, although the creator of the man himself is none but God. Remember, indeed, that you have deviated from your own teaching, by which you deny that God works the will in the minds of men. For I praised your words, which I confess are said by Catholics too, by my will—words which, however, you say I praised with God compelling me. See how God works in us even to will (See Phil 2:13)—which you are accustomed even against the Apostle to deny.
JulianImp.4.8IV. 9. Iulianus. Si igitur - inquio - non nisi per sexum fetus, non nisi per corpus sexus, non nisi per Deum corpus; quis ambigat fecunditatem Deo iure reputari? Hoc tam certum est, ut etiam tua in suam laudem ora concusserit. Verum post praeconium huic a te loco redditum, haeresim admones introduci, cum ea quae subdidi, nihil aliud quam quae praemissa fuerant, admota explanatione geminaverint.
IV. 9. Julian. If, then—I say—there is offspring only through sex, sex only through body, body only through God; who can doubt that fruitfulness is rightly reckoned to God? This is so certain that it has shaken even your mouth to its praise. But after the encomium rendered by you to this passage, you warn that a heresy is being introduced, when the things I subjoined doubled nothing other than what had been set before, with an explanation applied.
JulianImp.4.9Augustinus. Numquid in his, quae vera te dixisse concesseram, dixeras: Quid ergo suum diabolus cognoscit in sexibus? Hic enim coepisti introducere sensum haeresis vestrae; quasi propterea non possit diabolus aliquid suum cognoscere in sexibus, quia per creatorem Deum est corpus et sexus; cum diabolus et bonum Dei et malum diaboli etiam in se ipse cognoscat, illud scilicet in sua natura, illud in vitio. Sic et in sexibus agnoscit ille quae Dei sunt, sicut et ipsum sexum, et corpus, et spiritum; sed agnoscit et suum, quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum; illa enim sunt a Creatore, cuius vindictam vitare non potuit; hoc vulnere quod inflixit.
Augustine. Surely, in those things which I conceded you said truly, had you said: What, then, does the devil recognize as his own in the sexes? For here you began to introduce the meaning of your heresy; as though the devil could not recognize something of his own in the sexes for this reason, that body and sex are through God the creator—when the devil recognizes both the good of God and the evil of the devil even in himself: the former, namely, in his nature, the latter in his defect. So too in the sexes he recognizes the things that are God's, just as the very sex, and body, and spirit; but he recognizes also his own, by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit; for those things are from the Creator, whose vengeance he could not avoid; this is the wound which he inflicted.
JulianImp.4.9IV. 10. Iulianus. Aio enim: Quid ergo suum diabolus cognoscit in sexibus, ut fructum eorum, sicut dicis, iure possideat? Diversitatem? Sed haec in corporibus est, quae Deus fecit. Commixtionem? Sed non minus benedictionis, quam institutionis privilegio vindicatur. An forte ipsam fecunditatem? Sed ipsa est instituti causa coniugii. Quid hic ergo novum fuit; quid a superiore quam probaveras conclusione dissentiens, quod post laudem vituperandum putares? Certe nihil: ac per hoc quid de tam foeda varietate colligitur? Cum a me videlicet disputatio innovata non sit, a te vero sit aestimatio meorum dictorum permutata, teterrimam esse intentionem tuam, et rationem imbecillam.
IV. 10. Julian. For I say: What, then, does the devil recognize as his own in the sexes, so that he may, as you say, rightly possess their fruit? Diversity? But this is in bodies, which God made. Mingling? But it is vindicated no less by the privilege of blessing than of establishment. Or perhaps fruitfulness itself? But this is the very cause of the institution of marriage. What, then, was new here? What, dissenting from the earlier conclusion which you had approved, that you should think it must be censured after praise? Surely nothing; and through this, what is gathered from so foul an inconstancy? Since indeed the disputation has not been renewed by me, but the estimation of my words has been changed by you—that your intention is most foul, and your reasoning feeble.
JulianImp.4.10Augustinus. Miraris quod post laudem operum Dei, vituperavi insidiosam interrogationem tuam; interrogans quippe dixisti: Quid igitur suum diabolus cognoscit in sexibus? Et volens persuadere quod nihil suum cognoscat in sexibus, ea commemorasti, quae vere ad diabolum non pertineant, diversitatem scilicet, qua femininus a masculino diversus est sexus; et commixtionem, qua ut filii generentur, sexus uterque miscetur; et fecunditatem, qua ipsi filii generantur. Haec omnia fatemur futura fuisse in paradiso, etiamsi nemo peccasset; sed illa ibi futura non erat, quam senserunt, quando pudenda texerunt, qui priusquam peccarent, nudi erant, et non confundebantur. Hanc tu concupiscentiam carnis, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum , sine qua nullus hominum nascitur, et hanc discordiam carnis et spiritus, quam didicit catholicus Doctor, Pelagii vestri tam excellenter ore laudatus, per praevaricationem primi hominis in nostram vertisse naturam ; hanc ergo tu quare tacuisti? Qui interrogans quid suum diabolus cognoscat in sexibus, alia nominasti quae diaboli non sunt, et hoc quod eius est tuae interrogationi reddere noluisti. Hanc interrogationem tuam dolosam reprehendi, non divina opera quae iure laudavi.
Augustine. You wonder that after the praise of the works of God I censured your insidious questioning; for, questioning, you said: What, then, does the devil recognize as his own in the sexes? And, wishing to persuade us that he recognizes nothing of his own in the sexes, you mentioned those things which do not truly pertain to the devil—namely, diversity, by which the feminine sex is diverse from the masculine; and mingling, by which, that children may be generated, each sex is mingled; and fruitfulness, by which the children themselves are generated. All these things we confess would have been in paradise, even if no one had sinned; but that thing would not have been there which they felt when they covered the shameful parts—who, before they sinned, were naked, and were not confounded (See Gen 2:25). This concupiscence of the flesh, by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit (See Gal 5:17), without which no man is born, and this discord of flesh and spirit, which the Catholic Teacher learned—so excellently praised by the mouth of your Pelagius—turned into our nature through the transgression of the first man; this, then, why were you silent about? You who, asking what the devil recognizes as his own in the sexes, named other things which are not the devil's, and were unwilling to render to your question this which is his. This deceitful question of yours I censured, not the divine works, which I rightly praised.
JulianImp.4.10IV. 11. Iulianus. Et quod laudas catholica, pavoris tui esse, non fidei.
IV. 11. Julian. And that what you praise as Catholic belongs to your fear, not to your faith.
JulianImp.4.11Augustinus. Ille in laude catholica novit nostram fidem, qui per illam vestrum demonstrat et expugnat errorem.
Augustine. He recognizes our faith in the Catholic praise who, through it, displays and storms your error.
JulianImp.4.11IV. 12. Iulianus. Quod ergo laudata vituperas, non esse iudicii, sed furoris.
IV. 12. Julian. That you therefore censure what you praised belongs not to judgment, but to fury.
JulianImp.4.12Augustinus. Non laudata vitupero: sed laudavi quae vera dixisti; vituperavi autem quod insidiose interrogasti, videns quid tibi respondendum esset, atque ita hoc tacens quasi non esset. Hoc utrum iudicii sit, an furoris, videbis, si a furore conquieveris.
Augustine. I do not censure what I praised; rather, I praised the things you said truly; but I censured the fact that you questioned insidiously, seeing what should be answered you, and so passing over this in silence as though it were not. Whether this belongs to judgment or to fury, you will see, if you grow calm from your fury.
JulianImp.4.12IV. 13. Iulianus. Quo furore quidem numquam cariturus es, nisi prius obscenum dogma reieceris; quia inter paenitentiae pudorem, numquam tamen a Christianis aversatum, et argumentationis inopiam, graves perferens Symplegadas, necesse est ut bona dicta quibus obrueris, aut sequaris, aut laceres.
IV. 13. Julian. Of which fury you will indeed never be free, unless you first reject the obscene teaching; because, suffering grievous Symplegades between the shame of penance—which yet was never shunned by Christians—and the poverty of argumentation, it is necessary that the good words by which you are overwhelmed you either follow or tear to pieces.
JulianImp.4.13Augustinus. Non sunt bona dicta, Iuliane, negare Christum parvulis esse Iesum, aut Iesum, id est Salvatorem, ita esse parvulis confiteri, sicut universae mortali creaturae, unde dictum est: Homines et iumenta salvos facies, Domine . Non propterea ille veniens in similitudine carnis peccati tale nomen accepit; sed: Vocabis, ait angelus, nomen eius Iesum; ipse enim salvum facies populum suum a peccatis eorum . Non sunt bona dicta, ab hoc populo parvulos separare, et ideo Christum dicere etiam illis esse Iesum, quia salvos eos facit, non a peccatis, sed a scabiolis eorum. Resipisce, obsecro: puto quod non ex parentibus ista credentibus natus es; et certe in Ecclesia non ista credente renatus es.
Augustine. They are not good words, Julian, to deny that Christ is Jesus for the little ones, or to confess that Jesus, that is, the Savior, is for the little ones in the same way as for the whole mortal creation, whence it is said: You will save, O Lord, both men and beasts (Ps 36:6 (35:7)). He did not, in coming in the likeness of the flesh of sin, receive such a name on account of that; but the angel said: You shall call his name Jesus; for he will save his people from their sins (Matt 1:21). They are not good words, to separate the little ones from this people, and so to say that Christ is Jesus even for them because he saves them—not from their sins, but from their little scabs. Recover your senses, I beg you; I think that you were not born of parents who believed these things; and certainly you were reborn in a Church that does not believe them.
JulianImp.4.13IV. 14. Iulianus. Videamus tamen quid sententiarum mearum arripueris, quod nomine erroris incessas. Sed iste - inquis - in his omnibus nominare noluit concupiscentiam carnis, quae non est a Patre, sed ex mundo est; cuius mundi princeps dictus est diabolus; qui eam in Domino non invenit, quia Dominus homo non per ipsam ad homines venit . Dixisti certe me haeresim introducere, ad quod probandum nulla mea dicta subiungis.
IV. 14. Julian. Let us see, however, what of my sentences you have seized, to assail under the name of error. But this man—you say—was unwilling in all these to name the concupiscence of the flesh, which is not from the Father, but is from the world; of which world the devil is called the prince; who did not find it in the Lord, because the Lord, as man, did not come to men through it (See 1 John 2:16; John 14:30). You said, surely, that I introduce a heresy; to prove which you subjoin no words of mine.
JulianImp.4.14Augustinus. Illa dicta tua subiungo, quibus interrogasti, quid suum diabolus cognoscat in sexibus . Dolose quippe ista dicebas, quando concupiscentiam carnis, cuius plerumque motibus necesse est resistere etiam casta coniugia, videbas, et tacebas, et me interrogatione fraudulentissima, quasi nihil esset quod responderi posset, urgebas. Aut si non videbas, profecto haeresim vestram ipsa caecitate introducebas.
Augustine. I subjoin those words of yours by which you asked what the devil recognizes as his own in the sexes. For deceitfully you said these things, when you saw the concupiscence of the flesh—by whose movements even chaste marriages must often resist—and were silent, and pressed me with a most fraudulent question, as though there were nothing that could be answered. Or, if you did not see it, surely by that very blindness you were introducing your heresy.
JulianImp.4.14IV. 15. Iulianus. Sed ais me noluisse concupiscentiam carnis nominare. Qui nolui nominare, tacui; et si tacui, nihil quod reprehenderes sum locutus: quis ergo errorem persuadet tacendo? O nova criminum et hactenus inaudita portenta! Silentio meo ait perversum dogma componi!
IV. 15. Julian. But you say I was unwilling to name the concupiscence of the flesh. I who was unwilling to name it, kept silent; and if I kept silent, I spoke nothing you could censure: who, then, persuades to error by being silent? O new and hitherto unheard-of portents of crimes! He says that a perverse teaching is composed by my silence!
JulianImp.4.15Augustinus. Non silentio, sed dolosa interrogatione, sicut superius demonstravi. Quamquam et silentium merito reprehenditur, quando id quod dicendum fuit, ideo non dicitur, ne interrogationi responderi potuisse cernatur.
Augustine. Not by silence, but by a deceitful question, as I showed above. Although silence too is deservedly censured, when what ought to have been said is not said precisely lest it be seen that the question could be answered.
JulianImp.4.15IV. 16. Iulianus. Expendat hoc prudentia omnis, et rideat orationis invidiam nomine taciturnitatis ostensam. Confiteris igitur me nihil dixisse quod possis arguere.
IV. 16. Julian. Let all prudence weigh this, and laugh at the odium of a speech shown under the name of taciturnity. You confess, then, that I said nothing you could accuse.
JulianImp.4.16Augustinus. Immo vero, rectissime arguitur quod interrogando dixisti. Ut enim nihil esse putaretur, quod tibi responderi posset, illud quod posset, tu dicere noluisti. Aut certe ipsam cur non arguo caecitatem, qua id nec videre potuisti?
Augustine. Nay rather, what you said in questioning is most rightly accused. For, that it might be thought there was nothing that could be answered you, you were unwilling to say that which could be said. Or at least why should I not accuse the very blindness by which you could not even see it?
JulianImp.4.16IV. 17. Iulianus. Tu sane nostrum vexando silentium, protulisti quod olim quidem defendi non potuit; nunc vero postquam Manichaei epistola, cuius in libro tertio sententias posui, venit ad publicum, nec celari potest.
IV. 17. Julian. You, indeed, by harassing our silence, have brought forth what once could not be defended; but now, after the letter of the Manichean, whose sentences I set down in the third book, has come to the public, it can no longer be concealed.
JulianImp.4.17Augustinus. Concupiscentiam carnis nec Manichaeus veraciter vituperat, nec tu veraciter laudas; ille, quia nescit unde hoc sit malum; tu, quia negas malum; ille, quia eam permixtae nobis naturae tribuit alienae; tu, quia eam nostrae non vis esse vitiatae; ille, quia per illam credit corrumpi Dei partem; tu, quia per illam dehonestare conaris etiam paradisi felicitatem.
Augustine. Neither does the Manichean truly censure the concupiscence of the flesh, nor do you truly praise it: he, because he does not know whence this evil is; you, because you deny it is evil; he, because he attributes it to an alien nature mingled into us; you, because you do not want it to be of our corrupted nature; he, because he believes that through it a part of God is corrupted; you, because through it you try to dishonor even the happiness of paradise.
JulianImp.4.17IV. 18. Iulianus. Noluit - inquit - nominare concupiscentiam carnis, quae non est a Patre, sed ex mundo est; cuius mundi princeps dictus est diabolus: qui eam in Domino non invenit, quia Dominus homo non per ipsam ad homines venit . Verbis ergo ipsius Manichaei, concupiscentiam carnis non a Deo factam, sed a mundo, cuius tamen mundi principem diabolum dicis, conditam profiteris.
IV. 18. Julian. He was unwilling—he says—to name the concupiscence of the flesh, which is not from the Father, but is from the world; of which world the devil is called the prince; who did not find it in the Lord, because the Lord, as man, did not come to men through it. By the very words, then, of the Manichean, you profess that the concupiscence of the flesh was not made by God, but founded by the world, of which world you nonetheless call the devil the prince.
JulianImp.4.18Augustinus. Numquid ego dico diabolum principem mundi, et hoc Dominus ipse non dicit? Numquid hoc ego dixissem, nisi ipsum dixisse legissem? Quod cum et ipse legeris, cur obiciendum mihi putasti? Nec tamen ideo diabolus princeps est caeli et terrae, et omnis caelestis terrestrisque creaturae, secundum quod dictum est: Mundus per eum factus est; sed quia mundi nomine appellatus est orbis terrae in hominibus, qualibus plenus est, secundum quod dictum est: Et mundus eum non cognovit ; secundum quod dictum est et diabolus princeps mundi huius ; secundum quod dictum est: Mundus in maligno positus est ; secundum quod dictum est: Quia vero de mundo non estis, propterea odit vos mundus ; et innumerabilia talia. Ac per hoc, mundum, Scripturis sanctis docentibus, pro differentia sententiarum, nunc in bono accipimus, nunc in malo. Ad bona eius pertinent caelum et terra, et omnis in eis Dei creatura; ad mala eius pertinent concupiscentia carnis, et concupiscentia oculorum, et ambitio saeculi, vel, sicut ipse posuisti, superbia vitae. Sicut ergo nunc in bono, nunc in malo legitur mundus; sic lege, si potes, aliquando in bono positam concupiscentiam carnis, vel concupiscentiam oculorum; sed sic non invenies, sicut nec superbiam vitae, quod illis duobus malis additum est tertium.
Augustine. Do I say that the devil is the prince of the world, and does the Lord himself not say it? Would I have said this, had I not read that he himself said it? And since you too have read it, why did you think it must be objected to me? Yet the devil is not for that reason the prince of heaven and earth, and of every celestial and terrestrial creature, according to what is said, The world was made through him (John 1:10); but because by the name of the world is called the circle of the earth in the human beings of which it is full, according to what is said, And the world did not know him (John 1:10); according to what is said, the devil is the prince of this world (John 12:31); according to what is said, The world is set in the evil one (1 John 5:19); according to what is said, But because you are not of the world, therefore the world hates you (John 15:19); and innumerable such things. And through this, with the holy Scriptures teaching, we take the world, according to the difference of the statements, now in a good sense, now in an evil. To its goods pertain heaven and earth and every creature of God in them; to its evils pertain the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the ambition of this age (See 1 John 2:16)—or, as you yourself set it down, the pride of life. As, then, the world is read now in a good, now in an evil sense, so read, if you can, the concupiscence of the flesh, or the concupiscence of the eyes, somewhere placed in a good sense; but you will not find it so, just as you will not find the pride of life, which is added as a third to those two evils.
JulianImp.4.18IV. 19. Iulianus. Ideo autem dixi eloquiis te usum omnino Manichaei, quia etsi in apostoli Ioannis Epistola nonnulla ex his verba teneantur; tamen quia certum est, non ibi illum Ecclesiae magistrum aut de carne, aut de sensu carnis, aut de concupiscentia nuptiali, quidquam tale sensisse, quale Manichaeus verborum eius usurpatione componit; non iniuria eius verba esse dixi, cuius sensui serviebant, ut eloquia intentionis suae merito censeantur; et sicut apud sanctum Ioannem apostolica sunt dignitate reverenda, quia insinuant veritatem, ita apud Manichaeum obumbrata illorum signa non expressa videantur.
IV. 19. Julian. But I said that you used the words of the Manichean altogether, because, although some of these words are held in the Letter of the apostle John, yet since it is certain that that Master of the Church did not there think anything of the flesh, or of the sensation of the flesh, or of nuptial concupiscence, such as the Manichean composes by the usurpation of his words, I said not unjustly that the words were his whose meaning they served, so that words are deservedly reckoned to the intention of him who uses them; and just as in holy John they are to be revered with apostolic dignity, because they instill the truth, so in the Manichean they seem the obscured tokens of those words, not their genuine expression.
JulianImp.4.19Augustinus. Quid addis nuptiali, et dicis de concupiscentia nuptiali, ut vestias pudendam susceptam tuam nomine honesto nuptiarum? Concupiscentiam carnis dixit apostolus Ioannes, non concupiscentiam nuptialem; quae posset esse in paradiso, etiam si nemo peccasset, in appetitu fecunditatis, non in pruritu voluptatis; aut certe spiritui semper subiacens, ut non nisi spiritu volente moveretur; numquam adversus spiritum concupiscens, ut et spiritus adversus eam concupiscere cogeretur. Absit enim ut in loco tantae felicitatis, et in hominibus illic tanta pace felicibus esset ulla discordia carnis et spiritus.
Augustine. Why do you add nuptial, and say of nuptial concupiscence, so as to clothe this shameful thing you have taken up with the honorable name of marriage? The apostle John said the concupiscence of the flesh, not nuptial concupiscence—a concupiscence which could be in paradise, even if no one had sinned, in the appetite of fruitfulness, not in the itch of pleasure; or at least always subject to the spirit, so that it would be moved only with the spirit willing; never having desires opposed to the spirit, so that the spirit too would be compelled to have desires opposed to it. For far be it that in a place of such great happiness, and in human beings there so happy in such great peace, there should be any discord of flesh and spirit.
JulianImp.4.19IV. 20. Iulianus. Apostolus quippe Ioannes cum ad virtutum omnium fastigium provocaret fideles, et studium sanctitatis ad altitudinem dominicae conversationis extenderet, ad compendium, mundi totius nomine universa praesentium bonorum et iucunditatum irritamenta concludens: Nolite - inquit - diligere mundum, neque ea quae in mundo sunt. Si quis diligit mundum, non est caritas Patris in eo; quoniam omne quod est in mundo, concupiscentia carnis, et concupiscentia oculorum est, et superbia vitae; quae non est ex Patre, sed ex mundo est; et mundus transit, et concupiscentia eius; qui autem facit voluntatem Dei, manet in aeternum . Quantum ad superficiem verborum respicit, odium omnibus indicit elementis, et mundum et cuncta quae in mundo sunt, non esse ex Patre, neque diligi debere denuntiat.
IV. 20. Julian. The apostle John, indeed, when he summoned the faithful to the summit of all the virtues, and extended the zeal of holiness to the height of the Lord's manner of life, comprising in brief, under the name of the whole world, all the incitements of present goods and delights: Do not—he says—love the world, nor the things that are in the world. If anyone loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him; for all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life; which is not from the Father, but is from the world; and the world passes away, and its concupiscence; but he who does the will of God remains forever (1 John 2:15-17). As far as the surface of the words looks, he proclaims hatred for all the elements, and declares that the world and all that is in the world are not from the Father and ought not to be loved.
JulianImp.4.20Augustinus. Inaniter ista dicis: nullus vel idiota catholicus sic isto loco accipit mundum, ut de elementis aliquid cogitet. Neque enim et ubi dicit de Domino Christo: Ipse est propitiatio peccatorum nostrorum; non solum nostrorum, sed et totius mundi ; ita quisquam desipit, ut etiam elementorum hic exsistimet intellegenda esse peccata. Totum hoc ergo quod isto modo dicitur mundus, non nisi in hominibus intellegitur, qui sunt per totum mundum, id est, toto, quaquaversum incolitur, orbe terrarum. Ipsam denique humanam vitam qua non secundum Deum, sed secundum hominem vivitur, mundum hoc loco appellavit Apostolus. Ideo diligi vetat, et dicit: Omnia quae in mundo sunt, concupiscentia carnis est, et concupiscentia oculorum, et ambitio saeculi, vel superbia vitae; quae non est a Patre, sed ex mundo est . Tu, si quid potes, in bono aliquando nominatam, Scripturarum sanctarum loco ullo, concupiscentiam carnis ostende; et noli apertis rebus nebulas loquacitatis offundere.
Augustine. You say these things in vain; no Catholic, not even an unlearned one, takes the world in this passage so as to think anything of the elements. For neither, where he says of the Lord Christ, He himself is the propitiation of our sins; not of ours only, but of the whole world (1 John 2:2), does anyone so lose his senses as to think that here too the sins even of the elements are to be understood. This whole, then, which is in this way called the world, is understood only in the human beings who are throughout the whole world, that is, throughout the whole circle of the earth, in whatever direction it is inhabited. Finally, that human life by which one lives not according to God but according to man, the Apostle in this place called the world. Therefore he forbids it to be loved, and says: All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the ambition of this age, or the pride of life; which is not from the Father, but is from the world (See 1 John 2:16). You, if you can, show the concupiscence of the flesh somewhere named in a good sense, in any place of the holy Scriptures; and do not pour clouds of loquacity over open matters.
JulianImp.4.20IV. 21. Iulianus. Certe Apostolus est, et praecipua Domino Iesu caritate dilectus; tamen nisi intentionem eius, vel Evangelium quod scripsit, vel Epistolarum gravitas indicaret, verba ista quae posuimus, ita nullum possent rebus afferre praeiudicium, ut Scripturis omnibus, quae mundum a Deo factum asserunt, cedere cogerentur. Verum ipse Evangelii quod conscripsit, reverendo se communivit exordio. Deus - inquit - erat Verbum; per ipsum facta sunt omnia, et sine ipso factum est nihil. Ac deinceps: Erat lumen verum, quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum; in hoc mundo erat, et mundus per ipsum factus est. Itemque: Verbum caro factum est, ut habitaret in nobis . Quibus testimoniis nihil in sensibus suis obscuritatis reliquit; sed ostendit Deum se nosse et asserere totius mundi, atque eorum quae in mundo sunt omnium conditorem, Manichaeisque nullum ad sententias suas accessum patere perdocuit. Quoniam qui omnium naturarum Deum asserit creatorem, abutitur, sine fidei dispendio, substantiarum nominibus, ad significationem cupiditatis immodicae.
IV. 21. Julian. Surely he is an Apostle, and one specially loved by the Lord Jesus with love; yet, unless his intention—either the Gospel which he wrote, or the gravity of his Epistles—indicated it, these words which we have set down could so bring no prejudice to things that they would be compelled to yield to all the Scriptures, which assert that the world was made by God. But he himself fortified himself by the reverend opening of the Gospel which he composed. God—he says—was the Word; through him all things were made, and without him nothing was made (See John 1:1, 3). And thereafter: It was the true light, which enlightens every man coming into this world; he was in this world, and the world was made through him (See John 1:9-10). And likewise: The Word was made flesh, that he might dwell among us (See John 1:14). By which testimonies he left no obscurity in his meanings; but he showed that he knew and asserted God to be the founder of the whole world, and of all things that are in the world, and most thoroughly taught that no access lay open to the Manicheans for their opinions. Since whoever asserts God to be the creator of all natures uses the names of substances, without loss of faith, for the signification of immoderate desire.
JulianImp.4.21Augustinus. Sed tu concupiscentiam carnis, nec quando immodica est, vis intellegi malum esse, sed bonum, eosque potius bono male uti, qui ea utuntur immodice. Ac per hoc, si concupiscentia carnis bonum est; profecto et modica bonum est modicum, et immodica bonum est immodicum; sed modica uti, hoc est, ut dicis, bono bene uti; immodica vero uti, hoc est, ut dicis, bono male uti. Sicut vinum procul dubio bonum est; omnis enim creatura Dei bona est ; et qui modico vino utitur, bono bene utitur; qui vero immodico vino utitur, bono male utitur. Sed Ioannes numquam diceret vinum a Patre non esse, sicut concupiscentiam carnis dixit a Patre non esse. Non igitur invenis, quae concupiscentia carnis non sit a Patre; quia et immodica bonum est apud te; et ille potius non est bonus, qui bono immodico utitur, id est, qui bono male utitur. Quid ergo dubitas breviter aperteque dicere, quod obscure longis anfractibus dicis, quod dixit Ioannes falsum esse, et te verum dicere? Falsum est enim quod ille ait: Concupiscentia carnis non est a Patre; a quo sunt omnia naturalia bona; si concupiscentia carnis, ut dicitis, et tunc bona est, cum ea quisque immodica utitur; sed ille malus est qui bono male utitur.
Augustine. But you do not want the concupiscence of the flesh to be understood as evil even when it is immoderate, but as a good, and rather that those use a good badly who use it immoderately. And through this, if the concupiscence of the flesh is a good, then surely the moderate is a moderate good, and the immoderate an immoderate good; but to use it moderately is, as you say, to use a good well; and to use it immoderately is, as you say, to use a good badly. Just as wine is without doubt good—for every creature of God is good (See 1 Tim 4:4)—and he who uses a little wine uses a good well, but he who uses immoderate wine uses a good badly. But John would never say that wine is not from the Father, as he said that the concupiscence of the flesh is not from the Father. You do not, then, find what concupiscence of the flesh is not from the Father, since even the immoderate is with you a good, and rather he is not good who uses an immoderate good, that is, who uses a good badly. Why, then, do you hesitate to say briefly and openly what you say obscurely by long windings—that what John said is false, and that you say what is true? For it is false, what he says: The concupiscence of the flesh is not from the Father—from whom are all natural goods—if the concupiscence of the flesh, as you say, is good even when one uses it immoderately, and only he is evil who uses a good badly.
JulianImp.4.21IV. 22. Iulianus. Praecipit ergo non diligi mundum, neque ea quae in mundo sunt; et dicit quoniam dilectoribus saeculi Dei caritas inesse non possit: sed non ut hoc nomine dilectionis a saeculo submovendae, alterum eius quam Deum verum intellegi faciat conditorem; verum ut agnoscant fideles, nullas praesentis vitae cupiditates praeferendas esse virtutibus, ne mens eorum aut comparandis opibus, aut conquirendis voluptatibus occupata, a christianae, quae vera est, philosophiae deducatur vigore. Quoniam omne quod est in mundo, concupiscentia carnis, et concupiscentia oculorum est, et superbia vitae; quae non est ex Patre, sed ex mundo est; et mundus transit, et concupiscentia eius; qui autem facit voluntatem Dei, manet in aeternum . Mundi ergo nomine, mores hominum nihil post hanc vitam esse autumantium, diversasque mortalium tam pompas quam luxurias indicavit.
IV. 22. Julian. He commands, then, that the world not be loved, nor the things that are in the world; and he says that the love of God cannot be in the lovers of this age—but not in order to make another than the true God to be understood as its founder by this name of love to be withdrawn from the age; rather, that the faithful may recognize that no desires of the present life are to be preferred to the virtues, lest their mind, occupied either in acquiring riches or in seeking out pleasures, be led away from the vigor of the Christian—which is the true—philosophy. Since all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life; which is not from the Father, but is from the world; and the world passes away, and its concupiscence; but he who does the will of God remains forever (1 John 2:16-17). By the name of the world, then, he indicated the morals of human beings who claim that there is nothing after this life, and the various pomps and luxuries of mortals.
JulianImp.4.22Augustinus. Ergo si mundi nomine, mores hominum nihil post hanc vitam esse autumantium, diversasque mortalium tam pompas quam luxurias indicavit; in his sunt illa quae esse dixit in mundo, et a Patre non esse; in quibus primum locum tenet tua illa pulchra suscepta, concupiscentia scilicet carnis. Sed tu videris, in moribus hominum nihil post hanc vitam esse opinantium, voluisse intellegi oculorum concupiscentiam, quoniam his rebus quas vident inhaerendo, nolunt ea quae non vident credere; in pompis autem mortalium, ambitionem saeculi vel superbiam vitae; in luxuriis vero, concupiscentiam carnis; ut omnia tria quae Ioannes posuit, complexus esse videaris; quasi possit esse luxuria quam vituperas, nisi consentiatur concupiscentiae carnis quam vituperandam esse non putas, et bonum appellando insuper laudas. Quid est autem insanius, quam luxuriam malum, et concupiscentiam luxuriae bonum dicere? Et putare Apostolum Christi nomine concupiscentiae carnis, non ipsam concupiscentiam carnis, sed potius accusasse luxuriam, quae omnino nulla est, nisi cum quisque concupiscentia carnis illicitur, trahitur, possidetur? Quasi non invenerit tantus doctor unde illam, sed unde luxuriosum nomine eius argueret; cum luxuriosus non esset arguendus, nisi eius desideriis oboediret. Desine multum dicere et parum sapere. Numquam efficies, quantolibet loquacitatis tuae flumine, quo in profunda raptaris; prorsus numquam efficies, ut luxuria sit malum, et concupiscere quae ad luxuriam pertinent non sit malum, etiamsi tali concupiscentiae non consentiatur, ne malum perpetretur.
Augustine. Therefore, if by the name of the world he indicated the morals of human beings who claim that there is nothing after this life, and the various pomps and luxuries of mortals; among these are those things which he said are in the world, and are not from the Father; in which the first place is held by that beautiful thing you have taken up—namely, the concupiscence of the flesh. But you, it seems, wished, in the morals of human beings who suppose there is nothing after this life, the concupiscence of the eyes to be understood, since by clinging to those things which they see, they refuse to believe the things they do not see; but in the pomps of mortals, the ambition of this age or the pride of life; and in the luxuries, the concupiscence of the flesh—so that you may seem to have embraced all three things which John set down; as though there could be luxury, which you censure, unless consent be given to the concupiscence of the flesh, which you do not think should be censured, and which, by calling it a good, you even praise besides. But what is more insane than to call luxury an evil, and the concupiscence of luxury a good? And to think that the Apostle of Christ, under the name of the concupiscence of the flesh, accused not the concupiscence of the flesh itself, but rather luxury, which is altogether nothing unless one is enticed, dragged, possessed by the concupiscence of the flesh? As though so great a teacher did not find by what to accuse, not it, but the luxurious man by its name; since the luxurious man would not be accused, unless he obeyed its desires. Stop saying much and being wise about little. You will never effect, by however great a river of your loquacity, into whose depths you are swept; you will absolutely never effect that luxury be an evil, and that to desire the things that pertain to luxury be not an evil, even if no consent be given to such concupiscence, lest an evil be perpetrated.
JulianImp.4.22IV. 23. Iulianus. Sic enim et in Evangelio suo dixerat: Mundus per ipsum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit ; non utique ut elementa Christum ratione carentia potuisse viderentur vel cognoscere vel negare; sed ut mundi appellatione turba infidelium signaretur. Eodem ergo more in praesenti quoque, omne quod in mundo est, id est, omnia genera hominum ita voluptatibus inhaerentia, ut bona cuncta rationabilis animantis aut potestatum phaleris, aut opum sarcinis, sensibus metiantur, exosa ait superbia turguisse, quae ex Deo non est, id est, Deo non placet, sed ex mundo est, voluntatis scilicet humanae pravitate concepta. Et ideo vos, inquit, sua non debet aemulatione corrumpere; quia qui facit voluntatem Dei, aeternae fit beatitudinis compos, nec cum praesentium fragilitate praetervolat. Ergo Ioannes apostolus odio haberi mundum praecepit, quomodo et Dominus in Evangelio, non solum corpus, sed etiam animam ipsam nostram odio habendam esse monstravit: Qui - inquit - non odit patrem, aut fratrem, insuper etiam animam suam, non est me dignus . Cum certe fidelium animus se odisse non possit, qui amore consultissimo felicitatem suam doloribus etiam et periculis mercatur. Quid igitur egimus? Apostolum videlicet Ioannem, ex more Scripturarum mundi vocabulo non naturam perculisse rerum, sed vitia voluntatum; atque ita concupiscentiam carnis negasse ex Deo esse, sicut omnia quae in mundo sunt. Quod Manichaeus non secundum Apostoli sensum, sed secundum perfidiam suam velut consequenter arripiens, non concupiscentiam carnis, nec ipsam carnem, nec totum postremo mundum a Deo confirmat effectum; quem tu secutus, concupiscentiam carnis, non a Deo, sed a diabolo conditam credis.
IV. 23. Julian. For so too in his Gospel he had said: The world was made through him, and the world did not know him (John 1:10); not, surely, so that the elements, lacking reason, could be seen to be able to know or deny Christ, but so that by the name of the world the throng of unbelievers might be signified. In the same manner, then, in the present passage too, all that is in the world—that is, all kinds of human beings so clinging to pleasures that they measure all the goods of a rational living being either by the trappings of powers or by the burdens of riches by their senses—he says swelled up with hateful pride, which is not from God, that is, does not please God, but is from the world, that is, conceived by the depravity of the human will. And therefore, he says, it ought not corrupt you by emulation of it; because he who does the will of God becomes a partaker of eternal blessedness, and does not fly past with the fragility of present things. The apostle John, then, commanded the world to be held in hatred, just as the Lord too in the Gospel showed that not only the body, but even our very soul must be held in hatred: Whoever—he says—does not hate his father, or brother, and besides even his own soul, is not worthy of me (See Luke 14:26). Although surely the mind of the faithful cannot hate itself, since by a most prudent love it purchases its happiness even with sorrows and dangers. What, then, did we accomplish? Namely, that the apostle John, by the word of the world, in the manner of the Scriptures, struck not the nature of things, but the defects of wills; and so denied that the concupiscence of the flesh is from God, just as all the things that are in the world. Which the Manichean, seizing upon as though consequent, not according to the Apostle's meaning but according to his own perfidy, affirms that not the concupiscence of the flesh, nor the flesh itself, nor finally the whole world, was effected by God; and you, following him, believe that the concupiscence of the flesh was founded not by God, but by the devil.
JulianImp.4.23Augustinus. Hanc ergo concupiscentiam carnis malum dico esse, quam dicit Ioannes a Patre non esse, et quam dicit Ambrosius in naturam nostram ex primi hominis praevaricatione vertisse ; unde Ioannes volens homines intellegi, eam dicit ex mundo esse. Hanc concupiscentiam carnis et Manichaeus malum dicit; sed unde sit nescit; tu autem bonum dicis, quia et tu unde sit nescis; et eam negando esse unde illam esse dicit Ambrosius, facis ut naturae mali, quam Deo coaeternam desipit, recte sibi eam videatur tribuere Manichaeus. Ergo ut et tu redarguaris et Manichaeus, illud quod dicit Ioannes apostolus, episcopus exponit Ambrosius. Quod enim per praevaricationem primi hominis in naturam vertit, non utique Deo coaeternum malum est; taceat ergo Manichaeus: et tamen malum est; taceat ergo etiam Iulianus.
Augustine. This concupiscence of the flesh, then, I say is evil, which John says is not from the Father, and which Ambrose says turned into our nature from the transgression of the first man; whence John, wishing human beings to be understood, says it is from the world. This concupiscence of the flesh the Manichean too calls evil; but he does not know whence it is; you, however, call it good, because you too do not know whence it is; and by denying it to be whence Ambrose says it is, you bring it about that the Manichean seems to himself to attribute it rightly to a nature of evil, which he raves to be coeternal with God. Therefore, that both you and the Manichean may be refuted, that which the apostle John says, the bishop Ambrose expounds. For what turned into nature through the transgression of the first man is surely not an evil coeternal with God; let the Manichean, then, be silent: and yet it is an evil; let Julian too, then, be silent.
JulianImp.4.23IV. 24. Iulianus. Constat itaque beatum Ioannem nullam tibi erroris occasionem dedisse: te porro id quod Manichaeus protulit imbibisse. Atque ut Apostoli iam existimatione defensa, manum super hoc vel breviter construamus: quid hic sanctum Ioannem existimas intimare, cum concupiscentiam carnis et concupiscentiam oculorum ex Deo non esse pronuntiat? Genusne ipsum concupiscentiae, quae non mediocritate concessa, sed nimietate prohibita in vitium cadit; an solum excessum, qui non naturalis, sed voluntarius deprehenditur?
IV. 24. Julian. It is established, then, that blessed John gave you no occasion of error; but that you imbibed what the Manichean brought forth. And, the Apostle's estimation now defended, let us lay hands, even if briefly, upon this point: what do you suppose holy John intimates here, when he pronounces the concupiscence of the flesh and the concupiscence of the eyes not to be from God? The very genus of concupiscence, which falls into vice not by the moderation that is granted, but by the excess that is forbidden—or only that excess, which is found to be not natural but voluntary?
JulianImp.4.24Augustinus. Si in vitium cadit, tunc eam saltem malum esse concede; sed cur eam tunc quoque bonum esse contendis, et eum bono male uti dicis, qui concessum eius modum excedit? Sic enim non ipsa, sed ille cadit in vitium, qui ea male utitur. Videsne quam nescias quid loquaris, quando nec in tua definitione consistis?
Augustine. If it falls into vice, then at least concede that it is evil; but why do you then too contend that it is good, and say that he uses a good badly who exceeds its granted measure? For thus it is not the concupiscence itself, but he who uses it badly that falls into vice. Do you see how you do not know what you are saying, when you do not even stand by your own definition?
JulianImp.4.24IV. 25. Iulianus. Si dixeris, nomine concupiscentiae, etiam illum ipsum modum, quo licita rerum naturalium afficitur voluptate, ut concupiscentia carnis in universum reprobata videatur; ergo et sensum oculorum, et mundum ipsum, et quidquid in mundo est, a diabolo conditum profitere; quia omnia pariter ex Deo non esse dicuntur. Quod certe si annueris, non efficieris Manichaeus; es enim etiam nunc; sed hoc te esse, ut argumentis tuis olim, ita quoque professione monstrabis. Si autem nudatum errorem pavescens, dixeris Apostolum nomine concupiscentiae carnis et oculorum concupiscentiae, et nomine mundi, non res ipsas, quae cum intra concessos fines tenentur, innocuae sunt; cum autem in illicita procurrunt, fiunt reprehensibiles, adnotasse; clarebit, quod in primo opere egimus, concupiscentiae naturalis non genus, non speciem, non modum, sed excessum tantum in culpam venire. Atque ideo hoc testimonium Apostoli in reliquum pudenter caveto, ne illud si vel levi commemoratione pollueris, defensus quidem nihil, propalam vero proditus approberis.
IV. 25. Julian. If you say that by the name of concupiscence is meant even that very measure by which one is affected by the lawful pleasure of natural things, so that the concupiscence of the flesh seems reproved in its entirety; then profess too that the sense of the eyes, and the world itself, and whatever is in the world, was founded by the devil, since all are alike said not to be from God. If indeed you grant this, you will not be made a Manichean—for you are one even now—but you will show that you are one not only by your arguments, as before, but also by profession. But if, dreading your naked error, you say that the Apostle, by the name of the concupiscence of the flesh and of the concupiscence of the eyes, and by the name of the world, noted not the things themselves, which, when they are held within the granted bounds, are harmless, but, when they run out into unlawful things, become reprehensible; it will be clear—what we treated in the first work—that of natural concupiscence not the genus, not the species, not the measure, but only the excess comes into fault. And therefore for the rest beware modestly of this testimony of the Apostle, lest, if you pollute it even by a light mention, you, defended in nothing, be approved as openly betrayed.
JulianImp.4.25Augustinus. Sed, homo contentiose, modus concupiscentiae, quem dicis esse concessum, tunc non servatur, quando illi impellenti consentitur, aut ceditur, et itur in eius excessum; quo ut non eatur, resistitur malo. Quis enim dubitet malum esse, cui si oboedias, malum facis; si repugnes, bonum? Qui ergo vult temperanter vivere, non consentiat malo quod laudas; et qui vult fideliter vivere, non tibi consentiat cum malum laudas; proinde ut vos caveat, concupiscentiam carnis malum esse sciat; ut autem et vos et Manichaeos, unde sit sciat.
Augustine. But, contentious man, the measure of concupiscence which you say is granted is not preserved when consent is given to it as it impels, or yielded to, and one goes into its excess; lest one go into it, the evil is resisted. For who would doubt that it is evil, which, if you obey it, you do evil; if you fight against it, good? Whoever, then, wishes to live temperately, let him not consent to the evil which you praise; and whoever wishes to live faithfully, let him not consent to you when you praise the evil; accordingly, that he may beware of you, let him know that the concupiscence of the flesh is evil; but that he may beware of both you and the Manicheans, let him know whence it is.
JulianImp.4.25IV. 26. Iulianus. Exercui hunc locum in secundo prioris operis libello, atque ostendi, prius in homine concupiscentiam carnis quae speciem irritat saporis et oculorum fuisse, quam culpam.
IV. 26. Julian. I treated this place in the second little book of my earlier work, and I showed that the concupiscence of the flesh, which excites the appearance of taste and of the eyes, was earlier in man than the fault.
JulianImp.4.26Augustinus. Huic libro tuo secundo, satis respondi quarto meo. Nam sicut ibi, ita et hic garris inania. Nullo enim modo ostendisti, concupiscentiam carnis, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, prius in homine esse coepisse, quam culpam. Quidquid illud est, quod duo illi homines post peccatum in membris suis senserunt novum, unde pudor eorum pudenda contexit, procul dubio culpa contraxit.
Augustine. To this second book of yours I answered sufficiently in my fourth. For just as there, so here too you chatter empty things. For in no way did you show that the concupiscence of the flesh, by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit, began to be in man earlier than the fault. Whatever that thing was that those two human beings, after the sin, felt as new in their members—whence their shame covered the shameful parts—without doubt the fault contracted it.
JulianImp.4.26IV. 27. Iulianus. Hic tamen necessario exigo, quibus tibi somniis revelatum sit, ut nomine concupiscentiae, coeuntium libidinem indicatam putares. Salvis enim opibus veritatis, quas disputatio longa patefecit, putemus necdum claruisse, ad eumdem auctorem attinere sensus carnis, ad quem eius forma pertineat.
IV. 27. Julian. Here, however, I necessarily require by what dreams it was revealed to you, that by the name of concupiscence you should think the disordered desire of those coming together is meant. For, with the resources of truth preserved—which a long disputation has laid open—let us suppose that it has not yet become clear that the sense of the flesh pertains to the same author to whom its form belongs.
JulianImp.4.27Augustinus. Alii sunt carnis sensus, quibus caro praesentia corporalia spiritui quodam modo nuntiat; et alii sunt carnalis concupiscentiae motus, quibus caro adversus spiritum concupiscens in quaeque illicita atque inhonesta praecipitat, nisi adversus eam etiam ipse spiritus concupiscat; quae discordia carnis et spiritus, non creatori carnis aut sensus, sed malo suasori et homini praevaricatori tribuitur ab eis, quorum fide sana error insanus Pelagianorum et Manichaeorum damnatur.
Augustine. The senses of the flesh are one thing, by which the flesh, in a certain way, announces present corporeal things to the spirit; and the movements of carnal concupiscence are another, by which the flesh, having desires opposed to the spirit, hurls into all unlawful and dishonorable things, unless the spirit too has desires opposed to it; which discord of flesh and spirit is attributed, not to the creator of flesh or of sense, but to the evil persuader and to the man who transgressed, by those whose sound faith condemns the insane error of the Pelagians and the Manicheans.
JulianImp.4.27IV. 28. Iulianus. Sed si hoc fingatur ambiguum, te continuo crassissima dubii nubes involvet. Hac quippe concupiscentia carnis nullum absolute genitalium tenetur indicium. Dicam ergo aures hoc vocabulo variorum sitientes carminum verberari, dicam castigari a sancto Ioanne helluonum palatum, dicam culpari immorientes odoribus nares; totum postremo praeter id quod tu arbitraris; libera est electio, ubi specialis verbi nulla pressura est. Aut ergo nega illa quae diximus concupisci; et inficiare, ut soles, omnium conscientiae; aut si necdum eo usque impudentia incalluit, ut his conetur obniti, assentire damnationem genitalis iucunditatis nec in sermonibus inveniri.
IV. 28. Julian. But if this is feigned to be doubtful, at once a most dense cloud of doubt will envelop you. For by this concupiscence of the flesh no indication of the genitals at all is held. I shall say, then, that the ears are beaten by this word, thirsting for various songs; I shall say that the palate of gluttons is chastised by holy John; I shall say that the nostrils dying upon odors are blamed; in short, everything except what you suppose: the choice is free, where there is no pressure of a special word. Either, then, deny that the things we have mentioned are desired, and contradict, as you are accustomed, the conscience of all; or, if shamelessness has not yet grown so callous as to try to resist these things, assent that the condemnation of genital pleasure is found in no discourses.
JulianImp.4.28Augustinus. Ita hoc dicis, quasi nos concupiscentiam carnis in solam voluptatem genitalium dicamus aestuare. Prorsus in quocumque corporis sensu caro contra spiritum concupiscit, ipsa cognoscitur; et quoniam si non adversus eam spiritus fortius concupiscat, ad mala pertrahit, malum esse convincitur. Propter ipsam Scriptura dicit: Nequius oculo quid creatum est? Et utique oculum, non nequitiam, creavit omnium creator Deus et corporum et sensuum. Ecce unde intellegas (si veritati non resistas) inesse malum naturae nostrae, etiam cum creatur, quamvis creetur a bono bene bonum. Sed unde sit hoc malum, disce ab Ambrosio, ne ad aliam, id est, mali naturam introducendam Deo coaeternam, suffragium praebeas Manichaeo.
Augustine. You say this as though we said that the concupiscence of the flesh seethes only in the pleasure of the genitals. Absolutely, in whatever sense of the body the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit, it is recognized; and since, if the spirit does not more strongly have desires opposed to it, it drags to evils, it is convicted of being evil. On account of it Scripture says: What has been created more wicked than the eye? (See Sir 31:13 (Vg)) And surely God, the creator of all bodies and senses, created the eye, not wickedness. Behold whence you may understand (if you do not resist the truth) that there is evil in our nature, even when it is created, although it is created good, well, by the good. But whence this evil is, learn from Ambrose, lest you furnish support to the Manichean for introducing another nature, that is, of evil, coeternal with God.
JulianImp.4.28IV. 29. Iulianus. Quid ergo tibi opitulari potest, quod ego inter commixtionem sexuum, fecunditatem coeuntium, nolui concupiscentiae nomine lacerare, cum eam nec tu cum Manichaeo diabolicam potueris approbare; et iam ipsa praemissae disputationis consequentia claruisset, ad eiusdem operam recurrere sensum illam, quo commixtorum corpus afficitur, ad cuius institutionem corpora, coniugia semina referrentur?
IV. 29. Julian. What, then, can it profit you, that I, amid the mingling of the sexes, the fruitfulness of those coming together, was unwilling to tear it to pieces under the name of concupiscence, since you could not, with the Manichean, approve it as diabolical; and since now, by the very consequence of the foregoing disputation, it had become clear that the sense by which the body of those mingled is affected recurs to the work of him to whose institution bodies, marriages, seeds are referred?
JulianImp.4.29Augustinus. Alia est vis sentiendi, aliud vitium concupiscendi; discerne duo ista diligenter, noli errare deformiter. Alia est, inquam, vis sentiendi, aliud vitium concupiscendi. Lege Evangelium: Qui viderit, inquit, mulierem ad concupiscendum eam, iam moechatus est eam in corde suo . Non dixit: Qui viderit, quod est sentire per eum sensum corporis qui dicitur visus; sed: qui viderit, inquit, ad concupiscendum, quod est videre ad malum. Visus ergo sensus carnis est bonus: concupiscentia vero carnis motus est malus. Quo malo si bene utitur coniugatus, non eum bonum facit; sed operi bono servire compellit. Facit enim nonnisi boni aliquid et per ipsum, si nihil faciat propter ipsum; si autem faciat aliquid, sed tamen in coniuge, propter ipsum, non ei veniam daret Apostolus gratia nuptiarum , si non agnosceret esse peccatum.
Augustine. The power of sensing is one thing, the defect of desiring another; distinguish these two carefully, do not err deformedly. The power of sensing is one thing, I say, the defect of desiring another. Read the Gospel: Whoever, it says, has looked at a woman to desire her has already committed adultery with her in his heart (Matt 5:28). It did not say: Whoever has looked—which is to sense through that sense of the body called sight; but: whoever has looked, it says, to desire, which is to look toward evil. Sight, then, the sense of the flesh, is good; but the concupiscence of the flesh is an evil movement. If a married man uses this evil well, he does not make it good; but he compels it to serve a good work. For he does nothing but something good even through it, if he does nothing on account of it; but if he does something on account of it, yet within his spouse, the Apostle would not grant him pardon by the grace of marriage (See 1 Cor 7:6), did he not recognize it to be sin.
JulianImp.4.29IV. 30. Iulianus. Oportet quidem nihil post primum opus, quod ad sanctum Turbantium edidi, super necessario naturalium pudore disserere; quia ibi ita plene actum est, ut nisi depositis omnino mentibus, nihil hinc possit ambiguitatis oboriri.
IV. 30. Julian. It is fitting indeed to dispute nothing, after the first work which I published to holy Turbantius, about the necessary shame of natural things; because there it was treated so fully that, unless minds were laid utterly aside, no ambiguity could arise from this.
JulianImp.4.30Augustinus. Sanctus forte Turbantius, ipso opere tuo lecto, quod ad eum te scripsisse commemoras, etiam propterea in catholicam fidem respiravit, quoniam te in tali causa defecisse cognovit.
Augustine. Perhaps holy Turbantius, having read that very work of yours which you record you wrote to him, even for this reason breathed again into the Catholic faith—because he recognized that you had failed in such a cause.
JulianImp.4.30IV. 31. Iulianus. Tamen cum defensor traducis ne tenui quidem possit ab eo ungue deflectere, meumque rhetorica elegantia fatiget pudorem, cur diversis hominibus negotium ipsum commixtionis iuvat hinc ea quae rebus actis convenit, parcitate decernere? Et in hoc ergo loco, et in inferioribus, ubi ego dixi: " Propter hoc relinquet homo patrem et matrem, et adhaerescet uxori; et erunt duo in carne una " ; ut exprimeret fidem operum Propheta prope periculum pudoris accessit; quasi praedam inveniens gestit, exsultat, et clamat: Aperta prorsus, et vi veritatis, inquit, extorta confessio! Dicatur causa, cur in exprimendis operibus Dei, Propheta prope periculum pudoris accesserit. Itane vero humana opera pudenda esse non debent, sed plane glorianda, et divina pudenda sunt? Itane vero in eloquendis et exprimendis operibus Dei, non honoratur Prophetae vel amor vel labor, sed periclitatur pudor? Quid enim potuit Deus facere, quod eius praedicatorem pudeat dicere? Et quod est gravius, pudeat hominem alicuius operis, quod non homo, sed Deus fecit in homine; cum omnes opifices quantum possunt labore et industria id agant, ne de suis operibus erubescant? Sed profecto illud nos pudet, quod puduit primos illos homines, quando pudenda texerunt; illa est poena peccati, illa plaga vestigiumque peccati, illa illecebra fomesque peccati, illa lex in membris repugnans legi mentis. Huius pudet, et merito pudet. Nam si hoc non esset, quid nobis esset ingratius, quid irreligiosius, si in membris nostris, non de vitio vel poena nostra, sed de Dei confunderemur operibus? Claruit certe qualiter gestiat; gaudio suo non potest adhibere frenos; tenet meam sententiam, qua concupiscentiam naturalem malam possit ostendere, et diaboli operibus deputare; quam sententiam de ore meo dicit vi veritatis extortam, concionaturque scelestissimum atque profanissimum esse, si ea quae a Deo facta dicamus, pudore operienda fateamur. Sed alacritate commotior non potuit ponderare quid diceret; asserens enim in operibus Dei pudendum nihil esse, operam autem genitalium pudendam esse, et ideo non posse eam Conditoris operibus adscribi; subito confessus est illam non solum honestam, sed etiam iustam; non solum creante Deo, verum etiam iudicante, nostris corporibus attributam. Ostendi in tertio prioris operis libro, non posse idem poenam esse quod culpam.
IV. 31. Julian. Yet, since the defender of traduction cannot turn aside from it by so much as a fingernail, and harasses my modesty with rhetorical elegance, why should it help to decree the very business of mingling, with the sparingness that befits things done, for different people? In this place too, then, and in those below, where I said: "For this reason a man shall leave father and mother and cling to his wife; and the two shall be one flesh" (Gen 2:24); so that the Prophet, in order to express the faithfulness of the works, drew near to the peril of shame—as though finding plunder, he exults, he leaps, and he cries out: An open confession, wrested out by the force of truth—he says. Let the cause be told, why, in expressing the works of God, the Prophet drew near to the peril of shame. Are human works, then, not to be shameful, but plainly to be gloried in, while divine works are shameful? Is it true that, in uttering and expressing the works of God, not the love or labor of the Prophet is honored, but his shame is endangered? For what could God have made, that his proclaimer should be ashamed to tell? And, what is graver, that a man should be ashamed of some work which not man, but God made in man—when all craftsmen, as much as they can, by labor and industry, act so as not to blush at their own works? But surely it is that which shames us, which shamed those first human beings, when they covered the shameful parts; that is the punishment of sin, that is the wound and the trace of sin, that is the enticement and the tinder of sin, that is the law in the members resisting the law of the mind. Of this we are ashamed, and rightly ashamed. For if this were not so, what would be more ungrateful for us, what more irreligious, if in our members we were confounded not by our defect or punishment, but by the works of God? It became clear, surely, how he exults; he cannot put reins on his joy; he holds my sentence, by which he can show natural concupiscence to be evil and assign it to the works of the devil; which sentence he says was wrested from my mouth by the force of truth, and he harangues that it is most wicked and most profane, if we should confess that the things we say were made by God must be covered by shame. But, too moved by alacrity, he could not weigh what he was saying; for, asserting that in the works of God there is nothing shameful, but that the work of the genitals is shameful, and therefore cannot be ascribed to the works of the Founder, he has suddenly confessed it to be not only honorable but even just—not only with God creating, but even with God judging—allotted to our bodies. I showed in the third book of my earlier work that the punishment cannot be the same as the fault.
JulianImp.4.31Augustinus. Non ostendisti, quod te ostendisse inaniter iactas; immo etiam ipse quodam loco oblitus quid ante dixisses, confessus es culpam etiam poenam esse peccantis. Quod ego, cum tibi superius responderem , satis evidenter ostenderam, etiam per Apostolum probans puniri peccata peccatis; qui cum de quibusdam dixisset, quod immutaverint gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis, et volucrum, et quadrupedum, et serpentium; protinus hoc peccatum aliis peccatis ostendens esse punitum: Propterea, inquit, tradidit illos Deus in desideria cordis illorum, in immunditiam; ut contumeliis afficiant corpora sua in semetipsis , et cetera quae ibi contexuit. Nec in Psalmo diceretur: Appone iniquitatem super iniquitatem eorum, et non intrent in tuam iustitiam ; nisi iusto iudicio Dei punirentur additis praecedentia peccata peccatis.
Augustine. You did not show what you vainly boast you showed; nay rather, you yourself in a certain place, forgetting what you had said before, confessed that the fault is also a punishment of the one who sins. Which I, when I answered you above, had shown evidently enough, proving also through the Apostle that sins are punished by sins; who, when he had said of certain people that they had changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of serpents, at once, showing this sin to be punished by other sins: Therefore, he says, God handed them over to the desires of their heart, unto uncleanness; that they should afflict their own bodies with insults among themselves (See Rom 1:23-24), and the rest which he there wove together. Nor would it be said in the Psalm, Add iniquity upon their iniquity, and let them not enter into your righteousness (Ps 69:27 (68:28)), unless, by the just judgment of God, preceding sins were punished by added sins.
JulianImp.4.31IV. 32. Iulianus. Et ideo super hoc laborandum non est; commendo tamen disputatoris acrimoniam, qui quam dicit a Deo redditam, non vult a Deo conditam; pronuntians Dei non convenire operibus, quod vult eius convenire iudiciis.
IV. 32. Julian. And therefore one need not labor over this; yet I commend the disputant's sharpness, who does not want what he says was rendered by God to be founded by God; pronouncing that what he wants to befit his judgments does not befit the works of God.
JulianImp.4.32Augustinus. Apparet te non intellegere quomodo dictum sit: Deus mortem non fecit ; cuius tamen iudicio qui peccat moritur. Convenit ergo iudicio eius ut moriatur peccator; nec tamen operi eius convenit mors, quia Deus mortem non fecit. Eius quippe iustum est iudicium, ut peccato suo quisque pereat, cum peccatum Deus non faciat; sicut mortem non fecit, et tamen quem morte dignum censet, occidit. Unde legitur: Deus mortem non fecit; legitur: Mors et vita a Domino Deo est ; quae duo inter se non esse contraria profecto videt, quisquis ab operibus divinis iudicia divina discernit; quod tu si potuisses, non utique ista vana dixisses.
Augustine. It appears that you do not understand how it was said, God did not make death (Wis 1:13)—by whose judgment, nonetheless, he who sins dies. It befits his judgment, then, that the sinner die; and yet death does not befit his work, because God did not make death. For it is his just judgment that each one perish by his own sin, although God does not make sin; just as he did not make death, and yet he slays the one whom he judges worthy of death. Whence it is read: God did not make death (Wis 1:13); it is read: Death and life are from the Lord God (See Sir 11:14); which two things he surely sees are not contrary to each other, whoever discerns the divine judgments from the divine works—which if you had been able to do, you would not have said these empty things.
JulianImp.4.32IV. 33. Iulianus. Ergo in operibus eius nullus pudor est; in sententiis autem summa deformitas. Certum est nempe, quod poenam mereatur reatus; num ideo tamen confusio culpae debita, in vindicta recurrit, ut appelletur sine pudore quod fecit reus, sed non possit sine ignominia dici quod iudicando fecit Deus?
IV. 33. Julian. Therefore in his works there is no shame; but in his sentences the utmost deformity. It is certain, surely, that guilt deserves punishment; yet does the confusion due to fault therefore recur in the avenging, so that what the guilty man did is called shameless, but what God did in judging cannot be told without ignominy?
JulianImp.4.33Augustinus. Quid explicata implicas, et evoluta convolvis, ut ingeniis tardioribus, qualia in hominibus plura sunt, videaris dicere aliquid, cum dicas nihil? Homo es enim, qui potius inverecundia quam facundia persuadere conaris, quod deformitas vel nulla, vel parva sit, ut cum subiecta esse caro spiritui debeat, adversus spiritum concupiscat; aut quod non sit iustum Dei iudicium, relinquere delinquentem, ut ipse sibi sit poena, cui Deus fuerat vera felicitas; aut quod de peccato debeat, non de poena sua quisque confundi; cum plerique de peccatis suis non erubescant, si nulla poena fuerit subsecuta quam sentiant, et eos faciat poena confundi, quod non fecisset impunitas. Sed contra res apertissimas quem liberet esse disertum, nisi a veritate desertum? Utrumque autem nos libere dicimus, et quod fecit homo volens, et quod passus est nolens; id est, et spiritus inoboedientiam, et carnis contra spiritum concupiscentiam; sed unum horum dicere tu erubescebas, ne nos admoneres unde tuum convinceremus errorem. Et nunc quando iam concupiscentiam carnis et libidinem nominas, ne de tuae susceptae nomine erubescere dicaris, plus erubescere times, et errare non times.
Augustine. Why do you entangle what is unfolded, and roll up what is unrolled, so that to slower wits—of which there are many among human beings—you may seem to say something, when you say nothing? For you are a man who tries to persuade rather by shamelessness than by eloquence: that the deformity is either none or slight, that, when the flesh ought to be subject to the spirit, it has desires opposed to the spirit; or that it is not the just judgment of God to abandon the one who offends, so that he may be a punishment to himself, to whom God had been the true happiness; or that each one ought to be confounded by his sin, not by his punishment—when most people are not ashamed of their sins, if no punishment which they feel has followed, and the punishment makes them confounded, which impunity would not have done. But against most open matters who would care to be eloquent, except one deserted by the truth? Both of these we say freely: both what man did willing, and what he suffered unwilling; that is, both the disobedience of the spirit, and the concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit; but one of these you blushed to say, lest you warn us whence we might convict your error. And now, when you already name the concupiscence of the flesh and disordered desire, lest you be said to blush at the name of the thing you have taken up, you fear more to blush, and do not fear to err.
JulianImp.4.33IV. 34. Iulianus. Constat tamen accusatorem nostrum in eodem, quem aversatur luto volvi. Cum enim confinxerit iuste redditam libidinis poenam, et hanc iustitiam divinae inculcat convenire sententiae, in prolatione autem sententiae opus Dei esse non denegat, ex qua libidinem evenisse dicit, quam erubescendam fatetur; in operam nimirum Dei, illum, quem propulsaverat, reduxit pudorem.
IV. 34. Julian. Yet it is established that our accuser is rolling in the very mud he shuns. For when he has feigned that the punishment of disordered desire was justly rendered, and drives home that this justice befits the divine sentence—while in the pronouncing of the sentence he does not deny it to be a work of God, from which he says disordered desire arose, which he confesses must be blushed at—he has surely brought back upon the work of God that shame which he had thrust away.
JulianImp.4.34Augustinus. Iam tibi dictum est: Deus mortem non fecit ; in prolatione autem sententiae Dei est: Morte morieris . Ecce Deus hoc retribui peccatori fecit, quod Deus ipse non fecit. Et tamen quia Deus ultionum est , dicit etiam creare se mala ; et quaedam in libro Ecclesiastici ad vindictam creata dicuntur . Sed cum peccatum etiam poena peccati est, non Deus peccatum facit opere iniquo, sed ut peccatum sit poena peccantis facit opere iusto. Quis enim neget esse peccatum, prophetis mendacibus credere? Et tamen haec fuit poena regis Achab, divino inflicta iudicio, sicut Regnorum testatur historia . Nec ideo quisquam ita desipit, ut pseudoprophetarum putet laudanda esse mendacia, aut mendacii Deum dicat auctorem, cum iudicio iusto, ubi tali poena perspicit dignum, facit decipi quemque mendacio. Lege, et intellege; et noli tibi, ne intellegas, tumultu loquacitatis obstrepere.
Augustine. Already it has been said to you: God did not make death (Wis 1:13); but in the pronouncing of the sentence it is God's: You shall die the death (See Gen 2:17). Behold, God brought it about that this be rendered to the sinner, which God himself did not make. And yet, because God is the God of vengeances (See Ps 94:1 (93:1)), he says that he creates evils (See Isa 45:7); and certain things in the book of Sirach are said to have been created for vengeance (See Sir 39:28-31). But when sin is also the punishment of sin, God does not make sin by an unjust work, but, that sin be the punishment of the sinner, he makes by a just work. For who would deny it to be a sin to believe lying prophets? And yet this was the punishment of king Ahab, inflicted by divine judgment, as the history of the Kingdoms attests (See 1 Kgs 22:19-23). Nor for that reason does anyone so lose his senses as to think that the lies of the false prophets are to be praised, or to call God the author of a lie, when by a just judgment, where he perceives one worthy of such a punishment, he causes one to be deceived by a lie. Read, and understand; and do not, lest you understand, drown yourself out with the tumult of loquacity.
JulianImp.4.34IV. 35. Iulianus. Ad quod tamen quasi corollarium peculiaris sceleris adiunxit, ut talem poenam a Deo illatam diceret, quae esset illecebra et fomes peccati, quae lex in membris invicta repugnaret legi mentis nostrae; quo genere ultionis multiplicaret Deus flagitia, non puniret; et qui iratus erat malae voluntati, qua fuerat erratum, reliquum faceret peccandi necessitatem. Quale sit tamen hoc iudicium, Manichaei furor viderit; dum constet, quia hic iudex qui ab Augustino fingitur, simularit se horrere peccatum, caeterum tanto eis adhaeret affectu, ut diligentiorem nutritium invenire non possint.
IV. 35. Julian. To which, however, as though a corollary of a special crime, he added, so as to say that such a punishment was inflicted by God as would be the enticement and tinder of sin, the law in the members fighting unconquered against the law of our mind; by which kind of vengeance God would multiply outrages, not punish them; and he who was angry at the evil will by which there had been straying would make for the rest a necessity of sinning. Yet what kind of judgment this is, let the fury of the Manichean see; while it stands established that this judge, who is feigned by Augustine, pretended to abhor sin, but for the rest clings to sinners with such affection that they could not find a more diligent foster-father.
JulianImp.4.35Augustinus. Lege quod scriptum est, quoniam non probaverunt Deum habere in notitia, tradidit illos Deus in reprobam mentem, ut faciant quae non conveniunt ; et vide quaedam peccata etiam poenas esse peccantium. Quomodo autem id faciat Deus ut intellegas, relege quod te admonui superius de rege Achab, cuius utique peccatum fuit credere pseudoprophetis; et tamen hoc peccatum, Deo vindicante, fuit etiam poena peccantis. Ista considera, et noli oblatrare veritati, ne in te quoque agnoscatur haec poena.
Augustine. Read what is written: that, since they did not approve of having God in their knowledge, God handed them over to a reprobate mind, to do the things that are not fitting (Rom 1:28); and see that certain sins are also the punishments of those who sin. But that you may understand how God does this, reread what I admonished you of above concerning king Ahab, whose sin, surely, was to believe the false prophets; and yet this sin, with God avenging, was also the punishment of the one who sinned. Consider these things, and do not bark against the truth, lest in you too this punishment be recognized.
JulianImp.4.35IV. 36. Iulianus. Quid ergo vis, subtilissime disputator? Sacrilegam esse in Dei operibus verecundiam, quia omnia quae Deus fecerit, passim agi debeant, ne nostra trepidatio opificem videatur arguere? Erravit ergo apostolus Paulus, qui Dei opera describens, ait: Verecundiora nostra maiorem honestatem habent; et Deus temperavit corpus, ei cui deerat abundantiore dato honore, ut non sit scissura in corpore .
IV. 36. Julian. What, then, do you want, most subtle disputant? That shame in the works of God is sacrilegious, because all the things that God made ought to be done everywhere openly, lest our trepidation seem to accuse the craftsman? The apostle Paul erred, then, who, describing the works of God, says: Our more shameful parts have greater honorableness; and God tempered the body, giving more abundant honor to that which lacked it, that there might be no division in the body (See 1 Cor 12:23-25).
JulianImp.4.36Augustinus. Lege diligenter, et inspice codicem graecum; et invenies Apostolum inhonesta dixisse, quae verecundiora tu dicis; et quaerens cur inhonesta sint, quae prius usque adeo fuerant honesta, ut nudi essent duo illi, et non confunderentur ; reperies, si non te animositas contentionis excaecet, ut hoc sequeretur, praecessisse peccatum; neque in hominibus primis Deum aliquid fecisse inhonestum; sicut nec mortem fecit Deus, cum corpus non faciat nisi Deus; et tamen: Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum , verax dicit Apostolus.
Augustine. Read carefully, and inspect the Greek codex; and you will find that the Apostle said uncomely what you say are more shameful parts; and, asking why they are uncomely, which before had been so comely that those two were naked and were not confounded (See Gen 2:25); you will find, if the animosity of contention does not blind you, that, in order that this should follow, sin went before; and that God made nothing uncomely in the first human beings—just as God did not make death, since God alone makes the body; and yet, The body indeed is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10), the truthful Apostle says.
JulianImp.4.36IV. 37. Iulianus. Errat etiam honestorum cautio, quae naturalibus rebus verecundiae praetendit umbracula. Tu ergo ipse reliquias ciborum, quas certe confiteris non pertinere ad libidinem, sub oculis depelle populorum; immo ut dogmati tuo auctoritatem concilies exemplo, in Ecclesia facito omnia, quae ad nutum dicis fieri voluntatis, contentusque operam solius commixtionis occulere, a qua, et olim proposito, forsitan, et nunc senio destitisti, dicito ad grande sacrilegium pertinere, si res quae Deum conditorem habet, publicum vitet aspectum. Comede igitur in foro, aut in synagogis, in quibus disputationes tuae personant; et cum vestimenta sub sole torrido fuerint, oneri, tegens illam tantummodo corporis tui partem quam diabolus movit, reliqua nudus incedito; quia pronuntias ingratum esse et profanum, si quid tegatur quod Dei operibus adscribitur. Quod cum horum nihil facis (si tamen non proficiendo feceris), ipsis operibus confirmas alterum de duobus, aut omnia ista ad diabolum pertinere, quae non exsequeris sub conspectu publico; aut dogma vestrum, si non corde, vel ventre tuo teste cecidisse.
IV. 37. Julian. The caution of honorable people too errs, then, which holds out the coverings of modesty for natural things. You, then, yourself drive out before the eyes of the peoples the remains of foods, which you certainly confess do not pertain to disordered desire; nay, that you may win authority for your teaching by example, do in church all the things which you say are done at the nod of the will, and, content to hide only the work of mingling—from which, perhaps by an old resolve, and now perhaps by old age, you have desisted—say that it pertains to great sacrilege if a thing which has God for its founder shuns the public gaze. Eat, then, in the forum, or in the synagogues, in which your disputations resound; and when garments are a burden under the scorching sun, covering only that part of your body which the devil moved, walk naked for the rest; since you pronounce it ungrateful and profane if anything be covered that is ascribed to the works of God. And since you do none of these things (if at least you do not do them by way of making progress), by these very deeds you confirm one of two things: either that all these things pertain to the devil, which you do not perform under the public gaze; or that your teaching, if not by your heart, has fallen at least with your belly as witness.
JulianImp.4.37Augustinus. Eorum quae occultat pudor, alia sunt horribilia, alia concupiscibilia; illa occuluntur, ne horreantur, sicut egestiones reliquiarum ex alimentis; ista vero, ne concupiscantur, vel ne id quod per ea fieri solet, admoneant concupisci, sicut sunt ea membra, quae ab ipso pudore proprie pudenda dicuntur, vel si eis ipsum concupiscentiae opus agitur. Nam et cetera corporis ab his remotiora, cum pudet nuda relinquere sive nudare, ad hoc pertinet, quoniam concupiscentia carnis latius per oculos pascitur. Unde illi impudici pudicam Susannam, quantum potuerunt, nudare voluerunt . Potest ergo bene intellegi etiam Deus, eiusdem quoque pudoris commendasse curam, quando illos qui sibi succinctoria fecerant, de sua nuditate confusi, etiam tunicis induit; propterea quidem pelliceis , ut corruptibilibus iam corporibus mors signaretur adiuncta. In publico autem vesci mos prohibet, quoscumque prohibet, et facere contra morem merito pudet. Nam Romani antiqui, quod etiam ipse legisti, in propatulo caenitabant atque pransitabant. Quid est ergo quod, non ratiocinando, sed conviciando spatiaris in vacuum? Respice illos primos parentes, qui nudi erant, et non confundebantur; attende quid texerint, et confitere quid senserint. A succinctoriis ad tunicas ventum est: inde coepit, et crevit humani corporis tegimen, ubi humanis membris pudendorum est inditum nomen. Ibi pudoris maior est cura, ubi resistit concupiscentiae pudicitia. Pudet enim naturam rationalem aliquid habere in carne sua, ubi si non vult per impudicitiam dehonestari, necesse sit reluctari, tam coniugatis ne illicito, quam continentibus ne ullo concubitu sordidentur. Haec discordia carnis et spiritus in paradiso, si nemo peccasset, absit ut esse potuerit; non autem nos ex alienae naturae commixtione possedit: unde ergo ad nos, nisi ex primi hominis praevaricatione descendit?
Augustine. Of the things which shame conceals, some are horrible, others desirable; the former are concealed lest they be abhorred, like the discharges of the remains from food; the latter, lest they be desired, or lest they prompt to be desired that which is wont to be done through them, like those members which are properly called shameful by shame itself, or if by them the very work of concupiscence is performed. For even the other parts of the body, more remote from these, when one is ashamed to leave them naked or to bare them, this pertains to the fact that the concupiscence of the flesh is fed more widely through the eyes. Hence those shameless men wished, as far as they could, to strip the chaste Susanna (See Dan 13:32). It can therefore well be understood that God too commended care for this same shame, when those who had made themselves girdles, confounded at their nakedness, he even clothed with tunics; and these indeed of skins (See Gen 3:21), so that death adjoined might be signified by bodies now corruptible. But custom forbids eating in public—those whom it forbids—and it is deservedly shameful to act against custom. For the ancient Romans, as you yourself too have read, used to dine and lunch in the open. What is it, then, that you wander about in the void, not by reasoning but by reviling? Look back upon those first parents, who were naked and were not confounded; attend to what they covered, and confess what they felt. From girdles it came to tunics; thence began, and grew, the covering of the human body, where to the human members the name of shameful parts was given. There the care of shame is greater, where chastity resists concupiscence. For a rational nature is ashamed to have something in its flesh, where, if it does not wish to be dishonored by unchastity, it is necessary to resist—both for the married, lest they be defiled by an unlawful one, and for the continent, lest by any lying together. This discord of flesh and spirit—far be it that it could have been in paradise, if no one had sinned; nor did it possess us from the mingling of an alien nature: whence, then, did it descend to us, unless from the transgression of the first man?
JulianImp.4.37IV. 38. Iulianus. Res ineptae sunt, et quae stilo nostro convicium magis faciant quam laborem; sed fidem tuam necessario consequuntur. Verumtamen adhuc, ut sit intentus lector, admoneo. Conatus es nempe asserere, quod Dei opus probetur pudendum non esse; sed ut hoc efficere nequivisti, ita spopondisti illud absolutissime, demere te a libidine verecundiam, si opus Dei esse doceatur; quod in primo opere ita approbavi, ut nec te inde putem dubitaturum esse, cum legeris; tamen quoniam hoc commentum tuum significat, necdum ad manus tuas illos venisse libros, id ipsum in praesenti quoque ostendere non pigebit. Irrationabiles igitur animantes, a quo conditas putas, quae certis temporibus ardentissima libidine commoventur, ita ut etiam feritates acuat singularum? Tunc saevus aper, tunc pessima tigris. Ante omnes furor est insignis equarum . Vere tument herbae. Vere abundantia teneri humoris exuberat. Et coitum certis repetunt armenta diebus . Longum est ire per singula: omnia genera, quae suspendit volatus, quae demersit natatus, quae sparsit vagatus, per aera, per freta, per nemora, nec tamen aut sublimavit ratio, aut culpa depressit, nota commiscendorum corporum voluptate flammantur. Illum ergo sexuum quem patiuntur ardorem, Dei an diaboli opere susceperunt? Clamabis sine dubio, Dei. Deus ergo sexum naturali voluptate succendit; quod certe consequentius quam tu, Manichaeus negat. Ille enim, a quo concupiscentiam carnis damnare didicisti, quid sibi dicendum esset expendens, rem quam diabolicam definiverat, atque a Dei operibus removerat, quaquaversum eam potuit invenire persequitur; et ideo ut per concupiscentiam corpora hominum, ita per homines, omnes animantes diabolo deputavit auctori. Tu autem, cum in Manichaei castris hactenus manens, maximum eius feras draconem, de quo infelicibus mentibus per naturale malum et crimina nuptiarum lethale inspiras venenum; non vis tamen in omnes naturas suggesta a magistro tela iaculari; et brutis familiarior (quibus tamen ob hoc parcis, ut rationabilium statum auctoratius crimineris), consentis in illorum corporibus Deum fecisse, quod in nostris diabolum; cum tamen id ipsum, sed mitius in hominibus, quam in pecoribus esse fateare. Ut ergo quid sit effectum, prudens lector accipiat, libidinem corporum in animalibus factam a Deo non negas. Non est ergo Dei operibus indigna illa affectio, quae in his substantiis acrior invenitur, quae nihil de diaboli malo, vel tenui voluntate rapuerunt. Ergo quia concupiscentia defensa est exemplo animalium, defensa etiam dignitate auctoris sui, nec mala, nec diabolica est, quam fecit Deus formator corporum, et quam tenet ea quae est expers natura peccati; cum hoc ergo claruit, inquiro utrum istam libidinem, quam corpora humana persentiunt, Deum fecisse consentias? Si annueris, sublata contentio est, tu emendatus, et Manichaeus permanebit attritus. Si autem dixeris: In corporibus hominum a Deo non potuit fieri; refero, illam voluptatem et concupiscentiam carnis, hominis te, non Dei operibus indignam putare. Ambigi quippe non potest, quoniam si quod confiteris a Deo ubicumque factum, hoc dicas in homines fieri nequivisse, non concupiscentiae testimonia aufers debita, sed humano corpori conquiris indebita. Vide ergo cuius profanitatis sit sectae tuae finis. Dicis esse indignum carne mortalis, quod indignum non fuit opere Conditoris. Igitur hoc sensu non libidinem vituperasti; sed hominem, quem accusare volueras, extulisti. Talem habet constantiam talemque mercedem, qui veritati indicit bellum, ut contrariis semper conatui suo feriatur effectibus. Ego ergo nunc tuis verbis consequentius, sicut omnis prudentia cognoscit, insurgo. Itane in taxandis et exprimendis operibus Dei, non auditur ratio, non omnium naturarum considerantur exempla ; sed in tantum hominis effertur insania, ut putet inconveniens suis esse visceribus, quod per Dei operam in naturae suae cernit vigere consortibus? Neque enim alia nostrorum corporum est, vel origo, vel ratio, quam mutuorum.
IV. 38. Julian. They are inept matters, and such as would make our pen more an occasion of reviling than of labor; but they necessarily follow upon your faith. Yet still, that the reader may be attentive, I admonish him. You attempted, surely, to assert that the work of God is proved not to be shameful; but just as you could not effect this, so you pledged absolutely that you would withdraw shame from disordered desire, if it should be taught to be the work of God; which in the first work I so approved that I do not think you will doubt it when you read it; yet, since this contrivance of yours signifies that those books have not yet come to your hands, it will not irk me to show this same thing in the present too. The irrational animals, then—by whom do you think they were founded, which at certain times are moved by a most ardent disordered desire, so that it even sharpens the ferocity of each? Then the wild boar is savage, then the tigress most fierce. Before all, the frenzy of mares is notable (See Virgil, Georgics 3.266). Truly the grasses swell. In spring the abundance of tender moisture overflows. And on certain days the herds repeat their coupling (See Virgil, Georgics 2.323-324; 3.272-273). It is long to go through each one: all the kinds which flight suspends, which swimming has plunged, which wandering has scattered, through the air, through the seas, through the groves, and yet which neither reason has lifted up nor fault depressed, are inflamed with the known pleasure of bodies to be mingled. That ardor of the sexes, then, which they suffer, did they receive it by the work of God or of the devil? You will cry out, without doubt, of God. God, then, kindled sex with natural pleasure; which surely the Manichean denies more consistently than you. For he—from whom you learned to condemn the concupiscence of the flesh—weighing what he had to say, pursues the thing he had defined as diabolical, and removed from the works of God, wherever he could find it; and so, just as through concupiscence he assigned the bodies of human beings, so through human beings he assigned all living creatures to the devil as author. But you, while remaining thus far in the camp of the Manichean, and bearing his greatest dragon, from which you breathe lethal venom into unhappy minds through natural evil and the crimes of marriage; yet you do not want to hurl into all natures the darts supplied by your master, and, more familiar with the brutes (which yet you spare for this reason, that you may more authoritatively charge the state of rational beings), you consent that God made in their bodies what the devil made in ours; though you confess that the same thing, but more mildly, is in human beings than in cattle. So that the prudent reader may grasp what is effected, then, you do not deny that the disordered desire of bodies in animals was made by God. That affection is therefore not unworthy of the works of God, which is found sharper in those substances which have snatched nothing from the evil of the devil, even by a slight will. Therefore, since concupiscence has been defended by the example of animals, defended too by the dignity of its author, it is neither evil nor diabolical, which God the former of bodies made, and which that nature holds which is free of sin; since this became clear, then, I inquire whether you consent that God made this disordered desire which human bodies feel. If you grant it, the contention is removed, you are corrected, and the Manichean will remain ground down. But if you say, In the bodies of human beings it could not be made by God, I reply, you think that pleasure and concupiscence of the flesh unworthy of the works of man, not of God. For it cannot be doubted that, if what you confess to have been made everywhere by God, you say could not be made in human beings, you do not take from concupiscence its due testimonies, but procure for the human body things undue to it. See, then, of what profanity is the end of your sect. You say that what was not unworthy of the work of the Founder is unworthy of mortal flesh. Therefore in this sense you have not disparaged disordered desire, but exalted the man whom you wished to accuse. Such is the constancy and such the reward of one who declares war on truth, that he is always struck by effects contrary to his attempt. I, then, now more consistently with your words, as all prudence recognizes, rise up. Is it so, that in appraising and expressing the works of God, reason is not heard, the examples of all natures are not considered, but to such a degree is the madness of man borne up, that he thinks unbecoming to his own inmost parts what he sees, through the work of God, flourishing in the partners of his nature? For neither is the origin or the reasoning of our bodies other than that of one another's.
JulianImp.4.38Augustinus. Dic ergo resurrectionem atque incorruptionem sempiternam humanis corporibus non deberi; quia sicut belluina, etiam terrena ipsa sunt; dic finem non esse posse diversum, ubi non est origo diversa: dic ista, si placet; et contra evangelicas Litteras, quantum saecularibus litteris profeceris, impetu vanae loquacitatis ostenta. Si autem hoc dicere non audebis; fatere secundum christianam fidem, etiam istam esse hominis poenam, quod comparatus est pecoribus insensatis, et similis factus est eis . Huic ergo ista miseria est, cum misera esse pecora non possint; sic et carnis concupiscentia, homini est poena, non bestiae, in qua numquam caro adversus spiritum concupiscit. An placet tibi, sic aequare mortales naturas, ut in bestiis quoque asseras carnem contra spiritum concupiscere? Quod si non facis, ne sicut equus et mulus non habeas intellectum ; agnosce libidinem, qualem dicimus, in paradiso futuram non fuisse, si nemo peccasset, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. Talis quippe in pecoribus non est, ex quibus tuae susceptae tale patrocinium providisti, ubi mutis illis tu posses esse verbosus. Nam si humana libidine caro non concupisceret adversus spiritum, sed libido talis in hominibus esset, ut ad nutum voluntatis, cum opus esset, exsurgeret, cum autem non opus esset, nulla incitamenta suggereret, cum quibus cohibendis atque frenandis voluntas nostra pugnaret; nihil vos argueremus, quod in paradiso eam, hoc est, in habitatione tantae felicitatis, tam infeliciter locare velletis.
Augustine. Say, then, that resurrection and everlasting incorruption are not owed to human bodies, because, like the bestial, they too are themselves earthly; say that the end cannot be different where the origin is not different; say these things, if you please; and, against the evangelical Letters, show, by the rush of empty loquacity, how much you have profited by secular letters. But if you will not dare to say this, confess, according to the Christian faith, that even this is a punishment of man—that he was compared to senseless beasts and was made like them (See Ps 49:12, 20 (48:13, 21)). To him, then, this is a misery, since beasts cannot be miserable; so too the concupiscence of the flesh is a punishment to man, not to a beast, in which the flesh never has desires opposed to the spirit. Or does it please you so to equalize mortal natures that you assert that in beasts too the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit? But if you do not do this—lest, like the horse and the mule, you have no understanding (See Ps 32:9 (31:9))—acknowledge that disordered desire such as we speak of, by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit, would not have been in paradise, if no one had sinned. For such a thing is not in cattle, from which you provided such patronage for the thing you have taken up, where, with those mute creatures, you could be wordy. For if the flesh did not, by human disordered desire, have desires opposed to the spirit, but disordered desire in human beings were such that it rose up at the nod of the will, when there was need, but, when there was no need, supplied no incitements with which our will would fight to restrain and rein them, we would accuse you of nothing for being willing to place it in paradise, that is, in the dwelling of such great happiness, so unhappily.
JulianImp.4.38IV. 39. Iulianus. Ut enim imaginem Dei mentis ratione suscepimus; ita communionem pecudum carnis affinitate sentimus; cuius licet sit forma diversa, est tamen de materia elementorum una substantia; pro rationabilis sane animi meritis aeternitatem visura, vel aerumnis miseram, vel praemiis gloriosam.
IV. 39. Julian. For just as we received the image of God by the reason of the mind, so we perceive a communion with the cattle by the affinity of the flesh; of which, although the form is diverse, there is nonetheless one substance from the matter of the elements—a flesh which, for the merits, surely, of the rational soul, is to see eternity, either wretched with hardships or glorious with rewards.
JulianImp.4.39Augustinus. Si pro rationalis animi meritis, ut fateris, caro terrena, et sicut pecoris corruptibilis, tamen aeternitatem longe diverso fine visura est; cur non accipis, pro imaginis Dei meritis, quae nullo fuerat deformata peccato, sic prius fuisse conditam carnem, quamvis de materie terrena, ut si nemo peccasset, esset in aeternitate atque in incorruptione mansura; nec esset corruptibile corpus aggravans animam, hoc est, imaginem Dei; sed ita illi subditum, ut propter filios generandos, sicut cetera quibus aliquid operamur, ad nutum voluntatis etiam membra genitalia moverentur; aut talis esset carnis concupiscentia, quae nisi anima, hoc est Dei imagine, volente non surgeret, nec demergeret cogitationem mentis exundantia voluptatis? Si enim etiam talis nunc esset, non de illa diceretur, quod a Patre non esset; sed ex mundo esset , id est, ex hominibus, qui per illam, et cum illa nascuntur mundo, et procul dubio perituri sunt nisi renascantur Deo. Materiei ergo corporalis, nobis pecoribusque communis, convenienter creditur, merito imaginis Dei, nondum peccato coepto diversum fuisse initium, sicut peccato assumpto diversus est finis.
Augustine. If, for the merits of the rational soul—as you confess—earthly flesh, and corruptible like that of cattle, is nonetheless to see eternity with a far different end, why do you not accept that, for the merits of the image of God, which had been deformed by no sin, flesh was so founded at first—though of earthly matter—that, if no one had sinned, it would be going to remain in eternity and in incorruption; nor would the corruptible body be weighing down the soul, that is, the image of God, but so subject to it that, for the sake of children to be generated, just as the other members by which we work anything, even the genital members would be moved at the nod of the will; or such would be the concupiscence of the flesh that it would not rise except with the soul, that is, the image of God, willing, nor would it submerge the thought of the mind by an overflow of pleasure? For if it were even now such, it would not be said of it that it is not from the Father; but it would be from the world (See 1 John 2:16), that is, from human beings, who through it, and with it, are born to the world, and without doubt are going to perish unless they are reborn to God. Of the bodily matter, then, common to us and to the cattle, it is fittingly believed that, for the merit of the image of God, before sin had begun, the beginning was different, just as, after sin was taken on, the end is different.
JulianImp.4.39IV. 40. Iulianus. Qua ergo ratione indignum esset, non imagine Dei, quia animae quam carnis diversa substantia est, sed mancipio dissolubili imaginis Dei, quod indignum non fuerat conditu ipsius Dei? Fecit ergo corpora Deus, distinxit sexum corporum Deus, fecit membra genitalia Deus, indidit affectum quo sibi haec corpora miscerentur Deus, dedit etiam vim seminum Deus, operatur in secretis naturae de materia seminum Deus: nihil autem malum, nihil reum facit Deus.
IV. 40. Julian. By what reasoning, then, would it be unworthy—not of the image of God, since the substance of the soul is other than that of the flesh, but of the dissoluble bondsman of the image of God—what was not unworthy of the founding of God himself? God, then, made bodies; God distinguished the sex of bodies; God made the genital members; God implanted the affection by which these bodies might be mingled to one another; God gave also the force of the seeds; God works in the secrets of nature from the matter of the seeds: but God makes nothing evil, nothing guilty.
JulianImp.4.40Augustinus. Nihil malum, nihil reum facit Deus, sed in quantum Deus facit, non in quantum massa vitiata atque damnata est, de qua facit.
Augustine. God makes nothing evil, nothing guilty—but insofar as God makes it, not insofar as the mass is corrupted and condemned, from which he makes it.
JulianImp.4.40IV. 41. Iulianus. Libidinem ut pecorum, ita hominum fecit Deus; sed in pecoribus incoercitos dimisit affectus, in homine autem rationabili modum Deus instituit. Amictum ei prudentia et honestas comparat, quam dedit Deus. Igitur non modum, non genus; sed excessum eius culpat Deus, qui de insolentia liberae voluntatis exoriens, haud statum naturae, sed meritum agentis accusat.
IV. 41. Julian. God made disordered desire, as in cattle, so in human beings; but in cattle he sent forth the affections uncurbed, while in rational man God instituted a measure. Prudence and honorableness procure for him a garment, which God gave. Therefore God blames not the measure, not the genus, but its excess, which, arising from the insolence of free will, accuses not the state of nature, but the merit of the doer.
JulianImp.4.41Augustinus. Cur ergo libido spiritui resistit in homine, quod non facit in pecore; nisi quia pertinet ad naturam pecoris, ad poenam vero hominis, sive quia est, quae nulla esset, sive quia resistit, quae subiecta esset, si peccato facta vel vitiata non esset? Nam si in pecoribus Deus incoercitos dimisit affectus; profecto libidines, quandoquidem hos dicis affectus, fateris ab homine coerceri; nulla autem ratione coercerentur, nisi vitiose moverentur. Ecce enim Deum dicis in homine modum instituisse libidini; cur in eo modo non stat, in quo est divinitus instituta, sed eum, nisi coerceatur, egreditur? Quomodo ergo bonum dicitur, quae urget et compellit hominem facere malum, si ei non resistatur? Videsne eximiam susceptam tuam in natura hominis aut ex peccato natam, aut peccato esse vitiatam; et hinc esse illud, quod primi homines post peccatum pudenda texerunt, qui nudi erant ante peccatum, et non confundebantur? Quid est enim quod dicis: Amictum homini prudentia et honestas comparat, quam dedit Deus? Stulti ergo erant et inhonesti, et imprudentes atque impudentes homines ante peccatum, quando eos nuditatis non pudebat? Gratias peccato: nam sic remansissent. Quod si absurdissime dicitur, profecto prudentia naturalis et honestas pudenda texerunt; sed quae ante peccatum pudenda non fuerunt. Excessus proinde libidinis in peccato est; sed etiam impulsus in vitio. De quo impulsu erubuerunt illi, qui membra quae contra eorum voluntatem suscepta tua sollicitabat, nuda relinquere noluerunt.
Augustine. Why, then, does disordered desire resist the spirit in man, which it does not do in a beast—unless because it pertains to the nature of a beast, but to the punishment of man, either because it is, which would be none, or because it resists, which would be subject, if it had not been made or corrupted by sin? For if in cattle God sent forth the affections uncurbed, surely you confess that the disordered desires—since you call these affections—are curbed by man; but in no way would they be curbed, unless they were moved viciously. For behold, you say that God instituted in man a measure for disordered desire; why does it not stay in the measure in which it is divinely instituted, but goes beyond it unless it is curbed? How, then, is it called good, which urges and compels man to do evil, if it is not resisted? Do you see that the excellent thing you have taken up was, in the nature of man, either born from sin, or corrupted by sin; and that hence comes that fact—that the first human beings, after sin, covered the shameful parts, who, before sin, were naked and were not confounded? For what is it that you say: Prudence and honorableness procure for man a garment, which God gave? Were the human beings, then, foolish and dishonorable, and imprudent and shameless, before sin, when their nakedness did not shame them? Thanks to sin! For so they would have remained. But if this is said most absurdly, surely natural prudence and honorableness covered the shameful parts; but parts which, before sin, were not shameful. The excess of disordered desire, accordingly, is in sin; but even its impulse is in vice. Of this impulse they blushed, who were unwilling to leave naked the members which this thing you have taken up was soliciting against their will.
JulianImp.4.41IV. 42. Iulianus. Attende sane nunc quale sit, quod de tua opinione colligitur; videlicet operiendum pudore non esse, quidquid bonum creditur. Nos autem docuimus voluntatem illam naturaliter sexibus inditam, tam malam non esse, quam ad Dei operam pertinentem. Ac per hoc tu aut impietatem tuam deseres, aut pudorem. Sed quid nos haec autem? Si mutabit Aethiops pellem suam, aut pardus varietatem ; ita et tu a Manichaeorum mysteriis elueris.
IV. 42. Julian. Attend now, indeed, to what is gathered from your opinion: namely, that whatever is believed to be good ought not to be covered by shame. But we have taught that that will, naturally implanted in the sexes, is no more evil than it is pertaining to the work of God. And through this you will either desert your impiety, or your shame. But what is this to us? If the Ethiopian will change his skin, or the leopard his spots (Jer 13:23); so too will you be washed clean of the mysteries of the Manicheans.
JulianImp.4.42Augustinus. Immo tu Manichaeos adiuvare non desines, nisi istam susceptam tuam, quam etiam Manichaei malam esse convincunt, cum Ambrosio et cum omnibus Catholicis dixeris, ex praevaricatione primi hominis in nostram vertisse naturam; ne secundum illos, quos nesciens adiuvas nefandos haereticos, Deo coaeternum credatur habere principium, tam manifestum hominis vitium.
Augustine. Nay rather, you will not cease to aid the Manicheans, unless you say, with Ambrose and with all Catholics, that this thing you have taken up—which even the Manicheans convict of being evil—turned into our nature from the transgression of the first man; lest, according to those whom, unknowing, you aid, the impious heretics, so manifest a vice of man be believed to have a beginning coeternal with God.
JulianImp.4.42IV. 43. Iulianus. Sequitur ergo ut verecundiam deponas, ac manente amicitia cum magistro, Cynicis foedereris; quos tamen aliquorum, ut Cicero in Officiis refert, etiam Stoicorum argumenta comitantur. Arguunt quippe communem honestatem, quod ea quae re turpia non sint, verbo flagitiosa ducamus; illa autem quae re turpia sint, nominibus appellemus suis. Latrocinium perpetrare, fraudem facere, adulterium committere, re turpe est, sed dicitur non obscene; liberis operam dare, honestum est re, nomine obscenum. Pluraque in eam sententiam, ab eisdem - inquit - contra verecundiam disputantur. Nos autem naturam sequamur, et omne quod abhorret ab oculorum auriumque approbatione fugiamus . Et tu ergo, cui displicet ista ratio naturalis germana honestatis, aut dic, et latrocinio, et sacrilegio, et parricidio, quae omnia in re habent turpitudinem maximam, in nominibus nulla obscenitatem, tetrius esse et profanius operam dare liberis, quam verecundiae reposcit officium; aut si erubescis eo usque nuptias accusare, ut etiam sceleribus collatae praeponderent; adhortare coniuges tam secure appellare illam commixtionem, tamque libere, quam solemus parricidium et latrocinium nominare. Iamvero si addideris coniunctionem corporum fetibus destinatam, ob illudendum, ut soles, auribus christianis, nulla iniquitate maculari, sed pro suo modo bonam posse censeri, amplexare factum illud Cratae Thebani, hominis locupletis et nobilis, cui adeo fuit cordi secta Cynicorum, ut relinquens paternas opes, Athenas cum uxore migraverit Hyparcide, pari animo istius philosophiae sectatrice, cum qua cum concumbere in publico vellet, ut refert Cornelius Nepos, et illa occultandi gratia, pallii velamen obduceret, verberata est a marito: Tuis sensibus nimirum - inquit - parum adhuc docta es, quae quod te recte facere noveris, id aliis praesentibus exercere non audeas . Debetur omnino talis habitus vestris gregibus, ut naturalia, quia per hoc bona quod a Deo condita in multiplicationem corporum comprobantur, sine ullo pudoris usurpentur obiectu. Restituite igitur quadrupedibus gratiam, ut quia illa sensum corporum vestrorum a possessione diaboli et ore Manichaei suis tuentur exemplis, vos quoque illorum in coeundo libertatem pro rei bonae attestatione sectemini. Congruit quippe ut praestent morum magisterium, quibus patrocinium praestiterunt membrorum. Et ut quod egimus repetitione assignetur; dixisti libidinem, si eam Deus fecisset, nullo amiciendam pudore; nos licet in quattuor prioris operis libris id plene egerimus, tamen in praesenti quoque omnium animalium testimonio, quae a Deo condita interim confiteris, libidinem sexuum a Deo creatam esse monstravimus, quam tamen in hominibus pudore obumbrandam fatemur; tuum ergo dogma consequitur, ut longo postliminio Cynicorum nobis repraesentes decorem, et ea quae naturalia sunt, quia a Deo facta sunt, in oculis civitatis exerceas. Sentisne quam involutis luminibus insiliveris in sententiam meam, qua dixi: Ut exprimeret fidem operum propheta, prope periculum pudoris accessit ? Haec enim ut consequenter iuxta suas fabulas praeceptor tuus arguit, cuius in libro posui superiore commenta, qui omnia corpora facta a Deo pernegat; ita tu impudenter contrectare ausus es, qui creatorem Deum fateris (timendo licet) corporum, quorum sensum adscribis principi tenebrarum; quod certe tanta veritatis potestate detritum est, quanta fide dictum ab Evangelista: Quia per Deum facta sunt omnia, et sine ipso factum est nihil .
IV. 43. Julian. It follows, then, that you lay aside modesty, and, with friendship remaining toward your master, ally yourself with the Cynics; whom, however, the arguments even of some of the Stoics accompany, as Cicero relates in the Offices: For they fault common honorableness, because we hold to be disgraceful in word things that are not disgraceful in fact, while things that are disgraceful in fact we call by their proper names. To commit robbery, to practice fraud, to commit adultery is disgraceful in fact, but it is spoken of not obscenely; to labor at the begetting of children is honorable in fact, obscene in name. And many things to that effect are disputed by the same men—he says—against modesty. But let us follow nature, and flee everything that shrinks from the approval of the eyes and ears (Cicero, On Duties 1.35.127-128). And you, then, to whom this natural reasoning, the sister of honorableness, is displeasing, either say that to labor at the begetting of children—since robbery, sacrilege, and parricide all have the greatest disgrace in fact, none in their names—is fouler and more profane than the duty of modesty demands; or, if you blush to accuse marriage to such a degree that it would even outweigh crimes when set beside them, exhort spouses to call that mingling by name as securely and as freely as we are accustomed to name parricide and robbery. But if you should add that the union of bodies destined for offspring, in order to mock—as you are accustomed—Christian ears, is stained by no iniquity, but can be reckoned good in its own measure, embrace that deed of Crates of Thebes, a rich and noble man, to whom the sect of the Cynics was so dear to heart that, leaving his paternal wealth, he migrated to Athens with his wife Hipparchia, a follower of that philosophy with equal spirit; with whom, when he wished to lie together in public, as Cornelius Nepos relates, and she, for the sake of concealment, drew over the covering of a cloak, she was beaten by her husband: By your own opinions, surely—he said—you are still too little taught, who dare not exercise in the presence of others what you know you do rightly. Such a manner is altogether owed to your flocks, so that natural things—because, by this, they are proved good, since they are founded by God for the multiplication of bodies—may be usurped without any obstacle of shame. Restore to the four-footed beasts their thanks, then, so that, because by their examples they guard the sense of your bodies from the possession of the devil and the mouth of the Manichean, you too may follow their liberty in coupling as an attestation of a good thing. For it is fitting that those should furnish a teaching of morals to whom they furnished a patronage of members. And, that what we have done may be assigned by repetition: you said that disordered desire, if God had made it, was to be wrapped in no shame; we, although in the four books of the earlier work we treated this fully, nonetheless in the present too, by the testimony of all animals, which for the moment you confess were founded by God, have shown that the disordered desire of the sexes was created by God—which nonetheless we confess must be overshadowed by shame in human beings; your teaching, then, follows, that you should present to us, by a long restoration of the Cynics, their seemliness, and exercise the things that are natural, because they were made by God, in the eyes of the city. Do you perceive with what wrapped-up eyes you leaped upon my sentence, by which I said: So that, in order to express the faithfulness of the works, the Prophet drew near to the peril of shame? For just as your preceptor consistently accuses these things in accordance with his fables—whose fabrications I set down in the earlier book, who utterly denies that all bodies were made by God—so you have dared shamelessly to handle them, you who confess God to be the creator (though by fearing) of bodies, the sense of which you ascribe to the prince of darkness; which surely was worn down by so great a power of truth as the faith with which it was said by the Evangelist, that through God all things were made, and without him was made nothing (John 1:3).
JulianImp.4.43Augustinus. Numquid posses in carnis concupiscentia vel libidine bestias hominibus comparare, nisi etiam illos primos parentes generis humani tamquam corruptibilia gerentes corpora, etiamsi non peccassent, crederes fuisse morituros? Ac hoc in haeresis vestrae errore novitio sic catholica damnat Ecclesia, ut Pelagius princeps vester id sibi inter cetera obiectum apud quattuordecim episcopos orientales, a quibus iudicibus audiebatur, damnationis suae timore damnaret. In quo iudicio profecto etiam tu ipse damnatus es, qui dicis Adam ita factum, ut sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset; contradicens Apostolo dicenti: Corpus mortuum est propter peccatum . Porro, si non praecedente peccato moritura illa non erant corpora, utique nec corruptibilia erant, ne beatas animas illas aggravarent: Corpus enim corruptibile, sicut scriptum est, aggravat animam . Ac per hoc, quemadmodum mors atque corruptio belluinis humanisque corporibus potuit non esse communis, quamvis communis eis esset terrena materies; ita potuit nec in propagandis filiis eis esse libido communis; sed aut nulla in hominibus, ut quemadmodum aliis membris ad opera congrua, sic ad opus generandi voluntate motis etiam genitalibus uterentur; aut non talis qualis in bestiis, sed ad nutum serviens, et numquam mentem a cogitationis vigilia, nec ipsa postremo voluptate deponens. Nunc autem praecedente peccato, quo humana in deterius natura mutata est, facta sunt ei poenalia, quae sunt naturae pecoris congrua; sed in hoc malo, quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, maior pudoris est causa, quod inter duo, quorum ad nostram pertinet utrumque naturam, et quorum imperare unum, servire alterum debet, exorta est non dolenda tantum, verum etiam multum erubescenda discordia. Quid igitur tibi profuerunt ad rem non pertinentia convocata auxilia Cynicorum; quandoquidem te in hac tui erroris via de via deficientem, nec ea quae hominibus comparasti, iumenta iuvare potuerunt?
Augustine. Could you compare beasts with human beings in the concupiscence of the flesh or disordered desire, unless you believed that those first parents of the human race too, bearing as it were corruptible bodies, would have been going to die even if they had not sinned? And this, in the new error of your heresy, the Catholic Church so condemns that Pelagius, your prince, condemned it for himself, among other things objected to him before fourteen Eastern bishops, by whom as judges he was heard, through fear of his own condemnation. In which judgment, surely, even you yourself were condemned, who say that Adam was so made that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he would be going to die; contradicting the Apostle who says: The body is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10). Further, if, with no sin preceding, those bodies were not going to die, surely they were not even corruptible, lest they weigh down those blessed souls: For the corruptible body, as it is written, weighs down the soul (Wis 9:15). And through this, just as death and corruption could be not common to bestial and human bodies, although the earthly matter was common to them, so disordered desire could be not common to them in propagating children; but either none in human beings—so that, just as they used the other members at the will's motion for fitting works, so for the work of generating they would use even the genitals moved by the will—or not such as in beasts, but serving the nod, and never laying aside the mind from the vigilance of thought, nor at last by pleasure itself. But now, with sin preceding, by which human nature was changed for the worse, those things became penal for it which are fitting to the nature of a beast; but in this evil, by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit, there is a greater cause of shame, because between two things, each of which pertains to our nature, and of which the one ought to command, the other to serve, there has arisen a discord not only to be grieved over but even much to be blushed at. What, then, have the irrelevant aids of the Cynics, summoned by you, profited you—since, with you in this way of your error failing from the way, not even the beasts of burden you compared to human beings could help you?
JulianImp.4.43IV. 44. Iulianus. Tempus admonet ut ad alia transeamus; sed quoniam certum est, nihil te habere quod vendites imperitis auribus praeter verecundiam naturalium; quam brevissime potero, quod putatur superesse, contingam. Quis ergo neget, honestatem hanc, qua genitalia nostra contegimus, pro personis, locis, officiis moribusque variari? Sic in conventiculis publicis obscenior nuditas, nihil habet turpitudinis in lavacris. Sic alter est cubicularis habitus, seminudus et securus; alter vero forensis, sollicitior et profusior. Quid, quod ad testimonium crebro familiaritatis, respicit negligentia cautionis, et quanto persona aut ignotior aut honoratior adfuerit, tanto diligentior habitus comparatur? Quid, quod nautis et opificibus plerisque nemo vitio nuditatem dedit? Ac ne ista simplicitas personis magis quam negotiis imputetur, more omnium etiam Petrus apostolus, et post resurrectionem Domini nudus in navigio piscabatur . Dirige hinc oculos ad medicantum munera; ducunt artem studio salutis in locos pudoris. Athletis nuditas etiam decora est. Iam vero non solum adolescentulis, et petulanti sibi societate coniunctis, sed etiam totis quibusdam gentibus uterque sexus retectus, et sine secreti est electione commixtio. Quid tamen mirum, si id Scotus vicinarumque gentium barbaries agat; cum et philosophia, cuius supra commemorationem fecimus idem censuerit, et Traducianorum huc dogma pervenerit? Quae ergo pudoris tenebitur quantitas, quive limes inter tot eius diversitates, atque inter coeptus partim necessarios, partim societate defensos, per quem possit doceri, diabolum naturalem ardorem sexibus miscuisse? Ac per hoc, ut praesidium opinionis tuae constat, officiis, locis, moribus, artibus et totis simul gentibus dissolutum; ita remansit invictum, quod nos ipsa ratione et apostolo Paulo docente defendimus, omnia corpora, omnia membra corporum, omnesque sensus corporum, Deum auctorem universorum creasse; sed ita ordinasse, ut quaedam in membris nostris pro opportunitatibus temporum amiciret pudor, quaedam honestas naturalis offerret, quibus tam indecorum esset tegimen adhiberi, quam importune genitalium vulgare secretum.
IV. 44. Julian. The time admonishes that we pass on to other matters; but since it is certain that you have nothing to peddle to unskilled ears except the shame of natural things, I shall touch, as briefly as I can, what is thought to remain. Who, then, would deny that this honorableness, by which we cover our genitals, varies according to persons, places, offices, and customs? Thus in public gatherings nakedness is more obscene, which has nothing of disgrace in the baths. Thus the bedchamber dress is one thing, half-naked and unconcerned; the dress of the forum another, more careful and fuller. What of the fact that, by frequent attestation of familiarity, negligence of caution looks on, and the more unfamiliar or honored the person present, the more diligent the dress procured? What of the fact that to sailors and most workmen no one has counted nakedness a fault? And, lest this simplicity be imputed to persons rather than to occupations, in the custom of all even the apostle Peter, after the Lord's resurrection, fished naked in the boat (See John 21:7). Direct your eyes from here to the gifts of physicians; they lead their art, for the zeal of health, into places of shame. For athletes nakedness is even seemly. And now not only among young men, and those joined to themselves in wanton company, but even among whole nations, both sexes are uncovered, and there is mingling without choice of secrecy. Yet what wonder is it, if the Scot and the barbarism of neighboring nations does this; when even the philosophy of which we made mention above held the same view, and the teaching of the Traducianists has come to this point? What measure of shame, then, will be held, or what boundary among so many of its diversities, and among undertakings partly necessary, partly defended by society, through which it could be taught that the devil mingled a natural ardor into the sexes? And through this, just as the support of your opinion is established, by offices, places, customs, arts, and whole nations together, to be dissolved, so there has remained unconquered what we defend by reason itself and with the apostle Paul teaching: that God, the author of the universe, created all bodies, all members of bodies, and all senses of bodies; but so ordained that shame should cover certain things in our members for the opportunities of the times, and natural honorableness should present certain things, to which it would be as unbecoming to apply a covering as importunely to make common the secrecy of the genitals.
JulianImp.4.44Augustinus. Tu potius importune culpa importunitatis aspergis eos, de quibus ait Scriptura divina: Nudi erant, et non confundebantur . Et certe tunc ita recti erant, ut recti facti erant: Fecit enim Deus, sicut legimus, hominem rectum . Illo ergo tempore tantae rectitudinis suae, numquid tam pravi erant, ut imprudenter, impudenter, inhoneste, importune, genitalium secreta vulgarent? Agnosce igitur nondum fuisse causam pudendi, quando nondum pudenda erant illa membra, quae nunc proprie pudenda dicuntur. Non enim habitabat in membris lex repugnans legi mentis, sine qua nunc nascitur nemo. Nondum fuerat iusto iudicio Dei, qui merito deseruit desertorem, inoboedienti homini suae carnis inoboedientia retributa. Neque enim non est carnis inoboedientia contra spiritum concupiscere, quamvis etiam spiritu contra eam concupiscente non sinatur quod conatur implere. Hoc ergo nondum erat, quando nudi erant, et non confundebantur. Non itaque illi vera nuditate importune genitalium secreta vulgabant: sed adhuc importunum nihil in genitalibus senserant. Quid colligis verba inania, tamquam folia levia, quibus et tu contegas carnalem contentionem tuam contra spiritalem auctoritatem, quasi concupiscentem contra spiritum carnem? Quid quaeris quae pudoris tenenda sit quantitas, sive limes, inter tot eius diversitates, quae fiunt diversis necessitatibus, artibus, opinionibus, moribus, sive rectis, sive perversis? Ecce habes homines, non alicuius gentis, sicut Scotos, sed parentes omnium gentium; non aliqua prava opinione depravatos, sicut Cynicos, et quoslibet alios similis irreverentiae deformitate foedatos, sed a Deo conditos rectos; non opere alicuius necessitatis obstrictos, sicut Petri nuditas fuit, qua te putasti esse velandum, sed in deliciarum paradiso liberos; ipsos aspice, ante peccatum ostentatores libertatis, post peccatum doctores pudoris. Ante peccatum nudi erant, et non confundebantur; post peccatum de nuditate confusi sunt. Ante peccatum genitalia nondum pudenda sine tegimine reliquerunt; post peccatum genitalia iam pudenda texerunt. Hi ergo testes satis idonei, et Pelagianorum pervicaciam, et quarumdam gentium Cynicorumque impudentiam, prius non pudenda, et postea pudenda nuditate sua convincunt.
Augustine. You rather importunely sprinkle the fault of importunity upon those of whom the divine Scripture says: They were naked, and were not confounded (Gen 2:25). And surely they were then so upright as they had been made upright: for God made man upright (Eccl 7:29), as we read. At that time, then, of so great uprightness of theirs, were they so depraved as imprudently, shamelessly, dishonorably, importunely to make common the secrets of the genitals? Acknowledge, then, that there was not yet a cause for shame, when those members were not yet shameful which now are properly called shameful. For there did not dwell in the members a law fighting against the law of the mind, without which no one is now born. There had not yet been rendered, by the just judgment of God, who deservedly deserted the deserter, to the disobedient man the disobedience of his own flesh. For it is indeed the disobedience of the flesh to have desires opposed to the spirit, although, even with the spirit having desires opposed to it, it is not permitted to accomplish what it attempts. This, then, was not yet, when they were naked and were not confounded. They did not, therefore, by a true nakedness importunely make common the secrets of the genitals: but as yet they had felt nothing importunate in the genitals. Why do you gather empty words, like light leaves, with which you too may cover your carnal contention against spiritual authority—as it were, flesh having desires opposed to the spirit? Why do you ask what measure of shame must be held, or what boundary, among so many of its diversities, which arise from various necessities, arts, opinions, customs, whether upright or perverse? Behold, you have human beings, not of any nation, like the Scots, but the parents of all nations; not depraved by any perverse opinion, like the Cynics, and any others befouled with the deformity of similar irreverence, but founded upright by God; not constrained by the work of any necessity, like the nakedness of Peter, by which you thought yourself should be veiled, but free in the paradise of delights; look at them—before sin, displayers of liberty, after sin, teachers of shame. Before sin, they were naked and were not confounded; after sin, they were confounded at their nakedness. Before sin, they left the genitals, not yet shameful, without a covering; after sin, they covered the genitals, now shameful. These, then, are witnesses sufficiently fit, and they convict both the obstinacy of the Pelagians and the shamelessness of certain nations and of the Cynics, by their nakedness, before not shameful and afterward shameful.
JulianImp.4.44IV. 45. Iulianus. Hoc igitur in praesenti opere, quantum res acta pertulit, absoluto, venio ad illud quod dixisti, in Christo hanc naturalem concupiscentiam non fuisse. Sic enim obloqueris mihi: Sed iste in his omnibus noluit nominare concupiscentiam carnis, quae non est a Patre, sed ex mundo est; cuius mundi princeps dictus est diabolus; qui eam in Domino non invenit, quia Dominus homo non per ipsam ad homines venit . Pronuntiasti ergo Christum, quem verum per omnia hominem fides catholica confitetur, hanc concupiscentiam, quam dicit Ioannes apostolus, in sua non habuisse carne. Sed Ioannes, ut eius dicta docuerunt, concupiscentiam carnis, et concupiscentiam oculorum, cum omni mundo ex Patre non esse pronuntiat ; quod nos quemadmodum intellegi deberet ostendimus.
IV. 45. Julian. This, then, in the present work, being settled as far as the matter at hand has allowed, I come to that which you said—that in Christ this natural concupiscence was not. For thus you speak against me: But this man, in all these, was unwilling to name the concupiscence of the flesh, which is not from the Father, but is from the world; of which world the devil is called the prince; who did not find it in the Lord, because the Lord, as man, did not come to men through it (See 1 John 2:16; John 14:30). You pronounced, then, that Christ—whom the Catholic faith confesses to be in all things a true man—did not have in his flesh this concupiscence of which the apostle John speaks. But John, as his words have taught, pronounces that the concupiscence of the flesh and the concupiscence of the eyes, with the whole world, are not from the Father (See 1 John 2:16); how this ought to be understood, we have shown.
JulianImp.4.45Augustinus. Ostendisti quidem, sed quemadmodum tu intellegeres, vel potius non intellegeres, non quemadmodum deberet intellegi; de qua re tibi in ipsa tua non veraci, sed loquaci disputatione, certans pro veritate respondi.
Augustine. You have shown indeed, but how you understand it, or rather do not understand it, not how it ought to be understood; concerning which matter I have answered you in that disputation of yours, not truthful but talkative, contending for the truth.
JulianImp.4.45IV. 46. Iulianus. Tu vero nomen ipsum concupiscentiae amplexatus, vis a Christi corpore tam oculorum sensum abfuisse, quam viscerum.
IV. 46. Julian. But you, having embraced the very name of concupiscence, want both the sense of the eyes and that of the inmost parts to have been absent from the body of Christ.
JulianImp.4.46Augustinus. Ista non diceres, si tu sanum sensum, non corporis, sed animi haberes.
Augustine. You would not say these things, if you had a sound sense—not of body, but of mind.
JulianImp.4.46IV. 47. Iulianus. Hic igitur ut adsit toto animo lector, admoneo; videbit enim Apollinaristarum haeresim, sed cum Manichaei per te adiectione reparari. Apollinaris quippe primo talem incarnationem Christi induxisse fertur, ut diceret solum corpus de humana substantia assumptum videri, pro anima vero ipsam fuisse deitatem; Christusque non hominem, sed cadaver videretur hominis suscepisse. Quod posteaquam coepit tam rationis quam Evangelii attestatione convelli, videlicet quia hoc ipso necesse erat totum illud falsitatis argui, quod hominem se Christus dixerat, quem veritatem locutum persequebantur Iudaei, si erat ab eo caro sola suscepta, cum homo nisi anima simul et corpus esse non posset; vel quod in Evangelio dixerat: In potestate habeo ponere animam meam, et in potestate habeo iterum sumere eam . Quae enim anima poneretur, si assumpta non fuerat? Cum ergo auctoritate talium testimoniorum et perspicuae rationis eversus fuisset, excogitavit aliud unde eius haeresis, quae perdurat hactenus, nasceretur; et dixit, animam quidem humanam in Christo fuisse, sed sensus in eo corporis non fuisse, atque impassibilem eum pronuntiavit universis exstitisse peccatis.
IV. 47. Julian. Here, then, I admonish the reader to be present with his whole mind; for he will see the heresy of the Apollinarists, but, through you, restored with the addition of the Manichean. For Apollinaris is reported first to have introduced such an incarnation of Christ as to say that only a body seemed to have been assumed from human substance, while in place of the soul there was the deity itself; and that Christ seemed to have taken on not a man, but the corpse of a man. After this began to be shaken, both by the attestation of reason and of the Gospel—namely, because by this very thing it was necessary that all that falsity be convicted, that Christ had said he was a man, whom the Jews persecuted as having spoken the truth, if flesh alone had been assumed by him, since a man cannot be except soul and body at once; or because in the Gospel he had said: I have power to lay down my soul, and I have power to take it up again (See John 10:18). For what soul would be laid down, if it had not been assumed? When, then, he had been overthrown by the authority of such testimonies and of clear reason, he devised something else, from which his heresy, which endures to this day, would be born; and he said that there was indeed a human soul in Christ, but that the senses of the body were not in him, and pronounced him to have been impassible to all sins.
JulianImp.4.47Augustinus. Sanctae memoriae Cyprius episcopus Epiphanius in opusculo quod de haeresibus edidit, dixit Apollinaristarum quosdam in Domino Iesu Christo divinitati corpus consubstantiale dixisse; alios autem negasse quod animam sumpserit; alios propter quod dictum est: Verbum caro factum est , contendisse, non eum carnem sumpsisse de creata carne, id est, Mariae, sed Verbum carnem factum; postea vero nescio quid cogitantes dixisse quod non sumpserit mentem. Quod ergo affirmas Apollinaristas asseverasse in Christo sensus corporis non fuisse, eumque illos pronuntiasse impassibilem; nec uspiam legi, nisi in hoc libro tuo, nec aliquando ab aliquo audivi. Sed quoniam video te quaerere ubi expandas vaniloquia tua, ut cum sis verbosus, videaris esse copiosus, cito respondeo: Quisquis credit vel illa quae Apollinaristas dicere supra commemoravi, vel non habuisse Christum corporis sensus, atque impassibilem fuisse, anathema sit. Ut vero te quoque possis agnoscere: Quisquis credit carnem Christi contra spiritum concupisse, anathema sit.
Augustine. Epiphanius, the Cyprian bishop of holy memory, in the little work which he published on heresies, said that some of the Apollinarists said that in the Lord Jesus Christ the body was consubstantial with the divinity; but others denied that he assumed a soul; others, on account of what was said, The Word was made flesh (John 1:14), contended that he did not assume flesh from created flesh, that is, of Mary, but that the Word was made flesh; but afterward, thinking I-know-not-what, said that he did not assume a mind. But what you affirm—that the Apollinarists asserted that the senses of the body were not in Christ, and that they pronounced him impassible—I have neither read anywhere, except in this book of yours, nor ever heard from anyone. But since I see that you seek where to spread out your empty talk, so that, being wordy, you may seem to be copious, I answer quickly: Whoever believes either those things which I recounted above the Apollinarists to say, or that Christ did not have the senses of the body, and was impassible, let him be anathema. But that you too may recognize yourself: Whoever believes that the flesh of Christ had desires opposed to the spirit, let him be anathema.
JulianImp.4.47IV. 48. Iulianus. Non qui virtute iudicii delicta vitasset; sed qui felicitate carnis a nostris sensibus sequestratae, cupiditatem vitiorum sentire nequivisset.
IV. 48. Julian. Not one who, by the power of judgment, had avoided faults; but one who, by a felicity of flesh set apart from our senses, could not have felt the desire of vices.
JulianImp.4.48Augustinus. Non dicimus nos: Christum felicitate carnis a nostris sensibus sequestratae, cupiditatem vitiorum sentire non potuisse, sed dicimus, eum perfectione virtutis, et non per carnis concupiscentiam procreata carne, cupiditatem non habuisse vitiorum. Aliud est enim non habuisse cupiditatem malam; aliud non eam potuisse sentire; sensisset enim si habuisset; non enim sensus ei defuit quo eam sentiret, sed voluntas adfuit qua non haberet. Nec mireris Christum, quamvis hominem verum, tamen per omnia bonum, noluisse habere cupiditatem malam. Nam quis praeter vos cupiditatem negat esse malam, qua cupiuntur mala? quis, inquam, praeter vos persuadere conatur non esse vitium, quam cupiditatem confitetur esse vitiorum; et non esse malum, cui suadenti si consentiatur fit opus malum? Hanc cupiditatem Christus et sentire posset, si haberet; et habere, si vellet; sed absit ut vellet. Verumtamen si haberet cupiditatem malam, atque ut tuo verbo utar, cupiditatem vitiorum ab ipsius voluntate in illo esse coepisset; quia non cum illa est natus, ut nos. Ac per hoc, illius virtus haec erat, eam non habere; nostra virtus est, ei non consentire; et in hoc illum imitari, ut quemadmodum ipse peccatum non fecit, eam non habendo, ita nec nos faciamus, non ei consentiendo; et quemadmodum ipse eam voluit et potuit non habere, sic ea nos velimus, quia poterimus, carere. Eius quippe gratia nos liberabit de corpore mortis huius, hoc est, de carne peccati, qui venit ad nos in similitudinem carnis peccati, non in carne peccati.
Augustine. We do not say: That Christ, by a felicity of flesh set apart from our senses, could not feel the desire of vices, but we say that he, by the perfection of virtue, and by flesh procreated not through the concupiscence of the flesh, did not have the desire of vices. For it is one thing not to have had an evil desire, another not to have been able to feel it; for he would have felt it if he had had it, since the sense by which he would feel it was not lacking to him, but a will was present by which he would not have it. And do not wonder that Christ—though a true man, yet through all things good—was unwilling to have an evil desire. For who, except you, denies that disordered desire is evil, by which evils are desired? Who, I say, except you, tries to persuade that what he confesses to be the disordered desire of vices is not a vice, and that what, if it persuades and is consented to, becomes an evil work, is not an evil? This disordered desire Christ both could feel, if he had it, and could have, if he willed; but far be it that he would will it. Yet if he had an evil desire, and—to use your word—a desire of vices, it would have begun to be in him from his own will, since he was not born with it, as we are. And through this, his virtue was this: not to have it; our virtue is: not to consent to it; and in this to imitate him, that, just as he committed no sin by not having it, so neither do we commit any by not consenting to it; and as he willed and was able not to have it, so let us will to be free of it, because we shall be able. For his grace will set us free from the body of this death—that is, from the flesh of sin—he who came to us in the likeness of the flesh of sin, not in the flesh of sin (See Rom 7:24; 8:3).
JulianImp.4.48IV. 49. Iulianus. Tam gravi, ut res indicat, in fidem Catholicorum adulatione, non solum nihil necessaria, verum etiam profana. Cum enim vult ostendere plus aliquid fuisse in Christi corpore, ne carnis nostrae communione vilesceret, naturalium eum sensuum integritate fraudavit; non videns in quantum iret exitium damnum veritatis vel adulatione corruptae. Infremuit quippe a Catholicis excitata praescriptio; quia apud talem fidem maius damnum mysteria Christi, quam membra perferrent. Si enim propter hoc, inquiunt, factus est Christus ex semine David , factus ex muliere, factusque sub lege , ut nobis daret exemplum, et sequeremur vestigia eius, qui peccatum non fecit, nec inventus est dolus in ore eius ; nec tamen per omnia substantiae nostrae induit proprietatem, si vel carnem sine anima, vel hominem sine sensibus, quibus nos imbuit natura, gestavit, exempli formam et legis non docetur implesse. Quid enim fuit laude dignum, contemnere illecebras sensuum, quarum incapax erat beneficio naturae? Quid mirum, cohibere oculos carnis suae auxilio non vagantes? Quid magnum, abducere ab illecebrosis odoribus nares, quibus nescirent patere? Quid stupendum, tenere arduam quotidie in epulis parcitatem, quarum nequibat irritamenta sentire? Quid postremo ardui haberent in quadragesimum diem prolata ieiunia, si esuries molesta esse non poterat? Quid venerationis disciplina aurium mereretur, numquam nisi honestarum vocum receptrix, si nativam patiebatur in indebitas surditatem? Quae autem gloria castitatis, si virilitas magis aberat quam voluntas, et quod putabatur fieri de vigore animi, veniebat de debilitate membrorum?
IV. 49. Julian. By so grave a flattery toward the faith of the Catholics, as the matter shows, not only is it in no way necessary, but it is even profane. For when he wishes to show that there was something more in the body of Christ, lest it grow cheap by communion with our flesh, he defrauded him of the integrity of natural senses; not seeing into how great a destruction the loss of truth, even by flattery, would go when corrupted. For the prescription roused up by the Catholics roared out; because, with such a faith, the mysteries of Christ would suffer greater loss than his members. For if, they say, Christ was for this reason made of the seed of David (See Rom 1:3), made of a woman, made under the law (See Gal 4:4), that he might give us an example, and that we might follow his footsteps, who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth (See 1 Pet 2:22); and yet did not put on through all things the property of our substance—if he bore either flesh without a soul, or a man without the senses with which nature imbues us—he is not taught to have fulfilled the form of an example and of the law. For what was praiseworthy in despising the enticements of the senses, of which he was incapable by the benefit of nature? What wonder is it to restrain the eyes of his flesh, not wandering by his aid? What great thing to lead away the nostrils from enticing odors, to which they could not be open? What stupendous thing to keep an arduous sparingness daily at banquets, whose incitements he could not feel? What, finally, would there be of arduousness in fasting prolonged to the fortieth day, if hunger could not be troublesome? What veneration would the discipline of the ears deserve, ever the receiver only of honorable voices, if it suffered a native deafness to unbecoming ones? What glory of chastity, if manhood was absent more than the will, and what was thought to be done by vigor of mind came from weakness of members?
JulianImp.4.49Augustinus. Merito dicuntur haec, non contra Apollinarem vel Apollinaristarum aliquem, quos dixisse non arbitror Christi carnem non habuisse humani corporis sensus, sed contra quemlibet quisquis hoc dicit. Nos autem illum et pulchra ac deformia per oculos sensisse dicimus, et suaveolentia et graveolentia sensisse per nares, et sensu aurium percepisse canora et absurda, et a dulcibus amara discrevisse gustando, et aspera ac lenia, dura ac mollia, frigida et calida diiudicasse tangendo; et quidquid aliud corporis sensu sentiri et percipi potest, sentire ac percipere potuisse; nec ei possibilitatem, si voluisset, defuisse generandi; et tamen eius carnem numquam contra spiritum concupisse. Quod si propterea magnum honum est, ut putas, abstinere a delictis, quia non desunt libidines quae vincantur, non autem magnum esset, si defuissent; tanto quisque erit in virtute laudabilior, quanto fuerit in carne libidinosior. Ac per hoc Christus, secundum istam vestram horribilem et detestabilem pravitatem, sicut in virtute omnium hominum maximus, ita esse in carne libidinosissimus debuit. Quod quanta sentiatur impietate, si sentis, sententiam mutare ne differas; et libidines discernere a sensibus, quae sentiuntur potius in quibusque, quam sentiunt; ne tanto quisque videatur sensu esse vivacior, quanto fuerit libidine ardentior; et tanto Christus arsisse credatur libidinibus acrioribus, quanto viguit purioribus sensibus.
Augustine. These things are deservedly said, not against Apollinaris or any of the Apollinarists—whom I do not think to have said that the flesh of Christ did not have the senses of a human body—but against anyone whatever who says this. We, however, say that he both sensed beautiful and deformed things through the eyes, and sensed sweet-smelling and ill-smelling things through the nostrils, and perceived by the sense of the ears melodious and absurd things, and discerned bitter from sweet things by tasting, and distinguished rough and smooth, hard and soft, cold and hot things by touching; and whatever else can be sensed and perceived by the sense of the body, he could sense and perceive; nor was the possibility of generating lacking to him, if he had willed; and yet his flesh never had desires opposed to the spirit. But if for this reason it is a great good, as you suppose, to abstain from faults, because disordered desires are not lacking which may be conquered, and it would not be a great thing if they were lacking; then each one will be the more praiseworthy in virtue, the more lustful he was in the flesh. And through this Christ, according to that horrible and detestable depravity of yours, just as he was the greatest of all human beings in virtue, so ought he to have been the most lustful of all in the flesh. With how great an impiety this is perceived, if you perceive it, do not delay to change your opinion; and to distinguish disordered desires from the senses, which are sensed rather in any things than themselves sense; lest each one seem to be the more lively in sense, the more ardent he was in disordered desire; and lest Christ be believed to have burned with the sharper disordered desires, the more he flourished with the purer senses.
JulianImp.4.49IV. 50. Iulianus. Quae postremo palma tolerantiae, si dolor vulnerum et verberum, intercepto itinere sensuum, pertingere ad animum non valebat? Quo ergo profecit Apollinaris adulatio? Videlicet ut omnis virtutum pulchritudo, quam in se Christus expresserat, indebitis naturae eius laudibus vacuata flaccesceret, cunctoque veritatis suae splendore nudata sacrum magisterium Mediatoris offerret irrisui. Huc accedebat quoniam non solum operum suorum perdebat insignia, nativitate, non virtute felicior; sed etiam fraudis criminibus urgebatur, si indiceret mortalibus: Extendimini ad patientiam hominis nihil sentientis, et venite per veras cruces ad virtutes corporis falsi nihil dolentis; vel: Imitamini castitatem, certa naturae vestrae irritamenta vincentes, illius quem debilitas fecit pudicum videri. Certe nihil profanius, nihil scelestius talibus excogitari commentis potest. Et Apollinaris omnia ista non dixerat; per illud unum quod pronuntiarat, homini Christo defuisse eos sensus, qui a natura inditi, non usu, sed excessu ad vitia labuntur; haec omnia quae a Catholicis relata sunt, praeiudicio opinionis suae mutus excepit. Horum quippe cunctorum affirmatione construitur catholica fides, quorum negatione vel consecutione Apollinaris haeresis compacta est atque damnata. Tu igitur conice quid de te debeat iudicari, qui commixtionem sexuum damnas, ut Manichaeus; naturam carnis Christi a communione hominum sequestras, secundum Manichaeos; concupiscentiam carnis accusas, iuxta praeceptoris tui dicta Manichaei; dicis concupiscentiam sensuum in Christi corpore non fuisse, vel secundum Manichaeos vel secundum Apollinaristas; et tamen vis a nobis nec Apollinarista, nec Manichaeus vocari. Quamquam do manus, praestoque beneficium; nec nos liberalitatis poenitet; per me ut Apollinaris sectator non videaris licebit; minoris quippe est ille impietatis inventor; per te autem non licet ut voceris aliud quam Manichaeus.
IV. 50. Julian. What, finally, palm of endurance, if the pain of wounds and beatings, with the path of the senses intercepted, could not reach the soul? To what, then, did the flattery of Apollinaris profit? Namely, that all the beauty of the virtues which Christ had expressed in himself, emptied of the praises undue to his nature, would wilt; and, stripped of all the splendor of its truth, would offer the sacred teaching office of the Mediator to derision. To this was added that not only did he lose the marks of his works—being happier by birth than by virtue—but he was even pressed by charges of fraud, if he should declare to mortals: Stretch yourselves to the endurance of a man feeling nothing, and come through true crosses to the virtues of a false body feeling no pain; or: Imitate the chastity, conquering the certain enticements of your nature, of him whom weakness made seem chaste. Surely nothing more profane, nothing more wicked, can be devised by such fabrications. And Apollinaris had not said all these things; by that one thing which he had pronounced—that those senses were lacking to the man Christ which, implanted by nature, slip into vices not by use but by excess—he mutely incurred all these things which were reported by the Catholics in prejudgment of his opinion. For by the affirmation of all these the Catholic faith is built up, by whose denial or consequence the heresy of Apollinaris was compacted and condemned. You, therefore, conjecture what ought to be judged of you, who condemn the mingling of the sexes, like a Manichean; set apart the nature of the flesh of Christ from communion with human beings, according to the Manicheans; accuse the concupiscence of the flesh, according to the sayings of your preceptor the Manichean; say that the concupiscence of the senses was not in the body of Christ, either according to the Manicheans or according to the Apollinarists; and yet you want not to be called by us either an Apollinarist or a Manichean. Although I yield the point, and grant the favor; nor does our liberality repent us; through me it shall be permitted that you not seem a follower of Apollinaris—for he is the inventor of a lesser impiety; but through you it is not permitted that you be called anything other than a Manichean.
JulianImp.4.50Augustinus. Nec Apollinarista, nec Manichaeus fuit, sed haereticorum expugnator Ambrosius, qui per tuam susceptam quidquid hominum nasceretur, sine delicto dixit esse non posse, apostolum Paulum, sicut oportuit, et intellegens et exponens. Tu autem tanto magis adiuvas Manichaeos, quod saepissime ostendi, quanto magis ab eis te esse arbitraris alienum; es autem novus haereticus Pelagianus, in disputatione loquacissimus, in contentione calumniosissimus, in professione fallacissimus. Nihil enim quod dicas inveniens, inania multa dicis, falsum crimen Catholicis obicis, catholicum te esse mentiris.
Augustine. Neither an Apollinarist nor a Manichean was Ambrose, but the vanquisher of heretics, who, through this thing you have taken up, said that whatever of human beings is born cannot be without fault, understanding and expounding, as he ought, the apostle Paul. But you so much the more aid the Manicheans, as I have most often shown, the more you suppose yourself alien from them; you are, however, a new Pelagian heretic, most loquacious in disputation, most slanderous in contention, most fallacious in profession. For, finding nothing to say, you say many empty things, you object a false crime to the Catholics, you lie that you are Catholic.
JulianImp.4.50IV. 51. Iulianus. Ostendi quidem in tertio libello primi operis mei, irrefutabiliter necesse esse dici etiam Christum reatum de Mariae carne traxisse, si crederetur naturale peccatum; eumque a te sub potestate diaboli collocari, qui affirmares ad ius diaboli hominum universam pertinere substantiam.
IV. 51. Julian. I showed, indeed, in the third little book of my first work, that it must irrefutably be said that Christ too drew guilt from the flesh of Mary, if natural sin were believed; and that he is placed by you under the power of the devil, you who affirm that the whole substance of human beings belongs to the right of the devil.
JulianImp.4.51Augustinus. Quod in tertio tuo libro te ostendisse commemoras, quinto meo te non ostendisse convici.
Augustine. What you record you showed in your third book, I convicted you in my fifth of not having shown.
JulianImp.4.51IV. 52. Iulianus. Et ideo hoc in praesentiarum relicto, illud efflagito, ubi tu legeris Christum eunuchum fuisse naturaliter.
IV. 52. Julian. And therefore, leaving that aside for the present, I demand this: where have you read that Christ was a eunuch by nature?
JulianImp.4.52Augustinus. Tu enim ubi me hoc dixisse legisti, nisi quia calumniaris, ut soles? Aliud est possibilitas seminandorum filiorum, quam Christi carni defuisse non dicimus, sicut deesse carni novimus eunuchorum; et aliud est cupiditas vitiorum, quam tu persuadere conaris habuisse Christum, et iactas te esse christianum; quia videlicet, sicut paulo ante dixisti: Christus etiam fraudis criminibus urgeretur, si diceret mortalibus: Extendimini ad patientiam hominis nihil sentientis; quasi sequatur, ut non sentiat inflictos dolores, qui vult et potest non habere malas cupiditates; vel si diceret, ut tua verba ipse componis: Imitamini castitatem, certa naturae vestrae irritamenta vincentes, illius quem debilitas fecit pudicum videri. Sic enim es amator egregius castitatis, ut tibi castior videatur, qui concubitus illicitos cupit, sed ut non perpetret, suae cupiditati resistit; quam qui talia mala nec saltem cupit, non per impossibilitatem carnis, sed per summitatem perfectionemque virtutis; immo ille sit castus, iste autem omnino nec sit, sed esse tantummodo videatur; quoniam, secundum te, si castus esset, mala ista cuperet per naturam, sed eamdem naturalem cupiditatem virtute animi coerceret. Ita fit, ut te illa horribilis, sicut iam superius ostendi, sequatur absurditas, tanto esse quemque voluntate castiorem, quanto maiorem naturae suae libidinem vicerit, nec in aliquos excessus luxuriae, quamlibet illa magna sit, exire permiserit; qui autem minorem flagitiorum libidinem cohibet, minus esse castum; quoniam quem non libet quod non licet, secundum tuam sapientiam, vel potius amentiam, omnino nec castus est. Ecce quod Christo importare conaris insane, ut natura fuerit omnium libidinosissimus, quia ita posset voluntatis virtute omnium esse castissimus. Tanto quippe in eo, sicut disputas, continentiae spiritus maior esset, quanto maiorem carnis concupiscentiam coerceret. Ad hunc te interitum tua suscepta nimium dilecta perduxit.
Augustine. Where have you read that I said this, except that you slander, as you are accustomed? The possibility of sowing children is one thing, which we do not say was lacking to the flesh of Christ, just as we know it to be lacking to the flesh of eunuchs; and the desire of vices is another, which you try to persuade Christ had, and you boast that you are a Christian; because, namely, as you said a little before: Christ too would be pressed by charges of fraud, if he said to mortals: Stretch yourselves to the endurance of a man feeling nothing; as though it follows that one does not feel inflicted pains who wills and is able not to have evil desires; or if he said—as you yourself compose your own words: Imitate the chastity, conquering the certain enticements of your nature, of him whom weakness made seem chaste. For you are so excellent a lover of chastity that to you one seems chaster who desires unlawful unions but, that he may not perpetrate them, resists his own disordered desire, than one who does not even desire such evils—not through impossibility of the flesh, but through the summit and perfection of virtue; nay, that the former is chaste, but the latter not chaste at all, but only seems to be; since, according to you, if he were chaste, he would desire these evils by nature, but would curb that same natural disordered desire by vigor of mind. So it comes about that that horrible absurdity, as I have already shown above, follows you: that each one is by will the chaster, the greater the disordered desire of his nature he has conquered, and has not permitted to go out into any excesses of luxury, however great it be; but that he who curbs a lesser disordered desire of disgraceful acts is less chaste; since he to whom what is not lawful is not pleasing is, according to your wisdom—or rather your madness—not chaste at all. Behold what you insanely try to fasten upon Christ: that he was by nature the most lustful of all, in order that thus, by the virtue of his will, he could be the most chaste of all. For in him, as you dispute, the spirit of continence would be the greater, the greater the concupiscence of the flesh he curbed. To this destruction your thing you have taken up, loved too much, has led you.
JulianImp.4.52IV. 53. Iulianus. Qui etsi propter signum natus ex Virgine est, et tamen ita aversatus non est sexum virilem, ut eius susciperet veritatem, integer per omnia viscerum, integer corporis, homo verus, vir perfectus, si Petro apostolo creditur in Actibus disserenti ; intacta castitate conspicuus, et animum et oculos numquam remisso cordis vigore custodiens; sed quod hoc totum virtute mentis, non carnis infirmitate perfecerit, concupiscentiam carnis totius corporis immixtam sensibus, et veritatem ac sanitatem conditionemque membrorum fuisse in eo, et somnus eius, et cibus, et barba, et sudor, et labor, et crux testatur, et lancea. Non ergo sensus corporis non habuit ille, sed rexit. Hoc est unde Gentibus, unde Manichaeis insultat Catholicorum fides, quia verbum ut crucis, ita carnis eius, pereuntibus stultitia est, salvis autem futuris virtus Dei. Hoc est quod commendavit caritatem suam in nobis; quoniam quae lacerat impietas Manichaei, ea omnia pietas Mediatoris assumpsit. Nihil ergo me pudet in Domino meo; in quae propter salutem meam venit, teneo veritatem membrorum, ut exempli eius soliditatem arcemque suscipiam.
IV. 53. Julian. Who, although for the sake of a sign he was born of a Virgin, yet so did not turn away from the male sex that he took on its truth, whole through all his inmost parts, whole in body, a true man, a perfect man, if the apostle Peter is to be believed disputing in the Acts (See Acts 2:30-31); conspicuous in untouched chastity, guarding both his mind and his eyes, with the vigor of his heart never relaxed; but that he accomplished all this by virtue of mind, not by infirmity of flesh, both his sleep, and food, and beard, and sweat, and labor, and cross, and lance attest, and the concupiscence of the flesh mingled into the senses of his whole body, and the truth and health and condition of his members. He did not, then, lack the senses of the body, but he ruled them. This is whence the faith of the Catholics insults the Gentiles, insults the Manicheans, because the word of his cross, as of his flesh, is to those perishing folly, but to those who shall be saved the power of God (See 1 Cor 1:18). This is what commended his love among us; since whatever the impiety of the Manichean tears to pieces, all this the piety of the Mediator assumed. Nothing, then, shames me in my Lord; in the things into which he came for my salvation, I hold the truth of his members, that I may take on the solidity and citadel of his example.
JulianImp.4.53Augustinus. Aliud est veritas membrorum, quam christianus omnis agnoscit in Christo, aliud cupiditas peccatorum, quam tu importare vis Christo. Dicis enim concupiscentiam carnis, hoc est libidinem, quam libentius vocas concupiscentiam naturalem, bonum esse; et sic arguis eius excessum, ut quisquis eam concessos fines transgredi siverit, tamquam male utens bono, culpam contrahat; quisquis autem illam usque ad licita et concessa ingredi, nec ultra permiserit progredi, tamquam bono bene utens laude sit dignus. Proinde quoniam videmus alios ita esse natos, ut maiore libidine urgeantur, alios ut minore, si ei resistentes utrique sint casti, cogeris dicere illos maiore, istos minore bono bene uti. Erit igitur, te doctore, bono isto tuo quisque tanto copiosior, quanto libidinosior; et tanto laboriosior contra suam libidinem pro castitate certando, quanto abundantior naturali isto bono; et ideo etiam tanto laudabilior in hac virtute, quanto fortius reluctatur maiori bono, quam si minori reluctaretur. Quia ergo Christus in carne mortali omnium procul dubio castissimus vixit, tanto ei maiorem libidinem dabis naturalem, quanto in libidine cohibenda non potes invenire fortiorem. Sic enim sine fraudis crimine suis dicet: Imitamini castitatem meam, certa naturae vestrae irritamenta vincentes; haec quippe irritamenta bona sunt, sed tamen cohibenda atque vincenda; sicut ego habui, sed cohibui vicique maiora; ne diceretis mihi: Ideo vicisti, ideo castissimus in tua mortali carne vixisti, quoniam naturae felicitate minimas libidines, quas facillimas vinceres, habuisti. Estote ergo casti, quia ut vobis ad me imitandum obstacula excusationis auferrem, libidinosior vobis nasci volui, et tamen maximam libidinem meam concessos fines numquam transire permisi. Haec horribilia monstra peperit haeresis vestra.
Augustine. The truth of his members, which every Christian acknowledges in Christ, is one thing; the disordered desire of sins, which you wish to fasten upon Christ, is another. For you say that the concupiscence of the flesh—that is, disordered desire, which you more gladly call natural concupiscence—is a good; and so you accuse its excess, so that whoever permits it to transgress the granted bounds contracts fault, as one using a good badly; but whoever advances it only up to lawful and granted things, and permits it to proceed no further, is worthy of praise, as one using a good well. Accordingly, since we see that some are so born that they are urged by greater disordered desire, others by less, if both, resisting it, be chaste, you are compelled to say that the former use a greater good well, the latter a lesser. There will, then, with you as teacher, be each one the more abounding in this good of yours, the more lustful he is; and the more laborious in fighting for chastity against his own disordered desire, the more abundant in this natural good; and therefore even the more praiseworthy in this virtue, the more strongly he struggles against a greater good than if he struggled against a lesser. Since, then, Christ in mortal flesh lived without doubt the most chaste of all, you will give him so much the greater natural disordered desire, the stronger you cannot find anyone in curbing disordered desire. For thus, without a charge of fraud, he will say to his own: Imitate my chastity, conquering the certain enticements of your nature; for these enticements are good, but nonetheless to be curbed and conquered; just as I had them, but curbed and conquered greater ones; lest you should say to me: For this reason you conquered, for this reason you lived most chaste in your mortal flesh, because by the felicity of nature you had the least disordered desires, which you would conquer most easily. Be chaste, then, because, in order to take away from you the obstacles of excuse for imitating me, I willed to be born more lustful than you, and yet I never permitted my greatest disordered desire to cross the granted bounds. These horrible monsters your heresy has brought forth.
JulianImp.4.53IV. 54. Iulianus. Praedico omnem in eo sanctitatem beneficio animi, non carnis stetisse praeiudicio. Sic enim et natura tam conditione eius quam susceptione de fenditur, et vita hominum virtutum illius imitatione dirigitur. De his duobus non potest alterum sine alterius veritate laudari; tantum aderit dignitatis operi sacro, quantum humani corporis adfuerit veritati; et tantum aderit defensioni carnis, quantum sanctitas conversationis exegerit. Atque e regione, vituperatio unius utrique participat; quoniam tantum de virtutibus eius, quantum de artubus auferetur; ac si quid de substantiae solido radatur, universa morum ornamenta depereunt, atque ad tolerantis iniuriam recurrunt damna nascentis; postremo si carnis eius substantia aliqua naturalium ereptione tenuetur, universa evanescit pompa virtutum. Nihil ergo in membris Mediatoris facti ex muliere, quod naturale constat, negabo. Et vide quam diversi sint rationis termini, quam pudoris; non erubescit fides Christianorum, dicere Christum habuisse genitalia; cum tamen ea in nobis, quam honestissime possumus, occulamus.
IV. 54. Julian. I proclaim that all sanctity in him stood by the benefit of his mind, not by the prejudgment of the flesh. For thus both nature is defended, as much by his condition as by his assumption of it, and the life of human beings is directed by the imitation of his virtues. Of these two, the one cannot be praised without the truth of the other; there will be as much of dignity present to the sacred work as there is of truth present to the human body; and there will be as much present to the defense of the flesh as the sanctity of his manner of life shall have demanded. And, on the other side, the disparagement of one shares in both; since as much will be taken from his virtues as from his limbs; and if anything be scraped from the solid of his substance, all the ornaments of his morals perish, and the losses of the one being born recur to the injury of the one enduring; finally, if the substance of his flesh be thinned by any snatching-away of natural things, the whole pomp of his virtues vanishes. I will deny nothing in the members of the Mediator made of a woman that is established to be natural. And see how diverse are the bounds of reason, how of shame; the faith of Christians does not blush to say that Christ had genitals, while we nonetheless conceal them in ourselves as honorably as we can.
JulianImp.4.54Augustinus. Non quidem erubescit fides Christianorum, dicere Christum habuisse genitalia; sed tu erubescere debuisti, vel potius contremiscere, ne diceres Christi genitalia aliquando, et nolente ipso (non enim hoc umquam velle debuisset qui vitam caelibem duxit), tamen libidine fuisse commota, et in nonnullos illicitos usus contra eius sanctum propositum se illam partem sancti eius corporis erexisse. Talem quippe libidinem patitur etiam omne genus sanctorum, qualem Sancto sanctorum conaris inferre. Si vero genitalia Christi ipso invito commoveri et erigi solere libidine, non audes dicere; cur audes credere, infelix, cur audes talem libidinem naturae Christi tribuere, ut quod non audes dicere, compellas homines cogitare?
Augustine. The faith of Christians does not indeed blush to say that Christ had genitals; but you ought to have blushed—or rather to have trembled—lest you should say that the genitals of Christ were sometimes, and that even with him unwilling (for he ought never to have willed this, who led a celibate life), nonetheless moved by disordered desire, and that, against his holy resolve, that part of his holy body raised itself up to certain unlawful uses. For every kind of saint suffers such disordered desire as you try to bring upon the Holy of holies. But if you do not dare to say that the genitals of Christ were wont to be moved and raised by disordered desire with him unwilling, why do you dare to believe, unhappy man, why do you dare to attribute such disordered desire to the nature of Christ, that what you do not dare to say, you compel men to think?
JulianImp.4.54IV. 55. Iulianus. Ita natura praescripsit esse quaedam, quae ut ratio, ita fides cum religione pronuntiet; et tamen pudor et decentia conversationis oculis non permittat exponi. Hoc modo Magister etiam Gentium veritatem carni eius assignat, et spiritui sanctitatem. Magnum, inquit, pietatis sacramentum, quod manifestatum est in carne, iustificatum est in spiritu, apparuit Angelis, praedicatum est in Gentibus, creditum est in hoc mundo, assumptum est in gloria . Quod sicut commendavit cum veritate credendum, ita impugnatores eius in fine denuntiavit saeculi nascituros; nam statim sequitur: In novissimis autem temporibus recedent quidam a fide, attendentes spiritibus seductoribus, doctrinis daemoniorum in hypocrisi mendacia loquentium, cauteriatam habentes conscientiam, prohibentium nubere, abstinere a cibis, quos Deus creavit ad percipiendum cum gratiarum actione fidelibus, et his qui cognoverunt veritatem; quoniam omnis creatura Dei bona . Hanc ergo Ecclesiarum contaminationem, quam de Manichaei consectatione vomuisti, et hanc a fide recedentium praevaricationem, quae in naturalis mali praedicatione et in commixtionis coniugalis damnatione consistit, et Apostolus praevidit et punivit, non solum quid diceretur, sed etiam quid consequeretur ostendens.
IV. 55. Julian. Thus nature has prescribed that there be certain things which reason, as well as faith with religion, may pronounce upon; and yet shame and the decency of conduct do not permit them to be exposed to the eyes. In this manner the Teacher of the Gentiles too assigns truth to his flesh and sanctity to his spirit. Great, he says, is the sacrament of piety, which was manifested in the flesh, justified in the spirit, appeared to angels, was preached among the Gentiles, was believed in this world, was taken up in glory (1 Tim 3:16). Which, just as he commended to be believed with truth, so he announced that its assailants would be born at the end of the age; for at once there follows: But in the last times certain ones will depart from the faith, attending to spirits of seduction, to the teachings of demons speaking lies in hypocrisy, having their conscience seared, forbidding to marry, to abstain from foods which God created to be received with thanksgiving by the faithful, and by those who have known the truth; since every creature of God is good (1 Tim 4:1-4). This contamination of the Churches, then, which you vomited up from your following of the Manichean, and this transgression of those departing from the faith—which consists in the preaching of natural evil and in the condemnation of conjugal mingling—the Apostle both foresaw and punished, showing not only what would be said, but also what would follow.
JulianImp.4.55Augustinus. Et tamen tu, qui non potes nisi ructare calumnias, et vomere contumelias, verbis catholici hominis Dei, quem Manichaeum non potes dicere, non ausus es contradicere, suffocantis te, atque dicentis, ex commixtione maris et feminae nasci expertem delicti neminem posse . Namque ista verba eius et in primo ad Valerium libro commemoravi, quem libris quattuor redarguere conatus, quidquam inde attingere timuisti; et in isto, cui nunc respondes, eadem ipsa non tacui , et adversus illa adhuc mutus, quamvis eius nomine tacito, cui adversari palam non audes, hunc in me non metuis criminari.
Augustine. And yet you, who can do nothing but belch slanders and vomit insults, did not dare to contradict the words of the Catholic man of God—whom you cannot call a Manichean—who chokes you, and who says that, from the mingling of male and female, no one can be born free of fault (See Ambrose, Exposition of the Gospel of Luke 1.17). For these words of his I both recorded in my first book to Valerius, which—having tried to refute it with four books—you feared to touch anything thence; and in this one, to which you now respond, I did not pass over those same words in silence, and against them, still mute, although with the name of him you do not openly dare to oppose unspoken, you do not fear to accuse me of this.
JulianImp.4.55IV. 56. Iulianus. Nam hoc quod ait, abstinere a cibis docendum fore, non utique apud prudentem arguit Christianorum parcitatem, aut denuntiat posse existere homines qui inediae discrimen indicant; sed ostendit, quoniam cum exorirentur, qui dicerent animalia omnia victibus a Deo creata mortalium, quia de concupiscentia et commixtione sexus nascerentur, diabolico malo esse polluta, quid consequeretur expressit, videlicet renuntiandum esse alimentis, si eorum propagatio diabolica crederetur. Unde et tu hanc infamationem commixtionis corporum ab animalibus removes, ut subsistat ratio simulandi. Homines tamen qui ad imaginem Dei facti sunt, propter hanc ipsam concupiscentiam generantium, dicis ad ius daemonis pertinere. Ambo igitur, tu et Manichaeus unam habetis causam substantiarum vituperandarum et transcribendarum diabolo; sed ille propter hanc affectionem quae sentitur in naturali opere, universas damnat animantes; tu autem non omnes, sed quod est foedius, meliores. Absolvis enim sues, canes, et asinos, ut Manichaeos vitare videaris; sed damnas, propter hoc idem quod Manichaeus, omnes homines qui ad imaginem Dei facti sunt; ac nusquam malum naturale constituens nisi in imagine Dei, concionaris contra nos, accusator sanctorum et patronus asinorum.
IV. 56. Julian. For what he says—that it would have to be taught to abstain from foods—does not, surely, in the judgment of a prudent man, accuse the sparingness of Christians, nor announce that human beings can exist who would point out the peril of starvation; but he shows that, since there would arise those who would say that all animals created by God for the food of mortals, because they were born of concupiscence and the mingling of sex, were polluted by a diabolical evil, he expressed what would follow: namely, that one must renounce foods, if their propagation were believed diabolical. Whence you too remove this defamation of the mingling of bodies from animals, so that a reason for your pretense may subsist. Yet human beings, who were made to the image of God, you say pertain, on account of this very concupiscence of those generating, to the right of the demon. Both of you, then, you and the Manichean, have one cause for disparaging substances and transcribing them to the devil; but he, on account of this affection which is felt in the natural work, condemns all living things; you, however, not all, but—what is fouler—the better ones. For you absolve swine, dogs, and asses, so that you may seem to avoid the Manicheans; but you condemn, on account of this same thing which the Manichean does, all human beings who were made to the image of God; and, establishing natural evil nowhere except in the image of God, you harangue against us, an accuser of the saints and a patron of asses.
JulianImp.4.56Augustinus. Quid est quod dicis, calumniator Catholicorum et adiutor Manichaeorum? Quid est quod dicis? Quem tantae stoliditatis pudere deberet, etiamsi tibi asinina frons esset. Nonne accusator sanctorum et patronus asinorum, ab homine huius cordis cuius et ipse es, appellari posset, qui diceret, ignorantia veritatis homines fieri miseros posse, asinos vero nesciendo veritatem miseros esse non posse? Et tamen verissime diceret. Cur ergo non intellegis, asine, similiter esse verum, ex commixtione maris et feminae expertes delicti homines nasci non posse, et asinos posse? An ideo te arbitraris effugere insequentes plagas auctoritatis atque rationis, quia in societate libidinis, ad currum tui erroris, homines et asinos iungis? Non de pecoribus, sed de hominibus loquebatur Ambrosius, ubi ait: Servatum est igitur, ut ex viro et muliere, id est, per illam corporum commixtionem, nemo videatur expers esse delicti . Itane iste, iste doctor Ecclesiae accusator erat sanctorum, et patronus asinorum? Nempe corruptibile corpus est et asini et hominis; et tamen non asini aggravat, sed hominis animam; de homine quippe Scriptura dicit: Corpus corruptibile aggravat animam . Sic ergo et in libidine agnosce, et pecoris naturam, et hominis poenam, si animam non habes asininam.
Augustine. What is this you say, slanderer of the Catholics and helper of the Manicheans? What is this you say? A man who ought to be ashamed of so great a dullness, even if he had the brow of an ass. Could not one who said that human beings can be made miserable by ignorance of the truth, but that asses cannot be made miserable by not knowing the truth, be called by a man of such a heart as you yourself are, "an accuser of the saints and a patron of asses"? And yet he would be saying what is most true. Why, then, do you not understand, ass, that it is likewise true that human beings cannot be born free of fault from the mingling of male and female, but asses can? Or do you think that you escape the pursuing blows of authority and reason because, in the company of disordered desire, you yoke human beings and asses to the chariot of your error? Ambrose was speaking not of cattle, but of human beings, where he says: It has been so arranged, then, that from man and woman, that is, through that mingling of bodies, no one is seen to be free of fault (See Ambrose, Exposition of the Gospel of Luke 1.17). Was this man, this Teacher of the Church, then, an accuser of the saints and a patron of asses? Surely the body both of the ass and of man is corruptible; and yet it weighs down not the soul of the ass, but of man; for of man Scripture says: The corruptible body weighs down the soul (Wis 9:15). So then, in disordered desire too acknowledge both the nature of the beast and the punishment of man, if you do not have the soul of an ass.
JulianImp.4.56IV. 57. Iulianus. Christus igitur non minus homo verus, quam verus Deus, nihil de naturalibus minus habuit; sed iustum erat ut qui dabat perfectionis exemplum, omnibus virtutum studiis antecelleret, castitasque eius continua integritate celsa, nullo permota libidinis appetitu, quae virgo sanctae mentis exstiterat, et omnium sensuum domitrix animi magnitudo, et superatrix dolorum, cunctis fidelibus, et humanitate imitabilis fieret, et sublimitate mirabilis.
IV. 57. Julian. Christ, then, no less a true man than a true God, had nothing less of natural things; but it was just that he who gave an example of perfection should excel in all the pursuits of the virtues, and his chastity, lofty with continuous integrity, moved by no appetite of disordered desire—a virgin of holy mind, and a greatness of soul that was the tamer of all the senses, and the conqueror of pains—should be made, to all the faithful, both imitable in its humanity and admirable in its sublimity.
JulianImp.4.57Augustinus. Dicis castitatem Christi continua integritate celsam; sed homo es, cui non videtur castitas integra, ubi magnitudine et perfectione voluntatis bonae non solum non committuntur, sed nec cupiuntur illicita. Nam qui concupiscit mala, etsi resistens concupiscentiae suae non ea perpetrat, implet quidem quod scriptum est: Post concupiscentias tuas non eas ; sed non implet quod ait lex: Non concupisces . Christus ergo qui legem perfectissime implevit, nulla illicita concupivit; quia discordiam carnis et spiritus, quae in hominum naturam ex praevaricatione primi hominis vertit, prorsus ille non habuit, qui de Spiritu et Virgine non per concupiscentiam carnis est natus. In nobis autem caro concupiscit contra spiritum illicita, ita ut omnino perficiat, nisi et contra carnem spiritus ita concupiscat, ut vincat. Dicis mentem Christi omnium sensuum domitricem: sed hoc domandum est, quod resistit; caro autem Christi nihil habebat indomitum, nec in aliquo spiritui resistebat, ut ab illo eam domari oporteret. Quo proposito perfectionis exemplo, ad hoc se debet omnis imitator extendere, ut concupiscentias carnis, quas vetat Apostolus perfici , nitatur atque optet penitus non habere: sic enim eas potest provectu quotidiano minuere, quas nullas habeat salute perfecta.
Augustine. You say the chastity of Christ was lofty with continuous integrity; but you are a man to whom chastity does not seem integral where, by the greatness and perfection of a good will, unlawful things are not only not committed, but not even desired. For one who desires evils, even if, resisting his own concupiscence, he does not perpetrate them, fulfills indeed what is written: Go not after your concupiscences (Sir 18:30); but does not fulfill what the law says: You shall not covet (Exod 20:17). Christ, then, who fulfilled the law most perfectly, desired no unlawful things; because the discord of flesh and spirit, which turned into the nature of human beings from the transgression of the first man, he utterly did not have, who was born of the Spirit and of a Virgin, not through the concupiscence of the flesh. But in us the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit for unlawful things, so much so that it would altogether accomplish them, unless the spirit too had desires opposed to the flesh so as to conquer. You say that the mind of Christ was the tamer of all the senses; but that must be tamed which resists; the flesh of Christ, however, had nothing untamed, nor did it in anything resist the spirit, so that he should need to tame it. By which proposed example of perfection, to this every imitator ought to stretch himself: that he strive and desire utterly not to have the concupiscences of the flesh, which the Apostle forbids to be accomplished (See Gal 5:16); for thus he can by daily progress lessen those which he would have none of by a perfected salvation.
JulianImp.4.57IV. 58. Iulianus. Tu igitur, ut omnia, profanissime effatus es, in Christi carne non fuisse quod humanae naturae est; quod certe de nulla Scripturae rationabilis vena, sed de solo Manichaeorum coeno deceptus hausisti. Verum ut maior copia defendendae veritatis appareat, concedamus te somniasse, in Christo carnis quam dicis concupiscentiam non fuisse; quod certe in Manichaei prius, postea in Apollinaris furore damnatum est; tuo tamen quid possit dogmati suffragari; cum non continuo sequeretur malum esse, si quid ille assumere noluisset? Quoniam gradatim crescentibus meritis bonorum, diceretur isse per optima, nec bona tamen infra se locata superiorum electione damnasse. Quomodo enim nuptias non infamavit, integritatem secutus; ita nec sensum carnis genitalis damnasset, si eius possibilitatem nec in substantia sua habere voluisset.
IV. 58. Julian. You, therefore, as in all things, have spoken most profanely, that in the flesh of Christ there was not what belongs to human nature; which surely you drew from no vein of reasonable Scripture, but deceived, from the mud of the Manicheans alone. But, that a greater abundance of defending the truth may appear, let us grant that you dreamed that in Christ there was not the concupiscence of the flesh which you speak of—which surely was condemned first in the fury of the Manichean, afterward of Apollinaris; yet how could it support your teaching, since it would not at once follow that a thing is evil, if he had been unwilling to assume something? Since, with the merits of the good increasing by degrees, he would be said to have gone through the best things, and not for that reason to have condemned good things placed below himself by his choice of the higher. For just as he did not defame marriage by following integrity, so neither would he have condemned the sense of genital flesh, if he had been unwilling to have its possibility even in his own substance.
JulianImp.4.58Augustinus. Iam superius dixi, quod Christus non solum non perpetravit, sed nec concupivit illicita, ut impleret legem dicentem: Non concupisces . Hoc certe de sanctae Scripturae vena, non de coeno Manichaeorum manat in corda fidelium, quod vestrum dogma exstinguit haereticum. Somniasse me dicis, non fuisse in Christo carnis concupiscentiam spiritui resistentem; cuius tu etiam ipsis somniis non pepercisti. Dormisse quippe novimus Christum, in quo si erat ista tua suscepta, profecto sopitos eius sensus aliquando per talia somnia deludebat, ut sibi etiam concumbere videretur, atque ita caro eius isto tuo bono stimulante commota, et in irritum extenderet genitalia et irrita effunderet semina. Si autem hoc de Christi carne credere contremiscis (non enim sic es lapideus, ut non contremiscas, quod ego, quamvis ut te redarguerem, sine cordis tamen tremore non dixi); profecto fateri debes, naturae Christi non solum sine dispendio defuisse talem carnis concupiscentiam, verum etiam cum perfectarum laude virtutum, qualem concupiscentiam novimus carni ceterorum hominum et ipsorum non deesse sanctorum. Quod autem dicis, non esse consequens ut hoc malum sit, etiamsi concedas id Christum noluisse suscipere; sicut non ideo damnavit nuptias, quia noluit habere coniugium; hoc de libidine pecorum dici potest, quibus ideo non est malum, quia non habent rationis bonum, unde caro eorum non concupiscat adversus spiritum; quod vero resistit spiritui hominis volentis facere bonum, quantalibet loquacitate abs te defendatur, non est bonum. Sic igitur Christus abstinuit a peccato, ut abstineret etiam ab omni cupiditate peccati; non ut ei existenti resisteret, sed ut illa numquam prorsus existeret; non quod eam non posset habere si vellet, sed non recte vellet, quod eum caro peccati quam non gerebat, etiam invitum habere non cogeret. Proinde ille vir perfectus, non per concupiscentiam natus, quae indifferenter appetit et illicita et licita, sed de Spiritu Sancto et Virgine Maria, quidquid concupivit, licuit; quidquid non licuit, non concupivit. Natus enim de carne per Sanctum concipiente Spiritum, absit ut in se haberet discordiam carnis et spiritus.
Augustine. I have already said above that Christ not only did not perpetrate, but did not even desire unlawful things, so that he fulfilled the law that says: You shall not covet (Exod 20:17). This, surely, flows into the hearts of the faithful from the vein of holy Scripture, not from the mud of the Manicheans—the thing which your heretical teaching extinguishes. You say I dreamed that there was not in Christ a concupiscence of the flesh resisting the spirit; you spared not even its dreams. For we know that Christ slept; in whom, if this thing you have taken up was present, surely it sometimes deluded his lulled senses through such dreams, so that he too seemed to himself to lie together; and so his flesh, stirred by this good of yours goading it, would both stretch out the genitals in vain and pour forth seed in vain. But if you tremble to believe this of the flesh of Christ (for you are not so stony as not to tremble at what I, though to refute you, nonetheless did not say without trembling of heart), surely you ought to confess that not only was such concupiscence of the flesh lacking to the nature of Christ without loss, but even with the praise of perfect virtues—such concupiscence as we know is not lacking to the flesh of the rest of human beings, and even of the saints themselves. But what you say—that it does not follow that this is evil, even if you grant that Christ was unwilling to take it on; just as he did not for that reason condemn marriage, because he was unwilling to have a wife—this can be said of the disordered desire of beasts, to which for this reason it is not an evil, because they do not have the good of reason, whence their flesh does not have desires opposed to the spirit; but what resists the spirit of a man wishing to do good, with however great loquacity it be defended by you, is not good. So then Christ abstained from sin, so as to abstain even from all disordered desire of sin; not so as to resist it existing, but so that it should utterly never exist; not that he could not have it if he willed, but he would not rightly will it—a thing which the flesh of sin, which he did not bear, did not compel him to have even against his will. Accordingly that perfect man, born not through concupiscence, which indifferently desires both unlawful and lawful things, but of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, whatever he desired was lawful; whatever was not lawful, he did not desire. For, born of flesh with the Holy Spirit conceiving, far be it that he should have in himself the discord of flesh and spirit.
JulianImp.4.58IV. 59. Iulianus. Et ut res plana aliquo confirmetur exemplo, melius est habere rationem, quam non habere; homines autem rationabiles facti sunt, pecora vero irrationabilia; non tamen ideo quia humana natura quadrupedibus antestat, quadrupedia aut malum aliquod, aut diaboli opus esse dicenda sunt. Fac ergo, quoniam Christus, cum sua membra formaret, noluerit eis sensum admiscere genitalium, quo usurus non erat; num ideo cum Isaac, Iacob, et omnium membra fingebat, eisque et sexum dabat et sensum, malum aliquid faciebat? Aut ad haec veniens, in adiutorium advocabat diabolum, ut membris quae ipse compegerat, necessaria oblectamenta misceret? Nec exiguum quidquam igitur omnino (sicut et in hoc, et in priore opere, Deo adiuvante monstravimus) per Christi personam contra divina opera obtinere potuisti. Claruit enim nihil minus de natura hominum, Salvatoris corpus habuisse.
IV. 59. Julian. And, that a plain matter may be confirmed by some example: it is better to have reason than not to have it; but human beings were made rational, the cattle irrational; yet not for that reason, because human nature stands before the four-footed beasts, are the four-footed beasts to be said to be either some evil or the work of the devil. Grant, then, that since Christ, when he formed his members, was unwilling to mingle into them the sense of the genitals, which he was not going to use; did he therefore, when he fashioned the members of Isaac, Jacob, and of all, and gave them both sex and sense, make something evil? Or, coming to these things, did he summon the devil to his aid, to mingle into the members which he himself had compacted the necessary delights? You have therefore been able to obtain absolutely nothing at all, even slight (as we have shown both in this and in the earlier work, with God helping), through the person of Christ against the divine works. For it became clear that the body of the Savior had nothing less of the nature of human beings.
JulianImp.4.59Augustinus. Immo claruit hominum naturam, ad illam integritatem, rectitudinem, salutem, in qua primitus condita est, minus haec habere nunc omnia. Hanc venit Christus redintegrare, corrigere, atque sanare, integer sine ulla corruptione, rectus sine ulla pravitate, salvus sine ulla cupiditate peccati.
Augustine. Nay, it became clear that human nature now has all these things less than that integrity, uprightness, health in which it was first founded. This Christ came to restore, to correct, and to heal—whole without any corruption, upright without any depravity, sound without any disordered desire of sin.
JulianImp.4.59IV. 60. Iulianus. Ac per hoc, in ea natura non potest esse peccatum, cum in illo in quo tota est, nihil iniquitatis inventum est.
IV. 60. Julian. And through this, in that nature there cannot be sin, since in him, in whom it is whole, no iniquity was found.
JulianImp.4.60Augustinus. Immaniter, Iuliane, blasphemas, coaequans carnem Christi ceterorum hominum carni; nec videns illum venisse non in carne peccati, sed in similitudine carnis peccati , quod nullo modo verum esset, nisi ceterorum esset caro peccati.
Augustine. Monstrously, Julian, you blaspheme, equating the flesh of Christ with the flesh of the rest of human beings; and not seeing that he came not in the flesh of sin, but in the likeness of the flesh of sin (See Rom 8:3)—which would in no way be true, unless the flesh of the rest were flesh of sin.
JulianImp.4.60IV. 61. Iulianus. Concupiscentia itaque sexuum, sive in Christi carne fuit, sive non fuit, mala et diabolica non docetur.
IV. 61. Julian. The disordered desire of the sexes, then, whether it was in the flesh of Christ or was not, is not taught to be evil and diabolical.
JulianImp.4.61Augustinus. Concupiscentia carnis mala est, et quando ei non consentitur ad malum; ipsa est enim, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum; etiamsi adversus eam concupiscente spiritu, non perficiat quod conatur, id est, opus malum.
Augustine. The concupiscence of the flesh is evil even when consent is not given to it for evil; for it is itself that by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit; even if, with the spirit having desires opposed to it, it does not accomplish what it attempts, that is, the evil work.
JulianImp.4.61IV. 62. Iulianus. Ad alia ire festino, sed multum hic rerum admiratione defigor. Qui in alium tantus furor est, ut si Scripturas non intellegis, vel tua dicta non ponderes? Sed ita argumentaris iugiter, ut quidquid ieceris, recurrat in te impetu grandiore. Dixisti nempe, nullam esse causam pudoris, praeter concupiscentiam carnis in genitalibus motibus apparentem.
IV. 62. Julian. I hasten to other matters, but I am much fixed here in wonder at the matter. What so great a fury is there against another, that you neither understand the Scriptures nor weigh your own words? But you argue ever in such a way that whatever you have hurled recurs upon you with a greater impetus. You said, surely, that there is no cause of shame except the concupiscence of the flesh appearing in the movements of the genitals.
JulianImp.4.62Augustinus. Non hoc dixi. Sunt enim et aliae causae pudoris, sive ne fiat aliquid quod non decet, sive quia factum est. Sed huius pudoris de quo nunc agimus, cum quaeritur causa, illa verissima reperitur, qua factum est ut haec membra pudenda proprie vocarentur, quae prius pudenda non fuerunt, quando illi homines recti atque perfecti nudi erant, et non pudebat eos. Quod si prudenter cogitare voluisses, non ipse impudenter veritati manifestissimae restitisses.
Augustine. I did not say this. For there are also other causes of shame, whether lest something be done that is unbecoming, or because it has been done. But of this shame of which we now treat, when the cause is sought, that most true one is found, by which it came about that these members were properly called shameful, which before were not shameful, when those upright and perfect human beings were naked, and it did not shame them. But if you had been willing to think prudently, you would not yourself have shamelessly resisted a most manifest truth.
JulianImp.4.62IV. 63. Iulianus. Esse autem sacrilegium, pudendum aliquid quod Deus fecisse credatur, praeter hanc carnis concupiscentiam iudicare; Christum vero non habuisse hanc concupiscentiam carnis, quae mortalibus facit causam pudoris. Quid igitur ad haec occurreret, non vidisti, videlicet nudum eum, id est Christum, convencticulis debuisse misceri; nec aliquem verecundiae habere respectum, ne sacrilegium quod commentaris incurreret, in carne videlicet sua, quae concupiscentiam non habebat, de suis et Patris operibus erubescens. Si autem ei et concupiscentia non fuit, et tamen ille est pudoris functus officio; irrefutabiliter etiam secundum te approbatur, verecundiam corpori humano debitam, non calori.
IV. 63. Julian. And that it is sacrilege to judge anything shameful which is believed to have been made by God, except this concupiscence of the flesh; but that Christ did not have this concupiscence of the flesh, which makes for mortals a cause of shame. What, then, would meet these things, you did not see: namely, that he—that is, Christ—naked ought to have mingled in the gatherings, and to have no regard for modesty, lest he incur the sacrilege which you contrive—being ashamed, namely, in his own flesh, which had no concupiscence, of his own and his Father's works. But if there was in him both no concupiscence, and yet he discharged the office of shame, it is irrefutably approved, even according to you, that the modesty is owed to the human body, not to the heat.
JulianImp.4.63Augustinus. Ista tua ratione tam acuta et exquisita, debet negari baptismus Ioannis datus fuisse in poenitentiam peccatorum, quia eo baptizatus est Christus, qui nullum habebat omnino peccatum. Si autem potuit alia causa, non ea qua ceteri, baptizari, id est, non propter carnem peccati, quam non habebat; sed propter similitudinem carnis peccati, quam pro liberanda peccati carne susceperat: potuit etiam membra tegere, non ea causa qua ceteri; sed ut sic congrueret pudenda tegentibus, nihil habens pudendum; quemadmodum baptizatus congruit poenitentibus, nihil abluens poenitendum. Decebant quippe similitudinem carnis peccati, ea quibus indigebat caro peccati. Quamquam et ipsa species humani corporis nudi, ubicumque insolita est, humanum offendit aspectum. Unde et Angeli qui hominum similes hominibus apparuerunt, vestiti apparere voluerunt, sicut humana consuetudo poscebat. Sed haec consuetudo si unde originem sumpserit recordemur, occurrit primi causa peccati, in illis hominibus, qui priusquam peccarent, decenter et honeste erant in loco tantae beatitudinis nudi, nondum scilicet de sua carne, quae inobediens inobedientibus reddita est, contra spiritum concupiscente confusi. Nihil ergo te adiuvat Christi vestis, ut concupiscentiae carnis defensor impudens non sis.
Augustine. By this reasoning of yours, so sharp and exquisite, it ought to be denied that the baptism of John was given for the penance of sins, because Christ was baptized by it, who had no sin at all. But if he could be baptized by another cause, not that by which the rest are—that is, not on account of the flesh of sin, which he did not have, but on account of the likeness of the flesh of sin, which he had taken on for the flesh of sin to be set free—he could also cover his members, not by that cause by which the rest do, but so that he might thus accord with those covering the shameful parts, having nothing shameful; just as, baptized, he accorded with the penitent, washing off nothing to be repented of. For the things of which the flesh of sin had need befitted the likeness of the flesh of sin. Although the very appearance of the naked human body, wherever it is unusual, offends the human gaze. Whence even the angels who, like men, appeared to men, willed to appear clothed, as human custom demanded. But if we recall whence this custom took its origin, the cause of the first sin presents itself, in those human beings who, before they sinned, were decently and honorably naked in a place of so great blessedness—not yet, namely, confounded by their flesh, which was rendered disobedient to the disobedient, having desires opposed to the spirit. Nothing, then, does the garment of Christ help you, so that you may not be a shameless defender of the concupiscence of the flesh.
JulianImp.4.63IV. 64. Iulianus. Vides igitur frustra te peccatum vocasse, si in his operibus, quae Deus fecit, velamen fateamur adhibendum, quod Dominus noster et hominis formator instituit, et homo factus exercuit. Det sane veniam reverentia Redemptoris, quia ad asserendam veritatem mysterii, Manichaeorumque flagitia destruenda, loquimur de carne eius audacter; quod nisi fides exigeret, reverentia modesta non tangeret.
IV. 64. Julian. You see, then, that you have called it sin in vain, if in these works which God made we confess that a covering must be applied—a covering which our Lord and the former of man both instituted and, made man, practiced. Let the reverence of the Redeemer grant pardon, since, for asserting the truth of the mystery and destroying the disgraces of the Manicheans, we speak boldly of his flesh; which, did not faith demand it, modest reverence would not touch.
JulianImp.4.64Augustinus. Non audacter de carne Christi loqueris vera, sed infeliciter falsa; non ad Manichaeorum, sicut tibi blandiris, flagitia destruenda, sed potius adiuvanda. Si Manichaeum cogitas vincere, noli dicere bonum esse quod est malum; sed dic unde sit malum, quod ostendere non potes bonum. Hoc enim esse de praevaricatione primi hominis dum non vis cum Ambrosio dicere , profecto efficis, ut de aliena natura Manichaeus verum se iactitet dicere.
Augustine. You do not speak boldly true things of the flesh of Christ, but unhappily false ones; not, as you flatter yourself, for destroying the disgraces of the Manicheans, but rather for aiding them. If you think to conquer the Manichean, do not say that what is evil is good; but say whence is the evil which you cannot show to be good. For while you are unwilling to say with Ambrose that this is from the transgression of the first man, you surely effect that the Manichean boast he speaks the truth about an alien nature.
JulianImp.4.64IV. 65. Iulianus. Sed iste, inquis, noluit nominare concupiscentiam carnis; tacet quia pudet, ac mira, si dici potest, pudoris impudentia nominare pudet, quod laudare non pudet . Displicet igitur tibi, quia novimus verecundiora nostra, secundum Apostolum, necessaria honestate velanda ; quia in hoc consilium sequitur Conditoris, ut quod ille in secreta corporis parte constituit, nos totidem verecundo operiamus obtectu.
IV. 65. Julian. But this man, you say, was unwilling to name the concupiscence of the flesh; he is silent because he is ashamed, and—a thing wondrous, if it can be said, the shamelessness of shame—he is ashamed to name what he is not ashamed to praise. It displeases you, then, that we know our more shameful parts, according to the Apostle, must be veiled by a necessary honorableness (See 1 Cor 12:23); because in this we follow the counsel of the Founder, that what he placed in a secret part of the body, we likewise cover with a modest covering.
JulianImp.4.65Augustinus. Res dicis mirabiles, tunc Adam et Evam Conditoris esse secutos consilium, quando eius deseruere praeceptum, sequendo consilium deceptoris. Prius enim quam hoc malum perpetrassent, cum adhuc essent recti atque perfecti, non sequebantur consilium Conditoris, ut quod ille in secreta corporis parte constituit, nudum relinquerent, nec verecundo obtectu operire curarent? Homo impudentissime, quod senserunt quando erubuerunt, laudare peius est quam nudare.
Augustine. You say wondrous things—that Adam and Eve followed the counsel of the Founder then, when they deserted his precept, by following the counsel of the deceiver. For before they had perpetrated this evil, when they were still upright and perfect, were they not following the counsel of the Founder, in leaving naked what he placed in a secret part of the body, and not caring to cover it with a modest covering? Most shameless man, to praise what they felt when they blushed is worse than to lay it bare.
JulianImp.4.65IV. 66. Iulianus. Has tamen elocutionum diversitates, quas tu non solum non imitaris, verum etiam criminaris, quarum nos adiuvamur officiis, non linguarum omnium, sed graecae et latinae cultus invenit. Ceterum linguae aliae, quae naturales vocantur, ob hoc quod nihil eis aut opum aut nitoris studia secuta contulerint, simplicibus omnino nominibus membrorum abutuntur; unde et apud Hebraeos, quorum sermone Scripturarum puritas continetur, propriis omnia vocabulis indicantur.
IV. 66. Julian. These diversities of expressions, however—which you not only do not imitate but even accuse, by whose offices we are aided—the cultivation not of all languages, but of the Greek and Latin, devised. For the other languages, which are called natural, because the pursuits of wealth or refinement have brought to them nothing either of resources or of polish, abuse the members altogether by their simple names; whence even among the Hebrews, in whose speech the purity of the Scriptures is contained, all things are indicated by their proper words.
JulianImp.4.66Augustinus. Multum falleris: quasi in hebraeo eloquio non sit tropica locutio, in qua utique non propria, sed translata sunt verba. Verum hoc qualecumque sit, quid te adiuvat? In hebraeis certe sacris Litteris legitur, et quando illi primi homines nudi fuerint, nec puduerit eos; et quando de sua nuditate confusi sint, et quae membra texerint ; ut possemus nosse quid senserint, et unde confusi sint. Tu si vis in hac causa te unde confunderis tegere, tandem tace.
Augustine. You are much deceived—as though in Hebrew speech there were no tropical expression, in which surely the words are not proper but transferred. But however this may be, what does it help you? In the Hebrew sacred Letters surely it is read both when those first human beings were naked, and it did not shame them; and when they were confounded at their nakedness, and what members they covered (See Gen 2:25; 3:7); so that we might be able to know what they felt, and whence they were confounded. You, if you wish in this cause to cover yourself, by whom you are confounded, at last be silent.
JulianImp.4.66IV. 67. Iulianus. Eademque securitate, qua pedes et genua, etiam genitalia utriusque sexus vocantur. Nos sane nec cum ista suffragetur auctoritas, pudentioris eloquii adminicula negleximus; quia reprehensioni iustissimae patet, sine ullo negotiorum coactu neglectus decoris, qui non minus in verbis quam in operibus, quantum pertulerit causae ratio, retinendus est. Igitur quia concupiscentia naturalis nec pudoris opprobrio potuit coargui, et Conditoris sui dignitate defensa est, ad hoc solum, non ut quasi magnum bonum, quippe quod sit hominibus pecoribusque commune, sed quasi necessarium sexibus instrumentum, a iure daemonum vindicata, inter eius opera locaretur, qui mundum fecit et corpora, a nullo autem accusatur, nisi a Manichaeo, et Traduciano eius haerede; apparet naturalis peccati, cuius omne praesidium in naturae criminationibus haerebat, totum evanuisse figmentum.
IV. 67. Julian. And with the same security with which the feet and knees are named, the genitals too of either sex are named. We, indeed, even when this authority supports us, have not neglected the aids of a more modest speech; because the neglect of decorum, without any compulsion of the business, lies open to a most just censure—a decorum which, no less in words than in works, as far as the reason of the case shall bear, must be retained. Therefore, because natural concupiscence could not be convicted even by the reproach of shame, and was defended by the dignity of its Founder, it was vindicated from the right of the demons for this alone—not as though a great good, since it is common to human beings and cattle, but as a necessary instrument of the sexes—so as to be located among the works of him who made the world and bodies, but accused by none except the Manichean and his heir the Traducianist; it appears that the whole fabrication of natural sin, whose every support clung to the disparagements of nature, has vanished.
JulianImp.4.67Augustinus. Ecce adhuc dicis concupiscentiam naturalem, ecce adhuc quantum potes, susceptam tuam, ne possit quae sit intellegi, contegis ambigua veste verborum. Cur enim non dicis: Concupiscentia carnis, sed dicis: Concupiscentia naturalis? Nonne concupiscentia beatitudinis est concupiscentia naturalis? Cur ambigue loqueris? Quam tuendam suscepisti, appella suo nomine; quid vereris? An in mala causa eius forte turbatus, oblitus es quid vocetur? Immo vero vigilante memoria, non vis eam carnis concupiscentiam nominare; nosti enim laude eius offendi eos, qui hoc nomen in Scripturis sanctis nonnisi in rei malae significatione legerunt. Isto autem nomine utens, et appellans eam concupiscentiam naturalem, inter eius opera locare conaris, qui, ut dicis et verum est, mundum fecit et corpora, cum dicat eam Ioannes a Patre non esse . Deus quidem mundum fecit et corpora prorsus omnia, sed ut corpus corruptibile aggravet animam, et caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, non est praecedens natura hominis instituti, sed consequens poena damnati. A nullo, inquis, accusatur, nisi a Manichaeo, et Traduciano eius haerede. Contumelias tuas cum his me accipere gaudeo, quos in me culpare audes, et nominare non audes. Itane non accusat susceptam tuam, qui dicit concupiscentiam carnis adversus spiritum ex praevaricatione primi hominis in nostram vertisse naturam ? Et quis est hic? Ille scilicet, cuius fidem et purissimum in Scripturis sensum, sicut eum Pelagius auctor tuus praedicat , ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere. Adversus hunc accusatorem tuam defende susceptam. Huic doctori meo, et illi laudatori eius doctori tuo, pro illa conviciare, quantum potes, ut patrocinium tuum liberum satis et fidele demonstres; ne te defensorem suum tamquam timidum libido deserat; quamvis alterum non inveniat, qui pro illa minus erubescat.
Augustine. Behold, you still say natural concupiscence; behold, as far as you can, you cover the thing you have taken up, lest it can be understood what it is, with the ambiguous garment of words. For why do you not say: The concupiscence of the flesh, but say: Natural concupiscence? Is not the concupiscence of blessedness a natural concupiscence? Why do you speak ambiguously? Call by its name the thing you have undertaken to defend; what do you fear? Or, perhaps disturbed in its evil cause, have you forgotten what it is called? Nay rather, with your memory awake, you do not want to name it the concupiscence of the flesh; for you know that those are offended by its praise who have read this name in the holy Scriptures only in the signification of an evil thing. But using this name, and calling it natural concupiscence, you try to locate it among the works of him who, as you say and as is true, made the world and bodies, while John says it is not from the Father (See 1 John 2:16). God indeed made the world and all bodies whatever; but that the corruptible body weighs down the soul (See Wis 9:15), and the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit (See Gal 5:17), is not the preceding nature of man as established, but the consequent punishment of the condemned. It is accused by none, you say, except the Manichean and his heir the Traducianist. I rejoice to receive your insults together with those whom you dare to blame in me, and dare not to name. Does he, then, not accuse the thing you have taken up, who says that the concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit turned into our nature from the transgression of the first man (See Ambrose, Exposition of the Gospel of Luke 7.142-143)? And who is this? He, namely, whose faith and most pure sense in the Scriptures, as your author Pelagius proclaims, not even an enemy dared to censure. Against this accuser defend your thing you have taken up. Revile this teacher of mine, and your teacher who praised him, on its behalf, as much as you can, that you may show your patronage to be free enough and faithful; lest disordered desire desert you, its defender, as though timid—although it will not find another who would blush less for it.
JulianImp.4.67IV. 68. Iulianus. Ac per hoc necessarie interrogavi, quid suum cognosceret diabolus in sexibus, per quod fructum eorum iure decerperet; qui nec carnem compegerat, nec membra formaverat, nec genitalia dederat, nec distinxerat sexum, nec coniugium ordinaverat, nec commixtionem, sine qua coniugium esse non potest, aut fecunditate honoraverat, aut voluptate resperserat.
IV. 68. Julian. And through this I necessarily asked what the devil recognized as his own in the sexes, by which he might rightly pluck their fruit—he who had neither compacted the flesh, nor formed the members, nor given the genitals, nor distinguished the sex, nor ordained marriage, nor either honored with fruitfulness or sprinkled with pleasure the mingling, without which marriage cannot be.
JulianImp.4.68Augustinus. Nihil horum quidem fecerat diabolus, sed inobedientiam persuaserat animo humano, quam poenalis et pudenda carnis inobedientia sequeretur; unde peccatum originale traheretur, per quod diabolo subderetur qui nasceretur, cum eodem periturus diabolo nisi renasceretur.
Augustine. None of these things, indeed, did the devil make, but he persuaded disobedience to the human mind, which the penal and shameful disobedience of the flesh would follow; whence original sin would be drawn, through which whoever was born would be made subject to the devil, to perish with the same devil unless he were reborn.
JulianImp.4.68IV. 69. Iulianus. His itaque tu dissertionibus, cervino metu, et vulpino dolo obviam ire conatus, ita imposuisti patrono tuo ad quem scribis, ut referres, propter sensum corporis naturalem, id est concupiscentiam carnis, dominari operibus et imagini Dei principem tenebrarum; cum necesse esset ad eumdem spectare auctorem sensum carnis, ad quem etiam carnis natura respiceret.
IV. 69. Julian. And so, you, attempting to go to meet these disputations with the fear of a stag and the cunning of a fox, so imposed upon your patron, to whom you write, that you reported that, on account of the natural sense of the body—that is, the concupiscence of the flesh—the prince of darkness lords it over the works and image of God; when it was necessary that the sense of the flesh should look to the same author to whom the nature of the flesh too looked.
JulianImp.4.69Augustinus. Quid loquaris ignoras. Aliud est sensus carnis, aliud concupiscentia carnis, quae sentitur sensu et mentis et carnis; sicut dolor carnis non ipse sensus est, sed nisi sensus adsit, sentiri non potest. Sensu itaque carnis qui tactus vocatur, aspera et lenia differenter ut cetera sentiuntur; concupiscentia vero carnis indifferenter illicita et licita cupiuntur, quae non concupiscendo, sed intellegendo diiudicantur; nec ab illicitis abstinetur, nisi concupiscentiae resistatur. Non igitur caventur opera mala, nisi frenetur concupiscentia mala, quae abs te, horrenda impudentia vel potius amentia, dicitur bona; nec erubescis, nec horrescis te ad tantum dedecus pervenisse, ut nemo liberetur a suo malo, nisi non consentiat tuo bono. Concupiscentia igitur carnis, qua cupiuntur quae prohibentur, non est a Patre. Frustra putas, vel potius vis putari, ubi hoc Ioannes apostolus dixit, concupiscentiam carnis positam pro luxuria. Prorsus si non est a Patre luxuria, nec illa est a Patre cui si consentiatur, concipit paritque luxuriam. Nam motibus suis, quibus iubemur obsistere, quid conatur, quaeso, nisi ad luxuriam pervenire? Quomodo est ergo bonum, quae pervenire conatur ad malum? Quomodo est nostrum bonum, quae pervenire conatur ad malum? Quomodo est nostrum bonum, quae nos compellit ad malum? Sanandum est igitur hoc malum, Iuliane, divina bonitate; non humana vanitate, iniquitate, impietate laudandum.
Augustine. You do not know what you are saying. The sense of the flesh is one thing, the concupiscence of the flesh another, which is sensed by the sense both of the mind and of the flesh; just as the pain of the flesh is not itself the sense, but unless the sense be present, it cannot be felt. By the sense of the flesh, then, which is called touch, rough and smooth things, like the rest, are differently sensed; but by the concupiscence of the flesh unlawful and lawful things are indifferently desired, which are judged not by desiring but by understanding; nor is one held back from unlawful things, unless the concupiscence be resisted. Evil works, then, are not guarded against, unless the evil concupiscence be reined in—which by you, with a horrible shamelessness, or rather madness, is called good; nor do you blush, nor shudder, that you have come to so great a disgrace, that no one is set free from his own evil, unless he refuses to consent to your good. The concupiscence of the flesh, then, by which the things that are forbidden are desired, is not from the Father. In vain you think, or rather wish it to be thought, that where the apostle John said this, the concupiscence of the flesh was placed for luxury. Surely, if luxury is not from the Father, neither is that from the Father which, if consented to, conceives and brings forth luxury. For by its own movements, which we are commanded to resist, what, I ask, does it attempt, but to arrive at luxury? How, then, is it good, which attempts to arrive at evil? How is it our good, which attempts to arrive at evil? How is it our good, which compels us to evil? This evil, then, Julian, must be healed by the divine goodness; not praised by human vanity, iniquity, impiety.
JulianImp.4.69IV. 70. Iulianus. Te ergo apparet non studuisse ut obiecta refelleres; sed ut patrono tuo, ad quem scribebas, miserabiliter illuderes; putaretque te rude quidpiam detulisse quod iure morderes; cum id iam superiorum concessione et corporum institutione laudasses.
IV. 70. Julian. It appears, then, that you have not striven to refute the objections, but pitiably to mock your patron, to whom you were writing; and that he might think you had brought forward something crude which you rightly bit at, when you had already praised it both by the foregoing concession and by the institution of bodies.
JulianImp.4.70Augustinus. Institutionem laudavi corporum, quae bona est etiam in malo homine, non malum, sine quo nascitur nemo; quod tu nolens cum Ambrosio dicere unde sit, adiuvas Manichaeum dicentem quod ex aliena natura sit.
Augustine. I praised the institution of bodies, which is good even in an evil man, not the evil, without which no one is born; which, while you are unwilling to say with Ambrose whence it is, you aid the Manichean who says that it is from an alien nature.
JulianImp.4.70IV. 71. Iulianus. Fateor tamen, nimis te cogitasse, quid diceres; et ingenium tuum apparet, et studium; solertissime prorsus quid asserendum esset pro peccati traduce ponderasti; nemo alter callidius scribere potuisset pro naturali malo; quod quidem nec tu ipse tam urbane implere potuisses, nisi ingenium tuum magistri veteris commenta iuvissent.
IV. 71. Julian. Yet I confess that you have thought too much about what you said; and your wit appears, and your zeal; most skillfully indeed you weighed what must be asserted on behalf of the traduction of sin; no other could have written more elegantly on behalf of natural evil; which indeed not even you yourself could have accomplished so urbanely, had not your wit been aided by the contrivances of your old master.
JulianImp.4.71Augustinus. Magistrum plane meum, et contra te et contra Manichaeum, glorior esse Iesum, quem confiteor (quod tu negas) etiam parvulorum esse Iesum; quia periit Adam, et in illo omnes perierunt ; nec nisi ab illo qui venit quaerere quod perierat , a perditione salvantur.
Augustine. I glory that my master, both against you and against the Manichean, is plainly Jesus, whom I confess (which you deny) to be the Jesus even of the little ones; because Adam perished, and in him all perished (See 1 Cor 15:22); nor are they saved from perdition except by him who came to seek what was lost (See Luke 19:10).
JulianImp.4.71IV. 72. Iulianus. Intellexisti quippe, parvulis nihil de suo merentibus, nequaquam posse sine damnatione corporum, crimen affigi; et ideo opus esse auxilio Manichaei, qui concupiscentiam carnis a Dei operibus excluderet, et tam nuptias quam ipsa corpora diabolo deputaret auctori.
IV. 72. Julian. You understood, surely, that to the little ones, deserving nothing of their own, a crime could in no way be fastened without the condemnation of bodies; and therefore that there was need of the help of the Manichean, who would exclude the concupiscence of the flesh from the works of God, and reckon both marriages and the bodies themselves to the devil as author.
JulianImp.4.72Augustinus. Ego non opus habeo auxilio Manichaei, sed potius contra eum pugnans, auxilium quod tu ei praestas, expugno auxilio Dei. Quod mihi praestat etiam per suos clarissimos comites, non solum Prophetas et Apostolos, quorum conaris perversus dicta pervertere; verum etiam posteriores Ecclesiae suae doctores, Irenaeum, Cyprianum, Hilarium, Ambrosium, Gregorium, Basilium, Ioannem, aliosque plurimos, fide integerrimos, ingenio acerrimos, doctrina uberrimos, fama celeberrimos; qui omnes, salva laude corporum et nuptiarum, confessi sunt originale peccatum, scientes Christum, quod impie vos negatis, etiam parvulorum esse Iesum. Ipse enim salvum facit populum suum, in quo et illi parvuli sunt, non a febribus aliisque huiusmodi pestibus atque casibus, quod et non Christianis abundanti super omnem carnem bonitate largitur; sed sicut Christianos, a peccatis eorum . Hos tot et tantos catholicae Ecclesiae filios et patres, qui hoc eam in eius positi culmine docuerunt, quod in eius ubere didicerunt, Manichaeos dicere non reformidas; et cum me unum quasi aperte appetis, illos quanto obliquius, tanto insidiosius; et quanto insidiosius, tanto scelestius criminaris. In hoc tanto scelere, tua te omnino verba convincunt. Non enim mihi ob aliud tam nefario nomine calumniaris, nisi quia de peccato originali dico quod dicunt.
Augustine. I have no need of the help of the Manichean, but rather, fighting against him, I storm with the help of God the help which you furnish him. Which God furnishes me also through his most illustrious companions, not only the Prophets and Apostles, whose words, perverse, you try to pervert; but even the later teachers of his Church—Irenaeus, Cyprian, Hilary, Ambrose, Gregory, Basil, John, and very many others, most whole in faith, most keen in wit, most rich in teaching, most renowned in fame; who all, with the praise of bodies and of marriages preserved, confessed original sin, knowing that Christ—which you impiously deny—is the Jesus even of the little ones. For he himself saves his people, among whom those little ones too are, not from fevers and other pests and mishaps of this kind, which he bestows even on non-Christians by an abundant goodness over all flesh; but, as he saves Christians, from their sins (See Matt 1:21). These so many and so great sons and fathers of the Catholic Church, who taught this when placed on its summit, which they learned at its breast, you do not shrink to call Manicheans; and while you seem openly to attack me alone, them the more obliquely, the more insidiously; and the more insidiously, the more wickedly you slander. In this so great crime your own words altogether convict you. For you slander me by no other so nefarious a name except because of original sin I say what they say.
JulianImp.4.72IV. 73. Iulianus. Quod ergo a veritate defunderis, quod fugaris, causae fecit deformitas quam tueris. Ceterum si ad Catholicos transire velles, quanto tute, id quod nos asserimus, elegantius exsequereris et plenius.
IV. 73. Julian. Therefore, that you are poured out from the truth, that you are put to flight, the deformity of the cause you defend has caused. For the rest, if you were willing to cross over to the Catholics, how much more elegantly and fully would you yourself pursue that which we assert!
JulianImp.4.73Augustinus. O frontem linguatam, mentemque caecatam! Itane vero catholici non sunt, quibus inhaereo in huius fidei societate, quam contra tua vana dicta et maledicta defendo? Catholici non sunt, ut alios taceam, eosdemque repetam, Irenaeus, Cyprianus, Hilarius, Ambrosius, Gregorius, Basilius, Ioannes Constantinopolitanus; et catholici sunt Pelagius, Caelestius, Iulianus? Aude dicere ista, si potes. Quod si non audes, cur non potius ad hos, a quibus ego non recedo, tu redis? Cur me admones, ut ad Catholicos transeam? Ecce catholica lumina, oculos aperi; tu ad istos transi, quibus calumniaris in me; et continuo te compesces atque obmutesces a me.
Augustine. O brow full of tongue, and mind blinded! Are they not, then, Catholics to whom I cling in the fellowship of this faith, which I defend against your empty words and curses? Are they not Catholics—to be silent about others and to repeat the same ones—Irenaeus, Cyprian, Hilary, Ambrose, Gregory, Basil, John of Constantinople; and are Pelagius, Caelestius, Julian Catholics? Dare to say these things, if you can. But if you do not dare, why do you not rather return to these, from whom I do not withdraw? Why do you admonish me to cross over to the Catholics? Behold the Catholic lights, open your eyes; you cross over to these, against whom you slander me; and at once you will check yourself and grow dumb against me.
JulianImp.4.73IV. 74. Iulianus. Quamvis non audeam pronuntiare, ingenio te affectum acri et vigili, cuius in electione suscipiendi negotii video tam tardum ac deforme iudicium.
IV. 74. Julian. Although I would not dare to pronounce you endowed with a sharp and vigilant wit, whose judgment in the choice of the business to be taken up I see to be so slow and deformed.
JulianImp.4.74Augustinus. Dic tardi ingenio unde nascuntur: neque enim talis est Adam factus; qui non vis per eius peccatum in deterius humanam mutatam fuisse naturam; et hoc ad omnia vitia quae patiuntur, obesse nascentibus.
Augustine. Say whence those of slow wit are born: for Adam was not made such; you who do not want human nature to have been changed for the worse through his sin, and that this hampers those who are born, unto all the vices they suffer.
JulianImp.4.74IV. 75. Iulianus. Si enim incolumissima fide, scholari more ad ostendendas tantummodo eruditionis tuae vires, ea tentares quae sunt invicta concutere; finito tamen certaminis ludicro, his quibus obloquebaris palmam daturus; probaremus litterarum studium, sed irreligiosum castigaremus exemplum. Porro cum dogma nec verisimilitudinis corrupto saltem colore perfusum, quod nullis legis testimoniis (quippe numquam rationi praeiudicantibus) potestis tueri, et hoc tamen impietate sua horrens, stultitia iacens, nusquam nisi inter inguina voluntatum, honestate, disputatione, sacraque lege confossum, turpissima obstinatione secteris; consequitur ex tribus unum, ut aut plumbei ad intellegendum acuminis, aut maleficii illius quod Manichaeorum mysteriis teneri, fando accepimus, catenas, aut utrumque simul perpeti iudiceris.
IV. 75. Julian. For if, with faith most unimpaired, in the scholastic manner, only to show the powers of your erudition, you were attempting to shake things that are unconquered; yet, with the sport of the contest finished, you were about to give the palm to those whom you opposed; we would approve the zeal for letters, but chastise the irreligious example. But since you pursue—with a most foul obstinacy—a teaching not even tinged at least with a corrupted color of verisimilitude, which by no testimonies of the law (since these never prejudge reason) can you defend, and which moreover, horrible in its impiety, lying in its folly, pierced through everywhere—except amid the groins of wills—by honorableness, by disputation, and by the sacred law: it follows from three things, one—that you be judged to suffer either a leaden edge of understanding, or the chains of that sorcery by which we have heard tell men are held in the mysteries of the Manicheans, or both at once.
JulianImp.4.75Augustinus. Quantolibet rationis nomine contra testimonia divina, quae proferimus tibi, pugnare videaris, non illa subvertis; sed te vexant, cum contra stimulum calces. Dic, quantum potes, inter inguina voluntatum, qui tibi dicit, expertem non esse delicti, utriusque sexus commixtione conceptum . Ambrosius est iste, Iuliane; ipse te vincit, quem non audes negare catholicum, numquam certe dicturus es Manichaeum. Quin etiam me aut plumbei esse acuminis ad intellegendum, aut teneri maleficio Manichaei, aut utrumque simul perpeti affirmas. De Manichaei maleficio vel tuo convicio, iam tibi saepe respondimus, et opportunius, cum opus esse videbitur, adhuc forsitan respondebimus. Nunc de plumbeo ad intellegendum acumine, haeretice verbose, responde. Nemo est certe qui nollet, si id esset in hominis potestate, ingenio vividus atque ad intellegendum acutissimus nasci; et quam rari sint quis ignorat? Qui tamen omnes ipsi paucissimi, si hominis qui primus est factus, comparentur ingenio, plumbei iudicantur. Non enim tunc, sicut nunc, corpus corruptibile aggravabat animam . Aut enim corruptibile non erat, quia non erat moriturus Adam, nisi peccasset; aut si, ut vos novi haeretici dicitis, etsi non peccasset, moriturus esset; non tamen ita est institutus, quem primo Deus fecerat, et qui mali adhuc nihil fecerat, ut eius anima corpore gravaretur. Quis enim hanc esse poenam neget, nisi qui amplius ceteris aggravatur? Si ergo Manichaeus interroget, unde sit hoc tarditatis malum, non in corporibus, sed in ipsis, ubi Dei est imago ingeniis humanis, quae tarditas pervenit gradatim usque ad ridendam, vel potius, sicut Scriptura commonet, usque ad lugendam fatuitatem ; respondemus nos, et haec et omnia cetera mala, cum quibus nasci, negare vel dubitare non possumus, primorum duorum et aliorum deinde parentum peccatis esse tribuenda; quoniam non possunt tribui nascentium voluntati. Alia quippe animalia, ut cum suis generis vitiis nonnulla nascantur, quid mirum si accipiunt haec noxii spiritus in potestatem, quemadmodum porcos, ut novimus, acceperunt ? Qui maligni spiritus possunt, sicut homines irrationalium membra animalium, ita illi etiam ipsa semina vitiare. De hominibus quaestio est, in quibus Dei imago numquam diversorum vitiorum, cum quibus eos nasci videmus, poenas pateretur, quas pati non posset iniustas, nisi peccatis gignentium praecedentibus; quod vos negantes, et fidem catholicam deseritis, et Manichaei dogma nefarium, quantum optare non ausus est, adiuvatis, ut sibi certus securusque videatur, hominum opificem non confiteri verum Deum, sed gentem introducere tenebrarum.
Augustine. However much, under the name of reason, you may seem to fight against the divine testimonies which we bring forth to you, you do not overthrow them; but they vex you, when you kick against the goad. Say, as much as you can, amid the groins of wills, to him who tells you that no one conceived by the mingling of both sexes is free of fault (See Ambrose, Exposition of the Gospel of Luke 1.17). This is Ambrose, Julian; he himself conquers you, whom you do not dare to deny is a Catholic, whom you will certainly never call a Manichean. Nay rather, you affirm that I am either of a leaden edge for understanding, or held by the sorcery of the Manichean, or suffer both at once. Concerning the sorcery of the Manichean, or your reviling, we have already often answered you, and, more opportunely, when it shall seem necessary, we will perhaps answer still. Now, concerning the leaden edge for understanding, you wordy heretic, answer. There is certainly no one who would not wish, if it were in a man's power, to be born lively in wit and most sharp for understanding; and how rare these are, who does not know? Who, however, even those most rare—if they be compared to the wit of the man who was first made—are judged leaden. For not then, as now, did the corruptible body weigh down the soul (See Wis 9:15). For either it was not corruptible, because Adam was not going to die unless he had sinned; or if, as you new heretics say, even if he had not sinned, he would have been going to die; yet he was not so established—he whom God had first made, and who had as yet done nothing evil—that his soul should be weighed down by the body. For who would deny this to be a punishment, except one who is more weighed down than the rest? If, then, the Manichean should ask whence this evil of slowness is—not in bodies, but in those very human wits, where is the image of God—which slowness has come by degrees even to a foolishness to be laughed at, or rather, as Scripture admonishes, to be lamented (See Sir 22:11); we answer that both these and all other evils, with which we cannot deny or doubt that human beings are born, must be attributed to the sins of the first two and then of the other parents; since they cannot be attributed to the will of those who are born. For other animals—that some are born with the defects of their kind—what wonder if noxious spirits receive these into their power, as we know they received the swine (See Matt 8:31-32)? Which malignant spirits can, just as men can corrupt the members of irrational animals, so can corrupt even their seeds. But the question is about human beings, in whom the image of God would never suffer the punishments of the various vices with which we see them born—which it could not suffer unjust, unless the sins of those generating preceded; which you, in denying, both desert the Catholic faith and aid the nefarious teaching of the Manichean as much as he did not dare to wish—so that it may seem to him certain and secure that the maker of human beings does not confess the true God, but introduces a race of darkness.
JulianImp.4.75IV. 76. Iulianus. Nos vero nihil habemus, quod in nostro admirandum credamus ingenio, quia intellegimus nec peccatum sine voluntate, nec sine Deo corpora, nec sine corporibus sensus corporum, nec sine commixtione coniugia, nec sine Deo operatore existere posse nascentes; et indubitatum tenemus, neque divinum esse, quod doceatur iniustum; neque quod divinum sit, posse iniustum doceri. Non minus autem, quam ea quae diximus, relucet esse iniquum, si aliorum peccata aliis, qui ibi nec fuerint, nedum consenserint, imputentur. Proinde his illuminati solibus iure optimo Manichaeorum antra despicimus, qui putant vel esse posse sine voluntate peccatum, vel non a Deo homines fieri, vel ad alium auctorem sensum corporum, et ad alium corpora pertinere; vel Deum esse, qui iniquitatum criminibus opprimatur; aut scelere iniquitatis urgeri eum, qui aeternus omnium conditor aestimetur; aut umbram aliquam tenere iustitiae, si aliorum voluntates aliorum applicentur exortibus. Ac per hoc merita partium negotiis, non ingeniis imputamus.
IV. 76. Julian. We, indeed, have nothing that we should believe admirable in our wit, because we understand that there can exist neither sin without will, nor bodies without God, nor the senses of bodies without bodies, nor marriages without mingling, nor those who are born without God as the worker; and we hold it beyond doubt that neither is that divine which is taught to be unjust, nor can what is divine be taught to be unjust. And no less than the things we have said does it shine forth to be iniquitous, if the sins of some be imputed to others, who were not even there, much less consented. Accordingly, illumined by these suns, we by best right despise the caverns of the Manicheans, who think either that there can be sin without will, or that human beings are not made by God, or that the sense of bodies belongs to one author and bodies to another, or that there is a God who is oppressed by charges of iniquities, or that he is pressed by the crime of iniquity who is esteemed the eternal founder of all things, or that justice retains any shadow at all, if the wills of some be applied to the births of others. And through this we impute the merits of deeds to the business, not to the wits.
JulianImp.4.76Augustinus. Iam tibi ad omnia respondi: nec ideo firmantur adversus me, quia tam saepe et odiose repetuntur a te. Dic potius, si potes, unde humana ingenia cum tanta plerumque vitiositate nascantur; cum inter nos conveniat totius hominis esse opificem Deum iustum, et vos negatis ullum originale peccatum? Non autem diceres aliorum peccata nos aliis imputare, qui ibi quando commissa sunt, non fuerunt, si recoleres quod scriptum est, in lumbis Abrahae fuisse Levi, quando eumdem Abraham Melchisedech Dei excelsi decimavit antistes . Ibi enim videres, si te pervicacia non caecaret, in lumbis Adae fuisse genus humanum, quando perpetravit illud grande peccatum.
Augustine. I have already answered you on all points: nor are they made firm against me for this reason, that they are so often and so hatefully repeated by you. Say rather, if you can, whence human wits are born with so great viciousness for the most part; when it is agreed between us that the just God is the maker of the whole man, and you deny any original sin? But you would not say that we impute the sins of some to others who were not there when they were committed, if you recalled what is written, that Levi was in the loins of Abraham, when Melchizedek, the priest of God most high, took tithes of that same Abraham (See Heb 7:9-10; Gen 14:18-20). For there you would see, if obstinacy did not blind you, that the human race was in the loins of Adam, when he perpetrated that great sin.
JulianImp.4.76IV. 77. Iulianus. Sed ut revertamur ad causam, postquam dixisti, me ideo noluisse concupiscentiam nominare, quia non esset ex Patre, sed ex mundo; cuius mundi princeps dictus est diabolus; qui eam in Domino non invenit; quia Dominus homo non per ipsam ad homines venit . Ubi notandum est, quia cum de re naturali loquereris, eamque ex mundo esse dixisses, subdidisti mundi totius principem diabolum credi oportere; ut non actuum voluntariorum, sed naturalium rerum, utique naturarum, fatereris eum auctorem.
IV. 77. Julian. But, to return to the cause: after you said that I was for this reason unwilling to name concupiscence, because it was not from the Father, but from the world; of which world the devil is called the prince; who did not find it in the Lord; because the Lord, as man, did not come to men through it (See 1 John 2:16; John 14:30). Where it must be noted that, when you were speaking of a natural thing, and had said it was from the world, you subjoined that the devil must be believed the prince of the whole world; so that you confessed him to be the author not of voluntary acts, but of natural things—of natures, surely.
JulianImp.4.77Augustinus. Ubi posui: concupiscentiam carnis, tu abstulisti inde: carnis, quod ego dixi; et ubi dixi: cuius mundi dictus est princeps diabolus, tu addidisti: totius, et dixisti: totius mundi, quod ego non dixi. Age ut placet, dic quod tibi placet, vel illis etiam quibus places. Ego concupiscentiam carnis dixi, quam dicit Ioannes non esse a Patre, sed ex mundo , id est, ex hominibus, qui nascuntur in mundo, perituri nisi renascantur in Christo. Haec concupiscentia carnis non est luxuria, quando ei resistitur, sed quando perficitur, id est, quando pervenit quo impellit. Unde et apostolus Paulus: Spiritu, inquit, ambulate, et desideria carnis ne perfeceritis . Non ait: Ne habueritis; noverat quippe hoc munus futurum quidem esse nobis, sed vitae non esse praesentis. Ego principem mundi diabolum dixi, sicut eum appellat Scriptura divina , non sicut suspicatur vel calumniatur vanitas tua. Non itaque naturarum auctorem diabolum dixi, sed principem mundi, id est, hominum, quibus in orbe terrarum plenus est mundus, qui nascuntur in mundo, nec renascuntur in Christo. Ab eis quippe qui renascuntur in Christo, princeps mundi mittitur foras; quod mysteria significant, quando etiam parvuli baptizandi exorcizantur et exsufflantur. Ad haec responde, si potes. Noli velle lectorem tua loquacissima vanitate vanescere, et ab eo quod agitur, averti atque seduci. Dic, si audes, bonum esse concupiscere malum. Dic, mala quidem opera a Patre non esse, sed concupiscentiam malorum operum a Patre esse. Dic, diabolum non appellatum principem mundi. Dic, mundum non dici homines in mundo constitutos. Dic, mundum in malo non posse intellegi homines infideles, quibus in orbe terrarum plenus est mundus; et rursus, in bono homines fideles, quibus licet paucioribus, tamen etiam ipsis in orbe terrarum plenus est mundus, nomine mundi similiter appellari; sicut absurdum non est, ut arbor plena pomis, dicatur plena et foliis. Dic, parvulos, cum baptizantur, non erui de potestate tenebrarum, et cum magna iniuria Dei per universam catholicam Ecclesiam exorcizari et exsufflari imagines Dei; aut dic, eos a diabolo possideri sine ulla obligatione peccati. Haec si audebis dicere, mox apparebis; si non audebis, nec sic latebis.
Augustine. Where I put: the concupiscence of the flesh, you took away from it: of the flesh, which I said; and where I said: of which world the devil is called the prince, you added: the whole, and said: of the whole world, which I did not say. Do as you please, say what pleases you, or even those whom you please. I said the concupiscence of the flesh, which John says is not from the Father, but from the world (See 1 John 2:16), that is, from human beings, who are born in the world, to perish unless they are reborn in Christ. This concupiscence of the flesh is not luxury when it is resisted, but when it is accomplished, that is, when it arrives where it impels. Whence also the apostle Paul: Walk by the Spirit, he says, and do not accomplish the desires of the flesh (Gal 5:16). He did not say: Do not have them; for he knew this gift would indeed be ours, but not of the present life. I said the devil is the prince of the world, just as the divine Scripture calls him (See John 12:31), not as your vanity suspects or slanders. I did not, then, call the devil the author of natures, but the prince of the world, that is, of human beings, with whom, in the circle of the earth, the world is filled, who are born in the world and are not reborn in Christ. For from those who are reborn in Christ, the prince of the world is cast out; which the mysteries signify, when even the little ones to be baptized are exorcized and exsufflated. To these things answer, if you can. Do not want to make the reader vanish away by your most loquacious vanity, and be turned aside and seduced from the matter at hand. Say, if you dare, that it is good to desire evil. Say that evil works indeed are not from the Father, but the concupiscence of evil works is from the Father. Say that the devil is not called the prince of the world. Say that human beings established in the world are not called the world. Say that by the world in an evil sense cannot be understood unbelieving human beings, with whom the world in the circle of the earth is filled; and again, in a good sense, faithful human beings, with whom, though fewer, yet with these too in the circle of the earth the world is filled, are likewise called by the name of the world—just as it is not absurd that a tree full of fruits be called full also of leaves. Say that the little ones, when they are baptized, are not rescued from the power of darkness, and that, with great injury to God, throughout the whole Catholic Church images of God are exorcized and exsufflated; or say that they are possessed by the devil without any obligation of sin. If you will dare to say these things, you will soon appear; if you will not dare, not even so will you lie hidden.
JulianImp.4.77IV. 78. Iulianus. Postquam ergo hoc effatus es, intulisti: Unde dicit etiam ipse Dominus: Ecce venit princeps mundi huius, et in me nihil invenit ; addisque de tuo: Nihil utique peccati, nec quod a nascente trahitur, nec quod a vivente additur. Ostende igitur dixisse Dominum in Evangelio, non se habere peccatum quod a nascente traheretur.
IV. 78. Julian. After you uttered this, then, you brought in: Whence the Lord himself too says: Behold, the prince of this world comes, and in me he found nothing (See John 14:30); and you add of your own: Nothing, surely, of sin—neither what is drawn by one who is born, nor what is added by one who lives. Show, then, that the Lord said in the Gospel that he did not have sin which would be drawn by one being born.
JulianImp.4.78Augustinus. Tu ostende dixisse Dominum, non se habere sordem, sine qua Iob dicit nec infantem ullum esse, cuius est unius diei vita super terram. Et tamen ubi ait: Ecce venit princeps mundi huius, et in me inveniet nihil, nec ipsam sordem intellegimus, si recte intellegimus. Nam si ex eo quod dixit, non est intellegendum quod non dixit; nec diabolum nominavit, sed principem mundi: Et in me, inquit, nihil inveniet; non ait: In me non invenit peccatum. Et tamen nos ea dicimus, quae non dixit; sed ex his intellecta, quae dixit.
Augustine. You show that the Lord said he did not have the filth without which Job says there is not even any infant whose life upon earth is of one day (See Job 14:4-5 (LXX)). And yet where he says, Behold, the prince of this world comes, and in me he will find nothing (John 14:30), we understand not even that filth itself, if we rightly understand. For if, from what he said, that which he did not say is not to be understood—neither did he name the devil, but the prince of the world: And in me, he says, he will find nothing; he did not say: In me he will not find sin. And yet we say those things which he did not say; but understood from these things which he did say.
JulianImp.4.78IV. 79. Iulianus. Quid circumscribis infelices animas, ut mentiaris indicatum esse, quod non est? Dominus dicit in Evangelio: Ecce venit princeps mundi huius, et in me invenit nihil . Certum est nihil peccati in eo diabolum offendisse; quoniam in omni, vel quam esurienti, vel quam postea praedicanti, tamquam persecutores suos admoverat, tentatione superatus est. Profitetur ergo Salvator, nihil in se diabolum deprehendisse peccati. In quo certe invenisset, si quid de carnis conditione traheretur; quoniam et ipse factus fuerat ex muliere, de semine David et de Adam stirpe prognata.
IV. 79. Julian. Why do you circumscribe unhappy souls, that you may lie that what is not has been indicated? The Lord says in the Gospel: Behold, the prince of this world comes, and in me he found nothing (See John 14:30). It is certain that the devil came upon nothing of sin in him; since in every temptation—whether of him hungering, or of him afterward preaching, in which he had brought as it were his own persecutors—he was overcome. The Savior, then, professes that the devil discovered nothing of sin in him. In whom surely he would have found it, if anything were drawn from the condition of the flesh; since he too had been made of a woman, of the seed of David and born of the stock of Adam.
JulianImp.4.79Augustinus. Sed non eum per concupiscentiam carnis Virgo conceperat; et ideo in eum sine propagine peccati carnis propago pertransiit, ut esset in eo non caro peccati, sed similitudo carnis peccati, carnem salvatura peccati. Proinde Adam, priusquam peccaret, nec carnem peccati habuit, nec similitudinem carnis peccati; quia non erat moriturus, nisi peccasset; sed posteaquam peccavit, iam caro peccati genuit carnem peccati, quia per illam concupiscentiam carnis eam genuit, quae ante peccatum vel nulla in illo erat, vel spiritui non resistebat, propter quod eum nudum esse nihil pudebat. Christus autem qui non per illam concupiscentiam carnis est natus, sine peccato natus est, quod trahit omnis caro peccati, procul dubio propter quam moriuntur omnes, carnem non habens ipse peccati; sed tamen et ipse mortuus est propter similitudinem carnis peccati. Nam si nec moreretur, non solum carnem peccati non haberet, sicut non habebat; sed nec eius ostenderet similitudinem, quam pro nostra salute susceperat. Tu igitur qui negare non potes Christum non in carne venisse peccati, sed in carne quidem vera, tamen in similitudine carnis peccati, debes demonstrare carnem peccati; quoniam si nulla est, profecto nec similitudo eius ulla est. Porro quia solus Christus habuit similitudinem carnis peccati, quae non esset caro peccati, quia non ex commixtione sexuum natus est; quid restat, nisi ut peccati caro sit omnium, qui de tali commixtione nascuntur, pertinentes ad mundum, cuius est diabolus princeps, a quo malo non liberantur, si non in Christo renascuntur?
Augustine. But the Virgin had not conceived him through the concupiscence of the flesh; and therefore into him, without the propagation of the sin of the flesh, the propagation of the flesh passed, so that there was in him not the flesh of sin, but the likeness of the flesh of sin, about to save the flesh of sin (See Rom 8:3). Accordingly Adam, before he sinned, had neither the flesh of sin nor the likeness of the flesh of sin; because he was not going to die, unless he sinned; but after he sinned, the flesh of sin now begot the flesh of sin, because through that concupiscence of the flesh he begot it which before sin was either none at all in him, or did not resist the spirit, on account of which it shamed him in nothing to be naked. But Christ, who was not born through that concupiscence of the flesh, was born without the sin which all flesh of sin draws, on account of which without doubt all die—he himself not having the flesh of sin; but nonetheless he too died on account of the likeness of the flesh of sin. For if he did not even die, he would not only not have the flesh of sin, as he did not have it, but neither would he show its likeness, which he had taken on for our salvation. You, therefore, who cannot deny that Christ came not in the flesh of sin, but indeed in true flesh, yet in the likeness of the flesh of sin, ought to show the flesh of sin; since, if there is none, surely neither is there any likeness of it. Further, since Christ alone had the likeness of the flesh of sin, which was not the flesh of sin, because he was not born of the mingling of the sexes; what remains, except that there be the flesh of sin of all who are born of such a mingling, pertaining to the world, of which the devil is the prince, from which evil they are not set free, if they are not reborn in Christ?
JulianImp.4.79IV. 80. Iulianus. Invenisset ergo in eo diabolus naturale crimen, si ullum esset; teneret corpus obnoxium, si illud vel in primo parente, vel in ipsa pariente venenasset; nec referret, utrum conditionibus materiae suae sera et inefficax resultaret voluntatis intentio; contra naturam nitens, non expiaret natum, sed exasperaret tyrannum; salvo eo quod non posset esse voluntas libera, si fuisset natura captiva. Si ergo esset in ipsius carnis sensu et conditione peccatum, si ipsa natura hominum ad dominium daemonis pertineret; Christus aut reus erat futurus, aut homo non futurus. Ergo si adscribitur maledictum naturae humanitatis; illi quoque, qui caro factus est ut habitaret in nobis, aut crimen dabitur, aut humanitas auferetur.
IV. 80. Julian. The devil, then, would have found in him a natural crime, if there were any; he would hold his body liable, if he had poisoned it either in his first parent, or in her who bore him; nor would it matter whether, by the conditions of his matter, the intention of the will rose up late and ineffectual; striving against nature, it would not expiate the one born, but exasperate the tyrant; saving that the will could not be free, if the nature had been captive. If, then, there were sin in the very sense and condition of the flesh, if the very nature of human beings pertained to the dominion of the demon, Christ would either be guilty, or not be a man. Therefore, if a curse is ascribed to the nature of humanity, to him too who was made flesh that he might dwell among us (See John 1:14), either a crime will be given, or his humanity taken away.
JulianImp.4.80Augustinus. Nec crimen ei dabitur, in quo princeps mundi nullum potuit invenire peccatum; nec humanitas auferetur, in quo et anima et caro humana erat; quamvis non erat caro peccati, sed similitudo carnis peccati.
Augustine. Neither will a crime be given to him in whom the prince of the world could find no sin; nor will his humanity be taken away, in whom there was both a soul and human flesh; although it was not the flesh of sin, but the likeness of the flesh of sin (See Rom 8:3).
JulianImp.4.80IV. 81. Iulianus. Quod utrumque fecit Manichaeus, qui commentatus in carne malum esse naturaliter, dixit in Christo non fuisse carnem, ne confiteretur in eo fuisse iniquitatem.
IV. 81. Julian. Both of which the Manichean did, who, having contrived that there is evil in the flesh naturally, said that there was no flesh in Christ, lest he should confess that there was iniquity in him.
JulianImp.4.81Augustinus. Manichaeus haereticus carnem negat Christi; Pelagianus haereticus carnem peccati carni coaequare vult Christi; Christianus catholicus similitudinem carnis peccati discernit a carne peccati, ne blasphemet carnem Christi.
Augustine. The Manichean heretic denies the flesh of Christ; the Pelagian heretic wants to equal the flesh of sin to the flesh of Christ; the Catholic Christian distinguishes the likeness of the flesh of sin from the flesh of sin, lest he blaspheme the flesh of Christ.
JulianImp.4.81IV. 82. Iulianus. At hunc fides catholica in utroque contrivit; malum scilicet in carne non esse naturaliter, atque ob hoc Christo nec aliquid defuisse humanitatis, nec quidquam iniquitatis adfuisse pronuntians. Clamat ergo dispensationis suae conscius: Ecce venit princeps huius mundi, et invenit in me nihil ; nihil profecto quod possit arguere, quia non poterat infamare naturam, cuius ad peccata non inflexerat voluntatem.
IV. 82. Julian. But the Catholic faith ground him to pieces in both: pronouncing, namely, that there is no evil in the flesh naturally, and on account of this that nothing of humanity was lacking to Christ, nor anything of iniquity present. He cries out, then, conscious of his dispensation: Behold, the prince of this world comes, and he found in me nothing (See John 14:30); nothing, surely, that he could accuse, because he could not defame a nature whose will he had not bent to sins.
JulianImp.4.82Augustinus. Immo vero nihil peccati, nec quod a nascente trahitur, quia in nulla iniquitate conceptus est; nec quod a vivente additur, quia nulla tentatione deceptus est; quorum duorum unum est propter quod legimus: In iniquitatibus conceptus sum ; alterum propter quod dicimus: Ne nos inducas in tentationem .
Augustine. Nay rather, nothing of sin—neither what is drawn by one being born, because he was conceived in no iniquity; nor what is added by one living, because he was deceived by no temptation; of which two, the one is that on account of which we read, In iniquities I was conceived (Ps 51:5 (50:7)); the other, that on account of which we say, Lead us not into temptation (Matt 6:13).
JulianImp.4.82IV. 83. Iulianus. Ipsa etiam ei causa tentandi fuit Christum; quoniam more artis suae volebat capere persuadendo, cum neminem posset vitiare condendo.
IV. 83. Julian. The very cause too of the devil's tempting Christ was this: that, after the manner of his art, he wished to take him by persuading, since he could vitiate no one by founding him.
JulianImp.4.83Augustinus. Non condendo vitiat, qui neminem condit; sed male suadendo vitiavit, quod bonum conditum invenit. Non enim naturae auctor est, quae Dei bonitate in homine conditur; sed culpae, cum qua homo ex propagine vitiatorum primorum hominum de parentibus nascitur. Quid autem mirum, si tentavit eum, in quo non erat caro peccati; quae nec in illis erat, quos primo tentando deiecit, per quorum concupiscentiam carnis, de qua confusi sunt, caro est propagata peccati, quam sanaret ab hoc malo, nullum habens malum similitudo carnis peccati?
Augustine. He does not vitiate by founding, who founds no one; but by persuading badly he vitiated the good thing founded which he found. For he is not the author of the nature, which is founded in man by the goodness of God; but of the fault, with which man is born of his parents from the propagation of the vitiated first human beings. But what wonder is it, if he tempted him in whom there was not the flesh of sin—which was not even in those whom, by first tempting, he cast down; through whose concupiscence of the flesh, of which they were confounded, the flesh of sin was propagated, which the likeness of the flesh of sin, having no evil, would heal from this evil?
JulianImp.4.83IV. 84. Iulianus. Proinde incarnatio Christi opus suae divinitatis tuetur, qui afferens ad me naturam meam et voluntatem suam, cuius mihi speculum offerebat et regulam, pronuntiansque nihil in se diabolum invenisse peccati, ostendit culpam non de carnis conditu, sed de sola suscipi voluntate. Denique ut nusquam in Scripturis legitur Christum fugisse peccatum, quod a nascentibus trahi nosset; ita etiam illud claro testimonio perdocetur, quod suscepti hominis iustitia non de naturae diversitate, sed de voluntaria actione substiterit.
IV. 84. Julian. Accordingly the incarnation of Christ protects the work of his divinity, who, bringing to me my nature and his own will—of which he offered me both a mirror and a rule—and pronouncing that the devil found nothing of sin in him, showed that guilt is taken on not from the founding of the flesh, but from the will alone. Finally, just as nowhere in the Scriptures is it read that Christ fled sin, which he knew was drawn by those being born; so too that is most thoroughly taught by a clear testimony—that the righteousness of the man assumed subsisted not from a diversity of nature, but from a voluntary action.
JulianImp.4.84Augustinus. Nusquam scriptum est - dicis - Christum fugisse peccatum, quod a nascentibus trahi nosset; quid enim fugeret, quod ipse non traxerat, sed eos venerat salvare qui traherent? Quid, inquam, ipse fugeret, quod a nemine fugitur, nisi cum ad ipsum confugitur? Dicis etiam: Claro testimonio perdoceri, quod suscepti hominis iustitia Filio Dei non de naturae diversitate, sed de voluntaria actione substiterit. Itane vero, ne hoc quidem Christus diversum habuit in natura, quod ita ex Virgine natus est, ut iam esset non solum hominis, sed etiam Dei Filius? Ergone ista susceptio, quae Deum et hominem unam fecit esse personam, nihil illi homini valuit ad excellentiam iustitiae, quam dicis ei de voluntaria actione substitisse? Siccine vos contra Dei gratiam defensio liberi arbitrii praecipites agit, ut etiam ipsum Mediatorem, ut esset Dei Filius unicus, voluntate sua meruisse dicatis, et falsum esse quod tota confitetur Ecclesia, credere se in Iesum Christum Filium Dei Patris omnipotentis unicum Dominum nostrum, natum de Spiritu Sancto et Virgine Maria? Secundum vos enim, non a Verbo Dei homo susceptus est, ut ex Virgine nasceretur; sed natus ex Virgine, suae postea voluntatis virtute profecit, et fecit ut a Verbo Dei susciperetur; non talem ac tantam voluntatem illa susceptione habens, sed ad illam susceptionem tali et tanta voluntate perveniens; nec Verbum caro factum est in utero Virginis; sed postea merito ipsius hominis, et eius humanae voluntariaeque virtutis. Ex quo vos sequitur etiam illud, ut quomodo illum creditis a Verbo Dei propterea susceptum esse, quia voluit; sic multos credatis ita suscipi potuisse, si etiam ipsi similiter voluissent, vel posse, si velint; ac per hoc, segnitia humanae voluntatis fieri, ut ille unicus sit, cum plures esse possent, si homines vellent. Haec si dicitis, ubi est vestra frons? Si non dicitis, ubi est haeresis vestra?
Augustine. Nowhere is it written—you say—that Christ fled sin, which he knew was drawn by those being born; for why should he flee what he himself had not drawn, but had come to save those who would draw it? Why, I say, should he himself flee what is fled by no one, except when there is refuge to him? You also say: It is most thoroughly taught by a clear testimony that the righteousness of the man assumed subsisted in the Son of God not from a diversity of nature, but from a voluntary action. Is it so, then, that not even this did Christ have diverse in nature—that he was so born of a Virgin as to be now not only the Son of man, but also the Son of God? Did this assumption, then, which made God and man to be one person, avail nothing to that man toward an excellence of righteousness which you say subsisted in him from a voluntary action? Does the defense of free choice so drive you headlong against the grace of God, that you say even the Mediator himself, that he might be the only Son of God, merited it by his own will, and that what the whole Church confesses is false—that it believes in Jesus Christ, the only Son of God the Father almighty, our Lord, born of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary? For according to you, the man was not assumed by the Word of God, that he might be born of the Virgin; but, born of the Virgin, he afterward profited by the vigor of his own will, and brought it about that he was assumed by the Word of God; not having such and so great a will by that assumption, but coming to that assumption by such and so great a will; nor was the Word made flesh in the womb of the Virgin; but afterward by the merit of the man himself, and of his human and voluntary vigor. From which it follows for you also this: that, as you believe him to have been assumed by the Word of God for this reason, because he willed; so you believe that many could likewise have been assumed, if they too had likewise willed, or can be, if they will; and through this, that it is by the sloth of the human will that he is the only one, when more could be, if men willed. If you say these things, where is your brow? If you do not say them, where is your heresy?
JulianImp.4.84IV. 85. Iulianus. Petrus namque apostolus ait: Christus pro nobis mortuus est, vobis relinquens exemplum, ut sequamini vestigia eius; qui peccatum non fecit, nec inventus est dolus in ore eius . Certe Apostoli sententia cum Dominica voce concordat. Dicit ille in Evangelio: Venit princeps mundi huius, et in me nihil invenit . Hoc idem commendat magister Ecclesiae, dicitque in Christo nullum fuisse delictum; sed per quid non habuerit peccatum veraci attestatione commendat. Quia, inquit, peccatum non fecit. Non dixit: Quia peccatum non suscepit, sed: Quia peccatum non fecit.
IV. 85. Julian. For the apostle Peter says: Christ died for us, leaving you an example, that you should follow his footsteps; who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth (1 Pet 2:21-22). Surely the sentence of the Apostle agrees with the voice of the Lord. He says in the Gospel: The prince of this world comes, and in me he found nothing (See John 14:30). This same thing the Master of the Church commends, and says that in Christ there was no offense; but through what he did not have sin he commends by a truthful attestation. Because, he says, he did no sin. He did not say: Because he took on no sin, but: Because he did no sin.
JulianImp.4.85Augustinus. Utique ille qui peccatum originale non traxit, nullum peccatum habuit, quia non fecit; sicut ipse Adam, quia originale non habuit, nullum habuisset, si non fecisset.
Augustine. Surely he who did not draw original sin had no sin, because he did none; just as Adam himself, because he did not have original sin, would have had none, if he had not done any.
JulianImp.4.85IV. 86. Iulianus. At si esset in natura crimen, Petri erat imperita sententia, qui censuerat videlicet ad immaculatae sanctitatis testimonium posse sufficere, si actus eius a criminibus vindicaret; cum crederetur in eo habitare peccatum per naturale virus. Igitur si de naturali malo aliquid ille sensisset, sollicitius partem hanc commemorasset et pressius, ut scriberet, Christus nobis reliquit exemplum, qui peccatum nec fecit, nec quod nos trahimus nascendo, collegit; sicque merito sequeretur, inventum in ore eius dolum non esse. Porro si hoc putasset, numquam commemorationem fecisset exempli; quem enim hominibus esse ostenderet imitandum, si illum externae carnis natura discrevisset, et censuram magisterii substantiae diversitas arguisset?
IV. 86. Julian. But if there were a crime in nature, the sentence of Peter was unskilled, who judged, namely, that it could suffice for a testimony of immaculate sanctity if it vindicated his acts from crimes; when it would be believed that sin dwelt in him through a natural poison. Therefore, if he had thought anything of natural evil, he would have recorded this part more anxiously and more closely, so as to write: Christ left us an example, who neither did sin, nor gathered what we draw by being born; and so it would rightly follow that no guile was found in his mouth. Further, if he had thought this, he would never have made mention of an example; for whom would he show to be imitable by human beings, if an alien nature of flesh had distinguished him, and a diversity of substance had argued against the censure of his teaching office?
JulianImp.4.86Augustinus. Quam nihil dicas, alii certe intellegunt, si tu non intelleges. Exemplum quippe apostolus Petrus in Christo proponens hominibus imitandum, quid opus erat, ut aliquid de originali peccato diceret, quasi quisquam imitando Christum posset efficere, ut sine illo, sicut ille potuit, nasceretur? Sicut non posset efficere imitando Christum, ut quemadmodum ille de Spiritu Sancto et Virgine Maria nasceretur. Proinde ut imitemur Christum, voluntas nostra formatur: ut autem liberemur ab originali malo, natura regeneratur.
Augustine. How you say nothing, others surely understand, if you do not understand. For the apostle Peter, setting forth in Christ an example to be imitated by human beings, what need was there that he should say anything of original sin—as though anyone, by imitating Christ, could effect that he be born without it, as he was able? Just as he could not effect, by imitating Christ, that he be born, as he was, of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary. Accordingly, that we may imitate Christ, our will is formed; but that we may be set free from original evil, our nature is regenerated.
JulianImp.4.86IV. 87. Iulianus. Huc accedebat, quoniam opinio peccati naturalis non solum vim aemulationis absumeret, sed ipsius praeconii fraudem, quod ei deferebatur, urgeret. Qua enim diceretur gravitate, qua fronte, dolus in ore illius non fuisse; cum si in alia conditione carnis, quam quae est nostra, venisset, non solum docendo, quod levius est, sed etiam nascendo, quod est gravius, dolum malum convinceretur egisse? Quale quippe erat, ut homines in naturali malo regnoque diaboli constitutos, et sub pestifera tabis ingenitae necessitate peccantes, vel legi peccati, quae in membris eorum regnabat, naturaliter servientes, ille ad aemulationem suam etiam sub poenae interminatione compelleret, iustitiamque suam eius carnis hominibus imputaret, cuius malo sic fuerat perterritus, ut ipse qui sub specie eius formam voluerat honestatis exprimere, tamen naturae eius veritatem caveret. Quanto ei rectius diceret aegritudo peccantium et securitas coactorum: Cum valemus, omnes recta consilia praebemus aegrotis; tu si sic esses, aliter longe longeque sentires? Quo igitur vestra profecit impietas? Necessario videlicet consequi, ut si creditur naturaliter carni nostrae inesse peccatum, Christus quoque aut susceperit carnem istam, et hoc malo teneatur obnoxius; aut non susceperit, et non quidem nativitatis, quae in eo mendax videtur, sed tamen voluntariae fraudis iniquitate insolubili vinciatur. Quod quia totum tantis blasphemiarum sordibus squalet, ut vix sine horrore possit, vel cum dilaniatur, exponi; adsit dignitas Mediatoris exemplo suo et operi, ac nostrae fidei, quae veritatem tam ipsius, quam Apostoli eius sermonibus vindicans, numquam desinit praedicare, Christum verum hominem, eiusdem naturae cuius et nos carnem de Mariae suscepisse visceribus, verum per omnia hominem, nullum habuisse peccatum; ad quod indicandum, sufficit apostolo Petro dicere, nullum eum fecisse peccatum; docens quia qui non fecerat, habere non poterat. Nullus est dolus inventus in ore eius; sanctum consortibus naturae suae, quam in cunctis ipse fecerat, praebuit exemplum. Et ideo constat innatum non esse peccatum, quando illud Christus non habuit, qui salvo quoque honore deitatis suae, ob hoc factus est carnalis, ut nobis esset imitabilis.
IV. 87. Julian. To this was added that the opinion of natural sin would not only consume the force of emulation, but would press the fraud of the very encomium which was rendered to him. For with what gravity, with what brow could it be said that there was no guile in his mouth; when, if he had come in another condition of flesh than ours is, he would be convicted of having done malicious guile not only by teaching, which is lighter, but even by being born, which is graver? For what sort of thing would it be, that he should compel human beings—established in natural evil and in the kingdom of the devil, and sinning under the pestilent necessity of an inborn corruption, or naturally serving the law of sin which reigned in their members—to his own emulation, even under the threat of punishment, and should impute his own righteousness to the men of that flesh, by whose evil he had been so terrified that he himself, who under the appearance of it had wished to express the form of honorableness, nonetheless guarded against the truth of its nature? How much more rightly would the sickness of those who sin and the security of those who are compelled say to him: When we are well, we all give right counsels to the sick; you, if you were so, would feel far, far otherwise? To what, then, did your impiety profit? Namely, that it follows by necessity that, if it is believed that sin is naturally in our flesh, Christ too either took on this flesh, and is held liable to this evil; or did not take it on, and is bound by the inextricable iniquity not, indeed, of birth, which in him seems mendacious, but nonetheless of voluntary fraud. Which, because the whole thing is so squalid with such great filth of blasphemies that it can scarcely be set forth without horror, even when it is torn apart, let the dignity of the Mediator be present, by his example and his work and our faith—which, vindicating the truth as much of himself as of his Apostle by their words, never ceases to preach that Christ, a true man, took on flesh of the same nature as ours from the inmost parts of Mary, a true man through all things, had no sin; for the indicating of which it suffices the apostle Peter to say that he did no sin, teaching that he who had done none could not have it. No guile was found in his mouth; he furnished a holy example to the partners of his nature, which he himself had made in all. And therefore it is established that sin is not inborn, since Christ did not have it, who, even with the honor of his deity preserved, was for this reason made carnal, that he might be imitable by us.
JulianImp.4.87Augustinus. Quid enim, homo multum loquens et parum sapiens, si dicerent homines Christo: Quare nobis iubetur, ut imitemur te? Numquid nos de Spiritu Sancto et Maria Virgine nati sumus? Postremo, numquid tanta nobis esse virtus potest quanta tibi est, qui ita homo es, ut etiam Deus sis, et hoc Patri coaeternus et omnipotenti aequalis omnipotens? Ideone non debuit sic nasci, vel sic in unitatem personae a Verbo Dei suscipi, ut hominibus eum nolentibus imitari, talis excusatio non daretur? Sicut autem nobis ipse Patrem proposuit imitandum, qui certe homo numquam fuit, eumque sine dispendio vel infirmatione divinitatis eius imitantur, quicumque per eius gratiam et volunt et possunt, ut diligant inimicos suos, benefaciant eis qui oderunt eos; nec dicunt ei: Tu propterea hoc potes, quia Deus es, et quia inimici tui nihil tibi possunt nocere, nos autem homines sumus infirmi, et eos iubemur diligere, qui nobis tot et tanta mala ingerunt suis persecutionibus; ita Christo non dicunt imitatores eius: Non possumus ea facere, quae ut faciamus tuo nos exhortaris exemplo, quia longe potentior est excellentia tua, quam infirmitas nostra. Non itaque ideo debuit natus de Spiritu Sancto et Virgine Maria habere concupiscentiam, qua cuperet mala, etsi ei resistendo non faceret, ne dicerent ei homines: Habeto prius cupiditates malas, et eas vince, si potes, ut te imitari nostras vincendo possimus. Deinde quid dicis, Iuliane, de illo qui dicit: Non quod volo, ago; sed quod odi, illud facio ; quem vos asseritis, non concupiscentia cum qua natus est, sed mala consuetudine usque ad istam necessitatem premi? Numquid huiusmodi hominibus Christus non praebuit, ut se imitarentur exemplum? Numquid eos contempsit, eosque esse voluit a suis sectandis virtutibus alienos? Si ergo dicerent ei: Nescis quid patimur mole consuetudinis qua premimur; tu non premeris, propterea loqueris; facile omnes, cum valemus, recta consilia aegris damus. Placeretne tibi, ut etiam Christus tali consuetudine premeretur, eamque superaret, ut esset, remota eorum excusatione, talibus imitandus? An tua vaniloquia iam ridebis, et a nobis tacebis?
Augustine. For what, O man of much speaking and little wisdom, if human beings should say to Christ: Why is it commanded us that we imitate you? Are we, then, born of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary? Finally, can there be in us virtue so great as is in you, who are so man that you are also God, and this coeternal with the Father and equal in omnipotence to the Almighty, omnipotent? Ought he not, then, to have been so born, or so assumed into unity of person by the Word of God, that to human beings unwilling to imitate him such an excuse should not be given? But just as he himself set the Father before us to be imitated, who certainly was never a man, and they imitate him without loss or weakening of his divinity, whoever, by his grace, both will and are able, so that they love their enemies, do good to those who hate them (See Matt 5:44-45); nor do they say to him: You can do this for the reason that you are God, and because your enemies can do you no harm, but we are weak human beings, and are commanded to love those who heap so many and so great evils on us by their persecutions; so to Christ his imitators do not say: We cannot do those things which you exhort us by your example to do, because your excellence is far more powerful than our weakness. Not, then, ought he, born of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, to have had concupiscence by which he would desire evils, even if, by resisting it, he did not do them, lest human beings say to him: Have first evil desires, and conquer them, if you can, that by conquering ours we may be able to imitate you. Then what do you say, Julian, of him who says: I do not the good I will; but the evil I hate, that I do (See Rom 7:15, 19); whom you assert to be pressed, not by the concupiscence with which he was born, but by an evil habit, even to that necessity? Did Christ not furnish to human beings of this kind an example, that they should imitate him? Did he despise them, and will them to be alien from following his virtues? If, then, they should say to him: You do not know what we suffer by the weight of habit by which we are pressed; you are not pressed, therefore you speak; easily we all, when we are well, give right counsels to the sick—would it please you that Christ too should be pressed by such a habit, and overcome it, that he might be, with their excuse removed, imitable by such people? Or will you now laugh at your empty talk, and be silent from us?
JulianImp.4.87IV. 88. Iulianus. Verum his ut res postulabat impletis, iuvat te vel mediocriter convenire, qua fiducia tu, cum Hieronymi scripta collaudes, dicas in Christo non fuisse peccatum, cum ille in Dialogo illo, quem sub nomine Attici et Critoboli, mira et ut talem fidem decebat venustate composuit, etiam quinti Evangelii , quod a se translatum dicit, testimonio nitatur ostendere, Christum non solum naturale, verum etiam voluntarium habuisse peccatum, propter quod se cognoverit Ioannis baptismate diluendum. De alio etiam testimonio Ioannis evangelistae, flagitium ei assuit falsitatis . De quo opere tu in illa epistola, quam Alexandriam destinasti, ita gloriaris, ut dicas Pelagium, Scripturarum ab eo oppressum molibus, arbitrium liberum vindicare non posse. Verum illi operi a catholico viro, qui pulsatus fuerat, obviatum est. Nunc vero ad hoc commemorationem eius tantummodo feci, ut te recognosceres non solum Scripturis sanctis, sed nec ipsis tui dogmatis adiutoribus consonare.
IV. 88. Julian. But, these things being fulfilled as the matter demanded, it helps to confront you even moderately: with what confidence you, while you praise the writings of Jerome, say that there was no sin in Christ, when he, in that Dialogue which he composed under the name of Atticus and Critobulus, with a wondrous charm—and such as befitted such a faith—strives to show, even by the testimony of a fifth Gospel (See Jerome, Dialogue against the Pelagians), which he says was translated by himself, that Christ had not only natural but even voluntary sin, on account of which he knew himself must be washed by the baptism of John. From another testimony too, of John the Evangelist, he sews onto him the disgrace of falsehood. Of which work you boast in that letter which you sent to Alexandria, so as to say that Pelagius, oppressed by the heaps of Scriptures by him, cannot vindicate free choice. But that work was met by a Catholic man who had been assailed. Now, indeed, I have made mention of it only for this purpose: that you might recognize yourself to be in harmony not only not with the holy Scriptures, but not even with the very helpers of your teaching.
JulianImp.4.88Augustinus. Si posuisses verba Hieronymi, fortassis ostenderem quomodo accipienda essent sine blasphemia, quam tu illi importare conaris; quod si non possem, non tamen eius fidem, quam cum aliis praeclarissimis Ecclesiae catholicae doctoribus tenuit, ideo repudiandam putarem, quia dixisse aliquid inveniretur, si tamen inveniretur, in quo illis non consonaret. Illud autem mihi ex huius hominis persona contra te satis est, quod cum id sentiat de peccato originali, quod sic aversaris, ut idem appelles Manichaeum, ipsum tamen hoc appellare non audes. Ubi te apparet imprudentia falli, sed contra prudentiam tuam mihi calumniari. Ego sane non Hieronymi, sed Ambrosii; nec meis commemoratam, sed verbis eius expressam sententiam tibi opposui , qua Christum dicit non aliter expertem delicti esse potuisse, nisi expers fuisset illius conceptionis, quam commixtio viri et mulieris operatur. Ubi cernis esse consequens, ut si ego propter hanc sententiam sum Manichaeus, sit et Ambrosius; quia vero ille non est, neminem faciat vel ostendat ista sententia Manichaeum. Hoc cum videas (non enim tale est ut non possis hoc videre, vel possis hoc non videre), tantum tamen causae bonitate desereris, ut calumnieris mihi nomine Manichaei, non imprudente ignorantia, sed pudente fallacia.
Augustine. If you had set down the words of Jerome, perhaps I would show how they ought to be taken without the blasphemy which you try to fasten upon him; and if I could not, I would nonetheless not think his faith—which he held with other most illustrious teachers of the Catholic Church—should for that reason be repudiated, because he would be found to have said something, if indeed it were found, in which he did not harmonize with them. But this is enough for me against you from the person of this man: that, since he holds of original sin what you so turn away from that you call it Manichean, you nonetheless do not dare to call him this. Whence it appears that you are deceived by imprudence, but slander me against your prudence. I, indeed, set against you not a sentence of Jerome, but of Ambrose; not one recorded in my words, but expressed in his own (See Ambrose, Exposition of the Gospel of Luke 1.17), by which he says that Christ could not otherwise be free of fault, unless he were free of that conception which the mingling of man and woman works. Where you discern it to be consequent that, if I am for the sake of this sentence a Manichean, Ambrose too is one; but since he is not, this sentence makes or shows no one a Manichean. When you see this (for it is not such that you cannot see it, or can not see it), you are nonetheless so deserted by the goodness of your cause that you slander me with the name of Manichean, not by an imprudent ignorance, but by a shameless deceit.
JulianImp.4.88IV. 89. Iulianus. Nam Manichaeos deseris in vituperatione suum et caprarum, quos in humanae naturae criminatione comitaris; cum quibus etiam in Christo non speciem carnis, sed rationem evertis exempli. Submoves etiam a Christo verbis interim naturale peccatum, ne et ipsum sub potestate diaboli collocare videaris, quod non fecit vel ipse Manichaeus. Sed laudas Hieronymum, qui ita eum non metuit blasphemare, ut dicat illum familiaritatem cum voluntariis quoque iniisse criminibus. Ita inter diversas amicorum sordes et commenta volutatus sine deflexu, in Catholicorum solum efferaris iniurias, quia dicunt Deum mali auctorem non esse, homines qui ab eo fiunt, malos non esse naturaliter, leges Dei iustas esse, imaginem eius posse declinare a malo et facere bonum; Christum nec in membris, nec in praeceptis, nec in iudiciis ullum perpetrasse peccatum. Atque ideo si tu assertione veritatis aegrescas, credimus tamen prudentes instrui, nonnullosque etiam de his quos mendacia tua sauciarunt, posse sanari.
IV. 89. Julian. For you desert the Manicheans in the disparagement of swine and goats, whom you accompany in the disparagement of human nature; with whom too, in Christ, you overthrow not the appearance of flesh, but the reasoning of an example. You remove also from Christ, in words at least, natural sin, lest you should seem to place even him under the power of the devil—which not even the Manichean himself did. But you praise Jerome, who did not so fear to blaspheme him as to say that he entered into familiarity even with voluntary crimes. Thus, rolled without deflection amid the diverse filths and fictions of your friends, you are made savage only against the injuries of the Catholics, because they say that God is not the author of evil, that human beings who are made by him are not naturally evil, that the laws of God are just, that his image can decline from evil and do good; that Christ perpetrated no sin, neither in his members, nor in his precepts, nor in his judgments. And therefore, if you sicken at the assertion of truth, we trust nonetheless that the prudent are instructed, and that some even of those whom your lies have wounded can be healed.
JulianImp.4.89Augustinus. De Christi exemplo superius tibi respondi, quod neque negare debemus eius excellentiam, qua licet homo integerrimus, tamen de Spiritu natus, nec carne concupiscente conceptus, super omnes homines hic vitam iustissimam duxit; nec propter hanc excellentiam nos excusare, ut non eum pro modo nostro studeamus imitari. Non enim coniuges fideles coelibatum eius imitantur; et tamen, ut adulteria omnesve concubitus illicitos non perpetrent, imitantur illum; nec si eum amplius imitantur qui sancte ducunt coelibem vitam, ideo in hoc quoque imitari eum possunt, quod ille non solum non fecit, verum nec concupivit illicita. Caelibi autem sanctae vitae concubitus est omnis illicitus, cui nec coniugalis est licitus. Quid ergo mirum, si natus de Spiritu et Virgine non in se habuit ullum malum? Quis vero, nisi gravioribus depressus malis, neget malum esse, contra quod etiam sancti quotidie rogant Patrem ex ipsius Domini magisterio? Cum enim dicimus: Ne nos inferas in tentationem ; contra concupiscentiam nostram rogamus Deum. Unusquisque enim tentatur, ut scriptum est, a concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus . Avertat ergo a nobis iste, quem rogamus, Pater, ut dicere audeamus quod a Patre quidem non sit, ad quod nos concupiscentia carnis trahit, sed a Patre sit ipsa quae trahit, vel malum sit ad quod trahit, et malum non sit ipsa quae trahit. Porro, si eam malum esse veritas clamat; profecto eam qui sine ullo malo natus est, non habebat, ac per hoc, peccatum sicut non fecit, ita nec concupivit. Nos itaque imitamur eum, cum peccatum non facimus, non peccati concupiscentiam non habendo, sed non ei consentiendo; quamvis ita imitemur illum Sanctum sanctorum, cum bene vivimus, ut tamen non desit unde dicamus in oratione nostra: Dimitte nobis debita nostra . Ego autem non sic laudavi Hieronymum, quomodo Pelagius laudavit Ambrosium, quod eius fidem et purissimum in Scripturis sensum ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere . Ac per hoc, si quid mihi displicet, reprehendo in amici scriptis, sicut in meis. Sed aliud est alicubi catholicum errare, aliud magni erroris etiam haeresim condere vel tenere.
Augustine. Concerning the example of Christ I have answered you above: that we ought neither to deny his excellence, by which, although a most whole man, yet born of the Spirit, and conceived with no flesh having desires, he led here the most righteous life above all human beings; nor, on account of this excellence, to excuse ourselves, so as not to study to imitate him according to our measure. For faithful spouses do not imitate his celibacy; and yet, that they may not perpetrate adulteries or any unlawful unions, they imitate him; nor, if they imitate him more who lead the celibate life holily, can they for that reason imitate him in this too, that he not only did not do, but did not even desire unlawful things. But to a holy celibate life every union is unlawful, to which not even the conjugal is lawful. What wonder, then, if, born of the Spirit and of a Virgin, he had in himself no evil? But who, except those pressed down by graver evils, would deny it to be an evil, against which even the saints daily pray to the Father from the teaching of the Lord himself? For when we say: Bring us not into temptation (See Matt 6:13), we pray to God against our own concupiscence. For each one is tempted, as it is written, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence (Jas 1:14). Let him, then, whom we ask, the Father, turn away from us this, that we should dare to say that what is not from the Father, to which the concupiscence of the flesh draws us, is from the Father—that very thing which draws; or that the evil to which it draws is evil, and that the thing itself which draws is not evil. Further, if truth cries out that it is evil, surely he who was born without any evil did not have it, and through this, just as he did no sin, so he desired none. We, therefore, imitate him, when we do no sin—not by not having the concupiscence of sin, but by not consenting to it; although we so imitate that Holy of holies, when we live well, that there nonetheless is not lacking whence we should say in our prayer: Forgive us our debts (Matt 6:12). But I did not praise Jerome in the way Pelagius praised Ambrose, that his faith and most pure sense in the Scriptures not even an enemy dared to censure. And through this, if anything displeases me, I censure it in the writings of a friend, as in my own. But it is one thing somewhere for a Catholic to err, another to found or hold even the heresy of a great error.
JulianImp.4.89IV. 90. Iulianus. Sed hinc ista sufficiant: veniamus nunc ad illud, in quo pars negotii magna versatur; cuius potentia examinatus et exanimatus Manichaeorum legatus, tam fidelis responsionis documenta protulit quam elegantis ingenii. Nam postquam dicta mea, quae supra posui, nulla re nova intercedente, laudavit et probavit, ad eam partem qua disputatio a nobis promissa supplebatur, accessit; quaerente me quippe, per quid sub diabolo essent, quos Deus fecit; ad quod respondi ipsius nomine: Per peccatum, non per naturam; et retuli de meo: Sed, sicut ipse annuis, ut non potest esse sine sexibus fetus, ita nec sine voluntate delictum. Habent igitur tempore conceptus sui, parvuli voluntatem, qui adhuc animam non habent; aut habent tempore exortus sui, qui adhuc rationis usum non habent. Cum ad hunc igitur venisset locum, hoc solum de nostris proposuit obiectis, id est: Sed ut non potest esse sine sexibus fetus, ita nec sine voluntate delictum; responditque: Ita vero, ita est; sic enim " per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt " . Per unius illius voluntatem malam omnes in eo peccaverunt, quando omnes ille unus fuerunt, de quo propterea singuli peccatum originale traxerunt . Lectorem igitur adhortor, ut conflictum nostrum vigilanter inspiciat. Quid tibi profuit, eruditissime bipedum, meam non supplere sententiam; cum etsi in ea parte, quam suppressisti prioris dicti expositio teneretur, tamen etiam in illo, quod tibi obiecisti, vis aeque tota consistat? Proposui quippe fideliter, ut tua quoque manifestavit assensio, quod a te solet referri, et interrogans per quid sub diabolo essent parvuli, quos fecisset Deus, respondi vice tua: Per peccatum, non per naturam. Certe, vides me hinc nullam fecisse fraudem. Dixi quod in ore Traduciani est, licet hoc non sit in dogmate. Ad quod retuli: Sed ut non potest esse sine sexibus fetus, ita nec sine voluntate delictum. Tu hoc impudenti fraude fecisti dividuum; nam commemorans quod nos dixeramus, quia ut non esset absque sexibus fetus, ita nec sine voluntate delictum; illud quod sequebatur de parvulorum voluntate tacuisti, et respondes: Ita vero, ita est; sic enim " per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum " , per unius illius voluntatem malam omnes in eo peccaverunt. Hoccine est respondere? Hoccine disputare est? Hoccine postremo vel sobrietatis habere respectum? Ridetur certe ab eruditis calliditas sophismatum, ubi per communionem nominum simplicitati respondentis illuditur; sed illa ipsa sophismata licet non sint veritate solida, urbana tamen superficie colorantur; hoc autem quod monstrum disputationis est, quod nec veritate solidum est, nec sophismate levigatum. Dixi certe non posse esse sine libera voluntate peccatum; quo concesso, vestrum dogma consumitur, qui putatis esse in natura hominum sine ulla voluntate reorum delictum.
IV. 90. Julian. But let these things suffice from here: let us now come to that in which a great part of the business is engaged; by whose power the legate of the Manicheans, examined and unstrung, brought forth proofs as much of a faithful response as of an elegant wit. For after he praised and approved my words, which I set down above, with no new thing intervening, he came to that part in which the disputation promised by us was being supplied; for when I asked through what they were under the devil, whom God made; to which I answered in his name: Through sin, not through nature; and reported of my own: But, as you yourself grant, just as there cannot be offspring without the sexes, so neither can there be sin without the will. Therefore the little ones have, at the time of their conception, a will—they who as yet have no soul; or they have, at the time of their birth—they who as yet have no use of reason. When, then, he had come to this place, this alone of our objections he set forth, that is: But just as there cannot be offspring without the sexes, so neither can there be sin without the will; and he answered: So indeed, so it is; for thus "through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all men, in whom all sinned" (Rom 5:12). Through the evil will of that one man all sinned in him, when they all were that one man, from whom for that reason individuals drew original sin. I exhort the reader, then, to inspect our conflict vigilantly. What did it profit you, most learned of bipeds, not to supply my sentence; since, even if in that part which you suppressed the explanation of the prior saying was held, yet even in that which you objected to yourself the whole force likewise stands? For I set forth faithfully—as your assent too manifested—what is wont to be reported by you, and, asking through what the little ones, whom God had made, were under the devil, I answered in your stead: Through sin, not through nature. Certainly, you see that I committed no fraud here. I said what is in the mouth of the Traducianist, though this is not in his teaching. To which I reported: But just as there cannot be offspring without the sexes, so neither can there be sin without the will. You made this divided by a shameless fraud; for, recalling what we had said—that just as there would be no offspring without the sexes, so neither sin without the will—that which followed about the will of the little ones you kept silent, and you answer: So indeed, so it is; for thus "through one man sin entered into the world" (Rom 5:12), through the evil will of that one man all sinned in him. Is this to answer? Is this to dispute? Is this, finally, to have any regard even for sobriety? The cunning of sophisms is laughed at by the learned, where, through the community of names, the simplicity of the respondent is mocked; but those very sophisms, although they are not solid in truth, are nonetheless colored with an urbane surface; but this, which is a monster of disputation, is neither solid in truth nor polished by a sophism. I said, surely, that there cannot be sin without a free will; which being granted, your teaching is consumed, you who think there is in the nature of human beings a fault without any will of the guilty.
JulianImp.4.90Augustinus. Ego id solum de opere illo tuo legeram, quod chartula quae mihi missa est, continebat. Nam posteaquam libros tuos, de quibus illud nescio quis excerpsit, inveni, ad cuncta respondi. Dicimus autem et nos non posse esse sine libera voluntate peccatum; nec ideo tamen, ut dicis, nostrum dogma consumitur, cum asserimus esse originale peccatum; quia et ad hoc peccati genus ex libera voluntate perventum est, non eius propria qui nascitur, sed eius in quo omnes originaliter fuerunt, quando communem naturam mala voluntate vitiavit. Non habent ergo parvuli tempore conceptus vel ortus sui peccandi voluntatem; sed ille tempore praevaricationis suae magnum illud peccatum libera voluntate commisit, a qua originalis peccati contagium sic humana natura contraxit, ut verissime diceret sanctus: In iniquitatibus conceptus sum ; et alius itidem sanctus: Quis enim mundus est a sorde? Nec infans cuius est unius diei vita super terram . Haec eloquia veritatis subsannant vanitatem loquacitatis tuae.
Augustine. I had read only that of that work of yours which the paper sent to me contained. For after I found your books, from which someone or other excerpted that, I answered all things. But we too say that there cannot be sin without a free will; nor for that reason, however, as you say, is our teaching consumed, when we assert that there is original sin; because to this kind of sin too one has come by a free will—not the proper will of him who is born, but of him in whom all originally were, when by an evil will he vitiated the common nature. The little ones, then, do not have, at the time of their conception or birth, a will to sin; but he, at the time of his transgression, committed by a free will that great sin, from which the contagion of original sin human nature so contracted that a holy man could most truly say: In iniquities I was conceived (Ps 51:5 (50:7)); and another holy man likewise: For who is clean from filth? Not even the infant whose life is of one day upon earth (Job 14:4-5 (LXX)). These utterances of truth deride the vanity of your loquacity.
JulianImp.4.90IV. 91. Iulianus. Qua ergo tu impudentia et approbas sententiam meam, et tuum dogma non deseris; cum sententiae utriusque partis ita nullo possint foedere copulari, ut enuntiatorum opposita pariter non participant veritati? Quomodo ergo ego si consentirem naturale esse peccatum, necesse erat ut deciderem de iure sententiae, quae praescribit, nisi in voluntate libera peccatum esse non posse; ita tu e regione consentiens me bene dixisse, qui pronuntiavi nullum esse sine voluntate peccatum, reicere statim debuisti illam opinionem, qua peccatum naturale credebas.
IV. 91. Julian. With what shamelessness, then, do you both approve my sentence and not desert your teaching; when the sentences of each part can so be coupled by no compact that the opposites of the propositions do not equally not share in the truth? Just as, then, if I were to consent that sin is natural, it would be necessary that I fall away from the right of the sentence which prescribes that there cannot be sin except in a free will, so you, on the other side, consenting that I said well, who pronounced that there is no sin without a will, ought at once to reject that opinion by which you believed sin to be natural.
JulianImp.4.91Augustinus. Aliud est sine voluntate libera peccatum esse non posse, quod et nos dicimus, quia nec originale esse potuisset sine primi hominis libera voluntate; et aliud est, quomodo ipse dixisti: nisi in voluntate libera peccatum esse non posse, quod non concedimus. Originale namque peccatum non est in voluntate nascentis, sed neque in ipsa est voluntate primi hominis, quamvis sine ipsa esse non posset. Aliud est ergo: Non potest esse sine voluntate peccatum, et aliud est: Non potest esse nisi in voluntate peccatum. Neque enim, si recte dicimus: Sine conceptu partus non potest esse; ideo etiam recte dicitur: Nisi in conceptu partus non potest esse. Sed hoc ita est diversum, ut neque in conceptu partus, neque in partu possit esse conceptus. Peccatum vero in voluntate potest esse, sicut fuit primi hominis; potest etiam non in voluntate, sicut originale cuiuscumque nascentis quod omnino est in voluntate nullius; sed non sine voluntate primi illius. Ille quoque sanctus qui dixit Deo: Signasti peccata mea in sacculo, et adnotasti si quid invitus admisi ; non utique habuit in voluntate peccatum, quod commisit invitus. Quid ille qui dicit: Non quod volo, facio bonum, moxque subiungit, sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago ? Numquid in voluntate dicendus est habere peccatum, secundum vos ipsos, qui eum vultis intellegi vi consuetudinis cogi peccare nolentem? Desine igitur de vicinitate subrepere, et sensim limitem transgredi, ut quoniam dicimus sine voluntate libera, tu nos dicere affirmes, nisi in voluntate libera, esse non posse peccatum; tamquam si diceremus, sine igne carbones esse non posse; et tu nos affirmares dicere, nisi in igne carbones esse non posse. Haec si nesciebas, confitere te non fuisse intellegentem disputatorem; si autem sciebas, non intellegentem sperasse habiturum te esse lectorem.
Augustine. It is one thing that there cannot be sin without a free will, which we too say, because original sin too could not have been without the free will of the first man; and another, as you yourself said: that there cannot be sin except in a free will, which we do not grant. For original sin is not in the will of the one being born, nor is it even in the will of the first man, although it could not be without it. It is one thing, then: Sin cannot be without a will; and another: Sin cannot be except in a will. For if we rightly say: Birth cannot be without conception; it is not therefore rightly said: Birth cannot be except in conception. But this is so diverse that neither in conception can there be birth, nor in birth can there be conception. But sin can be in a will, as was that of the first man; it can also be not in a will, as the original sin of anyone being born, which is altogether in the will of no one; but not without the will of that first one. That holy man too who said to God: You have sealed up my sins in a bag, and you have noted whatever I admitted against my will (See Job 14:16-17), surely did not have in his will the sin which he committed against his will. What of him who says: I do not the good I will, and at once subjoins, but the evil I do not will, this I do (See Rom 7:19)? Must he be said, according to your very selves, to have sin in his will—you who want him to be understood to be compelled to sin, unwilling, by the force of habit? Cease, then, to creep up from the neighborhood, and bit by bit to transgress the boundary, so that, because we say without a free will, you affirm us to say, except in a free will, sin cannot be; just as if we said, coals cannot be without fire; and you affirmed us to say, coals cannot be except in fire. If you did not know these things, confess that you were not an understanding disputant; but if you did know them, that you hoped to have an unintelligent reader.
JulianImp.4.91IV. 92. Iulianus. Quidquid enim naturale est, voluntarium non esse manifestum est.
IV. 92. Julian. For whatever is natural, it is manifest, is not voluntary.
JulianImp.4.92Augustinus. Si quidquid est naturale, voluntarium non esse manifestum est; non est ergo naturale, quod salvi, quod beati esse volumus. Quod dicere quis audeat, nisi tu? Aut admonitus, fortasse nec tu.
Augustine. If whatever is natural, it is manifest, is not voluntary; then it is not natural that we will to be saved, that we will to be blessed. Who would dare to say this, except you? Or, when admonished, perhaps not even you.
JulianImp.4.92IV. 93. Iulianus. Si ergo est naturale peccatum, non est voluntarium; si est voluntarium, non est ingenitum. Istae duae definitiones tam contrariae sibi sunt, quam contrarium est necessitas et voluntas, quarum confirmatio ex mutua negatione generatur. Nam sicut nihil est aliud voluntarium, quam non coactum; ita nihil est aliud coactum, quam non voluntarium. Simul ergo exstare, et velut vivere, duo ista non possunt; quia talis eorum natura est, ut tunc aliud vivat, cum aliud exstinguitur.
IV. 93. Julian. If, then, sin is natural, it is not voluntary; if it is voluntary, it is not inborn. These two definitions are as contrary to each other as necessity and will are contrary, whose confirmation is generated from mutual negation. For just as the voluntary is nothing other than the uncompelled, so the compelled is nothing other than the unwilling. To exist together, then, and as it were to live, these two cannot; because their nature is such that one lives when the other is extinguished.
JulianImp.4.93Augustinus. Cur non attendis esse peccatum etiam non voluntarium, certe in illo qui dicit, quacumque causa hoc dicat: Si autem quod nolo ego, hoc facio; iam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum ? Cur non attendis esse etiam necessitatem, qua necesse est velimus beate vivere; et clausis oculis sic alteri alteram opponis, quasi voluntas necessitatis, aut necessitas voluntatis esse non possit?
Augustine. Why do you not attend that there is sin even not voluntary—surely in him who says, by whatever cause he says it: But if I do what I do not will, it is now not I who work it, but the sin that dwells in me (Rom 7:20)? Why do you not attend that there is also a necessity by which it is necessary that we will to live blessedly; and, with closed eyes, you so set the one against the other, as though will could not be of necessity, or necessity of will?
JulianImp.4.93IV. 94. Iulianus. Cum ergo hoc ita inconcussum sit, ut nulla queat argumentatione convelli; tu elige utrum mavis, et vel nostram, vel tuam constanter affirma sententiam; ut aut necessitati, aut voluntati imputes culpam. Cum autem dico, utrum mavis, non sic admoneo, quasi tua adhuc lateat opinio, qui crimina naturae per Manichaeum importare didicisti; sed ideo hoc commoneo, ut disputationis tuae veritas denotetur.
IV. 94. Julian. Since, then, this is so unshaken that it can be shaken by no argumentation, choose which you prefer, and constantly affirm either our sentence or yours; so as to impute the fault either to necessity or to will. But when I say, which you prefer, I do not so admonish as though your opinion still lay hidden—you who learned to bring in the crimes of nature through the Manichean; but for this reason I admonish, that the truth of your disputation may be noted.
JulianImp.4.94Augustinus. Velis nolis, quoniam saepe hoc dicis, saepe oportet ut audias, non fuisse Manichaeum qui dixit, dissensionem carnis et spiritus per praevaricationem primi hominis in naturam vertisse . Quam tu causam mali huius negans, cum quo malo nasci omnem hominem negare non sineris, facis ut Manichaeus aliae naturae commixtionem nobis inesse dicat, et vincat nisi tecum victus intereat.
Augustine. Like it or not, since you often say this, often must you hear it: that he was not a Manichean who said that the dissension of flesh and spirit turned into nature through the transgression of the first man (See Ambrose, Exposition of the Gospel of Luke 7.142-143). Which cause of this evil you deny, while you are not permitted to deny that every man is born with this evil; you bring it about that the Manichean says that the mingling of another nature is in us, and conquers—unless, conquered together with you, he perishes.
JulianImp.4.94IV. 95. Iulianus. Quid igitur mihi responderis prudens et sollicitus auditor expendat. De parvulis certe agimus, quibus nulla propriae mentis adest voluntas, de quibus quaeritur per quid sint sub diabolo, quos Deus fecit, cum nihil mali ipsos egisse consentias. Tu eos concionatus es, ad ius daemonis propter peccatum, non propter naturam pertinere. Ad hoc insurrexit nostra responsio: Sed ut non potest esse sine sexibus fetus, ita nec sine voluntate delictum. Ad quod tu retulisti: Ita vero, ita est; id est, non potest esse sine voluntate delictum. Verum qui hoc confirmaveras, qua impudentia subdidisti: Sed per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, per unius illius voluntatem?
IV. 95. Julian. What, then, you have answered me, let a prudent and careful hearer weigh. We are dealing, surely, with little ones, in whom there is no will of their own mind, concerning whom it is asked through what they are under the devil, whom God made, since you consent that they themselves did nothing evil. You harangued that they belong to the right of the demon on account of sin, not on account of nature. Against this our response rose up: But just as there cannot be offspring without the sexes, so neither can there be sin without the will. To which you reported: So indeed, so it is; that is, there cannot be sin without the will. But you who had confirmed this, with what shamelessness did you subjoin: But through one man sin entered into the world, through the will of that one (See Rom 5:12)?
JulianImp.4.95Augustinus. Numquid, quoniam de parvulis agebatur, ideo quod verum dixisti, non debui ostendere etiam meam non impedire sententiam, id est, non esse posse sine voluntate delictum; quandoquidem etiam originale delictum non habet causam, nisi ex illius voluntate, a quo ipsa origo deducitur? Illud ergo cum adversa intentione dixisses, non mihi tamen adversum esse respondi, et verum esse concessi; et quod tu non videras, quomodo mihi non adversaretur, ostendi. Potuisti enim dicere secundum intentionem tuam, non esse posse delictum sine illius, cuius delictum est, propria voluntate; quod si dixisses, nequaquam concederem; sine propria enim nascentis voluntate trahitur originale peccatum. Sed tamen verum dixisti, non posse esse sine voluntate peccatum; quia et ipsum originale voluntas eius effecit, qui primus ea, qua natura humana vitiata est, voluntate peccavit; ita ut quidquid hominum nasceretur per carnis concupiscentiam, quae reorum confusione velata est, liberum non fieret a reatu, nisi renasceretur per spiritus gratiam.
Augustine. Was it because we were dealing with little ones, that therefore what you said truly I ought not to show does not hamper even my sentence—that is, that there cannot be sin without will; since even original sin has no cause except from the will of him from whom the very origin is derived? That, then, although you said it with an adverse intention, I answered was nonetheless not adverse to me, and granted to be true; and what you had not seen—how it was not adverse to me—I showed. For you could have said, according to your intention, that there cannot be sin without the proper will of him whose sin it is; which, if you had said, I would by no means grant; for without the proper will of the one being born, original sin is drawn. But nonetheless you said truly that there cannot be sin without will; because original sin too the will of him effected, who first sinned by that will by which human nature was vitiated; so that whatever of human beings was born through the concupiscence of the flesh, which is veiled by the confusion of the guilty, would not become free from guilt, unless it were reborn through the grace of the Spirit.
JulianImp.4.95IV. 96. Iulianus. Numquid de Adam operibus interrogatus eras, aut quaesitum fuerat, utrum ille voluntate peccasset? Quod quidem contra te mox quaeretur. Esto, aliis te delectet illudere; cuius deformitatis est, ut tu tibimet imponas? Quippe haud mihi valeo persuadere, quod tantam deformitatem non fraude, sed opinione patiaris. In uno eodemque versu assentiris, non posse esse sine voluntate delictum, et subdis protinus, peccatum quod sine motu animi libero manere non dixeras, in omnibus hominibus sine voluntate regnare.
IV. 96. Julian. Were you asked about the works of Adam, or was it inquired whether he had sinned by will? Which indeed will soon be asked against you. So be it, let it delight you to mock others; of what deformity is it that you impose upon yourself? For I cannot persuade myself that you suffer so great a deformity not by fraud but by opinion. In one and the same line you assent that there cannot be sin without will, and you subjoin straightway that the sin which you had not said could remain without a free motion of the mind reigns in all human beings without will.
JulianImp.4.96Augustinus. Quid supponis verbum tuum quasi meum, ut non sentiente qui hoc audit aut legit, subtrahas sensum meum? Ego non dixi, sine voluntate manere non posse peccatum, sed esse non posse; quantum autem intersit, ex tuis verbis aperiam. Ubi enim dixisti: Non potest esse sine sexibus fetus, quis non te verum dixisse consentiat? Aliter enim non existit fetus, nisi ex maris et feminae sexibus. Si autem dixisses: Non potest manere sine sexibus fetus; quis tibi hoc verum esse concederet? Manet enim sine parentum sexibus fetus, sine quibus tamen esse non posset; nec omnino ipsi faciunt ut maneat, qui fecerunt ut esset. Sic ergo peccatum, quod esse sine voluntate non potest, manere sine voluntate potest. Itaque etiam peccatum Adae, quoniam ipsum est quod originaliter manet in posteris eius, nisi quibus in Christo remittitur, profecto cum dicitur et in ipsis sine voluntate non esse, ad illius voluntatem refertur, qua factum est ut esset quod manendo et in posteris esset, non qua factum est ut maneret quod et sine voluntate iam posset. Si autem hoc dicis esse, quod est manere; non contendo verbis, sed plane dico, quantum attinet ad manendum, sine voluntate esse posse omne peccatum. Quis est enim qui peccatum quod sine voluntate non fecit, manere etiam velit? Et tamen manet nolente peccatore peccatum, quod a voluntate commissum est. Manet ergo donec remittatur: et si numquam remittatur, manebit in aeternum; neque enim mendaciter in Evangelio dictum est: Reus erit aeterni peccati .
Augustine. Why do you substitute your word as though mine, so that, with the one who hears or reads this not perceiving it, you withdraw my meaning? I did not say that sin cannot remain without will, but cannot be; and how much there is between these, I will open from your words. For where you said: There cannot be offspring without the sexes, who would not consent that you said truly? For otherwise offspring does not exist, except from the sexes of male and female. But if you had said: Offspring cannot remain without the sexes; who would grant you this to be true? For offspring remains without the sexes of the parents, without which nonetheless it could not be; nor do they at all make it remain, who made it be. So, then, sin, which cannot be without will, can remain without will. And so the sin too of Adam—since it is itself that which originally remains in his posterity, except in those to whom it is remitted in Christ—surely when it is said to be in them too not without will, is referred to the will of that one, by which it came about that there should be that which, remaining, would be in his posterity too, not by which it came about that there should remain what could already be even without will. But if you say that to be is this, which is to remain; I do not contend about words, but plainly say, as far as pertains to remaining, that every sin can be without will. For who is there who would even will that the sin which he did not do without will should remain? And yet sin remains, with the sinner unwilling, which was committed by the will. It remains, then, until it is remitted; and if it is never remitted, it will remain forever; for it was not mendaciously said in the Gospel: He will be guilty of an eternal sin (See Mark 3:29).
JulianImp.4.96IV. 97. Iulianus. Deinde quia multa in propositionibus invenitur diversitas, dixeras: Non esse sine voluntate delictum, et respondisti: sed per unius voluntatem esse delictum. Numquid concinit superiori definitioni, quae ablativi casus praepositione munitur, secuta responsio per praepositionem accusativi casus illata? Quaesitum erat utrum esset crimen sine voluntate, quod non posse constiterat; tu subdidisti per unum hominem intrasse peccatum, cum non referret per quid coepisset, sed sine quo esse non posset.
IV. 97. Julian. Then, because much diversity is found in the propositions, you had said: That there is not sin without will, and you answered: but through the will of the one there is sin. Does the response that followed, brought in through the preposition of the accusative case, harmonize with the prior definition, which is fortified with the preposition of the ablative case? It had been asked whether there could be a crime without will, which had been established could not be; you subjoined that through one man sin entered; when it did not matter through what it began, but without what it could not be.
JulianImp.4.97Augustinus. Ego sic dixi peccatum sine voluntate esse non posse, quomodo dicimus poma vel frumenta sine radicibus esse non posse; ubi etiam sine offensione grammaticorum possumus dicere, poma vel frumenta nisi per radicem esse non posse. Cum ergo recte utrumque dicatur, quamvis illud per ablativi, hoc per accusativi casus praepositionem enuntietur; quid est quod nobis casibus nominum, velut cassibus aranearum, quanto subtilius, tanto infirmius tendis insidias? Quaere muscas morituras, quas istis reticulis capias. Non hoc erant illi, quos ideo sequimur, ut tuas tendiculas dissipemus. Non hoc erat Apostolus, qui dixit: Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum . Non hoc erat Hilarius, qui dixit: Ex peccato omnis caro est, a peccato scilicet Adam parentis deducta . Non hoc erat Ambrosius, qui dixit: Omnes sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est . Utinam tu potius istorum Christi piscatorum retibus tenaciter salubriterque capiaris; tunc accusativum casum, quo ipse a te ipso es accusatus, et ablativum, quo de Ecclesia catholica es ablatus, correctus melius declinabis. Praepositiones autem si recte atque integre sequeris, cur non istos doctores Ecclesiae tibi, deposita elatione, praeponis?
Augustine. I said that sin cannot be without will in the way that we say that fruits or grain cannot be without roots; where, without any offense to the grammarians, we can also say that fruits or grain cannot be except through a root. Since, then, each is rightly said, although the one is expressed through the preposition of the ablative, the other through that of the accusative case; what is it that you stretch out snares for us by the cases of nouns, as by the webs of spiders—the more subtly, the more weakly? Seek dying flies, which you may catch by these little nets. Not such were those whom we follow, that we should scatter your snares. Not such was the Apostle, who said: The body indeed is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10). Not such was Hilary, who said: From sin is all flesh, derived, namely, from the sin of the parent Adam (See Hilary, Treatise on Psalm 118). Not such was Ambrose, who said: We are all born under sin, whose very origin is in defect (See Ambrose, Defense of the Prophet David 11.56). Would that you rather were caught tenaciously and wholesomely in the nets of these fishermen of Christ; then, corrected, you would better decline the accusative case, by which you were accused by your own self, and the ablative, by which you were carried off from the Catholic Church. But if you follow the prepositions rightly and entirely, why do you not, having laid aside your elation, set these teachers of the Church before yourself?
JulianImp.4.97IV. 98. Iulianus. Apparet certe furtum detestabile, quod quidem confestim ea, quae peccatis adhaeret, ultione punitum est, videlicet ut antequam in pestem procederet audientium, suum circumveniret auctorem. Ecce enim non abnuitur primum hominem aliquod incurrisse peccatum; sed quaeritur quomodo hoc peccatum posset in nascentibus inveniri. Defini tu peccati primi qualem putes conditionem fuisse; dicis: Voluntas fuit libera, non enim potest esse sine voluntate peccatum; nos hoc probamus. Tu vero subdis: Sed hoc peccatum, quod sine voluntate esse non potest, haeret sine voluntate nascentibus .
IV. 98. Julian. A detestable theft appears, surely, which was indeed straightway punished by the vengeance that clings to sins: namely, that before it advanced into the pest of its hearers, it surrounded and ruined its own author. For behold, it is not denied that the first man incurred some sin; but it is asked how this sin could be found in those who are born. Define what you think the condition of the first sin was; you say: The will was free, for there cannot be sin without will; this we approve. But you subjoin: But this sin, which cannot be without will, clings to those being born without will.
JulianImp.4.98Augustinus. Haeret per contagium, non per arbitrium.
Augustine. It clings through contagion, not through choice.
JulianImp.4.98IV. 99. Iulianus. Falsum est ergo quod concesseras, non esse sine voluntate peccatum; si licet commissum sit per voluntatem, tamen ad alios potuit sine voluntate transire.
IV. 99. Julian. It is false, then, what you had conceded—that there is no sin without will; if, although it was committed through will, it could nonetheless pass over to others without will.
JulianImp.4.99Augustinus. Non est falsum quod concesseram, quia sine voluntate illius, a quo est origo nascentium, non est factum originale peccatum; potuit autem ad alios per contagium sine voluntate transire, quod non potuit ab illo sine voluntate committi. Ac per hoc, sine voluntate esse non posset, ut esset quod in alios sine voluntate transiret; sicut frumenta sine radicibus esse non possent, ut essent quae in alia loca transire sine radicibus possent.
Augustine. It is not false what I had conceded, because without the will of him from whom is the origin of those being born, original sin was not made; but it could pass over to others through contagion without will, which could not be committed by that one without will. And through this, it could not be without will, that there should be what would pass over into others without will; just as grain could not be without roots, that there should be what could pass over into other places without roots.
JulianImp.4.99IV. 100. Iulianus. Est ergo iam sine voluntate peccatum, cum invenitur in his quibus malam eripis voluntatem.
IV. 100. Julian. There is, then, now sin without will, since it is found in those from whom you snatch away the evil will.
JulianImp.4.100Augustinus. Est omnino sine voluntate peccatum, id est, manet. Non enim maneret, nisi esset utique quod maneret; sed ut esset quod maneret sine voluntate, non est factum nisi voluntate; si tamen peccatum tantummodo peccatum sit, non etiam poena; hac enim quisque peccat invitus. Sic ergo utrumque verum est, et esse non posse sine voluntate peccatum, et esse posse sine voluntate peccatum; quomodo utrumque verum est, et esse non posse sine parentum sexibus fetum, et esse posse sine parentum sexibus fetum. Illud enim dictum est, quia sine his non potest existere; hoc autem, quia sine his potest manere. Bene quidem ipse uno loco, et de peccato et de fetu locutus es, dicens: Ut non potest esse sine sexibus fetus, ita nec sine voluntate delictum. Sicut ergo intellegimus fetum ideo sine parentum sexibus esse non posse, quia sine his non potest existere, ut sit; et ideo sine parentum esse sexibus posse, quia sine his potest manere, cum iam sit; cur non ita intellegimus, etiam peccatum et sine voluntate esse non posse, quia sine illa non potest existere, ut sit; et sine voluntate esse posse, quia sine illa potest manere, cum iam sit?
Augustine. There is altogether sin without will, that is, it remains. For it would not remain, unless there were surely that which would remain; but that there should be, without will, what would remain, was made only by will; if at least the sin be sin only, not also a punishment; for by this each one sins unwilling. So, then, both are true—both that sin cannot be without will, and that sin can be without will; just as both are true—both that offspring cannot be without the sexes of the parents, and that offspring can be without the sexes of the parents. For the former was said because without these it cannot exist; the latter, because without these it can remain. Well indeed you yourself, in one place, spoke both of sin and of offspring, saying: Just as there cannot be offspring without the sexes, so neither sin without will. As, then, we understand that offspring cannot be without the sexes of the parents for this reason, that without these it cannot exist, so as to be; and that it can be without the sexes of the parents for this reason, that without these it can remain, when it now is; why do we not so understand that sin too both cannot be without will, because without it it cannot exist, so as to be; and can be without will, because without it it can remain, when it now is?
JulianImp.4.100IV. 101. Iulianus. Vide ergo quo tua acumina pervehantur; persuadere conaris, rem aliquam per hoc non esse, per quod potest esse.
IV. 101. Julian. See, then, to what your sharp points are carried: you try to persuade that a thing is not through that through which it can be.
JulianImp.4.101Augustinus. Quid enim tu, o magne ille, etiam contra gratiam Dei, defensor liberi arbitrii? Negabisne peccatum aliquod per liberum arbitrium non esse, quod per liberum arbitrium potest esse? Fit enim ut sit peccatum per liberum arbitrium, cum homo peccat si velit; et fit ut non sit peccatum per liberum arbitrium, cum homo non peccat si nolit. Ecce invenimus aliquid, et hoc ipsum de quo disputamus, id est, peccatum per hoc non esse, per quod potest esse, id est, per liberum arbitrium. Quid est, contentiose? Huccine mea acumina pervehentur? An hic tua lumina aciem perdiderunt? Noli esse praeceps: melius est attendere quid dicas, quam contendere ut contradicas.
Augustine. For what do you, that great one, even against the grace of God, the defender of free choice? Will you deny that some sin is not through free choice, which can be through free choice? For it comes about that there is sin through free choice, when a man sins if he wills; and it comes about that there is not sin through free choice, when a man does not sin if he does not will. Behold, we find something—and this very thing about which we dispute, that is, sin—not to be through that through which it can be, that is, through free choice. What is it, contentious one? To this are my sharp points carried? Or have your lights here lost their edge? Do not be headlong: it is better to attend to what you say, than to contend that you may contradict.
JulianImp.4.101IV. 102. Iulianus. Id est, peccatum per hoc esse sine voluntate, per quod non potest esse sine voluntate.
IV. 102. Julian. That is, that sin is without will through that through which it cannot be without will.
JulianImp.4.102Augustinus. Non sane peccatum per hoc est sine voluntate, per quod non potest esse sine voluntate, sed diversis quidem causis; tamen potest utrumque; nam sine voluntate non potest esse, quia sine voluntate non potest existere ut sit; sine autem voluntate potest esse, quia sine voluntate potest manere quod existit.
Augustine. Sin is not indeed without will through that through which it cannot be without will, but by diverse causes; nonetheless both are possible; for without will it cannot be, because without will it cannot exist so as to be; but without will it can be, because without will what exists can remain.
JulianImp.4.102IV. 103. Iulianus. Ut conditionem suam conditione sua perdat, et sit absque hoc, sine quo non posse esse definitum est. Hoc est inficiari rebus. Quid tale Anaxagoras, qui nivem nigram esse dicebat? Commentaris rei alicuius naturam suis fructibus negari; cumque sit contrarium necessitas et voluntas, ita ut, sicut supra ostendimus, mutua se impugnatione consumant; tu novo impossibilique foedere ac necessitudine monstruosa alterum alterius subdis effectui, et dicis necessitatem de fructibus voluntatis exortam, ut voluntas sua se multiplicatione deleverit, et statum proprium operata mutaverit; atque, ut rem ipsam suis vocabulis exprimamus, postquam coepit voluntas esse, voluntas esse desierit. Quo quid potest, non dico obtusius, sed furiosius cogitari? Cum ergo haec duo simul esse non possint, id est, necessitas et voluntas, tuque confirmaveris quod diximus, non posse esse sine voluntate delictum, assentiaris quo ⁄ que non esse in parvulis voluntatem; contorto gutture cogeris annuere nullum in his esse peccatum quod sine voluntate non posse esse professus es.
IV. 103. Julian. So that it loses its own condition by its own condition, and is without that without which it was defined that it cannot be. This is to deny things. What such did Anaxagoras, who said that snow is black? You comment that the nature of some thing is denied by its own fruits; and, since necessity and will are contrary, so that, as we showed above, they consume each other by mutual attack, you by a new and impossible compact and a monstrous bond subject one to the effect of the other, and say that necessity arose from the fruits of will, so that the will deleted itself by its own multiplication, and, having worked, changed its own state; and, to express the thing itself by its own words, after the will began to be, the will ceased to be. Than which what can be thought—I will not say more obtuse, but more furious? Since, then, these two cannot be at once, that is, necessity and will, and you have confirmed what we said, that there cannot be a fault without will, and you assent too that there is not will in the little ones; with twisted throat you are compelled to grant that there is no sin in them, which you professed cannot be without will.
JulianImp.4.103Augustinus. Necessitatem et voluntatem simul esse non posse non diceres, si tibi daretur nosse quod diceres. Cum enim sit moriendi necessitas, quis neget quod possit esse et voluntas? Unde ait Apostolus, concupiscentiam se habere dissolvi, et esse cum Christo . Cum ergo vult mori, quem necesse est mori, simul sunt necessitas et voluntas; quod tu fieri posse vana voluntate, nulla necessitate negaveras. Quod autem fiat etiam ex voluntate necessitas plerumque contraria voluntati, prorsus insipienter abnuitur. Qui enim se volens mori lethaliter percutit, moritur etsi nolit. Item qui volens fecit peccatum, nolens habet peccatum; volens impudicus, nolens reus; eo quippe nolente peccatum manet, quo nolente non fieret. Ac per hoc, et non potest esse sine voluntate peccatum, quia non fit nisi voluntate; et potest esse sine voluntate peccatum, quia manet etiam sine voluntate, quod factum est voluntate; et est iam necessitas etiam sine voluntate, quam fecit voluntas sine necessitate. Nam et ille qui dicit: Non quod volo ago , certe secundum vos necessitate consuetudinis premitur; hanc autem necessitatem, ne liberum auferatis arbitrium, eum sibi voluntate fecisse contenditis; et tale aliquid in natura humana factum esse non creditis, ut ex voluntate primi hominis, de quo est origo humani generis, fieret necessitas peccati originalis in posteris. Ecce illa quae impossibilia proponebas, in vi consuetudinis facta sunt possibilia, quae non frustra dicta est a quibusdam secunda natura. Dixeras, nos absurdius aliquid dicere, quam qui nivem nigram esse dicebat: ut peccatum conditionem suam sua conditione perdat, et sit absque hoc, sine quo non posse esse definitum est. Nonne conditionem suam sua conditione perdit, ut per vim consuetudinis fiat sine voluntate, cum consuetudo non facta sit nisi voluntate? Nonne rei huius natura fructibus suis negatur? Quandoquidem consuetudo fructus est voluntatis, quoniam ex voluntate gignitur; quae tamen id quod agit, negat se agere voluntate. Dicis, quod: contrarium sit necessitas et voluntas, ita ut se mutua impugnatione consumant; inde nos arguens, quod: alterum alterius subdamus effectui, dicentes necessitatem de fructibus voluntatis exortam; cum videas necessitatem consuetudinis fructum esse manifestissimum voluntatis. Nonne, quod tibi impossibile visum est, sua se voluntas multiplicatione delevit, et statum proprium operata mutavit, quae multiplicata necessitatem consuetudinis fecit; si voluntatem necessitas, te auctore, consumit? Si autem non consumit, profecto in homine mole consuetudinis presso simul esse possunt et iustitiae voluntas et peccati necessitas. Quoniam: Velle adiacet mihi, professio est voluntatis; Perficere autem bonum, non invenio , confessio est necessitatis. Tu vero dixisti voluntatem et necessitatem simul esse non posse; cum cernas simul eas esse cum concordant, simul esse cum pugnant. Illud porro ridiculum est, quod pro impossibili posuisti: Nihil, dicens, obtusius, immo furiosius cogitari, ut postquam coepit voluntas esse, voluntas esse desierit; quasi non hoc fiat, cum homo quando coeperit male aliquid velle, mox eum poenitet et desinit velle. Verumtamen talia loquens: contorto, ut dicis, gutture me cogis annuere nullum in parvulis esse peccatum; cum tu nec contorto gutture abrumpas vinculum catholicae veritatis, quo nisi ei consentias, miserrime strangularis.
Augustine. You would not say that necessity and will cannot be at once, if it were given you to know what you say. For since there is a necessity of dying, who would deny that there can be also a will? Whence the Apostle says that he has a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ (See Phil 1:23). When, then, he wills to die, whom it is necessary to die, necessity and will are at once; which you had denied could come about by an empty will, by no necessity. But that there comes about even from will a necessity often contrary to will, is altogether foolishly denied. For he who, willing to die, strikes himself mortally, dies even if he is unwilling. Likewise he who willingly committed a sin, unwillingly has the sin; willingly unchaste, unwillingly guilty; for the sin remains with him unwilling, which would not come about with him unwilling. And through this, both sin cannot be without will, because it is not done except by will; and sin can be without will, because there remains even without will what was done by will; and there is now a necessity even without will, which will, without necessity, made. For even he who says: I do not the good I will (Rom 7:19), is certainly, according to you, pressed by the necessity of habit; but this necessity—lest you take away free choice—you contend that he made for himself by will; and you do not believe that some such thing was done in human nature, that from the will of the first man, from whom is the origin of the human race, there came about a necessity of original sin in his posterity. Behold, those things which you set forth as impossible have, in the force of habit, been made possible—a force which was not without cause called by some a second nature. You had said that we say something more absurd than he who said that snow is black: that sin loses its own condition by its own condition, and is without that without which it was defined that it cannot be. Does it not lose its own condition by its own condition, so as to come about without will by the force of habit, since habit was made only by will? Is not the nature of this thing denied by its own fruits? Since habit is the fruit of will, because it is generated from will; which nonetheless denies that it does, by will, what it does. You say that necessity and will are contrary, so that they consume each other by mutual attack; thence accusing us, that we subject one to the effect of the other, saying that necessity arose from the fruits of will; when you see that the necessity of habit is the most manifest fruit of will. Is it not, what seemed to you impossible, that the will deleted itself by its own multiplication, and, having worked, changed its own state—a will which, multiplied, made the necessity of habit; if necessity, with you as author, consumes will? But if it does not consume it, surely in a man pressed by the weight of habit, both the will of righteousness and the necessity of sin can be at once. Since: To will is present to me, is a profession of will; but to accomplish the good, I do not find (See Rom 7:18), is a confession of necessity. But you said that will and necessity cannot be at once; when you discern them to be at once when they agree, at once when they fight. That, moreover, is ridiculous, which you set down as impossible, saying: Nothing—you say—can be thought more obtuse, nay, more furious, than that, after the will began to be, the will should cease to be; as though this did not come about, when a man, when he has begun to will something evil, soon repents and ceases to will. Yet, saying such things, with—as you say—a twisted throat, you compel me to grant that there is no sin in the little ones; when you, not even with a twisted throat, break the bond of Catholic truth, by which, unless you consent to it, you are most wretchedly strangled.
JulianImp.4.103IV. 104. Iulianus. Quod vero addidisti: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, ut hic ostensum est inconvenientissime collocatum, ita in secundo libro quemadmodum intellegatur expositum est. Sed iam, praesenti disputatione suppleta, libet acutissimam retractare sententiam; sic enim inquis: " Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt " . Per unius illius voluntatem malam omnes in eo peccaverunt, quando omnes ille unus fuerunt, de quo propterea singuli originale peccatum traxerunt . Tunc, inquis, peccaverunt, quando omnes ille unus fuerunt. Hoc autem iam ad Marcellinum te scripsisse signaveram; quo testimonio convinceris, animarum traducem de Manichaei specialiter visceribus acceptum (cuius in tertio libro sententias inserui) credere atque complecti. Quod certe tam deforme est, ut tu illud cum significes, nequaquam tamen audeas profiteri. Sed hoc nos in praesenti interim differamus, quod et prioris assertoris sui obscenitate, et sequentis, id est, tuo pavore iugulatur. Illud autem in praesenti dispicere iuvat, quanta in disputando perturbatione iacteris. Ais quippe: Per unius illius voluntatem malam omnes in eo peccaverunt, quando omnes ille unus fuerunt. Si omnes ille unus fuerunt, quomodo per voluntatem illius malam omnes peccaverunt; cum isti omnes, quos in illo fuisse dicis, sua potuerint voluntate peccare? Immo, ut retorqueamus, ille infelicior cunctis, qui solus portat invidiam, cum omnes in illo secundum tuum dogma deliquerint. Habuerunt ergo parvuli voluntatem, non solum antequam nascerentur, verum antequam proavi eorum generarentur; et usi sunt electionis arbitrio, priusquam substantiae eorum semina conderentur. Cur itaque metuis dicere, in eis tempore conceptuum suorum esse liberam voluntatem, qua peccatum non trahant naturaliter, sed sponte committant; si credis eos hodie conceptos, ante tot saecula habuisse sensum, iudicium, efficientiam voluntatis? Quod quidem in libris quos ad Marcellini nomen edidisti, non dubitasti ponere; plane ad ostendendum qua amentia teneantur inimici Dei. Ibi enim ita ais: Qui parvuli in Adam peccaverunt, ut ei similes crearentur . Quo quid mendacius, amentius, et spurcius potuit insonare, quam ante peccaverunt, ut crearentur? Id est, faciendo meruerunt, ut possent esse qui aliquid operarentur; et antiquior eorum fuit actio, quam substantia. Quae commenta, Orgiis et Thyrsis aptiora quam litteris, indicasse sufficiat. Inde ergo manavit ista responsio, qua dicis: Omnes in eo peccaverunt, quando ille unus omnes fuerunt, de quo singuli peccatum originale traxerunt. Hic enim laborandum non est, ut doceamus, cum voluntas opus personae sit, voluntatem ante personam, cuius voluntas est, esse non posse; sed illud potissimum intellegi volo, quia nec secundum hanc opinionem est originale peccatum. Nam si omnes ibi fuerunt, qui peccaverunt, nihil traxerunt de originali malo, quia id universi suis studiis perpetrarunt. Tradux ergo peccati non solum catholica veritate destruitur, verum etiam patroni sui argumentis omnibus; quod quidem habet mendaciorum natura, ut non servet simulandi concinentiam, sed verecundiae prodiga, et alieni appetens, in universis quae usurpaverit detegatur.
IV. 104. Julian. But what you added: Through one man sin entered into the world (See Rom 5:12)—just as it was here shown to be most unfittingly placed, so in the second book it was expounded how it is to be understood. But now, the present disputation being supplied, it pleases me to handle again that most acute sentence; for thus you say: "Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all men, in whom all sinned" (Rom 5:12). Through the evil will of that one all sinned in him, when they all were that one, from whom for that reason individuals drew original sin. Then, you say, they sinned, when they all were that one. But this I had marked that you wrote to Marcellinus; by which testimony you are convicted of believing and embracing a traduction of souls received specifically from the inmost parts of the Manichean (whose sentences I inserted in the third book). Which is surely so deformed that, although you signify it, you nonetheless by no means dare to profess it. But let us for the present defer this, which is throttled both by the obscenity of its prior assertor and by the fear of the following one, that is, yours. But it helps in the present to descry this: in how great a perturbation of disputing you are tossed. For you say: Through the evil will of that one all sinned in him, when they all were that one. If all were that one, how through the will of that one did all sin; when all these, whom you say were in him, could have sinned by their own will? Nay, that we may turn it back, that one is more unhappy than all, who alone bears the odium, when all sinned in him according to your teaching. The little ones, then, had a will, not only before they were born, but before their great-grandfathers were generated; and they used the choice of election, before the seeds of their substance were founded. Why, then, do you fear to say that there is in them, at the time of their conceptions, a free will, by which they do not draw sin naturally, but commit it of their own accord; if you believe that they, conceived today, had, so many ages ago, sense, judgment, the efficacy of will? Which indeed in the books you published to the name of Marcellinus you did not hesitate to put—plainly for showing by what madness the enemies of God are held. For there you say thus: The little ones, who sinned in Adam, that they might be created like him. Than which what could resound more mendaciously, more madly, and more foully, than that they sinned before, that they might be created? That is, by doing they merited that there could be those who would work something; and their action was older than their substance. Which fabrications, fitter for the Orgies and Thyrses than for letters, let it suffice to have indicated. Thence, then, flowed that response, by which you say: All sinned in him, when that one was all, from whom individuals drew original sin. For here one need not labor to teach that, since will is the work of a person, there cannot be a will before the person whose will it is; but I wish this above all to be understood: that not even according to this opinion is there original sin. For if all were there who sinned, they drew nothing of original evil, because all perpetrated it by their own pursuits. The traduction of sin, then, is destroyed not only by Catholic truth, but even by all the arguments of its own patron; which indeed the nature of lies has—that it does not preserve the harmony of pretense, but, prodigal of modesty and greedy of another's, is detected in all the things it has usurped.
JulianImp.4.104Augustinus. Per unum hominem, in quo omnes peccaverunt, in mundum intrasse peccatum, dixit Apostolus, intellexit Ambrosius; sed eadem verba apostolica in suum perversum sensum conatur pervertere Iulianus. Cur ei non ipse potius respondet Ambrosius? Audi ergo, Iuliane: Omnes, inquit, in Adam moriuntur; quia " per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt " ; illius ergo culpa mors omnium est . Audi adhuc aliud: Fuit, inquit, Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam, et omnes in illo perierunt . Huic dic, si audes, quod una anima propria voluntate peccante, non potuerunt perire tot animae nondum habentes proprias voluntates. Argue de origine animarum cunctationem meam, quia non audeo docere vel affirmare quod nescio; profer tu de huius rei tam profunda obscuritate quod placet; dum tamen fixa et inconcussa sit ista sententia, quia illius unius culpa mors omnium est, et in illo omnes perierunt; unde venit novissimus Adam quaerere et salvare quod perierat . Huic dic: Et isti ergo sua voluntate peccaverunt, quos in illo periisse dicis, qui sua voluntate peccavit. Sed poterat Ambrosius hoc intellegere, quod tu non potes, non hoc dici propter arbitrium singulorum, sed propter originem seminis, unde omnes futuri erant; secundum quam originem omnes in illo uno erant, et hi omnes unus ille erant, qui in se ipsis nulli adhuc erant. Secundum hanc originem seminalem, etiam Levi in lumbis patris sui Abraham fuisse dicitur, quando a Melchisedech decimatus est Abraham; unde et ipse Levi tunc decimatus ostenditur, non in se ipso, sed in illo in cuius fuit lumbis; nec voluit, nec noluit decimari; quoniam nulla eius voluntas erat, quando secundum substantiam suam nec ipse adhuc erat; et tamen secundum rationem seminis, non mendaciter, nec inaniter dictum est, quod ibi fuit, et decimatus est. Unde ab hac decimatione filiorum Abrahae, qui erant in lumbis eius, quando Melchisedech sacerdoti decimas dedit, ille solus sacerdos exceptus est, cui dictum est: Tu es sacerdos in aeternum secundum ordinem Melchisedech . Qui licet sit etiam ipse secundum carnem semen Abrahae, eo quod virgo Maria, de qua carnem sumpsit, ex ipso semine, propagata est; non tamen est obnoxius eidem semini, qui virili non est conceptus ex semine, liber a nexu seminatricis concupiscentiae. Non iam ergo Ambrosio, sicut dicebam, sed illi dic qui scripsit ad Hebraeos, atque ait: Et sicut oportet dicere, propter Abraham et Levi accipiens decimam decimatus est; adhuc enim in lumbis patris sui fuit, cum ei occurrit Melchisedech . Huic calumniare caeca loquacitate, et dic, si audes: Cum pater Abraham voluntate sua fuerit decimatus, quomodo potuit per illius voluntatem decimari, hoc est decimas dare Levi, cuius voluntas nulla erat, quia omnino ipse nondum erat? Ea ratione quippe, vel potius hoc errore dicis et nobis: Cum primus homo voluntate peccaverit, quomodo potuerunt per eius voluntatem simul in illo peccare, qui suam nondum habebant, quia per substantiam suam nulli adhuc erant? Immo desine vana garrire, et omnes qui nondum nati nihil per proprias voluntates agere poterant boni vel mali, in uno potuisse peccare, in quo per rationem seminis erant, quando ille propria voluntate peccatum illud grande peccavit, naturamque in se vitiavit, mutavit, obnoxiavit humanam; excepto uno homine, qui ex ipso quidem semine, non tamen seminali ratione procreatus est, si potes, intellege; si non potes, crede.
Augustine. That through one man, in whom all sinned, sin entered into the world, the Apostle said, Ambrose understood; but those same apostolic words Julian tries to pervert into his own perverse sense. Why does not Ambrose himself rather answer him? Hear, then, Julian: All, he says, die in Adam; because "through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all men, in whom all sinned" (Rom 5:12); the fault, then, of that one is the death of all (See Ambrose, Exposition of the Gospel of Luke 7.234). Hear yet another thing: Adam existed, he says, and in him we all existed; Adam perished, and in him all perished (See Ambrose, On Excessus of His Brother Satyrus 2.6). Say to him, if you dare, that with one soul sinning by its own will, so many souls, not yet having their own wills, could not perish. Accuse my hesitation about the origin of souls, because I do not dare to teach or affirm what I do not know; bring forth from the so profound obscurity of this matter what pleases you; provided only that this sentence be fixed and unshaken—that the fault of that one is the death of all, and that in him all perished; whence came the last Adam, to seek and to save what was lost (See Luke 19:10; 1 Cor 15:45). Say to him: These too, then, sinned by their own will, whom you say perished in him who sinned by his own will. But Ambrose could understand this, which you cannot—that this is said not on account of the choice of individuals, but on account of the origin of the seed, whence all were going to be; according to which origin all were in that one, and these all were that one, who in themselves as yet were no one. According to this seminal origin, even Levi is said to have been in the loins of his father Abraham, when Abraham was tithed by Melchizedek; whence Levi too is shown to have been then tithed, not in himself, but in him in whose loins he was; nor did he will, nor refuse to be tithed; since there was no will of his, when according to his own substance he himself as yet was not; and yet, according to the reasoning of the seed, it was said not mendaciously nor emptily that he was there, and was tithed (See Heb 7:9-10). Whence from this tithing of the sons of Abraham, who were in his loins when he gave tithes to the priest Melchizedek, that one priest alone was excepted, to whom it was said: You are a priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek (Ps 110:4 (109:4)). Who, although he too is according to the flesh the seed of Abraham—since the Virgin Mary, of whom he took flesh, was propagated from that same seed—is nonetheless not liable to the same seed, he who was conceived not from male seed, free from the bond of the disseminating concupiscence. Say no longer to Ambrose, then, as I was saying, but to him who wrote to the Hebrews, and says: And, so to speak, through Abraham even Levi, who receives tithes, was tithed; for he was still in the loins of his father, when Melchizedek met him (See Heb 7:9-10). Slander this man with your blind loquacity, and say, if you dare: Since father Abraham was tithed by his own will, how could Levi be tithed through his will, that is, give tithes, whose will was none, because he himself as yet was not at all? By that reasoning, surely, or rather by that error, you say to us too: Since the first man sinned by will, how could those sin at once in him through his will, who as yet did not have their own, because through their own substance they were as yet no one? Cease, rather, to chatter empty things, and understand, if you can—that all who were as yet not born could do nothing of good or evil by their own wills, but were able to sin in the one, in whom by the reasoning of the seed they were, when he by his own will sinned that great sin, and vitiated, changed, made liable to guilt human nature in himself—with the exception of the one man who was procreated indeed from that very seed, but not by the seminal reasoning; if you can, understand; if you cannot, believe.
JulianImp.4.104IV. 105. Iulianus. Post hanc vero responsionem aliud ubi a me pulsatus fuerat, deluere conatur. Ego quippe postquam de parvulorum voluntate requisiveram, secutus sum: Sed negas hoc, id est voluntatem peccatricem inesse nascentibus, et dicis tamen esse sub diabolo parvulos, nec dissimulas per quid eos degere sub potestate illius arbitreris; ais quippe: Quia de sexus utriusque commixtione nascuntur, sub adversaria sunt potestate. Dictorum eius itaque testimonio patuit, ob hoc illum parvulos daemoni vindicare, quia de sexus utriusque fuerant commixtione prognati; per quod docui, illum nuptias quae a Deo institutae sunt, quae sine commixtione esse non possunt, diabolo mancipasse.
IV. 105. Julian. But after this response he tries to wash away another point where he had been struck by me. For I, after I had inquired about the will of the little ones, went on: But you deny this—that is, that a sinning will is in those being born—and yet you say that the little ones are under the devil, nor do you dissemble through what you judge them to pass their life under his power; for you say: Because they are born of the mingling of both sexes, they are under the adverse power. By the testimony of his own words, then, it appeared that he vindicates the little ones to the demon for this reason, because they had been begotten of the mingling of both sexes; through which I taught that he had made over to the devil marriages, which were instituted by God, which cannot be without mingling.
JulianImp.4.105Augustinus. Hoc nulla ratione docere potuisti, quamvis fueris multa contentione conatus; quod possunt videre, qui legunt et tuas calumnias, et refutationes meas.
Augustine. This you could by no reasoning teach, although you attempted it with much contention; which those can see who read both your slanders and my refutations.
JulianImp.4.105IV. 106. Iulianus. Hoc ergo nunc sibi proposuit, et praemittit interrogationem meam. Dicis ergo, inquit, ideo illos esse sub diabolo, quia de sexus utriusque commixtione nascuntur? Ad quod qualem satisfactionem referat, audiamus. Dico, inquit, plane propter delictum illos esse sub diabolo; ideo autem expertes non esse delicti, quia de illa commixtione sunt nati, quae sine pudenda libidine non potest etiam quod honestum est operari. Dixit hoc etiam beatissimae memoriae Ambrosius . O calamitosam hominis pravitatem! O intentionem nefandam! O falsitatem erubescendam!
IV. 106. Julian. This, then, he now set forth for himself, and he prefaces my question. You say, then, he says, that they are under the devil for this reason, because they are born of the mingling of both sexes? To which what manner of satisfaction he reports, let us hear. I say, he says, plainly that they are under the devil on account of sin; but that they are not free of fault for this reason, because they are born of that mingling which cannot, even what is honorable, be worked without shameful disordered desire. This too the most blessed Ambrose said (See Ambrose, Apology of the Prophet David 11.56). O calamitous depravity of the man! O nefarious intention! O falsehood to be blushed at!
JulianImp.4.106Augustinus. Exclama, exclama quantum potes; adde exclamationibus tuis: O bia! Homo quippe innocens, vim pateris, ut Manichaeum dicere cogaris Ambrosium. Absit, inquis, ut dicam. Cur, quaeso? An hic ostendis quanta sit fortitudo liberi arbitrii, quando tantam vim pateris ut dicas, nec tamen dicis? Cur ergo me dicis, quod illum esse non dicis, cum hoc ille tanto ante dixerit, quod ego nunc dico, atque in hac sententia propter quam Manichaeum me dicis, mihi et illi sit causa communis? An, quoniam non invenis qua exeas, iram quidem simulas, non tamen iratus, sed turbatus exclamas? Verum in ipsis exclamationibus tuis audio: O calamitosam hominis pravitatem! Quia videlicet homo sum calamitosus et pravus, qui consentire eligo Ambrosio; essem vero beatus et rectus, si eligerem consentire Iuliano. Audio: O intentionem nefandam! Intentio quippe nostra nefanda est, quia opponimus Ambrosium Iuliano; esset autem fanda, si Iulianum praeponeremus Ambrosio. Sed quid est quod audio tertiam exclamationem tuam: O falsitatem erubescendam! Falsamne dicis esse Ambrosii sententiam, id est, quod falsum ipse senserit? An eam nos illi falso tribuere, cum hoc ipse non senserit, neque id omnino quod eum nos dixisse dicimus dixerit? An eam nos non intellegendo, falsum opinari de illa, cum ipsa sit vera? Sed non tam contumeliose de Ambrosio loqueris, ut illi viro erubescendam tribueres falsitatem. Nos vero eam composuisse, et quod ab illo prolata fuerit finxisse, non ausus es dicere; tam multis enim doctoris illius nota sunt scripta, ut in hoc abruptum te praecipitare timueris. Tam vero aperta est ista sententia, ut non acutus qui hanc intellexerit, sed superfluus videri possit qui exponendam putaverit. Denique ut quod dico possit attendi, verba ipsa beatissimi catholici antistitis et hic ponam. Ait ergo ille, ille cuius fidem et purissimum in Scripturis sensum, Pelagius vester dicit, ne inimicum quidem ausum fuisse reprehendere ; cum de nativitate Domini loqueretur: Ideo et quasi homo per universa tentatus est, et in similitudine hominum cuncta sustinuit; sed quasi de Spiritu natus abstinuit a peccato. Omnis enim homo mendax, et nemo sine peccato nisi unus Deus. Servatum est igitur, inquit, ut ex viro et muliere, id est, per illam corporum commixtionem, nemo videatur expers esse delicti; qui autem expers delicti, expers etiam huiusmodi conceptionis . Cum igitur hoc et Ambrosium dixisse non neges, et planum atque apertum esse perspicias; quid est quod clamas: O falsitatem erubescendam! Cui quaeso, erubescendam? Illine an mihi? Si illi, vide cui sis contumeliosus; si mihi, vide quam sis calumniosus. Sed hoc, inquis, etiam tu dicis. Dico plane, quia verum est: quod si tu verum esse non putas, cur in una eademque sententia, quam dicit ille, dico ego, non est Manichaeus ille, sed ego? Quanto iustius hic nos exclamamus: O erubescendam personarum acceptionem! Quae te procul dubio erubescere cogeret, nisi in tua persona frons ori tuo similis esset.
Augustine. Cry out, cry out as much as you can; add to your cries: O the violence! For you, an innocent man, suffer force, that you should be compelled to call Ambrose a Manichean. Far be it, you say, that I should say it. Why, I ask? Or do you here show how great is the strength of free choice, when you suffer such force that you should say, and yet do not say? Why, then, do you say that I am what you do not say that he is, when he so long before said what I now say, and in this sentence, on account of which you call me a Manichean, the cause is common to me and to him? Or, since you do not find by what to escape, do you feign anger indeed—not, however, angry, but disturbed—and cry out? But in your very cries I hear: O calamitous depravity of the man! Because, namely, I am a calamitous and depraved man, who choose to consent to Ambrose; but I would be blessed and upright, if I chose to consent to Julian. I hear: O nefarious intention! For our intention is nefarious, because we set Ambrose against Julian; but it would be allowable, if we set Julian before Ambrose. But what is this that I hear, your third cry: O falsehood to be blushed at! Do you say that the sentence of Ambrose is false, that is, that he himself thought falsely? Or that we falsely attribute it to him, since he himself did not think this, nor said at all what we say he said? Or that we, not understanding, opine falsely about it, when it itself is true? But you do not speak so contumeliously of Ambrose as to attribute to that man a falsehood to be blushed at. But that we composed it, and feigned that it was uttered by him, you did not dare to say; for the writings of that teacher are known to so many that you feared to hurl yourself headlong into this precipice. So open, indeed, is that sentence that whoever understands it can seem not acute, but superfluous, who thought it must be expounded. Finally, that what I say may be attended to, let me here too set down the very words of the most blessed Catholic bishop. He says, then, he—he whose faith and most pure sense in the Scriptures your Pelagius says not even an enemy dared to censure—when he was speaking of the nativity of the Lord: And therefore, as man, he was tempted through all things, and in the likeness of men sustained all things; but, as born of the Spirit, he abstained from sin. For every man is a liar, and no one is without sin except one God. It has been observed, then, he says, that from man and woman, that is, through that mingling of bodies, no one is seen to be free of fault; but he who is free of fault is free also of this kind of conception (See Ambrose, Exposition of the Gospel of Luke 1.17). Since, then, you do not deny that Ambrose said this, and you perceive that it is plain and open, what is it that you cry out: O falsehood to be blushed at! To whom, I ask, to be blushed at? To him, or to me? If to him, see to whom you are contumelious; if to me, see how slanderous you are. But this, you say, you too say. I say it plainly, because it is true; but if you do not think it true, why, in one and the same sentence, which he says, and I say, is he not a Manichean, but I am? How much more justly do we here cry out: O the respecting of persons to be blushed at! Which without doubt would compel you to blush, were not, in your person, your brow like your mouth.
JulianImp.4.106IV. 107. Iulianus. Hunccine audere dicere se damnatorem non esse coniugii, et tanto scelere illudere auribus imperitis, et a Manichaei se dicat recessisse consortio, qui commixtionem sexuum, qui operam nuptiarum, qui affectionem et sensum parentum in regno diaboli multiplici professione constituit; atque ad haec inventa Manichaei adiutorium sui acuminis iungens, pronuntiat quidem diabolicam commixtionem, eamque esse et opere et carne coniugum, ac propter eam deputat regno diaboli, absolutis tamen operatoribus, innocentes. Ita utique Deo semper infestus, diabolo, sicut dicit, per libidinem servientes tuetur.
IV. 107. Julian. That this man should dare to say that he is not a condemner of marriage, and to mock unskilled ears with so great a crime, and that he should say he has departed from the company of the Manichean—he who has, by a manifold profession, established the mingling of the sexes, the work of marriage, the affection and sense of parents in the kingdom of the devil; and, joining to these inventions of the Manichean the aid of his own sharpness, pronounces indeed the mingling to be diabolical, and that it is both in the work and in the flesh of the spouses, and on account of it adjudges them to the kingdom of the devil—the operators nonetheless being absolved, the innocent. Thus, surely, ever hostile to God, he protects those serving the devil, as he says, through disordered desire.
JulianImp.4.107Augustinus. Erras, et tibi consentientes mittis alios in errorem; non serviunt diabolo per libidinem, qui filiorum procreandorum causa utuntur coniugum corpore, ut generentur regenerandi. Nec ideo tamen defenditur libidinis malum; sed defenduntur qui bene utuntur malo. Est enim et mali usus bonus. Nam et ipsius satanae in Scripturis sanctis reperiuntur utilitates, manente eius scilicet vituperatione, laude vero utentis malo bene.
Augustine. You err, and you send others who consent to you into error; they do not serve the devil through disordered desire, who use the body of their spouses for the sake of procreating children, that those who must be regenerated may be generated. Nor for that reason, however, is the evil of disordered desire defended; but those are defended who use the evil well. For there is also a good use of evil. For even of Satan himself uses are found in the holy Scriptures—his reproach remaining, surely, but the praise being of one who uses the evil well.
JulianImp.4.107IV. 108. Augustinus. Parvulos vero, quos a Deo fieri dicit, dominio addicit inimici, sicque non opus daemonis arguit, cuius ministros absolvit a culpa; sed opus Dei, ad quod diabolici muneris conscia voluptas non potuit pervenire. Coniugalis ergo operis criminator, sed libidinum expiator, impugnator innocentiae, et divinae aequitatis infamator non timuit scribere: Dico plane, ideo illos esse sub diabolo, quia de illa commixtione sunt nati. Quod sententiae facinus cum nudatum videret, conatus illud aliqua auctoritate defendere, quam Scripturis proferre non poterat, subdidit etiam episcopum Ambrosium sensisse similiter. Non quidem mirum est quod criminatur et mortuos, cum criminatur innocuos.
IV. 108. Augustine. But the little ones, whom he says are made by God, he assigns to the dominion of the enemy, and thus convicts not the work of the demon, whose ministers he absolves from fault, but the work of God, to which the pleasure, conscious of a diabolical service, could not attain. The accuser, then, of the conjugal work, but the expiator of disordered desires, the assailant of innocence, and the defamer of divine equity, did not fear to write: I say plainly that they are under the devil for this reason, because they are born of that mingling. Which crime of his sentence, when he saw it laid bare, attempting to defend it by some authority which he could not bring forth from the Scriptures, he subjoined that bishop Ambrose too thought similarly. It is no wonder indeed that he accuses even the dead, when he accuses the innocent.
JulianImp.4.108Augustinus. Quisquis haec audit, quid te putat obicere nobis, nisi quod haec sententia beatissimi Ambrosii quam posuimus non sit ipsius, sed eam nos tamquam sit ipsius finxerimus? Nam et ego, cum haec legerem, nihil te agere existimavi; sed posteaquam veni ad illa quae adiungis, et hoc Ambrosium dixisse non abnuis, te potius horrendum criminatorem tanti illius doctoris inveni. Nam quidquid dicis in me, quoniam per commixtionem virilem mulierisque conceptum dico neminem expertem esse delicti, profecto etiam in illum dicis, qui hoc ante me dixit et scripsit. Ego autem cum te refellens et tibi resistens, assero parvulos propter originale delictum esse sub diabolo, nisi renascantur in Christo, non utique me solum, verum et Ambrosium, et alios socios eius, ac fidei huius participes atque doctores, universamque Christi Ecclesiam, quae se hoc accepisse, hoc tenere, hoc fideliter credere, parvulorum baptizatorum exorcismo et exsufflatione testatur, a tua nefaria criminatione defendo.
Augustine. Whoever hears these things, what does he think you object to us, except that this sentence of the most blessed Ambrose which we set down is not his, but that we feigned it as though it were his? For I too, when I read these things, supposed you were accomplishing nothing; but after I came to those things you add, and you do not deny that Ambrose said this, I found you rather a horrible accuser of that so great teacher. For whatever you say against me—since I say that, through the virile mingling and the conception of the woman, no one is free of fault—surely you say also against him who said and wrote this before me. But I, when refuting you and resisting you, assert that the little ones, on account of original fault, are under the devil unless they are reborn in Christ, defend from your nefarious accusation not myself alone, surely, but Ambrose too, and others his companions, and partakers and teachers of this faith, and the whole Church of Christ, which attests that it received this, holds this, faithfully believes this, by the exorcism and exsufflation of baptized little ones.
JulianImp.4.108IV. 109. Iulianus. Quanto rectius diceres: Dixit hoc idem et Manichaeus in epistola ad Patricium; dixit et in epistola quam scripsit ad filiam Menoch, dixit et in aliis multis scriptis, quae tu penitus imbibisti? Sed in consortium tuum episcopum Mediolanensem conaris attrahere, et quia non potes habere praesidium, vis invenire solatium.
IV. 109. Julian. How much more rightly would you say: This same thing Mani too said in the letter to Patricius; he said it also in the letter which he wrote to his daughter Menoch, he said it also in many other writings, which you have thoroughly imbibed? But you try to draw the bishop of Milan into your company, and because you cannot have a defense, you wish to find a solace.
JulianImp.4.109Augustinus. Valde contra Manichaeum est quod dixit Ambrosius. Nam Manichaeus alienam mali naturam nobis dicit esse commixtam; Ambrosius autem praevaricatione primi hominis nostram dicit esse vitiatam; in hac vero sententia de qua nunc agimus, nativitatem carnis Christi a ceterorum peccati carne discernens defendit Ambrosius, quam negat penitus Manichaeus. Quod ergo credit Ambrosius, hoc et ego; quod autem Manichaeus, nec ille, nec ego. Quid est quod tu niteris me separare ab Ambrosio, et coniungere Manichaeo? Nam si originale peccatum, non ex alienae commixtione, sed ex nostrae depravatione naturae dicere a nascentibus trahi, dogma est Manichaeorum; hoc mecum dicit Ambrosius; cur non ambos Manichaeis conaris adiungere? Si autem hoc Manichaeorum dogma non est, sicut non est: hoc dico cum Ambrosio; cur non ambos a Manichaeis dignaris abiungere? Cur ergo, ut dicis: Episcopum Mediolanensem in consortium meum conor attrahere; cum me ab eius consortio tu frustra coneris abstrahere? Quid est quod dicis: Quia non possum habere praesidium, velle me invenire solatium? Mihi cum Ambrosio, velis nolis, in fide catholica Christus commune praesidium est. Ideo plane est Ambrosius solatium meum, quia cum illo accipio convicium tuum; nec solum ipse me in hac causa plurimum consolatur, sed et Cyprianus, et Hilarius, aliique consimiles, quorum in me laceras catholicam fidem. Noli ergo invidere, quod Ambrosius, Cyprianus et Hilarius solatia sunt iniuriae meae; invitus enim videre compelleris, quantum intersit, quod Pelagius et Caelestius, et si quis est alius, solatia sunt damnationis tuae. Quid, quod ostendo debellantem Manichaeos pro catholica fide Ambrosium, et te in hoc certamine contra Ambrosium praebere Manichaeis vel victis solatium, vel etiam resistentibus, quod est peius, auxilium? Manichaei enim dicunt propriam mali esse substantiam atque naturam, bonae Dei substantiae naturaeque coaeternam. Impossibile enim est, aiunt, ut oriri possint mala de bonis; Ambrosius contradicit, et dicit: Ex bonis mala orta sunt; non enim sunt mala, nisi quae privantur bonis; per mala tamen factum est ut bona eminerent; ergo indigentia boni, radix malitiae est . Tu inter haec quid dicis? Rerum ratio non sinit, inquis, ut de bono malum, et de iusto iniquum aliquid proferatur. Haec verba tua pro Manichaeis adversus Ambrosium, ex illo praeclaro opere, in quo libris quattuor uni meo voluisti respondere, posuimus . Si in hac controversia iudex esses, profecto tua sententia victus a Manichaeis diceretur Ambrosius. Et non erubescis, cum sis calumniator eorum quos apertissime criminaris, adulator eorum quos ex obliquo pariter criminaris, adiutor eorum de quibus alios criminaris?
Augustine. Very much against the Manichean is what Ambrose said. For the Manichean says that an alien nature of evil is mingled into us; but Ambrose says that our own nature is vitiated by the transgression of the first man; while in this sentence of which we now treat, Ambrose, distinguishing the nativity of the flesh of Christ from the flesh of the sin of the rest, defends it, which the Manichean utterly denies. What Ambrose believes, then, this I too; but what the Manichean believes, neither he nor I. What is it that you strive to separate me from Ambrose, and join me to the Manichean? For if to say that original sin, not from the mingling of an alien nature, but from the depravation of our own nature, is drawn by those being born, is the teaching of the Manicheans; this Ambrose says with me; why do you not try to join us both to the Manicheans? But if this is not the teaching of the Manicheans, as it is not: this I say with Ambrose; why do you not deign to disjoin us both from the Manicheans? Why, then—as you say—do I try to draw the bishop of Milan into my company; when you in vain try to draw me away from his company? What is it that you say: That because I cannot have a defense, I wish to find a solace? To me, with Ambrose, like it or not, in the Catholic faith, Christ is the common defense. For this reason plainly Ambrose is my solace, because with him I receive your insult; nor does he alone in this cause console me most, but Cyprian too, and Hilary, and others like them, whose Catholic faith you lacerate in me. Do not, then, envy that Ambrose, Cyprian, and Hilary are solaces of my injury; for you are compelled to see, unwilling, how much it differs that Pelagius and Caelestius, and any other if there be, are solaces of your condemnation. What of the fact that I show Ambrose warring against the Manicheans on behalf of the Catholic faith, and you in this contest, against Ambrose, furnishing to the Manicheans either a solace if conquered, or—what is worse—an aid even to those resisting? For the Manicheans say that there is a proper substance and nature of evil, coeternal with the good substance and nature of God. For it is impossible, they say, that evils can arise from goods; Ambrose contradicts, and says: From goods, evils have arisen; for there are no evils, except those that are deprived of goods; yet through evils it came about that goods stood out; therefore the lack of good is the root of malice (See Ambrose, on the lapse of the angels). You, amid these, what do you say? The reasoning of things does not allow, you say, that from a good an evil, and from a just thing something unjust be brought forth. These words of yours on behalf of the Manicheans against Ambrose, from that famous work in which you wished to answer my one with four books, we have set down. If in this controversy you were judge, surely by your sentence Ambrose would be said to be conquered by the Manicheans. And do you not blush, when you are the slanderer of those whom you most openly accuse, the flatterer of those whom you obliquely accuse alike, the helper of those of whom you accuse others?
JulianImp.4.109IV. 110. Iulianus. Numquid legi Dei aut operi Dei scripta disputatorum praeiudicant?
IV. 110. Julian. Do the writings of disputants, then, prejudge the law of God or the work of God?
JulianImp.4.110Augustinus. Hic iam incipis confiteri, hanc a nobis non esse confictam velut Ambrosii, sed vere esse sententiam; quandoquidem sic te ab illo liberare conaris, ut dicas: Numquid legi Dei aut operi Dei disputatorum scripta praeiudicant? Sed perge, dic cetera quibus impudentior inimicus fidei catholicae iudiceris.
Augustine. Here now you begin to confess that this was not feigned by us as though it were Ambrose's, but that it is truly his sentence; since you so try to free yourself from him as to say: Do the writings of disputants prejudge the law of God or the work of God? But go on, say the rest, by which you may be judged a more shameless enemy of the Catholic faith.
JulianImp.4.110IV. 111. Iulianus. Mihi interim abunde sufficit, etiam per hoc ipsum probare, nusquam te in sacris Litteris legisse quod credis, quod tu in tali causa nihil praeter episcopi, quas dicis, dictiunculas protulisti; quibus si aliquid auctoratius potuisses offendere, ab his procul dubio temperasses.
IV. 111. Julian. Meanwhile it abundantly suffices me to prove, even through this very thing, that you have nowhere read in the sacred Letters what you believe—since you, in such a cause, brought forth nothing except the bishop's, as you call them, little sayings; with which, if you had been able to come upon anything more authoritative, you would without doubt have refrained from these.
JulianImp.4.111Augustinus. Qui legunt, videant utrum ego divina testimonia non protulerim; an a me prolata depravare, frustra ipse conatus sis.
Augustine. Let those who read see whether I have not brought forth divine testimonies; or whether you have vainly attempted to deprave those brought forth by me.
JulianImp.4.111IV. 112. Iulianus. Sed bene quod nos onere talium personarum prior levasti. Nam in libro quem ad Timasium contra liberum arbitrium texuisti, cum sanctus Pelagius venerabilium virorum tam Ambrosii quam Cypriani recordatus fuisset, qui liberum arbitrium in libris suis commendaverant, respondisti nulla te gravari auctoritate talium; ita ut diceres, eos processu vitae melioris, si quid male senserant, expiasse . Tua tibi ad hoc relata sint, ut excitare de solis nominibus erubescas invidiam. Ceterum vel Ambrosii dicta, vel aliorum, quorum famam vestrorum nitimini maculare consortio, clara benignaque possunt ratione defendi.
IV. 112. Julian. But it is well that you first relieved us of the burden of such persons. For in the book which you wove against free choice to Timasius, when holy Pelagius had made mention of the venerable men, both Ambrose and Cyprian, who had commended free choice in their books, you answered that you were burdened by no authority of such men; so that you said that they, by the progress of a better life, had expiated, if they had thought anything badly (See Augustine, On Nature and Grace). Let your own words be reported back to you for this, that you may blush to stir up odium from names alone. For the rest, either the sayings of Ambrose, or of others whose fame you strive to stain by the company of your own, can be defended by a clear and kindly reasoning.
JulianImp.4.112Augustinus. Tantam caecitatem cordis tibi potuisse contingere, quis credit, nisi qui haec legit? Tu dicis quod si aliquid auctoratius offendere, id est, invenire potuissem, a disputatorum dictis, vel, sicut tu loqueris, dictiunculis, temperassem; et continuo tu ipse dicis, Pelagium, quem vocas sanctum, in defensione liberi arbitrii venerabiles viros Cyprianum et Ambrosium testes adhibuisse; nec attendis quemadmodum hoc dicendo redarguas magistrum tuum ipsamque haeresim vestram. Secundum tuam quippe sententiam, si aliquid Pelagius pro eo quod defendebat, auctoratius, in scriptis canonicis invenisset, a disputatorum testimoniis temperasset. Quando ista diceres, nisi te ita perturbaret Ambrosius, ut adversarium subito Pelagius reperiret? Sed prior vos levavi, ut dicis, onere talium personarum, Ambrosii videlicet, eiusque sociorum. Plane hoc onere ita premeris, ut non solum opprimaris, verum etiam conteraris, et fias pulvis quem proicit ventus a facie terrae . Neque enim illi tot ac tanti et tam sancti clarique antistites Dei, Ecclesiae catholicae filii discendo, patres docendo, de peccato primi hominis eique obnoxia successione mortalium ita locuti sunt, ut alii ab aliis discreparent, aut eorum quisque a semetipso; sed ita prorsus, ut eorum consensione atque constantia, nec aliter esse de hac re sanctam Scripturam intellegendam, nec aliam putandam catholicam fidem, quisquis eos non haeretico animo legit, dubitare non possit. Quorum pondere iam ipse sic frangeris, ut eorum dicta quibus contradicis: clara benignaque ratione defendenda susceperis. Audiamus ergo claram benignamque rationem; qua tua ratione si defenduntur ea dicta, cur mihi ex eis ingeruntur tua maledicta? Nam omnino, quae in me detestaris et arguis, ipsa sunt, quae in illorum disputatione defendis. Si autem non defenduntur, sed sub nomine defensionis astutius arguuntur; absit ut ista clara et benigna sit ratio; sed irrisoria potius adulatio, quae ideo defensio vocatur, ne populorum catholicorum, a quibus iidem viri venerantur, tolerari non possit offensio.
Augustine. That so great a blindness of heart could befall you, who believes, except one who reads these things? You say that, if I had been able to come upon, that is, to find, something more authoritative, I would have refrained from the sayings of disputants, or, as you say, little sayings; and at once you yourself say that Pelagius, whom you call holy, in the defense of free choice adduced the venerable men Cyprian and Ambrose as witnesses; nor do you attend how, by saying this, you refute your master and your very heresy. For according to your sentence, if Pelagius had found anything more authoritative, in the canonical Scriptures, for that which he was defending, he would have refrained from the testimonies of disputants. When would you say these things, unless Ambrose so disturbed you that Pelagius suddenly found an adversary? But I first relieved you, as you say, of the burden of such persons—of Ambrose, namely, and his companions. Plainly you are so pressed by this burden that you are not only crushed, but even ground to pieces, and become the dust which the wind drives from the face of the earth (See Ps 1:4). For those so many and so great and so holy and illustrious bishops of God, sons of the Catholic Church by learning, fathers by teaching, did not so speak of the sin of the first man and of his liable succession of mortals, that one differed from another, or any of them from himself; but altogether so that, by their consensus and constancy, holy Scripture is to be understood concerning this matter in no other way, nor any other faith to be thought Catholic—whoever does not read them with a heretical mind cannot doubt. By whose weight you are now yourself so broken that you have undertaken to defend the sayings which you contradict by a clear and kindly reasoning. Let us hear, then, the clear and kindly reasoning; by which reasoning of yours, if those sayings are defended, why are your curses heaped upon me from them? For altogether, what you detest and accuse in me are those very things which you defend in their disputation. But if they are not defended, but under the name of defense more cunningly accused; far be it that this be a clear and kindly reasoning; but rather a derisory flattery, which is for this reason called a defense, lest the offense of the Catholic peoples, by whom those same men are venerated, could not be borne.
JulianImp.4.112IV. 113. Iulianus. Quia videlicet et simplicius quaepiam dixerint, et quodcumque aliud speculantes, non habuerint necessitatem a latere surgentibus quaestionibus obviandi. Cum enim crebro laudaverint coniugia, et nullam in corporibus affectionem a diabolo insertam putarint, nec regno diaboli divina opera, id est naturae membra, subiecerint, sed et a Deo instituta coniugia ac benedictione donata, liberumque arbitrium, prout opportunitas attulit, explicarint; humanum est ut non stare in societate vestri sceleris iudicentur, si in scripturis illorum aut ambigue, aut negligenter quaepiam locata deprehenditis. Quomodo enim non praeiudicat Scripturis sanctis, quod omnes haereses aliquibus se earum testimoniis occulunt ac nituntur tueri; ita etiam catholicorum virorum famam propter quaepiam incautius fusa, non patiemur addici. Neque enim habuerunt intentionem illi, aut damnandi nuptias, aut liberum arbitrium denegandi, vel innocentiam sauciandi; quam si habuissent, non vestrum dogma firmassent, sed honorem officii perdidissent.
IV. 113. Julian. Because, namely, they both said certain things more simply, and, contemplating something else, did not have the necessity of meeting questions arising at their side. For when they often praised marriages, and supposed no affection in bodies inserted by the devil, nor subjected divine works—that is, the members of nature—to the kingdom of the devil, but unfolded both marriages instituted by God and endowed with blessing, and free choice, as opportunity brought it; it is human that they not be judged to stand in the company of your crime, if in their writings you catch certain things placed either ambiguously or negligently. For just as it does not prejudge the holy Scriptures that all heresies conceal themselves under some of their testimonies and strive to defend themselves; so we will not allow the fame of Catholic men to be condemned on account of certain things poured out more incautiously. For they had no intention either of condemning marriages, or of denying free choice, or of wounding innocence; which had they had, they would not have confirmed your teaching, but would have lost the honor of their office.
JulianImp.4.113Augustinus. O clara et benigna ratio defensionis! Simplicius videlicet dixit Ambrosius, ex commixtione maris et feminae expertem neminem esse delicti; et quodcumque aliud speculando, nec habendo necessitatem a latere surgentibus quaestionibus obviandi, negligenter et incaute scriptis et disputationibus suis Manichaeum, quod dicis, virus infudit. Homo loquacissime, homines timens homini parcis, non illa dicta defendis. Nam si vera ratione defenduntur haec dicta, procul dubio veraciter defenduntur, et vera sunt; et si hoc ita est, recte asseritur originale peccatum, et dogma interimitur vestrum. Si autem falsa ratione defenduntur haec dicta clara tua illa et benigna ratio non est ratio, sed deceptio. At enim coniugia crebro laudavit Ambrosius; hoc et nos facimus. Nullam, inquis, in corporibus affectionem a diabolo ille putavit insertam; si affectionem bonam, nec nos; si malam, sicut ille, ita et nos. Nec regno, inquis, diaboli divina opera, hoc est naturae membra, ille subiecit; quasi adulterorum membra non sint divina opera et membra naturae, quae tamen vitio, et per hoc diabolo constat esse subiecta. Illi, inquis, a Deo instituta coniugia ac benedictione donata, liberumque arbitrium, prout opportunitas attulit, explicarunt. Sic et nos. Humanum est, inquis, ut non stare in societate vestri sceleris iudicentur; immo insanum est ut non stare in societate illorum vestro scelere iudicemur. Dicis: Non praeiudicare Scripturis sanctis, quod omnes haereses aliquibus earum testimoniis se occulunt ac nituntur tueri; et sic vis: disputatoribus non praeiudicare catholicis nonnulla, quae ab eis, sicut putas, incautius fusa vobis obiciamus. Quid est hoc, nisi dicere etiam in Scripturis sanctis, ea quae pro se usurpant haeretici, incautius fusa esse, et ideo vera non esse? Quo sceleratius quid potest dici? Aut si illa vera sunt, sed ab haereticis non ita intelleguntur ut sunt; nihil simile habet haec comparatio; quoniam dicta vel Ambrosii, vel Cypriani, vel aliorum catholicorum, quae contra vos ponimus, si vera esse concesseris, peccatum originale firmabis. Proinde, quemadmodum nos cum illis et laudamus nuptias, et liberum confitemur arbitrium, et defendimus innocentiam; sic tu cum illis dic parvulos non esse expertes delicti; alioquin nos sumus cum eis, tu adversus eos. Illorum enim dicta non defendis, ut promiseras, sed reprehendis. Tuo quippe dogmate, cum cogaris illa culpare et falsa esse contendere, nullo modo sineris auctoritatibus eorum defensionem quam spoponderas, exhibere; quia et in accusatione adulator esse conaris, et in adulatione deprehenderis accusator.
Augustine. O clear and kindly reasoning of defense! Ambrose, namely, said more simply that, from the mingling of male and female, no one is free of fault; and, contemplating something else, and not having the necessity of meeting questions arising at his side, negligently and incautiously poured the Manichean—as you say—poison into his writings and disputations. Most loquacious man, fearing men, you spare a man; you do not defend those sayings. For if these sayings are defended by a true reasoning, without doubt they are truly defended, and are true; and if this is so, original sin is rightly asserted, and your teaching is destroyed. But if these sayings are defended by a false reasoning, that clear and kindly reasoning of yours is not a reasoning, but a deception. But indeed Ambrose often praised marriages; this we too do. No affection, you say, did he suppose inserted in bodies by the devil; if a good affection, neither do we; if an evil one, as he, so we too. Nor did he subject, you say, divine works, that is, the members of nature, to the kingdom of the devil; as though the members of adulterers are not divine works and members of nature, which nonetheless it is established are by their fault, and through this by the devil, subjected. They, you say, unfolded both marriages instituted by God and endowed with blessing, and free choice, as opportunity brought it. So we too. It is human, you say, that they not be judged to stand in the company of your crime; nay, it is insane that we be judged not to stand in the company of theirs by your crime. You say: It does not prejudge the holy Scriptures that all heresies conceal themselves under some of their testimonies and strive to defend themselves; and so you wish: that it not prejudge the Catholic disputants, that we object to you certain things which were, as you suppose, more incautiously poured out by them. What is this, but to say that even in the holy Scriptures the things which heretics usurp for themselves were more incautiously poured out, and therefore are not true? Than which what more wicked thing can be said? Or if those things are true, but are not understood by the heretics as they are; this comparison has nothing similar; since the sayings either of Ambrose, or of Cyprian, or of other Catholics, which we set against you—if you grant them to be true—you will confirm original sin. Accordingly, just as we with them both praise marriages, and confess free choice, and defend innocence; so you with them say that the little ones are not free of fault; otherwise we are with them, you against them. For you do not defend their sayings, as you had promised, but censure them. For by your teaching, since you are compelled to blame them and to contend that they are false, you are in no way permitted to exhibit, by their authorities, the defense which you had promised; because both in accusing you try to be a flatterer, and in flattering you are caught an accuser.
JulianImp.4.113IV. 114. Iulianus. Libere itaque coniecto et pronuntio, quoniam si eorum aliquis his superesset diebus, videretque exstinctum disciplinae christianae decus, otiantem in omnibus liberam voluntatem, atque affectantem imputare necessitati quidquid sponte committit, vituperationem quoque operum Dei, eversionemque legis eius sub nomine inefficacis gratiae populorum auribus intimari; toto contra vos felle moveretur; perpendens etiam peccatum naturale a Manichaea non posse impietate discerni, fidem catholicam aut emendatis aut condemnatis vobis, et planius tueretur et cautius.
IV. 114. Julian. Freely, then, I conjecture and pronounce that, if any of them survived to these days, and saw the glory of Christian discipline extinguished, free will at leisure in all things, and affecting to impute to necessity whatever it commits of its own accord, and the disparagement of the works of God, and the overthrow of his law under the name of an ineffectual grace instilled into the ears of the peoples; he would be moved with all his gall against you; weighing too that natural sin cannot be discerned from the Manichean impiety, he would defend the Catholic faith—with you either corrected or condemned—both more plainly and more cautiously.
JulianImp.4.114Augustinus. Cur ergo emendatis nobis, et non etiam se ipsis? Ubi est quod te libere coniectare et pronuntiare promiseras? Ecce nec libera est tua vanitas, et falsa libertas; timuisti enim dicere, quod si his diebus superesset Ambrosius, vobis auditis, primum se ipsum, deinde nos emendaret; sed quasi homo liber hoc mutire formidans, tamen intellegi voluisti. En quo devenerunt hi dies, ut in eis Ambrosius, si hic viveret, disceret se fuisse Manichaeum, et audito Iuliano, vel Caelestio, vel ipso Pelagio, esse ulterius non debere, sed ex illa nefaria pestilentia vobis praecipientibus curantibusque sanari. Quale spectaculum animo cogitantis occurrit? Quale esset, videre Ambrosium stantem, vel si ille permitteret, sedentem ante Pelagium, atque discentem paradisum novum saeculi huius calamitatibus plenum, quas videmus parvulos perpeti, ubi necesse esset, etiamsi nemo peccasset, carnem concupiscere adversus spiritum; et ne ad illicita ac flagitiosa pertraheret, concupiscere etiam spiritum adversus carnem; quam dissensionem dicere soleret Ambrosius, per praevaricationem primi hominis in hominum vertisse naturam ; sed iam sub vobis magistris dicere non auderet? Necesse quoque esset in tali paradiso pallere praegnantes, tolerare longa fastidia, gemere atque ululare parientes; cum diversis vitiis ingeniorum et corporum homines nasci, paucosque cordatos, minore quidem, nec tamen sine labore litteras discere, ceteros tardiusculos sive tardos, et tanto magis quanto quisque esset tardior, aut concidi ferulis magistrorum, aut indoctos imperitosque manere; fatuos vero nec magistris dari, sed dolendos ridendosve nutriri; infantes, antequam quidquam mali possent velle vel agere, agitari morbis, torqueri doloribus, medicamentis curari cruciantibus, a daemonibus vexari, expirare superantibus cladibus. Si vero haec exhorrens credere nollet Ambrosius, et responderet haec omnia, si nemo peccasset, nullo modo futura fuisse in tantae beatitudinis loco, ubi nec post peccatum esse potuerunt, eiectis inde illis, quorum praevaricatione mala ista secuta sunt; ac per hoc de miseria venire mortalium, quae nulla esset, nisi gravissimo peccato primi hominis natura humana vitiata atque mutata hoc saeculum tot tantisque calamitatibus plenum propagare meruisset; ubi nec redempti, iam sempiternae salutis pignore accepto, malis huiusmodi carent; sed cum de hoc saeculo exierint, tunc carebunt; si ergo talia responderet Ambrosius, praeclaris syllogismis vestris prohiberetur haec dicere, ne scilicet concupiscentia carnis vituperata, et originali peccato credito, nuptiae damnarentur, liberum auferretur arbitrium, vituperarentur opera Dei, et sub nomine gratiae legis eversio sequeretur. Non sic plane, non sic. Erubescite, vel potius expavescite talia cogitare. Immo vero si vir ille superesset, multo vehementius quam nos et auctoratius vobis pro catholica fide et pro Dei gratia vel aequitate resisteret, quam non sint consequentia, quae consequentia putatis, ostendens; quia et recte vivi potest, non pulsa nec laudata mala concupiscentia, sed frenata; nec culpatur naturae Conditor, quando ab illo sananda monstratur, quae ab inimico vitiari potuit, non creari; nec damnantur nuptiae, quae bene utuntur pudenda libidine; nec liberum aufertur arbitrium, sed cuius beneficio sit in bono liberum ostenditur; nec lex evacuatur per gratiam, sed impletur. Haec ille doctor egregius egregie disputaret, et in vestras facies impudentes, illa quae superius de paradiso vestro diximus, et vestrum errorem vere consequuntur, et ab omnibus hominibus tamquam vesana atque furiosa vel ridentur, vel exhorrentur, illideret.
Augustine. Why, then, with us corrected, and not also with themselves? Where is what you had promised, that you would freely conjecture and pronounce? Behold, neither is your vanity free, and your liberty false; for you feared to say that, if Ambrose survived these days, having heard you, he would correct first himself, then us; but, as though a free man dreading to mutter this, you nonetheless wished it understood. Behold to what these days have come, that in them Ambrose, if he were living here, would learn that he had been a Manichean, and, having heard Julian, or Caelestius, or Pelagius himself, ought to be one no longer, but to be healed of that nefarious pestilence with you commanding and curing. What a spectacle presents itself to the mind of one thinking? What it would be, to see Ambrose standing, or, if he permitted it, sitting before Pelagius, and learning a new paradise full of the calamities of this age which we see the little ones suffer, where it would be necessary, even if no one had sinned, that the flesh have desires opposed to the spirit; and, lest it drag to unlawful and disgraceful things, that the spirit too have desires opposed to the flesh; which dissension Ambrose was wont to say turned into the nature of human beings through the transgression of the first man (See Ambrose, Exposition of the Gospel of Luke 7.142-143); but, under you now as masters, would not dare to say. It would be necessary too in such a paradise that the pregnant grow pale, endure long loathings, that those giving birth groan and howl; while human beings are born with diverse vices of wits and bodies, and a few of sound heart learn their letters with a lesser, yet not without, labor, the rest somewhat slow or slow, and the slower each one the more, are either cut up by the rods of teachers, or remain unlearned and unskilled; but the foolish are not even given to masters, but are reared to be grieved over or laughed at; while infants, before they could will or do anything evil, are agitated by diseases, tortured by pains, treated with torturing medicaments, vexed by demons, expire under overcoming disasters. But if Ambrose, abhorring this, were unwilling to believe it, and answered that all these things, if no one had sinned, would in no way have been going to be in the place of so great blessedness, where not even after sin could they be, those being cast out thence by whose transgression these evils followed; and through this that they come from the misery of mortals, which would be none, unless human nature, vitiated and changed by the gravest sin of the first man, had merited to propagate this age full of so many and so great calamities; where not even the redeemed, having now received the pledge of everlasting salvation, lack such evils; but when they have departed from this age, then they will lack them: if, then, Ambrose answered such things, by your splendid syllogisms he would be forbidden to say these things—lest, namely, the concupiscence of the flesh being disparaged, and original sin being believed, marriages be condemned, free choice be taken away, the works of God be disparaged, and under the name of grace the overthrow of the law follow. Not so, plainly, not so. Blush, or rather be aghast, to think such things. Nay rather, if that man survived, much more vehemently than we and more authoritatively would he resist you on behalf of the Catholic faith and on behalf of the grace or equity of God, showing how the things you think consequent are not consequent; because both one can live rightly, with evil concupiscence not driven out nor praised, but reined in; nor is the Founder of nature blamed, when that is shown by him to be healed which could be vitiated by the enemy, not created; nor are marriages condemned, which use shameful disordered desire well; nor is free choice taken away, but it is shown by whose benefit it is free in good; nor is the law made void through grace, but is fulfilled. These things that excellent teacher would dispute excellently, and would dash, against your shameless faces, those things which we said above about your paradise, and which truly follow from your error, and are either laughed at or abhorred by all human beings as insane and furious.
JulianImp.4.114IV. 115. Iulianus. Neque enim in iure cuiusquam est definita suscipere, et quae consequuntur excludere. Qui ergo dicit propter hoc parvulos ad ius diaboli pertinere, quoniam de sexus commixtione generantur; sine dubio ipsam commixtionem, in qua naturae opus est, cum naturae ipsius institutione condemnat.
IV. 115. Julian. For it is not in anyone's right to take up definite things and exclude what follows. Whoever, then, says that the little ones pertain to the right of the devil for this reason, because they are generated of the mingling of the sex, without doubt condemns the mingling itself, in which is the work of nature, together with the institution of that very nature.
JulianImp.4.115Augustinus. Tibi quidem hoc videtur: sed verum non esse (quod tu non vides) vidit Ambrosius, qui dixit expertes non esse delicti ex viro et muliere, id est, per illam commixtionem corporum natos ; nec tamen ipsam commixtionem cum ipsius naturae institutione condemnat. Commixtio quippe coniugum procreandi causa, bonum est nuptiarum; sed ita fiunt nonnulla opera bona non sine malo vitiorum, sicut opera mala non sine bono membrorum. Quantislibet autem vitiis turpetur quaecumque natura, institutio eius semper est bona. Nam sicut institutio corporis bona est, etiam quando nascitur morbidus; et institutio animi bona est, etiam quando nascitur fatuus; sic institutio hominis ipsius bona est, quando nascitur contagioni peccati originalis obnoxius.
Augustine. To you indeed this seems so; but that it is not true (which you do not see) Ambrose saw, who said that those born of man and woman, that is, through that mingling of bodies, are not free of fault (See Ambrose, Exposition of the Gospel of Luke 1.17); nor yet does he condemn the mingling itself together with the institution of that very nature. For the mingling of spouses for the sake of procreating is the good of marriage; but so do some good works come about not without the evil of vices, just as evil works come about not without the good of the members. But with however many vices any nature whatever is befouled, its institution is always good. For just as the institution of the body is good, even when it is born diseased; and the institution of the mind is good, even when it is born foolish; so the institution of the man himself is good, when he is born liable to the contagion of original sin.
JulianImp.4.115IV. 116. Iulianus. Quod aut utrumque simul negatur, aut simul utrumque suscipitur; et cum sit in potestate utriusque reiectio, non est tamen in arbitrio alterius electio; nisi quod facilius potest illicita commixtione gravari vitio voluntatis, seminum tamen fructificatione defensa, quam fructibus eius accusatis, sexuum negotium vindicari. Non ergo fluctuatio tua, quam inter formidinem impietatemque perpeteris, novas disputandi regulas condere valebit, ut de duobus connexis unum suscipias, et quod ei adhaeret excludas. Ante leves pascentur in aethere cervi , quam post praeiudicium sumpti negetur effectio. Exercet hoc genus apostolus Paulus, cum dicit: Si mortui non resurgunt, nec Christus resurrexit. Si Christus non resurrexit, vana est fides vestra . Nunc autem Christus resurrexit; constat ergo functorum diem resurrectionem futuram. Et ut hoc ipsum breviore propter legentem inculcemus exemplo; dubitetur utrum iustum bonum sit; peto, an omne iustum, honestum esse fatearis. Quo concesso, addo aliud, utrum omne honestum, bonum quoque esse pronunties. Hoc quoque dato, te volente nolente, concludo: Si omne iustum honestum, omne honestum bonum; omne igitur iustum bonum est. Huic effecto quicumque post prima sumpta voluerit obniti, non aedificium rationis quatit, sed ipse se exponit irrisui. Ut ergo ad causam comparatio recurrat, quaeritur utrum sit in natura peccatum; petivi, concederesne nullum esse sine voluntate peccatum; assensus es, sicut tua dicta testantur. Addidi, an in parvulo putares esse voluntatem; hoc etiam denegasti. Quid sequitur tertium, si non est sine voluntate peccatum? Hoc tam certum est ut nec ab Academicis venire possit in dubium, quorum divitiae sunt nihil certum tenere. Tu ergo cum post duo prima sumpta, tertium negas, in quo est effectus duorum, non rationis fundamenta convellis, sed tuum prodis furorem.
IV. 116. Julian. Which is either both denied at once, or both at once taken up; and although there is in the power of each a rejection, there is nonetheless not in the choice of one the election of the other; except that it can more easily, by an unlawful mingling, be burdened with the vice of will—the fruitfulness of the seeds being nonetheless defended—than that, with its fruits accused, the business of the sexes be vindicated. Your fluctuation, then, which you suffer between fear and impiety, will not be able to establish new rules of disputing, so that, of two connected things, you take up one and exclude what clings to it. Sooner shall the light-footed stags feed in the air (Virgil, Eclogues 1.59) than the effecting be denied after the prejudgment is taken up. This kind the apostle Paul exercises, when he says: If the dead do not rise, neither has Christ risen. If Christ has not risen, your faith is vain (See 1 Cor 15:16-17). But now Christ has risen; it is established, then, that the resurrection of the dead will be. And, to drive home this very thing by a briefer example for the reader's sake: let it be doubted whether the just is good; I ask, do you confess that every just thing is honorable? Which being granted, I add another: do you pronounce that every honorable thing is also good? This too being given, willing or unwilling, I conclude: If every just thing is honorable, every honorable thing good; therefore every just thing is good. Whoever, after the first things have been taken, wishes to struggle against this effected conclusion, does not shake the edifice of reason, but exposes himself to derision. That the comparison may recur to the cause, then, it is asked whether there is sin in nature; I asked, would you concede that there is no sin without will; you assented, as your words attest. I added, would you suppose there is a will in a little one; this too you denied. What follows as third, if there is no sin without will? This is so certain that it could not come into doubt even among the Academics, whose riches are to hold nothing certain. You, then, when, after the two first things have been taken, you deny the third, in which is the effect of the two, do not overturn the foundations of reason, but betray your fury.
JulianImp.4.116Augustinus. Itane es insipiens, ut putes in natura non esse peccatum, cum omnino peccatum nisi in natura esse non possit? Nam vel in angelo est, vel in homine, quae sine dubitatione naturae sunt; si ergo peccatum in nulla istarum natura esset, profecto nusquam esset. Ac per hoc, proposita quaestione utrum sit in natura peccatum, docere intenderas in natura non esse peccatum; vanam ergo fuisse intentionem tuam, et in vanus te istam proposuisse quaestionem, si non es nimium vanus, intellegis. Ecce rationis tuae, quoniam ratio vera non est, fundamenta convello; nec tamen, sicut conviciaris, prodo meum furorem, sed tuum errorem. Concessis enim duobus quae sumis, ideo tertium nego, quia non est in eo, sicut esse putas, duorum effectus illorum. Ideo quippe concedo non esse sine voluntate peccatum, quia sine voluntate non potest fieri. Sed alia ratione rursus recte dicitur, esse sine voluntate peccatum, quia manet, quamdiu non remittitur, etiam desistente voluntate qua factum est. Item concedo non esse sine voluntate peccatum, quia et originale peccatum sine voluntate non factum est eius, a quo ipsa origo sumpsit exordium. Proinde cum etiam illud concedo, quod peccandi voluntas non sit in parvulo, non ex his duobus conficitur tertium, quod peccatum non sit in parvulo. Conficeretur autem, si quemadmodum concedo non esse peccatum sine voluntate, ita concederem non esse cuiusque peccatum sine ipsius propria voluntate. Proinde peccati quidem voluntatem parvulus non habet, sed peccatum non haberet, nisi ille, de quo id attraxit, voluntate peccasset. Nam de ipsa hominis quoque nativitate tale aliquid dici potest; si enim diceres: Nemo nascitur nisi ex voluntate; non sine ratione concederem: si autem diceres: Nemo nascitur nisi ex propria sua voluntate, non concederem. Isto itaque modo, quia de peccato agimus parvuli, ita originale peccatum eius, sicut ipse ortus eius, sine voluntate esse non potuit, sed non eius.
Augustine. Are you so foolish as to think that there is no sin in nature, when sin can be at all only in a nature? For it is either in an angel or in a man, which without doubt are natures; if, then, sin were in the nature of none of these, surely it would be nowhere. And through this, the question being proposed whether there is sin in nature, you had intended to teach that there is no sin in nature; that your intention, then, was vain, and that you set forth this question in vain, you understand, if you are not too vain. Behold, I overturn the foundations of your reasoning, since the reasoning is not true; nor yet, as you revile, do I betray my fury, but your error. For, the two things being granted which you take, therefore I deny the third, because there is not in it, as you suppose, the effect of those two. For I therefore concede that there is no sin without will, because without will it cannot come to be. But by another reasoning, again, it is rightly said that there is sin without will, because it remains, as long as it is not remitted, even with the will ceasing by which it was done. Likewise I concede that there is no sin without will, because original sin too was not made without the will of him from whom that very origin took its beginning. Accordingly, when I concede this too, that the will to sin is not in a little one, the third is not effected from these two—that there is no sin in a little one. But it would be effected, if, just as I concede that there is no sin without will, so I conceded that there is not anyone's sin without his own will. Accordingly the little one indeed does not have a will to sin, but would not have sin, unless that one, from whom he drew it, had sinned by will. For of the very nativity of man too something such can be said; for if you said: No one is born except from will; I would not without reason concede it; but if you said: No one is born except from his own will, I would not concede it. In this way, then, since we are dealing with the sin of a little one, his original sin, just as his very origin, could not be without will, but not his own.
JulianImp.4.116IV. 117. Iulianus. Ergo si audirent illi sacerdotes, quorum nunc dicta deluimus, dubitari utrum commixtio coniugalis bona esset, atque ab eis peterem corporane a Deo informata, faterentur. Hocque concesso, adderem utrum coniugia a Deo annuerent ordinata. Quo similiter confirmato, peterem denuo, utrum esset sine commixtione fetura. Hocque denegato, quid sequebatur? Videlicet, si nonnisi per Deum corpus, nonnisi per corpus commixtio, nonnisi per commixtionem fetus, ad eumdem auctorem pertinere et fetum et commixtionem, ad quem corpora pertinerent.
IV. 117. Julian. Therefore, if those priests, whose sayings we are now washing, should hear it doubted whether the conjugal mingling were good, and I should ask of them whether bodies were formed by God, they would confess it. And this being granted, I would add whether they would grant that marriages were ordained by God. Which being likewise confirmed, I would ask again whether there could be offspring without mingling. And this being denied, what followed? Namely, that if there is body only through God, mingling only through body, offspring only through mingling, both offspring and mingling pertain to the same author to whom bodies pertain.
JulianImp.4.117Augustinus. Numquid haec inter nos vertitur quaestio, utrum bona sit commixtio coniugalis, cum eam bonam utrique dicamus? Quid est ergo quod tam male sentis de illis sacerdotibus, quorum non, ut mentiris, deluis dicta, sed polluis, ut eis quasi dubitantibus velis persuadere, unde nec illos, nec nos dubitare convincis? Bona est commixtio coniugalis, quae fit causa procreandi. Sed Ambrosius, qui dixit ex commixtione utriusque sexus neminem esse expertem delicti, non commixtionem redarguit coniugalem; sed vidit malum, cuius bono usu fit illud, quod nemo catholicus dubitat esse opus bonum. Inania loqueris, superfluis tempus impendis; quod agitur deseris, et unde non dubitatur, tamquam dubitetur, vel etiam negetur, docere moliris. Quid ergo mirum est, quod tam multos libros tamque vanos facis?
Augustine. Is this question turned between us, whether the conjugal mingling is good, when we both call it good? What is it, then, that you think so badly of those priests—whose sayings you do not, as you lie, wash, but pollute—as though you wished to persuade them, as though doubting, of what you convict neither them nor us to doubt? The conjugal mingling, which comes about for the sake of procreating, is good. But Ambrose, who said that no one is free of fault from the mingling of either sex, did not refute the conjugal mingling; but he saw the evil, by whose good use that comes about which no Catholic doubts to be a good work. You speak empty things, you spend time on superfluous ones; you desert what is at issue, and you strive to teach, as though it were doubted, or even denied, what is not doubted. But why do I marvel that you make so many and so empty books?
JulianImp.4.117IV. 118. Iulianus. Huic effecto sine dubio prudentes viri catholici annuerent sacerdotes, videntesque nihil in sensibus carnis, nihil in fetibus sexuum, alterum quempiam praeter Deum verum fecisse; nihil autem Deum fecisse quod malum esset; malumque nihil esse aliud quam voluntatem malam, sine aliquo coactu naturalium delinquentem; pronuntiarent profecto Manichaeos et Traducianos splendentibus catholicae rationis dissiluisse fulminibus.
IV. 118. Julian. To this effected conclusion the prudent Catholic priests would without doubt assent, and, seeing that nothing in the senses of the flesh, nothing in the offspring of the sexes, did any other than the true God make; but that God made nothing that was evil; and that evil is nothing other than an evil will, sinning without any compulsion of natural things; they would pronounce, surely, that the Manicheans and the Traducianists had burst apart at the gleaming thunderbolts of Catholic reasoning.
JulianImp.4.118Augustinus. Cur ergo eorum, quos prudentes viros dicis et catholicos sacerdotes, te dicta defendere atque deluere sine ullo pudore mentiris, si et ipsa dissiliunt fulminibus tuis? Si autem defenduntur atque deluuntur, et ob hoc manent integra, ipsis tu potius fulminaris. Nam quod ait Ambrosius, ex commixtione sexus utriusque conceptum expertem neminem esse delicti, aut falsum est, aut verum. Si falsum esse dicis, oppugnas ergo prudentium virorum et catholicorum, sicut tu fateris, sacerdotum dicta, non defendis ac deluis. Si autem ut merito defendantur atque deluantur, hoc verum esse concedis; tu potius dictis catholicorum antistitum fulminaris. Quid est ergo quod te iactas et dicis illos beatissimos et doctissimos viros, si audissent syllogismos tuos, pronuntiaturos fuisse, nos, quos appellas Manichaeos et Traducianos, splendentibus catholicae rationis dissiluisse fulminibus? Pronuntiarent igitur contra se ipsos, et se ipsos nobiscum dissiluisse te fulminante monstrarent. Cur directe non audes dicere, quod oblique convinceris dicere? Originale peccatum cum Ambrosio confitemur, et tu tanta potentia fulmina iacularis, ut propter haec dicta nobis illique communia, nos eis dissiliamus, ille deluatur? Vanus es: non eum distinguis a nobis; et nos prorsus accusas et ipsum; nec tamen fulminas aut nos, aut ipsum, si violare non vis testimonium Pelagii doctoris tui, qui dixit Ambrosii fidem et purissimum in Scripturis sensum ne inimicum quidem ausum fuisse reprehendere . Unde et tu cum fidei eius et purissimo in Scripturis sensui satis intellegaris inimicus, non eum tamen audes reprehendere; sed quid mali dicat, me reprehendendo, te arbitraris ostendere. Homo confosse, et non confesse, magna vi cogeris caliginosas anhelare fallacias; frustra fingis impetus fulminantis, cum spires fumum potius fulminati. Ista sunt certe, per quae docere conaris Ambrosium, aliosque doctores socios eius, non esse originale peccatum, quod Deus formaverit corpora, ordinaveritque coniugia, quod non esset sine commixtione fetura. Conceduntur haec; conceduntur etiam illa quae adiungis: fetum scilicet et commixtionem ad eum pertinere auctorem, ad quem pertinent corpora; si tamen commixtionem coniugalem voluisti intellegi, cum hoc diceres. Quamvis id per se ipsum verum esse noscatur, non tua ratiocinatione sit consequens; alioquin te dicente: Si nonnisi per Deum corpus, nonnisi per corpus commixtio; et hoc volente conficere, ad eum auctorem pertinere commixtionem, ad quem corpora pertinent; potest alius dicere: Si nonnisi per Deum corpus, nonnisi per corpus adulterium, ad eum auctorem pertinet adulterium, ad quem pertinet corpus; quod vides quanta dicatur iniuria Dei, et quantum mali doceant syllogismi tui. Sicut ergo non sequitur, ut ideo tribuatur adulterium Deo, quia non fit nisi per corpus, cuius auctor est Deus, ita non sequitur, ut ideo commixtio tribuatur Deo, quia non fit nisi per corpus, cuius auctor est Deus. Sed tamen concedimus commixtionem dumtaxat coniugalem, quae fit causa procreandi, Deo auctori esse tribuendam; non quia hoc tua sumpta sequitur, sed quia ratione alia consideratum, verum esse perspicitur. Quod vero ex hoc quaeris efficere, nec sequitur illa superiora, nec verum est. Neque enim, quia Deus fecit corpus, Deus instituit coniugia, quorum commixtione fetus oriatur, Deus creat ipsos fetus animantium, ideo verum est quod adiungis: Nihil in sensibus carnis, nihil in fetibus sexuum, alterum quempiam praeter Deum verum fecisse. Ubi enim fecit diabolus, quod mali fecit cum hominibus primis, nisi et in sensibus carnis illorum? Mala quippe suasione corruptus est sensus, quando est ad peccandum factus assensus. Et ubi fecit, quidquid mali postmodum generi humano fecit, nisi in fetibus sexuum, id est, filiis hominum? Quomodo autem dicis: Deum nihil fecisse quod malum est? Annon est malum gehenna damnatis? Iam vero qui tibi dicenti credit, malum nihil esse aliud quam voluntatem malam, sine aliquo coactu naturalium delinquentem; ut innumerabilia mala taceam, quae mali angeli et homines patiuntur inviti; ipsum aeternum supplicium non timebitur, quod et maximum malum est, et non est voluntas mala, sed poena voluntatis malae. Hae sunt ratiocinationes tuae quibus putas fulmen esse verbum tuum, cum sit cinis cor tuum.
Augustine. Why, then, do you lie without any shame that you defend and wash the sayings of those whom you call prudent men and Catholic priests, if they too burst apart at your thunderbolts? But if they are defended and washed, and for this reason remain entire, you rather are thunderstruck by them. For what Ambrose says—that one conceived from the mingling of either sex is free of fault—is either false or true. If you say it is false, then you assail the sayings of prudent men and Catholic, as you confess, priests, you do not defend and wash them. But if, that they may deservedly be defended and washed, you grant this to be true, you rather are thunderstruck by the sayings of Catholic bishops. What is it, then, that you boast and say that those most blessed and most learned men, if they had heard your syllogisms, would have pronounced that we, whom you call Manicheans and Traducianists, burst apart at the gleaming thunderbolts of Catholic reasoning? They would pronounce, then, against themselves, and would show that they themselves, together with us, burst apart with you thundering. Why do you not dare to say directly what you are convicted of saying obliquely? With Ambrose we confess original sin, and you hurl thunderbolts with so great power, that on account of these sayings common to us and to him, we burst apart at them, and he is washed? You are vain: you do not distinguish him from us; and you accuse both us utterly and him; nor yet do you thunder at either us or him, if you do not wish to violate the testimony of Pelagius your teacher, who said that the faith of Ambrose and his most pure sense in the Scriptures not even an enemy dared to censure (See Augustine, On the Grace of Christ 43.47). Whence you too, since you are understood to be enemy enough to his faith and most pure sense in the Scriptures, do not nonetheless dare to censure him; but you think to show, by censuring me, what evil he says. Man pierced through, and not professing, you are by a great force compelled to breathe out cloudy fallacies; in vain you feign the assaults of one thundering, when you rather breathe out the smoke of one thunderstruck. These are certainly the things by which you try to teach that Ambrose, and the other teachers his companions, do not hold that there is original sin: that God formed bodies, and ordained marriages, and that there would be no offspring without mingling. These things are granted; granted also those you add: namely, that offspring and mingling pertain to the same author to whom bodies pertain; if at least you wished the conjugal mingling to be understood, when you said this. Although that, by itself, is known to be true, it is not consequent upon your reasoning; otherwise, with you saying: If body only through God, mingling only through body, and wishing to conclude this, that mingling pertains to the same author to whom bodies pertain, another can say: If body only through God, adultery only through body, adultery pertains to the same author to whom body pertains; which you see how great an injury is said to God, and how much evil your syllogisms teach. As, then, it does not follow that adultery be attributed to God for this reason, because it comes about only through body, of which God is the author; so it does not follow that mingling be attributed to God for this reason, because it comes about only through body, of which God is the author. But nonetheless we concede that the conjugal mingling, surely—that which comes about for the cause of procreating—must be attributed to God as author; not because this follows from your premises, but because, considered by another reasoning, it is perceived to be true. But what you seek to effect from this, neither follows from those things above, nor is true. For neither, because God made the body, God instituted marriages, of whose mingling offspring would arise, does God create the very offspring of living things, is it therefore true what you add: That nothing in the senses of the flesh, nothing in the offspring of the sexes, did any other than the true God make. For where did the devil do the evil he did with the first human beings, except in the senses of their flesh too? For the sense was corrupted by an evil persuasion, when an assent to sinning was made. And where did he do whatever evil he afterward did to the human race, except in the offspring of the sexes, that is, in the sons of men? But how do you say: That God made nothing that is evil? Is not Gehenna an evil to the damned? But now, whoever believes you saying that evil is nothing other than an evil will, sinning without any compulsion of natural things—to be silent about the innumerable evils which evil angels and men suffer unwilling—the very eternal punishment will not be feared, which is both the greatest evil, and is not an evil will, but the punishment of an evil will. These are your reasonings, by which you think your word is a thunderbolt, when your heart is ash.
JulianImp.4.118IV. 119. Iulianus. Desine itaque viros sani capitis et Ecclesiarum antistites criminari; non subiciantur iudicio negligentiora commenta; neque enim iram cunctatio brevis, sed pertinax meretur intentio. Imitemur sane eorum illud studium, quo populos aedificaverunt exhortando, obsecrando, coarguendo; quorum num quidquam fecissent, si vestro more peccata non voluntaria, sed naturalia credidissent?
IV. 119. Julian. Cease, then, to accuse men of sound head and the bishops of the Churches; let their more negligent comments not be subjected to judgment; for not a brief hesitation, but a persistent intention, deserves wrath. Let us, surely, imitate that zeal of theirs, by which they built up the peoples by exhorting, beseeching, refuting; of which would they have done anything, if, after your manner, they had believed sins to be not voluntary, but natural?
JulianImp.4.119Augustinus. Et nos pro modulo nostro populos aedificamus, hortando, obsecrando, arguendo, quod fecit Ambrosius; et tamen de originali peccato hoc sentimus et dicimus, quod sensit et dixit Ambrosius, nec solus, sed cum aliis magnis consortibus suis. Quos antistites Ecclesiarum cum viros sani capitis dicas; tu quali capite ista, quae illi notissima consensione didicerunt atque docuerunt, reprehendis atrociter, defendisque fallaciter; et me arguis dicens eorum esse criminatorem, cum videas eorum contra tua crimina, quae ex obliquo illis obicis, defensorem? Dicis eorum: negligentiora commenta non esse subicienda iudicio; siccine illorum dicta defendis ac deluis? An potius nomine negligentiae reprobas et accusas, et nullo dubitante condemnas, quae negligenter effusa, et ideo falsa esse pronuntias? Rogamus te, si falsa esse asseris dicta quae defendis, vera esse assere quae reprehendis. Iram non cunctatio brevis, inquis, sed pertinax meretur intentio; quasi aliquid proferas, unde possis ostendere illos, non dico post brevem, sed saltem post longam intentionem, vel in fine vitae suae de peccato originali mutasse sententiam. Vana loqueris, insana loqueris, perversa et tuae saluti adversa loqueris; quiesce, obsecro, quid tantum loqueris?
Augustine. We too, according to our measure, build up the peoples by exhorting, beseeching, accusing, which Ambrose did; and yet of original sin we feel and say this, which Ambrose felt and said—nor he alone, but with his other great companions. Whom, since you call bishops of the Churches and men of sound head, with what head do you, atrociously, censure those things which they, by a most well-known consensus, learned and taught, and fallaciously defend them; and you accuse me, saying that I am their slanderer, when you see me the defender of them against your crimes, which you obliquely object to them? You say their more negligent comments should not be subjected to judgment; do you so defend and wash their sayings? Or do you rather, under the name of negligence, reprove and accuse, and, with no one doubting, condemn what was negligently poured out, and therefore pronounce to be false? We ask you, if you assert that the sayings you defend are false, assert that the things you censure are true. Not a brief hesitation, you say, but a persistent intention deserves wrath; as though you bring forth something whence you can show that they, I do not say after a brief, but at least after a long intention, or at the end of their life, changed their sentence about original sin. You speak empty things, you speak insane things, you speak perverse things and things adverse to your own salvation; be quiet, I beg, why do you speak so much?
JulianImp.4.119IV. 120. Iulianus. Verum pergamus ad reliqua. Nihil prorsus valet, quod te ais diabolo reputare, non corpora, sed delicta; inficiaris omnino, sicut frequenter ostendimus, nullo alio studio, nisi ut Manichaei vites invidiam, cuius inspiras venenum. Corpora enim, prorsus corpora reputas principi tenebrarum, quorum commixtionem diabolicam profiteris, quorum genitalia, quorum motus, quorum fructus accusas. Arguis palam ex primo magisterio membra, non vitia; illud enim dicis diabolicum, quod etiam Manichaeus, sicut in scripturis eius docui, in sexibus indignatur vigere. Et ut repetitione brevi lector noster, quod tenere possit, accipiat; aut ostende esse in parvulis voluntatem, aut ab eis crimen amoveto. Quod cum non facis, sed asseris eos propter hoc a diabolo possideri, quia de corporum sunt commixtione generati; ostendis te non peccata, quae sine voluntate non sunt, sed ipsa corpora adversariae potestati deputare. Ut ergo ea libido, quae et in hominibus et in pecoribus invenitur, naturalis et a Deo instituta est; ita ista libido, quam in disputationis tuae varietate perpeteris, per quam inter varia dogmata contrariaque versaris, non minus a stultitia quam a profanitate concepta est. Haud iniuria ergo Ambrosium a vestra cohorte distinguimus; nec illum, sicut petis, Manichaeum vocamus.
IV. 120. Julian. But let us proceed to the rest. It avails nothing at all, what you say you reckon to the devil, not bodies but faults; you wholly deny, as we have often shown, with no other zeal than to avoid the odium of the Manichean, whose poison you breathe in. For bodies, plainly bodies, you reckon to the prince of darkness, whose mingling you profess to be diabolical, whose genitals, whose movements, whose fruit you accuse. You openly accuse, from his first teaching office, the members, not the vices; for you call that diabolical which even the Manichean, as I taught in his writings, is indignant flourishes in the sexes. And, that our reader may receive by a brief repetition what he can hold: either show that there is a will in the little ones, or remove the crime from them. Which since you do not do, but assert that they are possessed by the devil for this reason, because they are generated of the mingling of bodies, you show that you reckon not the sins, which are not without will, but the bodies themselves, to the adverse power. Just as, then, that disordered desire which is found both in human beings and in cattle is natural and instituted by God, so this disordered desire which you suffer in the variety of your disputation, by which you turn amid diverse and contrary teachings, was conceived no less from folly than from profanity. Not unjustly, then, do we distinguish Ambrose from your cohort; nor do we call him, as you ask, a Manichean.
JulianImp.4.120Augustinus. Inaniter laborasti, ut ad istam conclusionem falsam atque ridiculam, longis et tortuosis, fallacibus et fugacibus anfractibus pervenires, ubi diceres: Non iniuria vos Ambrosium a nostra cohorte distinguere, nec eum dicere manichaeum. Prorsus si illum non dicis, nec me debes dicere; si autem me dicendum putas, et illum cogeris dicere, et illos omnes magnos Ecclesiae clarosque doctores, qui de peccato originali, propter quod me Manichaeum dicis, ea dicunt sine ulla obscuritate vel ambiguitate, quae dico, ut in primo et secundo sex librorum meorum, quos contra quattuor tuos edidi, satis evidenter ostendi. Sed per tuam scilicet dialecticam terreretur, si his diebus superesset Ambrosius, ut ex consequentibus falsis inveniens falsum esse quod senserat, dicere non auderet ulterius, de sexuum commixtione parvulos natos expertes non esse delicti, ne per hoc eos sub potestate diaboli constitueret; tunc ergo te doctore Manichaeus esse desisteret. O quid perdidit, qui te audire non potuit! Proinde quia propter hunc sensum manichaeum me esse dicis, profecto in hoc sensu perseverans, Manichaeus, te auctore, Ambrosius hac excessit e vita. Non ergo illum defendere, quod nullo modo potes, sed dolere debes, quia docere iam non potes; quod si facere potuisses, magisterio tuo ille correptus atque correctus prohiberet utique in Ecclesia quam regebat, exorcizari et exsufflari baptizandos parvulos; ne in tot innocentibus, neque ulla ratione, ut asseris, sub potestate diaboli constitutis imaginibus Dei, ipsi Deo fieret tam gravis atque insignis iniuria; quod tamen si fieri prohiberet Ambrosius, vobiscum de Ecclesia catholica pelleretur. Absit enim ut haec correctio potius, quam deceptio nominetur. Absit ergo ut ille vir vobiscum contra matrem Catholicam consisteret; sed vobis invictus pro illa resisteret. Quid est igitur, quo me ab illo in hac causa separandum putas? Per commixtionem corporum maris et feminae, delicti expertem nasci dico neminem, sicut ille; nec tamen corpora diabolo conditori tribuo, quia nec ille; quemadmodum naturae vitium ambo culpamus, ita naturae auctorem ambo veneramur. Si quoniam concupiscentiam carnis, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, per praevaricationem primi hominis in naturam vertisse dico, ideo arguo membra, non vitia: hoc fecit et ille; si vero aliunde est origo vitiorum, aliunde membrorum; nec ego, nec ille. Voluntatem propriam inesse nascentibus, nec Ambrosius dicit, nec ego; per primi hominis tamen praevaricatricem voluntatem factum esse concupiscentiae vitium, unde per commixtionem sexuum nascentes trahunt originale peccatum, et Ambrosius dicit, et ego. Ambo igitur natos homines, antequam renascantur, non propter eorum substantiam, cuius creator est Deus, sed propter peccatum quod per unum intravit, et per omnes homines pertransiit, cuius peccati auctor est diabolus, potestati adversariae deputamus. Quid est quod te impudentissima fronte mentiris, Ambrosii et aliorum similium dicta defendere atque deluere? Quis ita caecus est, ut non videat quod ea tu reprehendas, ego defendam; tu polluas, ego deluam? Ambrosii dicta sunt de Christo loquentis: Ideo, inquit, et quasi homo per universa tentatus est, et in similitudine hominum cuncta sustinuit; sed quasi de Spiritu natus, abstinuit a peccato; omnis enim homo mendax, et nemo sine peccato nisi unus Deus. Servatum est igitur, inquit, ut ex viro et muliere, id est, per illam corporum commixtionem, nemo videatur expers esse delicti; qui autem expers delicti, expers etiam huiusmodi conceptionis . Ista dicta dicis esse falsissima, eisque Manichaeum dogma nefarium contineri; ac per hoc Ambrosii dicta tu reprehendis et polluis. Ego vero illa et verissima praedico, et Manichaeo non solum non amica, verum et inimica, sicut iam feci, esse demonstro; ego igitur ea potius defendo, et a tuis nefandis criminationibus deluo. Utrum ergo ille noster an vester sit, et vos videtis; sed quia homines a quibus diligitur, formidatis; profecto eum, quem atrociter accusare convincimini, fallacia excusare conamini.
Augustine. You labored in vain, to arrive at that false and ridiculous conclusion, by long and twisting, fallacious and fleeting windings, where you should say: Not unjustly do you distinguish Ambrose from our cohort, nor call him a Manichean. Surely, if you do not call him this, neither ought you to call me this; but if you think me to be called this, you are compelled to call him too, and all those great and illustrious teachers of the Church, who concerning original sin—on account of which you call me a Manichean—say, without any obscurity or ambiguity, the things I say, as in the first and second of my six books, which I published against your four, I have shown evidently enough. But namely Ambrose would be terrified by your dialectic, if he survived these days, so that, finding from the false consequences that what he had thought was false, he would not dare to say any longer that the little ones born of the mingling of the sexes are not free of fault, lest through this he should establish them under the power of the devil; then, therefore, with you as teacher, he would cease to be a Manichean. O what has he lost, who could not hear you! Accordingly, because on account of this sense you say I am a Manichean, surely, persevering in this sense, Ambrose, with you as author, departed from this life a Manichean. You ought, then, not to defend him—which you can in no way do—but to grieve, because you can no longer teach him; which if you could do, that man, rebuked and corrected by your teaching office, would surely forbid, in the Church he ruled, the little ones to be baptized to be exorcized and exsufflated; lest, in so many innocents, and by no reasoning, as you assert, established under the power of the devil—images of God—so grave and signal an injury be done to God himself; which nonetheless, if Ambrose forbade to be done, he would be driven, with you, from the Catholic Church. For far be it that this be called correction rather than deception. Far be it, then, that that man should stand with you against mother Catholic; but, unconquered, he would resist on her behalf against you. What is it, then, by which you think I must be separated from him in this cause? Through the mingling of the bodies of male and female, I say that no one is born free of fault, as he; nor yet do I attribute bodies to the devil as founder, because neither does he; just as we both blame the vice of nature, so we both venerate the author of nature. If, because I say that the concupiscence of the flesh, by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit, turned into nature through the transgression of the first man, I therefore accuse the members, not the vices: this he too did; but if the origin of vices is from one source, of members from another; neither I, nor he. That a proper will is in those being born, neither Ambrose says, nor I; but that, through the transgressing will of the first man, the vice of concupiscence was made, whence those born through the mingling of the sexes draw original sin, both Ambrose says, and I. Both of us, then, reckon human beings born, before they are reborn—not on account of their substance, of which God is the creator, but on account of the sin which through one entered, and passed through all human beings, of which sin the devil is the author—to the adverse power. What is it that you lie, with a most shameless brow, that you defend and wash the sayings of Ambrose and of others like him? Who is so blind as not to see that you censure them, I defend; you pollute, I wash? The sayings of Ambrose, speaking of Christ, are: And therefore, he says, as man he was tempted through all things, and in the likeness of men sustained all things; but as born of the Spirit, he abstained from sin; for every man is a liar, and no one is without sin except one God. It has been observed, then, he says, that from man and woman, that is, through that mingling of bodies, no one is seen to be free of fault; but he who is free of fault is free also of this kind of conception (See Ambrose, Exposition of the Gospel of Luke 1.17). These sayings you say are most false, and that in them is contained the nefarious teaching of the Manichean; and through this you censure and pollute the sayings of Ambrose. But I both proclaim them most true, and show that they are not only not friendly but even hostile to the Manichean, as I have already done; I, therefore, rather defend them, and wash them from your nefarious slanders. Whether, then, that man is ours or yours, you too see; but because you fear the men by whom he is loved, surely him whom you are convicted of accusing atrociously, you try to excuse fallaciously.
JulianImp.4.120IV. 121. Iulianus. Quod dicis ei convicium a Ioviniano factum , in quo mentiri te tamen arbitror; sed annuamus vel Ioviniani te criminatorem verum esse posse, Ambrosiumque ab illo Manichaeum vocatum; at id constat insanum fuisse. Non enim sane poterat Manichaeus vocari, qui bonam naturam, qui peccata voluntaria, qui a Deo institutas nuptias, qui a Deo fieri parvulos praedicabat. Si ergo ille praelationem virginitatis nuptiarum accusationem putavit, nesciit omnino quid diceret. Aliud est enim contrarium, aliud ordinatum. Boni quippe laudatio ad meliora gradus est; infamatio autem naturae ad Manichaeum via est. Cum ergo non damnaret Ambrosius nuptias; nec commixtionem coniugum, vel opus diaboli, vel necessitatem diceret esse peccati; improbe fecit Iovinianus, ut eum conferret Manichaeo, putaretque nihil interesse inter nuptiarum accusatorem et laudatorem. Nam si de legitima et a Deo instituta corporum coniunctione generatos, posteaquam usum coeperunt habere rationis, sponte propria proborum imitatione mentitos dixit Ambrosius; non tamen hanc coniunctionem, mendacii voluit necessitatem videri, sed universitatis indicium. Tale est enim quod dixit: Nati ex parentibus mentiuntur, quale si dixisset: Omnis homo, dumtaxat sui rector arbitrii, aliquando mentitus est; sciebat quippe neminem sine commixtione parentum, praeter Christum, exstitisse. Igitur opere coniugali non iniquitatem, sed generalitatem vir prudens voluit indicari. Christum vero pronuntiavit omne cavisse mendacium, quem miraculo parientis ostendit; quod quidem vehementer contra Hieronymum, cuius tu assecla es, fremit; qui mendacium signatissime Christo est conatus affigere. Non ergo iure vocatus est Manichaeus (si tamen vocatus), qui contra errorem vestrum frequentavit laudationem creaturarum.
IV. 121. Julian. As for the insult you say was made to him by Jovinian (See Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence 2.5.15)—in which, however, I think you lie; but let us grant that you can be a true accuser even of Jovinian, and that Ambrose was called a Manichean by him; yet it is established that this was insane. For he could not rightly be called a Manichean who preached a good nature, voluntary sins, marriages instituted by God, little ones made by God. If, then, Jovinian thought the preferring of virginity to be an accusation of marriages, he knew not at all what he was saying. For one thing is contrary, another ordered. The praise of a good is a step toward better things; but the defamation of nature is a road to the Manichean. Since, then, Ambrose did not condemn marriages, nor say that the mingling of spouses was either a work of the devil or a necessity of sin; Jovinian acted wickedly, in comparing him to a Manichean, and in supposing there was no difference between an accuser and a praiser of marriages. For if Ambrose said that those generated of the legitimate and God-instituted union of bodies, after they began to have the use of reason, lied of their own accord by the imitation of the good; he nonetheless did not want this union to seem a necessity of lying, but an indication of universality. For such is what he said: Those born of parents lie, as if he had said: Every man, at least one having command of his own choice, has at some time lied; for he knew that no one without the mingling of parents, except Christ, had existed. Therefore by the conjugal work the prudent man wished not iniquity, but generality, to be indicated. But Christ he pronounced to have guarded against all lying, whom he showed by the miracle of his bearer; which indeed strongly rages against Jerome, of whom you are a follower, who most expressly tried to fasten a lie upon Christ. Not rightly, then, was he called a Manichean (if at least he was called one), who against your error frequented the praise of creatures.
JulianImp.4.121Augustinus. Laudationem creaturarum frequentamus et nos; quid est ergo quod dicis hoc facere Ambrosium contra errorem nostrum; cum hoc faciat secundum fidem nostram? Quomodo autem illa verba posuerit, quae a me tibi obiecta tu commemorare timuisti, ne tenebrae tuae clarissima luce illorum redarguerentur, aliis etiam scriptorum suorum locis sic ostendit Ambrosius, ut non ei sicut negligentiori, quomodo loqueris, et incautiori sententia ista semel subrepsisse videatur; sed de peccato originali dogma eius, quoniam dogma catholicum est, satis liquida manifestatione declaret. Cur ergo et qua ratione dixerit: Servatum est igitur, ut ex viro et muliere, id est, per illam corporum commixtionem, nemo videatur expers esse delicti; qui autem expers delicti, expers etiam huiusmodi conceptionis; quia non hic peccata hominum posteaquam usum coeperunt habere rationis, ut tu alienaris, sed originale peccatum intellegi voluit; quid alibi dicat attende: Iordanis, inquit, conversus retrorsum, significavit salutaris lavacri futura mysteria, per quae in primordia naturae suae, qui baptizati fuerint, parvuli a malitia reformantur . Dic, Iuliane, a qua malitia, si non trahunt originale peccatum. Audi adhuc alio loco: Non enim virilis coitus, inquit, vulvae virginalis secreta reseravit, sed immaculatum semen inviolabili utero Spiritus Sanctus infudit. Solus enim per omnia ex natis de femina sanctus Dominus Iesus, qui terrenae contagia corruptelae immaculati novitate partus non senserit, et caelesti maiestate depulerit . Responde, Iuliane, quae sint terrenae contagia corruptelae, quae solus ex natis de femina Dominus Iesus immaculati novitate partus non sensit. Adhuc audi: Antequam nascimur, inquit, maculamur contagio. Et paulo post: Et si nec unius, inquit, diei infans sine peccato, multo magis nec illi materni conceptus dies sine peccato sunt . Multa huius viri, quem sani capitis fuisse confessus es, talia commemorare possum; sed cui non sufficiunt ista, quid sufficit? Ex his ergo intellege, quam non sinaris etiam illa, sicut es conatus, in alium sensum detorquere atque pervertere, quo dixit Ambrosius de his qui nascuntur per commixtionem corporum, non arguens Dei creaturam, sed originale peccatum. Quid mihi obtendis Hieronymum cuius me convinciaris asseclam, de cuius verbis nulla nunc quaestio est? Quae tamen verba si posuisses aut ea non habere quod displicere deberet ostenderem, aut intellegentioribus exponenda relinquerem; aut si essent procul dubio contraria veritati, libertate qua dignum est improbarem. Ambrosium respice, quem Manichaeum non audes dicere; cum me propterea dicas, quia de originali peccato ea dico, quae dicit. Nam si propterea non diceres Ambrosium Manichaeum, quia bonam naturam, quia peccata voluntaria, quia nuptias a Deo institutas et a Deo factos parvulos praedicabat; nec me diceres, qui eadem fideliter praedico. Si autem me propterea Manichaeum dicendum putas, quia esse confiteor originale peccatum; hoc etiam ille confitetur; cur non ambos putas? Sed me petulanter dicis, illum latenter opinaris, non veritate distincta, sed exstincta potius libertate. Hoc enim de illo non audes dicere, quod audes credere; aut si de illo ista non credis, profecto nec de me credis; quia et si errare nos existimas, facile est ut videas non esse Manichaeos, qui peccantis propriam substantiam, quam Deus non creaverit non asserimus; sed originale peccatum de vitio voluntario naturae, quam Deus bonam condidit, propagatum esse firmamus. Facile est ergo ut hoc videas, et simul videas nos esse contrarios Manichaeis; sed eorum nomen ab Ambrosio abigis adulando, et mihi obicis calumniando.
Augustine. We too frequent the praise of creatures; what is it, then, that you say Ambrose does this against our error, when he does it according to our faith? But how he set down those words which, objected by me to you, you feared to record, lest your darkness be refuted by their most clear light, Ambrose shows in other places too of his writings, in such a way that this sentence does not seem to have crept upon him once, as upon one more negligent, as you speak, and more incautious; but he declares, by a sufficiently clear manifestation, his teaching about original sin, since it is a Catholic teaching. Why, then, and by what reasoning he said: It has been observed, then, that from man and woman, that is, through that mingling of bodies, no one is seen to be free of fault; but he who is free of fault is free also of this kind of conception—because here he wanted not the sins of human beings after they began to have the use of reason understood, as you alienate it, but original sin—attend to what he says elsewhere: The Jordan, he says, turned backward, signified the future mysteries of the saving bath, through which the little ones who have been baptized are reformed from malice into the first state of their nature (See Ambrose, On the Mysteries). Say, Julian, from what malice, if they do not draw original sin. Hear yet in another place: For not a man's coupling, he says, unbarred the secrets of the virginal womb, but the Holy Spirit poured an immaculate seed into the inviolable womb. For alone through all things, of those born of woman, holy is the Lord Jesus, who, by the newness of an immaculate birth, did not feel the contagions of earthly corruption, and by his heavenly majesty drove them off (See Ambrose, Commentary on Luke 2.56). Answer, Julian, what are the contagions of earthly corruption which alone of those born of woman the Lord Jesus did not feel by the newness of his immaculate birth. Hear still: Before we are born, he says, we are stained by contagion. And a little after: And if not even the infant of one day is without sin, much less are those days of the maternal conception without sin (See Ambrose, Apology of the Prophet David). Many such things of this man, whom you have confessed to have been of sound head, I can record; but to whom these do not suffice, what suffices? From these, then, understand how you are not permitted, even those, as you attempted, to wrench into another sense and pervert, by which Ambrose said of those who are born through the mingling of bodies—not accusing the creature of God, but original sin. Why do you hold out to me Jerome, whose follower you slander me to be, of whose words there is now no question? Which words, however, if you had set down, I would either show that they have nothing that ought to displease, or would leave them to be expounded by the more understanding; or if they were without doubt contrary to truth, I would, with the liberty that is worthy, disapprove them. Look at Ambrose, whom you do not dare to call a Manichean; when you call me one for this reason, because of original sin I say the things he says. For if you would not for that reason call Ambrose a Manichean, because he preached a good nature, voluntary sins, marriages instituted by God, and little ones made by God; neither would you call me one, who faithfully preach the same things. But if you think I must be called a Manichean for this reason, because I confess original sin; this he too confesses; why do you not think both? But me you say petulantly, him you opine secretly—not with truth distinguished, but rather with liberty extinguished. For this you do not dare to say of him, which you dare to believe; or if you do not believe these things of him, surely neither of me; because, even if you reckon us to err, it is easy for you to see that they are not Manicheans, who do not assert a proper substance of the sinner, which God did not create; but affirm that original sin was propagated from a voluntary vice of the nature which God founded good. It is easy, then, for you to see this, and at once to see that we are contrary to the Manicheans; but you drive away the name of Manichean from Ambrose by flattering, and object it to me by slandering.
JulianImp.4.121IV. 122. Iulianus. Verum ut illi infensus Iovinianus arguitur, ita vobis comparatus absolvitur. Quando enim tibi tantum prudentium censura donabit, ut te cum Ioviniani merito componat? Ille quippe dixit boni esse necessitatem; tu, mali; ille ait per mysteria homines ab errore cohiberi; tu vero, nec per gratiam liberari; ille virginitatem Mariae partus conditione dissolvit; tu ipsam Mariam diabolo nascendi conditione transcribis; ille meliora bonis aequat, id est, integritatem connubio; tu vero commixtionem coniugii morbidam vocas, et castitatem foedissimae rei collatione depretias; nec gradum inter haec addis; sed genus omne commutas, non utique bono virginitatem, sed malo praeferens. Est autem vilitatis extremae, nisi teterrimo comparatum, placere non posse. Iam vero quid ille tale de Dei iniuriis, quale tu? Ille eius iudicii vigorem a benignitatis voluit parte confundere; tu a malignitatis; ille dicit apud eum bonos et optimos aequo honore fruituros; tu vero, bonos et impios, id est innocentes et diabolum, uno supplicio cruciandos; ille ergo Deum clementissimum vult videri; tu, iniquissimum; ille dicit mysteriis eius imbutos homines non posse peccare; tu vero ipsum Deum, et in mysteriis imbecillitate, et in praeceptis immoderatione, et in iudiciis immanitate peccare contendis. Cum itaque tanta disparatio sit inter te et Iovinianum, quanta coniunctio inter te et Manichaeum; tanto te tolerabilior Iovinianus probatur, quanto Ioviniano horridior Manichaeus.
IV. 122. Julian. But just as Jovinian, hostile to him, is refuted, so compared to you he is absolved. For when will the censure of prudent men grant you so much as to place you on a par with the merit of Jovinian? For he said that there is a necessity of good; you, of evil; he said that human beings are restrained from error through the mysteries; you, that they are not even set free through grace; he dissolved the virginity of Mary by the condition of childbearing; you transcribe Mary herself to the devil by the condition of being born; he equals better things to good things, that is, integrity to wedlock; you call the mingling of marriage diseased, and depreciate chastity by comparison with a most foul thing; nor do you add a step between these things; but you change the whole genus, preferring virginity not, surely, to a good, but to an evil. But it is of the utmost vileness not to be able to please, unless compared to a most foul thing. But now what such thing did he say of the injuries of God as you? He wished to confound the vigor of his judgment on the side of kindness; you, on the side of malignity; he says that with him good and best men will enjoy equal honor; you, that good men and the impious, that is, innocents and the devil, are to be tortured with one punishment; he, then, wants God to seem most clement; you, most unjust; he says that men imbued with his mysteries cannot sin; you contend that God himself sins, both in the mysteries by weakness, and in the precepts by immoderation, and in the judgments by monstrousness. Since, then, there is so great a disparity between you and Jovinian, as great a conjunction between you and the Manichean; you are proved so much more bearable than Jovinian, as the Manichean is more horrid than Jovinian.
JulianImp.4.122Augustinus. Quam bellus tibi videris, cum me Ioviniano comparans, peiorem conaris ostendere. Verum hanc quoque contumeliam mendacissimam cum Ambrosio me a te accipere gaudeo; sed te sic insanire contristor. Ea quippe causa me Ioviniano dicis esse peiorem, qua me dicis etiam Manichaeum. Et quid est hoc? Illud scilicet originale peccatum, quod vos negatis cum Pelagio, nos vero cum Ambrosio confitemur. Cum illo igitur, secundum vos, sumus et Manichaei, et peiores Ioviniano, et quidquid nos aliud ore protervo, nec sane veridico, sed maledico dixeritis, docuit nos Dominus gaudere et exsultare, quando qualiacumque maledicta non ex veritate audimus, sed quia pro veritate certamus . Ecce ego non dico mali esse necessitatem, quia nec Ambrosius; et tamen dico parvulos a malitia reformari, quod et Ambrosius; et ideo mali nulla est necessitas, quia et illud Deo sanabile est, quod trahit nativitas; quanto magis quod addit voluntas? Non dico, nec per gratiam homines liberari; quod absit ut dicat Ambrosius; sed quod non vis dicimus, nonnisi per gratiam liberari, non solum ut eis debita dimittantur, verum etiam ne in tentationem inferantur. Non trascribimus diabolo Mariam conditione nascendi; sed ideo, quia ipsa conditio solvitur gratia renascendi. Non tamquam malo bonum, sed tamquam bono melius, virginitatem nuptiis anteponimus. Non, ut calumniaris, bonos et impios uno supplicio; sed bonos nullo, impios autem non uno, sed pro diversitate ipsius impietatis, diversis suppliciis dicimus esse cruciandos. Non dicimus Deum in mysteriis imbecillitate, in praeceptis immoderatione, in iudiciis immanitate peccare, cuius et gratia regeneratis mysteria sunt utilia, et gratia liberatis praecepta salubria, et bonis malisque convenienter distributa iudicia. Ecce nos ea, in quibus nos dicitis Ioviniano esse peiores, amolimur a nobis; vos a vobis amolimini, si potestis, in quibus vos peiores eodem ipso Ioviniano esse monstrabo. Ille dixit boni esse necessitatem; vos dicitis esse bonam mali cupiditatem; ille ait per mysteria homines ab errore cohiberi; vos, viam rectam gradiendi cupiditatem non inspirari a Deo, sed arbitrio libero acquiri; ille virginitatem Mariae partus conditione dissolvit; vos ipsam carnem sanctam de Virgine procreatam ceterae carni hominum coaequatis, similitudinem carnis peccati non distinguentes a carne peccati; ille meliora bonis aequat, id est, integritatem connubio; vos, mala bonis; nam discordiam carnis et spiritus tam dicitis esse bonum, quam concordiam nuptiarum; ille dicit apud Deum aequalem honorem bonos et optimos habituros; vos autem, quosdam bonos non solum in regno Dei honorem nullum adepturos, sed nec ipsum regnum esse visuros; ille dicit Dei mysteriis homines imbutos non posse peccare; vos dicitis facilius quidem per Dei gratiam, sed et sine illa per liberum arbitrium posse homines non peccare; audacia gigantea repugnantes Deo, cum de bonis fructibus loqueretur dicenti: Sine me nihil potestis facere . Cum igitur in deterius tantum a Ioviniani errore distetis, nos tamen ei subicitis, et Manichaeo potius adaequatis; magno scilicet praesidio communiti, quasi propterea condideritis haeresim novam, ut quando vos redarguimus, nullis haereticis adaequare possimus. Ego tamen in haec causa, in qua tibi de originali peccato multum videor detestandus, et Manichaeo potius coaequandus, cum Ambrosio sum, velis nolis, quem Iovinianus Manichaeum dicebat, ut tu; sed libere ille, tu subdole. Denique semel ille vincitur, cum Manichaeus non esse demonstratur Ambrosius; tu vero quia voluisti cor duplex habere, bis vinceris. Arguis Ambrosium Manichaeum esse: ostendo non esse; negas te arguere, ostendo te arguere; utrumque autem clarebit ei qui superius quae dixerit legerit.
Augustine. How handsome you seem to yourself, when, comparing me to Jovinian, you try to show me worse! But this most mendacious insult too I rejoice to receive with Ambrose from you; but I am saddened that you so rave. For by that cause you say I am worse than Jovinian, by which you say I am also a Manichean. And what is this? That original sin, namely, which you deny with Pelagius, but we confess with Ambrose. With him, then, according to you, we are both Manicheans, and worse than Jovinian, and whatever else you shall have said with a saucy mouth, and not, surely, truthful, but slanderous; the Lord has taught us to rejoice and exult, when we hear curses of any kind, not from truth, but because we contend for truth (See Matt 5:11-12). Behold, I do not say that there is a necessity of evil, because neither does Ambrose; and yet I say that the little ones are reformed from malice, which Ambrose too; and therefore there is no necessity of evil, because that too is curable by God which nativity draws; how much more what the will adds? I do not say that human beings are not even set free through grace; which far be it that Ambrose should say; but, what you do not want, we say that they are set free only through grace, not only that their debts be remitted to them, but even that they be not brought into temptation. We do not transcribe Mary to the devil by the condition of being born; but for this reason, because that very condition is dissolved by the grace of being reborn. Not as though a good to an evil, but as though to a good a better, do we prefer virginity to marriage. Not, as you slander, good men and the impious with one punishment; but the good with none, but the impious not with one, but, according to the diversity of the very impiety, with diverse punishments, do we say must be tortured. We do not say that God sins in the mysteries by weakness, in the precepts by immoderation, in the judgments by monstrousness—God, both whose grace the mysteries are useful to the regenerated, and whose grace the precepts are wholesome to the set free, and whose judgments are fittingly distributed to the good and the evil. Behold, we remove from us those things in which you say we are worse than Jovinian; you remove from yourselves, if you can, those in which I will show you to be worse than that same Jovinian. He said that there is a necessity of good; you say that there is a good disordered desire of evil; he said that human beings are restrained from error through the mysteries; you, that the disordered desire of walking the right way is not inspired by God, but acquired by free choice; he dissolved the virginity of Mary by the condition of childbearing; you equal the very holy flesh procreated from the Virgin to the rest of the flesh of human beings, not distinguishing the likeness of the flesh of sin from the flesh of sin; he equals better things to good things, that is, integrity to wedlock; you, evil things to good things; for the discord of flesh and spirit you say to be a good, as the concord of marriage; he says that with God good and best men will have an equal honor; but you say that some good men not only will obtain no honor in the kingdom of God, but will not even see that kingdom; he says that human beings imbued with the mysteries of God cannot sin; you say that more easily indeed through the grace of God, but even without it, through free choice, human beings can not sin; resisting God with a giant's boldness, when he speaks of good fruits and says: Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5). Since, then, you differ from the error of Jovinian by so much for the worse, you nonetheless subject us to him, and rather equate us to the Manichean; fortified, surely, by a great defense, as though for this reason you founded a new heresy, that when we refute you, we might be able to equate you to no heretics. I, however, in this cause, in which I much seem to you, on account of original sin, detestable, and rather to be equated to the Manichean, am with Ambrose, like it or not, whom Jovinian called a Manichean, as you call me; but he freely, you slyly. Finally, once he is conquered, when Ambrose is shown not to be a Manichean; but you, because you wished to have a double heart, are twice conquered. You argue that Ambrose is a Manichean: I show that he is not; you deny that you argue this: I show that you do argue it; but both will be clear to him who will read above what he himself said.
JulianImp.4.122IV. 123. Iulianus. Verum videamus et cetera. De his quae egimus satis superque lectorem instructum puto, qua virtute vel meorum dictorum aliquid oppugnet, vel opinionem tueatur suam; et ideo non erit necesse scriptorum id omnium repetitione monstrare. Quoniam vix singulos sparsosque versiculos de libro meo proponens sibi, eosque laudans frequenter, nonnumquam etiam titillat suggillatione brevissima; cum tamen hoc quod mordendum putat, a me non sit ita, ut suspicatur, prolatum. Quamobrem ad illud opus meum lectorem dirigo; videbit assertionem concinere veritati. Hic sane qui sibi querebatur obiectum, quod naturam criminaretur et semina, continuam simulandi non potuit tenere patientiam; sed postquam praestigiis patroni sui serenavit auditum, velut testudo caput aperit. Nam cum dixisset, quia nisi Adam peccasset, ita homines generare potuissent, ut solemus aut articulos commovere, aut unguiculas exsecare; addidit: Sed si semen ipsum nullum maledictum habet, quid est quod scriptum est in libro Sapientiae: Non ignorans quoniam nequam erat natio illorum, et naturalis malitia ipsorum, et quia non poterat mutari cogitatio illorum in perpetuum; semen enim erat maledictum ab initio ? Atque ipsum testimonium quod protulit, subdita argumentatione prosequitur: Nempe de quibuscumque ista dicat, de hominibus, inquit, dicit . En qui se profitebatur a Manichaeorum studiis destitisse, qui sub occasione sententiae quam non intellegit, maledictum semen, malitiam naturalem, et inconvertibilem cogitationem pronuntiat iniquorum. Fama est, apud cataclita Nili aquarum proruentium strepitu usu aurium accolas destitutos. Finxerit illud opinio, quae de magnis maiora dispergit; valet tamen exemplum ad castigandam insipientium surditatem, qui fragore terroris mutui, sicut aspides surdae rerum vocibus obnituntur. Clamat Augustinus: Nequam est hominum natio, naturalis malitia, immutabilis cogitatio in perpetuum, semen maledictum ab initio. Et inveniuntur adhuc, qui illum non usquequaque Manichaei autument charactere percussum? Interrogentur hodie quicumque sunt ipsarum sordium sectatores publici; si aliud dixerint, nos putemur fuisse mentiti. Ergo si est malitia naturalis, quomodo te fingis malam non pronuntiare naturam? Si est semen maledictum ab initio, quomodo te dicis vitia voluntatum accusare, non seminum? Si immutabilis cogitatio malignantium est, quomodo te peieras liberum arbitrium confiteri? Nisi superest, ut illos Hebraeos, Sirach, vel Philonem, qui libri ipsius qui Sapientia dicitur, auctores incerta opinione creduntur, dicas fuisse Manichaeos.
IV. 123. Julian. But let us look at the rest too. Concerning the things we have done, I think the reader is sufficiently and more than sufficiently instructed, with what strength he may either assail any of my words, or defend his own opinion; and therefore it will not be necessary to show it by a repetition of all the writings. Since, taking scarcely individual and scattered little verses from my book and setting them before himself, and frequently praising them, sometimes too he tickles them with a most brief suggillation; though nonetheless what he thinks must be bitten was not brought forth by me as he suspects. Wherefore I direct the reader to that work of mine; he will see the assertion harmonize with truth. This man, surely, who complained that it was objected to him that he was accusing nature and the seeds, could not keep a continual patience of pretense; but after he calmed his hearing with the legerdemain of his patron, like a tortoise he opens his head. For when he had said that, unless Adam had sinned, human beings could have generated in the way we are accustomed either to move our joints or to cut our little nails; he added: But if the seed itself has no curse, what is it that is written in the book of Wisdom: Not being ignorant that their nation was wicked, and their malice natural, and that their thought could not be changed forever; for their seed was cursed from the beginning (Wis 12:10-11)? And the very testimony which he brought forth he pursues with a subjoined argumentation: Surely, of whomsoever it says these things, it says them of human beings, he says. Behold one who professed that he had desisted from the pursuits of the Manicheans, who, under the occasion of a sentence which he does not understand, pronounces a cursed seed, a natural malice, and an unconvertible thought of the wicked. There is a report that, near the cataracts of the Nile, the inhabitants are deprived of the use of their ears by the roar of the rushing waters. Opinion may have feigned that, which scatters greater things about great matters; yet the example avails to chastise the deafness of the foolish, who, by the crash of mutual terror, like deaf asps, struggle against the voices of things. Augustine cries out: The nation of human beings is wicked, the malice natural, the thought immutable forever, the seed cursed from the beginning. And are there still found those who would suppose him not everywhere struck with the mark of the Manichean? Let any who are public followers of those same filths be questioned today; if they should say otherwise, let us be thought to have lied. If, then, there is a natural malice, how do you feign that you do not pronounce nature evil? If there is a seed cursed from the beginning, how do you say that you accuse the vices of wills, not of seeds? If there is an immutable thought of the malignant, how do you forswear yourself confessing free choice? Unless it remains for you to say that those Hebrews, Sirach, or Philo, who by an uncertain opinion are believed to be the authors of that book which is called Wisdom, were Manicheans.
JulianImp.4.123Augustinus. Quilibet auctor fuerit libri huius, bene, quia auctoritatem eius non respuis. Idoneus est igitur, ex quo adversus vos, quae possumus invenire, testimonia proferamus. Nam et Pelagius doctor vester in libro quem Testimoniorum vel Capitulorum edidit, posuit ex isto libro quae intentioni suae credidit convenire . Cuius libri auctor magis quia Manichaeus non fuit, satis aperteque demonstrat, etiam ab eis qui Manichaei non sunt, et in Ecclesia Christi legi accipique meruerunt, potuisse dici malitiam naturalem, sine ulla reprehensione institutionis et conditionis Dei, naturarum omnium sapientissimi atque optimi creatoris. Unde et Apostolus non alio sensu dixisse intellectus est: Fuimus enim et nos aliquando natura filii irae, sicut et ceteri . Quod quidam non ad verbum, sed ad sententiam sunt interpretati dicentes: Fuimus enim et nos aliquando naturaliter filii irae. Quod autem ait: sicut et ceteri, ostendit omnes irae filios esse natura, nisi quosdam eorum a massa perditionis gratia divina discernat. De alienis ergo ab hac gratia, etiam Petrus apostolus loquens: Hi vero, inquit, velut muta animalia procreata naturaliter in captivitatem et interitum . Non se quippe exuebant veterem hominem. Nisi autem vetus omnis homo nasceretur, nullus parvulus renascendo renovaretur. Absit ergo, ut cum Creatoris dicatur iniuria, naturaliter esse homines irae filios; sicut sine ulla eius iniuria quisque dicitur naturaliter surdus; aut naturaliter caecus, aut naturaliter morbidus; itemque alius naturaliter fatuus, alius naturaliter obliviosus, alius naturaliter iracundus; et cetera innumerabilia vitia, sive corporum, sive, quod est gravius, animorum, Dei opificio creatorum, eiusdemque Dei occulto, sed iusto iudicio vitiatorum. Idem quippe ipse totius hominis creator: et tamen quamvis cum eius laude natura sit homo; nullo modo tamen cum eius vituperatione natura vitiosus est homo. Scimus itaque non vitia, sed naturas esse tribuendas conditori Deo; sed unde sint vitia, debet dicere, qui vult resistere Manichaeo. Et de aliarum quidem rerum vitiis, quas a Deo creatas fatemur, sed eius sapientissima ordinatione, sive bonis, sive etiam malis angelis subditas, respondere facillimum est, ab eis quibus subiacent, earum quoque semina posse vitiari, ut non solum fiant, verum etiam concipiantur nascanturque vitiosae. De homine agitur, de rationali animante, de imagine Dei agitur, cuius natura nullo modo diaboli ludibrium fieret, quem recte credimus auctorem esse vitiorum, nisi per iustum Dei iudicium propter originale peccatum. Denique nec vos ipsi, quantum existimo, dicere audetis, quamvis dogma vestrum haec tam dira sequatur absurditas, in paradiso exortura fuisse tot ac tanta vitia naturalia, si peccante nemine, illa in qua est condita, naturae humanae felicitas permaneret. Vos autem negantes originale peccatum, profecto naturam quam Deus non creavit, ex cuius commixtione sint hominum cum quibus nascuntur vitia, facitis introduci. O perversi haeretici, Manichaeorum adiutores, de Manichaeis calumniatores, et Catholicorum eadem concorditer contra vos vera dicentium, aliorum contentiosi criminatores, aliorum subdoli adulatores!
Augustine. Whoever was the author of this book, it is well that you do not spurn its authority. It is therefore suitable, that from it we may bring forth, against you, what testimonies we can find. For Pelagius too, your teacher, in the book which he published of Testimonies or of Chapters, set down from that book the things he believed suited his intention (See Pelagius, Testimonies). The author of which book, the more because he was not a Manichean, sufficiently and openly shows that even by those who are not Manicheans, and who have merited to be read and received in the Church of Christ, a natural malice could be spoken of, without any censure of the institution and condition of God, the most wise and best creator of all natures. Whence the Apostle too is understood to have said in no other sense: For we too were once by nature children of wrath, like the rest (Eph 2:3). Which some have interpreted not according to the word, but according to the meaning, saying: For we too were once naturally children of wrath. But in that he says: like the rest, he shows that all are by nature children of wrath, unless divine grace discern certain of them from the mass of perdition. Of those alien from this grace, then, the apostle Peter too, speaking: But these, he says, like dumb animals, naturally procreated for capture and destruction (See 2 Pet 2:12). For they were not putting off the old man. But unless every old man were born, no little one would be renewed by being reborn. Far be it, then, that, when the injury of the Creator be said, human beings are naturally children of wrath; just as without any injury of his anyone is said to be naturally deaf; or naturally blind, or naturally diseased; and likewise another naturally foolish, another naturally forgetful, another naturally irascible; and other innumerable vices, whether of bodies, or—what is graver—of minds created by the handiwork of God, and by the hidden but just judgment of that same God vitiated. For he himself is the same creator of the whole man: and yet, although with his praise man be a nature, in no way nonetheless is man with his censure a vicious nature. We know, then, that not vices but natures are to be attributed to God the founder; but whence the vices are, he ought to say who wishes to resist the Manichean. And concerning the vices indeed of other things, which we confess were created by God, but, by his most wise ordination, subjected either to good or even to evil angels, it is most easy to answer, that by those to whom they are subject, their seeds too can be vitiated, so that they not only come to be, but even are conceived and born, vicious. It is about man that we are dealing, about a rational living being, about the image of God, whose nature would in no way become the plaything of the devil—whom we rightly believe to be the author of vices—except through the just judgment of God on account of original sin. Finally, not even you yourselves, as I think, dare to say—although your teaching is followed by this so dire absurdity—that in paradise so many and so great natural vices would have been going to arise, if, with no one sinning, the happiness in which it was founded had remained for human nature. But you, denying original sin, surely cause a nature which God did not create—from whose mingling are the vices of human beings with which they are born—to be introduced. O perverse heretics, helpers of the Manicheans, slanderers concerning the Manicheans, and contentious accusers of some Catholics saying the same true things concordantly against you, sly flatterers of others!
JulianImp.4.123IV. 124. Iulianus. Exspectet nunc forsitan lector, quomodo hoc testimonium debeat intellegi; quod certe non pertinere ad traducem peccati, nec ad Manichaeorum opinionem, iste ipse qui fuerat eius usurpator, ostendit; ait enim: De quibuscumque hoc dicat, de hominibus dicit; cum certe si de naturali peccato diceret, non de quibuscumque, sed de omnibus loqueretur. Opinio quippe Manichaeorum generaliter cunctorum mortalium infamat naturam; sententia vero de qua quaerimus, etiam ab ipso plagiatore suo recipit testimonium, quod non in omnes, sed in aliquos prolata sit. Ex quo constat, nullum ei negotium fuisse cum traduce, quae nequaquam universos, sed plerosque percellit. Igitur ostenso nihil de ea spectare ad profanam opinionem, ipsius libri suffragio scriptoris eius sanitas asseratur. Loquitur ad Deum: Misereris omnium, quoniam omnia potes, et dissimulas peccata hominum propter poenitentiam; diligis enim omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti horum quae fecisti. Quomodo enim posset aliquid permanere, nisi tu voluisses? Parcis autem omnibus, quoniam tua sunt, Domine, qui animas diligis. Bonus enim spiritus tuus est in omnibus; propter quod hos qui errant, partibus corripis, et de quibus peccant admonens alloqueris, ut relicta malitia credant in te, Domine .
IV. 124. Julian. Now perhaps the reader awaits how this testimony ought to be understood; which surely that it does not pertain to the traduction of sin, nor to the opinion of the Manicheans, this very man who had been its usurper shows; for he says: Of whomsoever it says this, it says it of human beings; when surely, if it spoke of natural sin, it would speak not of some, but of all. For the opinion of the Manicheans defames generally the nature of all mortals; but the sentence about which we ask receives even from its own plagiarist the testimony that it was uttered not against all, but against some. From which it is established that he had no business with traduction, which by no means strikes all, but very many. Therefore, it being shown that nothing of it pertains to the profane opinion, by the suffrage of the book itself let the soundness of its writer be asserted. He speaks to God: You have mercy on all, because you can do all things, and you overlook the sins of men for the sake of penance; for you love all things that are, and hate nothing of those things you have made. For how could anything endure, unless you had willed it? But you spare all, because they are yours, O Lord, who love souls. For your good spirit is in all things; for which reason those who err you correct in parts, and concerning the things in which they sin you admonish and address them, that, with malice abandoned, they may believe in you, O Lord (Wis 11:24-12:2).
JulianImp.4.124Augustinus. Quomodo miseretur omnium Deus, cum alia Scriptura dicat: Non miserearis omnium qui operantur iniquitatem ; nisi quia et in illis quorum non miseretur, omnes homines ita sunt, ut omnia genera hominum intellegantur; sicut dictum est: Decimatis omne olus , id est, omne oleris genus? Quid autem te adiuvat, quod scriptura libri Sapientiae non de omnibus hominibus loquebatur, ubi ait, quod naturalis esset malitia illorum. Neque enim quia de quibusdam, non de omnibus hominibus agebat, ideo etiam fecit intellegi nullos alios esse tales; cum Apostolus dicat: Fuimus nos aliquando natura filii irae, sicut et ceteri . Israelitas autem illo tempore, non quidem etiam ipsos omnes, sed pios, ab his de quibus dictum est: Naturalis malitia eorum, non discernebat natura, sed gratia; propter quod etiam Dei filii sunt nuncupati. Videndum est etiam, quomodo dictum sit: Diligis omnia quae sunt; quoniam sunt etiam iniqui; et alibi scriptum est: Odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem . Diligit ergo et ipsos, in quantum homines sunt, odit in quantum iniqui sunt; et damnat eos qui iniqui sunt, et facit esse quia homines sunt: Quia nihil, inquit, odisti horum quae fecisti. Amat ergo Deus homines usque adeo, ut etiam, cum iniqui sunt, amet ut homines sunt, quamvis oderit quod iniqui sint. Ac per hoc iniqui quos Deus odit, et sunt homines, quoniam Deus suum amat opificium; et miseri sunt, quoniam Deus amat iudicium.
Augustine. How does God have mercy on all, when another Scripture says: You will not have mercy on all who work iniquity (Ps 59:5 (58:6)); unless because even in those on whom he does not have mercy, all human beings are in such a way that all kinds of human beings are understood—just as it is said: You tithe every herb (See Luke 11:42), that is, every kind of herb? But what does it help you, that the scripture of the book of Wisdom was not speaking of all human beings, where it said that their malice was natural? For not because it was dealing with some, not all human beings, did it therefore make it understood that there are no others such; since the Apostle says: We were once by nature children of wrath, like the rest (Eph 2:3). But the Israelites at that time—not indeed all of them either, but the devout—from those of whom it was said, their malice is natural, not nature, but grace distinguished; on account of which they were also called sons of God. It must be seen too how it was said: You love all things that are; since there are also the wicked; and elsewhere it is written: You hate all who work iniquity (Ps 5:5 (5:6)). He loves, then, even those very ones, insofar as they are human beings; he hates them, insofar as they are wicked; and he condemns those who are wicked, and makes them be because they are human beings: For nothing, it says, you hate of those things you have made. God loves human beings, then, to such a degree that even when they are wicked, he loves them as they are human beings, although he hates that they are wicked. And through this the wicked, whom God hates, are both human beings, since God loves his handiwork; and miserable, since God loves judgment.
JulianImp.4.124IV. 125. Iulianus. Cernisne quam infesta sit opinioni vestrae gratificatio Dei laudatoris? Dicit eum condere animas, et amare; quod a vobis negatur, qui iuratis innocentium animas esse sub diabolo, et exosas Deo; cum nihil habeant aliud, quam quod ab auctore sortitae sunt.
IV. 125. Julian. Do you see how hostile to your opinion is the gratification of God's praiser? He says that he founds souls, and loves them; which is denied by you, who swear that the souls of innocents are under the devil, and hateful to God; when they have nothing else than what they have been allotted by their author.
JulianImp.4.125Augustinus. Ergo secundum te, et fatuitatem a Deo auctore sortiuntur quicumque fatui nascuntur, quos magis quam mortuos dicit sacra Scriptura esse lugendos . Sed istorum quoque animas secundum quemdam modum, id est, ut sint, ut vivant, ut sentiant, ut quamvis obtunsa mentis acie, tamen pecoribus antecellant, amat utique Deus. Alia autem est illa dilectio, de qua scriptum est: Neminem diligit Deus, nisi eum qui cum sapientia habitat . Sed vos dicite, unde plus amet Deus animas parvulorum, quibus providet lavacrum regenerationis, ut eos mittat in regnum; et unde aliis non praestet hoc beneficium; cum eos non discernant ulla merita voluntatum, nec sit apud Deum, quam nobis insulsissime soletis obicere, acceptio personarum. Quamquam ubi dictum est: Amas animas, nec dictum est: Omnes animas, nulla sit quaestio. Fortasse quippe sic positum est, ut omnes Deus animas condat; nec omnes tamen diligat, sed quas a ceteris non meritis earum, sed suae gratiae largitate discernit, ut habitent cum sapientia; quia neminem diligit Deus, nisi eum qui cum sapientia habitat; Dominus autem dat sapientiam .
Augustine. Therefore, according to you, whoever are born foolish are allotted foolishness too from God their author—whom the sacred Scripture says must be lamented more than the dead (See Sir 22:11). But the souls of these too, according to a certain measure—that is, that they be, that they live, that they have sense, that, though with a dulled edge of mind, they nonetheless surpass the cattle—God surely loves. But that love is another, of which it is written: God loves no one except him who dwells with wisdom (See Wis 7:28). But you, say whence God loves more the souls of those little ones for whom he provides the bath of regeneration, that he may send them into the kingdom; and whence to others he does not bestow this benefit; when no merits of wills distinguish them, nor is there with God, what you most insipidly are wont to object to us, a respecting of persons. Although where it is said: You love souls, it is not said: All souls, there is no question. For perhaps it is so set down that God founds all souls; nor yet loves all, but those whom, not by their own merits, but by the largess of his own grace, he distinguishes from the rest, so that they dwell with wisdom; because God loves no one except him who dwells with wisdom; but the Lord gives wisdom (See Wis 7:28; Prov 2:6).
JulianImp.4.125IV. 126. Iulianus. Paenitentiam quoque, quam Deum affirmat dare, vestrum dogma non recipit, in quo malum naturale et nequitia mutari nesciat continetur.
IV. 126. Julian. The penance too, which he affirms that God gives, your teaching does not receive, in which a natural evil and a malice that knows not how to be changed is contained.
JulianImp.4.126Augustinus. Immo nos potius contra vos dicimus, et ipsam paenitentiam Deum dare; quia licet voluntate quisque agat paenitentiam; praeparatur etiam voluntas a Domino , et haec est immutatio dexterae Excelsi , quam sacer insonat Psalmus; quia ut fleret Petrus, eum respexit Dominus ; unde ait de quibusdam coapostolus eius: Ne forte det illis Deus paenitentiam . Et quod immutabilis malitia dicitur, homini est immutabilis, qui eam mutare non potest; non Deo, qui omnia potest.
Augustine. Nay rather, we ourselves rather say against you that God gives the very penance too; because, although each one does penance by will, yet the will too is prepared by the Lord (See Prov 8:35 (LXX)), and this is the change of the right hand of the Most High (Ps 77:10 (76:11)), which the sacred Psalm sounds; because, that Peter might weep, the Lord looked upon him (See Luke 22:61-62); whence his fellow Apostle says of certain people: Lest perhaps God give them penance (See 2 Tim 2:25). And what is called an immutable malice is immutable to the man, who cannot change it, not to God, who can do all things.
JulianImp.4.126IV. 127. Iulianus. Quod autem commendavit admonere Deum, ut relicta malitia peccatores credant in eum, evertit omnino opinionem naturalis mali; quia certum est relinqui non posse congenita.
IV. 127. Julian. But what he commended—that God admonishes, so that, with malice abandoned, sinners may believe in him—wholly overturns the opinion of natural evil; because it is certain that congenital things cannot be abandoned.
JulianImp.4.127Augustinus. Possunt etiam congenita relinqui; sed quando id operatur in homine Omnipotens; nam et corruptio congenita est corpori, quod tamen erit incorruptibile.
Augustine. Even congenital things can be abandoned; but when the Almighty works this in a man; for corruption too is congenital to the body, which nonetheless will be incorruptible.
JulianImp.4.127IV. 128. Iulianus. Hinc explicata patientia Dei, et dispensatione mitissima, qua non vult mortem morientis, nisi ut revertatur et vivat, approbare quod dixerat etiam per exempla persistit, facitque mentionem eorum, qui in terra chananaea viventes pessime iram Omnipotentis accenderant, ut impenderetur ultione iustissima Israelitarum triumphis, sub Dei iam lege viventium. Illos enim antiquos habitatores sanctae tuae terrae odiens, quoniam odibilia opera tibi faciebant, per medicamina et sacrificia iniusta, et necatores filiorum sine misericordia, voluisti perdere per manus parentum nostrorum, ut dignam percipiant peregrinationem puerorum Dei, quae tibi omnium charior est terra . Septem gentes, quibus ex maxima parte deletis, Israelitis terra repromissionis data est, propter quid Deus voluerit perire, testatur. Ne enim in una hominum natura per aliquam personarum acceptionem apud Deum videretur esse discretio; propter quid Chananaei meruerint interfici, commendat. Illos ergo antiquos habitatores sanctae tuae terrae, inquit, odio habuisti. Quamobrem? Certe secundum te debuit subdere, quia de diabolica erant commixtione generati, quia a tenebrarum principe possidebantur, quia tabificavit Adam omnes de sua stirpe venturos. Verum nihil horum: sed quam causam reddit odiorum? Sola opera commissa per voluntatem liberam. Oderas, inquit, eos, quoniam exosa tibi opera faciebant. Verum ne nesciremus, quae essent opera, tuque haec gentium facta concupiscentiam genitalem vocares, ipsas species operationis exsequitur. Per medicamina, inquit, et sacrificia iniusta, et necatores erant filiorum sine misericordia; id est, maleficiis et sacrificiis serviebant, quae iniusta erant, cum idolis offerebantur, cultu Creatoris abiecto; quibus sacrilegiis ipsas necessitudines deputabant; daemonas videlicet etiam parricidiorum immanitate placantes. Vide itaque quam non de eo loquatur crimine, quod confingit Manichaeus, id est, cunctis per naturam adhaerente mortalibus, qui hinc illos potissimum offendisse commemorat, quod nec a parvulorum suorum exitiis temperabant. Quorum certe mors non recurreret ad interfectoris invidiam, si propter unum peccatum et parricida Deo displiceret, et filius.
IV. 128. Julian. Hence, the patience of God being unfolded, and his most mild dispensation, by which he does not will the death of the dying, but that he turn back and live (See Ezek 18:32; 33:11), he persists, by examples too, to approve what he had said, and he makes mention of those who, living most wickedly in the land of Canaan, had kindled the wrath of the Almighty, that it might be expended in the most just vengeance of the triumphs of the Israelites, now living under the law of God. For those ancient inhabitants of your holy land, hating because they did to you hateful works through medicaments and unjust sacrifices, and slayers of children without mercy, you willed to destroy through the hands of our parents, that the land, which of all is dearest to you, might receive a worthy colony of the children of God (Wis 12:3-7). The seven nations, for the most part destroyed, to the Israelites the land of promise was given; on account of what God willed them to perish, it attests. For lest, in one nature of human beings, there should seem to be a discrimination with God through some respecting of persons, on account of what the Canaanites merited to be slain, it commends. Those ancient inhabitants of your holy land, then, he says, you held in hatred. Wherefore? Surely, according to you, he ought to subjoin: because they were generated of a diabolical mingling, because they were possessed by the prince of darkness, because Adam infected with disease all who would come from his stock. But nothing of these; but what cause does he render for the hatreds? The deeds alone committed through free will. You hated them, he says, because they did to you hateful works. But lest we should not know what the works were, and you should call these deeds of the nations genital concupiscence, it pursues the very kinds of the working. Through medicaments, he says, and unjust sacrifices, and they were slayers of children without mercy; that is, they served sorceries and sacrifices, which were unjust, since they were offered to idols, with the worship of the Creator cast off; to which sacrileges they reckoned even their own kinships; placating the demons, namely, even by the monstrousness of parricides. See, then, how it does not speak of that crime which the Manichean contrives—that is, clinging by nature to all mortals—who records that they offended him chiefly by this, that they did not even spare from the destructions of their own little ones. Whose death surely would not recur to the odium of the slayer, if for one sin both the parricide displeased God, and the son.
JulianImp.4.128Augustinus. Sic ista loqueris, quasi propter unum aliquod peccati genus omnes homines puniantur, aut nos dicamus propter solum originale peccatum esse irae filios eos, qui iam grandes aetates agunt. Quisquis non credit in Filium, sicut ait ipse Filius, non habebit vitam, sed ira Dei manet super eum ; sed sunt aliis alii peiores, super quos Dei utique ira maior manet; nec tamen omnes sic evertuntur atque delentur, ut isti de quibus agitur, qui terram, quae Israelitis data est, possidebant. Quid est ergo quod dicis: Vide itaque quam non de eo loquatur crimine, quod confingit Manichaeus? Ubi vis intellegi originale peccatum; quod non confingit Manichaeus, sed, ut ceteri Catholici, et contra vos, et contra Manichaeum confitetur Ambrosius; quia non est alienae naturae commixtio, quam Manichaeus inducit; sed nostrae depravatio de peccato, quod in mundum per unum hominem intravit, et per omnes homines pertransiit, quod contra fidem catholicam vos negatis. Usque adeone caecus es, ut non videas, quia si propterea peccatum originale non est, quia hic commemoratum non est, nec alia peccata peccata erunt, quae hic commemorata non sunt, sive istis minora, sive maiora? Numquid ideo Sodomitae deleti non sunt, quia non de illis dictum est quod maleficia et parricidalia sacrificia faciebant? Aut ideo isti Chananaei deleti non sunt, quia non de illis dictum est quod masculi in masculos turpitudinem operabantur? Verumtamen tacitum non est, quod erat eorum malitia naturalis; quae quidem omnium hominum, sed in aliis minor, in aliis maior est; sicut corpora corruptibilia sunt omnium, sed alias animas minus, alias plus gravant, pro diversitate iudiciorum Dei, occultorum quidem, sed sine ulla dubitatione iustorum. Quid ergo mirum, si cum causa exponeretur, cur in eos talis vindicta processerit, non voluntaria tantum eorum malitia commemorata est, verum etiam naturalis, cui praeter generis humani commune contagium, accesserat aliquid amplius ex maledictione prophetica (sanctus enim Noe suum nepotem Chanaan progenitorem maledixit illorum ); non utique iniuste, cui tamen esset obnoxia, obligatione successionis, in prole? Quod apparet etiam in parvulis eorum, qui cum suis parentibus, et hoc iubente Deo, sine ullius aetatis exceptione deleti sunt ; cum maiores propterea maxime Deo displicuerint, quod daemonibus fundere solerent suorum sanguinem parvulorum. Nec Deus praecepit eisdem parvulis parci; immo praecepit omnino non parci. Hinc intellege semen ab initio maledictum; neque enim eum qui hoc praecepit, dicere audebis iniustum. Quod si tibi venisset in mentem, non ideo seiungeres a parentibus impiis innocentiam filiorum, quod inde potissimum offenderint parentes Deum, quia nec a parvulorum suorum exitiis temperabant. Quorum certe mors, inquis, non recurreret ad interfectoris invidiam, si propter unum peccatum et parricida Deo displiceret, et filius. Nec vides ita displicuisse Deo necatores filiorum, ut tamen eosdem quoque filios cum his iuberet occidi. Neque enim, quia illi impiissime etiam filios daemoniis immolabant, ideo non debuerunt etiam iidem filii, non humano scelere, sed iudicio divino, utique iusto, quamvis occulto, tamquam semen maledictum, sicut factum est, pariter interire. Haec non attendis, dum eloquentia sine sapientia raperis, et flumine vanitatis vis esse disertus, desertus lumine veritatis.
Augustine. You speak these things as though all human beings were punished on account of some one kind of sin, or as though we said that those who already pass through grown ages are children of wrath on account of original sin alone. Whoever does not believe in the Son, as the Son himself says, will not have life, but the wrath of God remains upon him (John 3:36); but some are worse than others, upon whom surely a greater wrath of God remains; nor yet are all so overthrown and destroyed as these of whom we are speaking, who possessed the land that was given to the Israelites. What is it, then, that you say: See, then, how it does not speak of that crime which the Manichean contrives? Where you wish original sin to be understood; which the Manichean does not contrive, but, as the other Catholics, both against you and against the Manichean, Ambrose confesses; because it is not the mingling of an alien nature, which the Manichean introduces, but the depravation of our own, from the sin which through one man entered into the world and passed through all human beings (See Rom 5:12), which against the Catholic faith you deny. Are you so blind as not to see that, if for this reason original sin is not, because it is here not mentioned, neither will the other sins be sins, which are here not mentioned, whether lesser than these, or greater? Were the Sodomites, then, not destroyed, because it was not said of them that they did sorceries and parricidal sacrifices? Or were these Canaanites for this reason not destroyed, because it was not said of them that males wrought shamefulness upon males? Yet it was not passed over in silence that their malice was natural; which indeed is of all human beings, but in some less, in others greater; just as bodies are corruptible of all, but they weigh down some souls less, others more, according to the diversity of the judgments of God, hidden indeed, but without any doubt just. What wonder, then, if, when the cause was set forth why such vengeance proceeded against them, not only their voluntary malice was mentioned, but also the natural—to which, besides the common contagion of the human race, something more had been added from a prophetic curse (for holy Noah cursed his grandson Canaan, the progenitor of those people (See Gen 9:25)); not unjustly, surely, since to it he was liable, by the obligation of succession, in his offspring? Which appears also in their little ones, who, with their parents, and this with God commanding, without exception of any age, were destroyed (See Deut 20:16-17); since the elders for this reason chiefly displeased God, because they were wont to pour out the blood of their own little ones to demons. Nor did God command those same little ones to be spared; nay, he commanded that they not be spared at all. From this understand the seed cursed from the beginning (See Wis 12:11); for you will not dare to call him who commanded this unjust. Which if it had come into your mind, you would not separate the innocence of the sons from the impious parents for this reason, that the parents chiefly offended God by this, that they did not even spare from the destructions of their own little ones. Whose death, you say, would not recur to the odium of the slayer, if for one sin both the parricide displeased God, and the son. Nor do you see that the slayers of children so displeased God that he nonetheless commanded those same sons too to be killed with them. For not because they most impiously immolated even their sons to demons, ought therefore those same sons too not, by no human crime, but by a divine judgment, surely just, although hidden, as a cursed seed, just as it was done, likewise to perish. These things you do not attend, while you are swept away by eloquence without wisdom, and, by a river of vanity, wish to be eloquent, deserted by the light of truth.
JulianImp.4.128IV. 129. Iulianus. Verum et his, inquit, tamquam hominibus pepercisti, et misisti praecedentes exercitum vespas; non quia impotens eras in pugna impios iustis subicere, sed partibus iudicans dabas locum paenitentiae. Aculeis, inquit, muscarum etiam illos ipsos sacrilegos stimulabas, ut potentiam vindicantis de ludicro suae afflictionis adverterent. Sed postquam ex consilio Dei, et ultionis genere voluntaria peccata patuerunt, quorum reiectio exspectabatur et petebatur; tunc demum in obstipam punitorum profanitatem scriptoris assurgit invectio, dicitque illos tantam inisse cum criminibus familiaritatem, ut innata quodam modo viderentur. Non ignorans, inquit, quoniam nequissima fuerit natio illorum, et naturalis malitia ipsorum, et quoniam non poterat commutari cogitatio eorum in perpetuum; semen enim erat maledictum ab initio; nec timens aliquem, veniam dabas peccatis illorum . Cum, inquit, tu tam benigne tamque patienter et paenitentiae tempus indulseris, et speculam admonitionis infixeris, ut iustitiam ac misericordiam ab omni infamia, ab omni suspicione crudelitatis assereres; tamen illi spreverunt commonitiones tuas, qui beneficia praemissa despexerant, velut qui velint probare de illius esse semine Cham, in quem Noe beatus nuditate derisa, censura patria fuerat maledicta iaculatus. Quid ergo mirum, si maioris eorum proterviae merito, sententiae erat austeritate perculsus, recordatus est scriptor in maculam posterorum non desistentium ab aemulatione, cum frequenter in lege imitatio posterorum necessitudinis quoque vocabulis arguatur? Sic quippe Dominus in Evangelio ad Iudaeos: Vos, inquit, ex patre diabolo estis . Et Daniel contra spurcos presbyteros, de Israel tamen stirpe venientes, eodem genere legitur invectus: Semen, inquit, Chanaan, et non Iuda . Ezechiel quoque propheta exprobrat plebi Ierusalem: Mater tua, inquit, Cetthaea, et pater tuus Amorrhaeus . Est ergo hic usus ut ad voluntatis invidiam infamatio stirpis accedat, nimiumque crimini videatur adhaerere, per cuius meritum convicium patiuntur et semina. Servatur autem hic idem mos etiam in bonorum parte, ut cum videtur homo per omnia probus, congenitis dicatur florere virtutibus. Unde et beatus Iob misericordiae affectum quo subveniebat indigentibus, de uberibus se traxisse, immo de utero matris suae secum confirmat egressum . Nihil ergo rebus perspicuis, aut similitudo, aut exaggeratio, aut ambiguitas praeiudicare potest; quoniam cum certum sit numquam naturalium rerum correctionem a mortalibus reposci, praecipiat autem Deus ut desistant homines a malo; omni vero verius approbatur, naturale peccatum non esse posse.
IV. 128. Julian. But even these, he says, as men you spared, and you sent before your army hornets; not because you were powerless in battle to subject the impious to the just, but, judging by parts, you gave place to penance (See Wis 12:8-10). By the stings of flies, he says, you goaded even those very sacrilegious ones, that they might turn from the sport of their own affliction to the power of the avenger. But after, by the counsel of God and by the kind of vengeance, voluntary sins were laid open, whose rejection was awaited and demanded; then at last against the obstinate profanity of the punished the writer's invective rises, and he says that they had entered into so great a familiarity with crimes that they seemed in some way inborn. Not being ignorant, he says, that their nation was most wicked, and their malice natural, and that their thought could not be changed forever; for their seed was cursed from the beginning; nor fearing anyone, you gave pardon to their sins (See Wis 12:10-11). When, he says, you have so kindly and so patiently both indulged a time of penance and fixed a watch-tower of admonition, that you might assert your justice and mercy free of all infamy, of all suspicion of cruelty; yet they spurned your admonitions, who had despised the benefits sent before, like those who would wish to prove that they were of the seed of that Ham, against whom blessed Noah, his nakedness derided, had hurled with paternal censure a curse (See Gen 9:22-25). What wonder, then, if, by the merit of their greater wantonness, the writer, struck by the severity of the sentence, recalled, to the stain of posterity not desisting from emulation, the curse—since frequently in the law the imitation of posterity is reproached even by the very terms of kinship? For thus the Lord in the Gospel to the Jews: You, he says, are from your father the devil (John 8:44). And Daniel against the foul elders, coming nonetheless from the stock of Israel, is read to have inveighed by the same kind: Seed of Canaan, he says, and not of Judah (See Dan 13:56). The prophet Ezekiel too reproaches the people of Jerusalem: Your mother, he says, was a Hittite, and your father an Amorite (See Ezek 16:3). There is, then, here a usage by which to the odium of the will is added the defamation of the stock, and crime seems to cling too much, by whose merit even the seeds suffer reproach. But this same custom is preserved also on the side of the good, so that when a man seems upright in all things, he is said to flourish with congenital virtues. Whence blessed Job too confirms that the affection of mercy by which he aided the needy he drew from his very nursing breasts, nay, that it came forth with him from the womb of his mother (See Job 31:18). Nothing, then, can prejudge perspicuous matters, whether a likeness, or an exaggeration, or an ambiguity; since, as it is certain that the correction of natural things is never demanded of mortals, but God commands that human beings desist from evil; so it is more truly than anything approved that natural sin cannot be.
JulianImp.4.129Augustinus. Putasti quidem te exposuisse verba libri Sapientiae; sed non ea sineris eludere verbis insipientiae. Satis enim apparet, et clarum est, quomodo illa natio nequissima dicta sit, eiusque malitia naturalis; quomodo etiam sit appellata, semen maledictum ab initio. Si enim, ut tu putas, propter aemulationem, id est imitationem, dictum fuisset, qua imitati sunt maiorem suum Cham, quem sui peccati merito maledixit pater eius Noe; profecto Deus quando in istam nationem vindictam iustissimam protulit, iuberet eius parvulis parci, quos dicere non potes suorum maiorum imitatione meruisse supplicium. Cum ergo eis non solum non iussit praeberi misericordiam, sed ut parem vindictam cum parentibus sumerent, ipse insuper iussit, qui utique aliquid iniustum iubere non potuit; satis evidenter lucet, quod non propter exaggerationem, neque propter imitationem, sed propter generationem dicta est eorum malitia naturalis, et ipse semen maledictum ab initio. Nam contra errorem vestrum, in hoc ipso semine, de quo agitur, prophetica vigilavit auctoritas, ut Noe iustus peccantem Cham filium in eius malediceret filio, id est, Chanaan; ut hinc intellegeremus vinctos esse filios meritis patrum, nisi hoc vinculum generatione tractum, regeneratione solvatur. De isto ergo Chanaan ducunt originem Chananaei, qui dicti sunt semen maledictum ab initio; quorum etiam parvuli, quia et ipsi hoc erant, non imitatione, sed stirpe interfici cum parentibus divinitus iussi sunt. His Chananaeis fuisse similes impudicos seniores, Daniel propheta intellegi voluit, quando eis dixit: Semen Chanaan, et non Iuda , tamquam diceret: Similes filiis Chanaan, et non filiis Iuda; sicut dictum est: Generatio viperarum , propter quamdam similitudinem malitiae viperinae. Ubi autem Dominus ait: Vos a patre diabolo estis; revera imitationem voluit, non semen intellegi; sed nec ipse dixit: Vos semen diaboli estis. Et ubi scriptum est: Pater tuus Amorrhaeus, et mater tua Cetthaea, apparet ideo dictum, quod eos fuerant imitati quibus hoc dicebatur; denique nec ibi dictum est: Semen Amorrhaeorum, vel Cetthaeorum. Non ergo ut dixisti: Propter meritum voluntatis nimium criminibus adhaerentis, convicium patiuntur et semina. Absit enim ut sancta Scriptura seminibus, sicut tu hominibus, convicietur immeritis. Ubi autem sanctus Iob affectum misericordiae de utero matris secum, sicut commemoras, egressum confirmat; et eum putas, ut eumdem affectum multum commendaret, hoc dixisse, non quod ita esset; cur non, quaeso te, annuimus esse quosdam natura misericordes, si natura quosdam non negamus excordes? Sunt enim nonnulla congenita, quae in aetate qua usus incipit esse rationis, sicut ipsa ratio, incipiunt apparere. Proinde hominibus natura filiis irae propterea dantur praecepta vivendi, quia datur et gratia, ut qui iubet iuvet; ac sic mala non solum quae voluntate sunt addita, verum etiam quae sunt congenerata, vincantur. Quod enim hominibus impossibile est, Deo facile est . Quibus autem non datur Dei gratia, propter quam dictum est: Quis enim te discernit? Quid autem habes quod non accepisti? praevaricatores fiunt, accedente lege, non iusti. Sed hi quoque ad utilitatem vivunt filiorum misericordiae, ut eos videntes, et quid sibi non merito, sed gratis donetur intellegentes, non extollantur, sed qui gloriatur, in Domino glorietur .
Augustine. You thought indeed that you had expounded the words of the book of Wisdom; but you are not permitted to elude them with words of folly. For it appears sufficiently, and it is clear, in what way that nation was said to be most wicked, and its malice natural; in what way too it was called a seed cursed from the beginning. For if, as you suppose, it had been said on account of emulation, that is, imitation, by which they imitated their forefather Ham, whom by the merit of his own sin his father Noah cursed; surely God, when he brought forth most just vengeance upon that nation, would command its little ones to be spared, whom you cannot say merited punishment by imitation of their forefathers. Since, then, he not only did not command mercy to be shown them, but he himself moreover commanded that they take an equal vengeance with their parents—he who surely could not command anything unjust—it shines clearly enough that their malice was said to be natural, and they themselves a seed cursed from the beginning, not on account of exaggeration, nor on account of imitation, but on account of generation. For against your error, in this very seed of which we are speaking, prophetic authority kept watch, so that the just Noah cursed his sinning son Ham in his son, that is, in Canaan; that hence we might understand that sons are bound by the merits of their fathers, unless this bond, drawn by generation, be loosed by regeneration. From this Canaan, then, the Canaanites draw their origin, who were called a seed cursed from the beginning; whose little ones too, because they themselves too were this, not by imitation, but by stock, were divinely commanded to be killed with their parents. To these Canaanites the prophet Daniel wished the unchaste elders to be understood to be like, when he said to them: Seed of Canaan, and not of Judah (See Dan 13:56), as though he said: Like the sons of Canaan, and not the sons of Judah; just as it was said: Brood of vipers (Matt 3:7), on account of a certain likeness of viperine malice. But where the Lord says: You are from your father the devil (John 8:44), he truly wished imitation, not seed, to be understood; but neither did he himself say: You are the seed of the devil. And where it is written: Your father an Amorite, and your mother a Hittite (See Ezek 16:3), it appears to have been said for this reason, that they had imitated those to whom this was said; finally, neither there was it said: Seed of the Amorites, or of the Hittites. Not, then, as you said: On account of the merit of a will clinging too much to crimes, the seeds too suffer reproach. For far be it that holy Scripture should, like you, revile undeserving seeds. But where holy Job, as you record, confirms that the affection of mercy came forth with him from the womb of his mother; and you think that he said this, in order to commend that same affection much, not because it was so; why, I beg you, do we not grant that some are by nature merciful, if we do not deny that some are by nature senseless? For there are certain congenital things which, at the age when the use of reason begins to be, just as reason itself, begin to appear. Accordingly, to human beings by nature children of wrath, precepts of living are for this reason given, because grace too is given, that he who commands may help; and thus the evils, not only those that are added by will, but also those that are congenital, may be conquered. For what is impossible for human beings is easy for God (See Luke 18:27). But those to whom the grace of God is not given—on account of which it was said: For who distinguishes you? But what have you that you have not received? (1 Cor 4:7)—become transgressors, the law being added, not just. But these too live for the usefulness of the sons of mercy, so that, seeing them, and understanding what is given them not by merit but freely, they may not be exalted, but he who glories may glory in the Lord (See 1 Cor 1:31).
JulianImp.4.129IV. 130. Iulianus. Sequitur vero Sapientia: Quis tibi imputabit si perierint nationes, quas tu fecisti, cum non sit alius Deus, quam tu, cui cura est de omnibus? Sed cum sis iustus, iuste omnia disponis; ipsum quoque qui non debet puniri, condemnare, exterum aestimas a tua virtute; virtus enim tua iustitiae initium est . Astipulatur certe communi prudentum rationi, quia maximum in Deo signum iustitia sit, quam Manichaeus, et Traducianus omni conatu fabularum suarum pernegat.
IV. 130. Julian. Wisdom then follows: Who will reproach you, if the nations perish whom you made? Since there is no other God than you, who have care of all things. But since you are just, you order all things justly; even him who ought not to be punished, to condemn, you reckon foreign to your power; for your power is the beginning of justice (Wis 12:12, 15-16). It supports, surely, the common reasoning of the prudent, that the greatest sign in God is justice, which the Manichean and the Traducianist, by every effort of their fables, deny.
JulianImp.4.130Augustinus. In conviciando cui te dicam similem, nisi tibi? Si autem saperetis Deum esse iustum, numquam congenita vitia, vel corporis humani, vel animi, quae negare non potestis, tribueretis opificio eius, sed iudicio; et hinc originale peccatum, sive peccata, intellegeretis, non negaretis.
Augustine. In reviling, to whom shall I say you are like, except to yourself? But if you were wise that God is just, you would never attribute the congenital vices, either of the human body or of the mind, which you cannot deny, to his handiwork, but to his judgment; and hence you would understand original sin, or sins, not deny them.
JulianImp.4.130IV. 131. Iulianus. Denique post paululum sequitur: Illos enim castigando, bonae spei fecisti filios tuos, quoniam iudicans, das in peccatis locum paenitentiae. Si enim inimicos servorum tuorum et morti debitos cum tanto cruciatu admonitionis liberasti, dans tempus et locum per quem possit mutari malitia; cum quanta diligentia iudicas filios tuos, quorum parentibus et iuramenta et pacta dedisti bonarum promissionum? Cum ergo nobis disciplinam das, inimicos nostros multipliciter flagellas, ut bonitatem tuam cogitemus iudicantis .
IV. 131. Julian. Finally, a little after, it follows: For chastising them, you made your sons of good hope, since, in judging, you give place to penance in their sins. For if you freed with so great a torment of admonition the enemies of your servants and those owed to death, giving time and place through which malice could be changed; with how great diligence do you judge your sons, to whose parents you gave both oaths and pacts of good promises? When, then, you give us discipline, you scourge our enemies in manifold ways, that we may think on your goodness when we judge (Wis 12:19-22).
JulianImp.4.131Augustinus. Quare Deus, cum sit praescius omnium futurorum, tempus et locum per quem possit mutari malitia, dederit etiam eis, de quibus dictum erat, quod eorum cogitatio non poterat mutari in perpetuum, satis ostendit, ubi ait: Bonae spei fecisti filios tuos, quoniam iudicans das in peccatis locum paenitentiae. Ad hoc ergo datur tempus et locus paenitentiae etiam filiis irae deditis morti et paenitentiam non acturis, quia sunt inter illos, vel exorturi sunt de illis filii misericordiae, quibus hoc prosit, quod illis non profuit. Itaque etiam super filios perditionis non est inanis Dei nec infructuosa patientia; necesse est enim prosit eis quos ex massa perditionis non humana merita, sed gratia divina discernit; cum vel gratias agunt, quod ab eis Dei misericordia discernuntur, vel ex perituris non perituri, Dei dispositione nascuntur.
Augustine. Why God—since he is foreknowing of all things future—gave time and place through which malice could be changed, even to those of whom it had been said that their thought could not be changed forever, he shows sufficiently, where he says: You made your sons of good hope, since, in judging, you give place to penance in sins (See Wis 12:19). For this end, then, time and place of penance are given even to the sons of wrath given over to death, and who will not do penance, because there are among them, or will arise from them, sons of mercy, to whom this may profit, which to those it did not profit. And so even over the sons of perdition the patience of God is neither empty nor fruitless; for it is necessary that it profit those whom, from the mass of perdition, not human merits, but divine grace distinguishes; when they either give thanks that they are distinguished from them by the mercy of God, or, out of those who will perish, those who will not perish are born by the disposition of God.
JulianImp.4.131IV. 132. Iulianus. Advertis ergo quantam distinctionem superficies verborum fecerit de naturis duarum plebium: Israelitas filios Dei vocat, et Chananaeos semen maledictum. Si hoc quod sonat ad generationes referretur et partus; dicendum erat, aliam esse religiosorum generationem, aliam profanorum.
IV. 132. Julian. You note, then, how great a distinction the surface of the words has made concerning the natures of the two peoples: it calls the Israelites sons of God, and the Canaanites a cursed seed. If what it sounds were referred to generations and births, it would have to be said that the generation of the religious is one thing, of the profane another.
JulianImp.4.132Augustinus. Numquid quoniam cum audimus filios Dei, intellegimus gratiam; ideo cum audimus filios hominum, non debemus agnoscere confiterique naturam? Quid est ergo quod dicis, non inveniendo quid dicas, homo contentiose? Cognosce quod verum est, attende quod clarum est. Semen maledictum Chananaei dicti sunt propter tam malam progeniem, ut Deo iustissimo vindicante atque imperante, nec eius parvulis parceretur, qui parentes suos nulla voluntatis imitatione sectati sunt. Filii vero Dei dicti sunt Israelitae, non propter progeniem naturae, sed propter adoptionem gratiae. Sive ergo dicantur filii et filii, sive semen et semen, quid te iuvat ista consonantia nominum, ubi rerum est tanta distantia?
Augustine. Is it so, that because, when we hear sons of God, we understand grace; therefore, when we hear sons of men, we ought not to acknowledge and confess nature? What is it, then, that you say, not finding what to say, contentious man? Recognize what is true, attend to what is clear. The Canaanites were called a cursed seed on account of so evil a progeny that, with God most just avenging and commanding, not even their little ones were spared, who followed their parents by no imitation of will. But the Israelites were called sons of God, not on account of the progeny of nature, but on account of the adoption of grace. Whether, then, they be called sons and sons, or seed and seed, what does this consonance of names help you, where there is so great a difference of things?
JulianImp.4.132IV. 133. Iulianus. Dum constaret tamen, secundum etiam hanc vanitatem, traducem primi non esse peccati; quod interruptum multarum simul semina gentium perdocebant.
IV. 133. Julian. While it would be established, nonetheless, even according to this vanity, that there is no traduction of the first sin; which the seeds, interrupted, of many nations at once thoroughly taught.
JulianImp.4.133Augustinus. Aliud est illius unius hominis semen, quod sunt omnes homines; aliud diversa diversarum gentium semina, quae illud non interrumpunt, quia ex illo cuncta descendunt; neque agunt sua varietate, ut illud peccatum primi hominis, quo mutari meruit humana natura, quibuslibet longe post natis sit posteris eius noxium; sed ut magis minusve sit innoxium. Sicut enim quidam parentes aggravant peccatum originale, ita quidem relevant; sed nemo tollit, nisi ille de quo dictum est: Ecce Agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccata mundi ; cui nullum bonum hominis impossibile, nullum malum est insanabile.
Augustine. One thing is the seed of that one man, which all human beings are; another the diverse seeds of diverse nations, which do not interrupt that one, because from it all descend; nor do they bring it about, by their variety, that that sin of the first man, by which human nature merited to be changed, should be either harmful, or rather less harmless, to any of his posterity born long after; but more or less harmless. For just as certain parents aggravate original sin, so certain relieve it; but no one takes it away, except he of whom it was said: Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who takes away the sins of the world (John 1:29); to whom no good of a man is impossible, no evil incurable.
JulianImp.4.133IV. 134. Iulianus. Porro, sicut illud quod de laude dicitur Iudaeorum, non ad hoc valet, ut quisquam genuina credatur sanctitate fulgere; ita etiam quod naturalis malitia vocatur, non ad hoc valet, ut semina vitiosa commendet, sed sine praeiudicio naturae, cuius imperturbabilis ratio est, quae quidquid habet, a Deo suo auctore sortitur, varietas ista verborum, aut invectionis impetum signat, aut laudationis officium.
IV. 134. Julian. Further, just as that which is said in praise of the Jews does not avail to this, that anyone be believed to shine with a congenital sanctity; so too what is called natural malice does not avail to this, that it commend vicious seeds; but, without prejudice to nature, whose reasoning is imperturbable—which, whatever it has, it is allotted from God its author—that variety of words signifies either the impetus of invective or the office of laudation.
JulianImp.4.134Augustinus. Si non est cuiusquam sanctitas genuina, quomodo dictum est Ieremiae: Priusquam de vulva exires, sanctificavi te ? Quomodo etiam dictum est de Ioanne Baptista: Spiritu Sancto replebitur iam inde ab utero matris suae ? Quod exsultatio eius quoque ostendit, quando Elizabeth praegnantem coniugatam praegnans Virgo Maria salutavit . An et haec dicta non proprietatis sunt dicta praeconio, sed laudationis officio? Sic agite, sic vanescite; hoc ut dicatis, vestrae restat insaniae. Quid enim Ieremiam, quid Ioannem tumori vestrae frontis apponimus; quando ipsum Christum non discernitis a carne peccati, nullamque carnem dicentes originaliter esse peccati, sic illum ceteris coaequatis, ut etiam ipsum habuisse genuinam negare cogamini sanctitatem, qui natus est de Spiritu Sancto et virgine Maria, expers omnino delicti, quia expers illius conceptionis quae commixtione fit sexuum? Quia et Ieremias et Ioannes, quamvis sanctificati in uteris matrum, traxerunt tamen originale peccatum. Nam quo alio merito interirent eorum animae de populo suo, nisi die octavo circumciderentur; id est nisi ad Christi gratiam pervenirent, quem die octavo, id est, post septimum sabbati, resurrecturum propter iustificationem nostram, carnis illa circumcisio figurabat? Erant ergo illi et natura filii irae ab uteris matrum, et gratia filii misericordiae ab uteris matrum; quia nec illa eis adhuc inerat sanctitas, quae vinculum solveret successionis obnoxiae quod suo tempore solvi oportebat, et inerat tamen quae praeconem Christi a maternis visceribus designabat. Sed novus haereticus, religiosus physicus vis putari, cum dicis: naturalem malitiam et semen maledictum sine praeiudicio naturae dici, cuius, inquis, imperturbabilis ratio quidquid habet, a Deo suo auctore sortitur. Nonne te admonent ut cor habeas, saltem qui fatui nascuntur? Nec tamen vel ipsi fatui Deum dicere audent fatuitatis auctorem. Nec utique, ut Manichaeus desipit vel insanit, alienae naturae commixtio, sed nostrae depravatio invexit hoc vitium. Huius ergo vitii meritum, et aliorum naturalium quorumque vitiorum non inveniunt, qui sani sunt in fide, nisi originale peccatum.
Augustine. If no one's sanctity is congenital, how was it said to Jeremiah: Before you came forth from the womb, I sanctified you (Jer 1:5)? How too was it said of John the Baptist: He will be filled with the Holy Spirit even from his mother's womb (Luke 1:15)? Which his exultation too shows, when the pregnant Virgin Mary greeted the pregnant married Elizabeth (See Luke 1:41-44). Or are these sayings too not sayings of the proclamation of a property, but of the office of laudation? So act, so vanish away; this it remains for your madness to say. For why do I set Jeremiah, why John, against the swelling of your brow; when you do not distinguish Christ himself from the flesh of sin, and, saying that no flesh is originally of sin, so equal him to the rest that you are compelled to deny that even he had a congenital sanctity—he who was born of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, utterly free of fault, because free of that conception which comes about by the mingling of the sexes? For both Jeremiah and John, although sanctified in the wombs of their mothers, nonetheless drew original sin. For by what other merit would their souls perish from their people, unless on the eighth day they were circumcised (See Gen 17:14); that is, unless they came to the grace of Christ, whom, about to rise on the eighth day, that is, after the seventh of the Sabbath, for the sake of our justification, that circumcision of the flesh prefigured? They were, then, both by nature children of wrath from the wombs of their mothers, and by grace children of mercy from the wombs of their mothers; because that sanctity was not yet in them which would loose the bond of the liable succession, which in its own time it behooved to be loosed; and yet that was in them which designated the herald of Christ from his maternal inmost parts. But, new heretic, you wish to be thought a religious natural philosopher, when you say: natural malice and a cursed seed are said without prejudice to nature, whose, you say, imperturbable reasoning, whatever it has, it is allotted from God its author. Do they not admonish you to have a heart, at least those who are born foolish? Nor yet do even the foolish themselves dare to call God the author of foolishness. Nor surely, as the Manichean is out of his senses or raves, did the mingling of an alien nature, but the depravation of our own, bring in this vice. The merit, then, of this vice, and of any other natural vices whatever, those who are sound in faith do not find, except original sin.
JulianImp.4.134IV. 135. Iulianus. Sicut autem hic semen maledictum, sic alibi equidem, ubi maior est lectionis auctoritas, semen dicitur benedictum. Loquens enim de Israelitis Isaias propheta: Aedificabunt, inquit, domus, et ipsi inhabitabunt; pastinabunt vineas, et ipsi manducabunt fructus earum; non aedificabunt, et alii habitabunt; et non pastinabunt, et alii manducabunt. Secundum enim dies ligni vitae, erunt dies populi mei; opera labiorum eorum perseverant; electi mei non laborabunt in vacuum, nec filios procreabunt in maledicto, quia semen benedictum a Deo est .
IV. 135. Julian. But just as here a cursed seed, so elsewhere indeed—where the authority of the reading is greater—the seed is called blessed. For Isaiah the prophet, speaking of the Israelites: They will build houses, he says, and themselves dwell in them; they will plant vineyards, and themselves eat their fruits; they will not build, and others dwell; and they will not plant, and others eat. For according to the days of the tree of life shall be the days of my people; the works of their hands shall endure; my elect shall not labor in vain, nor shall they procreate children unto a curse, because it is a seed blessed by God (See Isa 65:21-23).
JulianImp.4.135Augustinus. Hanc Isaiae prophetiam si intellegeres, non eam nobis ut elabereris, sed tibi potius ut corrigereris opponeres. Aliud enim non mortale, sed immortale; nec carnale, sed spiritale semen videres; quod videbat Ioannes evangelista, quando dicebat: Omnis qui natus est ex Deo, non peccat; quia semen eius in ipso manet . Secundum hoc semen quisque non peccat; quia et si peccat ut homo, habet tamen alterum semen, secundum quod semen non potest peccare, quia ex Deo natus est. Secundum hoc semen filii non procreantur in maledicto. In quibus Prophetae verbis evigilare debuisti, et advertere quod non pro magno munere hoc promitteretur populo Dei, nisi quia procreantur filii in maledicto secundum alterum semen, quod est ex Adam; non autem procreantur in maledicto secundum Christum, quod est semen benedictum ab initio. Ipse est enim et Sapientia Dei, de qua dictum est: Lignum vitae est omnibus amplectentibus eam ; unde et iste Propheta, vel Deus potius per Prophetam: Secundum dies ligni vitae, inquit, erunt dies mei populi . Vita aeterna et immortalis promittebatur his verbis, non carnalibus, sed spiritalibus Israelitis. Ibi vineae spiritales et domus non quandoque morientibus pastinatoribus et aedificatoribus suis possidebuntur ab aliis, sed ab ipsis sine fine viventibus. Ergo agnosce duo genera seminum, unum generationis, et alterum regenerationis; et noli esse incredulus, sed fidelis.
Augustine. If you understood this prophecy of Isaiah, you would set it against, not us, that you might slip away, but rather yourself, that you might be corrected. For you would see another seed, not mortal, but immortal; not carnal, but spiritual; which John the Evangelist saw, when he said: Everyone who is born of God does not sin; because his seed remains in him (1 John 3:9). According to this seed each one does not sin; because, even if he sins as a man, he has nonetheless another seed, according to which the seed cannot sin, because he is born of God. According to this seed children are not procreated unto a curse. In which words of the Prophet you ought to have awakened, and to have noticed that this would not be promised to the people of God as a great gift, unless because children are procreated unto a curse according to the other seed, which is from Adam; but they are not procreated unto a curse according to Christ, which is the seed blessed from the beginning. For he is also the Wisdom of God, of which it is said: It is a tree of life to all who embrace it (Prov 3:18); whence too this Prophet, or rather God through the Prophet: According to the days of the tree of life, he says, shall be the days of my people. Eternal and immortal life was promised by these words, not to carnal, but to spiritual Israelites. There the spiritual vineyards and houses will not be possessed by others, with their planters and builders dying at some time, but by those very persons living without end. Acknowledge, then, two kinds of seeds, one of generation, and the other of regeneration; and do not be unbelieving, but faithful.
JulianImp.4.135IV. 136. Iulianus. Patiantur ergo pueruli de istis verborum contrarietatibus quaestionem, ut nullius maioris rei quam sonorum capaces pro alludentibus sibi poculis praelientur; catholica vero fides neque iurgare adversum se legem Dei credit, neque ullam auctoritatem in exitium rationis admittit; nec cuiquam opinioni atque adulationi in maculam divinae aequitatis auscultat; sed ut Deum non solum credit, verum etiam novit omnium naturarum Creatorem; ibi peccatum nulli alii quam liberae imputat voluntati; per quae omnia traducem peccati falsam esse non dubitat.
IV. 136. Julian. Let the little boys, then, suffer a question from these contrarieties of words, so that, capable of nothing greater than the sounds, they may battle for the cups that mock them; but the Catholic faith neither believes the law of God to quarrel against itself, nor admits any authority to the destruction of reason; nor does it listen to any opinion or flattery to the stain of divine equity; but, as it not only believes but even knows God to be the Creator of all natures, so it imputes sin there to no other than a free will; through all which it does not doubt that the traduction of sin is false.
JulianImp.4.136Augustinus. Catholica potius fides peccatum esse originale non dubitat; quam fidem non pueruli, sed graves atque constantes viri, docti in Ecclesia, et docentes Ecclesiam, usque ad diem sui obitus defenderunt. Vos autem legem Dei adversum se, sicut dicis, iurgare non creditis, et ipsi adversus eam caeca impietate vel impia caecitate iurgatis. Ideo enim auctoritatem nullam in exitium rationis vos iactatis admittere; ut rationibus vestris, quae non rationes, sed deceptiones sunt, etiam divina deponatur potius, quam exponatur auctoritas. Quamvis nemo ita esse debeat gravis corde, ut decipiatur ratione Pelagii, quam velut exponens Apostolum protulit, et ait: Corpus mortuum propter peccatum, ideo dictum, quia corpus moritur peccatis, quando avertitur a peccatis. Contra quam vanitatem non disputandum, sed Apostolus ipse legendus est, dicens: Si autem Christus in vobis, corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum, spiritus autem vita est propter iustitiam, si autem spiritus eius, qui suscitavit Iesum a mortuis, habitat in vobis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra per inhabitantem spiritum eius in vobis . Quid apertius? Quid lucidius? Quis, rogo, contra istam manifestationem, nisi haeretica insania, negaret originale peccatum? Propter quod peccatum etiam nunc utique adhuc corpus est mortuum; quamvis iam propter iustitiam vita sit spiritus. Sed vivificabit, inquit, Deus et mortalia corpora vestra. Quis oblatraret huic veritati, nisi rabies vanitatis, quae se iactat nulli opinioni atque adulationi auscultare in maculam aequitatis divinae; cum potius aequitatem divinam negare cogatur, quisquis deceptus fuerit a vobis? Quoniam tot vitia vel corporum vel ingeniorum, cum quibus nascuntur homines, si nullius peccati dicuntur trahere meritum, procul dubio Dei negatur iustum esse iudicium. Itaque, cum voluntati peccata sic imputatis, ut voluntati primi hominis originale peccatum imputare nolitis, omnia mala quae trahunt vel patiuntur infantes, iniquo Dei iudicio, eos qui vobis credunt, imputare compellitis.
Augustine. The Catholic faith rather does not doubt that there is original sin; which faith not little boys, but grave and constant men, learned in the Church, and teaching the Church, have defended even to the day of their death. But you do not believe that the law of God, as you say, quarrels against itself, and you yourselves quarrel against it with a blind impiety or an impious blindness. For you boast that you admit no authority to the destruction of reason; so that to your reasonings, which are not reasonings but deceptions, even the divine authority be deposed rather than expounded. Although no one ought to be so grave of heart as to be deceived by the reasoning of Pelagius, which, as though expounding the Apostle, he brought forth, and said: The body dead because of sin was for this reason said, because the body dies to sins, when it turns away from sins. Against which vanity one must not dispute, but the Apostle himself must be read, saying: But if Christ is in you, the body indeed is dead because of sin, but the spirit is life because of righteousness; but if the spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he will give life even to your mortal bodies through his spirit dwelling in you (Rom 8:10-11). What plainer? What clearer? Who, I ask, against this manifestation, except a heretical madness, would deny original sin? On account of which sin even now still the body is dead; although now because of righteousness the spirit is life. But God will give life, he says, even to your mortal bodies. Who would bark against this truth, except the rabies of vanity, which boasts that it listens to no opinion or flattery to the stain of divine equity; when rather divine equity is compelled to deny, whoever has been deceived by you? Since so many vices either of bodies or of wits, with which human beings are born, if they are said to draw the merit of no sin, without doubt the just judgment of God is denied. And so, since you so impute sins to the will that you are unwilling to impute original sin to the will of the first man, all the evils which infants draw or suffer, you compel those who believe you to impute to an unjust judgment of God.
JulianImp.4.136Liber Quintus
Book Five
JulianImp.4.136V. 1. Iulianus. Compertum est omnis aevi periculis apud paucos incorrupti reverentiam vigere iudicii, qui et scientiae studiis dediti, et virtutum appetentes, vel possunt indagare verum, vel repertum audent tueri; aut, sicut ait Apostolus: Exercitatos habent sensus, ad discretionem boni malique ; nec ullis adversorum franguntur procellis, qui de eodem audiunt praeceptore, usque ad sanguinem resistendum esse peccatis . Hi ergo prudentes, quos stolidorum populi faciunt paucos videri, scientiae et fortitudini iuxta prorsus student. Neutra enim absque altera aut fructum assequitur, aut honorem; quoniam et fortitudo nisi optimis per scientiam admota rebus est, in despicabilem erumpit insaniam; et e regione examinatae iustitiae leges, nisi magnanimitatis murus incluserit, praedae confestim patebunt, ac servitum criminibus abducentur. Has ergo bigas, sine quibus triumphari de mundi erroribus nequitur, diversis aetatibus rarissimi quique, qui colerent et iugarent atque regerent, exstiterunt; quoniam et scientiae studium tam fuga laboris quam saecularium curarum diversitas impedit, et constantiam aerumnarum, quae ab improbis excitantur, formido percellit. Quae oppugnationum genera vincunt quidem fideles animi et sapientes; verum tam rari sunt, ut inter insanorum populos, quia non furiunt, insanire videantur.
V. 1. Julian. It has been ascertained that in the perils of every age the reverence of uncorrupted judgment flourishes among few, who, both given to the pursuits of knowledge and desirous of the virtues, either can track down the truth, or, when it is found, dare to defend it; or, as the Apostle says: They have their senses exercised to the discernment of good and evil (See Heb 5:14); nor are they broken by any storms of adversities, who hear from the same preceptor that one must resist sins even unto blood (See Heb 12:4). These prudent ones, then, whom the peoples of the dull make seem few, study knowledge and fortitude in equal measure. For neither, without the other, either attains its fruit or its honor; since both fortitude, unless applied through knowledge to the best things, breaks out into despicable madness; and, on the other side, the examined laws of justice, unless the wall of magnanimity enclose them, will lie open at once to plunder, and be led away into bondage to crimes. These two horses, then, without which one cannot triumph over the errors of the world, in diverse ages all the rarest sort have existed, who would cultivate them and yoke them and rule them; since both the flight of labor and the diversity of secular cares impede the pursuit of knowledge, and dread strikes down the constancy under hardships which are stirred up by the wicked. Which kinds of assaults faithful and wise minds indeed conquer; but they are so rare that, among the peoples of the insane, because they do not rage, they seem to be insane.
JulianImp.5.1Augustinus. Nonne te admonet raritas ista hominum, quam tu ipse commemoras, in quibus et scientia et fortitudo est, quid de humano genere sentire debeas, et de universa ista massa rationabilium mortaliumque animantium? Cur enim non genus mortalium ad studium scientiae roburque fortitudinis, naturali appetitu, vel universum, vel certe ex maxima parte consurgit, ut rarissimos quosque potius miremur, ab eo quod appetit naturae institutio deviare atque desciscere? Cur in profunda imperitiae ac mollitudinem ignaviae, quasi per proclivia, nescio quo velut onere urgente delabitur? Fugam laboris certe dicis esse causam, qua fit ut nesciant homines quae scire debuerunt; sed vellem diceres quid causae sit, ut homini tam bene naturaliter instituto utilia naturae atque salubria sit laboriosissimum discere, atque ita laborem fugiens, in tenebris ignorantiae familiarius libentiusque requiescat. Nempe tanta raritas ingeniosorum et studiosorum, per quae duo ad humanarum divinarumque rerum scientiam pervenitur, et tanta multitudo tardorum et desidiosorum, satis indicat in quam partem suo tamquam pondere feratur ipsa natura, quam negatis esse vitiatam. Neque secundum christianam cogitatis fidem, qualis sit factus Adam, qui universis generibus animarum vivarum nomina imposuit ; quod excellentissimae fuisse indicium sapientiae, in saecularibus etiam litteris legimus. Nam ipse Phytagoras, a quo philosophiae nomen exortum est, dixisse fertur, illum fuisse omnium sapientissimum, qui vocabula primus indidit rebus. Verum etsi nihil tale de Adam didicissemus, nostrum erat utique vera ratione conicere, qualis in illo homine natura sit condita, in quo vitium omnino nullum fuit. Quis autem usque adeo sit tardus ingenio, ut ad naturam neget obtunsa vel acuta ingenia pertinere, aut existimet non esse animi vitia vel memoriae vel intellegentiae tarditatem? Et quis dubitet christianus, eos qui in hoc saeculo erroribus aerumnisque plenissimo, ingeniosissimi apparent, quorum tamen corruptibilia corpora aggravant animas, si illius ingenio comparentur, distare longe amplius quam celeritate a volucribus testudines distant? Ingeniis ergo tam excellentibus paradisi felicitas impleretur, si nemo peccasset; tales quippe Deus de parentibus fuerat creaturus, qualem illum sine parentibus creaverat, utique ad imaginem suam. Nondum enim homo vanitati similis factus erat, ut dies eius sicut umbra in hoc saeculo aerumnoso praeterirent . Quod si ita esset, numquid ista tua querela, ullum haberet locum? Numquid assecutio scientiae laboriosa esset, ut fuga laboris imperiti esse homines mallent? Numquid ipsa fortitudine, quam verum dicis vix in paucissimis inveniri, opus haberemus, ubi nulla esset aerumna quam deberemus pro veritate fortiter sustinere? Cum ergo ista in contrarium versa sint omnia, ad hoc naturam nostram negas esse vitiatam, ut, te adiuvante, Manichaeus commixtam nobis introducat alienam; ac sic dum oppugnator eius prosilis imperitus, fis auxiliator ignarus.
Augustine. Does not this rarity of human beings—which you yourself record—in whom there is both knowledge and fortitude, admonish you what you ought to feel about the human race, and about this whole mass of rational and mortal living beings? For why does not the race of mortals, by a natural appetite, rise up—whether the whole, or at least for the greater part—to the pursuit of knowledge and the strength of fortitude, so that we should rather wonder at the rarest individuals for deviating and falling away from what the institution of nature seeks after? Why does it slip down into the depth of unskillfulness and the softness of cowardice, as down a slope, with I-know-not-what weight, as it were, pressing it? You say, surely, that the flight of labor is the cause, by which it comes about that human beings do not know the things they ought to have known; but I would wish you to say what cause there is, that for a man so well naturally established, it is most laborious to learn the things useful and wholesome to nature, and so, fleeing labor, he rests more familiarly and more gladly in the darkness of ignorance. Surely so great a rarity of the talented and studious, through which two things one comes to the knowledge of human and divine things, and so great a multitude of the slow and slothful, indicates sufficiently in which direction nature itself is carried by its own weight, as it were—a nature which you deny to be vitiated. Nor do you think, according to the Christian faith, what Adam was made, who imposed names on all kinds of living souls (See Gen 2:19-20); which we read, even in secular letters, to have been the indication of a most excellent wisdom. For Pythagoras himself, from whom the name of philosophy arose, is reported to have said that he was the wisest of all who first imposed words on things. But even if we had learned nothing such of Adam, it was surely ours to conjecture by a true reasoning what nature was founded in that man, in whom there was no vice at all. But who would be so slow of wit as to deny that dull or sharp wits pertain to nature, or to think that slowness of memory or of intelligence is not a vice of the mind? And what Christian would doubt that those who in this age, full of errors and hardships, appear most talented—whose corruptible bodies nonetheless weigh down their souls—if they be compared to his wit, differ far more from him than tortoises differ from birds in swiftness? With such excellent wits, then, the happiness of paradise would be filled, if no one had sinned; for God was going to create such ones from the parents as he had created that one without parents, namely, to his own image. For not yet had man been made like to vanity, that his days should pass like a shadow in this hardship-filled age (See Ps 144:4 (143:4)). But if this were so, would this complaint of yours have any place? Would the acquisition of knowledge be laborious, so that, through flight of labor, human beings preferred to be unskilled? Would we have need of that very fortitude, which you say truly is found scarcely in the fewest, where there would be no hardship which we should have to sustain bravely for the truth? Since, then, these things are all turned to the contrary, you deny our nature to be vitiated for this end—that, with you helping, the Manichean may introduce an alien one mingled into us; and so, while you leap forth, an unskilled assailant of him, you become an unwitting helper.
JulianImp.5.1V. 2. Iulianus. Ostendit hoc etiam liber ille, qui Sapientia dicitur, cum verba exprimens impiorum, qui post umbram praesentium retecta beatorum merita contuentur: Vitam, inquit, illorum aestimabamus insaniam; et quomodo, reputati sunt inter filios Dei? Inde est ergo, quod fidelium perseverantia temporum iniquitatibus contumax, et eligens affligi cum populo Dei magis quam temporalis peccati habere iucunditatem , ab his qui dicunt: Manducemus et bibamus, cras enim moriemur , nomine pertinaciae et contentionis arguitur; nihilque magis putatur cautis convenire consiliis, quam degeneris animi famulatum emere, vel infidam momentorum quietem. De hac quippe potissimum ignavorum pectorum vilitate factum est, ut per Ecclesiarum naufragia spurcum manichaeorum dogma velificet. Quia si in his qui sacerdotii munere fungebantur, libera stetisset et virilis auctoritas, traducianorum commenta ut invicta ratio proruit, ita publica contrivisset assensio. Verum cum nihil ab hominibus praesentium amantibus, religione vilius aestimatur, itum est in criminationes Dei; ut nobis necessitas immineret, tam longis disputationibus Deum nostrum, qui est Deus verus, fidelem in verbis suis, iustum in iudiciis, sanctum in operibus approbare .
V. 2. Julian. This too that book shows which is called Wisdom, when, expressing the words of the impious, who, after the shadow of present things, behold the merits of the blessed laid bare: Their life, it says, we esteemed madness; and how have they been reckoned among the sons of God? (See Wis 5:4-5) Hence it is, then, that the perseverance of the faithful, contumacious against the iniquities of the times, and choosing to be afflicted with the people of God rather than to have the enjoyment of temporal sin (See Heb 11:25), is accused, by those who say: Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we shall die (1 Cor 15:32; Isa 22:13), under the name of pertinacity and contention; and nothing is thought more befitting cautious counsels than to buy the servitude of a degenerate soul, or the faithless quiet of moments. From this vileness of slothful hearts above all it has come about that the foul teaching of the Manicheans sails through the shipwrecks of the Churches. For if, in those who discharge the office of priesthood, a free and manly authority had stood firm, the inventions of the Traducianists, just as invincible reason has overthrown them, so public assent would have ground to pieces. But since nothing is esteemed by lovers of present things more vile than religion, recourse was had to accusations of God; so that necessity pressed upon us, by such long disputations, to approve our God, who is the true God, faithful in his words, just in his judgments, holy in his works (See Deut 32:4).
JulianImp.5.2Augustinus. Si fidelis est Deus in verbis suis, cur ei contradicitis dicenti: Reddam peccata patrum in filios , et hoc verum non esse contenditis? Si iustus est in iudiciis, cur hoc ipsum quod peccata patrum redduntur in filios, iustum esse non vultis; et quod filii Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum gravi iugo premuntur, dicere sine ullius originalis peccati merito fieri, non timetis? Si sanctus est in operibus, cur immunditiam nascentium, quae hominem Dei dicere compulit, non esse mundum a sorde peccati, nec infantem cuius est diei unius vita super terram , ab eius sancto opificio quo naturam format, quamvis originis contagione pollutam, discernere recusatis; atque ita vitia et ingeniorum et corporum tam multa, et aliquando tam magna, sancto eius opificio cuncta tribuitis? Quae nolentes tribuere venientibus de natura peccato depravata originalibus meritis; profecto aditum amplissimum ad alienam mali naturam introducendam manichaeis exsecrabilibus aperitis; quorum dogma nefarium quasi accusatis horrentes, cum adiuvetis errantes.
Augustine. If God is faithful in his words, why do you contradict him when he says: I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the sons (See Exod 20:5), and contend that this is not true? If he is just in his judgments, why do you not want this very thing—that the sins of the fathers are repaid upon the sons—to be just; and do you not fear to say that the children of Adam are pressed by a heavy yoke from the day of their going forth from their mother's womb without the merit of any original sin (See Sir 40:1)? If he is holy in his works, why do you refuse to discern the uncleanness of those being born—which compelled the man of God to say that no one is clean from the filth of sin, not even the infant whose life is of one day upon earth (See Job 14:4-5 (LXX))—from his holy handiwork by which he forms nature, though polluted by the contagion of origin; and so attribute all the vices both of wits and of bodies, so many and sometimes so great, all to his holy handiwork? Which, unwilling to attribute to the original merits coming from a nature vitiated by sin, you surely open a most ample entrance for the introduction of an alien nature of evil to the execrable Manicheans; whose nefarious teaching, shuddering, you as it were accuse, while you aid those erring.
JulianImp.5.2V. 3. Iulianus. His ita negotiis librorum meorum operam destinatam, mali naturalis assertor oppugnat; quibus sane viribus, et quam consequenti responsione, satis superque praecedentium voluminum disputatione perdocui. Quorum lectione non dubito prudenti cuique constare (quem rarum esse hac praefatione testatus sum), nihil studere aliud veritatis inimicum, quam ut simpliciorum ludificentur aures et evasisse, si utcumque se respondisse videatur.
V. 3. Julian. The work destined for these matters of my books the assertor of natural evil assails; with what strength, indeed, and with how consequent a response, I have more than sufficiently taught by the disputation of the preceding volumes. By the reading of which I do not doubt it is established to every prudent person (whom I have testified, by this preface, to be rare) that the enemy of truth studies nothing else than that the ears of the simpler be mocked, and that he may seem to have escaped, if in any way he may seem to have answered.
JulianImp.5.3Augustinus. Raros esse prudentes, praefatione testaris d; et quae causa sit raritatis huius, vel cur nec ipsi qui rara ingeniorum capacitate ad prudentiam pervenerunt, sine labore magno potuerunt consequi utilem scientiam, nec dicis, nec discis; qui fateri non vis humanam per primi hominis praevaricationem depravatam esse naturam. Et tamen ad tuorum librorum lectionem, nonnisi eosdem prudentes mittis, quos testaris esse rarissimos; de quorum ingenio tam bene sentis, ut apud eos unum librum meum tuis octo refutare coneris, multiplicans eis laborem filiorum Adam; quo labore discant, etiamsi nemo peccasset, in ipso paradiso se fuisse laboraturos, ut litteratorum libros, et prius ipsas litteras discerent. Haec est enim vestra praeclara scientia, nulli hominum comprehensibilis, nisi prudentibus raris, nec ipsis nisi laborantibus miseris.
Augustine. That the prudent are rare, you testify by your preface; and what the cause is of this rarity, or why not even those very ones who, by a rare capacity of wit, have come to prudence, could attain useful knowledge without great labor, you neither say nor learn; you who are unwilling to confess that human nature was depraved through the transgression of the first man. And yet to the reading of your books you send none but those same prudent ones, whom you testify to be the rarest; of whose wit you think so well that, with them, you try to refute my one book with your eight, multiplying for them the labor of the children of Adam; by which labor they may learn that, even if no one had sinned, in paradise itself they would have been going to labor, in order to learn the books of the lettered, and first the letters themselves. For this is your splendid knowledge, comprehensible to no human beings, except the rare prudent ones, nor to these except laboring and wretched.
JulianImp.5.3V. 4. Iulianus. Cum igitur id a nobis abunde constet effectum; tamen quia operi nostro nascitur longitudo, sapiens lector intellegat, nobis quidem optabilem fuisse brevitatem, sed exegisse causae necessitatem, ut error saeculi favore diffusior, latiore veritatis acie vinceretur. Haud igitur de nihilo est, quod sermo noster extenditur. Adiutu enim Christi praesumo confore, ut nulla pars impietatis, contra quam nobis certamen est, aut negligenter quaesita, aut minus inventa, aut attrita mediocriter censeatur. Nec illud ergo desperare vel possumus, vel debemus, quoniam processu temporum tempestas excitata considat, et auctoritate sapientum vulgus ignavum quod nunc perstrepit corrigatur; sed voti quam sententiae minor causa est; quemvis enim status rerum exitum sortiatur, constabit nobis ratio et benignitatis et fidei. Neque enim pendemus ad prosperitatis popularis eventum. Scitum est siquidem illud trium in Babylone puerorum, qui cum a rege superbissimo ad adorandam statuam cogerentur, fidelissime restiterunt, neque anhela sunt fornace conterriti, quae accensa erat in religiosorum voratum; responderuntque ut et fidei et constantiae congruebat: Potens est, inquiunt, Deus, o rex, liberare nos de fornace hac; sed etiamsi non liberet, scito quoniam deos tuos non colimus, nec statuam quam erexisti adoramus . Quam sanctum votum iudicio miscuerunt, nec tamen consilii gravitatem desiderio levarunt! Fortitudinem fidei nec desperatione praecipitant, nec cupiditate suspendunt; miscent quidem vota; ceterum ordinem non relinquunt; consolantur tolerantiam h, sed iustis mitiora submittunt: Certum est, inquiunt, quoniam nos possit liberare Deus noster; sed utrum velit, est incertum; et ideo sub ambiguo rerum eventu stat piorum certa sententia, idola respuendi, supplicia perferendi. Viderit quid boni nostra liberatio etiam ceteris conferat; nobis interim veram felicitatem fides, inquiunt, invicta custodiat; non habet ergo mollioribus gratificandi nimiam necessitatem, cuius gloriae negotiantur adversa. De hac et nos disciplina, quam reliquerunt illustres magistri, intellegimus tenendam in prosperis votorum mediocritatem, in dogmatibus vero fidei consiliorum perennitatem; optamusque, persecutionum tumore compresso, etiam populis subvenire; at si id non accidat, stat quidquid acerbum est in contumeliis et periculis perpeti, quam non aversari illuviem sordesque manichaeas.
V. 4. Julian. Since, then, it is abundantly established that this has been accomplished by us; nonetheless, because a length is born to our work, let the wise reader understand that brevity was indeed desirable to us, but the necessity of the cause demanded that an error more widespread by the favor of the age be conquered by a broader edge of truth. It is not, then, for nothing that our discourse is extended. For with the help of Christ I presume it will come about that no part of the impiety against which we contend be judged either negligently sought out, or insufficiently found, or but moderately worn down. Nor, then, can we or ought we despair that, in the process of times, the storm that has been stirred up will subside, and that, by the authority of the wise, the slothful crowd which now roars about will be corrected; but the cause of the vow is less than that of the resolve; for whatever issue the state of affairs may be allotted, the reckoning both of kindness and of faith will stand firm for us. For we do not hang upon the outcome of popular prosperity. For that saying is well-known, of the three boys in Babylon, who, when they were compelled by a most proud king to adore a statue, most faithfully resisted, nor were terrified by the panting furnace which had been kindled for the devouring of the religious; and they answered as befitted both faith and constancy: God is able, O king, they say, to free us from this furnace; but even if he should not free us, know that we do not worship your gods, nor adore the statue which you have set up (See Dan 3:17-18). How holy a vow they mingled with judgment, nor yet lightened the gravity of counsel by desire! The fortitude of faith they neither cast headlong by despair nor suspended by cupidity; they mingle vows indeed, but they do not abandon order; they console endurance, but submit milder things to the just: It is certain, they say, that our God can free us; but whether he will, is uncertain; and therefore, under the ambiguous outcome of affairs, the certain sentence of the devout stands firm—to reject idols, to bear punishments. Let it be seen what good our liberation may confer also on others; for us meanwhile let faith, they say, keep unconquered the true happiness; therefore he does not have too great a necessity of gratifying the softer, whose adversities trade for glory. From this discipline too, which those illustrious masters left, we understand that, in prosperous things, a moderation of vows is to be held; but in the teachings of faith, a perennity of counsels; and we wish, with the swelling of persecutions pressed down, to come to the aid of the peoples too; but if this does not happen, it stands firm to suffer whatever is bitter in insults and dangers, rather than not to turn away from the Manichean foulness and filth.
JulianImp.5.4Augustinus. Quantum manichaeos adiuvetis, cum grave iugum super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum non tribuitis iusto iudicio Dei, propter originale peccatum, ac sic locum facitis alienae naturae mali, quam tradit insanus error illorum, et saepe admonuimus, et ubi opportunum visum fuerit, non cessabimus admonere. Nunc quoniam vos ita fortes esse iactatis, ut tamen pro multis etiam vestra, quamvis " mediocria vota ", commendes, quibus, ut dicis: " optatis persecutionum tumore compresso populis subvenire "; quaero abs te, utrum id a Domino optetis. Quod si non facitis, non sunt ista vota christiana; si autem facitis, quomodo speratis, exauditis votis vestris, hoc Dominum largiturum? Nempe ut corda hominum quae adversa sunt vobis, in vestrum favorem et amorem convertat. Si hoc creditis, profecistis i; vos ipsos convertere, vos ipsos in melius mutare iam coepit. Cogitate, quaeso, istud, atque retinete, tandemque fatemini operari omnipotentem Deum in cordibus hominum voluntates, aversosque convertere; ita eius misericordiam gratiamque sapietis; et ubi hoc non agit, iudicia occulta, sed iusta. Sic vota nostra potius fortassis exaudiet, ut vos ad fidem catholicam, sicut Turbantium paulo ante vestrum, nunc vero esse iam nostrum, simili sua operatione atque miseratione convertat.
Augustine. How much you aid the Manicheans, when you do not attribute the heavy yoke upon the children of Adam from the day of their going forth from their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1) to the just judgment of God on account of original sin, and so make room for an alien nature of evil, which their insane error hands down, both we have often admonished, and, where it shall seem opportune, we will not cease to admonish. Now, since you so boast that you are strong, that nonetheless you commend even your, though as you say "moderate," vows on behalf of many, by which, as you say, "with the swelling of persecutions pressed down, you wish to come to the aid of the peoples"; I ask of you whether you vow this from the Lord. For if you do not, these are not Christian vows; but if you do, how do you hope, your vows being heard, that the Lord will bestow this? Namely, that he turn the hearts of human beings which are adverse to you into favor and love of you. If you believe this, you have profited: he has now begun to convert you yourselves, to change you yourselves for the better. Think, I beg, of this, and retain it, and confess at last that the omnipotent God works the wills in the hearts of human beings, and converts the averse; thus you will be wise concerning his mercy and grace; and where he does not do this, judgments hidden, but just. Thus perhaps he will rather hear our vows, that he may convert you to the Catholic faith, as a little while ago your Turbantius, but now indeed already ours, by a like operation and commiseration of his.
JulianImp.5.4V. 5. Iulianus. Sed iam aggrediamur ad causam. Claruit tam priore quam praesenti opere, concupiscentiam naturalem, sine qua sexuum non potest esse commixtio, a Deo, qui est et hominum et pecudum conditor , institutam. Quod tantum valet, confessione quoque adversarii mei, ut sine eius vituperatione, id est, carna lis concupiscentiae, et sine infamatione commixtionis, asseri penitus non possit naturale peccatum.
V. 5. Julian. But let us now approach the cause. It became clear, both in the earlier and in the present work, that natural concupiscence, without which there cannot be the mingling of the sexes, was instituted by God, who is the founder both of human beings and of cattle (See Wis 9:1-2). Which avails so much, by the confession too of my adversary, that without the disparagement of it—that is, of carnal concupiscence—and without the defamation of mingling, natural sin cannot at all be asserted.
JulianImp.5.5Augustinus. Concupiscentiam sive naturalem, sive carnalem tibi placeat appellare, eam nos concupiscentiam vituperamus, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et trahit ad illicita, nisi et spiritus adversus eam fortius concupiscat. Hanc dissensionem in paradiso dicimus non fuisse, quando qui ibi erant, nudi erant, et non confundebantur. Hanc post peccatum esse coepisse, ipsa res clamat, quandoquidem post peccatum pudenda texerunt, quae prius pudenda non fuerant. Neque ut nuda prius essent, impudentia, sed innocentia faciebat; quia et impudentia vitium est; illi autem quando eos nudos esse non pudebat, utique vitium non habebant. Hoc ergo malum, quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, haereticus Iulianus dicit esse bonum; hoc malum ex aliena mali natura nobis esse commixtum dicit alius haereticus Manichaeus; hoc malum per praevaricationem primi hominis in nostram dicens vertisse naturam, catholicus ambos vincit Ambrosius.
Augustine. Whether you please to call concupiscence natural or carnal, we censure that concupiscence by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit, and draws to unlawful things, unless the spirit too more strongly has desires opposed to it. This dissension we say was not in paradise, when those who were there were naked and were not confounded. That it began to be after sin, the matter itself cries out, since after sin they covered the shameful parts, which before were not shameful. Nor was it shamelessness that they were naked before, but innocence; for shamelessness too is a vice; but they, when it did not shame them to be naked, surely did not have a vice. This evil, then, by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit, the heretic Julian says is good; this evil, the other heretic, Mani, says is mingled into us from an alien nature of evil; this evil, saying that it turned into our nature through the transgression of the first man, the Catholic Ambrose conquers both.
JulianImp.5.5V. 6. Iulianus. Quod quoniam a nobis ea facultate, quam veritas suppeditavit, ostensum est, prudens lector super hoc ulterius dubitare non debet; ubicumque hoc in Traduciani scriptis occurrerit (sine quo tamen hiare non potest), nihil moveat audientes, sed in verecundiam protestetur auctoris; nos autem id deinceps, si res compulerit, necessaria brevitate tangemus. Arguit ergo quod dixi: Ista corporum commixtio, cum calore, cum voluptate, cum semine a Deo facta, et pro suo modo laudabilis approbatur . Sed praeteriit illud quod subdidi: De re autem, quae instituta naturaliter, fitaliquando etiam amplum munus piorum, diabolus sibi nec tua fronte audet aliquid vindicare.
V. 6. Julian. Which, since it was shown by us with that faculty which truth supplied, the prudent reader ought not to doubt further about this; wherever this occurs in the writings of the Traducianist (without which, nonetheless, he cannot gape), let it move the hearers in nothing, but let it protest to the shame of its author; but we, henceforth, if the matter compels, will touch it with a necessary brevity. He accuses, then, what I said: That mingling of bodies, with heat, with pleasure, with seed made by God, is approved as in its own measure praiseworthy. But he passed over what I subjoined: But of a thing which, instituted naturally, becomes sometimes even an ample gift of the devout, the devil dares not, even with your brow, claim anything for himself.
JulianImp.5.6Augustinus. Ille hoc praetermisit, qui eam cui respondebam, chartulam misit; fortasse intellegens quod tu non intellegis, qui tam incaute locutus es, ut diceres: "De re instituta naturaliter, quae fit aliquando etiam amplum munus piorum, non audere diabolum aliquid sibi vindicare "; cum videamus quod ipsos homines diabolus sibi vindicet, qui utique naturaliter instituti sunt. An forte homines non sunt, qui eruuntur de potestate tenebrarum, quarum tenet diabolus principatum? Aut vero ita desipis, ut affirmes eos sibi diabolum non vindicare, quos possidet, et suae potestati subditos tenet? Sed ut taceam de his, quos potestis dicere, per suam malam voluntatem a diabolo possideri; quid dicturus es de illo, de quo pater ipsius, Domino interrogante, respondit, quod ex infantia sua ab immundo spiritu vexaretur ? Nonne membra eius et sensus, quae omnia Deo auctore naturaliter instituta sunt, et impiorum communia piorumque sunt munera, diabolus sibi ut affligeret vindicabat? Quod licet facere non posset, nisi a creatore hominis Deo bono et iusto acciperet potestatem, facit tamen, et tua verba vanissima esse ostendit, qui dicis: " De re naturaliter instituta, quae fit aliquando amplum etiam munus piorum, nihil sibi audere diabolum vindicare ". Debuisti enim dicere, eorum bonorum quae naturaliter instituta sunt, non diabolum sibi nihil vindicare, sed ipsum nihil creare. Haec ille forsitan vidit, qui de tuis libris quae amico suo mitteret, nonnulla decerpsit; atque ut haec tua verba praetermitteret, tibi pepercit. Ego vero gratulor, quia me admones quid debeam contra errorem tuum dicere. Parvulorum ergo, quos vexandos diabolus vindicat sibi, merita inquire, quae cum propria non inveneris, originalia confitere. Si enim etiam ista negare perstiteris, Dei profecto iudicium, qui haec imaginem suam a diabolo immeritam sinit perpeti, accusare convinceris.
Augustine. He passed this over who sent the paper to which I was answering; perhaps understanding what you do not understand, you who spoke so incautiously as to say: "Of a thing instituted naturally, which becomes sometimes even an ample gift of the devout, the devil dares not claim anything for himself"; when we see that the devil claims for himself the very human beings, who surely were instituted naturally. Or perhaps they are not human beings, who are rescued from the power of darkness, of which the devil holds the principality? Or are you so out of your senses as to affirm that the devil does not claim for himself those whom he possesses, and holds subject to his power? But, to be silent about those whom you can say are possessed by the devil through their own evil will; what will you say of that one, of whom his father, with the Lord asking, answered that from his infancy he was vexed by an unclean spirit (See Mark 9:21)? Did not the devil claim for himself, to afflict, his members and senses—all of which were instituted naturally by God as author, and are common gifts of the impious and the devout? Which, although he could not do, unless he received the power from God, the good and just creator of man, he nonetheless does, and shows your words to be most empty, you who say: "Of a thing instituted naturally, which becomes sometimes even an ample gift of the devout, the devil dares to claim nothing for himself." For you ought to have said, of those good things which are instituted naturally, that the devil does not claim nothing for himself, but that he himself creates nothing. These things perhaps that man saw who excerpted from your books some things to send to his friend; and, in order to pass over these words of yours, he spared you. But I indeed give thanks, because you admonish me what I ought to say against your error. Inquire, then, the merits of the little ones, whom the devil claims for himself to be vexed; which, since you do not find proper, confess to be original. For if you persist in denying even these, you are convicted of accusing the judgment of God, who allows his image undeservedly to suffer these things from the devil.
JulianImp.5.6V. 7. Iulianus. Istis ergo praetermissis, accusat cur non dixerim: " cum libidine "; subditque, ut dogmatis eius acumen decebat: " Munus piorum, propagatio est fecunda filiorum, non commixtio pudenda membrorum; quam non haberet in generandis filiis natura sana, nunc autem habet eadem natura vitiata. Ac per hoc, et qui inde nascitur, indiget renasci " . Quam consequenter omnia! Munus dicit piorum, existentiam filiorum; sed hoc constituit sub diabolo, quod Deum dare confirmat, id est, filios. Libidinem autem, quae est in pudenda commixtione membrorum, diabolicam vocat; quam in parentibus esse non abnuit, quos tamen absolvit a culpa. Ex homine hunc natum dicas? Quod agunt, inquit, parentes, diabolicum est, sed rei non sunt; quod nascuntur filii, divinum opus est, sed rei sunt. Et adhuc se non Deo, sed daemoni aestimat obluctatum? Meritissime patiuntur istum furorem, qui putant esse naturale peccatum.
V. 7. Julian. With these things, then, passed over, he accuses why I did not say: "with disordered desire"; and he subjoins, as the sharpness of his teaching befitted: "The gift of the devout is the fruitful propagation of children, not the shameful mingling of members; which a sound nature would not have in generating children, but now the same nature, vitiated, has. And through this, even he who is born thence needs to be reborn." How consistently all things! He calls the gift of the devout the existence of children; but this he establishes under the devil, which he affirms God gives, that is, children. But the disordered desire which is in the shameful mingling of members, he calls diabolical; which he does not deny is in the parents, whom nonetheless he absolves from fault. Would you say that this man was born of a man? What they do, he says, the parents, is diabolical, but they are not guilty; that children are born is a divine work, but they are guilty. And does he still think himself to have struggled not against God, but against the demon? They most deservedly suffer this fury, who think that there is natural sin.
JulianImp.5.7Augustinus. Tu furis potius adversus Deum, quem procul dubio criminaris iniustum, si filios Adam nulla ex illo, ut asseveras, mala merita trahentes, tamen ex die exitus de ventre matris eorum gravi iugo premit, quod negare non sineris; et obtusos credens mea tuaque verba esse lecturos, quod non dixi, dixisse me dicis. Quando enim ego dicerem: Quod agunt parentes, diabolicum est; cum id quod procreandi intentione miscentur casta coniugia, bonum opus esse proclamem? Sed hanc commixtionem non fuisse futuram pudendam, si peccatum hominis, quo natura vitiata est, non praecessisset; unde carnis concupiscentia talis effecta est, ut eo malo nemo bene utatur, nisi eius motibus ad illicita pertrahere molientibus, e contrario concupiscente spiritu reluctetur. Non itaque dicimus: Quod agunt parentes, diabolicum est; malo quippe bene uti usque adeo diabolicum non est, ut ipso quoque diabolo bene utatur Deus. Illud autem nos dicere non negamus: Quod nascuntur filii, Dei opus est; sed rei sunt; non Dei opere, quo creantur, ut nascantur; sed peccati origine, qua obligantur, si non renascantur.
Augustine. You rather rage against God, whom without doubt you slander as unjust, if the children of Adam, drawing from him—as you assert—no evil merits, he nonetheless presses with a heavy yoke from the day of their going forth from their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1)—which you are not permitted to deny; and, believing that the dull will read my words and yours, you say I said what I did not say. For when would I say: What the parents do is diabolical; when I proclaim that the thing chaste marriages do, mingled with the intention of procreating, is a good work? But that this mingling would not have been going to be shameful, if the sin of man, by which nature was vitiated, had not preceded; whence the concupiscence of the flesh was made such that no one uses that evil well, except by resisting, with the spirit having contrary desires, its movements striving to drag to unlawful things. We do not, then, say: What the parents do is diabolical; for to use an evil well is so far from being diabolical that God uses the very devil too well. But this we do not deny that we say: That children are born is the work of God; but they are guilty; not by the work of God, by which they are created, that they may be born; but by the origin of sin, by which they are bound, if they are not reborn.
JulianImp.5.7V. 8. Iulianus. Quod autem non fuerit aliter commiscendus Adam mulieri suae, quam eo genere quod inolevit, et forma membrorum, et Dei benedictio haud aliter in pecora quam in homines prolata, et ipsa historia testatur, quae ut ostendit formatam naturam corporum, ita non asserit immutatam. Contra quod universitatis testimonium nihil invenitur in lege Dei; nisi in Manichaei libris, qui hanc concupiscentiam a principe tenebrarum commentatur infusam.
V. 8. Julian. But that Adam was to be mingled with his wife in no other way than by that manner which grew up, both the form of the members, and the blessing of God brought forth no otherwise upon cattle than upon human beings, the very history too attests; which, just as it showed that the nature of bodies was formed, so it does not assert that it was changed. Against which testimony of universality nothing is found in the law of God; except in the books of the Manichean, who comments that this concupiscence was breathed in by the prince of darkness.
JulianImp.5.8Augustinus. Non forma membrorum, quia peccato primi hominis mutata non est, concupiscentiam carnis asserit talem fuisse ante peccatum, qualis apparuit, quando pudenda texerunt, et unde tu non erubescis, erubuerunt; ostendentes etiam manente forma in se aliquid esse mutatum. Quamvis et ipsa membra, quando deformia et monstruosa nascuntur, pudor vos fateri cogit, quod nullo modo, si nemo peccasset, in paradiso talia nascerentur. Benedictionem vero Dei, qua dictum est: Crescite et multiplicamini , quid mirum, si etiam peccato natura vitiata non perdidit? Non enim erat consequens, ut quia immortalitatem felicitatemque perdiderat, perderet etiam fecunditatem, quae irrationabilibus quoque animantibus est tributa; in quibus caro, etsi concupiscit, adversus spiritum non concupiscit; quod tuae susceptae miserrimum bellum aut turpissimum regnum introducere conaris in illius beatissimae pacis et libertatis locum; quandoquidem in paradiso, etiamsi nemo peccasset, tale futurum fuisse contendis humanum genus, ut contra libidinem pugnaremus, aut libidini serviremus, si pugnare nollemus.
Augustine. Not by the form of the members, because it was not changed by the sin of the first man, does it assert that the concupiscence of the flesh was such before sin as it appeared when they covered the shameful parts, and at which you do not blush, they blushed—showing that, even with the form remaining, something in them was changed. Although even the members themselves, when they are born deformed and monstrous, shame compels you to confess that in no way, if no one had sinned, would such ones be born in paradise. But the blessing of God, by which it was said: Increase and multiply (Gen 1:28), what wonder if even nature vitiated by sin did not lose? For it was not consequent, that because it had lost immortality and happiness, it should lose also fruitfulness, which was bestowed even on irrational living things; in which the flesh, even if it has desires, does not have desires opposed to the spirit; which most wretched war or most foul reign of the thing you have taken up you try to introduce into the place of that most blessed peace and liberty; since you contend that in paradise, even if no one had sinned, the human race would have been going to be such that we should either fight against disordered desire, or serve disordered desire, if we were unwilling to fight.
JulianImp.5.8V. 9. Iulianus. Nos vero renasci omnes Baptismate debere, et opere nostro et sermone testamur; sed non ut huius impertitione beneficii, de iure videantur diaboli plagiati; verum ut qui sunt opera Dei, fiant pignora Dei; et qui nascuntur viliter, non tamen noxie, renascantur pretiose, non tamen calumniose; quique prodeunt ex institutis Dei, provehantur mysteriis Dei; et qui afferunt opera naturae, dona gratiae consequantur; ac Dominus suus qui eos fecit condendo bonos, faciat innovando adoptandoque meliores. Ergo iure dicitur, confitearis necesse est, naturale quod Manichaeus finxerat, sed tu nomine commutato originale vocas, interiisse peccatum. Nec hoc ea catholica fides credit antiquitus, quae non dubitat et parvulos a Deo fieri, et malum ab eo nihil fieri: ac per hoc opera Dei ante liberae voluntatis usum, naturae praeiudicio nec rea, nec sub diaboli iure constituit.
V. 9. Julian. But we, both by our work and by our discourse, attest that all must be reborn by Baptism; but not so that, by the imparting of this benefit, they may seem snatched by right from the devil; but so that those who are works of God may become pledges of God; and those who are born vilely, yet not noxiously, may be reborn preciously, yet not slanderously; and those who come forth from the institutions of God may be advanced by the mysteries of God; and those who bring works of nature may obtain gifts of grace; and their Lord, who made them good by founding, may make them better by renewing and adopting. Therefore it is rightly said—you must confess it of necessity—that the sin which the Manichean had feigned natural, but which you, with the name changed, call original, has perished. Nor does that Catholic faith believe this from of old, which does not doubt both that little ones are made by God, and that no evil is made by him; and through this it establishes the works of God, before the use of free will, by the prejudgment of nature, neither guilty nor under the right of the devil.
JulianImp.5.9Augustinus. Originale peccatum propterea significatius quam naturale dicimus, ut non divini operis, sed humanae originis intellegatur; maxime propter illud significandum, quod per unum hominem intravit in mundum; quod non interit disputatione Pelagiana, sed regeneratione Christiana. Quare autem vos dicatis renasci omnes parvulos debere Baptismate, satis novimus; inde quippe estis haeretici; ac peste novitia contra antiquitatem catholicae Ecclesiae disputatis, dicentes non erui parvulos de potestate tenebrarum gratia Redemptoris; cum Catholica in eis exsufflet et exorcizet, utique potestatem diaboli, neque enim imaginem Dei. Quid est ergo quod dicis: Ut qui nascuntur viliter, non tamen noxie, renascantur pretiose, non tamen calumniose; nec ipsum eorum pretium, quo fit ut pretiose renascantur attendis? Quid est enim, nisi sanguis Agni immaculati? Qui cur sit effusus, clamat ipse Agnus. Annon ipse ait: Hic est sanguis meus, qui pro multis effundetur in remissionem peccatorum ? Tu vero magnus mirabiliarius et dicis illum sanguinem etiam pro parvulis fundi, et negas eis per illum peccata ulla dimitti; dicis lavandos, et negas abluendos; dicis innovandos, et negas a vetustate mundandos; dicis per Salvatorem adoptandos, et negas esse salvandos. Sed nos eis videlicet calumniamur, quia dicimus eos mortuos esse in delictis et praeputio carnis suae; et ideo in morte Christi baptizari, ut moriantur peccato, qui mortui fuerant in peccato; et tu eos defendis, qui negando illos mortuos, id agis, ne ab eis foras mittatur, qui mortis potestatem habet; ac sic de morte Christi nullum beneficium consequantur, qui unus pro omnibus mortuus est. Quod cum dixisset Apostolus, mox conclusit atque ait: Ergo omnes mortui sunt, et pro omnibus mortuus est . Unde qui ita defendit parvulos, ut neget mortuos; non eos a morte defendit, sed in mortem secundam premit, quos ab eius beneficio, qui nonnisi pro mortuis mortuus praedicatur, excludit.
Augustine. We say original sin more significantly than natural, for this reason, that it may be understood to be not of the divine work, but of human origin; chiefly for signifying that which through one man entered into the world (See Rom 5:12); which does not perish by Pelagian disputation, but by Christian regeneration. But why you say that all little ones must be reborn by Baptism, we know well enough; for thence you are heretics; and by a novel pest against the antiquity of the Catholic Church you dispute, saying that the little ones are not rescued from the power of darkness by the grace of the Redeemer; when the Catholic Church exsufflates and exorcizes in them, surely the power of the devil, for it is not the image of God. What is it, then, that you say: That those who are born vilely, yet not noxiously, may be reborn preciously, yet not slanderously; and you do not attend their very price, by which it comes about that they are reborn preciously? For what is it, but the blood of the immaculate Lamb? Why this was shed, the Lamb himself cries out. Does he not himself say: This is my blood, which will be shed for many unto the remission of sins (See Matt 26:28)? But you, a great worker of marvels, both say that that blood is shed even for little ones, and deny that any sins are remitted to them through it; you say they must be washed, and deny they must be cleansed; you say they must be renewed, and deny they must be cleansed from oldness; you say they must be adopted through the Savior, and deny they must be saved. But we, it seems, slander them, because we say they are dead in their offenses and in the uncircumcision of their flesh; and therefore are baptized into the death of Christ, that they may die to sin, who had been dead in sin (See Col 2:11-13); and you defend them, who, by denying them dead, bring it about that he who has the power of death be not cast out from them; and so they obtain no benefit from the death of Christ, who one died for all. Which when the Apostle had said, he at once concluded and said: Therefore all died, and he died for all (See 2 Cor 5:14-15). Whence he who so defends the little ones as to deny them dead, does not defend them from death, but presses them into the second death, whom he excludes from the benefit of him who is preached to have died for none but the dead.
JulianImp.5.9V. 10. Iulianus. Post haec, omnem illum contextum de Abraham et Sara, qui emortuis iam corporibus filium pro munere acceperunt, quorum exemplum quantum veritati suffragetur, non solum sapiens, sed etiam mediocris lector intellegit, sic praeteriit, ut diceret contra se non multum valere. A qua impudentia vel illa eum debuit revocare sententia, quae ita constructa est: Et ut breviter, inquio, disputationis huius summa claudatur; si per concupiscentiam redditus est quem Deus promisit, bona sine dubio quae absolvit Dei fidem; si sine concupiscentia, noxia non potest esse progenito; quae nec cum conciperetur, nec cum pareretur, interfuit.
V. 10. Julian. After these things, all that context about Abraham and Sarah, who, with their bodies now dead, received a son as a gift (See Gen 18:11-14; Rom 4:19; Heb 11:11-12)—whose example how much it supports the truth, not only a wise but even a moderate reader understands—he so passed over as to say that it avails not much against him. From which shamelessness even that sentence ought to have recalled him, which is so constructed: And, that briefly, I say, the sum of this disputation may be closed; if through concupiscence was rendered him whom God promised, the good things which fulfilled the faith of God are without doubt; if without concupiscence, it cannot be noxious to the one begotten, which was present neither when he was conceived nor when he was born.
JulianImp.5.10Augustinus. Sine concupiscentia carnis Abrahae filium seminatum fuisse, quis dicat? Neque enim hoc opus aliter fieret in corpore mortis huius, de quo dicit Apostolus: Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum . Hoc autem malo bene usus est Abraham in concubitu coniugali; quod malum non erat in corpore vitae illius, quae in paradiso fuit ante peccatum. Sed si propterea bona tibi videtur carnis concupiscentia, quia per illam reddita est proles, quam promiserat Deus; bonus tibi videatur et diabolus, quia per illum sanguis Christi, quo redimeremur, effusus est, quem Deus promiserat. Aut fatere, etiam per aliquod malum reddi posse aliquod bonum.
Augustine. Who would say that the son of Abraham was sown without the concupiscence of the flesh? For this work would not come about otherwise in the body of this death, of which the Apostle says: The body indeed is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10). But Abraham used this evil well in conjugal intercourse; which evil was not in the body of that life which was in paradise before sin. But if for this reason the concupiscence of the flesh seems good to you, because through it offspring was rendered which God had promised; let the devil too seem good to you, because through him the blood of Christ, by which we were redeemed, was shed, which God had promised. Or confess that even through some evil some good can be rendered.
JulianImp.5.10V. 11. Iulianus. Illis ergo praetermissis physicus iste novus falsum esse pronuntiat, quod nos diximus: Sicut tunc limus qui assumptus est, materia, non auctor hominis fuit, ita nunc vis illa voluptatis, confectrix commixtrixque seminum, non explet divinae operationis vicem; sed de thesauris naturae offert Deo, unde ille hominem dignetur operari. Quae tamen recte a me prolata testatur, sed excepto eo quod dixi, semina vi voluptatis confici; philosophaturque hoc modo: Voluptas, inquit, illa concupiscentiae carnalis non conficit semina, sed ea quae iam sunt in corporibus a vero Deo condita s, non fiunt voluptate, sed excitantur et emittuntur cum voluptate . Hoc sane apparet eum, non fraude, sed defectu intellegentiae protulisse. Vim quippe ego voluptatis, ipsam virilis corporis rationem pronuntiavi, cui necesse habui virilitatis nomen imponere. Ipsa ergo (quia trivimus iam hoc verbum) virilitas, in genitalium et viscerum compage ac sanitate consistens, quae et appetentiae et efficientiae vires ministrat, vis a me voluptatis et concupiscentiae nominata est. Ideo enim non voluptatem simpliciter, sed vim voluptatis appellare malui, ut universum illum ardorem, qui et ante opus, et in opere sentitur, ostenderem. Neque enim debilitati genitalibus membris, id est spadones, semen habent; cum certe quibusdam favillis moveantur ignis exstincti; at vero quoniam virtute partium, quarum ministerio conficiuntur de internis humoribus semina, speciali debilitate caruerunt, generationum non fiunt potentes. Sic ergo instituit Deus, ut esset vis in corpore, quae legitimis explicata temporibus, si adfuisset sanitas, ad fecunditatis valentiam perveniret. Conficiuntur itaque in corporibus semina, maturae pubertatis adiutu. Inde est quod impuberes stimulat quidem praecoqua voluptas, sed sine annorum legibus sterilis scintillat accensio. Quod autem cum voluptate semina misceantur, verum quod alia sit voluptas quae sensibus supernatat, alia viscerum interior et effectui propior, apud medicorum auctores latissime disputatur; unde ille etiam Mantuanus poeta naturalium gnarior quam philosophaster Poenorum, macie signat armenta tenuari, ut ubi concubitus primos voluptas nota sollicitat, et frondibus arceantur et fontibus. Saepe etiam cursu quatiunt, et sole fatigant; cum graviter tunsis area gemit frugibus, et leves paleae flatibus efferuntur. Hoc ideo, ne luxu nimio usus obtunsior sit genitali arvo, et sulcos oblimet inertes; sed siccitatem quamdam secreta patiantur; sicque rapiat sitiens venerem, interiusque recondat . Verum in his quoque, non multum causae necessariis, acumen hominis notasse sufficiat.
V. 11. Julian. Those things, then, being passed over, this new natural philosopher pronounces false what we said: Just as then the mud which was taken up was the matter, not the author, of man, so now that force of pleasure, the maker and mixer of seeds, does not fill the place of the divine operation; but offers from the treasures of nature that whence God deigns to work man. Which nonetheless he attests was rightly brought forth by me, except for that which I said—that the seeds are made by the force of pleasure; and he philosophizes in this manner: That pleasure, he says, of carnal concupiscence does not make the seeds, but those which are already in bodies, founded by the true God, come about not by pleasure, but are excited and emitted with pleasure. This indeed appears that he brought forth not by fraud, but by defect of understanding. For I pronounced the force of pleasure to be the very reason of the virile body, on which I had to impose the name of virility. That very virility, then (since we have now worn this word smooth), consisting in the structure and health of the genitals and the inmost parts, which ministers the forces both of appetite and of efficiency, was named by me the force of pleasure and of concupiscence. For I preferred to call it not pleasure simply, but the force of pleasure, that I might show that whole ardor which is felt both before the work and in the work. For neither do the debilitated in their genital members, that is, eunuchs, have seed; although surely they are moved by certain embers of an extinguished fire; but because, by the virtue of those parts by whose ministry the seeds are made from the internal humors, they have lacked a special vigor, they do not become potent for generations. So, then, God instituted, that there should be a force in the body which, unfolded at its lawful times, if health were present, would arrive at the strength of fruitfulness. The seeds, then, are made in bodies, with the aid of ripe puberty. Hence it is that a premature pleasure indeed goads the unripe, but, without the laws of years, a sterile kindling sparkles. But that the seeds are mingled with pleasure is true; that there is another pleasure, however, which floats upon the senses, another more inward of the inmost parts and nearer to the effecting, is most widely disputed among the authors of the physicians; whence that Mantuan poet too, more skilled in natural things than the petty-philosopher of the Carthaginians, marks that the herds are made lean by thinness, so that, where pleasure, once known, solicits to first couplings, they may be kept off both from leaves and from springs. Often too they shake them with running and tire them in the sun; when the threshing-floor groans heavily with the pounded grain, and the light chaff is tossed to the winds. This, namely, lest by too much luxury the use be made too dull for the genital field, and clog the sluggish furrows; but let them suffer a certain dryness in the secret parts; and so let the thirsty one snatch love, and store it more deeply within (See Virgil, Georgics 3.129-137). But in these too, not much necessary to the cause, let it suffice to have noted the man's sharpness.
JulianImp.5.11Augustinus. Verba tua, quae me praetermisisse dicis, quam vana sint, satis superius demonstravi; quod fortasse vidit etiam ille qui chartulam misit, et tibi parcendo eadem praetermisit. Quod autem de vi voluptatis u, quam confectricem seminum esse dixisti, homo loquacissimus inventa occasione loquaciter disputas, non opus habeo resistere tibi; haec enim non multum esse causae necessaria, etiam ipse commemoras. Ego quippe vim voluptatis acceperam te intellegi voluisse, qua voluptas aliquid facere posset, non qua ipsa fieret. Sic enim solemus loqui, ut vim rei cuiusque dicamus, qua valet ut aliquid faciat, non qua valet alia res quae ipsam facit. Tu autem, ut nunc tua verba exposuisti, vim voluptatis te dixisse asseris, qua voluptas effici potest, non qua efficit ipsa quae potest; tamquam si vim diceres esse ignis, qua ipse accenditur ut sit; cum omnes homines vim dicant esse ignis, qua urit, vel calefacit quaecumque potuerit. Insolito igitur more locutus es: sed quid ad nos? Utcumque didicimus, ubi de re constat, non certare de verbis. Convenit enim nobis, non solum homines de seminibus, sed ipsa etiam semina, opera Dei esse, quocumque efficiantur modo; ne physicos vel medicos, vel etiam poetas, ubi nihil opus est, testes adhibeamus; aut contendamus quomodo sit loquendum, cum id propter quod loquimur, ambo verum esse sentiamus, id est, Dei opera esse semina omnium naturarum. Sed falsum est quod hinc conaris ostendere, ideo nulla esse vitia seminum, quia Deus summe bonus est conditor seminum; quod non diceres, si eo modo rationem seminum nosses v, quomodo eam noverat qui dicebat: Homo vanitati similis factus est; atque ut hoc ipsam naturam, quae in ipsam mortalitatem lapsa est, meruisse doceret, addebat: Dies eius sicut umbra praetereunt , cum sciret hominem ad Dei similitudinem factum, et tamen discerneret ab institutione divina depravatae humanae originis vitium. Quod in ipsis quoque tuis verbis quibus me momordisti, videre debuisti. Dixisti enim: Verum in his quoque, non multum causae necessariis, acumen hominis notasse suffecerit; obtunsum me scilicet esse significans, quia intellegere non potui locutionem tuam in rebus non multum causae necessariis, ut fateris. Ego autem requiro a te, unde homines nascuntur obtunsi; neque enim sic ipse obtunsus es z, ut pertinere ad naturam neges vel obtunsa ingenia, vel acuta; quamvis et acuta ipsa, sicut iam in superioribus diximus, propter hoc corruptibile corpus quod aggravat animam , si primi hominis ingenio comparentur, obtunsa sint; qui utique non tale corpus acceperat, ut illo eius anima gravaretur. Ac sic et ego distinguerem in natura hominis qualis nunc est, quid distet inter ingenii vitium et tanti artificis opificium; cui procul dubio non recte vitia tribuuntur, quantacumque sint, humanorum ingeniorum; ut per hanc regulam discas ab eius institutione discernere, quamvis congenitum homini, originale peccatum; nec ideo neges esse, quia Deus homines facit, qui peccatum non facit; sicut non ideo neganda sunt ingeniis hominum congenita vitia, quia Deus homines facit, a cuius arte divina vitiositas est omnis aliena. Sic autem novit Deus bene operari homines de substantia peccato vitiata, quemadmodum novit bene operari de ipsis peccatis hominum, quorum sunt vitia voluntaria. Videmus enim quanta bona operatus sit de peccato fratrum, qui fratrem per invidentiam vendiderunt ; et alia multa quibus sacrae Litterae plenae sunt.
Augustine. Your words, which you say I passed over, how empty they are, I have shown sufficiently above; which perhaps even that man saw who sent the paper, and, sparing you, passed over the same. But what, about the force of pleasure—which you said is the maker of seeds—you, a most loquacious man, having found occasion, dispute loquaciously, I have no need to resist you; for these things, you yourself too record, are not much necessary to the cause. For I had taken it that you wished the force of pleasure to be understood as that by which pleasure could do something, not that by which it itself came about. For thus we are wont to speak, that we call the force of any thing that by which it avails to do something, not that by which avails another thing which makes it. But you, as you have now expounded your words, assert that you said the force of pleasure to be that by which pleasure can be effected, not that by which it itself effects that which it can; just as if you said the force of fire to be that by which it is kindled so as to be; when all human beings call the force of fire that by which it burns, or warms whatever it can. In an unusual manner, then, you have spoken: but what is that to us? In whatever way we have learned, where there is agreement about the thing, not to contend about words. For it is agreed between us, that not only human beings are made from seeds, but the very seeds too are works of God, in whatever manner they are effected; lest we adduce physicians or poets, where there is no need, as witnesses; or contend in what manner one must speak, when both of us perceive that to be true on account of which we speak, that is, that the seeds of all natures are works of God. But it is false, what hence you try to show—that there are for this reason no vices of seeds, because God is the most supremely good founder of seeds; which you would not say, if you knew the reason of seeds in the way that he knew it who said: Man was made like to vanity; and, that he might teach this very nature, which has fallen into mortality itself, to have merited it, he added: His days pass like a shadow (Ps 144:4 (143:4))—when he knew man was made to the likeness of God, and yet discerned from the divine institution the vice of the depraved human origin. Which even in your very words by which you bit at me, you ought to have seen. For you said: But in these too, not much necessary to the cause, let it suffice to have noted the man's sharpness; signifying me to be dull, surely, because I could not understand your locution in matters not much necessary to the cause, as you confess. But I require of you whence human beings are born dull; for you are not yourself so dull as to deny that either dull or sharp wits pertain to nature; although even sharp ones themselves, as we said in the foregoing, on account of this corruptible body which weighs down the soul (See Wis 9:15), if they be compared to the wit of the first man, are dull; who surely did not receive such a body that by it his soul should be weighed down. And so I too would distinguish, in the nature of man such as he now is, what difference there is between the vice of the wit and the handiwork of so great a craftsman; to whom without doubt the vices of human wits, however great they be, are not rightly attributed; so that by this rule you may learn to discern from his institution the original sin, though congenital to man; nor for that reason deny that it is, because God makes human beings, who does not make sin; just as the congenital vices of human wits are not for that reason to be denied, because God makes human beings, from whose divine art all viciousness is alien. But God knows so to work human beings well from a substance vitiated by sin, as he knows to work well from the very sins of human beings, whose vices are voluntary. For we see how great goods he worked from the sin of the brothers, who through envy sold their brother (See Gen 37:26-28; 45:5-8); and many other things of which the sacred Letters are full.
JulianImp.5.11V. 12. Iulianus. Verum demiror ubique constantiam disputantis, qui pronuntiat semina a Deo vero condita esse, a quo conduntur et corpora, licet cum voluptate emittantur. Semina ergo a Deo fieri confitetur, in quibus esse dicit diabolicum malum; et non erubescit credere a Deo fieri malum, quod innocentibus imputetur.
V. 12. Julian. But I wonder everywhere at the constancy of the disputant, who pronounces that the seeds were founded by the true God, by whom bodies too are founded, though they be emitted with pleasure. He confesses, then, that the seeds are made by God, in which he says there is a diabolical evil; and he does not blush to believe that there is made by God an evil which is imputed to the innocent.
JulianImp.5.12Augustinus. A Deo non fit malum, quando fit de malo bonum. Malum est enim de peccato veniens originis vitium, cum quo nascitur homo; bonum est opus Dei, non sine malo; cuius mali reatus non innocentibus, ut dicis, sed reis imputatur; ut quoniam nascendo tractum est, renascendo solvatur. Sic enim fuerunt omnes ratione seminis in lumbis Adam, quando damnatus est, et ideo sine illis damnatus non est; quemadmodum fuerunt Israelitae in lumbis Abrahae, quando decimatus est, et ideo sine illis decimatus non est . Melius enim quam tu, noverant rationem seminis, qui ista dixerunt, et litteris mandare curarunt, quae in Christi Ecclesia legerentur, in qua ab renascuntur ex Adam nati, ne remaneant in illa stirpe damnati.
Augustine. By God an evil is not made, when from an evil a good is made. For an evil is the vice of origin coming from sin, with which man is born; a good is the work of God, not without an evil; whose guilt of evil is imputed not to the innocent, as you say, but to the guilty; so that, since it was drawn by being born, it may be loosed by being reborn. For so all were, by the reasoning of the seed, in the loins of Adam, when he was condemned, and therefore he was not condemned without them; just as the Israelites were in the loins of Abraham, when he was tithed, and therefore he was not tithed without them (See Heb 7:9-10). For they knew better than you the reasoning of the seed, who said these things, and took care to commit to letters the things that would be read in the Church of Christ, in which those born of Adam are reborn, lest they remain damned in that stock.
JulianImp.5.12V. 13. Iulianus. Libido nihil attinet, inquit, ad semina, quia facta est a diabolo; huic autem libidini serviunt coniuges; semina autem et parvulos de seminibus facit Deus. Sed nec rei sunt, inquit, nec puniuntur parentes, qui agunt opus diaboli; sceleri autem et suppliciis destinantur parvuli, quos condidit Deus; impunitumque est quod fecit diabolus, id est libido; per quod docetur bona, quae nec supplicium meretur; sed accusatur damnaturque quod facit Deus; per quod docetur esse scelestum, quippe quod a supplicio, nec auctoris sui potest pudore defendi; credaturque hoc divinitas facere, quod nec extrema possit sustinere captivitas. Hunc habent exitum, qui inferunt veritati bellum, ut nihil non impium, non insanum loquantur; dum constet quia nulla oratione innocentium status ita, ut accusatorum suorum profanitate, defenditur.
V. 13. Julian. Disordered desire, he says, pertains in no way to the seeds, because it was made by the devil; but to this disordered desire the spouses serve; but the seeds and the little ones from the seeds God makes. But neither are they guilty, he says, nor are they punished, the parents, who do the work of the devil; but to crime and punishments are destined the little ones, whom God founded; and unpunished is what the devil did, that is, disordered desire; through which it is taught to be good, since it does not even merit punishment; but accused and condemned is what God does; through which it is taught to be wicked, since indeed it cannot be defended from punishment even by the shame of its own author; and let it be believed that the deity does this which not even the utmost captivity could sustain. They have this issue who bring war upon truth: that they say nothing not impious, not insane; while it is established that by no oration is the state of the innocent so defended as it is by the profanity of their accusers.
JulianImp.5.13Augustinus. Numquid ideo falsum facis esse quod dico, quia dicis me dicere quod non dico? Ego enim non dico ad semina nihil attinere libidinem, quandoquidem non nascuntur sine libidine, qui utique na scuntur ex semine; sed dico Deum operari sine ullo suo vitio, etiam de semine vitiato. Nec dico reos non esse, et non puniri parentes, qui agunt opus diaboli; sed dico non eos agere opus diaboli, quando utuntur libidine non propter libidinem, sed propter propaginem. Ita quippe bonum opus est bene uti libidinis malo, quod faciunt coniugati, sicut e contrario malum opus est male uti corporis bono, quod faciunt impudici. Nec impunitam dico esse libidinem, quae cum morte destruetur, quando mortale hoc induetur immortalitate . Non enim est nisi in corpore mortis huius, de quo liberari cupiebat Apostolus ; nec erat, aut non talis erat in corpore vitae illius, quam peccando perdidit homo, qui factus est rectus ; nec sicut aliqua substantia, liberatis separatisque ac nobis libido in alium ad locum est migratura; sed sicut infirmitas in nostrae salutis perfectione peritura; quamvis iam nunc esse desinat post corporis mortem. Neque enim in corpore mortuo adhuc potest esse, quae nisi in corpore mortis non potest esse; sed quae peritura est in corporis morte, non est resurrectura resurgente corpore sine morte. Quomodo ergo punita vel impunita erit, quae pereundo non erit? Erunt autem impuniti, qui eius reatu congenito regeneratione caruerunt, eiusque surgentibus et urgentibus motibus ad illicita perficienda non cedunt; et si quid non propter prolem de ipsa, sed propter ipsam cum coniugibus faciunt, venia subsequente sanantur. Quod vero Deus de origine merito et iuste damnata parvulos creat, bonum est ipse quod creat; quia homines creat, et homines etiam mali bonum aliquid sunt, in quantum homines sunt; nec cohibet ab eis bonitatem creandi, quos praescivit esse damnandos, immo scit originaliter iam esse damnatos; unde gratulandum est tam multos eorum a debita poena per indebitam gratiam liberari. Si autem crudele esse arbitramini damnari parvulos, quos originale peccatum trahere non putatis; crudele vobis videatur, non rapi ex hac vita parvulos, secundum vos, nullum habentes omnino peccatum, quos Deus utique novit in multis magnisque peccatis sine ulla in melius mutatione morituros; nam secundum ratiocinationes humanas, crudelius videtur non liberare cum possit, nullis inquinatum parvis magnisque peccatis, quam damnare progeniem peccatoris. Porro cum illud iustum esse, qua potestis voce, clametis; hoc esse iniustum, qua fronte contenditis?
Augustine. Do you therefore make false what I say, because you say that I say what I do not say? For I do not say that disordered desire pertains in no way to the seeds, since those are not born without disordered desire who surely are born from seed; but I say that God works without any vice of his own, even from a vitiated seed. Nor do I say that they are not guilty, and are not punished, the parents who do the work of the devil; but I say that they do not do the work of the devil, when they use disordered desire not on account of disordered desire, but on account of offspring. For so is it a good work to use the evil of disordered desire well, which the married do, as, on the contrary, it is an evil work to use the good of the body badly, which the unchaste do. Nor do I say that disordered desire is unpunished, which will be destroyed with death, when this mortal shall put on immortality (See 1 Cor 15:54). For it is not except in the body of this death, from which the Apostle desired to be set free (See Rom 7:24); nor was it, or was not such, in the body of that life which man, who was made upright (See Eccl 7:29), lost by sinning; nor, like some substance, with us set free and separated, will disordered desire migrate into another place; but, like an infirmity, it will perish in the perfecting of our salvation; although already now it ceases to be after the death of the body. For neither can that be in a dead body which cannot be except in the body of death; but that which is to perish in the death of the body is not to rise again when the body rises again without death. How, then, will it be punished or unpunished, which by perishing will not be? But unpunished will be those who, by being regenerated, lacked its congenital guilt, and, when its movements rise and press to the accomplishing of unlawful things, do not yield; and if they do something not on account of offspring concerning it, but on account of it, with their spouses, they are healed by a following pardon (See 1 Cor 7:6). But that God creates little ones from an origin deservedly and justly condemned, the very thing which he creates is good; because he creates human beings, and human beings even evil are some good, insofar as they are human beings; nor does he withhold from them the goodness of creating, whom he foreknew would be damned—nay, knows to be already originally damned; whence we must give thanks that so many of them are set free from the due punishment through an undue grace. But if you judge it cruel that little ones are damned, whom you do not think draw original sin; let it seem cruel to you that little ones are not snatched from this life, who, according to you, have utterly no sin, whom God surely knows will die in many and great sins with no change for the better; for, according to human reasonings, it seems more cruel not to set free, when he could, one stained by no small or great sins, than to damn the offspring of a sinner. Further, since you cry out, by whatever voice you can, that the former is just; with what brow do you contend that this is unjust?
JulianImp.5.13V. 14. Iulianus. Post haec illud conatur incessere, quod nos apostoli Pauli testimonio comprobavimus, quia Deus hominem de seminibus operetur. Argumentaturque me fecisse fraudem, qui huic loco illa dicta voluerim coaptare, qua de frumentis prolata constabat; quasi ego aut ibi Apostoli sententiam, ut hic aestimat, dividuam fecerim, aut propter aliud testimonii recordatus sim quam ut eius finem monstrarem formatorem seminum omnium Deum credi oportere. Beatus enim Paulus postquam fidem resurrectionis, multiplicationis diurnae conciliavit exemplis; intulit quod universam naturam possit attingere, dicens: Deus autem illi dat corpus prout vult, et unicuique seminum proprium corpus; id est, omni semini corpus, quod proprietas eius reposcit, attribuit. Non ergo quod de frumentis dictum est, de homine volui intellegi; sed hoc quod dictum est, unicuique seminum proprium corpus a Deo auctore conferri, in destructionem vestram, quorum dogmate id negatur, arripui. Nequaquam igitur, sicut tu putas, supervacuo feci illius sententiae mentionem, nec ea fraudulenter, ut mentiris, sum abusus; nec tu de humanis seminibus hominem a Deo fieri, sicut peieras, credis; quod non opinando, sed fidem tuam intellegendo confirmo.
V. 14. Julian. After these things he tries to assail that which we proved by the testimony of the apostle Paul—that God works man from seeds. And he argues that I committed fraud, who wished to fit to this place those words which it was established were brought forth about grains; as though I either there, as he here esteems, made the sentence of the Apostle divided, or recalled the testimony for any other reason than to show that its end is that God must be believed the former of all seeds. For blessed Paul, after he had conciliated the faith of the resurrection by the examples of the daily multiplication, brought in that which could touch the whole of nature, saying: But God gives it a body as he wills, and to each of the seeds its own body (1 Cor 15:38); that is, to every seed he attributes the body which its property demands. Not, then, what was said of grains did I wish to be understood of man; but this which was said—that to each of the seeds its own body is conferred by God as author—I seized for your destruction, by whose teaching this is denied. By no means, then, as you suppose, did I superfluously make mention of that sentence, nor did I, as you lie, fraudulently abuse it; nor do you, as you forswear yourself, believe that man is made by God from human seeds; which I confirm not by opining, but by understanding your faith.
JulianImp.5.14Augustinus. Quomodo posueris apostolicum testimonium, quo ille usus est de seminibus, quae seminantur in terra, quia non vivificantur nisi moriantur (hoc enim de resurrectione corporum, in qua versabatur, disputatio postulabat), qui tua illa legit, intellegenter advertat, et quae nos in eodem libro quem nunc refutare conaris tibi ad illa respondimus ; et inveniet te, quod ad rem pertineat, nec ibi aliquid dixisse, et hic nihil dicere. Si enim magno nisu moliris ostendere, quod homines Deus de seminibus operetur, quasi hoc negetur a nobis; et adhibes Apostolum testem, ubi abs te nulla necessitas causae flagitat probationem; et quod est insulsius, vis accipi de seminibus hominum, quod ille dixit de seminibus frumentorum, quoniam id causa poscebat; et dicis verba eius: Tu quod seminas non vivificatur; et taces quod ille connectit, nisi moriatur. Taces etiam illud quod adiungit et dicit: Et quod seminas, non corpus quod futurum est seminas, sed nudum granum, fere tritici, aut alicuius ceterorum; ubi satis aperit unde dicat. Quibus tacitis, quod sequitur ingeris: Deus autem illi dat corpus quomodo voluerit, et unicuique seminum proprium corpus ; et non vis hic intellegi quorum seminum, id est, fere tritici, aut alicuius ceterorum, eorum scilicet, quae cum seminantur, non vivificantur nisi moriantur. Et quaeris hoc dictum etiam ad semina humana transferre; de quibus quamvis veraciter dici possit, quod illis Deus det corpus quomodo voluerit, et unicuique eorum proprium corpus; non tamen dici potest, quod semen hominis, quando gremio feminae infunditur, non vivificatur nisi moriatur. Sed plane de corpore hominis dici potest; non enim resurget nisi moriatur, propter quod totum illud de seminibus frumentorum dixit Apostolus. Non itaque immerito mihi visum est, ideo te in hoc testimonio ea verba tacuisse, per quae appareret de quibus seminibus loqueretur, quem testem adhibuisti, ne mente vigili lector admoneretur (si tamen hoc praevidere potuisti), ita in paradiso po tuisse seminari homines in arvis genitalibus feminarum per membra genitalia masculorum, sicut frumenta in terris agricolarum manibus seminantur; ut sic ad hominem serendum stimulus nullus libidinis incitaret, quemadmodum ad hominem pariendum nullus dolor urgeret. Quibus haec tranquillitas displicet, rogo, quid eis in carne, nisi quod pudet placet? Nec sane concupiscentiae carnalis puderet, si hoc solum carnem liberet, quod mens iuberet, et quando liberet, et quantum iuberet. Nunc ergo quoniam talis non est, cur ei contra nos suffragamini, et non eam potius nobiscum fatemini aut de peccato natam, aut peccato esse vitiatam?
Augustine. In what manner you set down the apostolic testimony, which he used of the seeds that are sown in the earth, because they are not made alive unless they die (for this the disputation about the resurrection of bodies, in which he was engaged, demanded), let him who reads those things of yours understandingly notice, and what we answered you to them in the same book which you now try to refute (See 1 Cor 15:36); and he will find that you, as far as pertains to the matter, both there said nothing, and here say nothing. For if with great effort you strive to show that God works human beings from seeds, as though this were denied by us; and you adduce the Apostle as witness, where no necessity of the cause demands proof from you; and—what is more insipid—you wish it to be taken of the seeds of human beings, what he said of the seeds of grains, since the cause demanded it; and you say his words: What you sow is not made alive; and you are silent about what he connects, unless it dies. You are silent too about that which he adds and says: And what you sow, you sow not the body that is to be, but a bare grain, perhaps of wheat or of some of the rest (See 1 Cor 15:36-37); where he opens sufficiently of what he speaks. With which things kept silent, you thrust in what follows: But God gives it a body as he wills, and to each of the seeds its own body (1 Cor 15:38); and you do not want it understood here of which seeds, that is, of wheat, or of some of the rest, namely those which, when they are sown, are not made alive unless they die. And you seek to transfer this saying even to human seeds; of which, although it could be truly said that God gives them a body as he wills, and to each of them its own body; it cannot nonetheless be said that the seed of man, when it is poured into the lap of the woman, is not made alive unless it dies. But plainly it can be said of the body of man; for it will not rise again unless it dies, on account of which the Apostle said all that about the seeds of grains. Not without reason, then, did it seem to me that you for this reason kept silent, in this testimony, those words by which it would appear of what seeds he was speaking—the witness you adduced—lest a reader with a watchful mind be admonished (if at least you could foresee this) that human beings could so have been sown in paradise in the genital fields of women through the genital members of men, as grains are sown in the lands by the hands of farmers; so that to sow a man no goad of disordered desire would incite, just as to bear a man no pain would press. To whom this tranquility is displeasing, I ask, what in the flesh, except what shames them, pleases them? Nor surely would carnal concupiscence shame, if it freed only this, which the mind commanded, and when it pleased, and as much as it commanded. Now, then, since it is not such, why do you give it support against us, and not rather confess it with us, either born of sin, or vitiated by sin?
JulianImp.5.14V. 15. Iulianus. Iam vero quis risum teneat prudentium, cum ad haec quae subdidisti exempla pervenerit? Ais enim: De ipsis verbis Apostoli refutaretur, non religiosae voluntatis, sed libidinosae voluptatis pudens nominator et impudens praedicator. De ipsis quippe seminibus, quae in agris agricolae seminant, potest iste redargui. Cur enim non credamus Deum potuisse in paradiso concedere homini beato de suo semine, quod concessum videmus agricolis de tritici semine; ut eo modo illud sereretur, sicut hoc seritur, sine ulla pudenda libidine? . Quam venuste pudens nominator et impudens praedicator dat omnino incompositos motos, et circulatorum carmina dicit. Sed illud aliud nisi laetissime legi non potest; quoniam si non peccasset Adam, sic potuit mulier, sicut seges, ad fecunditatem parari; forte ut per omnes articulos ac per minutas corporum fistulas, quas medici povrou" vocant, spicae erumperent filiorum; atque ita omnibus laeta partibus, partus pro pediculis exsudaret. Sed si aliqui et per oculos erumperent, auferrentur lumina parienti, et si pupularum globulis examina galeata prodirent, imprecaretur sine dubio caecitas orbitatem. Nec difficulter sane, non parta, sed sudata soboles necaretur, atque haberetur gens, ut apud fabulas Myrmidonum, ita apud Manichaei dogmata, vel pedicularia, vel publicaria. Sed haec esset fetura mulieris; vir autem quid posset efficere? Admoveret nimirum non membra, sed ferramenta, et genitalium vacuus imprimeret vomeres ac ligones. Grates ergo et amplissimae primorum hominum debentur errori, quo tam beatae naturae tormenta vitata sunt. Mitius partus agit cum feminis, et maritus, quam si aut aratra sentirent, aut importuna per totum corpus fecunditate silvescerent. Impleantur Manichaeorum facies ignominia, et quaerant nomen tuum, Domine. O portenta criminantium innocentes et Deum, suffragia argumentorum et testimoniorum! Cur, inquit, non credamus quia potuit aliter fieri na tura, quam facta conspicitur? Quasi quaeratur quid potuerit, et non quid instituerit Deus. Si libet ea libidine opinandi quae sunt facta reprehendere, ut dicamus, quia fieri aliter potuerunt, ideo quae sunt instituta non reddunt naturae bonae testimonium; pronuntiemus quia potuit Deus bicipites facere mortales, ideo unicipites, et qui pedibus insisterent male sunt facti; fieri enim capitati ab utraque parte potuerunt; quae forma in quibusdam solet apparere vermiculis, quorum alvum vertex ambifariam natus includit, ut ab utroque incipientes ex humero, finem habere intellegantur in medio. Admittantur ista ludibria, et quis erit delirandi finis? Potuit ergo facere Deus, ut de terra cum floribus homines germinarent; quantum ad virtutem, potuisse non abnuo; sed noluit nisi ut de sexibus nascerentur. Nunc ergo quaeritur quid fecerit, non quid potuerit. In quo loco furiosa responsio est, ut dicatur: Malum est quod est, quia potuit Deus aliter facere; hoc est enim laudare Deum in vituperationem sui, et in maculam consilii eius omnipotentiam praedicare. Non solum nulla laudatio, verum etiam ingens contumelia est, dare viribus quod sapientiae detraxeris, et dicere adfuisse Deo fortitudinem, sed defuisse consilium. Pertingit omnino ad negationem potentiae, reprehensio consulentiae; non omnia potest, si ordinare bene non potest. Immo si sapientiae sublimitate deficitur, nihil de reverentia divinitatis retentat; quod quia suspicari profanissimum est, recurrit illud, quo tradux vestra iugulatur. Deus qui fecit omnia bona valde, nihil ita instituit, ut in illo genere quod factum est, fieri potuisse aut aptius, aut rationabilius, approbetur. Sapientia quippe et omnipotentia ex aequo praeditus non institueret, quod homunculus posset iure reprehendere. Quaecumque ergo in omnibus omnino creaturis naturalia docentur, ita summe facta sunt, ut affectata in his emendatio, stulta et profana doceatur. Ut ergo forma equi, forma bovis habent quidem in mutua collatione distantiam, in suis tamen generibus aptam ex omni parte concinentiam ita sortitae sunt, ut nec debuerit, nec potuerit aut equus aut bos, secus quam formatus videtur, institui (qua regula licet omnia natantia, repentia, gradientia, volitantia, postremo aetherea caelestiaque percurrere; nullius forma quippe melius, quam illi cui parabatur generi, institui potuisse convincitur); ita et homo quem supra iam gradientium generalitas indicavit, sic est per universa formatus, ut melius a nullo fingi posset; qui accepit prudenter in corpore et locos decoris, et locos pudoris, ut in se ipso et verecundiam et confidentiam disceret; ne et deformis videretur, si esset per cuncta velatus; et deses redderetur ac negligens, si semper esset per cuncta vulgatus. Ac per hoc fecunditas humana, non alia quam quae habet, utriusque sexus debuit membra suscipere, non aliam ratio nem viscerum, non alios sensus, non aliam voluptatem. Admoneamus igitur Manichaeos, ut desinant reprehendere divinae facta sapientiae, ut opinionum suarum corrigant pravitatem; quia nec ad quaestionem attinet, si aliter homines quam universitas testis est, generaturi fuisse dicantur; nec melius eos fieri potuisse quam facti sunt, ut ratio, ita et Scriptura testatur, quae clamat Deum non solum bona, sed etiam valde bona fecisse omnia . Ac per hoc ut per totum opus, hic quoque Manichaeorum dogma collapsum est. In futuro autem tempore gloriosiora corpora, nec opis egentia, fore beatorum fatemur. Sed et hoc ipsum optime institutum est a Deo iustissimo ac sapientissimo, ut statum praemii neutiquam natura perverteret; sed esset primus gradus, in quo consisteret ingenuitas naturalis, et de quo, pro iure arbitrii liberi, vel ad poenarum ima descenderet, vel ad gloriarum cacumen per eas vias, quas Deus instituit, niteretur.
V. 15. Julian. But now who of the prudent would hold his laughter, when he comes to these examples which you subjoined? For you say: By the very words of the Apostle would be refuted the namer—ashamed not of a religious will, but of a lustful pleasure—and the shameless preacher. For from the very seeds, which farmers sow in the fields, this man can be refuted. For why should we not believe that God could have granted to the blessed man in paradise, of his own seed, what we see granted to farmers of the seed of wheat; so that it might be sown in that way in which this is sown, without any shameful disordered desire?. How charmingly the namer—ashamed, and the shameless preacher—gives altogether disordered movements, and speaks the songs of mountebanks. But that other thing cannot be read except most joyfully; since, if Adam had not sinned, the woman could have been prepared for fruitfulness like a cornfield; perhaps so that through all the joints and through the minute little pipes of bodies, which the physicians call poroi, the ears of children might burst forth; and so, joyful in all her parts, she might sweat out offspring instead of lice. But if some burst forth even through the eyes, the lights would be taken from her who bears; and if from the little balls of the pupils helmeted swarms came forth, blindness would without doubt imprecate bereavement upon her. Nor surely with difficulty would the offspring—not born, but sweated out—be killed, and there would be a race, as among the fables of the Myrmidons, so among the teachings of the Manichean, either lice-bearing or louse-producing. But this would be the childbearing of the woman; the man, however, what could he effect? He would apply, surely, not members, but tools, and, empty of genitals, would press in ploughshares and mattocks. Great and most ample thanks, then, are owed to the error of the first human beings, by which the torments of so blessed a nature were avoided. More mildly childbirth deals with women, and the husband, than if either they felt ploughs, or grew wild over their whole body with an importunate fruitfulness. Let the faces of the Manicheans be filled with ignominy, and let them seek your name, O Lord (See Ps 83:16 (82:17)). O the portents of those who slander the innocent and God—the supports of arguments and testimonies! Why, he says, should we not believe that nature could have been made otherwise than it is beheld to have been made? As though it were asked what God could do, and not what he instituted. If it is pleasing, with the disordered desire of opining, to censure the things that were made, so that we say that, because they could have been made otherwise, therefore the things that were instituted do not render testimony to a good nature; let us pronounce that, because God could have made mortals two-headed, therefore the single-headed, and those who stand on their feet, were ill made; for they could have been made headed on either side; which form is wont to appear in certain little worms, whose belly a crown born on both sides encloses, so that, beginning from either shoulder, they are understood to have their end in the middle. Let these mockeries be admitted, and what will be the end of raving? God could, then, have brought it about that human beings should sprout from the earth with flowers; as far as power, I do not deny that he could; but he did not will it, except that they be born from the sexes. Now, then, it is asked what he did, not what he could do. In which place it is a furious response to say: It is evil that it is, because God could have made it otherwise; for this is to praise God to his own disparagement, and to proclaim his omnipotence to the stain of his counsel. Not only is it no praise, but even a huge contumely, to give to his powers what you would have detracted from his wisdom, and to say that fortitude was present to God, but counsel was lacking. The reproach of counsel reaches altogether to the denial of power; he is not omnipotent, if he cannot order well. Nay, if he is failed by the sublimity of wisdom, he retains nothing of the reverence of divinity; which, because to suspect is most profane, that recurs by which your traduction is throttled. God, who made all things very good, instituted nothing in such a way that, in that genus which was made, it is approved that it could have been made either more aptly, or more reasonably. For one endowed equally with wisdom and omnipotence would not institute what a little man could by right censure. Whatever, then, in absolutely all creatures is taught to be natural, has been so supremely made that an affected emendation in these things is taught to be foolish and profane. As, then, the form of a horse, the form of an ox, have indeed in mutual comparison a distance, yet in their own genera have been allotted a harmony apt on every side, so that neither ought nor could either horse or ox be instituted otherwise than it is seen to have been formed (by which rule it is allowed to run through all swimming, creeping, walking, flying things, finally the ethereal and celestial; the form of none, surely, is convicted of being able to be instituted better than for the genus for which it was prepared); so too man, whom above the generality of walking things has indicated, has been so formed through all things that he could be fashioned by none better; who prudently received in his body both places of comeliness and places of shame, that in himself he might learn both modesty and confidence; lest he should both seem deformed, if he were veiled through all things; and be rendered slothful and negligent, if he were always made common through all things. And through this, human fruitfulness ought to take on no other members of either sex than those it has, no other reasoning of the inmost parts, no other senses, no other pleasure. Let us admonish the Manicheans, then, to cease to censure the deeds of divine wisdom, that they may correct the depravity of their opinions; since it neither pertains to the question, if human beings be said to have been going to generate otherwise than universality is witness; nor that they could have been made better than they were made, as reason, so too Scripture attests, which cries out that God made all things not only good, but even very good (See Gen 1:31). And through this, as through the whole work, so here too the teaching of the Manicheans has collapsed. But in the future time we confess that there will be more glorious bodies of the blessed, needing no help. But this very thing too was most excellently instituted by the most just and most wise God, that nature should by no means pervert the state of reward; but that there should be a first step, in which natural freedom should stand, and from which, by the right of free choice, it should either descend to the depths of punishments, or strive to the summit of glories by those ways which God instituted.
JulianImp.5.15Augustinus. Prorsus, Iuliane, non putasti et mea et tua homines esse lecturos; sed eis tantummodo scripsisti, qui meis ignoratis sive neglectis, nec utrisque diligenter inspectis, tua sola legere ac nosse curarent; nec dixisse me crederent, nisi quod a te commemoratum, tamquam de meis, in tuis litteris invenirent. Hinc enim factum esse video, ut quia ego dixeram: " Cur enim non credamus Deum potuisse in paradiso concedere homini beato de suo semine, quod concessum videmus agricolis de tritici semine, ut eo modo illud sereretur sine ulla pudenda libidine? ", tu his verbis meis velut respondens, tua vaniloquia dilatares, eo usque progressus et diffusus, ut me sensisse iactares: " Si non peccasset Adam, sic potuisse mulierem ad fecunditatem parari, forte ut per omnes articulos, ac per minutas corporum fistulas, quas medici poros vocant, spicae erumperent filiorum, atque illa omnibus laeta partibus, partus pro pediculis exsudaret ", et cetera quae commemorare me taedet, te autem non puduit aggerare. In quibus etiam de viro dixisti, quod: " admoveret nimirum non membra, sed ferramenta, et genitalium vacuus imprimeret vomeres et ligones ". Haec certe atque huiusmodi (quae cum tui, non quicumque lectores, sed dilectores legunt, pro te, si ullus in eis humanus sensus est, erubescunt) numquid mea verba garrire te sinerent, quae non ob aliud praeteristi atque tacuisti, nisi ut tibi in istis latiora delirandi spatia praeparares? Ego enim dixi, seri hominem potuisse, ad voluntatis nutum membris obsequentibus genitalibus; tu autem genitalia membra tacuisti, ut ires per mulieris articulos et minutissimas fistulas filios per corporis poros tamquam pediculos exsudantis, et per oculorum pupulas caecitate consequente parientis. Membra, inquam, genitalia tacuisti, quasi nos ea, si Adam non peccasset, defutura hominibus diceremus; ut posses ridicula, non urbanitate, sed nugacitate dicere: " quod vir genitalium vacuus vomeres et ligones fetandae coniugi imprimeret ". Numquid de numero quaestio est, figuraque membrorum; quae ad generandum creata possent in locis suis salva et integra, nec indigere incitamento libidinis, et servire imperio voluntatis? Quae ideo a me commemorata commemorare noluisti, cum verba mea poneres, ne silentium tibi imponeres, et ad illa quae de filiis per totum corpus tamquam pediculis erumpentibus, et de ferramentis agricolarum ad impraegnandas feminas adhibendis, quae tibi festivissima dicacitate sonare videbantur, cum vanitate ineptissima dicerentur, os aperire non posses. Unde nec illud meum, quod in eodem loco, quem velut redarguendum susceperas, de parturientium doloribus posui, putasti esse tangendum. Si enim feminae sine parturitionis cruciatibus parerent, puto quod non eis membra genitalia, sed tormenta poenalia defuissent. Porro Scriptura divina (quod omnes qui legunt sciunt) de peccato Evae hoc tormenti genus in femineum genus transisse testatur . Hoc tu in meis verbis praeterire quam pertractare maluisti, ne diceretur tibi, ita salvis atque integris utriusque sexus genitalibus in illa felicitate paradisi potuisse sine pudenda libidine concumbere coniuges, sicut potuerunt salvis atque integris femineis genitalibus parere sine gemendo dolore mulieres. Sed vos non solum cruciatus et gemitus parientium, verum etiam labores alios aerumnasque mortalium, non a tempore arbitrii liberi eorum, sed a die exitus de ventre matris eorum, mavultis in loco tantae illius beatitudinis ponere, quam pudendam susceptam vestram ipso ibi saltem pudore non ponere. Et tamen qui negas in istam mortalitatem post peccatum mutatam fuisse naturam; fateris post meritum bonae voluntatis in gloriam beatae immortalitatis esse mutandam. In cuius gloriae cacumen parvuli, quod non potestis negare, meritis non suae, sed alienae voluntatis ascendunt; quos non vultis credere meritis malae voluntatis alienae, sed tamen eius in cuius lumbis ratione seminis fuerunt, ad profunda miseriarum quas novimus, fuisse deiectos.
Augustine. You altogether, Julian, did not think that human beings would read both mine and yours; but you wrote only for those who, with mine unknown or neglected, and with both not diligently inspected, would care to read and know yours alone; and would not believe that I had said anything, except what, recorded by you, as though of mine, they found in your letters. For hence I see it has come about that, because I had said: "For why should we not believe that God could have granted to the blessed man in paradise, of his own seed, what we see granted to farmers of the seed of wheat, so that it might be sown in that way without any shameful disordered desire?", you, as though answering these words of mine, spread out your empty talk, advancing and diffusing yourself so far as to boast that I thought: "If Adam had not sinned, the woman could thus have been prepared for fruitfulness, perhaps so that through all the joints and through the minute little pipes of bodies, which the physicians call pores, the ears of children might burst forth, and she, joyful in all her parts, might sweat out offspring instead of lice," and the rest which it wearies me to record, but which it did not shame you to heap up. In which you said also of the man, that he would apply, surely, not members, but tools, and, empty of genitals, would press in ploughshares and mattocks. These things, certainly, and of this kind (which, when not just any readers, but lovers of yours read them, they blush on your behalf, if there is in them any human sense)—would they let you chatter as my words, which you for no other reason passed over and kept silent than that you might prepare for yourself in these things broader spaces of raving? For I said that man could be sown, with the genital members obeying the nod of the will; but you kept silent about the genital members, that you might go through the joints of the woman and the minutest pipes, sweating out sons through the pores of the body like lice, and bringing them forth through the pupils of the eyes with blindness following her who bears. The genital members, I say, you kept silent, as though we said that these, if Adam had not sinned, would be lacking to human beings; that you might be able to say ridiculous things, not by urbanity, but by triviality: that the man, empty of genitals, would press in ploughshares and mattocks upon the wife to be impregnated. Is there, then, a question about the number and figure of the members; which, created for generating, could in their own places, safe and entire, both not need the incitement of disordered desire, and serve the command of the will? Which therefore, recorded by me, you were unwilling to record, when you set down my words, lest you impose silence on yourself, and could not open your mouth to those things—about sons bursting forth through the whole body like lice, and about the tools of farmers to be applied for impregnating women—which seemed to you to sound with a most festive raillery, when they were said with a most inept vanity. Whence neither did you think that must be touched, that I, in the same place which you had undertaken as though to be refuted, set down about the pains of those giving birth. For if women bore without the torments of bringing forth, I think that not the genital members, but the penal torments would have been lacking to them. Further, the divine Scripture (which all who read know) attests that this kind of torment passed into the female sex from the sin of Eve (See Gen 3:16). This you preferred to pass over rather than to handle in my words, lest it be said to you that, just as women could, with the female genitals safe and entire, bring forth without a groaning pain, so spouses could, with the genitals of either sex safe and entire, in that happiness of paradise, lie together without shameful disordered desire. But you prefer to place in the place of so great blessedness not only the torments and groans of those giving birth, but also the other labors and hardships of mortals—not from the time of their free choice, but from the day of their going forth from their mother's womb—rather than not place there your shameful thing you have taken up, by the very shame at least there. And yet you, who deny that nature was changed into this mortality after sin, confess that it must be changed, after the merit of a good will, into the glory of blessed immortality. To the summit of which glory the little ones—which you cannot deny—ascend by the merits not of their own, but of an alien will; whom you are unwilling to believe were cast down, by the merits of an evil alien will—but nonetheless of him in whose loins by the reasoning of the seed they were—into the depths of the miseries which we know.
JulianImp.5.15V. 16. Iulianus. Sed iam pergamus ad reliqua. Postquam ergo Abrahae, quod a me positum fuerat, vitavit exemplum; conatus est asserere, Abimelech quoque, qui orante Abraham ba, cum mulieribus suis sanatus, refertur, ut ad generationis operam, a qua per plagam erat suspensus, posset redire, non detractione libidinis, sed dolore aliquo posse intellegi mulierum vulvam fuisse conclusam ; quasi a nobis assereretur impendio, ut appetitus eis naturalis redditus videretur; cum ego testimoniis illis id solum probare fuerim contentus, impeditum concubitum, qui sine libidine esse non poterat, per iram Dei, redditumque per indulgentiam Dei, sive amolitis obstaculis, sive irritamentis sollemnibus restitutis; tamen diabolicum non doceri, sed etiam per hoc ad Dei operam pertinentem, qui inter corporis instrumenta mediocria, sed innoxia, non specie, non modo, verum solo peccaret excessu.
V. 16. Julian. But let us now proceed to the rest. After he avoided the example of Abraham, which had been set down by me, he tried to assert that Abimelech too, who is reported, with Abraham praying, to have been healed together with his women, so that he could return to the work of generation, from which he had been suspended through a plague, can be understood to have had the womb of the women closed not by the withdrawal of disordered desire, but by some pain (See Gen 20:17-18); as though it were asserted by us, at great cost, that natural appetite seemed to be restored to them; when I was content to prove by those testimonies only this—that intercourse, which could not be without disordered desire, was impeded through the wrath of God, and restored through the indulgence of God, whether with the obstacles removed, or with the customary incitements restored; that nonetheless it is taught to be not diabolical, but even through this pertaining to the work of God, who, among the moderate but harmless instruments of the body, would sin neither by species, nor by measure, but by excess alone.
JulianImp.5.16Augustinus. Quis non intellegat, si Deo indignante accidit aliquid corpori feminarum, unde impediretur concubitus, et per hoc proles, quae utique non posset, nisi a concumbentibus concipi, eo remoto impedimento, talem concubitum redditum, qualis est in corpore mortis huius, id est, cum libidine? In talem quippe statum revocantur corpora, cum sanantur, qualem iam sortita est post peccatum natura mortalium, quae illos compellit in mortem. Sed in corpore vitae illius, ubi homo, nisi peccasset, non erat moriturus, alius procul dubio status fuit; unde aut nulla ibi, aut talis, qualis nunc est, libido non fuit, qua caro contra spiritum concupisceret; ut ei necesse esset aut subiugari, aut reluctari; quorum alterum honestati, alterum paci beatitudinis illius convenire non posset. Noli ergo duas istas vitas haeretica perversitate confundere; aliter in corpore corruptibili, quod aggravat animam , vivitur; aliter in paradiso, si permansisset hominis rectitudo, in qua creatus fuerat, viveretur. Esset ergo et ibi propter generationem concubitus coniugum; sed aut membris genitalibus sine ulla libidine servientibus menti, aut ipsius, si ulla esset, libidinis motibus numquam repugnantibus voluntati; quae si talis esset, pudenda non esset; nec corporis membra, quae suo vel sollicitaret impetu, vel moveret, pudenda proprie vocari faceret, velarique compelleret; quod post peccatum factum esse, nec nisi peccati poena fieri potuisse, Dei verba testantur. Quis, inquit, nuntiavit tibi, quia nudus es, nisi ex ligno quod praeceperam tibi tantum ne ex eo manducares, ex eo manducasti? Non, inquit, tibi nuntiata esset nuditas tua, nisi esset a te praevaricata lex mea. Quid est autem nuditas nuntiata, cui procul dubio ignota non erat, nisi eo motu stimulante, ut inusitato aspectu se urgeret adverti, pudoremque incuteret? Quoniam peccato factum erat, ut hominis pars inferior contra superiorem, hoc est, caro contra spiritum concupisceret. Sed tu contra omnia claudis oculos, et Deo manifestante quod non confunderetur homo de sua nuditate, nisi peccasset, ita fuisse asseris institutum, ut etiamsi non peccasset, puderet eum nuditatis suae. Deus enim dicit: Quis nuntiavit tibi nuditatem tuam, nisi quia peccasti? Et tu dicis (ut ipsa verba tua ponam, quae paulo ante locutus es): " Sic est homo per universa formatus, ut melius a nullo fingi posset; qui accepit prudenter in corpore et locos decoris et locos pudoris, ut in se ipso et verecundiam et confidentiam disceret; ne et deformis videretur, si esset per cuncta velatus; et deses redderetur ac negligens, si semper esset per cuncta vulgatus ". Ac per hoc, secundum te longe melior peccando factus est homo; nisi enim peccasset, quem Deus fecerat rectum , viveret imprudenter non dignoscendo in corpore suo locos decoris et locos pudoris, et impudenter nulla velando, et negligenter cuncta vulgando; neque enim vitaret haec vitia, nisi ei, quia peccaverat, sua fuisset nuditas nuntiata.
Augustine. Who would not understand that, if, with God indignant, something befell the body of the women, whereby intercourse, and through this offspring (which surely could not be unless conceived by those coming together), was impeded, then, with that impediment removed, such intercourse was restored as is in the body of this death, that is, with disordered desire? For into such a state bodies are recalled when they are healed, as the nature of mortals has now been allotted after sin, which compels them into death. But in the body of that life, where man, unless he had sinned, was not going to die, there was without doubt another state; whence there was there either no disordered desire, or not such as now is, by which the flesh has desires opposed to the spirit, so that it should be necessary for it either to be subjugated or to resist; of which the one could not befit the honorableness, the other the peace of that blessedness. Do not, then, with heretical perversity, confound these two lives; in one way it is lived in a corruptible body which weighs down the soul (See Wis 9:15); in another it would be lived in paradise, if the uprightness of man, in which he was created, had remained. There would be there too, then, the intercourse of spouses for the sake of generation; but either with the genital members serving the mind without any disordered desire, or with the movements of disordered desire itself, if there were any, never resisting the will; which, if it were such, would not be shameful; nor would it make the members of the body, which it would solicit by its own impulse, or move, to be properly called shameful, and compel them to be veiled; which that it came about after sin, and could come about only as a punishment of sin, the words of God attest. Who, he says, told you that you are naked, unless because you ate of the tree of which alone I had commanded you that you should not eat? (See Gen 3:11) Your nakedness, he says, would not have been told you, unless my law had been transgressed by you. But what is the nakedness told, which surely was not unknown to him, except that, by that movement goading, by an unwonted sight, it urged itself to be noticed, and struck shame? Since it had come about by sin that the lower part of man should have desires opposed to the higher, that is, the flesh against the spirit. But you close your eyes against all things, and, though God makes manifest that man would not be confounded at his nakedness unless he had sinned, you assert that it was so instituted that, even if he had not sinned, his nakedness would shame him. For God says: Who told you your nakedness, except that you sinned? And you say (that I may set down your very words, which a little before you spoke): Man is so formed through all things that he could be fashioned by none better; who prudently received in his body both places of comeliness and places of shame, that in himself he might learn both modesty and confidence; lest he should both seem deformed, if he were veiled through all things, and be rendered slothful and negligent, if he were always made common through all things. And through this, according to you, man was made far better by sinning; for unless he had sinned—whom God made upright (See Eccl 7:29)—he would live imprudently, by not discerning in his body the places of comeliness and the places of shame, and shamelessly, by veiling nothing, and negligently, by making all things common; for he would not avoid these vices, unless his nakedness had been told him because he had sinned.
JulianImp.5.16V. 17. Iulianus. De quo quoniam satis actum est, ad illa properemus, quae super naturali malo Manichaeus olim acute, sed, ut probabo, perplexitate quaestionum deceptus obiecit. Breviter tamen prius, quid Augustinus contra Apostoli testimonium retulerit, ventilemus. Ego ergo cum notam istam operam sexuum a Deo auctore corporum institutam, etiam beati Pauli testimonio apertissime dixissem probari, qui invectus in flagitia eorum, quos in virilis quoque sexus concubitum praecipitarat insania, ait: Relicto naturali usu feminae, accensi sunt in desideria sua ; intuli Apostolo teste, approbari usum feminae naturaliter institutum. Ad hoc ergo iste rescribens: Non dixit, inquit, Apostolus coniugalem usum, sed naturalem, eum volens intellegi qui fit membris ad hoc creatis, ut per ea possit ad generandum sexus uterque misceri; ac per hoc, cum eisdem membris etiam meretrici quisque miscetur, naturalis est usus, nec tamen laudabilis, sed culpabilis. Non ergo isto nomine, id est, usu naturali, coniugalis est laudata commixtio; sed immundiora et sceleratiora flagitia denotata sunt, quam si illicite feminis, sed tamen naturaliter uterentur . Id est, hic usus feminae quem pronuntiavit Apostolus naturalem, non intellegitur coniugalis, ut bonus licitusque doceatur; sed ideo, inquit, dictus est naturalis, quia diversitatem sexus ad hoc indicat institutam, ut et commixtui pararetur et partui. Queis molitionibus cum iuvaretur nihil, cur tantum immoratus est? Profecto ob hoc solum, ut hi qui eum sequuntur, solutum putent quod viderint fuisse contactum; ceterum quam nihil dixerit, brevis disputatio palam faciet. Nempe Apostolus feminae usum ait naturaliter institutum, nec commendavit alteram commixtionem primitus ordinatam; sed de eo usu disputans, in quo libidinem cunctis noverat viguisse temporibus, naturalem illam vocavit.
V. 17. Julian. Of which, since enough has been done, let us hasten to those things which the Manichean once objected acutely concerning natural evil, but, as I will prove, deceived by the perplexity of questions. Yet briefly first let us ventilate what Augustine reported against the testimony of the Apostle. I, then, when I had said that this known work of the sexes was instituted by God the author of bodies, and had said it was most plainly proved even by the testimony of blessed Paul, who, inveighing against the disgraces of those whom madness had cast headlong even into the intercourse of the male sex, says: Having left the natural use of the woman, they were inflamed in their desires (See Rom 1:27)—I inferred, with the Apostle as witness, that the use of the woman, naturally instituted, is approved. To this, then, this man rescribing: The Apostle did not say, he says, the conjugal use, but the natural, wishing that to be understood which is done with the members created for this, that through them either sex might be mingled for generating; and through this, when one is mingled with a harlot too with the same members, it is a natural use, yet not praiseworthy, but culpable. Not, then, by this name, that is, the natural use, is the conjugal mingling praised; but the uncleaner and more wicked disgraces were noted, than if they used women unlawfully, but nonetheless naturally. That is, this use of the woman, which the Apostle pronounced natural, is not understood as conjugal, so as to be taught good and lawful; but for this reason, he says, it was called natural, because it indicates the diversity of the sex instituted for this, that it might be prepared both for mingling and for childbirth. By which devisings, since he was helped in nothing, why did he dwell so long? Surely for this alone: that those who follow him may think dissolved what they shall have seen was contacted; for the rest, how nothing he said, a brief disputation will make plain. Surely the Apostle says that the use of the woman was naturally instituted, nor did he commend the other mingling first ordained; but, disputing about that use in which he knew disordered desire to have flourished in all times, he called it natural.
JulianImp.5.17Augustinus. Usus feminae naturalis est, cum eius masculus illo membro utitur, quo natura eiusdem generis animantium propagatur; propter quod etiam ipsum membrum natura proprie dici solet; unde Cicero ait, mulierem vidisse se in somnis praesignatam habere naturam . Usus itaque naturalis et licitus est, sicut in coniugio, et illicitus, sicut in adulterio; contra naturam vero semper illicitus, et procul dubio flagitiosior atque turpior; quem sanctus Apostolus et in feminis et in masculis arguebat, damnabiliores volens intellegi, quam si in usu naturali, vel adulterando, vel fornicando peccarent. Usus itaque concumbentium naturalis idemque inculpabilis, et in paradiso esse potuisset, etiamsi nemo peccasset; non enim aliter ad humanum genus secundum benedictionem Dei multiplicandum filii gignerentur; sed eum vocatum esse ab Apostolo usum naturalem, in quo libidinem cunctis noverat viguisse temporibus, quis tibi dixit, nisi haeresis vestra? Absit enim ut Apostolus etiam illo tempore hominum crederet pudendam viguisse libidinem, quando nudi erant, et non pudebat eos. Verumtamen etiamsi Apostolus diceret, quod ipse dixisti: " in usu feminae naturali cunctis temporibus viguisse libidinem "; in his quoque verbis haberem quod recte intellegerem, ne pudendam susceptam tuam in illius beatae vitae corporibus, quae nondum fuerant corpora mortis huius, sicut tu facis, mente stultissima, lingua loquacissima, fronte impudentissima, collocarem. Cunctis quippe temporibus ex quo utriusque sexus fieri concubitus coepit, procul dubio usus feminae naturalis sine hac pudenda libidine esse non potuit; iam enim non vitae illius, sed mortis huius habebant corpus, quando post peccatum de paradiso egressi, masculus et femina utrumque sexum naturaliter primitus miscuerunt. Quod si ante facerent, ibi libido vel nulla esset, vel pudenda non esset; non enim sollicitaret invitum, et repugnare sibi cogeret castum; sed aut sine illa officium suum genitalia, iubente mente, peragerent; aut illa si esset, cum opus esset, assurgeret, tranquillissimum nutum subsequens voluntatis, nec opprimens cogitationem turbulento impetu voluptatis. Talem se modo non esse, multis suis importunis et coercendis motibus confitetur; ergo aut vitium esse, aut vitiatam se esse testatur. Ecce unde dicebat Apostolus: Scio quia non habitat in me, id est in carne mea, bonum . Ecce unde trahitur a nascentibus originale peccatum. Hoc malo bene utitur pudicitia coniugalis: hoc malo melius non utitur religiosa continentia vidualis, vel sacra integritas virginalis.
Augustine. The natural use of the woman is when her male uses that member by which the nature of living beings of the same kind is propagated; on account of which that very member too is wont properly to be called nature; whence Cicero says that a woman saw in dreams that she had been marked as having a nature (See Cicero, On Divination 2.70.145). The natural use, then, is both lawful, as in marriage, and unlawful, as in adultery; but against nature it is always unlawful, and without doubt more disgraceful and more foul; which the holy Apostle reproached both in women and in men, wishing them to be understood more damnable than if, in a natural use, they sinned either by adultery or by fornication. The natural and likewise inculpable use, then, of those coming together both could have been in paradise, even if no one had sinned; for not otherwise would children be begotten for the multiplying of the human race according to the blessing of God; but that the Apostle called natural use that in which he knew disordered desire to have flourished in all times—who told you, except your heresy? For far be it that the Apostle should believe that the shameful disordered desire of human beings flourished even at that time when they were naked and it did not shame them. Yet even if the Apostle said what you yourself said—"that in the natural use of the woman disordered desire has flourished in all times"—in these words too I would have what I might rightly understand, lest I should, as you do, with a most foolish mind, a most loquacious tongue, a most shameless brow, place your shameful thing you have taken up in the bodies of that blessed life, which were not yet the bodies of this death. For in all times, from when the intercourse of either sex began to come about, without doubt the natural use of the woman could not be without this shameful disordered desire; for already they had the body not of that life, but of this death, when, after sin, having gone forth from paradise, male and female first mingled either sex naturally. But if they had done it before, there either would have been no disordered desire there, or it would not have been shameful; for it would not solicit the unwilling, nor compel the chaste to resist it; but either, without it, the genitals would perform their office, with the mind commanding; or it, if there were any, would rise when there was need, following the most tranquil nod of the will, nor oppressing the thought by a turbulent impulse of pleasure. That it now is not such, by its many importunate movements to be coerced it confesses; therefore it attests either to be a vice, or itself to be vitiated. Behold whence the Apostle said: I know that good does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh (Rom 7:18). Behold whence original sin is drawn from those being born. This evil conjugal modesty uses well; this evil widowed religious continence does not use, better; this evil sacred virginal integrity does not use, better still.
JulianImp.5.17V. 18. Iulianus. Hoc nos intelleximus, cumque de naturae institutione loqueremur, id protulimus quod Apostolum sensisse constabat. Tu igitur quid promovisti, ut referres non ab eo usum coniugalem, sed naturalem vocari? Aut quo ore subiungis, quoniam " cum iisdem membris meretrici quisque miscetur, naturalis est usus, nec tamen laudabilis, sed culpabilis "? Ut enim etiam hic ostendamus, quod frequenter aperuimus, unam a te saltem sententiam non proferri, quae non adversum te plurimum valeat; si usus fornicationis naturalis, nec tamen laudabilis, sed culpabilis dicitur, ob hoc quia meretricis usus est; sine dubio coniugalem, quia honestum atque licitum, non culpabilem, sed laudabilem profiteberis.
V. 18. Julian. This we understood, and, when we were speaking of the institution of nature, we brought forth what it was established the Apostle had thought. What, then, did you advance, that you should report that the conjugal use was not called by him, but the natural? Or with what face do you subjoin that, "since one is mingled with a harlot with the same members, it is a natural use, yet not praiseworthy, but culpable"? For, that here too we may show what we have frequently laid open—that not even a single sentence is brought forth by you which does not avail very much against you—if the use of fornication is called natural, yet not praiseworthy, but culpable, for this reason because it is the use of a harlot; without doubt you will profess the conjugal use, because it is honorable and lawful, to be not culpable, but praiseworthy.
JulianImp.5.18Augustinus. Non quia sine malo est, sed quia bene utitur malo, coniugalis concubitus merito inculpabilis dicitur. Sic enim bonum est bene uti malo, quemadmodum malum est male uti bono. Sic ergo bene utuntur coniugati libidinis malo, quomodo male utuntur adulteri corporis bono. Hoc iam non semel dixi, et saepius me dicere non pigebit, quamdiu te veris contradicere non pudebit.
Augustine: It is not because it is without evil, but because it makes good use of an evil, that conjugal intercourse is rightly called blameless. For it is good to make good use of an evil, just as it is evil to make bad use of a good. Thus married people make good use of the evil of lust in the same way that adulterers make bad use of the good of the body. I have already said this more than once, and I will not grow tired of saying it again and again, as long as you are not ashamed to contradict the truth.
JulianImp.5.18V. 19. Iulianus. Et ubi est crimen tuum diabolicum, quod illi argumento pudoris nitebaris affigere? Non enim iam libido reprehenditur, quae et in prohibito et in concesso usu, naturae ipsius conditione sentitur, si depravatio eius, ad id quod non licebat excurrens, sola culpatur.
V. 19. Julian: And where is that diabolical crime which you were striving to fasten upon it by the argument from shame? For lust is no longer being blamed—lust which, in both forbidden and permitted use, is felt as a condition of nature itself—if only its perversion, when it runs out toward what was not lawful, is faulted.
JulianImp.5.19Augustinus. Non sola " culpatur depravatio libidinis ad id quod non licebat excurrens "; sed tua magna depravatio est, cum a te non culpatur ad id quod non licebat impellens. Quando enim ad id quod non licet impellit, profecto nisi pravitati eius repugnetur excurrit. Et haec est concupiscentia carnis, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum; adversus quam propterea concupiscit et spiritus, ne quo impellit excurrat. Malum est ergo, et quod impellit in malum; sed si non excurrit, repugnante sibi spiritu, non vincitur homo a malo. Tunc autem omni malo carebit, quando cui repugnet non erit. Neque hoc cum fiet, natura, sicut Manichaeus insanit, a nobis separabitur aliena, sed sanabitur nostra. Quae nunc, si quemadmodum regeneratione et remissione peccatorum sanatur a reatu, sic ab omni esset infirmitate iam sana; non contra carnem spiritus concupisceret, ut non operaremur nisi licitum; sed ita caro spiritui consentiret, ut nihil contra illum concupisceretur illicitum.
Augustine: It is not only "the perversion of lust when it runs out toward what was not lawful" that is faulted; rather, great is your own perversion, since you do not fault it even when it impels toward what was not lawful. For when it impels toward what is not lawful, it certainly runs out unless its depravity is resisted. And this is the concupiscence of the flesh, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit (Gal 5:17); and it is for this reason that the spirit too lusts against the flesh, that it may not run out to where lust impels. Therefore that which impels toward evil is itself evil; but if it does not run out, because the spirit resists it, the man is not overcome by evil. He will then be free of all evil when there will be nothing for him to resist. And when this comes to pass, an alien nature will not, as the Manichee madly holds, be separated from us, but our own nature will be healed. For if our nature now, just as it is healed of guilt by regeneration and the forgiveness of sins, were likewise already healed of all infirmity, the spirit would not lust against the flesh so that we might do only what is lawful; rather, the flesh would so consent to the spirit that nothing unlawful would be desired against it.
JulianImp.5.19V. 20. Iulianus. Utque presse interrogemus et breviter: apostolum Paulum, cum naturalem usum feminae nuncuparet, possibilitatem rei et honestatem, an solam possibilitatem indicasse arbitraris? Id est, hoc nomine naturali, intellegere nos voluit usum qui fieri poterat et debebat; an qui poterat, sed non debebat? Si dixeris, Qui poterat, licet non deberet, qualis in adulteris agitur: ergo et illud aliud flagitium non erit contra naturam, quia membris agitur naturalibus. Si autem expavescens retuleris, quod et veritas habet, Apostolum usum vocasse naturalem, qui fetibus destinatus honeste agi, quippe naturaliter, ut poterat et debebat, id est, in corporibus vel singularum vel plurium feminarum, temporum tamen ratione concessis; fateberis sine dubio inepte argumentatum fuisse; beatumque Paulum nomine naturalis usus, non fornicationem, sicut tu putaveras, sed et honestum et legitimum, qui fecunditati paratus est, corporum indicasse commixtum. Nos ergo merito generaliter defendimus, quod Manichaeus generaliter arguebat. Tu enim dicis commixtionem hanc sexuum cum voluptate, per diabolum institutam, causam originalis esse peccati, et necessitatem omnium criminum; ac per hoc ipsam criminaris naturam; nos quid consequentius facere potuimus, quam ut teste Magistro Gentium, naturae generalitate defenderemus et adscriberemus operi Dei, quod tu naturaliter malum vocabas? Factumque est ut quod tu dicis diabolicum, nos ad refellendum te probaremus naturaliter institutum. Ista est quippe legitima et erudita responsio, ut quod in specie accusatur, defendatur in specie; et quod in genere arguitur, vindicetur in genere. Quod etiam Manichaeus intellexit, quem tu aequas crimine, sed non aequas ingenio; ideo ille omnem substantiam corporum transcribit diabolo; tu autem non universam, sed, sicut in priore libro diximus, meliorem. Triumphavit ergo veritas sacris stipata praesidiis, quae per Apostolum probans naturale coniugum negotium, et per hoc ad Deum pertinere qui esset auctor naturae, vestra figmenta disrupit, qui in praevaricatorium, non naturale iuratis.
V. 20. Julian: And to put the question pointedly and briefly: when the apostle Paul named the natural use of the woman (Rom 1:26), do you think he indicated both the possibility and the honorableness of the act, or only its possibility? That is, by this word "natural," did he mean us to understand a use that could and ought to take place, or one that could but ought not? If you say, One that could, though it ought not—such as goes on among adulterers—then that other shameful act too will not be against nature, since it is carried out by natural members. But if, taking fright, you reply, as the truth also holds, that the Apostle called natural the use destined for offspring, carried out honorably—indeed naturally, as it could and ought, that is, in the bodies of women whether one or several, permitted, however, by the dispensation of the times—then you will admit beyond doubt that you have argued ineptly, and that the blessed Paul, by the term "natural use," indicated not fornication, as you had supposed, but the honorable and lawful union of bodies that is open to fruitfulness. We therefore rightly defend in general what the Manichee attacked in general. For you say that this commingling of the sexes with pleasure was instituted by the devil, and is the cause of original sin and the necessity of all crimes; and through this you charge nature itself. What more consistent thing could we do than, with the Teacher of the Gentiles as witness, defend by the generality of nature, and ascribe to the work of God, what you called naturally evil? And so it has come about that what you call diabolical, we have proved, in refuting you, to have been naturally instituted. For this is the lawful and learned reply: that what is accused in the species be defended in the species, and what is charged in the genus be vindicated in the genus. This the Manichee too understood, whom you match in crime but do not match in talent; and so he assigns the whole substance of bodies to the devil, while you assign not the whole, but, as we said in the earlier book, the better part. Truth therefore has triumphed, hedged about with sacred defenses, which by the Apostle, proving the conjugal business natural and therefore pertaining to God, who is the author of nature, has shattered your fabrications, since you swear by what belongs to transgression, not to nature.
JulianImp.5.20Augustinus. Iam etiam supra satis diximus quem dixerit Apostolus usum feminae naturalem, et cur appellaverit naturalem, id est, cum fit eis membris utriusque sexus, quae ad propagandam sunt instituta naturam; sive talis usus esset, qualis in paradiso esse potuisset, nullo scilicet utens malo, vel nulla existente, vel nonnisi nutum voluntatis subsequente libidine; sive qualis nunc est ex quo esse coepit, vel licitus sicut in coniugio, bene utens et corporis bono et libidinis malo; vel illicitus sicut in adulterio, male utens et illo bono et illo malo; nec tamen etiam ipse discedens ab eis membris, quae naturae etiam nomine proprie nuncupantur. Nihil est itaque cur presse, ut dicis, ac breviter interroges, utrum Apostolus in eo quod ait naturalem usum, eum voluerit intellegi, qui fieri et poterat et debebat; an qui fieri poterat, sed non debebat; non enim ut hoc diceret, aliquid horum intuebatur Apostolus, sed membra tantummodo utriusque sexus genitaliter naturalia, hoc est, ad generandam creata naturam. Nam quis ignorat, quod licitus usus feminae fieri et possit et debeat; illicitus autem fieri possit, nec tamen debeat; uterque autem sit naturalis, quia utriusque sexus ad naturam propagandam creatis membris genitalibus fit? Tergiversatorias aufer ambages, remove loquaces et fallaces fumos vanitatis tuae. Libido pecorum ideo non est vitium, quia non ea caro concupiscit adversus spiritum; quod Manichaeus si discernere valuisset, nec pecorum ab opificio Dei veri alienasset naturas, nec hominum vitia putaret esse substantias. Tu autem nisi cum Ambrosio et ceteris Catholicis senseris atque tenueris, per praevaricationem primi hominis carnis et spiritus dissensionem in nostram vertisse naturam , quantumlibet Manichaeos detestari videaris, eorum detestandus adiutor sine dubio permanebis; asserendo esse bonum, quod esse clamat veritas malum; et hoc malum negando ex depravatione venire peccato vitiatae naturae nostrae, ut Manichaeus, te adiutore, commixtionem nobis naturae introducat alienae.
Augustine: We have already said enough above as to what use of the woman the Apostle called natural, and why he called it natural—namely, when it is done with those members of each sex which were instituted for propagating nature; whether such a use as could have existed in paradise, employing no evil, since either none existed or there was a lust that only followed the bidding of the will; or such as it now is from the time it began to be, whether lawful as in marriage, making good use both of the good of the body and of the evil of lust, or unlawful as in adultery, making bad use both of that good and of that evil—yet even this not departing from those members which are properly called by the very name of nature. There is therefore no reason for you to ask, as you say, pointedly and briefly, whether by the phrase "natural use" the Apostle meant the use which both could and ought to take place, or the use which could but ought not. For the Apostle was not, in saying this, looking to any of these, but only to the members of each sex that are genitally natural, that is, created for generating nature. For who does not know that the lawful use of the woman both can and ought to take place, while the unlawful use can take place, yet ought not, and that both are natural, since both are done by the genital members created in each sex for propagating nature? Take away your shifty evasions; remove the wordy and deceitful fog of your vanity. The lust of beasts is for this reason not a fault, because their flesh does not lust against the spirit; and if the Manichee had been able to discern this, he would neither have alienated the natures of beasts from the work of the true God, nor have thought human faults to be substances. But unless you think and hold with Ambrose and the other Catholics that, through the transgression of the first man, the discord of flesh and spirit passed over into our nature, then however much you may seem to detest the Manichees, you will without doubt remain their detestable helper: by asserting to be good what truth proclaims to be evil, and by denying that this evil comes from the perversion of our nature vitiated by sin—so that the Manichee, with you as his helper, may introduce into us a commingling of an alien nature.
JulianImp.5.20V. 21. Iulianus. Simili acumine illud quoque labefactare conaris, quod dixi, evangelico testimonio ex fructi bus suis arborem debere cognosci; ut ostenderem, quod clarum est, doceri bona non posse coniugia, immo ipsam naturam, quae coniugiorum operatione suppletur, nec Dei posse opere vindicari, si de ea dicerentur crimina pullulare. Ad hoc ergo respondisti: Numquid Dominus inde loquebatur, et non potius de duabus voluntatibus hominum, bona scilicet et mala; istam bonam, illam malam arborem dicens; quia de bona voluntate opera bona nascuntur, et mala de mala? Quod si nuptias arborem bonam intellegamus, profecto e contrario posituri sumus fornicationem arborem malam. Porro si dixerit non illic arboris loco ponendum esse adulterium, sed naturam humanam de qua nascitur homo ita et hic non erit arbor connubium, sed natura humana de qua nascitur homo . Falleris: non ibi Dominus loquitur de duabus voluntatibus, sed de persona sua. Quoniam cum beneficia Iudaeis praestaret innumera, ab eius nihil criminationibus desinebant. Ceterum cum opera eius, quae etiam glorificabant, arguere non valerent; ipsum tamen Samaritanum ac plenum daemonio et Behelzebulis spiritu causabantur illudere. Tunc ergo Dominus ait: Aut facite arborem bonam, et fructus eius bonos; aut facite arborem malam, et fructus eius malos: ex fructibus enim suis arbor dignoscitur . Id est: Aut opera mea vituperate, quae bona esse infirmitates pulsae et restitutae sanitates loquuntur; ut improbum me, operum meorum testimonio comprobetis; aut si haec tanta beneficia non audetis arguere; reddite bonae arbori, mihi videlicet, testimonium fructuum meorum, et amate beneficum, qui beneficia praedicatis. Ibi ergo personam de operibus suis Christus iussit agnosci; quod nobis iure suffragatum est, ut doceremus naturam quoque atque coniugia de fructificationis suae qualitate censenda; ut si de his criminum virus fluebat, criminosa etiam radix iudicaretur. Vide ergo quam ad intellegendum caecutias, qui levare te obiecti mei pondus putasti, fornicationem nuptiis ex adverso locando, ut sicut bona arbor nuptiae, ita mala fornicatio videretur, de qua, id est, fornicatione, fecunditas nulla deberet existere, ne mala convinceretur, si bonae nuptiae bonis fetibus probarentur; cum homo sive de coniugio, sive de adulterio nascitur, non de flagitio, sed de natura seminum prodeat. Flagitium quippe quod moechantium voluntate committitur, substantiae instituta non turbat; verum exercet se natura per materias suas, et peccato remanente apud illicitae voluntatis auctorem, fetus innocuus de opere Conditoris erumpit. Quod quidem et tu vidisti esse referendum; sed qualiter conatus sis eludere, prudens lector attendat. Ais enim: Si arboris loco ibi non est ponendum adulterium, sed natura humana de qua nascitur homo; ita et hic non erit arbor bona connubium, sed natura humana de qua nascitur homo. Hoc est ergo quod eloqui conatus es: Sicut non imputatur homo fornicationi, sed naturae; ita peccatum quod trahitur de parentibus legitimis, non esse imputandum connubio, sed naturae humanae, quam crimine diabolus infecit antiquo. In adulteris ergo culpasti lascivientium voluntatem, sed laudasti humanam naturam, de qua homo etiam per illicitos concubitus nasceretur; in parentibus autem legitimis laudasti connubium, de quo non dicis venire peccatum; sed vituperasti naturam, de qua dicis infundi crimen horrendum. Vigilet hic ergo lector meus. Si naturam humanam in fornicatione laudabilem censuisti, quae causam nascenti flagitiis coeuntium impollutam fecisset; quomodo hanc ipsam naturam in connubii parte reprehendis, quam dicis causam naturali crimini praestitisse? Ergo non quidem connubium, sed naturam humanam et magnum bonum et magnum malum esse professus es. Nam quid ea nequius, si crimen ingenuit? Quid detestabilius, si a diabolo possidetur? Quid ergo habeat artis in semine, ipsa viderit; qualitatis interim, in qua bonum omne vel malum est, pessimae comprobatur, si et ipsa rea, et generans reatus, et diabolicae convincitur tyrannidis satelles. Merito ergo de fructibus suis debet arbor agnosci, ut quae causa mali est, mala iure optimo nominetur.
V. 21. Julian: With like sharpness you try to undermine this also, which I said—that on the gospel testimony a tree ought to be known by its fruits—so that I might show what is plain: that marriages cannot be taught to be good, nor indeed nature itself, which is supplemented by the operation of marriages, nor can it be vindicated as the work of God, if crimes were said to sprout from it. To this, then, you replied: Was the Lord speaking of that, and not rather of two wills of human beings, the good and the evil—calling the one a good tree, the other an evil tree, since from a good will good works are born, and evil works from an evil will? But if we understand marriage to be the good tree, then on the contrary we shall have to set fornication down as the evil tree. Moreover, if he should say that adultery is not to be put there in the place of the tree, but rather human nature, from which a human being is born, then here too the tree will not be marriage, but human nature, from which a human being is born. You are mistaken: the Lord is not there speaking of two wills, but of his own person. For when he was bestowing countless benefits on the Jews, they never ceased from their accusations against him. Since they could not censure his works, which even glorified him, they alleged that he—a Samaritan and full of a demon and of the spirit of Beelzebul—was mocking them. Then, therefore, the Lord said: Either make the tree good, and its fruit good, or make the tree bad, and its fruit bad; for the tree is known by its fruit (Matt 12:33). That is: Either disparage my works, which proclaim themselves good by infirmities driven out and health restored—so that by the testimony of my own works you may prove me wicked; or, if you do not dare to censure these great benefits, render to the good tree, namely to me, the testimony of my fruits, and love the benefactor, you who proclaim the benefits. There, therefore, Christ commanded his person to be recognized from his works; and this rightly supported us, that we might teach that nature too and marriages are to be judged from the quality of their fruitfulness, so that if the poison of crimes flowed from them, the root too should be judged criminal. See, then, how blind you are in understanding, you who thought to lighten the weight of my objection by setting fornication opposite to marriage, so that, as marriage is a good tree, so fornication might seem an evil tree—from which, that is, from fornication, no fruitfulness ought to exist, lest it be convicted of being evil, if good marriages were proven good by good offspring—whereas a human being, whether born of marriage or of adultery, comes forth not from the shameful deed but from the nature of the seeds. For the shameful deed, committed by the will of those who commit adultery, does not disturb the institutions of the substance; rather, nature exercises itself through its own materials, and, while the sin remains with the author of the unlawful will, an innocent offspring breaks forth from the work of the Creator. This indeed you too saw must be granted; but the prudent reader should observe how you have tried to evade it. For you say: If adultery is not to be put there in the place of the tree, but rather human nature, from which a human being is born, then here too the good tree will not be marriage, but human nature, from which a human being is born. This, then, is what you tried to say: As a human being is not imputed to fornication, but to nature, so the sin that is drawn from lawful parents is to be imputed not to marriage, but to human nature, which the devil infected with ancient crime. In adulterers, then, you faulted the will of the wanton, but praised human nature, from which a human being is born even through unlawful intercourse; in lawful parents, however, you praised marriage, from which you say sin does not come, but you found fault with nature, from which you say a dreadful crime is poured in. Let my reader therefore be watchful here. If you judged human nature praiseworthy in fornication, since it made the cause of the one being born unpolluted by the crimes of those uniting, how do you blame this same nature in the matter of marriage, which you say furnished the cause for a natural crime? Therefore you have professed not marriage, indeed, but human nature to be both a great good and a great evil. For what is more wicked than it, if it engendered crime? What more detestable, if it is possessed by the devil? Whatever artifice it has in the seed, let it see to that itself; meanwhile, in the matter of quality, in which all good or evil lies, it is proven utterly base, if it is itself guilty, and the begetter of guilt, and convicted as a satellite of diabolical tyranny. Rightly, then, ought a tree to be recognized by its fruits, so that what is the cause of evil may with the best right be named evil.
JulianImp.5.21Augustinus. Causam mali originalis, nec coniugium esse, nec adulterium, satis res ipsa declarat; quoniam, id quod bonum est in natura hominis, Deo creante ex homine nascitur; et id quod malum habet propter quod renasci debet, ex homine trahitur. Causa porro huius mali est, quod per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt . In quibus Apostoli verbis in aliam sententiam detorquendis, quanta loquacitate inaniter laboraveris, vident qui tua et nostra intellegenter legunt. Quid te igitur adiuvat? Utquid abs te, quaeso, commemoratum est evangelicum testimonium, quod arbor bona bonos fructus facit, cum tu de coniugali loquereris bono, eiusque fructus velles esse homines; tamquam ideo demonstrans eos sine malo nasci, quia bonum sunt nuptiae, et non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere; cum homines nascuntur ex hominibus, sive cum originali noxa, unde dicit Apostolus: Corpus mortuum est propter peccatum ; sive sine ulla noxa, ut vos contenditis contra Apostolum, non tamen per coniugales solos, verum etiam per concubitus impudicos; et aliquando sint sterilia coniugia, fecunda adulteria? Utrum autem Dominus duas voluntates, sicut nos dicimus, in duabus arboribus insinuare voluerit, unam bonam, qua bonus est homo, quae non potest facere opera mala, id est, fructus malos; alteram malam, qua malus est homo, quae non potest facere opera bona, id est, fructus bonos; an sicut tu dicis de se ipso Iu daeis ista locutus sit, qui nosse volunt, Evangelium legunt, te negligunt. Dominus enim cum cavendos esse monstraret, qui venirent in vestitu ovium, intrinsecus autem lupi essent rapaces: Ex fructibus, inquit, eorum cognoscetis eos. Numquid colligunt de spinis uvas, aut de tribulis ficus? Sic omnis arbor bona fructus bonos facit; mala autem arbor fructus malos facit. Non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere, neque arbor mala fructus bonos facere . Et secundum Lucam, cum hypocritae arguerentur, duae istae arbores commemoratae sunt, et mox evidenter expositae, subsequente Domino atque dicente: Bonus homo de bono thesauro cordis sui profert bonum; et malus homo de malo profert malum; ex abundantia enim cordis os loquitur . Ubi autem ait: Aut facite arborem bonam et fructum eius bonum, aut facite arborem malam et fructum eius malum (quod tu eum de se ipso dixisse opinaris), unde dixerit mox aperiens: Siquidem ex fructu, inquit, arbor cognoscitur. Progenies viperarum, quomodo potestis bona loqui, cum sitis mali? Ex abundantia enim cordis os loquitur. Bonus homo de bono thesauro profert bona; et malus homo de malo thesauro profert mala . Videsne te falli, non me? Redi ergo ad causam operis mali, et invenies voluntatem malam; redi ad causam originalis mali, et invenies primi hominis voluntatem malam, et ea vitiatam naturam bonam.
Augustine: That neither marriage nor adultery is the cause of original evil, the matter itself sufficiently declares; since that which is good in human nature is born of a human being by God's creating, and that which has the evil on account of which it must be reborn is drawn from a human being. The cause, moreover, of this evil is that through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed to all men, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12). With how much wordiness you have labored in vain to twist these words of the Apostle into another meaning, those see who read your writings and ours with understanding. What good, then, does it do you? Why, I ask, did you bring up the gospel testimony that a good tree bears good fruit (Matt 7:17), when you were speaking of the good of marriage, and wished its fruit to be human beings—as though thereby showing that they are born without evil, because marriage is good, and a good tree cannot bear bad fruit (See Matt 7:18)—when human beings are born of human beings, either with the original harm, whence the Apostle says the body is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10), or without any harm, as you contend against the Apostle, and that not through conjugal intercourse alone, but also through shameless intercourse? And sometimes marriages are sterile and adulteries fruitful? Now whether the Lord wished to suggest by the two trees two wills, as we say—one good, by which a human being is good, which cannot do evil works, that is, bad fruits; the other evil, by which a human being is evil, which cannot do good works, that is, good fruits—or whether, as you say, he spoke these things to the Jews about himself, those who wish to know read the Gospel and disregard you. For the Lord, when he showed that we must beware of those who come in sheep's clothing, but inwardly are ravening wolves, said: By their fruits you will know them. Do men gather grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles? So every good tree bears good fruit, but the bad tree bears bad fruit. A good tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can a bad tree bear good fruit (Matt 7:16-18). And according to Luke, when the hypocrites were being rebuked, these two trees were mentioned, and at once plainly expounded, the Lord going on to say: The good man out of the good treasure of his heart brings forth good, and the evil man out of evil brings forth evil; for out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks (Luke 6:45). But where he says, Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or make the tree bad and its fruit bad (which you suppose he said about himself), what he meant he at once makes clear, saying: For the tree is known by its fruit. You brood of vipers, how can you speak good, when you are evil? For out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks. The good man out of his good treasure brings forth good, and the evil man out of his evil treasure brings forth evil (Matt 12:33-35). Do you see that it is you who are mistaken, not I? Return then to the cause of evil work, and you will find an evil will; return to the cause of original evil, and you will find the evil will of the first man, and a good nature vitiated by it.
JulianImp.5.21V. 22. Iulianus. Verum haec loquimur, ut fidei vestrae quis sit finis ostendam; ceterum illud inconcussum valet, quod disputationibus praecedentibus fundatum est, nec quidquam malum esse, praeter opus voluntatis quod iustitia prohibet perpetrantis; nec quod naturale est, posse malum convinci. Manet ergo haec inconcussa turris, de cuius edito latrocinia diversorum propulsantur errorum.
V. 22. Julian: But we say these things to show what the end of your faith is. For the rest, that stands unshaken which was established in the preceding disputations: that there is nothing evil except the work of the will, which the justice of the one committing it forbids; and that what is natural cannot be convicted of being evil. There remains, therefore, this unshaken tower, from whose height the robberies of various errors are repelled.
JulianImp.5.22Augustinus. Quid est quod dicis; aut quae sunt tuae praecedentes disputationes, nisi loquacissimae vanitates? Quid est quod dicis: Nec quidquam malum esse, praeter opus voluntatis quod iustitia prohibet perpetrantis? Ergo ipsa voluntas mala non est malum, si non est quidquam malum nisi opus eius? Neque enim est consequens, ut mala voluntas habeat etiam perpetrandi operis facultatem; ac per hoc te auctore non erit malum hominis male velle, quando non potest facere. Quis istam ferat insipientiam, vel potius amentiam? Ubi etiam ponimus, quia si non est malum quidquam, nisi opus voluntatis quod iustitia prohibet perpetrantis; non erunt mala quaecumque homines nolentes sive agunt, sive patiuntur; non erit malum quod clamat Apostolus: Non enim quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago ; non erit malum supplicium ignis aeterni, ubi erit fletus et stridor dentium ; quia id volens nemo patietur, et non est opus voluntatis quod iustitia prohibet perpetrantis, sed poena nolentis. Quando ista saperes, si non mirabiliter desiperes, vel potius insanires? Quid est etiam quod dicis " nec quod naturale est, malum posse convinci "? Itane vero (ut innumerabilia naturalia vitia corporis taceam) malum non est surditas naturalis, quae ipsam quoque, ex qua iustus vivit , impedit fidem, quoniam fides ex auditu est ? Sed vos, nisi surdi intus essetis, Apostolo dicente: Fuimus enim et nos naturaliter filii irae, sicut et ceteri ; cordis auribus audiretis. Sed pergite adhuc, et cordibus caecis surdisque clamate: Non est malum naturaliter esse obliviosum, naturaliter esse obtunsum, naturaliter esse iracundum, naturaliter esse libidinosum. Cur enim non securi fatua ista verba iactatis, quibus malum non est etiam ipsa fatuitas naturalis? Usque adeo quippe omne originale malum meritum negantes, cuncta naturalia vitia laudare cogimini, ut non solum corpore deformes, debiles, monstruososque fetus, verum etiam fatuos, si nemo ibi peccasset, exorturos in paradiso fuisse dicatis; dum tamen pudendam susceptam vestram, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, inter delicias loci illius beatissimi collocetis.
Augustine: What is it you say? Or what are your preceding disputations, but most wordy vanities? What is it you say: that there is nothing evil except the work of the will, which the justice of the one committing it forbids? Then the evil will itself is not evil, if there is nothing evil but its work? For it does not follow that an evil will should also have the capacity of carrying out the work; and so, on your authority, it will not be evil for a man to will badly when he cannot do it. Who could bear such folly, or rather such madness? Where we may also point out that, if there is nothing evil but the work of the will which the justice of the one committing it forbids, then whatever men do or suffer unwillingly will not be evils; that will not be evil which the Apostle cries out about: For I do not do the good I will, but the evil I do not will, that I do (Rom 7:19); the punishment of eternal fire will not be evil, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth (See Matt 8:12)—because no one suffers it willingly, and it is not the work of the will which the justice of the one committing it forbids, but the punishment of one who is unwilling. When would you understand such things, if you were not so wonderfully out of your senses, or rather raving? What too is it that you say, "nor can what is natural be convicted of being evil"? Is it really so (to say nothing of the countless natural faults of the body) that natural deafness is not an evil—deafness which hinders even that faith by which the righteous man lives (See Rom 1:17), since faith comes from hearing (Rom 10:17)? But unless you were inwardly deaf, you would hear with the ears of the heart the Apostle saying: For we too were by nature children of wrath, like the rest (Eph 2:3). But go on still, and cry out with blind and deaf hearts: It is not an evil to be naturally forgetful, naturally dull, naturally irascible, naturally lustful. Why indeed do you not securely fling out these foolish words, by which not even natural foolishness itself is an evil? To such a degree, indeed, do you who deny that all original evil is deserved find yourselves compelled to praise all natural faults, that you say that not only those deformed, weak, and monstrous in body, but even the foolish, would have arisen in paradise had no one sinned there—while yet you place amid the delights of that most blessed place your shameful protégée, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit.
JulianImp.5.22V. 23. Iulianus. Verum nunc, quod locus exigit, insequamur. Apparet te, subtilissime disputator, unam eamdemque rem, naturam scilicet humanam magnis extulisse laudibus, sed maioribus maculasse criminibus; quod sicut uno tempore, uno opere, unoque consilio evenire simul non potest; ita ratio naturalis nequaquam capit haec, vel sub alternatione contraria, sed uno semper plena, id est, taxatione boni, numquam propter malum, quod eius instituta per actoris sui non capiunt dignitatem, nisi a pollutissimo Manichaeorum dente mordetur. Sed hoc expleto, illud inquiro, quos putes connubii fumos sequendos. Nam si connubium fateris non esse causam hominis, sed naturam; peccati quoque causam non esse connubium, sed naturam; hoc connubium, cui laudem dabas, totum prorsus evanuit. Cui ergo rei adscribitur, si nec mali tui, nec boni mei causa est? Si ab honestate connubii hominem submoves, ne eum etiam fornicationi cogaris adscribere; a necessitate connubii peccatum removes, ne nuptias damnare videaris; quid remansit laude dignum in possessione coniugii? Cur illud times violare sermone, quod admota disputatione funditus subruisti? Cuius ergo rei causa esse dicetur, si nec malo nec bono participat naturali? Nihil ergo iam agit in rebus humanis nomen honestasque coniugii? Sed angeris, et dure quidem; subveniendum est igitur anhelo seni. Remansit quod ei dare possis, sine quo tamen nihil aliud invenitur; videlicet ut dicas hoc connubium stare pro foribus, ut ad voluptatem coeuntium nullam obscenitatis famam permittat irruere, sed suo titulo illi negotio honestatem vindicet et pudorem. Sine causa ergo connubii fidem subdola corrumpere laude voluisti; nulli est infestius, quam tibi. Vos omnino proturbat, nec ad lacerationem commixtionis tutelae suae creditae, Manichaeorum linguas permittit irrepere. Habent, inquit, suo dogmate digna meritoria, in quibus nocturnis horis expleantur; illam verecundantium voluptatem connubii tuentur excubiae, arcentur crimina, et honor honestatis admittitur; privilegia sibi ab Apostolo concessa defendunt honorabiles nuptias et thoros immaculatos; fornicatores autem et adulteros iudicabit Deus . Ubi est ergo criminosa commixtio, si negotio eius atque secreto auctoritas connubii, quod laudabas, obsequitur?
V. 23. Julian: But now let us pursue what the topic requires. It is plain, most subtle disputant, that you have extolled one and the same thing—human nature, namely—with great praises, but stained it with greater charges; and since this cannot happen at one time, by one act, and by one design, so natural reason in no way admits these things, even under contrary alternation, but always full of one thing, that is, of the estimation of the good, never on account of the evil, since its institutions do not, through their author, admit of unworthiness, unless it be bitten by the most polluted tooth of the Manichees. But this being finished, I inquire this: which smoke-screens of marriage you think are to be followed. For if you confess that marriage is not the cause of the human being, but nature; and that the cause of sin too is not marriage, but nature; then this marriage, to which you were giving praise, has utterly vanished. To what thing, then, is it ascribed, if it is the cause neither of your evil nor of my good? If you remove the human being from the honorableness of marriage, lest you be forced to ascribe him to fornication as well; if you remove sin from the necessity of marriage, lest you seem to condemn marriage—what has remained worthy of praise in the possession of wedlock? Why do you fear to violate by speech what you have utterly undermined by your disputation once brought to bear? Of what thing, then, will it be said to be the cause, if it shares in neither the natural evil nor the natural good? Does the name and honor of wedlock, then, now do nothing in human affairs? But you are distressed, and grievously so; help, then, must be brought to the panting old man. There has remained something you can give it, without which, however, nothing else is found—namely, that you say this marriage stands at the door, so as to let no rumor of obscenity rush in upon the pleasure of those uniting, but to claim for that business, by its own title, honorableness and modesty. Without cause, then, did you wish by treacherous praise to corrupt the trustworthiness of marriage; to none is it more hostile than to you. It utterly drives you off, and does not let the tongues of the Manichees creep in to tear at the commingling committed to its protection. They have, it says, in their own teaching, brothels worthy of them, in which they may be satisfied in the hours of the night; the watchmen of marriage guard that pleasure of the bashful, crimes are kept off, and the honor of honorableness is admitted; the privileges granted to it by the Apostle defend honorable marriages and undefiled beds; but fornicators and adulterers God will judge (Heb 13:4). Where, then, is the criminal commingling, if the authority of wedlock, which you were praising, attends upon its business and its secret?
JulianImp.5.23Augustinus. Tu quidem, ut ex fructibus suis cognosci arborem diceres, non naturae hoc evangelicum testimonium, sed nuptiis proficere voluisti. Nam tua verba ista sunt: Si ergo trahitur, inquis, et de nuptiis originale malum, causa mali est conventio nuptiarum, et necesse est malum esse per quod et ex quo malus fructus apparuit, dicente Domino in Evangelio: " Ex fructibus suis arbor agnoscitur " . Quomodo, inquis, tu audiendus putaris, qui dicis bonum esse coniugium, de quo nihil aliud quam malum prodire definis? Constat igitur, inquis, rea esse coniugia, si peccatum inde originale deducitur, nec posse defendi, nisi fructus eorum innocens approbetur; defenduntur autem, et bona pronuntiantur; fructus igitur approbatur innocuus. Nempe his verbis tuis satis clarum est, arborem te intellegi voluisse coniugium, et fructus arboris eos fetus qui coniugum commixtione nascuntur. Sed quia hinc ratione manifestissima exclusus es, et ex adulteris enim tales fetus oriuntur; ad naturam putasti esse fugiendum, in cuius altitudine latitares; de qua non agebas, quando propter connubii bonum fructusque eius bonos similitudinem arboris evangelicae caecus adhibebas. Defende ergo naturam contra originale peccatum: relinque coniugia, ipsam dic bonam arborem, quia sive de coniugiis, sive de adulteriis, ipsa gignit homines; quos ideo dicis fructus bonos arboris bonae, ne aliquem reatum ex origine depravata credantur generatione traxisse, regeneratione solvendum; ne indigeant salvatore, ne in remissione peccatorum fuso sanguine redimantur. Age ista ut detestandus haereticus; imple paradisum Dei, etiamsi nemo peccasset, libidinibus concupiscentium, certaminibus contra libidines dimicantium, doloribus parturientium, fletibus vagientium, morbis languentium, funeribus morientium, moerore lugentium. Sic age, hoc te decet; tales enim, te auctore, subsequuntur poenae bonos fructus arboris bonae, et insinuant paradisum deliciarum, sed Pelagianorum. Quin etiam meam disputationem dialecticus acutus irrides, dicens, unam eamdemque rem, naturam videlicet humanam ma gnis extulisse me laudibus, sed maioribus maculasse criminibus. Ego vero non Aristotelem vel Chrysippum, multo minus vanum cum sua loquacitate Iulianum, magistrum delector habere; sed Christum, qui profecto nisi natura humana magnum esset bonum, non pro illa homo fieret, cum Deus esset; nisi magno peccati malo mortua esset, non pro illa moreretur, cum sine peccato ipse venisset et mansisset. Rursus tamen, quasi non tibi natura humana sufficiat, quae talis de adulteris, qualis de coniugibus nascitur, de bonitate nos putas urgendos esse nuptiarum, quaerens quid agant in rebus humanis, si neque malum ipsis imputandum est, quod non de illis, sed de vitiata per peccatum origine trahitur; neque bonum, quia homo etiam de adulteris nascitur. Et quia honestatem connubii a concubitus illiciti turpitudine invenimus esse discretam, hinc existimas confici, nullum originale malum trahi de coniugali concubitu; non intuens, quod si connubii bonum causa esset ne malum traherent, qui de coniugibus nascerentur; profecto adulterii malum causa esset ut malum traherent, qui de adulteris nascerentur. Habent igitur in rebus humanis honestum locum suum nuptiae, non ut homines nascantur, qui etsi nulla nuptiarum lege, naturali usu passim sexus uterque concumberet, utique nascerentur; sed ut ordinata propagatione nascantur; et quemadmodum partu certae sunt matres, ita fide coniugii habeantur certi et patres; et ne tua pudenda suscepta per quaslibet feminas tanto turpius, quanto liberius evagetur. Sed non quia de nuptiis certo genitore homo nascitur, ideo non indiget salvatore per quem renascatur, ut a malo cum quo nascitur, liberetur. Non est itaque in connubiis, ut nos dicere calumniaris, criminosa commixtio; sed ideo laudanda est coniugum castitas, quia sola potest bene uti malo, quod tu deformiter laudas.
Augustine: You indeed, in saying that a tree is known by its fruits, wished this gospel testimony to serve not nature but marriage. For these are your words: If, then, original evil is drawn even from marriage, the coming together of marriage is the cause of evil, and that must be evil through which and from which evil fruit appeared, as the Lord says in the Gospel: " The tree is known by its fruits ". How, you say, are you to be thought worthy of a hearing, you who say that marriage, from which you declare nothing but evil to come forth, is good? It is established, therefore, you say, that marriages are guilty, if original sin is derived from them, and that they cannot be defended unless their fruit is approved as innocent; but they are defended and pronounced good; their fruit, therefore, is approved as innocent. Surely by these words of yours it is clear enough that you wished the tree to be understood as marriage, and the fruits of the tree as those offspring who are born of the union of married people. But since you were shut out from this by the most manifest reason—for such offspring arise from adulterers too—you thought you must flee to nature, in whose depths you might lie hidden; though you were not treating of nature when, for the sake of the good of marriage and its good fruits, you blindly applied the likeness of the gospel tree. Defend nature, then, against original sin: leave marriages aside, call nature itself the good tree, because whether from marriages or from adulteries, it begets human beings; whom you therefore call the good fruits of a good tree, lest they be believed to have drawn from a depraved origin, by generation, any guilt to be loosed by regeneration—lest they need a savior, lest they be redeemed by blood poured out in the forgiveness of sins. Do these things, as the detestable heretic you are; fill the paradise of God, even if no one had sinned, with the lusts of those desiring, the struggles of those contending against lusts, the pains of those giving birth, the wailings of crying infants, the sicknesses of the ailing, the funerals of the dying, the grief of those mourning. So act—this befits you; for such, on your authority, are the punishments that follow the good fruits of the good tree, and introduce a paradise of delights—but a Pelagian one. Indeed you, a sharp dialectician, even mock my disputation, saying that I extolled one and the same thing, namely human nature, with great praises, but stained it with greater charges. But I delight to have as my master not Aristotle or Chrysippus, much less vain Julian with his wordiness, but Christ; who surely, unless human nature were a great good, would not have become man for it, since he was God; and unless it had died by the great evil of sin, would not have died for it, since he himself had come and remained without sin. Yet again, as though human nature were not enough for you—being such, born of adulterers, as it is born of married people—you think we must be pressed about the goodness of marriage, asking what marriages do in human affairs, if neither the evil is to be imputed to them, which is drawn not from them but from the origin vitiated by sin, nor the good, since a human being is born even of adulterers. And because we have found the honorableness of marriage to be distinct from the baseness of unlawful intercourse, you suppose it is thereby concluded that no original evil is drawn from conjugal intercourse; not seeing that if the good of marriage were the cause why those born of married people should draw no evil, then surely the evil of adultery would be the cause why those born of adulterers should draw evil. Marriage therefore has its honorable place in human affairs, not so that human beings might be born—who would be born anyway, even if, by no law of marriage, each sex came together indiscriminately by natural use—but so that they might be born by an ordered propagation; and that, as mothers are made certain by the birth, so fathers too may be held certain by the fidelity of marriage; and that your shameful protégée may not stray through any women whatever, the more basely the more freely. But it is not because a human being is born from marriage with a certain father that he therefore does not need a savior through whom he may be reborn, so as to be freed from the evil with which he is born. There is therefore in marriages no criminal commingling, as you slanderously claim we say; but the chastity of married people is to be praised for this reason, that it alone can make good use of the evil which you praise in unseemly fashion.
JulianImp.5.23V. 24. Iulianus. His igitur absolutis vel breviter ostendam, quam iaceas in profundo ignorantiae, qui hactenus subtilissimus et acutissimus habebare. Dicis te naturae adscribere crimen, quod transit in sobolem, non tamen in nuptiis; sicut e regione, hominum naturae applicas, non flagitio. Et ideo fingis te quidem laudare connubium, ne aperte deprehendaris manichaeus; sed vituperas naturam, cui et malum inesse, et de qua propagari malum fateris. Numquam igitur audire potuisti disputationis regulas et sanissimae constituta rationis? In omnibus enim praedicamentis plus amplectuntur genera, quam species; inde autem etiam fiunt genera subalterna; plus autem species, quam atomi; suntque genera quibus species continentur, species autem speciales quibus individua concluduntur. Minorum ergo quassatio, superiora non quatit; superiora vero casibus suis omnia, quae complectebantur, involvunt. Verbi gratia, ani mal genus est: sed latitudine suae significationis diversas species comprehendit, scilicet hominis, equi, bovis, etc. Si ergo pereat una species, genus illud non sentit exitium; fac enim ut de rebus boum natura deficiat; genus nimirum interemptum non est, aliorum animalium permanente natura. At contra, si hoc quod est animal, auferatur de rebus; omnes sine dubio species, quae hoc genere concludebantur, intereunt; nulla enim remanebit species animantis, animali penitus interempto. Ea ergo quae superiora sunt, eventus suos atque merita speciebus, quas amplectuntur, impertiunt; non tamen recurrit, ut specierum suarum quasi necessitudinum quarumdam varietatibus permutentur. Utque ad causam referatur exemplum; naturae humanae generalitas institutionum infra se locatarum genus quoddam est; haec velut species habet, in situ, in membris, in ordinibus, in motibus, vel aliis id genus. Qualitatem ergo suam omnibus suppositis speciebus impertit; non tamen obnoxiaretur sui, ut minorum a se rerum periculis misceatur. Si ergo natura vituperetur, et obnoxia diabolo reaque credatur, coniugium quoque quod sub illa est, et fecunditas, et substantia tota damnabitur. Non potest ergo laudari connubium, quod fit secundum naturam, si natura ipsa reprehenditur. Commoriatur necesse est radici suae germinum succisorum venustas; et ut rem ipsam planius eloquar, non potest dici bonum negotium nuptiarum, si commixtio naturalis arguitur; quoniam quod depretiatur in genere, cui indivisibiliter adhaeret, in specie nequit honorari. Porro cum mala voluntas instrumentis naturalibus ad flagitia utitur, vis illa voluptatis et seminis, quae numquam pro coeuntium voluntate variatur, nullam patitur criminis societatem; sed materiam Deo praestat operanti, flagitiumque adulterantis solummodo arguit meritum, non naturae. Cum igitur de naturalibus disputaremus, perobtunse naturam reprobans connubia laudasti; cum irrefutabiliter constet genus speciebus suis participare, quidquid exceperit; et ideo aut usus, quem naturalem Apostolus dicit, bonus legitimusque censebitur, et erunt honesta coniugia, nullumque erit naturale peccatum; aut si creditur natura esse diabolica, ut sit originale peccatum, connubii quoque usus damnabilis pronuntiabitur. Et non quidem sobrie, ex aperto tamen Manichaeorum dogma suscipitur; quod quoniam funestum est, nec apud illos quidquam est aut veritatis, aut honestatis, aut fidei; apud nullos autem alios opinio potest naturalis esse peccati; ut nos catholicos, ita vos constat esse Manichaeos.
V. 24. Julian: These things, then, being settled, I will show, if only briefly, how deep in the abyss of ignorance you lie—you who up to now were held to be most subtle and most acute. You say you ascribe to nature the crime that passes into offspring, yet not to marriage; just as, on the other side, you attach human beings to nature, not to the shameful deed. And so you pretend, indeed, to praise wedlock, lest you be openly caught as a Manichee; but you find fault with nature, in which you confess that evil is present, and from which you confess evil is propagated. Have you, then, never been able to hear the rules of disputation and the established principles of the soundest reasoning? For in all the categories the genera embrace more than the species; and from this too arise subaltern genera; while the species embrace more than the individuals; and there are genera by which species are contained, and special species by which individuals are enclosed. The shattering, then, of the lower does not shake the higher; but the higher, by their falls, involve all that they embraced. For example, "animal" is a genus; but by the breadth of its meaning it comprises diverse species, namely of man, horse, ox, and so on. If, then, one species perishes, that genus does not feel destruction; for suppose the nature of oxen should fail from the world; the genus is surely not destroyed, the nature of the other animals remaining. But on the contrary, if that which is "animal" be removed from the world, all the species which were enclosed under this genus undoubtedly perish; for no species of living thing will remain when "animal" is utterly destroyed. Those things, then, which are higher impart their outcomes and merits to the species which they embrace; yet it does not run back the other way, so that they should be changed by the varieties of their species as of certain dependents. And to apply the example to the matter: the generality of human nature, of the institutions placed beneath it, is a kind of genus; this has, as it were, species in posture, in members, in arrangements, in movements, or in other things of the kind. It therefore imparts its quality to all the species placed under it; yet it would not be made liable to itself, so as to be mixed up with the perils of things lower than it. If, then, nature be found fault with, and be believed liable to the devil and guilty, marriage too, which is under it, and fruitfulness, and the whole substance will be condemned. Marriage, therefore, which is done according to nature, cannot be praised, if nature itself is blamed. The beauty of the cut shoots must necessarily die together with their root; and, to put the matter more plainly, the business of marriage cannot be called good, if the natural commingling is impugned; since what is devalued in the genus, to which it indivisibly adheres, cannot be honored in the species. Moreover, when an evil will uses the natural instruments for shameful deeds, that force of pleasure and of seed, which is never varied according to the will of those uniting, suffers no association with the crime; rather, it furnishes the matter to God who is at work, and the shameful deed convicts only the desert of the adulterer, not of nature. Since, then, we were disputing about natural things, you most dully praised marriages while condemning nature; whereas it is irrefutably established that the genus shares with its species whatever it takes on; and therefore either the use which the Apostle calls natural will be judged good and lawful, and marriages will be honorable, and there will be no natural sin; or, if nature is believed to be diabolical, so that there is original sin, the use of marriage too will be pronounced damnable. And then indeed not soberly, but openly, the teaching of the Manichees is taken up; which, since it is deadly, and there is among them nothing of truth, or honorableness, or faith, while among no others can the opinion of natural sin exist—then just as we are Catholics, so you are established to be Manichees.
JulianImp.5.24Augustinus. Tu certe de arbore locutus es, et fructibus ex quibus arbor agnoscitur, cum in hac similitudine coniugium prolemque intellegendam putasses, exclu sus inde, quia et de concubitu adulterino potest talis existere fructus, ad naturam fugisti. Nec latere nos fugientis transitus potuit; in verbis enim tuis, quae nunc commemorabo, satis evidenter apparuit. Aisti enim loquens ad me ipsum: Simili acumine illud quoque labefactare conaris, quod dixi, testimonio evangelico, ex fructibus suis debere arborem cognosci; ut ostenderem, inquis, quod clarum est, doceri bona non posse coniugia; immo ipsam naturam, quae coniugiorum operatione suppletur, nec Dei posse operi vindicari, si de ea dicerentur crimina pullulare ". His tuis dictis aperuisti fugae tuae transitum, nominatis coniugiis addendo et dicendo: immo ipsam naturam, quae coniugiorum operatione suppletur. Distinxisti ergo duo ista, satisque ostendisti aliud esse naturam, aliud coniugia, quorum operatione natura suppletur. Quid est ergo quod postea naturam genus, eiusque speciem vis esse coniugium? Numquid ullum genus speciei suae ullius operatione suppletur? Non utique: neque enim animal, quod est genus, suppletur operatione hominis, vel equi, vel bovis, vel alterius alicuius pecoris, quod species est generis illius; quandoquidem etiamsi desit aliqua species, auferaturque de rebus; manet tamen genus, quod ceteras amplectitur species, sicut etiam ipse disputasti. Quod genus utique integrum non maneret, si operatione speciei, quae ablata est, suppleretur; non enim magis est genus, si plures; et minus est genus, si species habeat pauciores; quamvis si omnes auferantur species, nec genus erit; quemadmodum genere ablato, nulla erit species. Non est igitur connubium species, genusque natura, si connubiorum opere natura suppletur; sicut non est agricultura species segetis, quoniam suppletur seges opere agriculturae. Deinde si naturam genus, eiusque speciem dicis esse coniugium; procul dubio dicere cogeris, quod natura sit omne coniugium. Ideo quippe omnis equus animal est, etsi non omne animal equus; quia species est equus, animal genus. Ergo nec fit ab homine aliqua natura; quamvis enim, ut scriptum est, a Domino iungatur mulier viro ; quoniam nisi adiuvante ipso non fit, quando recte fit; quis tamen nesciat opera hominum esse coniugia? Porro si naturam non facit homo, non est natura coniugium; quia coniugium facit homo. Ac per hoc, quia coniugium natura non est, profecto naturae species, tamquam illa sit genus, nullo esse pacto potest. Coniugia igitur ad mores hominum pertinent, ipsi autem homines ad naturam. Licet itaque nobis mala vitiatae vituperare naturae, et laudare mores bene utentes bonis malisque naturae. Laudo ergo coniugia; absit autem ut laudem malum, quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum; sine quo malo quisquam hominum non potest nasci; cuius mali reatus, nisi renascendo, non potest solvi; cuius mali bonus usus laudatur in concubitu coniugali. Proinde originale peccatum, quod non trahitur ex alienae commixtione, sed ex nostrae depravatione naturae, non dicunt Manichaei, sed dicunt Catholici; quod vos negando estis haeretici.
Augustine: You certainly spoke of a tree, and of the fruits by which a tree is known, when you had thought that marriage and offspring were to be understood in this likeness; and being shut out from there, because such fruit can arise from adulterous intercourse too, you fled to nature. Nor could the passage of your flight lie hidden from us; for in your words, which I shall now recall, it appeared plainly enough. For you said, speaking to me myself: With like sharpness you try to undermine this also, which I said—that on the gospel testimony a tree ought to be known by its fruits—so that I might show, you say, what is plain: that marriages cannot be taught to be good; nor indeed nature itself, which is supplemented by the operation of marriages, nor can it be vindicated as the work of God, if crimes were said to sprout from it. By these words of yours you opened the passage of your flight, adding, after naming marriages, and saying: nor indeed nature itself, which is supplemented by the operation of marriages. You therefore distinguished these two, and showed clearly enough that nature is one thing, marriages another, by whose operation nature is supplemented. What is it, then, that afterward you wish nature to be the genus, and marriage its species? Is any genus supplemented by the operation of any species of its own? Surely not: for neither is "animal," which is a genus, supplemented by the operation of man, or horse, or ox, or any other beast, which is a species of that genus; since even if some species be lacking, and be removed from the world, the genus yet remains which embraces the other species, as you yourself also argued. And this genus would surely not remain whole, if it were supplemented by the operation of the species which has been removed; for it is no more a genus if it has more species, and no less a genus if it has fewer—although if all the species be removed, neither will there be a genus, just as, the genus being removed, there will be no species. Marriage, therefore, is not a species, nor nature a genus, if nature is supplemented by the work of marriages; just as agriculture is not a species of the crop, since the crop is supplemented by the work of agriculture. Then again, if you say nature is the genus and marriage its species, you are doubtless compelled to say that every marriage is nature. For every horse is an animal, though not every animal is a horse, precisely because the horse is a species, the animal a genus. Therefore no nature is produced by a human being; for although, as it is written, a wife is joined to a husband by the Lord (See Prov 19:14)—since it is not done without his help, when it is rightly done—who yet does not know that marriages are the works of human beings? Moreover, if a human being does not make nature, marriage is not nature, because a human being makes marriage. And thus, since marriage is not nature, it can in no way be a species of nature, as though nature were the genus. Marriages, therefore, pertain to the morals of human beings, but human beings themselves to nature. It is permitted us, then, to find fault with the evils of a vitiated nature, and to praise morals that make good use of the goods and evils of nature. I praise marriages, then; but far be it that I should praise the evil by which the flesh lusts against the spirit—without which evil no human being can be born; whose guilt cannot be loosed except by being reborn; whose good use is praised in conjugal intercourse. Accordingly, original sin, which is drawn not from the commingling of an alien nature, but from the perversion of our own, is asserted not by the Manichees, but by the Catholics; and by denying it you are heretics.
JulianImp.5.24V. 25. Iulianus. Ad cuius nominis cavendam invidiam, frustra omnino diversarum facis haereseon mentionem. Ais enim: Sicut Ariani Catholicos Sabellianos vocant, quamvis certam personarum distinctionem faciant, naturae tamen communione servata; ita et a nobis Manichaeorum vobis nomen imponi; cum vos non dicatis malum esse nuptias, quod dicunt Manichaei, sed dicatis malum in omnes homines naturae conditione transire . Haec autem argumenta tua prudentibus non ambigo irrisum iri; nam ut Ariani falsos Catholicos Sabellianos dicunt, cum a nobis et Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti personarum fiat sine ulla confusione et sine mutatione substantiae distinctio, illique hebetissime calumnientur, inter unum et tres nihil interesse; ita etiam Catholici iure meritoque vos Manichaeos esse pronuntiant; quia id a nobis dici fides vestra compellit. Asserunt quippe Manichaei naturalem peccatum: vos dicitis naturale. Dicunt Manichaei libidinem corporum a diabolo esse plantatam; tu id multiplicata disputatione confirmas. Contendunt illi per liberum arbitrium non posse malum caveri, quippe quod naturale sit; tu quoque iisdem sermonibus liberum commentaris arbitrium, sed per quod malum fieri possit, a malo autem non possit desisti. Dicit Manichaeus semen esse maledictum: tu id Scripturarum auctoritate probare conaris. Dicit Manichaeus inconvertibilem esse malitiam; tu sic esse vociferaris. Sed dicis tu Adam solum naturae fuisse melioris; dicit etiam Manichaeus ad Patricium, meliorem illum secutis credi oportere, quasi de primae concretum flore substantiae. Dicis tu commixtionem propter naturales motus esse diabolicam, atque homines a diabolo quasi fruticis a se plantati fructus iure decerpi; dicit etiam hoc Manichaeus, quippe a quo id credere et affirmare didicisti. Dicit Manichaeus et naturam et nuptias malas esse: tu autem bonas nuptias, sed ream naturam. Non tu hic religiosior, sed ille prudentior. Quomodo ergo falsum est, quod dicunt Ariani, Catholicos Sabellianos esse; ita verissimum est, quod dicunt Catholici, Traducianos non esse aliud quam Manichaeos; distinctionem autem inter vos illusoriam quidem, non fide vestra, sed imperitia contigisse. Unius ergo fidei tu et Manichaeus; sed ille minus impudens, quam tua gravitas invenitur; neque enim facile Manichaeus aut Melitidis alter offenditur, qui dicat se damnare naturam hominum, sed non infamare coniugia.
V. 25. Julian: To ward off the odium of this name, you make mention, quite in vain, of various heresies. For you say: Just as the Arians call Catholics Sabellians, although they make a definite distinction of persons while preserving the community of nature, so the name of Manichees is imposed upon you by us; since you do not say that marriage is evil, as the Manichees say, but you say that evil passes into all human beings by the condition of nature. But these arguments of yours, I do not doubt, will be laughed at by prudent men. For as the Arians call the true Catholics Sabellians, when by us the distinction of the persons of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is made without any confusion and without any change of substance, while they most dully slander us, as though there were no difference between one and three—so too the Catholics rightly and deservedly pronounce you Manichees, because your faith compels this to be said by us. For the Manichees assert sin to be natural; you say it is natural. The Manichees say that the lust of bodies was planted by the devil; you confirm this with multiplied disputation. They contend that evil cannot be guarded against by free choice, since it is natural; you too, in the same terms, devise a free choice, but one through which evil can be done, while one cannot desist from evil. The Manichee says the seed is accursed; you try to prove it by the authority of the Scriptures. The Manichee says that wickedness is unconvertible; you cry out that it is so. But you say that Adam alone was of a better nature; the Manichee too says, in his letter to Patricius, that one ought to believe him better than those who followed, as though compounded from the flower of the first substance. You say that the commingling, on account of its natural motions, is diabolical, and that human beings are rightly plucked by the devil like the fruits of a shrub he himself planted; the Manichee says this too, since it is from him that you learned to believe and affirm it. The Manichee says that both nature and marriage are evil; you, however, say marriage is good, but nature guilty. You are not here more religious, but he is more prudent. As, then, it is false, what the Arians say, that the Catholics are Sabellians, so it is most true, what the Catholics say, that the Traducianists are nothing other than Manichees; and that the distinction between you came about, indeed, by an illusion, not from your faith, but from inexperience. You and the Manichee, therefore, are of one faith; but he is found less shameless than your gravity; for one will not easily find a Manichee, or another Melitidian, who would say that he condemns the nature of human beings, but does not defame marriages.
JulianImp.5.25Augustinus. Cur ego Arianos et Sabellianos commemoraverim, qui librum illum meum intellegens legit, mox invenit; teque pervidet dolose agere, qui eamdem causam totam commemorare noluisti. Tibi enim dixi: Sicut Ariani dum Sabellianos fugiunt, in peius aliquid inciderunt, quia Trinitatis ausi sunt non personas discernere, sed naturas; ita Pelagiani dum Manichaeorum pestem in perversum vitare conantur, de nuptiarum fructu ipsis Manichaeis convincuntur perniciosiora sentire, credendo parvulos Christo medico non egere . Haec verba mea tibi proposuisses, vel certe hanc sententiam meam, si mihi quoquo modo respondere voluisses; quibus praetermissis dicis tibi ipse quod vis, ut mihi, non ea quae a me dicta sunt refellendo, sed non tacendo respondisse videaris. Et nunc, quod ea me sentire dicis, quae sentiunt Manichaei, multum falleris; vel potius quos potes fallis. Nam Manichaei malum coaeternum Deo, idemque malum esse substantiam, alienam quamdam dicunt esse naturam, quae in bonum mutari, nec per se ipsam, nec a bono Deo possit omnino; cuius immutabilis mali commixtione, animam bonam, quam credere audent boni Dei esse naturam, inquinatam perhibent atque corruptam; et ob hoc in qualibet hominis aetate necessarium habere salvatorem, a quo mundata et redintegrata atque a tali captivitate eruta liberetur. Vos autem dum in perversum fugitis Manichaeos, in has impietatis tenebras incidistis, ut ab omni malo asserendo parvulos salvos, Salvatorem miseris necessarium non putetis; et adiuvandis eis ipsis, quos fugitis, Manichaeis nescio quomodo per circuitum vestri occurratis erroris, negando malum vitiatae naturae nostrae; ut quidquid malorum vel recte creditur, vel aperte invenitur in parvulis, commixtioni (quod volunt ipsi) naturae tribuatur alienae. Catholica vero ut Manichaeos et Pelagianos devitet, nullam naturam atque substantiam esse dicit malum; sed voluntario malo, quod per unum hominem in omnes homines pertransiit, nostram naturam atque substantiam ideo mutabilem, quia Dei natura non est, non negat esse vitiatam; eique malo, quod insanabile Deo non est, ut absumi possit, in omnibus aetatibus Salvatorem necessarium confitetur. Proinde nec de peccato naturali, nec de libidine corporum, nec de libero arbitrio, nec de semine maledicto, nec de inconvertibili malitia, nec de natura primi hominis, nec de commixtione sexuum, nec de potestate diabolica in homines, eadem quae Manichaei, dicere possumus; qui duas naturas atque substantias, unam boni, alteram mali, sine initio temporis sempiternas, et ex quodam initio temporis commixtas esse non dicimus; ne inter multa absurda atque vesana, etiam Dei naturam coinquinabilem corruptibilemque dicamus. Quod autem me solum affirmas dicere bonas nuptias, reamque naturam; ut alios taceam, do tibi Paulum apostolum, quem tu quoque laudatorem praedicas nuptiarum, dicentem tamen de naturae originalis reatu, corpus mortuum esse propter peccatum . Do tibi alterum huius intellectorem, meumque doctorem, catholicum Ambrosium, qui cum laudet coniugalem pudicitiam, dicit tamen: Omnes sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est . Calumniose, contentiose, linguose, quid quaeris amplius?
Augustine: Why I mentioned the Arians and Sabellians, whoever reads that book of mine with understanding soon finds out; and he sees through you as acting deceitfully, since you were unwilling to recall the whole of that same matter. For I said to you: Just as the Arians, while fleeing the Sabellians, fell into something worse, because they dared, in the Trinity, to distinguish not persons but natures, so the Pelagians, while trying to avoid the plague of the Manichees in a perverse way, are convicted, on the matter of the fruit of marriage, of holding things more pernicious than the Manichees themselves, by believing that little ones do not need Christ the physician. You should have set before yourself these words of mine, or at least this sentiment of mine, if you had been willing to answer me in any way; but, passing these over, you say to yourself whatever you please, so that you may seem to have answered me—not by refuting what was said by me, but by not keeping silent. And now, in saying that I hold what the Manichees hold, you are greatly mistaken; or rather, you deceive whom you can. For the Manichees say that evil is coeternal with God, and that this same evil is a substance, a certain alien nature, which can in no way be changed into good, neither by itself nor by the good God; by the commingling of which unchangeable evil they declare the good soul—which they dare to believe is of the nature of the good God—to be defiled and corrupted; and on this account to have need, at every age of a human being, of a savior, by whom, cleansed and restored and rescued from such captivity, it may be set free. But you, while fleeing the Manichees in a perverse way, have fallen into these shadows of impiety, so that, asserting little ones to be safe from all evil, you think a Savior unnecessary for the wretched; and, by helping the very Manichees you flee, you somehow meet your own error by a roundabout way, denying the evil of our vitiated nature—so that whatever evils are rightly believed, or plainly found, in little ones may be attributed (as they themselves wish) to the commingling of an alien nature. But the Catholic Church, that it may avoid both Manichees and Pelagians, says that no nature and substance is evil; but, by a voluntary evil which through one man passed into all men, it does not deny that our nature and substance, being changeable precisely because it is not the nature of God, has been vitiated; and to that evil, which is not incurable for God, so that it can be done away with, it confesses a Savior to be necessary at every age. Accordingly, neither of natural sin, nor of the lust of bodies, nor of free choice, nor of the accursed seed, nor of unconvertible wickedness, nor of the nature of the first man, nor of the commingling of the sexes, nor of the devil's power over human beings, can we say the same things as the Manichees; we who do not say that there are two natures and substances, one of good, the other of evil, everlasting without beginning of time, and commingled from a certain beginning of time—lest, among many absurd and senseless things, we should also say that the nature of God is befoulable and corruptible. But as for your asserting that I alone say that marriages are good and nature guilty—to say nothing of others, I give you the apostle Paul, whom you too proclaim a praiser of marriages, yet who says of the guilt of our original nature that the body is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10). I give you another who understood this, my teacher, the Catholic Ambrose, who, though he praises conjugal chastity, yet says: We are all born under sin, whose very origin is in fault (Ambrose, Apology of the Prophet David 11.56). Slanderously, contentiously, with a wagging tongue, what more do you seek?
JulianImp.5.25V. 26. Iulianus. Verum adversum haec ludibria satis actum est: veniamus ad eam, quam supra dixi, perplexissimam quaestionem, quae ipsum praeceptorem tuum sui subtilitate decepit. Oppositioni quippe nostrae, haud exponendo, sed aliud difficilius ponendo conatus es occurrere. Cum enim docuissem, quia in hominibus perfectioris aetatis malum suapte voluntate operantibus, et innocua naturae laudarentur exordia, et actionum diverticula iure vituperarentur; duoque esse, quae possint contrariis applicari; in parvulis autem unum, id est, naturam, quia voluntas non esset; illudque unum aut Deo, aut daemoni esse reputandum; collegique ut si per Deum natura subsisteret, non posset esse in ea originale malum; si autem diabolo transcriberetur per ingenitum malum, nihil esset per quod homo divino operi vindicaretur; cum ergo ad ea pervenisses loca, respondisti, fide solita, me collegisse verum; sed et in parvulis duo esse, id est, naturam et peccatum. Quod tamen peccatum, ut priorum definitionum recorderis, nihil est aliud, quam voluntas retinendi vel admittendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. Constituto ergo peccatum nihil esse aliud, quam pravae voluntatis electionem; respondisti, Epicure nostri temporis, in parvulis peccatum esse, voluntatem non esse: quod cuius sit dedecoris, liber iam quartus ostendit. In his ergo locis cum dixissem: " Si ex voluntate est peccatum, mala voluntas, quae peccatum facit; si ex natura, mala natura, quae peccatum facit "; ea quaestione es mihi conatus occurrere, quam a te excogitatam non esse manifestum est. Nam cum ante hos annos essemus Carthagini, a quodam mihi Honorato nomine necessario tuo, manichaeo aeque, sicut epistolae vestrae indicant, id ipsum propositum est. Cuius rei ad hoc tantummodo feci mentionem, ut clareret hanc esse quaestionem, quae et Manem et Marcionem ante tot saecula decepisset. Sic ergo loqueris contra hoc quod ego dixeram: " Si peccatum in naturam, mala natura quae peccatum facit ": Quaero ab illo, si potest respondeat, sicut manifestum est, ex voluntate mala tamquam ex arbore mala fructus eius fieri omnia opera mala; sic ipsam voluntatem malam, id est, ipsam fructuum malorum arborem malam unde dicat exortam. Si ex angelo; quid erat ipse angelus, nisi bonum opus Dei? Si ex homine; quid erat ipse homo, nisi bonum opus Dei? Immo quia voluntas mala ex angelo angeli, et ex homine hominis orta est; quid erant haec duo, antequam in eis ista mala orirentur, nisi bonum opus Dei, et bona atque laudanda natura? Ecce ergo ex bono oritur malum, nec fuit omnino unde oriri posset, nisi ex bono; ipsam dico voluntatem malam, quam nullum praecessit malum; non opera mala, quae non sunt nisi ex voluntate mala, tamquam ex arbore mala. Nec ideo tamen ex bono potuit oriri voluntas mala, quia bonum factum est a Deo bono; sed quia de nihilo factum est, non de Deo. Quid est ergo quod dicit: Si natura opus est Dei, per opus Dei opus diaboli transire non sinitur? Nonne opus diaboli, quando in angelo qui diabolus factus est, prius ortum est, in opere Dei ortum est? Quapropter si malum quod omnino nusquam erat in opere Dei oriri potuit; cur malum quod alicubi iam erat, per opus Dei transire non potuit? Numquid homines non sunt opus Dei? Pertransiit ergo peccatum per homines, hoc est, diaboli opus per opus Dei; atque ut alio modo idipsum dicam, opus Dei per opus operis Dei . Haec tam multa, quae de tuis sermonibus posui, aperuerunt omnino ipsum caput et fontem erroris antiqui; nihil in dictis tuis acutius, nihil in disserendo perplexius attulisti; toto omnino campo disputationis agitatus, ac de omni loco, in quo tentaveras subsistere, armis infestae veritatis expulsus, pervenisti tandem ad illum specum, quem inter opaca quaestionum Manichaeus foderat. Reddidisti propositioni huic testimonium difficultatis suae, dicens: " Quaero ab illo, ut si potest respondeat "; et ideo quoniam convenit inter utrumque nostrum locum esse difficilem, ut toto animo adsit lector admoneo. Distinctiones pro rei conditione subtiles, quas adiuvante Christo confido pinguescere, prius intentus, mox securus sequitur. Quaesisti ergo, unde malum; interrogo, quod malum dicas; commune enim hoc nomen est culpae et vindictae; ceterum abusive supplicium malum vocatur, cum gravitate eius quo infertur iudicii vindicetur. Respondes, de peccato te dicere, non de supplicio.
V. 26. Julian: But against these mockeries enough has been done: let us come to that most perplexing question, which I mentioned above, which by its very subtlety deceived your own preceptor. For you tried to meet our objection not by explaining, but by posing something more difficult. For when I had taught that, in human beings of more mature age who work evil by their own will, both the harmless beginnings of nature were praised and the byways of their actions were rightly censured—and that there are two things which can be applied to contraries; but that in little ones there is one, namely nature, since there is no will; and that this one thing must be reckoned either to God or to the demon; and I had concluded that, if nature subsists through God, there could be no original evil in it, but if it were assigned to the devil through an inborn evil, there would be nothing by which the human being might be vindicated for the divine work—when, then, you had reached these passages, you answered, with your accustomed assurance, that I had concluded truly; but that in little ones too there are two things, that is, nature and sin. Which sin, however, that you may recall your earlier definitions, is nothing other than the will of retaining or committing what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. With sin, then, established as nothing other than the choice of a depraved will, you answered, O Epicurus of our time, that in little ones there is sin, but there is no will: of what disgrace this is, the fourth book has already shown. In these passages, then, when I had said, "If sin is from the will, the will that does the sin is evil; if from nature, the nature that does the sin is evil," you tried to meet me with that question which, it is plain, was not thought up by you. For when some years ago we were at Carthage, this very thing was put to me by a certain Honoratus, a friend of yours, likewise a Manichee, as your letters indicate. I have made mention of this matter only for this purpose: that it may be clear that this is the question which deceived both Manes and Marcion so many ages ago. So, then, you speak against what I had said—"If sin is in nature, the nature that does the sin is evil": I ask of him, let him answer if he can, that just as it is manifest that from an evil will, as from an evil tree, all evil works, its fruits, come to be, so let him say whence that evil will itself, that is, the evil tree of evil fruits, arose. If from an angel, what was the angel himself but a good work of God? If from a human being, what was the human being himself but a good work of God? Indeed, since the evil will arose from an angel in the case of the angel, and from a human being in the case of the human being, what were these two, before these evils arose in them, but a good work of God, and a good and praiseworthy nature? See, then, evil arises from good, and there was nothing at all from which it could arise except from good; I mean the evil will itself, which no evil preceded—not the evil works, which exist only from an evil will, as from an evil tree. Nor yet could an evil will arise from good because the good was made by the good God; but because it was made from nothing, not from God. What is it, then, that he says: If nature is a work of God, the work of the devil is not permitted to pass through the work of God? Was not the work of the devil, when it first arose in the angel who became the devil, a work that arose in a work of God? Wherefore, if evil, which was utterly nowhere, could arise in a work of God, why could not evil, which already was somewhere, pass through a work of God? Are not human beings the work of God? Sin, then, passed through human beings, that is, the work of the devil through the work of God; and, to say the same thing in another way, the work of God through the work of a work of God. These many things, which I have set down from your discourses, have fully laid open the very head and fountain of the ancient error; nothing sharper have you brought forward in your sayings, nothing more perplexing in your reasoning; tossed about over the whole field of disputation, and driven by the weapons of hostile truth from every place where you had tried to take your stand, you have come at last to that cave which the Manichee had dug amid the shadows of his questions. You gave to this proposition the testimony of its own difficulty, saying, "I ask of him, that if he can, he may answer"; and therefore, since it is agreed between us both that the place is difficult, I warn the reader to attend with his whole mind. The distinctions, subtle as the condition of the matter requires, which with Christ's help I trust to make rich, let him follow, first attentive, then at ease. You asked, then, whence evil comes; I ask, what evil you mean; for this is a name common to fault and to punishment; though punishment is called evil only by misuse, since it is vindicated by the gravity of the judgment by which it is inflicted. You answer that you speak of sin, not of punishment.
JulianImp.5.26Augustinus. Aperuisti omnino stultitiam tuam, quantum potuisti, qui malum confiteris esse peccare, et malum non esse dicis, sed abusive malum vocari, supplicio sempiterni ignis ardere. Sed tantae absurditatis rationem reddis egregiam: Abusive, inquis, supplicium malum vocatur, cum gravitate eius quo infertur iudicii vindicetur. Si ergo, ut hoc dicas, damnati poenam non ex miseria patientis, sed ex iustitia damnantis appendis; dic apertius, bonum esse supplicium, quod abusive dicis malum vocari. Supplicium est enim poena peccati, et iusta est utique poena peccati, iustum est itaque supplicium; et omne quod iustum est, bonum est: bonum est ergo supplicium. Nonne cernis, nisi ita damnatum a damnante distinguas, ut ipsam damnationem, quod supplicium est et poena peccati, bonum quidem opus esse asseras damnantis, sed damnati exitium malum; non, inquam, cernis, nisi haec ea ratione distinguas, ad hoc te perduci ut dicas, homines malis operibus suis, non ad mala quae patiantur graviora, quod verum est, sed ad bona potius pervenire, quod tam falsum est, et tanta vanitate dicitur, ut ista sapere tantum sit malum, quantum est etiam cordis caeci supplicium? Igitur non abusive vocatur malum; sed prorsus malum est patienti; bonum est autem facienti, quia iustum est poenam irrogare peccanti. Si delirare non vis, ista distingue.
Augustine: You have fully laid open your folly, as much as you could, you who confess that to sin is an evil, yet say that to burn in the punishment of eternal fire is not an evil, but is called evil only by misuse. But you give a remarkable reason for so great an absurdity: Punishment, you say, is called evil by misuse, since it is vindicated by the gravity of the judgment by which it is inflicted. If, then, to say this, you weigh the penalty of the condemned not from the misery of the one suffering, but from the justice of the one condemning, say more openly that the punishment is good, which you say is called evil by misuse. For punishment is the penalty of sin, and the penalty of sin is surely just; the punishment, therefore, is just; and everything that is just is good: the punishment, therefore, is good. Do you not see that, unless you so distinguish the condemned from the one condemning that you assert the condemnation itself—which is the punishment and the penalty of sin—to be indeed a good work of the one condemning, but the ruin of the condemned to be an evil; do you not, I say, see that, unless you distinguish these things by this reasoning, you are led to this: to say that by their evil works human beings come not to the graver evils that they suffer—which is true—but rather to goods, which is so false, and is said with such vanity, that to think such things is as great an evil as is even the punishment of a blind heart itself? Therefore it is not called evil by misuse; rather, it is altogether evil to the one suffering, but good to the one inflicting it, because it is just to impose punishment on the sinner. If you do not wish to rave, distinguish these things.
JulianImp.5.26V. 27. Iulianus. Quaeris ergo unde sit hoc malum, quod merito malum vocatur, id est, peccatum. Respondeo, imperite nimis rogari originem rei, de cuius adhuc definitione non constitit. Videamus ergo prius utrum sit, tunc quid sit, ultimum unde sit. Feci hoc quidem in primo praesentis operis libello; sed ibi ex aliqua parte securus: ambigatur ergo utrum sit malum.
V. 27. Julian: You ask, then, whence comes this evil which is rightly called evil, that is, sin. I answer that it is too unskilled to ask the origin of a thing about whose definition there is as yet no agreement. Let us see, then, first whether it is, then what it is, and last whence it is. I did this indeed in the first booklet of the present work; but there, on one side, free of care: let it be debated, then, whether evil is.
JulianImp.5.27Augustinus. Si tu esse malum diceres, ego autem negarem; tunc inter nos quaestio verteretur, utrum esset malum, in qua quaestione susciperes ostendere malum esse, quia id a me negatum esset; cum vero id neuter nostrum neget, neuter hinc ambigat; quid poscis ut ambigatur unde non ambigitur, nisi loquendi libidine; ut non verborum meorum convictione, sed librorum tuorum multitudine glorieris?
Augustine: If you said that evil is, while I denied it, then the question would be turned between us whether evil is, in which question you would undertake to show that evil is, because it had been denied by me; but since neither of us denies it, and neither is in doubt about it, why do you demand that what is not in doubt be put in doubt—except from a lust for talking, so that you may glory not in the conviction of my words, but in the multitude of your books?
JulianImp.5.27V. 28. Iulianus. At id esse testantur frequentata vitia et severa iudicia; constitit ergo esse peccatum. Quaerimus quid sit; utrum corpus aliquod sit, quod ex multis compositum videatur; an singulare quiddam, sicut unum aliquod elementum, vel per cogitationem a reliquorum communione purgatum. Porro nihil horum est. Quid est ergo? Appetitus liberae voluntatis, quem prohibet iustitia; vel, ut definitione utamur priore: Voluntas faciendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. Considera ergo, utrum extra terminos definitionis huius peccatum nequeat inveniri, ne alibi vagetur, quod nos comprehensum putamus. Consulamus ergo iustitiam iudicantis, ut et illius testimonio clareat, utrum bene cinctum sit his limitibus genus omne peccati. Imputatne Deus quod scit non posse vitari? At nulla iustitia est, et summa deformitas; immo si hoc fiat, non puniuntur peccata, sed crescunt. A iusto enim iudice culpa puniri solet; ea si in ipsum arbitrum iustitiae corruptione pervadat, vindicata est de iudice, non punita. Non ergo imputat iustitia in peccatum, nisi unde liberum est abstinere. Liberum autem dici non potest, nisi quod sine aliquo inevitabili naturalium coactu, in iure emancipatae constiterit voluntatis. Optime ergo est finitum et plene: Peccatum est voluntas faciendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. His ergo partibus absolutis, quaeratur unde sit, quod perturbatissime ante has definitiones fuerat inquisitum. Unde est ergo peccatum? Respondeo: De libera voluntate facientis.
V. 28. Julian: But that it is, frequent vices and severe judgments bear witness; it is established, then, that sin is. We ask what it is: whether it is some body, which would seem composed of many things; or something single, like some one element, or one purged by thought from communion with the rest. But it is none of these. What is it, then? An appetite of free will, which justice forbids; or, to use the earlier definition: The will to do what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. Consider, then, whether sin can be found outside the bounds of this definition, lest that wander elsewhere which we suppose to be enclosed. Let us therefore consult the justice of the one judging, that by his testimony too it may be clear whether the whole genus of sin is well girded by these limits. Does God impute what he knows cannot be avoided? But there is no justice in that, and the utmost deformity; indeed, if this were done, sins would not be punished, but would increase. For by a just judge fault is wont to be punished; if that fault, by corruption, should make its way into the very arbiter of justice, then it has been avenged of the judge, not punished. Justice, therefore, does not impute as sin anything except what one is free to abstain from. But it cannot be called free unless it stands in the right of an emancipated will, without any unavoidable compulsion of natural things. Excellently, then, and fully, has it been defined: Sin is the will to do what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. These parts, then, being settled, let it be asked whence it is—what, before these definitions, had been inquired into in the most confused way. Whence, then, is sin? I answer: From the free will of the one doing it.
JulianImp.5.28Augustinus. Itane vero de libera voluntate facientis est, ubi dicitur: Si autem quod nolo ego, hoc facio, iam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum ? Videsne cum quaeris unde sit peccatum, atque respondes: " De libera voluntate facientis ", illud te cogitare peccatum, quod non est etiam poena peccati; hoc autem ubi facit homo quod non vult, et tamen peccatum esse Apostolus clamat, ad hanc tuam responsionem minime pertinere, nec ad illam definitionem, quam commemorasti dicens: Peccatum id esse, quod est voluntas faciendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere? Quomodo enim liberum est abstinere, ubi clamatur: Quod nolo, hoc facio? Aliter ergo natura humana peccavit, quando ei liberum fuit abstinere a peccato; aliter nunc peccat perdita libertate, quando eget liberatoris auxilio. Et illud tantummodo peccatum erat; hoc autem etiam est poena peccati.
Augustine: Is it really from the free will of the one doing it, where it is said: But if I do what I do not will, it is no longer I that do it, but the sin that dwells in me (Rom 7:20)? Do you see that, when you ask whence sin comes, and answer, "From the free will of the one doing it," you are thinking of that sin which is not also the penalty of sin; but that this—where a man does what he does not will, and yet the Apostle proclaims it to be sin—pertains not at all to this answer of yours, nor to that definition which you recalled, saying that sin is what is the will to do what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain? For how is one free to abstain, where it is cried out: What I do not will, that I do (See Rom 7:19)? In one way, then, human nature sinned, when it was free for it to abstain from sin; in another way it now sins, having lost its freedom, when it needs the help of a liberator. And the former was sin only; but the latter is also the penalty of sin.
JulianImp.5.28V. 29. Iulianus. Sed videamus, utrum istud quod definitio praemissa confecit, omnium assensione firmetur. Certe nec prudens hinc ullus potest, nec catholicus dubitare, id est, nec peccatum esse nisi quod potest caveri, nec iustitiam esse nisi quae hoc imputet illi quem potuit, quod libera voluntate per se ipse commisit, cum potuisset cavere.
V. 29. Julian: But let us see whether that which the foregoing definition has accomplished is confirmed by the assent of all. Surely no one prudent, nor any Catholic, can doubt this: that there is no sin except what can be guarded against, and no justice except that which imputes this to him who could have guarded against it, what by his free will he himself committed, when he could have guarded against it.
JulianImp.5.29Augustinus. Hoc imputatum est primo homini, quod posset cavere, si vellet; sed eius peccato universa etiam in posteris natura vitiata Salvatore opus habet, ut possit cavere peccata, quando etiam aetas accesserit, qua uti possit rationis officio; ante hanc vero aetatem inest ex origine reatus generatione contractus, regeneratione detrahendus. Quod vos negando, apertissime dicitis Christum Iesum non esse Iesum parvulis; qui propterea teste Angelo sic vocatur, quia salvum faciet populum suum (in quo populo parvulos esse non vultis) a peccatis eorum .
Augustine: This was imputed to the first man, that he could guard against it, if he willed; but by his sin all nature, even in his descendants, having been vitiated, has need of a Savior, so that it may be able to guard against sins, when an age has also arrived at which it can use the office of reason; but before this age there is present, from the origin, a guilt contracted by generation, to be removed by regeneration. By denying this, you most openly say that Christ Jesus is not Jesus to little ones; who is therefore, on the angel's testimony, so called because he will save his people (among which people you do not wish little ones to be) from their sins (Matt 1:21).
JulianImp.5.29V. 30. Iulianus. Sed ut nobis iam ista non lubricant, ita a Manichaeo et Traduciano paribus animis repelluntur. Videamus ergo quid ipsi dicant. Manichaeus scribit naturale esse peccatum; annuit Augustinus naturale esse peccatum. Ambo ergo ab ea, quam praemisimus, definitione dissentiunt, habentque in naturalis peccati nuncupatione collegium. Videamus quid dicant etiam de genere peccati, id est, quod putant esse peccatum, quod ambo naturale confirmant, ne forte vel in sequente gradu dissentiant. Quid scribit Manichaeus ad filiam? Concupiscentiam carnis, et illam voluptatem de fecunditatis operi destinatam, per hoc probari diabolicam, per quod opus eius publicum vitet aspectum. Quid Augustinus? Idem per omnia: Illa concupiscentia carnis frutex est diaboli; causa, lex peccati, quae evitat, inquit, ubique conspectum, et quaerit pudendo secretum . Ergo nec de priore, nec de sequente mali ratione discordant. Quid tertium? Cum iam quaeritur unde sit malum, Manichaeus " De natura ", inquit, " tenebrarum aeterna ". Quid Augustinus? Nimie, inquit, istud magister meus, qui putat malum numquam coepisse; coepit per primi hominis voluntatem, immo iam per superioris naturae, id est, angelicae; sed ex eo tempore factum est naturale. Everberat eum nimirum praeceptor suus, et in ius auctoritatissime trahit. Quid iudicaturus est inter hos catholicus? Manichaeum quidem sine dubio stolidissimum, qui putet naturale peccatum; sed cum Augustini ingenio compositum, peracutum videri. Quibus enim conveniat naturale esse peccatum, atque hoc peccatum unius speciei esse fateantur, a quo omne genus hominum possideri putent? Sed post haec dicere audere discipulum, in uno tantum non esse naturale, quod omnibus fateatur ingenitum; puerilibus sine dubitatione verberibus infamatum, subdent eum magistro consequentius blasphemanti. Sed utrumque simul, discipulum et magistrum, a conventu exterminabunt piorum. Vide ergo quid indulgeamus. Non tibi placet quod dicit Manichaeus, malum esse naturale; dic ergo neminem reum nasci, et evasisti, negans profecto originale peccatum. Sed non dicis; confiteris ergo nec a magistro te velle desistere, nec catholicis copulari.
V. 30. Julian: But just as these things are no longer slippery to us, so they are repelled with equal resolve by the Manichee and the Traducianist. Let us see, then, what they themselves say. The Manichee writes that sin is natural; Augustine agrees that sin is natural. Both, therefore, dissent from the definition which we set forth, and have a fellowship in the naming of natural sin. Let us see what they say also about the genus of sin, that is, what they think sin is, which both affirm to be natural, lest perhaps they dissent even at the next step. What does the Manichee write to his daughter? That the concupiscence of the flesh, and that pleasure destined for the work of fruitfulness, are proved diabolical by the fact that their work avoids the public gaze. What does Augustine say? The same in everything: That concupiscence of the flesh is the shrub of the devil; the cause, the law of sin, which, he says, everywhere avoids the gaze, and seeks a shameful secrecy. Therefore they disagree neither about the first nor about the second account of evil. What of the third? When it is now asked whence evil comes, the Manichee says, "From the eternal nature of darkness." What does Augustine say? "My master," he says, "goes too far, who thinks that evil never began; it began through the will of the first man, indeed already through the will of a higher nature, that is, the angelic; but from that time it became natural." His preceptor surely thrashes him, and most authoritatively drags him into court. What will the Catholic judge between these two? The Manichee, indeed, beyond doubt most stupid, who thinks sin natural; but, set beside the genius of Augustine, he seems most acute. For to whom does it agree that sin is natural, and yet confess that this sin is of one species, by which they think the whole genus of human beings is possessed? But after this, for the disciple to dare to say that in one alone it is not natural, which he confesses to be inborn in all—without doubt branded with boyish whippings, they will subject him to a master who blasphemes more consistently. But both together, disciple and master, they will banish from the assembly of the pious. See, then, what we grant. It does not please you that the Manichee says evil is natural; say, then, that no one is born guilty, and you have escaped, denying, of course, original sin. But you do not say it; you confess, then, that you wish neither to desist from your master, nor to be joined to the Catholics.
JulianImp.5.30Augustinus. Numquid propterea dicere non debemus, quod bonus Deus fecerit mundum, quia hoc etiam dicit Manichaeus? Sed cum quaeritur unde fecerit, ibi discernimur. Nos enim dicimus: Ex his quae non erant; quoniam ipse dixit, et facta sunt ; ille autem: Ex duabus naturis, boni scilicet et mali, quae non solum iam erant, sed semper erant. Haec ergo quae non simul dicimus, non sinunt esse nos socios eorum ex illo quod simul dicimus. Item si interrogemur utrum sit Deus; et nos et Manichaei respondemus: Est Deus; et in hoc utrique separamur ab illo stulto, qui dixit in corde suo: Non est Deus ; sed cum quaeritur qualis sit Deus, a Manichaeorum nefaria fabula, magna discretione distinguimur. Nos enim dicimus incorruptibilem atque defendimus; illi vero fabulantur corruptibilem Deum. De ipsa quoque Trinitate interrogati, utrique dicimus, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum unius eiusdemque esse naturae; nec ideo tamen vel nos sumus Manichaei, vel ipsi catholici; dicunt enim alia de Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto, in quibus ab eis diversissimi eisque adversissimi sumus. Unde ista quae simul dicimus, adversus aliorum errores qui ea negant, fidenter asserimus; nec timemus ne Manichaeos nos appellent, et se inde praeferant nobis, quia cum Manichaeis dicimus, quod ipsi quoniam nolunt dicere, propterea redarguuntur a nobis. Sicut ergo Arianus ideo est haereticus, quia nobiscum non dicit unam Trinitatis essentiam, quod nobiscum dicit etiam Manichaeus; ita et vos haeretici estis, non dicendo nobiscum naturale peccatum, quod nobiscum dicit etiam Manichaeus; sed non ideo sumus Manichaei; quod enim dicit etiam ille, non ita dicimus sicut ille. Nos enim naturam nostram bonam voluntario peccato illius ex quo nati sumus, dicimus esse vitiatam, unde omnes sub peccato nascimur, et ipse noster ortus in vitio est, quod dicit Ambrosius ; ille autem naturam malam nobis portat alienam, cuius nos affirmat commixtione peccare. Denique, nos sanandae nostrae etiam parvulos offerimus Salvatori; ille autem Christum non ideo existimat necessarium, ut naturam nostram sanet in nobis, sed ut alienam seiungat a nobis. Cernis nempe, et in eo quod peccatum naturale simul dicimus, quanta diversitate distemus. Similiter et in eo quod simul dicimus, malam esse concupiscentiam carnis, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, cum quaeritur unde hoc sit malum, discretissimi reperimur. Nos etiam cum Ambrosio dicimus, hanc foedam discordiam carnis et spiritus per praevaricationem primi hominis in nostram vertisse naturam ; ille autem cum suis dicit, ut invicem adversentur caro et spiritus, alienam nobis, quae semper mala fuit, adhaesisse naturam. Unde nos poscimus Salvatorem, ut hoc vitium nostrum sanetur; ille vero, ut a nobis aliena natura, quae sanari omnino non potest, auferatur. Etiam hic cur non attendis, in eo quod carnis concupiscentiam spiritui resistentem simul malam dicimus, quanta dissimilitudine separemur? Cur non attendis, nec nos esse Manichaeos, quia cum eis aliqua dicimus; et vos esse haereticos, quoniam cum eis illa non dicitis? Si enim cum illis diceretis esse naturalia mala, et nobiscum contra illos diceretis unde sint ista, quia non sunt de aliena natura Deo coaeterna, Pelagiani haeretici non essetis; nunc vero concupiscentiam, qua caro concupiscit contra spiritum, negando malam esse, et de vitiata natura nostra esse, facitis ut illi ex aliena esse concludant; ac sic et haeretici novi estis, et haereticos veteres, quos perverse fugitis, adiuvatis. Desine ergo mihi opponere magistrum Manichaeum, sed mecum potius sequere Ambrosium; et Arianos intuere, eosque in eo saltem, quod te melius sapiunt, imitare; qui nos Manichaeos esse non dicunt, quamvis cum Manichaeis dicamus unam Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti esse naturam, ubi nobis contentiosissime contradicunt.
Augustine: Ought we therefore not to say that the good God made the world, because the Manichee too says this? But when it is asked from what he made it, there we are distinguished. For we say: From those things which were not; since he himself spoke, and they were made (Ps 33:9 (32:9)); but he says: From two natures, namely of good and of evil, which not only already were, but always were. These things, then, which we do not say together, do not allow us to be their associates on account of what we say together. Likewise, if we are asked whether God is, both we and the Manichees answer: God is; and in this we both are separated from that fool who said in his heart: There is no God (Ps 14:1 (13:1)); but when it is asked what sort God is, we are distinguished by a great difference from the impious fable of the Manichees. For we say he is incorruptible, and we defend it; but they fable a corruptible God. Asked also about the Trinity itself, both we and they say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one and the same nature; nor yet are we therefore Manichees, nor they Catholics; for they say other things about the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, in which we are most diverse from them and most opposed to them. Hence these things which we say together, we confidently assert against the errors of others who deny them; nor do we fear that they should call us Manichees, and on that account prefer themselves to us, because we say with the Manichees what they themselves, since they refuse to say it, are on that account refuted by us. As, then, the Arian is a heretic because he does not say with us the one essence of the Trinity, which the Manichee too says with us, so you too are heretics, by not saying with us natural sin, which the Manichee too says with us; but we are not therefore Manichees; for what he too says, we do not say as he says. For we say that our good nature has been vitiated by the voluntary sin of him from whom we are born, whence we are all born under sin, and our very origin is in fault, as Ambrose says (See Ambrose, Apology of the Prophet David 11.56); but he brings to bear upon us an alien evil nature, by whose commingling he affirms that we sin. Finally, we offer even little ones to the Savior, for our nature to be healed; but he thinks Christ necessary not in order to heal our nature in us, but to separate an alien nature from us. You see surely, even in the fact that we say together that sin is natural, by how great a diversity we stand apart. Likewise also, in the fact that we say together that the concupiscence of the flesh, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, is evil—when it is asked whence this evil comes, we are found most distinct. We say also with Ambrose that this foul discord of flesh and spirit passed over into our nature through the transgression of the first man (See Ambrose, On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation 7.71); but he, with his followers, says that, so that flesh and spirit oppose each other, an alien nature, which was always evil, clung to us. Hence we ask for a Savior, that this fault of ours may be healed; but he, that the alien nature, which can in no way be healed, may be taken away from us. Why too do you not attend here, in the fact that we say together that the concupiscence of the flesh resisting the spirit is evil, by how great an unlikeness we are separated? Why do you not attend that neither are we Manichees, because we say some things with them; and that you are heretics, because you do not say those things with them? For if you said with them that natural evils exist, and said with us against them whence they come—because they are not from an alien nature coeternal with God—you would not be Pelagian heretics; but as it is, by denying that the concupiscence by which the flesh lusts against the spirit is evil, and is from our vitiated nature, you cause them to conclude that it is from an alien nature; and so you are both new heretics, and helpers of the old heretics whom you perversely flee. Cease, then, to set against me my master the Manichee, but rather follow Ambrose with me; and look to the Arians, and in this at least, in which they are wiser than you, imitate them; for they do not say that we are Manichees, although we say with the Manichees that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one nature, where they most contentiously contradict us.
JulianImp.5.30V. 31. Iulianus. Verum vehementem obiectionem puta sti, ut diceres unde in ipso primo homine vel in diabolo qui angelus factus fuerat, mala exstitisset voluntas; quam tamen ais ideo esse ortam in opere Dei, id est, vel in angelo, vel in homine, non quia Dei opus erat, sed quia de nihilo factus erat. Vide ergo ne et tu per alteras vias aeternam dicas fuisse mali necessitatem. Nam si haec fuit causa exoriendi mali in opere Dei, quoniam de nihilo id factum esse constabat; antequam fieret autem quod esset, hoc nihilum semper fuit, id est, antequam fieret id quod esset, numquam aliquid fuit, et hoc quod numquam fuit, nihil fuisse dicitur; ab aeterno ergo numquam fuit, quod non fuit antequam fieret a Deo, cuius substantia sola sine principio est; hoc ergo inane, id est, nihil, antequam per rerum finiretur existentiam, semper fuit. Non ergo factum est hoc nihilum; sed factae sunt creaturae, et illud nihil esse cessavit. In ea ergo creatura, quae facta de nihilo est, tu ideo malum commentaris exortum, quoniam de nihilo facta erat. Malum ergo in homine exortum origini reputavisti; atque origo, id est, nihilum, dicitur a te causa fuisse peccati. Non enim, inquis, propterea in homine malum exortum est, quoniam a Deo factus fuerat; sed quia de nihilo factus fuerat. Si ergo ideo malum exortum est, quia conditio nihili praecedentis id exegit; hoc autem nihilum aeternum fuit; immutatis semitis incidisti, et pendes omnino in praeceptoris tui laqueo, ut malum ambo ab aeterno esse fateamini. Sed in hoc quoque ille prudentior; inducens enim naturale peccatum, dixit aeternam fuisse substantiam tenebrarum, quae sine voluntate peccatoris malum hoc inesse compelleret. Rei ergo, cuius faciebat necessitatem, auctorem dedit, ut malum quod substantias pervadebat, videretur habere cogentem; tu vero plumbo ingenii non ferendo, confirmas necessitatem mali, sed negas necessitatis auctorem. Et sicut in parvulis, ita in ipso priore peccati operatore opus relinquis; ac dicis nescio quid magnum posse intellegi, ut illud nihil valuerit plurimum, cum nihil esset.
V. 31. Julian: But you thought it a forceful objection, when you said whence, in the first man himself, or in the devil who had been made an angel, an evil will had arisen; which, however, you say arose in a work of God, that is, either in the angel or in the human being, not because it was a work of God, but because it had been made from nothing. See, then, lest you too, by other paths, should say that the necessity of evil was eternal. For if this was the cause of evil's arising in the work of God—because it was established that it had been made from nothing; and before that which was came to be, this nothing always was, that is, before that which was came to be, it was never anything, and this which never was is said to have been nothing; from eternity, therefore, that never was which was not before it was made by God, whose substance alone is without beginning; this void, then, that is, nothing, before it was bounded by the existence of things, always was. This nothing, therefore, was not made; rather, creatures were made, and that nothing ceased to be. In that creature, then, which was made from nothing, you accordingly devise that evil arose because it was made from nothing. Evil, then, arisen in the human being, you have reckoned to his origin; and the origin, that is, nothing, is said by you to have been the cause of sin. For it is not, you say, because he was made by God that evil arose in the human being, but because he was made from nothing. If, then, evil arose because the condition of the preceding nothing demanded it; and this nothing was eternal; then by altered paths you have stumbled, and you hang altogether in the snare of your preceptor, so that you both confess evil to be from eternity. But in this too he is more prudent; for, introducing natural sin, he said that the substance of darkness was eternal, which compelled this evil to be present without the will of the sinner. To the thing, then, whose necessity he was contriving, he gave an author, so that the evil which pervaded substances might seem to have something compelling it; but you, with the unbearable lead of your wit, confirm the necessity of evil, but deny an author of the necessity. And as in little ones, so in the very first worker of sin you leave a work; and you say that some great thing can be understood—how that nothing was worth very much, when it was nothing.
JulianImp.5.31Augustinus. Nihil vales, sed tu, asserendo quod nihil, cum sit nihil, valeat aliquid; nec intellegis, cum dicitur Deus de nihilo fecisse quae fecit, non dici aliud, nisi quia de se ipso non fecit; non enim antequam aliquid faceret, coaeternum illi erat aliquid facere. De nihilo est ergo, quod non est de aliquo; quia etsi fecit Deus aliqua de aliis rebus, has ipsas de quibus ea fecit, de nullis fecerat rebus. Peccare autem nulla res posset, si de natura Dei facta esset; nec iam facta esset, sed de illo esset, quidquid esset, et hoc quod ille esset; sicut est Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus, quoniam de illo sunt, hoc quod ille sunt, alius nascendo, alius procedendo; atque ita sunt de illo, ut numquam fuerit ipse prior illis. Et ideo ista natura non potest omnino peccare; quia non potest se ipsa deserere, nec meliorem habet cui debeat inhaerere, et cuius possit desertione peccare. Nec tamen ita rationalis est facta creatura, ut haberet peccandi necessitatem; sed nec possibilitatem haberet, si natura Dei esset; quoniam Dei natura peccare nec vult posse, nec potest velle.
Augustine: You are worth nothing; but it is you, in asserting that nothing, when it is nothing, is worth something; nor do you understand that, when God is said to have made from nothing the things he made, nothing else is said but that he did not make them from himself; for before he made anything, it was not coeternal with him to make something. That, then, is from nothing which is not from something; because, even though God made some things from other things, these very things from which he made them, he had made from no things. But no thing could sin, if it had been made from the nature of God; nor would it now have been made, but whatever it was would be from him, and that which he is; just as the Son is, and the Holy Spirit, since they are from him what he is, the one by being born, the other by proceeding; and they are so from him that he himself was never prior to them. And therefore this nature cannot sin at all; because it cannot desert itself, nor does it have a better one to which it ought to cleave, and by deserting which it might sin. Yet the rational creature was not so made that it had a necessity of sinning; but neither would it have had the possibility, if it were the nature of God; since the nature of God neither wills to be able to sin, nor can will it.
JulianImp.5.31V. 32. Iulianus. Hoc enim nihil, de quo facta sunt omnia, affirmas causam fuisse peccati. Tantum igitur facit apud te nihili huius potentia, quantum apud Manichaeum principis tenebrarum. Ambo ergo dicitis etiam primi mali necessitatem fuisse; sed dat ille soliditatem vel malam; tu inanitatem, aeque tamen malam: ille ergo dicit violentam substantiam; tu violentum aeque, sed nihilum. Vide ergo syllogismi tui finem: nihilum nempe, cum necdum quidquam esset creatum, aeternae erat inanitatis indicium; sed hoc ipsum nihilum, id est, inanitas, orientibus est finita creaturis; desivit enim nihil esse, cum coepit aliquid esse. Ipsum ergo nihilum etiam cum erat, non erat; quoniam tunc intellegitur fuisse, cum necdum aliquid erat. Postea vero quam factae res sunt, hoc inanitatis indicium, id est, nihilum, sicut substantiam numquam habuerat, ita etiam vocabulum suum perdidit; factumque est, ut quod in re numquam extiterat, etiam ipsum nomen amitteret. Huius ergo tu violentia malum et in angelo et in homine commentaris exortum; quo quid furiosius dici potest?
V. 32. Julian: For you affirm that this nothing, from which all things were made, was the cause of sin. As much, then, with you does the power of this nothing accomplish, as with the Manichee the power of the prince of darkness. Both of you, then, say that there was a necessity even of the first evil; but he gives it solidity, though an evil solidity; you, an emptiness, but equally evil: he, then, speaks of a violent substance; you of one equally violent, but nothing. See, then, the conclusion of your syllogism: nothing, surely, when as yet nothing had been created, was the token of an eternal emptiness; but this very nothing, that is, emptiness, was bounded when creatures arose; for it ceased to be nothing, when something began to be. The nothing itself, then, even when it was, was not; since it is understood to have been when as yet there was not anything. But after things were made, this token of emptiness, that is, nothing, just as it had never had substance, so also lost its very name; and it came about that what had never existed in reality, lost even its very name. By the violence of this, then, you devise that evil arose both in the angel and in the human being; than which what can be said more frenzied?
JulianImp.5.32Augustinus. Tu potius maledicendi studio furere videris. Ego non dixi violentum nihil: non enim est aliquid, quod possit esse violentum. Nec angelus, nec homo vi aliqua peccare compulsus est; nec peccassent, si peccare noluissent, qui etiam nolle potuissent; verum et posse peccare non in his esset, si natura Dei essent.
Augustine: It is rather you who seem to rave in your zeal for cursing. I did not say a violent nothing: for there is no thing that could be violent. Neither angel nor human being was compelled to sin by any force; nor would they have sinned, if they had not willed to sin—they who could even have not willed; but indeed the very ability to sin would not have been in them, if they were the nature of God.
JulianImp.5.32V. 33. Iulianus. Magnam, inquis, vim habuit res quae non erat, ob hoc solum, quia numquam fuerat, verum tum posse plurimum coepit, postquam et ipsum nomen amisit; sortitumque est hoc nihilum magnam dominationem, postquam etiam appellatio eius interiit.
V. 33. Julian: A thing which was not, you say, had great force, for this reason alone, that it had never been; indeed, then it began to be worth very much, after it had lost even its very name; and this nothing obtained great dominion, after even its appellation had perished.
JulianImp.5.33Augustinus. Si id quod nihil est, aliquid esset, apud te diceretur sortitum magnam dominationem; quandoquidem vanitas, sive falsitas, ita tibi dominatur, ut tamdiu te ista inania garrire compellat.
Augustine: If that which is nothing were something, it would, with you, be said to have obtained great dominion; since vanity, or falsity, so lords it over you that it compels you to keep chattering these empty things for so long.
JulianImp.5.33V. 34. Iulianus. Macte virtute sapientiae, qui novae et a te inventae primum disputationis regulis, secunda primorum negatione complecteris, et corpora capitibus trunca componis. Non invidemus subtilitatibus tuis; quin immo christiana humanitate miseramur, quod dignum reperisti exitum dogmati tuo, ut profectus a criminibus innocentum, ad nihilum pervenires.
V. 34. Julian: Bravo for the prowess of your wisdom—you who, by the rules of a disputation new and first invented by yourself, embrace the second things by the denial of the first, and join bodies, lopped off, to heads. We do not envy your subtleties; rather, with Christian kindness we pity you, that you have found an end worthy of your dogma: that, having set out from charging the innocent, you should arrive at nothing.
JulianImp.5.34Augustinus. Ad nihilum tu potius pervenisti, quod te ita delectat, ut inde recedere, vel redire adhuc nolis; qui me propterea dicis id quod nihil est, dixisse esse aliquid, ut tam multum tu diceres nihil.
Augustine: It is rather you who have arrived at nothing, which so delights you that you are unwilling as yet to withdraw from it or return; you who say that I called that which is nothing something, in order that you might say so much that is nothing.
JulianImp.5.34V. 35. Iulianus. O sanitatem, o elegantiam disputantis! Non ideo, inquit, malum exortum est in homine, quia a Deo factum est, sed ideo quia de nihilo . Ostendimus iam acumen, quo vis maxima huic nihilo subrogata est; nunc illud admoneo, quod etiam superior conflictus fecit intellegi, nec primum malum peccantis fuisse voluntate susceptum, si illud nasci conditio venientis de nihilo stirpis exegit.
V. 35. Julian: O the soundness, O the elegance of the disputant! Not on this account, he says, did evil arise in the human being, because he was made by God, but on this account, because he was made from nothing. We have already shown the acumen by which the greatest force was substituted for this nothing; now I point this out, which the earlier conflict too made understood: that the first evil was not taken up by the will of the sinner, if the condition of a stock coming from nothing demanded that it be born.
JulianImp.5.35Augustinus. Non exegit peccatum nasci ulla conditio stirpis de nihilo venientis; quandoquidem illud exigitur, quod compellitur reddi vel fieri; angelum vero vel hominem, a quibus et in quibus prima sunt orta peccata, peccare nulla res compulit; sed libera voluntate peccarunt; quod et nolle possent, quia nec cogebantur ut vellent; et tamen velle non possent, si de Deo naturam haberent, non de nihilo facti essent.
Augustine: No condition of a stock coming from nothing demanded that sin be born; since that is demanded which is compelled to be rendered or to be done; but the angel or the human being, by whom and in whom the first sins arose, no thing compelled to sin; rather, they sinned by free will—which they could even have not willed, since they were not compelled to will; and yet they could not have willed it, if they had their nature from God and had not been made from nothing.
JulianImp.5.35V. 36. Iulianus. Dedisti igitur et primi naturam mali, sed inaniorem quam Manichaeus, aeque tamen aeternam. Pugnandum super hoc non est; claret omnino quia maneat inter vos foedus, quod naturalis mali et aeterni mali catena connectit.
V. 36. Julian: You have given, then, a nature even to the first evil, but emptier than the Manichee's, yet equally eternal. There is no need to fight over this; it is altogether clear that there remains between you a covenant which the chain of natural evil and eternal evil binds together.
JulianImp.5.36Augustinus. Insulsissime, non potest aeternum esse quod nihil est, non potest aeternum esse quod nulla res est, postremo non potest esse aeternum quod non est.
Augustine: Most insipid one, that cannot be eternal which is nothing, that cannot be eternal which is no thing, and finally that cannot be eternal which is not.
JulianImp.5.36V. 37. Iulianus. Egi certe, ut fidem disputationis decebat; illudque quod tu argumentando effeceras, id est, ideo in opere Dei ortam voluntatem malam quia fuisset homo creatus ex nihilo, ratio perscrutata contrivit; ostendens videlicet, te immutatis vocabulis idem dixisse, quod Manichaeus finxit et credidit, id est, primum quoque peccatum aeternarum tenebrarum violentia genitum.
V. 37. Julian: I have acted, surely, as the good faith of disputation befitted; and that which you had effected by arguing—namely, that an evil will arose in the work of God because the human being had been created from nothing—reason, searching it through, has ground to powder; showing, that is, that you, with the words altered, said the same thing that the Manichee invented and believed, that is, that the first sin too was begotten by the violence of eternal darkness.
JulianImp.5.37Augustinus. Iam te superius admonuimus, aeternum non posse esse, quod non est; quid est ergo quod dicis, ideo me comparandum esse Manichaeo, quia Manichaeus aeternarum tenebrarum violentia genitum dixit primum esse peccatum? Quibus tenebris dedit ille substantiam; ego autem nihilo dare substantiam non potui, ut ob hoc et ego quasi constituerem tenebras aeternas, aeternum scilicet nihil. Sicut autem substantiam, ita violentiam vel aeternitatem dare nihilo non potui; nullo quippe modo, vel violentum, vel aeternum, sicut iam diximus, potest esse quod nihil est. Frustra igitur adversus me voluisti disputare quod nihil est.
Augustine: I have already warned you above that what is not cannot be eternal; what is it, then, that you say—that I am to be compared to the Manichee, because the Manichee said the first sin was begotten by the violence of eternal darkness? To those shadows he gave a substance; but I could not give a substance to nothing, so that on this account I too should, as it were, set up eternal shadows, that is, an eternal nothing. But just as I could not give substance, so I could not give violence or eternity to nothing; for in no way, as we have already said, can that be either violent or eternal which is nothing. In vain, then, did you wish to dispute against me about that which is nothing.
JulianImp.5.37V. 38. Iulianus. Verum ne tu detectum temet inspiciens, illo tentes erumpere, ut referas non te dixisse: Ideo malum ortum est in opere Dei, quoniam ex nihilo factum est; sed: Ideo potuit oboriri, quia ex nihilo factum est; ostendendum est, quanto violentioribus laqueis illigeris. Si enim dixeris possibilitatem te mali, non necessitatem, aeterni illius nihili viribus imputasse; nos referimus, quod potuit oriri mala voluntas in homine, non est certe aliud quam arbitrium liberum; ideo enim potuit oriri mala voluntas, ut oriri posset et bona. Haec libertas est, in qua se ratio exercet, propter quod ad imaginem Dei homo factus asseritur, per quam creaturis ceteris antecellit. Si ergo quod in homine mala voluntas potuit exoriri, nihil est aliud quam arbitrii libertas; et hoc tantum est, ut per eius insignia ceteris antistet animantibus; tu qui hanc possibilitatem profiteris ideo fuisse in homine, non quia a Deo, sed quia de nihilo factus est, novo dogmatis prodigio illud nihil, id est, antiquam inanitatem, tanti boni, id est, liberi arbitrii causam pronuntias. Denique ut res brevi interrogatione lucescat; hoc quod dixisti: Nec ideo tamen potuit oriri voluntas mala, quia a Deo factus est homo, sed ideo quia de nihilo factus est homo; hoc, inquam, ipsum quod potuit oriri voluntas, bonum esse, an malum credis? Id est, ipsam facultatem oriendae voluntatis, quam nihilo reputavisti, probam arbitraris, an pessimam? Si bonam dixeris: ergo non Deus est boni causa, sed nihilum. Sin autem, hoc esse insanissimum videns, malam eam pronuntiaveris; quippe quam dicis non Deo reputandam esse, sed nihilo; protestaberis nos nihil adversum te collegisse versute, sed bona disputandi fide malam fidem tui dogmatis subruisse. Stat ergo inconcussum quod egimus, te videlicet et Manichaeum, etiam primi hominis voluntatem malam necessitati aeternae originis imputasse.
V. 38. Julian: But lest, seeing yourself detected, you try to break out by this, namely to report that you did not say, "Evil arose in the work of God because it was made from nothing," but, "It was able to arise, because it was made from nothing"—it must be shown by how much more violent snares you are bound. For if you say that you imputed the possibility of evil, not its necessity, to the force of that eternal nothing, we reply that the fact that an evil will could arise in the human being is surely nothing other than free choice; for an evil will could arise precisely so that a good one too could arise. This is the liberty in which reason exercises itself, on account of which the human being is asserted to have been made to the image of God, and through which he excels the other creatures. If, then, the fact that an evil will could arise in the human being is nothing other than the liberty of choice, and this is so great that by its tokens he stands before the other living things; you, who profess that this possibility was in the human being not because he was made by God, but because he was made from nothing, by a new prodigy of dogma pronounce that nothing, that is, the ancient emptiness, to be the cause of so great a good, that is, of free choice. Finally, that the matter may be made clear by a brief question: this which you said—Nor yet could an evil will arise because the human being was made by God, but because the human being was made from nothing—this very thing, I say, that a will could arise, do you believe to be good, or evil? That is, the very faculty of a will's arising, which you reckoned to nothing, do you judge upright, or most base? If you call it good, then God is not the cause of the good, but nothing is. But if, seeing this to be most insane, you pronounce it evil—the very thing which you say is to be reckoned not to God but to nothing—you will testify that we concluded nothing against you craftily, but that with the good faith of disputation we have undermined the bad faith of your dogma. There stands, then, unshaken what we have done: namely that you, like the Manichee, imputed even the evil will of the first man to the necessity of an eternal origin.
JulianImp.5.38Augustinus. Quid tibi responderi posset, qualitercumque vidisti; sed frustra es conatus obsistere veritati, quasi respondens verbis meis, et non respondens verbis meis. Sic enim disputasti, tamquam ego dixerim: Nec ideo tamen orta est ex bono voluntas mala; quod ego non dixi; sed dixi: Nec ideo tamen ex bono potuit oriri mala voluntas, quia bonum factum est a Deo bono, sed quia de nihilo factum est, non de Deo . Sicut eadem verba mea etiam ipse posuisti . Quid est ergo quod ita respondendum putasti, quasi ego dixerim: Nec ideo tamen orta est; cum ego dixerim: Nec ideo tamen oriri potuit; et tamdiu locutus es adversus eum, qui necessitatem mali ut oriretur ex bono, ex hoc dixit irruisse, quia ipsum bonum a Deo de nihilo factum est, non de Deo; cum ego non necessitatem tribuerim tali causae, sed possibilitatem mali; quia non dixi ideo esse ortum, sed ideo potuisse oriri ex bono malum? Et accusasti tamdiu nihil, et violentum fecisti nihil; quasi peccare angelum et hominem inevitabili necessitate compulerit nihil. Nunc ergo ad mea verba tandem redi, sicut redire coepisti. Proponis enim tibi quaestionem, tamquam tibi subito venisset in mentem, respondere quid possem; cum hoc ego longe ante in eo, cui reluctaris, libro posuerim. Dicis enim: Referre me posse, non me dixisse: Ideo malum ortum est in opere Dei, quoniam ex nihilo factum est; sed: Ideo potuit oboriri, quia ex nihilo factum est. Hoc prorsus dixi: Ideo potuit oboriri dixi, non ideo dixi ortum; possibilitatem mali dedi huic causae, non necessitatem. Rationalis quippe creatura cum primum facta est, ita facta est, ut si peccare nollet, nulla necessitate urgeretur ut vellet, aut etiam non volens, id est, invita peccaret, et non quod vellet faceret bonum, sed malum quod nollet, hoc ageret; ubi iam non peccatum illud quod simpliciter peccatum dicitur, sed etiam poena peccati est. Verumtamen male aliquid velle, vel mali aliquid etiam nolens facere, omnino non posset, nisi de nihilo facta esset, id est, si Dei natura esset. Sola enim Dei natura de nihilo facta non est, quia nec facta est; et ideo nullo prorsus modo mutari potest. Quod cum dicimus, non vires nihilo damus, quasi potuerit facere aliquid, vel fecerit aliquid, cum sit nihil; sed naturam Dei non esse dicimus, quae peccare potuit. Sequitur autem ut natura quae Dei natura non est, facta sit; neque enim Deo coaeterna est; et si facta est, de nihilo facta sit; quia et illae naturae quae de aliis naturis factae sunt, stirpem de nihilo ducunt; quoniam naturae de quibus factae sunt, antequam fierent, nihil fuerunt, hoc est, omnino non fuerunt. Sed, inquis: Ideo potuit oriri voluntas mala, ut oriri posset et bona. Quasi non cum bona voluntate factus sit vel angelus vel homo. Factus est rectus, sicut dixit Scriptura ; non ergo quaeritur, unde in illo potuerit oriri bona voluntas, cum qua factus est; sed unde mala, cum qua factus non est. Et tu dicis, non attendens quid dicas: Ideo potuit oriri voluntas mala, ut oriri posset et bona; et hoc putas ad naturam liberi arbitrii pertinere, ut possit utrumque, et peccare scilicet, et non peccare; et in hoc existimas hominem factum ad imaginem Dei, cum Deus ipse non possit utrumque. Neque enim vel demens quisquam dixerit Deum posse peccare; aut tu dicere audes, Deum liberum arbitrium non habere. Dei ergo, non nihili, munus est liberum arbitrium; sed in ipso Deo summum est liberum ee arbitrium, qui peccare nullo modo potest. Quoniam si iniustus esse posset, etiam Deus non esse utique posset; si enim Deus est, consequentissime, iustus est; et ideo summe maximeque habens liberum arbitrium, peccare tamen non potest Deus. Angelus ergo vel homo propterea peccare potuit, id est, propterea isto Dei munere, quod est liberum arbitrium, male uti potuit, quia non est Deus, hoc est, de nihilo factus est a Deo, non de ipso Deo. Intellege, et tace; aut quod intellexeris, non autem quod non intellexeris, loquere.
Augustine: What might be answered to you, you have somehow seen; but in vain have you tried to withstand the truth, as though answering my words, and not answering my words. For you disputed as though I had said, "Nor yet did an evil will arise from good"—which I did not say; but I said: Nor yet could an evil will arise from good because the good was made by the good God, but because it was made from nothing, not from God. Just as you yourself also set down these same words of mine. What is it, then, that you thought you must answer as though I had said, "Nor yet did it arise"—when I said, "Nor yet could it arise"; and you spoke so long against one who said that the necessity of evil's arising from good rushed in for this reason, that the good itself was made by God from nothing, not from God—when I attributed to such a cause not the necessity, but the possibility of evil; because I did not say it therefore arose, but therefore could arise from the good, the evil? And you accused nothing for so long, and made nothing violent; as though nothing had compelled the angel and the human being to sin by an unavoidable necessity. Now, then, come back at last to my words, as you have begun to come back. For you set yourself a question, as though it had suddenly come into your mind what I could answer; when I set this down long before in the very book you resist. For you say: that I can report that I did not say, Evil arose in the work of God because it was made from nothing, but: It was able to arise, because it was made from nothing. This very thing I said: I said, It was able to arise; I did not say it arose; I gave to this cause the possibility of evil, not the necessity. For the rational creature, when it was first made, was so made that, if it did not wish to sin, it was urged by no necessity to will it, or even, not willing, that is, unwilling, to sin, and not to do the good it willed, but to do the evil it did not will—where there is now not that sin which is simply called sin, but also the penalty of sin. Yet to will anything evil, or even, unwilling, to do anything evil, it could in no way, unless it had been made from nothing, that is, if it were the nature of God. For the nature of God alone was not made from nothing, because it was not made at all; and therefore it can in no way be changed. When we say this, we do not give powers to nothing, as though it could have made something, or made something, when it is nothing; but we say it is not the nature of God which was able to sin. And it follows that the nature which is not the nature of God was made; for it is not coeternal with God; and if it was made, it was made from nothing; because even those natures which were made from other natures draw their stock from nothing; since the natures from which they were made, before they came to be, were nothing, that is, were not at all. But, you say: An evil will could arise so that a good one too could arise. As though the angel or the human being were not made with a good will. He was made upright, as Scripture said (Eccl 7:29); it is not asked, then, whence the good will could arise in him, with which he was made; but whence the evil, with which he was not made. And you say, not attending to what you say: An evil will could arise so that a good one too could arise; and you think this pertains to the nature of free choice, that it can do both, namely both sin and not sin; and in this you suppose that the human being was made to the image of God, when God himself cannot do both. For neither would anyone, even mad, say that God can sin; nor do you dare to say that God does not have free choice. Free choice, then, is the gift of God, not of nothing; but in God himself free choice is supreme, who can in no way sin. For if he could be unjust, then God too could surely not be; for if he is God, most consistently he is just; and therefore, while supremely and most greatly having free choice, God nevertheless cannot sin. The angel, then, or the human being, was able to sin for this reason—that is, was able to misuse this gift of God, which is free choice—because he is not God, that is, was made from nothing by God, not from God himself. Understand, and be silent; or speak what you understand, not what you do not understand.
JulianImp.5.38V. 39. Iulianus. Verum non uno modo vicisse con tentus, argumenti tui, cuius impietatem prodidi, coarguam falsitatem. Cum ergo scriberes: Non ideo potuit oriri voluntas mala in opere Dei, quia a Deo factum est; sed ideo quia de nihilo factum est ; videre debueras, quam valenter aliarum creaturarum exempla praescriberent, quae totidem productae de nihilo, malae tamen voluntatis capaces non sunt. Postremo ipsa elementa, quae vere sunt facta ex nihilo, non alicuius voluntatis conscientiam queunt habere, ut motibus malis protestentur originis suae necessitatem. Animantes autem, et reliqua queis impletus est orbis, non de nihilo, ceterum iam ex aliquo prodierunt. Ubi est ergo vis inanitatis antiquae, quae malam voluntatem coegit existere; cum praeter rationabile animal, neminem peccare posse manifestum sit?
V. 39. Julian: But not content to have conquered in one way, I will convict of falsity the argument whose impiety I have exposed. For when you wrote: An evil will could not arise in the work of God because it was made by God, but on this account, because it was made from nothing; you ought to have seen how powerfully the examples of other creatures prescribe against you—creatures which, produced just as much from nothing, are yet not capable of an evil will. Finally, the very elements, which were truly made from nothing, cannot have the consciousness of any will, so as to attest the necessity of their origin by evil motions. But living things, and the rest with which the world is filled, came forth not from nothing, but already from something. Where, then, is the force of the ancient emptiness, which compelled an evil will to exist, since it is plain that, apart from the rational animal, no one can sin?
JulianImp.5.39Augustinus. Posses putare me argui falsitatis, si cum ego dixissem, ideo posse nostra corpora vulnerari, quia terrestria sunt, ostenderes tu corpora multa terrestria, quae nequeant vulnerari. Non enim esse vulnus potest, nisi in corpore animantis, quae caro dicitur. Ubi te admonere deberem, quod videre non potueris sententiam istam non recurrere; quia non sicut verum est: Omne quod potest vulnerari, terrestre corpus est; ita etiam verum est: Omne terrestre corpus vulnerari potest. Cur ergo in dialecticis iactanticula tua sollertia dormitavit, ut non adverteres, ubi dixi ideo creaturam rationalem peccare potuisse, quia ex nihilo facta est, me intellegi voluisse, omne quod peccare potest, ex nihilo factum esse, non autem omne quod ex nihilo factum est, posse peccare? Quod tamquam dixissem, ita mihi obiecisti res alias, et ipsa mundi elementa, quae cum ex nihilo facta sint, peccare non possunt; quoniam solum potest animal rationale peccare. Nunc ergo evigila, atque aspice, omne quod peccare potest, de nihilo factum esse; nec ideo sequitur etiam omne quod de nihilo factum est, posse peccare. Non igitur mihi proferantur alia, quae de nihilo facta sunt, et peccare non possunt; quoniam non dico: Omne quod ex nihilo factum est, peccare potest; sed dico: Omne quod peccare potest, ex nihilo factum est; tamquam si dixissem: Omnis bos animal est, non utique adversum me commemorari debuerunt multa animalia, quae non sunt boves; quoniam non dixerim: Omne animal bos est, sed: Omnis bos animal est. Iterum ergo dico: Omne quod peccare potest, ex nihilo factum est; omne ergo quod ex nihilo factum est, potest peccare, non dico; quod velut dixerim, multa commemoras, quamvis ex nihilo facta, quae tamen peccare non possunt. Calliditatem tuam tolle de medio, qua tardis illudis ingeniis; aut caecitatem, qua manifesta non cernis. Cum autem dico: Natura quae rationalis creata est, ideo peccare potuit, quia de nihilo facta est, non de Deo; attende quid dicam, ne mihi rursus inani loquacitate ventiles nihil, et me dixisse affirmes vim faciendi aliquid habere, quod nihil est. Hoc dico ego, naturam quae rationalis creata est, propterea peccare potuisse, quia ex nihilo facta est; quod aliud quid est, quam propterea peccare potuisse, quia natura Dei non est? Si enim de nihilo facta non esset, de Deo naturaliter esset, quidquid esset; si naturaliter de Deo esset, Dei natura esset; si Dei natura esset, peccare non posset. Ideo igitur peccare potuit, quamvis facta sit a Deo, quia de nihilo facta est, non de Deo. Hoc tu si intellexeris, et veritati repugnare nolueris, ab hac contentione in hac quaestione cessabis.
Augustine: You might think me convicted of falsity if, when I had said that our bodies can be wounded because they are earthly, you showed many earthly bodies which cannot be wounded. For there can be no wound except in the body of a living thing, which is called flesh. Here I would have to warn you that you could not see that this statement does not run back the other way; because it is not, as it is true that "Everything that can be wounded is an earthly body," likewise true that "Every earthly body can be wounded." Why, then, in matters of logic did your little vaunted cleverness slumber, so that you did not notice that, where I said the rational creature could sin because it was made from nothing, I meant to be understood that everything which can sin was made from nothing, but not that everything which was made from nothing can sin? As though I had said this, you objected to me other things, and the very elements of the world, which, though made from nothing, cannot sin; since only the rational animal can sin. Now, then, wake up, and observe that everything which can sin was made from nothing; nor does it therefore follow that everything which was made from nothing can sin. Let not other things, then, be brought forward to me, which were made from nothing and cannot sin; since I do not say: Everything which was made from nothing can sin; but I say: Everything which can sin was made from nothing; just as if I had said: Every ox is an animal, there surely ought not to have been mentioned against me many animals which are not oxen; since I did not say: Every animal is an ox, but: Every ox is an animal. Again, then, I say: Everything which can sin was made from nothing; I do not say: Everything, therefore, which was made from nothing can sin; and, as though I had said this, you mention many things which, although made from nothing, yet cannot sin. Take away your craftiness, by which you mock dull wits; or your blindness, by which you do not see plain things. But when I say: The nature which was created rational could sin because it was made from nothing, not from God—attend to what I say, lest again with empty wordiness you fan nothing at me, and affirm that I said that which is nothing has the force of doing something. This I say: that the nature which was created rational could sin because it was made from nothing; which is nothing other than that it could sin because it is not the nature of God. For if it had not been made from nothing, it would naturally be from God, whatever it was; if it were naturally from God, it would be the nature of God; if it were the nature of God, it could not sin. For this reason, then, it could sin, although it was made by God, because it was made from nothing, not from God. If you understand this, and are unwilling to fight against the truth, you will cease from this contention in this question.
JulianImp.5.39V. 40. Iulianus. Cum ergo hoc tam magnum apertum esset, quid illud fuit, quod tibi persuasit, ut crederes antiqui nihili violentiam causam malae voluntatis fuisse? Profecto ut intellegeremus nos, omnia te, quae sunt facta de nihilo, rea credere, et universum mundum diabolo mancipare. Quoniam igitur mihi claruit antiquam inter vos dogmatum manere concordiam, hinc iam tibi pariter et Manichaeo respondeo. Quaeritis certe, ut qui nego mali esse naturam, si possum respondeam, unde ipsa mala voluntas in homine primo potuit exoriri. At ego refero non vos intellegere quid dicatis. Voluntas enim nihil est aliud, quam motus animi, cogente nullo.
V. 40. Julian: Since, then, this so great matter was plain, what was it that persuaded you to believe that the violence of the ancient nothing was the cause of the evil will? Surely it was that we might understand that you believe all things which were made from nothing to be guilty, and hand over the whole world to the devil. Since, therefore, it has become clear to me that an ancient concord of dogmas remains between you, hence I now answer you and the Manichee alike. You surely ask—since I, who deny that there is a nature of evil, am to answer if I can—whence that evil will itself could arise in the first human being. But I reply that you do not understand what you say. For the will is nothing other than a motion of the mind, with nothing compelling it.
JulianImp.5.40Augustinus. Motus animi quid est, nisi motus naturae? Animus enim sine dubitatione natura est; proinde voluntas motus est naturae, quoniam motus est animi. Tu autem cum superius naturam tamquam genus poneres, eique generi species suas subderes, sic certe locutus es: Naturae, inquis, humanae generalitas, institutionum infra se locatarum genus quoddam est; haec velut species habet in situ, in membris, in ordinibus, in motibus, vel aliis id genus . Ista ergo tua disputatione motus naturae speciem asseruisti esse naturae; unde te sequitur, quod non vis, ut natura sit omnis naturae motus, si natura genus, eiusque species est naturae motus; quemadmodum animal est omnis equus, eo quod animal genus est, species vero huius generis equus. Ac per hoc voluntas, quoniam motus est animi, et inde ostenditur motus esse naturae, te ita disputante natura est; quia naturae tamquam generi species huiusmodi subdidisti. Cur ergo reprehendis quod dicitur naturale peccatum, quod fecit voluntas mala, quam ipsam voluntatem tu dicere convincaris esse naturam? Sed natura non sit voluntas; certe tamen nisi in natura non potest esse; quantum enim pertinet ad hominem, motus est animi, animusque natura est. Sine iam, quaeso, ita dici naturale peccatum, quoniam cum homo peccat, natura utique peccat; homo quippe natura est: quemadmodum recte dici potest etiam spiritale peccatum, cum spiritus peccat. Non enim erravit Apostolus, ubi ait: spiritalia nequitiae ; quae spiritalia procul dubio naturalia sunt; quia spiritus sine ambiguitate natura est, sive sit creator, sive sit creatus. Nec tamen quod vel angelo vel homine volente ei commissum est, quoniam natura peccavit (et angelus enim et homo naturae sunt), ita hoc esse dicimus naturale peccatum, ut necessitate factum esse dicamus, quod factum est libera voluntate. Qui enim propterea peccavit, quia voluit, potuit et nolle peccare; et ita homo creatus est, ut et nolle posset et velle, et quodlibet horum haberet in potestate el. Sed aliud est originale peccatum, quod etsi trahunt sine propria voluntate nascentes, tamen per voluntatem primi hominis ipsa est origo vitiata; sicut aliud etiam est in maiore homine propter quod dicit: Non enim quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago ; nec tamen etiam ista necessitas insanabilis est ei, cui dicitur: De necessitatibus meis erue me .
Augustine: What is a motion of the mind, but a motion of nature? For the mind is without doubt a nature; accordingly the will is a motion of nature, since it is a motion of the mind. But you, when above you were setting nature down as a genus, and subjecting its species to that genus, surely spoke thus: The generality of human nature, you say, of the institutions placed beneath it, is a kind of genus; this has, as it were, species in posture, in members, in arrangements, in movements, or in other things of the kind. By this disputation of yours, then, you asserted a motion of nature to be a species of nature; whence it follows for you, what you do not wish, that every motion of nature is a nature, if nature is a genus, and a motion of nature is its species; just as every horse is an animal, in that an animal is a genus, and a horse a species of this genus. And through this the will, since it is a motion of the mind, and is thereby shown to be a motion of nature, is, on your own disputing, a nature; because you subjected a motion of this kind to nature as to a genus. Why, then, do you find fault with what is called natural sin, which an evil will did—which very will you are convicted of saying is a nature? But suppose the will is not a nature; surely, nevertheless, it cannot exist except in a nature; for so far as pertains to the human being, it is a motion of the mind, and the mind is a nature. Permit it now, I ask, that sin be called natural, since when a human being sins, nature surely sins; for a human being is a nature: just as it can rightly be called also spiritual sin, when the spirit sins. For the Apostle did not err where he said: spiritual wickedness (Eph 6:12); which spiritual things are without doubt natural, because the spirit is without ambiguity a nature, whether it be creator or created. Yet not because it was committed by the will of an angel or a human being—since a nature sinned (for both the angel and the human being are natures)—do we so call this natural sin as to say that what was done by free will was done by necessity. For he who sinned for this reason, that he willed it, could also have not willed to sin; and the human being was so created that he could both not will and will, and have either of these in his power. But original sin is another thing, which, although those being born draw it without their own will, yet through the will of the first man the very origin is vitiated; just as there is also another thing in the grown human being, on account of which he says: For I do not do the good I will, but the evil I do not will, that I do (Rom 7:19); yet this necessity too is not incurable for him to whom it is said: Deliver me from my necessities (Ps 25:17 (24:17)).
JulianImp.5.40V. 41. Iulianus. Quaeritis ergo necessitatem rei, quae esse non potest si patitur necessitatem. Huic motui animi libero, sine coactu originis inquieto, si causa ipso motu detur antiquior, non gignitur omnino, sed tollitur. Nomen enim ipsum voluntatis nullam vim habet alteram, quam non debere materiae quod movetur. Cum ergo unde orta sit voluntas, ipsa voluntate quaeris antiquius; non exordium eius, sed exitium requiris; omnino enim non intellegitur esse, si aut tenebris deputetur, aut nihilo; nec potest dici iam voluntas, quae subsistere non potest, nisi in motu animi, cogente nullo. Si ergo cogat aliquis, est quidem motus; sed non est voluntas, cuius vim illa definitionis pars secunda complevit, id est, nullo cogente. Si ergo voluntas nihil est aliud, quam motus animi, cogente nullo; male prorsus quaeritur origo rei, cuius conditio, si praevenitur, interit. Expende ergo quid sit quod roges: Unde, inquis, ipsa voluntas mala quasi arbor mala in primo homine potuit exoriri? , qui confiteris voluntatem de origine contigisse. Voluntas enim motus est animi, cogente nullo. Naturalia cuncta cogunt esse quod sequitur: voluntas autem si praecedentibus causis cogatur, voluntas esse mox desinit, et perdit conditionem, si accepit originem.
V. 41. Julian: You ask, then, the necessity of a thing which cannot be if it suffers necessity. To this free motion of the mind, restless without the compulsion of origin, if a cause more ancient than the motion itself be given, it is not begotten at all, but abolished. For the very name of will has no other force than that it does not owe to matter the fact that it is moved. When, therefore, you ask for something more ancient than the will itself, as the source whence the will arose, you seek not its beginning but its end; for it is in no way understood to be, if it be assigned either to darkness or to nothing; nor can that any longer be called will which cannot subsist except in a motion of the mind, with nothing compelling. If, then, someone compels, there is indeed a motion; but it is not will, whose force that second part of the definition completed, that is, "with nothing compelling." If, then, the will is nothing other than a motion of the mind, with nothing compelling, the origin of the thing is altogether wrongly sought, whose condition perishes if it is forestalled. Weigh, then, what it is you ask: Whence, you say, could that evil will itself, as an evil tree, arise in the first human being?—you who confess that the will came about from origin. For the will is a motion of the mind, with nothing compelling. All natural things compel that which follows to be; but the will, if it be compelled by preceding causes, at once ceases to be will, and loses its condition, if it has received an origin.
JulianImp.5.41Augustinus. Si voluntas ideo non habet originem, quia non cogitur; nec ipse homo habet originem ut sit homo, quia non coactus est esse. Quomodo enim cogi poterat, qui non erat? Et certe homo natura est; tuque dixisti: Naturalia cuncta cogunt esse quod sequitur. Rogo te, attende quid dicas; noli oculis clausis linguam movere, quomodo qui in somnis loquitur. Nulla res, quae non est, cogi potest. Vide etiam quam sit insanum, negare habere originem res quae ortae sunt; cum ipsa origo ab oriundo sit dicta. Nam quod est et originem non habet, semper fuit; si autem non fuit, et est, ortum est; si ortum est, habet originem. Et voluntas ergo peccati, quae non fuit, et est, utique orta est; si enim est, et orta non est, semper fuit; sed non fuit semper: ergo orta est. Iam tu clama contra apertissimam veritatem: hoc enim decet tuam vanam loquacitatem; et dic: Orta est quidem, sed originem non habet; aut, quod est insanius: Et non fuit, et est, et tamen orta non est. Porro si hoc non dicis, ne insulsissimus et omnino fatuus iudiceris, quaere unde orta sit hominis voluntas mala, quam negare non potes ortam esse, quia negare non potes non fuisse et esse coepisse; quaere, inquam, unde orta sit; et invenies ipsum hominem; ex illo quippe orta est voluntas mala, quae in illo ante non fuit. Quaere etiam qualis erat homo, antequam voluntas mala oriretur ex illo; et invenies bonum; ea quippe voluntate factus est malus, quae antequam oriretur ex illo, talis erat, qualis a bono factus erat, id est, bonus. Hoc est igitur quod ait meus doctor tuusque destructor Ambrosius: Ex bonis igitur mala orta sunt . Quod tu negando, et dicendo: Rerum ratio non sinit, ut de bono malum, et de iusto iniustum aliquid proferatur; tantum adiuvas Manichaeos ad introducendam naturam mali, de qua dicunt oriri mala, ut te patronum sui gratulentur erroris, nisi cum eis et ipse vincaris. Tu es enim qui mirabili eloquentia, vel potius amentia sic defendis parvulos, ut a Salvatore separes; sic oppugnas Manichaeos, ut contra Salvatorem subleves.
Augustine: If the will has no origin because it is not compelled, then the human being himself has no origin, so as to be a human being, because he was not compelled to be. For how could he be compelled, who was not? And surely the human being is a nature; and you said: All natural things compel that which follows to be. I ask you, attend to what you say; do not move your tongue with your eyes shut, like one who talks in his sleep. No thing that is not can be compelled. See, too, how insane it is to deny that things which have arisen have an origin; since the very word "origin" is derived from "arising." For what is, and has no origin, always was; but if it was not, and is, it has arisen; if it has arisen, it has an origin. The will of sin, therefore, which was not, and is, has surely arisen; for if it is, and has not arisen, it always was; but it was not always: therefore it has arisen. Now then cry out against the most manifest truth: for this befits your empty wordiness; and say: It has arisen indeed, but has no origin; or, what is more insane: It both was not, and is, and yet has not arisen. But if you do not say this, lest you be judged most insipid and altogether foolish, ask whence the evil will of the human being arose, which you cannot deny has arisen, because you cannot deny that it was not and began to be; ask, I say, whence it arose; and you will find the human being himself; for from him arose the evil will, which before was not in him. Ask too what sort the human being was before the evil will arose from him; and you will find him good; for it was by that will he was made evil, which, before it arose from him, was such as he had been made by the good one, that is, good. This, then, is what my teacher and your destroyer Ambrose says: From goods, therefore, evils have arisen (Ambrose, Hexaemeron 1.8.31). By denying this, and saying: The nature of things does not allow that anything evil be produced from good, or anything unjust from the just, you only help the Manichees toward introducing a nature of evil, from which they say evils arise—so that they congratulate you as the patron of their error, unless you too be conquered along with them. For it is you who, by a marvelous eloquence, or rather madness, so defend little ones that you separate them from the Savior; you who so assail the Manichees that you raise them up against the Savior.
JulianImp.5.41V. 42. Iulianus. Cum ergo bene definita sit voluntas: Motus animi, cogente nullo, quid quaeris superius causas, quas definitio voluntatis exclusit? Expendite igitur quid sit voluntas, et desinetis inquirere unde sit voluntas. Voluntas est enim motus animi, cogente nullo; vos, si tentetis ire dimidio ungue superius, statim constituta convellitis. Quid ergo dicit Manichaeus? Sed iste motus ideo exortus est, quia de tenebrarum natura homo factus est. Quid tu? Quia, inquis, de nihilo factus est homo. Unus ergo dicit: Ideo voluntas mala, quia de nihilo factus est homo; alter: Ideo voluntas mala in homine, quia de tenebris factus est homo. Utrique ergo illud voluntatis suppletorium denegatis, id est, cogente nullo. Si enim tanta fuit virtus in nihilo, quanta in aliquo; quae coegit hanc voluntatem existere, exclusit ab ea conditionem suam, qua dictum fuerat, cogente nullo. Sed non minus mali abegit infamiam; non est enim peccatum, quod de motu animi libero non venit; effectumque est ut cum dispendio veritatis, totius mali periret invidia; et evanuit mali natura, cum crimen voluntatis evanuit; crimen autem evanuit voluntatis, cum definitio voluntatis exsecta est. Et peccati igitur et voluntatis claruit eiusmodi esse conditionem, ut si causis praecedentibus deputetur, et ius eo perdat, et crimen. Ubi ergo erit mali natura, cum malum non esse constiterit?
V. 42. Julian: Since, then, the will has been well defined—a motion of the mind, with nothing compelling—why do you seek higher up for causes which the definition of the will has excluded? Weigh, then, what the will is, and you will cease to inquire whence the will comes. For the will is a motion of the mind, with nothing compelling; if you try to go up so much as half a fingernail higher, you at once tear down what was established. What, then, does the Manichee say? But this motion arose because the human being was made from the nature of darkness. What do you say? Because, you say, the human being was made from nothing. The one, then, says: The will is evil because the human being was made from nothing; the other: The will is evil in the human being because the human being was made from darkness. Both of you, then, deny that supplement of the will, that is, "with nothing compelling." For if there was as great a force in nothing as in something, which compelled this will to exist, it excluded from it its own condition, by which it had been said, "with nothing compelling." But it drove off no less the infamy of evil; for that is not sin which does not come from a free motion of the mind; and it came about that, with the ruin of truth, the odium of all evil perished; and the nature of evil vanished, when the crime of will vanished; but the crime of will vanished, when the definition of will was cut away. Of both sin and will, then, it has become clear that the condition is such that, if it be reckoned to preceding causes, it loses both its right and its crime. Where, then, will be the nature of evil, when it shall have been established that evil is not?
JulianImp.5.42Augustinus. Dici non potest, quantum mirer frontem tuam, quomodo dicas naturam mali, qui malum naturale non dicis; aut quomodo malum naturale non dicas, qui naturam mali dicis. Quid autem vanius definitionibus tuis, qui propterea putas non esse quaerendum unde sit voluntas, quia motus est animi, cogente nullo? Si enim dicatur, ut putas, unde sit; non erit verum quod dictum est: cogente nullo; quia illud unde est, eam cogit esse; et ideo non est alicunde, ne cogatur esse. O stultitiam singularem! Non est ergo alicunde ipse homo, qui non est coactus esse; quia non erat qui cogeretur, antequam esset. Prorsus et alicunde est voluntas, et esse non cogitur; et si eius origo quaerenda non est, non ideo quaerenda non est, quod voluntas alicunde non sit, sed quia manifestum est unde sit. Ab illo est enim voluntas, cuius est voluntas; ab angelo scilicet voluntas angeli, ab homine hominis, a Deo Dei. Et si operatur Deus in homine voluntatem bonam, id utique agit, ut oriatur ab illo bona voluntas, cuius est voluntas; sicut agit ut homo oriatur ab homine; non enim quia Deus creat hominem, ideo non homo ex homine nascitur. Malae autem voluntatis suae unusquisque auctor est, quia malum vult. Sed cum quaeritur, quare homo possit habere malam voluntatem, quamvis ut habeat non sit necesse, non origo quaeritur voluntatis, sed origo ipsius possibilitatis; et invenitur ea esse causa, quia etsi magnum bonum est rationalis creatura, non tamen est quod est Deus, cuius solius est inconvertibilis incommutabilisque natura. Et huius rei causa cum quaeritur, hoc invenitur, quia non de se ipso, hoc est, de sua natura atque substantia genuit, sed de nihilo, hoc est, de nulla re fecit haec Deus. Non quia nihil habet aliquam vim; si enim haberet, non nihil, sed aliquid esset; sed quia hoc est cuique naturae de nihilo factam esset, quod est naturam Dei non esse, quae immutabilis sola est. Nec ea quae de aliquibus rebus facta sunt, ab hac excipiuntur origine; quoniam res quae ita factae sunt, ut ex iis aliae fierent, de nullis exstantibus factae sunt, hoc est, omnino de nihilo. Mutari autem possunt quaecumque alia diversis et propriis qualitatibus suis; voluntate vero, quae ratione utitur, sola est rationalis creatura mutabilis. Haec diligenter et intellegenter quisquis advertit, multum te de nihilo nihil quod ad rem pertineat dixisse cognoscet.
Augustine: It cannot be said how I marvel at your effrontery—how you can say there is a nature of evil, you who do not say evil is natural; or how you can say evil is not natural, you who say there is a nature of evil. But what is emptier than your definitions, you who think that whence the will comes is not to be sought, because it is a motion of the mind, with nothing compelling? For if it be said, as you suppose, whence it is, then what was said will not be true, "with nothing compelling"; because that whence it is compels it to be; and therefore it is not from anywhere, lest it be compelled to be. O singular folly! The human being himself, then, who was not compelled to be, is not from anywhere; because there was no one who could be compelled, before he was. By all means the will both is from somewhere, and is not compelled to be; and if its origin is not to be sought, it is not to be sought, not because the will is not from somewhere, but because it is manifest whence it is. For the will is from him whose will it is: namely the will of an angel from an angel, of a human being from a human being, of God from God. And if God works a good will in a human being, he surely does this, that a good will may arise from him whose will it is; just as he brings it about that a human being arises from a human being; for it is not because God creates a human being that a human being is therefore not born from a human being. But of his own evil will each one is the author, because he wills evil. But when it is asked why a human being can have an evil will, although it is not necessary that he have it, it is not the origin of the will that is sought, but the origin of the possibility itself; and it is found that this is the cause: that although the rational creature is a great good, it is yet not what God is, whose alone is an unconvertible and unchangeable nature. And when the cause of this thing is sought, this is found: that God begot it not from himself, that is, from his own nature and substance, but made it from nothing, that is, from no thing. Not because nothing has some force; for if it had, it would not be nothing, but something; but because this is, for every nature, to have been made from nothing: that it is not the nature of God, which alone is unchangeable. Nor are those things which were made from certain things excepted from this origin; since the things which were so made that from them others might be made, were made from no existing things, that is, altogether from nothing. But whatever other things can be changed by their diverse and proper qualities; while in respect of the will, which uses reason, the rational creature alone is changeable. Whoever attends to these things carefully and intelligently will recognize that you have said much about nothing—nothing that pertains to the matter.
JulianImp.5.42V. 43. Iulianus. Quid est enim malum, id est, peccatum? Voluntas sequendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. Quid est ipsa voluntas? Motus animi, cogente nullo. Si ergo peccatum ex voluntate natum est, voluntas ex motu animi cogente nullo; nec nihili, nec tenebrarum conditio fecit ut esset hic motus, qui ideo a nullo cogitur, ut possit esse cogente nullo. Ac per hoc nullum est naturale, nullum originale peccatum: quia haec duo nomina unum indicant, id est, peccatum esse non voluntarium; praescripsit autem veritas, nisi voluntarium non posse esse peccatum; et ideo qui dicit malum esse quod constat ingenitum, non convincit in natura esse peccatum; sed se ostendit per pravitatem iudicii criminosum. Ecce responsum est, ad quod tu responderi non posse credebas. Oxymora prorsus fuit quaestio, quam tu arbitraris invictam.
V. 43. Julian: For what is evil, that is, sin? The will to follow what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. What is the will itself? A motion of the mind, with nothing compelling. If, then, sin is born of the will, and the will of a motion of the mind with nothing compelling; neither the condition of nothing nor of darkness made this motion to be, which is therefore compelled by no one, so that it can be "with nothing compelling." And through this there is no natural, no original sin: because these two names indicate one thing, that is, that sin is not voluntary; but truth has prescribed that there can be no sin unless it is voluntary; and therefore he who says that to be evil which is established to be inborn does not convict sin of being in nature, but shows himself, by the depravity of his judgment, to be criminal. Behold, an answer has been given to that to which you believed no answer could be given. The question was altogether a paradox, which you judge unconquerable.
JulianImp.5.43Augustinus. Exsultas inaniter, et dicis: " Ecce responsum est "; ubi te respondere non potuisse mox invenit, quicumque acutus legit haec tua, vel non multum tardus et mea. Quantalibet enim perplexitate, non implicata explicare, sed aperta implicare coneris; sani negare non possunt, oriri ab unoquoque voluntatem suam, nec nisi ab homine oriri hominis voluntatem. Ac per hoc, quoniam mala hominum mala voluntate esse coeperunt, et ante voluntatem malam scimus fuisse hominum naturam bonam; ex bonis orta sunt mala. Hoc dicit Ambrosius; hinc perimitur Manichaeus; hoc pro Manichaeo negat contra Ambrosium Iulianus, dicens: Si natura opus Dei est, per opus Dei opus diaboli transire non sinitur; ut Manichaeus dicat, non esse homines opus Dei, per quos Apostolus transisse dicit peccatum et mortem , quod est opus diaboli; quoniam secundum Iulianum per opus Dei opus diaboli transire non sinitur; et dicit Apostolus per homines transisse opus diaboli; non sunt ergo homines opus Dei. Manichaei est ista conclusio, veniens illi, Iuliane, de adiutorio tuo. Sed Apostolus pro veritate decertans, et homines dicit esse opus Dei, ut prosternat Manichaeum; et per opus Dei, hoc est, per homines transisse opus diaboli, ut cum illo prosternat et te ipsum.
Augustine: You exult in vain, and say, "Behold, an answer has been given," where anyone who reads these things of yours, if he is acute, or even not very dull, will soon find from mine that you could not answer. For however great the perplexity with which you try, not to unravel what is tangled, but to entangle what is plain, the sound cannot deny that each one's will arises from himself, and that a human being's will arises only from a human being. And through this, since the evils of human beings began to be by an evil will, and we know that before the evil will there was the good nature of human beings, evils have arisen from goods. This Ambrose says; by this the Manichee is destroyed; this Julian, on behalf of the Manichee, denies against Ambrose, saying: If nature is a work of God, the work of the devil is not permitted to pass through the work of God; so that the Manichee may say that human beings are not the work of God, through whom the Apostle says sin and death passed (See Rom 5:12), which is the work of the devil; since, according to Julian, the work of the devil is not permitted to pass through the work of God; and the Apostle says the work of the devil passed through human beings; therefore human beings are not the work of God. This conclusion is the Manichee's, coming to him, Julian, from your help. But the Apostle, contending for the truth, both says that human beings are the work of God, so that he may overthrow the Manichee, and says that the work of the devil passed through the work of God, that is, through human beings, so that with him he may overthrow you too.
JulianImp.5.43V. 44. Iulianus. Illud tamen admoneo, solere etiam te in scriptis tuis tenebras non dicere creaturam, sed absentia luminis remanere obscuritatem; ut nihil aliud sit obtenebratio, quam splendoris exclusio. Quod ergo excluditur, creaturam vocas; quod remanet, tenebras; quod quidem vulgatum a philosophis est; nec nunc quaero verumne esse putetur, an falsum; sed illud inculco, tenebras tu non dicis esse aliud quam nihil; in homine autem, id est, opere Dei malum ideo exstitisse argumentaris, quia de nihilo factus erat; causam ergo mali illud nihilum fuisse confirmas, quod nihilum tenebras etiam pronuntias. Necessitatem itaque mali de tenebrarum dicis conditione descendere. Igitur nec in hoc a praeceptore dissentis, quoniam voluntatem malam pariter aeternis tenebris deputatis.
V. 44. Julian: Yet I point this out, that you too are wont, in your writings, to say that darkness is not a creature, but that obscurity remains by the absence of light; so that a being-darkened is nothing other than the exclusion of brightness. That, then, which is excluded, you call a creature; what remains, darkness; which is indeed a commonplace among the philosophers; nor do I now ask whether it is thought to be true or false; but I drive home this: you say that darkness is nothing other than nothing; and yet you argue that in the human being, that is, in the work of God, evil arose because he was made from nothing; you therefore confirm that this nothing was the cause of evil, which nothing you also pronounce to be darkness. And so you say that the necessity of evil descends from the condition of darkness. Therefore in this too you do not dissent from your preceptor, since you both equally reckon an evil will to eternal darkness.
JulianImp.5.44Augustinus. Paulo ante iam tibi de nihilo nihil dicenti, quantum aperte potui, breviterque respondi, et nunc frustra ad tenebras voluisti fugere. Non latebis: lumen quippe te persequitur veritatis, ita dicens factas ex nihilo creaturas, quae non sunt quod ipse qui fecit, ut ipsum nihil non existimetur vel intellegatur esse aliquid, nec ad faciendum habere aliquam vim; quia si haberet, non esset nihil. Ac per hoc, nihil nec corpus est ullum, nec spiritus, nec his substantiis aliquid accidens, nec informis ulla materies, nec inanis locus, nec ipsae tenebrae, sed prorsus nihil; quia ubi sunt tenebrae, corpus est aliquod carens lumine, sive aer, sive aqua, sive aliquid aliud; corporali enim lumine vel illuminari ut clareat, vel privari ut tenebrescat, nisi corpus non potest. Ac per hoc istarum corporalium tenebrarum conditor non est, nisi qui condidit corpora, propter quod in hymno trium virorum benedicunt eum lux et tenebrae . Fecit ergo Deus cuncta de nihilo; id est, omnia quae ut essent fecit, si eorum originem primam respiciamus ex his quae non erant fecit; hoc Graeci dicunt: ejx oujk ojjvntwn. Quod ne credatur de Unigenito, qui est Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine, et ideo non de nihilo, vehementer Catholica resistit Arianis. Cum itaque dicimus, non ideo potuisse oriri ex bono malam voluntatem, quia bonum factum est a bono Deo, sed quia de nihilo factum est, non de Deo; non nihilo damus ullam naturam, sed naturam factoris a natura eorum quae sunt facta discernimus. Ideo quippe possunt ista mutari, sive voluntate, sicut rationalis potuit creatura, sive propriis qualitatibus suis, sicut caetera; quoniam de nihilo facta sunt, non de Deo, quamvis faciente nonnisi Deo; id est, quia non sunt quod illa natura, quae facta non est, atque ob hoc immutabilis sola est. Si ergo vis Manichaeos vel devitare vel vincere, hoc sape, hoc cape intellegendo, si potes, credendo, si non potes, quoniam ex bonis orta sunt mala, nec est aliquid malitia nisi indigentia boni.
Augustine: A little before, I already answered you, as openly and briefly as I could, when you were saying nothing about nothing; and now in vain have you wished to flee to darkness. You will not hide: for the light of truth pursues you, saying that creatures were made from nothing, things which are not what he himself who made them is, so that this nothing is not supposed or understood to be something, nor to have any force for making; because if it had, it would not be nothing. And through this, nothing is neither any body, nor any spirit, nor anything accidental to these substances, nor any formless matter, nor empty space, nor darkness itself, but altogether nothing; for where there is darkness, there is some body lacking light, whether air, or water, or something else; for by a corporeal light nothing can be either illumined so as to be bright, or deprived of it so as to grow dark, except a body. And through this the maker of this corporeal darkness is none other than he who made bodies, on which account, in the hymn of the three young men, light and darkness bless him (See Dan 3:72 (in the Song of the Three Young Men)). God therefore made all things from nothing; that is, all the things that he made so that they might be, if we look to their first origin, he made from those things which were not; this the Greeks express: ex ouk onton. And lest this be believed of the Only-Begotten, who is God from God, light from light, and therefore not from nothing, the Catholic Church vigorously resists the Arians. Therefore, when we say that an evil will could not have arisen from good because the good was made by the good God, but because it was made from nothing, not from God, we do not give any nature to nothing, but we distinguish the nature of the maker from the nature of the things that are made. For these can be changed for this reason, whether by will, as the rational creature could be, or by their own proper qualities, as the rest; because they were made from nothing, not from God—although by none making them but God; that is, because they are not what that nature is which was not made, and on this account is alone unchangeable. If, then, you wish either to avoid or to conquer the Manichees, understand this, grasp this—by understanding, if you can; by believing, if you cannot—that evils have arisen from goods, and that malice is nothing other than a lack of good.
JulianImp.5.44V. 45. Iulianus. Verum ut ambos vos veritas detexit, et proruit; ita a nobis consideratio nostri reposcit officii, ut quid sit hoc quod obscuritatem huic quaestioni, quae iam exarmata est, fecerat, explicemus. Omnia quae fiunt, aut a necessario, aut a possibili dicuntur existere. Necessarium autem hic dico, non quod solemus utile nuncupare, sed quod maioribus fuerit causis coactum. Necessarium ergo vocamus, non quod in iure sit voluntatis, sed quod patiatur existendi vim. Possibile autem dicimus, quod nec existendi, nec non existendi in alteram partem experiatur necessitatem, sed certis modis et possit esse, et possit non esse. Teneat ergo lector noster, quid hic necessarium, quid possibile nuncupemus. Et ut a grandibus inchoemus exemplis, ut Deus faceret mundum, a possibili venit, non a necessario; id est, omnipotentiae eius possibile fuit creare quae condidit, necessarium tamen non fuit, videlicet non est ab aliquo coactus ut faceret, sed fecit quia voluit, quod non fecisset profecto si noluisset. At hoc quod auctori adfuit a possibili, in opere a necessario factum est, id est, non fuit mundo possibile esse et non esse, qui esse ab Omnipotente iubebatur, sed cogebatur existere, cui Omnipotens mandabat essentiam.
V. 45. Julian: But as truth has uncovered and laid both of you low, so the consideration of our office demands that we explain what it was that had made obscurity for this question, which is now disarmed. All things that come to be are said to exist either from the necessary or from the possible. By "necessary" I mean here, not what we are wont to call useful, but what has been compelled by higher causes. We therefore call necessary, not what is within the right of the will, but what suffers a force of existing. We call possible, however, that which experiences a necessity neither of existing nor of not existing in either direction, but in certain ways can both be and not be. Let our reader hold, then, what here we call necessary, what possible. And to begin with great examples: that God made the world came from the possible, not from the necessary; that is, it was possible for his omnipotence to create what he founded, yet it was not necessary—namely, he was not compelled by anything to make it, but made it because he willed, which he certainly would not have made had he not willed. But this which was present to the author from the possible, was, in the work, made from the necessary; that is, it was not possible for the world to be and not to be, which was bidden to be by the Omnipotent, but it was compelled to exist, to which the Omnipotent commanded being.
JulianImp.5.45Augustinus. Quomodo mundus cogebatur existere, qui non erat antequam existeret? Quomodo cogitur quisque, si non est? Nonne satius erat ut diceres: Mundus factus est Dei voluntate, non sua? Sed perge, videamus quid ex ista distinctione possibilis et necessarii coneris ostendere; quam melius possemus intellegere, si eam commemorare tantummodo, et non exponere voluisses. Quis enim non videat, omne quod fieri necesse est, etiam fieri posse; non omne quod fieri potest, etiam fieri necesse esse? Si ergo hoc tibi placuit appellare possibile, quod ita fieri potest, ut non sit necesse; illud autem necessarium quod non solum fieri potest, verum etiam necesse est: loquere ut vis, ubi res apparent, non est de verbis controversia facienda. Satis est nosse omne necessarium esse possibile, non omne possibile esse necessarium.
Augustine: How was the world compelled to exist, which was not before it existed? How is anyone compelled, if he is not? Was it not better for you to say: The world was made by God's will, not its own? But go on; let us see what you try to show from this distinction of possible and necessary—which we could understand better, if you had wished merely to mention it, and not to expound it. For who does not see that everything which must come to be can also come to be; but not everything which can come to be must also come to be? If, then, it pleased you to call possible that which can come to be in such a way that it is not necessary, and necessary that which not only can come to be but must also; speak as you wish, where things are apparent there is no controversy to be made about words. It is enough to know that everything necessary is possible, but not everything possible is necessary.
JulianImp.5.45V. 46. Iulianus. Transiit ergo in necessitatem conditi, quod venerat de possibilitate condentis. Fecit etiam diversas naturas diversasque species in naturis, custodito eo ordine qui a rerum fluebat exordio, ut alia essent necessaria, alia possibilia. Quidquid ergo habent creaturae naturaliter, a necessarii parte sortitae sunt.
V. 46. Julian: It passed, then, into the necessity of the thing founded, what had come from the possibility of the founder. He also made diverse natures and diverse species within the natures, that order being kept which flowed from the beginning of things, so that some should be necessary, others possible. Whatever, then, creatures have naturally, they have received from the side of the necessary.
JulianImp.5.46Augustinus. Si quidquid habent creaturae naturaliter, a parte necessarii sortitae sunt, non ergo naturaliter habent homines quod concumbunt, sed quod possunt concumbere; nec ille quem Apostolus commemoravit, naturalis est usus feminae , sed possibilitas eius; si enim nolit homo, non est ipse usus, quamvis possit esse, si velit; possibilitas ergo eius naturalis est, ipse non est; non enim est necessarius, qui et nullus est, si nolimus, et erravit Apostolus qui dixit esse usum feminae naturalem. Ubi est etiam quod ante dixisti, naturam genus, speciemque eius esse coniugium; quandoquidem non necessitate, sed voluntate coniugia copulantur? An forte ut hoc diceres, nondum tibi in mentem venerat duorum istorum, id est, necessarii possibilisque distinctio? Et ut post concubitum sexuum nascatur homo, naturale non est, quia non est necessarium? Non enim necesse est ut sequatur conceptus et partus, cum mas et femina concubuerint; hoc autem possibile, non necessarium definisti, quod fieri potest, sed necesse non est. Nec naturaliter manducamus? Quia et hoc, si nolumus, non fit; et ideo possibile est, non necessarium. Sed ista negare esse naturalia, nihil est aliud quam magnam partem velle auferre naturae. Falsum est itaque quod aisti: Quidquid habent creaturae naturaliter, a necessarii parte sortitae sunt; quandoquidem et haec quae commemoravi, et alia quae commemorare longum est, naturaliter habent, nec ea tamen sunt a necessarii parte sortitae.
Augustine: If whatever creatures have naturally, they have received from the side of the necessary, then human beings do not have naturally that they have intercourse, but that they can have intercourse; nor is that which the Apostle mentioned the natural use of the woman (See Rom 1:26), but the possibility of it; for if a human being does not will it, the use itself does not occur, although it can occur if he wills; the possibility of it, therefore, is natural, but it itself is not; for it is not necessary, since it is also nothing, if we do not will it—and the Apostle erred who said there is a natural use of the woman. Where too is what you said before, that nature is the genus, and marriage its species; since marriages are joined not by necessity, but by will? Or had it perhaps not yet come into your mind, when you said this, the distinction of these two, that is, of the necessary and the possible? And that a human being should be born after the intercourse of the sexes, is not natural, because it is not necessary? For it is not necessary that conception and birth follow, when a male and female have had intercourse; but you defined this to be possible, not necessary, which can come to be, but is not necessary. And do we not eat naturally? Because this too, if we do not will it, does not happen; and therefore it is possible, not necessary. But to deny that these things are natural is nothing other than to wish to take away a great part of nature. It is false, then, what you said: Whatever creatures have naturally, they have received from the side of the necessary; since both these things which I mentioned, and others which it would be long to mention, they have naturally, and yet they have not received them from the side of the necessary.
JulianImp.5.46V. 47. Iulianus. Qui autem sentiunt in processu, non semper a necessario, sed multa a possibili capiunt. Hoc in cunctis licet videre corporibus, sed longior disputatio nascitur; pauca tamen demus exempla. Natura corporum est, ut coagmentatione concrescant, divisione solvantur; capacia ergo sunt vulneris, quae patiuntur interitum. Ut ergo possint vulnerari, a necessario habent; ut vulnerentur autem, a possibili. Ita a necessario est possibilitatis natura, cum non sit necessarius possibilitatis effectus. Verbi gratia, equus, bos, et similes animantes vulnerabilem habent naturam, et ideo incommodi capacia a necessario sunt; ut autem vulnerentur, non semper necessarium est. Si enim per diligentiam custodum defendantur a plagis, possunt non vulnerari; quod si non custodiantur, possunt etiam vulnerari. Plurimum ergo distat inter ea quae a possibili veniunt, et ea quae a necessario; quae nisi custodiatur distinctio, in innumeros itur errores. Quod ut comparatione clarescat: lapsi sunt quidam medicinae oppugnatores, argumentati hanc artem nihil habere utilitatis; disputantque hoc modo: Moriturisne medicina subvenit, an victuris? Si morituris, nihil promovet; si victuris, frustra gestit. Qui enim morituri erant, hac quoque laborante, morientur; qui victuri, sine quoque huius beneficio salvi esse potuerunt. Quam nempe concinna, quam urbana conclusio! Sed dissolvitur a propugnatoribus medicinae hoc modo: Haec ars, inquiunt, prodest nec victuris, nec morituris dumtaxat a necessario, sed a possibili id utrumque passuris; non ergo adiuvat medicina eum qui sine dubio moriturus est, quoniam facere immortalem non potest; sed neque ei subvenit, qui sine dubio futurus incolumis est; verum illi, qui si non curetur, periclitari potest; si curetur, liberari potest; sicut ergo nec victuro nec morituro a necessarii conditione subvenire, ita et morituro et victuro, sed a possibili, ars potest erudita prodesse. Illi ergo priores medicantum studiis obloquentes, propositionem a possibili inchoantem, necessarii fine clauserunt; quod disputationis genus in innumera extenditur. Verbi gratia, prohibet lex homicidium fieri, prohibet etiam negligentiae per quam in pericula ruitur occasionem dari, ut in tauro cornupeta , atque in domorum coronis . At potest dici: Victuro subvenit ista diligentia, an morituro? Si morituro, nihil promovet; si victuro, ex abundanti consulit; si utrumque hoc contrarium, et per impedimenta et sine impedimentis necessario consequentur. At hoc falsum est: optimo enim mortalibus iure consulitur, ut quod poterant pati sine diligentia, diligentiae opibus evadant. Aliud ergo est a possibili, aliud a necessario. Ostendamus, iam quid his anteloquiis adiuvemur. Fecit Deus hominem liberi arbitrii, naturae bonae; sed quae capax esset virtutum, quas sibi ex se mancipato animo comparasset; quod liberum arbitrium aliter constare non poterat, quam ut haberet etiam peccandi possibilitatem. Libertatem ergo a necessario habet, voluntatem a possibili. Non potest non esse liber; sed in neutram voluntatem cogi potest, factusque rei necessariae possibilis effectus. In possibili ergo peccari potest, in necessario non potest; quia necessario non actor, sed auctor ipse censetur; atque hoc quod potest homo ex integro Dei est, a possibili autem ipse actor expenditur.
V. 47. Julian: But things that have sensation, in their process, take not always from the necessary, but much from the possible. This one may see in all bodies, but a longer disputation arises; let us give, however, a few examples. It is the nature of bodies that they grow together by joining, and are dissolved by division; they are therefore capable of a wound, which suffer destruction. That they can be wounded, then, they have from the necessary; that they be wounded, however, from the possible. So the nature of possibility is from the necessary, while the effect of possibility is not necessary. For example, a horse, an ox, and similar living things have a woundable nature, and therefore are capable of harm from the necessary; but that they be wounded is not always necessary. For if by the diligence of keepers they are defended from blows, they can be not wounded; but if they are not kept, they can also be wounded. There is, then, the greatest difference between those things which come from the possible and those which come from the necessary; and unless this distinction is kept, one goes into countless errors. That this may become clear by comparison: certain assailants of medicine have fallen, arguing that this art has no usefulness; and they dispute in this manner: Does medicine help those about to die, or those about to live? If those about to die, it accomplishes nothing; if those about to live, it bestirs itself in vain. For those who were about to die will die even with this art laboring; those about to live could be safe even without the benefit of it. How neat, indeed, how clever a conclusion! But it is undone by the defenders of medicine in this manner: This art, they say, profits neither those about to live nor those about to die, that is, from the necessary, but those about to suffer either of these from the possible; medicine therefore does not help him who is beyond doubt about to die, since it cannot make him immortal; but neither does it aid him who is beyond doubt going to be unharmed; rather, it aids him who, if he is not treated, can be endangered, and if he is treated, can be freed; just as, then, it can profit neither one about to live nor one about to die from the condition of the necessary, so the learned art can profit both one about to die and one about to live, but from the possible. Those earlier objectors, then, to the labors of healers, beginning their proposition from the possible, closed it with the end of the necessary; which kind of disputation extends to countless cases. For example, the law forbids murder, and forbids also that occasion be given for the negligence by which one rushes into dangers, as in the case of a goring bull (See Exod 21:29), and of the parapets of houses (See Deut 22:8). But it can be said: Does this diligence help one about to live or one about to die? If one about to die, it accomplishes nothing; if one about to live, it counsels superfluously; if both this and its contrary, they will necessarily follow both through hindrances and without hindrances. But this is false: for by the best right it is provided for mortals that what they could suffer without diligence, they may escape by the resources of diligence. One thing, then, is from the possible, another from the necessary. Let us now show what we are helped by these prefatory remarks. God made the human being of free choice, of a good nature; but one that was capable of the virtues which it would acquire for itself, by a mind given over to itself; which free choice could not stand in any other way than that it have also the possibility of sinning. Liberty, then, it has from the necessary; will, from the possible. It cannot not be free; but it cannot be compelled into either will, and the possible effect of a necessary thing has been made. In the possible, then, one can sin; in the necessary, one cannot; because in the necessary not the agent, but the author himself is reckoned; and this, that the human being can, is wholly God's, but from the possible the agent himself is brought to account.
JulianImp.5.47Augustinus. Quid dicis de diabolo, de quo scriptum est: Ab initio diabolus peccat ? Possibilitatem peccandi habet an necessitatem? Si necessitatem, tu videris quomodo secundum tuas disputationes excusetur a crimine: si autem possibilitatem, potest ergo et non peccare, potest habere bonam voluntatem, potest agere poenitentiam et impetrare misericordiam Dei; quia cor contritum et humiliatum Deus non despiciet . Quod quidem visum est quibusdam, Origene ut perhibetur auctore; sed hoc, ut nosse te existimo, fides catholica et sana non recepit; unde nonnulli Originem quoque ipsum alienum fuisse ab hoc errore vel probant, vel volunt. Restat igitur, aut ante supplicium ignis aeterni, etiam necessitas ista peccandi magna sit diabolo magni poena peccati neque hinc excusetur a crimine, quoniam et ista vindicta est pro maximo crimine, ut eum delectet sola malitia, nec possit delectare iustitia. Ad hanc autem iam poenalem peccandi necessitatem non utique pervenisset, nisi prius libera voluntate, nulla necessitate peccasset. Definitio itaque illa peccati, cum fit quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere, ad illud peccatum pertinet quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod etiam poena peccati.
Augustine: What do you say of the devil, of whom it is written: The devil sins from the beginning (1 John 3:8)? Does he have a possibility of sinning, or a necessity? If a necessity, you may see how, according to your disputations, he is excused from crime; but if a possibility, then he can also not sin, can have a good will, can do penance and obtain the mercy of God; because a contrite and humbled heart God will not despise (Ps 51:17 (50:19)). This indeed seemed so to certain people, on the authority, as it is reported, of Origen; but this, as I think you know, the Catholic and sound faith has not received; whence some prove, or wish, that even Origen himself was a stranger to this error. It remains, therefore, either that even before the punishment of eternal fire, this very necessity of sinning is a great punishment to the devil for his great sin, nor is he hereby excused from crime, since this too is a vengeance for the greatest crime—that malice alone should delight him, and justice cannot delight him. But to this now penal necessity of sinning he certainly would not have come, unless he had first sinned by free will, with no necessity. And so that definition of sin, when one does what justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain, pertains to that sin which is only sin, not that which is also the penalty of sin.
JulianImp.5.47V. 48. Iulianus. Et malum ergo et bonum ex propria voluntate facit: sed bonum suum etiam Deo debet, qui parti huic, non quidem praeiudicium, tamen adiutorium subministrat.
V. 48. Julian: Therefore he does both the evil and the good by his own will; but his good he owes also to God, who supplies to this part, not indeed a prejudgment, yet a help.
JulianImp.5.48Augustinus. Tam bonum certe quam malum ex propria homo, sicut dicis, voluntate facit, et utriusque in illo possibilitas aequa lance libratur, et ad bene faciendum Deus adiutorium subministrat; cur ergo ad peccandum proclivior est natura mortalium, si nihil egit originale peccatum? Quamvis et ipsum adiutorium, quod subministrare Deum cogimini confiteri, quale dicatis esse, non lateat. Legem quippe, non spiritum dicitis, cum Paulus apostolus per subministrationem Spiritus Sancti nos doceat adiuvari . Quod ideo commemorandum putavi, ne forte qui audiunt vel legunt de subministratione divini adiutorii sententiam tuam, obliviscantur haeresim vestram.
Augustine: The human being, you say, does both the good and the evil by his own will, and the possibility of either is balanced in him in an equal scale, and for doing good God supplies a help; why, then, is the nature of mortals more prone to sinning, if original sin did nothing? Although it is not hidden what sort you say this help is, which you are compelled to confess God supplies. For you say it is the law, not the Spirit, although the apostle Paul teaches that we are helped by the supplying of the Holy Spirit (See Phil 1:19). I thought this should be mentioned, lest perhaps those who hear or read your opinion about the supplying of divine help forget your heresy.
JulianImp.5.48V. 49. Iulianus. Tantum ergo valet ista distinctio, ut si nescientes, quod a possibili incipit, in necessarium concludamus, omnia crimina ad Deum recurrant. Quod Manichaeus videns, tenebras peccati excogitavit auctores; non enim valuit inter possibile necessariumque distinguere. Omne ergo quod naturaliter habet homo, a necessarii parte sortitus est; quia non potuit aliter esse quam factus est.
V. 49. Julian: So great, then, is the force of this distinction, that if, not knowing it, we conclude into the necessary what begins from the possible, all crimes run back to God. Seeing this, the Manichee devised darkness as the author of sin; for he could not distinguish between the possible and the necessary. Everything, then, which a human being has naturally, he has received from the side of the necessary; because he could not be otherwise than he was made.
JulianImp.5.49Augustinus. Iam paulo ante monstravi, quam vana sit sententia ista; stolidissimum est enim, habere ho mines naturaliter possibilitatem manducandi, sed non naturaliter cibos naturae congruos manducare; aut habere homines naturaliter possibilitatem concumbendi, sed non naturaliter genitalibus membris sexus utriusque concumbere. Quis hoc dicat, qui considerat utcumque quod dicit? Utrumque enim naturale est, et quod fieri possunt ista, et quod fiunt; sed est illud et quando nolumus; hoc non est nisi velimus.
Augustine: I have already shown a little before how empty this opinion is; for it is most stupid that human beings should have naturally the possibility of eating, but not naturally eat foods suited to nature; or that human beings should have naturally the possibility of intercourse, but not naturally have intercourse with the genital members of each sex. Who would say this, who considers at all what he says? For both are natural—both that these things can come to be, and that they come to be; but the former is so even when we do not will it; the latter is not, unless we will it.
JulianImp.5.49V. 50. Iulianus. Malum autem quod agit, a possibili agit.
V. 50. Julian: But the evil that he does, he does from the possible.
JulianImp.5.50Augustinus. Attende eum qui dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago ; et responde utrum necessitatem non habeat agendi malum, qui non quod vult facit bonum, sed quod non vult malum, hoc agit. Quod si Apostolo repugnare non audes, ecce homo a necessario malum agens definitiones tuas disrumpit et dissipat: necessitate quippe malum agit, qui non vult, et agit. Hoc autem quod nolens agit, si tantummodo concupiscere est carne, sine ulla mentis consensione membrorumque operatione; mala est et concupiscentia carnis, etiamsi non ei consentiatur ad malum; quam te tamen laudare delectat; si autem tantum cogitur iste qui clamat: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago , ut etiam sua membra exhibeat arma peccato; non solum concupiscuntur a necessario mala, verum etiam committuntur. Ubi sunt definitiones tuae, quas tanta loquacitate distinguis? Nempe ut fumus defecerunt et perierunt. Necessarium atque possibile magna cura discernenda commendas, necessarium dicens esse quod fieri necesse est; possibile autem quod fieri potest, sed necesse non est. Proinde necessitatem necessario tribuis, possibile vero nulla necessitate constringis. Malos actus non das necessario, sed possibili; et dicis loquens de homine: Malum autem quod agit, a possibili agit; ne quisquam male agere necessitate, non voluntate, dicatur. Sed procedit in medium qui tibi validissime contradicit, et dicit: Quid est quod dicis? Ecce ego non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago . Notum est quod homo primus voluntate malum egit, non necessitate; sed iste qui dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago, necessitate se ostendit malum agere, non voluntate; et flens miserias suas, ridet definitiones tuas.
Augustine: Attend to him who says: The evil I do not will, that I do (See Rom 7:19); and answer whether he does not have a necessity of doing evil, who does not the good that he wills, but the evil that he does not will, that he does. And if you do not dare to oppose the Apostle, behold, a human being doing evil from the necessary shatters and scatters your definitions: for by necessity he does evil who does not will it, and yet does it. But this which he does unwilling, if it is only to desire by the flesh, without any consent of the mind and operation of the members, then the concupiscence of the flesh is evil, even if it is not consented to for evil—which concupiscence you yet delight to praise; but if he who cries out, The evil I do not will, that I do (See Rom 7:19), is so far compelled that he even offers his members as weapons to sin, then not only are evils desired from the necessary, but they are even committed. Where are your definitions, which you distinguish with such wordiness? Surely they have failed and perished like smoke. You commend that the necessary and the possible must be distinguished with great care, saying that the necessary is what must come to be, but the possible is what can come to be, but is not necessary. Accordingly, you attribute necessity to the necessary, but constrain the possible by no necessity. Evil acts you give not to the necessary, but to the possible; and you say, speaking of the human being: But the evil he does, he does from the possible; lest anyone be said to do evil by necessity, not by will. But there comes forward into the midst one who most strongly contradicts you, and says: What is it you say? Behold, I do not do the good I will, but the evil I do not will, that I do (See Rom 7:19). It is known that the first man did evil by will, not by necessity; but this man who says, The evil I do not will, that I do, shows himself to do evil by necessity, not by will; and weeping over his miseries, he laughs at your definitions.
JulianImp.5.50V. 51. Iulianus. Nisi ergo necessaria possibilitas fuisset, effectus possibilis non fuisset. Ut ergo possit malum et bonum facere, necessarium est; ut autem malum faciat, non necessario, sed possibili suo debet. Ubi autem possibilitas est partis utriusque, necessitas neutra est. Sic fit ut nihil sit aliud peccatum, quam voluntas agendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. Si nihil sit autem aliud voluntas, quam motus animi, cogente nullo, quomodo ergo Deus, ut mundum faceret, a possibili habuit; mundus autem ipse, ut existeret, a necessario pertulit; ita etiam in imagine Dei simile quiddam intellegitur. Quippe ut habeat, quam elegerit voluntatem, non cogitur; sed a possibili ei venit; illud autem quod male fecerit, ne cessitatem habet reatus. Ita crimen a necessario incurrit horrorem; licet exortum sit, non a necessitate, sed a possibilitate facientis. Opus ergo possibilitatis testimonium est liberi animantis.
V. 51. Julian: Unless, then, there had been a necessary possibility, the possible effect would not have been. That he can do evil and good, then, is necessary; but that he do evil, he owes not to the necessary, but to his own possible. But where there is a possibility of either part, there is necessity of neither. Thus it comes about that sin is nothing other than the will to do what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. But if the will is nothing other than a motion of the mind, with nothing compelling, how then, just as God, in order to make the world, had it from the possible, while the world itself, in order to exist, suffered it from the necessary, so also in the image of God a like thing is understood. For that he have whatever will he has chosen, he is not compelled; but it comes to him from the possible; but that which he has done badly has a necessity of guilt. So crime incurs horror from the necessary, although it arose not from necessity, but from the possibility of the one doing it. The work, then, is the testimony of the possibility of a free living being.
JulianImp.5.51Augustinus. Iam te omnino negligit, qui ea quae tibi supra respondimus, legit. Quoniam qui dicit: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago; necessitate se ad agendum malum premi satis aperte indicat et ostendit falsum esse quod dicis: Ut malum faciat, non necessario, sed possibili suo debet; et cetera talia quae garris inaniter. Sic fit ut illa definitio, qua dicitur, esse peccatum voluntas agendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere, illud peccatum complectatur, sicut iam superius admonui, quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod etiam poena peccati. Tali namque poena iste agebat quod nolebat malum; unde illi si liberum esset abstinere, nequaquam diceret: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago. Sicut ergo nos agnoscimus hominem in corpore vitae illius beatum, ubi liberum habuit quod vellet agere, sive bonum, sive malum; sic et tu agnosce hominem in corpore mortis huius miserum, ubi perdita libertate audis eum dicere: Non quod volo, ago; sed quod odi, illud facio; et: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago; et: Miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?
Augustine: Whoever reads those things which we answered you above now disregards you altogether. For he who says: I do not do the good I will, but the evil I do not will, that I do, indicates clearly enough that he is pressed by necessity to do evil, and shows it to be false what you say: That he do evil, he owes not to the necessary, but to his own possible; and the other such things you chatter in vain. So it comes about that that definition, by which it is said that sin is the will to do what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain, embraces that sin, as I already pointed out above, which is only sin, not that which is also the penalty of sin. For by such a penalty this man was doing the evil he did not will; whence, if it were free for him to abstain, he would by no means say: I do not do the good I will, but the evil I do not will, that I do. As, then, we recognize the human being blessed in the body of that life, where he was free to do what he willed, whether good or evil; so you too recognize the human being wretched in the body of this death, where, having lost liberty, you hear him say: I do not do what I will, but what I hate, that I do; (Rom 7:15) and: I do not do the good I will, but the evil I do not will, that I do; (Rom 7:19) and: Wretched man that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? (Rom 7:24)
JulianImp.5.51V. 52. Iulianus. Huius vituperatio ad necessaria non recurrit; quia quidquid ad necessarium pervenerit, ipsum pulsat auctorem.
V. 52. Julian: The censure of this does not run back to the necessary; because whatever reaches the necessary strikes the author himself.
JulianImp.5.52Augustinus. Numquid hoc malum hominis, ubi dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago, ipsum hominis pulsat auctorem? Et tamen eum qui sic agit malum, satis apparet ad necessarium pervenisse; necessitate quippe agit quod non agit voluntate.
Augustine: Does this evil of the human being, where he says: The evil I do not will, that I do, strike the author of the human being himself? And yet it is plain enough that he who thus does evil has reached the necessary; for by necessity he does what he does not do by will.
JulianImp.5.52V. 53. Iulianus. Quomodo ergo quod a necessario venit, possibili meo adscribi non potest; ita quod a possibili venit, necessario adscribi non potest. Id est, quomodo natura corporis et animi mei voluntati meae applicari non potest, ut ideo sic videar esse quia volui, cum non potuerim velle antequam essem, ita malum voluntatis naturae non potest admoveri, ut necessitati possibilitatis opera misceantur.
V. 53. Julian: As, then, what comes from the necessary cannot be ascribed to my possible, so what comes from the possible cannot be ascribed to the necessary. That is, as the nature of my body and mind cannot be applied to my will, so that I should seem to be thus because I willed it—when I could not will before I was—so the evil of the will cannot be brought to nature, so that the works of possibility be mixed with necessity.
JulianImp.5.53Augustinus. A necessitate quidem satis evidenter et aperte discernitur, quod ita fieri potest, ut non sit necesse; hoc tu possibile appellas, tamquam impossibile sit quod fieri non solum potest, verum etiam necesse est. Sed quoniam placuit tibi talia duobus istis nomina imponere, intellegamus ut possumus, et feramus. Sed quid est quod dicis: Malum voluntatis non potest admoveri naturae? Nonne cum angelus, vel homo aliquid vult, natura aliquid vult? Et angelus et homo naturae non sunt? Quis hoc dixerit? Si ergo naturae sunt angelus et homo; profecto natura vult quodcumque vult angelus, natura vult quodcumque vult homo. Quomodo ergo malum voluntatis naturae non potest admoveri, cum velle aliquid nisi natura non possit? Aut non imputetur homini peccatum voluntatis suae; quia homo natura est, et malum voluntatis, ut dicis, naturae non potest admoveri. An in tantum tua progreditur vanitas, ut naturae dicas debere imputari, quod naturae non potest admoveri? Nam quis dicat naturae non imputari, quod imputatur homini, nisi quisquis ita desipit, ut hominem neget esse naturam? Videsne quam multum loquaris, nesciens quid loquaris? Si ergo dicas: Voluntas necessitati non potest admoveri: ne hoc quidem universaliter verum est. Aliquando enim quod necesse est volumus; sicut necesse est ut qui perseveranter bene vivunt, fiant beati; aliquando etiam necesse est aliquid ut velimus; sicut necesse est nos beatitudinem velle; unde quaedam est et beata necessitas, quia necesse est Deum semper et immutabiliter et beatissime vivere. Sed quoniam sunt et quaedam necessitates sic a voluntatibus alienae, ut et necessitas sit ubi voluntas non est, et voluntas ubi non est necessitas; ex parte saltem verum est quod dicitur: Voluntas necessitati non potest admoveri. Qui vero dicit: Mala voluntas non potest naturae admoveri, idem nobis, si potest, voluntatem vel malam, vel bonam, ubi natura non est, ostendat; aut quod voluntas esse aliqua possit, si natura non sit quae aliquid velit. Attende igitur quam sis a veritate seclusus. Tu dicis: Voluntas mala naturae non potest admoveri; veritas autem dicit: Quamdiu est voluntas ulla, a natura non potest separari.
Augustine: From necessity, indeed, that is clearly and openly distinguished which can so come to be that it is not necessary; this you call possible, as though that were impossible which not only can come to be, but must also. But since it pleased you to impose such names on these two, let us understand as we can, and bear with it. But what is it you say: The evil of the will cannot be brought to nature? When an angel, or a human being, wills something, does not a nature will something? And are not the angel and the human being natures? Who would say this? If, then, the angel and the human being are natures, surely a nature wills whatever the angel wills, a nature wills whatever the human being wills. How, then, can the evil of the will not be brought to nature, when only a nature can will something? Or else let the sin of his will not be imputed to a human being; because a human being is a nature, and the evil of the will, as you say, cannot be brought to nature. Or does your vanity go so far that you say that ought to be imputed to nature which cannot be brought to nature? For who would say that what is imputed to a human being is not imputed to nature, unless someone so foolish that he denies a human being is a nature? Do you see how much you talk, not knowing what you talk? If, then, you say: The will cannot be brought to necessity—not even this is universally true. For sometimes we will what is necessary; as it is necessary that those who live well perseveringly become blessed; sometimes too it is necessary that we will something; as it is necessary that we will blessedness; whence there is also a certain blessed necessity, because it is necessary that God always and unchangeably and most blessedly live. But since there are also certain necessities so alien from wills that there is necessity where there is no will, and will where there is no necessity, it is at least in part true what is said: The will cannot be brought to necessity. But he who says: An evil will cannot be brought to nature, let him show us, if he can, a will, whether evil or good, where there is no nature; or that any will can exist, if there is no nature which wills something. Attend, then, how shut off you are from the truth. You say: An evil will cannot be brought to nature; but truth says: As long as there is any will, it cannot be separated from nature.
JulianImp.5.53V. 54. Iulianus. Hanc ergo subtilitatem divisionum non introspiciens Manichaeus, Traducianorum nobis produxit examina. Argumentatur enim hoc modo: Unde malum? Nimirum de voluntate. Unde voluntas mala? Respondet: De homine. Unde homo? Per Deum. Concluditque: Si malum ex homine, homo per Deum, malum igitur per Deum. Et post hoc, quasi religiosus, ne criminosum faciat Deum, dat tenebrarum naturam, cui malum debeamus adscribere. Hinc et Augustinus: Unde malum? De voluntate. Unde, inquit, ipsa voluntas? De homine, qui est opus Dei. Et colligit: Si malum ex voluntate, voluntas ex homine, homo opus Dei; malum igitur per Deum. Quod quasi conatus absolvere, ne Deum criminosum dicere videretur (quod tradux eius affirmat), violentum aeque pro Deo nobis nihil obtulit, id est, tenebras quibus malum hoc adscribere deberemus. Non enim, inquit, ideo in homine malum natum est, quia opus Dei erat, sed ideo quia de nihilo erat . Quasi veritas respondere non possit: Et qua impudentia primo mentitur Deus tuus esse in homine voluntatem; deinde condemnat, cum malum istud, videlicet peccatum, de necessitate noverit tenebrarum, id est, antiqui nihili contigisse? Infleximus per casus nihil, ut appareret Traduciani virtus in nihilo collocantis spem suam. Vide tamen imbecillitatem Dei, quem Traducianus inducit. Ipsum nihilum superare non valuit; cumque hominem fecisset ex nihilo, non eum potuit a conditione mali, quae de nihilo veniebat, exuere; sed rerum difficultate factus amarior, pro suis culpis hominem criminatur, et imaginis suae exitio nihili delicta condemnat. Benignius cum eo agit senex Manes, ut dicat illum non usquequaque tenebrarum gente vastatum; cuius debilitatem tantam inducit Traducianus, ut commentetur eum a nihilo fuisse superatum.
V. 54. Julian: Not looking into this subtlety of divisions, the Manichee brought forth to us the swarms of the Traducianists. For he argues in this manner: Whence comes evil? Surely from the will. Whence comes the evil will? He answers: From the human being. Whence the human being? Through God. And he concludes: If evil is from the human being, the human being through God, then evil is through God. And after this, as though religious, lest he make God criminal, he gives the nature of darkness, to which we should ascribe evil. Hence Augustine too: Whence comes evil? From the will. Whence, he says, the will itself? From the human being, who is the work of God. And he gathers: If evil is from the will, the will from the human being, the human being the work of God, then evil is through God. And as though trying to resolve this, lest he seem to call God criminal (which his offshoot affirms), he offered us a nothing equally violent in place of God, that is, darkness to which we should ascribe this evil. For it is not, he says, because he was a work of God that evil was born in the human being, but because he was from nothing. As though truth could not answer: And with what shamelessness does your God first lie that there is a will in the human being, then condemn it, since he knew that this evil, namely sin, came about from the necessity of darkness, that is, of the ancient nothing? We have declined "nothing" through its cases, that the virtue of the Traducianist who places his hope in nothing might appear. See, too, the weakness of the God whom the Traducianist introduces. He could not overcome the nothing itself; and when he had made the human being from nothing, he could not strip him of the condition of evil, which came from nothing; but, made the more bitter by the difficulty of the matter, he charges the human being with his own faults, and condemns the offenses of nothing by the destruction of his own image. The old man Manes deals more kindly with him, in saying that he was not everywhere laid waste by the race of darkness; whose so great feebleness the Traducianist introduces, that he devises that God was overcome by nothing.
JulianImp.5.54Augustinus. Nemo superatur a nihilo; sed tu superaris nihil dicendo; nec ego in nihilo collocavi spem meam; sed tu ad nihilum perduxisti loquacitatem tuam. Sane, si recte intellegas quod perverse loqueris, isto modo Deus a nihilo superatur, quoniam Deum nulla res superat; nihil enim quid est, nisi res nulla? Isto modo etiam Deus non potest superare nihil; quia nullam rem non superat, qui superat omnia; est enim super omnia. Sed: Non introspexit, ut dicis, Manichaeus subtilitates divisionum tuarum, et ideo dicit: Si malum ex homine, homo autem per Deum, malum igitur per Deum; ut hac conclusione territi, aut hominem per Deum, aut malum negemus ex homine, aut utrumque, ut ille, falsum esse dicamus; ac sic nobis introducat nescio quam substantiam tenebrarum, quae hominem fecerit, et quae principaliter malum sit, unde malum omne credatur. Tu ergo, divisor subtilissime, huic astutiae qua putas sapientia resistendum? Dicam, inquis, malum ab homine ex possibili exstitisse, non ex necessario. Quasi vero tibi ille respondere non possit: Si malum ex possibili, possibilitas ex natura, natura per Deum, malum igitur per Deum. Hanc conclusionem si tu non times, nec ego illam; quoniam ambo non ex necessario, sed ex possibili peccasse hominem primum confitemur. Etenim nos dicentes hominem propterea potuisse peccare, quia non est eius natura facta de Deo, quamvis omnino esse nisi illo creante non posset; non ita hoc dicimus, ut ex hoc ei dicamus impactam, sicut calumniaris, peccandi necessitatem. Prorsus peccare poterat et non peccare; sed si non de nihilo factus esset, id est, si de Deo natura eius esset, peccare omnino non posset. Quis enim est tam demens, qui dicere audeat, immutabilem et inconvertibilem naturam quae Deus est, ullo modo posse peccare; de quo dicat Apostolus: Negare se ipsum non potest ? Utrique igitur Manichaeo resistimus, dicentes a bono et iusto Deo non sic hominem factum esse, ut ei esset necesse peccare; et ideo peccasse quia voluit, qui posset et nolle. Sed quod in eius progenie mala tanta et tam manifesta conspicimus, non voluntaria hominum, sed cum quibus nati sunt, cum ea venire de vitiata per peccatum origine vos negatis, profecto ad naturam mali introducendam, cuius commixtione Dei natura corrupta sit, tamquam in arce Manichaeum haeresis vestra constituit, ex qua et illum simul et vos veritas deicit.
Augustine: No one is overcome by nothing; but you are overcome by saying "nothing"; nor did I place my hope in nothing; but you have brought your wordiness to nothing. Indeed, if you understand rightly what you say perversely, in this way God is overcome by nothing, since no thing overcomes God; for what is nothing, except no thing? In this way too God cannot overcome nothing; because he does not overcome any thing, who overcomes all things; for he is above all things. But: The Manichee, as you say, did not look into the subtleties of your divisions, and therefore says: If evil is from the human being, but the human being through God, then evil is through God; so that, terrified by this conclusion, we should deny either that the human being is through God, or that evil is from the human being, or, like him, say that both are false; and so introduce to us some substance of darkness, which made the human being, and which is principally evil, whence all evil is believed to come. You, then, most subtle divider, by what cleverness do you think this craftiness must be resisted? I will say, you say, that evil arose from the human being from the possible, not from the necessary. As though he could not answer you: If evil is from the possible, possibility from nature, nature through God, then evil is through God. This conclusion, if you do not fear it, neither do I; since we both confess that the first man sinned not from the necessary, but from the possible. For we, in saying that the human being could sin for this reason—that his nature was not made from God, although it could not exist at all except by him creating it—do not say this in such a way that from this we say a necessity of sinning was forced upon him, as you slanderously claim. He could altogether both sin and not sin; but if he had not been made from nothing, that is, if his nature were from God, he could not sin at all. For who is so mad as to dare to say that the unchangeable and unconvertible nature which is God can in any way sin—of whom the Apostle says: He cannot deny himself (2 Tim 2:13)? We therefore resist both Manichees, saying that the human being was not so made by the good and just God that it was necessary for him to sin; and that he sinned because he willed, who could also have not willed. But because we behold in his offspring evils so great and so manifest—not the voluntary evils of human beings, but those with which they are born—when you deny that these come from an origin vitiated by sin, your heresy surely sets up the Manichee, as if in a citadel, for introducing a nature of evil by whose commingling the nature of God is corrupted; from which citadel truth casts down both him at once and you.
JulianImp.5.54V. 55. Iulianus. Patiuntur hanc omnes ignominiam, qui indicunt veritati bellum. Nos ergo quod egimus colligamus. Quaeritur unde illa prima voluntas mala in homine fuerit exorta. Respondemus: A motu animi, cogente nullo. Obicitur: Si in opere Dei apparuit? Assentimur verum esse. Rogatur quomodo id non abnuamus, qui negamus naturale peccatum. Respondemus: Quia in opere Dei a possibili existit peccatum istud, non a necessario. Naturalia ergo necessaria sunt, possibilia autem voluntaria.
V. 55. Julian: All who declare war on truth suffer this ignominy. Let us, then, gather up what we have done. It is asked whence that first evil will arose in the human being. We answer: From a motion of the mind, with nothing compelling. It is objected: Even if it appeared in the work of God? We assent that it is true. It is asked how we do not refuse this, who deny natural sin. We answer: Because in the work of God this sin exists from the possible, not from the necessary. Natural things, then, are necessary, but possible things are voluntary.
JulianImp.5.55Augustinus. Sunt et voluntaria necessaria, sicut beati esse volumus, et necesse est ut velimus; sunt et possibilia naturalia; sic possibile est enim ut concipiat femina quae concumbit cum viro suis et illius genitalibus membris, si nec ipsa sterilis sit, nec ille; sed non est necessarium; fieri quippe potest, sed necesse non est; et tamen naturale est. Tace, obsecro; vanae sunt definitiones; nec subtiles, sed pueriles divisiones tuae.
Augustine: There are also voluntary things that are necessary, as we will to be blessed, and it is necessary that we will it; there are also possible things that are natural; for it is thus possible that a woman who has intercourse with her husband, by her own and his genital members, should conceive, if neither she be sterile nor he; but it is not necessary; for it can come to be, but is not necessary; and yet it is natural. Be silent, I beg; your definitions are empty; your divisions are not subtle, but childish.
JulianImp.5.55V. 56. Iulianus. Ac per hoc, ut peccatum motui libero, ita naturam Deo abscribimus conditori. Est igitur natura humana bonum opus Dei; est libertas arbitrii, id est, possibilitas vel delinquendi, vel recte faciendi, bonum aeque opus Dei. Utrumque hoc homini a necessario venit; neutra de his duabus rebus mali causa est. Sed huc usque necessaria illa venerunt; iam voluntas quidem in his exoritur, sed non de his. Capacia voluntatis sunt quippe, non plena; nec faciunt, sed accipiunt diversitatem meritorum.
V. 56. Julian: And through this, just as we ascribe sin to the free motion, so we ascribe nature to God the founder. Human nature, then, is a good work of God; the liberty of choice, that is, the possibility either of doing wrong or of doing right, is equally a good work of God. Both of these come to the human being from the necessary; neither of these two things is the cause of evil. But thus far those necessary things have come; now will indeed arises in these, but not from these. For they are capable of will, not full of it; nor do they make, but receive, the diversity of merits.
JulianImp.5.56Augustinus. Naturam et liberum arbitrium rectissime bona confiteris esse Dei opera; sed quod voluntatem in his quidem, sed non de his asseris exoriri, quid insanius dici potest? Itane vero, Iuliane, ex homine hominis voluntas non oritur, cum homo bonum opus Dei sit? Postremo potuitne ascendere in cor tuum, exoriri quidem hominis voluntatem, sed non de libero eius arbitrio? Dic ergo unde, si non de natura, id est, non de ipso homine; si non de libero eius arbitrio, dic, rogo, unde voluntas hominis oriatur. Dixisti ubi oriatur, dic et unde. Bona opera Dei sunt natura et liberum arbitrium: In his, inquis, voluntas exoritur, sed non de his. Unde ergo? Dic; audiamus, discamus. Aut ostende aliquid alicubi ortum esse, cum unde non esset. Mundus quidem de nihilo exortus est, sed Deo faciente; nam si Deum opificem non haberet, de nullis rebus omnino oriri non posset. Si ergo et voluntas in homine vel in eius libero arbitrio de nihilo exorta est, quis eam fecit? Aut si non facta, vel orta est, quis eam genuit? An sola est in rebus, quae esse coeperunt, facta a nullo, nata de nullo? Cur ergo propter illam damnatur homo, quo non volente exorta est in illo voluntas mala, cuius erat tantum capax, non efficax? Si autem, ut iure damnetur, eo volente in illo exorta est; cur eius ipsius voluntatem de illo exortam negas, quo volente exortam esse, et quo nisi volente exoriri non potuisse non negas? Cum vero de illo orta est, de natura exorta est, quia homo natura est; et quia potuit etiam nolle quod voluit, de libero eius arbitrio exorta est, quod et ipsum, sicut fateris, pertinet ad naturam; cur ergo negas clausis oculis res apertas, de natura hominis exoriri voluntatem hominis, dum times ne Manichaeus naturae huius accuset auctorem? Sufficit ad illam pestilentiam refellendam, quod catholica veritas praedicat, ab optimo Deo sic esse hominem conditum, ut necessitatem peccandi non haberet, nec peccaret, si peccare nollet; cum etiam semper nolle utique posset. Quis enim tam sit mente caecus, ut non videat, sicut homo est primitus conditus, magnum bonum esse naturae, posse non peccare; quamvis maius sit non posse peccare; atque ordinatissime constitutum, ut hoc prius esset unde fieret hominis meritum, et illud esset postea bene meriti praemium?
Augustine: You most rightly confess that nature and free choice are good works of God; but in asserting that will arises in these indeed, but not from these, what more insane thing can be said? Is it really so, Julian, that a human being's will does not arise from a human being, when a human being is a good work of God? Finally, could it ascend into your heart that a human being's will arises indeed, but not from his free choice? Say, then, whence—if not from nature, that is, not from the human being himself; if not from his free choice, say, I ask, whence a human being's will arises. You have said where it arises; say also whence. Nature and free choice are good works of God: In these, you say, will arises, but not from these. Whence, then? Say; let us hear, let us learn. Or show that something has somewhere arisen, when there was nothing whence it could arise. The world indeed arose from nothing, but with God making it; for if it did not have God as its maker, it could not arise at all from no things. If, then, will too arose in the human being or in his free choice from nothing, who made it? Or, if not made, but arisen, who begot it? Or is it alone among the things which began to be, made by no one, born of no one? Why, then, is the human being condemned on account of it, in whom an evil will arose without his willing—of which he was only capable, not effective? But if, so that he may be justly condemned, it arose in him with his willing, why do you deny that this very will arose from him, with whose willing you do not deny it arose, and without whose willing you do not deny it could not arise? But when it arose from him, it arose from nature, because a human being is a nature; and because he could also not will what he willed, it arose from his free choice, which itself, as you confess, pertains to nature; why, then, do you deny with closed eyes things that are plain—that a human being's will arises from a human being's nature—while you fear lest the Manichee accuse the author of this nature? To refute that pestilence it is enough that Catholic truth proclaims that the human being was so founded by the best God that he did not have a necessity of sinning, nor would he sin if he did not will to sin; while he could also always not will it. For who is so blind of mind as not to see that, as the human being was first founded, it is a great good of nature, to be able not to sin; although it is greater not to be able to sin; and that it was most orderly established that the former should be first, whence a human being's merit might come, and the latter should be afterward the reward of one who has merited well?
JulianImp.5.56V. 57. Iulianus. Bona ergo possibilitas mali atque boni voluntatem non cogit, sed permittit oboriri. Nemo igitur ideo bonus est, quia libero affectus arbitrio est; sunt quippe multi homines aeque liberi, sed tamen pessimi; sed nec ideo quisque malus est, quia liberi arbitrii est; sunt enim multi aeque libertatis huius participes, tamen optimi. Nec bonus igitur, nec malus homo ideo est, quia liber est; sed nec bonus, nec malus esse posset, nisi liber esset. Est ergo ista possibilitas, quae nomine libertatis ostenditur, ita a sapientissimo constituta Deo, ut sine ipsa non sit, quod per ipsam esse non cogitur. Contrariorum enim una capacitate ab utrorumque praeiudicio vindicatur; id est, nec malae voluntatis, nec bonae causa et necessitas dici potest, quae utramque sic recipit, ut neutram compellat existere. Necessariorum ergo singularis ductus, et unum quodam modo filum est, velut geometrica illa sine latitudine longitudo est, nec hic unio dividi potest. Quamdiu ergo singularis extenditur, vim naturae suae tenet; at ubi ei occurrerit quod in diversa findatur, illud necessarium illico terminatur. Id est, bonus Deus bonum fecit hominem.
V. 57. Julian: The good possibility of evil and good, then, does not compel the will, but permits it to arise. No one, therefore, is good because he is endowed with free choice; for there are many human beings equally free, but yet most wicked; but neither is anyone evil because he is of free choice; for there are many equally partakers of this liberty, yet most excellent. A human being, then, is neither good nor evil because he is free; but he could be neither good nor evil unless he were free. There is, then, this possibility, which is shown by the name of liberty, so established by the most wise God that without it there is not that which through it is not compelled to be. For by the one capacity for contraries it is vindicated from the prejudgment of either; that is, it cannot be called the cause and necessity of an evil will, nor of a good one, which so receives both that it compels neither to exist. The course of necessary things, then, is single, and is, as it were, one thread, like that geometrical length without breadth, nor can this unit be divided. As long, then, as it extends single, it holds the force of its nature; but where there meets it something by which it is split into diverse parts, that necessary thing is at once terminated. That is: the good God made the human being good.
JulianImp.5.57Augustinus. Cur ergo dixisti, nec bonum, nec malum esse hominem, nisi propria voluntate; et quidquid ex Deo habet, ex necessario habere, non ex possibili? Quod vis intellegi, ex natura, non ex voluntate; ut per se ipsum bonus sit homo, non per Deum, aut certe melior per se ipsum quam per Deum. Haec quippe verba tua sunt: Nemo, inquis, ideo bonus est, quia libero affectus arbitrio est. Et paulo post: Nec ideo quisque malus est, inquis, quia liberi arbitrii est. Quibus verbis quid dicis, nisi quod nec bonum nec malum Deus fecerit hominem, sed utrumlibet horum ipse se facit, cum bene vel male utitur libero arbitrio? Quid est ergo quod nunc dicis: Bonus Deus bonum fecit hominem; si nec bonus, nec malus est habendo liberum arbitrium quod in eo Deus fecit, sed bene utendo, id est, cum iam ipse bene vult, non cum habet possibilitatem volendi bene? Et quomodo verum erit: Fecit Deus hominem rectum ? An rectus erat non habens voluntatem bonam, sed eius possibilitatem? Ergo et pravus erat non habens voluntatem malam, sed eius possibilitatem; et a se ipso illi est voluntas bona, falsumque scriptum est: Praeparatur voluntas a Domino ; et: Deus in vobis operatur et velle . Quamquam tu nec a se ipso ei dicas esse voluntatem bonam vel malam; sed oriri in illo, non de illo. Ita fit, ut per tuam mirabilem sapientiam, nec Deus fecerit rectum hominem; sed qui rectus posset esse, si vellet; nec ipse se faciat, sed nescio quo casu rectus fiat, quia nec de illo, sed nescio unde, aut nescio quomodo, in illo voluntas oritur qua rectus fiat. Non est ista sapientia desursum descendens, sed terrena, animalis, diabolica .
Augustine: Why, then, did you say that a human being is neither good nor evil except by his own will; and that whatever he has from God, he has from the necessary, not from the possible? By which you wish it understood that he has it from nature, not from will; so that a human being is good through himself, not through God, or at least better through himself than through God. For these are your words: No one, you say, is good because he is endowed with free choice. And a little after: Nor is anyone evil, you say, because he is of free choice. By which words what do you say, but that God made the human being neither good nor evil, but he makes himself either of these, when he uses free choice well or badly? What is it, then, that you now say: The good God made the human being good; if he is neither good nor evil by having the free choice which God made in him, but by using it well, that is, when now he himself wills well, not when he has the possibility of willing well? And how will it be true: God made the human being upright (Eccl 7:29)? Or was he upright not having a good will, but the possibility of it? Then he was also depraved not having an evil will, but the possibility of it; and the good will is his from himself, and it is falsely written: The will is prepared by the Lord (Prov 8:35 LXX); and: God works in you also to will (Phil 2:13). Although you do not say that the good or evil will is his from himself; but that it arises in him, not from him. So it comes about that, by your marvelous wisdom, neither did God make the human being upright, but one who could be upright if he willed; nor does he make himself, but by some chance becomes upright, because the will by which he becomes upright arises in him not from him, but from I know not where, or in I know not what way. This is not the wisdom that comes down from above, but is earthly, animal, diabolical (See Jas 3:15).
JulianImp.5.57V. 58. Iulianus. Et incipere, et bene incipere substantiam, a necessarii unione dirigitur. Accipit etiam arbitrii libertatem; aeque adhuc necessarii linea continetur; sed iam necessariorum finis est; hinc finduntur in contraria voluntates. Ad unionem ergo necessarii divisionis natura non pertinet. Ita possibilitatem habere cogimur; uti autem vel bene vel male ipsa possibilitate non cogimur. Ita fit ut etiam possibilitas peccandi capax boni malique, sed voluntarii sit; quoniam boni proprii capax esse non poterat, nisi capax esset et pravi.
V. 58. Julian: And both to begin, and to begin well, the substance is directed by the union of the necessary. It also receives the liberty of choice; it is still likewise contained by the line of the necessary; but now is the end of necessary things; from here wills are split into contraries. To the union of the necessary, then, the nature of division does not pertain. Thus we are compelled to have possibility; but to use that possibility either well or badly, we are not compelled. So it comes about that even the possibility of sinning is capable of good and evil, but of voluntary good and evil; since it could not be capable of its proper good, unless it were also capable of evil.
JulianImp.5.58Augustinus. Dic potius, si vis verum dicere, hominis naturam capacem boni et pravi prius factam; non quod non posset solius boni capax fieri; sed quod ab ipso gradu ordinatissime surgere debuit, ut si non peccasset quando peccare posset, ad eam beatitudinem perveniret ubi peccare non posset. Quia, sicut iam dixi, utrumque magnum bonum est, quamvis minus unum, alterum maius. Minus est enim posse non peccare, maius autem non posse peccare; et oportebat a merito boni minoris ad praemium pervenire maioris. Nam si boni proprii, sicut dicis, capax esse non poterat humana natura nisi capax esset et pravi, cur post hanc vitam pie gestam, boni solius erit, et non mali capax, ab omni scilicet aliena, non solum voluntate, vel necessitate, verum etiam possibilitate peccandi? An vero metuendum est, ne tunc etiam forte peccemus, quando sanctis angelis erimus aequales? De quibus sine dubitatione credendum est, quod acceperint non posse peccare pro merito permansionis suae, quoniam steterunt, quando aliis cadentibus etiam ipsi peccare potuerunt. Alioquin adhuc timendum esset, ne multos novos diabolos, et eorum novos malos angelos haberet hic mundus. Sanctorum etiam qui de corporibus exierunt, erit nobis vita suspecta, ne ibi etiam quo venerunt, forsitan peccaverint, aut forsitan peccent; si in natura rationali possibilitas peccandi permanet, nec potest esse capax boni, si non sit et mali. Quae quoniam vehementer absurda sunt, haec opinio est respuenda; potiusque credendum, ideo fuisse istam naturam et boni et mali capacem primitus factam, ut horum alterum diligendo, meritum compararet, quo boni solius, vel mali solius capax postmodum fieret; ita tamen ut si plecteretur damnatione perpetua, pati cogeretur tantum, non etiam facere sineretur malum.
Augustine: Say rather, if you wish to say what is true, that human nature was first made capable of good and depraved; not that it could not be made capable of good alone; but that from that very step it ought most orderly to rise, so that if it did not sin when it could sin, it would arrive at that blessedness where it could not sin. For, as I have already said, both are a great good, though one is less, the other greater. For to be able not to sin is less, but not to be able to sin is greater; and it was fitting that from the merit of the lesser good one should arrive at the reward of the greater. For if, as you say, human nature could not be capable of its proper good unless it were also capable of evil, why, after this life is piously spent, will it be capable of good alone, and not of evil—free, that is, from all sinning that is alien, not only of will or necessity, but even of possibility? Or is it to be feared, lest then too we should perhaps sin, when we shall be equal to the holy angels? Of whom it is without doubt to be believed that they received the inability to sin as the reward of their perseverance, since they stood firm, when, others falling, they too could have sinned. Otherwise it would still be to be feared lest this world should have many new devils, and their new evil angels. The life of the saints too who have departed from their bodies will be suspect to us, lest there too, where they have come, they perhaps have sinned, or perhaps do sin; if in the rational nature the possibility of sinning remains, and it cannot be capable of good, if it be not also capable of evil. Since these things are vehemently absurd, this opinion is to be spat out; and it is rather to be believed that this nature was first made capable of both good and evil for this reason, that by loving the one of these it might acquire merit, by which it might afterward become capable of good alone, or of evil alone; yet so that, if it were punished with perpetual condemnation, it would be compelled only to suffer evil, not also permitted to do it.
JulianImp.5.58V. 59. Iulianus. Sed quantum interest inter plenum et vacuum, tantum nimirum inter possibilitatem et necessitatem. Possibilitas enim rei illius, cuius capax dicitur, vacua ostenditur; quando si vacua non esset, nec capax esset. Quis enim caperet, quod iam haberet? Necessitas autem non vacuitatem, sed plenitudinem indicat; non potest quippe capere quasi vacua, quod iam quasi plena esse compellit. Tantum itaque inter necessaria et possibilia interest, quantum inter conferta et inania. Ab utriusque ergo qualitatis, cuius aeque capax est, praeiudiciis ipsa repugnantium susceptione defenditur. Habet ergo bonum necessarium in natura tantum, quantum ad honorem spectat auctoris; quod est innocentia nulli malo admixta naturaliter, proprii operis pro boni proprietate et accusatione mali receptrix. Illud ergo quod ei de proprio venit, peccans quisque sauciare potest; hoc vero quod de Dei opere suscepit, decolorare non potest. Manet ergo et in malis hominibus taxatio naturalis boni; nec umquam malum erit, bonum malumque agere potuisse; sed personae illi nihil proderit, quae necessarii sui instituta non damnat quidem, sed tamen sibi ea non prodesse compulit. Sicut ergo in eo homine, in quo est iam explicata libertas, cum peccat, malum adscribimus voluntati, naturam autem Deo conditionis auctori; ita si parvulus, qui voluntatis usum non habet, nec quidquam ostendit praeter instituta naturae, scelere plenus esse dicatur, atque habere malum a necessario, quod alter a possibili capit; sine dubio is auctor criminis, qui naturae auctor, arguitur.
V. 59. Julian: But as great as is the difference between the full and the empty, so great surely is the difference between possibility and necessity. For the possibility of that thing of which it is said to be capable is shown to be empty; since, if it were not empty, it would not be capable. For who would contain what he already had? But necessity indicates not emptiness, but fullness; for it cannot, as it were empty, contain what it already compels to be, as it were full. As much, then, is there between necessary and possible things as between the crammed and the void. From the prejudgments of either quality, then, of which it is equally capable, it is defended by the very reception of the opposites. It has, therefore, the necessary good in nature only so far as pertains to the honor of its author; which is innocence mixed naturally with no evil, the receiver of its own work, for the property of good and the accusation of evil. That, then, which comes to it from its own, anyone sinning can wound; but this which it has received from the work of God, he cannot discolor. There remains, therefore, even in evil human beings, the estimation of the natural good; nor will it ever be an evil to have been able to do good and evil; but it will profit nothing that person who does not indeed condemn the institutions of his necessary, but yet has compelled them not to profit him. As, then, in the human being in whom liberty is already unfolded, when he sins, we ascribe the evil to the will, but nature to God the author of his condition; so if a little one, who has no use of will, and shows nothing beyond the institutions of nature, be said to be full of crime, and to have from the necessary the evil which another takes from the possible; without doubt he is charged as the author of the crime, who is the author of nature.
JulianImp.5.59Augustinus. Regulas tuas aperte in maioribus frangimus, ut eas ad parvulos transferre non possis. Non erat parvulus qui dicebat: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago . Non ei possibilitatis inanitas, sed necessitatis inerat plenitudo, ut tuo de his rebus loquamur modo; non erat vacuum quod caperet, sed refertum quo ceperat malum. Non enim ait: Bonum malumque agere possum; quae possibilitas naturae humanae malum non fuit, nec voluntatis; sed ait: Non quod volo, facio bonum. Nec tantum; verum et addidit: sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago. Ecce et quod non agit bonum, et quod agit malum, non possibili, ut ipse constituis, sed ut ille patitur et fatetur, necessario suo debet; infirmus quidem ad auferendas miserias suas, sed plane firmissimus malleus ad conterendas regulas vestras. Vult et non agit quod bonum est, non vult et agit quod malum est; unde ista necessitas? Agnoscunt eam quidem catholici doctores, qui Paulum apostolum intellegunt etiam de se ipso ista dicentem, et ex lege quae in membris repugnat legi mentis, sine qua nullus hominum nascitur, venire non dubitant; et ideo dici et a sanctis vident: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago; quia vident quantum bonum sit nec carne concupiscere, quae mente aversantur; eosque id velle, nec facere; et malum esse, quamvis mente non consentiente, vel carne tamen talia concupiscere; eosque id nolle, sed facere, sine ulla quidem condemnatione, quoniam peccati huius reatu regeneratione deleto, resistunt mente, ne perficiant quod concupiscunt carne; sed non sine suo aliquo malo, quia non eis aliena commixta, sed eorum natura est et in mente et in carne. Hunc sensum pium et verum contra vestram susceptam non vultis admittere; quasi propterea faciatis, ut in iudicio quo defenditur a vobis, non solum de litteris, verum etiam de ipsis hominum moribus gemitibusque sanctorum, nihil adversus eam recitetur, nolentibus vobis; et tanta veritatis manifestatione recitetur, ut non eloquentia, sed sola impudentia vestra remaneat, qua illam non possitis defendere, sed velitis. Quid enim agitis, quod res apertas turbidae loquacitatis tempestate nubilare conamini? Clamat Apostolus: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago. Clamat etiam superius: Iam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum; scio enim quia non habitat in me, hoc est in mea carne, bonum . Quid est: quod nolo facio? Et quid est: non ego operor? Quid est, nisi quod consequenter exponit? Dicendo quippe: quod nolo facio, se facere ostendit; et rursus dicendo: non ego operor, non mentem consentientem, sed carnem suam concupiscentem id facere ostendit; concupiscendo quippe caro agit, etsi ad consensum mentem non attrahit. Propter hoc adiungit: Scio quia non habitat in me. Et exponens quid dicat in me: Hoc est, inquit, in carne mea, bonum. Verum sint istae voces, non Apostoli, ut vultis, sed cuiuslibet hominis mala sua consuetudine praegravati, quam voluntate non potest vincere; nonne et haec tam robusta est, ut argumentationes vestras de possibili et necessario tamquam pueriles et ludicras tabellas robore suo frangat et conterat? Quoniam est, quod non vultis, non solum voluntarium atque possibile, unde liberum est abstinere; verum etiam necessarium peccatum, unde abstinere liberum non est, quod iam non solum peccatum, sed etiam poena peccati est. Nec attendere vultis, quod in unoquoque agitur per violentiam consuetudinis (quam quidam docti dixerunt esse secundam naturam), hoc actum esse per violentiam poenalem summi illius maximique pec cati primi hominis in omnibus qui erant in lumbis eius, per eius concupiscentiam exorturi, cum propagaretur humanum genus, quam concupiscentiam peccantium pudor operuit in regione lumborum.
Augustine: We openly break your rules in the grown, so that you cannot transfer them to little ones. He was no little one who said: I do not do the good I will, but the evil I do not will, that I do (Rom 7:19). In him was not the emptiness of possibility, but the fullness of necessity, to speak of these matters in your manner; that which contained was not empty, but stuffed with the evil it had taken in. For he does not say: I can do good and evil; which possibility of human nature was no evil, nor of the will; but he says: I do not do the good I will. Nor only that; but he even added: but the evil I do not will, that I do. Behold, both that he does not do the good, and that he does the evil, he owes not to the possible, as you establish, but, as he suffers and confesses, to his own necessary; weak indeed to take away his miseries, but plainly a most firm hammer to grind your rules to powder. He wills and does not do what is good, he does not will and does what is evil; whence this necessity? Catholic teachers indeed recognize it, who understand the apostle Paul to be saying these things even of himself, and do not doubt that it comes from the law which in the members fights against the law of the mind (See Rom 7:23), without which no human being is born; and therefore they see that it is said even by the saints: I do not do the good I will, but the evil I do not will, that I do; because they see how great a good it is not even to desire by the flesh what they turn from in mind; and that they will this, and do not do it; and that it is an evil, although the mind does not consent, yet by the flesh to desire such things; and that they do not will this, but do it, without any condemnation indeed, since, the guilt of this sin being blotted out by regeneration, they resist with the mind, lest they accomplish what they desire by the flesh; but not without some evil of their own, because not an alien nature is commingled with them, but it is their own nature both in mind and in flesh. This pious and true sense against your protégée you are unwilling to admit; as though for this reason you might bring it about that, in the judgment by which it is defended by you, nothing should be recited against it, not only from the writings, but even from the very morals of human beings and the groanings of the saints, against your will; and that it be recited with so great a manifestation of truth, that not your eloquence, but only your shamelessness remains, by which you cannot defend it, but wish to. For what are you doing, when you try to cloud plain things with the storm of your turbid wordiness? The Apostle cries out: I do not do the good I will, but the evil I do not will, that I do. He cries out also above: It is no longer I that do it, but the sin that dwells in me; for I know that there does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh, the good (See Rom 7:17-18). What is: what I do not will, I do? And what is: it is no longer I that do it? What is it, but what he consistently expounds? For by saying, what I do not will, I do, he shows that he does it; and again by saying, it is no longer I that do it, he shows that not the consenting mind, but his own desiring flesh does it; for the flesh acts by desiring, even if it does not draw the mind to consent. On this account he adds: I know that there does not dwell in me. And expounding what he means by "in me": That is, he says, in my flesh, the good. But suppose these words are not the Apostle's, as you wish, but of any human being weighed down by his evil habit, which he cannot conquer by will; are not these too so robust that they break and grind to powder your arguments about the possible and the necessary, like childish and playful little tablets, by their robustness? Since there is, what you are unwilling, not only a voluntary and possible sin, from which one is free to abstain, but also a necessary sin, from which one is not free to abstain, which is now not only sin, but also the penalty of sin. Nor do you wish to attend that what is done in each one through the violence of habit (which certain learned men have called a second nature), this has been done through the penal violence of that highest and greatest sin of the first man, in all who were in his loins, destined to arise through his concupiscence, when the human race was propagated—which concupiscence the shame of the sinners covered in the region of the loins.
JulianImp.5.59V. 60. Iulianus. Sed quid nos ad parvulos; cum quaestio Manichaeorum nec perfectae aetatis hominem dicat voluntate peccare? Nam si ideo exortum est in homine malum, quia de nihilo factus erat, a necessario autem habuit homo ut de nihilo fieret; sine dubio malum non a possibili, sed a necessario recepit. Quod quia longa disputatione destructum est, adhuc modicum, quo magis ac magis iteratione lucescat, super hoc eodem disseramus. Quaeris ergo unde ipsa voluntas mala in primo homine exstiterit. Respondeo: De motu animi, cogente nullo. Quaeris et unde ipse motus. Respondeo: Quid requiris? Unde esse potuerit, an unde esse compulsus sit? Si dicas, quod scripsisti quoque: Unde esse compulsus est, referam te asystata et contraria loqui. Quaeris enim quis coegerit, quod esse non possit, nisi cogente nullo; quod quia ipsa sui contrarietate dissolvitur, nihil habet virium quaestio, quae ordinem non habet. Igitur stolidissime interrogas, unde ipsa voluntas mala. Hoc enim quod dicis: Unde, non occasionem, sed originem eius, id est, naturam requiris; at id, sicut supra tractatum est, si naturam accipit, definitionem sui perdit, qua dictum est: cogente nullo; si vero definitionem tenet, praeiudicium nativitatis excludit. Non ideo ergo peccavit homo, quia de nihilo factus est, non ideo quia a Deo factus est, non ideo quia de tenebris factus est, non ideo quia liberi arbitrii factus est; sed ideo peccavit, quia voluit; id est, ideo habuit voluntatem malam, quia voluit.
V. 60. Julian: But what have we to do with little ones, when the question of the Manichees says that not even a human being of perfect age sins by will? For if evil arose in the human being because he was made from nothing, but the human being had from the necessary that he be made from nothing; without doubt he received evil not from the possible, but from the necessary. Since this has been destroyed by a long disputation, let us still discourse a little on this same matter, that it may grow clearer and clearer by repetition. You ask, then, whence that evil will arose in the first man. I answer: From a motion of the mind, with nothing compelling. You ask too whence the motion itself. I answer: What do you seek? Whence it could be, or whence it was compelled to be? If you say, as you also wrote: Whence it was compelled to be, I will report that you speak inconsistent and contradictory things. For you ask who compelled what cannot be, except with nothing compelling; which, since it is dissolved by its own self-contradiction, the question has no force which has no order. Therefore you ask most stupidly whence the evil will itself comes. For this which you say, "Whence," seeks not its occasion, but its origin, that is, its nature; but this, as was treated above, if it receives a nature, loses its definition, by which it was said, with nothing compelling; but if it keeps its definition, it excludes the prejudgment of birth. Not for this reason, then, did the human being sin, because he was made from nothing; not for this reason, because he was made by God; not for this reason, because he was made from darkness; not for this reason, because he was made of free choice; but he sinned for this reason, because he willed; that is, he had an evil will for this reason, because he willed.
JulianImp.5.60Augustinus. Nos, vel potius ipsa Veritas dicit, perfectae aetatis homines quosdam voluntate, quosdam necessitate, vel eosdem ipsos in quibusdam voluntate, in quibusdam necessitate agere malum. Quod si falsum putas, illum aspice clamantem: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago. Qui tibi toties in faciem retorquendus est, quoties dicens ista, vel non videre te fingis istum, vel fortasse non vides. Quid te anfractuosis involvis ambagibus? Non tibi dicitur: Necessitatem peccandi habuit homo, quia de nihilo factus est; sed tu tibi hoc dicis. Prorsus ita factus est, ut peccandi possibilitatem haberet a necessario, peccatum vero a possibili. Verumtamen nec ipsam peccandi possibilitatem haberet, si Dei natura esset; immutabilis enim profecto esset, et peccare non posset. Non igitur ideo peccavit, sed ideo peccare potuit, quia de nihilo factus est. Inter: Peccavit, et: Peccare potuit, plurimum distat; illa culpa est, ista natura. Nec omne quod de nihilo factum est, peccare potuit; non enim ligna et lapides peccare possunt; sed tamen natura quae peccare potuit, de nihilo facta est. Nec magnum est peccare non posse; sed magnum est cum beatitudine peccare non posse. Sicut non est magnum esse miserum non posse; quia om nia quae nec beatitudinem capiunt, misera esse non possunt; sed magnum est ita beatam esse naturam, ut misera esse non possit. Quod etsi maius est, nec illud parvum est, in ea beatitudine conditam hominis esse naturam, ut si vellet, posset esse non misera. Sic autem dicuntur omnia facta de nihilo, id est, ex his quae nulla erant, ut intellegamus, quidquid ex eo factum est quod iam erat, ad originem primam esse referendum. De terra enim caro; sed terra de nihilo. Sic enim dicimus etiam omnes homines esse filios Adam, cum patris sui quisque sit filius. Omnia tamen, quae facta sunt, mutabilia sunt, quia de nihilo facta sunt, id est, non fuerunt, et Deo faciente sunt, et bona sunt; a bono enim facta sunt; nec omnino essent mutabilia bona ulla, in quantum sunt, nisi esset a quo crearentur, immutabile bonum. Mala igitur omnia, quae nihil sunt aliud quam privationes bonorum, ex bonis orta sunt, sed mutabilibus; et angelum quippe et hominem, ex quibus orta sunt mala (quae tamen et non oriri potuissent, si illi peccare noluissent, quia et nolle potuerunt), naturas bonas recte, immutabiles autem non recte possumus dicere. Deus vero tam bonus est, ut malis quoque utatur bene, quae Omnipotens esse non sineret, si eis bene uti summa sua bonitate non posset; et hinc potius impotens appareret et minus bonus, non valendo bene uti etiam malo. Proinde tu negare non sineris, eum qui dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago , a necessario iam malum sumpsisse, non a possibili. Non igitur, ut dicis: Omnis actio mali non a necessario, sed a possibili; verum nonnulla et a necessario reperitur. Vide nunc ut tua machinatio tam elaborata collapsa sit. Sed quaerenti unde voluntas mala in homine primo exstiterit, cautius respondere te putas: De motu animi, cogente nullo; quasi non citius et expeditius responderes: De homine ipso. Illud quippe quod additur: cogente nullo, etiam hic addi a te potuit, resistente tibi nullo. Quis enim tibi resisteret dicenti vera, si diceres: Mala voluntas in homine primo de homine ipso exstitit cogente nullo? Nunc vero timens culpare naturam, tamquam hinc in eius auctorem ulla recurrat iniuria, et quod diu volebas, aliquando dixisti, et a natura non recessisti. Animus namque natura est: et ea quidem in hominis institutione corpore melior, de cuius motu, cogente nullo, malam voluntatem exstitisse dixisti. Videsne non potuisse nisi alicunde existere, quod negare non sineris, antequam existeret, non fuisse? Quid autem opus est ut quaeratur unde animi motus, cum satis appareat non potuisse animi motum nisi de animo existere? Quod si impudentissime atque insulsissime negas, adhuc ex te quaeritur, unde exstiterit in homine primo voluntas mala; nec iam permitteris dicere: De motu animi, cogente nullo; quia ipse animi motus cogente nullo voluntas est. Quapropter, hoc est dicere: Voluntas exstitit de animi motu, quod est dicere: Animi motus exstitit de animi motu; aut: Voluntas exstitit de voluntate. An dicis hunc motum de se ipso exstitisse, non de animo, ne hinc natura bona, id est, animus ipse culpetur? Non ergo inde damnetur; quis enim inde ferat animum iure damnari, unde non potest iure culpari? Sed dicis: Ideo peccavit homo, quia voluit; ideo habuit voluntatem malam, quia voluit. Verissime dicis; sed si lux clarissima tenebrae non sunt, de illo exstitit mala voluntas, quia voluit. Non enim dicimus, ut calumniaris, et ut nos etiam scripsisse mentiris: motus iste unde esse compulsus sit, sed nullo compellente unde exstiterit; quia et nullo compellente tamen exstitit, et nonnisi alicunde existere poterat, quod antequam existeret non erat. Si ergo homo voluit, de homine exstitit; et quid erat homo, antequam de illo existeret, nisi natura bona et bonum opus Dei? Quod est etiam malus homo, in quantum homo est et opus Dei. Confundatur ergo sua vanitate Iulianus; quoniam ex bonis esse mala orta, verum dixit Ambrosius ; sed quia cogente nullo, inculpatus est Deus; quod vero ea permisit existere, usu eorum iusto et bono laudatur insignius.
Augustine: We, or rather Truth itself, says that some human beings of perfect age do evil by will, some by necessity, or that the same persons do evil in some things by will, in some by necessity. And if you think this false, look at him who cries out: I do not do the good I will, but the evil I do not will, that I do. Whom you must so often have thrown back in your face, as often as, saying these things, you either pretend not to see him, or perhaps do not see him. Why do you wrap yourself in twisting evasions? It is not said to you: A human being had a necessity of sinning, because he was made from nothing; but you say this to yourself. He was certainly so made that he had the possibility of sinning from the necessary, but sin from the possible. Yet he would not have even the possibility of sinning, if he were the nature of God; for it would surely be unchangeable, and could not sin. Not for this reason, then, did he sin, but for this reason he could sin, because he was made from nothing. Between "He sinned" and "He could sin" there is the greatest difference; the former is fault, the latter nature. Nor could everything which was made from nothing sin; for wood and stones cannot sin; but yet the nature which could sin was made from nothing. Nor is it a great thing to be unable to sin; but it is a great thing to be unable to sin together with blessedness. Just as it is not a great thing to be unable to be wretched; because all things which do not have the capacity for blessedness cannot be wretched; but it is a great thing for a nature to be so blessed that it cannot be wretched. And though this is greater, neither is that small: that a human being's nature was founded in such blessedness that, if it willed, it could be not wretched. But all things are said to be made from nothing, that is, from those things which were not, in this sense, that we may understand that whatever was made from that which already was, is to be referred to the first origin. For flesh is from earth; but earth from nothing. For so we say also that all human beings are sons of Adam, when each is a son of his own father. Yet all things which were made are changeable, because they were made from nothing, that is, they were not, and by God making them they are, and they are good; for they were made by the good one; nor would any changeable goods exist at all, insofar as they are, unless there were he by whom they were created, the unchangeable good. All evils, therefore, which are nothing other than privations of goods, have arisen from goods, but changeable ones; for both the angel and the human being, from whom evils arose (which yet could also not have arisen, if they had not willed to sin, since they could also not will it), we can rightly call good natures, but not rightly unchangeable. But God is so good that he uses even evils well, which the Omnipotent would not allow to be, if by his supreme goodness he could not use them well; and hence he would rather appear powerless and less good, by not being able to use even evil well. Accordingly, you are not allowed to deny that he who says: The evil I do not will, that I do (See Rom 7:19), has now taken evil from the necessary, not from the possible. Not, then, as you say: Every action of evil is not from the necessary, but from the possible; rather, some is found also from the necessary. See now how your so labored contrivance has collapsed. But to one asking whence the evil will arose in the first man, you think you answer more cautiously: From a motion of the mind, with nothing compelling; as though you would not answer more quickly and readily: From the human being himself. For that which is added, with nothing compelling, could have been added by you here too, with no one resisting you. For who would resist you saying what is true, if you said: An evil will arose in the first man from the human being himself, with nothing compelling? But now, fearing to blame nature, as though hence any injury ran back to its author, you have at last said what you long wished to say, and have not withdrawn from nature. For the mind is a nature; and indeed in the constitution of the human being a nature better than the body, from whose motion, with nothing compelling, you said an evil will arose. Do you see that it could not exist except from somewhere, which you are not allowed to deny was not before it existed? But what need is there to ask whence the motion of the mind comes, when it is plain enough that the motion of the mind could not exist except from the mind? But if you most shamelessly and most insipidly deny this, it is still asked of you whence an evil will arose in the first man; nor are you any longer permitted to say: From a motion of the mind, with nothing compelling; because the motion of the mind itself, with nothing compelling, is the will. Wherefore, to say this—The will arose from a motion of the mind—is to say: The motion of the mind arose from a motion of the mind; or: The will arose from the will. Or do you say that this motion arose from itself, not from the mind, lest hence the good nature, that is, the mind itself, be blamed? Then let it not hence be condemned; for who would bear that the mind be justly condemned for that for which it cannot be justly blamed? But you say: The human being sinned for this reason, because he willed; he had an evil will for this reason, because he willed. You say most truly; but if the clearest light is not darkness, an evil will arose from him, because he willed. For we do not say, as you slanderously claim, and as you also lie that we wrote: whence that motion was compelled to be, but, with no one compelling, whence it arose; because, even with no one compelling, it yet arose, and could not exist except from somewhere, which before it existed was not. If, then, the human being willed, it arose from the human being; and what was the human being, before it arose from him, but a good nature and a good work of God? Which even an evil human being is, insofar as he is a human being and a work of God. Let Julian, then, be confounded by his own vanity; since Ambrose said truly that evils have arisen from goods (See Ambrose, Hexaemeron 1.8.31); but because it was with no one compelling, God is uncharged; but in that he permitted them to exist, he is more signally praised by his just and good use of them.
JulianImp.5.60V. 61. Iulianus. Voluntas ergo, quae nihil est aliud quam motus animi cogente nullo, possibilitatem suam naturae debet, effectum suum sibi. In natura enim exorta est, sed a possibili, non a necessario. Hic si dicat aliquis: Sed mala natura, quae potuit habere voluntatem malam; respondeo: Sed bona natura, quae potuit habere voluntatem bonam. Uno ergo tempore optima simul pessimaque dicetur. At id rerum ratio non sinit, ut uno eodemque tempore una eademque res contrariis meritorum qualitatibus impleatur. Si igitur ideo mala putetur, quia potuit malum facere; ideo bona credatur, quia potuit bonum operari. Cur autem, inquit, et malum potuit, quae bonum operabatur? Respondeo: Quia bonum hoc, quod virtus dicitur, proprium esse non poterat, nisi fuisset voluntarium; voluntarium autem non esset, si necessitatem boni habuisset; necessitatem autem boni pertulisset, si non habuisset possibilitatem mali. Ut ergo constaret ius boni, admissa est possibilitas mali.
V. 61. Julian: The will, then, which is nothing other than a motion of the mind with nothing compelling, owes its possibility to nature, its effect to itself. For it arose in nature, but from the possible, not from the necessary. Here if someone says: But it is an evil nature, which could have an evil will; I answer: But it is a good nature, which could have a good will. At one time, then, it will be called at once best and worst. But the nature of things does not allow that at one and the same time one and the same thing be filled with contrary qualities of merits. If, then, it be thought evil because it could do evil, let it be believed good because it could work good. But why, one says, could it also do evil, which was working good? I answer: Because this good which is called virtue could not be proper, unless it were voluntary; but it would not be voluntary, if it had a necessity of good; and it would suffer a necessity of good, if it did not have a possibility of evil. So that the right of good might stand, the possibility of evil was admitted.
JulianImp.5.61Augustinus. Ut video, nec bonam voluntatem vis tribuere naturae, quando est homo primitus conditus; quasi non potuerit Deus hominem facere voluntatis bonae; in qua eum tamen permanere non cogeret, sed in eius esset arbitrio sive in ea semper esse vellet, sive non semper, sed ex illa se in malam nullo cogente mutaret, sicut et factum est. Neque enim homo voluntatem non peccandi ante non habuit, et a voluntate peccandi exorsus est vitam, in qua eum rectum con didit Deus; utique talem, qui uti ratione iam posset. Quis enim ferat, si dicatur talis factus, quales nascuntur infantes? Illa itaque perfectio naturae, quam non dabant anni, sed sola manus Dei, non potuit nisi habere voluntatem aliquam, eamque non malam; alioquin non scriptum esset: Fecit Deus hominem rectum . Bonae igitur voluntatis factus est homo, paratus ad oboediendum Deo, et praeceptum oboedienter accipiens, quod sine ulla, quamdiu vellet, difficultate servaret, et sine ulla, cum vellet, necessitate desereret; nec illud sane infructuose, nec istud impune facturus. Unde pia et sobria cogitatione colligitur, primam voluntatem bonam Dei opus esse; cum illa quippe fecit hominem rectum; neque enim umquam, nisi recta volens, rectus est quisquam. Propter quod voluntas bona non redditur perdita nisi ab illo a quo est condita; nec aliunde putandum est sanari posse peccati necessitatem, nisi miserante illo, cuius alto iustoque iudicio subsecuta est posteros eius, qui sine ulla necessitate peccavit. Unde ille posteaquam peccati habitantis in carne sua, quo cogebatur malum agere quod nolebat, necessitatem poenamque deflevit, mox ad quem confugiendum esset ostendens: Miser ego homo, inquit, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum . Vides certe, quam non subveniat huic possibilitas illa, qua te tamquam magnum aliquid invenisse arbitraris; iam quippe amissa est, quando necessitate agitur malum, et sub necessario malo clamat homo: Miser ego homo; sed plane ille subveniat, cuius gratia superantur etiam quae propterea necessaria vocas, quod aliter esse non possunt. Quod enim hominibus impossibile est, Deo facile est. Cui non fuit necessarium ut camelus per foramen acus intrare non posset, sed possibile potius ut intraret ; sicut caro et ossa per ostia missa sunt clausa . Frustra itaque conaris naturam defendere vitiatam. Si aliquid utile pro illa quaeris agere, ut sanetur age, non ut excusetur. Sine ut ipsa sibi fecerit, unde merito damnaretur. Nam unde exstiterit mala voluntas, quidquid aliud dicis, et de illa exstitisse negas, iniustam damnationem eius affirmas. Quid enim aliud dicis, nisi: Non ipsa fecit unde damnatur? Quid ergo iniquius, quam ut inde damnetur, quod ipsa non fecit? Si autem ipsa fecit, quid eam de possibili excusare conaris, unde illam inexcusabilius accusare convinceris? Dicis autem: voluntatem malam in natura quidem exstitisse, sed a possibili, non a necessario. Si haec possibilitas extra naturam est, ipsa potius, unde mala exstitit voluntas, non natura damnetur. Si vero ad naturam etiam possibilitas pertinet, magis sibi voluntatem malam natura fecit, quia et non facere potuit; hoc enim abs te commendata definitio possibilitatis ostendit. Nemo tibi dicit: Ideo mala natura est, quia potuit habere voluntatem malam. Nos certe, contra quos nunc loqueris, non hoc dicimus; quid superfluis immoraris? In eo plane, quod dixisti: Bonum hoc quod virtus dicitur, non esset voluntarium, si necessitatem boni habuisset; necessitatem autem boni pertulisset, si non habuisset possibilitatem mali; prorsus oblitus es Deum, cuius virtus tanto magis est necessaria, quanto magis eam sic vult, ut nolle non possit. Nam et tu dixisti in primo huius operis tui libro: Deum nisi iustum esse non posse ; quae si necessitas dicenda est, dicatur omnino; dum tamen constet, nihil esse ista necessitate felicius, qua tam necesse est ut Deus non male vivat, quam necesse est ut semper atque beatissime vivat. Neque enim verba tua timet necessitas talis, in quibus noluisti dicere: Necessitatem autem boni habuisset, sed maluisti dicere: Pertulisset, si non habuisset possibilitatem mali; ut videlicet Deus homini pepercisse videatur, ne tamquam aerumnosum aliquid perferret necessitatem boni, non habendo possibilitatem mali; quod tam magnum est bonum, ut sanctis servaretur ad praemium; quos itidem oblitus es, sicut Deum. Neque enim tunc sine virtute vivemus, quando nobis concedetur, ne a Domino aliquando recedere possimus, quoniam nec velle poterimus. Ita enim nobis certum erit bonum, quo semper, ut promissum est, cum Domino erimus ; ut ab eo recedere non velimus, nec velle possimus. Non ergo aliter esset virtus in nobis, nisi voluntatem malam sic non haberemus, ut habere possemus: sed pro huius minoris virtutis merito, accedere nobis debuit virtus maior in praemio, ut malam voluntatem sic non haberemus, ut nec habere possemus. O desideranda necessitas! Donabit eam veritas, ut sit certa securitas, sine qua non potest esse illa, cui non est aliquid addendum, iam plena nostra felicitas.
Augustine: As I see, you are unwilling to attribute even a good will to nature, when the human being was first founded; as though God could not make a human being of good will, in which, however, he would not compel him to remain, but it would be in his choice whether he wished always to be in it, or not always, but should change himself from it into an evil will, with no one compelling, as in fact happened. For the human being did not first lack the will of not sinning, and begin his life from the will of sinning, the life in which God founded him upright; certainly such a one as could already use reason. For who would bear it, if he were said to be made such as infants are born? That perfection of nature, then, which not the years gave, but the hand of God alone, could not but have some will, and that not evil; otherwise it would not be written: God made the human being upright (Eccl 7:29). The human being, then, was made of a good will, ready to obey God, and obediently receiving the precept, which he would keep without any difficulty as long as he willed, and would forsake without any necessity when he willed; nor was he going to do the former without fruit, nor the latter with impunity. Whence by a pious and sober consideration it is gathered that the first good will is the work of God; for with it he made the human being upright; for no one is ever upright, except by willing what is right. On which account a good will is not restored, once lost, except by him by whom it was founded; nor is it to be thought that the necessity of sin can be healed from anywhere else, except by the mercy of him by whose deep and just judgment it followed the descendants of him who sinned without any necessity. Whence that man, after he had wept over the necessity and penalty of the sin dwelling in his flesh, by which he was compelled to do the evil he did not will, soon showing to whom one must flee for refuge, said: Wretched man that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? The grace of God, through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 7:24-25). You see surely how that possibility, by which you think you have found something great, does not aid this man; for it is now lost, when evil is done by necessity, and under a necessary evil a human being cries out: Wretched man that I am; but plainly let him aid him, by whose grace even those things are overcome which you call necessary for this reason, that they cannot be otherwise. For what is impossible for human beings is easy for God. To whom it was not necessary that a camel could not enter through the eye of a needle, but rather possible that it should enter; just as flesh and bones were sent through closed doors (See John 20:19, 26). In vain, then, do you try to defend a vitiated nature. If you seek to do something useful for it, act so that it be healed, not that it be excused. Allow that it itself did that for which it would be deservedly condemned. For whence the evil will arose, whatever else you say, and you deny that it arose from it, you affirm its condemnation to be unjust. For what else do you say, but: It itself did not do that for which it is condemned? What, then, is more iniquitous than that it be condemned for what it itself did not do? But if it itself did it, why do you try to excuse it from the possible, whence you are convicted of accusing it more inexcusably? But you say: An evil will arose in nature indeed, but from the possible, not from the necessary. If this possibility is outside nature, let it rather, whence the evil will arose, be condemned, not nature. But if the possibility too pertains to nature, then nature rather made an evil will for itself, because it could also not make it; for this the definition of possibility commended by you shows. No one says to you: It is an evil nature, because it could have an evil will. We at least, against whom you now speak, do not say this; why do you linger over superfluous things? But in that which you said: This good which is called virtue would not be voluntary, if it had a necessity of good; but it would suffer a necessity of good, if it did not have a possibility of evil; you have altogether forgotten God, whose virtue is the more necessary, the more he so wills it that he cannot not will it. For you too said, in the first book of this work of yours: That God cannot but be just (See Julian, in book 1); which, if it is to be called necessity, let it be called so by all means; provided only it be established that nothing is happier than this necessity, by which it is as necessary that God not live badly, as it is necessary that he always and most blessedly live. For such a necessity does not fear your words, in which you were unwilling to say: But it would have a necessity of good, but preferred to say: It would suffer it, if it did not have a possibility of evil; so that, namely, God might seem to have spared the human being, lest, as though suffering something burdensome, he should bear a necessity of good, by not having a possibility of evil; which is so great a good that it was reserved for the saints as a reward—whom likewise you have forgotten, as you have God. For neither shall we then live without virtue, when it shall be granted us that we can never depart from the Lord, since we shall not even be able to will it. For so will the good be certain for us, with which, as was promised, we shall always be with the Lord (1 Thess 4:17), that we shall not will to depart from him, nor be able to will it. There would not, then, be virtue in us otherwise than if we so did not have an evil will that we could have it; but for the merit of this lesser virtue, a greater virtue ought to accrue to us in reward, that we should so not have an evil will that we could not even have it. O necessity to be desired! Truth will bestow it, that there may be a sure security, without which there cannot be that fullness of our felicity, to which nothing is to be added.
JulianImp.5.61V. 62. Iulianus. At hoc in contrarium torqueri potest, ut dicatur: Sed malo aptata natura est; nam quia malum voluntarium esse non poterat, si necessitas fuisset mali, ob hoc data est possibilitas boni, ut malo proprietas pararetur. Quod quidem acutum est, sed insanum; omnia enim rerum a meliore parte taxantur: huc et dignitas auctoris accedit, id est, Dei, qui non ob ea quae puniturus erat, liberum animal fecit; sed propter ea qua remuneraturus, possibilitatem contrariorum dedit. Verumtamen super hoc pugnare nolo; sed permitto aliquid calumniae, ut nihil de opificis auctoritate praescribam. Illud tamen necessario sequitur, ut haec possibilitas faciendi boni et mali removeatur ab utriusque voluntatis effectu. Ac per hoc, nec virtutis a necessario probatur causa esse, nec vitii. Ut enim honestis hanc faciamus iniuriam, ut ex eo quo cum improbis certare videantur, nec bonae ei, nec malae adscribatur meritum voluntatis; habet ergo testimonium ingenuitatis suae, quod innocens est, quia nec bono, nec malo, voluntario dumtaxat, plena est. Possibilitatem ergo voluntatis adscribe naturae; voluntatem autem nec bonam, nec malam, naturae. Invicte ergo collectum est, voluntatem malam exortam quidem in opere Dei; sed a possibili, non a necessario; quod reputari non potest possibilitatis datori, sed possibilitatis ipsius gubernatori.
V. 62. Julian: But this can be twisted to the contrary, so that it be said: But nature was fitted to evil; for since evil could not be voluntary, if there were a necessity of evil, on this account a possibility of good was given, that a property might be prepared for evil. This indeed is acute, but insane; for all things are estimated from their better part: here too the dignity of the author, that is, of God, comes in, who made a free living being not on account of the things he was going to punish, but on account of the things he was going to reward, and gave the possibility of contraries. Yet over this I am unwilling to fight; but I permit some slander, so that I prejudge nothing about the authority of the maker. This, however, follows of necessity: that this possibility of doing good and evil be removed from the effect of either will. And through this, neither is the cause of virtue from the necessary, nor of vice. For—to do the honorable this injury, that from the fact that they seem to contend with the wicked, neither the merit of a good nor of an evil will be ascribed to it—it has, then, the testimony of its own nobility, that it is innocent, because it is full neither of good nor of evil, voluntary at least. Ascribe, then, the possibility of will to nature; but the will, neither good nor evil, to nature. It has, then, been concluded invincibly that an evil will arose indeed in the work of God, but from the possible, not from the necessary; which cannot be reckoned to the giver of the possibility, but to the governor of the possibility itself.
JulianImp.5.62Augustinus. Voluntatem nec bonam, nec malam, naturae concedis adscribi, sed tantum possibilitatem vel bonae vel malae voluntatis, cum sit natura et angelus et homo. Cui si non est adscribenda, ut dicis, voluntas bona vel mala, nec honorandus de bona, nec de mala est voluntate damnandus. Quid enim est iniquius, quam ut de malo, quod ei non est adscribendum, iudicemus esse damnandum? An angelus et homo naturae non sunt? Quis hoc loquitur, nisi nesciens quid loquatur? Naturae igitur adscribitur, quod angelo adscribitur; naturae adscribitur, quod homini adscribitur; sed naturae quae a bono Deo condita est bona, et voluntate sua facta est mala. Ac per hoc, rectissime malum, quod his naturis adscribitur, ei a quo sunt conditae non adscribitur; quia non eas ita condidit, cum primum condidit, ut eis esset habendae malae voluntatis ulla necessitas, sed tantummodo possibilitas; ubi meritum compararet atque inveniret in eis bona voluntas non deserta praemium, deserta supplicium. Quid ergo malitia voluntatis quaeris excusare naturam, cuius est velle seu nolle? Neque enim est mala voluntas, nisi volentis aut angeli, aut hominis, quas non esse naturas nulla ratione possumus dicere. Cur, inquam, adscribis homini malam voluntatem, ut non iniuste possit malae voluntatis merito poenas luere; et quod adscribis homini, non vis adscribere naturae, quasi ullo modo possit homo non esse natura? Quanto satius est, te sana loqui, et dicere hominis voluntatem malam nonnisi alicuius esse naturae, quia omnis homo natura est; sed istam naturam, cum primo malum egit, non ex necessario, sed ex possibili habuisse voluntatem malam; quandoquidem his nominibus tibi placuit duo ista discernere, quorum in uno intellegitur id fieri quod necesse est, in altero autem id quod fieri quidem potest, sed necesse non est, quia et non fieri potest? Hoc enim de peccato primi hominis, vel primorum hominum verissime dicitur; restat ille qui clamat: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago . Iste quippe ex necessario malum agit, qui non vult et agit; frangitque tuam regulam, quam temeraria loquacitate finxisti dicens quod nec virtutis a necessario probetur causa esse, nec vitii; cum huius causa probetur esse a necessario. Neque enim aut actio mali vitium non est; aut bonum quod vult, non facere, et malum nolle, et tamen agere, necessitas non est; aut e contrario non erit nobis etiam virtutis necessitas felix, quando tanta gratia natura nostra replebitur, et Deus erit omnia in omnibus , ut male aliquid velle non possit. Virtus est quippe iustitia; et caelum novum et terra nova promittitur nobis, in quibus iustitia inhabitat . Aut si forte turbatus, praesenti vitae, non futurae istam regulam finxisse te dicis; non contendo cum victo; illud certe ad hanc vitam pertinere non negas, ubi vides hominem velle, nec facere bonum; et nolle, atque agere malum; cogerisque hoc vitium contra regulam tuam necessitati tribuere, non voluntati. Ab hac autem necessitate, cum qua nascuntur et parvuli, sed aetatis accessu incipit apparere, quis liberat hominem miserum, nisi gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum ? Cuius gratiae vos inimici, in vestra virtute confiditis; et contra divina eloquia, quae damnant eos qui in sua virtute confidunt , impia superbia disputatis.
Augustine: You grant that a will, neither good nor evil, is to be ascribed to nature, but only the possibility of a good or evil will, although both the angel and the human being are a nature. To which, if a good or evil will is not to be ascribed, as you say, then it is neither to be honored for a good, nor to be condemned for an evil will. For what is more iniquitous than that we should judge it must be condemned for an evil which is not to be ascribed to it? Or are the angel and the human being not natures? Who says this, but one who does not know what he says? That, then, is ascribed to nature which is ascribed to the angel; that is ascribed to nature which is ascribed to the human being; but to a nature which was founded good by the good God, and was made evil by its own will. And through this, most rightly the evil which is ascribed to these natures is not ascribed to him by whom they were founded; because he did not so found them, when he first founded them, that there should be in them any necessity of having an evil will, but only a possibility; where a good will, not deserted, might acquire and find merit, the reward; deserted, the punishment. Why, then, do you seek to excuse nature by the malice of the will, whose it is to will or not to will? For there is no evil will but of an angel or a human being willing, which we can in no way say are not natures. Why, I say, do you ascribe an evil will to a human being, so that he can not unjustly pay penalties for the merit of an evil will; and what you ascribe to a human being, you are unwilling to ascribe to nature, as though a human being could in any way not be a nature? How much better it is for you to speak soundly, and to say that a human being's evil will is only of some nature, because every human being is a nature; but that this nature, when it first did evil, had an evil will not from the necessary, but from the possible; since by these names it pleased you to distinguish these two, in one of which is understood that to come to be which is necessary, in the other that which can indeed come to be, but is not necessary, because it can also not come to be? For this is said most truly of the sin of the first man, or of the first human beings; there remains he who cries out: I do not do the good I will, but the evil I do not will, that I do (Rom 7:19). For this man does evil from the necessary, who does not will and does it; and he breaks your rule, which you fashioned by rash wordiness, saying that neither the cause of virtue is proved to be from the necessary, nor of vice; when the cause of this is proved to be from the necessary. For either an action of evil is not a vice; or to not do the good one wills, and to not will evil, and yet do it, is not necessity; or, on the contrary, there will not be for us also a happy necessity of virtue, when our nature shall be filled with so great a grace, and God will be all in all (1 Cor 15:28), that it cannot will anything evil. For virtue is justice; and a new heaven and a new earth are promised us, in which justice dwells (See 2 Pet 3:13). Or, if perhaps, disturbed, you say that you fashioned this rule for the present life, not the future; I do not contend with one conquered; you at least do not deny that this pertains to this life, where you see a human being will, and not do good; and not will, and do evil; and you are compelled to attribute this vice, against your own rule, to necessity, not to will. But from this necessity, with which even little ones are born, but which begins to appear with the advance of age, who frees the wretched human being, except the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 7:25)? Of which grace you, enemies, trust in your own virtue; and against the divine words, which condemn those who trust in their own virtue (See Ps 49:6 (48:7)), you dispute with impious pride.
JulianImp.5.62V. 63. Iulianus. Haereat ergo prudentis animo lectoris multum interesse inter ea quae a possibili veniunt, et ea quae a necessario; naturaliaque omnia necessariis applicet, voluntaria vero possibilibus; et quaestiones universas ab ea, qua coeperint, parte consummet. Quoniam si per utramque caeco iudicio vagetur; in innumeros per verba pene omnia praecipitatur errores; quod quoniam satis claruit, apparet te nimis omnino caligasse, qui collegisti: Quomodo potuit malum, quod nusquam erat, exoriri in opere Dei; ita etiam, iam quod erat, transiit naturaliter per opus Dei. Vide enim quo sis involutus errore: peccatum prima voluntate conceptum, quod a possibili venit, in necessaria dicis fuisse mutatum, ut quomodo potuit oriri motus animi liber, ita sine motu libero transiret in naturalium necessitatem. Sed intellege quoniam necessariorum auctor sit Deus. Si ergo hoc facit Deus in naturis, quod fecit animus in culpis, necesse est ut sic sit reus, quomodo et ille cuius arguit voluntatem. Immo magis; quanto enim est plus necessarium quam possibile, tanto scelestius est ingenerare quam usurpare peccatum. Quod licet rerum natura non capiat; tamen hic ostenderim, multo peiorem esse opinionem tuam de Deo, quam Manichaei. Illius enim Deum vel subita bella truncarunt; tuum vero antiqua et multiplicata crimina corruperunt. Ac per hoc non solum de quaestione dissentis a Catholicis, sed omnino de Deo; non ipsum colis, quem nos aequissimum, omnipotentissimum, inviolabilem in Trinitate veneramur. Ergo permeare non potuit per naturam res voluntatis; meritoque nos diximus, quia opus diaboli per opus Dei transire non sinitur. Opus enim diaboli hominisque mali peccatum est, quod in nullo potest sine liberae motu voluntatis existere. Quod opus et diabolo et homini a possibili venit et venit; opus autem Dei est natura, in qua non a possibili, sed a necessario subsistit homo; quae natura multis est temporibus sine voluntate, quoniam vis eius aetate certa sentitur. Quamdiu ergo est natura sine voluntate, opus Dei tantummodo est; et haec quod non fecerit, non potest habere peccatum. Irrefutabiliter ergo dictum est, quia per opus Dei opus diaboli transire non sinitur. Non minus autem falsum est quam profanum, quod dixisti: Opus operis Dei transit per opus Dei. Hoc est enim dicere: Peccat et Deus, quia peccavit homo, quem fecit Deus. Nam sicut nusquam est peccatum, nisi in opere hominis; neque enim cum peccaverit homo, aliquid substantiae eius additur, ut peccatum ibi eminere videatur, sed tantummodo malum opus de mala voluntate commissum, illi quoque a quo factum est, comparat meritum malum, ut malus dicatur qui mala fecit; ita etiam Deus tuus, si malum in opere suo fecit, nihil quidem substantiae eius accedit, sicut nec hominis; tamen meritum ei deformissimum comparatur, ut malus male faciendo dicatur. Parvulus sane probatur etiam tunc reus non esse, quia malitiam a necessario habet, quam nisi diabolus a possibili haberet, reus esse non posset. Deus autem qui verus est Christianorum, malum non facit; parvulus quoque ante propriae voluntatis arbitrium nihil habet, nisi quod in eo fecit Deus. Naturale igitur nullum esse peccatum potest. Sed quoniam sollicitissime antiqui erroris antra prorupimus, nec quidquam super hac quaestione occultum remansit; teneat lector diligens distinctionem necessarii atque possibilis; et non minus Manichaeorum, quam Traducianorum commenta ridebit.
V. 63. Julian: Let it cleave, then, to the mind of the prudent reader that there is a great difference between those things which come from the possible and those which come from the necessary; and let him apply all natural things to necessary things, but voluntary things to possible ones; and let him conclude all questions from the side on which they began. For if through both he wanders with blind judgment, he is hurled into countless errors through almost all his words; and since this has become clear enough, it appears that you have been altogether too much in the dark, you who concluded: As evil, which was nowhere, could arise in the work of God; so also that which already was passed naturally through the work of God. For see in what error you are entangled: sin, conceived by the first will, which came from the possible, you say was changed into necessary things, so that, just as a free motion of the mind could arise, so without a free motion it passed into the necessity of natural things. But understand that God is the author of necessary things. If, then, God does in natures what the mind did in faults, it is necessary that he be guilty in the same way as he whose will he censures. Indeed more so; for as much as the necessary is more than the possible, so much more wicked is it to engender than to usurp sin. Although the nature of things does not admit this; yet here I would have shown that your opinion about God is much worse than the Manichee's. For the Manichee's God was maimed by sudden wars; but yours was corrupted by ancient and multiplied crimes. And through this you dissent from the Catholics not only about the question, but altogether about God; you do not worship him whom we venerate as most just, most omnipotent, inviolable in the Trinity. The thing of the will, then, could not permeate through nature; and we rightly said that the work of the devil is not permitted to pass through the work of God. For the work of the devil and of the evil human being is sin, which can exist in none without a motion of the free will. This work comes, and comes, to both the devil and the human being from the possible; but the work of God is nature, in which a human being subsists not from the possible, but from the necessary; which nature is for many times without will, since its force is felt at a certain age. As long, then, as it is a nature without will, it is only the work of God; and this, what it has not done, it cannot have as sin. Irrefutably, then, has it been said that the work of the devil is not permitted to pass through the work of God. But no less false than profane is what you said: The work of a work of God passes through the work of God. For this is to say: God too sins, because the human being whom God made sinned. For just as sin is nowhere except in the work of the human being—for neither, when a human being has sinned, is anything added to his substance, so that sin should seem to stand out there, but only an evil work, committed from an evil will, gains an evil merit for him too by whom it was done, so that he is called evil who did evil things—so too your God, if he did evil in his work, nothing indeed accrues to his substance, just as neither to the human being's; yet a most deformed merit is gained for him, that he be called evil by doing evil. The little one indeed is proved not to be guilty even then, because he has malice from the necessary, which, unless the devil had it from the possible, he could not be guilty. But God, who is the true God of Christians, does not do evil; the little one too, before the choice of his own will, has nothing except what God made in him. No sin, therefore, can be natural. But since we have most carefully burst forth into the caverns of the ancient error, nor has anything remained hidden on this question; let the diligent reader hold the distinction of the necessary and the possible; and he will laugh at the inventions of the Manichees no less than of the Traducianists.
JulianImp.5.63Augustinus. Apud homines qui ea quae legunt, sic intellegunt, ut etiam ista quae dicis intellegant, nihil egisti aliud, eadem per eadem tanta perplexitate repetendo, nisi ut te appareret responsionem nostram in uno meo libro, quem tuis octo refellere suscepisti, cum dissolvere non valeres, obscurare voluisse. Apud eos autem qui haec non intellegunt, id egisti saltem, ut ideo te putent dixisse aliquid, quoniam non intellegunt. Unde breviter admonendi sunt interim de hoc unde nunc agitur, ut illud ipsum meum, remotis nebulis tuae loquacitatis, aspiciant, et videant quam sit invictum. Tu enim dixeras: Si natura opus est Dei, per opus Dei opus diaboli transire non sinitur. Ad hoc ego: Quid est quod dicit, inquam, si natura opus est Dei, per opus Dei opus diaboli transire non sinitur? Nonne opus diaboli, quando in angelo, qui factus est diabolus, prius ortum est, in opere Dei ortum est? Quapropter si malum, quod nusquam erat omnino, in Dei opere oriri potuit; cur malum, quod alicubi iam erat, per opus Dei transire non potuit; praesertim cum ipso verbo utatur Apostolus dicens: " Et ita in omnes homines pertransiit " ? Numquid homines non sunt opus Dei? Pertransiit ergo peccatum per homines, hoc est, opus diaboli per opus Dei; atque ut alio modo idipsum dicam, opus operis Dei per opus Dei. Et ideo Deus solus est immutabilis et potentissimae bonitatis; qui et antequam esset ullum malum, bona opera fecit omnia, et de malis, quae in bonis ab eo factis orta sunt, bene ope ratur per omnia . Hac tu rerum evidentia perturbatus, oculos hominum de possibili et necessario longa et inani disputatione tenebrandos putasti, ut ista caligine obiecta sententiam tuam vanam non subtraheres, ne perimeretur, sed ne perempta iacere conspiceretur, absconderes. Utrum quippe a necessario, an a possibili, quid interest ad rem de qua quaerimus? Angelus certe et homo peccarunt; aut ergo aude dicere angelum et hominem non esse naturas; aut, quia non ita es insanus ut audeas, convinceris peccante angelo peccasse naturam, convinceris peccante homine peccasse naturam. Sed a possibili, inquis, non a necessario peccavit. Hoc verum est; tamen angelus peccavit, tamen homo peccavit, tamen natura peccavit; ac sic opus Dei, quod est angelus, quod est homo, non cogente Deo, sed sua mala voluntate, quam potuit et non habere, peccavit. Illi ergo naturae ignominia, quae cum bene facta esset, et malum facere coacta non esset, tamen malum fecit; Deo autem gloria, qui et naturam bonam fecit, et de malo bene facit, quod ipse non fecit. Cum igitur his atque huiusmodi veris catholicisque rationibus, et defendi et praedicari natura possit creatrix, et argui reprehendique peccatrix; atque ipsa peccatrix, et laudari in quantum eam Deus fecit, et culpari in quantum ab illo, nullo cogente, defecit, et in posteris meritum suum recepit (eadem quippe ipsa natura in singulis quibusque sine voluntate nascitur, quae in uno voluntate peccavit); quis te praecipitavit ut diceres, quis submersit ut scriberes: Si natura opus est Dei, per opus Dei opus diaboli transire non sinitur? O surde in vocibus sanctis! O caece in inventionibus tuis! Nonne peccatum opus est diaboli? Nonne in omnes homines pertransiit, qui sunt opus Dei? Nonne per peccatum mors, ea praesertim qualem vos solam per peccatum dicitis accidisse, id est, non corporis, sed animae, opus est diaboli? Nonne in omnes homines pertransiit, qui sunt opus Dei? Sed imitatione, ut dicitis, transiit. Tamen per homines transiit, qui sunt opus Dei. Sed a possibili, non a necessario transiit. Dic quidquid tibi placet: tamen per homines transiit, qui sunt opus Dei; tu autem sine ulla exceptione dixisti: Per opus Dei opus diaboli transire non sinitur; et hanc sententiae tuae tam perspicuam vanitatem, ut vanior fieres, tanta loquacitate non ut absolveretur defendere, sed ne aspiceretur operire conatus es. Si in mentem tibi apostolica verba non venerant, quae te hoc dicere prohiberent; cur non attendisti, obsecro, plus esse in opere Dei existere, quam per opus Dei transire opus diaboli? Cum ergo illud fatearis, cur hoc negas? An quod vis fieri potest, quod non vis non potest? Misereatur tui Deus, ut esse desinas vanus. Hanc autem sententiam tuam Manichaeus libenter amplectitur, tamquam amicam suam, et argumentatur ita: Si per opus Dei opus diaboli transire non sinitur, multo minus in opere Dei existere sinitur; unde ergo malum, nisi unde nos dici mus? Sed respondemus ei: Iuliano dicite ista, non nobis. Princeps huius sententiae missus est foras; absit ut praeiudicet nobis vobiscum vincendus, vel potius vobiscum iam victus a nobis.
Augustine: Among human beings who so understand what they read that they understand even these things you say, you have accomplished nothing else, by repeating the same things through the same with such great perplexity, except to make it appear that you wished to obscure our answer in my one book—which you undertook to refute with your eight—since you could not dissolve it. But among those who do not understand these things, you have at least accomplished this: that they think you have said something for the reason that they do not understand it. Whence they must be briefly admonished for the present about this matter now in hand, so that, the fogs of your wordiness removed, they may look at that very thing of mine, and see how unconquerable it is. For you had said: If nature is a work of God, the work of the devil is not permitted to pass through the work of God. To this I said: What is it that he says, I said, if nature is a work of God, the work of the devil is not permitted to pass through the work of God? Was not the work of the devil, when it first arose in the angel who became the devil, a work that arose in a work of God? Wherefore, if evil, which was utterly nowhere, could arise in a work of God, why could not evil, which already was somewhere, pass through a work of God; especially since the Apostle uses this very word, saying: " And so it passed to all men " (See Rom 5:12)? Are not human beings the work of God? Sin, then, passed through human beings, that is, the work of the devil through the work of God; and, to say the same thing in another way, the work of a work of God through the work of God. And therefore God alone is unchangeable and of most powerful goodness; who both, before there was any evil, made all good works, and from the evils which arose in the goods made by him, works well through all. Disturbed by this evidence of things, you thought the eyes of human beings should be darkened by a long and empty disputation about the possible and the necessary, so that, this fog being thrown up, you might not withdraw your empty opinion, lest it be destroyed, but conceal it, lest, being destroyed, it be seen to lie prostrate. For whether from the necessary or from the possible, what does it matter to the matter about which we inquire? The angel certainly and the human being sinned; either, then, dare to say that the angel and the human being are not natures; or, since you are not so mad as to dare, you are convicted that, the angel sinning, a nature sinned; you are convicted that, the human being sinning, a nature sinned. But from the possible, you say, not from the necessary, he sinned. This is true; yet the angel sinned, yet the human being sinned, yet a nature sinned; and so the work of God, which is the angel, which is the human being, sinned—not with God compelling, but by its own evil will, which it could also not have had. To that nature, then, belongs the ignominy, which, although it was well made, and was not compelled to do evil, yet did evil; but to God the glory, who both made the nature good, and from the evil which he himself did not do, does good. Since, therefore, by these and such-like true and Catholic reasons, the creating nature can both be defended and proclaimed, and the sinning nature can be charged and reprehended; and the sinning nature itself can both be praised insofar as God made it, and be blamed insofar as it fell away from him, with no one compelling, and received its merit in its descendants (for this same nature is born without will in each individual, which sinned by will in one); who hurled you headlong to say, who drowned you to write: If nature is a work of God, the work of the devil is not permitted to pass through the work of God? O deaf to the holy words! O blind in your own inventions! Is not sin the work of the devil? Did it not pass to all human beings, who are the work of God? Is not death through sin—that especially which you say alone happened through sin, that is, not of the body, but of the soul—the work of the devil? Did it not pass to all human beings, who are the work of God? But by imitation, as you say, it passed. Yet it passed through human beings, who are the work of God. But from the possible, not from the necessary, it passed. Say whatever you please: yet it passed through human beings, who are the work of God; but you, without any exception, said: The work of the devil is not permitted to pass through the work of God; and this so transparent vanity of your opinion, to make yourself the vainer, you tried, with such great wordiness, not to clear up so that it be resolved, but to cover so that it not be seen. If the apostolic words had not come into your mind, which would forbid you to say this; why did you not attend, I beg, that it is more for the work of the devil to exist in the work of God, than to pass through the work of God? Since, then, you confess the former, why do you deny the latter? Or can what you wish come to be, while what you do not wish cannot? May God have mercy on you, that you cease to be vain. But this opinion of yours the Manichee gladly embraces, as his friend, and argues thus: If the work of the devil is not permitted to pass through the work of God, much less is it permitted to exist in the work of God; whence, then, comes evil, except whence we say? But we answer him: Say these things to Julian, not to us. The prince of this opinion has been cast outside; far be it that he should prejudge against us, who is to be conquered along with you, or rather already conquered by us along with you.
JulianImp.5.63V. 64. Iulianus. Illud itaque aliud de eadem hebetudine protulisti. Ais enim: Sic creat Deus malos, quomodo pascit et nutrit malos , quia scriptum est in Evangelio, quod solem suum oriri faciat super bonos et malos, et pluat super iustos et iniustos . Longe enim lateque contrarium est, quod tu coniunctum putasti. Quod enim pascit Deus etiam peccatores, benignusque est super ingratos et malos, pietatis est eius testimonium, non malignitatis; qui non vult quippe mortem morientis, sed ut revertatur et vivat ; nec cito punit errantes; nec ob aliud id facit, quam ut bonitas eius paenitentiae tempus indulgeat. Sic enim ait Apostolus: An ignoras, quoniam bonitas Dei ad paenitentiam te adducit? Secundum autem duritiam tuam et cor impaenitens tu tibi thesaurizas iram . Disputat etiam apud Lycaones et Areopagitas, quoniam Deus nec temporibus praeteritae ignorantiae, providentiae suae documenta submoverit. Neque enim sine testimonio reliquit semetipsum, dans, inquit, pluvias de caelo, et tempora fructifera, implens cibo et laetitia corda eorum . Hoc ergo quod pluit super bonos et super malos, documentum est benignitatis eius, quae ideo sustinet et exspectat errantes, ut recedant tandem a malo et faciant bonum. In tantum ergo non vult fieri malum, ut amore etiam emendationis humanae pascat etiam ingratos. Ad id perfectae pietatis indicium illud vero quod dicis: Creat malos, perfectae iniquitatis testimonium est. Vide ergo quam nescias quid loquaris, qui de exemplo misericordiae voluisti crudelitatem probare. Bonum est enim pascere etiam malos, ut si voluerint, corrigantur; scelestum autem facere parvulos malos, ut qui velle non possunt, iniqui tamen esse cogantur. Liberalitas ergo in peccatores exercita abducit a malis, non in mala cogit. Conditio autem malorum non abducit a pessimis; sed et opus et operatorem in nefaria cuncta compellit. Insanis ergo cum dicis: Creat malum Deus; sed plus insanis, cum id Evangelii testimonio affirmare conaris, et eo testimonio in quo grande est argumentum bonitatis divinae. Attende igitur, quanto nunc fortius reflectatur; Deus, qui pascit etiam malos, ut patientia sua bonos esse faciat, manifestum est quod non creet malos. Si autem creat malos; nec amat nec remuneratur bonos, nec ipse postremo potest habere aliquid boni; quoniam quavis mala voluntate efficacius et violentius nocet potentia creatrix, non solum possibilium, sed etiam necessariorum malorum. Quod quoniam Deo Christianorum non convenit, id est, illi qui Pater misericordiae dicitur, et Deus consolationis ; cuius iudicia omnia aequitas praedicantur ; qui cuncta in sapientia fecisse perhibetur ; vobis ut Manichaeis non est in Dei nostri aestimatione commu nio; ad alium vos omnino quem colatis auctorem, tamen Manis furore simulatum hi, stulta commenta et genitalia traxere peccata.
V. 64. Julian: That other thing, too, you brought forth out of the same dullness. For you say: God so creates the evil as he feeds and nourishes the evil, because it is written in the Gospel that he makes his sun rise on the good and the evil, and rains on the just and the unjust (See Matt 5:45). For far and wide contrary is that which you thought joined. For that God feeds even sinners, and is kind toward the ungrateful and the evil, is a testimony of his goodness, not of his malignity; who indeed does not will the death of the dying, but that he turn back and live (See Ezek 18:23, 32); nor does he quickly punish the erring; nor does he do this for any other reason than that his goodness may grant a time for repentance. For so says the Apostle: Or do you not know that the goodness of God is leading you to repentance? But by your hardness and impenitent heart you are storing up wrath for yourself (Rom 2:4-5). He disputes also among the Lycaonians and the Areopagites that God, even in the times of past ignorance, did not withdraw the proofs of his providence. For he did not leave himself without witness, giving, he says, rains from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling their hearts with food and gladness (Acts 14:17). This, then, that he rains on the good and on the evil, is a proof of his kindness, which therefore bears with and awaits the erring, that they may at last withdraw from evil and do good. So far, then, is he from willing that evil be done, that out of love even for human emendation he feeds even the ungrateful. While that is the mark of perfect piety, this which you say—He creates the evil—is the testimony of perfect iniquity. See, then, how you do not know what you say, you who wished to prove cruelty from an example of mercy. For it is good to feed even the evil, that, if they will, they may be corrected; but it is wicked to make little ones evil, so that those who cannot will may yet be compelled to be unjust. Liberality, then, exercised toward sinners leads them away from evils, does not compel them into evils. But the condition of the evil does not lead away from the worst things; rather, it compels both the work and the worker into all wicked things. You are insane, then, when you say: God creates evil; but you are more insane when you try to affirm it by the testimony of the Gospel, and by that testimony in which there is a great argument of the divine goodness. Attend, then, how much more strongly it is now turned back; God, who feeds even the evil, that by his patience he may make them good, it is manifest does not create the evil. But if he creates the evil, he neither loves nor rewards the good, nor, finally, can he himself have anything of good; since the creating power harms more effectively and more violently than any evil will, not only of possible, but even of necessary evils. Since this does not befit the God of Christians, that is, him who is called the Father of mercies and the God of consolation (See 2 Cor 1:3); whose judgments are all proclaimed equity (See Ps 119:75 (118:75)); who is declared to have made all things in wisdom (See Ps 104:24 (103:24)); you have, as Manichees, no fellowship with us in the estimation of our God; to some other author altogether, whom you worship, yet feigned by the frenzy of Manes, these men have drawn their foolish inventions and inborn sins.
JulianImp.5.64Augustinus. Ego faciam, quod tu cur non feceris, quid me attinet et dicere? Qui legunt iudicent; propter hoc enim quia dixeras: quod secundum sensum nostrum Deus homines diabolo faciat, factum est ut ad verba ista veniretur responsione mea, ex quibus quod voluisti ipse posuisti; sed ego etiam te nolente commemorabo, quod praetereundum putasti. Inter cetera ergo, quae omnia dicere nimis longum est: An vero, inquam, filios perditionis haedos sinistrae partis , diabolo pascit, diabolo nutrit et vestit, quia facit solem suum oriri super bonos et malos, et pluit super iustos et iniustos ? Sic itaque creat malos, quomodo pascit et nutrit malos; quia quod eis creando tribuit, ad naturae pertinet bonitatem, et quod eis pascendo et nutriendo dat incrementum, non utique malitiae illorum, sed eidem naturae, quam creavit bonus, bonum tribuit adiumentum. In quantum enim homines sunt, bonum est naturae, cuius auctor est Deus; in quantum autem cum peccato nascuntur, perituri qui non renascuntur, ad semen pertinet maledictum ab initio ; illius antiquae inoboedientiae vitio. Quo tamen bene utitur factor etiam vasorum irae, ut notas faciat divitias suae gloriae in vasa misericordiae; ne meritis suis tribuat, si ad eamdem massam quisque pertinens gratia liberetur, sed qui gloriatur, in Domino glorietur . His dictis ista subiunxi: Ab hac fide, inquam, apostolica atque catholica, veracissima et fundatissima, cum Pelagianis iste discedens, non vult nascentes esse sub diabolo, ne parvuli portentur ad Christum, ut eruantur a potestate tenebrarum, et in regnum ipsius transferantur . Ac sic accusat toto orbe diffusam Ecclesiam, in qua ubique omnes baptizandi infantuli non ob aliud exsufflantur, nisi ut ab eis princeps mundi mittatur foras ; a quo necesse est vasa irae possideantur, cum ex Adam nascuntur, si in Christo non renascantur, et in eius regnum per gratiam facta vasa misericordiae transferantur ; et cetera quae ibi legat, vel legentem audiat, qui vult et potest. Nunc ergo quia his relictis, quibus ea quae posuisti astruuntur atque muniuntur, sic illa putasti esse ponenda, ut tamquam in solitudine defendente nullo latrocinanter invaderes; legant haec qui volunt scire quid egeris, vel potius ad eiusdem libri considerationem recurrant, unde ista reposui, et videant ea manere firmissima, quae velut infirma labefactare tentasti. Quid igitur te adiuvat, quod eos mihi obiecisti, quos exspectat Dei patientia per paenitentiam corrigendos, et ideo super eos oriri solem suum facit et pluit; cum ego tibi haedos sinistrae partis obiecerim, quos usque in finem sine paenitentia victuros in impietate et sceleribus suis, ac per hoc aeterno supplicio puniendos, ignorare non potest praescius omnium futurorum? Nec ab eis abstinet bonum creationis suae, quibus nec nasci expediret; nec bonum nutritionis et vivificationis suae, quantum ei placuerit, diuturnae, quibus mori quantocius expediret; inter quos sunt certe plurimi, qui si ex hac vita abriperentur infantes, secundum falsam vestram haeresim, penitus ab omni; secundum autem catholicam fidem, a damnatione gravissima tollerentur. Quid deinde illud est, quod in his sinistrae partis haedis, in Dei praescientia, quae falli non potest, igni perpetuo destinatis, multi sunt qui lavacro regenerationis abluti, postea vel apostasia pereunt, vel tam facinorose flagitioseque vivunt, ut eidem sinistrae sine dubio deputentur; nec rapiuntur, sicut quidam, ne malitia mutet intellectum eorum ? Neque ut hoc eis Deus tam magnum beneficium non conferat, fatali necessitate prohibetur; neque ut aliis conferat, personarum acceptione mutatur. Quid hic faciunt illa tua possibilia et necessaria, quae diligenter distinguenda commendas, ubi te nesciente quid loquaris, novit ille quid agat, cuius occulta possunt esse iudicia, iniusta non possunt? Non est igitur iniustum ut bona conferantur malis; sed iniustum est ut mala ingerantur bonis. Dic ergo qua iustitia parvuli tanta mala patiantur; quae saepe commemorare nos piget; vos vero eadem mala paradiso, etiamsi nemo peccasset, importare non pudet. Non creantur, ut dicis, mali, hoc est, trahentes originale peccatum; qua igitur iustitia premuntur gravi iugo, a die exitus de ventre matris eorum ? In quo iugo tanta miseria est, ut eam facilius deplorare, quam explicare possimus. Peccatum a possibili in necessarium, hoc est, a voluntario in non voluntarium, dicis non posse mutari; quod potuisse ostendimus in eo qui dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago . Hoc vos consuetudinis violentiae tribuitis, non vitiatae originis vinculis; peccatum tamen a possibili in necessarium potuisse converti videtis; nec de vestris distortis et fallacibus regulis erubescitis. Tale aliquid universo generi humano per unum hominem, in quo omnes fuerunt, accidere potuisse non vultis; et tamen sub omnipotentissimi et iustissimi Dei cura tot ac tantas poenas infantes pendere non negatis; quoniam vobis ora claudunt, et oculos feriunt, si negetis. Nonne ergo attenditis, quem faciatis iniustum, cernentes evidentissimas poenas et negantes ulla mala merita parvulorum? Falsum ac profanum tibi visum est, quod ego dixi: Opus operis Dei transiit per opus Dei. Quia utique angelus opus est Dei. Peccatum ergo, quod est opus angeli, opus est operis Dei, non ipsius Dei. Et de his verbis ita me arguis, quasi dixerim: Peccat et Deus, quia peccavit homo quem fecit Deus; quod ego non dixi. Peccavit quippe opus Dei, id est angelus, vel homo; sed opere suo peccaverunt; non opere Dei: ipsi sunt enim bonum opus Dei; peccatum vero eorum malum opus ipsorum est, non Dei. Sed quid est peius dicere: Peccat et Deus, quia peccavit homo quem fecit Deus; quod ego non dixi; an ita negare originale peccatum, ut poena parvuli iniusta nihil sit aliud quam peccatum Dei? Quod si in Deum cadere non potest, iusta ergo parvuli poena est; si autem iusta est, pro peccato est. Nemo igitur potest in tot tantisque poenis parvulorum praedicare Deum iustum, negans originale peccatum. Esset itaque, inquit, iniquitatis testimonium creare malos, si malum quo mali sunt, ipse creavisset; nunc autem, cum homines mali sint, et hoc creet ipse quod homines sunt, sequatur autem eos de vitiata natura per peccatum quod mali sunt; profecto etiam cum malos creat, bonum est ipse quod creat; quoniam mali sunt vitio quod nulla natura est, creat vero ipse naturam quae vitium non est, etsi vitiata est. Tale est autem tribuere creationis bonum stirpi vitiatae et iure damnatae, quale est etiam homini malo tribuere vitae ac salutis bonum, propter quod homo est, non propter quod malus est. Quod autem dicis esse scelestum facere parvulos malos, ut qui velle non possunt, iniqui tamen esse cogantur. Ad aliquid cogi, nulla possunt ratione qui non sunt. Si autem nondum quidem proprietate personae atque conditionis suae, sed occultissima ratione seminis iam sunt, sicut Levi in lumbis Abrahae ; ibi naturae vitio de peccato primi hominis veniente iam mali sunt; non Dei creatione, qui nec velle possunt, mali esse coguntur. Vide sane mirabilia gratiae Christi, cuius estis miseri inimici. Ecce parvuli, qui bonum vel malum velle aut nolle non possunt, tamen quando reluctantes et cum lacrymis reclamantes sacro Baptismate renascuntur, sancti et iusti esse coguntur. Nam procul dubio, si ante usum rationis obierint, in Dei regno sancti et iusti erunt, ea gratia ad quam non sua possibilitate, sed necessitate venerunt, sanctas et iustas sine fine ducentes vitas suas, calcantes et frangentes de possibili et necessario regulas tuas. Sine dubio autem plus est nolle malum agere, quam nec nolle, nec velle; et tamen ille nolebat et agebat, qui dicebat: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago. Non itaque insanio, nec dico: Malum creat Deus. Bonum enim creat, qui etiam de ipsa vitiata natura non creat vitium, sed naturam. Trahit vero illa vitium, non Dei opificio, sed iudicio. Tu autem utrum non insanias, si non valde insanis, attende, qui non malum poenale quod iustum est, sed malum quod vocatur iniquitas dicis facere Deum; quid enim aliud facit, si nullo malo reis parvulis tanta mala vel ingerit, vel ingeri sinit? Verum tu non a nobis alloquendus et redarguendus; sed ab universa Ecclesia, si posses, exsufflandus et exorcizandus esses, a qua frustra exsufflari et exorcizari dicis infantes.
Augustine: I will do what—why you did not do it, what concern is it of mine even to say? Let those who read judge; for because you had said that, according to our sense, God makes human beings over to the devil, it came about that one came to these words by my answer, from which you set down what you wished; but I will recall, even against your will, what you thought should be passed over. Among other things, then—all of which it would be too long to say: Or does he indeed, I said, feed the sons of perdition, the goats of the left hand (See Matt 25:33, 41), for the devil, nourish and clothe them for the devil, because he makes his sun rise on the good and the evil, and rains on the just and the unjust? So, then, he creates the evil as he feeds and nourishes the evil; because what he bestows on them by creating pertains to the goodness of nature, and the increase he gives them by feeding and nourishing, he bestows as a good aid not, surely, on their malice, but on the same nature which the good one created. For insofar as they are human beings, it is a good of nature, of which God is the author; but insofar as they are born with sin, destined to perish if they are not reborn, it pertains to the seed cursed from the beginning (See Gen 3:17-18), by the fault of that ancient disobedience. Which yet the maker uses well, even in the vessels of wrath, that he may make known the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy (See Rom 9:22-23); lest anyone attribute it to his own merits, if, belonging to the same lump, he be freed by grace, but let him who glories, glory in the Lord (See 1 Cor 1:31). Having said these things, I added these: From this faith, I said, apostolic and Catholic, most true and most well-founded, this man, departing with the Pelagians, is unwilling that those being born be under the devil, lest little ones be carried to Christ, that they may be rescued from the power of darkness and transferred into his kingdom (See Col 1:13). And so he accuses the Church spread throughout the whole world, in which everywhere all infants to be baptized are, for no other reason, exsufflated, except that the prince of the world may be cast out of them (See John 12:31); by whom the vessels of wrath are necessarily possessed, when they are born of Adam, if they are not reborn in Christ, and, made vessels of mercy, transferred by grace into his kingdom; and the other things which he who wishes and can may read there, or hear read. Now, then, since, leaving aside these things by which what you set down is built up and fortified, you thought those things should be set down in such a way that you might invade them robber-like, as though in a wilderness with no one defending; let those read these things who wish to know what you have done, or rather let them turn back to the consideration of the same book, from which I have set these down again, and let them see that those things remain most firm which you tried, as though weak, to undermine. What good, then, does it do you that you objected to me those whom God's patience awaits to be corrected by repentance, and therefore makes his sun rise upon them and rains; when I objected to you the goats of the left hand, whom he who foreknows all things to come cannot be ignorant will live to the end without repentance in their impiety and crimes, and therefore are to be punished with eternal punishment? Nor does he withhold from them the good of his creation, to whom it would not be expedient even to be born; nor the good of his nourishment and vivification, for as long as it shall please him, even prolonged, to whom it would be expedient to die as soon as possible; among whom there are certainly very many who, if they were snatched from this life as infants, according to your false heresy, would be taken away utterly from all; but according to the Catholic faith, from a most grievous condemnation. What, next, is this: that among these goats of the left hand, destined in the foreknowledge of God, which cannot be deceived, for perpetual fire, there are many who, washed by the laver of regeneration, afterward either perish by apostasy, or live so wickedly and shamefully that they are without doubt reckoned to the same left hand; nor are they snatched away, like some, lest malice change their understanding (Wis 4:11)? Neither is he prevented by any fatal necessity from conferring on them this so great benefit; nor, in conferring it on others, is he changed by any respect of persons. What do those possible and necessary things of yours do here, which you commend as needing to be carefully distinguished, where, while you do not know what you say, he knows what he does, whose judgments can be hidden, but cannot be unjust? It is not unjust, then, that goods be conferred on the evil; but it is unjust that evils be inflicted on the good. Say, then, by what justice little ones suffer such great evils, which it wearies us to mention so often; you who are not ashamed to bring those same evils into paradise, even if no one had sinned. They are not created evil, as you say, that is, drawing original sin; by what justice, then, are they pressed by a heavy yoke, from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1)? In which yoke there is so great misery that we can more easily deplore than explain it. You say that sin cannot be changed from the possible into the necessary, that is, from the voluntary into the non-voluntary; which we have shown could be, in him who says: The evil I do not will, that I do (See Rom 7:19). This you attribute to the violence of habit, not to the bonds of a vitiated origin; yet you see that sin could be converted from the possible into the necessary; and you do not blush at your distorted and deceptive rules. You are unwilling that something of the kind could have happened to the whole human race through one man, in whom all were; and yet you do not deny that, under the care of the most omnipotent and most just God, infants pay so many and so great penalties; since they shut your mouths and strike your eyes, if you should deny it. Do you not, then, attend whom you make unjust, beholding most evident penalties and denying any evil merits of little ones? It seemed to you false and profane, what I said: The work of a work of God passes through the work of God. Because, namely, the angel is a work of God. Sin, then, which is the work of the angel, is the work of a work of God, not of God himself. And about these words you charge me as though I had said: God too sins, because the human being whom God made sinned; which I did not say. For the work of God sinned, that is, the angel, or the human being; but they sinned by their own work, not by the work of God: for they themselves are the good work of God; but their sin is their own evil work, not God's. But which is worse: to say, God too sins, because the human being whom God made sinned (which I did not say); or so to deny original sin that the unjust penalty of a little one is nothing other than the sin of God? But if this cannot fall upon God, then the penalty of the little one is just; and if it is just, it is for sin. No one, therefore, can proclaim God just amid the so many and so great penalties of little ones, while denying original sin. It would be, he says, a testimony of iniquity to create the evil, if he himself had created the evil by which they are evil; but now, since human beings are evil, and he creates this, which is that they are human beings, but it follows them from their vitiated nature that they are evil, through sin; surely even when he creates the evil, he himself is good, in that which he creates; since they are evil by a fault which is no nature, but he himself creates a nature which is no fault, even though it is vitiated. But to bestow the good of creation on a vitiated and justly condemned stock is like bestowing on an evil human being also the good of life and health, on account of which he is a human being, not on account of which he is evil. But you say it is wicked to make little ones evil, so that those who cannot will may yet be compelled to be unjust. To be compelled to anything, those can in no way who are not. But if they already are—not indeed in the property of their own person and condition, but in the most hidden principle of the seed—as Levi was in the loins of Abraham (See Heb 7:9-10); there, by the fault of nature coming from the sin of the first man, they are already evil; not by the creation of God are they who cannot even will compelled to be evil. See indeed the marvels of the grace of Christ, of whom you are the wretched enemies. Behold, little ones, who can neither will nor not will good or evil, yet, when, struggling and crying out with tears, they are reborn in holy Baptism, are compelled to be holy and just. For without doubt, if they die before the use of reason, they will be holy and just in the kingdom of God, by that grace to which they came not by their own possibility, but by necessity, leading their holy and just lives without end, treading down and breaking your rules about the possible and the necessary. But without doubt it is more to be unwilling to do evil than neither to be unwilling nor to will; and yet he was unwilling and did it, who said: The evil I do not will, that I do. I am not insane, then, nor do I say: God creates evil. For he creates good, who even from a vitiated nature creates not a fault, but a nature. But that nature draws the fault, not by God's making, but by his judgment. But attend whether you are not insane, if you are not greatly insane, you who say that God does not the penal evil which is just, but the evil which is called iniquity; for what else does he do, if on guiltless little ones, with no evil, he either inflicts so great evils, or permits them to be inflicted? But you are not to be addressed and refuted by us; rather you ought, if it were possible, to be exsufflated and exorcized by the whole Church, by which you say infants are exsufflated and exorcized in vain.
JulianImp.5.64Liber Sextus
Book Six
JulianImp.5.64VI. 1. Iulianus. Non dubito eiusmodi opinionem hactenus super nostro fuisse certamine, ut ad quaestionem involutam magis, quam ad summam spectare fidei crederetur. Procul quippe ab studiis spiritalibus agitantes, solis famae aurulis commoventur; temporumque formidantes invidiam, nec compertae veritatis praesidium tenentes (ut fere in rebus trepidis, nulli minus quam sibi creditur), tutius iter, quod frequentius, arbitrantur.
VI. 1. Julian: I do not doubt that an opinion of this kind has hitherto prevailed concerning our contest, such that it was believed to look rather to an involved question than to the sum of the faith. For those who carry on far from spiritual pursuits are moved only by the little breezes of reputation; and, dreading the odium of the times, and not holding the safeguard of an ascertained truth (as generally in fearful matters, no one is trusted less than oneself), they judge the safer road to be that which is more frequented.
JulianImp.6.1Augustinus. Eo frequentius est iter nostrum, quo antiquius, quia catholicum est; vestrum vero tanto minus frequens, quanto magis novitium, quia haereticum.
Augustine: Our road is the more frequented in that it is the more ancient, because it is Catholic; but yours is the less frequented, the more it is novel, because it is heretical.
JulianImp.6.1VI. 2. Iulianus. Hoc autem in praesentiarum duabus ex causis accidit; quia et sententia Manichaeorum de criminum est probata consiliis, et excitae persecutionum procellae inopes spiritus a veritatis favore deterrent.
VI. 2. Julian: But this happens at present for two causes: because the opinion of the Manichees has been approved by the designs of criminals, and the stirred-up storms of persecutions deter needy spirits from favoring the truth.
JulianImp.6.2Augustinus. Quomodo est iter frequentius de sententia Manichaeorum, cum sint admodum rari? Aut quomodo persecutionem pro veritate patimini, qui subtrahitis parvulos Salvatori?
Augustine: How is the road more frequented by the opinion of the Manichees, when they are exceedingly rare? Or how do you suffer persecution for the truth, you who withdraw little ones from the Savior?
JulianImp.6.2VI. 3. Iulianus. Pars igitur et voluptati consulens et pavori, vel arenae, vel circi, vel scenae populis comitata luxuria, ambiens in omnibus flagitiis obtendere necessitatem, qua commissi invidia semper levatur, et fragores saeculi praevaricatione vitare; ea ergo sunt, quae comitatiorem faciunt vitiorum defensionem. Ex quo tamen vulgo pars maxima, ut praefatus sum, Traducianis et Catholicis vel de Deo rationes credidit consonare.
VI. 3. Julian: A part, then, both consulting pleasure and fear, the luxury attended by the crowds of the arena, or the circus, or the stage, seeking in all shameful deeds to put forward the necessity by which the odium of what is committed is always lightened, and to escape the uproars of the world by transgression; these, then, are the things which make the defense of vices more accompanied. From which, however, the greatest part of the common crowd, as I said before, has believed that the reasonings even about God, of the Traducianists and of the Catholics, are in harmony.
JulianImp.6.3Augustinus. Innumerabilis multitudo fidelium, quae promissa est Abrahae , quasi a vobis vulgaris turba contemnitur; quia videlicet paucis, quos Pelagianos, hoc est, venenis novitiae pestis insanos facitis, potest placere quod dicitis, tam evidentem miseriam generis humani, quae apparet in gravi iugo filiorum Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum , de peccati merito, quo in homine primo natura humana vitiata est, non venire. Unde vos sequitur, ut si nemo peccasset, cogamini etiam dicere in paradiso futura fuisse non solum tot et tanta onera molestiarum, quas videmus parvulos ferre; verum etiam tot et tanta vitia ingeniorum et corporum, cum quibus plerique nascuntur. In quo felicitatis et quietis loco etiam susceptam vestram, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, libidinem ponitis; et nos qui eam tamquam adversarium vitium contra concupiscente spiritu debellamus, clausis oculis accusatis velut amicos voluptatis et luxuriae; in quam nullus flagitiose ac turpiter cadit, nisi qui vestrae illi susceptae, quam nos arguimus, vos defenditis, sollicitanti suadentique consentit.
Augustine: The innumerable multitude of the faithful, which was promised to Abraham (See Gen 15:5), is despised by you as though a common throng; because, namely, what you say can please only the few whom you make Pelagians, that is, mad with the poisons of a novel pestilence—the few who say that the so evident misery of the human race, which appears in the heavy yoke of the sons of Adam from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1), does not come from the merit of the sin by which, in the first man, human nature was vitiated. Whence it follows for you that, if no one had sinned, you are compelled to say that there would have been in paradise not only so many and so great burdens of troubles, which we see little ones bear; but also so many and so great faults of minds and bodies, with which very many are born. In which place of felicity and rest you also place your protégée, the lust by which the flesh lusts against the spirit; and us, who war against it as an adversary fault, with the spirit lusting in opposition, you accuse with closed eyes as though we were friends of pleasure and luxury; into which no one falls shamefully and basely, except one who consents to that protégée of yours, which we charge and you defend, as it solicits and persuades.
JulianImp.6.3VI. 4. Iulianus. Verum quia et in primo et in praesenti certamine, argumentatione Augustini claruit non esse eum Traducianorum Deum, quem Christiani iustum atque omnium conditorem concinenti assertione venerantur; praecipio iam animo, quo plurimi eorum quoque, qui caeco errore lapsi sunt, his agnitis corrigantur.
VI. 4. Julian: But because, both in the first and in the present contest, it has become clear by Augustine's argumentation that he is not the God of the Traducianists whom Christians venerate, with harmonious assertion, as just and the founder of all things; I now take heart, by which very many even of those who have fallen by blind error may, on recognizing these things, be corrected.
JulianImp.6.4Augustinus. Immo vero, his agnitis, quae tuo fallaci vaniloquio secundum veritatis respondemus eloquium, neminem in errore haeresis vestrae nisi nimia vecordia vel pervicacia detinebit.
Augustine: Rather, on the contrary, once these things are recognized—the things which, against your deceitful empty talk, we answer in accordance with the word of truth—no one will be held in the error of your heresy except by excessive madness or obstinacy.
JulianImp.6.4VI. 5. Iulianus. Credit quippe adversum nos Manichaeus naturaliter mortales in flagitia facinoraque compelli; opinatur tenebrarum originem et corporibus materiam et criminibus praestitisse; voluptatem sexuum tabem esse generis humani, assertricem iuris diabolici, et in universa dedecora hominum coactricem. Quem Traducianus omnifariam secutus, quippe eius haeres et soboles, naturalia crimina, aeternam de tenebroso nihilo mali necessitatem, et affectionem sensibus destinatam sanctorum omnium pollutricem atque imaginem Dei in regno diaboli collocantem, oratione multiplici testatur.
VI. 5. Julian: For the Manichee believes, against us, that mortals are by nature compelled into shameful deeds and crimes; he supposes that the origin of darkness furnished both matter to bodies and crimes to them; that the pleasure of the sexes is the corruption of the human race, the asserter of the devil's right, and the compeller of human beings into all disgraces. The Traducianist, following him in every way, as his heir and offspring, attests with manifold discourse natural crimes, an eternal necessity of evil from the dark nothing, and an affection assigned to the senses that defiles all the saints and sets the image of God in the kingdom of the devil.
JulianImp.6.5Augustinus. Manichaeus naturam mali substantialiter Deo bono coaeternam, contra catholicam veritatem singulari vesania fabulatur; veritas autem catholica Deum solum sine ullo exordio confitetur aeternum; non solum bonum, quod et ille dicit, verum etiam immutabilem, quod ille non dicit. Hunc ergo Deum summe bonum, et ob hoc omnino immutabilem, cui nulla natura coaeterna est, quae non est quod ipse, nec esset nisi facta esset, non de ipso, sed tamen ab ipso, hoc est, non de natura eius, sed potentia tamen eius, adversus Manichaeorum dementiam praedicamus; factamque naturam, quae nulla esse potuisset, nisi eam, quamvis non de se ipsa, tamen omnipotens natura fecisset, bonum esse quidem scimus et dicimus, sed illi non aequale qui fecit. Fecit enim Deus omnia bona valde ; sed non summe bona, sicut est ipse; quae tamen bona qualiacumque non essent, nisi ea fecisset summe bonus; nec mutabilia ulla bona essent, nisi ea fecisset immutabiliter bonus. Ac per hoc, Manichaei cum quaerunt a nobis unde sit malum, volentes introducere malum Deo coaeternum, nescientes quid sit malum, idque putantes esse naturam atque substantiam; respondemus eis, non esse malum ex Deo, neque coaeternum Deo; sed malum ortum esse ex libera voluntate naturae rationalis, quae bene a bono condita est; sed bonitas eius non est aequalis bonitati Conditoris eius; quoniam non natura, sed opus eius est; ideoque habuit peccandi possibilitatem, non tamen necessitatem. Nec possibilitatem autem haberet, si Dei natura esset, qui peccare nec vult posse, nec potest velle. Verumtamen rationalis ista natura in hac possibilitate peccandi si non peccasset, quando peccare potuisset, magnum sibi meritum comparasset; cuius meriti praemium etiam hoc esset, ut maiore felicitate peccare non posset. Sed hoc audito Manichaeus adhuc pergit, et dicit: Si ex libera voluntate naturae rationalis est malum, unde sunt ista tot mala, cum quibus nasci videmus, qui nondum libertate voluntatis utuntur? Unde est concupiscentia, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum , et ad peccatum perpetrandum trahit, nisi adversus eam spiritus fortius concupiscat? Unde in homine uno duarum rerum, ex quibus constat, tanta discordia? Unde lex in membris repugnans legi mentis, sine qua lege nemo nascitur? Unde tot et tanta vitia vel ingeniorum, vel corporum, cum quibus plerique nascuntur? Unde labores et calamitates nondum voluntate peccantium parvulorum? Unde cum rationis usus accesserit, in discendis litteris vel quibuslibet artibus tanta poena mortalium, ut aerumnosis conatibus etiam verberum cruciatus addatur? Hic nos respondemus, etiam ista mala ex voluntate humanae naturae originem ducere, qua granditer peccante, vitiata et cum stirpe damnata est. Unde naturae huius tam multa naturalia bona veniunt de Dei opificio, mala de iudicio; quae mala nullo modo esse naturas vel substantias non vident Manichaei; verum ideo dici naturalia, quia cum eis homines vitiata originis tamquam radice nascuntur. Sed vos novi haeretici contradicitis nobis; respondete igitur Manichaeis; dicite unde sint tot ac tanta mala, cum quibus nasci homines si negatis, ubi est frons vestra? Si fatemini, ubi est haeresis vestra? Sed mala ista non esse mala contendite, et paradisum non verum, sed vestrum, laboribus, doloribus, erroribus, gemitibus, fletibus, luctibus, etiamsi nemo peccasset, implete. Quod si non audetis, ne ab ipsis quoque puerulis rideamini, et emendandi ferulis iudicemini, concludit adversus vos Manichaeus haec mala, quae de vitiata bona natura esse non vultis, de commixtione mali esse; quod malum dicit esse naturam coaeternam Deo atque contrariam. Ac per hoc ubi Manichaeo conaris esse remotior, illi efficeris eius adiutor.
Augustine: The Manichee, with singular madness, fables a nature of evil substantially coeternal with the good God, against Catholic truth; but Catholic truth confesses God alone to be eternal without any beginning—not only good, which he too says, but also unchangeable, which he does not say. This God, then, supremely good, and on this account altogether unchangeable, to whom no nature is coeternal—a nature which is not what he is, and would not be unless it had been made, not from him, yet by him, that is, not from his nature, yet by his power—we proclaim against the madness of the Manichees; and the nature that was made, which could have been nothing unless the omnipotent nature had made it (though not from itself), we know and say is indeed good, but not equal to him who made it. For God made all things very good (See Gen 1:31); but not supremely good, as he himself is; which goods, however, of whatever sort, would not be unless he who is supremely good had made them; nor would any changeable goods be unless he who is unchangeably good had made them. And through this, when the Manichees ask us whence evil comes, wishing to introduce an evil coeternal with God—not knowing what evil is, and thinking it to be a nature and substance—we answer them that evil is not from God, nor coeternal with God; but that evil arose from the free will of the rational nature, which was founded good by the good one; but its goodness is not equal to the goodness of its Founder, since it is not his nature, but his work; and therefore it had the possibility of sinning, yet not the necessity. But it would not have even the possibility, if it were the nature of God, who neither wills to be able to sin, nor can will it. Yet if this rational nature, in this possibility of sinning, had not sinned when it could have sinned, it would have acquired for itself a great merit; the reward of which merit would have been even this: that, with a greater felicity, it could not sin. But when he hears this, the Manichee still presses on, and says: If evil is from the free will of the rational nature, whence are these so many evils with which we see those born who do not yet use the freedom of the will? Whence is the concupiscence by which the flesh lusts against the spirit (Gal 5:17), and draws toward committing sin, unless the spirit lusts more strongly against it? Whence in one human being so great a discord of the two things of which he consists? Whence the law in the members fighting against the law of the mind (See Rom 7:23), without which law no one is born? Whence so many and so great faults, whether of minds or of bodies, with which very many are born? Whence the labors and calamities of little ones who do not yet sin by will? Whence, when the use of reason has arrived, so great a punishment of mortals in learning letters or any skills whatever, that to their toilsome efforts is added even the torment of beatings? Here we answer that these evils too draw their origin from the will of human nature, which, by sinning grievously, was vitiated and condemned along with its stock. Whence so many natural goods of this nature come from God's making, but evils from his judgment; which evils the Manichees do not see to be in no way natures or substances; but that they are called natural for this reason, that human beings are born with them from a vitiated origin, as from a root. But you, new heretics, contradict us; answer the Manichees, then; say whence are so many and so great evils with which human beings are born—and if you deny that they are born with them, where is your effrontery? If you confess it, where is your heresy? But contend that these evils are not evils, and fill paradise—not the true one, but yours—with labors, pains, errors, groans, weeping, mournings, even if no one had sinned. But if you do not dare to do this, lest you be laughed at even by the very children, and be judged by the rods of those who must be corrected, the Manichee concludes against you that these evils, which you are unwilling should be from a vitiated good nature, are from the commingling of evil; which evil he says is a nature coeternal with God and contrary to him. And through this, where you try to be more removed from the Manichee, you become his helper.
JulianImp.6.5VI. 6. Iulianus. Iam vero in ipsum Deum, pari fine, impari exordio, accusationum tela iaculantur. Manichaeus quippe dicit: Deus bonus malum non facit; sed addit quia pro naturalibus culpis aeterno incendio animas destinet; quod perspicuae immanitatis est: ac per hoc, fine opinionis suae, quem bonum dixerat, clara iniquitate contaminat. Porro Augustinus quasi ei ad quem scribit, fidens patrono, ausu grandiore despicit trepidationem magistri, nec dubitat inde incipere, quo Manichaeus pervenit; pronuntiatque quod malum, id est peccatum, faciat Deus et creet, quem constat non convenire ei Deo, quem Catholicorum fides colit. Hoc potissimum animo lectoris insidat, et nulli umquam fidelium maiorem causam quam nobis incubuisse conflictus, et omnem qui naturam ipsam necessitatem criminis arbitratur, in Dei Christianorum cultu non habere consortium; quod quoniam frequenter inculcatum est; iterationem quippe utilitas causae principalis exegit; veniamus iam ad discussionem primorum hominum, quorum taxatione aciei nostrae Numida quasi cetratus occurrit.
VI. 6. Julian: But now they hurl the darts of their accusations against God himself, with an equal end, though an unequal beginning. For the Manichee says: The good God does not make evil; but he adds that, for natural faults, he destines souls to eternal burning; which is of manifest monstrousness: and through this, by the end of his opinion, he contaminates with plain iniquity the one whom he had called good. Furthermore Augustine, as though trusting in a patron in him to whom he writes, with a bolder daring looks down on the trepidation of his master, and does not hesitate to begin where the Manichee arrived; and he pronounces that God does and creates evil, that is, sin—whom it is established does not befit that God whom the faith of the Catholics worships. Let this above all sit in the mind of the reader: that the contest has lain more heavily on us than on any of the faithful ever; and that everyone who thinks nature itself the necessity of crime has no fellowship in the worship of the God of Christians; which, since it has been frequently driven home—for the usefulness of the principal cause has demanded repetition—let us now come to the discussion of the first human beings, in whose appraisal the Numidian, like a light-shield bearer, runs to meet our battle line.
JulianImp.6.6Augustinus. Quid Manichaeus dicat de commixtione bonae et malae substantiae, nescire te crederem, nisi ea certe quae adversus eumdem errorem scripsimus, legisse te scirem; nam ex libro, in quo duarum animarum in homine constitutarum, quarum esset una bona, altera mala, eorum opinionem redargui , quaedam contra me ipsum esse existimans testimonia protulisti. Manichaeus ergo duas animas, sive spiritus, sive mentes, unam propriam carnis, eamdemque non accidente vitio, sed coaeternam Deo natura malam, alteram vero natura bonam tamquam Dei particulam, sed illius malae permixtione maculatam, in homine uno esse contendit; et hinc vult fieri, ut caro concupiscat adversus spiritum, utique bonum, per animam suam malam, ut eum teneat implicatum; spiritus autem adversus carnem, ut ab illa commixtione liberetur. Quod si nec ultima mundi conflagratione potuerit, tunc eum dicit affigi tenebrarum globo, atque in aeternum tali supplicio detineri. Non itaque, ut dicis, Manichaei Deus pro naturalibus culpis aeterno incendio animas destinat, sed natura bonas animas pro alienae malae naturae commixtione cui malo eas ipse commiscuit, quas inde non potuerit liberare, non incendio aeterno; nam nullum aeternum Manichaeus opinatur incendium; sed aeterno, ut dixi, tenebrarum globo, quo mens tenebrarum includetur, affiget. Catholica vero fides, quam reliquistis, ut Manichaeorum, non plane, quemadmodum putatis aut fingitis, oppugnatricem, sed potius adiutricem sectam novitiam conderetis, cum audit aut legit quod ait Apostolus: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, spiritus autem adversus carnem; haec enim invicem adversantur; ut non ea quae vultis, faciatis ; non naturas duas, boni scilicet et mali, inter se ab aeternitate contrarias, et bello posteriore commixtas, sicut Manichaeus haereticus opinatur; sed sicut catholicus doctor Ambrosius , istam discordiam carnis et spiritus ex praevaricatione primi hominis in naturam vertisse cognoscit; ut non intellegatur haec natura hominis primitus instituti, sed in naturam versa poena damnati. Haec fides non est cetra Numidica, de qua nobis velut facetus insultas; sed est veridicum scutum, in quo omnes sagittas ignitas maligni, sicut hortatur Apostolus, exstinguimus . Hoc muniebatur scuto, quando vobis futuris iam occurrebat armatus, non quidem Numida, sed tamen Poenus ille Cyprianus, quo rursus nomine tua in nos insilit vana loquacitas; hoc, inquam, scuto armatus Poenus ille dicebat in libro De Oratione Dominica, id nos orare, cum dicimus: Fiat voluntas tua sicut in caelo et in terra , ut inter duo ista, id est carnem et spiritum, fiat Deo opitulante concordia. Ubi Christi miles egregius et a Manichaeis et a vobis coniecta ignita maligni iacula exstinguit; cui maligno militant omnes haeretici, et cuius castra tirocinio vestro putastis augenda. Nam spiritus et carnis quaerendo concordiam, contro Manichaeos docet, ambas quibus constamus bonas esse naturas, si discordiae malum divina miseratione sanetur; vobis autem resistit, quia carnis concupiscentiam dicitis bonam, qua infestante existit ista discordia, quam poscit ille sanari; et tunc existit quando bene agimus, ut infestanti concupiscentiae carnis, contra concupiscente spiritu repugnemus. Nam si consentimus, non optabilis, sed culpabilis, vel etiam damnabilis fit spiritui cum carne concordia. Contra vos est etiam, quia libero datis arbitrio, quod ille ut fiat in homine, a Deo intellegit esse poscendum. Tu autem qui nesciens quid loquaris, obicis mihi quod dicam Deum creare peccatum, resiste Manichaeo dicenti in discordia carnis et spiritus duas inter se contrarias mali et boni apparere naturas. Unum est enim quod respondeamus, ut pestis ista vincatur: hanc scilicet discordiam per praevaricationem primi hominis in nostram vertisse naturam; quod tu negando conaris ut vincant; satisque manifestaris falsus Manichaeorum oppugnator, verus adiutor.
Augustine: What the Manichee says about the commingling of good and evil substance, I would believe you did not know, except that I know you have read those things which we wrote against that same error; for from the book in which I refuted their opinion of two souls established in a human being, one of which was good, the other evil (See Augustine, The Two Souls), you brought forward certain testimonies, thinking they were against me. The Manichee, then, contends that there are in one human being two souls, or spirits, or minds—one proper to the flesh, and this not evil by a supervening fault, but coeternal with God, evil by nature; the other indeed good by nature, as it were a particle of God, but stained by the commingling of that evil one; and from this he wishes it to come about that the flesh lusts against the spirit, namely the good one, through its own evil soul, so as to hold it entangled; but the spirit lusts against the flesh, so as to be freed from that commingling. And if it cannot, even in the final conflagration of the world, then he says it is fixed to the globe of darkness, and held in such punishment forever. Not, then, as you say, does the God of the Manichees destine souls to eternal burning for natural faults, but souls good by nature, on account of the commingling of an alien evil nature, with which evil he himself commingled them—souls he could not free from it—not by eternal burning; for the Manichee supposes no eternal burning; but, as I said, he fixes them to the eternal globe of darkness, in which the mind of darkness will be enclosed. But the Catholic faith, which you abandoned in order to found, as though against the Manichees—not, as you think or pretend, an opposing sect, but rather a helping novel sect—when it hears or reads what the Apostle says: The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are opposed to each other; that you may not do the things you wish (Gal 5:17); does not recognize two natures, namely of good and of evil, contrary to each other from eternity, and commingled by a later war, as the Manichean heretic supposes; but, as the Catholic teacher Ambrose does (See Ambrose, On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation 7.71), recognizes that this discord of flesh and spirit passed over into nature from the transgression of the first man; so that this is understood not as the nature of the human being as first established, but as a penalty turned into nature in the condemned. This faith is not the Numidian light-shield, over which you insult us as though wittily; but it is a truthful shield, in which we extinguish all the fiery darts of the wicked one, as the Apostle exhorts (See Eph 6:16). With this shield he was armed, when, already meeting you who were to come, that man—not indeed a Numidian, yet a Carthaginian, Cyprian—came armed; by which name again your empty wordiness leaps upon us; armed, I say, with this shield, that Carthaginian said, in the book On the Lord's Prayer, that we pray this, when we say: Your will be done, on earth as it is in heaven (See Cyprian, On the Lord's Prayer 16; Matt 6:10), namely that between these two, that is, flesh and spirit, there may be, with God's help, concord. There the excellent soldier of Christ extinguishes the fiery darts of the wicked one hurled both by the Manichees and by you; for which wicked one all heretics fight, and whose camp you thought should be increased by your enlistment. For by seeking the concord of spirit and flesh, he teaches against the Manichees that both the natures of which we consist are good, if the evil of the discord is healed by divine mercy; but he resists you, because you say the concupiscence of the flesh is good, by whose harassment this discord exists, which he asks to be healed; and it then exists when we act well, so that, with the spirit lusting in opposition, we resist the harassing concupiscence of the flesh. For if we consent, the concord of spirit with flesh becomes not desirable, but blameworthy, or even damnable. He is also against you, because you assign to free choice what he understands must be asked from God, that it may come to pass in the human being. But you who, not knowing what you say, object to me that I say God creates sin, resist the Manichee saying that in the discord of flesh and spirit there appear two natures, of evil and of good, contrary to each other. For there is one thing we may answer, that this pestilence be conquered: namely that this discord passed over into our nature through the transgression of the first man; which you, by denying, try to make them win; and you show yourself clearly a false assailant of the Manichees, a true helper.
JulianImp.6.6VI. 7. Iulianus. Ingerit quippe omnibus scripturis suis, Adam atque Evam bonos tantum a Deo conditos, id est, nulli naturali crimini mancipatos, eosque libera voluntate peccasse, sed ita granditer, ut omnia in natura sua Dei instituta subruerent. Illud enim, inquit, peccatum valde maius atque altius diabolus infixit, quam sunt ista hominibus nota peccata. Unde illo magno primi hominis peccato, natura ibi nostra, in deterius commutata, non solum facta est peccatrix, verum etiam generat peccatores; et tamen ipse languor, quo bene vivendi virtus periit, non est natura, sed vitium. Illud ergo peccatum, quod ipsum hominem in paradiso mutavit in peius, quia multo est grandius quam iudicare nos possumus , ab omni nascente trahitur. Ecce quam aperte quid sentiret exposuit: Primi, inquit, illi homines bonam habuere naturam, sed peccatum tam immane, tam inaestimabile perpetrarunt, ut virtutem bene vivendi interimerent, liberi arbitrii lumen exstinguerent, facerent in reliquum peccandi necessitatem; ne cui esset possibile de eorum stirpe nascenti, in virtutum decora conari, et declinatis vitiis compotem fieri sanctitatis.
VI. 7. Julian: For he urges throughout all his writings that Adam and Eve were founded by God only good, that is, made over to no natural crime, and that they sinned by free will, but so grievously that they overthrew all God's institutions in their nature. For, he says, the devil fixed in him a sin far greater and deeper than are those sins known to human beings. Whence, by that great sin of the first man, our nature there, changed for the worse, not only became sinful, but also begets sinners; and yet that very weakness, by which the strength of living well perished, is not nature, but a fault. That sin, then, which changed the human being himself for the worse in paradise, because it is much greater than we can judge, is drawn from everyone being born (See Augustine, The Punishment and Forgiveness of Sins 1.16.21; 2.34.56). See how openly he expounded what he held: Those first human beings, he says, had a good nature, but committed a sin so monstrous, so inestimable, that they killed the strength of living well, extinguished the light of free choice, and made for the remainder a necessity of sinning; so that to no one born of their stock would it be possible to strive after the beauties of the virtues, and, with vices set aside, to become a partaker of holiness.
JulianImp.6.7Augustinus. Videris tibi, vel etiam consortibus tuis Pelagianis aliquid dicere, cum relicta auctoritate divina, humana vanitate iactaris, et argumentationibus cordis tui Sanctarum Scripturarum veritati adversaris et obstrepis. Nam utique si christiano atque catholico animo attenderes quod ait Apostolus: Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum , profecto intellegeres tam granditer peccasse primum hominem, ut eo peccato, non unius hominis, sed totius generis humani mutata natura ex possibilitate immortalitatis in necessitatem mortis lapsa corruerit; ita ut etiam qui convertuntur ad Deum, per unum Dei et hominum mediatorem hominem Christum Iesum, non continuo immortalitatem corporis sumant; sed eis per Spiritum Dei, quo nunc inhabitantur, danda postea nunc promittatur. Quod idem Apostolus eodem loco sic explicat: Si quis, inquit, Spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est eius. Si autem Christus in vobis est, corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum, spiritus autem vita est propter iustitiam. Si ergo Spiritus eius qui suscitavit Iesum ex mortuis, habitat in vobis, qui suscitavit Iesum Christum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra per inhabitantem Spiritum eius in vobis . Corpus ergo mortuum est propter peccatum; quoniam necessitatem mortis etiam in viventibus habet. Quod autem peccatum, nisi primi hominis? Quandoquidem per iustitiam secundi hominis, id est Christi, eidem corpori quod nunc mortuum dicitur, vivificatio beata ventura est. Unde et secundus homo et secundus Adam dictus est Christus; cum inter Adam hominem factum, et Christum hominem natum, tot generationes hominum transisse videamus, nec in earum ordine possit dici secundus homo, nisi Cain; sed quia prima est mors corporis, quae facta est propter peccatum Adae, in qua decurrit hoc saeculum; secunda vita est corporis, quae fiet propter iustitiam Christi, et facta est in carne iam Christi, in qua vita futurum saeculum permanebit; ideo ille primus vel Adam vel homo, iste autem secundus est dictus. Et non vis intellegere tam grande illius fuisse peccatum, ut mortalium saeculum, huius vero tam grandem iustitiam, ut immortalium saeculum propagaret? Et mihi obicis peccati primi hominis granditatem, quae tanti mali hominum omnium exstitit causa, quasi hoc ego solus vel primus dixerim? Audi Ioannem Constantinopolitanum excellentis gloriae sacerdotem: Peccavit, inquit, Adam illud grande peccatum, et omne genus hominum in commune damnavit . Audi etiam in Lazari resuscitatione quid dicat, ut intellegas etiam corporis mortem de illo grandi venisse peccato: Flebat, inquit, Christus, quod eos qui immortales esse potuerunt, diabolus fecit esse mortales . Ubi, obsecro te, diabolus omnes homines fecit esse mortales, nisi in illo cui praevaricationis inflixit tam grande peccatum, quo ex paradisi beatitudine in tantam miseriam, quam videmus atque sentimus, genus proiceretur humanum? Quod non sola mors corporis, sed ipsius quoque animae, quam corruptibile aggravat corpus, mala tot et tanta testantur, et grave iugum super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum ; sub quo iugo est etiam quod in Psalmo legitur: Universa vanitas omnis homo vivens . Quae tu mala nolens tribuere illi grandi peccato primi hominis, quid agis, nisi ut ea, tu quidem paradiso illius tam magnae felicitatis importes, tamquam et illic futura essent, si nemo peccasset; Manichaei vero ea tribuant genti tenebrarum, non te accusante confusi, sed adiuvante confisi, nisi tecum fiant tamquam invictissimo gladio catholica veritate confossi? Non autem, ut insimulas, dicimus: Nemini de primorum hominum stirpe nascenti esse possibile in virtutum decora conari . Conantur enim multi, in quibus Deus operatur et velle; nec sine fructu perventionis ipso adiuvante conantur. Sed si animam corpus corruptibile non gravaret, non utique conarentur. Ac per hoc in paradiso (si nemo peccasset, et super filios Adam grave iugum non esset) sine conatu Deo suo facile et feliciter oboedirent.
Augustine: You seem to yourself, or even to your Pelagian associates, to say something, when, the divine authority abandoned, you are tossed about by human vanity, and by the arguments of your heart you oppose and clamor against the truth of the Holy Scriptures. For surely, if with a Christian and Catholic mind you attended to what the Apostle says: The body indeed is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10), you would surely understand that the first man sinned so grievously that, by that sin, the nature not of one man, but of the whole human race was changed, and, fallen from the possibility of immortality into the necessity of death, has collapsed; so that even those who are converted to God, through the one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, do not at once take on immortality of the body; but it is now promised them, to be given afterward through the Spirit of God by whom they are now inhabited. Which the same Apostle in the same place thus explains: If anyone, he says, does not have the Spirit of Christ, he does not belong to him. But if Christ is in you, the body indeed is dead because of sin, but the spirit is life because of righteousness. If, then, the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Jesus Christ from the dead will give life also to your mortal bodies through his Spirit dwelling in you (Rom 8:9-11). The body, then, is dead because of sin; since it has the necessity of death even in the living. And what sin, but the first man's? Since through the righteousness of the second man, that is, Christ, to the same body which is now called dead, a blessed making-alive is to come. Whence Christ was called both the second man and the second Adam; although between Adam, made a man, and Christ, born a man, we see so many generations of human beings to have passed, nor in their order could anyone be called the second man, except Cain; but because the first is the death of the body, which came about because of Adam's sin, in which this age runs its course; the second is the life of the body, which will come about because of Christ's righteousness, and has already come about in the flesh of Christ, in which life the age to come will abide; therefore he was called the first, either Adam or man, but this one the second. And do you refuse to understand that the sin of the former was so great that it propagated an age of mortals; but the righteousness of the latter so great that it propagated an age of immortals? And do you object to me the greatness of the first man's sin, which was the cause of so great an evil of all human beings, as though I alone or first said this? Hear John of Constantinople, a priest of excellent glory: Adam, he says, committed that great sin, and condemned the whole human race in common (See John Chrysostom, Homilies on Romans 10). Hear too what he says at the raising of Lazarus, that you may understand that even the death of the body came from that great sin: Christ wept, he says, because the devil made those mortal who could have been immortal (See John Chrysostom, Homilies on John 63). Where, I ask you, did the devil make all human beings mortal, except in him on whom he inflicted, by transgression, so great a sin, by which the human race was cast from the blessedness of paradise into so great a misery as we see and feel? Which not only the death of the body, but also of the soul itself, which the corruptible body weighs down, is attested by so many and so great evils, and the heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1); under which yoke is also that which is read in the Psalm: Every living man is altogether vanity (Ps 39:5 (38:6)). These evils you, unwilling to attribute to that great sin of the first man, what do you do, except either bring them into the paradise of so great a felicity—as though they would be there too, if no one had sinned—while the Manichees attribute them to the race of darkness, not confounded by your accusing, but emboldened by your helping, unless they be transfixed along with you, as if by a most unconquerable sword, by Catholic truth? But we do not say, as you allege: To no one born of the stock of the first human beings is it possible to strive after the beauties of the virtues. For many strive, in whom God works also to will; nor, with him helping, do they strive without the fruit of attainment. But if the corruptible body did not weigh down the soul, they surely would not have to strive. And through this, in paradise (if no one had sinned, and there were no heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam) they would obey their God easily and happily, without striving.
JulianImp.6.7VI. 8. Iulianus. Illorum ergo primorum hominum, id est, tantum duorum, opitulari sibi laudem arbitratur ad distinctionem inter Manichaeos et Traducianos tenendam; qua opinione haud facile quidquam vel eminentius, vel impudentius offendi potest. Libertas, inquit, arbitrii, postquam se uti coepit, vires suas perdidit. Et ut conversi ad eum, pedetentim omnia perscrutemur; confiteris nempe primum hominem effectum esse arbitrio libero, bonumque a Deo conditum, nulla ab exordio peccati tabe pollutum; sed conditionis innocuae sponte deinceps praevaricatum, coactionem inevitabilem cunctis ex se oriundis intulisse peccandi. Hoc certe est dogma vestrum, quod nos de Manichaei coeno testamur expressum, qui et ipsius Adae naturam, licet de primae concretam flore substantiae, multo meliorem secutis, tamen malam naturaliter opinatur.
VI. 8. Julian: He thinks, then, that the praise of those first human beings, that is, of only two, aids him toward maintaining the distinction between the Manichees and the Traducianists; than which opinion hardly anything either more eminent or more shameless can be found. The liberty, he says, of choice, after it began to use itself, lost its strength. And, that, turning to him, we may search through everything step by step; you confess, surely, that the first man was made of free choice, and founded good by God, polluted by no taint of sin from the beginning; but that, of an innocent condition, having afterward of his own accord transgressed, he brought an unavoidable compulsion of sinning upon all who arise from him. This is certainly your dogma, which we attest is expressed from the mire of the Manichee, who supposes that even the nature of Adam himself—although compounded of the flower of the first substance, far better than those who followed—is yet naturally evil.
JulianImp.6.8Augustinus. Superius quae dicta sunt, satis indicant, et catholicum dogma nostrum, et dogma haereticum vestrum, de primis hominibus et posteris eorum; illis rectis a Deo conditis, istis autem, quamvis eodem conditore, tamen de natura peccato vitiata cum peccati vinculo exortis, atque a salute in qua homo primitus factus est in contagionis languorem et mortis necessitatem originis conditione deiectis. Propter quod eis ope opus est Salvatoris, qui primum salvos facit, remissione omnium peccatorum; post etiam omnium sanatione languorum . Iam baptizatis enim et eis qui iam Spiritum Sanctum acceperant dicebat Apostolus: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, spiritus autem adversus carnem; haec enim invicem adversantur; ut non ea quae vultis, faciatis . Ubi tu qui negas liberum arbitrium vires suas perdidisse peccando, id est, male se utendo; quid respondebis, audiens quod carne concupiscente adversus spiritum, non ea quae volunt faciant et fideles, non ea quae volunt faciant etiam hi quibus sunt in Baptismo dimissa peccata; non ea quae volunt faciant, quos Apostolus ex auditu fidei dicit accepisse Spiritum Sanctum ; postremo non ea quae volunt faciant per liberam voluntatem, quos ait idem Doctor Gentium, vocatos in libertate ? Deinde, tam disertus defensor ipse libidinis, qui velut patronus egregius pro suscepta tua tantum audes, ut concupiscentiam carnis, qua concupiscit adversus spiritum, etiam in paradiso non dubites fuisse ante peccatum; non vides ad hoc te compelli, ut dicas nec tunc fuisse in illis primis hominibus efficacem liberam voluntatem? Si enim et tunc caro concupiscebat adversus spiritum, non ea quae volebant utique faciebant. Sed quoniam per liberum arbitrium, quod tunc integerrimas vires habuit, ea faciebant procul dubio quae volebant, id est, divinae legi non solum nulla impossibilitate, verum etiam nulla difficultate serviebant, tua ibi suscepta non fuit, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum; per quam fit ut homines iam etiam per fidem conversi ad Deum, iam baptizati, sanctificati, in libertatem vocati, non faciant in exstinguenda vitiosa delectatione quae volunt. Verissimumque illud est, quod per antistitem Ambrosium fides catholica dixit, hoc vitium quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, per praevaricationem primi hominis in nostram vertisse naturam . Quo telo inevitabili et insuperabili veritatis, et Manichaeus obtruncatur, et tu. Ambo quippe in hac re, videto quis vestrum peius, tamen prorsus erratis; tu propterea quia contendis quod ista pestilentia malum non sit; ille autem, quia malum quidem agnoscit, sed unde sit nescit, et fide catholica destitutus fabulam mendaciorum et turpitudinum plenam, de duarum naturarum boni scilicet et mali permixtione componit. Nunc ergo nostra iustitia est, ut iustificati per fidem pacem habeamus ad Deum ; contra vero carnis concupiscentiam nos oppugnantem, per ipsius Dei auxilium repugnante spiritu dimicemus. Non est ergo huius vitae iustitia, vitium non habere; sed vitia non eis consentiendo minuere, eisque resistendo, temperanter et iuste et pie vivere. Nullum autem cui resistamus habere vitium, posterioris est vitae, quae bene gestae praesentis est praemium; sanatione nostrae, non (sicut Manichaeus, cuius es adiutor, insanit) alienae separatione naturae. Ecce dogma nostrum non est de Manichaei coeno, sicut criminaris, expressum; quo dogmate Manichaeum, si non omnem sensum amisisti, tecum cernis oppressum.
Augustine: What was said above sufficiently indicates both our Catholic dogma and your heretical dogma concerning the first human beings and their descendants: those founded upright by God, but these, although by the same founder, yet arising, from a nature vitiated by sin, with the bond of sin, and cast down, by the condition of their origin, from the salvation in which the human being was first made, into the weakness of contagion and the necessity of death. On which account they need the help of the Savior, who first makes safe by the forgiveness of all sins; afterward also by the healing of all weaknesses (See Ps 103:3 (102:3)). For to those already baptized and to those who had already received the Holy Spirit the Apostle said: The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are opposed to each other; that you may not do the things you wish (Gal 5:17). Where you who deny that free choice lost its strength by sinning, that is, by using itself badly, what will you answer, hearing that, with the flesh lusting against the spirit, the faithful too do not do the things they wish, even those whose sins were forgiven in Baptism do not do the things they wish; even those whom the Apostle says received the Holy Spirit from the hearing of faith (See Gal 3:2) do not do the things they wish; finally, those whom the same Teacher of the Gentiles says were called in liberty (See Gal 5:13) do not do the things they wish through free will? Then, you yourself, so eloquent a defender of lust, who, like a distinguished patron, dare so much on behalf of your protégée that you do not hesitate that the concupiscence of the flesh, by which it lusts against the spirit, existed even in paradise before sin; do you not see that you are compelled to this: to say that not even then was there an effective free will in those first human beings? For if even then the flesh lusted against the spirit, they surely did not do the things they wished. But since, through free choice, which then had the most unimpaired strength, they did beyond doubt the things they wished—that is, they served the divine law not only with no impossibility, but even with no difficulty—your protégée was not there, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit; through which it comes about that human beings, now even converted to God through faith, now baptized, sanctified, called into liberty, do not, in extinguishing a vicious delight, do the things they wish. And that is most true which, through the bishop Ambrose, the Catholic faith said: that this fault, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, passed over into our nature through the transgression of the first man (See Ambrose, On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation 7.71). By which unavoidable and insuperable dart of truth, both the Manichee and you are cut down. For both of you in this matter—see which of you the worse—yet altogether err; you for this reason, because you contend that this pestilence is not an evil; but he, because he indeed recognizes the evil, but does not know whence it is, and, destitute of the Catholic faith, composes a fable full of lies and shameful things, about the commingling of two natures, namely of good and of evil. Now, then, this is our righteousness: that, justified by faith, we have peace with God (See Rom 5:1); but against the concupiscence of the flesh assailing us, by the help of God himself, with the spirit lusting in opposition, we fight. It is not, then, the righteousness of this life to have no fault; but to lessen the faults by not consenting to them, and, by resisting them, to live temperately and justly and piously. But to have no fault to resist is of the later life, which is the reward of the present one well lived; by the healing of our own nature, not (as the Manichee, whose helper you are, madly holds) by the separation of an alien one. Behold, our dogma is not expressed from the mire of the Manichee, as you charge; by which dogma, if you have not lost all sense, you see the Manichee crushed along with you.
JulianImp.6.8VI. 9. Iulianus. Nobis igitur in praesenti convincenda primo est sensus vestri hebetudo; tum ostendendum quod saepe iam fecimus, ne uno quidem pede a Manichaeorum vos gurgustiis meritoriisque discedere. Initio igitur, amentissimum est arbitrii negotium seminibus immixtum putare, et officia voluntatum inolevisse conceptibus; ut ea, quae est clarissima atque vastissima, naturarum et studiorum distinctione sublata, voluntas primorum posteris se ingenuisse dicatur. Cui errori obluctatur quidquid in rebus est. Numquam siquidem filii disertorum venustatem artis paternae in vagitibus attulerunt, aut soboles histrionum doctis motibus ad verba manus tetendit; nec bellatorum filii tubam populo poposcerunt. Licet hac forma, exempla omnium persequi clariora tonitribus concinentia. Respondebit universitas alios esse naturae limites, alios voluntatis; conditionesque seminum studiorum appetitibus pervias esse non posse. Bardissimum itaque et depositae stoliditatis apparuit credere conversum in naturam, quod voluntarium fuisse fateare. Ceterum illud aliud longe longeque deformius, quod possibilitatem operandi initio ais operationis assumptam, id est, ut liberum arbitrium (quod non est aliud quam possibilitas peccandi et non peccandi, nulli partis alterutrae subdita violentiae, sed quae habeat facultatem in quod voluerit latus suopte insistendi arbitratu), postquam coepit alterum velle, utrumque posse perdiderit.
VI. 9. Julian: For us, then, at present, the dullness of your understanding must first be convicted; then it must be shown, as we have often already done, that you do not depart even by one foot from the hovels and brothels of the Manichees. At the outset, then, it is utterly senseless to think that the business of choice is mixed into the seeds, and that the offices of wills have grown into conceptions; so that, the clearest and vastest distinction of natures and pursuits being removed, the will of the first human beings is said to have engendered itself into their descendants. Against which error everything in reality struggles. For never have the sons of the eloquent brought forth the charm of their father's art in their wailings, or has the offspring of actors stretched out its hands to words with learned movements; nor have the sons of warriors demanded the trumpet of the people. One may, in this way, pursue examples clearer than thunder, harmonious in agreement. The whole world will answer that the limits of nature are one thing, those of pursuit another; and that the conditions of seeds cannot be open to the appetites of pursuits. Most slow-witted, then, and of an abject stupidity it appeared, to believe that what you confess to have been voluntary was turned into nature. But that other thing is far and away more deformed: that you say the possibility of working was assumed at the beginning of working; that is, that free choice (which is nothing other than the possibility of sinning and not sinning, subject to the violence of neither part, but having the faculty of standing by its own judgment on whichever side it wills), after it began to will one of the two, lost the power of both.
JulianImp.6.9Augustinus. Itane vero non cernis, Manichaeo te, ignoranter quidem, sed instanter tamen isto tuae loquacitatis inflato atque spumoso strepitu suffragari? Si enim quaerente illo a nobis unde sit malum, qua quaestione consueverunt corda inerudita turbare; nos responderemus, de libera voluntate rationalis creaturae exortum; atque ille diceret: Unde ergo sunt ista tot mala, quae non iam natis, et voluntatis arbitrio accedente aetate iam utentibus accidunt, sed cum quibus vel omnes, vel plerique nascuntur? Omnibus quippe congenita est carnis concupiscentia, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, etiam recta fide atque doctrina pietatis imbutum; omnibus congenita est quaedam etiam tarditas mentis, qua et hi qui appellantur ingeniosi, non tamen sine aliqua laboris aerumna vel quascumque artes, vel eas etiam quas liberales nuncupant, discunt, vel ipsius religionis uberiorem scientiam consequuntur. Quidam etiam corpore deformi et aliquando monstruoso, multi obliviosi, multi ad intellegendum tardi et obtunsi, multi iracundi, multi libidinosi, nonnulli etiam omnino excordes fatuique nascuntur. Quid aliud catholica responderet fides, nisi haec omnia mala, ex quo peccavit homo, et de paradiso, id est, loco felicitatis eiectus est, ex natura quae peccati contagione vitiata est, exoriri? Neque enim, si nemo peccasset, vel talia in paradiso, vel alia ulla vitia nascerentur. Quo audito, ille tua nobis, si haberet, verba recitaret, ubi dicis: Esse amentissimum, arbitrii negotium seminibus immixtum putare, et officia voluntatum inolevisse conceptibus; et in hanc sententiam quidquid aliud addidisti, ex hoc eam probare conatus, quo nec diserti disertorum, nec histriones histrionum, nec bellatores nascuntur filii bellatorum. Isto tuo adiutorio Manichaeus ad hoc utitur, ut oppugnet quod dicimus, peccato primi hominis humanam vitiatam fuisse naturam, etiam in posteris eius, qui ratione seminali in illo erant, quando in illa grandi praevaricatione peccavit; quod cum oppugnaverit, introducat commixtionem duarum naturarum suarum, atque ex commixtione naturae malae illa mala, cum quibus homines nascuntur, asseveret existere. Tu autem ut mihi resistas, rem absurdissimam et detestabilissimam cogeris dicere, mala scilicet ista nascentium etiam in paradiso exortura fuisse, si nemo peccasset. Hic te Manichaeus urgebit, ut dicas unde fuerant exortura. Ubi magnis coarctatus angustiis, si dixeris ex ipsis naturis nascentium exortura fuisse mala ista, sine ullius merito voluntatis, profecto argues Creatorem; quod ne facias, confugiturus es ad merita voluntatum malarum. Sed ille quaesiturus est: Quarum? Non enim est voluntas ulla seminum, vel nascentium parvulorum. Quid ergo restabit, nisi ut nobiscum intellegas, si vis evadere vel superare Manichaeum, in occultis originum sinibus latenter implicari etiam semina nascentium, et ex mala voluntate venientia merita generantium; sed primi hominis tam magnum fuisse peccatum, ut omne genus humanum, ut verbis sancti Ioannis utar, in commune damnaret ? Ex quo conficitur mala ista exortura non fuisse, si nemo peccasset; nec in paradiso esse potuisse, unde qui peccaverant, antequam gignerent, exierunt. Quo catholico dogmate vacuatur, quod de artibus putasti esse subdendum, admonens nos, cum sui patris arte neminem nasci. Aliud est namque peccare in moribus, quibus recte vivitur, quod vel legibus solet vel divino iudicio vindicari; aliud in artibus, sive honestae sint, sive turpes, ubi contra artem factum aliquid dicitur; quae peccata non divina vel reprehenduntur lege, vel severitate plectuntur; sed ab iis hominibus, quorum iudiciis haec subiacent, maximeque a magistris earum, cum pueros docent, sub timore aut dolore poenarum. Qua in re tamen cogitare debemus, quia si in paradiso aliquid disceretur, quod illi vitae esset utile scire, sine ullo labore aut dolore id assequeretur beata natura, vel Deo docente, vel se ipsa. Unde quis non intellegat, in hac vita etiam tormenta discentium ad miserias huius saeculi, quod ex uno in condemnationem propagatum est , pertinere? Ubi etiam miserum hoc est, miseras mentes nolle quod bonum est; vel si iam parata est voluntas a Domino , clamare tamen adhuc eum qui in hoc vivit saeculo: Velle adiacet mihi; perficere autem bonum, non . Hoc si teneas, Manichaeos vinces; quia vero non tenes, utrosque vestrum vincit haec fides.
Augustine: Do you really not see that you support the Manichee—ignorantly indeed, yet earnestly—with this inflated and foaming din of your wordiness? For if, when he asks us whence evil comes, by which question they are wont to disturb untaught hearts, we answered that it arose from the free will of the rational creature; and he said: Whence, then, are these so many evils, which befall, not those already born and using the choice of the will as age advances, but with which all, or very many, are born? For congenital to all is the concupiscence of the flesh, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, even in one imbued with right faith and the teaching of piety; congenital to all is also a certain slowness of mind, by which even those who are called talented yet learn, not without some toil and trouble, whether any skills, or even those called liberal, or attain a richer knowledge of religion itself. Some too are born with a deformed and sometimes monstrous body, many forgetful, many slow and dull at understanding, many irascible, many lustful, some even altogether senseless and foolish. What else would the Catholic faith answer, except that all these evils, from the time the human being sinned and was cast out of paradise, that is, the place of felicity, arise from a nature vitiated by the contagion of sin? For neither, if no one had sinned, would either such things, or any other faults, be born in paradise. Hearing which, he would recite to us your words, if he had them, where you say: That it is utterly senseless to think the business of choice mixed into the seeds, and the offices of wills to have grown into conceptions; and whatever else you added to this sentiment, trying to prove it from this, that neither the eloquent are born sons of the eloquent, nor actors of actors, nor warriors sons of warriors. By this help of yours the Manichee uses this to assail what we say: that by the sin of the first man human nature was vitiated, even in his descendants, who were in him by seminal principle, when he sinned in that great transgression; and when he has assailed this, he introduces the commingling of his two natures, and asserts that from the commingling of the evil nature those evils with which human beings are born exist. But you, to resist me, are compelled to say a most absurd and most detestable thing: namely that these evils of those being born would have arisen even in paradise, if no one had sinned. Here the Manichee will press you, to say whence they would have arisen. Where, hemmed in by great straits, if you say that these evils would have arisen from the very natures of those being born, without the merit of any will, you will surely charge the Creator; and lest you do this, you will flee to the merits of evil wills. But he will ask: Whose? For there is no will of seeds, or of little ones being born. What, then, will remain, except that you understand with us—if you wish to escape or overcome the Manichee—that in the hidden recesses of origins are latently entangled even the seeds of those being born, and the merits coming from the evil will of those begetting; but that the sin of the first man was so great that it condemned the whole human race in common, to use the words of holy John (See John Chrysostom, Homilies on Romans 10)? From which it is concluded that these evils would not have arisen, if no one had sinned; nor could they have been in paradise, from which those who had sinned departed before they begot. By which Catholic dogma is emptied out what you thought should be subjoined about the arts, reminding us that no one is born with his father's art. For it is one thing to sin in morals, by which one lives rightly, which is wont to be punished either by the laws or by the divine judgment; another to sin in arts, whether they be honorable or base, where something is said to be done against the art; which sins are neither reprehended by the divine law, nor punished with severity; but by those human beings to whose judgments these things are subject, and especially by the masters of them, when they teach boys, under fear or pain of punishments. In which matter, however, we ought to consider that, if in paradise anything were learned which it was useful for that life to know, the blessed nature would attain it without any toil or pain, either with God teaching, or by itself. Whence who does not understand that, in this life, even the torments of those learning pertain to the miseries of this age, which was propagated from one into condemnation (See Rom 5:16)? Where this too is wretched: that wretched minds are unwilling to do what is good; or, if the will is already prepared by the Lord (See Prov 8:35 LXX), that he who lives in this age yet still cries out: To will is present with me; but to accomplish the good, I do not find (See Rom 7:18). If you hold this, you will conquer the Manichees; but because you do not hold it, this faith conquers both of you.
JulianImp.6.9VI. 10. Iulianus. Nunc igitur approbetur quod diximus, nullo a Manichaeis vestrum dogma differre. Non est omnino dubium, factam pessimam ipsius Adae naturam, si hac est conditione formata, ut haberet mali necessitatem, quae non habebat boni; id est, ut crimen, etiamsi fuisset voluntate conceptum, tamen fieret in ea naturale, in qua bonitas non fieret naturalis; falsoque dicitur voluntate peccasse, qui nequissimae conditionis praeiudicio laboravit. Apparet enim, quam vinctus malo fuerit, qui erat crimine inseparabili farciendus. Quid enim peius ea quibo invenire substantia, quae facta est ut in iniquitatem posset incidere, et recedere ab iniquitate non posset? Hanc si in boni parte violentiam pertulisset, si liberum perdidisset arbitrium, tamen nihil accusasset auctorem; quia nemo ei de copiis benignitatis quaestionem moveret; cum vero in mali parte dominatio talis collocatur, neminem magis quam ipsum hominis arguit conditorem, et supervacua criminatorum suorum, id est, vestra, Deus talis adulatione palpatur, qui amicissimus malitiae, creationis suae foeditate convincitur. Cui enim persuaderi potest, primum hominem non destinasse criminibus, si illum emendationis facultate privavit; si tam pravo affecit animo, ut error suus ei displicere non posset, ut nullum haberet ad honestatem regressum, nec fieret post experimenta correctior, ac ne forte recuperandae probitatis umquam sentiret affectum, ipsam ei possibilitatem correctionis evellit? Prorsus si talis eius conditio fuit, ut quamdiu in hac vita erat, uno lapsu virtutem emendationis amitteret, non est ob aliud quam ut caderet institutus; immo nec corruisse, sed iacuisse semper verius dicitur, qui non sinitur, quantum ad mores spectat, exsurgere. Qualis ergo fuit illa libertas, quae ei collata prius creditur, si e duabus contrariis qualitatibus peiorem a necessario, meliorem a mutabili capessebat; immo a tyrannide criminis occupata, despoliabatur resipiscentiae facultate. Teterrimus ergo primi hominis status ab ipso exordio, si a Deo est tam infeliciter institutus, ut ruiturus in crimen perpetua peccandi necessitate ligaretur.
VI. 10. Julian: Now, then, let what we said be approved: that your dogma differs in nothing from the Manichees'. It is altogether beyond doubt that the very nature of Adam was made the worst, if it was formed on this condition, that it had the necessity of evil, which it did not have of good; that is, that crime, even if it had been conceived by will, yet became natural in it, in which goodness did not become natural; and it is falsely said that he sinned by will, who labored under the prejudgment of a most wicked condition. For it appears how bound by evil he was, who was to be stuffed with an inseparable crime. For what worse substance could I find than one which was made so that it could fall into iniquity, and could not withdraw from iniquity? If it had suffered such violence on the side of good, if it had lost free choice, yet it would have accused its author in nothing; because no one would raise a question with it about the resources of his kindness; but when on the side of evil such domination is set up, it charges no one more than the very founder of the human being, and such a God is flattered by the superfluous adulation of his accusers, that is, of you, who, most friendly to malice, is convicted by the foulness of his creation. For who can be persuaded that he did not destine the first man to crimes, if he deprived him of the faculty of emendation; if he affected him with so depraved a mind that his error could not displease him, that he had no return to honorableness, nor became more corrected after his experiences, and—lest perhaps he should ever feel any affection for recovering uprightness—tore out from him the very possibility of correction? Indeed, if his condition was such that, as long as he was in this life, by one fall he lost the strength of emendation, he was established for no other reason than to fall; nay, it is more truly said that he never fell at all, but always lay prostrate, who, as far as morals are concerned, is not allowed to rise. What sort, then, was that liberty which is believed first conferred on him, if of two contrary qualities he took the worse from necessity, the better from the changeable; nay, occupied by the tyranny of crime, he was despoiled of the faculty of coming to his senses? Most foul, then, was the state of the first man from the very beginning, if he was so unhappily established by God that, about to fall into crime, he was bound by a perpetual necessity of sinning.
JulianImp.6.10Augustinus. Res dicis, quas si nobis saltem admonentibus considerare non negligas, etiam tibi ipsi, quantumlibet sis impudens, erubescas? Cur enim non attendis, si pessima est facta natura, quae voluntate iniusta incurrit in malum, poena vero iniusta non potest recurrere in bonum, non humanam quam nobis obicis, sed angelicam quoque naturam pessimam factam? Nisi forte dices, etiam diabolum voluntate a bono lapsum, si voluerit, et quando voluerit, in bonum quod deseruit reversurum, et Origenis nobis instaurabis errorem. Quod si non facis, quod dixisti incautus, corrige admonitus; et confitere bonam conditam esse naturam, quae in malum quod fecit, nulla necessitate compulsa, sed sua voluntate collapsa est. In bonum autem quod reliquit, solius Dei gratia revocari potest, non voluntate libertatis, quam merito iniquitatis amisit. Potest quippe et alius, similiter ut tu errans, dicere: Quid peius ea potero invenire substantia, quae facta est ut in aeternum supplicium possit ire, et inde redire non possit? Et utique Deus omnipotens a quo vult supplicio eruere potest; sed mentiri non potest, qui minatus est hoc se non esse facturum, quando id supplicium dixit aeternum. Sed ut de hac re vana sapias, fallit te definitio tua, qua in superiori prosecutione, cui iam respondimus, sicut saepe et alibi facis, liberum arbitrium definisti. Dixisti enim: Liberum arbitrium non est aliud quam possibilitas peccandi et non peccandi. Qua definitione primum ipsi Deo liberum arbitrium abstulisti, quem non negas, quia et hoc saepe dicis, et verum est, non posse peccare. Deinde ipsi sancti in regno eius liberum arbitrium perdituri sunt, ubi peccare non poterunt. Verum hic admonendus es, quid de hoc unde nunc agimus, sapere debeas, poenam scilicet et praemium, intuenda inter se esse contraria, et alia duo contraria his contrariis adhaerere; sic ergo in poena est non posse recte agere, sicut erit in praemio non posse peccare. Attende Scripturas, a quibus miserandus exorbitas, et vagabundus ventosa loquacitate tamquam tempestate iactaris; et vide quemadmodum dictum sit: Quod quaerebat Israel, hoc non est consecutus; electio autem consecuta est: ceteri vero excaecati sunt; sicut scriptum est: Dedit illis Deus spiritum compunctionis, oculos ut non videant, et aures ut non audiant, usque in hodiernum diem. Et David dicit: Fiat mensa eorum in laqueum, et in captionem, et in scandalum, et in retributionem illis; obscurentur oculi eorum ne videant, et dorsum illorum semper incurva . Aspice etiam illud in Evangelio: Propterea, inquit, non poterant credere, quia iterum dixit Isaias: Excaecavit oculos eorum, et induravit eorum cor, ut non videant oculis, nec intellegant corde, et convertantur, et sanem eos . Haec commemoravi, ut intellegas, si possis, fieri per poenam procul dubio iustam ut non credant homines excaecato corde; cum per misericordiam fiat ut credant libera voluntate. Quis enim nescit, neminem credere nisi libero voluntatis arbitrio? Sed paratur voluntas a Domino; nec omnino eruitur a servitute mala suis meritis debita, nisi quando per gratuitam gratiam paratur a Domino. Si enim Deus ex nolentibus volentes non faceret, profecto pro eis qui nolunt credere, non oraremus ut vellent. Quod et Apostolus se fecisse pro Iudaeis monstravit, ubi ait: Fratres, bona voluntas cordis mei, et deprecatio pro illis ad Deum in salutem . Hanc utique salutem consequi, nisi credente voluntate, non possent; hoc ergo beatus Paulus orabat ut vellent. Et episcopus Cyprianus quod dictum est in Oratione dominica: Fiat voluntas tua sicut in caelo et in terra , etiam sic intellegit, ut pro infidelibus inimicis nostris admoniti fuerimus orare; ut quemadmodum nos credimus, qui iam caelum sumus, portando hominis caelestis imaginem, sic etiam ipsi credant, qui propterea terra sunt, quia terreni tantum hominis imaginem portant .
Augustine: You say things which, if you do not neglect to consider them when we at least admonish you, you would, however shameless you are, blush at even before yourself. For why do you not attend that, if the nature is made worst which by an unjust will runs into evil, but by a just penalty cannot run back into good, then not only the human nature you object to us, but the angelic nature too was made worst? Unless perhaps you will say that the devil too, fallen by will from good, will return, if he wills and when he wills, into the good he forsook, and you will set up for us the error of Origen. But if you do not do this, then correct, being admonished, what you said incautiously; and confess that the nature was founded good, which fell into the evil it did, compelled by no necessity, but collapsed by its own will. But into the good it left, it can be recalled only by the grace of God, not by the will of liberty, which it lost by the merit of iniquity. For another too, erring like you, can say: What worse substance could I find than one which was made so that it could go into eternal punishment, and from there could not return? And surely God almighty can rescue from punishment whom he wills; but he cannot lie, who threatened that he would not do this, when he called that punishment eternal. But that you may think emptily about this matter, your definition deceives you, by which, in the prosecution above, to which we have already answered—as you often do elsewhere too—you defined free choice. For you said: Free choice is nothing other than the possibility of sinning and not sinning. By which definition you first took away free choice from God himself, whom you do not deny—because you both often say this, and it is true—cannot sin. Then the saints themselves will lose free choice in his kingdom, where they will not be able to sin. But here you must be admonished what you ought to think about this matter now in hand: namely that punishment and reward must be regarded as contraries to each other, and that two other contraries cleave to these contraries; so, then, in the punishment is the inability to act rightly, as in the reward will be the inability to sin. Attend to the Scriptures, from which, to be pitied, you wander off, and, a vagabond, are tossed by windy wordiness as if by a storm; and see how it is said: What Israel sought, this it did not obtain; but the election obtained it: the rest, however, were blinded; as it is written: God gave them a spirit of stupor, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear, to this very day. And David says: Let their table become a snare, and a trap, and a stumbling block, and a recompense to them; let their eyes be darkened that they may not see, and bend their backs forever (Rom 11:7-10). Look too at that in the Gospel: For this reason, he says, they could not believe, because Isaiah said again: He has blinded their eyes and hardened their heart, lest they see with their eyes, and understand with their heart, and turn, and I heal them (John 12:39-40). These things I have mentioned that you may understand, if you can, that by a punishment beyond doubt just it comes about that human beings do not believe with a blinded heart; while by mercy it comes about that they believe by free will. For who does not know that no one believes except by the free choice of the will? But the will is prepared by the Lord; nor is it at all rescued from the evil servitude due to its merits, except when by gratuitous grace it is prepared by the Lord. For if God did not make the unwilling willing, surely we would not pray for those who are unwilling to believe, that they may be willing. Which the Apostle showed that he did for the Jews, where he says: Brothers, the good will of my heart, and my prayer to God for them, is for salvation (Rom 10:1). This salvation they surely could not obtain except by a believing will; this, then, blessed Paul prayed that they might will. And the bishop Cyprian understands what is said in the Lord's Prayer, Your will be done, on earth as it is in heaven (Matt 6:10), in this sense too, that we have been admonished to pray for our unbelieving enemies; that, as we believe, who are now heaven, by bearing the image of the heavenly man, so they too may believe, who are therefore earth, because they bear only the image of the earthly man (See Cyprian, On the Lord's Prayer 17; 1 Cor 15:49).
JulianImp.6.10VI. 11. Iulianus. Durat nempe inter vos Manichaeosque foedus, ut illi professione, vos argumentatione, primi quoque hominis naturam asseratis malam fuisse; quod licet totum ineptiarum mendaciorumque plenum esse (ut praetermissis sanctorum legionibus, primum post peccatum Adae iustitia arripiamus exemplum), Abelis sanctitate mirabili comprobatur, qui de peccatoribus natus, bene vivendi se non caruisse virtute, effectu quoque ipsius virtutis ostendit; verumtamen his praeteritis iuvat sententias Traducianae nationis urgere. Quale igitur autumas fuisse arbitrium liberum, quod collatum primis hominibus confiteris? Certe ut possent animi alternare motus, et vel facere malum, vel recedere a malo, vel deserere vel servare iustitiam. Voluntas ergo peccandi non fuisset, nisi volendi possibilitas anteisset. Hoc postquam uti coeperunt propria voluntate, id est motu animi cogente nullo, tu dicis liberum arbitrium perdidisse; quo quid potest furiosius cogitari? Ut enim vis argumenti tui expressa teneatur, dicis eam rem periisse propter voluntatem, quae data non est nisi propter voluntatem; peccatum quippe nihil est aliud quam voluntas mala; libertas autem ad hoc solum data est, ut voluntatem non cogeret, sed permitteret exoriri; hanc autem tu libertatem conditionem suam dicis voluntatis opere perdidisse, ut per hoc interiisse credatur, per quod solum probatur vigere. Voluntas ergo mala non quidem fructus, sed testimonium libertatis est. Libertas autem nihil est aliud quam possibilitas boni malique, sed voluntarii. Qui ergo fieri potuit ut per hoc interiret, per quod proditur instituta, cum mala voluntas et bona voluntas non exitia sint, sed praeconia libertatis? Ac per hoc quantum distat inter officia atque discrimina, tantum inter opinionem tuam et rationem arbitrii liberi, cui excidium putas de suis laudibus comparatum. Quid ergo novum, quid insperatum delinquente homine accidit, per quod Dei instituta corruerent? Factus est qui peccare et non peccare posset; cum peccavit, fecit quod non debuit quidem, sed potuit tamen; per quid igitur facultatem illam perderet, quae ad hoc fuerat instituta, ut posset velle, posset nolle quod voluit.
VI. 11. Julian: A covenant remains, surely, between you and the Manichees, that you—they by profession, you by argument—assert that the nature even of the first man was evil; which, although it is wholly full of follies and lies (to pass over the legions of the saints, let us seize the first example of righteousness after the sin of Adam), is refuted by the marvelous holiness of Abel, who, born of sinners, showed that he did not lack the virtue of living well, by the very effect of that virtue; yet, these things passed over, it helps to press the opinions of the Traducianist nation. What sort, then, do you maintain was the free choice which you confess was conferred on the first human beings? Surely such that the motions of the mind could alternate, and either do evil, or withdraw from evil, either forsake or keep righteousness. The will of sinning, then, would not have been, unless the possibility of willing had gone before. After they began to use this by their own will, that is, by a motion of the mind with nothing compelling, you say free choice perished; than which what can be thought more frenzied? For, that the force of your argument may be held expressed, you say that thing perished on account of will, which was given only on account of will; for sin is nothing other than an evil will; but liberty was given for this alone, that it should not compel, but permit, the will to arise; and this liberty you say lost its condition by the work of the will, so that it is believed to have perished through the very thing by which alone it is proved to flourish. The evil will, then, is not indeed the fruit, but the testimony of liberty. But liberty is nothing other than the possibility of good and evil, but voluntary. How, then, could it perish through that by which it is shown to have been established, when an evil will and a good will are not the destructions, but the heralds of liberty? And through this, as far as offices differ from distinctions, so far does your opinion differ from the rationale of free choice, for which you think a destruction has been prepared out of its own praises. What new, what unhoped-for thing, then, happened when the human being transgressed, by which God's institutions collapsed? He was made one who could sin and not sin; when he sinned, he did what he indeed ought not, yet could; through what, then, would he lose that faculty, which had been established for this, that he could will, could not-will, what he willed?
JulianImp.6.11Augustinus. Eadem iterum et iterum dicis, quibus me iam superius respondisse qui legerit pervidebit. Sed hic etiam persistenti tibi atque asseveranti libertatem bene agendi seu male, suo malo usu perire non posse, respondeat et beatus papa Innocentius, Romanae antistes Ecclesiae; qui rescribens in causa vestra episcopalibus conciliis Africanis: Liberum - inquit - arbitrium olim ille perpessus, dum suis inconsultius utitur bonis, cadens in praevaricationis profunda demersus, nihil quemadmodum exinde surgere posset invenit; suaque in aeternum libertate deceptus, huius ruinae latuisset oppressus, nisi eum post Christi pro sua gratia relevasset adventus . Videsne quid sapiat per ministrum suum catholica fides? Vides possibilitatem standi et cadendi sic habuisse hominem, ut si cecidisset, non eadem possibilitate qua ceciderat surgeret, culpam scilicet sequente supplicio. Propter quod Christi gratia, cui miserabiliter estis ingrati, quae iacentem relevaret, advenit. In alia quoque epistola, quam de vobis ipsis rescripsit ad Numidas: Ergo - inquit - Dei gratiam conantur auferre, quam necesse est, etiam restituta nobis status pristini libertate, quaeramus . Audis restitui libertatem, et non periisse contendis; atque humana voluntate contentus divinam non petis gratiam, quam libertas nostra etiam in statum pristinum restituta sibi esse intellegit necessariam. Quaero autem a te, utrum iam in pristinum statum ita fuerit restituta libertas eius qui dicit: Non quod volo, ago; sed quod odi, illud facio; et: Velle adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum, non invenio ; et quibus dicitur: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem; ut non ea quae vultis faciatis . Puto quod non usque adeo desipis, ut in his dicas esse status pristini libertatem; et tamen si nulla eis esset, id quod sanctum et iustum et bonum est, nec velle potuissent. Sunt enim quos peccare ita delectat, ut nolint oderintque iustitiam; quam nec velle aliquis potest, nisi paretur voluntas a Domino, ut ad perficiendam iustitiam praecedat desiderium voluntatis, et paulatim effectus potestatis accedat, aliis citius, aliis tardius, unicuique sicut Dominus dedit, qui solus potest hominis reparare salutem atque augere iam perditam et donare etiam hoc, ut iam perire non possit. In quo liberatorum numero est et sanctus Abel, quem dicis bene vivendi non caruisse virtute. Non caruit plane, sed postquam coepit illi esse; antea vero, quis est mundus a sorde? Nec infans, cuius est diei unius vita super terram . Redimuntur ergo, quicumque redimuntur, ab eo qui venit quaerere quod perierat, qui et antequam in carne veniret, per fidem ipsam redemit, qua credebatur esse venturus. Redimuntur autem in libertatem beatitudinis sempiternam, ubi iam peccato servire non possint. Nam si, ut dicis, boni malique voluntarii possibilitas sola libertas est, non habet libertatem Deus, in quo peccandi possibilitas non est. Hominis vero liberum arbitrium congenitum et omnino inamissibile si quaerimus, illud est quo beati omnes esse volunt, etiam hi qui ea nolunt quae ad beatitudinem ducunt.
Augustine: You say the same things again and again, to which whoever reads will see that I have already answered above. But here too, to you persisting and asserting that the liberty of acting well or badly cannot perish by its own bad use, let the blessed Pope Innocent also answer, bishop of the Roman Church; who, writing back in your case to the African episcopal councils, says: That man, once enjoying free choice, while he uses his goods too inconsiderately, falling, plunged into the depths of transgression, found no way by which he could thence rise; and, deceived forever of his liberty, he would have lain crushed by this ruin, had not the coming of Christ afterward, by his grace, raised him up (See Innocent I, Letter 29 (to the Council of Carthage)). Do you see what the Catholic faith holds through its minister? Do you see that the human being had the possibility of standing and falling in such a way that, if he had fallen, he would not rise by the same possibility by which he had fallen, namely with punishment following the fault? On which account the grace of Christ, to which you are wretchedly ungrateful, came to raise up the one lying prostrate. In another letter too, which he wrote back about you yourselves to the Numidians: Therefore, he says, they try to take away the grace of God, which it is necessary that we seek, even when the liberty of our former state has been restored to us (See Innocent I, Letter 30 (to the Council of Milevis)). You hear that liberty is restored, and you contend it did not perish; and, content with the human will, you do not ask for divine grace, which our liberty, even restored to its former state, understands to be necessary to it. But I ask you whether the liberty of him who says, I do not do what I will, but what I hate, that I do; and: To will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I do not find (See Rom 7:15, 18); and to whom it is said: The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; that you may not do the things you wish (Gal 5:17)—has now been restored to its former state. I think you are not so foolish as to say there is in these the liberty of the former state; and yet, if there were none in them, they could not even will what is holy and just and good. For there are those whom it so delights to sin that they are unwilling and hate righteousness; which no one can even will, unless the will is prepared by the Lord, so that for accomplishing righteousness the desire of the will may go before, and gradually the effect of power accrue—to some sooner, to others later, to each as the Lord has given, who alone can repair the salvation of the human being, and increase it once lost, and bestow also this, that it can no longer perish. In which number of the freed is also holy Abel, who, you say, did not lack the virtue of living well. He did not lack it plainly, but after it began to be in him; before, however, who is clean from filth? Not even an infant whose life on earth is of one day (See Job 14:4-5 LXX). They are redeemed, then, whoever are redeemed, by him who came to seek what had perished, who, even before he came in the flesh, redeemed by that faith by which he was believed to be coming. And they are redeemed into the everlasting liberty of blessedness, where they can no longer be slaves to sin. For if, as you say, the possibility of voluntary good and evil alone is liberty, then God does not have liberty, in whom there is no possibility of sinning. But if we seek the congenital and altogether unlosable free choice of the human being, it is that by which all wish to be blessed, even those who do not wish the things that lead to blessedness.
JulianImp.6.11VI. 12. Iulianus. Deinde, ut praerupta opinionis tuae sequamur, argumentaris tali conditione liberum arbitrium ordinatum fuisse, ut vim suam merito secutae voluntatis amitteret, et qualitatis quam elegisset necessitatem, in reliquum sustineret. Hinc ergo quid a nobis referatur attende. Siccine putas hominem creatum, ut hanc electae qualitatis necessitatem in utraque parte pateretur, id est, ut si bonum voluisset, ulterius peccare non posset; et si elegisset malum, ultra se emendare nequiret? An ut tantummodo malam partem mali necessitas sequeretur, in bona autem nihil tale contingeret, sed semper periculis varietatum pateret? Ex his duobus quodlibet sumito: si dixeris talem factam esse naturam, quae mali tantum necessitatem pateretur; nulli dubium remanebit, teterrimam eam definiri, cui peioris partis violentia sola tribuatur; probaturque Adam quoque malae fuisse naturae; et nullius remanebit voluntarii, sub qua delitescas, umbra commissi. Sin autem profitearis, etiam in boni parte idem fuisse secuturum, id est, ut si bonum voluisset, ulterius peccare non posset; refero: Cur ergo peccavit? Cur nullam passus est boni necessitatem, ut insidiis diaboli impenetrabilis appareret, qui aliquo tempore, priusquam peccaret, fuisse obediens Deo invenitur? Neque enim illico quod ingressu animae limus intepuit, in appetitum malae voluntatis exarsit. Legitur quinimmo, ad culturam paradisi custodiamque translatus accepisse praeceptum a Deo, ut universis fructibus vesceretur, sed a ligno scientiae boni et mali, dicto audiens abstineret. Antequam ergo de latere eius corpus formaretur uxoris, obediens mansit imperio, amoeni ruris cultor innocuus; post hoc vero, adiutorium similis sibi consortis emeruit. Inculcavit nempe has distinctiones temporum Scripturae fides. Postquam vero iam sibi mulierem vidit paratam, in tantum praecepto Dei sedulo famulabatur officio, ut etiam feminae legem, quam acceperat, intimaret. Non solum igitur custos divini, sed etiam praedicator imperii, condocefecit Eva et reverentiam praecipientis, et genus servitutis, et causam timoris. Inde est quippe quod etiam mulier congredienti diabolo obluctata sollicite, cui nihil Deus imperaverat, refellit serpentis prima fronte mendacia, et dicit non abstinentiam omnium lignorum, sicut ille confinxerat, sed cum permissu fertilitatis universae unius tantum mandatam arbusculae cautionem, metumque mortis obiectum, qui praevaricatores iure sequeretur. Non ergo brevi tempore apparet Adam custodisse mandatum; sed etiam Evam curam devotionis habuisse, quae scientiae et divinitatis amore collapsa est. Cur ergo illa iustitia, illa devotio, quae in Adam diu, in Eva aliquandiu viguit, non eripuit delinquendi possibilitatem, ut boni necessitas impenetrabiles eos suadelis sontibus exhiberet? Fuerunt ergo quamdiu voluerunt obedientes, nec tamen perdiderunt merito devotionis facultatem praevaricandi; denique lapsi sunt ; igitur et posteaquam peccaverunt, manifestum est nequaquam eos potuisse vim correctionis amittere. Et ideo ut in omnibus locis, hic quoque totum quod confinxeras perdidisti; quia peccatum illud primorum hominum nec ullorum fecit criminum necessitatem, nec transiit in naturam; sicut iustitia quae praecessit, nec virtutum intulit necessitatem, nec sibi vias seminum vindicavit.
VI. 12. Julian: Then, to follow the precipices of your opinion, you argue that free choice was so ordained that it would lose its force by the merit of the will that followed, and would for the remainder sustain the necessity of the quality it had chosen. From this, then, attend to what is reported by us. Do you think the human being was so created that he would suffer this necessity of the chosen quality on either side, that is, that if he had willed good, he could no longer sin; and if he had chosen evil, he could no longer correct himself? Or that the necessity of evil should follow only the evil part, but on the good part nothing of the sort should happen, but it should always lie open to the perils of variations? Take whichever you please of these two: if you say a nature was made such that it suffered only the necessity of evil, no doubt will remain that it is defined most foul, to which the violence of the worse part alone is attributed; and it is proved that Adam too was of an evil nature; and there will remain no shadow of anything voluntary committed, under which you may lurk. But if you profess that the same would have followed on the good part too, that is, that if he had willed good, he could no longer sin; I report: Why, then, did he sin? Why did he suffer no necessity of good, so as to appear impenetrable to the snares of the devil—he who is found to have been obedient to God for some time before he sinned? For it was not immediately, when the clay grew warm by the entrance of the soul, that he was inflamed into the appetite of an evil will. Rather, it is read that, having been transferred to the cultivation and keeping of paradise, he received a precept from God, that he should eat of all the fruits, but abstain, obedient to the word, from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Before, then, the body of his wife was formed from his side, he remained obedient to the command, an innocent cultivator of the pleasant countryside; but after this, he earned the help of a consort like himself. The trustworthiness of Scripture, surely, has driven home these distinctions of times. But after he now saw the woman prepared for him, he served the precept of God with so diligent a duty that he even intimated to the woman the law which he had received. Not only the keeper, then, but also the preacher of the divine command, he thoroughly taught Eve both the reverence of the one commanding, and the kind of service, and the cause of fear. Hence it is that the woman too, when the devil approached, struggled anxiously—she to whom God had commanded nothing—and at the very first refuted the lies of the serpent, and says, not abstinence from all the trees, as he had feigned, but, with permission of all fruitfulness, the prescribed caution about one little tree only, and the fear of death set before her, which would justly follow transgressors. Not for a short time, then, does it appear that Adam kept the command; but also that Eve had a care of devotion, who collapsed through the love of knowledge and divinity. Why, then, did that righteousness, that devotion, which flourished long in Adam, for some time in Eve, not snatch away the possibility of sinning, so that the necessity of good should render them impenetrable to guilty persuasions? They were, then, obedient as long as they willed, nor yet did they lose, by the merit of devotion, the faculty of transgressing; finally, they fell (See Gen 3:6); therefore, even after they sinned, it is manifest that they could in no way lose the strength of correction. And so, as in all places, here too you have lost the whole of what you had feigned; because that sin of the first human beings neither made a necessity of any crimes, nor passed into nature; just as the righteousness that preceded neither brought a necessity of virtues, nor claimed for itself the ways of the seeds.
JulianImp.6.12Augustinus. Totum quod tamdiu et tanta verborum perplexitate dixisti, breviter sic potest dici. Cur, inquis, Adam male agendo perdidit posse bene agere, et bene prius agendo non perdidit posse peccare? Et vis intellegi, si ita est, hominem non bonae, sed malae factum fuisse naturae, in quo plus valuit actio mala, ne posset agere bene, quam actio bona, ne posset agere male. Posses isto modo dicere, male fuisse hominem cum oculis creatum, quia cum eos exstinxerit, fit in illo ut non possit videre; videndo autem non in illo factum est ut eos non posset exstinguere; aut male fuisse totum corpus hominis conditum, quia in potestate habet ut ipse se necet, nec habet in potestate ut se ipse resuscitet; et fit in eo per mortem ut se non possit vivificare, nec fit in eo per vitam ut se non possit occidere. Quod si non dicis, quoniam cernis quam sit insulsum, cur malam dicis Deum creasse hominis naturam, si fecit in eo mala voluntas ne redire posset ad bonum, quamvis in eo non fecerit voluntas bona ut ire non posset in malum? Cum libero enim sic est creatus arbitrio, ut posset non peccare, si nollet; non ut si vellet, impune peccaret. Quid ergo mirum, si delinquendo, hoc est, rectitudinem suam in qua factus erat depravatione mutando, cum supplicio secutum est non posse recta agere? Quamdiu vero in eadem rectitudine stetit, in qua poterat non peccare, ideo non accepit maius aliquid, hoc est, non posse peccare, quia in eo quod habuit, non usque ad finem remunerationis voluit permanere. Quod enim accepturi sunt sancti, qui in futuro saeculo in corpore futuri sunt spiritali, sine interventu mortis fuerat accepturus Adam, ut ascendens ab eo quod posset non mori, ad id perveniret ubi non posset mori; et ascendens ab eo quod non peccare posset, ad id perveniret ubi peccare non posset. Non quippe in corpore spiritali, sed in animali factus erat, quamvis nisi peccasset, minime morituro. Quia, sicut dicit Apostolus: Non prius quod spiritale est, sed quod animale; postea spiritale . Unde beatus Ambrosius, in umbra vitae dicit Adam esse factum, de qua posset cadere, non necessitate, sed voluntate . In qua utique si maneret, acciperet eam vitam, cuius illa umbra erat, quam sancti accepturi sunt, ex qua omnino cadere non poterunt. Hanc quoque mortalitatem, in qua decurrit hoc saeculum, e contrario umbram mortis intellegit; mortem vero, cuius haec umbra est, illam commemorat, quae secunda mors dicitur , de qua nemo, cum in eam venerit, revertetur. Quicumque autem de hac mortis umbra liberantur, non ad vitae umbram redire, sed ad eam vitam praeparantur ire, de qua numquam quisquam possit exire. Ibi erit et ipse Adam; quoniam recte creditur Domini adventu atque in inferna descensu, ab inferni vinculis iam solutus; ut primum Dei plasma, quod genitorem non habuit, sed Deum tantummodo creatorem, et secundum carnem primus pater Christi, ultra in illis vinculis non maneret, atque aeterno supplicio non periret. Ubi autem iudicio superexaltat misericordia , non sunt merita cogitanda, sed gratia: cuius est tanta et tam inscrutabilis atque investigabilis altitudo, ut post illam sententiam qua dictum est. Si quis non renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu, non intrabit in regnum Dei , videamus aliquando bene meritis fidelibus non concedi filios suos, ut sint in regno Dei cum parentibus suis; sed non regeneratos parvulos exire de hac vita, dum nonnumquam et ipsis suis parentibus ardenter desiderantibus, et ministris Sacramentorum alacriter festinantibus, ab omnipotentissimo et misericordissimo Deo non differtur paululum mors eorum, ut Christianorum nati exeant hinc renati, et neque regno Christi suisque genitoribus pereant; sed antequam baptizentur, exspirant; cum aliquando filiis infantibus infidelium, et ipsam Christi gratiam blasphemantium, in manus Christianorum mirabili Dei gubernatione perductis, praestetur haec gratia, ut in Dei regnum ab impiis separati parentibus veniant. Ubi si a te quaeratur, quae sit iustitia ista, profecto in illo dialectico et philosophico sermone, quo tibi videris de iustitia Dei diligentissime disputasse, non invenis eam. Dominus enim cognovit cogitationes sapientium, quoniam vanae sunt ; et abscondens haec a sapientibus et prudentibus, revelavit ea parvulis , id est, humilibus, et non in sua virtute, sed in Domino confidentibus; quod tu vel numquam, vel nondum esse dignaris. Si ergo quaeris, ubi vel quando detur homini non posse peccare, praemia quaere sanctorum, quae post hanc vitam illos oportet accipere. Si autem non credis, liberum hominis arbitrium, quo recte agere potuit et debuit, peccati malitia defecisse, illum saltem attende, qui dicit: Non quod volo, hoc ago; sed quod odi, illud facio; quem vos non vultis vitiata origine, sed praevalente mala consuetudine laborare; ac sic etiam vos fatemini liberum arbitrium, male se utendo, posse deficere; et non vultis illo tam grandi peccato, ut omni mala consuetudine fuerit maius et peius, vitiari potuisse in humana natura liberum arbitrium; in qua depravanda malam consuetudinem tantum dicitis posse, ut se perficere bonum clamet homo velle, nec posse. Immutabilis autem, cum qua homo creatus est et creatur, illa libertas est voluntatis, qua beati esse omnes volumus, et nolle non possumus; sed haec ut beatus sit quisque non sufficit, nec ut vivat recte per quod beatus sit; quia non ita est homini congenita libertas immutabilis voluntatis qua velit possitque bene agere, sicut congenita est qua velit beatus esse; quod omnes volunt, et qui recte agere nolunt.
Augustine: The whole of what you said so long and with so great a perplexity of words can be said briefly thus. Why, you say, did Adam, by acting badly, lose the ability to act well, and, by acting well first, did not lose the ability to sin? And you wish it understood that, if this is so, the human being was made of a nature not good, but evil, in which the evil action availed more, to make him unable to act well, than the good action, to make him unable to act badly. You could in this way say that the human being was made badly with eyes, because, when he has put them out, it comes about in him that he cannot see; but by seeing it was not brought about in him that he could not put them out; or that the whole body of the human being was founded badly, because he has it in his power to kill himself, and does not have it in his power to raise himself up again; and it comes about in him through death that he cannot bring himself to life, but it does not come about in him through life that he cannot kill himself. But if you do not say this, since you see how insipid it is, why do you say God created the nature of the human being evil, if an evil will brought it about in him that he could not return to good, although a good will did not bring it about in him that he could not go into evil? For he was created with free choice in such a way that he could not sin, if he willed not to; not that, if he willed, he could sin with impunity. What wonder, then, if, by transgressing—that is, by changing, by depravation, the uprightness in which he was made—it followed, with punishment, that he could not act rightly? But as long as he stood in the same uprightness, in which he could not sin, he did not for this reason receive something greater, that is, the inability to sin, because in what he had he was unwilling to remain to the end of reward. For what the saints are to receive, who in the age to come will be in a spiritual body, Adam would have received without the intervention of death, so that, ascending from being able not to die, he would arrive where he could not die; and ascending from being able not to sin, he would arrive where he could not sin. For he was made not in a spiritual body, but in an animal one, although, unless he had sinned, by no means destined to die. Because, as the Apostle says: Not first what is spiritual, but what is animal; afterward the spiritual (1 Cor 15:46). Whence blessed Ambrose says that Adam was made in the shadow of life, from which he could fall, not by necessity, but by will (See Ambrose, On Paradise 5.29). In which, surely, if he had remained, he would receive that life of which it was the shadow, which the saints are to receive, from which they can in no way fall. This mortality too, in which this age runs its course, he understands on the contrary as the shadow of death; but the death of which this is the shadow, he mentions as that which is called the second death (See Rev 20:14), from which no one, when he has come into it, will return. But whoever are freed from this shadow of death are prepared not to return to the shadow of life, but to go to that life from which no one can ever depart. There Adam himself too will be; for it is rightly believed that, by the Lord's coming and descent into hell, he was already loosed from the bonds of hell; so that the first work fashioned by God, who had no begetter, but only God as creator, and the first father, according to the flesh, of Christ, should not remain longer in those bonds, nor perish by eternal punishment. But where mercy exalts itself above judgment (See Jas 2:13), merits are not to be thought of, but grace: whose depth is so great and so inscrutable and unsearchable that, after that sentence by which it was said, Unless one is reborn of water and the Spirit, he will not enter the kingdom of God (John 3:5), we see sometimes that to well-deserving faithful their own children are not granted, that they may be in the kingdom of God with their parents; but unregenerate little ones depart from this life, while sometimes—even with their own parents ardently desiring it, and the ministers of the Sacraments eagerly hastening—the death of these little ones is not put off even a little by the most omnipotent and most merciful God, so that the children of Christians might depart hence reborn, and not perish from the kingdom of Christ and from their own begetters; but before they are baptized, they breathe their last; while sometimes to the infant children of unbelievers, even of those blaspheming the grace of Christ, brought into the hands of Christians by God's marvelous governance, this grace is granted, that they may come into the kingdom of God, separated from their impious parents. Where, if it be asked of you what this justice is, surely in that dialectical and philosophical discourse, in which you seem to yourself to have most diligently disputed about the justice of God, you do not find it. For the Lord knew the thoughts of the wise, that they are vain (See Ps 94:11 (93:11); 1 Cor 3:20); and hiding these things from the wise and prudent, he revealed them to little ones (See Matt 11:25), that is, to the humble, and to those trusting not in their own virtue, but in the Lord; which you either never, or not yet, deign to be. If, then, you seek where or when it is given to the human being to be unable to sin, seek the rewards of the saints, which they must receive after this life. But if you do not believe that the free choice of the human being, by which he could and ought to have acted rightly, failed by the malice of sin, at least attend to him who says: I do not do what I will, but what I hate, that I do (Rom 7:15); whom you are unwilling should labor under a vitiated origin, but under a prevailing evil habit; and so you too confess that free choice, by using itself badly, can fail; and you are unwilling that, by that so great sin, which was greater and worse than every evil habit, free choice could be vitiated in human nature; in the depraving of which you say that an evil habit alone has such power that the human being cries out that he wills to accomplish good, and cannot. But the unchangeable liberty with which the human being was created and is created is that liberty of the will by which we all wish to be blessed, and cannot not wish it; but this does not suffice for anyone to be blessed, nor to live rightly by which he is blessed; because the unchangeable liberty of the will by which one wills and is able to act well is not so congenital to the human being as is congenital that by which he wills to be blessed; which all will, even those who are unwilling to act rightly.
JulianImp.6.12VI. 13. Iulianus. Quid igitur confectum est? Unum esse necessarium de duobus, ut aut confitearis Adam factum bonae esse substantiae, nec naturam eius voluntaria qualitate destructam, et deseras naturale peccatum; aut si illum, ut hactenus opinatus es, naturalium malorum causam esse contenderis, et ipsum pessimae substantiae, atque ad Deum vestrum, id est, tuum et Manichaei, pertinere pronunties.
VI. 13. Julian: What, then, has been accomplished? That one of two things is necessary: that either you confess Adam was made of a good substance, and his nature not destroyed by a voluntary quality, and you abandon natural sin; or, if you contend that he, as you have hitherto opined, is the cause of natural evils, you pronounce that he too is of a most evil substance, and belongs to your God, that is, yours and the Manichee's.
JulianImp.6.13Augustinus. Non esse confectum quod putas esse confectum, nostra superior responsio declarat. Nam cum inter nos quaestio verteretur, utrum malo usu liberi arbitrii, cum quo homo creatus est, vitiari potuerit ista libertas, ne ad bene vivendum, qui male vixit, esset idoneus, nisi gratiae virtute sanatus; ut omittam cetera, quae in eadem responsione dicta sunt plurima, invenimus hominem in summa Scripturarum divinarum auctoritate dicentem: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago. In quibus verbis evidenter apparet, liberum arbitrium malo suo usu esse vitiatum. Non enim ante peccatum, quo male usus est homo libero arbitrio, in illa paradisi felicitate et ad bene agendum magna facilitate constitutus, posset hoc dicere. Sed hoc vos non vitiatae in primo homine naturae humanae, sed malae consuetudini cuiusque tribuitis, quam sibi praevalentem volens, nec valens homo vincere, suamque libertatem ad bonum perficiendum integram non inveniens, dicere ista compellitur; quasi vero vim consuetudinis malae insuperabilem patiatur, ut ab ea se poscat Dei gratia liberari, nisi infirmata natura. Nam qui ista dicebat, cum ad ista pervenisset, ubi ait: Video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captivantem me sub lege peccati, quae est in membris meis. Miser ego - inquit- homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum . Corpus mortis quomodo vultis interpretamini: tamen infirmato libero arbitrio, infirmata natura ista dicebat, et desiderabat per Dei gratiam de mortis corpore liberari, ubi non quod volebat agebat bonum, sed malum quod oderat faciebat. Verum documento evidentiore vincimini, tam grande peccatum illud fuisse primi hominis, ut omni violentia consuetudinis esset maius et peius, cum vobis proferuntur mala puerorum, quae utique in paradiso futura non fuissent, si ut inde non pelleretur, in ea rectitudinis felicitate, in qua facta est natura humana, mansisset. Nam ut talia taceamus, quae aliquot locis iam diximus, et ut non solum indoctam, verum etiam indocilem praetereamus infantiam; nonne aliqua puer accipiens a magistro quod memoria retineret, volens tenere nec valens, si posset dicere, verissime diceret: " Video aliam legem in anima mea, repugnantem legi voluntatis meae, et captivantem me sub lege ferularum, quae imminet membris meis? Miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Corpus enim corruptibile aggravat animam, ut quod vult memoria tenere, non possit". Et de hoc corruptibili corpore quis liberat, nisi gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum? Sive cum hoc exuta, redempta Christi sanguine anima requiescit, sive cum corruptibile hoc induet incorruptionem , et post aerumnas corporis mortui propter peccatum vivificabuntur et corpora mortalia nostra per inhabitantem Christi Spiritum in nobis. Contra cuius gratiam, liberae voluntatis arbitrium, peccati ancillam voluntatem defenditis. Nos autem a Manichaeo longe sumus, qui naturae bonae sive in grandibus, sive in parvulis, et vitium confitemur et medicum.
Augustine: That what you think has been accomplished has not been accomplished, our earlier answer declares. For when the question was turned between us, whether by the bad use of the free choice with which the human being was created, this liberty could be vitiated, so that he who lived badly would not be fit for living well, unless healed by the power of grace—to pass over the rest, which was said much in that same answer—we found a human being saying, on the supreme authority of the divine Scriptures: I do not do the good I will, but the evil I do not will, that I do. In which words it evidently appears that free choice has been vitiated by its own bad use. For not before sin, by which the human being used free choice badly, when he was established in that felicity of paradise and in great ease of acting well, could he say this. But you attribute this, not to the human nature vitiated in the first man, but to the evil habit of each one, which, prevailing over him, the human being, willing but not able to conquer, and not finding his liberty whole for accomplishing good, is compelled to say these things; as though, indeed, he suffered an insuperable force of evil habit, so that he asks to be freed from it by the grace of God, unless the nature were weakened. For he who said these things, when he had reached the point where he says: I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and taking me captive under the law of sin which is in my members. Wretched man that I am, he says, who will free me from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 7:23-25). Interpret the body of death as you wish: yet, with free choice weakened, with nature weakened, he said these things, and desired, through the grace of God, to be freed from the body of death, where he did not do the good he willed, but did the evil he hated. But you are conquered by a more evident proof, that the sin of the first man was so great that it was greater and worse than all the violence of habit, when there are brought forward to you the evils of children, which surely would not have been in paradise, if, so as not to be driven from it, the human nature had remained in that felicity of uprightness in which it was made. For, to be silent about such things, which we have already said in several places, and to pass over not only the untaught but even the unteachable infancy; would not a boy, receiving from a teacher something to retain in memory, willing to hold it and not able, if he could speak, say most truly: "I see another law in my soul, fighting against the law of my will, and taking me captive under the law of the rods that hangs over my members? Wretched man that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? For the corruptible body weighs down the soul (See Rom 7:24; Wis 9:15), so that what it wishes to hold in memory, it cannot." And from this corruptible body who frees, except the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord? Whether when, stripped of this body, the soul redeemed by the blood of Christ rests, or when this corruptible shall put on incorruption (1 Cor 15:53), and, after the troubles of the body dead because of sin, our mortal bodies too shall be made alive through the Spirit of Christ dwelling in us. Against whose grace you defend the free choice of the will, the will that is the handmaid of sin. But we are far from the Manichee, who confess both the fault of a good nature, whether in the grown or in little ones, and the physician.
JulianImp.6.13VI. 14. Iulianus. Sic disputavi hactenus, ut mos nostrae fidei postulabat; verum non hac solum parte contentus, agam tecum benigne, et consulto eam mihi personam induam, quae praeceptoris tui sententiae favere videatur. Hoc autem ea gratia fiet, ut tu in Manichaeum, si ab eo dissides, oppugnare cogaris. Assertioni quippe nostrae nihil astutiae inesse hoc ipso docebitur, cum Traducianus non invenit, quo Manichaeo possit obsistere. Itaque apparebit quanta inter vos coniuratio sit, quam procuretis mutuis cuncta compendiis, quando inter vos iurgium excitari non potuerit. Quo igitur id me consilio arripuisse ostenderim, animo lectoris insidat; nunc iam personae, quam assumimus, oratione fungamur. Errant omnino qui putant hanc concretionem corporis habilem esse iustitiae; omnibus bonis studiis repugnat vilis natura carnis et sanguinis. Quidquid irritamentorum est lenocinio sensuum, ad perturbationem, immo eversionem mentis elabitur, quae in hoc coenum nescio qua infelicitate deiecta, generosos micatus luteo perdit admixtu. Ipsa quantum in se est ad locum suum, id est, ad superiora conatur; sed terreno afflictatur ergastulo. Denique cum ad pudicitiam voluerit subvolare, gluten et viscum voluptatis obscenae de perustis visceribus experitur. Iam si liberalitatem munificentiae concupiscat, avaritiae, quae tegmine frugalitatis operitur, manicis arctissimis colligatur. Enim vero si in aequabili constantiae quadam voluerit serenitate consistere, obruitur illico grandine timoris, et doloris procellis, atque ad omnia exsanguescens dubia, compos sui non sinitur manere consilii. Iunge huc ignoratarum rerum noctem, qua circumdatur illuvie. Quid laudabilitatis in eo suspicabimur animante, qui nec ad utilium electionem oculos vigentes habet, et inter tempestates cupiditatum et discriminum sua naufragia numerare non sufficit? Nec tamen aliquis haec sponte depravatae substantiae accidisse mentiatur; ipsa primorum hominum institutio his aerumnis invenitur obnoxia. Nam ut hoc etiam Moysi, quem Catholici venerantur, testimonio comprobetur, experiebantur primi homines carnificinam timoris, quos intentatio, nisi obedissent, periculi territabat, quantumque de rerum collatione metiendum est, formidolosiores posteris eos opinamur fuisse, quos poena necdum cuiquam comperta vexabat. Cur enim mortis intentatione quaterentur, qui nesciebant quid incommodi afferret interitus? Sollicitabantur nimirum solis suspicionibus malorum. In qua ergo ille animus tranquillitate consisteret, quem tam aspera hiems formidinis commovebat? Porro ignorantia quam profunda, quamque patiendi eius dura conditio, ut liberari ab ea nisi praevaricatione non posset; scientiam quippe boni malique, absque ausu condemnabili nequaquam capessiturus. Hoc ita caecum et aerumnosum animal, inquies etiam cupiditas innata reddebat, quam rei interdictae et venustas irritabat et suavitas. Quod totum velut parum esset ad infelicitatem illius exprimendam, impugnationi naturae superioris exponitur. Quis ergo adeo desipiat, ut ibi quidquam boni fuisse arbitretur, ubi tot miseriarum instrumenta instituta fateatur? Pessimae igitur conditionis, pessimaeque naturae caro ista in istis primis hominibus suum, quod ab exordio tenebat, exseruit. Hanc autem tam malam substantiam Deus bonus non potuit fabricare. Quid ergo superest, nisi ut fateamur alterum esse animae datorem, alterum luteorum conditorem? Stat certe Manichaei, cuius indueram personam, acies ordinata. Quid opperiamur intellegis, videlicet ut qui ei adversus est, consequenti impugnatione id demonstret. Igitur vestrum dogma cum eo confligat; apparebit utrum sine pernicie sua vel leviter possit moveri. Pronuntiavit certe, non solum nasci omnes de commixtione corporum criminosos, verum ipsum Adam culparum necessitatem de concretione viscerum, et limi ex quo factus est sordibus attulisse. Natura, inquit, carnis in primis hominibus fuit noxia; ipsam scintillam animi studio honestatis sublucentem conclusit, madefecit, exstinxit. Ineptiunt prorsus Catholici, qui peccantium testimoniis obnituntur, et nec documentis propriis acquiescunt, videntesque non se bonum quod volunt agere, sed malum quod exsecrantur operari, putant tamen in carne non esse mali necessitatem. His ergo tam invidiose dictis congrediatur Traducianus, si potest; ego interim spectator assisto, et exitum vestri conflictus opperior. Quid itaque respondebis malam naturam etiam in primis hominibus fuisse iuranti? Sine dubio referes Deum formatorem hominum non potuisse malum condere quod creavit, et ideo quia Deus qui malum non facit, homines fecit, nequaquam eos naturaliter malos probari. Dixisti aliquid, et veraciter: sed vide utrum hoc me debueris audiente proferre. Qua enim virtute Manichaeum concusseris non satis curo; interim in mea totus iura transisti. Capto tibi iam delectat illudere; excipio quippe magno plausu professionem tuam, teque ut eius memineris admoneo. Dignitate enim auctoris, id est Dei, qui malum non facit, pronuntiasti opera eius bona debere asseri. Omnes ergo homines de instituta a Deo sexuum commixtione generatos, a Deo, an a diabolo fieri putas? Si a Deo: qui eos audes reos malosque pronuntiare, cum unicum dixeris esse testimonium Adam fieri malae non potuisse naturae, quia conditus a Deo qui est optimus, indicetur? Si ergo argumentum forte est, per quod credatur primorum hominum rea non instituta substantia, hoc ipsum quia Deus eam condidit quem bonum fatemur; remanet illud in excidium traducis, ut et omnes de coniugio genitos iniquos condi non posse, eodem testimonio comprobetur, quia Deus eos condidit, quem bonum fatemur. Sin autem et post hoc rabiens impudentia iurare perstiterit, et a Deo fieri parvulos, et tamen malos esse eos naturaliter; catholico quidem, sicut et Deo nostro, nihil his mendaciis praeiudicii comparatur; Manichaeum tamen constat a vobis oppugnatum non esse, qui libenter quod Deum criminaris amplectitur; illud tibi perisse contentus, per quod Adam conditionis bonae fueras approbare molitus.
VI. 14. Julian: I have disputed thus far as the manner of our faith demanded; but, not content with this part alone, I will deal kindly with you, and deliberately put on the persona of one who seems to favor the opinion of your preceptor. But this will be done for this reason, that you may be compelled to assail the Manichee, if you disagree with him. For it will be shown by this very thing that there is no craftiness in our assertion, when the Traducianist does not find a way to resist the Manichee. And so it will appear how great a conspiracy there is between you, how you procure all things by mutual gains, since a quarrel could not be stirred up between you. By what counsel, then, I have shown that I have seized upon this, let it sit in the mind of the reader; now let us discharge the discourse of the persona we assume. They err altogether who think this concretion of the body fit for righteousness; the base nature of flesh and blood is opposed to all good pursuits. Whatever there is of incitements by the allurement of the senses slides toward the perturbation, nay, the overthrow of the mind, which, cast down into this mire by some unhappiness, loses its noble flashings by the muddy admixture. It strives, as far as in it lies, toward its own place, that is, toward higher things; but it is afflicted by its earthly prison-house. Finally, when it wishes to fly up to chastity, it experiences the glue and birdlime of obscene pleasure from its scorched bowels. Now if it longs for the liberality of munificence, it is bound by the tightest manacles of avarice, which is covered under the garb of frugality. But indeed if it wishes to stand in a certain even serenity of constancy, it is at once overwhelmed by the hail of fear, and the storms of grief, and, growing bloodless at all uncertainties, is not allowed to remain master of its own counsel. Add to this the night of unknown things, by which it is surrounded as by filth. What praiseworthiness shall we suspect in that living being, which neither has vigorous eyes for the choosing of useful things, and amid the tempests of desires and dangers does not suffice to number its own shipwrecks? Nor yet let anyone falsely say that these things happened by the free will of a depraved substance; the very establishment of the first human beings is found liable to these troubles. For, that this too may be proved by the testimony of Moses, whom the Catholics venerate, the first human beings experienced the butchery of fear, whom the threatening of danger, unless they obeyed, terrified; and, as far as is to be measured from the comparison of things, we suppose them to have been more fearful than their descendants, whom a punishment not yet known to anyone vexed. For why would they be shaken by the threatening of death, who did not know what harm destruction brought? They were assuredly troubled by mere suspicions of evils. In what tranquillity, then, would that mind stand, which so harsh a winter of dread agitated? Moreover, how deep the ignorance, and how hard its condition of suffering, that it could not be freed from it except by transgression; since he would by no means take hold of the knowledge of good and evil without a condemnable daring. This animal so blind and troubled, you will say, an innate desire too rendered restless, which the very beauty and sweetness of the forbidden thing irritated. All of which, as though it were too little to express his unhappiness, is exposed to the assault of a higher nature. Who, then, would be so foolish as to think there was anything good there, where he confesses so many instruments of miseries were established? Of a most evil condition, then, and a most evil nature, this flesh in these first human beings put forth what it held from the beginning. But this so evil a substance the good God could not have fabricated. What, then, remains, except that we confess that one is the giver of the soul, another the founder of the clay? The battle line of the Manichee, whose persona I had put on, stands surely arrayed. What we await, you understand: namely that he who is opposed to him should, by a consequent assault, demonstrate it. Let your dogma, then, contend with him; it will appear whether, without its own ruin, it can be moved even slightly. He has pronounced, surely, that not only are all born criminal from the commingling of bodies, but that Adam himself brought the necessity of faults from the concretion of his bowels, and from the filth of the clay of which he was made. The nature of the flesh, he says, in the first human beings was noxious; it shut in, drenched, extinguished the very spark of the mind shining faintly with the zeal of honorableness. The Catholics are altogether silly, who lean on the testimonies of sinners, and do not acquiesce in their own proofs, and, seeing that they do not do the good they will, but work the evil they execrate, yet think that there is no necessity of evil in the flesh. With these things, then, so invidiously said, let the Traducianist engage, if he can; meanwhile I stand by as a spectator, and await the outcome of your conflict. What, then, will you answer to one swearing that an evil nature was in the first human beings too? Without doubt you will report that God the formator of human beings could not found the evil which he created, and therefore, because God, who does not make evil, made human beings, they are by no means proved to be naturally evil. You have said something, and truly: but see whether you ought to have brought this forward with me hearing. For by what strength you have shaken the Manichee I care little; meanwhile you have crossed wholly into my jurisdiction. Now that you are captured, it delights me to mock you; for I receive your profession with great applause, and warn you to remember it. For by the dignity of the author, that is, of God, who does not make evil, you have pronounced that his works ought to be asserted good. All human beings, then, generated from the commingling of the sexes instituted by God—do you think they are made by God, or by the devil? If by God: how do you dare to pronounce them guilty and evil, when you have said the sole testimony is that Adam could not be made of an evil nature, because he is shown to be founded by God, who is best? If, then, it is perhaps an argument by which it is believed that the substance of the first human beings was not founded guilty—this very thing, that God founded it, whom we confess good—there remains, for the destruction of the propagation-theory, that it be proved by the same testimony that all begotten of marriage too cannot be founded wicked, because God founded them, whom we confess good. But if, even after this, your raging shamelessness should persist in swearing both that little ones are made by God, and yet that they are naturally evil; to the Catholic indeed, as also to our God, no prejudice is gained by these lies; yet it is established that the Manichee has not been assailed by you, who gladly embraces what you charge against God; content that this much has perished for you, by which you had striven to prove that Adam was of a good condition.
JulianImp.6.14Augustinus. Cum mihi adversus Manichaeum certamen ineundum, tibique spectandum diserta caecitate proponis, partes tuas improvidus subruis; et quomodo illam teterrimam luem, quam Manichaeo funestus error invexit, tamquam pestifero adiuves dogmatis tui flatu, etiam his hominibus, qui suo tardantur ingenio, ut possent intellegere, praestitisti. Nam cum illa quae de vitae huius mortalis corruptibilisque miseriis copiose et facunde dixisti, audierit quisque vel legerit, vera te fuisse prosecutum, non solum in tuo sermone, verum in ipsis quoque humanis rebus agnoscet. Manichaeo quippe, cui velut adversus nos loquenti verba fecisti, nihil magnum aut difficile fuit in hac mortali vita, quae et de felicitate paradisi merito peccati eiecta atque deiecta est, ista quae abs te de illa dicta sunt intueri; et sive ut tu, sive uberius atque copiosius, tamen eadem ipsa garrire, quae tam manifesta sunt, ut etiam Scripturarum divinarum locis plurimis lectitentur, de corruptibilis corporis onere, et ex illo animae aggravatione venientia. Unde et in sanctis, in huius vitae agone luctantibus, caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem ; cum spiritus, sicut ait gloriosissimus Cyprianus, caelestia atque divina quaerit, caro terrena et saecularia concupiscit . Hinc est ille conflictus, quem memoratus martyr in libro, quem De Mortalitate conscripsit, diligenter et eloquenter explicat, dicens inter cetera, quod nobis sit cum carnalibus vitiis atque illecebris saecularibus assidua et molesta luctatio . Iam vero beatus Gregorius hoc certamen, quod habemus in corpore mortis huius, sic ante oculos ponit, ut nullus sit huius agonis athleta, qui non se in verbis eius tamquam in speculo recognoscat. Intra nosmetipsos - inquit - propriis vitiis et passionibus impugnamur, et die noctuque ignitis stimulis corporis humilitatis huius et corporis mortis urgemur; nunc latenter, nunc etiam palam provocantibus ubique et irritantibus rerum visibilium illecebris, luto hoc faecis cui inhaesimus caeni sui fetorem venis capacioribus exhalante; sed et lege peccati, quae est in membris nostris, legi spiritus repugnante, dum imaginem regiam quae intra nos est, captivam ducere studet; ut spoliis eius cedat, quidquid illud est, quod in nos beneficio divinae ac primae illius conditionis influxit . Haec verba hominis Dei, et in secundo libro illorum sex quos contra tuos quattuor edidi , et in hoc opere posui , cum tuo primo volumini responderem, ubi corpus mortis, de quo se dicit Apostolus Dei gratia liberari , aliter intellegendum putasti. Et sanctus Ambrosius cum dixisset: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur; quorum ipse ortus in vitio est, sicut habes lectum, dicente David: "Ecce enim in iniquitatibus conceptus sum, et in delictis peperit me mater mea ", protinus subiecit: Ideo Pauli caro corpus mortis erat, sicut ipse ait: "Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? " . Quid ergo mirum est, si Manichaeus intuens mala huius vitae, et corpus mortis huius quod aggravat animam, et discordiam carnis et spiritus, et iugum grave super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum usque in diem sepulturae in matrem omnium, dicit talia etiam per os tuum quasi contra nos, qualia videmus dixisse Gregorium contra vos? Unde constat mala vitae huius, quae temptatio est super terram , quibus malis in genere humano propter iugum grave filiorum Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum usque in diem sepulturae in matrem omnium , plenus est mundus, et Manichaeos cum Catholicis confiteri; sed unde sint haec, non utrosque idem dicere, et magnam hinc inter eos esse distantiam; quod ea Manichaei tribuunt alienae naturae malae, Catholici vero et bonae et nostrae, sed peccato vitiatae meritoque punitae. Tu qui non vis quod dicimus dicere, ipse quid dicis? Quomodo Manichaeo respondes unde sint haec mala, cum quibus nascuntur homines, et quae in paradiso non nascerentur si nemo peccasset, atque ibi non depravata, sed recta nostra natura, sicut condita est, permaneret? Si vitium congenitum est, quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et non est ex natura in origine vitiata, dic unde sit? Si vitium congenitum est, in quo clamat homo: Scio quia non inhabitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum; velle enim adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non invenio ; et non est ex natura vitiata primi hominis praevaricatione; dic unde sit. Si autem non sunt congenita vitia ista; dic unde sint? Ex peccandi, inquies, consuetudine, quam sibi quisque fecit libera voluntate. Ubi quod non vis, interim confiteris, scilicet libertatem voluntatis suo malo usu perire potuisse, quia perficiendo malum minus idonea facta est ad perficiendum bonum. Sed numquid voluntate quisquam obtunsus est corde? Numquid voluntate obliviosus est quispiam? Numquid voluntate est aliquis fatuus? Haec et alia vitia ipsius mentis atque animi, cum quibus homines nasci ambigit nemo, si ex origine vitiata dicis non esse, dic unde sint. Neque enim dicturus es, quod ista, si nemo peccasset, paradisus habere potuisset. Postremo, quod corpus corruptibile aggravat animam, sub qua miserabili sarcina omnes qui non usquequaque desipiunt, homines gemunt, dic unde sit. Non enim sic dicturus es primos homines creatos, ut corruptibili corpore alicuius eorum anima gravaretur; aut post eorum illud grande peccatum, sine tali corpore aliquis nascitur. Cur ergo adversus nos Manichaeum loquentem loquacissimus introducis, cum tu negando quod dicimus, ei respondere non possis? Cui respondet Cyprianus, ita discordare carnem spiritumque demonstrans, ut tamen utriusque sit a Deo Patre oranda concordia ; cui respondet Gregorius, qui cum talia de carne dixisset, qualia contra nos composuisti dicere Manichaeum, utrumque tamen ad Deum, ipso Deo propitio, revocandum esse testatur, id est, spiritum et carnem; cui respondet Ambrosius, qui cum dixisset carnem moderatioris animae arbitrio coniugandam: Qualis fuit - inquit - cum inhabitanda paradisi secreta suscepit, antequam veneno pestiferi serpentis infecta sacrilegam famem sciret . His enim suis sententiis catholici antistites satis aperteque docuerunt, carnis non naturam malam esse, sed vitium; quo sanato ad hoc redit, ut quemadmodum primitus instituta est, nullis suis corruptelis aggravet animam, nullamque habeat cum spiritu contraria concupiscendo discordiam; qua discordia deceptus est Manichaeus, ut alienam malam fingeret commixtam nobis esse substantiam. Horum catholicorum antistitum fidem si nobiscum sequi velles, Manichaeos everteres, non iuvares; nunc vero non eos destruere, sed magis aedificare conaris; negando enim mala, quae de origine vitiata homines nascentes trahunt, non id agis, ut nulla esse credamus mala naturalia, quoniam nimium manifesta sunt; sed potius agis, ut de aliena mala natura putentur esse ista, quam nobis esse commixtam Manichaeorum insania fabulatur; non de nostra bona primi hominis praevaricatione vitiata manare monstrentur, quod Catholicorum sanitas loquitur. Sed Manichaeus, inquis, etiam ipsam primi hominis carnem, qualis antequam peccaret fuit, sic detestatur, ut malam nitatur ostendere. Ita quidem a te inducitur loquens, ut ingerat respondendi qualecumque negotium, non solum mihi, verum etiam tibi. Nam ubi dicit a malo eam conditore factam esse; simul ei respondemus, tam bonam creaturam, quae posset non peccare, si nollet, quamvis non aequetur suo Creatori, non tamen potuisse nisi bonum habere Creatorem. Ubi vero de timore mortis, quam, si peccasset ei Deus est comminatu, etiam priusquam peccasset, miserum dicit, simul respondemus, quod hominis, qui numquam peccare potuisset, si numquam peccare voluisset, poenae illius devitandae, quae fuerat secutura peccato, tranquilla erat cautio, non turbulenta formido. Hoc quidem respondere communi adversario, sicut dictum est, communiter possumus; sed ego adversus Manichaeum laudes augeo rationalis illius creaturae, quae non solum non cruciabatur ullo metu, verum etiam laetitia magna fruebatur; quoniam malum mortis, quod omnium, vel pene omnium refugiunt corda fidelium, habebat in potestate non perpeti. Huic nostrae fidei quoniam vester error adversus est, quo putatis Adam, sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, fuisse moriturum, quid hic Manichaeo respondes dicenti miseram conditam esse naturam, quam vel peccantem vel non peccantem mors imminens timore torquebat? Si enim dixeris ita fuisse conditam, ut non timeret mortem, sine dubio quandoque venturam; profecto istam quae in posteris eius est, miseram fateberis nasci, cui mortis metum sic videmus esse congenitum, ut etiam hi qui spe fideli futurae vitae gaudia concupiscunt, in hac tamen vita cum mortis timore luctentur; nolunt enim spoliari, sed supervestiri, ut quantum ad eorum attinet voluntatem, non morte finiatur haec vita, sed mortale absorbeatur a vita . Ex quo fit, ut si mortis metum in paradiso posueris ante peccatum, vincaris a Manichaeis, qui putant et putari volunt, quod in primo quoque homine misera condita est natura humana; si autem timorem mortis, quo mortalium animus non sine miseria stimulatur, ante peccatum non fuisse responderis, vincaris a nobis, quoniam non mutaretur in peius nisi vitiata natura. Rursus in eo quod adversus nos facis dicere Manichaeum, quia illud caecum et aerumnosum animal etiam inquietum cupiditas innata reddebat, quam rei interdictae et venustas irritabat et suavitas, tui, Iuliane, dogmatis, tamquam in scopulo inevitabili cognosce naufragium. Nos enim dicimus in illa beatitudine nullam fuisse cupiditatem, quae resisteret voluntati. Porro si cupiebant illi homines, unde abstinere potius volebant; procul dubio voluntati eorum cupiditas resistebat. Hoc ergo non contra me, sed contra te, Manichaeum dicere per tua verba fecisti. Si enim tales erant illi, ut in eis cupiditas resisteret voluntati, iam caro concupiscebat adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem; ubi manifestissimum carnis intellegitur vitium, propter quod fidelibus dicebat Apostolus: Haec enim invicem adversantur: ut non ea quae vultis faciatis . Nullus quippe sanctorum est, qui non velit facere ne caro adversus spiritum concupiscat; quamvis ei resistat ne concupiscentiam carnis sua consensione perficiat, eumdem Apostolum audiens, ubi ait: Dico autem: Spiritu ambulate, et concupiscentias carnis ne perfeceritis . Non ait: Concupiscentias carnis adversarias ne habueritis; quoniam videbat perfectam pacem carnis et spiritus non posse in corpore mortis huius impleri; sed ait: Concupiscentias carnis ne perfeceritis; ubi certamen nobis potius, quod contra carnem adversantem debeamus exercere, proposuit, ut concupiscentias eius non perficiamus consentiendo, sed resistendo vincamus. Pax vero, ubi non eas adversantes repugnantesque patiamur, fuit in corpore vitae illius, quam natura vitiata primi hominis praevaricatione perdidimus. Nam si nec ibi fuit ante peccatum pax carnis et spiritus, falsumque est quod ait Ambrosius, utriusque discordiam per praevaricationem primi hominis in nostram vertisse naturam ; vera erit, quod absit, ista sententia, quam contra nos Manichaeum fecisti loquentem, miserum, scilicet, animal primum hominem conditum, quem cupiditas innata reddebat inquietum, quam cupiditatem rei interdictae et venustas irritabat et suavitas. Nos autem dicimus tam beatum fuisse illum hominem ante peccatum, tamque liberae voluntatis, ut Dei praeceptum magnis viribus mentis observans, resistentem sibi carnem nullo certamine pateretur, nec aliquid omnino ex aliqua cupiditate sentiret, quod nollet; voluntatemque eius prius fuisse vitiatam venenosa persuasione serpentis, ut oriretur cupiditas quae sequeretur potius voluntatem, quam resisteret voluntati; perpetratoque peccato iam poena infirmatae menti etiam carnis concupiscentia repugnaret. Ac per hoc, nisi prius homo faceret peccando quod vellet, non pateretur concupiscendo quod nollet. Ecce nos quemadmodum vincimus Manichaeum, introducere conantem naturae hominis conditorem malum; tu autem, qui certantibus nobis locum tibi spectatoris pro tuo arbitrio delegisti, his ipsis verbis tuis, quae contra nos Manichaeo danda existimasti, qua, quaeso, arte, quibus viribus resistere audebis, homo, qui dicis carnis concupiscentiam, qualis nunc est, quam videmus contra spiritum dimicare, talem fuisse etiam in paradiso ante peccatum? Deponimus ergo te, velis nolis, de theatri sedilibus in arenam, et de spectatore facimus luctatorem. Aggredere certamen, et adversarium, si potes, vince communem; quoniam tu quoque Deum creatorem etiam carnis te colere profiteris. Vince igitur inimicum, persuadere conantem malum Deum esse qui condidit carnem, cuius concupiscentia nondum depravato praevaricatione spiritui iam resistebat, et miserum hominem sua conflictatione faciebat. An dicturus es: Prorsus et concupiscentiam talem habebat, et tamen miser non erat? Hoccine est adversarium superare, an potius hoc est adiuvare Manichaeum et contra Apostolum rebellare? Itane oblitus es quis dixerit: Video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae; et post huiusmodi verba subiecerit: Miser ego homo? Si ergo Adam, cum praecepto vellet obtemperare divino, cupiditate irritabatur cibum manducare prohibitum, eique carnis concupiscentia, qualem illum et tunc dicis habuisse, contra concupiscenti spiritui resistebat, nonne verissime diceret, si vellet dicere: Condelector legi Dei secundum interiorem hominem; video autem aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae ? Quomodo ergo non erat miser homo, cum post verba talia dicat Apostolus: Miser ego homo? Postremo, quomodo miser non erat, et habebat liberam voluntatem, si concupiscente adversus spiritum carne, teste ipso Apostolo, non faciebat utique quod volebat? Quoniam ergo si dixeris, qualis nunc est, talem fuisse concupiscentiam carnis ante peccatum, vincet te procul dubio Manichaeus; in sententiam meam transi, et Ambrosium dicentem, per praevaricationem hominis primi, in naturam vertisse discordiam carnis et spiritus, ambo approbemus, ut Manichaeum ambo vincamus. Qui verbis tuis, quae illi composuisti quasi recitaturo, et quod in scholis rhetorum agitari solet, aliena dicturo, non solum aerumnosum, verum etiam caecum creatum esse dixit Adam; unde caecum, nisi quia non noverat peccatum; quod dictum est in laudibus Christi ? Quaecumque enim mala non per sapientiam, sed quae per experientiam discuntur, feliciter nesciuntur. Sed hoc contra Manichaeum de ignorantia primi hominis calumniantem, tu quoque mecum forsitan dicis; quid vero ei respondeas de morte corporis et de concupiscentia carnis, secundum ea quae nunc tibi nos respondimus, quaere. His enim duabus manifestissimis rebus apparet, aliam fuisse conditionem primorum hominum, qui de nulla parentum stirpe sunt geniti; aliam vero eorum, qui ita creantur a Deo, ut etiam ab hominibus procreentur; ab illo enim modum institutionis suae accipiunt, ab istis meritum originis ducunt, conformationem suam debentes opificio, obligationem iudicio, liberationem beneficio Conditoris. Quorum mala cum quibus nascuntur, intuentes Manichaei, hominis opificem malum conantur inducere, cuius (ut de anima taceam, quae carnis est vita) Deum esse opificem suum, a quo sunt omnia bona sive caelestia sive terrena, carnis ipsius compago testatur; quod tale bonum est, ut de concordia membrorum eius beatus Apostolus similitudinem sumeret, ad laudem praecipuam caritatis, cuius inter se pacifico vinculo boni fideles tamquam Christi membra nectuntur . Ita fit ut et illos primos sine vitio factos, et posteros eorum cum originali vitio natos, propter evidentissimum naturae bonum creare non potuerit nisi bonus conditor.
Augustine: When you propose to me a contest to be entered against the Manichee, and to yourself a contest to be watched, with eloquent blindness, you improvidently undermine your own side; and how, with the pestilential breath of your dogma, you aid that most foul plague which the deadly error of the Manichee brought in, you have made plain even to those human beings who are slowed by their wits, that they might be able to understand. For when anyone has heard or read those things which you said copiously and eloquently about the miseries of this mortal and corruptible life, he will recognize that you prosecuted true things, not only in your discourse, but also in human affairs themselves. For to the Manichee, to whom you spoke words as though speaking against us, it was nothing great or difficult to behold, in this mortal life—which both was cast out and cast down from the felicity of paradise by the merit of sin—those things which were said by you about it; and either as you, or more richly and copiously, yet to chatter those same things which are so manifest that they are even read in very many places of the divine Scriptures, coming from the burden of the corruptible body, and from the weighing-down of the soul that comes from it. Whence even in the saints, struggling in the contest of this life, the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh (Gal 5:17); when the spirit, as the most glorious Cyprian says, seeks heavenly and divine things, the flesh desires earthly and worldly things (See Cyprian, On the Lord's Prayer 16). Hence is that conflict which the said martyr, in the book he wrote On Mortality, diligently and eloquently explains, saying among other things that we have a constant and troublesome struggle with carnal vices and worldly allurements (See Cyprian, On Mortality 4). And indeed blessed Gregory sets this contest, which we have in the body of this death, so before our eyes that there is no athlete of this struggle who does not recognize himself in his words as in a mirror. Within ourselves, he says, we are assailed by our own vices and passions, and day and night we are pressed by the fiery goads of this lowly body and of the body of death; now secretly, now even openly, with the allurements of visible things provoking and irritating us everywhere, this clay of dregs to which we have clung breathing out the stench of its mire through its wider veins; and with the law of sin, which is in our members, fighting against the law of the spirit, while it strives to lead captive the royal image which is within us; so that whatever it is that flowed into us by the benefit of the divine and first creation should yield as spoils to it (See Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 14). These words of the man of God I set down both in the second book of those six which I published against your four (See Augustine, Answer to Julian (the six books)), and in this work, when I answered your first volume, where you thought the body of death, from which the Apostle says he is freed by the grace of God (See Rom 7:24-25), must be understood otherwise. And holy Ambrose, when he had said: All human beings are born under sin; whose very origin is in fault, as you have read, David saying: "For behold, I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins my mother bore me (Ps 51:5 (50:7))," at once added: Therefore Paul's flesh was a body of death, as he himself says: "Who will free me from the body of this death? (Rom 7:24)" (See Ambrose, Apology of the Prophet David 11.56). What wonder, then, if the Manichee, beholding the evils of this life, and the body of this death which weighs down the soul, and the discord of flesh and spirit, and the heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb until the day of burial in the mother of all (See Sir 40:1), says such things even through your mouth, as if against us, as we see Gregory said against you? Whence it is established that the evils of this life, which is a temptation upon earth (See Job 7:1 LXX)—with which evils, in the human race, on account of the heavy yoke of the sons of Adam from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb until the day of burial in the mother of all (See Sir 40:1), the world is full—both Manichees and Catholics confess; but whence these come, both do not say the same, and there is here a great difference between them; for the Manichees attribute them to an alien evil nature, but the Catholics to one both good and our own, but vitiated by sin and deservedly punished. You who are unwilling to say what we say, what do you yourself say? How do you answer the Manichee as to whence these evils come, with which human beings are born, and which would not be born in paradise if no one had sinned, and where our nature, not depraved, but upright, as it was founded, would remain? If the fault is congenital, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, and is not from a nature vitiated in its origin, say whence it is. If the fault is congenital, in which the human being cries out: I know that there does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh, the good; for to will is present with me, but to accomplish the good I do not find (See Rom 7:18); and is not from a nature vitiated by the transgression of the first man, say whence it is. But if these faults are not congenital, say whence they are. From the habit of sinning, you will say, which each one made for himself by free will. Where you confess, meanwhile, what you do not wish, namely that the liberty of the will could perish by its own bad use, because, by accomplishing evil, it was made less fit for accomplishing good. But is anyone dull of heart by will? Is anyone forgetful by will? Is anyone foolish by will? These and other faults of the mind itself and of the soul, with which no one doubts that human beings are born, if you say they are not from a vitiated origin, say whence they are. For you will not say that paradise, if no one had sinned, could have had these. Finally, that the corruptible body weighs down the soul—under which wretched burden all who are not utterly senseless groan—say whence it is. For you will not say that the first human beings were so created that the soul of any of them was weighed down by a corruptible body; or that, after that great sin of theirs, anyone is born without such a body. Why, then, do you, most wordy one, bring in the Manichee speaking against us, when you, by denying what we say, cannot answer him? To whom Cyprian answers, showing that flesh and spirit so disagree that yet the concord of both must be prayed for from God the Father (See Cyprian, On the Lord's Prayer 16); to whom Gregory answers, who, when he had said such things about the flesh as you composed for the Manichee to say against us, yet attests that both must be recalled to God, with God himself favorable, that is, spirit and flesh; to whom Ambrose answers, who, when he had said that the flesh must be joined to the arbitrament of a more moderate soul: Such was it, he says, when it took upon itself to inhabit the secret places of paradise, before, infected by the venom of the pestilent serpent, it knew a sacrilegious hunger (See Ambrose, On Cain and Abel 1.4.14). For by these sayings of theirs the Catholic bishops have taught clearly enough that the nature of the flesh is not evil, but its fault; which being healed, it returns to this, that, as it was first established, it weighs down the soul by no corruptions of its own, and has no discord with the spirit by lusting against it; by which discord the Manichee was deceived, so as to feign that an alien evil substance was commingled with us. If you were willing to follow with us the faith of these Catholic bishops, you would overthrow the Manichees, not aid them; but now you try not to destroy them, but rather to build them up; for by denying the evils which human beings being born draw from a vitiated origin, you do not bring it about that we believe there are no natural evils, since they are too manifest; but rather you bring it about that these are thought to be from an alien evil nature, which the madness of the Manichees fables to be commingled with us; and they are not shown to flow from our own good nature vitiated by the transgression of the first man, which the soundness of the Catholics declares. But the Manichee, you say, detests even the very flesh of the first man, such as it was before he sinned, so as to strive to show it evil. So indeed he is introduced by you as speaking, that he may force the business of answering, of whatever sort, not only upon me, but also upon you. For where he says it was made by an evil founder, we at once answer him that so good a creature, which could not sin if it willed not, although it is not equal to its Creator, yet could not but have a good Creator. But where, concerning the fear of death, with which, if he sinned, God threatened him, he calls him wretched even before he sinned, we at once answer that, for the human being who could never have sinned if he had never willed to sin, the avoidance of that punishment which would have followed sin was a tranquil caution, not a turbulent dread. This indeed we can answer the common adversary, as has been said, in common; but I, against the Manichee, increase the praises of that rational creature, which not only was tortured by no fear, but even enjoyed great gladness; since it had it in its power not to suffer the evil of death, which the hearts of all, or of almost all, the faithful shrink from. Since your error is opposed to this our faith—by which you think Adam, whether he sinned or did not sin, was to die—what do you here answer the Manichee saying that a wretched nature was founded, which, whether sinning or not sinning, impending death tortured with fear? For if you say it was so founded that it did not fear death, which would surely come at some time; you will surely confess that this nature, which is in his descendants, is born wretched, in which we see the fear of death so congenital that even those who, with faithful hope, long for the joys of the future life, yet in this life struggle with the fear of death; for they do not wish to be stripped, but to be further clothed, so that, as far as pertains to their will, this life may not be ended by death, but the mortal may be swallowed up by life (See 2 Cor 5:4). From which it comes about that, if you place the fear of death in paradise before sin, you are conquered by the Manichees, who think and wish it to be thought that, even in the first man, human nature was founded wretched; but if you answer that the fear of death, by which the mind of mortals is goaded not without misery, was not there before sin, you are conquered by us, since it would not be changed for the worse unless the nature were vitiated. Again, in that which you make the Manichee say against us—that an innate desire rendered that blind and troubled animal restless, which the very beauty and sweetness of the forbidden thing irritated—recognize, Julian, the shipwreck of your dogma, as if upon an unavoidable rock. For we say that in that blessedness there was no desire which resisted the will. Moreover, if those human beings desired what they rather wished to abstain from, beyond doubt desire resisted their will. This, then, you have made the Manichee say through your words, not against me, but against you. For if they were such that in them desire resisted the will, then already the flesh lusted against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; where the fault of the flesh is most manifestly understood, on account of which the Apostle said to the faithful: For these are opposed to each other: that you may not do the things you wish (Gal 5:17). For there is no one of the saints who does not wish to act so that the flesh may not lust against the spirit; although he resists it so as not to accomplish the concupiscence of the flesh by his consent, hearing the same Apostle, where he says: But I say: Walk by the Spirit, and you will not accomplish the concupiscences of the flesh (Gal 5:16). He does not say: Do not have the concupiscences of the flesh as adversaries; since he saw that perfect peace of flesh and spirit could not be fulfilled in the body of this death (Rom 7:24); but he says: Do not accomplish the concupiscences of the flesh; where he set before us rather a contest, which we ought to wage against the flesh as our adversary, so that we do not accomplish its concupiscences by consenting, but conquer them by resisting. But peace, where we do not suffer them as adversaries and opponents, was in the body of that life, which we lost by the nature vitiated through the transgression of the first man. For if even there, before sin, there was no peace of flesh and spirit, and it is false what Ambrose says, that the discord of both passed over into our nature through the transgression of the first man (See Ambrose, On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation 7.71); then that sentence will be true—which God forbid—which you made the Manichee speak against us, namely that the first man was founded a wretched animal, whom an innate desire rendered restless, which desire the very beauty and sweetness of the forbidden thing irritated. But we say that that man before sin was so blessed, and of so free a will, that, observing God's precept with the great strength of his mind, he suffered the flesh resisting him in no contest, nor felt anything at all from any desire that he did not wish; and that his will was first vitiated by the venomous persuasion of the serpent, so that there arose a desire which would follow the will rather than resist the will; and, the sin being committed, then, as a punishment, the concupiscence of the flesh too fought against the weakened mind. And through this, unless the human being first did by sinning what he willed, he would not suffer by desiring what he did not will. Behold how we conquer the Manichee, trying to introduce an evil founder of the human being's nature; but you, who chose for yourself the place of a spectator while we contend, by your own arbitration—by these very words of yours, which you thought should be given to the Manichee against us—by what art, I ask, by what strength, will you dare to resist, you, a human being, who say that the concupiscence of the flesh, such as it now is, which we see fighting against the spirit, was such even in paradise before sin? We depose you, then, whether you will or not, from the seats of the theater into the arena, and from a spectator we make you a wrestler. Enter the contest, and conquer, if you can, the common adversary; since you too profess that you worship God the creator even of the flesh. Conquer, then, the enemy, trying to persuade that the God who founded the flesh is evil, whose concupiscence already resisted the spirit not yet depraved by transgression, and made the human being wretched by its conflict with him. Or will you say: He had also such a concupiscence, and yet was not wretched? Is this to overcome the adversary, or rather is this to aid the Manichee and to rebel against the Apostle? Have you so forgotten who it was that said: I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind; and after such words subjoined: Wretched man that I am (Rom 7:23-24)? If, then, Adam, when he willed to obey the divine precept, was irritated by desire to eat the forbidden food, and the concupiscence of the flesh, such as you say he had even then, resisted the spirit lusting in opposition, would he not say most truly, if he wished to say it: I delight in the law of God according to the inner man; but I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind (Rom 7:22-23)? How, then, was the man not wretched, when, after such words, the Apostle says: Wretched man that I am? Finally, how was he not wretched, and yet had a free will, if, with the flesh lusting against the spirit, by the testimony of the Apostle himself, he surely did not do what he willed? Since, then, if you say that the concupiscence of the flesh was, before sin, such as it now is, the Manichee will beyond doubt conquer you; cross over into my opinion, and let us both approve Ambrose saying that, through the transgression of the first man, the discord of flesh and spirit passed into nature, that we both may conquer the Manichee. Who, by your words, which you composed for him as though about to recite them, and, as is wont to be practiced in the schools of the rhetoricians, about to say things not his own, said that Adam was created not only troubled, but also blind; whence blind, except because he did not know sin?—which was said in the praises of Christ (See 2 Cor 5:21). For whatever evils are learned not through wisdom, but through experience, are happily not known. But this, against the Manichee slandering about the ignorance of the first man, you too perhaps say with me; but what you would answer him about the death of the body and about the concupiscence of the flesh, according to what we have now answered you, inquire. For by these two most manifest matters it appears that the condition of the first human beings, who were begotten of no parental stock, was one thing; but that of those who are so created by God that they are also procreated by human beings is another; for from him they receive the mode of their establishment, from these they draw the merit of their origin, owing their conformation to the work, their obligation to the judgment, their liberation to the benefit of the Creator. Whose evils, with which they are born, the Manichees, beholding, try to introduce an evil maker of the human being; whose maker is God (to be silent about the soul, which is the life of the flesh), from whom are all good things whether heavenly or earthly, as the very framework of the flesh attests; which is so great a good that the blessed Apostle took from the concord of its members a likeness for the chief praise of love, by whose peaceful bond among themselves the good faithful, as members of Christ, are knit together (See 1 Cor 12:12-27). So it comes about that both those first ones, made without fault, and their descendants, born with original fault, on account of the most evident good of nature, could not be created except by a good founder.
JulianImp.6.14VI. 15. Iulianus. Sed ne nimis primam partem certaminis urgeamus, patiamur processu opinionis te bonam Adae probare naturam. Dicis profecto: Deus iustus legem devotionis homini non poneret, si eum nosset pati peccandi necessitatem; quia si iustitiam voluntatis exigeret ab eo quem malae naturae esse nosset, non illum cum praevaricabatur, reum arguebat, sed se inimicum esse iustitiae publicabat. Posuit autem Deus iustus legem homini, quem ulturum se, si fuisset praevaricatus, spopondit. Constat ergo eum bonum natura, non potuisse aliter, nisi sola voluntate peccare. Vides nempe, quam legitima sit a me tuo nomine prolata conclusio? Ipse est omnino gladius, qui in manu Catholicorum coruscans, Manichaeos Traducianosque populatur. Sed nimis propter vestrum nomen admiscui, quorum vice impraesentiarum volueram responsum videri. Concussit ergo Manichaeum solida responsio. Augustam rationem dignis laudibus prosequor: verum oleo laudationis huius, in te acui gladium contuere. Repete igitur, quaeso, quod dixeras. Deus iustus, inquis, legem non poneret homini, si esset malum natura; posuit autem legem qui iustus est; apparet nunc potuisse servare, quod aequissimus imperavit; quoniam nisi obediendi virtutem habuisset, numquam constaret praecipienti ratio iussionis. O lepidissimum capitulum! Me coram, me spectatore, bonitatem naturae, cui lex ponitur, de iustitia legem promulgantis affirmat; nec videt se, antequam vulnusculum Manichaeus sentiat, in Traducianos exitium pertulisse. Ut enim intellegas semineci me tibi rapere arma cruenta, victricemque ferant morientia lumina veritatem , in tua temet tela compellam. Si iustus Deus Adae legem dare non potuit, nisi eum sciret sine aliquo mali coactu liberum posse observare quod iustum est; sine dubio et in temporibus secutis eadem gravitate iustitiae lex etiam litteris tradita, multiplicatione diffusior, distinctione signatior, et aucta ultione reverentior, data hominibus non fuisset, si aut imbecilli ad faciendum bonum sine possibilitate iustitiae, aut rei, id est mali, ab utero nascerentur; quoniam ut istos in omni praevaricatione necessitatis excusaret obtentus; ita immoderatio praeceptorum, impotentia sanctionum, iniquitas iudiciorum, in maculam rediret auctoris. Igitur et haec pars secunda eodem genere, quo prior, cluditur; id est, ut confitearis, aut iustitiam Dei non potuisse imperare, nisi quod a subditis fieri posse perpenderet; et testimonio primi mandati Manichaeus, testimonio autem legum postea secutarum Manichaeus Traducianusque consumitur; aut si hoc relinquit impietas, ne leviter quidem a vobis pulsatus Manichaeus, vestrum se esse patrem, vestrum principem, cumque vobis adversum nos unicum sibi esse certamen, mundo teste monstrabit.
VI. 15. Julian: But lest we press the first part of the contest too hard, let us allow you, by the progress of the opinion, to prove Adam's nature good. You surely say: The just God would not set a law of devotion for the human being, if he knew him to suffer a necessity of sinning; because if he exacted the righteousness of the will from one whom he knew to be of an evil nature, then, when he transgressed, he would not be charging him as guilty, but publishing himself an enemy of righteousness. But the just God set a law for the human being, whom he pledged he would punish, if he transgressed. It is established, then, that he, being good by nature, could not sin except by will alone. Do you see, surely, how lawful is the conclusion brought forth by me in your name? It is altogether the very sword which, flashing in the hand of the Catholics, lays waste Manichees and Traducianists. But I added "too hard" on account of your name, in whose place I had for the present wished the answer to seem given. A solid answer, then, has shaken the Manichee. I follow up the august reasoning with worthy praises: but with the oil of this praise behold the sword sharpened against you. Repeat, then, I beg, what you had said. The just God, you say, would not set a law for the human being, if he were evil by nature; but he who is just set a law; it now appears that he could keep what the most equitable one commanded; since, unless he had the strength of obeying, there would never be a rationale of the command in the one commanding. O most charming little chapter! In my presence, with me watching, it affirms the goodness of the nature for which a law is set, from the justice of the one promulgating the law; nor does it see that, before the Manichee feels the little wound, it has brought destruction upon the Traducianists. For that you may understand that I snatch from you, half-dead, your bloody arms, and that your dying eyes may carry victorious truth (See Virgil, Aeneid 4.643-44), I will drive you against your own weapons. If the just God could not give a law to Adam, unless he knew that he, free, without any compulsion of evil, could observe what is just; without doubt, in the times that followed too, with the same gravity of justice, a law—even handed down in writing, more diffuse by multiplication, more marked by distinction, and more reverend by increased punishment—would not have been given to human beings, if they were either feeble for doing good without the possibility of righteousness, or guilty, that is, of evil, born from the womb; since, as the pretext of necessity would excuse them in every transgression, so the immoderation of the precepts, the impotence of the sanctions, the iniquity of the judgments, would turn into a stain upon the author. Therefore this second part too is closed by the same kind as the first; that is, you must confess either that the justice of God could not command except what it weighed could be done by its subjects—and by the testimony of the first command the Manichee, but by the testimony of the laws afterward following the Manichee and the Traducianist, is consumed; or, if impiety leaves this aside, then the Manichee, not even lightly struck by you, will show, with the world as witness, that he is your father, your prince, and that with you he has a single contest against us.
JulianImp.6.15Augustinus. Hoc est nempe, quod non eloquio, sed multiloquio prosecutus es, legem scilicet priorem, quae data est in paradiso, testimonium esse naturae bonae, quae condita est cum libero arbitrio; alioquin homini liberum arbitrium non habenti iniustissime lex daretur. Unde et posterior, inquis, lex quae copiosissime in litteris promulgata est, testimonium est naturae bonae, quae creatur ex parentibus, similiter sine vitio, cum libero arbitrio. Ista disputans videris tibi aliquid dicere, quia vel tuas vel humanas sectaris argutias; divina vero eloquia, ex quibus te nobis putas praescribere, non curas legere; aut si curas legere, non vis, vel non potes intellegere; sed si forte intellexeris disputantibus nobis, noli esse talis qualem Scriptura denotat dicens: Verbis non emendabitur servus durus, si enim et intellexerit, non obediet . Quamquam et cor lapideum, quo divinis verbis etiam intellectis non obeditur, possit tibi auferre, si velit, qui hoc populo duro, Ezechiele sancto prophetante, promisit . In paradiso enim legem accepit homo, qui factus est rectus, ut rationalis creaturae vel sola, vel praecipua virtus esse obedientia doceretur. Sed eiusdem legis praevaricatione, a se ipso factus est pravus. Et quoniam vitiari per se ipsum potuit, non sanari; etiam postea eo tempore et eo loco, quando esse faciendum et ubi esse faciendum Dei sapientia iudicavit, legem etiam pravus accepit, non per quam corrigi posset; sed per quam se pravum esse, et nec lege accepta a se ipso corrigi posse sentiret; ac sic peccatis non lege cessantibus, sed praevaricatione crescentibus, deiecta et contrita superbia, humillimo corde auxilium gratiae desideraret, et spiritu vivificaretur littera occisus. Si enim data esset lex quae posset vivificare, omnino ex lege esset iustitia; sed conclusit Scriptura omnia sub peccato, ut promissio ex fide Iesu Christi daretur credentibus . Si verba Apostoli agnoscis, vides profecto vel quid non intellegas, vel quid cum intellegas negligas. Non igitur lex, quae in litteris per Moysen data est, testimonium est liberae voluntatis; nam, si ita esset, non ad eam pertineret ille qui dicit: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod odi malum, hoc ago ; quem vos certe nondum sub gratia, sed adhuc sub lege esse contenditis. Nec ipsa lex nova, quae praedicata est ex Sion proditura, et verbum Domini ex Ierusalem , quod intellegitur esse Evangelium sanctum; nec ipsa, inquam, testimonium est liberae, sed liberandae potius voluntatis. Ibi enim scriptum est: Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis . Quod non solum propter peccata praeterita dictum esse, quorum remissione liberamur, verum etiam propter adiutorium gratiae, quod ne peccemus accipimus, id est, ita liberi efficimur, Deo nostra itinera dirigente, ut non nobis dominetur omnis iniquitas , dominica testatur oratio, ubi non solum dicimus: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, propter mala quae fecimus, verum etiam: Ne nos inferas in tentationem , propter hoc utique ne mala faciamus; unde et Apostolus dicit: Oramus autem ad Deum, ne quid faciatis mali . Quod si ita esset in potestate, quomodo fuit ante peccatum, priusquam esset natura humana vitiata, non utique posceretur orando, sed agendo potius teneretur. Verum quoniam post pristinam ruinam tam gravem, ut in huius mortalitatis miseriam caderemus, prius Deus certare nos voluit, donans nobis ut eius agamur Spiritu, et mortificemus opera carnis, atque ipso dante victoriam per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, in aeterna cum illa postea pace regnemus, profecto nisi Deus adsit, nemo est idoneus certare cum vitiis; ne sine certamine pertrahatur ab eis, aut ne iam certans in ipsa eorum conflictatione vincatur. Ideo in hoc agone magis nos Deus voluit orationibus certare, quam viribus; quia et ipsas vires, quantas hic habere nos competit, ipse subministrat certantibus, quem rogamus. Si ergo hi, quorum contra carnem iam spiritus concupiscit, ad actus singulos indigent Dei gratia, ne vincantur; qualem libertatem voluntatis habere possunt, qui nondum de potestate eruti tenebrarum, dominante iniquitate, nec certare coeperunt; aut si certare voluerunt, nondum liberatae voluntatis servitute vincuntur?
Augustine: This is surely what you have prosecuted, not with eloquence, but with much speaking: namely that the earlier law, which was given in paradise, is a testimony of the good nature, which was founded with free choice; otherwise the law would be given most unjustly to a human being not having free choice. Whence also the later law, you say, which was most copiously promulgated in writing, is a testimony of the good nature, which is created from parents, likewise without fault, with free choice. Disputing these things, you seem to yourself to say something, because you follow either your own or human subtleties; but the divine words, from which you think to prescribe against us, you do not care to read; or, if you care to read, you do not wish, or are not able, to understand; but if perhaps you understand while we dispute, do not be such as the Scripture marks, saying: A hard servant will not be corrected by words, for even if he understands, he will not obey (Prov 29:19). Although the heart of stone too, by which the divine words even when understood are not obeyed, he can take from you, if he wills, who promised this to that hard people, with holy Ezekiel prophesying (See Ezek 36:26). For in paradise the human being received a law, who was made upright, that it might be taught that obedience is either the sole or the chief virtue of the rational creature. But by the transgression of that same law, he was made depraved by himself. And since he could be vitiated by himself, but not healed, afterward too, at the time and in the place where and when the wisdom of God judged it must be done, he received a law even when depraved—not one through which he could be corrected; but one through which he might feel that he was depraved, and that, even with the law received, he could not be corrected by himself; and so, with sins not ceasing by the law, but increasing by transgression, his pride being cast down and crushed, with a most humble heart he might desire the help of grace, and, slain by the letter, be made alive by the spirit. For if a law had been given which could make alive, then surely righteousness would be from the law; but Scripture enclosed all things under sin, that the promise by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to believers (Gal 3:21-22). If you recognize the words of the Apostle, you surely see either what you do not understand, or what, when you understand, you neglect. Not, then, is the law which was given in writing through Moses a testimony of free will; for, if it were so, he would not pertain to it who says: I do not do the good I will, but the evil I hate, that I do (See Rom 7:15, 19); whom you certainly contend to be not yet under grace, but still under the law. Nor is the new law itself, which was foretold as coming forth from Zion, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem (See Isa 2:3)—which is understood to be the holy Gospel—nor is it, I say, a testimony of a free will, but rather of a will to be freed. For there it is written: If the Son frees you, then you will be truly free (John 8:36). Which is said not only on account of past sins, by whose forgiveness we are freed, but also on account of the help of grace, which we receive that we may not sin—that is, we are made free in such a way, with God directing our paths, that all iniquity may not have dominion over us (See Ps 119:133 (118:133))—the Lord's Prayer attests, where we say not only: Forgive us our debts, on account of the evils we have done, but also: Lead us not into temptation (Matt 6:12-13), on account of this surely, that we may not do evils; whence the Apostle too says: But we pray to God that you do nothing evil (2 Cor 13:7). But if this were so in our power, as it was before sin, before human nature was vitiated, it surely would not be sought by praying, but rather held by doing. But since, after the former ruin so grave that we fell into the misery of this mortality, God first willed us to contend, granting us to be led by his Spirit, and to mortify the works of the flesh, and, with him giving the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ, afterward to reign with him in eternal peace—surely, unless God is present, no one is fit to contend with vices; lest he be dragged off by them without a contest, or lest, already contending, he be conquered in the very conflict with them. Therefore in this struggle God willed us rather to contend by prayers than by strength; because even the strength itself, as much as it befits us to have here, he supplies to those contending, whom we ask. If, then, those whose spirit already lusts against the flesh need the grace of God for individual acts, lest they be conquered, what sort of liberty of the will can those have who, not yet rescued from the power of darkness, with iniquity ruling, have not even begun to contend; or, if they have willed to contend, are conquered by the servitude of a will not yet freed?
JulianImp.6.15VI. 16. Iulianus. Nescio sane, utrum hic iam coactus inopia, tam ineptum, tam imbecillum aliquid moliaris, ut dicas, nullis te quidem rationibus docere posse Adam bonum a Deo conditum, sed ad hoc credendum sola esse lectionis auctoritate contentum, qua post formatum hominem sexto iam die communiter de omnibus creaturis refertur: Et vidit Deus omnia quae fecit, et ecce bona valde . Quod non pro opificis dignitate, non pro appensione eius iustitiae, sed pro testimonio, quo communiter quae creata sunt, bene facta dicuntur, Adam quoque haud iniquum aestimes institutum. Porro licet hoc Manichaeum tam leviter pulset, ut rideat; Traducianum tamen revinctum exponit nobis. Ut enim nullo testimoniorum divinorum in hanc rem populos congregemus; Apostoli solius auctoritate praescribimus, qui cum foedum praevideret errorem, celso adversum vos ore detonuit dicens: Quoniam omnis creatura Dei bona est . Si ergo ad probandum bonae naturae primum hominem fuisse formatum, sufficit hoc quod dicit Moyses, universa Deum bene condidisse, perque hoc tu cum peccato creari a Deo Adam non potuisse contendis, quia bonus inter reliqua legitur institutus; iisdem lineis referemus, per hoc nullum posse cum peccato nasci, quoniam ab Apostolo omnis creatura Dei bona esse defenditur. Quid ergo his disputationibus actum est? Videlicet, ut id quod ratio indagarat, optio quoque indicti inter te et Manichaeum praelii publicaret; ut cum proposito certamine ne unum quidem telum sine tua pernicie in praeceptorem tuum vibrare posses, multo manifestissime reluceret, vos et Manichaeos in unum impietatis corpus obscena coaluisse concordia. Quid enim potest esse tam iunctum, quam quod nec discriminum separatur incursu? Omni exitio Manichaei, Traducianorum dogma commoritur; nihil est quod illum feriat, et te relinquat. Una vobis sunt instituta, una mysteria, unaque pericula; et substomacharis, si senis Manis soboles nuncupere?
VI. 16. Julian: I do not indeed know whether here, now compelled by want, you contrive something so inept, so feeble, as to say that you can by no reasonings teach that Adam was founded good by God, but are content, for believing this, with the authority of the reading alone, by which, after the human being was formed, on the sixth day it is reported in common of all the creatures: And God saw all that he made, and behold, it was very good (Gen 1:31). Which, not for the dignity of the maker, not for the weighing of his justice, but for the testimony by which the things created are said in common to be well made, you would judge that Adam too was established not unjust. Moreover, although this strikes the Manichee so lightly that he laughs, yet it exposes the Traducianist to us bound. For, that we may gather peoples of no divine testimonies on this matter, we prescribe by the authority of the Apostle alone, who, when he foresaw your foul error, thundered against you with lofty mouth, saying: For every creature of God is good (1 Tim 4:4). If, then, for proving that the first man was formed of a good nature, this suffices which Moses says, that God founded all things well, and through this you contend that Adam could not be created by God with sin, because he is read to have been established good among the rest; by the same lines we will report that through this no one can be born with sin, since by the Apostle every creature of God is defended to be good. What, then, has been accomplished by these disputations? Namely, that what reason had tracked down, the choice of a battle proclaimed between you and the Manichee should also publish; so that, the contest being set, since you could not brandish even one weapon against your preceptor without your own ruin, it might shine forth much more manifestly that you and the Manichees have, by a base concord, grown together into one body of impiety. For what can be so joined as that which is not separated by the assault of dangers? With every destruction of the Manichee, the dogma of the Traducianists dies along with it; there is nothing that strikes him and leaves you. You have one set of institutions, one set of mysteries, and one set of perils; and do you grumble, if you be called the offspring of old Manes?
JulianImp.6.16Augustinus. Ita dicis me nullis rationibus docere posse Adam bonum a Deo conditum, quasi tecum inde confligam. Nonne bonum conditum Adam, non ego tantum, nec tu, sed ambo dicimus? Ambo enim dicimus bonam esse naturam, quae posset non peccare, si nollet; sed cum ego eam meliorem asseram quam tu, quoniam dico etiam eam mori non potuisse, si peccare noluisset; quid est, quod dicis, nullis rationibus a me doceri posse Adam bonum a Deo conditum, cum rationibus meis magis bonus ostendatur esse quam tuis? Meis quippe ostenditur, non solum potuisse non peccare, si nollet; sed nec mori, si peccare noluisset; tuis autem, ita mortalem factum, ut sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset. Quod in episcopali iudicio Palaestino, cum Pelagio fuisset obiectum, ne damnaretur, ipse damnavit ; et est a semetipso damnatus, quod de homine haeretico dicit Apostolus . Dico etiam, non timuisse Adam mortem, in cuius erat potestate non mori; tu autem necessitatem habuisse moriendi, etiam sine ulla necessitate peccandi. Quem si dixeris mortem timuisse etiam ante peccatum, quid dicis nisi miserum creatum? Si autem ne miser esset, mortem, quamvis futuram, non tamen timuit; certe suam prolem, cui timorem mortis congenuit, procul dubio miseram genuit. Quis enim neget ita homines natura mortem timere, ut eam nonnullos vix rara animi magnitudo faciat non timere? Itemque addo ego ad bonitatem conditionis Adae, quod in eo caro adversus spiritum non concupiscebat ante peccatum; tu autem, qui talem dicis carnis concupiscentiam, qualis nunc est, in paradiso futuram fuisse, si nemo peccasset, talemque in illo fuisse et prius quam peccaret, addis eius conditioni et istam miseriam per spiritus carnisque discordiam. Cum ergo tot tantisque rationibus Adam meliorem, quam tu eum dicis, et feliciorem conditum ostendam; quid tibi visum est tanta vecordia delirare, ut diceres: nullis me rationibus docere posse Adam bonum a Deo conditum, sed ad hoc credendum sola esse auctoritate lectionis contentum, quia scriptum est fecisse Deum omnia bona valde ? Non usque adeo sum pistillo, sicut conviciaris, obtunsior, ut Manichaeo redarguendo libri huius divini auctoritatem, qua non tenetur, obiciam. Tibi hanc obicio, quando res postulat, quoniam mihi tibique communis est. Manichaeum vero non de opificio Dei, quod ipse negat, creaturas istas bonas esse convinco; sed de illarum bonitate potius compello, bonum eas habere opificem confiteri. Quod autem ait Apostolus, quem se Manichaei accipere profitentur: Omnis creatura Dei bona est, quoniam de qua creatura loqueretur apertum est, validum esset adversus eos testimonium, nisi etiam Libris canonicis, quos accipiunt, quasdam falsas sententias permixtas esse contenderent. Ac per hoc de bonitate creaturarum semper sunt urgendi, ut earum bonum Deum, quod negant, fateantur auctorem. Porro creaturae omnes ita sunt bonae, ut etiam ipsas, quae cum vitiis creantur, ratio bonas esse demonstret, ipsorum quoque attestatione vitiorum; quia vitium contra naturam est; nisi enim natura ipsa recte placeret, nullo modo recte ipsius vitium displiceret. Hoc contra Manichaeos, qui putant etiam ipsa vitia naturas esse atque substantias, in quibusdam nostris opusculis copiosius disputatur, ostenditurque vitium natura non esse; et quia contra naturam est, ideo malum esse; ac per hoc naturam in quantum natura est, bonum esse; unde colligitur, non esse creatorem naturarum nisi creatorem bonorum, ac per hoc bonum; sed creaturis suis magna differentia et summa bonitate meliorem, qui non potest omnino vitiari, non perceptione gratiae, sed proprietate naturae. Naturae igitur creatae, sive quae sine vitio sunt, sive quae natae vitiantur, sive quae vitiatae nascuntur, illum creatorem nisi eum qui bona creat, habere non possunt; quia in quantum naturae sunt, bonae sunt, etiam quaecumque vitiatae sunt. Non enim vitiorum, sed naturarum auctor est creator illarum. Nam et auctor ipse vitiorum natura bonus est, quam Deus fecit; sed vitio malus est, quo ipse a bono conditore mala voluntate defecit. Itaque Manichaeorum errorem ratio ista vera convincit, qui nolunt recipere auctoritatem, sive qua dictum est: Fecit Deus omnia, et ecce bona valde , quando adhuc nullum erat malum; sive qua dictum est: Omnis creatura Dei bona est, quando iam erat hoc saeculum malum, cum Deus sit utique factor omnium saeculorum. Tu autem, qui hanc recipis auctoritatem divinorum eloquiorum, ut ea merito possis urgeri, cur non attendis in eo libro, ubi legitur Deum fecisse omnia bona valde, omnium locorum optimum plantatum esse paradisum, ubi Deus usque adeo nihil mali esse voluit, ut nec imaginem suam ibi esse permitteret, posteaquam propria voluntate peccavit ? Et tamen vos in tantae felicitatis et decoris locum, ubi nec ligni, nec feni, nec pomi, nec cuiusquam vel frugis vel pecoris vitium esse potuisse vel posse credendum est, omnia humanorum corporum et ingeniorum vitia non dubitatis inducere, cum quibus homines nasci, dolere vos sinimus, non negare. Necesse est enim ut doleatis, quando quid respondeatis non invenitis, et tam pravam sententiam mutare non vultis, quae vos inevitabili necessitate compellit in loco tantae beatitudinis et pulchritudinis constituere caecos, luscos, lippos, surdos, mutos, claudos, deformes, distortos, tineosos, leprosos, paralyticos, epilepticos, et aliis diversis generibus vitiosos, atque aliquando etiam nimia foeditate et membrorum horribili novitate monstruosos. Quid dicam de vitiis animorum, quibus sunt quidam natura libidinosi, quidam iracundi, quidam meticulosi, quidam obliviosi, quidam tardicordes, quidam excordes atque ita fatui, ut malit homo cum quibusdam pecoribus, quam cum talibus hominibus vivere? Adde gemitus parientium, fletusque nascentium, cruciatus dolentium, languentium labores, tormenta multa morientium, et pericula multo plura viventium. Haec omnia, atque alia talia, sive peiora, quae verbis congruis saltem breviter commemorare quis sufficit?, secundum errorem vestrum, sed plane contra pudorem vestrum, aut fronte improbissima, aut manu fronti opposita, in Dei paradiso cogimini collocare, et dicere futura et ibi haec fuisse, etiamsi nemo peccasset. Dicite, dicite: cur enim revereamini dehonestare tot ac tantis vitiis et calamitatibus locum, quem nefario dogmate a vobis facitis alienum? Nam si aliquando illuc intrare disponeretis, numquam illic talia poneretis. Aut si vincit pudor in cordibus vestris, et in loco tali talia constituere erubescitis, horrescitis, obmutescitis, et tamen errori vestro, quo non creditis humanam naturam primi hominis praevaricatione vitiatam pertinaciter adhaerescitis, respondete Manichaeis unde sint ista, ne illi ea de commixtione alienae malaeque naturae esse concludant. A nobis enim cum hoc requiritur, respondemus non haec esse de permixtione alienae, sed de nostrae praevaricatione naturae, per eum qui in paradiso deiectus, et de paradiso eiectus est, ne in loco beatitudinis maneret natura damnata, et vitia vel supplicia, quae posteros eius merito fuerant secutura, in eo loco essent, ubi nulla esse sinuntur mala. Vos autem dum negatis ista vel deformia vel aerumnosa de meritis vitiatae nostrae naturae venire, commixtionem permittitis alienae, atque ita miseri et Manichaeos adiuvare cogimini, et mala illa in paradisum revocat error vester, unde illa abstulerat pudor vester.
Augustine: You say that I can by no reasonings teach that Adam was founded good by God, as though I contend with you about that. Do not both I and you—not I alone, nor you, but both—say that Adam was founded good? For both of us say that the nature was good which could not sin if it willed not; but since I assert it better than you do, since I say that it could not even die if it had willed not to sin; what is it that you say, that Adam cannot be taught by me by any reasonings to have been founded good by God, when by my reasonings he is shown to be more good than by yours? For by mine he is shown to have been able not only not to sin, if he willed not, but also not to die, if he had willed not to sin; but by yours, made so mortal that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he was to die. Which, when it had been objected to Pelagius in the episcopal judgment of Palestine, lest he be condemned, he himself condemned it (See Augustine, The Deeds of Pelagius 11.23-24); and he is condemned by himself, which the Apostle says of a heretical person (See Titus 3:10-11). I say also that Adam did not fear death, since it was in his power not to die; but you say he had a necessity of dying, even without any necessity of sinning. If you say that he feared death even before sin, what do you say but that he was created wretched? But if, lest he be wretched, he did not fear death, although it was to come; surely his offspring, to whom he engendered the fear of death, he without doubt begot wretched. For who would deny that human beings so fear death by nature that a rare greatness of soul scarcely makes some not fear it? Likewise I too add to the goodness of Adam's condition, that in him the flesh did not lust against the spirit before sin; but you, who say that such concupiscence of the flesh as now exists would have been in paradise, if no one had sinned, and that there was such in him even before he sinned, add to his condition this misery too, through the discord of spirit and flesh. Since, then, by so many and so great reasonings I show Adam to have been founded better and happier than you say him to have been; what seemed good to you, to rave with such senselessness, that you would say: that I can by no reasonings teach that Adam was founded good by God, but am content, for believing this, with the authority of the reading alone, because it is written that God made all things very good? I am not so much duller than a pestle, as you revile, that, in refuting the Manichee, I would object to him the authority of this divine book, by which he is not bound. I object it to you, when the matter demands, since it is common to me and you. But I convince the Manichee that these creatures are good, not from God's making, which he himself denies; but rather I compel him, from their goodness, to confess that they have a good maker. But as for what the Apostle says, whom the Manichees profess to receive: Every creature of God is good—since it is plain of what creature he was speaking, it would be a strong testimony against them, were it not that they contend that certain false sentences have been mixed into the canonical Books too, which they receive. And through this they must always be pressed about the goodness of the creatures, that they may confess God, whom they deny, to be the good author of them. Moreover, all creatures are so good that even those which are created with faults, reason demonstrates to be good, by the attestation of the very faults; because a fault is against nature; for unless the nature itself rightly pleased, the fault of it would in no way rightly displease. This, against the Manichees, who think that even faults themselves are natures and substances, is disputed more copiously in certain little works of ours, and it is shown that a fault is not a nature; and that, because it is against nature, it is therefore evil; and through this, that a nature, insofar as it is a nature, is good; whence it is gathered that there is no creator of natures except the creator of good things, and through this a good one; but, by a great difference and the highest goodness, better than his creatures, who cannot at all be vitiated—not by the receiving of grace, but by the property of nature. Created natures, then, whether those which are without fault, or those which, born, are vitiated, or those which are born vitiated, cannot have any creator except him who creates good things; because, insofar as they are natures, they are good, even whichever are vitiated. For the creator of them is the author not of the faults, but of the natures. For even the author of faults himself is by nature good, which God made; but by fault he is evil, by which he himself fell away from the good founder by an evil will. And so this true reasoning convicts the error of the Manichees, who are unwilling to receive the authority either by which it was said: God made all things, and behold, they were very good (Gen 1:31), when there was yet no evil; or by which it was said: Every creature of God is good (1 Tim 4:4), when this evil age already was, since God is surely the maker of all ages. But you, who receive this authority of the divine words, so that you can be deservedly pressed by it, why do you not attend that, in that book where it is read that God made all things very good, the best of all places, paradise, was planted, where God so willed nothing evil to be that he did not even permit his image to be there, after he had sinned by his own will (See Gen 3:23-24)? And yet you do not hesitate to introduce, into a place of so great felicity and beauty—where it must be believed that there could be no fault of tree, or hay, or fruit, or of any crop or beast whatsoever—all the faults of human bodies and minds, with which we let you grieve, not deny, that human beings are born. For it is necessary that you grieve, when you do not find what to answer, and are unwilling to change so depraved an opinion, which compels you, by an unavoidable necessity, to set in a place of so great blessedness and beauty the blind, the one-eyed, the bleary-eyed, the deaf, the dumb, the lame, the deformed, the distorted, the scabby, the leprous, the paralytic, the epileptic, and those vitiated in various other kinds, and sometimes even monstrous by excessive foulness and a horrible novelty of members. What shall I say of the faults of minds, by which some are by nature lustful, some irascible, some timid, some forgetful, some slow of heart, some senseless and so foolish that a human being would rather live with certain beasts than with such human beings? Add the groans of those giving birth, and the wailings of those being born, the torments of those in pain, the labors of the ailing, the many torments of the dying, and the far more numerous perils of the living. All these, and other such things, or worse, which who can suffice to mention even briefly in fitting words?—according to your error, but plainly against your shame, either with a most shameless brow, or with hand set against the brow, you are compelled to place in the paradise of God, and to say that these would have been there too, even if no one had sinned. Say it, say it: for why do you fear to dishonor with so many and so great faults and calamities a place which by your nefarious dogma you make alien from you? For if you ever intended to enter there, you would never place such things there. Or if shame conquers in your hearts, and you blush, shudder, fall silent at setting up such things in such a place, and yet you obstinately cling to your error, by which you do not believe that human nature was vitiated by the transgression of the first man, answer the Manichees as to whence these things are, lest they conclude that they are from the commingling of an alien and evil nature. For when this is asked of us, we answer that these are not from the commingling of an alien nature, but from the transgression of our own nature, through him who was cast down in paradise, and cast out of paradise, lest a condemned nature should remain in a place of blessedness, and lest the faults or punishments which were deservedly to follow his descendants should be in that place, where no evils are allowed to be. But you, while you deny that these deformed or troublesome things come from the merits of our vitiated nature, permit the commingling of an alien one, and thus, wretched, are both compelled to aid the Manichees, and your error recalls those evils into paradise, whence your shame had taken them away.
JulianImp.6.16VI. 17. Iulianus. At contra vide quam adversus te et Manichaeum, cuius te semper ruina convolvit, verus sit nobis conflictus, et de eo celer triumphus. Omnia illa, quae in vituperationem divini operis evomuit, primae statim definitionis aratro circumscribimus; cogimusque ut explicet, quid putet esse peccatum, quod claret nihil esse aliud, quam voluntatem appetentem quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. Quo constituto, omnes illi oblocutionum rubi, qui concretionem corporum pupugerant, et ut ille ait, eradicitus monstrantur evulsi . Iam vero affectus timoris et sensus doloris, per quos in naufragia hominum cieri tempestatem putavit, non solum nullius mali coactores, sed cum repagulum bonae voluntatis nacti sunt, adiutores et pervectores iustitiae perdocentur. Quis enim formidaret iudicium, nisi timoris admonitu? Quis paenitentiae gemitibus iuvaretur, nisi doloris et internae aegritudinis expiatu? Quid postremo severitas iudicantis valeret, nisi voluntaria peccata illati cruciatus aerumna puniret? Quorum omnium testimonio apparet, nihil aliud esse peccatum, quam voluntatem liberam despicientem praecepta iustitiae; aliterque non stare iustitiam, quam si illud imputet in peccatum, cuius noverit fuisse liberam cautionem; ac per hoc nulla lege, ea quae naturalia sunt, in culpam posse reputari; nec quemquam suscipere crimen, quod non ipse commiserit, cum vitare possit. Qua potentia Manichaeus et Traducianus consumitur, qui effossis totius intellegentiae oculis, rem voluntatis conatur seminibus admovere.
VI. 17. Julian: But on the contrary, see how true is our conflict against you and the Manichee, in whose ruin your own always entangles you, and how swift the triumph over it. All those things which he vomited out in disparagement of the divine work, we circumscribe at once with the plow of the first definition; and we compel him to explain what he thinks sin is, which is clear to be nothing other than the will desiring what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. This established, all those brambles of objections, which had pricked the concretion of bodies, are shown, as he says, to be plucked out by the roots (See Cicero?). But now the affection of fear and the sense of pain, through which he thought a storm was stirred up into the shipwrecks of human beings, are thoroughly taught to be not only the compellers of no evil, but, when they have met the barrier of a good will, the helpers and conveyers of righteousness. For who would dread judgment, except at the prompting of fear? Who would be aided by the groans of repentance, except by the expiation of pain and inner sickness? What, finally, would the severity of the one judging avail, unless it punished voluntary sins by the trouble of inflicted torment? By the testimony of all which it appears that sin is nothing other than a free will despising the precepts of justice; and that righteousness does not otherwise stand, than if it impute as sin that of which it knows there was a free caution; and through this that by no law can those things which are natural be reckoned as fault; nor does anyone take on a crime which he himself did not commit, when he could avoid it. By which power the Manichee and the Traducianist are consumed, who, with the eyes of all understanding dug out, tries to bring the matter of the will to the seeds.
JulianImp.6.17Augustinus. His tuis erroribus iam saepe respondimus: unde qui ea legunt, et memoriae commendant, non ubique desiderant responsionem meam, ubicumque tu repetis verbositatem tuam. Sed ne quisquam queratur, ignoscentibus mihi celerioribus ingenio, etiam tardiusculis deesse non debeo. Ecce et hic tibi respondeo de peccati definitione, qua te multum adiuvari putas. Illud quod peccatum ita est, ut non sit etiam poena peccati, definitio ista determinat, qua dicitur: Peccatum est voluntas appetens quod iustitia vetat, et unde est liberum abstinere. Quod maxime ad illum pertinet, ex cuius peccato illo magno posteris eius est exorta miseria per grave iugum a die exitus de ventre matris eorum, et per corpus corruptibile quod aggravat animam. Ille quippe lege brevissima accepta sciebat quid vetaret iustitia; et inde illi utique liberum fuerat abstinere, nondum adversus eius spiritum carne concupiscente, propter quod malum etiam fidelibus dictum est: Ut non ea quae vultis faciatis . Caecitas igitur cordis, qua nescitur quid iustitia vetet, et violentia concupiscentiae, qua vincitur etiam qui scit unde debeat abstinere, non tantum peccata, sed poena sunt etiam peccatorum. Et ideo non includuntur illa definitione peccati, qua non definitum est nisi peccatum solum, non quod est et poena peccati. Cum enim quis ignorat quid facere debeat, et ideo facit quod facere non debeat; non ei fuit liberum abstinere, unde abstinendum esse non noverat. Itemque ille qui, ut dicitis, non origine, sed consuetudine premitur, ut exclamet: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago , quomodo ei liberum est abstinere ab eo malo, quod non vult et facit, odit et agit? His autem poenis carere si esset in hominum potestate, non Deus rogaretur, et contra caecitatem, ubi ei dicitur: Illumina oculos meos ; et contra iniquam cupiditatem, ubi ei dicitur: Non dominetur mihi omnis iniquitas . Porro si etiam peccata ideo ista non essent, quia non ab eis liberum est abstinere, non diceretur: Delicta iuventutis meae et ignorantiae meae ne memineris : non diceretur: Signasti peccata mea in sacculo, et adnotasti si quid invitus admisi . Illa ergo definitione peccati, quale commisit Adam, qui sciebat quid vetaret iustitia, et non inde abstinuit, unde illi liberum fuerat abstinere, vincuntur Manichaei; sed a nobis, quia hinc esse originem dicimus malorum humanorum, quibus videmus et parvulos aggravari, et propter quod etiam illud scriptum est, cum de peccatis ageretur: Quia non est mundus a sordibus, nec infans cuius est diei unius vita super terram . Tu autem hoc negans, nostram quidem naturam, ne liberatorem misera inquirat, conaris perniciosa defensione plus premere; Manichaeum vero, cum quaeritur unde sit malum, alienam Deo coaeternam permittis introducere. Neque enim ille, unde naturam culpet humanam, timoris affectum et sensum doloris impingit; quae duo tu adversus eum putasti esse laudanda, quia scilicet timor et dolor adiutores et provectores iustitiae perdocentur, dum non peccat homo timore iudicii, aut peccasse se dolet aculeis paenitendi. Non hoc a te quaeritur, sed quid sit poena timoris in parvulis, qui peccata non fugiunt, et cur tantis doloribus affligantur, qui peccata non faciunt. Tu nempe dixisti: Quid severitas iudicantis valeret, nisi voluntaria peccata illati cruciatus aerumna puniret? Qua ergo iustitia, quorum voluntaria peccata nulla sunt propria, illati cruciatus aerumna parvuli puniuntur? In his certe apparet vana et inepta esse tua praeconia, quibus timorem doloremque laudasti. Gravia sunt quippe ista supplicia, quae non paterentur ab exortu recentes et novae imagines Dei sub iustissimo iudicio et omnipotentia Dei, si meritum non traherent originalis veterisque peccati. Denique in paradiso, si nemo peccasset, et provenisset coniugatorum ex illa veraci Dei benedictione fecunditas, absit ut quisquam ibi vel magnorum vel pusillorum pateretur ista tormenta. Non solum enim dolor, quod valde manifestum est; sed etiam timor, divina Scriptura testante, tormentum habet ; absit ergo ut in loco illius felicitatis essent ulla tormenta. Proinde in aetate qualibet, nemine terrente quid timerent? Nemine laedente quid dolerent? In hoc autem praesenti saeculo maligno, quod ut nostris miseriis perageretur, de paradiso deliciarum proiecti sumus, in his etiam quibus peccata dimissa sunt, timorum et dolorum aerumna permanet, ut nostra de saeculo futuro fides, ubi nulla erunt ista, non solum in nostris, verum etiam in nostrorum parvulorum aerumnis probetur; quia non eos ideo regenerari volumus, ut non patiantur haec mala; sed ut in regnum, in quo talia non erunt, pervehantur. Hanc fidem veram atque catholicam tibi respuenti, et vano buccarum strepitu refutare conanti, cum Manichaeus ingesserit quaestionem unde mala sint parvulorum, omnis tua loquacitas obmutescet; quoniam neganti originale peccatum, mox ille collidet frontem tuam, et mali naturam introducet alienam. Non autem timet catholica fides, quod tibi videtur, rem voluntatis non posse seminibus admoveri; cum audiat dicentem Deum, reddi peccata patrum in tertiam et quartam progeniem filiorum . Utique res voluntatis, qua peccant patres, seminibus admovetur, quando in filios vindicatur; et pater Abraham, ut decimaretur a Melchisedech, voluntate illi sacerdoti decimas dedit; et tamen etiam filios eius, quia in lumbis erant eius, tunc esse decimatos Sacra Scriptura testatur ; quod profecto non fieret, si non posset res voluntatis admoveri seminibus.
Augustine: To these errors of yours we have already often answered: whence those who read them, and commit them to memory, do not everywhere desire my answer, wherever you repeat your wordiness. But lest anyone complain, while those quicker of wit pardon me, I ought not to be lacking even to the slower. Behold, here too I answer you concerning the definition of sin, by which you think yourself much aided. That sin which is so sin that it is not also the penalty of sin, that definition determines, by which it is said: Sin is the will desiring what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. Which especially pertains to him from whose great sin there arose for his descendants the misery through the heavy yoke from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb, and through the corruptible body which weighs down the soul. For he, having received a very brief law, knew what justice forbade; and from it surely it was free for him to abstain, with the flesh not yet lusting against his spirit, on account of which evil it was said even to the faithful: That you may not do the things you wish (Gal 5:17). The blindness of heart, then, by which it is not known what justice forbids, and the violence of concupiscence, by which even one who knows from what he ought to abstain is conquered, are not only sins, but are also the penalties of sins. And therefore they are not included in that definition of sin, by which only sin alone was defined, not what is also the penalty of sin. For when someone is ignorant of what he ought to do, and therefore does what he ought not to do, it was not free for him to abstain from that which he did not know he ought to abstain from. Likewise he who, as you say, is pressed not by origin, but by habit, so as to cry out: I do not do the good I will, but the evil I do not will, that I do (Rom 7:19)—how is it free for him to abstain from that evil which he does not will and does, hates and does? But if it were in the power of human beings to be free of these penalties, God would not be asked, both against blindness, where it is said to him: Enlighten my eyes (See Ps 13:3 (12:4)); and against iniquitous desire, where it is said to him: Let no iniquity have dominion over me (Ps 119:133 (118:133)). Moreover, if these were not also sins for the reason that one is not free to abstain from them, it would not be said: Remember not the sins of my youth and my ignorances (See Ps 25:7 (24:7)); it would not be said: You have sealed up my sins in a bag, and noted if I have admitted anything unwillingly (See Job 14:17 LXX). By that definition of sin, then—such as Adam committed, who knew what justice forbade, and did not abstain from that from which it was free for him to abstain—the Manichees are conquered; but by us, because we say that from this is the origin of human evils, by which we see even little ones weighed down, and on account of which this too was written, when sin was being treated: Because no one is clean from filth, not even an infant whose life on earth is of one day (See Job 14:4-5 LXX). But you, denying this, try, by a pernicious defense, to press our nature more, lest, wretched, it seek a liberator; but the Manichee, when it is asked whence evil comes, you permit to introduce an alien nature coeternal with God. For he does not, in order to blame human nature, allege the affection of fear and the sense of pain; which two you thought should be praised against him, because, namely, fear and pain are thoroughly taught to be helpers and conveyers of righteousness, while the human being does not sin out of fear of judgment, or grieves that he has sinned with the goads of repenting. This is not asked of you, but what the penalty of fear is in little ones, who do not flee sins, and why they are afflicted with such great pains, who do not commit sins. You surely said: What would the severity of the one judging avail, unless it punished voluntary sins by the trouble of inflicted torment? By what justice, then, are little ones, whose voluntary sins are none of their own, punished by the trouble of inflicted torment? In these surely it appears that your praises are empty and inept, by which you praised fear and pain. For these are grievous punishments, which freshly arisen and new images of God would not suffer from their beginning, under the most just judgment and omnipotence of God, if they did not draw the merit of original and old sin. Finally, in paradise, if no one had sinned, and the fruitfulness of the married had come about from that truthful blessing of God, far be it that anyone there, whether of the great or of the small, should suffer these torments. For not only pain, which is very manifest; but also fear, by the testimony of the divine Scripture, has torment (See 1 John 4:18); far be it, then, that in the place of that felicity there should be any torments. Accordingly, at any age, with no one terrifying, what would they fear? With no one harming, what would they grieve over? But in this present evil age, which, that it might be passed through in our miseries, we were cast out from the paradise of delights, even in those whose sins have been forgiven, the trouble of fears and pains remains, so that our faith concerning the future age, where these will be none, may be proved not only in our own troubles, but also in those of our little ones; because we do not for this reason wish them to be regenerated, that they may not suffer these evils; but that they may be conveyed into the kingdom, in which there will be no such things. To this true and Catholic faith, which you spit out, and try to refute with the empty noise of your cheeks, when the Manichee has brought in the question whence the evils of little ones are, all your wordiness will fall silent; since, when you deny original sin, he will soon dash your face, and introduce an alien nature of evil. But the Catholic faith does not fear what seems so to you, that the matter of the will cannot be brought to the seeds; since it hears God saying that the sins of the fathers are repaid in the third and fourth generation of the sons (See Exod 20:5). Surely the matter of the will, by which the fathers sin, is brought to the seeds, when it is avenged in the sons; and father Abraham, that he might be tithed by Melchizedek, gave tithes to that priest by his own will; and yet his sons too, because they were in his loins, the Sacred Scripture attests were then tithed (See Heb 7:9-10); which surely would not happen, if the matter of the will could not be brought to the seeds.
JulianImp.6.17VI. 18. Iulianus. Sed proh Dei nostri atque hominum fidem! Haeccine potuisse commentorum prodigia reperiri, ut dedita opera impensoque studio in perversum conentur omnia asserere! Quid enim tam prodigiale, quam quod Poenus eloquitur? Ea, inquit, quae erant naturalia, perpetua non fuerunt; et illa, quae studio suscepta sunt, primis coagulis adhaesere membrorum. Bonus, inquit, Adam factus est, habuit innocentiam naturalem; ceteris etiam creaturis peculiari nobilitate praelatus, similitudine sui Conditoris enituit. Liberum arbitrium in conditione suscepit, ut in quam vellet partem suopte iudicio moveretur, facultatemque vel ad bonum, vel ad malum accedendi, vel ab utroque recedendi, ipsa facturae suae, qua ceteris antistabat, conditione sortitus est. Sed quoniam emancipato iudicio usurpavit pravam animi liberi voluntatem, illa omnia, quae ingenita constabat, evertit; solumque peccatum et peccandi necessitas ei inseparabiliter adhaesit. Hoc est, quod dixi prodigiale commentum. Inaudita quippe deformitas est dicere: Bene institutum est animal, in quo amissibilia fuerunt bona etiam naturalia, cui inseparabiliter adhaeserunt mala vel voluntaria.
VI. 18. Julian: But, by the faith of our God and of human beings! That such prodigies of inventions could be found, that with set purpose and lavished zeal they try to assert all things perversely! For what is so prodigious as what the Carthaginian utters? Those things, he says, which were natural, were not perpetual; and those which were taken up by zeal, clung to the first coagulations of the members. Adam, he says, was made good, he had a natural innocence; preferred to the other creatures too by a peculiar nobility, he shone with the likeness of his Founder. He received free choice in his condition, that he might move himself to whichever side he willed by his own judgment, and he obtained, by the very condition of his making, in which he stood before the rest, the faculty of going to good or to evil, or of withdrawing from both. But since, with his judgment emancipated, he usurped the depraved will of his free mind, he overthrew all those things which were established as inborn; and sin alone and the necessity of sinning clung inseparably to him. This is what I called a prodigious invention. For it is an unheard-of deformity to say: A living being was well established, in which even natural goods were losable, to which voluntary evils clung inseparably.
JulianImp.6.18Augustinus. Cum dicitur: Bene institutum est animal, in quo amissibilia fuerunt bona etiam naturalia, cui inseparabiliter adhaeserunt mala voluntaria; prodigiale putas esse commentum; et haec a nobis dici, tam vehementer et acriter commoveris, ut exclames in Dei atque hominum fidem, tamquam vim patiaris quia ista dicuntur. Sed, quaeso, terribiles impetus pone, et quietior attende quid dicam. Si quisquam voluntate se excaecet, nonne amittet naturale bonum, id est visum, et ei malum voluntarium, id est caecitas, inseparabiliter adhaerebit? Numquid ideo male est animal institutum, cui fuit amissibile naturale bonum, et inseparabile voluntarium malum? Cur ergo non potius ego exclamem: Proh Dei nostri atque hominum fidem! Haeccine tam manifesta et ante oculos constituta ab homine non videri, qui valde acutus, et eruditus, et philosophaster, et dialecticus vult videri? Quis enim quodlibet membrum si voluntate sibi amputat, non amittit naturale incolumitatis bonum; et sumit inseparabile detruncationis malum? Sed forsitan dicas, in bonis corporis posse ista contingere, non in animi. Cur ergo quando dixisti: naturalia bona, vel voluntaria mala, non addidisti "animi", ne de corporis bonis et malis tua destrueretur praeceps et inconsiderata sententia? An fortassis oblitus es? Sinamus: humanum est; sed in medium procedit homo ille qui clamat: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago ; et ostendit tibi nonnulla bona animi sic perire per voluntatem malam, ut non possint redire per bonam, nisi Deus faciat quod non potest homo, cui et lumina potest reddere voluntate caecata, et membra voluntate truncata. Deinde, qui de ipso diabolo responsurus es, qui bonam voluntatem irreparabiliter perdidit? An eam reparari posse dicturus es? Aude, si potes. An potius confiteberis, quod in mentem tibi etiam ista non venerint, et horum oblivio te fecerit temerariam praecipitare sententiam? Me ergo saltem commemorante, te corrige. An pertinacia corrigere non permittit, quod inconsulta temeritas dixit, et pudor emendationis lapsum confirmat erroris? Deus, ut video, pro te rogandus est; quem rogabat Apostolus pro Israelitis, ut sanaret eos, qui ignorantes Dei iustitiam, et suam iustitiam volentes constituere, iustitiae Dei subiecti non erant . Tales enim estis et vos, qui iustitiam vestram vultis constituere, quam vobis vos facitis ex vestro libero arbitrio; non ex Deo poscitis et sumitis veram, quae dicta est iustitia Dei; non illa qua iustus est Deus, sed quae datur ex Deo; sicut Domini est salus , non qua Dominus salvus fit, sed qua salvos facit. Unde dicit idem Apostolus: Ut inveniar in illo non habens meam iustitiam, quae ex lege est; sed eam, quae est ex fide, iustitiam ex Deo . Ipsa est iustitia Dei, quam nesciebant Israelitae, et suam volebant constituere, quae ex lege est; quam Paulus destruens, non legem utique destruebat, sed eorum superbiam, qui legem sibi sufficere putabant, tamquam per liberum arbitrium iustitiam legis implentes, et ignorabant Dei iustitiam, quae datur ex Deo, ut quod lex iubet, subveniente illo fiat, cuius sapientia legem et misericordiam in lingua portat : legem, quia iubet; misericordiam, quia iuvat, ut fiat quod iubet. Hanc Dei iustitiam concupisce, o fili Iuliane, noli in tua virtute confidere; hanc, inquam, Dei concupisce iustitiam; quam donet tibi Dominus concupiscere, donet tibi Dominus et habere. Noli istum Poenum monentem vel admonentem terrena inflatus propagine spernere. Non enim quia te Apulia genuit, ideo Poenos vincendos existimes gente, quos non potes mente. Poenas potius fuge, non Poenos; nam disputatores Poenos non potes fugere, quamdiu te delectat in tua virtute confidere; et beatus enim Cyprianus Poenus fuit, qui dixit: In nullo gloriandum, quando nostrum nihil sit .
Augustine: When it is said: A living being was well established, in which even natural goods were losable, to which voluntary evils clung inseparably, you think it a prodigious invention; and that these things are said by us, you are so vehemently and sharply moved that you cry out by the faith of God and of human beings, as though you suffered violence because these things are said. But, I beg, lay aside your terrible onslaughts, and more calmly attend to what I say. If anyone blinds himself by will, will he not lose a natural good, that is, sight, and will a voluntary evil, that is, blindness, cling to him inseparably? Was the living being therefore badly established, to which a natural good was losable, and a voluntary evil inseparable? Why, then, do I not rather cry out: By the faith of our God and of human beings! That these things, so manifest and set before the eyes, should not be seen by a human being who wishes to seem very acute, and learned, and a philosophaster, and a dialectician? For who, if he cuts off any member by will, does not lose the natural good of soundness, and take on the inseparable evil of mutilation? But perhaps you will say that these things can happen in the goods of the body, not of the mind. Why, then, when you said natural goods, or voluntary evils, did you not add "of the mind," lest your headlong and inconsiderate sentence be destroyed by the goods and evils of the body? Or did you perhaps forget? Let us allow it: it is human; but there comes forward into the midst that man who cries out: I do not do the good I will, but the evil I do not will, that I do (Rom 7:19); and shows you that certain goods of the mind so perish through an evil will, that they cannot return through a good one, unless God do what the human being cannot, who can both restore eyes to one blinded by will, and members to one mutilated by will. Then, what will you answer about the devil himself, who lost a good will irreparably? Will you say it can be repaired? Dare, if you can. Or will you rather confess that these things too did not come into your mind, and that the forgetfulness of them made you precipitate a rash sentence? At least, then, with me reminding you, correct yourself. Or does obstinacy not permit you to correct what inconsiderate rashness said, and does shame at emendation confirm the lapse of error? God, as I see, must be entreated for you; whom the Apostle entreated for the Israelites, that he might heal those who, ignorant of the righteousness of God, and wishing to establish their own righteousness, were not subject to the righteousness of God (See Rom 10:1-3). For such are you too, who wish to establish your own righteousness, which you make for yourselves out of your own free choice; you do not ask for and take from God the true one, which is called the righteousness of God; not that by which God is just, but that which is given from God; just as salvation is the Lord's (See Ps 3:8 (3:9)), not by which the Lord is saved, but by which he saves. Whence the same Apostle says: That I may be found in him, not having my own righteousness, which is from the law; but that which is from faith, the righteousness from God (Phil 3:9). This is the righteousness of God, which the Israelites did not know, and wished to establish their own, which is from the law; which Paul, in destroying, did not surely destroy the law, but their pride, who thought the law sufficient for them, as though fulfilling the righteousness of the law through free choice, and were ignorant of the righteousness of God, which is given from God, so that what the law commands is done with him helping, whose wisdom carries the law and mercy on its tongue (See Prov 31:26): the law, because it commands; mercy, because it helps, so that what it commands is done. Long for this righteousness of God, O son Julian, do not trust in your own virtue; long, I say, for this righteousness of God; may the Lord grant you to long for it, may the Lord grant you also to have it. Do not, puffed up by your earthly stock, spurn this Carthaginian admonishing or warning you. For not because Apulia bore you, should you think the Carthaginians are to be conquered by race, whom you cannot conquer in mind. Flee rather punishments, not Carthaginians; for Carthaginian disputants you cannot flee, as long as it delights you to trust in your own virtue; for blessed Cyprian too was a Carthaginian, who said: One must glory in nothing, since nothing is ours (See Cyprian, Testimonies 3.4).
JulianImp.6.18VI. 19. Iulianus. Hic dicat aliquis: Quid ergo? Tu negas illam innocentiam, in qua fuerat conditus, spontanei peccati admissione corruptam? Nam etsi possibilitas revertendi ad bonum commissa iniquitate non pereat; tamen certum est meritum innocentiae, cum qua humanum procedit exordium, voluntatis vitio deperire. At ego ita id esse non abnuo; sed illud est, quod his illuminatum exemplis volo, quia cum talis sit conditio facta qualitatum, per quas boni et mali dicimur, ut sub iure agitent voluntatis; tamque hoc sit serio constitutum, ut nec innocentia, quae pro dignitate auctoris officium antevenit voluntatis et naturalis est; tamen nulla se potestate in animo repugnante custodiat, longe longeque amplius hoc in mali parte ius valeat, ut nullam in rationis exitium tyrannidem capessat culpa voluntate suscepta. Et si bona qualitas, cum qua factus est homo, immutabilis non fuit (falso enim diceretur liber homo, si motus proprios variare non posset); multo magis qualitas mala fieri non potuit, ut immutabilis et rationalis; ne illa ratio libertatis praeiudicium a mali parte sentiret, quod propter statum suum nec a boni portione pertulerat.
VI. 19. Julian: Here someone may say: What then? Do you deny that that innocence, in which he had been founded, was corrupted by the admission of spontaneous sin? For although the possibility of returning to good does not perish when iniquity is committed; yet it is certain that the merit of the innocence with which the human beginning comes forth perishes by the fault of the will. But I do not deny that this is so; but this is what I wish illuminated by these examples: that, since the condition of the qualities by which we are called good and evil is such that they move under the right of the will; and this is so seriously established that not even innocence—which, for the dignity of the author, goes before the office of the will and is natural—yet guards itself by no power in a resisting mind; far and away more does this right avail on the side of evil, that fault taken up by will seizes no tyranny for the destruction of reason. And if the good quality with which the human being was made was not unchangeable (for the human being would be falsely called free, if he could not vary his own motions), much more could the evil quality not be made, as it were, unchangeable and rational; lest that rationale of liberty feel a prejudice on the side of evil, which, on account of its state, it had not suffered on the portion of good.
JulianImp.6.19Augustinus. Ecce tu quoque invenisti, et quamvis serius, tamen aliquando tibi venit in mentem, unde tua temeraria sententia destruatur; dixisti quippe, naturale bonum, quod est innocentia, posse voluntatis vitio deperire; ac per hoc tam magnum bonum, quod ita pertinet ad naturam, non corporis, sed ipsius animi, ut cum ipso bono Deus hominem fecerit, amissibile esse monstrasti; quod si ante tibi venisset in mentem, non putares prodigialiter et nimium deformiter dici: Bene institutum est animal, in quo amissibilia fuerunt bona etiam naturalia; amissibilia enim tu putasti esse, sed voluntaria, vel bona, vel mala; naturalia vero soles inamissibilia praedicare. Tu enim et alibi dicis, quia naturalia ab initio substantiae usque ad terminum illius perseverant ; ad hoc ut liberum arbitrium, quod homini Deus, cum eum crearet, dedit, amitti non posse contendas; praecipue asserens naturalia bona voluntariis malis perire non posse. Et ideo dicitis, quod in perversum omnia conemur asserere, tamquam dicamus non posse amitti voluntaria mala, posse autem naturalia bona; quod nos quidem non dicimus; utraque enim dicimus amitti posse; sed mala quae invehuntur per voluntatem liberam, per divinam indulgentiam posse amitti, vel per humanam voluntatem, sed a Deo liberatam, et a Domino praeparatam. Verum tu qui dicis, amitti posse per voluntatem malam, sed voluntaria bona, non naturalia, ecce invenisti, atque ipse dixisti innocentiam, quod est naturale bonum, amitti posse per voluntarium malum. Et innocentia, si bene attendas, maius bonum est, quam liberum arbitrium; quia innocentia res bonorum est, liberum vero arbitrium et bonorum est et malorum. Utrum autem mala voluntate sic pereat innocentia, ut possit bona voluntate reparari, non contemptibilis quaestio est. Sicut enim si voluntate amputentur corporis membra, non restituuntur itidem voluntate; ita videndum est, an in re quidem dissimili, id est, in animo tale aliquid de innocentiae perditione contingat, et voluntario motu perire possit, redire non possit. Nam et sacra virginitas, si per impudicam pereat voluntatem, ad pudicitiam rediri potest, ad virginitatem non potest. Sed adhuc respondetur et integritatem virginitatis in corpore, non utique animi esse, sed corporis; cum vero de innocentia disputatur, et tamen considerandum est, utrum ad iustitiam voluntate redeat qui peccaverit, non ad innocentiam; sicut illa ad pudicitiam, non ad virginitatem redit. Nam sicut iniustitia iustitiae, ita innocentiae velut eius contrarium, non iniustitia, sed reatus opponitur, qui hominis voluntate non tollitur, etsi eius voluntate sit factus. Non enim verum videt, qui putat reatum sibi ipsi tollere paenitentem; quamquam et ipsam paenitentiam Deus det, quod Apostolus confirmat dicens: Ne forte illis Deus det paenitentiam ; sed reatum apertissime Deus tollit, homini dando indulgentiam; non sibi ipse homo, agendo paenitentiam. Debemus quippe illum recolere, qui locum paenitentiae non invenit, quamvis cum lacrymis quaesierit eam . Ac per hoc et paenitentiam egit, et reus remansit, quia veniam non accepit; et illi qui dicent inter se: Paenitentiam agentes, et per angustiam spiritus gementes: Quid nobis profuit superbia? etc., rei utique in aeternum, non accepta venia, permanebunt; sicut etiam ille de quo Dominus ait: Non remittetur ei, sed reus erit aeterni peccati . Ecce inventa est innocentia magnum hominis bonum, atque ita naturale, ut cum illa sit conditus primus homo, et, sicut vos dicitis, cum illa nascitur omnis homo, quae tamen hominis voluntate perdi potest, non potest reddi; et reatus magnum malum innocentiaeque contrarium, quod tamen potestas hominis, cum sit voluntarium, possit inferre, nec possit auferre. Videsne quemadmodum generalis tua regula illa frangatur, qua putabas naturale bonum, nos voluntate non perdere; quando inventum est quod non solum pereat, sed nec redeat voluntate, dumtaxat humana? Deus autem potest hominem reatu ablato ad innocentiam revocare. Cur ergo non credis libertatem bene agendi voluntate humana perire potuisse, nec redire posse, nisi divina voluntate, cum audias hominem dicentem: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago; et post verba talia clamantem: Quis me liberabit? ac subicientem: Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum? Sed falso, inquis, diceretur liber homo, si motus proprios variare non posset . Nec te vides ipsi Deo tollere libertatem, et nobis, quando cum illo in regno eius immortales vivere coeperimus, nec motus nostros nunc in bonum, nunc in malum nobis erit possibile variare; et tamen tunc felicius liberi erimus, quando non poterimus servire peccato, sicut nec ipse Deus: sed nos ipsius gratia, ille vero sua natura.
Augustine: Behold, you too have found—and, though rather late, yet at some time it came into your mind—whence your rash sentence is destroyed; for you said that a natural good, which is innocence, can perish by the fault of the will; and through this you have shown that so great a good, which so pertains to the nature, not of the body, but of the mind itself, that God made the human being with that very good, is losable; which, if it had come into your mind before, you would not think it prodigiously and too deformedly said: A living being was well established, in which even natural goods were losable; for you thought losable things to be voluntary, whether goods or evils; but natural things you are wont to proclaim unlosable. For you too say elsewhere that natural things persevere from the beginning of the substance to its end (See Julian, in an earlier book); to this end, that you may contend that free choice, which God gave to the human being when he created him, cannot be lost; especially asserting that natural goods cannot perish by voluntary evils. And therefore you say that we try to assert all things perversely, as though we said that voluntary evils cannot be lost, but natural goods can; which indeed we do not say; for we say that both can be lost; but the evils which are brought in by free will can be lost through divine indulgence, or through a human will, but freed by God, and prepared by the Lord. But you who say that voluntary goods, not natural ones, can be lost through an evil will—behold, you have found, and you yourself have said, that innocence, which is a natural good, can be lost through a voluntary evil. And innocence, if you attend well, is a greater good than free choice; because innocence is a matter of good things, but free choice is of both good and evil things. But whether an evil will so destroys innocence that it can be repaired by a good will, is no contemptible question. For just as, if the members of the body are amputated by will, they are not likewise restored by will; so it must be seen whether, in a thing indeed dissimilar, that is, in the mind, something of the kind happens in the loss of innocence, and it can perish by a voluntary motion, but cannot return. For sacred virginity too, if it perishes through an unchaste will, one can return to chastity, but cannot to virginity. But to this it is still answered that the integrity of virginity is in the body, not surely of the mind, but of the body; whereas, when innocence is being discussed—and yet it must be considered whether he who has sinned returns by will to righteousness, not to innocence; as that one returns to chastity, not to virginity. For just as injustice is, as it were, the contrary of justice, so to innocence is opposed, as its contrary, not injustice, but guilt, which is not taken away by the will of the human being, even if it was made by his will. For he does not see the truth who thinks that the penitent takes away guilt from himself; although God also gives the penitence itself, which the Apostle confirms, saying: Lest perhaps God give them penitence (2 Tim 2:25); but God most openly takes away the guilt, by giving the human being indulgence; the human being does not take it away from himself by doing penitence. For we ought to recall him who found no place for penitence, although he sought it with tears (See Heb 12:17). And through this both he did penitence and remained guilty, because he did not receive pardon; and those who will say among themselves: Doing penitence, and groaning through anguish of spirit: What did pride profit us? (See Wis 5:3, 8)—they will surely remain guilty forever, not having received pardon; just as also he of whom the Lord says: It will not be forgiven him, but he will be guilty of an eternal sin (See Mark 3:29). Behold, innocence is found to be a great good of the human being, and so natural that, although the first man was founded with it, and, as you say, every human being is born with it, yet it can be lost by the will of the human being, but cannot be restored; and guilt is found to be a great evil and contrary to innocence, which yet the power of the human being, since it is voluntary, can bring in, but cannot take away. Do you see how that general rule of yours is broken, by which you thought we do not lose a natural good by will; when there has been found that which not only perishes, but does not even return by will, at least human will? But God can, the guilt being taken away, recall the human being to innocence. Why, then, do you not believe that the liberty of acting well could perish by human will, and could not return except by divine will, when you hear a human being saying: I do not do the good I will, but the evil I do not will, that I do; and after such words crying out: Who will free me? and subjoining: The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (See Rom 7:19, 24-25)? But falsely, you say, would the human being be called free, if he could not vary his own motions (See Julian, above). Nor do you see that you take away liberty from God himself, and from us, when we shall have begun to live immortal with him in his kingdom, nor will it be possible for us then to vary our motions, now to good, now to evil; and yet we shall then be more happily free, when we shall not be able to be slaves to sin, as neither can God himself: but we by his grace, he indeed by his nature.
JulianImp.6.19VI. 20. Iulianus. Deinde quis parasitus ita militis gloriosi vires assentationibus extulit, ut Traducianus diaboli? Quod de ponderibus affectuum agnosci licet. Fecit siquidem Deus hominem, materiam ipsam limi venerabili dignatione contrectans, quae in formam hominis auctoris sui manum subacta sequeretur. Steterat iam absolutum, ceterum pallens frigensque simulacrum, spiritum quo niteret et vigeret opperiens. Tunc augustissimo auctoris afflatu creatus et inspiratus animus, viscera impleta commovit; tunc omnes sensus in apparatum propriorum munerum suscitati sunt. Dedit habitator ingressus visceribus colorem, sanguini calorem, membris vigorem, cuti nitorem. Vide quod negotium in formando et animando homine pietas divina suscepit. Verum nec perfectum eum reliquit familiaritas Conditoris; transfertur ad amoeniorem locum, et quem clementer fecerat, munifice locupletat. Nec hoc tamen praestitisse contentus, illustrat eum impertitione colloquii; dat ei praeceptum, ut libertatem suam intellegens, videret sibi suppetere per quod fieret amicior Conditori; quod praeceptum non in multa distenditur, ne quid oneris de multiplicata lege sentiret; sed interdictu unius pomuli, testimonium devotionis expetitur. Postea quoque ut haberet consortem, per quam pater fieret, denuo illius manus, qua conditus erat, nobilitatur attactu; divino quoque subinde colloquio fovetur atque honoratur. Haec ergo a Deo praestita tam longa, tam multa, tam grandia, instituta, munera, praecepta, colloquia, nullam fecerunt homini boni necessitatem; at e regione diabolus non minus timide, quam callide, exigua cum muliere verba commiscuit; et tantum virium habuisse dicuntur, ut continuo in conditionem naturalium verterentur; immo ingenita cuncta subruerent, facerent perpetuam mali necessitatem, et dominum ac possessorem imagini Dei diabolum imponerent. Quid ergo fortius, quid excellentius, quid magnificentius adversaria potestate, si tantum levi confabulatione fecit, quantum Deus nec operibus suis potuit, nec muneribus obtinere? Manifestum est itaque, in eius vos parte consistere, cuius tam immodice potentiam praedicatis; nec in cultum Dei nostri ullum habere consortium, quem nos ut aequissimum, ita omnipotentissimum confitemur, qui potens est, et veritas in circuitu eius, qui humiliat sicut vulneratum superbum, id est, diabolum et Manichaeum, vosque eius asseclas calumniantes naturam, ne vos sponte peccare fateamini. Ipse ergo Deus noster in virtute brachii sui disperdit inimicos suos , per quod nihil aut a vobis, aut a Manichaeis afferri potuit, quod non veritatis eius fulmine dissiliret.
VI. 20. Julian: Then, what parasite ever extolled the strength of a boastful soldier with flatteries, as the Traducianist did the devil's? Which may be recognized from the weights of the affections. For God made the human being, handling the very matter of the clay with venerable condescension, that, subdued, it might follow the hand of its author into the form of a human being. The image had now stood, completed, but pale and cold, awaiting the spirit by which it might shine and be vigorous. Then, by the most august breath of its author created and inspired, the mind moved the filled bowels; then all the senses were roused to the apparatus of their proper functions. The indweller gave color to the entered bowels, heat to the blood, vigor to the members, sheen to the skin. See what a business the divine piety undertook in forming and animating the human being. But the familiarity of the Founder did not leave him even when perfect; he is transferred to a more pleasant place, and the one he had mercifully made, he munificently enriches. Yet not content to have bestowed this, he illumines him by the imparting of conversation; he gives him a precept, that, understanding his liberty, he might see that there was at hand for him that by which he might become more friendly to his Founder; which precept is not stretched into many things, lest he should feel any burden from a multiplied law; but by the prohibition of one little apple, a testimony of devotion is sought. Afterward too, that he might have a consort through whom he might become a father, again his hand by which he was founded is ennobled by his touch; and presently too he is cherished and honored by divine conversation. These things, then, bestowed by God—so long, so many, so great, institutions, gifts, precepts, conversations—made for the human being no necessity of good; but on the other side the devil, no less timidly than craftily, mingled a few words with the woman; and they are said to have had such force that they were at once turned into the condition of natural things; nay, that they overthrew all things inborn, made a perpetual necessity of evil, and set the devil as lord and possessor over the image of God. What, then, is stronger, what more excellent, what more magnificent than the adverse power, if by a slight conversation alone it did as much as God could not obtain either by his works or by his gifts? It is manifest, then, that you stand on his side, whose power you so immoderately proclaim; and that you have no fellowship in the worship of our God, whom we confess to be as most just so most omnipotent, who is mighty, and truth is round about him (See Ps 89:8 (88:9)); who humbles like a wounded one the proud (See Ps 89:10 (88:11)), that is, the devil and the Manichee, and you their followers slandering nature, lest you confess that you sin of your own accord. Our God himself, then, in the strength of his arm scatters his enemies (See Ps 89:10 (88:11)), by which neither you nor the Manichees could bring forward anything that would not leap apart at the thunderbolt of his truth.
JulianImp.6.20Augustinus. Assentatores diaboli non sumus, nec eius potestatem, quae Dei subiecta est potestati, adulatorio, sicut nobis conviciamini, praeconio laudis extollimus. Sed utinam vos non eius milites essetis, sicut omnes haeretici; quorum ille dogmata in quos potuerit, per vestras linguas velut tela mortifera iaculatur. Dicit Apostolus: Gratias agentes Patri, idoneos facienti nos in partem sortis sanctorum in lumine; qui eruit nos de potestate tenebrarum, et transtulit in regnum Filii caritatis suae ; et vos istas gratias pro parvulis nos agere prohibetis, asserentes eos non esse sub potestate diaboli; utquid, nisi ut inde non eruantur, ne lucra diaboli minuantur? Dicit Iesus, qui secundum hoc nomen suum, salvum facit populum suum a peccatis eorum : Nemo intrat in domum fortis, ut vasa eius eripiat, nisi prius alligaverit fortem ; et vos in hoc populo Christi, quem salvum facit a peccatis eorum, parvulos non esse contenditis, quos ut propriis, ita nec originalibus vultis obstrictos esse peccatis; et cum fallaci vestro sermone minuitis vires eius, quem dixit Veritas fortem, errore vestro eum facitis ad obtinendos parvulos fortiorem. Dicit Iesus: Venit enim Filius hominis quaerere et salvum facere quod perierat ; et vos ei respondetis: Non opus est ut parvulos quaeras, quia non perierant; atque ita cum ab eis Salvatoris inquisitionem repellitis, potestatem contra eos vulneratoris augetis. Dicit Iesus: Non est necessarius sanis medicus, sed male habentibus; non veni vocare iustos, sed peccatores ; et vos ei dicitis: Non es ergo parvulis necessarius, quia nec voluntate sunt propria, nec humana origine peccatores. Cum ergo non salvos venire salvandos vetatis ad medicum, diabolica in eis exercet pestis potentius principatum. Quanto ergo est tolerabilius, ut tamquam parasiti et assentatores diabolum falsis laudibus mulceatis, quam sicut milites vel satellites eum dogmatum falsitatibus adiuvetis? Copioso et ornato describis eloquio, quomodo Deus ex limo formaverit hominem, flando animaverit, paradiso locupletaverit, praecepto adminiculaverit, tantamque curam, ne in aliquo eum gravaret, habuerit, ut idem praeceptum non in multa distenderet ne quid oneris homo, quem tanta benignitate condiderat, de multiplicata lege sentiret. Cur ergo nunc corpus corruptibile aggravat animam ? Cur ergo grave iugum est super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum ? Quandoquidem ipsum Adam nec lege multiplicata voluit aggravare. Nempe cernitis, quod si in paradiso nemo peccasset, ita fecunditas coniugum genere humano locum illum tantae felicitatis impleret, ut nec animam corruptibile corpus gravaret, nec iugum grave natos homines premeret, nec labor et dolor miserandos parvulos erudiret. Unde ergo ista sunt, quae utique non sunt de nescio qua mala, quam Manichaeus fingit, aut credit, a nobis aliena, nobisque permixta, nisi de nostra vitiata primi hominis transgressione natura? Sed miraris, homo acutus ac prudens, et non existimas esse credendum, quod diaboli exigua verba cum muliere commixta tantum virium habuisse dicuntur, ut naturalia cuncta bona perverterent; quasi hoc loquentis verba fecerint, non consensus audientis. Non enim, ut dicis, pauca verba serpentis in conditionem versa sunt naturalium: sed hominis voluntas perdidit bonum, quod reddi non posset hominis voluntate, sed Dei, quando reddendum et quibus reddendum, iustissimus, potentissimus, et misericordissimus iudicabit; quemadmodum in corpore, sicut iam diximus, voluntate hominis potest eius visus auferri; quod si fit, sequitur caecitas, quam necessitas ferat, voluntas non auferat; et in animo potest hominis voluntas innocentiam eius perdere, et non potest reddere. Illud potius intuere, quod mala cum quibus nascuntur homines, quae congenerari hominibus in paradisi felicitate non possent, profecto nisi de paradiso exisset natura vitiata, nunc eis congenerata non essent. Ista, quae manifesta sunt, aspice. Non enim mortalium mala a die exitus de ventre matris filiorum Adam, in obscuro conicimus; sed in luce clarissima cernimus. Haec quia non sunt ex malae alienae commixtione naturae; procul dubio ex depravatione nostrae sunt. Nec tibi videatur indignum, quod subiecta est diabolo imago Dei; hoc enim non fieret, nisi iudicio Dei; nec removetur ista damnatio, nisi gratia Dei. Qui enim naturae excellentia, ut imago Dei esset, ad similitudinem Dei factus est, non est mirandum, quia naturae depravatione, vanitati similis factus est, unde dies eius velut umbra praetereunt . Tu dic, cur innumerabiles imagines Dei in parvula aetate nulla peccata facientes, non admittantur ad regnum Dei, si non renascantur. Habent enim aliquid unde mereantur iacere sub diabolo, propter quod non merentur regnare sub Deo; cuius si lumini cohaereres, non tanta arrogantia verba tua fulmini comparares.
Augustine: We are not flatterers of the devil, nor do we extol his power, which is subject to the power of God, with the adulatory proclamation of praise, as you revile us. But would that you were not his soldiers, as all heretics are; whose dogmas he, through your tongues, hurls like deadly weapons against those whom he can. The Apostle says: Giving thanks to the Father, who has made us fit for a share in the lot of the saints in light; who rescued us from the power of darkness, and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love (Col 1:12-13); and you forbid us to give these thanks for little ones, asserting that they are not under the power of the devil; for what reason, except that they may not be rescued thence, lest the gains of the devil be lessened? Jesus says, who according to this name of his saves his people from their sins (See Matt 1:21): No one enters the house of the strong man to snatch his vessels, unless he first binds the strong man (See Matt 12:29); and you contend that in this people of Christ, which he saves from their sins, little ones are not, whom you wish to be bound neither by their own nor by original sins; and while by your deceitful discourse you lessen the strength of him whom Truth called strong, you by your error make him stronger for holding little ones. Jesus says: For the Son of man came to seek and to save what had perished (Luke 19:10); and you answer him: There is no need for you to seek little ones, for they had not perished; and thus, while you repel the Savior's search from them, you increase the power of the wounder against them. Jesus says: The healthy do not need a physician, but those who are ill; I came not to call the just, but sinners (See Matt 9:12-13); and you say to him: You are not, then, necessary to little ones, because they are sinners neither by their own will, nor by human origin. When, then, you forbid those to be saved who are to be saved to come to the physician, the diabolical plague exercises its dominion over them more powerfully. How much more tolerable, then, is it for you, as parasites and flatterers, to soothe the devil with false praises, than, as soldiers or attendants, to aid him with the falsehoods of dogmas? With copious and ornate eloquence you describe how God formed the human being from clay, animated him by breathing, enriched him with paradise, supported him with a precept, and took such care, lest he should burden him in anything, that he did not stretch that same precept into many things, lest the human being, whom he had founded with so great kindness, should feel any burden from a multiplied law. Why, then, does the corruptible body now weigh down the soul (See Wis 9:15)? Why, then, is there a heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1)? Since he was unwilling to weigh down Adam himself even by a multiplied law. Surely you perceive that, if no one had sinned in paradise, the fruitfulness of the married would so fill that place of so great felicity with the human race that neither would a corruptible body weigh down the soul, nor a heavy yoke press born human beings, nor labor and pain instruct the pitiable little ones. Whence, then, are these things, which surely are not from some evil which the Manichee feigns or believes to be alien to us and commingled with us, except from our nature vitiated by the transgression of the first man? But you wonder, an acute and prudent man, and do not think it must be believed that the devil's few words mingled with the woman are said to have had such force that they perverted all the natural goods; as though the words of the speaker did this, not the consent of the hearer. For not, as you say, were the few words of the serpent turned into the condition of natural things: but the will of the human being lost a good, which could be restored not by the will of the human being, but of God, when and to whom he, most just, most powerful, and most merciful, shall judge it must be restored; just as in the body, as we have already said, the sight of the human being can be taken away by his will; which if it happens, blindness follows, which necessity bears, the will does not take away; and in the mind the will of the human being can lose his innocence, and cannot restore it. Rather consider this: that the evils with which human beings are born, which could not be engendered together with human beings in the felicity of paradise, surely, unless a vitiated nature had gone out of paradise, would not now be engendered together with them. These things, which are manifest, look at. For we do not conjecture in obscurity the evils of mortals from the day of the coming out of the womb of the mother of the sons of Adam; but we discern them in the clearest light. These, because they are not from the commingling of an alien evil nature, are beyond doubt from the depravation of our own. Nor let it seem unworthy to you that the image of God is subject to the devil; for this would not happen, except by the judgment of God; nor is this condemnation removed, except by the grace of God. For he who by the excellence of his nature, that he might be the image of God, was made to the likeness of God, it is not to be wondered at that, by the depravation of his nature, he was made like to vanity, whence his days pass away like a shadow (See Ps 144:4 (143:4)). Do you say why innumerable images of God, at a little age committing no sins, are not admitted to the kingdom of God, if they are not reborn. For they have something whereby they deserve to lie under the devil, on account of which they do not deserve to reign under God; to whose light if you adhered, you would not, with so great arrogance, compare your words to the thunderbolt.
JulianImp.6.20VI. 21. Iulianus. Liquet igitur absolutissime nullo Augustinum a praeceptore suo differre, sed disputationibus eius non minus Adae, quam ceterorum naturam pessimam definiri. Denique ut adhuc aliquid cum eodem de his, quae egimus, disseramus, apparet te etiam primi peccati non idem genus, quod aliarum putare culparum. Nam cum dicis flagitia temporum secutorum in naturam transire non posse, verbi gratia, ut de peculatore, de parricida, de incesto orti filii generantum peccatis nascantur obnoxii; nec ullum crimen esse quod seminibus misceatur, praeter illud unum, apertissime ostendis illam inobedientiam non te eiusdem generis arbitrari, cuius etiam ceterae sunt. Vide ergo interrogatio nostra quantae sit brevitatis et lucis. Si peccatum, quod Adam commisit, voluntate susceptum est, et potuit fieri naturale, cur non haec quae fiunt quotidie peccata, quae voluntas criminosa committit, in deformitatem et praeiudicia seminum congeruntur? Quod si ista non minus atrocia, quam plura, ingenerari nequeunt; qua lege, qua conditione, quo privilegio illud solum vindicatur ingenitum? Si unius generis peccata sunt, quae novimus, quae lex arguit, quae aequitas punit, et illud primi hominis, quod voluntate commissum et aequitate punitum est; cur non aut ista ex illo intellegimus, aut illud ex istis? Aut si mutuo sibi testimonio esse non possunt, qua impudentia denegatur illa praevaricatio alterius conditionis fuisse, id est, non de voluntate, sed naturali tabe prolata? Postremo, aude cum assertione traducis definire quodcumque peccatum, non dico illud primum, sed interim vel de his quae nunc fiunt, verbi gratia, sacrilegium, flagitium, vel malum quodpiam facinus; id est, haec peccata quam definitionem habeant, explicato. Dices sine dubio: Voluntas est appetens quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. Quia si voluntas mala non esset, peccatum esse non posset. Ad hoc quam rationabiliter assurgamus intende. O hebetudinem, o impudentiam non ferendam! Definis non esse peccatum nisi voluntatem liberam, et a iustitia prohibitam, cum mali naturalis opinio praescribat esse peccatum, cum quo nascitur homo, non voluntarium. Non est ergo verum, culpam non esse, nisi quae sponte committitur; quia est crimen, et maximum, quod non sponte, sed nascendo suscipitur. Remitte igitur definitionem peccati, quae Catholicis amica ad vos nec hospitii iure deflectit, atque ea remissa, proba te non esse illorum commilitonem, qui ipsam substantiam invidia pravitatis oppugnant. Et ut quod egimus colligatur: aut nullum docebitur voluntarium, si est aliquod naturale peccatum; aut nullum erit naturale, si omne peccatum voluntarium definitur; conficiturque ex his, ut aut neges nasci posse peccatum, et transeas in Catholicorum fidem; aut si perstiteris non aliquod, sed maximum crimen sine voluntate suscipi per naturam, reddas nomen tuum etiam Manichaeo, cui totum praestas obsequium.
VI. 21. Julian: It is clear, then, most absolutely, that Augustine differs in nothing from his preceptor, but that by his disputations the nature of Adam no less than of the rest is defined as most evil. Finally, that we may still discuss something with the same man about the things we have treated, it appears that you do not think even the first sin of the same kind as you think the rest of the faults. For when you say that the shameful deeds of later times cannot pass into nature—for example, that of an embezzler, of a parricide, of an incestuous man, sons born are born liable to the sins of their begetters; and that there is no crime which is mingled with the seeds, except that one alone—you show most openly that you do not think that disobedience of the same kind of which the rest also are. See, then, how brief and clear is our question. If the sin which Adam committed was taken up by will, and could become natural, why are not these sins which happen daily, which a criminal will commits, heaped into the deformity and prejudices of the seeds? But if these, no less atrocious than more numerous, cannot be engendered, by what law, by what condition, by what privilege is that one alone avenged as inborn? If the sins are of one kind—those which we know, which the law charges, which equity punishes, and that of the first man, which was committed by will and punished by equity—why do we not either understand these from that, or that from these? Or, if they cannot be a mutual testimony to each other, with what shamelessness is it denied that that transgression was of another condition, that is, brought forth not from will, but from a natural taint? Finally, dare, with the assertion of propagation, to define any sin whatever—I do not say that first one, but for the present even of those which now happen, for example, sacrilege, a shameful deed, or any evil crime—that is, explain what definition these sins have. You will say without doubt: It is the will desiring what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. For if there were not an evil will, there could not be sin. Attend how reasonably we rise to this. O dullness, O shamelessness not to be borne! You define sin to be nothing but a free will, forbidden by justice, when the opinion of natural evil prescribes that there is a sin, with which the human being is born, that is not voluntary. It is not true, then, that there is no fault except what is committed of one's own accord; because there is a crime, and the greatest, which is taken up not of one's own accord, but by being born. Dismiss, then, the definition of sin, which, friendly to the Catholics, does not turn aside to you even by the right of hospitality; and that being dismissed, prove that you are not the comrade-in-arms of those who assail the very substance by the malice of depravity. And that what we have done may be gathered: either no sin will be taught to be voluntary, if there is any natural sin; or there will be none natural, if every sin is defined voluntary; and it is concluded from these that either you deny that sin can be born, and cross over into the faith of the Catholics; or, if you persist that not some, but the greatest crime is taken up without will through nature, you surrender your name even to the Manichee, to whom you render total obedience.
JulianImp.6.21Augustinus. Magnam te mihi putas invidiam comparare, cum dicis, nihil me a meo praeceptore differre; at ego in laudem meam tua sumo convicia; nec quod cogitas, sed quod verbis sonas, revocans ad fidem meam, sicut me intellegere oportet, intellego. Verum enim dicis et nescis; sicut Caiphas pontifex persecutor Christi, scelera cogitabat, et salubria nesciens verba dicebat . Gaudeo prorsus, in hac quae inter nos vertitur quaestione, me nihil a meo praeceptore differre; primo, quia ipse Dominus docuit me, mortuos esse parvulos, nisi ipse eos vivificet, qui pro omnibus mortuus est; quod exponens Apostolus dicit: Ergo omnes mortui sunt, et pro omnibus mortuus est . Et tu contradicis, negans parvulos mortuos, ne vivificentur in Christo, cum fatearis mortuum etiam pro parvulis Christum. Hoc me docet etiam Ioannes omnium Praeceptoris Apostolus, qui dicit: Ideo venisse Filium Dei, ut solvat opera diaboli; quae vos negatis in parvulis solvi, quasi propter illos non venerit, qui ideo venit ut solvat opera diaboli . Praeceptores etiam meos negare non debeo, qui me ad hoc intellegendum suo litterario labore iuverunt. Meus praeceptor est Cyprianus, qui dicit: Infantem secundum Adam carnaliter natum, contagium mortis antiquae prima nativitate traxisse, et hoc ipso ad remissionem peccatorum accipiendam facilius accedere, quod ei remittuntur non propria, sed aliena peccata . Meus est praeceptor Ambrosius, cuius non solum libros legi, sed verba etiam loquentis audivi, et per eum lavacrum regenerationis accepi. Longe sum quidem impar meritis eius; sed confiteor et profiteor me in hac causa nihil ab hoc meo praeceptore differre. Cui absit ut audeas praeferre Pelagium praeceptorem tuum; quem tamen ego contra te de Ambrosio teneo testem meum. Pelagius enim dixit, quod eius fidem et purissimum in Scripturis sensum ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere . Quem sic tu audes reprehendere, ut quod ait discordiam carnis per praevaricationem primi hominis in nostram vertisse naturam , et quidquid aliud de vitiata per Adam natura humana sensit et dixit, Manichaei affirmes esse commentum. Sane testimonium praeceptoris tui in hoc tanto viro ex parte custodis, quod eum non audes aperte reprehendere: sed cum mihi nominatim conviciaris lingua maledica et fronte proterva, profecto et illum et alios, qui eadem senserunt atque dixerunt, Ecclesiae catholicae magnos clarosque doctores tanto nequius, quanto obliquius criminaris. Ego itaque adversus te et meam defendo et illorum fidem, quos palam times habere inimicos, et invitus pateris iudices. Absit autem ut apud tales iudices valeant aliquid argumentationes tuae, in quibus peccato illi magno, hoc est, praevaricationi primi hominis, peccata consequentium temporum comparas, et putas si scelere primi hominis natura generis humani mutata est, etiam nunc parentum scelera naturam debuisse mutare filiorum. Haec enim dicens non respicis peccatores illos, posteaquam peccatum illud grande fecerunt, et de paradiso esse dimissos, et a ligno vitae tanta severitate prohibitos. Numquid scelerati temporum istorum in aliquas inferiores terras proiciuntur de hoc orbe terrarum, cum hic ipsa scelera quamlibet magna commiserint? Numquid a ligno vitae, quod in hac miseria nullum est, prohibentur? Sed persistit generis humani locus et vita, in quibus et homines impiissimi vivunt; cum videamus illorum impiorum locum et vitam, sicut erat ante peccatum, post peccatum non potuisse consistere. Debuerunt autem, secundum opinionem vestram, parvuli nullo reatu obligati, mox ut nascuntur, tamquam innocentes imagines Dei perferri ab Angelis in paradisum Dei, et illic sine ullo labore et dolore nutriri, ut si quis eorum peccasset, ipse inde merito proiceretur, ne crescerent imitatione peccata. Nunc vero cum solus audierit qui in paradisi felicitate peccavit: Spinas et tribulos terra pariet tibi, maledicta in omnibus operibus tuis; et in sudore vultus tui edes panem tuum ; nullum hominum videmus a poena laboris alienum, qui utique labor beatos habitatores paradisi non erat gravaturus. Et cum sola mulier eius audierit: In tristitia paries filios, nullam parientium ab hoc supplicio scimus immunem. Numquid ergo ita estis absurdi, ut aut in paradiso existimetis homines istas aerumnas fuisse passuros si nemo peccasset, quas manifestissimum est, Deum nonnisi praevaricatoribus illis tunc hominibus intulisse; aut nunc eas negetis eorum posteros perpeti paradisi exsules, et ubique terrarum tot et tantas miserias perferentes; aut dicturi estis, quanto magis quisque est peccator et impius, tanto magis eius agros parere spinas et tribulos, et tanto magis eum sudare laboribus; et quanto est quaeque mulier iniquior, tanto eam parientem dolores perpeti graviores? Sicut ergo poenae humanarum miseriarum, quas communiter perferunt filii Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum, ideo sunt omnium, quia parentes communes sunt omnium, de quorum praevaricatione ista venerunt; ita ipsorum duorum praevaricatio tam magnum peccatum debet intellegi, ut posset omnium ex viro et muliere nascentium in deterius mutare naturam, et communi reatu tamquam hereditarii debiti obligare chirographum. Quisquis ergo dicit talem conditionem quorumlibet delictorum, quae nunc committuntur, esse debuisse, qualis fuit conditio delicti illius, quod in illius vitae tanta felicitate, et tanta non peccandi facilitate commissum est; etiam ipsas duas vitas debet aequare, eam scilicet quae nunc agitur, et eam quae in illis sanctis et beatis deliciis agebatur. Quod si esse stolidissimum cernis, desine de peccatis praesentis saeculi velle praescribere, ne illud magnum peccatum habeat suam vim et suum meritum singulare. Quamquam et in hac vita omnipotens et iustus ille qui dicit: Reddam peccata patrum in filios , parentum reatu etiam posteros irretiri satis evidenter ostendit, et quamvis mitiore nexu, tamen haereditarios debitores fieri, nisi eos, sicut iam in superioribus huius operis partibus disputavimus, a vinculo illius proverbii, quod dici solet: Patres manducaverunt uvam acerbam, et dentes filiorum obstupuerunt , non vestrum argumentum, sed Novum Testamentum, nec generationis natura, sed gratia regenerationis absolvat. Definitio vero illa peccati, ubi intellegitur voluntas appetens quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere, illius peccati definitio est, quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod etiam poena peccati; quod nescio quoties tibi iam ad ista responsum est. Qui enim dicit: Non quod volo, bonum facio; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago , non illi ab hoc malo liberum est abstinere, et ideo invocat liberatorem, quia perdidit libertatem.
Augustine: You think you bring great odium upon me, when you say that I differ in nothing from my preceptor; but I take your revilings for my praise; and, recalling to my faith not what you think, but what you sound forth in words, I understand, as it behooves me to understand. For you say what is true and do not know it; just as Caiaphas the high priest, the persecutor of Christ, was thinking of crimes, and, not knowing it, was saying salutary words (See John 11:49-51). I rejoice altogether that, in this question which is turned between us, I differ in nothing from my preceptor; first, because the Lord himself taught me that little ones are dead, unless he himself give them life, who died for all; which the Apostle, expounding, says: Therefore all have died, and he died for all (2 Cor 5:14-15). And you contradict, denying that little ones are dead, lest they be made alive in Christ, although you confess that Christ died even for little ones. This John too, the Apostle of the Preceptor of all, teaches me, who says: That the Son of God came for this, to destroy the works of the devil (See 1 John 3:8); which you deny are destroyed in little ones, as though he had not come for them, who came for this, to destroy the works of the devil. My preceptors too I ought not to deny, who aided me to understand this by their literary labor. My preceptor is Cyprian, who says that the infant, born carnally according to Adam, contracted the contagion of the ancient death by his first birth, and for this very reason approaches more easily to receive the forgiveness of sins, that there are forgiven him not his own, but another's sins (See Cyprian, Letter 64.5). My preceptor is Ambrose, whose books I not only read, but heard him speaking the words too, and through him received the laver of regeneration. I am indeed far unequal to his merits; but I confess and profess that in this matter I differ in nothing from this my preceptor. To whom far be it that you dare to prefer Pelagius your preceptor; whom yet I hold against you, concerning Ambrose, as my witness. For Pelagius said that not even an enemy dared to reprehend his faith and his most pure sense in the Scriptures (See Pelagius, on Ambrose). Whom you so dare to reprehend that what he says—that the discord of the flesh passed into our nature through the transgression of the first man (See Ambrose, On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation 7.71), and whatever else he held and said about human nature vitiated through Adam—you affirm to be the invention of the Manichee. You do indeed keep in part the testimony of your preceptor concerning this so great man, in that you do not dare openly to reprehend him: but when you revile me by name with a slanderous tongue and a brazen brow, you surely charge both him and the others who held and said the same things—the great and famous teachers of the Catholic Church—the more wickedly the more obliquely. I, therefore, against you, defend both my faith and theirs, whom you openly fear to have as enemies, and unwillingly endure as judges. But far be it that before such judges your argumentations should avail anything, in which you compare the sins of later times to that great sin, that is, the transgression of the first man, and think that if, by the crime of the first man, the nature of the human race was changed, then now too the crimes of parents ought to change the nature of the sons. For in saying these things you do not consider that those sinners, after they committed that great sin, were both dismissed from paradise, and forbidden from the tree of life with so great severity. Are the wicked of these times cast down into some lower lands away from this orb of the earth, when they have committed here the very crimes, however great? Are they forbidden the tree of life, which is none in this misery? But the place and life of the human race persists, in which even the most impious human beings live; whereas we see that the place and life of those impious ones, as it was before sin, could not stand after sin. But, according to your opinion, little ones bound by no guilt ought, as soon as they are born, to be carried, as innocent images of God, by the angels into the paradise of God, and there to be nourished without any labor and pain, so that if any of them sinned, he would deservedly be cast thence, lest sins should grow by imitation. But now, when only he who sinned in the felicity of paradise heard: Thorns and thistles the earth will bring forth for you, cursed in all your works; and in the sweat of your brow you will eat your bread (See Gen 3:17-19); we see no human being free from the penalty of labor, which labor surely was not going to weigh down the blessed inhabitants of paradise. And when only his wife heard: In sorrow you will bring forth children (Gen 3:16), we know no woman in childbirth immune from this punishment. Are you, then, so absurd that you either think human beings would have suffered these troubles in paradise, if no one had sinned—which it is most manifest God inflicted then only on those transgressing human beings; or now deny that their descendants, exiles of paradise, suffer them, enduring so many and so great miseries everywhere on earth; or are you going to say that, the more anyone is a sinner and impious, the more his fields bring forth thorns and thistles, and the more he sweats with labors; and the more iniquitous any woman is, the more grievous pains she suffers in childbirth? As, then, the penalties of human miseries, which the sons of Adam suffer in common from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb, are therefore of all, because the parents are common to all, from whose transgression these things came; so the transgression of those two ought to be understood to be so great a sin that it could change for the worse the nature of all born of man and woman, and bind them with a common guilt as with the bond of a hereditary debt. Whoever, then, says that the condition of any offenses whatsoever which are now committed ought to have been such as was the condition of that offense which was committed in so great a felicity of that life, and so great an ease of not sinning, ought also to equate the two lives—namely that which is now lived, and that which was being lived in those holy and blessed delights. But if you discern that this is most foolish, cease to wish to prescribe from the sins of the present age, lest that great sin should have its own force and its own singular merit. Although even in this life the omnipotent and just one who says: I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the sons (See Exod 20:5), shows clearly enough that the descendants too are entangled by the guilt of the parents, and, although by a milder bond, yet become hereditary debtors, unless—as we have already disputed in the earlier parts of this work—not your argument, but the New Testament, and not the nature of generation, but the grace of regeneration, absolve them from the bond of that proverb which is wont to be said: The fathers ate a bitter grape, and the teeth of the sons were set on edge (See Jer 31:29-30; Ezek 18:2). But that definition of sin, where it is understood as the will desiring what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain, is the definition of that sin which is only sin, not that which is also the penalty of sin; which I know not how many times has already been answered to you concerning these things. For he who says: I do not do the good I will, but the evil I do not will, that I do (See Rom 7:19), is not free to abstain from this evil, and therefore he invokes a liberator, because he has lost liberty.
JulianImp.6.21VI. 22. Iulianus. Tempus admonet ut ad alia transeamus; sed in eodem loco restare aliquid indignatione compellor. Tune audeas dicere Adam voluntate peccasse? Unde tibi venit hoc somnium? Quia iniquum, inquis, erat, ut imputaret in peccatum Deus, nisi a quo abstinere liberum nosset. Quid ergo? Hanc iustitiam ille princeps tenebrarum quem colitis, ad momentum ei crediderat, et eam propediem reposcens hunc Deum omni aequitate destituit, ut qui intellexerat a primordio non esse imputandum in peccatum, nisi unde liberum fuerat abstinere, per omne reliquum tempus a cunctis nascentibus noverit abstinere liberum non fuisse? Postremo, unde tu nosti illud tantummodo iustum fuisse, ut in Adam nisi voluntarium crimen non possit ulcisci; si iniustum esse non nosti, imputari cuiquam in crimen, quod fatearis sine voluntate susceptum? Aut ergo opinionem traducis iustam putabis, ut Dei possit convenire sententiae, cum imputat peccatum parvulo, quod sit nulla eius voluntate commissum, et cogeris illud quoque iustum et Dei conveniens iudiciis profiteri, ut Adae imputaverit in peccatum, quod noverat ab eo non voluntate, sed substantiae suae deformitate prolatum; perque hoc ipsum nulla erit tradux, nec depravata operantis arbitrio, sed male instituta ab exordio natura reprehendetur, confiteberisque te esse Manichaeum. Aut si resipiscens iniustum esse dixeris, ut Adam teneretur reus pro naturae suae culpis; irrefutabiliter consequitur, scelestissimum esse, si Abel, Enoch, Noe et omne hominum genus obnoxium crimini originali censeatur. Quod facinus iudicii si admoveas Deo tuo, solus pro omnibus remanebit reus; apparebitque, quod semper, non ipsum esse, quem catholici aequissimum in Trinitate veneramur. Quod si a Dei accusatione destiteris, Manichaeae traducis, qua hactenus confossus es, vel redivivus dogma damnabis.
VI. 22. Julian: The time admonishes us to pass to other matters; but I am compelled by indignation to dwell a little on this same point. Would you dare to say that Adam sinned by will? Whence came this dream to you? Because it was iniquitous, you say, that God should impute as sin except what he knew it was free to abstain from. What then? Had that prince of darkness whom you worship credited him with this justice for a moment, and, soon demanding it back, stripped this God of all equity, so that he who had understood from the beginning that nothing was to be imputed as sin except what it had been free to abstain from, knew, through all the remaining time, that for all those being born it was not free to abstain? Finally, whence do you know that this alone was just, that in Adam nothing but a voluntary crime could be punished; if you do not know that it is unjust that there be imputed to anyone as a crime what you confess was taken up without will? Either, then, you will think the opinion of propagation just, so that it can agree with the sentence of God, when he imputes to a little one a sin which was committed by no will of his, and you will be compelled to profess that this too is just and agreeable to the judgments of God, that he imputed to Adam as sin what he knew was brought forth by him not by will, but by the deformity of his substance; and through this very thing there will be no propagation-theory, nor will the nature be reprehended as depraved by the choice of the one acting, but as badly established from the beginning, and you will confess that you are a Manichee. Or, if, coming to your senses, you say it is unjust that Adam should be held guilty for the faults of his nature; it follows irrefutably that it is most wicked, if Abel, Enoch, Noah, and the whole human race be reckoned liable to original crime. Which crime of judgment, if you bring it upon your God, he alone will remain guilty for all; and it will appear, as always, that he is not the one whom the Catholics venerate as most equitable in the Trinity. But if you desist from accusing God, you will condemn the dogma of the Manichean propagation, by which you have hitherto been transfixed, even when revived.
JulianImp.6.22Augustinus. Hinc est quod vehementer erratis, hinc estis haeretici, hinc adversus catholicam fidem, quae evitans haereticos, eloquia divina sectatur, eisque munitur, novitias machinas humanis et vanis argumentationibus componere audetis; quoniam nescitis, et quod intellegere non potestis, credere recusatis, quid valeant in seriem generationis seminum nexus, et in creaturis quas Deus alias ex aliis secundum genus suum nasci voluit, quanta sint et quam sint ineffabilia, quamque etiam nullo penetrentur sensu, nulla cogitatione comprehendantur naturalia iura propaginis; unde iste sit insitus humano generi affectus, ut omnes, quantum ad ipsos attinet, certos filios velint habere; cui rei proficit in feminis castis foederis fides coniugalis; propter quod philosophus Plato iure displicuit, quia censuit permixte utendum feminis, in ea civitate, quam disputando velut optimam format, etiam ipse quid volens, nisi ut omnibus minoribus maiores eam redderent caritatem, quam videbat filiis ipsam debere naturam, cum quisque cogitaret esse posse filium suum, cuius eam videret aetatem, ut ex quacumque femina ignota qua indifferenter usus esset, suo natus semine non immerito crederetur. Quid? Illam vocem nonne de visceribus cunctorum patrum Cicero emisit ad filium, ad quem scribens ait: Solus es omnium, a quo me in omnibus vinci velim? Nonne ipsa quae occultissima esse diximus, et tamen plus quam credibile est valere cognoscimus, naturalia propaginis iura fecerunt, ut duo gemini non solum nondum gignentes, verum etiam nondum nascentes, adhuc in utero matris, duo populi dicerentur ? Eadem propaginis naturalia iura fecerunt, ut Israel dicatur servisse in Aegypto , Israel profectus esse ex Aegypto , Israel in terram promissionis intrasse, Israel adeptus bona vel expertus mala, quae illi populo Deus vel praestitit vel inflixit. De quo etiam scriptum est: Veniet ex Sion qui eripiat et avertat impietatem a Iacob; et hoc illis a me testamentum, cum abstulero peccata eorum ; cum ille homo, qui haec duo nomina propria primus et solus accepit, longe ante defunctus, bona vel mala ista non viderit. Haec propaginis naturalia iura fecerunt, ut idem populus decimaretur in Abraham, non ob aliud, nisi quia in lumbis eius erat, quando decimatus est ipse propria voluntate , ille autem populus non propria voluntate, sed naturali propaginis iure. Quomodo autem idem populus fuerit in lumbis Abrahae, non solum ex illo usque ad tempus quod scriptum est in Epistola ad Hebraeos, verum etiam ex ipso usque ad hoc tempus, et ab hoc usque in finem saeculi, quousque filii Israel alii ex aliis generantur; quomodo ergo esse potuerit in lumbis unius hominis tam innumerabilis hominum multitudo, quis eloquendo explicet, quis saltem inveniat cogitando? Neque enim semina ipsa, quorum est quantitas corporalis, licet singula sint exigua, ex quibus singuli quique nascuntur, si congesta essent ex quibus tot homines nati sunt atque nascuntur, et in finem usque nascentur, potuissent lumbis unius hominis contineri. Vis ergo nescio quae invisibilis et incontrectabilis secretis naturalibus insita est, ubi iura propaginis naturalia delitescunt, propter quam vim tamen non utique mendaciter in lumbis illius patris fuisse dicuntur, quotquot ex illo uno potuerunt generationum successibus et multiplicationibus propagari. Non solum autem ibi fuerunt, verum etiam illo sciente et volente decimato, et ipsi sunt decimati neque scientes neque volentes, quoniam nondum exstiterant qui scire ac velle potuissent. Hoc porro ideo dixit illius sacrae auctor Epistolae, ut sacerdotium Christi, quod figurabat sacerdos Melchisedech, qui decimavit Abraham, praeponeret Levitico sacerdotio; docens etiam ipsum Levi, qui decimabat fratres suos, hoc est, decimas ab eis accipiebat, decimatum fuisse a Melchisedech in Abraham; quia et ipse in lumbis Abrahae erat, quando decimavit eum Melchisedech, id est, ab eo decimas accepit. Ac per hoc Christum, cui dictum est: Tu es sacerdos in aeternum secundum ordinem Melchisedech , non vult intellegi decimatum; ut Levitico sacerdotio merito praeferatur ; Melchisedech enim decimavit Abraham, non decimatus est, sicut Levi in Abraham. Si autem quaeritur, quomodo Christus non fuerit decimatus, cum etiam ipse, quod manifestum est, secundum originem carnis fuerit in lumbis Abrahae, quando a Melchisedech pater ille decimatus est; nihil occurrit nisi quod Maria quidem mater eius, de qua carnem sumpsit, de carnali concupiscentia parentum nata est; non autem Christum sic ipsa concepit, quem non de virili semine, sed de Spiritu Sancto procreavit. Non ergo pertinuit ad rationem virilis seminis, per quam fuerunt in lumbis Abrahae, quos in illo decimatos esse sacra Scriptura testatur. Concupiscentia porro carnis, per quam iactus carnalium seminum provocatur, aut nulla in Adam fuit ante peccatum, aut in illo vitiata est per peccatum. Aut enim sine illa poterant et genitalia congruenter moveri, et coniugis gremio semen infundi, si nulla tunc fuit, aut ad nutum voluntatis etiam ipsa servire, si fuit. Nunc autem si talis esset, numquam caro contra spiritum concupisceret. Aut ergo ipsa vitium est, si nulla fuit ante peccatum; aut ipsa sine dubio est vitiata peccato; et ideo ex illa trahitur originale peccatum. Fuit ergo in Mariae corpore carnalis materia, unde carnem sumpsit Christus; sed non in ea Christum carnalis concupiscentia seminavit. Unde ille natus est ex carne cum carne, in similitudine tamen carnis peccati, non sicut alii homines in carne peccati; propterea originale peccatum in aliis regeneratione dissolvit, non ipse generatione contraxit. Ideo Adam primus ille, secundus iste; quia sine carnis concupiscentia factus ille, natus est iste; sed ille tantum homo, iste vero et Deus et homo; et ideo ille potuit non peccare, non sicut iste peccare non potuit. Frustra ergo peccato illius peccata filiorum eius quamlibet magna et horrenda, vel aequare, vel etiam praeferre conaris. Illius natura quanto magis sublimiter stabat, tanto magis graviter concidit. Natura illa talis fuit, ut nec mori posset, si peccare noluisset; natura illa talis fuit, ut in se discordiam carnis et spiritus non haberet; natura illa talis fuit, ut contra vitia sua nulla certaret; non quod ei cedebat, sed quod in eo nulla erant. Tunc ergo debes peccata posterorum eius peccato eius aequare, si talem; tunc vero et maiora ea dicere, si meliorem naturam potueris invenire. Natura quippe rationalis quanto est ipsa superior, tanto ruina eius peior, et peccatum eius quanto incredibilius, tanto est damnabilius. Ideo angelus irreparabiliter cecidit, quoniam cui plus datur, plus exigitur ab eo ; tanto itaque plus debebat obedientiae voluntariae, quanto plus habebat in bonitate naturae; unde sic punitus est non faciendo quod debuit, ut nec velle iam possit, aeternis etiam cruciatibus destinatus. Adam vero in tam multis posteris suis, ut eos ullus numerare non possit, gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum a sempiterno supplicio liberatur, et in se ipso quamvis a sua morte post annorum aliquot millia, quando Christus pro nobis mortuus ad loca mortuorum, non necessitate, sed potestate descendit, et dolores solvit inferni . Sic enim eum intellegenda est a delicto suo eduxisse Sapientia , quia per carnem sanctam unici Filii Dei quam progeneravit, patrem generis humani, ac sic etiam patrem Christi, qui pro salute hominum factus est homo, ab illis vinculis tunc solutum, non merito suo, sed gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum, non inaniter credit Ecclesia. Hoc ergo imputavit in peccatum Deus primo Adae, unde abstinere illi liberum fuit; sed ipse primus Adam naturae tam excellentis fuit, quoniam vitiata non fuit, ut peccatum eius tam longe maius ceterorum peccatis esset, quam longe melior ipse ceteris fuit; unde et poena eius, quae peccatum eius continuo subsecuta est, tam grandis apparuit, ut continuo etiam teneretur necessitate moriendi, cuius erat in potestate non mori; et de loco tantae felicitatis foras continuo mitteretur, et a ligno vitae continuo vetaretur. Hoc autem quando factum est, in lumbis eius erat genus humanum. Unde secundum illa, quae praelocuti sumus, nimis occulta et multum valentia naturalia iura propaginis, consequens erat ut qui erant in lumbis eius per cuncupiscentiam carnis venturi in hoc saeculum, simul damnarentur; sicut consequens erat ut qui eo iure propaginis et ratione seminis erant in lumbis Abrahae, simul decimarentur. Omnes itaque filii Adae in illo aspersi sunt contagione peccati et mortis conditione devincti. Ac per hoc quamvis sint parvuli, et bonum quidquam vel malum non agant voluntate; tamen quia induti sunt illo, qui voluntate peccavit, trahunt ab illo peccati reatum, mortisque supplicium; sicut parvuli qui Christo induuntur, quamvis nihil boni fecerint sua voluntate, sumunt ab illo participationem iustitiae, et vitae praemium sempiternae. Ita forma futuri a contrario Christus ostenditur, propter quod ait idem Apostolus: Sicut induimus imaginem terreni, induamus et imaginem eius qui de caelo est . Quae cum ita sint, ille dicat, peccato et morte primi Adam non indui qui nascuntur, quisquis dicere audet iustitia et vita Adam secundi non indui qui renascuntur; quamvis nec illi peccatum fecerint unde liberum est abstinere, nec isti iustitiam quam liberum est facere.
Augustine: Hence it is that you err vehemently, hence you are heretics, hence against the Catholic faith, which, avoiding heretics, follows the divine words and is fortified by them, you dare to compose novel engines from human and empty argumentations; since you do not know, and what you cannot understand you refuse to believe, what force the bonds of the seeds have in the series of generation, and, in the creatures which God willed to be born one from another according to their kind, how great and how ineffable are the natural rights of propagation, and how also they are penetrated by no sense, comprehended by no thought; whence is this affection implanted in the human race, that all, as far as pertains to themselves, wish to have certain sons; to which thing the fidelity of the conjugal covenant in chaste women avails; on account of which the philosopher Plato rightly displeased, because he judged that women should be used in common, in that city which he forms by disputation as it were the best—he too wishing what, except that the elder might render to all the younger that love which he saw nature owed to sons, when each one might think that he could be his son whose age he saw to be such that, born of his seed from any unknown woman whom he had used indifferently, he might not without reason be believed to be his? What? Did not Cicero utter that voice from the bowels of all fathers to his son, to whom, writing, he says: You alone are the one of all by whom I would wish to be surpassed in all things (See Cicero, On Duties 1.1)? Did not those very natural rights of propagation, which we have said are most hidden, and yet are known to avail more than is credible, bring it about that two twins, not only not yet begetting, but not even yet born, still in the womb of their mother, were called two peoples (See Gen 25:23)? The same natural rights of propagation brought it about that Israel is said to have served in Egypt (See Hos 11:1, etc), Israel to have set out from Egypt, Israel to have entered the land of promise, Israel to have obtained the goods or experienced the evils which God either bestowed on or inflicted upon that people. Of whom also it is written: There will come from Zion one who will rescue and turn away impiety from Jacob; and this is for them the covenant from me, when I shall have taken away their sins (Rom 11:26-27); whereas that man who first and alone received these two proper names, having died long before, did not see these goods or evils. These natural rights of propagation brought it about that the same people was tithed in Abraham, for no other reason than that it was in his loins, when he himself was tithed by his own will (See Heb 7:9-10), but that people not by its own will, but by the natural right of propagation. But how the same people was in the loins of Abraham, not only from him up to the time which is written in the Letter to the Hebrews, but also from him up to this time, and from this up to the end of the age, as long as the sons of Israel are generated one from another; how, then, there could have been in the loins of one man so innumerable a multitude of human beings, who can explain in speech, who can even find out in thought? For not even the very seeds, whose quantity is corporeal, although each is tiny, from which individuals are born—if those from which so many human beings have been and are born, and will be born to the very end, were heaped together—could be contained in the loins of one man. There is, then, some force, invisible and intangible, implanted in the natural secret places, where the natural rights of propagation lie hidden; on account of which force, however, it is not falsely said that as many as could be propagated from that one man by the successions and multiplications of generations were in the loins of that father. And not only were they there, but also, with him knowing and willing being tithed, they themselves were tithed neither knowing nor willing, since those who could know and will did not yet exist. This, moreover, the author of that sacred Letter said for this reason, that he might set the priesthood of Christ, which the priest Melchizedek prefigured, who tithed Abraham, before the Levitical priesthood; teaching that even Levi himself, who tithed his brothers, that is, received tithes from them, was tithed by Melchizedek in Abraham; because he too was in the loins of Abraham, when Melchizedek tithed him, that is, received tithes from him. And through this he does not wish Christ, to whom it was said: You are a priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek (Ps 110:4 (109:4)), to be understood as tithed; that he may be deservedly preferred to the Levitical priesthood (See Heb 7); for Melchizedek tithed Abraham, was not tithed, as Levi was in Abraham. But if it be asked how Christ was not tithed, since he too, which is manifest, was, according to the origin of the flesh, in the loins of Abraham, when that father was tithed by Melchizedek; nothing occurs except that Mary indeed his mother, of whom he took flesh, was born of the carnal concupiscence of her parents; but she did not so conceive Christ, whom she procreated not of male seed, but of the Holy Spirit. Christ, then, did not pertain to the principle of the male seed, through which those were in the loins of Abraham whom the sacred Scripture attests were tithed in him. Moreover the concupiscence of the flesh, through which the casting of carnal seeds is provoked, either was none in Adam before sin, or was vitiated in him through sin. For either without it the genitals could be moved suitably, and the seed poured into the bosom of the wife, if there was none then; or it too served the bidding of the will, if there was. But now, if it were such, never would the flesh lust against the spirit. Either, then, it itself is a fault, if there was none before sin; or it itself is without doubt vitiated by sin; and therefore from it original sin is drawn. There was, then, in the body of Mary the carnal matter whence Christ took flesh; but in it carnal concupiscence did not sow Christ. Whence he was born of flesh with flesh, yet in the likeness of sinful flesh (See Rom 8:3), not, like other human beings, in sinful flesh; therefore he dissolved original sin in others by regeneration, he did not himself contract it by generation. Therefore that first one is Adam, this one the second; because that one was made without carnal concupiscence, this one was born; but that one only a human being, this one both God and human being; and therefore that one could not sin, not as this one could not sin. In vain, then, do you try either to equate, or even to prefer, the sins of his sons, however great and horrible, to the sin of that one. The more loftily his nature stood, the more grievously it fell. That nature was such that it could not even die, if it had willed not to sin; that nature was such that it had in itself no discord of flesh and spirit; that nature was such that it contended against no faults of its own; not because it yielded to them, but because there were none in it. Then, therefore, you ought to equate the sins of his descendants to his sin, if you can find a nature equal; but then to say they are even greater, if you can find a better nature. For a rational nature, the higher it itself is, the worse its ruin, and its sin, the more incredible, the more damnable. Therefore the angel fell irreparably, since from him to whom more is given, more is required (See Luke 12:48); and so he owed the more of voluntary obedience, the more he had in the goodness of nature; whence he was so punished, by not doing what he ought, that he can no longer even will it, being destined also to eternal torments. But Adam, in his so many descendants, that no one can number them, is freed from everlasting punishment by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, and in himself too—although some thousands of years after his death, when Christ, who died for us, descended to the places of the dead, not by necessity, but by power, and loosed the pains of hell (See Acts 2:24). For so must it be understood that Wisdom led him out of his offense (See Wis 10:1-2), because, through the holy flesh of the only-begotten Son of God which she brought forth, the father of the human race, and so also the father of Christ, who for the salvation of human beings was made a human being, was then loosed from those bonds—not by his own merit, but by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord—the Church not vainly believes. This, then, God imputed as sin to the first Adam, whence it was free for him to abstain; but the first Adam himself was of so excellent a nature, since it was not vitiated, that his sin was so much greater than the sins of the rest, as he himself was far better than the rest; whence his penalty too, which immediately followed his sin, appeared so great that immediately he was held also by the necessity of dying, who had it in his power not to die; and was immediately sent out of the place of so great felicity, and immediately forbidden the tree of life. But when this happened, the human race was in his loins. Whence, according to those things which we spoke of before—the too hidden and greatly availing natural rights of propagation—it was consequent that those who were in his loins, about to come into this age through the concupiscence of the flesh, should be condemned together; just as it was consequent that those who, by that right of propagation and by the principle of the seed, were in the loins of Abraham, should be tithed together. And so all the sons of Adam were sprinkled in him with the contagion of sin, and bound by the condition of death. And through this, although they are little ones, and do nothing of good or evil by will; yet because they are clothed with him who sinned by will, they draw from him the guilt of sin and the punishment of death; just as little ones who are clothed with Christ, although they have done nothing of good by their own will, take from him a participation in righteousness, and the reward of eternal life. Thus Christ is shown by contrast to be the form of the one to come, on which account the same Apostle says: As we have borne the image of the earthly, let us bear also the image of him who is from heaven (See 1 Cor 15:49). Since these things are so, let him say that those who are born are not clothed with the sin and death of the first Adam, whoever dares to say that those who are reborn are not clothed with the righteousness and life of the second Adam; although neither did the former commit a sin from which it was free to abstain, nor the latter a righteousness which it is free to do.
JulianImp.6.22VI. 23. Iulianus. Illud ergo peccatum, quod ipsum hominem in paradiso in peius mutavit, quia multo est grandius quam iudicare nos possumus, ab omni nascente trahitur . Quis tibi dixit quoniam peccatum Adae multo fuerit grandius quam Cain? Multo etiam quam Sodomitarum? Multo postremo immanius quam tuum atque Manichaei? Certe in historia nulla istius vanitatis invenitur occasio. Iussum fuerat ut edulio unius arboris abstineret; rudis, imperitus, incautus, sine experimento timoris, sine exemplo iustitiae, suggestu mulieris usurpavit escam, cuius illexerat et suavitas, et venustas. Vide hic transgressionem fuisse mandati. Admissa est praevaricatio una de ceteris, quas diversis temporibus peccantium studia perpetrarunt; non fuit amplius, quam cum populus Israelis interdictis utebatur animalibus. Causa enim peccati haud in qualitate pomi erat, sed in transgressione mandati. Quid ergo tale fecit Adam, ut peccatum eius exstitisse supra aestimationem hominum crimineris? Nisi forte et hoc saecundum mysteria Manichaei, qui a decerptione pomorum et omnium nascentium manus cohibet, ne partem Dei sui laceret, quam corticibus et graminibus opinatur inclusam, tu quoque Adam graviter deliquisse, quia cum esu pomi, Dei tui substantiam laceraverit, arbitraris. O furorem! Quia multo est grandius illud peccatum, quam iudicare nos possumus, ab omni - inquit - nascente trahitur. Maius ergo fuit crimen pomum edere, cum non liceret, quam sanctum Abel parricidali livore confodere, quam hospitum in Sodomis et sexuum iura violare, quam filios suos iam sub lege demoniis immolare, quam innocentes postremo nullius conscios voluntatis, recens opus Dei, diaboli regno subdere, meritisque coniungere, quam Deum iniquitatis arguere, quam honorabiles nuptias tenebrarum principi deputare, postremo parvulos, quia nascantur per generantium non fingo, sed colligo; tu quippe illud peccatum ita universis criminibus maius grandiusque dixisti, ut nullo possit aequiparari reatu. Huius autem tam mali magni, quod omnibus vitiis praeponderat, plenos advenire parvulos asseveras. Bene itaque intelleximus, quod quanto maioris peccati participes sunt, tanto in condemnatione scelestis omnibus praeferantur.
VI. 23. Julian: That sin, then, which changed the human being himself in paradise for the worse, because it is much greater than we can judge, is drawn from everyone being born (See Augustine, The Punishment and Forgiveness of Sins 1.16.21). Who told you that the sin of Adam was much greater than Cain's? Much greater too than the Sodomites'? Much more monstrous, finally, than yours and the Manichee's? Certainly in history no occasion of this vanity is found. He had been bidden to abstain from the eating of one tree; raw, unskilled, incautious, without experience of fear, without example of righteousness, at the suggestion of the woman he usurped a food whose sweetness and beauty had enticed him. See, here was a transgression of a command. One transgression was committed among the rest, which the zeal of sinners has perpetrated at various times; it was no more than when the people of Israel used forbidden animals. For the cause of the sin lay not in the quality of the apple, but in the transgression of the command. What, then, did Adam do such that you charge his sin to have existed beyond the estimation of human beings? Unless perhaps you too, according to the mysteries of the Manichee—who restrains his hand from the plucking of apples and of all growing things, lest he tear a part of his God, which he supposes enclosed in barks and grasses—think that Adam grievously sinned, because by the eating of the apple he tore the substance of your God. O frenzy! Because that sin is much greater than we can judge, it is drawn, he says, from everyone being born. A greater crime, then, was it to eat an apple when it was not lawful, than for fratricidal envy to stab holy Abel, than to violate the rights of guests and of the sexes in Sodom, than to immolate one's own sons to demons already under the law, than finally to subject innocents conscious of no will, the fresh work of God, to the kingdom of the devil, and to join them to its merits, than to charge God with iniquity, than to assign honorable marriage to the prince of darkness, finally to make little ones, because they are born through the begetting of their parents—I do not feign, but gather; for you have so said that that sin is greater and more grievous than all crimes that it can be equaled by no guilt. And you assert that little ones come full of this so great evil, which outweighs all vices. Well, then, have we understood: that, the more they are partakers of a greater sin, the more they are preferred, in condemnation, to all the wicked.
JulianImp.6.23Augustinus. Propter verba mea, quae posuisti de libro meo, velut refellenda, si posses, ubi dixi: Illud ergo peccatum quod in paradiso ipsum hominem mutavit in peius, quia multo est grandius quam iudicare nos possumus, ab omni nascente trahitur; quaeris a me quis mihi dixerit, quod peccatum Adae multo fuerit grandius quam Cain, multo etiam quam Sodomitarum. Quod ego quidem non expressi verbis meis, sed ea tu sic intellexisti; ego enim dixi grandius quam iudicare nos possumus illud esse peccatum; non dixi grandius quam Cain vel Sodomitarum. Prohibiti enim pomi usurpatio, quoniam sic vindicata est, ut natura quae potestatem non moriendi habebat, haberet moriendi necessitatem, procul dubio iudicia cuncta excedit humana. Pomum quippe lege Dei vetitum manducare, leve videretur esse peccatum; sed quanti hoc aestimaverit qui non potest falli, satis apparet granditate supplicii. Cain vero fratricidae apparet omnibus immane peccatum, et scelus esse constat horrendum; quod si, ut tu facis, pomo illicite decerpto, per humanum comparetur examen, ridicula comparatio iudicabitur; qui tamen fratricida, quamvis quandoque moriturus, nec morte punitus est, qua solent humanis iudiciis talia crimina vindicari. Ait quippe illi Deus: Operaberis terram, et non adiciet virtutem suam dare tibi; gemens et tremens eris super terram. Et cum ille audiens terram non sibi daturam fructum secundum laborem suum, et super eam cum gemitu et tremore miserum se futurum, magis mortis formidine quateretur, ne quis ei faceret, quod ipse fecerat fratri; posuit ei Deus signum, ne quisquam eum, cum invenisset, occideret . Hic rursus ingens culpa, et levis poena; sed hominum iudiciis hoc videtur, qui nec mysteria ista cognoscunt, et hominum culpas tam liquido atque integro examine, quam Deus pensare non possunt. Sodomitae sane igne super illam terram veniente de caelo, poena suis factis congruente, sunt consumpti ; sed ibi erant et parvuli, te patrono, puri et liberi ab omni contagione peccati, nec tamen iustus et misericors Deus tot innocentes imagines suas per Angelorum ministerium, quod ei facillimum fuit, ante rapuit de incendio Sodomorum, aut sicut tribus illis in camino viris , innoxias eis flammas, quibus parentes eorum cremabantur, omnipotens praebuit. Ista considera, ista diligenter et pie cogita; et videns in hoc saeculo pusillos cum magnis, pariter talibus miseriis subiacere, quales nullo modo possent in Dei paradiso, si nemo peccasset, existere; agnosce originale peccatum, et iustum grave iugum super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum ; et noli eos tua defensione amplius aggravare, aegrotis vel mortuis salvatorem et vivificatorem denegans Christum. Nam si quaeris, quis mihi dixerit quam magnum peccatum Adam perpetrarit, ipse est qui dixit et tibi; sed si habes aures audiendi, audies eum; habebis autem eas, si non illas tuas arbitrio tribuas, sed ab illo accipias qui dixit: Dabo eis cor cognoscendi me, et aures audientes . Quis enim, nisi qui talibus auribus caret, non audit Scripturam sine ulla obscuritate vel ambiguitate dicentem homini primo peccatori: Terra es, et in terram ibis ? Ubi evidenter ostenditur, non eum fuisse vel carne moriturum, id est, in terram, unde caro eius sumpta fuerat, morte ipsius carnis iturum, nisi propter peccatum hoc audire perpetique meruisset, unde postea dixit Apostolus: Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum . Quis non audiat, nisi qui tales aures non habet, dicentem Deum de ipso Adam: Ne aliquando extendat manum suam, et sumat de ligno vitae, et edat, et vivat in aeternum; et dimisit illum Dominus de paradiso voluptatis ? Ubi utique sine labore et dolore ullo viveret in aeternum. Voluptas quippe illa paradisi, quod necesse est fateamini, si christianum nomen nondum estis obliti, non turpitudinis, sed beatitudinis cogitanda est. Haec ergo poena, quam meruit Adam, ne viveret in aeternum, et ideo dimissus est de loco tantae beatitudinis, ubi si esset, neque peccasset, procul dubio viveret in aeternum, quam magna poena est, tam magnum debemus intellegere peccatum, quod ea poena dignum fuerat vindicari. Quid igitur agis, obsecro te, cum peccatum Adae tanta extenuare conaris instantia, nisi Deum arguis immanis horrendaeque saevitiae, qui hoc tanta, non dico severitate, sed crudelitate punivit? Quod de Deo, si nefas est sentire, cur non quantitatem culpae, de qua homines iudicare non possunt, iudicante iudice incomparabiliter iusto, de poenae granditate metiris, et tuam linguam a sacrilega loquacitate compescis? Ego autem iniquitatis non arguo Deum, cuius dico iustum iugum super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum; sed tu potius iniquum facis Deum, qui putas eos hoc perpeti sine ullo merito qualiscumque peccati. Nec propter opus quod fecit Deus, sed propter vitium quod insevit inimicus, eos sub eodem inimico esse dico, qui ex primo homine nascuntur, si in secundo non renascuntur. In quibus tu Ecclesiam catholicam crimine maiestatis accusas, si, ut dicis, non eruuntur de potestate tenebrarum, cum baptizantur parvuli, et illa, priusquam baptizentur, exorcizat et exsufflat tot imagines Dei. Nec honorabiles nuptias deputo principi tenebrarum, quas purgo ab omni noxa libidinis, si ea bene utuntur intentione propaginis. Tu vero malum quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, constituere in paradiso non perhorrescis, hoc est, in loco tantae pacis, tantae quietis, tantae honestatis, tantae felicitatis. Nec parvulos non habentes nisi originale peccatum, omnibus flagitiosis et sceleratis, ut calumniaris, iudico esse peiores. Aliud est enim peccato a se commisso gravari, aliud alieni quamlibet magni contagione respergi. Propter quod parvuli ad remissionem peccatorum, sicut ait Poenus, poena vestra, Cyprianus, hoc ipso facilius accedunt, quod eis remittuntur non propria, sed aliena peccata . Tu autem, cum parvulos, non solum, quod et nos dicimus, nullum ex propria voluntate fecisse, verum etiam nullum dicis ex origine traxisse peccatum, iniustum procul dubio facis Deum, quod tibi iam saepe dictum, saepiusque dicendum est, qui eis imposuit grave iugum a die exitus de ventre matris illorum. Sane ut intellegas quomodo parvuli ex Adam nati, et participatione peccati illius hominis obligentur, et tamen ipsius reatui non aequentur, attende Christum, quem legisti esse formam futuri ; et vide quemadmodum parvuli in illo renati, et eius participes iustitiae fiant, et eius meritis non audeas eos comparare. Tu quoque in huius operis tui libro secundo , in Adam peccati formam, quia prior peccavit Eva, non primam dixisti esse, sed maximam; sicut in Christo iustitiae formam non primam esse, sed maximam, quia fuerunt iusti et ante ipsum; quod a te dictum si oblitus non fuisses, non hic Adae peccatum extenuares, in quo maximam formam peccati exstitisse confessus es.
Augustine: On account of my words, which you set down from my book, as if to be refuted, if you could, where I said: That sin, then, which in paradise changed the human being himself for the worse, because it is much greater than we can judge, is drawn from everyone being born; you ask me who told me that the sin of Adam was much greater than Cain's, much greater too than the Sodomites'. Which I indeed did not express in my words, but you so understood them; for I said that that sin is greater than we can judge; I did not say greater than Cain's or the Sodomites'. For the usurpation of the forbidden apple, since it was so avenged that the nature which had the power of not dying should have the necessity of dying, beyond doubt exceeds all human judgments. For to eat an apple forbidden by the law of God would seem a slight sin; but how greatly he who cannot be deceived esteemed it, appears well enough by the greatness of the punishment. The sin of Cain the fratricide indeed appears monstrous to all, and is established to be a horrible crime; which, if, as you do, it be compared, by a human appraisal, with an apple unlawfully plucked, the comparison will be judged ridiculous; yet that fratricide, although destined to die at some time, was not punished by the death by which such crimes are wont to be avenged in human judgments. For God said to him: You will work the earth, and it will not add its strength to give you fruit; groaning and trembling you will be upon the earth. And when he, hearing that the earth would not give him fruit according to his labor, and that upon it he would be wretched with groaning and trembling, was shaken rather by the dread of death, lest anyone do to him what he himself had done to his brother; God set a sign on him, lest anyone, finding him, should kill him (See Gen 4:12-15). Here again a huge fault, and a light penalty; but it seems so to the judgments of human beings, who neither know these mysteries, nor can weigh the faults of human beings with so clear and whole an appraisal as God can. The Sodomites indeed, with fire coming upon that land from heaven, with a punishment fitting their deeds, were consumed (See Gen 19:24-25); but there too were little ones, by your patronage, pure and free from all contagion of sin, and yet the just and merciful God did not snatch away so many of his innocent images beforehand, by the ministry of the angels, which would have been most easy for him, from the burning of Sodom; nor did the omnipotent one furnish to them, as to those three men in the furnace (See Dan 3:23-27), harmless flames, by which their parents were being burned. Consider these things, consider them diligently and piously; and seeing in this age the small subject, along with the great, equally to such miseries as could in no way exist in the paradise of God, if no one had sinned; recognize original sin, and the just heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1); and do not weigh them down further by your defense, denying to the sick or dead Christ the Savior and life-giver. For if you ask who told me how great a sin Adam committed, it is he who told you too; but if you have ears to hear, you will hear him; but you will have them, if you do not attribute them to your own choice, but receive them from him who said: I will give them a heart to know me, and ears that hear (See Bar 2:31; Jer 24:7). For who, except one who lacks such ears, does not hear the Scripture saying without any obscurity or ambiguity to the first sinful human being: You are earth, and into earth you will go (Gen 3:19)? Where it is evidently shown that he was not even going to die in the flesh, that is, to go into the earth, whence his flesh had been taken, by the death of the flesh itself, unless he had merited, on account of sin, to hear and suffer this; whence the Apostle afterward said: The body indeed is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10). Who does not hear, except one who has not such ears, God saying of Adam himself: Lest perhaps he stretch out his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever; and the Lord sent him out of the paradise of pleasure (See Gen 3:22-23)? Where surely, without any labor and pain, he would live forever. For that pleasure of paradise—which you must confess, if you have not yet forgotten the Christian name—is to be thought of not as of baseness, but of blessedness. This penalty, then, which Adam merited, that he should not live forever, and therefore was dismissed from a place of so great blessedness, where, if he were, and had not sinned, he would beyond doubt live forever—how great a penalty it is, so great a sin must we understand, which deserved to be avenged by that penalty. What, then, are you doing, I beg you, when you try with such insistence to extenuate the sin of Adam, except that you charge God with monstrous and horrendous savagery, who punished this with so great—I do not say severity, but cruelty? Which, if it is wicked to think of God, why do you not measure the greatness of the fault—about which human beings cannot judge, with an incomparably just judge judging—from the greatness of the penalty, and restrain your tongue from sacrilegious wordiness? But I do not charge God with iniquity, whose just yoke I say is upon the sons of Adam from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1); but you rather make God unjust, who think that they suffer this without any merit of any sin whatsoever. And not on account of the work which God made, but on account of the fault which the enemy implanted, I say that those who are born of the first man are under the same enemy, if they are not reborn in the second. In which matter you accuse the Catholic Church of the crime of treason, if, as you say, they are not rescued from the power of darkness when little ones are baptized, and it, before they are baptized, exorcizes and exsufflates so many images of God. Nor do I assign honorable marriage to the prince of darkness, which I purge from all harm of lust, if they use it well with the intention of propagation. But you do not shudder to set up in paradise the evil by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, that is, in a place of so great peace, so great quiet, so great honorableness, so great felicity. Nor do I judge little ones, having only original sin, to be worse than all the shameful and wicked, as you slanderously claim. For it is one thing to be weighed down by a sin committed by oneself, another to be sprinkled by the contagion of another's, however great. On account of which little ones approach the more easily to the forgiveness of sins, as the Carthaginian, your punishment, Cyprian, says, for this very reason, that there are forgiven them not their own, but another's sins (See Cyprian, Letter 64.5). But you, when you say that little ones not only—which we too say—have done none of their own will, but also have drawn no sin from their origin, beyond doubt make God unjust—which has already often been said to you, and must more often be said—he who imposed on them a heavy yoke from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb. But, that you may understand how little ones, born of Adam, are both bound by participation in the sin of that man, and yet are not equated to his guilt, attend to Christ, whom you have read to be the form of the one to come (See Rom 5:14); and see how little ones, reborn in him and made partakers of his righteousness, you dare not compare to his merits. You too, in the second book of this work of yours (See Julian, book 2), said that in Adam the form of sin, because Eve sinned first, was not the first, but the greatest; just as in Christ the form of righteousness was not the first, but the greatest, because there were just men even before him; which, if you had not forgotten that you said it, you would not here extenuate the sin of Adam, in whom you confessed the greatest form of sin existed.
JulianImp.6.23VI. 24. Iulianus. Sed cur tibi de inimicitiis innocentiae commoveatur invidia, cum petulantia et rabies oris obsceni nec divinitatis honore frenetur? Accusas enim parvulos, sed cum Deo; incessis innocentiam, sed cum aequitatis iniuria; inficiaris veritati, sed cum eius criminatione quem Deum tuum fateris. Ac per hoc, etsi non deficeremus rationis auxilio, abunde tamen tradux peccati assertorum suorum deformitate corrueret.
VI. 24. Julian: But why should odium be stirred against you concerning enmities against innocence, when the petulance and rabidity of your obscene mouth is not even bridled by the honor of divinity? For you accuse little ones, but together with God; you assail innocence, but with injury to equity; you deny the truth, but with the slander of him whom you confess to be your God. And through this, even if we lacked the help of reasoning, yet the propagation-theory of sin would abundantly collapse by the deformity of its own asserters.
JulianImp.6.24Augustinus. Tua conviciosa loquacitas rabiem mihi obiecit oris obsceni. Numquid ego sum defensor laudatorque libidinis? Numquid ego ausus sum concupiscentiam carnis, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, paradisi etiam possessione ditare? In quem locum tanti decoris et pacis, simul introduxisti aut bellum, quo ad peccandum impellenti laudabiliter repugnatur, aut dedecus, quo turpiter ei ceditur. Cur ergo tam contumeliose insurgis in me, nec respicis te? Nam ego non accuso Deum; sed tu, qui dicis parvulos nullum ex origine trahere peccatum, quibus ille imposuit grave iugum. Nec incesso innocentiam cum aequitatis iniuria; sed tu aequitati facis iniuriam, qui tantam dicis habere parvulos innocentiam; quos tamen, si quod ipse sapis, verum esse sciret, gravi iugo aequitas non puniret. Nec inficior veritati, nec Deum criminor; sed tu potius. Verum enim dixit Apostolus: Corpus mortuum est propter peccatum ; quod tu negas. Deum vero quomodo non criminaris, cui miserias, quas negare non potes, imputas parvulorum, nullum habentium miseria dignum originale peccatum? Ac per hoc conclusio tua, quae deformitatem nobis ingerit, nullius rationis sequitur veritatem.
Augustine: Your abusive wordiness has objected to me the rabidity of an obscene mouth. Am I the defender and praiser of lust? Have I dared to enrich the concupiscence of the flesh, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, even with the possession of paradise? Into which place of so great beauty and peace you have at once introduced either war, in which one laudably resists the one impelling toward sin, or disgrace, in which one basely yields to it. Why, then, do you so contumeliously rise up against me, and do not look back at yourself? For I do not accuse God; but you, who say that little ones draw no sin from their origin, on whom he imposed a heavy yoke. Nor do I assail innocence with injury to equity; but you do injury to equity, who say that little ones have so great an innocence; whom yet, if equity knew that what you yourself think were true, it would not punish with a heavy yoke. Nor do I deny the truth, nor charge God; but you rather. For the Apostle said truly: The body is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10); which you deny. But how do you not charge God, to whom you impute the miseries, which you cannot deny, of little ones, having no original sin worthy of misery? And through this your conclusion, which charges us with deformity, follows the truth of no reasoning.
JulianImp.6.24VI. 25. Iulianus. Verum quid nos tam obstipe veritatis solius rationem sequendam putamus; cum inimicorum nostrorum phalanx ipsis innitatur rerum periculis, et insurgat in nos aerumnarum munita suffragiis? Vult quippe pudore coeuntis, dolore parientis, sudore laborantis, transmissionem culparum et poenarum in semina comprobare; ut his videlicet signis, difficilium partuum, agricolarum sudantium, et dumosorum novalium, crimen naturale credatur, cuius merito per tot incommoda genus exerceatur humanum; quod quidam per Adae peccatum, mortale opinantur effectum. Ideo autem dixi: Quidam, quia princeps eorum Augustinus hoc quidem erubuit dicere. Denique scribit ad Marcellinum, mortalem Adam factum videri; sed elegantia solita subdit, mortem stipendium iniquitatis fuisse; et quem fatetur mortaliter institutum secundum naturam, mori non potuisse pronuntiat. Illae ergo adversus nos, quae leguntur in Genesi, sententiae proferri solent, quibus Adam atque Eva vexantur, de quibus disserendi iam est tempus. Dixit - inquit - Dominus Deus serpenti: Quia fecisti hoc, maledictus tu ab omnibus pecoribus, et ab omnibus bestiis quae sunt super terram; super pectus et ventrem ambulabis, et terram manducabis omnibus diebus vitae tuae; et inimicitias ponam inter te et mulierem, et inter semen tuum et semen eius. Ipsa tuum captabit caput, et tu illius captabis calcaneum. Mulieri vero dixit: Multiplicans multiplicabo tristitias tuas et gemitum tuum; in tristitia paries filios, et ad virum tuum conversio tua, et ipse tui dominabitur. Adae autem dixit: Quoniam audisti vocem mulieris tuae, et manducasti de ligno, de quo praeceperam tibi de eo solo ne manducares ex eo, maledicta terra in operibus tuis; in tristitia manducabis eam omnibus diebus vitae tuae; spinas et tribulos edet tibi, et edes fenum agri tui; in sudore faciei tuae edes panem tuum, donec convertaris in terram de qua sumptus es; quoniam terra es, et in terram ibis . Has ergo sententias ad testimonium ingenitae iniquitatis assumitis, concionaminique non fuisse in pariendo feminas dolituras, nisi ad eas cum peccato Evae fecunditatis illius aerumna transisset. Ipsum ergo supplicium vultis esse peccati indicium, ut quod prima feminarum meruit per delictum, nulla quoque sine eadem credatur iniquitate sentire. Non enim esset, inquitis, dolor in pariente, nisi in nascente esset peccatum. His ergo quam attonitus occurram, haud facile metior? Tantum enim stimulorum admovit in hoc loco vestra opinio, ut vix digner ad certationem moveri; plura quippe in his obiectionibus intellegentiae sunt peccata quam syllabae.
VI. 25. Julian: But why do we think the reason of truth alone must be so stubbornly followed; when the phalanx of our enemies leans on the very perils of things, and rises against us fortified by the suffrages of troubles? For he wishes, by the shame of the one having intercourse, the pain of the one giving birth, the sweat of the one laboring, to prove the transmission of faults and penalties into the seeds; so that by these signs, namely, of difficult births, of sweating farmers, and of brambly fallow fields, a natural crime may be believed, by the merit of which the human race is exercised through so many troubles; which some suppose was made mortal through the sin of Adam. But I said "some," because their prince Augustine indeed blushed to say this. Finally, he writes to Marcellinus that Adam seems to have been made mortal; but, with his accustomed elegance, he subjoins that death was the wages of iniquity; and the one whom he confesses was established mortal according to nature, he pronounces could not have died. Those sentences, then, which are read in Genesis are wont to be brought forward against us, by which Adam and Eve are harassed, about which it is now time to discourse. The Lord God said, he says, to the serpent: Because you have done this, cursed are you above all the cattle, and above all the beasts which are on the earth; upon your breast and belly you will go, and you will eat earth all the days of your life; and I will put enmities between you and the woman, and between your seed and her seed. She will lie in wait for your head, and you will lie in wait for her heel. But to the woman he said: Multiplying I will multiply your sorrows and your groaning; in sorrow you will bring forth children, and your turning will be to your husband, and he will have dominion over you. But to Adam he said: Because you have heard the voice of your wife, and have eaten of the tree, of which alone I had commanded you that you should not eat of it, cursed is the earth in your works; in sorrow you will eat of it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles it will bring forth to you, and you will eat the hay of your field; in the sweat of your face you will eat your bread, until you turn into the earth from which you were taken; for earth you are, and into earth you will go (Gen 3:14-19). These sentences, then, you take as testimony of inborn iniquity, and you harangue that women would not have been going to suffer pain in giving birth, unless, with the sin of Eve, the trouble of that fruitfulness had passed to them. You wish, then, the very punishment to be the indication of sin, so that what the first of women merited through her offense, no woman either is believed to feel without the same iniquity. For there would not be, you say, pain in the one giving birth, unless in the one being born there were sin. How, then, astonished, I am to meet these things, I scarcely measure. For your opinion has applied so many goads in this place that I scarcely deign to be moved to the contest; for there are more sins of understanding in these objections than syllables.
JulianImp.6.25Augustinus. Aerumnas generis humani quamlibet dicax et facetus irrideas, vel irridere te fingas, ipsae te in angustias has impulerunt, ut paradisum Dei, etiamsi nemo peccasset, aerumnosum futurum fuisse affirmare cogaris; quod si verecundatus nolueris facere, ut facias tuo dogmate urgeberis; quod dogma nisi correctus abieceris, istas prementes et in horrendum praecipitium contrudentes angustias non effugies. Quaeritur enim a te, has aerumnas, quas et in maioribus et in parvulis esse conspicimus; unde existimes emanare. Respondes ex tuo dogmate, humanum genus sic esse ab exordio sui divinitus institutum. Referturque responsioni tuae: Ergo et in paradiso futurae fuerant, si nullum ibi peccatum esset exortum. Hic tu aut praeceps ibis, aut dogma mutabis, aut fronte perditus, aut mente correctus. Aut enim aerumnosa vita locum famosissimae felicitatis implebis, et non invenies oculos quibus qualescumque aspicere audeas Christianos; aut in abrupta horribiliora deiectus, alienae malae naturae nobisque permixtae has aerumnas hominis imputabis, et Manichaei tartarea profunditate sorbeberis; aut de natura vitiata hanc aerumnarum poenam iudicio Dei punientis existere confiteberis, et in auram catholicam respirabis. Quin etiam dicis, quod quidam genus humanum per Adae peccatum mortale, opinantur effectum; et addis, ideo te dixisse: Quidam, quia ego princeps eorum hoc erubuerim dicere; sed ad Marcellinum scripserim mortalem Adam factum videri. Qui haec tua et illa mea legerunt vel legunt, si Pelagiani non sunt, profecto vident quemadmodum lingua tua amplexa sit dolositatem. Numquam enim ego sensi, numquam omnino dixi, sicut vos dicitis, mortalem Adam factum, qui sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset. Haec prorsus verba obiecta sunt Caelestio in episcopali iudicio Carthaginensi. Haec obiecta sunt et Pelagio in episcopali iudicio Palaestino Haec quippe de hac re inter nos et vos vertitur quaestio, utrum Adam, sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset. Nam quis ignorat, quia secundum definitionem, qua immortalis dicitur ille qui non potest mori, mortalis autem qui potest mori, Adam potuit mori, quia potuit peccare; et ideo mori merito culpae, non necessitate naturae? Secundum illam vero definitionem, qua et ille immortalis dicitur cuius est in potestate non mori, quis neget Adam esse conditum huius potestatis? Quoniam qui habebat potestatem numquam peccandi, profecto habebat potestatem numquam moriendi. Illud ergo est quod contra vos dicitur, hoc dogma vestrum, quo putatis Adam, sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, fuisse moriturum, omnino esse falsissimum. Quae cum ita sint, quo pacto ego dicerem, quod me dixisse mentiris, Adam secundum naturam mortaliter institutum, quasi urgeretur necessitate moriendi; cum in mortem nisi propter peccatum non posset urgeri? Aut quomodo eum mori non potuisse pronuntio, cum esse mortuum sciam; et utique si mori non potuisset, mortuus non esset? Sed plane illum non mori potuisse pronuntio. Aliud est autem non posse mori, aliud posse non mori; illud maioris est immortalitatis, hoc minoris. Si duo ista discernis, et quod vos de Adam dicitis, et quod nos contra vos dicimus, cernis. Vos enim dicitis: Sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset; nos autem dicimus: Quamdiu non peccaret, moriturus non esset; et si numquam peccasset, mortuus non esset. Deinde commemoras quae contra vos de Genesi dici soleant; et de dolore parientis, qua poena prior Eva punita est, dicis aliquid, quod nos dicere vis putari, vel putas. Non enim dicimus, non fuisse in pariendo feminas dolituras, nisi ad eas cum peccato Evae fecunditatis illius aerumna transisset; cum ad eas non fecunditatis, sed iniquitatis aerumna transierit. Etsi enim facta est aerumnosa fecunditas; iniquitas, non fecunditas hoc fecit; aerumna quippe parientis ex iniquitate hominis, fecunditas autem ex Dei benedictione descendit. Aut si aerumnam fecunditatis non sic intellegi voluisti, tamquam eam fecunditas fecerit, sed acceperit; haec est nostra sententia. Verum nos non dicimus etiam in paradiso parientes feminas fuisse dolituras; immo inde colligimus hunc dolorem poenam esse peccati, quia in eo loco non fuisset, ubi non sinerentur manere quicumque peccassent; quod tu refutare non niteris, nisi Dei paradisum, manu fronti opposita et oculis clausis, non solum libidinibus hominum, verum etiam cruciatibus implere cogaris. Sed quid mirum? Quando implere vis illum memorabilis felicitatis locum etiam mortibus hominum, quarum sine aliquo corporis cruciatu, vel nulla, vel pene nulla contingit. Et cum haec portenta te dicere tuum dogma compellat; eos, qui haec absit ut dicant, quia illud potius antiquitus Ecclesiae Dei traditum tenent, unde dictum est: A muliere initium factum est peccati, et propter illam morimur omnes ; audes insuper irridere, eorumque me principem insultanter appellas contra scientiam et conscientiam tuam. Nullo modo namque ignoras, quot et quanti in Ecclesia docti Ecclesiaeque doctores ante nos dixerint, sic naturam hominis divinitus institutam, ut si non peccasset, moriturus non esset. Horum ergo quomodo princeps vocor, quos non duco, sed sequor? Te autem non dico esse principem eorum qui asserunt sic Adam mortalem factum, ut sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset, atque ita paradisum sanctae voluptatis, ubi tanta requies animae et corporis erat, morientium cruciatibus, mortuorum funeribus, lugentium maeroribus implere conantur. Non es tu eorum princeps: Pelagius et Caelestius, qui priores ista dixerunt, tenent huius nefandi dogmatis principatum; quos utinam, sicut non ducis, ita nec sequereris!
Augustine: However glibly and wittily you mock the troubles of the human race, or pretend to mock them, those very troubles have driven you into these straits, that you are compelled to affirm that the paradise of God, even if no one had sinned, would have been full of troubles; which, if, ashamed, you are unwilling to do, you will be pressed by your own dogma to do; which dogma, unless, corrected, you cast away, you will not escape these pressing straits that thrust you into a horrible precipice. For it is asked of you whence you suppose these troubles, which we behold both in the grown and in little ones, flow forth. You answer, from your dogma, that the human race was so divinely established from its beginning. And it is reported to your answer: Then they would have been in paradise too, if no sin had arisen there. Here you will either go headlong, or change your dogma; either lost in brow, or corrected in mind. For either you will fill the place of most famous felicity with a troublesome life, and will not find eyes with which you may dare to look at any Christians whatever; or, cast down into more horrible precipices, you will impute these troubles of the human being to an alien evil nature commingled with us, and will be swallowed up by the tartarean depth of the Manichee; or you will confess that this penalty of troubles exists from a vitiated nature, by the judgment of God punishing, and you will breathe again into the Catholic air. Indeed you also say that some suppose the human race was made mortal through the sin of Adam; and you add that you therefore said some, because I, their prince, blushed to say this; but wrote to Marcellinus that Adam seems to have been made mortal (See Augustine, The Punishment and Forgiveness of Sins 1.2.2). Those who have read or read these things of yours and those of mine, if they are not Pelagians, surely see how your tongue has embraced deceit. For I never thought, never at all said, as you say, that Adam was made mortal so that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he was to die. These very words were objected to Caelestius in the episcopal judgment of Carthage. These were objected also to Pelagius in the episcopal judgment of Palestine (See Augustine, The Deeds of Pelagius 11.23). For this is the question that is turned between us and you concerning this matter: whether Adam, whether he sinned or did not sin, was to die. For who is ignorant that, according to the definition by which he is called immortal who cannot die, but mortal who can die, Adam could die, because he could sin; and therefore could die by the merit of fault, not by the necessity of nature? But according to that definition by which he too is called immortal who has it in his power not to die, who would deny that Adam was founded of this power? Since he who had the power of never sinning, surely had the power of never dying. That, then, is what is said against you—this dogma of yours, by which you think Adam, whether he sinned or did not sin, was to die, is altogether most false. Since these things are so, in what way would I say—what you lie that I said—that Adam was established mortal according to nature, as though he were pressed by the necessity of dying; when he could not be pressed into death except on account of sin? Or how do I pronounce that he could not die, when I know that he died; and surely, if he could not have died, he would not have died? But plainly I pronounce that he could not-die. But it is one thing to be unable to die, another to be able not to die; the former is of a greater immortality, the latter of a lesser. If you distinguish these two, you discern both what you say about Adam, and what we say against you. For you say: Whether he sinned or did not sin, he was to die; but we say: As long as he did not sin, he was not to die; and if he had never sinned, he would not have died. Then you recall what is wont to be said against you from Genesis; and about the pain of the one giving birth, by which penalty Eve first was punished, you say something which you wish to be thought, or think, that we say. For we do not say that women would not have been going to suffer pain in giving birth, unless with the sin of Eve the trouble of that fruitfulness had passed to them; since to them passed the trouble not of fruitfulness, but of iniquity. For although a troublesome fruitfulness was made, iniquity, not fruitfulness, did this; for the trouble of the one giving birth descends from the iniquity of the human being, but fruitfulness from the blessing of God. Or, if you did not wish the trouble of fruitfulness to be so understood as though fruitfulness made it, but received it, this is our opinion. But we do not say that even in paradise women giving birth would have suffered pain; nay rather, from this we gather that this pain is a penalty of sin, because it would not have been in that place, where whoever had sinned would not be allowed to remain; which you do not strive to refute, except that you are compelled, with hand set against brow and eyes shut, to fill the paradise of God not only with the lusts of human beings, but also with their torments. But what wonder? Since you wish to fill that place of memorable felicity even with the deaths of human beings, of which few or almost none come to pass without some torment of the body. And since your dogma compels you to say these monstrous things; those who—far be it that they say them, because they hold rather what was anciently handed down to the Church of God, whence it was said: From a woman was the beginning of sin, and on account of her we all die (Sir 25:24)—you dare moreover to mock, and insultingly call me their prince, against your knowledge and conscience. For in no way are you ignorant how many and how great learned men in the Church, and teachers of the Church, before us said that human nature was so divinely established that, if it had not sinned, it would not have been going to die. How, then, am I called the prince of these, whom I do not lead, but follow? But you I do not call the prince of those who assert that Adam was made mortal in such a way that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he was to die, and so try to fill the paradise of holy pleasure, where there was so great rest of soul and body, with the torments of the dying, the funerals of the dead, the griefs of the mourning. You are not their prince: Pelagius and Caelestius, who said these things earlier, hold the principate of this nefarious dogma; whom would that, as you do not lead, so you did not follow!
JulianImp.6.25VI. 26. Iulianus. Hoc enim ipsum quam insanum est, quod dicitis, primo dolorem pariendi comitem esse peccati, cum ita perspicue ad sexuum conditionem magis, quam ad criminum respiciat ultionem, ut omnia animalia nullo maculata peccato, hos angores, hos gemitus in parturitione patiantur? Per quod apparet, argumentum non esse peccati, quod inveniri etiam sine peccato potest. Deinde promoventes affertis aliud, multo ineptissimum. Non doleret, inquis, femina, nisi esset criminum particeps. Verum illico subditis: Sed hoc peccatum, propter quod dolet mulier, non in pariente, ceterum in nascente deprehenditur. Nam ideo et baptizatae mulieres, liberae, ais, agitant a peccato; sed pro filiorum iniquitate, quos edunt, fecunditatis suae difficultatibus affliguntur. Qua opinione tradux peccati non iam a matre decurrit in sobolem, sed in parentes a nascente refunditur. Nam si ideo mulier baptizata sentit dolores, quia iniquitates inveniuntur in parvulo; supina incipit tradux esse, non prona. At non ideo cruciatur, quia iniquitatem filius habet; sed ideo quia eam secum ipsa, cum nasceretur, advexerat. Verum hoc malum sublatum ab ea per gratiam dixeras; si ergo peccato dolor parturientis adhaerebat, amotio peccati cruciatui parturitionum debuit mederi. Aut si cruciatus hic sine iniquitate esse non potest, qui tamen post Baptisma in feminis invenitur; iniquitas quoque eis non est dempta per gratiam, et eviluit pompa Baptismatis. Si autem in his mysteriis ea quam nos credimus, non vos fingitis, fuit virtus et veritas, sublatumque est omne peccatum, remanet dolor tamen, qui partus difficultate generatur; manifestum est illum gemitum naturae indicem esse, non culpae; quem te quoque annuente patiuntur, quas a Manichaeorum peccato liberatas fateris. Porro id exemplis rerum solis apparuit; si vero inspiciamus et ipsius verba sententiae, nae illa vestras nebulas splendidiore fulgore solis radiis dissolvet. Non est quippe dictum ad mulierem: Orientur in te dolores, aut: Generabo tibi gemitus; ut post culpam sensus eorum institui viderentur; sed: Multiplicans, inquit, multiplicabo tristitias tuas. Ostendit iam esse in naturali ratione, quod se in peccatrice persona non condere, sed multiplicare promittit. Numquam quippe multiplicantur nisi exstantia; ceterum antequam sint, fieri quidem proprie, augeri autem praepropere nuncupantur. Denique, ne hoc nostrum magis, quam ipsius veritatis esse videatur, hic in cunctis animantibus verborum refertur ordo servatus. De homine quoque priusquam fieret: Faciamus, inquit Deus, hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram ; et denuo de muliere: Dixit, inquit, Deus: Non est bonum esse solum hominem; faciamus ei adiutorium simile sui . Postea vero, quam facti sunt: Benedixit eis, inquit, dicens: Crescite et multiplicamini, et implete terram. Antequam conderentur, non est dictum: Multiplicentur; sed: Fiat homo; posteaquam exstitit qui acciperet incrementa, consequenter adiungit: Crescite et multiplicamini, et implete terram . Hoc itaque ordine gemitus parturitionum, qui secundum naturam fuerat, ita in hominum corporibus, sicut in pecoribus institutus, non conditur in Eva, sed crescit, ut peculiari granditate excitatorum affligeretur angorum. Nec tamen ad posterae aetatis feminas, nisi naturali mediocritate et corporum varietate pertingerent. Ibi ergo, non ut doleret in pariendo mulier, de peccato fuit, sed ut nimis doleret; sicut etiam temporibus diversis debilitates corporum pro peccatis, quibusdam legimus accidisse; sed non illa ampliatio miseriarum parcimoniam modi naturalis evertit. Nec tamen omnia quae in eadem sententia continentur, animadvertentis vigore clauduntur. Ceterum quaedam ibi pars indicat meritum, quaedam designat officium. Multiplicans, inquit, multiplicabo tristitias tuas et gemitum tuum; in tristitia paries filios. Huc usque ultio, quam non natura, sed persona promeruit. Iam hinc simpliciter posterioris sexus munus ostenditur: Ad virum, inquit, tuum conversio tua, et ipse tui dominabitur. Hoc nimirum non spectat ad poenam, quod nisi esset, spectaret ad culpam; ut viro quippe mulier modesto subdatur affectu, ordo est, supplicium non est. Caput enim, secundum Apostolum, mulieris, vir ; quia non est creatus homo propter mulierem, sed mulier propter virum . Si ergo caput suum congruo pudore veneretur, naturae instituta custodit, non peccati tormenta perpetitur; cui ordini si resultaverit, rea est. Non est ergo in miseria functio rei, cuius neglectus in noxa est.
VI. 26. Julian: For this very thing, how insane it is, which you say—first, that the pain of giving birth is the companion of sin, when it so plainly looks to the condition of the sexes rather than to the avenging of crimes, that all animals, stained by no sin, suffer these anguishes, these groans, in parturition. By which it appears that it is not an argument of sin, which can be found even without sin. Then, advancing, you bring forward another thing, much more inept. The woman would not feel pain, you say, unless she were a partaker of crimes. But you at once subjoin: But this sin, on account of which the woman feels pain, is detected not in the one giving birth, but in the one being born. For therefore even baptized women, free, you say, are driven from sin; but for the iniquity of the sons whom they bring forth, they are afflicted by the difficulties of their fruitfulness. By which opinion the propagation of sin now no longer runs down from the mother into the offspring, but is poured back into the parents from the one being born. For if the baptized woman feels pains for this reason, that iniquities are found in the little one, the propagation begins to be backward, not forward. But she is not tortured for this reason, that the son has iniquity; but for this reason, that she herself had carried it with her, when she was born. But this evil you had said was taken away from her by grace; if, then, the pain of the one giving birth clung to sin, the removal of sin ought to have healed the torment of childbirths. Or, if this torment cannot be without iniquity, which yet is found in women after Baptism; then iniquity too is not taken away from them by grace, and the pomp of Baptism has become worthless. But if in these mysteries there was that virtue and truth which we believe, not which you feign, and every sin was taken away, yet the pain remains, which is generated by the difficulty of birth; it is manifest that that groan is an index of nature, not of fault; which, with you too consenting, those women suffer whom you confess freed from the sin of the Manichees. Moreover this appeared from the examples of things alone; but if we inspect also the very words of the sentence, lo, they will dissolve your fogs with a brighter brightness than the rays of the sun. For it was not said to the woman: Pains will arise in you, or: I will generate groans for you; so that after the fault their feeling would seem to be established; but: Multiplying, he says, I will multiply your sorrows. He shows that there was already in the natural rationale that which he promises, in the sinful person, not to found, but to multiply. For things are never multiplied unless they exist; but before they are, they are properly called to be made, but to be increased prematurely. Finally, lest this seem to be ours rather than the very truth's, here the order of words is reported to be kept in all living things. Of the human being too, before he was made: Let us make, says God, the human being to our image and likeness (Gen 1:26); and again of the woman: God said, he says, It is not good for the human being to be alone; let us make for him a help like himself (See Gen 2:18). But afterward, when they were made: He blessed them, he says, saying: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth (Gen 1:28). Before they were founded, it was not said: Let them be multiplied; but: Let the human being be made; after there existed one who might receive increases, he consequently adds: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth. By this order, then, the groan of childbirths, which was according to nature, so established in the bodies of human beings as in the cattle, is not founded in Eve, but increased, so that she should be afflicted by a peculiar greatness of aroused anguishes. Nor yet would these reach the women of later ages, except by natural moderation and the variety of bodies. There, then, not that the woman should feel pain in giving birth was from sin, but that she should feel too much; just as also at various times we read that debilities of body befell certain people for their sins; but that enlargement of miseries did not overturn the sparingness of the natural measure. Nor yet are all the things contained in that same sentence closed by the vigor of one observing. But a certain part there indicates merit, a certain part designates duty. Multiplying, he says, I will multiply your sorrows and your groaning; in sorrow you will bring forth children. Thus far the punishment, which not nature, but the person merited. Now hence simply the duty of the later sex is shown: Your turning, he says, will be to your husband, and he will have dominion over you. This surely does not look to penalty, which, if it were not so, would look to fault; for that the woman should be subject to her husband with a modest affection is an order, not a punishment. For the head, according to the Apostle, of the woman is the man (See 1 Cor 11:3); because the man was not created for the woman, but the woman for the man (See 1 Cor 11:9). If, then, she venerates her head with fitting modesty, she keeps the institutions of nature, she does not suffer the torments of sin; to which order if she rebels, she is guilty. There is not, then, in misery the performance of a duty, the neglect of which is in fault.
JulianImp.6.26Augustinus. Dolorem pariendi poenam dicimus esse peccati. Scimus enim hoc Deum sine ulla ambiguitate dixisse, nec dixisse nisi praevaricatrici sui mandati, nec ob aliud dixisse, nisi quia irascebatur suum praevaricatum esse mandatum. Sed hanc iram Dei ut tu exinanires et frustrares, dixisti usque adeo poenam istam non esse peccati, ut animalia quorum nulla peccata sunt, gemitus huiusmodi in partu doloresque patiantur. Non quidem tibi dixerunt animalia, utrum ille gemitus sit canentium vel dolentium. Gallinas sane parituras, similiores esse cantantibus quam dolentibus cernimus; post partum vero tales voces edere, quales in formidine consuerunt; porro cum pariunt in summo esse silentio, sicut columbas, et alias aves, quae advertentibus innotescunt. Quis ergo novit muta animantia, quae quid in se agatur indicare non possunt, utrum tempore pariendi eorum motus et sonus non solum nihil doloris, sed habeat aliquid etiam voluptatis? Sed quid mihi est in hac re scrutari obscura naturae, cum inde nostra causa non pendeat? Prorsus si muta animalia nihil doloris patiuntur in partu, argumentum tuum nullum est; si autem patiuntur, ea ipsa poena est imaginis Dei, conditioni pecorum comparari: poena porro imaginis Dei, nisi culpa praecederet, iusta esse non posset. Illud autem absit ut dicam, quod tamquam dicam, refellendum putasti, non suo, sed nascentis merito matrem dolere cum parturit, et ideo etiam dimissis peccatis fideles dolere urgente necessitate pariendi. Absit, inquam, ut hoc dicam. Numquid enim quia mortem dicimus peccati esse supplicium, ideo dicendum est eam post remissionem peccatorum non debuisse contingere? Hae quippe, quas in natura praevaricatione vitiata dicimus poenas esse peccati, ideo etiam post remissionem peccatorum manent, ut probetur fides, quam de venturo credimus saeculo, ubi ista non erunt. Neque enim fides esset, si propterea crederemus, quia continuo nobis nihil dolendi et non moriendi praemium redderetur. Qua ratione reddita, id est, ad agonem fidei nobis relinqui mala contracta peccato, quamvis reatu peccatorum per Baptismum iam soluto, quid habet virium quod aisti: Si in mysteriis sublatum est omne peccatum, et remanet tamen dolor qui partus difficultate generatur, manifestum est illum gemitum naturae indicem esse, non culpae? Hoc enim, quod nullas adversus nos habet vires, non utique diceres, si fidei tu vel haberes vel attenderes vires, quae tanto sunt fortiores, quanto magis ea speramus quae non videmus, et per patientiam miseriarum, plenitudinem beatitudinis exspectamus . Sed ipsa - inquis - Dei verba, quibus non ait: Orientur in te dolores, aut: Generabo tibi gemitus, ut post culpam sensus eorum viderentur institui; sed ait: "Multiplicans multiplicabo tristitias tuas"; ostendunt quia iam erat in naturali ratione, quod se in peccatrice persona non condere, sed multiplicare promittit; et addis, quasi definitivam generalemque sententiam, dicens: Numquam quippe multiplicantur nisi exstantia; ceterum antequam sint, fieri quidem proprie, augeri autem praepropere nuncupantur. Ubi primum a te quaero, quomodo dicas dolores Evae iam exstantes fuisse, quos perpessa non fuerat; quomodo, inquam, iam dolores habebat, quae nihil dolebat? Quod si non exstabant in ea dolores, quia eos non habebat quae non dolebat; poterant ergo multiplicari et qui non erant; et recte accipitur dictum: Multiplicabo tristitias tuas, id est, multas eas esse faciam; quod fieri potest, sive aliquid esse iam coeperit, sive nec coeperit. Frustra igitur dixisti: Numquam enim multiplicantur nisi exstantia; quia ecce in Eva post peccatum dolores sunt multiplicati, qui priusquam peccasset, non erant ulli. Ac per hoc, non ideo dixit Deus: Multiplicabo tristitias tuas, quia tristitiae in illa esse iam coeperant aliquae; sed quia multiplices erant futurae, ex quo inciperent esse. Sed erant, inquis, in naturali ratione. Si ergo in naturali ratione iam sunt etiam quae nondum orta sunt, quid te adiuvat quod aisti: Propterea Deum non dixisse: Orientur in te dolores, sed: "Multiplicabo dolores tuos", quia iam erant in naturali ratione? Respondetur enim tibi: Potuit dicere: Orientur in te; quia eos erat multiplicaturus, qui in ratione naturali iam erant, non qui iam orti erant. An forte dicturus es: Iam prorsus orti erant in ipsa naturali ratione? Quanto igitur manifestius et acceptione dignius tibi dicitur: Iam erant filii Adam in Adam naturali ratione, quando, sicut ait beatus Ioannes episcopus: Illud peccatum grande commisit, et omne hominum genus in commune damnavit ; vel, sicut ait collega eius Ambrosius: Fuit Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam, et in illo omnes perierunt ; si tu audes dicere, non solum: Iam erant; verum etiam, quod nos de filiis Adam, quando peccatum illud admissum est, dicere non audemus: Iam orti erant dolores Evae, quando eos Deus multiplicaturum se esse minatus est! Verumtamen non in naturali ratione iam erant Evae dolores, quos parturientes necesse est perpeti; quia non eos illam necesse erat perpeti, cum parturire coepisset; venerunt quippe illi damnatione culpae, non conditione naturae. Quod vos negando quid agitis, nisi ut in loco illius beatitudinis, ubi esse homines permissi non sunt, quos iam cruciari oportebat, cruciatus hominum etiam peccante nemine collocetis? Quod ignoro qua fronte faciatis; nisi quia vos paradiso contrarios, contra paradisum quodammodo habitare delectat; quia et Adam de paradiso eiectus, contra paradisum est collocatus . Iam itaque paradiso contrarius, quanta vanitate contra paradisum argumenteris attende. Multiplicari non tibi videntur, nisi ea quae ex aliqua parte iam existunt; ceterum, antequam sint, non multiplicari putas dicenda esse, sed fieri. Nulla ergo multiplicia nascuntur, si non additamentis multiplicantur, id est, fiunt multiplicia. Ac per hoc, ille qui dictus est esse in Sapientia spiritus multiplex , qui esse non coepit, sed ex aeterno ita est, non recte appellatus est multiplex, quia eum multiplicem nulla additamenta fecerunt. Quid etiam dicturus es de responso Dei ad Abraham, ubi ait: Multiplicans multiplicabo semen tuum sicut stellas caeli ? Ubi videmus Deum multiplicasse etiam stellas caeli, sicut se promisit multiplicaturum semen Abrahae? Numquid ergo stellae caeli, ut multiplicarentur, pauciores prius esse coeperunt, et non in numero suo multiplices sunt institutae, ex quo sunt institutae? Cur ergo non sic accipis quod dictum est: Multiplicans multiplicabo tristitias tuas; tamquam dixisset: Faciam tristitias tuas multiplices, nisi quia sic agis, ut in paradisum, contra quam collocatus es, si possis introducas dolores, et in loco tantae beatitudinis ante peccatum praedices miserias institutas? Quod enim Eva, ut affirmas, cum doloribus parturitionem naturaliter, antequam peccaret, accepit, istam vocas parcimoniam naturalem; quam videri non vis eversam ex eo quod amplius de poena mulieri Deo vindicante, cum peccasset, accessit. Sic enim loqueris, ut dicas: Sed non illa ampliatio miseriarum parcimoniam modi naturalis evertit. Proinde te docente, ut feminae in partu mediocriter doleant, parcimonia naturalis est; quod vero peccati merito additum est Evae, ampliatio miseriarum est. Nec vides, cum ista dicis, quia si ampliatae sunt miseriae per peccatum, iam fuerant institutae per naturam, et mulier, cui ampliatae sunt miseriae merito peccati, iam naturaliter misera erat ante peccatum. Tu licet eam dicas parcimonia naturali mediocriter miseram; tamen, velis nolis, cui dicis accessisse ampliationem miseriarum, profecto et ante hanc accessionem miseram confiteris. Ecce quod de te meretur natura hominis a Deo primitus instituti; ecce quod de te meretur paradisus Dei. Eiectus quippe, et contra eum collocatus talia contrarius reddidisti, ut in loco beatitudinis diceres miserias divinitus institutas, non autem coepisse, sed crevisse peccatis. Quid tam contrarium, quam miseria beatitudini, et beatitudo miseriae? Aut quid significat, quod de paradiso peccator exclusus, contra paradisum est collocatus; nisi quia in miseria collocatus est, quae beatitudini sine cuiusquam contradictione vel dubitatione est contraria? Et quid sic fugit natura, ut miseriam? Quid sic appetit, ut beatitudinem? Denique liberum arbitrium quod de hac re habemus, ita nobis naturaliter insitum est, ut nulla miseria nobis possit auferri quod miseri esse nolumus, et volumus esse beati. Usque adeo ut iam ipsi qui male vivendo sunt miseri, male vivere quidem velint, nolint tamen esse miseri, sed beati. Hoc est liberum arbitrium nostris mentibus immobiliter fixum, non quo bene agere volumus, nam in humana iniquitate potuimus amittere, et gratia divina possumus recipere; sed liberum arbitrium quo beati esse volumus, et miseri nolumus, nec miseri possunt amittere, nec beati. Beati quippe omnes esse volumus, quod ipsi quoque philosophi huius saeculi, et Academici de rebus omnibus dubitantes, teste patrono suo Tullio, coacti sunt confiteri; idque unum esse dixerunt, quod disputatione non egeat, quod nemo est qui non expetat. Hoc arbitrium liberum adiuvatur per Dei gratiam, ut quod naturaliter volumus, hoc est beate vivere, bene vivendo habere possimus. Et tu dicis, quamvis mediocres miserias, tamen miserias, beatitudini nullo negante, nullo ambigente contrarias, in primis operibus Dei, nullo cuiusquam praecedente peccato, naturaliter institutas, ut scilicet peccatricis mulieris poena, propter quam dictum est: Multiplicans multiplicabo tristitias tuas, non sit institutio miseriarum, quae, ut dicis, iam fuerat in natura; sed ampliatio quae accessit ex poena. Quid ego iam tecum agam de sequentibus Dei verbis, ubi posteaquam dixit quod ad poenam pertinebat: In tristitia paries filios; mox addidit: Et ad virum tuum conversio tua, et ipse tui dominabitur ? Quid opus est ut tecum inde confligam, utrum ista dominatio viri poena sit feminae an ordo naturae? Quem tamen ordinem non commemoravit Deus, quando condidit, sed quando punivit. Verum, ut dixi, quid opus est in eo remorari, quod utrumlibet sit, nostram non impedit causam? Prorsus Deus, a supplicio quod infligebat mulieri, ad praecipiendum fuerit repente conversus, et iubendo non damnando dixerit: Ad virum tuum conversio tua, et ipse tui dominabitur; quid hoc ad quaestionem, quam de supplicio peccatricis ista disputatione versamus? De miseriis tecum ago, quas de paradiso eiectus eique contrarius, in paradiso locare conaris; easque non peccantium meritis, sed Deo naturarum institutori, tamquam et ipsas naturaliter instituerit, tuo pudore pereunte, et ore blasphemante tribuere. Dic iam quid etiam de viri poena persuadere nitaris; quandoquidem iam satis est, quid ista mulier quae ante peccatum nuda erat et non confundebatur, te nudavit atque confudit.
Augustine: We say that the pain of giving birth is a penalty of sin. For we know that God said this without any ambiguity, and said it only to the transgressor of his command, and said it for no other reason than that he was angry that his command had been transgressed. But that you might empty out and frustrate this anger of God, you said that this penalty is so far from being of sin that animals, whose sins are none, suffer groans of this kind and pains in giving birth. The animals indeed did not tell you whether that groan is of those singing or of those in pain. We see that hens about to give birth are more like those singing than those in pain; but after the birth they utter such cries as they are wont in fear; moreover, when they give birth they are in the deepest silence, like doves, and other birds, which become known to those observing. Who, then, knows of mute living things, which cannot indicate what is done within them, whether at the time of giving birth their motion and sound have not only nothing of pain, but even something of pleasure? But what is it to me in this matter to scrutinize the obscure things of nature, when our cause does not hang from it? If mute animals suffer nothing of pain in giving birth, your argument is none; but if they suffer, this very thing is a penalty of the image of God, to be compared to the condition of cattle: but a penalty of the image of God could not be just, unless fault went before. But far be it that I say what you thought must be refuted, as if I said it: that the mother feels pain when she gives birth not by her own, but by the merit of the one being born, and therefore that even faithful women whose sins have been forgiven feel pain by the urgency of the necessity of giving birth. Far be it, I say, that I say this. For because we say that death is the punishment of sin, ought it therefore to be said that it ought not to come about after the forgiveness of sins? For these things, which in a nature vitiated by transgression we say are penalties of sin, therefore remain even after the forgiveness of sins, that the faith we believe concerning the age to come, where these will be none, may be proved. For it would not be faith, if we believed for this reason, that immediately the reward of not grieving and not dying were rendered to us. By which reason being given, that is, that the evils contracted by sin are left to us for the contest of faith, although the guilt of sins is already loosed by Baptism, what force has what you said: If in the mysteries every sin is taken away, and yet there remains the pain which is generated by the difficulty of birth, it is manifest that that groan is an index of nature, not of fault? For this, which has no force against us, you surely would not say, if you either had or attended to the force of faith, which is the stronger the more we hope for the things we do not see, and through the patience of miseries await the fullness of blessedness (See Rom 8:24-25). But the very words of God, you say, by which he did not say: Pains will arise in you, or: I will generate groans for you, so that after the fault their feeling would seem to be established; but he said: "Multiplying I will multiply your sorrows"; show that there was already in the natural rationale that which he promises, in the sinful person, not to found, but to multiply; and you add, as though a definitive and general sentence, saying: For things are never multiplied unless they exist; but before they are, they are properly called to be made, but prematurely to be increased. Where first I ask of you, how you say that the pains of Eve already existed, which she had not suffered; how, I say, did she already have pains, who felt no pain? But if pains did not exist in her, because she who felt no pain did not have them; then even those which were not could be multiplied; and rightly is what was said received: I will multiply your sorrows, that is, I will make them many; which can come about whether something has already begun to be, or has not even begun. In vain, then, did you say: For things are never multiplied unless they exist; because behold, in Eve after sin pains were multiplied, which before she sinned were none. And through this, not for this reason did God say: I will multiply your sorrows, because some sorrows had already begun to be in her; but because they were going to be manifold, from the time they should begin to be. But they were, you say, in the natural rationale. If, then, in the natural rationale there already are even those which have not yet arisen, what does it help you that you said: For this reason God did not say: Pains will arise in you, but: "I will multiply your pains," because they were already in the natural rationale? For it is answered to you: He could say: They will arise in you; because he was going to multiply those which were already in the natural rationale, not those which had already arisen. Or will you perhaps say: They had already utterly arisen in the very natural rationale? How much more manifestly, then, and more worthy of acceptance, is it said to you: The sons of Adam were already in Adam by natural rationale, when, as blessed John the bishop says: He committed that great sin, and condemned the whole human race in common (See John Chrysostom, Homilies on Romans 10); or, as his colleague Ambrose says: Adam was, and in him we all were; Adam perished, and in him all perished (See Ambrose, On the Death of His Brother Satyrus 2.6); if you dare to say, not only: They already were; but also, what we do not dare to say of the sons of Adam, when that sin was committed: The pains of Eve had already arisen, when God threatened that he would multiply them! Yet the pains of Eve were not already in the natural rationale, which those giving birth must of necessity suffer; because it was not necessary for her to suffer them, when she had begun to give birth; for they came by the condemnation of fault, not by the condition of nature. Which you, by denying, what do you do, except that, in the place of that blessedness, where human beings were not permitted to be who already ought to be tortured, you set up the torments of human beings, even with no one sinning? Which I know not with what brow you do; unless because, opposed to paradise, it delights you in a way to dwell against paradise; because Adam too, cast out of paradise, was set over against paradise (See Gen 3:24). Now, then, opposed to paradise, attend with how great vanity you argue against paradise. Things do not seem to you to be multiplied, except those which in some part already exist; but, before they are, you think they must be said not to be multiplied, but to be made. No multiple things, then, are born, if they are not multiplied by additions, that is, made multiple. And through this, that one who is said in Wisdom to be a manifold spirit (See Wis 7:22), who did not begin to be, but is so from eternity, was not rightly called manifold, because no additions made him manifold. What too will you say about the answer of God to Abraham, where he says: Multiplying I will multiply your seed like the stars of heaven (See Gen 22:17)? Where we see God multiplied even the stars of heaven, as he promised he would multiply the seed of Abraham? Did the stars of heaven, then, in order to be multiplied, first begin to be fewer, and were not established manifold in their number, from the time they were established? Why, then, do you not so receive what was said: Multiplying I will multiply your sorrows; as though he had said: I will make your sorrows manifold—unless because you act so that, into paradise, against which you are set, you may, if you can, introduce pains, and proclaim in a place of so great blessedness, before sin, that miseries were established? For that Eve, as you affirm, received parturition with pains naturally, before she sinned, you call this natural sparingness; which you do not wish to seem overturned by the fact that more accrued of penalty to the woman, with God avenging, when she had sinned. For you so speak as to say: But that enlargement of miseries did not overturn the sparingness of the natural measure. Accordingly, with you teaching, that women in childbirth feel moderate pain is natural sparingness; but what was added to Eve by the merit of sin is an enlargement of miseries. Nor do you see, when you say these things, that if the miseries were enlarged through sin, they had already been established through nature, and the woman, to whom the miseries were enlarged by the merit of sin, was already naturally wretched before sin. Although you call her, by natural sparingness, moderately wretched; yet, whether you will or not, her to whom you say an enlargement of miseries accrued, you surely confess wretched even before this accrual. Behold what the nature of the human being first established by God merits from you; behold what the paradise of God merits from you. For, cast out, and set over against it, you have made such returns, opposed to it, that you say miseries were divinely established in a place of blessedness—and not begun, but grown by sins. What is so contrary as misery to blessedness, and blessedness to misery? Or what does it signify, that the sinner, excluded from paradise, was set over against paradise; except that he was set in misery, which is contrary, without anyone's contradiction or doubt, to blessedness? And what does nature so flee as misery? What does it so seek as blessedness? Finally, the free choice we have concerning this matter is so naturally implanted in us that by no misery can it be taken from us that we are unwilling to be wretched, and wish to be blessed. So much so that even those who by living badly are wretched, indeed wish to live badly, yet do not wish to be wretched, but blessed. This is the free choice immovably fixed in our minds, not by which we wish to act well, for in human iniquity we could lose it, and by divine grace we can receive it; but the free choice by which we wish to be blessed, and are unwilling to be wretched, neither the wretched can lose, nor the blessed. For we all wish to be blessed, which even the philosophers of this age, and the Academics doubting of all things, by the testimony of their patron Tully, were compelled to confess; and they said this one thing was that which needs no disputation, which there is no one who does not seek. This free choice is aided through the grace of God, that what we naturally will, that is, to live blessedly, we may be able to have by living well. And you say that miseries—although moderate, yet miseries, contrary to blessedness with no one denying, no one doubting—were naturally established in the first works of God, with no one's sin preceding, so that, namely, the penalty of the sinful woman, on account of which it was said: Multiplying I will multiply your sorrows, is not the establishment of miseries, which, as you say, was already in nature; but the enlargement which accrued from the penalty. What now shall I deal with you concerning the following words of God, where, after he said what pertained to penalty: In sorrow you will bring forth children; he at once added: And your turning will be to your husband, and he will have dominion over you (Gen 3:16)? What need is there that I contend with you thence, whether this dominion of the husband is a penalty of the woman or the order of nature? Which order, however, God did not mention when he founded, but when he punished. But, as I said, what need is there to linger over that which, whichever it be, does not impede our cause? Granted that God, from the punishment which he was inflicting on the woman, was suddenly turned to commanding, and said, by commanding, not by condemning: Your turning will be to your husband, and he will have dominion over you; what is this to the question which we treat in this disputation concerning the punishment of the sinful woman? I deal with you concerning the miseries, which, cast out of paradise and opposed to it, you try to place in paradise; and to attribute them not to the merits of those sinning, but to God the founder of natures, as though he established them too naturally, with your shame perishing, and your mouth blaspheming. Say now what you strive to persuade also concerning the man's punishment; since it is already enough how this woman, who before sin was naked and was not confounded, has stripped and confounded you.
JulianImp.6.26VI. 27. Iulianus. Verum sufficiant ista de muliere, transeamus ad viri munia. Adae - inquit - dixit: Maledicta terra in operibus tuis; in tristitia manducabis eam omnibus diebus vitae tuae; spinas et tribulos edet tibi, et edes fenum agri tui; in sudore faciei tuae edes panem tuum, donec convertaris in terram de qua sumptus es; quoniam terra es, et in terram ibis . Hic non est dictum: Multiplicabo spinas tuas, aut sudores tuos; sed quasi tunc primum creata dicuntur. At etiam huius invidia, non maiore quam uxoris eius labore dissolvitur; initio quippe non semini hominis, sed humo maledicitur: In tuis operibus -inquit - maledicta terra erit. Quid commerita fuerant arva (quae certe de traduce Adae habere nihil poterant), ut pro peccato voluntatis alienae convicium maledictionis exciperent? An ut etiam ipsorum cespitum doceretur exemplo, posse esse maledictum, ubi culpa non esset? Nam si in homine peccatum, in segete maledictum, manifestum est crimina non semper adhaerere dispendiis. Si ergo propter hoc maledicitur terrae, ut ille qui peccaverat affligatur, nec tamen ibi iniquitas, ubi maledictio continetur; cur non ea conditione, etiamsi quid aerumnarum naturae nostrae post peccatum primi hominis doceretur illatum, tamen sequeretur non ideo miseros esse nascentes, ut rei convincerentur; sed ut commemoratione peccati primi, afflictio succedanea his quos reos non fecerat, imitationis malae indiceret cautionem? Quandoquidem et terra ob hoc ostenderetur maledicti convicium pertulisse, ut malum alienae voluntatis argueret, non ut participationem sui criminis gigneret; nisi forte credamus cariorem Deo terram esse, quam innocentiam, ut scelere alieno cum glebam non patiatur pollui, addici tamen permittat infantiam. Maledictum ergo dirigitur in terram, nec tamen hoc ipsum relinquitur involutum. Disseritur quippe quo fine eiusmodi sententia tenderetur, vel quomodo humus maledicta vocaretur. In tristitia - inquit - manducabis eam omnibus diebus vitae tuae. Quo igitur genere se exponat, advertito; maledicta dicitur terra, non quo in eam animadverti quiverit, sed hoc nomine opinio animi maerentis ostenditur; ut quoniam sterilem sciebat pro cultoris sui meritis, aegritudo esurientis operarii imputaret terrae quod ipse promeruerat, et maledictam eam afflictus vocaret, cuius ideo claudebatur opimitas, ut praevaricator ille nec naturam, nec terram, sed voluntatem atque personam suam maledicto fateretur obnoxiam. Spinas - inquit - et tribulos edet tibi. Non fuit contentus dicere: Spinas et tribulos edet; sed addidit: tibi. Inter virgulta quippe alia, et veprium frutices olim iussa protulerat; tunc vero, ut compungeretur homo, solito senticosior futura promittitur. Quod Adam vehementer castigare poterat, quem post paradisi fontes et prata, etiam unus rubus posset offendere. In sudore autem faciei tuae edes panem tuum; non satis ad aerumnam video pertinere; siquidem etiam naturale adiumentum est, ut operantium artus sudore recreentur. Illi autem ante peccatum laborem incubuisse culturae lectio ipsa testatur. Sic enim ait: Et sumpsit Dominus Deus hominem quem fecit, et posuit illum in paradiso, operari eum et custodire . Si ergo etiam in paradiso noluit eum Deus pabula examussim illaborata suscipere, sed indicto operationis, quam indiderat excitavit industriam; quid ei novum accidisse credimus, si sentiret sudorem, qui experiebatur laborem? Sequitur autem: Donec convertaris in terram ex qua sumptus es; quoniam terra es, et in terram ibis. Haec sane pars extrema sententiae, sicut illa mulieris, ad indicium, non ad supplicium respicit; quin immo, ut res indicat, promisso fine consolatur hominem. Quia enim supra commemoraverat dolores, labores, sudores, quorum sensum natura, nimietatem persona susceperat; ne hoc in aeternum videretur extendi, mitificat aegritudinem terminus indicatus; ac si diceret: Verum non semper ista patieris; sed donec convertaris in terram de qua sumptus es; quia terra es - inquit - et in terram ibis. Cur non, postquam dixit: donec convertaris in terram de qua sumptus es, subdidit: Quia peccasti et mea praecepta transgressus es? Hoc enim dicendum erat, si resolutio corporum ad crimina pertineret. Verum quid dixit? Quia terra es - inquit - et in terram ibis. Causam cur in terram rediturus esset, ostendit: Quia terra es, inquit. Quomodo autem esset terra, superior sermo patefecerat: Quia de terra - inquit - sumptus es. Si ergo redeundi in terram, hanc esse rationem dixit Deus, quoniam fuerat assumptus e terra, porro ut assumeretur, ad iniquitatem spectare non potuit; procul dubio non iniquitatis, sed naturae mortalis fuit, ut qui aeternus non erat, in corporis parte solveretur. Illa ergo sterilitas arborum, illa veprium ubertas, illa aegri partus aucta calamitas, personis hominum sunt illata, non generi. Denique iam natis Cain et Abel unius naturae ambobus, sed diversarum voluntatum, nec Cain sponte peccanti profuit quod eum peccata patris non presserant, nec Abeli nocuit quod parentes eius deliquerant; sed suopte uterque iudicio nec virtutis sibi, nec vitii naturale infuisse praeiudicium vario proposito, fine vario publicarunt. Functi quippe officio sacerdotum, conditori suo Deo hostias obtulerunt. Ceterum par obsequium, impar cura discrevit. Patefecit hoc divina sententia, quae complacitum sibi munus Abelis ostendit; offenso autem Cain causam suae indignationis aperuit, dicens eum bene obtulisse, sed male divisisse. Nec mora exarsit profanus animus in livorem, et germani sanctitate gravatus, parricidium gratificatur invidiae. Ita prima occasione claruit malum non esse mortem, quod eam iustus primus omnium dedicavit. Nec tamen iram Dei animi sontis audacia effugit. Interrogatur de fratre, convincitur de scelere, addicitur ultioni, et extra eum terrorem, qui ei pro insigni crudelitatis incubuit, terrae quoque maledictione punitur: Maledictus - inquit - tu a terra, quae aperuit os suum accipere sanguinem fratris tui de tua manu; quoniam operaberis terram, et non adiciet virtutem suam dare tibi . Ecce denuo sterilitas terrae in poena cultoris indicitur. Innumera autem generis tormenta in Deuteronomio promittuntur. Quid ergo? Nostrarum dumeta terrarum, quibus amputandis runcone armatus cultor invigilat, per Cain parricidium germinarunt? Et quia omnis spinosi ruris dominus, peccato quod spinarum ubertate punitum est, a vobis putatur obnoxius; omnes iam parvuli non solum comedisse poma, quamvis nascantur sine dentibus, sed etiam Abelis sanguinem effudisse dicentur? Apparet certe, ad quem furorem perveniat Manichaeorum tradux; quae quoniam nihil habet praeter amentiam, ridet de argumentis vestris Catholicorum gravitas; sed de ruinis vestris eorumdem plorat affectio.
VI. 27. Julian: But let these things about the woman suffice; let us pass to the duties of the man. To Adam, he says, he said: Cursed is the earth in your works; in sorrow you will eat it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles it will bring forth to you, and you will eat the hay of your field; in the sweat of your face you will eat your bread, until you turn into the earth from which you were taken; for earth you are, and into earth you will go (Gen 3:17-19). Here it was not said: I will multiply your thorns, or your sweats; but they are said as though then first created. But the odium of this too is dissolved by a labor no greater than that of his wife; for at the beginning it is not the seed of the human being, but the soil that is cursed: In your works, he says, the earth will be cursed. What had the fields deserved (which surely could have nothing of the propagation of Adam), that for the sin of another's will they should receive the reproach of a curse? Or was it that, even by the example of the very turf, it might be taught that there can be a curse where there is no fault? For if in the man there is sin, in the crop a curse, it is manifest that crimes do not always cling to detriments. If, then, the earth is cursed for this reason, that he who had sinned might be afflicted, and yet there is not iniquity there where the curse is contained; why would it not follow, on the same condition—even if something of troubles were taught to have been brought upon our nature after the sin of the first man—that yet it would follow that those being born are not wretched for this reason, that they should be convicted as guilty; but that, by the commemoration of the first sin, an affliction succeeding to those whom it had not made guilty might indicate a caution against evil imitation? Since the earth too would be shown for this reason to have borne the reproach of a curse, that it might charge the evil of another's will, not that it might engender a participation in its crime; unless perhaps we believe the earth dearer to God than innocence, so that, while it does not suffer the clod to be polluted by another's wickedness, it yet permits infancy to be condemned. The curse, then, is directed against the earth, nor yet is this very thing left wrapped up. For it is set forth with what end such a sentence was aimed, or how the soil was called cursed. In sorrow, he says, you will eat it all the days of your life. By what kind, then, it explains itself, take note; the earth is said cursed, not because anything could be punished in it, but by this name the opinion of a grieving mind is shown; so that, since he knew it was barren for the merits of its cultivator, the sickness of the hungering worker might impute to the earth what he himself had merited, and, afflicted, call it cursed, whose richness was therefore shut off, that that transgressor might confess neither nature, nor the earth, but his will and his person to be liable to the curse. Thorns, he says, and thistles it will bring forth to you. He was not content to say: Thorns and thistles it will bring forth; but he added: to you. For among other shrubs and bushes of brambles it had once, when bidden, brought them forth; but then, that the man might be pricked, it is promised to be more thorny than usual. Which could vehemently chastise Adam, whom, after the fountains and meadows of paradise, even one bramble could offend. But in the sweat of your face you will eat your bread; I do not see that it pertains much to trouble; since indeed it is even a natural aid that the limbs of those working be refreshed by sweat. But that labor lay upon the cultivation even before sin, the reading itself attests. For so it says: And the Lord God took the human being whom he made, and put him in paradise, to work it and to keep it (Gen 2:15). If, then, even in paradise God was unwilling that he should take his food exactly without labor, but, by the imposition of work, roused the industry which he had implanted; what new thing do we believe befell him, if he felt sweat, who experienced labor? But there follows: Until you turn into the earth from which you were taken; for earth you are, and into earth you will go. This last part of the sentence, surely, like that of the woman, looks to an indication, not to a punishment; nay rather, as the matter indicates, it consoles the human being by the end promised. For because above he had mentioned pains, labors, sweats, the feeling of which nature, the excess the person had taken on; lest this seem to be extended forever, the indicated term mitigates the sickness; as if he said: But you will not always suffer these things; but until you turn into the earth from which you were taken; for earth you are, he says, and into earth you will go. Why, after he said: until you turn into the earth from which you were taken, did he not subjoin: Because you have sinned and transgressed my precepts? For this ought to have been said, if the dissolution of bodies pertained to crimes. But what did he say? Because earth you are, he says, and into earth you will go. He showed the cause why he was to return into the earth: Because earth you are, he says. But how he was earth, the earlier discourse had made plain: Because from earth, he says, you were taken. If, then, God said this was the reason for returning into the earth, that he had been taken from the earth, and that he should be taken could not look to iniquity; without doubt it was not of iniquity, but of mortal nature, that he who was not eternal should be dissolved in the part of the body. That barrenness of trees, then, that fertility of brambles, that increased calamity of painful birth, were brought upon the persons of human beings, not upon the race. Finally, when Cain and Abel were already born, of one nature both, but of different wills, neither did it profit Cain, sinning of his own accord, that the sins of his father had not pressed him, nor did it harm Abel that his parents had transgressed; but each of his own judgment, by a varied purpose, with a varied end, published that no natural prejudice of virtue or of vice had been in him. For, performing the office of priests, they offered victims to God their founder. But an equal obedience, an unequal care, distinguished them. This the divine sentence made plain, which showed the gift of Abel pleasing to itself; but, offended with Cain, opened the cause of its indignation, saying that he had offered well, but divided badly (See Gen 4:7 LXX). And without delay the profane mind flared into envy, and, weighed down by the holiness of his brother, gratified his envy with parricide. Thus on the first occasion it became clear that death is not an evil, since a just man first of all dedicated it. Nor yet did the audacity of the guilty mind escape the anger of God. He is questioned about his brother, convicted of crime, sentenced to punishment, and, beyond that terror which lay upon him for his notable cruelty, is punished also by the curse of the earth: Cursed, he says, are you from the earth, which opened its mouth to receive the blood of your brother from your hand; for you will work the earth, and it will not add its strength to give to you (Gen 4:11-12). Lo, again the barrenness of the earth is decreed in the punishment of the cultivator. But innumerable torments of the race are promised in Deuteronomy. What then? Did the brambles of our lands, for the cutting away of which the cultivator keeps watch armed with a hook, germinate through the parricide of Cain? And because every lord of a thorny field is by you thought liable to the sin which was punished by the fertility of thorns; will all little ones now be said not only to have eaten apples, although they are born without teeth, but also to have shed the blood of Abel? It certainly appears to what frenzy the propagation-theory of the Manichees comes; which, since it has nothing but madness, the gravity of the Catholics laughs at your arguments; but the affection of the same weeps over your ruins.
JulianImp.6.27Augustinus. Nempe nihil agit tua tam diuturna et operosissima disputatio de poena primi hominis, nisi ut hac extenuata, etiam ipsa culpa extenuetur, quae poenae huius ingestione damnata est. Et hoc facis propter verba libri mei, cui respondes, quae tibi tamquam redarguenda proponis, ubi dixi: Illud ergo peccatum, quod ipsum hominem in paradiso mutavit in peius, quia multo est grandius quam iudicare nos possumus, ab omni nascente trahitur. Ut ergo non videatur grande peccatum, quo potuerit in deterius natura mutari, leve ac prope nullum supplicium esse contendis quod meruit. Hinc est quod maledictam terram in operibus praevaricatoris retorques ad tui dogmatis pravitatem; hinc est quod spinas et tribulos, et antequam homo peccaret, fuisse asseris institutos; cum Deus haec inter sua primitus instituta non nominet, sed in peccatoris supplicio comminetur; hinc est quod sudorem laborantis, ut non satis ad aerumnam pertinere videretur, etiam naturale adiumentum esse dixisti, ut scilicet operantium artus sudore recreentur; tamquam Deus ista dicens non irrogaret supplicium pro peccato, sed daret insuper praemium. Quamquam hoc congrue diceremus, si sudorem laboris ita laudares, ut tunc diceres institutum; nunc autem et ante peccatum sic affirmas in paradiso hominem collocatum, ut operando terram sine labore non esset; quasi non posset illa firmitas, et nulla infirmitas corporis, non solum sine labore, verum etiam cum animi voluptate, quod delectare poterat, operari. Sed cur hoc dixeris, occulere nequivisti; apertissime quippe loqueris, cum addis: Quid novum accidisse dicimus, si sentiret sudorem, qui experiebatur laborem? Tantumne te libuit quietissimo beatorum loco, non solum tristitias parturitionis in feminis, verum etiam in viris sudorem laboris immittere, ut Deo damnante, nihil novi damnato diceres accidisse? Tantumne illudis et despicis severitatem Dei, ut quod irrogavit ille poenaliter, tu donatum naturaliter asseveres? Si nihil novi homini accidisse dicis, cui Deus dixit: In sudore faciei tuae edes panem tuum; negato hoc Deum dixisse damnantem. An dicturus es: Ille quidem hominem damnavit his verbis, sed nihil homini ex hoc accidit novi? Ergo ille damnavit, sed non est iste damnatus? Frustratus est impetus ultionis, tamquam Deus telum eiecerit et non potuerit ferire quem voluit? Immo, inquis, et damnatus est, et nihil ei accidit novi. Hic risum tenere difficile est. Si enim damnatus est, et nihil ei novi accidit; solebat ergo damnari, ac per hoc solebat et peccare; non enim damnaretur iniuste. An quia eum tunc primum peccasse nemo ambigit, iniuste solebat ante damnari? Non enim, sicut de pariente dixisti, hoc saltem novi accidisse homini fassus es, quod sicut mulieri dolor parturitionis, ita viro sudor laboris est additus; hoc modo enim, hac additione quae antea non fuit, novi illi aliquid accidisse concederes. Sed cum dicis: Quid ei accidit novi? quem tamen confiteris esse damnatum; quid aliud affirmas, quam sic eum solere damnari? Aut si solere fieri non dicimus, nisi quod assidue factum novimus; certe sic vel semel necesse est ante damnatum esse concedas, cui nihil novi accidisse, quod sic damnatus est, asseveras. Ubi vides, in quae fueris abrupta progressus. Redi ergo a praecipitio laboriosae disputationis tuae, et noli labores et dolores in sedes felicium gaudiorum, atque in locum ineffabilis quietis inferre. Quid, quod etiam corporis mortem sic paradiso conaris immittere, ut eam dicas praevaricatori pro beneficio fuisse promissam, vel potius indicatam, ubi Deus dixit: Terra es, et in terram ibis; tamquam nesciret homo sic se fuisse institutum, ut sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset; et hanc illi scientiam tunc Deus donaverit, quando eum pro commissa iniquitate damnavit? Disputans quippe de his Dei verbis, ubi ait: In sudore faciei tuae edes panem tuum, donec revertaris in terram de qua sumptus es; quia terra es, et in terram ibis. Haec sane, inquis, pars extrema sententiae, sicut illa mulieris, ad indicium, non ad supplicium pertinet; quin immo, ut res indicat, consolatur hominem. Quia enim supra - inquis - commemoraverat dolores, labores, sudores, quorum sensum natura, nimietatem persona susceperat; ne hoc in aeternum videretur extendi, mitificat aegritudinem terminus indicatus; ac si diceret: Verum non semper ista patieris, sed donec convertaris in terram de qua sumptus es; quia "terra es, et in terram ibis". Haec dicens persuadere conaris, ita quidem creatum hominem, ut etiamsi in rectitudine vitae, in qua creatus est, permaneret, tamen mortalis necessitate naturae quandoque moreretur; sed hoc ei non esse indicatum, nisi tempore damnationis suae, ut aerumna eius, ne putaretur aeterna, de promisso acciperet fine solatium. Putaret ergo Adam non se moriturum, si hoc illi non indicasset Deus: hoc autem non illi indicasset Deus, nisi peccatorem damnari oporteret; remaneret ergo in hoc errore, quo aeternum se, aut numquam moriturum esse credebat, nisi ad sapientiam, qua se homo cognoscit, peccati merito perveniret. Sentisne quid dicas? Accipe aliud. Procul dubio nesciens Adam se esse moriturum, quod nisi peccasset utique nesciret, tamen si peccare noluisset etiam hoc nesciens beatus esset, et credens contraria veritati miser non esset. Audisne quid dicas? Accipe et tertium. Si iustitiae suae tempore Adam credebat se nec corpore moriturum, si Dei praeceptum minime violasset, moriturum autem tunc didicit, quando violavit; hoc nos credimus, quod cum esset iustus, ille credebat; hoc autem vos creditis, quod nisi iniustus nosse non meruit. Noster ergo error stat in parte iustitiae, et in parte iniquitatis vestra sapientia. Intellegisne quid dicas? Accipe et quartum. Si beato et iusto illi homini non indicavit Deus corporis eius mortem futuram, indicavit autem misero et peccatori; congruentius creditur, timore quoque mortis eum cruciare voluisse, etiam isto scilicet dignum iudicans esse tormento. Ut enim clamat ipsa natura, plus mors metuitur, quam labores; laborant quippe omnes homines ne moriantur, si eis talis optio proponatur, ut continuo moriantur, si non laboraverint; quotusquisque autem reperitur, qui mori malit, quam laborare? Denique ipse Adam per tot annos maluit laborare, quam non laborando et fame moriendo vitam simul et laborem finire. Nam quo alio sensu naturali etiam Cain plus mortem timuit, quam laborem? Quo alio sensu per non iniqua nec inhumana iudicia, minora crimina labore metallico, maiora morte iudices damnant? Unde autem martyres tanta gloria praedicantur, quod pro iustitia mortui sunt, nisi quia maior virtus est mortem spernere, quam laborem? Propter quod non ait Dominus: Maiorem caritatem nemo habet, quam ut laboret; sed: ut animam suam ponat pro amicis suis . Si ergo maior est caritas mori, quam laborare pro amicis; quis tam caecus est, ut non videat minorem poenam laboris esse quam mortis? Aut si plus homo debet laborem metuere, quam mortem; quomodo non est misera ipsa natura, quae plus mortem metuit, quam laborem? Et tu ista non cogitans, dicis indicata sibi sua morte hominem consolatum, ne suum laborem putaret aeternum; cum, si vestrum dogma verum esset, quo affirmatis Adam, etiamsi non peccasset, fuisse moriturum, propterea hoc illi indicandum non fuisset, antequam inciperet poena damnationis affligi, ne illum Deus priusquam peccasset, mortis timore torqueret; tunc autem, cum iam, posteaquam peccavit, poena dignissimum iudicaret, indicaret etiam esse moriturum, ut eamdem poenam Deus iustus, mali ultor admissi, etiam timore mortis augeret. Quisquis igitur haec Dei verba, quibus est punitus Adam, quando dictum est: Terra es, et in terram ibis, secundum fidem catholicam intellegit, nec vult introducere in paradisum corporis mortem praecipue, ne introducat et morbos, quorum miserabili varietate morientes videmus affligi, et paradisum sanctae voluptatis, ac spiritalis et corporalis felicitatis, cui vos non pudet esse contrarios, doloribus, laboribus, maeroribus implere cogatur; sicut vos cogimini, nec invenitis qua exire possitis, quamdiu tam impium dogma mutare non vultis; qui ergo, ut dixi, haec Dei verba secundum catholicam suscipit et intellegit fidem, sicut cernit poenam laboris in eo quod dictum est: In sudore faciei tuae edes panem tuum, ita poenam cernit et mortis in eo quod sequitur: Donec revertaris in terram de qua sumptus es; quia terra es, et in terram ibis; ac sic accipit dictum, tamquam diceretur: Ego quidem te de terra sumpsi, et hominem feci; et utique potui facere, ut eadem terra quam viventem feci, numquam cogeretur vita carere quam dedi; sed quia terra es, id est, secundum carnem quae de terra sumpta est, non secundum me, qui te de terra sumpsi, vivere voluisti; laborabis in terra, donec revertaris in eam; et ideo reverteris in terram, quia terra es; et iusta poena ibis in terram de qua factus es, quia spiritui non obedisti a quo factus es. Iste intellectus sanus atque catholicus praecipue inde cognoscitur, quia non cogit mortibus implere terram viventium, terramque felicium malis omnibus laboriosissimis et gravissimis, quae homines in hoc corpore corruptibili patiuntur, et ea non ferendo ut moriantur urgentur. Non enim potestis dicere, leniter homines in paradiso fuisse morituros, si nemo peccasset; quia et hoc contra vos est. Si enim tunc leniter morerentur, et nunc tam aspere moriuntur, per peccatum hominis mutata est humana natura; quod vos negantes, consequenter cogimini tales omnino mortes, quales nunc sunt, loco illius tantae felicitatis et iucunditatis immittere; ac per hoc et innumerabilia genera morborum, tam gravia, tamque intolerabilia, ut eis homines compellantur in mortem. Quae paradisi facies si vestras facies aliquo pudore perfundit atque confundit; qui non vultis confiteri nostram per peccatum mutari potuisse naturam, vestram potius mutate sententiam; et corpus mortuum propter peccatum cum Apostolo confitemini . Dicite cum Ecclesia Dei: A muliere initium factum est peccati, et propter illam morimur omnes . Agnoscite cum Ecclesia Dei, quia corpus corruptibile aggravat animam . Non enim ante peccatum in paradiso tale erat corpus, ut illo anima gravaretur. Cantate cum Ecclesia Dei: Homo vanitati similis factus est, dies eius velut umbra praetereunt . Neque enim qui est ad similitudinem Dei factus, fieret nisi per peccatum similis vanitati, ut aetatum cursu et mortis incursu, velut umbra dies illius praeterirent. Nolite luci serenissimae veritatis nubila vestri erroris offundere; paradisum Dei corda fidelium, quem debent amare, non debent amaricare. Quid enim vos offendit, obsecro, quid vos offendit ille memorabilis beatorum et quietorum locus, ut eum mortibus hominum, et per has malis omnibus quibus abundare cernimus angustias necessitatesque morientium, oculis clausis, fronte impudentissima, mente pertinacissima, lingua loquacissima, velitis implere; ne cogamini confiteri in has miserias, quibus videtis refertum genus humanum a vagitibus parvulorum usque ad anhelitus decrepitorum, per peccatum maximum primi hominis humanam corruisse naturam? Et quia iniustum esse respicitis parentum in posteros sine culpa transire poenam, transisse concedatis et culpam. Maximam quippe culpam primi hominis exstitisse, quam tu propterea, quantum potuisti, extenuare conatus es, ne propter illam crederetur natura humana potuisse mutari; ergo illam culpam maximam fuisse, non solum per ipsas miserias generis humani, quae ab infantium cunabulis incipiunt, verum etiam per te ipsum probo. Et tu enim in secundo tui huius operis libro maximam formam peccati in primo homine posuisti, ut e contrario maxima forma iustitiae commendaretur in Christo ; quod te dixisse mihi videris oblitus; nam si memor fuisses, numquam profecto peccatum Adae tam loquaciter minuere nitereris. Ego autem maximum illud peccatum fuisse poenae ipsius granditate demonstro; non enim est maior, quam ut de paradiso proiceretur, et a ligno vitae separaretur ne viveret in aeternum; additis etiam huius angoribus vitae, ut dies eius et in laboribus gemerent, et sicut umbra transirent. Enimvero haereditaria ipsa generis humani, ab infantibus usque ad senes, calamitas testis est; quae miseriae non haberent conditionem supplicii, nisi traherentur contagione peccati. De qua contagione nobiscum pertinaciter pugnas, et ne ista credatur, et ipsum peccatum primi hominis, et supplicium eius extenuas, et dolores, labores, et mortes in paradisum introducere impudentissima et impiissima contentione conaris. Dicis etiam: Si propter hoc maledicitur terrae, ut ille qui peccaverat affligatur, nec tamen ibi iniquitas, ubi maledictio continetur; cur non ea conditione etiam, si quid aerumnarum naturae nostrae post peccatum primi hominis doceretur illatum, sequeretur tamen non ideo miseros esse nascendos, ut rei convincerentur; sed ut commemoratione peccati primi afflictio succedanea, his quos reos non fecerat, imitationis malae indiceret cautionem? Video quibus premaris angustiis. Miserias nascentium cogeris confiteri, quoniam vim tibi facit rerum evidentia, quam prae oculis omnium constitutam negare non sineris; has autem miserias nascentium, etiam in paradiso futuras fuisse, si nemo peccasset, vis quidem asserere; sed cernis te hominibus qualecumque cor habentibus, id persuadere non posse. Remanet igitur, ut propter peccatum primi hominis genus humanum fatearis miserum effectum; sed hoc absolute dicere formidans: Si quid aerumnarum - inquis - naturae nostrae post peccatum primi hominis doceretur illatum. Quid est: Si quid doceretur? Itane vero res manifestissima, quam tu quoque iam sentire compelleris, non docetur? An eo redeundum est, unde per haec verba sensim fugere meditaris; intellegens quam intolerabili absurditate credatur nascentium miserias etiam in paradiso futuras fuisse, si nemo peccasset? Quod si dicere horrescis, quoniam revera vehementer horrendum est; cur dicis: etiamsi doceretur; cum sine ulla dubitatione doceatur, non aliquid aerumnarum, sed omnes aerumnas nascentium post peccatum primi hominis, immo propter peccatum primi hominis, nostrae illatas esse naturae? Sed: Non- inquis - ideo sunt miseri nascentes, ut esse rei convincantur. Nec ego dico: Ideo miseri sunt nascentes, ut convincantur rei; sed dico potius: Ideo convincuntur rei esse, quoniam sunt miseri. Iustus est enim Deus, quod assidue contra te dicis, et nescis; iustus est, inquam, Deus; et ideo nascentes nec facere nec fieri sineret miseros, nisi nosset reos. Unde non aliter fides catholica intellegit quod ait Apostolus: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt . Quod tu nolens referre ad originis nexum, detorquere conaris ad imitationis exemplum; ex quo fit, ut cum tibi dicitur: Cur ergo miserias generis humani in ipso incipientis aetatis exordio, innumeris et diversis malis suis protestantur infantes, qui nulla imitatione peccarunt? Tamquam gravissima et inevitabili pressura stomachi, in hos vomitus erumpas, et dicas: Non quia rei sunt, ideo sunt miseri qui nascuntur; sed ut hac miseria commoniti, caveant peccatum primi hominis imitari. Sic enim putavi planius et explicatius esse dicendum, quod tu obscurius perplexiusque dixisti. Sed quomodolibet hoc dicas, quis non videat studio defendendae opinionis tuae omnino te attendere nolle quid dicas? Ideone fuerant, quaeso te, homines innocentes plectendi miseria, non quod ullum peccatum haberent, sed ut non haberent? Debuit ergo et Eva prius fieri misera quam rea, ut miseria sua commoneretur non consentire serpenti. Debuit et Adam prius puniri malo miseriae, ne ad malum peccati seductae consentiret uxori. Placet enim tibi, ut poenis praecedentibus crimina caveantur, non ut sequentibus vindicentur; ac sic inverse, non quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur, non reatus, sed innocentia puniatur. Corrige, obsecro, perversam, praeposteramque sententiam; quia utique tunicam corrigeres, si te dextra in sinistra forte vestires. Hoc dixi, quoniam peccata, ne sequantur, suppliciis praecedentibus vis caveri; cum soleant et debeant suppliciis sequentibus peccata praecedentia vindicari. Deinde dic nobis, quomodo calamitosos commoneamus infantes, ut intueantur miseriam suam, ne peccatum primi hominis imitentur; qui nec imitari quemquam, nec commoneri adhuc possunt. Maledicta enim terra (unde ad hoc tuum deliramentum sumis exemplum, quia sic potuerunt nascentes effici miseri, ut caverent peccata gignentium, quamvis non ex eis trahant originale peccatum, quemadmodum terra maledicta est propter hominis poenam, quamvis ipsa non habens culpam) cur non attendis quia sicut non habet culpam, sic ex illa maledictione non habet poenam; sed peccantis hominis cum maledicitur terra, ipsa fit poena? Nascentes autem cum miseri sunt, ipsi sentiunt miserias suas; ipsi nullum, sicut putatis, trahentes peccatum; immeritas, si hoc ita est, procul dubio sustinent poenas, qui nec admoneri adhuc, ut dixi, aliquid possunt, nec peccatum primi hominis imitari, propter quod debeant admoneri. An exspectandum est ut crescendo perveniant ad liberum arbitrium, quando sentiant admonentem, atque intuendo miseriam suam, culpam non imitentur alienam? Sed ubi ponimus tam multos qui usque ad diem mortis suae quis fuerit, vel utrum fuerit, vel quid admiserit Adam nesciunt? Ubi ponimus tam multos qui prius moriuntur, quam perveniant ad aetatem, in qua sentiant commonentem? Ubi ponimus eos qui tam insulso ac fatuo nascuntur ingenio, ut nec grandes possint cum aliquo fructu tale aliquid admoneri? Nempe hi omnes tanta miseria sine ullo merito, sine ulla utilitate plectuntur. Ubi est iustitia Dei? Quam si cogitares, numquam crederes sine ullo merito peccati originalis tam miseros esse nascentes. Sed quoniam cum conditione locutus es; non enim aisti: Quoniam docetur, sed aisti: Si quid doceretur aerumnarum post peccatum primi hominis nostrae illatum esse naturae; paratus es, ut arbitror, dicere: Non docetur. Ac per hoc restat ut dicas, mala quae videmus parvulos perpeti, etiam in paradiso futura fuisse, si nemo peccasset, ne propter peccatum primi hominis ea fatearis exorta. Ita cum hos nodos quaeris evadere, et fieri ex nostris manibus labilis, contra paradisum stabis immobilis; cui sic es contrarius, ut eius felicitati et quieti turbandae, et dolores parturientium, et labores operantium, et iactationes aegrotantium, morbosque morientium, audacissimo ore et fronte perditissima immittas. Sed in laude mortis magnum te putas aliquid invenisse quod diceres: Prima, scilicet, occasione claruisse, malum non esse mortem, quod eam iustus primus omnium dedicavit. Ergo redde rationem, quomodo non haberet quam dedicaret iustus, nisi hanc aedificaret iniustus. Auctor quippe et effector mortis illius Cain exstitit, non Abel. Ille itaque dedicavit, qui fabricavit. Mors enim hominis boni, malum opus fuit hominis mali. Iste autem qui pro bono malum pertulit, non mortem, sed martyrium dedicavit, gerens eius figuram, quem populus Iudaeorum tamquam malus frater carnalis occidit. Propterea itaque gloriosus Abel, non quia aliquid boni sumpsit a fratre, sed quia patienter pro iustitia moriendo, malo eius usus est bene. Nam sicut bono legis male utendo praevaricatores puniuntur; ita e contrario malo mortis bene utendo martyres coronantur. Proinde si non dedignaris dicere, quod te cerno nescire, mors in morientibus omnibus mala est; in mortuis autem quibusdam mala, quibusdam bona. Hoc secuti sunt, qui de bono mortis laudabiles disputationes etiam litteris mandaverunt. Mors ergo iusti Abelis habitantis in requie, non solum mala non est, verum etiam bona est. Tu autem in paradisum non bonorum mortuorum requiem, sed cruciatus morientium, ne bonorum ibi requies esset, intulisti. Aut si dicis: Si nemo peccasset, in paradiso sine cruciatu homines morerentur; saltem quia extra paradisum non fere quisquam sine cruciatu moritur, tandem convictus atque contortus, in deterius commutatam peccato primi hominis humanam confitere naturam.
Augustine: Surely your so long and most laborious disputation about the penalty of the first man does nothing, except that, this being extenuated, the fault itself too may be extenuated, which was condemned by the infliction of this penalty. And you do this on account of the words of my book, to which you reply, which you propose to yourself as if to be refuted, where I said: That sin, then, which changed the human being himself in paradise for the worse, because it is much greater than we can judge, is drawn from everyone being born. So, then, lest that great sin seem to be such that the nature could be changed for the worse by it, you contend that the punishment which it merited is light and almost none. Hence it is that you twist the earth cursed in the works of the transgressor to the depravity of your dogma; hence it is that you assert that thorns and thistles were established even before the human being sinned; whereas God does not name these among his first institutions, but threatens them in the punishment of the sinner; hence it is that the sweat of the one laboring, lest it should seem to pertain much to trouble, you said was even a natural aid, namely that the limbs of those working be refreshed by sweat; as though God, in saying these things, did not inflict a punishment for sin, but bestowed in addition a reward. Although we would say this fittingly, if you so praised the sweat of labor as to say it was then established; but now you affirm that the human being was placed in paradise even before sin in such a way that he was not without labor in working the earth; as though that firmness, and no infirmity of the body, could not work, not only without labor, but even with pleasure of the mind, that which could delight. But why you said this you could not conceal; for you speak most openly, when you add: What new thing do we say befell the one who felt sweat, who experienced labor? Did it so please you to send into the most quiet place of the blessed not only the sorrows of parturition in women, but also the sweat of labor in men, that you would say nothing new befell the one condemned, with God condemning? Do you so mock and despise the severity of God, that what he inflicted as a penalty, you assert was bestowed naturally? If you say nothing new befell the human being, to whom God said: In the sweat of your face you will eat your bread (Gen 3:19); deny that God said this in condemning. Or will you say: He indeed condemned the human being by these words, but nothing new befell the human being from this? Then he condemned, but this one was not condemned? Was the impetus of vengeance frustrated, as though God hurled a weapon and could not strike whom he willed? Nay, you say, he was both condemned, and nothing new befell him. Here it is difficult to hold back laughter. For if he was condemned, and nothing new befell him; then he was wont to be condemned, and through this he was wont also to sin; for he would not be condemned unjustly. Or, because no one doubts that he then first sinned, was he wont before to be condemned unjustly? For you have not confessed, as you said of the one giving birth, that at least this new thing befell the human being, that, as to the woman the pain of parturition, so to the man the sweat of labor was added; for in this way, by this addition which was not before, you would grant that something new befell him. But when you say: What new thing befell him?—whom yet you confess was condemned; what else do you affirm but that he was so wont to be condemned? Or if we do not say a thing is wont to be done, except what we know was done continually; surely you must grant that he was at least once condemned before, to whom you assert that nothing new befell, because he was so condemned. Where you see into what precipices you have advanced. Return, then, from the precipice of your laborious disputation, and do not bring labors and pains into the seats of happy joys, and into the place of ineffable rest. What of the fact that you try also to introduce the death of the body into paradise in such a way that you say it was promised, or rather indicated, to the transgressor as a benefit, where God said: Earth you are, and into earth you will go (Gen 3:19); as though the human being did not know that he had been so established that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he was to die; and God gave him this knowledge then, when he condemned him for the iniquity committed? For disputing about these words of God, where he says: In the sweat of your face you will eat your bread, until you turn into the earth from which you were taken; for earth you are, and into earth you will go. This indeed, you say, last part of the sentence, like that of the woman, pertains to indication, not to punishment; nay rather, as the matter indicates, it consoles the human being. For because above, you say, he had mentioned pains, labors, sweats, the feeling of which nature, the excess the person had taken on; lest this seem extended forever, the indicated term mitigates the sickness; as if he said: But you will not always suffer these things, but until you turn into the earth from which you were taken; for "earth you are, and into earth you will go." Saying these things, you try to persuade that the human being was so created that, even if he remained in the uprightness of life in which he was created, yet, mortal by the necessity of nature, he would at some time die; but that this was not indicated to him except at the time of his condemnation, so that his trouble, lest it be thought eternal, might receive consolation from the promised end. Adam, then, would think he was not to die, if God had not indicated this to him: but God would not have indicated this to him, unless the sinner had to be condemned; he would remain, then, in this error, by which he believed himself eternal, or never to die, unless, by the merit of sin, he came to the wisdom by which the human being knows himself. Do you perceive what you say? Take another. Beyond doubt Adam, not knowing that he was to die—which, unless he had sinned, he surely would not know—yet, if he had been unwilling to sin, even not knowing this, would be blessed, and, believing things contrary to truth, would not be wretched. Do you hear what you say? Take a third too. If, in the time of his righteousness, Adam believed he was not even going to die in body, if he had not violated God's precept, but learned that he was to die then, when he violated it; this we believe, which, when he was just, he believed; but this you believe, which he did not deserve to know except when unjust. Our error, then, stands on the side of righteousness, and your wisdom on the side of iniquity. Do you understand what you say? Take a fourth too. If God did not indicate to that blessed and just human being that the death of his body would be, but indicated it to the wretched and the sinner; it is more fittingly believed that he wished to torture him also with the fear of death, judging him, namely, worthy of this torment too. For, as nature itself cries out, death is more feared than labors; for all human beings labor that they may not die, if such a choice be set before them, that they die at once if they do not labor; but how rare is one found who would rather die than labor? Finally Adam himself, through so many years, preferred to labor, rather than, by not laboring and dying of hunger, to end at once both life and labor. For by what other natural sense did even Cain fear death more than labor? By what other sense do judges, by judgments not unjust nor inhuman, condemn lesser crimes to the labor of the mines, greater ones to death? But whence are the martyrs proclaimed with such great glory, that they died for righteousness, except because it is a greater virtue to spurn death than labor? On which account the Lord did not say: No one has greater love than that he labor; but: that he lay down his life for his friends (John 15:13). If, then, it is greater love to die than to labor for friends; who is so blind as not to see that the penalty of labor is less than that of death? Or if the human being ought to fear labor more than death; how is not nature itself wretched, which fears death more than labor? And you, not considering these things, say that the human being, his death being indicated to him, was consoled, lest he think his labor eternal; whereas, if your dogma were true, by which you affirm that Adam, even if he had not sinned, was to die, therefore this ought not to have been indicated to him before he began to be afflicted by the penalty of condemnation, lest God torture him with the fear of death before he had sinned; but then, when, after he sinned, he judged him most worthy of penalty, he would indicate also that he was to die, so that the just God, the avenger of the evil committed, might increase the same penalty even with the fear of death. Whoever, then, understands these words of God, by which Adam was punished, when it was said: Earth you are, and into earth you will go, according to the Catholic faith, and does not wish to introduce into paradise especially the death of the body, lest he introduce also diseases, by whose pitiable variety we see the dying afflicted, and be compelled to fill the paradise of holy pleasure and of spiritual and corporeal felicity, to which you are not ashamed to be opposed, with pains, labors, griefs; as you are compelled, and find no way by which you may go out, as long as you are unwilling to change so impious a dogma; he, then, who, as I said, receives and understands these words of God according to the Catholic faith, as he discerns the penalty of labor in that which was said: In the sweat of your face you will eat your bread, so he discerns also the penalty of death in that which follows: Until you turn into the earth from which you were taken; for earth you are, and into earth you will go; and thus receives the saying, as though it were said: I indeed took you from the earth, and made you a human being; and surely I could have brought it about that the same earth which I made living should never be compelled to lack the life I gave; but because you are earth, that is, you willed to live according to the flesh which was taken from the earth, not according to me, who took you from the earth; you will labor in the earth, until you return into it; and therefore you will return into the earth, because you are earth; and by a just penalty you will go into the earth from which you were made, because you did not obey the spirit by which you were made. This sound and Catholic understanding is especially recognized from this, that it does not compel us to fill with deaths the earth of the living, and the earth of the happy with all the most laborious and most grievous evils which human beings suffer in this corruptible body, and, by not bearing them, are forced to die. For you cannot say that human beings would have died gently in paradise, if no one had sinned; because this too is against you. For if they then died gently, and now die so harshly, human nature has been changed through the sin of the human being; which you, denying, are consequently compelled to send into the place of that so great felicity and joy such deaths altogether as now are; and through this also innumerable kinds of diseases, so grievous and so intolerable, that by them human beings are driven into death. Which face of paradise, if it pours over and confounds your faces with any shame; you who are unwilling to confess that our nature could be changed through sin, change rather your sentence; and confess with the Apostle that the body is dead because of sin (See Rom 8:10). Say with the Church of God: From a woman was the beginning of sin, and on account of her we all die (Sir 25:24). Recognize with the Church of God that the corruptible body weighs down the soul (Wis 9:15). For before sin, in paradise, the body was not such that the soul should be weighed down by it. Sing with the Church of God: The human being became like to vanity, his days pass away like a shadow (See Ps 144:4 (143:4)). For he who was made to the likeness of God would not become like to vanity except through sin, so that, by the course of his ages and the incursion of death, his days should pass away like a shadow. Do not pour over the most serene light of truth the clouds of your error; the paradise of God, which the hearts of the faithful ought to love, they ought not to embitter. For what offends you, I beg, what offends you that memorable place of the blessed and the quiet, that you should wish to fill it with the deaths of human beings, and through these with all the evils with which we discern the straits and necessities of the dying to abound—with eyes shut, with a most shameless brow, a most obstinate mind, a most talkative tongue; lest you be compelled to confess that, into these miseries with which you see the human race crammed, from the wailings of little ones to the gaspings of the decrepit, human nature collapsed through the greatest sin of the first man? And because you discern that it is unjust that the penalty of parents should pass into their descendants without fault, grant that the fault too passed. For that the fault of the first man was the greatest—which you for this reason, as much as you could, tried to extenuate, lest on account of it human nature should be believed able to be changed—therefore that that fault was the greatest, I prove not only by the very miseries of the human race, which begin from the cradles of infants, but also by you yourself. For you too, in the second book of this work of yours, set down the greatest form of sin in the first man, so that, on the contrary, the greatest form of righteousness might be commended in Christ (See Julian, book 2); which you seem to me to have forgotten you said; for if you had remembered, you would surely never strive so wordily to lessen the sin of Adam. But I demonstrate that that sin was the greatest by the very greatness of the penalty; for it is not greater, than that he should be cast out of paradise, and separated from the tree of life lest he live forever; with the anguishes of this life added too, so that his days both groaned in labors, and passed away like a shadow. Indeed the very hereditary calamity of the human race, from infants to the old, is a witness; which miseries would not have the condition of punishment, unless they were drawn by the contagion of sin. About which contagion you obstinately fight with us, both that it be not believed, and you extenuate both the sin itself of the first man, and his penalty, and try, with a most shameless and most impious contention, to introduce pains, labors, and deaths into paradise. You say too: If the earth is cursed for this reason, that he who had sinned might be afflicted, and yet there is not iniquity there where the curse is contained; why would it not follow, on the same condition too, even if something of troubles were taught to have been brought upon our nature after the sin of the first man, that yet it would follow that those being born are not to be wretched for this reason, that they should be convicted as guilty; but that, by the commemoration of the first sin, an affliction succeeding, to those whom it had not made guilty, might indicate a caution against evil imitation? I see by what straits you are pressed. You are compelled to confess the miseries of those being born, since the evidence of things does violence to you, which, set before the eyes of all, you are not allowed to deny; but that these miseries of those being born would have been even in paradise, if no one had sinned, you indeed wish to assert; but you discern that you cannot persuade this to human beings having any sort of heart. There remains, then, that on account of the sin of the first man you confess the human race made wretched; but, dreading to say this absolutely: If something of troubles, you say, were taught to have been brought upon our nature after the sin of the first man. What is: If something were taught? Is really a most manifest thing, which you too are now compelled to feel, not taught? Or must we return to that point, whence you meditate gradually to flee through these words; understanding by what intolerable absurdity it is believed that the miseries of those being born would have been even in paradise, if no one had sinned? Which if you shudder to say, since truly it is vehemently to be shuddered at; why do you say: even if it were taught; when, without any doubt, it is taught, not that something of troubles, but that all the troubles of those being born were brought upon our nature after the sin of the first man, nay, on account of the sin of the first man? But: Not, you say, for this reason are those being born wretched, that they may be convicted guilty. Nor do I say: For this reason are those being born wretched, that they may be convicted guilty; but I rather say: For this reason are they convicted to be guilty, since they are wretched. For God is just—which you assiduously say against yourself, and do not know; God is just, I say; and therefore he would not allow those being born either to make or to be made wretched, unless he knew them guilty. Whence the Catholic faith understands not otherwise what the Apostle says: Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed to all men, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12). Which you, unwilling to refer to the bond of origin, try to twist to the example of imitation; from which it comes about that, when it is said to you: Why, then, do infants, who have sinned by no imitation, attest the miseries of the human race in the very beginning of their age, by their innumerable and various evils? You, as by a most grievous and unavoidable pressure of the stomach, burst out into these vomits, and say: Not because they are guilty are those who are born wretched; but that, admonished by this misery, they may beware to imitate the sin of the first man. For so I thought it should be said more plainly and explicitly, what you said more obscurely and more perplexedly. But however you say this, who does not see that, in your zeal for defending your opinion, you altogether refuse to attend to what you say? Were innocent human beings, I ask you, to be punished by misery, not because they had any sin, but that they might not have it? Eve, then, ought first to have been made wretched rather than guilty, that by her misery she might be admonished not to consent to the serpent. Adam too ought first to have been punished by the evil of misery, lest he consent to his wife seduced to the evil of sin. For it pleases you that crimes be guarded against by preceding punishments, not avenged by following ones; and thus, inversely, not because there is sin, but lest there be sin, not guilt, but innocence is punished. Correct, I beg, this perverse and preposterous sentence; for you would surely correct your tunic, if perhaps you clothed the right side in the left. This I have said, because you wish sins to be guarded against by preceding punishments; whereas preceding sins are wont and ought to be avenged by following punishments. Then tell us how we may admonish calamitous infants to behold their misery, lest they imitate the sin of the first man; who can neither yet imitate anyone, nor be admonished. For the cursed earth (whence you take an example for this raving of yours, that those being born could so be made wretched that they might beware the sins of their begetters, although they do not draw from them original sin, just as the earth was cursed on account of the human being's penalty, although it itself does not have fault)—why do you not attend that, as it does not have fault, so from that curse it does not have penalty; but when the earth is cursed for the sinning human being, it itself becomes his penalty? But those being born, when they are wretched, themselves feel their miseries; themselves drawing no sin, as you suppose; without merit, if this is so, they beyond doubt sustain penalties, who can neither yet, as I said, be admonished anything, nor imitate the sin of the first man, on account of which they ought to be admonished. Or must we wait until, by growing, they reach free choice, when they may feel the one admonishing, and, by beholding their misery, not imitate another's fault? But where do we place so many who, to the day of their death, do not know who Adam was, or whether he was, or what he committed? Where do we place so many who die before they reach the age in which they may feel the one admonishing? Where do we place those who are born of so insipid and foolish a wit that not even when grown can they be admonished such a thing with any fruit? Surely all these are punished with so great a misery without any merit, without any usefulness. Where is the justice of God? Which if you considered, you would never believe that those being born are so wretched without any merit of original sin. But since you spoke with a condition; for you did not say: Since it is taught, but you said: If something of troubles were taught to have been brought upon our nature after the sin of the first man; you are ready, as I think, to say: It is not taught. And through this it remains that you say that the evils which we see little ones suffer would have been even in paradise, if no one had sinned, lest you confess that they arose on account of the sin of the first man. So, while you seek to escape these knots, and to become slippery from our hands, you will stand immovable against paradise; to which you are so opposed that, for disturbing its felicity and quiet, you send in, with a most audacious mouth and a most abandoned brow, both the pains of those giving birth, and the labors of those working, and the tossings of the ailing, and the diseases of the dying. But in praise of death you think you have found something great to say: namely that on the first occasion it became clear that death is not an evil, since a just man first of all dedicated it. Then render an account how the just man would not have what he might dedicate, unless the unjust man built it. For the author and effecter of that death was Cain, not Abel. He therefore dedicated it who fabricated it. For the death of a good man was the evil work of an evil man. But this man, who suffered evil for good, dedicated not death, but martyrdom, bearing the figure of him whom the people of the Jews, like an evil carnal brother, killed. For this reason, then, Abel is glorious, not because he took anything of good from his brother, but because, by patiently dying for righteousness, he used his evil well. For just as transgressors are punished by using the good of the law badly; so, on the contrary, the martyrs are crowned by using the evil of death well. Accordingly, if you do not disdain to say what I see you do not know, death is an evil in all the dying; but in the dead, an evil to some, a good to others. This those followed who committed to writing even praiseworthy disputations about the good of death. The death, then, of the just Abel dwelling in rest is not only not an evil, but is even a good. But you have brought into paradise not the rest of the good dead, but the torments of the dying, lest there be there the rest of the good. Or if you say: If no one had sinned, in paradise human beings would die without torment; at least because outside paradise hardly anyone dies without torment, at last, convicted and contorted, confess that human nature was changed for the worse by the sin of the first man.
JulianImp.6.27VI. 28. Iulianus. Quid postremo de ipso serpente dicetur? Diabolum maledictione illa punitum, an hoc commune reptile animal opinaris? Id est, illam sententiam quae ait ad serpentem: Maledictus tu ab omnibus pecoribus, et ab omnibus bestiis quae sunt super terram; super pectus et ventrem tuum ambulabis, et terram manducabis omnibus diebus vitae tuae , in diaboli supplicio, an bestiae huius quae vernis caloribus educitur de cavernis, arbitraris impletam? Si in huius serpentis, cuius species in corpus enode porrigitur atque ob illius culpae meritum dicas eam factam esse terrifagam; ergo et omnibus bestiis tradux iniquitatis incumbit, quam putas nisi per libidinem coeuntium non posse deduci; fitque ut etiam serpentum libidinem, iamque inde irrationabilium animantium, asseras a diabolo fuisse plantatam, retectaque sententia Manichaei nobis carmen inclangas. Sin autem quidquid ad serpentem dicitur, intellegibiliter in diabolo profitearis impletum; annues sine dubio, nec hoc quod ibi pro ultione profertur, indicium nunc reorum esse serpentum, nec diabolum terram edere corporaliter; sed etsi tunc ministerium draconis arripuit, atque hoc quasi telum, quo ad vulnerandum hominem usus fuerat, severitas postea paterna confregit; tamen peccatum in solius agentis voluntate resedisse. Cibos autem et spinas et sudores primo fuisse naturaliter instituta, post in aliquibus aucta iudicialiter, ad nostram vero aetatem sine peccati illius admiratione venisse; res tam apertae sunt, ut longiore penitus assertione non egeant.
VI. 28. Julian: Finally, what shall be said about the serpent itself? Do you think the devil was punished by that curse, or this common reptile animal? That is, that sentence which says to the serpent: Cursed are you above all the cattle, and above all the beasts which are on the earth; upon your breast and your belly you will go, and you will eat earth all the days of your life (Gen 3:14)—do you think it was fulfilled in the punishment of the devil, or of this beast which is led out of its caverns by the warmths of spring? If in this serpent, whose form is stretched into a smooth body, and you say that by the merit of that fault it was made earth-eating; then the propagation of iniquity lies even upon all the beasts, which you think cannot be drawn down except through the lust of those copulating; and it comes about that you assert that even the lust of serpents, and thence of irrational animals, was planted by the devil, and, the opinion of the Manichee being uncovered, you clang your song at us. But if you profess that whatever is said to the serpent was intelligibly fulfilled in the devil; you will without doubt grant that neither is this which is there brought forward for vengeance now an indication of guilty serpents, nor does the devil eat earth corporeally; but although then he seized the ministry of the dragon, and afterward fatherly severity broke this as it were a weapon, by which he had used to wound the human being; yet the sin resided in the will of the agent alone. But that foods, and thorns, and sweats were first established naturally, afterward in some increased judicially, but came to our age without the wonderment of that sin; these things are so plain that they need no further assertion at all.
JulianImp.6.28Augustinus. Quid est quod vipereas astutias tuas etiam de serpente contorques? Quis enim divini libri haec verba, quae commemorasti, congruenter intellegens, non videat in diabolum potius, qui serpente ad id quod voluit, ut potuit, usus est, quam in ipsum animal, qualecumque terrenum, illam prolatam fuisse sententiam? Sed quia non per seipsum, per serpentem autem seductorias loquelas diabolus operatus est, ideo ad serpentem locutus est Deus, quod significandae malitiae diaboli conveniret, et natura huius figura esset illius. Proinde quod dixit Deus serpenti: Maledictus tu ab omnibus pecoribus, et omnibus bestiis quae sunt super terram; super pectus et ventrem tuum ambulabis, et terram manducabis omnibus diebus vitae tuae, et cetera; tanto intelleguntur et exponuntur melius, quanto congruentius de diabolo accipiuntur. Sed quoniam secundum etiam rectam fidem, multis tamen modis de his disputari solet, nec ad causam nunc pertinet quid eorum magis eligam promere, satis est ut tibi respondeam, diaboli naturam nequaquam ad connexionem successionemque propaginis pertinere, ubi peccati originalis quaestio vertitur. De spinis vero et sudore laborantis, quam impudenter affirmes, quod priusquam peccaretur, fuerint instituta, credo quod persuadeat legentibus superior nostra responsio. Vultis quippe facere talem paradisum, ut nulla ratione dicatur Dei esse, sed vestrum. Verumtamen, cum ante peccatum spinas dixeris institutas, in paradisum eas non ausus es introducere; immo expressisti eas ibi non fuisse; ubi tamen laborem ponere voluisti, cuius onus etsi non pungit, premit. Verumtamen, si et tibi placet spinas non congruere paradiso; itane vero naturae humanae, ut ibi prius esset ubi spinae non sunt, et nunc ibi sit ubi sunt, nulla beatitudinis in miseriam mutatione contingeret, aut sine ullo peccati merito contigisset? Cogat ergo vos agnoscere originale peccatum, tale saltem, quale non potuistis negare supplicium, si non iniustum esse creditis Deum.
Augustine: What is it that you twist your viperous cunning even about the serpent? For who, fittingly understanding these words of the divine book which you mentioned, does not see that that sentence was brought forth rather against the devil, who used the serpent for what he willed, as he could, than against the animal itself, of whatever earthly kind? But because the devil worked his seductive words not through himself, but through the serpent, therefore God spoke to the serpent what would befit the signifying of the devil's malice, and the nature of this one was a figure of that one. Accordingly, what God said to the serpent: Cursed are you above all the cattle, and all the beasts which are on the earth; upon your breast and your belly you will go, and you will eat earth all the days of your life, and the rest; these things are understood and expounded the better, the more fittingly they are received of the devil. But since, even according to a right faith, these things are wont to be disputed in many ways, nor does it pertain to the cause now which of them I should rather choose to bring forth, it is enough that I answer you that the nature of the devil in no way pertains to the connection and succession of propagation, where the question of original sin is turned. But about thorns and the sweat of the one laboring, how shamelessly you affirm that they were established before there was sin, I believe our earlier answer persuades those who read. For you wish to make such a paradise that it can by no reasoning be said to be God's, but yours. Yet, although you said thorns were established before sin, you did not dare to introduce them into paradise; nay rather, you expressed that they were not there; where, however, you wished to set labor, whose burden, even if it does not prick, presses. But yet, if it pleases you too that thorns do not befit paradise; would it really befall human nature so that it was first there where thorns are not, and now is there where they are, with no change of blessedness into misery; or would it have so befallen without any merit of sin? Let it, then, compel you to recognize original sin, at least such as you could not deny the punishment to be, unless you believe God to be unjust.
JulianImp.6.28VI. 29. Iulianus. Tamen ne quid negligenter praeteriisse videamur, accipe aliud. Hunc parturitionum dolorem compertum est pro parentium corporibus viribusque variari. Barbarorum certe feminae, et pastorum, quae exercitatione indurescunt, in mediis itineribus tanta facilitate pariunt, ut non intermisso viandi labore fetus suos procurent, et statim vehant, quae nihil pariendi difficultate marcentes, onera ventris ad humeros suos transferunt; et generaliter inopia vilium feminarum, operam obstetricum non requirit; at e regione locupletes deliciis molliuntur, et quo plures habuerit quaeque sollicitos, eo amplius et discit et gestit aegrescere, putatque se tantis egere, quantis abundat obsequiis. Maritorum sane divitum manus numquam in sentibus aerumnam primi hominis experitur; quin immo fidentes copiis, indignum se putant momentum aliquod votis fertilitatis impendere, extra formidinem etiam famis possessionum dilatatione sistentes, mandant aliquoties, ut ait poeta: Deiunge boves, dum tubera mittas . Si ergo et parientium dolor spectat ad instituta naturae, quod et brutorum exemplo animalium, et sententiae divinae proprietate perdoctum est; si interceptio fructuum, et exortus spinarum inter cetera quidem creatus est, personis tamen quibusdam factus est densior et molestior; si postremo, ut difficultas ipsa parientis, ita etiam glebarum spinositas pro corporibus regionibusque variatur; postremo, si perdurat ille angor post gratiam in visceribus feminarum, hunc vero opulentorum luxuries penitus ignorat; si resolutio corporis propter quid secutura esset, expressum est, et artibus magis quam erroribus applicata; apparet hic quoque Catholicorum veritati omnia consonare, nec quidquam vobis vel feminas prodesse, vel spinas.
VI. 29. Julian: Yet, lest we seem to have negligently passed over anything, take another point. It is found that this pain of parturition is varied according to the bodies and strengths of the parents. Surely the women of barbarians, and of shepherds, who are hardened by exercise, give birth in the midst of journeys with such ease that, without interrupting the labor of traveling, they care for their offspring, and at once carry them—they who, withering not at all from the difficulty of giving birth, transfer the burdens of the belly to their shoulders; and generally the poverty of lowly women does not require the work of midwives; but on the other side the rich are softened by delicacies, and the more attendants each has solicitous about her, the more she both learns and longs to be sick, and thinks she needs as much service as she abounds in. The hands of rich husbands, surely, never experience the trouble of the first man among brambles; nay rather, trusting in their resources, they think it unworthy to spend any moment on the prayers of fertility, and, beyond the fear even of hunger, settling themselves by the enlargement of their possessions, they sometimes command, as the poet says: Unyoke the oxen, while you cast in the truffles (See Juvenal, Satires 5.142). If, then, both the pain of those giving birth looks to the institutions of nature—which is taught both by the example of brute animals and by the property of the divine sentence; if the interception of fruits, and the springing up of thorns, was indeed created among the rest, yet became denser and more troublesome for certain persons; if, finally, as the very difficulty of the one giving birth, so also the thorniness of the clods is varied according to bodies and regions; finally, if that anguish persists after grace in the bowels of women, but the luxury of the wealthy is utterly ignorant of it; if the reason why the dissolution of the body would follow was expressed, and applied to skills rather than to errors; here too it appears that all things harmonize with the truth of the Catholics, and that neither the women nor the thorns profit you anything.
JulianImp.6.29Augustinus. Cum de poena, quam Deus inflixit primis peccatoribus, disputares, sic iamdudum a muliere transieras, ut diceres: Sufficiant ista de muliere. Cur ergo non servasti fidem promissionis tuae? Ecce post tam multa redis ad eam, ecce loquacitati tuae non sufficiunt, quae dixeras de muliere sufficiant. Sed nisi talis verbosus esses, unde octo libros, quos uni meo reddis, impleres? Sed dic quod tibi placet; ecce post promissam sufficientiam, abundantiam quoque tuam patienter audivimus. Cur enim perdas res tam bellas, quae postea tibi in mentem venerunt? Quamvis et illud venire debuit, ut de libro tuo, qui complendus adhuc in manibus erat, tolleres quod dixeras: Sufficiant ista de muliere; ne tuae pollicitationi tam indecenter contrarius legereris. Sed perge, profer in medium, contra quam promisisti, quae postea cogitasti. Dic parturitionum laborem pro parientium corporibus viribusque variari; atque ita describe barbaras rusticasque feminas in facilitate pariendi, ut nec parturire videantur; ac per hoc non parvum dolorem in pariendo sentire, sed nullum. Quod si ita est, quid te adiuvat? Nonne contra te ipsum loqueris, qui dolores istos ita naturales esse dixisti, ut sine illis Eva parere non posset, etiamsi in paradiso nulla iniquitate perpetrata persisteret? Numquid barbaras ac rusticas tuas illa prima muliere in hac re feliciores esse dicturus es, ut in his aerumnosis terris sine dolore pariant, quod in paradiso, si pareret illa, non posset? Tamquam in istis natura sit mutata feminea in melius quam fuerat instituta, plusque valuerit in ea mutanda humana exercitatio, quam in creanda divina operatio. Si vero in tuis verbis non vis intellegi sine doloribus parere feroces agrestesque mulieres, atque eis ita partum tolerabilem facilemque concedis, ut tamen eas cum pariunt, dolere fatearis; numquid ideo est nulla poena, quia minor est? Sive ergo minus doleant, cum pariunt istae feminae, sive aliis feminis aequales, vel earum etiam quibusdam maiores dolores, comparata per exercitationem fortitudine, mirabiliter ferant, nec illo cruciatu fatigentur atque languescant; dolent tamen, et utique omnes dolentes, seu magis seu minus doleant, maiores minoresve poenas, sed tamen poenas, sine ulla dubitatione patiuntur. Tu autem si te cogitares, non dico, Christianum, sed qualemcumque hominem, facilius nullum esse contenderes paradisum Dei, quam eum faceres tua sacrilega disputatione poenalem. Eleganter sane divites viros ab haereditario primi hominis labore defendis, ignorans, aut te scire dissimulans, amarius laborare cogitationibus divites, quam operationibus pauperes. Nomine quippe sudoris generalem sacra Scriptura significavit laborem, a quo nullus hominum est immunis, cum alii laborant operibus duris, alii sollicitantibus curis. Ad eosdem labores pertinent etiam studia quorumque discentium. Et quae parit haec, nisi terra haec, quam formator eius, quando primum hominem condidit, non fecerat onerosam? Nunc vero, sicut scriptum est: Corpus corruptibile aggravat animam, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem; et difficulter aestimamus quae in terra sunt, et quae in prospectu sunt, invenimus cum labore . Sive ergo utiles, sive inutiles quascumque doctrinas studeat homo discere, aggravante animam corruptibili corpore, necesse est laboret. Quocirca etiam sic ei terra ista spinas parit. Nec ab his spinis divites dicantur alieni: praesertim quia spinas illas in Evangelio, quibus iacta semina ne ad fecunditatem perveniant, opprimuntur, curas esse huius vitae et sollicitudines divitiarum Deus magister exponit ; qui certe non solos pauperes, verum etiam divites vocat dicens: Venite ad me, omnes qui laboratis. Propter quid autem vocat, nisi quod paulo post dicit: Et invenietis requiem animabus vestris ? Quando istud erit, nisi quando corruptio corporum, quae nunc aggravat animas, non erit? Nunc vero laborant pauperes, laborant divites, laborant iusti, laborant iniqui, laborant magni, laborant pusilli, a die exitus de ventre matris eorum, usque in diem sepulturae in matrem omnium. Tam quippe malignum est hoc saeculum, ut nisi exitum hinc fuerit, promissa requies nobis adesse non possit; quamvis per praevaricationem primi hominis labor posteris eius advenerit; tamen etiam reatu praevaricationis illius quem traximus iam soluto, ut fidei examen exerceatur, labor remanet ad certamen. Oportet enim nos certare cum vitiis, et in ipso certamine laborare, donec donetur nobis adversarium non habere. Quapropter ut boni praeliatores perducantur ad praemia, supplicia vertuntur in praelia. Parvulorum quoque, soluto reatu originali, propterea labores manent, quamvis ex ipso reatu doceantur exorti; quia etiam sic Deo placuit fidem probare maiorum, a quibus ei offeruntur ut regenerentur. Qualis et quanta fides esset rerum invisibilium, si invisibilis remuneratio continuo sequeretur; ac non potius dilata requie quae promittitur, ageretur fidei negotium cum corde, non cum oculis; ac sic futurum saeculum, ubi nulli labores erunt, quod nondum videmus, et crederetur sincerius, et desiderabilius quaereretur? Ac per hoc Deus labores nostros, id est poenas nostras, ad utilitates nostras mirabili benignitate convertit. Haec refellere cupiens inutiliter tu laboras; laboras enim pariendo spinas, non evellendo; nos autem laboramus ut spinas tuas, quantum donat Dominus, evellamus. Nisi forte ideo non laborare te iactas, quoniam tot libros magna ingenii facilitate conscribis, ac sicut illae barbarae ac rusticanae fetus suos, ita et tu sine difficultate spinas paris. Sed puto quod te de ingenii facilitate inaniter iactes; prorsus laboras: quomodo enim agis ut non labores, qui etiam conaris introducere in paradisum labores? Nam utique res ista quanto impossibilior probatur, tanto tuus labor et amplior, et inanior invenitur.
Augustine: When you were disputing about the penalty which God inflicted on the first sinners, you had long ago so passed away from the woman that you said: Let these things about the woman suffice. Why, then, did you not keep the faith of your promise? Behold, after so many things you return to her; behold, those things you had said do not suffice for your wordiness—those things which you had said about the woman should suffice. But unless you were so wordy, whence would you fill the eight books which you render to my one? But say what you please; behold, after the sufficiency you promised, we have patiently heard your abundance too. For why should you lose such pretty things, which afterward came into your mind? Although that too ought to have come about, that from your book, which was still in your hands to be completed, you should take away what you had said: Let these things about the woman suffice; lest you be read so unbecomingly contrary to your own promise. But go on, bring forward into the midst, against what you promised, the things you afterward thought of. Say that the labor of parturitions is varied according to the bodies and strengths of those giving birth; and so describe barbarian and rustic women in the ease of giving birth, as though they did not even seem to give birth; and through this that they feel in giving birth not a small pain, but none. But if it is so, what does it help you? Do you not speak against yourself, you who said that these pains are so natural that without them Eve could not give birth, even if she had persisted in paradise with no iniquity perpetrated? Will you say that your barbarian and rustic women are happier in this matter than that first woman, so that in these troublesome lands they give birth without pain, which in paradise, if she gave birth, she could not? As though in these the womanly nature were changed for the better than it had been established, and human exercise availed more in changing it than divine working in creating it. But if in your words you do not wish it understood that fierce and rustic women give birth without pains, and so grant them a birth tolerable and easy, yet in such a way that you confess that they feel pain when they give birth; is it therefore no penalty, because it is less? Whether, then, these women feel less pain when they give birth, or pains equal to other women, or even, for some of them, greater pains, which, by a strength gathered through exercise, they bear marvelously, nor are wearied and weakened by that torment; yet they feel pain, and surely all who feel pain, whether they feel more or less pain, suffer without any doubt greater or lesser penalties, but penalties nonetheless. But if you thought of yourself, I do not say as a Christian, but as a human being of any sort, you would more easily contend that there is no paradise of God, than make it penal by your sacrilegious disputation. Elegantly indeed you defend rich men from the hereditary labor of the first man, ignorant—or pretending not to know—that the rich labor more bitterly with thoughts than the poor with works. For by the name of sweat the sacred Scripture signified labor in general, from which no human being is immune, since some labor with hard works, others with harassing cares. To the same labors pertain also the studies of all who learn. And what bears these, except this earth, which its former, when he founded the first man, had not made burdensome? But now, as it is written: The corruptible body weighs down the soul, and the earthly dwelling presses down the mind that ponders many things; and with difficulty do we estimate the things that are on earth, and the things that are in our sight we find with labor (Wis 9:15-16). Whether, then, the human being studies to learn useful or useless teachings, with the corruptible body weighing down the soul, he must labor. Wherefore even so this earth brings forth thorns for him. Nor let the rich be said to be free from these thorns; especially since those thorns in the Gospel, by which the seeds cast are choked lest they reach fruitfulness, God the teacher expounds to be the cares of this life and the solicitudes of riches (See Matt 13:22); who surely calls not only the poor, but also the rich, saying: Come to me, all you who labor. But why does he call them, except what he says a little after: And you will find rest for your souls (Matt 11:28-29)? When will this be, except when the corruption of bodies, which now weighs down souls, will be no more? But now the poor labor, the rich labor, the just labor, the unjust labor, the great labor, the small labor, from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb until the day of burial in the mother of all. For this age is so malignant that, unless we have gone out from here, the promised rest cannot be present to us; although through the transgression of the first man labor came upon his descendants; yet, even with the guilt of that transgression which we drew already loosed, labor remains for the contest, that the testing of faith may be exercised. For we must contend with vices, and in the very contest labor, until it be granted us to have no adversary. Wherefore, that as good fighters we may be brought to the rewards, the punishments are turned into battles. For little ones too, with original guilt loosed, labors remain for this reason, although they are taught to have arisen from that very guilt; because even so it pleased God to prove the faith of the elders, by whom they are offered to him to be regenerated. What sort and how great would the faith of invisible things be, if an invisible reward followed at once; and if, rather than the promised rest being deferred, the business of faith were carried on with the heart, not with the eyes; and so the age to come, where there will be no labors, which we do not yet see, might be both more sincerely believed and more desirably sought? And through this God, by a marvelous kindness, turns our labors, that is, our penalties, to our advantages. Wishing to refute these things, you labor uselessly; for you labor by bringing forth thorns, not by plucking them out; but we labor that we may pluck out your thorns, as far as the Lord grants. Unless perhaps you boast that you do not labor, since you write so many books with great ease of wit, and, like those barbarian and rustic women their offspring, so you too bring forth thorns without difficulty. But I think you boast emptily of your ease of wit; you labor altogether: for how do you act so as not to labor, you who even try to introduce labors into paradise? For surely, the more impossible this thing is proved, the more your labor is found both more abundant and more empty.
JulianImp.6.29VI. 30. Iulianus. Haud sane impugnavero eos qui autumant Adam, si dicto audiens exstitisset, ad immortalitatem potuisse pro remuneratione transferri. Enoch quippe et Eliam translatos legimus, ne viderent mortem. Verum aliud sunt instituta naturae, aliud praemia obedientiae. Non est enim tanti unius meritum, ut universa quae naturaliter sunt instituta perturbet. Exercuisset se igitur in reliquis innata mortalitas, etiamsi primus ille in aeternitatem a diuturnitate migrasset. Non inficiabili coniectura, sed certo res tenetur exemplo, siquidem Enoch filii, immortalitate parentis non potuerunt asseri a conditione moriendi. Nec illud forte putetur occurrere, quoniam si non peccatores, iusti tamen omnes ad immortalitatem sine intercessu corporalis dissipationis evaderent: siquidem Abel iustorum primus, Noe, Abraham, Isaac, Iacob, et omnia sanctorum agmina, tam in Novo quam in Vetere Testamento, et meritum suum virtutibus, et naturam morte docuerunt. Rem in absoluto positam Christi quoque confirmavit auctoritas. Nam cum ei Sadducaei quaestionem exemplo septinubae mulieris intulissent, rogantes, si corporum excitatio crederetur, a quo marito esset potissimum vindicanda, respondit: Erratis, nescientes Scripturas, neque Dei virtutem; in resurrectione enim neque nubent, neque uxores accipient; neque enim morientur . Conscius operis sui, propter quid coniugia instituisset expressit, videlicet ut damna mortis fetura suppleret; statim autem cessatum ire munificam fecunditatem, cum mors avara cessaverit. Si ergo, Christo teste qui condidit, fertilitas ob hoc creata est, ut cum fragilitate confligeret, et haec conditio nuptiarum ante peccatum ordinata est; apparet quoque mortalitatem non ad praevaricationem spectare, sed ad naturam ad quam spectare leguntur et nuptiae. Illa ergo lex quae promulgata est, id est: Quacumque die ex interdicto ederis, morte morieris; poenalis mors intellegitur, non corporalis; peccatis, non seminibus imminens; quam non incurrit nisi praevaricatio, non evadit nisi emendatio. Die autem peccati quod dicitur inferenda, mos Scripturae est, quae damnatum solet vocare damnandum. Inde est quod in Evangelio Dominus: Omnis - inquit - qui non crediderit in me, iam iudicatus est; quia non credidit in nomine unigeniti Filii Dei . Non quod infidelitas Christum negans, ante tempus iudicii, supplicio iuncta esset perpetuo; cum omnes qui ad fidem veniunt, prius fuerint infideles; sed ut censura praecipientis appareat, dicuntur peccata iam esse supplicia. Denique Adam ipsum, et ille liber qui Sapientia dicitur, et multorum opinio, secuta emendatione asserit expiatum.
VI. 30. Julian: I will surely not assail those who maintain that Adam, if he had been obedient to the word, could have been transferred to immortality as a reward. For we read that Enoch and Elijah were transferred, so as not to see death. But the institutions of nature are one thing, the rewards of obedience another. For the merit of one is not of such weight as to disturb all the things that are naturally established. The inborn mortality, then, would have exercised itself in the rest, even if that first man had migrated from longevity into eternity. The matter is held not by indubitable conjecture, but by a sure example, since the sons of Enoch could not, by the immortality of their parent, be claimed from the condition of dying. Nor perhaps let it be thought to occur, that if not the sinners, yet the just at least would all escape to immortality without the intervention of bodily dissolution: since Abel, the first of the just, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and all the bands of the saints, both in the New and in the Old Testament, taught both their merit by their virtues, and their nature by death. A thing set in the absolute the authority of Christ too confirmed. For when the Sadducees brought to him a question by the example of the woman married seven times, asking, if the rousing of bodies were believed, by which husband especially she was to be claimed, he answered: You err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God; for in the resurrection they will neither marry nor take wives; for neither will they die (See Matt 22:29-30; Luke 20:35-36). Conscious of his own work, he expressed why he had instituted marriages, namely that offspring might supply the losses of death; but that bountiful fecundity would at once cease, when greedy death had ceased. If, then, with Christ who founded it as witness, fertility was created for this, that it might struggle with frailty, and this condition of marriage was ordained before sin; it appears also that mortality looks not to transgression, but to nature, to which marriages too are read to look. That law, then, which was promulgated, that is: On whatever day you eat of the forbidden thing, you will die the death (See Gen 2:17), is understood as the penal death, not the bodily; threatening sins, not seeds; which none incurs but transgression, none escapes but emendation. But that it is said to be inflicted on the day of sin, is the custom of Scripture, which is wont to call the condemned one the one to be condemned. Hence it is that in the Gospel the Lord says: Everyone, he says, who does not believe in me is already judged; because he has not believed in the name of the only-begotten Son of God (See John 3:18). Not that unbelief denying Christ was, before the time of judgment, joined to perpetual punishment, since all who come to faith were first unbelievers; but that the censure of the one commanding might appear, sins are said to be already punishments. Finally, that Adam himself was expiated, with emendation following, both that book which is called Wisdom, and the opinion of many, assert (See Wis 10:1-2).
JulianImp.6.30Augustinus. Si non oppugnas, ut dicis, eos qui existimant Adam, si dicto audiens exstitisset, ad immortalitatem pro remuneratione potuisse transferri, discerne immortalitatem, maiorem scilicet a minore. Nam et ista non absurde immortalitas dicitur, qua potest quisque non mori, si non faciat unde moriatur, quamvis possit et facere. In hac immortalitate fuit Adam: hanc immortalitatem merito praevaricationis amisit. Haec ei subministrabatur de ligno vitae, a quo non est prohibitus, quando legem bonam, ne peccaret, accepit, sed quando mala voluntate peccavit; tunc enim de paradiso eiectus est, ne extenderet manum ad lignum vitae, et manducaret, et viveret in aeternum. Unde intellegendum est de hoc ligno vitae solere sumere sacramentum; de ceteris alimentum. De solo enim ligno quod appellatum est dignoscentiae boni et mali, non manducare praeceptum est ei. Cur ergo putetur non manducasse de ligno vitae, quandoquidem et ceteris longe praestabilius erat, et illo solo excepto in quo peccavit, ex omnibus manducandi acceperat potestatem? Dei namque praecipientis haec verba sunt: Ab omni ligno - inquit - quod est in paradiso, edes; de ligno autem cognoscendi bonum et malum, non manducabis de illo . Itemque ista sunt verba damnantis: Quia audisti - inquit - vocem mulieris tuae, et edisti de ligno, de quo praeceperam tibi, de eo solo non edere . Quae igitur fuit causa ut non praecipue de ligno vitae manducare curaret, cum prohibitus non fuerit nisi ab illo solo, cuius usurpatione peccavit? Immo si vigilanter intellegamus, sicut de ligno interdicto manducando peccavit, ita de ligno vitae non manducando peccaret; quoniam ipse sibi vitam, quae ex illo ligno aderat, invideret. Illa vero immortalitas in qua sancti Angeli vivunt, et in qua nos quoque victuri sumus, procul dubio maior est. Non enim talis, in qua homo habeat quidem in potestate non mori, sicut non peccare, sed tamen possit et mori, quia potest peccare; sed talis est illa immortalitas, in qua omnis qui ibi est, vel erit, mori non poterit, quia nec peccare iam poterit. Tanta quippe erit ibi voluntas bene vivendi, quanta etiam nunc est voluntas beate vivendi, quam nobis nec miseria potuisse videmus auferri. In hanc immortalitatem, nullo ambigente maiorem, si ex illa minore dicas Adam remuneratione obedientiae, nulla interposita morte potuisse mutari; dices aliquid quod recta fides non debeat improbare; si autem sic laudas istam, ut neges illam; profecto et mortibus, et morientium cladibus, quas non ferendo urgentur in mortem, cogeris implere paradisi faciem; atque ita tuam decolorare, ut te velis fugere, si illam in speculo possis aspicere. Cur enim et posteri primi hominis in paradiso nati, et non solum boni, verum etiam beati, cogerentur mori, si eos nulla culpa de paradiso exire compelleret, ubi erat lignum vitae, et summa ex illo vivendo potestas, moriendi autem nulla necessitas? A qua necessitate translati sunt Enoch et Elias: in his enim terris erant, ubi lignum vitae non erat, et ideo eos ad huius vitae finem, communis omnibus necessitas mortis urgebat. Nam quo eos credendum est fuisse translatos, nisi ubi est ipsum vitae lignum, unde illis sit potestas vivendi, nec ulla moriendi necessitas; sicut esset in paradiso hominibus, in quibus nulla peccandi oriretur voluntas, quae illos ibi esse non sineret, ubi nulla aequitas mori cogeret? Quapropter exempla Enoch et Eliae nos potius quam vos adiuvant. Deus quippe in his duobus ostendit, quid etiam illis quos dimisit de paradiso, praestaturus esset, si peccare noluissent; inde namque eiecti sunt isti, quo traiecti sunt illi. Ubi etiam hoc eis Dei gratia credimus esse collatum, ne haberent unde dicerent: Dimitte nobis debita nostra . In his enim terris, ubi corpus corruptibile eorum animas aggravabat , ita confligebant magno agone cum vitiis, ut tamen si dicerent se non habere peccatum, se ipsos deciperent, et veritas non esset in eis . Qui sane creduntur ad exiguum temporis redituri in has terras, ut etiam ipsi cum morte confligant, et quod primi hominis propagini debetur exsolvant. Unde intellegendum est, quod ii qui peccatum nullum haberent, et filii eorum, si paradisi habitatores in eadem rectitudine permanerent, magis in illa immortalitate persisterent, donec in ampliorem, nulla interposita morte, transirent, si eis qui sic erant in his terris extra paradisum iusti, ut non possent dicere se non habere peccatum, id est, Enoch et Eliae tantam diuturnitatem vitae fateamur esse collatam. Sed Dominus - inquis - interrogatus de septinuba illa muliere, sua responsione firmavit, propterea nuptias institutas, ut damna mortis fetura suppleret; cessaturam vero munificam fecunditatem, cum mors avara cessaverit. Omnino erras, qui propterea putas instituta esse coniugia, ut decessio mortuorum suppleretur successione nascentium. Instituta sunt namque coniugia, ut filios patribus, et patres filiis, certos faceret pudicitia feminarum. Nam et permixto usu atque indiscreto quarumque mulierum, homines nasci possent; sed certa necessitudo inter patres et filios esse non posset. Si autem nemo peccaret, et ob hoc etiam nemo moreretur; sanctorum numero terminato, quantus futuro sufficeret saeculo, hoc saeculum finiretur, ubi et non peccandi et peccandi facultas esset, atque illud succederet, ubi quisquam peccare non posset. Si enim animae corporibus exutae, possunt esse vel miserae vel beatae, et tamen peccare non possunt; quis fidelium neget, in regno Dei, ubi erit corpus incorruptibile, quod non gravabit animam, sed ornabit, nec alimentis amplius indigebit, hunc affectum futurum, ut nullius ibi ullum possit esse peccatum, non id agente nulla voluntate, sed bona? Dominus ergo ubi dixit, cum de resurrectione loqueretur: Neque nubent, neque uxores accipient; neque enim morientur; non ideo dixit, ut propter morientes ostenderet nuptias institutas; sed quia sanctorum numero impleto, non opus esset aliquem nasci, ubi necesse esset neminem mori. Sed - inquis - Adam secuta emendatione a delicto suo asseritur expiatus, et libro Sapientiae, et opinione multorum; et tamen - inquis - mortuus est, ut sciremus corporis mortem non pertinere ad supplicium illius peccati, sed ad instituta naturae. Quasi vero David duo illa scelera gravia, id est, adulterium et homicidium, non sic expiaverit poenitendo, ut ei datam veniam propheta ipse qui eum terruerat, testaretur; et tamen ita ea quae Deus fuerat comminatus, legimus subsecuta, ut intellegamus ad hoc profuisse illam veniam, ne homo qui tanta mala commiserat, sempiterno pro eis supplicio plecteretur. Erat ergo et primo homini, ad quam rem proficeret paenitentia, id est, ut eum diuturna, non tamen aeterna poena puniret. Unde factum est, quod rectissime creditur, ut eum filius eius, id est, secundum hominem Dominus Iesus, quando ad inferna descendit, ab inferni vinculis solveret. Tunc enim, iuxta librum Sapientiae, intellegendum est eductus a delicto suo, ut hoc ille liber non factum dixisse, sed futurum praedixisse monstretur, quamvis per verbum praeteriti temporis; sic enim ait: Eduxit illum a delicto suo , quemadmodum dictum est: Foderunt manus meas , et cetera, quae ibi per verba praeteriti temporis futura esse dicuntur. Ac per hoc et morte corporis factum est, ut pro peccato poenam lueret temporalem; et paenitentia non nihil actum est, ut evaderet sempiternam; ubi plus valuit gratia liberantis, quam meritum paenitentis. Non est unde te munias adversus impetum veritatis, quo cum tuis machinis in clarissima luce prosterneris, nec in Dei paradisum et mortes et innumerabiles morbos, mortiferis cruciatibus plenos, immittere ulla penitus ratione permitteris. Crede Deo dicenti: Quacumque die ederitis ex eo, morte moriemini . Ea quippe die coeperunt mori, quo separati a ligno vitae, quod utique in loco positum corporali, corpori vitam subministrabat, necessitatem mortis conditionemque sumpserunt. Certe damna mortis, et mors avara verba sunt tua; saltem te ista verba tam dura et horrenda, ut paradiso Dei parceres, admonerent. Tantumne te offendit locus praedicatissimus beatorum, ut a te in eum et mors et damnifica et avara mittatur? O inimici Dei gratiae, inimici paradiso Dei, quo amplius progredi poteritis, quam ut sanctarum deliciarum dulcedinem amarissimis poenis impleatis, nihilque velitis esse paradisum nisi gehennam minorem?
Augustine: If you do not assail, as you say, those who think that Adam, if he had been obedient to the word, could have been transferred to immortality as a reward, distinguish immortality, namely the greater from the lesser. For that too is not absurdly called immortality, by which anyone can not die, if he does not do that whence he may die, although he can also do it. In this immortality was Adam: this immortality he lost by the merit of transgression. This was supplied to him from the tree of life, from which he was not prohibited when he received the good law, lest he sin, but when he sinned by an evil will; for then he was cast out of paradise, lest he stretch out his hand to the tree of life, and eat, and live forever. Whence it must be understood that from this tree of life he was wont to take a sacrament; from the rest, nourishment. For only from the tree which was called of the discernment of good and evil was he commanded not to eat. Why, then, should it be thought that he did not eat of the tree of life, since it was both far more excellent than the rest, and, that one alone excepted in which he sinned, he had received the power of eating from all? For these are the words of God commanding: From every tree, he says, which is in paradise, you shall eat; but from the tree of knowing good and evil, you shall not eat of it (See Gen 2:16-17). And likewise these are the words of him condemning: Because you have heard, he says, the voice of your wife, and have eaten of the tree, of which I had commanded you, of that one alone, not to eat (See Gen 3:17). What, then, was the cause that he did not take care to eat especially of the tree of life, since he was prohibited from none but that one alone, by whose usurpation he sinned? Nay rather, if we understand vigilantly, just as he sinned by eating of the forbidden tree, so he would sin by not eating of the tree of life; since he would begrudge himself the life which was present from that tree. But that immortality in which the holy angels live, and in which we too are to live, is beyond doubt greater. For it is not such that the human being has it in his power not to die, as not to sin, but yet can also die, because he can sin; but that immortality is such that everyone who is or will be there cannot die, because he can no longer even sin. For there will be there so great a will of living well, as there is even now the will of living blessedly, which we see misery could not take from us. Into this immortality, which no one doubts is greater, if you say that Adam could, from that lesser one, by the reward of obedience, with no death interposed, be changed; you will say something which a right faith ought not to disapprove; but if you so praise the former that you deny the latter; you will surely be compelled to fill the face of paradise with deaths, and with the disasters of the dying, by which, not bearing them, they are driven into death; and so to discolor your own, that you would wish to flee yourself, if you could look at it in a mirror. For why would even the descendants of the first man, born in paradise, and not only good, but also blessed, be compelled to die, if no fault compelled them to go out of paradise, where there was the tree of life, and the highest power of living from it, but no necessity of dying? From which necessity Enoch and Elijah were transferred: for they were in these lands, where the tree of life was not, and therefore the common necessity of death for all urged them to the end of this life. For where must we believe they were transferred, except where the very tree of life is, whence they have the power of living, and no necessity of dying; as it would be in paradise for human beings in whom no will of sinning arose, which would not allow them to be there, where no equity compelled them to die? Wherefore the examples of Enoch and Elijah aid us rather than you. For God in these two showed what he would bestow even on those whom he dismissed from paradise, if they had been unwilling to sin; for from there these were cast out, whither those were transferred. Where we believe this too was conferred on them by the grace of God, that they should not have whence to say: Forgive us our debts (Matt 6:12). For in these lands, where the corruptible body weighed down their souls (See Wis 9:15), they so struggled in a great contest with vices, that yet, if they said they had no sin, they would deceive themselves, and the truth would not be in them (See 1 John 1:8). Who indeed are believed to be going to return for a short time into these lands, that they too may struggle with death, and pay what is owed to the propagation of the first man. Whence it must be understood that those who had no sin, and their sons, if the inhabitants of paradise remained in the same uprightness, would rather persist in that immortality, until, with no death interposed, they passed into the ampler one—if we confess that so great a longevity of life was conferred on those who were just in these lands outside paradise in such a way that they could not say they had no sin, that is, on Enoch and Elijah. But the Lord, you say, asked about that woman married seven times, confirmed by his answer that marriages were instituted for this, that offspring might supply the losses of death; but that bountiful fecundity would cease, when greedy death had ceased. You err altogether, who think that marriages were instituted for this, that the departure of the dead might be supplied by the succession of those being born. For marriages were instituted that the chastity of women might make sons certain to fathers, and fathers to sons. For even by the mixed and indiscriminate use of any women whatever, human beings could be born; but a certain bond between fathers and sons could not exist. But if no one sinned, and on this account no one died either; with the number of the saints fixed, as great as would suffice for the future age, this age would be ended, where there was the faculty both of not sinning and of sinning, and that one would succeed, where no one could sin. For if souls stripped of bodies can be either wretched or blessed, and yet cannot sin; what one of the faithful would deny that in the kingdom of God, where there will be an incorruptible body, which will not weigh down the soul, but adorn it, nor will need food any more, this disposition will be, that no sin of anyone could be there, no will bringing it about, but a good one? The Lord, then, where he said, when he was speaking of the resurrection: They will neither marry nor take wives; for neither will they die; did not say it for this reason, that, on account of the dying, he might show marriages were instituted; but because, with the number of the saints filled, there would be no need for anyone to be born, where it would be necessary for no one to die. But, you say, Adam is asserted, with emendation following, to have been expiated from his offense, both by the book of Wisdom, and by the opinion of many; and yet, you say, he died, that we might know that the death of the body does not pertain to the punishment of that sin, but to the institutions of nature. As though indeed David did not so expiate those two grievous crimes, that is, adultery and murder, by repenting, that the prophet himself who had terrified him attested that pardon was given him; and yet we read that those things which God had threatened followed in such a way that we understand that that pardon profited to this, that the man who had committed such great evils should not be punished for them by everlasting punishment. There was, then, even for the first man, a thing to which repentance might profit, that is, that it might punish him with a long, yet not eternal, penalty. Whence it came about, what is most rightly believed, that his son, that is, according to the human being, the Lord Jesus, when he descended to hell, loosed him from the bonds of hell. For then, according to the book of Wisdom, he must be understood to have been led out from his offense, so that that book is shown to have said not a thing done, but to have foretold a thing to come, although through a word of past time; for so it says: She led him out from his offense (See Wis 10:1-2), just as it was said: They dug my hands (See Ps 22:16 (21:17)), and the rest, which there through words of past time are said to be future. And through this both by the death of the body it came about that he paid a temporal penalty for sin; and by repentance something was accomplished, that he might escape the eternal one; where the grace of the liberator availed more than the merit of the penitent. There is no place from which you may fortify yourself against the assault of truth, by which you are laid low with your engines in the clearest light, nor are you permitted by any reasoning whatever to send into the paradise of God both deaths and innumerable diseases, full of deadly torments. Believe God saying: On whatever day you eat of it, you will die the death (See Gen 2:17). For on that day they began to die, on which, separated from the tree of life—which, surely set in a corporeal place, supplied life to the body—they took on the necessity and condition of death. Certainly the losses of death, and greedy death are your words; let at least these words, so hard and horrible, admonish you to spare the paradise of God. Does that most famous place of the blessed so offend you, that by you both death, and that ruinous and greedy, should be sent into it? O enemies of the grace of God, enemies of the paradise of God, how much further will you be able to go, than to fill the sweetness of holy delights with the most bitter penalties, and to wish paradise to be nothing but a lesser hell?
JulianImp.6.30VI. 31. Iulianus. Porro iam satis multa de Genesi. Transeamus ad apostolum Paulum, quem opinionis suae Manichaeus et Traducianus opinantur. Cum ergo de mortuorum resurrectione dissereret, ait: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur . Hoc testimonium usurpasti tu, cum quo nobis causa est; sed quid eo confici putares, quia tu tacuisti, etsi suspicer, tamen confirmare vix possum. Quid enim spectat ad traducem, si omnes in Adam mori dicantur; cum Adam nomen hominis sit, tradux autem peccati et labis Manichaeae indicium? Nisi forte nihil aliud ipsum Adam, quam peccatum et esse, et sonare fatearis; ut hac appellatione Apostolus omnes mori in peccato pronuntiasse videatur? Sed hoc propalam insanum est. Quid igitur novum, si quia Adam sermo hebraeus nihil aliud indicat quam hominem (hoc enim interpretatio ipsius exprimit) dixerit Apostolus: In Adam omnes moriuntur, et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur; id est, secundum hominis qui moriuntur naturam, per virtutem Christi a mortuis excitantur? Huic sententiae qui inficiatur, insanit; eiusdem quippe auctoris virtute, qui in hac vita fecunditatem et mortalitatem instituit, universi excitabuntur e sepulcris, ut recipiat unusquisque propria corporis sui, prout gessit, sive bonum, sive malum . Hoc itaque dicto Apostoli, quo ait: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur; mortem corporalem quae iustis iniustisque communis est, an poenalem illam diabolo et impiis deputatam insinuari putas? Si naturalem istam simplicem, quae in sanctis etiam pretiosa est , quae non solum bonis et malis, verum etiam hominibus pecudibusque ex aequo accidit; hanc, inquam, mortem hic Apostolus indicavit; manifestum est quoniam nomine Adae naturam humanitatis, nomine autem Christi potentiam creatoris et excitatoris ostendit. Sin autem quod ait: In Adam omnes moriuntur; crimen hic velis intellegi, non naturam; suppetit expositio tam aperta quam certa, videlicet ut dixerit: Sicut omnes, id est, multi Adae imitatione moriuntur; ita omnes, id est, multi Christi imitatione salvantur. Aut ergo de communi morte locutus est, et naturam indicavit; aut de peccato, et imitationem accusavit. Sic enim et post pauca subiunxit: Sicut portavimus - inquit - imaginem terrestris, portemus etiam imaginem illius caelestis . Certe susceptio imaginis non poterat imperari, si naturalis in qualitate alterutra crederetur.
VI. 31. Julian: But now enough things about Genesis. Let us pass to the apostle Paul, whom the Manichee and the Traducianist suppose to be of their opinion. For when he was discoursing about the resurrection of the dead, he said: As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive (1 Cor 15:22). This testimony you usurped, with whom our cause lies; but what you thought was accomplished by it, because you kept silent, although I suspect it, yet I can scarcely affirm. For what does it look to, as regards propagation, if all are said to die in Adam; when Adam is the name of a human being, but propagation is the indication of sin and of the Manichean taint? Unless perhaps you confess that Adam himself is and sounds nothing but sin; so that by this appellation the Apostle may seem to have pronounced that all die in sin? But this is openly insane. What new thing, then, if, because Adam, a Hebrew word, indicates nothing but human being (for its interpretation expresses this), the Apostle said: In Adam all die, and in Christ all will be made alive; that is, those who die according to the nature of the human being are roused from the dead by the power of Christ? Whoever denies this sentence is insane; for by the power of the same author, who in this life instituted both fecundity and mortality, all will be roused from the tombs, that each may receive the proper things of his body, according as he has done, whether good or evil (See 2 Cor 5:10). By this saying of the Apostle, then, by which he says: As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive; do you think the bodily death, which is common to the just and the unjust, or that penal death assigned to the devil and the impious, is suggested? If this simple natural death—which even in the saints is precious (See Ps 116:15 (115:15)), which befalls not only the good and the evil, but even human beings and cattle equally—this death, I say, the Apostle indicated here; it is manifest that by the name of Adam he showed the nature of humanity, but by the name of Christ the power of the creator and rouser. But if what he says: In Adam all die; you wish here to be understood as crime, not nature; an exposition is at hand as clear as it is certain, namely that he said: As all, that is, many, die by the imitation of Adam; so all, that is, many, are saved by the imitation of Christ. Either, then, he spoke of common death, and indicated nature; or of sin, and accused imitation. For so he subjoined a little after: As we have borne, he says, the image of the earthly, let us bear also the image of that heavenly one (1 Cor 15:49). Surely the taking on of an image could not be commanded, if it were believed natural in either quality.
JulianImp.6.31Augustinus. Quis est tam negligens apostolicorum eloquiorum, ut non videat quod Apostolus de resurrectione corporis disserebat, ubi ait: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur? Sed tu ad dilatanda, non eloquia, sed vaniloquia tua, ubi nulla quaestio est, ingeris quaestionem, et quaeris a me illud quod dictum est: In Adam omnes moriuntur; de qua morte sit dictum. Prorsus de morte corporis dictum est, ista scilicet qua necesse est moriantur boni et mali, non illa qua mortui dicuntur qui eadem morte sunt mali; quas duas mortes, una brevi Dominus complectitur sententia, dicens: Sine mortuos sepelire mortuos suos . Est etiam mors, quae in Apocalypsi mors secunda dicitur , qua et corpus et anima igne cruciabuntur aeterno; quam minatur Dominus ubi dicit: Eum timete, qui habet potestatem, et corpus et animam perdere in gehennam . Quamvis ergo multae mortes inveniantur in Scripturis; duae tamen sunt praecipuae, prima et secunda; prima est, quam peccando intulit primus homo; secunda est, quam iudicando illaturus est secundus homo. Sicut in sanctis Libris multa Dei testamenta commemorantur; quod possunt advertere, qui diligenter legunt; sunt tamen duo praecipua, Vetus et Novum. Prima ergo mors coepit esse, quando Adam de paradiso eiectus est, et separatus a ligno vitae; mors secunda esse incipiet, quando dicetur: Discedite a me, maledicti, in ignem aeternum . Cum igitur de resurrectione corporis loqueretur Apostolus, ait: Per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum; sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur; sic et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur . Non itaque debemus inquirere, de qua morte agatur hoc loco; manifestum est enim de morte corporis agi; sed potius debemus attendere, per quem sit mors ipsa de qua agitur, utrum per Deum qui hominem condidit, an per hominem qui peccando causa huius mortis exstitit. Sed hoc, ut dixi, attendere debemus in promptu positum, non quasi abditum quaerere. Nam et hanc abstulit Apostolus quaestionem, apertissime dicens: Per hominem mors. Et quis est iste, nisi primus Adam? Ipse est quippe ille, de quo dictum est: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; cui e contrario Adam secundus opponitur, qui est forma futuri ; unde et hic dictum est: Per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum. Sic ergo est accipiendum quod ait: In Adam omnes moriuntur; ut non obliviscamur quod ait: Per hominem mors. Ideo quippe in Adam omnes moriuntur, quia per hominem mors; sicut ideo in Christo vivificantur, quia per hominem resurrectio mortuorum. Homo igitur, et homo; sicut ergo unus iste, sic unus est ille; ac per hoc, quia homo secundus est iste, homo primus est ille. Scimus Adam, sicut commemoras, hebraea lingua hominem dici; sed non hinc efficitur quod impudentissime persuadere conaris, ut in eo quod dixit Apostolus: In Adam omnes moriuntur, omnem mortalem hominem significasse credatur; ut scilicet non in illo primo homine, sed in eo quod mortales sunt, existimemus omnes mori. Noli obscurare clara, recta pervertere, implicare simplicia; in illo moriuntur omnes, per quem mors; sicut in illo vivificantur, per quem resurrectio mortuorum. Et quis est iste, nisi secundus homo? Quis ergo est ille, nisi primus homo? Proinde quis iste, nisi unus est Christus? Quis ille nisi unus Adam? Itaque sicut portavimus imaginem terrestris hominis, ita portemus etiam caelestis. Indicatur illud, hoc imperatur; illud quippe iam praesens est, hoc futurum. Et ideo illam portavimus imaginem conditione nascendi, et peccati contagione; hanc autem portamus gratia renascendi; portamus autem interim spe, re vero portabimus eam praemio resurgendi, et beate iusteque regnandi. Quae cum ita sint, mors quidem hominis ita instituti, et in eo constituti loco, ut non moreretur, nisi peccasset, sine dubitatione poenalis est; sed Deo per gratiam suam in usum nobis bonum poenalia mala nostra vertente, in conspectu Domini pretiosa est mors sanctorum eius. Per illam certant, sicut per disciplinam: Disciplina enim, sicut scriptum est, ad praesens non gaudii videtur esse, sed tristitiae; postea vero, uberiorem fructum, his qui per eam certarunt, reddit iustitiae . Tu autem, qui mortem corporis etiam in paradiso, etiam peccante nullo, futuram fuisse contendis, hostis es gratiae Dei, hostisque sanctorum, quorum mors pretiosa est, per illam certantium intrare atque habitare paradisum. Non enim mortem solam, id est, resolutionem animae a corpore, nolentis tamen spoliari, sed supervestiri, ut absorbeatur mortale a vita ; sed etiam omnes morbos, et omnia genera malorum, quae homines non valendo ferre moriuntur, quantum ad te attinet, in locum tantae felicitatis et quietis immittis; quod errore quanto facias video, sed qua fronte nescio.
Augustine: Who is so negligent of the apostolic words as not to see that the Apostle was discoursing about the resurrection of the body, where he says: As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive? But you, to expand not your words, but your empty talk, where there is no question, bring in a question, and ask of me about that which was said: In Adam all die; of what death it was said. It was altogether said of the death of the body, namely that by which the good and the evil must die, not that by which those are said to be dead who, by the same death, are evil; which two deaths the Lord embraces in one brief sentence, saying: Let the dead bury their dead (Matt 8:22). There is also a death which in the Apocalypse is called the second death (See Rev 20:14), by which both body and soul will be tortured by eternal fire; which the Lord threatens where he says: Fear him who has the power to destroy both body and soul in hell (Matt 10:28). Although, then, many deaths are found in the Scriptures; yet there are two chief ones, the first and the second; the first is that which the first man brought in by sinning; the second is that which the second man will bring in by judging. Just as in the holy Books many covenants of God are mentioned, which those who read diligently can notice; yet there are two chief ones, the Old and the New. The first death, then, began to be when Adam was cast out of paradise, and separated from the tree of life; the second death will begin to be when it will be said: Depart from me, you cursed, into eternal fire (Matt 25:41). When, therefore, the Apostle was speaking of the resurrection of the body, he said: Through a human being death, and through a human being the resurrection of the dead; for as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive (1 Cor 15:21-22). We ought not, then, to inquire of what death it is treated in this place; for it is manifest that it is treated of the death of the body; but we ought rather to attend through whom is the very death of which it is treated, whether through God who founded the human being, or through the human being who, by sinning, became the cause of this death. But this, as I said, we ought to attend as something set in the open, not to seek as though hidden. For the Apostle removed this question too, saying most openly: Through a human being death. And who is this, except the first Adam? For he himself is that one of whom it was said: Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; to whom, on the contrary, the second Adam is opposed, who is the form of the one to come (See Rom 5:12, 14); whence here too it was said: Through a human being death, and through a human being the resurrection of the dead. So, then, must we receive what he says: In Adam all die; that we do not forget what he says: Through a human being death. For therefore in Adam all die, because through a human being death; just as therefore in Christ they are made alive, because through a human being the resurrection of the dead. A human being, then, and a human being; as, therefore, this one is one, so that one is one; and through this, because this one is the second human being, that one is the first human being. We know that Adam, as you mention, is in the Hebrew tongue called human being; but it is not hence effected what you most shamelessly try to persuade, namely that in that which the Apostle said, In Adam all die, he be believed to have signified every mortal human being; so that, namely, we should suppose all to die, not in that first human being, but in the fact that they are mortal. Do not obscure clear things, pervert right things, entangle simple things; in that one all die, through whom death; just as in that one they are made alive, through whom the resurrection of the dead. And who is this one, except the second human being? Who, then, is that one, except the first human being? Accordingly, who is this one, except the one Christ? Who that one, except the one Adam? And so, as we have borne the image of the earthly human being, so let us bear also that of the heavenly one. The former is indicated, the latter commanded; for the former is already present, the latter is to come. And therefore we have borne that image by the condition of being born, and by the contagion of sin; but we bear this one by the grace of being reborn; we bear it, however, for the present in hope, but in reality we shall bear it by the reward of rising again, and of reigning blessedly and justly. Since these things are so, the death indeed of the human being so established, and set in that place, that he would not die unless he sinned, is without doubt penal; but with God, by his grace, turning our penal evils to good use for us, in the sight of the Lord the death of his saints is precious. Through it they contend, as through a discipline: For discipline, as it is written, seems for the present to be not of joy, but of sorrow; but afterward it renders a richer fruit of righteousness to those who have contended through it (See Heb 12:11). But you, who contend that the death of the body would have been even in paradise, even with no one sinning, are an enemy of the grace of God, and an enemy of the saints, whose death is precious, who through it contend to enter and dwell in paradise. For not only death, that is, the dissolution of the soul from the body—of the soul, however, unwilling to be stripped, but to be further clothed, that the mortal may be swallowed up by life (See 2 Cor 5:4)—but also all diseases, and all kinds of evils, which human beings, not being able to bear them, die of, as far as pertains to you, you send into the place of so great felicity and quiet; which by how great an error you do, I see, but with what brow, I do not know.
JulianImp.6.31VI. 32. Iulianus. Verum totum contextum loci ipsius ventilemus. Si - inquit - Christus praedicatur quia ex mortuis resurrexit, quomodo quidam dicunt in vobis quia resurrectio mortuorum non est? Si autem resurrectio mortuorum non est, nec Christus resurrexit; si autem Christus non resurrexit, inanis est praedicatio nostra, et vacua est fides vestra; invenimur etiam falsi testes Dei, quia testimonium diximus adversus Deum, quod suscitaverit Christum, quem non suscitavit. Si enim mortui non resurgunt, nec Christus resurrexit; si autem Christus non resurrexit, vana est fides vestra, quia adhuc estis in peccatis vestris; et qui dormierunt ergo in Christo, perierunt. Si in hac vita in Christo speramus tantum, miserabiliores sumus omnibus hominibus. Nunc autem Christus ex mortuis resurrexit primitiae dormientium, quoniam quidem per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum. Sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur. Unusquisque autem in suo ordine; primitiae Christus, deinde hi qui sunt Christi, qui in adventu eius; deinde finis .
VI. 32. Julian: But let us winnow the whole context of the passage itself. If, he says, Christ is preached as having risen from the dead, how do some among you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there is no resurrection of the dead, neither has Christ risen; but if Christ has not risen, our preaching is empty, and your faith is void; we are found also false witnesses of God, because we testified against God that he raised Christ, whom he did not raise. For if the dead do not rise, neither has Christ risen; but if Christ has not risen, your faith is vain, for you are still in your sins; and those, then, who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished. If in this life only we hope in Christ, we are more pitiable than all human beings. But now Christ has risen from the dead, the firstfruits of those who sleep, since indeed through a human being death, and through a human being the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive. But each in his own order: the firstfruits Christ, then those who are Christ's, who are at his coming; then the end (1 Cor 15:12-23).
JulianImp.6.32Augustinus. Ventilandum totum istum in apostolicis Litteris de corporis resurrectione locum ideo te suscepisse, ut haberes occasionem qua tuum multiloquium copiosa, si dici potest, egestate diffunderes, et ad tot libros implendos tibi evagandi spatia procurares, in ipsa tua prolixa et supervacanea disputatione clarebit.
Augustine: That you undertook to winnow this whole passage in the apostolic writings about the resurrection of the body for this reason, that you might have an occasion by which to spread out your much-speaking with a copious—if it can be said—poverty, and procure for yourself spaces of wandering for filling so many books, will become clear in your very prolix and superfluous disputation.
JulianImp.6.32VI. 33. Iulianus. Instruxit acerrime disputationem magister egregius, et spem nobis de consortio Mediatoris ingessit, asserens illum hominem, quantum spectat ad substantiam qua nobis iungitur, nihil exceptum habuisse, opinionemque quam infidelitas sciscebat, non minus Christo praeiudicare posse quam nobis. Sic ergo miscet negotium Christi et hominum, ut necesse sit in utraque parte credi, quod in altera censeatur. Opinati quippe fuerant per idem tempus homines, quia resurrectio mortuorum futura non esset; non tamen resurrexisse Christum negabant. Arripit hoc Magister Gentium, et pronuntiat necesse esse ut uni praeiudicio pars utraque sit pervia, et aut omnes homines resurrecturi, aut nec Christus resurrexisse credatur. Certe hanc vim in disputando Apostolus non haberet, si secundum Manichaeos et eorum discipulos Traducianos, carnem Christi a naturae nostrae communione distingueret.
VI. 33. Julian: The excellent master built up his disputation most keenly, and instilled in us hope concerning the fellowship of the Mediator, asserting that that human being, as far as pertains to the substance by which he is joined to us, had nothing excepted, and that the opinion which unbelief was decreeing could prejudge Christ no less than us. So, then, he mingles the business of Christ and of human beings, that it is necessary that in both parts be believed what is judged in the one. For human beings at the same time had supposed that the resurrection of the dead would not be; yet they did not deny that Christ had risen. The Teacher of the Gentiles seizes this, and pronounces that it is necessary that both parts be open to one prejudgment, and that either all human beings be believed to be going to rise, or not even Christ be believed to have risen. Surely the Apostle would not have this force in disputing, if, according to the Manichees and their disciples the Traducianists, he distinguished the flesh of Christ from the communion of our nature.
JulianImp.6.33Augustinus. Manichaei non sunt, qui carnem Christi a naturae nostrae communione distinguunt; sed qui nullam carnem Christum habuisse contendunt. Nobis itaque iungendo Manichaeos, anathemandos vobiscum atque damnandos, etiam eorum sublevas causam, dicens eos carnem Christi a naturae nostrae communione distinguere; quasi carnem Christum habere fateantur, quam quoquo modo a nostra carne distinguant. Dimitte illos multum a nobis, multumque et a vobis, in ista de carne Christi quaestione distantes; nobiscum age quod agis; quia nobiscum carnem Christi, etsi dissimiliter, confiteris. Nec nos enim eam a naturae atque substantiae carnis nostrae, sed a vitii communione distinguimus. Caro est enim nostra peccati; propter quod illa dicta est, non similitudo carnis, quia vera caro est; sed similitudo carnis peccati, quia peccati caro non est. Si ergo peccati caro, caro nostra non esset, quomodo, rogo te, similitudo carnis peccati caro Christi esset? An usque adeo desipis, ut dicas aliquid simile esse, sed cui simile sit non esse? Hilarium audi catholicum antistitem, quem certe, quidquid de illo sentias, Manichaeum non potes dicere; qui cum de Christi carne loqueretur: Ergo cum missus est - inquit - in similitudine carnis peccati, non sicut carnem habuit, ita habuit et peccatum; sed quia ex peccato omnis caro est, a peccato scilicet Adam parente deducta, in similitudine peccati carnis est missus, existente in eo, non peccato, sed peccati carnis similitudine. Quid ad ista dicturus es, improbissime, loquacissime, contumeliosissime, calumniosissime? Numquid et Hilarius Manichaeus est? Sed absit ut tuas accipere dedigner iniurias, non solum cum Hilario, ceterisque ministris Christi, sed etiam cum ipsa carne Christi, cui tantam facere non expavescis iniuriam, ut audeas eum coaequare ceterae hominum carni, quam carnem constat esse peccati; si non mendaciter dictum est, Christum in similitudine carnis venisse peccati .
Augustine: They are not Manichees who distinguish the flesh of Christ from the communion of our nature; but those who contend that Christ had no flesh. And so, by joining the Manichees to us, who are to be anathematized and condemned along with you, you even lift up their cause too, saying that they distinguish the flesh of Christ from the communion of our nature; as though they confessed that Christ had flesh, which they in any way distinguished from our flesh. Dismiss them far from us, and far from you too, differing in this question about the flesh of Christ; do with us what you do; because with us you confess the flesh of Christ, though dissimilarly. For neither do we distinguish it from the communion of the nature and substance of our flesh, but from the communion of its fault. For our flesh is the flesh of sin; on account of which his was called not the likeness of flesh, because it is true flesh; but the likeness of sinful flesh, because it is not the flesh of sin. If, then, the flesh of sin were not our flesh, how, I ask you, would the likeness of sinful flesh be the flesh of Christ? Or are you so foolish as to say that something is like, but that there is not that to which it is like? Hear Hilary, the Catholic bishop, whom surely, whatever you think of him, you cannot call a Manichee; who, when he spoke of the flesh of Christ: Therefore when he was sent in the likeness of sinful flesh, he says, he did not, as he had flesh, so also have sin; but because all flesh is from sin, namely derived from Adam the parent, he was sent in the likeness of sinful flesh, there being in him not sin, but the likeness of sinful flesh (See Hilary, On the Trinity). What will you say to these things, most wicked, most wordy, most contumelious, most slanderous one? Is Hilary too a Manichee? But far be it that I disdain to receive your injuries, not only with Hilary and the other ministers of Christ, but even with the very flesh of Christ, to which you do not dread to do so great an injury, that you dare to make it equal to the rest of human flesh, which is established to be the flesh of sin; if it was not falsely said that Christ came in the likeness of sinful flesh (See Rom 8:3).
JulianImp.6.33VI. 34. Iulianus. Numquam quippe diceret: Si mortui non resurgunt, nec Christus resurrexit; cui poterat referri: Sed Christus, quoniam de Virgine natus est, peculiariter resurrexit; homines autem, quia nati sunt de commixtione diabolica, non resurgunt. Verum ille protinus referret: Et quae fuit resurgendi vanitas, si nec spei nostrae nec magisterio parabatur? Quae enim esset ratio docendi, quae gravitas exempli, si natura in nobis dissimilis, et spe conregnandi, et vi careret imitandi? Procul igitur, et nimis procul fides Apostoli ab hac opinione consistit. Eodem plenus spiritu, quo etiam Petrus, scit Christum pro nobis ob hoc mortuum, ut nobis donaret exemplum, ut sequeremur vestigia eius . Et quia causam tanti mysterii, sacrificium novit et exemplum fuisse, pronuntiare non dubitat, immo diligenter inculcat, quia non accesserit homo Christus aliquo, a quo quisquam nostrum naturae suae praeiudiciis arceatur. Si - inquit - resurrectio non est mortuorum, neque Christus resurrexit. Si autem Christus ex mortuis resurrexit, quomodo dicunt quidam in vobis quia resurrectio mortuorum non est? Id est, si confitemini eiusdem illum secundum hominem, cuius nos, fuisse naturae, qua ratione vel in illo factam resurrectionem, vel in reliquis non futuram putatis? Praemissis conditionibus, implet ex omni parte sententiam: Nunc autem - inquit - Christus resurrexit ex mortuis; erit ergo resurrectio mortuorum.
VI. 34. Julian: For never would he say: If the dead do not rise, neither has Christ risen; to whom it could be reported: But Christ, since he was born of a Virgin, rose in a peculiar way; but human beings, because they are born of a diabolical commingling, do not rise. But he would at once report: And what was the vanity of rising, if it was prepared neither for our hope nor for instruction? For what would be the reason of teaching, what the gravity of the example, if a nature in us dissimilar lacked both the hope of reigning together and the force of imitating? Far, then, and very far, does the faith of the Apostle stand from this opinion. Full of the same Spirit by which Peter too was, he knows that Christ died for us for this, that he might give us an example, that we should follow his footsteps (See 1 Pet 2:21). And because he knows that the cause of so great a mystery was that it was a sacrifice and an example, he does not hesitate to pronounce, nay diligently drives home, that the human being Christ did not approach in anything by which any of us is barred by the prejudices of his nature. If, he says, there is no resurrection of the dead, neither has Christ risen. But if Christ has risen from the dead, how do some among you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? That is, if you confess that he was, according to the human being, of the same nature of which we are, by what reasoning do you think either the resurrection accomplished in him, or that it will not be in the rest? With the conditions premised, he completes the sentence from every side: But now, he says, Christ has risen from the dead; there will be, then, a resurrection of the dead.
JulianImp.6.34Augustinus. Resurrectionem mortuorum non esse putantibus, et tamen Christum resurrexisse credentibus, propterea dicitur: Si resurrectio mortuorum non est, neque Christus resurrexit; quia Christus ideo resurrexit, ut resurrectionis mortuorum aedificaret fidem, in carne resurrecturos homines ostendens, sicut ipse homo factus resurrexit in carne. Ac per hoc consequens erat, ut negarent resurrexisse Christum, qui resurrectionem non crederent esse mortuorum. Unde quia isti, cum quibus agebatur, illud negare non poterant; hoc quoque debebant ablata caligine confiteri. Nam si propter aliquam Christi differentiam, recte sibi homines videntur resurrectionem negare mortuorum, et tamen resurrectionem Domini non negare; possunt et alia dicere, quae multa reperiunt, quibus errorem suum defendere sibi videantur. Quid si enim, cum audierint: Si mortui non resurgunt, neque resurrexit Christus, respondeant et dicant: Sed ille non tantum homo, verum etiam Deus est; quod aliorum hominum nemo? Ille secundum ipsum hominem de Spiritu Sancto natus et ex Virgine Maria; quod aliorum hominum nemo: ille potestatem habuit ponendi animam suam, et iterum sumendi eam ; quod aliorum hominum nemo: quid ergo mirum, si a mortuis resurgere potuit; quod aliorum hominum poterit nemo? Si ergo ista dicant, quia Christum solum resurrexisse concedunt, ceteros nolunt; numquid ideo illas Christi tam magnas a ceteris differentias negaturi sumus, ut aliorum quoque mortuorum resurrectionem de Christi cum eis aequalitate persuadere possimus? Sic ergo nec istam differentiam denegantes, qua fatemur solam carnem Christi, non ut aliorum fuisse carnem peccati, sed carnis peccati similitudinem; non ideo tamen solam resurrexisse, sed aliorum quoque resurrecturam esse defendimus, et sic defendimus, ut dicamus quod Apostolus dixit: Si mortui non resurgunt, neque Christus resurrexit; resurrexit autem Christus; resurgunt igitur mortui. Neque enim quia non eadem sunt in utraque carne originis merita, ideo non est eadem terrena mortalisque substantia. Habet quidem differentiam suam similitudo carnis peccati, qua discernitur a carne peccati; sed absit ut Christus eis se disparem faciat resurgendo, quibus se voluit aequare moriendo. Non itaque propterea debemus similitudinem carnis peccati carni aequare peccati, quantum attinet ad differentiam pertinendi ad peccatum et non pertinendi, quia noluit esse inter utramque carnem differentiam resurgendi et non resurgendi, qui noluit esse non moriendi atque moriendi. Imitatio autem quam, suffulcis, ubi non opus est, quid ad istam causam valet? Imitatio quippe in voluntate est; sed cum bona est, praeparatur, sicut scriptum est, voluntas a Domino . Nemo ergo imitatur, nisi velit; moritur autem homo et resurgit, velit nolit. Verum et ipsa imitatio non semper tunc fit, quando eadem natura est imitandi, quae imitantis; alioquin Angelorum, quorum diversa natura est, iustitiam et pietatem non possemus imitari; quod tamen nos a Domino poscere in oratione, cum dicimus: Fiat voluntas tua sicut in caelo et in terra , etiam ipse confessus es . Nec Deum Patrem imitaremur, cuius a nobis longe diversa natura est; tamen Dominus ait: Estote sicut Pater vester qui in caelis est ; et per Prophetam dicitur: Sancti estote, quia ego sanctus sum . Non ergo ideo Christum non possumus imitari, quia ille in similitudine carnis peccati in hoc saeculo fuit, nos autem in carne peccati.
Augustine: To those thinking that there is no resurrection of the dead, and yet believing that Christ has risen, it is said for this reason: If there is no resurrection of the dead, neither has Christ risen; because Christ rose for this, that he might build up faith in the resurrection of the dead, showing that human beings will rise in the flesh, just as he himself, made a human being, rose in the flesh. And through this it was consequent that those should deny that Christ had risen, who did not believe there was a resurrection of the dead. Whence, because those with whom it was dealt could not deny that, they ought also, the fog removed, to confess this. For if, on account of some difference of Christ, human beings rightly seem to themselves to deny the resurrection of the dead, and yet not to deny the resurrection of the Lord; they can say other things too, of which they find many, by which they may seem to themselves to defend their error. For what if, when they have heard: If the dead do not rise, neither has Christ risen, they answer and say: But he is not only a human being, but also God; which none of other human beings is? He, according to the human being himself, was born of the Holy Spirit and of the Virgin Mary; which none of other human beings is: he had the power of laying down his soul, and of taking it again (See John 10:18); which none of other human beings is: what wonder, then, if he could rise from the dead; which none of other human beings will be able to do? If, then, they say these things, because they grant that Christ alone rose, but are unwilling that the rest do; shall we therefore deny those so great differences of Christ from the rest, in order to persuade them of the resurrection of other dead too from Christ's equality with them? So, then, neither, denying that difference by which we confess that the flesh of Christ alone was not, like that of others, the flesh of sin, but the likeness of sinful flesh; not for that reason do we defend that he alone rose, but that the rest too will rise, and so defend it that we say what the Apostle said: If the dead do not rise, neither has Christ risen; but Christ has risen; therefore the dead rise. For it is not because the merits of origin are not the same in both flesh, that therefore the earthly and mortal substance is not the same. The likeness of sinful flesh has indeed its difference, by which it is distinguished from the flesh of sin; but far be it that Christ should make himself unequal to them in rising, to whom he willed to make himself equal in dying. We ought not, then, to make the likeness of sinful flesh equal to the flesh of sin, as far as pertains to the difference of pertaining to sin and not pertaining to it, because he was unwilling that there be between either flesh a difference of rising and not rising, who was unwilling that there be a difference of not dying and dying. But the imitation which you prop up, where there is no need, what does it avail to this cause? For imitation is in the will; but when it is good, the will is prepared, as it is written, by the Lord (See Prov 8:35 LXX). No one, then, imitates, unless he wills; but the human being dies and rises, whether he will or not. And indeed imitation itself does not always take place then, when the nature of the one imitating is the same as that of the one imitated; otherwise we could not imitate the righteousness and piety of the angels, whose nature is different; which yet that we ask of the Lord in prayer, when we say: Your will be done, on earth as it is in heaven (Matt 6:10), you yourself too have confessed. Nor would we imitate God the Father, whose nature is far different from us; yet the Lord says: Be like your Father who is in heaven (See Matt 5:48); and through the Prophet it is said: Be holy, for I am holy (Lev 11:44). Not, then, for this reason can we not imitate Christ, because he was in the likeness of sinful flesh in this age, but we in the flesh of sin.
JulianImp.6.34VI. 35. Iulianus. Has vires exseramus in traducem, dicamusque: Si Christus, qui homo factus est, non habuit naturale peccatum, quomodo dicunt quidam in vobis quia imagini Dei pravitas dominetur ingenita? Si autem in natura malum est, et Christus, qui in eadem natura deprehenditur, sub regno diaboli est constitutus. Si autem ille creditur reus, inanis est praedicatio nostra, et vacua est fides vestra; inveniuntur autem falsi testes Apostoli, quia testimonium dixerunt adversus Deum, quod Filium suum, ex semine David secundum carnem, innocuum sanctumque formaverit, si eum maledicti seminis crimen infecit. Prorsus si in tali Christo speramus, miserabiliores sumus omnibus hominibus. Nunc autem Christus non minus verus homo, quam verus Deus, de Adam stirpe generatus, factus ex muliere, factusque sub lege, nullum fecit, et ideo nullum habuit peccatum. Apparet igitur crimen voluntatis esse, non seminis.
VI. 35. Julian: Let us put forth these forces against the propagation-theory, and say: If Christ, who was made a human being, did not have natural sin, how do some among you say that an inborn depravity has dominion over the image of God? But if there is evil in the nature, then Christ too, who is found in the same nature, is established under the kingdom of the devil. But if he is believed guilty, our preaching is empty, and your faith is void; and the Apostles are found false witnesses, because they testified against God, that he formed his Son, from the seed of David according to the flesh, harmless and holy, if the crime of the accursed seed infected him. Surely, if we hope in such a Christ, we are more pitiable than all human beings. But now Christ, no less true human being than true God, generated from the stock of Adam, made of a woman, and made under the law, did no sin, and therefore had no sin. It appears, then, that crime is of the will, not of the seed.
JulianImp.6.35Augustinus. Ex hoc certe quasi fundamine tota ratiocinationis tuae structura consurgit, quod primum posuisti, dicens: Si Christus, qui homo factus est, non habuit naturale peccatum, quomodo dicunt quidam in vobis quia imagini Dei pravitas dominetur ingenita? Istaque propositione convulsa et effossa, quidquid deinde tamquam subsequens addidisti, facillima labe subvertitur. Non enim sequitur ut si Christus, qui homo factus est, non habuit naturale, hoc est, originale, peccatum, nulla imagini Dei pravitas dominetur ingenita; quoniam non sequitur ut si nihil habuit pravitatis similitudo carnis peccati, nihil habeat pravitatis cui est ista similis, id est, caro ipsa peccati; immo vero id sequitur, ut si est similitudo carnis peccati, sit etiam caro peccati. Quia omne simile, alicui simile sit necesse est; et si solus habuit Christus veram quidem carnem, sicut ceteri homines, sed tamen carnis peccati non proprietatem, sed similitudinem; non solum necesse est ut sit alia cui haec similis sit caro peccati, sed omnium ceterorum hominum non sit nisi caro peccati. Quapropter etsi malum est in carne peccati, non est tamen in Christo, qui venit in carne vera, non tamen in carne peccati, sed in similitudine carnis peccati, carnem sanare peccati. Non ergo ille creditur reus, sed ab illo noster solvitur reatus, et originalis, et additus. Unde nec inanis est Apostoli praedicatio, qui non praedicaret in Christo similitudinem carnis peccati, nisi aliorum carnem sciret esse peccati. Nec vacua est fides nostra, qua vacuatur haeresis vestra. Nec falsi testes inveniuntur Apostoli, qui similitudinem carnis peccati discernunt a carne peccati, quod non facit haeresis vestra; et sic ex semine David evangelizant Christum, ut tamen de Spiritu Sancto natum asserant et Virgine Maria, non de carnis concupiscentia, ut similitudinem carnis peccati haberet, carnem vero peccati habere non posset. Nec miserabiliores sumus omnibus hominibus ista credentes; sed carnem Christi a carne peccati non esse discretam magna miseria credimus. Proinde argumentationem tuam vana conclusione determinas, dicens: Apparet igitur crimen voluntatis esse, non seminis. Hoc omnino inaniter intulisti; quoniam superiora, ex quibus eam confectam putas, consequentia non esse monstravi; et procul dubio, quia in paradiso esse possent, nulla esse post paradisum vitia nascentium, nisi mala voluntate primorum gignentium vitiarentur et semina. Cur non ergo potius tibi dicitur (ut nos veraciter, qua tu fallaciter usus es, eadem forma ratiocinationis utamur): Si Christus homo in similitudine carnis peccati ad homines missus est, quomodo non quidam in vobis, sed omnes vos dicitis, aliam cui sit ista similis, carnem non esse peccati, si non est alia caro peccati? Si Christus non habuit similitudinem carnis peccati, inanis est praedicatio eius qui hoc dixit, inanis est et fides Ecclesiae catholicae quae hoc credidit; invenitur autem et falsus testis Apostolus, qui testimonium dixit adversus Christum, quia similitudinem carnis peccati habuit, quam non habuit. Sed si hoc credimus, fidelibus non sociamur hominibus. Nunc autem Christus missus est in similitudine carnis peccati; quia solus veram carnem sic habuit, ut non esset caro peccati, sed eius similitudo; ac per hoc necesse est ut fateamur, carnem ceterorum hominum esse peccati, cui similis facta est vera caro Christi, sed non caro peccati.
Augustine: From this, surely, as from a foundation, the whole structure of your reasoning rises up, which you set down first, saying: If Christ, who was made a human being, did not have natural sin, how do some among you say that an inborn depravity has dominion over the image of God? And this proposition being torn up and dug out, whatever you afterward added as following is overturned by an easiest collapse. For it does not follow that, if Christ, who was made a human being, did not have natural, that is, original, sin, then no inborn depravity has dominion over the image of God; since it does not follow that, if the likeness of sinful flesh had nothing of depravity, then that to which it is like, that is, the flesh of sin itself, has nothing of depravity; nay rather, this follows, that if there is the likeness of sinful flesh, there is also the flesh of sin. Because everything like must necessarily be like to something; and if Christ alone had indeed true flesh, like other human beings, but yet not the property, but the likeness of sinful flesh; not only is it necessary that there be another to which this is like, namely the flesh of sin, but that the flesh of all other human beings be nothing but the flesh of sin. Wherefore, although there is evil in the flesh of sin, yet it is not in Christ, who came in true flesh, yet not in the flesh of sin, but in the likeness of sinful flesh, to heal the flesh of sin. Not, then, is he believed guilty, but by him our guilt is loosed, both the original and the added. Whence neither is the preaching of the Apostle empty, who would not preach in Christ the likeness of sinful flesh, unless he knew the flesh of others to be of sin. Nor is our faith void, by which your heresy is voided. Nor are the Apostles found false witnesses, who distinguish the likeness of sinful flesh from the flesh of sin, which your heresy does not do; and so evangelize Christ from the seed of David, that yet they assert him born of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, not of carnal concupiscence, so that he might have the likeness of sinful flesh, but could not have the flesh of sin. Nor are we more pitiable than all human beings by believing these things; but it is a great misery to believe that the flesh of Christ is not distinct from the flesh of sin. Accordingly, you determine your argumentation with an empty conclusion, saying: It appears, then, that crime is of the will, not of the seed. This you inferred altogether emptily; since the earlier things, from which you think it is made, I have shown not to be consequent; and beyond doubt, because they could be in paradise, there would be no faults of those being born after paradise, unless the seeds too were vitiated by the evil will of the first begetters. Why, then, is it not rather said to you (that we may use truthfully the same form of reasoning which you used deceitfully): If the human being Christ was sent to human beings in the likeness of sinful flesh, how do, not some among you, but all of you say that the other flesh, to which this is like, is not flesh of sin, if there is no other flesh of sin? If Christ did not have the likeness of sinful flesh, empty is the preaching of him who said this, empty too is the faith of the Catholic Church which believed it; and the Apostle is found a false witness too, who testified against Christ that he had the likeness of sinful flesh, which he did not have. But if we believe this, we are not associated with faithful human beings. But now Christ was sent in the likeness of sinful flesh; because he alone so had true flesh that it was not the flesh of sin, but its likeness; and through this it is necessary that we confess that the flesh of other human beings is of sin, to which the true flesh of Christ was made like, but not the flesh of sin.
JulianImp.6.35VI. 36. Iulianus. Confodiuntur nempe Manichaei, et peccatum naturale credentes, et resurrectionem carnis negantes. Nunc autem - inquit - Christus resurrexit a mortuis primitiae dormientium; quoniam quidem per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum . De resurrectione hic Apostolus non generali loquitur, quam experturi sunt etiam scelesti, etiam profani homines; sed de eorum tantummodo, qui transferentur in gloriam. Beatam ergo resurrectionem puro nomine resurrectionis ostendit, cuius comparatione, illa impiorum quasi non sit resurrectio, praeteritur. Hic ergo Apostolus non solum resurrectionem, ut dixi, quae bonis malisque communis est, sed resurrectionem inculcat beatam; et licet non sit unum resurrectio et beatitudo resurrectionis, sicut nec resurrectio et resurrectionis miseria unum est; tamen quia beatitudo aeterna absque resurrectione non est, nomine eius illa quoque felicitas, quae excitationem haud paenitendam facit esse, signatur. Ut si aliquis industriam, vires, et studia diversa collaudans, compendio ea vitae velit ostendere, verbi gratia, eruditam illius vitam, elegantem huius, impigram appellet alterius; non utique amoverit distinctionem, ut idem vita quod industria, quod elegantia, quod fortitudo videatur; aliud est quippe vivere, aliud studere; verumtamen nisi vixeris, nullus studebis. Ita etiam non est idem resurrectio quod beatitudo; est quippe misera excitatio cinerum; tamen nullus regnabis, nisi ante resurrexeris. Mors ergo corporis et resurrectio corporis e regione consistunt; si mors esset universa poenalis, esset quoque universa resurrectio praemialis; nunc autem est resurrectio poenalis omnium, qui ignibus deputantur aeternis; ergo et mors non supplicialis est, sed naturalis. Sicut enim non facit generaliter mors corporis, ut paeniteat interiisse; sic non facit generaliter resurrectio, ut placeat revixisse. Verum et istius bonum in remuneratione surgentium, et illius amaritudo in adustione punitorum est; quae utraque pro meritis consequuntur. Apparet igitur Apostolum non de morte naturali, sed de criminosorum, quam infelicem facit poena perpetua; nec de resurrectione communi, sed quam beatam facit gloria sempiterna, disserere; nec ubi de personis disputat praeiudicium inferre creaturis, sed salvis semper distinctionibus latisque limitibus naturarum et voluntatum, sic miscere nonnumquam vocabula, ne specialitas rerum confusione depereat. Per hominem ergo mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum: non hic ab homine morte conditam; sed in homine apparuisse denuntiat; sicut et resurrectionem mortuorum non dicit ab homine factam, hoc est, a Christo; sed in homine, sicut ad Philippenses idem magister: Oboediens - inquit - factus est usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis; propter quod et Deus illum exaltavit, et donavit illi nomen super omne nomen 2. Petri quoque apostoli in hoc concurrit assertio: Viri Israelitae, audite: Iesum virum Nazarenum approbatum a Deo in vobis per manus iniquorum interemistis, quem Deus suscitavit solutis doloribus inferni. Et item: Hunc Iesum Deus resuscitavit, cui omnes nos testes sumus . Ibi ergo sicut proprium erat hominis sine deitatis iniuria obire mortem, ita proprium divinitatis hominem illum a mortuis excitare. Quod autem Deus pronuntiatur operari ex persona Verbi, ipse quoque Christus facit. Sic enim dixerat: In potestate habeo ponere animam meam, et in potestate habeo sumere illam . Cum ergo sit Filii una persona, tamen distinctione legitima aliud applicatur carni, aliud deitati. Per hominem ergo mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum, manifestata, non creata; ceterum utrumque institutum per Deum est; sed in Adam mortis conditio, in persona vero Christi primitiae resurrectionis claruerunt. Hic ergo ubi dicit Apostolus: Per hominem mors; si per voluntatem eius dicas, nihil pertinet ad naturam; si per naturam, nihil spectat ad culpam. Homines nempe alterum mortis, alterum resurrectionis ex adverso locavit, istum secundum nolens illi subdere. Et sequitur: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur. Hoc ergo quod ait: Omnes in Christo vivificabuntur, etiam de impiis, an tantum de fidelibus dicit? Si de impiis, quod omnes vivificentur in Christo, ergo nullus in poena est; si de fidelibus, non ergo universi vivificantur in fide Christi, sed tantum fideles, quamvis omnes omnino virtute ipsius, qua conditi fuerant, excitentur. Si ergo de morte corporis loquitur: In Adam omnes moriuntur, nullus hoc nomine indicatur reatus, quando in eodem Adam et Christus mortuus invenitur; neque enim secuta esset veritas resurrectionis, nisi praecessisset veritas mortis. Igitur in Adam pronuntiat Apostolus omnes mori. Si haec mors non indicat aliud quam corporis resolutionem; nihil spectat profecto ad naturale peccatum, nec quidquam praeiudicat innocentibus, si in Adam mori dicantur, in quo et Christus est mortuus. Sin autem hoc quod ait: In Adam omnes moriuntur, ad peccatum vis animi, et non ad mortem solum, sed ad mortem ream et miseram pertinere, id est, quam deputata criminibus poena consequitur; in ea autem videlicet gehenna nec Christus potuit esse, nec sancti; igitur nec innocentibus praeiudicat, qui ut nihil boni, ita nihil mali voluntarii habent; sed hoc solum retinent, quod a Deo facti sunt; quos iure Baptismatis consecramus, ut qui eos fecit condendo bonos, faciat innovando et adoptando meliores. Quod itaque dicit Apostolus: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur; abest tantum ab ista suspicione traducis Manichaeae, quantum Christus a peccato, qui et iniquitatem non habuit, et minus de hominis natura nihil habuit.
VI. 36. Julian: The Manichees are surely transfixed, both believing in natural sin and denying the resurrection of the flesh. But now, he says, Christ has risen from the dead, the firstfruits of those who sleep; since indeed through a human being death, and through a human being the resurrection of the dead (1 Cor 15:20-21). Here the Apostle speaks not of the general resurrection, which even the wicked, even profane human beings will experience; but only of theirs who will be transferred into glory. He shows the blessed resurrection, then, by the pure name of resurrection, in comparison with which that of the impious is passed over as though it were not a resurrection. Here, then, the Apostle drives home not only the resurrection, as I said, which is common to the good and the evil, but the blessed resurrection; and although resurrection and the blessedness of resurrection are not one, just as neither are resurrection and the misery of resurrection one; yet, because eternal blessedness is not without resurrection, by its name that felicity too, which makes the rousing not to be regretted, is marked. As if someone, praising diligence, strengths, and diverse pursuits, should wish to show them by the abridgment of life, for example, calling that one's life learned, this one's elegant, another's tireless; he would not surely remove the distinction, so that life would seem the same as diligence, as elegance, as fortitude; for it is one thing to live, another to study; yet unless you live, you will not study at all. So too resurrection is not the same as blessedness; for there is a wretched rousing of ashes; yet you will reign at all only if you have first risen. The death of the body, then, and the resurrection of the body stand opposite; if death were universally penal, the resurrection too would be universally a reward; but now there is a penal resurrection of all who are assigned to the eternal fires; therefore death too is not penal, but natural. For just as the death of the body does not generally make one regret having died; so the resurrection does not generally make one pleased to have lived again. But the good of the latter is in the reward of those rising, and the bitterness of the former in the burning of the punished; both of which follow according to merits. It appears, then, that the Apostle discourses not of natural death, but of that of the criminal, which perpetual punishment makes unhappy; nor of the common resurrection, but of that which eternal glory makes blessed; nor, where he disputes about persons, does he bring prejudice upon the creatures, but, the distinctions always preserved and the wide limits of natures and wills, so sometimes mingles the terms, that the particularity of things may not perish by confusion. Through a human being, then, death, and through a human being the resurrection of the dead: he announces here not that death was founded by the human being, but that it appeared in the human being; just as also he does not say that the resurrection of the dead was made by a human being, that is, by Christ, but in a human being, as the same master says to the Philippians: He became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross; on which account God also exalted him, and gave him the name which is above every name (Phil 2:8-9). The assertion of the apostle Peter too concurs in this: Men of Israel, hear: Jesus the man of Nazareth, approved by God among you, you killed by the hands of the wicked, whom God raised up, the pains of hell being loosed (See Acts 2:22-24). And again: This Jesus God raised up, of which we all are witnesses (Acts 2:32). There, then, as it was proper to the human being to undergo death without injury to the deity, so it was proper to the divinity to rouse that human being from the dead. But what God is pronounced to work, from the person of the Word, Christ himself also does. For so he had said: I have it in my power to lay down my soul, and I have it in my power to take it up (John 10:18). Since, then, the person of the Son is one, yet by a lawful distinction one thing is applied to the flesh, another to the deity. Through a human being, then, death, and through a human being the resurrection of the dead—manifested, not created; for the rest, both were instituted through God; but in Adam the condition of death, in the person of Christ the firstfruits of resurrection, became clear. Here, then, where the Apostle says: Through a human being death; if you say through his will, it does not pertain to nature; if through nature, it does not look to fault. For he set human beings opposite, one of death, the other of resurrection, unwilling to subject the second to the first. And it follows: As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive. This, then, that he says: All will be made alive in Christ, does he say it even of the impious, or only of the faithful? If of the impious, that all are made alive in Christ, then no one is in punishment; if of the faithful, then not all are made alive in the faith of Christ, but only the faithful, although absolutely all are roused by his power, by which they had been founded. If, then, he speaks of the death of the body: In Adam all die, no guilt is indicated by this name, when in the same Adam Christ too is found dead; for the truth of resurrection would not have followed, unless the truth of death had preceded. Therefore the Apostle pronounces that all die in Adam. If this death indicates nothing but the dissolution of the body; it surely looks not at all to natural sin, nor does it prejudge the innocent, if they are said to die in Adam, in whom Christ too died. But if this which he says: In Adam all die, you wish to pertain, by the force of mind, to sin, and not only to death, but to a guilty and wretched death, that is, the one which the punishment assigned to crimes follows; but in that hell, namely, neither Christ could be, nor the saints; therefore it does not prejudge the innocent either, who, as they have nothing good, so have nothing voluntarily evil; but retain this alone, that they were made by God; whom by the right of Baptism we consecrate, that he who made them good by founding may make them better by renewing and adopting. What, then, the Apostle says: As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive; is as far from this suspicion of the Manichean propagation as Christ is from sin, who both had no iniquity, and had nothing less of human nature.
JulianImp.6.36Augustinus. Quid est, quod adversus nos disputans dicis: Confodiuntur nempe Manichaei, et peccatum naturale credentes, et resurrectionem carnis negantes? Numquid nos, sicut illi, aut peccatum tribuimus alienae naturae, aut carnis resurrectionem negamus? Prorsus Manichaei confodiantur a vobis, qui vobiscum confodiuntur a nobis, et quando adiuvantur a vobis. In eorum quippe adiutorium discordiam carnis et spiritus peccato Adae negatis esse tribuendam; ut illi huius mali causam requirentes sive reddentes, alienam mali naturam Deo bono coaeternam commixtam nobis esse concludant. Exponis deinde sequentia, ubi de carnis resurrectione Apostolus disputat, et dicis: Non eum loqui de resurrectione communi, bonorum scilicet et malorum; sed eorum tantum, qui transferentur in gloriam. Ita est quidem: tamen de resurrectione corporis loquitur. Huic ergo e contrario mors opponitur corporis, eisque, id est morti corporis et resurrectioni, singuli distribuuntur auctores, homines duo: Quoniam per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum. Et ipsi homines duo propriis etiam nominibus exprimuntur, ut de quibus hoc dictum sit, evidenter appareat, atque additur: Sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur. Moriuntur ait; non ait: Morientur; ex altera vero parte non ait: Vivificantur; sed: vivificabuntur. Nunc enim moriuntur ex poena, tunc vivificabuntur ex praemio. Non itaque de illa morte nunc loquitur, quae futura est eis qui cum anima et corpore igne cruciabuntur aeterno; alioquin ex utraque parte verbum futuri temporis poneret, et sicut dixit: vivificabuntur, ita diceret: Morientur. Cum vero dixit: moriuntur, quod utique nunc fit; vivificabuntur autem, quod tunc fiet; satis ostendit se de illa morte agere, in eo quod dicit: Per hominem mors, quae animam dissolvit a carne; quamvis et ad illam mortem futuram pertineant, quae secunda mors dicitur, qui reatum quem per Adam generatione traxerunt, per Christum regeneratione non solvunt. Nunc proinde quia de resurrectione corporis loquitur, quae futura est, cui opponit e contrario mortem corporis, quae nunc fit; et duo ista contraria singulos auctores habent, Adam mors, Christum resurrectio mortuorum; sicut intellegitur resurrectio illa praemialis, ita esse intellegenda est mors ista poenalis. Praemio quippe a contrario non opponitur natura, sed poena. Et ideo isto loco, ubi resurrectio corporis opponitur morti corporis, non de communi resurrectione agit Apostolus, quae ad iustos et iniustos pertinet; sed de illa potius, in qua erunt qui vivificabuntur in Christo, non qui damnabuntur a Christo; quamvis utrosque ipse resurgere faciat, cuius vocem audient omnes qui in monumentis sunt; et procedent qui bene fecerunt, in resurrectionem vitae; qui autem mala egerunt, in resurrectionem iudicii . Ideo ergo, ut dixi, eam volui commendare, quae ad beneficium Christi pertinet, non etiam illam, quae tantum ad iudicium; ut quoniam ista praemialis est, mors quoque corporis, quae a contrario huic opponitur, ostendatur esse poenalis. Sicut enim vitae mors, ita praemio poena contraria est; per quam poenam, id est, corporis mortem, quoniam sancti martyres certaverunt atque vicerunt, mors eorum in qua nunc dormiunt in conspectu Domini, non suo genere, sed illius munere pretiosa est . Etiam poenae quippe sanctorum, sine dubitatione pretiosae sunt; sed non quia pretiosae sunt, ideo poenae non sunt; sicut non quia poenae sunt, ideo pretiosae sunt; sed quia pro veritate susceptae, vel cum pietate toleratae sunt. Hunc sensum sanum et catholicum si teneres, non in paradisum Dei, hoc est, in locum sanctarum deliciarum, non solum mortium poenas, verum etiam mortiferarum valetudinum mitteres. Omnis autem poena hominis quid est, nisi poena imaginis Dei? Quae si infertur iniuste, profecto a quo infertur, iniustus est. Quis porro dubitet quod iniuste inferatur poena imagini Dei, nisi hoc culpa meruerit? Solus enim mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus sine culpa pertulit poenam, ut nostram scilicet et culpam vacuaret et poenam; non eam poenam quae luenda in hoc maligno saeculo fuit, sed quae nobis debebatur aeterna. Et tamen ipse etiam nostrum in se affectum, morte propinquante, suscipiens: Pater - inquit - si fieri potest, transeat a me calix iste . Qui utique potestatem habebat ponendi et sumendi animam suam; sed mortem, quam nulla culpa praecedente, pro nobis voluntate, non necessitate suscepit, poenam tamen esse his verbis suis Deus ille magister ostendit, quam solus pro nostra sine ulla sua iniquitate sustinuit. Si ergo ista gloria misericordiae Christi, qua pro nobis poenam sine culpa pertulit, singularis est, ut non quidem in carne peccati, sed propter similitudinem carnis peccati, in Adam tamen, a quo descendit caro peccati, etiam ipse moreretur; procul dubio ceteri homines in hoc maligno saeculo, quod extra paradisum est, poenas quascumque patiuntur a nativitate usque ad mortem, in quibus poenis utique patiuntur et mortem, pro suis peccatis vel nascendo tractis, vel male vivendo additis, merito digneque patiuntur sub iusto et omnipotente iudice; qui utique nec faceret, nec sineret inferri poenas imaginibus suis, sine cuius voluntate nec passer cadit in terram , nisi iuste sciret inferri. Et quid est iuste, nisi merito peccatorum, vel examinatione virtutum; ita ut remissis etiam peccatis, pignus quod renati accipiunt salutis aeternae, in futurum eis saeculum prosit, hic autem solvant, quidquid in huius saeculi poenalis vanitate et malignitate solvendum est? Quid est ergo quod dicis: Ideo baptizari parvulos, ut quos Deus fecerat condendo bonos, faciat innovando et adoptando meliores? Bonos quidem fecit, quia omnis natura in quantum natura est, bona est; sed quos fecit bonos, non iniuste faceret vel sineret esse miseros. Quamvis et tu, qui eos innovari dicis, ducere vetustatem veteris hominis, cum sint nascendo utique novi, incautus et nesciens confiteris. Compelleris igitur unum ex his tribus eligere, ut aut paradisum impleas poenis hominum; aut iniustum Deum dicas in poenis imaginum eius, quas patitur innocentia parvulorum; aut quia haec duo detestanda et damnanda sunt, agnoscas originale peccatum; et sic intellegas, omnes qui morte corporis moriuntur, in Adam mori, quia per ipsum hominem mors, id est, per culpam eius et poenam; et omnes qui resurrectione corporis non damnantur, sed vivificantur, in Christo vivificari, quia per ipsum hominem resurrectio mortuorum, id est, per iustitiam eius et gratiam. Quia enim est poenalis corporis mors, ideo illi resurrectionem corporis tantummodo praemialem (cum sit alia quoque poenalis), e contrario videmus oppositam.
Augustine: What is it that, disputing against us, you say: The Manichees are surely transfixed, both believing in natural sin and denying the resurrection of the flesh? Do we, like them, either attribute sin to an alien nature, or deny the resurrection of the flesh? Surely let the Manichees be transfixed by you, who are transfixed by us along with you, even when they are aided by you. For to their aid you deny that the discord of flesh and spirit must be attributed to the sin of Adam; so that they, seeking or rendering the cause of this evil, may conclude that an alien nature of evil, coeternal with the good God, is commingled with us. You expound then the following words, where the Apostle disputes about the resurrection of the flesh, and you say: That he does not speak of the common resurrection, namely of the good and the evil; but only of theirs who will be transferred into glory. So it is indeed: yet he speaks of the resurrection of the body. To this, then, on the contrary, the death of the body is opposed, and to these, that is, to the death of the body and the resurrection, individual authors are distributed, two human beings: Since through a human being death, and through a human being the resurrection of the dead. And the two human beings themselves are expressed even by their proper names, so that of whom this was said may evidently appear; and it is added: For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive. They die, he says; he does not say: They will die; but on the other side he does not say: They are made alive; but: they will be made alive. For now they die from penalty, then they will be made alive from reward. He does not, then, now speak of that death which will be for those who, with soul and body, will be tortured by eternal fire; otherwise he would set a word of future time on either side, and as he said: they will be made alive, so he would say: They will die. But since he said: they die, which surely now takes place; but: they will be made alive, which will then take place; he shows well enough that he is treating of that death, in that which he says: Through a human being death, which dissolves the soul from the flesh; although those too pertain to that future death, which is called the second death, who do not loose by regeneration through Christ the guilt which they drew by generation through Adam. Now accordingly, because he speaks of the resurrection of the body, which is to come, to which he opposes on the contrary the death of the body, which now takes place; and these two contraries have individual authors, Adam death, Christ the resurrection of the dead; as that resurrection is understood as a reward, so this death must be understood as penal. For to a reward, on the contrary, not nature, but penalty is opposed. And therefore in this place, where the resurrection of the body is opposed to the death of the body, the Apostle does not treat of the common resurrection, which pertains to the just and the unjust; but rather of that in which will be those who will be made alive in Christ, not those who will be condemned by Christ; although he makes both rise, whose voice all who are in the tombs will hear; and they will come forth, those who did good, into the resurrection of life; but those who did evil, into the resurrection of judgment (See John 5:28-29). For this reason, then, as I said, I wished to commend that resurrection which pertains to the benefit of Christ, not also that which pertains only to judgment; so that, since this is a reward, the death of the body too, which on the contrary is opposed to it, may be shown to be penal. For as death is contrary to life, so penalty to reward; through which penalty, that is, the death of the body, since the holy martyrs contended and conquered, their death, in which they now sleep in the sight of the Lord, is precious, not by its own kind, but by his gift (See Ps 116:15 (115:15)). For even the penalties of the saints are without doubt precious; but not because they are precious are they therefore not penalties; just as not because they are penalties are they therefore precious; but because they were undertaken for the truth, or borne with piety. If you held this sound and Catholic sense, you would not send into the paradise of God, that is, into the place of holy delights, not only the penalties of deaths, but also of deadly sicknesses. But what is every penalty of the human being, except the penalty of the image of God? Which if it is inflicted unjustly, surely he by whom it is inflicted is unjust. But who would doubt that a penalty is inflicted unjustly upon the image of God, unless fault merited this? For the sole mediator of God and human beings, the human being Christ Jesus, bore a penalty without fault, namely that he might empty out both our fault and penalty; not that penalty which was to be paid in this malignant age, but that which was owed us eternal. And yet he too, taking on our affection in himself, with death approaching: Father, he says, if it can be, let this cup pass from me (Matt 26:39). Who surely had the power of laying down and taking up his soul; but that death, which with no fault preceding he took on for us by will, not by necessity, God the master shows by these words of his to be a penalty, which he alone bore for us without any iniquity of his own. If, then, this glory of the mercy of Christ, by which he bore a penalty for us without fault, is singular, so that not indeed in the flesh of sin, but on account of the likeness of sinful flesh, yet in Adam, from whom the flesh of sin descends, he too should die; without doubt other human beings, in this malignant age, which is outside paradise, suffer whatever penalties from birth to death, in which penalties they surely suffer death too, for their sins either drawn by being born or added by living badly, deservedly and worthily suffer them under a just and omnipotent judge; who surely would neither inflict, nor allow to be inflicted, penalties upon his images, without whose will not even a sparrow falls to the ground (See Matt 10:29), unless he knew it inflicted justly. And what is justly, except by the merit of sins, or by the testing of virtues; so that, even with sins forgiven, the pledge of eternal salvation which the reborn receive may profit them in the age to come, but here they pay whatever must be paid in the penal vanity and malignity of this age? What is it, then, that you say: That little ones are baptized for this, that those whom God had made good by founding, he may make better by renewing and adopting? He indeed made them good, because every nature, insofar as it is a nature, is good; but those whom he made good, he would not unjustly make or allow to be wretched. Although you too, who say they are renewed, confess, incautious and not knowing it, that they carry the oldness of the old man, when they are surely new by being born. You are compelled, then, to choose one of these three: that you either fill paradise with the penalties of human beings; or say God is unjust in the penalties of his images, which the innocence of little ones suffers; or, because these two are detestable and damnable, acknowledge original sin; and so understand that all who die by the death of the body die in Adam, because through that human being death, that is, through his fault and penalty; and all who are not condemned by the resurrection of the body, but are made alive, are made alive in Christ, because through that human being the resurrection of the dead, that is, through his righteousness and grace. For because the death of the body is penal, therefore we see opposed to it, on the contrary, only the resurrection of the body that is a reward (although there is another that is penal too).
JulianImp.6.36VI. 37. Iulianus. Unusquisque autem in suo ordine: primitiae Christus, deinde hi qui sunt Christi in adventu eius, deinde finis . Idem et alibi: Qui est primogenitus - inquit - ex mortuis . Deinde hi qui sunt Christi: id est, sancti rapiuntur in nubibus . Post hoc finis: quoniam hi ibunt in regnum aeternum, impii vero in ignem aeternum . Cum tradiderit regnum Deo et Patri, cum evacuaverit omnem principatum, et omnem potestatem, et virtutem; oportet enim eum regnare, donec ponat inimicos omnes sub pedibus eius; omnia enim subiecit subtus pedes eius; novissima autem inimica destruetur mors. Cum autem dixerit: Omnia ista subiecta sunt, sine dubio praeter illum qui illi subiecit omnia; nam cum subiecta fuerint illi omnia, tunc et ipse subiectus erit ei qui sibi subiecit omnia, ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus . Regnum Dei et Patris est, ut impleto numero sanctorum qui in eius praescientia continetur, omnis principatus et universa virtus adversariae potestatis intereat. Oportet quippe hanc efficientiam tanti esse mysterii, ut omnes inimici iustitiae sub divinis pedibus collocentur. Quod tunc fiet, cum destructam se et victam ab omnibus sanctis mors aeterna conspiciet. Cum autem fuerint tam Christo quam corpori eius omnia illa potestatum genera regni manifestatione subiecta, multo maxime congregatio omnis glorificata sanctorum esse Deo subdita non desistet; sed totum corpus dignum regno caelorum, quod sub Christo capite construitur, divinae voluntati perfecta affectione cohaerebit, ut exstincta omni cupiditate culparum, Deus et contineat cunctos, et compleat.
VI. 37. Julian: But each in his own order: the firstfruits Christ, then those who are Christ's at his coming, then the end (1 Cor 15:23-24). The same elsewhere too: Who is the firstborn, he says, from the dead (Col 1:18). Then those who are Christ's: that is, the saints are caught up in the clouds (See 1 Thess 4:17). After this the end: since these will go into the eternal kingdom, but the impious into eternal fire (See Matt 25:46). When he has handed over the kingdom to God and the Father, when he has made void all rule, and all power, and might; for he must reign, until he puts all enemies under his feet; for he has subjected all things under his feet; but the last enemy, death, will be destroyed. But when he has said: All these things are subjected, without doubt except him who subjected all things to him; for when all things have been subjected to him, then the Son too will be subjected to him who subjected all things to him, that God may be all in all (1 Cor 15:24-28). It is the kingdom of God and the Father, that, with the number of the saints fulfilled which is contained in his foreknowledge, all rule and all might of the adverse power may perish. For this efficacy of so great a mystery must be such that all the enemies of righteousness are set under the divine feet. Which will then come about, when eternal death will behold itself destroyed and conquered by all the saints. But when all those kinds of powers have been subjected, both to Christ and to his body, by the manifestation of the kingdom, much more will the whole glorified congregation of the saints not cease to be subject to God; but the whole body worthy of the kingdom of heaven, which is built up under Christ the head, will cleave to the divine will with a perfect affection, so that, every desire of faults extinguished, God may both contain and complete all.
JulianImp.6.37Augustinus. In hac parte disputationis tuae nihil pene, quod ad causam quae inter nos agitur pertineat, prosecutus es. Cur enim totum locum istum, ubi de resurrectione corporis Apostolus disserit, inserendum putasti, nisi propter illud quod ait: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur? Quia scilicet corporis mortem non vultis peccato primi hominis tribuere, sed naturae; quam sic in illo homine primo dicitis institutam, ut sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset. Unde satis tibi existimo esse responsum. Quamobrem praetermissis eis, in quibus exponendis superfluo te dilatare voluisti, illud quod ait Apostolus: Novissima inimica destruetur mors, discutiendum forsitan sit, de qua morte sit dictum; utrum de ista quae nunc est, qua de corpore exire anima compellitur; an de illa qua de corpore anima exire non sinitur; ut simul utrumque sempiterno igne crucietur; quae mors utique nondum est, sed futura est; neque tunc destruetur, sed potius esse tunc incipit; quam nunc nondum esse quis ambigit? Haec autem, quae tunc in omnibus corpore morientibus frequentatur, cui contraria est corporis resurrectio, de qua ut haec omnia diceret Apostolus disputabat; haec, inquam, quae nunc agitur, usitata et omnibus nota mors corporis, tunc utique novissima destruetur, cum corruptibile hoc induerit incorruptionem, et mortale hoc induerit immortalitatem . Quod procul dubio de resurrectione corporis quae tunc erit, contra mortem corporis quae nunc est, dictum esse perspicimus. Quapropter, si mors aeterna quae numquam fuit, non potest tunc destrui, quando esse potius incipit, nec umquam destruetur, quia semper erit; restat ut ista quae nunc est, ipsa novissima, hoc est, in fine destruatur, quando fiet resurrectione carnis ut non sit. Porro inimica quomodo esset, si naturalis ita esset, ut poenalis non esset? Poenalis autem sub iusto et omnipotente iudice nullo pacto esset, nisi meritis peccati accidisset. Iam tandem sensum tuum, rogamus, emenda; et paradisum beatorum, quem poenis hominum contaminaveras, munda. Dici autem non potest, quamtum mihi placeat, quod dixisti: In regno caelorum futurum esse, ut exstincta omni cupiditate culparum, Deus et contineat cunctos, et compleat. O utinam tuae huius sententiae commonitione te corrigas, et cupiditatem culparum, quae in carne nostra nunc, etiam coercita, nobis repugnare non desinit, tunc vero, ut rectissime confiteris, exstincta nulla erit, iam non te libeat laudare ut aliquod bonum, sed ut malum potius accusare! Ipsa est enim tua illa suscepta, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, ut necesse sit etiam spiritui adversus carnem concupiscere , ne committatur unde homo damnetur. Quod discordiae malum, rei utriusque bonae et a Deo bono conditae, id est carnis et spiritus, per praevaricationem primi hominis in naturam vertisse, proclamat, neque Manichaeus, neque Manichaeorum adiutor, sed destructor Ambrosius .
Augustine: In this part of your disputation you have prosecuted almost nothing that pertains to the cause which is dealt with between us. For why did you think this whole passage, where the Apostle disputes about the resurrection of the body, must be inserted, except on account of that which he says: As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive? Because, namely, you are unwilling to attribute the death of the body to the sin of the first man, but to nature; which you say was so established in that first human being that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he was to die. Whence I think enough has been answered you. Wherefore, those things being passed over, in expounding which you wished superfluously to expand yourself, that which the Apostle says: The last enemy, death, will be destroyed, must perhaps be discussed, of what death it was said; whether of this which now is, by which the soul is compelled to go out of the body; or of that by which the soul is not allowed to go out of the body, that both at once may be tortured by everlasting fire; which death surely is not yet, but is to come; nor will it then be destroyed, but rather then begins to be; which now, who doubts that it is not yet? But this, which is then frequent in all dying in body, to which the resurrection of the body is contrary—about which, that he might say all these things, the Apostle was disputing—this, I say, which now takes place, the usual death of the body known to all, will then surely be destroyed last, when this corruptible will have put on incorruption, and this mortal will have put on immortality (See 1 Cor 15:53). Which we perceive was beyond doubt said about the resurrection of the body which will then be, against the death of the body which now is. Wherefore, if eternal death, which never was, cannot then be destroyed, when it rather begins to be, nor will ever be destroyed, because it will always be; it remains that this which now is, this very one, last, that is, at the end, be destroyed, when it will come about by the resurrection of the flesh that it be not. Moreover, how would it be an enemy, if it were natural in such a way that it were not penal? But penal, under a just and omnipotent judge, it would in no way be, unless it had happened by the merits of sin. Now at last, we ask, correct your sense; and the paradise of the blessed, which you had contaminated with the penalties of human beings, cleanse. It cannot be said, however, how much it pleases me, what you said: That in the kingdom of heaven it will come about that, every desire of faults extinguished, God may both contain and complete all. O would that by the admonition of this sentence of yours you correct yourself, and the desire of faults, which in our flesh now, even when restrained, does not cease to fight against us, but then, as you most rightly confess, extinguished, will be none; that it may no longer please you to praise it as some good, but rather to accuse it as an evil! For it is that very protégée of yours, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, so that it is necessary that the spirit too lust against the flesh (See Gal 5:17), lest that be committed whence the human being may be condemned. Which evil of discord, of both things good and founded by the good God, that is, of flesh and spirit, passed over into nature through the transgression of the first man, neither a Manichee, nor a helper of the Manichees, but the destroyer Ambrose proclaims (See Ambrose, On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation 7.71).
JulianImp.6.37VI. 38. Iulianus. Alioquin - inquit - quid facient qui baptizantur pro mortuis, si omnino mortui non resurgunt? Quid et baptizantur pro illis? Quid et nos periclitamur omni hora? Quotidie morior per vestram gloriam, quam habeo in Domino. Si secundum hominem pugnavi bestiis Ephesi, quid mihi prodest, si mortui non resurgunt? Manducemus et bibamus, cras enim moriemur. Si, inquit, ista spes futurae gloriae, qua Deus omnia in omnibus erit, impia infidelitate quatiatur, negeturque resurrectio mortuorum, quid facient qui baptizantur pro mortuis? Natus hinc error aliquorum est, putantium inter exordia Evangelii eum morem fuisse, quo astantes pro cadaveribus profiterentur, et aqua Baptismatis etiam defunctorum membra perfunderent; quod apparet de imperitia contigisse. Hoc enim quod ait Apostolus: Baptizantur pro mortuis, nihil aliud indicat, quam illud quod ad Romanos dixit: Consepulti illi sumus per Baptisma in mortem ; id est: Qua gratia, tali ad Baptismatis susceptionem animo accedimus, ut membra nostra mortificemus in posterum, et pro mortuis omnino degamus, si spes non est, quia post mortem vivamus? Cur autem et quotidianis, inquit, subdor periculis, in mortem iugiter incidens, quam inferunt persequentes, ut de vestris ante Deum possim profectibus gloriari, si mortui non resurgunt? Cur autem et secundum hominem pugnavi bestiis Ephesi, id est, cur sustinui bestialem seditiosorum furorem, si adhuc nutat quod mortui resurgunt? Nolite seduci; bonos mores corrumpunt colloquia mala. Ignorantiam enim Dei quidam habent; ad confusionem vobis dico . Amor, inquit, peccatorum diffidere vos suadet de futuris; putatur non esse iudicium, ut maiore peccetur audacia. Omnino, inquit, nesciunt aestimare Deum, qui inficiantur resurrectioni. Non ergo solum remunerationem, sed virtutem divinitatis negatis, unde nimium debetis erubescere. Ad confusionem vobis dico, posse inter vos tales quospiam reperiri.
VI. 38. Julian: Otherwise, he says, what will those do who are baptized for the dead, if the dead do not rise at all? Why are they baptized for them? Why are we too in peril every hour? I die daily by your glory, which I have in the Lord. If, according to a human being, I fought with beasts at Ephesus, what does it profit me, if the dead do not rise? Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we shall die (1 Cor 15:29-32). If, he says, this hope of future glory, by which God will be all in all, is shaken by impious unbelief, and the resurrection of the dead is denied, what will those do who are baptized for the dead? Hence arose the error of some, thinking that in the beginnings of the Gospel there was a custom by which people, standing in for corpses, would make profession, and would pour the water of Baptism even over the members of the dead; which it appears came about from inexperience. For this which the Apostle says: They are baptized for the dead, indicates nothing other than what he said to the Romans: We were buried with him through Baptism into death (See Rom 6:4); that is: With what grace, with what mind do we approach the receiving of Baptism, that we may mortify our members for the future, and live altogether for the dead, if there is no hope that we live after death? But why, he says, am I subjected also to daily perils, falling continually into the death which persecutors bring, that I may be able to glory before God of your advances, if the dead do not rise? But why too did I, according to a human being, fight with beasts at Ephesus, that is, why did I endure the bestial fury of the seditious, if it still wavers that the dead rise? Do not be deceived; evil conversations corrupt good morals. For some have ignorance of God; I say it to your shame (1 Cor 15:33-34). The love, he says, of sins persuades you to distrust about future things; it is thought that there is no judgment, that one may sin with greater audacity. They altogether, he says, do not know how to esteem God, who deny the resurrection. Not only, then, do you deny the reward, but the power of the divinity, whence you ought to be exceedingly ashamed. I say it to your shame, that such people can be found among you.
JulianImp.6.38Augustinus. Et hic nihil prorsus quod ad rem pertineat, quae in nostra disceptatione versatur, dicere voluisti. Proinde verbis Apostoli, quae pro tuo captu explanare conatus es, quia ea quae dixisti, quamvis in nonnullis sensum non tenueris eius auctoris, tamen non sunt contra fidem, non opus habeo respondere multiloquio tuo.
Augustine: And here too you wished to say nothing at all that pertains to the matter which is turned in our discussion. Accordingly, to the words of the Apostle, which you tried to explain to your capacity—because the things you said, although in some you did not hold the sense of that author, yet are not against the faith—I have no need to answer your much-speaking.
JulianImp.6.38VI. 39. Iulianus. Sed dicet aliquis: Quomodo resurgunt mortui? Quo autem in corpore veniunt? Insipiens, tu quod seminas non vivificatur, nisi prius moriatur. Non omnis caro eadem caro; alia quidem hominis, alia pecoris; alia caro volatilium, alia autem piscium; et corpora caelestia et terrestria; sed alia quidem caelestium claritas, alia vero terrestrium; alia claritas solis, et alia claritas lunae, et alia claritas stellarum; stella enim a stella differt in gloria; ita et resurrectio mortuorum. Seminatur in corruptione, surget in incorruptela; seminatur in ignominia, surget in gloria; seminatur in infirmitate, surget in virtute; seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spiritale. Sic etiam scriptum est: Factus est homo primus Adam in animam viventem, novissimus Adam in spiritum vivificantem. Primus homo de terra, terrestris; secundus homo de caelo, caelestis; qualis terrestris, tales et terreni; et qualis caelestis, tales et caelestes. Sicut portavimus imaginem terrestris, portemus etiam imaginem illius caelestis . Difficultatem rei exemplis edomat, et dicit nihil esse impossibile, cum omnipotentia pollicetur effectum. Sed sicut resurrectionem corporum seminum collatione commendat, ita etiam resurgentium diversitatem creaturarum varietatibus aperit; totum tamen loquitur de resurrectione beatorum. Seminatur - inquit - in ignominia, surget in gloria; seminatur in infirmitate, surget in virtute; seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spiritale. Hoc certe nisi in sanctis impleri non potest; impii quoque non in gloriam excitantur, sed in opprobrium, sicut Propheta asserit, sempiternum . Hic opportune distantiam naturae atque gratiae facit, recordaturque testimonii veteris quo dictum est: Factus est homo primus Adam in animam viventem; subditque de suo: novissimus Adam in spiritum vivificantem. Ostenditque immortalitatis dona ad vivificantem spiritum pertinere; animam vero solum viventem, ad naturam quandoque morientem. Non est ergo, inquit, hoc vivens quod vivificans; vivificans est, qui confert immortalitatem, quam Christo applicat; vivens est autem, qui vita utitur, sed non excludit mortalitatem. Ergo hoc utramque sententiam fine discrevit, ut ostenderet Adam factum esse viventem, sed non immortalem; Christum autem in spiritum, non solum viventem, verum etiam conferentem resurrectionem, suis gloriosam, omnibus aeternam.
VI. 39. Julian: But someone will say: How do the dead rise? And in what body do they come? Foolish one, what you sow is not made alive unless it first dies. Not all flesh is the same flesh; one indeed of human beings, another of cattle; another the flesh of birds, another of fishes; and there are heavenly bodies and earthly; but one indeed is the brightness of the heavenly, another that of the earthly; one the brightness of the sun, and another the brightness of the moon, and another the brightness of the stars; for star differs from star in glory; so also the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption, it will rise in incorruption; it is sown in dishonor, it will rise in glory; it is sown in weakness, it will rise in power; an animal body is sown, a spiritual body will rise. So also it is written: The first man Adam was made into a living soul, the last Adam into a life-giving spirit. The first man from the earth, earthly; the second man from heaven, heavenly; as the earthly, such also the earthly ones; and as the heavenly, such also the heavenly ones. As we have borne the image of the earthly, let us bear also the image of that heavenly one (1 Cor 15:35-49). He tames the difficulty of the matter by examples, and says that nothing is impossible, when omnipotence promises the effect. But as he commends the resurrection of bodies by the comparison of seeds, so he opens the diversity of those rising by the varieties of creatures; yet he speaks the whole about the resurrection of the blessed. It is sown, he says, in dishonor, it will rise in glory; it is sown in weakness, it will rise in power; an animal body is sown, a spiritual body will rise. This surely cannot be fulfilled except in the saints; the impious too are roused not into glory, but into reproach, as the Prophet asserts, everlasting (See Dan 12:2). Here opportunely he makes the distance between nature and grace, and recalls the old testimony by which it was said: The first man Adam was made into a living soul; and adds from his own: the last Adam into a life-giving spirit. And he shows that the gifts of immortality pertain to the life-giving spirit; but the soul only living, to the nature at some time dying. There is not, then, he says, this living the same as life-giving; the life-giving is he who confers immortality, which he applies to Christ; but the living is he who uses life, but does not exclude mortality. So he distinguished each sentence by its end, that he might show that Adam was made living, but not immortal; but Christ into a spirit not only living, but even conferring resurrection, glorious to his own, eternal to all.
JulianImp.6.39Augustinus. Numquid ideo moriturus fuerat Adam, etiamsi non peccasset, quia in corpore animali, non spiritali, erat factus? Prorsus erras, si propterea necesse nobis esse arbitraris, paradisum Dei mortibus poenisque morientium, postremo ignominia, infirmitate, corruptione, in quibus nunc animalia hominum corpora seminantur, implere. Lignum enim vitae, quod in paradiso suo plantavit Deus, etiam corpus animale defendebat a morte, donec perseverantis obedientiae merito, in gloriam spiritalem, quam resurgentes habituri sunt iusti, sine morte interveniente transiret. Iustum enim erat ut imago Dei nullo fuscata et obsoleta peccato, tali insereretur corpori, quamvis de terrena materie creato atque formato, ut ei de ligno vitae subministrata vivendi stabilitas permaneret; ac viveret interim per animam viventem, quam nulla ab illo necessitas separaret; atque inde, propter obedientiam custoditam, ad vivificantem spiritum perveniret, ita ut non ei subtraheretur haec vita minor, ubi et mori et non mori posset, sed illa amplior adderetur, ubi viveret sine ullius ligni beneficio, morique non posset. Nam quaero a te in quali corpore nunc esse existimes Eliam et Enoch; animali, an spiritali? Si dixeris: Animali, cur non vis credere Adam, et Evam, et posteros eorum, si praeceptum Dei nulla praevaricatione violarent, quamvis in corpore animali, ita fuisse victuros, ut nunc vivunt isti? Quandoquidem ibi erant illi, quo translati sunt isti; et illic vivunt isti, unde ut morerentur eiecti sunt illi. Corporale namque lignum vitae sic vitam subministrabat corporibus animalibus, sicut spiritale lignum vitae, quod est Dei sapientia, vitam salutiferae doctrinae sanctis mentibus subministrat. Unde nonnulli divinorum eloquiorum etiam catholici tractatores paradisum spiritalem commendare maluerunt; non tamen historiae resistentes, quae ostendit evidentius corporalem. Si vero Enoch et Eliae spiritale iam corpus esse responderis, cur non primorum hominum, et eorum qui ex illis per seriem successionis nascerentur, si nullum peccatum existeret, quod illos a ligno vitae merito separaret, animale corpus in spiritale potuisse transire sine morte media confiteris, ne paradisum Dei, ne locum felicium gaudiorum, poenis mortium atque morientium, et innumerabilibus mortiferorum morborum cruciatibus implere cogaris?
Augustine: Was Adam therefore going to die, even if he had not sinned, because he was made in an animal body, not a spiritual one? You err altogether, if you think it therefore necessary for us to fill the paradise of God with the deaths and penalties of the dying, and finally with the dishonor, weakness, corruption in which now the animal bodies of human beings are sown. For the tree of life, which God planted in his paradise, defended even the animal body from death, until, by the merit of persevering obedience, it should pass, with no death intervening, into the spiritual glory which the just who rise are to have. For it was just that the image of God, darkened and rendered obsolete by no sin, should be set in such a body, although created and formed from earthly material, that the stability of living supplied to it from the tree of life should remain; and that it should meanwhile live through a living soul, which no necessity would separate from it; and thence, on account of obedience kept, should reach the life-giving spirit, in such a way that this lesser life should not be taken from it, where it could both die and not die, but that ampler one should be added, where it should live without the benefit of any tree, and could not die. For I ask of you, in what kind of body do you now think Elijah and Enoch are; an animal, or a spiritual one? If you say: An animal one, why are you unwilling to believe that Adam, and Eve, and their descendants, if they had violated God's precept by no transgression, although in an animal body, would have lived as these now live? Since those were there, whither these were transferred; and there these live, whence those were cast out so that they might die. For the corporeal tree of life supplied life to animal bodies, just as the spiritual tree of life, which is the wisdom of God, supplies the life of salutary teaching to holy minds. Whence some Catholic treaters of the divine words too preferred to commend a spiritual paradise; not, however, resisting the history, which more evidently shows a corporeal one. But if you answer that Enoch and Elijah have already a spiritual body, why do you not confess that the animal body of the first human beings, and of those who would be born of them through the series of succession, if no sin existed which deservedly separated them from the tree of life, could pass into a spiritual one without death intervening, lest you be compelled to fill the paradise of God, the place of happy joys, with the penalties of deaths and of the dying, and with innumerable torments of deadly diseases?
JulianImp.6.39VI. 40. Iulianus. Sed non primum - inquit - quod spiritale est, sed quod animale; deinde, quod spiritale est. Primus homo de terra, terrestris; secundus homo de caelo, caelestis; sicut portavimus imaginem terrestris, portemus et imaginem illius caelestis . Aperte nempe transit ad studia, vultque tantum interesse inter praeteritam nostram et praesentem conversationem, quantum interest inter mortalitatem et immortalitatem. Primus - inquit - homo de terra, terrestris; secundus homo de caelo, caelestis; nomine substantiarum propositi indicat diversitatem. Neque enim Christus, quem hominem caelestem vocat, carnem suam de caelo deposuit, quam de semine David, de semine Adam, et intra mulierem de mulieris carne suscepit. Terrestrem ergo et caelestem refert ad virtutes et vitia. Denique sequitur: Sicut portavimus imaginem terrestris; portemus etiam imaginem illius caelestis. Sic et ad Romanos: Humanum est quod dico, propter infirmitatem carnis vestrae; sicut enim exhibuistis membra vestra servire immunditiae, et iniquitati ad iniquitatem; ita nunc exhibete membra vestra servire iustitiae in sanctificationem . Tenorem vero sequens exhortationis assumptae, subdit, quod nisi intellegatur, omnia eius videbitur dicta subruere: Hoc ergo dico, fratres, quia caro et sanguis regnum Dei possidere non possunt, nec perpetuitatem interitus possidebit. Nempe in his locis, in quibus nihil aliud quam de affirmanda carnis resurrectione laboraverat, quam dixerat in regni gloria collocandam, nunc pronuntiat: quia caro et sanguis regnum Dei possidere non possunt. Si caro non possidet, si sanguis non possidet, ubi est, cuius supra pompam regenerat resurrectio mortuorum? Verum Scripturae more, carnem et sanguinem, vitia, non substantiam nominavit. Denique hoc idem aperuit: Ecce mysterium vobis dico: omnes quidem resurgemus, sed non omnes immutabimur. Intellexit se magister egregius, supra beatitudini tantum futurae resurrectionis vocabulum vindicasse; et ideo illud ne ambiguum remaneret, absolvit: Omnes quidem, resurgemus; ecce quae est excitatio communis: sed non omnes immutabimur; ecce ubi est resurrectio beatorum. Immutatio ergo in gloriam illis tantum debetur, qui non iram Dei, sed amorem merentur. In momento - inquit - in ictu oculorum, in novissima tuba, et mortui resurgent incorrupti, et nos immutabimur. Denuo hic transit ad eos sanctos, quos dies ille in carne reperiet; et dicit quoniam in momento tam brevi, quam potest esse extremus finis sonorum, et qui mortui fuerant, excitentur incorrupti, id est, integri; et qui inventi fuerint, immutentur in gloriam. Oportet enim hoc corruptibile induere incorruptelam; et mortale hoc induere immortalitatem. Cum autem mortale hoc induerit immortalitatem, tunc fiet sermo qui scriptus est: Absorpta est mors in victoriam tuam. Ubi est, mors, tuus aculeus? Ubi est victoria tua? Aculeus autem mortis, peccatum; virtus autem peccati, lex . Ostendit, ut saepe, quoniam de sanctorum tantum resurrectione loqueretur; ideo praetermittens illam impiorum excitationem, dignum esse pronuntiat ut in corporibus sanctorum corruptibilitas aeternitate gloriae devoretur. Cum autem hoc, inquit, fuerit impletum, tunc licebit insultare diabolo, et morti perpetuae, quae hanc corruptionem naturalem fecerat malam videri; tunc increpabunt sanctorum gaudia, contusum a se aculeum mortis videntium, dicentque: Ubi est, mors, aculeus tuus? Ubi est victoria tua? Aculeus autem mortis, peccatum; virtus autem peccati, lex. Id est: O tu mors aeterna, aculeum habebas peccatum, quo desertores iustitiae vulnerares; quoniam si hoc aculeo armata non esses, id est, peccato voluntario, nulli omnino nocuisses. Peccatum hoc et hunc aculeum viribus fidei confractum vides, remuneratione nostra teste, a qua nos conabaris abducere; aculeus quippe tuus peccatum fuit, et virtus peccati tui lex erat; quoniam ubi non est lex, nec praevaricatio . Vel certe quamvis aculeus tuus peccatum esset; tamen fortior factus est apud praevaricatorum dumtaxat animos, postquam mors ei legis admota est; quae tamen non ad hoc data fuerat, ut acueret. Lex enim sancta, et mandatum sanctum, et iustum et bonum; sed peccatum ut appareat peccatum, per bonum mihi mortem operabatur, ut fieret supra modum ipsum peccatum peccans per mandatum . Haec ergo virtus, quam aculeus tuus spontaneae in nobis iniquitatis consequebatur adiutu, fidelium virtutibus, fidelium iam coronis victa comprobatur, et fracta. Insultamus igitur tibi: Deo nostro gratias referentes, qui dedit nobis hanc victoriam per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum .
VI. 40. Julian: But not first, he says, that which is spiritual, but that which is animal; then, that which is spiritual. The first man from the earth, earthly; the second man from heaven, heavenly; as we have borne the image of the earthly, let us bear also the image of that heavenly one (1 Cor 15:46-49). He openly, surely, passes over to pursuits, and wishes there to be as much difference between our past and present conversation as there is between mortality and immortality. The first man, he says, from the earth, earthly; the second man from heaven, heavenly; by the name of substances he indicates the diversity of purpose. For neither did Christ, whom he calls the heavenly man, bring down his flesh from heaven, which he took from the seed of David, from the seed of Adam, and within the woman from the woman's flesh. He refers, then, earthly and heavenly to virtues and vices. Finally it follows: As we have borne the image of the earthly, let us bear also the image of that heavenly one. So too to the Romans: It is a human thing that I say, on account of the weakness of your flesh; for as you presented your members to serve uncleanness, and iniquity unto iniquity; so now present your members to serve righteousness unto sanctification (Rom 6:19). But following the tenor of the exhortation undertaken, he subjoins what, unless it be understood, will seem to overturn all his sayings: This, then, I say, brothers, that flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God, nor will corruption possess perpetuity. Surely in these passages, in which he had labored at nothing but affirming the resurrection of the flesh, which he had said was to be set in the glory of the kingdom, now he pronounces: that flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God. If flesh does not possess, if blood does not possess, where is that whose pomp above the resurrection of the dead regenerates? But, by the custom of Scripture, by flesh and blood he named the vices, not the substance. Finally he made this same thing plain: Behold, I tell you a mystery: we shall all indeed rise, but we shall not all be changed. The excellent master understood that above he had claimed the name of resurrection only for the future blessedness; and therefore, lest that remain ambiguous, he resolved it: We shall all indeed rise; behold the common rousing: but we shall not all be changed; behold where the resurrection of the blessed is. The change into glory, then, is owed only to those who merit not the wrath of God, but his love. In a moment, he says, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet, and the dead will rise incorrupt, and we shall be changed. Again here he passes to those saints whom that day will find in the flesh; and he says that in a moment as brief as can be the last end of sounds, both those who had been dead are roused incorrupt, that is, whole; and those who shall be found are changed into glory. For this corruptible must put on incorruption; and this mortal put on immortality. But when this mortal has put on immortality, then will come about the word that is written: Death is swallowed up in your victory. Where, O death, is your sting? Where is your victory? But the sting of death is sin; and the power of sin is the law (1 Cor 15:51-56). He shows, as often, that he was speaking only of the resurrection of the saints; therefore, passing over that rousing of the impious, he pronounces it worthy that in the bodies of the saints corruptibility be devoured by the eternity of glory. But when this, he says, has been fulfilled, then it will be permitted to insult the devil, and perpetual death, which had made this natural corruption seem evil; then the joys of the saints will rebuke, seeing the sting of death crushed by themselves, and will say: Where, O death, is your sting? Where is your victory? But the sting of death is sin; and the power of sin is the law. That is: O you, eternal death, you had sin as a sting, by which you wounded the deserters of righteousness; since, if you were not armed with this sting, that is, with voluntary sin, you would have harmed no one at all. This sin and this sting you see broken by the forces of faith, our reward bearing witness, from which you tried to lead us away; for your sting was sin, and the power of your sin was the law; since where there is no law, neither is there transgression (Rom 4:15). Or certainly, although your sting was sin; yet it was made stronger, at least in the minds of transgressors, after the death of the law was applied to it; which yet had not been given for this, that it should sharpen. For the law is holy, and the commandment holy, and just and good; but sin, that it might appear sin, worked death for me through the good, that sin might become sinning beyond measure through the commandment (See Rom 7:12-13). This power, then, which your sting attained by the help of the spontaneous iniquity in us, is proved conquered and broken by the virtues of the faithful, by the crowns now of the faithful. We insult you, therefore: Giving thanks to our God, who gave us this victory through our Lord Jesus Christ (See 1 Cor 15:57).
JulianImp.6.40Augustinus. De imagine terrestris, et de imagine caelestis hominis satis iam superius disputatum est; tibique respondimus quod imago caelestis nunc fide ac spe portari potest; portabitur autem re ipsa praesentata atque donata, cum resurrexerit corpus spiritale, quod nunc animale seminatur. Duas quippe istas imagines, terrestris videlicet hominis unam, caelestis autem alteram, singulis rebus attribuit; illam scilicet animali corpori, hanc spiritali. Superius enim dixit: Sed non primum quod spiritale est, sed quod animale; postea, quod spiritale est; protinusque subiunxit: Primus homo de terra, terrestris; secundus homo de caelo, caelestis, sicut portavimus imaginem terrestris, portemus etiam imaginem illius caelestis. Quis est ille, nisi Adam, per quem mors? Et quis est iste, nisi Christus, per quem resurrectio mortuorum? Quoniam per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum. Sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur; id est, quicumque vivificabuntur, nonnisi in Christo vivificabuntur; unde iam supra sumus locuti. Nulla est utique ambiguitas, ad quas duas res duae istae referantur imagines; illa namque refertur ad mortem, haec ad resurrectionem. Illa ergo ad mortem corporis; quia haec ad resurrectionem corporis; illa ad corpus animale, quod seminatur in ignominia; haec ad spiritale, quod resurget in gloria; illa nascendo, hac induimur renascendo. Sed quoniam sub peccato nascimur, in peccatorum autem remissione renascimur: Sicut portavimus - inquit - imaginem terrestris, portemus etiam imaginem illius caelestis. Illud factum esse commemorat, hoc exhortatur ut fiat. Nemo enim potest efficere ut non fuerit natus in poena, qua corpus eius seminetur in ignominia; sed nisi fuerit renatus, et perseveraverit in eo quod est renatus in gratia, non perveniet ad spiritalis corporis habitudinem, quod resurget in gloria. Quid est ergo quod dicis: Aperte nempe transiit ad studia, vultque tantum interesse inter praeteritam nostram et praesentem conversationem, quantum interest inter mortalitatem et immortalitatem? Cum potius Apostolus non ad aliud transeat; sed id quod de resurrectione carnis coeperat, exsequatur, cui e contrario mortem carnis opponit. Non itaque duas conversationes, malam scilicet, et bonam, vult hoc loco intellegi; sed resurrectionem carnis ita per Christum futuram, sicut per Adam mortem carnis asserit factam. Sine hominem Dei agere quod agit; tu eum sequere, noli ut te sequatur ipse conari. Non enim sequitur, quantumcumque coneris. Aperte resurrectioni carnis mortem carnis opponit; aperte his singulis rebus singulos dispertitur auctores, morti corporis Adam, resurrectioni corporis Christum; aperte duas imagines, unam terrestris hominis, aliam caelestis, a contrario inter se conferens, illam corpori attribuit animali, quod per Adam meruit ut seminetur in ignominia; istam spiritali, quod per Christum merebitur resurgere in gloria. Qui etiam secundum carnem homo caelestis est dictus, non quia eam sumpsit e caelo, sed quia et ipsam levavit in caelum. Si studium bonum et bona conversatio facit, ut ad gloriosam resurrectionem perveniant; numquid studio malo et mala conversatione vitae huius, quam nati, et accessu aetatis aucti duximus, factum est ut in corpore animali cum mortis propagine nasceremur? Quis enim malo studio vel ullo studio sibi comparavit aerumnosae nativitatis initium? Quis mala conversatione id egit, ut eum, quomodolibet vixerit, mori necesse sit? Plane si haec duo, id est, imaginem terrestris hominis, quae ad corpus pertinet animale, et imaginem caelestis, quae ad corpus pertinet spiritale, etiam ad conversationes referre volumus; sicut resurrectionem spiritalis corporis in parte iustitiae ponimus, ita mortem corporis animalis ponere in peccati parte debemus; quia sicut in Christi iustitia fiet ista resurrectio, ita in Adae iniquitate facta est mors illa. Quod si intellegas, et huic apertissimae consentias veritati; concedo quod dicis, terrestrem et caelestem referri ad vitia et virtutes; sicut enim virtus Christi faciet ut resurgat corpus spiritale, ita vitium Adae fecit ut moreretur corpus animale. Non itaque huic congruit, eiusdem Apostoli ad Romanos illa sententia: Sicut enim exhibuistis membra vestra servire immunditiae, et iniquitati ad iniquitatem; ita nunc exhibete vestra membra servire iustitiae in sanctificationem . Ibi enim de malis et bonis moribus loquebatur; hic autem de resurrectione corporis et morte corporis loquitur. Sed quoniam qui ratione iam utuntur, ad resurrectionem gloriosam, quae tunc fiet, quando spiritale corpus resurget, venire non poterunt, nisi hoc et credant et sperent; ideo quod terrestris hominis imaginem portaverimus commemorans, in qua est per hominem mors; ut imaginem caelestis hominis portemus hortatur, in qua est per hominem resurrectio mortuorum; ut quomodo per Adae peccatum venimus in mortem corporis animalis, ita per Christi iustitiam veniamus in resurrectionem corporis spiritalis. Deinde subiungit: Hoc autem dico, fratres, quia caro et sanguis regnum Dei possidere non possunt. Ubi te non reprehendimus nomine carnis et sanguinis significatam carnalem prudentiam credidisse, non ipsam substantiam corporis animalis, quae seminatur quidem in ignominia, sed tamen resurget in gloria, et regnum Dei procul dubio possidebit. Quamvis et aliter hoc possit intellegi, ut isto loco, nomine carnis et sanguinis, corruptio significata sit, quam nunc in carne videmus et sanguine; quae utique corruptio regnum Dei non possidebit, quia corruptibile hoc induetur incorruptione. Unde cum dixisset: Caro et sanguis regnum Dei possidere non possunt; tamquam exponendo quid his nominibus significaverit, ne ipsa carnalis substantia crederetur, adiunxit: Neque corruptio incorruptionem possidebit. Et secundum istum sensum magis videtur cetera attexere. Sed utrumlibet his verbis auctor eorumdem verborum significare voluerit, neutrum est contra fidem, quae ita se habet, ut non dubitet in carne incorruptibili possessuram regnum Dei ex omnibus gentibus congregatam Dei familiam. Non itaque hoc reprehendimus, quod etiam ante nos divinarum Scripturarum catholici tractatores plerique dixerunt, carnem et sanguinem hic posse accipi homines, qui secundum carnem et sanguinem sapiunt, et ideo regnum Dei non possidebunt; sic enim ait idem Doctor Gentium: Sapere secundum carnem mors est. Sed quod non vis mortem corporis animalis per peccatum primi hominis accidisse, cum audias eumdem Apostolum dicentem: Corpus mortuum est propter peccatum ; neque negare audeas, resurrectionem corporis spiritalis, quae morti corporis animalis opponitur e contrario, per iustitiam secundi hominis adfuturam; et hoc ideo non vis, ut corporibus mortuorum, et per haec etiam cruciatibus morientium impleas paradisum, beatarum deliciarum memorabilem locum; hoc reprehendimus, hoc detestamur, hoc dignum anathemate iudicamus. Cui enim morti in fine insultabitur, cum dicetur: Ubi est, mors, victoria tua? Ubi est, mors, aculeus tuus? Nisi aut diabolo, etiam mortis corporalis auctori, aut ipsi morti corporis, quam resurrectio corporis absorbebit? Hic enim sermo tunc fiet, cum corruptibile hoc induerit incorruptionem, et mortale hoc induerit immortalitatem. Sine ambiguitate quippe dicit Apostolus: Cum corruptibile hoc induerit immortalitatem, tunc fiet sermo qui scriptus est: Absorpta est mors in victoriam. Ubi est, mors, victoria tua? Ubi est, mors, aculeus tuus? Cui morti hoc dicetur, nisi quae absorbebitur in victoriam? Et quae ista est, nisi quae tunc absorbebitur, quando corruptibile hoc corpus atque mortale incorruptione atque immortalitate vestietur? Huius ergo corporalis mortis aculeus peccatum est; quia huic morti dicetur: Ubi est, mors, aculeus tuus? Quem aculeum dixit esse peccatum; aculeum videlicet quo mors est facta, non quem fecit ipsa; sicut poculum mortis est quo mors fit, non quod a morte fit. Quomodo ergo, ut putas, non huic, sed perpetuae insultabitur morti? Numquid ipsa absorbebitur in victoriam, cum mortale hoc induerit immortalitatem? Numquid adversus sanctos ipsa contendit, ut eius timor certamine vincatur illorum, quae prius eos victos tenebat, quando eam timendo peccabant? Nonne propter ipsam vincendam Dominus mortuus est, et evacuavit eum qui potestatem habebat mortis, id est, diabolum, et liberavit eos qui timore mortis per totam vitam rei erant servitutis ? Numquid timore mortis aeternae rei erant; cum potius qui eam non timuerint, rei fiant? Propter quod Dominus, ne mors ista corporis timeatur, cuius timor facit reos, sed illa potius sempiterna, quam non timendo, fiunt rei, apertissime dicit: Nolite timere eos qui corpus occidunt, et postea non habent quod faciant; sed eum timete, qui habet potestatem et corpus et animam perdere in gehennam . Haec est certe mors secunda atque perpetua, contra cuius timorem non certant sancti, sed contra istam potius corporis temporalem. Nam ut hanc vincant, illam timent; quia cum hanc pro pietate et iustitia vicerint, illam non sentient. Huic ergo, non illi, insultabunt, dicentes: Ubi est, mors, victoria tua? Quod alibi scriptum est: Ubi est, mors, contentio tua? Cum igitur huius mortis aculeus sit peccatum; qua fronte audes dicere, non peccato primi hominis esse factum ut in illo a ligno vitae separaremur, et morte etiam corporis plecteremur? Quid est, rogo te, quod adversus divinorum eloquiorum evidentiam, incredibili rabie spumantis loquacitatis oblatras, tamquam non possit in Dei paradiso anima tua obtinere vitam, nisi illuc introduxeris corporis mortem, cum tot et tantis corporalibus morbis, carnificibus, praecursoribus mortis? Attende tibi potius, ne in locum deliciarum sanctarum mittendo corporis poenas, tu ipse pendas in loco perpetuorum dolorum et animi et corporis poenas.
Augustine: About the image of the earthly, and about the image of the heavenly human being, enough has already been disputed above; and we answered you that the image of the heavenly can now be borne by faith and hope; but it will be borne, presented and bestowed in reality, when the spiritual body shall have risen, which is now sown an animal one. For these two images, namely the one of the earthly human being, the other of the heavenly, he attributes to individual things; the former, namely, to the animal body, the latter to the spiritual. For above he said: But not first that which is spiritual, but that which is animal; afterward, that which is spiritual; and at once subjoined: The first man from the earth, earthly; the second man from heaven, heavenly, as we have borne the image of the earthly, let us bear also the image of that heavenly one. Who is that one, except Adam, through whom death? And who is this one, except Christ, through whom the resurrection of the dead? Since through a human being death, and through a human being the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive; that is, whoever will be made alive, will be made alive only in Christ; whence we have already spoken above. There is surely no ambiguity to which two things these two images are referred; for the former is referred to death, this to resurrection. The former, then, to the death of the body; because this to the resurrection of the body; the former to the animal body, which is sown in dishonor; this to the spiritual, which will rise in glory; with the former we are clothed by being born, with this by being reborn. But since we are born under sin, and reborn in the forgiveness of sins: As we have borne, he says, the image of the earthly, let us bear also the image of that heavenly one. He mentions the former as done, this he exhorts that it be done. For no one can bring it about that he was not born in the penalty by which his body is sown in dishonor; but unless he is reborn, and perseveres in that in which he is reborn in grace, he will not reach the disposition of the spiritual body, which will rise in glory. What is it, then, that you say: He openly, surely, passed over to pursuits, and wishes there to be as much difference between our past and present conversation as there is between mortality and immortality? When rather the Apostle passes over to nothing else; but pursues that which he had begun about the resurrection of the flesh, to which on the contrary he opposes the death of the flesh. He does not, then, wish two conversations, namely an evil and a good one, to be understood in this place; but asserts the resurrection of the flesh to be coming through Christ, just as through Adam the death of the flesh was made. Let the man of God do what he does; you follow him, do not try to make him follow you. For he does not follow, however much you try. He openly opposes the death of the flesh to the resurrection of the flesh; he openly distributes to these individual things individual authors, to the death of the body Adam, to the resurrection of the body Christ; he openly, comparing on the contrary between themselves two images, one of the earthly human being, the other of the heavenly, attributes the former to the animal body, which through Adam merited to be sown in dishonor; this to the spiritual, which through Christ will merit to rise in glory. Who too according to the flesh was called a heavenly human being, not because he took it from heaven, but because he also lifted it into heaven. If a good pursuit and a good conversation bring it about that they reach a glorious resurrection; was it by an evil pursuit and an evil conversation of this life, which, born, and increased by the advance of age, we have led, brought about that we are born in an animal body with the propagation of death? For who by an evil pursuit or by any pursuit procured for himself the beginning of a troublesome birth? Who by an evil conversation brought it about that, however he has lived, it is necessary for him to die? Plainly, if these two, that is, the image of the earthly human being, which pertains to the animal body, and the image of the heavenly, which pertains to the spiritual body, we wish to refer also to conversations; as we set the resurrection of the spiritual body on the side of righteousness, so we ought to set the death of the animal body on the side of sin; because as this resurrection will come about in the righteousness of Christ, so that death came about in the iniquity of Adam. But if you understand this, and consent to this most open truth; I grant what you say, that the earthly and the heavenly are referred to vices and virtues; for just as the virtue of Christ will bring it about that the spiritual body rise, so the fault of Adam brought it about that the animal body die. Not, then, does that sentence of the same Apostle to the Romans agree with this: For as you presented your members to serve uncleanness, and iniquity unto iniquity; so now present your members to serve righteousness unto sanctification (Rom 6:19). For there he was speaking of evil and good morals; but here he speaks of the resurrection of the body and the death of the body. But since those who already use reason cannot reach the glorious resurrection, which will then be, when the spiritual body rises, unless they both believe and hope this; therefore, mentioning that we have borne the image of the earthly human being, in which is through a human being death; he exhorts that we bear the image of the heavenly human being, in which is through a human being the resurrection of the dead; so that, as through Adam's sin we came into the death of the animal body, so through Christ's righteousness we may come into the resurrection of the spiritual body. Then he subjoins: But this I say, brothers, that flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God. Where we do not reprehend you for having believed that by the name of flesh and blood was signified carnal prudence, not the very substance of the animal body, which is sown indeed in dishonor, but yet will rise in glory, and will beyond doubt possess the kingdom of God. Although this too can be understood otherwise, so that in this place, by the name of flesh and blood, corruption is signified, which we now see in flesh and blood; which corruption surely will not possess the kingdom of God, because this corruptible will be clothed with incorruption. Whence, when he had said: Flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God; as though expounding what he had signified by these names, lest the very carnal substance be believed, he added: Neither will corruption possess incorruption. And according to this sense he rather seems to weave the rest. But whichever of these the author of those same words wished to signify, neither is against the faith, which holds itself thus, that it does not doubt that the family of God gathered from all nations will possess the kingdom of God in incorruptible flesh. Not, then, do we reprehend this, which even before us very many Catholic treaters of the divine Scriptures said, that flesh and blood here can be taken as human beings who are wise according to flesh and blood, and therefore will not possess the kingdom of God; for so the same Teacher of the Gentiles says: To be wise according to the flesh is death (Rom 8:6). But that you are unwilling that the death of the animal body happened through the sin of the first man, when you hear the same Apostle saying: The body is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10); and dare not deny that the resurrection of the spiritual body, which is opposed on the contrary to the death of the animal body, will be present through the righteousness of the second man; and this you are unwilling for, that you may fill paradise, the memorable place of blessed delights, with the bodies of the dead, and through these even with the torments of the dying; this we reprehend, this we detest, this we judge worthy of anathema. For what death will be insulted at the end, when it will be said: Where, O death, is your victory? Where, O death, is your sting? Except either the devil, the author even of bodily death, or the death of the body itself, which the resurrection of the body will swallow up? For this word will then come about, when this corruptible will have put on incorruption, and this mortal will have put on immortality. For without ambiguity the Apostle says: When this corruptible will have put on immortality, then will come about the word that is written: Death is swallowed up in victory. Where, O death, is your victory? Where, O death, is your sting? To what death will this be said, except to that which will be swallowed up in victory? And what is this, except that which will then be swallowed up, when this corruptible and mortal body will be clothed with incorruption and immortality? Of this bodily death, then, the sting is sin; because to this death it will be said: Where, O death, is your sting? Which sting he said is sin; the sting, namely, by which death was made, not which death itself made; just as the cup of death is that by which death is made, not that which is made by death. How, then, as you suppose, will not this, but perpetual death be insulted? Will it itself be swallowed up in victory, when this mortal will have put on immortality? Does it itself contend against the saints, so that its fear may be conquered by the contest of those whom it formerly held conquered, when, by fearing it, they sinned? Did not the Lord die for the sake of conquering it, and empty out him who had the power of death, that is, the devil, and free those who through the fear of death were all their life subject to the guilt of servitude (See Heb 2:14-15)? Were they guilty by the fear of eternal death; when rather those who do not fear it become guilty? On which account the Lord, that this death of the body should not be feared, whose fear makes guilty, but rather that everlasting one, which by not fearing they become guilty, says most openly: Do not fear those who kill the body, and afterward have nothing they can do; but fear him who has the power to destroy both body and soul in hell (See Matt 10:28; Luke 12:4-5). This is surely the second and perpetual death, against whose fear the saints do not contend, but rather against this temporal one of the body. For that they may conquer this, they fear that one; because when they have conquered this for piety and righteousness, they will not feel that one. This one, then, not that one, they will insult, saying: Where, O death, is your victory? which elsewhere is written: Where, O death, is your strife? (See Hos 13:14) Since, therefore, the sting of this death is sin; with what brow do you dare to say that it was not by the sin of the first man brought about that in him we were separated from the tree of life, and punished even by the death of the body? What is it, I ask you, that, against the evidence of the divine words, you bark with the incredible rabidity of foaming wordiness, as though your soul could not obtain life in the paradise of God, unless you introduced thither the death of the body, with so many and so great bodily diseases, butchers, forerunners of death? Attend rather to yourself, lest, by sending the penalties of the body into the place of holy delights, you yourself pay, in the place of perpetual sorrows, the penalties both of soul and of body.
JulianImp.6.40VI. 41. Iulianus. In hoc sane loco Augustinus aculeum mortis, peccatum illud opinatur antiquum, non intellegens quid sequatur, id est: virtus peccati lex; quam legem, praeceptum quod Adae positum est, conatur asserere. Sed illa lex non fuit peccati virtus, verum peccati genus. Aliud est enim exstanti rei dare virtutem, aliud quod non exstitit procreare. Esus ergo illius arboris, si non esset interdictus, malus non fuisset; postquam autem interdictus est, et a praevaricatione usurpatus, natum est ibi ex interdicente et contemnente peccatum; quamvis non ideo data lex fuisset, ut delinqueretur; sed tamen idem faciendo, id est, de arbore comedendo, non deliquisset homo, quia bona arbor erat, nisi gustus eius a lege interdictus fuisset. Quod ergo per se pravum est, verbi gratia parricidium, sacrilegium, adulterium, et malum esse etiam sine lata lege dignoscitur, bene dicitur apud praevaricatores, qui cupientiores prohibitione redduntur, virtutem acquisisse per legem; quod vero inique non usurpatur, nisi interdicatur, genus ibi proprie, non robur ei constat a legis occasione collatum. Verum quoniam hic fui longior, huius quoque libri fine commoneo lectorem meum, ut vigilanter inspiciat, nullam in lege Dei occasionem Manichaeae impietatis offendi; sed si qua putantur ambigua, secundum regulas veritatis atque rationis et exponi posse, et iustitiae convenire non dubitet. Et illos ergo qui dicunt: Non per Christum erit resurrectio mortuorum, et istos qui asserunt aeque contra Apostolum, non nostrae naturae corpus habuisse Christum, per quod Manichaeorum scita venerantur; eodem et qui legi Dei congruat vigore damnamus.
VI. 41. Julian: In this place, surely, Augustine supposes the sting of death to be that ancient sin, not understanding what follows, that is: the power of sin is the law; which law he tries to assert to be the precept that was set for Adam. But that law was not the power of sin, but truly the kind of sin. For it is one thing to give power to an existing thing, another to procreate what did not exist. The eating of that tree, then, if it had not been forbidden, would not have been evil; but after it was forbidden, and usurped by transgression, there was born there, from the one forbidding and the one despising, sin; although the law had not been given for this, that there should be transgression; but yet, by doing the same, that is, by eating of the tree, the human being would not have transgressed, because the tree was good, unless the tasting of it had been forbidden by the law. That, then, which is depraved in itself, for example parricide, sacrilege, adultery, and is recognized to be evil even without a law passed, is well said, among transgressors, who are made more desirous by the prohibition, to have acquired power through the law; but that which is not iniquitously usurped unless it be forbidden, the kind there properly, not the strength, is established to be conferred on it from the occasion of the law. But since here I have been rather long, at the end of this book too I admonish my reader to inspect vigilantly, that no occasion of Manichean impiety is found in the law of God; but that, if any things are thought ambiguous, he should not doubt that they can both be expounded according to the rules of truth and reason, and agree with righteousness. And so both those who say: The resurrection of the dead will not be through Christ, and these who assert, equally against the Apostle, that Christ did not have a body of our nature, by which they venerate the decrees of the Manichees; we condemn with the same vigor that agrees with the law of God.
JulianImp.6.41Augustinus. Ego numquam dixi eam legem, quae in paradiso data est, Apostolum significasse, ubi ait: Virtus peccati lex. Frustra ergo adversus me, tamquam hoc dixerim, tu multa dixisti. Virtutem namque peccati, iam quidem existentis, sed minus operantis, eam legem semper intellexi, de qua idem Apostolus: Quid ergo dicemus? -inquit - Lex peccatum est? Absit! Sed peccatum non cognovi nisi per legem. Nam concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: Non concupisces. Occasione autem accepta, peccatum per mandatum operatum est in me omnem concupiscentiam . Ecce quomodo est virtus peccati lex: minus enim operabatur peccatum, quando praevaricationem nondum operabatur, quia lex nondum data erat: Ubi enim lex non est, nec praevaricatio . Nondum ergo erat omnis concupiscentia, antequam prohibitione sic cresceret, tamque fortis fieret, ut ipsius prohibitionis, qua creverat, vinculum rumperet. Hoc et te ipsum scire monstrasti, multa in hanc sententiam disserendo; quamvis ut hoc ostenderes, alia potius adhibuisti testimonia apostolica, non hoc quo ego nunc usus sum; fortasse ideo, ne peccatum esse concupiscentiam fatereris. Apertissime quippe illam demonstravit esse peccatum, qui dixit, quod commemoravi: Peccatum non cognovi, nisi per legem. Et velut quaereremus quod peccatum: Nam concupiscentiam - inquit - nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: Non concupisces. Haec igitur concupiscentia, utique mala, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, nondum erat ante primi hominis illud grande peccatum; sed esse tunc coepit, naturamque humanam tamquam in traduce vitiavit, unde trahit originale peccatum. Cum illa quippe omnis homo nascitur; nec huius concupiscentiae reatus, nisi in renascentibus solvitur, ut eo post hanc absolutionem non inquinetur, nisi qui ei ad perpetrandum opus malum, spiritu adversus eam vel non concupiscente, vel non fortius concupiscente, consentit. Addunt ergo vires eidem concupiscentiae peccata, quae accedunt propria voluntate peccantium, et ipsa consuetudo peccandi, quae non frustra dici solet secunda natura; sed ne tunc quidem omnis est concupiscentia. Adhuc enim habet quo crescat; quoniam minor est, quamdiu non a sciente, sed ab ignorante peccatur. Ideo non ait: Non habebam, sed: Nesciebam concupiscentiam, nisi lex diceret: Non concupisces. Occasione autem accepta, peccatum per mandatum operatum est in me omnem concupiscentiam. Omnis est enim concupiscentia, quando prohibita concupiscuntur ardentius, et peccata iam cognita, ignorantiae sublata excusatione, et accedente legis praevaricatione, committuntur immanius. Unde lex Dei, apud eos quos non adiuvat gratia Dei per Agnum Dei qui tollit peccatum mundi, non correctio peccantis, sed virtus potius est dicta peccati. Et ideo cum dixisset: Virtus peccati lex, tamquam responderetur: Quid ergo faciemus, si peccatum nec lege tollitur, sed augetur? Continuo subiciens ubi spes debeat esse certantibus: Gratias - inquit - Deo qui dedit nobis victoriam; vel, sicut alii codices habent, quod et graeci habent, qui dat nobis victoriam per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum. Verissime prorsus: Si enim data esset lex, quae posset vivificare, omnino ex lege esset iustitia; sed conclusit Scriptura omnia sub peccato, ut promissio ex fide Iesu Christi daretur credentibus . Hi enim sunt filii promissionis et vasa misericordiae, quibus ideo data est promissio ex fide Iesu Christi, quia misericordiam consecuti sunt, ut fideles essent, quod etiam de se ipso dicit Apostolus ; ne vel ipsa fides, ex qua incipit, et ad quam refertur, quidquid temperanter et iuste et pie gerimus, ita tribuatur nostrae voluntatis arbitrio, tamquam non nobis Deo miserante donetur; a quo etiam voluntas ipsa, sicut scriptum est, praeparatur . Unde sancta Ecclesia per ora supplicantium sacerdotum non solum pro fidelibus, ut in eo quod credunt, perseverante pietate non deficiant, verum etiam pro infidelibus orat, ut credant. Ex quo enim per humanum liberum arbitrium Adam commisit illud grande peccatum, et omne genus humanum in commune damnavit , ab hac communi damnatione homines quicumque liberantur, nonnisi divina gratia et misericordia liberantur; et quidquid lex Dei iubet, nonnisi eo qui iubet adiuvante, inspirante, donante completur; qui rogatur ut permaneant, ut proficiant, ut perficiantur fideles; qui rogatur etiam ut credere incipiant infideles. Quas Ecclesiae sanctae preces toto terrarum orbe crescentes et ferventes, opprimere ac exstinguere cupiunt, qui contra istam Dei gratiam humanae voluntatis arbitrium, ut gravius de alto praecipitent, extollunt potius, quam defendunt. In quibus contentiosum locum vel soli, vel praecipue vos tenetis, qui Christum Iesum parvulis non vultis esse Iesum, quos nullo peccato originali attaminatos esse contenditis; cum ille propterea Iesus appellatus sit, quia salvum fecit populum suum, non a corporalibus morbis, quos et in populo non suo sanare consuevit, sed a peccatis eorum . Quamvis ergo Apostolus in eo quod ait: Aculeus autem mortis est peccatum, illam sine ambiguitate expresserit mortem, quae resurrectioni corporis, de qua loquebatur, opposita est, id est, corporis mortem; ipsa enim absorbebitur in victoriam, quando corpore spiritali resurgente iam non erit, quia immortalitas etiam corporis erit, quae nullo peccato possit amitti: tamen in eo quod secutus adiunxit: Virtus vero peccati, lex, non legem significavit, quae data est in paradiso; illa enim peccati, quod nullum adhuc erat, virtus esse non posset; sed eam legem virtutem dixit esse peccati, quae subintravit ut abundaret peccatum, et operaretur omnem concupiscentiam; id est, non eam tantum, quae in paradiso exorta mortificavit et corpus, cum qua omnis homo nascitur; nec eam tantum, quae peccatis per cuiusque malos mores accedentibus crevit; verum etiam illam, quae mandato prohibente ardentius excitata, ad praevaricationem usque pervenit; ut victoria, qua non solum peccati cupiditas, verum etiam mortis corporalis vinceretur timor, postremo ipsius mortalitatis absorberetur infirmitas, non lege per Moysem data, sed per Christum facta gratia praestaretur. Proinde ita dixit Apostolus: Aculeus autem mortis est peccatum; virtus vero peccati, lex; gratias autem Deo qui dat nobis victoriam per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum; tamquam diceret: Aculeus quidem mortis est peccatum, quia peccato etiam mors ista corporis facta est; cuius auctori vel ipsi etiam morti dicetur in fine ab eis, quibus in gloria resurgentibus absorbebitur: Ubi est, mors, victoria tua? Ubi est, mors, aculeus tuus? Sed iste aculeus, id est peccatum, per unum ingrediens, et in omnes homines cum morte pertransiens, aliis quoque additis multiplicatum, nec lex sancta et iusta et bona quivit auferre; virtus enim potius eius effecta est, cum prohibita concupiscentia magis ardesceret, et ad praevaricationis cumulum perveniret. Quid ergo restabat, nisi ut gratia subveniret? Gratias itaque Deo qui dat nobis victoriam per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum; qui nostra debita dimittendo, et nos in temptationem non inferendo, ad novissimam victoriam, qua mors etiam corporis absorbeatur, adducit; ut qui gloriatur, non confidat in virtute sua, sed in Domino glorietur . Haec recta et catholica fides, in qua etiam didicimus et tenemus, mortem quoque corporis eo aculeo factam, quod est peccatum, tantum a Manichaeorum errore diversa est, eique potius declaratur adversa, ut vobiscum illi dicant potius, quam nobiscum, sic mortalem Adam factum, ut sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset. Nec tamen ideo vos Manichaeos dicimus, quia et vos hoc dicitis; nec videtis tamen, neque nos a vobis ideo dici debere Manichaeos, quia malum esse concupiscentiam, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et illi et nos dicimus. Sed vos ab eis, in eo quod simul dicitis, dissimili quidem, verumtamen alio errore distatis, qui mortem carnis non sicut illi naturae tribuitis alienae, nobisque permixtae, sed eam naturae nullo vitiatae peccato impingitis nostrae; ac sic paradisum honestissimae ac felicissimae voluptatis, funeribus mortuorum et cruciatibus morientium infeliciter atque indecenter impletis. Nos vero, in eo quod cum Manichaeis dicimus concupiscentiam carnis, qua contra spiritum concupiscit, malum esse, atque a Patre non esse , non ab eis alio, quamvis dissimili, tamen ipso haeretico errore, sed catholica veritate distamus; quia istam discordiam duarum concupiscentiarum carnis et spiritus, non cum illis per alienae Deo coaeternae malaeque naturae commixtionem nobis accidisse, sed cum catholico Ambrosio eiusque consortibus, per praevaricationem primi hominis in naturam nostram vertisse disserimus, et contra utrosque vestrum fidenter asserimus: carnemque Christi, non sicut illi nullam, nec sicut vos calumniamini, a natura nostrae carnis alienam; sed ab hoc nostro vitio, quo caro contra spiritum concupiscit, immunem atque omnino integram praedicamus. Vos autem mala negando esse quae mala sunt, eorumque originem non ad primi hominis referendo peccatum, non ut ea mala non sint efficitis; sed ut ex mala natura bono aeterno coaeterna esse credantur, detestabili caecitate suffragamini Manichaeis, eosque accusatis inaniter, quia miserabiliter adiuvatis.
Augustine: I never said that the law which was given in paradise was what the Apostle signified, where he says: The power of sin is the law. In vain, then, against me, as though I had said this, have you said many things. For I always understood that law to be the power of sin—of sin, that is, already existing, but working less—about which the same Apostle says: What then shall we say? Is the law sin? Far be it! But I did not know sin except through the law. For I did not know concupiscence, unless the law said: You shall not covet. But sin, taking occasion, worked in me, through the commandment, all concupiscence (Rom 7:7-8). Behold how the law is the power of sin: for sin worked less, when it did not yet work transgression, because the law had not yet been given: For where there is no law, neither is there transgression (Rom 4:15). There was not yet, then, all concupiscence, before, by prohibition, it so grew, and became so strong, that it burst the bond of the very prohibition by which it had grown. This you too showed that you yourself know, disputing many things to this sentiment; although, that you might show this, you applied rather other apostolic testimonies, not this which I have now used; perhaps for this reason, lest you confess that concupiscence is sin. For he most openly demonstrated that it is sin, who said what I mentioned: I did not know sin except through the law. And, as though we asked what sin: For I did not know concupiscence, he says, unless the law said: You shall not covet. This concupiscence, then, surely evil, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, was not yet before that great sin of the first man; but then began to be, and vitiated human nature as though in propagation, whence it draws original sin. For with it every human being is born; nor is the guilt of this concupiscence loosed except in those being reborn, so that after this absolution he is defiled by it only who consents to it for perpetrating an evil work, with the spirit either not lusting against it, or not lusting more strongly. Sins, then, add strength to this same concupiscence, sins which accrue by the proper will of those sinning, and the very habit of sinning, which is not without reason wont to be called a second nature; but not even then is it all concupiscence. For it still has whereby it may grow; since it is less, as long as it is sinned not by one knowing, but by one ignorant. Therefore he does not say: I did not have, but: I did not know concupiscence, unless the law said: You shall not covet. But sin, taking occasion, worked in me, through the commandment, all concupiscence. For it is all concupiscence, when forbidden things are coveted more ardently, and sins now known, the excuse of ignorance removed, and transgression of the law accruing, are committed more monstrously. Whence the law of God, among those whom the grace of God through the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world does not aid, was called not the correction of the one sinning, but rather the power of sin. And therefore, when he had said: The power of sin is the law, as though it were answered: What then shall we do, if sin is not taken away by the law, but increased? At once subjoining where there ought to be hope for those contending: Thanks, he says, be to God who gave us the victory; or, as other codices have, which the Greek also has, who gives us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ (1 Cor 15:57). Most truly altogether: For if a law had been given which could make alive, then surely righteousness would be from the law; but Scripture enclosed all things under sin, that the promise by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to believers (Gal 3:21-22). For these are the sons of the promise and the vessels of mercy, to whom the promise by the faith of Jesus Christ was given for this reason, that they obtained mercy that they might be faithful, which the Apostle says even of himself (See 1 Cor 7:25); lest even the very faith, from which begins, and to which is referred, whatever we do temperately and justly and piously, be so attributed to the choice of our will, as though it were not granted us by God's mercy; by whom even the will itself, as it is written, is prepared (See Prov 8:35 LXX). Whence holy Church, through the mouths of supplicating priests, prays not only for the faithful, that in that which they believe they may not fail by persevering piety, but also for the unbelieving, that they may believe. For from the time that, through human free choice, Adam committed that great sin, and condemned the whole human race in common (See John Chrysostom, Homilies on Romans 10), whatever human beings are freed from this common condemnation are freed only by divine grace and mercy; and whatever the law of God commands is fulfilled only with him who commands aiding, inspiring, granting; who is asked that the faithful may remain, may advance, may be perfected; who is asked also that the unbelieving may begin to believe. These prayers of holy Church, growing and fervent throughout the whole world, those wish to oppress and extinguish, who, against this grace of God, exalt rather than defend the choice of the human will, so that they hurl it down more grievously from on high. Among whom you hold the contentious place, either alone or chiefly, you who are unwilling that Christ Jesus be Jesus to little ones, whom you contend to be tainted by no original sin; whereas he was for this reason called Jesus, because he saved his people, not from bodily diseases, which he was wont to heal even in a people not his own, but from their sins (See Matt 1:21). Although, then, the Apostle, in that which he says: But the sting of death is sin, expressed without ambiguity that death which was opposed to the resurrection of the body, of which he was speaking, that is, the death of the body; for it itself will be swallowed up in victory, when, with the spiritual body rising, it will be no more, because there will be immortality even of the body, which can be lost by no sin: yet in that which he added following: But the power of sin is the law, he did not signify the law which was given in paradise; for that could not be the power of sin, which as yet was none; but he said that law to be the power of sin, which entered in that sin might abound, and might work all concupiscence; that is, not only that which, having arisen in paradise, mortified even the body, with which every human being is born; nor only that which grew by sins accruing through the evil morals of each one; but also that which, more ardently aroused by the prohibiting commandment, reached even to transgression; so that the victory, by which not only the desire of sin, but also the fear of bodily death would be conquered, and finally the weakness of mortality itself swallowed up, might be bestowed not by the law given through Moses, but by the grace made through Christ. Accordingly the Apostle so said: But the sting of death is sin; but the power of sin is the law; but thanks be to God who gives us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ; as though he said: The sting of death indeed is sin, because by sin this death of the body too was made; whose author, or even death itself, will be told at the end by those who, rising in glory, will swallow it up: Where, O death, is your victory? Where, O death, is your sting? But this sting, that is, sin, entering through one, and passing into all human beings with death, multiplied by others added too, not even the law holy and just and good could take away; for it became rather its power, when, the concupiscence being forbidden, it burned more, and reached the accumulation of transgression. What, then, remained, except that grace should come to the aid? Thanks, therefore, be to God who gives us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ; who, by forgiving our debts, and by not leading us into temptation, brings us to the final victory, by which even the death of the body is swallowed up; so that he who glories may not trust in his own virtue, but glory in the Lord (See 1 Cor 1:31). This right and Catholic faith, in which we have also learned and hold that the death of the body too was made by that sting which is sin, is as far diverse from the error of the Manichees, and is rather declared adverse to it, that they rather say with you than with us that Adam was so made mortal that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he was to die. Nor yet do we therefore call you Manichees, because you too say this; nor yet do you see that neither ought we to be called Manichees by you, because both they and we say that the concupiscence by which the flesh lusts against the spirit is an evil. But you differ from them, in that which you say together, by a dissimilar indeed, yet by another error, you who do not, like them, attribute the death of the flesh to an alien nature commingled with us, but impute it to our own nature vitiated by no sin; and so unhappily and indecently fill the paradise of most honorable and most happy pleasure with the funerals of the dead and the torments of the dying. But we, in that which we say with the Manichees that the concupiscence of the flesh, by which it lusts against the spirit, is an evil, and is not from the Father (See 1 John 2:16), differ from them not by another, though dissimilar, yet by the same heretical error, but by Catholic truth; because we discuss that this discord of the two concupiscences of flesh and spirit happened to us not, with them, through the commingling of an alien nature coeternal with God and evil, but, with the Catholic Ambrose and his associates, passed over into our nature through the transgression of the first man (See Ambrose, On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation 7.71); and against both of you we confidently assert: and the flesh of Christ we proclaim, not, like them, none, nor, as you slanderously claim, alien from the nature of our flesh; but immune and altogether whole from this our fault, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit. But you, by denying that those things are evils which are evils, and by referring their origin not to the sin of the first man, do not bring it about that they be not evils; but that they be believed to be from an evil nature coeternal with the eternal good, and by a detestable blindness you give your vote to the Manichees, and accuse them in vain, because you pitiably aid them.
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