Answer to Julian
Against Pelagianism
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haeresis Pelagianae defensorem
defender of the Pelagian heresy
Revisions II
C. 62Answer to Julian, in six booksContra Iulianum, libri sex
Interea libri quattuor Iuliani pelagiani (Retract. 2, 53), quos supra commemoravi, venerunt etiam in manus nostras. In quibus comperi illa, quae ex eis decerpserat qui ea comiti Valerio miserat, non omnia eo modo quo a Iuliano dicta sunt ad eumdem comitem scripta, sed nonnulla eorum aliquantum fuisse mutata. Scripsi ergo sex libros adversus illos quattuor (Opus imp. c. Iul. 4, 5); sed meorum duo primi testimoniis sanctorum, qui fidem catholicam post Apostolos defenderunt, Iuliani impudentiam redarguunt, qui tamquam Manichaeorum dogma nobis obiciendum putavit, quia ex Adam trahi dicimus originale peccatum, quod per lavacrum regenerationis (Tit 3, 5), non solum in maioribus, verum etiam in parvulis solvitur. Quantum autem ipse Iulianus quibusdam sententiis suis adiuvet Manichaeos, in primi libri mei parte posteriore monstravi. Ceteri autem nostri quattuor redduntur illis singulis singuli.
Meanwhile, the four books of the Pelagian Julian (Retract. 2, 53), which I mentioned above, also came into my hands. In them I found that the passages excerpted from them by the man who had sent them to Count Valerius had not all been written to that same count in the way Julian had stated them, but that some of them had been somewhat altered. I therefore wrote six books against those four of his (Opus imp. c. Iul. 4, 5); but the first two of mine refute the impudence of Julian by the testimonies of the saints who defended the catholic faith after the apostles. For he thought he could throw it in our face as a Manichean doctrine that we say original sin is contracted from Adam—a sin that through the bath of rebirth (Titus 3:5) is taken away not only in adults but also in little ones. How much Julian himself helps the Manicheans by certain of his statements I showed in the latter part of my first book. My remaining four books reply to his four, one to one.
IulianumVerum in huius tanti tamque elaborati operis quinto volumine, ubi commemoravi deformem maritum coniugi suae, ne deformes pareret, proponere in concubitu formosam solere picturam (C. Iul. 5, 14, 51), nomen hominis qui hoc facere solebat, quasi certum posui, cum sit incertum, quia memoria me fefellit. Hoc autem Soranus auctor medicinae scripsit regem Cyprium facere solere, sed nomen eius proprium non expressit.
But in the fifth volume of this great and laborious work, where I recalled that a deformed husband, so as not to beget deformed children, used to set a beautiful picture before his wife during intercourse (C. Iul. 5, 14, 51), I gave the name of the man who used to do this as though it were certain, when it is uncertain, for my memory deceived me. Soranus, an authority on medicine, wrote that a king of Cyprus used to do this, but he did not give the man's proper name.
IulianumHoc opus sic incipit: Contumelias tuas et verba maledica, Iuliane.
This work begins thus: Your insults and abusive words, Julian.
IulianumPreface
Adversus haereticos Pelagianos, qui dicunt Adam, etiamsi non peccasset, fuisse corpore moriturum, nec in illo humanum genus esse vitiatum (unde sequitur eos, ut mortes, et mortiferos morbos, et omnia mala quae videmus et parvulos perpeti, etiam in paradiso futura fuisse contendant, etiamsi nemo peccasset), scripsi librum ad comitem Valerium, cuius libri titulus est: De nuptiis et concupiscentia; eo quod ad illum pervenisse cognoveram dicere Pelagianos damnatores nos esse nuptiarum. Denique in illo opere, nuptiarum bonum a concupiscentiae carnalis malo, quo bene utitur pudicitia coniugalis, quali potui disputatione, discrevi.
Against the Pelagian heretics, who say that Adam, even if he had not sinned, would have died in body, and that the human race was not corrupted in him (from which it follows that they maintain that deaths, deadly diseases, and all the evils we see even little ones suffer would have existed in paradise too, even if no one had sinned), I wrote a book to Count Valerius, whose title is: Marriage and Desire; for I had learned that the Pelagians, after this book reached him, were saying that we condemn marriage. In that work, accordingly, I distinguished, with such argument as I could, the good of marriage from the evil of carnal desire, of which conjugal chastity makes good use.
IulianumQuo libro accepto, memoratus vir illustris misit mihi in cartula nonnullas sententias decerptas ex opere Iuliani haeretici Pelagiani (in quo opere libris quattuor respondisse sibi visus est illi uni meo, quem De nuptiis et concupiscentia me scripsisse memoravi), missas sibi a nescio quo, qui eas, ut voluit, ex primo Iuliani libro decerpendas curavit; quibus ut quantocius responderem, idem Valerius poposcit. Et factum est ut sub eodem titulo etiam secundum librum scriberem, contra quem Iulianus alios octo nimia loquacitate conscripsit. His nunc respondeo, eius verba proponens, eisdemque subiungens responsionem meam ad loca singula, sicut refutatio eorum visa est esse reddenda; cum iam priores quattuor eius libros, posteaquam in manus meas venerunt, sex libris satis aperteque refellerim.
When he had received this book, the renowned and illustrious man sent me on a sheet certain statements excerpted from the work of the Pelagian heretic Julian (a work in which, in four books, he thought he had answered that one book of mine, which I have recorded as having written under the title Marriage and Desire), statements sent to him by I know not whom, who saw to it that they were excerpted, as he chose, from Julian's first book; and Valerius asked that I reply to them as quickly as possible. And so it came about that under the same title I wrote a second book as well, against which Julian, with excessive verbosity, composed another eight. To these I now reply, setting out his words and appending my response to each passage, as their refutation seemed best to require; for I had already refuted his earlier four books, after they came into my hands, clearly enough in six books.
IulianumBk. 1
1. IULIANUS. Magnis licet impeditus angoribus, quos intuenti mihi hac tempestate Ecclesiarum statum, partim indignatio ingerit, partim miseratio; non abieceram tamen promissionis meae fidem, videlicet ut qui fueram factus debitor promittendo, solvendo quoque esse curarem. Nam in libris quos ad fratrem nostrum Turbantium episcopum, virum magno virtutum fulgore conspicuum, contra Augustini scripta dictavi, pollicitus sum, si nihil quod studiis obsisteret, eveniret incommodi, occursurum me protinus eorum argumentis omnibus, qui ex sententia Manichaeorum traducem peccati, id est malum naturale defenderent; a quo sum hactenus munere varia et indissimulabili necessitate suspensus.
1. JULIAN. Though hindered by great distresses, which—as I look upon the state of the Churches in this season—are prompted in me partly by indignation, partly by pity, I had nonetheless not cast off the pledge of my promise: namely, that having become a debtor by promising, I should take care also to discharge the debt by paying. For in the books I dictated to our brother Bishop Turbantius, a man conspicuous for the great splendor of his virtues, against the writings of Augustine, I promised that, if no setback should arise to hinder my efforts, I would forthwith confront all the arguments of those who, following the view of the Manicheans, defend a transmission of sin—that is, a natural evil; and from this task I have until now been held back by various and undisguisable necessity.
Iulianum.1.1AUGUSTINUS. Utinam imiteris Turbantium post illa tua scripta, et post has tuas laudes, quibus eum dicis virum magno virtutum fulgore conspicuum, a vestro errore liberatum! Responsum est autem illis tuis libris, et demonstratum tibi, quae catholica lumina in sanctarum Scripturarum tractatione clarissima hoc opprobrio, id est Manichaeorum appellatione, offuscare coneris.
AUGUSTINE. Would that, after those writings of yours, and after these praises of yours in which you call him a man conspicuous for the great splendor of his virtues, you might imitate Turbantius, who has been set free from your error! For those books of yours have been answered, and it has been shown you what catholic lights, most brilliant in the treatment of the holy Scriptures, you are trying to obscure with this reproach—that is, with the name of the Manicheans.
Iulianum.1.12. IUL. Verum, ut primum respirare licuit, consilium erat, quantum maxime tulisset ipsius rei natura, breviter promissa complere, nisi me actuosiorem denuo ingredi provinciam, beatissime pater Flore, voluisses; qui, quoniam tantum vales reverentia sanctitatis, ut praeceptis tuis segniter oboedire irreligiosum iudicem, obtinuisti facile ut in longiores vias compendium illius, quam elegeram, brevitatis extenderem.
2. JUL. But as soon as I was permitted to breathe again, my plan was, so far as the nature of the matter itself would allow, to fulfill my promises briefly—had you not wished, most blessed father Florus, that I should enter once more upon a more active campaign. Since you have such weight by the reverence of your holiness that I judge it irreligious to obey your commands sluggishly, you have easily obtained that I should extend the brevity I had chosen into longer paths.
Iulianum.1.2Favebis itaque operi tua auctoritate suscepto, cuius ob hoc potissimum nomen inserui, ut stilus securior et hilarior graderetur sub tantae patrocinio iussionis. Fuit igitur concepta animo non importuna ratio brevitatis; quia in illis quattuor libris cuncta fere, quae inventa a Manichaeis Augustini contra nos fuerant ore prolata, catholicae fidei veritas, pro qua et cum qua labentis mundi odia promeremur, tam disputationibus invictis, quam sacrae Legis testimoniis armata, protriverat, nec quidquam pene reliquum erat, si aequis iudicibus uteremur.
And so you will favor with your authority a work undertaken on your account, whose name I have inserted for this reason above all, that my pen might proceed more securely and more cheerfully under the patronage of so great a command. There was, then, conceived in my mind a not untimely plan of brevity; for in those four books the truth of the catholic faith—for which, and with which, we earn the hatred of a falling world—armed both with unconquered arguments and with the testimonies of the sacred Law, had ground down nearly everything that Augustine, with what the Manicheans devised, had uttered against us; and scarcely anything was left, if we had fair judges.
Iulianum.1.2AUG. Contra tuos illos quattuor libros sex libri a me scripti sunt. Post commemorationem quippe doctorum catholicorum (quos Manichaeos facis, mihi sub hoc crimine obiciendo quod illi in catholica Ecclesia didicerunt atque docuerunt), quam duobus prioribus voluminibus explicavi, sequentes quattuor singulos tuis singulis reddidi; redarguens tenebras haeresis vestrae luce catholicae veritatis, quam deserendo caecatus insanis, et rei, de qua nulla umquam in Ecclesia Christi controversia fuit, sicut novus haereticus, aequos iudices quaeris; quasi tibi videri aequi iudices possint, nisi quos vestro errore deceperis. Quem vero iudicem poteris Ambrosio reperire meliorem? De quo magister tuus Pelagius ait, quod eius fidem et purissimum in Scripturis sensum ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere? Numquid ergo iste sensu in Scripturis purissimo impurissimi Manichaei dogma retineret, dicens: Omnes sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13; cf. C. duas epp. Pelag. 4, 11, 29)? Tu ergo iam iudica quam non puro sensu hoc catholicum dogma reprehendas, teque corrigere Ambrosio iudicante ne differas.
AUG. Against those four books of yours, six books have been written by me. For after the recollection of the catholic teachers (whom you make out to be Manicheans, throwing in my face under this charge what they learned and taught in the catholic Church), which I set out in the first two volumes, I assigned the following four, one to each of yours; refuting the darkness of your heresy by the light of catholic truth—a truth from which, by deserting it, you are blinded and rave; and on a matter about which there was never any controversy in the Church of Christ, you, like a new heretic, seek fair judges, as though any could seem fair to you except those whom you have deceived by your error. But what judge better than Ambrose will you be able to find? Of him your own teacher Pelagius said that not even an enemy dared to find fault with his faith and his most pure sense of the Scriptures. Would this man, then, with his most pure sense of the Scriptures, hold to the doctrine of the most impure Manichean, when he says: We are all born under sin, whose very origin is in fault (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13; cf. C. duas epp. Pelag. 4, 11, 29)? Judge now, then, with how impure a sense you find fault with this catholic doctrine, and do not delay to correct yourself with Ambrose as judge.
Iulianum.1.23. IUL. Testimonia tamen Scripturarum, quibus contra nos agi aliquid posse existimant, nonnulla praeterieram, quae me explanatum ire pollicitus eram, ut docerem ambigua quaeque Legis verba, quae ab inimicis nostris assumi solent, nec veritati praeiudicare perspicuae, et secundum hoc esse intellegenda, quod absolutissimis Scripturae sanctae auctoritatibus et insuperabili ratione firmatur. Siquidem hoc ipso, quam sit divinae Legis imperitus interpres et profanus apparet, quisquis putat eius sanctione defendi, quod iustitia non potest vindicari.
3. JUL. Some testimonies of the Scriptures, however, by which they think something can be alleged against us, I had passed over—testimonies I had promised to explain, in order to show that any ambiguous words of the Law which our enemies are accustomed to take up neither prejudge what is plain, and are to be understood in accordance with what is established by the most absolute authorities of holy Scripture and by unanswerable reason. Indeed, by this very fact anyone shows himself an unskilled and profane interpreter of the divine Law who thinks that something is defended by its sanction which cannot be vindicated by justice.
Iulianum.1.3AUG. Vos quod dicitis, potius non potest ulla iustitiae ratione defendi. Quia miseria generis humani, a qua nullum hominum ab exortu usque ad obitum videmus alienum, non pertinet ad Omnipotentis iustum iudicium, si non est originale peccatum.
AUG. It is rather what you say that cannot be defended by any reasoning of justice. For the misery of the human race, from which we see no one exempt from birth to death, does not belong to the just judgment of the Almighty if there is no original sin.
Iulianum.1.34. IUL. Nam si Lex Dei fons est ac magistra iustitiae, auxiliis quoque eius, Dei aequitas adiuvari potest, impugnari non potest. Nullum ergo adminiculum iniquitati de illius Scripturae viribus comparari natura rerum sinit, quae hanc unam promulgationis causam habuit, ut eius testimoniis, remediis, minis, ultionibus iniquitas deleretur.
4. JUL. For if the Law of God is the source and mistress of justice, the equity of God can also be helped by its aids, but cannot be assailed. The nature of things therefore allows no support for iniquity to be drawn from the power of that Scripture, which had this one cause for its promulgation: that by its testimonies, remedies, threats, and punishments iniquity might be destroyed.
Iulianum.1.4AUG. Eius testimoniis declaratur, quod: Homo vanitati similis factus est, dies eius velut umbra praetereunt (Ps 143, 4). Cum qua eum vanitate nasci, non solum veridica Scriptura qua plangitur, verum etiam laboriosa et aerumnosa cura qua eruditur, ostendit. In eius remediis legitur, etiam cum parvulus natus fuerit, offerendum esse sacrificium pro peccato (Cf. Lev 12, 6-8). In eius minis legitur, interituram fuisse animam parvuli, si die non circumcideretur octavo (Cf. Gen 17, 14). In eius ultionibus legitur, iussos interimi etiam parvulos, quorum parentes ad iracundiam provocaverunt Deum, ut internitione bellica delerentur (Cf. Ios 6, 21; 10, 32).
AUG. It is declared by its testimonies that man has become like to vanity; his days pass away like a shadow (Ps 144:4 (143:4)). And that he is born with this vanity is shown not only by the truthful Scripture in which it is lamented, but also by the laborious and toilsome care with which he is educated. Among its remedies it is read that even when a little one has been born, a sacrifice must be offered for sin (Cf. Lev 12:6-8). Among its threats it is read that the soul of a little one would perish if he were not circumcised on the eighth day (Cf. Gen 17:14). Among its punishments it is read that even little ones whose parents had provoked God to anger were ordered to be slain, so that they might be destroyed in the slaughter of war (Cf. Josh 6:21; 10:32).
Iulianum.1.45. IUL. Nihil ergo per Legem Dei agi potest contra Deum Legis auctorem. Quo uno compendio excluditur quidem quidquid ab errantibus consuevit obici; sed nos ad docendum quam sit veritas locuples cui credimus, illis quoque Scripturarum locis, quae intellectum sententiae elocutionum perplexitate velarunt, expositionis lucem solemus afferre; ut originis suae dignitatem reserata possideant, nec ab stemmate sacro velut notha aut degenerantia separentur.
5. JUL. Nothing, then, can be done through the Law of God against God the author of the Law. By this one short formula everything is indeed excluded that is wont to be objected by those who err; but, to teach how rich is the truth in which we believe, we are accustomed to bring the light of exposition also to those passages of the Scriptures which have veiled the understanding of their sense by the intricacy of their phrasing—so that, opened up, they may possess the dignity of their origin, and not be separated from the sacred lineage as though spurious or degenerate.
Iulianum.1.5AUG. Immo vero Scripturarum sanctarum lumina certa veritate fulgentia vos pravarum disputationum perplexitate obscurare conamini. Quid enim lucidius, quam id quod modo dixi: Homo vanitati similis factus est, dies eius velut umbra praetereunt (Ps 143, 4)? Quod utique non fieret, si ad Dei similitudinem in qua est conditus permaneret. Quid lucidius, quam id quod dictum est: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur (1 Cor 15, 22)? Quid lucidius, quam id quod dictum est: Quis enim est mundus a sorde? Nec infans, cuius est unius diei vita super terram (Iob 14, 4-5 (sec. LXX)); et alia plurima, quae vestris tenebris involvere, et in vestrum perversum sensum molimini vana loquacitate convertere?
AUG. On the contrary, it is the lights of the holy Scriptures, shining with sure truth, that you are trying to obscure by the intricacy of your perverse arguments. For what is clearer than what I just said: Man has become like to vanity; his days pass away like a shadow (Ps 144:4 (143:4))? This would certainly not happen if he remained in the likeness of God in which he was created. What is clearer than what was said: As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive (1 Cor 15:22)? What is clearer than what was said: For who is clean from filth? Not even the infant whose life upon earth is of a single day (Job 14:4-5 (sec. LXX)); and very many other passages, which you labor to wrap in your darkness and to twist, by empty loquacity, into your perverse sense?
Iulianum.1.56. IUL. Hoc ergo ex nostro more adhuc solum exsequi cogitabam, id est ut a Traducianorum interpretationibus membra divinae Legis, quae subiacebant contumeliae, liberarem; quae erant scilicet divina, quod essent iusta monstrando.
6. JUL. This alone, then, I was still thinking to pursue after our manner: that is, to free from the interpretations of the Traducianists those members of the divine Law which lay open to insult—members which were divine precisely by being shown to be just.
Iulianum.1.6AUG. Contumelioso ore Traducianos vocas, Cyprianum, Ambrosium, Gregorium, ceterosque socios eorum confitentes originale peccatum. Sed non est mirum quod novi haeretici Catholicis, a quibus exeunt, novum nomen imponunt; hoc et alii fecerunt, quando similiter exierunt.
AUG. With insulting tongue you call them Traducianists—Cyprian, Ambrose, Gregory, and the rest of their company who confess original sin. But it is no wonder that new heretics impose a new name on the catholics from whom they go out; others too have done this, when they likewise went out.
Iulianum.1.67. IUL. Verum quia id impendio poposcisti, immo indixisti auctoritate patria, ut libro tractatoris Poeni, quem ad Valerium comitem vernula peccatorum eius Alypius nuper detulit, obviarem, hinc mihi est longior facta responsio.
7. JUL. But because you demanded it earnestly—nay, enjoined it by a father's authority—that I confront the book of the African disputant which Alypius, a home-bred slave of his sins, recently delivered to Count Valerius, on this account my response has been made longer.
Iulianum.1.7AUG. Magna tibi poena est disputator hic Poenus; et longe antequam nasceremini, magna poena haeresis vestrae Poenus praeparatus est Cyprianus.
AUG. This African disputant is a great punishment to you; and long before you were born, Cyprian the African was prepared as a great punishment for your heresy.
Iulianum.1.78. IUL. Dedit enim ingenii sui denuo fideique monumenta, quae intellegantur aegerrime, exponantur difficillime, vix sine horrore audiantur; convincantur autem facillime, confodiantur acerrime, et propter honestatis reverentiam oblivioni exterminata mandentur.
8. JUL. For he has once again given proofs of his talent and his faith—proofs that are understood with the greatest difficulty, expounded with the greatest difficulty, and scarcely heard without horror; but refuted with the greatest ease, pierced through most sharply, and, out of regard for decency, consigned to oblivion once they have been driven out.
Iulianum.1.8AUG. Non quomodo vis iudicant qui legunt.
AUG. Those who read judge otherwise than you wish.
Iulianum.1.89. IUL. Primus igitur eius liber, qui ante hunc solus est editus, novos nos esse haereticos criminatur (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 1, 1); quia repugnemus opinioni, quae dealbati instar sepulcri, quod secundum Evangelii sententiam, mundo extrinsecus colore vestitum, spurcitia est et iniquitate confertum (Cf. Mt 23, 27), sub laude Baptismatis eructat Manichaeorum sordes ac naturale peccatum, ut Ecclesiae catholicae pura hactenus Sacramenta contaminet.
9. JUL. His first book, then, which was published alone before this one, accuses us of being new heretics (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 1, 1); because we resist the opinion which, like a whitewashed tomb—which, according to the saying of the Gospel, is clothed on the outside with color, but within is full of filth and iniquity (Cf. Matt 23:27)—belches forth, under the praise of Baptism, the filth of the Manicheans and natural sin, so as to contaminate the hitherto pure sacraments of the catholic Church.
Iulianum.1.9AUG. Novos haereticos vos antiqua catholica fides, quam modo oppugnare coepistis, a praeclarissimis, qui fuerunt ante nos, doctoribus praedicata demonstrat. Non autem omnibus respondendum est conviciis potius quam accusationibus tuis, quae non in me, sed etiam in Ambrosium, Hilarium, Gregorium, Cyprianum, aliosque praedicatissimos Ecclesiae doctores, fronte impudentissima et lingua procacissima iacularis.
AUG. That you are new heretics is shown by the ancient catholic faith, which you have just now begun to attack—a faith proclaimed by the most illustrious teachers who were before us. But we need not answer all your reproaches rather than your accusations, which you hurl with most shameless brow and most insolent tongue not only at me, but also at Ambrose, Hilary, Gregory, Cyprian, and the other most renowned teachers of the Church.
Iulianum.1.910. IUL. Laudat etiam potentem hominem, quod nostris petitionibus, qui nihil aliud quam dari tanto negotio iudices vociferabamur, ut ea quae subreptionibus acta constabat, emendarentur potius, quam punirentur examine, mole suae dignitatis obstiterit, nec disceptationi tempus aut locum permiserit impetrare. Quod utrum ille ad quem scribitur, tam nequiter fecerit, quam testatur ista laudatio, ipse viderit. Nos tamen in quantum de eo melius aestimaverimus, nominis illius commemoratio opusculo meo honorifice inserta patefecit. Verum liber ille de patrono suo falsa fortasse contineat. Porro fideliter quid scriptor eius cupiat ostendit; videlicet, ut contra rationem, contra fidem, contra omnem morum et dogmatum sanctitatem, vi fera et caeca impotentia dimicetur.
10. JUL. He also praises a powerful man because, against our petitions—we who clamored for nothing other than that judges be appointed for so great a matter, so that what had been done by stealth might rather be corrected than punished by examination—that man stood in the way with the mass of his dignity, and would not allow time or place for a hearing to be obtained. Whether the one to whom he writes acted as wickedly as this praise testifies, let him see to it himself. But insofar as I have judged better of him, the honorable mention of his name inserted into my little work has made plain. Still, that book may perhaps contain falsehoods about its patron. Yet it faithfully shows what its writer desires: namely, that against reason, against faith, against all holiness of morals and of teachings, the fight be carried on by savage force and blind violence.
Iulianum.1.10AUG. Absit a christianis potestatibus terrenae reipublicae, ut de antiqua catholica fide dubitent, et ob hoc oppugnatoribus eius locum et tempus examinis praebeant; ac non potius in ea certi atque fundati, talibus, quales vos estis, inimicis eius disciplinam coercitionis imponant. Quod enim propter Donatistas factum est, eorum violentissimae turbae fieri coegerunt, ignorantes quid ante sit gestum, quod eis fuerat ostendendum; quales vos turbas Deus avertat ut habeatis; Deo tamen propitio non habetis.
AUG. Far be it from the Christian powers of the earthly commonwealth that they should doubt the ancient catholic faith, and on this account grant its assailants place and time for examination, instead of, being themselves sure and grounded in it, imposing the discipline of correction on such enemies of it as you are. For what was done on account of the Donatists, their most violent crowds compelled to be done, not knowing what had been done before, which ought to have been shown them; may God turn away from you having such crowds; yet, God being favorable, you do not have them.
Iulianum.1.1011. IUL. Quibus gestis inter voluminis primas partes, progressus est ad distinctionem nuptiarum et concupiscentiae, sicut fuerat tituli inscriptione pollicitus; deditque toto deinceps opere documentum artis et virtutis suae. Inter negationem enim confessorum et negatorum confessionem ultima necessitate vexatus, quid aerumnarum pateretur foeda conscientia publicavit.
11. JUL. When these things had been done, among the first parts of his volume he proceeded to the distinction between marriage and desire, as he had promised in the inscription of his title; and throughout the rest of the work he gave a demonstration of his art and his virtue. For, tormented by the utmost necessity between the denial of confessors and the confession of deniers, he made public, with foul conscience, the sufferings he was undergoing.
Iulianum.1.11AUG. Conviciare quantum potes; quis enim conviciosus hoc non potest?
AUG. Revile as much as you can; for what reviler cannot do this?
Iulianum.1.1112. IUL. Priori ergo operi quattuor libellis ea, quam suppeditavit veritas, facultate respondi; praefatus sane praeteriturum me, quae et pro dogmate illius nihil habere ponderis apparebat, et me possent arguere multiloquii, si fuissem imbecilla quaeque et inania persecutus. Quamquam, si hanc regulam, ut decuit, servare licuisset, id est ut nec oppugnationem ex professione inepta mererentur, pene omnia eius inventa publico fuerant spernenda silentio. Sed quoniam, rebus in peiorem partem properantibus (quod mundi fini suo incumbentis indicium est), in Ecclesia quoque Dei adepta est stultitia et turpitudo dominatum; pro Christo legatione fungimur (2 Cor 5, 20), et pro virili portione quantum valemus opis, ad defensionem catholicae religionis afferimus; nec piget mandare litteris remedia, quae contra errorum venena conficimus.
12. JUL. To his earlier work, then, I replied in four little books, with such ability as truth supplied; having stated at the outset that I would pass over what both appeared to carry no weight for his doctrine and could convict me of long-windedness, had I pursued every feeble and empty point. And yet, if I had been allowed to keep this rule, as was fitting—that is, that things should not earn refutation by their inept profession—nearly all his inventions ought to have been spurned by public silence. But since, as matters hasten to the worse (which is a sign of a world bearing down toward its end), folly and baseness have gained mastery even in the Church of God, we discharge an embassy on behalf of Christ (2 Cor 5:20), and to the best of our manly portion we bring, so far as we are able, our help for the defense of the catholic religion; nor do we shrink from committing to writing the remedies we prepare against the poisons of errors.
Iulianum.1.12aug. Stultitia et turpitudo vos peperit; sed si in Ecclesia dominatum adepta esset, ibi vos utique tenuisset.
AUG. Folly and baseness gave you birth; but if they had gained mastery in the Church, they would certainly have kept you there.
Iulianum.1.1213. IUL. Testatus utique, ut dixi, fueram, nec contra omnes me species defendendae traducis in primo disserturum opere, nec cuncta, quae ille liber tenebat, replicaturum; sed cum his conflicturum, in quibus summam et vim sui dogmatis collocasset. Hoc autem me spopondisse fideliter, quicumque vel obliquus sit, tantum diligens utriusque operis lector, agnoscet. Ego autem conscientiae honestate securus inimicum nostrum et adhortor, et stimulo, ut si aliquod a se prolatum, a me praetermissum aestimat argumentum, quod cuiuspiam momenti vel ipse iudicet, in medium proferat, et me timoris dolique convincat.
13. JUL. I had testified, as I said, that in my first work I would neither argue against every form of the transmission to be refuted, nor repeat everything that book contained, but would grapple with those points in which he had placed the sum and force of his doctrine. That I faithfully promised this, anyone—however biased, provided he is a careful reader of both works—will recognize. And I, secure in the honesty of my conscience, both exhort and goad our enemy: if he thinks that any argument put forward by him has been passed over by me which he himself judges to be of any weight, let him bring it forward into the open and convict me of fear and trickery.
Iulianum.1.13AUG. Non credo quod ea quae praetermisisti, nullius momenti esse putaveris; quamvis et si hoc te putasse concedam; non tamen ita esse, catholicus et intellegens, si et unum illum meum et tuos quattuor habuerit, diligentiamque adhibuerit, lector inveniet.
AUG. I do not believe that you thought the things you passed over to be of no weight; though even if I grant that you thought this, a catholic and intelligent reader, if he has both that one book of mine and your four, and applies diligence, will find that it is not so.
Iulianum.1.1314. IUL. Scripturarum sane testimonia quaedam latius exposui, quaedam brevius; quia me plene id secuturo opere facturum spopondi. Nihil itaque ibi de omnibus Augustini argumentis et propositionibus non explosum remansit, nihil a me impletum est aliter quam promissum; multa in inventis eius falsa, multa stolida, sacrilega multa convici.
14. JUL. Some testimonies of the Scriptures, indeed, I expounded more fully, others more briefly; for I promised that I would treat the matter fully in the work that was to follow. So nothing remained there of all Augustine's arguments and propositions that was not exploded, nothing was carried through by me otherwise than I had promised; many things among his inventions I convicted as false, many as foolish, many as sacrilegious.
Iulianum.1.14AUG. Hoc quidem dicis, sed tu dicis; qui autem legit et intellegit, si non Pelagianus est, non hoc dicit.
AUG. This you say, but it is you who say it; whoever reads and understands, if he is not a Pelagian, does not say this.
Iulianum.1.1415. IUL. Qua professione non est nobis arrogantiae fama metuenda; quia non ingenio meo veritatem defensam, sed imbecillitatem nostri ingenii veritatis viribus confitemur adiutam.
15. JUL. By this profession we need not fear a reputation for arrogance; for we confess that the truth was defended not by my talent, but that the weakness of our talent was helped by the strength of truth.
Iulianum.1.15AUG. Elisam dixisses, si verum dicere voluisses.
AUG. You would have said "crushed," if you had wished to speak the truth.
Iulianum.1.1516. IUL. Cum haec itaque haud aliter quam dixi, constet impleta; mirari satis nequeo hominis impudentiam, qui in hoc recenti opere suo libros meos falsitatis accusat, quos tamen necdum in manus suas venisse testatur (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 2, 2). Durum quidem, quod consuetudo peccandi amorem delicti facit; sed nihil durius, quam quod exstinguit pudorem; quod licet ex improbitatis usu esse constaret, tamen amplius praesentia pericula docuerunt, quam quisquam nostrum poterat autumare. Quando enim crederem eo usque Numidae induruisse frontem, ut in uno opere et uno versu utrumque fateretur, et me falsa dixisse, et se non legisse quid dixerim.
16. JUL. Since, then, these things stand fulfilled no otherwise than I have said, I cannot sufficiently wonder at the impudence of the man who, in this recent work of his, accuses my books of falsehood—books which he nonetheless testifies have not yet come into his hands (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 2, 2). It is a hard thing that the habit of sinning produces love of the offense; but nothing is harder than that it extinguishes shame. Although this was already evident from the practice of wickedness, present dangers have taught it more fully than any of us could have surmised. For when would I have believed that the African's brow had grown so hardened that, in one work and one line, he would confess both that I had said false things and that he had not read what I said?
Iulianum.1.16AUG. Si hoc non fecisti, ille fecit qui de libris tuis ea, quae comiti Valerio putavit mittenda esse, decerpsit. Quod eum non credens ego fecisse mendaciter, auctori tribui quod decerptori debui. Tuos quippe libros nondum legeram, sed quae ille ex eis decerpserat, legeram. Si te hominem cogitares, hoc fieri potuisse cum cerneres, nequaquam tam invidiosam quaereres homini hac occasione calumniam.
AUG. If you did not do this, the man did who excerpted from your books what he thought should be sent to Count Valerius. Because I did not believe that he had done this falsely, I attributed to the author what I owed to the excerptor. For I had not yet read your books, but I had read what he had excerpted from them. If you would consider yourself a human being, when you saw that this could happen, you would by no means seek so spiteful a slander against a man on this occasion.
Iulianum.1.1617. IUL. Nam scribens ad eum, quem miratur studiosum esse librorum suorum, cum sit militiae sudoribus occupatus, indicat ab Alypio chartulas ad se fuisse delatas, quae ita superscriptae essent: Capitula de libro Augustini quem scripsit, contra quae de libris pauca decerpsi. Hic video eum, qui tuae Praestantiae ista scripta direxit, de nescio quibus libris ea, causa, quantum existimo, celerioris responsionis, ne tuam differret instantiam, voluisse decerpere.
17. JUL. For, writing to the one whom he admires as a devoted student of his books, though occupied with the toils of military service, he indicates that sheets were delivered to him by Alypius, sheets inscribed thus: Chapters from the book of Augustine which he wrote, against which I have excerpted a few things from the books. Here I see that the man who directed these writings to Your Excellency wished, for the sake (as I suppose) of a quicker reply, so as not to delay your insistence, to excerpt them from I know not what books.
Iulianum.1.17Qui autem sint isti libri cum cogitarem, eos esse arbitratus sum, quorum mentionem Iulianus facit in epistola quam Romam misit, cuius exemplum simul ad me usque pervenit. Ibi quippe ait: Dicunt etiam istas, quae modo aguntur, nuptias a Deo institutas non fuisse, quod in libro Augustini legitur, contra quem ego modo quattuor libellis respondi. Et post haec verba infert iterum suis sermonibus: Credo ex his libellis ista decerpta sunt; unde melius fortasse fuerat, ut universo ipsi operi eius, quod quattuor voluminibus explicavit, refellendo et redarguendo nostra elaboraret intentio; nisi et ego responsionem differre noluissem; sicut nec tu transmissionem scriptorum, quibus respondendum est, distulisti (De nupt. et concup. 2, 2). Ostendit ergo hic apertissime excerpta illa suspicari se de opere meo tumultuarie fuisse collecta; integros autem ignorare libros, quibus tamen audet se dicere respondere potuisse.
But when I considered which books these were, I judged them to be those which Julian mentions in the letter he sent to Rome, a copy of which reached me at the same time. For there he says: They also say that the marriages now contracted were not instituted by God, which is read in the book of Augustine, against which I have just now replied in four little books. And after these words he again adds in his own words: I believe these things were excerpted from those little books; whence it had perhaps been better that our effort should have labored to refute and confute that whole work of his, which he set forth in four volumes—had I not been unwilling to delay my reply, just as you did not delay the transmission of the writings to which a reply was to be made (De nupt. et concup. 2, 2). Here, then, he shows most plainly that he suspects those excerpts to have been hastily collected from my work, but that he is ignorant of the whole books, to which nonetheless he dares say he could have replied.
Iulianum.1.17AUG. Cur non auderem, qui te in eis vana dixisse dubitare utique non deberem? Non enim contra vera posses loqui nisi vana. Neque meus animus me fefellit; eos namque libros tuos tales inveni, cum legerem, quales praesumpseram esse, antequam legerem.
AUG. Why should I not dare, when I certainly ought not to doubt that you said empty things in them? For you could not speak against true things except empty ones. Nor did my judgment deceive me; for when I read those books of yours, I found them to be such as I had presumed them to be before I read them.
Iulianum.1.1718. IUL. Facit quoque epistolae mentionem, quam a me ait Romam fuisse directam; sed per verba quae posuit, nequivimus quo de scripto loqueretur, agnoscere (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 2, 2). Nam ad Zosimum quondam illius civitatis episcopum super his quaestionibus duas epistolas destinavi; verum eo tempore, quo adhuc libros exorsus non eram.
18. JUL. He also makes mention of a letter which he says was directed by me to Rome; but from the words he set down, we could not recognize which writing he was speaking of (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 2, 2). For to Zosimus, once bishop of that city, I addressed two letters on these questions; but at that time, when I had not yet begun the books.
Iulianum.1.18AUG. Haec epistola non est ad Zosimum; sed ad eos seducendos qui Romae possent tali suasione seduci. Sed si eam non agnoscis, ecce, non sit tua. Utinam et illi libri non essent tui, sed alieni; ne per eos tu longe a veritate fieres alienus.
AUG. This letter is not to Zosimus, but to those at Rome who could be led astray by such persuasion. But if you do not acknowledge it, then let it not be yours. Would that those books too were not yours, but another's, so that you might not through them be made an utter stranger to the truth.
Iulianum.1.1819. IUL. Porro utatur indicio epistolae, qua aut accepit, aut finxit me responsionem contra novos Manichaeos (quia vetus dedignatur videri) quattuor voluminibus explicasse; cur non curavit ea quae obiecissemus addiscere? Cur non studuit, qui cum esset congressurus, agnoscere; sed levitate turpissima concitatus in certamen maximum luminibus involutis, Andabatarum more, processit? Quod factum eiusmodi allegatione defendit, ut dicat se patroni sui festinationem, quam ille in transmittendis schedis habuit, imitari praecipiti responsione voluisse; quasi non honestissime potuerit intimare tempus sibi aliquod debere concedi, quo ad lectionem editi operis perveniret; flagitium esse inter eruditos in scribendi gravitate delinquere, et impatientia deliberandi impugnare, quod nescias. Huc accedit, quod nobis calliditatis moliturus invidiam, quae dictorum eius seriem curtaverit, his excerptis fidem accommodavit, quae verisimilius falsitate eius et malignitate, quam cuiusquam nostrum imperita simplicitate videntur esse composita. Verum id quovis animo, quovis auctore contigerit; nobis tamen duobus suffragatur modis; quia simul patuit et quanta sit levitas, et quanta imbecillitas in veritatis inimico, qui se approbavit, et cum loqui non debeat, tacere non posse, et paucis semiplenis discerptisque magis quam aggregatis sententiis, de primo tamen solum libro meo ita cessisse fractum, ut vulgi in nos femineis admodum vocibus pectora commoveret; quod disputationis nostrae processibus apparebit.
19. JUL. Further, let him make use of the evidence of the letter by which he either received or fashioned the claim that I had set forth a reply against the new Manicheans (for he disdains to seem the old kind) in four volumes; why did he not take care to learn the points we had objected? Why did he not strive, when he was about to engage, to acknowledge them; but, driven by most shameful frivolity into a very great contest with eyes muffled, did he advance in the manner of the gladiators called Andabatae? This deed he defends by an allegation of such a kind that he says he wished to imitate, by his headlong reply, the haste his patron showed in transmitting the sheets—as though he could not most honorably have intimated that some time ought to be granted him, in which he might come to read the published work; that it is a disgrace among the learned to offend against the gravity of writing, and out of impatience of deliberating to attack what one does not know. To this is added that, intending to stir up against us an odium of cunning—as though we had cut short the sequence of his statements—he gave credence to these excerpts, which seem to have been put together more probably by his falsehood and malice than by the unskilled simplicity of any of us. But by whatever intent, by whatever author, this came about, it nonetheless supports us in two ways; for at once it became plain both how great is the frivolity and how great the weakness in this enemy of truth—who showed himself unable to be silent even when he ought not to speak; and who, by a few half-full and torn-up sentences rather than gathered ones, yet only from my first book, gave way so broken that, with very womanish cries, he stirred the breasts of the crowd against us—as the progress of our argument will make plain.
Iulianum.1.19AUG. Quid mihi irasceris, quod ad me libri tui pervenire tardius potuerunt; vel quod eos quaerens non potui celeriter invenire? Tamen potui et omnino debui, ea quae mihi missa chartula continebat, cuiuscumque et qualiacumque essent, ne putarentur invicta, plane apertis, non involutis oculis inspicere, et sine dilatione refellere;
AUG. Why are you angry with me, because your books could reach me rather late, or because, seeking them, I could not quickly find them? Nevertheless I both could and most certainly ought, with eyes plainly open, not muffled, to inspect what the sheet sent to me contained—whoever's and of whatever kind it was—lest it be thought unconquered, and to refute it without delay;
Iulianum.1.19quia etsi numquam libros tuos reperire possem, oportuit ut ea, quae alicuius momenti esse credidit, qui tanto viro arbitratus est esse mittenda, quantum valerem, ne quisquam legens eis deciperetur, arguerem.
for even if I could never find your books, it was fitting that I should refute, as far as I was able, what he believed to be of some weight—he who judged it should be sent to so great a man—lest anyone reading it be deceived.
Iulianum.1.19Non ergo mihi quod obiecisti obiceres, nisi tu potius ista, ut non dicam exstinctis, certe clausis oculis loquereris. Nullo modo autem diceres, vulgi a nobis in vos pectora commoveri, nisi scires multitudinem christianam in utroque sexu fidem catholicam non latere, quam conaris evertere.
You would therefore not be throwing in my face the charge you have thrown, were it not rather that you speak these things with eyes—I will not say extinguished, but at least closed. And you would by no means say that the breasts of the crowd are stirred by us against you, did you not know that the catholic faith, which you are trying to overthrow, is not hidden from the Christian multitude of both sexes.
Iulianum.1.1920. IUL. Admoneo tamen hic quoque, sicut priore a nobis opere factum est, non me omnia examussim eius verba positurum; sed ea capita, quibus destructis, naturalis mali opinio conteratur.
20. JUL. Yet here too I give notice, as was done by us in the earlier work, that I will not set down all his words exactly, but those chief points by whose destruction the opinion of a natural evil is crushed.
Iulianum.1.20AUG. Ea quae praetermittis, colligentur fortasse vel a nobis vel ab aliis, ut appareat cur praetermiseris.
AUG. The things you pass over will perhaps be gathered up, either by us or by others, so that it may appear why you passed them over.
Iulianum.1.2021. IUL. Quod licet plene primo opere constet effectum; tamen quoniam nunc nonnulla de uno dumtaxat libro meo sibi refellenda proposuit, meque, ut praelocutus sum, arguit, quod capita dictorum eius quae inserui, magna ex parte truncaverim; ostendam primo, id quod reprehendit, nec a me esse factum, et ab illo impudentissime in hoc eodem opere frequentatum. Tunc probabo, illis ipsis concisis brevibusque sententiis, quas de scriptis meis, quibus fuerat impugnatus, interserit, ita nullis eum solidis responsionibus obstitisse, ut et illa invexata permaneant, et hic planius detestanda fateatur, quam nostra operatio laboraverat explicare.
21. JUL. Although this stands fully accomplished in my first work, yet because he has now proposed to himself to refute certain things from one book of mine only, and accuses me—as I said before—of having for the most part mutilated the chapters of his statements which I inserted; I will first show that what he reproves was neither done by me, and was most shamelessly practiced by him in this very work. Then I will prove that, by those very concise and brief sentences which he inserts from my writings (by which he had been assailed), he has opposed them with no solid replies, so that both those points remain unshaken, and here he confesses more plainly the things to be detested than our effort had labored to set forth.
Iulianum.1.21AUG. Iam superius ad ista respondi.
AUG. I have already replied to these things above.
Iulianum.1.2122. IUL. Attoniti ergo, quid contra me scripserit, audiamus. Verba - inquit - de libro meo tibi a me misso tibique notissimo ista posuit, quae refutare conatus est: "damnatores nos esse nuptiarum, operisque divini, quo ex maribus et feminis Deus homines creat, invidiosissime clamitant; quoniam dicimus, eos qui de tali commixtione nascuntur, trahere originale peccatum; eosque, de qualibuscumque parentibus nascantur, non negamus adhuc esse sub diabolo, nisi renascantur in Christo " (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 2, 2).
22. JUL. Astounded, then, let us hear what he has written against me. The words, he says, from my book sent to you by me and most well known to you, he set down thus, words he tried to refute: "they cry out most spitefully that we are condemners of marriage and of the divine work by which God creates human beings from males and females, because we say that those who are born of such a union contract original sin; and that those born of whatever sort of parents we do not deny are still under the devil, unless they are reborn in Christ" (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 2, 2).
Iulianum.1.22In his verbis meis testimonium Apostoli, quod interposui praetermisit, cuius se premi magna mole sentiebat. Ego enim cum dixissem, homines trahere originale peccatum, mox adiunxi: De quo Apostolus ait: "r unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt " (Rom 5, 12); quo testimonio, ut diximus, praetermisso, cetera illa contexuit quae supra commemorata sunt. Novit enim quemadmodum soleant haec verba apostolica, quae praetermisit, accipere catholicorum corda fidelium; quae verba tam recta et tanta luce fulgentia, tenebrosis et tortuosis interpretationibus novi haeretici obscurare et depravare moliuntur.
In these words of mine he passed over the testimony of the Apostle which I had interposed, by whose great weight he felt himself pressed. For when I had said that human beings contract original sin, I at once added: Of which the Apostle says: through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed to all human beings, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12); and with this testimony, as I said, passed over, he wove together those other things mentioned above. For he knows in what manner these apostolic words, which he passed over, are wont to be received by the hearts of faithful catholics; words so right and shining with such great light that the new heretics labor to obscure and corrupt them with shadowy and twisted interpretations.
Iulianum.1.22Deinde alia mea verba subtexuit, ubi dixi: "c advertunt, quod ita nuptiarum bonum malo originali quod inde trahitur non potest accusari, sicut adulteriorum et fornicationum malum bono naturali, quod inde nascitur, non potest excusari. Nam, sicut peccatum, sive hinc sive inde a parvulis trahatur, opus est diaboli, sic homo, sive hinc sive inde nascatur, opusest Dei ".
Then he appended other words of mine, where I said: "they do not notice that the good of marriage can no more be accused of the original evil that is drawn from it than the evil of adulteries and fornications can be excused by the natural good that is born from it. For just as sin, whether drawn from this side or that by little ones, is the work of the devil, so a human being, whether born from this side or that, is the work of God."
Iulianum.1.22Etiam hic ea praetermisit, in quibus aures catholicas timuit. Nam ut ad haec verba veniretur, supra dictum erat a nobis: "c ergo quia dicimus, quod antiquissima atque firmissima catholicae fidei regula continetur, isti novelli et perversi dogmatis assertores, qui nihil peccati esse in parvulis dicunt quod lavacro regenerationis abluatur, tamquam damnemus nuptias, et tamquam opus Dei, hoc est hominem qui ex illis nascitur, opus diaboli esse dicamus, infideliter vel imperite calumniantur " (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 1, 1). His ergo nostris praetermissis sequuntur illa nostra quae posuit, sicut supra scriptum est (De nupt. et concup. 2, 3s).
Here too he passed over the things in which he feared catholic ears. For, that one might come to these words, it had been said above by us: "because, then, we say what is contained in the most ancient and firmest rule of the catholic faith, these assertors of a novel and perverse doctrine—who say there is no sin in little ones to be washed away by the bath of rebirth—charge us, unfaithfully or unskillfully, with condemning marriage, as it were, and with saying that the work of God, that is, the human being born of marriage, is the work of the devil" (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 1, 1). With these words of ours, then, passed over, there follow those words of ours which he set down, as is written above (De nupt. et concup. 2, 3s).
Iulianum.1.22Quousque simplicitati, qui haec loqueris, religiosorum pectorum et imperitis auribus perstabis illudere? Quem ad finem sese impudentia effrenata iactabit? Nihil te, cum haec scriberes, censura doctorum virorum, nihil reverentia futuri iudicii, nihil ipsa litterarum monumenta moverunt? Patere iam fallaciam tuam, et deprehensam teneri non vides? Quid in primo, quid in secundo opere conscripseris, quem nostrum ignorare arbitraris? Libuit enim prorsus, et decuit, his te compellare modis, quibus in parricidam publicum eloquens consul infremuit (Cf. CICERO, Catil. 1, 1).
How long, you who say these things, will you go on mocking the simplicity of religious breasts and unskilled ears? To what end will unbridled impudence vaunt itself? When you wrote these things, did the censure of learned men move you nothing, the reverence of the coming judgment nothing, the very monuments of letters nothing? Lie open now in your deceit, and do you not see that, once detected, you are held fast? What you wrote in your first and second work, whom of us do you suppose to be ignorant? For it pleased me, and was fitting, to address you in those modes in which an eloquent consul thundered against a public parricide (Cf. CICERO, Catil. 1, 1).
Iulianum.1.22AUG. Bene facis, indicare nobis, ne forte non agnosceremus, de invectivis Ciceronis te ista sumpsisse atque vertisse, sed non timemus Iulianum, cum videmus factum esse Tullianum; immo potius dolemus insanum, cum videmus sensum perdidisse christianum. Quid enim insanius, quam prohibere a parvulis medicum Christum, dicendo non esse in eis quod venit ille sanare? Cicero invectus in patriae parricidam, eam defendebat civitatem quam rex eius Romulus, congregatis undecumque peccatoribus condidit; tu autem tot parvulos, qui sine sacro Baptismate moriuntur, et clamas peccatum nullum habere, et ad civitatem Regis, ad cuius imaginem facti sunt, non permittis accedere.
AUG. You do well to indicate to us—lest perhaps we should not recognize it—that you took these things from the invectives of Cicero and turned them about; but we do not fear Julian, when we see him become Tullian; nay rather, we grieve over the madman, when we see him lose the Christian sense. For what is more insane than to keep little ones away from Christ the physician, by saying there is nothing in them for him to come and heal? Cicero, inveighing against the parricide of his fatherland, was defending the city which its king Romulus founded by gathering sinners from everywhere; but you both cry out that so many little ones, who die without sacred Baptism, have no sin, and do not permit them to come to the city of the King to whose image they were made.
Iulianum.1.2223. IUL. Apostoli me testimonium praetermisisse confingis, quod nec tibi opitulari potest, et a me praetermissum non est; sed eo insertum ordine, quo a te fuerat collocatum; utque in primo fideliter commemoratum, ita enim in quarto operis mei libro, licet cursim et breviter, explanatum est (Cf. C. Iul. 6, 75). Commemorationem quoque catholicae Ecclesiae, quam tu ad hoc feceras, ut catholicam fidem desererent a te decepti, et catholica miserabiles appellatione gauderent, non praetermisi. Et quamvis nulla argumentorum vis in eiusmodi verbis esset, tamen a me haud aliter dictorum tuorum caput propositum est, quam a te fuerat ordinatum. Lege editos libros meos responsionisque fidem, quam tu arguis fraudis, aspiciens, me interim pronuntia vera dicere; tu vero, si consuetudo tua permiserit, erubesce. Sed iam ostensa inexcusabili falsitate, quae semper quidem turpis, fit tamen turpior cum locum censoris invadit, et deformitatem suam decori exprobrat alieno; responde, quid Manichaeis sensibus aut nomen Ecclesiae aut Apostoli verba conducant, ut ea cum tam magna invidia praetermissa causeris?
23. JUL. You feign that I passed over the testimony of the Apostle—which can neither help you nor was passed over by me, but was inserted in the order in which it had been placed by you; and just as it was faithfully recalled in the first book, so in the fourth book of my work, though cursorily and briefly, it was explained (Cf. C. Iul. 6, 75). The mention too of the catholic Church, which you had made for this purpose—that those deceived by you might desert the catholic faith, and the wretches rejoice in the catholic name—I did not pass over. And although there was no force of argument in such words, yet the chapter of your statements was set forth by me no otherwise than it had been arranged by you. Read my published books, and looking at the fidelity of the reply, which you charge with fraud, pronounce me meanwhile to speak the truth; but you, if your custom permit it, blush. But now that the inexcusable falsehood has been shown—which is always base, but becomes baser when it invades the place of a censor, and reproaches its own deformity to another's decency—answer: what do the name of the Church or the words of the Apostle profit Manichean senses, that you should allege them passed over with such great odium?
Iulianum.1.23AUG. Iam superius respondi huic calumniae tuae, qua mihi verborum tuorum minus integre positorum obicis falsitatem. Sed quod fecit ille decerptor, tu mihi tam libenter non tribueres, si eorum qui haec legunt, nolles esse deceptor.
AUG. I have already replied above to this slander of yours, by which you throw in my face the falsehood of your words being set down less than whole. But what that excerptor did, you would not so gladly attribute to me, were you not willing to be a deceiver of those who read these things.
Iulianum.1.2324. IUL. Hoc semper fuit maximum inter Manichaeos Catholicosque discrimen, et limes quidam latissimus, quo a se mutuo piorum et impiorum dogmata separantur, immo magna moles sententias nostras quasi coeli a terra profunditate disiungens, quod nos omne peccatum voluntati malae, illi vero malae conscribunt naturae; qui cum diversos sequuntur errores, sed velut de capite fontis istius effluentes consequenter ad sacrilegia flagitiaque perveniunt; sicut Catholici e regione, a bono inchoantes exordio, bonis aucti processibus, ad religionis summam, quam ratio munit et pietas, pervehuntur. Tu igitur malum naturale conatus asserere profano quidem voto, sed inefficaci intentione usurpasti Apostoli testimonium, quem hac eadem perscriptione ostendo nihil tale sensisse, quale tu persuadere conaris, quod repugnantibus modis et illum catholicum confiteris, et dicta eius Manichaeo aestimas suffragari.
24. JUL. This was always the greatest distinction between the Manicheans and the catholics, and a certain very broad boundary by which the doctrines of the pious and the impious are separated from each other—nay rather, a great mass that divides our views from theirs as deeply as heaven from earth: that we ascribe every sin to an evil will, but they to an evil nature; and they, though they follow diverse errors, yet, flowing as it were from the head of this same spring, consequently arrive at sacrileges and crimes; just as the catholics, on the other side, beginning from a good beginning, increased by good progress, are carried up to the summit of religion, which reason and piety fortify. You, then, trying to assert a natural evil—with a profane wish indeed, but with ineffective intent—usurped the testimony of the Apostle, whom by this very passage I show to have felt nothing such as you try to persuade us of; for in contradictory ways you both confess him catholic, and judge his words to support a Manichean.
Iulianum.1.24AUG. Quos doctores catholicos Manichaeo asseras suffragari, qui in verbis apostolicis intellexerunt trahere parvulos originale peccatum, nec vestro more insano velut sanam laudare naturam, sed ei sanandae adhibuerunt medicinam potius christianam, si christiano corde cogitares, erubesceres, contremisceres, obmutesceres.
AUG. What catholic teachers you would assert to support a Manichean—who understood in the apostolic words that little ones contract original sin, and did not, in your insane manner, praise nature as though sound, but applied to it, to be healed, a rather Christian medicine—if you thought with a Christian heart, you would blush, tremble, and fall silent.
Iulianum.1.2425. IUL. Numquid non idem, Adimantus et Faustus (quem in libris Confessionis tuae praeceptorem tuum loqueris (Cf. Confess. 5, 6-7. 13)), haeresiarchae sui traditione fecerunt, obscuriores quasque vel de Evangelio, vel de Apostolorum Epistolis sententias rapientes et corro ntes, ut profanum dogma nominum auctoritate tuerentur? Quamquam quid dico de Manichaeis? Omnes prorsus haereses inventa sua, quibus a pietate et fide exorbitaverunt, Scripturarum elocutionibus sententiisque communiunt.
25. JUL. Did not Adimantus and Faustus (whom in the books of your Confessions you call your teacher (Cf. Confess. 5, 6-7. 13)) do the very same thing, by the tradition of their heresiarch, snatching up and corrupting the more obscure sentences whether of the Gospel or of the Epistles of the apostles, so as to protect a profane doctrine by the authority of names? Yet why do I speak of the Manicheans? Absolutely all heresies fortify their inventions—by which they have strayed from piety and faith—with the phrasings and sentences of the Scriptures.
Iulianum.1.25AUG. Illi obscuras sententias in suum dogma convertere; vos apertas ipso vestro dogmate obscurare conamini. Quid enim apertius quam quod ait Apostolus: Peccatum in hunc mundum per unum hominem intrasse, et per peccatum mortem, et ita in omnes homines pertransisse (Cf. Rom 5, 12)? Quod si probare idem cogeretur Apostolus, ipsam generis humani miseriam testem daret, quae incipit a vagitibus parvulorum, et usque ad decrepitorum gemitus pervenit. Nullo enim modo sub cura omnipotentis et iusti eadem tam magna miseria naturae irrogaretur humanae, nisi in duobus hominibus tota de paradisi felicitate in hanc infelicitatem peccati merito pelleretur.
AUG. They turned obscure sentences to their doctrine; you try to obscure plain ones by your very doctrine. For what is plainer than that the Apostle says that sin entered into this world through one man, and through sin death, and so it passed to all human beings (Cf. Rom 5:12)? And if the Apostle were compelled to prove this, he would give as his witness the very misery of the human race, which begins from the wailings of little ones and reaches to the groans of the decrepit. For in no way, under the care of the Almighty and just God, would so great a misery be inflicted on human nature, unless in two human beings the whole was driven, by the deserved merit of sin, from the felicity of paradise into this unhappiness.
Iulianum.1.2526. IUL. Num igitur ideo aut Libri sacri auctores probabuntur errorum, aut crimina pereuntium, Scripturarum dignitas expiabit?
26. JUL. Will the authors of the sacred Books therefore be proved authors of errors, or will the dignity of the Scriptures expiate the crimes of those who perish?
Iulianum.1.26AUG. Hoc vobis dicite.
AUG. Say this to yourselves.
Iulianum.1.2627. IUL. Exstinguatur itaque indisciplinatarum expositionum libido; nihil agere contra manifestam Dei iustitiam verba credantur; quae si eius personae sunt, quam venerari necesse est, defendantur explanationibus divinae congruentibus aequitati; sin autem non metuendo sunt auctore prolata, etiam ineliquata pellantur. Igitur nunc Dei iudicio disputatur, de quo scribitur : Deus fidelis, in quo non est iniquitas; iustus et sanctus Dominus Deus (Deut 32, 4). Et iterum: Iustus Dominus, et iustitiam dilexit, aequitatem vidit vultus eius (Ps 10, 8). Et iterum: Omnia iudicia tua aequitas (Ps 118, 172). Innumera sunt testimonia, quibus aequitas divina in sacris Voluminibus praedicatur; de qua nemo tamen vel Gentilium, vel haereticorum, praeter Manichaeos Traducianosque dubitavit.
27. JUL. Let the lust for undisciplined expositions therefore be extinguished; let no words be believed to do anything against the manifest justice of God; if they are of that Person whom it is necessary to venerate, let them be defended by explanations befitting the divine equity; but if they have been uttered by an author not to be feared, let them be driven away even unrefined. Now, then, the discussion concerns the judgment of God, of whom it is written: God is faithful, in whom there is no iniquity; just and holy is the Lord God (Deut 32:4). And again: Just is the Lord, and he has loved justice; his countenance has beheld equity (Ps 11:7 (10:8)). And again: All your judgments are equity (Ps 119:172 (118:172)). Innumerable are the testimonies by which the divine equity is proclaimed in the sacred Volumes; of which, however, no one—whether of the gentiles or of the heretics, save the Manicheans and Traducianists—has doubted.
Iulianum.1.27AUG. Ex hac aequitate grave iugum est super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum (Cf. Eccli 40, 1); quod omnino esse asserit iniquum, qui negat originale peccatum.
AUG. From this equity there is a heavy yoke upon the children of Adam from the day they come forth from their mother's womb (Cf. Sir 40:1); which he who denies original sin asserts to be altogether unjust.
Iulianum.1.2728. IUL. Ita enim omnibus generaliter, edocente natura, inculcatum est, Deum iustum esse, ut manifestum sit, Deum non esse quem constiterit iustum non esse. Potest igitur et homo iustus esse; Deus vero esse nisi iustus non potest.
28. JUL. For it has been so impressed upon all men generally, by the teaching of nature, that God is just, that it is manifest he is not God who is found not to be just. A human being, therefore, can also be just; but God cannot be anything except just.
Iulianum.1.28AUG. Tibi dic.
AUG. Say it to yourself.
Iulianum.1.2829. IUL. Qui cum est hic unus verus cui credimus, et quem in Trinitate veneramur, dubio procul in omnes iudicii est ratione iustissimus.
29. JUL. Since this one true God, in whom we believe and whom we venerate in the Trinity, is such, beyond doubt he is most just toward all in the reckoning of judgment.
Iulianum.1.29AUG. Tibi dic: et ostende iustum esse, ut cum tam manifesta miseria, vel ad tam manifestam miseriam nascatur, a quo peccatum originale non trahitur.
AUG. Say it to yourself: and show that he is just, who, with such manifest misery, or unto such manifest misery, is born—he from whom original sin is not drawn.
Iulianum.1.2930. IUL. De huius itaque legibus ita probari et vindicari non potest, quod esse constat iniustum, ut si hoc fieri posset, illius divinitas tota vilesceret. Ab eo igitur probabitur de Scripturis sanctis iniustitiae dogma firmari, a quo approbari quiverit Trinitatem, cui credimus, divinitatis gloria posse privari.
30. JUL. From his laws, then, what is established to be unjust can in no way be proved and vindicated; so that, if this could be done, his whole divinity would become worthless. By him, therefore, it will be proved that a doctrine of injustice is established from the holy Scriptures, by whom it could be approved that the Trinity, in which we believe, can be deprived of the glory of divinity.
Iulianum.1.30AUG. Verum dicis: sed vobis dicite, qui gloriam Christo, qua parvulos sanat, molimini auferre.
AUG. You speak the truth: but say it to yourselves, who labor to take away from Christ the glory by which he heals little ones.
Iulianum.1.3031. IUL. Quod quoniam nec ratio sustinet ulla, nec pietas; aut doce, vel posse esse, vel iustum esse, imputari cuiquam naturale peccatum; aut a Scripturarum sanctarum contaminatione discedito, quarum sententiis sanciri aestimas quod iniquum cogeris confiteri.
31. JUL. Since neither any reason nor any piety can sustain this, either teach that a natural sin can exist, or that it is just for it to be imputed to anyone; or else depart from the contamination of the holy Scriptures, by whose sentences you judge to be sanctioned what you are compelled to confess unjust.
Iulianum.1.31AUG. Erratis: vos potius iniquum cogimini confiteri grave super parvulos iugum; si quemadmodum nullum habent proprium, ita nullum trahunt originale peccatum.
AUG. You err: it is rather you who are compelled to confess a heavy yoke upon little ones to be unjust, if, just as they have no sin of their own, so they draw no original sin.
Iulianum.1.3132. IUL. Quod si neutrum horum quae diximus, facies; et huic Deo te asseris credere, cuius institutis iniustitiam communiri aestimas; cognosce, multo te novum antiquo Manichaeo esse peiorem, qui talem Deum habeas, qualem Manichaeus Dei sui est commentus inimicum.
32. JUL. But if you will do neither of the things we have mentioned, and yet assert that you believe in this God, by whose institutions you judge injustice to be fortified, know that you are much worse than the old Manichean, you who have such a God as the Manichean devised as the enemy of his own God.
Iulianum.1.32AUG. Vos peius quam Manichaei saevitis in parvulos. Illi quippe animam saltem, quam partem Dei putant, sanari per Christum in parvulo volunt; vos autem, quem nec in anima, nec in carne ullum malum habere dicitis, per Christum sanari nulla ex parte permittitis. Et praeclari praedicatores sic praedicatis Iesum, ut eum negetis parvulorum esse Iesum. Unde namque hoc nomen acceperit, in Evangelio legite (Cf. Mt 1, 21), et nolite Salvatorem non salvis parvulis denegare.
AUG. You rage against little ones worse than the Manicheans. For they at least wish the soul, which they think a part of God, to be healed through Christ in the little one; but you permit the one whom you say has no evil either in soul or in flesh to be healed by Christ in no part. And you, illustrious preachers, so preach Jesus that you deny him to be the Jesus of little ones. Read in the Gospel from where he received this name (Cf. Matt 1:21), and do not deny the Savior to little ones who are not saved.
Iulianum.1.3233. IUL. Quas mihi ergo tu hic ambages, quae cervicalia, mendaciorum et ineptiarum, quae Hierusalem fornicanti Ezechiel propheta imputat (Cf. Ezech 13, 18); admovebis, in quibus muliebres animae cubent, nomina mysteriorum tenentes, cum in ipsam divinitatem retecta profanitate commiserint. Remotis omnibus praestigiis et advocatarum saepe a te plebicularum catervis, doce iustum esse quod per Scripturas sanctas affirmare conaris.
33. JUL. What roundabouts of lies and inanities, then, what cushions—which the prophet Ezekiel charges against fornicating Jerusalem (Cf. Ezek 13:18)—will you bring against me here, cushions on which womanish souls recline, holding the names of mysteries, while in their disclosed profanity they have committed an offense against divinity itself? With all illusions removed, and the throngs of the lowly little folk you so often summon, teach that what you try to affirm through the holy Scriptures is just.
Iulianum.1.33AUG. Plebicularum, quas irrides, catervae, noverunt catholicam fidem, quae a Salvatore salvari confitentur infantes; et ideo Pelagianorum, qui hoc negant, detestantur errorem.
AUG. The throngs of the lowly little folk you mock know the catholic faith, who confess that infants are saved by the Savior; and therefore they detest the error of the Pelagians, who deny this.
Iulianum.1.3334. IUL. Ne ergo in infinita volumina extendatur oratio, hic, hic harum de quibus agimus, rerum genus, species, differentia, modus, qualitasque cernatur; immo sollicitius utrum sint, unde sint, ubi sint, quid etiam mereantur, et a quo. Hoc enim modo nec diu per disputationum anfractus errabitur, et certum quod teneri debeat, apparebit.
34. JUL. Lest, then, the discourse be drawn out into endless volumes, here, here let the genus, species, difference, mode, and quality of the things we are treating be discerned; nay, more carefully, whether they are, whence they are, where they are, what too they deserve, and from whom. For in this way there will be no long wandering through the windings of disputations, and what ought to be held as certain will appear.
Iulianum.1.34AUG. Ideo contra unum librum meum libros octo scripsisti, quia per tua compendia dialectica diu disputare noluisti.
AUG. You wrote eight books against one book of mine, precisely because, by your dialectical shortcuts, you were unwilling to dispute at length.
Iulianum.1.3435. IUL. Creatoris his igitur et creaturae ratio vertitur, id est Dei et hominis; iudicat ille, iudicatur iste; itaque iustitiae et culpae quae sit natura, videatur. Iustitia est, et ut ab eruditis definiri solet, et ut nos intellegere possumus, virtus (si per Stoicos liceat alteri alteram praeferre) virtutum omnium maxima, fungens diligenter officio ad restituendum sua unicuique sine fraude, sine gratia.
35. JUL. Here, then, the account of Creator and creature is in question, that is, of God and man; the one judges, the other is judged; and so let it be seen what is the nature of justice and of fault. Justice is—as it is wont to be defined by the learned, and as we can understand—the virtue (if, against the Stoics, one may be preferred to another) greatest of all virtues, diligently discharging its office of rendering to each his own without fraud, without favor.
Iulianum.1.35AUG. Dic ergo qua iustitia retributum sit parvulis grave iugum tam magnae manifestaeque miseriae; dic qua iustitia ille parvulus adoptetur in Baptismo, ille sine hac adoptione moriatur; cur non sit ambobus honor iste communis, aut ab isto honore alienatio, cum sit ambobus seu bona seu mala causa communis. Non dicis, quia nec Dei gratiam, nec Dei iustitiam homo magis Pelagianus quam Christianus sapis.
AUG. Say, then, by what justice the heavy yoke of so great and manifest a misery has been requited to little ones; say by what justice that little one is adopted in Baptism, while that one dies without this adoption; why this honor is not common to both, or this estrangement from the honor, when the cause—whether good or bad—is common to both. You do not say it, because, more a Pelagian than a Christian, you have no taste either for the grace of God or for the justice of God.
Iulianum.1.3536. IUL. Quod si eam maximam dici Zeno non siverit, qui tantam virtutum copulam unitatemque confirmat, ut ubi fuerit una, omnes dicat adesse virtutes et, ubi una non fuerit, omnes deesse; atque illam veram esse virtutem, quae hac quadrua iugalitate perficitur; tunc quoque nobis plurimum praebebit auxilii, cum docuerit, nec prudentiam, nec fortitudinem, nec temperantiam posse sine iustitia contineri; secundum quam veritatem et Ecclesiastes pronuntiat: Qui in uno peccaverit, multa bona perdet (Eccle 9, 18).
36. JUL. But if Zeno will not allow it to be called the greatest—Zeno, who affirms so great a bond and unity of the virtues that he says where one is present, all the virtues are present, and where one is absent, all are absent, and that that is true virtue which is perfected by this fourfold partnership—then too he will furnish us very much help, when he has taught that neither prudence nor fortitude nor temperance can be contained without justice; according to which truth Ecclesiastes too declares: He who sins in one thing will lose many good things (Eccl 9:18).
Iulianum.1.36AUG. Audi eumdem Ecclesiasten dicentem: Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas; quae abundantia hominis in omni labore suo, quem ipse laborat sub sole (Eccle 1, 2-3) etc.? Et dic mihi, quare homo etiam vanitati similis factus est (Ps 143, 4), qui factus fuerat similis veritati. An hinc excipis parvulos, quos videmus crescendo et, si bene erudiantur, proficiendo, tam magnam minuere, cum qua nati sunt, vanitatem; nec ea tota carere, nisi omnes dies vanitatis velut umbra transierint (Cf. Ps 143, 4)?
AUG. Hear the same Ecclesiastes saying: Vanity of vanities, and all is vanity; what abundance has a man in all his labor with which he labors under the sun (Eccl 1:2-3), and so on? And tell me, why has man also been made like to vanity (Ps 144:4 (143:4)), who had been made like to truth? Or do you except little ones from this—little ones whom we see, as they grow and (if they are well educated) make progress, lessen the great vanity with which they were born, and not be wholly free of it until all the days of vanity have passed like a shadow (Cf. Ps 144:4 (143:4))?
Iulianum.1.3637. IUL. Haec igitur augusta virtus, expunctrix uniuscuiusque meritorum, in operibus quidem imaginis Dei, id est humanae animae, pro creaturae ipsius modo et viribus intermicat; in ipso vero Deo, omnium quae sunt ex nihilo conditore, immenso et claro per aeternum orbe resplendet. Origo eius divinitas est, aetas eius aeternitas, et aeternitas ultro citro nescia vel desinere vel coepisse. Ut ergo genus eius (quo nomine nihil aliud quam originem intellegi volo) Deus est; ita species eius in legum promulgatione iudiciorumque apparet effectibus.
37. JUL. This august virtue, then, the assessor of each one's merits, in the works indeed of the image of God, that is, of the human soul, gleams in proportion to the measure and powers of the creature itself; but in God himself, the maker from nothing of all things that are, it shines resplendent through an immense and bright orb forever. Its origin is divinity, its age eternity, and eternity that knows neither to cease nor to have begun, this way or that. As therefore its genus (by which name I wish nothing else to be understood than its origin) is God, so its species appears in the promulgation of laws and in the effects of judgments.
Iulianum.1.37AUG. Si origo iustitiae Deus est, ut fateris, cur homini ab ipso dari iustitiam non fateris, et potius humanae voluntatis arbitrium, quam Dei donum, vis esse iustitiam; ut sis in eis de quibus dictum est: Ignorantes Dei iustitiam, et suam volentes constituere, iustitiae Dei non sunt subiecti (Rom 10, 3)? Erubescite tandem, obsecro, et ab illo iustitiam poscite, qui est, ut fateri compulsi estis, origo iustitiae.
AUG. If the origin of justice is God, as you confess, why do you not confess that justice is given to man by him, and would rather have justice be the choice of the human will than the gift of God—so that you are among those of whom it was said: Being ignorant of the justice of God, and wishing to establish their own, they are not subject to the justice of God (Rom 10:3)? Blush at last, I beseech you, and ask justice from him who is, as you have been compelled to confess, the origin of justice.
Iulianum.1.3738. IUL. Differentiam vero eius non absurde intellegere possumus, variam pro opportunitate temporum dispensationem. Verbi gratia, hostiae de pecoribus in Vetere Testamento fuerant imperatae. Id tunc implere pertinebat ad reverentiam iussionis; nunc vero indicta eorum dissimulatio ita servit iustitiae praecipienti, ut tunc oblatio serviebat. Modus vero eius est vel status, quod nec cuiquam amplius quam vires patiuntur indicit, vel quod misericordiam non retundit. Qualitas autem eius intellegitur, per quam piis mentibus sapit dulciter. Est igitur procul dubio iustitia, sine qua deitas non est; quae si non esset, Deus non esset; est autem Deus, est itaque sine ambiguitate iustitia. Non est autem aliud quam virtus omnia continens, et restituens suum unicuique, sine fraude, sine gratia. Consistit autem maxime in divinitatis profundo.
38. JUL. Its difference, indeed, we can not absurdly understand to be the varied dispensation suited to the opportunities of the times. For example, sacrifices of beasts had been commanded in the Old Testament. To fulfill them then belonged to reverence for the command; but now the prescribed disregard of them serves the justice that commands, just as then the offering served it. Its mode, indeed, is its state: that it enjoins on no one more than his powers can bear, or that it does not blunt mercy. Its quality, moreover, is understood to be that by which it tastes sweetly to pious minds. There is, then, beyond doubt, justice, without which there is no deity; which, if it did not exist, God would not exist; but God exists, and therefore, without ambiguity, justice exists. And it is nothing other than the virtue containing all things and rendering to each his own, without fraud, without favor. It consists chiefly in the depth of divinity.
Iulianum.1.38AUG. Definisti esse iustitiam virtutem omnia continentem, et restituentem suum unicuique, sine fraude, sine gratia. Proinde videmus eam sine fraude restituisse denarium eis, qui per totum diem in opere vineae laboraverant; hoc enim placuerat, hoc convenerat, ad hanc mercedem se fuisse conductos negare non poterant (Cf. Mt 20, 1-10). Sed dic mihi, quaeso te, quomodo eis sine gratia tantumdem dedit, qui una hora in illo opere fuerunt? An amiserat fortasse iustitiam? Cohibe itaque te potius. Neminem quippe fraudat divina iustitia, sed multa donat non merentibus gratia. Cur autem huic sic, illi autem sic, aspice quod secutus adiungis. Verissime quippe dicis, eam consistere maxime in divinitatis profundo. In hoc profundo est, quod neque volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei (Rom 9, 16). In hoc profundo est, quod ille parvulus in honorem adoptatur per regenerationis lavacrum, ille in contumelia relinquitur, non admittendus ad Regnum; cum amborum in neutram partem sit meritum per voluntatis arbitrium.
AUG. You have defined justice to be the virtue containing all things and rendering to each his own, without fraud, without favor. Accordingly we see that, without fraud, it rendered the denarius to those who had labored all day in the work of the vineyard; for this had pleased them, this had been agreed, and they could not deny that they had been hired for this wage (Cf. Matt 20:1-10). But tell me, I beg you, how, without favor, it gave just as much to those who had been at that work for one hour? Had it perhaps lost its justice? Restrain yourself, then. For the divine justice defrauds no one, but its grace gives many things to those who do not deserve them. But why it does so for this one and so for that one, look at what you go on to add. For you say most truly that it consists chiefly in the depth of divinity. In this depth lies that it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy (Rom 9:16). In this depth lies that this little one is adopted into honor through the bath of rebirth, while that one is left in dishonor, not to be admitted to the Kingdom; though neither has any merit, in either direction, through the choice of the will.
Iulianum.1.3839. IUL. Testimonium vero, ut ab auctore suo, ita etiam vel a probis, vel a improbis meretur, quod et illos iure provexerit, et istos iure damnaverit. Cum vero per se nec boni quidquam nec mali merentibus misericordiam liberalem esse permittit, nihil sentit iniuriae; quia et hoc ipsum, ut sit clemens operi suo Deus, cum in severitatem non cogitur, pars magna iustitiae est.
39. JUL. Testimony, indeed, as from its author, so also it earns either from the good or from the wicked, in that it has by right both advanced the former and condemned the latter. But when it permits liberal mercy toward those who deserve, of themselves, neither anything good nor anything evil, it feels no injury; for this very thing—that God should be merciful to his own work, when he is not compelled to severity—is a great part of justice.
Iulianum.1.39AUG. Saltem misericordiae nomen attende, et unde dicta sit, respice. Quid igitur opus est misericordia, ubi nulla est miseria? Miseriam porro in parvulis si nullam esse dicitis, eis misericordiam praebendam negatis; si ullam esse dicitis, malum meritum ostenditis. Neque enim sub Deo iusto miser esse quisquam, nisi mereatur, potest. Ecce duo parvuli iacent: unus eorum baptizatus, alter non baptizatus exspirat; cui eorum dicis Deum fuisse clementem?
AUG. Attend at least to the name of mercy, and consider whence it is named. What need, then, is there of mercy where there is no misery? Further, if you say there is no misery in little ones, you deny that mercy is to be shown them; if you say there is any, you show an evil merit. For under a just God no one can be miserable unless he deserves it. Behold, two little ones lie there: one of them baptized, the other expires unbaptized; to which of them do you say God was merciful?
Iulianum.1.39Si uni, ostende alterius malum meritum, qui negas esse originale peccatum; si ambobus, ostende baptizati ullum bonum meritum, qui negas gratiam, ubi nulla est acceptio personarum; et dic, si potes, cur ambos adoptare noluerit, qui certe ambos ad imaginem suam condidit. An ita iustus est, ut non sit omnipotens, si voluit et non potuit? Ubi certe illorum nullus noluit, ne impedimentum potestatis divinae referatis ad meritum voluntatis humanae; hic certe nulli eorum dicere potest Deus: Volui, et noluisti. Aut si propterea non vult infans, quia plorat cum baptizatur, ambo ergo relinquantur, ambo enim nolunt; et tamen unus assumitur et alter relinquitur, quia magna est gratia Dei, et verax iustitia Dei. Sed quare ille potius quam ille: Inscrutabilia sunt iudicia Dei (Rom 11, 33).
If to the one, show the evil merit of the other—you who deny there is original sin; if to both, show some good merit of the baptized one—you who deny grace, where there is no respect of persons; and say, if you can, why he was unwilling to adopt both, who certainly created both to his own image. Or is he so just that he is not omnipotent, if he willed and could not? Where certainly neither of them was unwilling—lest you refer the hindrance of the divine power to the merit of the human will; here certainly God can say to neither of them: I willed, and you were unwilling. Or if the infant is unwilling because he cries when he is baptized, then let both be left, for both are unwilling; and yet one is taken up and the other left, because the grace of God is great and the justice of God is true. But why this one rather than that one: The judgments of God are inscrutable (Rom 11:33).
Iulianum.1.3940. IUL. Quos enim fecit quia voluit, nec condemnat nisi spretus; si cum non spernitur, faciat consecratione meliores; nec detrimentum iustitiae patitur, et munificentia miserationis ornatur.
40. JUL. For those whom he made because he willed it, he condemns only when scorned; if, when he is not scorned, he makes them better by consecration, he both suffers no detriment of justice and is adorned by the munificence of his mercy.
Iulianum.1.40AUG. Qui non condemnat nisi spretus, dic, utrum spernat suam imaginem nisi spretus. Quod si non audes, dic unde spernat eos quos parvulos non adoptat, a quibus eum spretum non invenies, nisi eos invenias in Adam. Ubi simul invenies, ut spernantur, deberi omnibus per iustitiam, nec tamen sperni omnes propter ineffabilem et inscrutabilem gratiam.
AUG. He who condemns only when scorned—say whether he scorns his own image except when scorned. If you dare not, say whence he scorns those little ones whom he does not adopt, by whom you will not find him scorned, unless you find them in Adam. There you will at the same time find that, by justice, it is owed to all that they be scorned, and yet that not all are scorned, on account of his ineffable and inscrutable grace.
Iulianum.1.4041. IUL. His igitur iustitiae, quas praemisimus, divisionibus explicatis, discutiamus quae sit definitio peccati. Equidem affatim mihi tam philosophantium quam eorum qui catholici fuerunt, quod quaerimus, scripta suppeditant; sed vereor ne refrageris et, si philosophorum ego senatum advocavero, tu continuo sellularios opifices omneque in nos vulgus accendas.
41. JUL. With these divisions of justice, which we set forth, explained, let us discuss what is the definition of sin. For me, indeed, the writings both of the philosophers and of those who were catholics abundantly supply what we seek; but I fear that you will object, and that, if I summon the senate of the philosophers, you will at once inflame against us the stool-bound craftsmen and the whole crowd.
Iulianum.1.41AUG. Contumeliosus es in infirma mundi, quae Deus elegit ut confunderet fortia (Cf. 1 Cor 1, 27). Denique ipsi confundunt eos qui confidunt in virtute sua (Ps 48, 7). Ubi quid dicam: Vos estis? Prorsus me tacente apparetis, cum vos non tacetis.
AUG. You are insulting toward the weak things of the world, which God chose to confound the strong (Cf. 1 Cor 1:27). Indeed, these very ones confound those who trust in their own strength (Ps 49:6 (48:7)). Here, what shall I say: You are they? Plainly, even while I am silent, you appear so, since you are not silent.
Iulianum.1.4142. IUL. Vociferans cum feminis, cunctisque canibus et tribunis, quibus octoginta aut amplius equos tota Africa saginatos collega tuus nuper adduxit Alypius.
42. JUL. Crying out with the women and all the curs and tribunes, for whom your colleague Alypius recently brought eighty or more horses fattened throughout all Africa.
Iulianum.1.42AUG. Aut calumniaris, aut nescis quid loquaris; et ideo, aut mendax, aut temerarius, ista loqueris. Quid te autem nequius, si haec ipse finxisti? Quid stolidius, si fingentibus credidisti?
AUG. Either you slander, or you do not know what you are saying; and therefore, either as a liar or as a reckless man, you speak these things. But what is more wicked than you, if you yourself invented them? What more stupid, if you believed those who invented them?
Iulianum.1.42Iam vero quod etiam scribere ausus es, neque veritus ne ad ea loca libri pervenirent tui, quae terra marique transeuntem seu venientem collegam meum Alypium susceperunt, ubi legi apertissime tua falsiloquia sine tua irrisione vel potius detestatione non possunt; cui, non dico impudentiae, sed dementiae comparatur?
And now, as for what you even dared to write, not fearing that it might reach those places of your book which received my colleague Alypius crossing land and sea, whether going or coming—places where your falsehoods can plainly be read—it cannot be done without your derision, or rather your detestation; to what, I do not say impudence, but madness, is it to be compared?
Iulianum.1.4243. IUL. Nequaquam te acquiescere eruditorum sententiis, ut addas, secundum quod intellectui tuo congruit dixisse Apostolum, quia stultam fecit Deus sapientiam mundi (1 Cor 1, 20); disputatores vero nostros sine metu a te posse despici, quod nulla auctoritate talium premaris.
43. JUL. That you by no means acquiesce in the sentences of the learned, so that you add that the Apostle, in accordance with what suits your understanding, said that God made foolish the wisdom of the world (1 Cor 1:20); and that our disputants can be despised by you without fear, because you are pressed by no authority of such men.
Iulianum.1.43AUG. Tu eos despicis, qui eis docentibus originale peccatum ita resistis, ut tamquam Manichaeos insuper crimineris, me nominans, illos significans.
AUG. You despise those who, by teaching original sin, you so resist that you charge them besides as Manicheans—naming me, signifying them.
Iulianum.1.4344. IUL. Quid ergo? Acquiescam prorsus tibi, faciamque in hoc loco iacturam omnium, quorum adminiculo uti possem, contentusque ero definitione, quae ad indicium bonae naturae post Manichaeorum secretum de ore tuae honestatis effugit. In eo igitur libro cui titulus est, vel De duabus animabus, vel Contra duas animas, ita loqueris: Exspecta, sine prius peccatum definiamus. Peccatum est voluntas admittendi vel retinendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. Quamquam si liberum non est, nec voluntas dici potest; sed malui grossius, quam scrupulosius definire (Cf. De duab. anim. 15).
44. JUL. What then? Shall I acquiesce entirely to you, and here make a sacrifice of all those whose support I could use, and be content with the definition which escaped from the mouth of your honorable self—to the testimony of good nature—after the Manichean secret? In that book, then, whose title is either The Two Souls, or Against the Two Souls, you speak thus: Wait, let us first define sin. Sin is the will to admit or to retain what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. Although, if one is not free, it cannot be called will; but I preferred to define it roughly rather than scrupulously (Cf. De duab. anim. 15).
Iulianum.1.44AUG. Hic peccatum definitum est quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod etiam poena peccati. De hoc quippe agendum fuit, quando mali origo quaerebatur, quale commissum est a primo homine ante omne hominis malum. Sed tu aut non potes intellegere, aut non vis.
AUG. Here sin is defined which is only sin, not which is also the penalty of sin. For this was what had to be treated, when the origin of evil was sought, such as was committed by the first man before any evil of man. But you either cannot understand, or do not wish to.
Iulianum.1.4445. IUL. O lucens aurum in stercore! Quid verius, quid plenius dici a quoquam vel orthodoxo potuisset? Peccatum est, inquis, voluntas admittendi vel retinendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere (Ibidem). Ostendit hoc Ecclesiasticus: Deus, inquit, fecit hominem, et dimisit eum in manibus consilii sui; posuit ante eum vitam et mortem, aquam et ignem; quod placuerit ei, dabitur illi (Eccli 15, 14. 17-18). Et per Isaiam Deus: Si volueritis, inquit, et audieritis me, quae bona sunt terrae edetis. Si nolueritis, nec audieritis, gladius vos comedet (Isa 1, 19-20). Et Apo olus: Resipiscite iuste, et nolite peccare (1 Cor 15, 34); atque iterum: Nolite errare; Deus non irridetur; quae enim seminaverit homo, illa et metet (Gal 6, 7-8).
45. JUL. O gold gleaming in dung! What could have been said by anyone, even an orthodox man, more true, more full? Sin, you say, is the will to admit or to retain what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain (Ibidem). Ecclesiasticus shows this: God, he says, made man, and left him in the hand of his own counsel; he set before him life and death, water and fire; whatever pleases him will be given him (Sir 15:14. 17-18). And through Isaiah God says: If you are willing and hearken to me, you shall eat the good things of the earth. If you are unwilling and do not hearken, the sword shall devour you (Isa 1:19-20). And the Apostle: Come to your senses justly, and do not sin (1 Cor 15:34); and again: Do not be deceived; God is not mocked; for whatever a man sows, that he shall also reap (Gal 6:7-8).
Iulianum.1.45AUG. Haec testimonia propter illam voluntatem dicta sunt, in qua quisque id quod vult agit; ut si non habetur, ab eo poscatur qui in nobis operatur et velle (Phil 2, 13); si autem habetur, fiant opera iustitiae, et ei, qui illam operatus est, agantur gratiae.
AUG. These testimonies were spoken on account of that will by which each one does what he wills; so that if it is not had, it may be asked of him who works in us even to will (Phil 2:13); but if it is had, let the works of justice be done, and let thanks be given to him who has worked it.
Iulianum.1.4546. IUL. Voluntas itaque motus est animi, in iure suo habentis utrum sinisterior ad prava decurrat, an dexterior ad celsa contendat.
46. JUL. The will, then, is a motion of the mind, which has it within its own right whether to run leftward to depraved things, or to strive rightward toward lofty ones.
Iulianum.1.46AUG. Quid est ergo: Ne declines in dexteram, neque in sinistram (Prov 4, 27)?
AUG. What, then, is this: Do not turn aside to the right hand, nor to the left (Prov 4:27)?
Iulianum.1.4647. IUL. Motus autem animi eius, qui iam per aetatem iudicio rationis uti potest; cui cum poena monstratur et gloria, aut contra commodum vel voluptas, adiutorium et velut occasio offertur, non necessitas imponitur partis alterutrae. Haec igitur voluntas, quae alternatur, originem possibilitatis in libero accepit arbitrio; ipsius vero operis existentiam a se suscipit, nec est prorsus voluntas antequam velit, nec potest velle antequam potuerit et nolle; nec utrumque habet in parte peccati, id est, velle et nolle, antequam usum rationis adipiscitur.
47. JUL. It is a motion of the mind of one who can already, by reason of age, use the judgment of reason; to whom, when penalty and glory are shown, or on the contrary advantage or pleasure, a help and, as it were, an occasion is offered, but no necessity is imposed of either part. This will, then, which alternates, received the origin of its possibility in free choice; but the existence of the act itself it takes from itself, nor is it at all a will before it wills, nor can it will before it could also be unwilling; nor does it have either of these—that is, to will and to be unwilling—in the matter of sin, before it attains the use of reason.
Iulianum.1.47Quibus collectis, apparet te verissime definisse: Peccatum est voluntas retinendi vel admittendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere (De duab. anim. 15). Hoc ergo peccatum, quod claruit nihil esse praeter voluntatem, constat genus, id est ipsam originem, ab appetitu proprio suscepisse. Huius species iam in unoquoque, qui dicuntur atomi, reperitur. Differentia vero et in varietate culparum, et in rationibus temporum. Modus est ipsa immoderatio; nam si modus est servire cui debeas, qui hoc praetermittit, veri modi transgressione delinquit. Hic tamen dici subtiliter potest, modum esse peccati, quia nemo plus quam potest delinquit; nam si supra vires, inefficaci voluntate peccatur; hoc ipsum fieri vel sola potuit voluntate. Qualitas autem ascribatur vitio, per quam ostenditur quid amaritudinis, vel dedecore convehat vel dolore. Est ergo peccatum, quia si non esset, nec tu sequereris errores; nihil est autem aliud, praeter voluntatem excedentem ab eo calle, cui debet insistere, et unde liberum est non deflectere. Fit autem de appetitu inconcessorum; et nusquam est nisi in eo homine, qui et habuit voluntatem malam, et potuit non habere.
From these things gathered, it appears that you defined most truly: Sin is the will to retain or to admit what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain (De duab. anim. 15). This sin, then, which it is clear is nothing but the will, takes its genus, that is, its very origin, from one's own appetite. Its species is now found in each one of those who are called individuals. Its difference lies both in the variety of faults and in the reckonings of the times. Its mode is immoderation itself; for if it is a mode to serve whom you ought, he who neglects this offends by transgressing the true mode. Here, however, it can be subtly said that there is a mode of sin, because no one offends more than he can; for if it is beyond his powers, the sin is by an ineffective will; this very thing could happen by the will alone. Its quality, moreover, is ascribed to the vice, by which it is shown what bitterness it conveys, whether of disgrace or of grief. There is, then, sin, because if there were not, you too would not pursue errors; but it is nothing other than the will straying from that path on which it ought to keep, and from which it is free not to deviate. It arises from the appetite for forbidden things; and it is nowhere except in that human being who both had an evil will and could have not had it.
Iulianum.1.47AUG. Ipse est Adam, quem nostra illa definitio, quae tibi placuit, intuebatur, cum dicerem: Peccatum est voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere (Ibidem). Adam quippe omnino, quando peccavit, nihil in se habebat mali, quo nolens urgeretur ad operandum malum, et propter quod diceret: Non quod volo facio bonum, sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 19). Ac per hoc id egit peccando, quod iustitia vetabat, et unde liberum illi fuerat abstinere. Nam ei qui dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago, abstinere inde, liberum non est. Ac per hoc, si tria ista discernas, et scias aliud esse peccatum, aliud poenam peccati, aliud utrumque, id est ita peccatum, ut ipsum sit etiam poena peccati, intellegis quid horum trium pertineat ad illam definitionem, ubi voluntas est agendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. Peccatum namque isto modo definitum est, non peccati poena, non utrumque. Habent autem tria ista genera etiam species suas, de quibus nunc longum est disputare. Horum sane trium generum si requirantur exempla, primi generis in Adam sine ullo nodo quaestionis occurrit. Multa quippe sunt quae agunt homines mala, a quibus eis liberum est abstinere; sed nulli tam liberum est, quam illi fuit, qui Deo suo, a quo erat conditus rectus, nullo prorsus vitio depravatus adstabat.
AUG. It is Adam himself whom that definition of ours which pleased you was regarding, when I said: Sin is the will to retain or to obtain what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain (Ibidem). For Adam, when he sinned, had absolutely no evil in himself by which, unwilling, he was urged to do evil, and on account of which he might say: It is not the good I will that I do, but the evil I do not will, this I do (Rom 7:19). And by this he did, in sinning, what justice forbade, and from which he had been free to abstain. For he who says, The evil I do not will, this I do, is not free to abstain from it. And by this, if you distinguish these three things, and know that one thing is sin, another the penalty of sin, another both—that is, sin in such a way that it is also the penalty of sin—you understand which of these three belongs to that definition, where there is a will to do what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. For sin in this way was defined, not the penalty of sin, not both. But these three kinds have also their own species, of which it would be long to dispute now. If indeed examples of these three kinds are sought, that of the first kind occurs in Adam without any knot of question. For there are many evils that human beings do, from which they are free to abstain; but to no one is it so free as it was to him who stood before his God, by whom he had been created upright, depraved by no vice at all.
Iulianum.1.47Secundi autem generis, ubi tantummodo est poena peccati, exemplum in eo malo est, quod quisque ex nulla parte agit, sed tantummodo patitur; velut cum pro suo scelere, qui peccavit, occiditur, sive alia corporis poena quacumque cruciatur. Tertium vero genus, ubi peccatum ipsum est et poena peccati, potest intellegi in eo qui dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago. Ad hoc pertinent etiam omnia quae per ignorantiam, cum aguntur mala, non putantur mala, vel etiam putantur bona. Caecitas enim cordis, si peccatum non esset, iniuste argueretur; arguitur autem iuste, ubi dicitur: Pharisaee caece! (Mt 23, 26); et aliis plurimis divinorum eloquiorum locis. Eademque rursus caecitas, si peccati poena non esset, non diceretur: Excaecavit enim illos malitia illorum (Sap 2, 21); quod si de Dei iudicio non veniret, non legeremus: Obscurentur oculi eorum ne videant, et dorsum eorum semper incurva (Ps 68, 24). Quis porro volens caecus est corde, cum velit nemo caecus esse vel corpore?
But of the second kind, where there is only the penalty of sin, the example is in that evil which one in no part does, but only suffers; as when one who has sinned is, for his crime, killed, or tortured by any other bodily penalty. But the third kind, where the sin itself is also the penalty of sin, can be understood in him who says: The evil I do not will, this I do. To this belong also all those things which, when evils are done through ignorance, are not thought evils, or are even thought good. For the blindness of heart, if it were not sin, would be unjustly reproved; but it is justly reproved, where it is said: Blind Pharisee! (Matt 23:26); and in very many other passages of the divine words. And again that same blindness, if it were not the penalty of sin, it would not be said: For their malice blinded them (Wis 2:21); and if this did not come from the judgment of God, we would not read: Let their eyes be darkened that they may not see, and bow down their back always (Ps 69:23 (68:24)). Moreover, who is blind in heart by willing it, when no one wills to be blind even in body?
Iulianum.1.47Proinde originale peccatum nec ad illud pertinet quod primo loco posuimus, ubi est voluntas malum operandi, unde liberum est abstinere; alioquin non esset in parvulis, qui nondum voluntatis utuntur arbitrio; nec ad illud quod secundo commemoravimus. De peccato enim nunc agimus, non de poena, quae non est peccatum, quamvis peccati merito subsequatur; quam quidem patiuntur et parvuli, quia inest eis corpus mortuum propter peccatum (Cf. Rom 8, 10). Non tamen mors corporis ipsa peccatum est, vel corporales quicumque cruciatus;
Accordingly, original sin belongs neither to that which we placed first, where there is a will to do evil from which one is free to abstain—otherwise it would not be in little ones, who do not yet use the choice of the will; nor to that which we mentioned second. For we are now treating of sin, not of penalty, which is not sin, although it follows by the merit of sin; which penalty indeed little ones too suffer, because there is in them a body dead on account of sin (Cf. Rom 8:10). Yet the death of the body is not itself sin, nor any bodily torments;
Iulianum.1.47sed pertinet originale peccatum ad hoc genus tertium, ubi sic peccatum est, ut ipsum sit et poena peccati; quod inest quidem nascentibus, sed in eis crescentibus incipit apparere, quando est insipientibus necessaria sapientia, et mala concupi entibus continentia; origo tamen etiam huius peccati descendit a voluntate peccantis. Fuit enim Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam, et in illo omnes perierunt (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 234).
but original sin belongs to this third kind, where it is sin in such a way that it is also the penalty of sin; which is in those who are born, but in them begins to appear as they grow, when wisdom is necessary to the foolish, and continence to those desiring evil things; yet the origin of this sin too descends from the will of the one sinning. For Adam existed, and in him we all existed; Adam perished, and in him all perished (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 234).
Iulianum.1.4748. IUL. Meretur autem et ab honestis exsecrationem, et ab illa iustitia, cuius hic tota causa vertitur, legitimam condemnationem. Omnibus itaque aulaeis reductis profer aliquando luce palam, per quid doceas naturale esse peccatum. Certe nihil superius falso vel de divinae laude iustitiae, vel de culpae definitione collectum est. Ostende ergo, haec duo in parvulis posse constare: si nullum est sine voluntate peccatum, si nulla voluntas, ubi non est explicata libertas, si non est libertas, ubi non est facultas per rationem electionis; quo monstro peccatum in infantibus invenitur, qui rationis usum non habent?
48. JUL. It earns, moreover, both execration from the honorable, and from that justice—on which the whole case here turns—a lawful condemnation. With all the curtains drawn back, then, bring forth at last, plainly in the light, that by which you teach sin to be natural. Surely nothing above has been falsely gathered, either about the praise of divine justice, or about the definition of fault. Show, then, that these two things can hold true in little ones: if there is no sin without will, if there is no will where freedom has not been unfolded, if there is no freedom where there is no faculty of choice through reason; by what monstrosity is sin found in infants, who do not have the use of reason?
Iulianum.1.48Igitur nec eligendi facultatem, ac per hoc nec voluntatem; atque his irrefutabiliter concessis, nec aliquod omnino peccatum. His igitur molibus pressus, videamus quo eruperis. Nullo, inquis, peccato parvuli premuntur suo, sed premuntur alieno (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 1, 22). Necdum claruit quid mali sentias. Suspicamur enim te ad invidiam cuiuspiam hominis, cuius iniquitatem ut Poenus orator exprimeres, haec in medium protulisse. Apud quem igitur impollutam innocentiam scelus gravavit externum? Quis ille fuit, qui hos adiudicaret reos, tam excors, tam trux, tam oblitus Dei et aequitatis, barbarus perduellis?
Therefore neither the faculty of choosing, and by this neither the will; and with these granted irrefutably, neither any sin at all. Pressed, then, by these masses, let us see where you have broken out. No sin, you say, presses little ones as their own, but another's presses them (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 1, 22). It is not yet clear what evil you mean. For we suspect that you have brought these things forward to stir up odium against some man, whose iniquity you, as an African orator, were expressing. With whom, then, did a crime not his own burden unstained innocence? Who was he so senseless, so savage, so forgetful of God and of equity, a barbarous foe, who would adjudge these guilty?
Iulianum.1.48Laudamus prorsus ingenium tuum; apparet eruditio, non potuisti aliter, dignam generis humani odio, iudicis nescio cuius, immo tyranni allegare personam, quam iurando non solum eum non pepercisse his qui nihil peccavissent, verum etiam his qui nec peccare potuissent. Solet quippe apud suspiciosum animum bona conscientia laborare pro defensione sui, ne forte deliquerit, quia delinquere vel potuit; absolute autem vindicatur a crimine, qui ipsa rei impossibilitate defenditur. Pande igitur quis est iste innocentium addictor. Respondens: Deus; percussisti quidem animum, sed quoniam vix tantum sacrilegium fidem meretur, quid dixeris ambigamus. Scimus enim homonyme usurpari nomen hoc posse: Sunt quippe dii multi et domini multi; nobis tamen unus est Deus Pater ex quo omnia, et unus est Dominus Iesus Christus per quem omnia (1 Cor 8, 5-6). Quem igitur Deum in crimen vocas? Hic tu, sacerdos religiosissime, rhetorque doctissime, exhalas tristius et horridius aliquid, quam vel Amsancti vallis, vel puteus Averni, immo scelestius quam ipsa in his locis idolorum cultura commiserat (Cf. VERG., Aen. 7, 565). Deus, ais, ipse qui commendat suam caritatem in nobis (Rom 5, 8), qui dilexit nos, et Filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis illum tradidit (Rom 8, 32), ipse sic iudicat, ipse est nascentium persecutor, ipse pro mala voluntate aeternis ignibus parvulos tradit, quos nec bonam, nec malam voluntatem scit habere potuisse. Post hanc ergo sententiam, tam immanem, tam sacrilegam, tam funestam, si sanis iudicibus uteremur, nihil praeter exsecrationem tui referre deberem. Iusta enim, et probabili gravitate, indignum te disputatione censerem, qui eo usque a religione, ab eruditione, a communibus postremo sensibus aufugisses ut, quod vix ulla barbaries, Dominum tuum criminosum putares.
We praise your talent outright; your learning appears; you could not otherwise allege a person worthy of the hatred of the human race—of some judge, nay rather tyrant—than by swearing that he not only did not spare those who had committed no sin, but even those who could not even have sinned. For a good conscience is wont, in a suspicious mind, to labor in its own defense, lest perhaps it has offended, because it even could offend; but he is absolutely vindicated from a crime who is defended by the very impossibility of the deed. Disclose, then, who is this assigner of the innocent to punishment. You answer: God; you have indeed struck the mind, but since so great a sacrilege scarcely earns belief, let us be in doubt as to what you said. For we know that this name can be used homonymously: For there are many gods and many lords; yet to us there is one God the Father, from whom are all things, and one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things (1 Cor 8:5-6). Which God, then, do you summon to the charge? Here you, most religious priest and most learned rhetorician, exhale something gloomier and more horrid than even the valley of Amsanctus or the pit of Avernus—nay, more wicked than the very cult of idols had committed in those places (Cf. VERG., Aen. 7, 565). It is God, you say, the very one who commends his love toward us (Rom 5:8), who has loved us, and did not spare his own Son, but handed him over for us (Rom 8:32)—he himself judges thus, he himself is the persecutor of the new-born, he himself, for an evil will, hands over to eternal fires little ones whom he knows could have had neither a good nor an evil will. After this sentence, then, so monstrous, so sacrilegious, so deadly, if we had sane judges, I ought to report nothing concerning you except execration. For with just and probable gravity I would judge you unworthy of disputation, you who had fled so far from religion, from learning, and finally from common sense, that you would think your own Lord criminal—what scarcely any barbarism would do.
Iulianum.1.48AUG. Non est magnum, quod vides non habere parvulos propriam voluntatem ad eligendum bonum, vel malum. Illud vellem videres, quod vidit qui scribens ad Hebraeos dixit, filium Israel Levi in lumbis Abraham patris sui fuisse, quando est ille decimatus, et ideo etiam istum in illo fuisse decimatum (Cf. Hebr 7, 9-10). Ad hoc si haberes oculum christianum, fide cerneres, si intellegentia non valeres, in lumbis Adam fuisse omnes, qui ex illo fuerant per concupiscentiam carnis orituri; quam, post peccatum, quo illi sua nuditas nuntiata est, sensit, aspexit, erubuit, operuit.
AUG. It is no great thing that you see little ones not to have a will of their own for choosing good or evil. I would that you saw what he saw who, writing to the Hebrews, said that Levi, son of Israel, was in the loins of his father Abraham when the latter was tithed, and that therefore he too was tithed in him (Cf. Heb 7:9-10). To this, if you had a Christian eye, you would discern by faith—if you were not strong in understanding—that all were in the loins of Adam who were to arise from him through the concupiscence of the flesh; which, after the sin by which his nakedness was announced to him, he felt, beheld, blushed at, and covered.
Iulianum.1.48Unde Ambrosius doctor meus, tui quoque doctoris excellenter ore laudatus: Quod igitur gravius est, inquit, hac se Adam interpretatione succinxit, eo loci, ubi fructu magis castitatis se succingere debuisset. In lumbis enim quibus praecingimur, quaedam semina generationis esse dicuntur. Et ideo male ibi succinctus Adam foliis inutilibus, ubi futurae generationis non fructum futurum, sed quaedam peccata signaret (AMBROSIUS, De paradiso 13, 67). Merito etiam dicit, quod paulo ante memoravi: Fuit Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam, et in illo omnes perierunt (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 234). Hoc tu non videns, mihi caecus oblatras; sed in me, quidquid dicis, profecto et in ipsum dicis. Utinam ergo ita mihi cum illo commune sit praemium, sicut abs te audio cum illo commune convicium.
Whence Ambrose, my teacher, praised so excellently by the mouth of your own teacher: What is more grave, he says, Adam girded himself with this interpretation in that place where he ought rather to have girded himself with the fruit of chastity. For in the loins, with which we are girded, certain seeds of generation are said to be. And therefore Adam was badly girded there with useless leaves, where he signified not the future fruit of future generation, but certain sins (AMBROSIUS, De paradiso 13, 67). Rightly too he says what I recalled a little before: Adam existed, and in him we all existed; Adam perished, and in him all perished (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 234). Not seeing this, you bark at me as a blind man; but whatever you say against me, you say assuredly also against him. Would, then, that I might have a reward in common with him, just as I hear from you that I have abuse in common with him.
Iulianum.1.48Quid est quod clamas, et dicis: Si sanis iudicibus uteremur, nihil praeter exsecrationem tui referre deberem? Possumne tecum largius, beneficentius, liberalius agere, quam ut ipsum inter nos constituam iudicem, de quo tui doctoris Pelagii iudicium iam tenemus? En adest ille, qui inter latinae linguae scriptores, flos quidam speciosus enituit, cuius fidem, et purissimum in Scripturis sensum ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere (PELAGIUS, De lib. arb. 3). Hoc Pelagius de Ambrosio iudicavit. Quid ergo de hoc quod inter nos agitur, iudicavit Ambrosius? Dixi superius eius de peccato originali sine ulla obscuritate vel ambiguitate sententias; sed si parum est, adhuc audi: Oms, inquit, sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13). Quid ad ista respondes? Illa de Ambrosio dixit praeclara Pelagius; ista pro me contra te manifesta pronuntiavit Ambrosius; istum reprehende de quo dicit magister tuus, quod eum ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere; et qui sanos iudices quaeris, istum nega sanum, ut te plane profitearis insanum.
What is it that you cry out and say: If we had sane judges, I ought to report nothing concerning you except execration? Can I deal with you more generously, beneficently, liberally, than to set up between us as judge that very one of whose judgment concerning your teacher Pelagius we already hold the verdict? Behold, here is present that man who shone forth as a certain beautiful flower among the writers of the Latin tongue, whose faith and most pure sense in the Scriptures not even an enemy dared to find fault with (PELAGIUS, De lib. arb. 3). This Pelagius judged concerning Ambrose. What, then, did Ambrose judge concerning the matter that is in question between us? I have said above his sentences concerning original sin, without any obscurity or ambiguity; but if that is too little, hear yet more: We are all, he says, born under sin, whose very origin is in fault (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13). What do you answer to this? Those praises of Ambrose Pelagius spoke; these clear things in my favor against you Ambrose pronounced. Reprove the man of whom your master says that not even an enemy dared reprove him; and you who seek sane judges, deny that this man is sane, so that you may plainly profess yourself insane.
Iulianum.1.48Sed indignaris homo piissimus, quod parvuli non renati, si moriantur ante propriae voluntatis arbitrium, propter aliena dicantur peccata damnari ab eo, qui commendat caritatem suam in nobis (Rom 5, 8), qui dilexit nos, et Filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis illum tradidit (Rom 8, 32); quasi non de illo gravius conquerantur stulti et indocti similes tui, qui dicunt: Utquid creat, quos impios futuros et damnandos esse praescivit?
But you, most pious man, are indignant that little ones not reborn, if they die before the choice of their own will, are said to be condemned for another's sins by him who commends his love toward us (Rom 5:8), who has loved us, and did not spare his own Son but handed him over for us (Rom 8:32); as though fools and unlearned men like you did not complain more grievously of him, who say: Why does he create those whom he foreknew would be impious and to be condemned?
Iulianum.1.48Utquid eos postremo, donec ad impietatem damnabilem perveniant, facit vivere, quos antequam tales fierent, ex hac vita posset auferre; si animas amat, si commendat caritatem suam in nobis, si Filio suo non pepercit; sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit eum? Quibus si dicatur: O homo, tu qui es qui respondeas Deo? (Rom 9, 20)Inscrutabilia sunt iudicia eius (Rom 11, 33); irascuntur potius, quam mitescunt. Sed novit Dominus qui sunt eius (2 Tim 2, 19).
Why, finally, does he make those live until they reach a damnable impiety, whom he could have taken from this life before they became such; if he loves souls, if he commends his love toward us, if he did not spare his own Son, but handed him over for us all? If it be said to them: O man, who are you to answer back to God? (Rom 9:20) His judgments are inscrutable (Rom 11:33); they grow angry rather than grow gentle. But the Lord knows who are his (2 Tim 2:19).
Iulianum.1.48Si ergo sanis iudicibus uti cupis, audi iudicem sanum singulariter a tuo doctore laudatum. Fuit, inquit, Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam, et in illo omnes perierunt (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 234). Sed peccatis, inquis, alienis non utique perire debuerunt. Aliena sunt, sed paterna sunt; ac per hoc iure seminationis atque germinationis et nostra sunt. Quis ab hac perditione liberat, nisi qui venit quaerere quod perierat (Lc 19, 10)? In eis ergo quos liberat, amplectamur misericordiam; in eis autem quos non liberat, agnoscamus iudicium occultissimum quidem, sed sine ulla dubitatione iustissimum.
If, then, you wish to use sane judges, hear a sane judge praised singularly by your own teacher. Adam existed, he says, and in him we all existed; Adam perished, and in him all perished (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 234). But, you say, they ought not to have perished by another's sins. They are another's, but they are a father's; and by this, by the right of sowing and sprouting, they are also ours. Who frees from this perdition, except he who came to seek what had perished (Luke 19:10)? In those, then, whom he frees, let us embrace mercy; but in those whom he does not free, let us acknowledge a judgment most hidden indeed, but without any doubt most just.
Iulianum.1.4849. IUL. Pugnasse quidem cum principe tenebrarum deum lucis, Manichaeus finxit, et credidit, addiditque eius captivam teneri in hoc orbe substantiam; sed tantam infelicitatem colore pietatis nititur excusare, affirmans eum quasi bonum pro patria dimicasse civem, atque ideo obiecisse membra, ne perderet regna.
49. JUL. That the god of light fought with the prince of darkness, Manichaeus invented and believed, and he added that the god's substance is held captive in this world; but he strives to excuse so great an unhappiness with a color of piety, affirming that the god fought, as it were, like a good citizen for his fatherland, and therefore exposed his members lest he lose his kingdoms.
Iulianum.1.49Tu qui haec didiceras, quantum ea vel ad tempus deserendo profeceris intuere; dicis, Deum necessitatem non pertulisse belli, sed iniquitatem admisisse iudicii; nec tenebrosis hostibus, sed perspicuis subiacere criminibus; non impertisse postremo substantiam suam, sed aeternam violasse iustitiam. Quo quis vestrum peior sit, aliis aestimandum relinquo.
You who had learned these things, consider how much you have profited even by deserting them for a time; you say that God did not endure the necessity of war, but committed the iniquity of judgment; that he is subject not to dark enemies, but to manifest crimes; that he finally did not impart his own substance, but violated eternal justice. Which of you is the worse, I leave for others to estimate.
Iulianum.1.49Illud tamen liquet, ad unum vos opinionis nefas redire. Nam et Manichaeus subscribit iniquitatem Deo suo, cum eum allegat damnaturum, in ultimo die membra quae tradidit; et tu per hoc illum asseris infelicem, per quod corrumpit gloriam qua cluebat, et persequendo innocentiam quam creavit, perdidit iustitiam qua sacerrimus fuit. Tantum igitur huic, quem tu inducis Deo ille, quem magister tuus commentus fuerat, antecellit, quantum excusabilius est praelio superatum esse quam vitio.
This, however, is clear: that you come back to one and the same impiety of opinion. For the Manichean too subscribes iniquity to his God, when he alleges that he will condemn, on the last day, the members he handed over; and you assert that one unhappy through this, by which he corrupts the glory in which he was famed, and, by persecuting the innocence he created, lost the justice by which he was most holy. By so much, then, does this God whom you bring in surpass that one whom your master devised, as it is more excusable to have been overcome in battle than by vice.
Iulianum.1.49AUG. Si tibi placet innocentia parvulorum, remove ab eis, si potes, grave iugum quod est super filios Adam a dieexitus de ventre matris eorum (Cf. Eccli 40, 1). Sed puto quod Scriptura, quae hoc dixit, melius te noverat quid esset innocentia creaturae, et quid iustitia Creatoris. Quis autem non videat, si habent parvuli, qualem praedicas, innocentiam, in gravi iugo eorum Dei non esse iustitiam? Porro, quia in iugo gravi eorum divina iustitia est; non est in eis talis, qualem praedicas, innocentia.
AUG. If the innocence of little ones pleases you, remove from them, if you can, the heavy yoke that is upon the children of Adam from the day they come forth from their mother's womb (Cf. Sir 40:1). But I think that the Scripture which said this knew better than you what the innocence of the creature was, and what the justice of the Creator. But who would not see that, if little ones have such innocence as you proclaim, there is no justice of God in their heavy yoke? Further, because in their heavy yoke there is the divine justice, there is not in them such innocence as you proclaim.
Iulianum.1.49Nisi forte tibi in hac quaestione laboranti, Deus iustus quidem, sed infirmus quodam modo subvenire poterit, quia suis imaginibus, ne innocentes gravis iugi miseria premerentur, subvenire non potuit; ut eum dicas voluisse quidem, quia iustus est, sed non potuisse quia omnipotens non est; atque ita de his angustiis exeas, ut fidei caput perdas, qua fide primitus in Symbolo confitemur credere nos in Deum Patrem omnipotentem. Deus igitur tuus, in tot et tantis malis quae parvuli patiuntur, aut iustitiam, aut omnipotentiam, aut ipsam curam rerum humanarum est perditurus; quodlibet autem istorum dixeris, vide quid eris.
Unless perhaps, in this question on which you labor, a God who is just indeed, but in some manner weak, can come to your aid—because he could not come to the aid of his own images, lest the innocent be pressed by the misery of a heavy yoke; so that you say he willed indeed, because he is just, but could not, because he is not omnipotent; and thus you escape these straits in such a way that you lose the very head of the faith, by which faith we first confess in the Creed that we believe in God the Father almighty. Your God, then, in so many and so great evils which little ones suffer, will lose either his justice, or his omnipotence, or his very care for human affairs; whichever of these you say, see what you will be.
Iulianum.1.4950. IUL. Amolire te itaque cum tali Deo tuo de Ecclesiarum medio; non est ipse, cui Patriarchae, cui Prophetae, cui Apostoli crediderunt, in quo speravit et sperat Ecclesia primitivorum, quae conscripta est in caelis (Cf. Hebr 12, 23); non est ipse quem credit iudicem rationabilis creatura; quem Spiritus Sanctus iuste iudicaturum esse denuntiat. Nemo prudentium, pro tali Domino suum umquam sanguinem fudisset; nec enim merebatur dilectionis affectum, ut suscipiendae pro se onus imponeret passionis.
50. JUL. Remove yourself, then, with such a God of yours, from the midst of the Churches; he is not the one in whom the Patriarchs, the Prophets, the Apostles believed, in whom the Church of the firstborn, which is enrolled in heaven (Cf. Heb 12:23), hoped and hopes; he is not the one whom the rational creature believes to be judge, whom the Holy Spirit announces will judge justly. No prudent man would ever have shed his own blood for such a Lord; for he did not deserve the affection of love, that he should impose the burden of a passion to be undertaken for him.
Iulianum.1.50Postremo iste quem inducis, si esset uspiam, reus convinceretur esse, non deus; iudicandus a vero Deo meo, non iudicaturus pro Deo. Ut igitur prima fidei fundamenta cognoscas: noster Deus, Ecclesiae catholicae Deus, substantia nobis ignotus est, et ab aspectu similiter remotus; quem vidit nemo hominum, nec videre potest (1 Tim 6, 16); ut aeternus sine principio, ita sanctus iustusque sine vitio; omnipotentissimus, aequissimus, misericordissimus, innotescens solo splendore virtutum; factor omnium quae non erant, dispensator eorum quae sunt, examinator cunctorum qui et sunt et futuri sunt et fuerunt, in ultimo die; terram, caelum, et cuncta simul elementa moturus; excitator cinerum, et corporum restitutor; sed propter solam iustitiam, haec quae diximus, cuncta facturus.
Finally, this god whom you bring in, if he existed anywhere, would be convicted of being guilty, not a god; to be judged by my true God, not to judge in God's place. That you may know, then, the first foundations of the faith: our God, the God of the catholic Church, is unknown to us in substance, and likewise removed from sight; whom no man has seen, nor can see (1 Tim 6:16); as eternal without beginning, so holy and just without vice; most almighty, most equitable, most merciful, made known only by the splendor of his virtues; the maker of all things that were not, the dispenser of the things that are, the examiner of all things that both are and will be and have been, on the last day; about to move earth, heaven, and all the elements together; the rouser of ashes and the restorer of bodies; but on account of justice alone about to do all the things we have said.
Iulianum.1.50AUG. Si Deum Patriarcharum colis, quare non credis circumcisionem octavi diei, quae praecepta est Abrahae, prefigurationem fuisse regenerationis in Christo? Hoc enim, si crederes, videres non potuisse iuste animam parvuli exterminari de populo suo, si die non circumcideretur octavo (Cf. Gen 17, 12-14), nisi alicui fuisset obligata peccato?
AUG. If you worship the God of the Patriarchs, why do you not believe that the circumcision of the eighth day, which was commanded to Abraham, was a prefiguration of rebirth in Christ? For if you believed this, you would see that the soul of a little one could not justly be exterminated from his people if he were not circumcised on the eighth day (Cf. Gen 17:12-14), unless he were bound by some sin?
Iulianum.1.50Si Deum Prophetarum colis, cur non credis quod per eos totiens Deus dixerit: Reddam peccata patrum in filios (Ex 34, 7; Ier 32, 18)? Si Deum Apostolorum colis, cur non credis, corpus mortuum propter peccatum (Cf. Rom 8, 10)? Si Deum colis in quo speravit et sperat Ecclesia primitivorum, quae conscripta est in caelis (Cf. Hebr 12, 23), cur non credis baptizandos parvulos erui de potestate tenebrarum (Cf. Col 1, 13), cum eos propter hoc exsufflet atque exorcizet Ecclesia, ut ab eis potestas tenebrarum mittatur foras?
If you worship the God of the Prophets, why do you not believe what God said through them so often: I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Exod 34:7; Jer 32:18)? If you worship the God of the Apostles, why do you not believe that the body is dead on account of sin (Cf. Rom 8:10)? If you worship the God in whom the Church of the firstborn, which is enrolled in heaven (Cf. Heb 12:23), hoped and hopes, why do you not believe that little ones to be baptized are rescued from the power of darkness (Cf. Col 1:13), since for this reason the Church breathes upon them and exorcizes them, that the power of darkness may be sent forth from them?
Iulianum.1.50Ille vero quem sperat iudicem rationalis creatura, quae in sanctis eius est et fidelibus, lege nobis, praeter regnum bonis et supplicium malis, quem tertium locum praeparaverit et promiserit non regeneratis innocentibus tuis. Quomodo autem dicis, neminem prudentum pro Domino, quem colimus, sanguinem fundere; cum eum coluerit et pro eo sanguinem fuderit gloriosissimus Cyprianus, qui vos in ista quaestione suffocat, dicens parvulum ex Adam carnaliter natum, contagium mortis antiquae prima nativitate contrahere (Cf. CYPRIANUS, Ep. ad Fidum 64, 5)? Videsne te potius reum, qui blasphemas istum sanctorum martyrum Deum?
But that one whom the rational creature, which is in his saints and faithful, hopes will be judge—read to us what third place, besides the kingdom for the good and the punishment for the wicked, he has prepared and promised for your unregenerate innocents. And how do you say that no prudent man sheds his blood for the Lord whom we worship, when most glorious Cyprian worshiped him and shed his blood for him—Cyprian, who chokes you in this very question, saying that a little one born carnally from Adam contracts, by his first birth, the contagion of the ancient death (Cf. CYPRIANUS, Ep. ad Fidum 64, 5)? Do you not see that you are rather the guilty one, who blaspheme this God of the holy martyrs?
Iulianum.1.50Dicis te colere omnipotentissimum, aequissimum, misericordissimum Deum; sed ipse est omnipotentissimus, qui iugum grave, quo premuntur filii Adam ex die nativitatis suae (Cf. Eccli 40, 1), procul dubio ab eis posset auferre, immo ne ullo tali iugo prorsus gravarentur efficere; sed ipse est aequissimus, qui nullo modo illud imponeret, imponive permitteret, nisi peccata in eis, cum quibus nati sunt, inveniret, quorum reatum renatis idem ipse misericordissimus solveret.
You say that you worship the most almighty, most equitable, most merciful God; but he is the most almighty who could without doubt remove from the children of Adam the heavy yoke by which they are pressed from the day of their birth (Cf. Sir 40:1)—nay, bring it about that they be not burdened at all by any such yoke; but he is the most equitable, who would in no way impose it, or permit it to be imposed, unless he found in them sins with which they were born, the guilt of which he, the most merciful, himself looses in the reborn.
Iulianum.1.50Si ergo te delectaret divina iustitia, videres profecto quod ex ipsa veniat, non utique iniuste a parvulis incipiens, nota omnibus humana miseria, qua peragitur haec vita, a primis fletibus nascentium, usque ad extremos halitus morientium; sanctis tantum et fidelibus, sed in alia vita, felicitate promissa.
If, then, divine justice delighted you, you would assuredly see that from it comes—not unjustly, beginning from little ones—the human misery known to all, by which this life is carried through, from the first weepings of the newborn to the last breaths of the dying; while felicity is promised, but in another life, only to the holy and the faithful.
Iulianum.1.5051. IUL. Pro hoc igitur Deo meo, quem mihi qualem credo omnis creatura et sancta Scriptura denuntiat, rectius dixi facerem, si nec librorum te concertatione dignum putarem. Verum quoniam mihi potissimum hoc a sanctis viris, nostri temporis confessoribus, munus impositum est, ut dicta tua quid habeant ponderis rationisque discutiam, opportunum fuit ostendere prius, non a te credi ei Deo, qui in Catholicorum semper Ecclesia praedicatus est et usque ad finem ubi illa fuerit praedicabitur.
51. JUL. For this God of mine, then, whom every creature and holy Scripture proclaim to me to be such as I believe him, I would more rightly act if I judged you unworthy even of a contest of books. But since this task above all has been imposed on me by holy men, the confessors of our time—that I discuss what weight and reason your statements have—it was opportune to show first that you do not believe in that God who has always been proclaimed in the Church of the catholics and will be proclaimed to the end wherever that Church shall be.
Iulianum.1.51AUG. Ego potius non te ostendisse, quod te ostendisse dicis, ostendi; et ei me Deo credere, qui a Catholicorum semper Ecclesia praedicatus est, si nimium caecus non sis, edocui.
AUG. I have rather shown that you have not shown what you say you have shown; and I have taught—if you are not too blind—that I believe in that God who has always been proclaimed by the Church of the catholics.
Iulianum.1.5152. IUL. Nunc vero consequenter inspiciam, quibus hoc, quod expugnat fides piorum, testimoniis affirmare coneris. Sed quoniam institui libro tuo secundo, quem Alypius detulit, obviare, ne confunderetur rescripti series, paucis adhuc, usque dum ad testimonium Apostoli, quo plurimum tibi videris muniri, sermo perveniat, respondendum est. Illis ergo, quae supra posui, verbis tuis haec, quae sequuntur, adiungis: In his itaque quae praetermisit, hoc timuit, quia cuncta Ecclesiae catholicae pectora convenit, fidemque ipsam antiquitus traditam atque fundatam, clara quodam modo voce compellat, et adversus eos vehementissime permovet quod diximus, quia "nihil peccati esse in parvulis dicunt, quod lavacro regenerationis abluatur" (De nupt. et concup. 1, 1).
52. JUL. Now, then, I will consequently examine by what testimonies you try to affirm this thing which the faith of the pious assails. But since I have set out to confront your second book, which Alypius delivered, lest the series of the reply be confused, a few things must still be answered, until the discourse reaches the testimony of the Apostle by which you seem to think yourself most fortified. To those words of yours, then, which I set down above, you add these that follow: In the things, therefore, which he passed over, he feared this—because it addresses, in a certain clear voice, all the breasts of the catholic Church and the faith itself handed down and founded of old, and most vehemently moves them against those—what we said, namely, that "they say there is no sin in little ones to be washed away by the bath of rebirth" (De nupt. et concup. 1, 1).
Iulianum.1.52Omnes enim ad Ecclesiam non propter aliud cum parvulis currunt, nisi ut in eis originale peccatum generatione primae nativitatis attractum regeneratione secundae nativitatis expietur. Deinde ad nostra superiora verba revertitur, quae nescio cur repetat:"Eos autem qui de tali commixtione nascuntur, dicimus trahere originale peccatum; eosque, de parentibus qualibuscumque nascantur, non negamus adhuc esse sub diabolo, nisi renascantur in Christo" (Ibidem). Haec verba nostra et paulo ante dixerat. Deinde subiunxit quod de Christo diximus: "Qui de eadem sexus utriusque commixtione nasci noluit". Sed etiam hic praetermisit quod ego posui: "Ut per eius gratiam eruti de potestate tenebrarum in regnum illius, qui de eadem sexus utriusque commixtione nasci noluit, transferantur".
For all run to the Church with their little ones for no other reason than that in them the original sin contracted by the generation of the first birth may be expiated by the regeneration of the second birth. Then he returns to our earlier words, which I know not why he repeats: "but those who are born of such a union, we say, draw original sin; and those born of whatever sort of parents we do not deny are still under the devil, unless they are reborn in Christ" (Ibidem). These words of ours he had also said a little before. Then he added what we said of Christ: "who was unwilling to be born of the same union of both sexes." But here too he passed over what I set down: "that by his grace, rescued from the power of darkness, they may be transferred into the kingdom of him who was unwilling to be born of the same union of both sexes."
Iulianum.1.52Vide, obsecro te, quae nostra verba vitavit, tamquam inimicus omnino gratiae Dei, quae venit per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum. Scit enim ab illa Apostoli sententia, qua dixit de Deo Patre: "i nos eruit de potestate tenebrarum, et transtulit in regnum Filii caritatis suae " (Col 1, 13); improbissime et impiissime parvulos separari; ideo procul dubio verba ista praetermittere quam ponere maluit (De nupt. et concup. 2, 4-5).
See, I beseech you, what words of ours he avoided, as one altogether an enemy of the grace of God which came through Jesus Christ our Lord. For he knows that from that sentence of the Apostle, by which he said of God the Father: "who rescued us from the power of darkness, and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love" (Col 1:13), little ones are most wickedly and most impiously separated; and therefore he doubtless preferred to pass over these words rather than to set them down (De nupt. et concup. 2, 4-5).
Iulianum.1.52Egone sum inimicus gratiae Dei, homo omnium impudentissime, qui in primo libro meo, unde tu ista a contextu suo avulsa rapuisti, ut aliquid sine ratione garrires, professione pura et plena os tuum mysteriis Manichaeorum madens tuorumque damnavi?
Am I an enemy of the grace of God, most impudent of all men—I who, in my first book, from which you snatched these things torn from their context to chatter something without reason, condemned with a pure and full profession your mouth dripping with the mysteries of the Manicheans and of your own people?
Iulianum.1.52AUG. Numquid ut habeas causam bonam conviciando facturus es? Dic quorum meorum os, sicut meum damnasse te iactas. Dicturus es: Manichaeorum; sed ut maledicus, non ut veridicus. Ego enim et Manichaeos detestor, et adiutores eorum, in quibus appetis principatum, et utrosque adiuvante ac subve ente Domino Deo nostro catholica veritate redarguo. Sed ostendam meos, quos in me tanto nequius quanto astutius criminaris. In hac enim causa, ubi originalis peccati vertitur quaestio, propter quod me nomine Manichaeorum atrocissimis dignum arbitraris opprobriis, meus est Cyprianus, qui cum peccasse nihil dixerit parvulum, non tamen tacuit, eum contraxisse peccati ex Adam prima nativitate contagium (CYPRIANUS, Ep. ad Fidum 64, 5).
AUG. Will you really, in order to have a good case, do it by reviling? Say whose mouth—as you boast that I condemned mine. You will say: the Manicheans'; but as a slanderer, not as a truth-teller. For I both detest the Manicheans, and their helpers, among whom you aspire to the chief place, and I refute both, with the Lord our God helping and supporting, by catholic truth. But I will show who are mine, whom you charge against me the more wickedly the more cunningly. For in this case, where the question of original sin is in dispute—on account of which you judge me, under the name of the Manicheans, worthy of most atrocious reproaches—mine is Cyprian, who, though he said the little one had sinned in nothing, yet was not silent that he had contracted from Adam, by his first birth, the contagion of sin (CYPRIANUS, Ep. ad Fidum 64, 5).
Iulianum.1.52Meus est Hilarius, qui cum exponeret quod in Psalmo legitur: Vivet anima mea et laudabit te (Ps 118, 175). Vivere se, inquit, in hac vita non reputat; quippe qui dixerat: "ce in iniquitatibus conceptum sum, et in delictis peperit me mater mea " (Ps 50, 7), scit sub peccati origine, et sub peccati lege se natum (HILARIUS, In Ps 118, 175). Meus est a tuo doctore excellentissime laudatus Ambrosius, qui dixit: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est; sicut habes lectum, dicente David: "ce enim in iniquitatibus conceptus sum, et in delictis peperit me mater mea ". Ideo Pauli caro, corpus mortis erat (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13). Meus est Gregorius, qui cum de Baptismo loqueretur: Venerare, inquit, nativitatem, per quam terrenae nativitatis vinculis liberatus es (GREGORIUS NAZ., Orat. in Christi Natalem 38, 17).
Mine is Hilary, who, when he was expounding what is read in the Psalm: My soul shall live and shall praise you (Ps 119:175 (118:175)), says: He does not reckon himself to live in this life; since indeed he had said: "behold, in iniquities was I conceived, and in offenses did my mother bear me" (Ps 51:5 (50:7)), he knows himself born under the origin of sin, and under the law of sin (HILARIUS, In Ps 119 (118), 175). Mine is Ambrose, most excellently praised by your teacher, who said: We are all born under sin, whose very origin is in fault; as you have read, with David saying: "for behold, in iniquities was I conceived, and in offenses did my mother bear me." Therefore Paul's flesh was a body of death (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13). Mine is Gregory, who, when he spoke of Baptism: Venerate, he says, the birth through which you have been freed from the bonds of earthly birth (GREGORIUS NAZ., Orat. in Christi Natalem 38, 17).
Iulianum.1.52Meus est Basilius, qui cum ageret de ieiunio: Quia non ieiunavimus, inquit, decidimus de paradiso; ieiunemus ut ad eum redeamus (BASILIUS, Serm. I de ieiunio 4). Meus est Ioannes Constantinopolitanus, dicens: Adam peccavit illud grande peccatum, et omne hominum genus in commune damnavit (IOANNES CONSTANTINOP., Ep. ad Olymp. 3, 3). Hi omnes, et alii socii eorum eadem sentientes, quos commemorare longum est, mei sunt; si agnoscis, et tui sunt; sed mei doctores, improbatores tui.
Mine is Basil, who, when he was treating of fasting: Because we did not fast, he says, we fell from paradise; let us fast that we may return to it (BASILIUS, Serm. I de ieiunio 4). Mine is John of Constantinople, saying: Adam committed that great sin, and condemned the whole human race in common (IOANNES CONSTANTINOP., Ep. ad Olymp. 3, 3). All these, and others, their companions, holding the same view, whom it would be long to recall, are mine; if you acknowledge them, they are also yours; but they are my teachers, your reprovers.
Iulianum.1.52Quomodo igitur os meum meorumque damnasti; cum istorum, quos esse conspicis meos, concordissimo et veracissimo potius ore ipse damneris? Istisne tu luminibus civitatis Dei, mente tenebrosissima, fronte impudentissima, lingua procacissima audes crimen obicere Manichaei? Si autem non audes, cur mihi non ob aliud audes, nisi quia hoc dico, quod dicunt quibus non audes?
How, then, did I condemn the mouth of myself and of mine, when by the most concordant and most truthful mouth of these men, whom you see to be mine, you yourself are rather condemned? Do you dare, with most darkened mind, most impudent brow, most insolent tongue, to throw the charge of the Manichean at these lights of the city of God? But if you do not dare, why do you dare it against me for no other reason than that I say what they say, whom you do not dare to charge?
Iulianum.1.5253. IUL. Ibi namque hic est a me collatus ordo verborum, cum dixissem auctorem Deum caeli et terrae, omniumque quae in eis sunt, ac per hoc et hominum propter quos cuncta facta sunt. Non autem me fugit - inquio - cum haec dicimus, illud de nobis disseminandum esse, quia gratiam Christi necessariam parvulis non putemus. Quod christianos populos laudabiliter et vehementer offendit; si tamen dicti per se nefarii non nos arbitrarentur auctores; eo enim modo nec de fratribus suis falsa credendo crimen incurrerent, et studiosos se circa amorem fidei comprobarent. Munienda igitur nobis ista parsest contra impetum vanitatis, et confessione brevi os obloquentium consuendum. Nos igitur in tantum gratiam Baptismatis omnibus utilem aetatibus confitemur, ut cunctos, qui illam non necessariam etiam parvulis putant, aeterno feriamus anathemate. Sed hanc gratiam locupletem spiritalibus donis credimus, quae multisopima muneribus ac reverenda virtutibus, pro infirmitatum generibus et humanorum statuum diversitatibus, una, tam remediorum collatrice quam munerum, virtute medicatur.
53. JUL. For there this order of words was set down by me, when I had said that God is the author of heaven and earth and of all things that are in them, and by this also of human beings, on whose account all things were made. It does not escape me, I say, when we say these things, that this will be spread about concerning us: that we think the grace of Christ not necessary for little ones. This rightly and vehemently offends Christian peoples; if only they did not judge us the authors of a thing in itself nefarious; for in that way they would neither incur a crime by believing falsehoods about their brothers, and would prove themselves zealous about the love of the faith. This part, then, must be fortified by us against the assault of empty rumor, and the mouth of detractors must be sewn shut by a brief confession. We, then, so far confess the grace of Baptism to be useful to all ages, that we strike with an eternal anathema all who think it not necessary even for little ones. But this grace we believe to be rich in spiritual gifts, which, opulent with many gifts and venerable for its virtues, according to the kinds of infirmities and the diversities of human conditions, heals by one virtue, the bestower both of remedies and of gifts.
Iulianum.1.53Quae cum admovetur, non est mutanda pro causis; iam enim ipsa dona sua pro accedentium capacitate dispensat. Sicut enim artes omnes non pro diversitate materiarum, quas arripiunt excolendas, ipsae quoque aut detrimenta aut augmenta patiuntur, sed idem semper atque uno modo se habentes multiplici decorantur effectu; ita et secundum Apostolum: "a fides, unum Baptisma " (Eph 4, 5).
And when it is applied, it is not to be changed for the cases; for it now dispenses its gifts according to the capacity of those who approach. For just as all the arts do not themselves suffer either losses or increases on account of the diversity of the materials they take up to be worked, but, remaining always the same and in one manner, are adorned by a manifold effect; so too, according to the Apostle: "one faith, one Baptism" (Eph 4:5).
Iulianum.1.53Et multiplicantur et dilatantur in donis, nec tamen in mysteriorum mutantur ordinibus. Sed haec gratia non adversatur iustitiae, quae maculas eluit iniquitatis; nec facit peccata, sed purgat; quae absolvit reos, non calumniatur innocuos.
And they are multiplied and enlarged in gifts, yet are not changed in the orders of the mysteries. But this grace is not opposed to justice, which washes away the stains of iniquity; nor does it make sins, but purifies them; which absolves the guilty, does not slander the harmless.
Iulianum.1.53Christus enim, qui est sui operis redemptor, auget circa imaginem suam continua largitate beneficia; et quos fecerat condendo bonos, facit innovando adoptandoque meliores (C. Iul. 3, 8 ss). Hanc igitur gratiam, per quam reis venia, illuminatio spiritalis, adoptio filiorum Dei, municipatus Hierusalem caelestis, sanctificatio atque in Christi membra translatio, et possessio Regni caelorum mortalibus datur, qui aliquibus negandam putat, omnium bonorum exsecrationem meretur.
For Christ, who is the redeemer of his own work, increases his benefits toward his own image with continual bounty; and those whom he had made good by creating, he makes better by renewing and adopting (C. Iul. 3, 8 ss). This grace, then—through which pardon for the guilty, spiritual illumination, the adoption of the children of God, citizenship of the heavenly Jerusalem, sanctification, and translation into the members of Christ, and the possession of the Kingdom of heaven are given to mortals—whoever thinks it ought to be denied to any, deserves the execration of all good men.
Iulianum.1.53AUG. In his omnibus quae commemorasti gratiae Dei muneribus illud, quod prius posuisti, dari per illam reis veniam, non vis ad parvulos pertinere, quos ullum reatum negas ex Adam trahere. Cur ergo cetera multis negat Deus parvulis, qui sine hac gratia in illa aetate moriuntur? Cur, inquam, non eis datur illuminatio spiritalis, adoptio filiorum Dei, municipatus Hierusalem caelestis, sanctificatio atque in Christi membra translatio, et possessio regni caelorum? Haeccine tot munera tam necessaria, tot imaginibus suis nullum secundum vos peccatum habentibus negaret Deus, penes quem summa potestas est, cum hoc beneficium non a se prohibeat voluntas contraria parvulorum? Tu certe ut hanc a vobis amolireris invidiam, qua dicimini parvulis Baptismi gratiam denegare, dixisti quod eam gratiam, qui aliquibus negandam putat, omnium bonorum exsecrationem meretur.
AUG. Among all these gifts of the grace of God which you have recalled, the one you set first—that through it pardon is given to the guilty—you are unwilling to have belong to little ones, whom you deny to draw any guilt from Adam. Why, then, does God deny the rest, so many, to little ones who die at that age without this grace? Why, I say, is there not given to them spiritual illumination, the adoption of the children of God, citizenship of the heavenly Jerusalem, sanctification, and translation into the members of Christ, and the possession of the Kingdom of heaven? Would God, with whom is the highest power, deny these so many and so necessary gifts to so many of his images who, according to you, have no sin, when no contrary will of the little ones bars this benefit from him? You certainly, in order to remove from yourselves this odium—by which you are said to deny to little ones the grace of Baptism—said that whoever thinks that grace ought to be denied to any deserves the execration of all good men.
Iulianum.1.53Non igitur eam Dei omnipotentis aequitas negaret innumerabilibus parvulis, qui sine hac sub eius omnipotentia moriuntur, si mali nihil in eius occulto iudicio mererentur. A quo iudicio de stirpe Adam venientibus omnibus debito, quicumque secundum gratiam, non secundum debitum liberantur, non in suis meritis, sed in Domino glorientur. Vos ergo si carere vultis opprobrio, quo Ecclesiae catholicae detestabiles facti estis, sinite Christum parvulis esse Iesum.
The equity, then, of God the Almighty would not deny it to the innumerable little ones who die without this grace under his omnipotence, if they deserved no evil in his hidden judgment. From which judgment, owed to all who come from the stock of Adam, whoever are freed according to grace, not according to debt, let them glory not in their own merits, but in the Lord. You, then, if you wish to be free of the reproach by which you have been made detestable to the catholic Church, allow Christ to be the Jesus of little ones.
Iulianum.1.53Quod omnino non erit, si non eis conferet propter quod hoc nomen accepit, id est, si non eos salvos faciet a peccatis eorum (Cf. Mt 1, 21). Hoc igitur de ista gratia dicite, ut offensione Christianorum, de qua conquerimini careatis, quod dixit catholicus doctus doctorque Gregorius: Venerare nativitatem, per quam terrenae nativitatis vinculis liberatus es (GREGORIUS NAZ., Orat. in Christi Natalem 38, 17). Nullo itaque modo ad istam gratiam pertinere parvulos confitemini, quamdiu negatis eos nativitate caelesti a terrenae nativitatis vinculis liberari.
And this will not be at all, if he will not confer on them that on account of which he received this name—that is, if he will not save them from their sins (Cf. Matt 1:21). Say this, then, of that grace, so that you may be free of the offense to Christians of which you complain, what the learned catholic teacher Gregory said: Venerate the birth through which you have been freed from the bonds of earthly birth (GREGORIUS NAZ., Orat. in Christi Natalem 38, 17). In no way, then, do you confess little ones to belong to that grace, as long as you deny that they are freed by the heavenly birth from the bonds of earthly birth.
Iulianum.1.5354. IUL. Quae quoniam, ut locus interim hic patiebatur, munivi, revertamur illo unde digressi sumus; de hoc ipso, ubicumque opportunum fuerit, plenius locuturi. Ecce quanta confessionis luce, et eos qui Baptisma parvulis denegarent, et vos qui eius praeiudicio iustitiam Dei audetis maculare, reprobavi;
54. JUL. Since I have fortified these things, as the place here meanwhile allowed, let us return to where we digressed; about this very matter we shall speak more fully wherever it is opportune. See with how great a light of confession I have reproved both those who would deny Baptism to little ones, and you who dare, by the prejudice of it, to stain the justice of God;
Iulianum.1.54protestans aliud me non tenere, quam instituta mysteria iisdem, quibus tradita sunt verbis, in omni prorsus aetate esse tractanda, nec pro causarum varietate debere mutari; verum fieri peccatorem ex malo perfecte bonum; innocentem autem, qui nullum habet malum propriae voluntatis, ex bono fieri meliorem, id est, optimum; ut ambo quidem in Christi membra transeant consecrati; sed unus deprehensus in mala vita, alter in bona natura.
protesting that I hold nothing other than that the instituted mysteries are to be administered, in the very words by which they were handed down, in absolutely every age, and ought not to be changed for the variety of cases; but that a sinner is made from evil perfectly good, while an innocent—one who has no evil of his own will—is made from good better, that is, best; so that both indeed pass over, consecrated, into the members of Christ; but the one was caught in an evil life, the other in a good nature.
Iulianum.1.54Ille enim innocentiam, quam exortus acceperat, prava actione corrupit; hic vero sine laude, sine crimine voluntatis, hoc solum habet, quod a Deo conditore suscepit, qui infucata primaevitate felicior, bonum simplicitatis suae vitiare non potuit, nullum habens de actibus meritum, sed hoc solum retinens, quod tanti opificis dignatione possedit.
For the one corrupted by a depraved action the innocence he had received at his origin; but the other, without praise, without crime of will, has only this, which he received from God his Creator—he who, happier in his uncolored newness, could not vitiate the good of his own simplicity, having no merit from his acts, but retaining only this, which by the favor of so great a maker he possessed.
Iulianum.1.54AUG. Quare ergo grave iugum super eum a die exitus de ventre matris eius (Cf. Eccli 40, 1)? Cur tanta corruptibilitas corporis, ut hac aggravetur anima eius (Cf. Sap 9, 15)? Cur tanta mentis obtunsio, ut etiam plagis erudiatur tarditas eius? Quousque, Iuliane, gravis es corde? Quousque diligis vanitatem, et quaeris mendacium (Cf. Ps 4, 3), quo vestra haeresis fulciatur? Numquid si nemo peccasset, si natura humana in ea qua condita est bonitate mansisset, etiam in paradiso ad istas homo miserias, ut alia taceam, nasceretur?
AUG. Why, then, is there a heavy yoke upon him from the day he comes forth from his mother's womb (Cf. Sir 40:1)? Why so great a corruptibility of body that his soul is weighed down by it (Cf. Wis 9:15)? Why so great a dullness of mind that his slowness is even instructed by blows? How long, Julian, will you be heavy of heart? How long will you love vanity, and seek a lie (Cf. Ps 4:2 (4:3)), by which your heresy may be propped up? Surely, if no one had sinned, if human nature had remained in the goodness in which it was created, would man be born even in paradise unto these miseries—to pass over others?
Iulianum.1.5455. IUL. Aetas igitur illa sicut misericordiam Christi praedicat innovata, id est, innovantis mysterii virtute provecta; ita iniquitatem iudicis, infamiam iustitiae, aut accusata, aut aggravata convincit.
55. JUL. That age, then, just as it proclaims the mercy of Christ when renewed—that is, advanced by the virtue of the renewing mystery—so it convicts the iniquity of the judge, the infamy of justice, whether accused or aggravated.
Iulianum.1.55AUG. Ex qua vetustate aetas illa dicitur innovata, cum sit ortu nova? Labia dolosa sunt ista; si vis agnoscere vetustatem, ex qua parvuli christiana gratia renovantur, audi fideliter quod ait homo Dei Reticius ab Augustoduno episcopus, qui cum Melchiade Romano Episcopo quondam iudex sedit, Donatumque damnavit haereticum. Hic enim cum de christiano Baptismate loqueretur: Hanc igitur, inquit, principalem esse in Ecclesia indulgentiam, neminem praeterit, in qua antiqui criminis omne pondus exponimus, et ignorantiae nostrae facinora prisca delemus; ubi et veterem hominem cum ingenitis sceleribus exuimus (C. Iul. 1, 7).
AUG. From what oldness is that age said to be renewed, when by birth it is new? These are deceitful lips; if you wish to recognize the oldness from which little ones are renewed by Christian grace, hear faithfully what the man of God Reticius, bishop of Autun, says—who once sat as judge with Melchiades, bishop of Rome, and condemned the heretic Donatus. For when he spoke of Christian Baptism: This, he says, is the chief indulgence in the Church, as no one fails to know, in which we lay down the whole weight of the ancient crime, and blot out the former misdeeds of our ignorance; where we also put off the old man with his inborn wickednesses (C. Iul. 1, 7).
Iulianum.1.55Audisne non postea perpetrata, sed etiam ingenita scelera veteris hominis? Numquid Manichaeus fuit iste Reticius? Quomodo ergo non dolose innovari parvulos dicitis in christiana regeneratione, qui mala, quae ingeneravit antiqui criminis pondus, in vetere homine non vultis agnoscere? Deinde, si aggravata aetas illa iniquitatem iudicis convincit, ut dicis, itane non est aggravata gravi iugo super filios Adam? Et tamen non est hinc iniquus Deus; ac per hoc merito est aggravata. Nullum est autem huius aetatis meritum malum, si non est originale peccatum.
Do you hear "not the misdeeds afterward perpetrated, but even the inborn misdeeds of the old man"? Was this Reticius a Manichean? How, then, do you say—not deceitfully—that little ones are renewed in Christian regeneration, you who are unwilling to acknowledge in the old man the evils which the weight of the ancient crime engendered? Then, if that age aggravated convicts the iniquity of the judge, as you say, is it not aggravated by the heavy yoke upon the children of Adam? And yet God is not on this account unjust; and so it is deservedly aggravated. But there is no evil merit of this age, if there is no original sin.
Iulianum.1.5556. IUL. Non ergo unitate sacramenti rea monstratur infantia, sed veritate iudicii nihil aliud quam innocens approbatur.
56. JUL. Infancy, then, is shown guilty not by the unity of the sacrament, but by the truth of judgment it is approved as nothing other than innocent.
Iulianum.1.56AUG. Invenisse te putas quare baptizetur; dic quare exsuffletur. Certe Pelagii auctoris vestri magna et invicta est putata sententia, ubi ait: Si Adae peccatum etiam non peccantibus nocuit, ergo et Christi iustitia etiam non credentibus prodest (Cf. De pecc. mer.et rem. 3, 2).
AUG. You think you have found why an infant is baptized; say why he is breathed upon. Surely the sentence of Pelagius, your author, has been thought great and unconquered, where he says: If Adam's sin harmed even those who do not sin, then Christ's justice profits even those who do not believe (Cf. De pecc. mer. et rem. 3, 2).
Iulianum.1.56Quid ergo de parvulis dicitis quando baptizantur? Credunt, an non credunt? Si dixeritis: Non credunt, quomodo non eis Christi iustitia etiam non credentibus prodest, ut Regnum caelorum possideant?
What, then, do you say of little ones when they are baptized? Do they believe, or do they not believe? If you say: They do not believe, how does the justice of Christ not profit them, who do not believe, so that they may possess the Kingdom of heaven?
Iulianum.1.56Aut si prodest, ut cogimini confiteri; sic igitur eis nocuit Adae peccatum nondum peccandi habentibus voluntatem, quomodo eis prodest iustitia Christi nondum credendi habentibus voluntatem? Si autem dixeritis: Per alios credunt, sic etiam per alium peccaverunt. Et quoniam verum est quod per alios credunt (propter hoc enim et fideles per totam Ecclesiam nuncupantur), profecto pertinent ad illud quod ait Dominus: Qui autem non crediderit, condemnabitur (Mc 16, 16).
Or if it profits them, as you are compelled to confess; then in this way Adam's sin harmed them, who do not yet have a will to sin, just as the justice of Christ profits them, who do not yet have a will to believe. But if you say: They believe through others, then they sinned too through another. And since it is true that they believe through others (for on this account they are also called faithful throughout the whole Church), they assuredly belong to that which the Lord said: But he who will not have believed shall be condemned (Mark 16:16).
Iulianum.1.56Condemnabuntur ergo si per alios non credant, cum per se ipsos non valent credere; condemnari autem iuste nullo modo possent, si non sub peccato, ac per hoc et sub peccati principe nascerentur. Propter hoc ergo et exsufflantur. Removete ab eis deceptoriam vanitatem vestram; sinite parvulos venire ad Iesum (Mc 10, 14; cf. Mt 19, 14; Lc 18, 16), qui salvum facit populum suum (in quo utique et ipsi sunt) a peccatis eorum (Mt 1, 21).
They will be condemned, then, if they do not believe through others, since through themselves they cannot believe; but they could in no way be justly condemned, if they were not born under sin, and by this also under the prince of sin. For this reason, then, they are also breathed upon. Remove from them your deceptive vanity; allow little ones to come to Jesus (Mark 10:14; cf. Matt 19:14; Luke 18:16), who saves his people (among whom they too certainly are) from their sins (Matt 1:21).
Iulianum.1.5657. IUL. Quamquam mihi, ut de statu explicando immorer parvulorum, consequentia rationis indicit, quae res sua lege coniunctas dividi non sinit. Ceterum facilior esset iactura nascentium, si non eis compericlitaretur ipsa maiestas. Excusa igitur Deum, et accusa parvulum; iustum doceatur ille quod facit, qui sine iustitia Deus esse non potest; et quaevis suscipiat persona supplicium. Ceterum nunc extra sacrilegium res, quas putas esse consertas, mutuo sibi vehementer repugnant. Dicis enim, quoniam unis mysteriis, idololatrae ac parricidae, imbuuntur et parvuli, omnes scelestos posse convinci; et addis rem multo absurdiorem, a Sacramenti huius, de quo agimus, auctore aliena peccata innocentibus imputari.
57. JUL. Although the consequence of reason indicates to me that I should dwell on explaining the condition of little ones—a reason which does not allow things joined by their own law to be divided. But the loss of the newborn would be easier to bear, if majesty itself were not endangered along with them. Excuse God, then, and accuse the little one; let him be taught to be just in what he does, who without justice cannot be God; and let whatever person you please undergo the punishment. But as it is, apart from the sacrilege, the things you think are joined together vehemently fight against each other. For you say that, because little ones too are imbued with the same mysteries as idolaters and parricides, all can be convicted as criminals; and you add a thing far more absurd, that by the author of this sacrament we are treating of, the sins of others are imputed to the innocent.
Iulianum.1.57Hoc est quod pugnare dixi, quia non capit rerum natura ut uno tempore et adeo sit misericors Deus, ut propria unicuique confitenti peccata condonet; et adeo crudelis, ut innocenti impingat aliena. Horum prorsus cum alterum dederis, alterum sustulisti; si donat veniam reis, non calumniatur innoxiis; si calumniatur innocuis, numquam parcit obnoxiis.
This is what I said fights, because the nature of things does not admit that at one and the same time God should be both so merciful as to pardon to each one confessing his own sins, and so cruel as to charge another's upon the innocent. Of these two, when you grant the one, you have taken away the other; if he grants pardon to the guilty, he does not slander the harmless; if he slanders the innocent, he never spares the liable.
Iulianum.1.57AUG. Tu potius facis iniustum Deum, cum tibi videtur iniustum peccata patrum reddere in filios, quod se ille facere et verbis saepe testatur et rebus ostendit.
AUG. It is rather you who make God unjust, since it seems to you unjust to repay the sins of the fathers upon the children—which he often both testifies in words that he does, and shows by deeds.
Iulianum.1.57Tu, inquam, facis iniustum Deum, sub cuius omnipotentis cura, cum videas gravi iugo miseriae parvulos premi, nullum eos peccatum habere contendis, simul accusans et Deum, et Ecclesiam; Deum quidem, si gravantur et affliguntur immeriti; Ecclesiam vero, si exsufflantur a iure diabolicae potestatis alieni. Ubi autem somniasti, idololatris et parricidis originalia parvulorum nos aequare peccata?
You, I say, make God unjust, under whose almighty care, when you see little ones pressed by the heavy yoke of misery, you contend that they have no sin, accusing at once both God and the Church: God indeed, if the undeserving are burdened and afflicted; the Church, if those free from the right of the devil's power are breathed upon. But where did you dream that we equate the original sins of little ones with idolaters and parricides?
Iulianum.1.57Verum tamen mysteriis indita remissio peccatorum, in peccatis, et maioribus, et minoribus, et pluribus, et paucioribus, et singulis, vera est; in nullis vero peccatis, sicut esse parvulorum dicitis, falsa est. Sic autem aliena sunt originalia peccata propter nullum in eis nostrae voluntatis arbitrium, ut tamen propter originis contagium esse inveniantur et nostra. Quid est ergo quod clamas, et dicis non posse Deum et dimittere peccata maioribus propria, et imputare parvulis aliena; nec vis attendere, quod nonnisi in Christo renatis utraque; non renatis autem in Christo, neutra dimittat?
Nevertheless, the remission of sins placed in the mysteries is true in sins—both greater and lesser, both more and fewer, both single ones; but in no sins, as you say is the case with little ones, it is false. But original sins are another's, on account of there being in them no choice of our will, in such a way that, on account of the contagion of origin, they are found to be also ours. What is it, then, that you cry out and say that God cannot both forgive their own sins to adults and impute another's to little ones; and you are unwilling to attend to this, that he forgives both only in those reborn in Christ, but to those not reborn in Christ, neither?
Iulianum.1.57Ipsa sunt enim christianae gratiae sacramenta abscondita sapientibus et prudentibus, et revelata parvulis (Cf. Mt 11, 25). In quibus o si esses, nec quasi magnus in tua virtute confideres, profecto intellegeres, sic imputari generatis parvulis iniustitiam primi hominis ad subeundum supplicium, quemadmodum imputatur parvulis regeneratis iustitia secundi hominis ad obtinendum Regnum caelorum; quamvis voluntate atque opere proprio nec illum in malo, nec istum in bono reperiantur imitati.
For these are the sacraments of Christian grace hidden from the wise and prudent, and revealed to little ones (Cf. Matt 11:25). If you were among them, and did not trust as though great in your own virtue, you would assuredly understand that the injustice of the first man is so imputed to little ones who are generated, for the undergoing of punishment, as the justice of the second man is imputed to little ones who are regenerated, for the obtaining of the Kingdom of heaven; although in will and in their own work neither are they found to have imitated the former in evil, nor the latter in good.
Iulianum.1.5758. IUL. Nihil itaque in verbis tuis, coactus, ut dicis, timore praeterii. Quid enim in tam elegantis ingenii possem pavere monumentis, nisi forte hoc solum, quod horrorem de obscaenitatis tuae impugnatione perpetior?
58. JUL. Nothing, then, did I pass over in your words, compelled, as you say, by fear. For what could I dread in the monuments of so elegant a talent, except perhaps this alone—that I suffer horror at the assault of your obscenity?
Iulianum.1.58AUG. Si emeres ista convicia, prodigum te dicerem; gratis tibi adiacent; cur non eis fruaris, quibus maledicum animum pascis?
AUG. If you were buying these insults, I would call you a spendthrift; they lie ready for you free of charge; why do you not enjoy them, with which you feed your abusive mind?
Iulianum.1.5859. IUL. Audi igitur, contra ea quae dixisti, breviter: non sunt Ecclesiae catholicae pectora, quae sermo tuus convenit, si a pietate et ratione discordant. Quod utrumque committunt, cum nec de Dei aequitate bene aestimant, nec mysteriorum, quae criminantur, sapientiam et divitias intellegunt. Non est haec fides antiquitus tradita atque fundata, nisi in conciliis malignantium, inspirata a diabolo, prolata a Manichaeo, celebrata a Marcione, Fausto, Adimanto, omnibusque eorum satellitibus, et nunc a te in Italiam, quod graviter gemimus, eructata.
59. JUL. Hear, then, briefly, against what you have said: they are not the breasts of the catholic Church which your discourse addresses, if they disagree with piety and reason. And they commit both, since they neither judge well of the equity of God, nor understand the wisdom and riches of the mysteries which they charge. This is not the faith handed down and founded of old, except in the councils of the malign, inspired by the devil, brought forth by Manichaeus, celebrated by Marcion, Faustus, Adimantus, and all their satellites, and now belched out by you into Italy—which we grievously bewail.
Iulianum.1.59AUG. Quo ore, qua fronte concilium malignantium dicis, consensionem tot catholicorum, qui doctores Ecclesiarum fuerunt ante nos? Quasi vero, si in concilio episcoporum, quod non salubriter, sed iactanter, propter vestras quaestiones debere dicitis congregari, sederent episcopi, quos supra memoravi, ut alios omittam, Cyprianus, Hilarius, Ambrosius, Gregorius, Basilius, Ioannes Constantinopolitanus, aliquos eorum qui nunc manent facile inveniretis, quos eis in doctrina ecclesiastica antiquitus tradita aequare, nedum praeferre possetis. Cum ergo ipsi contra vos de peccato originali proferant apertas clarasque sententias, et quas paulo ante posui, et alias plurimas; horumne in catholica veritate consensum audetis malignantium appellare concilium? Et cogitatis, quid istis contradicatis, ac non potius quo fugiatis, si eis consentire non vultis?
AUG. With what mouth, with what brow do you call a council of the malign the agreement of so many catholics who were the teachers of the Churches before us? As though, if in a council of bishops—which you say ought to be gathered, not wholesomely but boastfully, on account of your questions—those bishops were to sit whom I recalled above, to pass over others—Cyprian, Hilary, Ambrose, Gregory, Basil, John of Constantinople—you would easily find any of those who now remain whom you could equate with them, much less prefer to them, in the ecclesiastical teaching handed down of old. Since, then, these very men bring forth against you, concerning original sin, open and clear sentences—both those I set down a little before, and very many others—do you dare to call the agreement of these men in catholic truth a council of the malign? And do you consider what you contradict in these men, and not rather where you may flee, if you are unwilling to agree with them?
Iulianum.1.59Sed quoniam me dixisti eructasse in Italiam quod gematis, eumdem illum episcopum Italiae a tuo doctore laudatum in tuam frontem replico Ambrosium. Omnes homines, inquit, sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est; sicut habes lectum, dicente David: "ce in iniquitatibus conceptus sum, et in delictis peperit me mater mea " (Ps 50, 7). Ideo Pauli caro corpus mortis erat, sicut ipse ait: "is me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? " (Rom 7, 24). Christi autem caro damnavit peccatum, quod nascendo non sensit, quod moriendo crucifixit, ut in carne nostra esset iustificatio per gratiam, ubi erat ante colluvio per culpam (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13).
But since you said that I have belched out into Italy what you bewail, I throw back against your brow that same bishop of Italy praised by your teacher—Ambrose. We are all, he says, born under sin, whose very origin is in fault; as you have read, with David saying: "in iniquities was I conceived, and in offenses did my mother bear me" (Ps 51:5 (50:7)). Therefore Paul's flesh was a body of death, as he himself says: "who will free me from the body of this death?" (Rom 7:24). But the flesh of Christ condemned sin, which it did not feel by being born, which it crucified by dying, so that in our flesh there might be justification through grace, where before there was filth through fault (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13).
Iulianum.1.59Hanc ergo fidem antiquitus traditam dico atque fundatam; tu renuis, et cui relucteris, non respicis. Numquid huic eam a diabolo dicere poteris inspiratam? Numquid iste Manichaeus est? Numquid Marcion, Faustus, Adimantus? Non utique, sed longe his dissimilis, longeque contrarius. Pelagius certe dicat quis iste sit. Ille, ille est, cuius fidem, et purissimum in Scripturis sensum ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere. Quid est, Iuliane? Ubi te vides? Ille, cuius ne inimicus quidem reprehendere ausus est fidem, hanc habebat fidem, quam tu ita reprehendis, ut eam tribuas conciliis malignantium.
This faith, then, I call handed down and founded of old; you refuse it, and you do not see whom you are resisting. Will you be able to say it was inspired in him by the devil? Is this man a Manichean? Is he Marcion, Faustus, Adimantus? By no means, but far unlike these, and far contrary to them. Let Pelagius, surely, say who this man is. It is he, it is he, whose faith and most pure sense in the Scriptures not even an enemy dared to find fault with. What is this, Julian? Where do you see yourself? He, whose faith not even an enemy dared to reprove, held this faith which you so reprove that you ascribe it to councils of the malign.
Iulianum.1.59Ecce non est eorum, sed est Ambrosii; quia vera est, quia sana est, quia ut dixi, antiquitus tradita atque fundata est, haec et mea est. Non ergo hanc in Italiam (quod vos gemere dicitis) eructavi; sed potius ab isto episcopo Italiae hanc praedicante et docente lavacrum regenerationis accepi. Quoniam fides ista catholica est, et tamen tua non est; tu ergo ubi es? Vide, obsecro, et redi. Videre tibi expedit, non invidere; redire cupimus, non perire.
Behold, it is not theirs, but it is Ambrose's; because it is true, because it is sound, because, as I said, it is handed down and founded of old, this is also mine. I have not, then, belched this out into Italy (which you say you bewail), but rather I received the bath of rebirth from this bishop of Italy who proclaimed and taught it. Since this faith is catholic, and yet is not yours, where, then, are you? See, I beseech you, and return. It is to your advantage to see, not to envy; we desire that you return, not that you perish.
Iulianum.1.5960. IUL. Nihil est peccati in homine, si nihil est propriae voluntatis vel assensionis; hoc mihi hominum genus, quod vel leviter sapit, sine dubitatione consentit. Tu autem concedis nihil fuisse in parvulis propriae voluntatis; non ego, sed ratio concludit: nihil igitur in eis esse peccati. Nequaquam ergo propter hoc ad Ecclesiam deferuntur, ut infamentur, immo ut infament Deum: sed deferuntur, ut laudent Deum, quem et bonorum naturalium et donorum spiritalium protestantur auctorem.
60. JUL. There is no sin in a human being if there is nothing of his own will or assent; this the class of men that has even a little sense agrees with me without hesitation. But you grant that there was nothing of their own will in little ones; not I, but reason concludes: there is therefore no sin in them. By no means, then, are they brought to the Church for this purpose, to be defamed—nay, to defame God; but they are brought that they may praise God, whom they attest to be the author both of natural goods and of spiritual gifts.
Iulianum.1.60AUG. Non infamantur, cum exsufflantur, sed eruuntur de potestate tenebrarum; nec infamant Deum, sed quo creatore nati sunt, hoc indigent salvatore; et ideo renascendo, ex Adam transferuntur ad Christum.
AUG. They are not defamed when they are breathed upon, but rescued from the power of darkness; nor do they defame God, but by whatever Creator they are born, they need this Savior; and therefore by being reborn, they are transferred from Adam to Christ.
Iulianum.1.60Ubi autem dixisti: Nihil est peccati in homine, si nihil est propriae voluntatis, vel assensionis, plenius verum diceres, si adderes: Vel contagionis.
And where you said: There is no sin in a human being if there is nothing of his own will or assent, you would speak more fully the truth if you added: Or of contagion.
Iulianum.1.6061. IUL. Originale autem peccatum, si generatione primae nativitatis attrahitur, nuptias quidem a Deo institutas damnare potest, ceterum auferri a parvulis non potest; quoniam quod innascitur, usque ad finem eius, cui a principiorum causis inhaeserit, perseverat.
61. JUL. But original sin, if it is drawn by the generation of the first birth, can indeed condemn marriage as instituted by God, but cannot be taken away from little ones; since what is born in is permanent, even to the end of the one to whom it has clung from the causes of its beginnings.
Iulianum.1.61AUG. Nec nuptias damnat, quia non ipsae sunt causa eius; et aufertur ab Omnipotente illo, qui et homo nasci potuit sine illo.
AUG. It neither condemns marriage, because marriage is not its cause; and it is taken away by that Almighty who could also be born a man without it.
Iulianum.1.6162. IUL. Nullam itaque tibi calumniam commovemus, quasi damnes nuptias, et quasi hominem, qui ex illis nascitur, opus diaboli esse dicas; nec infideliter hoc obicimus, nec imperite colligimus; sed qui sit consequentium sententiarum effectus, sollicite et simpliciter intuemur. Numquam sunt enim sine commixtione nuptiae corporales. Tu dicis, quicumque ex illa commixtione nascuntur, ad diabolum pertinere; dubio procul pronuntias nuptias ad ius daemonis pertinere.
62. JUL. We stir up no slander against you, then, as though you condemn marriage, and as though you say that the human being who is born of it is the work of the devil; nor do we object this unfaithfully, nor conclude it unskillfully; but we attend carefully and simply to what is the effect of the consequent sentences. For carnal marriages are never without union. You say that all who are born of that union belong to the devil; beyond doubt you pronounce that marriage belongs to the right of the demon.
Iulianum.1.62AUG. Numquid nos dicimus, sine commixtione corporis nuptias in paradiso esse potuisse, si nemo peccasset? Sed non ibi esset malum, quo nunc bene utitur pudicitia coniugalis. Illud autem malum est a vulnere, quod diabolica inflixit astutia. Hinc rea tenetur propago mortalium; hinc est qui nascitur sub principe peccatorum, donec renascatur in Christo, qui nullum habuit omnino peccatum; a quo solo vinculum solvitur mortis, quia solus fuit liber in mortuis.
AUG. Do we say that marriage in paradise could have been without bodily union, if no one had sinned? But there would not be there the evil of which conjugal chastity now makes good use. That evil is from the wound which diabolical cunning inflicted. From this the offspring of mortals is held guilty; from this it is that one is born under the prince of sins, until he is reborn in Christ, who had no sin at all; by whom alone the bond of death is loosed, because he alone was free among the dead.
Iulianum.1.6263. IUL. Dicis trahi naturae conditione peccatum, qui vis hoc malum a voluntate primi hominis accidisse. Differo hic responsionem, qua convincendus es quod sine verecundia mentiaris. Sed quod ad praesentem locum spectat, colligo, et sapientiae ratiocinanti credo, quod naturam videlicet diabolicam sine ambiguitate definias. Nam si in ea vel per eam est, propter quod homo a diabolo possidetur; irrefutabiliter diaboli est, per quod Dei imaginem sibi potuit vindicare. Immo nec imago Dei est, quae per exortum suum in regno diaboli est.
63. JUL. You say that sin is drawn by the condition of nature, you who would have this evil to have happened from the will of the first man. I defer here the reply by which you must be convicted of lying without shame. But as for what pertains to the present point, I gather, and I believe the reasoning of wisdom, that you are without ambiguity defining nature to be diabolical. For if there is in it, or through it, that on account of which a man is possessed by the devil, then irrefutably it is the devil's, that through which he could claim for himself the image of God. Nay, it is not even the image of God, which through its origin is in the kingdom of the devil.
Iulianum.1.63AUG. Credis, sed opinanti stultitiae, non ratiocinanti sapientiae. Sine parvulos erui de potestate tenebrarum, ut Christi transferantur in regnum. Nam dicendo eos veteris delicti non habere contagium, et sic removendo a misericordia Salvatoris, qui salvum facit populum suum a peccatis eorum (Mt 1, 21), unde vocatus est Iesus; nihil agis, nisi ut ira Dei maneat super eos, de qua locutus est Iob, dicens: Homo natus ex muliere, brevis vitae, et plenus irae, et sicut flos feni decidit, fugit autem sicut umbra, et non stabit; nonne et huius curam fecisti, et hunc fecisti intrare in conspectu in iudicium? Quis enim erit mundus a sordibus? Ne unus quidem, etiamsi unius fuerit diei vita eius super terram (Iob 14, 1-5 (sec. LXX)).
AUG. You believe, but a believing folly, not a reasoning wisdom. Allow little ones to be rescued from the power of darkness, to be transferred into the kingdom of Christ. For by saying that they have no contagion of the ancient offense, and thus removing them from the mercy of the Savior who saves his people from their sins (Matt 1:21), whence he was called Jesus; you do nothing except cause the wrath of God to remain over them, of which Job spoke, saying: Man born of woman, of short life and full of wrath, falls like a flower and flees like a shadow, and shall not stand; and have you not made an account of him too, and made him to enter into judgment in your sight? For who shall be clean from filth? Not even one, even if his life upon earth has been of a single day (Job 14:1-5 (sec. LXX)).
Iulianum.1.63Sed videlicet, homo misericors, miseraris imaginem Dei, ne dicas eam sub peccato carnaliter nasci. O quam crudelis est ista vana misericordia tua, quae parvulis negat misericordiam Salvatoris sui; qui venit quaerere quod perierat (Lc 19, 10)! Per illas igitur sordes, sine quibus homo Dei dicit esse neminem, etsi unius diei sit vita eius super terram, sibi vindicat diabolus imaginem Dei, non per substantiam, quam creavit Deus. Vitiata est enim natura, non vitium est. Sed tu: Nec imago Dei est, inquis, quae per exortum suum in regno diaboli est. Quid, si tibi alius dicat: Non est imago Dei, quae nullo rea peccato, non tamen intrat in regnum Dei?
But you, of course, merciful man, pity the image of God, lest you say it is born carnally under sin. O how cruel is this empty mercy of yours, which denies to little ones the mercy of their own Savior, who came to seek what had perished (Luke 19:10)! Through that filth, then, without which the man of God says there is no one—even if his life upon earth be of a single day—the devil claims for himself the image of God, not through the substance which God created. For the nature is vitiated, not the vice. But you say: It is not the image of God, which through its origin is in the kingdom of the devil. What if another should say to you: It is not the image of God, which, guilty of no sin, yet does not enter the kingdom of God?
Iulianum.1.63Nonne, quid respondeas non habebis, si vana respondere nolueris? Et certe propterea est homo imago Dei, quia factus est ad similitudinem Dei (Cf. Gen 1, 26; 5, 1). Cur ergo et vanitati similis factus est, propter quod dies eius velut umbra praetereunt (Ps 143, 4)? Non enim ab hac vanitate separaturus es parvulos, cum dies eorum velut umbra praetereant. Postremo numquid eos et a viventibus separabis? Audi ergo eum qui dicit in Psalmo: Ecce veteres posuisti dies meos, et substantia mea tamquam nihil ante te; verumtamen universa vanitas, omnis homo vivens (Ps 38, 6). Cum ergo sit imago Dei omnis homo vivens, dic unde sit etiam vanitas omnis homo vivens. Sed quid dicturus es, qui non vis agnoscere, aliud horum esse ex conditione Dei, aliud accidisse ex conditione peccati? Permittite, quaesumus, ut homo vivens, qui ad Dei similitudinem factus est, eruatur a potestate tenebrarum, sub qua vanitati similis factus est; eruatur autem nunc interim a reatus obligatione; post hanc vero corruptibilem vitam, ab omni etiam vanitate.
Will you not be unable to answer, if you are unwilling to answer empty things? And certainly a man is the image of God for this reason, that he was made to the likeness of God (Cf. Gen 1:26; 5:1). Why, then, has he also been made like to vanity, on account of which his days pass away like a shadow (Ps 144:4 (143:4))? For you will not separate little ones from this vanity, since their days too pass away like a shadow. Finally, will you also separate them from the living? Hear, then, him who says in the Psalm: Behold, you have made my days old, and my substance is as nothing before you; nevertheless, all is vanity, every living man (Ps 39:5-6 (38:6)). Since, then, every living man is the image of God, say whence every living man is also vanity. But what will you say, who are unwilling to acknowledge that one of these is from the condition of God, the other has happened from the condition of sin? Permit, we beseech you, that the living man, who was made to the likeness of God, be rescued from the power of darkness, under which he has been made like to vanity; and let him be rescued now, for the time being, from the bond of guilt; but after this corruptible life, also from all vanity.
Iulianum.1.6364. IUL. Si igitur legas opus meum, desines mirari, cur ad verba tua, quae supra posueram, reverterim. Promiseram quippe me de scriptis tuis probaturum, quoniam tu inter impietatem quam biberas, et eius invidiam quam time s, pariter utrumque dixisses, et quod a Catholicis, et quod a Manichaeis asseri solet. Est itaque ibi talis ordo verborum admotus tuo capiti, quod nunc fronte sycophantae interpolatum fuisse mentitus es.
64. JUL. If, then, you read my work, you will cease to wonder why I have returned to your words, which I had set down above. For I had promised that I would prove from your writings that, between the impiety you had drunk in and the odium of it which you fear, you had stated both equally—both what is wont to be asserted by the catholics, and what by the Manicheans. There is, then, such an order of words applied to your chapter, which you have now, with the brow of a sycophant, lied to have been interpolated.
Iulianum.1.64Scio me magna pollicitum, id est, ut de adversarii sermonibus approbarem et eos, qui homines opus Dei negant, iure damnari, et istum ipsum, qui hoc confitetur, nihil aliud agere, quam ut peculium diaboli confirmet esse quidquid de nuptiarum fecunditate procedit.
I know I promised great things, that is, that I would approve from the adversary's discourses both that those who deny human beings to be the work of God are rightly condemned, and that this very man who confesses this does nothing else but confirm that whatever proceeds from the fecundity of marriage is the devil's property.
Iulianum.1.64Hoc enim genere, patrocinii sui quoque legibus, Manichaeorum opinio destruetur. Verum id tota libri eius exordia publicarunt. Ait enim opus esse divinum homines, qui ex nuptiis, id est, ex maribus nascuntur et feminis; qua sententia omne quod erat acturus evertit, nobisque assentitur dicentibus esse impios, qui haec audeant denegare.
For in this way, by the very laws of his own patronage, the opinion of the Manicheans will be destroyed. Indeed, the whole opening of his book made this public. For he says that human beings are a divine work, who are born of marriage, that is, of males and females; by which sentence he overturns all that he was about to do, and agrees with us who say that those are impious who dare to deny these things.
Iulianum.1.64Absoluta igitur iam una pars est: superest ut ostendam id eum, quod nuper impugnarat, astruere. Quibus dictis partem tui capitis retractavi, in qua dixeras: Eos, qui de tali commixtione nascuntur, dicimus trahere originale peccatum, eosque de parentibus qualibuscumque nascantur, non negamus adhuc esse sub diabolo, nisi renascantur in Christo, et per eius gratiam de potestate eruti tenebrarum, in regnum illius qui ex eadem sexus utriusque commixtione nasci noluit, transferantur (De nupt. et concup. 1, 1).
One part, then, is now finished: it remains that I show that he builds up what he had just attacked. With these things said, I have reviewed part of your chapter, in which you had said: Those who are born of such a union we say draw original sin, and those born of whatever sort of parents we do not deny are still under the devil, unless they are reborn in Christ, and through his grace, rescued from the power of darkness, are transferred into the kingdom of him who was unwilling to be born of the same union of both sexes (De nupt. et concup. 1, 1).
Iulianum.1.64Cur ergo putes hinc te excusari posse ab errore Manichaeorum, quia ausus es sententiam, cum qua omnibus ingenii tui viribus luctabaris, inserere; cum hoc non patrocinium erroris tui, sed testimonium sit stultitiae singularis, qui putas Calliphontis more virtutem et vitia, iustitiam et iniquitatem oratione tua posse in foedera convenire? Quod autem ait Apostolus: Qui eruit nos de potestate tenebrarum, et transtulit in regnum Filii dilectionis suae (Col 1, 13); lege quartum operis mei librum, et tunc tibi quid Magister Gentium senserit, innotescet.
Why, then, do you think you can be excused from the error of the Manicheans, because you dared to insert a sentence with which you wrestled with all the strength of your talent; when this is not a patronage of your error, but a testimony of singular folly—you who think that, in the manner of Calliphon, virtue and vices, justice and iniquity, can be brought into a treaty by your oratory? But as for what the Apostle says: Who rescued us from the power of darkness, and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love (Col 1:13); read the fourth book of my work, and then it will be made known to you what the Teacher of the gentiles meant.
Iulianum.1.64AUG. Sexto nostro responsum est quarto tuo, et nunc ego magis admoneo ut illa tua et mea legant, qui volunt scire quantum ibi fueris a veritate devius, et quanta sis veritate convictus. De hac autem chartula, in qua ex tuis libris quaedam decerpta conscripta sunt, liberum tibi est mihi imputare quod ille fecit, qui eam misit homini, a quo missa est mihi. Ille quippe quod voluit, in ea posuit ex opere tuo, et quod voluit praetermisit; unde tibi iam supra breviter satisque respondi. Quid te obscuris tuis adversus Apostoli manifesta conaris involvere? Ille Deum praedicans ait: Qui eruit nos de potestate tenebrarum, et transtulit in regnum Filii caritatis suae (Ibidem); et tu dicis hoc ab illo, exceptis parvulis, dictum. Si ergo non eruuntur parvuli de potestate tenebrarum, non sunt mortui; si non sunt mortui, non pro eis mortuus est Christus; tu autem etiam pro ipsis Christum mortuum confiteris; et idem Apostolus dicit: Unus pro omnibus mortuus est; ergo omnes mortui sunt (2 Cor 5, 14).
AUG. My sixth book answered your fourth, and now I rather urge that those of yours and mine be read by those who wish to know how far you wandered there from the truth, and by how great a truth you are convicted. But about this sheet, in which certain things excerpted from your books are written down, you are free to impute to me what that man did who sent it to the man by whom it was sent to me. For he set down in it what he wished from your work, and passed over what he wished; on which I have already answered you above, briefly and sufficiently. Why do you try to wrap your obscurities around the plain things of the Apostle? He, proclaiming God, says: Who rescued us from the power of darkness, and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love (Ibidem); and you say this was said by him with little ones excepted. If, then, little ones are not rescued from the power of darkness, they are not dead; if they are not dead, Christ did not die for them; but you confess that Christ died even for them; and the same Apostle says: One died for all; therefore all died (2 Cor 5:14).
Iulianum.1.64Conclusio haec Apostoli invicta est; ac per hoc quia et pro parvulis mortuus est, profecto etiam parvuli mortui sunt. Mortuus est porro Christus, ut evacuaret eum qui potestatem habebat mortis, id est, diabolum (Hebr 2, 14). Sine igitur parvulos, ut vivant, de potestate erui tenebrarum. Quid est autem, quod mihi Calliphontis morem obicis, vel errorem, in eo quod me putare dicis virtutem et vitia, iustitiam et iniquitatem oratione mea posse in foedera convenire?
This conclusion of the Apostle is unconquered; and by this, because he died also for little ones, assuredly little ones too died. Moreover, Christ died to destroy him who had the power of death, that is, the devil (Heb 2:14). Allow, then, little ones to be rescued from the power of darkness, that they may live. But what is it that you throw in my face the manner, or the error, of Calliphon—in that you say I think virtue and vices, justice and iniquity, can be brought into a treaty by my oratory?
Iulianum.1.64Ego quidem absit ut hoc vel corde teneam, vel sermone suadeam; sed tam bene te intellexisse istum philosophum gratulor (Cf. CICERO, De fin. 2, 11, 34; 5, 25, 73; LACT., De falsa sap. 3, 7). Etenim cum ille putaverit in virtute animi et in voluptate corporis esse hominis bonum; tu eum dicis virtutes et vitia voluisse coniungere; ac per hoc, sicut decuit, vitium iudicasti esse corporalis appetentiam voluptatis; vitium est igitur libido, quam laudas. Subrepsit itaque undecumque tuis sensibus veritas, ut susceptae tuae causam paululum deserens, quod dicimus diceres.
Far be it from me to hold this in my heart, or to urge it in speech; but I congratulate you on having understood this philosopher so well (Cf. CICERO, De fin. 2, 11, 34; 5, 25, 73; LACT., De falsa sap. 3, 7). For since he thought the good of man to lie in the virtue of the mind and the pleasure of the body, you say that he wished to join virtues and vices; and by this, as was fitting, you judged the appetite for bodily pleasure to be a vice; lust, then, which you praise, is a vice. Thus the truth crept into your thoughts from somewhere, so that, abandoning the case you had undertaken a little, you said what we say.
Iulianum.1.6465. IUL. Argui ergo, et iure argui, deiectam et debilem varietatem, qua fuerat effectum ut et nuptias te non damnare praemitteres, et diceres, ob viri et feminae commixtionem, quam de nuptiarum conditione et natura venire perspicuum est, immo in qua sola (quantum ad conflictum nostrum respicit) nuptiarum veritas est, homines in diaboli iura transcribi.
65. JUL. I have therefore been reproved—and rightly reproved—for a downcast and feeble inconsistency, by which it came about that you both prefaced that you do not condemn marriage, and said that, on account of the union of man and woman—which it is plain comes from the condition and nature of marriage, nay, in which alone (so far as concerns our dispute) the truth of marriage lies—human beings are transcribed into the right of the devil.
Iulianum.1.65AUG. Si in sola viri et feminae commixtione est veritas nuptiarum; eadem ergo est veritas adulteriorum quae nuptiarum, quia in utrisque est ista sexus utriusque commixtio. Quod si absurdissimum est; non in sola, ut deliras, commixtione maris et feminae nuptiarum veritas est, quamvis sine illa nuptiae filios propagare non possint; sed alia sunt ad nuptias proprie pertinentia, quibus ab adulteriis nuptiae discernuntur, sicut est thori coniugalis fides, et cura ordinate filios procreandi et, quae maxima differentia est, bonus usus mali, hoc est, bonus usus concupiscentiae carnis, quo malo adulteri utuntur male.
AUG. If the truth of marriage is in the union of man and woman alone, then the truth of adulteries is the same as that of marriages, because in both there is this union of both sexes. But if this is most absurd, then the truth of marriage is not in the union of male and female alone, as you rave—although without it marriages cannot propagate children; but there are other things properly belonging to marriage, by which marriages are distinguished from adulteries, such as the fidelity of the conjugal bed, the care to procreate children in an orderly way, and—what is the greatest difference—the good use of an evil, that is, the good use of the concupiscence of the flesh, of which evil adulterers make evil use.
Iulianum.1.6566. IUL. Quam commixtionem ita exsecrabilem persuadere conatus es, ut velis intellegi Christum, non propter signi splendorem, sed propter damnandam sexuum coniunctionem nasci de virgine matre voluisse. Quid ergo umquam a quoquam dici improbius aut impudentius potuit, quam hoc, quod duos velut reges de humanitatis possessione certantes his signis, et duo eorum regna separasti, ut diceres, dia li esse quidquid nuptiae protulissent, Dei vero solum quod Virgo peperisset? Quid est aliud, Virginis fecundatorem et egentissimum ostendere inopia portionis suae, et eumdem negare eorum qui prodeunt de nuptiis hominum conditorem? Teneat igitur verbi tui lector diligens chirographum, sciatque te, discipulum fidelem Manichaeorum et Traducianae nationis primatem, nihil aliud quam commixtionem legitimi damnasse coniugii.
66. JUL. This union you have tried to persuade us is so execrable that you would have it understood that Christ willed to be born of a virgin mother not on account of the splendor of the sign, but on account of the union of the sexes to be condemned. What, then, could ever have been said by anyone more wickedly or more impudently than this—that, with these signs you have set up two kings, as it were, contending for the possession of humanity, and their two kingdoms—so that you said that whatever marriage brought forth was the devil's, but God's alone what the Virgin bore? What else is this than to show the one who made the Virgin fruitful to be most needy through the lack of his own portion, and to deny the same to be the Creator of those who come forth from the marriages of human beings? Let the careful reader, then, hold the handwriting of your word, and know that you—a faithful disciple of the Manicheans and chief of the Traducian nation—have condemned nothing other than the union of lawful wedlock.
Iulianum.1.66AUG. Non habes exercitatos sensus ad separandum bonum a malo. Et hominum et Angelorum natura atque substantia vel bonorum vel malorum Deo creatore subsistit; sed vitia naturarum atque substantiarum, quae Manichaei naturas dicunt esse atque substantias, veritas autem negat, Deus iustus atque omnipotens ordinatione iudiciaria esse permittit; et ipsa sunt mala, quae nisi ex bonis et in bonis naturis inesse non possunt.
AUG. You do not have senses exercised to separate good from evil. Both the nature and substance of human beings and of angels, whether good or evil, subsists with God as Creator; but the vices of natures and substances—which the Manicheans say are natures and substances, but the truth denies—the just and almighty God permits to exist by a judicial ordering; and these are themselves evils, which can be only in good and from good natures.
Iulianum.1.66Sic sunt autem in diaboli potestate quaecumque illi, Deo iudicante, subduntur, ut a Dei potestate, sub qua et ipse diabolus constitutus est, aliena esse non possint. Cum igitur omnes Angeli et omnes homines sub Dei sint potestate, inanis est loquacitas tua, qua dicis Deum et diabolum divisisse inter se, quis eorum quos habeat sub propria potestate. In quem vero crudo pectore evomas istas, quibus pasceris, contumelias, paulisper attende.
But whatever things, by God's judging, are subjected to the devil, are so in the power of the devil that they cannot be foreign to the power of God, under which the devil himself too has been placed. Since, then, all angels and all human beings are under the power of God, empty is your loquacity, by which you say that God and the devil have divided between themselves which of them should have under his own power those whom each has. But upon whom, with raw breast, you vomit these insults on which you feed, attend a little.
Iulianum.1.66En adest ille Ambrosius; de hoc in quod inveheris, quid dicat vide: Quomodosolus, inquit, potuit iustus esse, cum generatio omnis erraret, nisi natus ex Virgine generationis obnoxiae privilegio minime teneretur? (AMBROSIUS, De Arca Noe 3, 7) Audi adhuc, audi, et protervam linguam frontis elisione compesce: Non enim virilis coitus, inquit, vulvae virginalis secreta reseravit; sed immaculatum semen inviolabili utero Spiritus Sanctus infudit; solus enim per omnia ex natis de femina sanctus Dominus Iesus, qui terrenae contagia corruptelae, immaculati partus novitate non senserit, et caelesti maiestate depulerit (AMBROSIUS, Lib II in Lc 2, 23. 56). Cernis nempe, quod dico, quis dixerit? Cernis, quidquid contra me dicis, contra quem dicas? Si enim ego hinc sum discipulus Manichaei, hoc est et ille. Non est autem hoc ille, qui haec ante nos dixit. Non est hoc igitur, quisquis haec dicit; sed haereticus manifestus est, quisquis huic antiquo catholico dogmati contradicit.
Behold, here is Ambrose; concerning this matter against which you inveigh, see what he says: How could he alone be just, he says, when all generation was erring, unless, born of a Virgin, he was not held by the privilege of a liable generation? (AMBROSIUS, De Arca Noe 3, 7) Hear yet more, hear, and curb your insolent tongue by the striking of your brow: For no virile intercourse, he says, unlocked the secret places of the virginal womb; but the Holy Spirit poured immaculate seed into the inviolable womb; for alone among all those born of woman is the holy Lord Jesus, who did not feel the contagions of earthly corruption, by the newness of his immaculate birth, and drove them off by his heavenly majesty (AMBROSIUS, Lib II in Lc 2, 23. 56). You see, surely, what I say, who said it? You see, whatever you say against me, against whom you say it? For if I am hence a disciple of the Manichean, so too is he. But this man is not, who said these things before us. Therefore neither is he, whoever says these things; but he is a manifest heretic, whoever contradicts this ancient catholic doctrine.
Iulianum.1.6667. IUL. Sed iam pergamus ad cetera. De me itaque scribens, post illa quae supra texui verba tua, haec quae sequuntur adiungis: Post haec illud nostrum posuit, ubi diximus: Haec enim quae ab impudentibus impudenter laudatur, pudenda concupiscentia, nulla esset, nisi homo ante peccasset; nuptiae vero essent, etiamsi nemo peccasset; fieret quippe sine isto morbo seminatio filiorum.
67. JUL. But let us now proceed to the rest. Writing of me, then, after those words of yours which I wove above, you add these that follow: After these things he set down that statement of ours, where we said: For this desire to be ashamed of—which is praised shamelessly by the shameless—would not exist, had man not first sinned; but marriage would exist, even if no one had sinned; for the sowing of children would take place without this disease.
Iulianum.1.67Huc usque illeverba mea posuit. Timuit enim quod adiunxi: Potestin corpore vitae illius, sine quo nunc fieri non potest in corpore mortis huius. Et hic ut meam sententiam non finiret, sed eam quodam modo detruncaret, illud Apostoli testimonium formidavit, ubi ait: "ser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum " (Rom 7, 24-25). Non enim erat corpus mortis huius in paradiso ante peccatum, propter quod diximus: In corpore vitae illius, quae ibi erat, sine isto morbo seminationem fieri potuisse filiorum, sine quo in corpore mortis huius fieri non potest (DE NUPT. ET CONCUP. 2, 6).
Thus far he set down my words. For he feared what I added: It could be done in the body of that life, without which it now cannot be done in the body of this death. And here, so as not to finish my sentence, but in a manner to cut it short, he dreaded that testimony of the Apostle where he says: "wretched man that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord" (Rom 7:24-25). For there was no body of this death in paradise before sin, on which account we said: In the body of that life, which was there, the sowing of children could be done without this disease, without which it cannot be done in the body of this death (DE NUPT. ET CONCUP. 2, 6).
Iulianum.1.67Tenes tu quidem consuetudinem tuam, equidem in hoc potissimum opere consequenter, ut qui contra veritatem agis, nihil verum loquaris; sed numerosis eruditionis tuae peccatis correptionum multitudo vix sufficit. Ideo hic iam breviter annotabo, te fallere; me autem, vel post hoc opus intelleges, insolentem esse mendacii. Tibi ergo huius vitii vindica totam possessionem, ut ab Evangelio, nec sane iniuria audire possis, quia ab initio mendax es, sicut et pater tuus (Cf. Io 8, 44), vel ille ad cuius te dicis dominium pertinuisse nascentem, vel alter secundarius, qui te elegantibus, quae tamen inter honestos nominari non queant, imbuit sacramentis. Totum ergo hoc protuli in opere meo priore, quod tu praetermissum esse confingis; quod quanta sit disputationis veritate ac luce convictum, si prope ultimas primi voluminis mei partes legas, etiam ipse poteris confiteri. Non ergo tua detruncata sententia, sed integra valenti est responsione destructa. Nunc autem audi breviter Apostolus hoc quod ait: Miser ergo homo, quis meliberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum; non ad mortalitatem nostri corporis rettulit, quam caro animalium de naturae institutione suscepit, sed ad consuetudinem delinquendi;
You hold to your custom, indeed, in this work above all consistently—that you, who act against the truth, speak nothing true; but for the numerous sins of your erudition a multitude of corrections scarcely suffices. So here I will now note briefly that you deceive; but me—you will understand, even after this work—to be unaccustomed to lying. Claim, then, for yourself the whole possession of this vice, so that you may, and not undeservedly, hear from the Gospel that you are a liar from the beginning, like your father (Cf. John 8:44)—whether the one to whose dominion you say you belonged when you were born, or the other, the secondary one, who imbued you with elegant sacraments, which yet cannot be named among the honorable. This whole thing, then, I set forth in my earlier work, which you pretend was passed over; and by how great a truth and light of disputation it was refuted, you yourself will be able to confess, if you read the nearly final parts of my first volume. Your sentence, then, was destroyed not cut short, but whole, by a strong reply. But now hear briefly that this which the Apostle says: Wretched man that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord; he referred not to the mortality of our body, which the flesh of animals received from the institution of nature, but to the habit of offending;
Iulianum.1.67a quo reatu post incarnationem Christi, per Testamentum Novum, quisquis ad virtutis studia migraverit, liberatur. Ibi ergo sub persona Iudaeorum loquens, illecebrarum cupiditate etiam post interdictum sacrae legis errantium, ostendit unicum esse in illa tempestate subsidium, si crederent Christo;
from which guilt, after the incarnation of Christ, through the New Testament, whoever migrates to the pursuits of virtue is freed. There, then, speaking under the person of the Jews—who, even after the prohibition of the sacred law, were erring through the desire of enticements—he shows that there was a single help in that season: if they should believe in Christ;
Iulianum.1.67qui sic indicebat cautiones de futuris, ut veniam condonaret peractis; nec insistebat reis in tentatione supplicii, sed currentes liberalissimo gremio confovebat; non exanimans terrore depressos, sed reparans benignitate correctos.
who so enjoined cautions about future things that he pardoned what was done; nor did he press upon the guilty in the temptation of punishment, but cherished those running with a most liberal bosom; not dispiriting the depressed by terror, but restoring the corrected by kindness.
Iulianum.1.67Quam benignitatem ipse iam senserat, qui dicebat: Humanus sermo, quoniam Christus Iesus venit in hunc mundum peccatores salvos facere, quorum primus sum ego; sed ideo misericordiam consecutus sum, ut in me ostenderet Christus Iesus omnem patientiam, ad exemplum eorum, qui credituri sunt illi in vitam aeternam (1 Tim 1, 15-16).
This kindness he had already felt who said: It is a human saying, that Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners, of whom I am the first; but for this reason I obtained mercy, that in me Christ Jesus might show all patience, as an example to those who are to believe in him unto eternal life (1 Tim 1:15-16).
Iulianum.1.67Quod ut intellegeres ad vitam malam, non ad naturam hominum pertinere; ne per adventus Christi causam, putares ab eo etiam parvulos peccatores pronuntiatos, ait: In me ostendit omnem patientiam. Patientia autem Dei illa est, de qua ad Romanos loquitur: An ignoras quoniam bonitas Dei ad paenitentiam te adducit? Sendum autem duritiam tuam et cor impaenitens thesaurizas tibi iram in die irae (Rom 2, 4-5). Exercetur ergo patientia Dei, cum non exiguo tempore exspectatur humana conversio. In parvulis autem non potest apparere patientia. Si enim essent peccata naturae, quae eis Salvator adscriberet; patiens quidem falso, saevus vero certissime diceretur. Non potest autem Deus nisi pius et iustus esse, quod est Deus meus Iesus Christus; cuius patientiam, vel Paulus diu persecutor, vel alii sub quorum persona loquitur, experti sunt; quia diu exspectati sunt, licet sero liberati.
That you might understand this to belong to an evil life, not to the nature of human beings—lest, on account of the cause of Christ's coming, you should think that even little ones were pronounced sinners by him—he says: In me he showed all patience. But the patience of God is that of which he speaks to the Romans: Or do you not know that the goodness of God leads you to repentance? But according to your hardness and impenitent heart, you store up for yourself wrath on the day of wrath (Rom 2:4-5). The patience of God, then, is exercised when human conversion is awaited for no small time. But in little ones patience cannot appear. For if there were sins of nature, which the Savior ascribed to them; he would indeed be called patient falsely, but most certainly savage. But God cannot be anything except pious and just, which is my God Jesus Christ; whose patience either Paul, long a persecutor, or others under whose person he speaks, experienced; because they were long awaited, though freed late.
Iulianum.1.67Ac per hoc ab Apostolo vita hominum, non natura damnatur. Commendans ergo hanc gratiam Iudaeis, quia lex punit scelestos, nec habet illam efficientiam misericordiae, quam Baptisma, in quo confessione brevi actuum delicta purgantur, ostendit debere illos currere ad Christum, implorare opem huius indulgentiae; et advertere quod lex morum vulneribus comminetur, gratia vero efficaciter celeriterque medeatur. Corpus itaque mortis, peccata dixit esse, non carnem; nam si de membrorum miseria pronuntiasset, quam peccato aestimas contigisse, rectius mortem corporis, quam corpus mortis vocasset. Verum ut scias, secundum consuetudinem Scripturarum peccata membra dici; lege ad Colossenses, ubi ipse Apostolus ait: Mortificate membra vestra, quae sunt super terram; fornicationem, immunditiam et avaritiam, quae est simulacrorum servitus; propter quae venit ira Dei in filios incredulitatis, in quibus et vos aliquando ambulastis, cum viveretis in illis (Col 3, 5-7).
And by this the life of human beings, not their nature, is condemned by the Apostle. Commending, then, this grace to the Jews—because the law punishes the wicked, and does not have that efficacy of mercy which Baptism has, in which, by a brief confession, the offenses of deeds are purified—he shows that they ought to run to Christ, to implore the help of this indulgence; and to notice that the law threatens the wounds of morals, but grace heals efficaciously and quickly. The body of death, then, he said sins are, not the flesh; for if he had pronounced concerning the misery of the members, which you judge happened by sin, he would more rightly have called it the death of the body than the body of death. But that you may know that, according to the custom of the Scriptures, sins are called members, read to the Colossians, where the Apostle himself says: Mortify your members which are upon the earth: fornication, uncleanness, and avarice, which is the service of idols; on account of which the wrath of God comes upon the children of unbelief, among whom you too once walked, when you lived in them (Col 3:5-7).
Iulianum.1.67Ecce quomodo membra appellat, quae peccata pronuntiat. Corpus autem peccati hic ipsum ad Romanos: Vetus homo noster, inquit, simul confixus est cruci, ut destruatur corpus peccati, ut ultra non serviamus peccato (Rom 6, 6). Hoc itaque more et hic exclamavit sub persona, ut diximus, Iudaeorum: Miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? (Rom 7, 24) id est: Quis me liberabit a reatu peccatorum meorum, quae commisi, cum vitare potuissem? Quae legis severitas non donat, sed ulciscitur? Quis me ab his membris, id est a vitiis, quae improborum imitatione collegi, ut peccati plenum corpus exstruerem, poterit vindicare? Quis, inquam?
See how he calls members what he pronounces to be sins. But the body of sin—here he himself, to the Romans: Our old man, he says, was crucified together with him, that the body of sin might be destroyed, that we might no longer serve sin (Rom 6:6). In this manner, then, here too he exclaimed under the person, as we said, of the Jews: Wretched man that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? (Rom 7:24) That is: Who will free me from the guilt of my sins, which I committed when I could have avoided them? Which the severity of the law does not pardon, but avenges? Who will be able to vindicate me from these members, that is, from the vices which I gathered by the imitation of the wicked, so that I built up a body full of sin? Who, I say?
Iulianum.1.67Et respondit, quasi rerum ipsarum voce commonitus: Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Rom 7, 25). Gratia Dei, quae acceptam fert iustitiam fidelium sine operibus, secundum quod David dicit: Beati quorum remissae sunt iniquitates, et quorum tecta sunt peccata; beatus vir cui non imputavit Dominus peccatum (Ps 31, 1-2). Qui ergo facit hominem beatum, etiam ipse beatus est, iustitia sempiterna, per quam non donat peccatum, nisi quod iure potuit imputare. Non autem iure potuit imputare, si non illud cui imputatur, potuit et cavere. Nemo autem potest cavere naturalia. Igitur nullus prorsus habere potest de naturae necessitate peccatum. Haec breviter dixisse sufficiat.
And he answered, as though admonished by the voice of the very things: The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 7:25). The grace of God, which brings the imputed justice of the faithful without works, according to what David says: Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered; blessed is the man to whom the Lord has not imputed sin (Ps 32:1-2 (31:1-2)). He, then, who makes a man blessed, is himself also blessed, eternal justice, through which he does not pardon sin except what he could by right have imputed. But he could not by right impute it, if the one to whom it is imputed could not also have guarded against it. But no one can guard against natural things. Therefore no one at all can have sin from the necessity of nature. Let it suffice to have said these things briefly.
Iulianum.1.67AUG. Conatus es quidem quod ait Apostolus: Quisme liberabit de corpore mortis huius? in sensum vestrum disputando convertere; sed hoc te non posse, ille melius vidit, qui viro illustri chartulam misit; et ideo verba mea commemorans id praetermisit, ne tua rideretur exspectata et prolata responsio.
AUG. You tried indeed, by disputing, to turn what the Apostle says: Who will free me from the body of this death? into your sense; but that you could not do this, that man saw better who sent the sheet to the illustrious man; and therefore, recalling my words, he passed this over, lest your awaited and produced reply be laughed at.
Iulianum.1.67Quis enim non rideat quod nescio utrum vobis persuadere potueritis, et tamen aliis persuadendum putastis, Iudaei Apostolum induxisse personam, nondum sub Christi gratia constituti, atque dicentis: Miser ego homo, quis me liberabitde corpore mortis huius? Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Rom 7, 24-25). Itane vero Iudaeus, nondumque Christianus est, qui dicit: Dei gratia me liberabit per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum? Verum hoc omitto; illud autem quis ferat, de praeteritis suis peccatis putare hominem dicere: Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? ut ei per ignoscentis Christi gratiam remittantur; cum dilucide appareat, unde ad ista verba pervenerit? Ecce verba eius sunt in auribus nostris; videamus ergo, utrum ex eo quod egit volens, an ex eo quod agit nolens, miserum se esse fateatur.
For who would not laugh at what—I know not whether you could persuade yourselves of it, and yet thought ought to be persuaded to others—that the Apostle introduced the person of a Jew, not yet established under the grace of Christ, and saying: Wretched man that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 7:24-25). Is he, then, really a Jew, and not yet a Christian, who says: The grace of God will free me through Jesus Christ our Lord? But this I omit; but who would bear that a man should be thought to say of his past sins: Who will free me from the body of this death? that they might be remitted to him through the grace of the pardoning Christ; when it appears clearly whence he came to these words? Behold his words are in our ears; let us see, then, whether from what he did willingly, or from what he does unwillingly, he confesses himself to be wretched.
Iulianum.1.67Clamat homo: Non quod volo, ago; sed quod odi, illud facio (Rom 7, 15). Clamat: Iam non ego operor illud, sed id quod habitat in me peccatum. Scio enim quia non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum; velle enim adiacet mihi; perficere autem bonum, non invenio. Non enim quod volo, facio bonum; se quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 17-19).
The man cries out: It is not what I will that I do, but what I hate, that I do (Rom 7:15). He cries out: Now it is no longer I that work it, but the sin that dwells in me. For I know that there does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh, what is good; for to will is present to me, but to accomplish the good I do not find. For it is not the good I will that I do, but the evil I do not will, this I do (Rom 7:17-19).
Iulianum.1.67Non ait: Feci, sed: facio; non ait: Operatus sum, sed: operor; non ait: Egi, sed: ago; et hoc: Non quod volo, sed: quod nolo. Postremo, condelectatur legi Dei secundum interiorem hominem; videt autem aliam legem in membris suis, repugnantem legi mentis suae; qua lege utique compellitur, non quod vult, facere bonum, sed quod non vult malum, hoc agere. Propter hoc exclamat: Miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? (Rom 7, 24) Et tu contra clarissimam veritatem oculos claudis, gemitumque eius exponis, non ut omnibus patet, sed ut tibi placet, dicens: Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? hoc est: Quis me liberabit a reatu peccatorum meorum quae commisi? Ille dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago; et tu dicis: Quae commisi.
He does not say: I did, but: I do; he does not say: I worked, but: I work; he does not say: I acted, but: I act; and this: not what I will, but: what I do not will. Finally, he delights in the law of God according to the inner man; but he sees another law in his members, fighting against the law of his mind; by which law indeed he is compelled not to do the good he wills, but to do the evil he does not will. On account of this he exclaims: Wretched man that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? (Rom 7:24) And you, against the most clear truth, close your eyes, and expound his groan not as it is plain to all, but as it pleases you, saying: Who will free me from the body of this death? that is: Who will free me from the guilt of my sins which I committed? He says: The evil I do not will, this I do; and you say: which I committed.
Iulianum.1.67Usque adeone desperas de hominibus qui haec legunt, ut non ipsum malint audire quam te, et ipsi potius quam tibi credere? Sine hominem gratiam Dei, non solum quia peccavit, ut absolvatur, verum etiam ne peccet, ut adiuvetur, exposcere: quod isto loco agitur. Qui enim dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago, non est locus ut dicat: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, sed: Ne nos inferas in tentationem (Mt 6, 12-13).
Do you so despair of the men who read these things that they should not prefer to hear him rather than you, and to believe him rather than you? Allow a man to ask for the grace of God, not only because he has sinned, that he may be absolved, but also that he may not sin, that he may be helped: which is what is at issue in this place. For he who says: The evil I do not will, this I do, has no occasion to say: Forgive us our debts, but: Lead us not into temptation (Matt 6:12-13).
Iulianum.1.67Unusquisque autem tentatur, sicut ait apostolus Iacobus, a concupiscentia sua attractuset illectus (Iac 1, 14). Hoc malum est de quo ait: Scio quia non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum (Rom 7, 18). Hoc malum est in corpo mortis huius. Hoc malum non fuit in paradiso ante peccatum; quia nondum erat haec caro corpus mortis huius; cui dicetur in fine: Ubi est, mors, contentio tua? (Cf. 1 Cor 15, 54-55) Sed tunc dicetur, cum corruptibile hoc induerit incorruptionem, et mortale hoc induerit immortalitatem (1 Cor 15, 53-54); nunc autem corpus est mortis; quia idem ipse dixit Apostolus: Corpus mortuum est propter peccatum (Rom 8, 10). Audi catholicos intellectores Apostoli; accipe eorum verba, non mea, cum quibus accipio convicia tua; audi non Pelagium, sed Ambrosium. Etiam Pauli caro, inquit, corpus mortis erat, sicut ipse ait: "Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?" (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13; Rom 7, 24).
But each one is tempted, as the apostle James says, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence (Jas 1:14). This is the evil of which he says: I know that there does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh, what is good (Rom 7:18). This is the evil in the body of this death. This evil was not in paradise before sin; because this flesh was not yet the body of this death; to which it will be said in the end: Where, O death, is your striving? (Cf. 1 Cor 15:54-55) But it will then be said, when this corruptible has put on incorruption, and this mortal has put on immortality (1 Cor 15:53-54); but now it is a body of death; because the same Apostle said: The body is dead on account of sin (Rom 8:10). Hear the catholic understanders of the Apostle; take their words, not mine, with whom I take your insults; hear not Pelagius, but Ambrose. Even Paul's flesh, he says, was a body of death, as he himself says: "who will free me from the body of this death?" (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13; Rom 7, 24).
Iulianum.1.67Audi non Caelestium, sed Gregorium: Intra nosmetipsos, inquit, propriis vitiis ac passionibus impugnamur, et die noctuque ignitis stimulis corporis humilitatis huius et corporis mortis urgemur, nunc latenter, nunc etiam palam, provocantibus ubique et irritantibus rerum visibilium illecebris, luto hoc faecis, cui inhaesimus, caeni sui fetorem venis capacioribus exhalante; sed et lege peccati, quae est in membris nostris, legi spiritus repugnante (GREGORIUS NAZ., Orat. I de fuga sua 2, 9). His tu luminibus caelestis civitatis oblatrans: Corpus mortis, inquis, peccata dixit esse, non carnem; negans Apostolum hoc ad mortalitatem nostri corporis retulisse: Quam caro, inquis, animalium de naturae institutione suscepit.
Hear not Celestius, but Gregory: Within ourselves, he says, we are assailed by our own vices and passions, and day and night we are pressed by the fiery goads of this lowly body and of the body of death, now secretly, now even openly, with the enticements of visible things everywhere provoking and irritating us; this clay of dregs, to which we have clung, exhaling the stench of its mire through the more capacious veins; but also with the law of sin, which is in our members, resisting the law of the spirit (GREGORIUS NAZ., Orat. I de fuga sua 2, 9). Barking at these lights of the heavenly city, you say: The body of death he called sins, not the flesh; denying that the Apostle referred this to the mortality of our body: Which, you say, the flesh of animals received from the institution of nature.
Iulianum.1.67Hoc enim sapis, quod Pelagius in iudicio Palaestino ficto corde damnavit, Adam scilicet mortalem factum, ita ut sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset. Ac sic resistens his viris, et aliis eorum sociis fidei sanae, tot tantisque doctoribus, cogeris implere paradisum, etiamsi nemo peccasset, dolore parturientium, labore nascentium, gemitibus languentium, funeribus morientium, maerore lugentium. Quid igitur mirum, si et de isto paradiso, quod est Ecclesia, foras istis; qui paradisum illum, de quo foras ierunt, qui nos in istas miserias peccando miserunt, talem facitis, qualem non dico Christianorum nullus, sed nec hominum quisquam suspicari audet, si non sit insanus?
For you have a taste for this, which Pelagius, with a feigned heart, condemned in the Palestinian trial—namely, that Adam was made mortal, so that whether he sinned or did not sin, he would die. And so, resisting these men, and others their companions in sound faith, so many and so great teachers, you are compelled to fill paradise, even if no one had sinned, with the pain of those giving birth, the labor of those being born, the groans of the sick, the funerals of the dying, the mourning of those lamenting. What wonder, then, if you are also outside this paradise, which is the Church, you who make that paradise—out of which they went who, by sinning, sent us into these miseries—such as I say no Christian, nay no human being at all, dares to suspect, unless he is insane?
Iulianum.1.6768. IUL. In primo enim opere latius disputata sunt. Quamvis nec tu dilucide loquaris, quam mortem intellegi velis, cuius corpus dicis in paradiso non fuisse ante peccatum; quia in libris, quos ad Marcellini nomen edidisti, mortalem Adam factum fuisse professus es (Cf. De pecc. mer. et rem. 1, 3-4). Quod vero adiungis morbum esse negotium nuptiarum, leniter audiri potest, si hoc solum de tuis parentibus dicas. Conscius enim forte esse potes matris tuae morbi alicuius occulti, quam in libris Confessionis, ut ipso verbo utar, meribibulam vocatam esse signasti (Cf. Confess. 9, 18). Ceterum in sanctorum connubio, et in omnium honestorum, nullus omnino morbus est. Quia nec Apostolus morbum pro remedio concessit, cum per reverentiam nuptia m a morbo fornicationis, Ecclesiae homines muniebat; qui sensus quomodo et frontem tuam et dogma penitus eraserit, primi voluminis mei prope ultima parte monstratur; quod et in toto ipsius responsionis corpore, prout locorum opportunitas attulit, explicatum est.
68. JUL. For in my first work these things have been disputed more broadly. Although you do not even speak clearly which death you wish to be understood, whose body you say was not in paradise before sin; for in the books which you published in the name of Marcellinus, you professed that Adam was made mortal (Cf. De pecc. mer. et rem. 1, 3-4). But as for your addition that the business of marriage is a disease, it can be heard mildly, if you say this only of your own parents. For perhaps you can be aware of some hidden disease of your mother, whom in the books of your Confessions—to use the very word—you noted to have been called a tippler (Cf. Confess. 9, 18). But in the wedlock of the saints, and of all the honorable, there is no disease at all. For the Apostle did not concede a disease for a remedy, when, through reverence for marriage, he fortified the men of the Church against the disease of fornication; and how this sense has utterly erased both your brow and your doctrine is shown in the nearly final part of my first volume; which has also been explained throughout the whole body of that reply, as the opportunity of the places afforded.
Iulianum.1.68AUG. Nusquam sic apparuit dolus tuus, et per scientiam damnata conscientia. Scis enim, scis omnino; tam quippe apertum est, ut qui libros illos legit, hoc nescire non possit; scis, inquam, in libris quos ad Marcellinum edidi, me vehementer egisse contra incipientem surgere iam tunc haeresim vestram, ne crederetur Adam, etiamsi non peccasset, fuisse moriturus. Sed quoniam mortalem hactenus dixi, quia poterat mori, poterat namque peccare; tu eis qui libros illos non legerunt, nec fortasse lecturi sunt, fuco insidioso, si haec tua legerent, subripere voluisti; quasi ego ita dixerim, Adam mortalem factum, ut sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset.
AUG. Nowhere has your guile so appeared, and your conscience condemned through knowledge. For you know, you know entirely; it is so plain that whoever reads those books cannot fail to know it; you know, I say, that in the books I published to Marcellinus, I argued vehemently against your heresy, which was even then beginning to rise, lest it be believed that Adam, even if he had not sinned, would have died. But because I called him mortal only in this sense—that he could die, for he could sin—you wished, by an insidious gloss, to filch upon those who have not read those books, and perhaps will not read them, were they to read these words of yours, as though I had said that Adam was made mortal in such a way that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he would die.
Iulianum.1.68Hoc enim vobiscum agitur, hinc tota de hac re inter nos et vos vertitur quaestio, quod nos dicimus, Adam si non peccasset, nec corporis mortem fuisse passurum; vos autem, sive peccasset, sive non peccasset, corpore fuisse moriturum. Quid est ergo quod ignorare te fingis, quam mortem intellegi velim, cuius corpus dico in paradiso non fuisse ante peccatum; cum scias, in libris illis quid egerim, quamque aperte dilucideque egerim, non fuisse Deum puniendo dicturum peccatori: Terra es, et in terram ibis (Gen 3, 19) (quod de morte corporis dictum quis non intellegit?), si Adam etiam nulla iniquitate commissa iturus esset in terram, id est, vel corpore moriturus?
For this is what is at issue with you; here the whole question on this matter turns between us and you—that we say that Adam, if he had not sinned, would not have suffered even the death of the body; but you, that whether he had sinned or had not sinned, he would have died in body. What is it, then, that you pretend not to know which death I wish to be understood, whose body I say was not in paradise before sin; when you know what I argued in those books, and how openly and clearly I argued—that God, in punishing, would not have said to the sinner: You are earth, and into earth you shall go (Gen 3:19) (which who does not understand was said of the death of the body?), if Adam, even with no iniquity committed, were going to go into the earth, that is, were going to die even in body?
Iulianum.1.68Quod autem etiam matrem meam, quae te nihil laesit, nec contra te aliquid disputavit, convicio lacerandam putasti, victus es maledicendi libidine, non timens quod scriptum est: Neque maledici regnum Dei possidebunt (1 Cor 6, 10). Sed quid mirum est quod te inimicum etiam eius ostendis, cum sis inimicus gratiae Dei, qua eam dixi ab illo puellari vitio liberatam?
But as for the fact that you thought my mother too—who did you no harm, nor argued anything against you—ought to be torn with insult, you were overcome by the lust of abuse, not fearing what is written: Nor will the abusive possess the kingdom of God (1 Cor 6:10). But what wonder is it that you show yourself an enemy even of her, when you are an enemy of the grace of God, by which I said she was freed from that girlish vice?
Iulianum.1.68Ego vero parentes tuos tamquam catholicos christianos honorabiles habeo, eisque gratulor quod ante defuncti sunt, quam haereticum te viderent. Non autem dicimus, morbum esse negotium nuptiarum, quod est liberorum procreandorum causa concumbere, non satiandae libidinis; quam tu negas morbum, cum fatearis adversus eam provisum fuisse coniugale remedium. Nam utique ne fornicatio perpetretur, libidini, quam laudas, contradicitur, obsistitur, repugnatur.
But I hold your parents in honor as catholic Christians, and I congratulate them that they died before they saw you a heretic. But we do not say that the business of marriage is a disease—which is to have intercourse for the sake of procreating children, not for the satisfying of lust; which lust you deny is a disease, though you confess that the conjugal remedy was provided against it. For surely, lest fornication be committed, the lust which you praise is contradicted, opposed, resisted.
Iulianum.1.68Ut si eum, qui procreandis filiis constitutus est, transgreditur limitem; saltem qui ei cedit, in coniuge venialiter peccet; coniugibus enim loquebatur Apostolus, ubi cum dixisset: Nolite fraudare invicem, nisi ex consensu ad tempus, ut vacetis orationi; et iterum ad idipsum estote, ne vos tentet Sanas propter intemperantiam vestram; continuo subiecit, atque ait: Hoc autem dico secundum veniam, non secundum imperium (1 Cor 7, 5-6).
So that if anyone oversteps the limit which has been set for procreating children, at least he who yields to it may sin venially in his spouse; for the Apostle was speaking to spouses, when, having said: Do not defraud one another, except by consent for a time, that you may have leisure for prayer; and again return to it together, lest Satan tempt you on account of your intemperance; he at once added, and said: But this I say by way of indulgence, not by way of command (1 Cor 7:5-6).
Iulianum.1.68Hoc itaque malo sola bene utitur intentione propagandae prolis pudicitia coniugalis; huic malo venialiter in coniuge ceditur, non causa prolis, sed carnalis tantummodo voluptatis; huic malo resistitur, ne appetitus damnabilis voluptatis expleatur. Hoc malum habitat in corpore mortis huius; propter cuius motum, etiam mente non consentiente importunum, dicitur: Scio quia non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum (Rom 7, 18). Hoc malum non erat in corpore vitae illius, ubi aut voluntati servientibus etiam genitalibus membris, libido nulla erat, aut omnino se umquam contra voluntatis arbitrium non movebat. Huius mali repente exorti puduit eos (Cf. Gen 3, 7), qui priusquam peccarent nudi erant, et non pudebat eos (Cf. Gen 2, 25). Huius mali laudes impudenter sparsisti etiam quattuor illis libris tuis, quibus coactus sum respondere sex meis.
This evil, then, conjugal chastity alone makes good use of, with the intention of propagating offspring; to this evil one yields venially in a spouse, not for the sake of offspring, but only for carnal pleasure; this evil is resisted, lest the damnable appetite of pleasure be satisfied. This evil dwells in the body of this death; on account of whose motion, importunate even when the mind does not consent, it is said: I know that there does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh, what is good (Rom 7:18). This evil was not in the body of that life, where either, with the genital members serving the will, there was no lust at all, or it never moved itself against the choice of the will. Of this evil, suddenly arisen, they were ashamed (Cf. Gen 3:7), who before they sinned were naked, and were not ashamed (Cf. Gen 2:25). The praises of this evil you have shamelessly scattered even in those four books of yours, which I was compelled to answer with six of mine.
Iulianum.1.6869. IUL. Ut autem ad istam commemorationem humanae miseriae et divinae gratiae veniret Apostolus supra dixerat: Video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captivantem me in lege peccati (Rom 7, 23); post haec verba exclamavit: Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Rom 7, 24-25). Constat quidem praemissis illis quae posuisti, subdidisse Apostolum: Miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum. Sed non quaerimus impraesentiarum, utrum hoc Apostolus dixerit; verum qua fide, quo sensu, qua ratione dixerit quaerimus. Ille enim in membris legem per flagitiorum usum sanctis consiliis inter principia tamen emendationis rebellem, consuetudinem malam vocabat, quae ab eruditis etiam saeculi dici solet secunda natura. Ante pauca enim eos, ad quos loquitur, cum exprobratione conveniens dixerat: Humanum est quod dico, propter infirmitatem carnis vestrae; sicut enim exhibuistis membra vestra servire immunditiae et iniquitati ad iniquitatem; ita nunc exhibete membra vestra servire iustitiae in sanctificationem (Rom 6, 19). Utque ostenderet quia carnem, non hoc corpus quod causas in seminibus habet, sed vitia abusive vocaret; post duo capita fortasse subiungit: Cum essemus in carne, passiones peccatorum quae per legem ostenduntur, operabantur in membris nostris, ut fructificarent morti (Rom 7, 5). Sic dixit: Cum essemus in carne, quasi eo tempore cum disputaret, in carne non esset; sed qui Scripturas novit, genus hoc elocutionis agnoscit. Et ideo, ubi verborum communitas ingerit quaestionem, adhibeatur regula rationis, ad cuius aequalitatem, quae putabantur deflexisse, tendantur. Ceterum Faustus, Manichaeorum episcopus, praeceptor tuus, hoc vel maxime Apostoli testimonio contra nos nititur, dicens ab eo nihil aliud his sermonibus, legis videlicet quae repugnans consilio in membris habitet, quam naturam malam significatam fuisse. Unde nihil minus a te fieri debuit, quam hic locus sic intellegi, quomodo ab illis exponitur, ne, cum per easdem lineas, quas Faustus torsit, ingrederis, non disputasse, sed praeterita reddidisse videaris.
69. JUL. But that the Apostle might come to this mention of human misery and divine grace, he had said above: I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and taking me captive in the law of sin (Rom 7:23); after these words he exclaimed: Who will free me from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 7:24-25). It is established, indeed, with those premises which you set down, that the Apostle added: Wretched man that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord. But we do not ask at present whether the Apostle said this; what we ask is by what faith, in what sense, with what reasoning he said it. For he called the law in his members—rebellious against holy counsels through the use of disgraceful deeds, yet in the very beginnings of amendment—an evil habit, which by the learned even of the world is wont to be called a second nature. For a little before he had said to those to whom he speaks, in reproach: It is a human thing that I say, on account of the weakness of your flesh; for as you presented your members to serve uncleanness and iniquity unto iniquity; so now present your members to serve justice unto sanctification (Rom 6:19). And that he might show that by flesh he called, abusively, not this body which has its causes in the seeds, but the vices; after two chapters perhaps he adds: When we were in the flesh, the passions of sins which are shown through the law worked in our members, to bring forth fruit unto death (Rom 7:5). He spoke thus: When we were in the flesh, as though at the time when he was disputing, he were not in the flesh; but he who knows the Scriptures recognizes this kind of expression. And therefore, where the commonness of words brings up a question, let the rule of reason be applied, to whose equality the things that seemed to have deviated may be directed. But Faustus, the bishop of the Manicheans, your teacher, leans on this testimony of the Apostle above all against us, saying that by these words—namely, the law that, fighting against counsel, dwells in the members—nothing else was signified by him than an evil nature. Whence nothing less ought to have been done by you than that this passage be understood as it is expounded by them, lest, since you walk along the same lines that Faustus twisted, you should seem not to have disputed, but to have repeated past things.
Iulianum.1.69AUG. Respondeat tibi non Faustus Manichaeus, sed catholicus doctus doctorque Gregorius, qui non inter principia, ut dicis, emendationis, in membris legem per flagitiorum usumsanctis consiliis rebellem, consuetudinem malam vocabat, quae ab eruditis etiam dici solet secunda natura; sed legem peccati quae est in membris nostris repugnans legi mentis, mortali huic terrenoque corpori nostro plane aperteque tribuebat dicens: Legem peccati quae est in membris nostris, legi spiritus repugnare, dum imaginem regiam quae intra nos est, captivam ducere studet, ut spoliis eius cedat, quidquid illud est quod in nos beneficio divinae ac primae illius conditionis influxit. Unde vix aliquis, inquit, fortasse longa se et districta regens philosophia, et paulatim animae suae nobilitatem recolens, naturam lucis, quae in se est, humili huic et tenebroso luto coniuncta, revocet ac reflectat ad Deum. Vel si certe propitio Deo agat, utrumque pariter revocabit; si tamen longa et assidua meditatione insuescat sursum semper aspicere, et deorsum male trahentem ac degravantem materiam sibimet astrictam frenis arctioribus sublevare (GREGORIUS NAZ., Orat. I de fuga sua 2, 9).
AUG. Let there answer you not Faustus the Manichean, but the learned catholic teacher Gregory, who called the law in the members—rebellious against holy counsels through the use of disgraceful deeds, not in the beginnings (as you say) of amendment—an evil habit, which by the learned is wont to be called a second nature; rather, the law of sin which is in our members, fighting against the law of the mind, he plainly and openly attributed to this mortal and earthly body of ours, saying: That the law of sin which is in our members fights against the law of the spirit, while it strives to lead captive the royal image which is within us, so that whatever it is that flowed into us by the benefit of the divine and first creation should yield as its spoils. Whence scarcely anyone, he says, perhaps ruling himself by long and strict philosophy, and gradually recollecting the nobility of his soul, recalls and turns back to God the nature of the light which is in him, joined to this lowly and dark clay. Or if indeed he acts with God favorable, he will recall both together; if at least, by long and assiduous meditation, he grows accustomed always to look upward, and to lift up, with tighter reins, the matter that drags him downward badly and weighs him down, bound to himself (GREGORIUS NAZ., Orat. I de fuga sua 2, 9).
Iulianum.1.69Haec dicebat beatus Gregorius, non inter principia emendationis suae, sed iam episcopus, volens exponere, vel potius quae nota sunt, admonere, in quali quantoque certamine cum vitiis interioribus, propter corpus quod aggravat animam, constituti sint sancti. Quod certamen utique non fuisset in illo beatae pacis loco, id est, paradiso deliciarum sanctarum, si nemo peccasset.
These things blessed Gregory said, not in the beginnings of his amendment, but already a bishop, wishing to expound—or rather to admonish of things that are known—in what kind and how great a contest with their inner vices the saints are placed, on account of the body that weighs down the soul. Which contest certainly would not have been in that place of blessed peace, that is, in the paradise of holy delights, if no one had sinned.
Iulianum.1.69Non enim corpus mortis huius ibi esset, cuius corruptibilitate anima gravaretur; sed corpus vitae illius, ubi non caro concupisceret adversus spiritum, ut necesse esset spiritui concupiscere adversus carnem (Cf. Gal 5, 17); sed felici utriusque concordia natura laetaretur humana.
For there would not be there the body of this death, by whose corruptibility the soul might be weighed down; but the body of that life, where the flesh would not desire against the spirit, so that it would be necessary for the spirit to desire against the flesh (Cf. Gal 5:17); but human nature would rejoice in the happy concord of both.
Iulianum.1.69Si ergo Manichaeos introducentes aliam naturam mali atque substantiam expugnare velles, non adiuvare; profecto istas omnibus apertas a parvulis incipientes humanae vitae miserias cum tuis deceptoribus non negares; sed unde in eas collapsa sit nostra natura, quae beata est primitus instituta, cum catholicis fidelibus et praeclarissimis doctoribus diceres.
If, then, you wished to assail the Manicheans, who introduce another nature and substance of evil, not to help them; you would assuredly not deny, with your deceivers, these miseries of human life, plain to all, beginning from little ones; but you would say, with the faithful catholics and the most illustrious teachers, whence our nature—which was first established blessed—has collapsed into them.
Iulianum.1.6970. IUL. Ut igitur quod egimus colligatur, nec ego dictis tuis fraudem intuli, nec tu attulisti aliquid, quod vel dilutiore pietatis colore perfunderes, nedum Scripturis testibus approbares. Nec hoc quod tu putas, intellexit Apostolus; nec alia prorsus in paradiso fuit conditio commixtionis, quam qualis nunc in coniugiis agitur quae a se instituta Deus, tam ipsorum conditione sexuum et qualitate membrorum, quam frequentata benedictione perdocuit.
70. JUL. That, then, what we have done may be gathered together: neither did I bring fraud upon your statements, nor did you bring anything by which you might wash them over with even a fainter color of piety, much less prove them with the Scriptures as witnesses. Neither did the Apostle understand this which you think; nor was there at all another condition of union in paradise than such as is now carried on in marriages—which God taught to be instituted by him, both by the very condition of the sexes and the quality of the members, and by the often-repeated blessing.
Iulianum.1.70Quibus absolutis claret, cunctos qui a te decipiuntur, ira esse quam misericordia digniores, quoniam in excusationem criminum suorum, quae mala voluntate committunt, te auctore infamant nativitatem, ne corrigant actionem.
With these things settled, it is plain that all who are deceived by you are worthier of wrath than of mercy, since, to excuse their own crimes, which they commit by an evil will, they—with you as author—defame birth, that they may not correct their action.
Iulianum.1.70AUG. Actio pia est in hac vita Deum colere, et eius gratia contra vitia interna pugnare, eisque ad illicita instigantibus cogentibusve non cedere; et ubi ceditur indulgentiam, atque ut non cedatur adiutorium Dei affectu religiosae pietatis exposcere. In paradiso autem, si nemo peccasset, non esset actio pietatis expugnare vitia; quoniam permansio felicitatis esset vitia non habere. Sed non est indicium hominum contra vitia veraciter dimicantium, ea quae impudenter frequentatur a vobis laudatio vitiorum. Itane vero, Iuliane, quando dicebat Ambrosius: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13); aut me dicebat auctore, aut infamabat nativitatem, ne corrigeret actionem? Itane vero Gregorius, quando dicebat: Venerare nativitatem, per quam terrenae nativitatis vinculis liberatus es (GREGORIUS NAZ., Orat. in Natalem Domini 41, 14); aut quando dicebat de Christo loquens, vel de Spiritu Sancto: Per hunc primae nativitatis maculae purgantur, per quas in iniquitatibus concipimur, et in delictis genuerunt nos matres nostrae (GREGORIUS NAZ., Orat. in Pentecosten); aut quando dicebat Hilarius de rege David: Scit sub peccati origine, et sub lege peccati esse se natum (HILARIUS, In Ps. 118, 75); infamabant isti viri nativitatem, ne corrigerent actionem?
AUG. The pious action in this life is to worship God, and by his grace to fight against inner vices, and not to yield to them when they instigate or compel to unlawful things; and where one yields, to ask for pardon, and that one may not yield, to ask for the help of God with the affection of religious piety. But in paradise, if no one had sinned, it would not be an action of piety to assail vices; since the permanence of happiness would be to have no vices. But the praise of vices which is shamelessly frequented by you is no sign of men truly fighting against vices. Was it really so, Julian, that when Ambrose said: We are all born under sin, whose very origin is in fault (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13); either he said it with me as author, or he defamed birth, that he might not correct action? Was it really so that Gregory, when he said: Venerate the birth through which you have been freed from the bonds of earthly birth (GREGORIUS NAZ., Orat. in Natalem Domini 41, 14); or when he said, speaking of Christ, or of the Holy Spirit: Through him the stains of the first birth are purified, through which we are conceived in iniquities, and in offenses our mothers begot us (GREGORIUS NAZ., Orat. in Pentecosten); or when Hilary said of king David: He knows himself born under the origin of sin, and under the law of sin (HILARIUS, In Ps. 118, 75); did these men defame birth, that they might not correct action?
Iulianum.1.70Audebisne persuadere cordi tuo, quod Pelagianorum actio actioni praeferatur istorum? Date veniam, numquam vos vitam melius illis agere crederemus, nec si non sic amaretis concupiscentiam carnis, ut eam, qualis nunc est contra spiritum concupiscens, etiam in paradiso ante peccatum collocare velletis. Nam si, ut dicis: Non alia fuit in paradiso conditio commixtionis, quam qualis nunc in coniugiis agitur; erat ibi et ante peccatum libido carnalis, sine qua non potest nunc sexus uterque misceri.
Will you dare persuade your heart that the action of the Pelagians is to be preferred to the action of these men? Grant pardon: we would never believe that you live a better life than they, not even if you did not so love the concupiscence of the flesh that you would place it—such as it now is, desiring against the spirit—even in paradise before sin. For if, as you say: There was no other condition of union in paradise than such as is now carried on in marriages; then there was there, even before sin, the carnal lust without which now neither sex can be joined.
Iulianum.1.70Si ergo non vultis, in illa beatitudine membra genitalia nondum pudenda, ad opus suum peragendum, quo proles seminaretur, voluntati hominum sine libidine potuisse servire; adhuc quaero eamdem libidinem qualem tunc fuisse credatis. Voluntatem certe quando esset necessaria, sequebatur; an etiam quando non erat propter propagandos filios necessaria, stimulabat tamen animum, et propellebat in concubitus vel quosque damnabiles, vel cum coniuge veniales?
If, then, you are unwilling, in that blessedness, that the genital members—not yet shameful—could, for accomplishing their work, by which offspring was to be sown, serve the will of human beings without lust; I still ask of what kind you believe that same lust to have been then. Did it certainly follow the will, when it was necessary; or even when it was not necessary for propagating children, did it nonetheless stimulate the mind, and drive it on into acts of intercourse, whether damnable or venial with a spouse?
Iulianum.1.70Si enim talis erat, qualis nunc est; hoc sine dubitatione faciebat, sive illi resisteretur per temperantiam, sive per intemperantiam cederetur. Ac sic, homo libidini aut peccando servire cogeretur, aut bello intimo repugnare; quorum alterum honestati, alterum paci felicitatis illius, si humanum sensum habetis, non convenire sentitis. Remanet igitur, ut si libido ibi esset, ita esset subdita voluntati, ut rectam quietamque mentem, nec ad delictum traheret, nec ad proelium provocaret; et spiritum oboedientem Deo, ac fruentem Deo, nec peccare nec pugnare compelleret.
For if it was such as it is now, it did this without doubt, whether it was resisted by temperance, or yielded to by intemperance. And thus a man would be compelled either to serve lust by sinning, or to resist it by inner war; one of which does not befit honor, the other does not befit the peace of that felicity—as you perceive, if you have human sense. It remains, then, that if lust were there, it would be so subject to the will that it would neither draw the upright and quiet mind to an offense, nor provoke it to battle; and would compel the spirit—obedient to God and enjoying God—neither to sin nor to fight.
Iulianum.1.70Quae quoniam nunc talis non est, sed ipsa licita inhianter, non obtemperanter appetit; in illicitis autem aut spiritum deicit, aut contra spiritum concupiscit; agnoscite malum vitiata naturae integritate contractum; quo malo bene utitur propagandi officio castitas coniugum, et de quo malo ducitur generationis obnoxiae vinculum, regeneratione solvendum.
Since now it is not such, but greedily seeks even lawful things, not obediently; and in unlawful things either casts down the spirit, or desires against the spirit; acknowledge the evil contracted by the vitiated integrity of nature; of which evil the chastity of spouses makes good use in the office of propagating, and from which evil is drawn the bond of liable generation, to be loosed by regeneration.
Iulianum.1.7071. IUL. Se de hoc satis sit, nunc quae sequuntur arripiam. In corpore igitur mortis huius, quale in paradiso ante peccatum, profecto non erat, alia lex in membris nostris repugnat legi mentis; quia et quando nolumus, et quando non consentimus, nec ei membra nostra ut impleat quod appetit exhibemus; habitat tamen in eis, et mentem resistentem repugnantemque sollicitat; ut ipse conflictus etiamsi non sit damnabilis, quia non perficit iniquitatem; sit tamen miseralis, quia non habet pacem (De nupt. et concup. 2, 6).
71. JUL. But about this let it suffice; now let me take up what follows. In the body of this death, then—such as certainly was not in paradise before sin—another law in our members fights against the law of the mind; because both when we are unwilling, and when we do not consent, nor present our members to it to fulfill what it craves, it nonetheless dwells in them, and solicits the resisting and reluctant mind; so that the very conflict, even if it is not damnable, because it does not accomplish iniquity, is nonetheless wretched, because it does not have peace (De nupt. et concup. 2, 6).
Iulianum.1.71Naturalem esse omnium sensuum voluptatem, testimonio universitatis docemus. Hanc autem voluptatem et concupiscentiam ante peccatum in paradiso fuisse, res illa declarat, quia ad delictum via per concupiscentiam fuit, quae cum pomi decore oculos incitasset, spem etiam iucundi irritavit saporis. Non ergo potuit haec concupiscentia, quae cum modum non tenet, peccat; cum vero intra limitem concessorum tenetur, affectio naturalis et innocens est; non, inquam, potuit fructus esse peccati, quae docetur, non suo quidem vitio, sed voluntatis, occasio fuisse peccati. Lege et de hoc secundum librum meum: invenies hoc quod dicimus etiam tuo posse animo persuaderi.
That the pleasure of all the senses is natural, we teach by the testimony of the universe. But that this pleasure and concupiscence existed before sin in paradise, that thing declares, that the way to the offense was through concupiscence, which, when it had incited the eyes with the beauty of the apple, also stirred up the hope of a pleasant taste. This concupiscence, then, could not—which, when it does not keep its measure, sins; but when it is kept within the limit of permitted things, is a natural and innocent affection—could not, I say, be the fruit of sin, which is taught to have been, not indeed by its own vice, but by that of the will, the occasion of sin. Read about this too my second book: you will find that this which we say can be persuaded even to your mind.
Iulianum.1.71Quod vero quasi acutule posuisti, legem quidem peccati esse in membris nostris; sed tunc habere peccatum, quando ei consentimus; tunc vero solum proelium suscitare, quando non consentimus, et indicere miseriam pace turbata; quis non prudens pugnare perspiciat? Nam si lex peccati, id est, peccatum, et necessitas peccati membris est inserta naturaliter; quid prodest non ei praebere consensum, cum propter hoc ipsum quod est, necesse sit subire supplicium? Aut si est lex quidem peccati, sed quando ei non consentio non peccat; inaestimabilis potentia voluntatis humanae, quae (si dici permittat absurditas) cogit ipsum non peccare peccatum. Sed revertitur eo, ut quod dicis asystaton sit; nam si non peccat, nec lex peccati est; si lex peccati est, peccat; si vero peccat, solum quia est, quomodo ei obsisti potest ut non peccetur, quae repelli non potest ut a peccati opere desinatur?
But as for what you set down, as though acutely, that there is indeed a law of sin in our members; but that it has sin then, when we consent to it; but that it stirs up war only when we do not consent, and brings in misery with peace disturbed; who, being prudent, would not see that it fights against itself? For if the law of sin—that is, sin, and the necessity of sin—is naturally inserted into the members; what does it profit not to give consent to it, when, on account of this very thing that it is, it is necessary to undergo punishment? Or if there is indeed a law of sin, but when I do not consent to it, it does not sin; inestimable is the power of the human will, which (if absurdity permit the saying) compels sin itself not to sin. But it comes back to this, that what you say is inconsistent; for if it does not sin, neither is it a law of sin; if it is a law of sin, it sins; but if it sins, only because it exists, how can it be resisted that there be no sinning, which cannot be repelled that one should cease from the work of sin?
Iulianum.1.71AUG. Secundo libro tuo iam respondi quarto meo, teque inania dixisse convici; sed videant qui legunt, utrum respondendum sit homini, qui in tantam progreditur insaniam, ut cum fateatur malum esse peccatum, bonam esse dicat concupiscentiam peccatorum. Et tamen respondere compellimur, nolentes deserere hominum ingenia tardiora, ad quos istae litterae potuerint pervenire. Quid est ergo quod loqueris, nesciens quid loquaris? Ergone et in paradiso ante malesuadi venena serpentis, ante corruptam sermone sacrilego voluntatem, illiciti cibi libido iam fuit?
AUG. I have already answered your second book in my fourth, and convicted you of having said empty things; but let those who read see whether one should answer a man who advances into such madness that, while he confesses that sin is an evil, he says the concupiscence of sins is good. And yet we are compelled to answer, unwilling to abandon the slower talents of men, to whom these writings could come. What is it, then, that you say, not knowing what you say? Was there, then, even in paradise—before the poisons of the evil-counseling serpent, before the will was corrupted by sacrilegious speech—already a lust for unlawful food?
Iulianum.1.71Et, quod intolerabilius dicitur, ad malum provocabat, et mala non fuit? Et videbant illi homines fructum ligni prohibiti, et concupiscebat, sed ut non manducarent, concupiscentia spiritus carnis concupiscentiae repugnabat; et vivebant in loco illo tantae beatitudinis non habentes in se ipsis pacem mentis et corporis?
And—what is more intolerable to say—did it provoke to evil, and yet was not evil? And did those human beings see the fruit of the forbidden tree, and did it crave it, but, that they might not eat, did the concupiscence of the spirit resist the concupiscence of the flesh; and did they live in that place of so great blessedness, not having within themselves peace of mind and body?
Iulianum.1.71Non usque adeo dementes estis, ut ista credatis; non usque adeo impudentes, ut ista dicatis. Ergo intellegite, vel intellegentibus obstrepere vana loquacitate nolite. Praecessit mala voluntas, qua serpenti subdolo crederetur; et secuta est mala concupiscentia, qua cibo inhiaretur illicito. Non itaque ibi qualiscumque cupiditas qualicumque reluctata est voluntati; sed ei potius depravatae depravata servivit. Ac per hoc quamvis iam utraque mala esset, tamen voluntas cupiditatem, non voluntatem cupiditas duxit; non praecessit voluntatem, nec restitit voluntati. Denique si ante peccati consummationem ab opere illicito averteretur voluntas, sine labore ullo cupiditas illicita sedaretur.
You are not so demented as to believe these things; not so shameless as to say these things. Therefore understand, or do not, with empty loquacity, clamor against those who understand. An evil will went before, by which the cunning serpent was believed; and an evil concupiscence followed, by which the unlawful food was craved. Not, then, did some desire there resist some will; but rather, depraved, it served the depraved. And by this, although now both were evil, yet the will led the desire, not the desire the will; it did not go before the will, nor resist the will. Finally, if before the consummation of the sin the will had been turned away from the unlawful work, without any labor the unlawful desire would have been calmed.
Iulianum.1.71Hinc loquens beatus Ambrosius: Caro, inquit, in naturam regressa vigoris sui, agnoscit altricem; atque ausu deposito contumaciae, moderationis animae coniugatur arbitrio;
Speaking of this, blessed Ambrose: The flesh, he says, returned to the nature of its vigor, recognizes its nurse; and, the daring of its contumacy laid aside, is joined to the moderating choice of the soul;
Iulianum.1.71qualis fuit, cum inhabitanda paradisi secreta suscepit, antequam veneno pestiferi serpentis infecta sacrilegam famem sciret, divinorumque memoam praeceptorum animae sensibus inhaerentem edacitatis studio praeteriret.
such as it was, when it received the secret places of paradise to be inhabited, before, infected by the poison of the pestiferous serpent, it knew sacrilegious hunger, and, by its zeal for gluttony, passed over the memory of the divine precepts clinging to the senses of the soul.
Iulianum.1.71Hinc peccatum manasse proditur, tamquam corpore animaque genitoribus; dum corporis natura tentatur, anima male sana compatitur; quae si appetentiam corporis refrenasset, in ipso ortu esset exstincta origo peccati (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 142-143). Videsne quemadmodum doctor catholicus, et christiana sapientia praeditus, ipsam cibi illiciti concupiscentiam, quam tu, si non permittatur implere quod appetit, asseris innocentem, iam famem sacrilegam nuncupavit? Et tamen si anima utique voluntate correcta, hanc appetentiam corporis refrenasset, in ipso, ut ait, exortu exstincta esset origo peccati; sed quoniam non represso appetitu illiciti cibi, ad peccati consummationem perventum est; non exstincta est origo peccati, sed etiam manavit in posteros; et tanta est carnis et spiritus dissensio subsecuta, ut in naturam, sicut idem doctor alio loco dicit, per praevaricationem primi hominis verteretur (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 141).
Hence it is disclosed that sin flowed forth as it were from parents, body and soul; while the nature of the body is tempted, the unsound soul suffers along with it; and if the soul had reined in the appetite of the body, in its very rising the origin of sin would have been extinguished (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 142-143). Do you see how the catholic teacher, endowed with Christian wisdom, called that very concupiscence of unlawful food—which you, if it is not permitted to fulfill what it craves, assert to be innocent—already a sacrilegious hunger? And yet, if the soul, with the will indeed corrected, had reined in this appetite of the body, in its very rising, as he says, the origin of sin would have been extinguished; but because, with the appetite for unlawful food not repressed, the consummation of sin was reached, the origin of sin was not extinguished, but even flowed into posterity; and so great a dissension of flesh and spirit followed, that, as the same teacher says in another place, it turned into nature through the transgression of the first man (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 141).
Iulianum.1.71Sed tu adversus haec: Naturalem esse omnium sensuum voluptatem testimonio universitatis docere te dicis; quasi non posset in corpore, non mortis huius, sed vitae illius, ita esse omnium sensuum voluptas naturae sufficiens, ut summa in iura virtutis animi carnisque concordia, nulla concupiscerentur illicita. O quam multum erras, qui ex ista, quae nunc est, corruptibilitate atque infirmitate naturae sanctas paradisi delicias atque illam beatitudinem conicis! Alia erat illa immortalitas, ubi homo poterat non mori; alia est ista mortalitas, ubi homo non potest nisi mori; alia erit summa immortalitas, ubi homo non poterit mori.
But you, against these things: You say you teach by the testimony of the universe that the pleasure of all the senses is natural; as though there could not be, in a body—not of this death, but of that life—a pleasure of all the senses sufficient for nature, in such a way that, by the highest concord of the virtue of the mind and of the flesh, no unlawful things should be craved. O how greatly you err, who from this corruptibility and infirmity of nature, which now is, conjecture the holy delights of paradise and that blessedness! Other was that immortality, where man was able not to die; other is this mortality, where man is not able but to die; other will be the highest immortality, where man will not be able to die.
Iulianum.1.71Quid litigas de concupiscentia litigante, hoc est, de lege in membris repugnante legi mentis? Lex peccati dicitur, quia suadet peccata atque, ut ita dixerim, iubet; et si ei mente serviatur, sine excusatione peccatur. Peccatum dicitur, quia peccato facta est, appetitque peccare. Reatus eius regeneratione solutus est, conflictus eius ad agonem relictus est. Malum est, clarum est. Non viribus nostrae voluntatis, ut putas, huic obsistimus, nisi divinitus adiuvemur. Debellandum hoc malum est, non negandum; vincendum est, non defendendum. Postremo, si ei consentis, malum agnosce peccando; si ei resistis, malum agnosce pugnando.
Why do you wrangle about the wrangling concupiscence, that is, about the law in the members fighting against the law of the mind? It is called the law of sin, because it persuades sins and, so to speak, commands them; and if it is served by the mind, sin is committed without excuse. It is called sin, because it was made by sin, and craves to sin. Its guilt has been loosed by regeneration, its conflict has been left for the struggle. It is an evil, this is clear. We do not, as you think, resist it by the strength of our will, unless we are helped from on high. This evil must be warred down, not denied; conquered, not defended. Finally, if you consent to it, acknowledge the evil by sinning; if you resist it, acknowledge the evil by fighting.
Iulianum.1.7172. IUL. Vel quid prodest eius rei modestia, cuius accusat se ipsa praesentia? Vide ergo quo tua acumina provehantur. Primo, quia peccat natura sine voluntate; quod non potest. Secundo, quia est peccatum, et non peccat, id est, una res est, et non est. Deinde, quando turbat pacem, miserabilis est, nec pro tanto crimine plectitur dissipatae quietis; quando autem perficit iniquitatem, damnabilis est. Sed lex peccati sicut meretur ipsa tormentum, ita excusat hominis voluntatem. Quia lex et cogens, et naturalis, et numquam recedens, superari utique a voluntate non potest; et nemo propter hoc reus est, quod vitare non potuit.
72. JUL. Or what does the moderation of that thing profit, whose very presence accuses itself? See, then, whither your subtleties are carried. First, that nature sins without will; which cannot be. Second, that it is sin, and does not sin, that is, it is one thing, and is not. Then, when it disturbs peace, it is wretched, and is not punished for so great a crime of disrupted quiet; but when it accomplishes iniquity, it is damnable. But the law of sin, just as it itself earns torment, so it excuses the will of the man. Because the law—both compelling, and natural, and never withdrawing—certainly cannot be overcome by the will; and no one is guilty for this, that he could not avoid it.
Iulianum.1.72Sed nec ipsa lex peccat, quia aliud facere non potuit. Deus autem inevitabilia reatui adscribit; nec ut hoc tantum mali faciat, ab ullo cogitur; omnibus igitur absolutis, hic solus in crimine reperitur, qui mira fronte imputat aliis necessitatem, cum ipse sine necessitate delinquat.
But neither does the law itself sin, because it could do nothing else. But God ascribes unavoidable things to guilt; nor is he compelled by anyone to do even this much evil; with all, then, absolved, this one alone is found in the crime, who with wondrous brow imputes necessity to others, while he himself offends without necessity.
Iulianum.1.72Macte virtute prudentiae, nobilissime disputator, qui gradibus Punicae dialexeos, ut commendares dona, evertisti iudicia; ut simulares gratiam, subruisti iustitiam; ut infamares naturam, criminatus es hominum Conditorem; et ita criminatus es, ut non solum aliquo peccatore, sed ipsa lege peccati Deus tuus nocentior appareret.
Well done, by the virtue of prudence, most noble disputant, who by the steps of African dialectic—in order to commend gifts—overturned judgments; in order to feign grace, undermined justice; in order to defame nature, accused the Creator of human beings; and so accused him that not only by some sinner, but by the very law of sin, your God should appear more harmful.
Iulianum.1.72Et post haec profanissime catholicis sacerdotibus convicium facis, ut dicas eos negare gratiam Christi, cuius aequitatem tuentur; cum nos laudemus quidem clementiam remediorum, sed legum manente iustitia.
And after these things you most profanely cast insult at the catholic priests, saying that they deny the grace of Christ, whose equity they protect; whereas we praise indeed the clemency of the remedies, but with the justice of the laws remaining.
Iulianum.1.72AUG. Utinam catholicos agnosceres sacerdotes, qui longe priusquam esse coepistis, dixerunt concupiscentiam carnis, quae concupiscit adversus spiritum, quamvis adversus eam etiam spiritus concupiscat, quae lex intellegitur esse peccati, resistens legi mentis post peccatum quod in paradiso perpetratum est, humanam vitiasse naturam; unde sine illa modo nascitur nemo; eique spiritus adversatur in sanctis, ut iuste vivant, pugnando contra illam, donec perfecta hominis salute, et carne cum spiritu plenissime concordante iam non sit.
AUG. Would that you would acknowledge the catholic priests, who, long before you began to exist, said that the concupiscence of the flesh—which desires against the spirit, although the spirit too desires against it, which is understood to be the law of sin, resisting the law of the mind after the sin which was perpetrated in paradise—vitiated human nature; whence now no one is born without it; and that the spirit opposes it in the saints, that they may live justly, by fighting against it, until, with the salvation of man perfected, and the flesh fully agreeing with the spirit, it is no more.
Iulianum.1.72Dicit Ambrosius, per praevaricationem primi hominis in naturam vertisse dissensionem carnis et spiritus (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 141); eamque dissensionem sic Cyprianus ostendit, in quo Poeno Punicam dialexim, ut puto, irridere non audes, quod facere in me ausus es: Est, inquit, inter carnem et spiritum colluctatio, et discordantibus adversum se invicem quotidiana congressio, ut non quae volumus ipsa faciamus, dum spiritus caelestia et divina quaerit, caro terrena et saecularia concupiscit; et ideo petimus inter duo ista, ope et auxilio Dei concordiam fieri, ut dum et in spiritu et in carne voluntas Dei geritur, quae pereum renata est anima servetur.
Ambrose says that through the transgression of the first man the dissension of flesh and spirit turned into nature (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 141); and that dissension Cyprian shows thus—the African in whom, I think, you do not dare mock African dialectic, as you have dared to do in me: There is, he says, between the flesh and the spirit a struggle, and a daily encounter of things at variance with each other, so that we do not do the very things we will, while the spirit seeks heavenly and divine things, the flesh craves earthly and worldly things; and therefore we ask that between these two, by the help and aid of God, concord may be made, so that, while the will of God is carried out both in the spirit and in the flesh, the soul which has been reborn through him may be saved.
Iulianum.1.72Quod aperte atque manifeste Apostolus sua voce declarat: "caro, inquit, concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem; haec enim invicem adversantur sibi; ut non ea quae vultis, ipsa faciatis " (Gal 5, 17; CYPRIANUS, De Orat. Dominica 16). Hanc tu concordiam carnis et spiritus, quam nos optare, et a Domino dicit orare Cyprianus, nec in paradiso ante peccatum fuisse concedis; aut si fuit, cur non fateris eam per praevaricationem primi hominis vitiata periisse natura, beataeque paci animae et corporis miseram successisse discordiam? Et indignaris nobis, quod velut catholicis sacerdotibus, id est vobis, faciamus nostro sermone convicium, quia dicimus vos negare gratiam Christi; cum vos istis vere catholicis sacerdotibus impudentissime ac profanissime conviciemini his verbis, quae in me, qui eorum fidem sequor et tueor, indigesto furore ructatis. Apostolus dicit: Spiritu ambulate, et concupiscentias carnis ne perfeceritis (Gal 5, 16).
Which the Apostle openly and manifestly declares with his own voice: The flesh, he says, desires against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are opposed to each other; so that you do not do the very things you will (Gal 5:17; CYPRIANUS, De Orat. Dominica 16). This concord of flesh and spirit, which we desire, and which Cyprian says we pray for from the Lord, you do not grant to have existed even in paradise before sin; or if it existed, why do you not confess that, with nature vitiated, it perished through the transgression of the first man, and that a wretched discord succeeded the blessed peace of soul and body? And you are indignant with us, because, as though against catholic priests—that is, against you—we cast insult by our discourse, in saying that you deny the grace of Christ; when you cast insult most impudently and most profanely against these truly catholic priests, with those words which, against me, who follow and protect their faith, you belch out with undigested fury. The Apostle says: Walk by the spirit, and do not accomplish the concupiscences of the flesh (Gal 5:16).
Iulianum.1.72Rogo cur eas appellat, si nullae sunt? Cur eas perfici vetat, si bonae sunt? Sed adhuc quales sint, ostendit et dicit: Caro enim concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem; haec enim invicem adversantur; ut non ea quae vultis faciatis (Gal 5, 17). Quibus dicebat: Ut non ea quae vultis faciatis?
I ask, why does he call them so, if they are none? Why does he forbid them to be accomplished, if they are good? But further, what kind they are, he shows and says: For the flesh desires against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are opposed to each other; so that you do not do the things you will (Gal 5:17). To whom did he say: So that you do not do the things you will?
Iulianum.1.72Numquid Iudaeis, secundum mirabilem vestram intellegentiam, nondum sub Christi gratia constitutis; et non eis quibus dixerat: Ex operibus legis Spiritum accepistis, an ex auditu fidei? (Gal 3, 2) Fideles itaque christianos dicebat non ea quae vellent facere, concupiscente adversus spiritum carne.
Was it to the Jews, according to your wonderful understanding, not yet established under the grace of Christ; and not to those to whom he had said: Did you receive the Spirit by the works of the law, or by the hearing of faith? (Gal 3:2) He was therefore saying that faithful Christians did not do the things they willed, with the flesh desiring against the spirit.
Iulianum.1.72Quid ita, nisi quia volebant inferiorem partem suam consentire superiori, id est, carnem spiritui, nec valebant perficere quod volebant; eisque restabat non consentire illi vitio, sed adversum carnem spiritui concupiscere? Verum et si hoc in eis erat, quod vos putatis, ut propter consuetudinem malam etiam nolentes male viverent; quid est ergo quod dicis, naturam sine voluntate peccare non posse, cum istos non volentes peccare fatearis?
Why so, except because they willed their lower part to consent to the higher, that is, the flesh to the spirit, and were not able to accomplish what they willed; and there remained for them not to consent to that vice, but to desire, against the flesh, in the spirit? But even if there was in them what you suppose—that on account of an evil habit they lived badly even when unwilling; what is it, then, that you say, that nature cannot sin without will, when you confess that these men sinned unwilling?
Iulianum.1.72Cur autem dicta sit concupiscentia carnis peccatum, lexve peccati, iam supra diximus (Cf. supra 71); cui si bonum est non consentire ad illicita, profecto ipsa malum est, qua concupiscuntur illicita, etsi nulla consensione, nulloque opere perpetrantur.
But why the concupiscence of the flesh is called sin, or the law of sin, we have already said above (Cf. supra 71); and if it is good not to consent to it in unlawful things, then it is itself surely an evil, by which unlawful things are craved, even if they are perpetrated by no consent and no deed.
Iulianum.1.72Iudicia Dei porro vos evertitis, qui generis humani miserias incipientes a parvulis, sine ullo peccati merito fieri dicitis; nec donum Dei poscitis, ne intretis in tentationem (Mt 26, 41), hoc est, ne peccetis; in vestra enim virtute confiditis, et vos in Psalmo sancto notatos esse atque damnatos (Cf. Ps 48, 7), vel non videtis caeci, vel stolidi non doletis.
Moreover, you overturn the judgments of God, you who say that the miseries of the human race, beginning from little ones, come about without any merit of sin; nor do you ask the gift of God, that you may not enter into temptation (Matt 26:41), that is, that you may not sin; for you trust in your own virtue, and that you have been noted and condemned in the holy Psalm (Cf. Ps 49:6 (48:7)), either being blind you do not see, or being stupid you do not grieve.
Iulianum.1.7273. IUL. Verum iam pergamus et ad verba mea, quae de praefatione sublata, sibi impugnanda proposuit: Satis igitur admonuerim, sic istum verba mea quasi refellenda sibi proponere voluisse, ut alibi mediis detractis, sententias interrumperet; alibi extremis non additis decurtaret; et cur hoc fecerit, sufficienter ostenderim. Nunc ad ea quae sicut voluit, nostra proposuit, quae sua posuerit, videamus. Sequuntur enim iam verba eius, et sicut iste insinuavit, qui tibi chartulam misit, prius aliquid de praefatione conscripsit, procul dubio librorum eorum, de quibus pauca decerpsit.
73. JUL. But now let us proceed also to my words, which, taken from the preface, he set down for himself to attack: Let me have sufficiently warned, then, that this man wished to set down my words as though to be refuted by him, in such a way that in one place, with the middle removed, he interrupted the sentences; in another, with the ends not added, he cut them short; and why he did this I have shown sufficiently. Now let us see, in those things which, as he wished, he set forth as ours, what he set down as his own. For now his words follow; and as the man who sent you the sheet indicated, he first wrote something from the preface—without doubt of those books from which he excerpted a few things.
Iulianum.1.73Id autem ita sese habet: Doctores, inquit, nostri temporis, frater beatissime, et nefariae, quae adhuc fervet, seditionis auctores, ad hominum, quorum sanctis studiis uruntur, contumelias, et exitium decreverunt per ruinam totius Ecclesiae pervenire; non intellegentes, quantum his contulerint honoris, quorum ostenderunt gloriam nisi cum catholica religione non potuisse convelli. Nam si quis aut liberum in hominibus arbitrium, aut Deum esse nascentium conditorem dixerit, Caelestianus et Pelagianus vocatur. Ne igitur vocentur haeretici, fiunt Manichaei; et dum falsam verentur infamiam, verum crimen incurrunt; instar ferarum, quae circumdantur pinnis, ut cogantur in retia; quibus quoniam deest ratio, in verum exitium vana formidine contruduntur (De nupt. et concup. 2, 6-7).
And it stands thus: The teachers, he says, of our time, most blessed brother, and the authors of the nefarious sedition which still rages, have decided to arrive, through the ruin of the whole Church, at insults to and the destruction of men, by whose holy pursuits they are burned; not understanding how much honor they have conferred on those whose glory they have shown could not be torn down except along with the catholic religion. For if anyone says either that there is free choice in human beings, or that God is the Creator of those who are born, he is called a Celestian and a Pelagian. Lest, then, they be called heretics, they become Manicheans; and while they fear a false reproach, they incur a true crime; like wild beasts, which are encircled with feathers that they may be driven into the nets; which, since they lack reason, are thrust into true destruction by an empty fear (De nupt. et concup. 2, 6-7).
Iulianum.1.73Cognosco dicta mea, sed non a te cum integritate prolata; et licet non in his certaminis summa consistat, quia de praefatione sunt; tamen, ut levitas tua liqueat, frater beatissime, in eo loco positum non est, sed in primo statim versu libri. Item cum dixissem: Ad hominum quorum sanctis studiis uruntur, contumelias et exitium; addidi: quoniam iter aliud non patebat, decreverunt per ruinam totius Ecclesiae pervenire.
I recognize my words, but not set down by you with integrity; and although the sum of the contest does not consist in these, since they are from the preface; yet, that your frivolity may be plain, most blessed brother, it was not placed in that location, but at the very first line of the book. Likewise, when I had said: To insults to and the destruction of men, by whose holy pursuits they are burned; I added: because no other way lay open, they decided to arrive through the ruin of the whole Church.
Iulianum.1.73Post quod etiam dixi: Quia liberi confessor arbitrii et Dei conditoris, Caelestianus et Pelagianus vocatur, quo simplices iniquosermone perterriti, ut ab invidia nominis exuantur, etiam sanam fidem deserunt; credituri procul dubio, nec liberum esse in hominibus arbitrium, nec Deum nascentium conditorem, quando illud, quod prius affirmaverant, utrumque deseruerint. Hoc autem totum a te praetermissum est. Post quod sunt illa quae posuisti, quam sane vera, et quam inexpugnabilia, haud difficilis erit opera comprobare. Nec ego igitur quidquam de tuis dictis minus, nec tu vel primum caput, ita ut a me ordinatum fuerat, rettulisti. Quod ideo inculco, ut gravitas Poeni scriptoris emineat.
After which I also said: Because a confessor of free choice and of the Creator God is called a Celestian and a Pelagian, by which speech the simple, terrified by an unjust word, so that they may strip off the odium of the name, even desert sound faith; about to believe, without doubt, that there is neither free choice in human beings, nor that God is the Creator of those who are born, when they shall have deserted both of those things which they had earlier affirmed. But all this was passed over by you. After which come those things you set down, how true and how unassailable, it will not be a difficult task to prove. Neither did I, then, set down anything less of your statements, nor did you report even the first chapter as it had been arranged by me. This I press home for this reason, that the gravity of the African writer may stand out.
Iulianum.1.73AUG. Qui de libris tuis, quae voluit decerpta, cui voluit, legenda transmisit, ipse quod mihi imputas fecit; nec aliud etiam te ipsum existimo credere. Neque enim in eodem libro meo, contra quem latras, non sum praelocutus, cui sim chartulae respondere compulsus; sed quaeris conviciando quid dicas, sentiens te nihil validum dicere disputando.
AUG. He who transmitted from your books what he wished excerpted, to whom he wished, to be read, himself did what you impute to me; nor do I think that you yourself believe otherwise. For in that very book of mine, against which you bark, I did preface to what sheet I had been compelled to reply; but you ask, by reviling, what you may say, feeling that you say nothing strong by disputing.
Iulianum.1.73Quamquam et in his meis verbis, quae mox tibi quasi refellenda proponis, id quod dico advertere potuisti; non enim dicerem: Non est ita ut loqueris, quicumque ista dixisti (De nupt. et concup. 2, 8); si certus essem te illa dixisse, non eum qui qualem voluit, et cui voluit scripturam misit, quam mihi missam refutare susceperam. Sed Deo gratias, quod universo ipsi operi tuo, unde quae voluit, sicut ei placuit, iste decerpsit, ita Domino adiuvante respondi, ut omnia tua, quae contra antiquissimam catholicam fidem novus haereticus erexeras, machinamenta subverterem.
And yet even in these words of mine, which you presently set forth as though to be refuted, you could notice what I say; for I would not say: It is not as you say, whoever it was who said these things (De nupt. et concup. 2, 8); if I were certain that you had said them, not the man who sent the writing such as he wished, and to whom he wished, which, sent to me, I had undertaken to refute. But thanks be to God, that to your whole work—from which this man excerpted what he wished, as it pleased him—I have so, with the Lord helping, replied, that I have subverted all your engines, which, as a new heretic, you had erected against the most ancient catholic faith.
Iulianum.1.7374. IUL. Contra haec ergo verba mea, quae rescripseris audiamus: Non est ita ut loqueris, quicumque ista dixisti, non est ita; multum falleris, vel fallere meditaris; non liberum negamus arbitrium; sed: " vos Filius liberaverit - ait Veritas - tunc vere liberi eritis " (Io 8, 36). Hunc vos invidetis liberatorem, quibus captivis vanam tribuitislibertatem. " A quo enim quis devictus est - sicut dicit Scriptura - huic et servus addictus est " (2 Pt 2, 19); nec quisquam nisi per gratiam Liberatoris isto solvitur vinculo servitutis, a quo est hominum nullus immunis. "r unum quippe hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt " (Rom 5, 12; De nupt. et concup. 2, 8). Amplissimam esse nostri negotii dignitatem, ut ipsa rerum consideratio et appensio indicat, quas tuemur, ita etiam vester pavor; qui contra nostrorum sanguinem, pecuniarum effusione, haereditatum largitate, equorum transmissione, populorum seditione, potestatum corruptione pugnantes, et fidem vestram quae a nobis impugnatur, erubescitis profiteri, et ad nostrae sententiae, a qua deviastis, verba confugitis.
74. JUL. Against these words of mine, then, let us hear what you have written in reply: It is not as you say, whoever it was who said these things, it is not so; you are much deceived, or you are plotting to deceive; we do not deny free choice; but: if the Son frees you—says the Truth—then you will be truly free (John 8:36). This Liberator you envy, you who bestow an empty freedom on captives. For by what one is overcome—as Scripture says—to that he is also assigned as a slave (2 Pet 2:19); nor is anyone loosed from this bond of slavery except by the grace of the Liberator, from which no human being is free. For through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed to all human beings, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12; De nupt. et concup. 2, 8). That the dignity of our business is very great—as the very consideration and weighing of the things we defend shows—so also your dread shows it; you who, fighting against our blood with the pouring out of money, the lavishing of inheritances, the sending of horses, the seditions of peoples, the corruption of authorities, both blush to profess your faith, which is assailed by us, and flee to the words of our view, from which you have deviated.
Iulianum.1.74AUG. Aut sciens calumniaris, si tu ista mentiris; aut nescis quid loquaris, cum mentientibus credis; sed iam satis sit quod superius tuae vanitati, vel etiam malignitati ad ista respondi (Cf. supra 42).
AUG. Either you slander knowingly, if you lie about these things; or you do not know what you say, when you believe liars; but let it now suffice what I have answered above to your vanity, or even your malice, on these matters (Cf. supra 42).
Iulianum.1.7475. IUL. Tam enim scelestum est, quod suscepit praevaricatio pudenda Babylonis, ut cum a nobis obicitur, a vobis negetur; et tam sanctum est, quod a nobis creditur, ut sub umbra eius delitescere, licet adversaria mente, cupiatis. Nam cum ego quidquid disputationis vestrae sparsim membris tenebatur exprimerem, et summam quaestionis in brevitatem cogerem, ut ecclesiasticae dissensionis causa, quanta et qualis esset, sine fumo et nebulis proderetur, dixi liberum a vobis arbitrium negari, et Deum nascentium conditorem; porro a nobis id utrumque defendi, et ob hoc vos imperitis auribus de nominibus catholicorum virorum, qui propter fidem apostolicam quam tuemur, nobiscum laborant, ciere inanem fragorem, ut qui timuissent Caelestiani a vobis dici, amitterent caelestis fidei dignitatem; et qui expavissent ne a vobis Pelagiani dicerentur, in Manichaeorum pelagus praecipitarentur; putarentque se imperiti quique non posse Christianos appellari, si eos Traduciani Pelagianos vocassent; cum e regione prudentes statuerent, quamvis nominum invidiam sibi et iniuriam sustinendam magis, quam fidem catholicam relinquendam. Sed ne vel hoc ipsum convicii genus vestro inventum ingenio glorieris; recordamini, ab omnibus quidem haereticis diversa nos vocabula solere suscipere; sed in Synodo Ariminensi vehementius claruisse, quid apud plumbeos animos vel ambiguitas verbi, vel comminatio novi vocabuli possit sceleris obtinere. Nam cum sub Ariano principe, vir magnae constantiae, fidei sanissimae, Athanasius Alexandrinus episcopus, dilapso a fide Apostolorum omni pene mundo, et impiatis temporibus obstitisset, atque ob hoc in exsilia coactus esset; de sescentis et quinquaginta, ut fertur, episcopis, vix septem inventi sunt, quibus cariora essent Dei praecepta quam regis; videlicet ut nec in Athanasii damnationem convenirent, nec Trinitatis confessionem negarent. Illa vero omnis deiectorum pectorum multitudo, extra iniuriarum metum, hac est potissimum vel nominis comminatione, ne Athanasiana vocaretur, vel interrogationis calliditate decepta.
75. JUL. For so wicked is what the shameful prevarication of Babylon has undertaken, that when it is objected by us, it is denied by you; and so holy is what is believed by us, that you desire to hide beneath its shade, though with an adverse mind. For when I expressed whatever of your disputation was held scattered through its members, and forced the sum of the question into brevity, that the cause of the ecclesiastical dissension—how great and of what kind it was—might be brought forth without smoke and mist, I said that free choice was denied by you, and that God is the Creator of those who are born; but that both of these are defended by us; and that on this account you, to unskilled ears, stir up an empty din about the names of catholic men, who labor with us for the apostolic faith which we defend, so that those who had feared to be called Celestians by you would lose the dignity of the heavenly faith; and those who had dreaded to be called Pelagians by you would be hurled into the sea of the Manicheans; and the unskilled would think themselves unable to be called Christians, if the Traducianists called them Pelagians; while on the other side the prudent decided that the odium and injury of names was rather to be endured than the catholic faith to be relinquished. But lest you should glory that even this kind of insult was invented by your talent; recall that from all heretics we are wont to receive diverse names; but in the Synod of Ariminum it shone forth more vehemently what the ambiguity of a word, or the threat of a new name, can obtain of crime among leaden minds. For when, under an Arian prince, a man of great constancy, of most sound faith, Athanasius, bishop of Alexandria, had withstood—with almost the whole world fallen away from the faith of the Apostles, and the times made impious—and on this account had been driven into exile; of six hundred and fifty bishops, as is reported, scarcely seven were found to whom the precepts of God were dearer than those of the king: namely, who neither came together for the condemnation of Athanasius, nor denied the confession of the Trinity. But all that multitude of cast-down breasts, apart from the fear of injuries, was deceived chiefly either by this threat of the name, lest it be called Athanasian, or by the cunning of the question.
Iulianum.1.75AUG. Athanasianos vel Homousianos Ariani Catholicos vocant, non et alii haeretici. Vos autem non solum a Catholicis, sed etiam ab haereticis, vobis similibus et a vobis dissentientibus, Pelagiani vocamini; quemadmodum non tantum a Catholica, sed ab haeresibus etiam vocantur Ariani. Vos vero soli nos appellatis Traducianos, sicut illi Homousianos, sicut Donatistae Macarianos, sicut Manichaei Pharisaeos, et ceteri haeretici diversis nominibus.
AUG. The Arians call the catholics Athanasians or Homoousians, and no other heretics do. But you are called Pelagians not only by the catholics, but even by heretics like yourselves who dissent from you; just as the Arians are called Arians not only by the catholic Church, but also by heresies. But you alone call us Traducianists, just as they call us Homoousians, as the Donatists call us Macarians, as the Manicheans call us Pharisees, and the other heretics by diverse names.
Iulianum.1.7576. IUL. Nam cum proponerent Ariani, qui rerum ea tempestate potiebantur, Homousion sequi vultis, aut Christum? Responderunt continuo, quasi in nomen religiosi, Christum se sequi; homousion repudiavere; atque ita exeunt gestientes, velut qui Christo crederent, quem iam negaverant, homousion, id est unius cum Patre substantiae, denegando.
76. JUL. For when the Arians, who at that time were in power, proposed: Do you wish to follow the Homoousion, or Christ? they at once answered, as though under the name of religion, that they followed Christ; they repudiated the Homoousion; and so they go out exulting, as though they believed in Christ, whom they had already denied, by denying the Homoousion, that is, the one-substance with the Father.
Iulianum.1.76Ita ergo et nunc vos fabricatores doli, imperitas terretis aures, ut si nolunt laborantium pro fide virorum appellatione respergi, et liberum arbitrium negent, et Deum hominum conditorem. Hoc igitur a me in illo loco constat obiectum; et quam non falso, praesens disputatio palam faciet. Respondisti ergo hoc modo: Non negamus liberum arbitrium; et nihil aliud subiunxisti de tuo. Consequens enim fuerat, ut impleres sine tergiversatione sententiam; cumque praemisisses non te negare arbitrii libertatem, adderes: Sed confitemur datam a Deo libertatem arbitrii in hominum permanere natura.
So, then, even now you fabricators of guile terrify unskilled ears, so that, if they do not wish to be bespattered with the name of men laboring for the faith, they should both deny free choice and deny that God is the Creator of human beings. This, then, was objected by me in that place; and how not falsely, the present disputation will make plain. You answered, then, in this way: We do not deny free choice; and you added nothing else of your own. For it would have been consequent that you should fill out the sentence without evasion; and, having premised that you do not deny the freedom of choice, you should add: But we confess that the freedom of choice given by God remains in the nature of human beings.
Iulianum.1.76AUG. Quomodo manet libertas in eis, qui ut liberentur a servitute, qua victori peccato addicti sunt, divina indigent gratia, nisi quia liberi sunt et ipsi, sed iustitiae? Unde dicit Apostolus: Cum essetis servi peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae (Rom 6, 20).
AUG. How does freedom remain in those who, that they may be freed from the slavery to which they have been assigned, having been overcome by sin, need divine grace, unless because they are free, but only of justice? Whence the Apostle says: When you were slaves of sin, you were free of justice (Rom 6:20).
Iulianum.1.7677. IUL. Impleveras enim hoc sermone aliquid, contra quod si fuisses locutus ulterius, nimium impudens; sin autem omnia continenter, vel tarde posses apparere correctior.
77. JUL. For you had completed something by this discourse, against which, if you had spoken further, you would have been too impudent; but if you had said everything continuously, you could at least belatedly have appeared more corrected.
Iulianum.1.77Nunc vero me dicis fallere, qui quod obieci, per te probo; et tu statim in eo, quod te putas consequenter instruxisse, mentiris. Ais quippe: Non liberum negamus arbitrium; et subiungis testimonium Evangelii, sed " vos Filius liraverit - ait Veritas - tunc vere liberi eritis " (Io 8, 36). Cum hoc in illo loco a Domino nostro Iesu constet in liberum arbitrium non fuisse prolatum, cuius expositionem sententiae paululum differentes, definitionibus et divisionibus, quid nostrum alteruter sentiat, explicemus. Debet quippe, secundum omnium doctorum disciplinam, inchoatio disputationis a definitione sumi.
But as it is, you say that I deceive, who prove what I objected by your own words; and you at once lie in that which you think you have consequently set forth. For you say: We do not deny free choice; and you add the testimony of the Gospel, but: if the Son frees you—says the Truth—then you will be truly free (John 8:36). Since it is established that in that place this was not brought forth by our Lord Jesus concerning free choice, deferring a little the exposition of that sentence, let us, by definitions and divisions, explain what each of us thinks. For, according to the discipline of all teachers, the beginning of a disputation ought to be taken from a definition.
Iulianum.1.77AUG. Apostoli ergo, qui disputationum suarum inchoationes non a definitione sumpserunt, non erant docti? Et tamen erant doctores Gentium, et contemptores doctorum talium, de quibus te delectat inflari. Quod autem ait Dominus: Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis, conaberis quidem in tuam detorquere sententiam; sed quam te non sequatur, cum conari coeperis, apparebit.
AUG. The apostles, then, who did not take the beginnings of their disputations from a definition, were not learned? And yet they were teachers of the gentiles, and despisers of such teachers as you delight to be puffed up with. But as for what the Lord says: If the Son frees you, then you will be truly free, you will indeed try to twist it into your own sense; but how it does not follow you, when you have begun to try, will appear.
Iulianum.1.7778. IUL. Omnis quippe, ut ait ille, quae ratione suscipitur de aliqua re disputatio, debet a definitione proficisci, ut intellegatur quid sit id de quo disputatur (CICERO, De officiis 1, 7). Ita ergo et nos, sicut supra de iustitiae et peccati definitione disseruimus, nunc quoque videamus quae libertati arbitrii definitio competat ut planum sit, quis ei nostrum consentiat, quis repugnet. Libertas arbitrii, qua a Deo emancipatus homo est, in admittendi peccati et abstinendi a peccato possibilitate consistit.
78. JUL. For every disputation, as he says, which is undertaken by reason concerning anything, ought to proceed from a definition, that it may be understood what that is about which the dispute is held (CICERO, De officiis 1, 7). So, then, we too, just as above we discussed the definition of justice and of sin, let us now also see what definition befits the freedom of choice, so that it may be clear which of us agrees with it, which resists it. The freedom of choice, by which man is emancipated from God, consists in the possibility of admitting sin and of abstaining from sin.
Iulianum.1.78AUG. Emancipatum hominem dicis a Deo: nec attendis hoc cum emancipato agi, ut in familia patris non sit.
AUG. You say that man is emancipated from God; and you do not attend that with one emancipated this is done, that he should not be in his father's household.
Iulianum.1.7879. IUL. Factum est enim animal rationale, mortale, capax virtutis et vitii, quod posset ex concessa sibi possibilitate vel servare Dei mandata, vel transgredi, vel magisterio naturali conservare ius humanae societatis, liberumque haberet alterutram velle partem, in quo peccati et iustitiae summa est. Nam cum aliquid secundum virtutem indigentibus, aut de misericordiae fontibus, aut de iustitiae immulget uberibus; hoc operatur foris iam ipsa iustitia, quam intus voluntas sancta concepit et peperit.
79. JUL. For he was made a rational, mortal animal, capable of virtue and of vice, who could, by the possibility granted him, either keep God's commandments or transgress them, or by natural guidance preserve the right of human society, and who had it free to will either part, in which is the sum of sin and of justice. For when one bestows something according to virtue on the needy, whether from the fountains of mercy or from the udders of justice; this justice itself now works outwardly, which the holy will within has conceived and brought forth.
Iulianum.1.79AUG. Utrum de suo iustitiam conceperit, hoc vobiscum agitur, qui ignorantes Dei iustitiam, vestram vultis constituere (Cf. Rom 10, 3); cum voluntas sancta utique iustitiam sancta cogitatione concipiat, de qua scriptum est: Cogitatio sancta servabit te (Prov 2, 12 (sec. LXX)); dicit autem Apostolus: Non quia idonei sumus cogitare aliquid quasi ex nobismetipsis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est (2 Cor 3, 5). Hoc si intellegatis, non aliud intellegetis esse arbitrium laudabiliter liberum, nisi quod fuerit Dei gratia liberatum.
AUG. Whether it conceives justice from itself, this is what is at issue with you, who, ignorant of the justice of God, wish to establish your own (Cf. Rom 10:3); whereas the holy will certainly conceives justice by a holy thought, of which it is written: A holy thought will preserve you (Prov 2:12 (sec. LXX)); but the Apostle says: Not that we are sufficient to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God (2 Cor 3:5). If you understand this, you will understand that there is no other choice praiseworthily free, except that which has been freed by the grace of God.
Iulianum.1.7980. IUL. Sic et cum e diverso statuens prave agere in aliorum iniuriam, vel iniquus quis fuerit, vel crudelis; operatio qua nocet aliis, a nequitia foras proficiscitur, quam intus mala voluntas seminavit et genuit; cum vero deest facultas, per quam in proximos vis secretae voluntatis erumpat, in ipsa tamen sola voluntate, quae aliquid vel boni, vel mali, non impetu brevi, sed cogitatione appetituque patraverit, vel benignitatis est ratio impleta, vel malignitatis.
80. JUL. So too when, on the other side, one resolving to act wickedly to the injury of others is either unjust or cruel; the operation by which he harms others proceeds outward from the wickedness which an evil will within sowed and begot; but when the faculty is lacking through which the force of the secret will might break out upon one's neighbors, yet in the will alone—which has accomplished something either good or evil, not by a brief impulse, but by thought and appetite—either the reckoning of kindness or of malignity is fulfilled.
Iulianum.1.80AUG. Sicut intellegitis voluntatem etiam sola cogitatione rationem vel benignitatis vel malignitatis implere, si eo modo intellegas, quod de bona et sancta cogitatione loquens Apostolus ait, non esse nos idoneos cogitare aliquid quasi ex nobismetipsis, sed sufficientiam nostram ex Deo esse; poteris corrigi, et humilis suscipere gratiam, cui te superbia fecit inimicum, dum vis in eis esse, qui confidunt in virtute sua (Ps 48, 7); non in eis qui dicunt: Diligam te, Domine, virtus mea (Ps 17, 2).
AUG. Just as you understand that the will fulfills, even by thought alone, the reckoning either of kindness or of malignity, if you understand it in this way—that, as the Apostle, speaking of good and holy thought, says, we are not sufficient to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God; you will be able to be corrected, and humbly to receive the grace to which pride has made you an enemy, while you wish to be among those who trust in their own virtue (Ps 49:6 (48:7)); not among those who say: I will love you, O Lord, my strength (Ps 18:1 (17:2)).
Iulianum.1.8081. IUL. Et boni igitur possibilitas, et mali, bona est; quoniam posse bonum facere, aula virtutis est; posse malum facere, testimonium libertatis est.
81. JUL. Both the possibility of good, then, and of evil, is good; since to be able to do good is the court of virtue; to be able to do evil is the testimony of freedom.
Iulianum.1.81AUG. Non est ergo liber Deus, de quo dictum est: Negare se ipsum non potest (2 Tim 2, 13); et de quo etiam ipse dixisti: Deus esse nisi iustus non potest; et alio loco: Non potest autem Deus, inquis, nisi iustus et pius esse (Cf. supra 28. 67).
AUG. God, then, is not free, of whom it was said: He cannot deny himself (2 Tim 2:13); and of whom you yourself said: God cannot be anything except just; and in another place: But God cannot, you say, be anything except just and pious (Cf. supra 28. 67).
Iulianum.1.8182. IUL. Per hoc igitur suppetit homini habere proprium bonum, per quod ei subest posse facere malum. Tota ergo divini plenitudo iudicii tam iunctum habet negotium cum hac libertate hominum, ut harum qui unam agnoverit, ambas noverit. Unde fit ut harum unam qui violaverit, ambas violet. Sic igitur et libertas humani custodiatur arbitrii, quemadmodum divina aequitas custoditur. Hic intellectus liberi arbitrii est, qui et fatorum opinionem, et Chaldaeorum supputationem, et Manichaeorum phantasias, veritati ecclesiasticae subiugavit. Hic intellectus est, qui cum illis, quos enumeravimus, vos etiam a Christo monstrat alienos. Libertas igitur arbitrii, possibilitas est vel admittendi, vel vitandi peccati, expers cogentis necessitatis, quae in suo utpote iure habet, utrum surgentium partem sequatur, id est, vel ardua asperaque virtutum, vel demersa et palustria voluptatum.
82. JUL. Through this, then, it falls to man to have a good of his own, through which it lies within him to be able to do evil. The whole fullness of divine judgment, then, has its business so joined with this freedom of human beings, that whoever has acknowledged one of them has known both. Whence it comes about that whoever has violated one of them, violates both. So, then, let the freedom of human choice be guarded, just as the divine equity is guarded. This is the understanding of free choice, which subjected to ecclesiastical truth both the opinion of the fates, and the calculation of the Chaldeans, and the phantasms of the Manicheans. This is the understanding which shows you, along with those we have enumerated, to be also strangers to Christ. The freedom of choice, then, is the possibility either of admitting or of avoiding sin, free of compelling necessity, which has within its own right, as it were, which part of those rising it will follow—that is, either the steep and rough things of the virtues, or the sunken and marshy things of the pleasures.
Iulianum.1.82AUG. Homo quamdiu stetit in bona voluntate liberi arbitrii, non opus habebat ea gratia, qua levaretur, cum surgere ipse non posset; nunc vero in ruina sua, liber est iustitiae, servusque peccati, nec potest servus esse iustitiae, et liber a dominante peccato, nisi eum Filius liberaverit.
AUG. As long as man stood in the good will of free choice, he had no need of that grace by which he might be lifted up, since he could not himself rise; but now, in his ruin, he is free of justice and a slave of sin, nor can he be a slave of justice and free from the dominating sin, unless the Son frees him.
Iulianum.1.8283. IUL. Quod ut breviter absolvatur, possibilitas est ad hoc solum excubans, ne homo vel in peccatum a quoquam impellatur, vel a peccato abstrahatur, voluntate captiva; quam non posse capi, si dedi ipsa noluerit, testatur fortitudo, cuius lacerti in contemptu dolorum et per Gentiles et per Christianos assidue claruerunt.
83. JUL. That this may be briefly settled, it is a possibility keeping watch over this alone: lest a man be either driven into sin by anyone, or drawn away from sin, with the will captive; which will, that it cannot be captured if it has not itself willed to surrender, fortitude testifies, whose sinews have shone forth assiduously, in the contempt of pains, both through gentiles and through Christians.
Iulianum.1.83AUG. Hoc est utique, quod agit haeresis vestra; ad hoc enim additis et Gentiles, ne piae fortitudinis opus Dei gratia Christiani facere potuisse, aut fecisse credantur; quae Christianis est propria, non Christianis Gentilibusque communis. Audite ergo, et intellegite: fortitudinem Gentilium mundana cupiditas, fortitudinem autem Christianorum Dei caritas facit; quae diffusa est in cordibus nostris, non per voluntatis arbitrium, quod est a nobis, sed per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis (Rom 5, 5).
AUG. This is precisely what your heresy does; for to this you add even the gentiles, lest it be believed that Christians, by the grace of God, could do or did the work of pious fortitude; which is proper to Christians, not common to Christians and gentiles. Hear, then, and understand: the fortitude of the gentiles, worldly desire makes; but the fortitude of the Christians, the love of God makes; which has been poured out in our hearts, not through the choice of the will, which is from us, but through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (Rom 5:5).
Iulianum.1.8384. IUL. Si ergo est, ut ratio prodidit, arbitrii libertas propulsatrix necessitatum, ut nemo sit vel bonus vel malus, cui non sit liberum esse contrarium; quemadmodum tu aut confessus es liberum arbitrium usurus tali testimonio, quod captivis convenit, aut tale testimonium subdidisti, postquam liberum fueras confessus arbitrium? Ais enim: Non negamus arbitrium liberum; sed: " vos Filius liberaverit - ait Veritas - tunc vere liberi eritis " (Io 8, 36). Manifestum est Christum in illo loco ad captivam conscientiam verba fecisse; quam liberam non esse prodebat; sed obnoxiam ei ultioni, quae condemnat peccata, libera voluntate commissa. Quam sententiam tu male intellegens, id est, non intellegens, aut forte in te intellegens, et huc natura sua repugnante trahens, in eo posuisti loco, ubi a tuis sermonibus tota sui proprietate discordat. Ut enim ipsa verba iungamus: Quod liberatur, captivum est; quod captivum est, liberum non est; quod liberum est, captivum non est.
84. JUL. If, then, the freedom of choice is, as reason has disclosed, a repeller of necessities, so that no one is either good or evil who is not free to be the contrary; how did you either confess free choice, while using such a testimony as suits captives, or set down such a testimony, after you had confessed free choice? For you say: We do not deny free choice; but: if the Son frees you—says the Truth—then you will be truly free (John 8:36). It is manifest that Christ in that place spoke his words to a captive conscience; which he disclosed to be not free, but liable to that punishment which condemns sins committed by a free will. This sentence you, understanding it badly—that is, not understanding it, or perhaps understanding it in you, and dragging it hither though its nature resists—you set in that place where it disagrees, by all its own property, with your discourse. For, that we may join the very words: What is freed, is captive; what is captive, is not free; what is free, is not captive.
Iulianum.1.84AUG. Alia est remissio peccatorum, in eis quae male facta sunt; alia caritas, quae facit liberum ad ea quae bona facienda sunt. Utroque modo liberat Christus; quia et iniquitatem ignoscendo aufert, et inspirando tribuit caritatem.
AUG. The remission of sins, in those things which were done evilly, is one thing; the love which makes free for those good things which are to be done, is another. In both ways Christ frees; for he both takes away iniquity by pardoning, and bestows love by inspiring.
Iulianum.1.8485. IUL. Tu utrumvis hic simpliciter confitere, et cavillari desine; aut dic nobiscum liberum esse arbitrium; et remove testimonium, quod suo tempore congrue prolatum est; aut, sicut in his libris, quos nunc per Alypium ad Bonifacium misisti, dic captivum esse arbitrium, quod nos liberum dicimus, et desine te negare Manichaeum.
85. JUL. You, confess here simply one or the other, and cease to quibble; either say with us that choice is free, and remove the testimony, which was brought forth fittingly in its own time; or, as in those books which you have now sent through Alypius to Boniface, say that choice is captive, which we say is free, and cease to deny that you are a Manichean.
Iulianum.1.85AUG. Manichaeus immutabilem substantiam mali naturae Dei sui miscet insanus, et eamdem naturam Dei potius corruptibilem facit, et sub aliena natura vult esse captivam; fides autem catholica, bonam, sed tamen mutabilem, creaturam in deterius voluntate mutatam; ac per hoc, depravata sua vitiataque natura, non sub aliena substantia, sed sub peccato suo ream dicit serviliter detineri.
AUG. The Manichean, insane, mixes an unchangeable substance of evil with the nature of his god, and rather makes the same nature of god corruptible, and wishes it to be captive under an alien nature; but the catholic faith says that the creature, good but yet changeable, was changed for the worse by the will; and by this, with its own nature depraved and vitiated, is held in slavery, guilty, not under an alien substance, but under its own sin.
Iulianum.1.85Ac per hoc, et de ipso liberatore multum ab eo nostra diversa sententia est. Manichaeus enim dicit opus esse liberatore, ut a nobis naturam separet alienam; nos autem, ut sanet et vivificet nostram. Tu ergo adiutorem Manichaei te non esse ostende, si potes, qui miserias hominum, cum quibus eos nasci, quoniam sine dubio sentit, sine dubio consentit genus humanum, nolens tribuere peccato vitiatae naturae nostrae facis, ut eas ille permixtae nobis naturae tribuat alienae.
And by this, even concerning the Liberator himself our view is very different from his. For the Manichean says that a liberator is needed, to separate an alien nature from us; but we, that he may heal and vivify our own. You, then, show that you are not a helper of the Manichean, if you can—you who, since the human race without doubt perceives the miseries with which men are born, and without doubt consents that it perceives them, by being unwilling to attribute them to the sin of our vitiated nature, cause him to attribute them to an alien nature mixed with us.
Iulianum.1.8586. IUL. Ceterum duo ista quae iungis, liberum et non liberum, id est liberum et captivum, illi quidem rei de qua agitur, convenire non possunt; tibi vero stultitiam singularem, impudentiam novam, impietatem veterem inesse testantur.
86. JUL. But for the rest, these two which you join, free and not free, that is, free and captive, cannot indeed befit the matter we are treating; but they testify that singular folly, a new impudence, an old impiety, are in you.
Iulianum.1.86AUG. Liberos dicimus ad facienda opera pietatis eos, quibus dicit Apostolus: Nunc autem liberati a peccato, servi autem facti Deo, habetis fructum vestrum in sanctificationem, finem vero vitam aeternam (Rom 6, 22). Hunc in sanctificationem fructum, qui fructus procul dubio caritas est, atque opera eius, nullo modo habere possumus a nobis; sed habemus per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis (Rom 5, 5). De ipso quippe fructu loquebatur magister Deus, quando palmitibus in se manentibus dicebat: Sine me nihil potestis facere (Io 15, 5). Sed stultitiam singularem nobis inesse conviciaris, quia Deus nobis virtus est, nec in nostra virtute confidimus; et impudentiam novam, quia concupiscentiam carnis, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, non tua fronte laudamus; et impietatem veterem, quoniam dogmata antiqua catholica, quae docuerunt qui Ecclesiam Christi ante nos in eius gratia vera pietate rexerunt, contra perversitatem vestram novitiam quantulocumque labore defendimus. In te igitur agnosce stultitiam, in te impudentiam, in te impietatem, non veterem sane, sed novam.
AUG. We call free for doing the works of piety those to whom the Apostle says: But now freed from sin, and made slaves to God, you have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end eternal life (Rom 6:22). This fruit unto sanctification—which fruit is without doubt love, and its works—we can in no way have from ourselves; but we have it through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (Rom 5:5). For of this very fruit the Teacher God was speaking, when he said to the branches abiding in him: Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5). But you reproach us with having singular folly, because God is our strength, and we do not trust in our own strength; and a new impudence, because we do not, with your brow, praise the concupiscence of the flesh, by which the flesh desires against the spirit; and an old impiety, because we defend, with whatever labor we can, the ancient catholic teachings, which those taught who ruled the Church of Christ before us in his grace with true piety, against your novel perversity. In yourself, then, acknowledge folly, in yourself impudence, in yourself impiety—not indeed old, but new.
Iulianum.1.8687. IUL. Sed iam tempus est, ut de Evangelii sententia disseratur. Dicebat, inquit evangelista Ioannes, Iesus ad Iudaeos eos qui crediderunt ei: Si vos manseritis in sermone meo, vere discipuli mei eritis; et cognoscetis veritatem, et veritas liberabit vos (Io 8, 31-32). Id est, Dominus noster Iesus loquebatur ad credentes sibi, ut de nulla saeculi nobilitate gaudentes, nec de Abrahae sibi semine gloriam vindicantes, niterentur et studerent virtutibus, et nullis post agnitio m Christi servire peccatis, ut veram libertatem conscientia gaudente retinerent, et spe certorum, id est aeternorum, vindicarentur a cupiditate aliorum omnium, quae propter fragilitatem sui, vana frequenter et falsa dicuntur. Tunc responderunt ei Iudaei, non intellegentes de qua Iesus libertate dixisset: Semen Abrahae sumus, et nemini servivimus umquam; quomodo tu dicis: Liberi eritis? (Io 8, 33)
87. JUL. But now it is time that the sentence of the Gospel be discussed. Jesus was saying, says the evangelist John, to the Jews who believed in him: If you abide in my word, you will truly be my disciples; and you will know the truth, and the truth will free you (John 8:31-32). That is, our Lord Jesus was speaking to those who believed in him, that—rejoicing in no nobility of the world, nor claiming glory for themselves from the seed of Abraham—they should strive and be zealous for the virtues, and serve no sins after the knowledge of Christ, so that they might retain true freedom with a rejoicing conscience, and, by the hope of sure things, that is, of eternal things, be vindicated from the desire of all others, which, on account of their fragility, are frequently called empty and false. Then the Jews answered him, not understanding of what freedom Jesus had spoken: We are the seed of Abraham, and we have never served anyone; how do you say: You will be free? (John 8:33)
Iulianum.1.87Multis enim modis libertas appellari solet, ut in hoc loco sanctitas, ut resurrectio in Apostolo, ubi dicit creaturam liberari a servitute corruptionis in libertatem gloriae filiorum Dei (Rom 8, 21); ut libertas quae notior est, ad distinctionem dicitur servitutis. Eo autem nomine et libertas nuncupatur arbitrii. Dividantur ergo causae, ne res multum distantes confundantur nominis communione. Hic ergo non arbitrii libertatem Dominus dicit esse liberandam; sed illa integra permanente, convenit Iudaeos, ut accipientes indulgentiam liberentur a reatibus, et eam quae apud Deum maxima est, libertatem occupent, ut incipiant nihil debere criminibus. Denique sequitur Evangelista: Respondit eis Iesus: Amen, amen dico vobis, quoniam omnis qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Servus autem non manet in domo in aeternum; filius autem manet in aeternum. Si ergo Filius vos liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis (Io 8, 34-36).
For freedom is wont to be called by many modes, as in this place sanctity; as resurrection in the Apostle, where he says that the creation is freed from the slavery of corruption into the freedom of the glory of the children of God (Rom 8:21); as the freedom which is more familiar is spoken of in distinction from slavery. And by that name the freedom of choice too is called. Let the cases, then, be divided, lest things far apart be confused by the community of a name. Here, then, the Lord does not say that the freedom of choice is to be freed; but, with it remaining whole, it suits the Jews that, receiving indulgence, they be freed from guilt, and seize that freedom which is greatest with God, so that they begin to owe nothing to crimes. Finally, the Evangelist follows: Jesus answered them: Amen, amen, I say to you, that everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin. But the slave does not abide in the house forever; the son, however, abides forever. If, then, the Son frees you, then you will truly be free (John 8:34-36).
Iulianum.1.87AUG. Attende quod dictum est: Omnis qui facit peccatum. Non enim ait: Qui fecit; sed: qui facit. Et non vis eum ab hoc malo liberare homines; non vis eum hoc loco talem promittere libertatem, qua peccatum non faciamus; sed ideo tantummodo liberare, quia fecimus.
AUG. Attend to what was said: Everyone who commits sin. For he does not say: who committed; but: who commits. And you do not wish him to free men from this evil; you do not wish him in this place to promise such a freedom by which we may not commit sin; but only to free for this reason, because we have committed it.
Iulianum.1.8788. IUL. Aperuit, de qua hic servitute loqueretur. Omnis, inquit, qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati (Io 8, 34). Hoc autem ipsum quam vehemens est contra errorem vestrum, quia dicit, servum non esse peccati, nisi eum qui fecerit ipse peccatum; nec posse cuiquam adhaerere peccatum, quod non is de quo agitur, per se, aut actione, aut vel sola commiserit voluntate? Quam etiam ostendit universitatem humani generis non posse iam a diabolo possideri, cum distinctionem facit inter servum et filium, id est, iustum et iniustum? Hic enim, ut se Christus, ita etiam unumquemque sanctorum a servorum conditione separabat: sicut fuerunt et ante Vetus, et in Vetere Testamento, quos in domo Patris sui manere, et in mensa eius denuntiat iucundari (Cf. Lc 13, 28-29). Totum hoc autem exhortationis genus inepte prolatum esset, si non liberi arbitrii homines conveniret.
88. JUL. He disclosed of what slavery he was here speaking. Everyone, he says, who commits sin is a slave of sin (John 8:34). But how vehemently is this very thing against your error, in that he says that no one is a slave of sin except him who himself has committed sin; and that sin can cling to no one which the one in question has not himself committed, either by action or by will alone? Which also shows that the universality of the human race cannot now be possessed by the devil, since he makes a distinction between slave and son, that is, between just and unjust? For here, as Christ separated himself, so also each one of the saints, from the condition of slaves: such as were both before the Old, and in the Old Testament, whom he declares to abide in the house of his Father, and to rejoice at his table (Cf. Luke 13:28-29). But this whole kind of exhortation would have been brought forth ineptly, if it did not befit human beings of free choice.
Iulianum.1.88AUG. Convenit plane ideo facientes peccatum, quia servi sunt peccati, ut accepta libertate quam promittit, desinant facere peccatum. Regnabat namque peccatum in eorum mortali corpore, ita ut oboedirent concupiscentiis eius, et exhiberent membra arma iniquitatis peccato (Cf. Rom 6, 12-13. 17-19). Contra hoc ergo malum, quo peccatum faciebant, libertate indigebant, quam promittebat: Omnis enim, inquit, non qui fecit, sed qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Quid verba lucida caliginosis disputationibus obscurare conaris?
AUG. It befits, plainly, those committing sin for this reason, that they are slaves of sin, so that, having received the freedom which he promises, they may cease to commit sin. For sin reigned in their mortal body, so that they obeyed its concupiscences, and presented their members as weapons of iniquity to sin (Cf. Rom 6:12-13. 17-19). Against this evil, then, by which they committed sin, they needed the freedom which he promised: For everyone, he says, not who committed, but who commits sin, is a slave of sin. Why do you try to obscure clear words with murky disputations?
Iulianum.1.88Erumpunt omnino, et te licet obsistente fulgore suo vincunt tenebras tuas. Omnis, ait, qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Audis: qui facit; et tu non exponere sed supponere vis: Qui fecit. Audiant ergo, quibus ipse aperit sensum, ut intellegant Scripturas; audiant: Omnis qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Et quaerant accipere libertatem, ut non faciant peccatum, clamantes ad eum, cui dicitur: Itinera mea dirige secundum verbum tuum, et ne dominetur mihi omnis iniquitas (Ps 118, 133). Cur autem illudis sensibus tardis, et ita insinuas verba Domini, quasi dixerit servum non esse peccati, nisi eum qui fecerit ipse peccatum? Fraude agis, non hoc dixit; non enim ait: Nemo est servus peccati, nisi qui facit peccatum; sed ait: Omnis qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati.
They break forth altogether, and, though you oppose, by their splendor conquer your darkness. Everyone, he says, who commits sin is a slave of sin. You hear: who commits; and you wish not to expound but to substitute: Who committed. Let them hear, then, to whom he himself opens the sense, that they may understand the Scriptures; let them hear: Everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin. And let them seek to receive freedom, that they may not commit sin, crying out to him to whom it is said: Direct my steps according to your word, and let no iniquity have dominion over me (Ps 119:133 (118:133)). But why do you mock slow minds, and so insinuate the words of the Lord, as though he had said that no one is a slave of sin except him who himself has committed sin? You act with fraud; he did not say this; for he did not say: No one is a slave of sin except him who commits sin; but he said: Everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin.
Iulianum.1.88Sunt enim servi peccati originalis, qui peccatum ipsi nondum faciunt; et ab hoc vinculo servitutis regeneratione solvuntur. Non igitur omnis qui servus est peccati, facit peccatum; sed omnis qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati; sicut non omne animal equus est; sed tamen omnis equus animal est. Ubi est dialectica tua, qua te inflare consuesti? Tam doctum et acutum quare te ista fugiunt? Aut quare insidiaris indoctis et tardis, si te ista non fugiunt? Quis autem nostrum dicit, universitatem hominum a diabolo possideri; cum sanctorum tanta sint millia, quae non possidentur a diabolo? Sed dicimus, eos solos a diabolo non possideri, quos Christi liberat gratia; cuius gratiae vos estis inimici. Si enim hanc gratiam non oppugnaretis, sed intellegeretis; procul dubio etiam ante Vetus Testamentum, et tempore Veteris Testamenti, omnes sanctos, a servorum conditione separatos, eadem liberatos Christi gratia videretis.
For there are slaves of original sin, who do not yet themselves commit sin; and from this bond of slavery they are loosed by regeneration. Not, then, everyone who is a slave of sin commits sin; but everyone who commits sin is a slave of sin; just as not every animal is a horse, but yet every horse is an animal. Where is your dialectic, with which you are accustomed to puff yourself up? Why do these things escape you, who are so learned and acute? Or why do you lie in wait for the unlearned and slow, if these things do not escape you? But who of us says that the universality of human beings is possessed by the devil, when there are so many thousands of saints who are not possessed by the devil? But we say that those alone are not possessed by the devil whom the grace of Christ frees; of which grace you are the enemies. For if you did not assail this grace, but understood it, you would assuredly see that even before the Old Testament, and in the time of the Old Testament, all the saints, separated from the condition of slaves, were freed by the same grace of Christ.
Iulianum.1.8889. IUL. Denique ut intellegas, non eum naturae eorum exprobrare, sed vitae; sequitur: Scio quia filii Abrahae estis (Io 8, 37). Ecce de qua illi se liberos dixerant originis dignitate; nunc cui servituti obnoxii sint demonstrat, dicens: Quaeritis me interficere, quia sermo meus non capit in vobis. Ego quod audiviapud Patrem meum, loquor; et vos quae vidistis apud patrem vestrum, facitis (Io 8, 37-38).
89. JUL. Finally, that you may understand that he does not reproach their nature, but their life, it follows: I know that you are children of Abraham (John 8:37). Behold, of what dignity of origin they had said they were free; now he shows to what slavery they are liable, saying: You seek to kill me, because my word does not take hold in you. I speak what I have heard from my Father; and you do what you have seen with your father (John 8:37-38).
Iulianum.1.89AUG. Quid est: Sermo meus non capit in vobis, si natura etiam talis, qualis nunc indiget liberante, iam capax est sermonis eius, etiamsi sensum non aperiat gratia eius, sicut aperuit Apostolis, ut intellegerent Scripturas (Cf. Lc 24, 27); sicut illi purpurariae Thyatirenorum, ut intenderet in ea, quae a Paulo di bantur (Cf. Act 16, 14)?
AUG. What is: My word does not take hold in you, if a nature even such as now needs a liberator is already capable of his word, even though his grace does not open the sense, as it opened it to the Apostles, that they might understand the Scriptures (Cf. Luke 24:27); as it opened it to that seller of purple of the Thyatirans, that she might attend to the things spoken by Paul (Cf. Acts 16:14)?
Iulianum.1.8990. IUL. Vide quam diversa sit naturae ratio et voluntatis. Non negavit Iesus, carnem eorum pertinere ad semen Abrahae, sed inculcat eis, quod ad diabolum patrem voluntatis iniquitate migraverint; qui ideo genitor eorum dicitur, quod criminum arguitur eruditor.
90. JUL. See how diverse is the account of nature and of will. Jesus did not deny that their flesh belonged to the seed of Abraham, but he presses upon them that, by the iniquity of will, they had migrated to the devil their father; who is called their begetter for this reason, that he is convicted as the instructor of their crimes.
Iulianum.1.90Responderunt, inquit, et dixerunt ei Iudaei: Pater noster Abraham est. Dicit eis Iesus: Si filii Abrahae essetis, opera Abrahae faceretis; nunc autem quaeritis me interficere, hominem qui veritatem locutus sum vobis, quam audivi a Deo; hoc Abraham non fecit, vos autem facitis opera patris vestri (Io 8, 39-41). Aspicisne quas faciat verborum divisiones Sapientia? Negat eos Abrahae filios esse, quos supra dixerat esse filios Abrahae; sed quoniam diversus est de natura ac voluntate tractatus, ostendit alterum esse prosatorem carnis innocuae, alterum seductorem miserae voluntatis.
They answered, he says, and said to him: Our father is Abraham. Jesus says to them: If you were children of Abraham, you would do the works of Abraham; but now you seek to kill me, a man who has spoken to you the truth, which I heard from God; this Abraham did not do; but you do the works of your father (John 8:39-41). Do you see what divisions of words Wisdom makes? He denies that they are children of Abraham, whom above he had said to be children of Abraham; but because the treatment of nature and of will is diverse, he shows that one is the begetter of harmless flesh, the other the seducer of a wretched will.
Iulianum.1.90AUG. Verum dicis incautus. In paradiso enim diabolus seductor beatae voluntatis fuit, quam seducendo miseram fecit; nunc autem, sicut fateris, seductor est miserae voluntatis. Ab hac ergo miseria (ne per illam nunc facilius, quam tunc ad illam seducta est, adhuc seducatur a diabolo) non eam liberat, nisi ille ad quem quotidie tota clamat Ecclesia: Ne nos inferas in tentationem, sed libera nos a malo (Mt 6, 13).
AUG. You speak the truth incautiously. For in paradise the devil was the seducer of a blessed will, which by seducing he made wretched; but now, as you confess, he is the seducer of a wretched will. From this misery, then (lest through it the will be still more easily seduced now by the devil than it was then seduced unto it), no one frees it except him to whom the whole Church daily cries: Lead us not into temptation, but free us from evil (Matt 6:13).
Iulianum.1.9091. IUL. Hic ergo ubi dixit Dominus: Si vos Filius liberaverit, vere liberi eritis (Io 8, 36), promisit indulgentiam reis, qui peccantes non arbitrii libertatem, sed conscientiam iustitiae perdiderunt. Liberum autem arbitrium et post peccata tam plenum est, quam fuit ante peccata; siquidem ipsius opera fiat ut abdicent plerique occulta dedecoris (Cf. 2 Cor 4, 2), et flagitiorum abiectis sordibus, virtutum comantur insignibus.
91. JUL. Here, then, where the Lord said: If the Son frees you, you will truly be free (John 8:36), he promised indulgence to the guilty, who, by sinning, lost not the freedom of choice, but the conscience of justice. But free choice, even after sins, is as full as it was before sins; since indeed it is by its own work that many renounce the hidden things of disgrace (Cf. 2 Cor 4:2), and, casting off the filth of crimes, are adorned with the badges of virtues.
Iulianum.1.91AUG. Te audi saltem, ubi dicis (Cf. supra 69) propter consuetudinem peccatorum scriptum esse: Non quod volo, ago; sed quod odi, hoc facio (Rom 7, 15. 19). Quomodo ergo post peccata liberum est, quorum etsi non propagine, quia non vultis, certe tamen consuetudine, quam solam huic necessitati victi contortique conceditis, sic perdidit libertatem, ut gemitus eius feriat aures vestras, frontemque collidat, cum auditis: Non quod volo ago; et: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 19)?
AUG. Hear at least yourself, where you say (Cf. supra 69) that on account of the habit of sins it was written: It is not what I will that I do, but what I hate, this I do (Rom 7:15. 19). How, then, is it free after sins—those whose freedom, if not by propagation (because you are unwilling), yet certainly by habit (which alone you concede to this necessity, overcome and twisted)—it has so lost, that its groaning strikes your ears, and beats your brow, when you hear: It is not what I will that I do; and: It is not the good I will that I do, but the evil I do not will, this I do (Rom 7:19)?
Iulianum.1.9192. IUL. Desine itaque impiare te (si tamen ullum tibi fas aut nefas restat), Christi verba sic exponendo, ut ille arbitrium negasse liberum videatur, sine cuius integritate aequitas ei proprii non potest constare iudicii.
92. JUL. Cease, then, to make yourself impious (if indeed any right or wrong remains to you), by so expounding the words of Christ that he may seem to have denied free choice, without whose integrity the equity of his own judgment cannot stand.
Iulianum.1.92AUG. Immo, ideo grave iugum est super filios Adam, a die exitus de ventre matris eorum (Eccli 40, 1), quia ei constat aequitas iudicii; quod omnino iniquum esset, si non traherent originale peccatum, per quod homo vanitati similis factus est (Ps 143, 4).
AUG. Nay rather, there is a heavy yoke upon the children of Adam, from the day they come forth from their mother's womb (Sir 40:1), for this reason, that the equity of his judgment stands; which would be altogether unjust, if they did not draw original sin, through which man has been made like to vanity (Ps 144:4 (143:4)).
Iulianum.1.9293. IUL. Audi sane ubi vim humanae libertatis ostendit: Ego veni in nomine Patris mei, et non suscepistis me; si alius venerit in nomine suo, illum accipietis (Io 5, 43). Et item: Aut facite arborem bonam, et fructum eius bonum; aut facite arborem malam, et fructum eius malum (Mt 12, 33). Et item: Si mihi non vultis credere, operibus credite (Io 10, 38). Atque omnibus vehementius, quod dicit intentionem suam humana voluntate impeditam fuisse: Hierusalem, inquit, Hierusalem, quoties volui congregare filios tuos, sicut gallina pullos suos sub alas suas, et noluisti! (Mt 23, 37)
93. JUL. Hear, indeed, where he shows the force of human freedom: I came in the name of my Father, and you did not receive me; if another comes in his own name, him you will receive (John 5:43). And likewise: Either make the tree good, and its fruit good; or make the tree bad, and its fruit bad (Matt 12:33). And likewise: If you will not believe me, believe the works (John 10:38). And more vehemently than all, that he says his own intention was hindered by human will: Jerusalem, he says, Jerusalem, how often have I willed to gather your children, as a hen her chicks under her wings, and you would not! (Matt 23:37)
Iulianum.1.93Post quod non sequitur: Sed te nolente collegi; verum: Relinquetur vobis domus vestra deserta (Mt 23, 38); ut illos ostendat pro malo quidem opere iure puniri, sed ab intentione propria non debuisse ulla necessitate revocari. Sic enim et per Prophetam locutus erat: Si volueritis, et audieritis me, quae bona sunt terrae comeditis; si nolueritis, et non audieritis, gladius vos comedet (Isa 1, 19-20). Quomodo ergo tu liberum arbitrium non negas, quod non quidem sermone tuo, sed Evangelii testimonio, sensu autem tuo, non liberum pronuntiasti?
After which there does not follow: But, you being unwilling, I gathered them; but: Your house will be left to you desolate (Matt 23:38); so that he shows them to be justly punished for an evil work indeed, but that they ought not to have been recalled by any necessity from their own intention. For thus too he had spoken through the Prophet: If you are willing, and hearken to me, you shall eat the good things of the earth; if you are unwilling, and do not hearken, the sword shall devour you (Isa 1:19-20). How, then, do you not deny free choice, which—not indeed by your discourse, but by the testimony of the Gospel, yet by your sense—you have pronounced not free?
Iulianum.1.93AUG. Ignoscendum est, quia in re multum abdita ut homo falleris. Absit ut impediatur ab homine omnipotentis et cuncta praescientis intentio. Parum de re tanta cogitant, vel ei excogitandae non sufficiunt, qui putant Deum omnipotentem aliquid velle, et homine infirmo impediente, non posse.
AUG. You are to be pardoned, because in a matter very hidden you err as a man. Far be it that the intention of the omnipotent and all-foreknowing God be hindered by a man. They think too little of so great a matter, or are not sufficient to think it out, who suppose that God Almighty wills something, and, with a weak man hindering, cannot.
Iulianum.1.93Sicut certum est Hierusalem filios suos ab illo colligi noluisse, ita certum est eum etiam ipsa nolente quoscumque eorum voluit collegisse. Deus enim, sicut homo eius dixit Ambrosius, quos dignatur vocat, et quem vult religiosum facit (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 27).
Just as it is certain that Jerusalem was unwilling to have her children gathered by him, so it is certain that he, even with her unwilling, gathered as many of them as he willed. For God, as his man Ambrose said, calls those whom he deigns, and makes religious whom he wills (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 27).
Iulianum.1.93Convenit autem Scriptura plerumque hominis voluntatem, ut quod non habet, vel non potest, admonitus sentiat; et ab eo a quo sunt bona omnia, indigens poscat. Si enim exauditus fuerit in eo, quod dicere iussi sumus: Ne nos inferas in tentationem (Mt 6, 13); procul dubio nulla decipietur inscitia, nulla cupiditate vincetur.
But Scripture for the most part addresses the will of man, that, admonished, he may perceive what he does not have, or cannot do; and from him from whom are all good things, being needy, may ask. For if he be heard in that which we are commanded to say: Lead us not into temptation (Matt 6:13); without doubt he will be deceived by no ignorance, overcome by no desire.
Iulianum.1.93Propterea ergo per Prophetam dictum est: Si nolueritis, et non audieritis me, gladius vos comedet (Isa 1, 20); et cetera huiusmodi; ut cum invenissent in se ipsis victrices cupiditates, ad propellendum malum scirent a quo deberent poscere auxilium.
For this reason, then, it was said through the Prophet: If you are unwilling and do not hearken to me, the sword will devour you (Isa 1:20); and other things of this kind; so that, when they had found in themselves victorious desires, they might know from whom they ought to ask help for driving off the evil.
Iulianum.1.93Ideo autem dictum est: Ecce relinquetur vobis domus vestra deserta (Cf. Act 9, 1); quia plures ibi erant, quos obduratione et desertione iudicaverat dignos, occulto iudicio, iusto tamen. Nam si, ut dicis: Ab intentione propria, utique mala, non debet homo ulla necessitate revocari, cur apostolus Paulus adhuc Saulus, caedem spirans et sanguinem sitiens, violenta corporis caecitate, et terribili desuper voce, a sua pessima intentione revocatur; et ex persecutore prostrato, illius Evangelii, quod oppugnabat, laboriosior ceteris futurus praedicator erigitur (Cf. Act 9, 4-5. 20)? Agnosce gratiam; alium sic, alium autem sic Deus, quem dignatur, vocat; et: Spiritus ubi vult spirat (Io 3, 8).
But for this reason it was said: Behold, your house will be left to you desolate (Cf. Acts 9:1); because there were many there whom he had judged worthy of hardening and desertion, by a hidden judgment, yet a just one. For if, as you say: From his own intention—certainly evil—a man ought not to be recalled by any necessity, why is the apostle Paul, while still Saul, breathing slaughter and thirsting for blood, recalled from his most wicked intention by a violent blindness of the body, and by a terrible voice from above; and, from a persecutor cast down, raised up to be a preacher of that Gospel which he was assailing—about to be more laborious than the rest (Cf. Acts 9:4-5. 20)? Acknowledge grace; God calls one in this way, another in that, whom he deigns; and: The Spirit breathes where it wills (John 3:8).
Iulianum.1.9394. IUL. Nam in illo opere, quod te supra dixi nuper Romam misisse, audacius quid sentires aperuisti. In primo enim libro, cum tibi similiter proposuisses quod nos obicimus, arbitrium vos liberum denegare, ita disseris constantissimus et subtilissimus disputator. Quis autem nostrum dicat, quod primi hominis peccato perierit liberum arbitrium de genere humano? Libertas quidem periit per peccatum, sed illa quae in paradiso fuit, habendi plenam cum immortalitate iustitiam; propter quod natura humana divina indiget gratia, dicente Domino in Evangelio suo: " vos Filius liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis " (Io 8, 36), utique liberi ad bene iusteque vivendum. Nam liberum arbitrium usque adeo in peccatore non periit, ut per ipsum peccent, maxime omnes qui cum delectatione peccant et amore peccati, et eis placet quod eos libet. Unde Apostolus: "m essetis - inquit <197> servi peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae " (Rom 6, 20).
94. JUL. For in that work which I said above you recently sent to Rome, you disclosed more boldly what you think. For in the first book, when you had likewise set down for yourself what we object—that you deny free choice—you discuss thus, a most constant and most subtle disputant. But which of us would say that by the sin of the first man free choice perished from the human race? Freedom indeed perished through sin, but that freedom which was in paradise, of having full justice with immortality; on account of which human nature needs divine grace, with the Lord saying in his Gospel: "if the Son frees you, then you will truly be free" (John 8:36)—free, certainly, for living well and justly. For free choice has so not perished in the sinner, that through it they sin—especially all who sin with delight and with love of sin, and to whom that pleases which delights them. Whence the Apostle: "when you were," he says, "slaves of sin, you were free of justice" (Rom 6:20).
Iulianum.1.94Ecce ostenduntur etiam peccato minime potuisse, nisi alia libertate, servire. Liberi ergo a iustitia non sunt, nisi arbitrio libertatis; liberi autem a peccato non fiunt, nisi gratia Salvatoris. Propter quod admirabilis Doctor etiam verba ipsa discrevit: "m enim servi essetis - inquit <197> peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae. Quem ergo tunc fructum habuistis in his, in quibus nunc erubescitis? Nam finis illorum mors est; nunc autem liberati a peccato, servi autem facti Dei, habetis fructum vestrum in sanctificationem, finem vero vitam aeternam " (Rom 6, 20-22).
Behold, they are shown to have been able to serve sin too by no other than another freedom. They are not, then, free of justice except by the freedom of choice; but they are not made free of sin except by the grace of the Savior. On account of which the admirable Doctor distinguished even the very words: "for when," he says, "you were slaves of sin, you were free of justice. What fruit, then, did you have then in those things of which you are now ashamed? For the end of them is death; but now freed from sin, and made slaves of God, you have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end eternal life" (Rom 6:20-22).
Iulianum.1.94Liberos dixit iustitiae, non liberatos; a peccato autem non liberos, ne sibi hoc tribuerent, sed vigilantissime maluit dicere liberatos; referens hoc ad illam Domini sententiam: " vos Filius liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis ". Cum itaque non vivant bene filii hominum, nisi effecti filii Dei, quid est quod iste libero arbitrio vultbene vivendi tribuere potestatem; cum enim haec potestas non detur nisi "atia Dei, per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum " (Rom 7, 25), dicente Evangelio: "Quotquot autem receperunt eum, dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri " (Io 1, 12; C. duas epp. Pelag. 1, 2, 4).
He said free of justice, not freed; but of sin not free, lest they should ascribe this to themselves, but most vigilantly he preferred to say freed; referring this to that sentence of the Lord: "if the Son frees you, then you will truly be free." Since, then, the children of men do not live well unless made children of God, what is it that this man wishes to attribute to free choice the power of living well; when this power is not given except "by the grace of God, through Jesus Christ our Lord" (Rom 7:25), with the Gospel saying: "but as many as received him, to them he gave the power to become children of God" (John 1:12; C. duas epp. Pelag. 1, 2, 4).
Iulianum.1.94Et item post modicum: Datur ergo, inquis, potestas ut filii Dei fiant, qui credunt in eum. Quae potestas, nisi detur a Deo, nulla esse potest ex libero arbitrio; quia nec liberum in bono erit, quod liberator non liberaverit; sed in malum liberum habet arbitrium, cui delectationem malitiae vel occultus vel manifestus deceptor insevit, vel sibi ipse persuasit.
And likewise after a little: Power, then, you say, is given that they may become children of God, who believe in him. Which power, unless it be given by God, can be none from free choice; because what the liberator has not freed will not be free in good; but it has free choice toward evil, into which a deceiver, whether hidden or manifest, has implanted the delight of malice, or it has persuaded itself.
Iulianum.1.94Non itaque, sicut dicunt nos quidam dicere, et iste audet insuper scribere, omnes in peccatum, velut inviti, carnis suae necessitate coguntur; sed si iam in ea aetate sunt, ut propriae mentis utantur arbitrio, et in peccato sua voluntate retinentur, et a peccato in peccatum sua voluntate praecipitantur. Sed haec voluntas, quae libera est in malis, quia delectatur malis, ideo libera in bonis non est, quia liberata non est. Nec potest homo boni aliquid velle, nisi adiuvetur ab eo qui malum non potest velle (C. duas epp. Pelag. 1, 6-7).
Not, then—as some say we say, and this man dares besides to write—are all compelled into sin, as though unwilling, by the necessity of their flesh; but if they are now of that age that they use the choice of their own mind, both they are retained in sin by their own will, and they are hurled headlong from sin to sin by their own will. But this will, which is free in evil things, because it delights in evil things, is for that reason not free in good things, because it has not been freed. Nor can a man will any good thing, unless he is helped by him who cannot will evil (C. duas epp. Pelag. 1, 6-7).
Iulianum.1.94In his omnibus verbis tuis, quae posui, ita video gratiae nomen cum liberi arbitrii negatione consertum, ut non tam mala sensus tui appellationum bonis vindicari queant, quam dignitas nominum dogmatum tuorum adhaesione vilescat. Non ergo te his sermonibus honestasti, sed ornamenta ipsa turpasti. Nos tamen ea quae a te iuncta sunt, separamus, ut gratiae divinitas ab scaevis colligationibus enodata, nec responsione quatiatur; et gravitate Catholicorum, non Manichaeorum adulatione laudetur. Gratiam ergo Christi multiplicem confitemur. Primum munus eius est, quod facti ex nihilo sumus. Secundum, quod ut viventibus sensu, ita sentientibus ratione praestamus; quae impressa est animo, ut Conditoris imago doceretur: ad cuius aeque respicit dignitatem arbitrii concessa libertas.
In all these words of yours, which I have set down, I so see the name of grace knit together with the denial of free choice, that the evil things of your sense can not so be vindicated by the good names, as the dignity of the names is cheapened by the adherence of your doctrines. Not, then, did you honor yourself by these discourses, but you befouled the very ornaments. We, however, separate the things which have been joined by you, so that the divinity of grace, untangled from these awkward bindings, may neither be shaken by a reply; and may be praised by the gravity of catholics, not by the flattery of Manicheans. We confess, then, the grace of Christ to be manifold. His first gift is that we have been made from nothing. The second, that we excel the living by sense, as the sentient by reason; which has been impressed upon the mind, so that it might be taught the image of its Creator: to whose dignity the granted freedom of choice equally looks.
Iulianum.1.94Ipsi etiam gratiae beneficiorum quae nobis praestare non desinit, augmenta reputamus. Ipsa gratia legem in adiutorium misit (Isa 8, 20 (sec. LXX)); ad eius spectabat officium, ut rationis lumen, quod pravitatis exempla hebetabant et consuetudo vitiorum, multimodis eruditionibus excitaret, atque invitatu suo foveret. Ad istius ergo gratiae, id est, divinae benevolentiae, quae rebus causam dedit, plenitudinem spectavit, ut Verbum caro fieret, et habitaret in nobis (Cf. Io 1, 14). Reposcens enim Deus ab imagine sua amoris vicem, palam fecit quam totum in nos inaestimabili egisset affectu, ut vel sero redamaremus eum, qui commendans caritatem suam nobis (Cf. Rom 5, 8), Filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis illum tradidit (Rom 8, 32); pollicens quia si voluissemus deinceps voluntati eius oboedire, Unigeniti sui praestaret nos esse cohaeredes (Cf. Rom 8, 17).
We reckon among the gifts of grace also the increases of the benefits which it does not cease to bestow upon us. This grace itself sent the law as a help (Isa 8:20 (sec. LXX)); to its office it pertained, that it should rouse with manifold instructions the light of reason, which the examples of depravity and the habit of vices blunted, and should cherish it with its invitation. To the fullness of this grace, then—that is, of the divine benevolence which gave a cause to things—it looked, that the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us (Cf. John 1:14). For God, demanding from his image a return of love, made plain how wholly, with inestimable affection, he had acted toward us, that we might at least belatedly love in return him who, commending his love toward us (Cf. Rom 5:8), did not spare his own Son, but handed him over for us (Rom 8:32); promising that if we should henceforth be willing to obey his will, he would grant that we be coheirs of his Only-begotten (Cf. Rom 8:17).
Iulianum.1.94AUG. Homo Pelagiane, caritas vult bonum, et caritas ex Deo est; non per legis litteram, sed per spiritum gratiae. In hoc est praedestinatis adiutorium littera, quia iubendo et non iuvando, admonet infirmos confugere ad spiritum gratiae. Sic lege legitime utuntur, quibus bona est (Cf. 1 Tim 1, 8), id est, utilis; alioquin per se ipsam littera occidit (Cf. 2 Cor 3, 6); quia iubendo bonum, et non largiendo caritatem, quae sola vult bonum, reos praevaricationis facit.
AUG. Pelagian man, love wills good, and love is from God; not through the letter of the law, but through the spirit of grace. In this the letter is a help to the predestined, because, by commanding and not helping, it admonishes the weak to flee to the spirit of grace. Thus they use the law lawfully, to whom it is good (Cf. 1 Tim 1:8), that is, useful; otherwise, by itself the letter kills (Cf. 2 Cor 3:6); because, by commanding good, and not bestowing the love which alone wills good, it makes them guilty of transgression.
Iulianum.1.9495. IUL. Haec ergo gratia, quae in Baptismate non solum peccata condonat, sed cum hoc indulgentiae beneficio, et provehit, et adoptat, et consecrat; haec, inquam, gratia, meritum mutat reorum, non liberum condit arbitrium; quod eo accipimus tempore, quo creamur; utimur autem, quo valentiam inter bonum et malum discretionis adipiscimur. Bonae itaque voluntati innumeras adiutorii divini adesse species non negamus; sed ita ut non per adiutorii genera aut fabricetur, quae fuerit arbitrii destructa libertas, aut aliquando ea exclusa, vel boni vel mali cuiquam necessitas credatur incumbere; verum arbitrio libero omne adiutorium cooperatur.
95. JUL. This grace, then, which in Baptism not only pardons sins, but, with this benefit of indulgence, both advances, and adopts, and consecrates; this grace, I say, changes the merit of the guilty, does not found free choice; which we receive at the time when we are created, but use when we attain the strength of discernment between good and evil. We do not, then, deny that to the good will there are present innumerable kinds of divine help; but in such a way that neither, through the kinds of help, is there fashioned a freedom of choice that was destroyed, nor, that freedom being at any time excluded, is a necessity of either good or evil to be believed to press upon anyone; but every help cooperates with free choice.
Iulianum.1.95AUG. Si non praevenit, ut operetur eam, sed prius exsistenti voluntati gratia cooperatur, quomodo verum est: Deus in vobis operatur et velle (Phil 2, 13)? Quomodo: Praeparatur voluntas a Domino (Prov 8, 35 (sec. LXX))? Quomodo: Caritas ex Deo est (1 Io 4, 7), quae sola vult beatificum bonum? Aut si scientia legis et eloquiorum Dei caritatem operatur in nobis, ut non per donum Dei, sed per nostrae voluntatis arbitrium diligamus, quod esse diligendum Deo docente cognoscimus; quomodo res minor ex Deo nobis est, et maior ex nobis? Quia sine Deo donante scientiam, hoc est docente, nosse non possumus; illo autem caritatem quae supereminet scientiae (Cf. Eph 3, 19), non donante, diligere possumus. Sic non sapiunt, nisi novi haeretici et gratiae Dei nimis inimici.
AUG. If it does not go before, so as to work it, but grace cooperates with a will already existing, how is it true: God works in you even to will (Phil 2:13)? How: The will is prepared by the Lord (Prov 8:35 (sec. LXX))? How: Love is from God (1 John 4:7), which alone wills the beatific good? Or if the knowledge of the law and of the words of God works love in us, so that not through the gift of God, but through the choice of our will we love what we recognize, with God teaching, ought to be loved; how is the lesser thing from God to us, and the greater from ourselves? For without God giving knowledge, that is, teaching, we cannot know; but without him giving the love which surpasses knowledge (Cf. Eph 3:19), we can love. None think thus, except the new heretics and the too-great enemies of the grace of God.
Iulianum.1.9596. IUL. Hoc ergo arbitrium liberum, propter quod solum nos manifestari ante tribunal Christi, Magister Gentium scribit, ut reportet unusquisque propria corporis prout gessit, sive bonum, sive malum (2 Cor 5, 10), sicut Catholici quidem confitentur; ita vos non solum cum Manichaeo, sed etiam cum Ioviniano, quem nobis audes impingere, diverso quidem genere, sed impietate simili denegatis. Quod ut planius fiat, divisionum adhibeatur examen. Nos dicimus peccato hominis, non naturae statum mutari, sed meriti qualitatem; id est, et in peccante hanc esse liberi arbitrii naturam, per quam potest a peccato desinere, quae fuit in eo ut posset a iustitia deviare.
96. JUL. This free choice, then—on account of which alone the Teacher of the gentiles writes that we are made manifest before the tribunal of Christ, that each one may carry back the things proper to the body, according as he has done, whether good or evil (2 Cor 5:10)—as the catholics indeed confess, so you deny, not only with the Manichean, but even with Jovinian (whom you dare to fasten upon us), by a diverse kind indeed, but a like impiety. That this may be made plainer, let the examination of divisions be applied. We say that by the sin of man not the state of nature is changed, but the quality of merit; that is, both in the sinner there is this nature of free choice, through which he can cease from sin, which was in him so that he could deviate from justice.
Iulianum.1.96AUG. Scimus vos ideo dicere, peccato hominis naturae statum non mutari, quia deseruistis fidem catholicam, quae dicit primum hominem sic factum, ut non haberet moriendi necessitatem; peccato autem ita hunc statum naturae fuisse mutatum, ut hominem necesse sit mori, usque adeo ut etiam spiritu iam regeneratis atque vivificatis Apostolus dicat: Si Christus in vobis est, corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum, spiritus autem vita est propter iustitiam; si ergo spiritus eius, qui suscitavit Iesum ex mortuis, habitat in vobis; qui suscitavit Iesum Christum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra per inhabitantem spiritum eius in vobis (Rom 8, 10-11).
AUG. We know that you say for this reason that the state of nature is not changed by the sin of man, because you have deserted the catholic faith, which says that the first man was so made that he did not have a necessity of dying; but that by sin this state of nature was so changed that it is necessary for man to die, to such a degree that, even to those already regenerated and vivified by the spirit, the Apostle says: If Christ is in you, the body indeed is dead on account of sin, but the spirit is life on account of justice; if, then, the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Jesus Christ from the dead will vivify also your mortal bodies, through his Spirit dwelling in you (Rom 8:10-11).
Iulianum.1.96Ideo utique dixit: Vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra, quod in carnis resurrectione speramus, quia dixerat: Corpus mortuum est propter peccatum; et vos non vultis peccato statum mutatum esse naturae. Verumtamen Pelagio cum in Palaestino iudicio fuisset obiectum, quod diceret infantes nuper natos in eo statu esse, in quo Adam fuit ante peccatum, negavit se dicere, idque damnavit (Cf. De gestis Pelag. 11, 23-24). Quod si fecisset corde veraci, iam fortasse vestra haeresis interisset; postremo ipse saltem fuisset ab illa peste sanatus. Deinde quaero utrum vitio careat natura peccatrix; quod si absurdissimum est, habet ergo vitium; si habet vitium, procul dubio vitiata est.
For he said this for this reason: He will vivify also your mortal bodies, which we hope for in the resurrection of the flesh, because he had said: The body is dead on account of sin; and you are unwilling that the state of nature was changed by sin. Nevertheless, when it was objected to Pelagius in the Palestinian trial that he said newly born infants are in that state in which Adam was before sin, he denied that he said it, and condemned it (Cf. De gestis Pelag. 11, 23-24). If he had done this with a true heart, perhaps your heresy would already have perished; at least he himself would have been healed of that plague. Then I ask whether the sinful nature is free of vice; which if it is most absurd, then it has a vice; if it has a vice, without doubt it has been vitiated.
Iulianum.1.96Quomodo ergo mutata non est, quae cum fuisset sana, vitiata est? Ac per hoc, etiam excepto peccato illo, de quo Ioannes Constantinopolitanus ait: Adam peccavit illud grande peccatum, et omnes in commune damnavit (IOANNES CONSTANTINOP., Ep. ad Olymp. 3, 3);
How, then, was it not changed, which, when it had been sound, was vitiated? And by this, even apart from that sin of which John of Constantinople says: Adam committed that great sin, and condemned all in common (IOANNES CONSTANTINOP., Ep. ad Olymp. 3, 3);
Iulianum.1.96et illo ergo excepto, de quo damnationem humana natura originaliter trahit, quomodo sobrie dici potest, statum naturae in homine non fuisse mutatum, qui dicit: Lex spiritalis est, ego autem carnalis sum, venundatus sub peccato; quod enim operor, ignoro; non enim quod volo, ago (Rom 7, 14-15), et cetera huiusmodi; etiam si hanc mutationem non in eo nascendi traxit conditio, sed, ut vultis, contraxit consuetudo peccandi?
even that, then, excepted, from which human nature draws condemnation originally, how can it be soberly said that the state of nature was not changed in man, who says: The law is spiritual, but I am carnal, sold under sin; for what I work, I do not understand; for it is not what I will that I do (Rom 7:14-15), and other things of this kind; even if he drew this change not by the condition of being born, but, as you wish, contracted it by the habit of sinning?
Iulianum.1.96Cernitisne, vanum esse quod dicitis, peccato hominis non naturae statum mutari, sed meriti qualitatem? Nisi forte dicatis, non naturam peccato mutari, sed hominem. Et quid est hoc, nisi hominem negare esse naturam? Quando ista diceretis, si cogitaretis sana mente quod dicitis?
Do you see that it is empty, what you say, that by the sin of man not the state of nature is changed, but the quality of merit? Unless perhaps you say that nature is not changed by sin, but man. And what is this, except to deny that man is a nature? When would you say these things, if you considered with a sound mind what you say?
Iulianum.1.9697. IUL. Manichaeus dicit, voluntatem malam ab ea inspirari natura, quae bonum velle non potest; voluntatem vero bonam ab ea infundi natura, quae malum velle non potest; ita utique naturis singularum rerum imponit necessitatem, ut propriae voluntates non possint velle contraria. Inter nos et illum certe grande chaos est; videamus nunc quantum ab eo tu recesseris. Dicis esse liberam voluntatem, sed ut malum tantummodo faciat, non autem esse in hoc liberam, ut malum desistat operari, nisi ei fuerit imposita necessitas volendi bonum, ab ea natura, quae, ut tuis utar sermonibus: malum non potest velle (C. duas epp. Pelag. 1, 7). Definis ergo genus hominum per liberum arbitrium nihil aliud quam peccare, nec aliud posse facere. Per quod absolute pronuntias, humanam naturam unum semper cupere quod malum est, et velle non posse contrarium; naturam autem Dei malum non posse velle; et ideo, nisi necessitatis suae participem fecerit malam hominum naturam, bonum in ea actionis esse non posse. Post haec itaque utrum non multum ames Manichaeum, in cordis tui secreto Deus viderit; quantum tamen ex dogmatum germanitate monstratur, nihil aliud prorsus egisti, quam ut ordine commutato idem quod ille affirmarat adstrueres.
97. JUL. The Manichean says that an evil will is inspired by that nature which cannot will good; but a good will is poured in by that nature which cannot will evil; thus indeed he imposes upon the natures of single things a necessity, so that their wills cannot will contrary things. Between us and him there is certainly a great chasm; let us now see how far you have receded from him. You say that the will is free, but only so that it does evil; but that it is not free in this, that it should cease to do evil, unless there be imposed upon it a necessity of willing good, by that nature which—to use your words—cannot will evil (C. duas epp. Pelag. 1, 7). You define, then, the kind of human beings through free choice to do nothing else than to sin, nor to be able to do anything else. By which you absolutely pronounce that human nature always craves the one thing which is evil, and cannot will the contrary; but the nature of God cannot will evil; and therefore, unless it makes the evil nature of human beings a partaker of its necessity, there can be no good of action in it. After these things, then, whether you do not greatly love the Manichean, God will see in the secret of your heart; yet, so far as is shown by the kinship of your doctrines, you have done absolutely nothing else than, with the order changed, to build up the very thing he had affirmed.
Iulianum.1.97AUG. Utinam Manichaeum fortiter destrueres, non turpiter adiuvares! Ille namque nimia perversus insania non dicit naturam mali cogi bene facere ab alia natura boni, quae malum non potest velle; sed naturam boni cogi male facere ab ea natura mali, quae bonum non potest velle; ac per hoc mirabiliter demens naturam mali vult esse immutabilem, mutabilem vero naturam boni.
AUG. Would that you would strongly destroy the Manichean, not basely help him! For he, perverted by excessive madness, does not say that the nature of evil is compelled to do well by another nature of good, which cannot will evil; but that the nature of good is compelled to do evil by that nature of evil, which cannot will good; and by this, wondrously demented, he wishes the nature of evil to be unchangeable, but the nature of good changeable.
Iulianum.1.97Proinde, voluntatem malam ab ea inspirari natura, quae bonum velle non potest, certum est dicere Manichaeum; voluntatem vero bonam ab ea infundi natura, quae malum velle non potest, non dicit Manichaeus, sicut tu de illo mitius suspicaris; quoniam boni naturam nullo modo immutabilem credit, quae malum velle non possit, cui credit inspirari voluntatem malam ab ea natura, quae bonum non potest velle; itaque fieri per mali naturam, ut malum velit boni natura, quam nihil vult esse aliud quam naturam Dei.
Accordingly, that an evil will is inspired by that nature which cannot will good, it is certain that the Manichean says; but that a good will is poured in by that nature which cannot will evil, the Manichean does not say, as you more mildly suspect of him; since he in no way believes the nature of good to be unchangeable, which cannot will evil—the nature into which he believes an evil will is inspired by that nature which cannot will good; and so it comes about, through the nature of evil, that the nature of good wills evil, which he wishes to be nothing other than the nature of God.
Iulianum.1.97Tu ergo hunc adiuvas, negando humanam peccato primi hominis vitiatam esse naturam, ut naturae mali, quam fingit, attribuat, quidquid malorum in manifestissima invenit miseria parvulorum. Deinde cum displicet tibi, hominem non posse bonum velle, nisi adiuvetur ab eo qui malum non potest velle, nonne respicis ei te contradicere, qui dixit: Sine me nihil potestis facere (Io 15, 5); et Scripturae, ubi legitur: Paratur voluntas a Domino (Prov 8, 35 (sec. LXX)); et ubi legitur: Deus est enim qui operatur in nobis et velle (Phil 2, 13); et ubi legitur: A Domino gressus hominis dirigentur, et viam eius volet (Ps 36, 23)? Ubi nihil miror, nisi unde te Christianum dicas, cum his divinis tot et tam claris vocibus contradicas.
You, then, help this man, by denying that human nature was vitiated by the sin of the first man, so that he may attribute to the nature of evil, which he fabricates, whatever of evils he finds in the most manifest misery of little ones. Then, since it displeases you that a man cannot will good unless he is helped by him who cannot will evil, do you not consider that you contradict him who said: Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5); and the Scripture, where it is read: The will is prepared by the Lord (Prov 8:35 (sec. LXX)); and where it is read: For it is God who works in us even to will (Phil 2:13); and where it is read: By the Lord the steps of a man will be directed, and he will will his way (Ps 37:23 (36:23))? At which I wonder at nothing, except whence you call yourself a Christian, when you contradict these divine words, so many and so clear.
Iulianum.1.9798. IUL. Ioviniano autem in una parte coniungeris; nam dicit in secundo operis sui libro, baptizatum hominem non posse peccare; ante Baptisma autem et peccare et non peccare posse. Tecum ergo putat, a tempore Baptismatis imponi hominibus necessitatem boni; quod aeque falsum est, quam quod tu putas, ante Baptisma inesse hominibus necessitatem faciendi mali. Nam cum dicis tu: Non potest homo boni aliquid velle, nisi adiuvetur ab eo, qui malum non potest velle (C. duas epp. Pelag. 1, 7); participatione utique gratiae et naturae bonae vis hominem possibilitatem consequi faciendi boni; quod dicis tamen a tempore Baptismatis posse contingere. Inter impietatem igitur medius et timorem, ad Ioviniani consortium confugisti, sed Manichaei lupanar necdum reliquisti. Verumtamen tanto te innocentior Iovinianus, quanto Ioviniano profanior Manichaeus.
98. JUL. With Jovinian, moreover, you are joined in one part; for he says, in the second book of his work, that a baptized man cannot sin; but before Baptism he can both sin and not sin. With you, then, he thinks that from the time of Baptism a necessity of good is imposed on men; which is equally false as what you think, that before Baptism there is in men a necessity of doing evil. For when you say: A man cannot will any good thing, unless he is helped by him who cannot will evil (C. duas epp. Pelag. 1, 7); by the participation, certainly, of grace and of the good nature, you wish a man to attain the possibility of doing good; which you say, nonetheless, can happen from the time of Baptism. Between impiety, then, and fear, you have fled in the middle to the fellowship of Jovinian, but you have not yet left the brothel of the Manichean. Nevertheless, by so much is Jovinian more innocent than you, by as much as the Manichean is more profane than Jovinian.
Iulianum.1.98Ut enim adhuc brevius quod egimus colligatur, Manichaeus dicit: In omnibus hominibus inspiratrix malae voluntatis tenebrarum natura delinquit, et aliud facere non potest. Tu dicis: In cunctis hominibus primi peccati tenebris infecta, et per hoc malae voluntatis auctor natura delinquit, et bonum velle non potest. Iovinianus dicit: Voluntas quidem hominum, sed usque ad Baptisma delinquit; postea autem nisi bonum velle non potest. Catholici, id est nos, dicimus, quod ab initio usque ad finem sine aliquo naturalium coactu, voluntas et ante Baptisma in unoquoque delinquit, quae illo ipso tempore quo peccat, potestatem habet recedere a malo, et facere bonum, ut constet ratio libertatis.
For that what we have done may be gathered yet more briefly: the Manichean says: In all human beings the nature of darkness, the inspirer of the evil will, offends, and can do nothing else. You say: In all human beings nature, infected by the darkness of the first sin, and through this the author of the evil will, offends, and cannot will good. Jovinian says: The will indeed of human beings, but up to Baptism, offends; but afterward it cannot will anything but good. The catholics, that is, we, say that from the beginning to the end, without any compulsion of natural things, the will offends, even before Baptism, in each one—the will which, at that very time when it sins, has the power to withdraw from evil, and to do good, so that the account of freedom may stand.
Iulianum.1.98Vestrum itaque nulli quidem veritas dogmatum constat; tamen cum ab uno principio erroris fueritis egressi, vel minus inhonestum erat, si quae consequuntur admitteres, et quia cum Manichaeo dicis, natura mala, id est, manca libertate delinqui, diceres cum eodem, nullo illam pacto posse mundari; quod quidem alibi affirmas; sed quod necessario consequebatur, adiungeres ideo ei opus non esse baptismatis sacramentis. Aut si cum Ioviniano, a tempore susceptae fidei imprimi asseris bonas cupiditates; diceres cum eodem, bonam et ante Baptisma fuisse naturam, quae licet haberet possibilitatem mali, non tamen habuerit necessitatem, ac per hoc ad indissimulabile bonum consecrata pervenerit. Hoc enim modo, etsi rationi, nequaquam tamen eorum, quos sequeris, dogmatibus contravenires.
The truth of your doctrines, then, stands for none of you; yet, since you have gone forth from one principle of error, it would have been less dishonorable, if you admitted the things that follow, and—because you say with the Manichean that there is offending by an evil, that is, a maimed freedom—you said with the same that it can in no way be cleansed (which indeed you affirm elsewhere); but you added what necessarily followed, that therefore there is no need for it of the sacraments of baptism. Or if, with Jovinian, you assert that from the time of receiving the faith good desires are impressed; you said with the same that nature was good even before Baptism, which, though it had the possibility of evil, yet did not have the necessity, and by this came, consecrated, to an undissembling good. For in this way, even if you would not contravene reason, you would yet by no means contravene the doctrines of those whom you follow.
Iulianum.1.98AUG. Oblitus es quid dicamus: recordare, quaeso. Nos sumus qui vobis reclamantibus dicimus, etiam iustis, quamdiu sunt in hac vita, non deesse, unde in oratione sua de se ipsis veraciter dicant: Dimitte nobis debita nostra (Mt 6, 12). Quoniam si dixerint se non habere peccatum, se ipsos decipiunt, et veritas in eis non est (Cf. 1 Io 1, 8). Quid est ergo quod inaniter loqueris, me Ioviniano in ea parte coniungi, qua dicit baptizatum hominem non posse peccare? Absit ut tam simus surdi et muti, ut non audiamus eorum qui baptizati sunt vocem, vel non cum eis dicamus: Dimitte nobis debita nostra. Ex quo autem homo incipit uti voluntatis arbitrio, et peccare et non peccare potest; sed alterum horum non facit, nisi adiutus ab eo qui dixit: Sine me nihil potestis facere (Io 15, 5); alterum vero propria voluntate, sive a se ipso, sive ab alio deceptore seductus, vel peccato sicut servus addictus.
AUG. You have forgotten what we say: recall it, I beg. We are they who, against your protests, say that even to the just, as long as they are in this life, there is not lacking that on account of which, in their prayer, they truly say of themselves: Forgive us our debts (Matt 6:12). For if they say they have no sin, they deceive themselves, and the truth is not in them (Cf. 1 John 1:8). What is it, then, that you say emptily, that I am joined with Jovinian in that part where he says a baptized man cannot sin? Far be it that we should be so deaf and dumb that we should not hear the voice of those who are baptized, or should not say with them: Forgive us our debts. But from the time a man begins to use the choice of the will, he can both sin and not sin; but he does not do one of these except helped by him who said: Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5); but the other by his own will, whether seduced by himself, or by another deceiver, or assigned as a slave to sin.
Iulianum.1.98Adiutos autem homines novimus Dei spiritu, ut ea vellent quae Dei sunt, et ante Baptismum, sicut Cornelium (Cf. Act 10, 1-3); quosdam vero nec post Baptismum, sicut Simonem Magum (Cf. Act 8, 9-13. 18-24). Iudicia enim Dei sicut multa abyssus (Ps 35, 7); et gratia eius non ex operibus; alioquin gratia iam non est gratia (Cf. Rom 11, 6).
But we know that men are helped by the Spirit of God, so that they will the things that are of God, even before Baptism, as Cornelius (Cf. Acts 10:1-3); but some not even after Baptism, as Simon Magus (Cf. Acts 8:9-13. 18-24). For the judgments of God are like a great abyss (Ps 36:6 (35:7)); and his grace is not of works; otherwise grace is no longer grace (Cf. Rom 11:6).
Iulianum.1.98Desine igitur conviciari nobis de Manichaeo et Ioviniano; quibus enim convicieris in nobis, quos subsecuti negare non possumus originale peccatum, videres, si oculos haberes, et taceres, si frontem haberes. Sic autem calumniosus es, tu alibi affirmasse me dicas, a peccatis hominem non posse mundari; cum ita dicam posse, ut eo quoque perducatur, ubi beatissimus peccare non possit.
Cease, then, to revile us with the Manichean and Jovinian; for those whom you would revile in us—whom, following them, we cannot deny original sin—you would see, if you had eyes, and would be silent, if you had a brow. But you are so slanderous that you say I affirmed elsewhere that a man cannot be cleansed from sins; whereas I say he can, in such a way that he is even led to that point where, most blessed, he cannot sin.
Iulianum.1.9899. IUL. Nunc autem omnibus perfidus, dicis factam in natura carnis peccati necessitatem.
99. JUL. But now, faithless in all things, you say that a necessity has been made in the nature of the flesh of sin.
Iulianum.1.99AUG. Tu nega dixisse Apostolum: Cum essetis servi peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae (Rom 6, 20). Aut si hoc ab eo dictum esse non negas, non eum recte dixisse redargue. Si autem non audes, nega, si potes, eos quibus hoc dixit, habuisse in malis liberam voluntatem, quando fuerunt liberi iustitiae; aut habuisse liberam in bonis, quando fuerunt servi peccati; et ab hac servitute eos aude dicere per se ipsos, non per Dei gratiam liberatos, quibus dicitur: Nunc autem liberati a peccato, servi facti estis iustitiae (Rom 6, 18).
AUG. Deny that the Apostle said: When you were slaves of sin, you were free of justice (Rom 6:20). Or if you do not deny that this was said by him, refute that he said it rightly. But if you dare not, deny, if you can, that those to whom he said this had a free will in evil things, when they were free of justice; or that they had a free will in good things, when they were slaves of sin; and dare to say that they were freed from this slavery by themselves, not by the grace of God—those to whom it is said: But now freed from sin, you have been made slaves of justice (Rom 6:18).
Iulianum.1.99Si autem dicis, a reatu praeteritorum malorum, non a dominatu peccati, quo quisque iustus esse non sinitur, eos fuisse Dei gratia liberatos; ut autem eis non dominaretur peccatum, ipsos facere potuisse si vellent, neque ad hoc indiguisse gratia Salvatoris; ubi ponis eum qui dicit: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 19)? Si enim sub lege, non sub gratia constitutus haec loquitur; istum nega sub gravi necessitatis pondere ingemere; hunc ad bene vivendum et ad recte agendum per voluntatis arbitrium assere liberum, clamantem tibi: Mentiris, aut falleris; non quod volo, ago. Si autem, sicut melius sensit Ambrosius, hoc etiam de se ipso dicit Apostolus; nec iustorum est in hac vita ad perficiendum bonum tanta libertas propriae voluntatis, quanta erit in illa vita, ubi non dicetur: Non quod volo, ago.
But if you say that they were freed by the grace of God from the guilt of past evils, not from the dominion of sin, by which one is not permitted to be just; but that, that sin should not have dominion over them, they themselves could do, if they willed, nor needed for this the grace of the Savior; where do you place him who says: It is not the good I will that I do, but the evil I do not will, this I do (Rom 7:19)? For if, established under the law, not under grace, he speaks these things, deny that this man groans under the heavy weight of necessity; assert that this man is free for living well and acting rightly through the choice of the will—he who cries out to you: You lie, or you are deceived; it is not what I will that I do. But if, as Ambrose better understood, the Apostle says this even of himself; then there is not in this life such freedom of the just for accomplishing good by their own will as there will be in that life, where it will not be said: It is not what I will that I do.
Iulianum.1.99100. IUL. Ut possessione aeternitatis amissa (quam quidem numquam eam per exortum sui constat habuisse), voluntas appetendae iugiter pravitatis incumberet. Et adiungis: Voluntas quae libera est in malis, libera in bonis non est; non minore plane stultitiae professione, quam profanitatis, liberum vocas, quod dicis nisi unum velle non posse.
100. JUL. So that, with the possession of eternity lost (which indeed it is established it never had through its own origin), the will should incline assiduously to the seeking of depravity. And you add: The will which is free in evil things, is not free in good things; with no less a profession plainly of folly than of profanity, you call free that which you say can will only one thing.
Iulianum.1.100AUG. Si liberum non est, nisi quod duo potest velle, id est, et bonum et malum; liber Deus non est, qui malum non potest velle, de quo etiam ipse dixisti, verumque dixisti: Deus esse nisi iustus non potest (Cf. supra 28). Siccine Deum laudas, ut ei auferas libertatem? An potius intellegere debes esse quamdam beatam necessitatem, qua Deus iniustus non potest esse?
AUG. If nothing is free except what can will two things, that is, both good and evil; God is not free, who cannot will evil, of whom you yourself too said, and said truly: God cannot be anything except just (Cf. supra 28). Do you so praise God that you take away from him freedom? Or rather, ought you to understand that there is a certain blessed necessity, by which God cannot be unjust?
Iulianum.1.100101. IUL. Sed licet nulla ex parte constes, tamen quid attuleris prudens lector attendat. Consentiamus voluntatem liberam dici posse, quae bonum velle non potest; hanc autem voluntatem in Baptismate asseris liberari. Interrogo, ad quem modum liberatur? Ut bonum semper velle cogatur, et malum velle non possit? An ut utrumque possit appetere? Hic tu si responderis: Ut bonum semper velle cogatur; quam sis Iovinianista, etiam ipse cognoscis. Si autem dixeris: Quomodo potest esse voluntas libera, si bonum semper velle cogatur? Respondeo: Quomodo dicebatur ante voluntas libera, si malum velle tantummodo cogebatur? Si ergo responderis, sic fieri post Baptisma liberam voluntatem, ut et peccare et non peccare possit; hoc ipso pronuntiabis liberum arbitrium non fuisse, cum utrumque non poterat. Clauderis undique disputationis tuae laqueis; arbitrium ante Baptisma liberum fuit; facultatem habuit faciendi boni, sicut facultatem habuit faciendi mali; et omnis dogmatis tui, quo malum naturale persuades, scena collabitur.
101. JUL. But although you stand firm in no part, yet let the prudent reader attend to what you have brought forward. Let us agree that a will can be called free which cannot will good; but you assert that this will is freed in Baptism. I ask, in what manner is it freed? So that it is compelled always to will good, and cannot will evil? Or so that it can crave either? Here, if you answer: So that it is compelled always to will good; how much of a Jovinianist you are, you yourself too recognize. But if you say: How can a will be free, if it is compelled always to will good? I answer: How was it before said to be a free will, if it was compelled only to will evil? If, then, you answer that the free will is so made free after Baptism that it can both sin and not sin; by this very thing you will pronounce that there was no free choice, when it could not do both. You are shut in on every side by the snares of your own disputation; choice before Baptism was free; it had the faculty of doing good, just as it had the faculty of doing evil; and the whole stage-set of your doctrine, by which you persuade a natural evil, collapses.
Iulianum.1.101AUG. De Manichaeo et Ioviniano iam me tibi supe us inveniet respondisse qui legerit; quomodo autem dicas eum, cuius voluntatem nos dicimus a Domino praeparari, ita fieri bonae voluntatis, ut bonum velle cogatur (quod absit ut dicatur a nobis), viderit praeclara intellegentia tua. Si enim cogitur, non vult; et quid absurdius, quam ut dicatur nolens velle quod bonum est? De natura etiam Dei vide quid sentias, homo qui dicis cogi hominem ut bonum velit, si malum velle non possit. Numquid enim Deus cogitur velle bonum, quia velle non potest malum, quoniam est omnino immutabilis? Natura vero humana quamvis mutabilis, quantum ad id pertinet quod condita est, bona est; quae non solum sine vitio facta est, verum etiam cum per vitium mala est, capax est boni, quo bona sit. Haec vera sententia fallacem Manichaeorum evertit insaniam. In Baptismo autem ita peccata omnia dimittuntur in Dei gratia, qua et ad ipsum Baptismum homo praeparata ab illo voluntate perducitur, ut deinceps quamvis concupiscat spiritus eius adversus carnem ne consentiat iniquitati, tamen et caro concupiscat adversus spiritum, ut non faciat et ille quod vult. Vult enim et istam carnis concupiscentiam non habere, sed non potest nunc; propter quod adhuc in se ipso ingemiscit, adoptionem exspectans redemptionem corporis sui (Cf. Rom 8, 23), ubi sic habeat carnem, ut iam peccare non possit. Nunc ergo, non solum potest peccare post Baptismum, verum etiam quia et bene reluctans concupiscentiae carnis aliquando ab ea trahitur ad consensionem; et quamvis venialia, tamen aliqua peccata committit; habet cur semper hic dicat: Dimitte nobis debita nostra (Mt 6, 12). Haec quoque catholica veritas Ioviniani redarguit vanitatem. Utrumque autem, id est, et quod contra Manichaeum, et quod contra Iovinianum dicimus, haeresim vestram calumniasque subvertit.
AUG. Concerning the Manichean and Jovinian, he who reads will already find me to have answered you above; but how you say that he whose will we say is prepared by the Lord, is so made of good will that he is compelled to will good (which far be it that it be said by us), let your splendid understanding see to it. For if he is compelled, he does not will; and what is more absurd than to say that one unwilling wills what is good? Concerning the nature of God too, see what you think, you who say that a man is compelled to will good, if he cannot will evil. For is God compelled to will good, because he cannot will evil, since he is altogether unchangeable? But human nature, although changeable, as far as pertains to that which it was created, is good; which is not only made without vice, but even when through vice it is evil, is capable of the good by which it may be good. This true sentence overturns the deceptive madness of the Manicheans. But in Baptism all sins are so remitted in the grace of God—by which a man is even led to Baptism itself with a will prepared by him—that henceforth, although his spirit desires against the flesh that it may not consent to iniquity, yet also the flesh desires against the spirit, so that he too does not do what he wills. For he wills not to have this concupiscence of the flesh, but he cannot now; on account of which he still groans within himself, awaiting the adoption, the redemption of his body (Cf. Rom 8:23), where he will so have flesh that he can no longer sin. Now, then, not only can he sin after Baptism, but even because, while struggling well against the concupiscence of the flesh, he is sometimes drawn by it to consent; and although venial, yet he commits some sins; he has reason always to say here: Forgive us our debts (Matt 6:12). This catholic truth too refutes the vanity of Jovinian. But both—that is, both what we say against the Manichean, and what against Jovinian—subverts your heresy and your slanders.
Iulianum.1.101102. IUL. Sin autem liberum ante ad bonum non fuit, et factum est post Baptisma ita liberum, ut malum facere non possit; numquam quidem ei adfuit arbitrii libertas, et probatur sine reatu antea peccasse, et postea sine cura sanctitatis gloriam possidere.
102. JUL. But if it was not free toward good before, and was made after Baptism so free that it cannot do evil; then indeed the freedom of choice was never present to it, and it is proved both to have sinned beforehand without guilt, and afterward to possess the glory of sanctity without any care.
Iulianum.1.102AUG. Ergo nec in Deo est arbitrii libertas, quia malum facere non potest, sicut negare se ipsum non potest (2 Tim 2, 13), qui et nobis summo illo praemio largiturus est, ut non quidem ipsi Deo, sed tamen Angelis eius aequales, nec nos peccare possimus. Hoc enim eis post lapsum diaboli pro merito bonae voluntatis, qua in veritate steterunt, donasse credendus est, ut postea nullus per liberum arbitrium novus diabolus fieret.
AUG. Then neither in God is there freedom of choice, because he cannot do evil, just as he cannot deny himself (2 Tim 2:13)—he who will also bestow on us, by that highest reward, that we too may be unable to sin, equal not indeed to God himself, but yet to his angels. For he is to be believed to have granted this to them, after the fall of the devil, for the merit of the good will by which they stood in the truth, so that afterward none through free choice should become a new devil.
Iulianum.1.102103. IUL. Quo collecto convinceris inficiari prorsus dogmati tuo; ut promittas te liberum arbitrium non negare, quod antea mali, postea boni necessitate subvertis.
103. JUL. From which gathered, you are convicted of utterly contradicting your own doctrine; so that you promise that you do not deny free choice, which you subvert, before by a necessity of evil, afterward of good.
Iulianum.1.103AUG. Dicturus es, ut video, Deum necessitate premi, ut peccare non possit; qui utique nec potest velle, nec vult posse peccare. Immo vero, si necessitas dicenda est, qua necesse est aliquid vel esse, vel fieri; beatissima est ista omnino necessitas, qua necesse est feliciter vivere, et in eadem vita necesse est non mori, necesse est in deterius non mutari. Hac necessitate, si necessitas etiam ipsa dicenda est, non premuntur sancti Angeli, sed fruuntur; nobis autem est futura, non praesens.
AUG. You are about to say, as I see, that God is pressed by necessity, so that he cannot sin; he who certainly neither can will, nor wills to be able, to sin. Nay rather, if it is to be called a necessity by which it is necessary that something either be or come about; this is altogether a most blessed necessity, by which it is necessary to live happily, and in that same life it is necessary not to die, it is necessary not to be changed for the worse. By this necessity—if it too is to be called a necessity—the holy angels are not pressed, but they enjoy it; for us, however, it is future, not present.
Iulianum.1.103104. IUL. Verumtamen, ad destructionem totam dogmatis tui proficit, ut etiam recordemur definitionum superiorum. Si peccatum non est nisi voluntas retinendi et admittendi, quod iustitia vetat et unde liberum est abstinere, nullum peccatum in rebus penitus invenitur.
104. JUL. Nevertheless, it profits toward the whole destruction of your doctrine, that we also recall the earlier definitions. If sin is nothing but the will to retain and to admit what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain, no sin at all is found in things.
Iulianum.1.104AUG. Ista definitio peccati eius est, quod peccatum tantummodo est, non quod etiam poena peccati, qua periit libertas non peccandi; a quo malo non liberat, nisi ille cui non tantum dicimus: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, verum etiam: Ne nos inferas in tentationem, sed libera nos a malo (Mt 6, 12-13).
AUG. That definition is of sin which is only sin, not which is also the penalty of sin, by which the freedom of not sinning perished; from which evil he frees not, except he to whom we say not only: Forgive us our debts, but also: Lead us not into temptation, but free us from evil (Matt 6:12-13).
Iulianum.1.104105. IUL. Nam si non imputat iustitia, nisi unde liberum est abstinere; et ante Baptisma necessitas mali est, quoniam voluntas, sicut dixisti, ad faciendum bonum non est libera, perque hoc aliud agere non potest nisi malum; ab infamia mali ipsa quam patitur necessitate defenditur; quoniam apud eam iustitiam gravari operibus suis non potest, quae non imputat malum, nisi a quo liberum est abstinere. Post Baptisma autem, si necessitas boni est, nullum utique potest esse peccatum. Vide igitur quam illud quod esse peccatum ratio demonstrat, inveniri nequeat in seminibus, quando secundum definitiones tuas iam nec in moribus invenitur.
105. JUL. For if justice does not impute except that from which one is free to abstain; and before Baptism there is a necessity of evil, since the will, as you said, is not free for doing good, and through this can do nothing else but evil; it is defended from the infamy of evil by the very necessity it suffers; since with that justice it cannot be burdened by its own works, which does not impute evil except that from which one is free to abstain. But after Baptism, if there is a necessity of good, there can certainly be no sin. See, then, how that which reason demonstrates to be sin cannot be found in the seeds, when according to your definitions it is now not even found in morals.
Iulianum.1.105AUG. Multum erras, qui vel necessitatem nullam putas esse peccandi, vel eam non intellegis illius peccati esse poenam, quod nulla necessitate commissum est. Si enim necessitas nulla peccandi est (ut omittam vim mali eius quod originaliter trahitur; hoc enim nullum esse vos vultis) quid patiebatur, quaeso, qui secundum vestrum sensum, tanta mole malae consuetudinis premebatur, ut diceret: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 19)?
AUG. You err greatly, who either think there is no necessity of sinning, or do not understand it to be the penalty of that sin which was committed with no necessity. For if there is no necessity of sinning (to omit the force of that evil which is drawn originally; for this you would have to be none), what, I ask, was he suffering who, according to your sense, was pressed by so great a mass of evil habit that he said: It is not the good I will that I do, but the evil I do not will, this I do (Rom 7:19)?
Iulianum.1.105Deinde cogitare te existimo, quid appetendum, quid vitandum sit in agenda vita, quanto labore discatur. Qui autem hoc nesciunt, ipsa boni appetendi malique vitandi ignorantia patiuntur peccandi necessitatem. Necesse est enim ut peccet, qui nesciendo quid facere debeat, quod non debet facit. De quo genere malorum Deus rogatur, ubi dicitur: Delicta iuventutis et ignorantiae meae ne memineris (Ps 24, 7). Quod genus delictorum si non imputaret Deus iustus, non ea sibi dimitti posceret homo fidelis. Unde dicit et Dei famulus Iob: Signasti peccata mea in sacculo, et annotasti si quid invitus commisi (Iob 14, 17 (sec. LXX)). Tu quoque ipse in libro novissimo tuo eorum, quos contra unum meum quattuor edidisti, ex affectionibus atque passionibus animi dicis: Evenire hominibus affectionalem qualitatem atque ita inhaerescere, ut aut magnis molitionibus, aut nullis separetur omnino (Cf. C. Iul. 6, 54). Quisquis ergo ea timiditate peccaverit, quae ab illo non potest separari, quid aliud quam necessitate peccabit?
Then I suppose you consider with how great labor it is learned what is to be sought, what to be avoided in the conduct of life. But those who do not know this, by the very ignorance of the good to be sought and the evil to be avoided, suffer a necessity of sinning. For it is necessary that he sin who, not knowing what he ought to do, does what he ought not. Of which kind of evils God is asked, where it is said: Remember not the offenses of my youth and of my ignorance (Ps 25:7 (24:7)). Which kind of offenses, if the just God did not impute, a faithful man would not ask that they be forgiven him. Whence the servant of God Job too says: You have sealed up my sins in a bag, and have noted if I have committed anything unwillingly (Job 14:17 (sec. LXX)). You yourself too, in the last book of those four you published against my one, say, concerning the affections and passions of the mind: That an affective quality befalls human beings and so inheres, that it is separated either with great efforts, or with none at all (Cf. C. Iul. 6, 54). Whoever, then, sins by that timidity which cannot be separated from him, what else will he do but sin by necessity?
Iulianum.1.105Sed vos ista peccata ex illis venire peccatis, quae nulla necessitate commissa sunt, in illo saltem conceditis, qui dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago. Qui enim, ut istam patiatur necessitatem, non nisi peccandi consuetudine premitur; procul dubio priusquam peccaret, nondum necessitate consuetudinis premebatur. Ac per hoc, etiam secundum vos, peccandi necessitas unde abstinere liberum non est, illius peccati poena est, a quo abstinere liberum fuit, quando nullum pondus necessitatis urgebat. Cur ergo non creditis tantum saltem valuisse illud primi hominis ineffabiliter grande peccatum, ut eo vitiaretur humana natura universa, quantum valet nunc in homine uno secunda natura? Sic enim a doctis appellari consuetudinem nos commemorandos putasti (Cf. supra 69). Cum igitur et illa fateamur in hominibus esse peccata, quae committuntur, non necessitate, sed voluntate, quae tantummodo peccata sunt, unde ab eis liberum est abstinere; et peccatis de ignorantiae vel affectionum necessitate venientibus, quae iam non solum peccata, verum etiam poenae sunt peccatorum, plenum sit genus humanum; quomodo dicis definitionibus nostris peccatum nec in moribus inveniri? Sed quod non vultis, audite. A peccatis omnibus sive originalibus, sive moralibus, vel quae facta sunt, vel ne fiant, non liberat nisi gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum, in quo regenerati sumus, et a quo didicimus orando dicere, non solum: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, id est, quia peccavimus; verum etiam: Ne nos inferas in tentationem (Mt 6, 12-13), id est, ne peccemus.
But you grant that these sins come from those sins which were committed by no necessity, at least in him who says: The evil I do not will, this I do. For he who, that he may suffer this necessity, is pressed only by the habit of sinning; without doubt, before he sinned, was not yet pressed by the necessity of habit. And by this, even according to you, the necessity of sinning, from which one is not free to abstain, is the penalty of that sin from which it was free to abstain, when no weight of necessity urged. Why, then, do you not believe that that ineffably great sin of the first man availed at least so much, that by it the whole of human nature was vitiated, as a second nature now avails in one man? For thus you thought we ought to be reminded that habit is called by the learned (Cf. supra 69). Since, then, we both confess that there are in men sins which are committed not by necessity, but by will, which are only sins, from which one is free to abstain; and the human race is full of sins coming from the necessity of ignorance or of the affections, which are now not only sins, but also penalties of sins; how do you say that, by our definitions, sin is not found even in morals? But hear what you are unwilling to. From all sins, whether original or moral, whether those that have been done, or that they may not be done, none frees except the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord, in whom we have been reborn, and from whom we have learned to say in prayer, not only: Forgive us our debts, that is, because we have sinned; but also: Lead us not into temptation (Matt 6:12-13), that is, that we may not sin.
Iulianum.1.105106. IUL. Verum consignata hac disputationis summa prudentis animo lectoris, excutiamus quid Baptisma tuum, quod propter solam genitalium commotionem dicis fuisse provisum, crediti sibi muneris exsequatur. Profitetur se a peccatis homines expiare, sed cum apud iustitiam causa agitur voluntatis, non pronuntiatur rea, quae aliud velle non potuit. Evanescente autem invidia reatus, etiam pompa indulgentis evanuit; quia non potest ignoscere, quod iure non potest imputare. Ac per hoc, promissionis suae frustratur effectibus; quoniam nec invenit crimina, quorum remissione laudetur; nec habet huius beneficii debitores, quo peccatorum vincula solvuntur; quia in necessitatis asylo collocatos non potest malae convincere voluntatis; per quae omnia supervacuum de ehenditur. Verum quia gratia quae a Christo provisa est, supervacua non est; rationabilis eius munificentia teneatur, per quod rea voluntas convincitur peccatoris, quae potuit utique tam bonum velle, quam malum voluit. Totum ergo figmentum necessitatis evanuit; ac per hoc, nullum est de naturae conditione peccatum; sed liberum arbitrium in natura hominum perseverat; quod ut tu cum Manichaeis negas, ita nos cum Apostolis et omnibus Catholicis confitemur.
106. JUL. But, with the sum of this disputation sealed in the mind of the prudent reader, let us shake out what your Baptism—which you say was provided on account of the mere stirring of the genitals—carries out of the office entrusted to it. It professes to expiate men from sins, but when the case of the will is tried before justice, that will is not pronounced guilty which could not will otherwise. But with the odium of guilt vanishing, the pomp too of the indulgent one vanished; for he cannot pardon what he cannot by right impute. And by this it is frustrated of the effects of its own promise; since it neither finds crimes by the remission of which it may be praised, nor has debtors of this benefit by which the bonds of sins are loosed; because it cannot convict of an evil will those placed in the sanctuary of necessity; through all which it is found superfluous. But because the grace which was provided by Christ is not superfluous, let its reasonable munificence be held, through which the guilty will of the sinner is convicted, which could surely will good as well as it willed evil. The whole fiction of necessity, then, has vanished; and by this, there is no sin from the condition of nature; but free choice abides in the nature of human beings; which, as you deny with the Manicheans, so we confess with the Apostles and all the Catholics.
Iulianum.1.106AUG. Necesse est ut peccet, a quo ignoratur iustitia; numquid ideo cum iustitiam cognoverit, non sunt ei remittenda peccata, quae ignorantiae necessitate commisit? Aut quia iam cognovit quemadmodum vivere debeat, de se ipso ei praesumendum est ut iuste vivat, non de illo cui dicitur: Ne nos inferas in tentationem (Mt 6, 13)? Non est igitur impunitatis securitas in necessitate peccandi, sed ut non obsit ista necessitas, donat ille cui dicitur: De necessitatibus meis erue me (Ps 24, 17). Donat autem duobus modis: et praeteritam dimittendo iniquitatem, et opitulando ne intremus in tentationem. Unusquisque vero tentatur a concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus (Iac 1, 14). Quae suscepta tua tam tibi grata est ut, cum ab illa in consensionem quisque non trahitur, ipsam putes esse laudandam; quasi malum non sit res quae impellit in malum, si non ei cedat, sed resistat ille qui impellitur.
AUG. It is necessary that he sin by whom justice is not known; is it for that reason that, when he has come to know justice, the sins which he committed by the necessity of ignorance are not to be remitted to him? Or because he now knows in what way he ought to live, is it to be presumed of himself that he will live justly, and not of him to whom it is said: Lead us not into temptation (Matt 6:13)? There is not, then, a security of impunity in the necessity of sinning; but, that this necessity may not harm, he grants it to whom it is said: From my necessities deliver me (Ps 25:17 (24)). And he grants in two ways: both by remitting past iniquity, and by helping that we may not enter into temptation. But each one is tempted, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence (Jas 1:14). This, undertaken by you, is so pleasing to you that, when one is not drawn by it into consent, you think it is itself to be praised; as though that were not an evil thing which impels into evil, if he who is impelled does not yield to it, but resists.
Iulianum.1.106Quamvis tu, etiamsi si consentiatur, illum qui cecidit, non ipsam quae impulit; illum qui attractus est, non ipsam quae attraxit; illum qui illectus est, non ipsam quae illexit; magno vaniloquio contendas esse culpandum; quia scilicet, ut definis, male usus est bono; habes quippe tam malum spiritum, ut concupiscentia bona tibi videatur, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. Sed eleganter te existimas irrisisse de Baptismo sententiam nostram, mendacissime affirmans quod propter solam genitalium commotionem Baptismum dicamus esse provisum. Non hoc dicimus, sed illud, quod vos nova et haeretica perversitate subvertere conamini, dicimus, ideo divinitus esse provisum secundae spiritalis nativitatis auxilium, quam fieri in se ipso Christus instituit, quoniam secundum Adam carnaliter nati contrahunt mortis antiquae prima nativitate contagium (Cf. CYPRIANUS, Ep. ad Fidum 64, 5). Ecce verbis usus sum Poeni episcopi Cypriani, contra quem tu etiam martyrem latras, cum Ecclesiae fundatissimam fidem, pro qua Ecclesia fusus est eius sanguis, oppugnas. Sicut enim Paulus apostolus dixit: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt (Rom 5, 12); ita et Cyprianus episcopus, intellector huius Apostoli confessus est, secundum Adam carnaliter natos contagium mortis antiquae prima nativitate contrahere. Quid est ergo quod te Apostolis et omnibus Catholicis fallaciter iungis; quandoquidem Apostolo fraudulenter, catholico au m episcopo et martyri, in eo quod sensit cum orientali et occidentali catholica Ecclesia, apertissime contradicis?
Although you, even if it is consented to, contend with great empty talk that it is he who fell, not the very thing that impelled; he who was drawn, not the very thing that drew; he who was enticed, not the very thing that enticed—that is to be blamed; namely because, as you define, he made bad use of a good; for you have so evil a spirit that the concupiscence by which the flesh desires against the spirit seems to you good. But you think you have elegantly mocked our sentence about Baptism, most mendaciously affirming that we say Baptism was provided on account of the mere stirring of the genitals. We do not say this, but that—which you, with a new and heretical perversity, try to subvert—we say that for this reason the help of the second, spiritual birth was divinely provided, which Christ instituted to be effected in himself, because those born carnally according to Adam contract, by their first birth, the contagion of the ancient death (See Cyprian, Letter to Fidus 64.5). Behold, I have used the words of the African bishop Cyprian, against whom you bark even though he is a martyr, when you assail the most firmly founded faith of the Church, for which Church his blood was shed. For just as Paul the apostle said: Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed to all human beings, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12); so too Cyprian the bishop, an understander of this Apostle, confessed that those born carnally according to Adam contract, by their first birth, the contagion of the ancient death. What is it, then, that you fallaciously join yourself to the Apostles and all the Catholics; since you most openly contradict the Apostle fraudulently, and the Catholic bishop and martyr, in what he held with the Eastern and Western Catholic Church?
Iulianum.1.106107. IUL. Expositio sane, quam Pauli apostoli sermonibus admovisti, cum risu esset praetereunda, nisi Scripturarum terreret ignaros. Cum essetis, inquit Apostolus, servi peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae (Rom 6, 20).
107. JUL. The exposition, indeed, which you applied to the words of the apostle Paul would have to be passed over with laughter, did it not terrify those ignorant of the Scriptures. When you were, the Apostle says, slaves of sin, you were free of justice (Rom 6:20).
Iulianum.1.107Dicere utique non poterat: Liberatos; quoniam hic sermo liberationis tunc decenter infertur et proprie, cum homo a noxiis liberatur; liberi autem a virtutibus dici possunt, qui decernunt nihil debere virtutibus. Liber ergo et a bono et a malo dici potest, qui alteri serviens, alteri studet nihil debere; liberatus autem nisi a malo dici non potest; quia verbum hoc liberationis in se habet indicium illius qui propulsatur angoris.
He certainly could not say: freed; since this word of liberation is then fittingly and properly brought in, when a man is freed from harmful things; but those can be called free of virtues who decree that they owe nothing to the virtues. Free, then, both from good and from evil, can be called one who, serving the one, is zealous to owe nothing to the other; but freed cannot be said except from evil; because this word of liberation has in itself the indication of that distress from which one is rescued.
Iulianum.1.107Quae igitur hic quaestio Apostolo de verbis suis fieri potuit, cum ille more generis humani, a bono liberos, a malo dixerit liberatos? Cum ergo, inquit, servi essetis peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae; quem fructum habuistis tunc in his, in quibus nunc erubescitis? (Rom 6, 21) Sed ne tu aestimares servos nos peccato fieri per naturam, audi ipsum Apostolum in iisdem locis loquentem: An nescitis, quoniam cui exhibetis vosmetipsos servos ad oboediendum, servi estis eius cui oboeditis, sive peccati, sive obauditionis iustitiae? (Rom 6, 16) Vosmetipsos, inquit, exhibuistis peccato servos; ut intellegeres eum voluntati, non nativitati imputare peccatum. Ob hoc ergo solum eos dixit liberos fuisse iustitiae, quia detrectassent eius praecepta servare.
What question, then, could be raised with the Apostle about his own words, when he, in the manner of the human race, called those free of good, freed of evil? When, then, he says, you were slaves of sin, you were free of justice; what fruit did you have then in those things of which you are now ashamed? (Rom 6:21) But lest you should think that we are made slaves to sin by nature, hear the Apostle himself speaking in those same places: Or do you not know that to whom you present yourselves as slaves to obey, his slaves you are whom you obey, whether of sin, or of the obedience of justice? (Rom 6:16) You presented yourselves, he says, as slaves to sin; that you might understand that he imputes sin to the will, not to birth. For this reason alone, then, he said they were free of justice, because they had refused to keep its precepts.
Iulianum.1.107AUG. Si ob hoc solum dicti sunt homines liberi fuisse iustitiae, quod detrectassent eius praecepta servare; ergo antequam acciperent praecepta iustitiae, quae detractarent servare, non erant liberi iustitiae, servique peccati? Quis hoc dixerit? Ab hac ergo necessitate servitutis ille liberat, qui non solum dat praecepta per legem; verum etiam donat per spiritum caritatem, cuius delectatione vincatur delectatio peccati; alioquin perseverat invicta, et servum suum tenet. A quo enim quis devictus est, huic et servus addictus est (2 Pt 2, 19).
AUG. If for this reason alone men were said to have been free of justice, because they had refused to keep its precepts; then before they received the precepts of justice, which they would refuse to keep, were they not free of justice, and slaves of sin? Who would say this? From this necessity of slavery, then, he frees who not only gives precepts through the law, but also bestows love through the spirit, by whose delight the delight of sin is overcome; otherwise it perseveres unconquered, and holds its slave. For by what one is overcome, to that he is also assigned as a slave (2 Pet 2:19).
Iulianum.1.107108. IUL. Denique statim addit, ita eos servos esse iustitiae, sicut fuerant servi ante peccati. Per quod potes eos iam tu, si placet, liberos dicere peccato, cum serviunt iustitiae; sicut ab illo dicti sunt a iustitia liberi, cum servirent delicto. Ineptissime itaque simplicitati apostolicae voluisti calumniam commovere. Neque enim ille, ut putas, vigilantissime hoc quod aestimas intimavit; sed tu somniculosissime quod ille protulit intueris. Argumentaris quippe, ideo illum liberatos dicere maluisse, quam liberos, ut intellegeremus arbitrii libertate male quidem posse, bene autem fieri non posse.
108. JUL. Finally, he at once adds that they are slaves of justice in the same way as they had been slaves of sin before. By which you can now, if you please, call them free of sin, when they serve justice; just as they were called by him free of justice, when they served the offense. Most ineptly, then, did you wish to stir up a slander against apostolic simplicity. For he did not, as you think, most vigilantly intimate what you suppose; but you most drowsily look at what he brought forth. For you argue that he therefore preferred to say freed rather than free, that we might understand that by the freedom of choice one can indeed do evil, but cannot be made to do good.
Iulianum.1.108Verum ipse tibi verborum eius ordo renititur. Nam si hoc, quod tu, putasset, quia libertate solum peccaretur, debuit dicere: Liberi fuistis peccato; non: Liberi fuistis iustitiae (Rom 6, 20), ut ille diceretur esse liber, cui operabatur ipsa libertas. Si enim placet etiam casuum pensare momenta, huic illos iustitiae dixit esse liberos, non ab hac iustitia liberos. Consequentius ergo hac elocutione nos adiuvaremur, si etiam tam leves res premere vellemus.
But the very order of his words resists you. For if he had thought what you do—that by freedom one sins only—he ought to have said: You were free of sin; not: You were free of justice (Rom 6:20); so that he would be called free for whom freedom itself worked. For if it pleases to weigh even the moments of the cases, he said they were free of this justice, not free from this justice. More consequently, then, would we be helped by this expression, if we too wished to press such trivial matters.
Iulianum.1.108Sed absit hoc: sensum intellegimus Apostoli, et elocutionum simpliciter prolatarum officio contenti sumus. Nihil aliud dixit Magister Gentium, nisi: Liberi fuistis, non servistis, iustitiae; liberati estis, peccatorum veniam suscepistis, manente arbitrii libertate; per quam potuerunt et ante peccato, et postea oboedire iustitiae.
But far be it: we understand the sense of the Apostle, and are content with the office of expressions simply set forth. The Teacher of the Gentiles said nothing else but: You were free—you did not serve—justice; you have been freed—you have received the pardon of sins, with the freedom of choice remaining; through which they could both obey sin before, and afterward obey justice.
Iulianum.1.108AUG. Ex isto haeretico sensu, quo dicitis non fieri per gratiam liberationem a peccato, nisi cum de praeterito accipitur venia; non autem etiam ne dominetur peccatum, cum quisque a concupiscentia sua trahitur in eius assensum; etiam sanctorum orationibus contradicitis. Utquid enim Deo dicitur: Ne nos inferas in tentationem (Mt 6, 13); si, ut hoc non fiat, in liberi arbitrii nostri est potestate, quod nobis naturaliter insitum est? Utquid dicit Apostolus: Oramus autem ad Deum, ne quid faciatis mali (2 Cor 13, 7); si Deus non liberat a peccatis, nisi veniam dando praeteritis?
AUG. By this heretical sense of yours—by which you say that freedom from sin does not come about through grace, except when pardon is received for the past; but not also that sin may not have dominion, when each one is drawn by his own concupiscence into consent to it—you contradict even the prayers of the saints. For why is it said to God: Lead us not into temptation (Matt 6:13), if, that this may not happen, it is in the power of our free choice, which is naturally implanted in us? Why does the Apostle say: But we pray to God that you do nothing evil (2 Cor 13:7), if God does not free from sins except by giving pardon to past ones?
Iulianum.1.108109. IUL. Denique quid exhortatio ipsius teneret, ostendit, praemittens: Humanum est quod dico, propter infirmitatem carnis vestrae; sicut enim exhibuistis membra vestra servire immunditiae et iniquitati ad iniquitatem; ita nunc exhibete membra vestra servire iustitiae in sanctificationem; cum enim servi essetis peccati, liberi fuistis iustitiae (Rom 6, 19-20). Ordinatissime prorsus ipsos dicit liberos fuisse iustitiae, quos convenerat, ut membra sua in omni sanctificatione retinerent.
109. JUL. Finally, what his exhortation held, he showed by premising: It is a human thing that I say, on account of the weakness of your flesh; for as you presented your members to serve uncleanness and iniquity unto iniquity; so now present your members to serve justice unto sanctification; for when you were slaves of sin, you were free of justice (Rom 6:19-20). Most orderly, indeed, he says that those were free of justice whom he had addressed, that they should retain their members in all sanctification.
Iulianum.1.109Verum, quia non parum hic immorati sumus, ut ostenderemus certissimum esse quod dixeram (Cf. supra 73), quia negarent liberum arbitrium homines qui vestro fuissent sermone deterriti, et in verum exitium vana formidine truderentur; atque te esse praecipuum arbitrii liberi negatorem; revertamur ad illum librum, qui est ad Valerium destinatus, ut probemus primo te negasse conditorem Deum; nunc autem, alibi quidem negare, alibi scelestius multo quam negaveras confiteri. Et quidem, quam in illo libro tuo priore absolute Deum negaveris conditorem hominum, satis cum discuteretur apparuit; dixisti quippe, quod genus humanum diabolus quasi plantati a se fruticis fructum iure decerperet (De nupt. et concup. 1, 26); multaque alia quae loco a te argumentorum posita huic cooperantur errori. In hoc vero secundo libro, etsi universitate dogmatis tui idem agas, tamen perniciosius niteris emendare sententiam, quam ante protulisti.
But because we have dwelt here not a little, in order to show that what I had said was most certain (See above, 1.73)—that men who had been terrified by your discourse would deny free choice, and would be thrust into true destruction by an empty fear; and that you are the chief denier of free choice—let us return to that book which is addressed to Valerius, that we may prove first that you denied God the Creator; but now, that you deny it in one place, and in another, far more wickedly than you had denied it, confess it. And indeed, how absolutely you denied God the Creator of human beings in that earlier book of yours, has appeared sufficiently when it was discussed; for you said that the devil plucked the human race, as it were, like the fruit of a shrub planted by himself, by right (Marriage and Desire 1.26); and many other things which, placed by you in the place of arguments, cooperate with this error. But in this second book, although you do the same thing by the universality of your doctrine, yet you strive more perniciously to amend the sentence you brought forth before.
Iulianum.1.109AUG. Si tibi parum est Apostolus, qui dicit: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt (Rom 5, 12); Ambrosius utique, non ut Manichaeus, quo nomine tales, qualis ille fuerat fidei, criminaris; sed ut Catholicus intellexit Apostolum, eumque intellegens ait: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13). Ecce de quo tamquam de suo frutice diabolus fructum iure decerpsit; non de natura quam Deus condidit, sed de vitio quod ipse plantavit. Neque enim qui nascuntur sub peccato, possunt nisi sub auctore esse peccati, si non renascantur in Christo.
AUG. If the Apostle is too little for you, who says: Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed to all human beings, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12); Ambrose certainly—not as a Manichean, by which name you charge such men, of such faith as he was; but as a Catholic—understood the Apostle, and understanding him says: We are all born under sin, whose very origin is in fault (Ambrose, On Penance 1.3.13). Behold of what, as of his own shrub, the devil plucked the fruit by right; not of the nature which God created, but of the vice which he himself planted. For neither can those who are born under sin be except under the author of sin, if they are not reborn in Christ.
Iulianum.1.109110. IUL. Verum suppleamus breviter responsionem, quae capiti tuo, quod supra posuimus (Cf. supra 74), debetur. Constanter itaque fideliterque respondeo, quia non invideamus liberatorem hominibus Dominum Iesum Christum; quos convenimus, ne vobis credentes, emendationis desperatione frangantur, et recedant ab eruditione Christi, quasi ea praecipientis, quae capere mortalium natura non possit, quippe malo aggravata congenito.
110. JUL. But let us briefly supply the reply which is owed to your chapter, which we set down above (See above, 1.74). Constantly and faithfully, then, I answer that we do not envy men the Lord Jesus Christ as Liberator; men whom we address, lest, believing you, they be broken by despair of amendment, and withdraw from the instruction of Christ, as though commanding things which the nature of mortals cannot grasp, being weighed down forsooth by a congenital evil.
Iulianum.1.110AUG. Sed et mors congenita est; et tamen ab ea liberat, qui quos vult vivificat (Io 5, 21); ad quem debent confugere, qui volunt a malo congenito liberari; quod ut faciant, quis attrahat, in Evangelio lege (Cf. Io 6, 44).
AUG. But death too is congenital; and yet he frees from it who vivifies whom he wills (John 5:21); to whom they ought to flee who wish to be freed from a congenital evil; and that they may do this, read in the Gospel who draws them (See John 6:44).
Iulianum.1.110111. IUL. Sed currant ad eum qui clamat: Iugum meum suave est, et onus meum leve est (Mt 11, 30); qui et malae voluntati veniam pro inaestimabili liberalitate largitur, et innocentiam, quam creat bonam, facit innovando adoptandoque meliorem.
111. JUL. But let them run to him who cries: My yoke is sweet, and my burden is light (Matt 11:30); who both bestows pardon on an evil will by inestimable liberality, and the innocence which he creates good, makes better by renewing and adopting.
Iulianum.1.111AUG. Ipsi sunt homines, quibus invides liberatorem, quos habere malum, a quo liberentur, negas. Quomodo ergo constanter fideliterque respondes, quod non invideatis liberatorem hominibus Dominum Iesum Christum; cum potius pertinaciter et infideliter agas, ne ab illo salvi fieri credantur parvuli, sicut salvum facit populum suum a peccatis eorum (Cf. Lc 19, 10); propter quod eum, Evangelio loquente, didicimus appellatum esse Iesum (Cf. Mt 1, 21)? Non igitur docere poteritis liberatorem Christum vos hominibus non invidere, quia parvulos non esse homines nullo modo potestis ostendere.
AUG. They are the very men whom you envy the Liberator, whom you deny to have an evil from which they may be freed. How, then, do you constantly and faithfully answer that you do not envy men the Lord Jesus Christ as Liberator; when you rather act, pertinaciously and unfaithfully, that little ones be not believed to be saved by him, as he saves his people from their sins (See Luke 19:10); on account of which, the Gospel speaking, we have learned that he was called Jesus (See Matt 1:21)? You will not, then, be able to teach that you do not envy men Christ the Liberator, because you can in no way show that little ones are not human beings.
Iulianum.1.111112. IUL. Demiror itaque ausum te fuisse ponere testimonium, quo dicitur: A quo enim quis devictus est, huic et servus addictus est (2 Pt 2, 19). Quod manifestissime pro nobis facit, asserentibus non posse quemquam obnoxium esse diabolo, nisi qui fuerit post certamen voluntatis degeneri deditione superatus. A te autem usurpari non debuit, cui vehementer repugnat, persuadenti in regno diaboli esse nascentes, qui sine voluntate propria nec vinci utique, nec peccare potuerunt.
112. JUL. I wonder, then, that you dared to set down the testimony where it is said: For by what one is overcome, to that he is also assigned as a slave (2 Pet 2:19). Which most manifestly makes for us, who assert that no one can be liable to the devil except him who, after a contest of the will, has been overcome by a degenerate surrender. But by you it ought not to have been usurped, since it vehemently resists you, who persuade that those are in the kingdom of the devil who are born, who without a will of their own could neither be conquered nor sin.
Iulianum.1.112AUG. Quos dicis nascentes nec vinci, nec certare potuisse, ab illo originem ducunt, in quo omnes peccaverunt; qui homo, quod est peius, sine certamine victus est. Fuit enim Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam, et in illo omnes perierunt (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 234). Sinite ergo parvulos inveniri ab eo, qui venit quaerere quod perierat (C. Lc 19, 10; Rom 5, 12); alioquin liberatorem Iesum, quoniam et ipsi homines sunt, prorsus hominibus invidetis, quantacumque loquacitate crudelitatem vestri huius erroris obtegendam esse credatis.
AUG. Those whom you say, being born, could neither be conquered nor contend, draw their origin from him in whom all sinned; who—man, which is worse—was conquered without a contest. For Adam existed, and in him we all existed; Adam perished, and in him all perished (See Ambrose, On Luke 7.234). Allow, then, little ones to be found by him who came to seek what had perished (See Luke 19:10; Rom 5:12); otherwise you altogether envy men Jesus the Liberator, since they too are men, with whatever loquacity you may believe the cruelty of this error of yours is to be covered.
Iulianum.1.112113. IUL. Quod quidem videns contra te valere plurimum, quasi ipso testimonio interrogatus: Per quid ergo parvuli in regno sunt adversariae potestatis, si Scripturae creditur unumquemque, cum vincitur, tunc servum esse victoris, et constat infantiam sine usu rationis et voluntatis nec confligere potuisse, nec cedere?, addis: "r unum quippe hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt " (Rom 9, 21; De nupt. et concup. 2, 8). Sic est autem Deus nascentium conditor, ut omnes ex uno eant in condemnationem, quorum non fuerit renascentium liberator. Ipse quippe dictus est "gulus ex eadem massa faciens vas, aliud in honorem secundum misericordiam, aliud in contumeliam secundum iudicium " (Ps 100, 1; De nupt. et concup. 2, 8), cui cantat Ecclesia: "Misericordiam et iudicium " (Cf. Isa 45, 9). Hoc quod dicis, per unum hominem intrasse peccatum, quo testimonio Apostoli plurimorum ineruditorum tamen pectora commovistis, licet in quarto libro breviter quomodo intellegendum esset ostenderim (Cf. infra 2, 20), tamen adiuvante Christo, in hoc opere plenius exponemus, ita ut in secundo libro, praetermissis aliis, locus ipse apostolicus contextu suo plenissime disseratur.
113. JUL. Seeing that this avails very much against you, as though questioned by the testimony itself: Through what, then, are little ones in the kingdom of the adverse power, if Scripture is believed that each one, when he is conquered, is then the slave of the conqueror, and it is established that infancy, without the use of reason and of will, could neither fight nor yield?, you add: for through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed to all human beings, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12; Marriage and Desire 2.8). But God is the Creator of those who are born in such a way that all from one go into condemnation, of whom he is not the Liberator of those who are reborn. For he himself was called the potter, making from the same lump one vessel for honor according to mercy, another for dishonor according to judgment (Marriage and Desire 2.8), to whom the Church sings: mercy and judgment (Ps 101:1 (100)). This which you say, that through one man sin entered—a testimony of the Apostle by which you have moved the breasts of very many of the unlearned—although in the fourth book I have briefly shown how it ought to be understood (See below, 2.20), yet, with the help of Christ, in this work we shall expound it more fully, so that in the second book, with other things passed over, that apostolic passage itself may be most fully discussed in its own context.
Iulianum.1.113AUG. Ad id quod in quarto libro tuo breviter ostendisse te dicis, in sexto nostro tibi responsum est (C. Iul. 6, 75); quod autem in hoc opere polliceris, cum reddere coeperis, ibi quam sis vaniloquus apparebit.
AUG. To that which in your fourth book you say you have briefly shown, you have been answered in my sixth (Answer to Julian 6.75); but as for what you promise in this work, when you have begun to render it, there it will appear how empty a talker you are.
Iulianum.1.113114. IUL. Hic autem breviter admonuerim, quoniam suffragari tibi non potest ad eius sententiae confirmationem, quam omnis eruditio, omnis ratio, et lex Dei convincit iniquissimam. Diligens ergo lector intendat quod pronuntiasti, Deum esse factorem malorum; et tales eum condere, qui sine aliquo propriae merito voluntatis eant in condemnationem prorsus omnes.
114. JUL. But here let me briefly admonish, since it cannot support you toward the confirmation of that sentence which all erudition, all reason, and the law of God convict of being most unjust. Let the diligent reader attend, then, to what you have pronounced—that God is the maker of evils; and that he creates such men as go into condemnation, absolutely all, without any merit of their own will.
Iulianum.1.114AUG. Hoc dixi: quia facit hominum naturam, qui vitio mali sunt, quod ipse non fecit; et de quo ipse bene facit, etiam cum mali sunt homines quos facit; quia in quantum homines sunt, non in quantum mali sunt, eos facit. Neque enim vasa in contumeliam fierent, nisi mali essent; qui tamen per naturam quam facit Deus, utique boni sunt; mali autem secundum vitium, quod contra naturam quidem, sed tamen naturae insevit inimicus; ut ex hoc esset natura mala, hoc est, malus homo. Non enim potest esse ullum malum nisi in aliquo bono; quia non potest esse nisi in aliqua natura; omnis autem natura, in quantum natura est, bonum est (PROSPERUS, Excerpta 296. 8). Diligenter attendite, quomodo dicantur, quae velut contraria inter se dici videntur, et non sunt; si tamen non penitus fumo superbae contentionis oculos perdidistis.
AUG. This I said: that he makes the nature of human beings, who are evil by the vice of evil which he himself did not make; and of which nature he himself does good, even when the men he makes are evil; because, insofar as they are men, not insofar as they are evil, he makes them. For neither would vessels be made for dishonor, unless they were evil; who yet, by the nature which God makes, are surely good; but evil according to the vice which the enemy implanted, against nature indeed, but yet in nature; so that from this there should be an evil nature, that is, an evil man. For there can be no evil except in some good; because it cannot be except in some nature; but every nature, insofar as it is a nature, is a good (Prosper, Excerpts 296.8). Diligently attend in what manner those things are said which seem to be said as though contrary to each other, and are not; if indeed you have not utterly lost your eyes by the smoke of proud contention.
Iulianum.1.114115. IUL. Ac ne nesciremus de quo tempore loquereris; ab Adam, quem ais unum omnes fuisse, usque ad finem, qui baptizati non sunt, damnationi et diabolo obnoxios pronuntias inveniri. In qua sententia multo te perniciosius curare niteris, quam antea vulnerasti. Nam ut removeres invidiam, quae in te ruebat, quod diceres diabolum conditorem hominum; correctus confiteris Deum conditorem, sed talium, quales ascribit Manichaeus principi tenebrarum.
115. JUL. And lest we should not know of what time you were speaking, you pronounce that from Adam, whom you say all were one, to the end, those who are not baptized are found liable to condemnation and to the devil. In which sentence you strive to wound much more perniciously than you had wounded before. For, to remove the odium which was rushing upon you—that you said the devil was the Creator of human beings—corrected, you confess God the Creator, but of such as the Manichean ascribes to the prince of darkness.
Iulianum.1.115AUG. Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13). Hoc non dixit haereticus immundus Manichaeus, sed catholicus sanctus Ambrosius. Porro autem Manichaeus nec omnem naturam, in quantum natura est, dicit bonam; nec eam, quam dicit naturam malam, ullo modo dicit sanari posse ac fieri bonam; quod catholica fides dicit de natura humana pusillorum atque magnorum, et contra Manichaeos et contra Pelagianos, utrosque diversis morbis, sed pariter insanos.
AUG. We are all born under sin, whose very origin is in fault (Ambrose, On Penance 1.3.13). This was not said by the unclean heretic Manichaeus, but by the holy Catholic Ambrose. Moreover, the Manichean neither says that every nature, insofar as it is a nature, is good; nor does he say that the nature which he calls evil can in any way be healed and made good; which the Catholic faith says of the human nature of the small and the great, both against the Manicheans and against the Pelagians—both insane with diverse diseases, but equally.
Iulianum.1.115116. IUL. Enimvero credens malos esse homines conditione nascendi, illum eis deputavit auctorem, per quem mali operis crimen a Deo bono separaretur; et quoniam erraverat in definitione peccati, ut putaret naturale esse, quod nisi voluntarium esse non potest; consequenter deinceps malae originis malum est commentus artificem; hic religiosior in Deum, contumacior in naturam. Tu vero dicis, malos quidem nasci, sed Deum esse auctorem malorum; contumacior tu in Deum, honorificentior in naturam; haec quippe auctoris maiestate defenditur, auctor autem foeditate operis accusatur.
116. JUL. For indeed, believing men to be evil by the condition of being born, he deputed to them that author through whom the crime of an evil work might be separated from the good God; and because he had erred in the definition of sin, so as to think that natural which cannot be except voluntary, he consequently afterward devised an evil artificer of an evil origin; here more religious toward God, more contumacious toward nature. But you say that men are indeed born evil, but that God is the author of the evils; you more contumacious toward God, more honoring toward nature; for nature is defended by the majesty of its author, but the author is accused by the foulness of the work.
Iulianum.1.116AUG. Accusa ergo Deum, si placet, operis foeditate; quandoquidem aliqua corpora tam foeda nascuntur, ut nonnulla in eis nimia deformitate etiam monstra dicantur. Non enim alius deus, sicut Manichaeus fingit, aut dii minores, sicut Plato errat, sunt corporum conditores; sed utique Deus bonus et iustus operatur etiam corpora talia; quae si referas ad grave iugum super filios Adam (Cf. Eccli 40, 1), invenies eum nec malum, qualem Manichaeus fabricandis corporibus adhibet; nec victum malisque implicatum atque commixtum, quod Manichaeus de Deo bono credere non timet; sed plane iustum propter originale peccatum, qualem fides catholica novit, a qua vester error exorbitavit. Neque enim, si nemo peccasset, foeda atque monstrosa etiam in paradiso corpora nascerentur.
AUG. Accuse God, then, if you please, by the foulness of the work; since some bodies are born so foul that some among them, by reason of excessive deformity, are even called monsters. For not another god, as the Manichean feigns, nor lesser gods, as Plato errs, are the creators of bodies; but assuredly the good and just God works even such bodies; which, if you refer to the heavy yoke upon the children of Adam (See Sir 40:1), you will find him neither evil, such as the Manichean applies to the fashioning of bodies; nor conquered and entangled with and mixed into evils, which the Manichean does not fear to believe of the good God; but plainly just on account of original sin, such as the Catholic faith knows him, from which your error has strayed. For if no one had sinned, foul and monstrous bodies would not be born even in paradise.
Iulianum.1.116117. IUL. Non timuisti, scelestissime, hoc applicare Deo, quod ne ei admoveret Manichaeus, commentus est alium conditorem; ambo quidem estis veritatis inimici, sed putabatur ante te non posse ille impietate superari.
117. JUL. You did not fear, most wicked man, to apply to God this which, lest he might apply it to him, the Manichean devised another creator; both of you indeed are enemies of the truth, but before you it was thought that he could not be surpassed in impiety.
Iulianum.1.117AUG. Ante me erat Ambrosius, qui non erat Manichaeus; ante ipsum Hilarius, Gregorius; ante hos Cyprianus, et ceteri, quos commemorare longum est, qui non erant Manichaei. Et tamen Ecclesiam docuerunt, quod in Ecclesia didicerunt, trahere parvulos originale peccatum, et exsufflandos in exorcismis, ut eruantur de potestate tenebrarum, et in regnum sui Salvatoris et Domini transferantur (Cf. Col 1, 13). Quoniam Christus si etiam pro ipsis mortuus est, quod et tu coactus es confiteri, ergo omnes mortui sunt; et pro omnibus mortuus est (2 Cor 5, 14-15), quod ait Apostolus; qui profecto si secundum verba tua etiam ipse Manichaeus erit, iam tu quid eris?
AUG. Before me was Ambrose, who was not a Manichean; before him Hilary, Gregory; before these Cyprian, and the rest, whom it would be long to recall, who were not Manicheans. And yet they taught the Church what they learned in the Church—that little ones draw original sin, and are to be breathed upon in the exorcisms, that they may be rescued from the power of darkness, and transferred into the kingdom of their Savior and Lord (See Col 1:13). Since Christ, if he died even for them—which you too were compelled to confess—therefore all died; and he died for all (2 Cor 5:14-15), as the Apostle says; who assuredly, if according to your words he too will be a Manichean, then what will you be?
Iulianum.1.117118. IUL. Tu vero iustificasti, ut Propheta ait, sororem tuam Sodomam (Cf. Ez 16, 48. 51. 55); absolvi putabitur Manichaeus, si tuis blasphemiis comparetur. Gloriatus in primo operis mei libro fueram, quod eo ore lacerarer, quo et Apostoli iniuriam pertulissent; nunc vero expavesco magnitudinem felicitatis meae; ab eo vituperor, qui criminatur Deum.
118. JUL. But you have justified, as the Prophet says, your sister Sodom (See Ezek 16:48.51.55); the Manichean will be thought acquitted, if he is compared with your blasphemies. I had gloried, in the first book of my work, that I was torn by the same mouth by which the apostles too had borne injury; but now I dread the greatness of my felicity; I am reviled by him who charges God.
Iulianum.1.118AUG. Ab eo vituperaris, qui cum Ambrosio et ceteris sociis eius, etiam parvulorum liberatorem praedicat Christum; quem tu non solum criminaris tamquam mentientem, ubi dicit se venisse salvare et quaerere quod perierat (Cf. Lc 19, 10); verum etiam contradicis ei, ne salvandos parvulos quaerat.
AUG. You are reviled by him who, with Ambrose and the rest of his companions, proclaims Christ the Liberator even of little ones; whom you not only charge as a liar, where he says he came to save and to seek what had perished (See Luke 19:10); but you even contradict him, lest he seek little ones to be saved.
Iulianum.1.118119. IUL. Unde mihi accidit tantae contumeliae dignitas? Nihil in me tale conferre laudando potuisses. Sensa mea dicis esse reprobanda, sed Dei opera damnanda; me male disputare; sed Deum nequiter creare pronuntias, me errare clamas; illum saevire, me asseris nescire legem; Deum vero nescire iustitiam; me vociferaris catholicum non esse, quod dicam Christum provocare quos salvet; Deum vero iuras creare quos damnet, nec ob aliud condere, nisi ut eant omnes in condemnationem.
119. JUL. Whence has there befallen me the dignity of so great an insult? You could have conferred nothing such on me by praising. You say my views are to be reproved, but God's works to be condemned; that I dispute badly; but you pronounce that God creates wickedly; you cry that I err; that he is savage; you assert that I do not know the law; but that God does not know justice; you vociferate that I am not Catholic, because I say that Christ summons those whom he saves; but you swear that God creates those whom he condemns, and creates for no other reason than that all may go into condemnation.
Iulianum.1.119AUG. Hoc et de praescientia Dei dici potest, quae tamen a fidelibus negari non potest, et puto quod nec a vobis. Aut negate Deum praescium multos se damnaturum esse quos creat, ne videatur creare quos damnet; et quod est mirabilius et inscrutabilius, multos, ne malitia mutet eorum intellectum, de hac vita non rapere (Cf. Sap 4, 11), quos malos futuros non potest ignorare. Date honorem Deo: altitudini iudiciorum eius cedat vestrorum crepula ruina verborum, quasi nitida et acuta, sed vitrea.
AUG. This can be said also of the foreknowledge of God, which yet cannot be denied by the faithful, and I think not by you either. Either deny that God foreknows that he will condemn many whom he creates, lest he seem to create those whom he condemns; and—what is more wonderful and more inscrutable—that he does not snatch from this life many, lest malice change their understanding (See Wis 4:11), whom he cannot fail to know will be evil. Give honor to God: let the babbling ruin of your words—glistening and sharp as it were, but glassy—yield to the depth of his judgments.
Iulianum.1.119120. IUL. Inter te igitur et Manichaeum prosatorem sensuum tuorum, video per profectum eruditionis tuae magnam factam esse distantiam. Ille enim licet duos induxisset auctores, tamen spem salutis ex ea reliquit parte, qua dixit bonum Deum esse alienissimum ab iniquitate, et a crudelitate; tu vero unum bonum quidem Deum, sed eumdem malorum conditorem loquens, ut reverentiam divinitatis, ita spem salutis funditus sustulisti.
120. JUL. Between you, then, and the Manichean, the begetter of your views, I see that, by the progress of your erudition, a great distance has been made. For he, although he had introduced two authors, yet left a hope of salvation from that part where he said the good God is most alien from iniquity and from cruelty; but you, speaking of one God indeed as good, but the same as the Creator of evils, have utterly taken away both the reverence of divinity and the hope of salvation.
Iulianum.1.120AUG. Manichaei fingunt Deum crudeliter infirmum, qui partem suam, substantiam suam, membra naturae suae dilanianda et contaminanda hostibus tradidit, a quibus vastitatem sibi imminere cernebat; vos autem, qui Deum omnipotentissimum non negatis, in gravi iugo parvulorum credi vultis iniustum, negando originale peccatum.
AUG. The Manicheans feign a God cruelly weak, who handed over his own part, his own substance, the members of his nature, to be torn and contaminated by enemies, by whom he saw devastation threatening him; but you, who do not deny that God is most almighty, wish him to be believed unjust in the heavy yoke of little ones, by denying original sin.
Iulianum.1.120121. IUL. Non est enim qui subveniat reis, quando ipse, qui est unus, desiderio creandarum miseriarum etiam eos punit, in quibus nihil aliud quam hoc, quod ipse fecit, agnoscit.
121. JUL. For there is none to come to the aid of the guilty, when he himself, who is one, by a desire of creating miseries, punishes even those in whom he acknowledges nothing other than this, which he himself made.
Iulianum.1.121AUG. Agnoscit ibi etiam quod ipse non fecit; peccatum quippe ipse non fecit. Alius autem similiter ut vos vanus posset dicere Deum desiderio creandarum miseriarum etiam eos creare, quos damnaturum se esse ignorare non potuit, incomparabiliter plures, quam eos quos liberaturum se esse praescivit.
AUG. He acknowledges there also what he himself did not make; for sin he himself did not make. But another, empty like you, could say that God, by a desire of creating miseries, creates even those whom he could not fail to know he would condemn—incomparably more than those whom he foreknew he would free.
Iulianum.1.121122. IUL. Perspecta igitur abysso impietatis tuae, licet numquam quidquam possit profanius inveniri; tamen quam hoc nihil habeat virium, et quid de illis quae annexueras colligatur, brevi disputatione monstrabitur. Deus qui hoc appellari nomine voluit, ut omnipotentissimus, ita etiam iustissimus creditur; quorum si unum defuerit, neutrum aderit; ut conditor benignissimus hominum, ita meritorum expunctor aequissimus; omne quod facit, bonum valde est (Cf. Gen 1, 31). Ac per hoc, nemo naturaliter malus est, sed quicumque reus est, moribus, non exordiis accusatur.
122. JUL. With the abyss of your impiety inspected, then—though nothing more profane could ever be found—yet how this has no force, and what is to be gathered from those things you had appended, will be shown by a brief disputation. God, who willed to be called by this name, is believed, as he is most almighty, so also most just; of which if one be lacking, neither will be present; as the most benign Creator of human beings, so the most equitable assessor of merits; everything that he makes is very good (See Gen 1:31). And by this, no one is naturally evil, but whoever is guilty is accused by his morals, not by his beginnings.
Iulianum.1.122AUG. Cur ergo grave iugum super exordia parvulorum sub Deo potentissimo atque iustissimo?
AUG. Why, then, is there a heavy yoke upon the beginnings of little ones under a God most powerful and most just?
Iulianum.1.122123. IUL. Nec malum itaque naturale est, nec Deus creare reos potest, nec in regno diaboli collocare. Quibus collectis et tu Manichaeus, immo Manichaeo peior ostenderis; et sine peccato in hunc mundum humanitatis ingressus, et sub iure Dei, non diaboli, fructus fecunditatis, et naturalis innocentia claruerunt.
123. JUL. And so evil is not natural, nor can God create the guilty, nor place them in the kingdom of the devil. With these gathered, you too are shown a Manichean, nay worse than the Manichean; and the entrance of humanity into this world without sin, and the fruit of fecundity under the right of God, not of the devil, and natural innocence, have shone forth.
Iulianum.1.123AUG. Ergo et Ambrosius, qui dixit: In primordia naturae suae, qui baptizati fuerint parvuli, a malitia reformantur (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 1, 37), Manichaeus, aut Manichaeo peior ostenditur, sicut conviciaris, aut furis.
AUG. Then Ambrose too, who said: In the first beginnings of their nature, little ones who have been baptized are reformed from malice (Ambrose, On Luke 1.37), is shown a Manichean, or worse than the Manichean, as you revile—or you are raving.
Iulianum.1.123124. IUL. Hoc igitur consignato, quid processum tuum consequatur attende. Prophetas et Patriarchas, omnesque sanctos Veteris Testamenti constat Baptismatis expertes fuisse, sed a Deo conditos propriis deinceps fulsisse virtutibus; sub diaboli ergo regno, contra testimonium legis, esse credentur aeternis suppliciis mancipandi; quia ex Adam omnes pronuntiantur a te in condemnationem creati.
124. JUL. With this sealed, then, attend to what follows from your progress. It is established that the Prophets and Patriarchs, and all the saints of the Old Testament, were without Baptism, but created by God, and thereafter shone with their own virtues; they will therefore be believed to be under the kingdom of the devil—against the testimony of the law—to be consigned to eternal punishments; because from Adam all are pronounced by you created unto condemnation.
Iulianum.1.124AUG. Et ipsos antiquos iustos eadem gratia liberavit, cui vos bellum indixistis; quamvis diversis usi fuerint pro tempore sacramentis. Quoniam quod de Christo credimus, hoc credebant. Unus enim Deus, unus et Mediator Dei et hominum homo Christus Iesus (1 Tim 2, 5), cuius illis praenuntiatus est, nobis autem annuntiatus est humilitatis adventus; claritatis vero, qui in fine futurus est, et illis est praenuntiatus et nobis.
AUG. The same grace, against which you have declared war, freed those ancient just ones too; although they used diverse sacraments for the time. For what we believe about Christ, they too believed. For there is one God, and one Mediator of God and human beings, the man Christ Jesus (1 Tim 2:5), whose coming in lowliness was foretold to them, but announced to us; but the coming in glory, which will be at the end, was both foretold to them and to us.
Iulianum.1.124Et illorum ergo et nostra in isto uno Mediatore una fides est, et idem spiritus fidei et in illis et in nobis; unde dicit Apostolus: Habentes autem eumdem spiritum fidei, secundum quod scriptum est: Credidi, propter quod locutus sum; et nos credimus, propter quod et loquimur (2 Cor 4, 13). Unde autem sit haec fides, ne ita gloriemur tamquam ex nobis sit, eumdem audiamus Apostolum: Gratia, inquit, salvi facti estis per fidem, et hoc non ex vobis, sed Dei donum est (Eph 2, 8). Et alio loco: Pax, inquit, fratribus et caritas cum fide a Deo Patre et Domino Iesu Christo (Eph 6, 23).
Both theirs, then, and ours, in this one Mediator, is one faith, and the same spirit of faith both in them and in us; whence the Apostle says: But having the same spirit of faith, according to what is written: I believed, on which account I have spoken; and we too believe, on which account we also speak (2 Cor 4:13). But whence this faith is, lest we glory as though it were from ourselves, let us hear the same Apostle: By grace, he says, you have been saved through faith, and this not from yourselves, but it is the gift of God (Eph 2:8). And in another place: Peace, he says, to the brethren, and love with faith, from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ (Eph 6:23).
Iulianum.1.124125. IUL. Quod si dixeris, quam sis aperte Manichaeus, etiam patroni tui poterunt confiteri. Si vero intellexeris tantum veri Regis exercitum contra tuam dimicare sententiam, nec illis te afferre posse praeiudicium; acquiesce destructum esse quod extruxeras, et per hoc non ire omnes ex uno in condemnationem (Cf. Rom 5, 16); sed eos tantum, qui rebelles voluntati Dei, sine paenitentia, sine correctione, ultimo fuerint fine deprehensi.
125. JUL. But if you say this, even your patrons will be able to confess how openly you are a Manichean. But if you understand that so great an army of the true King fights against your view, and that you can bring no prejudice against them; acquiesce that what you had built up has been destroyed, and that by this not all from one go into condemnation (See Rom 5:16); but only those who, rebellious against the will of God, without repentance, without correction, have been caught at the last end.
Iulianum.1.125AUG. Adde et generatos, si non fuerint regenerati; quia in uno omnes peccaverunt (Cf. Rom 5, 12).
AUG. Add also the generated, if they have not been regenerated; because in one all sinned (See Rom 5:12).
Iulianum.1.125126. IUL. Quod autem Deus dictus est: Figulus ex eadem massa faciens aliud vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam (Rom 9, 21), a te commemorari omnino non debuit; quia ut a nobis consequenter exponitur, ita tibi totum repugnat; nam cum alii in honorem, alii in contumeliam fieri dicuntur, iuvatur sensus Catholicorum, quo secundum diversitatem voluntatis humanae, diversus etiam vasorum exitus praedicatur.
126. JUL. But as for the fact that God was called: The potter making from the same lump one vessel for honor, another for dishonor (Rom 9:21), it ought by no means to have been recalled by you; because, as it is consequently expounded by us, so it is wholly opposed to you; for when some are said to be made for honor, others for dishonor, the sense of the Catholics is helped, by which, according to the diversity of the human will, a diverse outcome too of the vessels is proclaimed.
Iulianum.1.126AUG. Ambrosium audi, qui dicit: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13). Sic quippe intellexit cum ceteris condiscipulis et condoctoribus suis, sine ulla dubitatione catholicis, quod scriptum est de peccato et morte, quod per unum intraverit, et in omnes homines pertransierit (Cf. Rom 5, 12). Et intellege hanc esse massam de qua fiunt vasa, sive illa, sive ista. Nam si inscrutabilis quaestionis huius ista esset solutio, quam tu sapis, secundum merita voluntatum; tam manifesta esset, ut nulla eius difficultate compelleretur Apostolus dicere: O homo, tu quis es qui respondeas Deo? (Rom 9, 20) De nondum natis enim agebatur, quorum non ex operibus, sed secundum propositum suum Deus unum dilexit, alterum odio habuit; unde ad haec verba perventum est, ut de eadem massa et diversis vasis, et de potestate figuli diceretur.
AUG. Hear Ambrose, who says: We are all born under sin, whose very origin is in fault (Ambrose, On Penance 1.3.13). For so he understood, with the rest of his fellow disciples and fellow teachers, without any doubt Catholics, what was written of sin and death, that it entered through one, and passed to all human beings (See Rom 5:12). And understand that this is the lump from which the vessels are made, whether those or these. For if the solution of this inscrutable question were that which you think, according to the merits of wills, it would be so manifest that the Apostle would not be compelled by any difficulty of it to say: O man, who are you to answer back to God? (Rom 9:20) For it was treated concerning those not yet born, of whom, not from works, but according to his own purpose, God loved one and hated the other; whence it came to these words, that of the same lump and the diverse vessels, and of the power of the potter, it was said.
Iulianum.1.126127. IUL. Tu autem qui supra dixeras, omnes ire in condemnationem, qua testimonium fronte posuisti, quo pronuntiatur ire alius in honorem, alius in contumeliam?
127. JUL. But you, who said above that all go into condemnation, with what brow did you set down the testimony by which it is pronounced that one goes into honor, another into dishonor?
Iulianum.1.127AUG. Sed gratia liberat a totius massae damnatione quos liberat; quam vos negando, estis haeretici. Quantum enim pertinet ad originis meritum, ex uno omnes in condemnationem (Rom 5, 16); quantum autem ad gratiam, quae non secundum merita datur, quicumque ab ista condemnatione liberantur, dicuntur vasa misericordiae; qui vero non liberantur ira Dei manet super eos (Io 3, 36), veniens de iusto iudicio Dei; quod non ideo vituperabile, quia inscrutabile est; et propterea vasa irae nuncupantur, quia et his bene utitur Deus, ut notas faciat divitias gloriae suae, in vasa misericordiae (Rom 9, 23). Quod enim Deo iudicante a ceteris exigitur, hoc istis eo miserante donatur; quas investigabiles vias Domini si aestimas improbandas, audi: O homo, tu quis es qui respondeas Deo? (Rom 9, 20)
AUG. But grace frees from the condemnation of the whole lump those whom it frees; which by denying, you are heretics. For so far as pertains to the merit of origin, from one all go into condemnation (Rom 5:16); but so far as pertains to grace, which is given not according to merits, whoever are freed from this condemnation are called vessels of mercy; but those who are not freed, the wrath of God remains over them (John 3:36), coming from the just judgment of God; which is not for that reason to be blamed because it is inscrutable; and therefore they are called vessels of wrath, because God uses even these well, to make known the riches of his glory toward the vessels of mercy (Rom 9:23). For what is exacted from the rest, by God judging, is granted to these, by him being merciful; whose unsearchable ways of the Lord, if you judge to be condemned, hear: O man, who are you to answer back to God? (Rom 9:20)
Iulianum.1.127128. IUL. Nihil enim ita pugnat, quam dicere, omnes, et non omnes. Tu dicis, a figulo Deo omnes fieri in condemnationem; Apostolus dicit, non omnes in condemnationem, nec omnes in honorem; quod in loco suo, quid habeat dignitatis absolvam. In ipsa tamen pronuntiatione sententiae, constat inter vos magnam esse discordiam, nec eumdem esse figulum in condemnationem cuncta fingentem, quem Paulus dicat in honorem alios fabricantem; nec te illi credere, qui a magistro admirabili praedicatur; quoniam tuus figulus omnes in condemnationem fingit, Apostoli figulus plurimos fingit in gloriam.
128. JUL. For nothing so fights as to say: all, and not all. You say that all are made for condemnation by God the potter; the Apostle says, not all for condemnation, nor all for honor; which, in its own place, what dignity it has, I will resolve. Yet in the very pronouncement of the sentence, it is established that there is a great discord between you, and that the potter who fashions all things for condemnation is not the same as the one whom Paul says fashions others for honor; and that you do not believe him who is proclaimed by the admirable teacher; since your potter fashions all for condemnation, the Apostle's potter fashions very many for glory.
Iulianum.1.128AUG. Cum dicuntur omnes ex uno in condemnationem, ipsa massa significatur, ex qua fiunt a figulo alia vasa in honorem, id est, quae assumuntur in gratiam, alia in contumeliam, id est, quae ad luendum debitum relinquuntur; ut filii gratiae id sibi donari sciant, quod si exigeretur, non esset iniustum; ac sic non in se ipsis, sed in Domino glorientur (Cf. 1 Cor 1, 31).
AUG. When all from one are said to go into condemnation, that very lump is signified, from which the potter makes other vessels for honor, that is, those which are taken up into grace; others for dishonor, that is, those which are left to pay the debt; so that the children of grace may know that this is granted to them, which, if it were exacted, would not be unjust; and so they may glory not in themselves, but in the Lord (See 1 Cor 1:31).
Iulianum.1.128129. IUL. Et haec quidem dixerim, ut statim appareret, te esse aut imperitiae aut impudentiae singularis, qui tuorum vice, contrariis utereris; ceterum pietas explanabit et ratio, Deum meum neminem in contumeliam formare.
129. JUL. And these things indeed I have said, that it might at once appear that you are of singular ignorance or impudence, who, in place of your own people, would use contraries; but for the rest, piety and reason will explain that my God forms no one for dishonor.
Iulianum.1.129AUG. Si Deus tuus in contumeliam neminem format, non est ipse Pauli apostoli Deus; ille quippe de Deo vero dicebat: O homo, tu quis es qui respondeas Deo? Numquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit: Quid me fecisti sic? An non habet potestatem figulus luti, ex eadem massa facere aliud vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam? (Rom 9, 20-21; cf. Isa 45, 9) Sed tu videlicet artifex magnus profers ex officina Pelagiana meliorem deum, qui nullum vas facit in contumeliam.
AUG. If your God forms no one for dishonor, he is not the God of the apostle Paul; for he was speaking of the true God: O man, who are you to answer back to God? Does the thing formed say to him who formed it: Why have you made me thus? Or does not the potter of the clay have power, from the same lump, to make one vessel for honor, another for dishonor? (Rom 9:20-21; see Isa 45:9) But you, forsooth, a great craftsman, bring forth from the Pelagian workshop a better god, who makes no vessel for dishonor.
Iulianum.1.129130. IUL. Sed imaginem suam, id est, omnes homines bonos condere, qui etiam demolitos studiorum pravitate, reformare remediorum desiderat largitate. Ipsi quidem cantat Ecclesia misericordiam et iudicium (Ps 100, 1); quia et illis est benignus qui nihil deliquerunt, et iusto punit iudicio eos qui boni a Deo conditi suapte voluntate peccarunt, ac misericordiae subsidia respuerunt. Hanc igitur misericordiam, et hoc iudicium cantat Ecclesia Catholicorum; ceterum in vestra nihil potest tale resonare, quae dicit sine iustitia, sine iudicio, sine misericordia, Deum conditorem malorum, formare quos puniat; atque ob hoc punire, quod eos ex Adam ipse formaverit.
130. JUL. But to create his own image, that is, all human beings good, who desires to reform even those demolished by the depravity of their pursuits, by the bounty of his remedies. To him indeed the Church sings mercy and judgment (Ps 101:1 (100)); because he is both benign to those who have committed no offense, and punishes with a just judgment those who, created good by God, sinned by their own will, and spurned the helps of mercy. This mercy, then, and this judgment, the Church of the Catholics sings; but in yours nothing such can resound, which says that God, without justice, without judgment, without mercy, the Creator of evils, forms those whom he may punish; and for this reason punishes, because he himself formed them from Adam.
Iulianum.1.130AUG. Iam quidem tibi superius ad omnia ista responsum est; tamen et hic breviter audi. Non abstinet Deus bonum formationis suae etiam ab stirpe damnata; sed si tibi displicet, Deum creare quos damnet; contradic ei, si potes, ne creet eos, quos malos futuros, et in malignitate usque in finem perseveraturos, et ob hoc sine dubitatione damnandos esse praescivit; aut ei suggere, si videtur, ut tot millia parvulorum non baptizatorum, quos novit perdite esse victuros, et in aeternum ignem, damnante ipso, cum diabolo ituros, rapiat ex hac vita, dum sunt innocentes et boni; ut si non in regno eius, certe in loco aliquo secundae felicitatis, quem talibus aedificavit haeresis vestra, vitam teneant sempiternam.
AUG. You have indeed already been answered above on all these things; yet hear here too briefly. God does not withhold the good of his fashioning even from the condemned stock; but if it displeases you that God creates those whom he condemns; contradict him, if you can, lest he create those whom he foreknew would be evil, and would persevere in malignity even to the end, and on this account, without doubt, were to be condemned; or suggest to him, if it seems good, that he should snatch from this life so many thousands of unbaptized little ones, whom he knows will live perdition, and will go, by his condemning, with the devil into eternal fire, while they are innocent and good; so that, if not in his kingdom, yet certainly in some place of a second felicity—which your heresy has built for such—they may hold everlasting life.
Iulianum.1.130Habes adhuc quod suggeras consiliarius Dei, pro filiis eius quos regeneravit, quos adoptavit, et tamen malos atque damnandos futuros esse praevidit; ut antequam veniant in ream vitam, vitae ipsius productione priventur, et ad regnum eius, non ad supplicia aeterna pertineant.
You have still what to suggest, as a counselor of God, on behalf of his children whom he has regenerated, whom he has adopted, and yet has foreseen will be evil and to be condemned; that, before they come into a guilty life, they be deprived of life itself, and belong to his kingdom, not to eternal punishments.
Iulianum.1.130Cum enim te invidiose dicere putaveris, Deum creare quos damnet; cogita quanto invidiosius possit dicere alius similiter vanus, Deum regenerare quos damnet; cum sit in eius omnipotentiae potestate, antequam damnabiles fiant, eos de tentationibus mortalis vitae huius auferre.
For when you think you say spitefully that God creates those whom he condemns; consider how much more spitefully another, empty in like manner, could say that God regenerates those whom he condemns; since it is in the power of his omnipotence, before they become damnable, to take them away from the temptations of this mortal life.
Iulianum.1.130Si autem non potes ista dicere, nec Deo contradicere, nec illi sapientiae tuum praebere consilium; quis enim cognovit sensum Domini, aut quis consiliarius eius fuit? (Rom 11, 34; cf. Isa 40, 13), desine nobis introducere alterum figulum, qui non facit vasa in contumeliam; et ab isto qui ea facit reprehendendo cohibe te, et agnosce te; quia ut non te implices hoc sacrilegio, ideo tibi dicit Apostolus: O homo, tu quis es qui respondeas Deo? (Rom 9, 20)
But if you cannot say these things, nor contradict God, nor offer your counsel to that wisdom; for who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor? (Rom 11:34; see Isa 40:13), cease to introduce to us another potter, who does not make vessels for dishonor; and restrain yourself from reproving this one who makes them, and recognize yourself; for, that you may not entangle yourself in this sacrilege, therefore the Apostle says to you: O man, who are you to answer back to God? (Rom 9:20)
Iulianum.1.130131. IUL. Sed iam apostolicae sententiae dignitas asseratur, ne putetur vel de aliquibus hoc sensisse, quod tu de omnibus aestimasti. Apostolus itaque Paulus disputans cum quaestionibus Iudaeorum, qui generis sui dignitate turgentes, dedignabantur coaequari sibi ex Gentibus fideles, et iustitiam Dei commendat et gratiam, disputans ad earum munificentiam pertinere, quod et primo Iudaeos nobilitaverat legis agnitio, et quod deinceps etiam Gentes adsciverat Christi praedicatio.
131. JUL. But now let the dignity of the apostolic sentence be asserted, lest it be thought to have meant of some what you have judged of all. The apostle Paul, then, disputing with the questions of the Jews—who, swollen with the dignity of their race, disdained that believers from the Gentiles should be made equal to them—both commends the justice of God and his grace, disputing that it belongs to their munificence both that first the recognition of the law had ennobled the Jews, and that afterward the preaching of Christ had admitted the Gentiles also.
Iulianum.1.131Unus enim utriusque populi conditor iudicaturus et illos per legem, et istos sine lege, et istos in lege (Cf. Rom 2, 12; 3, 29-31); quia non erat Iudaeorum Deus tantum, sed etiam Gentium, reddens suum unicuique sine fraude, sine gratia (Cf. Rom 3, 29), id est sine cuiusquam acceptione personae (quod exprimit nomen gratiae in definitione iustitiae), ita de semine venientes Abraham, cum nequiter vivunt, iure condemnat, ac de sua haereditate proturbat, sicut etiam Gentiles in simili operatione deprehensos; et e regione, utriusque populi bonas voluntates et veram fidem probitatemque actionum donat gaudiis sempiternis.
For there is one Creator of both peoples, about to judge both these through the law, and those without the law, and these in the law (See Rom 2:12; 3:29-31); because he was not the God of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles, rendering to each his own without fraud, without favor (See Rom 3:29)—that is, without any respect of persons (which the name of favor expresses in the definition of justice)—so that those coming from the seed of Abraham, when they live wickedly, he by right condemns, and drives from his inheritance, just as the Gentiles too, caught in a like working; and on the other side, the good wills and the true faith and uprightness of actions of both peoples he rewards with everlasting joys.
Iulianum.1.131Comprimit igitur Gentium Magister Iudaeorum tumorem, et ostendit non in seminibus humani generis, sed in moribus esse distantiam; ut se illi agnoscerent, nisi fideles esse curassent, nulla praerogativa circumcisi generis vindicandos; siquidem Iacob et Esau una seminis exceptione concepti, et una vi parientis effusi, diversos nimium exitus pro meritorum diversitate pertulerint.
The Teacher of the Gentiles, then, represses the swelling of the Jews, and shows that the distance is not in the seeds of the human race, but in morals; so that they might recognize themselves to be vindicated by no prerogative of a circumcised race, unless they had taken care to be faithful; since indeed Jacob and Esau, conceived by one taking of seed, and poured forth by one force of her giving birth, suffered exceedingly diverse outcomes according to the diversity of their merits.
Iulianum.1.131AUG. Si secundum Apostolum saperes, non commemorares hoc loco merita Iacob, ubi eum dicit ille non ex operibus fuisse dilectum; ut gratiam commendet, quae non secundum merita nostra datur; alioquin merces non imputatur, sicut ipse dicit, secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum (Rom 4, 4). Quibus verbis quid ostendit, nisi gratiam non esse debitam, sed gratuitam? Hanc itaque commendabat, ubi dicebat: Cum enim nondum nati essent, neque egissent aliquid boni aut mali, ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est: Quia maior serviet minori (Rom 9, 11-12). Clara sunt, quae obscurare conaris; fumos tolle, Scripturarum lumen attende. Gratia quippe hominem praevenit, ut diligat Deum, qua dilectione operetur bona. Quod et Ioannes apostolus apertissime ostendit, ubi ait: Nos diligamus, quoniam prior dilexit nos (1 Io 4, 19). Non ergo diligimur, quia dileximus; sed quia dilecti sumus, diligamus.
AUG. If you had a taste according to the Apostle, you would not here recall the merits of Jacob, where he says that the one was loved not from works; that he might commend grace, which is not given according to our merits; otherwise the reward is not reckoned, as he himself says, according to grace, but according to debt (Rom 4:4). By which words what does he show, except that grace is not owed, but gratuitous? This, then, he was commending, where he said: For when they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil, that according to the election the purpose of God might stand, not from works, but from him who calls, it was said: That the elder shall serve the younger (Rom 9:11-12). The things you try to obscure are clear; remove the smoke, attend to the light of the Scriptures. For grace goes before a man, that he may love God, by which love he may work good. Which the apostle John too most openly shows, where he says: Let us love, because he first loved us (1 John 4:19). Not, then, are we loved because we have loved; but because we have been loved, let us love.
Iulianum.1.131132. IUL. Esau enim profanus et fornicator, propter unam escam vendens primitiva sua, quaesivit benedictionem quam spreverat, nec adeptus est, quamquam eam cum lacrymis poposcisset. Iacob autem quietus et mitis, oboediens parentum praeceptis, et sanctificationum appetentissimus, ad hoc usque provectus est, ut sicut Abrahae et Isaac, ita etiam et Iacob Deus in sancto populo diceretur (Cf. Ex 3, 6; Mt 22, 32; Hebr 12, 16-17). Cum igitur omnibus constaret exemplis, Deum iusto iudicio bonis mentibus in quacumque gente suam misericordiam non negare, malas vero mentes nulla sinere stirpis nobilitate defendi; intellegerent Iudaei Gentium fidem a se despici non debere; quia sicut non patrocinatur Israelitarum stemma criminibus, ita etiam nullo impedimento est Gentium origo virtutibus. Hoc ergo totum agens conflictu illo Apostolus; in quibusdam tamen locis, ad incurvandam circumcisorum arrogantiam, sub nomine gratiae de sola Dei praeiudicat potestate.
132. JUL. For Esau, profane and a fornicator, selling his birthright for one meal, sought the blessing he had spurned, and did not obtain it, although he had begged for it with tears. But Jacob, quiet and meek, obedient to his parents' precepts, and most desirous of sanctifications, was advanced to this point, that, as of Abraham and Isaac, so also of Jacob God should be called among the holy people (See Exod 3:6; Matt 22:32; Heb 12:16-17). Since, then, it was established by all examples that God by a just judgment does not deny his mercy to good minds in whatever nation, but allows evil minds to be defended by no nobility of stock; the Jews were to understand that the faith of the Gentiles ought not to be despised by them; because, just as the lineage of the Israelites does not patronize crimes, so too the origin of the Gentiles is no hindrance to virtues. Doing all this in that contest, then, the Apostle, in certain places nonetheless, to curve down the arrogance of the circumcised, under the name of grace makes a prejudgment from the power of God alone.
Iulianum.1.132AUG. Ergo ad incurvandam circumcisorum arrogantiam, sub nomine gratiae mentitur Apostolus, nam Deus ex operibus eligit, non ex gratia. Quis ita sapiat, nisi haereticus inimicus gratiae, amicus superbiae? Clamat Vas electionis, et gratiae, qua talis factus est, praedicator, non ex operibus dilectum esse Iacob, et tu commemoras opera Iacob, ex quibus eum dilectum esse contendis; et hoc faciens, mihi te existimas contradicere, cum sis novus Antichristus, eique apertissime contradicas in quo locutus est Christus (Cf. 2 Cor 13, 3).
AUG. Then, to curve down the arrogance of the circumcised, the Apostle lies under the name of grace; for God chooses from works, not from grace. Who would think thus, except a heretic, an enemy of grace, a friend of pride? The Vessel of election, and the preacher of the grace by which he was made such, cries out that Jacob was loved not from works, and you recall the works of Jacob, from which you contend he was loved; and doing this, you think you contradict me, when you are a new Antichrist, and most openly contradict him in whom Christ spoke (See 2 Cor 13:3).
Iulianum.1.132133. IUL. Ut illis in cerimoniarum et hostiarum observatione gloriantibus, perque hoc aestimantibus alias nationes nullis legis ritibus consecratas ad consortium sui nec posse admitti subito, nec debere, diceret, quia etsi in illis observationibus fuisset summa iustitiae, haberet tamen in potestate sua Deus, quamdam facere populorum commutationem, ut reiceret quos vellet, et quos vellet assumeret. Cui sensui respondet sub persona Iudaeorum, nihil debere iam exigi ab hominis voluntate; quandoquidem Deus, cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult obdurat (Rom 9, 18). Ad quod refert Apostolus: O homo, tu quis es qui respondeas Deo? (Rom 9, 20) Et infert testimonium prophe e Isaiae: Numquid dicit, inquit, figmentum ei qui se finxit: Utquid me fecisti sic? (Isa 45, 9; Rom 9, 20)
133. JUL. So that, to those glorying in the observance of ceremonies and sacrifices, and on this account judging that other nations, consecrated by no rites of the law, could neither be admitted suddenly to their fellowship, nor ought to be, he might say that, even if in those observances were the sum of justice, yet God had in his power to make a certain interchange of peoples, so as to reject whom he willed, and take up whom he willed. To which sense he answers under the person of the Jews, that nothing ought now to be exacted from the will of man; since indeed God has mercy on whom he wills, and hardens whom he wills (Rom 9:18). To which the Apostle replies: O man, who are you to answer back to God? (Rom 9:20) And he brings in the testimony of the prophet Isaiah: Does the thing formed say, he says, to him who formed it: Why have you made me thus? (Isa 45:9; Rom 9:20)
Iulianum.1.133Additque de suo: Aut non habet potestatem figulus lutiex eadem massa facere aliud vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam? (Rom 9, 21) Et est sensus eiusmodi: Quia ego commendavi voluntatem Dei, auctoritatemque gratiae eius exposui, dicens quod misericordiam praestaret, cuiuscumque misertus fuisset; tu mihi, o Iudaee, calumniam concitasti, quasi commendatio prolata a me voluntatis et potestatis divinae ad excidium iustitiae illius pertineret; et quia dixi: Facit quod vult; argumentatus es nihil iam reposci ab hominis voluntate debere, si Deus totum pro sua faceret voluntate; cum personae dignitas locum excluserit quaestionis. Nam si dixissem: Facit Deus quod debet secundum iustitiae suae leges quae de meritis iudicat singulorum; nihil quale nunc obicis, utique rettulisses; nunc vero quia dixi: Facit Deus quod vult, putasti me aliquid furatum esse de iustitiae dignitate. Utrumque igitur idem est. Nam cum de Deo dico: Facit quod vult, nihil aliud dico, quam: Facit quod debet; quia scio eum nihil aliud velle quam debet. Ubi ergo inseparabiliter voluntas cohaeret aequitati quamcumque de illis nominavero, utramque signavi.
And he adds of his own: Or does not the potter of the clay have power, from the same lump, to make one vessel for honor, another for dishonor? (Rom 9:21) And the sense is of this kind: Because I commended the will of God, and set forth the authority of his grace, saying that he would show mercy to whomever he had mercy on; you, O Jew, stirred up a slander against me, as though the commendation brought forth by me of the divine will and power pertained to the destruction of that justice; and because I said: He does what he wills; you argued that nothing now ought to be required of the will of man, if God did everything according to his own will; whereas the dignity of the person excluded the place for the question. For if I had said: God does what he ought according to the laws of his justice, which judges of the merits of individuals; you would surely have brought forward nothing of the kind you now object; but now, because I said: God does what he wills, you thought I had stolen something from the dignity of justice. Both, then, are the same. For when I say of God: He does what he wills, I say nothing else than: He does what he ought; for I know that he wills nothing other than what he ought. Where, then, the will inseparably clings to equity, whichever of them I shall have named, I have signified both.
Iulianum.1.133AUG. Quomodolibet dicas Deum facere quod debet; gratiam nemini debet, multisque non reddit supplicium, quod malis eorum operibus debet, et largitur gratiam, quam nullis eorum bonis operibus debet. Quid enim debebat eidem ipsi Paulo, cum adhuc Saulus persequeretur Ecclesiam? Nonne supplicium? Quod ergo eum emissa voce de caelo prostravit, quod excaecavit, quod ad fidem percipiendam quam vastabat, tam violenter attraxit (Cf. Act 9, 4. 8s), procul dubio secundum gratiam, non secundum debitum fecit, ut in eis esset reliquiis populi Israel, de quibus dicit: Sic ergo et in hoc tempore reliquiae per electionem gratiae factae sunt; si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus; alioquin gratia iam non est gratia (Rom 11, 5-6). Quid debebat etiam illis nisi supplicium quibus dicit: Non propter vos ego facio, domus Israel, sed propter nomen meum sanctum, quod profanastis in Gentibus (Ez 36, 22)?
AUG. In whatever way you say that God does what he ought; he owes grace to no one, and to many he does not render the punishment which he owes to their evil works, and he bestows the grace which he owes to none of their good works. For what did he owe to Paul himself, while still Saul he was persecuting the Church? Was it not punishment? That, then, he cast him down by a voice sent from heaven, that he blinded him, that he so violently drew him to receive the faith he was laying waste (See Acts 9:4.8), he did without doubt according to grace, not according to debt, so that he might be among those remnants of the people of Israel, of whom he says: So then even at this time the remnants have been made by the election of grace; but if by grace, then no longer from works; otherwise grace is no longer grace (Rom 11:5-6). What did he owe even to those except punishment, to whom he says: Not on your account do I act, O house of Israel, but on account of my holy name, which you have profaned among the Gentiles (Ezek 36:22)?
Iulianum.1.133Facere ergo se dicit bona eorum in ipsis, sed propter nomen suum quod profanaverunt, non propter ipsos qui profanaverunt; nam propter ipsos si facere vellet, supplicium illis debitum redderet, non gratiam donaret indebitam. Quod enim se facturum dicit, ad hoc pertinet, ut bona faciant, non quia boni erant, qui profanaverunt nomen sanctum eius. Denique apertissime dicit eos bona esse facturos; sed se faciente ut ea faciant; ait quippe inter cetera: Et faciam ut in iustificationibus meis ambuletis, et iudicia mea observetis et faciatis (Ez 36, 27). His certe operibus merces imputatur secundum debitum; debetur enim merces, si fiant; sed gratia quae non debetur, praecedit ut fiant. Debetur, inquam, bona merces operibus hominum bonis; sed non debetur gratia, quae ipsos homines bonos operatur ex malis.
He says, then, that he makes their good things in them, but on account of his own name which they profaned, not on account of those who profaned it; for if he willed to do it on their account, he would render them the punishment owed, not bestow grace unowed. For what he says he will do pertains to this, that they may do good things, not because they were good who profaned his holy name. Finally, he says most openly that they will do good things; but he doing it, that they may do them; for he says, among other things: And I will make you walk in my justifications, and observe and do my judgments (Ezek 36:27). To these works certainly the reward is reckoned according to debt; for the reward is owed, if they be done; but grace, which is not owed, goes before that they may be done. The reward, I say, is owed to the good works of men; but grace is not owed, which works the men themselves good out of evil.
Iulianum.1.133Postremo, qui facere Deum dixisti quod debet, et alta cervice humana merita ventilasti, dic quaeso, quibus meritis parvulorum debeat regnum caelorum. Dicturus es forte, debere hoc eum gratiae suae, qua opitulante renati sunt. Propter hanc enim acceptam iam venire in eius regnum merentur; sed ipsam gratiam, quam regenerandis exhibet, nullis eorum omnino meritis debet. Propterea Pelagius vester in episcopali iudicio Palaestino, eos qui dicunt gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra dari, ne ipse damnaretur, damnare compulsus est; ubi et te ipsum, et se ipsum, qui hoc dicere non desistitis, sine dubitatione damnavit (Cf. De gestis Pelag. 13, 30).
Finally, you who said that God does what he ought, and with high neck fanned about human merits, say, I beg, by what merits of little ones the kingdom of heaven is owed them. You will say perhaps that he owes this to his grace, by whose help they have been reborn. For on account of having received this grace, they now deserve to come into his kingdom; but that very grace, which he shows to those to be regenerated, he owes to none of their merits at all. For this reason your Pelagius, in the episcopal Palestinian trial, that he might not himself be condemned, was compelled to condemn those who say that the grace of God is given according to our merits; where he condemned without doubt both you yourself, and himself, who do not cease to say this (See The Deeds of Pelagius 13.30).
Iulianum.1.133Istam gratiam, vere gratiam, id est, gratuitam, nullisque meritis praecedentibus debitam, commendabat Apostolus, quando dicebat: Cum enim nondum nati essent, nec aliquid egissent boni aut mali, ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret (Rom 9, 11-12). Haec est electio, de qua et illud dicitur: Reliquiae per electionem gratiae factae sunt, si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus; alioquin gratia iam non est gratia (Rom 11, 5-6). Unde et hic, cum dixisset: Ut per electionem propositum Dei maneret; continuo subdidit: Nonex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est: Quia maior serviet minori (Rom 9, 12).
This grace, truly grace, that is, gratuitous, and owed to no preceding merits, the Apostle was commending, when he said: For when they were not yet born, nor had done anything good or evil, that according to the election the purpose of God might stand (Rom 9:11-12). This is the election, of which it is also said: The remnants have been made by the election of grace; but if by grace, then no longer from works; otherwise grace is no longer grace (Rom 11:5-6). Whence here too, when he had said: That the purpose of God might stand according to the election; he at once added: Not from works, but from him who calls, it was said: That the elder shall serve the younger (Rom 9:12).
Iulianum.1.133Contra istam veritatis tubam reclamas, et dicis: Ad incurvandam circumcisorum arrogantiam, sub nomine gratiae Paulus apostolus de sola Dei praeiudicat potestate. Ubi quid dicis aliud, nisi: Ad incurvandam circumcisorum arrogantiam mentitur Apostolus, dicens non ex operibus dilectum esse Iacob; cum ex operibus sit dilectus, quia erat quietus, et mitis, oboediens parentum praeceptis, et sanctificationumappetentissimus (Cf. supra 132)? Nec intellegis, non ideo quia talis erat, vel talis futurus erat, fuisse dilectum; sed talem, quia dilectus est, factum. Erubesce: non mentitur Apostolus; non ex operibus Iacob dilectus est; si enim gratia, iam non ex operibus (Rom 11, 6), sed gratia dilectus, eadem gratia faciente bonis oportuit ut polleret operibus. Parce animae tuae, noli esse inimicus huic gratiae.
Against this trumpet of truth you cry out, and you say: To curve down the arrogance of the circumcised, the apostle Paul, under the name of grace, makes a prejudgment from the power of God alone. Where what do you say else, except: To curve down the arrogance of the circumcised, the Apostle lies, saying that Jacob was loved not from works; whereas he was loved from works, because he was quiet, and meek, obedient to his parents' precepts, and most desirous of sanctifications (See above, 1.132)? Nor do you understand that he was loved not because he was such, or would be such; but was made such, because he was loved. Blush: the Apostle does not lie; Jacob was not loved from works; for if by grace, then no longer from works (Rom 11:6); but loved by grace, it behooved that, by the same grace working, he should be strong in good works. Spare your own soul, do not be an enemy of this grace.
Iulianum.1.133134. IUL. Ergo superbia illa, quae volebat otiari, et desidiam suam ob id colore necessitatis obnubere, ut in susceptione Gentium reclamaret Evangelio; audit quoniam etsi sic esset quomodo tu commentaris, tamen supplicare Deo, non seditionem excitare deberes; quibus verbis nequitiam retundit hominis, qui diversitatem meritorum ex voluntatis qualitate venientem, aucupans elocutionis ambiguum, ideo necessitati divinae conabatur adscribere, ut assereret necesse esse alterum de duobus, id est, aut Gentes ad promissionis non venire consortium aut, si hoc liceret Deo, exstingui officia liberae voluntatis.
134. JUL. Therefore that pride, which wished to be idle, and to veil its sloth under the color of necessity, so as to clamor against the Gospel in the reception of the Gentiles, hears that even if it were as you contrive, yet you ought to supplicate God, not to stir up sedition; with which words he beats down the wickedness of a man who, hunting the ambiguity of the expression, was trying to ascribe to divine necessity the diversity of merits coming from the quality of the will, so as to assert that one of two things was necessary: that is, either that the Gentiles should not come to the fellowship of the promise, or, if this were permitted to God, that the offices of free will should be extinguished.
Iulianum.1.134Verum quia id non sufficiebat negotio; neque enim a tali magistro, sicut commendabatur auctoritas Dei, ita erat indefensa relinquenda iustitia; subdit consequentissime vasa, quae in contumelia et quae in honore fiunt, habere hoc de propriae stipendio voluntatis. Si enim Deus volens ostendere iram, et notam facere potentiam suam in multa patientia, in vasis irae, consummatis in perditionem; et ut notas faceret, inquit, divitias gloriae suae in vasis misericordiae, quae praeparavit in gloriam, quos et vocavit nos, non solum ex Iudaeis, sed etiam ex Gentibus (Rom 9, 22-24).
But because this was not sufficient for the matter; for from such a teacher, just as the authority of God was commended, so justice was not to be left undefended; he most consequently adds that the vessels which are made for dishonor and which for honor have this from the wage of their own will. For if God, willing to show wrath, and to make known his power, in much patience, on the vessels of wrath, fitted for perdition; and that he might make known, he says, the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he prepared for glory, whom also he called, us, not only from the Jews, but also from the Gentiles (Rom 9:22-24).
Iulianum.1.134Certe hic absolvit, quod superior conflictus operuerat, non inferri a Deo iram nisi his vasis, quae ad perditionem consummata fuerint; gloriam autem dari his, quae ad hoc fuerint praeparata. A quo autem vasa huiusmodi in susceptionem horum quae diximus praeparentur, ipsius Apostoli sermo patefecit. In magna, inquit, domo, non sunt tantummodo vasa aurea et argentea, sed et lignea et fictilia; alia quidem in honorem, alia in contumeliam. Si ergo mundaverit quis semetipsum ab his, erit vas in honorem sanctificatum, utile Domino, ad omne opus bonum paratum (2 Tim 2, 20-21).
Certainly here he resolves what the earlier contest had covered: that wrath is brought by God only upon those vessels which have been fitted for perdition; but glory is given to those which have been prepared for this. But by whom vessels of this kind are prepared for the reception of those things we have mentioned, the Apostle's own discourse made plain. In a great house, he says, there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and earthenware; some indeed for honor, others for dishonor. If, then, anyone cleanses himself from these, he will be a vessel for honor, sanctified, useful to the Lord, prepared for every good work (2 Tim 2:20-21).
Iulianum.1.134AUG. Ergo ipsa vasa ita se praeparant, ut frustra de Deo dictum sit: Quae praeparavit in gloriam? Hoc enim apertissime dicis; nec intellegis ita dictum esse: Siquis mundaverit semetipsum, ut ostenderetur et opus hominis per voluntatem; sed, ingrate homo, praeparatur voluntas a Domino (Prov 8, 35 (sec. LXX)); ideo utrumque verum est, et quia Deus praeparat vasa in gloriam, et quia ipsa se praeparant.
AUG. Then the vessels themselves so prepare themselves, that it was said in vain of God: Which he prepared for glory? For this you say most openly; nor do you understand that it was said: If anyone cleanses himself, in such a way that the work of man too through the will might be shown; but, ungrateful man, the will is prepared by the Lord (Prov 8:35 (LXX)); therefore both are true—both that God prepares the vessels for glory, and that they prepare themselves.
Iulianum.1.134Ut enim faciat homo, Deus facit; quia ut diligat homo, Deus prior diligit. Lege Ezechielem prophetam, unde quod satis visum est supra commemoravi (Cf. supra 133); ista etiam verba reperies, id est, Deum facere ut praecepta eius homines faciant, quorum miseretur, non propter merita eorum, quae mala ibi esse commemorat, sed propter nomen suum; ut Deo sine meritis eorum faciente ut faciant praecepta eius, incipiant merita bonorum habere factorum. Haec est gratia quam negatis, non ex operibus quae fiunt, sed ut fiant.
For that man may do it, God does it; because that man may love, God first loves. Read the prophet Ezekiel, whence I recalled above what seemed sufficient (See above, 1.133); you will find also these words—that is, that God makes those of whom he has mercy do his precepts, not on account of their merits, which he there recalls to be evil, but on account of his own name; so that, with God, without their merits, making that they do his precepts, they may begin to have the merits of good deeds. This is the grace which you deny—not from the works that are done, but that they may be done.
Iulianum.1.134135. IUL. Ecce officium liberae voluntatis: Si, inquit, mundaverit quis semetipsum a societate vasorum vilium (quo nomine vitia denotantur), erit vas in honorem sanctificatum, utile Domino, ad omne opus bonum paratum (2 Tim 2, 21). Haec igitur vasa, studiis propriis, aut ad iram, aut ad gloriam praeparantur; Deus autem notam facit potentiam suam in utroque, vel severitatem in impios exserendo, vel benedictionem fidelibus largiendo. Apparuit itaque hanc sententiam egregii praeceptoris, nec Manichaeis opem sensibus attulisse, et e diverso nos consequenter armasse.
135. JUL. Behold the office of free will: If, he says, anyone cleanses himself from the fellowship of vile vessels (by which name vices are denoted), he will be a vessel for honor, sanctified, useful to the Lord, prepared for every good work (2 Tim 2:21). These vessels, then, by their own pursuits, are prepared either for wrath or for glory; but God makes known his power in both, either by exerting severity upon the impious, or by bestowing blessing upon the faithful. It appeared, then, that this sentence of the excellent preacher both brought no help to the Manichean senses, and on the contrary armed us consequently.
Iulianum.1.135AUG. Quid calumniaris, quid falso crimineris, nec quos et quales Ecclesiae doctores crimineris attendis? Non cuiusquam Manichaei, sed sancti Ambrosii verbis tibi respondeo: Deus quos dignatur vocat, et quem vult religiosum facit (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 27). Hoc in veritate facit, hoc in veritate Scripturarum divinarum intellexit Ambrosius; sed iudicium, cum alios facit, et alios non facit, occultum est.
AUG. Why do you slander, why do you falsely charge, and do not attend whom and what kind of teachers of the Church you charge? Not with the words of any Manichean, but of holy Ambrose I answer you: God calls those whom he deigns, and makes religious whom he wills (Ambrose, On Luke 7.27). This he does in truth, this Ambrose understood in the truth of the divine Scriptures; but the judgment, when he makes some and does not make others, is hidden.
Iulianum.1.135Propter quod dicitur homini per hominem, sed non ab homine: O homo, tu quis es, qui respondeas Deo? Numquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit: Quid me fecisti sic? An non habet potestatem figulus luti, ex eadem massa facere aliud vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam? (Rom 9, 20-21) Aufer tuas nebulas ab istorum serenitate verborum, quibus Dei quidem iudicium significatur occultum; sed ipsa tam clara sunt, ut se tua caligine obumbrari obscurarique non sinant.
On account of which it is said to man through man, but not from man: O man, who are you to answer back to God? Does the thing formed say to him who formed it: Why have you made me thus? Or does not the potter of the clay have power, from the same lump, to make one vessel for honor, another for dishonor? (Rom 9:20-21) Take away your mists from the serenity of these words, by which the judgment of God indeed is signified to be hidden; but they themselves are so clear that they do not suffer themselves to be shadowed and obscured by your fog.
Iulianum.1.135136. IUL. Ac per hoc et tibi vehementer obnixa est, dicens, non omnes fingi in condemnationem, in quam tu omnes ire pronuntias. Absurdissime autem argumentari soles, ut dicas: Sed hi non finguntur in condemnationem, qui postea liberantur; cum nec sic possit sermonis apostolici tibi vel superficies convenire. Nam cum dicis tu: Omnes in condemnationem creantur lege nascendi, sed aliqui inde, licet perexigui, mysteriis liberantur; non hoc asseris quod ille, qui non solum de condemnatis liberari praedicat, verum non omnes in condemnationem fingi, sed alios in contumeliam, alios in honorem.
136. JUL. And by this it is vehemently opposed to you too, saying that not all are fashioned for condemnation, into which you pronounce all to go. But you are wont to argue most absurdly, so that you say: But these are not fashioned for condemnation, who are afterward freed; whereas not even thus can even the surface of the apostolic discourse fit you. For when you say: All are created for condemnation by the law of being born, but some thence, though very few, are freed by the mysteries; you do not assert this which he does, who not only proclaims that some are freed from the condemned, but that not all are fashioned for condemnation, but others for dishonor, others for honor.
Iulianum.1.136AUG. Ubi dixit Apostolus: Ex uno omnes in condemnationem (Rom 5, 16); ipsam massam demonstravit, quae tota vitiata ex Adam fluxit; ubi autem dicit, ex illa fieri vasa in honorem, gratiam commendat, qua homines quos creat, etiam liberat; ubi vero, ex illa fieri vasa in contumeliam, iudicium ostendit, quo homines, quamvis creet, non tamen liberat.
AUG. Where the Apostle said: From one all into condemnation (Rom 5:16); he showed that very lump, which, wholly vitiated, flowed from Adam; but where he says that from it vessels are made for honor, he commends the grace by which God even frees the men he creates; but where, that from it vessels are made for dishonor, he shows the judgment by which God, although he creates men, yet does not free them.
Iulianum.1.136Quod etiam vos de parvulis cogimini confiteri, quorum certe omnium unam esse massam non potestis negare, qualemlibet eam putetis; ex qua tamen alios in Dei regnum adoptari fatemini, quos procul dubio vasa in honorem facta conceditis; alios vero non adoptari, quos facta vasa in contumeliam, nisi intellegenter consentiatis, impudenter negatis.
Which you too are compelled to confess concerning little ones, whose lump—of all of them—you certainly cannot deny to be one, of whatever sort you think it; from which lump, nevertheless, you confess that some are adopted into the kingdom of God, whom without doubt you grant to be made vessels for honor; but others not adopted, whom—made vessels for dishonor—unless you intelligently consent, you impudently deny.
Iulianum.1.136Neque enim, si non est ista poena damnationis, sicut vultis, non erit saltem contumelia imaginis Dei, separari a regno Dei. Sed vos si illam perseveranter negabitis gratiam, ad hoc iudicium vos pertinere monstrabitis; quod utique in parvulis iniustum esset, si peccatum originale non esset.
For even if this is not, as you wish, the penalty of damnation, will it not be at least the dishonor of the image of God, to be separated from the kingdom of God? But you, if you will persevere in denying that grace, will show yourselves to belong to this judgment; which certainly in little ones would be unjust, if there were no original sin.
Iulianum.1.136137. IUL. Quod ut claruit Apostolum dixisse de moribus, ita apparet quanta testimoniorum Legis inopia labores, qui ab his sententiis contra fulmina rationis opem petis, quae tibi dedignantur, immo natura sui subvenire non possunt.
137. JUL. But just as it has become clear that the Apostle spoke of morals, so it appears with what great poverty of the testimonies of the Law you labor, who from these sentences seek help against the thunderbolts of reason—sentences which disdain, nay, by their own nature cannot, come to your aid.
Iulianum.1.137AUG. Contra Apostolum dicentem, ex eadem massa aliud vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam Deum facere; nec dicentem, aliud nec in honorem, nec in contumeliam, quod utique diceret, si hoc quod vos de parvulis crederet; contra hunc ergo divinitus intonantem non est fulminea ratio vestra, sed fumea.
AUG. Against the Apostle, who says that God makes from the same lump one vessel for honor, another for dishonor; and does not say, neither for honor nor for dishonor—which he certainly would say, if he believed concerning little ones what you do; against him, then, thundering divinely, your reasoning is not a thunderbolt, but smoke.
Iulianum.1.137138. IUL. Et haec quidem quantum spectat ad testimonium Apostoli disputata sunt. Ceterum in Isaia, unde ipsam sententiam Paulus assumpsit, in tantum non deterret Deus rationabilem creaturam a sui consideratione iudicii, ut sicut per eumdem Prophetam dixerat: Quiescite agere perverse, discite bene facere, subvenite oppresso; et venite, arguite me, dicit Dominus (Isa 1, 16-18); ita etiam hic, ne quid potestate sola, non iustitia videretur fecisse, dispensationum suarum dignatur aperire rationem. Afflicto enim in captivitate populo Iudaeorum redemptionis appropiare tempus, quo ad terram suam reverterentur, annuntiat; et causam vel praecedentium angorum reserat, vel instantium gaudiorum. Epuletur, inquit, caelum desuper, et nubes spargant iustitiam; oriatur ex terra misericordia, et iustitia oriatur simul. Ego sum Dominus Deus qui creavi te, faciens meliorem, praeparavi te sicut lutum figuli. Numquid qui arat, arabit terram per omnem diem? Numquid dicit lutum figulo: Quid facis, quia non operaris, quia non habes manus?Numquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit: Sapienter me finxisti? Vel qui dicit patri: Quid generabis? Et matri: Quid parturies? Quia sic dicit Dominus Deus Israelsanctus, qui fecit futura: Interrogate me pro filiis meis et filiabus, et pro operibus manuum mearum mandate mihi. Ego feci terram et hominem super eam; ego manu mea firmavi caelum; ego omnibus sideribus mandavi; ego levavi cum iustitia regem, et omnes viae eius rectae; hic aedificabit civitatem meam, et captivitatem populi mei reducet, non cum praemio, nec cum muneribus, dixit Dominus Sabaoth (Isa 45, 8-13).
138. JUL. And these things indeed have been disputed so far as concerns the testimony of the Apostle. But in Isaiah, whence Paul took the sentence itself, so far is God from deterring the rational creature from the consideration of his judgment, that, just as through the same Prophet he had said: Cease to act perversely, learn to do well, come to the aid of the oppressed; and come, accuse me, says the Lord (Isa 1:16-18); so here too, lest he should seem to have done anything by power alone, not by justice, he deigns to open the reason of his dispensations. For he announces to the people of the Jews, afflicted in captivity, that the time of redemption is drawing near, in which they would return to their own land; and he discloses the cause both of the preceding distresses and of the impending joys. Let the heaven feast from above, he says, and let the clouds rain down justice; let mercy spring up from the earth, and let justice spring up together. I am the Lord God who created you, making you better; I have prepared you as the clay of the potter. Does he who plows, plow the earth all day? Does the clay say to the potter: What do you make, since you do not work, since you have no hands? Does the thing formed say to him who formed it: You have formed me wisely? Or who says to a father: What will you beget? And to a mother: What will you bring forth? For thus says the Lord God of Israel, the Holy One, who made things to come: Ask me concerning my sons and daughters, and concerning the works of my hands command me. I made the earth, and man upon it; I with my hand established the heaven; I gave command to all the stars; I raised up a king with justice, and all his ways are straight; he will build my city, and bring back the captivity of my people, not with reward, nor with gifts, says the Lord of Sabaoth (Isa 45:8-13).
Iulianum.1.138AUG. Si intellegeres verba Prophetae, intellegeres ibi regem, de quo dictum est: Ego levavi cum iustitia regem, et omnes viae eius rectae (Isa 45, 13), hunc esse Mediatorem Dei et hominum hominem Christum Iesum; sed intellegeres ut intellegendus est. Neque enim audebis eum dire praecedentibus operum meritis Filium Dei factum ab initio, id est, a Virginis utero. Qua ergo gratia homo ille ab initio factus est bonus, eadem gratia homines qui sunt membra eius ex malis fiunt boni. Quid enim dicatis de Christo secundum hominem, non invenitis, id est, secundum id quod Verbum caro factum est; quod ille qui Deus erat, et Deus mansit et homo factus est; quod ipse homo numquam ita fuit homo, ut non esset unigenitus Dei Filius, propter unigenitum Verbum.
AUG. If you understood the words of the Prophet, you would understand that the king there, of whom it was said: I raised up a king with justice, and all his ways are straight (Isa 45:13), is the Mediator of God and human beings, the man Christ Jesus; but you would understand it as it is to be understood. For you will not dare to say that, by preceding merits of works, he was made the Son of God from the beginning, that is, from the womb of the Virgin. By what grace, then, that man was from the beginning made good, by the same grace human beings who are members of him are made good out of evil. For what you may say of Christ according to the man, you do not find—that is, according to that by which the Word became flesh; that he who was God both remained God and was made man; that the man himself was never so a man as not to be the only-begotten Son of God, on account of the only-begotten Word.
Iulianum.1.138Neque enim ut hoc esset, morum suorum de propria voluntate venientium meritis comparavit; sed, sicut verum dixit Ambrosius, quasi de Spiritu natus abstinuit a delicto (AMBROSIUS, In Isa.; cf. De nupt. et concup. 1, 40). Alioquin secundum vos, multi essent tales, si esse voluissent; atque ut ille talis nonnisi unus esset, in potestate hominum fuit, qui tales esse noluerunt; quae si attenditis quanta impietate dicantur, vel tacita cogitatione credantur; sicut agnoscitis Unigeniti naturam, quod in principio erat Verbum, et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum (Io 1, 1); agnoscite et gratiam, quod Verbum caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis (Io 1, 14). Ille igitur quos dignatur vocat, et quem vult religiosum facit (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 27), qui hominem quem voluit, unum sine ullis humanae voluntatis praecedentibus meritis Mediatorem Dei et hominum fecit.
For not, that he might be this, did he obtain it by the merits of his own morals coming from his own will; but, as Ambrose truly said, as though born of the Spirit he abstained from offense (Ambrose, On Isaiah; see Marriage and Desire 1.40). Otherwise, according to you, there would be many such, if they had willed to be; and that he was the only such one, was in the power of human beings who were unwilling to be such; which, if you attend with how great impiety they are said, or even believed by silent thought; just as you acknowledge the nature of the Only-begotten, that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God (John 1:1); acknowledge also the grace, that the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us (John 1:14). He, then, calls those whom he deigns, and makes religious whom he wills (Ambrose, On Luke 7.27), who made the man he willed, alone without any preceding merits of human will, the Mediator of God and human beings.
Iulianum.1.138139. IUL. In hoc igitur loco hic sensus, quantum spectat ad historiam continetur, ut Deus loquatur ad populum: Quia nec odio vos in captivitatem tradidi, nec nunc oblivione iudicii de vinculis Babylonicae captivitatis exemi; sed ego, quantum in me est, paratus iugi vos benevolentia confovere, iustitiae meae tamen debui, ut et delinquentes hostibus traderem, et recrearem liberaremque vexatos. Sicut enim rusticandi gnarus non semper uno imminet operi, ut solis findat arva dentalibus; sed diverso genere votivae fertilitati rura componit; ita etiam ego dispensationum vices vario, ut tum pressuris, tum consolationibus voluntatem vestram frugibus possim aptare iustitiae.
139. Jul. In this passage, then, so far as the historical sense is concerned, this meaning is contained: that God speaks to the people thus—It was not out of hatred that I handed you over into captivity, nor have I now released you from the bonds of the Babylonian captivity through any forgetfulness of judgment; rather, for my own part, I am ready to cherish you with unbroken kindness, yet I owed it to my own justice both to hand over wrongdoers to their enemies and to restore and set free those who had been afflicted. For just as one skilled in farming does not always press on with a single task, cleaving the fields with the ploughshares all day long, but arranges his lands for a hoped-for fruitfulness by various means, so too do I vary the turns of my dispensations, that now by hardships, now by consolations, I may make your will fit for the harvest of justice.
Iulianum.1.139Denique, ut intellegatis quanta aequitate agam vobiscum, possem mussitationes vestras pro potestate despicere, ut sicut figulo figmentum suum dicere non potest: Quid fecisti? Ita etiam vobis silentii pondus imponerem; tamen contra haec exempla provoco vos, ut pro filiis meis et filiabus, id est, pro vobis et operibus manuum mearum me interrogetis, et discatis, totum me iuste, nec quidquam umquam fecisse crudeliter.
Finally, that you may understand with how great fairness I deal with you—I could, by my power, despise your mutterings, so that, just as the thing fashioned cannot say to the potter, What have you made? so I might likewise lay the weight of silence upon you; yet, against such precedents, I invite you, as my sons and daughters, that is, for your own sake and for the works of my hands, to question me, and to learn that I have done everything justly and never anything cruelly.
Iulianum.1.139AUG. Quod vis dicis, non quod dixit Isaias; ille gratiam loquitur, contra quam tu loqueris.
Aug. You say what you wish, not what Isaiah said; he speaks of grace, against which you speak.
Iulianum.1.139140. IUL. Et a Propheta ergo, et ab Apostolo, in exemplum adductus est figulus, nihil aliud praebiturus, quam comparationis officium; non tamen ut tam viles apud Deum esse homines indicentur, quam argilla est in fornace et orbe figulorum. Absoluta hac expositione quam praemisimus, admonemus secundum interpretationem recentem in eodem loco aliud relucere. Rorate, inquit, caeli, desuper, et nubes pluant iustum; aperiatur terra, et germinet Salvatorem, et iustitia oriatur simul; ego Dominus creavi eum. Vae qui contradicit fictorisuo, testa de samiis terrae; numquid dicit lutum figulo suo: Quid facis? Et opus tuum absque manibus est? (Isa 45, 8-9) Quibus verbis etsi secundum historiam Cyrus rex, secundum prophetiam tamen incarnatio Salvatoris exprimitur; qui quoniam erat de Virgine nasciturus, Iudaeorum et omnium infidelium obstinatio convenitur, ne sint signis fidelibus perduelles. Cum enim praemisisset: Aperiatur terra, et germinet Salvatorem, et iustitia oriatur simul. Ego Dominus, inquit, creavi eum.
140. Jul. Both by the prophet, then, and by the Apostle the potter has been brought forward as an illustration, offering nothing more than the service of a comparison; not, however, so as to show that human beings are as cheap before God as clay is in the furnace and on the potter's wheel. Having completed the exposition we set forth above, we note that, according to the recent translation, something else shines forth in this same passage. Drop down dew, you heavens, from above, and let the clouds rain down the just one; let the earth be opened and bring forth a Savior, and let justice spring up together; I the Lord have created him. Woe to him who contradicts his maker, a potsherd among the earthen vessels of Samos. Does the clay say to its potter, What are you making? And your work is without hands? (Isa 45:8-9) By these words, even though according to history King Cyrus is signified, according to prophecy the incarnation of the Savior is expressed; and since he was to be born of a Virgin, the obstinacy of the Jews and of all unbelievers is confronted, lest they wage war against the signs of the faithful. For when he had first said, Let the earth be opened and bring forth a Savior, and let justice spring up together, he says, I the Lord have created him.
Iulianum.1.140AUG. Dic mihi quibus operibus hoc meruit homo Christus Iesus; et qua iustitia Dei solus hoc meruerit, aude garrire; aut si non audes, tandem gratiam sine meritis confitere, non solum remittentem peccata homini, verum etiam in natura humana iustitiam Sancto Spiritu facientem. Non enim et homini Christo gratia peccata dimisit, aut non eum gratia talem fecit, ut ab initio semper esset bonus, sicut ab initio semper Dei Filius? Prorsus, sicut admoniti sunt, qui in eremo serpentum morsibus lethaliter vexabantur, ut illum qui in signo exaltatus fuerat, attenderent, ne perirent (Cf. Num 21, 6-9); ita sunt admonendi, qui vestris disputationibus venenantur, ut Christum attendant, et in illius hominis mediatoris iustitia gratiam sine meritis videant, unde a se vestri oris virus excludant.
Aug. Tell me by what works the man Christ Jesus merited this, and by what justice of God he alone merited it—dare to prattle on; or, if you do not dare, then at last confess that grace is without merits, grace that not only remits sins to a human being but also works justice in human nature by the Holy Spirit. For did not grace also remit sins to the man Christ, or did not grace make him such that from the beginning he was always good, just as from the beginning he was always the Son of God? Surely, just as those who in the desert were being deadly afflicted by the bites of the serpents were admonished to look to the one who had been lifted up as a sign, lest they perish (See Num 21:6-9), so too must those who are being poisoned by your disputations be admonished to look to Christ, and to see in the justice of that mediating man a grace without merits, so that they may shut out from themselves the venom of your mouth.
Iulianum.1.140Denique in verbis Prophetae, etiam secundum recentem interpretationem quam commemorasti ubi evidentius prophetatus est Christus, non inde assumpsisti unde disputares, nisi quod ex Virgine natus est, quia dictum est: Aperiatur terra, et germinet Salvatorem; de iustitia vero eius, quae hic pariter praenuntiata est, nihil dicere voluisti; cum tu verba ipsa prophetica proposueris, ubi ait: Rorate, caeli, desuper, et nubes pluant iustum; aperiatur terra, et germinet Salvatorem, et iustitia oriatur simul.
Then in the words of the prophet, even according to the recent translation that you have cited, where Christ has been more clearly prophesied, you took up nothing from which to argue except that he was born of a Virgin, because it was said, Let the earth be opened and bring forth a Savior; but about his justice, which here is foretold along with it, you chose to say nothing—even though you yourself set forth the very words of the prophet, where he says, Drop down dew, you heavens, from above, and let the clouds rain down the just one; let the earth be opened and bring forth a Savior, and let justice spring up together.
Iulianum.1.140Dic mihi quem iustum nubes pluerunt, nisi quia Prophetae et Apostoli Christum praedicaverunt, qui ex ipso Virginis utero cum iustitia natus est? Unde cum dictum esset: Aperiatur terra, et germinet Salvatorem; mox additum est: et iustitia oriatur simul.
Tell me what just one the clouds rained down, except that the prophets and the apostles preached Christ, who was born with justice from the very womb of the Virgin? Hence, when it had been said, Let the earth be opened and bring forth a Savior, there was at once added, and let justice spring up together.
Iulianum.1.140Ac per hoc, ea gratia fiunt iusti homines, qui renascuntur in Christo, qua gratia iustus homo natus est Christus. Sicut ergo exemplum est vitae, ut eum imitando iuste agamus; ita est etiam exemplum gratiae, ut in eum credendo inde nos fieri speremus iustos per ipsum, unde factus est ipse, qui factus est nobis sapientia a Deo, et iustitia et sanctificatio et redemptio; ut quemadmodum scriptum est: Qui gloriatur, in Domino glorietur (1 Cor 1, 30-31).
And through this, human beings become just by that grace, being reborn in Christ, by which grace Christ was born a just man. Just as, then, he is an example of life, so that by imitating him we may act justly, so too is he an example of grace, so that by believing in him we may hope to be made just by him from the same source from which he himself was made, who was made for us wisdom from God, and justice and sanctification and redemption, so that, as it is written, Let him who boasts, boast in the Lord. (1 Cor 1:30-31)
Iulianum.1.140Quoscumque itaque dente mortifero momordistis, hunc iustum intueantur, et sanabuntur; hoc est, inde se credant accipere iustitiam, unde Christo est innata iustitia; et ideo non in suo arbitrio, nec in suo merito, sed in Domino glorientur.
Therefore, whomever you have bitten with your deadly tooth, let them gaze upon this just one, and they will be healed; that is, let them believe that they receive justice from the same source from which justice was born in Christ, and so let them boast not in their own choice, nor in their own merit, but in the Lord.
Iulianum.1.140141. IUL. Ante terra aperitur in germen, quam opera colentis semen accipiat; quod in puerperio virginis approbatur, quae munere matris officium praevenit et exclusit uxoris. Quod ergo in usu non erat, id facturum se Deus omnipotens pollicetur; et addit, praevidens infidelium multitudinem: Vae qui contradicit fictori suo, testa de samiis terrae (Isa 45, 9). Id est: Vae his qui, Deo promittente, fetam fieri virginem non potuisse contendunt; cumque ipsi totidem licet de seminibus a Deo institutis, tamen interveniente Dei potentia, in visceribus fingantur maternis, obstipo studio affirmant, nequivisse carnem sine ministerio viri ex carne virginis fabricari.
141. Jul. The earth is opened to bring forth a shoot before the works of the cultivator receive the seed; this is borne out in the childbearing of the Virgin, who anticipated and excluded the office of a wife by the gift of a mother. What was not, then, in the customary order, this almighty God promises that he will do; and he adds, foreseeing the multitude of unbelievers, Woe to him who contradicts his maker, a potsherd among the earthen vessels of Samos. (Isa 45:9) That is, Woe to those who contend that, when God promised it, a virgin could not be made pregnant; for though they themselves are fashioned in their mothers' wombs from just so many seeds appointed by God, yet by the intervening power of God, they affirm with stubborn zeal that flesh could not be fashioned from the flesh of a virgin without the ministry of a man.
Iulianum.1.141Tale est igitur quod vos, o pervicaces, non putatis me id facere potuisse, ac mihi de rei difficultate praescribitis, cum vos ipsos manibus meis constet effectos; quale, si lutum figulo suo, cum ab eo tractatur, diceret: Non habes manus; quibus tunc in vas aliquod formabatur. Ita ergo et vos, qui inquiritis quis filium virgini dederit sine viri semine, cognoscite eumdem esse qui vos fecit ex semine. Sed iam quoniam Scripturis sanctis expositio varia licet, utraque tamen pia et religiosa concinuit, primus terminetur liber; suo tamen fine commonens, ut opifex nascentium Deus credatur, innocentium tutor, Catholicorum remunerator, Manichaeorumque damnator.
Such, then, is the case: you, O obstinate ones, do not think that I could have done this, and you lay down rules for me about the difficulty of the matter, when it is established that you yourselves were made by my hands—just as if the clay, when it is being handled by its potter, should say to him, You have no hands, by which it was then being formed into some vessel. So too you, who ask who gave a son to a virgin without the seed of a man, recognize that he is the same one who made you from seed. But now, since a varied exposition of the holy Scriptures is permissible—though both expositions, pious and religious, have agreed together—let the first book be brought to a close; yet let it admonish at its very end that God is to be believed the maker of those who are born, the guardian of the innocent, the rewarder of Catholics, and the condemner of the Manichees.
Iulianum.1.141AUG. Ut sciant, qui intellegenter legunt, quemadmodum conatus fueris verba apostolica obnubilare clara, et recta pervertere, huic disputationi tuae ex eadem oportet Apostoli disputatione respondeam. Volens igitur beatus Paulus ostendere, quod ea quae promisit Deus, potens est et facere; ubi maxime gratia commendatur, cuius estis inimici; neque enim in potestate hominum est, ut Deus impleat quae promisit, et non in ipsius qui promisit; volens ergo id ostendere: Non potest, inquit, excidere verbum Dei; non enim omnes qui ex Israel, hi sunt Israel; neque quia sunt semen Abraham, omnes filii; sed in Isaac vocabitur tibi semen; hoc est, non hi qui filii carnis, hi filii Dei; sed filii promissionis deputantur in semen. Promissionis enim verbum hoc est: Ad hoc tempus veniam, et erit Sarrae filius (Rom 9, 6-9). Tene in mente filios promissionis, quoniam qui promisit potens est et facere (Rom 9, 10-13). Non solum autem, inquit, sed et Rebecca ex uno concubitu habens Isaac, patris nostri. Cum enim nondum nati fuissent, aut aliquid egissent boni vel mali, ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est: Quia maior serviet minori (Rom 9, 14). Et hic tene in mente electionem non ex operibus, quam quodam modo exposuit Propheta posterior; quod subiungens Apostolus ait: Sicut scriptum est: Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio habui (Rom 9, 15-16).
Aug. So that those who read intelligently may know how you have attempted to becloud the clear words of the Apostle and to pervert what is right, I must answer this disputation of yours from that same disputation of the Apostle. Wishing, then, to show that what God has promised he is also able to do—where grace, of which you are the enemies, is especially commended; for it is not in the power of human beings that God should fulfill what he has promised, but in the power of him who promised—wishing, then, to show this, blessed Paul says, It is not as though the word of God had failed; for not all who are of Israel are Israel; nor, because they are the seed of Abraham, are they all sons; but through Isaac shall your descendants be named, that is, it is not the children of the flesh who are the children of God, but the children of the promise are reckoned as descendants. For this is the word of promise: At this time I will come, and Sarah shall have a son. (Rom 9:6-9) Hold in mind the children of the promise, since he who promised is also able to do it. (Rom 9:10-13) And not only so, but also Rebecca, having conceived Isaac by one act of intercourse with our father. For when they had not yet been born, and had done nothing either good or evil, in order that God's purpose according to election might stand, not by works but by him who calls, it was said: The elder shall serve the younger. (Rom 9:14) And here hold in mind the election not from works, which in a certain way the later prophet expounded; and the Apostle, adding it, says, As it is written: Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated. (Rom 9:15-16)
Iulianum.1.141Hic occurrit quaestio, quae perturbare posset non intellegentes altitudinem gratiae; eamque sibi ipse proponens, ait: Quid ergo dicemus? Numquid iniquitas est apud Deum? Absit! (Rom 9, 16) Et ut doceret quod dixit: Absit! Moyses, enim, inquit, dicit: Miserebor cui misertus ero, et misericordiam praestabo cui misericors fuero. Igitur non volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei (Ibidem). Hoc si attenderes, non extolleres contra gratiam merita voluntatis; ubi audis: Non volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei. Non ergo ideo misertus est Deus, quia voluit et cucurrit Iacob; sed ideo voluit et cucurrit Iacob, quia misertus est Deus. Paratur enim voluntas a Domino (Prov 8, 35); et a Domino gressus hominis diriguntur, et viam eius volet (Ps 36, 23).
Here a question arises that could disturb those who do not understand the depth of grace; and, setting it before himself, he says, What shall we say then? Is there injustice with God? By no means! (Rom 9:16) And to teach what he meant by By no means, he says, For Moses says: I will have mercy on whomever I have had mercy, and I will show compassion to whomever I have been compassionate. So then it depends not upon him who wills or upon him who runs, but upon God who has mercy. (Rom 9:16) If you attended to this, you would not exalt the merits of the will against grace, where you hear, not upon him who wills or upon him who runs, but upon God who has mercy. God did not, therefore, have mercy because Jacob willed and ran; rather, Jacob willed and ran because God had mercy. For the will is prepared by the Lord (Prov 8:35); and by the Lord the steps of a man are directed, and he will choose his way. (Ps 37:23 (36))
Iulianum.1.141Deinde, quia propter Iacob dicta est ista sententia generalis: Non volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei; datur etiam exemplum de Pharaone, propter id quod dictum est: Esau autem odio habui; et subicitur: Dicit enim Scriptura Pharaoni: Quia ad hoc te excitavi, ut ostendam in te virtutem meam, et ut annuntietur nomen meum in universa terra (Rom 9, 13. 16-17). Post haec ad utrumque concluditur: Ergo cuius vult miseretur, et quem vult obdurat (Rom 9, 18); sed miseretur utique secundum gratiam, quae gratis datur, non meritis redditur; obdurat autem secundum iudicium, quod meritis redditur. De massa quippe damnata facere vas in honorem, manifesta est gratia; facere autem inde vas in contumeliam, iustum iudicium est.
Then, because that general statement—not upon him who wills or upon him who runs, but upon God who has mercy—was made on account of Jacob, the example of Pharaoh is also given, on account of what was said, but Esau I hated; and there is added, For the Scripture says to Pharaoh: For this very purpose I have raised you up, that I might show my power in you, and that my name might be proclaimed in all the earth. (Rom 9:13.16-17) After these things a conclusion is drawn regarding both: So then he has mercy on whomever he wills, and he hardens whomever he wills. (Rom 9:18) But he has mercy, surely, according to grace, which is given freely, not repaid for merits; and he hardens according to judgment, which is repaid for merits. For to make from the condemned mass a vessel for honor is manifest grace; but to make from it a vessel for dishonor is just judgment.
Iulianum.1.141Hinc iam subiciens verba eorum, quibus hoc displicet, ait: Dicis itaque mihi: Quid adhuc conqueritur? Nam voluntati eius quis resistit? Eosque cohibens: O homo, inquit, tu quis es qui respondeas Deo? Numquid dicit figmentum ei qui se finxit: Quid me fecisti sic? An non habet potestatem figulus luti, ex eadem massa facere aliud quidemvas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam? (Rom 9, 19-21)
Hence, now setting forth the words of those who are displeased by this, he says, You will say to me then: Why does he still find fault? For who resists his will? And, restraining them, he says, O man, who are you to answer back to God? Will what is fashioned say to him who fashioned it: Why have you made me thus? Or has the potter no power over the clay, to make from the same lump one vessel for honor and another for dishonor? (Rom 9:19-21)
Iulianum.1.141Vide si non consonat superioribus suis, et dissentit a tuis; qui putas hoc dictum secundum merita voluntatum, contra id quod ipse ait: Cum enim nondum nati essent, nec aliquid egissent boni vel mali, ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictumest: Quia maior serviet minori; et contra id quod ipse ait: Igitur non volentis, neque currentis, sed miserentis est Dei.
See whether this does not accord with what he said before, and disagree with what you say—you who suppose this to have been said according to the merits of wills, against what he himself says: For when they had not yet been born, nor had done anything good or evil, in order that God's purpose according to election might stand, not by works but by him who calls, it was said: The elder shall serve the younger; and against what he himself says: So then it depends not upon him who wills or upon him who runs, but upon God who has mercy.
Iulianum.1.141Nec solum contra haec quae praecesserunt, verum etiam contra illa quae subsequuntur. Vasa quippe irae dicit, quae sunt perfecta in perditionem; quod iniustum esset, nisi omnibus ex uno in condemnationem venientibus iam damnata massa esset; et vasa dicit misericordiae, quae praeparavit in gloriam; ad misericordiam quippe gratuitam, non debitam, pertinet de massa damnata vasa in gloriam praeparare: Non solum ex Iudaeis, sicut dicit, sed etiam ex Gentibus, propter quod ponit testimonium de Osee propheta: Vocavi non plebem meam, plebem meam (Rom 9, 24; Osea 1, 9); et de Isaia: Propter Israel reliquiae salvae fient (Isa 10, 22; cf. Rom 11, 5).
And not only against what preceded, but also against what follows. For he speaks of vessels of wrath, which are made ready for destruction—which would be unjust, unless the mass were already condemned, all coming into condemnation from the one; and he speaks of vessels of mercy, which he prepared for glory; for it belongs to mercy that is free, not owed, to prepare from the condemned mass vessels for glory—not only from the Jews, as he says, but also from the Gentiles, on account of which he sets down the testimony from the prophet Hosea: I will call those who are not my people, my people (Rom 9:24; Hos 1:9); and from Isaiah: For the sake of Israel a remnant shall be saved. (Isa 10:22; see Rom 11:5)
Iulianum.1.141Ut autem essent istae reliquiae, gratia Dei factum esse testimonio sequente docet, per eumdem Prophetam dicentem: Nisi Dominus Sabaoth reliquisset nobis semen (Isa 1, 9). Deinde ostendit Gentes ex fide apprehendisse iustitiam; Israel autem ideo non apprehendisse, quia non ex fide, sed tamquam ex operibus. Fides enim habet, quod aliquando post dicit: Quoniam omnis qui invocaverit nomen Domini, salvus erit (Rom 10, 13). Ad quam salutem pertinet, ut opera bona sint et iustitia nobis ex Deo sit, non ex nobis.
But that there might be this remnant, he teaches by the following testimony that it was brought about by the grace of God, the same prophet saying, If the Lord of hosts had not left us seed. (Isa 1:9) Then he shows that the Gentiles laid hold of justice from faith; but that Israel did not lay hold of it, because it was not from faith, but as though from works. For faith holds what he says somewhat later: For everyone who calls upon the name of the Lord will be saved. (Rom 10:13) To this salvation it belongs that good works should be ours, and that justice should be ours from God, not from ourselves.
Iulianum.1.141Propter quod de illis, qui non ex fide, sed tamquam ex operibus offenderunt in lapidem offensionis, sequitur, et dicit: Fratres, bona voluntas quidem cordis mei, et deprecatio ad Deum pro illis in salutem; testimonium enim perhibeo illis quia zelum Dei habent, sed non secundum scientiam. Ignorantes enim Dei iustitiam et suam iustitiam quaerentes constituere, iustitiae Dei non sunt subiecti (Rom 10, 1-3). Quod omnino et vos facitis; iustitiam quippe vestram vultis constituere, cui Deus secundum merita retribuat gratiam; nec vultis gratiam Dei praecedere, quae vos faciat habere iustitiam.
For which reason, concerning those who, not from faith but as though from works, stumbled over the stone of stumbling, there follows, and he says, Brethren, the good will indeed of my heart, and my prayer to God for them is for their salvation; for I bear them witness that they have a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge. For, being ignorant of God's justice and seeking to establish their own justice, they have not submitted to the justice of God. (Rom 10:1-3) This is altogether what you also do; for you wish to establish your own justice, to which God would repay grace according to merits; and you are unwilling that the grace of God should go before, the grace that would make you have justice.
Iulianum.1.141Deinde connexa sibimet serie disputationis, ad illud pervenit, ubi ait: Dico ergo: Numquid repulit Deus plebem suam? Absit! Nam et ego Israelita sum, ex semine Abraham, ex tribu Beniamin; non repulit Deus plebem suam, quam praescivit. An nescitis in Elia quid dicit Scriptura, quemadmodum interpellat Deum adversus Israel? Domine, prophetas tuos occiderunt, et altaria tua suffoderunt, et ego relictus sum solus, et quaerunt animam meam. Sed quid dicit illi responsum divinum? Reliqui mihi septem millia virorum, qui non curvaverunt genu ante Baal. Sic ergo et in hoc tempore reliquiae per electionem gratiae factae sunt. Si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus; alioquin gratia iam non est gratia (Rom 11, 1-6).
Then, by the series of his disputation linked together, he arrives at the point where he says, I ask, then: Has God rejected his people? By no means! For I too am an Israelite, of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Benjamin. God has not rejected his people whom he foreknew. Do you not know what the Scripture says of Elijah, how he pleads with God against Israel? Lord, they have killed your prophets, and dug down your altars, and I alone am left, and they seek my life. But what does the divine response say to him? I have left for myself seven thousand men who have not bowed the knee before Baal. So too, then, at this present time there is a remnant brought about by the election of grace. But if by grace, then it is no longer from works; otherwise grace would no longer be grace. (Rom 11:1-6)
Iulianum.1.141Deinde vide quid adiungat. Quid ergo? inquit, quod quaerebat Israel, hoc non est consecutus; electio autem consecuta est (Rom 11, 7). Sed superius respice qualis electio, ubi ait: Reliquiae per electionem gratiae factae sunt; si autem gratia, iam non ex operibus. Et hoc refert ad illud, unde disputatio ista profecta est: Cum enim nondum nati essent, neque aliquid egissent boni aut mali, ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret; non ex operibus (Rom 9, 11). Haec est electio gratiae, non ex operibus, qua fiunt vasa in honorem, ut bona opera faciant; quia bona opera subsequuntur gratiam, non praecedunt; quoniam gratia Dei facit ut ea faciamus; nec constituamus iustitiam nostram, sed Dei iustitia sit in nobis, id est, quam donat Deus nobis.
Then see what he adds. What then? he says. What Israel sought, this it did not obtain; but the election obtained it. (Rom 11:7) But look back above to what sort of election it is, where he says, A remnant was brought about by the election of grace; but if by grace, then no longer from works. And he refers this back to that from which this disputation set out: For when they had not yet been born, nor had done anything good or evil, in order that God's purpose according to election might stand, not from works. (Rom 9:11) This is the election of grace, not from works, by which vessels are made for honor, so that they may do good works; for good works follow grace, they do not precede it, since the grace of God brings it about that we do them; nor do we establish our own justice, but the justice of God is in us, that is, the justice which God gives to us.
Iulianum.1.141Ceteri vero excaecati sunt (Rom 11, 7); hoc est iudicium, quo fiunt vasa in contumeliam; ex quo iudicio dictum est: Esau autem odio habui. Ex quo iudicio dictum est etiam Pharaoni: Ad hoc te excitavi. Unde apparet vos sic intellegentes, vel potius non intellegentes Apostolum, ex operibus contra gratiam velle gloriari, et vestram iustitiam volentes constituere, iustitiae Dei non esse subiectos. Nos vero Deum quidem parvulorum opificem praedicamus; sed ex eadem massa medium locum vasis, ubi nec in honorem fiant, nec in contumeliam, quem non dedit Apostolus, non damus; quod vos faciendo evaderetis iudicium Dei, si eum tantummodo Manichaeorum, et non omnium haereticorum damnatorem demonstrare possetis.
But the rest were blinded (Rom 11:7); this is the judgment by which vessels are made for dishonor; from which judgment it was said, but Esau I hated. From which judgment it was also said to Pharaoh, For this I have raised you up. Hence it appears that you, understanding the Apostle in this way—or rather not understanding him—wish to boast from works against grace, and, wishing to establish your own justice, are not subject to the justice of God. We, however, preach God indeed as the maker of little children; but from the same mass we do not grant a middle place for vessels, where they would be made neither for honor nor for dishonor—a place which the Apostle did not grant. By granting it, you would escape the judgment of God, if you could show him to be the condemner only of the Manichees and not of all heretics.
Iulianum.1.141Bk. 2
1. Iulianus. Commode nobiscum ageretur, si aut apud eruditos iudices negotium veritatis tueri daretur facultas aut, quia hoc interim negatur, vel nullo imperitorum obverberaremur tumultu.
1. Julian. It would go well for us if either the opportunity were given to defend the cause of truth before learned judges or—since for the present this is denied—we were at least battered by no uproar of the unskilled.
Iulianum.2.1Augustinus. Tales certe eruditos iudices quaeris, qui nisi fuerint exculti et ornati liberalibus disciplinis, neque ignoraverint, quid senserint etiam huius mundi philosophi, de tuis dictis iudicare non possint. Talis hic erat Ambrosius, quem iudicem si non refugis, dubitare non debes iustissime te esse damnatum. Ille enim dixit: Omnes homines sub peccatonascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13); ut his verbis suis, Christum Salvatorem, hoc est Iesum ostenderet parvulis necessarium; cui tu cum contradicis, fatendum tibi est, ita te habere velle iudices eruditos, ut nolis habere iudices catholicos christianos.
Augustine. The sort of learned judges you seek are surely those who, unless they have been cultivated and adorned with the liberal disciplines and are not ignorant of what even the philosophers of this world have thought, cannot pass judgment on your sayings. Such was Ambrose here, whom, if you do not flee him as judge, you ought not to doubt that you have been most justly condemned. For he said, We are all born under sin, whose very origin is in fault (Ambrose, On Penance 1.3.13); so that by these words of his he might show that Christ the Savior, that is, Jesus, is necessary for little children. Since you contradict him, you must confess that you wish to have learned judges in such a way that you are unwilling to have Catholic Christian judges.
Iulianum.2.12. Iul. Et quia obtollendi in Ecclesiarum salutem tropaei damna perpetimur, quod bonae causae prudentia cognitorum miris erat delatura suffragiis; vel nihil aliud ad contumelias nostras vulgi valeret assensio.
2. Jul. And since we endure the loss of a trophy that was to be raised for the welfare of the Churches—a loss that the prudence of the examiners would, by their admirable votes, have conferred upon a good cause; or else the assent of the crowd would have availed nothing toward our reproach.
Iulianum.2.2De his ergo, quas dixi, hominum partibus una nobis prodesset, altera nihil noceret, si aut illa potestatem obtineret, aut ista verecundiam. Verum quia rerum est magna confusio, et stolidorum maxima multitudo; eripiuntur Ecclesiae gubernacula rationis, ut erecto cornu velificet dogma populare.
Concerning these classes of people, then, of which I have spoken, the one would benefit us, the other would do no harm, if either the former held power or the latter held a sense of shame. But because there is great confusion of affairs, and the greatest multitude of the dull-witted, the rudder of reason is wrested away from the Churches, so that the popular dogma sails on with horn upraised.
Iulianum.2.2Aug. Si hoc quod asserimus, dogma populare est, non est ergo dogma Manichaeorum hoc, quod in populis christianis mente perdita oppugnas. Manichaeorum quippe dementiam in paucis merito contemnis, sed habes et tuam, qua nomine Manichaeorum, eos populos, quos iudices refugis, reddere nobis conaris infestos; quasi possint populi tua loquacitate decepti Manichaeum dicere Ambrosium, Manichaeum dicere Cyprianum, qui propter salutem etiam parvulorum docuerunt esse originale peccatum. Tales autem populos non fecit, sed invenit Ambrosius; non fecit, sed invenit etiam ipse Cyprianus; tales populos in Ecclesia invenit etiam pater tuus, quando baptizatus es, ut dicitur, parvulus (Cf. C. Iul. 1, 14); tales postremo populos catholicos invenistis et vos. Compescite vos; fatemur dogma nostrum esse populare; quia populus eius sumus, qui propterea est appellatus Iesus, quia salvum facit populum suum a peccatis eorum (Cf. Mt 1, 21); a quo populo cum separare parvulos vultis, vos ipsos potius separatis.
Aug. If what we assert is a popular dogma, then this which you attack with a deranged mind among Christian peoples is not the dogma of the Manichees. For you rightly despise the madness of the Manichees, found in only a few; but you have your own madness too, by which, under the name of the Manichees, you try to make those peoples whom you flee as judges hostile to us—as though peoples deceived by your loquacity could call Ambrose a Manichee, could call Cyprian a Manichee, who for the sake of the salvation even of little children taught that there is original sin. But Ambrose did not make such peoples, he found them; Cyprian himself did not make them, he found them too; such Catholic peoples your own father also found, when you were baptized, as is said, as a little child (See Answer to Julian 1.14); such Catholic peoples, in short, you yourselves found. Restrain yourselves; we confess that our dogma is popular, because we are the people of him who was called Jesus for this reason, that he saves his people from their sins (See Matt 1:21); from which people, when you wish to separate little children, you rather separate yourselves.
Iulianum.2.23. Iul. Ita cum prudentibus parum licet, vilibus autem quod libet etiam licet seditionum decreto exclusa est de Ecclesiis censura virtutum; nobisque hoc apud homines vulgi officit, quod accessio erroris esse renuimus; vulgi, inquam, qui sententiae meritum de prosperitatibus ponderans, eam veriorem aestimat quam pluribus placere conspexerit.
3. Jul. Thus, since with the prudent little is permitted, but to the worthless whatever they please is even permitted, the assessment of virtues has been excluded from the Churches by a decree of seditions; and this stands in our way among the people of the crowd, because we refuse to be an accession to error—of the crowd, I say, who, weighing the merit of an opinion by its prosperity, judge that one to be truer which they observe to please the greater number.
Iulianum.2.3Aug. Numquid Manichaeus pluribus placet? Nonne sicut parricidae, et pauci, et pessimi sunt? Nolite ergo de paucitate gloriari et, quod est vanius, dicere, quod pluribus placeat dogma nostrum, et obicere nobis detestabilium dogma paucorum.
Aug. Does Manichaeus please the greater number? Are they not, like parricides, both few and most wicked? Do not, then, boast of fewness and—what is more empty—say that our dogma pleases the greater number, and charge us with the dogma of a detestable few.
Iulianum.2.34. Iul. Quodque ait, in Epicurum Tullius, manifesto argumento non dici illa subtiliter, quod cuiuscemodi homines passim sibi ea profitentur placere (Cf. CICERO, Tuscul. 4, 7). Id isti, sicut omnia, more perverso, ad sapientiae putant testimonium pertinere.
4. Jul. And what Tully says against Epicurus—that those things are not spoken with subtlety, since it is by manifest argument that all sorts of men everywhere profess that they are pleased by them (See Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 4.7)—this these men, as in all things, in their perverse way suppose to pertain to the testimony of wisdom.
Iulianum.2.4Aug. Sed Tullium vicit atque convicit in hac sententia ille qui dicit: Laudate Dominum, omnes gentes; laudate eum, omnes populi (Ps 116, 1). Quos tu quaeris, non veraciter docere, sed subtiliter fallere aliquos eorum, et vestrae addere paucitati, subtilitatem paucorum philosophorum saecularium praedicando, et nos reprehendendo quod non dicantur nostra subtiliter, et ideo cuiuscemodi homines passim sibi ea profiteantur placere. Me tamen aliquoties dixisti, nihil magis agere, quam ut non intellegar; quomodo ergo id quod defendo, multitudini placet, nisi quia multitudo ista catholica est, cui merito vestra haeresis displicet?
Aug. But in this matter Tully was overcome and refuted by him who says, Praise the Lord, all you nations; praise him, all you peoples. (Ps 117:1 (116)) Whom you seek not to teach truthfully but to deceive subtly—some few of them—and to add to your own fewness, by praising the subtlety of a few worldly philosophers and reproaching us because our teachings are said not to be subtle, and therefore all sorts of men everywhere profess that they are pleased by them. Yet you have several times said of me that I do nothing more than make myself not understood; how, then, does what I defend please the multitude, unless because that multitude is Catholic, to whom your heresy rightly is displeasing?
Iulianum.2.45. Iul. Delectat enim prorsus subantes animas infamare, quidquid umquam et usquam sanctorum fuit, ne clarorum operum castigentur exemplis.
5. Jul. For it gives outright delight to defame, with rutting souls, whatever there has ever been of holy men anywhere, lest they be chastened by the examples of illustrious deeds.
Iulianum.2.5Aug. Subantes ergo animae post te potius currunt, qui libidinem laudas; nam castae animae vituperando arguunt, quod expugnando laudantur.
Aug. The rutting souls, then, run rather after you, who praise lust; for chaste souls, by finding fault, prove that they are praised by your assault upon them.
Iulianum.2.56. Iul. Delectat prorsus et penitus afficit, causari imbecillitatem naturae, dicere carnem congenitis obnoxiam esse peccatis, nec in voluntate hominis emendationis effectum locare, sed studiorum crimina officia vocare membrorum; catholicam hanc fidem esse, ut liberum confiteatur arbitrium, sed per quod homo malum facere cogatur, bonum velle non possit.
6. Jul. It gives outright delight, and touches them to the depths, to plead the weakness of nature, to say that the flesh is liable to congenital sins, and to locate the effect of amendment not in the will of a human being, but to call the crimes of zeal the duties of the members; that this is the Catholic faith—to confess free choice, but free choice through which a human being is compelled to do evil and cannot will the good.
Iulianum.2.6Aug. Quid nobis irasceris, qui emendationis effectum tanto certius appetimus, quanto fidelius eum a Domino petimus? Frustra inflatam linguam voce superbiente dilatas; nolumus prorsus, nolumus eis annumerari qui confidunt in virtute sua (Ps 48, 7). Anima nostra Deo sitit (Cf. Ps 62, 2), cui dicit: Diligam te, Domine, virtus mea (Ps 17, 2). Potest enim homo bonum velle; sed praeparatur voluntas a Domino (Prov 8, 35 (sec. LXX)); in malum vero libens vergit vitiata, propter quod est sananda natura.
Aug. Why are you angry at us, who seek the effect of amendment all the more surely the more faithfully we ask it of the Lord? In vain do you spread out your puffed-up tongue with a proud voice; we are altogether unwilling, unwilling, to be numbered among those who trust in their own strength. (Ps 49:7 (48)) Our soul thirsts for God (See Ps 63:2 (62)), to whom it says, I will love you, Lord, my strength. (Ps 18:2 (17)) For a human being can will the good; but the will is prepared by the Lord (Prov 8:35 (LXX)); toward evil, however, the wounded nature willingly inclines, on account of which nature must be healed.
Iulianum.2.67. Iul. Vanos vero hominum haereticosque sermones, qui asserant Deum iustum ad bonum opus liberum hominem condidisse, et esse in uniuscuiusque potestate recedere a malo, ac studiis splendere virtutis, ut his qui flagitia in necessitatem carnis refundunt, sollicitudinum et timorum aculeus infigatur.
7. Jul. The empty and heretical sayings, indeed, of those men who assert that a just God created the human being free for good work, and that it is in each one's power to withdraw from evil and to shine with zeal for virtue, so that to those who pour off their disgraceful deeds onto the necessity of the flesh, the sting of anxieties and fears may be fixed.
Iulianum.2.7Aug. Non dicimus hominum vanos haereticosque sermones, qui asserunt Deum iustum ad bonum opus liberum hominem condidisse. Talem quippe Adam condidit, in quo fuimus omnes; sed peccando perdidit se, et omnes in se. Unde nunc non est in potestate filiorum hominis a malo liberari, nisi gratia Dei det potestatem filios Dei fieri (Cf. Io 1, 12). Propter hoc, non his qui flagitia, sicut dicis, in necessitatem carnis refundunt; sed his qui ut in tentationes flagitiorum non inferantur, preces Deo fundunt, figitur aculeus sollicitudinis et timoris, ne consentiant superbissimis et Deo ingratissimis disputationibus vestris.
Aug. We do not call empty and heretical the sayings of those men who assert that a just God created the human being free for good work. For such did he create Adam, in whom we all were; but by sinning he ruined himself, and all in himself. Hence it is now not in the power of the sons of men to be freed from evil, unless the grace of God gives them the power to become sons of God (See John 1:12). For this reason, the sting of anxiety and fear is fixed not in those who, as you say, pour off their disgraceful deeds onto the necessity of the flesh, but in those who, that they may not be led into temptations of disgraceful deeds, pour out prayers to God—lest they consent to your most proud disputations, most ungrateful to God.
Iulianum.2.78. Iul. Postremo, in Ecclesiis quae magnum honorem et magnum populum possideant, praedicari tantam vim esse peccati, ut ante membrorum formam, ante initium adventumque animae, iactis seminibus supervolans, in secretum matris invadat, et reos faciat nascituros, ortuque ipso antiquior exspectet culpa substantiam; quae lex peccati habitans deinceps in membris, captivum hominem cogat servire criminibus, non castigatione in turpitudinibus, sed misericordia digniorem; quandoquidem quod nos vitia pravae voluntatis esse dicimus, id in Ecclesia a viris et feminis magnisque pontificibus originalis passio nuncupatur.
8. Jul. Lastly, that in Churches which possess great honor and a great people, it should be preached that the power of sin is so great that, before the form of the members, before the beginning and the coming of the soul, it flies over the seeds once cast and bursts into the secret place of the mother and makes those about to be born guilty, and that guilt, older than the birth itself, awaits the substance; that this law of sin, dwelling thereafter in the members, compels the captive human being to be a slave to crimes, more deserving of mercy than of chastisement amid its shameful deeds—since what we call the vices of a depraved will is, in the Church, called by men and women and great pontiffs an original passion.
Iulianum.2.8Aug. Respondet tibi Ambrosius pontifex magnus, haeresiarchae vestri excellenter ore laudatus, et dicit: Male Eva parturivit, ut partus relinqueret mulieribus haereditatem, atque unusquisque concupiscentiae voluptate concretus, et genitalibus visceribus infusus, et coagulatus in sanguine, in pannis involutus, prius subiret delictorum contagium, quamvitalis spiritus munus hauriret (AMBROSIUS, Liber de Sacram. regen). Sananda est itaque, Iuliane, humana, Deo miserante, natura; non, te inaniter declamante, tamquam sana laudanda.
Aug. Ambrose, the great pontiff, praised with such excellence by the mouth of your own heresiarch, answers you and says, Eve gave birth in evil, so that her offspring should leave to women an inheritance, and each one, formed by the pleasure of concupiscence, poured into the genital innards, and curdled in blood, wrapped in swaddling clothes, should first undergo the contagion of sins before he draws in the gift of the vital breath (Ambrose, On the Sacrament of Regeneration). Human nature, therefore, Julian, must be healed by God's mercy; it is not to be praised, by your empty declaiming, as though it were sound.
Iulianum.2.89. Iul. Haec ergo Manichaeorum scorta dogmatum impurissimorum lenocinantur auribus.
9. Jul. These, then, are the harlots of the Manichees, pandering to the ears with their most impure dogmas.
Iulianum.2.9Aug. Ambrosium, si audes, criminare Manichaeum. Attende in quem dicas, quod vis videri tamquam in me dicere; et si ullus tibi vel Dei timor, vel humanus pudor est, conticesce. Me oportet cum talibus tua convicia, non solum patienter, verum etiam gratulanter audire; sed tu debes in talibus lacerandis et humana erubescere et divina iudicia formidare.
Aug. Charge Ambrose with being a Manichee, if you dare. Attend to the one against whom you say what you wish to seem to say against me; and if you have any fear of God or any human shame, be silent. With such men I must hear your reproaches not only patiently but even gladly; but you ought, in tearing such men apart, both to blush before human judgments and to dread the divine.
Iulianum.2.910. Iul. Haec in utroque sexu positos inimicos nostros urtica commovit, quae olim quidem vitio malae consuetudinis mordax, tamen exhortationum salutarium velut quibusdam curabatur unguentis.
10. Jul. This nettle has stirred up our enemies, placed in both sexes—a nettle that was once indeed stinging through the vice of a bad habit, yet was being cured, as it were, by certain ointments of salutary exhortations.
Iulianum.2.10Aug. Urtica pungente prurit, sed qui libidinem laudat. Si autem propter malam consuetudinem, sicut sapis, clamat homo: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 19); certe vel in isto fatemini humanam voluntatem vires bonorum operum perdidisse, cui nisi divinae gratiae subveniat adiutorium, quid ei prodest copiosum et ornatum cuiuslibet exhortantis eloquium?
Aug. He itches with the stinging nettle, but it is the one who praises lust. But if, on account of a bad habit, as you understand it, a man cries out, I do not do the good that I will, but the evil that I do not will, this I do (Rom 7:19), then surely even in this you confess that the human will has lost the strength for good works; and unless the help of divine grace comes to its aid, what does the copious and ornate eloquence of any exhorter profit it?
Iulianum.2.1011. Iul. At nunc, postquam pro medicamine coepit offerri, et delectationi accessit auctoritas, ut consensu pene mundi, membripotens regina mentium, expugnatrix honestatis, et invicta animorum omnium captivatrix turpitudo baccharetur; nobis quanto honestior, tanto durior tuendae veritatis causa facta est. Quia contra praecipites populos et suis remediis infensos, non multum valet raritas oratione medicantium. Quid igitur? Horumne intuitu, receptui canere debebimus, et contumelias nostras ultum ire silentio, ac de conscientiae portu aliorum ridere naufragia? Verum contradicit huic odio, primo benignitas quam generi debemus humano; deinceps spes et fides, quam habemus in Deum, qui extra id quod frequenter desperatas temporum levavit ruinas; constantiam tamen quam usque ad mortis horam exerceri voluit, etiamsi nullus in praesentiarum sequeretur effectus, aeterna remuneratione donavit.
11. Jul. But now, after authority has begun to be offered in place of a remedy, and authority has been added to pleasure, so that, by the consent of almost the whole world, shamefulness—the queen mighty in her members, the conqueror of honor, and the unconquered captivator of all minds—runs riot; for us the cause of defending the truth has been made as much harder as it is more honorable. For against headlong peoples, hostile to their own remedies, the rarity of those who heal by speech does not avail much. What then? In view of these, ought we to sound the retreat, and avenge our reproaches by silence, and from the harbor of conscience laugh at the shipwrecks of others? But against this hatred there speaks, first, the kindness we owe to the human race; then the hope and faith we have in God, who, apart from the fact that he has often raised up the ruins of desperate times, has nevertheless rewarded with eternal recompense the constancy that he willed to be exercised even to the hour of death, even if no effect should follow for the present.
Iulianum.2.11Aug. Quomodo levat Deus ruinas malarum voluntatum (per quas utique tempora vituperantur, quando recte vituperantur), nisi bonas voluntates operando in cordibus hominum? Aut si possunt, ipsae se levent, sicut dementissime sentiendo, magna ruina facti estis. Unde pro vobis ipsum rogamus, atque utinam sic etiam de te, quemadmodum de fratre Turbantio, nos exaudire dignetur (Cf. supra 1, 1).
Aug. How does God raise up the ruins of evil wills—through which times are surely blamed, when they are rightly blamed—except by working good wills in the hearts of human beings? Or, if they can, let them raise themselves up, just as, by thinking most senselessly, you have become a great ruin. Hence we pray for you, and would that he might deign to hear us concerning you, as concerning your brother Turbantius (See above, 1.1).
Iulianum.2.1112. Iul. Hac igitur fidei consolatione gaudentes immineamus coepto operi, et disputationum promissa reddamus; non ambigentes hoc ipsum maximam esse praemii partem, quia in eius dogmatis arce constitimus, quod cum tam multorum livor, sed plurium error oppugnet; tamen ita supra casus evasit ancipites, ut invincibilis cluat possessione victoriae.
12. Jul. Rejoicing, then, in this consolation of faith, let us press on with the work begun, and render the promises of our disputations, not doubting that this very thing is the greatest part of the reward—that we have taken our stand on the citadel of a dogma which, though the malice of so many and the error of still more assails it, has nonetheless so escaped its doubtful chances that it is famed for the possession of victory.
Iulianum.2.12Aug. Ipse tibi das palmam contra tot antistites Dei, qui ante nos, ea quae oppugnas, in Ecclesia Christi didicerunt, atque docuerunt, bibentes et ministrantes de fontibus Israel (Cf. Ps 67, 27). Hoc ergo quod facis, non est victoriae possessione cluere, sed in odiosae arrogantiae cloacam deformiter fluere. Cluere quippe, pollere est; quomodo autem potes victoriae possessione pollere, qui conaris catholica dogmata, antiqua et invicta polluere?
Aug. You award yourself the palm against so many of God's prelates, who before us learned and taught in the Church of Christ the very things you assail, drinking and ministering from the fountains of Israel (See Ps 68:27 (67)). This, then, that you do, is not to be famed for the possession of victory, but to flow deformedly into the sewer of hateful arrogance. To be famed is to be strong; but how can you be strong in the possession of victory, you who try to pollute the Catholic dogmas, ancient and unconquered?
Iulianum.2.1213. Iul. Nam si, ut et superior sermo patefecit, et secuturus docebit, quidquid ratio est, quidquid eruditio, quidquid iustitia, quidquid pietas, quidquid testimoniorum sacrorum, huic quod tuemur dogmati suffragatur; nihil aliud inimici nostri toto adipiscuntur conatu, quam ut doctis quibusque impudentissimi, sanctis contumacissimi, in Deum profanissimi comprobentur.
13. Jul. For if, as the foregoing discourse has made plain and as the one to follow will teach, whatever is reason, whatever is learning, whatever is justice, whatever is piety, whatever is of the sacred testimonies, supports this dogma which we defend, then our enemies obtain by their whole effort nothing other than that they should be shown, to all learned men, to be most shameless; to the saints, most defiant; toward God, most profane.
Iulianum.2.13Aug. Sed falsa loqueris: nam neque ratio, neque sana eruditio, neque iustitia, neque pietas, neque sacra Testimonia vestro dogmati suffragantur; immo, haec omnia, sicut hi qui recte intellegunt iudicant, vestrum dogma subvertunt. Ratio quippe cernit vix ad aliquid veri se posse pervenire, tarditate impediente naturae; eruditio poenam laboris habet in eadem tarditate naturae; iustitia clamat non ad se pertinere, ut Adam filii gravi iugo premantur a die exitus de ventre matris suae (Cf. Eccli 40, 1), sine ullo merito peccatorum; pietas adversus hoc malum, divinum poscit auxilium; sacra Testimonia, ut hoc fiat, humanum admonent animum.
Aug. But you speak falsely; for neither reason, nor sound learning, nor justice, nor piety, nor the sacred Testimonies support your dogma; rather, all these, as those who understand rightly judge, overturn your dogma. For reason discerns that it can scarcely arrive at any truth, the slowness of nature hindering it; learning has the penalty of toil in that same slowness of nature; justice cries out that it does not belong to it that the sons of Adam should be pressed by a heavy yoke from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1), without any merit of sins; piety, against this evil, asks for divine help; the sacred Testimonies admonish the human mind that this should be done.
Iulianum.2.1314. Iul. Et quidem quam nihil habeant Traduciani, quod vi qua proteruntur, rationis opponant, ut alia eorum scripta, ita hi, contra quos agimus, testantur libelli, qui directi ad militarem virum (quod etiam ipse profiteri potest), aliis magis negotiis quam litteris occupatum, impotentiae contra nos precantur auxilium, ac pro se sursum deorsum plebicularum, aut ruralium, aut theatralium scita commendant, quae quo sint promulgata consilio, historia nulla commemorat.
14. Jul. And indeed how little the Traducianists have to oppose, by force of reason, to the force by which they are crushed—as their other writings do, so do these very pamphlets bear witness against which we are contending. Addressed to a military man (as he himself can also profess), occupied with other affairs more than with letters, they beg the help of a power against us, and on their own behalf commend, up and down, the decrees of the little common folk, or of rustics, or of theatergoers—by what counsel these were promulgated, no history records.
Iulianum.2.14Aug. Non impotentiae contra vos precamur auxilium; sed pro vobis potius, ut ab ausu sacrilego cohibeamini, christianae potentiae laudamus officium. Vide sane quemadmodum rurales et theatrales dicas, Cyprianum, et Ambrosium, et tot eruditos in regno Dei scribas, socios eorum.
Aug. We do not beg the help of a power against you; rather, on your behalf, that you may be restrained from your sacrilegious daring, we praise the duty of Christian power. See, indeed, how you call rustics and theatergoers Cyprian, and Ambrose, and so many learned scribes in the kingdom of God, their companions.
Iulianum.2.1415. Iul. Illud tamen nequaquam inficiari possumus, quod plurimum, ut dixi, turbis placeat, luteis tamen delicta voluntatis imputare naturae, et infamatione seminum morum petulantiam vindicare; ut numquam quis emendare conetur, quod sperat in se ipso alterum perpetrare.
15. Jul. This, however, we can by no means deny: that it pleases the crowds greatly, as I have said, to impute the faults of the will to nature, men of clay, and to vindicate the wantonness of morals by defaming the seeds; so that no one ever tries to amend what he hopes another perpetrates in himself.
Iulianum.2.15Aug. Quis tibi dixit, quod alter perpetret peccatum cuiusquam? Quandoquidem etiam ille qui dicit: Iam non ego operor illud, sed id quod in me habitat peccatum; continuo subiciens: Scio enim quia non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum (Rom 7, 17-18); ostendit suum esse, quidquid illud est; quia et ipsa caro ad eum pertinet, qui ex carne constat et spiritu. Et tamen non vis cum Ambrosio sapere, quod hoc malum quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, praevaricatione primi hominis in naturam verterit (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 141). Sed et tu cum dicere soleas in his apostolicis verbis violentiam malae consuetudinis exprimi, quid est, quod modo dicere voluisti: Ut numquam quis emendare conetur, quod scit in se alterum perpetrare? Cum velis utique se ipsum emendare eum qui dicit: Non ego operor illud; et hoc velis fieri viribus propriae voluntatis; cum videas quam sit voluntas eius infirma qui dicit: Non quod volo, ago (Rom 7, 15). Istum saltem, quaeso, permittite divinum poscere auxilium, in quo defecisse cernitis suae voluntatis arbitrium.
Aug. Who told you that another perpetrates anyone's sin? Since even he who says, It is no longer I who do it, but the sin that dwells in me, at once adding, For I know that the good does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh (Rom 7:17-18), shows that whatever it is, it is his own; because the flesh itself belongs to him who is composed of flesh and spirit. And yet you are unwilling to think with Ambrose that this evil, by which the flesh has desires against the spirit, passed over into nature by the transgression of the first man (See Ambrose, On Luke 7.141). But you too, though you are accustomed to say that in these apostolic words the violence of a bad habit is expressed, what is it that you now wished to say: So that no one ever tries to amend what he knows another perpetrates in himself? For surely you would want him to amend himself who says, It is not I who do it; and you would want this to be done by the strength of his own will, though you see how weak is the will of him who says, It is not what I will that I do. (Rom 7:15) At least allow this man, I beg, to ask for divine help, in whom you see that the choice of his own will has failed.
Iulianum.2.1516. Iul. Verum imbecillum caecae opinionis patrocinium multiplicat peccata, non minuit. Hic igitur miserorum pruritus et sponte aegrescentium, nullum contra ipsam rationem valebit pondus afferre; sed quia nonnullis Scripturarum locis, et maxime apostoli Pauli sermonibus confirmari asserunt naturale peccatum, quorum expositionem in secundum volumen distuli, eiusque reddendae tempus est; breviter prius (ut fiat lector instructior), et quae sint acta, et quae sint agenda distinguam. Ostensum est ergo, nihil posse per sanctas Scripturas probari, quod iustitia non possit tueri; quia si in lege Dei est perfecta forma iustitiae, nihil per eam adversaria eius, id est, iniustitia sinitur virtutis acquirere; ac per hoc, quod ratio arguit, non potest auctoritas vindicare. Deinde probatum est, Deum nobis notum esse virtutibus; huius ergo iustitiam ut omnipotentiam confitendam; cuius si admittatur excidium, maiestas incipiet tota nutare; quia ita Deus iustus est, ut si probaretur iustus non esse, convinceretur Deus non esse; conclusumque est, nos Deum aequissimum in Trinitate venerari; et irrefutabiliter apparuit, non posse ab eo peccatum alienum parvulis imputari.
16. Jul. But the feeble patronage of a blind opinion multiplies sins, it does not lessen them. This itching, then, of wretched men who fall sick of their own accord will be able to bring no weight to bear against reason itself; but because they assert that natural sin is confirmed by some passages of the Scriptures, and especially by the discourses of the apostle Paul—the exposition of which I deferred to the second volume, and the time has come to render it—I will first, briefly (that the reader may become better instructed), distinguish both what has been done and what is to be done. It has been shown, then, that nothing can be proved through the holy Scriptures which justice cannot defend; for if in the law of God there is a perfect form of justice, nothing is allowed through it to its adversary, that is, to injustice, to acquire any virtue; and through this, what reason refutes, authority cannot vindicate. Then it was proved that God is known to us by his virtues; that his justice, therefore, must be confessed as his omnipotence; and if the ruin of it be admitted, his whole majesty will begin to totter; for God is just in such a way that, if he were proved not to be just, he would be convicted of not being God. And it was concluded that we venerate a most equitable God in the Trinity; and it appeared irrefutably that another's sin cannot be imputed by him to little children.
Iulianum.2.16Aug. Quare non fateris ab omnipotente iusto grave iugum super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum, sine ullo peccati merito non potuisse constitui?
Aug. Why do you not confess that a heavy yoke could not be set by the omnipotent and just God upon the sons of Adam, from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb, without any merit of sin?
Iulianum.2.1617. Iul. Sed ut de definitione iustitiae, ita etiam de peccati conditione dissertum est, quod peccatum apparuit nihil esse aliud quam malam voluntatem, cui esset liberum ab eo, quod prave appetiverat, abstinere.
17. Jul. But as concerning the definition of justice, so also concerning the condition of sin it was discussed, where sin appeared to be nothing other than an evil will, which was free to abstain from what it had wrongly desired.
Iulianum.2.17Aug. Hoc est omnino peccatum primi hominis, unde in homines mali origo descendit. Ei quippe valde liberum fuit, ab eo quod prave appetiverat abstinere; quia nondum erat vitium, quo caro concupisceret adversus spiritum; nondum dicebat: Non quod volo, ago (Ibidem); nondum positus in carne peccati ullum necessarium habebat auxilium de similitudine carnis peccati.
Aug. This is altogether the sin of the first man, from which the origin of evil descended into human beings. For he was indeed quite free to abstain from what he had wrongly desired; because there was not yet the vice by which the flesh has desires against the spirit; he did not yet say, It is not what I will that I do (Rom 7:15); not yet placed in the flesh of sin, he had no need of any help from the likeness of the flesh of sin.
Iulianum.2.1718. Iul. Ac per hoc illustrissimo testimonio perdoctum est, in nascentibus non esse peccatum, quod in his usus voluntatis non poterat inveniri.
18. Jul. And through this, it has been thoroughly taught by a most illustrious testimony that there is no sin in the newborn, because in them the use of the will could not be found.
Iulianum.2.18Aug. Et unde grave iugum, nisi quia ita non habent voluntatis usum, ut obnoxiae tamen habeant originis vinculum?
Aug. And whence the heavy yoke, except that, although they do not have the use of the will, they nonetheless have the binding chain of their liable origin?
Iulianum.2.1819. Iul. Liberum autem arbitrium negari ab his, qui dicunt peccata esse naturalia, lucida est disputatione monstratum. Quod quidem Poenus, non suo sermone, ne minus ponderis haberet, sed Evangelii testimonio, quasi auctoratius, denegavit, quod nos exponendo, evangelicae reddidimus dignitati. Apostoli quoque Pauli testimonium laqueis calumniatoris exemimus, et bonorum vasorum figulum Deum nostrum esse omnium conditorem, Propheta teste monstravimus.
19. Jul. But that free choice is denied by those who say that sins are natural has been shown by a lucid argument. This indeed the Carthaginian denied, not in his own discourse, lest it should have less weight, but by the testimony of the Gospel, as though with more authority; which, by expounding it, we restored to its gospel dignity. We have also freed the testimony of the apostle Paul from the snares of the slanderer, and have shown, with the prophet as witness, that our God, the potter of the good vessels, is the maker of all.
Iulianum.2.19Aug. Illic tibi responsum est, et quantum aberraveris a veritate monstratum.
Aug. There you have been answered, and it has been shown how far you have strayed from the truth.
Iulianum.2.1920. Iul. His igitur maxime actis in primo libro, quorum unum aliquod abunde sufficit ad victoriam veritatis; ex abundanti quidem, superest tamen, ut Magistri Gentium, qua per unum hominem peccatum dixit intrasse in mundum (Cf. Rom 5, 12), sententiam disputemus; et definitionibus, quas praemisimus, cum necesse fuerit, adiuvandi; et probaturi nihil rationem fuisse mentitam; sed iniustitiae esse crimen, aliorum studia aliorum ortibus imputare; hocque ipsum quod iniquum est, quamvis nemo hinc dubitare debuerit, tamen Deo displicere, et ab eodem prohiberi, testimoniis legis, vel in hoc libro, vel in sequenti docebimus. Ex quibus necessario conficitur, et nos rectissime defendere, neminem cum peccato nasci, et Deum reos non posse iudicare nascentes; ac per hoc, tam integrum esse liberum arbitrium, quam ante voluntatis propriae usum innoxiam in unoquoque naturam.
20. Jul. These things, then, having been chiefly done in the first book—any one of which abundantly suffices for the victory of truth—it yet remains, though it be more than enough, that we discuss the opinion of the Teacher of the Gentiles, where he said that through one man sin entered into the world (See Rom 5:12); and, when it is necessary, we shall be helped by the definitions we have set forth beforehand, and shall prove that reason has lied in nothing, but that it is a crime of injustice to impute the pursuits of some to the births of others; and that this very thing which is unjust—although no one ought to doubt this—is nonetheless displeasing to God and forbidden by him, we shall teach by the testimonies of the law, either in this book or in the next. From which it is necessarily concluded both that we most rightly defend that no one is born with sin, and that God cannot judge the newborn guilty; and through this, that free choice is as whole, as nature is harmless in each one before the use of his own will.
Iulianum.2.20Aug. Dic, videamus, quod de Apostoli testimonio dicturus es, tam inaniter, quam superiora dixisti.
Aug. Speak, let us see what you are going to say about the Apostle's testimony—as emptily as you have said the foregoing things.
Iulianum.2.2021. Iul. Manichaeos autem et pietati et rationi rebelles, qui putent et ante tempus voluntatis esse peccatum, quod rerum natura non sinit; et Deum esse, quem argumentantur iniustum; et infamare sanctas Paginas, quarum monumentis probari allegant crimen divinitatis; quod cum ex tribus nihil queat ratione monstrari, id est, nec sine voluntate peccatum, nec in Deo iniquitas, nec in lege perversitas; soli illi stulti, impudentes et impii demonstrentur.
21. Jul. But the Manichees are rebels against both piety and reason, who suppose both that there is sin before the time of the will—which the nature of things does not allow—and that God, whom they argue to be unjust, exists; and that they defame the holy Pages, by whose records they allege that the crime of the divinity is proved; and since none of these three can be shown by reason—that is, neither sin without the will, nor iniquity in God, nor perversity in the law—those men alone are shown to be foolish, shameless, and impious.
Iulianum.2.21Aug. Erubesce: non fuit Ambrosius Manichaeus, cum diceret hominem prius subire delictorum contagium, quam vitalis spiritus munus haurire (Cf. AMBROSIUS, Liber de Sacram. regen), sed nec ista delicta, nisi ex voluntate exstiterunt, unde originem trahunt; et ideo nec in Deo est iniquitas, qui propter hoc posuit nascentibus grave iugum; nec in lege perversitas, in qua hoc discitur esse verissimum; quod et ipsi videretis, nisi vos potius perversos oculos haberetis.
Aug. Blush: Ambrose was not a Manichee when he said that a human being undergoes the contagion of sins before he draws in the gift of the vital breath (See Ambrose, On the Sacrament of Regeneration); but neither did these sins exist except from the will, whence they draw their origin; and therefore there is neither iniquity in God, who for this reason placed a heavy yoke upon the newborn, nor perversity in the law, in which this is learned to be most true—which you yourselves would also see, were it not that you have rather perverse eyes.
Iulianum.2.2122. Iul. Haereat igitur hoc maxime prudentis animo lectoris, omnibus Scripturis sacris solum illud, quod in honorem Dei Catholici sapiunt, contineri, sicut frequentium sententiarum luce illustratur; et sicubi durior elocutio moverit quaestionem, certum quidem esse, non ibi id, quod iniustum est, loci illius auctorem sapuisse; secundum id autem debere intellegi, quod et ratio perspicua, et aliorum locorum, in quibus non est ambiguitas, splendor aperuerit. Iam igitur eius cum quo agimus verba ponamus. Equidem in illo capite dictorum suorum, quod usque ad figulum peccatorum Deum suum adduxerat, contra quod libro superiore confliximus, tenuiter dixit, per unum hominem peccatum intrasse in mundum; non est autem in expositione loci ipsius immoratus.
22. Jul. Let this, then, cleave above all to the mind of the prudent reader: that in all the sacred Scriptures only that is contained which has wisdom for the honor of the Catholic God, as is illustrated by the light of frequent statements; and that, if anywhere a harsher expression should raise a question, it is certain that the author of that passage did not have in mind what is unjust there, but it must be understood according to that which both clear reason and the splendor of other passages, in which there is no ambiguity, have made plain. Now, then, let us set down the words of the one with whom we are dealing. Indeed, in that chapter of his sayings in which he had brought forward his God as far as the potter of sinners—against which we contended in the foregoing book—he said slightly that through one man sin entered into the world; but he did not linger over the exposition of that passage.
Iulianum.2.22Postquam vero multis verbis contra illa excerpta, quae ad se confirmat missa, disseruit, pervenit ad aliquem dictorum meorum locum, quem sibi quasi oppugnaturus obiecit; sed nihil secundum id quod fuerat pulsatus referens, ad hanc Apostoli sententiam convolavit, in qua dicit, per unum hominem peccatum intrasse in mundum; et secundum dogma suum, contextum loci ipsius exponere molitus est; propter quod ego, praetermissis aliis, ad eam properavi partem, ut quia me promiseram hanc esse quaestionem in secundo volumine soluturum (Cf. supra 1, 113), et fidem promissionis implerem, et argumentatio illius quae esset ostenderem, ne putarer fecisse fraudem, si illius expositione suppressa, eam quam catholicam fatemur inferrem.
After he had argued at length against those excerpts which he confirms to himself were sent to him, he came to a certain passage of my sayings, which he set before himself as though about to assail it; but referring nothing to that on which he had been pressed, he flew off to this opinion of the Apostle, in which he says that through one man sin entered into the world; and according to his own dogma he labored to expound the context of that passage. On account of which I, leaving other things aside, hastened to that part, so that—since I had promised that I would solve this question in the second volume (See above, 1.113)—I might both fulfill the pledge of my promise and show what his argumentation was, lest I should be thought to have committed a fraud if, suppressing his exposition, I were to bring in the one we confess to be Catholic.
Iulianum.2.22Aug. Pelagianam illaturus es, non catholicam. Catholica illa est, quae ostendit iustum Deum in tot ac tantis poenis et cruciatibus parvulorum; quos in paradiso ullus eorum nulla aequitate sentiret, si natura humana vitiata peccato, et merito damnata non esset.
Aug. You are going to bring in the Pelagian one, not the Catholic. The Catholic is that which shows God to be just amid so many and so great punishments and torments of little children—which not one of them would suffer in paradise with any equity, if human nature had not been corrupted by sin and deservedly condemned.
Iulianum.2.2223. Iul. Retractans igitur in primo opere meo sententiam eius, qua dixerat: Nam sicut peccatum, sive hinc, sive inde trahatur a parvulis, opus est diaboli; sic homo, sive hinc, sive inde nascatur, opus est Dei (De nupt. et concup. 1, 1); ita autem a me nunc hic refertur, sicut in meo opere continetur, unde maximam partem fuerat iste furatus.
23. Jul. In my first work, then, reconsidering his statement in which he had said, For just as sin, whether it be drawn from here or from there in little children, is the work of the devil, so a human being, whether he be born from here or from there, is the work of God (Marriage and Desire 1.1)—it is now reported by me here just as it is contained in my work, from which this man had stolen the greatest part.
Iulianum.2.23Aug. Sic vera disputas, quomodo verum est quod ego illa furatus sim; cum potius ille cuius chartula mihi missa est, quod voluit atque ut voluit, ex opere tuo, arbitrio suo iudicioque transtulerit.
Aug. You argue as truly as it is true that I stole those things—when rather the man whose little paper was sent to me transferred, by his own choice and judgment, what he wished and as he wished, from your work.
Iulianum.2.2324. Iul. Respondi ergo ibi: Tu quidem (pacemagisterii tui dixerim) tergiversaris, sed intellege quod ademerit tibi veritas licentiam pervagandi. Ecce enim et nos acquiescimus, quia peccatum opus est malae voluntatis, vel opus est diaboli; sed per quid hoc peccatum invenitur in parvulo? Per voluntatem? At nulla in eo fuit. Per formam corporis? Sed hanc Deus tribuit. Per ingressum animae? Sed nihil debet semini corporali, quae nova a Deo conditur. Per nuptias? Sed hae pertinent ad opus parentum, quos in hoc actu non peccasse praemiseras; quod si non vere id concesseras, sicut processus tui sermonis indicat, ipsae sunt exsecrandae, quae causam fecerunt mali.
24. Jul. I answered there, then: You indeed—I would say it with the leave of your magisterial office—shuffle and evade; but understand that the truth has taken from you the license of roaming about. For behold, we too acquiesce that sin is the work of an evil will, or the work of the devil; but through what is this sin found in a little child? Through the will? But there was none in him. Through the form of the body? But God bestowed this. Through the entrance of the soul? But it owes nothing to the bodily seed, being created new by God. Through marriage? But this pertains to the work of the parents, whom you had premised did not sin in this act; and if you had not truly conceded that, as the progress of your discourse indicates, then they themselves are to be execrated, who made the cause of the evil.
Iulianum.2.24Verum illae substantiam propriam non habent; sednomine suo personarum opus indicant; parentes igitur, qui conventu suo causam fecere peccato, iure damnabiles. Ambigi ergo iam non potest, coniuges aeterno supplicio mancipari, quorum labore actum est, ut ad dominatum exercendum in homines diabolus perveniret. Quod si concesseris; illud totum quod antea tenuisse videbaris, amittes, id est, quod hominem Dei opus dixeras. Necessario quippe sequitur, quia per commixtionem corporum origo progenitis est, si per originem malum in hominibus, per malum ius diaboli in homines, diabolum esse auctorem hominum, a quo est origo nascentium (De nupt. et concup. 2, 44-49).
But they do not have a substance of their own; they signify by their name the work of persons; the parents, therefore, who by their intercourse made the cause for the sin, are by right damnable. It can no longer, then, be doubted that spouses are consigned to eternal punishment, by whose labor it was brought about that the devil should arrive at exercising dominion over human beings. And if you concede this, you will lose all that you before seemed to hold, that is, that you had said a human being is the work of God. For it necessarily follows that, since the origin of those begotten is through the mingling of bodies, if there is evil in human beings through origin, and through evil the right of the devil over human beings, then the devil is the author of human beings, from whom is the origin of those who are born (Marriage and Desire 2.44-49).
Iulianum.2.24Post quae ipsius denuo verba repetivi: Nam sicut peccatum, sive hinc, sive inde trahatur, opus est diaboli; sic homo, sive hinc, sive inde nascatur, opus est Dei. Ac protinus insurrexi hoc modo: Cum illam vocem timoris tui cogito, qua dicis nuptias malum non esse, istos alios sermones tuos sine risu considerare non possum. Si enim credis a Deo homines fieri, et esse coniuges innocentes, videquam stare non possit, trahi ex his originale peccatum. Certe non peccat iste qui nascitur, non peccat ille qui genuit, non peccat ille qui condidit; per quas rimas, inter tot praesidia innocentiae, peccatum fingis ingressum?
After which I again repeated his words: For just as sin, whether it be drawn from here or from there, is the work of the devil, so a human being, whether he be born from here or from there, is the work of God. And I at once rose up in this way: When I consider that voice of your fear, by which you say that marriage is not an evil, I cannot consider those other discourses of yours without laughter. For if you believe that human beings are made by God, and that spouses are innocent, see how it cannot stand that original sin is drawn from them. Surely this one who is born does not sin, that one who begot does not sin, that one who created does not sin; through what cracks, amid so many safeguards of innocence, do you imagine that sin entered?
Iulianum.2.24Aug. Iam his verbis tuis, etiam cum ipsos libros tuos legissem, respondisse me sufficit (C. Iul. 3, 54. 57). Verum et hic admoneo, Apostolum potius audiendum esse, quam te, qui non occultam rimam, sed apertissimam ianuam demonstravit, qua peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt (Rom 5, 12); quae verba eius, cum secundum vos, non secundum ipsum, exponere coeperis, tunc apparebit cui rectitudini veritatis loquacitate tortuosissima relucteris.
Aug. To these words of yours, even when I had read your very books, it suffices that I have already answered (Answer to Julian 3.54.57). But here too I admonish that the Apostle is rather to be heard than you, who showed not a hidden crack but a most open door, by which sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12); and when you begin to expound these words of his according to you, not according to him, then it will appear against what rectitude of truth you struggle with your most tortuous loquacity.
Iulianum.2.2425. Iul. Hunc ergo de opere meo priore contextum, in hoc secundo libro suo sibi, licet cum interpolatione, proposuit (De nupt. et concup. 2, 44-49). Nam et commemoratam a me formationem corporis, et ingressum animae, quam novam in unoquoque a Deo conditam, tam ratio, quam legis sacrae Ecclesiaeque catholicae confirmat auctoritas, ut spero, arte praeteriit.
25. Jul. This passage, then, from my earlier work he set before himself for himself in this second book of his, though with interpolation (Marriage and Desire 2.44-49). For both the formation of the body mentioned by me, and the entrance of the soul—which both reason and the authority of the sacred law and of the Catholic Church confirm to be created new in each one—he, as I suppose, artfully passed over.
Iulianum.2.25Aug. Qui legit sex libros meos, quibus refutavi quattuor tuos, de quorum primo quae voluit, et sicut voluit, ille decerpsit, cui respondi in libro isto, quem nunc frustra redarguere loquacissima vanitate conaris; sic me tibi in tertio meo respondisse reperiet, ut videat, non me arte praeterisse quod dicis; sed illum potius, cuius chartulae respondebam, hoc de opere tuo noluisse transferre, sive studio brevitatis, sive quia pertinere non putavit ad causam.
Aug. Whoever reads my six books, by which I refuted your four—from the first of which the man to whom I replied in this book plucked what he wished and as he wished, the book which you now vainly try to refute with most loquacious vanity—will find that I have answered you in my third book in such a way that he sees that I did not artfully pass over what you say; but rather the man whose little paper I was answering chose not to transfer this from your work, whether from a zeal for brevity or because he did not think it pertained to the case.
Iulianum.2.2526. Iul. Iam reliqua, licet aliquibus sermonibus variata, contexuit. Contra has ergo obiectiones meas nihil quo repercuterer excogitavit; sed verum me collegisse, argumentandi inopia confessus, dicit mihi ad haec omnia Apostolum respondere debere, qui pronuntiet, per unum hominem peccatum intrasse in hunc mundum. In quo loco, quis eum eruditus sanum habuisse caput aestimet, qui non intellexerit aut praetereunda sibi esse, contra quae nihil poterat invenire, aut quaecumque excogitanda, quae referret obiectis, ad quorum confirmationem Apostoli verba coniungeret?
26. Jul. Now he has woven together the rest, though varied with some discourses. Against these objections of mine, then, he devised nothing with which to strike back; but, confessing by his poverty of argument that I had reasoned truly, he says that to all these things the Apostle ought to answer for him, who pronounces that through one man sin entered into this world. In which passage, what learned man would judge that he had a sound head, who did not understand that he must either pass over those things against which he could find nothing, or devise whatever he might bring to bear against the objections, to the confirmation of which he might join the Apostle's words?
Iulianum.2.26Aug. Sed melius verbis apostolicis refelleris quam meis, nec tamen et apostolicis cedis; sed mavis etiam ipsa pervertere, quam te corrigere.
Aug. But you are better refuted by the apostolic words than by mine, and yet you do not yield even to the apostolic ones; rather, you prefer to pervert even these than to correct yourself.
Iulianum.2.2627. Iul. Quaesivi ergo consequentissime, ut omnis mecum eruditio recognoscat, peccatum quod opus est malae voluntatis, et opus diaboli dicitur, per quid inveniretur in parvulo, si per voluntatem; at nullam in eo fuisse, etiam hic, cum quo agimus, confitetur, si per nuptias; sed has pertinere ad opus parentum, nemo qui dubitet, quos in hac commixtione non peccasse praemiserat (De nupt. et concup. 2, 46);
27. Jul. I asked, then, most consistently—that all learning may recognize it with me—through what the sin which is called the work of an evil will, and the work of the devil, would be found in a little child: if through the will; but that there was none in him, even this man with whom we are dealing confesses; if through marriage, but that this pertains to the work of the parents, no one doubts, whom he had premised did not sin in this mingling (Marriage and Desire 2.46);
Iulianum.2.27aut si concessionis huius paeniteret disputatorem, sicut processus operis indicabat; profiteretur esse reos parentes, quorum conventu regnum in imaginem Dei diabolo pararetur; et addidi necessariis disputationum gradibus, per originale peccatum auctorem corporum diabolum definiri; quia si per originem malum in hominibus, per malum ius diaboli in homines; diabolus est auctor hominum, a quo est origo nascentium.
or, if the disputant should repent of this concession, as the progress of the work indicated, he would profess that the parents are guilty, by whose intercourse a kingdom over the image of God would be prepared for the devil; and I added, by the necessary steps of disputation, that through original sin the devil is defined as the author of bodies; for if there is evil in human beings through origin, and through evil the right of the devil over human beings, then the devil is the author of human beings, from whom is the origin of those who are born.
Iulianum.2.27Quae quoniam in antro Manichaeorum Traducianos esse clusura deprehenderat; verti clavem, ut praeberem captis effugium, admonuique ut, si vere a Deo crederet homines fieri, pureque confiteretur esse coniuges innocentes, intellegeret trahi non posse ex his originale peccatum. Certe non peccat, inquam, iste qui nascitur, non peccat ille qui genuit, non peccat iste qui condidit; per quas rimas, inter tot praesidia innocentiae, peccatum fingis ingressum? (De nupt. et concup. 2, 47) Quid potuit, rogo, sanctius, quid verius, quid lucidius, quid brevius firmiusque componi, quam post tria sumpta quae inimico concedente susceperam, inferrem quartum, in quo erat summa conclusio? Nam cum uno nonnumquam, aut duobus sumptis, tertium necessario colligatur, qua lege mihi post tria concessa, quartum quod his adhaeret, non liceret inferre? Et hoc quidem in secunda disputatione; caeterum in priore, quinque mihi aut amplius conceduntur, post quae fit legitima invictaque conclusio.
Since I had caught that these things were going to shut up the Traducianists in the cave of the Manichees, I turned the key, that I might offer the captives an escape, and I admonished that, if he truly believed human beings to be made by God and purely confessed spouses to be innocent, he should understand that original sin cannot be drawn from them. Surely, I said, this one who is born does not sin, that one who begot does not sin, that one who created does not sin; through what cracks, amid so many safeguards of innocence, do you imagine that sin entered? (Marriage and Desire 2.47) What could, I ask, be composed more holy, more true, more lucid, more brief and firm, than that, after the three premises which I had taken up with my enemy conceding them, I should bring in a fourth, in which was the sum of the conclusion? For since sometimes, from one or two premises, a third is necessarily gathered, by what law would it not be permitted to me, after three concessions, to bring in a fourth that adheres to them? And this indeed in the second disputation; but in the earlier one, five or more are conceded to me, after which a legitimate and unconquered conclusion is made.
Iulianum.2.27Aug. Vide quam per multa vageris, timens ne Apostoli verba sine tuis praeiudiciis audita te damnent, sicut iam Ecclesia catholica iudicante damnarunt. Sed excurre quo volueris, remorare quantum volueris, multiplica gyros tuos quaquaversum volueris; quandocumque ad eadem verba veritatis navis fallaciarum tuarum pervenerit, sine dubio naufragabis.
Aug. See through how many things you wander, fearing lest the Apostle's words, heard without your prejudices, should condemn you, as they have already condemned you with the Catholic Church judging. But run wherever you will, delay as much as you will, multiply your circlings in whatever direction you will; whenever the ship of your fallacies arrives at the same words of truth, without doubt you will be shipwrecked.
Iulianum.2.2728. Iul. Iam igitur ad eum convertamur. Dederas mihi peccatum opus esse voluntatis; potui statim dicere consequenter: Voluntas autem, quae peccet, in parvulis nulla est; peccatum igitur in parvulis non est. Verum ut pluribus premereris testibus, interrogavi sensim, per quid hoc peccatum inveniretur in parvulo; ne forte per voluntatem? Post quod, te connivente, suscepi nullam in eo fuisse conscientiam voluntatis; adiunxi, ne per primam culpam membrorum lineamenta traxisset. Sed haec a Deo informari, et per hoc bona esse concesseras. Petivi tertium, utrum per ingressum animae, reatum advectum putares. Sed hanc esse novam, ne quidquam seminibus debere constabat. Intuli deinceps, ne (quia nihil tibi de his remanserat arguendum) nuptias, id est commixtionem corporum, diaboli opus vocares?
28. Jul. Now, then, let us turn to him. You had granted me that sin is the work of the will; I could at once have said, consistently: But there is no will to sin in little children; therefore there is no sin in little children. But, that you might be pressed by more witnesses, I asked step by step through what this sin would be found in a little child—lest perhaps through the will? After which, with you assenting, I took up that there was in him no consciousness of will. I added: lest he had drawn the outlines of his members through the first fault. But you had conceded that these are formed by God, and through this are good. I sought a third point: whether you thought guilt was conveyed through the entrance of the soul. But it was established that this is new, lest it should owe anything to the seeds. I next brought in—since nothing remained for you to be argued about these—lest you should call marriage, that is, the mingling of bodies, the work of the devil?
Iulianum.2.28Sed has pertinere ad parentum operam, te quoque annuente, monstravi. Illis igitur omnibus quae supra diximus absolutis, coniuges qui fuerant causa peccati, tradux tua diabolo mancipabat. Post quae omnia, quod tibi propinquabat impegi, ut dicerem credere te diabolum auctorem corporum, cui commixtionis operam, sine qua origo corporum esse non poterat, deputasses. Et haec quidem disputatio, quo morbo oppressus esses, ostendit; illa autem secunda, et te miserabilem cum eiusmodi sensibus, et Catholicos etiam timoris tui suffragio invictos probavit.
But that this pertains to the labor of the parents, with you also nodding assent, I showed. All those things, then, which we said above being settled, your traducianism consigned the spouses, who had been the cause of the sin, to the devil. After all which, I drove home what was drawing near to you, so that I might say that you believe the devil to be the author of bodies, to whom you had assigned the labor of mingling, without which the origin of bodies could not be. And this disputation indeed showed by what disease you were oppressed; but that second one proved both you to be wretched with such opinions, and the Catholics to be unconquered by the very support of your fear.
Iulianum.2.28Te enim dante, a Deo fieri homines, et esse coniuges innocentes, ac parvulos per se nihil operari; his tribus sumptis, irrefutabiliter illatum est, cum non peccat ille qui nascitur, non peccat ille qui genuit, non peccat iste qui condidit, nullam remansisse rimam, per quam peccatum doceatur ingressum. Tibi ergo si displicet quod collectum est; abnue quod dedisti, et dic aut illum peccasse qui genuit, aut illum qui condidit, aut istum qui natus est; ex quibus unum insanum est, aliud Manichaeum, tertium supra Manichaeos; insanum, si dixeris delinquere parvulos; Manichaeum, si accusaveris coniuges, supra Manichaeos, si peccati Deum aestimaris auctorem. Quod si haec omnia tam aliena sunt a vero, ut adhuc ea metuas libere confiteri; qua impudentia, homo omnium amentissime, hoc quod a nobis illatum est, persistis negare?
For with you granting that human beings are made by God, and that spouses are innocent, and that little children do nothing of themselves—these three being taken up, it was irrefutably brought in that, since this one who is born does not sin, that one who begot does not sin, that one who created does not sin, no crack remained through which sin might be taught to have entered. If, then, what has been gathered displeases you, deny what you granted, and say either that the one who begot sinned, or the one who created, or the one who was born; of which one is insane, another Manichean, the third beyond the Manichees: insane, if you say that little children offend; Manichean, if you accuse the spouses; beyond the Manichees, if you judge God to be the author of sin. But if all these are so alien from the truth that you still fear to confess them freely, with what shamelessness, O man most senseless of all, do you persist in denying what has been brought in by us?
Iulianum.2.28Aug. Cum ad verba Apostoli veneris, ibi non rimam invenies, sed apertissimam ianuam, qua peccatum intravit in mundum; quam conaberis quidem claudere, sed ex ore infantium atque lactentium, salvatorem potius Christum, quam te laudatorem quaerentium, et non anfractuosis disputationibus, sed mutis fletibus miseriam suam multo certius contestantium (quam profecto, si primi hominis rectitudo et beatitudo mansisset, nullo modo in paradiso habere potuissent) cum tua tota loquacitate vinceris.
Aug. When you come to the Apostle's words, there you will find not a crack but a most open door, by which sin entered into the world; which you will indeed try to shut, but by the mouth of infants and sucklings, who seek Christ as Savior rather than you as praiser, and who, not by winding disputations but by mute weepings, far more surely attest their misery (which assuredly, if the rectitude and blessedness of the first man had remained, they could in no way have had in paradise)—by these you, with all your loquacity, are overcome.
Iulianum.2.2829. Iul. Quattuor hic personarum causa vertitur: Dei opificis, duorum parentum de quibus materia praestatur operanti, et parvuli qui nascitur. Dicis tu in hoc choro habitare peccatum; interrogo ego, a quo fiat, utrum a Deo? Negas: A patre? Totidem negas: A matre? Idem negas: A parvulo? Negas; et adhuc non putas fuisse conclusum, quia non possit esse inter hos quattuor, quod ab his quattuor nullus admittit?
29. Jul. Here the case of four persons is at issue: of God the maker, of the two parents from whom material is supplied to the one working, and of the little child who is born. You say that sin dwells in this chorus; I ask, by whom is it made—whether by God? You deny it. By the father? You likewise deny it. By the mother? The same you deny. By the little child? You deny it; and do you still not think it has been concluded that there cannot be among these four what none of these four admits?
Iulianum.2.29Aug. Quidquid vis dicas: ad verba Apostoli aliquando venturus es; et quisquis ea per istarum argumentationum tuarum loca singula recordatur, quae nos assidue propter lectoris fastidium repetere nolumus, ipsa sua tibi recordatione respondet.
Aug. Whatever you wish to say, you will at some point come to the Apostle's words; and whoever recalls them through the several passages of these argumentations of yours—which we, for the reader's weariness, are unwilling constantly to repeat—answers you by his very own recollection.
Iulianum.2.2930. Iul. Ad quid ergo persuadendum aut Scripturas releges, aut conscios nominabis, qui adhuc quod sentis non potes definire? Quid te iuvat, ut Adam doceas deliquisse, quod ego penitus non refello? Quaerimus, Adam ante tot saecula mortuo, peccatum, quo in diaboli ius Dei imago transcribitur, per quid inveniatur in parvulo.
30. Jul. To what end, then, do you either read out the Scriptures or name accomplices, to persuade of something which you still cannot define as you hold it? What does it help you to teach that Adam offended, which I do not at all refute? We ask, with Adam dead so many ages ago, through what the sin, by which the image of God is transferred into the right of the devil, is found in a little child.
Iulianum.2.30Aug. Cur nec tu admittis in regnum Dei, nullum habentem secundum te meritum peccati, imaginem Dei? Cur ministratur sanguis, qui de similitudine carnis peccati in remissionem fusus est peccatorum, quem bibat parvulus, ut habere possit vitam, si de nullius peccati origine venit in mortem? Si hoc tibi displicet, aperte nega parvulum Christum, aperte nega pro parvulis mortuum, qui unus pro omnibus mortuus est; unde colligitur quod dicit Apostolus: Ergo omnes mortui sunt, et pro omnibus mortuus est (2 Cor 5, 14-15). Dic aperte: Mortui parvuli non sunt, qui peccatum nullum habent; morte pro se Christi, in qua baptizentur, non opus habent. Iam dic evidenter, quod latenter sentis, quoniam satis prodis tua disputatione quod sentis; dic, inquam, parvulos frustra fieri Christianos; sed vide, utrum te ipsum debeas dicere Christianum.
Aug. Why do you yourself not admit into the kingdom of God the image of God, who according to you has no merit of sin? Why is the blood ministered, which was poured out from the likeness of the flesh of sin for the remission of sins, for the little child to drink, so that he may have life, if he comes into death from the origin of no sin? If this displeases you, openly deny Christ to the little child, openly deny that he died for little children, he who alone died for all; from which is gathered what the Apostle says, Therefore all have died, and he died for all. (2 Cor 5:14-15) Say openly: Little children are not dead, who have no sin; they have no need of Christ's death for themselves, in which they are baptized. Now say plainly what you secretly hold, since you sufficiently betray by your disputation what you hold; say, I say, that little children are made Christians in vain; but see whether you ought to call yourself a Christian.
Iulianum.2.3031. Iul. Si per commixtionem parentum, damna nuptias professione, quas argumentatione condemnas; et deme nobis laborem, quo te convicimus esse Manichaeum.
31. Jul. If through the mingling of the parents, condemn by profession the marriage which you condemn by argument; and spare us the labor by which we have convicted you of being a Manichee.
Iulianum.2.31Sin autem tu non id audes dicere, ac ratione contumax concumbentibus inclinaris, ut per argumentorum hactenus inaudita portenta, dicas libidinem diabolicam esse, eamque in sensu coeuntium positam, ad voluptatem parentum, ad reatum pertinere nascentium; tuam quidem amentiam et turpitudinem prodis;
But if you do not dare to say that, and, defiant against reason, you incline toward those who lie together, so that by portents of arguments hitherto unheard you say that lust is diabolical, and that it, placed in the sense of those who couple, pertains to the pleasure of the parents and to the guilt of those who are born—you betray, indeed, your own madness and shamefulness;
Iulianum.2.31sed precor ne tibi tantum arroges, ut putes nobis liberum non esse cum honore Dei nascentium innocentiam contueri; cum tibi liceat et libeat, cum accusatione Dei a reatu, quem dicis libidinis, libidinantium membra purgare.
but I beg that you not arrogate so much to yourself as to think that we are not free to behold the innocence of the newborn with honor to God, when it is permitted and pleasing to you, with an accusation of God, to purge the members of those who lust from the guilt of lust which you allege.
Iulianum.2.31Aug. Quolibet pruritu libidinem, id est, concupiscentiam carnis laudes, dicit eam Ioannes apostolus a Patre non esse, sed ex mundo esse (Cf. 1 Io 2, 16); propter quam recte dicitur diabolus princeps mundi esse (Cf. Io 12, 31; 14, 30). Nam scimus quod mundum Deus fecerit. Hoc ergo malo concupiscentiae carnis bene utitur pudicitia coniugalis; eiusque mali reatum a nascentibus tractum solvit regeneratio spiritalis. Hoc quamdiu non sapis, non Catholicus, sed Pelagianus futurus es; et Scripturis sanctis, quantumlibet eas defendere tibi videaris, contradicturus es. Me autem quoties propter hoc cui contradicis, Manichaeum dicis; profecto et illum dicis, qui hominem membris genitalibus infusum, et concupiscentiae voluptate concretum, ante dicit excipere delictorum contagium, quam vitalis spiritus munus haurire (Cf. AMBROSIUS, Liber de Sacram. regen). Ambrosius est iste, Iuliane, Ambrosium Manichaeum dicis, insane!
Aug. With whatever itching you praise lust, that is, the concupiscence of the flesh, the apostle John says that it is not from the Father but is from the world (See 1 John 2:16); on account of which the devil is rightly said to be the prince of the world (See John 12:31; 14:30). For we know that God made the world. This evil of the concupiscence of the flesh, then, conjugal chastity uses well; and the guilt of that evil, drawn by those who are born, spiritual regeneration looses. As long as you do not have wisdom about this, you will be not a Catholic but a Pelagian; and you will contradict the holy Scriptures, however much you may seem to yourself to defend them. But as often as, on account of this which you contradict, you call me a Manichee, you surely also call him a Manichee who says that a human being, poured into the genital innards and formed by the pleasure of concupiscence, takes on the contagion of sins before he draws in the gift of the vital breath (See Ambrose, On the Sacrament of Regeneration). This is Ambrose, Julian; you call Ambrose a Manichee, you madman!
Iulianum.2.3132. Iul. Nam cum pronuntias, concupiscentiam carnis a principe tenebrarum in homine fuisse plantatam, eamque esse diaboli fruticem, ex se humanum genus quasi poma propria proferentem; absolute quidem proderis, quod non Deum, sed diabolum dicas hominum conditorem; quo dogmate impiissimo, et coniugiorum negotium, id est, genitalium admixtio, et caro cuncta damnatur.
32. Jul. For when you pronounce that the concupiscence of the flesh was planted in the human being by the prince of darkness, and that it is the shrub of the devil, bringing forth the human race from itself like its own fruit, you betray plainly that you say not God but the devil is the maker of human beings; by which most impious dogma both the business of marriages, that is, the mingling of the genitals, and all flesh is condemned.
Iulianum.2.32Aug. Non damnatur: sed non a te quasi sana laudetur, ut etiam te confitente, a suo Conditore ac Salvatore sanetur. Nam hoc in quibus non fit, sine ulla dubitatione damnabitur.
Aug. It is not condemned; but it is not to be praised by you as though sound, so that—with you also confessing it—it may be healed by its Maker and Savior. For in those in whom this does not happen, it will without any doubt be condemned.
Iulianum.2.3233. Iul. Cum vero post hoc sacrilegium adiungis, et dicis, profiteri te diabolicam quidem esse gignentium coniugum voluptatem, diabolicam genitalium commotionem; sed tamen et ipsa membra quae moventur, et coniuges qui voluptate afficiuntur, reos non esse; verum pro his omnibus novos homines, id est, rude opus in nascentibus deitatis accusas; nihil quidem de Manichaeorum impietate deponis; sed tam immanem moti capitis ostendis furorem, ut consequentius fovendum, quam amputandum iudicaretur, nisi voluntatem ac studium in hac re tuum, et multorum eversio, et tua obstinatio, et Scripturarum multiplicatio loqueretur.
33. Jul. But when, after this sacrilege, you add and say that you profess the pleasure of begetting spouses to be indeed diabolical, the movement of the genitals diabolical, but that nevertheless the very members which are moved, and the spouses who are affected by pleasure, are not guilty—but for all these you accuse the new human beings, that is, the deity's raw work in the newborn—you lay aside nothing of the Manichees' impiety; but you show so monstrous a frenzy of your shaken head that it would more consistently be judged to need fostering than amputating, did not your will and zeal in this matter speak through both the overthrow of many, and your own obstinacy, and the multiplication of Scriptures.
Iulianum.2.33Aug. Has contumelias non indignanter audire debeo, cum his Ecclesiae doctoribus, qui per unum hominem in mundum introisse peccatum, sic intellegunt, ut rectus Apostolus loquitur, non ut Iulianus perversissimus opinatur. In his sunt, ut alios taceam, Afer Cyprianus, Gallus Hilarius, Italus Ambrosius, Graecus Gregorius; a quibus eruditissimis prudentissimisque iudicibus, quales te non invenire vana praesumptione conquereris, haeresis vestra prius est damnata quam nata.
Aug. I ought not to hear these reproaches with indignation, since I share them with those teachers of the Church who understand that through one man sin entered into the world as the upright Apostle speaks, not as the most perverse Julian supposes. Among these are—to be silent about others—Cyprian the African, Hilary the Gaul, Ambrose the Italian, Gregory the Greek; by which most learned and most prudent judges—the like of whom you complain, with vain presumption, that you do not find—your heresy was condemned before it was born.
Iulianum.2.3334. Iul. Lege et de hoc quartum operis mei librum: et quantum diabolo, quem patrem tuum dicis, ac libidini matri tuae, sub criminandi specie blandiaris, intelleges.
34. Jul. Read about this too the fourth book of my work; and you will understand how much you flatter the devil, whom you call your father, and lust, your mother, under the appearance of accusing them.
Iulianum.2.34Aug. Legi etiam quartum tuum, et meo sexto ad eius tibi cuncta respondi; quis autem nostrum vicerit, iudicet pius lector amborum.
Aug. I have read your fourth book too, and in my sixth I have answered you in all things against his; but which of us has conquered, let the pious reader of us both judge.
Iulianum.2.3435. Iul. Verum iam Apostoli verba videamus, quem mihi ad omnia, quae supra posui, respondere dixisti: Ad omnia ista huic respondit Apostolus, qui neque voluntatem arguit parvuli, quae propria in illo nondum est ad peccandum; neque nuptias, in quantum nuptiae sunt, quae habent a Deo non solum institutionem, verum etiam benedictionem; neque parentes, in quantum parentes sunt, invicem licite atque legitime ad procreandos filios coniugati; sed: " Per unum - inquit - hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt " (Rom 5, 12). Quod isti si catholicis auribus mentibusque perciperent, adversum fidem gratiamque Christi rebelles animos non haberent, neque conarentur inaniter, ad suum proprium et haereticum sensum haec apostolica verba tam dilucida et tam manifesta convertere, asserentes hoc ideo dictum esse, quod Adam peccaverit primum, in quo de cetero, quisquis peccare voluit, peccandi invenit exemplum; ut peccatum scilicet non generatione ab illo uno in omnes homines, sed illius unius imitatione transire, cum profecto, si Apostolus hic imitationem intellegi voluisset, non per unum hominem, sed per diabolum potius, in hunc mundum peccatum intrasse, et per omnes homines pertransisse dixisset. De diabolo quippe scriptum est: " Imitantur eum, qui sunt ex parte ipsius " (Sap 2, 25). Sed ideo " per unum hominem " - dixit - a quo generatio utique hominum coepit, ut per generationem doceret isse per omnes originale peccatum (De nupt. et concup. 2, 45).
35. Jul. But now let us see the words of the Apostle, who you said would answer me as to all the things I set forth above: To all these things the Apostle answers this man, who neither blames the will of the little child, which is not yet his own for sinning; nor marriage, insofar as it is marriage, which has from God not only its institution but also its blessing; nor the parents, insofar as they are parents, lawfully and legitimately joined to each other for procreating children; but he says, Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned. (Rom 5:12) If these men perceived this with Catholic ears and minds, they would not have minds rebellious against the faith and grace of Christ, nor would they try in vain to turn these apostolic words, so clear and so manifest, to their own heretical sense, asserting that this was said for the reason that Adam sinned first, in whom thereafter whoever willed to sin found an example of sinning—so that sin, namely, passed into all human beings not by generation from that one man, but by imitation of that one man; whereas surely, if the Apostle had wished imitation to be understood here, he would have said that sin entered into this world and passed through all human beings not through one man, but rather through the devil. For of the devil it is written, They imitate him who are of his party. (Wis 2:25) But he said through one man—from whom, surely, the generation of human beings began—in order to teach that original sin passed through all by generation. (Marriage and Desire 2.45)
Iulianum.2.35Aug. Dixisti verba libri mei, dic iam quemadmodum accipienda sint quae ibi posui verba Apostoli; ut magis magisque manifesteris haereticus, laudatorem te supponendo, ut auferas parvulis Salvatorem.
Aug. You have spoken the words of my book; now say how those words of the Apostle which I set down there are to be taken—so that you may be ever more clearly shown a heretic, putting yourself forward as a praiser, in order to take away the Savior from little children.
Iulianum.2.3536. Iul. Abuti te imperitia faventium tibi, et delitescere sub ambiguitate verborum, quicumque ille fuerit operum nostrorum eruditus lector, intellegit. Reliquum vero vulgus, de quo Propheta loquitur ad Deum: Aestimasti homines sicut pisces maris (Hab 1, 14); mutua praegressione decipitur, ac salutiferae discretionis ignarum, totum putat coniungi posse rebus, quod viderit vocibus esse sociatum. Quid vero sit consequens, quid repugnans, quibusque concessis quid lex inexpugnabilis et veneranda orationis cogat inferri, nisi doctissimus attentissimusque non iudicat.
36. Jul. That you abuse the inexperience of those who favor you, and hide beneath the ambiguity of words, whoever shall be a learned reader of our works understands. But the rest of the crowd—of which the prophet speaks to God, You have made human beings like the fish of the sea (Hab 1:14)—is deceived by a mutual leap forward, and, ignorant of saving discernment, thinks that all can be joined in fact which it has seen joined in words. But what is consequent, what is contradictory, and, certain things being conceded, what the inexpugnable and venerable law of discourse compels to be inferred, no one judges but the most learned and most attentive.
Iulianum.2.36Aug. Adhuc circuis quaerendo dialecticos, et vitando ecclesiasticos iudices. Dic iam quomodo accipiendum sit: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit inmundum; melius videlicet hoc intellegens, quam ille qui dixit: Omnes in Adam moriuntur, quia " per unum hominem peccatum intravit in hunc mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt " (Rom 5, 12). Illius igitur culpa mors omnium est (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 4, 67). Et idem ipse alibi: Fuit Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam et in illo omnes perierunt (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 234). Ambrosius est ille, non quicumque de vulgo, cuius imperitam multitudinem non valentem de tuis disputationibus iudicare, nimis alta cervice et proterva fronte contemnis; Ambrosius est, inquam, cui nulla ex parte in ipsis litteris saecularibus, de quibus multum inflaris, aequaris; in ecclesiasticis vero quis ille sit, audi vel lege Pelagium doctorem tuum, et noli amare sensum a sensu tanti huius doctoris alienum.
Aug. Still you go around seeking dialecticians and avoiding ecclesiastical judges. Now say how it is to be taken: Through one man sin entered into the world—understanding this better, no doubt, than he who said: All die in Adam, because through one man sin entered into this world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12). Therefore the death of all is from his fault (Ambrose, On Luke 4.67). And the same man elsewhere: There was Adam, and in him we all were; Adam perished, and in him all perished (Ambrose, On Luke 7.234). This is Ambrose, not someone of the crowd, whose unlearned multitude—unable to judge of your disputations—you despise with too high a neck and too brazen a brow; this is Ambrose, I say, to whom you are in no respect equal even in those secular letters of which you are much puffed up; but in ecclesiastical matters, what sort of man he is, hear or read Pelagius your teacher, and do not love a sense alien to the sense of so great a teacher.
Iulianum.2.3637. Iul. Et hoc est propter quod maxime, miserantes Ecclesiarum ruinas, ad virorum prudentia illustrium provocamus examen, ut non quid dicatur, sed quid consequenter dicatur appareat. Si enim sub tali concilio disceptaretur, tibi utique non liceret, aut quod negaveras inferre, aut quod affirmaveras denegare; in libro vero tuo, quem nulla pudoris censura castigat, et quod Catholici dicunt, et quod Manichaei, confidenter agglomeras, hac sola opinione contentus, si respondisse dicaris; quid autem habeat ponderis oratio tua, quid constantiae, cogitare etiam ineptum putas.
37. Jul. And this is the reason why especially, pitying the ruins of the Churches, we appeal to the examination of men illustrious for prudence, so that it may appear not what is said, but what is consequently said. For if it were debated under such a council, you surely would not be permitted either to bring in what you had denied, or to deny what you had affirmed; but in your book, which no censure of shame chastens, you confidently heap together both what the Catholics say and what the Manichees say, content with this one opinion: if you are said to have answered. But what weight your discourse has, what consistency, you think it foolish even to consider.
Iulianum.2.37Aug. Rogo, dic iam quomodo intellegendum sit: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum (Rom 5, 12); quid adhuc calumniaris, conviciaris, tergiversaris? Si in concilio, cuius videris desiderare iudicium, sederent Cyprianus, Hilarius, Ambrosius, Gregorius, Basilius, Ioannes Constantinopolitanus, ut alios taceam; numquid doctiores, prudentiores, veraciores iudices quaerere auderes? Ipsi contra dogmata vestra clamant, ipsi scriptis suis vestra scripta condemnant; quid quaeris amplius? Hoc iam in primo et secundo librorum meorum satis docui, quos contra tuos quattuor ego sex edidi; sed ecce adhuc te audire paratus sum; dic iam quomodo sit accipiendum, quod per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum.
Aug. I beg you, say now how it is to be understood: Through one man sin entered into the world (Rom 5:12); why do you still slander, revile, evade? If in a council, whose judgment you seem to desire, there sat Cyprian, Hilary, Ambrose, Gregory, Basil, John of Constantinople—to be silent about others—would you dare to seek more learned, more prudent, more truthful judges? They themselves cry out against your dogmas, they themselves condemn your writings by their writings; what more do you seek? This I have already taught sufficiently in the first and second of my books, of which I have published six against your four; but behold, I am still prepared to hear you; say now how it is to be taken that through one man sin entered into the world.
Iulianum.2.3738. Iul. Denique sine cunctatione tribuens quae poposci, quidque ex his confectum esset aspiciens, profiteris te ad hoc quod exstruximus, imbecillum esse; apostolum Paulum illis omnibus quae diximus, obviare; quem tamen inducis eadem quae tu dederas, concedentem. Ais enim: Apostolus neque voluntatem arguit parvuli, quae propria in illo nondum est ad peccandum (De nupt. et concup. 2, 45); quo dato iam convictum est, nec posse in illo quodpiam esse peccatum, cuius nulla alia conditio est, secundum definitionem quoque tuam, quam voluntas admittendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere.
38. Jul. Finally, granting without hesitation what I asked, and seeing what was concluded from these things, you profess that you are too feeble for what we have constructed; that the apostle Paul opposes all those things which we have said; whom, however, you bring in conceding the very things you had granted. For you say: The Apostle neither blames the will of the little child, which is not yet his own for sinning (Marriage and Desire 2.45); with which granted, it is now convicted that there cannot be any sin in him whose only condition, even according to your own definition, is the will to admit what justice forbids, and from which it is free to abstain.
Iulianum.2.38Aug. Haec definitio peccati est eius, quod non est etiam poena peccati. Nam ubi malae consuetudinis voces esse contenditis, atque ita voces vestri dogmatis suffocatis, dic, si audes, quomodo voluntati hominis liberum sit abstinere a malo, ubi audis. Non quod volo ago (Rom 7, 15), aut nega esse malum, ubi audis: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 19). Sed utique agnoscimus, hoc peccatum poenam esse peccati; et ideo discernendum ab illa definitione peccati, ubi voluntas hoc committit, unde liberum est abstinere. Intellege quod dico; et dic iam, quaeso, quomodo sit accipiendum: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum (Rom 5, 12).
Aug. This is the definition of that sin which is not also a punishment of sin. For where you contend that they are the voices of a bad habit, and so suffocate the voices of your dogma, say, if you dare, how it is free for the will of a human being to abstain from evil, where you hear, It is not what I will that I do (Rom 7:15); or deny that it is evil, where you hear, It is not the good that I will that I do, but the evil that I do not will, this I do (Rom 7:19). But surely we acknowledge that this sin is a punishment of sin; and therefore it must be distinguished from that definition of sin where the will commits that from which it is free to abstain. Understand what I say; and now, I beg, say how it is to be taken: Through one man sin entered into the world (Rom 5:12).
Iulianum.2.3839. Iul. Ergo si Apostolus non arguit in illo propriam voluntatem, quam intellegit nec esse potuisse; pronuntiat utique, nec signum in eo criminis apparere, ea maxime iudicante iustitia, quae non imputat peccatum, nisi a quo liberum est abstinere. Verum non hoc solum tribuisse contentus, addis: Neque nuptias arguit Apostolus, in quantum nuptiae sunt, quae habent a Deo non solum institutionem, verum etiam benedictionem (De nupt. et concup. 2, 45). Quod per se solum aeque posset ad expugnandum peccatum naturale sufficere; quia, si scit Apostolus, ut scit, non esse nuptias arguendas, ad quarum conciliationem et ministerium et instrumentum pertinet a Deo instituta et benedicta sexuum cum voluptate commixtio; non potest de his diabolica germinare possessio, nec fructus earum reus est, apud eam maxime iustitiam, quae peccatum non imputat, nisi unde liberum est abstinere.
39. Jul. Therefore, if the Apostle does not blame in him his own will, which he understands could not even have existed, he surely pronounces that no sign of crime appears in him either—justice especially judging this, which does not impute sin except where it is free to abstain. But not content to have granted this alone, you add: Nor does the Apostle blame marriage, insofar as it is marriage, which has from God not only its institution but also its blessing (Marriage and Desire 2.45). Which by itself alone could equally suffice to overcome natural sin; because, if the Apostle knows, as he does, that marriage is not to be blamed, to whose reconciliation, ministry, and instrument belongs the mingling of the sexes with pleasure, instituted and blessed by God, then no diabolical possession can sprout from these, nor is their fruit guilty—especially before that justice which does not impute sin except where it is free to abstain.
Iulianum.2.39Aug. Noli, obsecro, cum tali voluptate commixtionem coniugum in paradiso suspicari, qualem nunc facit libido, quae non ad nutum voluntatis exsurgit, quae mentes etiam sanctorum, cohibenda quidem, sed tamen importuna sollicitat. Absit ut a fidelibus et prudentibus talis voluptas paradisi, talis illa pax et felicitas cogitetur.
Aug. Do not, I beseech you, imagine the mingling of spouses in paradise with such pleasure as lust now makes—lust that does not rise at the nod of the will, that solicits even the minds of the saints, to be restrained indeed, but nonetheless importunate. Far be it that such pleasure of paradise, such peace and happiness, be conceived by the faithful and the prudent.
Iulianum.2.3940. Iul. Consideremus et tertium, quo benignitas tua in acquiescendi facilitate cernatur. Neque parentes, in quantum parentes sunt invicem licite atque legitime ad procreandos filios coniugati, Apostolus arguit (Ibidem). Expende quid dixeris, non argui ab Apostolo parentes, in quantum parentes sunt. Ideo ergo eos, in quantum parentes sunt, non posse diabolo fructificare, nec de his aliquid, in quantum parentes sunt, ad diabolum pertinere pronuntiat; filii autem in tantum pertinent ad parentes, in quantum parentes sunt; igitur nec rei, nec sub regno diaboli, nec arguendi a diabolo comprobantur. Ut enim hoc quod diximus, repetitione clarescat: In tantum sexuum coniunctio suboli participat, in quantum qui coniuges sunt, fiunt parentes; si autem aliquid inter se voluerint agere petulantius, vel per illicitos adulteriorum aberrare concubitus, hoc ad filios non potest attinere, qui de vi seminum, non de vitiorum obscaenitate nascuntur.
40. Jul. Let us consider the third point too, in which your kindness may be discerned in the readiness of your assent. Nor does the Apostle blame the parents, insofar as they are parents, lawfully and legitimately joined to each other for procreating children (Marriage and Desire 2.45). Weigh what you have said: that the parents are not blamed by the Apostle, insofar as they are parents. Therefore he pronounces that, insofar as they are parents, they cannot bear fruit to the devil, nor does anything of them, insofar as they are parents, pertain to the devil; but children pertain to parents only insofar as they are parents; therefore they are proved neither guilty, nor under the kingdom of the devil, nor to be blamed by the devil. For—that what we have said may grow clear by repetition—the union of the sexes shares in offspring only insofar as those who are spouses become parents; but if they should wish to do something more wanton between themselves, or to stray through the unlawful couplings of adulteries, this cannot pertain to the children, who are born from the force of the seeds, not from the obscenity of vices.
Iulianum.2.40Aug. Iamne confiteris etiam inter coniuges esse posse petulantiam commixtionis? Ecce quod facit tua illa pulchra suscepta; hoc enim nisi cum ei ceditur non fit, quando ad petulantiam, quam tu quoque reprehendis, etiam coniuges liberorum procreandorum causa copulatos, nulla necessitate serendae prolis impellit; cuius tantus laudator esse voluisti, ut nemo credat quod etiam oppugnator esse audeas; quippe quam sic laudare non erubuisti, ut eam te liberet, nec puderet, etiam in paradisi beatitudine collocare.
Aug. Do you now confess that even between spouses there can be wantonness of mingling? Behold what that fine thing of yours, taken up by you, does; for this does not happen except when one yields to it, when no necessity of sowing offspring drives even spouses, joined for the sake of procreating children, to the wantonness which you too reprehend; of which you wished to be so great a praiser that no one would believe you would even dare to be its assailant—seeing that you have not blushed to praise it in such a way that you would, and would not be ashamed to, place it even in the blessedness of paradise.
Iulianum.2.4041. Iul. Igitur ad nascentes generantium, non flagitia, sed semina pervehuntur; vim autem seminum Deus instituit, et sicut confiteri cogeris, benedixit.
41. Jul. Therefore, to those who are born, not the disgraceful deeds but the seeds of those who beget are conveyed; but the force of the seeds God instituted, and, as you are compelled to confess, blessed.
Iulianum.2.41Aug. Semina Deus instituit, sed qui possunt in natura vitiata bonum eius a malo eius ita discernere, ut neque putent naturam malum esse, neque vitium naturam esse, ipsi possunt discernere quid horum duorum ad Deum creare pertineat, quid sanare. Sed hoc vos non potestis, quamdiu Pelagiani, non Catholici estis. Dic iam, rogo, dic iam, quomodo sit accipiendum, quod per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum (Rom 5, 12).
Aug. The seeds God instituted; but those who can so distinguish, in a corrupted nature, its good from its evil that they neither think nature an evil nor think the vice to be nature—these can distinguish which of these two it belongs to God to create, and which to heal. But this you cannot do, so long as you are Pelagians, not Catholics. Say now, I beg, say now how it is to be taken that through one man sin entered into the world (Rom 5:12).
Iulianum.2.4142. Iul. Filii igitur nec tunc rei sunt, quando in eorum generatione peccant parentes; quia in tantum ad liberos suos pertinent, in quantum parentes sunt; igitur et tantum filii ad parentes pertinent, in quantum filii sunt. Naturae quippe generantium constat germina communicare, non culpae. Quod si, ut ratio demonstrat, ita etiam Apostolum confirmare pronuntias; merito nos, eo docente, defendimus peccata parentum ad filios pertinere non posse; quandoquidem et Apostolus Spiritu Sancto clarus, et nos instructi luce rationis, et tu pondere impugnatae a te veritatis oppressus, communiter vereque fateamur, parentes in quantum parentes sunt, reos non esse; in tantum autem ad filios pertinere, in quantum parentes sunt; igitur filios in quantum filii sunt, id est, antequam aliquid per voluntatem propriam operentur, reos esse non posse.
42. Jul. Children, therefore, are not guilty even then, when the parents sin in their generation; because they pertain to their children only insofar as they are parents; therefore children too pertain to parents only insofar as they are children. For it is established that those who beget share the germs of nature, not of fault. And if, as reason shows, you pronounce that the Apostle likewise confirms this, then rightly do we, with him teaching, defend that the sins of parents cannot pertain to children; since both the Apostle, illustrious by the Holy Spirit, and we, instructed by the light of reason, and you, oppressed by the weight of the truth you have attacked, may commonly and truly confess that parents, insofar as they are parents, are not guilty; and that they pertain to children only insofar as they are parents; therefore that children, insofar as they are children—that is, before they do anything by their own will—cannot be guilty.
Iulianum.2.42Aug. Parentes quidem gignendo parentes sunt, et filii nascendo filii sunt; nec gignere autem, nec nasci malum est, quod pertinet ad institutionem Dei, et utrumque sine pudenda libidine posset in paradiso fieri, si nemo peccasset. Pudenda enim libido nisi aut peccato exorta, aut peccato vitiata esset, pudenda non esset; et aut nulla esset omnino, et sine illa ita servirent genitalia membra gignentibus, ut manus serviunt operantibus; aut ita esset subsequens voluntatem, ut numquam posset sollicitare nolentem;
Aug. Parents indeed are parents by begetting, and children are children by being born; but neither to beget nor to be born is an evil, which pertains to the institution of God, and both could happen in paradise without shameful lust, if no one had sinned. For shameful lust, unless it had either arisen from sin or been corrupted by sin, would not be shameful; and either it would be none at all, and without it the genital members would so serve those who beget as the hands serve those who work; or it would so follow the will that it could never solicit one who is unwilling;
Iulianum.2.42qualem nunc eam non esse, castitas docet, quae tales motus eius expugnat, et in coniugatis, ne vel inter se indecenter lasciviant, vel in adulteria prolabantur, et in quibusque continentibus, ne huic consentiendo, deiciantur. Ecce de qua trahitur originale peccatum; ecce per quam nasci noluit, qui venit, non suum ferre, sed nostrum auferre peccatum.
such as it now is not, chastity teaches, which overcomes such movements of it both in the married, lest even between themselves they should sport indecently or slip into adulteries, and in all who are continent, lest by consenting to it they be cast down. Behold from what original sin is drawn; behold through what he willed not to be born, who came not to bear his own sin, but to take away ours.
Iulianum.2.4243. Iul. Eant nunc, et omnia quidquid possunt, Manichaeae rationis moliantur ingenia, quam volunt longas patiantur cogitationum aerumnas; non arroganter, sed religiose polliceor, numquam hanc instructuram posse quassari.
43. Jul. Let them go now, and let the wits of Manichean reasoning contrive whatever they can; let them suffer as long as they wish the toils of cogitations; not arrogantly, but religiously I promise that this structure can never be shaken.
Iulianum.2.43Aug. Quam instructuram vocas, tibi ruina est, quae te ita pressit, ut laudare cogeret quod expugnas; si tamen est in te qualiscumque castitas, quae te faciat expugnare quod laudas.
Aug. What you call a structure is, for you, a ruin, which has so pressed you that it has compelled you to praise what you attack—if indeed there is in you any chastity whatever, which makes you attack what you praise.
Iulianum.2.4344. Iul. Qua igitur fronte subiungis: Sed " per unum hominem peccatum in mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt (Ibidem) "? Quod interpretaris hoc modo, ut peccatum ab illo dicat Apostolus generatione in posteros fuisse transmissum (De nupt. et concup. 2, 45). Supra concesseras Magistrum Gentium nuptias, quibus Deus benedixerat, nihil accusare; voluntatem ad peccandum in nascente non esse; parentes autem, in quantum parentes sunt, licite sibi legitimeque ad procreandos filios coniugari; et addis illico, quasi dormiens priora dixisses, crimen ad posteros generatione transmitti. Si enim in tantum generant, in quantum parentes sunt; in quantum autem parentes sunt, licite sibi et legitime iunguntur; et haec coniunctio ab Apostolo non improbatur, quia a Deo non solum instituta, verum etiam benedicta est; quo ore, qua lege, qua fronte, hanc generationem reatus causam, radice criminum, servam diaboli, esse confirmas?
44. Jul. With what brow, then, do you add: But through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12)? Which you interpret in this way, that the Apostle says sin was transmitted from that man by generation into his descendants (Marriage and Desire 2.45). Above you had conceded that the Teacher of the Gentiles accuses in nothing the marriage which God had blessed; that there is no will to sin in the one being born; that the parents, insofar as they are parents, are lawfully and legitimately joined for procreating children; and you add at once, as though, sleeping, you had said the foregoing, that the crime is transmitted to descendants by generation. For if they beget only insofar as they are parents, and insofar as they are parents they are joined lawfully and legitimately, and this union is not disapproved by the Apostle, because it is by God not only instituted but also blessed—with what mouth, by what law, with what brow, do you affirm this generation to be the cause of guilt, the root of crimes, the slave of the devil?
Iulianum.2.44Aug. Iam nescio quoties haec dicta sunt, eisque responsum est. Multiloquio tibi excitas caliginem, quae te non permittit malitiam vitiorum a naturae bonitate discernere; et usque ad odiosum fastidium eadem per eadem repetens, nondum dicis quomodo sit accipiendum, quod per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum (Rom 5, 12).
Aug. I no longer know how often these things have been said, and answered. By your much speaking you stir up for yourself a darkness that does not permit you to distinguish the malice of vices from the goodness of nature; and, repeating the same things by the same things to a hateful weariness, you do not yet say how it is to be taken that through one man sin entered into the world (Rom 5:12).
Iulianum.2.4445. Iul. Non ergo argui meretur ab Apostolo et a diabolo possidetur; a Deo instituitur, et criminum fons est; a Deo postremo, ut confiteris, benedicitur, et a te frutex diabolicus accusatur.
45. Jul. It does not, then, deserve to be blamed by the Apostle, and yet is possessed by the devil; it is instituted by God, and is the source of crimes; it is, finally, as you confess, blessed by God, and is accused by you as a diabolical shrub.
Iulianum.2.45Aug. Nuptias benedixit Deus, non resistentem spiritui concupiscentiam carnis, quae non fuit ante peccatum; peccatum autem, sicut nec illam concupiscentiam quae resistit spiritui, non benedixit Deus. Nuptiae porro, quas benedixit, si peccatum non fuisset admissum, quo natura vitiata est, aut sic uterentur genitalibus membris, quemadmodum aliis utimur, sine ulla libidine oboedientibus voluntati; aut pudenda ibi libido non esset, quoniam numquam resisteret voluntati, qualis nunc utique non est; quod profecto etiam tu sentis, quando ab ea sollicitante atque illiciente dissentis. Nuptiae tamen, etiam nunc laudabiles sunt; quia neque instituunt hoc malum in hominibus, sed inveniunt; et eo malo bene utuntur intentione generandi, quamvis trahant inde qui generantur originale peccatum, propter quod sunt regenerandi.
Aug. God blessed marriage, not the concupiscence of the flesh resisting the spirit, which was not before sin; but sin—just as neither that concupiscence which resists the spirit—God did not bless. Moreover, the marriage which he blessed, if the sin had not been committed by which nature was corrupted, would either so use the genital members as we use the others, obeying the will without any lust; or there would be no shameful lust there, since it would never resist the will, such as it now certainly is not—which assuredly you too perceive, when you dissent from it as it solicits and entices. Marriage, nevertheless, is even now praiseworthy; because it neither institutes this evil in human beings, but finds it; and it uses that evil well, with the intention of begetting, although those who are begotten draw thence original sin, on account of which they must be regenerated.
Iulianum.2.4546. Iul. Quam mecum nihil egeris, litterarum omnium testatur eruditio; quam vero contra Apostolum nitaris, et contra Deum insanias, sententiarum tuarum pugna demonstrat. Sed ostenso iam, non posse haec coniungi, quae rerum natura dissociat; interrogemus et Apostolum, ne illius putetur inesse sensibus, quae in tuis est sententiis probata barbaries.
46. Jul. How you have accomplished nothing with me, the learning of all letters testifies; but how you strive against the Apostle, and rave against God, the conflict of your own opinions shows. But, it having now been shown that these things cannot be joined which the nature of things dissociates, let us question the Apostle too, lest there be thought to be in his thoughts the barbarism which is proved to be in your opinions.
Iulianum.2.46Aug. Dic iam nunc saltem, quod tantis anfractibus differebas.
Aug. Say now at least what you were deferring by such windings.
Iulianum.2.4647. Iul. Audio itaque Paulum pronuntiantem, quia: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatummors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt (Ibidem). Quod tu, non propter exemplum peccati, sed propter generationem dictum esse confirmas; nosque haereticos vocas, qui id ad exempla referamus; illoque te iuvari aestimas argumento: Profecto si Apostolus imitationem, inquis, intellegi voluisset, non " per unum hominem ", sed per diabolum peccatum intrasse, et per omnes homines pertransisse dixisset. De diabolo quippe scriptum est: " Imitantur autem eum, qui sunt ex parte ipsius " (Sap 2, 25). Sed ideo " per unum hominem " dixit, a quo generatio utique hominum coepit, ut per generationem doceret isse per omnes originale peccatum (De nupt. et concup. 2, 45). At ego video Apostolum nihil quod ad infamationem generationis spectaret humanae, nihil quod ad condemnationem innocentiae naturalis, nihil quod ad crimen divini operis, protulisse.
47. Jul. I hear, then, Paul pronouncing that through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12). Which you affirm to have been said not on account of the example of sin, but on account of generation; and you call us heretics, who refer it to example; and you think yourself helped by this argument: Surely, you say, if the Apostle had wished imitation to be understood, he would have said that sin entered and passed through all human beings not through one man, but through the devil. For of the devil it is written, They imitate him who are of his party (Wis 2:25). But he said through one man—from whom, surely, the generation of human beings began—in order to teach that original sin passed through all by generation (Marriage and Desire 2.45). But I see that the Apostle brought forth nothing that would look toward the defaming of human generation, nothing toward the condemnation of natural innocence, nothing toward the crime of the divine work.
Iulianum.2.47Aug. Diu dicis: Nihil, et cum hoc verbum repetere destiteris, dicturus es nihil. Quis enim non te rideat persuadere conantem, non pertinere ad generationem quod ait Apostolus: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum; cum ipse homo non sit genitus ab aliquo, de quo ceteri gignerentur; sed pertinere dicitis ad exemplum, cum exemplum peccati, quod posteriores imitarentur, non intrarit in mundum, nisi per eum, qui nullum imitando peccavit? Primus namque peccavit. Hunc autem non Adam, sed diabolum esse, quis Christianus ignorat? Quid est ergo, quod te libet, nisi et non tacere, et nihil dicere?
Aug. For a long time you say, Nothing; and when you have ceased to repeat this word, you are going to say nothing. For who would not laugh at you, trying to persuade that what the Apostle says—Through one man sin entered into the world—does not pertain to generation, since that very man was not begotten by anyone from whom the rest might be begotten? But you say it pertains to example, when the example of sin which the later ones might imitate did not enter into the world except through him who sinned by imitating no one. For he sinned first. But who among Christians is ignorant that this is not Adam, but the devil? What is it, then, that pleases you, except both not to be silent and to say nothing?
Iulianum.2.4748. Iul. Denique id, quod ipsa verba non indicaverant, tu colligere argumentatione conatus, subdis, quia si de imitatione loqueretur, diabolum commemorare debuerat; sed quia de generatione voluisset intellegi, hominem dicere maluisse, quam daemonem. Interrogo ergo, quae fuerit tibi huius opinionis occasio. Quid enim? Negas tu hominum imitatione delinqui? Et licet res absoluta Scripturarum attestatione non egeat, tamen audi David: Noli aemulari inter malignantes, neque zelatus fueris facientes iniquitatem (Ps 36, 1); ne aemulatus fueris eum qui prosperatur in via sua (Ps 36, 7).
48. Jul. Finally, that which the words themselves had not indicated, you, trying to gather by argument, subjoin: that if he were speaking of imitation, he ought to have mentioned the devil; but because he wished it to be understood of generation, he preferred to say man rather than demon. I ask, then, what was the occasion for you of this opinion. For what? Do you deny that men offend by the imitation of men? And although the matter, being settled, does not need the attestation of the Scriptures, yet hear David: Do not strive among the malicious, nor be envious of those who do iniquity (Ps 37:1 (36)); do not be envious of him who prospers in his way (Ps 37:7 (36)).
Iulianum.2.48Deinde omnes Scripturae Veteris Testamenti commonent Israelem, ne ritum profanae gentis imitetur. Quae igitur necessitas id cogebat, ut Apostolus, si imitationem vellet intellegi, diabolum magis quam hominem nominaret, cum et hominum et diaboli nosset imitatione delinqui? Aut ergo tu proba, non posse hominum imitatione peccari, nec hoc in lege uspiam contineri, et sic assere suspicioni tuae locum paratum; aut certe si manifestum est, nulla magis re quam imitatione vitiorum invaluisse peccata, grandi imperitia collegisti Apostolum de diabolo profecto dicturum fuisse, si imitationem voluisset intellegi.
Then all the Scriptures of the Old Testament admonish Israel not to imitate the rite of a profane nation. What necessity, then, compelled this—that the Apostle, if he wished imitation to be understood, should name the devil rather than man, when he knew that men offend by the imitation both of men and of the devil? Either, then, prove that men cannot sin by the imitation of men, and that this is nowhere contained in the law, and thus assert that a place has been prepared for your supposition; or surely, if it is manifest that sins have grown strong by nothing more than the imitation of vices, you have concluded with great ignorance that the Apostle would surely have spoken of the devil, had he wished imitation to be understood.
Iulianum.2.48Aug. Nonne ante dixi nihil te esse dicturum, homo nihil loquendo loquacissime? Sunt quidem peccata imitationis in mundo, cum homines peccantium hominum exempla sectantur, non tamen per eos homines, quos quilibet imitantur, peccatum quod peccantes imitarentur, intravit in mundum; sed per eum qui primus nullum imitando, peccavit; hic est diabolus, quem imitantur omnes qui sunt ex parte ipsius (Sap 2, 25). Sic et peccatum, quod non imitando committitur, sed nascendo trahitur, per hunc intravit in mundum, qui primus hominem genuit. Nihil ergo dixisti, et nonnisi ad quosdam decipiendos, quosdam fatigandos lectores, tacere noluisti.
Aug. Did I not say before that you would say nothing, O man most loquaciously speaking nothing? There are indeed sins of imitation in the world, when human beings follow the examples of sinning human beings; yet it was not through those human beings whom anyone imitates that the sin which the sinners imitated entered into the world, but through him who first, imitating no one, sinned; this is the devil, whom all imitate who are of his party (Wis 2:25). So too the sin which is committed not by imitating but is drawn by being born, entered into the world through him who first begot a human being. You have said nothing, then, and have been unwilling to be silent only in order to deceive some readers and to weary others.
Iulianum.2.4849. Iul. Quia ergo claret, imitationem malorum hominum non solum consequenter, sed et necessario dici; hoc interim argumentum tuum iacere perspicuum est. Quod vero addis, de diabolo esse scriptum: Imitantur eum, qui sunt ex parte ipsius (Ibidem); et ego assentior dictum esse prudenter ab eo, quicumque libri ipsius auctor est; sed tibi non prodest, quod scribuntur quidam diaboli imitatione peccare, nisi docueris non posse hominum imitatione delinqui.
49. Jul. Since, then, it is clear that the imitation of evil men is spoken of not only consequently but even necessarily, it is for the present evident that this argument of yours lies prostrate. But as for your addition, that it is written of the devil, They imitate him who are of his party (Wis 2:25)—I too assent that it was prudently said by whoever is the author of that book; but it does not help you that some are written to sin by imitation of the devil, unless you teach that men cannot offend by the imitation of men.
Iulianum.2.49Aug. Non hic quaeritur utrum hominum imitatione peccetur; quis enim nesciat, etiam hominum imitatione peccari? Sed quaeritur, quale peccatum per unum hominem intrarit in mundum; utrum quod imitando committeretur, an quod nascendo traheretur. Quia illud primum, id est, quod imitando committeretur, nonnisi per eum intravit in mundum, qui primus neminem imitatus ceteris imitaturis peccandi introduxit exemplum, hoc est, diabolus; hoc autem alterum, id est, quod nascendo traheretur, nonnisi per eum intravit in mundum, qui primus a nemine generatus, generandis ceteris originis ingessit initium; hic est Adam.
Aug. The question here is not whether men sin by imitation of men; for who does not know that men sin even by imitation of men? But the question is, what sort of sin entered into the world through one man—whether that which is committed by imitating, or that which is drawn by being born. Because the former, that is, that which is committed by imitating, entered into the world only through him who first, imitating no one, introduced for the rest who would imitate the example of sinning, that is, the devil; but the latter, that is, that which is drawn by being born, entered into the world only through him who first, begotten by no one, brought in for the rest who would be begotten the beginning of origin; this is Adam.
Iulianum.2.49De imitatione igitur Angelorum et hominum intellege te nihil ad causam pertinens dicere; sed tantum tacere noluisse. Disputamus enim, non de quocumque peccatore, qui quandocumque peccavit in mundo, sed de illo per quem peccatum intravit in mundum; ubi si quaeratur exemplum imitationis, diabolus invenitur; si contagium generationis, Adam. Proinde, dicens Apostolus: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum (Rom 5, 12), peccatum generationis intellegi voluit. Imitationis enim peccatum, non per unum hominem, sed per diabolum intravit in mundum.
Understand, then, that concerning the imitation of angels and of men you say nothing that pertains to the case; you have only been unwilling to be silent. For we are disputing not about any sinner whatever, who at some time sinned in the world, but about that one through whom sin entered into the world; where, if the example of imitation is sought, the devil is found; if the contagion of generation, Adam. Accordingly, when the Apostle says, Through one man sin entered into the world (Rom 5:12), he wished the sin of generation to be understood. For the sin of imitation entered into the world not through one man, but through the devil.
Iulianum.2.4950. Iul. Nam cum utrumque ex more dicatur, aliquando quod diabolum quis imitatus, invideat; aliquando quod hominem aemulatus, aut invidia, aut flagitiosorum sordibus oblinatur; hoc quoque imitationis nomen utrique possit convenire personae, id est, et cum de homine, et cum de diabolo dicitur; tu perridicule ineptire voluisti, per imitationis intellectum Adam non potuisse monstrari.
50. Jul. For since each is said in customary speech—sometimes that someone, having imitated the devil, envies; sometimes that, having emulated a man, he is smeared with either envy or the filth of the disgraceful—this name of imitation too could suit either person, that is, both when it is said of a man and when it is said of the devil; you have wished, most ridiculously, to play the fool, as though through the understanding of imitation Adam could not be shown.
Iulianum.2.50Aug. Numquid per quemcumque hominem, quem peccando alius imitatur, peccatum intravit in mundum? Dic, si potes, quid sit: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit (Ibidem), sive mors, sive peccatum, sive potius cum morte peccatum. Nam peccatum, cuius imitatione peccatur, nonnisi per diabolum intravit in mundum, qui primus non imitando fecit, quod alii facerent imitando.
Aug. Did sin then enter into the world through any man whom another imitates by sinning? Say, if you can, what this means: Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings (Rom 5:12)—whether death, or sin, or rather sin together with death. For the sin by whose imitation one sins entered into the world only through the devil, who first, not by imitating, did what others would do by imitating.
Iulianum.2.5051. Iul. Ad reliqua festinat oratio, sed premendus adhuc locus est, ut divisionibus quam possumus brevibus, lectori et intellegentia rei et memoria suggeratur. In omnibus quidem pene rebus homonymorum, quae aequivoca appellamus, conditio reperitur.
51. Jul. The discourse hastens on to the rest, but the passage must still be pressed, so that by divisions as brief as we can make them both the understanding of the matter and the memory of it may be supplied to the reader. In almost all things, indeed, the condition of homonyms—which we call equivocals—is found.
Iulianum.2.51Aug. Promiseras te intellegentiam suggesturum esse lectori, et loqueris de homonymis et aequivocis; quomodo ergo te ipsi saltem Pelagiani intellecturi sunt, nisi prius ad scholas dialecticorum, ubicumque terrarum potuerint inveniri, propter haec discenda mittantur? An forte et categorias Aristotelis, antequam tuos libros legant, eis exponens ipse lecturus es? Cur non et hoc facias, homo ingeniosissimus, quandoquidem a deceptis miseris pasceris otiosus?
Aug. You had promised that you would supply understanding to the reader, and you speak of homonyms and equivocals; how, then, will even the Pelagians themselves understand you, unless they are first sent to the schools of the dialecticians, wherever in the world they can be found, to learn these things? Or will you perhaps yourself read out Aristotle's Categories to them, expounding them, before they read your books? Why not do this too, O most ingenious man, since you are fed in idleness by the wretches you have deceived?
Iulianum.2.5152. Iul. Sed ut nunc nobis sermo de praesentibus sit, generatio proprie sexibus imputatur, imitatio autem semper animorum est. Hic ergo affectus animi, quod possibiliter voluerit imitantis, hominem pro diversitate causarum aut accusat, aut provehit; ita fit ut in bono et Deum, et Angelos, et Apostolos dicatur imitari; Deum: Estote perfecti, sicut Pater vester perfectus est (Mt 5, 48); Angelos: Fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra (Mt 6, 10); Apostolos: Imitatores mei estote, sicut et ego Christi (1 Cor 11, 1).
52. Jul. But that our discourse may now be about the matters before us: generation is properly imputed to the sexes, but imitation is always of minds. This affection of the mind, then, which the imitator possibly willed, either accuses or advances a human being according to the diversity of causes; thus it comes about that in the good one is said to imitate both God, and the angels, and the apostles. God: Be perfect, as your Father is perfect (Matt 5:48); the angels: Your will be done, on earth as it is in heaven (Matt 6:10); the apostles: Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ (1 Cor 11:1).
Iulianum.2.52In malo vero imitatur diabolum, sicut dicitur: Imitantur eum, qui sunt ex parte ipsius (Sap 2, 25); imitantur homines: Nolite esse tristes sicut hypocritae, exterminantes facies suas (Mt 6, 16), imitantur animalia, cum mandatur: Nolite fieri sicut equus et mulus, quibus non est intellectus (Ps 31, 9). His ergo verbis, tam adhortantibus quam deterrentibus, ostenditur imitationis affectus, qui utique si esse non posset, non indiceretur cavendus.
But in the evil one imitates the devil, as it is said, They imitate him who are of his party (Wis 2:25); one imitates men: Do not be sad like the hypocrites, who disfigure their faces (Matt 6:16); one imitates animals, when it is commanded, Do not become like the horse and the mule, which have no understanding (Ps 32:9 (31)). By these words, then, both exhorting and deterring, the affection of imitation is shown, which surely, if it could not exist, would not be declared something to be guarded against.
Iulianum.2.52Aug. Sed peccatum imitationis, id est, quod imitatione fieret, non intravit in mundum, nisi per eum, qui ut imitatione peccaretur, sine imitatione peccavit; et non est Adam certe iste, sed diabolus. Qui enim dixit: Intravit in mundum (Rom 5, 12), initium peccati huius ostendit; quod initium manifestum est, non esse factum per hominem, sed per diabolum; si peccatum quod imitarentur peccantes, velimus attendere. Restat igitur ut peccatum quod per unum hominem intravit in mundum, non imitationi, sed generationi recte possit attribui. Agimus sane Deo gratias, quoniam contra vestrum locutus errorem, voluntatem bonam, qua imitamur bonos, non viribus nostri liberi arbitrii, sed auxilio Dei esse tribuendam, velut coruscante tibi veritate confessus es; quandoquidem ut Angelos imitemur, non praesumendum a nobis, sed a Domino demonstrasti esse poscendum, sic exponens quod oramus et dicimus: Fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra (Mt 6, 10).
Aug. But the sin of imitation, that is, that which is done by imitation, did not enter into the world except through him who, that there might be sin by imitation, sinned without imitation; and this surely is not Adam, but the devil. For he who said, It entered into the world (Rom 5:12), shows the beginning of this sin; which beginning is manifest to have been made not through a man, but through the devil—if we wish to attend to the sin which sinners would imitate. It remains, therefore, that the sin which entered into the world through one man can rightly be attributed not to imitation, but to generation. We give thanks, surely, to God, since, speaking against your error, you have confessed—as though the truth were flashing upon you—that the good will by which we imitate the good is to be attributed not to the strength of our free choice, but to the help of God; since you have shown that, in order to imitate the angels, it is not to be presumed by us but to be asked of the Lord, thus expounding what we pray and say: Your will be done, on earth as it is in heaven (Matt 6:10).
Iulianum.2.5253. Iul. Sed ut imitationis vocabulum rebus diversis manifestum est communiter convenire; ita generatio vere et proprie generantem substantiam indicat; non proprie autem, sed abusive studiis applicatur. Et tamen quia hic est iam usus loquendi et quod indicarit agnoscitur, et proprietatibus praeiudicium afferre non sinitur. Dicitur ergo diabolus generare peccantes, secundum quod Dominus in Evangelio: Vos, ait, ex patre diabolo estis (Io 8, 44).
53. Jul. But as the term of imitation is manifestly common to diverse things, so generation truly and properly indicates the substance that generates; but it is applied to pursuits not properly, but by misuse. And yet, because this is now the usage of speech, both what it indicates is recognized, and it is not allowed to bring prejudice to proprieties. The devil, then, is said to generate sinners, according to what the Lord says in the Gospel: You are from your father the devil (John 8:44).
Iulianum.2.53Quo sermone, eum dixit criminosorum patrem, cuius malignitatem convincebantur imitari; et tamen in absoluto est intellegentia, quia per hoc nomen, videlicet patris, nec diabolo sexus, nec hominibus illis aeria sit adscripta substantia. Iam igitur quid confici hinc voluerimus appareat. Si proprie numquam hominem homo iudicaretur imitari, et Apostolus per Adam omnes peccasse dixisset; ego libere praescriberem usu Scripturarum esse Apostolum vindicandum, ut quomodo Dominus diabolum dixerat patrem, qui substantia generare non poterat; ita Apostolus hominem scripsisset imitabilem, ne quid docuisse contra rationem perspicuam crederetur.
By which discourse he called him the father of the criminal, whose malignity they were convicted of imitating; and yet the understanding is settled, that through this name, namely of father, neither is sex ascribed to the devil, nor an airy substance to those men. Now, then, let it appear what we wished to be concluded from this. If a man were never properly judged to imitate a man, and the Apostle had said that all sinned through Adam, I would freely lay it down that the Apostle must be vindicated by the usage of the Scriptures, so that, just as the Lord had called the devil a father, who could not generate by substance, so the Apostle had written that man is imitable, lest he be believed to have taught anything against clear reason.
Iulianum.2.53Aug. Numquid Adam prior in peccato imitabilis fuit, ut merito per illum hoc peccati genus intrasse diceretur in mundum? Nonne diabolus prior imitabilis in peccato exstitit? Per illum ergo intrasse in mundum peccatum, Apostolus diceret, si peccatum, quod imitando alii facerent, eo loco vellet intellegi.
Aug. Was Adam the earlier in sin who was imitable, so that this kind of sin might rightly be said to have entered into the world through him? Was not the devil the earlier who stood forth imitable in sin? Through him, then, the Apostle would have said that sin entered into the world, if he had wished, in that passage, the sin which others would do by imitating to be understood.
Iulianum.2.5354. Iul. Nunc vero si colligam, quae sunt in Evangelio abusive prolata, non sustinent; multo magis apostolus Paulus nullam errori occasionem praebuit, qui nihil dixit improprium, si pronuntiavit, peccatorem primum hominem sequentibus peccantibus exemplum fuisse.
54. Jul. But now, if I should gather together what in the Gospel is uttered by misuse, they do not bear it out; much more did the apostle Paul give no occasion for error, who said nothing improper, if he pronounced that the first man, a sinner, was an example to the sinners who followed.
Iulianum.2.54Aug. Non ergo debuit istos duos proponere, unum ad peccatum, alterum ad iustitiam, Adam scilicet, et Christum. Si enim primum peccatorem, propter peccatum quod imitati sunt ceteri, posuisset Adam; profecto primum iustum, propter iustitiam ceteris imitandum, non Christum poneret, sed Abel; primus quippe Abel, nullum hominum imitans, sed ceteris imitandus, iustus fuit. Sciens autem quod loqueretur, Apostolus Adam posuit ad peccatum, Christum ad iustitiam; quia illum noverat generationis, istum regenerationis auctorem.
Aug. Then he ought not to have set forth those two, one for sin, the other for justice—namely, Adam and Christ. For if he had set down Adam as the first sinner, on account of the sin which the rest imitated, surely he would set down, as the first just one whose justice was to be imitated by the rest, not Christ, but Abel; for Abel was the first who, imitating no human being but to be imitated by the rest, was just. But the Apostle, knowing what he was speaking of, set down Adam for sin, Christ for justice; because he knew the former to be the author of generation, the latter of regeneration.
Iulianum.2.5455. Iul. Ac per hoc bardissime argumentatus es, quod si apostolus Paulus per imitationem transisse peccatum voluisset intellegi, diabolum magis quam Adam nominasset; cum clareat, et hominis et diaboli malum non nisi imitatione transire potuisse. Verum disiecto quod tu exstruxeras, non tam meis quam ipsius rationis manibus, quid nunc a nobis afferatur attende.
55. Jul. And through this you have argued most dully, that if the apostle Paul had wished sin to be understood to have passed through imitation, he would have named the devil rather than Adam; since it is clear that the evil both of man and of the devil could not pass except by imitation. But with what you had constructed scattered—not so much by my hands as by the hands of reason itself—attend now to what is brought forward by us.
Iulianum.2.55Aug. Non te disiecisse quod struxeram, nec sanae rationis, sed vanae tuae opinionis manus te frustra intulisse structurae nostrae, utriusque nostrum verba qui legerint iudicabunt.
Aug. That you have not scattered what I had constructed, and that you have brought to bear upon our structure, in vain, the hands not of sound reason but of your empty opinion—those who read the words of us both will judge.
Iulianum.2.5556. Iul. Ostendit Apostolus non a se dictum esse, peccatum generatione transisse, quando nominans hominem, adiecit: unum; unus enim numeri principium est; et ille explicans per quem diceret intrasse peccatum, non solum eum nominavit, verum etiam numeravit: Per unum, inquit, hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit (Rom 5, 12). Hic autem unus praebendae imitationi sufficit, generationi implendae non sufficit. Peccatum autem transiit, sed per unum. Manifestum est, imitationem hic, non generationem coargui, quae nisi per duos fieri non potest.
56. Jul. The Apostle shows that it was not said by him that sin passed by generation, when, naming the man, he added one; for one is the beginning of number; and, explaining through whom he was saying sin entered, he not only named him but also numbered him: Through one man, he says, sin entered into this world (Rom 5:12). But this one suffices for offering imitation; it does not suffice for fulfilling generation. But sin passed, yet through one. It is manifest that imitation, not generation, is here at issue, which cannot be done except through two.
Iulianum.2.56Aut igitur ostende, per Adam solum sine muliere generationem exstitisse; nec hoc enim ab elegantia tui abhorret ingenii; aut certe quoniam vides generationem nisi per duos constare non posse, assentire vel sero, accusatum non esse per unum numerum opus duorum. Per unum, inquit, hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, qui dixit: per unum, intellegi per duos noluit. Quid rogo, quaerebat inter haec dogmata numerus, ut Apostolus tanta cura, non solum hominem, sed unum hominem nominaret? Verum apparet cautus augusti sermo consilii, qui revelante Spiritu Sancto, temporum nostrorum praecavit et exarmavit errores; ne in infamationem quippe aliquid instituti a Deo coniugii vel benedictae fecunditatis dixisse putaretur; cum causa posceret ut peccati replicaret exordia, per eum dixit numerum transisse peccatum, qui fetibus non poterat convenire.
Either, then, show that generation came about through Adam alone, without the woman—for this too is not foreign to the elegance of your wit; or surely, since you see that generation cannot stand except through two, assent at last that the work of two was not accused through the number one. Through one man, he says, sin entered into the world; he who said through one did not wish it to be understood through two. What, I ask, was number seeking amid these dogmas, that the Apostle should with such care name not only man, but one man? But it appears that the august discourse was wary of design, which, by the revealing of the Holy Spirit, forestalled and disarmed the errors of our times; lest, indeed, he be thought to have said anything to the defaming of the marriage instituted by God or of blessed fecundity, when the case required that he unfold the beginnings of sin, he said that sin passed through that number which could not suit offspring.
Iulianum.2.56Et certe primi homines ambo deliquerant, qui ambo merito vocantur forma posteris fuisse peccati; cur non igitur Apostolus per duos ait transisse peccatum; quod et ad fidem magis historiae congruebat? Verum nihil potuit ab eo prudentius fieri; vidit enim, si duos nominasset, qui praevaricationi initium exemplumque praestiterant, et per eos affirmasset transisse peccatum, errori occasionem patere, ut putaretur per duorum nomina coniunctionem fecunditatemque damnasse. Ideoque prudentissime unum maluit nominare, qui non sufficiens ad generationis indicium, ad signum abundaret exempli; atque imitationem accusatus gravaret, nec fecunditatem numeratus argueret. Et ut breviter quod egimus colligatur, fecunditas in primis hominibus instituta, nisi per duos agi non potest; peccatum autem Apostolus intrasse pronuntiat, sed per unum.
And surely the first human beings, both of them, had offended, who are both rightly said to have been a form of sin to their descendants; why, then, did the Apostle not say that sin passed through two—which would also have agreed better with the faith of history? But nothing could have been done by him more prudently; for he saw that, if he had named the two who had furnished the beginning and example of the transgression, and had affirmed that sin passed through them, an occasion would lie open for error, that he might be thought, through the names of the two, to have condemned union and fecundity. And therefore most prudently he preferred to name one, who, not sufficient for an indication of generation, would abound for a sign of example; and, being accused, would burden imitation, but, being numbered, would not accuse fecundity. And, that what we have done may be briefly gathered: fecundity, instituted in the first human beings, cannot be carried on except through two; but the Apostle pronounces that sin entered, yet through one.
Iulianum.2.56Aug. Praedixeram te nihil esse dicturum; et ita esse, cuivis tardissimo clarum est. Numquid enim Evam non imitantur peccantes, aut peccatum generis humani non magis ex ipsa sumpsit initium? A muliere initium factum est peccati, et propter illam, sicut scriptum est, morimur omnes (Eccli 25, 33). Cur ergo non vis attendere, propterea potius Apostolum unum dixisse hominem, per quem peccatum intravit in mundum, quia non imitationem, sed generationem volebat intellegi? Sicut enim a muliere initium peccati fuit, sic initium generationis a viro est; prior enim vir seminat, ut femina pariat; ideo per unumhominem peccatum intravit in mundum (Rom 5, 12), quia per semen generationis intravit, quod a viro excipiens concepit femina; quo more nasci noluit, qui solus sine peccato est natus ex femina.
Aug. I had foretold that you would say nothing; and that it is so is clear to anyone, however slow. For do not sinners imitate Eve, or did not the sin of the human race take its beginning rather from her? From a woman the beginning of sin was made, and on account of her, as it is written, we all die (Sir 25:24 (25:33)). Why, then, will you not attend that the Apostle said one man, through whom sin entered into the world, rather for this reason, because he wished not imitation but generation to be understood? For just as the beginning of sin was from the woman, so the beginning of generation is from the man; for the man first sows, that the woman may bear; therefore through one man sin entered into the world (Rom 5:12), because it entered through the seed of generation, which the woman, receiving from the man, conceived; in which manner he willed not to be born, who alone was born of a woman without sin.
Iulianum.2.5657. Iul. Irrefutabiliter confectum est, peccatum illud ostendi ab Apostolo moribus ad posteros, non seminibus fuisse devectum. Quanta ergo de ore tuo effluxerit falsitas, intuere: Sed ideo " per unum hominem " Apostolus dixit, a quo generatio utique hominum coepit, ut per generationem doceret isse per omnes originale peccatum (De nupt. et concup. 2, 45); cum ideo Apostolus per unum hominem (Rom 5, 12) dixerit, ne putaretur isse per omnes originale peccatum. Ineptis ita, ut vix teneam cachinnum, qui dicis generationem ab uno homine coepisse; cum et diversitas sexuum, et lectio divina testetur, generationem non esse potuisse, nisi duo prius homines, id est vir et mulier, exstitissent.
57. Jul. It has been irrefutably concluded that the Apostle shows that sin to have been conveyed to descendants by morals, not by seeds. See, then, how great a falsity has flowed from your mouth: But for this reason the Apostle said through one man, from whom the generation of human beings surely began, in order to teach that original sin passed through all by generation (Marriage and Desire 2.45)—whereas the Apostle said through one man (Rom 5:12) for this reason, lest original sin be thought to have passed through all. You play the fool so that I can scarcely hold my laughter, you who say that generation began from one man—when both the diversity of the sexes and the divine reading testify that generation could not have been, unless two human beings, that is, a man and a woman, had first existed.
Iulianum.2.57Aug. Qui hoc legunt, legant iterum superiorem responsionem meam; aut, si eius bene meminerunt, deliramenta huius irrideant. Quamvis possem dicere, ideo non duos, sed unum hominem dixisse Apostolum, per quem peccatum intravit in mundum, quia scriptum est: Erunt duo in carne una (Gen 2, 24); unde Dominus ait: Igitur iam non sunt duo, sed una caro (Mt 19, 6); maxime quando vir adhaeret uxori, et initur concubitus. De concubitu autem proles gignitur, trahens originale peccatum, vitio propagante vitium, Deo creante naturam; quam naturam coniuges, etiam bene utentes vitio, non possunt tamen ita generare, ut possit esse sine vitio; quod ille qui sine ipso natus est vitio, evacuat in parvulis, etiam nolente Iuliano.
Aug. Those who read this, let them read again my earlier answer; or, if they remember it well, let them laugh at this man's ravings. Although I could say that the Apostle said not two but one man, through whom sin entered into the world, for this reason, because it is written, They shall be two in one flesh (Gen 2:24); whence the Lord says, Therefore they are now no longer two, but one flesh (Matt 19:6)—especially when a man cleaves to his wife and intercourse is entered upon. But from intercourse offspring is begotten, drawing original sin, the vice propagating the vice, God creating the nature; which nature spouses, even using the vice well, cannot nonetheless so generate that it can be without the vice; which he who was born without that vice empties out in little children, even with Julian unwilling.
Iulianum.2.5758. Iul. Aut si forte (quoniam aliter dogma tuum stare non potest) Adam ex se concepisse et peperisse responderis; Apostolum quidem non hoc sensisse nulli dubium; tu vero, quid sexui tuo volueris evenire, monstrabis.
58. Jul. Or if perhaps—since otherwise your dogma cannot stand—you should answer that Adam conceived and bore from himself, no one doubts that the Apostle did not mean this; but you will show what you would wish to befall your own sex.
Iulianum.2.58Aug. Non expavescis quod scriptum est: Neque maledici regnum Dei possidebunt (1 Cor 6, 10)? Neque enim tam foeda convicia nihil te adiuvantia, nisi maledicendi libidine loquereris.
Aug. Do you not shudder at what is written, Nor will the slanderous possess the kingdom of God (1 Cor 6:10)? For you would not speak such foul reproaches, which help you in nothing, except from a lust for reviling.
Iulianum.2.5859. Iul. Verum haec omissa faciamus, et illud, quod a vobis apparet posse in hoc loco referri, rationis viribus deteramus. Si ergo dixeris, scriptum esse de hac commixtione, quod fiant duo in carne una, et secundum hunc modum, Apostolum per unum hominem (Rom 5, 12) dixisse, ut adhaerentia sibi generantium membra signaret; respondebo hoc quoque contra vestram impietatem valere. Non enim dictum est: Erunt duo homines in uno homine; sed: Erunt duo in carne una (Gen 2, 24); quo unitionis nomine voluptas illa coeuntium et libido, quae sensum afficiens membra consternat ac, sicut ille prudens intellexit, unam carnem gestit efficere, a Deo instituta et corporibus ante peccatum doceretur inserta.
59. Jul. But let us pass over these things, and grind down, by the strength of reason, that which appears can be brought forward by you in this passage. If, then, you should say that it is written of this mingling that they become two in one flesh, and that according to this manner the Apostle said through one man (Rom 5:12), in order to signify the members of those who generate cleaving to each other, I will answer that this too avails against your impiety. For it was not said, They shall be two human beings in one human being, but, They shall be two in one flesh (Gen 2:24); by which name of union that pleasure of those who couple, and the lust which, affecting the senses, prostrates the members and, as that prudent man understood, longs to make one flesh, would be taught to have been instituted by God and inserted into bodies before sin.
Iulianum.2.59Aug. Si ut essent duo in carne una, facere nisi libido non posset (quam susceptam tuam talem prorsus, qualis nunc a te et laudatur et expugnatur, quam pudendam confiteris et sine pudore sic diligis, audes etiam paradisi possessione dotare); nullo modo etiam in Christo et in Ecclesia posset intellegi: Erunt duo in carne una. Neque enim tam longe exorbitas a veritatis via, ut etiam coniunctioni Christi et Ecclesiae, hanc audeas importare libidinem. Porro, si possunt sine ista esse duo in carne una Christus et Ecclesia, potuerunt etiam vir et uxor, si nemo peccasset, non pudenda libidine, de qua erubescit et qui eam laudare non erubescit, sed merito laudanda caritate coniungi, et filiorum procreandorum causa esse duo in carne una. Unde Dominus cum dicit: Igitur iam non sunt duo, sed una caro (Mt 19, 6); non utique dicit: Non sunt duae, sed una caro. Quid ergo non sunt duo, nisi homines? Sicut Christus et Ecclesia simul non duo Christi, sed unus est Christus; unde et nobis dictum est: Ergo Abrahae semen estis (Gal 3, 29); cum de illo dictum sit Abraham: Et semini tuo, quod est Christus (Gal 3, 16).
Aug. If only lust could bring it about that there should be two in one flesh (lust which, taken up by you to be quite such as it is now both praised and assailed by you, which you confess to be shameful and yet without shame so love that you dare even to endow it with the possession of paradise)—then in no way could it be understood of Christ and the Church, They shall be two in one flesh. For you do not stray so far from the way of truth as to dare to import this lust even into the union of Christ and the Church. Moreover, if Christ and the Church can be two in one flesh without it, so too could a man and his wife, if no one had sinned, be joined not by shameful lust—at which even he blushes who does not blush to praise it—but by the love that deserves to be praised, and could be two in one flesh for the sake of procreating children. Whence the Lord, when he says, Therefore they are now no longer two, but one flesh (Matt 19:6), surely does not say, They are not two flesh, but one flesh. What, then, are they that are not two, except human beings? Just as Christ and the Church together are not two Christs, but one Christ; whence it is also said to us, Then you are the seed of Abraham (Gal 3:29), since it was said of that seed of Abraham, And to your seed, which is Christ (Gal 3:16).
Iulianum.2.5960. Iul. Ac per hoc nihil sibi vel de iucunditate eius, vel de verecundia potest diabolus vindicare.
60. Jul. And through this the devil can claim nothing for himself either of its pleasantness or of its modesty.
Iulianum.2.60Aug. Quid est quod dicis: de verecundia? An confusionem nominare confunderis? Et tamen pudendam libidinem, et ante peccatum fuisse dicis in eis, de quibus dicit Scriptura: Nudi erant, et non confundebantur (Gen 2, 25).
Aug. What do you mean by saying, of its modesty? Are you ashamed to name shame? And yet you say that shameful lust existed even before sin in those of whom Scripture says, They were naked, and were not ashamed (Gen 2:25).
Iulianum.2.6061. Iul. Verumtamen hic Apostolus si quid tale sensisset, per unam carnem, non per unum hominem peccatum intrasse dixisset. Per generationem vero substantia carnis soboli sola participat; quia non anima de anima, sed caro de carne trahitur; in nomine autem hominis, et animus proprie iudicatur et corpus, ac per hoc Apostolus unum hominem nominando, nec negotium fecunditatis ostendit, in quo nihil praeter substantiam carnis impertiri noverat; nec duos intellegi voluit, qui unum inculcavit, ut doceret imitatione transisse, non generatione peccatum.
61. Jul. Yet here, if the Apostle had meant anything of the sort, he would have said that sin entered through one flesh, not through one man. But by generation only the substance of the flesh is shared with the offspring; for it is not the soul that is drawn from the soul, but the flesh from the flesh; whereas in the name of man both the mind properly and the body are judged, and through this the Apostle, by naming one man, neither showed the business of fecundity, in which he knew that nothing is imparted but the substance of the flesh; nor wished two to be understood, he who pressed home one, in order to teach that sin passed by imitation, not by generation.
Iulianum.2.61Aug. Quid est ergo: Iam non sunt duo, sed una caro (Mt 19, 6), nisi: Non sunt duo homines, propter unam carnem? Cum et ipsa caro possit dici homo, a parte totum; sicut: Verbum caro factum est (Io 1, 14); quia homo factus est, de quo dictum est. Apostolus etiam quod ait: Exterior homo corrumpitur (2 Cor 4, 16); puto quod carnem intellegi voluit.
Aug. What, then, is They are now no longer two, but one flesh (Matt 19:6), except: They are not two human beings, on account of one flesh? Since the flesh itself can be called man, the whole from the part; as in The Word was made flesh (John 1:14)—because he was made man, of whom it was said. The Apostle too, when he says, The outer man is being corrupted (2 Cor 4:16), I think wished the flesh to be understood.
Iulianum.2.61Propter quod recte loquimur, cum dicimus: Hominis sepulchrum; quamvis caro ibi sola sepulta sit. Nec erravit quae dixit: Tulerunt Dominum meum de monumento (Io 20, 2. 13); quamvis sola caro ibi posita fuerit. Manente ergo de anima obscurissima quaestione, potuit dici: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum (Rom 5, 12); etiamsi ad propaginem sola caro pertineat. Haec itaque attende, et quam nihil dixeris vide.
On account of which we rightly speak when we say, A man's tomb, although only the flesh is buried there. Nor did she err who said, They have taken away my Lord from the tomb (John 20:2.13), although only the flesh had been laid there. With the most obscure question about the soul, then, remaining, it could be said, Through one man sin entered into the world (Rom 5:12), even if only the flesh pertains to propagation. Attend to these things, then, and see how you have said nothing.
Iulianum.2.6162. Iul. Hic iam licet egerit partes suas veritas, tamen ut sit intentus lector, admoneo. Plurimum igitur in hoc conflictu de meo iure deposui, secutusque quo adversarii temeritas provocaverat, adeo sanae fidei scita defendi, ut etiamsi Magistri Gentium verba essent, quibus illum usum Traducianus putavit; liqueret tamen eum nihil de naturali sensisse peccato, qui nominando hominem, sed unum, non utique generationem criminis, sed exempla culpasset.
62. Jul. Here now, although truth has played its parts, yet I admonish, that the reader may be attentive. I have laid down much, then, of my own right in this conflict, and, following where the rashness of my adversary had provoked, I have so defended the decrees of sound faith that, even if they were the words of the Teacher of the Gentiles which the Traducianist thought he had used, it would yet be clear that he meant nothing of natural sin, who, by naming a man—but one—had blamed surely not the generation of crime, but examples.
Iulianum.2.62Aug. Exemplum dedisti, sed vanitatis in te ipso, quia, si exemplum peccati a primo peccatore homine Apostolus poneret, id est, Adam; profecto exemplum iustitiae a primo homine iusto poneret, id est, Abel.
Aug. You have given an example—but of vanity in yourself; for if the Apostle were setting down an example of sin from the first sinning man, that is, Adam, surely he would set down an example of justice from the first just man, that is, Abel.
Iulianum.2.6263. Iul. Constat autem non esse apostolicorum verborum eum ordinem, quem inimicus noster putavit. Argumentatur quippe hoc modo: Si Apostolus imitationem, inquit, voluisset intellegi, non " per unum hominem " (Ibidem), sed per diabolum peccatum intrasse, et per omnes homines pertransisse dixisset. De diabolo quippe scriptum est: " Imitantur eum, qui sunt exparte eius " (Sap 2, 25). Sed ideo " per unum hominem " dixit, a quo generatio utique hominum coepit ut per generationem doceret isse per omnes originale peccatum (De nupt. et concup. 2, 45).
63. Jul. But it is established that the order of the apostolic words is not that which our enemy supposed. For he argues in this way: If the Apostle, he says, had wished imitation to be understood, he would have said that sin entered and passed through all human beings not through one man (Rom 5:12), but through the devil. For of the devil it is written, They imitate him who are of his party (Wis 2:25). But for this reason he said through one man, from whom the generation of human beings surely began, in order to teach that original sin passed through all by generation (Marriage and Desire 2.45).
Iulianum.2.63In hoc ergo mentitur, quod affirmat beatum Paulum pronuntiasse, quia per unum hominem peccatum intraverit in mundum, atque ita in omnes homines pertransierit; hoc, inquam, in Magistri Gentium sermonibus non tenetur; ille quippe non dixit peccatum transisse, sed mortem. Est ergo ordo verborum: Sicut per unum hominem peccatum in mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt (Rom 5, 12). Sublimis informator Ecclesiae, quid sibi dicendum esset expendit: Per unum, inquit, hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit. Iam nominaverat mortem, atque peccatum; quid fuit necesse ut in eo quod pertransisse dicebat, mortem a peccati communione separaret, ut signanter ostenderet, in hunc quidem mundum per unum hominem intrasse peccatum, et per peccatum mortem; in omnes vero homines non peccatum transisse, sed mortem, utique iudicii illatam severitate, praevaricationis ultricem, non corporum semina, sed morum vitia persequentem; nisi quia commendare et praemunire curavit, ne vestro dogmati opitulatus aliquid putaretur?
In this, then, he lies, in that he affirms that blessed Paul pronounced that through one man sin entered into the world and so passed into all human beings; this, I say, is not held in the discourses of the Teacher of the Gentiles; for he did not say that sin passed, but death. The order of the words, then, is: As through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12). The sublime instructor of the Church weighed what he ought to say: Through one man, he says, sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings. He had already named death and sin; what need was there that, in that which he said passed, he should separate death from the fellowship of sin, so as to show pointedly that into this world sin indeed entered through one man, and through sin death, but that into all human beings not sin passed, but death—death surely brought in by the severity of judgment, the avenger of transgression, pursuing not the seeds of bodies but the vices of morals—unless because he took care to commend it and fortify it beforehand, lest he be thought to have given any aid to your dogma?
Iulianum.2.63Aug. In eo quidem loco, ubi dictum est: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit; utrum peccatum, an mors, an utrumque per omnes homines pertransisse dictum sit, videtur ambiguum; sed quid horum sit, res ipsa tam aperta demonstrat. Nam si peccatum non pertransisset, non omnis homo cum lege peccati, quae in membris est, nasceretur; si mors non pertransisset, non omnes homines, quantum ad istam conditionem mortalium pertinet, morerentur. Quod autem dicit Apostolus: In quo omnes peccaverunt; in quo, non intellegitur nisi in Adam, in quo eos dicit et mori; quia non erat iustum, sine crimine transire supplicium. Quacumque te vertas, nullo modo catholicae fidei fundamenta subvertes; praesertim quia et tu ipse tibi adversaris, qui nunc dicis non peccatum transisse, sed mortem; cum superius dixeris, Apostolum ideo non duos homines, sed unum inculcasse, ut doceret imitatione transisse, non generatione peccatum (Cf. supra 56. 61). Transiit ergo cum morte peccatum; quid est quod nunc dicis, non peccatum transisse, sed mortem?
Aug. In that passage, indeed, where it was said, Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all human beings, whether sin, or death, or both is said to have passed into all human beings, seems ambiguous; but which of these it is, the matter itself shows clearly enough. For if sin had not passed, not every human being would be born with the law of sin, which is in the members; if death had not passed, not all human beings, as far as pertains to this condition of mortals, would die. But what the Apostle says, in whom all sinned—the in whom is understood only as in Adam, in whom he says they also die; because it was not just that the punishment should pass over without crime. Whichever way you turn yourself, in no way will you overturn the foundations of the Catholic faith; especially because you yourself contradict yourself, you who now say that not sin passed, but death—when above you said that the Apostle pressed home not two men but one, in order to teach that sin passed by imitation, not by generation (See above, 56.61). Sin, then, passed together with death; what is it that you now say, that not sin passed, but death?
Iulianum.2.6364. Iul. Quantum igitur inter te et Paulum distet, intende. Ille dicit: Per unum hominem (Rom 5, 12), tu: Per duos, id est, per generationem. Ille pronuntiat, in primo homine et peccatum et mortem fuisse, ad posteros vero solam transisse mortem; tu contra asseris, et peccatum ad omnes et interitum cucurrisse.
64. Jul. Consider, then, how great is the distance between you and Paul. He says, Through one man (Rom 5:12); you, Through two, that is, through generation. He pronounces that in the first man there was both sin and death, but that to his descendants death alone passed; you, on the contrary, assert that both sin and destruction ran on to all.
Iulianum.2.64Aug. Iam responsum est: relegant qui volunt, quae supra diximus, ne superfluo eadem iterum iterumque repetamus.
Aug. It has already been answered; let those who wish reread what we have said above, lest we superfluously repeat the same things again and again.
Iulianum.2.6465. Iul. Impudenter igitur sub umbra eius nominis delitescis, cum nimis diversa contrariaque dicatis. Ille enim arguit opus hominum, tu opus Dei; ille studia delinquentium, tu innocentiam vitamque nascentium; ille voluntatem hominum, tu naturam.
65. Jul. Shamelessly, then, do you hide beneath the shadow of his name, since you say things exceedingly diverse and contrary. For he blames the work of human beings, you the work of God; he the pursuits of those who offend, you the innocence and life of those who are born; he the will of human beings, you nature.
Iulianum.2.65Aug. Superius ad omnia ista responsum est; unde iam te irridet qui meminit; qui vero non meminit, si illa relegerit, profecto ista tua vana cum irriserit, te dolebit.
Aug. Above, all these things have been answered; whence he who remembers already laughs at you; but he who does not remember, if he rereads those things, will surely, when he has laughed at these empty things of yours, grieve for you.
Iulianum.2.6566. Iul. Intravit igitur, secundum Apostolum, per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum et per peccatum mors, quoniam illum et reum et damnationi mortis perpetuae destinatum mundus aspexit. In omnes autem homines mors pertransiit, quia una forma iudicii praevaricatores quosque etiam reliquae comprehendit aetatis; quae tamen mors nec in sanctos nec in innocentes ullos saevire permittitur, sed in eos pervadit, quos praevaricationem viderit aemulatos (De gestis Pel. 23, 57).
66. Jul. According to the Apostle, then, through one man sin entered into this world, and through sin death, since the world beheld him both guilty and destined to the condemnation of perpetual death. But death passed into all human beings, because one form of judgment also embraced all the transgressors of the remaining age; which death, however, is not permitted to rage against any saints or any innocent persons, but invades those whom it shall have seen to have emulated the transgression (The Deeds of Pelagius 23.57).
Iulianum.2.66Aug. Hoc loqueris, quod obiectum est haeresiarchae vestro Pelagio in episcopali iudicio Palaestino, quod ita factus fuerit Adam ut, sive peccaret sive non peccaret, moriturus esset. Hanc enim mortem, qua omnes morimur, de qua dictum est: A muliere initium factum est peccati et propter illam omnes morimur (Eccli 25, 33), non vis ex peccato in omnes fecisse originaliter transitum, ne cogaris fateri simul etiam originaliter transisse peccatum; sentis quippe, quam iniquum sit sine merito transisse supplicium.
Aug. You say what was objected to your heresiarch Pelagius in the episcopal judgment of Palestine: that Adam was so made that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he would die. For this death, by which we all die, of which it was said, From a woman the beginning of sin was made, and on account of her we all die (Sir 25:24 (25:33))—this you are unwilling should have made its passage into all from sin originally, lest you be compelled to confess that at the same time sin too passed originally; for you perceive how unjust it is that punishment should pass over without merit.
Iulianum.2.66Verumtamen tam catholicum est, quod expugnare conaris, ut hoc ille, cui sicut dixi, obiectum est, nisi damnasset, profecto ex illo iudicio damnatus exisset. Mors ergo et ista, qua spiritus a corpore separatur, et illa, quae dicitur secunda, qua spiritus cum corpore cruciabitur, quantum attinet ad meritum generis humani, in omnes homines pertransiit; sed gratia Dei per eum, qui venit, ut moriendo regnum mortis auferret, ea resurrectione, cuius in illo praecessit exemplum, mortem regnare non sivit.
But so Catholic is what you try to assail that, unless that man—to whom, as I said, it was objected—had condemned it, he would surely have gone out condemned from that judgment. Both this death, then, by which the spirit is separated from the body, and that which is called the second, by which the spirit will be tormented together with the body, as far as pertains to the merit of the human race, passed into all human beings; but the grace of God, through him who came to take away the reign of death by dying, did not allow death to reign, by that resurrection whose example went before in him.
Iulianum.2.66Hoc tenet catholica fides, hoc tenent iudices, quos Pelagius formidavit, hoc non tenent haeretici, quos Pelagius seminavit.
This the Catholic faith holds, this the judges hold whom Pelagius dreaded, this the heretics do not hold whom Pelagius sowed.
Iulianum.2.6667. Iul. Quae praevaricatio licet non sit facta naturalis, fuit tamen forma peccati atque ob hoc licet non aggravet nascentes, tamen accusat imitantes.
67. Jul. Which transgression, although it was not made natural, was nonetheless a form of sin, and on account of this, although it does not weigh down those who are born, yet it accuses those who imitate.
Iulianum.2.67Aug. Et si tu oblitus es grave iugum, quod aggravat nascentes, nos te non desistimus commonere.
Aug. And if you have forgotten the heavy yoke that weighs down those who are born, we do not cease to remind you.
Iulianum.2.6768. Iul. Mors autem iudicialis transiit in eo, in quo peccaverunt omnes, sed libera voluntate; quo verbo, id est omnes Scripturarum more multitudo, non universitas indicatur.
68. Jul. But judicial death passed in him in whom all sinned, yet by free will; by which word, that is, all, a multitude is indicated, after the manner of the Scriptures, not the whole.
Iulianum.2.68Aug. Frustra recta verba torquere et clara obscurare conaris: in eo peccaverunt omnes, in quo moriuntur omnes. Ipse est Adam, in quo si parvuli non moriuntur, profecto nec in Christo vivificabuntur; sed quoniam, sicut in Adam omnesmoriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur (1 Cor 15, 22), ideo qui volunt haec verba pervertere, ipsi eis manentibus evertuntur.
Aug. In vain do you try to twist straight words and to obscure clear ones: in him all sinned, in whom all die. He himself is Adam, in whom, if little children do not die, surely neither will they be made alive in Christ; but since, as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive (1 Cor 15:22), therefore those who wish to pervert these words are themselves overturned while the words remain.
Iulianum.2.6869. Iul. Sed iam pergamus ad reliqua, ut, cui dogmati Apostolus concinat, sicut ex multa parte claruit, processibus sacri sermonis ostendat. Quid autem aliud indicant etiam sequentia verba apostolica? Cum enim hoc dixisset, adiunxit: " Usque ad legem peccatum in mundo fuit ", id est quia nec lex potuit auferre peccatum; " peccatum autem non deputabatur, cum lex non esset " (Rom 5, 13). Erat ergo, sed non deputabatur, quia non ostendebatur, quod deputaretur; sicut enim alibi dicit: " Per legem cognitio peccati (Rom 3, 20), sed regnavit - inquit - mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen ", hoc est, quod supra dixerat:" usque ad legem "; non usque ad Moysen, ut deinceps non esset peccatum, sed quia nec lex per Moysen data regnum potuit mortis auferre, quae non regnat utique nisi per peccatum. Regnum porro eius est, ut hominem mortalem in secundam etiam, quae sempiterna est, praecipitet mortem. " Regnavit autem ". In quibus? " Etiam in his - inquit - qui non peccaverunt in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, qui est forma futuri " (Rom 5, 14).
69. Jul. But now let us proceed to the rest, so that the Apostle may show, by the advances of his sacred discourse, with what dogma he is in concord, as has appeared in great part. But what else do the following apostolic words also indicate? For when he had said this, he added, Until the law sin was in the world—that is, because not even the law could take away sin—but sin was not reckoned, when there was no law (Rom 5:13). It was, then, but it was not reckoned, because that was not shown which might be reckoned; for, as he says elsewhere, Through the law is the knowledge of sin (Rom 3:20); but death, he says, reigned from Adam until Moses—this is what he had said above, until the law—not until Moses, as though thereafter there were no sin, but because not even the law given through Moses could take away the reign of death, which surely does not reign except through sin. Moreover, its reign is to cast the mortal man down even into the second death, which is everlasting. But it reigned. In whom? Even in those, he says, who did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, who is a form of the one to come (Rom 5:14).
Iulianum.2.69Cuius futuri nisi Christi? Et qualis forma nisi a contrario? Quod alibi etiam dicit: " Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita in Christo omnes vivificabuntur " (1 Cor 15, 22). Sicut in illo illud, ita in isto istud; ipsa est forma. Sed haec forma non omni ex parte conformis est; unde hic Apostolus secutus adiunxit: " Sed non sicut delictum ita et donatio; si enim ob unius delictum multi mortui sunt, multo magis gratia Dei et donum in gratia unius hominis Iesu Christi in multos abundavit " (Rom 5, 15). Quid est: " multo magis abundavit "? Quia omnes, qui per Christum liberantur, temporaliter propter Adam moriuntur, propter ipsum autem Christum sine fine victuri sunt (De nupt. et concup. 2, 46). Nihil aliud consequentibus Apostoli sermonibus indicari professus es quam originale peccatum; quod nos approbavimus ipso sui exordio non ab eo ostensum fuisse, quia per unum, non per duos peccatum transisse signaverat.
Of what one to come, except Christ? And what sort of form, except by contrast? Which he also says elsewhere: As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive (1 Cor 15:22). As in the one that, so in the other this; this is the form. But this form is not in every part conformable; whence the Apostle, following on, added, But the gift is not as the offense; for if by the offense of one many have died, much more has the grace of God and the gift, in the grace of the one man Jesus Christ, abounded unto many (Rom 5:15). What is much more abounded? Because all who are freed through Christ die temporally on account of Adam, but on account of Christ himself shall live without end (Marriage and Desire 2.46). You professed that the following discourses of the Apostle indicate nothing other than original sin; which we have shown was not shown by him at its very outset, because he had signified that sin passed through one, not through two.
Iulianum.2.69Aug. Iam responsum est et adhuc tu vana loqueris, neque hoc mirum est; adhuc enim, quid responderim, nescis. Tunc eris impudentior, quando scieris, si vanis relictis vera tenere nolueris.
Aug. It has already been answered, and still you speak empty things; nor is this surprising, for you still do not know what I have answered. You will be more shameless then, when you do know—if, leaving empty things, you are unwilling to hold the true.
Iulianum.2.6970. Iul. Verumtamen utrum id, quod praeterierat, vel nunc intimet, expendendum est. Usque ad legem - inquit - peccatum in mundo (Rom 5, 13). Tu dicis, quia hoc peccatum Apostolus naturale voluerit intellegi; quaero ergo, si usque ad legem fuit, cur desierit esse post legem. Neque enim acquiesco, ut usque ad legem usque ad finem eius potius quam usque ad exortum intellegam; mecum facit verbi proprietas: quod dicit usque ad legem fuisse, ostendit non esse post legem et, quodcumque tempore ablatum est, naturale non fuit. Quod ergo infregit censura legis et infringendo ex multa parte restinxit, imitatione apparet, non generatione susceptum.
70. Jul. Yet it must be weighed whether he intimates even now that which he had passed over. Until the law, he says, sin was in the world (Rom 5:13). You say that the Apostle wished this sin to be understood as natural; I ask, then, if it was until the law, why it ceased to be after the law. For I do not acquiesce in understanding until the law as up to its end rather than up to its rise; the propriety of the word makes for me: in saying that it was until the law, he shows that it is not after the law; and whatever has been taken away in time was not natural. What, then, the censure of the law broke and, by breaking, in great part extinguished, appears to have been taken on by imitation, not by generation.
Iulianum.2.70Aug. O intellectum, quid aliud dicam quam haereticum! Si ergo lex abstulit peccatum, quia sic vis intellegi usque ad legem, fuit ergo per legem iustitia. Si per legem iustitia, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est (Gal 2, 21). Si autem peccatum lex non abstulit, ut non esset, quod prius eam fecisse dixeras et mox te paenituit, sed tamen peccatum lex infregit, ut postea correxisti, et ex multa parte restinxit, mentitus est qui ait: Lex subintravit, ut abundaret delictum (Rom 5, 20); sed quia ille verum dixit, tu nihil dicis et tamen nihil dicendo haeretica pertinacia contradicis.
Aug. O understanding—what else shall I call it than heretical! If, then, the law took away sin, because you wish until the law to be understood thus, then there was justice through the law. If justice through the law, then Christ died in vain (Gal 2:21). But if the law did not take away sin so that it should not be—which you had first said it did, and soon repented of it—but the law nonetheless broke sin, as you afterward corrected yourself, and in great part extinguished it, then he lied who said, The law entered in, that the offense might abound (Rom 5:20); but since he spoke the truth, you say nothing, and yet, by saying nothing, you contradict with heretical stubbornness.
Iulianum.2.7071. Iul. Verum ne videar hic nimis tecum agere tenaciter, acquiescamus, quod usque ad legem (Rom 5, 13) usque ad Christum possit intellegi; concedis ergo peccatum hoc, quod dicis originale, non esse post Christum. Et quomodo et in Apostolorum membris et in omnibus baptizatis et usque hodie post tot saecula adventus Christi opus diaboli, fruticem adversariae potestatis, legemque peccati manere, vigere, vivere dicis?
71. Jul. But, lest I seem here to deal too tenaciously with you, let us acquiesce that until the law (Rom 5:13) can be understood as up to Christ; you concede, then, that this sin which you call original is not after Christ. And how do you say that, both in the members of the apostles and in all the baptized and even today, after so many ages of Christ's coming, the work of the devil, the shrub of the adversary power, and the law of sin remain, flourish, live?
Iulianum.2.71Aug. Non hoc dico; nihil dicis. Aliud est peccatum, aliud concupiscentia peccati, cui non consentit, qui per gratiam Dei non peccat, quamvis et ipsa concupiscentia peccati vocetur peccatum, quia peccato facta est, sicut scriptura quaelibet manus eius dicitur, cuius manu facta est. De quo autem dictum est: Ecce Agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccata mundi (Io 1, 29), ipse reatum peccati, quod generatione trahitur, regeneratione dissolvit; ipse spiritum donans facit non regnare peccatum in nostro mortali corpore ad oboediendum concupiscentiis eius (Cf. Rom 6, 12); ipse quotidiana indulgentia, propter quam quotidie dicimus: Dimitte nobis debita nostra (Mt 6, 12), si quid concupiscentia peccati etiam bene resistendo certantibus male persuaserit, misericors delet; ipse gravi ruina elisos erigit paenitentes; ipse, ubi non possit omnino peccari, perducet constituetque regnantes, quando dicetur : Ubi est, mors, contentio tua? Ubi est, mors, aculeus tuus? Aculeus autem mortis est peccatum (1 Cor 15, 55-56). Ecce quomodo peccatum mundi Agnus ille Dei tollit, quod lex auferre non potuit.
Aug. I do not say this; you say nothing. One thing is sin, another the concupiscence of sin, to which he who does not sin by the grace of God does not consent—although that concupiscence of sin too is called sin, because it was made by sin, just as any writing is called the hand of him by whose hand it was made. But he of whom it was said, Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who takes away the sins of the world (John 1:29), himself dissolves by regeneration the guilt of the sin that is drawn by generation; he himself, giving the Spirit, brings it about that sin does not reign in our mortal body so as to obey its concupiscences (See Rom 6:12); he himself, by his daily indulgence, on account of which we daily say, Forgive us our debts (Matt 6:12), mercifully blots out whatever the concupiscence of sin has evilly persuaded even to those who struggle by resisting well; he himself raises up the penitent who have been dashed down by a grievous fall; he himself, where there can be no sinning at all, will lead through and establish those who reign, when it will be said, Where, O death, is your strife? Where, O death, is your sting? But the sting of death is sin (1 Cor 15:55-56). Behold how that Lamb of God takes away the sin of the world, which the law could not take away.
Iulianum.2.7172. Iul. Verum videamus et reliqua. Peccatum autem non deputabatur, ait Apostolus, cum lex non esset (Rom 5, 13); post quod tu subdis: Erat ergo, sed non deputabatur, sicut alibi dicit: " Per legem cognitio peccati " (Rom 3, 20; De nupt. et concup. 2, 46). Si ergo per legem peccati est facta cognitio et peccatum traducis ante legem non imputabatur, ostende hoc imputatum fuisse sub lege. Nam si per legem peccati cognitio, ante legem ignoratio peccati, ambigi non potest hanc fuisse causam maximam promulgandae legis, ut proderetur et caveretur, quod prius latebat.
72. Jul. But let us see the rest also. But sin was not reckoned, says the Apostle, when there was no law (Rom 5:13); after which you subjoin: It was, then, but it was not reckoned, as he says elsewhere, Through the law is the knowledge of sin (Rom 3:20; Marriage and Desire 2.46). If, then, through the law there was made the knowledge of sin, and you say that the sin of traducianism was not imputed before the law, show that this was imputed under the law. For if through the law there is the knowledge of sin, before the law the ignorance of sin, it cannot be doubted that this was the greatest cause of promulgating the law: that what was previously hidden might be brought forth and guarded against.
Iulianum.2.72Aug. Ut proderetur, verum dicis, hoc et nos dicimus; ut autem caveretur, non lex sed gratia, non littera sed spiritus fecit; lex enim subintravit, non ut caveretur, sed ut abundaret peccatum et superabundaret gratia, qua peccatum et deleretur factum et, ne fieret, caveretur.
Aug. That it might be brought forth, you speak truly, and this we too say; but that it might be guarded against, not the law but grace, not the letter but the spirit, brought about; for the law entered in, not that it might be guarded against, but that sin might abound and grace superabound, by which sin both committed might be blotted out and, lest it be committed, guarded against.
Iulianum.2.7273. Iul. Hic sit ergo summa certaminis: aut ostende imputatum sub lege fuisse cuiquam originale peccatum, ostende fuisse monstratum, et consentiam de hoc peccato Apostolum locutum fuisse.
73. Jul. Here, then, let the sum of the contest be: either show that original sin was imputed to anyone under the law, show that it was demonstrated, and I will consent that the Apostle was speaking of this sin.
Iulianum.2.73Aug. Ostendo quidem, quod provocas ut ostendam; sed si oculos operiatis ad ea, quae videre non vultis, et ne ab aliis videantur, nebulas contentionis offunditis? Circumcisio carnis lege praecepta est (Cf. Gen 17, 11-14), qua non posset melius significari per Christum, regenerationis auctorem, tolli originale peccatum. Cum praeputio quippe omnis homo nascitur, quemadmodum cum originali peccato, et octavo die lex circumcidi carnem praecepit, quia Christus die dominico resurrexit, qui post septimum sabbati octavus est; et circumcisus praeputiatum gignit traiciens in illum, quo ipse iam caruit, sicut baptizatus in filium, quem generat carne, reatum tamen traicit originis, quo absolutus est ipse. Postremo in lege scriptus est Psalmus: Ego in iniquitatibus conceptus sum et in peccatis mater mea in utero me aluit (Ps 50, 7). Quod videretis profecto nec auderetis aliquid contradicere, si Cypriano et Ambrosio ceterisque talibus Ecclesiae Doctoribus fidei oculos similes haberetis.
Aug. I do indeed show what you challenge me to show; but what if you close your eyes to those things which you do not wish to see, and, lest they be seen by others, pour out the clouds of contention? Circumcision of the flesh was commanded by the law (See Gen 17:11-14), by which it could not be better signified that original sin is taken away through Christ, the author of regeneration. For every human being is born with a foreskin, just as with original sin, and the law commanded the flesh to be circumcised on the eighth day, because Christ rose on the Lord's day, which is the eighth after the seventh of the Sabbath; and the circumcised man begets one uncircumcised, transferring into him that which he himself now lacks, just as the baptized man transfers into the son whom he begets in the flesh the guilt of origin from which he himself has been absolved. Finally, in the law was written the Psalm: I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins my mother nourished me in the womb (Ps 51:7 (50)). Which you would surely see, and would not dare to contradict anything, if you had eyes of faith like those of Cyprian and Ambrose and the other such Doctors of the Church.
Iulianum.2.7374. Iul. Aut certe, quia hoc in lege non potest inveniri, acquiesce, impudentissime, de eo peccato loqui Apostolum, quod imitatione trahitur, voluntate committitur, ratione arguitur, lege ostenditur, aequitate punitur.
74. Jul. Or surely, because this cannot be found in the law, acquiesce, most shameless one, that the Apostle is speaking of that sin which is drawn by imitation, committed by the will, refuted by reason, shown by the law, punished by equity.
Iulianum.2.74Aug. De omni peccato, quod per Christum tollitur, dictum est: Usque ad legem peccatum in mundo fuit (Rom 5, 13), quoniam lege non tollitur sive originale sive additum, sive quod erat et ante legem, sive quod etiam lege subintrante abundavit. Cum autem ais de eo peccato loqui Apostolum, quod aequitate punitur, expergiscere et vide ibi esse et originale peccatum; non enim aliter aequitas Dei grave iugum imponeret ipsis quoque exordiis parvulorum, quod iugum cura nostra saepe commemorat, ut cervicem tuam, si non inflexerit, frangat. Nam hoc peccatum etiam lege monstrari praecepto circumcisionis ostendi; quod si negas tu, doce, quo peccato proprio, si non circumcideretur, interibat anima parvuli de populo suo (Cf. Gen 17, 14). Scio, non doces, sed volens nos fatigare nec taces.
Aug. Of all sin which is taken away through Christ it was said, Until the law sin was in the world (Rom 5:13), since by the law there is taken away neither the original nor the added, neither what was also before the law nor what abounded even with the law entering in. But when you say that the Apostle is speaking of that sin which is punished by equity, wake up and see that original sin is there too; for otherwise the equity of God would not impose the heavy yoke even upon the very beginnings of little children—which yoke our care often recalls, so that, if it does not bend your neck, it may break it. For I have shown that this sin too is demonstrated by the law, by the precept of circumcision; and if you deny this, teach by what sin of his own the soul of a little child, if it were not circumcised, perished from his people (See Gen 17:14). I know you do not teach it, but, wishing to weary us, you do not keep silent either.
Iulianum.2.7475. Iul. Ceterum, quod fingitis, originale peccatum nec per unum transmitti potest, quoniam generatio per duos agitur.
75. Jul. For the rest, what you imagine—that original sin cannot even be transmitted through one, since generation is carried on through two.
Iulianum.2.75Aug. Iam responsum est: lege, quae hinc a me dicta sunt, et invenies te vana dixisse.
Aug. It has already been answered: read what has been said by me on this, and you will find that you have said empty things.
Iulianum.2.7576. Iul. Nec potuit aliquando esse, si potest aliquando non esse, quia naturalia ab initio substantiae usque ad terminum illius perseverant.
76. Jul. Nor could it ever have been, if it can at some time not be, because natural things persevere from the beginning of the substance to its end.
Iulianum.2.76Aug. Hoc et de morte posses dicere, nam etiam cum ipsa nascimur. Corpus enim mortuum est propter peccatum (Rom 8, 10); sed et si non propter peccatum, sicut desipitis, nascimur tamen sine dubitatione mortales, et tamen mors atque mortalitas non erit immortaliter viventibus nobis. Sicut ergo mors originalis est et tamen potuit esse, potest non esse melius nostra manente natura, sic et originale peccatum et potuit esse generatione tractum et potest non esse regeneratione detractum.
Aug. This you could say of death too, for we are born even with it. For the body is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10); but even if not because of sin, as you foolishly hold, we are nonetheless born without doubt mortal, and yet death and mortality will not be when we live immortally. As, then, death is original and yet could have been, can not be while our nature remains—indeed, better—so too original sin both could have been drawn by generation and can not be, taken away by regeneration.
Iulianum.2.7677. Iul. Nec a lege ostensum est vel ostendi potuit, quia numquam legislator usque ad hanc veniret amentiam, ut praeciperet cuiquam: Noli ita vel ita nasci; et quod admoneri non decuit, ut corrigatur, iustum esse non potest, ut puniatur.
77. Jul. Nor was it shown by the law, or could be shown, because never would a lawgiver come to such madness as to command anyone, Do not be born thus or thus; and what it was not fitting to be admonished of, in order to be corrected, cannot justly be punished.
Iulianum.2.77Aug. Non praecipitur homini, quomodo nascatur, sed praeceptum est, quomodo ille viveret, praeceptumque violavit; a quo parente peccatum originale deducitur. Praecipitur etiam, ut infans circumcidatur, damnandus nisi circumcidatur, cui tamen non solum aliquid aliud, sed nec saltem circumcisio ipsa praecipitur; ac per hoc non quidem praecipitur homini, quo modo nascatur, mundus tamen non est a sorde peccati nec infans, cuius est unius diei vita super terram (Iob 14, 4-5). Lege verba sancti Iob et invenies te esse mendacem loquente illo, quem Deus dixit esse veracem.
Aug. A human being is not commanded how to be born, but it was commanded how that man should live, and he violated the precept; from which parent original sin is derived. It is also commanded that an infant be circumcised, to be condemned if he is not circumcised—yet to whom not only is nothing else commanded, but not even circumcision itself; and through this a human being is indeed not commanded how to be born, yet not even an infant, whose life upon the earth is of one day (Job 14:4-5), is clean from the filth of sin. Read the words of holy Job, and you will find yourself to be a liar, with him speaking whom God said to be truthful.
Iulianum.2.7778. Iul. Et quod usque ad legem est, ostenditur non esse post legem, ostenditur postremo non esse post Christum.
78. Jul. And what is until the law is shown not to be after the law, is shown finally not to be after Christ.
Iulianum.2.78Aug. Ita reatus huius peccati ostenditur non esse post peccatorum abolitionem, sicut mors post carnis resurrectionem.
Aug. Thus the guilt of this sin is shown not to be after the abolition of sins, as death is not after the resurrection of the flesh.
Iulianum.2.7879. Iul. Ac per hoc secundum argumentationem quoque tuam olim non est, secundum testimonium veritatis numquam fuit.
79. Jul. And through this, according to your own argument too, it once is not; according to the testimony of truth, it never was.
Iulianum.2.79Aug. O si vos non essetis, qui contra testimonium veritatis falsum testimonium vestrum et dicitis et insuper scribitis!
Aug. O that you did not exist, who against the testimony of truth both speak your false testimony and, on top of that, write it!
Iulianum.2.7980. Iul. Et ut, quod egimus, inculcetur memoriae lectoris: definisti quondam peccatum et optime nihil esse aliud quam voluntatem admittendi, quod iustitia vetat et unde liberum est abstinere.
80. Jul. And, that what we have done may be pressed home upon the reader's memory: you once defined sin, and most excellently, to be nothing other than the will to admit what justice forbids and from which it is free to abstain.
Iulianum.2.80Aug. Iam responsum est, quod peccati sit ista definitio, non eius, quod sit et poena peccati (Cf. supra 1, 74).
Aug. It has already been answered, that this is the definition of sin, not of that which is also a punishment of sin (See above, 1.74).
Iulianum.2.8081. Iul. Quae definitio ad intellegendam quoque iustitiam Dei aperuit viam, ut censeremus aequitatem divini neutiquam stare iudicii, nisi illud imputasset in peccatum, a quo nosset liberum fuisse ei, qui propter hoc affligitur, abstinere.
81. Jul. Which definition opened the way also to understanding the justice of God, so that we might judge that the equity of the divine judgment in no way stands, unless it had imputed as sin that from which it knew it was free for him who is afflicted on account of it to abstain.
Iulianum.2.81Aug. Propter quid ergo affliguntur parvuli, si nullum habent omnino peccatum? An omnipotens et iustus Deus iniustas poenas a tot innocentibus prohibere non potuit?
Aug. On account of what, then, are little children afflicted, if they have no sin at all? Or could the omnipotent and just God not prevent unjust punishments from so many innocent ones?
Iulianum.2.8182. Iul. Magistrum vero Gentium rationem privilegio auctoritatis armantem pronuntiasse, quia per unum hominem in hunc mundum culpa transierit, quo nomine separavit opera nuptiarum, quae sine duorum negotio esse non possunt, commendavimusque ob hoc ab illo unum fuisse nominatum, ne quis duos intellegere auderet.
82. Jul. But the Teacher of the Gentiles, arming reason with the privilege of authority, pronounced that through one man guilt passed into this world; by which name he separated the works of marriage, which cannot be without the business of two; and we noted that for this reason one was named by him, lest anyone should dare to understand two.
Iulianum.2.82Aug. Iam responsum est; assidue te delectat vana garrire.
Aug. It has already been answered; you constantly delight to prattle empty things.
Iulianum.2.8283. Iul. Et re vera multo ego consequentius unum, quem Apostolus dicit, unum assero, ut doceam vitium imitationis, non generationis fuisse, quam Traducianus unius nomine, qui dicitur peccati fuisse vestibulum, seminibus rem admovet voluntatis, quod rerum natura non recipit.
83. Jul. And in truth, much more consistently do I assert that the one whom the Apostle calls one is one, in order to teach that it was a vice of imitation, not of generation; whereas the Traducianist, under the name of one, who is said to have been the vestibule of sin, applies to seeds a matter of the will, which the nature of things does not receive.
Iulianum.2.83Aug. Desine, quod iam refellimus, iterare. Quid nos cogis adhuc eadem atque eadem dicere contra tantam sapientiam tuam, qua putas ideo non significari generationem, ubi dictum est: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum (Rom 5, 12), quia, per duos fit generatio, non per unum, quasi peccatum illud, quod non vultis generatione, sed imitatione transisse, unus admiserit? Cum ergo et ipsum fuerit a duobus admissum, cur per unum hominem dictum est peccatum intravit in mundum, nisi quia non a femina concipiente atque pariente, sed a viro seminante est generationis exordium aut quia iam non sunt duo, quando per coitum una fit caro?
Aug. Cease to repeat what we have already refuted. Why do you compel us still to say the same things again and again against your great wisdom—by which you think that generation is not signified where it was said, Through one man sin entered into the world (Rom 5:12), because generation is done through two, not through one, as though one had admitted that sin which you are unwilling to have passed by generation but by imitation? Since, then, that sin too was admitted by two, why was it said that through one man sin entered into the world, except because the beginning of generation is not from the woman conceiving and bearing, but from the man sowing—or because they are now no longer two, when through coitus they become one flesh?
Iulianum.2.8384. Iul. Postea quoque ad legem ventum est, ad cuius usque tempus perscripsit Apostolus non ostensum viguisse peccatum; quod tu tempus usque ad finem legis protelare conatus es non intellegens nequidquam te argumentatum, quandoquidem constringendus a nobis esses, ut probares hoc peccatum, de quo mentiris Paulum locutum et quod asseris usque ad abolitionem regnasse Veteris Testamenti, vel imputatum fuisse vel imputari potuisse sub lege, vel certe acquiesceres non regnare post Christum, ut sensibus tuis saltem inflexa violenter Apostoli sententia consonaret. Horum autem nihil reddi a te potest; fidei ergo nostrae in solido est puritas collocata, cui et rationis instituta et iustitiae dignitas et Apostoli per omnia scita conveniunt.
84. Jul. Afterward, too, we came to the law, up to whose time the Apostle wrote that sin, not being shown, flourished; which time you tried to prolong up to the end of the law, not understanding that you argued to no purpose, since you would have to be constrained by us to prove that this sin—of which you lie that Paul spoke, and which you assert reigned up to the abolition of the Old Testament—was either imputed or could have been imputed under the law; or surely you would acquiesce that it does not reign after Christ, so that the Apostle's opinion, violently bent at least to your views, might be in concord with them. But none of these things can be rendered by you; the purity of our faith, then, is set on solid ground, with which both the institutions of reason and the dignity of justice and the decrees of the Apostle in all things agree.
Iulianum.2.84Aug. Nihil te dicere et, quod respondimus, monstrat et tu ipse; Apostolus quod ait: Usque ad legem peccatum in mundo fuit (Rom 5, 13), non originale tantum, sed omne peccatum intellegi voluit, et ideo usque ad legem fuit, quia nec lex potuit auferre peccatum. Usque ad legem quippe dictum est, ut etiam ipsam legem sententia ista concluderet, quomodo dictum est in Evangelio: Omnes ergo ab Abraham usque ad David generationes quattuordecim (Mt 1, 17); non enim excepto David, sed ipso etiam computato numerus iste completur. Sicut ergo cum audimus quattuordecim generationes usque ad David, non excipimus David, sed ipsum etiam computamus, ita cum audimus: Usque ad legem peccatum in mundo fuit, non excipere legem, sed etiam ipsam computare debemus, quia, sicut David non est extra numerum, qui dictus est usque ad ipsum, sic lex non est extra permansionem peccati, quod fuisse dictum est usque ad ipsam, ac per hoc nemo tollit peccatum, quod nec lex, quamvis sancta et iusta et bona, potuit auferre, nisi ille de quo dictum est: Ecce Agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccata mundi (Io 1, 29). Tollit autem et dimittendo, quae facta sunt, ubi et originale comprehenditur, et adiuvando ne fiant, et perducendo ad vitam, ubi fieri omnino non possint.
Aug. That you say nothing, both what we have answered and you yourself show. The Apostle, when he says, Until the law sin was in the world (Rom 5:13), wished not only original but all sin to be understood, and therefore it was until the law, because not even the law could take away sin. Until the law, indeed, was said so that this statement might include even the law itself, just as it was said in the Gospel, So all the generations from Abraham until David are fourteen (Matt 1:17); for that number is completed not by excepting David, but by counting him too. As, then, when we hear fourteen generations until David, we do not except David but count him too, so when we hear, Until the law sin was in the world, we ought not to except the law but to count it too; because, as David is not outside the number which was said to be up to him, so the law is not outside the persistence of sin which was said to have been up to it; and through this no one takes away the sin which not even the law, though holy and just and good, could take away, except he of whom it was said, Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who takes away the sins of the world (John 1:29). But he takes them away both by remitting those that have been committed, where original sin too is comprehended, and by helping that they be not committed, and by leading to the life where they can in no way be committed.
Iulianum.2.8485. Iul. Sed videamus et reliqua. Postquam ergo dixisti: Haec forma non omni ex parte conformis est, adiungis: Unde hic Apostolus secutus adiunxit: " Sed non sicut delictum ita et donatio; si enim ob unius delictum multi mortui sunt, multo magis gratia Dei et donum in gratia unius hominis Iesu Christi in plures abundavit " (Rom 5, 15). Quam sententiam hoc modo exponis: Quid est: " multo magis abundavit ", nisi quia omnes, qui per Christum liberantur, temporaliter propter Adam moriuntur, propter ipsum autem Christum sine fine victuri sunt? (De nupt. et concup. 2, 46) Pronuntiavit certe Apostolus, de cuius nobis est opinione certamen, efficacius operari ad collationem salutis et copiosius gratiam Salvatoris quam peccatum Adae, ut ostenderet multo vehementius profuisse Christum et pluribus profuisse, cuius gratia, ut ipso eius verbo utar: abundavit in plures, quam praevaricationem primi hominis nocuisse, quem tu dicis seminibus illigasse peccatum.
85. Jul. But let us see the rest also. After you had said, This form is not in every part conformable, you add: Whence the Apostle, following on, added, But the gift is not as the offense; for if by the offense of one many have died, much more has the grace of God and the gift, in the grace of the one man Jesus Christ, abounded unto many (Rom 5:15). Which opinion you expound in this way: What is much more abounded, except that all who are freed through Christ die temporally on account of Adam, but on account of Christ himself shall live without end? (Marriage and Desire 2.46) The Apostle, surely, about whose opinion is our contest, pronounced that the grace of the Savior works more efficaciously and more copiously toward the conferring of salvation than the sin of Adam, in order to show that Christ profited much more vehemently and profited more people, whose grace—to use his own word—abounded unto many, than the transgression of the first man harmed, whom you say bound sin to the seeds.
Iulianum.2.85Aug. Multo magis abundavit dixit, non: In magis multos, id est non: In plures. Quis enim non videat plures esse in genere humano, in quos non abundavit, ut ex pluribus ostenderetur, quid universae massae iusto iudicio deberetur, nisi, ubi vellet Spiritus spiraret et Deus quos dignaretur vocaret et quem vellet religiosum faceret (Cf. De pecc. mer. et rem. 1, 14; AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 27)?
Aug. He said much more abounded, not, Unto more many, that is, not, Unto more people. For who does not see that there are more in the human race unto whom it did not abound, so that from the more might be shown what was owed to the whole mass by just judgment, unless that the Spirit breathed where he would, and God called those whom he deigned, and made religious whom he would (See The Punishment and Forgiveness of Sins 1.14; Ambrose, On Luke 7.27)?
Iulianum.2.8586. Iul. Proba igitur hoc, quod intellexit Apostolus, vestris cohaerere dogmatibus.
86. Jul. Prove, then, that what the Apostle meant coheres with your dogmas.
Iulianum.2.86Aug. Legantur verba eius sine perversitate legentium, qualis est in vobis, et nulla alia probatio requiretur.
Aug. Let his words be read without the perversity of readers, such as is in you, and no other proof will be required.
Iulianum.2.8687. Iul. Si enim Adam, ut dicitis, peccato naturali generavit omnes in condemnationem tantumque de suis visceribus in sobolem virus effudit, ut in natura hominis cuncta Dei instituta turbaret.
87. Jul. For if Adam, as you say, by natural sin generated all unto condemnation and poured out from his innards so much venom into his offspring that in the nature of the human being he disturbed all the institutions of God.
Iulianum.2.87Aug. Quando parvulum spiritus vexat immundus animamque eius et corpus affligit, sensus sanitatemque pervertit, nonne universa eius quam Deus instituit natura turbatur? Nec invenitis omnino tanti huius mali meritum negantes originale peccatum. Cur enim non hic attendis in natura hominis per diaboli virus cuncta Dei instituta turbari? Dic causam parvuli, dic reatum eius, cui recens nato ista contingunt, qui non vis verba Apostolica sic accipere, quemadmodum accipit, ex quo est instituta, catholica Ecclesia et quemadmodum suis tam perspicuis malis confitetur ipsa natura. Et tamen, si bene consideremus, Dei nullo modo instituta turbantur, quoniam praescius futurorum cuncta constituit nec totum, quod meretur apostatica creatura, singulis reddit, sed in mensura et numero et pondere disponens omnia (Cf. Sap 11, 21) neminem sinit mali aliquid perpeti quod non meretur, quamvis non tantum, quantum massae debetur universae, singulus quisque patiatur.
Aug. When an unclean spirit vexes a little child and afflicts his soul and body, perverts his senses and health, is not all his nature, which God instituted, disturbed? Nor do you find at all the merit of so great an evil, denying original sin. For why do you not here attend that in the nature of the human being all the institutions of God are disturbed through the venom of the devil? State the case of the little child, state his guilt, to whom, newly born, these things befall—you who are unwilling to take the apostolic words as the Catholic Church takes them, from when it was instituted, and as nature herself confesses by her own so manifest evils. And yet, if we consider well, the institutions of God are in no way disturbed, since, foreknowing things to come, he established all things, and does not repay to individuals the whole that the apostate creature deserves, but, disposing all things in measure and number and weight (See Wis 11:21), allows no one to suffer any evil that he does not deserve—although each single one suffers not so much as is owed to the whole mass.
Iulianum.2.8788. Iul. Ut sine dono diaboli, ad quod dicis libidinem sexuum pertinere, nuptiae, quas Deus creaverat, esse non possent; immo illis, quas ordinaverat, institutionis suae honore avolantibus, has, quarum ordo permansit, cum motione genitalium, cum pudore coeuntium, cum calore et consternatione membrorum, cum iucunditate sensuum, cum iniquitate nascentium, diaboli, non Dei opus esse cogeret atque convinceret.
88. Jul. So that without the gift of the devil, to which you say the lust of the sexes pertains, the marriage which God had created could not exist; rather, with those marriages which he had ordained flying away with the honor of his institution, he would compel and convict that these, whose order has remained—with the movement of the genitals, with the shame of those who couple, with the heat and prostration of the members, with the pleasantness of the senses, with the iniquity of those who are born—are the work of the devil, not of God.
Iulianum.2.88Aug. Si malum vitiorum, quod nisi in aliquo bono esse non potest, a naturarum bonitate discernas, nec excusabis diabolum nec accusabis Deum, nec excusabis libidinis malum nec accusabis nuptiarum bonum.
Aug. If you would distinguish the evil of vices, which cannot exist except in some good, from the goodness of natures, you will neither excuse the devil nor accuse God, neither excuse the evil of lust nor accuse the good of marriage.
Iulianum.2.8889. Iul. Ipsam postremo arbitrii libertatem unius peccati impulsione subrueret, ut nemo deinceps in potestate haberet vetera crimina virtutis electione respuere, sed uno omnes in condemnationem eversae humanitatis torrente raperentur.
89. Jul. Finally, he would undermine the very liberty of choice by the impulse of one sin, so that no one thereafter would have it in his power to reject old crimes by the choice of virtue, but all would be swept by one torrent into the condemnation of overthrown humanity.
Iulianum.2.89Aug. Cur non potius miraris universi generis humani ab exordio nativitatis tantam miseriam, ut nemo beatus nisi ex misero fiat neque nisi post hanc vitam malis omnibus careat, cui per Dei gratiam praestatur, ut careat? Hoc mirando te corriges et iustum Dei iudicium, quoniam per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, in generis humani non iniusta afflictione cognosces.
Aug. Why do you not rather wonder at the so great misery of the whole human race from the very outset of birth, that no one becomes blessed except from being wretched, nor lacks all evils except after this life—he to whom, through the grace of God, it is granted that he should lack them? By wondering at this you will correct yourself, and will recognize the just judgment of God—since through one man sin entered into the world—in the not unjust affliction of the human race.
Iulianum.2.8990. Iul. Si haec, inquam, cuncta in Dei imaginem primi hominis invexit iniquitas, manifestum est nimis esse imbecillam Christi gratiam in suis muneri bus, quae nihil, quod his tot trabalibus malis mederetur, invenit; aut si invenit, affirma. Singula enim nunc singulis conferamus. Si Adam praeter voluntatis opera ipsius naturae instituta subvertit, nihil debuit magis Christus quam ea, quae ab illo fuerant elisa, reparare his videlicet vestigiis, quibus ille subruerat.
90. Jul. If, I say, the iniquity of the first man brought all these things into the image of God, it is too manifest that the grace of Christ is feeble in its gifts, which found nothing to heal these so many beam-like evils; or, if it found something, affirm it. For let us now compare individual things with individual. If Adam, beyond the works of the will, subverted the institutions of nature itself, Christ ought to have done nothing more than to repair those things which had been dashed down by him—and by these very footsteps, namely, by which he had undermined them.
Iulianum.2.90Aug. Hoc facit, sed non quomodo tu vis. Quis enim cognovit mentem Domini aut quis consiliarius eius fuit? (Isa 40, 13; Rom 11, 34)
Aug. This he does, but not as you wish. For who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor? (Isa 40:13; Rom 11:34)
Iulianum.2.9091. Iul. Id est ut in nuptiis baptizatorum neutiquam sentiretur libido nec eodem modo, quo etiam ceterarum Gentium, genitalia moverentur.
91. Jul. That is, so that in the marriages of the baptized lust would in no way be felt, nor would the genitals be moved in the same manner as in the rest of the nations.
Iulianum.2.91Aug. Non ergo debuerunt baptizatae cum gemitu parere, quoniam hoc, quod negare non potes, poena est feminae peccatricis.
Aug. Then the baptized ought not to have given birth with groaning, since this—which you cannot deny—is the punishment of the sinning woman.
Iulianum.2.9192. Iul. Recederet postremo post donum gratiae coeuntium pudor nec iret per membra quietis imitatio nec paterentur sensus onera dulcedinis, liberum postremo baptizatis redderetur arbitrium, ut per correctionem naturae expulsa lege peccati tam possibile confitereris esse mortalibus nitere splendore virtutum quam sordibus horrere vitiorum, immo penitus nec mortales, qui sacramentis imbuuntur, esse deberent.
92. Jul. Finally, after the gift of grace the shame of those who couple would withdraw, nor would the imitation of repose pass through the members, nor would the senses suffer the burdens of sweetness; finally, free choice would be restored to the baptized, so that, the law of sin being expelled through the correction of nature, you would confess it as possible for mortals to strive to shine with the splendor of virtues as to shudder at the filth of vices—rather, those who are imbued with the sacraments ought not to be mortal at all.
Iulianum.2.92Aug. Et tamen, Iuliane, tales nuptias in paradiso constituere non te pudet, ubi coeuntium confiteris pudorem. Ergone aliquid pudendum erat, ubi nihil nisi laudandum, qui super cuncta laudandus est, conditor instituerat? Sed quis potest hoc sapere et dicere, nisi quem non pudet id laudare quod pudet?
Aug. And yet, Julian, you are not ashamed to set up such marriages in paradise, where you confess the shame of those who couple. Was there, then, anything shameful where the Creator, who is to be praised above all things, had instituted nothing but what is to be praised? But who can have wisdom about this and say it, except one who is not ashamed to praise that which is shameful?
Iulianum.2.9293. Iul. Si enim pugnat medicina cum vulnere et mors peccato dicitur accidisse, ablationem mortis amotio peccati debet operari.
93. Jul. For if medicine fights with the wound, and death is said to have befallen on account of sin, then the removal of sin ought to work the removal of death.
Iulianum.2.93Aug. Adhuc quidem dicitis Adam sic fuisse factum, ut, sive peccaret sive non peccaret, moriturus esset; sed ista dicentes iam vos magister vester in episcopali iudicio Palaestino nec sine se ipso, quia non se correxit, Pelagius ipse damnavit (Cf. De gestis Pel. 23-24. 57). Deus autem non in isto saeculo maligno beatificat suos, quibus hic peccata dimittit, et spiritus gratiae pignus impertit. Ideo eis, qui etiam malis saeculi huius vel delectabilibus vel saevis atque asperis partim non utuntur, partim bene utuntur, futurum promisit saeculum, in quo mala nulla patiantur, ubi tales essent et nuptiae, quales in illo paradiso, si nemo peccasset, esse potuissent, in quibus nihil pudendum esset; sed nec tales erunt, quoniam beatorum numero impleto, cui sint nuptiae necessariae, generatio ipsa non erit.
Aug. You still say that Adam was so made that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he would die; but in saying these things, your teacher Pelagius himself, in the episcopal judgment of Palestine, already condemned you—and not without himself, since he did not correct himself (See The Deeds of Pelagius 23-24.57). But God does not make his own blessed in this evil age, to whom here he forgives sins and imparts the pledge of the Spirit of grace. Therefore to those who, of the evils of this age—whether delightful or savage and harsh—partly do not use them, partly use them well, he promised a future age in which they suffer no evils, where marriages would be such as they could have been in that paradise, if no one had sinned, in which there would be nothing shameful; but there will not even be such, since, the number of the blessed being completed, for whom marriages might be necessary, generation itself will not be.
Iulianum.2.9394. Iul. Verum cum nihil horum quae diximus baptizatorum constet evenire corporibus, non potuisse autem aliter, id est non debuisse, quam his medicinae modis totum fieri veritas clarior sole monstraverit, confitendum tibi est aut illa, quae prius enumeravimus, non accidisse peccato et ideo nec vulnera fuisse naturae, ut constet ratio gratiae, per quam manifestum est illa de suis ordinibus mota non esse, aut certe negandum in mysteriis Christi quidquam esse medicinae, quae de tot secundum te morbis ne unum quidem sanare potuerunt.
94. Jul. But since it is established that none of those things which we have mentioned befalls the bodies of the baptized, and since truth clearer than the sun has shown that the whole could not have been done otherwise—that is, ought not to have been done otherwise—than by these modes of medicine, you must confess either that those things which we enumerated above did not befall on account of sin, and therefore were not wounds of nature, so that the account of grace may stand, by which it is manifest that those things were not moved from their orders; or surely you must deny that there is anything of medicine in the mysteries of Christ, which, of so many diseases according to you, could not heal even one.
Iulianum.2.94Aug. Immo vero hinc deberetis agnoscere, si mente sobria viveretis, quam magnum illud peccatum fuerit, quod per unum hominem intravit in mundum et cum morte in omnes homines pertransiit, quandoquidem malis huius saeculi, cum quibus homines oriuntur, nec baptizati iam reatu ablato omnibus eruuntur nisi post hanc vitam, in qua nos oportet etiam promissis bonis exerceri adhuc malis. Nam si merces fidei continuo redderetur, iam nec fides ipsa esset, quae mala praesentia videns ideo pie tolerat, quia bona promissa non videns fideliter et patienter exspectat.
Aug. Rather, indeed, from this you ought to recognize, if you lived with a sober mind, how great that sin was which entered into the world through one man and passed with death into all human beings, since not even the baptized, their guilt now taken away, are delivered from the evils of this age, with which human beings are born, until after this life—in which it is fitting that we be exercised, even with goods promised, still by evils. For if the reward of faith were rendered at once, then there would no longer even be faith itself, which, seeing present evils, therefore piously endures them, because, not seeing the promised goods, it faithfully and patiently awaits them.
Iulianum.2.9495. Iul. Sic egi hactenus, quasi vim donorum et vulnerum, in contrariis licet effectibus, aequalem tamen Apostolus aestimasset; crescit autem dubio procul sublimitas sanae fidei quam tuemur, cum consideratur Paulus non solum remediis gratiae aegritudinem non praetulisse culparum, verum etiam copiosiora beneficia iudicasse dispendiis.
95. Jul. So far I have argued as though the Apostle had judged the force of the gifts and of the wounds, in their contrary effects, to be nevertheless equal; but without doubt the sublimity of the sound faith which we defend grows, when it is considered that Paul not only did not prefer the sickness of faults to the remedies of grace, but even judged the benefits more copious than the losses.
Iulianum.2.95Aug. Verum est; temporalia quippe sunt dispendia regeneratorum, beneficia vero erunt sine dubio sempiterna; sed dispendia, quae nascentes flendo testantur, dicite, quo merito sub iustissimo et omnipotentissimo iudice eis, si nullum peccatum attrahunt, irrogentur.
Aug. It is true; for the losses of the regenerated are temporal, but the benefits will without doubt be everlasting; but the losses which those who are born attest by weeping, say by what merit they are inflicted on them under a most just and most omnipotent judge, if they draw to themselves no sin.
Iulianum.2.9596. Iul. Quid ergo etiam haec disputatio collegerit, prudens lector attendat. Apostolus dixit in plures abundasse donationem Christi ad salutem, quam Adae culpa nocuisset.
96. Jul. Let the prudent reader attend, then, to what this disputation too has gathered. The Apostle said that the gift of Christ abounded unto more people for salvation than the fault of Adam had harmed.
Iulianum.2.96Aug.Non hoc dixit, sed: Multo magis abundavit gratia in multos (Rom 5, 15), hoc est: Magis abundavit, non in magis multos, id est non in plures, sicut iam responsum est (Cf. De pecc. mer. et rem. 1, 14).
Aug. He did not say this, but, Much more did grace abound unto many (Rom 5:15), that is, It abounded more, not unto more many, that is, not unto more people, as has already been answered (See The Punishment and Forgiveness of Sins 1.14).
Iulianum.2.9697. Iul. Qua culpa tu illas clades, quas supra enumeravimus, dicis accidisse naturae, ex quibus nec unam in his, qui ad Christi perveniunt sacramenta, constat sanari, ac per hoc multo plus iniquitatem primi hominis ad nocendum asseris habuisse virtutis, quam gratia Christi obtinet ad medendum, quo collecto ostensum est, quantam inter Catholicos et Manichaeos, tantam inter te et apostolum Paulum esse discordiam.
97. Jul. By which fault you say those disasters befell nature which we enumerated above, of which not one is established to be healed in those who arrive at the sacraments of Christ; and through this you assert that the iniquity of the first man had much more power to harm than the grace of Christ obtains to heal; from which, when it is gathered, it has been shown that there is as great a discord between you and the apostle Paul as between Catholics and Manichees.
Iulianum.2.97Aug. Tollit gratia Christi originalis peccati reatum, sed rem invisibilem invisibiliter tollit; dimittit etiam cuncta peccata, quae homines male vivendo insuper addiderunt. Iudicium quippe ex uno delicto in condemnationem, quia et unum illud, quod a nascentibus trahitur, trahit ad aeternam condemnationem, si non remittatur; nec tamen hoc solum gratia dimittit, alioquin tantum valeret, sed cum ipso dimittit et cetera; ergo plus valet, propter quod dictum est: Iudicium quidem ex uno in condemnationem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem (Rom 5, 16).
Aug. The grace of Christ takes away the guilt of original sin, but it takes away the invisible thing invisibly; it also remits all the sins which human beings have added on top by living badly. For the judgment is from one offense unto condemnation, because even that one which is drawn by those who are born draws unto eternal condemnation, if it is not remitted; nor, however, does grace remit only this—otherwise it would be of equal value—but together with it, it remits the rest also; therefore it is of more value, on account of which it was said, The judgment indeed was from one unto condemnation, but grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16).
Iulianum.2.97Donat etiam gratia, ut contra concupiscentiam carnis spiritus concupiscat; et, si quando fidelis homo in hoc certamine venialiter vincitur, debita dimittit oranti et, quando damnabiliter vincitur, dat humiliorem paenitentiam, cui tribuat indulgentiam; donat postremo vitam aeternam et animae et corpori, ubi, qualia et quanta bona sint, cogitare quis possit? Quomodo ergo plus nocuit primi hominis iniquitas, quam profuit secundi hominis, hoc est Christi bonitas, cum ille temporaliter nocuerit, Christus autem et temporaliter adiuvet et liberet ac beatificet in aeternum? Quae cum ita sint, sententia nostra Catholica, non Manichaea est et ideo nec Pelagiana est, quia Catholica est.
Grace also grants that the spirit may have desires against the concupiscence of the flesh; and, if ever the faithful man is in this struggle venially overcome, it remits his debts as he prays; and, when he is damnably overcome, it gives a more humble penance, to which it may grant indulgence; finally, it grants eternal life to both soul and body, where—of what sort and how great the goods are—who could conceive? How, then, did the iniquity of the first man harm more than the goodness of the second man, that is, Christ, profited, when the former harmed temporally, but Christ both helps temporally and frees and beatifies eternally? Since these things are so, our opinion is Catholic, not Manichean, and therefore is not Pelagian either, because it is Catholic.
Iulianum.2.9798. Iul. Frivolam sane expositionem in hoc loco tuam optimo iure despicerem et irrepercussam praeterirem, quasi nimis humo cohaerentem, nisi vererer, ne pellaciae magis quam constantiae crederetur. Loqueris ergo hoc modo: Quid est: " Multo magis abundavit " (Rom 5, 15), nisi quia omnes, qui per Christum liberantur, temporaliter propter Adam moriuntur, propter ipsum autem Christum sine fine victuri sunt? (De nupt. et concup. 2, 46) Quo sermone si, quid consequenter diceretur, attenderes, omnem arcem tuam id est traducem cecidisse faterere; dicis enim ideo multo magis abundasse Christi gratiam, quia per eam vita conferatur aeterna, cum per Adae peccatum subeunda sit corruptio temporalis. Si ergo nihil aliud intulit Adam praeter corporis mortem, contra quem Christus copiosiore beneficio vitam contulit sine fine durantem, apparet non peccatum Adae ad posteros transisse, sed mortem.
98. Jul. I would, indeed, with the best right, despise your frivolous exposition in this passage and pass it by unrebuked, as too much cleaving to the ground, did I not fear that it would be ascribed to trickery rather than to constancy. You speak, then, in this way: What is much more abounded (Rom 5:15), except that all who are freed through Christ die temporally on account of Adam, but on account of Christ himself shall live without end? (Marriage and Desire 2.46) By which discourse, if you attended to what would be said consistently, you would confess that your whole citadel, that is, traducianism, has fallen; for you say that the grace of Christ abounded much more for this reason, because through it eternal life is conferred, whereas through Adam's sin temporal corruption must be undergone. If, then, Adam brought in nothing else but the death of the body, against whom Christ conferred, with a more copious benefit, a life enduring without end, it appears that not Adam's sin passed to his descendants, but death.
Iulianum.2.98Aug. Apparet te propterea irrisisse quod dixi, vel potius te irridere finxisse, ut his, qui te non intellegunt, videreris dicere aliquid, cum diceres nihil; primum quia eis dixi Adam temporali morte nocuisse, quos Christi liberat gratia; quos enim occulti quidem, sed iusti iudicii veritate non liberat, etiamsi parvuli moriantur, aeterna morte plectuntur. Quomodo ergo hinc apparet non peccatum Adae ad posteros transisse, sed mortem, nisi quia hoc vis putari, quod perstrepunt verba tua, non quod sequitur verba mea? Nos enim dicimus utrumque transisse et a Christo utrumque clamamus auferri, reatum scilicet peccati plenissima remissione peccatorum, mortem vero beatissima resurrectione sanctorum, quae propterea non statim regeneratis datur, ut exerceatur fides, qua id quod non videtur speratur; hoc enim et in se ipsis et in parvulis suis cum sperant fideles, utique sunt fideles. Ecce quod dicimus, ecce cui Catholicae veritati contradicitis; sed magis contra vos quam contra illam dicitis, quidquid haereticis disputationibus dicitis.
Aug. It appears that you laughed at what I said—or rather pretended to laugh—for this reason: that to those who do not understand you, you might seem to say something, when you said nothing. First, because I said that Adam harmed by temporal death those whom the grace of Christ frees; for those whom, by the truth of a hidden but just judgment, it does not free, even if they die as little children, are stricken with eternal death. How, then, does it appear from this that not Adam's sin passed to his descendants, but death, except because you wish that to be thought which your words clamor, not that which follows my words? For we say that both passed, and we proclaim that both are taken away by Christ—the guilt of sin, namely, by a most full remission of sins, but death by the most blessed resurrection of the saints, which therefore is not given at once to the regenerated, so that faith may be exercised, by which what is not seen is hoped for; for when the faithful hope this, both for themselves and for their little children, they are surely faithful. Behold what we say, behold the Catholic truth you contradict; but you say more against yourselves than against it, whatever you say in your heretical disputations.
Iulianum.2.9899. Iul. Constabit autem consequentissime mortem perpetuam, id est poenam sempiternam, ad nos non fuisse transmissam ac per hoc peccatum traducis esse non posse. Ut enim breviter, quid tenendum constet, appareat; ab Apostolo dona Christi peccato primi hominis praeferuntur; tu per hoc peccatum tuum id est traducis unam dicis an duas transisse mortes? Si unam et corporalem, ut hic confessus es, constat gratiam Christi antecellere peccato primi hominis et iam nascitur nemo peccator, quia, si ut supra dixisti, regnum peccati est, ut in secundam homo mortem id est in poenam perpetuam praecipitetur, et per Adam mortem corporis solum advectam dicis, nec peccatum per Adam ad posteros nec mors aeterna transmittitur.
99. Jul. But it will be established most consistently that perpetual death, that is, everlasting punishment, was not transmitted to us, and through this that the sin of traducianism cannot exist. For that it may briefly appear what is established to be held: by the Apostle the gifts of Christ are preferred to the sin of the first man; do you, through this sin of yours, that is, traducianism, say that one death or two passed? If one, and that bodily, as here you confessed, it is established that the grace of Christ surpasses the sin of the first man, and now no one is born a sinner; because, if—as you said above—the reign of sin is that a human being should be cast into the second death, that is, into perpetual punishment, and you say that through Adam only the death of the body was conveyed, then neither does sin pass through Adam to his descendants, nor eternal death.
Iulianum.2.99Aug. Iam responsum est: nihil dicis. Regnum enim peccati etiam in aeternam praecipitat mortem, nisi per Christi gratiam remittatur; verumtamen ista quoque mors temporalis nulla esset, nisi Adam non moriendi possibilitatem peccati merito perdidisset; hanc enim peccatori denuntiavit Deus dicens: Terra es et in terram ibis (Gen 3, 19). Hanc sine merito peccati suscipere dignatus est Christus, ut per illam quidem moriendo iret in terram, sed resurgendo terram levaret in caelum ac sic aeterna morte destructa temporalem fidelibus ideo non auferret, ut adversus eam resurrectionis fides in huius vitae agone certaret.
Aug. It has already been answered: you say nothing. For the reign of sin casts even into eternal death, unless it is remitted through the grace of Christ; yet this temporal death too would be none, had not Adam lost, by the merit of sin, the possibility of not dying; for this God announced to the sinner, saying, You are earth, and into earth you shall go (Gen 3:19). This Christ deigned to undergo without the merit of sin, so that through it he might indeed, by dying, go into the earth, but, by rising, might lift the earth into heaven, and thus, eternal death being destroyed, might for this reason not take temporal death away from the faithful: that against it the faith of the resurrection might contend in the struggle of this life.
Iulianum.2.99100. Iul. Sin autem dixeris per peccatum Adae naturalem factam esse iniquitatem duasque accidisse mortes, unam aeternam, alteram temporalem, per Christi autem gratiam unam interim auferri a persona, non a natura, id est perpetuam, temporalem vero remanere, Apostolus convincitur falsitatis, qui dixit multo magis profuisse gratiam quam nocuisse peccatum (Cf. Rom 5, 15); Apostolus autem argui non potest, tu igitur iure reprobaris.
100. Jul. But if you should say that through Adam's sin iniquity was made natural and that two deaths befell, one eternal, the other temporal, but that through the grace of Christ one is for the present taken away from the person, not from the nature—that is, the perpetual one—while the temporal remains, then the Apostle is convicted of falsity, who said that grace profited much more than sin harmed (See Rom 5:15); but the Apostle cannot be charged; you, therefore, are by right reproved.
Iulianum.2.100Aug. Ego dixi una resurrectione beatorum ambas mortes tolli, et istam, ne sit anima sine corpore suo, et illam, ne aggravetur vel affligatur anima etiam corpore suo. Sic autem ista fidelibus ad tempus relinquitur, ut habeat per illam fides adiumentum, quemadmodum postea reis tollitur, ut, quod de suo corpore non recedunt, miseriae sit incrementum. Ac per hoc eis qui regenerantur in Christo et de isto saeculo maligno electi eius exeunt, manifestum est plus prodesse gratiam quam nocuisse peccatum, quod per unum hominem in mundum intravit et cum morte per omnes homines pertransiit. Apostolus itaque redargui non potest, quia verum dixit; sed tu non intellegis aut contra id, quod intellegis, asserere, quod falsum est, haeretica contentione conaris.
Aug. I said that by one resurrection of the blessed both deaths are taken away—both that one, lest the soul be without its body, and that one, lest the soul be weighed down or afflicted even by its body. But this is left to the faithful for a time in such a way that faith may have help through it, just as afterward it is taken away from the guilty, so that, in that they do not depart from their body, it may be an increase of their misery. And through this, to those who are regenerated in Christ and go out as his elect from this evil age, it is manifest that grace profits more than the sin harmed which entered into the world through one man and passed with death through all human beings. The Apostle, then, cannot be refuted, because he spoke the truth; but you do not understand, or, against what you understand, you try by heretical contention to assert what is false.
Iulianum.2.100101. Iul. Apostolus dixit magis gratiam Christi quam Adae abundasse culpam; non igitur natura ab eo, non generatio, non fecunditas, sed voluntas, electio mali, morum pravitas accusatur.
101. Jul. The Apostle said that the grace of Christ abounded more than the fault of Adam; therefore not nature is accused by him, not generation, not fecundity, but the will, the choice of evil, the depravity of morals.
Iulianum.2.101Aug. Si nihil nocuit generatio, nihil praestat regeneratio; si non est natura vitiata, non habent Christum parvuli salvatorem; si malum et bonum meritum singulorum in eorum propria est voluntate, quo merito Christus regnum Dei parvulis confert, qui in neutram partem sua usi sunt voluntate? Postremo, quoniam duos posuit Apostolus, unum ad peccatum, non diabolum sed Adam, et unum ad iustitiam, non Abel sed Christum, ut non exemplis imitatio, sed generationi regeneratio referretur, si non traicit peccatum in homines generatos Adam, non donat Christus parvulis regeneratis iustitiam, quia nec generati nec regenerati parvuli usi sunt propria libertate.
Aug. If generation harmed nothing, regeneration bestows nothing; if nature is not corrupted, little children do not have Christ as savior; if the evil and good merit of individuals is in their own will, by what merit does Christ confer the kingdom of God on little children, who have used their will toward neither part? Finally, since the Apostle set down two, one for sin—not the devil but Adam—and one for justice—not Abel but Christ—so that imitation might be referred not to examples but regeneration to generation, if Adam does not transfer sin into the human beings generated, neither does Christ grant justice to the little children regenerated, because neither the generated nor the regenerated little children have used their own liberty.
Iulianum.2.101Ite nunc, si vultis, et clamate, si audetis, iustitiam parvulis non donari nec eos habituros esse iustitiam, quando habitabunt in illo regno, ubi erunt, sicut scriptum est, caeli novi et terra nova, in quibus iustitia inhabitat (Cf. 2 Pt 3, 13); aut ex vestro quo inebriati estis meracissimo dogmate delirate in illo regno iustitiam parvulos habituros quidem, sed propriae voluntatis meritis, non divinae gratiae largitate. Quod si dicere non audetis (hic enim merita comparari, ibi autem praemia reddi fatemini), cur fateri dubitatis sive non vultis sic eos ex Adam potuisse habere peccatum sine meritis propriae voluntatis malae, quemadmodum a Christo percepturi sunt iustitiam sine suis meritis praecedentibus voluntatis bonae?
Go now, if you wish, and cry out, if you dare, that justice is not granted to little children and that they will not have justice when they dwell in that kingdom, where there will be, as it is written, new heavens and a new earth, in which justice dwells (See 2 Pet 3:13); or, from that most unmixed dogma with which you are inebriated, rave that in that kingdom little children will indeed have justice, but by the merits of their own will, not by the bounty of divine grace. But if you do not dare to say this (for you confess that here merits are gained, but there rewards are repaid), why do you doubt to confess—or are unwilling—that they could so have had sin from Adam without the merits of their own bad will, as they will receive from Christ justice without their own preceding merits of good will?
Iulianum.2.101102. Iul. Ac per hoc, si quem in rebus adhuc humanis locum veritas habet et non strepitu iniquitatis totus omnino mundus obsurduit, ratione, disputatione et Apostoli fide atque ipsa eius sententia teste perdoctum esse fatebitur inter Traducianos et Catholicos tantum esse discrimen, quantum inter Paulum et Manichaeum, quantum inter sapientiam et stultitiam, quantum inter rationem et insaniam, quantum inter constantiam dictorum et eam fluctuationem, quam nova foeditate perpeteris, ut in iisdem pene versibus quod dixeris neges, quod negaveris asseveres.
102. Jul. And through this, if truth has any place in human affairs still, and the whole world has not become utterly deaf with the din of iniquity, anyone will confess that he has been thoroughly taught—by reason, by disputation, and with the faith of the Apostle and his very opinion as witness—that there is as great a difference between Traducianists and Catholics as between Paul and Manichaeus, as between wisdom and folly, as between reason and madness, as between constancy of statements and that fluctuation which you suffer with a new foulness, so that in almost the same lines you deny what you have said and assert what you have denied.
Iulianum.2.102Aug. Iam responsum est. Rogo te, si aliquid dicere non potes, tace, si potes; sed quod peius est, nec hoc potes.
Aug. It has already been answered. I ask you, if you can say nothing, be silent—if you can; but, what is worse, you cannot do even this.
Iulianum.2.102103. Iul. Et non - inquit - sicut per unum peccantem ita est et donum; nam iudicium ex uno in condemnationem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem (Rom 5, 16). Quibus Apostoli verbis admoves expositionem tuam ita se habentem: " Ex uno " ergo quid - inquis - nisi delicto? Quia sequitur: " Gratia autem ex multis delictis ". Dicant isti, quomodo ex uno delicto in condemnationem, nisi quia sufficit ad condemnationem etiam unum originale peccatum, quod in omnes homines pertransiit; gratia vero ideo ex multis delictis in iustificationem, quia non solum unum illud solvit, quod originaliter trahitur, sed etiam cetera, quae in unoquoque homine motu propriae voluntatis adduntur. " Si enim ob unius delictum mors regnavit per unum, multo magis qui abundantiam gratiae et iustitiae accipiunt, in vita regnabunt per unum Iesum Christum. Itaque sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines ad condemnationem, ita et per unius iustitiamin omnes homines ad iustificationem vitae " (Rom 5, 17-18; De nupt. et concup. 2, 46).
103. Jul. And the gift, he says, is not as through one who sinned; for the judgment was from one unto condemnation, but grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16). To which words of the Apostle you bring your exposition, which runs thus: From one, then, you say, what, except offense? Because there follows, but grace from many offenses. Let these men say how it is from one offense unto condemnation, except because even one original sin, which passed into all human beings, suffices for condemnation; but grace is from many offenses unto justification for this reason, because it looses not only that one which is drawn originally, but also the rest, which in each human being are added by the movement of his own will. For if, by the offense of one, death reigned through one, much more shall those who receive the abundance of grace and of justice reign in life through the one Jesus Christ. Therefore, as through the offense of one unto all human beings unto condemnation, so also through the justice of one unto all human beings unto the justification of life (Rom 5:17-18; Marriage and Desire 2.46).
Iulianum.2.103Post quae Apostoli verba, quasi aliquid confeceris, insultando de nobis loqueris: Adhuc permaneant in vanitate mentis suae et dicant unum hominem non propaginem traiecisse, sed exemplum praebuisse peccati. Quomodo ergo " per unius delictum in omnes homines ad condemnationem " et non potius per multa sua cuiusque delicta, nisi quia, etiamsi illud unum sit tantum, idoneum est perducere ad condemnationem etiam nullis additis ceteris, sicut perducit parvulos morientes, qui ex Adam nascuntur, si in Christo non renascantur? Quid ergo a nobis quaerit iste quod non vult ab Apostolo audire, per quid peccatum inveniatur in parvulo; utrum per voluntatem an per nuptias an per parentes? Ecce, audiat per quid, audiat et taceat, per quid peccatum inveniatur in parvulo. Apostolus: " Per unius delictum - inquit - in omnes homines ad condemnationem " (De nupt. et concup. 2, 46). Nihil te quidem magis timere quam interrogationem perscrutatricem animi tui et dogmatis novimus; inde est quippe quod omnibus opibus negationem examinis a mundi potestatibus comparatis; intellegitis enim agendum vobis vi esse, cum deserimini rationis auxilio.
After which words of the Apostle, as though you had accomplished something, you speak insultingly of us: Let them still remain in the vanity of their mind, and say that one man did not transmit propagation but furnished an example of sin. How, then, through the offense of one unto all human beings unto condemnation, and not rather through the many offenses of each one, except because, even if that one is alone, it is sufficient to lead unto condemnation even with no others added, just as it leads the dying little children who are born of Adam, if they are not reborn in Christ? What, then, does this man seek from us which he is unwilling to hear from the Apostle—through what sin is found in a little child, whether through the will or through marriage or through the parents? Behold, let him hear through what, let him hear and be silent, through what sin is found in a little child. The Apostle: Through the offense of one, he says, unto all human beings unto condemnation (Marriage and Desire 2.46). We know that you fear nothing more than the question that searches out your mind and your dogma; thence it is that with all your resources you procure from the powers of the world a denial of examination; for you understand that you must act by force, when you are deserted by the help of reason.
Iulianum.2.103Aug. Vis non timere potestatem? Bonum fac (Rom 13, 3). Non est autem bonum contra apostolicum sensum exserere et asserere haereticum sensum. Quid adhuc quaeris examen, quod iam factum est apud Apostolicam Sedem, quod denique iam factum est in episcopali iudicio Palaestino, ubi Pelagius, vestri auctor erroris, procul dubio damnatus esset, nisi ista quae tu defendis dogmata vestra damnasset? Damnata ergo haeresis ab episcopis non adhuc examinanda, sed cohercenda est a potestatibus christianis.
Aug. Do you wish not to fear the power? Do good (Rom 13:3). But it is not good to put forth, against the apostolic sense, and to assert, the heretical sense. Why do you still seek an examination which has already been made at the Apostolic See, which finally has already been made in the episcopal judgment of Palestine, where Pelagius, the author of your error, would without doubt have been condemned, had he not condemned those dogmas of yours which you defend? A heresy condemned by bishops, then, is not still to be examined, but to be restrained by the Christian powers.
Iulianum.2.103104. Iul. Sed non tua opinio apud prudentes tantum valebit, ut, cum tu sis caput horum et causa malorum (VERGILIUS, Aen. 11, 361), de conflictu medio Apostoli te obiectione subducas et putes illum pro te esse feriendum, quo potissimum contra vos praeceptore armamur ac principe.
104. Jul. But your opinion will not prevail so much among the prudent that, since you are the head of these men and the cause of these evils (Virgil, Aeneid 11.361), you may withdraw yourself from the midst of the conflict by an objection of the Apostle, and think that he is to be struck for you—he by whom especially we are armed against you as our instructor and prince.
Iulianum.2.104Ut ergo, quid tibi dicendum sit, consequenter agnoscas; si mihi et tibi super hoc esset nulla dissensio, quod Apostolus naturali peccato Manichaeorum dogma firmaret, tunc tuum caput petenti illum constanter opponeres; nunc vero, cum inviolabilis apud me Magistri Gentium dignitas perseveret eiusque verba tua laedi expositione non patiar, quae secundum regulam prolatam rationis stulto, impuro et impio assero dogmati repugnare nihilque eum pro peccato naturali dixisse convinco, qua tu impudentia ingeris, ut vel pro te mihi ille respondeat, qui non interrogatur, quoniam nec de eius sapientia dubitatur, vel me vociferaris nolle audire ab Apostolo, quod in te ab Apostolo nobis tradita intellegentiae sanitate detestor?
So that you may consistently recognize what is to be said to you: if there were no disagreement between me and you over this, that the Apostle confirmed the dogma of the Manichees by natural sin, then you would constantly set him in the way of one seeking your head; but now, since the dignity of the Teacher of the Gentiles remains inviolable with me, and I will not allow his words to be injured by your exposition—which, according to the rule of reason set forth, I assert to be repugnant to a foolish, impure, and impious dogma, and I convict that he said nothing for natural sin—with what shamelessness do you press that either he, who is not questioned (since his wisdom is not doubted), should answer me for you, or that you cry out that I am unwilling to hear from the Apostle what, in you, I detest by the soundness of understanding handed down to us by the Apostle?
Iulianum.2.104Aug. Numquid non post Apostoli verba a me interposita nihil aliud quam tacere debuisti? Et tamen contra illa nihil dicens nec secundum illa aliquid dicens mihi non taces et iactas inter cetera, quod ego sim caput horum et causa malorum, quasi ego prior vel crediderim vel esse disputaverim originale peccatum. Tam quippe imperitos haec tua credis esse lecturos, qui nesciant, quam multi ante nos Ecclesiae clarique Doctores sic ista Apostoli verba intellexerint et exposuerint, quemadmodum tota ex ipso initio sui catholica intellegit vel credit Ecclesia; quae Doctorum verba si mala sunt, sicut vos dicere non timetis, quomodo ego sum, quaeso te, caput horum et causa malorum, nisi quia tu es caput harum, quas mihi rabiosus ingeris, calumniarum?
Aug. Ought you not, after the Apostle's words interposed by me, to have done nothing but be silent? And yet, saying nothing against them, and saying nothing according to them, you do not keep silent to me, and you boast, among other things, that I am the head of these men and the cause of these evils—as though I had first either believed or argued that there is original sin. For you believe that those who will read these things of yours are so unlearned as not to know how many before us, Doctors of the Church and illustrious ones, so understood and expounded these words of the Apostle as the whole Catholic Church, from its very beginning, understands or believes; and if those words of the Doctors are evil, as you do not fear to say, how am I, I ask you, the head of these men and the cause of these evils, except because you are the head of these slanders which you, raging, press upon me?
Iulianum.2.104Nam si sano cerebro considerares humanae vitae miserias a primis fletibus infantium usque ad extremos gemitus morientium, videres profecto, quod nec ego nec tu, sed ille Adam fuerit caput horum et causa malorum; quod nolens videre clausis oculis clamas et iustum Dei esse iudicium et non esse originale peccatum. Quae duo inter se quam sint contraria procul dubio cerneres, non dico, si horum malorum caput non esses, quia utique non es, sed si sanum caput haberes, quod habere posses, si Doctores sequendo catholicos caput Pelagium non haberes.
For if with a sound brain you considered the miseries of human life from the first weepings of infants to the last groans of the dying, you would surely see that neither I nor you, but that Adam, was the head of these men and the cause of these evils; which, unwilling to see, with closed eyes you cry out both that the judgment of God is just and that there is no original sin. How contrary these two are to each other you would without doubt discern—I do not say, if you were not the head of these evils, for surely you are not, but if you had a sound head, which you could have, if, by following the Catholic Doctors, you did not have Pelagius as your head.
Iulianum.2.104105. Iul. Exprimatur igitur vis argumentorum tuorum. Postquam dixit Paulus, quia multo magis abundasset gratia Salvatoris ad medendum quam praevaricatio primi hominis ad nocendum, sequitur: Et non sicut per unum peccantem ita est et donum; nam iudicium ex uno in condemnationem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem (Rom 5, 16). Quod tu delictum unum ad condemnationem sufficiens originale esse contendis in omnes videlicet homines pertransiens, gratiam autem ideo ex multis delictis in iustificationem dici, quia non solum illud unum solvit, quod originaliter trahitur, sed etiam cetera, quae in unoquoque homine motu propriae voluntatis adduntur (De nupt. et concup. 2, 46). Ad quod confirmandum paulo post argumentaris, quia, si hoc unum delictum ad condemnationem sufficiens Apostolus dixisset imitatione susceptum, addere debuisset omnes homines ad condemnationem non per unum ire delictum, sed per multa sua quaeque voluntate commissa.
105. Jul. Let the force of your arguments, then, be brought out. After Paul had said that the grace of the Savior abounded much more for healing than the transgression of the first man for harming, there follows: And the gift is not as through one who sinned; for the judgment was from one unto condemnation, but grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16). Which one offense you contend to be original, sufficient for condemnation, passing, namely, into all human beings; but that grace is for this reason said to be from many offenses unto justification, because it looses not only that one which is drawn originally, but also the rest, which in each human being are added by the movement of his own will (Marriage and Desire 2.46). To confirm which, a little later you argue that, if the Apostle had said this one offense, sufficient for condemnation, was taken on by imitation, he ought to have added that all human beings go unto condemnation not through one offense, but through their many, each committed by his own will.
Iulianum.2.105In quibus locis quoniam elaqueandus est Apostoli sermo a cassibus Manichaeorum, ut sit attentus lector admoneo. Ais ergo secundum nostrum sensum, quo asseritur prima culpa formam praebuisse peccantibus, debuisse Apostolum, sicut gratiam ex multis delictis iustificationem dixit operari, ita ex multis peccatis dicere regnasse mortem. Porro hoc argumento contra te omnino luctaris; convinco enim secundum dogma tuum inconsequenter Apostolum pronuntiare: Gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem, qui dixerat: Ex uno peccato iudicium in condemnationem.
In which passages, since the Apostle's discourse must be disentangled from the nets of the Manichees, I admonish that the reader be attentive. You say, then, according to our sense, by which it is asserted that the first fault furnished a form to those who sin, that the Apostle ought—just as he said that grace works justification from many offenses—so to have said that death reigned from many sins. Moreover, by this argument you struggle altogether against yourself; for I convict that, according to your dogma, the Apostle pronounces inconsistently, But grace from many offenses unto justification, who had said, From one sin the judgment unto condemnation.
Iulianum.2.105Ut enim egredientes de nostris finibus in vestra regione versemur: si libertas arbitrii primo est eversa peccato et in omni deinceps hominum genere manca adeo remansit, ut non sit ei possibile nisi tantummodo malum facere, non autem habeat in facultate electionem partis alterius, id est recedere a malo et facere bonum, sed iniquitatis necessitate depressa appetentiae criminum parere compellitur;
For, going out of our borders to dwell in your region: if the liberty of choice was overthrown by the first sin and thereafter remained in all the race of human beings so maimed that it is not possible for it to do anything but evil, and it does not have in its power the choice of the other part—that is, to withdraw from evil and to do good—but, depressed by the necessity of iniquity, is compelled to obey the appetite of crimes;
Iulianum.2.105si perrupta omni lege iustitiae facta sunt naturalia, quae fuerant voluntaria; si lex peccati habitat in membris, quae tyrannidem in imaginem et opus Dei nuptiarum verecundia et iucunditate sortita est; si frutex diaboli in visceribus pangitur ante animam et cum incrementis naturalibus adolescit, frondescit et pestifera fruge ingravescit; si haec, inquam, ut dicitis, una primi hominis culpa progenuit,
if, every law of justice being broken through, those things have become natural which had been voluntary; if the law of sin dwells in the members, which has obtained its tyranny over the image and work of God by the shame and pleasantness of marriage; if the shrub of the devil is planted in the innards before the soul, and grows up with the natural increases, puts forth leaves, and grows heavy with pestilent fruit; if these things, I say, as you say, one fault of the first man begot,
Iulianum.2.105consequentius dicitur ex uno delicto in condemnationem genus ire mortalium quam ex multis delictis gratiam liberare, ut magis proprie intellegatur dici posse haec gratia ex uno delicto liberare quos liberat. Nulla enim alia motu propriae voluntatis adduntur, si omne malum fracta arbitrii libertate, exclusa honestate desiderii infectrix seminum culpa primi genitoris operatur.
then it is said more consistently that the race of mortals goes unto condemnation from one offense than that grace frees from many offenses, so that it may be understood more properly that this grace can be said to free from one offense those whom it frees. For no others are added by the movement of one's own will, if every evil, the liberty of choice being broken and the honor of desire shut out, is worked by the seed-infecting fault of the first parent.
Iulianum.2.105Aug. Unde fieri potest, ut homo, qui conaris apostolica verba pervertere, possis loqui nisi perverse? Nam utique, cum ad illud delictum, quod generatio trahit, usus voluntatis accesserit, quem non habent parvuli, in multas et varias cupiditates arbor multorum pullulat peccatorum, quod antequam fieret, etiam ipsum unum trahebat ad damnationem, si ante voluntatis usum parvulus finiret hanc vitam. Neque enim, quia maior damnatio debetur iam magno et multiplicato malo, ideo nulla parvo et nondum multiplicato debebatur. Quomodo ergo regeneratio, quae multiplicatum per usum voluntatis malum tollit, non plus praestat quam nocuit generatio, quae huius quamvis magni et multiplicis mali nondum tamen auctum et nondum multiplicatum traxit initium, quod solum sine ulla pullulatione remaneret, si nullus voluntatis usus, quo augeretur et multiplicaretur, accederet? Voluntas autem antequam bonae libertati ad operandam veram iustitiam gratia Dei subveniente reddatur, multis aliis etiam causis praeter originis vitium movetur ad peccandum vel non movetur, unde fit, ut ipsi impii, quibus vel nondum subvenit vel numquam subventura est gratia, quae iustificat impium, alii magis, alii minus peccent. Iudicium ergo ex uno in condemnationem (Rom 5, 16), quia damnantur et hi qui unum illud generatione traxerunt; gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem, quia non solum illud, cum quo nascitur homo, sed quidquid aliud delictorum voluntatis usus illi malo addidit, tollit. Haec est apostolicorum verborum catholica veritas, quam nulla haeretica loquacitate depravas, quantalibet nos prolixitate vanitatis et loquacitatis exerceas.
Aug. How can it come about that a man who tries to pervert the apostolic words should be able to speak except perversely? For surely, when the use of the will—which little children do not have—has come to that offense which generation draws, the tree of many sins sprouts into many and varied desires; which, before it came about, even that one was drawing unto damnation, if the little child should end this life before the use of the will. For not because a greater damnation is owed to an evil now great and multiplied, was none therefore owed to one small and not yet multiplied. How, then, does regeneration, which takes away the evil multiplied through the use of the will, not bestow more than generation harmed, which drew the beginning of this evil—however great and manifold—not yet increased and not yet multiplied, which alone would remain without any sprouting, if no use of the will, by which it might be increased and multiplied, were added? But the will, before it is restored to good liberty for working true justice by the help of God's grace, is moved to sin, or not moved, by many other causes too besides the vice of origin; whence it comes about that even the impious themselves, to whom either the grace which justifies the impious has not yet come or never will come, sin, some more, some less. The judgment, then, is from one unto condemnation (Rom 5:16), because even those are damned who drew that one by generation; but grace is from many offenses unto justification, because it takes away not only that with which a human being is born, but whatever else of offenses the use of the will has added to that evil. This is the Catholic truth of the apostolic words, which you deprave by no heretical loquacity, however great a prolixity of vanity and loquacity you exercise upon us.
Iulianum.2.105106. Iul. Ac per hoc, si est naturale peccatum tantorum auctor malorum, gratia Christi nequaquam multa delicta donando iustificationem operatur, sed uni peccato indulgendo negotium benignitatis exsequitur; quod cum se spondet acturam, fidem faciet promissis, si haec quae dicuntur per peccati vulnus invecta curaverit; ceterum si et post remedia quae detulit eadem tamen diabolicorum morborum series perseverat, voto eius gratificatio, praesumptioni venia debetur, quia ad curandum innatas pestes virtus ei defuit, non voluntas.
106. Jul. And through this, if natural sin is the author of so many evils, the grace of Christ in no way works justification by remitting many offenses, but, by pardoning one sin, carries out the business of its kindness; which, when it pledges that it will do, will make good its promises, if it heals these things which are said to have been brought in through the wound of sin; but if, even after the remedies it has brought, the same series of diabolical diseases nonetheless persists, then to its will is owed gratification, to its presumption pardon, because for healing the inborn pestilences it lacked power, not will.
Iulianum.2.106Aug. Iam responsum est; intellege et tace. Aliter gratia certantem facit atque adiuvat, aliter victorem sine hoste ullo vel externo vel interno in aeterna pace conservat; ista laboriosa militia est in praesenti saeculo, illa beata requies in futuro. Sed si tu cum vitiis carnalibus in te ipso bellum non geris, erubesce; si geris, obmutesce.
Aug. It has already been answered; understand and be silent. In one way grace makes one struggle and helps him, in another way it preserves the victor, without any enemy either external or internal, in eternal peace; the former is a laborious warfare in the present age, the latter a blessed rest in the future. But if you wage no war with the carnal vices in yourself, blush; if you do wage it, fall mute.
Iulianum.2.106107. Iul. Quid igitur hac disputatione confectum est? Sensui videlicet tuo et Apostolo non convenire. Apostolus enim ait multa delicta gratiae liberalitate donari; dogma vero tuum asserit unum peccatum naturale, quod legem peccati vocas, in cunctis hominibus desideria iniquitatis effingere. In absoluto itaque est a te naturam, quae est opus Dei, ab illo argui voluntatem. Non autem aliter prorsus eloqui debuit quam elocutus est, id est ex uno condemnationem fieri posse peccato, quia et primus ille homo per unum peccatum delinquendi praebuit exemplum et, sicut illi ipsi ad condemnationem una praevaricatio abundavit, sic etiam ceteris ad reatum una potest culpa sufficere. Propter quod Ecclesiastes: Qui in uno peccaverit, multa bona perdit (Eccle 9, 18); et Iacobus: Si totam legem observaveris, offendas autem in uno, factus es omnium reus (Iac 2, 10).
107. Jul. What, then, has been accomplished by this disputation? Namely, that your view and the Apostle do not agree. For the Apostle says that many offenses are remitted by the liberality of grace; but your dogma asserts that one natural sin, which you call the law of sin, forms desires of iniquity in all human beings. It is therefore settled that nature, which is the work of God, is accused by you, the will by him. But he ought not to have spoken otherwise at all than he did speak—that is, that condemnation can come from one sin, because both that first man, through one sin, furnished an example of offending, and, just as for that man himself one transgression abounded unto condemnation, so also for the rest one fault can suffice unto guilt. On account of which Ecclesiastes: He who sins in one thing loses many goods (Eccl 9:18); and James: If you observe the whole law, but offend in one point, you have become guilty of all (Jas 2:10).
Iulianum.2.107Aug. Ergo peccatum Adae ipsum solum laesit, non et genus humanum? Non enim in tantum eris absurdus, ut dicas peccato eius laesos esse vel laedi homines nescientes vel non credentes, utrum fuerit et quid egerit, quia, etsi nescientes homines aliquid imitantur, eo tamen peccato laedi et fieri peccatores, quod ante annorum millia factum esse nesciunt, nimis insipienter dicis, nisi hoc peccatum ad omnes generationes transisse fatearis. Dicentes autem quod Adae peccatum ipsum solum laeserit et non genus humanum, nisi damnaret Pelagius, damnaretur ab eis iudicibus, qui Manichaei utique non sunt.
Aug. Then Adam's sin harmed only himself, and not the human race too? For you will not be so absurd as to say that human beings were harmed, or are harmed, by his sin who do not know, or do not believe, whether he existed and what he did; because, although human beings unknowingly imitate something, yet to say that they are harmed and made sinners by that sin which they do not know was committed thousands of years ago is to speak too foolishly—unless you confess that this sin passed to all generations. But those who say that Adam's sin harmed only himself and not the human race, unless Pelagius had condemned it, would be condemned by those judges who surely are not Manichees.
Iulianum.2.107108. Iul. Gratia vero Domini Iesu Christi non est ita data, ut per singula peccata, quasi per singula vulnera, singula quoque indulgentiae remedia provideret diversisque baptismatibus peccatis variis veniam praeberet, sed pro efficacissimae potestate medicinae, quae criminibus id est malae voluntatis operibus admovetur, ita communiter subvenit, ut diversas species reatuum unius vi consecrationis abstergat.
108. Jul. But the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ was not so given that, for individual sins, as for individual wounds, it should provide individual remedies of indulgence, and, by diverse baptisms, grant pardon to varied sins; but, according to the power of a most efficacious medicine, which is applied to crimes, that is, to the works of an evil will, it so comes to aid in common that it wipes away the diverse kinds of guilt by the force of one consecration.
Iulianum.2.108Aug. Quomodocumque dicas datam gratiam Domini Iesu Christi, separas ab ea parvulos, quos ea salvos fieri negas, ut scilicet vobis ipsa vocabula pro vestro arbitrio dividentibus Christus ad parvulos pertinere videatur propter regnum Dei, quo non nisi baptizatos posse pervenire conceditis, Iesum autem sit ab eis prorsus alienus, quoniam non in illis operatur, unde hoc vocatur. Scriptum est enim: Vocabis nomen eius Iesum, continuoque causam subiciens quare Iesum: Ipse enim salvum faciet - inquit - populum suum a peccatis eorum (Mt 1, 21). Quod in parvulis fieri negantes et a nomine Iesu illos et ab eius populo separatis et audetis indignari, quod vos potius ab eodem populo separamini. Quantum autem attinet ad delicta voluntaria, sicut ex multis iudicium mittit in condemnationem sic ex multis gratia in iustificationem. Quare ergo dictum est: Iudicium ex uno in condemnationem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem (Rom 5, 16), nisi quia hoc loco non est opposita voluntati voluntas aut imitationi imitatio, sed generationi regeneratio? Sicut enim generatio iudicium habet ex uno in condemnationem, ita regeneratio gratiam ex multis delictis in iustificationem. Clarum est, quod voluit intellegi Apostolus; vos si subditas aures aperiatis, contentiosa ora claudetis.
Aug. In whatever way you say the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ was given, you separate from it the little children, whom you deny it makes saved—so that, with you dividing the very words at your pleasure, Christ may seem to pertain to little children on account of the kingdom of God, into which you concede that none but the baptized can arrive, but Jesus may be utterly alien to them, since he does not work in them that from which he is so called. For it is written, You shall call his name Jesus, and at once subjoining the reason why Jesus, For he himself, he says, will save his people from their sins (Matt 1:21). Denying that this is done in little children, you separate them both from the name of Jesus and from his people, and you dare to be indignant that you yourselves are rather separated from that same people. But as far as pertains to voluntary offenses, just as from many the judgment sends unto condemnation, so from many grace sends unto justification. Why, then, was it said, The judgment from one unto condemnation, but grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16), except because in this passage will is not set against will, nor imitation against imitation, but regeneration against generation? For as generation has the judgment from one unto condemnation, so regeneration has grace from many offenses unto justification. It is clear what the Apostle wished to be understood; if you open submissive ears, you will close your contentious mouths.
Iulianum.2.108109. Iul. Prudenter ergo, cum de Adam loqueretur, nominavit unum peccatum, quod voluit intellegi formam praevaricationis fuisse; ideo, inquam, unum et non multa memoravit, quia sciebat unum tantum Adae peccatum in legis historia contineri. Gratiam vero ex multis delictis in iustificationem imbutos a se laudavit emittere, ne beneficii pauperis suspicio nasceretur; et si dixisset: Gratia ex uno in iustificationem, non tam omnia videretur abolere quam singula. Quod ergo praemisit unum peccatum, fidem servavit historiae; quod subdidit: Ex multis gratia in iustificationem, munificentiam mysterii commendavit et copiam.
109. Jul. Prudently, then, when he was speaking of Adam, he named one sin, which he wished to be understood to have been a form of transgression; for this reason, I say, he mentioned one and not many, because he knew that only one sin of Adam is contained in the history of the law. But he praised those imbued by him for putting forth grace from many offenses unto justification, lest a suspicion of a poor benefit should arise; and if he had said, Grace from one unto justification, he would seem to abolish not so much all things as single ones. In that, then, he set forth one sin, he kept the faith of history; in that he subjoined, From many grace unto justification, he commended the munificence and abundance of the mystery.
Iulianum.2.109Aug. Quid autem opus erat, ut de Adam loqueretur, cum Christi gratiam commendaret, nisi quia per illum generatio, per istum regeneratio est?
Aug. But what need was there that he should speak of Adam, when he was commending the grace of Christ, except because through the former is generation, through the latter regeneration?
Iulianum.2.109110. Iul. Quae expositio ut rationi concinit, ita vos destruit; hoc enim ipso confiteri tibi necesse est in omnibus superioribus verbis Apostolum de peccato Manichaeae traducis non locutum, quando in commemoratione gratiae multa absolvi peccata monstravit.
110. Jul. Which exposition, as it accords with reason, so it destroys you; for by this very thing you are compelled to confess that in all the foregoing words the Apostle was not speaking of the sin of the Manichean traducianism, since in the mention of grace he showed that many sins are loosed.
Iulianum.2.110Aug. Manichaeos tu adiuvas, quibus inducendi aliam naturam malam das locum negando in originali malo esse causam miseriae parvulorum, quam miseriam in paradiso utique non haberent, si perseverante ibi naturae humanae rectitudine ac beatitudine nascerentur.
Aug. You help the Manichees, to whom you give a place for introducing another evil nature, by denying that in the original evil is the cause of the misery of little children—a misery which they surely would not have in paradise, if they were born there with the rectitude and blessedness of human nature persisting.
Iulianum.2.110111. Iul. De istorum enim peccatorum genere, quae multa esse et dimitti omnia per gratiam commendavit, ostendit se etiam illud unum superius dixisse peccatum; tu autem haec multa ea consentis esse, quae committuntur ab unoquoque homine motu propriae voluntatis; et illud ergo unum de eodem genere est.
111. Jul. For from the kind of those sins which he commended as being many and as all remitted through grace, he shows that he had above called that one a sin too; but you agree that these many are those which are committed by each human being by the movement of his own will; that one, then, is also of the same kind.
Iulianum.2.111Aug. Simul cum illo uno dico esse multa, non praeter illud; potest autem et hoc recte dici de eodem genere esse, si ad originem referatur, quia et ipsum ex primi hominis voluntate manavit, quando illius peccatum intravit in mundum et per omnes homines pertransiit.
Aug. Together with that one I say there are many, not apart from it; but this too can rightly be said to be of the same kind, if it is referred to origin, because that one also flowed from the will of the first man, when his sin entered into the world and passed through all human beings.
Iulianum.2.111112. Iul. Ut intellegatur ab unoquoque motu propriae voluntatis attractum; et iam non fecunditas seminum, sed studiorum pravitas arguetur. Ceterum si illud unum originale voluisset intellegi, non utique in sequentibus peccata multa dixisset, quae per gratiam dimissa testatur.
112. Jul. So that it may be understood to be drawn by each one by the movement of his own will; and now not the fecundity of the seeds, but the depravity of pursuits will be accused. But if he had wished that one original sin to be understood, he surely would not in what follows have spoken of many sins, which he testifies are remitted through grace.
Iulianum.2.112Aug. Quare non dixisset, nisi quia hoc volunt Pelagiani? Sed non vult veritas, qua Pelagiana redarguitur novitas et vincitur vanitas. Multa enim delicta, ex quibus gratia mittit in iustificationem, simul cum illo uno multa sunt; ex quo uno iudicium, etiamsi alia non addantur, mittit in condemnationem. Sic ergo Adam unum delictum potuit generatis inserere, Christus autem regeneratis multa dimittere, quoniam plus iste profuisse quam ille nocuisse monstratur.
Aug. Why would he not have spoken of them, except because the Pelagians wish it so? But the truth does not wish it, by which the Pelagian novelty is refuted and the vanity is conquered. For the many offenses, from which grace sends unto justification, are many together with that one; from which one the judgment, even if no others be added, sends unto condemnation. So, then, Adam could insert one offense into the generated, but Christ could remit many to the regenerated, since the latter is shown to have profited more than the former harmed.
Iulianum.2.112113. Iul. Et quamvis quae acta sunt, ad defensionem veritatis exuberent, tamen ad ea, quae inferimus, ut sit lector intentus, admoneo. Apparebit enim irrefutabiliter nihil in his locis apostolum Paulum de natura, sed de conversatione mortalium disputasse; vim nempe gratiae Christi et peccati primi e regione constituens comparansque effectus utriusque laboravit ostendere magis Christi profuisse mysterium quam primi hominis nocuisse peccatum.
113. Jul. And although the things that have been done overflow for the defense of truth, yet I admonish that the reader be attentive to what we bring forward. For it will appear irrefutably that in these passages the apostle Paul disputed nothing about nature, but about the conduct of mortals; for, setting the force of the grace of Christ and of the sin of the first man over against each other, and comparing the effects of both, he labored to show that the mystery of Christ profited more than the sin of the first man harmed.
Iulianum.2.113Id autem docuimus in sensu traducis non posse constare; ut ergo multa quae enumeravit, ita hoc peculiariter ad laudem voluit gratiae pertinere, quod ait: Iudicium ex uno in condemnationem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem vitae (Ibidem).
But this we have taught cannot stand in the sense of traducianism; so, just as the many things he enumerated, so this he wished especially to pertain to the praise of grace, where he says, The judgment from one unto condemnation, but grace from many offenses unto the justification of life (Rom 5:16-18).
Iulianum.2.113Quod hoc modo naturalis mali assertor exposuit: Ideo - inquit - " ex uno in condemnationem ", quia sufficiens est illud unum peccatum, quod originaliter trahitur, ad condemnationem ducere, sicut ducit parvulos, qui ex Adam nascuntur, si in Christo non renascantur, etiamsi alia peccata nulla sint. " Gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem ", quia non solum illud dimittit, quod originaliter trahitur, sed etiam cetera, quae ab unoquoque motu propriae voluntatis adduntur (De nupt. et concup. 2, 46). Ecce professus es, licet impietate Manichaea, esse quidem naturale peccatum, verumtamen unum, ob quod ais nascentes debere damnari.
Which the asserter of natural evil expounded in this way: For this reason, he says, from one unto condemnation, because that one sin, which is drawn originally, is sufficient to lead unto condemnation, as it leads the little children who are born of Adam, if they are not reborn in Christ, even if there be no other sins. But grace from many offenses unto justification, because it remits not only that which is drawn originally, but also the rest, which are added by each one by the movement of his own will (Marriage and Desire 2.46). Behold, you have professed—though with Manichean impiety—that there is indeed a natural sin, yet one, on account of which you say those who are born must be damned.
Iulianum.2.113Aug. Quid dixit: Omnes sub peccato nascimur (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13), Manichaeus non erat, sed vos, responde, quid sitis, qui tot imagines Dei sine ullius peccati merito separatis a regno Dei, negatis damnari iudicio Dei et facitis duas aeternas felicitates, unam, quae sit in regno Dei, alteram, quae sit extra regnum Dei; dicite, obsecro, in ea felicitate, quae extra Dei regnum erit, ullusne regnabit an nullus?
Aug. He who said, We are all born under sin (Ambrose, On Penance 1.3.13), was not a Manichee; but you—answer—what are you, who separate so many images of God, without the merit of any sin, from the kingdom of God, deny that they are damned by the judgment of God, and make two eternal felicities, one which is in the kingdom of God, another which is outside the kingdom of God; tell me, I beseech you, in that felicity which will be outside the kingdom of God, will anyone reign, or no one?
Iulianum.2.113Si nullus, liberior erit procul dubio sine ullo rege illa felicitas; si vero ullus in ea regnabit, quis erit rex imaginum Dei, qui non erit Deus? Porro si Deus erit, vos introducitis alterum deum et me dicitis Manichaeum? Quod si Deus ipse ibi regnabit, cuius illae imagines sunt, etiam ipsae imagines eius in veri Dei sui regno felices erunt. Et ubi erit: Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu, non potest introire in regnum Dei (Io 3, 5)? At tandem aliquando extra regnum Dei infelices futuros fatemini parvulos non renatos. Dicite ergo huius infelicitatis meritum, verbosi et contentiosi, qui negatis originale peccatum.
If no one, that felicity, without any king, will without doubt be freer; but if anyone will reign in it, who will be the king of the images of God, who will not be God? Moreover, if he will be God, you introduce another god, and you call me a Manichee? But if God himself will reign there, whose images those are, then those images of his too will be happy in the kingdom of their own true God. And where will be, Unless one is reborn of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God (John 3:5)? But at last, at some point, you confess that the little children not reborn will be unhappy outside the kingdom of God. State, then, the merit of this unhappiness, you wordy and contentious ones, who deny original sin.
Iulianum.2.113114. Iul. Proba ergo hoc in eis, quod gratiae Christi apostolus Paulus ascripsit, impleri, videlicet ut ex multis delictis iustificationem operetur, id est ut iustitiam peccatorum plurium una semel remissione contribuat; aut ergo doce parvulos multis obnoxios esse criminibus, ut eis quoque illud persuadeas convenire, in quo laudem munificentiae Christi Apostolus collocavit, ut ex multis eos constet liberatos esse peccatis; aut confitere Paulum nihil in his locis de parvulis, nihil de hominum disputasse natura, quando ea dimitti gratiae liberalitate testatus est, quae te quoque annuente nequeunt in nascentibus inveniri.
114. Jul. Prove, then, that this which the apostle Paul ascribed to the grace of Christ is fulfilled in them, namely that it works justification from many offenses, that is, that it confers the justice of several sins by one single remission; either, then, teach that little children are liable to many crimes, so that you may persuade that to them too applies that in which the Apostle placed the praise of Christ's munificence, that they are established to have been freed from many sins; or confess that Paul disputed nothing in these passages about little children, nothing about the nature of human beings, since he testified that those things are remitted by the liberality of grace which, with you also nodding assent, cannot be found in the newborn.
Iulianum.2.114Aug. Quid est, quod loqueris, quid est, quod tibi obstrepit loquacissima vanitas, ne intret in aures tuas mani festissima veritas? Utique Iesus, qui ex multis delictis salvum facit populum suum, non praetermittit etiam originalia singula parvulorum, quia in eisdem multis et ipsa sunt.
Aug. What is it that you say, what is it that your most loquacious vanity bawls at you, lest the most manifest truth enter into your ears? Surely Jesus, who from many offenses saves his people, does not pass over even the single original sins of little children, because among those same many are these very ones.
Iulianum.2.114115. Iul. Gratia - inquit - ex multis delictis in iustificationem (Rom 5, 16); tu parvulos non plus quam uni obnoxios dicis esse peccato. Vides ergo in eorum persona laudem gratiae claudicantem, quia non invenit multa peccata, quorum remissione laudetur; quod dixit itaque apostolus Paulus: Gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem (Ibidem), falsissimum esse in parvulorum statu proditur. Quo hinc tu igitur conaberis exsilire? Procul dubio dicturus es, hunc enim sensum tuum superior sermo patefecit, hoc, quod ait Apostolus: Gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem (Ibidem), apud homines perfectae aetatis impleri, qui multis delictis per motum propriae voluntatis convincantur obnoxii, in parvulis autem non ex multis, sed ex uno delicto fieri iustificationem.
115. Jul. Grace, he says, from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16); but you say that little children are liable to no more than one sin. You see, then, in their person, the praise of grace limping, because it does not find many sins by whose remission it may be praised; what the apostle Paul said, then—But grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16)—is betrayed to be most false in the case of little children. From this, then, how will you try to leap out? Without doubt you are going to say—for your foregoing discourse has made plain this view of yours—that what the Apostle says, But grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16), is fulfilled in human beings of perfect age, who are convicted of being liable to many offenses through the movement of their own will, but that in little children justification is wrought not from many, but from one offense.
Iulianum.2.115Aug. Non erat magnum, ut intellegeres ab hac iustificatione, quam Salvator ex multorum delictorum dimissione suis confert, vos potius subtrahere parvulos, quibus nullum peccatum remitti posse contenditis, non autem nos, qui, cum dicimus per unum peccantem missos omnes in condemnationem, nullam excipimus aetatem, quia hoc delictum etiam maioris aetatis homines habent; itemque, cum dicimus ex multis delictis iustificare gratiam, nullam nihilominus excipimus aetatem, quoniam, qui multa peccata dimittit, quo multorum nomine utique omnia intelleguntur, profecto ulla non praetermittit, hoc est nec pessimorum plura nec aliquorum pauciora nec singula parvulorum. Hoc ergo ut videretis, non erat magnum, nisi invideretis parvulis medicum Christum eumque illis Iesum prorsus esse nolletis horrenda impietate, mira caecitate, blasphema loquacitate. Quid est autem insanius quam velle gratiam Christi ad eos tantummodo pertinere, quorum sunt multa peccata? Hac quippe ratione vel potius mentis excaecatione non solos huic gratiae subducitis parvulos, quos nullum ex origine reatum trahere existimatis, sed omnes omnino, qui multa peccata non habent, quoniam sic putatis intellegendum, quod ait Apostolus: Gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem (Ibidem), ut ad istam gratiam nemo pertineat, nisi cui dimittit multa peccata. Ac per hoc, quoniam nullum peccatum, sicut opinamini, parvulus habet, profecto, cum creverit et peccare iam coeperit, non dico si pauca peccata, sed si adhuc unum forte commiserit et ad Christum baptismum venerit, nullo modo ad istam gratiam pertinebit, quia non ex multis delictis in iustificationem mittitur, sed ex uno. Puto, quod non usque adeo cordis in vobis praevalet surditas, ut vos haec tanta erubescere non compellat absurditas. Porro si pertinet ad istam gratiam etiam, cui unum peccatum dimiserit, sic dixit Apostolus: Gratia ex multis delictis in iustificationem, ut totius populi peccata voluerit, qui per illam iustificatur, intellegi, aliis illic habentibus plura, aliis pauciora, aliis etiam singula, quae utique multa sunt omnia.
Aug. It was not a great thing for you to understand that from this justification, which the Savior confers on his own by the remission of many offenses, you rather withdraw the little children, to whom you contend no sin can be remitted, but not we, who, when we say that through one who sinned all were sent unto condemnation, except no age, because this offense even human beings of greater age have; and likewise, when we say that grace justifies from many offenses, we nonetheless except no age, since he who remits many sins—by which name of "many" surely all are understood—surely passes over none, that is, neither the more sins of the worst, nor the fewer of some, nor the single sins of little children. That you might see this, then, was no great thing, unless you grudged little children Christ as physician, and were utterly unwilling that he be Jesus to them, with horrible impiety, marvelous blindness, blasphemous loquacity. But what is more insane than to wish the grace of Christ to pertain only to those whose sins are many? For by this reasoning—or rather by this blinding of the mind—you withdraw from this grace not only the little children alone, whom you think draw no guilt from origin, but absolutely all who do not have many sins, since you think it must be understood thus, what the Apostle says, But grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16)—that no one pertains to this grace except him to whom it remits many sins. And through this, since a little child, as you suppose, has no sin, surely, when he has grown and has now begun to sin—I do not say if he commits a few sins, but if he has perhaps committed even one more—and comes to the baptism of Christ, he will in no way pertain to this grace, because he is sent unto justification not from many offenses, but from one. I think that the deafness of heart in you does not prevail so far that so great an absurdity does not compel you to blush. Moreover, if even he to whom it remits one sin pertains to this grace, then the Apostle so said, Grace from many offenses unto justification, that he wished the sins of the whole people, which is justified by it, to be understood—some there having more, others fewer, others even single ones, which surely all together are many.
Iulianum.2.115116. Iul. Verum tali expositione, qua quidem nec pervertere sensum nec suffugere valebis, tamen non solum praestigias tuas, sed etiam illius, quam in nos inflammabas, figmentum invidiae perdidisti. Graviter quippe nos in fidem commisisse iactabas, qui dicimus gratiam quidem Christi uniformiter esse tradendam nec debere verba eius et instituta concuti, sed aequaliter cunctis a se imbutis adoptionis et sanctificationis promotionisque dona conferre, verum non omnes accedentes in unis reatibus invenire, sed eos quidem, qui propria voluntate peccaverint, sine cuius opere nullum potest esse peccatum, liberare de reatu et de malis facere bonos, innocentes autem infucata primaevitate felices pro nullo opere malae voluntatis arguere, cuius apud eos novit experientiam non fuisse.
116. Jul. But by such an exposition, by which indeed you will be able neither to pervert the sense nor to escape, you have nonetheless lost not only your sleights of hand, but also the figment of envy which you were inflaming against us. For you boasted that we had gravely offended against the faith, who say that the grace of Christ is indeed to be handed on uniformly, and that his words and institutions ought not to be shaken, but that it confers equally on all who are imbued by it the gifts of adoption and sanctification and advancement, yet does not find all who approach in the same guilts, but indeed frees from guilt and makes good out of evil those who have sinned by their own will (without whose work no sin can exist), but does not accuse the innocent, happy in their unstained earliest age, for any work of an evil will, the experience of which it knows there was not in them.
Iulianum.2.116Aug. O dementiam singularem! Hoc disputare est an insanire? Cum miseria se natos esse parvuli flendo testantur, quos non vis Christum habere Iesum et felices eos dicis, quos tamen eius non admittis in regnum; quod regnum si christiana caritate diligeres, ab illo separari magnam esse miseriam iudicares.
Aug. O singular madness! Is this to dispute, or to rave? When little children testify by weeping that they were born into misery, you are unwilling that they have Christ as Jesus, and you call them happy whom nonetheless you do not admit into his kingdom; which kingdom, if you loved it with Christian love, you would judge that to be separated from it is a great misery.
Iulianum.2.116117. Iul. Sed de bono facere meliores; atque ad unum quidem collem omnes, quos susceperit, sanctificationis evehere, sed non omnes in eadem vitiorum palude deprehendere, verum alios invenire in statu innocentium, alios in studiis noxiorum. Hoc ergo quia dicimus, quod fidei sanitate, praesidio rationis atque intellegentiae pietate munitur, per quod et Christi gratia iure laudatur nec Deo applicatur ullus reatus, tu dicis auctoritatem nutare sacramenti atque acumine pistillo omni obtunsiore asseris auferri auctoritatem gratiae, nisi ei calumniandi flagitium adscribatur, nisi iustitiae instituta perverterit, nisi his, qui scientiam non habent, alienae conscientiae crimen impegerit, postremo nihil eam efficere, si non in omnibus uniformiter praedicetur operari.
117. Jul. But it makes better out of good; and it raises all whom it receives to one and the same hill of sanctification, but does not find all in the same marsh of vices, but finds some in the state of the innocent, others in the pursuits of the harmful. Because we say this, then—which is fortified by the soundness of faith, by the protection of reason, and by the piety of understanding, through which both the grace of Christ is rightly praised and no guilt is applied to God—you say that the authority of the sacrament totters, and you assert, with a point blunter than any pestle, that the authority of grace is taken away, unless the disgrace of slandering be ascribed to it, unless it has perverted the institutions of justice, unless it has charged the crime of another's conscience upon those who have no knowledge, and finally that it accomplishes nothing, if it is not preached to work uniformly in all.
Iulianum.2.117Aug. Quid est, quod acumen non meum, sed omnium catholicorum disputatorum, cum quibus inconcussum teneo, quod frustra labefactare conamini, pistillo comparandum putasti? An, quod vos fragiles conterat, sentire coepisti? Et tamen, qui velut defensione iustitiae Dei niteris, ut evertas, quod de parvulorum non regeneratorum damnatione tota Christi sentit Ecclesia, numquam dicturus es, grave iugum super parvulos unde sit iustum, si non trahunt originale peccatum, nec advertis vos potius pervertere instituta iustitiae et hoc omnipotentis Dei, a quo vel sub quo istam poenam sine ullo merito innumerabilibus omnium hominum millibus, hoc est imaginum Dei, a die exitus de ventre matris eorum dicitis irrogari.
Aug. Why have you thought that a point—not mine, but that of all Catholic disputants, with whom I hold unshaken what you try in vain to weaken—must be compared to a pestle? Or have you begun to perceive that it grinds you, who are fragile? And yet, you who strive, as though in defense of the justice of God, to overturn what the whole Church of Christ holds about the damnation of the little children not regenerated, will never say whence it is just that there is a heavy yoke upon little children, if they do not draw original sin; nor do you notice that you rather pervert the institutions of justice, and this the institutions of omnipotent God, by whom or under whom you say this punishment is inflicted, without any merit, upon the innumerable thousands of all human beings, that is, of the images of God, from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb.
Iulianum.2.117Postremo numquam dicturus es, unde sit iustum, ut parvuli nulla sua, nulla plerumque etiam suorum culpa sine baptismate mortui a parentibus et propinquis fidelibus separentur et ad Dei regnum non admittantur nec inter vasa facta in honorem, sicut alii parvuli baptizati, sed inter vasa facta in contumeliam, quia nullum est tertium genus vasorum, sine ullis malis meritis deputentur. Displicet enim haereticae prudentiae vestrae, quod catholica fides credit, posteaquam ierunt omnes ex uno in condemnationem, in aliis fieri misericordiam gratiae, in aliis iudicium veritatis manere per in vestigabiles Domini vias, quae universae sunt misericordia et veritas (Cf. Ps 24, 10).
Finally, you will never say whence it is just that little children, dying without baptism through no fault of their own—and very often none even of their own people—are separated from their faithful parents and kinsfolk and not admitted to the kingdom of God, and are reckoned, with no evil merits, not among the vessels made for honor, like other baptized little children, but among the vessels made for dishonor (since there is no third kind of vessels). For it displeases your heretical prudence, what the Catholic faith believes: that, after all went from the one unto condemnation, in some the mercy of grace is shown, in others the judgment of truth abides, through the inscrutable ways of the Lord, which are all mercy and truth (See Ps 25:10 (24)).
Iulianum.2.117118. Iul. Id ergo totum, per quod stultitia sordentes decipiebas animos, tua expositione evanuisse manifestum est.
118. Jul. That whole thing, then, by which you were deceiving minds sordid with folly, it is manifest has vanished by your own exposition.
Iulianum.2.118Aug. Evanuisti, sed tu, qui videre vel confiteri non vis remissionem peccatorum etiam ad illos pertinere, qui unum habent; ad quam medicinalem gratiam non pertinent parvuli, si nullum habent; quos impie necatis, quia eis Salvatorem negatis.
Aug. You have vanished—you, who are unwilling to see or confess that the remission of sins pertains even to those who have one; to which medicinal grace little children do not pertain, if they have none; whom you impiously slay, because you deny them the Savior.
Iulianum.2.118119. Iul. Nam cum Apostolus pronuntiat: Gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem (Rom 5, 16), et hoc tu dicis in parvulis quidem non posse constare, in illis autem, qui iam perfectae aetatis sunt, solis ideo impleri, quia ad unum illud alia quoque motu propriae voluntatis addiderint, confiteris sine dubio diversam esse operationem gratiae pro diversitate venientium. In his quippe, qui motu propriae voluntatis utuntur, suppetit ei materia gloriandi, quia ex multis criminibus in iustificationem, quos adoptarit, educit; in parvulis autem secundum te ieiunius, angustius, exilius nec virtute magna nec medicina idonea nec honestate salva nec pudore securo unum illud peccatum se promittit auferre, quod nec debuit imputare, et ex hoc uno, quos liberat, in iustificationem conatur emittere.
119. Jul. For when the Apostle pronounces, But grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16), and you say that this cannot stand in little children, but is fulfilled only in those who are now of perfect age, for this reason: that to that one they have added others too by the movement of their own will, you confess without doubt that the operation of grace is diverse according to the diversity of those who come. For in those who use the movement of their own will, there is supplied to it matter for boasting, because it leads out, from many crimes unto justification, those whom it has adopted; but in little children, according to you, more meagerly, more narrowly, more thinly—neither with great power, nor with a fitting medicine, nor with honor preserved, nor with shame secure—it promises that it will take away that one sin, which it ought not even to have imputed, and from this one it tries to send forth, unto justification, those whom it frees.
Iulianum.2.119Aug. Iam responsum est; eadem multum dicis non inveniendo quid dicas. Cum dicitis nullum peccatum parvulis imputandum, iniustum facitis Deum, qui eis grave iugum a die exitus de ventre matris imposuit (Cf. Eccli 40, 1); quod etsi Scriptura non diceret, quis tam caecus est mente, qui non videat miseriam generis humani a fletibus incipere parvulorum? Iniustam facitis etiam Dei legem, quae octavo die non circumcisi animam damnat infantis (Cf. Gen 17, 14); vanum quoque iudicatis esse praeceptum, ubi sacrificium pro peccato infante nato iubetur offerri (Cf. Lev 12, 6).
Aug. It has already been answered; you say the same things much, by not finding what to say. When you say that no sin must be imputed to little children, you make God unjust, who placed a heavy yoke upon them from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1); which, even if Scripture did not say it, who is so blind of mind that he does not see that the misery of the human race begins from the weepings of little children? You also make the law of God unjust, which damns the soul of an infant not circumcised on the eighth day (See Gen 17:14); you also judge to be empty the precept where a sacrifice for sin is commanded to be offered for a born infant (See Lev 12:6).
Iulianum.2.119Si autem reatus iste originis et Scriptura sancta proditur, et ipse se prodit; etiam hoc peccatum inter illa est multa peccata, ex quibus iustificat gratia, quae parvulos quoque ex hac miseria beatificat, et hoc non isto in saeculo, quod universum Deus hominibus voluit esse poenale, ex quo primos homines foras de paradisi felicitate dimisit, sed in futuro aeterno, unde nunc Christus membris suis Sancti Spiritus pignus impertit (Cf. 2 Cor 1, 22).
But if this guilt of origin is both betrayed by holy Scripture and betrays itself, then this sin too is among those many sins from which grace justifies, which beatifies little children too out of this misery—and this not in this age, which God willed to be wholly penal for human beings, from when he sent the first human beings out of the happiness of paradise, but in the future eternal age, of which now Christ imparts to his members the pledge of the Holy Spirit (See 2 Cor 1:22).
Iulianum.2.119120. Iul. Confessus es ergo aliter operari gratiam in maioribus, aliter in minoribus. Nec quidquam putes responsioni tuae relictum loci, si inferas magnam quidem, sed in remissione peccatorum esse distantiam, ut, etsi unum peccatum, tamen inveniat, quod remittat. Verum nihil hac argumentatione promoves; neque enim refert, in qua specie varios unius gratiae fatearis effectus, dummodo varios posse esse fateare.
120. Jul. You have confessed, then, that grace works in one way in the older, in another in the younger. And do not think any place left to your answer, if you should bring in that there is indeed a great distinction, but in the remission of sins, so that, even if there is one sin, it nonetheless finds what to remit. But by this argument you advance nothing; for it does not matter in what kind you confess the various effects of one grace, provided you confess that they can be various.
Iulianum.2.120Aug. Aliud est varios effectus gratiae dicere, quia et Scriptura sancta multiformem dicit gratiam Dei (Cf. 1 Pt 4, 10), et aliud est gratiam remissionis peccatorum parvulis denegare eosque in Ecclesia veritatis, si non eruuntur de potestate tenebrarum, mendaciter exorcizari exsufflarique contendere cum magna iniuria Creatoris, si non indigent auxilio Salvatoris, ut de potestate eruantur deceptoris.
Aug. One thing is to speak of various effects of grace—for holy Scripture too calls the grace of God manifold (See 1 Pet 4:10)—and another is to deny to little children the grace of the remission of sins, and to contend that in the Church of truth, if they are not delivered from the power of darkness, they are falsely exorcized and breathed upon, with great injury to the Creator, if they do not need the help of the Savior to be delivered from the power of the deceiver.
Iulianum.2.120121. Iul. Ego enim hoc contentus sum, quod mihi es tu dare compulsus, quia, quod praedicavit Apostolus in liberalitate gratiae non possit cunctis aequaliter aetatibus convenire; tu si quid attuleris, quod et in prima nascentium aetate remissionem confirmes exsequi, illud tamen non admovisti, quia non compleatur in parvulis, unde Apostolus gratiam Christi pronuntiavit esse laudabilem. Nam cum medicinam mysterii peccato primi hominis, quem formam fuisse docebat sequentibus, anteferret, ait: Iudicium ex uno delicto in condemnationem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem (Rom 5, 16). Illud ergo, per quod praetulit gratiam, quia ex multis videlicet delictis iustificationem operatur, nec secundum te constat in parvulis; atque ad hoc, quamvis reluctareris, attractus es, ut non aequaliter in diversis aetatibus gratiam faterere versari.
121. Jul. For I am content with this, which you were compelled to grant me: that what the Apostle preached in the liberality of grace cannot suit all ages equally; you, if you have brought forward anything to confirm that remission carries through even in the first age of those who are born, have nonetheless not brought forward that which is not fulfilled in little children—that from which the Apostle pronounced the grace of Christ to be praiseworthy. For when he preferred the medicine of the mystery to the sin of the first man, whom he was teaching to have been a form to those who follow, he said, The judgment from one offense unto condemnation, but grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16). That, then, by which he preferred grace—namely, because it works justification from many offenses—does not, according to you, stand in little children; and to this, although you struggled, you have been drawn: to confess that grace is not engaged equally in the diverse ages.
Iulianum.2.121Aug. Iam responsum est; vana loqueris. Gloriosa est gratia Dei, etiam cum dimittit singula quorumque peccata, quia et ipsa singula ad eam multitudinem pertinent peccatorum, ex qua iustificat homines, qui salvum facit populum suum a peccatis eorum (Mt 1, 21); ad quem populum dignissime non pertinetis, quia parvulos ad eum pertinere non vultis.
Aug. It has already been answered; you speak empty things. The grace of God is glorious, even when it remits the single sins of any, because those single sins too pertain to that multitude of sins from which it justifies human beings—he who saves his people from their sins (Matt 1:21); to which people you most deservedly do not pertain, because you are unwilling that little children pertain to it.
Iulianum.2.121122. Iul. Quod cum receptum est a te, apparuit nullam fuisse necessitatem naturae humanae calumniam concitandi ob hoc solum, ne baptismatis magis gratia varios habere pro aetatibus diceretur effectus. Quo persuasionis colore sublato, si quid nervorum habes, si quid ingenii, si quid virtutis, annitere probare naturale peccatum, quod vides ratione, auctoritate, aequitate destructum. Quo enim es deceptus intuitu, ut commixtionem corporum, quae Deus instituit, et conciliatricem ipsius commixtionis, voluptatem sexuum, quae tam in hominibus quam in pecoribus vigens auctorem suum eum, quem corporum indicat conditorem, diaboli opus et fruticem vocares?
122. Jul. Which, when it has been accepted by you, it appeared that there was no necessity for stirring up a slander against human nature for this alone: lest the grace of baptism should rather be said to have various effects according to the ages. With this color of persuasion removed, if you have any sinews, any wit, any power, strive to prove natural sin, which you see destroyed by reason, authority, and equity. For with what intent were you deceived, that you should call the mingling of bodies, which God instituted, and the conciliator of that mingling, the pleasure of the sexes—which, flourishing as much in human beings as in cattle, indicates as its author the one whom it shows to be the Creator of bodies—the work and shrub of the devil?
Iulianum.2.122Aug. Erubesce; tu es ille laudator libidinis. Erubesce, inquam. Libido ista, quae tibi multum placet, contra quam necesse est ut pugnet, qui non vult ei sollicitanti consentiendo perpetrare peccatum, non erat in paradiso ante peccatum; aut ergo nulla ibi erat aut voluntatem mentis nec praecedebat nec excedebat.
Aug. Blush; you are that praiser of lust. Blush, I say. This lust, which much pleases you, against which he must necessarily fight who does not wish, by consenting to it as it solicits, to perpetrate sin, was not in paradise before sin; either, then, there was none there, or it neither preceded nor exceeded the will of the mind.
Iulianum.2.122Non est talis modo; hoc in se ipso sentit omnis homo et tu homo es; cohibe renitendi studium et agnosce vitium, unde trahitur originale peccatum. Hoc in hominibus propagatis invenerunt nuptiae, non fecerunt; hoc necessitate utuntur, castitate bene utuntur, idcirco nulla ratione culpantur; hoc in pecoribus ideo non est malum, quia non in eis caro concupiscit adversus spiritum (Gal 5, 17), quod malum in hominibus sanandum est bonitate divina, non humana vanitate laudandum.
It is not such now; this every human being perceives in himself, and you are a human being; restrain your zeal for striving, and recognize the vice from which original sin is drawn. This marriage found in propagated human beings, it did not make; this it uses by necessity, uses well by chastity, and therefore is in no way blamed; this in cattle is for this reason not an evil, because in them the flesh does not have desires against the spirit (Gal 5:17)—which evil in human beings must be healed by divine goodness, not praised by human vanity.
Iulianum.2.122123. Iul. Quae autem ratio fuit, ut primo innocentiam crimine sauciares alieno, dehinc rem studiorum miscere seminibus conareris ?
123. Jul. But what reason was there that you should first wound innocence with another's crime, then try to mingle a matter of pursuits with seeds?
Iulianum.2.123Aug. Eadem per eadem dicis; sed procul dubio sunt vana, quae dicis. Natura bona sunt semina, sed vitiantur et semina eisque vitiatis propagantur et vitia. Saltem species te corporum doceat, quorum cum sit opifex summe bonus et nullo vitio depravatus, vitiosa tamen multa nascuntur; et utique, si nemo peccasset, nulla in paradiso talia nascerentur.
Aug. You say the same things by the same things; but without doubt the things you say are empty. The seeds are good by nature, but the seeds too are corrupted, and, they being corrupted, the vices too are propagated. Let at least the forms of bodies teach you, of which, though the maker is supremely good and depraved by no vice, many things are nonetheless born defective; and surely, if no one had sinned, no such things would be born in paradise.
Iulianum.2.123124. Iul. Ut baptismati veritatem propriae operationis auferres? Ut Deo, qui totus aequitas est, qui sine iustitia Deus esse non potest, perspicuae iniquitatis crimen ascriberes?
124. Jul. That you might take from baptism the truth of its proper operation? That you might ascribe to God, who is wholly equity, who cannot be God without justice, the crime of manifest iniquity?
Iulianum.2.124Aug. Vos hoc potius facitis, quoniam, si parvuli sine ullius peccati merito premuntur gravi iugo, iniquus est Deus; sed quia ille non est iniquus, tu es calumniosus et caecus.
Aug. You rather do this, since, if little children are pressed by a heavy yoke without the merit of any sin, God is unjust; but because he is not unjust, you are slanderous and blind.
Iulianum.2.124125. Iul.Tam, inquam, perspicuae, ut ipse hanc iniustitiae speciem, quam eius mentiris adhaerere iudiciis, legis suae auctoritate damnaverit.
125. Jul. So manifest, I say, that he himself has condemned, by the authority of his own law, this very kind of injustice which you falsely allege to cleave to his judgments.
Iulianum.2.125Aug. In eius lege scriptum est animam parvuli, si die octavo non circumcidatur, interituram de populo suo (Cf. Gen 17, 14); quo merito? Dic, si potes; sed omnino non potes et tamen originale peccatum negando non taces.
Aug. In his law it is written that the soul of a little child, if he is not circumcised on the eighth day, shall perish from his people (See Gen 17:14); by what merit? Say, if you can; but you cannot at all, and yet, by denying original sin, you do not keep silent.
Iulianum.2.125126. Iul. Quae ergo tot blasphemiarum necessitas fuit, si nec ista, quam amplexabaris, fuit? Quae quidem nihil habens momenti, tamen velut quaedam tabula videbatur, quam in tanto naufragio contineres, quam victis remisisti, sero licet, lacertis.
126. Jul. What necessity, then, was there for so many blasphemies, if not even that one which you were embracing existed? Which, indeed, having no weight, nonetheless seemed like a certain plank to which you might cling in so great a shipwreck—a plank which, conquered, you let go, late though it be, with slackened arms.
Iulianum.2.126Ut enim res repetitione clarescat: ideo Manichaeus credebaris ab ineptis quibusque tolerandus, ne gratiae Christi non in omnibus una efficientia videretur, ad hoc tu nunc sine adactu nostro expositionis tuae processibus intulisti dicens Apostoli sententiam, quae ait: Gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem (Rom 5, 16), in hominibus quidem maioris aetatis posse, in parvulis vero non posse compleri, sed esse in parvulis aliud brevius exilius egentius, quod licet tu excogites, tamen nequaquam dixisse Apostolum confiteris.
For—that the matter may grow clear by repetition—you were for this reason believed a Manichee, to be tolerated by every foolish person, lest the grace of Christ should seem not to have one efficacy in all; to this you now, without our compulsion, by the advances of your own exposition, have brought yourself, saying that the opinion of the Apostle, which says, But grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16), can in human beings of greater age, but in little children cannot, be fulfilled, but that in little children there is something else briefer, thinner, more needy, which, though you devise it, you nonetheless confess the Apostle in no way said.
Iulianum.2.126Aug. Relegatur, quod tibi responsum est (Cf. supra 115), ut intellegatur te nihil dicere et tamen tacere non posse, homo linguose. Gratia ex multis delictis in iustificationem mittit, cum salvum facit Iesus populum suum a peccatis eorum. In eisdem multis invenit etiam singula parvulorum, quemadmodum, etiamsi peccata originalia nulla essent, in eisdem multis inveniret peccare incipientium etiam singula grandiorum, quibus ad Christi baptisma venientibus nullo modo diceretur: Non potestis modo baptizari, quia nondum habetis multa delicta; gratia enim ex multis delictis mittit in iustificationem. Verissime quippe responderent: In multitudine delictorum, ex quibus iustificat gratia, etiam nostra delicta sunt singula, ubi habent aliqui plura, aliqui pauciora, quae simul cum singulis nostris multa sunt omnia.
Aug. Let what was answered to you be reread (See above, 115), that it may be understood that you say nothing and yet cannot keep silent, O tongued man. Grace sends from many offenses unto justification, when Jesus saves his people from their sins. Among those same many it finds also the single sins of little children, just as, even if there were no original sins, among those same many it would find also the single sins of older persons beginning to sin, to whom, coming to the baptism of Christ, it would in no way be said: You cannot now be baptized, because you do not yet have many offenses; for grace sends from many offenses unto justification. For they would most truly answer: In the multitude of offenses, from which grace justifies, our offenses too are single ones, where some have more, some fewer, which together with our single ones are all many.
Iulianum.2.126127. Iul. Igitur et secundum te in adoptione quidem per omnes aetates gratiae est aequalis effectus; in remissione vero peccatorum non in omnibus est una taxatio. Sed egi hactenus parce nimis atque patienter.
127. Jul. Therefore, even according to you, in adoption the effect of grace is indeed equal through all ages; but in the remission of sins there is not one reckoning in all. But so far I have acted too sparingly and patiently.
Iulianum.2.127Aug. Si tam multa loqueris parce loquens, ut unum meum librum nec ipsum totum tuis octo libris insecteris, nimium profusa et luxuriosa est parsimonia tua. Sed si hactenus parce egisti, quare in tam multis contra veritatem clamans animae tuae non pepercisti?
Aug. If you speak so much while speaking sparingly, so that you assail one book of mine—and not even the whole of it—with your eight books, your sparingness is too profuse and luxurious. But if so far you have acted sparingly, why, crying out in so many things against the truth, have you not spared your own soul?
Iulianum.2.127128. Iul. Praemissa scilicet disputatione probare contentus te quoque, qui nobis seditionem per hoc maximam concitabas, dicere remissionis peccatorum non in cunctis unam constare rationem, ut etiamsi unum hoc naturale peccatum persuadere possis, tamen liqueret necessario dici non semper accedentium ad gratiam unum statum esse et hoc Apostoli dictum: Ex multis delictis in iustificationem (Rom 5, 16) in adulta solum, non autem etiam in prima aetate compleri.
128. Jul. Content, namely, with the foregoing disputation, to prove that you too—who were stirring up against us by this the greatest sedition—say that there is not one reckoning of the remission of sins in all; so that, even if you could persuade of this one natural sin, it would nonetheless necessarily be clear that the state of those who come to grace is not always one, and that this saying of the Apostle, From many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16), is fulfilled only in the adult, but not also in the first age.
Iulianum.2.128Aug. Secundum tua vaniloquia nec in adulta aetate completur, quoniam multi adulti habent singula, etiamsi secundum vos non habent originalia, quibus contigit venire ad baptismum, quando peccare coeperunt; aliqui habent etiam paucissima, non tamen multa, non ergo pertinebunt ad hanc gratiam Christi, quoniam ex multis delictis illa iustificat, quae non habent isti; quod si quisquis sapit, ineffabiliter desipit. Agnosce Christum ex multis delictis iustificantem salvumque facientem populum suum et in eisdem multis intellegens posse quorumlibet et pauca et singula computari noli ab hoc populo sortem subtrahere parvulorum; etiam ipsis crede necessarium esse Iesum, qui hoc non vocatur, nisi quia salvum facit populum suum (Cf. Mt 1, 21), in quo utique sunt et parvuli, a peccatis eorum.
Aug. According to your empty talk it is not fulfilled even in the adult age, since many adults have single sins—even if, according to you, they have no original ones—to whom it has befallen to come to baptism when they began to sin; some have even very few, yet not many; they will not, then, pertain to this grace of Christ, since it justifies from many offenses, which these do not have; and if anyone has wisdom about this, he is unspeakably foolish. Recognize Christ as justifying from many offenses and saving his people, and, understanding that among those same many can be counted both the few and the single sins of any, do not withdraw from this people the lot of little children; believe that Jesus is necessary even to them, who is not so called except because he saves his people (See Matt 1:21)—in which surely are little children too—from their sins.
Iulianum.2.128129. Iul. Nunc vero assero consequenter nihil Apostolum de Manichaea traduce suspicatum; ostendit quippe ad gravem iniuriam pertinere mysteriorum, si compararentur per cuncta peccatis, id est si non efficacius prodesset gratia, quam culpae forma nocuisset. Maximam ergo christianae fidei dignitatem in eo Magister Gentium collocavit, quod eam affirmavit antestare delictis; ob hoc illi curae fuit, ut morbis veteribus medicinae praeferret effectum.
129. Jul. But now I consistently assert that the Apostle suspected nothing of the Manichean traducianism; for he showed that it would pertain to a grave injury of the mysteries, if they were compared in all things with sins—that is, if grace did not profit more efficaciously than the form of fault had harmed. The greatest dignity of the Christian faith, then, the Teacher of the gentiles placed in this: that he affirmed it to stand before offenses; on account of this it was his care that he should prefer the effect of medicine to the old diseases.
Iulianum.2.129Aug. Hanc medicinam negatis parvulis, quos falsa et inimica defensione salvos esse contenditis, sed Deus eorum, qui ex ore infantium atque lactantium medicinae suae perficit laudem, profecto et vos destruit, qui eis adhibetis inimicam defensionem, cum destruit inimicum et defensorem.
Aug. This medicine you deny to little children, whom by a false and hostile defense you contend to be saved; but their God, who out of the mouth of infants and sucklings perfects the praise of his medicine, surely destroys you too, who apply to them a hostile defense, when he destroys the enemy and the defender.
Iulianum.2.129130. Iul. Inde gratiam ostendit esse laudabilem, si ei per omnia conveniret, quod dixit: Iudicium ex uno in condemnationem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem (Rom 5, 16). Qua tu ergo licentia gratiam Christi ea laudatione fraudabis, qua illam Apostolus voluit praedicari; ut deicias titulum dignitatis, per quem solum honorem eius vas electionis voluit agnosci?
130. Jul. Thence he shows grace to be praiseworthy, if there suited it in all respects what he said: The judgment from one unto condemnation, but grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16). By what license, then, will you defraud the grace of Christ of that praise by which the Apostle wished it to be preached, so as to cast down the title of dignity by which alone the vessel of election wished its honor to be recognized?
Iulianum.2.130Aug. Haec ad parvulos non pervenit, si nullo delicto secundum vos obligati sunt; sed quia obligati sunt, profecto gratia ex multis delictis multitudinem fidelium suorum iustificans etiam ad unum delictum sanandum pervenit eorum, ut ex ore infantium destruat ora fallentium inimicorum et defensorum.
Aug. This does not reach little children, if, according to you, they are bound by no offense; but because they are bound, surely grace—justifying from many offenses the multitude of its faithful—reaches also to the healing of that one offense of theirs, so that out of the mouth of infants it may destroy the mouths of the deceiving enemies and defenders.
Iulianum.2.130131. Iul. Ille dixit: Gratia ex multis delictis in iustificationem (Ibidem); ille peccati efficientiae medicinae copiam praetulit; qui sensus catholicorum dogmati congruit intellegentium in his remissionem peccatorum fieri, in quibus possunt multa deprehendi, id est motu propriae voluntatis attracta, in quibus autem non sit hic motus propriae voluntatis, id est in parvulis, non minus nulla esse quam multa.
131. Jul. He said, Grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16); he preferred the abundance of medicine to the efficiency of sin; which view agrees with the dogma of Catholics, who understand that the remission of sins takes place in those in whom many can be detected, that is, those drawn by the movement of one's own will; but in those in whom this movement of one's own will does not exist, that is, in little children, they are no less none than many.
Iulianum.2.131Aug. Nulla ergo ad eos Salvatoris pertinet medicina et Christus non est eis Iesus; et tu, qui hoc dicis, audes vocari Christianus. Deinde, si, ut definis, in his fit remissio peccatorum, in quibus possunt multa deprehendi, quoniam sic accipis, quod ait Apostolus: Gratia ex multis delictis in iustificationem, non pertinent ad remissionem peccatorum, qui secundum vos non habentes originale peccatum ad lavacrum regenerationis cum singulis veniunt paucisve peccatis? Videte, quae dicitis, et non erubescitis, non expavescitis, non tacetis? Si autem homines peccare incipientes et nondum habentes multa delicta percipiunt tamen gratiam ex multis iustificantem delictis, cur in eisdem multis etiam singula quorumlibet computare non vultis non ob aliud, nisi ut ab ea parvulos impie separetis vobisque pernicies pessimae iniquitatis incumbat, ut ab illa etiam grandiores primum peccare incipientes nondumque habentes multa, sed singula vel pauca peccata alienos esse dicatis?
Aug. No medicine of the Savior, then, pertains to them, and Christ is not Jesus to them; and you, who say this, dare to be called a Christian. Further, if, as you define, the remission of sins takes place in those in whom many can be detected—since you so take what the Apostle says, Grace from many offenses unto justification—then those do not pertain to the remission of sins who, according to you not having original sin, come to the laver of regeneration with single or few sins? See what you say, and do you not blush, do you not shudder, are you not silent? But if human beings beginning to sin and not yet having many offenses nonetheless receive grace justifying from many offenses, why are you unwilling to count, among those same many, the single sins of any—for no other reason than that you may impiously separate little children from it, and the ruin of a most wicked iniquity falls upon you, so that you say that from it even older persons first beginning to sin, and not yet having many but single or few sins, are alien?
Iulianum.2.131132. Iul. Apostolus ergo ubi praetulit gratiam peccato, nostrum dogma communit.
132. Jul. The Apostle, then, where he preferred grace to sin, fortifies our dogma.
Iulianum.2.132Aug. Immo vestrum dogma subvertit, quia ista gratia, quam peccato praetulit, ex multis delictis iustificat et ideo pertinens ad pusillos cum magnis, nec ullum praeterit pusillorum, qui remittit omnia omnium suorum, id est pusillorum atque magnorum.
Aug. Rather, he overturns your dogma; for this grace, which he preferred to sin, justifies from many offenses, and therefore, pertaining to the small along with the great, it passes over none of the small, since it remits all the sins of all its own, that is, of the small and the great.
Iulianum.2.132133. Iul. Nunc tu ede, ubi aequaverit peccato gratiam, ut, quoniam fides tua non capit remedia praelata vulneribus, saltem capiat in angustum non excedentia comparationem redacta; quod si scriptum uspiam reppereris, Paulum tamen ab hac constabit abhorrere sententia; et ut compendio totus Apostoli sensus eluceat, ait: Gratia ex multis delictis in iustificationem (Ibidem). Multa autem delicta nec secundum te parvuli habent, qui secundum Apostolum nullum habent.
133. Jul. Now do you bring forth where he made grace equal to sin, so that, since your faith does not grasp remedies preferred to wounds, it may at least grasp them reduced to a comparison not exceeding into the narrow; but if you should find this written anywhere, it will nonetheless be established that Paul shrinks from this opinion; and that the whole sense of the Apostle may shine forth in brief, he says, Grace from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16). But many offenses little children do not have even according to you, who according to the Apostle have none.
Iulianum.2.133Aug. Multa delicta nec secundum te habent, qui primum peccare coeperunt; et tamen eos negare non potes ad hanc ex multis delictis iustificantem gratiam, cum ad baptisma veniunt, pertinere. Multa ergo delicta sunt totius populi, in quo sunt et parvuli; ad quem populum civitatis Dei cum pervenit gratia ex multis delictis iustificans, invenit ibi et multa delicta aliquorum et pauca aliorum et singula parvulorum; quae simul utique multa sunt omnia et multitudine sua redarguunt multa et inania verba tua. Si autem secundum Apostolum, sicut putas, nullum delictum habent parvuli, unde ergo secundum Apostolum mortui sunt? Quia et secundum te etiam pro ipsis mortuus est Christus: Unus enim pro omnibus mortuus est; ergo omnes mortui sunt et pro omnibus mortuus est (2 Cor 5, 14-15). Iuliane, non hoc Augustinus, sed Apostolus dixit; immo ipse per suum Apostolum Christus; cohibe te a vaniloquio, cede Deo.
Aug. Many offenses, even according to you, those do not have who have first begun to sin; and yet you cannot deny that they pertain to this grace justifying from many offenses, when they come to baptism. The many offenses, then, are of the whole people, in which there are little children too; to which people of the city of God, when grace justifying from many offenses arrives, it finds there both the many offenses of some and the few of others and the single ones of little children; which together surely are all many, and by their multitude refute your many and empty words. But if, according to the Apostle, as you think, little children have no offense, whence, then, according to the Apostle, are they dead? For even according to you Christ died also for them: For one died for all; therefore all have died, and he died for all (2 Cor 5:14-15). Julian, not Augustine but the Apostle said this—rather, Christ himself through his Apostle; restrain yourself from empty talk, yield to God.
Iulianum.2.133134. Iul. Constat hic igitur Magistrum Gentium non de nascentibus disputasse, sed de his, qui iam motu propriae voluntatis utuntur.
134. Jul. It is established here, then, that the Teacher of the gentiles disputed not about those who are born, but about those who already use the movement of their own will.
Iulianum.2.134Aug. Digere crapulam contentionis et expergiscere et intellege delictum et unius et unum, de quo dictum est: Si enim ob unius delictum multi mortui sunt (Rom 5, 15); multi quippe isti ipsi sunt omnes, de quibus alio loco dicit: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur (1 Cor 15, 22); et ibi videbis et parvulos, quia et pro ipsis etiam te confitente mortuus est Christus. Utique cum dixisset Apostolus quia unus pro omnibus mortuus est, continuo, quid necessario sequeretur, ostendit dicens: Ergo omnes mortui sunt et pro omnibus mortuus est (2 Cor 5, 14-15).
Aug. Digest the drunkenness of contention, and wake up, and understand the offense both of one and one, of which it was said, For if by the offense of one many have died (Rom 5:15); for these many are the very same as all, of whom in another place he says, As in Adam all die (1 Cor 15:22); and there you will see little children too, because even for them Christ died, with you confessing it. Surely, when the Apostle had said that one died for all, he at once showed what necessarily followed, saying, Therefore all have died, and he died for all (2 Cor 5:14-15).
Iulianum.2.134135. Iul. Iam vero quod addidit Apostolus: Sicut per unius delictum in omnes ad condemnationem, ita et per unius iustitiam in omnes homines ad iustificationem (Rom 5, 18), tantum opis impertit nobis, quantum in dogma tuum movet fragoris. Ponens quippe in contrariis partibus omnes, quibus verbis non potest ulla esse coniunctio, ad Scripturarum nos morem remittit, ut intellegamus omnes dici solere pro " multis ". Nam in ipsa fronte verborum magna barbaries est; qui enim omnes ad iustificationem veniunt, si perrexerunt omnes ad condemnationem? Aut qui omnes ad poenam, si omnes rapiuntur ad gloriam? Generalitas unius partis locum excludit alterius.
135. Jul. But now what the Apostle added—As through the offense of one unto all unto condemnation, so also through the justice of one unto all human beings unto justification (Rom 5:18)—imparts as much help to us as it stirs up crashing ruin against your dogma. For setting in contrary parts all, with which words there can be no conjunction, he refers us to the manner of the Scriptures, that we may understand all usually said for "many." For in the very front of the words there is great barbarism; for how do all come unto justification, if all proceeded unto condemnation? Or how all unto punishment, if all are snatched unto glory? The generality of one part excludes the place of the other.
Iulianum.2.135Aug. Ergo et ubi dictum est: In quo omnes peccaverunt (Rom 5, 12), multi sunt intellegendi: " non omnes "? Quod si ita est, cogeris dicere non omnes peccatores unius illius hominis imitatione peccasse, sed multos; quod si dixeris ideo non omnes, sed multos eius imitatione peccasse, quia multi, non omnes peccaverunt, volens eos, qui non peccaverunt, intellegi parvulos, respondebitur tibi, quia nec mortui sunt in illo parvuli ac per hoc non pro illis Christus mortuus est, quia non nisi pro mortuis ille mortuus est, sicut Apostolus clamat; atque ita et contra te ipsum venies et a gratia Christi penitus parvulos separabis pro quibus Christum mortuum non esse dicturus es. Consequenter etiam baptizandos negabis in Christo.
Aug. Then where it was said, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12), are "many," not "all," to be understood? But if that is so, you are compelled to say that not all sinners sinned by the imitation of that one man, but many; and if you say that for this reason not all but many sinned by his imitation—because many, not all, sinned—wishing those who did not sin to be understood as little children, you will be answered that neither did little children die in him, and through this Christ did not die for them, because he died only for the dead, as the Apostle proclaims; and thus you will both come against yourself and utterly separate from the grace of Christ the little children, for whom you are going to say Christ did not die. Consequently you will also deny that they must be baptized in Christ.
Iulianum.2.135Quicumque enim baptizati sumus in Christo, sicuti ait idem Apostolus, in morte ipsius baptizati sumus (Rom 6, 3); illi autem baptizantur in morte Christi, pro quibus mortuus est Christus. Nullo modo igitur ab originali peccato alienabis parvulos, nisi eos simul a gratia baptismatis Christi feceris alienos.
For whoever of us have been baptized in Christ, as the same Apostle says, have been baptized in his death (Rom 6:3); but those are baptized in the death of Christ for whom Christ died. In no way, then, will you alienate little children from original sin, unless you make them at the same time alien from the grace of the baptism of Christ.
Iulianum.2.135In eo vero, quod tibi videtur duo ista inter se esse contraria, ut omnes eant in condemnationem per Adam et omnes rursus in iustificationem per Christum, omnino erras; nullus enim hominum nisi per Adam trahitur ad damnationem, de qua per lavacrum regenerationis homines liberantur, et nullus hominum nisi per Christum ab hac damnatione liberatur; ideo ex utraque parte dicti sunt omnes, quia nemo ad damnationem generationis nisi per istum, nemo ad vitam regenerationis nisi per illum. Ac per hoc non generalitas unius partis locum excludit alterius, quia ex his ipsis, qui generaliter moriuntur in Adam, quos vult, vivificat Christus. Non ergo tibi videbuntur inter se ista contraria, si non sis tibi ipse contrarius.
But in that these two seem to you to be contrary to each other—that all go unto condemnation through Adam and all again unto justification through Christ—you err altogether; for no human being is drawn to damnation except through Adam, from which damnation human beings are freed through the laver of regeneration, and no human being is freed from this damnation except through Christ; therefore on both sides all were said, because no one comes to the damnation of generation except through the former, no one to the life of regeneration except through the latter. And through this the generality of one part does not exclude the place of the other, because from these very ones who generally die in Adam, Christ makes alive whom he wills. These things, then, will not seem to you contrary to each other, if you are not contrary to yourself.
Iulianum.2.135136. Iul. Verum ut hic quoque quantum muniamur advertas, a loco medicantis locum intellege vulnerantis. Si Christus salvavit universos, Adam quoque universis nocuisse fingatur.
136. Jul. But that you may notice here too how much we are fortified, from the case of the healer understand the case of the wounder. If Christ saved all, let Adam too be imagined to have harmed all.
Iulianum.2.136Aug. Numquid ideo non mittuntur omnes in damnationem per Adam, quoniam quos vult ab hac damnatione liberat Christus? Qui propterea omnes liberare dictus est etiam ipse, quoniam non liberat quemquam nisi ipse, sicut dictus est illuminare omnem hominem (Cf. Io 1, 9), quia nemo quemquam illuminat, si non ipse.
Aug. Are not all, then, sent unto damnation through Adam, because Christ frees from this damnation whom he wills? Who for this reason is himself too said to free all, since no one frees anyone but he, just as he is said to enlighten every man (See John 1:9), because no one enlightens anyone, if not he.
Iulianum.2.136137. Iul. Si Christus mutavit officia genitalium, Adam ea pervertisse credatur; si Christus aliquid correxit in sensibus carnis, aestimetur eos Adae culpa turbasse; si Christus fecit medicinam ire per propaginem, dicatur Adam per generationem transmisisse delictum.
137. Jul. If Christ changed the offices of the genitals, let it be believed that Adam perverted them; if Christ corrected something in the senses of the flesh, let it be reckoned that the fault of Adam disturbed them; if Christ made medicine go through propagation, let Adam be said to have transmitted offense through generation.
Iulianum.2.137Aug. Iam ad ista responsum est; sed audi breviter etiam nunc. Si Christianus catholicus esses, appareret tibi et Adam delictum generando transmittens et Christus regenerando dimittens; carnaliter autem generat Adam, spiritaliter regenerat Christus; noli ergo quaerere in utroque propaginem carnis, quam propaginem non pertinere ad regenerationem spiritalem, si non contendis, attendis. Contra infirmitatem vero carnis nunc Christi gratia certamen instituit, postea eius perficiet sanitatem, cuius sanitatis futurae atque perpetuae nunc pignus Spiritum Sanctum dedit (Cf. 2 Cor 5, 5), per quem diffunditur in nostris cordibus caritas (Cf. Rom 5, 5), ut nos ad agonem interim relicta carnis non vincat infirmitas.
Aug. To these things it has already been answered; but hear briefly even now. If you were a Catholic Christian, there would appear to you both Adam transmitting offense by generating and Christ remitting it by regenerating; but Adam generates carnally, Christ regenerates spiritually; do not, then, seek in both the propagation of the flesh—which propagation does not pertain to spiritual regeneration, as you notice, if you do not contend. But against the infirmity of the flesh the grace of Christ now establishes a struggle, and afterward will perfect its health, of which future and perpetual health he has now given the pledge, the Holy Spirit (See 2 Cor 5:5), through whom love is poured out in our hearts (See Rom 5:5), that the infirmity of the flesh, left for the present for the struggle, may not conquer us.
Iulianum.2.137138. Iul. Sin autem his omnibus in eo, quem suscipiunt a natura, ordine permanentibus adhortationibus, signis, exemplis, promissione vel munerum vel poenarum ad fidem voluntas sine inductione necessitatis allicitur et haec per instituta, per mysteria, per dona non oppressa, sed exspectata, sed libera, sed provocata curatur, apparet, etsi uno spiritu totus mundus vel rugiens vel rabiens refragetur, voluntatem uniuscuiusque, non nativitatem tinctam imitatione fuisse peccati.
138. Jul. But if, with all these things remaining in the order which they receive from nature, the will is allured to faith by exhortations, signs, examples, the promise of rewards or punishments, without the inducement of necessity, and is healed through institutions, through mysteries, through gifts—not oppressed, but awaited, but free, but provoked—it appears that, even if the whole world with one spirit, whether roaring or raging, gainsays, it was the will of each one, not his birth, that was dyed by the imitation of sin.
Iulianum.2.138Aug. Quacumque te vertas, ab originali peccato non alienabis parvulos, nisi eos negaveris mortuos; quod si feceris, mortuum pro eis Christum simul negabis; si autem, ne hoc neges, mortuos parvulos confiteris, profecto in Adam mortuos non negabis, aut si non ibi, dic ubi.
Aug. Whichever way you turn yourself, you will not alienate little children from original sin, unless you deny that they are dead; and if you do this, you will at the same time deny that Christ died for them; but if, lest you deny this, you confess that little children are dead, you will surely not deny that they are dead in Adam—or, if not there, say where.
Iulianum.2.138139. Iul. Quamvis nimis molliter egerim; etsi enim Christus ex eo quo venit tempore universis hominibus doceretur et iter interclusisse mortis et vitam donasse perpetuam, ut nemo prorsus ex eo die, quo Verbum caro factum est (Io 1, 14), aut in peccatum laberetur aut pro peccato poenam timeret, non tamen ea condicio primae iniquitatis, quae liberalitatis doceretur extremae, quoniam subvenire non merentibus potest et solet Deus cum laude clementiae, punire autem non peccantes non potest sine eversione iustitiae.
139. Jul. Although I have acted too gently; for even if Christ, from the time he came, were taught to have both barred the way of death and granted perpetual life to all human beings, so that no one at all, from the day on which the Word was made flesh (John 1:14), should either slip into sin or fear punishment for sin, yet that condition of the first iniquity, which would be taught of the utmost liberality, would not be the same; since God can and is wont, with the praise of clemency, to come to the aid of those who do not deserve it, but cannot, without the overthrow of justice, punish those who do not sin.
Iulianum.2.139Aug. Quia ergo gravi iugo a die exitus de ventre matris puniti sunt parvuli, agnosce iudicem iustum et confitere originale peccatum. Punire enim nullius peccati meritum habentes, sicut etiam ipse confiteris, non potest sine eversione iustitiae.
Aug. Since, then, little children have been punished by a heavy yoke from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb, recognize the just judge and confess original sin. For to punish those who have the merit of no sin—as you yourself also confess—cannot be without the overthrow of justice.
Iulianum.2.139140. Iul. Attende igitur, quid disputatio tota confecerit. Si gratia Christi et Adae culpa in diversis effectibus aequaliter censerentur, ut vel numero operationum pares essent, quae operationum genere dissidebant, docendum erat tantis profuisse gratiam, quantis culpa nocuisset, ut appensionis illius, qua trutinabantur, aequitas et momenta constarent.
140. Jul. Attend, then, to what the whole disputation has accomplished. If the grace of Christ and the fault of Adam were reckoned equally in their diverse effects, so as to be equal even in the number of operations, though they differed in the kind of operations, it would have to be taught that grace profited as many as fault had harmed, so that the equity and weights of that scale by which they were balanced might stand.
Iulianum.2.140Subvenire ergo debuit etiam illis omnino locis illisque partibus medicina, quibus insederat aegritudo, id est si aliquid in motibus genitalium, in sensibus coeuntium, in obscaenitate membrorum, in infelicitate nascentium antiquum crimen effecerat, immutatione horum, quae diximus, remedia contulisset; alioquin grande testimonium imbecillae artis nihilque profuturae nec locum aegritudinis invenisse et languentibus eversisque naturalibus inertia fomenta voluntatibus admovisse.
The medicine, then, ought to have come to the aid of altogether those very places and those very parts in which the sickness had settled, that is: if the ancient crime had wrought something in the movements of the genitals, in the senses of those who couple, in the obscenity of the members, in the unhappiness of those who are born, it would have conferred remedies by the change of these things which we have mentioned; otherwise it is a great proof of a feeble art, profiting in nothing, both not to have found the place of the sickness and to have applied inert poultices to wills languishing and overthrown.
Iulianum.2.140Aug. Iam responsum est, cum de distantia praesentis et futuri saeculi locuti sumus (Cf. supra 93-94. 106). Hic enim accipimus per pignus spiritus et certandi et vincendi vires; ibi autem sine hoste ullo externo et interno ineffabili ac sempiterna pace perfruemur. Quisquis ergo omnia, quae ibi habenda sunt, hic vult habere, fidem se indicat non habere.
Aug. It has already been answered, when we spoke of the distance between the present and the future age (See above, 93-94.106). For here we receive, through the pledge of the Spirit, the strength both to struggle and to conquer; but there, without any enemy external and internal, we shall fully enjoy ineffable and everlasting peace. Whoever, then, wishes to have here all the things which are to be had there, shows that he does not have faith.
Iulianum.2.140141. Iul. Ostendit autem inter haec veritas, quia, etsi prodesset effusa generaliter medicina motibus atque mortalibus, illis quoque, qui eam nullo studio nec ulla intentione meruissent, non tamen continuo noceret culpa nascentibus, qui nihil ad eam assensionis admovere potuissent. Ac per hoc, etsi aequalis esset gratiae peccatique taxatio, clarebat tamen ne tum quidem eiusmodi appensionem eo usque constare, ut quisquam nasci probaretur reus.
141. Jul. But amid these things truth has shown that, even if the medicine poured out generally profited the movements and the mortal, even those who had merited it by no zeal nor any intention, fault nonetheless would not forthwith harm those who are born, who could have brought to it nothing of assent. And through this, even if the reckoning of grace and of sin were equal, it would yet be clear that not even then would such a balance stand so far that anyone should be proved to be born guilty.
Iulianum.2.141Aug. In illo gravi iugo, quo etiam parvuli premuntur, quomodo est iustus Deus, si nullus nascitur reus?
Aug. In that heavy yoke by which little children too are pressed, how is God just, if no one is born guilty?
Iulianum.2.141142. Iul. Nunc autem, cum Apostolus non solum non postposuerit culpae gratiam, verum etiam praeposuerit dicens multo in plures abundasse beneficia quam irrepsisse dispendia, per opinionem autem traducis multo magis constet nocuisse peccata quam profuisse gratiam, irrefutabiliter approbatum est apostolum Paulum nihil sensisse de traduce, sed eius sententia Traducianos cum Manichaeis magistris suis pariter fuisse destructos.
142. Jul. But now, since the Apostle not only did not place grace after fault, but even placed it before, saying that the benefits abounded much unto more people than the losses crept in—but according to the opinion of traducianism it is established that sins harmed much more than grace profited—it has been irrefutably proved that the apostle Paul meant nothing of traducianism, but that by his opinion the Traducianists were destroyed together with their Manichean masters.
Iulianum.2.142Aug. Non dixit apostolus Paulus: " Multo in plures abundasse beneficia quam irrepsisse dispendia ", non hoc dixit; prorsus falleris, si ipse non fallis. Multo magis enim abundasse gratiam dixit in multos, non in magis multos, sed magis abundasse. In comparatione namque pereuntium pauci sunt, qui salvantur; sine comparatione autem pereuntium et ipsi multi sunt. Sed quare sint illi plures quam illi, consilium Dei velle nosse multorum est, nosse autem vel paucissimorum hominum vel omnino nullorum.
Aug. The apostle Paul did not say, "The benefits abounded much unto more people than the losses crept in"—he did not say this; you are utterly deceived, if you yourself do not deceive. For he said that grace abounded much more unto many, not unto more many, but abounded more. For in comparison with those who perish, few are those who are saved; but without comparison with those who perish, even they are many. But why those are more than these, to wish to know the counsel of God belongs to many, but to know it belongs to very few human beings, or to none at all.
Iulianum.2.142Posset enim omnipotens non creare, quos omnium rerum praescius malos futuros ignorare non posset, nisi uti etiam malis pluribus optime optimus posset; unde nos aliquid Apostolus docuit, id est ut iram suam potentiamque monstraret in eis, quae attulit in multa patientia vasa irae, et ut notas faceret divitias gloriae suae in vasa misericordiae (Cf. Rom 9, 22-23).
For the omnipotent could refrain from creating those whom, foreknowing all things, he could not be ignorant would be evil, unless he could also use even the more numerous evil ones in the best way—of which the Apostle taught us something, that is, that he might show his wrath and power in those whom he brought, in much patience, as vessels of wrath, and that he might make known the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy (See Rom 9:22-23).
Iulianum.2.142Sed nolunt credere Pelagiani, quod in uno homine tota est massa vitiata et tota damnata; a quo vitio et damnatione sola sanat et liberat gratia. Quare enim iustus vix salvus erit (Cf. 1 Pt 4, 18)? Numquid liberare iustum labor est Deo? Absit!
But the Pelagians are unwilling to believe that in one man the whole mass was corrupted and the whole condemned; from which corruption and condemnation grace alone heals and frees. For why will the just man scarcely be saved (See 1 Pet 4:18)? Is it labor for God to free the just? By no means!
Iulianum.2.142Sed ut ostendatur, quo merito fuerit damnata natura, non vult facile de tanto malo nec ipse omnipotens liberare; propter quod et peccata proclivia sunt et laboriosa iustitia nisi amantibus; sed caritas, quae hos amantes facit, ex Deo est (Cf. 1 Io 4, 7).
But, that it may be shown by what merit nature was condemned, not even the omnipotent himself wills easily to free from so great an evil; on account of which both sins are easy and justice laborious, except to those who love; but the love which makes these lovers is from God (See 1 John 4:7).
Iulianum.2.142143. Iul. Verum, quia hic fui longior, pergamus ad reliqua.
143. Jul. But, because I have been rather long here, let us proceed to the rest.
Iulianum.2.143Aug. Ita hoc dicis, quasi alibi brevior sis futurus, cum loquacissime inquiras, quemadmodum Apostoli manifestissimis verbis nebulas ingeras vanitatis.
Aug. You say this as though elsewhere you were going to be briefer, when you inquire most loquaciously how you may bring clouds of vanity upon the most manifest words of the Apostle.
Iulianum.2.143144. Iul. Omnes autem dixit ad condemnationem per Adam et omnes ad iustificationem vitae per Iesum Christum, cum utique non omnes eos, qui moriuntur in Adam, transferat Christus ad vitam, sed omnes dixit atque omnes, quia sicut sine Adam nullus ad mortem, ita sine Christo nullus ad vitam. Sicut dicimus de litterarum magistro, si in civitate solus est: omnes iste hic litteras docet, non quia omnes discunt, sed quia nemo nisi ab ipso. Quos autem omnes dixerat, multos postea dixit, eosdem tamen omnes multosque significans. " Sicut enim per unius inoboedientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi, ita et per unius oboedientiam iusti constituentur multi " (Rom 5, 19). Adhuc quaerat, per quid peccatum inveniatur in parvulo; respondent ei Paginae sanctae: " Per unum hominem peccatum in mundum intravit " (Rom 5, 12; De nupt. et concup. 2, 46-47). Sanctas quidem Apostoli esse paginas confitemur non ob aliud, nisi quia rationi pietati fidei congruentes erudiunt nos et Deum credere inviolabilis aequitatis et opera eius bona honestaque defendere et praeceptis eius moderationem prudentiam iustitiam vindicare.
144. Jul. But he said all unto condemnation through Adam and all unto the justification of life through Jesus Christ, although Christ surely does not transfer to life all who die in Adam, but he said all and all, because, just as without Adam none unto death, so without Christ none unto life. As we say of a teacher of letters, if he is the only one in a city: This man teaches all here their letters—not because all learn, but because no one except from him. But those whom he had called all, he afterward called many, signifying nonetheless the same all and many. For as through the disobedience of one many were made sinners, so also through the obedience of one many shall be made just (Rom 5:19). Let him still ask through what sin is found in a little child; the holy Pages answer him: Through one man sin entered into the world (Rom 5:12; Marriage and Desire 2.46-47). We confess indeed that the pages of the Apostle are holy, for no other reason than that, agreeing with reason, piety, and faith, they instruct us both to believe God of inviolable equity, and to defend his works as good and honorable, and to vindicate for his precepts moderation, prudence, justice.
Iulianum.2.144Aug. Ipsa te convincit in parvulis aequitas Dei, quoniam magna est iniquitas, si iugo gravi premuntur et parvuli sine ullo merito vinculoque peccati.
Aug. The very equity of God convicts you in the case of little children, since it is a great iniquity if little children too are pressed by a heavy yoke without any merit and bond of sin.
Iulianum.2.144145. Iul. Ac per hoc negare quemquam pro alterius peccato posse damnari, negare ullum peccatum ad posteros naturae condicione transire atque credere atque asserere hominem de instituta a Deo fecunditate genitum liberi arbitrii iustis legibus conveniri, ut vitet omne, quod malum est, exerceat omne, quod bonum est, nec secundum vos aestimet amorem et necessitatem criminum substantiae suae causis, id est ipsis adhaesisse seminibus nec recipiat tam stultam, tam insanam, tam impiam sententiam in contumeliam videlicet naturae rationis Dei Apostoli volumine contineri, quia dixerit per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intrasse et in omnes homines transisse mortem (Cf. Rom 5, 12), cum hoc diu caligare non siverit, addens eos, quos omnes dixerat, debere multos intellegi, qui imitatione, non generatione peccassent (Cf. Rom 5, 19).
145. Jul. And through this, to deny that anyone can be damned for another's sin, to deny that any sin passes to descendants by the condition of nature, and to believe and assert that a human being, born of the fecundity instituted by God, is dealt with by the just laws of free choice, so that he may avoid all that is evil and practice all that is good, and may not, according to you, reckon that the love and necessity of crimes cleaves to the causes of his substance, that is, to the very seeds, nor accept so foolish, so insane, so impious an opinion—namely, that it is contained in the volume of the Apostle, to the reproach of nature, of reason, of God—because he said that through one man sin entered into this world and that death passed into all human beings (See Rom 5:12), when he did not allow this to remain long in darkness, adding that those whom he had called all must be understood as many, who had sinned by imitation, not by generation (See Rom 5:19).
Iulianum.2.145Aug. Potes dicere non omnes gentes semini Abrahae fuisse promissas, ubi dictum est: In semine tuo benedicentur omnes gentes (Gen 22, 18), quia easdem dixit et multas, ubi legitur: Patrem multarum gentium posui te (Gen 17, 5)? Potes, inquam, hoc dicere et in eo quoque loco Scripturae praenuntianti, quod rebus ipsis videmus impleri, tuo vaniloquio contradicere et prohibere nos intellegere omnes gentes, ubi promissae sunt quid aliud quam omnes gentes? Quia per tuam dialecticam omnes non pro " omnibus ",sed pro " multis ", quae omnes non sunt, positas atque intellegendas doces. Si autem possunt quidem, ubi dicuntur multi, non omnes intellegi, sed tamen, ubi dicuntur omnes vereque sunt omnes, recte dicuntur et multi, ne ipsi omnes pauci intellegantur, sicut illi sancti, quos ignis ardens urere est vetitus, omnes inter innoxias flammas laudabant Deum et tamen ipsi omnes pauci erant, quoniam tres erant (Cf. Dan 3, 49-51), quid habet virium argumentatio tua, qua propterea omnes non vis omnes intellegi, quoniam idem ipsi dicti sunt multi? Quandoquidem, qui vere sunt omnes, ideo nonnumquam dicuntur et multi, ut discernantur ab eis, quicumque ita sunt omnes, ut sint tamen pauci. Capilli quippe hominis omnes etiam multi sunt, digiti vero etiam omnes pauci sunt.
Aug. Can you say that not all nations were promised to the seed of Abraham, where it was said, In your seed all nations shall be blessed (Gen 22:18), because he called the same ones also many, where it is read, I have made you the father of many nations (Gen 17:5)? Can you, I say, say this, and in that passage too of Scripture foretelling what we see fulfilled in the facts themselves, contradict by your empty talk and forbid us to understand all nations, where they were promised, as anything other than all nations? For by your dialectic you teach that all is set down and to be understood not for "all" but for "many," which are not all. But if, indeed, where many are said, not all can be understood, yet where all are said and truly are all, they are rightly called many too, lest those same all be understood as few—just as those holy ones whom the burning fire was forbidden to scorch, all amid the harmless flames were praising God, and yet those all were few, since they were three (See Dan 3:49-51)—what force has your argument, by which you are unwilling that all be understood as all, because the same ones were called many? Since those who truly are all are for this reason sometimes called many too, that they may be distinguished from those who are all in such a way that they are nonetheless few. For all the hairs of a man are also many, but the fingers, even all of them, are few.
Iulianum.2.145146. Iul. Totum denique, quod egerat, enodavit dicens: Sicut enim per inoboedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi, ita et per unius oboedientiam iusti constituentur multi (Rom 5, 19), ut, sicut nemo praemia virtutis meretur, nisi qui ad ea post incarnationem tamen Christi sanctitatis eius imitatione contenderit, ita in Adam praevaricator nemo teneatur, nisi qui in transgressione legis, qua peccati est facta cognitio, primi hominis imitatione deliquerit.
146. Jul. Finally, he unraveled the whole of what he had done, saying, For as through the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so also through the obedience of one many shall be made just (Rom 5:19); so that, just as no one merits the rewards of virtue except him who, after the incarnation of Christ, has striven toward them by the imitation of his holiness, so in Adam no one is held a transgressor except him who, in the transgression of the law—by which there was made the knowledge of sin—has offended by the imitation of the first man.
Iulianum.2.146Aug. Hoc est occultum et horrendum virus haeresis vestrae, ut velitis gratiam Christi in exemplo eius esse, non in dono eius dicentes, quia per eius imitationem fiunt iusti, non per sumministrationem Spiritus Sancti, ut eum imitentur, adducti, quem Spiritum super suos ditissime effudit (Cf. Phil 1, 19); et quasi vigilanter additis: Post incarnationem tamen eius propter antiquos videlicet, quos sine gratia eius fuisse dicitis iustos, eo quod non habuerint eius exemplum.
Aug. This is the hidden and horrible venom of your heresy, that you wish the grace of Christ to be in his example, not in his gift, saying that human beings are made just through his imitation, not led, through the supplying of the Holy Spirit, to imitate him—the Spirit which he most richly poured out upon his own (See Phil 1:19); and, as though vigilantly, you add: after his incarnation, however—namely on account of the ancients, whom you say were just without his grace, in that they did not have his example.
Iulianum.2.146Quid si ergo et post incarnationem Christi nondum audito Evangelio proposuerint sibi aliqui homines superiorum exempla iustorum iusteque vixerint ? Quid agitis? Ubi vos videtis? Itane vero isti virtutis praemia non merentur? Si ergo ex iustorum imitatione iustitia, Christus gratis mortuus est (Cf. Gal 2, 21), quia fuerunt iusti et ante ipsum, quos imitari possent, qui iusti esse voluissent. Quid est etiam quod Apostolus non ait: Imitatores estote Christi, sicut et ego; sed ait: Imitatores mei estote, sicut et ego Christi (1 Cor 11, 1)? Ergo se illis voluit esse pro Christo? Videtisne, quae mala vos consequantur, quando Adam et Christum Apostolo proponente vos imitationem imitationi, non regenerationem generationi vultis opponere?
What, then, if even after the incarnation of Christ, before the Gospel was heard, some human beings set before themselves the examples of the earlier just ones and lived justly? What do you do? Where do you see yourselves? Do those, then, indeed not merit the rewards of virtue? If, then, justice is from the imitation of the just, Christ died in vain (See Gal 2:21), because there were just ones even before him whom those who wished to be just could imitate. What is it, too, that the Apostle does not say, Be imitators of Christ, as I am, but says, Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ (1 Cor 11:1)? Did he wish, then, to be to them in place of Christ? Do you see what evils follow you, when, with the Apostle setting forth Adam and Christ, you wish to oppose imitation to imitation, not regeneration to generation?
Iulianum.2.146147. Iul. Pervenire autem et ad innocentes gratiam Christi, ad quos Adae culpa non pervenit, propter quod vigilanter inculcavit: Multo magis gratia Dei et donum unius hominis Iesu Christi in plures abundavit (Rom 5, 15), ut illa superior coaequatio eius aetatis, quae ratione utitur, in contrariis studiis indicet imitationem, haec autem in gratiae largitate praelatio consecratos et provectos approbet innocentes. Quae cum ita sint, tibi, non mihi Apostolum obviare senti, contra te eum arma ferre cognoscito, qui dogma tuum praeceptorisque tui Fausti, a quo es velut prima manu tinctus, hoc uno, si cetera deessent, vehementer everteret, quia dicit per unius inoboedientiam multos, non omnes peccatores constitutos fuisse et per unius oboedientiam iustos non omnes constitutos fuisse, sed multos. Ut enim diligenter, quam tibi sermo hic repugnet, lectoris intellegentiae suggeratur, Apostolus pronuntiat non omnes per Adam peccatores constitutos fuisse, tu dicis omnes omnino per Adam peccato naturali ad ius diaboli pertinere; ambigi non potest inter te et Apostolum magnam esse pugnam.
147. Jul. But that the grace of Christ reaches also to the innocent, to whom the fault of Adam does not reach—on account of which he vigilantly pressed home, Much more did the grace of God and the gift of the one man Jesus Christ abound unto more people (Rom 5:15)—so that that earlier equalization, of that age which uses reason, indicates imitation in contrary pursuits, but this preferment, in the bounty of grace, proves the innocent to be consecrated and advanced. Since these things are so, perceive that the Apostle stands in your way, not mine; recognize that he bears arms against you, who would vehemently overturn your dogma and that of your teacher Faustus—by whom you were dyed, as it were, with the first hand—by this one thing, if the rest were lacking: because he says that through the disobedience of one, many, not all, were made sinners, and through the obedience of one, not all were made just, but many. For that it may be carefully supplied to the reader's understanding how this discourse is repugnant to you: the Apostle pronounces that not all were made sinners through Adam; you say that absolutely all, through Adam, pertain by natural sin to the right of the devil; it cannot be doubted that there is a great battle between you and the Apostle.
Iulianum.2.147Aug. Omnes dicit eosdemque multos; non multos dicendo negat omnes, ne sibi sit ipse contrarius, sicut vestra aut fallit improbitas aut fallitur caecitas. Quia enim utrumque dixit Apostolus, et omnes et multos, ostendi ego non inter se duo ista pugnare, quia ipsi omnes ideo etiam multi sunt dicti, quia omnes aliquando dicuntur et pauci, tu autem dicendo non omnes, quos omnes dixit Apostolus, procul dubio convinceris Apostolo esse contrarius.
Aug. He says all and the same ones many; by saying many he does not deny all, lest he be contrary to himself, as your wickedness either deceives or your blindness is deceived. For because the Apostle said both all and many, I have shown that these two do not battle each other, because those same all were for this reason called also many, because all are sometimes called even few; but you, by saying not all those whom the Apostle called all, are without doubt convicted of being contrary to the Apostle.
Iulianum.2.147148. Iul. Nam cum tu et Manichaeus dicitis: Omnes sunt naturaliter peccatores, Apostolus autem dicit: Multi sunt, non omnes peccatores, removet accusationem a seminibus, quae armatur in mores, et destruit originale peccatum. Utque hoc ipsum, quod egimus, urgeamus: praescribit Apostolus multos debere intellegi per Adae inoboedientiam peccatores, multos autem per Christi oboedientiam iustos eos utique, qui iusti sunt, ostendens ab illis, qui criminosi sunt, esse discretos; tu quia impudentia argumentari niteris, ut ex his sermonibus probes naturale peccatum? Nam cum dicis omnes nasci criminosos per Adam et propter hoc ad diabolum pertinere, sed aliquos inde per Christum postea liberari, non hoc sentis, quod Apostolus, qui dicit non omnes per Adam peccatores constitutos esse, sed multos.
148. Jul. For when you and Manichaeus say, All are by nature sinners, but the Apostle says, Many are sinners, not all, he removes the accusation from the seeds, which is armed against morals, and destroys original sin. And that we may press home this very thing which we have done: the Apostle lays it down that many must be understood as made sinners through Adam's disobedience, and many as made just through Christ's obedience—showing surely that those who are just are distinguished from those who are criminal; do you, because you strive with shamelessness to argue, prove natural sin from these discourses? For when you say that all are born criminal through Adam, and on account of this pertain to the devil, but that some are afterward freed thence through Christ, you do not mean what the Apostle means, who says that not all were made sinners through Adam, but many.
Iulianum.2.148Aug. Quoniam non est contrarium, sicut iam ostendimus, ut idem sint multi, qui sunt omnes, ideo quos multos, eosdem omnes Apostolus dicit; non omnes autem non Apostolus, sed tu dicis ac per hoc Apostolo contradicis. Verum est autem, quod Apostolus dicit; falsum ergo, quod tu dicis. Et quod superius dixisti (Cf. supra 147) vigilanter inculcasse Apostolum: Multo magis gratia Dei et donum unius hominis Iesu Christi in plures abundavit (Rom 5, 15) volens intellegi ideo plures dictos, quia pervenit gratia eius ad parvulos, ad quos imitatio primi hominis non pertinet, aut mendosus codex tibi mentitus est aut ipse mentiris aut ab aliquo falso sive fallente aut oblivione deceptus es.
Aug. Since it is not contrary, as we have already shown, that the same be many who are all, therefore the Apostle says that those who are many are the same all; but it is not the Apostle, it is you, who say "not all," and through this you contradict the Apostle. But what the Apostle says is true; therefore what you say is false. And as for what you said above (See above, 147)—that the Apostle vigilantly pressed home, Much more did the grace of God and the gift of the one man Jesus Christ abound unto more people (Rom 5:15), wishing it to be understood that for this reason "more people" was said, because his grace reaches the little children, to whom the imitation of the first man does not pertain—either a faulty codex has lied to you, or you yourself lie, or you have been deceived by some false or deceiving person, or by forgetfulness.
Iulianum.2.148Non enim ait Apostolus " plures " sed multos. Graecum attende codicem et invenies pollous, non " pleisous ". Dixit ergo multo magis abundasse gra tiam in multos, non in magis multos, hoc est non in plures, sicut iam ostendimus, quoniam, si plures dixisset, propter parvulos, quos tenet gratia, cum primi hominis non teneat imitatio, falsum dixisset et esset similis vobis. Si enim omnes imitatores Christi post eius incarnationem regeneratis parvulis additis conferantur cum peccatoribus, quos omnes vultis propter arbitrium libertatis ad imitationem primi hominis pertinere ab ipso Adam usque in finem saeculi voluntate peccantes, qui eorum multo plures sint, evidenter apparet, ut et vestra falsitate vincamini.
For the Apostle did not say "more people," but many. Attend to the Greek codex, and you will find "pollous," not "pleiosus." He said, then, that grace abounded much more unto many, not unto more many, that is, not unto more people, as we have already shown; since, if he had said "more people," on account of the little children whom grace holds, though the imitation of the first man does not hold them, he would have said something false and would be like you. For if all the imitators of Christ after his incarnation, with the regenerated little children added, were compared with the sinners—whom you wish all, on account of the choice of liberty, to pertain to the imitation of the first man, from Adam himself to the end of the age, sinning by their will—how much more numerous these are appears evidently, so that you are conquered by your own falsity too.
Iulianum.2.148149. Iul. Si enim, quale tu, tale aliquid ille sensisset, debuit utique dicere: Per unius inoboedientiam peccatores constituti sunt omnes, sed per oboedientiam Christi ex his aliqui ad iustitiam reverterunt. Ita enim prorsus ei loquendum fuerat, si hoc, quod tu fingis, voluisset intellegi. Verumtamen cum hac sententia illud aliud nequivisset asserere multo magis profuisse Christi gratiam, quam Adae laesisset iniquitas. Etsi ergo penitus nesciremus, qui mos esset, quo per inoboedientiam unius hominis multi peccatores constitui dicerentur, tamen maneret in solido non hoc pertinere ad originale peccatum, quod Apostolus inculcaverat multis, non omnibus convenire.
149. Jul. For if he had meant something such as you do, he ought surely to have said: Through the disobedience of one all were made sinners, but through the obedience of Christ some of these returned to justice. For so he would altogether have had to speak, if he had wished that to be understood which you imagine. Yet with this opinion he could not have asserted that other thing—that the grace of Christ profited much more than the iniquity of Adam had injured. Even if, then, we were utterly ignorant what the manner was by which, through the disobedience of one man, many were said to be made sinners, it would yet remain on solid ground that this does not pertain to original sin, which the Apostle had pressed home as suiting many, not all.
Iulianum.2.149Aug. De multis et omnibus iam responsum est. Nec sic locutum fuisse Apostolum, quemadmodum dicis eum loqui debuisse, si hoc diceret, quod nos dicimus, quid mirum est? Quandoquidem etiamsi secundum vos Apostolus per unius delictum ita multos peccatores constitutos esse dixisset, ut idem multi non possent omnes intellegi, sed hi tantum qui ex imitatione primi hominis propria voluntate peccarunt, non dixit per oboedientiam Christi ex his aliquos iustificatos, quod tamen verum est. Quid est ergo, quod dicis, si tale aliquid, quale nos, sensisset Apostolus, eum dicere debuisse: Per unius inoboedientiam peccatores constituti sunt omnes, sed per oboedientiam Christi ex his aliqui ad iustitiam reverterunt? Quasi vos negetis ex praevaricatoribus legis, quales tantummodo peccatores ad similitudinem praevaricationis Adae pertinere contenditis, aliquos per oboedientiam Christi ad iustitiam fuisse conversos. Possumus ergo et nos vobis dicere: Si tale aliquid, quale vos, sensisset Apostolus, debuit utique dicere: Per unius inoboedientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi quidem, non omnes, sed etiam ex his per oboedientiam Christi aliqui ad iustitiam reverterunt; aut etiam multo apertius ita loqueretur, si aliquid tale sensisset, ut diceret: Multi quidem Iudaeorum per inoboedientiam unius hominis peccatores sunt constituti, qui lege accepta simili praevaricatione peccarunt, sed etiam ex his aliquos iustificavit Christi oboedientia. Quod si tibi non praeiudicavit non ita loquendo, sicut dixi eum loqui debuisse, si hoc sentiret, quod tu, nec mihi utique praeiudicare debet, quia non ita locutus est, quomodo eum dicis loqui debuisse, si hoc sentiret, quod ego. Cum ergo Apostolus ita sit locutus, sicut loquendum esse arbitratus est, videndum est, quis ei nostrum consentiat, utrum ego, qui dico verum esse quod ait: Per unius delictum in omnes homines ad condemnationem (Rom 5, 18), et verum esse quod ait: Per unius inoboedientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi (Rom 5, 19), quoniam non repugnat, ut qui multi sunt, omnes sint et, qui omnes sunt, multi sint, an tu, qui dicis: Ubi ait multos, multi sunt, ubi ait omnes, non omnes sunt.
Aug. About many and all it has already been answered. And that the Apostle did not speak as you say he ought to have spoken, if he meant what we say—what wonder is it? Since even if, according to you, the Apostle had said that through the offense of one many were made sinners in such a way that those same many could not be understood as all, but only those who sinned by their own will from the imitation of the first man, he did not say that some of these were justified through the obedience of Christ, which is nonetheless true. What is it, then, that you say—that, if the Apostle had meant something such as we do, he ought to have said: Through the disobedience of one all were made sinners, but through the obedience of Christ some of these returned to justice? As though you denied that, of the transgressors of the law—the only sinners you contend pertain to the likeness of Adam's transgression—some were converted to justice through the obedience of Christ. We too, then, can say to you: If the Apostle had meant something such as you do, he ought surely to have said: Through the disobedience of one many indeed, not all, were made sinners, but of these too some returned to justice through the obedience of Christ; or even much more openly he would so speak, if he meant something of the sort, as to say: Many indeed of the Jews were made sinners through the disobedience of one man, who, having received the law, sinned by a like transgression, but of these too the obedience of Christ justified some. But if it did not prejudge you that he did not so speak, as I said he ought to have spoken if he meant what you do, neither surely ought it to prejudge me that he did not speak as you say he ought to have spoken if he meant what I do. Since, then, the Apostle so spoke as he judged it ought to be spoken, it must be seen which of us agrees with him—whether I, who say that what he says is true, Through the offense of one unto all human beings unto condemnation (Rom 5:18), and that what he says is true, Through the disobedience of one many were made sinners (Rom 5:19), since it is not repugnant that those who are many should be all, and those who are all should be many—or you, who say: Where he says many, they are many; where he says all, they are not all.
Iulianum.2.149150. Iul. Patefacta igitur vel imperitia vel impudentia tua, quae aut non curat aut non valet, quid dicatur, exponere, ostensoque veritatis ipsius, quam se esse Christus appellavit (Cf. Io 14, 6), lumine nihil de apostoli Pauli sermonibus Manichaeae id est vestrae cohaerere dementiae, nunc expositioni operam demus, ut, sicut ostensum est, qualiter non possit, ita clareat, qualiter et debeat Paulus et possit intellegi.
150. Jul. Your inexperience, then, or your shamelessness—which either does not care or is not able to expound what is said—being laid bare, and it having been shown, by the light of truth itself, which Christ called himself (See John 14:6), that nothing of the apostle Paul's discourses coheres with the Manichean, that is, your, madness, let us now devote our effort to exposition, so that, just as it has been shown how Paul cannot be understood, so it may grow clear how he both ought and can be understood.
Iulianum.2.150Aug. Ita desereris veritate et contra manifesta Apostoli verba non potes invenire quid dicas, ut, quod in eis intellexerunt tot sancti clarique Doctores, qui hoc in Ecclesia catholica didicerunt atque docuerunt (non enim sanum sensum habentes in tam manifestis verbis aliud intellegere potuerunt), tu Manichaeorum esse dicas, quod illos non fuisse cogeris confiteri, quantolibet veneno Pelagianae pestis insanias.
Aug. You are so deserted by truth and, against the manifest words of the Apostle, can find nothing to say, that what so many holy and illustrious Doctors understood in them—who learned and taught this in the Catholic Church (for, having a sound sense, they could not understand otherwise in such manifest words)—you say is of the Manichees, which you are compelled to confess those men were not, however much you rave with the venom of the Pelagian pestilence.
Iulianum.2.150151. Iul. Scribens itaque ad Romanos eo iam tempore, quo Gentium coeperat esse permixtio atque ideo tam ex Iudaeis quam ex Gentibus complebantur Ecclesiae, tumultus populi utriusque componit inculcans, quoniam nec Gentes impietatem suam, qua mutaverant gloriam Dei in similitudine imaginis hominis et volucrum et quadrupedum et serpentium, legis possint ignoratione diluere, quae per vim rationis ingenitae, etsi non ritum cerimoniarum Iudaicarum, tamen Deum innotescentem operibus, substantiae vero profunditate secretum, potuerint ex his, ab eo quae sunt facta, cognoscere.
151. Jul. Writing, therefore, to the Romans at that time when a mingling of the gentiles had begun, and therefore the Churches were being filled both from Jews and from gentiles, he composes the tumults of both peoples, pressing home that the gentiles cannot wash away their impiety—by which they had changed the glory of God into the likeness of the image of a man and of birds and of four-footed beasts and of serpents—by ignorance of the law, since by the force of inborn reason, even if not the rite of the Jewish ceremonies, yet God, made known by his works but secret in the depth of his substance, they could have recognized from these things which were made by him.
Iulianum.2.151Legis autem normam, quantum ad vitae probitatem respicit, proprius unicuique suggerebat affectus, videlicet ut nihil tale inferret proximo, quale perpeti noluisset; atque ideo profanitatem Gentium iure optimo argui posse convincit, etsi non per legem, per eam tamen iustitiam, quae condidit legem,
But the norm of the law, as far as regards uprightness of life, each one's own affection suggested—namely, that he should bring upon his neighbor nothing such as he would have been unwilling to suffer; and therefore he proves that the profanity of the gentiles can with the best right be refuted, even if not through the law, yet through that justice which founded the law,
Iulianum.2.151et qua iudicante hi, qui sine lege peccaverunt, sine lege et peribunt. Iudaeos vero, quorum magis intererat, quia in despectum Gentium maxime tumescebant, honorem sibi de legis purificationibus vindicantes ac per hoc aestimantes non sibi ita ut Gentibus profuisse Christi gratiam peccata donantem, quandoquidem legis ea institutione vitassent, magna disputationum virtute confringit allegans eis tanto amplius per indulgentiam fuisse collatum, quanto post legis admonitionem sine ulla ignoratione peccassent;
and by whose judgment those who sinned without the law shall also perish without the law. But the Jews—whose concern it was the more, because they were swelling up especially in contempt of the gentiles, claiming honor for themselves from the purifications of the law and thereby reckoning that the grace of Christ remitting sins did not profit them as it did the gentiles, since by that institution of the law they had avoided them—he shatters with great force of disputation, alleging to them that so much the more was conferred through indulgence, the more, after the admonition of the law, they had sinned without any ignorance;
Iulianum.2.151per quod approbat eos reos fuisse et vehementer potuisse damnari in iustitiae examine, apud quem qui in lege peccaverunt, per legem iudicabuntur: Non enim auditores legis iusti sunt apud Deum, sed factores legis iustificabuntur (Rom 2, 13). Hoc ergo proposito per totum librum disputans tum superbiam reprimit Iudaeorum, tum excusationem vanitatis Gentibus demit, ut doceat aequaliter ambobus populis Christi profuisse medicinam.
through which he proves that they were guilty and could vehemently have been damned in the examination of justice, before whom those who sinned in the law shall be judged through the law: For it is not the hearers of the law who are just before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified (Rom 2:13). With this purpose, then, disputing through the whole book, he both represses the pride of the Jews and removes from the gentiles the excuse of vanity, so as to teach that the medicine of Christ profited both peoples equally.
Iulianum.2.151Aug. Hanc medicinam parvulis vos negatis, quos lex ipsa circumcidi octavo die iussit eius gratiam praefigurans, cuius resurrectionem dominicus, id est post septimum sabbati dies octavus ostendit; nec valetis ac vultis attendere ita parvulum morientem sine Christi gratia periturum, quemadmodum dictum est incircumcisi animam parvuli interire de populo suo (Cf. Gen 17, 14), cuius interitus invenire meritum non potestis, quamdiu non trahere peccatum originis parvulos dicitis.
Aug. This medicine you deny to little children, whom the law itself commanded to be circumcised on the eighth day, prefiguring the grace of him whose resurrection the Lord's day—that is, the eighth day after the seventh of the Sabbath—shows; nor are you able and willing to attend that a dying little child will so perish without the grace of Christ, as it was said that the soul of the uncircumcised little child perishes from his people (See Gen 17:14)—the merit of whose perishing you cannot find, so long as you say that little children do not draw the sin of origin.
Iulianum.2.151152. Iul. Qui et crimina voluntatis ignovit, a quibus liberum fuerat abstinere, et sui imitatione, qui erat virtutum forma et norma, correctis gloriam beatae aeternitatis indulsit. Cum ergo utramque nationem pro voluminis sui tempore et iure conveniat, in his tamen locis, de quibus quaestio est, cum Israelitis omnino manum conserit, qui audebant de praeputiorum stirpe venientes eo usque despicere ut affirmarent eos nec suffragio fidei ad consortium suum transire potuisse; contra quod supercilium replicat Iudaeae gentis exordia et in ipsa radice circumcisionis ostendit non tanti esse praeputium, ut aut iniustos eius relictio aut iustos faciat eius ablatio.
152. Jul. He who both pardoned the crimes of the will, from which it was free to abstain, and granted the glory of blessed eternity to those corrected by the imitation of himself, who was the form and norm of virtues. Since, then, it suits him to deal with both nations according to the time and right of his volume, yet in these passages, about which is the question, he wholly joins hands with the Israelites, who, coming from the stock of the circumcised, dared to despise them so far as to affirm that they could not, even by the support of faith, pass over to their fellowship; against which haughtiness he unfolds the beginnings of the Jewish nation and shows, in the very root of circumcision, that the foreskin is not of such moment that either its retention makes men unjust or its removal makes them just.
Iulianum.2.152Aug. Quando ista dicebat Apostolus, non de circumcisione vel praeputio, sed de praeceptis legis (Cf. Rom 7, 5), in quibus est etiam: Non concupisces (Ex 20, 17; Deut 5, 21), agebat, quod et ipse commemoravit. Quid tergiversamini? Priores peritis, dum caliginem offunditis imperitis.
Aug. When the Apostle said these things, he was treating not of circumcision or the foreskin, but of the precepts of the law (See Rom 7:5), among which is also, You shall not covet (Exod 20:17; Deut 5:21), which he himself also mentioned. Why do you evade? You harm those who know, while you pour out darkness upon those who do not know.
Iulianum.2.152153. Iul. Non ergo per legem promissio Abrahae, ut haeres esset mundi, sed per iustitiam fidei. Si enim qui sunt ex lege, haeredes sunt, evacuata est fides, destructa est promissio. Lex enim iram operatur; ubi autem non est lex, nec praevaricatio.
153. Jul. Not through the law, then, was the promise to Abraham that he should be heir of the world, but through the justice of faith. For if those who are of the law are heirs, faith is made void, the promise is destroyed. For the law works wrath; but where there is no law, there is no transgression.
Iulianum.2.153Ideo ex fide, ut secundum gratiam firma sit promissio omni semini, non ei tantum, quod ex lege est, sed quod ex fide est Abrahae, qui est pater omnium nostrum, sicut scriptum est: Quia patrem multarum gentium posui te, ante Deum cui credidit, qui vivificat mortuos et vocat ea, quae non sunt, tamquam quae sunt; qui praeter spem in spem credidit, ut fieret pater multarum gentium secundum id, quod dictum est: Sic erit semen tuum, et non infirmatus in fide consideravit corpus suum iam emortuum, cum fere centum annorum esset, et emortuam vulvam Sarrae; in repromissione autem Dei non haesitavit diffidentia, sed confirmatus est fide dans gloriam Deo plenissime sciens, quia quaecumque promisit potens est et facere, propter quod et reputatum est illi ad iustitiam (Rom 4, 13-22).
Therefore it is of faith, that according to grace the promise might be firm to all the seed, not only to that which is of the law, but to that which is of the faith of Abraham, who is the father of us all, as it is written: For I have made you the father of many nations, before God in whom he believed, who makes alive the dead and calls those things which are not as though they were; who against hope believed in hope, that he might become the father of many nations, according to that which was said, So shall your seed be; and, not weakened in faith, he considered his own body now dead, when he was about a hundred years old, and the dead womb of Sarah; but in the promise of God he did not hesitate through distrust, but was strengthened in faith, giving glory to God, most fully knowing that whatever he promised he is also able to do; on account of which it was reckoned to him for justice (Rom 4:13-22).
Iulianum.2.153Aug. Haec te commemorare non pudet, qui oppugnas gratiam, qua ista promissa complentur? Contra Deum enim loquimini dicendo: Nos facimus, quod ille se facturum esse promisit. In Isaac quippe, qui Abrahae promissus est filius, hi praefigurati sunt, non qui se ipsos iustos, sed quos Deus fuerat ipse facturus. Unde universae per Prophetam dicit Ecclesiae: Ego enim sum Dominus qui facio te (Isa 45, 8).
Aug. Are you not ashamed to mention these things, you who assail the grace by which these promises are fulfilled? For you speak against God by saying: We do what he promised that he would do. For in Isaac, the son promised to Abraham, those were prefigured not who make themselves just, but whom God himself was going to make. Whence he says to the whole Church through the prophet, For I am the Lord who makes you (Isa 45:8).
Iulianum.2.153Propter quod et filii promissionis vocantur apertissime dicente Apostolo: Non potest autem excidere verbum Dei; non enim omnes qui ex Israel hi sunt Israel neque quia semen Abrahae omnes filii, sed in Isaac vocabitur tibi semen; hoc est: Non hi qui filii carnis hi filii Dei, sed filii promissionis deputantur in semine (Rom 9, 6-8). Quod itaque Deus promisit, Deus facit. Hoc ergo totum sicut aedificat eos, quorum spes in Deo est, sicut evertit eos, qui confidunt in virtute sua (Ps 48, 7); ac per hoc sicut catholicam fidem aedificat, sic Pelagianum evertit errorem.
On account of which they are also called the children of the promise, the Apostle saying most plainly: But the word of God cannot fail; for not all who are of Israel are Israel, nor, because they are the seed of Abraham, are they all children, but: In Isaac shall your seed be named; that is, it is not the children of the flesh who are the children of God, but the children of the promise are reckoned as the seed (Rom 9:6-8). What, then, God promised, God does. This whole thing, therefore, as it builds up those whose hope is in God, so it overthrows those who trust in their own strength (Ps 49:7 (48)); and through this, as it builds up the Catholic faith, so it overthrows the Pelagian error.
Iulianum.2.153154. Iul. Qui locus quam sit opinioni vestrae totus infestus, et primo opere disputatum est et, si quid hinc recoli oportuerit, disseretur. Nunc autem advertatur promissionem, quae facta est ad Abraham ob remunerationem fidei eius, in qua dicitur, quia pater multarum gentium constitueretur, ostendisse nec unius illum populi genitorem debere defendi, qui multarum gentium sit pater praedictus, nec ita solum credulitatis recepisse mercedem, ut alios similiter credentes a praemii consortio putetur excludere. Non est autem scriptum - inquit - tantummodo propter ipsum, quia reputatum est illi, sed et propter nos, quibus reputabitur credentibus in eum, quisuscitavit Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum a mortuis, qui traditus est propter delicta nostra et resurrexit propter iustificationem nostram (Rom 4, 23-25).
154. Jul. How hostile this passage is, in its entirety, to your opinion, both was disputed in my first work and, if anything from here ought to be recalled, will be discussed. But now let it be noticed that the promise made to Abraham as a reward for his faith—in which it is said that he would be made the father of many nations—showed both that he ought not to be defended as the begetter of one people only, who is foretold to be the father of many nations, and that he so received the reward of his belief that he should not be thought to exclude from the fellowship of the reward others believing likewise. But it was not written, he says, only on account of him, that it was reckoned to him, but also on account of us, to whom it will be reckoned, believing in him who raised Jesus Christ our Lord from the dead, who was handed over on account of our offenses and rose again on account of our justification (Rom 4:23-25).
Iulianum.2.154Aug. Dicite nobis, o vani, non defensores, sed inflatores liberi arbitrii, qui ignorantes Dei iustitiam et vestram iustitiam volentes constituere iustitiae Dei non estis subiecti (Cf. Rom 10, 3); dicite, inquam, nobis: Si noluissent gentes credere iusteque vivere, evacuaretur promissio, quae facta est ad Abraham? Non, inquies. Ergo ut Abraham ob stipendium fidei consequeretur dilatationem seminis, praeparata est gentium voluntas a Domino, et ut vellent, quod et nolle potuissent, ab illo factum est, qui ea, quae promisit, potens est facere.
Aug. Tell us, O empty ones—not defenders, but inflaters of free choice, who, being ignorant of God's justice and wishing to establish your own justice, are not subject to the justice of God (See Rom 10:3)—tell us, I say: If the gentiles had been unwilling to believe and to live justly, would the promise made to Abraham have been made void? No, you will say. Therefore, that Abraham, as the wage of his faith, might obtain the dilation of his seed, the will of the gentiles was prepared by the Lord, and that they should will what they could also have not willed was brought about by him who is able to do what he promised.
Iulianum.2.154155. Iul. Cum ergo ille adhuc in praeputio testis sit fidei pronuntiatus et ob eius stipendium dilatationem fuerit seminis consecutus qua, inquit, regula tu, Iudaee, non putas ad consortium iustitiae pertinere gentiles, qui fidem Abrahae paria de Dei virtutibus credendo restituunt?
155. Jul. Since, then, he, while still in the foreskin, was pronounced a witness of faith, and as its wage obtained the dilation of his seed, by what rule, he says, do you, O Jew, think that the gentiles do not pertain to the fellowship of justice, who restore the faith of Abraham by believing equal things about the powers of God?
Iulianum.2.155Aug. Bene contra vos loqueris, quia utique, si de Dei virtutibus credunt, non sicut vos confidunt in virtute sua, ut iustificentur, id est ut iusti fiant, sed in illius, qui iustificat impium.
Aug. You speak well against yourselves, because surely, if they believe about the powers of God, they do not, as you do, trust in their own strength that they may be justified, that is, made just, but in the strength of him who justifies the impious.
Iulianum.2.155156. Iul. Cur putes, inquit, sine consecrationibus legis ad Abrahae stemma nationes non posse perduci, cum constet promissionem, quae facta est ad Abraham, anteriorem fuisse quam legem nec eam ablutionibus tributam fuisse, sed moribus?
156. Jul. Why, he says, should you think that the nations cannot be led to the lineage of Abraham without the consecrations of the law, when it is established that the promise made to Abraham was earlier than the law and was bestowed not by washings, but by morals?
Iulianum.2.156Aug. Hos mores, quos procul dubio bonos vis intellegi, si, ut putatis, homo sibi facit, praedicere ista debuit Deus praescius, non promittere, ut non de illo in hac causa diceretur: Quae promisit potens est et facere (Rom 4, 21), sed: Quae praescivit, potens est et praenuntiare, aut: Potens est et ostendere. Quando autem dicunt homines: Quod Deus promisit, nos facimus, se ipsos faciunt instantia potentes, illum arrogantia mentientem.
Aug. These morals, which you without doubt wish to be understood as good—if, as you suppose, a man makes them for himself—the foreknowing God ought to have foretold, not promised, so that it might not be said of him in this case, What he promised he is also able to do (Rom 4:21), but: What he foreknew he is also able to foretell, or: He is also able to show. But when men say, What God promised, we do, they make themselves powerful by their effort, and him a liar by their arrogance.
Iulianum.2.156157. Iul. Si enim qui sunt ex lege, haeredes sunt, evacuata est fides, destructa est repromissio (Rom 4, 14). Qui sermo nisi intellegatur, ingerit maximam quaestionem; dubio enim procul dicit eos esse ex lege, quos supra dixerat ex circumcisione, quos sibi tantum noverat arrogare, ut putarent praeter se neminem assumi ad Abrahae seminis dignitatem; atque hoc disputatione collegerat, ut quia non solum hi, qui ex circumcisione, sed et illi, qui ex praeputio sectari voluissent vestigia fidei Abrahae, non immerito Abrahae filii censerentur.
157. Jul. For if those who are of the law are heirs, faith is made void, the promise is destroyed (Rom 4:14). Which discourse, unless it is understood, brings in a very great question; for without doubt he says that those are of the law whom above he had called of the circumcision, who, he knew, claimed so much for themselves that they thought no one besides themselves was taken up to the dignity of the seed of Abraham; and he had gathered this by disputation, that, because not only those who are of the circumcision, but also those of the foreskin who wished to follow the footsteps of Abraham's faith, were not undeservedly reckoned the children of Abraham.
Iulianum.2.157Aug. Quid si noluissent, evacuaretur promissio? Admoneo, ut intellegatis, cui gratiae sitis inimici negando operari Deum voluntates in mentibus hominum, non ut nolentes credant, quod absurdissime dicitur, sed ut volentes ex nolentibus fiant, non sicut facit doctor homo docendo et hortando, minando et promittendo in sermone Dei, quod frustra fit, nisi Deus intus operetur et velle per investigabiles vias suas. Cum enim verbis doctor plantat et rigat, possumus dicere: Forte credit, forte non credit auditor; cum vero dat incrementum Deus (Cf. 1 Cor 3, 8), sine dubio credit et proficit. Ecce quod interest inter legem et promissionem, inter litteram et spiritum.
Aug. What if they had been unwilling—would the promise have been made void? I admonish you to understand to what grace you are enemies by denying that God works wills in the minds of human beings—not that the unwilling believe, which is most absurdly said, but that of the unwilling they become willing—not as a human teacher does by teaching and exhorting, threatening and promising, in the word of God, which is done in vain unless God works within both to will, by his inscrutable ways. For when the teacher plants and waters with words, we can say: Perhaps the hearer believes, perhaps he does not believe; but when God gives the increase (See 1 Cor 3:8), without doubt he believes and advances. Behold what is the difference between the law and the promise, between the letter and the spirit.
Iulianum.2.157158. Iul. Cum ergo superius id egisset, ut intellegeremus a consortio iustitiae non potuisse excludi gentes, sed per eamdem fidem cum filiis circumcisionis in Abrahae stirpe numerari, nunc intulit neminem de circumcisione ad eam promissionem, quae Abrahae data est, pertinere; hoc autem omnino nisi intellegatur, repugnat.
158. Jul. Since, then, above he had done this, that we might understand that the nations could not be excluded from the fellowship of justice, but through the same faith were numbered with the children of the circumcision in the stock of Abraham, now he brought in that no one of the circumcision pertains to that promise which was given to Abraham; but this, unless it is wholly understood, is repugnant.
Iulianum.2.158Quod itaque ait: Si enim qui sunt ex lege, haeredes sunt, evacuata est fides et destructa est promissio (Rom 4, 14), non hoc pronuntiavit, ut videlicet nemo de Iudaeis per fidem fieri credatur haeres promissionis antiquae, sed deest sermo, cuius vicem implet intellegentia, non solos haeredes esse, qui ex lege sunt, ut si hoc modo dictum esset: Si enim qui sunt ex lege, soli haeredes sunt, evacuata est fides. Vere enim praeputium videretur excludi, si ad nullos praeter eos, qui ex circumcisione erant, benedictionis haereditas perveniret. Intellegenda igitur consuetudo Scripturarum est, quia non continuo, quod non dicitur, denegatur, ut intellegentiae opere verborum dispendia suppleantur.
So that what he says—For if those who are of the law are heirs, faith is made void, and the promise is destroyed (Rom 4:14)—he did not pronounce so as to make it believed that no one of the Jews becomes through faith an heir of the ancient promise, but a word is lacking, whose place the understanding fills: that not only those are heirs who are of the law, as if it had been said thus: For if those who are of the law are the only heirs, faith is made void. For the foreskin would truly seem to be excluded, if the inheritance of the blessing reached none besides those who were of the circumcision. The custom of the Scriptures, then, must be understood: that what is not said is not at once denied, so that, by the work of understanding, the losses of words may be supplied.
Iulianum.2.158Aug. Sic intellegunt, qui non intellegunt. Cur non attenditis, rogo, ideo non esse haeredes ex lege, quia lex iram operatur, ubi enim non est lex, nec praevaricatio (Rom 4, 15), ideo autem ex promissione, quia Deus, quod promittit, ipse facit? Qui enim praecepta legis implere se putat per arbitrium propriae voluntatis sine spiritu gratiae, suam iustitiam vult constituere, non iustitiam Dei sumere. Nam unde dicit idem Apostolus: Ut inveniar in illo non habens meam iustitiam, quae ex lege / CSEL 281/ est, sed iustitiam, quae ex fide, iustitiam ex Deo (Phil 3, 9)?
Aug. So understand those who do not understand. Why do you not attend, I ask, that for this reason they are not heirs of the law, because the law works wrath—for where there is no law, neither is there transgression (Rom 4:15)—but for this reason of the promise, because God himself does what he promises? For he who thinks he can fulfill the precepts of the law by the choice of his own will without the spirit of grace, wishes to establish his own justice, not to take up the justice of God. For why does the same Apostle say, That I may be found in him, not having my own justice, which is of the law, but the justice which is of faith, the justice from God (Phil 3:9)?
Iulianum.2.158Quare suam dicit iustitiam, quae ex lege est, eamque iustitiam reprobat, non autem suam, sed ex Deo iustitiam, quae est ex fide? Numquid lex non est ex Deo? Quis nisi infidelis hoc dixerit? Sed ex lege dicit iustitiam suam, in qua homo putat sufficere sibi legem ad facienda divina mandata confidens in virtute sua.
Why does he call that justice his own which is of the law, and reprove that justice, but call the justice from God, which is of faith, not his own? Is the law not from God? Who but an unbeliever would say this? But he calls his own justice that of the law, in which a human being thinks the law suffices him for doing the divine commands, trusting in his own strength.
Iulianum.2.158Ex fide autem iustitiam ideo dicit esse ex Deo, quia Deus unicuique partitur mensuram fidei (Cf. Rom 12, 3); et ad fidem pertinet credere, quod in nobis Deus operetur et velle (Cf. Phil 2, 13), sicut operabatur in illa purpuraria, cuius aperuerat sensum, ut intenderet in ea, quae a Paulo dicebantur (Cf. Act 16, 14). Ac per hoc nec ipsi Iudaei, qui crediderunt in Christum, in quibus et Paulus fuit, ex lege haeredes omnino dicendi sunt, sed potius ex promissione. Ideo enim dictum est: In Isaac vocabitur tibi semen, quia non qui filii carnis, hi filii Dei, sed filii promissionis deputantur in semine (Rom 9, 7-8).
But he says the justice of faith is from God for this reason, because God distributes to each one a measure of faith (See Rom 12:3); and it pertains to faith to believe that God works in us also to will (See Phil 2:13), as he was working in that seller of purple, whose understanding he had opened, that she might attend to the things which were said by Paul (See Acts 16:14). And through this not even the Jews themselves who believed in Christ, among whom Paul was, are at all to be called heirs of the law, but rather of the promise. For it was said, In Isaac shall your seed be named, because it is not the children of the flesh who are the children of God, but the children of the promise are reckoned as the seed (Rom 9:7-8).
Iulianum.2.158159. Iul. Collegit itaque Apostolus argumentum hoc modo: Si nulli essent haeredes benedictionis, nisi qui ex lege sunt, ut praeputium constabat exclusum, ita consequens erat neminem, qui fuisset ex lege, benedictione privari, id est, si circumcisio tantum valeret, ut sine ea fides nihil valeret, sicut gentes liquebat repulsas, ita probabatur de Iudaeis ad perditionem numquam quisquam ire potuisse.
159. Jul. The Apostle, then, gathered the argument in this way: If there were no heirs of the blessing except those who are of the law, just as the foreskin was established to be excluded, so it was consequent that no one who was of the law should be deprived of the blessing—that is, if circumcision were of such worth that without it faith were worth nothing, just as it was clear that the nations were repelled, so it was proved that no one of the Jews could ever go to perdition.
Iulianum.2.159Aug. Quomodo erat consequens, o grosse dialectice? Quomodo erat consequens, si nulli essent haeredes benedictionis, nisi qui ex lege sunt, neminem, qui fuisset ex lege, benedictione privari? Numquid, quia nemo est haeres, nisi baptizetur, propterea qui baptizantur, omnes haeredes sunt? Sed hoc dixerim (Cf. supra 117), non quia ibi est, quae inter nos vertitur quaestio, verum ut ostenderem, quam sis ipse acutus, qui me obtunsiorem dicis esse pistillo.
Aug. How was it consequent, O gross dialectician? How was it consequent, if there were no heirs of the blessing except those who are of the law, that no one who was of the law should be deprived of the blessing? Is it, because no one is an heir unless he is baptized, that therefore all who are baptized are heirs? But I would say this (See above, 117), not because the question that is at issue between us is there, but to show how acute you yourself are, who say that I am blunter than a pestle.
Iulianum.2.159160. Iul. Nunc autem, cum confiteamini praevaricatores in lege non esse benedictionis haeredes, quia talibus lex iram operatur, constat promissionem illam non circumcisioni convenire, sed fidei. Destrueretur autem promissio, si praeter legem nemo iustus esset, quandoquidem post quadringentos et triginta annos promissionis allata lex (Cf. Gal 3, 17), et ipsum Abraham et Isaac et Iacob et omnes in medietate sanctos expertes benedictionis ostenderet, quae non potuisset cuiquam sine lege conferri.
160. Jul. But now, since you confess that transgressors in the law are not heirs of the blessing, because for such the law works wrath, it is established that that promise does not suit circumcision, but faith. But the promise would be destroyed if, apart from the law, no one were just, since the law, brought in four hundred and thirty years after the promise (See Gal 3:17), would show that Abraham himself and Isaac and Jacob and all the saints in the middle were without share in the blessing, which could not have been conferred on anyone without the law.
Iulianum.2.160Aug. Immo destrueretur promissio, si ex lege quisquam iustus esset. Si enim qui ex lege, haeredes sunt, exinanita est fides, evacuata est promissio; lex enim iram operatur (Rom 4, 14-15) ad hoc utique, ut ad iram evadendam Dei gratia requiratur.
Aug. Rather, the promise would be destroyed if anyone were just from the law. For if those who are of the law are heirs, faith is emptied, the promise is made void; for the law works wrath (Rom 4:14-15)—surely to this end, that, to escape wrath, the grace of God may be sought.
Iulianum.2.160161. Iul. Quod quia manifeste falsum est, et sub lege quippe peccatores poenam merebantur et ante legem iustitia et fides remunerationis suae fructibus privatae non sunt, constat non ad truncatas ferro carnes, sed ad illustres probitate mentes promissionis illius gloriam pertinere; sequitur autem fulminea contra traducem sententia: Lex enim - inquit - iram operatur; ubi autem non est lex, nec praevaricatio (Rom 4, 15). Per suade ergo legem datam esse conceptis, legem posse dari nascentibus, ut eos praevaricationis reos possit arguere. Ceterum nos cum Apostolo credimus, quem nihil contra rationem sensisse defendimus, non esse in ea aetate praevaricationem, in qua lex esse non potuit, quia ubi non est lex, nec praevaricatio, quae lex iram operatur, non vitio suo, sed eorum iniquitate, qui peccata virtutibus anteponunt.
161. Jul. Because this is manifestly false—for both under the law sinners were deserving punishment, and before the law justice and faith were not deprived of the fruits of their reward—it is established that the glory of that promise pertains not to flesh cut by the knife, but to minds illustrious for uprightness. But there follows a thunderbolt of an opinion against traducianism: For the law, he says, works wrath; but where there is no law, neither is there transgression (Rom 4:15). Persuade us, then, that the law was given to the conceived, that the law can be given to those who are born, so that it can accuse them as guilty of transgression. But we believe, with the Apostle—whom we defend as having meant nothing against reason—that there is no transgression in that age in which the law could not exist, because where there is no law, neither is there transgression; which law works wrath not by its own fault, but by the iniquity of those who set sins before virtues.
Iulianum.2.161Aug. Non est ergo lex Christi: Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu, non potest intrare in regnum Dei (Io 3, 5)? Quam legem vides etiam ad parvulos pertinere. Verum tu dic potius: parvulus, cuius anima interibat de genere eius, si die non circumcideretur octavo (Cf. Gen 17, 12-14), cuius praevaricationis arguebatur, ut tali supplicio plecteretur? Nisi quia ipse in se ipso nihil peccans tenebatur reus in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, in quo omnes peccaverunt (Rom 5, 12. 14). Quae verba apostolica tam clara obscurare, tam recta curvare ingenti quidem, sed inani labore conaris.
Aug. Is it not, then, the law of Christ, Unless one is reborn of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God (John 3:5)? Which law you see pertains even to little children. But do you rather say: A little child, whose soul perished from his kindred if he were not circumcised on the eighth day (See Gen 17:12-14), of what transgression was he accused, that he should be stricken with such a punishment? Except because, sinning nothing in himself, he was held guilty in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12.14). Which apostolic words, so clear, you try to obscure, so straight, to bend, with great but empty labor.
Iulianum.2.161162. Iul. Approbavit ergo Apostolus, quia non sit tantummodo scriptum propter Abraham, quod reputatum est illi ad iustitiam (Cf. Rom 4, 23), sed et propter nos, quibus sine dubio reputatur, cum in Deum credimus, qui Iesum Christum ex mortuis excitavit, qui traditus est - inquit - propter delicta nostra et resurrexit propter iustificationem nostram (Rom 4, 24-25).
162. Jul. The Apostle proved, then, that it was written not only on account of Abraham, that it was reckoned to him for justice (See Rom 4:23), but also on account of us, to whom without doubt it is reckoned, when we believe in God, who raised Jesus Christ from the dead, who was handed over, he says, on account of our offenses and rose again on account of our justification (Rom 4:24-25).
Iulianum.2.162Aug. Ab hac gratia separatis parvulos, quos nullum delictum ex origine tractum habere contenditis; unde fit consequens, ut non ad eos pertineat beneficium, quo propter delicta nostra est traditus Christus; et haec sentientes et dogmatizantes Christianos catholicos vos dicere audetis!
Aug. From this grace you separate little children, whom you contend have no offense drawn from origin; whence it follows that the benefit by which Christ was handed over on account of our offenses does not pertain to them; and, holding and dogmatizing these things, you dare to call yourselves Catholic Christians!
Iulianum.2.162163. Iul. Quam vehementer inculcat apud iustum iudicem Deum aliena peccata aliis non nocere, qui commendans mortem Christi vigilanter enuntiat propter nostra illum delicta, quae et plura erant et nostra erant, non propter unum et alienum et olim defuncti hominis mortem oppetiisse?
163. Jul. How vehemently he presses home that, before the just judge God, the sins of others do not harm others—he who, commending the death of Christ, vigilantly declares that he met death on account of our offenses, which were both many and ours, not on account of one and another's, the death of a man long since dead!
Iulianum.2.163Aug. Inoboedientia quidem unius hominis non absurde utique delictum dicitur alienum, quia nondum nati nondum egeramus aliquid proprium sive bonum sive malum; sed quia in illo, qui hoc egit, quando id egit, omnes eramus tantumque fuit ac tale delictum, ut eo natura universa vitiaretur humana, quod satis indicat etiam ipsa generis humani tam manifesta miseria, hoc delictum alienum obnoxia successione fit nostrum; propter quod dictum est a Doctore catholico, qui recte intellexit Apostolum: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13).
Aug. The disobedience of one man is indeed not absurdly called another's offense, because, not yet born, we had not yet done anything of our own, whether good or evil; but because in him who did this, when he did it, we all were, and the offense was so great and of such a kind that by it the whole human nature was corrupted—which the so manifest misery itself of the human race sufficiently indicates—this offense of another becomes ours by liable succession; on account of which it was said by a Catholic Doctor, who rightly understood the Apostle, We are all born under sin, whose very origin is in fault (Ambrose, On Penance 1.3.13).
Iulianum.2.163Cuius intellectum et aliorum eius in catholica veritate sociorum si sequi volueritis, non cogemini alienare parvulos a beneficio mortis eius, qui traditus est propter delicta nostra et unus pro omnibus mortuus est (Rom 4, 25); ubi quod sequitur clamat Apostolus: Ergo omnes mortui sunt et pro omnibus mortuus est (2 Cor 5, 14-15), et vos reclamatis: Non sunt mortui parvuli; clamate et quod sequitur: Ergo non pro ipsis mortuus est, et videte, utrum vos non mortui iaceatis, qui mortuis, ne vivificentur, Christi mortem negatis; quia non eis, sicut putatis, peccatum debet unius et olim defuncti hominis imputari. Nec attenditis primum hominem Adam sic olim fuisse defunctum, ut tamen post illum secundus homo sit Christus, cum tot hominum millia inter illum et hunc orta sint. Et ideo manifestum est ad illum pertinere omnem, qui ex illo successione propaginis nascitur, sicut ad istum pertinet omnis, qui in illo gratiae largitate renascitur; unde fit, ut totum genus humanum quodammodo sint homines duo, primus et secundus.
If you are willing to follow his understanding and that of others, his fellows in the Catholic truth, you will not be compelled to alienate little children from the benefit of the death of him who was handed over on account of our offenses and died as one for all (Rom 4:25); where what follows the Apostle proclaims, Therefore all have died, and he died for all (2 Cor 5:14-15); and you cry back, Little children are not dead; cry out also what follows: Therefore he did not die for them; and see whether you do not lie dead, who deny to the dead, that they be not made alive, the death of Christ—because, as you think, the sin of one and long-dead man ought not to be imputed to them. Nor do you attend that the first man Adam was so long since dead that nonetheless after him the second man is Christ, though so many thousands of men arose between that one and this. And therefore it is manifest that every one who is born of him by the succession of propagation pertains to him, just as every one who is reborn in him by the bounty of grace pertains to this one; whence it comes about that the whole human race is, in a certain way, two men, the first and the second.
Iulianum.2.163164. Iul. Qui ergo dicit multa delicta, nihil de uno Manichaeorum id est traducis suspicatur.
164. Jul. He, then, who says many offenses, suspects nothing of the one of the Manichees, that is, of traducianism.
Iulianum.2.164Aug. Sed utique, homo contentiose, multa delicta essent, quae multi haberent, etiam singula singuli, propriae voluntatis, si ad lavacrum regenerationis venirent, cum primum peccare coepissent; quos omnes secundum istam non rationem, sed distortionem tuam ab hac gratia, quae ex multis delictis iustificat, facitis alienos, quoniam non vultis eius esse participes quoslibet homines, quorum delicta sunt singula; quanto magis ergo multa sunt eis additis, quae habent alii plura, alii pauciora. A quibus tamen omnibus liberat ista gratia, de qua dictum est: Ex multis delictis in iustificationem (Rom 5, 16). Fuit enim Adam et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam et in illo omnes perierunt (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 234). Ambrosius hoc dixit; calumniose, non erat Manichaeus. Parvulos contagium mortis antiquae prima nativitate contrahere Cyprianus dixit (CYPRIANUS, Ep. 64, 5); calumniose, non erat Manichaeus. Omnes in uno Adam peccasse Hilarius dixit (Cf. HILARIUS, 1, 52); calumniose, non erat Manichaeus; in qua Ecclesia ista didicerunt, calumniose, non erat Manichaea; et quia catholica erat atque catholica perseverat, ideo vos contra ista sentientes et contendentes ferre non potuit; et ut catholica permaneret, infirmitatem parvulorum suorum vestra damnatione munivit.
Aug. But surely, O contentious man, there would be many offenses which many had—even single ones, each having one, of their own will—if they came to the laver of regeneration when they had first begun to sin; all of whom, according to this not reasoning but distortion of yours, you make alien from this grace which justifies from many offenses, since you are unwilling that any human beings whose offenses are single should be partakers of it; how much more, then, are they many when there are added those which some have more, some fewer. From all of which, nonetheless, that grace frees, of which it was said, From many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16). For there was Adam, and in him we all were; Adam perished, and in him all perished (Ambrose, On Luke 7.234). Ambrose said this; slanderously, he was not a Manichee. That little children contract the contagion of the ancient death by their first birth Cyprian said (Cyprian, Letter 64.5); slanderously, he was not a Manichee. That all sinned in one Adam Hilary said (See Hilary, 1.52); slanderously, he was not a Manichee; the Church in which they learned these things—slanderously, it was not Manichean; and because it was Catholic and perseveres Catholic, therefore it could not bear you who think and contend against these things; and, that it might remain Catholic, it fortified the weakness of its little children by your condemnation.
Iulianum.2.164165. Iul. Iustificati itaque ex fide pacem habeamus ad Deum per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, per quem et accessum habemus in gratiam istam, in qua stamus, et gloriamur in spe gloriae Dei (Rom 5, 1-2). Qui vobis videtis, inquit, iustificationem per peccatorum veniam fuisse collatam, firmam tenete concordiam et paribus animis Mediatoris dona laudate, cuius munere collatum nobis est, ut in hanc gratiam haberemus introitum; et eos, quos iustitia reos tenebat, quia reos nos non natura fecerat, sed voluntas, libertati reddidit et eripuit ultioni praestititque, ut, qui sperabamus aeterna supplicia, modo gloriemur in spe gloriae Dei.
165. Jul. Justified, therefore, by faith, let us have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we also have access into this grace in which we stand, and we glory in the hope of the glory of God (Rom 5:1-2). You who see, he says, that justification was conferred through the pardon of sins, hold firm concord and with equal minds praise the gifts of the Mediator, by whose gift it was conferred on us that we should have entrance into this grace; and those whom justice held guilty—because not nature but will had made us guilty—he restored to liberty and rescued from vengeance, and granted that we who were hoping for eternal punishments should now glory in the hope of the glory of God.
Iulianum.2.165Aug. Non per solam peccatorum dimissionem iustificatio ista confertur nisi auctoribus vobis. Iustificat quippe impium Deus non solum dimittendo, quae mala facit, sed etiam donando caritatem, ut declinet a malo et faciat bonum per Spiritum Sanctum (Cf. Phil 1, 19), cuius sumministrationem iugem poscebat Apostolus eis, quibus dicebat: Oramus autem ad Deum, ne quid faciatis mali (2 Cor 13, 7). Contra istam gratiam geritis bellum, ut liberum non sermone defendatis, sed praesumptione decipiatis voluntatis arbitrium.
Aug. This justification is not conferred by the remission of sins alone, except with you as the authors. For God justifies the impious not only by remitting the evils he does, but also by granting love, that he may turn from evil and do good, through the Holy Spirit (See Phil 1:19), whose continual supplying the Apostle was asking for those to whom he said, But we pray to God that you do nothing evil (2 Cor 13:7). Against this grace you wage war, so that you may not defend free choice of the will by discourse, but deceive concerning it by presumption.
Iulianum.2.165166. Iul. Verum ut magis exprimeretur virtus istius securitasque doctrinae, quid conferat fidelibus philosophia christiana, persequitur: Non solum autem, sed et gloriamur in pressuris scientes, quoniam tribulatio patientiam operatur, patientia autem probationem, probatio autem spem, spes autem non confundit, quia caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostrisper Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis (Rom 5, 3-5). Id est: Non solum nobis haec beneficia contulerunt, ut amplitudine quandoque munerum gaudeamus, sed iam impraesentiarum in mediis angorum aestibus constituti alacres sumus ipsius possessione virtutis et de persequentium furore ridemus impiorum crudelitatem, eruditionem patientiae magis quam perturbationem laetitiae iudicantes, ut non solum propter praemia non peccemus, sed hoc ipsum non peccare praemium censeamus.
166. Jul. But, that the power and security of this doctrine might be more expressed—what Christian philosophy confers on the faithful—he continues: And not only so, but we also glory in tribulations, knowing that tribulation works patience, and patience trial, and trial hope, and hope does not confound, because the love of God is poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us (Rom 5:3-5). That is: They have not only conferred on us these benefits, that we may at some time rejoice in the amplitude of the gifts, but already in the present, set in the midst of the heats of anguish, we are eager with the possession of virtue itself, and we laugh at the cruelty of the impious from the fury of persecutors, judging it the instruction of patience rather than the disturbance of joy, so that we both do not sin on account of rewards and reckon this very thing—not to sin—a reward.
Iulianum.2.166Aug. Si praemium est non peccare, quis dat hoc praemium? Puto, quia non dicturus es: Ipse sibi homo, quamvis hoc te cogat dicere perversitas haeresis vestrae. Si ergo Deus dat hoc praemium, ut homo non peccet, donum potius video dicendum esse quam praemium, ne aliqua merita praecessisse videantur, cum eos, qui dicunt gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra dari, Pelagius quoque ipse damnaverit (De gestis Pel. 30). Quomodo autem detur hoc donum id est non peccare, et tu paulo ante dixisti Apostoli verba commemorans: Quoniam caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis (Rom 5, 5).
Aug. If not to sin is a reward, who gives this reward? I think you will not say: The man himself to himself—although the perversity of your heresy compels you to say this. If, then, God gives this reward, that a human being not sin, I see that it ought rather to be called a gift than a reward, lest some merits seem to have preceded—since even Pelagius himself condemned those who say that the grace of God is given according to our merits (The Deeds of Pelagius 30). But how this gift is given, that is, not to sin, you yourself said a little before, mentioning the words of the Apostle: Because the love of God is poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us (Rom 5:5).
Iulianum.2.166Ac per hoc in philosophia christiana ut gloriemur in tribulationibus, non est nostrum, quia et hoc accepimus; alioquin tamquam de suo a se sibi parto glorianti homini dicitur: Quid enim habes, quod non accepisti? Si autem et accepisti, quid gloriaris, quasi non acceperis? (1 Cor 4, 7) Et tamen gloriamur, non sic, quasi non acceperimus, sed gloriamur in illo, qui hoc dedit, ut qui gloriatur, in Domino glorietur (1 Cor 1, 31). Haec est gratia, quam catholica fides praedicat; utquid eam, quaeso, vester error oppugnat, cum etiam vestro vos ore convincat?
And through this, in Christian philosophy, that we glory in tribulations is not ours, because we have received this too; otherwise it is said to the man glorying as of something gained by himself for himself, For what do you have that you have not received? But if you have also received it, why do you glory as if you had not received it? (1 Cor 4:7) And yet we glory—not as though we had not received, but we glory in him who gave this, so that he who glories may glory in the Lord (1 Cor 1:31). This is the grace which the Catholic faith preaches; why, I ask, does your error assail it, when it convicts you even by your own mouth?
Iulianum.2.166167. Iul. Deinde cum in Testamentis agi ea, quae sunt promissa, conspicimus, praesentis vitae inter ludicra omnino omnia bona malaque numeramus fidem pollicitationis Dei de magnitudine in nos caritatis illius aestimantes. Neque enim confutabit spem nostram aeternorum frustratio commodorum, quandoquidem vadem beatitudinis futurae Dei caritatem tenemus, quae effusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum, qui datus est nobis (Cf. Rom 5, 5), id est per dona Sancti Spiritus amorem suum Deus circa genus probavit humanum.
167. Jul. Then, when we behold those things which are promised being carried on in the Testaments, we count among the trifles of the present life all goods and evils whatsoever, estimating the faith of God's promise from the greatness of his love toward us. For the frustration of eternal benefits will not refute our hope, since we hold as the surety of future blessedness the love of God, which is poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us (See Rom 5:5)—that is, through the gifts of the Holy Spirit God has proved his love toward the human race.
Iulianum.2.167Aug. Non vis esse inter haec dona etiam non peccare, sed confidens in virtute tua (Cf. Ps 48, 7) hoc tibi tu ipse vis dare. Noli irasci, obsecro; maledictus omnis, qui spem habet in homine (Ier 17, 5).
Aug. You are unwilling that even not to sin be among these gifts, but, trusting in your own strength (See Ps 49:7 (48)), you wish to give this to yourself, yourself. Do not be angry, I beseech you; cursed is everyone who has his hope in man (Jer 17:5).
Iulianum.2.167168. Iul. Restituet ergo totum fideliter, quod fidelibus repromisit.
168. Jul. He will faithfully restore, then, the whole that he promised to the faithful.
Iulianum.2.168Aug. Restituet plane etiam hoc ipsum, ut fideles sint, quia fidem gentium promisit Abrahae, et quidam magnus fidelis dicit: Misericordiam consecutus sum, ut fidelis essem (1 Cor 7, 25).
Aug. He will plainly restore even this very thing, that they be faithful, because he promised the faith of the nations to Abraham, and a certain great faithful one says, I have obtained mercy, that I might be faithful (1 Cor 7:25).
Iulianum.2.168169. Iul. Qui enim Filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit eum, per quem nos operatione Sancti Spiritus consecravit, procul dubio cum illo omnia nobis donavit (Rom 8, 32). Utquid enim Christus, cum adhuc infirmi essemus, secundum tempus pro impiis mortuus est? (Rom 5, 6)
169. Jul. For he who did not spare his own Son, but handed him over for us all—through whom he consecrated us by the working of the Holy Spirit—without doubt has, with him, given us all things (Rom 8:32). For why did Christ, while we were yet weak, according to the time die for the impious? (Rom 5:6)
Iulianum.2.169Aug. Testimonia divina commemoras, quibus vester error evertitur; non enim dictum est: Christum etiam pro impiis, sed: pro impiis - inquit - mortuus est. Ut autem et ipse alibi confessus es, etiam pro parvulis mortuus est et tamen, qua fronte nescio, transisse in eos originaliter impietatem primi hominis negas (Cf. C. Iul. 3, 58). Quomodo ergo pertinent ad eum, qui pro impiis mortuus est?
Aug. You mention the divine testimonies by which your error is overturned; for it was not said: Christ died even for the impious, but, he says, he died for the impious. But, as you yourself elsewhere confessed, he died even for little children, and yet—with what brow I do not know—you deny that the impiety of the first man passed into them originally (See Answer to Julian 3.58). How, then, do they pertain to him who died for the impious?
Iulianum.2.169170. Iul. Vix enim pro iusto quis moritur; nam pro bono forsitan quis audeat mori. Commendat autem Deus caritatem suam in nobis, quoniam si, cum adhuc peccatores essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est, multo magis iustificati nunc in sanguine ipsius salvierimus per eum ab ira. Si enim cum inimici essemus, reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem Filii eius, multo magis reconciliati salvi erimus in vita eius. Non solum autem hoc, sed et gloriantes in Deo per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, per quem nunc reconciliationem accepimus (Rom 5, 7-11). Aperuit, quanta totum Christus pietate gessisset, qui mori dignatus est pro nihil boni merentibus.
170. Jul. For scarcely for a just man will one die; for perhaps for a good man one might dare to die. But God commends his love toward us, since, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us; much more, then, being now justified in his blood, shall we be saved through him from wrath. For if, while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved in his life. And not only so, but we also glory in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have now received reconciliation (Rom 5:7-11). He opened with how great piety Christ had done the whole, who deigned to die for those meriting no good.
Iulianum.2.170Aug. Haec verba tua sic temperata sunt, ut etiam parvulos tangere videantur, quoniam et ipsos nihil boni meruisse conceditis, quos nihil boni egisse fatemini; sed Apostolus non ita locutus est, qui dixit Christum pro impiis et peccatoribus mortuum fuisse. Frustra ergo tu magnam Christi misericordiam extenuandam putasti; ille enim pro male merentibus mortuus est, a quo tanto beneficio Salvatoris parvulos separatis, quoniam salvos eos dicitis; ille autem dicit: Non est opus sanis medicus (Mt 9, 12); non est ergo opus parvulis Christus, quibus utique secundum vos non est Iesus; quibus autem opus est, his procul dubio est Iesus. Sed discedite, maligni; opus est parvulis. Et ipsos ergo a peccatis eorum salvos facit, quoniam propterea tale nomen accepit, ubi angelus dixit: Vocabis nomen eius Iesum; ipse enim salvum faciet populum suum a peccatis eorum (Mt 1, 21).
Aug. These words of yours are so tempered as to seem to touch even little children, since you concede that they too have merited no good, whom you confess to have done no good; but the Apostle did not so speak, who said that Christ died for the impious and for sinners. In vain, then, did you think the great mercy of Christ must be attenuated; for he died for those meriting ill, from which so great a benefit of the Savior you separate little children, since you say they are saved; but he says, The healthy have no need of a physician (Matt 9:12); little children, then, have no need of Christ, to whom surely, according to you, he is not Jesus; but those who have need, to them without doubt he is Jesus. But depart, you malicious ones; little children have need. Them too, then, he saves from their sins, since he received such a name for this reason, when the angel said, You shall call his name Jesus; for he himself will save his people from their sins (Matt 1:21).
Iulianum.2.170171. Iul. Quippe qui rationem et legem criminum amore calcaverant euntes post desideria sua, quae ipsa conscientia, cuius vis est maxima, castigabat. Verum quia constabat etiam Prophetas propter iustitiam crebro mortis enituisse contemptu et plurimos pro magnis quibusque rebus dignitatisque insitae fulgore rutilantibus securo ad interitum animo cucurrisse, ne non singularitas virtutis Christi dilucidior eiusmodi esset exemplis, intulit Apostolus, per quod ostenderet caritatem et fortitudinem illius unico eminere fastigio. Assentior et ego, licet raro, licet vix, tamen pro rebus iustis et bonis mori elegisse nonnullos. Sed illis negotiorum dignitas, id est ipsarum rerum, pro quibus dimicaverant, claritudo periculorum temperavit dolorem; Christus autem nihil habuit, quod amaret in studiis impiorum, et pro his, qui erant propria voluntate deformes, non est aspernatus impendi; apparet illum omnium virtutibus antecellere, quia, etsi in tolerantia paucos, in causa tamen nullos potest habere consortes. Nihil igitur de eius munificentia desperemus, quia, si pro nobis mortuus est, cum adhuc essemus peccatores, multo magis iustificati nunc in sanguine ipsius salvi erimus per eum ab ira.
171. Jul. Since indeed they had trodden underfoot reason and the law of crimes by their love, going after their own desires, which their very conscience—whose force is greatest—chastised. But because it was established that the prophets too often shone with contempt of death on account of justice, and that very many ran to destruction with an untroubled mind for any great things and for the gleam of inborn dignity, lest the singularity of Christ's virtue should not be more clear than such examples, the Apostle brought in that by which he might show that his love and fortitude rise to a unique summit. I too assent that, though rarely, though scarcely, yet some have chosen to die for just and good things. But for them the dignity of the affairs, that is, the renown of the very things for which they had fought, tempered the pain of the dangers; but Christ had nothing that he could love in the pursuits of the impious, and he did not disdain to be spent for those who were deformed by their own will; it appears that he excels all in virtue, because, even if in endurance he can have few partners, in cause he can have none. Let us, then, despair of nothing concerning his munificence, because, if he died for us while we were yet sinners, much more, being now justified in his blood, shall we be saved through him from wrath.
Iulianum.2.171Aug. Nolite ergo eximere parvulos de numero peccatorum, quia et pro ipsis mortuum fatemini Christum.
Aug. Do not, then, take little children out of the number of sinners, since you confess that Christ died for them too.
Iulianum.2.171172. Iul. Et post reconciliationem, quam cum Deo habere promeruimus per opera videlicet Mediatoris, debemus percipere animo sempiterna gaudia et non solum salutem sperare, sed etiam gloriam.
172. Jul. And after the reconciliation which we have deserved to have with God—namely through the works of the Mediator—we ought to receive in our mind everlasting joys, and not only to hope for salvation, but also for glory.
Iulianum.2.172Aug. Rogo te, attende, quod dicit Apostolus, propter quod factum est, ut de primo homine loqueretur; de reconciliatione agebat, quam tu quoque per mediatorem Christum ex inimicitiis, quas cum Deo habuimus, factam esse concedis. Ecce, vide verba Apostoli: Iustificati igitur ex fide - inquit - pacem habeamus ad Deum per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum (Rom 5, 1); et paulo post: Si enim Christus, cum infirmi essemus, adhuc iuxta tempus pro impiis mortuus est (Rom 5, 6); item paulo post: Commendat autem - inquit - caritatem suam Deus in nobis, quoniam, cum adhuc peccatores essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est; multo magis nunc iustificati in sanguine ipsius salvi erimus ab ira per ipsum (Rom 5, 8-9). Adhuc attende: Si enim, cum inimici essemus - inquit - reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem Filii eius, multo magis reconciliati salvi erimus in vita ipsius (Rom 5, 10). Hanc reconciliationem, quam totiens commendavit, etiam in novissimo posuit dicens: Per quem et nunc reconciliationem accepimus (Rom 5, 11); ac deinde intulit: Propter hoc, sicut per unumhominem peccatum intravit in mundum (Rom 5, 12). Sicut ergo per hunc unum inimicitiae, sic per unum Christum reconciliatio. Quisquis igitur a peccato, in quo inimicitiae factae sunt, liberos esse parvulos dicit, profecto eos negat ad hanc reconciliationem, propter quam Christus mediator factus est, pertinere; proinde separat eos et a iustificatione, quae fit in Christi sanguine, cuius fundendi causa, quando eum bibendum commendavit, nulla nisi in remissionem dicta est peccatorum (Cf. Mt 26, 27-28).
Aug. I beg you, attend to what the Apostle says, on account of which it came about that he spoke of the first man; he was treating of reconciliation, which you too concede was made through the mediator Christ out of the enmities which we had with God. Behold, see the words of the Apostle: Justified, therefore, by faith, he says, let us have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ (Rom 5:1); and a little after: For if Christ, while we were weak, still according to the time died for the impious (Rom 5:6); likewise a little after: But God commends his love toward us, since, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us; much more now, being justified in his blood, shall we be saved from wrath through him (Rom 5:8-9). Attend still: For if, while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved in his life (Rom 5:10). This reconciliation, which he so often commended, he set down also at the last, saying, Through whom we have now received reconciliation (Rom 5:11); and then he brought in, On account of this, as through one man sin entered into the world (Rom 5:12). As, then, through this one man enmities, so through one Christ reconciliation. Whoever, therefore, says that little children are free from the sin in which the enmities were made, surely denies that they pertain to this reconciliation on account of which Christ was made mediator; accordingly he separates them also from the justification which takes place in the blood of Christ, the cause of whose shedding, when he commended it to be drunk, was said to be nothing other than the remission of sins (See Matt 26:27-28).
Iulianum.2.172Unde fit consequens, ut parvulis peccata non habentibus mors Christi nihil prosit omnino; per hanc enim reconciliati sumus Deo, cum inimici essemus, quod parvuli secundum vos non fuerunt. Ut enim propter hanc reconciliationem moreremur peccato, in quo inimicitiae fuerunt, quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo, sicut idem dicit Apostolus, in mortem illius baptizati sumus (Rom 6, 3). Ad haec autem verba ut perveniret: Si enim mortui sumus - inquit - peccato, quomodo vivemus in eo? (Rom 6, 2) Statimque ut ostenderet mortuos nos esse peccato: An ignoratis - inquit - quoniam quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in mortem ipsius baptizati sumus? (Ibidem) Ubi est libertas et fortitudo animi vestri? Quare timetis dicere, quod credere non timetis, parvulos in Christo baptizari non oportere, quos peccatum, cui moriantur, dicitis non habere?
Whence it follows that the death of Christ profits nothing at all to little children not having sins; for through it we were reconciled to God while we were enemies, which little children, according to you, were not. For, that on account of this reconciliation we might die to the sin in which the enmities were, whoever of us have been baptized in Christ, as the same Apostle says, have been baptized into his death (Rom 6:3). But that he might arrive at these words, he says, For if we have died to sin, how shall we live in it? (Rom 6:2) And at once, to show that we are dead to sin: Or do you not know that whoever of us have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death? (Rom 6:3) Where is the liberty and fortitude of your mind? Why do you fear to say what you do not fear to believe—that little children ought not to be baptized in Christ, who, you say, have no sin to which they may die?
Iulianum.2.172173. Iul. Propterea sicut per unum hominem in hunc mundum peccatum intravit et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt (Rom 5, 12). Ad edomandam superbiam Iudaeorum, qui sibi necessariam pecca torum veniam non tantum quantum Gentilibus aestimabant, praerogativa legis sanctitatem suo generi vindicantes, in morbum humanae conversationis invadit et multitudinem delinquentium retro petit, ut quantum dominationis in hoc mundo iniquitas occupaverit, antiquitatis ipsius prodat auctoritas, quamque multa et veternosa crimina ab obscenitate praecedentium per manus mutuae imitationis posteris tradita Christi gratia sustulisset, ostenderet. Atque ob hoc recordationem facit primi hominis, non a quo peccatum coeperat, constat enim prius mulierem deliquisse, sed qui per privilegium sexus magisterium occupasset delicti: Per hunc ergo intravit peccatum et per peccatum mors, sine dubio illa quae peccatoribus id est aeterna promittitur, et ita - inquit - in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt. Aperuit prorsus, qualiter haec mors transisset ad posteros, ob imitationem scilicet, non generationem.
173. Jul. On account of this, as through one man sin entered into this world, and through sin death, and so death passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12). To tame the pride of the Jews, who reckoned that the pardon of sins necessary for them was not as great as for the gentiles, claiming holiness for their race by the prerogative of the law, he invades the disease of human conduct and seeks back the multitude of offenders, so that the authority of antiquity itself may betray how much dominion iniquity has seized in this world, and may show how many and how chronic crimes—handed down to descendants by the hands of mutual imitation from the obscenity of those who preceded—the grace of Christ had taken away. And on account of this he makes recollection of the first man—not from whom sin had begun, for it is established that the woman first offended, but who by the privilege of his sex had seized the magisterium of the offense: through this one, then, sin entered and through sin death—without doubt that which is promised to sinners, that is, eternal—and so, he says, death passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned. He plainly opened how this death passed to descendants, namely on account of imitation, not generation.
Iulianum.2.173Aug. Iam quidem responsum est tibi, cur non mulierem nominaverit, ex qua fuit initium peccati, sed unum hominem; aut ut ipsa quoque in illo intellegeretur propter unam carnem aut quod a viro incipit generatio, per quam volebat ostendere in mundum intrasse peccatum. Sed, homines, qui dicitis mortem, quae in peccato est, ob imitationem, non generationem ad posteros transisse, cur non aperte dicitis baptizari in Christo Iesu parvulos non debere? Si enim baptizandi sunt in Christo, quoniam quicumque baptizantur in Christo, in morte ipsius baptizantur, procul dubio peccato et ipsi moriuntur. Hinc quippe probavit Apostolus peccato nos esse mortuos, quia in morte Christi baptizati sumus; cum enim dixisset: Si mortui sumus peccato, quomodo vivemus ineo? (Rom 6, 2) Mox ut ostenderet mortuos nos esse peccato: An ignoratis - inquit - quoniam quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in morte illius baptizati sumus? (Rom 6, 3) Quisquis igitur peccatum non habet, non est, cui moriatur in baptismo; quisquis autem, cum baptizatur, non peccato moritur, non baptizatur in morte Christi ac per hoc non baptizatur in Christo. Quid tergiversamini? Libere aperite inferos vestros, libere ad vos intrent, qui nolunt in delicto mortuos in baptismo vivificari parvulos suos.
Aug. It has already been answered you why he named not the woman, from whom was the beginning of sin, but one man: either that she too might be understood in him, on account of the one flesh, or because generation begins from the man, through which he wished to show that sin entered into the world. But, O men, who say that the death which is in sin passed to descendants on account of imitation, not generation, why do you not openly say that little children ought not to be baptized in Christ Jesus? For if they are to be baptized in Christ, since whoever are baptized in Christ are baptized into his death, without doubt they too die to sin. For from this the Apostle proved that we are dead to sin, because we have been baptized into the death of Christ; for when he had said, If we are dead to sin, how shall we live in it? (Rom 6:2) at once, to show that we are dead to sin: Or do you not know that whoever of us have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death? (Rom 6:3) Whoever, then, has no sin, has nothing to die to in baptism; but whoever, when he is baptized, does not die to sin, is not baptized into the death of Christ, and through this is not baptized in Christ. Why do you evade? Freely open your underworld; freely let those enter to you who are unwilling that their little children, dead in offense, be made alive in baptism.
Iulianum.2.173174. Iul. Postquam enim dixerat: In omnes homines pertransiit, subdidit statim: in quo omnes peccaverunt; hoc: in quo omnes peccaverunt, nihil aliud indicat quam: Quia omnes peccaverunt secundum illud Davidicum: In quo corrigit adulescentior viam suam? Id est: Quomodo corrigit viam suam? In custodiendo sermones tuos (Ps 118, 9). Io eo ergo corrigi dicitur, per quod et corrigitur. Ita et Apostolus in eo dixit pertransisse mortem, in quo omnes propria voluntate peccaverunt, non ut hoc: in quo aut Adam aut peccatum videatur ostendere, sed in quo omnes peccantes intellegatur exprimere.
174. Jul. For after he had said, It passed into all human beings, he at once subjoined, in whom all sinned; this, in whom all sinned, indicates nothing other than: Because all sinned—according to that saying of David, In what does a young man correct his way? That is: How does he correct his way? In keeping your words (Ps 119:9 (118)). In that, then, he is said to be corrected by which he is also corrected. So too the Apostle said that death passed in that, in which all sinned by their own will—not so that this, in whom, should seem to point out either Adam or sin, but so that it should be understood to express, in which all sinning.
Iulianum.2.174Aug. Aperi oculos: in Adam omnes moriuntur, in quo si non sunt mortui parvuli, nec in Christo vivificantur, utquid cum eis ad baptismum vivificatoris et salvatoris simulatione damnabili curritis, quos vivos sanosque clamando vivificari sanarique non vultis?
Aug. Open your eyes: in Adam all die, in whom, if little children are not dead, neither are they made alive in Christ; why do you run with them to the baptism of the one who makes alive and saves, by a damnable pretense, whom, by crying out that they are alive and healthy, you are unwilling to have made alive and healed?
Iulianum.2.174175. Iul. Omnes autem pro multis poni innumera Scripturarum exempla testantur secundum illud: Omnesdeclinaverunt, simul inutiles facti sunt, et post pauca: Qui devorant - inquit - plebem meam sicut cibum panis (Ps 13, 3-4), ostendens ab illis omnibus, quos malum pronuntiaverat operari, hanc plebem fuisse discretam. In Evangelio refertur: Et clamabat omnis populus: Crucifige! Crucifige! (Lc 23, 21; Mc 15, 13; cf. Mt 27, 33) Et tamen generalitate verbi huius nequaquam aut Apostoli aut Nicodemus aut sanctae mulieres includuntur. Hic ipse Apostolus, quos nunc dixit omnes, paulo post multos nominat.
175. Jul. But that all is put for many, innumerable examples of the Scriptures testify, according to that: All have turned aside, together they have become useless, and after a little: Who devour my people, he says, as the food of bread (Ps 14:3-4 (13)), showing that this people was distinguished from all those whom he had pronounced to work evil. In the Gospel it is reported: And all the people cried out: Crucify! Crucify! (Luke 23:21; Mark 15:13; see Matt 27:23) And yet by the generality of this word the apostles or Nicodemus or the holy women are in no way included. This same Apostle, those whom he now called all, a little after names many.
Iulianum.2.175Aug. Ad hoc iam responsum est non repugnare omnibus multos, quia ipsi omnes non pauci, sed multi sunt; et quod de Psalmo commemorasti: Omnes declinaverunt, simul inutiles facti sunt, prorsus verum est; filios quippe hominum, qui declinaverunt omnes, discrevit a filiis Dei, quos non declinantes devorabant; Deus enim respexit super filios hominum; hi omnes declinaverunt, ab eis quippe excepti sunt filii Dei. Ex his ergo declinantibus omnibus filiis hominum erat etiam ille omnis populus, qui clamabat: Crucifige! Crucifige! Ad hunc quippe populum nullo modo illi, qui iam in Christum crediderant, pertinebant. Hinc te exue, si potes, quod unus pro omnibus mortuus est, et aude dicere, non omnes esse mortuos, pro quibus mortuus est Christus, cum statim Apostolus tibi fauces premat et opprimat audacissimam vocem, quid sequeretur, ostendens et dicens: Ergo omnes mortui sunt. Noli sic laudare Apostolum; noli sic exponere, ut nolis audire: Si unus pro omnibus mortuus est, ergo omnes mortui sunt (2 Cor 5, 14-15). In hos omnes cum peccato mors pertransiit per illum, in quo omnes moriuntur. Ibi sunt et parvuli, quia et pro ipsis Christus mortuus est, qui propterea pro omnibus mortuus est, quia omnes mortui sunt. Quidquid argumenteris, quidquid tergiverseris, quidquid apostolicorum verborum coneris evertere sive pervertere, a morte, quae in peccato est, parvulos non ostendis immunes, quia et pro eis Christum mortuum negare non audes.
Aug. To this it has already been answered that many is not repugnant to all, because those same all are not few, but many; and what you mentioned from the Psalm, All have turned aside, together they have become useless, is altogether true; for it distinguished the children of men, who all turned aside, from the children of God, whom, not turning aside, they were devouring; for God looked down upon the children of men; these all turned aside—for from them the children of God were excepted. From these, then, all the children of men turning aside, was also that whole people which cried out, Crucify! Crucify! For to this people in no way did those pertain who had already believed in Christ. From this extricate yourself, if you can—that one died for all—and dare to say that not all are dead for whom Christ died, when at once the Apostle presses your throat and crushes your most audacious voice, showing what follows and saying, Therefore all have died. Do not so praise the Apostle; do not so expound, that you may be unwilling to hear: If one died for all, therefore all have died (2 Cor 5:14-15). Into these all, death with sin passed through him in whom all die. There are little children too, because for them too Christ died, who for this reason died for all, because all have died. Whatever you argue, whatever you evade, whatever of the apostolic words you try to overturn or pervert, you do not show little children immune from the death which is in sin, because you do not dare to deny that for them too Christ died.
Iulianum.2.175176. Iul. Quid ergo egerimus appareat: omnes plurimos Apostolus dixit, quos ideo ait obnoxios morti, quoniam voluntate propria peccaverunt. Non igitur originale, sed voluntarium crimen accusat; et re vera nihil aliud indicant verba, si eorum fides et proprietas expendatur. Nam si peccatum crederet ad posteros generatione transisse, id est ad eos, qui ibi non fuerant, ab illo fuisse iaculatum, falsissime omnes peccasse pronuntiaret.
176. Jul. Let it appear, then, what we have done: the Apostle said all, meaning very many, whom he therefore said to be liable to death, since they sinned by their own will. He accuses, then, not the original, but the voluntary crime; and in truth the words indicate nothing else, if their faith and propriety be weighed. For if he believed that sin passed to descendants by generation—that is, that it was hurled by that man unto those who had not been there—he would most falsely pronounce that all sinned.
Iulianum.2.176Aug. Possem tibi dicere: Quomodo secuti sunt posteri Adam peccantis exemplum, qui non ibi fuerunt nec ipsum peccatum vel viderunt, vel audierunt vel crediderunt? Sed non hoc dico. Fuit enim Adam et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam et in illo omnes perierunt (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 234), propter quod in illo omnes moriuntur. Apostolum audi apertissime loquentem, non te tortuosissime garrientem.
Aug. I could say to you: How did descendants follow the example of sinning Adam, who were not there nor either saw or heard or believed that very sin? But I do not say this. For there was Adam, and in him we all were; Adam perished, and in him all perished (Ambrose, On Luke 7.234), on account of which in him all die. Hear the Apostle speaking most plainly, not yourself prattling most tortuously.
Iulianum.2.176177. Iul. Quod enim unus facit et ad alios dirigit, non vere hoc omnes fecisse dicuntur; aut enim pertransiit ad eos et ipsi non peccaverunt aut ipsi peccaverunt, quo sermone negotium operationis exprimitur, et ad eos non pertransiit nisi imitatione sola.
177. Jul. For what one does and directs to others, all are not truly said to have done this; for either it passed to them and they themselves did not sin, or they themselves sinned—by which discourse the business of operation is expressed—and it did not pass to them except by imitation alone.
Iulianum.2.177Aug. Si quis intemperantia sibi podagram faciat eamque transmittat in filios, quod saepe contingit, nonne recte dicitur in eos illud vitium de parente transisse, ipsos quoque hoc in parente fecisse, quoniam, quando ipse fecit, in illo fuerunt? Ac sic ipsi atque ille adhuc unus fuerunt; fecerunt ergo non actione hominum, sed ratione iam seminum. Quod ergo aliquoties invenitur in corporis morbis, hoc in illo unius primi genitoris antiquo magnoque peccato, quo natura humana universa vitiata est, factum esse noverat, qui lucidissima locutione, quam vos conamini tenebrare, dicebat: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt (Rom 5, 12). Gratiam quippe Christi commendare intenderat a contrario formam constituens et regenerationis principem principi generationis opponens.
Aug. If anyone by intemperance makes gout for himself and transmits it into his sons, which often happens, is it not rightly said that that vice passed into them from the parent, and that they too did this in the parent, since, when he did it, they were in him? And thus they and he were still one; they did it, then, not by the action of men, but by the principle now of the seeds. What, therefore, is sometimes found in the diseases of the body, this he knew was done in that ancient and great sin of the one first begetter, by which the whole human nature was corrupted—he who, with most lucid speech, which you try to darken, said, Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death, and so it passed into all human beings, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12). For he had intended to commend the grace of Christ, setting up the form by contrast and opposing the prince of regeneration to the prince of generation.
Iulianum.2.177178. Iul. Illud autem, quod te opponere credidisti vel in isto libro, cui nunc respondeo, vel in his, quos ad Marcellinum scripseras, tunc transisse peccatum, quando omnes homines, ut tuis verbis utar, ille unus fuerunt (De pecc. mer. et rem. 1, 11), sine difficultate veritas deterit et irrisioni cuiusce prudentis exponit. Nam tali argumento praeter impietatem tuam nihil aliud indicatur, impietatem inquam, qua credis ita esse animarum traducem in Tertulliani olim et Manichaei profanitate damnatam, sicut est etiam corporum tradux, quod tam nefarium est, ut, cum a nobis in ea epistula, quam ad Orientem misimus, vobis fuisset obiectum, tu in his libris, quos nuper ad Bonifacium misisti, negando a te propulsare coneris.
178. Jul. But that which you believed you were setting against me, either in this book to which I now reply, or in those which you had written to Marcellinus—that sin passed then, when all human beings, to use your words, were that one man (The Punishment and Forgiveness of Sins 1.11)—truth grinds down without difficulty and exposes to the laughter of any prudent person. For by such an argument nothing else is indicated than your impiety—impiety, I say, by which you believe that the traducianism of souls, long since condemned in the profanity of Tertullian and Manichaeus, exists just as there is also a traducianism of bodies—which is so nefarious that, when it had been objected to you by us in that letter which we sent to the East, you, in those books which you recently sent to Boniface, by denying try to repel it from yourself.
Iulianum.2.178Ais enim: Dicunt nos autem animarum traducem confiteri, quod in cuius libris legerint, nescio (Cf. C. duas epp. Pelag. 3, 26), ut a te videlicet nihil dici tale deieres. Porro, ut falsitas tua tuorum verborum collatione prodatur, quomodo traducem animarum, profanam re vera opinionem, tuis dicis sensibus non teneri, cum profitearis omnes homines illum unum fuisse? Si enim non credis partem animae seminibus illigatam, quo ore scribis omnes homines Adam solum fuisse, cum homo utique nisi anima et corpus simul esse non possit?
For you say: They say that we confess a traducianism of souls; in whose books they have read it, I do not know (See Answer to Two Letters of the Pelagians 3.26)—so that you might, namely, swear that nothing of the sort was said by you. Moreover, that your falsity may be betrayed by the comparison of your own words: how do you say that traducianism of souls—an opinion truly profane—is not held in your views, when you profess that all human beings were that one man? For if you do not believe a part of the soul bound to the seeds, with what mouth do you write that all human beings were Adam alone, since a human being surely cannot exist except as soul and body together?
Iulianum.2.178Aug. Putas hominem non posse dici solum hominis corpus, cum scias ipsum Filium Dei unicum, Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, sub Pontio Pilato crucifixum et sepultum, sicut tota eius Ecclesia confitetur et haereses multae, in quibus et vestra est; et tamen solum corpus Christi sepultum est. Debuit ergo secundum te Iesus Christus Filius Dei unicus, Dominus noster, non dici sepultus, quoniam non ex solo corpore, sed ex Verbo Dei et anima rationali et corpore est Christus Dei Filius unicus, Dominus noster, sed cum venisset ad haec verba confessio: Sub Pontio Pilato crucifixus est, subici debuit: et corpus eius sepultum.
Aug. Do you think that the body alone of a man cannot be called a man, when you know that the only Son of God himself, our Lord Jesus Christ, was crucified under Pontius Pilate and buried, as his whole Church confesses and many heresies, among which is yours too; and yet only the body of Christ was buried. According to you, then, Jesus Christ the only Son of God, our Lord, ought not to be said to have been buried, since Christ the only Son of God, our Lord, is not of body alone, but of the Word of God and a rational soul and a body; but when the confession had come to these words, Crucified under Pontius Pilate, it ought to have been subjoined: and his body was buried.
Iulianum.2.178Nec de ipso primo homine, de quo agitur, dicere Scriptura debuit: Finxit Deus hominem pulverem terrae (Gen 2, 7), quia solum hominis corpus ex terra est. Ipsum denique Deum errasse clamate, qui mortem minando dixit homini: Terra es et in terram ibis (Gen 3, 19), cum potius ex tua doctrina debuerit dicere: Terra est corpus tuum et in terram ibit. Quia ergo fuit Adam et in illo fuimus omnes (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 234), quod ante nos catholici Doctores secundum Scripturas sanctas in sancta Ecclesia didicerunt atque docuerunt, ideo dixi: Omnes ille unus fuerunt, quia et illi duo, masculus et femina, non iam duo erant, sed una caro (Cf. Mt 19, 6).
Nor ought Scripture, about that very first man of whom we treat, to have said, God formed man, dust of the earth (Gen 2:7), because only the body of man is of earth. Cry out, finally, that God himself erred, who, threatening death, said to the man, You are earth, and into earth you shall go (Gen 3:19), when rather, according to your doctrine, he ought to have said: Your body is earth, and into earth it shall go. Because, then, there was Adam, and in him we all were (Ambrose, On Luke 7.234)—which before us the Catholic Doctors learned and taught according to the holy Scriptures in the holy Church—therefore I said: All were that one man, because even those two, the male and the female, were now not two, but one flesh (See Matt 19:6).
Iulianum.2.178Et ego de omnibus genitis dixi, quoniam, quando peccatum est, omnes ille unus fuerunt; nondum quippe inde fuerat ullus in matrem seminatione transfusus, et utique filii a viris transfunduntur in feminas. Ex qualibet ergo et quantalibet parte omnes, qui ex illo nati sunt, ille unus fuerunt sive secundum solum corpus sive secundum utramque hominis partem, quod me nescire confiteor nec me pudet, ut vos, fateri nescire quod nescio, nec ideo tamen nescio de omni homine scriptum esse: Homo vanitati similis factus est, dies eius velut umbra praetereunt (Ps 143, 4), quia et alibi eadem sancta Scriptura dicit: Verum tamen universa vanitas omnis homo vivens (Ps 38, 6), quod iusto Deo creante non fieret, si peccatum originale non esset.
And I said of all the begotten, that, when sin was committed, all were that one man; for not yet had any been transfused thence into a mother by sowing, and surely sons are transfused from men into women. From whatever part, then, and however great a part, all who are born of him were that one man, whether according to the body alone or according to both parts of man—which I confess I do not know, nor am I ashamed, as you are, to confess that I do not know what I do not know; nor for that reason, however, am I ignorant that it is written of every man, Man has become like vanity, his days pass away like a shadow (Ps 144:4 (143)), because the same holy Scripture says elsewhere, Yet truly every living man is altogether vanity (Ps 39:6 (38))—which, with the just God creating, would not be, if there were no original sin.
Iulianum.2.178179. Iul. Deinde etiamsi hoc solum ad carnem referas, nec sic potest haec intellegentiae tuae fatuitas excusari, qua dicis: Omnes ille unus fuerunt, cum eo tempore, quo peccavit Adam, iam duo essent homines, non unus, id est ipse et uxor eius, de quorum substantia, non culpa genus hominum, secundum quod Deus instituerat, pullulavit.
179. Jul. Then, even if you refer this to the flesh alone, not even thus can this fatuity of your understanding be excused, by which you say: All were that one man, when at that time, in which Adam sinned, there were now two human beings, not one—that is, he and his wife, from whose substance, not fault, the human race sprouted, according as God had instituted.
Iulianum.2.179Aug. Iam dixi et ecce iterum dico: Ego de his dixi: Omnes ille unus fuerunt, quos fuerat seminaturus, id est generaturus Adam; ex illo ergo uno principaliter erant tracturi nascentes originale peccatum, qui genuit; illa autem, qua coniuncta duo fuerunt, quod excepit concepit peperitque posterior, quamvis peccaverit prior. Unde et sancta Scriptura in lumbis patris Abraham dicit fuisse filios Levi et in illo a sacerdote Melchisedech fuisse decimatos (Cf. Hebr 7, 5. 9-10). Ad Hebraeos Epistulam lege et linguam corrige.
Aug. I have already said, and behold I say again: I said of these, All were that one man, whom Adam was going to sow, that is, to generate; from that one, then, principally—who begot—those who are born were going to draw original sin; but she, with whom, being joined, the two were, what the latter received she conceived and bore, although the former sinned. Whence holy Scripture too says that the sons of Levi were in the loins of their father Abraham and in him were tithed by the priest Melchizedek (See Heb 7:5.9-10). Read the Letter to the Hebrews and correct your tongue.
Iulianum.2.179180. Iul. Denique Abeli filio parentum peccatum nihil nocuisse sanctitas eius Scripturis omnibus celebrata testatur.
180. Jul. Finally, that the sin of the parents harmed nothing to their son Abel, his holiness, celebrated in all the Scriptures, testifies.
Iulianum.2.180Aug. Cur ergo non ipsum posuit Apostolus imitandum, qui primus iustus fuit, sed cum de duobus hominibus ageret, quorum unus in condemnationem mitteret, alter in iustificationem, Adam dixit et Christum? Si autem Abel legem non habebat in membris repugnantem legi mentis (Cf. Rom 7, 23), quam sicut iustus debellabat interiore certamine, et si caro eius non concupiscebat adversus spiritum (Cf. Gal 5, 17), nihil ei nocuerat peccatum parentum. Sed quisquis talem dicit fuisse Abel, dicat eum carnem non habuisse peccati, cum procul dubio Dominus Christus non habuisset similitudinem carnis peccati, nisi aliorum omnium hominum esset caro peccati.
Aug. Why, then, did the Apostle not set down him to be imitated, who was the first just man, but, when he was treating of two men, one of whom would send unto condemnation, the other unto justification, said Adam and Christ? But if Abel did not have the law in his members fighting against the law of his mind (See Rom 7:23), which, like a just man, he overcame in the inner struggle, and if his flesh did not have desires against the spirit (See Gal 5:17), the sin of his parents harmed him nothing. But whoever says Abel was such, let him say that he did not have the flesh of sin—since without doubt the Lord Christ would not have had the likeness of the flesh of sin, unless the flesh of all other human beings were the flesh of sin.
Iulianum.2.180181. Iul. E regione Cain, invidus, parricida, de eadem natura progenitus, non eadem voluntate provectus, excarnificante animum tremore vastatur. Ergo in hunc mundum peccatum intrasse per unum Apostolus dixit et per peccatum mortem et ita in omnes homines mortem pertransisse, qui peccaverunt. Quae sententia catholico dogmati conveniens nihil vobis impertit auxilii.
181. Jul. On the opposite side Cain—envious, a parricide, begotten of the same nature, advanced by not the same will—is laid waste by a trembling that tortures his mind. Therefore the Apostle said that sin entered into this world through one, and through sin death, and so death passed into all human beings, who sinned. Which opinion, agreeing with the Catholic dogma, imparts no help to you.
Iulianum.2.181Aug. Mortem cum peccato pertransisse ostendit Apostolus dicendo: Et ita in omnes homines pertransiit (Rom 5, 12). Propter hoc et infantes, cum baptizantur, eruuntur de potestate tenebrarum; alioquin cum magna iniuria Dei, sicut iam diximus et saepe dicendum est, exorcizatur et exsufflatur imago Dei, si non ille ibi exorcizatur et exsufflatur princeps mundi, qui mittitur foras, ut sit illic habitatio Spiritus Sancti (Cf. Io 12, 31). Scelus autem, quod fecit Cain, ad originis causam non pertinet, quoniam voluntate commissum est.
Aug. The Apostle showed that death passed with sin by saying, And so it passed into all human beings (Rom 5:12). On account of this, infants too, when they are baptized, are delivered from the power of darkness; otherwise, with great injury to God—as we have already said and must often say—the image of God is exorcized and breathed upon, if there is not there exorcized and breathed upon that prince of the world who is cast out, that there may be there a dwelling of the Holy Spirit (See John 12:31). But the crime which Cain did does not pertain to the cause of origin, since it was committed by the will.
Iulianum.2.181182. Iul. His enim est ordinata verbis, quibus exemplum praecedens et studium sequens imitantis ostenditur.
182. Jul. For it is ordered with these words, by which the preceding example and the following zeal of the imitator are shown.
Iulianum.2.182Aug. Iam tibi dictum est: Abel ergo ei debuit opponi a contraria parte, non Christus.
Aug. It has already been said to you: Abel, then, ought to have been opposed to him from the contrary part, not Christ.
Iulianum.2.182183. Iul. Ceterum si generationem peccato aut infectam aut obnoxiam voluisset ostendere, non dixisset per unum hominem intrasse peccatum, sed per duos.
183. Jul. But if he had wished to show generation either infected with sin or liable to it, he would not have said that sin entered through one man, but through two.
Iulianum.2.183Aug. Iam responsum est. Nihil dicis et tamen dicis et dicis, quoniam rectum non potes invenire, quod dicas.
Aug. It has already been answered. You say nothing, and yet you say and say, since you cannot find anything straight to say.
Iulianum.2.183184. Iul. Nec dixisset: In eo transiit mors, in quo omnes peccaverunt (Rom 5, 12), sed: In eo, quod de primi hominis et de primae mulieris diabolica voluptate et carne fluxerunt; quod si pronuntiavisset, non vestrum dogma firmasset, sed omnes suas sententias subruisset Apostolus. Ergo peccantium voluntatem et peccati accusat exemplum ac per hoc vos et ratio deproeliatur et Paulus.
184. Jul. Nor would he have said: In him death passed, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12), but: In that they flowed from the diabolical pleasure and flesh of the first man and the first woman; and if he had pronounced this, he would not have confirmed your dogma, but would have undermined all his own opinions. Therefore he accuses the will of those who sin and the example of sin; and through this both reason and Paul do battle against you.
Iulianum.2.184Aug. Ergo in Abel primo iusto ponere debuit iustificationis exemplum, sicut in Adam primo peccatore positum putatis esse peccati. Cur enim nos pigeat eadem tibi respondere, cum te non pudeat eadem totiens frustra repetere?
Aug. Therefore in Abel, the first just man, he ought to have set down the example of justification, just as you think the example of sin was set down in Adam, the first sinner. For why should it weary us to answer you the same things, when it does not shame you to repeat the same things so often in vain?
Iulianum.2.184185. Iul. Usque ad legem enim peccatum in hoc mundo; peccatum autem non imputabatur, cum lex non esset, sed regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen etiam in eos, qui non peccaverunt in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, qui est forma futuri (Rom 5, 13-14). Qualitatem peccati appellationum varietate discernit, ut aliud ostendat esse peccatum, aliud praevaricationem; vultque in hoc dumtaxat loco omnem quidem praevaricationem peccatum videri, non omne autem peccatum praevaricationem, ut per vocabulum praevaricationis peccato crescat invidia magisque rei esse videantur, qui fuerint praecepta transgressi, quam qui sine legis admonitione rationis ingenitae dissimulatione deliquerint. Ante eam ergo legem, quae per Moysen data est et consignata litteris, cuius sanctione actuum forma praescripta est, quam ignorare populo sub ea degenti non licuit, medium illud tempus inter Adam et Moysen, mortales varia studiorum pravitate pollutos, peccati Apostolus, non praevaricationis accusat.
185. Jul. For until the law sin was in this world; but sin was not imputed, when there was no law; but death reigned from Adam until Moses, even in those who did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, who is a form of the one to come (Rom 5:13-14). He distinguishes the quality of sin by a variety of appellations, so as to show that sin is one thing, transgression another; and he wishes, in this passage at least, that every transgression indeed seem sin, but not every sin transgression, so that through the term of transgression the odium against sin may grow, and those may seem to be more guilty who have transgressed precepts than those who have offended without the admonition of the law, by dissimulation of inborn reason. Before that law, then, which was given through Moses and consigned to letters, by whose sanction the form of acts was prescribed, which it was not permitted the people living under it to be ignorant of—that middle time between Adam and Moses—the Apostle accuses the mortals, polluted by various depravity of pursuits, of sin, not of transgression.
Iulianum.2.185Aug. Quid est ergo: Regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen et in eos, qui non peccaverunt in similitudine praevaricationis Adae? Quomodolibet enim distinguatis, contra vos dixisse Apostolus invenitur. Nam si: Regnavit mors et in eos, qui non peccaverunt, distinxeritis; quo modo sit iustum nisi propter originale peccatum, et ideo, tamquam quaereretur, quare regnaverit et in eos, qui non peccaverunt, responsio reddita est: In similitudinem praevaricationis Adae, id est non propter sua propria peccata, sed quoniam sui similes genuit praevaricator Adam, sicut exposuerunt haec verba etiam qui ante nos catholici Doctores fuerunt. Quamvis enim peccatum illud primum atque unum, quod per unum hominem intravit in mundum, commune sit omnium, propter quod dictum est: In quo omnes peccaverunt, tamen sua propria parvuli peccata non habent. Et ideo de illis etiam hoc veraciter dici potuit, quod non peccaverunt, sed regnavit in eos mors in similitudine, ut dictum est, praevaricationis Adae. Si autem: Regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen et in eos, qui non peccaverunt in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, id est et in eos, qui peccaverunt quidem, sed non in similitudine praevaricationis Adae peccaverunt, neminem secundum vos invenitis, quia omnes, qui peccaverunt, in similitudine eius peccasse, id est exemplum eius secutos esse contenditis. Fovea igitur vulpeculae ex utraque parte conclusa est; non est, qua intret, ut lateat, aut si iam ibi latebat, non est, qua exeat, ut evadat.
Aug. What, then, is, Death reigned from Adam until Moses, even in those who did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam? For however you distinguish it, the Apostle is found to have spoken against you. For if you distinguish, Death reigned even in those who did not sin, how is it just except on account of original sin?—and therefore, as though it were asked why it reigned even in those who did not sin, the answer was given: In the likeness of the transgression of Adam, that is, not on account of their own proper sins, but because the transgressor Adam begot ones like himself, as the Catholic Doctors who were before us also expounded these words. For although that first and one sin which entered into the world through one man is common to all, on account of which it was said, In whom all sinned, yet little children do not have their own proper sins. And therefore of them too it could truly be said that they did not sin, but that death reigned in them in the likeness, as it was said, of the transgression of Adam. But if, Death reigned from Adam until Moses, even in those who did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam—that is, even in those who did indeed sin, but did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam—you find no one, according to you, because you contend that all who sinned sinned in his likeness, that is, followed his example. The pit, then, has been closed on the little fox from both sides; there is no way by which it may enter, that it may lie hidden, or, if it was already lying hidden there, there is no way by which it may go out, that it may escape.
Iulianum.2.185186. Iul. Ut quibus lex data non est, intellegantur non esse praecepta transgressi, rei autem convincantur, quoniam neglegentes rationem, quam proprii in unoquoque protestantur affectus, vel humanae societatis vel pudoris iura temeraverint; atque ideo mutua quidem imitatione, non tamen legis, quae necdum lata erat, dicuntur transgressione peccasse, usque ad legem ergo peccatum fuit, non praevaricatio, post legem autem non solum peccatum, sed etiam praevaricatio.
186. Jul. So that those to whom the law was not given may be understood not to have transgressed precepts, but may yet be convicted as guilty, since, neglecting the reason which each one's own affections attest in him, they violated the rights either of human society or of shame; and therefore by mutual imitation, yet not by transgression of the law—which had not yet been brought in—they are said to have sinned; until the law, then, there was sin, not transgression; but after the law, not only sin, but also transgression.
Iulianum.2.186Regnavit autem mors aeterna, quam Adae, si peccasset, ascripturum se Deus spoponderat. Igitur illa mors peccato debita, mors poenalis, regnavit et ante legem in eos, qui peccaverunt, sicut in Sodomitis et in his, qui diluvii tempore propter iniquitatem, voluntariam tamen, vel varia sunt aetate consumpti, regnavit et post legem in his, quos reos praevaricationis invenit.
But eternal death reigned, which God had pledged he would ascribe to Adam if he sinned. Therefore that death owed to sin, the penal death, reigned even before the law in those who sinned—as in the Sodomites and in those who, at the time of the flood, were consumed on account of iniquity, yet voluntary, at various ages—and reigned after the law in those whom it found guilty of transgression.
Iulianum.2.186Aug. Quoniam mortem nisi aeternam non vis esse poenalem; si mors poenalis non est, quae a corpore animam separat, cur eam timet natura, quam sic laudas, ut neges esse vitiatam? Quid causae est, ut infans, ubi paululum ab infantia progredi coeperit, iam formidet occidi? Cur non ita, ut in somnum, sensus est proclivis in mortem? Cur magni habentur, qui mortem non metuunt, hique tam rari sunt? Cur etiam ipse, qui cuncupiscentiam se habere dixit dissolvi et esse cum Christo (Cf. Phil 1, 23), non vult tamen spoliari, sed supervestiri, ut absorbeatur mortale a vita (Cf. 2 Cor 5, 4)? Utquid Petro dictum est de ipso glorioso fine: Alter te cinget et feret, quo tu non vis (Io 21, 18)? Si ergo frustra mors timetur, ipse timor eius est poena; si autem anima separari a corpore naturaliter non vult, ipsa mors poena est, quamvis eam in usum bonum gratia divina convertat.
Aug. Since you are unwilling that any death but the eternal be penal—if the death which separates the soul from the body is not penal, why does the nature which you so praise as to deny it corrupted fear it? What is the cause that an infant, when he has begun to advance a little from infancy, already dreads to be killed? Why is the sense not as inclined to death as to sleep? Why are they held great who do not fear death, and these so rare? Why does even he himself, who said he had the desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ (See Phil 1:23), nonetheless wish not to be stripped, but to be further clothed, that the mortal may be swallowed up by life (See 2 Cor 5:4)? Why was it said to Peter, about his very glorious end, Another will gird you and carry you where you do not wish (John 21:18)? If, then, death is feared in vain, the very fear of it is a punishment; but if the soul naturally does not wish to be separated from the body, death itself is a punishment, although divine grace turns it to a good use.
Iulianum.2.186187. Iul. Quoniam ea iudicante iustitia, quae non imputat peccatum, nisi a quo liberum est abstinere, hi, qui sine lege peccaverunt, sine lege iudicabuntur (Cf. Rom 2, 12), et hi qui in lege peccaverunt, per legem iudicabuntur. Quod autem ait Apostolus: Sed regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen etiam in eos, qui non peccaverunt in similitudine praevaricationis Adae (Rom 5, 14), fecit translucere, quod senserat, id est Iudaeos sub lege peccantes similiter ut Adam praevaricatos fuisse definiens, quia et illi primo homini, licet non libris, auribus tamen commendata lex fuerat abstinendi a gustu arboris, in quo oboedientiae exploratio fuit, de qua contra praeceptum edendo praevaricationis crimen incurrit. Ergo et post datam legem ministerio Moysi peccans populus in similitudine praevaricationis Adae deliquisse convincitur, quia ita ut ille legis transgressione peccabat; in media autem aetate duarum legum, primae datae, non scriptae, secundae vero et latae et litteris traditae, qui peccaverunt, non a peccato ostenduntur alieni, sed non in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, quia legem non acceperant, perhibentur errasse.
187. Jul. Since, with that justice judging which does not impute sin except where it is free to abstain, those who sinned without the law shall be judged without the law (See Rom 2:12), and those who sinned in the law shall be judged through the law. But what the Apostle says, But death reigned from Adam until Moses, even in those who did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam (Rom 5:14), he made to shine through what he had meant—that is, defining that the Jews sinning under the law transgressed similarly to Adam, because to that first man too the law of abstaining from the taste of the tree had been entrusted—though not by books, yet to his ears—in which was the testing of obedience, in which, by eating against the precept, he incurred the crime of transgression. Therefore, after the law given by the ministry of Moses, the people sinning is convicted of having offended in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, because it sinned just as he did, by transgression of the law; but in the middle age of the two laws—the first given, not written, the second both brought in and handed down in letters—those who sinned are shown not to be alien from sin, but are reported to have erred not in the likeness of the transgression of Adam, because they had not received the law.
Iulianum.2.187Aug. Ubi negas similitudinem praevaricationis Adae, te ipse convincis, quod hi, qui sine lege peccaverunt, non primi hominis exemplo sunt rei; non est igitur imitatio, sed generatio, qua per peccatum mors in omnes homines pertransiit. Neque enim, si tam prolixa tempora, quae ante legem fuerunt, transiluisset haec mors, quae per peccatum primi hominis intravit in mundum, et a Iudaeis serpere inciperet, qui praevaricatores legis effecti sunt, ut servaret similitudinem praevaricationis Adae, diceretur de illa: Per unum hominem intravit et per omnes homines pertransiit (Rom 5, 12). Cui enim, non dico stulto, sed fatuo, persuadebitis mortem per unum hominem intrasse et per omnes homines pertransisse, quam dicitis tot gentes et tot saecula praetermisisse et ad eos, qui legem acceperant, intactis ceteris pervenisse, cum et in eos mortem regnasse dicatis, qui non in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, sed sine praevaricatione, quia sine lege, peccaverunt? Prorsus non est, unde vestrum corrigatis errorem, nisi redeatis ad catholicam fidem, quae homini primo, principi generationis, hominem secundum, principem regenerationis, opponit.
Aug. Where you deny the likeness of Adam's transgression, you refute yourself, since those who sinned without the Law are not held guilty by the example of the first man; it is therefore not imitation but generation by which, through sin, death passed to all human beings. For if this death, which entered the world through the sin of the first man, had leaped over those long ages that came before the Law and had only begun to creep upon the Jews, who became transgressors of the Law, so as to preserve the likeness of Adam's transgression, it would not be said of it that it entered through one man and passed to all human beings (Rom 5:12). For to whom will you persuade—I do not say a fool, but an idiot—that death entered through one man and passed to all human beings, when you say that it passed over so many peoples and so many ages and reached, with all the rest untouched, only those who had received the Law, while you also say that death reigned even over those who sinned not in the likeness of Adam's transgression, but without any transgression, because without the Law? There is simply no way for you to correct your error, unless you return to the catholic faith, which sets over against the first man, the head of generation, the second man, the head of regeneration.
Iulianum.2.187188. Iul. Qui Adam forma dicitur futuri, id est Christi, verum forma a contrario, ut, sicut ille peccati, ita hic iustitiae forma credatur;
188. Jul. Adam is called a form of the one to come, that is, of Christ—yet a form by contrast, so that, as the one is believed to be the form of sin, the other is believed to be the form of justice;
Iulianum.2.188sed sicut incarnatio Christi iustitiae fuit forma, non prima, sed maxima, quia et, antequam Verbum caro fieret, ex ea fide, quae in Deum erat, et in Prophetis et in multis aliis sanctis fulsere virtutes, veniente autem temporum plenitudine exacta in Christo iustitiae norma resplenduit et, qui praedictus fuerat pater futuri saeculi, tam praecedentium sanctorum quam etiam sequentium remunerator eminuit.
but just as the incarnation of Christ was a form of justice—not the first, but the greatest, since even before the Word was made flesh the virtues shone forth, both in the prophets and in many other holy persons, out of that faith which was in God; yet when the fullness of time had come, the exact rule of justice shone resplendent in Christ, and he who had been foretold as the father of the age to come stood forth as the rewarder both of the saints who preceded and of those who followed.
Iulianum.2.188Aug. Agnoscimus haeresim vestram; definivit enim Pelagius, quod non ex fide incarnationis Christi antiqui vixerint iusti, quia videlicet nondum in carne venerat Christus, cum profecto id futurum non praenuntiassent, nisi priores utique credidissent; sed in hanc absurditatem cecidistis, dum defenditis esse potuisse per naturam legemque iustitiam, utrumlibet autem si verum est, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est (Gal 2, 21).
Aug. We recognize your heresy; for Pelagius defined that the ancient just did not live by faith in the incarnation of Christ, on the ground that Christ had not yet come in the flesh—though assuredly they would not have foretold that this was to come unless those earlier ones had indeed believed. But you have fallen into this absurdity by defending the view that justice could exist through nature and the Law; yet if either of these is true, then Christ died for nothing (Gal 2:21).
Iulianum.2.188189. Iul. Ita etiam in parte contraria Adam dicitur forma peccati non prima, sed maxima.
189. Jul. So too, on the contrary side, Adam is called a form of sin—not the first, but the greatest.
Iulianum.2.189Aug. Unde ergo non prima, sed maxima? Quandoquidem propter exordium generis humani non negas primam nec / CSEL 307/ invenis, cur dicas maximam, nisi fatearis tanto gravius Adam peccasse, quanto ibi maior non peccandi facilitas erat, ubi vitiata natura nondum erat nec lex peccati in membris repugnabat legi mentis. Cum qua poena omnis homo nascitur periturus in aeternum, si non renascatur, et perditus, nisi ab eo quaesitus inveniatur, qui venit quaerere quod perierat (Cf. Lc 19, 10).
Aug. How, then, is he not the first but the greatest? Since, on account of the beginning of the human race, you do not deny that he is the first, and you find no reason to call him the greatest, unless you confess that Adam sinned all the more gravely inasmuch as there was a greater ease of not sinning where nature was not yet corrupted and the law of sin in the members did not yet war against the law of the mind. With this penalty every human being is born, doomed to perish forever if he is not reborn, and lost unless he is found by him who came to seek what had perished (See Luke 19:10).
Iulianum.2.189190. Iul. Maximam autem dico, non quia diabolum magis reum fuisse diffitear, sed quia, cum institutionis ratio peteretur, accommodatius Apostolus hominis, quem plurimum successio humanitatis aspexit, quam aeriae substantiae fecerit mentionem. Verum in ipsa humanitate primam mulierem deliquisse constabat; sed quia patrum in omnibus efficacior est et maior auctoritas, eum dixit formam fuisse peccati, non a quo coepit delictum, sed qui per potestatem sexus virilis magis fuisse probatur imitabilis. Vides nempe, ut consequentia intellectus veritatem sibi inesse testetur.
190. Jul. I call him the greatest, however, not because I would deny that the devil was more guilty, but because, when the account of the institution was sought, the Apostle more fittingly made mention of the man, on whom the succession of humanity chiefly looked, than of the airy substance. But within humanity itself it was settled that the first woman had transgressed; yet because in all things the authority of the fathers is more effective and greater, he said that the man was the form of sin—not the one by whom the transgression began, but the one who, through the power of the male sex, is shown to have been more apt for imitation. You see, surely, how the sequence of thought bears witness that truth is present within it.
Iulianum.2.190Aug. Non imitationem imitationi, sed regenerationem generationi opposuisse Apostolum ipsa Christi forma demonstrat, qui homini primo homo secundus opponitur. Si ergo non pertinent ad iustitiam Christi, qui renascuntur, non pertinent ad peccatum Adae, qui nascuntur, et non est Christus forma a contrario, sed quia forma est, procul dubio, sicut renati ad iustitiam Christi transeunt etiam parvuli, quamvis operari iustitiam non valentes, ita cum transitu peccati ex Adam nati sunt sive nascuntur, quamvis nec peccatum adhuc valeant operari. Agnosce formam et noli esse contradictione deformis.
Aug. That the Apostle set, not imitation against imitation, but regeneration against generation, the very form of Christ shows, since the second man is set over against the first man. If, then, those who are reborn do not belong to the justice of Christ, then those who are born do not belong to the sin of Adam, and Christ is not a form by contrast; but because he is a form, then beyond doubt, just as the reborn pass over to the justice of Christ—even little ones, though unable to work justice—so, by the passing over of sin, those born of Adam were born, or are born, into it, though they too are not yet able to work sin. Acknowledge the form, and do not make yourself deformed by contradiction.
Iulianum.2.190191. Iul. Nunc intuere, quantum a tua expositione discordent ut cetera eiusdem loci ita illa verba, quibus Apostolus pronuntiat etiam in eos regnasse mortem, qui non peccaverunt in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, qui est forma futuri (Rom 5, 14). Si enim de naturali peccato ageret, de quo dixerat, ut videtur tibi: In quo omnes peccaverunt (Rom 5, 12), qui essent hi, quos statim pronuntiat non solum in praevaricatione Adae, sed ne in similitudine quidem culpae illius obnoxios deprehendi?
191. Jul. Now consider how greatly at variance with your exposition are, along with the rest of the same passage, those words by which the Apostle declares that death reigned even over those who did not sin in the likeness of Adam's transgression, who is a form of the one to come (Rom 5:14). For if he were treating of a natural sin, of which he had said, as it seems to you, in whom all have sinned (Rom 5:12), who would those be whom he immediately declares to be found guilty not only of no transgression of Adam, but not even of any likeness of that fault?
Iulianum.2.191Aug. Sed tu sic intellegis, qui non intellegis; Apostolus autem rationem reddidit, quare mors regnaverit et in eos, qui non peccaverunt, addendo et dicendo: In similitudinem praevaricationis Adae, id est propterea regnasse ostendens mortem et in eos, qui non peccaverunt, quoniam quamdam similitudinis formam ex Adae praevaricatione traxerunt. Adam quippe induunt, qui nascuntur, sicut Christum induunt, qui renascuntur.
Aug. But so you understand, who do not understand; the Apostle, however, gave the reason why death reigned even over those who did not sin, by adding the words in the likeness of Adam's transgression—showing, that is, that death reigned even over those who did not sin because they drew a certain form of likeness from Adam's transgression. For those who are born put on Adam, just as those who are reborn put on Christ.
Iulianum.2.191192. Iul. Regnavit - inquit - mors etiam in eos, qui non peccaverunt in similitudine praevaricationis Adae (Rom 5, 14). Vides eum distinctionem fecisse perspicuam inter eos, qui similiter ut Adam, et eos, qui dissimiliter erraverant.
192. Jul. Death reigned, he says, even over those who did not sin in the likeness of Adam's transgression (Rom 5:14). You see that he made a clear distinction between those who erred just as Adam did and those who erred unlike him.
Iulianum.2.192Aug. Si dissimiliter erraverant, ubi est ergo imitationis exemplum? Regenerationem redde generationi, non imitationem imitationi, et invenies formam, quam commendavit Apostolus veritatis, non quam finxit Pelagius, vestri auctor erroris.
Aug. If they erred unlike him, where then is the example of imitation? Render regeneration to generation, not imitation to imitation, and you will find the form which the Apostle of truth commended, not the one which Pelagius, the author of your error, invented.
Iulianum.2.192193. Iul. Quae divisio naturali peccato non potest convenire, quod si esset, omnes prorsus aequaliter colligaret; nemo ergo esset, cui malum hoc non inesset, et nullus inveniretur, de quo vere posset dici, quia in similitudine peccati illius non deliquisset, in cuius omnes veritate peccassent.
193. Jul. This distinction cannot fit a natural sin, for if there were such a sin, it would bind absolutely all alike; there would then be no one in whom this evil was not present, and none could be found of whom it could truly be said that he had not sinned in the likeness of that sin in whose reality all had sinned.
Iulianum.2.193Aug. Quod renitendo clamas, hoc verum est et contra vos est: omnes prorsus originale peccatum aequaliter colligavit; nemo esset, cui malum hoc non inesset, nisi per Christum gratia divina prodesset. In eos enim, qui non peccaverunt, id est qui sua peccata propria non fecerunt, ut mors regnaret, similitudo meruit praevaricationis Adae, qui est forma futuri, id est Christi; sicut enim primo homine, qui nascuntur, ita secundo homine, qui renascuntur, induuntur.
Aug. What you cry out in resistance is true and tells against you: original sin has bound absolutely all alike; there would be no one in whom this evil was not present, were it not that the grace of God benefits through Christ. For upon those who did not sin—that is, who did not commit sins of their own—the likeness of Adam's transgression deserved that death should reign, Adam who is a form of the one to come, that is, of Christ; for just as those who are born are clothed in the first man, so those who are reborn are clothed in the second man.
Iulianum.2.193194. Iul. Colligit autem Apostolus et pronuntiat esse alios, qui peccaverint sicut Adam, alios, quos nec similitudo antiquae praevaricationis asperserit; absolute ergo claret morum crimina esse, non seminum. Atque ut breviter quae sunt acta repetamus, ait Apostolus per unum hominem intrasse peccatum. Hoc ratio ostendit imitationi, non generationi congruere, quae est opus duorum.
194. Jul. The Apostle gathers and declares that there are some who sinned as Adam did, and others whom not even the likeness of the ancient transgression has stained; it is therefore plain beyond question that the crimes are crimes of conduct, not of seeds. And, to recall briefly what has been done, the Apostle says that sin entered through one man. Reason shows that this fits imitation, not generation, which is the work of two.
Iulianum.2.194Aug. Quam multum eadem dicis et nihil dicis nec vides, quia, si peccatum imitationis a genere humano coeptum isto significaretur loco, per unam potius quam per unum in mundum diceretur intrasse, quae ita prima peccavit, ut eam vir quoque ipsius fuerit imitatus.
Aug. How much you say the same things and say nothing, nor do you see that, if a sin of imitation begun by the human race were meant in this passage, it would be said to have entered the world through one woman rather than through one man, since she sinned first in such a way that her husband too imitated her.
Iulianum.2.194Sed quia generationem, non imitationem volebat intellegi: Per unum - inquit - hominem peccatum intravit in mundum (Rom 5, 12), aut ambos singulari numero includens, propter quod dictum est: Igitur iam non sunt duo (Mt 19, 6), aut eum potissimum commemorans, a quo est principium generandi, cum seminatio exorditur, ut conceptio subsequatur. Haec saepe iam diximus, sed iterationibus tuis nostras quoque vel rarius, tamen iterando non cedimus.
But because he wished generation, not imitation, to be understood, he says, Through one man sin entered the world (Rom 5:12)—either including both under the singular number, on account of what was said, Therefore they are now not two (Matt 19:6), or mentioning especially the one from whom the principle of generating comes, when the sowing begins so that conception may follow. We have already said these things often, but we too do not yield to your repetitions, even though we repeat ours more rarely.
Iulianum.2.194195. Iul. Secutus est: Et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit (Rom 5, 12).
195. Jul. He went on: And so death passed to all human beings (Rom 5:12).
Iulianum.2.195Aug. Quid est: ita pertransiit, nisi quomodo intravit, id est, cum peccato sive per peccatum?
Aug. What does so it passed mean, except in the way it entered—that is, with sin or through sin?
Iulianum.2.195196. Iul. Fecit distinctionem, ne quis putaret transisse peccatum, ut mors, quae praecucurrit, iudicante iustitia secuta probaretur materias ultionis, quas in unoquoque peccatore de studio malae voluntatis invenerat. Ostendit igitur non naturam accusandam esse, sed studia.
196. Jul. He made the distinction lest anyone should think that sin had passed over in such a way that death, which had run ahead, was shown—by justice judging—to have followed up the materials of vengeance which it had found in each sinner from the pursuit of an evil will. He showed, therefore, that nature is not to be accused, but pursuits.
Iulianum.2.196Aug. Frustra te versas et reversas. Adam respice et Christum: ille formam est futuri, non est ergo a contrario iste conformis, qui iustitiam suam in renascentes parvulos traicit, si peccatum in nascentes ille non traicit.
Aug. In vain do you twist and turn yourself about. Look at Adam and Christ: the one is a form of the one to come; the latter, then, is not conformed to him by contrast, casting his justice over into the little ones who are being reborn, if the former does not cast sin over into those who are being born.
Iulianum.2.196197. Iul. Subiunxit in eo regnasse mortem, in quo omnes peccaverunt (Ibidem), quo sermone non nascentis ruina, sed opera agentis expressa est. Approbavit se itaque pravitatem arguere nec innocentiam sauciare.
197. Jul. He added that death reigned in him in whom all have sinned (Rom 5:12); by which expression not the ruin of the one being born, but the deeds of the one acting are expressed. He thus showed that he was reproving depravity and not wounding innocence.
Iulianum.2.197Aug. In illo peccaverunt omnes, in quo moriuntur omnes; cuius a contrario forma est, in quo vivificantur omnes. Sicut autem in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic in Christo omnes vivificabuntur (1 Cor 15, 22). Quod ideo dictum est, quia, sicut nemo nisi per Adam vergit in mortem, ita nemo nisi per Christum surgit in vitam. O homo, qui nihil potes dicere, posses saltem tacere?
Aug. In him all have sinned, in whom all die; whose form by contrast is the one in whom all are made alive. For as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive (1 Cor 15:22). This was said because, just as no one slips into death except through Adam, so no one rises into life except through Christ. O man, who can say nothing—could you not at least be silent?
Iulianum.2.197198. Iul. Post hoc autem intulit usque ad legem regnasse peccatum ostendens regnum peccati lata lege cecidisse.
198. Jul. After this he added that sin reigned until the Law, showing that the reign of sin fell when the Law was passed.
Iulianum.2.198Aug. Si lata lege cecidit regnum peccati, ergo per legem iustitia est. Si per legem iustitia est, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est (Gal 2, 21). Apostoli est vox ista, non mea. Iam erumpite in apertum, inimici crucis Christi. Quid timetis magnum populum Christi et Christi magnum iudicium non timetis? Aperte dicite: Iustificari natura, iustificari lege possemus; gratis mortuus est Christus.
Aug. If the reign of sin fell when the Law was passed, then justice is through the Law. If justice is through the Law, then Christ died for nothing (Gal 2:21). That is the Apostle's voice, not mine. Now burst forth into the open, enemies of the cross of Christ. Why do you fear the great people of Christ and yet do not fear the great judgment of Christ? Say openly: We could be justified by nature, we could be justified by the Law; Christ died for nothing.
Iulianum.2.198Sed formidantes multitudinem christianam Pelagianum verbum supponitis et quaerentibus a vobis, quare mortuus sit Christus, si natura vel lex efficit iustos, respondetis: Ut hoc ipsum facilius fieret, quasi posset, quamvis difficilius, fieri tamen sive per naturam sive per legem. Christe, responde, vince atque convince; clama: Sine me nihil potestis facere (Io 15, 5), ut taceant, qui clamant: Etsi difficilius, tamen possemus et sine te facere.
But, dreading the Christian multitude, you slip in your Pelagian word, and to those who ask you why Christ died, if nature or the Law makes people just, you reply: So that this very thing might be done more easily—as though it could be done, even if more laboriously, either through nature or through the Law. O Christ, answer, conquer, and convict; cry out, Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5), that they may fall silent who cry out: Even if more laboriously, yet we could do it even without you.
Iulianum.2.198Aut si tacere non possunt, se ipsos in latebras aliquas ducant, ut alios non seducant. Cur ergo ait Apostolus: Usque enim ad legem peccatum in mundo fuit (Rom 5, 13), nisi, quia peccatum auferre nec lata lex potuit, sed ille, de quo dictum est: Ecce Agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccata mundi (Io 1, 29)?
Or, if they cannot keep silent, let them lead themselves off into some hiding places, that they may not lead others astray. Why, then, does the Apostle say, For until the Law sin was in the world (Rom 5:13), except that not even the Law, once passed, could take away sin, but only he of whom it was said, Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who takes away the sins of the world (John 1:29)?
Iulianum.2.198199. Iul. Generatio autem, quae coepit ab Adam, et post legem permanet; quae si esset fons peccatorum et frutex diaboli, sicut tu argumentaris, non utique usque ad legem, sed et post legem et post Christum hoc crimen vigeret. Peccatum itaque, de quo Apostolus pronuntiat, quia usque ad legem fuerit nec potuerit manere post legem, actionis, non nativitatis esse convincitur.
199. Jul. But the generation that began from Adam remains even after the Law; and if it were the fountain of sins and the shrub of the devil, as you argue, this crime would surely flourish not only until the Law, but even after the Law and after Christ. The sin, therefore, of which the Apostle declares that it was until the Law and could not remain after the Law, is shown to be a sin of action, not of birth.
Iulianum.2.199Aug. Ecce aperte dicis non ideo dixisse Apostolum: Usque ad legem peccatum in mundo fuit (Rom 5, 13), quia nec lex potuit auferre peccatum, sed quia peccatum non potuit manere post legem. Nec expavescis vocem Dei per hominem Dei intendentem in Christum atque dicentem: Ecce Agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccatum mundi (Io 1, 29)? Quid desipis? Quid insanis? Non natura, non lex, sed ecce qui tollit peccatum mundi. Et audes dicere peccati regnum lata lege cecidisse, et post legem non potuisse manere peccatum? Cum dicat Apostolus: Si per legem iustitia, ergo Christus gratis mortuus est (Gal 2, 21); cum dicat Apostolus: Quia in lege nemo iustificatur (Gal 3, 11); cum dicat Apostolus: Lex subintravit, ut abundaret delictum (Rom 5, 20); cum dicat Apostolus: Si data esset lex, quae posset vivificare, omnino ex lege esset iustitia; sed conclusit Scriptura omnia sub peccato, ut promissio ex fide Iesu Christi daretur credentibus (Gal 3, 21-22).
Aug. See, you say openly that the Apostle did not say Until the Law sin was in the world (Rom 5:13) because not even the Law could take away sin, but because sin could not remain after the Law. And you do not shudder at the voice of God, through the man of God, pointing to Christ and saying, Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who takes away the sin of the world (John 1:29)? Why do you talk nonsense? Why are you mad? Not nature, not the Law, but behold him who takes away the sin of the world. And do you dare to say that the reign of sin fell when the Law was passed, and that sin could not remain after the Law—when the Apostle says, If justice is through the Law, then Christ died for nothing (Gal 2:21); when the Apostle says, that in the Law no one is justified (Gal 3:11); when the Apostle says, The Law slipped in, that the offense might abound (Rom 5:20); when the Apostle says, If a law had been given which could give life, justice would altogether be from the Law; but Scripture has shut up all things under sin, that the promise by faith in Jesus Christ might be given to those who believe (Gal 3:21-22)?
Iulianum.2.199Si aures habetis, ora iam claudite; si recte aperire ora vultis, prius aures divinis vocibus aperite. Sane memineris te dixisse generationem coepisse ab Adam, qui soles dicere generationem non nisi a duobus incipere et ideo non eam voluisse intellegi Apostolum in eo peccato, quod per unum hominem intrasse dixit in mundum. Quis te posse crederet oblivisci, quod totiens dixeras falsum? Sed tamen oblitus es, ut aliquando diceres verum. Expergiscere, audi vel te ipsum: ab Adam coepit generatio ac per hoc per generationem intravit peccatum, quod per unum hominem intravit in mundum. Etenim tu dixisti: Generatio autem, quae coepit ab Adam, et post legem permanet. Convenienter igitur Apostolus unum hominem posuit, a quo peccatum intravit in mundum, quod generatione traheretur, non diabolum, a quo illud peccatum intravit in mundum, quod imitatio sequeretur.
If you have ears, now close your mouths; if you wish to open your mouths rightly, first open your ears to the divine words. And take good note that you have said that generation began from Adam—you who are wont to say that generation begins only from two, and therefore that the Apostle did not wish it to be understood in that sin which he said entered the world through one man. Who would believe that you could forget what you had so often called false? Yet you have forgotten it, so that for once you might say something true. Wake up, and listen even to yourself: from Adam generation began, and so it was through generation that sin entered, the sin which entered the world through one man. For you yourself said: But the generation that began from Adam remains even after the Law. Fittingly, then, the Apostle named one man from whom sin entered the world, the sin that was drawn by generation—not the devil, from whom that sin entered the world which imitation would follow.
Iulianum.2.199200. Iul. Peccatum autem - inquit - non imputatur, cum lex non est (Rom 5, 13); qua sententia sicut et omnibus dictis suis opinionem traducis interemit.
200. Jul. But sin, he says, is not imputed when there is no law (Rom 5:13); by which sentence, as by all his statements, he has destroyed the opinion you are defaming.
Iulianum.2.200Aug. Plane cum lex non est, non imputatur peccatum, sed ab hominibus, qui inscrutabilia iudicia Dei nesciunt. Nam si Deus peccatum non imputat, cum lex non est, qua tandem iustitia Dei, qui sine lege peccaverunt, sine lege peribunt (Rom 2, 12)?
Aug. Plainly, when there is no law, sin is not imputed—but by human beings, who do not know the inscrutable judgments of God. For if God does not impute sin when there is no law, then by what justice of God shall those who have sinned without the Law perish without the Law (Rom 2:12)?
Iulianum.2.200201. Iul. Nam si ante legem non imputata est peccati tradux, post legem autem non fuit, numquam omnino, quo noceret humano generi, virus obtinuit. Ante legem enim imputatum non est naturale peccatum, sub lege imputatum non est, quia in nullo umquam loco legis vel monstratum hoc vel imputatum docetur. Apparet ergo Apostolum peccatum ante legem liberae voluntatis, post legem autem praevaricationem totidem liberae voluntatis arguere.
201. Jul. For if before the Law the propagation of sin was not imputed, and after the Law it did not exist, then never at all did this poison gain power to harm the human race. For before the Law natural sin was not imputed; under the Law it was not imputed, since in no passage of the Law is it taught either to be shown or to be imputed. It is clear, then, that the Apostle is censuring sin before the Law as a matter of free will, and transgression after the Law as just as much a matter of free will.
Iulianum.2.201Aug. Si in lege non ostenditur originale peccatum, cur ergo in lege anima parvuli octavo die non circumcisi de genere suo dicta est interire (Cf. Gen 17, 12. 14)? Cur infante nato offerebatur sacrificium pro peccato (Cf. Lev 12, 6)? Iam, quaeso, tace; attende infantem et imitare non fantem.
Aug. If original sin is not shown in the Law, why then in the Law is the soul of a little one not circumcised on the eighth day said to perish from its people (See Gen 17:12, 14)? Why, when an infant was born, was a sacrifice offered for sin (See Lev 12:6)? Now, I beg you, be silent; attend to the infant and imitate the one who does not speak.
Iulianum.2.201202. Iul. Ac per hoc constat nihil eum de peccato traducis elocutum, quae quamvis copiosa essent, ad probandum nihil Apostolum de naturali, quod esse non potest et a Manichaeis fingitur, sensisse peccato; ex abundantia tamen etiam distinctionem inculcavit non omnes omnino Adae praevaricatione pollutos, quandoquidem etiam de his, in quibus pro iniquitate regnaret interitus, invenirentur plurimi, qui a praevaricatione Adae docerentur alieni.
202. Jul. And by this it stands established that he said nothing about a propagation of sin; and though his words were copious, they prove that the Apostle thought nothing about a natural sin—which cannot exist and is fashioned by the Manicheans. Yet out of abundance he also pressed home the distinction, namely that not absolutely all were polluted by Adam's transgression, since even among those in whom destruction reigned for iniquity, very many would be found who would be taught to be strangers to Adam's transgression.
Iulianum.2.202Aug. Calumniose, linguose: Omnes homines subpeccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13), qui dixit, Manichaeus non fuit, sed sicut vestri doctoris ore laudatur, inter scriptores ecclesiasticos flos quidam speciosus enituit. Quomodo autem dicis non omnes Adae praevaricatione pollutos et, quod peius est, Apostolo imputas, quod tu insipienter sapis? Cum ille dicat: Regnavit mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen et in eos, qui non peccaverunt, volens intellegi parvulos, qui nulla propria peccata fecerunt, et addat: in similitudine praevaricationis Adae (Rom 5, 14) ostendens, cur in eos regnaverit mors, quod iam superius satis egimus. Quomodo enim per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors (Rom 5, 12), si in aliquos ad hoc unius hominis peccatum non pertinentes regnavit tamen mors? In quos enim mors regnavit, pertinent ad peccatum, per quod intravit; qui vero ad peccatum, per quod mors intravit, non pertinent, quo iusto iudicio ad mortem pertinent? Non autem pertinent ad peccatum, quod per unum hominem intravit in mundum, qui non in praevaricationis / CSEL 315/ illius similitudine peccaverunt, sicut ipse dixisti; non igitur in eos regnavit mors. Quid est ergo: Regnavit mors etiam in eos, qui non peccaverunt in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, nisi quia regnavit mors et in eos, qui non peccaverunt, quoniam nulla peccata propria commiserunt? Regnavit autem in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, quia licet nulla ipsi propria peccata commiserint, pertinent tamen ad peccatum, per quod mors intravit in mundum, trahentes similitudinem praevaricationis, non praevaricationem peccato proprio perpetrando, sed de praevaricatore, per quem natura humana tota est vitiata, nascendo.
Aug. O slanderer, O man of tongue: We are all born under sin, and our very origin is in fault (Ambrose, On Penance 1.3.13)—he who said this was no Manichean, but, as he is praised by the mouth of your own teacher, he shone forth among ecclesiastical writers as a certain comely flower. But how do you say that not all were polluted by Adam's transgression and—what is worse—impute to the Apostle what you yourself foolishly fancy you know? For he says, Death reigned from Adam until Moses, even over those who did not sin—meaning the little ones, who committed no sins of their own—and he adds, in the likeness of Adam's transgression (Rom 5:14), showing why death reigned over them, which we have already treated sufficiently above. For how did sin enter the world through one man, and through sin death (Rom 5:12), if death nevertheless reigned over some to whom the sin of the one man did not pertain? For those over whom death reigned belong to the sin through which it entered; but those who do not belong to the sin through which death entered—by what just judgment do they belong to death? Now those who did not sin in the likeness of that transgression do not belong to the sin which entered the world through one man, as you yourself said; death therefore did not reign over them. What then is, Death reigned even over those who did not sin in the likeness of Adam's transgression, except that death reigned even over those who did not sin, because they committed no sins of their own? But it reigned in the likeness of Adam's transgression because, although they themselves committed no sins of their own, they nonetheless belong to the sin through which death entered the world, drawing the likeness of the transgression—not by perpetrating the transgression through a sin of their own, but by being born of the transgressor through whom the whole of human nature was corrupted.
Iulianum.2.202203. Iul. Vide ergo, utrum adhuc dubium vel tibi debeat esse, quod dicimus innocentes videlicet ante propriae voluntatis usum, rude opus Dei, non peccasse in Adam, quando Apostolo teste etiam de iniquis, qui in similitudine praevaricationis Adae non deliquerint, plurimi esse doceantur.
203. Jul. See, then, whether it ought any longer to be doubtful even to you, what we say—namely, that the innocent, before the use of their own will, the raw work of God, did not sin in Adam, since, on the Apostle's testimony, even among the wicked, very many are taught not to have transgressed in the likeness of Adam's transgression.
Iulianum.2.203Aug. Iam responsum est. Opus est ut taceas; nam non potes nisi perversa dicere conando Apostoli verba pervertere. Ille enim et in eos, qui non peccaverunt, id est parvulos peccata propria non habentes, dixit tamen regnasse mortem in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, qui est forma futuri, quia ita Christus traicit in eos iustitiam, sicut Adam peccatum; ita Christus vitam, sicut Adam mortem. Alioquin a forma Christi alieni erunt et Christiani non erunt; quod quidem sentitis, sed aperte dicere formidatis.
Aug. The answer has already been given. You ought to be silent; for you can say nothing but perverse things in trying to pervert the Apostle's words. For he said that death reigned even over those who did not sin—that is, the little ones who have no sins of their own—yet in the likeness of Adam's transgression, who is a form of the one to come, because Christ casts justice over into them just as Adam casts sin; Christ casts life just as Adam casts death. Otherwise they will be strangers to the form of Christ and will not be Christians—which is indeed what you hold, but you dread to say openly.
Iulianum.2.203204. Iul. Sed videamus et cetera. Sed non sicut delictum ita gratia; si enim in unius delicto multi mortui sunt, multomagis gratia Dei et donum in gratia unius hominis Iesu Christi in plures abundavit (Rom 5, 15). Superari dicit malum delicti copia gratiae et eorum qui salvantur numerum illis, quos praevaricatione perisse asserit, anteponit.
204. Jul. But let us look at the rest as well. But the gift is not as the offense; for if by the offense of one many died, much more has the grace of God and the gift, in the grace of the one man Jesus Christ, abounded unto many (Rom 5:15). He says that the evil of the offense is overcome by the abundance of grace, and he sets the number of those who are saved before those whom he asserts to have perished by the transgression.
Iulianum.2.204Aug. Iam saepe diximus: non ait plures, sed multos, nec magis multos, sed magis abundavit, quoniam in aeternum victuri sunt, in quos transiit vita Christi, quibus ad tempus nocuit mors in eos transiens per Adam; ecce quomodo multo magis in eos abundavit gratia quam peccatum.
Aug. We have already said it often: he does not say more, but many; nor more numerous, but has more abounded—since those into whom the life of Christ has passed will live forever, those whom the death passing into them through Adam harmed only for a time. See how grace has much more abounded unto them than sin.
Iulianum.2.204205. Iul. Si veritatem Apostoli verbis vindicas nec eum impudenter putas fuisse mentitum, doce, quemadmodum de naturali peccato dicenti haec sententia non incutiat publicae falsitatis pudorem. Nam si esset originale peccatum, quod omnem omnino naturam hominum ad ius diaboli faceret pertinere, qui erat locus ad aequiparandum partium numerum, eorum videlicet qui salvantur, et illorum qui intereunt? In Evangelio Dominus, cum beatorum ostenderet raritatem: Quam arta et angusta - inquit - via, quae ducit ad vitam, et pauci sunt, qui inveniunt eam! Quam lata et spatiosa via, quae ducit ad perditionem, et multi sunt, qui intrant per eam! (Mt 7, 13-14)
205. Jul. If you defend the truth of the Apostle's words and do not shamelessly suppose that he lied, teach how this sentence, in one speaking of natural sin, does not strike him with the shame of public falsehood. For if there were an original sin which made the whole of human nature without exception belong to the right of the devil, what room was there for matching the number of the parts—namely those who are saved and those who perish? In the Gospel the Lord, when he showed the rarity of the blessed, said, How strait and narrow is the way that leads to life, and few there are who find it! How broad and spacious is the way that leads to perdition, and many there are who enter by it! (Matt 7:13-14)
Iulianum.2.205Aug. Hoc est, quo sensus iste vester evertitur, quoniam pauci sunt, qui salvantur, in eorum comparatione, qui pereunt (Cf. Lc 13, 23-24); nam sine illorum comparatione per se ipsos etiam ipsi multi sunt; eorum quippe multitudinem dicit Apocalypsis numerare neminem posse (Cf. Apoc 7, 9). Ideo Paulus si eos non multos, sed plures dixisset, non possemus eos dicere pauciores; verbum enim comparationis est plures, quod verbum vos supponitis, non Apostolus ponit. Sed nec sic vobis ratio constabit; vestra quippe illa imitatio, quam vobis videmini velut acute invenisse contra verborum apostolicorum clarissimam veritatem, ut non per generationem, sed per imitationem peccatores omnes ad peccatum primi hominis pertinere credantur, multo plures unius delicto vel ob unius delictum perire affirmat quam gratia unius hominis Iesu Christi liberari. Quis enim non videat peccatores plures esse quam iustos?
Aug. This is the very thing by which that view of yours is overthrown, since those who are saved are few in comparison with those who perish (See Luke 13:23-24); for, apart from that comparison, in themselves they too are many. Indeed, the Apocalypse says that no one can number their multitude (See Rev 7:9). Therefore, if Paul had called them not many but more numerous, we could not call them fewer; for more numerous is a word of comparison—a word which you slip in, which the Apostle does not use. But not even so will your reasoning hold. For that imitation of yours, which you seem to yourselves to have shrewdly devised against the most manifest truth of the apostolic words—so that all sinners may be believed to belong to the sin of the first man not through generation but through imitation—affirms that far more perish by the offense of the one, or on account of the offense of the one, than are set free by the grace of the one man Jesus Christ. For who does not see that sinners are more numerous than the just?
Iulianum.2.205Quos peccatores non aliquos, sed omnes, non quidem per generationem, sed tamen per imitationem ad unius delictum dicitis pertinere. Sed etsi non omnes peccatores, sed tantum praevaricatores legis peccato primi hominis per imitationis vinculum dicatis obstrictos, etiam sic, ex quo lex Dei per multas gentes praedicatur, quam lata et spatiosa via est, quae ducit in interitum, et multi praevaricatores ingrediuntur per illam! Quam arta et angusta via est, quae ducit ad vitam, et pauci sunt, qui inveniunt eam, in comparatione utique multorum, qui pereunt, etiamsi paucis, qui liberantur, et parvuli, qui baptizati moriuntur, addantur. Quomodo ergo Apostolus diceret: Multo magis gratia Dei in plures abundavit? Quod vos dicitis, ille non dixit; sed ille dixit: Multo magis abundavit in multos, quia etiam, qui salvantur, ut iam dictum est, in comparatione pereuntium pauci, sine comparatione autem illorum tam multi sunt, ut eos quisquam numerare non possit. Multo magis autem in eos abundat gratia, quia temporaliter per Adam misere atque mortaliter vivunt, per Christum vero beatissime et sine fine victuri sunt. Turbata est vestra inventio, iam tandem intentio corrigatur.
And these sinners—not some, but all—you say belong to the offense of the one, not indeed through generation, but yet through imitation. But even if you say that not all sinners, but only the transgressors of the Law, are bound to the sin of the first man by the bond of imitation, even so, ever since the Law of God is preached among many peoples, how broad and spacious is the way that leads to destruction, and many transgressors enter by it! How strait and narrow is the way that leads to life, and few there are who find it—few, surely, in comparison with the many who perish—even if to the few who are set free there be added the little ones who die baptized. How, then, could the Apostle say, Much more has the grace of God abounded unto many? What you say, he did not say; but he said, Much more has it abounded unto many, because even those who are saved, as has already been said, are few in comparison with those who perish, but apart from that comparison are so many that no one can number them. And grace much more abounds unto them, because for a time, through Adam, they live wretchedly and subject to death, but through Christ they will live most blessedly and without end. Your invention is in disorder; let your aim at last be corrected.
Iulianum.2.205206. Iul. Hoc nempe, quod dicitis multos et paucos, ad quantitatem infinitam pertinet, quoniam in comparatione mutua aut multitudo invenitur aut paucitas; conferens itaque Dominus multitudini pereuntium eos qui salvandi sunt, paucos eos vocavit; et hic Apostolus conferens his, qui ita peccassent ut Adam, illos, quos salvat Christi gratia, multo plures esse pronuntiat.
206. Jul. This, surely—what you say, "many" and "few"—pertains to unlimited quantity, since it is in mutual comparison that either multitude or fewness is found; and so the Lord, comparing those who are to be saved with the multitude of those who perish, called them few; and here the Apostle, comparing those whom the grace of Christ saves with those who had sinned as Adam did, declares them to be far more numerous.
Iulianum.2.206Aug. Non pronuntiat " plures ", sed " multos ". Graece locutus est: polloùs dixit, non " pleisous "; lege et tace.
Aug. He does not declare them "more numerous," but "many." He spoke in Greek: he said "pollous," not "pleious"; read and be silent.
Iulianum.2.206207. Iul. Assere ergo hoc peccato Manichaeorum id est traducis convenire.
207. Jul. Assert, then, that this fits the sin of the Manicheans, that is, propagation.
Iulianum.2.207Aug. Doctores catholici, non Manichaei deceptores dixerunt omnes in Adam peccasse; illi hoc dixerunt, qui intellexerunt Apostolum, quod vos negatis contra Apostolum. Ergo et vos deceptores estis; et vos enim sicut Manichaei, sed diverso morbo, insanitis.
Aug. It was the catholic teachers, not the Manichean deceivers, who said that all sinned in Adam; those said this who understood the Apostle, which you deny against the Apostle. Therefore you too are deceivers; for you too, like the Manicheans, are mad—though with a different disease.
Iulianum.2.207208. Iul. Nam si universitatem, quam fecunditas humana protulit, regno diaboli peccatum naturale transcripsit et inde in extrema aetate mundi aliqui liberati per Christum putantur, quae veritas est aut quae auctoritas eius Magistri, qui contra tam clarum testimonium totius mundi dicit in plures iustitiam abundasse quam culpam? Quid ergo ei creditur de involutis dogmatibus disserenti, si de rebus tam perspicuis mentiatur? Quod quia sentire sacrilegium est, id autem dici dogma tuum compulit, honore Apostoli Manichaeorum vilitas conteratur.
208. Jul. For if natural sin has made over to the kingdom of the devil the whole multitude that human fruitfulness has brought forth, and from it, at the world's last age, some are thought to be set free through Christ, what truth is there, or what authority belongs to that Teacher, who, against so clear a testimony of the whole world, says that justice has abounded unto more than fault? Why, then, is he believed when he discourses on involved teachings, if he lies about matters so plain? And because it is sacrilege to think this—though it is your dogma that has driven it to be said—let the worthlessness of the Manicheans be crushed by the honor of the Apostle.
Iulianum.2.208Aug. Vos potius perspicua nubilare contenditis non solum non intellegendo, quod Apostolus dixit, verum etiam mutando et supponendo, quod ille non dixit; plures enim non dixit ille, sed multos, qui tamen multi pauci inveniuntur, quando pereuntibus comparantur. Calumniose, frontose, verbose, hoc dixit Apostolus, quod intellexit Ambrosius, qui non erat Manichaeus: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13). Audi, sicut eum laudavit magister tuus, florem speciosum, et de tuo corde istam spinarum deformitatem hoc est foeda acumina improbae contentionis evelle.
Aug. It is rather you who strive to cloud over plain things, not only by not understanding what the Apostle said, but even by changing it and substituting what he did not say; for he did not say more, but many—those who, however, are found to be few when they are compared with those who perish. O slanderer, O brazen, O wordy one, the Apostle said what Ambrose understood, who was no Manichean: We are all born under sin, and our very origin is in fault (Ambrose, On Penance 1.3.13). Listen to the comely flower, as your teacher praised him, and pluck out of your heart that deformity of thorns—that is, the foul sharp points of dishonest contention.
Iulianum.2.208209. Iul. Non mentitur Apostolus; ergo in plures abundavit Christi gratia quam Adae culpa, cuius imitatione dicuntur peccasse, qui sub lege peccaverunt; sub lege autem usque ad Christum Iudaei tantummodo deliquerunt. Confer ergo Iudaicam nationem solam perfectae dumtaxat aetatis sub lege positam et per hoc in similitudine praevaricationis Adae peccantem, qui accepta lege peccavit, ac de multitudine vocatarum Gentium per praedicationem Evangelii eorum millia, qui gratiae sunt liberalitate salvati, tuncque intelleges apostolum Paulum vere pronuntiasse ad plures gratiam Dei et donum Iesu Christi pervenisse quam societatem praevaricationis antiquae.
209. Jul. The Apostle does not lie; therefore the grace of Christ abounded unto more than the fault of Adam, by whose imitation those are said to have sinned who sinned under the Law; but under the Law, until Christ, the Jews alone transgressed. Compare, then, the Jewish nation alone—placed under the Law, and at least of the age of maturity, and therefore sinning in the likeness of Adam's transgression, who sinned after receiving the Law—with the thousands, from the multitude of the gentiles called through the preaching of the Gospel, who are saved by the bounty of grace; and then you will understand that the apostle Paul truly declared that the grace of God and the gift of Jesus Christ reached more people than the fellowship of the ancient transgression.
Iulianum.2.209Aug. Cum Apostolus invenitur non " plures " dixisse, sed " multos ", tui huius argumenti machina tota subvertitur, quamvis non soli Iudaei, sicut tibi placet, sed omnes praevaricatores esse reperiantur, qui legem cum ipso Evangelio praedicatam praevaricando damnabiliores fiunt; qualibus praevaricatoribus simul cum Iudaeis ita plenus est mundus, ut in omnium comparatione sint pauci, qui parvulis quoque baptizatis additis liberantur; quod et responsione superiore comprehendi. Evidenter contra vos clamat Doctor Gentium: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita in Christo omnes vivificabuntur (1 Cor 15, 22), qui omnes non pauci, sed multi sunt. Ac per hoc multi moriuntur in Adam, multi vivificabuntur in Christo, sed plures moriuntur in Adam, quam in Christo vivificabuntur; plures itaque ad illius mortem, ad huius vero vitam comparatione illorum pertinent pauciores, sed etiam ipsorum per se ipsos ea est multitudo, quam numerare nemo possit (Cf. Apoc 7, 9). Quid est ergo: Omnes in Christo vivificabuntur, nisi quia nemo vivificabitur nisi in illo? Cuius rei similitudinem de magistro posui litterarum, si unus sit in civitate, a quo ibi dicantur omnes litteras discere, non quia omnes discunt, sed quia nemo nisi ab ipso (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 2, 46). Quam locutionem nec tentasti refellere, quia vidisti esse rectissimam et omnibus notam.
Aug. Since the Apostle is found to have said not "more," but "many," the whole engine of this argument of yours is overthrown—although not the Jews alone, as it pleases you, but all are found to be transgressors who, by transgressing the Law preached together with the Gospel itself, become more deserving of damnation. With such transgressors, together with the Jews, the world is so full that, in comparison with them all, those who are set free are few—even with the addition of the baptized little ones who die. This too I covered in my earlier answer. The Teacher of the gentiles cries out evidently against you: As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive (1 Cor 15:22)—and these "all" are not few, but many. And by this, many die in Adam, many shall be made alive in Christ; but more die in Adam than shall be made alive in Christ. More, then, belong to the death of the one; to the life of the other belong fewer in comparison with those—yet even these in themselves are so great a multitude that no one can number them (See Rev 7:9). What then is, All shall be made alive in Christ, except that no one shall be made alive except in him? Of this I gave the likeness of a teacher of letters: if there be one in a city by whom all there are said to learn their letters—not because all learn, but because no one learns except from him (See Marriage and Desire 2.46). This manner of speaking you did not even try to refute, because you saw it was most correct and known to all.
Iulianum.2.209210. Iul. Exposita liberalitate gratiae in hominum salvatorum copia comparat donum atque peccatum et eruditissime ad laudem doni applicat, quod multis vulneribus una virtute medicetur: Et non sicut per unum - inquit - peccatum ita et donum.
210. Jul. Having set forth the bounty of grace in the abundance of human beings who are saved, he compares the gift and sin, and most learnedly applies to the praise of the gift the fact that by one power it heals many wounds: And the gift is not as that which came through one sin, he says.
Iulianum.2.210Aug. Per unum peccantem dixit, non: Per unum peccatum, ut quod deinde dicit: Iudicium ex uno delicto in condemnationem (Rom 5, 16), nonnisi illius unius peccantis hoc delictum possit intellegi, quod quidem vos non vultis; sed quid facturi estis, quandoquidem hoc dixit Apostolus etiam nolentibus vobis? Corrigimini ergo; non enim habetis hic aliud, quod facere debeatis.
Aug. He said "through one who sinned," not "through one sin," so that what he then says, judgment from one offense unto condemnation (Rom 5:16), can be understood only of the offense of that one who sinned—which indeed you do not wish; but what will you do, since the Apostle said this even against your will? Be corrected, then; for here you have nothing else that you ought to do.
Iulianum.2.210211. Iul. Nam iudicium ex uno in condemnationem, gratia autem ex multis delictis in iustificationem (Ibidem), id est: peccata quidem, quae gravia sunt, etiam singula possunt sufficere ad accusationem et ad damnationem reorum.
211. Jul. For judgment is from one unto condemnation, but grace is from many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16)—that is, sins which are grave can suffice, even singly, for the accusation and condemnation of the guilty.
Iulianum.2.211Aug. Quare dixisti gravia, quod non dixit Apostolus, nisi quia vidisti, si unum delictum leve sit, non sufficere ad damnationem, de qua loquebatur? Non ergo ex quocumque uno cuiuscumque delicto est hoc iudicium, sed ex uno illo delicto, quod factum est per unum peccantem, id est Adam, iudicium est in condemnationem. Et adhuc pervertere recta verba Apostoli vultis, ne vestra, quae perversa sunt, corrigatis?
Aug. Why did you say "grave," which the Apostle did not say, except that you saw that if one offense were slight it would not suffice for the condemnation of which he was speaking? This judgment, then, is not from any one offense of anyone whatever, but from that one offense which was committed through one who sinned, that is, Adam—the judgment is unto condemnation. And do you still wish to pervert the right words of the Apostle, rather than correct your own, which are perverse?
Iulianum.2.211212. Iul. Gratia autem non eodem confertur modo, ut peccatis aeque admota singulis crebro repetatur; sed infusa semel uno virtutis suae impetu atque compendio diversa et plurima delet crimina. Ideo ait: Ex multis delictis in iustificationem (Ibidem), id est ex multis delictis liberatos homines ad gloriam perducit iustificationis indultae. Non ergo hic unum Adae peccatum, ut suspicaris, intellegit, sed ad hoc solum numerum admovit unius et plurium, ut ad laudem gratiae respiceret, quia non quoties peccatum ab unoquoque mortalium fuerat, totiens etiam frequentaretur gratia, quasi baptismata singula nisi peccatis singulis non possint mederi.
212. Jul. But grace is not bestowed in the same way, so as to be repeated again and again, applied equally to each single sin; rather, poured in once by one onset and shortcut of its power, it blots out crimes diverse and very many. So he says, From many offenses unto justification (Rom 5:16)—that is, it leads human beings, set free from many offenses, to the glory of the justification granted. Here, then, he does not understand the one sin of Adam, as you suspect, but he brought in the number of the one and of the many only for this purpose, to look to the praise of grace: that grace was not repeated as often as a sin had been committed by each mortal, as though single baptisms could heal nothing but single sins.
Iulianum.2.212Aug. Ita hoc loqueris, quasi dixerit Apostolus: Gratia autem semel ex multis delictis in iustificationem; non hoc dixit. Attende quod dixit, et corrige quod dixisti. Gratia - inquit - ex multis delictis in iustificationem. Quid huc pertinet, quod semel et simul unicuique omnia dimittuntur in baptismo? Nonne et illa condemnatio, ad quam iudicium perducit extremum, procul dubio semel fit omnium quae remissa non fuerint peccatorum? Et magis ipsa damnatio semel quam remissio peccatorum per gratiam Christi semel fit, quoniam, si post baptismum quisque peccaverit, non eadem sunt peccata, sed per eamdem gratiam peccantibus remittuntur, non semel nec septies, sed etiam septuagies septies (Cf. Mt 18, 22). Eadem gratia quotidie dimittit orantibus etiam quotidiana peccata, cum dicunt: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, veraciter addentes: sicut et nos dimittimus debitoribus nostris (Mt 6, 12). Gratia ergo ex multis delictis sive singula in singulis sive in quibusdam pauca, in quibusdam plurima invenerit, sive quae ante baptismum, sive quae postea committuntur et paenitendo orando eleemosynas dando sanantur, in iustificationem mittit, quos a damnatione liberat; haec enim omnia ipsa sunt multa, ex quibus multis iustificat gratia. Quae si non subveniat, profecto etiam ex uno delicto, non quod proprium quisque committit, hoc enim loco non inde loquebatur Apostolus, sed quod per unum peccantem intravit in mundum, itur in damnationem; hoc enim Apostolus evidentissime expressit. Neque enim ait sicut tu: Non sicut per unum peccatum, tamquam singulum cuiusque volens intellegi, sed ait: Non sicut per unum peccantem (Rom 5, 16). Aperi oculos et lege et noli tamquam caecis aliud pro alio velle supponere.
Aug. You speak of this as though the Apostle had said: But grace is once from many offenses unto justification. He did not say this. Attend to what he said, and correct what you said. Grace, he says, is from many offenses unto justification. What has it to do with this, that all sins are forgiven to each person once and together in baptism? Is not that condemnation too, to which the last judgment leads, beyond doubt made once, of all the sins that have not been remitted? And rather is that damnation made once than is the remission of sins through the grace of Christ made once; for if anyone sins after baptism, they are not the same sins, but they are forgiven to those who sin through the same grace—not once, nor seven times, but even seventy times seven (See Matt 18:22). The same grace daily forgives even daily sins to those who pray, when they say, Forgive us our debts, truthfully adding, as we also forgive our debtors (Matt 6:12). Grace, then, from many offenses—whether it finds single offenses in single persons, or in some few, in others very many, whether those committed before baptism or those committed afterward and healed by repenting, praying, and giving alms—sends unto justification those whom it sets free from damnation; for all these are the very "many" out of which grace justifies. And if grace did not come to the rescue, then surely even from one offense—not the one each person commits as his own (for in this passage the Apostle was not speaking of that), but the one that entered the world through one who sinned—one goes into damnation; for this the Apostle expressed most evidently. For he does not say, as you do, "the gift is not as through one sin," as though wishing each person's single sin to be understood, but he says, The gift is not as through one who sinned (Rom 5:16). Open your eyes and read, and do not, as though to the blind, wish to substitute one thing for another.
Iulianum.2.212213. Iul. Sed hoc curavit exprimere: Cum, inquit, peccata singula reos suos lethaliter vulnerassent, innumerabiliter confossos homines haec gratia singulari et semel tradita virtute salvavit.
213. Jul. But he took care to express this: When, he says, single sins had wounded their authors mortally, this grace, by its single power and once delivered, saved human beings pierced through past counting.
Iulianum.2.213Aug. Per unum peccantem (Ibidem), dixit, ubi Adam intellegitur, non per unum peccatum, ubi tu verbo mutato atque supposito vis intellegi singula singulorum.
Aug. Through one who sinned (Rom 5:16), he said, where Adam is understood—not "through one sin," where you, with the word changed and substituted, wish the single sins of single persons to be understood.
Iulianum.2.213214. Iul. Si enim ob unius delictum mors regnavit per unum, multo magis, qui abundantiam gratiae et donum iustitiae accipiunt, in vita regnabunt per unum Iesum Christum (Rom 5, 17). Consequenter, quod coepit, affirmat; duas enim posuit sententias utrique volens convenire, quod in fine subiunxit. Per unum enim, qui fuit forma peccati et in cuius similitudine praevaricantur sub lege peccantes, pronuntiat regnare mortem, et per unum regnare in vita abundantiam quosque gratiae consecutos, quae gratia virtutem imitantibus prodest. Non remansit ergo de uno quaestio, quia hoc, quod subditum est eos videlicet in vita regnare, qui abundantiam gratiae perceperint, etiam primum illud absolvit, ut nemo videlicet cogatur in mortem, nisi qui exemplum peccantis adamaverit.
214. Jul. For if by the offense of one death reigned through one, much more shall those who receive the abundance of grace and the gift of justice reign in life through the one Jesus Christ (Rom 5:17). He consistently affirms what he had begun; for he set down two statements, wishing what he subjoined at the end to fit both. For through one who was the form of sin, and in whose likeness those who sin under the Law transgress, he declares that death reigns; and through one he declares that all who have obtained the abundance of grace reign in life—which grace benefits those who imitate virtue. No question, then, remained about the one; for this, which was added—namely, that those reign in life who have received the abundance of grace—also resolves that first point: that no one, namely, is forced into death except one who has fallen in love with the example of the one who sinned.
Iulianum.2.214Aug. Cuius exemplum peccantis adamaverit? Nempe primi hominis; hunc enim formam dicis esse peccati propter imitationem, non propter generationem; proinde sicut dicis: Nemo in mortem cogitur, nisi qui exemplum peccantis huius adamaverit, non ergo coguntur in mortem, qui non in similitudine praevaricationis eius, sicut existimas, peccaverunt. Quomodo ergo dicis mortem regnasse et in eos, qui peccaverunt quidem per liberum arbitrium, sed non in similitudine praevaricationis Adae, quia sine lege peccaverunt? Non itaque peccaverunt eius exemplo, quoniam non peccantes in similitudine praevaricationis eius non exemplum peccantis amaverunt; quantum enim ab hac similitudine peccantis huius, tantum ab imitatione exempli huius alieni sunt. Cum igitur et in eos regnaverit mors, quid est quod dicis: Ut nemo cogatur in mortem, nisi qui exemplum peccantis adamaverit, eius videlicet, quem propter imitationem formam vis fuisse peccati? Ecce non amaverunt peccantis exemplum, qui non in praevaricationis eius similitudinem peccaverunt, et tamen etiam in eos regnavit mors. An vis redire ad catholicam veritatem, ut in eos quoque mortem regnasse fatearis, qui non peccaverunt propria non faciendo peccata, sed regnum mortis in similitudine praevaricationis eius, de cuius stirpe sunt nati, tamquam haereditario miseriae iure subierunt? Sic quippe intellexerunt haec apostolica verba Doctores Ecclesiae, qui viderunt ea non posse recte intellegi, nisi in eis intellegatur obnoxiae successionis origo peccati; propter quod dixerunt parvulos secundum Adam carnaliter natos contagium mortis antiquae prima nativitate contrahere (Cf. CYPRIANUS, Ep. 64, 5), nec Manichaei fuerunt, sed vos Pelagianos Dei spiritu, qui per eos locutus est, damnaverunt.
Aug. With whose example, the example of one who sinned, has he fallen in love? Surely the first man's; for you say that he is the form of sin on account of imitation, not on account of generation. Accordingly, as you say, "no one is forced into death except one who has fallen in love with the example of this one who sinned," then those are not forced into death who did not, as you suppose, sin in the likeness of his transgression. How, then, do you say that death reigned even over those who did indeed sin through free choice, but not in the likeness of Adam's transgression, because they sinned without the Law? They did not sin by his example, then, since those not sinning in the likeness of his transgression did not love the example of the one who sinned; for as far as they are from this likeness of the one who sinned, so far are they strangers to the imitation of his example. Since, then, death reigned even over them, what becomes of your statement, "that no one is forced into death except one who has fallen in love with the example of the one who sinned"—namely of him whom, on account of imitation, you wish to have been the form of sin? See, those who did not sin in the likeness of his transgression did not love the example of the one who sinned, and yet death reigned even over them. Or will you return to catholic truth, so as to confess that death reigned even over those who did not sin by not committing sins of their own, but who underwent the reign of death in the likeness of the transgression of him from whose stock they were born, as it were by a hereditary right of misery? For so the teachers of the Church understood these apostolic words, who saw that they cannot be rightly understood unless in them is understood the origin of a sin bound up in our succession; on which account they said that little ones, born carnally according to Adam, contract the contagion of the ancient death at their first birth (See Cyprian, Letter 64.5)—and they were no Manicheans, but, by the Spirit of God who spoke through them, condemned you Pelagians.
Iulianum.2.214215. Iul. Vita autem, in qua regnaturi sunt sancti, aeterna monstratur; ergo et mors, quae iniquitatem voluntariam sequitur, aeterna credatur. Itaque sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines in condemnationem, sic et per unius iustitiam in omnes homines in iustificationem vitae. Sicut enim per unius inoboedientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi, ita et per unius oboedientiam iusti constituentur multi (Rom 5, 18-19). Omnis est soluta perplexitas, impudenter de universitate calumnia concitatur, ineptissime in scirpo nodus quaeritur. Pronuntiat Apostolus non omnes esse, sed multos, qui per inoboedientiam primi hominis peccata didicissent, et multos esse, non omnes, qui per alterius oboedientiam iustitiam essent adepti. Nihil hic de exortu humanitatis agitur, mores in diversis studiis publicantur; inoboedientia et oboedientia studiorum operam, non generationis ostendit. Certe ubi opportunius, si quid secundum te saperet Apostolus, pronuntiaret omnes ad condemnationem ire nascendo, paucos autem ad vitam credendo quam in hoc loco, ubi summa disputationis complenda erat? Debuit enim dicere: Sicut per inoboedientiam unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt omnes, immo non per inoboedientiam, sed sicut per generationem primi hominis peccatores nati sunt omnes, ita et per unius oboedientiam iusti constituentur multi.
215. Jul. But the life in which the saints are to reign is shown to be eternal; therefore let the death too, which follows voluntary iniquity, be believed to be eternal. And so, as through the offense of one unto condemnation upon all human beings, so also through the justice of one unto justification of life upon all human beings. For as through the disobedience of one many were made sinners, so also through the obedience of one many will be made just (Rom 5:18-19). The whole tangle is undone; the slander about the universal multitude is impudently stirred up; most ineptly is a knot sought in a bulrush. The Apostle declares that they are not all, but many, who had learned to sin through the disobedience of the first man, and that they are many, not all, who through another's obedience had obtained justice. Nothing here is treated about the origin of humanity; ways of conduct are made known in their various pursuits; disobedience and obedience show the work of pursuits, not of generation. Surely, where could the Apostle more fittingly declare—if he had any view such as yours—that all go to condemnation by being born, but few to life by believing, than in this passage, where the sum of the disputation was to be completed? For he ought to have said: As through the disobedience of one man all were made sinners—nay, not through the disobedience, but as through the generation of the first man all were born sinners—so also through the obedience of one many will be made just.
Iulianum.2.215Aug. Immo debuit dicere: Sicut per inoboedientiam suam peccatores constituti sunt multi, ita per oboedientiam suam iusti constituentur multi, aut si imitationem, quam vos in magnis angustiis constituti et persequente veritate coartati invenisse vos putatis, qua exire possetis, hoc loco ille commendare voluisset, debuit dicere: Sicut per imitationem inoboedientiae unius hominis peccatores constituti sunt multi, ita et per imitationem oboedientiae unius hominis iusti constituentur multi. Ecce et ego dixi, quomodo debuerit Apostolus loqui, si hoc vellet dicere, quod vos dicitis; ne putes aliquid magnum esse pro voluntate nostra verba componere, non auctoris voluntatem in verbis eius exponere.
Aug. Rather, he ought to have said: As through his own disobedience many were made sinners, so through his own obedience many will be made just. Or, if he had wished to commend in this passage that imitation which you—set in great straits and hemmed in as truth pursues you—think you have devised as a way out, he ought to have said: As through the imitation of one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so also through the imitation of one man's obedience many will be made just. See, I too have said how the Apostle ought to have spoken, if he wished to say what you say; do not think it any great thing to compose words to suit our own will, rather than to set forth the author's will in his own words.
Iulianum.2.215Dixit ergo per inoboedientiam unius hominis, quem generationis principem noverat, peccatores constitutos esse multos, quoniam illa inoboedientia est natura humana vitiata, et per oboedientiam unius hominis, qui regenerationis est princeps, iustos constituti multos, quia illius oboedientia natura humana sanatur, qui factus est oboediens usque ad mortem crucis, ut iusti constituantur per eius gratiam, etiam qui non hic per suam conversationem iusti esse potuerunt sicut hi, qui continuo post lavacrum regenerationis exspirant sive grandioris sive infantilis aetatis (Cf. Phil 2, 8). Unde maluit verbum futuri temporis ponere et constituentur dicere, non " constituti sunt ", quoniam iusti illa iustitia, quae sine ullo peccato erit, in futuri saeculi aeternitate victuri sunt. Cum autem de peccatoribus non dixit " constituentur ", sed constituti sunt, saeculum hoc, quod praeterit, ubi iam vitiata est humana natura, verbo temporis praeteriti expressit. Iam vero de multis, quia ipsi sunt omnes, satis tibi responsum est; tu autem, quos Apostolus dixit omnes, non potuisti nisi contradicendo exponere et dicendo: Non sunt omnes; ad quod te nulla necessitas cogeret, si catholicum quam Pelagianum sensum tenere maluisses; omnes enim propterea dicuntur et multi, ut discernantur ab eis, qui cum sint omnes, sunt tamen pauci.
He said, then, that through the disobedience of one man, whom he knew to be the head of generation, many were made sinners, because by that disobedience human nature was corrupted; and that through the obedience of one man, who is the head of regeneration, many were made just, because by his obedience human nature is healed—he who was made obedient unto the death of the cross, so that even those might be made just through his grace who could not here be just by their own way of life, such as those who breathe their last immediately after the bath of regeneration, whether of greater or of infant age (See Phil 2:8). Hence he chose rather to put a verb of the future tense and to say "will be made," not "have been made," since those who are just with that justice which will be without any sin are to live in the eternity of the age to come. But when, of sinners, he did not say "will be made," but "have been made," he expressed by a verb of past time this present age, which passes away, where human nature is already corrupted. As for the "many," since these are indeed all, you have been answered enough; you, however, could expound those whom the Apostle called "all" only by contradicting and saying, "they are not all"—to which no necessity would force you, if you had preferred to hold a catholic rather than a Pelagian sense; for they are called both "all" and "many," that they may be distinguished from those who, though they are all, are nonetheless few.
Iulianum.2.215216. Iul. Quod si ita intulisset, non minus docebatur impia esse quam inepta sententia, qua et comparatio ipsa in diverso proposito personarum stolidissima doceretur, cum res non similes ad collationem venirent, natura videlicet et voluntas, ut in parte mali seminum necessitas poneretur, in parte vero boni studii sola libertas, immo iam non libertas, quoniam non suppetebat facultas eligendi boni et cavendi mali, si naturalis reatus fuisset. Dicit ergo Apostolus, sapiens et eruditus Ecclesiae Doctor, per inoboedientiam exstitisse transisseque peccatum multiplicarique iustitiam.
216. Jul. But if he had inferred it so, the opinion would be shown no less impious than inept—by which the comparison itself, set in the differing case of the persons, would be shown most stupid, since things unlike would come up for comparison, namely nature and will: so that on the side of evil the necessity of seeds would be placed, but on the side of good only the freedom of pursuit—nay, no longer freedom, since there would be no power of choosing the good and avoiding the evil if there were a natural guilt. The Apostle, then, a wise and learned Teacher of the Church, says that through disobedience sin arose and passed over, and that justice is multiplied.
Iulianum.2.216Aug. Ubi est, quod dixeras non peccatum transisse sed mortem (Cf. supra 63-64)? Ecce nunc dicis per inoboedientiam, quae unius hominis commemorata est, non solum exstitisse, verum etiam transisse peccatum; an quid prius dixeris, fortassis oblitus es? Gratulandum est oblivioni tuae, qua verum compelleris dicere. Nam quod tibi videtur in collatione contrariarum partium non debere ex una parte poni necessitatem seminis et ex altera studium voluntatis, stolidum esse reperires, si videres sic in mala parte illos, qui pertinent ad hominem primum, connexione generationis sine studio suae voluntatis peccati traxisse contagium, quemadmodum illi parvuli, qui pertinent ad hominem secundum, sine studio propriae voluntatis per pacem regenerationis iustitiae participes fiunt. Si autem semen ex utraque parte deposcis, sicut per Adam semen carnale vitiatum est, sic viget spiritale per Christum; quod semen insinuavit nobis Ioannes apostolus dicens: Et non potest peccare, quia semen eius in ipso manet (1 Io 3, 9). Quod in futuro saeculo bono potius apparebit, ubi qui erunt, peccare non poterunt, non in hoc saeculo maligno, ubi et hi, qui pertinent ad saeculum peccata non habiturum, habent unde quotidie petant a Patre veniam peccatorum.
Aug. Where now is what you had said, that not sin but death passed over (See above, 63-64)? See, now you say that through the disobedience which was recorded of one man not only did sin arise, but also that it passed over. Or have you perhaps forgotten what you said before? We must be thankful for your forgetfulness, by which you are compelled to say something true. For as to your view that, in a comparison of contrary sides, the necessity of seed ought not to be placed on the one side and the pursuit of will on the other—you would find it stupid, if you saw that on the evil side those who belong to the first man drew the contagion of sin by the connection of generation, without any pursuit of their own will, just as those little ones who belong to the second man are made partakers of justice without any pursuit of their own will, through the peace of regeneration. But if you demand seed on both sides: just as through Adam the carnal seed was corrupted, so through Christ the spiritual seed flourishes—the seed which the apostle John conveyed to us, saying, And he cannot sin, because his seed abides in him (1 John 3:9). This will appear rather in the good age to come, where those who will be cannot sin—not in this evil age, where even those who belong to the age that will have no sins have reason daily to ask the Father for the pardon of sins.
Iulianum.2.216217. Iul. Ac per hoc destruit opinionem peccati naturalis et docet alias esse causas substantiae, alias voluntatis; ac ne intellegentia haec nostro magis imputetur ingenio quam apostolico dogmati, ea, quae huic loco addidit, audiamus: Lex autem subintravit - inquit - ut abundaret delictum, ubi autem abundavit peccatum, superabundavit gratia, ut sicut regnavit peccatum in mortem, ita gratia regnet per iustitiam in vitam aeternam per Iesum Christum, Dominum nostrum (Rom 5, 20-21). Assere igitur, quemadmodum peccatum tuum id est traducis coeperit abundare post legem, quae post ministerium Moysi incrementa susceperit.
217. Jul. And by this he destroys the opinion of natural sin and teaches that the causes of substance are one thing, the causes of will another; and lest this understanding be imputed to our own wit rather than to apostolic teaching, let us hear what he added to this passage: But the Law slipped in, he says, that the offense might abound; but where sin abounded, grace abounded yet more, that, as sin reigned unto death, so grace also might reign through justice unto eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 5:20-21). Assert, then, how your sin—that is, the sin of propagation—began to abound after the Law, which received its increases after the ministry of Moses.
Iulianum.2.217Aug. Immo tu assere, quomodo, sicut superius dixisti (Cf. supra 198), regnum peccati lata lege ceciderit, cum dicat Apostolus lata lege abundasse peccatum. Ego autem quod dixi assero, quia, etsi non asseram, clarum est. Peccatum quippe originale fuit et ante legem, quia per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et cum illo mors per omnes homines pertransiit (Rom 5, 12). Erat et voluntarium, quoniam qui sine lege peccaverunt, sine lege peribunt (Rom 2, 12). Subintravit autem lex, ut abundaret peccatum (Rom 5, 20), quia his generibus peccatorum, quae ante legem fuerunt, etiam illud accessit, quod praevaricatio nuncupatur. Ubi enim lex non est, nec praevaricatio (Rom 4, 15).
Aug. Rather, you assert how, as you said above (See above, 198), the reign of sin fell when the Law was passed, when the Apostle says that, when the Law was passed, sin abounded. As for me, I assert what I said, since, even if I did not assert it, it is clear. For original sin existed even before the Law, since through one man sin entered the world, and with it death passed to all human beings (Rom 5:12). And there was also voluntary sin, since those who sinned without the Law will perish without the Law (Rom 2:12). But the Law slipped in, that sin might abound (Rom 5:20), because to those kinds of sin which existed before the Law there was added also that which is called transgression. For where there is no law, neither is there transgression (Rom 4:15).
Iulianum.2.217Ubi ergo his omnibus generibus peccatorum abundavit peccatum, superabundavit gratia (Rom 5, 20), quia in his, qui ad eam pertinent, omnium istorum generum reatum delet et insuper donat, ut delectatio peccati iustitiae delectatione vincatur atque ad eam postea perveniatur vitam, ubi nullum erit omnino peccatum. Quomodo ergo res non similes in collationem venire non debent, sicut paulo ante dixisti, cum ex contrariis fiat ista collatio et ex una parte generatio ponatur et ex altera regeneratio, ex una regnum mortis, ex altera regnum vitae, ex una abundantia, ex altera remissio peccatorum, ex una delectatio peccati per naturae vitium usque ad consuetudinis malum, ex altera proelium contra concupiscentiam carnis per Sancti Spiritus adiutorium usque ad victoriae pacem, quae nullum intrinsecus, nullum extrinsecus patietur inimicum? Haec tene, si vis sanus esse, et noli contra haec, quae ad sanam doctrinam pertinent, insanire.
Where, then, sin abounded in all these kinds of sin, grace abounded yet more (Rom 5:20), because in those who belong to it grace blots out the guilt of all these kinds and besides grants that the delight of sin be overcome by the delight of justice, and that one afterward arrive at that life where there will be no sin at all. How, then, ought things unlike not to come up for comparison, as you said a little before, when this comparison is made from contraries: on the one side generation is set, on the other regeneration; on the one side the reign of death, on the other the reign of life; on the one side abundance of sin, on the other remission of sins; on the one side the delight of sin, through the fault of nature unto the evil of habit, on the other the battle against the concupiscence of the flesh, through the help of the Holy Spirit unto the peace of victory, which will suffer no enemy within and none without? Hold to these things, if you wish to be sound, and do not rage against these things, which belong to sound doctrine.
Iulianum.2.217218. Iul. Certe in his locis Apostolum de peccato naturali disseruisse contendis. Ad hoc supra dixerat usque ad legem fuisse, ut intellegeretur post legem esse desisse; nunc autem de eodem dicit, quod coeperit crescere et abundare post legem. Catholico intellectui, quem sequimur, utrumque hoc convenire monstravimus; tuo vero dogmati qua impudentia vindicatur, ut unum idemque peccatum lege lata superius quidem defecisse, nunc autem crevisse dicatur? Quomodo ergo post legem abundavit naturale peccatum? Acriusne coeperunt genitalia commoveri, ut de augmentis et novitate motuum peccato tuo virtus videatur adiuncta? An lex data nascentibus est, ut qui de libidine, quam dicis diabolicam esse et radicem fructumque peccati, geniti erant, admonerentur emendare quod facti erant, et gestum corrigere quem habuerant, cum eos generarent parentes? Cogerent postremo, quae facta erant, infecta esse, quod illi audire videlicet renuentes inoboedientiae crimen incurrerent? At hoc a nullo stultorum, nedum a lege, quam Deus dedit, poterat imputari.
218. Jul. You certainly contend that in these passages the Apostle discoursed about natural sin. To this end he had said above that it existed until the Law, so that it might be understood to have ceased after the Law; but now he says of the same sin that it began to grow and abound after the Law. We have shown that both of these fit the catholic understanding, which we follow; but with what impudence is it claimed for your dogma, that one and the same sin should be said both to have failed earlier when the Law was passed and now to have grown? How, then, did natural sin abound after the Law? Did the generative parts begin to be more keenly stirred, so that from the increase and novelty of motions some power might seem added to your sin? Or was the Law given to those being born, so that those begotten of the lust which you say is diabolical and the root and fruit of sin might be warned to amend what they had been made, and to correct the act they had performed when their parents begot them? Would it, finally, force what had been done to be undone—which, refusing to hear, they would incur the charge of disobedience? But this could be imputed by none of fools, much less by the Law which God gave.
Iulianum.2.218Aug. Numquid alicubi diximus peccatum originale crevisse post legem? Aut hoc intellegi volumus in eo, quod ait Apostolus: Lex subintravit, ut abundaret delictum (Ibidem)? Abundavit enim, non quia illud genus crevit, quod ante iam fuerat, sed quia genus aliud peccati accessit, quod sine lege non erat, id est praevaricatio, sicut paulo ante monstravimus. Cuncupiscentia est autem carnis et libido genitalium, contra quam sanctorum castitas pugnat; hanc tibi multum placentem quoniam cum ipsa sua pugna, cui repugnat etiam pudicitia coniugalis nonnisi ad filios procreandos ea bene utens, aliis autem motibus eius obsistens, hanc ergo cum ista sua pugna quia etiam in paradisi pacem conaris admittere vel immittere, ipse in paradisum non disponis intrare.
Aug. Have we anywhere said that original sin grew after the Law? Or do we wish this to be understood in what the Apostle says, The Law slipped in, that the offense might abound (Rom 5:20)? For it abounded—not because that kind which had already existed before grew, but because another kind of sin was added, which did not exist without the Law, that is, transgression, as we showed a little before. But the concupiscence of the flesh is the lust of the generative parts, against which the chastity of the saints fights; this lust, which pleases you so much—because, together with its own warfare, against which even conjugal modesty struggles, using it well only for begetting children but resisting its other motions—this lust, then, together with this warfare of its own, because you try to admit or let into the peace of paradise as well, you yourself are not minded to enter paradise.
Iulianum.2.218Quantalibet autem abs te defensione muniatur et laudibus adornetur, aut vitium est aut vitiata est nec immerito militibus Christi, a quibus debellatur, odiosa est; cum qua ipse colludis, ut eam et expugnare te dicas et laudare non erubescas. Per hanc humana, quae nascitur, caro peccati est; propter quod per illam nasci noluit ille, qui natus est in similitudine carnis peccati (Cf. Rom 8, 3) ac per hoc, quamvis in carne vera, non tamen in carne peccati; ex hac concupiscentia suscepta tua, tibi quidem pulchra nimis, sed foeda omnibus sanctis, generatione trahitur originalis peccati vinculum sola regeneratione solvendum. Illud factum est per Adam, hoc fit per Christum; illud, per quem peccatum intravit in mundum, hoc per eum, qui tollit peccatum mundi. Sic agnoscit Adam et Christum, qui ex Adam transiit ad Christum.
But however much it be fortified by your defense and adorned with praises, it is either a fault or is itself faulted, and not without reason is it hateful to the soldiers of Christ, by whom it is fought down; with it you yourself dally, so that you say both that you assail it and are not ashamed to praise it. Through it the human flesh that is born is the flesh of sin; on which account he was unwilling to be born through it who was born in the likeness of the flesh of sin (See Rom 8:3)—and thus, though in true flesh, yet not in the flesh of sin. From this concupiscence, taken up by you, beautiful indeed to you but foul to all the saints, the bond of original sin is drawn by generation, to be loosed by regeneration alone. The former was done through Adam, the latter is done through Christ; the former through him by whom sin entered the world, the latter through him who takes away the sin of the world. So does he acknowledge Adam and Christ who has passed over from Adam to Christ.
Iulianum.2.218219. Iul. Quid ergo additum post legem est peccato naturali, quod quidem non solum prohibitum aut condemnatum, verum etiam nec leviter vituperatum aut tenuiter ostensum probatur in lege?
219. Jul. What, then, has been added after the Law to natural sin, which is proved in the Law to be not only not prohibited or condemned, but not even lightly censured or faintly shown?
Iulianum.2.219Aug. Ostenditur et in lege, sed si vobis auferatur velamen (Cf. 2 Cor 3, 16); quid enim aliud ostenditur damnatione animae illius, qui octavo die non circumciditur (Cf. Gen 17, 12. 14)? Quid aliud ostenditur, quando infante nato sacrificium pro peccato iubetur offerri (Cf. Lev 12, 6), quod iam supra memoravi?
Aug. It is shown even in the Law—if only the veil be taken away from you (See 2 Cor 3:16); for what else is shown by the condemnation of the soul of the one who is not circumcised on the eighth day (See Gen 17:12, 14)? What else is shown when, an infant being born, a sacrifice is commanded to be offered for sin (See Lev 12:6), which I have already mentioned above?
Iulianum.2.219220. Iul. Certe ne tu quidem adeo desipis, ut dicas peccati traducem post circumcisionem factam esse maiorem; quomodo ergo abundavit post legem, quae nec arguitur in lege nec proditur? At hoc vide, quam sanae intellegentiae concinat, quae peccatum in sola delinquentis voluntate constituit. Usque ad legem dicit Apostolus fuisse peccatum, ut post legem intellegatur fuisse praevaricatio (Cf. Rom 5, 13), promulgata videlicet praecepta transgrediens; atque hoc genere abundavit lege subintroeunte peccatum, quoniam reatui eius de praevaricatione crevit invidia, et opus malae voluntatis, sicut ante legem peccatum erat, ita post legem coepit esse transgressio, quamvis non eo proposito legem Deus tulerit, ut mortales fierent eius sanctione peiores. Neque enim lex peccatum aut causa peccati, sed mandatum sanctum et iustum et bonum (Rom 7, 12). Verum quia delinquentium pravitas eo se ferro, quo curari debuit, vulneravit obstititque consilio Dei, ut inde periclitaretur, unde debuerat sanari, dicit Apostolus de effectu rerum opinionem divini consilii, quo data lex fuerat, iniuriam pertulisse; et quia non fuit is proventus emendationis humanae, in quem lator legis intenderat, sed in plurimis evenere contraria, eo usque ait profecisse studia peccantium, ut non ob aliud videretur data lex esse, quam ut improbi improbiores fierent et ad peccatum praevaricatio iungeretur.
220. Jul. Surely not even you are so foolish as to say that the propagation of sin became greater after circumcision was instituted; how, then, did it abound after the Law, since it is neither charged in the Law nor disclosed? But see how well it accords with a sound understanding, which places sin in the will of the offender alone. The Apostle says that sin existed until the Law, so that after the Law transgression might be understood to exist (See Rom 5:13)—transgressing, namely, the precepts promulgated; and by this kind sin abounded as the Law slipped in, since, from the transgression, the odium attaching to its guilt grew, and the work of an evil will, just as before the Law it was sin, so after the Law began to be transgression—although God did not pass the Law with the design that mortals should be made worse by its sanction. For the Law is not sin or the cause of sin, but a commandment holy and just and good (Rom 7:12). But because the depravity of offenders wounded itself with that very iron by which it ought to have been healed, and resisted the counsel of God, so that it was endangered from the very thing by which it ought to have been healed, the Apostle says that, from the outcome of things, the design of the divine counsel by which the Law had been given suffered injury; and because the result of human amendment was not that at which the giver of the Law aimed, but in very many the contrary came about, he says that the pursuits of sinners went so far that the Law seemed to have been given for no other reason than that the wicked might become more wicked and that transgression might be joined to sin.
Iulianum.2.220Aug. Tu dicis ista, qui consilium Dei in danda lege non ipsum sapis, quod apostolus Paulus ostendit, et ad eas blasphemias ipse te impingis, ut dicas opinionem divini consilii, quo data lex fuerat, iniuriam pertulisse, tamquam aliud factum sit, quam Deus futurum fuerat opinatus, neque hoc provenerit lata lege, quod lator legis intenderat. Deum igitur omnium praescium futurorum secundum tuam sapientiam sua fefellit intentio; nonne attendis quod scriptum est: Multae cogitationes in corde viri, consilium autem Domini manet in aeternum (Prov 19, 21)?
Aug. You say these things, you who do not yourself grasp the very counsel of God in giving the Law which the apostle Paul shows, and you fling yourself into such blasphemies as to say that the design of the divine counsel, by which the Law had been given, suffered injury—as though something other had been done than God had foreseen would be, and as though, the Law being passed, what the giver of the Law had aimed at did not come about. According to your wisdom, then, his own intention deceived God, who foreknows all things to come. Do you not attend to what is written: Many are the thoughts in a man's heart, but the counsel of the Lord abides forever (Prov 19:21)?
Iulianum.2.220Si ergo vis nosse, quantum homini fas est, quo consilio Dei omnipotentis et omnia praescientis lex data fuerit, intuere, quod dicit Apostolus: Si enim data esset lex, quae posset vivificare, omnino ex lege esset iustitia (Gal 3, 21). Et tamquam diceremus: Cur ergo data est? Sed conclusit - inquit - Scriptura omnia sub peccato, ut promissio ex fide Iesu Christi daretur credentibus (Gal 3, 22).
If, then, you wish to know, as far as is lawful for a man, with what counsel of God almighty and foreknowing all things the Law was given, look at what the Apostle says: For if a law had been given which could give life, justice would altogether be from the Law (Gal 3:21). And as though we said, Why then was it given? But Scripture, he says, has shut up all things under sin, that the promise by faith in Jesus Christ might be given to those who believe (Gal 3:22).
Iulianum.2.220Ecce quod est consilium datae legis. Quis autem nescit non legis, sed hominum vitio lege subintrante abundasse peccatum? Sed hoc vitium, quo prohibita plus delectant et fit virtus peccati lex (Cf. 1 Cor 15, 56), non sanat nisi vivificans spiritus, non littera occidens; quae tamen ad hoc utilis fuit, quia, cum ipsa occideret per praevaricationem crescente per prohibitionem cupiditate peccandi, vivificantem Spiritum fecit inquiri et hominem de sua virtute lethaliter confidentem adiutorium gratiae Dei compulit poscere, sub lege, quamvis sancta et iusta et bona, tamen deficientem atque ad operanda, quae sancta quae iusta quae bona sunt, sibi subvenire propriis viribus non valentem.
See what is the counsel of the Law's being given. But who does not know that sin abounded as the Law slipped in by the fault not of the Law but of human beings? But this fault, by which forbidden things give more delight and the law becomes the power of sin (See 1 Cor 15:56), is healed only by the life-giving Spirit, not by the killing letter—which letter was nonetheless useful for this, that, while it killed through transgression as the desire to sin grew through the prohibition, it caused the life-giving Spirit to be sought, and compelled the human being, mortally trusting in his own power, to beg for the help of God's grace—a human being who, under a Law that is holy and just and good, was nonetheless failing, and unable by his own strength to come to his own aid in doing what is holy, what is just, what is good.
Iulianum.2.220221. Iul. Iure igitur hoc genere dicitur abundasse delictum, quod et ante legem et post legem uniuscuiusque committebat voluntas; sed ante legem peccatrix, post legem autem etiam praevaricatrix. Tunc ergo crescit et abundat aliquid, cum in genere suo colligit incrementa, sicut peccato liberae voluntatis post Moysen cumulus transgressionis accessit; de eodem enim genere fuit, licet in tempore diverso, id est de mala voluntate, quae et ante legem et post legem non coactu insuperabili, sed studio vituperabili deliquit. Quae cum ita sint, tibi nihil potest de apostolicis convenire verbis; neque enim subintroeunte lege peccatum traducis aut copiosius factum docetur aut grandius; nec peccatis voluntatis illud abundare iure dicitur, quod ad nascentium voluntatem nequaquam attinere monstratur. Non ergo abundavit post legem, quod lex nec prohibere potuit nec punire. Ubi autem abundavit peccatum, superabundavit gratia, ut sicutregnavit peccatum in mortem, ita gratia regnet per iustitiam in vitam aeternam (Rom 5, 20-21).
221. Jul. Rightly, then, the offense is said to have abounded by this kind, which the will of each one committed both before the Law and after the Law—but before the Law as a sinner, after the Law also as a transgressor. Something grows and abounds, then, when it gathers increases within its own kind, just as to the sin of free will, after Moses, the accumulation of transgression was added; for it was of the same kind, though at a different time, that is, of an evil will, which both before the Law and after the Law offended not by an insuperable compulsion, but by a blameworthy pursuit. Since these things are so, nothing in the apostolic words can fit you; for the sin of propagation is taught neither to have been made more copious nor greater as the Law slipped in; nor is that rightly said to abound by sins of the will which is shown in no way to pertain to the will of those being born. It did not, then, abound after the Law, which the Law could neither prohibit nor punish. But where sin abounded, grace abounded yet more, that, as sin reigned unto death, so grace might reign through justice unto eternal life (Rom 5:20-21).
Iulianum.2.221Aug. Originale peccatum non quidem post legem crevit, sed tamen lex etiam ipsum, cuius abolitionem circumcisione infantis significaret, invenit, sicut invenit etiam peccata ignorantiae, quae nec ipsa data lege creverunt, quandoquidem potius ipsa ignorantia deminuta est, quia scientia legis accessit; sed peccatum, sine quo nemo nascitur, crevit voluntatis accessu originali concupiscentia trahente peccantis assensum. Abundavit autem peccatum, id est nimis crevit, posteaquam per legem facta est cognitio peccati et coepit etiam praevaricatione peccari (Cf. Rom 3, 20). Quod si velitis advertere et acquiescere veritati, nulla necessitate cogemini aperte Apostolo contradicere clamanti: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines pertransiit (Rom 5, 12); illo enim dicente: pertransiit per omnes, cum vos non per omnes pertransisse dicitis, quid aliud quam Apostolo contradicitis? Et si Apostolo, utique Christo. Quid ergo miramini, quod abominatur vos Ecclesia Christi, qui sententiis lethalibus vestris infirmos parvulos subtrahere conamini medicamentis salubribus Christi?
Aug. Original sin did not indeed grow after the Law; yet the Law found even it—whose abolition it signified by the circumcision of an infant—just as it found also the sins of ignorance, which themselves did not grow when the Law was given, since rather that ignorance was diminished, because the knowledge of the Law was added; but the sin without which no one is born grew by the addition of the will, as original concupiscence drew on the sinner's consent. Sin abounded, that is, grew exceedingly, after through the Law there came the knowledge of sin and one began to sin even by transgression (See Rom 3:20). And if you are willing to attend and acquiesce in the truth, you will be forced by no necessity openly to contradict the Apostle, who cries out: Through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death, and so it passed to all human beings (Rom 5:12); for when he says, "it passed to all," while you say it did not pass to all, what else do you do but contradict the Apostle? And if the Apostle, then surely Christ. Why, then, do you marvel that the Church of Christ abominates you, who try, by your deadly opinions, to snatch sick little ones away from the saving remedies of Christ?
Iulianum.2.221222. Iul. Aperit se Apostolus clarius in processu et docet in perditione salutis humanae Deum copia suae miserationis admonitum desperatis rebus efficaciorem solito medicinam tulisse, ut quos praeceptis non correxerat, beneficiis obligaret et ita devotionem exigeret in futurum, ut non imputaret peracta, studerentque deinceps custodire iustitiam homines, quam compendio credulitatis fuerant assecuti. Abundantia ergo praecedentium peccatorum tam abundantis misericordiae exegit auxilium, quoniam, nisi tanta copia indulgentis fuisset, nulla alia disciplina morbis tam gravibus subveniret. Verum in hac divini commendatione beneficii vidit Apostolus obiectioni locum patere eorum, qui dicere poterant: Si rite merita causarum de effectibus aestimamus, et peccatorum copia, ut misericordia Dei afflueret, impetravit; insistendum peccatis est, ut gratiae non desit ubertas. Occurrens itaque opinioni eiusmodi: Quid ergo dicemus? - inquit - permanebimusin peccato, ut gratia abundet? Absit! Qui enim mortui sumus peccato, quemadmodum adhuc vivemus in eo? An ignoratis, quoniam quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in mortem illius baptizati sumus? Consepulti ergo sumus illi per baptismum in mortem, ut quemadmodum surrexit Christus in gloria Patris, ita et nos in novitate vitae ambulemus (Rom 6, 1-4).
222. Jul. The Apostle opens himself more clearly as he goes on, and teaches that in the ruin of human salvation God, prompted by the abundance of his own mercy, brought to desperate matters a medicine more effective than usual, so that those whom he had not corrected by precepts he might bind by benefits, and so exact devotion for the future as not to impute what was done, and that human beings might thenceforth be eager to keep the justice which they had obtained by the shortcut of belief. The abundance, then, of preceding sins demanded the help of so abundant a mercy, since, unless there had been so great an abundance of one who pardons, no other discipline would have come to the rescue of diseases so grave. But in this commendation of the divine benefit the Apostle saw that room lay open for the objection of those who could say: If we rightly estimate the deserts of causes from their effects, then the abundance of sins, too, obtained that the mercy of God should flow forth; we must persist in sins, that the richness of grace may not be wanting. So, meeting an opinion of this kind: What then shall we say? he says. Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound? God forbid! For we who have died to sin, how shall we still live in it? Or do you not know that all of us who have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death? We are therefore buried together with him through baptism into death, so that, as Christ rose in the glory of the Father, so we too may walk in newness of life (Rom 6:1-4).
Iulianum.2.222Aug. Numquid ideo non vos apostolica ista verba suffocant, quia et vos ea commemoratis, ne obliviscamur, quam firma conemini domus Dei fundamenta convellere? Insane, cum dixisset Apostolus: Si mortui sumus peccato, quomodovivemus in eo?, ideo subiecit: An ignoratis, quoniam quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in mortem ipsius baptizati sumus? ut baptizatos in Christo mortuos probaret esse peccato. Usque adeone surdus es, ut ista non audias? Usque adeo caecus, ut ista non videas? Confitere ergo peccato mortuos parvulos baptizatos, confitere tandem originale peccatum; non enim aliud, cui morerentur, habuerunt; aut dic aperte baptizari eos non oportere aut, cum baptizantur, non eos in Christo Iesu baptizari aut non in mortem ipsius baptizari et dele, si potes, Apostoli verba dicentis: Quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in mortem ipsius baptizati sumus. Porro si haec verba delere non potes, sicut non potes, cum ergo audis: quicumque, noli velle inde parvulos separare, permitte Christum etiam parvulis esse Iesum, quoniam non exceptis ipsis, sed cum ipsis salvum facit populum suum a peccatis eorum, propter quod dictum est ab angelo: Vocabis nomen eius Iesum (Mt 1, 21).
Aug. Do these apostolic words then fail to choke you, just because you yourselves cite them—lest we forget how firm are the foundations of God's house that you try to wrench away? O madman, when the Apostle had said, If we have died to sin, how shall we live in it?, he therefore added, Or do you not know that all of us who have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death?—so as to prove that those baptized in Christ are dead to sin. Are you so deaf as not to hear these things? So blind as not to see them? Confess, then, that little ones baptized are dead to sin; confess at last original sin; for they had nothing else to which they might die. Either say openly that they ought not to be baptized, or that, when they are baptized, they are not baptized in Christ Jesus, or that they are not baptized into his death—and blot out, if you can, the Apostle's words, who says, All of us who have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death. But if you cannot blot out these words, as you cannot, then, when you hear "all of us," do not wish to separate little ones from this; allow Christ to be Jesus even to little ones, since not with them excepted, but together with them, he saves his people from their sins—on which account it was said by the angel, You shall call his name Jesus (Matt 1:21).
Iulianum.2.222223. Iul. Dicit nos mortuos esse peccato eo iam tempore, quo, ut acciperemus indulgentiae donum, renuntiare nos mundo omnibusque peccatis professi sumus, atque ideo muneris memores debere sic vivere, ut Christo consepulti esse doceamur atque resurrectionem eius conspicua sanctitate gestemus et, quomodo ille, postquam resurrexit a mortuis, nullas infirmitates corporis, nulla flagella perpetitur, ita etiam et nos esse invulnerabiles peccatis omnibus et vitiis annitamur. Si enim complantati sumus similitudini mortis eius, simul et resurrectionis erimus hoc scientes, quoniam vetus homo noster simul confixus est cruci, ut destruatur corpus peccati, ut ultra non serviamus peccato; qui enim mortuus est, iustificatus est a peccato (Rom 6, 5-7). Clara fideles ratione constringit; si vultis, inquit, resurrectionis eius fieri participes, virtutem quoque mortis imitamini, ut mortui vitiis in virtute vivatis; tunc enim eritis in illa felicitate consortes, si mortis eius imaginem tuleritis moriendo peccatis; vetus enim homo noster debet cruci eius affixus doceri, ut destruat corpus peccati fortitudine videlicet passionis. Corpus autem peccati consuetudine sua Paulus vitia, non substantiam carnis appellat; sic enim sequitur: Ut destruatur corpus peccati, ut ultra non serviamus peccato; qui enim mortuus est, iustificatus est a peccato.
223. Jul. He says that we have died to sin at that time when, in order to receive the gift of pardon, we professed to renounce the world and all sins, and that therefore, mindful of the gift, we ought so to live as to be taught that we are buried together with Christ and to bear his resurrection by a conspicuous holiness; and that, just as he, after he rose from the dead, suffers no weaknesses of body, no scourges, so we too should strive to be invulnerable to all sins and vices. For if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall be so also in the likeness of his resurrection—knowing this, that our old self has been crucified together with him, that the body of sin may be destroyed, that we may no longer be slaves to sin; for whoever has died has been justified from sin (Rom 6:5-7). He binds the faithful by a clear reasoning: If, he says, you wish to be made partakers of his resurrection, imitate also the power of his death, that, dead to vices, you may live in virtue; for then you will be sharers in that happiness if, by dying to sins, you have borne the image of his death; for our old self ought to be taught, fastened to his cross, to destroy the body of sin—namely by the strength of the Passion. And by "the body of sin," Paul, by his own custom, calls the vices, not the substance of the flesh; for so it follows: that the body of sin may be destroyed, that we may no longer be slaves to sin; for whoever has died has been justified from sin.
Iulianum.2.223Aug. Quomodolibet interpreteris corpus peccati, non negabis parvulos in Christo Iesu baptizatos mortuos esse peccato, ne apertissime neges eos baptizatos in mortem Christi Iesu ac per hoc neges baptizatos in Christo Iesu. Quicumque enim baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in mortem ipsius baptizati sumus (Rom 6, 3). Dic ergo, cui peccato moriuntur, cum parvuli baptizantur in Christo Iesu? Sed quid dicas, penitus non habebis, nisi cum tota Ecclesia Christi intellegas atque respondeas: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt (Rom 5, 12). Ecce cui peccato moriuntur, cum in mortem Christi Iesu parvuli baptizantur. Rogo: Nolite esse sicut equus et mulus non habentes intellectum (Ps 31, 9). Audite: Si mortui sumus peccato, quomodo vivemus in eo? An ignoratis, quoniam quicumque baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in mortem ipsius baptizati sumus? (Rom 6, 3) Quicumque igitur baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, peccato mortui sumus, quia in mortem ipsius baptizati sumus. Audite: Quicumque baptizati sumus; neque enim parvuli et non maiores aut vero maiores et non parvuli, sed quicumque, id est sive parvuli sive maiores baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in mortem illius baptizati sumus ac per hoc peccato mortui sumus. Aut ergo aperte dicite non esse baptismum Christi parvulis necessarium aut peccatum, cui moriuntur, quando in Christo baptizantur, dicite parvulorum aut, quia nullum potestis aliud invenire, tandem aliquando agnoscite originale peccatum.
Aug. However you interpret "the body of sin," you will not deny that little ones baptized in Christ Jesus are dead to sin—unless you most openly deny that they are baptized into the death of Christ Jesus, and thereby deny that they are baptized in Christ Jesus. For all of us who have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death (Rom 6:3). Say, then, to what sin do they die, when little ones are baptized in Christ Jesus? But you will have nothing at all to say, unless, with the whole Church of Christ, you understand and answer: Through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death, and so it passed to all human beings, in whom all have sinned (Rom 5:12). See to what sin they die, when little ones are baptized into the death of Christ Jesus. I beg: Do not be like the horse and the mule, which have no understanding (Ps 32:9 (31:9)). Listen: If we have died to sin, how shall we live in it? Or do you not know that all of us who have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death? (Rom 6:3) All of us, therefore, who have been baptized in Christ Jesus have died to sin, because we have been baptized into his death. Listen: "all of us who have been baptized"; for it is not little ones and not the older, or rather the older and not little ones, but "all of us"—that is, whether little ones or older, we who have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death, and thereby have died to sin. Either, then, say openly that the baptism of Christ is not necessary for little ones, or name the sin to which they die when they are baptized in Christ—the sin of little ones—or, because you can find no other, at last acknowledge original sin.
Iulianum.2.223224. Iul. Nempe cum viventibus loquebatur et his dicebat iustitiam per mysteria fuisse collatam. Quomodo ergo ait eum iustificatum esse, quem mortuum, nisi quia sine aliquo ostendit ambiguo mortem hic abrenuntiationem vocare et ideo a se nomen mortis assumi, ut ostendat ita fideles a peccatis sicut mortuos ab actibus debere cessare?
224. Jul. Surely he was speaking with the living, and to these he was saying that justice had been conferred through the mysteries. How, then, does he say that the one is justified whom he calls dead, except that he shows without any ambiguity that here he calls the renunciation "death," and that therefore the name of death is taken up by him in order to show that the faithful ought to cease from sins just as the dead cease from acts?
Iulianum.2.224Aug. Homo contentiose, si hoc loco apostolicorum verborum mors abrenuntiatio vocatur, ut qui peccato abrenuntiat, peccato moriatur, recole, quemadmodum in Ecclesia Christi, in qua baptizatus es, baptismatis mysteria celebrentur, et invenies, quod abrenuntient et parvuli per ora gestantium, sicut credunt per ora gestantium, quod apud vos iam forsitan non fit; sic enim profecistis in peius ipsi errantes et alios in errorem mittentes, qui vobis consenserint non debere abrenuntiare parvulum baptizandum, quia non traxit originale peccatum (Cf. 2 Tim 3, 13), aut si debet abrenuntiare peccato, dicite cui et errorem vestrum aliquando corrigite.
Aug. O contentious man, if in this passage of the apostolic words "death" is called "renunciation," so that one who renounces sin dies to sin, recall how, in the Church of Christ, in which you were baptized, the mysteries of baptism are celebrated, and you will find that little ones too renounce through the mouths of those who carry them, just as they believe through the mouths of those who carry them—which among you perhaps now is not done; for you have so advanced for the worse, yourselves erring and sending others into error, that those who agree with you say that the little one to be baptized ought not to renounce, because he has drawn no original sin (See 2 Tim 3:13); or, if he ought to renounce sin, say which sin, and at last correct your error.
Iulianum.2.224225. Iul. Si enim mortui sumus cum Christo, credimus, quia vivemus cum Christo scientes, quia Christus suscitatus a mortuis iam non moritur, mors in eum iam non dominabitur; quod enim mortuus est peccato, mortuus est semel, quod autem vivit, vivit Deo. Ita et vos deputate vos mortuos esse peccato, viventes autem Deo in Christo Iesu (Rom 6, 8-11). Quomodo Christus, inquit, qui peccato mortuus est semel, id est propter peccata nostra mortuus est semel, ultra non moritur, sed vivit in gloria Dei, ita et vos, deputate vos peccato mortuos solis vivere et servire virtutibus.
225. Jul. For if we have died with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with Christ—knowing that Christ, raised from the dead, dies no more; death shall no longer have dominion over him. For in that he died to sin, he died once; but in that he lives, he lives to God. So you too, reckon yourselves to be dead to sin, but alive to God in Christ Jesus (Rom 6:8-11). As Christ, he says, who died to sin once—that is, died once for our sins—dies no more, but lives in the glory of God, so you too, reckon yourselves to be dead to sin, to live for and serve the virtues alone.
Iulianum.2.225Aug. O mira expositio! Apostolus dicit Christum peccato mortuum et tu dicis, id est propter peccata nostra; ergo quod dicit ille: Sic et vos existimate vos mortuos esse peccato, hoc putandus est dicere: Existimate vos mortuos esse propter peccata vestra? Non utique hoc dicit isto loco nec tu sic intellegis, sed peccato mortuos, ne peccato viverent, confiteris. Ostende ergo et Christum mortuum fuisse peccato, ne inconvenienter Apostolus dixerit: sic et vos; propter auferenda enim nostra peccata, sed tamen peccato mortuus est, et hoc quomodo, qui nullum habuit omnino peccatum nec originale nec proprium, nisi quia similitudo, cuius rei similitudo erat, eius nomen accepit? Novimus enim Christum in similitudine venisse carnis peccati (Cf. Rom 8, 3), quoniam in vera carne venit, sed non sicut alii homines in carne peccati; mortuus est ergo ille similitudini peccati, quam gerebat in carne mortali, ac sic mysterium nostrae salutis implevit, ut nos peccato moreremur, cuius ille similitudinem gessit. Ideo in mortem ipsius baptizamur, quia sicut in illo vera mors facta est, ita in nobis vera fit remissio peccatorum. Sed hic sunt et parvuli: Quicumque enim baptizati sumus in Christo Iesu, in mortem ipsius baptizati sumus (Rom 6, 3). Non enim sic homines baptizantur in Christo, ut aliqui in mortem ipsius, aliqui non in mortem ipsius baptizentur, sed, sicut ait, in quo loquebatur ipse Christus: Quicumque baptizantur in Christo Iesu, in mortem ipsius baptizantur, ac per hoc, quicumque baptizantur in Christo Iesu, peccato moriuntur; si quicumque, utique et parvuli. Sed cui peccato parvuli moriuntur? Iam tandem quaeso confiteatur generatio, ne mentiatur regeneratio; confiteatur in parvulis caro peccati, ut non negetur etiam pro parvulis mortua similitudo carnis peccati.
Aug. O wondrous exposition! The Apostle says that Christ died to sin, and you say it means "for our sins"; so what he says, So you too, reckon yourselves to be dead to sin, is he to be supposed to mean: Reckon yourselves to be dead for your sins? Surely he does not say this in that passage, nor do you so understand it, but you confess that they died to sin, that they might not live to sin. Show, then, that Christ too died to sin, lest the Apostle have said unfittingly, "so you too"; for it was to take away our sins, yet he nonetheless died to sin—and how, he who had no sin at all, neither original nor of his own, except that the likeness took the name of the thing of which it was the likeness? For we know that Christ came in the likeness of the flesh of sin (See Rom 8:3), since he came in true flesh, but not, like other human beings, in the flesh of sin; he died, then, to the likeness of sin which he bore in his mortal flesh, and so fulfilled the mystery of our salvation, that we might die to the sin whose likeness he bore. Therefore we are baptized into his death, because, just as in him a true death took place, so in us a true remission of sins takes place. But here are little ones too: For all of us who have been baptized in Christ Jesus have been baptized into his death (Rom 6:3). For human beings are not baptized in Christ in such a way that some are baptized into his death and others not into his death; but, as he says, in whom Christ himself was speaking, All who are baptized in Christ Jesus are baptized into his death; and thereby, all who are baptized in Christ Jesus die to sin; if all, then surely also little ones. But to what sin do little ones die? Now at last, I beg, let generation confess, lest regeneration lie; let it confess in little ones the flesh of sin, so that the likeness of the flesh of sin be not denied to have died even for little ones.
Iulianum.2.225226. Iul. Ubi hic ergo accusatur natura? Ubi humanae substantiae culpantur exordia? Ubi motus generantis arguitur? Luce clarius est, quod sola a Magistro Gentium conveniatur voluntas, ut abdicet occulta dedecoris (Cf. 2 Cor 4, 2) et in meliorem vitam actuum correctione proficiat. Sed iam accipiat expositio nostra compendium nec interpretari in his locis dicta Apostoli perseveret; ipsum de suis disserentem sensibus audiamus. In fine disputationis eius apparebit, cuius dogmati fideique consentiat.
226. Jul. Where, then, is nature accused here? Where are the beginnings of human substance found at fault? Where is the motion of the one begetting censured? It is clearer than light that the will alone is addressed by the Teacher of the gentiles, that it may renounce the hidden things of shame (See 2 Cor 4:2) and advance into a better life by the correction of its acts. But now let our exposition take a shortcut, and not persist in interpreting the words of the Apostle in these passages; let us hear him discoursing on his own views. At the end of his disputation it will appear with what teaching and faith he agrees.
Iulianum.2.226Nos nempe dicimus de peccato Apostolum voluntatis humanae, quae in unoquoque peccante est, locutum fuisse; tu vero de eo, quod Fausto credis generatione transmissum et a cunctis sine voluntate susceptum. Concertationes itaque nostrae, si placet, facessant et, ut mediocriter agam, dissimulemus Apostoli dignitatem, qua praescribi posset, etiamsi vobis per omnia eius verba concinerent, tamen illum pro officii sui splendore nihil tam deforme sensisse, ambiguitatem esse elocutionum, non sensuum pravitatem; hoc solum ei in praesenti negotio concedatur, ut vir non perturbatae mentis magis scripta sua quam tu intellexisse credatur. Non ergo regnet - inquit - peccatum in vestro mortali corpore ad oboediendum ei (Rom 6, 12). Possem iam hic dicere exhortationis testimonio probatum esse de peccatis eum agere voluntatis, quia mala, si essent naturalia, per iustitiam defendi possent, per misericordiam postremo defleri, nullo autem pacto admonerentur cavenda. Quovis enim naturali malo, si ullum esse posset, hoc malum erat maius insaniae, qua tenebatur, quicumque devotionem in cavendis rebus naturalibus exigebat. Apostolus autem nihil sanxit, quod possit iure reprehendi; peccatum itaque voluntatis ostendit, quod inculcat debere vitari.
We, surely, say that the Apostle spoke of the sin of the human will, which is in each one who sins; you, however, of that which you believe, with Faustus, to be transmitted by generation and received by all without will. Let our wranglings, then, if you please, be done away with; and, to deal moderately, let us pass over the dignity of the Apostle, by which it could be laid down that, even if all his words accorded with you in every respect, nonetheless, for the splendor of his office, he held no view so deformed, and that there is an ambiguity of expressions, not a depravity of meanings; let only this be granted him in the present business, that a man of an untroubled mind is to be believed to have understood his own writings better than you. Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, to obey it (Rom 6:12), he says. I could now say here that it is proved, by the testimony of his exhortation, that he is treating of sins of the will, because evils, if they were natural, could be defended by justice, or at last be bewailed by mercy, but could by no means be warned against. For with any natural evil whatever, if any could exist, this evil was greater—the madness that gripped whoever demanded devotion in guarding against natural things. But the Apostle sanctioned nothing that could be rightly reprehended; he therefore showed it to be a sin of the will, which he urges ought to be avoided.
Iulianum.2.226Aug. Quis ignorat non loqui Apostolum parvulis, sed eis, qui possunt intellegere verba dicentis et adiuvante Dei gratia oboedire praeceptis? Sed utique agunt etiam cum filiis suis, ut, quemadmodum in eis crescit rationis usus, ita exseratur oboedientiae fructus, ne in vacuum gratiam Dei susceperint, quando regenerati sunt nescientes. Verumtamen illam pulchram susceptam tuam, quae deformis est omnibus debellatoribus suis, concupiscentiam carnis dico, per quam nascitur et cum qua nascitur homo, hanc ergo concupiscentiam carnis cohiberi Apostolus praecipit (Cf. 2 Cor 6, 1) nec regnare permittit eamque peccati nomine appellat, quia et de primo peccato originem ducit et, quisquis eius motibus ad illicita consenserit, peccat, quae tunc nulla erit in nobis, quando immortale corpus habebimus; ideoque cum posset dicere: Non regnet peccatum in vestro corpore, cur addidit verbum et ait: in vestro mortali corpore (Rom 6, 12), nisi ut tunc speraremus istam, quam peccatum vocat, concupiscentiam non futuram, quando mortale non habebimus corpus?
Aug. Who does not know that the Apostle is not speaking to little ones, but to those who can understand the words of the one speaking and, with the help of God's grace, obey the precepts? But surely they also work with their children, that, as the use of reason grows in them, so the fruit of obedience may be brought forth, lest they have received the grace of God in vain when they were regenerated without knowing it. Nevertheless, that beautiful thing you have taken up, which is deformed to all who fight it down—I mean the concupiscence of the flesh, through which a human being is born and with which he is born—this concupiscence of the flesh the Apostle commands to be restrained (See 2 Cor 6:1), and does not permit it to reign, and he calls it by the name of sin, because it both draws its origin from the first sin and because whoever consents to its motions toward unlawful things sins; this concupiscence will be none at all in us when we have an immortal body. And so, when he could have said, "Let not sin reign in your body," why did he add a word and say, in your mortal body (Rom 6:12), except that we should then hope that this concupiscence, which he calls sin, will not exist when we no longer have a mortal body?
Iulianum.2.226Nam tu dic nobis, cur non ait: Non sit peccatum in vestro mortali corpore, sed ait: Non regnet, nisi quia ista concupiscentia, quae non potest nisi esse in carne mortali, in eis regnat, qui desideriis eius ad mala perpetranda consentiunt et ab ea, quocumque illexerit, victi pertrahuntur maiore impetu, quia lege prohibentur, si gratia non iuvantur; in eis autem, qui Deo donante faciunt, quod praeceptum est, id est commotae atque instanti non oboediunt nec ei arma exhibent membra, inest quidem, sed non regnat. Probatur autem inesse, dum concupiscuntur mala, et probatur non regnare, dum iustitiae delectatione vincente non fiunt. Quomodo enim praecipimur ei non oboedire nisi iubenti sive suadenti? Quomodo autem facere hoc potest, si non inest?
For you tell us why he did not say, "Let there be no sin in your mortal body," but said, "Let it not reign," except that this concupiscence, which cannot but be in mortal flesh, reigns in those who consent to its desires for the perpetrating of evils and are dragged off, conquered, wherever it allures—with a greater onset, because they are forbidden by the Law if they are not helped by grace; but in those who, by God's gift, do what is commanded—that is, do not obey it when it stirs and presses, nor furnish their members to it as arms—it is indeed present, but does not reign. It is proved to be present while evils are desired, and proved not to reign while, the delight of justice prevailing, they are not done. For how are we commanded not to obey it except when it commands or persuades? And how can it do this, if it is not present?
Iulianum.2.226227. Iul. Neque exhibeatis membra vestra arma iniquitatis peccato, sed exhibete vos Deo, tamquam ex mortuis viventes, et membra vestra arma iustitiae Deo. Peccatum enim in vobis non dominatur; non enim sub lege estis, sed sub gratia (Rom 6, 13-14). Eo, inquit, debetis servire Deo fidelius, quo etiam liberalius; peccatum quippe dominabatur vobis, cum reatuum impendebat ultio; postea autem quam gratia Dei beneficia consecuti estis et depositis reatuum ponderibus respirastis, ingenuo pudore commoniti debetis gratiam referre medicanti.
227. Jul. Neither present your members as arms of iniquity to sin, but present yourselves to God, as those alive from the dead, and your members as arms of justice to God. For sin shall not have dominion over you; for you are not under the Law, but under grace (Rom 6:13-14). You ought, he says, to serve God all the more faithfully, the more freely you do so; for sin had dominion over you when the vengeance of your guilt hung over you; but after you have obtained the benefits of God's grace and, the weights of your guilt laid aside, have breathed again, then, prompted by a noble shame, you ought to render thanks to your healer.
Iulianum.2.227Aug. Tu vestro more, qui de vestro descendit errore, non agnoscis gratiam nisi in dimissione peccatorum, ut iam de cetero per liberum arbitrium ipse homo se ipsum fabricet iustum. Sed non hoc dicit Ecclesia, quae clamat tota, quod didicit a Magistro bono: Ne nos inferas in tentationem (Mt 6, 13); non hoc dicit qui dicit: Oramus autem ad Deum, ne quid faciatis mali (2 Cor 13, 7); non hoc dicit qui dicit: Rogavi pro te, Petre, ne deficiat fides tua (Lc 22, 32). Isto enim modo gratia, ut non peccemus, facit, non quae peccavimus diluit; utroque enim modo adiuvat gratia, et dimittendo, quae male fecimus, et opitulando, ut declinemus a malis et bona faciamus.
Aug. After your manner, which descends from your error, you acknowledge grace only in the remission of sins, so that thenceforth, through free choice, the human being may fashion himself just by his own doing. But the Church does not say this, the Church that cries out as a whole what she learned from the good Teacher: Lead us not into temptation (Matt 6:13); he does not say this who says, We pray to God that you may do no evil (2 Cor 13:7); he does not say this who says, I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail (Luke 22:32). For in this way grace acts that we may not sin, and not only washes away the sins we have committed; for grace helps in both ways, both by forgiving what we have done wrongly and by aiding us to turn away from evils and do good.
Iulianum.2.227228. Iul. Verum quia eiusdem quam supra exposuerat quaestionis incurrebat occasio, ut opponeretur videlicet liberatos a lege, quae intendebat iram, securos posse sub gratiae Dei benignitate peccare, subdidit protinus: Quid ergo? Peccabimus, quoniam non sumus sub lege, sed sub gratia? Absit! An ignoratis, quoniam cui exhibetis vos servos ad oboediendum, servi estis eius, cui oboedistis, sive peccati sive oboeditionis iustitiae? (Rom 6, 15-16) Iamne ei credimus, de cuius disseruerit hactenus conditione peccati? Cui, inquit, exhibetis vos servos ad oboediendum, eius servi estis, sive peccati, sive iustitiae. Ubi hic ergo indicatur ab Apostolo peccatum illud, quod ante voluntatis tempora, ante oboedientium studium, ante scientiae et conscientiae aetatem ipsis fingitur supervolasse seminibus? Quod certe nisi in Manichaeorum libris inveniri non potest.
228. Jul. But because the occasion arose for the same question he had expounded above—namely, that it might be objected that those set free from the Law, which threatened wrath, could sin securely under the kindness of God's grace—he immediately added: What then? Shall we sin, because we are not under the Law, but under grace? God forbid! Or do you not know that to whom you present yourselves as servants to obey, you are the servants of him whom you obey, whether of sin or of obedience unto justice? (Rom 6:15-16) Do we now believe him, about whose condition of sin he has thus far discoursed? To whom, he says, you present yourselves as servants to obey, of him you are the servants, whether of sin or of justice. Where, then, is that sin indicated here by the Apostle which is imagined to have flown over upon the very seeds themselves, before the times of will, before the pursuit of those who obey, before the age of knowledge and conscience? A thing which surely cannot be found except in the books of the Manicheans.
Iulianum.2.228Aug. Non sunt Manichaeorum libri, ubi legitur: Fuimus enim et nos natura filii irae sicut et ceteri (Eph 2, 3), quod vos novo more, sed impudentissimo ore interpretamini ex Graeco, ut Apostolus dixisse videatur non natura, sed prorsus, hoc est: Fuimus prorsus filii irae; et forte hoc emendare audebitis in codicibus vestris, non enim vultis acquiescere, quod, nisi haec quanto verior, tanto antiquior fides esset, hoc omnes Latini codices non haberent. Nec ideo tamen Apostolus monere non debuit oboediendum esse iustitiae, non peccato, quia omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est (Cf. AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3).
Aug. They are not the books of the Manicheans where one reads, For we too were by nature children of wrath, like the rest (Eph 2:3)—which you, in a new manner but with a most impudent mouth, interpret from the Greek, so that the Apostle may seem to have said not "by nature," but "altogether," that is, "We were altogether children of wrath"; and perhaps you will dare to emend this in your codices, for you are unwilling to acquiesce in the fact that, unless this faith were as true as it is ancient, all the Latin codices would not have it. Nor for that reason ought the Apostle not to have warned that one must obey justice, not sin, just because we are all born under sin, and our very origin is in fault (See Ambrose, On Penance 1.3).
Iulianum.2.228Cum enim generationis reatus regenerationis indulgentia fuerit absolutus, oboediendum est iustitiae spiritui, cui consentire, nec oboediendum est concupiscentiae carnis, contra quam certare debemus, ita sane, ut ipsam quoque oboedientiam piam donum Dei esse meminerimus, quod promisit per Prophetam dicens: Dabo eis cor cognoscendi me et aures audientes (Ier 24, 7); quod quid est aliud quam oboedientes?
For when the guilt of generation has been absolved by the indulgence of regeneration, one must obey the spirit of justice, to which we must consent, and not obey the concupiscence of the flesh, against which we ought to struggle—yet so, to be sure, that we remember that this pious obedience itself is the gift of God, which he promised through the prophet, saying, I will give them a heart to know me, and ears that hear (Jer 24:7); and what is this but "obedient ears"?
Iulianum.2.228229. Iul. Ceterum Apostolus ostendit, si tamen aliquam ab hominibus hac tempestate fidem impetrat, servos se non dicere peccati nisi eos, quos constat voluntate propria oboedisse peccato, cuius mutatione id est voluntatis coeperunt servire iustitiae; oboedientiam ergo in medio collocavit et ei imputavit, quod vel vitiis prius vel postea studuerunt parere virtutibus.
229. Jul. For the rest, the Apostle shows—if indeed he obtains any belief from human beings in this storm—that he calls servants of sin only those who, it is agreed, obeyed sin by their own will, and who, by the change of that same will, began to serve justice; he placed obedience, then, in the middle, and imputed to it that they were eager either to obey vices before or virtues afterward.
Iulianum.2.229Aug. Qui confidunt in virtute sua (Ps 48, 7), vani sunt sicut vos et destruentur sicut vos.
Aug. Those who trust in their own strength (Ps 49:6 (48:7)) are empty like you, and will be destroyed like you.
Iulianum.2.229230. Iul. Gratias autem Deo, quod fuistis - inquit - servi peccati; sed oboedistis ex corde in eam formam doctrinae, in quam traditi estis; liberati autem a peccato servi estis facti iustitiae (Rom 6, 17-18).
230. Jul. But thanks be to God that you were, he says, servants of sin; but you have obeyed from the heart that form of teaching to which you were delivered; and, set free from sin, you have been made servants of justice (Rom 6:17-18).
Iulianum.2.230Aug. Surde, audi Apostolum gratias agentem Deo, quod eius doctrinae ex corde oboedierunt, quandoquidem non dixit: Gratias Deo, quia praedicata est vobis doctrina eius, sed: quia oboedistis. Non enim omnes obaudiunt Evangelio (Rom 10, 16), sed quibus datum est, ut obaudiant, sicut: Nosse mysterium regni caelorum vobis datum est, ait Dominus, illis autem non est datum (Mt 13, 11; cf. Mc 4, 11; Lc 8, 10). Non ergo ex corde, hoc est ex voluntate oboedissent, si non praepararetur voluntas a Domino; alioquin mendaciter ei de hac re Apostolus gratias agit, si hoc ipse non fecit.
Aug. O deaf one, hear the Apostle giving thanks to God that they obeyed his teaching from the heart—since he did not say, "Thanks to God, because his teaching was preached to you," but, "because you have obeyed." For not all obey the Gospel (Rom 10:16), but those to whom it is given that they should obey, as the Lord says: To you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is not given (Matt 13:11; see Mark 4:11; Luke 8:10). They would not, then, have obeyed from the heart—that is, from the will—if the will were not prepared by the Lord; otherwise the Apostle falsely gives him thanks for this matter, if he himself did not bring it about.
Iulianum.2.230231. Iul. Ex corde, inquit, oboedientiae facta mutatio, liberavit vos a peccato et sanctitati fecit adhaerere.
231. Jul. The change of obedience, made from the heart, he says, set you free from sin and made you cleave to holiness.
Iulianum.2.231Aug. Sed haec mutatio dexterae Excelsi est; audi hominem Dei hanc in Psalmo gratiam confitentem et disce, quis mutet in melius hominis voluntatem: Et dixi - inquit - nunc coepi; haec est immutatio dexterae Excelsi (Ps 76, 11).
Aug. But this change is of the right hand of the Most High; hear the man of God confessing this grace in the Psalm, and learn who changes a human being's will for the better: And I said, Now I have begun; this is the change of the right hand of the Most High (Ps 77:10 (76:11)).
Iulianum.2.231232. Iul. Humanum est, quod dico propter infirmitatem carnis vestrae; sicut enim exhibuistis membra vestra servire immunditiae et iniquitati ad iniquitatem, ita nunc exhibete membra vestra servire iustitiae in sanctificationem (Rom 6, 19). O praeceptorem Spiritu Dei plenum, vere vas aureum et tubam non concisis stridoribus, sed absolutis vocibus increpantem! Auctoritatem sermoni suo de exhortationis humanitate conciliat.
232. Jul. I speak in a human way, on account of the weakness of your flesh; for as you presented your members to serve uncleanness and iniquity unto iniquity, so now present your members to serve justice unto sanctification (Rom 6:19). O teacher full of the Spirit of God, truly a golden vessel and a trumpet sounding not with broken shrillness but with clear notes! He wins authority for his discourse by the humaneness of his exhortation.
Iulianum.2.232Aug. O te deceptorem spiritu haeretico plenum, totum dantem hominis voluntati contra eum qui dicit: Quid enim habes, quod non accepisti? (1 Cor 4, 7) Homo Pelagiane, plantando et rigando ista dicebat Apostolus; sciens autem quod neque qui plantat est aliquid neque qui rigat, sed qui incrementum dat, Deus (1 Cor 3, 7), non praecipiebat tantum, sed etiam orabat ad Deum, ut malum non facerent, quibus eius eloquia praedicabat. Aperte quippe alibi dicit: Oramus autem ad Deum, ne quid faciatis mali (2 Cor 13, 7).
Aug. O you deceiver full of a heretical spirit, giving everything to the human being's will, against him who says, For what have you that you have not received? (1 Cor 4:7) O Pelagian man, the Apostle said these things while planting and watering; but knowing that neither he who plants is anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase (1 Cor 3:7), he not only gave precepts, but also prayed to God that those to whom he preached his words might not do evil. For he plainly says elsewhere: We pray to God that you may do no evil (2 Cor 13:7).
Iulianum.2.232233. Iul. Ne quid enim arduum et inaccessum homini praecipere videretur, verbum de consuetudine usurpavit, ut humanum diceret, id est facile tractabile, et quod causarum comparatione mitescat. Non a vobis, inquit, reposco parem augustis rebus intentionem nec, quam magnae sunt virtutum opes, tam nova vobis, quibus eas capessatis, praecepta constituo, nihil ferum ingero, nihil quod vix portari possit indico, ne, si pro splendore iustitiae tale aliquid imperarem, de carnis infirmitate conquesti allegaretis iugem vos laborem ferre non posse.
233. Jul. For lest he should seem to command anything arduous and inaccessible to a human being, he borrowed a word from common usage, calling it "human," that is, easily manageable, and such as is softened by the comparison of causes. I do not demand of you, he says, an effort equal to lofty matters, nor do I set for you precepts as new as the riches of the virtues are great, by which you may lay hold of those riches; I bring in nothing savage, I lay down nothing that can scarcely be borne—lest, if for the splendor of justice I commanded something of that sort, you should complain of the weakness of the flesh and plead that you cannot bear continual toil.
Iulianum.2.233Nunc itaque hac moderatione convenio, ut tale studium virtutibus adhibeatis, quale adhibuistis ante criminibus; cumque iniuria sit honestarum rerum, si tali appetantur proposito, quale est deformibus impensum rebus, tamen disciplinae huic, in qua estis, sufficit, si vel tali intentione iustitiam sectemini, quali iniquitatem estis immunditiamque sectati.
Now, therefore, I approach you with this moderation: that you apply to the virtues such zeal as you applied before to crimes; and although it be an injury to honorable things if they are sought with such a purpose as is spent on shameful things, nonetheless for this discipline, in which you are, it suffices if you pursue justice even with such intent as you pursued iniquity and uncleanness.
Iulianum.2.233Aug. Hoc tamen non facient, nisi illi formosae susceptae tuae concupiscentiae carnis repugnent robore caritatis; cum qua lege membrorum repugnatura legi mentis omnis homo nascitur et cuius obligatione reus est, si non renascatur; quam mortales non vincunt suo spiritu, si non aguntur Dei Spiritu: Quotquot enim Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii sunt Dei (Rom 8, 14). Ite nunc et contra istam christianam atque apostolicam veritatem extollendo praecipitate liberum arbitrium et in vestra virtute non assurgendo, sed cadendo confidite.
Aug. Yet they will not do this unless they resist, by the strength of love, that beautiful concupiscence of the flesh you have taken up; with which law of the members, about to war against the law of the mind, every human being is born, and by whose binding he is guilty if he is not reborn—a concupiscence which mortals do not conquer by their own spirit if they are not led by the Spirit of God: For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God (Rom 8:14). Go now, and against this Christian and apostolic truth fling free choice into the abyss by extolling it, and trust in your own strength—not by rising, but by falling.
Iulianum.2.233234. Iul. Credamus itaque Magistro Gentium et reddamus ei testimonium veritatis suae. Vere enim, sicut dixit, humanum est, quod praecepit, ut voluntatis correctio emendaret vitia voluntatis.
234. Jul. Let us, then, believe the Teacher of the gentiles, and render him the testimony of his own truth. For truly, as he said, what he commanded is "human": that the correction of the will should amend the faults of the will.
Iulianum.2.234Aug. Sed correctio haec humana non fit nisi opitulatione divina. Quis enim hominis corrigit voluntatem nisi ille cui dicitur: Deus virtutum, converte nos (Ps 79, 8), et: Deus, tu convertens vivificabis nos (Ps 84, 7)? A Domino enim gressus hominis diriguntur et viam eius volet (Ps 36, 23). Si autem non ab illo dirigantur, homo viam Dei non volet, etsi iubeat lex, ut velit.
Aug. But this human correction does not come about except by divine aid. For who corrects a human being's will except him to whom it is said, O God of hosts, turn us back (Ps 80:7 (79:8)), and, O God, you will turn and give us life (Ps 85:6 (84:7))? For by the Lord are a man's steps directed, and he will choose his way (Ps 37:23 (36:23)). But if they are not directed by him, a human being will not choose the way of God, even though the Law command that he choose it.
Iulianum.2.234235. Iul. Sed ut hoc humanum, sic illud aliud, si putasset, non solum inhumanum, non solum ferum, verum etiam iniustum, non solum iniustum, verum etiam insanum, ut peccatum si nosset innasci, exprobraret suae aetatis hominibus vitia partus antiqui et ab his praeciperet abstinendum, quae innata credebat, atque cum interminatione praescriberet debere me ea deponere, quae ante habere coeperam, quam anima in corpus meum, in hunc vero mundum corpus intraret.
235. Jul. But, just as this is "human," so the other thing he would have thought—if he had thought it—not only inhuman, not only savage, but even unjust, not only unjust but even insane: that, if he knew sin to be born in us, he should reproach the human beings of his own age with the faults of an ancient birth, and command that they abstain from things he believed to be inborn, and with a threat prescribe that I ought to lay aside what I had begun to have before my soul entered into my body, and before my body entered into this world.
Iulianum.2.235Aug. Ergo carnis concupiscentia non est innata aut non ab ea praecipit abstinendum, qui dicit: Contine te ipsum (Eccli 30, 24), et: Desideria iuvenilia fuge (2 Tim 2, 22). Cur non dixit: Voluntaria desideria fuge? Iuventus utique nomen aetatis est, aetates autem natura, non voluntas habet et ea concupiscentia de iuvenili aetate maxime accenditur, cuius utique vis in infante sopita est sicut rationis, sicut ipsius voluntatis. Sed discernit oculus christianus, non Pelagianus, quid de Creatoris institutione, quid de vitii contaminatione vel sumat natura vel contrahat, Conditorem suo bono praedicans eodemque propter malum, quo vitiata est, indigens Salvatore; de reatu enim, cum quo homo nascitur, non est, quod ei praecipiatur, nisi ut renascatur.
Aug. Then the concupiscence of the flesh is not inborn, or else he does not command abstinence from it, who says, Restrain yourself (Sir 30:24), and, Flee youthful desires (2 Tim 2:22). Why did he not say, "Flee voluntary desires"? "Youth," surely, is the name of an age, and ages nature has, not will; and that concupiscence is kindled most of all from the age of youth—a concupiscence whose force, to be sure, is dormant in an infant, as is that of reason and of will itself. But the Christian eye, not the Pelagian, discerns what nature takes from the Creator's institution and what it contracts from the defilement of fault, proclaiming its Maker by reason of its good, and by reason of the evil by which it is corrupted standing in need of a Savior; for as to the guilt with which a human being is born, there is nothing to be commanded him except that he be reborn.
Iulianum.2.235236. Iul. Iustius admoneretur ab his, quos emendare studebat, ut, quantum imperaret, expenderet et sciret primum esse consilii constantis gradum imperii modum tenere; exauctorata quippe doctrina est, quam non tuetur aequitas, et plena auctoritatis, quam iustitiae libra commendat. Ac per hoc constat Apostolum, reverendum ecclesiarum informatorem, rationem magisterii sui consilio aequitate humanitate reddentem nihil de naturali sensisse peccato, sed inculcasse, ut res erat, et vitiorum nos servos nonnisi per voluntatem fuisse et iustitiae nos eadem posse, si corrigatur, voluntate servire.
236. Jul. He would more justly be admonished by those whom he was eager to amend, that he should weigh how much he commanded, and know that the first step of constant counsel is to keep measure in commanding; for that teaching is stripped of authority which equity does not guard, and that is full of authority which the balance of justice commends. And by this it is established that the Apostle, the reverend instructor of the Churches, rendering the reason of his teaching with counsel, equity, and humaneness, thought nothing about natural sin, but pressed home, as the matter stood, both that we were servants of vices only through the will, and that, if it be corrected, we can serve justice by that same will.
Iulianum.2.236Verum quoniam in expositione loci huius fui hactenus occupatus, ut ostenderem per apostoli Pauli verba Manichaeos nihil posse defendi, patuitque contextu orationis eius veritas, quam per omne dictorum suorum corpus exsequitur, hic sit secundi finis libelli, quo tamen necessario commonemus nihil Traducianis praeter impudentiam remansisse, quia, cum se confiterentur nullum in ratione habere praesidium, de Apostoli dictis, quae exposita sunt, totum sibi solacium vindicabant; et quoniam claruit nihil in his deforme, nihil non sanctitati et rationi consentiens fuisse praescriptum, apparet cecidisse sententiam, quam et ratio cum multis auctoritatibus Scripturarum et, quae in Deo est, religio catholicorum proruit et iam loci istius opinio non tuetur.
But since I have thus far been occupied in the exposition of this passage, to show that through the words of the apostle Paul nothing can be defended for the Manicheans, and the truth has appeared in the context of his discourse, which he carries through the whole body of his sayings, let this be the end of the second little book—by which, however, we necessarily admonish that nothing has remained to the Traducianists except impudence; for, since they confessed that they had no defense in reason, they claimed all their solace for themselves from the sayings of the Apostle, which have been expounded. And since it has become clear that in these nothing deformed, nothing not consonant with holiness and reason, was prescribed, it appears that the opinion has fallen which reason, together with many authorities of the Scriptures, and the religion of catholics, which is in God, has overthrown, and which the sense of this passage no longer protects.
Iulianum.2.236Aug. Apparet omnibus, qui sano capite atque intellegenter haec legunt, cum contra verba non magis mea quam beati Apostoli multa tua diceres, nihil te invenisse quod diceres, et tortuoso strepitu loquacitatis egisse, ut eis, qui non intellegunt, dixisse aliquid videreris. Velitis nolitis: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines pertransiit (Rom 5, 12). Quid est ita nisi per peccatum, non sine peccato? Neque enim pertransiret mors nisi ducente peccato; mors enim peccatum sequitur, non praecedit.
Aug. It is apparent to all who read these things with a sound head and intelligently that, when you said many things against words that are not so much mine as the blessed Apostle's, you found nothing to say, and that you acted, by the tortuous noise of your loquacity, so as to seem to those who do not understand to have said something. Whether you will or not: Through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death, and so it passed to all human beings (Rom 5:12). What is "so" except "through sin," not "without sin"? For death would not pass over except with sin leading the way; for death follows sin, it does not precede it.
Iulianum.2.236Hinc sunt omnes miseriae mortalium a die exitus de ventre matris eorum (Eccli 40, 1), sicut scriptum est. Quas miserias vos cum sine ullo peccato accidere dicitis parvulis, iniustum Deum vere vos facitis, Manichaeos autem horribiliter adiuvatis. Illi enim, ne faciant iniustum Deum, istas miserias a nativitate mortalium immutabili naturae mali et ab alio principio venienti substantiae tribuunt tenebrarum.
Hence come all the miseries of mortals from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb (Sir 40:1), as it is written. And when you say that these miseries befall little ones without any sin, you truly make God unjust, and you horribly help the Manicheans. For they, lest they make God unjust, attribute these miseries, from the birth of mortals, to an unchangeable nature of evil and to a substance coming from another principle, the principle of darkness.
Iulianum.2.236Quos impios simul et vos ipsos vincit catholica fides, quae ista omnia peccato illi tribuit, quod ex primi hominis voluntate intravit in mundum, quos secuta est mors etiam ista, quae fugans animam corpus interimit, quam vos homini, etiamsi non peccasset, dicitis naturaliter fuisse venturam. Unde sequitur, ut non solum illam imperiosam libidinem, qua nimium delectamini, verum etiam molestissimam febrem ceterosque innumerabiles morbos, quibus videmus afflictos parvulos emori, in paradiso futuros fuisse dicatis, etiamsi nemo peccasset, quia sine ullius peccati merito haec perpeti parvulos dicitis. Cohibete vos, quaeso, cum falsis et noxiis laudibus vestris, cohibete vos ab infantibus et lactantibus, quos tamquam nihil mali habentes crudeli errore laudatis, ad Christum liberatorem venire liberandos parvulos sinite, miseram naturam, quam vitiavit homo primus, ut sanet homo secundus, victi correctique permittite.
The catholic faith conquers these impious men and yourselves together—the faith which attributes all these things to that sin which entered the world by the will of the first man, which sin was followed by this death too, the death that, putting the soul to flight, destroys the body—a death which you say would naturally have come to a human being even if he had not sinned. From which it follows that you say that not only that imperious lust, in which you delight too much, but even the most troublesome fever and the countless other diseases by which we see little ones afflicted and dying, would have existed in paradise, even if no one had sinned, because you say that little ones suffer these things without the desert of any sin. Restrain yourselves, I beg, with your false and harmful praises; restrain yourselves from infants and sucklings, whom by a cruel error you praise as though having nothing evil; let the little ones come to Christ the liberator, to be set free; conquered and corrected, permit the wretched nature, which the first man corrupted, to be healed by the second man.
Iulianum.2.236Bk. 3
1. IULIANUS. Oportuerat quidem apud humanum genus reverentiam omnium.vigere virtutum; oportuerat resisti sapienti semper mente criminibus et demereri bonis studiis Conditoris favorem; dignum erat postremo, ut quia hic continuae devotionis prior et felicior gradus cum rarus tum arduus etiam nimis videtur, vel diu fota vitia respui et ad emendationis ac paenitentiae praesidium rediri. Oportuerat certe vel in hoc inviolabilem Dei manere reverentiam, ut non nobis esset necesse divinam legem tanto vindicare certamine, verum, quia eo usque peccantium furore perventum est, ut summis laboribus Deum iustum esse doceamus, ipsius iustitiae, cuius causa agitur, praesumentes auxilium, quae libro promisimus praecedente, reddamus.
1. Jul. It ought indeed to have been that among the human race reverence for all the virtues flourished; it ought to have been that with an ever-wise mind one resisted crimes and earned the favor of the Creator by good pursuits; it was fitting, finally, that, since the prior and happier step of continual devotion seems here both rare and exceedingly arduous, one should at least spit out faults that had long been cherished and return to the help of amendment and repentance. It ought certainly to have been that at least in this the reverence due to God remained inviolable: that it should not be necessary for us to vindicate the divine Law with so great a contest; but, because the madness of sinners has come to such a point that with the greatest labors we must teach that God is just, presuming upon the help of that very justice whose cause is being pleaded, let us render what we promised in the preceding book.
Iulianum.3.1AUGUSTINUS. Auxilium Dei quaeris, ut impleantur vani libri tui, et non quaeris, ut corrigantur perversi sensus tui. Vellem tamen diceres, propter quid in hoc opere auxilium Dei poscas, cum sit in tuo libero arbitrio sive facere hoc sive non facere. An ut ea tibi praesto sint, quae in potestate tua non sunt et sine quibus hoc effici non potest, sicut sunt, ut alia omittam, ipse victus atque otium? At haec pene semper Deus per voluntates nobis subministrat aliorum. Vides ergo id te poscere ab omnipotente Deo, cum propter implendos tuos libros poscis auxilium, ut in voluntatibus hominum, quod te adiuvet et quod te non impediat, operetur. Nam si nolint homines victum tibi subministrare sumptusque congruentes, si nolint postremo a te inquietando impediendoque cessare, scribere vel dictare ista non poteris. Speras ergo auxilio Dei sic agi hominum voluntates, inter quos vivis, ut tibi necessarium nihil desit. Paratur enim, quod non creditis, voluntas a Domino (Prov 8, 35). Aut igitur tuum dogma iam corrige aut ad hoc defendendum desine divinum auxilium postulare.
Aug. You seek the help of God, that your empty books may be filled, and you do not seek that your perverse meanings may be corrected. Yet I would have you say why in this work you beg the help of God, when it is in your free choice either to do this or not to do it. Is it that those things may be at hand for you which are not in your power, and without which this cannot be accomplished—such as, to omit others, your very food and leisure? But these God supplies to us almost always through the wills of others. You see, then, that when you beg help for the filling of your books, you are begging this of God almighty: that in the wills of human beings he should work what helps you and does not hinder you. For if human beings should be unwilling to supply you with food and fitting provisions, if, finally, they should be unwilling to cease from disturbing and hindering you, you will not be able to write or dictate these things. You hope, then, that by the help of God the wills of the human beings among whom you live are so directed that nothing necessary is wanting to you. For—what you do not believe—the will is prepared by the Lord (Prov 8:35). Either, then, correct your dogma now, or cease to ask divine help for defending it.
Iulianum.3.12. IUL. Cum in primo volumine perspicuis definitionibus constitisset Deum ita iustum esse, ut, si probari posset iustus non esse, convinceretur Deus non esse, cumque super hoc remansisset nulla dubitatio, claruit etiam iustitiam nihil esse aliud quam virtutem numquam quidquam inique iudicantem, nihil inique facientem, sed reddentem sua unicuique sine fraude sine gratia, id est sine personarum acceptione.
2. Jul. Since in the first volume it had been established by clear definitions that God is so just that, if it could be proved that he is not just, he would be convicted of not being God, and since over this no doubt remained, it became clear also that justice is nothing other than the virtue that never judges anything iniquitously, does nothing iniquitously, but renders to each his own without fraud and without favor—that is, without acceptance of persons.
Iulianum.3.2AUG. Sine fraude verum dicis, ne puniatur immeritus; sine gratia vero si iustitia Dei esset, numquam Christus pro impiis, id est pro nihil boni et multum mali merentibus, mortuus fuisset, numquam postremo parvulos, quorum nulla bona opera voluntasque praecessit, in suum regnum adoptasset nec in eadem causa alios parvulos eiusdem regni participatione fraudasset, qui numquam inique iudicat, nihil inique facit et sua unicuique sine fraude reddit. Agnosce ergo parvulos vasa in honorem per gratiam, qui assumuntur in Dei regnum, et alios parvulos, qui in illum honorem non assumuntur, vasa in contumeliam per iudicium et tandem aliquando, ne iniquum facias Deum, confitere originale peccatum.
Aug. You speak truly "without fraud," that the undeserving may not be punished; but if the justice of God were "without favor," Christ would never have died for the impious—that is, for those who deserve no good and much evil—nor, finally, would he have adopted into his kingdom little ones whose good works and will did not precede, nor, in the same case, would he have defrauded other little ones of participation in that same kingdom, he who never judges iniquitously, does nothing iniquitously, and renders to each his own without fraud. Acknowledge, then, that little ones who are taken up into the kingdom of God are vessels unto honor through grace, and other little ones who are not taken up into that honor are vessels unto dishonor through judgment; and at last, lest you make God unjust, confess original sin.
Iulianum.3.23. IUL. Eius autem virtutis tunc constare rationem, si nullum subditorum puniret nisi pro his delictis, quae constabat libera voluntate commissa.
3. Jul. But the reason of that virtue then holds good, if he punished none of his subjects except for those offenses which it was established were committed by free will.
Iulianum.3.3AUG. Et illud libera voluntate commissum est eius, in quo natura humana damnata est, ex qua homines damnationi nascuntur obnoxii, nisi renascantur in eo, qui non est natus obnoxius. Hoc dogma christianum vultis everti, sed illo stante vos evertimini.
Aug. And that too was committed by free will—the will of him in whom human nature was condemned, from which human beings are born subject to condemnation, unless they are reborn in him who was not born subject to it. You wish this Christian dogma to be overthrown; but, while it stands, you are overthrown.
Iulianum.3.34. IUL. Nec ea hominibus praeciperet, quae per naturam eorum sciret non posse servari, nec pro rebus naturalibus reum quempiam iudicaret.
4. Jul. Nor would he command human beings things which he knew could not be kept through their nature, nor would he judge anyone guilty for natural things.
Iulianum.3.4AUG. Sed fuit Adam et in illo fuimus omnes (AMBROSIUS, In Luc., 7, 234), quando ita peccavit, ut per deret in se omnes, nisi quos vellet inde liberaret, qui venit quaerere quod perierat (Cf. Lc 19, 10).
Aug. But there was Adam, and in him we all were (Ambrose, On Luke 7.234), when he so sinned as to destroy in himself all—except those whom he willed to set free from it, he who came to seek what had perished (See Luke 19:10).
Iulianum.3.45. IUL. Nec aliena peccata aliis imputaret ac per hoc nec propter parentum iniquitates innocentes eorum filios, qui per se nihil operati essent vel boni vel mali, per quod parentum suorum crimina docerentur imitati, aeternis adiudicaret suppliciis (Cf. Eccli 40, 1). Quibus collectis Deum et esse et iustum esse constat, quem claruerat, si aliquid operetur iniustum, tantum subire in divinitate, quantum pertulisset in aequitate dispendium.
5. Jul. Nor would he impute the sins of some to others, and thereby would not, on account of the iniquities of parents, adjudge to eternal punishments their innocent children, who had done nothing of themselves, whether good or evil, through which they might be shown to have imitated the crimes of their parents (See Sir 40:1). From which gathered together, it is established that God both exists and is just—he of whom it had become clear that, if he were to do anything unjust, he would suffer in his divinity as great a loss as he would have undergone in equity.
Iulianum.3.5AUG. Verum dicis, ac per hoc nihil operatur iniustum, cum gravi iugo premit filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum, quod utique iniustum esset, si peccatum originale non esset.
Aug. You speak truly; and thereby he does nothing unjust when he presses with a heavy yoke the children of Adam from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb—which would surely be unjust if there were no original sin.
Iulianum.3.56. IUL. Quamquam, o infelicitas erroris humani, nimio quippe perpendens ipsam conflictus nostri rationem dolore concutior, potuissene hoc in dubitationem venire atque assertione hanc eguisse causam; potuisse, inquam, in ecclesiis, quae Christo se credere faterentur, dubitari, utrum Deus iuste id est rationabiliter iudicaret!
6. Jul. And yet—O the unhappiness of human error! for, pondering too deeply the very reason of our conflict, I am shaken with grief—could this have come into doubt, and could this cause have needed assertion? Could it, I say, in churches that professed to believe in Christ, have been doubted whether God judges justly—that is, reasonably?
Iulianum.3.6AUG. Quia hoc non dubitatur, ideo scriptum est grave iugum esse super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum (Ibidem); neque enim melior est Pelagiana quam ecclesiastica sapientia.
Aug. Because this is not doubted, therefore it is written that there is a heavy yoke upon the children of Adam from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb (Sir 40:1); for the Pelagian wisdom is no better than the ecclesiastical.
Iulianum.3.67. IUL. Sed nimis sum ipsa rerum reverentia eius qua de agitur contentionis oblitus. Miror enim ambigi de Dei aequitate potuisse, cum constet in Traducianorum synagogis nihil de eius iniquitate dubitari.
7. Jul. But I have too much forgotten, in the very reverence for the matter, the contention with which we are dealing. For I marvel that it could be doubted about the equity of God, when it is established that in the synagogues of the Traducianists nothing about his iniquity is doubted.
Iulianum.3.7AUG. Quia de Dei aequitate non ambigitur, ideo grave iugum super parvulum iustum esse creditur et, quia hoc iustum esse creditur, ideo parvulus sine originali peccato esse non creditur. Proinde in Ecclesia catholica, unde Pelagiani ex nobis exierunt, non, sicut dicis, nihil de iniquitate Dei, sed potius nihil de eius aequitate dubitatur, ubi nec infans, cuius est unius diei vita super terram, sine sorde peccati esse docetur et dicitur (Cf. Iob 14, 4-5), et ideo in malis, quae patitur, non iniustus Deus, sed iustus agnoscitur.
Aug. Because the equity of God is not doubted, therefore the heavy yoke upon the little one is believed to be just; and because this is believed to be just, therefore the little one is not believed to be without original sin. Accordingly, in the catholic Church, from which you Pelagians went out from us, it is not, as you say, that nothing about the iniquity of God is doubted, but rather that nothing about his equity is doubted—where even the infant, whose life upon the earth is of one day, is taught and said not to be without the stain of sin (See Job 14:4-5), and therefore, in the evils that he suffers, God is acknowledged not as unjust, but as just.
Iulianum.3.78. IUL. Quod certe tanto peius est, quanto gravius est studium malorum quam neglectus bonorum, quanto perniciosior intentio profanitatis quam dubitatio veritatis, quanto postremo scelestius est audere criminari Deum quam nolle venerari.
8. Jul. Which is surely so much the worse, the graver the zeal for evils is than the neglect of goods, the more pernicious the intent of profanity than the doubt of truth, the more wicked, finally, it is to dare to accuse God than to be unwilling to venerate him.
Iulianum.3.8AUG. Sed vos criminamini Deum, dum parvulos, quos iudicio eius gravi iugo premi cernitis, ullum tamen negatis habere peccatum.
Aug. But it is you who accuse God, when, while you see that little ones are pressed by his judgment with a heavy yoke, you nonetheless deny that they have any sin.
Iulianum.3.89. IUL. Dixerat quidem, ut David propheta testis est, insipiens in corde suo, quia non esset Deus (Ps 13, 1; 52, 1), non tamen dixerat, quia esset quidem, sed tamen iniustus Deus; ita concinenter totius naturae voce resonabat inseparabiliter Deo adhaerere iustitiam, ut facilius inveniretur, qui substantiam eius quam qui aequitatem negaret; potuit exsistere, qui putaret non esse, quod non videbat, non fuerat tamen inventus, qui diceret iniquum, quod divinum esse credebat.
9. Jul. The fool had indeed said in his heart, as the prophet David is witness, that there is no God (Ps 14:1 (13:1); 53:1 (52:1)); yet he had not said that there is indeed a God, but that God is unjust; so harmoniously did the voice of all nature resound that justice cleaves inseparably to God, that one would more easily be found to deny his substance than his equity. One could exist who supposed that what he did not see did not exist; yet no one had been found to call iniquitous what he believed to be divine.
Iulianum.3.9AUG. Et ipse inventus es; nam cui nisi tali dicit: Suspicatus es iniquitatem, quod ero tibi similis? (Ps 49, 21) Sed quoniam Christiani catholici et esse Deum et iustum esse sciunt, ideo natos homines, si non renati in parvula aetate moriuntur, cum sint imagines Dei, non iniuste tamen, sed peccati originalis merito in regnum Dei non suscipi dubitare non possunt.
Aug. And you yourself have been found such a one; for to whom but such a one does he say, You supposed iniquity, that I would be like you (Ps 50:21 (49:21))? But since catholic Christians know both that God exists and that he is just, they therefore cannot doubt that human beings who are born—if they die unregenerate in early childhood—although they are images of God, are nonetheless not unjustly, but by the desert of original sin, not received into the kingdom of God.
Iulianum.3.910. IUL. Insipiens ergo ille negando Deum stetisse in extimo criminum videbatur. At inventa est natio Manichaeorum et Traducianorum, cuius profanitatibus vinceretur.
10. Jul. That fool, then, by denying God, seemed to have stood at the farthest edge of crimes. But there has been found a nation of Manicheans and Traducianists, by whose profanities he is outdone.
Iulianum.3.10AUG. Sciens, quam clari probatique Doctores Ecclesiae Christi de originali peccato et de iustitia Dei quod credo crediderint, quod doceo docuerint, quod defendo defenderint, sic audire debeo contumelias tuas quomodo laudes meas.
Aug. Knowing how illustrious and approved teachers of the Church of Christ believed, concerning original sin and the justice of God, what I believe, taught what I teach, and defended what I defend, I ought to hear your insults as I hear my own praises.
Iulianum.3.1011. IUL. Sed ut revertamur, unde digressi sumus, liquerat ab eo, quem fateremur verum Deum, nihil in iudicio posse fieri, quod iustitiae repugnaret, ac per hoc nec pro alienis peccatis quosquam reos teneri atque ideo nascentium innocentiam nequaquam damnari ob iniquitatem parentum, quia iniustum esset, ut reatus per semina traderetur.
11. Jul. But, to return to where we digressed: it had become clear that nothing can be done in judgment by him whom we confess to be the true God which is contrary to justice, and thereby that none can be held guilty for the sins of others, and that therefore the innocence of those being born is by no means condemned on account of the iniquity of their parents, because it would be unjust that guilt should be transmitted through seeds.
Iulianum.3.11AUG. Cur ergo dictum esset: Semen eorum maledictum ab initio (Sap 12, 11)? Non enim sic dictum est quomodo: SemenChanaan et non Iuda (Dan 13, 56), ubi demonstratum est, quibus similes facti erant et a quibus degeneraverant, sed eorum ipsorum semen dixit maledictum, quos naturaliter malos volebat intellegi, sicut sunt omnes filii Adam, ex quibus gratia fiunt filii Dei.
Aug. Why then would it have been said, Their seed is accursed from the beginning (Wis 12:11)? For it was not said in the way that You are the seed of Canaan and not of Judah (Dan 13:56), where it was shown to whom they had been made like and from whom they had degenerated; rather, he called the seed of those very ones accursed, whom he wished to be understood as naturally evil, as are all the children of Adam, who by grace become children of God.
Iulianum.3.11Ubi enim dicitur: Non ignorans, quoniam nequam est natio illorum et naturalis malitia ipsorum et quoniam non poterat mutari cogitatio illorum in perpetuum, semen enim illorum maledictum ab initio (Sap 12, 10-11), puto, quod natura, non imitatio redarguitur; et quomodo natura nisi vitiata peccato, non in primo homine sic creata? A quo ergo initio maledictum semen, nisi ex quo per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum? A se ipsis autem mutari non poterant, non ab omnipotente Deo, qui tamen eos utique iustissimo, quamvis occultissimo iudicio non mutabat. Ab hac enim massa non arbitrio, sed Dei gratia se mutatum esse sciebat Apostolus, quando dicebat: Fuimus et nos natura filii irae sicut et ceteri (Eph 2, 3).
For where it is said, Not unaware that their nation is wicked, and that their malice is natural, and that their thought could not be changed forever, for their seed is accursed from the beginning (Wis 12:10-11), I think it is nature, not imitation, that is reproved; and how is it nature, except as corrupted by sin, not so created in the first man? From what beginning, then, is the seed accursed, except from the time when through one man sin entered the world? But they could not be changed by themselves—not by God almighty, who, however, by a most just though most hidden judgment did not change them. For the Apostle knew that he had been changed from this mass not by his own choice but by the grace of God, when he said, We too were by nature children of wrath, like the rest (Eph 2:3).
Iulianum.3.1112. IUL. Quod licet in tanta luce consistat, ut nihil aut absolutius inveniatur aut verius, tamen pollicitus eram hoc ipsum divinae me legis testimonio comprobare, id est iniquissimum esse, si generantium scelera nascentibus eorum liberis imputentur, sicque id adversari Deum, ut etiam in sua lege praescripserit, ne tale quidquam iudicantium deformitas perpetraret. Hoc me ergo spoponderam redditurum, sed, quoniam secundus liber apostoli Pauli exponen dis est sententiis occupatus, huius voluminis primis partibus fidem congruit promissionis impleri. Legimus ergo in Deuteronomio in catalogo praeceptorum, quibus vita et conversatio populi illius ordinatur, etiam hoc apertissime a Deo fuisse mandatum; nam ut de praecedentibus et de sequentibus, inter quae sit collocatum, possit intellegi: Non fraudabis - inquit - mercedem pauperis et egentis ex fratribus tuis aut ex proselytis, qui sunt in civitatibus tuis; quotidianam reddes mercedem illius, non occidat sol super eam, quia pauper est et in ea habet spem; et non proclamabit contra te ad Dominum et erit in te peccatum. Non morientur patres pro filiis et filii non morientur pro patribus; unusquisque in suo peccato morietur (Deut 24, 14-16).
12. Jul. And although this stands in so great a light that nothing can be found either more conclusive or more true, nonetheless I had promised to prove this very thing by the testimony of the divine Law—namely, that it is most iniquitous if the crimes of those who beget are imputed to their children when born, and that God opposes this so far as even to prescribe in his own Law that the deformity of those judging should perpetrate no such thing. This, then, I had pledged myself to render; but since the second book was occupied in expounding the sentences of the apostle Paul, it is fitting that the faith of my promise be fulfilled in the first parts of this volume. We read, then, in Deuteronomy, in the catalogue of precepts by which the life and conduct of that people is ordered, that this too was most plainly commanded by God—for, that it may be understood from what precedes and what follows, among which it is placed: You shall not defraud the hired servant who is poor and needy, of your brethren or of the proselytes who are in your cities; you shall render his wages each day, let not the sun go down upon it, for he is poor and has hope in it; and let him not cry out against you to the Lord, and it become sin in you. The fathers shall not die for the sons, and the sons shall not die for the fathers; everyone shall die in his own sin (Deut 24:14-16).
Iulianum.3.12AUG. De filiis hoc dixit iam natis, non in primo parente damnatis, in quo omnes peccaverunt et in quo omnes moriuntur. Et hoc quidem praeceptum dedit hominibus iudicantibus, ne pater pro filio vel filius pro patre moreretur, cum reus tantummodo pater esset inventus aut filius. Ceterum iudicia sua Deus, sive cum per se ipsum sive cum per homines iudicat, quibus dat propheticum spiritum, non alligavit hac lege. Neque enim, quando excepto Noe cum suis ceteros omnes diluvio perdidit, separavit infantes, qui nondum fuerant imitati parentes suos, aut sine suis parvulis Sodomitas ille ignis assumpsit (Cf. Gen 7, 21-23; 19, 24-25); quod si voluisset, utique potuisset Omnipotens. Et ille Achar praecepti transgressor unus inventus et tamen cum suis filiis et filiabus occisus est (Cf. Ios 7, 24-25).
Aug. He said this of sons already born, not condemned in their first parent, in whom all have sinned and in whom all die. And this precept he indeed gave to human beings who judge, lest a father should die for a son or a son for a father, when only the father, or the son, had been found guilty. But God did not bind his own judgments—whether he judges by himself or through human beings to whom he gives the prophetic spirit—by this law. For when, except for Noah with his household, he destroyed all the rest by the flood, he did not set apart the infants who had not yet imitated their parents; nor did that fire take up the Sodomites without their little ones (See Gen 7:21-23; 19:24-25)—which, had he wished, the Almighty surely could have done. And that Achar, found to be the one transgressor of the precept, was nonetheless slain together with his sons and daughters (See Josh 7:24-25).
Iulianum.3.12Quid de tot civitatibus debellatis eodem duce Iesu Nave, homine Dei? Nonne ita omnes interfecti sunt, ut spirans nullus relinqueretur (Cf. Ios 6, 21; 10, 32-40)? Parvuli igitur quid mali fecerant? Nonne per suorum parentum peccata, quorum nec conscii nec imitatores esse adhuc poterant, divino iudicio poenam subiere communem? Aliter ergo iudicat Deus, aliter homini praecipit ut iudicet, cum Deus homine sine ulla dubitatione sit iustior. Haec debuisti ante cogitare, ne ad causam non pertinentibus immorareris exemplis.
What of so many cities subdued under the same leader, Joshua son of Nun, the man of God? Were they not all so slain that not one breathing was left (See Josh 6:21; 10:32-40)? What evil, then, had the little ones done? Did they not, by the sins of their parents—of which they could not yet be either conscious or imitators—undergo, by divine judgment, the common penalty? God, then, judges in one way, and commands a human being to judge in another, since God is, beyond any doubt, more just than a human being. These things you ought to have considered before, lest you dwell on examples that do not pertain to the case.
Iulianum.3.1213. IUL. Non declinabis iudicium proselyti et orphani et viduae, non accipies pignus vestimentum viduae, quia famulus eras in terra Aegypti et liberavit te Dominus Deus tuus inde; propter hoc ego tibi praecipio facere verbum hoc (Deut 24, 17-18). Cum institueret Deus iudicandi formam, hoc statim sancire curavit, ne aut parentes in filiorum aut filii in parentum scelere ferirentur. Principium ergo et ingressum iustitiae, quam servari in iudicatione mandabat, ostendit istud esse, ne affinitas gravaret innoxios et in ipsum genus excurreret odium, quod persona meruisset.
13. Jul. You shall not turn aside the judgment of the proselyte and the orphan and the widow; you shall not take a widow's garment as a pledge, because you were a slave in the land of Egypt and the Lord your God set you free from there; for this reason I command you to do this thing (Deut 24:17-18). When God established the form of judging, he at once took care to sanction this: that neither parents should be struck in the crime of their children, nor children in that of their parents. He showed, then, that the beginning and entrance of the justice which he commanded to be kept in judging is this: that kinship should not burden the guiltless, and that the hatred which a person had deserved should not run out into the whole stock.
Iulianum.3.13In causa ergo actuum discernit iustitia, quos necessitudo coniungit; quod utique non faceret, si una esset ratio voluntatis et seminis aut si opus arbitrii ad posteros fecunditate transiret. Satis ergo superque docuimus hoc uno testimonio taeterrimam istam iudicii pravitatem, quam novus error ample ctitur, antiqua latae legis auctoritate contritam. Quae certe sententia ita est in causam prolata, ut nullum locum reliquerit ambigendi.
In the case of acts, then, justice distinguishes those whom kinship joins; which it surely would not do if the reason of will and of seed were one, or if the work of choice passed over to posterity by fruitfulness. We have therefore taught enough and more than enough, by this one testimony, that this most foul depravity of judgment, which the new error embraces, is crushed by the ancient authority of the Law that was passed. And this sentence is surely brought forward into the case in such a way as to leave no room for doubting.
Iulianum.3.13AUG. Resistit tibi Deus, qui dixit in libro Levitico: Et qui remanserint ex vobis, disperibunt propter peccata sua et propter peccata patrum suorum (Lev 26, 39).
Aug. God resists you, who said in the book of Leviticus, And those of you who remain shall perish for their own sins and for the sins of their fathers (Lev 26:39).
Iulianum.3.1314. IUL. Instituens quippe Deus, quae in examinibus deberet forma servari, praescripsit ne innocentia necessitudinis suae periculis iungeretur, atque ut patrem a supplicio peccantis filii, ita filium a patris condemnatione separavit, ostendens profecto simili exitu utriusque personae tam non posse parentum ad filios peccata transire, quam nec filiorum transeunt ad parentes.
14. Jul. For God, in establishing what form ought to be kept in trials, prescribed that innocence should not be joined to the perils of its own kinship, and just as he separated the father from the punishment of an offending son, so he separated the son from the condemnation of the father—showing surely, by the like outcome of either person, that the sins of parents can as little pass over to children as the sins of children pass over to parents.
Iulianum.3.14AUG. Suffocant te parvuli, qui non etiam propter sua, sed propter sola parentum peccata totiens leguntur occisi.
Aug. The little ones choke you—those who are read to have been slain so many times not even for their own sins, but for the sins of their parents alone.
Iulianum.3.1415. IUL. Qui ergo contra hanc sententiam dicit traducem esse peccati, dicat quoque recursum esse peccati ut, si a parentibus ad filios peccata descendunt, ascendant a filiis ad parentes, quoniam divinae legis ostendit auctoritas ita parentum crimina filiis non nocere sicut nec parentibus filiorum.
15. Jul. Whoever, then, says against this sentence that there is a propagation of sin, let him say also that there is a recurrence of sin, so that, if sins descend from parents to children, they ascend from children to parents, since the authority of the divine Law shows that the crimes of parents harm children just as little as the crimes of children harm parents.
Iulianum.3.15AUG. Divinae legis auctoritas in iudiciis humanis noluit filios pendere pro parentibus poenas, non in divinis, ubi Deus dicit: Reddam peccata patrum in filios (Ex 20, 5; cf. Num 14, 18; Deut 5, 9; Ier 32, 18). Sic debes legere legis verba quae vis, ut cogites te auditurum esse quae non vis.
Aug. The authority of the divine Law, in human judgments, did not wish children to pay penalties for parents—not in divine judgments, where God says, I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Exod 20:5; see Num 14:18; Deut 5:9; Jer 32:18). You must so read the words of the Law that you wish, as to consider that you will hear those you do not wish.
Iulianum.3.1516. IUL. Ergo contra hanc nitens ire sententiam pariter fieri asserat, quod pariter ne fieret imperatum est. Facilius quippe lex Dei negari quam emendari potest et, licet sit profana negatio, profanior tamen absurdiorque correctio est. Si enim de duobus eius decretis unum venereris, alterum exsecreris, ingratus ab eius parte, quod suscipis, et illi cogeris oboedire, quod respuis, quoniam unius quod tibi carum est dignitate, etiam id, quod adversabare, defenditur atque absurdissime ea se quisquam credit praecepta venerari, quorum partem audet incessere.
16. Jul. Striving, then, to go against this sentence, let him assert that what was commanded should equally not be done, is equally done. For the Law of God can more easily be denied than emended; and although the denial be profane, more profane and more absurd is the correction. For if, of his two decrees, you should venerate the one and execrate the other, ungrateful to that side of him which you accept, you are forced also to obey what you reject—since by the dignity of the one which is dear to you, even that which you opposed is defended; and most absurdly does anyone believe himself to venerate those precepts, part of which he dares to assail.
Iulianum.3.16Unde consequentius potest negari lex universa quam corrigi; nemo autem eam corrigere nisi impius quisque tentabit; a religiosis ergo et prudentibus tota suscipitur, tota laudatur. Nec sane quemquam moveat, quod ritum sacrificiorum veterum Novi Testamenti videat aetate cessasse. Non est una ratio virtutum et hostiarum: alia est praeceptorum perennitas, alia sacrificiorum temporalitas. Veniente tamen Christo, qui hostiis figurabatur antiquis, impleta sunt, non condemnata, quae fuerant instituta; neque enim suis temporibus praedicuntur exercita, sed succedente perfectione, quae promissa officiis eorum fuerant, quieverunt.
Hence the whole Law can more consistently be denied than corrected; but no one, except some impious person, will attempt to correct it; by the religious and prudent, therefore, it is wholly received, wholly praised. Nor indeed should anyone be moved by the fact that he sees the rite of the ancient sacrifices to have ceased in the age of the New Testament. The reason of virtues and of victims is not one: the perennity of precepts is one thing, the temporality of sacrifices another. Yet when Christ came, who was prefigured by the ancient victims, what had been instituted was fulfilled, not condemned; for they are not foretold as performed in their own times, but, perfection succeeding, the things that had been promised by their offices rested.
Iulianum.3.16AUG. Hoc quid ad rem? Peccata patrum se dixit Deus in filios redditurum, non sacrificia, et cum possint etiam parentes imitari malos filios, numquam ta men Deus dixit: Reddam peccata filiorum in patres, sed ubicumque hoc dixit, cum saepe hoc dixerit (Cf. supra 15), patrum dixit in filios, ubi utique generationis, non imitationis se ostendit vitia persequentem.
Aug. What has this to do with the matter? God said that he would repay the sins of the fathers upon the children, not the sacrifices; and although parents too can imitate evil children, God nonetheless never said, "I will repay the sins of the children upon the fathers," but wherever he said this—and he said it often (See above, 15)—he said "of the fathers upon the children," where surely he shows himself to be pursuing the faults of generation, not of imitation.
Iulianum.3.1617. IUL. Praecepta autem, quibus pietas fides iustitia sanctitas continetur, non solum non cessaverunt, verum etiam cumulata sunt. Et haec lex iustitiae in iudiciis custodiendae, quam de Deuteronomio protulimus, non ad cerimoniarum aetatem, sed ad praeceptorum perennitatem respicit nec cum circumcisione discessit, sed cum iustitia perseverat.
17. Jul. But the precepts in which piety, faith, justice, and holiness are contained not only have not ceased, but have even been multiplied. And this law of the justice to be kept in judgments, which we have brought forward from Deuteronomy, looks not to the age of the ceremonies, but to the perennity of the precepts; nor did it depart with circumcision, but it perseveres with justice.
Iulianum.3.17AUG. Iam tibi dictum est hominibus haec imperata esse iudicia, non Deo posita praeiudicia. Denique si homo iudicans dicat: Reddam peccata patrum in filios, iniustissime dicit et divino imperio contradicit, nec ideo tamen Deus aut mendax aut iniustus est, cum hoc dicit.
Aug. It has already been said to you that these are judgments commanded to human beings, not prejudgments laid down for God. In short, if a human being judging should say, "I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children," he speaks most unjustly and contradicts the divine command; nor for that reason, however, is God either a liar or unjust, when he says this.
Iulianum.3.1718. IUL. In absoluto est igitur, si Moysi creditur magis, per quem Deus loquitur, quam Augustino, per quem Manichaeus, parentum peccatis reos per naturam filios non teneri.
18. Jul. It is settled, therefore—if Moses, through whom God speaks, is believed rather than Augustine, through whom Manichaeus speaks—that children are not held guilty by nature for the sins of their parents.
Iulianum.3.18AUG. Eam fidem me defendere adversus te, quam catholici sancti clarique Doctores, qui fuerunt ante nos, in Ecclesia catholica didicerunt atque docuerunt, etiam ipse nosti; sed quoniam, illos si lacerare audeas, nec tui te ferunt, ideo unum me elegisti, quem convitio falsi criminis appetitum quasi fugiendum persuadeas, ut fides illa fugiatur, quae defensa vos damnat. Iam et superius tibi dixi; quando pro defensione catholicae fidei ab haereticis contumelias audio, pro laudibus habeo.
Aug. That I defend against you the faith which the holy, catholic, and illustrious teachers who were before us learned and taught in the catholic Church, you yourself also know; but because, if you should dare to tear them apart, not even your own people would bear with you, therefore you have singled out me alone, whom, assailed with the reviling of a false charge, you would persuade men to flee as though to be shunned, so that that faith may be fled which, when defended, condemns you. I have already said this to you above too: when, in defense of the catholic faith, I hear insults from heretics, I count them as praises.
Iulianum.3.18Quid laboras nobis praedicare quod scimus? Moyses verum dixit, sed tu nihil dicis. Reddam peccata patrum in filios (Ex 20, 5; cf. Num 14, 18; Deut 5, 9; Ier 32, 18) non ait homo sed Deus; neque, ut homo id faciat, Deus praecepit hoc loco, sed quid ipse faciat, indicavit.
Why do you labor to proclaim to us what we know? Moses spoke the truth, but you say nothing. I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Exod 20:5; see Num 14:18; Deut 5:9; Jer 32:18)—not a human being said this, but God; nor did God in this passage command that a human being should do it, but he indicated what he himself does.
Iulianum.3.1819. IUL. Atque ita non transire ad posteros crimina generantium, quamvis ex eis nati sint, sicut nec filiorum ad parentes, qui de filiis suis nequaquam potuere generari. Ita igitur innocentiae nativitas sua officere non potest, sicut non potest obesse, cum non est.
19. Jul. And so the crimes of those who beget do not pass over to posterity, although they are born of them, just as neither do the crimes of children pass over to parents, who could by no means be begotten of their own children. So, then, his own birth can no more harm innocence than it can stand in the way when it does not exist.
Iulianum.3.19AUG. Negare tamen non potes posse parentes imitari filios suos nec umquam Deum dixisse: Reddam peccata filiorum in patres. Cum ergo dicit: patrum in filios, non imitationem, sed generationem redarguit, non quomodo ex illo uno, in quo ipsa in deterius natura mutata est, ut propter hoc etiam mori necesse sit homini, sed tamen aliquo modo nonnulla quorumque patrum peccata redduntur in filios non imitatione, sed generatione punita; ideo non dicit: in tertiam et quartam imitationem, sed: generationem (Ibidem) vobis quidem nolentibus, verumtamen et vobis velitis nolitis audientibus.
Aug. Yet you cannot deny that parents can imitate their own children, and that God never said, "I will repay the sins of the children upon the fathers." When, therefore, he says "of the fathers upon the children," he reproves not imitation but generation—not in the way that, from that one man in whom nature itself was changed for the worse (so that on this account it is even necessary for a human being to die), but yet in some manner certain sins of various fathers are repaid upon the children, punished not by imitation but by generation; and therefore he does not say, "unto the third and fourth imitation," but "generation" (Exod 20:5)—you indeed being unwilling, but yet you too, will you or not, hearing it.
Iulianum.3.1920. IUL. Acta quidem res est; sed tamen, ut ad id quod affero sit intentus lector, admoneo. Si quispiam exsisteret, qui hoc profiteretur libertate verborum, quod argumentando Traducianus conficere conatur, id est ut pugnam indiceret legi Dei et sententiam, quam protulimus, sine aliquo timore despiceret assereretque, quibus posset modis, falsum hoc utrumque esse, quod Deus servari voluit, et sententiam, de qua loquimur, ex utraque, quantum in se erat, parte subrueret, prorsus putasset parentes propter filiorum et filios propter parentum peccata tam solere quam debere damnari, nec hic tamen talis peccati traducem, vel secundum opiniones suas quiret asserere.
20. Jul. The matter is indeed concluded; but nonetheless, that the reader may be attentive to what I bring forward, I give warning. If anyone should arise who professed, with freedom of words, what the Traducianist tries to accomplish by arguing—that is, who should declare war on the Law of God and, without any fear, despise the sentence we have brought forward, and assert, by whatever means he could, that both of these are false which God willed to be kept, and should undermine the sentence of which we speak from both sides, as far as in him lay—he would think outright that parents are wont, as much as they ought, to be condemned for the sins of their children, and children for the sins of their parents; and yet not even this man, of such a kind, could assert a propagation of sin, even according to his own opinions.
Iulianum.3.20Cur? Videlicet quia, etsi constaret falsam legis esse sententiam, quae testificaretur eiusmodi necessitudines respergi mutuis non posse criminibus, tamen inconcussum manebat traducem non esse peccati. Hoc enim ipso, quo et parentum reatus ad filios et filiorum ad parentes redibat, constabat non fuisse generationis, quod ad filios gignentium peccata pervenerant, quoniam et a filiis ad parentes, ubi generatio non poterat causa esse, remeaverant. Quid igitur hic confecerim appareat, inviolabilem quidem esse auctoritatem legis divinae et quam nulla queant impietatum argumenta proruere, eius autem sanctione signantissime atque absolutissime fuisse praescriptum foedam esse opinionem perversitatemque iudicii, quam mandaverat vehementer cavendam, si rei filii pro peccato pronuntiarentur parentum, quo fulmine traducis structura dissiluit, verumtamen tantis esse veritatis praesidiis munitam quam tuemur fidem, ut nec ab ea profanitate, quae potest Dei legem negare, quatiatur.
Why? Namely because, even if it were established that the sentence of the Law is false—which testified that kinships of this sort cannot be bespattered with mutual crimes—nonetheless it remained unshaken that there is no propagation of sin. For by this very thing, that the guilt both of parents returned to children and of children to parents, it was established that it was not a matter of generation that the sins of those who beget had reached the children, since they had also returned from children to parents, where generation could not be the cause. Let it appear, then, what I have here accomplished: that the authority of the divine Law is indeed inviolable, and such as no arguments of impieties can overthrow; and that by its sanction it has been most expressly and most conclusively prescribed that the opinion and perversity of judgment is foul which it had commanded to be vehemently guarded against—namely, if children were pronounced guilty for the sin of their parents; by which thunderbolt the structure of propagation has burst asunder—but nonetheless that the faith we maintain is fortified with such defenses of truth that it is not even shaken by that profanity which can deny the Law of God.
Iulianum.3.20AUG. Quaeris, ubi spatieris, vagabunda loquacitate non copiosus, sed odiosus eis, qui rebus inhaerentes superflua verba contemnunt. Vinceris quippe ab adversariis, quos habes, et vincendos proponis tibi, quos non habes. Quis enim tibi dicit falsum esse, quod Deus servare voluit in iudiciis humanis, cum iam patres et filii suas proprias causas habent ad suam cuiusque vitam, quae separatim ducitur, pertinentes, ut nec filii pro patribus nec patres pro filiis puniantur? Nemo vel legi vel tibi haec dicenti adversatur. Tu noli obsurdescere adversus Deum dicentem: Reddam peccata patrum in filios (Cf. supra 15) et, cum hoc assidue dicat, nusquam dicentem peccata filiorum se reddere in patres, ut intellegas non qui eorum quos imitentur, sed qui ex quibus generentur attendi.
Aug. You seek where you may range about, with a wandering loquacity—not copious, but hateful to those who, cleaving to the matter, despise superfluous words. For you are conquered by the adversaries you have, and you set before yourself adversaries to be conquered whom you do not have. For who tells you that what God willed to be kept in human judgments is false, since fathers and sons already have their own proper cases, pertaining to the life of each, which is led separately, so that neither sons may be punished for fathers nor fathers for sons? No one opposes either the Law or you when you say these things. Do you only not grow deaf against God, who says, I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (See above, 15), and who, while he says this continually, nowhere says that he repays the sins of children upon fathers—that you may understand that it is regarded not whom they imitate, but from whom they are begotten.
Iulianum.3.2021. IUL. Nunc igitur ad eum, quicum agimus, sermo respiciat. Acquiescis legi Dei (professione interim, ceterum, quid facias argumentando, novimus), an resistis? Si acquiescis, sublata contentio est, si resistis, sublata consensio est; si acquiescis, exstincta Traducianorum, si resistis, Manichaeorum revelata perfidia est, dummodo constet opinioni vestrae et legi Dei neutiquam convenire.
21. Jul. Now, then, let the discourse look back to him with whom we are dealing. Do you acquiesce in the Law of God (in profession, for the present; but what you do by arguing, we know), or do you resist? If you acquiesce, the contention is removed; if you resist, agreement is removed; if you acquiesce, the perfidy of the Traducianists is extinguished; if you resist, that of the Manicheans is revealed—provided it be established that your opinion and the Law of God in no way agree.
Iulianum.3.21AUG. Ego acquiesco legi Dei, sed tu non acquiescis. Ego non nego nec filium pro patre nec patrem pro filio, quando suas separatas causas habent, debere damnari; sed tu audire non vis in Levitico: Disperibunt propter peccata patrum suorum (Lev 26, 39), et in libro Numerorum: Reddens peccata patrum in filios usque in tertiam et quartam generationem (Num 14, 18), et apud Ieremiam: Reddens peccata patrum in sinu filiorum eorum post eos (Ier 32, 18).
Aug. I acquiesce in the Law of God, but you do not acquiesce. I do not deny that neither a son for a father nor a father for a son ought to be condemned, when they have their own separate cases; but you are unwilling to hear in Leviticus, They shall perish for the sins of their fathers (Lev 26:39), and in the book of Numbers, Repaying the sins of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation (Num 14:18), and in Jeremiah, Repaying the sins of the fathers into the bosom of their children after them (Jer 32:18).
Iulianum.3.21Haec et alia similia tu non audis, his ac talibus legis testimoniis tu non acquiescis et tamen loqui et Manichaeos catholicis obicere non quiescis.
These and other like testimonies you do not hear; in these and such testimonies of the Law you do not acquiesce; and yet you do not rest from talking and from flinging the Manicheans in the face of catholics.
Iulianum.3.2122. IUL. Nisi forte dicas Deum quidem hoc imperasse, sed non facere, quod praecepit, immo contraria agere his, quae agenda mandaverit.
22. Jul. Unless perhaps you say that God indeed commanded this, but does not do what he commanded—nay, does the contrary of what he ordered to be done.
Iulianum.3.22AUG. Et hoc quam insipienter cogites, cur non attendis? Facit enim Deus aliquando contra quam facienda mandavit. Nec opus est, ut multa commemorem, ne sit longum. Ecce quod notum est omnibus dico; mandavit homini Scriptura divina dicens: Non te laudet os tuum (Prov 27, 2), nec tamen Deus dicendus est arrogans aut superbus, cum se innumerabiliter laudare non desinit; et unde agitur, iam superius demonstravi, quemadmodum Deus sine ulla iniquitate pro peccatis parentum simul cum eis interemerit parvulos, quamvis mandaverit homini, ne filios pro peccatis patrum, cum iudicat, damnet. Haec si adverteres, ista non diceres; aut si et haec advertis et tamen ista dicis, adverte etiam vana esse quae dicis.
Aug. And why do you not attend to how foolishly you think this too? For God sometimes does the contrary of what he commanded to be done. Nor is there need for me to recall many instances, lest it be long. See, I say what is known to all: divine Scripture commanded a human being, saying, Let not your own mouth praise you (Prov 27:2); nor yet is God to be called arrogant or proud, when he does not cease innumerable times to praise himself. And as to the matter at hand, I have already shown above how God, without any iniquity, slew little ones for the sins of their parents together with them, although he commanded a human being not to condemn children for the sins of their fathers when he judges. If you attended to these things, you would not say those; or if you do attend to these and yet say those, attend also to the fact that what you say is empty.
Iulianum.3.2223. IUL. Quod licet, quantae sit profanitatis, vix indicatum iam vehementer appareat, tamen pace ipsius divinitatis, cuius aequitatem tuemur, quale sit hoc, vel levi discus sione videamus. Ut ipse itaque fiat legis suae praevaricator, rerum necessitate, quae eum premunt, an sua imbecillitate compellitur? An, quia horum neutrum est, sola libidine delinquendi? At hoc nec Manichaeus dicere potuit et ideo commentus est Deum vestrum grave proelium pertulisse.
23. Jul. And although it now strongly appears, scarcely even pointed out, how great a profanity this is, nonetheless, with the leave of that very divinity whose equity we maintain, let us see, even by a light examination, what sort of thing this is. So that he himself becomes a transgressor of his own Law: is he compelled by the necessity of things that press upon him, or by his own weakness? Or, because it is neither of these, by the lust of offending alone? But this not even Manichaeus could say, and therefore he devised that your God endured a heavy battle.
Iulianum.3.23AUG. Verba iactas, cum rebus urgearis; non est legis suae praevaricator, quando aliud Deus facit ut Deus, aliud imperat homini ut homini.
Aug. You toss out words when you are pressed by the facts; he is not a transgressor of his own Law, when God does one thing as God, and commands another to a human being as a human being.
Iulianum.3.2324. IUL. Si ergo nec calamitas nec imbecillitas nec libido ei praevaricationis incumbit, qui fieri potest, ut eam iustitiae formam, quam commendavit iubendo, destruat iudicando, immo non in istam iustitiam, sed in reverentiam suam saeviat (tanta est quippe aequitatis potentia, ut et deviantes arguat et nulla fugientium a se auctoritate minuatur) postremo ut quae sunt iusta a nobis fieri velit et ipse faciat quod iniustum est? Iustiores nos, quam ipse est, cupit videri, immo non iustiores, sed nos aequos et se iniquum?
24. Jul. If, then, neither calamity nor weakness nor lust of transgression weighs upon him, how can it come about that he destroys by judging that form of justice which he commended by commanding—nay, rages not against this justice, but against his own reverence (for so great is the power of equity that it both reproves those who deviate and is diminished by no authority of those who flee from it)—and, finally, that he should wish just things to be done by us, and himself do what is unjust? Does he desire us to seem more just than he himself is—nay, not more just, but us upright and himself iniquitous?
Iulianum.3.24AUG. Quid est quod dicis, homo, qui multum desipis? Quanto excelsior, tanto inscrutabilior divina quam hu mana iustitia tantoque ab hac illa distantior. Quis enim homo iustus sinit perpetrari scelus, quod habet in potestate non sinere? Et tamen sinit haec Deus incomparabiliter iustis omnibus iustior et cuius potestas est incomparabiliter omnibus potestatibus maior. Haec cogita et noli iudicem Deum iudicibus hominibus comparare, quem non dubitandum est esse iustum, etiam quando facit, quod hominibus videtur iniustum et quod homo si faceret esset iniustus.
Aug. What is this you say, O man, who are very foolish? The higher the divine justice is than the human, the more inscrutable it is, and the more distant the one from the other. For what just human being permits a crime to be perpetrated which it is in his power not to permit? And yet God permits these things—God, incomparably more just than all the just, and whose power is incomparably greater than all powers. Consider these things, and do not compare God the judge with human judges—God, who, it must not be doubted, is just even when he does what seems unjust to human beings, and what, if a human being did it, he would be unjust.
Iulianum.3.2425. IUL. An illud quidem iustum est, quod ipse facit, id est aliena peccata aliis imputando, et nobis praecipit, quod iniustum est, ut unumquemque pro voluntatis suae delictis reum pronuntiemus?
25. Jul. Or is it just, indeed, what he himself does, that is, imputing the sins of some to others, while he commands us what is unjust, that we should pronounce each one guilty for the offenses of his own will?
Iulianum.3.25AUG. Lege quod superius tibi responsum est, et disce, si potes, quemadmodum peccata originalia et aliena intellegantur et nostra, non eadem causa aliena qua nostra; aliena enim, quia non ea in sua vita quisque commisit, nostra vero, quia fuit Adam et in illo fuimus omnes (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 234).
Aug. Read what was answered to you above, and learn, if you can, how original sins are understood as both another's and our own—not another's by the same cause by which they are our own; for they are another's, because each one did not commit them in his own life, but our own, because there was Adam, and in him we all were (Ambrose, On Luke 7.234).
Iulianum.3.2526. IUL. Et unde ei aut tanta invidia aut tanta malignitas? Invidia est enim, si ad hoc decepit praecipiendo creaturam suam, ne virtutes eius, in quantum poterat, conaretur imitari; malignitas autem, immo crudelitas, si puniat propter iniusta opera mortales, quae, cum legi eius oboediunt, perpetrarunt.
26. Jul. And whence comes to him either so great envy or so great malignity? For it is envy, if he deceived his creature by commanding to this end, that it should not try to imitate his virtues so far as it could; but it is malignity—nay, cruelty—if he punishes mortals for unjust works which they perpetrated while obeying his Law.
Iulianum.3.26AUG. Iam superius demonstravi quaedam Deum iuste facere, quae si homo faciat, iniuste facit. Nam et iniurias suas Deus ulciscitur iuste; hominibus autem dicitur: Non vos ipsos vindicantes, carissimi, sed date locum irae; scriptum est enim: Mihi vindictam, ego retribuam, dicit Dominus (Rom 12, 19).
Aug. I have already shown above that God justly does certain things which, if a human being did them, he does unjustly. For God also avenges his own injuries justly; but to human beings it is said, Do not avenge yourselves, beloved, but give place to wrath; for it is written, Vengeance is mine, I will repay, says the Lord (Rom 12:19).
Iulianum.3.2627. IUL. An forte non punit, quod quidem facit prudenter, sed etiam remuneratur famulos praeceptis suis, licet iniustitiam docentibus, obsecutos? Et quid ei profuit invidere, si et iniustas res faciendo eo pervenerunt mortales, quo etiam iustitiam servando venissent? Cumque illis, quos circumvenit, de felicitate nihil pereat, hic tamen benignitatis ac iustitiae conscientia simul et honore privatur. Quanto erat tolerabilius a religionis professione colla subducere quam per tam praerupta, tam exitialia orbitas ducere?
27. Jul. Or perhaps he does not punish—which indeed he does prudently—but even rewards servants who have obeyed his precepts, though they teach injustice? And what did it profit him to envy, if by doing unjust things too mortals have arrived where they would have arrived even by keeping justice? And while nothing of happiness is lost to those whom he circumvents, he himself is here deprived at once of the conscience and of the honor of kindness and justice. How much more tolerable it would have been to withdraw one's neck from the profession of religion than to lead the bereaved through such precipitous, such deadly paths?
Iulianum.3.27AUG. Sequeris te nihil dicens. Ab humana iustitia discerne divinam et videbis iuste Deum peccata patrum reddere in filios, quod tamen in iudicio suo si homo sibi usurpet iniustus est. Ne tu exorbites a via iusta, ut, cum audis peccata patrum in filios vindicari, aut Deum nolis id facere aut hominem velis vel testimoniis vel mandatis resistendo divinis.
Aug. You follow yourself, saying nothing. Distinguish divine justice from human, and you will see that God justly repays the sins of the fathers upon the children—which, however, if a human being usurped it for himself in his own judgment, he would be unjust. Do not you stray from the just way, so that, when you hear that the sins of the fathers are avenged upon the children, you either wish God not to do it, or wish a human being to do it, resisting the divine testimonies and commands.
Iulianum.3.2728. IUL. Igitur quoniam vel a servis suis nihil tale committi Deus sinit, quale tu ab ipso asseris perpetrari, manifestum est non minus te ab honore eius quam ab humana ratione fugisse; ac per hoc non Pelagiano, sicut dicis, errore decipimur, sed Dei lege dirigimur, ut asseramus iniquum esse pa rentum crimina filiis imputari.
28. Jul. Therefore, since God does not even permit his servants to commit such a thing as you assert is perpetrated by him, it is manifest that you have fled no less from his honor than from human reason; and thereby we are not deceived, as you say, by a Pelagian error, but are guided by the Law of God to assert that it is iniquitous for the crimes of parents to be imputed to their children.
Iulianum.3.28AUG. Non semel, sed saepius dixit Deus peccata patrum se reddere in filios, ubi utique non dixit in patres se reddere peccata filiorum aut in fratres fratrum aut in amicos amicorum aut in cives civium aut aliquid eiusmodi, ut sciremus, quando illud dicitur, generationem redargui, non imitationem; quod et tu posses in divinis eloquiis intellegere, si non Pelagiano impedireris errore.
Aug. Not once, but more often, God said that he repays the sins of the fathers upon the children, where surely he did not say that he repays the sins of children upon fathers, or of brothers upon brothers, or of friends upon friends, or of fellow citizens upon fellow citizens, or anything of this sort—so that we might know that, when that is said, generation is reproved, not imitation; which you too could understand in the divine words, if you were not hindered by a Pelagian error.
Iulianum.3.2829. IUL. Quod tradux peccati, Manichaeorum filia, vestra mater, hac tempestate prodigialiter peperisse defletur.
29. Jul. That the propagation of sin, daughter of the Manicheans, your mother, is bewailed as having, in this storm, monstrously given birth.
Iulianum.3.29AUG. Non ratiocinaris, sed convitiaris et calumniaris. Relege antiquos divini eloquii tractatores et vide non hac tempestate, sed longe ante nos in verbis Apostoli hoc intellectum esse, quod apertissime dixit, id est quod per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines pertransiit (Rom 5, 12), ad generationem pertinere, quam regeneratio sanat, non ad imitationem, quam vos potius hac tempestate peperistis. Unde vos tempestas novitii dogmatis vestri a facie catholicae proiecit Ecclesiae tamquam pulverem, quem proicit ventus a facie terrae (Cf. Ps 1, 4).
Aug. You do not reason, but revile and slander. Reread the ancient expounders of the divine word, and see that not in this storm, but long before us, it was understood in the words of the Apostle—what he most plainly said, that is, that through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death, and so it passed to all human beings (Rom 5:12)—to pertain to generation, which regeneration heals, not to imitation, which you rather, in this storm, have given birth to. Hence the storm of your novel dogma has cast you from the face of the Catholic Church like the dust which the wind drives from the face of the earth (See Ps 1:4).
Iulianum.3.2930. IUL. Esse igitur hoc a Deo imperatum, quod asserimus, claruit; et quamvis sententiae ipsius aperta et intellectui omnium conciliata germanitas nullius in se naevum obscuritatis admiserit, tamen, ne tu ad ingenii nostri confugias tarditatem et dicas non nos intellegere quod praeceptum est, alio quoque testimonio non iam praecepti, sed operis secundum praeceptum exerciti, quemadmodum sit lex intellecta, doceamus. Legimus in libro quarto Regnorum de Amessia, filio Ioas, regis Iuda: Factum est, inquit, postquam stabilitum est regnum in manibus eius, occidit pueros suos, qui occiderant patrem suum; sed filios eorum non occidit secundum testamentum legis Domini, quo praeceptum est: Non morientur patres pro filiis nec filii pro patribus (4 Reg 14, 5-6). Vides, quemadmodum historiae fides iustitiam regis iudicantis ostenderit, qui quamvis fuisset devotus, tamen, quoniam claudicasse animo in nonnullis refertur, ad iudicii eius confirmationem commemoratae legis Dei accessit auctoritas; ne enim parum haberet ponderis factum hoc consideratione facientis, secundum legem et testamentum Dei commendatur impletum.
30. Jul. It has become clear, then, that this is commanded by God which we assert; and although the open kinship of that very sentence, in accord with the understanding of all, has admitted in itself no blemish of obscurity, nonetheless, lest you take refuge in the slowness of our wit and say that we do not understand what was commanded, let us teach also by another testimony—now not of a precept, but of a deed carried out according to the precept—how the Law was understood. We read in the fourth book of Kings, concerning Amaziah, son of Joash, king of Judah: It came to pass, after the kingdom was established in his hands, that he slew his servants who had slain his father; but their sons he did not slay, according to the covenant of the Law of the Lord, in which it is commanded: The fathers shall not die for the sons, nor the sons for the fathers (2 Kgs 14:5-6). You see how the trustworthiness of the history has shown the justice of the king who judged, who, although he had been devout, yet—since he is reported in some matters to have halted in mind—has the authority of the recorded Law of God added to confirm his judgment; for lest this deed should have too little weight from consideration of the doer, it is commended as fulfilled according to the Law and covenant of God.
Iulianum.3.30AUG. Hoc iudicium Deus hominum voluit esse, non suum, qui dixit: Reddam peccata patrum in filios (Cf. Deut 5, 9). Quod etiam per hominem fecit, quando per Iesum Nave non solum Achar, sed etiam filios eius occidit (Cf. Ios 7, 24-25), vel per eumdem populi sui ducem filios Chananaeorum etiam parvulos nondum parentum peccata suis moribus imitatos cum eisdem tamen parentibus, ut perirent, non iniusta utique severitate damnavit (Cf. Ios 6, 21; 10, 40). Noli ergo loquaciter ac inaniter multiplicare tua scripta, sed Scripturam Dei diligenter attende ne, quod in una eius parte aperuisse te putas, clausum contra te in altera invenias.
Aug. This judgment God willed to be that of human beings, not his own—he who said, I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (See Deut 5:9). Which he also did through a human being, when through Joshua son of Nun he slew not only Achar but also his sons (See Josh 7:24-25); or, through the same leader of his people, he condemned the sons of the Canaanites—even little ones who had not yet imitated their parents' sins by their own conduct—together with those same parents, to perish, by a severity surely not unjust (See Josh 6:21; 10:40). Do not, then, loquaciously and emptily multiply your writings, but attend diligently to the Scripture of God, lest what you think you have opened in one part of it you find closed against you in another.
Iulianum.3.3031. IUL. Duobus et tribus testibus etiam contra sanguinem hominis credi solet; quanto magis duobus sacris testibus, legi, quae in Deuteronomio continetur, et historiae, quae regum facta complectitur, pro Dei honore crederetur! Quomodo iudicari vellet, ipse praescripsit; quomodo, quod mandaverat, accipi deberet, secundum legem eius iudicia prolata testantur; et dubitatur adhuc traducem peccati Scripturarum probari auctoritate non posse? Certe sunt ista contraria, pro quibus tam longis conflictibus dimicatur, id est unum quod a vobis, aliud quod a nobis defenditur, et ita contraria atque repugnantia, ut vos persequendo, nos disputando, vos furore, nos ratione certemus.
31. Jul. By two and three witnesses it is wont to be believed even against a man's blood; how much more, by two sacred witnesses—the Law contained in Deuteronomy, and the history that embraces the deeds of the kings—should it be believed, for the honor of God! How he wished judgment to be passed, he himself prescribed; how what he had commanded ought to be received, the judgments rendered according to his Law bear witness; and is it still doubted that a propagation of sin cannot be proved by the authority of the Scriptures? Surely these are contraries, for which we contend with such long conflicts—that is, the one defended by you, the other by us—and so contrary and opposed that you fight by persecuting, we by disputing; you by fury, we by reason.
Iulianum.3.31Utraque ergo pars distare sibi haec et repugnare consentit, id est propter parentum peccata puniri filios et propter parentum peccata filios non puniri; crimen naturale esse et crimen naturale non esse; ut parentum peccata filiis imputentur, Dei lege praescribi et, ut non imputentur parentum peccata filiis, Dei lege praescribi. Has opiniones contra semet sententiasque bellantes pariter veras non posse esse manifestum est. Nam et disputationis eruditae regulis indicatur, cum de rebus incertis opinio duplex nascitur, utramque falsam esse posse, utramque veram esse non posse; quod quidem in speciebus diversis et quae medium habere dicuntur, non tamen in his, quae contraria sunt, sed medio carent, evenire potest. Notae dialecticis res sunt, sed propter lectorem disciplinae huius expertem aliquo id reseremus exemplo.
Both sides, then, agree that these differ from each other and are opposed—namely, that children are punished for the sins of their parents, and that children are not punished for the sins of their parents; that there is a natural crime, and that there is no natural crime; that it is prescribed by the Law of God that the sins of parents be imputed to children, and that it is prescribed by the Law of God that the sins of parents not be imputed to children. It is manifest that these opinions and sentences, warring against each other, cannot both be true. For it is shown also by the rules of learned disputation that, when about uncertain matters a double opinion arises, both can be false, but both cannot be true—which indeed can happen in differing kinds, and in things said to have a mean, but not in things which are contrary and lack a mean. These things are known to dialecticians; but for the sake of the reader unversed in this discipline, let us open it up by some example.
Iulianum.3.31AUG. Ita quaeris, unde libros loquacissimos impleas, ut etiam dialecticam, ubi non opus est, lectores eorum docere coneris non cogitans, quomodo abiciat Christi Ecclesia dialecticum, quem cernit haereticum. Quis enim te id agere non intellegat, ut in sapientia verbi evacues crucem Christi (Cf. 1 Cor 1, 17), qui pro omnibus, pro quibus mortuus est, in quibus et te confitente sunt parvuli, in remissionem peccatorum sanguinem fudit?
Aug. So you seek whence to fill your most loquacious books, that you even try to teach dialectic, where there is no need, to their readers—not considering how the Church of Christ casts away the dialectician whom she perceives to be a heretic. For who does not understand that you are at work to empty the cross of Christ by the wisdom of word (See 1 Cor 1:17)—Christ, who for all for whom he died (among whom, by your own confession, are little ones) poured out his blood unto the remission of sins?
Iulianum.3.3132. IUL. Veniat verbi gratia in quaestionem Golias quo fuerit affectus colore, et unus eum nigrum, alter candidum fuisse confirmet (Cf. 1 Reg 17, 4-5); diversa haec opinio potest utraque falsa, utraque autem vera esse non potest. Non enim potest verum esse nigrum illum fuisse, si candidus fuit semper, aut candidum fuisse, si niger omni aetate permansit. Haec ergo utraque opinio, quae simul vera esse non potest, simul falsa esse hoc modo potest, si nec candidus nec niger, sed flavus eius color fuit vel infracto candore nec tamen infusa nigredine ex contrariis mediocriter temperatus. Facilius ergo res diversae et contrariae negari possunt pariter quam pariter approbari. Ista autem contraria, quae medium non habent, ut puta bonum et malum, iustum et iniustum, innocentia et reatus, ut uno tempore in unum atque idem convenire non possunt, ita necesse est, ut altero eorum posito alterum denegetur, id est, ut vel praeceptum vel consilium vel adiumentum non potest simul in uno tempore et iustum et iniustum esse, ita et homo non potest uno eodemque tempore et reus et innocens et bonus et malus esse.
32. Jul. Let it come into question, for example's sake, with what color of complexion Goliath was endowed, and let one affirm that he was black, another that he was white (See 1 Sam 17:4-5); this differing opinion can both be false, but cannot both be true. For it cannot be true that he was black, if he was always white, or that he was white, if he remained black his whole life. These two opinions, then, which cannot be true together, can be false together in this way: if he was neither white nor black, but his color was tawny, or, with the whiteness broken yet without blackness suffused, moderately tempered from the contraries. Differing and contrary things, then, can more easily be denied together than approved together. But those contraries which have no mean—such as good and evil, just and unjust, innocence and guilt—just as they cannot meet in one and the same at one time, so it is necessary that, when one of them is posited, the other is denied; that is, just as a precept, or a counsel, or an aid cannot at one and the same time be both just and unjust, so a human being cannot at one and the same time be both guilty and innocent, both good and evil.
Iulianum.3.32AUG. Nemo quaerit cuius fuerit coloris Golias; sed tu quaeris, ut insidieris, quibus te coloribus versipellis involvas. Si dialectica ista, quae te non aedificat, sed inflat et ridiculum, quoniam iactanticulum facit, si haec, inquam, dialectica, quae asserit unumquemque bonum et malum simul esse non posse, ad leges christianae disputationis admittitur, non potest esse unus homo simul et natura bonus et vitio malus, quod tamen esse posse clamat veritas nec tu negas; et contra dialecticam tuam testis etiam ipse produceris, cum, sicut se res habet, horum duorum, quae contraria esse non ambigis, alterum tribuis Conditori hominis, alterum voluntati. Erubescat ergo dialectica tua et sicut tu de communione, ita et ipsa de catholicorum disputatione discedat; si autem, quod optamus, tu redire volueris, foris ipsa remaneat.
Aug. No one asks of what color Goliath was; but you ask, in order to lie in wait, with what colors, like a turncoat, you may wrap yourself. If this dialectic—which does not build you up but puffs you up, and makes you ridiculous because it makes you a little braggart—if this dialectic, I say, which asserts that each thing cannot be good and evil at once, is admitted to the laws of Christian disputation, then one human being cannot be at once both good by nature and evil by fault—which, however, truth cries out can be so, and which you do not deny; and you are produced even as a witness against your own dialectic, since, as the matter stands, of these two things, which you do not doubt to be contrary, you attribute the one to the Maker of the human being, the other to the will. Let your dialectic, then, blush, and just as you depart from communion, so let it too depart from the disputation of Catholics; but if, as we wish, you should be willing to return, let it remain outside.
Iulianum.3.3233. IUL. Ad causam itaque referantur exempla. Ut parentum peccata filiis imputentur et parentum peccata filiis non imputentur, non potest hoc utrumque contrarium pariter iustum probari; sed si iustitia est generantium subolem ream teneri, necesse est, ut iniustitia sit, si propter eadem peccata rea non esse dicatur; et sicut bonum est iuste praecipere, ita malum est iniuste quidquam iubere; et quamvis res perspicua argumentando levior fiat, tamen, quoniam causam in absoluto positam iuvat etiam legis divinae confirmare suffragiis, inhaereamus huic loco, in quo, quicumque sana mente constiterit, per praerupta quaestionum praesentium errare non sinitur.
33. Jul. Let the examples, then, be referred to the case. That the sins of parents be imputed to children, and that the sins of parents not be imputed to children—these two contraries cannot both be proved equally just; but if it is justice for the offspring of those who beget to be held guilty, it is necessary that it be injustice if, for those same sins, it is said not to be guilty; and just as it is good to command justly, so it is evil to order anything unjustly; and although a plain matter becomes the lighter by arguing, nonetheless, since it helps to confirm a case set in clear standing even by the votes of the divine Law, let us cleave to this passage, in which whoever takes his stand with a sound mind is not allowed to wander through the precipices of the present questions.
Iulianum.3.33Acquiescis igitur, annuntiator naturalis mali, praescriptum esse lege Dei, ne filii puniantur in peccatis parentum; agnoscis etiam non aliter hoc praeceptum ab illo populo intellectum fuisse, quam a nobis nunc observandum defenditur. Et ideo regem Amessiam praeceptis Dei oboedientem indignationem, quam de patris sui internecione conceperat, laudabili moderatione frenasse atque occisis parentis sui percussoribus eorum tamen filiis non per ignaviam, sed per iustitiam pepercisse. Laudatur quidem Amessias et hoc secundum Dei refertur fecisse legem commendaturque oboedisse voluntati Domini, sed tamen infuscatus vanitatis reliquiis non tacetur et ostenditur devotionem David patris sui imitatus non esse (Cf. 4 Reg 14, 6). Hic tamen ab illa generis sui sanctitate degenerans tenuit in iudicio commendatam divina lege iustitiam; tantum reverentia perspicuae aequitatis valebat. Quid ergo mali fides tua complectatur, expende: hanc iniquitatem Deo admoves, quem aeternum et pium et iustum fatemur, quam nec superbia purpurati nec dolor commisit orbati.
You acquiesce, then, O herald of natural evil, that it is prescribed by the Law of God that children not be punished for the sins of their parents; you acknowledge also that this precept was understood by that people in no other way than as we now defend that it ought to be observed. And therefore that King Amaziah, obedient to the precepts of God, bridled with laudable moderation the indignation he had conceived over the murder of his father, and, the slayers of his father slain, yet spared their sons—not through cowardice, but through justice. Amaziah is indeed praised, and is reported to have done this according to the Law of God, and is commended for having obeyed the will of the Lord; yet, darkened with the remnants of vanity, it is not passed over in silence, and he is shown not to have imitated the devotion of David his father (See 2 Kgs 14:6). Yet here, degenerating from that holiness of his stock, he held in judgment the justice commended by the divine Law; so great was the power of reverence for clear equity. Weigh, then, what evil your faith embraces: you ascribe to God—whom we confess to be eternal and pious and just—this iniquity which neither the pride of one clothed in purple nor the grief of one bereaved committed.
Iulianum.3.33AUG. Amessias homo fuit, cui non licebat iudicare de occultis, quae nosse non poterat; ideo praeceptum, quod datum est homini, in iudicio suo tenuit, ut pro peccato parentum non occideret filios. Peccatum autem tam magnum, ut verteret in naturam, quod per unum hominem intravit in mundum, sine quo nullus homo nascitur, quomodo posset ab hominibus vindicari, quandoquidem ita in omnes homines cum morte pertransiit, ut ei sua poena sit comes usque ad interitum sempiternum, nisi ubi gratia divina generationem regeneratione sanaverit?
Aug. Amaziah was a human being, to whom it was not lawful to judge concerning hidden things, which he could not know; therefore the precept that was given to a human being he held in his own judgment, that he should not slay sons for the sin of their parents. But a sin so great that it turned into nature—the sin that entered the world through one man, without which no human being is born—how could it be avenged by human beings, since it so passed to all human beings together with death that its own penalty is its companion even to everlasting destruction, except where divine grace has healed generation by regeneration?
Iulianum.3.33Hoc ergo ad Dei iudicium, non ad hominum pertinet, sicut alia multa, de quibus homines omnino iudicare non possunt. Et ideo aliter mandavit homini parentes et filios iudicandos iam separatim proprias vitas agentes, aliter autem iudicavit ipse, quando praevaricatricem naturam, quam noverat in radice, quamvis nondum pullulasset in germine, secundum inscrutabilem iustitiam suam cum stirpe damnavit, liberaturus ab hac damnatione quos vellet, per gratiam nihilominus inscrutabilem, quamvis et separatim iam viventibus filiis peccata separatim viventium reddidit patrum, quod licere iudicanti homini noluit, quia novit ipse, cur hoc iuste faciat, quando facit, id autem humana infirmitas nescit.
This, then, pertains to the judgment of God, not of human beings—as do many other things concerning which human beings can in no way judge. And therefore he commanded a human being in one way, that parents and children, now leading their own lives separately, be judged separately; but he himself judged in another way, when, according to his own inscrutable justice, he condemned, together with its stock, the transgressing nature which he knew in its root, although it had not yet sprouted in the shoot—about to set free from this condemnation those whom he willed, by a grace no less inscrutable; although even upon children now living separately he repaid the sins of fathers living separately, which he was unwilling that a human being judging should be permitted to do, because he himself knows why he does this justly when he does it, but human weakness does not know.
Iulianum.3.3334. IUL. Verum ut urgeamus locum: constitit nempe iniustitiam Deo adhaerere non posse, constitit etiam ab ipso esse praescriptum, ne obsint filiis peccata generantium; asseruit quidem ipsa praecipientis dignitas iniustum id esse quod prohibet. Porro, ut agamus tecum liberalius, respondendi tribuo facultatem de his duabus opinionibus, quas supra comminus posui, id est ut imputentur peccata parentum filiis vel non imputentur; quam putas credi iustitiam debere? Si dixeris tuam quam vis etiam ultimo convenire iudicio, refero, utrum illam, quae remansit, nostram iustam an iniustam putes: sine dubio iniquam pronuntiabis; at haec legis auctoritate custodienda mandatur. Vides ergo unum remanere necessario de tribus: ut aut legem Dei fatearis iniustam, immo per legem Deum ipsum iniquitatis accuses aut certe ad vocem confugias magistrorum tuorum et dicas legem, quae per Moysen data est, a Deo tuo non fuisse mandatam, aut, si hoc utrumque proferre non audes, traducem peccati asseri contra legis documenta et praecepta fatearis. Neque enim adeo te desipere posse credendum est, ut dicas Deum iustitiam quidem in praeceptis, in iudiciis vero iniquitatem tenere aut certe secundum dogma vestrum in iudiciis quidem servare iustitiam, praeceptis autem iniquitatem do cere; quod licet superius egerimus, nunc tamen necessario repetivimus.
34. Jul. But, to press the passage: it has been established, surely, that injustice cannot cleave to God; it has been established also that it was prescribed by him that the sins of those who beget should not harm their children; and the very dignity of the one commanding asserted that what he forbids is unjust. Further, to deal more liberally with you, I grant you the power of answering about these two opinions, which I set above face to face—that is, that the sins of parents be imputed to children, or not be imputed: which do you think ought to be believed to be justice? If you say that yours is the one which you wish to accord even with the last judgment, I ask whether you think the other, which remains—ours—just or unjust: without doubt you will pronounce it iniquitous; but this is the one commanded to be kept by the authority of the Law. You see, then, that of three things one necessarily remains: that either you confess the Law of God to be unjust—nay, through the Law accuse God himself of iniquity—or else take refuge in the voice of your teachers and say that the Law given through Moses was not commanded by your God, or, if you dare to bring forward neither of these, confess that a propagation of sin is asserted against the documents and precepts of the Law. For it is not to be believed that you can be so foolish as to say that God holds justice indeed in his precepts, but iniquity in his judgments, or, according to your dogma, that he keeps justice indeed in his judgments, but teaches iniquity in his precepts—which, although we have dealt with it above, we have now necessarily repeated.
Iulianum.3.34AUG. Odiose repetis, quod otiose loqueris; vacat enim tibi easdem res loquacitate revolvere, quas non potes asserere veritate, et dicere sine modo, quae astruere non vales ullo modo. Vis enim videri inter se esse duo ista contraria: reddi in filios peccata patrum et pro peccatis patrum filios non esse puniendos, quasi ego unum horum dicam, alterum Deus.
Aug. You hatefully repeat what you idly say; for you have leisure to revolve by loquacity the same matters which you cannot assert by truth, and to say without measure what you are unable to establish in any way. For you wish these two things to seem contrary to each other—that the sins of fathers are repaid upon children, and that children are not to be punished for the sins of fathers—as though I said the one of these, and God the other.
Iulianum.3.34Surde, utrumque Deus dixit; ergo utrumque iustum est, quia iustus hoc dixit. Sed quod inter se contraria Deus non sit locutus, ut intellegas, Dei iudicis et hominis iudicis pro diversitate causarum discerne personas; ita nec Deum, quamvis in filios patrum peccata reddentem, reum facies nec hominem sic iudicare compelles, sed tu duo ista velut inter se contraria tanta prolixitate et perplexitate disputationis non ob aliud mihi obicis, nisi quia multum loqueris et parum sapis.
O deaf one, God said both; therefore both are just, because the Just One said this. But that God did not speak things contrary to each other—that you may understand—distinguish the persons of God the judge and of a human being the judge according to the diversity of cases; thus you will neither make God guilty, though he repays the sins of fathers upon children, nor compel a human being so to judge; but you fling these two things at me, as though contrary to each other, with such prolixity and perplexity of disputation for no other reason than that you talk much and understand little.
Iulianum.3.3435. IUL. Si autem dixeris utrumque iustum esse, et quod nos dicimus et quod vos, id est et quod lex Dei sanxit et quod Manichaeus Traducianusque confinxit, hic sane rationis perspicuae potentiam cohibentes benignius te convenimus et mitius. Cur ergo, si creditis et hoc bonum esse quod dicimus, et illud bonum esse quod dicitis, tantis totam Italiam factionibus commovistis? Cur seditiones Romae conductis populis excitastis? Cur de sumptibus pauperum saginastis per totam pene Africam equorum greges, quos prosequente Alypio tribunis et centurionibus destinastis? Cur matronarum oblatis haereditatibus potestates saeculi corrupistis, ut in nos stipula publici furoris arderet? Cur dissipastis ecclesiarum quietem? Cur religiosi principis tempora persecutionum impietate maculastis, si a nobis nihil aliud dicitur, quam quod etiam tu bonum cogeris confiteri?
35. Jul. But if you say that both are just—both what we say and what you say, that is, both what the Law of God sanctioned and what Manichaeus and the Traducianist fabricated—here, restraining the power of clear reasoning, we approach you more kindly and more gently. Why, then, if you believe both that this is good which we say, and that that is good which you say, have you stirred all Italy with so great factions? Why have you roused seditions at Rome with hired mobs? Why, from the expenses of the poor, have you fattened, through almost all Africa, herds of horses, which, with Alypius in attendance, you dispatched to the tribunes and centurions? Why, with the inheritances of matrons offered, have you corrupted the powers of the world, that the stubble of public fury might burn against us? Why have you scattered the peace of the Churches? Why have you stained the times of a religious prince with the impiety of persecutions, if nothing else is said by us than what even you are forced to confess to be good?
Iulianum.3.35AUG. Sicut falsa sunt crimina, quae obicis nobis, ita falsa sunt dogmata, quae fingitis vobis; sed dicite, quantum potestis, omne malum adversus nos mentientes, nos tantummodo adversus vos fidem christianam et catholicam defendemus. Et quid opus est vobis reddere similia maledicta et non potius Evangelio credere atque gaudere, quod ex istis falsissimis maledictis vestris nobis merces augeatur in caelis (Cf. Mt 5, 11-12)? Quomodo autem in hac re, de qua nunc agimus, et illud quod dicitis, et illud quod dicimus, bonum esse possumus credere, cum dicamus nos Deum dixisse: Reddam peccata patrum in filios (Deut 5, 9), vos autem, quod praecepit homini iudicanti, ne peccata patrum reddat in filios, ita laudetis, ut, quod ipse se dixit reddere, tamquam nostrum arguatis et, tamquam falsum iniustumque sit, improbetis nec in eo vos non nobis, sed Deo refragari calumniarique sentiatis?
Aug. As false are the crimes which you fling at us, so false are the dogmas which you fabricate for yourselves; but say, as much as you can, every evil against us, lying; we will only defend against you the Christian and Catholic faith. And what need is there for you to return like insults, rather than to believe the Gospel and rejoice that, out of these most false insults of yours, our reward is increased for us in heaven (See Matt 5:11-12)? But how, in this matter of which we now treat, can we believe that both what you say and what we say is good, when we say that God said, I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Deut 5:9), while you so praise what he commanded to a human being judging—that he not repay the sins of fathers upon children—that you accuse what he himself said he repays, as though it were ours, and condemn it as though it were false and unjust, and do not perceive that in this you are resisting and slandering not us, but God?
Iulianum.3.3536. IUL. Verum hactenus mitiore sim functus eloquio, nunc autem splendor flammeae rationis ostendit malis et bonis, profanis et sacris, piis et impiis, iustis et iniquis nullum esse consortium atque ideo inter praecepta et iudicia Dei nihil esse pugnarum,
36. Jul. But thus far I have used a gentler speech; now, however, the splendor of flaming reason shows that between evil and good, profane and sacred, pious and impious, just and iniquitous there is no fellowship, and therefore that between the precepts and the judgments of God there are no conflicts,
Iulianum.3.36contrarium autem esse aliena peccata aliis imputare et, eadem ne imputentur, iubere, quoniam de his duobus necesse est uno concesso alterum summoveri, id est uno iusto alterum iniquum doceri, in legem autem Dei praescriptum esse, ne parentum peccata filiis imputentur (Cf. Deut 24, 16), ac per hoc eadem auctoritate contrarium eius id est opinionem traducis cum Manichaeis funditus corruisse.
but that it is contrary to impute the sins of some to others, and to command that those same sins not be imputed, since, of these two, it is necessary that, one being granted, the other be removed—that is, one being just, the other be shown iniquitous; but in the Law of God it is prescribed that the sins of parents not be imputed to children (See Deut 24:16), and thereby, by the same authority, its contrary—that is, the opinion of propagation—has, together with the Manicheans, utterly collapsed.
Iulianum.3.36AUG. Totiens dicere vera me piget, cum totiens te dicere vana non pudeat. Peccata patrum se reddere in filios Deus dicit; peccata patrum ne reddat in filios Deus quidem, sed homini dicit. Utrumque approbandum est, quia utrumque Deus dicit.
Aug. It wearies me to say true things so often, when it does not shame you to say empty things so often. God says that he repays the sins of fathers upon children; that he not repay the sins of fathers upon children, God indeed says, but to a human being. Both are to be approved, because God says both.
Iulianum.3.3637. IUL. Ostendi certe non nos aliud defendere, quam quod primo ratio signat aequissimum, tum etiam Deus sua lege confirmat, tertio non aliter quam asserimus, id quod fuerat praeceptum, cum operis laude completum. Inculcatum est quoque hanc veram esse iustitiam, quam placere sibi Deus etiam praecipiendo monstravit. Ac per hoc constitit nihil adminiculi Manichaeam traducem aut in ratione aut in legis testimoniis invenire.
37. Jul. I have certainly shown that we defend nothing other than what, first, reason marks as most just, then also God confirms by his own Law, and, third, what had been commanded was completed, with praise of the deed, in no other way than as we assert. It has also been pressed home that this is the true justice which God showed, even by commanding, pleases him. And by this it is established that the Manichean propagation finds no support either in reason or in the testimonies of the Law.
Iulianum.3.37AUG. Manichaei naturam dicunt sine initio semper malam, unde omne malum esse contendunt, catholici autem, quod esse noluistis, conditam bonam peccatoque vitiatam medico Christo indigere a parvulis usque ad senes, quoniam pro omnibus mortuus est, ergo omnes mortui sunt (2 Cor 5, 14).
Aug. The Manicheans say that nature is, without beginning, always evil, whence they contend that all evil exists; but Catholics say what you have been unwilling to hold—that it was created good and corrupted by sin, and stands in need of Christ the physician, from little ones to the aged, since he died for all; therefore all have died (2 Cor 5:14).
Iulianum.3.37Unde Manichaei separandum a bono malum sic opinantur, ut extra sit; nos vero, quamvis malum a bono intellegentia separemus nec id, quod malum dicitur, aliquam substantiam esse credamus, tamen ab eis, qui liberantur, non ita separandum malum putamus, ut extra sit, sed in eis sanandum esse scimus, ut non sit. Illi enim malum substantiam malam dicunt, nos vitium substantiae bonae nullamque substantiam.
Hence the Manicheans suppose that evil must be separated from good in such a way that it be outside; but we, although by understanding we separate evil from good, and do not believe that what is called evil is any substance, yet do not think that evil must be so separated from those who are set free that it be outside, but we know that it must be healed in them, so that it not be. For they say that evil is an evil substance; we say it is the fault of a good substance, and no substance.
Iulianum.3.37Quantum intersit, attende et desine medicum Christum sanandis parvulis invidere, ne ira Dei maneat super eos dicentis: Reddam peccata patrum in filios (Deut 5, 9). Illum aspice qui hoc dixit: Deus est, non Manichaeus; illum aspice qui dixit: Per hominem mors et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum; sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur (1 Cor 15, 21-22); Apostolus Christi est, non discipulus Manichaei. Illum aspice qui dixit: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13); episcopus est Catholicus, non Manichaeus aut Pelagius aut Pelagianus haereticus. Quapropter, quoniam peccatum operis punit et homo, peccatum autem originis nonnisi Deus, ideo Deus, cum se dicat peccata patrum reddere in filios, praecipit tamen homini, ne pro peccatis patrum damnet et filios. Discerne divina et humana iudicia et invenies inter se duo ista non esse contraria.
Attend to how great the difference is, and cease to begrudge Christ the physician the healing of little ones, lest the wrath of God remain upon them, who says, I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Deut 5:9). Look at him who said this: he is God, not Manichaeus; look at him who said, Through a man came death, and through a man the resurrection of the dead; for as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive (1 Cor 15:21-22): he is the Apostle of Christ, not a disciple of Manichaeus. Look at him who said, We are all born under sin (Ambrose, De paenit. 1.3.13): he is a Catholic bishop, not Manichaeus or Pelagius or a Pelagian heretic. Wherefore, since a human being too punishes the sin of deed, but only God the sin of origin, therefore God, while he says that he repays the sins of fathers upon children, nonetheless commands a human being not to condemn children too for the sins of their fathers. Distinguish divine and human judgments, and you will find that these two are not contrary to each other.
Iulianum.3.3738. IUL. Sed ne forte exsistat quis usque adeo obstipus, ut perspicuis sibi velit sententiis approbari Deum videlicet non aliter iudicare quam iudicari imperavit, quod quidem est contentionis nefandae, tamen, quoniam veritati arma suppeditant ad omnem documentorum satietatem, in id ipsum ostendere testes acerrimos non pigebit. Impletus itaque Sancto Spiritu loquitur Ezechiel propheta: Factus est sermo Domini ad me dicens: Fili hominis, quid vobis parabolam istam, in terra Israel dicentium: Patres manducaverunt uvam acerbam et dentes filiorum obstupuerunt? Vivo ego, dicit Adonai Dominus, si amplius dicetur parabola haec in Israel, quoniam omnes animae meae sunt, quemadmodum anima patris, ita et anima filii; omnes animae meae sunt. Anima, quae peccat, ipsa morietur, homo autem, qui fuerit iustus, qui faciet iudicium et iustitiam, in montibus non manducabit et oculos suos non extollet ad desideria domus Israel et uxorem proximi sui non contaminabit et ad mulierem menstruatam non accedet et hominem non deprimet et pignus debitori reddet et rapinam non rapuerit, panem suum esurienti dabit et nudum operiet vestimento et pecuniam suam in usuram non dabit et superabundantiam non accipiet et ab iniustitia avertet manum suam et iudicium iustum faciet inter virum et proximum eius et in praeceptis meis ambulavit et iustificationes meas custodivit, ut faceret eas, iustus est iste, vita vivet, dicit Adonai Dominus.
38. Jul. But lest perhaps there arise someone so utterly bent over as to wish it proved to him by clear sentences that God, namely, does not judge otherwise than he commanded judgment to be passed—which indeed belongs to a wicked contentiousness—nonetheless, since truth supplies arms to every satiety of documents, it will not be irksome to show most keen witnesses to this very point. Filled, then, with the Holy Spirit, the prophet Ezekiel speaks: The word of the Lord came to me, saying: Son of man, what is this proverb to you, of those who say in the land of Israel: The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge? As I live, says the Lord Adonai, this proverb shall no more be spoken in Israel; for all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son; all souls are mine. The soul that sins shall die. But the man who is just, who does judgment and justice, who does not eat upon the mountains, and does not lift up his eyes to the desires of the house of Israel, and does not defile his neighbor's wife, and does not approach a menstruous woman, and does not oppress a man, and restores his pledge to the debtor, and does not seize by robbery, gives his bread to the hungry and covers the naked with a garment, does not give his money for usury and does not take any increase, and turns away his hand from injustice, and does just judgment between a man and his neighbor, and has walked in my precepts and kept my ordinances to do them—this man is just, he shall surely live, says the Lord Adonai.
Iulianum.3.38Et si genuerit filium pestilentem, effundentem sanguinem et facientem peccata, in via patris sui iusti non ambulavit; sed qui in montibus manducavit et uxorem proximi sui contaminavit et mendicum et pauperem depressit et rapinam rapuit et pignus non reddidit et in simulacra posuit oculos suos et iniquitatem fecit, cum usura dedit et superabundantiam accepit, hic vita non vivet; omnes iniquitates istas fecit, morte morietur, sanguis eius superipsum erit. Si autem genuerit filium et viderit omnia peccata patris sui, quae fecit, et timuerit et non fecerit secundum ista, in montibus non manducavit et oculos suos non laevavitad desideria domus Israel et uxorem proximi sui non contaminavit et hominem non depressit et pignus non pigneravit et rapinam non rapuit, panem suum esurienti dedit et nudum operuit vestimento et ab iniquitate avertit manum suam, usuram et superabundantiam non accepit, iustitiam fecit et in praeceptis meis ambulavit, iste non morietur in patris sui iniquitatibus, vita vivet, pater autem eius, quia tribulatione tribulavit et rapinam rapuit, contraria fecit in medio populo meo et mortuus est in sua iniquitate.
And if he begets a pestilent son, shedding blood and committing sins, who has not walked in the way of his just father, but who has eaten upon the mountains and defiled his neighbor's wife and oppressed the beggar and the poor and seized by robbery and not restored the pledge and set his eyes upon idols and done iniquity, has lent with usury and taken increase—this man shall not live; he has done all these iniquities, he shall surely die, his blood shall be upon him. But if he begets a son who sees all his father's sins which he did, and fears, and does not do according to them, who has not eaten upon the mountains and has not lifted up his eyes to the desires of the house of Israel and has not defiled his neighbor's wife and has not oppressed a man and has not taken a pledge and has not seized by robbery, has given his bread to the hungry and covered the naked with a garment and turned away his hand from iniquity, has taken neither usury nor increase, has done justice and walked in my precepts—this man shall not die in his father's iniquities, he shall surely live; but his father, because he wronged grievously and seized by robbery, did contrary things in the midst of my people and died in his own iniquity.
Iulianum.3.38Et dixistis: Quid est, quod non accepit iniquitatem patris sui filius? Quia filius iustitiam et iudicium et misericordiam fecit, omnia legitima mea conservavit et fecit ea, vita vivet, anima autem, quae peccat, ipsa morietur. Filius non accipiet iniustitiam patris sui neque pater accipiet iniustitiam filii sui, iustitia iusti super ipsum erit et iniquitas iniquisuper ipsum erit. Et iniquus, si convertat se ab omnibus iniquitatibus suis, quas fecit, et custodiat omnia mandata mea et faciat iudicium et iustitiam et misericordiam, vita vivet et non morietur, omnia delicta eius, quaecumque fecit, non erunt in memoria, in sua iustitia, quam fecit, vita vivet. Numquid voluntate volo mortem iniusti, dicit Adonai Dominus, quantumut avertat se a via sua mala et vivat? Cum se autem converterit iustus a sua iustitia et fecerit iniquitates secundum omnes iniquitates, quas fecit iniquus, si fecerit, non vivet, omnes iustitiae eius, quas fecit, non erunt in memoria, in delicto eius quo excidit, et in peccatis suis quibus peccavit, in ipsis morietur.
And you said: Why is it that the son has not borne the iniquity of his father? Because the son has done justice and judgment and mercy, has kept all my statutes and done them, he shall surely live; but the soul that sins shall die. The son shall not bear the injustice of his father, nor shall the father bear the injustice of his son; the justice of the just shall be upon him, and the iniquity of the iniquitous shall be upon him. And the iniquitous, if he turn himself away from all his iniquities which he did, and keep all my commandments and do judgment and justice and mercy, he shall surely live and shall not die; all his offenses which he did shall not be remembered; in his justice which he did he shall surely live. Do I will with my will the death of the unjust, says the Lord Adonai, rather than that he turn himself away from his evil way and live? But when the just turns himself away from his justice and does iniquities according to all the iniquities which the iniquitous did—if he do them, he shall not live; all his acts of justice which he did shall not be remembered; in his offense by which he fell away, and in his sins by which he sinned, in these he shall die.
Iulianum.3.38Et dixistis: Non dirigit via Domini. Audite nunc, domus Israel: numquid via mea non dirigit? Nunc via vestra non est aequa. Cum convertit se iustus a sua iustitia et facit delictum, morietur in eodelicto, quod fecit, in ipso morietur; et cum averterit se iniquus ab iniquitate sua, quam fecit, et fecerit iudicium et iustitiam, hic animam suam custodivit et vivit, ut averteret se ab omnibus iniquitatibus suis, quas fecit, vita vivet et non morietur. Et dicit domus Israel: Non corrigit via Domini. Numquid via mea non corrigit, domus Israel? Nonne magisvia vestra non corrigit? Ideo unumquemque vestrum secundum vias ipsius iudicabo vos, domus Israel, dicit Adonai Dominus (Ez 18, 1-30).
And you said: The way of the Lord is not right. Hear now, O house of Israel: is my way not right? Now your way is not equitable. When the just turns himself away from his justice and does an offense, he shall die in that offense which he did; in it he shall die. And when the iniquitous turns himself away from his iniquity which he did, and does judgment and justice, this man has kept his soul alive and lives, because he turned himself away from all his iniquities which he did; he shall surely live and shall not die. And the house of Israel says: The way of the Lord is not upright. Is my way not upright, O house of Israel? Is it not rather your way that is not upright? Therefore I will judge each one of you according to his own ways, O house of Israel, says the Lord Adonai (Ezek 18:1-30).
Iulianum.3.38AUG. Haec per Ezechielem prophetam promissio est Novi Testamenti, quam non intellegis, ubi Deus regeneratos a generatis, si iam in maioribus aetatibus sunt, secundum propria facta discernit; de quibus enim dicitur: Anima patris mea est et anima filii mea est (Ez 18, 4), separatim procul dubio suas vitas agunt. Si autem filius adhuc esset in lumbis patris sui, sicut scriptum est de Levi, quod in lumbis fuit Abrahae, quando decimatus est a Melchisedech Abraham (Cf. Hebr 7, 9-10), non posset tunc dici: Anima patris mea est et anima filii mea est, quando una utique anima erat. Velans autem Propheta mysterium suo tempore revelandum regenerationem non nominavit, per quam quisque filius hominis ex Adam transit ad Christum, sed quod non dixit illo tempore, intellegi voluit isto tempore, quo fuerat ad Christum transeuntibus auferendum velamen.
Aug. This, through the prophet Ezekiel, is a promise of the New Testament, which you do not understand, where God distinguishes the regenerated from the merely begotten—if they are already of greater age—according to their own deeds; for of those of whom it is said, The soul of the father is mine, and the soul of the son is mine (Ezek 18:4), beyond doubt lead their lives separately. But if the son were still in the loins of his father—as it is written of Levi, that he was in the loins of Abraham when Abraham was tithed by Melchizedek (See Heb 7:9-10)—it could not then be said, "The soul of the father is mine, and the soul of the son is mine," when there was surely one soul. But the prophet, veiling a mystery to be revealed in its own time, did not name regeneration, through which each son of man passes from Adam to Christ; but what he did not say at that time, he wished to be understood in this time, when the veil was to be taken away from those passing over to Christ.
Iulianum.3.38Nam quoniam profiteris te esse Christianum, quamvis ostendas antichristum id efficere moliens, ut Christus gratis mortuus sit, quaero abs te, utrum, si homo faciat opera illa cuncta iustitiae, quae propheta Ezechiel totiens repetendo commemorat, etiam non regeneratus vita vivat. Si dicis eum vita vivere, contradicit Christus antichristo et dicit: Nisi manducaveritis carnem meam et biberitis sanguinem meum, non habebitis vitam in vobis (Io 6, 54); quem cibum et potum ad regeneratos pertinere velis nolis cogeris confiteri. Si autem tanta mole auctoritatis obtritus responderis eum, qui omnia illa bona fecerit, si non fuerit regeneratus, vita non vivere, responde, quae causa sit, et vide generationi regenerationem, non imitationi imitationem in eo, quod Apostolus Adam ex parte peccati et Christum ex parte iustitiae proponit, opponi. Evidentius autem tibi ostendam ad Novum Testamentum pertinere, in quo regeneratorum haereditas est, quod Ezechielem prophetam dixisse commemoras, non quidem nunc, sed cum dixeris omnia, quae de ipsis verbis eius tuae loquacitatis more dicturus es.
For since you profess to be a Christian—although you show that you are striving to bring it about, like antichrist, that Christ died for nothing—I ask you whether, if a human being does all those works of justice which the prophet Ezekiel records by repeating them so often, he shall surely live even unregenerated. If you say that he shall surely live, Christ contradicts antichrist and says, Unless you eat my flesh and drink my blood, you shall not have life in you (John 6:54); which food and drink you are forced, will you or not, to confess pertain to the regenerated. But if, crushed by so great a mass of authority, you answer that one who has done all those good things, if he has not been regenerated, shall not live, then answer what the cause is, and see that regeneration is set over against generation, not imitation over against imitation, in that the Apostle sets forth Adam on the side of sin and Christ on the side of justice. But I will show you more evidently that what you record the prophet Ezekiel to have said pertains to the New Testament, in which is the inheritance of the regenerated—not now, however, but after you have said all that, in the manner of your loquacity, you are about to say from his very words.
Iulianum.3.3839. IUL. Videturne assertor locuples iudiciorum suorum Deus, qui tam multis capitibus de hac quaestione non solum iudicavit, sed etiam disputavit? Plane, qui temporum nostrorum praevideret errores, tanta verborum suorum vel luce vel copia duo est iuste operatus et provide: unum, ne quis ulla quaestionum ambiguitate moveretur, aliud, ne apud eos, qui se immersissent sponte naufragiis, excusationis tabula ulla remaneret. Loquitur ad Iudaeos, qui captivitatem sceleribus exigentes ad revelandam propriae praevaricationis invidiam parentibus, non moribus suis debitam eam fuisse iactabant, et convenit eos auctoritate patria: Utquid vobis, inquit, istam parabolam, ut dicatis: Parentes manducaverunt uvas acerbas et filiorum dentes obstupuerunt? Vivo ego, dicitAdonai Dominus, si dicetur amplius parabola haec in Israel, quoniam omnes animae meae sunt, quemadmodum anima patris, ita anima filii; omnes animae meae sunt. Anima, quae peccat, ipsa morietur (Ez 18, 2-4).
39. Jul. Does not God seem a rich asserter of his own judgments, who, in so many chapters, has not only judged on this question but even disputed? Plainly, foreseeing the errors of our times, by so great a light and abundance of his words he justly and providently accomplished two things: one, that no one should be moved by any ambiguity of the questions; the other, that among those who had plunged themselves of their own accord into shipwreck no plank of excuse should remain. He speaks to the Jews, who, exacting their captivity by their crimes, to turn aside the odium of their own transgression, boasted that it was owed to their parents, not to their own ways; and he confronts them by paternal authority: Why is this proverb to you, he says, that you say: The parents have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge? As I live, says the Lord Adonai, this proverb shall no more be spoken in Israel; for all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so the soul of the son; all souls are mine. The soul that sins shall die (Ezek 18:2-4).
Iulianum.3.39AUG. Cum ait: Si dicetur amplius parabola haec in Israel, ostendit solere dici: Patres manducaverunt uvam acerbam et dentes filiorum obstupuerunt, nec arguit, quia dicebatur, sed promittit, ubi non dicatur. Unde autem hoc dicebant, nisi quia reddam peccata patrum in filios (Deut 5, 9) Deum dixisse sciebant?
Aug. When he says, if this proverb shall be spoken any more in Israel, he shows that it was wont to be said, "The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge"—and he does not reprove the fact that it was said, but promises a place where it shall not be said. But whence did they say this, except that they knew God had said, I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Deut 5:9)?
Iulianum.3.3940. IUL. Ad exemplandam et confirmandam iudicii sui aequitatem iuramento Deus utitur et auctoritatem constituti obtestatione cumulat. Intellexit hoc genus loquendi Apostolus, qui ad Hebraeos ita disseruit: Volens, inquit, Deus ostendere, promissionis haeredibus immobilitatem consilii sui interposuit iusiurandum, ut per duas res immobiles, quibus impossibile est mentiri Deum, fortissimum solacium habeamus (Hebr 6, 17-18).
40. Jul. To exemplify and confirm the equity of his judgment, God uses an oath, and heaps up the authority of his decree with a solemn attestation. The Apostle understood this manner of speaking, who discoursed thus to the Hebrews: God, wishing, he says, to show to the heirs of the promise the immutability of his counsel, interposed an oath, that by two immutable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we might have the strongest consolation (Heb 6:17-18).
Iulianum.3.40AUG. Et ibi Novum Testamentum promittebatur.
Aug. And there too the New Testament was being promised.
Iulianum.3.4041. IUL. Duobus ergo his ostendi dicit Deum non posse mentiri, hoc ipso, quia promisit atque id, quod promisit, quia se testatur implere. Non quod Deus sine attestatione tali imbecillum atque dubium soleat habere sermonem, sed ut veritatem suam documentis grandibus oneraret, eo genere elocutionis abusus est, quod hominibus etiam fallere solitis credi faciat. Hoc ergo pondere in praesenti quoque causa admonet Deus atque praescribit, ut et nullus hoc, quod Traduciani asserunt, de populo suspicetur et Deum non posse eo quem detestatur modo iudicare cognoscat: Vivo ego, dicit Adonai Dominus, si amplius dicetur parabola haec in Israel (Ez 18, 3).
41. Jul. By these two things, then, he says, it is shown that God cannot lie: by this very thing, that he promised, and that what he promised, he testifies that he fulfills. Not that God is wont, without such attestation, to have a feeble and doubtful word, but that, to weigh down his truth with great documents, he made use of that kind of expression which makes even human beings, who are wont to deceive, to be believed. With this weight, then, in the present case too, God admonishes and prescribes, both that no one of his people should suspect this which the Traducianists assert, and that he should know that God cannot judge in the way he detests: As I live, says the Lord Adonai, this proverb shall no more be spoken in Israel (Ezek 18:3).
Iulianum.3.41AUG. Non diceturin Israel recte diceres, si veros Israelitas regeneratos videres, in quibus hoc non dicetur. Nam in his, qui non regenerantur, merito dicitur, quoniam non sunt Israel secundum id, quod ait ad Romanos Apostolus: Non enim omnes, qui ex Israel, hi sunt Israel (Rom 9, 6), ubi sine dubio filios Novi Testamenti, hoc est filios promissionis volebat intellegi. Denique sequitur: Sed in Isaac vocabitur tibi semen, hoc est non, qui filii carnis, hi filii Dei, sed filii promissionis deputantur in semine (Rom 9, 7-8).
Aug. "It shall not be said in Israel"—you would say rightly, if you saw the true Israelites, the regenerated, in whom this shall not be said. For in those who are not regenerated it is rightly said, since they are not Israel, according to what the Apostle says to the Romans: For not all who are of Israel are Israel (Rom 9:6), where without doubt he wished the children of the New Testament—that is, the children of the promise—to be understood. Then it follows: But in Isaac shall your seed be called, that is, not those who are children of the flesh are children of God, but the children of the promise are reckoned as the seed (Rom 9:7-8).
Iulianum.3.4142. IUL. Quid est hoc: Amplius non dicetur, cum hoc usque hodie tantis Manichaeorum conatibus asseratur? Sed hoc est quod indicat, quoniam nemo, qui est de populo Israel vel qui huius Scripturae auctoritatem suscipit, post definitionem meam tale quid audebit accredere. Porro omnis, qui in illa opinione perstiterit nec his oboedit litteris, nec in eo, qui est verus Israel, enumerabitur.
42. Jul. What is this, "It shall no more be said," when even today it is asserted with such great efforts of the Manicheans? But this is what he indicates: that no one who is of the people of Israel, or who accepts the authority of this Scripture, after my definition will dare to give credence to any such thing. Further, everyone who has persisted in that opinion and does not obey these writings shall not be numbered among those who are the true Israel.
Iulianum.3.42AUG. Si ergo post definitionem suam vult intellegi Deus hoc neminem crediturum, quaerendum est, cur ante hanc non improbe credebatur peccata patrum etiam in filios esse reddenda. Et si bene quaeratur, invenietur propter obnoxiam generationem dictum: Reddam peccata patrum in filios (Deut 5, 9), unde natum est illud proverbium de uvis acerbis.
Aug. If, then, God wishes it to be understood that after his definition no one will believe this, it must be asked why before this it was not wrongly believed that the sins of fathers were to be repaid even upon children. And if it be well asked, it will be found that on account of guilty generation it was said, I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Deut 5:9), whence arose that proverb about the sour grapes.
Iulianum.3.42Propter liberam vero regenerationem promissum est Testamentum Novum, ubi hoc amplius non dicatur, quia haereditati damnosae, quae venit ex Adam, per Christi gratiam renuntiatur, quando renuntiatur huic saeculo, ubi necesse est premi gravi iugo filios Adam, non utique iniuste, a die exitus de ventre matris eorum usque in diem sepulturae in matre omnium (Eccli 40, 1); unde sacra mysteria etiam parvulis renuntiantibus satis quid agatur ostendunt.
But on account of free regeneration the New Testament was promised, where this shall no more be said, because the inheritance damaging to us, which comes from Adam, is renounced through the grace of Christ, when this age is renounced—the age in which it is necessary that the children of Adam be pressed by a heavy yoke, surely not unjustly, from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb until the day of their burial in the mother of all (Sir 40:1); whence the sacred mysteries, even when little ones renounce, show well enough what is being done.
Iulianum.3.4243. IUL. Postquam parabolae illius vanitate reprehensa sanxit sententiam promulgatione atque obtestatione divina, etiam iustitiae suae dignatur aperire rationem, cur necessitudines peccatis non graventur alternis. Quoniam omnes animae - inquit - meae sunt, quemadmodum anima patris, ita et anima filii; omnes animae meae sunt; anima, quae peccat, ipsa morietur (Ez 18, 4). Quare ergo esset aequissima sententiae ista moderatio, proprietate quoque ostendit animarum.
43. Jul. After he had reproved the vanity of that proverb, he sanctioned the sentence by a divine promulgation and attestation, and deigns also to disclose the reason of his justice, why kinships are not burdened with one another's sins. Since all souls, he says, are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son; all souls are mine; the soul that sins shall die (Ezek 18:4). Why, then, this moderation of the sentence should be most equitable, he shows also by the property of souls.
Iulianum.3.43AUG. Ista proprietas animarum ad vitas pertinet separatas; non enim renasci aliquis nisi natus potest. Quare autem decimatus est Levi, cum esset in lumbis Abrahae, nisi quia nondum in eis fuerat suarum proprietas animarum?
Aug. This property of souls pertains to separate lives; for no one can be reborn unless he has been born. But why was Levi tithed when he was in the loins of Abraham, except that the property of their own souls was not yet in them?
Iulianum.3.4344. IUL. Cum anima, inquit, patris mea sit et anima filii mea sit, quo testimonio ut multis aliis docetur animam nihil debere seminibus, quam Deus iuri suo vindicat, iniquissimum, inquit, et stolidum est, ut mea res, mea imago alienis gravetur operibus.
44. Jul. Since, he says, the soul of the father is mine and the soul of the son is mine—by which testimony, as by many others, it is taught that the soul owes nothing to seeds, the soul which God claims for his own right—it is, he says, most iniquitous and stupid that my own thing, my own image, should be burdened with another's works.
Iulianum.3.44AUG. Separas ergo carnem a iure Dei, quem putas animam solam iuri proprio vindicare, et oblitus es quod scriptum est: Sicut enim mulier ex viro, ita et vir per mulierem, omnia autem ex Deo (1 Cor 11, 12). Quod certe aut secundum carnem dictum est aut secundum utrumque, non tamen secundum animam solam. Quod autem tibi placet, ut dicat Deus: Iniquissimum et stolidum est, ut mea res, mea imago alienis gravetur operibus, cur non quaeris, unde sit iustum, ut anima carne de parentibus tracta et ipsius Dei gravetur operibus? Corpus enim corruptibile aggravat animam (Sap 9, 15).
Aug. You separate, then, the flesh from the right of God, you who think that he claims the soul alone for his own right, and you have forgotten what is written: For as the woman is from the man, so also the man is through the woman; but all things are from God (1 Cor 11:12). Which surely is said either of the flesh or of both, but not of the soul alone. But as for what pleases you—that God should say, "It is most iniquitous and stupid that my own thing, my own image, should be burdened with another's works"—why do you not ask whence it is just that the soul, with the flesh drawn from its parents, should be burdened even with the works of God himself? For the corruptible body weighs down the soul (Wis 9:15).
Iulianum.3.44Et puto te agnoscere Dei opus esse etiam corruptibile corpus. Quid igitur meruit imago Dei, ut ad impedimentum rerum sciendarum corruptibili corpore gravetur, si nullum est originale peccatum? Cur autem non etiam hoc facis Deum dicere: Iniquissimum et stolidum est, ut mea res, mea imago per infidelitatem vel neglegentiam parentum vel quorumlibet, inter quos vivit, vel per quamcumque necessitatem sine baptismo de corpore exeat et ad regnum meum non admittatur nec vita vivat, quia carnem sanctam non manducavit nec sanguinem bibit (Cf. Io 6, 53-54)?
And I think you acknowledge that even the corruptible body is the work of God. What, then, did the image of God deserve, that it should be weighed down by a corruptible body, to the hindrance of the things to be known, if there is no original sin? But why do you not also make God say this: "It is most iniquitous and stupid that my own thing, my own image, should, through the unbelief or negligence of its parents or of any among whom it lives, or through any necessity whatever, depart from the body without baptism and not be admitted to my kingdom, nor live, because it did not eat the holy flesh nor drink the blood" (See John 6:53-54)?
Iulianum.3.44An et contra istam Christi sententiam disputabis atque clamabis dicens: Prorsus, etiamsi non manducaverit carnem Christi neque biberit eius sanguinem, vita vivet? O vocem cuius nisi antichristi! Vade, dic ista, doce ista, audiant te christiani viri et feminae, audiant homines mente corrupti, reprobi circa fidem, audiant te, ament te, honorent te, pascant, vestiant, ornent te, et perditum sequendo perdant et se. Sed novit Dominus, qui sunt eius (2 Tim 2, 19), nec desperandum est et de vobis, quamdiu patientia eius impenditur vobis.
Or will you dispute even against this sentence of Christ and cry out, saying: Outright, even if it has not eaten the flesh of Christ nor drunk his blood, it shall surely live? O voice of none but antichrist! Go, say these things, teach these things; let Christian men and women hear you, let human beings hear you who are corrupt in mind, reprobate concerning the faith; let them hear you, love you, honor you, feed, clothe, adorn you, and by following one who is lost, lose themselves too. But the Lord knows who are his (2 Tim 2:19); nor must one despair even of you, so long as his patience is spent upon you.
Iulianum.3.4445. IUL. Cui hunc statum dedi, ut ei nolenti nemo noceret externus, sed sponte capesseret vel peccatum vel iustitiam vel praemium vel reatum.
45. Jul. To whom I gave this state, that, against his will, no one from outside might harm him, but that of his own accord he should take up either sin or justice, either reward or guilt.
Iulianum.3.45AUG. De prima natura hominis hoc dici potest, non de ista vitiata atque damnata. Neque enim et in paradiso ante peccatum aggravabat animam corpus corruptibile; aut vero usque adeo vos mente corrupti estis, ut etiam hoc dicere audeatis? Si autem non audetis, dicite, quare corruptibili corpore imago Dei meruerit aggravari, qui non vultis cum catholica Ecclesia peccati originem confiteri.
Aug. This can be said of the first nature of the human being, not of this corrupted and condemned one. For in paradise, before sin, a corruptible body did not weigh down the soul; or are you so far corrupt in mind that you dare to say even this? But if you do not dare, say why the image of God deserved to be weighed down by a corruptible body—you who are unwilling, with the Catholic Church, to confess the origin of sin.
Iulianum.3.4546. IUL. Indignaris itaque mihi, cur iuranti magis Deo credam quam Manichaeo somnianti, qui nulla praesertim si non sanae fidei testimonia vel argumenta promit vigilantis ingenii, quae, licet numquam tanta inveniri queant, ut veritatis valeant fundamenta convellere, tamen quae vel impraesentiarum contra stoliditatis pudorem solacii quippiam, si apte dicerentur, afferrent. Persistit Deus id, quod sacrum fecerat praecipiendo, communire iurando. Pergit planum facere etiam per exempla quod sancit, et dicit, quia, si fuerit homo omnes iustitiae species impolluta devotione custodiens et hic genuerit filium, qui pestilentibus moribus adhaerescat atque ab itineribus deflectat paternis, nihil ei prosit tanta patris cura iustitiae comparata nobilitas; atque item e regione huius peccatoris filium statuit patris sui vias consilio meliore fugientem ostenditque nihil ei nocere iniquitatem parentis. Paremque condicionem iustitiae facit atque peccati, asserens vitia generantium ita non ire per semina, sicut non queunt ire virtutes, sed ad ius suum omnes animas pertinere, per quod et illud ostenditur profanum, quod dicis nascentium et animas et corpora a iure diaboli possideri.
46. Jul. You are indignant with me, then, that I believe God swearing rather than Manichaeus dreaming—Manichaeus, who, especially if his faith is not sound, brings forward no testimonies or arguments of a wakeful wit, which, though they could never be found so great as to avail to wrench away the foundations of truth, would yet, if they were aptly stated, bring at present some solace against the shame of stupidity. God persists in fortifying by an oath what he had made sacred by commanding. He goes on to make plain by examples too what he sanctions, and says that if a man should keep all the kinds of justice with undefiled devotion and should beget a son who clings to pestilent ways and turns aside from his father's paths, the so great care of justice acquired by the father profits him nothing; and likewise, over against this sinner, he sets the son who, by better counsel, flees the ways of his father, and shows that the iniquity of the parent does him no harm. And he makes the condition of justice and of sin equal, asserting that the faults of those who beget do not pass through the seeds, just as the virtues cannot pass, but that all souls belong to his own right—through which that too is shown profane which you say, that both the souls and the bodies of those being born are possessed by the right of the devil.
Iulianum.3.46AUG. Iam tibi responsum est: inaniter verbosaris. Totus homo, hoc est et anima et corpus, per substantiam suam ad ius pertinet Creatoris; per vitium vero, quod nulla substantia est, diabolo est mancipatus, sub eadem tamen potestate Creatoris, sub qua et ipse est diabolus constitutus.
Aug. You have already been answered: you wordily talk to no purpose. The whole human being—that is, both soul and body—through his substance belongs to the right of the Creator; but through fault, which is no substance, he is made over to the devil—yet under the same power of the Creator, under which the devil himself too is set.
Iulianum.3.4647. IUL. Asserta examinis sui libra iam tunc opinionem vestram in his, qui similia arbitrabantur, accusat. Et dixistis: Quid est quod non accepit iniquitatem patris sui filius? Quoniam anima - inquit - quae peccat, ipsa morietur; filius autem non accipit iniustitiam patris sui neque pater accipit iniustitiam filii sui; iustitia iusti super ipsum erit et iniquitas iniqui super ipsum erit (Ez 18, 19-20). Quis nostrum hinc cum tanta diligentia umquam disputare potuisset, cum quanta Deus per os Prophetae sui dividendo, comparando repetendoque disseruit?
47. Jul. Having asserted the balance of his trial, he then accuses your opinion in those who thought such things. And you said: Why is it that the son has not borne the iniquity of his father? Because the soul, he says, that sins shall die; but the son does not bear the injustice of his father, nor does the father bear the injustice of his son; the justice of the just shall be upon him, and the iniquity of the iniquitous shall be upon him (Ezek 18:19-20). Who of us could ever have disputed on this with such great diligence as God disputed through the mouth of his prophet, by dividing, comparing, and repeating?
Iulianum.3.47AUG. Et tamen, cum hoc fecerit Deus, tantae perspicuitati verborum eius misces loquacitatem tuam sciens bonam non esse causam tuam.
Aug. And yet, though God has done this, you mix your loquacity with so great a clarity of his words, knowing that your cause is not good.
Iulianum.3.4748. IUL. Verum non hoc solum explanasse contentus aliud quoque ad confirmationem iustitiae huius a misericordiae operibus admovet argumentum et pronuntiat illis ipsis personis, quae sponte peccaverunt, si ad paenitentiam emendationemque confugerint, errores praeteritos non nocere. Iniquus - inquit - si convertat se ab iniquitatibus suis, quas fecit, et custodiat mandata mea, omnia delicta eius, quaecumque fecit, non erunt in memoria; in sua iustitia, quam fecit, vita vivet (Ez 18, 21-22). Id est cum in hoc sim proposito clementiae, ut etiam propria indulgeam peccata correctis, qui potest fieri, ut imputem aliena nascentibus? Aut sinunt res, ut sit apud me rea innocentia, cum conditur, apud quem est efficax, si vel interpolata repetatur?
48. Jul. But not content to have explained this alone, he also brings forward another argument from the works of mercy, for the confirmation of this justice, and declares that to those very persons who sinned of their own accord, if they take refuge in repentance and amendment, their past errors do no harm. The iniquitous, he says, if he turn himself away from his iniquities which he did, and keep my commandments, all his offenses which he did shall not be remembered; in his justice which he did he shall surely live (Ezek 18:21-22). That is: since I am of this purpose of clemency, that I pardon even their own sins to those who are corrected, how can it come about that I impute another's to those being born? Or do things allow that innocence should be guilty before me, when it is created—before whom it is effective, even if it be repeated after interruption?
Iulianum.3.48AUG. Alia est causa paenitentium, alia nascentium. Nam prorsus, quomodo iustum ostendatis Deum, non invenitis, si et in nascentibus peccata nulla invenit et eos tamen corruptibili corpore et tot tantisque insuper calamitatibus aggravat. Non enim numerari possunt mala, quae patiuntur infantes: febrem, tussim, scabiem, dolores quorumque membrorum, ventris fluxum, lumbricos et alia innumerabilia ex ipsa carne exsistentia et ipsarum curationum quam morborum plura tormenta et extrinsecus ictus vulnerum, plagas verberum, incursus daemonum. Vos autem sapientes haeretici, ne fateamini originale pecca tum, parati estis talibus floribus implere paradisum. Si enim haec ibi futura fuisse non dicitis, quaero, cur sint in parvulis nullum habentibus, ut contenditis, omnino peccatum. Si autem et ista ibi futura fuisse non erubescitis dicere, quales Christiani sitis, quid nos opus est dicere?
Aug. The case of the penitent is one thing, the case of those being born another. For outright you do not find how you may show God just, if he finds no sins in those being born and yet weighs them down with a corruptible body and, besides, with so many and so great calamities. For the evils that infants suffer cannot be numbered: fever, cough, scab, pains of various members, flux of the belly, worms, and countless other things arising from the flesh itself, and the torments of the very cures, more numerous than those of the diseases, and the blows of wounds from outside, the strokes of beatings, the assaults of demons. But you wise heretics, lest you confess original sin, are prepared to fill paradise with such flowers. For if you say these things would not have been there, I ask why they are in little ones who have, as you contend, no sin at all. But if you are not ashamed to say that these things too would have been there, what need is there for us to say what sort of Christians you are?
Iulianum.3.4849. IUL. Displicuit hoc cultoribus idolorum, displicet et vobis fides nostra, quam videtis hac lege formatam. Dixerunt ergo profani: Non est recta via Domini. Audite ergo - inquit - domus Israel. Numquid non est via mea recta? Nonne via vestra non est aequa? Ideo unumquemque vestrum secundum viam vestram iudicabo vos, dicit Adonai Dominus (Ez 18, 29-30).
49. Jul. This displeased the worshipers of idols, and our faith displeases you too, which you see formed by this Law. The profane, then, said: The way of the Lord is not right. Hear, then, he says, O house of Israel. Is my way not right? Is it not your way that is not equitable? Therefore I will judge each one of you according to your way, says the Lord Adonai (Ezek 18:29-30).
Iulianum.3.49Perspicisne quibus testimoniis muniamur? Num aliqua sectamur ambigua? Num aucupamur verba generalia? Num aut debilibus aut involutis argumentis fidem tuemur? Exsecramur quod exsecratur Deus, intellegimus quod exponit Deus, disserimus quod disputavit Deus, credimus propter quod iuravit Deus: Non accipiet iniquitatem patris sui filius neque pater accipiet iniustitiam filii sui; iustitia iusti super ipsum erit et iniquitas iniqui super ipsum erit (Ez 18, 20).
Do you see by what testimonies we are fortified? Do we pursue anything ambiguous? Do we hunt for general words? Do we guard our faith with weak or involved arguments? We execrate what God execrates, we understand what God expounds, we discourse on what God disputed, we believe that for which God swore: The son shall not bear the iniquity of his father, nor shall the father bear the injustice of his son; the justice of the just shall be upon him, and the iniquity of the iniquitous shall be upon him (Ezek 18:20).
Iulianum.3.49Quomodo se Deus iudicaturum promittat, relucet, id est nec peccata parentum imputare filiis nec filiorum parentibus; ac per hoc constitit etiam testimoniis Scripturarum, de quo ambigi ratio non sinebat, eam videlicet iustitiam Deum tenere in iudiciis suis, quam tenuit in praeceptis.
How God promises that he will judge shines forth—that is, that he imputes neither the sins of parents to children nor those of children to parents; and thereby it is established, even by the testimonies of the Scriptures, what reason did not allow to be doubted—namely, that God holds in his judgments the same justice which he held in his precepts.
Iulianum.3.49AUG. Hinc saltem intellege de his ista locutum Deum patribus et filiis, qui separatim iam viverent, quia, cum dixisset: Non accipiet iniquitatem patris sui filius neque pater accipiet iniustitiam filii sui, mox addidit: Iustitia iusti super ipsum erit. Numquid enim in hoc saeculo dici de parvulo potest, quod iustitia eius super ipsum sit, quandoquidem per vitam propriam nec iuste nec inique adhuc potest vivere? Quidquid igitur poenarum in hac aetate patitur, quo merito patitur, si nullum ex parentibus traxit? Cum iustissimus Deus poenas immeritas nec infligat alicui nec infligi sinat, nec dici possit ad exercendam virtutem parvuli, quae adhuc in eo nulla est, haec mala eum perpeti.
Aug. From this at least understand that God said these things of those fathers and sons who already lived separately, because, when he had said, The son shall not bear the iniquity of his father, nor shall the father bear the injustice of his son, he soon added, The justice of the just shall be upon him. For can it be said in this age of a little one that his justice is upon him, since through his own life he cannot yet live either justly or iniquitously? Whatever punishments, then, he suffers at this age, by what desert does he suffer them, if he has drawn nothing from his parents? Since the most just God neither inflicts undeserved punishments on anyone nor permits them to be inflicted, and it cannot be said that the little one suffers these evils for the exercising of a virtue which as yet is none in him.
Iulianum.3.49Porro, si futurum saeculum cogites, quod pertinet ad haereditatem Testamenti Novi, etiam de parvulis rectissime dicitur, qui in ipsa aetate moriuntur: Iustitia iusti super ipsum erit et iniquitas iniqui super ipsum erit. Sic enim discernetur a regenerato generatus, ut in eo regno iste vita vivat, in quo iustitia inhabitat, in eo autem supplicio ille morte moriatur, ubi cruciatur iniquitas. Sed quae istius iustitia, nisi quae in illum transit a Christo, in quo omnes vivificabuntur? Et quae huius iniquitas, nisi quae in illum transit ex Adam, in quo omnes moriuntur?
Further, if you consider the age to come, which pertains to the inheritance of the New Testament, it is most rightly said even of the little ones who die at that age: The justice of the just shall be upon him, and the iniquity of the iniquitous shall be upon him. For so will the begotten be distinguished from the regenerated, that the one shall surely live in that kingdom where justice dwells, but the other shall surely die in that punishment where iniquity is tormented. But what is the justice of the one, except that which passes into him from Christ, in whom all shall be made alive? And what is the iniquity of the other, except that which passes into him from Adam, in whom all die?
Iulianum.3.4950. IUL. Sed ne forte simpliciorum auribus tali cavillo coneris illudere, ut dicas Deum hic de his, qui perfectae sunt aetatis, locutum, id est ut illis filiis parentum crimina diceret non nocere, qui naturale malum operum suorum sanctitate vacuassent, osten dendum est nihil hanc promovere fraudem. Quamvis enim absolute praescripserit Deus, quoniam iniquitas parentum non addicat filios innocentes, sed unusquisque propriis iniquitatibus arguatur nec hinc fidelis animus possit ambigere, tamen, ut opinionis tuae confossum tot fulminibus legis retractemus cadaver, quatenus accipiendam hanc Dei disputationem putabis, videlicet ut parentum sicut nec adultis ita nec nascentibus filiis obsint delicta? An, ut tantummodo iam grandioris aetatis et iustitiam operantibus non sinantur nocere, parvulos autem, antequam per propriam iustitiam naturale virus exhauriant, scelere generantium gravari, sicque fiat quod per Prophetam Deus futurum negavit?
50. Jul. But lest perhaps you try to mock the ears of the simpler by such a cavil, saying that God here spoke of those who are of mature age—that is, that he said the crimes of parents do no harm to those sons who had emptied out the natural evil by the holiness of their own works—it must be shown that this fraud advances nothing. For although God prescribed absolutely that the iniquity of parents does not condemn innocent children, but each one is reproved by his own iniquities, and a faithful mind cannot doubt this, nonetheless, that we may handle the corpse of your opinion, pierced through by so many thunderbolts of the Law: how will you think this disputation of God ought to be received—namely, that the offenses of parents harm neither adult nor newborn sons? Or that they are not permitted to harm only those of greater age and working justice, but that little ones, before they exhaust the natural poison by their own justice, are burdened by the crime of those who beget—and so there comes about what God, through the prophet, denied would be?
Iulianum.3.50AUG. Immo sic fit, quod alio loco Deus dicit: Reddam peccata patrum in filios (Deut 5, 9). Cum enim utrumque ipse dicat, id est et patrum ad filios non pertinere peccata et reddere se in filios patrum peccata, non potest utique sibi esse contrarius; et ideo recte quaerentibus, quomodo utrumque sit verum, unum horum generationi, alterum regenerationi intellegitur convenire. Tu, qui pervertis cor tuum, cave illum et, quod verum audis, non vocabis cavillum.
Aug. Rather, there comes about what God says in another place: I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Deut 5:9). For since he himself says both—that is, both that the sins of fathers do not pertain to children, and that he repays the sins of fathers upon children—he surely cannot be contrary to himself; and therefore, to those who rightly ask how both are true, the one of these is understood to fit generation, the other regeneration. You, who pervert your own heart, beware of him; and what you hear to be true, you will not call a cavil.
Iulianum.3.5051. IUL. Sed ad hoc nos referimus. Et illud ergo aliud, quod paribus momentis appenditur fieri profitere, id est ut iustitiae parentum filiis suis prosint eosque sanctificent atque illis tantummodo non dicantur prodesse, qui grandioris iam aevi natales iustitias propriis attrivere criminibus, ut, quia utrumque a Deo negatum et alterum alterius exemplo dissertum atque inculcatum est, quam tu negationem rationibus tuis videns esse contrariam in parvulis mentitam esse contendis, ambas eius partes nascentium conditione confutes. Quod cum feceris, duo mala pariter perpetrabis, unum, quod oppugnat sententiam Dei, aliud quoniam nasci de iusto iustum et de criminoso asseris criminosum.
51. Jul. But to this we come back. Profess, then, that that other thing too, which is weighed in equal measures, comes about—that is, that the acts of justice of parents profit their children and sanctify them, and are said not to profit only those who, already of greater age, have worn away the acts of justice of their birth by their own crimes—so that, since both were denied by God and the one expounded and pressed home by the example of the other, you, seeing that denial to be contrary to your reasonings, contend that in little ones it lied, and refute both its sides by the condition of those being born. And when you have done this, you will perpetrate two evils equally: one, that it attacks the sentence of God; the other, that you assert that of a just man is born a just man, and of a criminal a criminal.
Iulianum.3.51AUG. Negationem Prophetae non dico mentitam, sed a te non intellectam. Ille quippe regenerationem prophetavit, quae a peccatis parentum ad Dei, non ad hominum iudicium pertinentibus sola filios esse praestat alienos; tu autem dum negas generationem contagium mortis antiquae de patribus trahere, ipsam regenerationis causam conaris extinguere. Quamvis enim lavacrum regenerationis, quidquid peccatorum invenerit, diluat, tamen alia peccata possent et paenitendo sanari, sicut possunt in eis, quos iterum regenerare fas non est; illud vero, quod generatione contrahitur, nisi regeneratione non solvitur. Iustus ergo ex Deo, non ex homine nascitur, quoniam renascendo, non nascendo fit iustus; unde etiam tales filii Dei vocantur. Lege Evangelium: Non ex sanguinibus neque ex voluntate carnis neque ex voluntate viri, sed ex Deo natisunt (Io 1, 13). Quid quaeris rerum genera multum diversa coniungere? Homines hominum carne nascuntur, Dei Spiritu renascuntur. Quid ergo mirum, si quemadmodum de Spiritu iustitiae sumit homo iustitiam, ita de carne peccati trahit originale peccatum? Neque enim venisset homo unus ad liberandos nos in similitudine carnis peccati, nisi omnium nostrum esset caro peccati. Cum igitur huic gratiae christianae sit inimica haeresis vestra, adhuc mirari et conqueri audetis, quod vos Christi detestetur Ecclesia?
Aug. I do not say that the prophet's denial lied, but that it was not understood by you. For he prophesied regeneration, which alone makes sons strangers to the sins of parents—sins that pertain to the judgment of God, not of human beings; but you, while you deny that generation draws the contagion of the ancient death from the fathers, try to extinguish the very cause of regeneration. For although the bath of regeneration washes away whatever sins it finds, yet other sins could be healed even by repenting, as they can be in those whom it is not lawful to regenerate again; but that which is contracted by generation is not loosed except by regeneration. The just man, then, is born of God, not of man, since by being reborn, not by being born, he becomes just; whence too such are called the sons of God. Read the Gospel: Not of bloods, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God they were born (John 1:13). Why do you seek to join kinds of things much diverse? Human beings are born of the flesh of human beings; they are reborn of the Spirit of God. What wonder, then, if, just as a human being takes justice from the Spirit of justice, so he draws original sin from the flesh of sin? For the one man would not have come to set us free in the likeness of the flesh of sin, were not the flesh of us all the flesh of sin. Since, then, your heresy is the enemy of this Christian grace, do you still dare to marvel and complain that the Church of Christ detests you?
Iulianum.3.5152. IUL. Si autem non sustinens reclamantis strepitum veritatis alio tentaris effugere, in plagas incides fortiores. Nam si dicas: Vera quidem est sententia Prophetae, sed in personis grandioribus, quae dicit necessitudines culpis mutuis non gravari, in parvulis autem ab una sui parte mentitur, qua dicit eos reos non esse ob scelera generantium, in alia autem non mentitur, in qua asserit eos nullis parentum virtutibus sublevari, tunc plane foedissimam non disputandi sed confingendi, non eloquendi sed loquendi, non postremo sani hominis, sed excidentis sensu Manichaei libidinem publicabis, si tibi putes contra perspicuam rationem, contra honorem Dei, contra exempla, contra testimonia praeceptorum, contra expositionem iudiciorum, quod libuerit, licere respuere et, quod delectarit, assumere.
52. Jul. But if, not bearing the clamor of resisting truth, you try to flee elsewhere, you will fall into stronger snares. For if you say: The sentence of the prophet is indeed true, but in the case of persons of greater age, where it says that kinships are not burdened with one another's faults; but in little ones it lies in one part, where it says that they are not guilty for the crimes of those who beget, while in another it does not lie, where it asserts that they are relieved by no virtues of their parents—then plainly you will publish the lust not of disputing but of fabricating, not of speaking eloquently but of mere talking, and finally not of a sound human being but of Manichaeus, falling from his senses, if you think it lawful for you, against clear reason, against the honor of God, against the examples, against the testimonies of the precepts, against the exposition of the judgments, to reject what you please and take up what delights you.
Iulianum.3.52AUG. Sententia Prophetae ex nulla parte mentitur. Sed tu non intellegens, quod per illam prophetatur, ut non dicam mentiris, certe, quod sine iniuria tua dixerim, nescis, quid loquaris. Nam et hoc, quod dicis asserere Prophetam nullis parentum virtutibus filios sublevari, quomodo et quatenus accipiatur, interest plurimum. Numquid enim vos negatis fide parentum regenerandos offerri filios Ecclesiae matri et baptizandos ministris Dei? Quomodo ergo nullis parentum virtutibus filii sublevantur? An christianam fidem dicere audebis nullam esse virtutem? An non sublevantur, cum in Dei regnum non aliter quam eadem regeneratione mittuntur?
Aug. The sentence of the prophet lies in no part. But you, not understanding what is prophesied through it—not to say that you lie, at least, what I may say without injury to you, you do not know what you are saying. For even this, that you say the prophet asserts that sons are relieved by no virtues of their parents—how and in what sense it is to be taken matters very much. For do you deny that sons are offered, by the faith of their parents, to mother Church to be regenerated, and to the ministers of God to be baptized? How, then, are sons relieved by no virtues of their parents? Or will you dare to say that the Christian faith is no virtue? Or are they not relieved, when they are sent into the kingdom of God in no other way than by that same regeneration?
Iulianum.3.52In ipsis quoque beneficiis temporalibus quare dicitur ad Isaac: Faciam tibi propter Abraham, patrem tuum (Gen 26, 24)? Quare etiam Loth, filius fratris Abrahae, patrui sui meritis adiuvatur, si nullis parentum virtutibus filii sublevantur (Cf. Gen 14, 14-16)? Quare postremo et propter peccata Salomonis filio eius regnum minuitur et propter bona merita David non totum tollitur, si nullis peccatis parentum filii gravantur aut nullis virtutibus sublevantur (Cf. 3 Reg 11, 11-13)? Homo linguate, non cordate, ista discerne, hic vide, si potes, quid per Ezechielem fuerit prophetatum (Ez 18, 21).
And in temporal benefits too, why is it said to Isaac, I will do it for you on account of Abraham your father (Gen 26:24)? Why also is Lot, the son of Abraham's brother, helped by the merits of his uncle, if sons are relieved by no virtues of their parents (See Gen 14:14-16)? Why, finally, is the kingdom diminished for Solomon's son on account of Solomon's sins, and not wholly taken away on account of the good merits of David, if sons are burdened by no sins of their parents or relieved by no virtues (See 1 Kgs 11:11-13)? O man of tongue, not of heart, distinguish these things; see here, if you can, what was prophesied through Ezekiel (Ezek 18:21).
Iulianum.3.52In aperto est enim nec patrem non regeneratum obesse filio regenerato ad capessendam vitam aeternam, de qua dictum est: vita vivet,
For it is in the open that a father who is not regenerated does not harm a regenerated son in the laying hold of eternal life, of which it was said, he shall surely live,
Iulianum.3.52nec patrem regeneratum prodesse ad hoc ipsum filio non regenerato nec vicissim filium patri aut prodesse regeneratum non regenerato aut obesse non regeneratum regenerato, ut ille vita vivat vel iste morte moriatur. Si autem ista non potes videre, cur nec tacere?
nor does a regenerated father profit, to this very end, a son who is not regenerated; nor, in turn, does a son either, being regenerated, profit an unregenerated father, or, being unregenerated, harm a regenerated father, so that the one should surely live or the other surely die. But if you cannot see these things, why can you not at least keep silent?
Iulianum.3.5253. IUL. Quis tu es, qui oestro Marcionis concitatus in excidium aequitatis irrumpas? Qui sub censuram linguae tuae mysteriis adhuc Manichaeorum lubricae Dei tam iudicia quam praecepta compellas? Nemo hoc umquam facere, nisi qui prius ea negavit, aggressus est. Tu testamentum Dei, quod ratio aequitas pietas veritas fide scribentibus Prophetis quasi quidam sacrorum testium ordo signavit, audebis Manichaeo auctore perrumpere. Olim et intellegentiae sanctitatem et religionis speciem perdidisti, si hac sententia, quae apud Ezechielem est, traducis tuae putes aut auxilium reperiri aut exitium non teneri.
53. Jul. Who are you, who, stirred up by the gadfly of Marcion, burst forth to the destruction of equity? Who force under the censure of your tongue, still slippery with the mysteries of the Manicheans, both the judgments and the precepts of God? No one ever attempted to do this except one who first denied them. Will you dare, with Manichaeus as your authority, to break through the testament of God, which reason, equity, piety, truth—the prophets writing in faith, as it were a certain order of sacred witnesses—have sealed? Long ago you lost both the holiness of understanding and the appearance of religion, if by this sentence which is in Ezekiel you think that either help is found for your propagation, or destruction is not held.
Iulianum.3.53AUG. Spatiatur loquacitas inopiae copiosa, ubi non cernitur vel etiam, si cernitur, spernitur veritas, ubi est non verborum vanissima, sed rerum certissima copia. Aliud est directus veridicus, aliud disertus maledicus. Propheta filiis et patribus suas vitas separatim ducentibus vera dicit, tu Manichaeorum nomine catholicis Prophetam recte intellegentibus Pelagiana rabie maledicis.
Aug. Loquacity, copious in its poverty, ranges about where truth is not perceived, or, even if it is perceived, is spurned—where there is an abundance not of words, most empty, but of facts, most sure. A speaker of truth, in a straight line, is one thing; an eloquent slanderer another. The prophet speaks truth to sons and fathers leading their lives separately; you, in the name of the Manicheans, slander with Pelagian rage Catholics who rightly understand the prophet.
Iulianum.3.5354. IUL. Iniquitas iniqui - inquit - super caput eius; unumquemque vestrum secundum vias suas iudicabo (Ez 18, 20. 30). Non morientur patres pro filiis neque filii pro parentibus; anima - inquit - quae peccat, ipsa morietur; quoniam omnes animae meae sunt, unumquemque pro suis iniquitatibus iudicabo (Ez 18, 4. 30).
54. Jul. The iniquity of the iniquitous, he says, shall be upon his head; I will judge each one of you according to his ways (Ezek 18:20, 30). The fathers shall not die for the sons, nor the sons for the parents; the soul, he says, that sins shall die; since all souls are mine, I will judge each one for his own iniquities (Ezek 18:4, 30).
Iulianum.3.54AUG. Deus, qui haec dicit, ipse Deus est, qui dicit: Reddam peccata patrum in filios (Deut 5, 9). Nisi intellexeris, quomodo utrumque sit verum, nullo modo credas Prophetam te intellexisse veridicum, quantalibet te patiar loquacitate maledicum.
Aug. God, who says these things, is the same God who says, I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Deut 5:9). Unless you understand how both are true, in no way believe that you have understood the truth-telling prophet, however much I bear with you as a slanderer of such loquacity.
Iulianum.3.5455. IUL. En cui luci, cui populo sententiarum, cui dignitati iudiciorum tradux tua et convitium facere non timet et conatur inferre praeiudicium. Hic dubium non est, quia non te pudeat illud dicere, quod videtur reliquum, id est ut respondeas veram Prophetae, immo Dei per Prophetam esse sententiam, insuperabilem prudentum rationem, qua docetur iniquissimum, ut peccata parentum filiis imputentur.
55. Jul. See against what light, against what host of sentences, against what dignity of judgments your propagation does not fear to revile, and tries to bring in a prejudgment. Here there is no doubt that you are not ashamed to say that which seems to remain—that is, that you answer that the sentence of the prophet, nay, of God through the prophet, is true: the insuperable reason of the prudent, by which it is taught that it is most iniquitous for the sins of parents to be imputed to children.
Iulianum.3.55AUG. Erubesce, tu es iniquissimus; nam qui dixit: Reddam peccata patrum in filios (Ibidem), non est iniquus.
Aug. Blush: you are the most iniquitous; for he who said, I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Deut 5:9), is not iniquitous.
Iulianum.3.5556. IUL. Nec te hoc putare, quia reatu voluntatis semina omnium hominum polluantur, sed tamen hanc iustitiam in Adae solius crimine non valere, ipsius unum esse peccatum, quod omnibus imputetur. Ad quod ego quid prius facere debeam nescio: rideamne, quod ineptiae exigunt singulares? Sed multorum perditio, quos decipitis, miserationem expectat et lacrimas. Serio ergo maerore conficiar? Sed argumentorum tuorum prodigia incutiunt, quamvis maesto animo, cachinnum.
56. Jul. Nor that you think this—that the seeds of all human beings are polluted by the guilt of the will, but that this justice does not hold in the crime of Adam alone, his being one sin which is imputed to all. To which I know not what I ought to do first: should I laugh, as such singular absurdities demand? But the perdition of the many whom you deceive awaits pity and tears. Should I, then, be consumed with serious grief? But the portents of your arguments strike out a guffaw, though from a mournful mind.
Iulianum.3.56AUG. Dic, quod dicturus es, egregie corrector. Quo auctore deceptor est credendus Ambrosius, de quo ait Pelagius (PELAGIUS, De lib. arb. 3), magister tuus, quod eius fidem et purissimum in Scripturis sensum ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere. Tu eum reprehende; fortior enim es atque potentior inimicus crucis Christi, quam si esses inimicus Ambrosii; audacius invides gratiae Dei, quam si invideres illi homini Dei. Reprehende, inquam, irride exagitando, defle dolendo; potes enim vi magna eloquentiae in urbanitatem ducere vanitatem tuam et in misericordiam transfigurare vecordiam.
Aug. Say what you are going to say, O excellent corrector. On whose authority is Ambrose to be believed a deceiver—Ambrose, of whom Pelagius (Pelagius, De lib. arb. 3), your master, says that not even an enemy dared to reprove his faith and his most pure understanding in the Scriptures? Do you reprove him; for you are a braver and more powerful enemy of the cross of Christ than if you were an enemy of Ambrose; more boldly do you begrudge the grace of God than if you begrudged that man of God. Reprove him, I say; mock him by harrying him, bewail him with grief; for you can, by the great force of your eloquence, lead your vanity into wit and transfigure your madness into mercy.
Iulianum.3.56Dic ergo illum virum errasse deformiter, desipuisse infeliciter affirmando discordiam concupiscentiae carnis et spiritus in naturam ex primi hominis praevaricatione vertisse (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 141). Quis enim sine illa nascitur, ex quo coeperunt homines nasci nascendo utique in carne peccati? Sed tu, homo acutissimus, non credens tale ac tantum illud fuisse peccatum, ut posset in hoc malum tunc ipsam mutare naturam eamque ineffabilis apostasiae merito facere cum stirpe damnandam, hoc, quod omnes sobrii malum sentiunt, malum iudicant, ebrius Pelagiano dogmate asseris bonum.
Say, then, that that man erred deformedly, was unhappily out of his senses, in affirming that the discord of the concupiscence of the flesh and of the spirit turned into nature out of the transgression of the first man (See Ambrose, In Luc. 7.141). For who is born without it, from the time when human beings began to be born—being born, surely, in the flesh of sin? But you, a most acute man, not believing that that sin was such and so great that it could then change nature itself into this evil, and make it, by the desert of an unspeakable apostasy, to be condemned together with its stock, assert, drunk with the Pelagian dogma, to be good this which all sober persons feel to be evil and judge to be evil.
Iulianum.3.56Mirabili enim facundia potes eam, quam sancti accusant gemitibus, tu laudibus ornare libidinem et talem prorsus, qualis et nunc est, se scilicet nolentibus ingerentem et ad certamen provocantem corda castorum tamquam formosum et amoenum lignum, etiamsi nemo ibi peccasset, inter paradisi nemora collocare. Erubesce, beatitudo Pelagianorum, et vide quo fugias, quia casti te fugiunt.
For by a wondrous eloquence you can adorn with praises that lust which the saints accuse with groans, and place it—just such as it is even now, namely, forcing itself upon those who do not will it and provoking the hearts of the chaste to combat—among the groves of paradise, as a beautiful and pleasant tree, even if no one had there sinned. Blush, O beatitude of the Pelagians, and see whither you flee, since the chaste flee from you.
Iulianum.3.5657. IUL. Quis enim hoc, si quid saeculo huic superfuerit aetatis, monumentis credere poterit litterarum exstitisse videlicet hominem, qui crederet et iuraret non esse naturale, quod esset naturale, non esse generationis, quod esset generationis, non pertinere ad condicionem parentum, quod ad aliquos non ob aliud pertineret, nisi quia fuissent parentes? Puto, quod conficta haec magis quam ab ullis defensa mortalibus arbitretur secutura generatio. Hos enim natatus et has nauseas atque hos vomitus vestra natio fidesque perpetitur, qui dicitis: Non possunt parentum peccata ad filios decurrere per naturam, quia res arbitrii seminibus non ligatur, sed peccatum Adae, quod de voluntate conceptum est, transit in omnes homines per naturam, quia res arbitrii seminibus illigata est; non damnat etiam Deus filios pro peccatis parentum, quia summae iniquitatis est, sed damnat Adae posteros propter peccatum parentum, quod nulla potest iustitia vindicari. Non pertinet postremo ad condicionem generationis, quia hi, qui coniuges sunt, fiunt parentes, quod non ob aliud pertinuit ad Adam, nisi quia coniugii lege generavit. Hoccine cursum gubernare est an natare? Hoccine est conficere an nauseare? Hoccine est sumere aliquid solidum an semper evomere? Isdem sermonibus quod negaveris, affirmas, isdem lineis quod affirmaveris, denegas, et irasceris, cur non acquiescamus homini, qui gravi morbo ruptus non potest tenere, quod suscipit.
57. Jul. For who—if anything of this age survives into this world—could believe by the monuments of letters that there existed a man who would believe and swear that what was natural is not natural, that what was of generation is not of generation, that what pertained to the condition of parents did not pertain to certain persons for any other reason than that they had been parents? I think the generation to follow would judge these things to be fabricated rather than defended by any mortals. For your nation and faith suffer these swimmings and these nauseas and these vomitings, you who say: The sins of parents cannot run down to children through nature, because a matter of choice is not bound to the seeds; but the sin of Adam, which was conceived of will, passes into all human beings through nature, because a matter of choice is bound to the seeds; God does not condemn children too for the sins of parents, because it is of the highest iniquity—but he condemns the posterity of Adam on account of the sin of their parent, which can be vindicated by no justice. It does not, finally, pertain to the condition of generation, because those who are spouses become parents—which pertained to Adam for no other reason than that he begot by the law of marriage. Is this to steer one's course, or to flounder? Is this to accomplish something, or to be nauseous? Is this to take in something solid, or always to vomit it up? By the same words you affirm what you denied; by the same lines you deny what you affirmed; and you are angry that we do not acquiesce in a man who, ruptured by a grave disease, cannot keep down what he takes in.
Iulianum.3.57AUG. Absit, ut dicamus aliorum patrum in filios Deum peccata non reddere, cum Scriptura divina totiens nominatimque testetur, pro quibus patrum peccatis in quos eorum filios vindicta processerit usque adeo, ut quoddam peccatum grave regis Achab parcens ei Deus in eius filium vindicare distulerit (Cf. 3 Reg 21, 29). Sed quis modus et quae sit divinae ratio atque mensura iustitiae de aliorum patrum peccatis, ut reddantur in filios, indagare quis potest?
Aug. Far be it from us to say that God does not repay the sins of other fathers upon their children, since divine Scripture testifies so often and by name, for which sins of fathers the vengeance went forth upon which of their children—so far that God, sparing King Ahab, deferred the vengeance for a certain grave sin of his upon his son (See 1 Kgs 21:29). But who can search out what the measure is, and what the reason and divine measure of justice, concerning the sins of other fathers, that they should be repaid upon their children?
Iulianum.3.57Propter quod Deus sibi tenuit ista iudicia, hominem vero iudicantem sic vindicare prohibuit. Sed apostasia primi hominis, in quo summa erat et nullo impediebatur vitio libertas propriae voluntatis, tam magnum peccatum fuit, ut ruina eius natura humana esset tota collapsa, quod indicat humani generis tanta miseria, quae a primis ploratibus vagientium usque ad exspirantium novissimos halitus omnibus nota est ita, ut, qui eam negant, maiorem partem sibi vindicent humanae miseriae tam horribili et incredibili caecitate, sicut vos facitis, qui mortalem Adam ita factum ut, sive peccaret sive non peccaret, moriturus esset, etiam post iudicium Palaestinum, ubi vos ista dicentes Pelagius ipse damnavit (De gestis Pel. 23-24. 57), adhuc dicere non timetis. Sed perge, ut tibi placet, atque ipsos etiam tot Palaestinos episcopos criminare Manichaeos; clama Pelagium ad horam cessisse Manichaeis, ne damnaretur ab eis. Imple paradisum pomis libidinum et tot ac tanta mala, quae perpeti videmus infantes, tamquam non sint poenales dolores, sed vernales odores, per illa felicia prata diffunde. Et me irride quasi natantem, cum tu in haec profunda demersus intereas; me irride quasi nauseantem ac vomentem, cum tu mortuus iaceas et tamquam vermescente putredine sic inquieta loquacitate putescas; me argue quasi affirmantem, quod negaverim, et, quod affirmaverim, denegantem, cum tu potius hoc feceris, sicut in tuo volumine superiore monstravi, et me hoc non fecisse possint, qui legunt, attendere et, quam fallaciter hoc me fecisse dixeris, invenire; me dic gravi morbo ruptum, quod suscipio, tenere non posse, cum tu spiritu vitae penitus amisso non saltem valeas ingesta suscipere.
On account of which God kept these judgments to himself, but forbade a human being judging so to take vengeance. But the apostasy of the first man—in whom the freedom of his own will was at its height and was impeded by no fault—was so great a sin that by his ruin the whole of human nature collapsed; which is indicated by the so great misery of the human race, known to all from the first wailings of the crying infant to the last breaths of the dying, so that those who deny it claim for themselves the greater part of human misery by so horrible and incredible a blindness—as you do, who do not fear to say even now, after the Palestinian judgment, where Pelagius himself condemned you for saying these things (The Deeds of Pelagius 23-24, 57), that Adam was so made mortal that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he would die. But go on, as it pleases you, and accuse even those many Palestinian bishops themselves of being Manicheans; cry out that Pelagius for the hour yielded to the Manicheans, lest he be condemned by them. Fill paradise with the fruits of lusts, and pour out through those happy meadows the so many and so great evils which we see infants suffer, as though they were not penal pains, but vernal scents. And mock me as though swimming, while you, plunged into these depths, perish; mock me as though nauseous and vomiting, while you lie dead and, as though with rotting putrefaction, so molder with restless loquacity; accuse me as though affirming what I have denied, and denying what I have affirmed, while it is rather you who have done this, as I showed in your earlier volume—and those who read can attend to the fact that I have not done this, and find how falsely you have said that I did; call me ruptured by a grave disease, unable to keep down what I take in, while you, having utterly lost the spirit of life, cannot even take in what is set before you.
Iulianum.3.5758. IUL. Vides quidem etiam ipse rem dignam conflictatione non esse; tamen, ut mentibus subveniatur incautis, quae crassiores quasque opiniones et malis moribus blandientes in solacium assumunt conscientiae sauciatae, interrogamus, utrum tantae stoliditatis inventum de aliqua Scripturarum occasione compereris. Si dixeris: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum (Rom 5, 12), admonemus te, ut relegas praesentis operis superiorem libellum, cuius si memor fueris, Apostoli testimonium usurpare non poteris.
58. Jul. You see indeed yourself that the matter is not worthy of contention; nonetheless, that aid may be brought to incautious minds, which take up the coarser opinions, and those flattering evil ways, as a solace for a wounded conscience, we ask whether you discovered the invention of such great stupidity from any occasion of the Scriptures. If you say, Through one man sin entered the world (Rom 5:12), we admonish you to reread the earlier book of the present work; and if you remember it, you will not be able to make use of the Apostle's testimony.
Iulianum.3.58AUG. Nos te potius admonemus, ut ipsum Apostolum legas et videas pauca ipsa, de quibus agimus, verba eius tam manifesta esse contra te, ut non libello, sed plane longissimo et loquacissimo libro frustra ea fueris in haereticam vestram sententiam non vertere sed pervertere, non exponere sed obscurare conatus.
Aug. We rather admonish you to read the Apostle himself and see that those very few words of his, about which we are dealing, are so manifest against you that, not in a book, but plainly in a most long and most loquacious book, you have tried in vain not to turn but to pervert them into your heretical sentence, not to expound but to obscure them.
Iulianum.3.5859. IUL. Si autem dixeris, quia una est forma baptismatis, qua diversae aetatis homines consecrantur, fateberis etiam me tacente commemorationem ibi nec generationis infectae nec carnis diabolicae nec Adae aliquam contineri; ad quod tamen suo loco, quamvis ad traducem non spectet, plene responsuri sumus.
59. Jul. But if you say that there is one form of baptism by which human beings of different ages are consecrated, you will confess, even though I be silent, that there is contained there no mention either of an infected generation or of diabolical flesh or of Adam; to which, however, in its own place, although it does not bear on propagation, we shall fully answer.
Iulianum.3.59AUG. Ubi respondere coeperis, quid ibi nisi ut soles haereticus apparebis?
Aug. When you begin to answer, how will you appear there except, as you are wont, a heretic?
Iulianum.3.5960. IUL. Unam ergo saltem contra tantam a nobis productorum testium dignitatem, contra iustitiam manifestam, contra perspicuam rationem legis ede sententiam, per quam te ostendas fuisse deceptum; quod ideo addidi, quia, etiamsi esset, quae tale aliquid ambiguitate verborum putaretur ostendere, aliarum tamen sententiarum splendore et magisterio ita, ut iustitiae congruebat, cogebatur exponi.
60. Jul. Bring forth, then, at least one sentence against so great a dignity of the witnesses we have produced, against manifest justice, against the clear reason of the Law, through which you may show that you have been deceived; which I have added for this reason, because, even if there were a sentence that, by the ambiguity of its words, was thought to show something of the sort, it would nonetheless be compelled, by the splendor and instruction of the other sentences, to be expounded as accorded with justice.
Iulianum.3.60AUG. Certa, non ambigua contra vos divina testimonia proferuntur, sicut a nobis iam multa prolata sunt (Deut 5, 9); sed quia tenebras vestras redarguunt, vobis lucida non videntur et, quaecumque vobis sua radiante luce molesta sunt, contra illa cor clauditis, ne inde nox fugetur erroris.
Aug. Certain, not ambiguous, divine testimonies are brought forward against you, as many have already been brought forward by us (Deut 5:9); but because they refute your darkness, they do not seem luminous to you; and whatever things, by their radiant light, are troublesome to you, against these you close your heart, lest from there the night of your error be put to flight.
Iulianum.3.6061. IUL. Nunc autem, cum nec exigua opinionis huius in Scripturis sanctis inveniatur occasio et e regione fides, quam tuemur, non minus rationibus suis quam exemplis et testimoniis muniatur, funesta es prorsus obstinatione pervasus, qui putas damno legis, damno rationis, damno prudentiae damnoque iustitiae Manichaeorum somniis annuendum.
61. Jul. But now, since neither the slightest occasion for this opinion is found in the holy Scriptures, and, on the other side, the faith we maintain is fortified no less by its reasonings than by examples and testimonies, you are wholly possessed by a deadly obstinacy, you who think that, at the cost of the Law, at the cost of reason, at the cost of prudence, at the cost of justice, one must assent to the dreams of the Manicheans.
Iulianum.3.61AUG. Damno legis non audis: Reddam in filios peccata patrum (Ibidem); damno rationis non vides mala, quae parvuli patiuntur, qui propria peccata in hac vita nulla fecerunt, nonnisi ex peccatis originis causas iustas habere apud Deum; damno prudentiae non caves, contra antiquissimum fidei catholicae fundamentum dogma proferre vel defensare novitium, quo negatur originale peccatum; damno iustitiae sic iniquus es, ut sub meo nomine tot viris sanctis, Ecclesiae Christi filiis et patribus, discipulis atque doctoribus, qui ante nos fuerunt, atque ipsi matri omnium, catholicae Ecclesiae, non timeas Manichaeae pestis obiectare contagium.
Aug. At the cost of the Law you do not hear, I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Deut 5:9); at the cost of reason you do not see that the evils which little ones suffer—who committed no sins of their own in this life—have just causes before God only from the sins of origin; at the cost of prudence you do not beware of bringing forward or defending, against the most ancient foundation of the Catholic faith, a novel dogma by which original sin is denied; at the cost of justice you are so iniquitous that, under my name, you do not fear to fling the contagion of the Manichean plague at so many holy men—sons and fathers, disciples and teachers of the Church of Christ, who were before us—and at the very mother of all, the Catholic Church.
Iulianum.3.6162. IUL. Quid tamen in hunc sensum afferamus attende. Etiamsi posses probare Adae peccatum filiis imputari, assentireris tamen aliorum parentum suboli eorum crimina non nocere.
62. Jul. Yet attend to what we bring forward to this purpose. Even if you could prove that Adam's sin is imputed to his children, you would nonetheless agree that the crimes of other parents do not harm their offspring.
Iulianum.3.62AUG. Quis huic errori assentiatur, nisi qui non credit Deo dicenti: Reddam peccata patrum in filios?
Aug. Who would agree with this error, except one who does not believe God when he says, I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children?
Iulianum.3.6263. IUL. Manifestum erat non generationis, sed alterius cuiuscumque fuisse causae, quod unius generantis peccato apud iniquum tamen iudicem filii videbantur obnoxii.
63. Jul. It was manifest that it was not of generation, but of some other cause whatever, that the sons seemed liable—before an iniquitous judge, however—for the sin of one who begot them.
Iulianum.3.63AUG. Apertissime dicis iniquum Deum, qui peccata patrum apertissime dicit se in filios redditurum.
Aug. Most openly you call God iniquitous—God, who most openly says that he will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children.
Iulianum.3.6364. IUL. Fiebatque, ut sicut iudicis aestimatio innocentibus maculabatur addictis, ita generationis status aliorum parentum vindicaretur exemplis. Si enim tramitis, si criminis causa in fecunditatis opere constitisset, omnem fecunditatem condicio ista pollueret.
64. Jul. And it came about that, just as the judge's estimate was stained by the innocent being condemned, so the state of generation was vindicated by the examples of other parents. For if the cause of the path, if the cause of the crime, lay in the work of fruitfulness, this condition would pollute all fruitfulness.
Iulianum.3.64AUG. Reddam peccata patrum in filios (Ibidem) Deus clamat; ergo quia ille verax est, tu ab itinere veritatis exorbitas.
Aug. I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Deut 5:9), God cries out; therefore, because he is truthful, you stray from the path of truth.
Iulianum.3.6465. IUL. Cum vero non diversae generationis diversus tamen appareret status, relucebat prorsus etiam in illo coniugio, cuius reatui suboles sua communicaverat, generationem non fuisse vitiatam.
65. Jul. But since, though the generation was not different, the state nonetheless appeared different, it shone forth outright, even in that marriage whose guilt its offspring had shared, that the generation had not been corrupted.
Iulianum.3.65AUG. Etsi diversa generatio non est, cum morituri ex morituris nascuntur, tamen, quod dicit Apostolus: Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum (Rom 8, 10), non ad alios patres, sed ad illum pertinet, qui tanta impietate peccavit, quantam nos metiri atque aestimare non possumus. Sed quantam illam iudicaverit Deus, satis idoneis didicimus testibus et divina scilicet Scriptura et ipsa generis humani miseria, quantam pro peccato eius propagini eius non iniusto utique iudicio Dei redditam cernimus, qui, non dico aeternam et animae et corporis, sed nec temporalem corporis mortem nec tot ac tanta mala, quae videmus parvulos perpeti, etiam in paradiso, si nemo peccasset, futura fuisse dicimus, quoniam Christiani sumus. Alii vero patres etiamsi multa peccant, tamen, quia et anima infirma et in corpore corruptibili, quod aggravat animam, peccant, nec peccatis eorum fit natura moritura et peccata eorum in filios supplicio longe diverso et longe minore redduntur eius occulto iustoque iudicio, qui in mensura et numero et pondere cuncta disponit (Cf. Sap 11, 21), et: Reddam peccata patrum in filios (Deut 5, 9) non mendaciter dicit.
Aug. Although the generation is not different, when those doomed to die are born of those doomed to die, nonetheless what the Apostle says, The body indeed is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10), pertains not to other fathers, but to that one who sinned with so great an impiety as we cannot measure or estimate. But how great God judged it to be, we have learned by sufficiently fitting witnesses, namely both divine Scripture and the very misery of the human race—how great a misery we perceive to have been repaid, by a judgment of God surely not unjust, to his offspring for his sin. For we say that not—I do not say the eternal death of soul and body, but—even the temporal death of the body, nor the so many and so great evils which we see little ones suffer, would have existed even in paradise, if no one had sinned, since we are Christians. But other fathers, even if they sin much, yet, because they sin with a weak soul and in a corruptible body that weighs down the soul, their sins do not make nature doomed to die, and their sins are repaid upon their children by a far different and far lesser punishment, by the hidden and just judgment of him who orders all things in measure and number and weight (See Wis 11:21), and who says, I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Deut 5:9), not falsely.
Iulianum.3.6566. IUL. Quid igitur actum est? Videlicet tam certum esse traducem non esse peccati ut, etiamsi doceres propter Adae peccatum filios puniri, constaret tamen innasci peccata non posse nec crimen ire cum semine, quando non hoc in omni fecunditate esse faterere; ac per hoc, etsi traderentur personis vitia, non tamen conceptibus miscerentur. Nunc au tem cum inter me et te conveniat parentum peccatum ad filios nisi vitio et reatu generationis non potuisse transire, rationi autem, exemplis legique convenerit generationis statum nullo pacto potuisse vitiari, quod ex tua etiam concessione firmatur, qui dicis nullorum parentum peccata praeter duorum ad liberos permeare, invictissime confectum est nec fecunditatem primorum hominum a diabolo fuisse corruptam nec nasci ullum posse peccatum.
66. Jul. What, then, has been accomplished? Namely, that it is so certain that there is no propagation of sin that, even if you should teach that children are punished on account of Adam's sin, it would nonetheless be established that sins cannot be born, nor a crime go with the seed—since you would confess that this is not so in all fruitfulness; and thereby, even if faults were transmitted to persons, they would not be mingled with conceptions. But now, since it is agreed between me and you that the sin of parents could not pass over to children except by the fault and guilt of generation, and since it has accorded with reason, with examples, and with the Law that the state of generation could in no way be corrupted—which is confirmed even by your own concession, you who say that the sins of no parents but two pass over to their children—it has been most invincibly concluded that neither was the fruitfulness of the first human beings corrupted by the devil, nor can any sin be born.
Iulianum.3.66AUG. Non hoc tibi dicitur; ipse tibi, quod non dicimus, dicis. Et aliorum patrum in filios peccata redduntur divina iustitia, non humana; scit enim Deus, quando et quomodo id iustissime faciat, homo autem nescit et secundum cognitionem suam debet ferre iudicium. Potest enim scire, cum iudicat, quamvis et hoc non semper, factum cuiusque personae; unde autem novit, quibus et qualibus vinculis connexa sit, de qua orta est, natura naturae? Sed illud unum, quo in mortis necessitatem mutata est humana natura, etiamsi alia nulla sint, sufficere ad damnationem, nisi generationis obligatio regeneratione solvatur, hoc dicimus, etsi audire non vultis; hoc veritate non vincitis, etsi oppugnare loquacitate persistitis.
Aug. This is not said to you; you yourself say to yourself what we do not say. The sins of other fathers too are repaid upon their children by divine, not human, justice; for God knows when and how he does this most justly, but a human being does not know, and according to his own knowledge ought to render judgment. For he can know, when he judges—though not even this always—the deed of each person; but whence does he know with what and what sort of bonds is bound the nature from which that nature arose? But that one sin, by which human nature was changed into the necessity of death, even if there were no others, suffices for condemnation, unless the bond of generation be loosed by regeneration—this we say, even though you are unwilling to hear it; this you do not conquer by truth, even though you persist in attacking it by loquacity.
Iulianum.3.6667. IUL. Quaeritur ergo a nobis, cur non assentiamur naturale esse peccatum. Respondemus: Quia nullum habet verisimilitudinis necdum veritatis, nullum iustitiae, nullum pietatis colorem, quia diabolum conditorem hominum facit videri.
67. Jul. It is asked of us, then, why we do not agree that sin is natural. We answer: Because it has no color of verisimilitude, much less of truth, none of justice, none of piety, because it makes the devil seem to be the creator of human beings.
Iulianum.3.67AUG. Facit plane videri, sed vobis, non eis, qui noverunt a natura discernere vitium, quamvis in natura sit vitium. Lege ad Hebraeos et vide eorum esse solidum cibum, qui exercitatos habent sensus ad separandum bonum a malo, quod vos non habetis (Cf. Hebr 5, 14). Ideo quando dicimus: Nascitur homo cum vitio, diabolum eius conditorem dici putatis ita caeci vel contentiosi, ut nec corporum vitia, cum quibus quidam nascuntur, possitis aut velitis attendere; quorum vitiorum merita si quaerantur a vobis, quo confugiatis nisi ad praecipitium, non invenitis, quamdiu ad catholicae solidam petram redire non vultis.
Aug. It plainly makes it seem so—but to you, not to those who know how to distinguish fault from nature, although the fault is in the nature. Read the Epistle to the Hebrews and see that solid food is for those who have their senses exercised to separate good from evil—which you do not have (See Heb 5:14). Therefore, when we say, "A human being is born with a fault," you think the devil is called his creator, being so blind or contentious that you can neither attend to, nor are willing to attend to, even the faults of bodies with which some are born; and if the deserts of those faults are asked of you, you find no place to flee except to the precipice, so long as you are unwilling to return to the solid rock of the Catholic faith.
Iulianum.3.6768. IUL. Quia Deo iudici iniquitatis crimen affigit.
68. Jul. Because it fixes the charge of iniquity upon God the judge.
Iulianum.3.68AUG. Vos hoc facitis, quia iniquum est grave super parvulos iugum, si nullum est originale peccatum.
Aug. It is you who do this, because the heavy yoke upon little ones is iniquitous if there is no original sin.
Iulianum.3.6869. IUL. Quia liberum arbitrium, quo potissimum praesidio contra diversos Ecclesia Christi munitur errores, infringit et destruit.
69. Jul. Because it breaks down and destroys free choice, the chief defense by which the Church of Christ is fortified against various errors.
Iulianum.3.69AUG. Liberum arbitrium vos opprimitis, cui reddendo vel adiuvando Dei gratiam denegatis.
Aug. It is you who oppress free choice, to which, for its restoring or its helping, you deny the grace of God.
Iulianum.3.6970. IUL. Dicens omnes homines adeo capaces nullius esse virtutis, ut in ipsis matrum visceribus antiquis criminibus impleantur.
70. Jul. Saying that all human beings are so incapable of any virtue that in their very mothers' wombs they are filled with ancient crimes.
Iulianum.3.70AUG. Quomodo diceremus gratia iustificari, id est iustos fieri, si capaces virtutis homines negaremus?
Aug. How could we say that human beings are justified by grace—that is, made just—if we denied that they are capable of virtue?
Iulianum.3.7071. IUL. Quorum tamen scelerum vim non solum expultricem innocentiae naturalis commentaris, verum etiam deinceps per totam vitam in universa vitia coactricem.
71. Jul. The force of which crimes, however, you devise as not only the expeller of natural innocence, but even thereafter, through the whole of life, the compeller into all vices.
Iulianum.3.71AUG. Per Dei gratiam minuitur, per Dei gratiam finitur necessitas nostra; non hic habet, quod agat, loquacitas vestra.
Aug. Through the grace of God our necessity is lessened, through the grace of God it is ended; here your loquacity has nothing to do.
Iulianum.3.7172. IUL. Quam legem etiam peccati in Prophetis et Apostolis iam magno morum et signorum fulgore conspicuis et post illam gratiam mysteriorum Christi, quam tu his omnibus dogmatis tui flagitiis opitulari putas, mansisse et viguisse deiuras.
72. Jul. Which law of sin you swear remained and flourished even in the prophets and apostles—already conspicuous for the great brightness of their conduct and signs—and even after that grace of the mysteries of Christ, which you think comes to the aid of all the disgraceful parts of your dogma.
Iulianum.3.72AUG. Susceptam tuam libidinem, hoc est concupiscentiam carnis concupiscentiae spiritus repugnantem, Prophetae et Apostoli fideliter expugnabant, quia non laudabant.
Aug. That lust you have taken up—that is, the concupiscence of the flesh warring against the concupiscence of the spirit—the prophets and apostles faithfully fought down, because they did not praise it.
Iulianum.3.7273. IUL. Quoniam conatus omnimodae honestatis exstinguit, quoniam morum obscaenitatem operum Dei, id est naturae humanae, consolatur et auget infamia, quoniam omnia mandata legis reatui impossibilitatis id est iniquitatis addicit.
73. Jul. Since it extinguishes the effort of all honesty, since it consoles and increases the obscenity of conduct with the infamy of God's works—that is, of human nature—since it adjudges all the commandments of the Law to the guilt of impossibility—that is, of iniquity.
Iulianum.3.73AUG. Qui dicit: Non quod volo ago, sed quod odio illud facio (Rom 7, 15), possibilitatem perfectionis suae in Dei gratia ponit contra vos; non in sua virtute confidit, ne sit vanus ut in vos.
Aug. He who says, I do not do what I will, but what I hate, that I do (Rom 7:15), places the possibility of his perfection in the grace of God, against you; he does not trust in his own strength, lest he be empty—as in you.
Iulianum.3.7374. IUL. Quoniam non minus habet turpitudinis quam profanitatis, cum pro summis assertionis suae testimoniis genitalium amplexatur pudorem.
74. Jul. Since it has no less of baseness than of profanity, when, for the highest testimonies of its assertion, it embraces the shame of the generative parts.
Iulianum.3.74AUG. Non amplexamur genitalium pudorem, sed potius, pudor iste unde sit, quod vos non vultis, agnoscimus. Audimus enim Scripturae manifestissimum testimonium (Cf. Gen 2, 25), contra quod vos obsurdescitis, cum obmutescere deberetis. Quis enim audiens, quod illi primi homines nudi erant et non pudebat eos, non videat, unde sit factum, ut post peccatum puderet eos nudos esse et ea membra, quorum puderet, festinarent succinctoriis qualibuscumque velare (Cf. Gen 3, 7)? Sed inventus est homo, qui etiam talem libidinem, cui repugnandum est, ne peccetur, et cuius etiam impudentes pudet, in paradiso constitueret, etiamsi nemo ibi peccasset, nec eum ista dicentem tantae ac tam sacrilegae deformitatis puderet. Rogo te, si libido ista, ut credimus, solam tibi ingerit resistendi molestiam, nullam vero exhibet voluntatem, cur ei, quamvis falsae, tam magnam laudis persolvendam putas esse mercedem?
Aug. We do not embrace the shame of the generative parts, but rather we acknowledge whence this shame is—which you are unwilling to do. For we hear the most manifest testimony of Scripture (See Gen 2:25), against which you grow deaf, when you ought to fall mute. For who, hearing that those first human beings were naked and were not ashamed, does not see whence it came about that, after sin, they were ashamed to be naked and hastened to veil with girdles of whatever sort those members of which they were ashamed (See Gen 3:7)? But a man has been found who would place even such a lust—which must be resisted, lest one sin, and of which even the shameless are ashamed—in paradise, even if no one had there sinned; nor is he, in saying these things, ashamed of so great and so sacrilegious a deformity. I ask you: if that lust, as we believe, brings upon you only the trouble of resisting, but presents no will, why do you think so great a reward of praise must be paid to it, even though that praise be false?
Iulianum.3.7475. IUL. Et pro auctoritatibus sacris Dei criminationibus intumescit.
75. Jul. And it swells, in place of the sacred authorities of God, with accusations.
Iulianum.3.75AUG. Itane vero sacra auctoritas non est: Corpus mortuum est propter peccatum (Rom 8, 10)? Et Dei criminatio, non laudatio est: Vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra (Rom 8, 11)? Puto, quod non criminator, sed ipso Deo plenus Dei praedicator haec dixit, ubi ostendit Adam non sic esse factum, quemadmodum dicitis, ut, sive peccaret sive non peccaret, moriturus esset.
Aug. Is this, then, not sacred authority: The body is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10)? And is it an accusation of God, not a praise: He will give life to your mortal bodies also (Rom 8:11)? I think that it was no accuser, but one full of God himself, a herald of God, who said these things, where he showed that Adam was not so made—as you say—that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he would die.
Iulianum.3.7576. IUL. In cuius praeceptis immoderationem tyrannicam.
76. Jul. That in his precepts there is a tyrannical immoderation.
Iulianum.3.76AUG. Praeceptum Dei tyrannicum non est, sed, ut impleatur, ipse rogandus est; hoc vos non vultis, quia in vestra virtute confiditis.
Aug. The precept of God is not tyrannical, but, that it may be fulfilled, he himself must be asked; this you are unwilling to do, because you trust in your own strength.
Iulianum.3.7677. IUL. In iudiciis iniquitatem barbaram.
77. Jul. That in his judgments there is a barbarous iniquity.
Iulianum.3.77AUG. Quoniam Dei non est iniquum iudicium, ideo in miseria generis humani, quae incipit a fletibus parvulorum, agnoscendum est originale peccatum.
Aug. Because the judgment of God is not iniquitous, therefore in the misery of the human race, which begins from the weeping of little ones, original sin must be acknowledged.
Iulianum.3.7778. IUL. In iuramentis falsitatem punicam inesse confirmat.
78. Jul. It affirms that in his oaths there is a Punic falsehood.
Iulianum.3.78AUG. Numquid quando Deus dicit: Reddam peccata patrum in filios (Deut 5, 9), punice loquitur?
Aug. When God says, I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Deut 5:9), does he speak as a Punic?
Iulianum.3.7879. IUL. Quoniam pro disputationibus et pro omnibus syllogismis Manichaei innititur somniis et furori.
79. Jul. Since, in place of disputations and all syllogisms, it relies on the dreams and frenzy of Manichaeus.
Iulianum.3.79AUG. Nec Manichaeus erat nec somniabat nec furebat, sive qui dixit: Fuimus et nos natura filii irae sicut et ceteri (Eph 2, 3), sive qui dixit: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13).
Aug. He was no Manichean, nor did he dream, nor did he rave—neither he who said, We too were by nature children of wrath, like the rest (Eph 2:3), nor he who said, We are all born under sin, and our very origin is in fault (Ambrose, De paenit. 1.3.13).
Iulianum.3.7980. IUL. Istae sunt ergo causae, quae nos in impugnationem mali naturalis accendunt, quae dedignari et despicere faciunt consortia perditorum.
80. Jul. These, then, are the causes that kindle us to the assault upon natural evil, that make us disdain and despise the fellowships of the lost.
Iulianum.3.80AUG. Tot tantorumque Doctorum catholicorum pium consensum nullo modo, nisi perditus, diceres consortium perditorum.
Aug. The pious consensus of so many and so great Catholic teachers you would in no way call a fellowship of the lost, unless you were lost yourself.
Iulianum.3.8081. IUL. Quae praestant nihilo magis nos totius mundi fragore terreri, quam si videremus tristis lupini silvam sonantem vel immundis suibus vel ventis irruentibus commoveri (Cf. VERGILIUS, Georg. 1, 75-76).
81. Jul. Which bring it about that we are no more terrified by the uproar of the whole world than if we saw a wood of dismal lupines sounding, stirred either by unclean swine or by inrushing winds (See Virgil, Georg. 1.75-76).
Iulianum.3.81AUG. Diffusa toto orbe catholica Ecclesia, quae prudenter exhorruit ora vestra, non est lupini silva, sed esse voluit a lupinis morsibus tuta.
Aug. The Catholic Church spread throughout the whole world, which prudently shuddered at your mouths, is no wood of lupines, but wished to be safe from the bites of wolves.
Iulianum.3.8182. IUL. Ergo Deum et iustum et pium credimus et veracem ac per hoc nihil impossibile mandasse legem eius tenemus, nihil falsum confirmare testimonia, nihil iniquum pronuntiare iudicia, sed ipsum esse hominum conditorem, quos nullo crimini obnoxios creat, verum plenos quidem innocentia naturali, voluntariarum autem virtutum capaces.
82. Jul. We believe, then, that God is both just and pious and truthful, and thereby we hold that his Law has commanded nothing impossible, that its testimonies affirm nothing false, that its judgments pronounce nothing iniquitous; but that he himself is the creator of human beings, whom he creates liable to no crime, but full indeed of natural innocence, and capable of voluntary virtues.
Iulianum.3.82AUG. Unde ergo non exsufflatam, non exorcizatam, non baptizatam imaginem suam non admittit ad vitam suam? Siccine merces innocentiae redditur? An potius generatione reatus attractus neque regeneratione dimissus iuste negata vita, morte consequente punitur? Aliena tos quippe a vita Dei detestatus Apostolus non fuisset (Cf. Eph 4, 18), si poena nulla esset.
Aug. Why, then, does he not admit to his own life his own image, unbreathed-upon, unexorcized, unbaptized? Is this how the reward of innocence is repaid? Or is it rather that, the guilt being drawn by generation and not remitted by regeneration, life is justly denied and the death that follows is the punishment? For the Apostle would not have detested those alienated from the life of God (See Eph 4:18), if there were no punishment.
Iulianum.3.8283. IUL. Quibus collectis alterum teneatur necesse est ex duobus: videlicet ut aut talis credatur Deus, qualem confingit Traducianus Manichaeus, aut talis intellegaris cum omnibus, qui in traducis scita concedunt, qualem deproeliatur honoratus Deus. Non autem potest esse Deus talis, qualem Manichaeus somniat, sed est pius et iustus et verus Deus, qualem omnis sancta Scriptura, omnis lex et fides nostra veneratur. Ac per hoc, hoc est tuum dogma, quod ut cum Dei iniuria suscipitur, ita cum eius honore destruitur.
83. Jul. From which gathered together, it is necessary that one of two be held: namely, that either God be believed such as the Traducianist Manichaeus fabricates, or that you be understood, with all who concede the decrees of propagation, to hold such a God as the honored God fights against. But God cannot be such as Manichaeus dreams; rather, he is the pious and just and true God, such as all holy Scripture, all the Law, and our faith venerates. And thereby this is your dogma, which, just as it is taken up with injury to God, so is destroyed with honor to him.
Iulianum.3.83AUG. Si pium Deum sentitis, quare salvatorem, hoc est Iesum a parvulis impie prohibetis? Si iustum, quare grave super parvulos iugum sine ullius peccati meritis creditis? Si verum, quare dicenti: Reddam in filios patrum peccata (Deut 5, 9) non creditis?
Aug. If you hold God to be pious, why do you impiously keep the Savior—that is, Jesus—from little ones? If just, why do you believe in a heavy yoke upon little ones without the deserts of any sin? If true, why do you not believe him when he says, I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Deut 5:9)?
Iulianum.3.8384. IUL. Tempus est, ut ad alia transeamus; sed reposcit a nobis causae dignitas, ut etiam ea, quae superiore libro putamus praetermissa, reddamus. Quod quidem prudens lector supervacaneum forsitan iudicabit; tamen, quoniam compertum est rerum periculis depositam causam etiam levibus inhaerere, opera est, quibus praesidia sustuleris, auferre solacia.
84. Jul. It is time for us to pass to other matters; but the dignity of the case demands of us that we render also those things which we think were passed over in the earlier book. Which indeed a prudent reader will perhaps judge superfluous; nonetheless, since it has been found that a case forsaken amid the perils of facts clings even to light things, it is worthwhile to take away the solaces of those from whom you have removed the defenses.
Iulianum.3.84AUG. Quoniam in alia transire coepisti, iam, quod superius promisimus, debemus ostendere, prophetiam scilicet Ezechielis, qua dicitur patrum in filios peccata non reddi, sicut filiorum non redduntur in patres, ad praenuntiationem pertinere revelationis Testamenti Novi. Dicit enim tale aliquid etiam propheta Ieremias et ibi, unde hoc dicatur, illustrat. Nam inter cetera: Convertere -, inquit - virgo Israel, revertere in civitates tuas lugens; usque quo averteris, filia inhonorata, quoniam creavit Dominus salutem in plantationem novam, in qua salute circuibunt homines? Sic dixit Dominus: Adhuc dicent verbum hoc in terra Iuda et in civitatibus eius, cum revocabo captivitatem eius: Benedictus Dominus super iustum montem sanctum suum, et qui inhabitant in Iudaea et in omni civitate eius, simul cum agricola et tolletur in grege, quoniam inebriavi omnem animam sitientem et omnem animam esurientem satiavi. Propter hoc exsurrexi et vidi et somnus meus dulcis mihi factus est. Propterea ecce dies veniunt, dicit Dominus, et seminabo Israel et Iuda semen hominis et semen pecoris. Et erit: sicut vigilabam super eos deponere et affligere, ita vigilabo super eos aedificare et complantare, dicit Dominus. In diebus illis non dicent: Patres manducaverunt uvam acerbam et dentes filiorum obstupuerunt; sed unusquisque in suo peccato morietur et eius, qui manducaverit uvam acerbam, obstupebunt dentes ipsius (Ier 31, 21-30). Nempe manifestum est hoc ad dies pertinere plantationis novae, de qua, ut hoc diceret, loquebatur.
Aug. Since you have begun to pass to other matters, we ought now to show what we promised above—namely, that the prophecy of Ezekiel, in which it is said that the sins of fathers are not repaid upon children, just as those of children are not repaid upon fathers, pertains to the foretelling of the revelation of the New Testament. For the prophet Jeremiah too says something of the sort, and there he makes clear whence this is said. For among other things he says: Turn back, O virgin Israel, return to your cities, mourning; how long will you turn away, O dishonored daughter? For the Lord has created salvation for a new planting, in which salvation human beings shall go about. Thus said the Lord: Yet shall they say this word in the land of Judah and in its cities, when I bring back its captivity: Blessed be the Lord upon his just holy mountain, and those who dwell in Judea and in every city of it, together with the husbandman, and he shall be lifted up in the flock; for I have made drunk every thirsting soul and have satisfied every hungering soul. For this I rose up and saw, and my sleep became sweet to me. Therefore behold, the days are coming, says the Lord, and I will sow Israel and Judah with the seed of man and the seed of beast. And it shall be: as I watched over them to pull down and to afflict, so will I watch over them to build up and to plant, says the Lord. In those days they shall not say: The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge; but each one shall die in his own sin, and the teeth of him who eats the sour grape shall be set on edge (Jer 31:21-30). Surely it is manifest that this pertains to the days of the new planting, of which, that he might say this, he was speaking.
Iulianum.3.84Ubi et illud semen hominis et semen pecoris, quod se Deus seminaturum esse promisit, spiritaliter intellectum eos, qui praesunt, et eos, qui reguntur, facit agnosci. Sed quia inveteratum erat in cordibus populi scriptum esse in Veteri Testamento: Reddam peccata patrum in filios (Deut 5, 9), ne quisquam Scripturam Dei repugnare sibi arbitraretur, ut apertius ostenderet illud Veteri, hoc Novo congruere Testamento, continuo subiunxit: Ecce dies veniunt, dicit Dominus, et consummabo domui Israel et domui Iuda Testamentum Novum, non secundum Testamentum, quod disposui patribus eorum in die, qua apprehendi manum eorum, ut educerem eos de terra Aegypti (Ier 31, 31-32), et cetera.
Where also that seed of man and seed of beast, which God promised he would sow, understood spiritually, makes those who preside and those who are ruled to be acknowledged. But because it was inveterate in the hearts of the people that it was written in the Old Testament, I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Deut 5:9), lest anyone think the Scripture of God to be at variance with itself, in order to show more openly that the one accords with the Old, the other with the New Testament, he immediately subjoined: Behold, the days are coming, says the Lord, and I will accomplish for the house of Israel and the house of Judah a New Testament, not according to the Testament which I made with their fathers in the day when I took their hand to lead them out of the land of Egypt (Jer 31:31-32), and the rest.
Iulianum.3.84Ad illud igitur Testamentum generatio pertinet, ad hoc autem regeneratio; unde ibi peccata patrum redduntur in filios, hic vero generationis vinculo per regenerationem soluto non dicitur: Patres manducaverunt uvam acerbam et dentes filiorum obstupuerunt, sed: eius, qui manducaverit uvam acerbam, obstupebunt dentes (Ez 18, 2; Ier 31, 29), quia non in patris, sed in suo peccato, si commiserit, quisque morietur. Tu autem cum prophetia, ubi dicitur: Non accipiet filius peccatum patris sui (Ier 31, 30), non ostendisti, quemadmodum Scriptura concordet, ubi dicitur: Reddam peccata patrum in filios. Haec quippe inter se contraria remanebunt, nisi horum duorum singula ad Testamenta singula referantur, quod evidentissime Ieremias propheta monstravit.
To that Testament, then, generation pertains, but to this, regeneration; whence in the one the sins of fathers are repaid upon children, but in the other, the bond of generation being loosed by regeneration, it is not said, "The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge," but, the teeth of him who eats the sour grape shall be set on edge (Ezek 18:2; Jer 31:29), because each one shall die not in his father's sin, but in his own, if he commits it. But you, in the prophecy where it is said, The son shall not bear the sin of his father (Jer 31:30), did not show how the Scripture agrees with that where it is said, I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children. For these will remain contrary to each other, unless each of these two be referred to a separate Testament—which the prophet Jeremiah most evidently showed.
Iulianum.3.8485. IUL. Igitur, cum venissemus ad apostoli Pauli sententiam (Cf. supra, 2, 56-57), quam Scripturarum expertibus Traducianus venditare solitus erat, id est: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum (Rom 5, 12), ostendi primitus ipsius sermonis testimonio a loci illius adytis Traducianos fuisse summotos, quando Gentium Magister peccati antiquitatem revolvens ad generationis custodiam quasi fortissimum stipatorem finitum numerum collocasset, ut dicens per unum hominem peccatum intrasse in mundum praescriberet nihil se de generatione sensisse, quae nisi per duos non posset exsistere. Atque assignavi distinctum esse inter commixtionem et peccatum parentum, cum diceretur intrasse peccatum quidem in mundum, sed per eum numerum, qui fetibus non poterat convenire.
85. Jul. Therefore, when we had come to the sentence of the apostle Paul (See above, 2.56-57), which the Traducianist was wont to peddle to those unversed in the Scriptures—that is, Through one man sin entered the world (Rom 5:12)—I showed, first, by the testimony of that very discourse, that the Traducianists were driven from the inner shrines of that passage, since the Teacher of the Gentiles, recalling the antiquity of sin, had placed the determinate number, as it were a most stalwart bodyguard, for the keeping of generation; so that, saying that through one man sin entered the world, he prescribed that he thought nothing about generation, which cannot exist except through two. And I assigned that there is a distinction between the intercourse and the sin of parents, since it was said that sin indeed entered the world, but through that number which could not fit offspring.
Iulianum.3.85Actumque est sufficienter per totum libellum peccati ibi non naturam indicatam esse, sed formam, quod a praevaricatoribus post secutis imitatione constaret, non generatione susceptum.
And it was sufficiently shown through the whole little book that there not the nature of sin was indicated, but the form, which it was established was taken up by the transgressors who followed afterward by imitation, not by generation.
Iulianum.3.85Verum quia scriptum legimus in Epistula ad Hebraeos de Iudaeis: Ex uno orti sunt et hoc emortuo (Hebr 11, 12), id est de Abraham, superius quoque in eadem epistula de Christo legitur: Qui sanctificat, et sanctificantur ex uno omnes (Hebr 2, 11), ne horum aliquid vel similium, si inveniri poterit, Traducianus arripiat atque argumentetur quidquam de responsione nostra ponderis fuisse discussum, qua affirmavimus ideo dictum esse unum, per quem transierit peccatum, ne generatio sineretur intellegi, cum inventum sit in hac epistula nomine unius generationem indicatam, ideo, inquam, id retractandum putavi. Ut igitur sit intentus lector, admoneo; multiplici enim haec oppositio genere destruetur.
But because we read it written in the Epistle to the Hebrews, of the Jews, From one they sprang, and him as good as dead (Heb 11:12)—that is, from Abraham—and earlier too in the same epistle it is read of Christ, He who sanctifies, and those who are sanctified, are all of one (Heb 2:11)—lest the Traducianist seize upon any of these or similar things, if any can be found, and argue that something of weight has been shaken from our answer, by which we affirmed that "one" was said, through whom sin passed over, so that generation should not be allowed to be understood, since it is found in this epistle that generation is indicated by the name of one—therefore, I say, I thought this must be reconsidered. That the reader may be attentive, then, I give warning; for this objection will be destroyed by a manifold kind of refutation.
Iulianum.3.85Ibi itaque, ubi commemoratio Abrahae fit et Sarra, eius uxor, inseritur; talis est quippe ordo verborum: Fide qui vocatur Abraham oboedivit in locum exire, quem accepturus erat in haereditatem, et exiit nesciens quo iret. Fide demoratus est in terra promissionis tamquam in aliena incasulis habitando cum Isaac et Iacob, cohaeredibus repromissionis eiusdem; exspectabat enim fundamenta habentem civitatem, cuius artifex et conditor Deus. Fide et ipsa Sarra sterilis virtutem in conceptione seminis accepit etiam praeter tempus aetatis, quoniam fidelem credidit esse qui promiserat. Propter quod ab uno orti sunt et hoc emortuo tamquam sidera caeli in multitudine et sicut harena, quae est ad oram maris innumerabilis (Hebr 11, 8-12).
There, then, where mention is made of Abraham, Sarah, his wife, is inserted; for such is the order of the words: By faith he who is called Abraham obeyed to go out to a place which he was to receive as an inheritance, and he went out not knowing where he went. By faith he dwelt in the land of promise as in a foreign land, living in tents with Isaac and Jacob, fellow heirs of the same promise; for he looked for the city having foundations, whose craftsman and maker is God. By faith Sarah herself, being barren, received power for the conception of seed even beyond the time of age, since she believed him faithful who had promised. Therefore from one they sprang, and him as good as dead, like the stars of heaven in multitude and like the sand which is on the seashore, innumerable (Heb 11:8-12).
Iulianum.3.85Cum ergo utrumque commemorasset, id est et Abraham et Sarram, eamque dixisset lege senectutis effetam, sed fide virtutem concipiendi seminis accepisse, secure subdidit ab uno ortos tot populos, qui multitudini conferrentur astrorum. Ut ergo copula exponeretur parentum, tam fidelium praedicatio quam rei gestae veritas imperavit; ut autem de ipsis duobus in commendatione propagatae multitudinis non utrumque, sed alterum diceret, ars laudantis admonuit. Volebat quippe ostendere, certa fides quam magna meruisset; dicens virtute Dei excedentem numeros multitudinem propagatam accomodatius ad laudem operis eius esse perpendens, si ex uno eos quam ex duobus diceret procreatos, maxime cum in laudis augmento, quam ultimus sermo cumulabat, nullum esset historiae dispendium, quam supra utriusque personae commemoratione suppleverat.
When, then, he had mentioned both—that is, both Abraham and Sarah—and had said that she was, by the law of old age, past childbearing, but that by faith she received the power of conceiving seed, he securely subjoined that from one had sprung so many peoples, to be compared to the multitude of the stars. So that the union of the parents might be set forth, both the praise of persons so faithful and the truth of the deed required it; but that, of those two themselves, in commending the propagated multitude, he should name not both but one, the art of one praising advised. For he wished to show how great a thing sure faith had merited; and judging, in saying that a multitude exceeding number was propagated by the power of God, that it was more fitting for the praise of his work if he said they were begotten from one rather than from two—especially since, in the increase of praise which the last clause heaped up, there was no loss to the history, which he had supplied above by the mention of both persons.
Iulianum.3.85AUG. Qui te nihil dicere non intellegit, quid intellegat nescio. Dixeras Apostolum propterea dixisse: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum (Rom 5, 12), quia exemplum peccandi homo ille ceteris praebuit. Nam si generationem - inquis - eo loco vellet intellegi, per duos diceret, non " per unum " (Cf. supra, 2, 56), cum potius, si exemplum vellet intellegi, per unam diceret non per unum, quam constat etiam ipsi viro suo exemplum praebuisse peccandi. Sed quia generatione peccatum intravit in mundum sola regeneratione sanandum, ideo dixit: per unum, quia sicut humani exemplum peccati coepit a femina, sic generatio coepit a viro; conceptionem quippe, quae ad feminam pertinet, seminatio, quae ad virum pertinet, nullo dubitante praecedit.
Aug. Who does not understand that you say nothing, I know not what he understands. You had said that the Apostle therefore said, Through one man sin entered the world (Rom 5:12), because that man furnished the rest an example of sinning. For if, you say, he wished generation to be understood in that passage, he would say "through two," not "through one" (See above, 2.56)—when rather, if he wished an example to be understood, he would say "through one woman," not "through one man," since it is agreed that she furnished even her own husband the example of sinning. But because by generation sin entered the world, to be healed by regeneration alone, therefore he said "through one," because, just as the example of human sin began from the woman, so generation began from the man; for, as no one doubts, the sowing, which pertains to the man, precedes the conception, which pertains to the woman.
Iulianum.3.85Sed ecce inventum est evidentissimum testimonium sive a te ipso sive ab alio, qui hoc tibi fortassis obiecit, ubi sine ulla ambiguitate ab uno orti dicti sunt innumerabiles, cum virum et feminam, duos utique parentes, ut orerentur, habuerint; sed dictum est rectissime propter exordium generationis, quod a semine viri est. Denique cum laudabilia fidei exempla proponeret, ab ipso Abel coepit et commemorato Abraham pervenit ad Sarram. Iam utique ab illo transierat et de eius coniuge loquebatur et tamen, cum ad commemorandam generationem immensi populi ventum esset, ad illum reversus est, quia ille genuit, quod illa peperit.
But behold, a most evident testimony has been found—whether by you yourself or by another who perhaps objected this to you—where, without any ambiguity, innumerable persons are said to have sprung from one, although they had a man and a woman, surely two parents, in order to spring; but it was most rightly said, on account of the beginning of generation, which is from the man's seed. In short, when he set forth praiseworthy examples of faith, he began from Abel himself and, having mentioned Abraham, came to Sarah. Now surely he had passed from the one and was speaking of his wife; and yet, when it came to mentioning the generation of an immense people, he returned to him, because he begot what she bore.
Iulianum.3.85Quod si, ut debueras, cogitares, non blasphemares fidelem fidei praedicatorem, qui scripsit epistulam, et diceres eum: arte laudis admonitum. Quid admonitum, quaeso? An ut mentiretur ab uno asserens ortos, qui orti sunt a duobus?
But if, as you ought, you considered this, you would not blaspheme the faithful herald of faith who wrote the epistle, nor say that he was "advised by the art of praise." Advised to what, I ask? That he should lie, asserting that those sprang from one who sprang from two?
Iulianum.3.85Accommodatius videlicet, ut existimas, id esse perpendens ad laudem operis Dei. Multum erras; non delectat Deum falsa laudatio. Soles eam tu quidem libenter exhibere libidini; sed valde displicet falsitas veritati. Nam et ipsi libidini te cur praebeas non laudatorem, sed adulatorem nescio. Numquid ideo te plus amabit? Prorsus falleris; illa non amat hominem, sed plane stimulat, ut amet quod amare non debet.
More fittingly, as you suppose, judging this to be for the praise of God's work. You err much; false praise does not delight God. You indeed are wont gladly to offer it to lust; but falsehood greatly displeases the truth. For why you should offer yourself to lust itself, not as a praiser but as a flatterer, I do not know. Will it for that reason love you more? You are utterly deceived; it does not love a human being, but plainly goads him to love what he ought not to love.
Iulianum.3.85Si autem potest quocumque locutionis modo non mendaciter, sed veraciter dici ex uno esse ortos, qui orti sunt ex duobus, cur putas ideo generationem non potuisse insinuari, ubi dictum est: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, quia generatio per duos fit, non per unum? Cum sit omnibus notum aut eum potius aut prius generare qui seminat, feminam vero aut non generare, sed parere aut, si et ipse partus recte generatio dici potest, prius eam de viro generante concipere et postea fetum, quem conceperat, generare.
But if, by whatever manner of speaking, it can be said not falsely but truly that those sprang from one who sprang from two, why do you think generation therefore could not be conveyed where it was said, Through one man sin entered the world, just because generation is made through two, not through one? Since it is known to all that he rather, or first, begets who sows, but that the woman either does not beget but bears, or, if the bearing itself can rightly be called begetting, first conceives from the begetting man and afterward begets the offspring she had conceived.
Iulianum.3.85Proinde Apostolus, cum peccatum in mundum, quod Christus regeneratione dilueret, generatione intrasse vellet intellegi, per unum hominem dixit, qui tunc vel prius vel potius generavit, praesertim quia, ut iam diximus et tibi inculcandum est, si hoc propter exempli diceret principatum, per unam diceret, ex qua primum in genere humano peccandi processit exemplum, et magis praetermitteret virum, quem mulieris exemplum, ut etiam ipse peccaret imitando, noverat subsecutum.
Accordingly the Apostle, when he wished it to be understood that sin entered the world by generation—the sin which Christ would wash away by regeneration—said "through one man," who then either first or rather begot; especially because, as we have already said and must be pressed home to you, if he said this on account of the precedence of the example, he would say "through one woman," from whom the example of sinning first proceeded in the human race, and would rather pass over the man, whom he knew to have followed the woman's example, so as himself to sin by imitating.
Iulianum.3.8586. IUL. Ad Hebraeos ergo, ubi de generatione sermo est, ex uno dicuntur multi exstitisse, ad Romanos autem, ubi de peccato Apostolus loquitur, per unum hominem ait intrasse peccatum, quo numero absolutissime se nihil de generatione sensisse perdocuit.
86. Jul. To the Hebrews, then, where the discourse is of generation, many are said to have arisen from one; but to the Romans, where the Apostle speaks of sin, he says that through one man sin entered—by which number he most conclusively taught that he thought nothing about generation.
Iulianum.3.86AUG. Contra res apertas sic loqui non est, ut putas, eloquentia laudabilis, sed incredibilis impudentia.
Aug. To speak thus against plain things is not, as you think, praiseworthy eloquence, but incredible impudence.
Iulianum.3.8687. IUL. Ubi autem de Christo dicitur: Qui sanctificat, et sanctificatur ex uno omnes (Hebr 2, 11), non de Adam, sed de Deo accipi potest, cuius virtute Christus secundum carnem factus est et omne humanum genus; ac per hoc ad labefactandam intellegentiam Apostoli, qua dixit per unum hominem peccatum intrasse in mundum, aliorum similitudo verborum nihil quivit afferre momenti. Haereat tamen id, quod sequitur, maxime prudentis animo lectoris, ut intellegat me hactenus multo remissius, quam res postulabat, egisse.
87. Jul. But where it is said of Christ, He who sanctifies, and the one sanctified, are all of one (Heb 2:11), it can be taken not of Adam, but of God, by whose power Christ according to the flesh was made, and the whole human race; and thereby, to overthrow the understanding of the Apostle, by which he said that through one man sin entered the world, the likeness of other words could bring no weight. Yet let this, which follows, cling especially to the mind of a prudent reader, that he may understand that I have thus far dealt much more remissly than the matter demanded.
Iulianum.3.87Patiamur quippe, ut plurimis testimoniis doceatur generationem, quae nisi per duos fieri non potest, agi tamen etiam per unum solere dici. Verum nihil opinio traducis promovebit: cur? Videlicet quia alia sunt, quae abusive, alia, quae proprie dicimus. Ergo ea, quae sunt propria, appellationes suas sine dispendio largiuntur; ea vero, quae per usurpationem dicuntur, principalibus rebus videlicet propriis definitionum suarum praeiudicia non sinuntur invehere; fitque hoc totum inculpabiliter, cum rebus, de quibus non est ulla dubitatio, per abusionem vocabula impertimur aliena.
For let us grant that, by very many testimonies, it is taught that generation, which cannot be made except through two, is nonetheless wont to be said to be done even through one. But your opinion of propagation will advance nothing: why? Namely because some things we say improperly, others properly. Those, then, which are proper, grant their appellations without loss; but those which are said by usurpation are not allowed to bring prejudgments of their own definitions upon the principal, proper things; and all this is done blamelessly, when, to things about which there is no doubt, we impart by improper use the names of others.
Iulianum.3.87AUG. Sed tu dubitationem apertis etiam rebus, quae contra te fuerint, illaturus es.
Aug. But you are about to bring doubt even upon plain things, when they are against you.
Iulianum.3.8788. IUL. Ceterum cum res aliqua contra opinionem omnium eo sermone inducitur, in cuius sono habet omne praesidium, graviter peccatur, si proprio eius nomine ad manum posito emendicata abusivi appellatione signetur. Cum ergo de fetibus sermo est, quoniam nullus dubitat, quin natus quisque duos habeat parentes, nec hoc astipulatione indiget, non incommodabit intellectui, si dicam ex uno illum esse generatum; neminem quippe sermo meus adeo permovebit, ut putet illum nasci aut sine patre aut sine matre potuisse.
88. Jul. But when some matter is introduced, against the opinion of all, by a word in whose sound it has all its defense, grievous wrong is done if, its proper name being at hand, it is signified by the borrowed appellation of an improper use. When, then, the discourse is of offspring, since no one doubts that each one born has two parents, nor does this need confirmation, it will not incommode the understanding if I say that he was begotten from one; for my speech will so move no one as to make him think that he could be born either without a father or without a mother.
Iulianum.3.88AUG. Natus quidem duos parentes habet; sed ut nascatur, unus eum serendo gignit, altera edendo parit. Unde satis apparet, cui sit potissimum vel cui primum generatio tribuenda, ut desinas rebus in luce positis nebulas loquacitatis offundere. Quis autem sic loquitur, ut dicat quemquam ex uno generatum? Cum omnis, qui hoc audit, non cogitet nisi patrem nec hominem seminando generet nisi unus pater; sed ex uno generati duo vel plures recte dici solent, qui non habere unum patrem possent existimari.
Aug. One who is born indeed has two parents; but, that he may be born, one begets him by sowing, the other bears him by bringing forth. Hence it sufficiently appears to whom generation is chiefly, or first, to be attributed—that you may cease to spread the mists of loquacity over things set in the light. But who speaks so as to say that anyone was begotten from one? Since everyone who hears this thinks of nothing but the father, nor does any but one father beget a human being by sowing; but two or more are rightly wont to be said to be begotten from one, who could be supposed not to have one father.
Iulianum.3.88Ubi autem pater et mater sunt cogitandi, quis ex uno natus nisi mendaciter dicitur? Numquid enim, si manifestum sit duos simul ambulasse aut aliquid simul egisse, ideo sine mendacio dicis unum ambulasse aut unum hoc egisse, quia manifestum est duos fuisse? Nonne mendacium tuum tanto erit impudentius, quanto illud apertius? Ponitur quidem et singularis numerus pro plurali tropica locutione sicut in plagis, quibus percussa est Aegyptus, ubi dicitur rana vel locusta numero utique singulari, cum multae fuerint (Cf. Ps 77, 45-46; 104, 34); si autem diceretur rana una vel locusta una, quis dubitaret tanto esse hoc mendacium vanius, quanto est illa veritas clarior? Desine igitur istos fumos hominibus harum rerum imperitissimis vendere et per unum hominem in mundum intrasse peccatum, non sicut tu, sed sicut Apostolus dicit, intellege.
But where father and mother are to be thought of, who is said to be born of one, except falsely? For if it be manifest that two walked together or did something together, do you therefore say without lying that one walked or that one did this, just because it is manifest that there were two? Will not your lie be the more impudent, the more open that is? The singular number is indeed put for the plural by a figurative manner of speaking, as in the plagues by which Egypt was struck, where it is said "the frog" or "the locust," surely in the singular number, when there were many (See Ps 78:45-46 (77:45-46); 105:34 (104:34)); but if it were said "one frog" or "one locust," who would doubt that this lie would be the more empty, the clearer that truth is? Cease, then, to sell these vapors to human beings most unskilled in these matters, and understand that through one man sin entered the world—not as you say, but as the Apostle says.
Iulianum.3.88Per unum quippe hominem non exemplo praecedentem, nam hoc de femina diceretur, sed principio generantem, quia prior sevit, quod illa conciperet, et ipse genuit, quod illa pareret, peccatum intravit in mundum (Rom 5, 12), sicut scriptum est: Abraham genuitIsaac, Isaac genuit Iacob (Mt 1, 2) et per ceteras subsequentes generationes ista locutio perseverat nec dictum est: Abraham et Sarra genuerunt Isaac aut Isaac et Rebecca genuerunt Iacob; et ubi matres commemorari necessarium fuit, non ait Evan gelista: Iudas et Thamar genuerunt Phares et Zaram, sed ait: Iudas genuit de Thamar (Mt 1, 3), et ubicumque adiunxit et matres, generationem tamen patribus dedit, non dicens: Ille et illa genuerunt illum, sed: Ille genuit illum de illa. Unde intellegas eo modo dictum ex uno Abraham genitos esse innumerabiles, quia ipse illos genuit unus ex Sarra. Ideoque dictum: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum (Rom 5, 12), ut intellegeretur ibi generationis initium, quod ex viro est, non imitationis exemplum, quod in genere humano per unam potius quam per unum intravit in mundum.
For through one man—preceding not by example, for that would be said of the woman, but begetting by way of beginning, because he first sowed what she would conceive, and he begot what she would bear—sin entered the world (Rom 5:12), just as it is written: Abraham begot Isaac, Isaac begot Jacob (Matt 1:2); and through the rest of the following generations this manner of speaking persists, nor is it said, "Abraham and Sarah begot Isaac," or "Isaac and Rebekah begot Jacob"; and where it was necessary to mention the mothers, the Evangelist does not say, "Judah and Tamar begot Perez and Zerah," but he says, Judah begot of Tamar (Matt 1:3); and wherever he added the mothers too, he nonetheless gave the begetting to the fathers, not saying, "He and she begot him," but, "He begot him of her." Whence you may understand that in this way it was said that innumerable were begotten of one Abraham, because he, one, begot them of Sarah. And therefore it was said, Through one man sin entered the world (Rom 5:12), so that there might be understood the beginning of generation, which is from the man, not the example of imitation, which entered the world in the human race through one woman rather than through one man.
Iulianum.3.8889. IUL. Cum vero de peccato agitur, quod contra omnium opinionem omnemque rationem simulatur ingenitum.
89. Jul. But when the discourse is of sin, which against the opinion of all and against all reason is pretended to be inborn.
Iulianum.3.89AUG. Non contra omnium opinionem omnemque rationem simulatur, sed contra vestrum errorem teste Scriptura et ipsa generis humani miseria peccatum originale monstratur.
Aug. It is not pretended against the opinion of all and against all reason, but against your error, original sin is shown, with Scripture as witness and the very misery of the human race.
Iulianum.3.8990. IUL. Et hoc peccatum transisse per unum proprie dicitur, si exemplum delinquendi praebuit, inconvenientissime autem, si peccatum istud ingenuit, quod ad posteros nisi per duos transire non potuit.
90. Jul. And this sin is properly said to have passed over through one, if he furnished the example of offending, but most unfittingly if he engendered that sin which could not pass to posterity except through two.
Iulianum.3.90AUG. Immo per unum intravit, a quo seminatum est, quod peperit illa; exemplum autem in illa praecessit, quod secutus est ille.
Aug. Rather, it entered through one, by whom was sown what she bore; but the example preceded in her, which he followed.
Iulianum.3.9091. IUL. Commendaveritque Apostolus transisse peccatum, sed per unum, ostenderitque hoc veritas ad exemplum proprie pertinere, intolerabili impudentia Traducianus facit, ut dicat et ad se illum numerum inflexum abusione pertingere.
91. Jul. And though the Apostle commended that sin passed over, but through one, and though truth shows that this properly pertains to example, the Traducianist, with intolerable impudence, makes out that that number too, by an improper use, reaches and applies to himself.
Iulianum.3.91AUG. Quid est, quod tam saepe novo nomine quasi contumelioso agere te putas, ut fugiatur veritas antiquissimi catholici dogmatis, dum novitas expavescitur nominis? Quid non potest isto modo derideri? Sed vanitate, non urbanitate. Apostolus enim dicit: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors et ita in omnes homines pertransiit (Ibidem); haec verba utrique suscipimus. Si ergo nos Traduciani sumus propter peccatum, quod generatione traductum est, ut in omnes homines pertransiret, vos Traduciani estis propter peccatum, quod imitatione traductum esse fingitis, ut in omnes homines pertransiret; et prior Apostolus Traducianus apparuit, qui sive hoc, quod eum sensisse clarum est, sive illud, quod errando dicitis, senserit, peccatum tamen in mundum per unum hominem intrasse et in omnes homines pertransisse dicendo huius occasionem nominis praebuit. Si autem traducis nomen his verbis non convenit, ubi dicitur per unum hominem intrasse et in omnes homines pertransisse peccatum, nec nobis hoc nomen nec vobis nec Apostolo convenit, sed plane hoc dicere, hoc obicere, hoc assidue odioseque repetere ineptiae vestrae satis convenit.
Aug. What is this, that so often you think to act with a new name, as though insulting, so that the truth of the most ancient Catholic dogma may be fled, while the newness of the name is dreaded? What cannot be mocked in this way? But by vanity, not by wit. For the Apostle says, Through one man sin entered the world, and through sin death, and so it passed to all human beings (Rom 5:12); these words both of us accept. If, then, we are "Traducianists" on account of the sin which was transmitted by generation, so that it might pass to all human beings, you are "Traducianists" on account of the sin which you pretend was transmitted by imitation, so that it might pass to all human beings; and the Apostle appeared the first "Traducianist," who—whether he thought this, which it is clear he thought, or that, which you in your error say—nonetheless, by saying that sin entered the world through one man and passed to all human beings, furnished the occasion of this name. But if the name "propagation" does not fit these words, where it is said that through one man sin entered and passed to all human beings, then this name fits neither us nor you nor the Apostle; but plainly, to say this, to object this, to repeat it assiduously and hatefully, fits your ineptitude well enough.
Iulianum.3.9192. IUL. Nam cum inauditum monstrum sit, si dogma etiam tolerabile, novum tamen, aliquis relin quens propria abusivis verbis condere ambiguisque conetur, tum istud infinite deformius est, quod res obscaenas et Dei iustitiam criminantes tam ancipitibus Augustinus nititur confirmare sententiis, ut eas contra se proprie, pro se autem precario sonare fateatur. Quisquamne eruditorum illi argumento fidat, quod, cum in ius venerit, ab inimico eius quasi vernaculum, ab illo vero quasi fugitivum plagiatumque pensetur?
92. Jul. For although it is an unheard-of monstrosity if anyone, leaving aside the proper words, tries to establish a dogma—even a tolerable one, yet new—by improper and ambiguous words, that thing is infinitely more deformed in that Augustine strives to confirm matters obscene and accusing the justice of God by sentences so two-edged that he confesses they sound properly against him, but for him only by sufferance. Will any of the learned trust that argument which, when it comes into court, is weighed by his enemy as it were a home-born slave, but by him as a fugitive and kidnapped?
Iulianum.3.92AUG. De verbis abusivis et propriis ea loqueris, ut hominum paucitate contempta, qui te intellegunt et inveniunt delirantem, eligas multis, qui te non intellegunt, videri dicere aliquid, cum dicas nihil. Melius ergo paucis doctis te relinquo, qui et me non demonstrante facillime intellegunt te nihil dicere, quam te refellendo, quamvis vera dicam, ea, quae multi non intellegunt, dico. Verumtamen, ubi dictum est: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum (Ibidem), propter generationis auctorem, ideo formam futuri, propter regenerationis auctorem, non verba sunt abusiva, sed propria.
Aug. You speak of improper and proper words in such a way that, despising the fewness of those who understand you and find you raving, you choose to seem, to the many who do not understand you, to say something, when you say nothing. Better, then, do I leave you to the learned few, who, even without my showing it, most easily understand that you say nothing, than that, by refuting you, although I speak true things, I say things which the many do not understand. Nevertheless, where it is said, Through one man sin entered the world (Rom 5:12), on account of the author of generation; therefore, a form of the one to come, on account of the author of regeneration—these are not improper words, but proper.
Iulianum.3.9293. IUL. Quod igitur ad Hebraeos positum est: Ex uno omnes, exigit laus Dei, post commemorationem tamen parentum; quod autem dicitur de Christo: Qui sanctificat et sanctificantur ex uno omnes (Hebr 2, 11), ad Deum relatum est.
93. Jul. What, then, is set down to the Hebrews, All of one, the praise of God demands—after the mention of the parents, however; but what is said of Christ, He who sanctifies, and those who are sanctified, are all of one (Heb 2:11), is referred to God.
Iulianum.3.93AUG. Magis post commemorationem parentum, praesertim quia iam transierat a patre et de matre loquebatur, praeteriri non debuit ipsa mater, sed dici debuit: Ex duobus orti sunt, qui non ex uno, sed ex duobus orti erant, ut laus Dei esset vera, non falsa, nisi quia et hoc verum est, quod ex uno orti sunt, nec abusive dictum est, sed proprie propter auctorem seminis patrem, non propter augendam mendacio, sicut tu existimas, Dei laudem. Dicere quippe: Homo fecit, quod homines duo pluresve fecerunt, potest tropica esse locutio; si quis autem dicit unum hominem fecisse, quod duo fecerunt, nisi eorum duorum auctor facti sit unus, aut mentitur aut fallitur, sicut de locusta et rana paulo ante iam diximus.
Aug. Rather, after the mention of the parents—especially since he had already passed from the father and was speaking of the mother—the mother herself ought not to have been passed over, but it ought to have been said, "They sprang from two," who had sprung not from one but from two, so that the praise of God might be true, not false—were it not that this too is true, that they sprang from one, nor was it said improperly, but properly, on account of the author of the seed, the father; not in order to increase the praise of God by a lie, as you suppose. For to say, "A man did" what two or more men did, can be a figurative manner of speaking; but if anyone says that one man did what two did, unless one be the author of the deed of those two, he either lies or is deceived—as we have already said a little before about the locust and the frog.
Iulianum.3.9394. IUL. Sic enim Apostolus ad Corinthios: Nam sicut mulier - inquit - ex viro, ita et vir per mulierem, omnia autem ex Deo (1 Cor 11, 12). Tertio vero ostendit ratio, quoniam, etsi neutrum horum, quod nobis amminiculatur, fuisset, tamen illam sententiam, qua per unum hominem intrasse peccatum in hunc mundum Paulus disputat, nullum cum Manichaeis inisse foedus.
94. Jul. For thus the Apostle to the Corinthians: For as the woman, he says, is from the man, so also the man is through the woman; but all things are from God (1 Cor 11:12). But, third, reason shows that, even if neither of these things which aid us had existed, nonetheless that sentence by which Paul argues that through one man sin entered this world entered into no compact with the Manicheans.
Iulianum.3.94AUG. Tu potius ista dicendo ostenderis foedus. Nam quod foedus est Apostolo cum Manichaeo, cum Apostolus dicat: Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum (Rom 8, 10), quod evertit haeresim vestram, Manichaeus autem dicat: Corpus immutabiliter malum est propter coaeternam bono mali naturam? Itemque in eo loco, ubi dictum est: Corpus mortuum est propter peccatum, Apostolus dicat: Qui suscitavit Christum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra (Rom 8, 11), Manichaeus autem dicat carnis corpora non pertinere ad boni Dei creaturam, sed ad mali naturam nec Christum a mortuis suscitatum, sed non esse mortuum? Vos ergo, qui Manichaei non estis, sed diversa peste nec vos sani estis, dicite, quomodo sit corpus mortuum propter peccatum, qui corporis mortem non per peccatum illius hominis, sed lege naturae intrasse asseveratis in mundum.
Aug. It is rather you, by saying these things, who appear to have entered a compact. For what compact has the Apostle with Manichaeus, when the Apostle says, The body indeed is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10)—which overthrows your heresy—but Manichaeus says, "The body is unchangeably evil, because of a nature of evil coeternal with the good"? And likewise, in that passage where it is said, The body is dead because of sin, the Apostle says, He who raised Christ from the dead will give life to your mortal bodies also (Rom 8:11), but Manichaeus says that the bodies of the flesh do not belong to the creation of the good God, but to the nature of evil, and that Christ was not raised from the dead, but did not die? You, then, who are not Manichaeans, but by a different plague are no more sound than they, say how the body is dead because of sin—you who assert that the death of the body entered the world not through the sin of that man, but by the law of nature.
Iulianum.3.9495. IUL. Ac per hoc inconcussa manet nostra responsio, quae ostendit per unum hominem non generatione vitiatam atque corruptam, sed integra permanente natura vitiosam solummodo allegari ab Apostolo peccantium voluntatem.
95. Jul. And thereby our answer remains unshaken, which shows that through one man it was not generation that was corrupted and made faulty, but, nature remaining whole, only the will of those sinning that is alleged by the Apostle to be faulty.
Iulianum.3.95AUG. Numquid usque adeo caeci estis aut homines excaecatis caliginosis disputationibus vestris, ut negare audeatis nasci corpora vitiosa? Numquid ad hominum naturam non pertinent corpora? Aut quod Manichaei dicunt, quorum dementiam nescientes quidem, sed, quantum adiuvetis, advertere et cogitare non vultis, gentis tenebrarum corporibus anima bona tenetur admixta? Dicite ergo vitiosorum corporum merita, qui negatis parvulos ex parentibus trahere ulla peccata. Ecce Manichaei dicunt: Usque adeo caro ista mortalis non ad opificium Dei, sed ad gentis pertinet tenebrarum, ut etiam hominum corpora, quos ad imaginem Dei factos esse perhibetis, non solum corruptibilia et condicioni mortis obnoxia, verum etiam vitiosa saepe nascantur. Quid eis respondebit haeresis vestra nisi humanam, quamvis sub Deo creatore et artifice, hanc tamen esse naturam, ut etsi nemo peccasset, etiam in paradiso talia hominum corpora nascerentur? O abominabilem et damnabilem vocem! Nos autem, quoniam hominum corpora non solum corruptibilia et necessitati mortis obstricta, verum etiam multa in eis innumerabili vitiositate languida distorta deformia nullo parentum praecedente peccato in paradiso exortura fuisse non dicimus et eos, qui dicunt, dignissimos anathemate iudicamus, non ab initio sic institutae naturae, sed iniquitatis merito postea vitiatae ista tribuimus, ut et vos et Manichaeos inconcussa et antiqua fidei catholicae stabilitate destruamus.
Aug. Are you so blind, or do you so blind human beings by your murky disputations, that you dare to deny that faulty bodies are born? Do bodies not belong to the nature of human beings? Or, as the Manicheans say—whose madness you do not indeed know, but you are unwilling to attend to and consider how much you aid it—is a good soul held mingled with the bodies of the nation of darkness? Say, then, the deserts of faulty bodies, you who deny that little ones draw any sins from their parents. Behold, the Manicheans say: This mortal flesh belongs so much not to the workmanship of God, but to the nation of darkness, that even the bodies of human beings, whom you maintain were made to the image of God, are born not only corruptible and subject to the condition of death, but even often faulty. What will your heresy answer them, except that this is human nature—under God the creator and craftsman, indeed, yet such that, even if no one had sinned, even in paradise such bodies of human beings would be born? O abominable and damnable voice! But we, since we do not say that the bodies of human beings—not only corruptible and bound by the necessity of death, but also many of them, languid, distorted, deformed with countless faultiness—would have arisen in paradise with no preceding sin of the parents, and judge those who say this most worthy of anathema, attribute these things not to a nature so instituted from the beginning, but to one afterward corrupted by the desert of iniquity—so that we destroy both you and the Manicheans by the unshaken and ancient stability of the Catholic faith.
Iulianum.3.9596. IUL. Sed revertamur ad librum illum, quem ad Valerium destinavit, in quo decerptas de libro meo uno dumtaxat sententias sibi discutiendas refellendasque proposuit. Et quidem in primo operis praesentis libello usque ad ea Augustini dicta perveneram, quibus retecta impudentia, qua opinionis illius fugiebat invidiam, ne diabolum videretur asserere hominum conditorem, pronuntiavit Deum esse auctorem malorum atque ipsum talis meriti creare substantiam, quae reatum, antequam usum rationis, accipiat et quae in regno diaboli conditoris sui manibus collocetur.
96. Jul. But let us return to that book which he sent to Valerius, in which he set forth, for himself to examine and refute, sentences excerpted from one book only of mine. And indeed, in the first little book of the present work, I had reached those sayings of Augustine in which, the impudence being uncovered by which he fled the odium of that opinion—lest he should seem to assert the devil to be the creator of human beings—he declared that God is the author of evils, and that he himself creates a substance of such desert as to receive guilt before the use of reason, and which is placed in the kingdom of the devil by the hands of its own creator.
Iulianum.3.96AUG. Qui naturam discernit a vitio, non dicit quod dicis; qui intellegenter legit quod dico, non me putat dicere quod non dico.
Aug. He who distinguishes nature from fault does not say what you say; he who reads with understanding what I say does not think that I say what I do not say.
Iulianum.3.9697. IUL. Eumque esse figulum irae et perditionis vasa fingentem (Cf. Rom 9, 22).
97. Jul. And that he is a potter fashioning vessels of wrath and of perdition (See Rom 9:22).
Iulianum.3.97AUG. Quantumlibet non intellegas, quomodo Deus faciat ex eadem massa aliud vas in honorem, aliud in contumeliam (Cf. Rom 9, 21), ita facit tamen, ut non faciat tertium genus vasorum nec in honorem nec in contumeliam, quales vos esse parvulos vultis et in regnum Dei non intrare imaginem Dei nullam esse contumeliam deputatis. Ipsum enim regnum sic amatis, ut non ibi esse non saltem levem poenam credatis hominis esse, sed nullam.
Aug. However much you do not understand how God makes from the same mass one vessel unto honor, another unto dishonor (See Rom 9:21), he nonetheless so makes them as not to make a third kind of vessels, neither unto honor nor unto dishonor—such as you wish little ones to be, and you reckon it no dishonor for the image of God not to enter the kingdom of God. For you so love that kingdom that you believe it to be not even a light punishment for a human being not to be there, but none at all.
Iulianum.3.9798. IUL. Sed quae in perditionem non processu liberae voluntatis, verum informatoris sui potestate cogantur.
98. Jul. But that they are forced into perdition not by the advance of free will, but by the power of their own former.
Iulianum.3.98AUG. Potes dicere non quoslibet homines, sed iam regeneratos filios suos Deum in perditionem cogere faciendo eos vivere, quos a fide praevidet recessuros, cum posset eos hinc rapere, antequam malitia mutarentur.
Aug. You can say that not just any human beings, but his own already regenerated sons, God forces into perdition by making them live—those whom he foresees will fall away from the faith—when he could snatch them from here before they were changed by malice.
Iulianum.3.9899. IUL. Tantumque hoc prodigialis dogmatis nefas apostoli Pauli molitus est roborare sententiis, quas contextu totius lectionis exposui; et ostendi prophetam Isaiam, de quo hanc comparationem figuli constabat assumptam, iustitiae divinae plenissime causam tueri.
99. Jul. And he strove to strengthen this so great wickedness of a monstrous dogma by sentences of the apostle Paul, which I expounded in the context of the whole reading; and I showed that the prophet Isaiah, from whom it was established this comparison of the potter was taken, most fully maintains the cause of divine justice.
Iulianum.3.99AUG. Quid ostendisti legentibus et intellegentibus nisi te verba apostolica nimia loquacitate conatum, non tamen potuisse pervertere?
Aug. What did you show to those who read and understand, except that you tried, by excessive loquacity, to pervert the apostolic words, but were nonetheless unable?
Iulianum.3.99100. IUL. Secundum autem librum expositione Apostoli argumentis Augustini ex adverso positis pro ea, quam suppeditavit veritas, facultate complevi; atque ideo nunc ad libri eius ordinem revertamur.
100. Jul. And I completed the second book with the ability that truth supplied, the arguments of Augustine being set over against the exposition of the Apostle; and therefore let us now return to the order of his book.
Iulianum.3.100AUG. Secundum librum non expositione Apostoli, sed sub expositionis professione, inani oppugnatione complesti vanitate tibi, non veritate suppeditante, quae diceres.
Aug. You completed the second book not by an exposition of the Apostle, but, under the profession of exposition, by an empty assault—vanity, not truth, supplying you what to say.
Iulianum.3.100101. IUL. Igitur postquam sibi unum de praefatiuncola prioris operis mei caput, quod quasi impugnaret, obiecit illudque de figulo peccatorum Deo suo subdidit, me arguit; quam sane constanter et pure ipsius eloquiis publicetur: Non itaque, sicut te atque alios fallens loqueris, si quis aut liberum in hominibus arbitrium aut Deum esse nascentium conditorem dixerit, Caelestianus et Pelagianus vocatur, ista quippe et catholica fides dicit. Sed si quis ad colendum recte Deum sine ipsius adiutorio dicit esse in hominibus liberum arbitrium et quisquis ita dicit Deum nascentium conditorem, ut parvulorum neget a potestate diaboli redemptorem, ipse Caelestianus et Pelagianus vocatur.
101. Jul. Therefore, after he had set before himself one chapter from the little preface of my earlier work, as though he were attacking it, and had subjoined that bit about the potter of sinners to his own God, he reproves me—how steadfastly and purely let it be made public in his own words: Not, then, as you, deceiving yourself and others, say, is anyone called a Caelestian and a Pelagian if he says that there is either free choice in human beings or that God is the creator of those being born; for these things the Catholic faith too says. But if anyone says that there is in human beings free choice for rightly worshiping God without his help, and whoever so says that God is the creator of those being born as to deny that he is the redeemer of little ones from the power of the devil, he is called a Caelestian and a Pelagian.
Iulianum.3.101Liberum itaque arbitrium esse in hominibus et Deum esse nascentium conditorem utrique dicimus; non hinc estis Caelestiani et Pelagiani. Liberum autem esse quemquam ad agendum bonum sine adiutorio Dei et non erui parvulos a potestate tenebrarum, et sic transferri in regnum Dei (Cf. Col 1, 13)hoc vos dicitis; hinc estis Caelestiani et Pelagiani (De nupt. et concup. 2, 8). Natare te quidem in impietatis tuae et formidinis palude frequenter ostendi nec super hoc dubitaturum prudentem constat esse lectorem.
That there is free choice in human beings, and that God is the creator of those being born, both of us say; you are not Caelestians and Pelagians on this account. But that anyone is free to do good without the help of God, and that little ones are not rescued from the power of darkness and so transferred into the kingdom of God (See Col 1:13)—this you say; on this account you are Caelestians and Pelagians (Marriage and Desire 2.8). That you swim in the marsh of your impiety and your dread I have frequently shown, and it is certain that a prudent reader will not doubt about this.
Iulianum.3.101AUG. Nec natare te posse, sed mergi alii noverunt, qui haereticum te esse cognoscunt; nam tu eadem submersione sensum etiam perdidisti.
Aug. That you cannot swim, but are drowned, others know who recognize you to be a heretic; for you, by that same submersion, have even lost your senses.
Iulianum.3.101102. IUL. Atque ideo in primo libro nec me fuisse mentitum, qui scripseram omnes, qui fugissent nostrae societatis invidiam, in Manichaeorum praerupta corruere liberum arbitrium denegantium et Deum hominum conditorem teque id, quod fueras propulsare conatus, statim absolutis arripuisse sermonibus etiam illorum scriptorum, quae ad Bonifatium miseras, insertione patefeci (Cf. supra, 1, 14). Verumtamen hoc etiam haec, quam nunc posui, tua responsio confitetur; dixisti enim catholicam fidem esse, quae et liberum credit arbitrium et Deum nascentium conditorem, quod utrumque omnium haereticorum Manichaeos certum est vobiscum negare.
102. Jul. And therefore, in the first book, I made plain that I had not lied, who had written that all who fled the odium of our fellowship rush down the precipices of the Manicheans, who deny free choice and that God is the creator of human beings; and that you, what you had tried to ward off, immediately seized again in the very next words, by inserting also those writings of yours which you had sent to Boniface (See above, 1.14). Nevertheless, this very answer of yours, which I have now set down, confesses this too; for you said that it is the Catholic faith which believes both free choice and that God is the creator of those being born—both of which it is certain that the Manicheans, of all heretics, deny along with you.
Iulianum.3.102AUG. Manichaei, quod videre non vultis, a vobis potius adiuvantur, qui tot et tanta mala, quae pati parvulos cernimus, non meritis peccatorum, sed genti tribuunt tenebrarum; non enim habetis, quo fugiatis, quando a vobis, mala ista unde sint, percunctantur. Sed nobis ad liberum arbitrium hominis, quo natura humana, cum bona fuerit instituta, vitiata est, haec omnia referentibus catholica vobiscum veritate vincuntur.
Aug. The Manicheans, what you are unwilling to see, are rather aided by you, who attribute the so many and so great evils which we perceive little ones to suffer not to the deserts of sins, but to the nation of darkness; for you have nowhere to flee, when they ask you whence these evils come. But when we refer all these things to the free choice of the human being, by which human nature, having been instituted good, was corrupted, you are conquered together with them by the Catholic truth.
Iulianum.3.102103. IUL. Verum quia fidei catholicae, cuius solido nudatus es, quasi amiculum tenue, solum nomen assumis, vis nos credere etiam a te hoc teneri, quod catholici confitentur, id est et liberum arbitrium esse in hominibus et Deum nascentium conditorem. Sed si hoc a te simpliciter fideliterque prolatum est, finem certamini impone silentio; fama ad nos criminantium recurrat, qui id obiecerimus tibi, quod secura negatione deleveris. Hoc solum huic adde sententiae, si qua inventa fuerit secta, si qua disputatio, quae hanc duplicem confessionem, quam catholicam esse professus es, aliqua conetur argumentatione convellere, aut tuam non esse aut a te ulterius non defendi. Si autem iuvat ea, quae dicturus es negasse, locupleti etiam disputatione defendere, explica definitiones liberi arbitrii et fines eius distinctionibus absolutis quasi quibusdam cinge limitibus.
103. Jul. But because you take only the name of the Catholic faith—of whose substance you are stripped—as it were a thin little cloak, you wish us to believe that this too is held by you which Catholics confess, that is, both that there is free choice in human beings and that God is the creator of those being born. But if this was uttered by you simply and faithfully, put an end to the contest by silence; let the report run back to us of those accusing, who objected to you that which you have wiped out by a secure denial. Add only this to this sentence: that if any sect be found, any disputation, which tries by some argument to wrench away this twofold confession which you have professed to be Catholic, either it is not yours or is no longer defended by you. But if it pleases you to defend by a copious disputation the things you are about to say you have denied, unfold the definitions of free choice and gird its bounds, as it were with certain limits, by clear distinctions.
Iulianum.3.103AUG. Inimici et defensores, liberum arbitrium defendendo premitis, quod ad suos limites revocari omnipotentis et veri defensoris bonitate non vultis.
Aug. As enemies and defenders, by defending free choice you oppress it—you who are unwilling that it be recalled to its bounds by the goodness of the almighty and true defender.
Iulianum.3.103104. IUL. Deum quoque talium hominum assere conditorem, quales manibus eius iustitiaeque conveniunt.
104. Jul. Assert also that God is the creator of such human beings as are fitting to his hands and his justice.
Iulianum.3.104AUG. O stulti haeretici novi! Si manibus Dei non conveniunt opera vitiosa, numquid manibus Dei subtrahere ulla hominum corpora audebitis, quae videtis saepe nasci nonnulla vitiosa? Cur non ergo naturam primario peccantis hominis arbitrio vitiatam cum catholica veritate fatemini, de qua Deus facit, quod non solum artifici bono, sed etiam iudici convenit iusto, ne Manichaei vos cogant humana corpora tribuere artifici maligno et iniusto?
Aug. O foolish new heretics! If faulty works are not fitting to the hands of God, will you dare to withdraw from the hands of God any bodies of human beings, which you see are often born somewhat faulty? Why, then, do you not confess, with the Catholic truth, that the nature of the primally sinning human being was corrupted by his own choice—the nature from which God makes what befits not only the good craftsman but also the just judge—lest the Manicheans force you to attribute human bodies to a malign and unjust craftsman?
Iulianum.3.104105. IUL. Quorum certe nihil a te actum est; sed postquam respondisti catholicos liberum arbitrium confiteri, de quorum te numero esse confingis, statim definitionem admovisti, quae id, quod dedisse videbaris, eriperet. Ais enim: Sed si quis ad colendum recte Deum sine ipsius adiutorio dicit esse in hominibus liberum arbitrium, hic Pelagianus vocatur; et item: Liberum arbitrium esse in hominibus dicimus, liberum autem quemquam esse ad agendum bonum vos dicitis (De nupt. et concup. 2, 8).
105. Jul. Of which, surely, nothing was done by you; but after you answered that Catholics confess free choice, of whose number you pretend to be, you immediately brought in a definition which would snatch away what you seemed to have granted. For you say: But if anyone says that there is in human beings free choice for rightly worshiping God without his help, this man is called a Pelagian; and likewise: That there is free choice in human beings, we say; but that anyone is free to do good, you say (Marriage and Desire 2.8).
Iulianum.3.105AUG. Ibi si adiunxisses: haeretici dicunt, quamvis ego verba ista non dixerim, a mea tamen sententia non recessisses. Verum est enim haereticos dicere, id est vos ipsos, liberum esse quemquam ad agendum bonum sine adiutorio Dei. Sed cur ibi non legerim sine adiutorio Dei, quae in hac sententia verba mea etiam ipse paulo ante posuisti, quamdiu possum, mendoso potius codici tribuo quam tibi. Dic ergo cetera.
Aug. There, if you had added, "the heretics say"—although I did not say those words—you would nonetheless not have departed from my meaning. For it is true that heretics say—that is, you yourselves—that anyone is free to do good without the help of God. But why I did not read there "without the help of God," words of mine which you yourself a little before set down in this very sentence, I attribute, as long as I can, rather to a faulty codex than to you. Say, then, the rest.
Iulianum.3.105106. IUL. Quod enim ais ad colendum recte Deum sine ipsius adiutorio dici a nobis sufficere unicuique libertatem arbitrii, omnino mentiris. Cum enim cultus Dei multis intellegatur modis et in custodia mandatorum et in exsecratione vitiorum et in simplicitate conversationis et in ordine mysteriorum et in profunditate dogmatum, quae de Trinitate vel de resurrectione multisque aliis similibus fides christiana consequitur, qui fieri potest, ut nos inconfuso dicamus sine adiutorio Dei liberum arbitrium sufficiens ad eius esse culturam, cum legamus in Evangelio dicentem Dominum: Confiteor tibi, Pater, Domine caeli et terrae, qui abscondisti haec a sapientibus et prudentibus et revelasti ea parvulis; ita, Pater, quoniam sic fuit beneplacitum ante te (Mt 11, 25-26)? Cum utique ista omnia, tam quae dogmatibus quam quae mysteriis continentur, libertas arbitrii per se non potuerit invenire, quamvis, ut nec idola colerentur nec Deus, qui innotescebat mundi ipsius Conditor, sperneretur, Magistro Gentium teste docere potuerit ratio naturalis (Cf. Rom 1, 20). Non ergo hoc, quod fingis, aut nos aut quisquam dicit prudentium, sed affirmamus a Deo fieri hominem liberi arbitrii eumque innumeris divinae gratiae speciebus iuvari, cui possibile sit vel servare Dei mandata vel transgredi. Et hoc est, ubi liberum arbitrium esse defendimus, ut, cum Deus tam multis modis benignitatem suam asserat, id est praecipiendo benedicendo sanctificando cohercendo provocando illuminando, unusquisque eorum, qui iam ratione utitur, liberum habeat voluntatem Dei vel servare vel spernere.
106. Jul. For what you say—that we say the freedom of choice suffices for each one for rightly worshiping God without his help—is an utter lie. For since the worship of God is understood in many ways—both in the keeping of the commandments, and in the execration of vices, and in the simplicity of conduct, and in the order of the mysteries, and in the depth of the doctrines which the Christian faith pursues concerning the Trinity or the resurrection and many other like things—how can it come about that we should say, unabashed, that free choice without the help of God suffices for his worship, when we read in the Gospel the Lord saying: I confess to you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that you have hidden these things from the wise and prudent and revealed them to little ones; yes, Father, for so it was well-pleasing before you (Matt 11:25-26)? Since surely all these things, both those contained in the doctrines and those in the mysteries, the freedom of choice could not by itself have discovered—although, that idols should not be worshiped, nor God, who was made known as the Creator of the world itself, be despised, natural reason could teach, with the Teacher of the Gentiles as witness (See Rom 1:20). Not, then, this which you feign do either we or any of the prudent say; rather, we affirm that a human being of free choice is made by God, and is aided by countless forms of divine grace—a human being to whom it is possible either to keep the commandments of God or to transgress. And this is where we defend that there is free choice: that, since God asserts his kindness in so many ways—that is, by commanding, blessing, sanctifying, restraining, provoking, illuminating—each one of those who already use reason may have a free will either to keep or to spurn God.
Iulianum.3.106AUG. Tam multa dicis, quibus nos adiuvat Deus, id est praecipiendo benedicendo sanctificando cohercendo provocando illuminando, et non dicis caritatem dando, cum dicat Ioannes apostolus: Caritas ex Deo est (1 Io 4, 7). Unde item dicit: Ecce, qualem caritatem dedit nobis Pater, ut filii Dei vocemur et simus (1 Io 3, 1). In hac caritate, quae cordi humano spiritu, non littera datur, etiam potestas illa intellegitur, de qua idem ipse in Evangelio suo: Dedit eis - inquit - potestatem filios Dei fieri (Io 1, 12).
Aug. You say so many things by which God aids us—that is, by commanding, blessing, sanctifying, restraining, provoking, illuminating—and you do not say, "by giving love," though the apostle John says, Love is from God (1 John 4:7). Whence likewise he says, Behold what manner of love the Father has given us, that we should be called and be the sons of God (1 John 3:1). In this love, which is given to the human heart by the Spirit, not by the letter, is understood also that power of which the same John, in his Gospel, says: He gave them power to become the sons of God (John 1:12).
Iulianum.3.106Hanc vos ab homine esse dicitis homini per liberum arbitrium, spiritum habentes huius mundi, non eum, qui ex Deo est, propter quod nescitis, quae a Deo donata sint nobis (Cf. 1 Cor 2, 12). Ideo nec pacem habetis cum Ecclesia, de qua existis, nec caritatem, quam Dei esse donum negatis, nec fidem, quia haeretici estis, quoniam pax fratribus et caritas cum fide non ab humano libero arbitrio, sed a Deo Patre et Domino Iesu Christo (Eph 6, 23). Si agnoscis in his verbis dogma apostolicum, et in verbis tuis agnosce te haereticum.
This you say is from the human being to the human being through free choice, having the spirit of this world, not him who is from God, on which account you do not know the things that are given to us by God (See 1 Cor 2:12). Therefore you have neither peace with the Church from which you arose, nor love, which you deny to be the gift of God, nor faith, because you are heretics—since peace to the brethren and love with faith are not from human free choice, but from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ (Eph 6:23). If you recognize the apostolic dogma in these words, recognize yourself a heretic in your own words.
Iulianum.3.106107. IUL. Non ergo sine adiutorio Dei ad cultum eius, qualem exhibent initiati mysteriis, liberum arbitrium idoneum credimus, sed divinae aequitatis locupletem testem libertatem arbitrii confitemur, ut eo tempore, quo nos manifestari oportet ante tribunal Christi et recipere unumquemque propria corporis sicut gessit, sive bonum sive malum, nihil Deus iniuste iudicare doceatur, qui nulli imputat peccatum, nisi quod is, qui propter illud ponitur, potuit et cavere.
107. Jul. We do not, then, believe free choice fit, without the help of God, for his worship such as those initiated in the mysteries render; but we confess the freedom of choice to be a rich witness of divine equity, so that, at that time when we must be made manifest before the tribunal of Christ and each one receive the proper things of the body, as he has done, whether good or evil, God may be shown to judge nothing unjustly—he who imputes sin to no one except what he, who is condemned on account of it, could also have avoided.
Iulianum.3.107AUG. Bene me commones, quid contra te dicam. Omnes nos certe, sicut dicit Apostolus, manifestari oportet ante tribunal Christi, ut ferat unusquisque secundum ea, quae per corpus gessit, sive bonum sive malum (2 Cor 5, 10). Numquid ab hac universitate parvulos separabis? Dic ergo, quid boni per corpus gesserint proprio libero arbitrio, ut recipiant regnum Dei tam magnum bonum, aut quid mali egerint propria voluntate, qui parvuli abalienabuntur ab hac vita Dei.
Aug. Well do you remind me what I should say against you. All of us certainly, as the Apostle says, must be made manifest before the tribunal of Christ, that each one may bear according to the things he has done through the body, whether good or evil (2 Cor 5:10). Will you separate little ones from this universal company? Say, then, what good they have done through the body by their own free choice, that they may receive the kingdom of God, so great a good; or what evil they have done by their own will—those little ones who will be estranged from this life of God.
Iulianum.3.107Quod si necesse est fatearis sine ullis operibus liberae voluntatis, quae gerit quisque per corpus, illos in Christo vivificari, cur non fateris istos in Adam mori, cum scias Adam Christo e contrario esse formam futuri? An clausis oculis os aperies et dices illis, in quo renati sunt, spiritum profuisse iustitiae et istis, in qua nati sunt, carnem non obfuisse peccati? Quis nisi vos hoc dicere audebit? Maioris vero aetatis homines, quando audiunt vel legunt unumquemque recepturum secundum ea, quae per corpus gessit, non debent in suae voluntatis virtute confidere, sed orare potius talem sibi praeparari a Domino voluntatem, ut non intrent in tentationem. Praeparatur enim voluntas a Domino (Prov 8, 35); et: Orate, inquit ipse Dominus, ne intretis in tentationem (Mt 26, 41); et: Oramus ad Deum, ait Apostolus, ne quid faciatis mali (2 Cor 13, 7).
But if you must confess that, without any works of free will which each one does through the body, those are made alive in Christ, why do you not confess that these die in Adam, since you know that Adam, by contrast, is a form of the one to come? Or will you, with closed eyes, open your mouth and say that the spirit of justice profited those in whom they were reborn, and that the flesh of sin did not harm these in which they were born? Who but you will dare to say this? But human beings of greater age, when they hear or read that each one will receive according to the things he has done through the body, ought not to trust in the strength of their own will, but rather to pray that such a will be prepared for them by the Lord that they enter not into temptation. For the will is prepared by the Lord (Prov 8:35); and, Pray, says the Lord himself, that you enter not into temptation (Matt 26:41); and, We pray to God, says the Apostle, that you do no evil (2 Cor 13:7).
Iulianum.3.107108. IUL. Prior ergo sententia tua nihil obscuritate promovebit; secunda vero, qua repetis, quoniam liberum quidem confiteris arbitrium, non tamen ut quisquam homo liber ad agendum bonum credatur, viscera tua tota nudavit.
108. Jul. Your earlier sentence, then, will advance nothing by its obscurity; but the second, in which you repeat that you indeed confess free choice, yet not so that any human being should be believed free to do good, has laid bare your whole inward parts.
Iulianum.3.108AUG. Cogis me iam tibi tribuere, quod codici paulo ante tribuebam. Ecce enim sic repetis sententiam meam, ut eam non impleas verbis meis, quae valde sunt necessaria vobisque contraria. Ego enim dixi non esse liberum quemquam ad agendum bonum sine adiutorio Dei, tu autem dicis fateri me quidem liberum arbitrium, non tamen ut quisquam homo liber ad agendum bonum credatur, nec addis, quod ego addidi: sine adiutorio Dei. Non accuso furem, ablata civiliter repeto: redde verba mea et nihil valebunt tua.
Aug. You now force me to attribute to you what a little before I was attributing to the codex. For behold, you so repeat my sentence as not to complete it with my words, which are very necessary and contrary to you. For I said that no one is free to do good without the help of God, but you say that I confess free choice indeed, yet not so that any human being should be believed free to do good—and you do not add what I added: "without the help of God." I do not accuse a thief, I reclaim by lawful means what was taken away: restore my words, and yours will be worth nothing.
Iulianum.3.108109. IUL. Ecce enim nos, sicut primo libro fecimus, ita nunc presse cogimus, ut ostendas quemadmodum liberum arbitrium non negaris. Insidat autem hoc lectori nostro te videlicet confessum esse liberum arbitrium et Deum nascentium conditorem catholicis praedicare, quae duo numquam nisi Manichaeus negavit; sed cum haec communiter ambo dederimus nec tibi autem nec dogmati tuo libertas constet arbitrii, conficitur omnino te et dogma tuum de fide catholica nihil tenere. Interrogo ergo, quae vis sit quaeve definitio liberi arbitrii.
109. Jul. For behold, just as we did in the first book, so now we press you closely to show how you have not denied free choice. But let this settle in our reader: that you have confessed that Catholics preach both free choice and that God is the creator of those being born—two things which no one ever denied except Manichaeus; but since we have both granted these in common, while neither to you nor to your dogma is the freedom of choice consistent, it is altogether concluded that you and your dogma hold nothing of the Catholic faith. I ask, then, what is the force or what the definition of free choice.
Iulianum.3.109Certe in eius potestate naturalium nulla conversio est. Nemo enim sensuum in se umquam mutavit officia, verbi gratia ut voces naribus aut auribus susciperet odores, nemo sexus sui convertit proprietatem, nemo in formam transire animantis alterius, nemo per liberum arbitrium pilos corporis sui innatis potuit mutare velleribus, nemo sibi pro ingenio aut qualitatem aut quantitatem corporis vindicavit. His exemplis licet omnia, quae ad hanc condicionem respiciunt, pervagari. Transeamus igitur a naturalibus ad externorum discussionem.
Surely in its power there is no change of natural things. For no one ever altered in himself the functions of the senses—for example, to receive voices with the nostrils or odors with the ears; no one changed the property of his own sex; no one could pass into the form of another living thing; no one could, through free choice, change the hairs of his body into inborn fleeces; no one claimed for himself, at his pleasure, either the quality or the quantity of his body. By these examples one may range through all things that regard this condition. Let us pass, then, from natural things to the discussion of external things.
Iulianum.3.109Cui agrorum fecunditas, cui prosperitas navigationum, cui nobilitas et opes, cui constantia ipsius nobilitatis in iure constitit voluntatis, ut vel ad horum vel ad similium sibi conquisitionem voluntate se libera a Deo effectum esse fateretur? Naturalia ergo inconcussis ordinibus, externa vero casibus semper feruntur incertis. In quibus igitur liberum consistit arbitrium, propter quod homines bestiis antecellunt, propter quod ad Dei imaginem facti sunt et quo solo divini examinis iustitia continetur? In quo est hoc, inquam, arbitrium liberum, quod ut Manichaeos negare certum est, ita catholicos asserere etiam tu fateris? Sine dubio in eo, ut possibile sit homini voluntatem suam sine aliquo inevitabili naturalium coactu vel immittere in crimen vel a crimine cohibere.
For whom did the fruitfulness of fields, for whom the prosperity of voyages, for whom nobility and wealth, for whom the constancy of that very nobility, stand in the right of his own will, so that he might confess himself made by God with a free will for the acquiring either of these or of like things? Natural things, then, are borne along by unshaken orders, but external things always by uncertain chances. In what, then, does free choice consist—on account of which human beings excel the beasts, on account of which they were made to the image of God, and in which alone the justice of the divine examination is contained? In what, I say, is this free choice—which, just as it is certain the Manicheans deny, so you too confess that Catholics assert? Without doubt in this: that it is possible for a human being, without any inevitable compulsion of natural things, either to send his will into crime or to restrain it from crime.
Iulianum.3.109AUG. Cohibere a crimine voluntatem hoc ipsum est nec aliud quidquam non intrare in tentationem. Sed si hoc haberemus in potestate propriae voluntatis, non moneremur, ut id orando a Domino posceremus. Cui ergo dicitur: Declina a malo (Ps 36, 27), hoc utique dicitur, ut a crimine suam cohibeat volun tatem. Et tamen Apostolus, cum posset etiam hoc recte dicere: Praecipimus vobis, ne quid faciatis mali: Oramus - inquit - ad Deum, ne quid faciatis mali (2 Cor 13, 7).
Aug. To restrain the will from crime is itself nothing other than not to enter into temptation. But if we had this in the power of our own will, we would not be admonished to ask it of the Lord by praying. To him, then, to whom it is said, Turn away from evil (Ps 37:27 (36:27)), this surely is said, that he restrain his will from crime. And yet the Apostle, when he could also rightly say, "We command you to do no evil," says, We pray to God that you do no evil (2 Cor 13:7).
Iulianum.3.109Ecce quare dixi, non sicut tu dixisse me dicis, neminem liberum ad agendum bonum sine adiutorio Dei; hoc quippe adiutorium fidelibus orabat Apostolus, non ex natura hominis liberum auferebat arbitrium. Homines elati et inflati, nolite in vestra virtute confidere, Deo vos subdite atque, ut voluntatem cohibeatis a crimine et in tentationem non intretis, orate; nec existimetis non vos intrare in tentationem, quando ab opere aliquo malo concupiscentiam carnis forti voluntate cohibetis. Ignoratis versutias tentatoris; in maiorem tentationem, quando haec voluntati vestrae sine adiutorio Dei deputatis, intratis. Vellem sane, quomodo dixeris, nos doceres, quod ea, quae in bonis vel in malis hominum appellantur externa, sicut divitiae vel paupertas et cetera, casibus ferantur incertis. Etiam haec enim catholica fides ita demit humanae, ut divinae tribuat potestati.
Behold why I said—not, as you say I said, that no one is free to do good without the help of God; for the Apostle prayed for this help for the faithful, he did not take away from human nature its free choice. O human beings lifted up and puffed up, do not trust in your own strength; submit yourselves to God; and, that you may restrain your will from crime and not enter into temptation, pray; and do not suppose that you do not enter into temptation when, by a strong will, you restrain the concupiscence of the flesh from some evil work. You do not know the wiles of the tempter; you enter into a greater temptation when you reckon these things to your own will without the help of God. I would indeed have you teach us how you said that the things which are called external among the goods or evils of human beings—such as riches or poverty and the rest—are borne along by uncertain chances. For the Catholic faith too so takes these away from human power as to attribute them to divine power.
Iulianum.3.109Hoc autem dico, quia timeo vobis, ne forte id quoque vestro addideritis errori, ut quidquid homines patiuntur vel adipiscuntur sive in corporibus suis sive in rebus externis, ad divinam negetis providentiam pertinere ac per hoc, quidquid malorum perpetiuntur et parvuli, ita incertis casibus deputetis, ut a iudicio eius, sine cuius voluntate, ut ipse Dominus dicit, nec passer cadit in terram, haec alienare conemini, quoniam videtis haeresim vestram in hac parvulorum miseria naufragare, quae sub Deo iusto nulla esset, nisi eam natura humana primi peccati magnitudine vitiata et damnata meruisset (Cf. Mt 10, 29).
But I say this because I fear for you, lest perhaps you add this too to your error: that whatever human beings suffer or obtain, whether in their own bodies or in external things, you deny to pertain to divine providence—and thereby, whatever evils little ones too suffer, you reckon to such uncertain chances that you try to estrange these from the judgment of him without whose will, as the Lord himself says, not even a sparrow falls to the ground; for you see your heresy shipwrecked in this misery of little ones, which, under a just God, would be none, unless human nature, corrupted and condemned by the greatness of the first sin, had merited it (See Matt 10:29).
Iulianum.3.109110. IUL. Et ut res absoluta paucis illuminetur exemplis, ut tam liberum sit homini sacrilegium facere velle quam nolle, tam liberum sit parricidium velle perpetrare quam nolle, tam liberum sit adulterium committere velle quam nolle, tam possibile sit verum testimonium perhibere quam falsum, tam liberum Deo oboedire imperanti quam diabolo persuadenti.
110. Jul. And, that the matter may be illuminated in few words by examples: that it is as free for a human being to will to commit sacrilege as not to will it, as free to will to perpetrate parricide as not to will it, as free to will to commit adultery as not to will it, as possible to bear true witness as false, as free to obey God commanding as the devil persuading.
Iulianum.3.110AUG. Verum dicis; hoc est liberum arbitrium, tale omnino accepit Adam, sed quod datum est a conditore et a deceptore vitiatum, utique a Salvatore sanandum est. Hoc vos non vultis cum Ecclesia confiteri; hinc estis haeretici. Homo, qui non cogitas ubi sis et in diebus malis tamquam in bonis caecus extolleris, quando erat tale, quale describis, liberum arbitrium, nondum homo vanitati similis factus erat, ut dies eius sicut umbra praeterirent (Cf. Ps 143, 4); non enim vanitas Deus, ad cuius similitudinem factus erat, quae per eius gratiam renovatur de die in diem. Nondum dicebatur: Ego in iniquitatibus conceptus sum (Ps 50, 7); nondum dicebatur: Quis enim est mundus a sorde? Nec infans, cuius est diei unius vita super terram (Iob 14, 4-5); postremo non dicebatur: Non quod volo, sed quod odio illud facio (Rom 7, 15); et: Scio, quia non habitat in me hoc est in carne mea bonum; velle enim adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non invenio (Rom 7, 18), et: Video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae (Rom 7, 23).
Aug. You speak truly; this is free choice—Adam received it altogether such; but what was given by the creator and corrupted by the deceiver must surely be healed by the Savior. This you are unwilling to confess with the Church; on this account you are heretics. O man who do not consider where you are, and who, blind, are lifted up in evil days as in good—when free choice was such as you describe, the human being had not yet been made like to vanity, so that his days passed away like a shadow (See Ps 144:4 (143:4)); for it is not vanity, God, to whose likeness he had been made, which is renewed by his grace from day to day. It was not yet said, Behold, I was conceived in iniquities (Ps 51:7 (50:7)); it was not yet said, For who is clean from filth? Not even the infant whose life upon earth is of one day (Job 14:4-5); finally, it was not said, I do not do what I will, but what I hate, that I do (Rom 7:15); and, I know that there dwells in me—that is, in my flesh—no good; for to will lies near to me, but to accomplish the good I find not (Rom 7:18), and, I see another law in my members warring against the law of my mind (Rom 7:23).
Iulianum.3.110Hoc malum in Adam, quando rectus creatus est, non erat, quia natura humana depravata nondum erat; rectorem habebat, quem libero reliquit arbitrio, non liberatorem quaerebat, per quem fieret liber a vitio. Nam et si verba illa: Non quod volo ago (Rom 7, 19) et cetera talia hominis sunt, ut dicitis, nondum sub Christi gratia constituti, ergo etiam hinc convincimini, quod tam infirmae voluntatis ad agendum bonum homines Christus invenit et quod arbitrii liberi infirmitatem ad agendum bonum nonnisi per Christi gratiam potest humana reparare natura. Ac per hoc verum est, quod dixi neminem esse liberum ad agendum bonum sine adiutorio Dei, et propterea tu subtraxisti sine adiutorio Dei, ut tibi campus aperiretur, ubi te loquacius quam eloquentius per multa iactares, quibus non delectares legentem, sed intellegere volentem, quantum posses, potius impedires. Subdimini Deo, ut corrigamini. Nemo est liber ad agendum bonum sine adiutorio Dei. Quid, ut praecipitetis, humanam extollitis voluntatem? Orate potius, ne intretis in tentationem.
This evil was not in Adam when he was created upright, because human nature was not yet depraved; he had a ruler, whom he forsook by free choice; he was not seeking a liberator through whom he might be made free from fault. For if those words, I do not do what I will (Rom 7:19), and others of the sort, belong, as you say, to a human being not yet set under the grace of Christ, then from this too you are convicted, that Christ found human beings of so weak a will to do good, and that human nature cannot repair the weakness of free choice to do good except through the grace of Christ. And thereby it is true, what I said, that no one is free to do good without the help of God; and therefore you removed "without the help of God," that a field might be opened for you where you might display yourself more loquaciously than eloquently, in many things by which you would not delight the reader, but rather, as much as you could, hinder one who wished to understand. Submit yourselves to God, that you may be corrected. No one is free to do good without the help of God. Why, that you may fall headlong, do you exalt the human will? Pray rather that you enter not into temptation.
Iulianum.3.110111. IUL. Propterea autem in superioribus voluntatem perfectam magis quam rerum effectus locavi, quoniam et parricidium et sacrilegium et adulterium vel horum similia facilius est cavere quam facere; neque enim semper voluntati malae perpetrandi quod vult adest facultas, at e regione horum abstinentia in summa quiete consistit, nisi forte hoc ipsum a vobis labor dicatur, laborare nolle. Omitto ea, quae tam Scripturae sanctae, quas Prophetae, quas Evangelistae, quas Apostoli protulerunt, quam disputatores catholica sanitate fulgentes, Ioannes, Basilius, Theodorus et horum similes, commendaverunt, multo esse maiorem laborem committere crimina quam cavere.
111. Jul. But for this reason, in the above, I placed perfect will rather than the effecting of deeds, since both parricide and sacrilege and adultery, or things like these, are easier to avoid than to do; for the power of perpetrating what it wills is not always present to an evil will, whereas, on the contrary, abstinence from these stands in the deepest quiet—unless perhaps this very thing be called by you a labor, to be unwilling to labor. I pass over what both the holy Scriptures, which the prophets, which the evangelists, which the apostles brought forth, and the disputants shining with Catholic soundness—John, Basil, Theodore, and the like of these—commended: that it is a much greater labor to commit crimes than to avoid them.
Iulianum.3.111AUG. Utinam horum fidem teneres, peccatum originale in parvulis non negares.
Aug. Would that you held the faith of these, and did not deny original sin in little ones.
Iulianum.3.111112. IUL. Interim, quod ad praesens negotium spectat, inculco liberum arbitrium nec ob aliud datum esse nec intellegi in alio posse, quam ut nec ad iustitiam nec ad iniquitatem captiva aliquis voluntate rapiatur.
112. Jul. Meanwhile, as regards the present business, I press home that free choice was given for no other reason, and cannot be understood in any other, than that one should be dragged neither to justice nor to iniquity by a captive will.
Iulianum.3.112AUG. Qui per legem, quam videt in membris suis repugnantem legi mentis suae et captivantem se sub lege peccati, clamat: Non quod volo facio bonum, sed quod odio malum hoc ago (Rom 7, 15), debes utique dicere, quomodo non rapiatur ad malum voluntate captiva. Ut enim secundum vos interim loquar, si sub mala iste consuetudine gemit nondum, sicut dicitis, sub Christi gratia constitutus, habet iste an non habet liberum voluntatis arbitrium? Si habet, quare non facit bonum quod vult, sed malum quod odit hoc agit? Si autem propterea non habet, quia sub gratia Christi nondum est, ecce, quod iam dixi, iterum dico et vobis video saepe dicendum: Nemo nisi per gratiam Christi ad bonum quod vult agendum et ad malum quod odit non agendum potest habere liberum voluntatis arbitrium, non ut voluntas eius ad bonum sicut ad malum captiva rapiatur, sed ut a captivitate liberata ad liberatorem suum liberali suavitate amoris, non servili amaritudine timoris attrahatur.
Aug. He who, through the law which he sees in his members warring against the law of his mind and taking him captive under the law of sin, cries out, I do not do the good that I will, but the evil that I hate, that I do (Rom 7:15)—you must surely say how he is not dragged to evil by a captive will. For, to speak for the present according to you, if this man groans under an evil habit, not yet, as you say, set under the grace of Christ, does this man have or not have free choice of will? If he has it, why does he not do the good he wills, but does the evil he hates? But if he does not have it for this reason, that he is not yet under the grace of Christ, behold what I have already said, I say again, and I see must be often said to you: No one, except through the grace of Christ, can have free choice of will for doing the good he wills and for not doing the evil he hates—not that his will be dragged captive to good as to evil, but that, freed from captivity, it be drawn to its liberator by the liberal sweetness of love, not by the servile bitterness of fear.
Iulianum.3.112113. IUL. Sunt quidem dulcia incitamenta vitiorum, amara etiam frequenter, quae a persecutoribus excitantur, tormenta poenarum, sed et illa censura honestatis everberat et ista consumit magnitudo patientiae.
113. Jul. There are indeed sweet incitements of vices, and often bitter too are the torments of punishments stirred up by persecutors; but both the censure of honesty beats back the former, and the greatness of patience consumes the latter.
Iulianum.3.113AUG. Inter illos declamas: Qui confidunt in virtute sua (Ps 48, 7); attende tibi, ne inter illos clames, qui torquebuntur de superbia sua.
Aug. You declaim among those who trust in their own strength (Ps 49:6 (48:7)); take heed to yourself, lest you cry out among those who will be tormented for their pride.
Iulianum.3.113114. IUL. Verumtamen nec virtutum est aerumnosa possessio, quae extra regnum quoddam bonae conscientiae promissa aeternae beatitudinis sublimitate fruitur; adsunt tamen adiutoria gratiae Dei, quae in parte virtutis numquam destituunt voluntatem, cuius licet innumerae species, tali tamen, semper moderatione adhibentur, ut numquam liberum arbitrium loco pellant, sed praebeant amminicula, quamdiu eis voluerit inniti, cum tamen non opprimant reluctantem animum. Inde quippe est, quod ut alii ad virtutes a vitiis ascendunt, ita etiam alii ad vitia a virtutibus relabuntur.
114. Jul. Nevertheless, the possession of virtues is not toilsome, which, beyond a certain kingdom of good conscience, enjoys the promised sublimity of eternal beatitude; yet there are present the helps of God's grace, which on the side of virtue never desert the will—of which grace, though there be countless forms, they are nonetheless applied always with such moderation that they never drive free choice from its place, but offer supports, as long as it is willing to lean on them, while yet they do not oppress a struggling mind. Hence indeed it is that, just as some ascend from vices to virtues, so also others slip back from virtues to vices.
Iulianum.3.114AUG. Unde fieri potest, ut adiutoria gratiae Dei liberum arbitrium loco pellant, quod potius vitiis pulsum et nequitiae subiugatum, ut in locum suum redeat, liberant? Sed cum quaeritur a vobis, quae sint ista adiutoria gratiae Dei, ea edicitis, quae supra commemorasti, Deum adiuvare praecipiendo benedicendo sanctificando cohercendo provocando illuminando, quae omnia etiam per homines fiunt secundum Scripturas. Nam et praecipiunt homines et benedicunt et per divina sacramenta sanctificant et corripiendo cohercent et exhortando provocant et docendo illuminant; non tamen qui plantat est aliquid neque qui rigat, sed qui incrementum dat Deus (1 Cor 3, 7).
Aug. How can it come about that the helps of God's grace drive free choice from its place, when rather they set it free, that—having been driven from its place by vices and subjugated to wickedness—it may return to its place? But when it is asked of you what these helps of God's grace are, you declare those things which you mentioned above—that God helps by commanding, blessing, sanctifying, restraining, provoking, illuminating—all of which are done even through human beings, according to the Scriptures. For human beings too command, and bless, and sanctify through the divine sacraments, and restrain by rebuking, and provoke by exhorting, and illuminate by teaching; yet neither he who plants is anything, nor he who waters, but God who gives the increase (1 Cor 3:7).
Iulianum.3.114Hoc est autem incrementum, ut unusquisque oboediat praeceptis Dei, quod non fit, quando vere fit, nisi caritate. Unde Ecclesia incrementum corporis facit in aedificationem sui in caritate (Eph 4, 16). Istam caritatem non dat nisi Deus; caritas enim ex Deo est (Cf. 1 Io 4, 7). Hanc vos inter adiutoria gratiae, quae commemoratis, nominare non vultis, ne hoc ipsum, quod oboedimus Deo, eius esse gratiae concedatis. Putatis quippe isto modo auferri voluntatis arbitrium, cum hoc quisquam facere nisi voluntate non possit, sed, quod vos non vultis, praeparatur voluntas a Domino (Prov 8, 35) non forinsecus sonantibus verbis, sed sicut orante exauditaque regina convertit Deus et transtulit indignationem regis in lenitatem (Cf. Esth 15, 11); sicut enim hoc divino et occulto modo egit in hominis corde, sic operatur in nobis et velle et operari pro bona voluntate (Phil 2, 13).
But this is the increase: that each one obey the precepts of God—which, when it is truly done, is not done except by love. Whence the Church makes the increase of its body unto its own building up in love (Eph 4:16). This love none but God gives; for love is from God (See 1 John 4:7). This you are unwilling to name among the helps of grace which you mention, lest you grant that this very thing, that we obey God, belongs to his grace. For you suppose that in this way free choice is taken away, since no one can do this except by will; but—what you are unwilling—the will is prepared by the Lord (Prov 8:35), not by words sounding from without, but as, when the queen prayed and was heard, God turned and transferred the king's indignation into gentleness (See Esth 15:11); for just as in this divine and hidden manner he acted in the human heart, so he works in us both to will and to work, for his good will (Phil 2:13).
Iulianum.3.114115. IUL. Tu ergo quomodo liberum arbitrium confiteris, cui unum tantummodo dicis esse possibile, id est facere malum, non autem esse possibile deflectere a malo et facere bonum (Cf. Ps 33, 15)?
115. Jul. How, then, do you confess free choice, to which you say only one thing is possible—that is, to do evil—but it is not possible to turn aside from evil and do good (See Ps 34:14 (33:15))?
Iulianum.3.115AUG. Dico esse possibile voluntati hominis deflectere a malo et facere bonum, sed ei voluntati, quam Deus adiuvat gratis, non quam Iulianus inflat ingratus.
Aug. I say that it is possible for the human will to turn aside from evil and do good—but for that will which God aids freely, not which Julian, ungrateful, puffs up.
Iulianum.3.115116. IUL. Taceo interim, qua rabie in totam legem fremas, quam credis ea imperasse mortalibus, quorum apud eos nullam facultatem videret.
116. Jul. I pass over, for the present, with what rage you rave against the whole Law, which you believe commanded to mortals things of which it saw no power in them.
Iulianum.3.116AUG. Non est verum, quod dicis. Haec imperat Deus, quae fieri possunt, sed ipse dedit, ut faciant, eis, qui facere possunt et faciunt, et eos, qui non possunt, imperando admonet a se poscere, ut possint. Et quod non omnia ab unoquoque sanctorum fiunt, novit Deus, quemadmodum eis ad humilitatem consulat, quibus quotidie dicentibus: Dimitte nobis debita nostra (Mt 6, 12), sic opitulatur ad habendam oboedientiam, ut sit, unde etiam veniam largiatur.
Aug. What you say is not true. God commands these things which can be done, but he himself gave it to those who can do them and do do them, and by commanding admonishes those who cannot to ask of him that they may be able. And that not all things are done by each of the saints, God knows—as he provides for their humility, to whom, while they daily say, Forgive us our debts (Matt 6:12), he so brings aid to having obedience that there may be that for which he may also grant pardon.
Iulianum.3.116117. IUL. Sed quaero, cum quibus poetis in talem incurreris Ippocrenem, ut bimembrem bestiam fingeres non quidem carminando, sed blasphemando, cuius corpus de mala necessitate formares et solam faciem nomine libertatis obduceres.
117. Jul. But I ask, with what poets you ran into such a Hippocrene that you fashioned a two-membered beast—not, indeed, by versifying, but by blaspheming—whose body you would form out of evil necessity, and overlay only its face with the name of liberty.
Iulianum.3.117AUG. Pingis tibi ipse, quod placet, cui vacat inani corde inania volutare phantasmata. Cur enim tu amminicula gratiae supponis voluntati bonae, cum voluntas mala nullo innitatur amminiculo, ut mala sit vel mala esse persistat? An hic libra tua, quam conaris ex utraque parte per aequalia momenta suspendere, ut voluntas, quantum est ad malum, tantum sit etiam ad bonum libera, vergendo in unam partem te indicat delirantem?
Aug. You paint for yourself what pleases you, you who have leisure, with an empty heart, to roll about empty phantasms. For why do you set the supports of grace under the good will, when the evil will leans on no support to be evil or to persist in being evil? Or here does your balance, which you try to hold suspended on both sides by equal weights—so that the will should be as free to good as to evil—by inclining to one side show you to be raving?
Iulianum.3.117118. IUL. Sic enim et in illo opere, quod Romam misisti, disputas: Voluntas, quae libera in malis est, libera in bonis non est (Cf. C. duas epp. Pelag. 1, 7).
118. Jul. For so too in that work which you sent to Rome you argue: The will, which is free in evil things, is not free in good things (See Answer to the Two Letters of the Pelagians 1.7).
Iulianum.3.118AUG. Cur non addis, quod ibi legisti: Si liberata non est? Aut quid est, quod ait Dominus, cum de fructibus palmitum hoc est de bonis actibus loqueretur: Sine me nihil potestis facere (Io 15, 5), nisi quia nemo ad bene agendum, quem non ipse liberat, liber est?
Aug. Why do you not add what you read there: "if it has not been set free"? Or what is it that the Lord says, when he was speaking of the fruits of the branches—that is, of good acts—Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5), except that no one is free to act well whom he himself does not set free?
Iulianum.3.118119. IUL. Et hic Caelestianum dicis, qui putat liberum esse quemquam ad agendum bonum; liberum ergo dicis, quod nisi malum facere non posse contendis. Inveni, si potes, alteram definitionem rei non liberae et hoc liberum vindicato, si adeo sensu excideras, ut definitionem liberi in suo corpore non videres, vel de contrario eius non debuisti intellegere, quae esset libertatis essentia. Fac enim te similiter ambigere potuisse, quid esset, quod visus diceretur oculorum, idque tu definires hoc modo: visus est vel effossos habere oculos vel impedimentis quibusque videndi tempore nihil posse conspicere, atque hanc definitionem putares visui convenire, referres te autem, ut contrarii eius id est caecitatis quae explicatio esset assereres, cumque nullam aliam invenires, quam si in eo animali, cuius naturae adesset visus oculorum, vel effossio luminum vel crassi humoris obsaeptio videndi eripiens facultatem, resipisceres procul dubio et videres rebus contrariis definitionem unam non posse competere. Sicque fiebat, ut, si caecitas nihil dici aliud poterat quam in animalis oculo eo tempore, quo videre deberet, privatio cernendi, visus quoque definitio per negationem illorum, quibus caecitatem exposueras, redderetur, ut videlicet nihil esset aliud visus quam nec effossis nec obseratis oculis opportuno tempore facultas congrua conspicandi. Quibus tu ostensis, si obstipe reluctareris, nihil obtineres aliud, quam ut aut contra conscientiam tuam pervicacia pudenda niti te crederent audientes aut, si eis fidem faceres tibi ita prorsus videri, non te minus effossos habere mentis oculos iudicarent quam illum, qui a te visum habens fuerat definitus.
119. Jul. And here you call him a Caelestian who thinks anyone is free to do good; you call free, then, that which you contend can do nothing but evil. Find, if you can, another definition of a thing not free, and claim this as free—if you had so fallen from your senses as not to see the definition of the free in its own body, you ought at least, from its contrary, to have understood what was the essence of liberty. For suppose you could likewise have been in doubt what that was which is called the sight of the eyes, and you defined it thus: sight is either to have one's eyes gouged out, or, by whatever hindrances at the time of seeing, to be able to behold nothing—and you thought this definition fit sight; but you brought yourself to assert what the explanation of its contrary, that is, of blindness, might be; and when you found no other than this—if, in that living thing to whose nature the sight of the eyes belonged, either the gouging out of the lights or the obstruction of a thick humor took away the power of seeing—you would without doubt come to your senses and see that one definition cannot fit contrary things. And so it would come about that, if blindness could be called nothing other than, in the eye of a living thing, at the time when it ought to see, the privation of discerning, the definition of sight too would be rendered by the negation of those things by which you had explained blindness—namely, that sight is nothing other than, with the eyes neither gouged out nor obstructed, the fitting power of beholding at an opportune time. And if, these things being shown, you should stubbornly resist, you would obtain nothing else than that your hearers should believe you to strive, against your own conscience, by a shameful obstinacy, or, if you made them believe that it indeed so seemed to you, they would judge you to have the eyes of your mind no less gouged out than the one who had been defined by you as having sight.
Iulianum.3.119AUG. Nolo, ut definias, sed ut finias caecitatem et videas recte dici a Christo non potuisse: Sine me nihil potestis facere (Ibidem), si ad bene agendum sine gratia Christi liberi esse potuissent.
Aug. I do not wish you to define, but to make an end of blindness and see that it could not rightly be said by Christ, Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5), if they could have been free to do well without the grace of Christ.
Iulianum.3.119120. IUL. Ita ergo ut ad causam referamus exemplum, intellegere potuisti vel definitione non liberi, quid deberes liberum nuncupare. Nam etsi in liberi arbitrii definitione intellegentia caligasset, ut id dici liberum posse arbitrareris, quod inter duo contraria uni doceretur adhaerere, respicere debuisti exponi aliter non posse captivum, id est non liberum, quam ut inter duo contraria uni vindicaretur addictum, et ideo nomen libertati captivitatis negatione tribuendum, ut, quoniam id, quod liberum non erat, alteri de contrariis cogeretur adhaerere, illud adversum ei id est liberum neutro sineretur addici.
120. Jul. So, then, to refer the example to the case, you could have understood, even from the definition of the not-free, what you ought to call free. For although, in the definition of free choice, your understanding had grown dark, so that you supposed that could be called free which was taught to cleave to one of two contraries, you ought to have considered that the captive—that is, the not-free—cannot be explained otherwise than as adjudged to cleave to one of two contraries, and therefore that the name is to be given to liberty by the negation of captivity; so that, since that which was not free was forced to cleave to one of the contraries, that which is opposed to it—that is, the free—should be allowed to be adjudged to neither.
Iulianum.3.120AUG. Quid aperta implicas loquacitate perplexa? Ad malum liber est, qui voluntate agit mala aut opere aut sermone aut sola certe cogitatione; hoc autem grandioris aetatis quis hominum non potest? Ad bonum autem liber est, qui voluntate bona agit bona etiam ipse aut opere aut sermone aut certe sola cogitatione; sed hoc sine Dei gratia nullus hominum potest. Quod si dicis aliquem posse, contradicis ei qui dixit: Sine me nihil potestis facere (Io 15, 5), contradicis etiam illi qui dixit: Non quia idonei sumus cogitare aliquid quasi ex nobismetipsis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est (2 Cor 3, 5). Puto, quod aliquid boni, non mali non se dixit ex semetipso cogitare idoneum, sed ex Deo; de cogitatione autem bona et sermo bonus est et opus bonum.
Aug. Why do you entangle plain things with perplexed loquacity? Free to evil is he who by his will does evil things, whether by deed or by word or at least by thought alone; and this what human being of greater age cannot do? But free to good is he who by a good will does good things himself too, whether by deed or by word or at least by thought alone; but this no human being can do without the grace of God. And if you say that anyone can, you contradict him who said, Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5); you contradict also him who said, Not that we are sufficient to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God (2 Cor 3:5). I think that he said he was not sufficient of himself to think something good, not evil, but from God; but from a good thought comes both good speech and good work.
Iulianum.3.120Ac per hoc qui cogitare boni aliquid idoneus non est ex semetipso, profecto nec loqui est idoneus nec agere aliquid boni ex semetipso, sed, si est sub gratia, sufficientia eius ex Deo est; unde dictum est: Non enim vos estis, qui loquimini, sed Spiritus Patris vestri, qui loquitur in vobis (Mt 10, 20), et: Quotquot Spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii sunt Dei (Rom 8, 14). Haec ego intuens neminem esse liberum ad agendum bonum sine adiutorio Dei dixi; haec tu metuens neminem esse liberum ad agendum bonum me dixisse dixisti et sine adiutorio Dei, quod addidi, sustulisti. Unde non dubito, quod victum te esse iam scias, sed prolixo vaniloquio id agas, ne victus appareas, qui sic definis liberam voluntatem, ut, nisi utrumque, id est, et bene et male agere possit, libera esse non posset. Ac per hoc necesse tibi est auferre libertatem Deo, qui tantummodo bonam potest, malam vero habere non potest voluntatem.
And thereby he who is not sufficient of himself to think anything good is surely not sufficient of himself to speak or to do anything good either; but, if he is under grace, his sufficiency is from God; whence it was said, For it is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you (Matt 10:20), and, As many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God (Rom 8:14). Considering these things, I said that no one is free to do good without the help of God; fearing these things, you said that I said that no one is free to do good, and you took away "without the help of God," which I added. Whence I do not doubt that you now know yourself to be conquered, but, by prolix empty talk, are at work not to appear conquered—you who so define free will that, unless it can do both, that is, both act well and act ill, it could not be free. And thereby you must needs take away liberty from God, who can have only a good will, but cannot have an evil one.
Iulianum.3.120121. IUL. Quod cum ita sit atque huic tu loco miserrime obnitaris, incertum est, quid magis de te aestimari conveniat, utrum contra conscientiam tuam falsa defendas an, quod falsum est, esse verum putes ac per hoc sit incertum, utrum oculos rationis amiseris, dum certum sit oculos te fidei perdidisse.
121. Jul. Since this is so, and you most wretchedly struggle against this point, it is uncertain what should rather be judged of you—whether you defend false things against your own conscience, or think what is false to be true; and thereby it is uncertain whether you have lost the eyes of reason, while it is certain that you have lost the eyes of faith.
Iulianum.3.121AUG. Numquid ideo te victum consolaris, quia convitiaris?
Aug. Do you console yourself, conquered, just because you revile?
Iulianum.3.121122. IUL. Ut autem quae sunt acta, breviter repetamus, arbitrium liberum, quod in mali parte vitiorum voluptatibus vel diaboli persuasionibus, in boni autem parte virtutum dogmatibus et variis gratiae divinae speciebus iuvatur, non potest aliter constare, nisi ut et iustitiae ab eo et peccati necessitas auferatur.
122. Jul. But, to recall briefly what has been done: free choice, which on the side of evil is aided by the pleasures of vices or the persuasions of the devil, but on the side of good by the doctrines of the virtues and the various forms of divine grace, cannot stand otherwise than if the necessity both of justice and of sin be taken away from it.
Iulianum.3.122AUG. Inter divinae gratiae species si poneretis dilectionem, quam non ex nobis, sed ex Deo esse eamque Deum dare filiis suis apertissime legitis, sine qua nemo pie vivit et cum qua nemo nisi pie vivit, sine qua nullius est bona voluntas et cum qua nullius est nisi bona voluntas, vere liberum defenderetis, non inflaretis arbitrium.
Aug. If you placed among the forms of divine grace that love which you read most openly to be not from us but from God, and which God gives to his sons—without which no one lives piously, and with which no one lives except piously, without which no one has a good will, and with which no one has any but a good will—you would truly defend free choice, you would not puff it up.
Iulianum.3.122Necessitatem porro si eam dicis, qua quisque invitus opprimitur, iustitiae nulla est, quia nemo est iustus invitus, sed gratia Dei ex nolente volentem facit. Si autem nullus peccaret invitus, non esset scriptum: Signasti peccata mea in sacculo et annotasti, si quid invitus admisi (Iob 14, 17).
Further, if by "necessity" you mean that by which anyone is oppressed against his will, there is none of justice, because no one is just against his will, but the grace of God makes one willing from unwilling. But if no one sinned against his will, it would not be written, You have sealed up my sins in a bag and noted if I have committed anything against my will (Job 14:17).
Iulianum.3.122123. IUL. Huius autem veritatem catholici confitentur, Traduciani autem cum Manichaeis, magistris suis, negant.
123. Jul. The truth of this Catholics confess, but the Traducianists, with the Manicheans their masters, deny.
Iulianum.3.123AUG. Convitia sunt ista, non iudicia; vellem ut iudicare posses, conviciari autem quis improbus non potest?
Aug. These are revilings, not judgments; I would that you could judge—but who, however base, cannot revile?
Iulianum.3.123124. IUL. Nos igitur verum diximus, quoniam qui a vobis decipiuntur, ne vocentur haeretici, fiunt Manichaei et, dum falsam verentur infamiam, verum crimen incurrunt instar ferarum, quae circumdantur pinnis, ut cogantur in retia et in verum exitium vana formidine contrudantur. Deum vero nascentium conditorem ita dicimus, ut quoniam certum est Deum catholicorum, qui verus est, nihil facere posse, quod malum est, ipsius opificis dignitate homines, qui ab eo fiunt, ante voluntatis usum de manibus eius iniqui et rei nullo modo exire credantur; quorum vos cum alterum negatis, utrumque subruitis. Ais quippe credere te quidem conditorem Deum, sed malorum hominum, ac per hoc infitiaris dogmati tuo, cum negas te asserere diabolum hominum conditorem.
124. Jul. We, then, have spoken the truth, since those who are deceived by you, lest they be called heretics, become Manicheans, and, while they fear a false infamy, incur a true crime—like beasts which are surrounded with feathers, that they may be driven into the nets and forced into a true ruin by an empty dread. But we say that God is the creator of those being born in such a way that, since it is certain that the God of Catholics, who is the true God, can do nothing that is evil, by the dignity of the craftsman himself, human beings who are made by him, before the use of will, are by no means believed to come from his hands iniquitous and guilty; and when you deny one of these, you undermine both. For you say that you indeed believe God to be the creator, but of evil human beings—and thereby you contradict your own dogma, when you deny that you assert the devil to be the creator of human beings.
Iulianum.3.124AUG. Quidquid in hominibus, qui cum vitio nascuntur, ad Deum creatorem pertinet, bonum est, quia et, quod iustum est, bonum est, naturarum autem, non vitiorum auctor est Deus. Ad illud iam veni: videamus, quid inde dicturus es, quomodo non eruantur parvuli de potestate tenebrarum, quando in Christi regnum per sacramenta Ecclesiae transferuntur; quantislibet enim tegminibus te multiplicis loquacitatis involvas, ubi ad hoc veneris, nudus haereticus apparebis.
Aug. Whatever in human beings, who are born with a fault, pertains to God the creator, is good—because what is just too is good; but God is the author of natures, not of faults. I have now come to this point: let us see what you are going to say there—how little ones are not rescued from the power of darkness when they are transferred into the kingdom of Christ through the sacraments of the Church; for however many coverings of manifold loquacity you wrap yourself in, when you come to this, you will appear a naked heretic.
Iulianum.3.124125. IUL. Nam cum tales ascribis operi Dei, quales facere non potest, ostendis nihil ad Deum, id quod ab eo dixeras fieri, pertinere.
125. Jul. For when you ascribe to the work of God such as he cannot make, you show that what you had said was made by him pertains in no way to God.
Iulianum.3.125AUG. Homines nisi Deus facere non potest. Dic potius, quomodo non eruantur parvuli de potestate tenebrarum, quando per divina sacramenta regenerantur.
Aug. None but God can make human beings. Say rather how little ones are not rescued from the power of darkness when they are regenerated through the divine sacraments.
Iulianum.3.125126. IUL. Quod licet in primo libro uberius actum sit (Cf. supra, 1, 52. 64), tamen et hic vel breviter, quid sentias, exprimamus. Times operi diaboli aliquam deputare substantiam, verum non times Deo non aliquod, sed magnum crimen impingere. Maiorem apud te habet reverentiam natura carnis humanae quam iustitia Dei; quasi enim magnum aliquid, ita substantiam hominis diabolo deputare metuisti et quasi rei non magnae id est iustitiae et sanctitati Dei informationem sceleris appulisti, quasi non tolerabilius fuerit inter duas opiniones, sed utrasque falsas, diaboli operibus deputare carnem quam Dei operibus iniquitatem.
126. Jul. Although this was treated more fully in the first book (See above, 1.52, 64), nonetheless here too let us express, even briefly, what you think. You fear to attribute any substance to the work of the devil, but you do not fear to fasten upon God not some crime, but a great crime. The nature of human flesh has greater reverence with you than the justice of God; for as though it were something great, so you feared to attribute the substance of the human being to the devil, and as though to a thing not great—that is, to the justice and holiness of God—you brought the fashioning of wickedness; as though it had not been more tolerable, between two opinions, both false, to attribute flesh to the works of the devil than iniquity to the works of God.
Iulianum.3.126AUG. Vos potius Dei iustitiam blasphematis, sub cuius omnipotentia sine ullis malis meritis tanta mala perpeti parvulos dicitis. Sed iam dic, quemadmodum eos separatis ab eis, quos Deus de potestate eruit tenebrarum, ut transferat in regnum Filii caritatis suae (Col 1, 13).
Aug. It is rather you who blaspheme the justice of God, under whose omnipotence you say that little ones suffer so many evils without any evil deserts. But now say how you separate them from those whom God rescues from the power of darkness, that he may transfer them into the kingdom of the Son of his love (Col 1:13).
Iulianum.3.126127. IUL. Ut enim hic in potestate diaboli parvulos a Deo reos formari dixisti, ita in inferioribus libri tui partibus taetrius aliquid, quam sunt Manichaeorum sacramenta, vomuisti dicens de Deo: Sic creat malos, quomodo pascit et nutrit malos (Cf. Isa 45, 7).
127. Jul. For just as here you said that little ones in the power of the devil are formed guilty by God, so in the later parts of your book you vomited something fouler than are the mysteries of the Manicheans, saying of God: He so creates the evil as he feeds and nourishes the evil (See Isa 45:7).
Iulianum.3.127AUG. Cum veneris ad easdem partes libri mei, ibi quemadmodum dictum fuerit, quod hic obicis, apparebit. Nunc iam dic, quaeso, quomodo cum regenerantur parvuli et transferuntur ad regnum Christi, de tenebrarum potestate non eruantur.
Aug. When you come to those same parts of my book, there it will appear in what way was said what you here object. Now say, I beg, how, when little ones are regenerated and transferred to the kingdom of Christ, they are not rescued from the power of darkness.
Iulianum.3.127128. IUL. Creat igitur malum Deus.
128. Jul. God, then, creates evil.
Iulianum.3.128AUG. Non intellegis, quemadmodum dicat apud Prophetam: Ego creo mala (Isa 45, 7).
Aug. You do not understand in what way he says in the prophet, I create evils (Isa 45:7).
Iulianum.3.128129. IUL. Et puniuntur innocentes, propter quod facit Deus.
129. Jul. And the innocent are punished, on account of what God does.
Iulianum.3.129AUG. Nec innocentes origine nec propter quod facit Deus.
Aug. They are neither innocent in origin nor punished on account of what God does.
Iulianum.3.129130. IUL. Et a diabolo possidentur, quia hoc facit Deus.
130. Jul. And they are possessed by the devil, because God does this.
Iulianum.3.130AUG. Et Apostolus tradidit hominem satanae, sed iustitia, non malitia (Cf. 1 Cor 5, 5), et Deus tradidit quosdam in reprobum sensum (Rom 1, 18), atque utinam non ibi essetis et vos.
Aug. The Apostle too handed a man over to Satan—but by justice, not by malice (See 1 Cor 5:5)—and God handed certain ones over to a reprobate sense (Rom 1:18); and would that you too were not there.
Iulianum.3.130131. IUL. Et imputat hominibus crimen manuum suarum Deus.
131. Jul. And God imputes to human beings the crime of his own hands.
Iulianum.3.131AUG. Non est crimen manuum Dei, quod de vitiata origine sua trahunt parvuli.
Aug. It is no crime of God's hands which little ones draw from their own corrupted origin.
Iulianum.3.131132 IUL. Et quod persuasit diabolus tenuiter, sollerter et perseveranter fingit et protegit et custodit et format Deus.
132. Jul. And what the devil persuaded faintly, God subtly and persistently fashions and protects and guards and forms.
Iulianum.3.132AUG. Non quod persuasit diabolus, format Deus, sed ex natura, quam vitiavit diabolus, bene format, quod format Deus.
Aug. God does not form what the devil persuaded, but, out of the nature which the devil corrupted, God forms well what he forms.
Iulianum.3.132133. IUL. Et fructum ab homine bonitatis reposcit, cui malum ingenuit Deus.
133. Jul. And God demands the fruit of goodness from the human being into whom God engendered evil.
Iulianum.3.133AUG. Non malum ingenuit Deus, sed malum, quod generatio vitiata ingenuit, regeneratione purgat Deus.
Aug. God did not engender evil; but the evil which corrupted generation engendered, God purges by regeneration.
Iulianum.3.133134. IUL. Et postea tota lege mentitur, quia iustus sit Dominus.
134. Jul. And afterward, through the whole Law, he lies, in that the Lord is said to be just.
Iulianum.3.134AUG. Mentiris, sed tu, qui negas habere peccatum gravi iugo dignum filios Adam (Cf. Eccli 40, 1); quid conaris ostendere, nisi quod iniustus sit Deus?
Aug. You lie—you who deny that the children of Adam have a sin worthy of the heavy yoke (See Sir 40:1); what do you try to show, except that God is unjust?
Iulianum.3.134135. IUL. Et qui tot crimina capit, adhuc vocatur Deus?
135. Jul. And he who takes on so many crimes is still called God?
Iulianum.3.135AUG. Quoniam nulla crimina capit Deus, ideo nec hoc, quod ei vos impingitis, capit, ut sine ullius originalis peccati merito mala parvuli tot et tanta ipso vel faciente vel permittente patiantur.
Aug. Since God takes on no crimes, therefore he does not take on this either which you fasten upon him—that, without the desert of any original sin, little ones should suffer so many and so great evils, either by his doing or by his permitting.
Iulianum.3.135136. IUL. Interibit Manichaeorum memoria cum strepitu, quia Dominus in aeternum permanet, qui paravit in iudicio sedem suam et ipse iudicabit orbem terrarum in aequitate (Ps 9, 7-9). Nullum est in Deo crimen. Non igitur creat malos, quoniam, si mali essent natura, Deus eos creare non posset; ac per hoc, ut catholicorum est confiteri Deum conditorem bonorum, ita Manichaeorum proprie Deum credere conditorem malorum.
136. Jul. The memory of the Manicheans shall perish with a crash, because the Lord remains forever, who has prepared his seat in judgment, and he himself shall judge the world in equity (Ps 9:6-8 (9:7-9)). There is no crime in God. He does not, then, create the evil, since, if they were evil by nature, God could not create them; and thereby, just as it belongs to Catholics to confess God the creator of good things, so it belongs properly to the Manicheans to believe God the creator of evil things.
Iulianum.3.136AUG. Si adversum divina eloquia, ubi dicitur: Iudicabit orbem terrarum in aequitate, non surdi essetis, aequitatem Dei etiam in poenis infantium disceretis; natura enim boni sunt, quod illos creat Deus, sed vitio mali sunt, propter quod illos sanat Deus. In qua catholica sententia non solum Manichaeorum memoria perit, verum etiam Pelagianorum cum strepitu loquacitatis illorum.
Aug. If you were not deaf against the divine words, where it is said, He shall judge the world in equity, you would learn the equity of God even in the punishments of infants; for by nature they are good, in that God creates them, but by fault they are evil, on account of which God heals them. In which Catholic sentence not only does the memory of the Manicheans perish, but even that of the Pelagians, with the crash of their loquacity.
Iulianum.3.136137. IUL. Sed videamus et reliqua.
137. Jul. But let us see the rest as well.
Iulianum.3.137AUG. Ecce ad alia libri mei verba iam transis et adversus illud, quod tibi quasi refellendum ex praecedentibus proposueras, nihil dicis. Ego enim, ut vos auctoritate apostolica urgerem, dixi vos dicere non erui parvulos a potestate tenebrarum et sic transferri in regnum Dei (Cf. Col 1, 13); contra quod nihil dicens apparuisti quidem, sicut supra praedixi, nudus haereticus, sed in te expoliando non laboravi, quia contra apostolicam fidem antiquissimae matris Ecclesiae nullo verborum tuorum vaniloquio tegmine te ausus es operire.
Aug. Behold, you now pass to other words of my book, and against that which you had set before yourself, as though to be refuted, from the preceding matters, you say nothing. For I, to press you with apostolic authority, said that you say that little ones are not rescued from the power of darkness and so transferred into the kingdom of God (See Col 1:13); against which, saying nothing, you have appeared indeed, as I foretold above, a naked heretic; but in stripping you I did not labor, because, against the apostolic faith of the most ancient mother Church, you dared to cover yourself with no covering of the empty talk of your words.
Iulianum.3.137138. IUL. Audi ergo breviter, quid ista quaestione versetur. Catholici dicunt humanam a creatore Deo bono conditam bonam, sed peccato vitiatam medico Christo indigere naturam. Manichaei dicunt humanam naturamnon a Deo conditam bonam peccatoque vitiatam, sed ab aeternarum principe tenebrarum de commixtione duarum naturarum, quae semper fuerunt, una bona et una mala, hominem creatum. Caelestiani et Pelagiani dicunt naturam humanam a Deo bono conditam bonam, sed ita esse in nascentibus parvulis sanam, ut Christi non habeant necessariam in illa aetate medicinam. Agnosce igitur in tuo dogmate nomentuum et catholicis, a quibus confutaris, desine obicere et dogma et nomen alienum; nam veritas utrosque redarguit, et Manichaeos et vos. Manichaeis enim dicit: " Non legistis, quia, qui ab initio fecit hominem, masculum et feminam fecit eos? Propter hoc relinquet homo patrem et matrem et adhaerebit uxori suae et erunt duo in carne una, itaque iam non sunt duo, sed una caro. Quod ergo Deus coniunxit, homo non separet " (Mt 19, 4-6).
138. Jul. Hear, then, briefly what is at issue in this question. Catholics say that human nature, founded good by the good creator God, but corrupted by sin, stands in need of Christ the physician. The Manicheans say that human nature was not founded good by God and corrupted by sin, but that the human being was created by the prince of the eternal darkness from the mingling of two natures, which always existed, one good and one evil. The Caelestians and Pelagians say that human nature was founded good by the good God, but is so sound in the little ones being born that it does not need the medicine of Christ at that age. Recognize, then, your own name in your own dogma, and cease to object to Catholics, by whom you are refuted, both a dogma and a name that are another's; for the truth refutes both—both the Manicheans and you. For to the Manicheans it says: Have you not read that he who made man from the beginning made them male and female? For this reason a man shall leave father and mother and shall cleave to his wife, and the two shall be one flesh; and so they are now not two, but one flesh. What therefore God has joined together, let no man separate (Matt 19:4-6).
Iulianum.3.138Ita quippe ostendit et hominum conditorem et coniugum copulatorem Deum adversus Manichaeos, qui utrumque horum negant. Vobis autem dicit: " Venit Filius hominis quaerere et salvare, quod perierat " (Lc 19, 10). Sed vos, egregii Christiani, respondete Christo: Si quod perierat quaerere et salvarevenisti, ad parvulos non venisti; isti nec perierant et salvi nati sunt, vade ad maiores; de verbis tuis tibi praescribimus: " Non est opus sanis medicus, sed male habentibus " (Mt 9, 12). Ita fit, ut Manichaeus, qui homini commixtam dicit esse naturam malam, velit inde saltem salvari a Christo animam bonam; tu vero in parvulis, cum salvi sunt corpore, nihil a Christo salvandum esse contendis. Ac per hoc Manichaeus quidem naturam humanam detestabiliter vituperat, sed tu crudeliter laudas. Quicumque enim tibi crediderint laudatori, infantes suos non offerent Salvatori (De nupt. et concup. 2, 9). Commendavi quidem etiam in primo opere nihil te magis agere, quam ut parum intellegaris.
For so it shows that God is both the creator of human beings and the joiner of spouses, against the Manicheans, who deny both of these. But to you it says: The Son of man came to seek and to save what had perished (Luke 19:10). But you, excellent Christians, answer Christ: If you came to seek and save what had perished, you did not come to little ones; these had not perished and were born safe; go to the older; from your own words we lay it down for you: The healthy have no need of a physician, but those who are ill (Matt 9:12). So it comes about that the Manichean, who says that an evil nature is mingled with the human being, wishes at least the good soul to be saved thence by Christ; but you, in little ones, since they are safe in body, contend that there is nothing in them to be saved by Christ. And thereby the Manichean indeed detestably reviles human nature, but you cruelly praise it. For whoever believes you, the praiser, will not offer their infants to the Savior (Marriage and Desire 2.9). I noted indeed, even in my first work, that you do nothing more than make yourself little understood.
Iulianum.3.138AUG. Prorsus intellegor, velis nolis; sed tu nihil contra ista dicturus vis non intellegi, quod ego verissimum atque firmissimum dixi; denique res ipsa indicavit haec a te non potuisse redargui.
Aug. I am understood plainly, will you or not; but you, about to say nothing against these things, wish that what I said—most true and most firm—not be understood; in short, the matter itself has shown that these things could not be refuted by you.
Iulianum.3.138139. IUL. Ostendique maiorem pene partem commentorum tuorum grandiore intellegi labore quam vinci.
139. Jul. And I showed that almost the greater part of your inventions is understood with greater labor than it is conquered.
Iulianum.3.139AUG. Et laboras, quod tibi est peius, et vinceris; non tamen laboras, ut me intellegas, quod facillime potes, sed laboras, ut me refellas, quod non potes.
Aug. And you both labor—which is worse for you—and are conquered; yet you labor not to understand me, which you most easily can, but you labor to refute me, which you cannot.
Iulianum.3.139140. IUL. Sed si id per singula facere velim, et eadem repetendo superfluus et cuncta persequendo longus videbor.
140. Jul. But if I were willing to do this point by point, I would seem both superfluous, by repeating the same things, and long-winded, by pursuing everything.
Iulianum.3.140AUG. Ecce quomodo agis, ut longe recedat lector ab his, quae dixi, et te respondisse arbitretur, dum ea, quae tibi quasi refellenda proposueras, obliviscitur.
Aug. See what you are doing: you make the reader withdraw far from what I said and suppose that you have answered, while he forgets the very things that you had set before yourself as if to be refuted.
Iulianum.3.140141. IUL. Unde quamvis omnia, quae contra nos edidisti, scripta ad unum finem properent, videlicet ut naturalia mala esse persuadeas et aut diabolum hominum aut Deum criminum conditorem, tamen puto aliquid procedere ad studium brevitatis, si ea potissimum argumenta, quibus totam opinionem tuam tueri te, cum obumbraris, putas, de diversis in unum partibus congregavero eaque prius admota expositione iuvero, ut, quid conentur, appareat, post vero non sparsa, sed collecta, non involuta, sed explicata proruero.
141. Jul. Hence, although everything you have published against us hastens toward one end—namely, to persuade us that natural things are evil and that either the devil is the author of human beings or God the author of their crimes—still I think it makes some progress toward brevity if I gather into one those arguments above all by which, when you take cover, you suppose you defend your whole opinion, drawing them together from their different parts; and if I first aid them by an exposition set before them, so that what they attempt may appear; and then bring them forth not scattered but collected, not tangled but unfolded.
Iulianum.3.141AUG. Mirabili studio brevitatis octo libros uni meo reddis, quem nec tanta multiloquii prolixitate convellis. Dic nunc, si potes, quomodo non dicere cogamini Christo, etsi non verbis, certe ipsis perversis sensibus vestris: Si quod perierat, quaerere et salvare venisti, ad parvulos non venisti; isti nec perierant et salvi nati sunt, vade ad maiores; de verbis tuis tibi praescribimus: " Non est opus sanis medicus, sed male habentibus " (Mt 9, 12; De nupt. et concup. 2, 9). Ad ista responde. Quid vanis vera involvere et occultare conaris?
Aug. With wonderful zeal for brevity you give back eight of your books for my one, which you do not even shake with so prolix a flood of words. Tell me now, if you can, how you are not forced to say to Christ—if not in words, certainly by your own perverse opinions: If you came to seek and to save what had perished, you did not come to the little ones; these had not perished and were born saved—go to the older folk; from your own words we prescribe to you: Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick (Matt 9:12; De nupt. et concup. 2.9). Answer this. Why do you try to wrap up and hide the truth in empty things?
Iulianum.3.141142. IUL. In inferioribus itaque libri tui partibus postquam dixisti: Sic creat malos Deus, quomodo pascit et nutrit malos, addis: Quia, quod eis creando tribuit, ad naturae pertinet bonitatem et, quod eis pascendo et nutriendo dat incrementum, non utique malitiae eorum, sed eidem bonae naturae, quam creavit bonus, bonum tribuit adiumentum. In quantum enim homines sunt, bonum est naturae, cuius auctor est Deus; in quantum autem cum peccato nascuntur perituri, qui non renascuntur, ad semen pertinet maledictum ab initio illius antiquae inoboedientiae vitio (Cf. Sap 12, 11).
142. Jul. And so in the later parts of your book, after you said, "God creates the wicked in the same way that he feeds and nourishes the wicked," you add: Because what he grants them in creating belongs to the goodness of nature, and what he gives them in feeding and nourishing as their increase he bestows certainly not as a good help to their wickedness, but to that same good nature which, being good, he created. For insofar as they are human beings, it is a good of nature, of which God is the author; but insofar as they are born with sin, doomed to perish if they are not reborn, it belongs to the seed cursed from the beginning by the fault of that ancient disobedience (See Wis 12:11).
Iulianum.3.142Quo tamen bene utitur factor etiam vasorum irae, ut notas faciat divitias gloriae suae in vasis misericordiae, ut non meritis suis tribuat, si ad eamdem massam quisque pertinens gratia liberetur, sed " qui gloriatur, in Domino glorietur " (1 Cor 1, 31).
Yet the maker uses well even the vessels of wrath, so that he may make known the riches of his glory in the vessels of mercy, so that, if anyone belonging to that same mass is set free by grace, he may attribute it not to his own merits, but let him who boasts boast in the Lord (1 Cor 1:31).
Iulianum.3.142Ab hac fide iste discedens non vult nascentes esse sub diabolo, ne parvuli portentur ad Christum, ut eruantur a potestate tenebrarum et in regnum ipsius transferantur (Cf. Col 1, 13). Et sic Ecclesiam accusat toto orbe diffusam, in qua ubique omnes baptizandi infantuli non ob aliud exsufflantur, nisi ut ab eis mundi princeps mittatur foras (De nupt. et concup. 2, 32-33).
Departing from this faith, this man does not want those being born to be under the devil, lest the little ones be carried to Christ to be rescued from the power of darkness and transferred into his kingdom (See Col 1:13). And so he accuses the Church spread throughout the whole world, in which everywhere all the infants to be baptized are exorcised for no other reason than that the prince of this world may be cast out of them (De nupt. et concup. 2.32-33).
Iulianum.3.142Item deorsum de libidine loquens, sine qua coniugum non potest esse commixtio, quam nos naturalem et ad Dei operam pertinentem non ut magnum aliquod bonum, sed ut sensum corporum, quae sunt a Deo facta, defendimus, quam tu inditam visceribus humanis a diabolo atque in eius verecundia dogma tuum collocans tam multis scriptis conaris asserere, de ipsa ergo libidine, sicut frequenter, ita etiam in inferiore parte libri tui loqueris: Quocirca - inquis - commixtionem quoque honestam coniugum non reprehendimus propter pudendam libidinem corporum. Illa enim posset esse nulla praecedente perpetratione peccati, de qua non erubescerent coniugati; haec autem exorta est post peccatum, quam coacti sunt velare confusi (Cf. Gen 3, 7). Unde remansit posterioribus coniugatis, quamvis hoc malo bene et licite utentibus, in eiusmodi opere humanum vitare conspectum atque ita confiteri, quod pudendum est, cum debeat neminem pudere, quod bonum est. Proinde pudenda libidine, qui licite concumbit, malo bene utitur; qui autem illicite, malo male utitur (De nupt. et concup. 2, 36).
Likewise, speaking below of the lust without which there can be no union of spouses—which we defend as natural and belonging to the work of God, not as some great good, but as a sensation of bodies that were made by God; which you, placing your doctrine in its shame, try to assert in so many writings to have been implanted in the human flesh by the devil—speaking, then, of that very lust, as you frequently do, so also in the lower part of your book you say: For this reason, you say, we do not blame even the honorable union of spouses on account of the shameful lust of the bodies. For that union could have existed with no prior commission of sin, and at it spouses would not blush; but this lust arose after sin, and being confounded they were compelled to veil it (See Gen 3:7). Hence it has remained for later spouses, although they use this evil well and lawfully, to avoid the human gaze in a work of this kind, and so to confess what is shameful, although no one should be ashamed of what is good. Accordingly, by shameful lust the one who lies with his wife lawfully uses an evil well; but the one who does so unlawfully uses an evil badly (De nupt. et concup. 2.36).
Iulianum.3.142AUG. Quare est interrupta sententia et quibusdam praetermissis, tamquam hoc sequeretur, adiunctum est: Proinde pudenda libidine et cetera praetermissa sunt autem verba mea, ubi dictum est: Sic insinuantur haec duo, et bonum laudandae coniunctionis, unde filii generantur, et malum pudendae libidinis, unde qui generantur, regenerandi sunt, ne damnentur (Ibidem).
Aug. Why is the sentence broken off, and—with certain things passed over, as though this followed—was there joined to it: Accordingly, by shameful lust, and the rest? But my words have been passed over, where it was said: These two things are thus insinuated, both the good of the praiseworthy union, from which children are begotten, and the evil of shameful lust, from which those who are begotten must be reborn, lest they be condemned (De nupt. et concup. 2.36).
Iulianum.3.142Quare ista verba mea de media sententia mea subtrahis eisque subtractis alia mea, quasi ipsa sequantur, adiungis? Quid est quod facis? Cur hoc facis? Parum est, quod ea, quae tibi ex eodem libro meo ex ordine proposueras refellenda, dimittis et in alia pergis, ut ordo turbetur et, quod a te propositum fuerat, de lectoris memoria dilabatur. Insuper et ea, quae praeter ordinem, ut tibi libitum est, interponis, non tota et integra fideliter ponis, sed concidis ubi vis, tollis quod vis, iungis quomodo vis. Sed fac quidquid vis; convictus et victus apparebis, ut non vis.
Why do you remove these words of mine from the middle of my sentence, and, once they are removed, join to them other words of mine as though they followed upon those? What is this that you are doing? Why do you do it? Is it too little that you abandon the things you had set out from this same book of mine, in order, to be refuted, and pass on to others, so that the order may be thrown into confusion and what had been proposed by you may slip from the reader's memory? Besides, the things that you insert out of order, as it pleases you, you do not set down whole and entire and faithfully, but cut them where you wish, take away what you wish, and join them however you wish. But do whatever you wish; you will be shown to be refuted and conquered, as you do not wish.
Iulianum.3.142143. IUL. Rectius enim accipit nomen mali quam boni, unde erubescunt mali et boni, meliusque credimus Apostolo, qui dicit: " Quia non habitat in carne mea bonum " (Rom 7, 18), quam huic, qui hoc dicit bonum.
143. Jul. For it more rightly takes the name of evil than of good—this from which both the wicked and the good blush—and we more rightly believe the Apostle, who says that no good dwells in my flesh (Rom 7:18), than this man who calls it a good.
Iulianum.3.143AUG. Non erat magnum et istam de libro meo implere sententiam. Ego enim dixi: Quam huic, qui hoc dixit bonum, unde si confunditur, confitetur malum; si autem non confunditur, addit impudentiae peius malum (De nupt. et concup. 2, 36). Sed nescio, cur hoc non posueris, cum similiter eis posses non respondere sicut aliis, quae tamquam refellenda posuisti nec attingere voluisti.
Aug. It would have been no great thing to fill out this sentence too from my book. For I said: Than this man who called it a good; and so, if he is confounded, he confesses the evil; but if he is not confounded, he adds to his shamelessness a worse evil (De nupt. et concup. 2.36). But I do not know why you did not set this down, since you could have left it unanswered, as you did the other things which you set down as if to be refuted and were unwilling even to touch.
Iulianum.3.143144. IUL. Et post modicum addis: Quoniam natura humana, quae nascitur vel de coniugio vel de adulterio, Dei opus est. Quae, si malum esset, non esset generanda, si malum non haberet, non esset regeneranda; atque ut ad unum verbum utrumque concludam, natura humana, si malum esset, salvanda non esset; si ei mali nihil inesset, salvanda non esset. Qui ergo dicit eam bonum non esse, bonum negat conditae Creatorem; qui vero negat ei malum inesse, misericordem vitiatae invidet Salvatorem. Quapropter in hominibus nascentibus nec excusanda sunt adulteria per bonum, quod indea Conditore bono creatum est, nec accusanda coniugia per malum, quod ibi a misericordi Salvatore sanandum est (Ibidem).
144. Jul. And a little later you add: Since human nature, which is born either from marriage or from adultery, is the work of God. If it were evil, it would not have to be begotten; if it had no evil, it would not have to be reborn; and, to conclude both in a single phrase, human nature, if it were evil, would not have to be saved; if there were no evil in it, it would not have to be saved. Therefore, whoever says that it is not good denies that the Creator made it good; but whoever denies that there is evil in it begrudges the merciful Savior to what is corrupted. For this reason, in human beings being born, adulteries are not to be excused by the good which is created there by the good Creator, nor are marriages to be accused by the evil which there is to be healed by the merciful Savior (De nupt. et concup. 2.36).
Iulianum.3.144Haec tam multa, quae de tuis scriptis posui, quoniam grandem in his aerumnam cogitationis pertuleras, ut acute aliquid dicere videreris, et ex more nostro, quo versute nihil agimus, et ex veritatis securitate, quoniam tuis sermonibus vix intellegi queunt, nostra oportet repetitione distingui. Dixisti ergo Manichaeos carnis vituperare naturam atque asserere hominem factum ex commixtione duarum naturarum, unius bonae, alterius malae, nos autem, quos haereticos vocas, dicere a bono Deo conditam humanam naturam testimonio auctoris sui bonam in infantibus ita esse sanam, ut Christi non habeant necessariam medicinam, te autem dicere bonam quidem a Deo bono conditam aliquando Adae fuisse naturam, sed tamen peccato esse vitiatam et ideo Christi indigere medicina. In primo quidem libro praesentis operis, quam nullo distaret fides vestra a Manichaeorum profanitate, quippe ex qua eam natam esse manifestum est, iunctis amborum opinionibus indicavi, ubi apparuit Ioviniano te per timorem copulari, Manichaeo autem omnino per amorem. Hoc ergo etiam in praesenti nobis genere disserendum est, sed prius nostra, post vestra distinguo. Verum ergo dixisti nos dicere a bono Deo naturam humanam bonam conditam, sed huc usque nostrum est; unam enim partem, qua suppletur nostra sententia, aut non vidisti aut suppressisti, aliam autem de tuo, cum non sit nostra, posuisti; nos enim non solum dicimus naturam hominis bonam a Deo esse conditam in Adam, sed in omnibus parvulis bonam ab eo Deo condi, qui primi illius auctor fuit, propter quod illum omnium hominum asserimus conditorem.
These many things, which I have set down from your writings—since in them you had endured great toil of thought in order to seem to say something sharp, and since, both by our custom, by which we do nothing cunningly, and by the security of truth, they can scarcely be understood from your discourses—must be distinguished by our restatement. You said, then, that the Manicheans disparage the nature of the flesh and assert that the human being is made from a mixture of two natures, one good, the other evil; but that we, whom you call heretics, say that the human nature founded by the good God is, on the testimony of its author, so sound and good in infants that they do not have any need of Christ's medicine; while you say that the nature of Adam was indeed at one time founded good by the good God, but that it was nevertheless corrupted by sin and therefore needs Christ's medicine. In the first book of the present work I showed, by joining the opinions of both, how little your faith differs from the profanity of the Manicheans, from which it is manifestly born; there it appeared that you are joined to Jovinian through fear, but to the Manichean altogether through love. This, then, must also be discussed by us in the present kind of question; but I first distinguish our position, then yours. You said truly, then, that we say human nature was founded good by the good God, but only this far is it ours; for the one part by which our opinion is completed you either did not see or suppressed, while you put down another part, of your own, since it is not ours. For we say not only that the nature of the human being was founded good by God in Adam, but that in all the little ones it is founded good by that same God who was the author of the first one—on account of which we assert that he is the founder of all human beings.
Iulianum.3.144AUG. Quid enim aliud et nos dicimus de Domino Deo, omnium hominum conditore? Sed, quod absit a nobis, salvatorem Deum parvulis necessarium vos negatis, sic eorum naturam bonam esse asserendo, ut ei mali nihil inesse dicatis, propter quod indigeat medico Christo. Ad hoc responde; quod tibi redarguendum proposueras, primo redargue; cur exsufflentur baptizandi parvuli ostende aut universae antiquissimae Ecclesiae bellum apertissimum indicens exsufflari eos non debere contende. Hoc age, hic insiste, huic firmamento, si potes, aliquid, unde cuncutiatur, impinge. Quid fugis sub pelles loquacitatis tuae? Quid fumos vanissimos subicis, quibus haec obtecta et obscura ita lector obliviscatur, ut te respondere nihil valentem dicere aliquid arbitretur?
Aug. For what else do we too say of the Lord God, the founder of all human beings? But—far be it from us—you deny that God the Savior is necessary for the little ones, asserting their nature to be good in such a way that you say there is no evil in it on account of which it would need Christ as physician. Answer this; refute first what you had set out for yourself to refute; show why the little ones to be baptized are exorcised, or, declaring most open war on the whole most ancient Church, contend that they ought not to be exorcised. Do this, press on here; against this foundation, if you can, drive something by which it may be shaken. Why do you flee beneath the hides of your loquacity? Why do you send up the most empty smoke, by which the reader may so forget these things, covered over and obscured, that he supposes you—able to answer nothing—to be saying something?
Iulianum.3.144145. IUL. Hanc ergo partem sententiae non solum a nostra definitione removisti, sed pro hac etiam intulisti tuam, quae prima fronte aliquid haberet invidiae, sed tamen discussa vanesceret. Posuisti enim nos dicere bonam a Deo bono conditam naturam, sed ita esse sanam, ut necessariam Christi non habeat medicinam. Intuere ergo, quanta penuria veritatis labores, qui et in ipsis verbis, quae dicuntur YYYY, furtum tam perspicuum facere non vereris; nam cum supra proposuisses: bonam naturam, subdidisti: ita esse sanam. Numquid YYYY boni sanum est?
145. Jul. This part of the opinion, then, you not only removed from our definition, but in its place you also brought in your own, which on first appearance might have something invidious in it, but yet, once examined, would vanish. For you put down that we say nature was founded good by the good God, but that it is so sound that it does not have need of Christ's medicine. Consider, then, with what poverty of truth you labor, you who, even in the very words that are called "antitheta," do not fear to commit so plain a theft; for when you had above proposed "good nature," you added "to be so sound." Is the opposite of "good" "sound"?
Iulianum.3.145Certe cum dicimus bonum, nihil contra hoc proprie ponimus nisi malum; si autem causa poscit, ut sanum dicamus, ex adverso debile vel aegrum locamus ut, si sanum est, non utique debile, si debile, sanum non esse dicatur; cum autem dicimus: Bonum est hoc, a contrario eius non sani nomen, sed mali vocabulum sistimus. Tibi ergo dicendum fuit, quia definiremus nos bonam a Deo conditam naturam hominum, sed ita esse in parvulis bonam, ut institutionis suae nullum quaereret emendatorem, aut si ea, quae bona erant, alieno vocabulo, id est sanitatis indicare malebas, consonanti totum elocutione signasses. Nunc autem quasi murenula inter definitionum saxa prolaberis; cum enim te veritas compulisset, ut nos confitereris bonam hominum dicere naturam a Deo bono conditam atque in ea parte sententiae ut multam rationem, ita invidiam nullam videres, ad alia continuo verba migrasti subiciens: sed ita nos eam sanam defendere, ut medicinam Christi ei necessariam non esse credamus. Quodsi totum tu per imperitiam incurris, bardissimus, sin autem id astu facis, vaferrimus inveniris.
Certainly when we say "good," we properly set nothing against it except "evil"; but if the matter requires that we say "sound," we place over against it "weak" or "sick," so that, if it is sound, it is said not to be weak, and if weak, not to be sound. But when we say "this is good," we set up against it the term not of "unsound" but the word "evil." You ought, then, to have said that we define human nature as founded good by God, but that it is so good in the little ones that it would seek no one to amend its constitution; or, if you preferred to indicate by another word—that is, by "soundness"—the things that were good, you should have marked the whole by a consistent manner of speech. As it is, like a little eel you slip away among the rocks of definitions; for when truth had compelled you to confess that we say human nature is good, founded by the good God, and when in that part of the opinion you saw much reason but no invidiousness, you migrated at once to other words, adding: but that we defend it as sound in such a way that we believe Christ's medicine to be unnecessary for it. But if you incur the whole of this through inexperience, you are found most dull; but if you do it by craft, most sly.
Iulianum.3.145AUG. Quando ista diceres, nisi non habendo quod diceres? Non enim debuimus, ut putas, ita sanam, quam diximus bonam, ne sibi non vera opponerentur antitheta; quod imperitia quanta dicas, si ostendere velim, rebus non necessariis tui similis immorabor. De medio tolle superflua et omnino, etiamsi vera essent, tibi minime profutura et dic, si potes, quomodo medicum Christum parvulis non negetis; cum enim coeperis dicere, ibi apparebit, quare ista vana et ad rem, quae agitur, non pertinentia tamen interponenda putaveris.
Aug. When would you say these things, except by having nothing to say? For we ought not, as you suppose, to have called sound what we called good, lest false antitheses be set against it; and how great is the inexperience with which you say this—if I were willing to show it, I would, like you, dwell on things not necessary. Take away the superfluous things from the middle—things that, even if they were true, would profit you not at all—and say, if you can, how you do not deny Christ as physician to the little ones; for when you begin to say it, then it will appear why you thought these empty things, not pertaining to the matter under discussion, ought nevertheless to be inserted.
Iulianum.3.145146. IUL. Ecce enim breviter respondeo adeo nos Christi medicinam parvulis, quos innocentes novimus, non negare, ut illos potissimum copiosiore ea indigere fateamur. Nascuntur enim exigui, debiles, qui non solum ali proprio labore non possint, verum nec implorare queant opem parentum, qui tam multis casibus obnoxii sunt, ut eis etiam lac densius et lactantium plerumque somnus exitio sit.
146. Jul. See, then, I answer briefly: we are so far from denying Christ's medicine to the little ones, whom we know to be innocent, that we confess them above all to need it in more abundant measure. For they are born tiny and weak, who not only cannot feed themselves by their own labor, but cannot even implore the help of their parents; they are subject to so many mishaps that even too-thick milk, and very often the sleep of those nursing them, is their undoing.
Iulianum.3.146AUG. Ecce, quare memoriae lectoris interponendo res superfluas obstrepas. Medicum Christum non negatis parvulis necessarium propter mala corporis, cuius imbecillitate vitiantur invalidi vel necantur, et negatis eis necessarium medicum Christum, propter quod sub diaboli potestate sunt, unde, ut liberentur, baptizandi exsufflantur;
Aug. See how, by inserting superfluous matters, you drown out the reader's memory. You do not deny that Christ the physician is necessary for the little ones on account of the evils of the body, by whose feebleness the weak are injured or killed; and you deny that Christ the physician is necessary for them on account of their being under the power of the devil, from which, that they may be set free, those to be baptized are exorcised;
Iulianum.3.146ut hoc tibi obiectum non intellegaris ob aliud proposuisse quasi refellendum nisi, ne hoc timuisse deprehendereris, ideo autem non tentasse refellere, quoniam de firmissimo et tamquam adamantino fundamento in te potius perimen dum tua iacula resilirent, et ideo de antithetis disputationem interposuisse superfluam, ut illud invictum lector oblitus sineret te in eis, quaecumque inferres vanissima, respirare tamquam respondentem aliquid et dicentem nihil.
so that one may not understand that you proposed this objection to yourself as if to be refuted for any reason other than this—lest you be caught having feared it; and that you did not attempt to refute it for this reason, namely, because, against a foundation most firm and as it were of adamant, your darts would rather rebound to your own ruin; and that for this reason you inserted a superfluous disputation about antitheses, so that the reader, forgetting that invincible point, might let you take breath in whatever most empty things you brought forward—as though answering something and saying nothing.
Iulianum.3.146Sic quippe imbecillitatem corporis infantilis multis obnoxiam casibus intulisti, quasi vel in ipsa cruciarentur vel in eius tanta infirmitate premerentur vel eis accidere in illa aetate mali aliquid posset, si natura humana, sicut instituta fuerat, permaneret. Cur exsufflet baptizandos parvulos Christi Ecclesia, ostende, si potes, aut eos exsufflandos non esse contende, si potes, aut obmutesce, si non potes; immo obmutesce, quia non potes.
For you brought in the feebleness of the infant body, subject to many mishaps, as if either they would be tormented in that very feebleness, or be oppressed in its great infirmity, or some evil could befall them at that age, if human nature remained as it had been constituted. Show, if you can, why the Church of Christ exorcises the little ones to be baptized; or contend, if you can, that they ought not to be exorcised; or fall silent, if you cannot—rather, fall silent, because you cannot.
Iulianum.3.146147. IUL. Pro condicione mortalis corporis incurrunt et aegritudinum aerumnas et dolorum poenas et pericula morborum. Non solum ergo parvulis necessariam Christi, a quo et facti sunt, medicinam fatemur, sed etiam omnium mortalium naturae.
147. Jul. By reason of the condition of the mortal body they incur both the troubles of sicknesses and the punishments of pains and the dangers of diseases. We confess, therefore, that Christ's medicine—Christ by whom they were also made—is necessary not only for the little ones, but for the nature of all mortals.
Iulianum.3.147AUG. Ergo et in paradiso omnia ista mala futura fuisse creditis, si nemo peccasset, et mortes illic hominum tamquam pecorum cogitatis, quia omnibus ibi communem mortalitatem corporum creditis. O miseri, si beatitudinem loci illius christiano cogitaretis affectu nec bestias ibi morituras fuisse crederetis sicut nec saevituras, sed hominibus mirabili mansuetudine subditas nec pastum de alternis mortibus quaesituras, sed communia, sicut scriptum est, cum hominibus alimenta sumpturas (Cf. Gen 1, 29-30).
Aug. Therefore you believe that all these evils would have existed even in paradise, if no one had sinned, and you imagine deaths of human beings there as of cattle, because you believe that a mortality of bodies common to all would be there. O wretched men, if only you would consider the blessedness of that place with a Christian disposition and would not believe that the beasts would die there—as neither would they rage, but, with wonderful gentleness, would be subject to human beings and would not seek their food from one another's deaths, but, as it is written, would take their nourishment in common with human beings (See Gen 1:29-30).
Iulianum.3.147Aut si istas ultima senecta dissolveret, ut sola ibi natura humana vitam possideret aeternam, cur non credamus, quod auferrentur de paradiso moriturae vel inde sensu imminentis mortis exirent, ne mors cuiquam viventi in loco vitae illius eveniret? Nam neque ipsi, qui peccaverant, homines, mori potuissent, si non de habitatione tantae felicitatis merito iniquitatis exissent.
Or, if extreme old age were to dissolve those animals, so that human nature alone would there possess eternal life, why should we not believe that they would be taken away from paradise when about to die, or would go out from there at the sense of impending death, lest death should befall any living thing in the place of that life? For not even those human beings who had sinned could have died, had they not gone out, by the desert of their iniquity, from the dwelling of so great a happiness.
Iulianum.3.147148. IUL. Cuius infirmitates ut in praesenti vita diverso remediorum genere mitescunt, ita etiam plene in iustorum tamen corporibus resurrectionis evacuabuntur adventu.
148. Jul. Just as the infirmities of that nature are softened in the present life by various kinds of remedies, so also they will be fully emptied out in the bodies of the just at the coming of the resurrection.
Iulianum.3.148AUG. In his iustis et parvulos ponis, qui nihil egerunt propria voluntate sive boni sive mali? An separas eos a iustis, quos tamen a carnis felici resurrectione non separas? Quare ergo iustorum corpora excepisti, in quibus haec mala resurrectionis evacuantur adventu? Si autem parvuli propter iustitiam secundi hominis, qui regenerationis est auctor, deputantur iusti, cur non propter peccatum primi hominis, qui generationis est auctor, deputantur iniusti?
Aug. Among these just do you also place the little ones, who have done nothing of their own will, whether good or evil? Or do you separate them from the just—whom nonetheless you do not separate from the happy resurrection of the flesh? Why, then, did you make an exception of the bodies of the just, in which these evils are emptied out at the coming of the resurrection? But if the little ones are reckoned just on account of the righteousness of the second man, who is the author of regeneration, why are they not reckoned unjust on account of the sin of the first man, who is the author of generation?
Iulianum.3.148149. IUL. Ecce ergo, in quantis humanae naturae necessariam Christi medicinam fatemur. At scio te vociferaturum cavillo tecum agi, non enim hanc te medicinam, qua corporibus subvenitur, sed nomine medicinae significasse Christi gratiam, quam a nobis affirmabas negari. Ad quod responderi potest tibi hoc ascribendum esse, qui rem, quam volebas intellegi, propriis noluisses signare nominibus. Sed quia vel tarde intellectum est, quam diceres medicinam, quam confuse nos negare mentitus eras, respondeamus et ad hoc, quod secundo intulisti, sicut et primo opere protestati sumus nos gratiam Christi, id est baptisma, ex quo ritum eius Christus instituit, ita necessariam omnibus in commune aetatibus confiteri, ut, quicumque eam utilem etiam parvulis negat, aeterno feriamus anathemate.
149. Jul. See, then, in how many respects we confess Christ's medicine to be necessary for human nature. But I know you will cry out that you are being dealt with by a quibble: for it was not this medicine, by which bodies are aided, but by the name of medicine you signified the grace of Christ, which you were affirming to be denied by us. To this it can be answered that this must be charged to you, who were unwilling to mark by their proper names the thing you wanted understood. But since, even if late, it has been understood what medicine you meant—the one you had lyingly said we so confusedly denied—let us answer also to this point which you brought forward in the second place: just as in our first work too we protested, we confess the grace of Christ, that is, baptism, from the time Christ instituted its rite, to be so necessary for all ages in common that whoever denies it to be useful even to the little ones we strike with an eternal anathema.
Iulianum.3.149AUG. De medicina agimus, quo nomine Christus gratiam suam vocari voluit, ubi ait de se ipso: Non est opus sanis medicus, sed male habentibus (Mt 9, 12). Vos autem gratiam Christi non propter sanandos parvulos, sed propter adoptandos in regnum Dei tantummodo eis dicitis necessariam; noli ergo te respondentem facere, ubi te vides respondere non posse.
Aug. We are dealing with medicine, by which name Christ willed his grace to be called, when he said of himself: Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick (Matt 9:12). But you say the grace of Christ is necessary to the little ones not in order to heal them, but only in order to adopt them into the kingdom of God; do not, then, make yourself out to be answering where you see that you cannot answer.
Iulianum.3.149150. IUL. Quod cum lucida professione inculcemus, convictus es tu publicae falsitatis, qui scribis adeo a nobis bonam defendi hominum naturam, ut sanae in infantibus negemus Christi necessariam medicinam.
150. Jul. Since we drive this home with a clear profession, you are convicted of public falsehood—you who write that the good nature of human beings is so defended by us that we deny Christ's medicine to be necessary for infants who are sound.
Iulianum.3.150AUG. Verum dixi; medicinam quippe christianae gratiae, quae non confertur nisi christianis, non autem omnibus hominibus etiam infidelibus et insuper catellis atque porcellis, pisciculis atque vermiculis omnique generi qualiumcumque animantium, sine dubio parvulis denegatis, quos utique sine ullo originis reatu, qui regeneratione sanatur, generatos esse contenditis. Unde tu modo magnas passus angustias detraxisti medicinae nomen et supposuisti gratiae, quia gratiam propter adoptionem parvulis necessariam dicere potestis, medicinam vero eis, quibus aeternam salutem, etiamsi christiani non fiant, promittere audetis, per sacramenta Christi necesariam dicere non potestis. Christum quippe illis non vultis esse Iesum, quod ideo vocatur teste angelo, teste Evangelio, quia salvum facit populum suum non a morbis atque vulneribus carnis, a quibus quoslibet homines et quaelibet volatilia atque reptilia sanat, sed a peccatis eorum (Cf. Mt 1, 21).
Aug. I said the truth; for the medicine of Christian grace, which is not conferred except on Christians—and not on all human beings, including even unbelievers, and besides on puppies and piglets, little fishes and little worms and every kind of whatever living things—you without doubt deny to the little ones, whom you contend to have been begotten without any guilt of origin, which is healed by regeneration. Hence you, now suffering great straits, withdrew the name "medicine" and substituted "grace," because you can say that grace is necessary to the little ones for the sake of adoption, but the medicine that is necessary through the sacraments of Christ you cannot say is necessary for those to whom you dare to promise eternal salvation even if they do not become Christians. For you do not want Christ to be Jesus to them—who is called this, as the angel testifies, as the Gospel testifies, because he saves his people not from the diseases and wounds of the flesh, from which he heals any human beings whatever and any birds and creeping things whatever, but from their sins (See Matt 1:21).
Iulianum.3.150151. IUL. Quae tamen gratia, quoniam etiam medicina dicitur, salva lege iustitiae facit alios ex malis bonos, parvulos autem, quos creat condendo bonos, reddit innovando adoptandoque meliores.
151. Jul. Yet this grace, since it is also called medicine, makes—while the law of justice is preserved—others good out of evil, but the little ones, whom it creates good by founding them, it renders better by renewing and adopting them.
Iulianum.3.151AUG. Ergo quod ait ipse Iesus: Non est opus sanis medicus, sed aegrotantibus (Mt 9, 12), quantum attinet ad medicinam, quae solis Christianis praebetur a Christo, in parvulis falsum est, quos et sanos esse et eis, ut devitetis invidiam, medicinam christianam dicitis necessariam. Quomodo autem innovat Christus, quos novos, a nativitate recentissimos invenit, si nihil trahunt de vetustate peccati? An dicturus es etiam non vetus aliquid innovari, cum legas ad Hebraeos: Quando hoc dicit novum, vetus fecit primum (Hebr 8, 13)? Dic ergo, unde sint veteres modo nati, quos dicis sanos a vetustate peccati; et tamen ad indignationem verorum Christianorum cavendam, a Christo eos simulas innovari. Postremo aliud est sanari, aliud innovari; propter sanandos curatio, propter innovandos instauratio necessaria est. Manifestum est igitur haeresim vestram parvulis prorsus christianam negare medicinam.
Aug. Therefore what Jesus himself says—Those who are well have no need of a physician, but those who are sick (Matt 9:12)—as regards the medicine which is offered by Christ to Christians alone, is false in the case of the little ones, whom you say to be both sound and yet, in order to avoid invidiousness, to need Christian medicine. But how does Christ renew those whom he finds new, most recent from birth, if they draw nothing from the oldness of sin? Or will you say that even something not old is renewed, when you read in the Letter to the Hebrews: In saying "new," he has made the first old (Heb 8:13)? Tell me, then, how those just born are old, whom you say to be sound from the oldness of sin; and yet, to avoid the indignation of true Christians, you pretend that they are renewed by Christ. Finally, it is one thing to be healed, another to be renewed; for the sake of those to be healed a cure is necessary, for the sake of those to be renewed a restoration is necessary. It is manifest, therefore, that your heresy altogether denies Christian medicine to the little ones.
Iulianum.3.151152. IUL. Ecce ergo planum est nos Christi gratiam utilem parvulis non negare. Quid igitur controversiae remansit, propter quod nos Traducianus erroris insimulat, videlicet quia non annuimus Adae quidem bonam, sed omnium hominum malam factam esse naturam? Hoc sane non solum nos non annuere, verum etiam et summis viribus impugnare profiteor. Remotis igitur illis figmentorum tuorum distortis pueriliter retibus et vulgaribus maniis, quibus susurrabas nos Christi gratiam negare cunabulis, super hoc congrediamur, in quo est summa certaminis. Eo igitur ordine, quem promisi, quia iam nostra defendi, Manichaei, cui te adversari simulabas, et vestra sensa pensemus.
152. Jul. See, then, it is plain that we do not deny Christ's grace to be useful to the little ones. What controversy, then, remains on account of which the Traducianist charges us with error—namely, because we do not grant that the nature of Adam was indeed made good, but that of all human beings made evil? This indeed I profess not only not to grant, but even to fight against with all my strength. Therefore, with those nets of your fabrications, childishly twisted, removed, and the common follies by which you whispered that we deny Christ's grace to cradles, let us join battle over this, in which the sum of the contest lies. In that order, then, which I promised—since our position has now been defended—let us weigh the opinions of the Manichean, whom you pretended to oppose, and yours.
Iulianum.3.152AUG. Vestra non defendisti, sed defendi non posse monstrasti.
Aug. You did not defend your position, but showed that it cannot be defended.
Iulianum.3.152153. IUL. Ille ergo dicit a principe tenebrarum, id est auctore mali, de duarum commixtione naturarum, bonae et malae, hominem creatum fuisse. Tu quid dicis? A Deo quidem bono, sed omnes homines malos creari.
153. Jul. He, then, says that the human being was created by the prince of darkness, that is, the author of evil, from a mixture of two natures, good and evil. What do you say? That all human beings are created by the good God, indeed, but evil.
Iulianum.3.153AUG. In homine nato et natura est, quam non negas bonum, de quo laudamus creatorem Deum, et vitium, quod non negas malum, si vel pressus confiteris necessarium parvulis medicum Christum, quoniam non est necessarius sanis medicus (Mt 9, 12) eumdem de se ipso dixisse negare non potes Christum.
Aug. In the human being who is born there is both a nature, which you do not deny to be good, for which we praise God the creator, and a fault, which you do not deny to be evil—if, even under pressure, you confess that Christ the physician is necessary to the little ones, since those who are well have no need of a physician (Matt 9:12); for you cannot deny that Christ said this very thing of himself.
Iulianum.3.153154. IUL. Inter te et Manichaeum itaque nulla de qualitate naturae, sed de solo est auctore dissensio; hoc enim malum tu Deo reputas, quem parvulorum creatorem fateris, quod Manichaeus principi tenebrarum, quem naturae humanae conditorem putavit. Ad instaurandum igitur foedus non grande vobis remansit obstaculum. Mox tamen docebo, apud utrumque vestrum etsi veritatis vestigia nulla videantur, illius tamen magis quam tua sibimet dicta concinere. Nos porro quid dicimus? Sine dubio, quod utrique vestrum repugnet, id est nec a bono Deo malam nec a principe tenebrarum aliam vel factam vel commixtam esse naturam, sed unum Deum, auctorem rerum omnium, bonam hominum non solum fecisse primum, sed etiam facere in unoquoque nascente naturam, cui tamen creatoris sui opitulationem ut multis modis utilem, ita etiam necessariam profitemur. Quamquam alia est conditionum ratio, alia donorum; nec hic maior operis quam opificis aestimatio vertitur. Ambo igitur, tu et Manichaeus, pariter malum naturale firmatis, id est ambo malam naturam hominum aeque dicitis, sed ille fidelius, tu fraudulentius.
154. Jul. Between you and the Manichean, then, there is no disagreement about the quality of the nature, but only about its author; for you impute to God, whom you confess to be the creator of the little ones, this evil which the Manichean imputes to the prince of darkness, whom he supposed to be the founder of human nature. No great obstacle, therefore, remains to your restoring the alliance. Yet I will soon teach that with each of you, though no traces of truth appear, his sayings nonetheless agree among themselves more than yours do. But what do we say? Without doubt, what opposes each of you: that nature was neither made evil by the good God nor made or mixed otherwise by the prince of darkness, but that the one God, author of all things, not only made the nature of human beings good in the first one, but also makes it good in each one who is born—to which, however, we profess the help of its creator to be, as in many ways useful, so also necessary. Although the account of foundings is one thing, that of gifts another; nor here does the estimation of the work turn out greater than that of the worker. Both of you, then, you and the Manichean, equally affirm a natural evil—that is, both of you alike say the nature of human beings is evil; but he more honestly, you more fraudulently.
Iulianum.3.154Huic enim malo, quod inspiratum a diabolo visceribus humanis pariter arbitramini, nullius ortum ille subducit, tu autem, ut videaris aliquo distare, quod nullum est, solos ab eo duos homines conaris eximere, quorum non tamen personas a peccato liberas, sed provectu eruditioris ingenii dicis in illis non fuisse naturale, quod per illos tamen naturale factum esse persuades.
For from this evil, which you both alike judge to have been breathed into the human flesh by the devil, he withdraws the origin of no one; but you, in order to seem to differ in some way—a way that is nothing—try to exempt from it only two human beings, whose persons, however, you do not free from sin, but say that in them, by the advance of a more cultivated talent, there was not what was natural, while you persuade us that what was natural was nonetheless made by them.
Iulianum.3.154Ita, ne vel istic fraus impunita remaneret, furtum, quod magistro tuo feceras, stultitiae castigavit adiectio; nam credere naturale, quod fatearis de voluntate susceptum, non dico ineruditae, sed ebriae mentis inventum est. Verum hinc alias, nunc interim rem premamus.
Thus, lest even here the fraud should remain unpunished, the addition of stupidity has chastised the theft you had committed against your master; for to believe that natural which you confess to be taken on from the will is the invention not, I say, of an uncultivated, but of a drunken mind. But of this elsewhere; now meanwhile let us press the matter.
Iulianum.3.154Affirmat ergo Manichaeus malum esse naturale, tu annuis; dicit peccata nasci, tu ita esse consentis; dicit malam naturam hominum, hoc quoque confirmas; dicit omnium prorsus, hic resistis atque illam primam duorum hominum copulam sequestrari petis, sane quod nec ipsos vindices a reatu, quin immo affirmes mali naturalis auctores. Id si et nos tibi indulgere possimus, tamen tuus non dabit magister, quin forte etiam ferulis in tardum animadvertet ingenium, ita ut tibi necesse sit aut auctoritati acquiescere aut scolas eius omni ex parte deserere. Colligit autem ad extremum et dicit naturae malae bonum auctorem esse non posse ac per hoc principis tenebrarum id est diaboli opus esse hominem, quem naturaliter malum ambo fatemini.
The Manichean, then, affirms that evil is natural; you assent. He says that sins are born; you agree that it is so. He says that the nature of human beings is evil; this too you confirm. He says of absolutely all; here you resist and ask that that first union of two human beings be set apart—though indeed you do not vindicate even them from guilt, but rather affirm them to be the authors of the natural evil. Even if we could grant you this, your master nonetheless will not allow it, but perhaps will even with the rod take vengeance on a slow wit, so that it is necessary for you either to acquiesce in his authority or to desert his schools in every part. He gathers it up at last and says that a good nature cannot have a good author, and that through this the human being is the work of the prince of darkness, that is, of the devil—the human being whom you both confess to be by nature evil.
Iulianum.3.154AUG. Naturam humanam a Deo bono conditam bonam magno inoboedientiae peccato ita fuisse vitiatam, ut etiam posteritas inde traheret mortis meritum atque supplicium, cui tamen posteritati non negat Deus bonus opificium bonum, et contra vos et contra Manichaeos catholica fides dicit. Sed vos, qui hoc negatis, quaeso, paulisper paradisum cogitate.
Aug. That human nature, founded good by the good God, was so corrupted by the great sin of disobedience that its posterity too drew thence the desert and punishment of death—posterity to which, nonetheless, the good God does not deny good workmanship: this the Catholic faith says both against you and against the Manicheans. But you, who deny this, consider paradise, I pray you, for a little while.
Iulianum.3.154Placetne vobis, ut ponamus ibi castos et castas contra libidinem dimicantes, gravidas nauseantes, fastidiantes, pallentes, alias in abortu puerperia immatura fundentes, alias in partu gementes et ululantes natosque ipsos omnes flentes, sero ridentes, serius loquentes et hoc balbutientes, in scholas postea duci, ut litteras discant, sub loris, ferulis virgisque plorantes, pro varietatibus ingeniorum distributa varietate poenarum, insuper innumerabiles morbos et daemonum incursus et ferarum morsus, quibus quidam cruciarentur, quidam et absumerentur; qui vero sani essent, sub incertis eorum casibus misera parentum sollicitudine nutrirentur; essent ibi etiam utique orbitates et luctus et amissorum carissimorum desideria cum doloribus cordis.
Does it please you that we place there men and women, chaste, fighting against lust; pregnant women nauseated, queasy, pale; some pouring forth premature births in miscarriage, others groaning and wailing in childbirth; and all the newborns themselves weeping, laughing late, speaking later and that with a stammer; afterward led into schools to learn their letters, weeping under straps and rods and switches, with a variety of punishments meted out for the varieties of their talents; and besides, countless diseases and the assaults of demons and the bites of wild beasts, by which some would be tormented, some even consumed; while those who were sound would be reared, amid their uncertain mishaps, by the wretched anxiety of their parents; there would be there, too, bereavements and griefs and the longings, with pains of heart, for dearest ones who had been lost?
Iulianum.3.154Longum est persequi omnia, quibus malis abundat haec vita, nec sunt tamen ista ulla peccata. Haec ergo si futura erant in paradiso nullo ibi, cuius merito exsisterent, praecedente peccato, quaerite, ista quibus non plane fidelibus, sed irrisoribus praedicetis. Certe, si talis paradisus pingeretur, nullus diceret esse paradisum, nec si supra legisset hoc nomen inscriptum, nec diceret errasse pictorem, sed plane agnosceret irrisorem.
It would be long to pursue all the evils with which this life abounds, and yet none of these are sins. If, then, these things were to be in paradise with no preceding sin there by whose desert they would exist, look for those to whom you may preach this—plainly not the faithful, but the mockers. Certainly, if such a paradise were painted, no one would call it paradise, even if he had read this name inscribed above it; nor would he say the painter had erred, but would plainly recognize a mocker.
Iulianum.3.154Verumtamen eorum qui vos noverunt nemo miraretur, si adderetur ad titulum nomen vestrum et scriberetur paradisus Pelagia norum. Si autem hinc erubescitis (neque enim re vera pudoris ullum putandum est in vobis remansisse vestigium, si non hinc erubescitis), perversam, quaeso, tandem mutate sententiam et humanam credite in has miserias peccato illo magno mutatam fuisse naturam neque ullo modo ista in paradiso esse potuisse, propterea inde exisse illos, quorum etiam propago digna erat talia sustinere transeunte in omnes contagione peccati cum conditione supplicii. Hoc dogma catholicum et iustitiam Dei defendit, quia non immerito vitam mortalium voluisset esse poenalem, et vos Manichaeosque subvertit, vos quidem, quia malis talibus horribilem paradiso tribuitis infelicitatem, Manichaeos autem, quia malis talibus naturam Dei sui ac per hoc quid aliud quam Deum suum asserunt infelicem.
And yet none of those who know you would be surprised if your name were added to the title and it were written "the paradise of the Pelagians." But if you blush at this—for in truth no trace of shame is to be thought to have remained in you, if you do not blush at this—change at last, I pray, your perverse opinion, and believe that human nature was changed into these miseries by that great sin, and that these things could in no way have been in paradise; that for this reason those went out from there whose offspring too deserved to endure such things, with the contagion of sin passing into all along with the condition of punishment. This dogma defends both the Catholic position and the justice of God, who not without desert willed the life of mortals to be penal; and it overturns both you and the Manicheans—you, indeed, because you attribute to paradise a horrible unhappiness with such evils; the Manicheans, because with such evils they assert the nature of their god, and through this what else than that their god is unhappy.
Iulianum.3.154Proinde me movere non debet, quod mihi magistrum Manichaeum, qui ferulis in meum tardum ingenium animadvertat, opponis, sed te obsecro moveat, quod secundum erroris vestri infandum horrendumque portentum erudireris ferulis, etiamsi in paradisi populis nascereris. Quam deformissimam absurditatem si nobiscum horrescitis, ut debetis, unde est, rogo vos, etiam ista miseria puerorum, quae procul dubio non est ex natura mali, quam desipiunt Manichaei, nisi quia illo peccato magno et nobis inaestimabili sic vitiata est humana natura et poenis iustissimis implicata, ut ex ea non solum corruptibilitas corporum tot aerumnosis casibus subdita, verum etiam tarditas ingeniorum obnoxia ferulis aliisque verberibus oreretur, atque ita hoc malignum saeculum per malos dies usque ad suum terminum curreret, ut etiam sancti ab aeterno supplicio eruti per divinam indulgentiam pignore incorruptibilis salutis accepto poenas tamen vitae huius in bono uso earum tolerare iuberentur cum mer cede patientiae, potius quam illis mererentur etiam post remissionem peccatorum carere?
Accordingly it ought not to move me that you set against me the Manichean as a master who would punish my slow wit with rods; but I beseech you, let it move you that, according to the unspeakable and horrible monstrosity of your error, you would be educated with rods even if you were born among the peoples of paradise. If, as you ought, you shudder with us at this most hideous absurdity, then whence, I ask you, come even these miseries of children—which without doubt are not from the nature of evil that the Manicheans rave about—unless because by that great sin, inestimable even to us, human nature was so corrupted and so enmeshed in most just punishments that from it there arose not only the corruptibility of bodies, subject to so many wretched mishaps, but also the slowness of wits, liable to rods and other beatings; and so this malignant age runs through evil days up to its end in such a way that even the saints, rescued from eternal punishment by divine indulgence, having received the pledge of incorruptible salvation, were nonetheless bidden to bear the punishments of this life, using them well, with the reward of patience—rather than that they should deserve to be free of them even after the forgiveness of sins?
Iulianum.3.154155. IUL. At tu contra hoc ultimum totus insurgis et, cum in unam navem cum Manichaeo ascenderis cumque idem cursum vestrum spiritus direxerit, transmissio, iam freto putasti tibi tamen in litus aliud exeundum. Verum forte dilectu utilitatis proximae tolerabilior fiat licet tarda cunctatio. In quem igitur portum navigium dirigis? Dico - inquis - bonum quidem Deum esse, eumdem tamen conditorem malorum. O periculi fugam in scopulos actam, totam Manichaei sentinam super eum effundere voluisse, quem Deum putaris!
155. Jul. But you rise up wholly against this last point, and, although you have boarded one ship with the Manichean and the same spirit has steered your course across the strait, you supposed that you nonetheless had to disembark on a different shore. But perhaps, by the choice of a nearer advantage, even a slow delay may become more tolerable. Into what harbor, then, do you steer your vessel? I say, you say, that God is indeed good, but that the same one is the founder of evils. O flight from danger driven onto the rocks—to have wished to pour out the whole bilge of the Manichean upon the one you suppose to be God!
Iulianum.3.155AUG. Numquid tu negas etiam in malis hominibus bonam esse naturam et animi et corporis? Huius boni est conditor Deus; quod Manichaeus malum dicit et huic bono, quod malum dicit, malum assignat auctorem. Non enim saltem animae parcit; sed sicut suam quandam dicit esse animam carnis, ita malam naturam Deo bono coaeternam, ut bona omnino esse non possit, alteram vero animam bonam in eodem homine non a Deo factam, sed substantiam Dei atque naturam in huius commixtionis miserias nulla sua iniquitate, sed Dei mala necessitate contrusam. Hoc autem totum opificium, quod est homo, et malum et mali esse dicit auctoris.
Aug. Do you deny that even in evil human beings the nature both of mind and of body is good? Of this good God is the founder; the Manichean calls it evil, and to this good, which he calls evil, he assigns an evil author. For he does not spare even the soul; but just as he says that there is a certain soul of the flesh that is its own, namely an evil nature coeternal with the good God, so that it cannot be good at all, so he says there is another, good soul in the same human being, not made by God but the substance and nature of God, thrust into the miseries of this mixture by no iniquity of its own but by the evil necessity of God. But this whole workmanship, which is the human being, he says is both evil and the work of an evil author.
Iulianum.3.155Videsne, quam diversa ille sapiat et ob hoc insanissime nefarieque desipiat? Tu autem, qui propterea malos nasci posse non putas, quia Deus bonus eos creat, contende, si potes, nec corpora nasci posse vitiosa, quia et ipsa Deus integer creat, contende postremo sicut malos, quia bonus eos creat, ita nec tardos ingenio nec fatuos homines nasci, quia sapiens eos creat. An non est malum fatuitas, cum Scriptura dicat incomparabiliter amplius fatuum lugendum esse quam mortuum (Cf. Eccli 22, 10)?
Do you see how different are the things he is wise about, and how, for this reason, he raves most insanely and wickedly? But you, who think that evil persons cannot be born because the good God creates them, contend, if you can, that bodies cannot be born defective either, because God whole and entire creates them too; contend, finally, that just as evil persons cannot be born because the good God creates them, so neither can human beings be born slow of wit or foolish, because the wise God creates them. Or is foolishness not an evil, when Scripture says that the foolish person is incomparably more to be mourned than the dead (See Sir 22:11)?
Iulianum.3.155Sicut ergo nobiscum non dicitis Deum fatuitatis auctorem, cum tamen nasci fatuos homines Deo creante fateamini, sic nos auctorem malitiae non dicimus Deum et tamen originalis obligatione peccati malos homines nasci non nisi creante ipso, quia non creat homines nisi ipse, recte possumus dicere.
Just as, then, you do not say with us that God is the author of foolishness, although you confess that foolish human beings are born with God creating them, so we do not say that God is the author of wickedness, and yet we can rightly say that by the obligation of original sin evil human beings are born only with him creating them, since no one creates human beings but he.
Iulianum.3.155156. IUL. Absolute igitur claret opinionem illius consequentiae plus habere: si malum aliquid naturaliter conderetur, consimilem sui indicaret auctorem.
156. Jul. It clearly stands out, then, that his opinion has more of consequence: if anything evil were founded by nature, it would point to an author like itself.
Iulianum.3.156AUG. Sic sapiant qui nisi haeretici Pelagiani? Ergo quia mortalis homo secundum te non poenaliter, sed naturaliter conditur, consimilem sui mortalem ostendit auctorem; et ut fatuitas tua saltem fatuis erubescat, quia fatuus homo naturaliter conditur, consimilem sui fatuum ostendit auctorem.
Aug. So may they be wise who are nothing but Pelagian heretics. Therefore, because according to you mortal man is founded not penally but naturally, he points to a mortal author like himself; and—that your foolishness may at least blush before the foolish—because the foolish man is founded naturally, he points to a foolish author like himself.
Iulianum.3.156157. IUL. Praescribit autem veritas primo malum id est peccatum dici non posse, quod ita est, ut eius natura compulerit, peccatumque nihil esse aliud quam exorbitantem a calle iustitiae liberam voluntatem.
157. Jul. But truth prescribes, first, that what is so because its nature has compelled it cannot be called evil, that is, sin, and that sin is nothing other than a free will straying from the path of justice.
Iulianum.3.157AUG. Sed hoc quoque originale peccatum ex voluntate peccantis originem ducit atque ita nullum est nisi voluntate peccatum.
Aug. But this original sin too draws its origin from the will of the one sinning, and so it is no sin except by the will.
Iulianum.3.157158. IUL. Quibus praesidiis innocens rerum omnium natura defenditur, quae ita manens, ut condita est, nulli crimini probatur obnoxia.
158. Jul. By these defenses the innocent nature of all things is defended, which, remaining as it was founded, is proved liable to no charge.
Iulianum.3.158AUG. Non autem ita mansit, ut condita est. Ideo crimini probatur obnoxia suamque stirpem suo crimini tamquam haereditario fecit obnoxiam; quae tamen etiam ipsa, in quantum a Deo conditur, bona est.
Aug. But it did not remain as it was founded. Therefore it is proved liable to a charge, and it made its own stock liable to its charge as if by inheritance—which stock, nonetheless, insofar as it is founded by God, is itself good.
Iulianum.3.158159. IUL. Malum igitur naturale esse non potest ac per hoc nec rea ulla naturaliter creatura nec malus auctor. Malum quippe non exstantis invenitur naturae, sed sicut omnis creatura, in quantum conditur, bona est, ita et Deus, naturarum auctor bonarum, nullo operis sui crimine maculatus per omnia bonus probatur. Totum igitur, quidquid Manichaeus attulerat, hac una catholicorum ratione subversum est.
159. Jul. Evil, then, cannot be natural, and through this no creature is guilty by nature, nor is its author evil. For evil is found not of an existing nature; but just as every creature, insofar as it is founded, is good, so too God, the author of good natures, stained by no charge in his work, is proved good through all. The whole, then, of whatever the Manichean had brought forward has been overturned by this one reasoning of the Catholics.
Iulianum.3.159AUG. Hoc verum dicis. Prorsus omnis creatura, in quantum conditur, bona est; et ideo sicut hoc ita et, quod sequitur, utrique dicimus, quoniam Deus, naturarum auctor bonarum, nullo operis sui crimine maculatus, per omnia bonus probatur. Hoc enim totum illic connectitur, quod omnis creatura, in quantum conditur, bona est. Ac per hoc et homo, in quantum conditur, bonus est, in quantum autem de vitiata origine generatur, bonus non est, ideo regenerandus est.
Aug. This you say truly. Absolutely every creature, insofar as it is founded, is good; and therefore, as this, so also what follows we both say, namely that God, the author of good natures, stained by no charge in his work, is proved good through all. For this whole is bound up there, that every creature, insofar as it is founded, is good. And through this the human being too, insofar as he is founded, is good; but insofar as he is begotten from a corrupted origin, he is not good, and therefore he must be reborn.
Iulianum.3.159160. IUL. Sed tamen ille, qui fulmine tam perspicuae veritatis interiit, ex parte aliqua videtur spirare, cum confertur tibi; illi enim tota dogmatis sui fundamento eius tantummodo nutante structura collabitur, tibi autem tria similiter vacillant ut illi unum. Ac per hoc vide, utrum aedificii tui quidquam possit assurgere. Mani ergo putans naturale esse peccatum, quod nisi voluntarium esse non potest, in vacuo fundamenta locavit; reliqua vero iuxta se consequenter imposuit dicens, quoniam est naturale peccatum, malam esse naturam, malae autem rei auctorem bonum non esse ac per hoc omne humanum genus reputandum principi tenebrarum. Quod totum utique stare potuisset, nisi illud primum eius suffodisset veritas, id est peccatum opus liberae voluntatis doceri naturale non posse et, quidquid fuisset naturale, peccatum esse non posse.
160. Jul. But nevertheless he who perished by the thunderbolt of so plain a truth seems in some part to breathe, when he is compared with you; for his whole structure collapses with only the foundation of his teaching tottering, while in your case three things waver alike, as for him one does. And through this see whether anything of your building can rise up. Mani, then, thinking sin natural—which cannot be anything but voluntary—laid his foundations in a void; but the rest he placed upon it consistently, saying that, since there is a natural sin, the nature is evil, and that of an evil thing the author is not good, and through this the whole human race must be reckoned to the prince of darkness. All of which certainly could have stood, had not truth undermined that first point of his—that is, that sin, the work of free will, cannot be taught to be natural, and that whatever was natural cannot be sin.
Iulianum.3.160AUG. Similiter contra te potest ratiocinatio ista contexi; quia non ita fatuus es, ut ingenia fatua id est homines fatuos nasci neges, ergo audi tua fatuitate quantum adiuveris dementiam Manichaei. Dicit enim doctus a te ipso, quoniam est naturalis fatuitas, eamdem fatuam esse naturam, quomodo tu dixisti: Quoniam est naturale peccatum, malumesse naturam; deinde ille addit fatuae autem rei auctorem sapientem non esse, sicut tu dixisti: Malae autem rei auctorem bonum non esse;
Aug. This reasoning can be woven together in like manner against you; for you are not so foolish as to deny that foolish wits—that is, foolish human beings—are born; so hear how much by your own foolishness you aid the madness of the Manichean. For, taught by you yourself, he says that, since there is a natural foolishness, this same nature is foolish, just as you said: Since there is a natural sin, the nature is evil; then he adds that of a foolish thing the author is not wise, just as you said: But of an evil thing the author is not good;
Iulianum.3.160postremo ille concludit: ac per hoc fatuorum hominum genus reputandum principi tenebrarum; sic enim et tu conclusisti dicens: Ac per hoc omne humanum genus reputandum principi tenebrarum. Ecce Manichaeus ore tuo te vicit, tuo te gladio iugulavit. Quid est acturus? Neque enim te adversus eum potest aliquid adiuvare ac non etiam plus premere atque confodere, quod adiungis et dicis: Totum hoc utique stare potuisse, nisi illud primum eius suffodisset veritas, id est peccatum opus liberae voluntatis doceri naturale non posse et, quidquid fuisset naturale, peccatum esse non posse. Quid te hoc adiuvat et quomodo non magis magisque suffocat? Numquid enim potes dicere fatuitatem naturalem esse non posse?
finally he concludes: and through this the race of foolish human beings must be reckoned to the prince of darkness; for so you too concluded, saying: And through this the whole human race must be reckoned to the prince of darkness. See, the Manichean has conquered you by your own mouth, has cut your throat with your own sword. What will he do? For nothing can aid you against him without rather pressing and piercing you the more—what you add, saying: All of this certainly could have stood, had not truth undermined that first point of his—that is, that sin, the work of free will, cannot be taught to be natural, and that whatever was natural cannot be sin. How does this aid you, and how does it not choke you more and more? For can you say that foolishness cannot be natural?
Iulianum.3.160Stat ergo adversus te, quod in simili ratiocinatione primum posuit Manichaeus, quoniam est naturalis fatuitas; cui velut fundamento cetera eius putasti consequenter astructa usque ad culmen, ubi dicit tale hominum genus reputandum principi tenebrarum. Nos autem primum illud fundamentum eius evertimus, qui naturalem fatuitatem ideo dicimus, quia nascuntur homines fatui ex accidenti scilicet vitio, ex quo huiusmodi origo merito traheretur, non quia prava est primitus humana instituta natura, sicut desipit Manichaeus.
There stands against you, then, what the Manichean placed first in a like reasoning—that there is a natural foolishness; upon which, as upon a foundation, you supposed the rest of his points consistently built up to the summit, where he says that such a race of human beings must be reckoned to the prince of darkness. But we overturn that first foundation of his, we who say foolishness is natural for this reason: that foolish human beings are born by an accidental fault, namely, from which an origin of this kind would deservedly be drawn—not because human nature was first constituted depraved, as the Manichean raves.
Iulianum.3.160Ac per hoc etiam, quod consequenter adiungit eamdem fatuam esse naturam, nos propter vitium, cum quo natus est fatuus homo, non propter quod in illo est opificium conditoris boni, verum esse concedimus; natus est enim fatuus accidente vitio, homo autem creatus est operante Deo.
And through this, also what he consistently adds—that this same nature is foolish—we grant to be true on account of the fault with which the foolish person is born, not on account of what is in him the workmanship of the good founder; for he is born foolish by an accidental fault, but the human being was created with God working.
Iulianum.3.160Deinde quod addit fatuae autem rei auctorem non esse sapientem, ut res ipsa homo intellegatur, non esse consequens dicimus; eius quippe hominis, qui fatuus natus est, Deum dicimus, quamvis non dicamus ipsius fatuitatis, auctorem. Quae fatuitas non est natura atque substantia, quae non nascitur nisi creante Deo, sed eiusdem naturae vitium, quod accidit sinente Deo; iusto autem iudicio Deum ista sinere non utique dubitamus. Ita destruimus et Manichaeos, malos ruinae suae structores, et Pelagianos, Manichaeorum fatuos adiutores.
Then what he adds—that of a foolish thing the author is not wise, so that the thing itself, the human being, is meant—we say does not follow; for of the human being who was born foolish we say God is the author, although we do not say he is the author of the foolishness itself. This foolishness is not a nature and substance, which is not born except with God creating, but a fault of that same nature, which befalls it with God permitting; and we certainly do not doubt that God permits these things by a just judgment. Thus we destroy both the Manicheans, the evil builders of their own ruin, and the Pelagians, the foolish helpers of the Manicheans.
Iulianum.3.160161. IUL. Primae igitur definitionis eversu culmina eius in solum cuneus rationis effudit. Quid igitur de te speras, cuius tria sunt ita in lubrico sicut illius unum? Dicis enim primo naturale esse peccatum, secundo bonum Deum, qui mala id est peccata condat informet extendat, tertio vero rem voluntatis immixtam esse seminibus. Haec ergo tria definitionum tuarum capita singula apud semet vacillant; vacillant, inquio, immo ut funes e sabulo dilabuntur, ante quam coeant. Unum ergo id est naturale peccatum iam in Manichaeo ex directo quidem destructum iacet; alia autem duo quae opinionis vestrae sunt propria, Manichaeo totidem intereunte sed consueta ceciderunt. Nam si ille reos nasci homines nec per malam naturam nec per principem tenebrarum potuit vindicare, quanto magis vos stulti, qui ad ostendenda nascentium crimina iunxistis accusationem Dei? Ac per hoc, sicut non potest natura esse peccatum, quo fulmine Manichaei dogma dissiluit, ita recurrit, ut, quod peccatum est, naturale esse non possit; res enim voluntatis non transit in conditionem substantiae, quod tu factum arbitraris. Multo autem magis constat Deum bonum malos numquam creare, apparuit itaque peccatum in nascente, quem Deus creat, esse non posse.
161. Jul. With the first definition overturned, then, the wedge of reason has poured its peaks to the ground. What, then, do you hope for yourself, whose three points are as much on slippery ground as his one? For you say, first, that sin is natural; second, that God is good, who founds, forms, and extends evils, that is, sins; third, that a thing of the will has been mixed into the seeds. These three heads of your definitions, then, each waver by themselves; they waver, I say—nay rather, like ropes of sand they slip apart before they come together. One, then—that is, natural sin—already lies destroyed directly in the Manichean; but the other two, which are proper to your opinion, fell along with as many of the Manichean's, but ones customary to you. For if he could not vindicate that human beings are born guilty either through an evil nature or through the prince of darkness, how much more you fools, who, to show the crimes of those being born, joined an accusation of God? And through this, just as nature cannot be sin—by which thunderbolt the Manichean's teaching burst apart—so it recoils, that what is sin cannot be natural; for a thing of the will does not pass into the condition of a substance, which you suppose to have happened. But it stands much more that the good God never creates evil persons; and so it has appeared that there cannot be sin in the one being born, whom God creates.
Iulianum.3.161AUG. Ita constat Deum bonum malos non creare, quemadmodum constat Deum sapientem fatuos non creare. Si enim dixeris: Creat sapiens fatuos, respondebitur tibi: Cur non ergo et bonus malos? Unde factus intentus, cum quaesieris, unde nascantur fatui, quos tamen homines Deus creat, ibi forte invenies originis vitium, qui fateri non vis originale peccatum. An vero paratus es dicere nullo ullius praecedente peccato etiam fatuos nasci in illa paradisi felicitate potuisse, qui erudiri, non dico ferulis, sed nec fustibus possent?
Aug. It stands that the good God does not create evil persons in just the way that it stands that the wise God does not create fools. For if you say, "The wise God creates fools," it will be answered to you: Why, then, does the good God not also create the evil? Hence, made attentive, when you ask whence the foolish are born, whom nonetheless God creates as human beings, there perhaps you will find the fault of origin, you who are unwilling to confess original sin. Or are you prepared to say that, with no preceding sin of anyone, even fools could have been born in that happiness of paradise—fools who could be educated not, I say, by rods, but not even by cudgels?
Iulianum.3.161Quod si non dicis, ne omnem fatuitatem haec transcendat absurditas, dic, quo merito imago Dei cum tanta mentis deformitate nascatur, ut nullo robore aetatis, nulla prolixitate temporis, nullo labore studiorum, nulla industria magistrorum, nullis poenis verberum possit, non dico ad sapientiam, sed ad qualemcumque doctrinam utilem pervenire, qui non vis credere Deum iustum ideo de paradiso, hoc est felicitatis loco,
But if you do not say this, lest this absurdity surpass all foolishness, tell me by what desert the image of God is born with so great a deformity of mind that by no vigor of age, no length of time, no labor of studies, no industry of teachers, no punishments of beatings can he attain—I do not say to wisdom, but to any useful learning whatever—you who are unwilling to believe that the just God for this reason dismissed corrupted and condemned human nature from paradise, that is, from the place of happiness,
Iulianum.3.161vitiatam atque damnatam humanam dimisisse naturam, ne mors illic ulla contingeret, id est nec temporalis corporis nec totius hominis sempiterna, nec ista tot ac tanta, quae in genere humano cernimus, ingeniorum et corporum mala, quae de radice depravata atque punita et massa perdita nasci oportebat, in regione beatitudinis illius nascerentur, sed potius in his terris miseriae mortalium, quae iustissime inflicta est, deputatis, reatu persequente nascentes neque a renascentibus labore recedente aerumnoso usque ad corporis mortem.
so that no death might befall there—that is, neither the temporal death of the body nor the everlasting death of the whole human being—and so that these so many and so great evils of wits and bodies which we discern in the human race, which had to be born from a depraved and punished root and a lost mass, might not be born in that region of blessedness, but rather in these lands assigned to the misery of mortals, which was most justly inflicted, with guilt pursuing those born and the wretched toil not departing from those reborn, even up to the death of the body.
Iulianum.3.161162. IUL. Res clara est et iam in primo opere sufficienter impleta; verum quoniam tu adeo pellax esse voluisti, ut aliquam inter te et Manichaeum distinctionem facere nitereris, ideo necesse mihi nunc est urgere causam, ut non solum praeteritis dictis tuis, sed etiam, si qua deinceps inferre tentaveris, clareat obviatum. Dicimus itaque tam bonum esse opus Dei in nascente, ut ea quae substantiae eius sunt naturalia opus emendatore non habeant, quoniam, quicumque censuerit, id quod a Deo factum confitetur, aliter fieri debuisse, illum sine dubio reprehendit, quem corrigendae in alteram formam creaturae confitetur artificem.
162. Jul. The matter is clear and has already been sufficiently fulfilled in the first work; but since you wished to be so deceitful as to strive to make some distinction between yourself and the Manichean, it is now necessary for me to press the case, so that it may be clear that not only your past words but also whatever you may henceforth attempt to bring forward has been met. We say, then, that the work of God in the one being born is so good that the things which are natural to his substance have no need of an amender, since whoever should judge that what he confesses to have been made by God ought to have been made otherwise, without doubt blames the one whom he confesses to be the craftsman of a creature to be corrected into another form.
Iulianum.3.162AUG. Tace, obsecro; quid loquaris, ignoras. Nonnulli clausis oribus nati sunt et eis a medicis sunt aperta. Erat apud nos Acatius quidam honesto apud suos ortus loco; clausis oculis natum se esse dicebat, sed quia intus sani palpebris cohaerentibus non patebant, medicum eos ferro aperire voluisse neque hoc permisisse religiosam matrem suam, sed id effecisse imposito ex eucharistia cataplasmate, cum iam puer quinque fere aut amplius esset annorum, unde hoc se satis meminisse narrabat. Omitto illum evangelicum caecum natum, cui lumina, quae propter commendanda mirabilia sua minus fecerat, ipse artifex reddidit; ibi enim, cur caecus natus fuerit, causa non tacita est, non scilicet propter peccatum suum vel parentum, sed ut manifestarentur opera Dei in illo (Cf. Io 9, 1-3).
Aug. Be silent, I beg you; you do not know what you are saying. Some have been born with closed mouths, and these have been opened for them by physicians. There was among us a certain Acatius, born in an honorable place among his own people; he said he had been born with closed eyes, but that, because the eyes within were sound, with the eyelids clinging together they did not open, and a physician had wished to open them with a knife, but his devout mother did not permit this, but accomplished it by applying a poultice from the Eucharist, when the boy was already about five years old or more—whence he related that he remembered this well enough. I pass over that man blind from birth in the Gospel, to whom the craftsman himself restored the lights of his eyes, which he had made less perfect in order to commend his own wonders; for there the reason why he was born blind is not left unspoken—namely, not on account of his own sin or his parents', but that the works of God might be made manifest in him (See John 9:1-3).
Iulianum.3.162Verumtamen interroga medicos et dicant tibi, quam multis, ubi possunt, opitulentur, ne vitia corporibus innata permaneant vel etiam natos necent; nam quidam, sicut alii oribus, ita clausis inferioribus meatibus oriuntur, quae utique vitia, si maneant, non eos sinunt vivere. Neque enim, cum his medicinali peritia subvenitur hominibus, Dei opera culpata emendantur. Quis enim verax Dei cultor ignorat, quod tales sic nasci oportebat, ut nati sunt?
But ask the physicians, and let them tell you how many they aid, where they can, lest defects innate to bodies remain, or even kill those born; for some, just as others with closed mouths, are born with closed lower passages, which defects, if they remain, certainly do not allow them to live. Nor, when these human beings are aided by medical skill, are the blamed works of God amended. For what truthful worshiper of God does not know that such persons had to be born thus, as they were born?
Iulianum.3.162Sed etiam hoc pertinet ad aerumnas generis humani, in quibus aguntur hi dies mali, iusto iudicio Dei laboribus doloribus timoribus periculis pleni; quae omnia mala absit ut essent in illa felicitate paradisi, ac per hoc non pullulaverunt nisi de radice peccati. Quid? Ipsa ingenia, si dimittantur, ut nata sunt, nec doctrinis sollertibus excolantur labore magno docentium atque discentium, nonne apparet, qualia remanebunt? Sed vos hominibus et corpore et animo vitioso natis vestrum implete paradisum, ut infeliciter oculis clausis et impudenter ore aperto negetis originale peccatum.
But this too belongs to the troubles of the human race, in which these evil days are spent—days full, by the just judgment of God, of labors, pains, fears, and dangers; all which evils, far be it that they should have existed in that happiness of paradise, and through this they did not sprout except from the root of sin. What? The wits themselves, if they are let go as they are born and are not cultivated by skillful teachings with the great labor of those teaching and learning, does it not appear what sort they will remain? But fill your paradise with human beings born defective both in body and in mind, so that, unhappily with eyes closed and shamelessly with mouth open, you may deny original sin.
Iulianum.3.162163. IUL. Probabilitate itaque et ea mediocritate laudum, quae naturis debetur, etiam in nascentibus quibusque servata, augmenta beneficiorum divinorum utilia esse et necessaria omnibus in commune aetatibus dicimus, ita tamen, ut nec virtus nec peccatum sine propria cuiquam voluntate tribuatur.
163. Jul. And so, with probability and that moderation of praises which is owed to natures preserved even in any who are being born, we say that the increases of divine benefits are useful and necessary to all ages in common, yet in such a way that neither virtue nor sin is attributed to anyone without his own will.
Iulianum.3.163AUG. Non tribuitur cuiquam virtus sine propria voluntate, sed praeparatur voluntas a Domino (Prov 8, 35), sicut regis illius, propter quod oravit Esther (Cf. Esth 15, 11).
Aug. Virtue is not attributed to anyone without his own will, but the will is prepared by the Lord (Prov 8:35), as was the will of that king for whom Esther prayed (See Esth 15:11).
Iulianum.3.163164. IUL. Quamvis in hoc quoque clementia Dei uberior approbetur, quoniam sanctificat parvulos nescientes; ad laudem quippe misericordiae respicit, cum eos nescientes culpa non inquinet; ad leges enim id pertinet aequitatis.
164. Jul. Although in this too the mercy of God is shown more abundant, since he sanctifies the little ones who do not know; for it pertains to the praise of mercy when fault does not defile them, who do not know—for this belongs to the laws of equity.
Iulianum.3.164AUG. Si eos nulla culpa inquinat, cur non omnes sanctificantur? Et cur omnes, qui sanctificantur, exsufflantur?
Aug. If no fault defiles them, why are not all sanctified? And why are all who are sanctified exorcised?
Iulianum.3.164165. IUL. Sed de illis ego virtutibus dico, quas usu iam perfectae rationis adipiscimur. Ac per hoc, quia id etiam hic sicut frequenter inculcari nobis fuit necesse, ad ea, quae inferimus, ut sit attentus lector, admoneo; videbit enim ita in nullo Traducianos differre a Manichaeis, ut non alia nobis obiciant argumentorum vice, quam quae in illorum libris tenentur. Feci id quidem etiam in primi operis mei libro quarto.
165. Jul. But I am speaking of those virtues which we attain by the use of reason now perfected. And through this, because it was necessary for this to be impressed upon us here, as frequently elsewhere, I admonish the reader to be attentive to what we bring forward; for he will see that the Traducianists differ in nothing from the Manicheans, so that they bring against us, in the place of arguments, none other than those contained in the books of the Manicheans. I did this, indeed, even in the fourth book of my first work.
Iulianum.3.165AUG. Et respondi tibi libro meo sexto.
Aug. And I answered you in my sixth book.
Iulianum.3.165166. IUL. Sed quia post editionem illorum oratu tuo, beatissime pater Flore, apud Constantinopolim Manichaei epistula inventa est atque ad has directa partes, opera est aliqua eius inserere, ut intellegant omnes, unde haec pro traduce argumenta descendant.
166. Jul. But because, after the publication of those books, at your entreaty, most blessed father Florus, a letter of a Manichean was found at Constantinople and directed to these parts, it is worthwhile to insert some of his work, so that all may understand whence these arguments on behalf of transmission descend.
Iulianum.3.166AUG. Quomodo cuiusquam oratu inventam dicis epistulam atque directam, si Deus non operatur in cordibus hominum voluntates? Utique homo, qui invenit, epistulam voluntate quaesivit aut voluntate aliquid quaerebat eo loco, ubi eam potuit invenire, aut, cum de rebus talibus voluntate homines loquerentur, voluntate, apud quem fuerat, indicavit eam se habere, quam posset ostendere et volenti tradere, quam volens ad has partes et ille dirigeret; et vel quocumque alio modo prorsus voluntate hominis vel hominum factum est, ut illa inveniretur et dirigeretur epistula. Et tamen orante homine dicis hoc factum. Cur ergo non confiteris sine ulla forinsecus sonante iussione Deum occulto instinctu, ad quod voluerit efficacissime implendum, praeparare atque excitare hominum voluntates, qui liberum non defendis intellegendum, sed praecipitandum extollis arbitrium?
Aug. How do you say the letter was found and directed at anyone's entreaty, if God does not work the volitions in the hearts of human beings? Certainly the man who found it sought the letter by his will, or by his will was seeking something in that place where he could find it, or, when human beings were speaking by their will of such matters, by his will indicated to the one with whom it had been that he had it, which he could show and hand over to one willing it; which that other man, willing it, would also direct to these parts; and in whatever other way at all, it was done by the will of a man or of men that that letter was found and directed. And yet you say this was done with a man praying. Why, then, do you not confess that, without any command sounding from outside, God by a hidden prompting prepares and rouses the wills of human beings most effectively to fulfilling what he has willed—you who do not defend free choice as a thing to be understood, but extol it as a thing to be flung headlong?
Iulianum.3.166167. IUL. Et quamvis iam pro concupiscentia vel voluptate carnis, quae etiam libido dicitur, quae sexibus ob virilitatem propagationis inserta est, primo illo opusculo eatenus disputaverim, ut docerem illam nihil aliud esse quam unam de instrumentis corporis rationabilibus et irrationabilibus aeque inditam ad Dei operam pertinentem, qui carnem nostram in sensibus affecisset, tamen, quia ei vehementer Augustinus incumbit eamque dicit malam, id est peccatum esse naturale atque omnium peccatorum parentem, quod pudore eius potissimum persuadere conatur meque irridet, qui eam erubescam nominare directim.
167. Jul. And although I have already disputed, in that first little work, on behalf of the desire or pleasure of the flesh, which is also called lust, which is implanted in the sexes for the sake of the strength of propagation—disputing to this extent, that I showed it to be nothing other than one of the instruments of the body, implanted alike in rational and irrational creatures, belonging to the work of God, who had endowed our flesh with senses—nevertheless, because Augustine presses hard upon it and says it is evil, that is, that it is a natural sin and the parent of all sins, which he tries to persuade above all by its shame, and mocks me, who blush to name it directly,
Iulianum.3.167AUG. Ego concupiscentiam carnis, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et quae libido etiam nuncupatur, malam esse dico, nunc in hac carne frenandam et bona consuetudine minuendam, in aeterna vero vita omni ex parte sanandam, non, quasi addita vel commixta nobis fuerit aliqua mala substantia, sicut Manichaei desipiunt, separandam; sed, quodlibet de illa sentias, talem te illam, qualis nunc est, ut ad illicita perpetranda etiam castorum sive coniugatorum sive continentium corda sollicitet et, nisi ei robustiore voluntate resistatur, evertat, in paradiso constituere posse non crederem, nisi in istis tuis libris vana et insana loquacitate plenissimis invenirem.
Aug. I say that the desire of the flesh, by which the flesh desires against the spirit and which is also called lust, is evil—now to be bridled in this flesh and lessened by good habit, but in eternal life to be wholly healed in every part; not to be separated as if some evil substance had been added or mixed into us, as the Manicheans rave. But whatever you may think of it, I would not believe that you could place it, such as it now is—soliciting even the hearts of the chaste, whether married or continent, to perpetrate unlawful things, and, unless it is resisted by a stronger will, overthrowing them—in paradise, had I not found it in these books of yours, most full of empty and insane loquacity.
Iulianum.3.167168. IUL. Ideo et ego qualitatem rei, quam prioribus scriptis distinguendo a Manichaei ore defendi, nunc quoque breviter criminatorum eius, qui tamen se ei servire profitentur invitos, proditu vindicabo.
168. Jul. Therefore I too will now briefly vindicate, by exposing it, the quality of the thing which in my earlier writings I defended from the Manichean's mouth by distinguishing it—vindicate it, I say, from his accusers, who nonetheless profess that they serve him unwillingly.
Iulianum.3.168AUG. Vos potestis congruenter servire laudatae libidini, nos autem in adiutorio Domini oppugnamus et vincimus accusatam.
Aug. You can fittingly serve the lust you praise, but we, with the Lord's help, attack and conquer the lust we accuse.
Iulianum.3.168169. IUL. Quod igitur libris tuis, senex Augustine, retinetur: Libido exorta est post peccatum, quam coacti sunt velare confusi (De nupt. et concup. 2, 36).
169. Jul. What, then, is retained in your books, old man Augustine: Lust arose after sin, which being confounded they were compelled to veil (De nupt. et concup. 2.36).
Iulianum.3.169AUG. Quod igitur libris tuis, iuvenis Iuliane, retinetur, apparet te contra libros meos non invenire quid dicas et quaerere calumnias, quas nobis loquaciter et inaniter ingeras.
Aug. What, then, is retained in your books, young man Julian, makes it appear that you find nothing to say against my books and that you seek slanders to heap upon us loquaciously and emptily.
Iulianum.3.169170. IUL. Et item: Pudenda libidine, qui licite concumbit, malo bene utitur, qui autem illicite, malo male utitur; rectius enim accipit nomen mali quam boni, unde erubescunt et mali et boni, meliusque credimus Apostolo, qui dicit: " Quia non habitat in carne mea bonum " (Rom 7, 18; De nupt. et concup. 2, 36); et alibi: Non est libido nuptiarum bonum, sed obscaenitas peccantium, necessitas generantium, lasciviarum ardor, nuptiarum pudor (De nupt. et concup. 1, 13); et illud:
170. Jul. And likewise: By shameful lust the one who lies with his wife lawfully uses an evil well, but the one who does so unlawfully uses an evil badly; for it more rightly takes the name of evil than of good—this from which both the wicked and the good blush—and we more rightly believe the Apostle, who says that no good dwells in my flesh (Rom 7:18; De nupt. et concup. 2.36); and elsewhere: The lust of marriage is not a good, but the obscenity of those who sin, the necessity of those who beget, the ardor of wanton acts, the shame of marriage (De nupt. et concup. 1.13); and this:
Iulianum.3.170Quod postea propagatione fecerunt, hoc est connubii bonum, quod vero prius confusione texerunt, hoc est concupiscentiae malum, quod vitat ubique conspectum et quaerit pudendo secretum (De nupt. et concup. 1, 8), vel alia, quibus ad hoc argumentum uti soles, memoria tua magis quam ingenio prolata sunt. Manichaeus ergo afflictus est, ut ea, quae putabat acuta, componeret, tu vero frustratus, qui putasti latere posse, quod legeras et tenebas.
What they afterward did by propagation, this is the good of wedlock; but what they first covered out of confusion, this is the evil of concupiscence, which everywhere avoids the gaze and seeks a shameful secrecy (De nupt. et concup. 1.8)—or other things which you are accustomed to use for this argument, brought forth by your memory rather than by your wit. The Manichean, then, was afflicted in order to compose what he thought sharp, but you were frustrated, you who thought that what you had read and held could lie hidden.
Iulianum.3.170AUG. Quis enim est, qui vel tenuiter Manichaeorum dogma cognovit et lateat eum Manichaeos dicere malam esse concupiscentiam carnis? Sed non est hoc proprium dogmatis eorum; nam quid aliud dicit etiam ille, qui dicit: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, spiritus autem adversus carnem; haec eniminvicem adversantur, ut non ea quae vultis faciatis (Gal 5, 17)? Quid aliud etiam ille, qui dicit: Quisquis dilexerit mundum, non est caritas Patris in illo, quia omnia, quae in mundo sunt, concupiscentia carnis est et concupiscentia oculorum et ambitio saeculi, quae non est ex Patre, sed ex mundo est (1 Io 2, 15-16)?
Aug. For who is there who has come to know, even slightly, the teaching of the Manicheans, and to whom it lies hidden that the Manicheans say the concupiscence of the flesh is evil? But this is not proper to their teaching; for what else does he too say, who says: The flesh desires against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are opposed to each other, that you may not do the things you wish (Gal 5:17)? What else does he too say, who says: If anyone loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him, because all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh and the concupiscence of the eyes and the ambition of the age, which is not from the Father but is from the world (1 John 2:15-16)?
Iulianum.3.170Malam ergo esse concupiscentiam carnis non proprio dogmate Manichaei dicunt, quod vident, qui caeci non sunt, et Apostolos dicere, sed Manichaeorum propriam virosamque sententiam error adiuvat vester, qui concupiscentiam carnis, cui, velitis nolitis, ad illicita perpetranda sollicitanti castitas reluctatur, negatis de peccato accidisse naturae, quam Deus condidit bonam.
That the concupiscence of the flesh is evil, then, the Manicheans say not by their own proper teaching—which those who are not blind see that the Apostles too say—but your error aids the proper and poisonous opinion of the Manicheans, you who deny that the concupiscence of the flesh, against which—whether you will or not—chastity struggles as it solicits to perpetrate unlawful things, befell, from sin, the nature that God founded good.
Iulianum.3.170Ac sic agitis, ut eam Manichaei, quam conflictatione castorum et Apostolorum testimonio convincunt malam de gente tenebrarum et de mala substantia Deo coaeterna etiam ipsam non malam qualitatem sanandam, sed malam substantiam separandam, nec bonae naturae accidisset, sed bonae naturae commixtam fuisse concludant. Sed pergite et nobis calumnias de Manichaeorum peste molimini, quos ita adiuvatis, ut faciatis invictos, nisi et vos cum illis ea, quae vere invicta est, catholica veritate vincamini.
And so you act in such a way that the Manicheans conclude that this concupiscence—which by the struggle of the chaste and by the testimony of the Apostles they convict to be evil, coming from the nation of darkness and from an evil substance coeternal with God, itself a not-evil quality to be healed but an evil substance to be separated, and that it did not befall a good nature but was mixed into a good nature. But go on and contrive slanders against us out of the plague of the Manicheans, whom you so aid that you make them unconquered—unless you too along with them be conquered by us with that Catholic truth which is truly unconquered.
Iulianum.3.170171. IUL. Audi igitur nunc atque cognosce, quid parens tuus ad quamdam filiam suam, vestram scribat sororem.
171. Julian: Hear now, then, and learn what your parent writes to a certain daughter of his, your sister.
Iulianum.3.171AUG. Convitia sunt ista nec urbana, sed vana.
Augustine: These are insults, and not witty ones, but empty.
Iulianum.3.171172. IUL. Mani apostolus Iesu Christi filiae Menoch. Gratia tibi et salus a Deo nostro, qui est re vera verus Deus, tribuatur ipseque tuam mentem illustret et iustitiam suam tibimet revelet, quia es divinae stirpis fructus. Et post pauca: Per quos et tu splendida - inquit - reddita es agnoscendo, qualiter prius fueris, ex quo genere animarum emanaveris, quod est confusum omnibus corporibus et saporibus et speciebus variis cohaeret. Nam sicut animae gignuntur ab animabus, ita figmentum corporis a corporis natura digeritur. " Quod, ergo, nascitur de carne, caro est et, quod de spiritu, spiritus est " (Io 3, 6); spiritum autem animam intellege, anima de anima, caro de carne (De nupt. et concup. 1, 8).
172. Julian: Mani, apostle of Jesus Christ, to his daughter Menoch. Grace and salvation be granted to you from our God, who is in very truth the true God, and may he himself enlighten your mind and reveal his justice to you, because you are a fruit of the divine stock. And after a little: Through these, he says, you too have been rendered splendid, by recognizing what you formerly were, from what race of souls you have emanated—which is mingled with all bodies and clings to flavors and various forms. For just as souls are begotten from souls, so the fashioning of the body is disposed from the nature of the body. What, therefore, is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of the spirit is spirit (John 3:6); but understand the soul by "spirit"—soul from soul, flesh from flesh (De nupt. et concup. 1.8).
Iulianum.3.172AUG. Si dicam tibi istam Manichaei epistulam me omnino nescire, quamvis verum dicam, omnino non credes et mecum vana, ut soles, loquacitate conten des; sed si hoc dixit Manichaeus, quid mirum est, quod se ipse destruxit? Si enim sicut hominis caro, etiam hominis anima nascitur sive mala sive bona, duas enim simul animas in homine uno esse delirant, unam malam, alteram bonam, de suis diversis principiis emanantes, si ergo nascitur anima, quando nascitur caro, profecto nec mala illa est Deo coaeterna nec contra principes tenebrarum bona, sicut eius secta desipit, ab aeterno Patre prolata est.
Augustine: If I should tell you that I do not know this letter of the Manichean at all—although I would be telling the truth—you would not believe me at all, and you would contend with me, as you are wont, in empty loquacity; but if the Manichean said this, what wonder is it that he destroyed himself? For if, like the flesh of a human being, the soul of a human being too is born, whether evil or good—for they rave that there are two souls at once in one human being, one evil, the other good, emanating from their different principles—if, then, the soul is born when the flesh is born, surely that evil one is not coeternal with God, nor was the good one brought forth from the eternal Father against the princes of darkness, as his sect raves.
Iulianum.3.172Sed quoquo modo dicat Manichaeus animas nasci, ad nos quid pertinet, qui verba illa Domini: Quod natum est ex carne, caro est et, quod natum est de spiritu, spiritus est (Io 3, 6) non, cum homo ex homine nascitur, sed cum ex Dei Spiritu renascitur, fieri novimus et tenemus? Non enim evangelicus ipse totus locus aliud permittit intellegi. Quaere ergo ibi, quibus possis Manichaei has fabulas vendere, et potius propter illa, quae superius dixi, quomodo Manichaeorum non sis adiutor, ostende.
But however the Manichean may say souls are born, what does it pertain to us, who know and hold that those words of the Lord—What is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of the spirit is spirit (John 3:6)—come about not when a human being is born from a human being, but when he is reborn from the Spirit of God? For the entire Gospel passage itself does not permit it to be understood otherwise. Seek out, then, those to whom you can sell these fables of the Manichean, and rather, on account of the things I said above, show how you are not a helper of the Manicheans.
Iulianum.3.172173. IUL. Cognoscis nempe, quomodo signatissime Manichaeus traducem confirmet animarum et quo testimonio utatur ad vituperationem carnis, illo videlicet, quod in vestro ore versatur, id est: Quod nascitur de carne, caro est et, quod de spiritu, spiritus est (Ibidem).
173. Julian: You recognize, surely, how very plainly the Manichean confirms the transmission of souls, and what testimony he uses for disparaging the flesh—namely, the one that is upon your lips, that is: What is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of the spirit is spirit (John 3:6).
Iulianum.3.173AUG. Iam dixi, quomodo nos accipiamus haec verba evangelica, quoniam non generationem, sed regenerationem docent. Tu dic, si potes, quomodo non adiuves Manichaei verba sacrilega de concupiscentia carnis, quam propterea tu negas de natura primi hominis praevaricatione vitiata in nostram naturam propagatione descendere, ut eam putetur ille Deo coaeternae tenebrarum genti rectissime deputare. Insipientissime quippe et impudentissime abs te negatur malum, quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et contra quod geruntur interiora bella castorum.
Augustine: I have already said how we take these Gospel words, since they teach not generation but regeneration. You tell me, if you can, how you do not aid the sacrilegious words of the Manichean about the concupiscence of the flesh, which you deny for this reason to descend by propagation into our nature from the nature of the first man, corrupted by transgression—so that he may be thought most rightly to assign it to the nation of darkness coeternal with God. For most foolishly and most shamelessly is the evil denied by you, by which the flesh desires against the spirit and against which the inner wars of the chaste are waged.
Iulianum.3.173174. IUL. Ideo non solum eloquendo, sed etiam repetendo inculcat dogmatis sui esse proprium traducem animarum putare, quod etiam per similitudinem generantium corporum approbare conatur. Sicut animae - inquit - gignuntur ab animabus, ita figmentum corporis a corporis natura digeritur et sicut caro de carne, ita anima de anima. Sed pergamus ad reliqua: Sicut ergo auctor animarum Deus est, ita corporum auctor per concupiscentiam diabolus est, ut in viscatorio diaboli per concupiscentiam mulieris, unde diabolus aucupatur non animas, sed corpora.
174. Julian: Therefore not only by stating it but also by repeating it he drives home that it is proper to his teaching to suppose a transmission of souls, which he also tries to prove by a likeness to the bodies that beget. Just as souls, he says, are begotten from souls, so the fashioning of the body is disposed from the nature of the body, and just as flesh from flesh, so soul from soul. But let us proceed to the rest: Just as, then, God is the author of souls, so through concupiscence the devil is the author of bodies, so that in the bird-lime trap of the devil, through the concupiscence of the woman, the devil snares not souls but bodies.
Iulianum.3.174AUG. Non corpora, sed animas aucupari diabolum potuit dicere Manichaeus; corpora enim dicit ad gentis tenebrarum naturam, unde est et diabolus, pertinere. Proinde secundum Manichaeum non corpora, quae ipsius sunt, sed animas bonas, quae ipsius non sunt, dicitur diabolus aucupari; sed fides nostra bonum Deum creatorem et animarum et corporum novit.
Augustine: The Manichean could have said that the devil snares not bodies but souls; for he says bodies belong to the nature of the nation of darkness, whence the devil too is. Accordingly, according to the Manichean the devil is said to snare not bodies, which are his own, but good souls, which are not his own; but our faith knows the good God to be the creator both of souls and of bodies.
Iulianum.3.174175. IUL. Sive per visum sive per tactum sive per auditum sive per odoratum sive per gustum. Tolle denique malignae huius stirpis radicem et statim te ipsam spiritalem contemplaris. " Radix enim - ait Scriptura - omnium malorum concupiscentia " (1 Tim 6, 10). Vides, quo spiritu et propter quod dogma Manichaeus concupiscentiam carnis incessat hanc dicens legem esse peccati, quae si a corporibus auferretur, spiritalem se filia eius, ad quam scribit, factam videret. Quam opinionem quibus Apostoli nitatur confirmare sententiis audiamus: " Caro enim adversatur spiritui ", quia filia concupiscentiae est, " et spiritus carni " (Gal 5, 17), quia filius animae est.
175. Julian: Whether through sight or through touch or through hearing or through smell or through taste. Take away, finally, the root of this malignant stock, and at once you contemplate yourself as spiritual. For concupiscence, says Scripture, is the root of all evils (1 Tim 6:10). You see by what spirit and on account of what teaching the Manichean attacks the concupiscence of the flesh, saying that it is the law of sin, which, if it were taken away from bodies, his daughter—to whom he writes—would see herself made spiritual. By what sentences of the Apostle he relies on to confirm this opinion, let us hear: For the flesh is opposed to the spirit, because it is the daughter of concupiscence, and the spirit to the flesh (Gal 5:17), because it is the son of the soul.
Iulianum.3.175AUG. Duas substantias in verbis Apostoli Manichaeus opinatur, unam bonam, alteram malam, non unam bonam substantiam et alteram bonae substantiae vitium ex primi hominis peccato generatione contractum, secundi hominis iustitia regeneratione sanandum, quod et contra Manichaeos et contra vos tamquam invictissimum telum catholica fides fortiter iacit et utrosque prosternit.
Augustine: The Manichean supposes two substances in the words of the Apostle, one good, the other evil—not one good substance and another, a fault of the good substance contracted by generation from the sin of the first man, to be healed by regeneration through the righteousness of the second man; which the Catholic faith hurls strongly, both against the Manicheans and against you, as a most invincible dart, and lays both of you low.
Iulianum.3.175176. IUL. Intellegis retectas esse Manichaei dogmatis medullas, quibus fides vestra concrescit. Iam vero nos id est catholicos pergit arguere: Quare vide, quam stulti sunt, qui dicunt hoc figmentum a Deo bono esse conditum, quod certi sunt ab spiritu concupiscentiae gigni.
176. Julian: You understand that the marrow of the Manichean's teaching, on which your faith grows together, has been laid bare. But now he goes on to accuse us, that is, the Catholics: Wherefore see how foolish are those who say that this fashioning was founded by the good God, which they are certain is begotten by the spirit of concupiscence.
Iulianum.3.176AUG. In hoc a Manichaeis simul arguimur et nos et vos, quoniam figmentum carnis a Deo bono utrique conditum dicimus, spiritum vero concupiscentiae Manichaei substantiam esse dicunt malam, non vitium substantiae bonae, quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, quod ad eos redarguendos dicimus nos et ad eos adiuvandos negatis vos. Nam quia concupiscentiam, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, etiam vobis resistentibus malum esse convincunt, si non est, ut putatis, bonae substantiae vitium, mala substantia deputabitur; quod est dogma Manichaeorum catholicae fidei vobis adiutoribus inimicum.
Augustine: In this both we and you are accused alike by the Manicheans, since we both say that the fashioning of the flesh was founded by the good God; but the spirit of concupiscence the Manicheans say is an evil substance, not a fault of a good substance by which the flesh desires against the spirit—which we say in order to refute them, and which you deny in order to aid them. For because they convict the concupiscence by which the flesh desires against the spirit to be evil, even with you resisting, then, if it is not, as you suppose, a fault of a good substance, it will be reckoned an evil substance; which is the teaching of the Manicheans, hostile to the Catholic faith with you as helpers.
Iulianum.3.176177. IUL. Cum animo nolente coeunt et secretis pudoribus gerunt, quo tempore odio habent lucem, uti ne manifestentur opera eorum; cuius rei gratia ait Apostolus:" Non est volentis " (Rom 9, 16), ut subaudiatur: hoc opus. Sive enim bonum geramus, non est carnis, quia " manifesta sunt opera carnis, quae sunt fornicatio " (Gal 5, 19)et cetera, sive malum geramus, non est animae, quia " fructus spiritus pax gaudium est " (Gal 5, 22). Denique clamat et ad Romanos Apostolus: " Non bonum quod volo ago, sed malum operor quod exhorreo " (Rom 7, 19). Videtis vocem animae contumacis contra concupiscentiam defendentem libertatem animae. Dolebat enim, quia peccatum id est diabolus operaretur in se omnem concupiscentiam.
177. Julian: They come together with the mind unwilling and act in secret shames, at which time they hate the light, so that their works may not be made manifest; for which reason the Apostle says: It is not of the one willing (Rom 9:16), so that one may understand: this work. For whether we do good, it is not of the flesh, because the works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication (Gal 5:19) and the rest; or whether we do evil, it is not of the soul, because the fruit of the spirit is peace, joy (Gal 5:22). Finally, the Apostle cries out also to the Romans: I do not do the good that I will, but I work the evil that I abhor (Rom 7:19). You see the voice of the obstinate soul defending the soul's liberty against concupiscence. For it grieved, because sin—that is, the devil—was working in it all concupiscence.
Iulianum.3.177Legalis auctoritas indicat malum eius, cum omnes eius usus vituperat, quos caro miratur et laudat; omnis enim amaritudo concupiscentiae suavis est animae, per quam nutritur anima et ad vigorem accitur. Denique cohercentis se ab omni usu concupiscentiae animus vigilat, ditatur et cre scit, per usum autem concupiscentiae consuevit decrescere. Intellegisne vel sero deprehendisse nos, unde non solum saperes, sed etiam loquereris? Tanto enim magistrum tuum amore complecteris, ut non solum itineribus eius, sed etiam vestigiis insistas, quod tu omnibus scriptis asseris, sicut et illi, quos ad Marcellini nomen edidisti, libri et isti testantur, quos ad Valerium destinasti, istam videlicet concupiscentiam carnis, quam etiam pudendam vocas, per diabolum admixtam humanis esse corporibus.
The authority of the law indicates its evil, since it disparages all the uses of it which the flesh admires and praises; for all the bitterness of concupiscence is sweet to the soul, through which the soul is nourished and roused to vigor. Finally, the mind of one restraining himself from every use of concupiscence is watchful, is enriched, and grows; but through the use of concupiscence it has been wont to decrease. Do you understand—even if late—that we have grasped whence you not only think but even speak as you do? For with so great a love do you embrace your master that you tread not only in his paths but even in his footsteps, which you assert in all your writings; as both those books which you published addressed to Marcellinus testify, and these which you have directed to Valerius—namely, that this concupiscence of the flesh, which you also call shameful, was mingled into human bodies by the devil.
Iulianum.3.177AUG. Tu enim qua impudentia pudendam negas, contra quam nunc, quandoquidem illam libenter laudas, miror si fideliter dimicas? Quando autem miscebaris uxori, quamvis nihil timendo usui concessae voluptatis inhiabas, secretum tamen erubescendo quaerebas.
Augustine: With what shamelessness do you deny it to be shameful—against which, since you now gladly praise it, I wonder whether you fight faithfully? But when you used to lie with your wife, although you—fearing nothing—gaped after the pleasure granted to that use, you nonetheless, blushing, sought secrecy.
Iulianum.3.177Proinde ista tua suscepta, si hominum in paradiso felicitas permaneret, aut nulla ibi esset aut nullos suos motus contra nutum voluntatis exsereret, quibus necesse esset obsistere, ut illi felicitati honestas congrua redderetur. Sed quoniam in eius laudibus eo usque progressus es, ut libidinem, qualem nunc esse sentimus, talem in paradiso futuram fuisse contendas sibi reluctantium sollicitantem corda castorum, quis non videat, quod non sapientia, non eloquentia, sed impudentia mihi resistis, quia tu victum confiteri perverso pudore prohiberis?
Accordingly, this thing you have taken up—if the happiness of human beings in paradise had remained—would either not have been there at all, or would have exerted no motions of its own against the bidding of the will, motions which would have to be withstood, so that a fittingly honorable state might be rendered to that happiness. But since in its praises you have gone so far as to contend that lust, such as we now perceive it to be, would have been such in paradise too, soliciting the hearts of the chaste who struggle against it, who does not see that it is not by wisdom, not by eloquence, but by shamelessness that you resist me, because you are prevented by a perverse shame from confessing yourself conquered?
Iulianum.3.177Nos ergo carnis concupiscentiam nec substantiam naturae malae esse dicimus, quod dicunt Manichaei, nec omnis eius usus reprobatur a nobis sicut a Manichaeis; nec eam rursus bonam dicimus, quod dicunt Pelagiani, nec eius contra spiritum motus laudatur a nobis sicut a Pelagianis, sed dicimus eam vitium esse substantiae bonae, quod in nostram naturam per praevaricationem primi hominis versum est, quod dicunt catholici Christiani; eiusque mali usus licitus et honestus liberorum procreandorum causa approbatur a nobis sicut a catholicis Christianis. Ita et Manichaeos et Pelagianos superamus atque vitamus, quorum sic errores utrorumque diversi sunt, ut, qui videtur minor, ipse illius, qui videtur maior, demonstretur adiutor. Quod enim malum esse satis evidenter apparet, dum Pelagiani negant esse vitium bonae substantiae, Manichaeos adiuvant, qui vitium ipsum malam dicunt esse substantiam boni Dei substantiae coaeternam.
We, then, say that the concupiscence of the flesh is neither a substance of an evil nature, as the Manicheans say, nor is every use of it reproved by us, as by the Manicheans; nor, on the other hand, do we say it is good, as the Pelagians say, nor is its motion against the spirit praised by us, as by the Pelagians; but we say that it is a fault of a good substance, which was turned into our nature through the transgression of the first man—which the Catholic Christians say; and the lawful and honorable use of this evil, for the sake of procreating children, is approved by us, as by the Catholic Christians. Thus we overcome and avoid both the Manicheans and the Pelagians, whose errors—of both—are so different that the one which seems lesser is shown to be the helper of the one which seems greater. For since it appears clearly enough to be evil, while the Pelagians deny that it is a fault of a good substance, they aid the Manicheans, who say that this very fault is an evil substance coeternal with the substance of the good God.
Iulianum.3.177178. IUL. Hanc esse peccati filiam et aliorum peccatorum matrem atque de ea conqueri apostolum Paulum, cum dicit: Scio, quia non habitat in carne mea bonum (Rom 7, 18); et: Non quodvolo bonum hoc ago, sed quod odio illud facio (Rom 7, 15), quod semper a catholicis ita expositum est, ut non ad naturae infamiam, sed ad consuetudinis referretur invidiam.
178. Julian: That this is the daughter of sin and the mother of other sins, and that the apostle Paul complains of it when he says: I know that no good dwells in my flesh (Rom 7:18); and: I do not do the good that I will, but I do that which I hate (Rom 7:15)—which has always been so expounded by the Catholics that it is referred not to the disrepute of nature, but to the disrepute of habit.
Iulianum.3.178AUG. Ita vero catholicus tu es et Ambrosius catholicus non est? Non usque adeo evanuerunt homines vestrae contagio vanitatis, quoscumque decipere potuistis, ut hoc audeant in animum inducere. Proinde paulisper attende; discordiam carnis et spiritus, de qua scriptum est: Scio, quia non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea bonum; velle enim adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non (Rom 7, 18), et cetera huiusmodi atque illud multo manifestius: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, spiritus autem adversus carnem; haec enim invicem adversantur, ut non ea quae vultis faciatis (Gal 5, 17), esse in hominibus nec nos dubitamus nec vos nec Manichaei; sed unde sit in homine uno ista discordia, inde dissensio est et tres proferuntur in hac dissensione sententiae, una nostra, vestra altera, tertia Manichaeorum.
Augustine: Are you then so Catholic, and is Ambrose not Catholic? Not so far have the people whom you were able to deceive by the contagion of your vanity vanished away as to dare to take this into their mind. Accordingly, attend a little while: that there is a discord of flesh and spirit, of which it is written: I know that no good dwells in me, that is, in my flesh; for to will is present to me, but to accomplish the good is not (Rom 7:18), and other things of this kind, and that much more manifest one: The flesh desires against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are opposed to each other, that you may not do the things you wish (Gal 5:17)—that this is in human beings neither we nor you nor the Manicheans doubt; but whence this discord is in one human being, thence comes the dissension, and three opinions are brought forward in this dissension, one ours, the second yours, the third the Manicheans'.
Iulianum.3.178Sed ne arroganter vel fallaciter vobis dicere videamur nostram esse catholicam, ille eam proferat, cuius fidem et purissimum in Scripturis sensum, sicut eum praedicat vester ipse Pelagius, ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere (PELAGIUS, De lib. arb. 3; cf. De grat. Christi 47). Dicit ergo Ambrosius hanc discordiam carnis et spiritus per praevaricationem primi hominis nostrae accidisse naturae (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 141); vos autem dicitis ex vi consuetudinis; Manichaei dicunt ex commixtione duarum naturarum coaeternarum, boni scilicet et mali. Poteram iam dicere, ut eligat horum trium quod voluerit, qui vult catholicus permanere; neque enim timere debeo, ne Manichaeos quisque fugiens vos praeponat Ambrosio.
But lest we seem to say arrogantly or deceitfully that ours is the Catholic one, let that man bring it forward whose faith and most pure sense in the Scriptures not even an enemy has dared to reprehend, as your own Pelagius proclaims him (Pelagius, De lib. arb. 3; see De grat. Christi 47). Ambrose, then, says that this discord of flesh and spirit befell our nature through the transgression of the first man (See Ambrose, In Luc. 7.141); but you say it is from the force of habit; the Manicheans say it is from the mixture of two coeternal natures, namely good and evil. I could now say, let whoever wishes to remain Catholic choose which of these three he wishes; for I need not fear that anyone fleeing the Manicheans would prefer you to Ambrose.
Iulianum.3.178Sed vestram sententiam, qua dicitis hoc malum vi consuetudinis inolescere, esse vanissimam iudicat, qui videt sine hoc malo neminem nasci. Mox enim, ut quisque ratione uti coeperit, si concupiverit castitatem, concupiscentiam carnis, quae fuerat aetate sopita, velut evigilantem repugnantemque iam sentit et aut victus abstrahitur aut, ne in eius labatur assensum, adversus eam, si pius est, Domino adiuvante confligit. Quod si non vultis accipere, quid in me saevitis? Manichaeos Ambrosiumque committite atque in spectaculo huius certaminis, si catholici estis, cui parti faveatis, eligite. Puto, quod a vobis victor Ambrosius iudicatur; sed quia catholici non estis, etiam sic securi spectamus; et vos enim et Manichaeos sine dubio vincit Ambrosius.
But your opinion, by which you say this evil grows up by the force of habit, he judges to be most empty who sees that no one is born without this evil. For as soon as anyone begins to use reason, if he desires chastity, he now feels the concupiscence of the flesh—which had been lulled asleep by his age—as if waking up and fighting back, and either, conquered, he is dragged off, or, lest he slip into consent to it, he struggles against it, if he is devout, with the Lord helping. But if you are unwilling to accept this, why do you rage against me? Set the Manicheans and Ambrose to combat, and in the spectacle of this contest, if you are Catholics, choose which side you favor. I think that by you Ambrose is judged the victor; but because you are not Catholics, even so we watch untroubled; for without doubt Ambrose conquers both you and the Manicheans.
Iulianum.3.178179. IUL. Tu tamen argumentando et testimonia Scripturarum usurpando de hac illum concupiscentia, quam legem peccati vocas, et omnes sanctos tam pollutos quam conquestos fuisse confirmas.
179. Julian: You, however, by arguing and by usurping the testimonies of the Scriptures, affirm concerning this concupiscence, which you call the law of sin, that all the saints were as polluted as they were complaining.
Iulianum.3.179AUG. Non polluuntur hoc malo sancti, quos constat esse vel fuisse fortissimos huius mali debellatores; sed ne isto malo inexpiabiliter polluantur, timeant potius eius impudentissimi laudatores.
Augustine: The saints are not polluted by this evil, who are agreed to be or to have been the most valiant subduers of this evil; but lest they be polluted unexpiably by this evil, let its most shameless praisers rather fear it.
Iulianum.3.179180. IUL. Quid Manichaeus dicit? Per concupiscentiam corporum auctor diabolus est; per hanc diabolus corpora, non animas aucupatur; tolle - inquit - malignae stirpis radicem et spiritalis fies; de hac Apostolus clamat ad Romanos: " Non bonum quod volo, sed malum operor quod exhorreo " (Rom 7, 19). Nos etiam stultos vocat, qui dicamus figmentum hoc corporis ad Deum pertinere, quod per con cupiscentiam generatum esse fateamur. Vides ergo, quanta tibi sit et Manichaeo in nostri impugnatione concordia; eius dimicas verbis, eius niteris argumentis et nos mentiri dicis, qui te discipulum illius non solum fuisse, ut ipse scribis, sed etiam esse dicamus. Et in hoc tamen ille prudentior, qui, cum hanc concupiscentiam carnis a diabolo credidisset immissam, collegit confitendum esse ad Dei operam non pertinere, quidquid de diabolica concupiscentia appareret prolatum.
180. Julian: What does the Manichean say? Through the concupiscence of bodies the devil is the author; through this the devil snares bodies, not souls; take away, he says, the root of the malignant stock, and you will become spiritual; of this the Apostle cries out to the Romans: I do not do the good that I will, but I work the evil that I abhor (Rom 7:19). He also calls us foolish, who say that this fashioning of the body pertains to God, which we confess to have been generated through concupiscence. You see, then, how great is the concord between you and the Manichean in attacking us; you fight with his words, you rely on his arguments, and you say we lie, who say that you not only were his disciple, as you yourself write, but even are. And in this, nonetheless, he is more prudent, who, when he had believed that this concupiscence of the flesh was sent in by the devil, concluded that it must be confessed that whatever appeared brought forth from diabolical concupiscence does not pertain to the work of God.
Iulianum.3.180AUG. Contra hoc totum valet superior nostra responsio et cum hac aliae superiores, quas legat qui volet.
Augustine: Against all this our earlier answer holds good, and with it other earlier ones, which let whoever wishes read.
Iulianum.3.180181. IUL. Tu autem hebetior, qui fructum concupiscentiae diabolicae hominem dicens, Dei tamen eum ascribis operibus, non quasi de malo bonum factum, sed malum et de mala radice prolatum, habere tamen auctorem bonum, quem fructum radicis suae diabolus sibi vindicet.
181. Julian: But you are more dull, who, calling the human being the fruit of diabolical concupiscence, nonetheless ascribe him to the works of God—not as a good made from an evil, but an evil and brought forth from an evil root, yet having a good author—a fruit which the devil claims for himself as the fruit of his own root.
Iulianum.3.181AUG. Bonum aliquod est homo, etiam quisquis maioris aetatis est malus homo. Non enim, quod malus homo est, aufert ei, quod bonum aliquod est, quia homo est, cuius naturae id est boni huius auctor est Deus, quaecumque mala vel originis attrahat vel voluntatis adiciat; non enim substantiae naturaeque sunt vitia, ab eo salvatore sananda, quo creatore condita est isdem vitiis vitiata natura. Hoc est, quod et Manichaeos evertit et vos, qui non mecum, sed cum Ambrosio certatis, quem Manichaeis in hoc certamine opposui, in quo et ipsos vincit et vos.
Augustine: A human being is some good, even any evil human being of greater age. For the fact that he is an evil human being does not take away from him the fact that he is some good, because he is a human being, of whose nature—that is, of this good—God is the author, whatever evils he may either draw from his origin or add by his will; for they are not faults of substance and nature, to be healed by the same Savior by whom, as creator, the nature corrupted by these same faults was founded. This is what overturns both the Manicheans and you, who contend not with me but with Ambrose, whom I have set against the Manicheans in this contest, in which he conquers both them and you.
Iulianum.3.181182. IUL. Tuis enim sermonibus omnes de concupiscentia natos diabolus quasi suae arboris fructus iure decerpit (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 1, 26); aeque igitur blasphemas ut Manichaeus, qui concupiscentiam carnis a Deo conditam vindicemus.
182. Julian: For by your discourses the devil rightfully plucks all who are born from concupiscence as if they were the fruits of his own tree (See De nupt. et concup. 1.26); equally, then, you blaspheme as does the Manichean, we who vindicate the concupiscence of the flesh as founded by God.
Iulianum.3.182AUG. Si ad causam venire voluisses, cur baptizandi et exsufflentur et exorcismo mundentur infantes, ibi apertissime non solum eruditis, verum etiam idiotis Christianis catholicis novus haereticus appareres. Sed quia id ex libro meo tibi quidem proposuisti quasi refellendum, sed pertractare ita timuisti, ut fallaci loquacitate vitares et multa dicendo, quid tacueris, operires, Apostolum tibi replico, velis nolis, et inculco dicentem de Deo Patre: Qui eruit nos de potestate tenebrarum et transtulit in regnum filii caritatis suae (Col 1, 13).
Augustine: If you had been willing to come to the issue—why those to be baptized, the infants, are both exorcised and cleansed by exorcism—there you would appear a new heretic most openly, not only to learned Catholic Christians but even to unlearned ones. But because you set this out from my book as if to be refuted, yet were so afraid to treat it thoroughly that you avoided it by deceitful loquacity and, by saying many things, covered over what you passed by in silence, I bring the Apostle back to you, whether you will or not, and drive home his words about God the Father: Who rescued us from the power of darkness and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love (Col 1:13).
Iulianum.3.182Hinc parvulos, si potestis, excipite et audete dicere eos in regnum quidem Christi regeneratione transferri, sed de tenebrarum potestate non erui. Verumtamen parate vos in facies vestras easdem exsufflationes dignissime excipere, quae in Ecclesia Christi et maioribus adhibentur et parvulis; talibus quippe exsufflationibus exsufflandi estis, qualibus apertissime verum esse ostenditur, quod negatis.
From this make an exception of the little ones, if you can, and dare to say that they are indeed transferred into the kingdom of Christ by regeneration, but are not rescued from the power of darkness. Yet prepare yourselves to receive most deservedly upon your faces those same exorcisms which in the Church of Christ are applied both to the older and to the little ones; for by such exorcisms you are to be exorcised, by which it is shown most openly to be true, what you deny.
Iulianum.3.182183. IUL. Iam vero illud tuum, quod priore opere ventilavi, ubi dicis: Aliquando non facit libido animo volente, cum aliquando faciat et nolente (De nupt. et concup. 1, 7), atque hanc eius superbiam, qua nolente animo commovetur, accusas, Manichaei non solum sensibus, sed etiam eloquiis explicatum est. Nam cum nos arguisset, quia diceremus a Deo fieri homines, quos seminari fateremur per coeuntium voluptatem: Stulti - inquit - dicunt a Deo esse conditum, quod certi sunt a concupiscentia gigni, cum animo nolente coeunt.
183. Julian: But now that statement of yours, which I aired in my earlier work, where you say: Sometimes lust does not act with the mind willing, while sometimes it acts even with the mind unwilling (De nupt. et concup. 1.7), and you accuse this pride of it, by which it is moved with the mind unwilling—this has been unfolded by the Manichean not only in opinions but even in words. For when he had accused us, because we said that human beings are made by God whom we confess to be sown through the pleasure of those coming together: The foolish, he says, say that what they are certain is begotten from concupiscence was founded by God, when they come together with the mind unwilling.
Iulianum.3.183AUG. Sed Manichaeus non intellegit etiam de hominis malo posse Deum creare, quod bonum est, et hominem ipsum malo bene uti per pudicitiam coniugalem, cui malo reluctatur illicienti ad damnabilem turpitudinem. Sed tu, qui hoc, quod malum est, malum esse negas, cur ei repugnas, ne turpiter vivas, et cur ei si consentias, necesse est ut turpiter vivas?
Augustine: But the Manichean does not understand that even from the evil of a human being God can create what is good, and that the human being himself can use the evil well through conjugal chastity—the evil that resists him as it entices him to damnable baseness. But you, who deny that this, which is evil, is evil, why do you struggle against it, lest you live basely, and why, if you consent to it, is it necessary for you to live basely?
Iulianum.3.183184. IUL. Quod vero tu posuisti: Concupiscentiae malum est, quod vitat ubique conspectum et quaerit pudendo secretum (De nupt. et concup. 1, 8); ita et Manichaeus: Secretis - inquit - pudoribus agunt, quo tempore odio habent lucem, uti ne manifestentur opera eorum.
184. Julian: But what you put down: The evil of concupiscence is that it everywhere avoids the gaze and seeks a shameful secrecy (De nupt. et concup. 1.8); so also the Manichean: They act, he says, in secret shames, at which time they hate the light, so that their works may not be made manifest.
Iulianum.3.184AUG. Sicut Manichaeus nescit, quid boni agatur per carnalis concupiscentiae malum, sic et tu nescis, cui malo pudor quaerat secretum etiam in bono opere nuptiarum.
Augustine: Just as the Manichean does not know what good is done through the evil of carnal concupiscence, so you too do not know for what evil shame seeks secrecy even in the good work of marriage.
Iulianum.3.184185. IUL. Quod vero ais: Quia concupiscentia qui licite commiscetur, malo bene utitur (De nupt. et concup. 2, 36), ut magis credi Apostolo commemores, qui dixisset quia non habitat in carne sua bonum, et hoc non bonum, id est malum in carne Apostoli habitans, vis concupiscentiam carnis videri (Cf. Rom 7, 18), Manichaeus non aliter quam tu posuit. Nam postquam dixit: Ne manifestentur opera eorum; propter quod Apostolus - inquit - clamat ad Romanos: " Non bonum quod volo ago, sed malum operor quod exhorreo " (Rom 7, 19). Dolebat enim - inquit - quia peccatum id est diabolus operabatur in eo omnem concupiscentiam, legalis auctoritas indicat malum concupiscentiae, cum omnem eius usum vituperat, quem caro miratur et laudat.
185. Julian: But what you say: Because by concupiscence the one who is joined lawfully uses an evil well (De nupt. et concup. 2.36)—so that you may make the Apostle more to be believed, who had said that no good dwells in his flesh, and you want this "not good," that is, the evil dwelling in the Apostle's flesh, to be seen as the concupiscence of the flesh (See Rom 7:18)—the Manichean put it down no otherwise than you. For after he said: That their works may not be made manifest; for which reason, he says, the Apostle cries out to the Romans: I do not do the good that I will, but I work the evil that I abhor (Rom 7:19). For he grieved, he says, because sin—that is, the devil—was working in him all concupiscence; the authority of the law indicates the evil of concupiscence, since it disparages every use of it which the flesh admires and praises.
Iulianum.3.185AUG. Numquid Apostolus omnem concupiscentiae carnalis usum vituperat qui dicit: Et si acceperis uxorem, non peccasti et, si nupserit virgo, non peccat (1 Cor 7, 28)? Ergo Manichaeus, quid loquatur, ignorat. Sed nec tu, quid loquaris, intellegis, qui putas aliud significasse Apostolum quam carnis concupiscentiam, de qua alius Apostolus, quod non sit a Patre, sed ex mundo sit, dicit; qua ut caro concupiscat adversus spiritum, ex primi hominis praevaricatione descendere catholicus doctus et doctor et didicit in Catholica et docuit (Cf. 1 Io 2, 16).
Augustine: Does the Apostle disparage every use of carnal concupiscence, who says: And if you take a wife, you have not sinned; and if a virgin marries, she does not sin (1 Cor 7:28)? Therefore the Manichean does not know what he is saying. But neither do you understand what you are saying, who suppose the Apostle signified something other than the concupiscence of the flesh, of which another Apostle says that it is not from the Father but is from the world; and that by it the flesh desires against the spirit, descending from the transgression of the first man—this a learned Catholic and teacher both learned in the Catholic Church and taught (See 1 John 2:16).
Iulianum.3.185186. IUL. Quod autem multum ad distinctionem inter te et Manichaeum tenendam valere exi stimasti, ut diceres bonam quidem, sed primorum hominum tantum factam naturam, omnem autem deinceps per concupiscentiam fuisse subversam, etiam Manichaeus ita disseruit: Operae - inquit - pretium est advertere, quia prima anima, quae a Deo luminis manavit, accepit fabricam istam corporis, ut eam freno suo regeret. Venit mandatum, peccatum revixit, quod videbatur captivum, invenit articulos suos diabolus, materiam concupiscentiae in eam seduxit et per illam occidit. Lex quidem sancta, sed sancta sanctae, et mandatum et iustum et bonum, sed iustae et bonae. Sic etiam in illa ad Patricium epistula: Quasi de primae factum flore substantiae meliorem - dicit - secutis. Non ergo magnum est nec aliquid ad defensionem tui promovet, quod a criminatione naturae humanae Adam sequestrandum putasti, super cuius statu mox plenius disseremus. Hic monstrasse sufficiat nihil ita rude in tuis sensibus inveniri, ut non sit iam Manichaei volutatione detritum.
186. Julian: But what you thought availed much to maintaining the distinction between you and the Manichean—that you said the nature was indeed made good, but only that of the first human beings, while all thereafter was overturned through concupiscence—the Manichean too discoursed thus: It is worthwhile, he says, to note that the first soul, which flowed from the God of light, received this fabric of the body, that it might govern it with its own bridle. The commandment came, sin revived, which seemed captive; the devil found his openings, seduced into it the matter of concupiscence, and through it killed it. The law indeed is holy, but holy for the holy; and the commandment both just and good, but for the just and good. So also in that letter to Patricius: As if made from the flower of the first substance—he says—better than those that followed. It is, then, no great thing, nor does it advance anything toward your defense, that you thought Adam must be set apart from the accusation of human nature, about whose state we shall soon discourse more fully. Here let it suffice to have shown that nothing so crude is found in your opinions that is not already worn down by the Manichean's rolling.
Iulianum.3.186AUG. Manichaeus ex commixtione duarum naturarum coaeternarum, boni scilicet et mali, non solum hominem, sed universum mundum constare dicit et ad eum omnia pertinentia ita sane, ut ipsam fabricam mundi, quamvis ex commixtione boni et mali, Deo bono artifici tribuat, animalia vero et cuncta, quae nascuntur e terra, et ipsum hominem opera esse dicat malignae mentis, quam genti attribuit tenebrarum (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 141). Hinc est, quod " animam primam " dicit " a Deo lucis manasse et accepisse istam fabricam corporis, ut eam freno suo regeret ". Non enim hoc de homine, sed de anima bona dicit, quam Dei partem atque naturam universo mundo et omnibus, quae in eo sunt, opinatur esse permixtam, in homine autem per concupiscentiam decipi. Quam concupiscentiam, quod saepe inculcandum est, non vitium substantiae bonae, sed malam vult esse substantiam. Mala non vacuum fuisse dicit Adam, se eius minus habuisse multoque plus lucis.
Augustine: The Manichean says that not only the human being but the whole world consists of a mixture of two coeternal natures, namely good and evil, and that all things pertaining to it do so—yet in such a way that he attributes the very fabric of the world, though from a mixture of good and evil, to God the good craftsman, but says that the animals and all things which are born from the earth, and the human being himself, are the works of a malignant mind, which he attributes to the nation of darkness (See Ambrose, In Luc. 7.141). Hence it is that he says "the first soul flowed from the God of light and received this fabric of the body, that it might govern it with its own bridle." For he says this not of the human being but of the good soul, which he supposes to be a part and nature of God mixed into the whole world and all things that are in it, but in the human being to be deceived through concupiscence. Which concupiscence—as must often be driven home—he wants to be not a fault of a good substance but an evil substance. He says Adam was not empty of evil, but had less of it and much more of light.
Iulianum.3.186Videsne huic dementiae, quae Dei naturam corruptibilem dicit eamque malae naturae commixtione corrumpit, quantum fides catholica adversa sit, quae omnia mala generis humani, quorum non parvam partem parvulos etiam cernimus perpeti, et ipsam concupiscentiam, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, quibus malis omnibus paradisus a vobis, sed vester impletur, non dicit esse nisi ex natura bona et a Deo bono bene instituta, sed propria voluntate et primi hominis praevaricatione vitiata?
Do you see how opposed the Catholic faith is to this madness, which says the nature of God is corruptible and corrupts it by mixture with an evil nature—the faith which says that all the evils of the human race, of which we see even the little ones suffer no small part, and concupiscence itself, by which the flesh desires against the spirit (with all which evils paradise is filled by you—but your paradise), are not anything except from a good nature well established by the good God, but corrupted by its own will and by the transgression of the first man?
Iulianum.3.186Quod vos negantes quid agitis, nisi ut haec omnia mala, quae de peccato naturae bonae in parvulos venire non vultis, commixtioni malae naturae tribuantur, quam Manichaeorum furiosus error inducit? Videtis igitur, etsi videre nolitis, insanos et perditos Manichaeos, ne vobis adiuvantibus vincant, vobiscum esse vincendos, immo adiuvante Domino vobiscum esse iam victos.
Denying which, what do you accomplish, except that all these evils, which you do not want to come into the little ones from the sin of a good nature, are attributed to the mixture of an evil nature, which the furious error of the Manicheans introduces? You see, then—even if you are unwilling to see—that the insane and lost Manicheans, lest with you helping they conquer, must be conquered along with you; nay rather, with the Lord helping, they are already conquered along with you.
Iulianum.3.186187. IUL. Persistit sane invehi in nos et adiungit: Hi autem, qui concupiscentiam istam contra evangelicos etapostolicos libros, quos vacuo lectitant, bonum ausi sunt dicere, videas - inquit - sanctos eorum nunc cum filiabus dormisse, nunc cum pluribus et concubinis et uxoribus miscuisse negotium, nec hoc Apostoli vident: " Quae societas luci et tenebris, fideli et infideli, Christo et Belial? " (2 Cor 6, 14-15). Errant glomerati nubilo concupiscentiae, cuius veneno ita fruuntur, ut amentia capti, cum hoc gerunt, a Deo id concessum putent, quasi ignorent Apostolum dixisse: " Quae geruntur ab eis in tenebris, turpe est etiam dicere " (Eph 5, 12).
187. Julian: He persists, indeed, in inveighing against us, and adds: But as for these, who against the gospel and apostolic books, which they read to no purpose, have dared to call this concupiscence a good—you may see, he says, their saints now having slept with their daughters, now having had dealings with many concubines and wives, and they do not see this saying of the Apostle: What fellowship has light with darkness, the faithful with the unbeliever, Christ with Belial? (2 Cor 6:14-15) They wander gathered in the cloud of concupiscence, of whose poison they so enjoy that, seized with madness, when they do this, they think it granted them by God, as if they did not know that the Apostle said: The things that are done by them in darkness, it is shameful even to speak of (Eph 5:12).
Iulianum.3.187Vides nempe, quomodo negotium vexat pudoris atque id contra nos valere plurimum putat, qui non malum dicere audeamus, quod velandum tamen pudore fateamur. Nullum vestimentum igitur texuisti, quo deformitatem tui dogmatis operires, praeter pannos, quibus in parentis tui et magistri haereditate crevisti. Persistit igitur erigi in nos faciensque apostrophen: Age tu - inquit - defensor concupiscentiae, aperto sermone narra fructus et opera eius. Ecce ego contra eam non timeo lucem, quam illa trepidat, quam illa odit. " Omnis enim, qui male agit, odit lucem et non venit ad lucem, ne manifestentur opera eius " (Io 3, 20). Videsne concupiscentiam mali esse originem, per quam miserae animae libidini serviunt, non sponte, quia hoc est, quod nolente animo gerimus solum (De nupt. et concup. 1, 7)?
You see, surely, how he troubles the matter of shame and thinks it avails very much against us, who do not dare to call evil what we nonetheless confess must be veiled by shame. You have woven, then, no garment with which to cover the deformity of your teaching, except the rags in which you grew up in the inheritance of your parent and master. He persists, then, in rising up against us, and, making an apostrophe: Come, you, he says, defender of concupiscence, narrate in open speech its fruits and works. Behold, I against it do not fear the light, which it dreads, which it hates. For everyone who does evil hates the light and does not come to the light, lest his works be made manifest (John 3:20). Do you see that concupiscence is the origin of evil, through which wretched souls serve lust, not willingly, because this is the only thing we do with the mind unwilling (De nupt. et concup. 1.7)?
Iulianum.3.187Hinc est, quod et tu: Nam quid est - inquis - quod labia, lingua, manus, inflexiones dorsi, cervicis et laterum ut ad opera congrua moveantur, positum in potestate est, cum vero ventum fuerit, ut filii seminentur, membra in hoc opus creata non serviunt, sed exspectatur, ut ea velut sui iuris libido commoveat et aliquando non faciat animovolente, cum aliquando faciat et nolente? Enumerasti tu nempe omnia officia membrorum eaque commendans servire voluntatis imperio libidinis negotium dicis, quod hoc solum animo nolente faciamus.
Hence it is that you too say: For what is it that the lips, the tongue, the hands, the bendings of the back, of the neck, and of the sides are placed in our power to be moved to their fitting works, but when it has come to the point that children should be sown, the members created for this work do not serve, but it is waited upon that lust, as if of its own right, should move them—and sometimes it does not act with the mind willing, while sometimes it acts even with the mind unwilling? You have enumerated, surely, all the offices of the members, and commending them as serving the command of the will, you call lust an affair which we do, this alone, with the mind unwilling.
Iulianum.3.187Quid Manichaeus? Videsne - inquit - concupiscentiam mali esse originem, per quam miserae animae libidini serviunt, non sponte, quia hoc est, quod nolente animo gerimus solum? Sed videamus, quid aliud adiungat: Denique omne peccatum extra corpus est, quia actuale est; qui autem fornicatur, in corpus suum peccat (Cf. 1 Cor 6, 18); omne enim peccatum, antequam fiat, non est et post factum memoria sola eius operis, non ipsa species manet. Malum autem concupiscentiae, quia naturale est, antequam fiat, est, cum fit, augetur, post factum et videtur et permanet.
What does the Manichean say? Do you see, he says, that concupiscence is the origin of evil, through which wretched souls serve lust, not willingly, because this is the only thing we do with the mind unwilling? But let us see what else he adds: Finally, every sin is outside the body, because it is actual; but he who fornicates sins against his own body (See 1 Cor 6:18); for every sin, before it is done, is not, and after it is done only the memory of that work, not the thing itself, remains. But the evil of concupiscence, because it is natural, is before it is done; when it is done, it is increased; after it is done it is both seen and remains.
Iulianum.3.187Quid igitur nobiscum iurgas, quia te Manichaeum vocemus, cum nec in illius scriptis aliud, quam quod tu dicis, nec in tuis aliud, quam quod ille vult persuadere, teneatur? Iam vero illud, quod per plebeia, a vobis tamen infusum, ora discurrit, in eadem Manichaei epistula continetur, id est: Si peccatum naturale non est, quare baptizantur infantes, quos nihil per se mali egisse constat? Ideo autem dixi illud per multorum volitare linguas, quia vulgarius argumentum etiam a tardis quibusque comprehensum est. Ceterum tu in libris tuis in eo spem totam reponis; et hoc ergo ipsum hoc modo tuus praeceptor exsequitur: Qui his verbis mihi interrogandi sunt: Si omne malum actuale est, antequam malum quispiam agat, quare accipit purificationem aquae, cum nullum malum egerit per se?
Why, then, do you quarrel with us, because we call you a Manichean, when neither in his writings is anything held other than what you say, nor in yours anything other than what he wants to persuade? But now that argument which runs about through common—yet by you instilled—mouths is contained in the same letter of the Manichean, that is: If sin is not natural, why are infants baptized, who are agreed to have done nothing evil through themselves? I said that this flies about on the tongues of many because it is a more common argument, grasped even by any who are slow. But you in your books place all your hope in it; and so this very thing your teacher pursues in this way: They are to be questioned by me with these words: If every evil is actual, before anyone does evil, why does he receive the purification of water, when he has done no evil through himself?
Iulianum.3.187Aut si necdum egit et purificandus est, licet eos naturaliter malae stirpis pullulationem ostendere, illos ipsos, quos amentia non sinit intellegere, neque quae dicuntneque de quibus affirmant. Audis, quomodo convitiatur nobis? Amentes vocat nec intellegentes, vel quae dicamus vel quae affirmemus, qui malae stirpis pullulationem negemus, cum baptizemus etiam eos purificante aqua, qui malum nullum egerint, id est parvulos. Posita sunt nempe de eius multa sententiis; sed nisi Menoch filiam et Manichaeum, qui se Christi Apostolum nominat, titulus indicaret, te omnino suum pollicerentur auctorem (Cf. supra 172). Cum ergo nihil aliud dicas quam quod Mani docente didicisti, putas te in aestimatione Catholicorum aliter habendum quam illum, per quem talium dogmatum sacramenta potasti?
Or, if he has not yet acted and is to be purified, it is permitted to show that they are naturally a sprouting of the evil stock—those very ones whom madness does not allow to understand either what they say or what they affirm. Do you hear how he heaps insults on us? He calls us mad and not understanding either what we say or what we affirm, we who deny a sprouting of the evil stock, while we baptize, with purifying water, even those who have done no evil, that is, the little ones. Many things, surely, have been set down from his opinions; but did not the title indicate his daughter Menoch and the Manichean, who names himself an Apostle of Christ, they would altogether proclaim you their author (See above, 172). Since, then, you say nothing other than what you learned with Mani teaching, do you suppose that you are to be held, in the estimation of Catholics, otherwise than the one through whom you drank the sacraments of such teachings?
Iulianum.3.187AUG. Finisti tandem, quae de Manichaei epistula, quam tui collegae Flori orationibus adiutus te invenisse laetaris, contra nos putasti esse dicenda, ubi certe Manichaeus concupiscentiam carnis accusat, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, hanc autem Catholicis obiciendam sic arbitratur, tamquam eam bonam esse dicant, quia nuptiarum bonum doctrinae dominicae atque apostolicae sanitate commendant.
Augustine: You have finished at last what you thought ought to be said against us from the letter of the Manichean—which, aided by the prayers of your colleague Florus, you rejoice to have found—where certainly the Manichean accuses the concupiscence of the flesh, by which the flesh desires against the spirit; but he thinks this must be cast in the teeth of the Catholics as though they called it good, because they commend the good of marriage with the soundness of the Lord's and the apostolic teaching.
Iulianum.3.187Quando enim posset Manichaeus malum concupiscentiae carnalis a bono discernere coniugali, cum ad Hebraeos epistula non nisi eorum dicat esse solidum cibum, qui exercitatos habent sensus ad separandum bonum a malo (Cf. Hebr 5, 14)? Sed plane tu in huius Manichaei morsum inevitabiliter incidisti, tantus laudator concupiscentiae carnis, ut eam, non qualis ibi esse potuisset, si esse debuisset, sed omnino, qualis nunc est, etiam in paradiso, id est in loco tam magnae beatitudinis, collocares, ut scilicet illius loci habitatores ita beata pace fruerentur, ut in se ipsis intestino bello, ne in consensus illius illiciti vel inhonesti concubitus laberentur, contra motus concupiscentiae dimicarent. Hoc malum in paradiso esse non posset nisi forte illo picto, de quo superius locuti sumus (Cf. supra 154), qui haberet titulum suprascriptum: Paradisus Pelagianorum,
For when could the Manichean discern the evil of carnal concupiscence from the good of marriage, when the Letter to the Hebrews says that solid food belongs only to those who have their senses exercised to separate good from evil (See Heb 5:14)? But plainly you have fallen inevitably into the bite of this Manichean, so great a praiser of the concupiscence of the flesh that you place it—not such as it could have been there, if it had had to be, but altogether such as it now is—even in paradise, that is, in a place of so great blessedness, so that, namely, the inhabitants of that place would so enjoy a blessed peace that within themselves, in an intestine war, lest they slip into consent to that unlawful or dishonorable intercourse, they would fight against the motions of concupiscence. This evil could not be in paradise, unless perhaps in that painted one, of which we spoke above (See above, 154), which would have the title inscribed above it: "The paradise of the Pelagians,"
Iulianum.3.187ubi etsi ipsa concupiscentia occultis motibus casta corda sollicitans non posset ulla exprimi arte pictoris, pingi tamen possent gravidae feminae, cibos utiles fastidio repellentes, foeda delectatione noxios appetentes, nauseantes, vomentes, pallentes, immaturos fetus abortu aliquando fundentes, in ipso etiam partu poenam, quam mater Eva suscepit, sua miseria protestantes, etsi non sonante pictura, tamen facies tristium gementium plorantium sicut poterat, imitante, natosque ipsos omnes flentes communi sorte nascentium et diversarum varietate poenarum et multi postea etiam sub verberibus magistrorum.
where, even though concupiscence itself, soliciting chaste hearts with hidden motions, could not be expressed by any art of the painter, yet there could be painted pregnant women repelling useful foods in their queasiness, craving harmful ones with foul delight, nauseated, vomiting, pale, sometimes pouring forth premature offspring in miscarriage, in the very childbirth attesting by their misery the punishment which mother Eve received—even if the painting did not sound, yet imitating, as it could, the faces of the sorrowful, groaning, weeping—and all the newborns themselves weeping by the common lot of those being born and by the variety of various punishments, and many afterward even under the beatings of teachers.
Iulianum.3.187Hanc picturam nesciens quisquis aspiceret et titulum legeret causamque requireret, haec ei videlicet, sed a vobis, egregia ratio redderetur, qua diceretis: Talis esset omnino etiam ibi condicio generis humani, quia talis est hic, ubi similiter a fetibus hominum nulla trahitur origo peccati. Si acquiesceret, fieret Pelagianus; si vero irrisae huic insipientiae nollet acquiescere, argueretur a vobis ut Manichaeus.
Whoever, not knowing, should look upon this picture and read the title and ask the reason, this excellent reason, namely, would be given him—but by you—by which you would say: Such altogether would be the condition of the human race even there, because such it is here, where likewise no origin of sin is drawn from the offspring of human beings. If he acquiesced, he would become a Pelagian; but if he were unwilling to acquiesce in this ridiculous folly, he would be accused by you as a Manichean.
Iulianum.3.187Sed huic contentioni, Dei sancte antistes Ambrosi, docte in Ecclesia et Doctor Ecclesiae (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 141), dic istis concupiscentiam, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum et de qua Manichaeus nesciens, quid loquitur, tendit muscipulas imperitis, non ex alienae commixtione naturae, sicut ille desipit, sed naturae nostrae bonae a bono conditae ex prae varicatione primi hominis accidisse. Sed vos fortasse impudentissima pervicacia eligitis adiumenta praebere impurissimo Manichaeo quam sancto acquiescere Ambrosio.
But to this contention, holy bishop of God, Ambrose, learned in the Church and Doctor of the Church (See Ambrose, In Luc. 7.141), tell these men that the concupiscence by which the flesh desires against the spirit—and about which the Manichean, not knowing what he says, sets snares for the inexperienced—befell, not from the mixture of an alien nature, as he raves, but our own good nature, founded by the Good One, from the transgression of the first man. But you perhaps, by most shameless obstinacy, choose to furnish helps to the most impure Manichean rather than to acquiesce in holy Ambrose.
Iulianum.3.187Agite, ut placet, sed non gaudebit vel vobis adiutoribus Manichaeus, quoniam catholica fide in Christi nomine atque virtute utrosque vincit Ambrosius. Si enim talis esset ista concupiscentia, quae carnali suo motu nec praecederet nec excederet hominis voluntatem, sed eius semper sequeretur arbitrium, profecto nec Manichaeus, quid in ea iuste reprehenderet, inveniret; nec eam quispiam nostrum in paradiso coniugatos habere non potuisse contenderet; nec Ambrosius de praevaricatione primi hominis eam traxisse nos diceret, quia concupiscere contra spiritum non videret. Nunc vero, quia talis est, ut contra spiritum concupiscat, etiamsi spiritu resistente non vincat, et ideo esse non posset pace illa magna in paradiso fruentium beatorum, nec fas est credere commixtione malae naturae corruptibilem Deum, restat, ut et vos et Manichaeos fides vincat Ambrosii de primi contagione peccati.
Do as you please, but the Manichean will not rejoice even with you as helpers, since by the Catholic faith, in the name and power of Christ, Ambrose conquers both. For if this concupiscence were such that by its carnal motion it neither preceded nor exceeded the will of the human being, but always followed his choice, surely the Manichean would not find what he might justly reprehend in it; nor would any of us contend that the married could not have it in paradise; nor would Ambrose say that we drew it from the transgression of the first man, because he would not see it desire against the spirit. But now, because it is such that it desires against the spirit, even if, with the spirit resisting, it does not conquer—and therefore could not be in that great peace of the blessed enjoying paradise, nor is it lawful to believe God corruptible by mixture with an evil nature—it remains that the faith of Ambrose, concerning the contagion of the first sin, conquers both you and the Manicheans.
Iulianum.3.187188. IUL. Superest, ut examinemus illam sententiam tuam, quam tu te ad unum sermonem revocare pollicitus breviter, ut non est negandum, et acutule collegisti: Natura humana, si malum esset, non esset generanda; si malum non haberet, non esset regeneranda; atque ut ad unum verbum utrumque concludam, natura humana, si malum esset, salvanda non esset, si ei mali nihil inesset, salvanda non esset (De nupt. et concup. 2, 36). In hoc loco non es a nobis ingenii tui laude fraudandus; pro tua enim prorsus dici melius ratione non potuit, sed tamen rerum natura non sinit, ut promoveat quidquam exacta calliditas. Durum tibi est omnino contra stimulum calcitrare; quidquid enim compegeris, non minus quam glacies admotae veritatis igne dissolvitur. Denique nunc quid a nobis referatur, attende. Conclusisti hoc modo: Certe natura humana si malum esset, salvanda non esset.
188. Julian: It remains for us to examine that opinion of yours which you, having promised to recall it to a single statement, gathered briefly—as is not to be denied—and rather cleverly: Human nature, if it were evil, would not have to be begotten; if it had no evil, it would not have to be reborn; and, to conclude both in a single phrase, human nature, if it were evil, would not have to be saved; if there were no evil in it, it would not have to be saved (De nupt. et concup. 2.36). In this place you are not to be defrauded by us of the praise of your wit; for, given your reasoning, it could not have been said better; but nevertheless the nature of things does not allow refined cunning to advance anything. It is altogether hard for you to kick against the goad; for whatever you frame is dissolved no less than ice by the fire of truth applied to it. Finally, attend now to what is brought forward by us. You concluded in this way: Certainly, human nature, if it were evil, would not have to be saved.
Iulianum.3.188Assentimur, prorsus verum dixisti: Si malum esset, salvanda non esset, quia res mala et naturaliter mala nec mereretur nec caperet salutem. Cur non caperet? Quia aliud quam facta erat fieri non posset; non autem mereretur, quia nihil in ea erat, quod Dei dignaretur liberare clementia. Cum autem dicimus: si esset, quod certe esse non potest, non illi spem negati conciliamus effectus, sed ad destructionem alterius opinionis, quae incidit, de rebus impossibilibus dicere solemus. Si hoc vel illud verbi gratia esset, illud sine dubio sequeretur, ut, cum illud esse non potest, etiam hoc, propter cuius amolitionem illatum fuerat, multo magis negetur.
We assent; you have said something altogether true: If it were evil, it would not have to be saved, because a thing evil and naturally evil would neither deserve nor receive salvation. Why would it not receive it? Because it could not become other than it was made; but it would not deserve it, because there was nothing in it which the mercy of God would deign to set free. But when we say "if it were"—which certainly cannot be—we do not procure for it the hope of an effect that is denied, but, for the destruction of another opinion that comes up, we are wont to speak of impossible things. If this or that, for the sake of argument, were so, that without doubt would follow; so that, since that cannot be, also this, for whose removal it had been brought forward, is much more denied.
Iulianum.3.188Iam igitur frequenter ostendimus malum aliquid per naturam esse non posse, sed tamen nunc sine praeiudicio istius constituti sententiae tuae partem probamus, qua dixisti: Natura humana si malum esset, salvanda non esset. Salutem in baptismate collocasti et argumentatus es consequenter, quoniam, si verum dicerent Manichaei, qui malam dicunt naturam, desiperent Christiani, qui malae naturae remedium baptismatis crederent admovendum; et ideo, qui malam confirmat hominum naturam, gratiam negare compellitur, quod ita recurrit, ut, qui gratiam confirmat, hominum laudet naturam, cuius saluti eam intellegit fuisse provisam.
Now, then, we have frequently shown that nothing can be evil by nature; but nevertheless, without prejudice to this settled point, we approve the part of your opinion in which you said: Human nature, if it were evil, would not have to be saved. You placed salvation in baptism and argued consequently that, if the Manicheans spoke the truth, who say nature is evil, the Christians would be raving who believed the remedy of baptism must be applied to an evil nature; and therefore whoever affirms the nature of human beings to be evil is forced to deny grace, which recoils so that whoever affirms grace praises the nature of human beings, to whose salvation he understands it was provided.
Iulianum.3.188AUG. Non est verum, quod dicis; fallis aut falleris. Non enim qui malam, sed qui malum confirmat hominum esse naturam, id est non, qui eam malam esse, sed qui eam malum esse confirmat, gratiam negare compellitur; nam ubi mala est, ibi magis indiget gratia. Mala est quippe natura malus homo, quoniam homo sine dubitatione natura est; sic mala natura est mala mulier, quoniam mulier utique natura est. Quomodo ergo, qui hoc dicit, gratiam negare compellitur, cum gratia naturis malis, id est hominibus malis, ut mali esse desinant, opituletur? Sed aliter dicimus: Malus est iste homo, aliter: Malum est iste homo; illud verum esse potest, hoc non potest. Sicut: Vitiosus est iste homo, si dicimus, verum esse potest; si autem dicimus: Vitium est iste homo, verum non potest esse.
Augustine: It is not true, what you say; you deceive or are deceived. For not the one who affirms that the nature of human beings is evil, but the one who affirms it to be an evil—that is, not the one who affirms it to be evil, but the one who affirms it to be an evil—is forced to deny grace; for where it is evil, there it needs grace the more. For an evil human being is an evil nature, since a human being is without doubt a nature; thus an evil woman is an evil nature, since a woman is certainly a nature. How, then, is the one who says this forced to deny grace, when grace aids evil natures, that is, evil human beings, that they may cease to be evil? But we say one thing when we say, "This human being is evil," another when we say, "This human being is an evil"; the former can be true, the latter cannot. Just as, if we say, "This human being is faulty," it can be true; but if we say, "This human being is a fault," it cannot be true.
Iulianum.3.188Proinde noli errare vel mittere homines in errorem et sic me dixisse intellege: Natura humana, si malum esset, non esset generanda; si malum non haberet, non esset regeneranda, ac si dixissem: Natura humana, si vitium esset, non esset generanda; si vitium non haberet, non esset regeneranda. Item quod sequitur, ubi me ad unum verbum dixi utrumque concludere, ita dixi: Natura humana, si malum esset, salvanda non esset; si ei mali nihil inesset, salvanda non esset, tamquam dicerem: Natura humana, si vitium esset, salvanda non esset; si ei vitii nihil inesset, salvanda non esset. Ecce feci verba mea planiora, non ut invenires, quod contra diceres, sed ut intellegereris non potuisse invenire, quod diceres.
Accordingly, do not err or send human beings into error, and understand that I said this: Human nature, if it were evil, would not have to be begotten; if it had no evil, it would not have to be reborn—as if I had said: Human nature, if it were a fault, would not have to be begotten; if it had no fault, it would not have to be reborn. Likewise what follows, where I said I concluded both in a single phrase, I said thus: Human nature, if it were evil, would not have to be saved; if there were no evil in it, it would not have to be saved—as though I said: Human nature, if it were a fault, would not have to be saved; if there were no fault in it, it would not have to be saved. Behold, I have made my words plainer, not so that you might find something to say against them, but so that you might be understood to have been unable to find what to say.
Iulianum.3.188189. IUL. Quid igitur hinc conficiatur, adverte; non adhaerere negationem gratiae laudi humanae naturae, quin immo haec quattuor ita esse coniuncta, ut alterum sine altero teneri nequeat, sed infamia naturae pariat negationem gratiae et laus gratiae pariat praedicationem naturae; ista enim in quamvis sibi partem reciprocari possunt. Bene ergo dixisti: Natura humana, si malum esset, salvanda non esset (Ibidem); hoc enim dicunt utrumque Manichaei, malam videlicet carnis naturam nec posse salvari per gratiam nec debere.
189. Julian: Note, then, what is concluded from this: that the denial of grace does not cling to the praise of human nature, but rather that these four things are so joined that the one cannot be held without the other; but the disrepute of nature begets the denial of grace, and the praise of grace begets the proclamation of nature; for these can be reciprocated to whichever side you please. Well, then, did you say: Human nature, if it were evil, would not have to be saved (De nupt. et concup. 2.36); for the Manicheans say both of these, namely, that the nature of the flesh is evil and that it can neither be saved through grace nor ought to be.
Iulianum.3.189AUG. Sed illi sic dicunt malam carnis naturam, ut eam malum esse dicant, non malum habere, quia ipsum vitium non substantiae accidens, sed substantiam putant esse.
Augustine: But they say the nature of the flesh is evil in such a way that they say it is an evil, not that it has an evil, because they suppose the fault itself to be not something befalling a substance but a substance.
Iulianum.3.189190. IUL. Sed post haec admoves sententiam tibi caram et dicis: Si autem naturae humanae mali nihil inesset, salvanda non esset. Qui ergo dicit eam bonum non esse, bonum negat conditae Creatorem; qui vero negat ei malum inesse, misericordem vitiatae invidet Salvatorem (Ibidem). Sit igitur lector intentus, videbit nihil te dixisse aliud, quam quod dicendum negaras; pronuntiasti enim ei rei malum inesse naturaliter, quam dixeras malam non esse naturaliter.
190. Julian: But after this you bring in an opinion dear to you and say: But if there were no evil in human nature, it would not have to be saved. Whoever, then, says it is not good denies that the Creator made it good; but whoever denies that there is evil in it begrudges the merciful Savior to what is corrupted (De nupt. et concup. 2.36). Let the reader, then, be attentive; he will see that you have said nothing other than what you had denied must be said; for you pronounced that there is evil naturally in the thing which you had said is not naturally evil.
Iulianum.3.190AUG. Non dixeram malam non esse, sed malum non esse, hoc est, ut planius loquar, non dixeram vitiatam non esse, sed vitium non esse; relege et intellege.
Augustine: I had not said it is not evil, but that it is not an evil—that is, to speak more plainly, I had not said it is not corrupted, but that it is not a fault; read again and understand.
Iulianum.3.190191. IUL. Sed intellegi non potest aliud mala natura quam id, quod malum est habere congenitum.
191. Julian: But an evil nature cannot be understood as anything other than that which has an evil innate to it.
Iulianum.3.191AUG. Sive congenitum sit malum sicut ingenii fatuitas sive voluntate assumptum sicut homicidium, potest dici malus homo etiam mala natura, quia et homo natura est, sicut malus equus potest et malum animal dici, quia et equus animal est.
Augustine: Whether the evil be innate, like the foolishness of one's wit, or assumed by the will, like homicide, a human being can be called an evil human being and also an evil nature, because a human being too is a nature—just as an evil horse can also be called an evil animal, because a horse too is an animal.
Iulianum.3.191192. IUL. Et ut fiat brevis ac pura conclusio: si naturae inest ita malum, ut nascatur ex ea cum ipsis seminibus malum, mala sine dubitatione convincitur.
192. Julian: And, to make a brief and pure conclusion: if there is evil in a nature in such a way that an evil is born from it together with the seeds themselves, it is without doubt convicted of being evil.
Iulianum.3.192AUG. Etsi mala convincitur, non tamen malum est, quia etsi vitiata convincitur, non tamen vitium est.
Augustine: Even if it is convicted of being evil, it is nonetheless not an evil, because even if it is convicted of being corrupted, it is nonetheless not a fault.
Iulianum.3.192193. IUL. Si autem vindicatur a malis et bona defenditur, nec nasci ex ea malum nec ei inesse potest naturaliter. Evanuit igitur conclusio tua, quia sententia, quam secundo loco intulisti, non distinxit, sed geminavit priorem.
193. Julian: But if it is vindicated from evils and defended as good, neither can an evil be born from it nor be in it naturally. Your conclusion, then, has vanished, because the opinion you brought in in the second place did not distinguish, but doubled, the former.
Iulianum.3.193AUG. Non continuo, si bona defenditur, vindicatur a malis. Eadem quippe natura et bona est, in quantum natura est, et mala est, si vitiata est; non est tamen malum ulla omnino natura. Non igitur evanuit conclusio mea qua dixi: Natura humana, si malum esset, salvanda non esset; si ei mali nihil inesset, salvanda non esset (De nupt. et concup. 2, 36). Sed si vis verum dicere, dic potius evanuisse argumentationem tuam, qua voluisti refellere conclusionem meam.
Augustine: It does not follow at once that, if it is defended as good, it is vindicated from evils. For the same nature is both good, insofar as it is a nature, and evil, if it is corrupted; yet no nature at all is an evil. My conclusion, then, has not vanished, by which I said: Human nature, if it were evil, would not have to be saved; if there were no evil in it, it would not have to be saved (De nupt. et concup. 2.36). But if you wish to say the truth, say rather that your argument has vanished, by which you wished to refute my conclusion.
Iulianum.3.193194. IUL. Natura - inquis - humana, si malum esset, salvanda non esset; si ei mali nihil inesset, salvanda non esset (Ibidem). Quid aliud ostendisti quam unam rem propter id debere salvari, propter quod illam negaveras debere salvari?
194. Julian: Human nature, you say, if it were evil, would not have to be saved; if there were no evil in it, it would not have to be saved (De nupt. et concup. 2.36). What else have you shown than that one and the same thing must be saved for the very reason for which you had denied it must be saved?
Iulianum.3.194AUG. Salvanda est, quia mala est, non quia malum est; si autem malum esset, salvanda non esset. Non enim, quia malum est, sed quia malum habet, mala est, sicut non, quia vitium est, sed quia vitium habet, vitiosa est. Quia vitiosa est ergo, salvanda est; si autem ipsa natura hoc est ipsa substantia vitium esset, salvanda non esset. Quomodo ergo unam rem propter hoc dixi debere salvari, propter quod illam negaveram debere salvari, cum aliud sit vitium habere, aliud vitium esse? Salvanda est ergo, quia vitium habet, non quia vitium est; si autem vitium esset, salvanda non esset. Vides, quam non hoc sit respondere, quod est non tacere, quandoquidem vides nihil te respondisse et tamen tacere noluisse.
Augustine: It must be saved because it is evil, not because it is an evil; but if it were an evil, it would not have to be saved. For it is evil not because it is an evil, but because it has an evil—just as it is faulty not because it is a fault, but because it has a fault. Because it is faulty, then, it must be saved; but if the nature itself, that is, the substance itself, were a fault, it would not have to be saved. How, then, did I say that one and the same thing must be saved for the very reason for which I had denied it must be saved, when it is one thing to have a fault, another to be a fault? It must be saved, then, because it has a fault, not because it is a fault; but if it were a fault, it would not have to be saved. You see how this is not to answer, which is not to be silent—since you see that you have answered nothing and yet have been unwilling to be silent.
Iulianum.3.194195. IUL. Ac per hoc eo revolutus es, ut Manichaeum, quem professione contempseras, argumentatione reparares. Nam dicendo: Si mala esset, salvanda non esset speciem pugnandi indueras; subdendo autem: sed si nihil in ea mali esset, salvanda non esset (Ibidem), ipsi te fideliter militare docuisti. Cum ergo apparuerit hoc tua quod Manichaei sententia contineri, id est malam esse hominum naturam, cui ille et tu pariter inesse malum dicitis, tuque pronuntiaveris malam naturam non esse salvandam, absolutissime confectus est fidem vestram iunctis omnino turmis tam naturam impugnare quam gratiam.
195. Julian: And through this you have come round again to repairing by argument the Manichean whom by profession you had despised. For by saying: If it were evil, it would not have to be saved, you had put on the appearance of fighting against him; but by adding: but if there were no evil in it, it would not have to be saved (De nupt. et concup. 2.36), you taught that you faithfully soldier for him. Since, then, it has appeared that this opinion of yours is contained in that of the Manichean—that is, that the nature of human beings is evil, in which both he and you alike say there is an evil, and you have pronounced that an evil nature is not to be saved—it has been most completely demonstrated that your faith, with your troops altogether joined, attacks both nature and grace.
Iulianum.3.195AUG. Numquid, quoniam verba mea mutas, ut aliquid respondisse videaris, ideo difficile aut impossibile facis legentibus vel recolere animo vel certe in hoc ipso tuo libro paulo superius relegere et videre, quid dixerim, ubi et ipse illa, sicut a me sunt dicta, posuisti? Ego enim non dixi: Si mala esset, salvanda non esset, cum ideo salvanda sit ut non sit mala; sed dixi: Si malum esset, salvanda non esset. Habendo quippe vitium mala est, quo consumpto sine dubitatione fit salva; non ipsa vitium est, alioquin ipsa consumeretur, cum consumitur vitium. Cum vero salute vitium consumatur, quid isto modo nisi natura salvatur?
Augustine: Because you change my words, so that you may seem to have answered something, do you therefore make it difficult or impossible for readers either to recall to mind or certainly to read again, a little above in this very book of yours, and to see what I said—where you yourself set down those words as they were said by me? For I did not say: If it were evil, it would not have to be saved—since it must be saved for this very reason, that it may not be evil; but I said: If it were an evil, it would not have to be saved. For by having a fault it is evil, and when that is consumed, it without doubt becomes saved; it is not itself the fault, otherwise it itself would be consumed when the fault is consumed. But since by salvation the fault is consumed, what, in this way, is saved except the nature?
Iulianum.3.195Cum itaque dicitur sanari vitium, non ipsum vitium, sed illa, cui hoc inerat, natura salvatur, quae si vitium esset, non salvaretur, sed finiretur potius sanitate; immo sanitas hoc modo fieri ulla non posset, quoniam, si fieret, maneret natura sanata consumpto vitio, quo non erat sana; si autem natura vitium esset, non utique consumpto vitio sanaretur, sed ipsa consumeretur. Ac per hoc natura humana non, si mala esset, sed si malum esset, hoc est si vitium esset, salvanda non esset; si ei nihil mali inesset, id est si vitio mala non esset, salvanda non esset. Ecce quod dixi; noli mutatis abs te verbis meis velle facere locum non responsionibus, sed contentionibus tuis.
And so, when a fault is said to be healed, not the fault itself, but the nature in which it was, is saved—a nature which, if it were a fault, would not be saved, but would rather be ended by the healing; nay rather, healing in this way could not happen at all, since, if it happened, the nature would remain healed when the fault was consumed by which it was not sound; but if the nature were a fault, it would certainly not be healed by the fault being consumed, but would itself be consumed. And through this human nature would not have to be saved—not if it were evil, but if it were an evil, that is, if it were a fault; if there were no evil in it, that is, if it were not evil by a fault, it would not have to be saved. Behold what I said; do not, by changing my words, wish to make room not for answers but for your contentions.
Iulianum.3.195196. IUL. Sequiturque, ut nemo possit laudare gratiam Christi, nisi qui in natura bonum opus laudaverit Conditoris.
196. Julian: And it follows that no one can praise the grace of Christ except one who has praised in nature the good work of the Founder.
Iulianum.3.196AUG. Hoc verum dixisti, et ideo etiam in mala natura opus laudabile est Conditoris, quia et natura mala, in quantum natura est, bonum est atque, ut hoc bonum liberetur a malo, gratia necessaria est.
Augustine: This you said truly, and therefore even in an evil nature the work of the Founder is praiseworthy, because an evil nature too, insofar as it is a nature, is a good; and, that this good may be set free from evil, grace is necessary.
Iulianum.3.196197. IUL. Certe nulla hic de studiis adultorum hominum quaestio, sed de sola nascentium qualitate versatur, in quibus naturae examinatur status. Hanc tu itaque naturam sine aliquo propriae voluntatis admixtu ream, damnatam, malis id est criminibus plenam cum Manichaeo tamen asseris, quam nos sine scelere, sine peccati malo innoxiam et capacem virtutis tuemur.
197. Julian: Certainly there is here no question about the pursuits of adult human beings, but only about the quality of those being born, in whom the state of nature is examined. This nature, then—without any admixture of its own will—you, along with the Manichean, assert to be guilty, condemned, full of evils, that is, of crimes; whereas we defend it as innocent, without crime, without the evil of sin, and capable of virtue.
Iulianum.3.197AUG. Agnoscimus te, agnoscimus magnum tutorem, qui parvulis, quos tueris, non sinis succurrere Salvatorem. Si autem sinis, dic, quaeso, quando salvi corpore baptizantur, ex quo malo, ex quo vitio, ex qua parte salventur. Sed quid dicturus es, homo, qui facis tibi paradisum tuum, quem non erubescis implere poenis immeritis parvulorum?
Augustine: We recognize you; we recognize a great guardian, who does not allow the Savior to succor the little ones whom you guard. But if you do allow it, tell me, I pray, when they are baptized sound in body, from what evil, from what fault, in what part they are saved. But what will you say, you who make for yourself your own paradise, which you do not blush to fill with the undeserved punishments of little ones?
Iulianum.3.197198. IUL. Hanc ergo tu in parvulis criminosam, vitiosam et damnatam voluntate sua arguis an conditione nascendi? Si propria voluntate, ut videlicet illi parvuli suis studiis peccasse dicantur, monstrum quidem opinionis exoritur, peccati tamen tradux negatur, non enim accepit ab alio, quod potuit ipse committere; sin autem tot mala non actione sua, sed conditione sortitur, naturaliter iniqua convincitur.
198. Julian: Do you, then, accuse this nature in the little ones of being criminal, faulty, and condemned by its own will or by the condition of being born? If by its own will—so that, namely, those little ones may be said to have sinned by their own pursuits—a monster of opinion does indeed arise, yet a transmission of sin is denied, for it did not receive from another what it could itself commit; but if it obtains so many evils not by its own action but by its condition, it is convicted of being unjust by nature.
Iulianum.3.198AUG. Nec sua voluntate arguo naturam parvulorum, nemo enim, quia vult, nascitur, nec conditione nascendi, nisi quia miseri nascuntur, non quia nascuntur. Nasceretur enim etiam in paradiso natura humana ex Dei benedictione fecunda, etiamsi nemo peccasset, donec Deo praecognitus sanctorum numerus compleretur.
Augustine: I accuse the nature of the little ones neither by its own will—for no one is born because he wills it—nor by the condition of being born, except in that they are born wretched, not in that they are born. For human nature, fruitful by God's blessing, would be born even in paradise, even if no one had sinned, until the number of the saints foreknown to God were completed.
Iulianum.3.198Sed illi parvuli nec flerent in paradiso nec muti essent nec aliquando uti ratione non possent nec sine usu membrorum infirmi et inertes iacerent nec morbis affligerentur nec a bestiis laederentur nec venenis necarentur nec aliquo casu vulnerarentur, vel ullo sensu aut ulla parte corporis privarentur nec a daemonibus vexarentur nec surgentes in pueritiam domarentur verberibus aut erudirentur laboribus nec ulli eorum tam vano et obtunso nascerentur ingenio, ut nec labore nec dolore ullo emendarentur, sed excepta propter incapaces uteros matrum sui corporis quantitate, tales omnino, qualis Adam factus est, gignerentur. Nunc autem nec tales essent, quales videmus, nec talia paterentur nisi peccato illo magno natura humana in has miserias mutata atque damnata. Non ergo ita se habent conditione nascendi, sed contagione peccati et conditione supplicii.
But those little ones would neither weep in paradise nor be mute nor at some point be unable to use reason nor lie feeble and helpless without the use of their members nor be afflicted by diseases nor be harmed by beasts nor be killed by poisons nor be wounded by any mishap, or be deprived of any sense or any part of the body, nor be vexed by demons nor, rising into boyhood, be tamed by beatings or educated by labors; nor would any of them be born with a wit so empty and dull that it could be amended by no labor and no pain; but, except for the size of their own body—on account of mothers' wombs incapable of it—they would be begotten altogether such as Adam was made. But now they would neither be such as we see them, nor suffer such things, had not human nature, by that great sin, been changed and condemned into these miseries. They are so, then, not by the condition of being born, but by the contagion of sin and the condition of punishment.
Iulianum.3.198199. IUL. Quo ergo super naturae iudicio Manichaeus tuque distatis? Quia ille, inquis, malam eam fatetur. Tu ergo si id abnuis, bonam eam esse pronuntia et sublata contentio est; capieris statim veritatis retibus in salutem. Sed reclamas. Audiamus ergo, quid parias, Aristoteles Poenorum. Tantum - inquis - malum ei inest, ut possideatur a diabolo atque aeternum mereatur incendium.
199. Julian: In what, then, concerning the judgment of nature, do you and the Manichean differ? Because he, you say, confesses it to be evil. You, then, if you deny this, pronounce it to be good, and the contention is removed; you will at once be caught in the nets of truth unto salvation. But you cry out against this. Let us hear, then, what you bring forth, Aristotle of the Carthaginians. So great an evil, you say, is in it, that it is possessed by the devil and deserves the eternal fire.
Iulianum.3.199AUG. Tu autem, qui eam negas a diabolo possideri, procul dubio negas a potestate erui tenebrarum, cum in Christi regnum regeneratione transfertur, et accusas universam catholicam Ecclesiam magno crimine maiestatis. Non enim legibus huius mundi alio crimine tenetur reus, quisquis imaginem, quamvis non vivam, tamen imperatoris exsufflat. Exsufflantur autem parvuli in exorcismo, priusquam baptizentur; exsufflantur igitur vivae imagines, non regis cuiuscumque, sed Dei; immo vero exsufflatur, sed diabolus, qui contagione peccati tenet parvulum reum, ut illo foras misso parvulus transferatur ad Christum (Cf. Io 12, 31).
Augustine: But you, who deny that it is possessed by the devil, without doubt deny that it is rescued from the power of darkness when it is transferred into the kingdom of Christ by regeneration, and you accuse the whole Catholic Church of the great crime of treason. For not by the laws of this world is anyone held guilty of any other crime who exorcises the image of the emperor, though not a living one. But the little ones are exorcised in exorcism before they are baptized; living images, then, are exorcised—not of any king, but of God; nay rather, what is exorcised is the devil, who by the contagion of sin holds the little one guilty, so that, with him cast out, the little one may be transferred to Christ (See John 12:31).
Iulianum.3.199Exsuffletur itaque Iuliani amentia, ne maiestatis rea in parvulorum mundatione et exsufflatione dicatur Ecclesia. Si autem non eruitur a potestate tenebrarum et illic remanet parvulus, quid miraris in igne aeterno cum diabolo futurum, qui in Dei regnum intrare non sinitur? An quia Pelagiani nescio quem parvulis non baptizatis praeter Dei regnum quietis et vitae aeternae locum praeparant, ideo Christi erit falsa sententia: Qui crediderit et baptizatus fuerit, salvus erit; qui autem non crediderit, condemnabitur (Mc 16, 16)? Quisquis autem negat parvulos credere per ora gestantium, neget eos et accipere baptismum, quia in manibus gestantium reluctantur.
Let the madness of Julian, then, be exorcised, lest the Church be called guilty of treason in the cleansing and exorcising of the little ones. But if the little one is not rescued from the power of darkness and remains there, why do you wonder that he who is not allowed to enter into the kingdom of God will be in the eternal fire with the devil? Or, because the Pelagians prepare for unbaptized little ones I know not what place of rest and eternal life apart from the kingdom of God, will therefore the saying of Christ be false: Whoever believes and is baptized will be saved; but whoever does not believe will be condemned (Mark 16:16)? But whoever denies that the little ones believe through the mouths of those carrying them, let him deny also that they receive baptism, because they struggle in the hands of those carrying them.
Iulianum.3.199200. IUL. Sed adeo mala non est, ut nisi Manichaeus eam accusare non possit.
200. Julian: But it is so far from being evil that no one but a Manichean could accuse it.
Iulianum.3.200AUG. Manichaeus ergo dixit: Omnes sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 3, 13)? Sed quia hoc dixit doctus et Doctor catholicus, quid es nisi deceptus et deceptor haereticus?
Augustine: Did the Manichean, then, say: We are all born under sin, whose very origin is in fault (Ambrose, De paenitentia 1.3.13)? But because a learned man and a Catholic Doctor said this, what are you but a deceived and deceiving heretic?
Iulianum.3.200201. IUL. Ego, inquit, tamen non sum Manichaeus, qui eam absolvo verbis et condemno iudiciis.
201. Julian: I, however, he says, am not a Manichean, who absolve it in words and condemn it in my judgments.
Iulianum.3.201AUG. Tu eam condemnas iudicio et hoc iniquo, quam mala tanta vis perpeti sine merito malo.
Augustine: You condemn it by a judgment, and that an unjust one, you who wish it to suffer so many evils without any evil desert.
Iulianum.3.201202. IUL. Quid igitur hic primum accusem, impudentiam mentientis, libidinem disputantis an profanitatem tam prava credentis? Nobis tamen intellego utendum Prophetae esse verbis: Beati sumus, Israel, quoniamquae Deo placent, nobis nota sunt (Bar 4, 4).
202. Julian: What, then, am I to accuse here first—the shamelessness of one lying, the lust of one disputing, or the profanity of one believing things so depraved? Yet I understand that we must use the words of the Prophet: Blessed are we, O Israel, because the things that please God are known to us (Bar 4:4).
Iulianum.3.202AUG. Itane vero, quae Deo placent, vobis nota sunt? Insulse, ut sine ulla contagione peccati premantur parvuli gravi iugo, non placet Deo. Trahunt ergo contagium de illo primo magnoque peccato, quod vos nolentes fateri quid nisi iniustum iudicium datis Deo?
Augustine: Is it so, indeed, that the things which please God are known to you? Foolish man—that the little ones should be oppressed with a heavy yoke without any contagion of sin does not please God. They draw, then, a contagion from that first and great sin, which you, being unwilling to confess, what do you give to God but an unjust judgment?
Iulianum.3.202203. IUL. Sed invectionum officium legentium censura supplebit; nos pergamus ad reliqua. Certe nullum est in rebus aliud malum, quod vere malum est, nisi quod peccatum vocamus.
203. Julian: But the office of invectives the censure of readers will supply; let us proceed to the rest. Certainly there is no other evil among things, which is truly evil, except what we call sin.
Iulianum.3.203AUG. Si non sunt mala etiam supplicia peccatorum, non est, quomodo defendas verum dixisse Deum, qui dixit creare se mala (Cf. Isa 45, 7); non enim dicendus est creare peccata.
Augustine: If even the punishments of sins are not evils, there is no way for you to defend that God spoke truly, who said that he creates evils (See Isa 45:7); for he is not to be said to create sins.
Iulianum.3.203204. IUL. Ex quo peccato gignitur in unoquoque, ut dicis, naturale malum; nihil est igitur aliud vere malum quam meritum malum.
204. Julian: From which sin there is begotten in each one, as you say, a natural evil; nothing else, then, is truly evil except a deserved evil.
Iulianum.3.204AUG. Non tantum meritum malum, verum etiam poena, quae malo merito redditur, malum est; non enim vere malum est peccatum et non est vere malum poena peccati. Si ergo nullum esset in parvulis ex origine malum meritum, quidquid mali patiuntur, esset iniustum. Et ideo ista mala in paradiso esse non possent, quia nullum ibi esset meritum malum, si felix oboedientia permaneret. Ac per hoc, quia hic sunt in parvulis mala, quae ibi non essent, habent etiam meritum malum, quod nisi originaliter non haberent.
Augustine: Not only the deserved evil, but also the punishment which is rendered for an evil desert, is an evil; for sin is not truly evil while the punishment of sin is not truly evil. If, then, there were no evil deserved from origin in the little ones, whatever evil they suffer would be unjust. And therefore these evils could not be in paradise, because there would be no deserved evil there, if happy obedience remained. And through this, because here in the little ones there are evils which would not be there, they have also a deserved evil, which they would not have except from origin.
Iulianum.3.204205. IUL. Si ergo et Manichaeus non ob aliud dicit malam naturam, quam quod eam mali meriti arbitratur, cui putat inferenda supplicia, et tu naturae humanae malum inesse confirmas nec aliud malum quam quod Manichaeus, id est concupiscentiam carnis, quam a diabolo contionaris infusam; eamque sic mali meriti esse dicis, ut aeternis eam persistas adiudicare tormentis, non aliter sine dubio quam Manichaeus pessimam illam damnatamque pronuntias.
205. Julian: If, then, the Manichean too says nature is evil for no other reason than that he judges it to be of an evil desert, on which he thinks punishments must be inflicted, and you affirm that there is an evil in human nature—and no other evil than the Manichean's, that is, the concupiscence of the flesh, which you declaim was infused by the devil—and you say it is of so evil a desert that you persist in adjudging it to eternal torments, then without doubt no otherwise than the Manichean you pronounce it most wicked and condemned.
Iulianum.3.205AUG. Iam erubesce. Concupiscentia carnis non est a Patre, sed ex mundo est, id est ex hominibus, quorum fetibus impletus est mundus; hanc autem Manichaei genti tribuunt tenebrarum adiuvantibus vobis, qui hoc malum nobis per praevaricationem primi hominis secundum Ambrosianam hoc est catholicam fidem in naturam vertisse non vultis (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 141).
Augustine: Blush now. The concupiscence of the flesh is not from the Father but is from the world, that is, from human beings, with whose offspring the world is filled; but this the Manicheans attribute to the nation of darkness, with you helping, who are unwilling that this evil turned into our nature through the transgression of the first man, according to the Ambrosian—that is, the Catholic—faith (See Ambrose, In Luc. 7.141).
Iulianum.3.205206. IUL. Videamus ergo, quomodo huc redeat etiam pars tuae secunda sententiae. Dixisti enim: Qui dicit naturam humanam bonum non esse, bonum negat conditae Creatorem; qui vero negat ei malum inesse, misericordem vitiatae invidet Salvatorem (De nupt. et concup. 2, 36). Si ergo, ut tu profiteri coactus es, qui negat eam bonum esse, bonum etiam Conditorem eius id est Deum negat, et nihil aliud est malam esse naturam quam malum meritum habere naturaliter; veritati nostrae amminiculatur etiam vestra confessio negare vos videlicet Deum bonum hominum conditorem, quorum malam esse naturam et vitiis eius iuratis et poenis.
206. Julian: Let us see, then, how the second part of your opinion too comes back to this. For you said: Whoever says that human nature is not good denies that the Creator made it good; but whoever denies that there is evil in it begrudges the merciful Savior to what is corrupted (De nupt. et concup. 2.36). If, then, as you have been forced to profess, whoever denies it to be good denies also its Founder, that is, God, to be good, and if to be an evil nature is nothing other than to have an evil desert by nature, then your confession too supports our truth—namely, that you deny the good God to be the founder of human beings, whose nature you swear to be evil both by its faults and by its punishments.
Iulianum.3.206AUG. Natura humana, etsi mala est, quia vitiata est, non tamen malum est, quia natura est. Nulla enim natura, in quantum natura est, malum est, sed prorsus bonum, sine quo bono ullum esse non potest malum, quia nisi in aliqua natura ullum esse non potest vitium, quamvis sine vitio possit esse vel numquam vitiata vel sanata natura; quod Manichaei si intellegerent, Manichaei omnino non essent, duas ex contra riis partibus boni et mali introducendo naturas. Si ergo vides, quid inter nos et Manichaeos intersit, tace; si non vides, tace.
Augustine: Human nature, even if it is evil because it is corrupted, is nonetheless not an evil, because it is a nature. For no nature, insofar as it is a nature, is an evil, but altogether a good—without which good no evil can exist, because no fault can exist except in some nature, although there can be without a fault a nature either never corrupted or healed; which, if the Manicheans understood, they would not be Manicheans at all, introducing two natures from contrary parts, of good and of evil. If, then, you see what lies between us and the Manicheans, be silent; if you do not see, be silent.
Iulianum.3.206207. IUL. Non ergo invidemus Salvatorem illi, quam Conditoris sui dignitate defendimus; sed malum eam negamus esse, ne efficiamur Manichaei, malum ei negamus inesse, ne mutatis nominibus simus totidem Manichaei.
207. Julian: We do not, then, begrudge the Savior to that nature which we defend by the dignity of its Founder; but we deny it to be an evil, lest we be made Manicheans; we deny that there is an evil in it, lest, with the names changed, we be just so many Manicheans.
Iulianum.3.207AUG. Prorsus contra Manichaeos estis, cum dicitis naturam malam non esse; sed Pelagiani estis, cum ei malum dicitis non inesse, et nescientes suffragamini Manichaeis dicendo malum, quod ei manifestum est inesse, ex primi hominis praevaricatione non esse, ut concludant illi aliam substantiam naturamque mali esse.
Augustine: You are altogether against the Manicheans when you say that nature is not an evil; but you are Pelagians when you say there is no evil in it, and, not knowing it, you support the Manicheans by saying that the evil which is manifestly in it is not from the transgression of the first man—so that they conclude that evil is another substance and nature.
Iulianum.3.207208. IUL. Vitiari autem in unoquoque iam suo arbitratu vel bonum agente vel malum personae meritum dicimus, non naturae. Et ideo per gratiam Christi id sanari asserimus, quod vitiari potest, quoniam nec aliud sauciatum ostenditur, quam quod sanatum docetur.
208. Julian: But we say that, in each one, by his own choice in doing either good or evil, it is the desert of the person, not of the nature, that is corrupted. And therefore we assert that by the grace of Christ that is healed which can be corrupted, since nothing is shown to be wounded other than what is taught to be healed.
Iulianum.3.208AUG. Certe vos invidetis parvulis Salvatorem, exsufflandi sicut ipsi, si hoc vobis prodesse crederetur, ut erueremini de potestate tenebrarum et in regnum transferremini Christi.
Augustine: Certainly you begrudge the little ones the Savior, you who are to be exorcised as they are—if it were believed to profit you—so that you might be rescued from the power of darkness and transferred into the kingdom of Christ.
Iulianum.3.208209. IUL. In baptizatis autem non concupiscentia carnis, quae naturalis est, sed concupiscentiae malae aufertur reatus.
209. Julian: But in the baptized it is not the concupiscence of the flesh, which is natural, but the guilt of the evil concupiscence, that is taken away.
Iulianum.3.209AUG. Iohannes apostolus concupiscentiam carnis dixit a Patre non esse, sed ex mundo (Cf. 1 Io 2, 16), hoc modo eam malam faciens intellegi; tu autem non concupiscentiam carnis, quae naturalis est, sed concupiscentiam malam reatum habere dicis. Apud te quippe nec, quando concupiscitur fornicatio, concupiscentia carnis mala est, quia, ut dicis, bono male utitur, qui ea sic utitur.
Augustine: The apostle John said that the concupiscence of the flesh is not from the Father but is from the world (See 1 John 2:16), in this way making it to be understood as evil; but you say that not the concupiscence of the flesh, which is natural, but an evil concupiscence has guilt. For with you not even when fornication is desired is the concupiscence of the flesh evil, because, as you say, the one who uses it thus uses a good badly.
Iulianum.3.209Bonum est ergo ipsa semper, ut vis, sive quis ea coniugium sive adulterium concupiscat, quoniam, si coniugium, bono bene utitur, si adulterium, bono male utitur. Pugna igitur cum apostolo Ioanne, non mecum; non enim consentis ei dicenti eam malam, quam dicit, concupiscentiam carnis a Patre non esse, sed ex mundo, quamdiu tu dicis concupiscentiam carnis, etiam quando ea malum concupiscitur, esse bonam ac per hoc numquam malam. Sed, crede mihi, nemo Christianus est, qui non malit apostolo Ioanni consentire quam tibi.
It is itself, then, always a good, as you wish, whether one desires marriage by it or adultery, since, if marriage, he uses a good well, if adultery, he uses a good badly. Fight, then, with the apostle John, not with me; for you do not agree with him when he says that the concupiscence of the flesh, which he says is evil, is not from the Father but is from the world—so long as you say that the concupiscence of the flesh, even when an evil is desired by it, is good, and through this never evil. But, believe me, no one is a Christian who would not rather agree with the apostle John than with you.
Iulianum.3.209210. IUL. Ac per hoc, nec aliquod peccatum [naturae in] esse, tam Conditoris humani generis quam Redemptoris testimonio comprobatur.
210. Julian: And through this, that there is not any sin in nature is proved by the testimony both of the Founder of the human race and of its Redeemer.
Iulianum.3.210AUG. Quid est, quod dicis nimis inconsiderate: Nec aliquod peccatum naturae inesse? Quasi peccatum possit omnino inesse nisi naturae, etiamsi non sit origine attractum, sed voluntate commissum. Sive quippe angeli sive hominis peccatum, manifestum est vel angelo inesse vel homini; quis autem sic exorbitet a rerum natura, ut hominem vel angelum neget esse naturam? Quid est item, quod clausis oculis loqueris? Quid est, rogo, quod dicis: Nec concupiscentiam peccatum esse? Itane contra Apostolum te disputare non vides? Ille namque peccatum esse concupiscentiam satis omnino monstravit, ubi ait: Peccatum non cognovi nisi per legem; nam concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: Non concupisces (Rom 7, 7). Quid hoc testimonio clarius, quid tua sententia vanius dici potest?
Augustine: What is it that you say too inconsiderately: that there is not any sin in nature? As if sin could be at all except in a nature, even if it is not drawn from origin but committed by the will. For whether it is the sin of an angel or of a human being, it is manifest that it is in either the angel or the human being; but who would so stray from the nature of things as to deny that a human being or an angel is a nature? What is it, likewise, that you say with eyes closed? What is it, I ask, that you say: that concupiscence is not sin? Do you not see that you dispute against the Apostle? For he showed quite plainly that concupiscence is sin, where he says: I did not know sin except through the law; for I would not have known concupiscence, unless the law said: You shall not covet (Rom 7:7). What can be said clearer than this testimony, what emptier than your opinion?
Iulianum.3.210211. IUL. Et ut, quae sunt acta, repetamus: inimicam esse iustitiae Dei opinionem traducis, tam praeceptorum Dei quam iudiciorum eius attestatione monstravi.
211. Julian: And, to recall what has been done: I have shown, by the attestation both of the precepts of God and of his judgments, that the opinion of transmission is hostile to the justice of God.
Iulianum.3.211AUG. Inimicos vos potius esse iustitiae Dei, quem facitis super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum iniuste posuisse grave iugum, dum negatis originale peccatum, et testimonio Scripturarum et ipsis calamitatibus parvulorum, quae in paradiso nisi vestro non possent esse, monstratum est (Cf. Eccli 40, 1).
Augustine: That you are rather the enemies of the justice of God—whom you make to have placed unjustly a heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam from the day of their coming out from their mother's womb, while you deny original sin—has been shown both by the testimony of the Scriptures and by the very calamities of the little ones, which could not be in paradise, except in yours (See Sir 40:1).
Iulianum.3.211212. IUL. Concupiscentiam autem carnis ad conciliandum sexibus fecunditatis negotium a Deo inditam, creatore corporum, non nisi a Manichaeo accusari scriptorum eius insertione perdocui.
212. Julian: But that the concupiscence of the flesh, implanted by God, the creator of bodies, for procuring for the sexes the business of fruitfulness, is accused by no one but the Manichean—this I have thoroughly taught by the insertion of his writings.
Iulianum.3.212Aug.Concupiscentiam carnis, quam malam docet esse Scriptura divina, per illam quippe caro concupiscit adversus spiritum (Gal 5, 17); vos autem adiuvantes Manichaeos Deo coaeternae genti tribuere tenebrarum, dum non vultis eam pertinere ad originale peccatum et in Dei paradiso audetis insuper collocare, evidentissimis documentis et divinae auctoritatis et sobriae rationis ostendimus.
Augustine: The concupiscence of the flesh, which divine Scripture teaches to be evil—for through it the flesh desires against the spirit (Gal 5:17)—but which you, helping the Manicheans to attribute it to the nation of darkness coeternal with God, are unwilling to belong to original sin and dare moreover to place in the paradise of God: this we have shown by the most evident proofs both of divine authority and of sober reason.
Iulianum.3.212213. IUL. Nec alia apud vos argumenta esse pro traduce, quam quae Manichaeus tribuisset, ostendi.
213. Julian: And I have shown that there are among you no other arguments for transmission than those which the Manichean had supplied.
Iulianum.3.213AUG. Non esse Ambrosium Manichaeum, qui fidei catholicae invictissimus et Manichaeos prostravit et vos, qui dixit discordiam carnis et spiritus (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 141), ubi per tuam susceptam caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, per primi hominis praevaricationem in nostram vertisse naturam, etiam testimonio tui principis eumdem laudantis episcopum convictus atque contortus cogeris confiteri (PELAGIUS, De lib. arb. 3; cf. De grat. Christi 47).
Augustine: That Ambrose is not a Manichean—he who, most invincible in the Catholic faith, laid low both the Manicheans and you, who said that the discord of flesh and spirit, by which (through that thing you have taken up) the flesh desires against the spirit (See Ambrose, In Luc. 7.141), was turned into our nature through the transgression of the first man—you, convicted and confounded even by the testimony of your own leader praising this same bishop, are forced to confess (Pelagius, De lib. arb. 3; see De grat. Christi 47).
Iulianum.3.213214. IUL. Te autem liberi arbitrii negatorem et Dei, nascentium conditoris, sententiae tuae discussione patefeci.
214. Julian: But I have laid open, by the examination of your opinion, that you are a denier of free choice and of God, the founder of those being born.
Iulianum.3.214AUG. Me non esse liberi arbitrii, quod tu extollendo praecipitas, negatorem, sed potius defensorem Dei gratiam confitendo, quod arbitrium tu decipis in tua virtute fidendo, innumerabilia testimonia sacra proclamant; nosque non negare Deum nascentium conditorem, sed vos negare Deum nascentium salvatorem ea, quae utrique diximus, legentibus indicabunt.
Augustine: That I am not a denier of free choice—which you, by extolling, fling headlong—but rather its defender, by confessing the grace of God, the choice which you deceive by trusting in your own strength: innumerable sacred testimonies proclaim it; and that we do not deny God to be the founder of those being born, but that you deny God to be the savior of those being born, the things which we have both said will show to readers.
Iulianum.3.214215. IUL. Malam autem a vobis pronuntiari naturam eius sententiae, quam tu uno verbo conclusu rum te promiseras, explicatione convici.
215. Julian: But that nature is pronounced evil by you I have convicted by the unfolding of that opinion which you had promised to conclude in a single phrase.
Iulianum.3.215AUG. Naturam humanam non malum esse, sed ei malum inesse monstravi unum horum docens per eiusdem naturae substantiam et eius substantiae conditorem Deum, alterum per eiusdem naturae miseriam et ab eadem miseria salvatorem Deum. Te autem ratiocinationem meam non potuisse dissolvere, etsi non tibi respondissem, lector posset diligens et intellegens invenire.
Augustine: I have shown that human nature is not an evil, but that there is an evil in it, teaching the one of these by the substance of that same nature and by God the founder of that substance, the other by the misery of that same nature and by God the savior from that same misery. But that you could not dissolve my argument—even had I not answered you—a diligent and understanding reader could find out.
Iulianum.3.215216. IUL. Atque ideo etiam tardissimis ad intellegendum vel tuo favore deceptis liquere confido te Manichaei solum aversari nomen, ceterum ex omni fide cum cunctis traducis sectatoribus non minus spurcis quam stolidis eius inhaerere dogmatibus.
216. Julian: And therefore I am confident that it is clear, even to those slowest to understand or deceived by favor toward you, that you turn away only from the name of the Manichean, but for the rest cling, with full faith, along with all the followers of transmission—no less filthy than stupid—to his teachings.
Iulianum.3.216AUG. Aliud et contra est omnino quam putas, quod liquere etiam tardissimis dicis. Illud namque potius etiam tardissimis liquet, si legendis utriusque nostrum scriptis intentam curam non graventur impendere, me demonstrasse non solum, quod ego sim Manichaeorum inimicus errori eorumque nefaria dogmata Deo veritatis opitulante subverterim, sed etiam quod vos Manichaeorum tantum adiuvetis insaniam, ut se omnino gloriarentur invictos, nisi catholica fides, quam Deo miserante defendimus, non per vos vel a vobis, sed vobiscum potius vincerentur. Te autem ideo me unum elegisse, cui Manichaeorum nomine et crimine, quanto crebrius, tanto convitiareris odiosius, quia eo modo putasti catholicam, quae vos arguit, fundatissimam fidem et clarorum atque sanctorum defensorum eius notissimam multitudinem, qui ea, quae didicimus et docemus, didicerunt atque docuerunt, sine invidia te posse destruere horrore nefandi nominis, non obiecti criminis veritate. Sed firmum fundamentum Dei stat: novit enim Dominus qui sunt eius (2 Tim 2, 19). Verba vero libri mei, quae tibi quasi refellenda proposueras, quomodo quibusdam paucissimis quasi ad speciem pugnae qualiscumque tentatis, multo plura cetera diffusa atque interfusa tua nebulosa loquacitate vitaveris, interim, quia longum est hic ostendere, ut per se ipsum advertat et inveniat, dimitto lectori.
Augustine: It is altogether otherwise, and the contrary of what you suppose, that you say is clear even to those slowest. For this rather is clear even to those slowest, if they are not loath to spend attentive care on reading the writings of both of us: that I have shown not only that I am an enemy to the error of the Manicheans and have, with the God of truth helping, overturned their nefarious teachings, but also that you so aid the madness of the Manicheans that they would altogether boast themselves unconquered, were it not that by the Catholic faith, which by God's mercy we defend, they are conquered—not through you or by you, but rather along with you. But that you chose me alone, against whom you would heap, the more frequently, the more hatefully, the name and crime of the Manicheans, because in that way you supposed that without invidiousness you could destroy the most firmly founded Catholic faith which accuses you, and the most well-known multitude of its illustrious and holy defenders, who learned and taught the things which we have learned and teach—destroy it by the horror of an unspeakable name, not by the truth of the crime charged. But the firm foundation of God stands; for the Lord knows who are his (2 Tim 2:19). But the words of my book, which you had set out as if to be refuted, how—with a very few attempted, as if for an appearance of some kind of fight—you avoided far more of the rest, scattered and interspersed by your nebulous loquacity: meanwhile, because it is long to show here, I leave it to the reader to notice and find out for himself.
Iulianum.3.216Bk. 4
1. IULIANUS. Existimo ego sollicitum lectorem posse mirari, cur cum opusculum meum certo librorum numero, ex scribentium sollemnitate distinxerim, tamen libri alterius solvam in altero quaestiones; unde est illud quod in tertio volumine disputavi, Apostoli sensus, qui per unum hominem peccatum in mundo intrasse dixit (Cf. Rom 5, 12) (quo numero opinionem mali originalis oppressit), illud quod ex uno Abraham generatio Iudaeorum descendisse perhibetur (Cf. Hebr 11, 12), nihil vel exigui intulisse concussus. Id autem putet lector iste, cui nunc satisfacere instituo, in secundo debuisse volumine collocari. Norit igitur, hanc responsionis fidem, qua etiam illa quae putantur intermissa, vel in libro sequenti supplentur, nec quidquam incommodare certamini, nec de ulla festinationis perturbatione, sed tam de causarum necessitate, quam de consilii ratione contingere. Suppetit vero magnorum ingeniorum copia, quorum exemplis talis stili consequentia vindicetur; sed inepta iactatio est, ad defensionem simplicis negotii sonantia priscorum nominum advocare suffragia, et securitatem facti reddere defensione suspectam.
1. Julian: I think that a careful reader may wonder why, although I have divided my little work into a fixed number of books, according to the custom of writers, I nevertheless settle in one book the questions of another; whence comes the fact that, in the third volume, I disputed the sense of the Apostle, who said that through one man sin entered into the world (See Rom 5:12) (by which figure he crushed the opinion of original evil), and that the generation of the Jews is reported to have descended from one Abraham (See Heb 11:12), struck by which I brought forward nothing, even slightly. But let this reader, whom I now undertake to satisfy, suppose that this ought to have been placed in the second volume. Let him know, then, that this fidelity of response—by which even those things which are thought to be passed over are supplied in a following book—neither inconveniences the contest at all, nor comes from any disturbance of haste, but from the necessity of the causes as much as from the reasoning of the plan. There is, indeed, abundant supply of great talents, by whose examples such a sequence of style might be vindicated; but it is an inept boast, in defense of a simple matter, to summon the resounding support of ancient names, and to render the security of the deed suspect by a defense.
Iulianum.4.1Secundum ergo librum, quem asserendis Apostoli sententiis destinaram, ne in nimiam longitudinem levium quaestionum proferret adiectio, disputatione necessaria terminavi. Verum quia munere seriae dissertationis impleto, libuit etiam ineptis quaestionibus obviare, et tardissimorum quorumque, qui et frigidis possunt obiectionibus permoveri, placuit habere respectum, tertio libro qualiter ex uno multi nati dicerentur ostendi. Est tamen etiam decentissimum, si volumen sequens prioris debitum luat, ut et magna inter libros videatur esse concordia, et ad cognitionem totius operis invitentur legentes; cum et si dilata in primis aliqua aestimaverint, intellegunt praetermissa non esse.
The second book, then, which I had destined for asserting the opinions of the Apostle, I ended with the necessary disputation, lest the addition of light questions should draw it out to an excessive length. But since, the task of serious dissertation being fulfilled, it pleased me also to meet inept questions, and it seemed good to have regard for any who are slowest, who can be moved even by frigid objections, in the third book I showed in what way many are said to be born from one. It is, however, most fitting too, if a following volume pays the debt of the prior one, both that there may seem to be great concord among the books, and that readers may be invited to the knowledge of the whole work; since, even if they judged some things deferred at the first, they understand that they have not been passed over.
Iulianum.4.1Ostenso igitur fidei et industriae operis convenire quod fecimus, congrediamur cum Manichaeis pro Dei operibus et legibus; ab illis naturalis mali deformitatem, ab istis iniquitatem iudiciorum feralium repellentes; docentes in istarum praeceptis nihil de bono suo perdidisse iustitiam, in illorum seminibus nihil de malo suo diabolum miscuisse; haec postremo digna esse Deo rectore, illa Deo dignissima conditore.
Having shown, then, that what we have done befits the fidelity and the industry of the work, let us join battle with the Manicheans on behalf of the works and laws of God, repelling from the former the deformity of natural evil, from the latter the iniquity of deadly judgments; teaching that in the precepts of the latter justice has lost nothing of its own good, and that in the seeds of the former the devil has mixed in nothing of his own evil; that these, finally, are worthy of God as ruler, those most worthy of God as founder.
Iulianum.4.1AUGUSTINUS. Congressionem tuam Manichaei, ne in nostra congressione superarentur, pro auxilio magno sumerent, nisi et vos cum eis fides catholica superaret; quandoquidem discordiam concupiscentiarum carnis et spiritus, et miserias generis humani, quibus plena est natura mortalium, incipientes a fletibus et calamitatibus parvulorum, propterea non sinuntur duarum, quas inducunt, naturarum commixtioni tribuere; quia haec omnia naturae peccato vitiatae, quam Deus bonam condidit, nec vitiatam fecunditatis munere et bono opificio suo deserit, auctoritate divina et verissima ratione tribuuntur.
Augustine: Your joining battle the Manicheans would take as a great help, lest they be overcome in our joining battle, were it not that the Catholic faith overcomes you too along with them; since the discord of the concupiscences of flesh and spirit, and the miseries of the human race, with which the nature of mortals is full—beginning from the weepings and calamities of the little ones—are for this reason not allowed to be attributed to the mixture of the two natures which they introduce: because all these things are attributed, by divine authority and most true reason, to a nature corrupted by sin, which God founded good, and, though corrupted, does not forsake by the gift of fruitfulness and his good workmanship.
Iulianum.4.1Quod vos negantes, arma quidem quibus vincuntur, conamini infringere; sed tam sunt firma et invicta, ut sive illis ad vos, sive vobis ad illos transfixis et peremptis perveniant, utrosque prosternant.
Denying which, you try indeed to break the arms by which they are conquered; but they are so firm and invincible that, whether they reach you with the Manicheans pierced and slain, or reach the Manicheans with you pierced and slain, they lay both low.
Iulianum.4.12. IUL. Quibus duobus si creditis, id est Dei nec opera mala esse, nec iniqua iudicia; totum traducis dogma conteritur: sicut e regione, traducis impietate suscepta, haec duo, conditio Dei atque iudicatio, per quae solum Deus potest intellegi, destruuntur.
2. Julian: If you believe these two things, that is, that the works of God are neither evil nor are his judgments unjust, the whole teaching of transmission is crushed; just as, on the contrary, once the impiety of transmission is taken up, these two things—the founding by God and the judging by God, through which alone God can be understood—are destroyed.
Iulianum.4.2AUG. Nec opera mala sunt Dei, quando et de malis quibuscumque bene operatur, et parvulis, quod de massa per primi hominis praevaricationem perdita bene operatus est, etiam sanandis benigne opitulatur; nec iniqua iudicia, quando gravi iugo super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum (Cf. Eccli 40, 1), nonnisi peccatorum merita ulciscitur. Haec cum creduntur atque intelleguntur, et Manichaeorum et Pelagianorum error exstinguitur; Manichaeorum scilicet, quia mala ista generis humani volunt deputari nescio cui mali principio aeternitati Dei coaeterno; Pelagianorum autem, quia nolunt imputare peccato.
Augustine: Neither are the works of God evil, since he works well even out of any evils whatever, and benignly aids the little ones too, to be healed, in that he has worked well out of the mass lost through the transgression of the first man; nor are his judgments unjust, since by a heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam from the day of their coming out from their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1) he avenges nothing but the deserts of sins. When these things are believed and understood, both the error of the Manicheans and that of the Pelagians is extinguished—of the Manicheans, namely, because they want these evils of the human race to be reckoned to I know not what principle of evil coeternal with the eternity of God; of the Pelagians, because they are unwilling to impute them to sin.
Iulianum.4.23. IUL. Iam ergo ea quae contexuit lacerator naturalium, ponderemus; sed ut rerum, quae mutua sunt responsione perplexae, lectori nostro tam intellegentia quam discretio suggeratur, quo genere obluctetur, admoneo. Profitetur scriptis obviare nostris, quae ad se ait in brevi chartula destinata, et ponit aliquas sententiarum mearum particulas atque suggillat, quae in meo opere non tenentur.
3. Julian: Now, then, let us weigh the things which the mangler of natural things has woven together; but, so that to our reader there may be supplied as much understanding as discernment of matters which are entangled by mutual response, I advise by what manner he struggles. He professes to meet our writings, which he says were directed to him on a brief sheet, and he sets down some particles of my opinions and derides them, which are not held in my work.
Iulianum.4.3AUG. Deo gratias, quod ipsis quattuor libris tuis, unde ille quod voluit, sicut voluit, excerpsit, cuius ad me chartula missa pervenit, sex libris meis ad cuncta respondi. Puto quod ibi non es dicturus, aliqua me redarguere voluisse, quae in tuo opere non tenentur; quod et si dixeris, idque probaveris; etiam gratulari debeo, non te dixisse, quae dicere non deberes; atque utinam quaecumque verba tua rectissime reprehenduntur, nulla omnino dixisses.
Augustine: Thanks be to God, that to those very four books of yours, from which that man—whose sheet sent to me reached me—excerpted what he wished, as he wished, I have answered everything in my six books. I think that there you are not going to say that I wished to refute some things which are not held in your work; and even if you say it, and prove it, I ought even to be glad that you did not say what you ought not to say; and would that you had said none at all of whatever words of yours are most rightly reprehended.
Iulianum.4.34. IUL. Loquitur ergo ad Valerium: Attende quibus se existimat adversum nos huic praemisso titulo consonare; Deus - inquit - qui Adam ex limo fuerat fabricatus, Evam construxit e costa, et dixit: " Haec vocabitur Vita, quoniam mater est omnium viventium " (Gen 3, 20). Non quidem ita scriptum est, sed quid ad nos? Solet memoria falli in verbis, dum tamen sententia teneatur. Nec Evae nomen ut appellaretur Vita, Deus imposuit, sed maritus. Sic enim loquitur: " Et vocavit Adam nomen uxoris suae "Vita", quoniam mater est omnium viventium " (De nupt. et concup. 2, 4, 12).
4. Julian: He speaks, then, to Valerius: Note in what things he thinks himself to agree against us, with this title set before it: God, he says, who had fashioned Adam from clay, constructed Eve from a rib, and said: She shall be called Life, because she is the mother of all the living (Gen 3:20). It is not indeed so written, but what is that to us? Memory is wont to be deceived in the words, provided the sense is held. Nor did God impose the name on Eve, that she should be called Life, but her husband. For thus it speaks: And Adam called the name of his wife "Life," because she is the mother of all the living (De nupt. et concup. 2.4.12).
Iulianum.4.4Stupenda doctoris eruditio, qui ne paululum quidem a Scripturarum sinit sermone deflecti. Imperitiam nostram arguit; sed oblivioni veniam dare dignatur, qua factum erat ut ego dicerem nomine Vitae a Deo mulierem nuncupatam; ita per occasionem brevem, et eruditus apparere studuit, et benignus. Sed ut non est admiranda diligentia, nominatorem feminae comperisse; ita impudentia non ferenda est, velle ignoscere quod culpare non possis. Non enim ita in meo opere legitur, sicut in commentis huius tenetur.
Astounding erudition of the teacher, who does not allow even a little to be turned aside from the speech of the Scriptures! He accuses our inexperience, but deigns to grant pardon to the forgetfulness by which it had come about that I said the woman was named with the name Life by God; so, on a brief occasion, he was eager to appear both learned and benign. But just as the diligence is not to be admired—to have found out the namer of the woman—so the shamelessness is not to be borne, of wishing to forgive what you cannot blame. For it is not so read in my work as it is held in this man's fabrications.
Iulianum.4.4Ego quippe posito legis testimonio, quod dixisse rerum Creator ostenditur: " Non estbonum solum esse hominem; faciamus ei adiutorium simile sui " (Gen 2, 18). Quid est hoc - inquio - " Non est bonum esse solum hominem "? Numquid Deus aliquid fecerat, quod non bonum iuredici posset; maxime qui omnianon solum bona, sed etiam bona valde fecerat? Quomodo ergo ait: " Non est bonum solum esse hominem "? quo sermone non reprehenditur creaturae status, sed ostenditur humano generi perniciosam unionem esse potuisse, nisi ministerio diversi sexus successio germinasset. Nam si etiam Adam speretur potuisse immortalis fieri, nisi deliquisset; tamen manifestum est, patrem eum numquam fieri potuisse, nisi reperisset uxorem, quae de latere dormientis assumpta, prima compellatione cui operi parata esset audivit: " Haec vocabitur Vita, quoniam mater est omnium viventium ". Quo sermone monstratum est, neminem deinceps hominum vel esse posse, vel vivere, qui non conceptus beneficio substitisset (De nupt. et concup. 2, 4, 12).
For I, having set down the testimony of the law, by which the Creator of things is shown to have said: It is not good for man to be alone; let us make for him a helper like himself (Gen 2:18). What is this, I say—It is not good for man to be alone? Had God made anything that could not rightly be called good—especially he who had made all things not only good, but even very good? How, then, does he say: It is not good for man to be alone? By which speech the state of the creature is not reprehended, but it is shown that union could have been ruinous to the human race, unless succession had germinated by the ministry of a different sex. For even if Adam be supposed to have been able to become immortal, had he not transgressed, yet it is manifest that he could never have become a father, had he not found a wife, who, taken from the side of the sleeping man, heard at the first address for what work she was prepared: She shall be called Life, because she is the mother of all the living. By which speech it was shown that no one of human beings thereafter could either be or live who had not subsisted by the benefit of conception (De nupt. et concup. 2.4.12).
Iulianum.4.4Cum ergo clareat, in re quidem non magni ponderis, tamen nihil a me ita fuisse prolatum, ut illud praeter impudentiam singularem quisquam possit arguere; inusta est nota publicae falsitatis egentissimo omnium, qui cum vult donare quod non tenet, uno tempore pariter delinquit, et penuria iuris, et ambitu largitatis.
Since, then, it is clear that—in a matter indeed of no great weight—nothing was nevertheless brought forward by me in such a way that anyone could accuse it, except by singular shamelessness, the brand of public falsehood has been burned upon the neediest of all men, who, when he wishes to grant what he does not hold, at one and the same time offends alike by poverty of right and by ambition of largesse.
Iulianum.4.4AUG. Si non tu ita posuisti Libri verba divini, sicut ego in illa chartula inveni; non tibi, sed ei qui sic scripsit, ignovi; cui ambo debemus ignoscere. Si autem me putas non hoc invenisse in chartula, sed tamquam hoc invenerim, ideo mendaciter illa verba posuisse, ut esset quod tribuerem quasi errori tuo; nunc tibi certe, quod tam male ac falso de me fueris opinatus, ignosco.
Augustine: If you did not set down the words of the divine Book as I found them in that sheet, I forgave not you, but the one who wrote thus; whom we both ought to forgive. But if you suppose that I did not find this in the sheet, but, as though I had found it, set down those words mendaciously, so that there might be something I could attribute as if to your error—now I certainly forgive you for having so badly and falsely supposed of me.
Iulianum.4.45. IUL. Postquam ergo hoc tali gravitate reprehendit, pergit ad reliqua, ac patronum suum commonet, ut his quae sequuntur attendat. Deus igitur - inquit - maris creator et feminae, convenientia generationibus membra formavit. Sed hoc tantum de capite dictorum meorum inserens, praetermissis plurimis omnino versibus, quibus novitas potissimum inculcatur animarum nihil aut carni aut semini debentium, subdit illum meum: Ita gigni corpora de corporibus ordinavit; quorum tamen efficientiae potentia operationis intervenit, omne quod est, ea administrans virtute, qua condidit. Si igitur non nisi per sexum fetus, non nisi per corpus sexus, non nisi per Deum corpus; quis ambigat fecunditatem Deo iure reputari? (Ibidem)
5. Julian: After he has reprehended this with such gravity, he proceeds to the rest, and reminds his patron to attend to the things which follow. God, then, he says, the creator of male and of female, formed members suited to generation. But inserting only this much from the heading of my words, with very many verses altogether passed over, in which is driven home above all the newness of souls owing nothing either to flesh or to seed, he subjoins that statement of mine: He so ordained that bodies should be begotten from bodies; in whose producing, nevertheless, the power of his operation intervenes, administering all that exists by that power by which he founded it. If, then, offspring is only through sex, sex only through the body, the body only through God, who would doubt that fruitfulness is rightly reckoned to God? (De nupt. et concup. 2.4.12)
Iulianum.4.5Postquam haec itaque de meo posuit, commendat quoniam catholice ea dicta etiam ipse fateatur. Quis non ergo putaret hominem fuisse mutatum? Verum non fit immemor sui; sed similem conditionem arbitratur pravi dogmatis et pudoris, ut etiam illud perspicuo reparetur exitio, sicut hic assiduo durescit attritu. Probat ergo sententiam meam, et ferrum praeiudicii in fidem suam spontaneo defigit amplexu; sed post haec quasi integer virium, autumat superesse quo dimicet.
And so, after he has set down these things from mine, he commends them, since he himself too confesses they are said in a Catholic way. Who, then, would not suppose that the man had been changed? But he does not become forgetful of himself; rather, he judges that the condition of his depraved teaching and of shame is alike, so that even that is repaired by a manifest destruction, just as this is hardened by constant attrition. He approves, then, my opinion, and fixes the iron of prejudgment into his own faith by a spontaneous embrace; but after this, as if whole in his strength, he asserts that there remains something for him to fight over.
Iulianum.4.5Sic enim sequitur: Post haec quae veraciter et catholice dicta sunt, immo in divinis Libris veraciter scripta, non autem ab isto catholice dicta sunt, quia non intentione catholici pectoris dicta sunt; iam propter quod ea dixit, Pelagiana et Caelestiana haeresis incipit introduci. Namque attende quid sequitur. Hic denuo nostra dicta subiungit: Quid ergo suum diabolus cognoscit in sexibus, per quod fructum eorum iure possideat? Diversitatem?
For thus he goes on: After these things, which were said truly and in a Catholic way—nay rather, were written truly in the divine Books, but were not said in a Catholic way by this man, because they were not said with the intention of a Catholic heart; now, on account of why he said them, the Pelagian and Caelestian heresy begins to be introduced. For note what follows. Here again he subjoins our words: What, then, does the devil recognize as his own in the sexes, by which he may rightfully possess their fruit? The diversity?
Iulianum.4.5Sed haec in corporibus est, quae Deus fecit. Commixtionem? Sed non minus benedictionis quam institutionis privilegio vindicatur. Vox enim Dei est: " Relinquet homo patrem et matrem, et adhaerebit uxori, et erunt duo in carne una " (Gen 2, 24); vox Dei est: "Crescite et multiplicamini, et replete terram " (Gen 1, 28). An forte ipsam fecunditatem? Sed ipsa est instituti causa coniugii (De nupt. et concup. 2, 4, 13).
But this is in bodies, which God made. The union? But it is vindicated by no less a privilege of blessing than of institution. For it is the voice of God: A man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and the two shall be in one flesh (Gen 2:24); it is the voice of God: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth (Gen 1:28). Or perhaps fruitfulness itself? But it is the very cause for which marriage was instituted (De nupt. et concup. 2.4.13).
Iulianum.4.5Ad quod respondit, quia nec diversitatem sexuum, nec commixtionem, nec fecunditatem diabolus cognoscat in sexibus, per quod fructum eorum iure possideat; sed his omnibus absolutis invenit quod diabolo deputaret, nostramque honestatem nomine timoris incessit, qui inter tot corporum sexuumque munera, veriti simus carnis concupiscentiam nominare. Sic ergo adversum me patrono suo loquitur: Sed iste in his omnibus noluit nominare concupiscentiam carnis, quae non est a Patre, sed ex mundo est (Cf. 1 Io 2, 16); cuius mundi princeps dictus est diabolus; qui eam in Domino non invenit, quia Dominus homo non per ipsam ad homines venit.
To which he answered that the devil recognizes neither the diversity of the sexes, nor the union, nor the fruitfulness in the sexes, by which he might rightfully possess their fruit; but, all these being resolved, he found what he might assign to the devil, and attacked our honorable conduct under the name of fear—us who, among so many endowments of bodies and of sexes, were afraid to name the concupiscence of the flesh. Thus, then, he speaks against me to his patron: But this man, in all these things, was unwilling to name the concupiscence of the flesh, which is not from the Father but is from the world (See 1 John 2:16), of which world the devil is called the prince; who did not find it in the Lord, because the Lord, as man, did not come to human beings through it.
Iulianum.4.5Unde dicit etiam ipse: " Ecce venit princeps mundi huius, et in me nihil inveniet " (Io 14, 30); nihil utique peccati, nec quod a nascente trahitur, nec quod a vivente additur. Hanc iste noluit nominare in his omnibus, quae commemoravit, naturalibus bonis, de qua etiam nuptiae confunduntur, quae de his omnibus gloriantur. Nam quare illud opus coniugatorum subtrahitur et absconditur etiam oculis filiorum, nisi quia non possunt esse in laudanda commixtione sine pudenda libidine? De hac erubuerunt etiam qui primi pudenda texerunt (Cf. Gen 3, 7); quae prius pudenda non fuerunt, sed tamquam Dei opera praedicanda atque glorianda (De nupt. et concup. 2, 4, 13).
Whence he himself too says: Behold, the prince of this world comes, and in me he will find nothing (John 14:30)—nothing of sin, certainly, neither what is drawn from the one being born, nor what is added by the one living. This man was unwilling to name it among all those natural goods which he mentioned—that thing on account of which even marriage is confounded, marriage which glories in all these things. For why is that work of spouses withdrawn and hidden even from the eyes of their children, except because they cannot be in the praiseworthy union without shameful lust? At this even those blushed who first covered their shameful parts (See Gen 3:7)—parts which were not before shameful, but were to be proclaimed and gloried in as works of God (De nupt. et concup. 2.4.13).
Iulianum.4.5Egi quidem, beatissime pater Flore, in primi operis quattuor libellis causam nuptiarum, causam commixtionis, causam corporum, causam sexuum, causam operis Dei, causam postremo aestimationis Dei, quae necessario, ut operum suorum probitate laudatur, ita eorum sauciatur infamia; ac per totum scriptorum opus, nec formationi corporis aliquid diabolum addidisse nec sensui, inobumbrabilis omnino veritas approbavit; et ideo opinionem traducis de Manichaei luto haustam esse, perdoctum est.
I have indeed, most blessed father Florus, in the four little books of my first work, pleaded the cause of marriage, the cause of union, the cause of bodies, the cause of the sexes, the cause of the work of God, the cause, finally, of the estimation of God, which necessarily, just as it is praised by the uprightness of his works, so is wounded by their disrepute; and throughout the whole work of my writings, that the devil added nothing either to the formation of the body or to its sense, a wholly unobscurable truth has approved; and therefore it has been thoroughly taught that the opinion of transmission was drawn from the mud of the Manichean.
Iulianum.4.5AUG. Quomodo egeris in illis quattuor libris tuis, et quomodo nostra responsione fueris confutatus, ut te nihil egisse clareret, qui et meos et tuos legunt, non difficulter intellegunt. Quamquam et cum tui non leguntur, sed tantummodo mei, apparet in eis vestrum haereticum dogma destructum. Sed cum meo uni, quattuor illis tuis sic responderis, ut eius vix partem attingeres tertiam, nullamque refelleres; tantum de illis praesumpsisti, ut contra unum alterum meum in eadem causa, istos tuos octo conscripseris, quasi me non vincendum firmamento disputationum, sed numero voluminum putaveris esse terrendum; usque adeo quippe quadrupla illa responsione nihil te profecisse sensisti, ut haec tibi octupla necessaria videretur. Si ergo talibus incrementis loquacitas tua promovetur; quem non terreat, non veritas, sed numerositas librorum tuorum, quam computare me piget? Homo enim stupenda ubertate facundus, qui prius uni meo tuos quattuor, et alteri meo tuos octo putasti esse reddendos; quis non timeat ne forte sex libris meis amplius quam mille tuos reddere mediteris, si uni eorum qui prior est, iam sexdecim reddas, atque ita singulos quosque sequentium duplicato praecedente numero persequaris, ostendens nobis quam multum loquaris non intellegendo quae loqueris?
Augustine: How you pleaded in those four books of yours, and how you were confuted by our answer, so that it became clear you had accomplished nothing, those who read both mine and yours understand without difficulty. And yet, even when yours are not read but only mine, your heretical teaching appears destroyed in them. But when you answered my one book by those four of yours in such a way that you scarcely touched a third part of it and refuted none, you presumed so much from those that, against another single book of mine in the same cause, you composed these eight of yours—as though you thought me to be terrified not by the firmness of arguments to be conquered but by the number of volumes; for you so felt that you had accomplished nothing by that fourfold answer that this eightfold one seemed to you necessary. If, then, your loquacity advances by such increments, whom would not the number—not the truth—of your books terrify, which it irks me to count? For you, a man eloquent with astounding abundance, who first thought that your four must be rendered to my one, and your eight to another of mine—who would not fear lest perhaps you meditate rendering more than a thousand of yours to my six books, if to the one of them that is first you now render sixteen, and so pursue each of the following ones with the preceding number doubled, showing us how much you speak by not understanding what you speak?
Iulianum.4.56. IUL. Tamen cum hoc ibi satiatissime constet effectum, breviter licet, in praesenti quoque disputatione repetetur. Convertamur ergo ad ipsum, cuius cum eruditione decertamus. Annuis nempe, a nobis recte fuisse collectum, quia si fetus non nisi per sexum, si sexus non nisi per corpus, si corpus non nisi per Deum exstitisset, ambigi non posset fecunditatem ad Dei opera pertinere, nihilque suum in sexibus agnoscere principem tenebrarum, propter quod fructus eorum iuris sui assertione retineret; quia et diversitas pertinebat ad sexum, et commixtio ad membrorum diversitatem, et fructus fecunditatis ad Deum, qui etiam generantium fuerat institutor; ac per hoc nihil remanserat propter quod diabolo esset commixtionis adiudicanda fertilitas.
6. Julian: Yet, since it is agreed that this was there accomplished most fully, it will be repeated—briefly, though—in the present disputation too. Let us turn, then, to the man himself, with whose erudition we contend. You grant, surely, that it was rightly gathered by us that, if offspring existed only through sex, sex only through the body, the body only through God, it could not be doubted that fruitfulness pertains to the works of God, and that the prince of darkness recognizes nothing of his own in the sexes, on account of which he might retain their fruit by the assertion of his own right; because both diversity pertained to sex, and union to the diversity of members, and the fruit of fruitfulness to God, who had also been the institutor of those begetting; and through this nothing had remained on account of which the fertility of union should be adjudged to the devil.
Iulianum.4.6Quod ergo tibi putas vel solatium vel praesidium a sermonis mei honestate conferri, quia nolui in hoc loco carnis concupiscentiam nominare? Quod etsi in omni opere silentio praeterissem, nihil tamen vituperationis aut iniuriae res illa susciperet, quae honestioribus signata nominibus vindicabatur, et clarissimis quidem intellegentiae vocibus. Fac igitur me prudentius, quam suscepti negotii ratio petebat, tegere voluisse silentio nomen eius rei, quam tegimus amictu; num ideo totius rationis, totius veritatis iactura facienda est? Num ideo negotiorum arbiter intellectus iacebit, quia est aliquid, quod ut ante oculos, ita ad aures non semper decore possit adduci? Verumtamen quid deformitatis habet, carnis concupiscentiam nominare; quam et ego appellavi, cum poposcit locus; et tu licet indomabilem te eam sentire confirmes, tamen crebro commemoras?
What, then, do you suppose to be conferred on you, whether of solace or of protection, by the honorable conduct of my speech, because I was unwilling in this place to name the concupiscence of the flesh? Even if I had passed it over in silence throughout the whole work, that thing would nonetheless take on no reproach or injury, which was being vindicated under more honorable names—and indeed under the clearest words of understanding. Grant, then, that I wished, more prudently than the reasoning of the undertaken matter demanded, to cover with silence the name of that thing which we cover with a garment: must therefore the loss of all reason, of all truth, be made? Must therefore the understanding, the arbiter of affairs, lie low, because there is something which—just as before the eyes—cannot always be brought decorously to the ears? Yet what deformity is there in naming the concupiscence of the flesh, which I too have named when the place demanded, and which you, although you affirm that you feel it to be untamable, nevertheless frequently mention?
Iulianum.4.6AUG. Domabilem dico, id est, carnem, sed expugnatoribus, non laudatoribus eius.
Augustine: I say it is tamable, that is, the flesh, but by its assailants, not by its praisers.
Iulianum.4.67. IUL. Porro hinc post modicum: Per quid igitur sunt sub diabolo parvuli, qui de corporibus nascuntur quae fecit Deus, de commixtione sexus quem distinxit formando, sed benedicendo coniunxit, et fecunditatem inserendo multiplicavit Deus, et ipsos parvulos de materia seminis fecit Deus? Si per Deum materiam corporum, per Deum genitalia corporum, per Deum commixtionem genitalium, per Deum etiam vim seminum, per Deum quoque omnium nascentium formam atque vitam existere confiteris; quid putas remansisse, propter quod diabolo tot Dei opera transcribas? (De nupt. et concup. 2, 5, 15) Ergo haeresim vocas alterius disputationis corpus, cuius membra omnia recta atque catholica confiteris.
7. Julian: Further, from here, a little later: Through what, then, are the little ones under the devil, who are born from bodies which God made, from the union of a sex which God distinguished by forming, but joined by blessing, and multiplied by implanting fruitfulness—and the little ones themselves God made from the matter of the seed? If you confess that the matter of bodies exists through God, the genitals of bodies through God, the union of the genitals through God, the force of the seeds too through God, and also the form and life of all that is born through God, what do you suppose has remained, on account of which you transcribe so many works of God to the devil? (De nupt. et concup. 2.5.15) Therefore you call a heresy the body of another's disputation, all whose members you confess to be upright and Catholic.
Iulianum.4.7AUG. Novatianos, Arianos, Eunomianos, aliosque nonnullos, nonne etiam cum totum Symbolum confessi fuerint, vocamus haereticos? Ut ergo alia taceam pertinentia ad haeresim vestram; quomodo vos non vis vocemus haereticos, qui negatis parvulos erui de potestate tenebrarum, quando transferuntur ad Christum, in quibus accepturis Spiritum Sanctum tota antiquitus Ecclesia, quae laudat nomen Domini a solis ortu usque ad occasum, exsufflat et exorcizat spiritum immundum?
Augustine: Do we not call the Novatians, the Arians, the Eunomians, and some others heretics, even when they have confessed the whole Creed? To pass over, then, other things pertaining to your heresy, how would you not have us call you heretics, who deny that the little ones are rescued from the power of darkness when they are transferred to Christ—they who are to receive the Holy Spirit, over whom the whole Church from of old, which praises the name of the Lord from the rising of the sun to its setting, breathes and exorcises the unclean spirit?
Iulianum.4.78. IUL. Nam postquam collectionem nostram, quae tanta est veritate munita, ut in te tota ferretur, nec convicio eam temerare quiveris, Deo adigente laudasti, effectum tamen eius accusas.
8. Julian: For after you had praised—with God compelling you—our collection, which is fortified with so great a truth that it was borne wholly against you, nor could you violate it even by insult, you nevertheless accuse its effect.
Iulianum.4.8AUG. Quem dicis eius effectum, non intellegis esse vestrum defectum. Ex his enim veris quae dicitis, quasi catholici, non efficitur illud quo estis haeretici. Namque ut catholici dicitis quod per sexum sit fetus, per corpus sexus, per Deum corpus, unde fecunditas Deo iure deputatur. Sed numquid ideo non inde talis nascitur homo, qui non sit sine sorde peccati, etiamsi unius diei sit vita eius super terram (Cf. Iob 14, 4 (sec. LXX))? Non igitur illa vera dicendo, sed hoc quod itidem verum est negando, estis haeretici.
Augustine: What you call its effect, you do not understand to be your defect. For from these true things which you say, as if Catholics, that is not produced by which you are heretics. For as Catholics you say that offspring is through sex, sex through the body, the body through God, whence fruitfulness is rightly reckoned to God. But is therefore the kind of human being not born from there who would not be without the filth of sin, even if his life upon the earth were of one day (See Job 14:4 (LXX))? Not, then, by saying those true things, but by denying this which is likewise true, are you heretics.
Iulianum.4.8Quia utique Deus non est auctor fatuitatis, et tamen auctor est fetus, et quando nascitur fatuus. Sic intellege, si potes, innasci homini ex origine vitium, cuius non sit auctor Deus, cum creator ipsius hominis non sit nisi Deus. Memento sane exorbitasse te a tuo dogmate, quo negatis operari Deum in hominum mentibus voluntatem. Nam ego verba tua, quae confiteor et a Catholicis dici, voluntate laudavi, quae me tamen dicis Deo adigente laudasse. Ecce quomodo Deus in nobis operatur et velle (Cf. Phil 2, 13), quod soletis et contra Apostolum vos negare.
For certainly God is not the author of foolishness, and yet he is the author of offspring, even when a fool is born. So understand, if you can, that there is born in a human being from origin a fault of which God is not the author, since the creator of the human being himself is none but God. Remember, indeed, that you have strayed from your own teaching, by which you deny that God works the will in the minds of human beings. For I praised your words, which I confess are said also by Catholics, by my will—words which you nevertheless say I praised with God compelling me. See how God works in us even to will (See Phil 2:13)—which you are wont to deny, even against the Apostle.
Iulianum.4.89. IUL. Si igitur - inquio - non nisi per sexum fetus, non nisi per corpus sexus, non nisi per Deum corpus; quis ambigat fecunditatem Deo iure reputari? Hoc tamcertum est, ut etiam tua in suam laudem ora concusserit. Verum post praeconium huic a te loco redditum, haeresim admones introduci, cum ea quae subdidi, nihil aliud quam quae praemissa fuerant, admota explanatione geminaverint.
9. Julian: If, then, I say, offspring is only through sex, sex only through the body, the body only through God, who would doubt that fruitfulness is rightly reckoned to God? This is so certain that it has shaken even your mouth into its praise. But after the proclamation rendered to this place by you, you give warning that a heresy is introduced, when the things I subjoined doubled, with an explanation applied, nothing other than what had been set forth before.
Iulianum.4.9AUG. Numquid in his, quae vera te dixisse concesseram, dixeras: Quid ergo suum diabolus cognoscit in sexibus? (De nupt. et concup. 2, 4, 13) Hic enim coepisti introducere sensum haeresis vestrae; quasi propterea non possit diabolus aliquid suum cognoscere in sexibus, quia per creatorem Deum est corpus et sexus; cum diabolus et bonum Dei et malum diaboli etiam in se ipse cognoscat, illud scilicet in sua natura, illud in vitio.
Augustine: Was it not in those things which I had granted you said truly that you had said: What, then, does the devil recognize as his own in the sexes? (De nupt. et concup. 2.4.13) For here you began to introduce the sense of your heresy, as if for this reason the devil could recognize nothing of his own in the sexes, because the body and the sex are through God the creator—when the devil recognizes both the good of God and the evil of the devil even in himself, the former namely in his nature, the latter in his fault.
Iulianum.4.9Sic et in sexibus agnoscit ille quae Dei sunt, sicut et ipsum sexum, et corpus, et spiritum; sed agnoscit et suum, quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum; illa enim sunt a Creatore, cuius vindictam vitare non potuit; hoc vulnere quod inflixit.
So also in the sexes he recognizes the things that are God's, namely the sex itself, and the body, and the spirit; but he also recognizes his own, by which the flesh desires against the spirit; for those are from the Creator, whose vengeance he could not avoid, while this is from the wound which he inflicted.
Iulianum.4.910. IUL. Aio enim: Quid ergo suum diabolus cognoscit in sexibus, ut fructum eorum, sicut dicis, iure possideat? Diversitatem? Sed haec in corporibus est, quae Deus fecit. Commixtionem? Sed non minus benedictionis, quam institutionis privilegio vindicatur. An forte ipsam fecunditatem? Sed ipsa est instituti causa coniugii. Quid hic ergo novum fuit; quid a superiore quam probaveras conclusione dissentiens, quod post laudem vituperandum putares? Certe nihil: ac per hoc quid de tam foeda varietate colligitur? Cum a me videlicet disputatio innovata non sit, a te vero sit aestimatio meorum dictorum permutata, teterrimam esse intentionem tuam, et rationem imbecillam.
10. Julian: For I say: What, then, does the devil recognize as his own in the sexes, that he may, as you say, rightfully possess their fruit? The diversity? But this is in bodies, which God made. The union? But it is vindicated by no less a privilege of blessing than of institution. Or perhaps fruitfulness itself? But it is the very cause for which marriage was instituted. What, then, was new here? What, dissenting from the earlier conclusion which you had approved, that you should think it must be disparaged after praise? Certainly nothing; and through this, what is gathered from such a foul variety? Since the disputation was not renewed by me, but the estimation of my words was changed by you, that your intention is most foul and your reasoning feeble.
Iulianum.4.10AUG. Miraris quod post laudem operum Dei, vituperavi insidiosam interrogationem tuam; interrogans quippe dixisti: Quid igitur suum diabolus cognoscit in sexibus? (Ibidem) Et volens persuadere quod nihil suum cognoscat in sexibus, ea commemorasti, quae vere ad diabolum non pertineant, diversitatem scilicet, qua femininus a masculino diversus est sexus; et commixtionem, qua ut filii generentur, sexus uterque miscetur; et fecunditatem, qua ipsi filii generantur. Haec omnia fatemur futura fuisse in paradiso, etiamsi nemo peccasset; sed illa ibi futura non erat, quam senserunt, quando pudenda texerunt, qui priusquam peccarent, nudi erant, et non confundebantur.
Augustine: You wonder that, after the praise of the works of God, I disparaged your insidious question; for, questioning, you said: What, then, does the devil recognize as his own in the sexes? (De nupt. et concup. 2.4.13) And, wishing to persuade that he recognizes nothing of his own in the sexes, you mentioned things which truly do not pertain to the devil—namely, the diversity by which the female sex is diverse from the male, and the union by which both sexes are mingled that children may be begotten, and the fruitfulness by which those children themselves are begotten. All these we confess would have been in paradise, even if no one had sinned; but that thing would not have been there which they felt when they covered their shameful parts—they who, before they sinned, were naked and were not confounded.
Iulianum.4.10Hanc tu concupiscentiam carnis, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum (Cf. Gal 5, 17), sine qua nullus hominum nascitur, et hanc discordiam carnis et spiritus, quam didicit catholicus Doctor, Pelagii vestri tam excellenter ore laudatus, per praevaricationem primi hominis in nostram vertisse naturam (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 12); hanc ergo tu quare tacuisti? Qui interrogans quid suum diabolus cognoscat in sexibus, alia nominasti quae diaboli non sunt, et hoc quod eius est tuae interrogationi reddere noluisti. Hanc interrogationem tuam dolosam reprehendi, non divina opera quae iure laudavi.
This concupiscence of the flesh, by which the flesh desires against the spirit (See Gal 5:17), without which no human being is born, and this discord of flesh and spirit which the Catholic Doctor—so excellently praised by the mouth of your own Pelagius—learned to have turned into our nature through the transgression of the first man (Ambrose, In Luc. 7.12): this, then, why did you pass over in silence? You who, asking what the devil recognizes as his own in the sexes, named other things which are not the devil's, and were unwilling to render to your question this which is his. This deceitful question of yours I reprehended, not the divine works which I rightly praised.
Iulianum.4.1011. IUL. Et quod laudas catholica, pavoris tui esse, non fidei.
11. Julian: And that what you praise as Catholic belongs to your fear, not to your faith.
Iulianum.4.11AUG. Ille in laude catholica novit nostram fidem, qui per illam vestrum demonstrat et expugnat errorem.
Augustine: He knows our faith in Catholic praise who, through it, demonstrates and assails your error.
Iulianum.4.1112. IUL. Quod ergo laudata vituperas, non esse iudicii, sed furoris.
12. Julian: That, then, you disparage what you praised belongs not to judgment but to fury.
Iulianum.4.12AUG. Non laudata vitupero: sed laudavi quae vera dixisti; vituperavi autem quod insidiose interrogasti, videns quid tibi respondendum esset, atque ita hoc tacens quasi non esset. Hoc utrum iudicii sit, an furoris, videbis, si a furore conquieveris.
Augustine: I do not disparage what I praised; but I praised the true things you said, and disparaged what you asked insidiously, seeing what had to be answered to you, and so passing this over in silence as if it were nothing. Whether this belongs to judgment or to fury, you will see, if you grow quiet from fury.
Iulianum.4.1213. IUL. Quo furore quidem numquam cariturus es, nisi prius obscenum dogma reieceris; quia inter paenitentiae pudorem, numquam tamen a Christianis aversatum, et argumentationis inopiam, graves perferens Symplegadas, necesse est ut bona dicta quibus obrueris, aut sequaris, aut laceres.
13. Julian: Of which fury you will certainly never be free, unless you first cast off your obscene teaching; for, between the shame of penance—never, however, turned away from by Christians—and the poverty of argument, bearing grievous Symplegades, it is necessary that you either follow or mangle the good sayings by which you are overwhelmed.
Iulianum.4.13AUG. Non sunt bona dicta, Iuliane, negare Christum parvulis esse Iesum, aut Iesum, id est Salvatorem, ita esse parvulis confiteri, sicut universae mortali creaturae, unde dictum est: Homines et iumenta salvos facies, Domine (Ps 35, 7). Non propterea ille veniens in similitudine carnis peccati tale nomen accepit; sed: Vocabis, ait angelus, nomen eius Iesum; ipse enim salvum facies populum suum a peccatis eorum (Mt 1, 21). Non sunt bona dicta, ab hoc populo parvulos separare, et ideo Christum dicere etiam illis esse Iesum, quia salvos eos facit, non a peccatis, sed a scabiolis eorum. Resipisce, obsecro: puto quod non ex parentibus ista credentibus natus es; et certe in Ecclesia non ista credente renatus es.
Augustine: They are not good sayings, Julian, to deny that Christ is Jesus to the little ones, or to confess that he is Jesus—that is, Savior—to the little ones in just the way that he is to the whole mortal creation, whence it is said: You will save human beings and beasts, O Lord (Ps 36:6 (35:7)). Not for this reason did he, coming in the likeness of sinful flesh, receive such a name; but: You shall call his name Jesus, says the angel, for he will save his people from their sins (Matt 1:21). They are not good sayings, to separate the little ones from this people, and so to say that Christ is Jesus to them too because he saves them, not from their sins, but from their little scabs. Come to your senses, I beg you; I think you were not born of parents believing these things, and certainly you were not reborn in a Church that believes them.
Iulianum.4.1314. IUL. Videamus tamen quid sententiarum mearum arripueris, quod nomine erroris incessas. Sed iste - inquis - in his omnibus nominare noluit concupiscentiam carnis, quae non est a Patre, sed ex mundo est; cuius mundi princeps dictus est diabolus; qui eam in Domino non invenit, quia Dominus homo non per ipsam ad homines venit (De nupt. et concup. 2, 5, 14). Dixisti certe me haeresim introducere, ad quod probandum nulla mea dicta subiungis.
14. Julian: Let us see, nevertheless, what of my opinions you have seized upon, which you attack under the name of error. But this man, you say, in all these things was unwilling to name the concupiscence of the flesh, which is not from the Father but is from the world, of which world the devil is called the prince; who did not find it in the Lord, because the Lord, as man, did not come to human beings through it (De nupt. et concup. 2.5.14). You certainly said that I introduce a heresy, to prove which you subjoin no words of mine.
Iulianum.4.14AUG. Illa dicta tua subiungo, quibus interrogasti, quid suum diabolus cognoscat in sexibus (De nupt. et concup. 2, 4, 13). Dolose quippe ista dicebas, quando concupiscentiam carnis, cuius plerumque motibus necesse est resistere etiam casta coniugia, videbas, et tacebas, et me interrogatione fraudulentissima, quasi nihil esset quod responderi posset, urgebas. Aut si non videbas, profecto haeresim vestram ipsa caecitate introducebas.
Augustine: I subjoin those words of yours by which you asked what the devil recognizes as his own in the sexes (De nupt. et concup. 2.4.13). For you said those things deceitfully, when you saw the concupiscence of the flesh—to whose motions even chaste marriages must for the most part resist—and were silent, and pressed me with a most fraudulent question, as if there were nothing that could be answered. Or, if you did not see it, you were surely introducing your heresy by that very blindness.
Iulianum.4.1415. IUL. Sed ais me noluisse concupiscentiam carnis nominare. Qui nolui nominare, tacui; et si tacui, nihil quod reprehenderes sum locutus: quis ergo errorem persuadet tacendo? O nova criminum et hactenus inaudita portenta! Silentio meo ait perversum dogma componi!
15. Julian: But you say I was unwilling to name the concupiscence of the flesh. I who was unwilling to name it was silent; and if I was silent, I said nothing that you could reprehend: who, then, persuades to error by being silent? O new and hitherto unheard-of monstrosities of charges! He says that a perverse teaching is composed by my silence!
Iulianum.4.15AUG. Non silentio, sed dolosa interrogatione, sicut superius demonstravi. Quamquam et silentium merito reprehenditur, quando id quod dicendum fuit, ideo non dicitur, ne interrogationi responderi potuisse cernatur.
Augustine: Not by silence, but by a deceitful question, as I showed above. And yet silence too is deservedly reprehended, when that which ought to have been said is for this reason not said—lest it be discerned that the question could have been answered.
Iulianum.4.1516. IUL. Expendat hoc prudentia omnis, et rideat orationis invidiam nomine taciturnitatis ostensam. Confiteris igitur me nihil dixisse quod possis arguere.
16. Julian: Let all prudence weigh this, and laugh at the malice of speech shown under the name of silence. You confess, then, that I said nothing that you could accuse.
Iulianum.4.16AUG. Immo vero, rectissime arguitur quod interrogando dixisti. Ut enim nihil esse putaretur, quod tibi responderi posset, illud quod posset, tu dicere noluisti. Aut certe ipsam cur non arguo caecitatem, qua id nec videre potuisti?
Augustine: Nay rather, what you said in questioning is most rightly accused. For, so that it might be supposed there was nothing that could be answered to you, you were unwilling to say that which could be said. Or, certainly, why do I not accuse the very blindness by which you could not even see it?
Iulianum.4.1617. IUL. Tu sane nostrum vexando silentium, protulisti quod olim quidem defendi non potuit; nunc vero postquam Manichaei epistola, cuius in libro tertio sententias posui, venit ad publicum, nec celari potest.
17. Julian: You, indeed, by harassing our silence, have brought forth what once could not be defended; but now, after the letter of the Manichean—whose opinions I set down in the third book—has come to the public, it can no longer be concealed.
Iulianum.4.17AUG. Concupiscentiam carnis nec Manichaeus veraciter vituperat, nec tu veraciter laudas; ille, quia nescit unde hoc sit malum; tu, quia negas malum;
Augustine: The concupiscence of the flesh neither the Manichean truly disparages nor you truly praise; he, because he does not know whence this evil is; you, because you deny it is evil;
Iulianum.4.17ille, quia eam permixtae nobis naturae tribuit alienae; tu, quia eam nostrae non vis esse vitiatae; ille, quia per illam credit corrumpi Dei partem; tu, quia per illam dehonestare conaris etiam paradisi felicitatem.
he, because he attributes it to an alien nature mixed into us; you, because you are unwilling that it belong to our corrupted nature; he, because through it he believes a part of God is corrupted; you, because through it you try to dishonor even the happiness of paradise.
Iulianum.4.1718. IUL. Noluit - inquit - nominare concupiscentiam carnis, quae non est a Patre, sed ex mundo est; cuius mundi princeps dictus est diabolus: qui eam in Domino non invenit, quia Dominus homo non per ipsam ad homines venit (De nupt. et concup. 2, 5, 14). Verbis ergo ipsius Manichaei, concupiscentiam carnis non a Deo factam, sed a mundo, cuius tamen mundi principem diabolum dicis, conditam profiteris.
18. Julian: He was unwilling, he says, to name the concupiscence of the flesh, which is not from the Father but is from the world, of which world the devil is called the prince; who did not find it in the Lord, because the Lord, as man, did not come to human beings through it (De nupt. et concup. 2.5.14). By the very words, then, of the Manichean, you profess that the concupiscence of the flesh was made not by God, but by the world, of which world, however, you say the devil is the prince.
Iulianum.4.18AUG. Numquid ego dico diabolum principem mundi, et hoc Dominus ipse non dicit? Numquid hoc ego dixissem, nisi ipsum dixisse legissem? Quod cum et ipse legeris, cur obiciendum mihi putasti? Nec tamen ideo diabolus princeps est caeli et terrae, et omnis caelestis terrestrisque creaturae, secundum quod dictum est: Mundus per eum factus est; sed quia mundi nomine appellatus est orbis terrae in hominibus, qualibus plenus est, secundum quod dictum est: Et mundus eum non cognovit (Io 1, 10); secundum quod dictum est et diabolus princeps mundi huius (Io 12, 31); secundum quod dictum est: Mundus in maligno positus est (1 Io 5, 19); secundum quod dictum est: Quia vero de mundo non estis, propterea odit vos mundus (Io 15, 19); et innumerabilia talia.
Augustine: Do I say the devil is the prince of the world, and does not the Lord himself say this? Would I have said this, had I not read that he himself said it? Since you too have read it, why did you think it must be cast in my teeth? Nor yet is the devil for that reason the prince of heaven and earth and of every heavenly and earthly creature, according to which it is said: The world was made through him; but because the round earth, in the human beings of whom it is full, has been called by the name of the world, according to which it is said: And the world did not know him (John 1:10); according to which it is said: and the devil the prince of this world (John 12:31); according to which it is said: The world is set in the evil one (1 John 5:19); according to which it is said: But because you are not of the world, therefore the world hates you (John 15:19); and innumerable such things.
Iulianum.4.18Ac per hoc, mundum, Scripturis sanctis docentibus, pro differentia sententiarum, nunc in bono accipimus, nunc in malo. Ad bona eius pertinent caelum et terra, et omnis in eis Dei creatura; ad mala eius pertinent concupiscentia carnis, et concupiscentia oculorum, et ambitio saeculi, vel, sicut ipse posuisti, superbia vitae.
And through this, with the holy Scriptures teaching, we take "world," according to the difference of the statements, now in a good sense, now in an evil. To its good things belong heaven and earth, and every creature of God in them; to its evil things belong the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the ambition of the age, or, as you yourself put it, the pride of life.
Iulianum.4.18Sicut ergo nunc in bono, nunc in malo legitur mundus; sic lege, si potes, aliquando in bono positam concupiscentiam carnis, vel concupiscentiam oculorum; sed sic non invenies, sicut nec superbiam vitae, quod illis duobus malis additum est tertium.
Just as, then, "world" is read now in a good, now in an evil sense, so read, if you can, the concupiscence of the flesh, or the concupiscence of the eyes, placed at some point in a good sense; but you will not find it so—just as neither the pride of life, which is added to those two evils as a third.
Iulianum.4.1819. IUL. Ideo autem dixi eloquiis te usum omnino Manichaei, quia etsi in apostoli Ioannis Epistola nonnulla ex his verba teneantur; tamen quia certum est, non ibi illum Ecclesiae magistrum aut de carne, aut de sensu carnis, aut de concupiscentia nuptiali, quidquam tale sensisse, quale Manichaeus verborum eius usurpatione componit; non iniuria eius verba esse dixi, cuius sensui serviebant, ut eloquia intentionis suae merito censeantur; et sicut apud sanctum Ioannem apostolica sunt dignitate reverenda, quia insinuant veritatem, ita apud Manichaeum obumbrata illorum signa non expressa videantur.
19. Julian: But I said that you used altogether the words of the Manichean for this reason: although in the Letter of the apostle John some of these words are held, yet, because it is certain that that teacher of the Church did not there feel anything about the flesh, or about the sense of the flesh, or about conjugal concupiscence, such as the Manichean composes by the usurpation of his words, I said, not unjustly, that they are the words of the one to whose sense they served, so that the words are deservedly reckoned to his intention; and just as with holy John they are to be revered with apostolic dignity, because they instill truth, so with the Manichean their signs seem obscured, not expressed.
Iulianum.4.19AUG. Quid addis nuptiali, et dicis de concupiscentia nuptiali, ut vestias pudendam susceptam tuam nomine honesto nuptiarum? Concupiscentiam carnis dixit apostolus Ioannes, non concupiscentiam nuptialem; quae posset esse in paradiso, etiam si nemo peccasset, in appetitu fecunditatis, non in pruritu voluptatis; aut certe spiritui semper subiacens, ut non nisi spiritu volente moveretur; numquam adversus spiritum concupiscens, ut et spiritus adversus eam concupiscere cogeretur. Absit enim ut in loco tantae felicitatis, et in hominibus illic tanta pace felicibus esset ulla discordia carnis et spiritus.
Augustine: Why do you add "conjugal" and say "conjugal concupiscence," so that you may clothe the shameful thing you have taken up with the honorable name of marriage? The apostle John said "the concupiscence of the flesh," not "conjugal concupiscence"—which could be in paradise even if no one had sinned, in the appetite for fruitfulness, not in the itch of pleasure; or, certainly, always subject to the spirit, so that it would not be moved except with the spirit willing; never desiring against the spirit, so that the spirit too would be compelled to desire against it. For far be it that in a place of so great happiness, and in human beings there happy in so great a peace, there should be any discord of flesh and spirit.
Iulianum.4.1920. IUL. Apostolus quippe Ioannes cum ad virtutum omnium fastigium provocaret fideles, et studium sanctitatis ad altitudinem dominicae conversationis extenderet, ad compendium, mundi totius nomine universa praesentium bonorum et iucunditatum irritamenta concludens: Nolite - inquit - diligere mundum, neque ea quae in mundo sunt. Si quis diligit mundum, non est caritas Patris in eo; quoniam omne quod est in mundo, concupiscentia carnis, et concupiscentia oculorum est, et superbia vitae; quae non est ex Patre, sed ex mundo est; et mundus transit, et concupiscentia eius; qui autem facit voluntatem Dei, manet in aeternum (1 Io 2, 15-17). Quantum ad superficiem verborum respicit, odium omnibus indicit elementis, et mundum et cuncta quae in mundo sunt, non esse ex Patre, neque diligi debere denuntiat.
20. Julian: For the apostle John, when he called the faithful to the summit of all the virtues, and stretched the zeal for sanctity to the height of the Lord's manner of life, gathering for brevity, under the name of the whole world, all the incitements of present goods and delights, says: Do not love the world, nor the things that are in the world. If anyone loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him; for all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life, which is not from the Father but is from the world; and the world passes away, and its concupiscence; but he who does the will of God abides forever (1 John 2:15-17). So far as regards the surface of the words, he declares hatred against all the elements, and announces that the world and all the things that are in the world are not from the Father and ought not to be loved.
Iulianum.4.20AUG. Inaniter ista dicis: nullus vel idiota catholicus sic isto loco accipit mundum, ut de elementis aliquid cogitet. Neque enim et ubi dicit de Domino Christo: Ipse est propitiatio peccatorum nostrorum; non solum nostrorum, sed et totius mundi (1 Io 2, 2); ita quisquam desipit, ut etiam elementorum hic exsistimet intellegenda esse peccata. Totum hoc ergo quod isto modo dicitur mundus, non nisi in hominibus intellegitur, qui sunt per totum mundum, id est, toto, quaquaversum incolitur, orbe terrarum. Ipsam denique humanam vitam qua non secundum Deum, sed secundum hominem vivitur, mundum hoc loco appellavit Apostolus. Ideo diligi vetat, et dicit: Omnia quae in mundo sunt, concupiscentia carnis est, et concupiscentia oculorum, et ambitio saeculi, vel superbia vitae; quae non est a Patre, sed ex mundo est (Ibidem). Tu, si quid potes, in bono aliquando nominatam, Scripturarum sanctarum loco ullo, concupiscentiam carnis ostende; et noli apertis rebus nebulas loquacitatis offundere.
Augustine: You say these things to no purpose: no Catholic, even an unlettered one, so takes "world" in this place as to think of anything about the elements. For neither, where he says of the Lord Christ: He is the propitiation for our sins; not only for ours, but also for those of the whole world (1 John 2:2), does anyone so rave as to suppose that here even the sins of the elements are to be understood. This whole, then, which in this way is called the world, is understood of nothing but the human beings who are throughout the whole world, that is, throughout the entire round earth, wherever it is inhabited. In short, the Apostle in this place called "the world" that human life itself which is lived not according to God but according to man. Therefore he forbids it to be loved, and says: All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the ambition of the age, or the pride of life, which is not from the Father but is from the world (1 John 2:16). You, if you can, show the concupiscence of the flesh named at some point in a good sense in any place of the holy Scriptures; and do not pour the clouds of loquacity over things that are plain.
Iulianum.4.2021. IUL. Certe Apostolus est, et praecipua Domino Iesu caritate dilectus; tamen nisi intentionem eius, vel Evangelium quod scripsit, vel Epistolarum gravitas indicaret, verba ista quae posuimus, ita nullum possent rebus afferre praeiudicium, ut Scripturis omnibus, quae mundum a Deo factum asserunt, cedere cogerentur. Verum ipse Evangelii quod conscripsit, reverendo se communivit exordio. Deus - inquit - erat Verbum; per ipsum facta sunt omnia, et sine ipso factum est nihil. Ac deinceps: Erat lumen verum, quod illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum; in hoc mundo erat, et mundus per ipsum factus est. Itemque: Verbum caro factum est, ut habitaret in nobis (Io 1, 1. 3. 9-10. 14).
21. Julian: Certainly he is an Apostle, and beloved by the Lord Jesus with a special love; yet, unless his intention, or the Gospel which he wrote, or the gravity of his Letters indicated it, these words which we have set down could bring no prejudice to things, so that they would be compelled to yield to all the Scriptures which assert that the world was made by God. But he himself fortified himself with a reverend opening of the Gospel which he composed. God, he says, was the Word; through him all things were made, and without him was made nothing. And then: He was the true light, which enlightens every man coming into this world; he was in this world, and the world was made through him. And likewise: The Word was made flesh, that he might dwell among us (John 1:1, 3, 9-10, 14).
Iulianum.4.21Quibus testimoniis nihil in sensibus suis obscuritatis reliquit; sed ostendit Deum se nosse et asserere totius mundi, atque eorum quae in mundo sunt omnium conditorem, Manichaeisque nullum ad sententias suas accessum patere perdocuit. Quoniam qui omnium naturarum Deum asserit creatorem, abutitur, sine fidei dispendio, substantiarum nominibus, ad significationem cupiditatis immodicae.
By which testimonies he left no obscurity in his meaning, but showed that he knew and asserted God to be the founder of the whole world and of all things that are in the world, and thoroughly taught that no access to his opinions lies open to the Manicheans. For one who asserts God to be the creator of all natures uses, without loss of faith, the names of substances to signify immoderate cupidity.
Iulianum.4.21AUG. Sed tu concupiscentiam carnis, nec quando immodica est, vis intellegi malum esse, sed bonum, eosque potius bono male uti, qui ea utuntur immodice. Ac per hoc, si concupiscentia carnis bonum est; profecto et modica bonum est modicum, et immodica bonum est immodicum; sed modica uti, hoc est, ut dicis, bono bene uti; immodica vero uti, hoc est, ut dicis, bono male uti. Sicut vinum procul dubio bonum est; omnis enim creatura Dei bona est (Cf. 1 Tim 4, 4); et qui modico vino utitur, bono bene utitur; qui vero immodico vino utitur, bono male utitur. Sed Ioannes numquam diceret vinum a Patre non esse, sicut concupiscentiam carnis dixit a Patre non esse.
Augustine: But you are unwilling that the concupiscence of the flesh, not even when it is immoderate, be understood to be evil, but a good, and that those rather use a good badly who use it immoderately. And through this, if the concupiscence of the flesh is a good, then surely the moderate is a moderate good, and the immoderate an immoderate good; but to use it moderately is, as you say, to use a good well; and to use it immoderately is, as you say, to use a good badly. Just as wine is without doubt a good—for every creature of God is good (See 1 Tim 4:4)—and the one who uses moderate wine uses a good well, while the one who uses immoderate wine uses a good badly. But John would never say that wine is not from the Father, as he said that the concupiscence of the flesh is not from the Father.
Iulianum.4.21Non igitur invenis, quae concupiscentia carnis non sit a Patre; quia et immodica bonum est apud te; et ille potius non est bonus, qui bono immodico utitur, id est, qui bono male utitur. Quid ergo dubitas breviter aperteque dicere, quod obscure longis anfractibus dicis, quod dixit Ioannes falsum esse, et te verum dicere? Falsum est enim quod ille ait: Concupiscentia carnis non est a Patre; a quo sunt omnia naturalia bona; si concupiscentia carnis, ut dicitis, et tunc bona est, cum ea quisque immodica utitur; sed ille malus est qui bono male utitur.
You do not find, then, what concupiscence of the flesh is not from the Father; because with you even the immoderate is a good, and rather it is the one who uses an immoderate good—that is, who uses a good badly—who is not good. Why, then, do you hesitate to say briefly and openly what you say obscurely in long windings: that what John said is false, and that you say the truth? For it is false, what he says: The concupiscence of the flesh is not from the Father—from whom are all natural goods—if the concupiscence of the flesh is, as you say, good even then, when anyone uses it immoderately; but it is the one who uses a good badly who is evil.
Iulianum.4.2122. IUL. Praecipit ergo non diligi mundum, neque ea quae in mundo sunt; et dicit quoniam dilectoribus saeculi Dei caritas inesse non possit: sed non ut hoc nomine dilectionis a saeculo submovendae, alterum eius quam Deum verum intellegi faciat conditorem; verum ut agnoscant fideles, nullas praesentis vitae cupiditates praeferendas esse virtutibus, ne mens eorum aut comparandis opibus, aut conquirendis voluptatibus occupata, a christianae, quae vera est, philosophiae deducatur vigore.
22. Julian: He instructs, then, that the world is not to be loved, nor the things that are in the world; and he says that in the lovers of the age the love of God cannot be present—but not so that, by this name of the love that is to be removed from the age, he makes another than the true God to be understood as its founder; rather, so that the faithful may recognize that no cupidities of the present life are to be preferred to the virtues, lest their mind, occupied either with amassing wealth or with seeking out pleasures, be led away from the vigor of the Christian philosophy, which is the true one.
Iulianum.4.22Quoniam omne quod est in mundo, concupiscentia carnis, et concupiscentia oculorum est, et superbia vitae; quae non est ex Patre, sed ex mundo est; et mundus transit, et concupiscentia eius; qui autem facit voluntatem Dei, manet in aeternum (1 Io 2, 16-17). Mundi ergo nomine, mores hominum nihil post hanc vitam esse autumantium, diversasque mortalium tam pompas quam luxurias indicavit.
For all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life, which is not from the Father but is from the world; and the world passes away, and its concupiscence; but he who does the will of God abides forever (1 John 2:16-17). By the name of the world, then, he indicated the manners of human beings who suppose there is nothing after this life, and the various pomps as well as luxuries of mortals.
Iulianum.4.22AUG. Ergo si mundi nomine, mores hominum nihil post hanc vitam esse autumantium, diversasque mortalium tam pompas quam luxurias indicavit; in his sunt illa quae esse dixit in mundo, et a Patre non esse; in quibus primum locum tenet tua illa pulchra suscepta, concupiscentia scilicet carnis.
Augustine: Therefore, if by the name of the world he indicated the manners of human beings who suppose there is nothing after this life, and the various pomps as well as luxuries of mortals, among these are those things which he said are in the world and are not from the Father; among which the first place is held by that beautiful thing you have taken up, namely the concupiscence of the flesh.
Iulianum.4.22Sed tu videris, in moribus hominum nihil post hanc vitam esse opinantium, voluisse intellegi oculorum concupiscentiam, quoniam his rebus quas vident inhaerendo, nolunt ea quae non vident credere; in pompis autem mortalium, ambitionem saeculi vel superbiam vitae; in luxuriis vero, concupiscentiam carnis; ut omnia tria quae Ioannes posuit, complexus esse videaris; quasi possit esse luxuria quam vituperas, nisi consentiatur concupiscentiae carnis quam vituperandam esse non putas, et bonum appellando insuper laudas.
But you, it seems, wished the concupiscence of the eyes to be understood in the manners of human beings who suppose there is nothing after this life, since by clinging to those things which they see they are unwilling to believe the things they do not see; and the ambition of the age, or the pride of life, in the pomps of mortals; and the concupiscence of the flesh in the luxuries—so that you may seem to have embraced all three things which John set down; as though luxury, which you disparage, could exist unless consent were given to the concupiscence of the flesh, which you do not think must be disparaged, and which, by calling it a good, you moreover praise.
Iulianum.4.22Quid est autem insanius, quam luxuriam malum, et concupiscentiam luxuriae bonum dicere? Et putare Apostolum Christi nomine concupiscentiae carnis, non ipsam concupiscentiam carnis, sed potius accusasse luxuriam, quae omnino nulla est, nisi cum quisque concupiscentia carnis illicitur, trahitur, possidetur? Quasi non invenerit tantus doctor unde illam, sed unde luxuriosum nomine eius argueret; cum luxuriosus non esset arguendus, nisi eius desideriis oboediret.
But what is more insane than to call luxury an evil and the concupiscence for luxury a good? And to suppose that the Apostle, under the name of the concupiscence of the flesh, accused not the concupiscence of the flesh itself, but rather luxury, which is altogether nothing unless someone is enticed, dragged, and possessed by the concupiscence of the flesh? As though so great a teacher had not found whereby to accuse it, but only whereby to accuse the luxurious man by its name—when the luxurious man would not be accused unless he obeyed its desires?
Iulianum.4.22Desine multum dicere et parum sapere. Numquam efficies, quantolibet loquacitatis tuae flumine, quo in profunda raptaris; prorsus numquam efficies, ut luxuria sit malum, et concupiscere quae ad luxuriam pertinent non sit malum, etiamsi tali concupiscentiae non consentiatur, ne malum perpetretur.
Cease to say much and to understand little. You will never bring it about, by however great a river of your loquacity, into whose depths you are swept away—you will never at all bring it about—that luxury is an evil, and that to desire the things which pertain to luxury is not an evil, even if such concupiscence is not consented to, lest the evil be perpetrated.
Iulianum.4.2223. IUL. Sic enim et in Evangelio suo dixerat: Mundus per ipsum factus est, et mundus eum non cognovit (Io 1, 10); non utique ut elementa Christum ratione carentia potuisse viderentur vel cognoscere vel negare; sed ut mundi appellatione turba infidelium signaretur. Eodem ergo more in praesenti quoque, omne quod in mundo est, id est, omnia genera hominum ita voluptatibus inhaerentia, ut bona cuncta rationabilis animantis aut potestatum phaleris, aut opum sarcinis, sensibus metiantur, exosa ait superbia turguisse, quae ex Deo non est, id est, Deo non placet, sed ex mundo est, voluntatis scilicet humanae pravitate concepta. Et ideo vos, inquit, sua non debet aemulatione corrumpere; quia qui facit voluntatem Dei, aeternae fit beatitudinis compos, nec cum praesentium fragilitate praetervolat.
23. Julian: For so too in his Gospel he had said: The world was made through him, and the world did not know him (John 1:10)—certainly not so that the elements, lacking reason, could seem to be able to see Christ or to know or deny him, but so that by the appellation of the world the throng of unbelievers might be signified. In the same manner, then, in the present passage too, all that is in the world—that is, all kinds of human beings so clinging to pleasures that they measure all the goods of a rational living being by their senses, either by the trappings of powers or by the burdens of wealth—he says has swollen with a hateful pride, which is not from God, that is, does not please God, but is from the world, namely conceived by the depravity of the human will. And therefore, he says, it ought not to corrupt you by emulation of itself, because he who does the will of God becomes a sharer in eternal blessedness, and does not fly past with the frailty of present things.
Iulianum.4.23Ergo Ioannes apostolus odio haberi mundum praecepit, quomodo et Dominus in Evangelio, non solum corpus, sed etiam animam ipsam nostram odio habendam esse monstravit: Qui - inquit - non odit patrem, aut fratrem, insuper etiam animam suam, non est me dignus (Lc 14, 26). Cum certe fidelium animus se odisse non possit, qui amore consultissimo felicitatem suam doloribus etiam et periculis mercatur. Quid igitur egimus? Apostolum videlicet Ioannem, ex more Scripturarum mundi vocabulo non naturam perculisse rerum, sed vitia voluntatum; atque ita concupiscentiam carnis negasse ex Deo esse, sicut omnia quae in mundo sunt. Quod Manichaeus non secundum Apostoli sensum, sed secundum perfidiam suam velut consequenter arripiens, non concupiscentiam carnis, nec ipsam carnem, nec totum postremo mundum a Deo confirmat effectum; quem tu secutus, concupiscentiam carnis, non a Deo, sed a diabolo conditam credis.
Therefore the apostle John instructed that the world be held in hatred, just as the Lord too in the Gospel showed that not only the body but even our soul itself must be held in hatred: He who does not hate father, or brother, and moreover even his own soul, is not worthy of me (Luke 14:26). Although certainly the mind of the faithful cannot hate itself, which by a most prudent love purchases its own happiness even at the cost of pains and dangers. What, then, have we done? Namely, that the apostle John, after the manner of the Scriptures, by the word "world" struck not the nature of things but the faults of wills; and so denied that the concupiscence of the flesh is from God, just as all the things that are in the world. Which the Manichean, seizing upon it as if consistently, not according to the sense of the Apostle but according to his own perfidy, affirms that neither the concupiscence of the flesh, nor the flesh itself, nor finally the whole world, was made by God; whom you, following, believe that the concupiscence of the flesh was founded not by God but by the devil.
Iulianum.4.23AUG. Hanc ergo concupiscentiam carnis malum dico esse, quam dicit Ioannes a Patre non esse, et quam dicit Ambrosius in naturam nostram ex primi hominis praevaricatione vertisse (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 12); unde Ioannes volens homines intellegi, eam dicit ex mundo esse.
Augustine: This concupiscence of the flesh, then, I say is evil—the concupiscence which John says is not from the Father, and which Ambrose says turned into our nature from the transgression of the first man (See Ambrose, In Luc. 7.12); whence John, wishing human beings to be understood, says it is from the world.
Iulianum.4.23Hanc concupiscentiam carnis et Manichaeus malum dicit; sed unde sit nescit; tu autem bonum dicis, quia et tu unde sit nescis; et eam negando esse unde illam esse dicit Ambrosius, facis ut naturae mali, quam Deo coaeternam desipit, recte sibi eam videatur tribuere Manichaeus. Ergo ut et tu redarguaris et Manichaeus, illud quod dicit Ioannes apostolus, episcopus exponit Ambrosius. Quod enim per praevaricationem primi hominis in naturam vertit, non utique Deo coaeternum malum est; taceat ergo Manichaeus: et tamen malum est; taceat ergo etiam Iulianus.
This concupiscence of the flesh the Manichean too says is evil; but he does not know whence it is; you, however, say it is good, because you too do not know whence it is; and by denying it to be from whence Ambrose says it is, you bring it about that the Manichean rightly seems to himself to attribute it to the nature of evil, which he raves to be coeternal with God. Therefore, so that both you and the Manichean may be refuted, the bishop Ambrose expounds that which the apostle John says. For what turned into nature through the transgression of the first man is certainly not an evil coeternal with God; let the Manichean, then, be silent: and yet it is an evil; let Julian, then, be silent too.
Iulianum.4.2324. IUL. Constat itaque beatum Ioannem nullam tibi erroris occasionem dedisse: te porro id quod Manichaeus protulit imbibisse. Atque ut Apostoli iam existimatione defensa, manum super hoc vel breviter construamus: quid hic sanctum Ioannem existimas intimare, cum concupiscentiam carnis et concupiscentiam oculorum ex Deo non esse pronuntiat? Genusne ipsum concupiscentiae, quae non mediocritate concessa, sed nimietate prohibita in vitium cadit; an solum excessum, qui non naturalis, sed voluntarius deprehenditur?
24. Julian: And so it is established that blessed John gave you no occasion for error, but that you have imbibed what the Manichean brought forth. And, the Apostle's estimation being now defended, let us lay our hand on this matter, even briefly: what do you suppose holy John intimates here, when he pronounces that the concupiscence of the flesh and the concupiscence of the eyes are not from God? The very kind of concupiscence, which—not by a granted measure, but by an excess that is forbidden—falls into a fault; or only the excess, which is found to be not natural but voluntary?
Iulianum.4.24AUG. Si in vitium cadit, tunc eam saltem malum esse concede; sed cur eam tunc quoque bonum esse contendis, et eum bono male uti dicis, qui concessum eius modum excedit? Sic enim non ipsa, sed ille cadit in vitium, qui ea male utitur. Videsne quam nescias quid loquaris, quando nec in tua definitione consistis?
Augustine: If it falls into a fault, then at least grant that it is evil; but why do you contend that even then it is good, and say that he uses a good badly who exceeds the measure granted to it? For thus it is not the thing itself, but the one who uses it badly, that falls into the fault. Do you see how you do not know what you are saying, when you do not even stand by your own definition?
Iulianum.4.2425. IUL. Si dixeris, nomine concupiscentiae, etiam illum ipsum modum, quo licita rerum naturalium afficitur voluptate, ut concupiscentia carnis in universum reprobata videatur; ergo et sensum oculorum, et mundum ipsum, et quidquid in mundo est, a diabolo conditum profitere; quia omnia pariter ex Deo non esse dicuntur. Quod certe si annueris, non efficieris Manichaeus; es enim etiam nunc; sed hoc te esse, ut argumentis tuis olim, ita quoque professione monstrabis. Si autem nudatum errorem pavescens, dixeris Apostolum nomine concupiscentiae carnis et oculorum concupiscentiae, et nomine mundi, non res ipsas, quae cum intra concessos fines tenentur, innocuae sunt; cum autem in illicita procurrunt, fiunt reprehensibiles, adnotasse; clarebit, quod in primo opere egimus, concupiscentiae naturalis non genus, non speciem, non modum, sed excessum tantum in culpam venire. Atque ideo hoc testimonium Apostoli in reliquum pudenter caveto, ne illud si vel levi commemoratione pollueris, defensus quidem nihil, propalam vero proditus approberis.
25. Julian: If you say that by the name of concupiscence even that very measure is meant by which one is affected by the lawful pleasure of natural things—so that the concupiscence of the flesh may seem to be reproved entirely—then profess also that the sense of the eyes, and the world itself, and whatever is in the world, was founded by the devil, because all alike are said not to be from God. Which, certainly, if you grant, you will not be made a Manichean—for you are one even now—but you will show yourself to be this by profession, as you formerly did by your arguments. But if, dreading the error laid bare, you say that the Apostle, by the name of the concupiscence of the flesh and the concupiscence of the eyes, and by the name of the world, noted not the things themselves—which, when they are held within the granted bounds, are harmless, but when they run forth into unlawful things become reprehensible—then it will be clear, what we treated in the first work, that of natural concupiscence not the kind, not the form, not the measure, but only the excess comes into fault. And therefore beware, henceforth, modestly of this testimony of the Apostle, lest, if you pollute it by even a light mention, you, defended in nothing but openly betrayed, be proved.
Iulianum.4.25AUG. Sed, homo contentiose, modus concupiscentiae, quem dicis esse concessum, tunc non servatur, quando illi impellenti consentitur, aut ceditur, et itur in eius excessum; quo ut non eatur, resistitur malo. Quis enim dubitet malum esse, cui si oboedias, malum facis; si repugnes, bonum? Qui ergo vult temperanter vivere, non consentiat malo quod laudas; et qui vult fideliter vivere, non tibi consentiat cum malum laudas; proinde ut vos caveat, concupiscentiam carnis malum esse sciat; ut autem et vos et Manichaeos, unde sit sciat.
Augustine: But, contentious man, the measure of concupiscence which you say is granted is then not preserved, when consent is given to it as it impels, or it is yielded to, and there is a going into its excess; and that there be no going into it, the evil is resisted. For who would doubt that to be evil, which, if you obey it, you do evil, and if you fight against it, good? Whoever, then, wishes to live temperately, let him not consent to the evil you praise; and whoever wishes to live faithfully, let him not consent to you when you praise the evil; accordingly, that he may beware of you, let him know that the concupiscence of the flesh is evil; but that he may beware of both you and the Manicheans, let him know whence it is.
Iulianum.4.2526. IUL. Exercui hunc locum in secundo prioris operis libello, atque ostendi, prius in homine concupiscentiam carnis quae speciem irritat saporis et oculorum fuisse, quam culpam.
26. Julian: I worked through this passage in the second little book of my earlier work, and showed that the concupiscence of the flesh, which excites the appearance of taste and of the eyes, was in the human being before the fault.
Iulianum.4.26AUG. Huic libro tuo secundo, satis respondi quarto meo. Nam sicut ibi, ita et hic garris inania. Nullo enim modo ostendisti, concupiscentiam carnis, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, prius in homine esse coepisse, quam culpam. Quidquid illud est, quod duo illi homines post peccatum in membris suis senserunt novum, unde pudor eorum pudenda contexit, procul dubio culpa contraxit.
Augustine: To this second book of yours I answered sufficiently in my fourth. For just as there, so here too you prattle empty things. For in no way did you show that the concupiscence of the flesh, by which the flesh desires against the spirit, began to be in the human being before the fault. Whatever it is that those two human beings felt as new in their members after sin—whence their shame covered the shameful parts—they without doubt contracted it by fault.
Iulianum.4.2627. IUL. Hic tamen necessario exigo, quibus tibi somniis revelatum sit, ut nomine concupiscentiae, coeuntium libidinem indicatam putares. Salvis enim opibus veritatis, quas disputatio longa patefecit, putemus necdum claruisse, ad eumdem auctorem attinere sensus carnis, ad quem eius forma pertineat.
27. Julian: Here, however, I necessarily demand by what dreams it was revealed to you, that you supposed the lust of those coming together to be indicated by the name of concupiscence. For, with the resources of truth preserved which the long disputation laid open, let us suppose it not yet to have been made clear that the sense of the flesh pertains to the same author to whom its form belongs.
Iulianum.4.27AUG. Alii sunt carnis sensus, quibus caro praesentia corporalia spiritui quodam modo nuntiat; et alii sunt carnalis concupiscentiae motus, quibus caro adversus spiritum concupiscens in quaeque illicita atque inhonesta praecipitat, nisi adversus eam etiam ipse spiritus concupiscat; quae discordia carnis et spiritus, non creatori carnis aut sensus, sed malo suasori et homini praevaricatori tribuitur ab eis, quorum fide sana error insanus Pelagianorum et Manichaeorum damnatur.
Augustine: The senses of the flesh are one thing, by which the flesh in a certain way announces corporeal present things to the spirit; and the motions of carnal concupiscence are another, by which the flesh, desiring against the spirit, casts headlong into all unlawful and dishonorable things, unless against it the spirit too desires; which discord of flesh and spirit is attributed, not to the creator of the flesh or of the sense, but to the evil persuader and to the man the transgressor, by those whose sound faith condemns the insane error of the Pelagians and the Manicheans.
Iulianum.4.2728. IUL. Sed si hoc fingatur ambiguum, te continuo crassissima dubii nubes involvet. Hac quippe concupiscentia carnis nullum absolute genitalium tenetur indicium. Dicam ergo aures hoc vocabulo variorum sitientes carminum verberari, dicam castigari a sancto Ioanne helluonum palatum, dicam culpari immorientes odoribus nares; totum postremo praeter id quod tu arbitraris; libera est electio, ubi specialis verbi nulla pressura est. Aut ergo nega illa quae diximus concupisci; et inficiare, ut soles, omnium conscientiae; aut si necdum eo usque impudentia incalluit, ut his conetur obniti, assentire damnationem genitalis iucunditatis nec in sermonibus inveniri.
28. Julian: But if this be feigned doubtful, the thickest cloud of doubt will at once envelop you. For by this concupiscence of the flesh no indication of the genitals at all is absolutely held. I will say, then, that ears thirsting for various songs are struck by this word; I will say that the palate of gluttons is castigated by holy John; I will say that nostrils dying upon odors are blamed; everything, finally, except what you suppose—the choice is free, where there is no constraint of a special word. Either, then, deny that the things we have said are desired, and contradict, as you are wont, the conscience of all; or, if shamelessness has not yet hardened to such a point that it tries to resist these things, assent that the condemnation of genital pleasure is not even found in his words.
Iulianum.4.28AUG. Ita hoc dicis, quasi nos concupiscentiam carnis in solam voluptatem genitalium dicamus aestuare. Prorsus in quocumque corporis sensu caro contra spiritum concupiscit, ipsa cognoscitur; et quoniam si non adversus eam spiritus fortius concupiscat, ad mala pertrahit, malum esse convincitur. Propter ipsam Scriptura dicit: Nequius oculo quid creatum est? (Eccli 31, 15) Et utique oculum, non nequitiam, creavit omnium creator Deus et corporum et sensuum. Ecce unde intellegas (si veritati non resistas) inesse malum naturae nostrae, etiam cum creatur, quamvis creetur a bono bene bonum. Sed unde sit hoc malum, disce ab Ambrosio, ne ad aliam, id est, mali naturam introducendam Deo coaeternam, suffragium praebeas Manichaeo.
Augustine: You say this as though we said that the concupiscence of the flesh burns only for the pleasure of the genitals. Surely in whatever sense of the body the flesh desires against the spirit, it is recognized; and since, unless the spirit desires more strongly against it, it draws to evils, it is convicted of being evil. On account of it Scripture says: What has been created more wicked than the eye? (Sir 31:15) And certainly God, the creator of all bodies and senses, created the eye, not the wickedness. See whence you may understand—if you do not resist the truth—that there is an evil in our nature even when it is created, although it is created good by the Good One well. But whence this evil is, learn from Ambrose, lest you furnish support to the Manichean for introducing another nature, that is, the nature of evil, coeternal with God.
Iulianum.4.2829. IUL. Quid ergo tibi opitulari potest, quod ego inter commixtionem sexuum, fecunditatem coeuntium, nolui concupiscentiae nomine lacerare, cum eam nec tu cum Manichaeo diabolicam potueris approbare; et iam ipsa praemissae disputationis consequentia claruisset, ad eiusdem operam recurrere sensum illam, quo commixtorum corpus afficitur, ad cuius institutionem corpora, coniugia semina referrentur?
29. Julian: What, then, can it avail you, that I, amid the union of the sexes and the fruitfulness of those coming together, was unwilling to mangle it by the name of concupiscence, when you too could not, with the Manichean, approve it as diabolical; and when already the very consistency of the preceding disputation had made it clear that the sense by which the body of those joined is affected recurs to the work of the same one to whose institution the bodies, the marriages, the seeds were referred?
Iulianum.4.29AUG. Alia est vis sentiendi, aliud vitium concupiscendi; discerne duo ista diligenter, noli errare deformiter. Alia est, inquam, vis sentiendi, aliud vitium concupiscendi. Lege Evangelium: Qui viderit, inquit, mulierem ad concupiscendum eam, iam moechatus est eam in corde suo (Mt 5, 28). Non dixit: Qui viderit, quod est sentire per eum sensum corporis qui dicitur visus; sed: qui viderit, inquit, ad concupiscendum, quod est videre ad malum. Visus ergo sensus carnis est bonus: concupiscentia vero carnis motus est malus. Quo malo si bene utitur coniugatus, non eum bonum facit; sed operi bono servire compellit. Facit enim nonnisi boni aliquid et per ipsum, si nihil faciat propter ipsum; si autem faciat aliquid, sed tamen in coniuge, propter ipsum, non ei veniam daret Apostolus gratia nuptiarum (Cf. 1 Cor 7, 6), si non agnosceret esse peccatum.
Augustine: The power of sensing is one thing, the fault of desiring another; distinguish these two carefully, do not err disgracefully. The power of sensing, I say, is one thing, the fault of desiring another. Read the Gospel: Whoever looks at a woman to desire her has already committed adultery with her in his heart (Matt 5:28). He did not say, "Whoever looks"—which is to perceive through that sense of the body which is called sight—but, "whoever looks to desire," which is to look unto evil. The sense of sight, then, is a good of the flesh; but the concupiscence of the flesh is an evil motion. If a married man uses this evil well, he does not make it good, but compels it to serve a good work. For he does nothing but some good even through it, if he does nothing on account of it; but if he does something—yet with his spouse—on account of it, the Apostle would not grant him pardon by the indulgence of marriage (See 1 Cor 7:6), did he not recognize it to be a sin.
Iulianum.4.2930. IUL. Oportet quidem nihil post primum opus, quod ad sanctum Turbantium edidi, super necessario naturalium pudore disserere; quia ibi ita plene actum est, ut nisi depositis omnino mentibus, nihil hinc possit ambiguitatis oboriri.
30. Julian: It is fitting, indeed, to discourse nothing, after the first work which I published to holy Turbantius, about the necessary shame of natural things; because there it was treated so fully that, unless minds were altogether laid aside, no ambiguity could arise from this.
Iulianum.4.30AUG. Sanctus forte Turbantius, ipso opere tuo lecto, quod ad eum te scripsisse commemoras, etiam propterea in catholicam fidem respiravit, quoniam te in tali causa defecisse cognovit.
Augustine: Holy Turbantius perhaps, when he had read that work of yours which you mention you wrote to him, even for that reason breathed again into the Catholic faith, because he recognized that you had failed in such a cause.
Iulianum.4.3031. Iul. Tamen cum defensor traducis ne tenui quidem possit ab eo ungue deflectere, meumque rhetorica elegantia fatiget pudorem, cur diversis hominibus negotium ipsum commixtionis iuvat hinc ea quae rebus actis convenit, parcitate decernere? Et in hoc ergo loco, et in inferioribus, ubi ego dixi: " Propter hoc relinquet homo patrem et matrem, et adhaerescet uxori; et erunt duo in carne una " (Gen 2, 24); ut exprimeret fidem operum Propheta prope periculum pudoris accessit; quasi praedam inveniens gestit, exsultat, et clamat: Aperta prorsus, et vi veritatis, inquit, extorta confessio!
31. Julian: Nevertheless, since the defender of transmission cannot turn aside from it by even a slender nail's breadth, and wearies my shame with rhetorical elegance, why, for different people, does the very matter of union help one to decide it here with that sparingness which befits the deeds done? And in this place, then, and in the lower ones, where I said: For this reason a man will leave father and mother, and will cleave to his wife; and the two shall be in one flesh (Gen 2:24)—in order to express the fidelity of the works, the Prophet came near the peril of shame; as if finding prey, he exults, leaps for joy, and cries out: An open confession, he says, and one wrung out by the force of truth!
Iulianum.4.31Dicatur causa, cur in exprimendis operibus Dei, Propheta prope periculum pudoris accesserit. Itane vero humana opera pudenda esse non debent, sed plane glorianda, et divina pudenda sunt? Itane vero in eloquendis et exprimendis operibus Dei, non honoratur Prophetae vel amor vel labor, sed periclitatur pudor? Quid enim potuit Deus facere, quod eius praedicatorem pudeat dicere? Et quod est gravius, pudeat hominem alicuius operis, quod non homo, sed Deus fecit in homine; cum omnes opifices quantumpossunt labore et industria id agant, ne de suis operibus erubescant?
Let the cause be told, why in expressing the works of God the Prophet came near the peril of shame. Is it really so, that human works ought not to be shameful, but plainly to be gloried in, and that divine works are shameful? Is it really so, that in declaring and expressing the works of God the Prophet's love or labor is not honored, but his shame is endangered? For what could God have made that his herald should be ashamed to tell? And—what is more grievous—that a man should be ashamed of some work which not man but God made in man, when all craftsmen, as much as they can, by labor and industry strive that they may not blush at their works?
Iulianum.4.31Sed profecto illud nos pudet, quod puduit primos illos homines, quando pudenda texerunt; illa est poena peccati, illa plaga vestigiumque peccati, illa illecebra fomesque peccati, illa lex in membris repugnans legi mentis. Huius pudet, et merito pudet. Nam si hoc non esset, quid nobis esset ingratius, quid irreligiosius, si in membris nostris, non de vitio vel poena nostra, sed de Dei confunderemur operibus? (De nupt. et concup. 2, 9, 22)
But surely we are ashamed of that of which those first human beings were ashamed, when they covered their shameful parts; that is the punishment of sin, that the wound and the trace of sin, that the enticement and the tinder of sin, that the law in the members resisting the law of the mind. Of this we are ashamed, and deservedly ashamed. For if this were not so, what would be more ungrateful, what more irreligious in us, than if in our members we were confounded, not at our fault or punishment, but at the works of God? (De nupt. et concup. 2.9.22)
Iulianum.4.31Claruit certe qualiter gestiat; gaudio suo non potest adhibere frenos; tenet meam sententiam, qua concupiscentiam naturalem malam possit ostendere, et diaboli operibus deputare; quam sententiam de ore meo dicit vi veritatis extortam, concionaturque scelestissimum atque profanissimum esse, si ea quae a Deo facta dicamus, pudore operienda fateamur. Sed alacritate commotior non potuit ponderare quid diceret; asserens enim in operibus Dei pudendum nihil esse, operam autem genitalium pudendam esse, et ideo non posse eam Conditoris operibus adscribi; subito confessus est illam non solum honestam, sed etiam iustam; non solum creante Deo, verum etiam iudicante, nostris corporibus attributam. Ostendi in tertio prioris operis libro, non posse idem poenam esse quod culpam.
It has become clear, certainly, in what way he exults; he cannot put a bridle on his joy; he holds my opinion, by which he can show natural concupiscence to be evil, and reckon it to the works of the devil; which opinion he says was wrung from my mouth by the force of truth, and he proclaims that it is most wicked and most profane, if we confess that the things which we say were made by God must be covered by shame. But, made more excited by his eagerness, he could not weigh what he was saying; for, asserting that in the works of God there is nothing shameful, but that the work of the genitals is shameful, and therefore cannot be ascribed to the works of the Founder, he suddenly confessed that it was attributed to our bodies not only as honorable but even as just—not only with God creating, but even with God judging. I showed, in the third book of my earlier work, that the same thing cannot be punishment and fault.
Iulianum.4.31AUG. Non ostendisti, quod te ostendisse inaniter iactas; immo etiam ipse quodam loco oblitus quid ante dixisses, confessus es culpam etiam poenam esse peccantis. Quod ego, cum tibi superius responderem (Cf. Contra Iul. 5, 3, 10), satis evidenter ostenderam, etiam per Apostolum probans puniri peccata peccatis; qui cum de quibusdam dixisset, quod immutaverint gloriam incorruptibilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis, et volucrum, et quadrupedum, et serpentium; protinus hoc peccatum aliis peccatis ostendens esse punitum: Propterea, inquit, tradidit illos Deus in desideria cordis illorum, in immunditiam; ut contumeliis afficiant corpora sua in semetipsis (Rom 1, 23-24), et cetera quae ibi contexuit. Nec in Psalmo diceretur: Appone iniquitatem super iniquitatem eorum, et non intrent in tuam iustitiam (Ps 68, 28); nisi iusto iudicio Dei punirentur additis praecedentia peccata peccatis.
Augustine: You did not show what you emptily boast you have shown; nay rather, you yourself in a certain place, forgetting what you had said before, confessed that fault is also a punishment of the one sinning. Which I, when I answered you above (See Contra Iul. 5.3.10), had shown clearly enough, proving even through the Apostle that sins are punished by sins; for when he had said of certain men that they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of corruptible man, and of birds, and of quadrupeds, and of serpents, at once showing this sin to be punished by other sins, he says: Therefore God handed them over to the desires of their heart, unto uncleanness, that they should afflict their bodies with insults among themselves (Rom 1:23-24), and the rest that he wove together there. Nor would it be said in the Psalm: Add iniquity upon their iniquity, and let them not enter into your justice (Ps 69:27 (68:28)), unless by the just judgment of God preceding sins were punished by added sins.
Iulianum.4.3132. IUL. Et ideo super hoc laborandum non est; commendo tamen disputatoris acrimoniam, qui quam dicit a Deo redditam, non vult a Deo conditam; pronuntians Dei non convenire operibus, quod vult eius convenire iudiciis.
32. Julian: And therefore there is no need to labor over this; yet I commend the disputant's sharpness, who is unwilling that what he says was rendered by God be founded by God, pronouncing that it does not befit the works of God which he wishes to befit his judgments.
Iulianum.4.32Aug. Apparet te non intellegere quomodo dictum sit: Deus mortem non fecit (Sap 1, 13); cuius tamen iudicio qui peccat moritur. Convenit ergo iudicio eius ut moriatur peccator; nec tamen operi eius convenit mors, quia Deus mortem non fecit. Eius quippe iustum est iudicium, ut peccato suo quisque pereat, cum peccatum Deus non faciat; sicut mortem non fecit, et tamen quem morte dignum censet, occidit. Unde legitur: Deus mortem non fecit; legitur: Mors et vita a Domino Deo est (Eccli 11, 14); quae duo inter se non esse contraria profecto videt, quisquis ab operibus divinis iudicia divina discernit; quod tu si potuisses, non utique ista vana dixisses.
Augustine: It appears that you do not understand how it is said: God did not make death (Wis 1:13)—by whose judgment, nonetheless, he who sins dies. It befits his judgment, then, that the sinner die; and yet death does not befit his work, because God did not make death. For his judgment is just, that each one perish by his own sin, though God does not make sin; just as he did not make death, and yet he slays the one whom he judges worthy of death. Whence it is read: God did not make death; it is read: Death and life are from the Lord God (Sir 11:14); which two things, that they are not contrary to each other, surely he sees who distinguishes divine judgments from divine works; which, if you had been able to do, you certainly would not have said these empty things.
Iulianum.4.3233. IUL. Ergo in operibus eius nullus pudor est; in sententiis autem summa deformitas. Certum est nempe, quod poenam mereatur reatus; num ideo tamen confusio culpae debita, in vindicta recurrit, ut appelletur sine pudore quod fecit reus, sed non possit sine ignominia dici quod iudicando fecit Deus?
33. Julian: Therefore in his works there is no shame, but in his sentences the greatest deformity. It is certain, surely, that guilt deserves punishment; but does therefore the confusion due to fault recur in the punishment, so that what the guilty one did is called without shame, but what God did in judging cannot be told without ignominy?
Iulianum.4.33AUG. Quid explicata implicas, et evoluta convolvis, ut ingeniis tardioribus, qualia in hominibus plura sunt, videaris dicere aliquid, cum dicas nihil? Homo es enim, qui potius inverecundia quam facundia persuadere conaris, quod deformitas vel nulla, vel parva sit, ut cum subiecta esse caro spiritui debeat, adversus spiritum concupiscat; aut quod non sit iustum Dei iudicium, relinquere delinquentem, ut ipse sibi sit poena, cui Deus fuerat vera felicitas; aut quod de peccato debeat, non de poena sua quisque confundi; cum plerique de peccatis suis non erubescant, si nulla poena fuerit subsecuta quam sentiant, et eos faciat poena confundi, quod non fecisset impunitas.
Augustine: Why do you entangle what is unfolded, and roll up what is unrolled, so that to slower wits—of which there are many among human beings—you may seem to say something, when you say nothing? For you are a man who try to persuade, by shamelessness rather than by eloquence, that the deformity is either none or small—that, when the flesh ought to be subject to the spirit, it desires against the spirit; or that the judgment of God is not just, to leave the transgressor so that he is himself a punishment to himself, to whom God had been the true happiness; or that each one ought to be confounded at his sin, not at his punishment—when most people do not blush at their sins, if no punishment that they feel has followed, and the punishment makes them confounded which impunity would not have done.
Iulianum.4.33Sed contra res apertissimas quem liberet esse disertum, nisi a veritate desertum? Utrumque autem nos libere dicimus, et quod fecit homo volens, et quod passus est nolens; id est, et spiritus inoboedientiam, et carnis contra spiritum concupiscentiam; sed unum horum dicere tu erubescebas, ne nos admoneres unde tuum convinceremus errorem. Et nunc quando iam concupiscentiam carnis et libidinem nominas, ne de tuae susceptae nomine erubescere dicaris, plus erubescere times, et errare non times.
But who would wish to be eloquent against things most plain, unless one deserted by the truth? But we say both freely—both what the man did willingly, and what he suffered unwillingly; that is, both the disobedience of the spirit, and the concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit; but one of these you blushed to say, lest you remind us whence we might convict your error. And now, when you already name the concupiscence of the flesh and lust, lest you be said to blush at the name of the thing you have taken up, you fear to blush more, and do not fear to err.
Iulianum.4.3334. IUL. Constat tamen accusatorem nostrum in eodem, quem aversatur luto volvi. Cum enim confinxerit iuste redditam libidinis poenam, et hanc iustitiam divinae inculcat convenire sententiae, in prolatione autem sententiae opus Dei esse non denegat, ex qua libidinem evenisse dicit, quam erubescendam fatetur; in operam nimirum Dei, illum, quem propulsaverat, reduxit pudorem.
34. Julian: It is established, nevertheless, that our accuser is rolled in the same mud which he turns away from. For when he has feigned that the punishment of lust was justly rendered, and drives home that this justice befits the divine sentence, but in the bringing forth of the sentence does not deny it to be a work of God, from which he says lust came about, which he confesses must be blushed at—he has, of course, brought back to the work of God that shame which he had driven away.
Iulianum.4.34AUG. Iam tibi dictum est: Deus mortem non fecit (Sap 1, 13); in prolatione autem sententiae Dei est: Morte morieris (Gen 2, 17). Ecce Deus hoc retribui peccatori fecit, quod Deus ipse non fecit. Et tamen quia Deus ultionum est (Cf. Ps 93, 1), dicit etiam creare se mala (Cf. Isai 45, 7); et quaedam in libro Ecclesiastici ad vindictam creata dicuntur (Cf. Eccli 39, 33). Sed cum peccatum etiam poena peccati est, non Deus peccatum facit opere iniquo, sed ut peccatum sit poena peccantis facit opere iusto.
Augustine: It has already been said to you: God did not make death (Wis 1:13); but in the bringing forth of the sentence it is God's: You shall die the death (Gen 2:17). See, God brought it about that this be repaid to the sinner, which God himself did not make. And yet, because God is the God of vengeance (See Ps 94:1 (93:1)), he says that he creates evils (See Isa 45:7); and in the book of Sirach certain things are said to be created for vengeance (See Sir 39:33). But when a sin is also a punishment of sin, God does not make the sin by an unjust work, but, that the sin may be a punishment of the one sinning, he makes it by a just work.
Iulianum.4.34Quis enim neget esse peccatum, prophetis mendacibus credere? Et tamen haec fuit poena regis Achab, divino inflicta iudicio, sicut Regnorum testatur historia (Cf. 3 Reg 22). Nec ideo quisquam ita desipit, ut pseudoprophetarum putet laudanda esse mendacia, aut mendacii Deum dicat auctorem, cum iudicio iusto, ubi tali poena perspicit dignum, facit decipi quemque mendacio. Lege, et intellege; et noli tibi, ne intellegas, tumultu loquacitatis obstrepere.
For who would deny that it is a sin to believe lying prophets? And yet this was the punishment of king Ahab, inflicted by divine judgment, as the history of Kings testifies (See 1 Kgs 22). Nor for that reason does anyone so rave as to suppose that the lies of the false prophets are to be praised, or to say that God is the author of the lie, since by a just judgment, where he perceives one worthy of such punishment, he brings it about that someone be deceived by a lie. Read, and understand; and do not, lest you understand, drown yourself out with the tumult of loquacity.
Iulianum.4.3435. IUL. Ad quod tamen quasi corollarium peculiaris sceleris adiunxit, ut talem poenam a Deo illatam diceret, quae esset illecebra et fomes peccati, quae lex in membris invicta repugnaret legi mentis nostrae; quo genere ultionis multiplicaret Deus flagitia, non puniret; et qui iratus erat malae voluntati, qua fuerat erratum, reliquum faceret peccandi necessitatem. Quale sit tamen hoc iudicium, Manichaei furor viderit; dum constet, quia hic iudex qui ab Augustino fingitur, simularit se horrere peccatum, caeterum tanto eis adhaeret affectu, ut diligentiorem nutritium invenire non possint.
35. Julian: To which, however, as a kind of corollary of his peculiar wickedness, he added that he would say such a punishment was inflicted by God as would be the enticement and the tinder of sin—a law in the members fighting back unconquered against the law of our mind; by which kind of vengeance God would multiply outrages, not punish them, and, being angry at the evil will by which the wrong had been done, would make the rest a necessity of sinning. Yet what kind of judgment this is, let the fury of the Manichean look to; while it is agreed that this judge, who is feigned by Augustine, pretended to shudder at sin, but for the rest clings to sinners with so great an affection that they could not find a more diligent nurse.
Iulianum.4.35AUG. Lege quod scriptum est, quoniam non probaverunt Deum habere in notitia, tradidit illos Deus in reprobam mentem, ut faciant quae non conveniunt (Rom 1, 28); et vide quaedam peccata etiam poenas esse peccantium. Quomodo autem id faciat Deus ut intellegas, relege quod te admonui superius de rege Achab, cuius utique peccatum fuit credere pseudoprophetis; et tamen hoc peccatum, Deo vindicante, fuit etiam poena peccantis. Ista considera, et noli oblatrare veritati, ne in te quoque agnoscatur haec poena.
Augustine: Read what is written, that, since they did not approve of having God in their knowledge, God handed them over to a reprobate mind, to do the things that are not fitting (Rom 1:28); and see that certain sins are also punishments of the ones sinning. But that you may understand how God does this, read again what I reminded you of above concerning king Ahab, whose sin certainly was to believe the false prophets; and yet this sin, with God avenging it, was also a punishment of the one sinning. Consider these things, and do not bark against the truth, lest in you too this punishment be recognized.
Iulianum.4.3536. IUL. Quid ergo vis, subtilissime disputator? Sacrilegam esse in Dei operibus verecundiam, quia omnia quae Deus fecerit, passim agi debeant, ne nostra trepidatio opificem videatur arguere?
36. Julian: What, then, do you wish, most subtle disputant? That shame at the works of God is sacrilegious, because all things which God made ought to be done in the open, lest our trepidation seem to accuse the maker?
Iulianum.4.36Erravit ergo apostolus Paulus, qui Dei opera describens, ait: Verecundiora nostra maiorem honestatem habent; et Deus temperavit corpus, ei cui deerat abundantiore dato honore, ut non sit scissura in corpore (1 Cor 12, 23-25).
The apostle Paul, then, erred, who, describing the works of God, says: Our less honorable parts have greater honorableness; and God tempered the body, giving more abundant honor to that which lacked it, that there might be no division in the body (1 Cor 12:23-25).
Iulianum.4.36AUG. Lege diligenter, et inspice codicem graecum; et invenies Apostolum inhonesta dixisse, quae verecundiora tu dicis; et quaerens cur inhonesta sint, quae prius usque adeo fuerant honesta, ut nudi essent duo illi, et non confunderentur (Cf. Gen 2, 25); reperies, si non te animositas contentionis excaecet, ut hoc sequeretur, praecessisse peccatum; neque in hominibus primis Deum aliquid fecisse inhonestum; sicut nec mortem fecit Deus, cum corpus non faciat nisi Deus; et tamen: Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum (Rom 8, 10), verax dicit Apostolus.
Augustine: Read diligently, and inspect the Greek codex; and you will find that the Apostle said "dishonorable" what you call "less honorable"; and, asking why those things are dishonorable which formerly had been so far honorable that those two were naked and were not confounded (See Gen 2:25), you will find—if the animosity of contention does not blind you—that, for this to follow, sin preceded; and that in the first human beings God made nothing dishonorable, just as neither did God make death, though no one but God makes the body; and yet: The body indeed is dead on account of sin (Rom 8:10), the truthful Apostle says.
Iulianum.4.3637. IUL. Errat etiam honestorum cautio, quae naturalibus rebus verecundiae praetendit umbracula. Tu ergo ipse reliquias ciborum, quas certe confiteris non pertinere ad libidinem, sub oculis depelle populorum; immo ut dogmati tuo auctoritatem concilies exemplo, in Ecclesia facito omnia, quae ad nutum dicis fieri voluntatis, contentusque operam solius commixtionis occulere, a qua, et olim proposito, forsitan, et nunc senio destitisti, dicito ad grande sacrilegium pertinere, si res quae Deum conditorem habet, publicum vitet aspectum.
37. Julian: The caution of honorable people too errs, which holds out for natural things the little shadows of shame. You yourself, then, drive out under the eyes of the peoples the remnants of foods, which you certainly confess do not pertain to lust; nay rather, so that you may win authority for your teaching by example, do in the Church all the things which you say are done at the bidding of the will; and, content to hide the work of union alone—from which perhaps you have desisted, both formerly by resolve and now by old age—say that it pertains to great sacrilege if a thing that has God as its founder avoids the public gaze.
Iulianum.4.37Comede igitur in foro, aut in synagogis, in quibus disputationes tuae personant; et cum vestimenta sub sole torrido fuerint, oneri, tegens illam tantummodo corporis tui partem quam diabolus movit, reliqua nudus incedito; quia pronuntias ingratum esse et profanum, si quid tegatur quod Dei operibus adscribitur. Quod cum horum nihil facis (si tamen non proficiendo feceris), ipsis operibus confirmas alterum de duobus, aut omnia ista ad diabolum pertinere, quae non exsequeris sub conspectu publico; aut dogma vestrum, si non corde, vel ventre tuo teste cecidisse.
Eat, then, in the forum, or in the synagogues in which your disputations resound; and when, under the burning sun, your garments are a burden, covering only that part of your body which the devil moved, walk naked as to the rest; because you pronounce that it is ungrateful and profane if anything be covered which is ascribed to the works of God. Since you do none of these things (if, that is, you have not done them by making progress), by these very deeds you confirm one of two things: either that all those things which you do not carry out under the public gaze pertain to the devil; or that your teaching, if not by your heart, at least by your belly as witness, has fallen.
Iulianum.4.37AUG. Eorum quae occultat pudor, alia sunt horribilia, alia concupiscibilia; illa occuluntur, ne horreantur, sicut egestiones reliquiarum ex alimentis; ista vero, ne concupiscantur, vel ne id quod per ea fieri solet, admoneant concupisci, sicut sunt ea membra, quae ab ipso pudore proprie pudenda dicuntur, vel si eis ipsum concupiscentiae opus agitur.
Augustine: Of the things which shame hides, some are horrible, others desirable; the former are hidden lest they cause horror, like the excretions of the remnants of food; but the latter, lest they be desired, or lest they remind one to desire that which is wont to be done through them—like those members which by shame itself are properly called shameful, or if by them the very work of concupiscence is done.
Iulianum.4.37Nam et cetera corporis ab his remotiora, cum pudet nuda relinquere sive nudare, ad hoc pertinet, quoniam concupiscentia carnis latius per oculos pascitur. Unde illi impudici pudicam Susannam, quantum potuerunt, nudare voluerunt (Cf. Dan 13, 32). Potest ergo bene intellegi etiam Deus, eiusdem quoque pudoris commendasse curam, quando illos qui sibi succinctoria fecerant, de sua nuditate confusi, etiam tunicis induit; propterea quidem pelliceis (Cf. Gen 3, 21), ut corruptibilibus iam corporibus mors signaretur adiuncta.
For also as for the other parts of the body more remote from these, when there is shame at leaving them naked or at baring them, it pertains to this, that the concupiscence of the flesh is fed more widely through the eyes. Whence those shameless men wished, as much as they could, to strip chaste Susanna (See Dan 13:32). It can, then, be well understood that even God commended the care of this same shame, when he clothed with tunics even those who had made for themselves girdles, confounded at their nakedness—tunics indeed of skins (See Gen 3:21), so that death joined to their now corruptible bodies might be signified.
Iulianum.4.37In publico autem vesci mos prohibet, quoscumque prohibet, et facere contra morem merito pudet. Nam Romani antiqui, quod etiam ipse legisti, in propatulo caenitabant atque pransitabant. Quid est ergo quod, non ratiocinando, sed conviciando spatiaris in vacuum? Respice illos primos parentes, qui nudi erant, et non confundebantur; attende quid texerint, et confitere quid senserint. A succinctoriis ad tunicas ventum est: inde coepit, et crevit humani corporis tegimen, ubi humanis membris pudendorum est inditum nomen.
But custom forbids eating in public—whomever it forbids—and to act against custom deservedly causes shame. For the ancient Romans, which you yourself too have read, used to dine and lunch out in the open. What is it, then, that—not by reasoning but by reviling—you range about in the void? Look back at those first parents, who were naked and were not confounded; attend to what they covered, and confess what they felt. From girdles it came to tunics: thence began, and grew, the covering of the human body, where to the human members the name of "shameful parts" was given.
Iulianum.4.37Ibi pudoris maior est cura, ubi resistit concupiscentiae pudicitia. Pudet enim naturam rationalem aliquid habere in carne sua, ubi si non vult per impudicitiam dehonestari, necesse sit reluctari, tam coniugatis ne illicito, quam continentibus ne ullo concubitu sordidentur. Haec discordia carnis et spiritus in paradiso, si nemo peccasset, absit ut esse potuerit; non autem nos ex alienae naturae commixtione possedit: unde ergo ad nos, nisi ex primi hominis praevaricatione descendit?
There the care of shame is greater, where chastity resists concupiscence. For it shames the rational nature to have something in its flesh where, if it does not wish to be dishonored by unchastity, it is necessary to struggle—the married, lest they be defiled by unlawful intercourse, the continent, lest by any. This discord of flesh and spirit—far be it that it could have been in paradise, if no one had sinned; but it has not possessed us from the mixture of an alien nature: whence, then, did it descend to us, except from the transgression of the first man?
Iulianum.4.3738. IUL. Res ineptae sunt, et quae stilo nostro convicium magis faciant quam laborem; sed fidem tuam necessario consequuntur. Verumtamen adhuc, ut sit intentus lector, admoneo. Conatus es nempe asserere, quod Dei opus probetur pudendum non esse; sed ut hoc efficere nequivisti, ita spopondisti illud absolutissime, demere te a libidine verecundiam, si opus Dei esse doceatur; quod in primo opere ita approbavi, ut nec te inde putem dubitaturum esse, cum legeris; tamen quoniam hoc commentum tuum significat, necdum ad manus tuas illos venisse libros, id ipsum in praesenti quoque ostendere non pigebit.
38. Julian: These are inept matters, and ones that make for our pen reviling rather than labor; but they necessarily follow upon your faith. Yet still, that the reader may be attentive, I give warning. You attempted, surely, to assert that the work of God is proved not to be shameful; but as you could not accomplish this, so you most absolutely promised that you would take away shame from lust, if it be taught to be a work of God; which in my first work I approved in such a way that I do not think you will even doubt it, when you have read it; yet, since this fabrication of yours signifies that those books have not yet come into your hands, it will not irk me to show this same thing in the present passage too.
Iulianum.4.38Irrationabiles igitur animantes, a quo conditas putas, quae certis temporibus ardentissima libidine commoventur, ita ut etiam feritates acuat singularum? Tunc saevus aper, tunc pessima tigris. Ante omnes furor est insignis equarum (Cf. VERGILIUS, Georg. 3, 248. 266). Vere tument herbae. Vere abundantia teneri humoris exuberat. Et coitum certis repetunt armenta diebus (Cf. VERGILIUS, Georg. 2, 324-331). Longum est ire per singula: omnia genera, quae suspendit volatus, quae demersit natatus, quae sparsit vagatus, per aera, per freta, per nemora, nec tamen aut sublimavit ratio, aut culpa depressit, nota commiscendorum corporum voluptate flammantur.
By whom, then, do you suppose the irrational animals to have been founded, which at certain seasons are moved with the most burning lust, so that it even sharpens the fierceness of each? Then the boar is savage, then the tigress most fierce. Above all others, the frenzy of mares is notable (See Virgil, Georgics 3.248, 266). In spring the grasses swell. In spring an abundance of tender moisture overflows. And the herds repeat their coupling on certain days (See Virgil, Georgics 2.324-331). It would be long to go through them one by one: all the kinds which flight has suspended, which swimming has plunged, which wandering has scattered—through the air, through the seas, through the woods—and yet neither has reason lifted them up nor fault depressed them, are inflamed by the known pleasure of mingling bodies.
Iulianum.4.38Illum ergo sexuum quem patiuntur ardorem, Dei an diaboli opere susceperunt? Clamabis sine dubio, Dei. Deus ergo sexum naturali voluptate succendit; quod certe consequentius quam tu, Manichaeus negat. Ille enim, a quo concupiscentiam carnis damnare didicisti, quid sibi dicendum esset expendens, rem quam diabolicam definiverat, atque a Dei operibus removerat, quaquaversum eam potuit invenire persequitur; et ideo ut per concupiscentiam corpora hominum, ita per homines, omnes animantes diabolo deputavit auctori.
That ardor of the sexes, then, which they undergo—did they receive it by the work of God or of the devil? You will cry out, without doubt, of God. God, then, kindled the sex with natural pleasure; which certainly, more consistently than you, the Manichean denies. For he, from whom you learned to condemn the concupiscence of the flesh, weighing what he had to say, pursues the thing which he had defined as diabolical and removed from the works of God wherever he could find it; and therefore, as he assigned the bodies of human beings to the devil as author through concupiscence, so he assigned all animals to the devil through human beings.
Iulianum.4.38Tu autem, cum in Manichaei castris hactenus manens, maximum eius feras draconem, de quo infelicibus mentibus per naturale malum et crimina nuptiarum lethale inspiras venenum; non vis tamen in omnes naturas suggesta a magistro tela iaculari; et brutis familiarior (quibus tamen ob hoc parcis, ut rationabilium statum auctoratius crimineris), consentis in illorum corporibus Deum fecisse, quod in nostris diabolum; cum tamen id ipsum, sed mitius in hominibus, quam in pecoribus esse fateare.
But you, since, remaining thus far in the camps of the Manichean, you carry his greatest dragon, from which you breathe into unhappy minds, through natural evil and the crimes of marriage, a deadly poison, are nonetheless unwilling to hurl into all natures the darts supplied by your master; and, more familiar with the brutes (whom, however, you spare for this reason, that you may with more authority accuse the state of rational beings), you grant that God made in their bodies what the devil made in ours—while you nevertheless confess that this same thing is, but more mildly, in human beings than in cattle.
Iulianum.4.38Ut ergo quid sit effectum, prudens lector accipiat, libidinem corporum in animalibus factam a Deo non negas. Non est ergo Dei operibus indigna illa affectio, quae in his substantiis acrior invenitur, quae nihil de diaboli malo, vel tenui voluntate rapuerunt. Ergo quia concupiscentia defensa est exemplo animalium, defensa etiam dignitate auctoris sui, nec mala, nec diabolica est, quam fecit Deus formator corporum, et quam tenet ea quae est expers natura peccati; cum hoc ergo claruit, inquiro utrum istam libidinem, quam corpora humana persentiunt, Deum fecisse consentias? Si annueris, sublata contentio est, tu emendatus, et Manichaeus permanebit attritus.
So that, then, the prudent reader may grasp what has been accomplished: you do not deny that the lust of bodies in animals was made by God. That affection, then, is not unworthy of the works of God, which is found sharper in those substances which seized nothing of the devil's evil, not even by a slight will. Therefore, since concupiscence has been defended by the example of animals, and defended also by the dignity of its author, that concupiscence is neither evil nor diabolical which God the former of bodies made, and which that nature holds which is free of sin; since this, then, has become clear, I inquire whether you grant that God made this lust which human bodies perceive. If you grant it, the contention is removed, you are amended, and the Manichean will remain worn down.
Iulianum.4.38Si autem dixeris: In corporibus hominum a Deo non potuit fieri; refero, illam voluptatem et concupiscentiam carnis, hominis te, non Dei operibus indignam putare. Ambigi quippe non potest, quoniam si quod confiteris a Deo ubicumque factum, hoc dicas in homines fieri nequivisse, non concupiscentiae testimonia aufers debita, sed humano corpori conquiris indebita. Vide ergo cuius profanitatis sit sectae tuae finis. Dicis esse indignum carne mortalis, quod indignum non fuit opere Conditoris. I gitur hoc sensu non libidinem vituperasti; sed hominem, quem accusare volueras, extulisti.
But if you say: It could not be made by God in the bodies of human beings; I reply that you think that pleasure and concupiscence of the flesh unworthy of the works of man, not of God. For it cannot be doubted that, if you say that what you confess was made by God anywhere could not be made in human beings, you do not take away from concupiscence the testimonies owed to it, but seek out for the human body those not owed. See, then, of what profanity is the conclusion of your sect. You say that to be unworthy of mortal flesh which was not unworthy of the work of the Founder. Therefore, in this sense you have not disparaged lust, but have exalted the man whom you wished to accuse.
Iulianum.4.38Talem habet constantiam talemque mercedem, qui veritati indicit bellum, ut contrariis semper conatui suo feriatur effectibus. Ego ergo nunc tuis verbis consequentius, sicut omnis prudentia cognoscit, insurgo. Itane in taxandis et exprimendis operibus Dei, non auditur ratio, non omnium naturarum considerantur exempla (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 2, 9, 22); sed in tantum hominis effertur insania, ut putet inconveniens suis esse visceribus, quod per Dei operam in naturae suae cernit vigere consortibus? Neque enim alia nostrorum corporum est, vel origo, vel ratio, quam mutuorum.
Such constancy and such reward has he who declares war on the truth, that he is always struck by effects contrary to his own attempt. I, then, now more consistently with your words, as all prudence recognizes, rise up. Is it really so, that in assessing and expressing the works of God, reason is not heard, the examples of all natures are not considered (See De nupt. et concup. 2.9.22), but the madness of man is carried so far that he supposes that to be unsuited to his own inner parts which he discerns, through the work of God, to flourish in the partners of his own nature? For there is no other origin, or reasoning, of our bodies than of one another's.
Iulianum.4.38AUG. Dic ergo resurrectionem atque incorruptionem sempiternam humanis corporibus non deberi; quia sicut belluina, etiam terrena ipsa sunt; dic finem non esse posse diversum, ubi non est origo diversa: dic ista, si placet; et contra evangelicas Litteras, quantum saecularibus litteris profeceris, impetu vanae loquacitatis ostenta. Si autem hoc dicere non audebis; fatere secundum christianam fidem, etiam istam esse hominis poenam, quod comparatus est pecoribus insensatis, et similis factus est eis (Cf. Ps 48, 13). Huic ergo ista miseria est, cum misera esse pecora non possint; sic et carnis concupiscentia, homini est poena, non bestiae, in qua numquam caro adversus spiritum concupiscit.
Augustine: Say, then, that resurrection and everlasting incorruption are not owed to human bodies, because, like those of beasts, they too are earthly; say that the end cannot be different where the origin is not different: say these things, if you please; and against the gospel Scriptures, as much as you have profited by secular letters, display them with the rush of empty loquacity. But if you will not dare to say this, confess, according to the Christian faith, that this too is a punishment of man, that he was compared to senseless beasts, and was made like them (See Ps 49:13 (48:13)). To him, then, this is a misery, since beasts cannot be miserable; so too the concupiscence of the flesh is a punishment to man, not to the beast, in which the flesh never desires against the spirit.
Iulianum.4.38An placet tibi, sic aequare mortales naturas, ut in bestiis quoque asseras carnem contra spiritum concupiscere? Quod si non facis, ne sicut equus et mulus non habeas intellectum (Cf. Ps 31, 9); agnosce libidinem, qualem dicimus, in paradiso futuram non fuisse, si nemo peccasset, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. Talis quippe in pecoribus non est, ex quibus tuae susceptae tale patrocinium providisti, ubi mutis illis tu posses esse verbosus. Nam si humana libidine caro non concupisceret adversus spiritum, sed libido talis in hominibus esset, ut ad nutum voluntatis, cum opus esset, exsurgeret, cum autem non opus esset, nulla incitamenta suggereret, cum quibus cohibendis atque frenandis voluntas nostra pugnaret; nihil vos argueremus, quod in paradiso eam, hoc est, in habitatione tantae felicitatis, tam infeliciter locare velletis.
Or does it please you so to equalize mortal natures that in beasts too you assert that the flesh desires against the spirit? But if you do not do this, lest, like horse and mule, you have no understanding (See Ps 32:9 (31:9)), acknowledge that the lust such as we describe—by which the flesh desires against the spirit—would not have been in paradise if no one had sinned. For such lust is not in cattle, from which you have provided such patronage for the thing you have taken up, that among those mute creatures you could be verbose. For if the flesh did not desire against the spirit by human lust, but lust were such in human beings that it rose at the bidding of the will, when there was need, but, when there was no need, supplied no incitements which our will would have to fight to restrain and bridle, we would accuse you of nothing for wishing to place it in paradise—that is, in the dwelling of so great a happiness—so unhappily.
Iulianum.4.3839. IUL. Ut enim imaginem Dei mentis ratione suscepimus; ita communionem pecudum carnis affinitate sentimus; cuius licet sit forma diversa, est tamen de materia elementorum una substantia; pro rationabilis sane animi meritis aeternitatem visura, vel aerumnis miseram, vel praemiis gloriosam.
39. Julian: For just as we received the image of God by the reason of the mind, so we feel a fellowship with the cattle by the affinity of the flesh; whose form, although it is different, is yet one substance from the matter of the elements—a flesh that, in accordance with the deserts of the rational soul, will see eternity, either miserable with troubles or glorious with rewards.
Iulianum.4.39AUG. Si pro rationalis animi meritis, ut fateris, caro terrena, et sicut pecoris corruptibilis, tamen aeternitatem longe diverso fine visura est; cur non accipis, pro imaginis Dei meritis, quae nullo fuerat deformata peccato, sic prius fuisse conditam carnem, quamvis de materie terrena, ut si nemo peccasset, esset in aeternitate atque in incorruptione mansura;
Augustine: If, in accordance with the deserts of the rational soul, as you confess, the earthly flesh, corruptible like that of a beast, will nonetheless see eternity by a far different end, why do you not accept that, in accordance with the deserts of the image of God which had been deformed by no sin, the flesh was at first so founded—though from earthly matter—that, if no one had sinned, it would have remained in eternity and in incorruption;
Iulianum.4.39nec esset corruptibile corpus aggravans animam, hoc est, imaginem Dei; sed ita illi subditum, ut propter filios generandos, sicut cetera quibus aliquid operamur, ad nutum voluntatis etiam membra genitalia moverentur; aut talis esset carnis concupiscentia, quae nisi anima, hoc est Dei imagine, volente non surgeret, nec demergeret cogitationem mentis exundantia voluptatis?
and the corruptible body would not weigh down the soul, that is, the image of God, but would be so subject to it that, for the sake of begetting children, the genital members too, like the other things by which we accomplish something, would be moved at the bidding of the will; or the concupiscence of the flesh would be such that it would not rise except with the soul—that is, the image of God—willing, nor would it submerge the thought of the mind by an overflow of pleasure?
Iulianum.4.39Si enim etiam talis nunc esset, non de illa diceretur, quod a Patre non esset; sed ex mundo esset (Cf. 1 Io 2, 16), id est, ex hominibus, qui per illam, et cum illa nascuntur mundo, et procul dubio perituri sunt nisi renascantur Deo. Materiei ergo corporalis, nobis pecoribusque communis, convenienter creditur, merito imaginis Dei, nondum peccato coepto diversum fuisse initium, sicut peccato assumpto diversus est finis.
For if it were even now such, it would not be said of it that it is not from the Father, but is from the world (See 1 John 2:16)—that is, from human beings, who through it, and with it, are born into the world, and without doubt are to perish unless they are reborn unto God. Of the corporeal matter, then, common to us and to the cattle, it is fittingly believed that, on account of the desert of the image of God, before sin began, there was a different beginning, just as, sin once taken on, there is a different end.
Iulianum.4.3940. IUL. Qua ergo ratione indignum esset, non imagine Dei, quia animae quam carnis diversa substantia est, sed mancipio dissolubili imaginis Dei, quod indignum non fuerat conditu ipsius Dei? Fecit ergo corpora Deus, distinxit sexum corporum Deus, fecit membra genitalia Deus, indidit affectum quo sibi haec corpora miscerentur Deus, dedit etiam vim seminum Deus, operatur in secretis naturae de materia seminum Deus: nihil autem malum, nihil reum facit Deus.
40. Julian: By what reasoning, then, would that be unworthy—not of the image of God, since the substance of the soul is different from that of the flesh, but of the dissoluble bondservant of the image of God—which was not unworthy of the founding of God himself? God, then, made bodies; God distinguished the sex of bodies; God made the genital members; God implanted the affection by which these bodies might be mingled with one another; God also gave the force of the seeds; God works in the secret places of nature from the matter of the seeds: but God makes nothing evil, nothing guilty.
Iulianum.4.40AUG. Nihil malum, nihil reum facit Deus, sed in quantum Deus facit, non in quantum massa vitiata atque damnata est, de qua facit.
Augustine: God makes nothing evil, nothing guilty—but insofar as God makes it, not insofar as it is the corrupted and condemned mass from which he makes it.
Iulianum.4.4041. IUL. Libidinem ut pecorum, ita hominum fecit Deus; sed in pecoribus incoercitos dimisit affectus, in homine autem rationabili modum Deus instituit. Amictum ei prudentia et honestas comparat, quam dedit Deus. Igitur non modum, non genus; sed excessum eius culpat Deus, qui de insolentia liberae voluntatis exoriens, haud statum naturae, sed meritum agentis accusat.
41. Julian: Lust, as in cattle so in human beings, God made; but in cattle he let the affections go uncurbed, while in the rational human being God instituted a measure. Prudence and honorableness, which God gave, provide a garment for it. Therefore not the measure, not the kind, but its excess God blames—an excess which, arising from the insolence of the free will, accuses not the state of nature but the desert of the one acting.
Iulianum.4.41AUG. Cur ergo libido spiritui resistit in homine, quod non facit in pecore; nisi quia pertinet ad naturam pecoris, ad poenam vero hominis, sive quia est, quae nulla esset, sive quia resistit, quae subiecta esset, si peccato facta vel vitiata non esset? Nam si in pecoribus Deus incoercitos dimisit affectus; profecto libidines, quandoquidem hos dicis affectus, fateris ab homine coerceri; nulla autem ratione coercerentur, nisi vitiose moverentur.
Augustine: Why, then, does lust resist the spirit in the human being, which it does not do in the beast, unless because it pertains to the nature of the beast, but to the punishment of the human being—either because it exists, which would not exist, or because it resists, which would be subject, if it had not been made or corrupted by sin? For if in cattle God let the affections go uncurbed, then surely you confess that the lusts—since you call these "affections"—are curbed by the human being; but by no reasoning would they be curbed, unless they were moved faultily.
Iulianum.4.41Ecce enim Deum dicis in homine modum instituisse libidini; cur in eo modo non stat, in quo est divinitus instituta, sed eum, nisi coerceatur, egreditur? Quomodo ergo bonum dicitur, quae urget et compellit hominem facere malum, si ei non resistatur? Videsne eximiam susceptam tuam in natura hominis aut ex peccato natam, aut peccato esse vitiatam; et hinc esse illud, quod primi homines post peccatum pudenda texerunt, qui nudi erant ante peccatum, et non confundebantur?
For see, you say that God instituted in the human being a measure for lust; why does it not stand in that measure in which it was divinely instituted, but goes beyond it unless it is curbed? How, then, is that called good which urges and compels the human being to do evil, if it is not resisted? Do you see that this excellent thing you have taken up was either born from sin or corrupted by sin in the nature of the human being; and that from this comes the fact that the first human beings, after sin, covered their shameful parts, who were naked before sin and were not confounded?
Iulianum.4.41Quid est enim quod dicis: Amictum homini prudentia et honestas comparat, quam dedit Deus? Stulti ergo erant et inhonesti, et imprudentes atque impudentes homines ante peccatum, quando eos nuditatis non pudebat? Gratias peccato: nam sic remansissent. Quod si absurdissime dicitur, profecto prudentia naturalis et honestas pudenda texerunt; sed quae ante peccatum pudenda non fuerunt. Excessus proinde libidinis in peccato est; sed etiam impulsus in vitio. De quo impulsu erubuerunt illi, qui membra quae contra eorum voluntatem suscepta tua sollicitabat, nuda relinquere noluerunt.
For what is it that you say: Prudence and honorableness, which God gave, provide a garment for the human being? Were human beings, then, foolish and dishonorable, and imprudent and shameless, before sin, when nakedness did not shame them? Thanks to sin! For so they would have remained. But if this is said most absurdly, then surely natural prudence and honorableness covered the shameful parts—but parts which before sin were not shameful. Accordingly, the excess of lust is in sin; but its impulse too is in fault. At this impulse those blushed who were unwilling to leave naked the members which the thing you have taken up was soliciting against their will.
Iulianum.4.4142. IUL. Attende sane nunc quale sit, quod de tua opinione colligitur; videlicet operiendum pudore non esse, quidquid bonum creditur. Nos autem docuimus voluntatem illam naturaliter sexibus inditam, tam malam non esse, quam ad Dei operam pertinentem. Ac per hoc tu aut impietatem tuam deseres, aut pudorem. Sed quid nos haec autem? Si mutabit Aethiops pellem suam, aut pardus varietatem (Ier 13, 23); ita et tu a Manichaeorum mysteriis elueris.
42. Julian: Attend now, indeed, to what kind of thing is gathered from your opinion; namely, that whatever is believed good ought not to be covered by shame. But we have taught that the will naturally implanted in the sexes is as little evil as it is belonging to the work of God. And through this you will desert either your impiety or your shame. But why do we say these things? If the Ethiopian will change his skin, or the leopard his spots (Jer 13:23), so too will you be washed clean from the mysteries of the Manicheans.
Iulianum.4.42AUG. Immo tu Manichaeos adiuvare non desines, nisi istam susceptam tuam, quam etiam Manichaei malam esse convincunt, cum Ambrosio et cum omnibus Catholicis dixeris, ex praevaricatione primi hominis in nostram vertisse naturam; ne secundum illos, quos nesciens adiuvas nefandos haereticos, Deo coaeternum credatur habere principium, tam manifestum hominis vitium.
Augustine: Nay rather, you will not cease to aid the Manicheans, unless you say of this thing you have taken up—which even the Manicheans convict to be evil—along with Ambrose and with all Catholics, that it turned into our nature from the transgression of the first man; lest, according to those nefarious heretics whom, not knowing it, you aid, so manifest a fault of the human being be believed to have a beginning coeternal with God.
Iulianum.4.4243. IUL. Sequitur ergo ut verecundiam deponas, ac manente amicitia cum magistro, Cynicis foedereris; quos tamen aliquorum, ut Cicero in Officiis refert, etiam Stoicorum argumenta comitantur. Arguunt quippe communem honestatem, quod ea quae re turpia non sint, verbo flagitiosa ducamus; illa autem quae re turpia sint, nominibus appellemus suis. Latrocinium perpetrare, fraudem facere, adulterium committere, re turpe est, sed dicitur non obscene; liberis operam dare, honestum est re, nomine obscenum. Pluraque in eam sententiam, ab eisdem - inquit - contra verecundiam disputantur. Nos autem naturam sequamur, et omne quod abhorret ab oculorum auriumque approbatione fugiamus (CICERO, De off. 1). Et tu ergo, cui displicet ista ratio naturalis germana honestatis, aut dic, et latrocinio, et sacrilegio, et parricidio, quae omnia in re habent turpitudinem maximam, in nominibus nulla obscenitatem, tetrius esse et profanius operam dare liberis, quam verecundiae reposcit officium; aut si erubescis eo usque nuptias accusare, ut etiam sceleribus collatae praeponderent; adhortare coniuges tam secure appellare illam commixtionem, tamque libere, quam solemus parricidium et latrocinium nominare.
43. Julian: It follows, then, that you lay aside shame, and, with your friendship with your master remaining, make a treaty with the Cynics; whom, however, the arguments even of some of the Stoics accompany, as Cicero relates in the Offices. For they accuse common honorableness, that we hold to be disgraceful in word those things which are not base in fact, but call by their own names those things which are base in fact. To perpetrate robbery, to commit fraud, to commit adultery, is base in fact, but is not spoken of obscenely; to give effort to the begetting of children is honorable in fact, obscene in name. And many things to that effect, he says, are disputed by the same men against honorableness. But let us follow nature, and flee everything that shrinks from the approval of the eyes and the ears (Cicero, De off. 1). You, then, to whom this natural reasoning, the genuine sister of honorableness, is displeasing, either say that to give effort to begetting children is more foul and profane—for which the office of shame asks a covering—than robbery and sacrilege and parricide, all of which have the greatest baseness in fact but no obscenity in their names; or, if you blush to accuse marriage so far that, compared even with crimes, it should weigh heavier, exhort spouses to name that union as securely and as freely as we are wont to name parricide and robbery.
Iulianum.4.43Iamvero si addideris coniunctionem corporum fetibus destinatam, ob illudendum, ut soles, auribus christianis, nulla iniquitate maculari, sed pro suo modo bonam posse censeri, amplexare factum illud Cratae Thebani, hominis locupletis et nobilis, cui adeo fuit cordi secta Cynicorum, ut relinquens paternas opes, Athenas cum uxore migraverit Hyparcide, pari animo istius philosophiae sectatrice, cum qua cum concumbere in publico vellet, ut refert Cornelius Nepos, et illa occultandi gratia, pallii velamen obduceret, verberata est a marito: Tuis sensibusnimirum - inquit - parum adhuc docta es, quae quod te recte facere noveris, id aliis praesentibus exercere non audeas (CORNELIUS NEPOS). Debetur omnino talis habitus vestris gregibus, ut naturalia, quia per hoc bona quod a Deo condita in multiplicationem corporum comprobantur, sine ullo pudoris usurpentur obiectu.
But now, if you add that the joining of bodies destined for offspring is stained by no iniquity, but can be judged good in its own measure—in order, as you are wont, to mock Christian ears—embrace that deed of Crates of Thebes, a rich and noble man, to whom the sect of the Cynics was so much at heart that, leaving his paternal wealth, he migrated to Athens with his wife Hipparchia, a follower of this philosophy with equal spirit; with whom, when he wished to lie together in public, as Cornelius Nepos relates, and she, for the sake of concealment, drew over the covering of a cloak, she was beaten by her husband: You are, it seems, he said, still too little taught in your senses, since what you know you do rightly, you dare not perform with others present (Cornelius Nepos). Such a manner of life is altogether owed to your flocks, so that natural things—because, by this, that they are confirmed to have been founded by God for the multiplication of bodies, they are good—may be usurped without any obstacle of shame set in the way.
Iulianum.4.43Restituite igitur quadrupedibus gratiam, ut quia illa sensum corporum vestrorum a possessione diaboli et ore Manichaei suis tuentur exemplis, vos quoque illorum in coeundo libertatem pro rei bonae attestatione sectemini. Congruit quippe ut praestent morum magisterium, quibus patrocinium praestiterunt membrorum. Et ut quod egimus repetitione assignetur; dixisti libidinem, si eam Deus fecisset, nullo amiciendam pudore; nos licet in quattuor prioris operis libris id plene egerimus, tamen in praesenti quoque omnium animalium testimonio, quae a Deo condita interim confiteris, libidinem sexuum a Deo creatam esse monstravimus, quam tamen in hominibus pudore obumbrandam fatemur;
Restore, then, gratitude to the quadrupeds, so that, because they protect the sense of your bodies from the possession of the devil and from the mouth of the Manichean by their own examples, you too may follow their freedom in coupling, as an attestation of a good thing. For it is fitting that those should furnish a teaching of morals to whom they have furnished a patronage of members. And, so that what we have treated may be marked by repetition: you said that lust, if God had made it, was to be clothed in no shame; we, although in the four books of the earlier work we treated this fully, nevertheless in the present passage too have shown, by the testimony of all animals—which you meanwhile confess to have been founded by God—that the lust of the sexes was created by God, which lust, however, we confess must be overshadowed by shame in human beings.
Iulianum.4.43tuum ergo dogma consequitur, ut longo postliminio Cynicorum nobis repraesentes decorem, et ea quae naturalia sunt, quia a Deo facta sunt, in oculis civitatis exerceas. Sentisne quam involutis luminibus insiliveris in sententiam meam, qua dixi: Ut exprimeret fidem operum propheta, prope periculum pudoris accessit (De nupt. et concup. 2, 9, 22)? Haec enim ut consequenter iuxta suas fabulas praeceptor tuus arguit, cuius in libro posui superiore commenta, qui omnia corpora facta a Deo pernegat; ita tu impudenter contrectare ausus es, qui creatorem Deum fateris (timendo licet) corporum, quorum sensum adscribis principi tenebrarum; quod certe tanta veritatis potestate detritum est, quanta fide dictum ab Evangelista: Quia per Deum facta sunt omnia, et sine ipso factum est nihil (Io 1, 3).
Your teaching, then, follows, that by a long restoration of the right of return you represent to us the comeliness of the Cynics, and that you perform in the eyes of the city the things which are natural, because they were made by God. Do you perceive with what veiled eyes you have leaped upon my opinion, by which I said: In order to express the fidelity of the works, the Prophet came near the peril of shame (De nupt. et concup. 2.9.22)? For just as your teacher accused these things consistently in accordance with his own fables—whose fabrications I set down in the earlier book, who utterly denies all bodies to have been made by God—so you have shamelessly dared to handle them, you who confess God to be the creator (though through fear) of bodies, whose sense you ascribe to the prince of darkness; which is certainly worn down by as great a power of truth as the faith with which it was said by the Evangelist: For all things were made through God, and without him was made nothing (John 1:3).
Iulianum.4.43AUG. Numquid posses in carnis concupiscentia vel libidine bestias hominibus comparare, nisi etiam illos primos parentes generis humani tamquam corruptibilia gerentes corpora, etiamsi non peccassent, crederes fuisse morituros? Ac hoc in haeresis vestrae errore novitio sic catholica damnat Ecclesia, ut Pelagius princeps vester id sibi inter cetera obiectum apud quattuordecim episcopos orientales, a quibus iudicibus audiebatur, damnationis suae timore damnaret. In quo iudicio profecto etiam tu ipse damnatus es, qui dicis Adam ita factum, ut sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset; contradicens Apostolo dicenti: Corpus mortuum est propter peccatum (Rom 8, 10).
Augustine: Could you compare beasts to human beings in the concupiscence of the flesh or in lust, unless you also believed that those first parents of the human race—as bearing, so to speak, corruptible bodies—would have died even if they had not sinned? And this, in the novel error of your heresy, the Catholic Church so condemns that Pelagius, your leader, condemned it, among other things charged against him before fourteen Eastern bishops, by whom as judges he was being heard—condemned it through fear of his own condemnation. In which judgment surely you yourself too were condemned, who say that Adam was so made that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he would die, contradicting the Apostle who says: The body is dead on account of sin (Rom 8:10).
Iulianum.4.43Porro, si non praecedente peccato moritura illa non erant corpora, utique nec corruptibilia erant, ne beatas animas illas aggravarent: Corpus enim corruptibile, sicut scriptum est, aggravat animam (Sap 9, 15).
Further, if those bodies were not going to die without preceding sin, then certainly they were not corruptible either, lest they weigh down those blessed souls; for the corruptible body, as it is written, weighs down the soul (Wis 9:15).
Iulianum.4.43Ac per hoc, quemadmodum mors atque corruptio belluinis humanisque corporibus potuit non esse communis, quamvis communis eis esset terrena materies; ita potuit nec in propagandis filiis eis esse libido communis; sed aut nulla in hominibus, ut quemadmodum aliis membris ad opera congrua, sic ad opus generandi voluntate motis etiam genitalibus uterentur; aut non talis qualis in bestiis, sed ad nutum serviens, et numquam mentem a cogitationis vigilia, nec ipsa postremo voluptate deponens.
And through this, just as death and corruption could be not common to beastly and human bodies, although the earthly matter was common to them, so lust too could be not common to them in propagating children; but either none in human beings—so that, just as they used the other members, moved by the will, for their fitting works, so they would use the genitals for the work of begetting—or not such as in beasts, but serving at a bidding, and never laying aside the mind from the wakefulness of thought, nor, finally, by pleasure itself.
Iulianum.4.43Nunc autem praecedente peccato, quo humana in deterius natura mutata est, facta sunt ei poenalia, quae sunt naturae pecoris congrua; sed in hoc malo, quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, maior pudoris est causa, quod inter duo, quorum ad nostram pertinet utrumque naturam, et quorum imperare unum, servire alterum debet, exorta est non dolenda tantum, verum etiam multum erubescenda discordia. Quid igitur tibi profuerunt ad rem non pertinentia convocata auxilia Cynicorum; quandoquidem te in hac tui erroris via de via deficientem, nec ea quae hominibus comparasti, iumenta iuvare potuerunt?
But now, with sin preceding, by which human nature was changed for the worse, those things have become penal to it which are fitting to the nature of a beast; but in this evil, by which the flesh desires against the spirit, there is a greater cause of shame, because between two things—both of which pertain to our nature, and of which the one ought to command, the other to serve—there has arisen a discord not only to be grieved over but even much to be blushed at. What, then, have the helps of the Cynics, summoned though they do not pertain to the matter, profited you—since you, failing on this road of your error from the road itself, could not be helped even by the beasts of burden which you compared to human beings?
Iulianum.4.4344. IUL. Tempus admonet ut ad alia transeamus; sed quoniam certum est, nihil te habere quod vendites imperitis auribus praeter verecundiam naturalium; quam brevissime potero, quod putatur superesse, contingam. Quis ergo neget, honestatem hanc, qua genitalia nostra contegimus, pro personis, locis, officiis moribusque variari? Sic in conventiculis publicis obscenior nuditas, nihil habet turpitudinis in lavacris. Sic alter est cubicularis habitus, seminudus et securus; alter vero forensis, sollicitior et profusior. Quid, quod ad testimonium crebro familiaritatis, respicit negligentia cautionis, et quanto persona aut ignotior aut honoratior adfuerit, tanto diligentior habitus comparatur? Quid, quod nautis et opificibus plerisque nemo vitio nuditatem dedit? Ac ne ista simplicitas personis magis quam negotiis imputetur, more omnium etiam Petrus apostolus, et post resurrectionem Domini nudus in navigio piscabatur (Cf. Io 21, 7).
44. Julian: The time admonishes us to pass on to other things; but since it is certain that you have nothing to peddle to inexperienced ears except shame at natural things, I will touch as briefly as I can on what is thought to remain. Who, then, would deny that this honorableness, by which we cover our genitals, is varied according to persons, places, offices, and customs? Thus in public gatherings nakedness is more obscene, while in the baths it has nothing of baseness. Thus one manner of dress is for the bedchamber, half-naked and untroubled; another for the forum, more anxious and more ample. What of the fact that negligence of caution often looks to a testimony of familiarity, and the more unknown or more honored the person present, the more diligent the dress provided? What of the fact that no one has counted nakedness a fault in sailors and most craftsmen? And, lest this simplicity be imputed to persons rather than to occupations, by the custom of all, even the apostle Peter, and after the resurrection of the Lord, was fishing naked in the boat (See John 21:7).
Iulianum.4.44Dirige hinc oculos ad medicantum munera; ducunt artem studio salutis in locos pudoris. Athletis nuditas etiam decora est. Iam vero non solum adolescentulis, et petulanti sibi societate coniunctis, sed etiam totis quibusdam gentibus uterque sexus retectus, et sine secreti est electione commixtio. Quid tamen mirum, si id Scotus vicinarumque gentium barbaries agat; cum et philosophia, cuius supra commemorationem fecimus idem censuerit, et Traducianorum huc dogma pervenerit?
Direct your eyes from here to the offices of physicians; they lead their art, in the zeal for health, into the places of shame. To athletes nakedness is even seemly. And now not only among young men joined to one another by a wanton fellowship, but even among certain whole nations, both sexes are uncovered, and union is without any choice of secrecy. Yet what wonder is it if the Scot and the barbarism of neighboring nations do this, when both the philosophy of which we made mention above judged the same, and the teaching of the Traducianists has come to this point?
Iulianum.4.44Quae ergo pudoris tenebitur quantitas, quive limes inter tot eius diversitates, atque inter coeptus partim necessarios, partim societate defensos, per quem possit doceri, diabolum naturalem ardorem sexibus miscuisse? Ac per hoc, ut praesidium opinionis tuae constat, officiis, locis, moribus, artibus et totis simul gentibus dissolutum; ita remansit invictum, quod nos ipsa ratione et apostolo Paulo docente defendimus, omnia corpora, omnia membra corporum, omnesque sensus corporum, Deum auctorem universorum creasse; sed ita ordinasse, ut quaedam in membris nostris pro opportunitatibus temporum amiciret pudor, quaedam honestas naturalis offerret, quibus tam indecorum esset tegimen adhiberi, quam importune genitalium vulgare secretum.
What measure of shame, then, will be held, or what boundary among so many of its diversities, and among undertakings partly necessary, partly defended by fellowship, through which it could be taught that the devil mixed natural ardor into the sexes? And through this, just as the support of your opinion is found dissolved by offices, places, customs, arts, and whole nations together, so there has remained invincible what we defend by reason itself and with the apostle Paul teaching: that God, the author of all things, created all bodies, all the members of bodies, and all the senses of bodies; but ordained them in such a way that certain things in our members shame would clothe according to the opportunities of the times, while others natural honorableness would offer, for which it would be as unseemly to apply a covering as it is inopportune to make public the secrecy of the genitals.
Iulianum.4.44AUG. Tu potius importune culpa importunitatis aspergis eos, de quibus ait Scriptura divina: Nudi erant, et non confundebantur (Gen 2, 25). Et certe tunc ita recti erant, ut recti facti erant: Fecit enim Deus, sicut legimus, hominem rectum (Eccle 7, 30). Illo ergo tempore tantae rectitudinis suae, numquid tam pravi erant, ut imprudenter, impudenter, inhoneste, importune, genitalium secreta vulgarent?
Augustine: You rather inopportunely sprinkle the fault of inopportuneness upon those of whom divine Scripture says: They were naked, and were not confounded (Gen 2:25). And certainly they were then as upright as they had been made upright; for God, as we read, made man upright (Eccl 7:30 (7:29)). At that time, then, of so great an uprightness of theirs, were they so depraved as to make public, imprudently, shamelessly, dishonorably, inopportunely, the secrecy of the genitals?
Iulianum.4.44Agnosce igitur nondum fuisse causam pudendi, quando nondum pudenda erant illa membra, quae nunc proprie pudenda dicuntur. Non enim habitabat in membris lex repugnans legi mentis, sine qua nunc nascitur nemo. Nondum fuerat iusto iudicio Dei, qui merito deseruit desertorem, inoboedienti homini suae carnis inoboedientia retributa. Neque enim non est carnis inoboedientia contra spiritum concupiscere, quamvis etiam spiritu contra eam concupiscente non sinatur quod conatur implere. Hoc ergo nondum erat, quando nudi erant, et non confundebantur. Non itaque illi vera nuditate importune genitalium secreta vulgabant: sed adhuc importunum nihil in genitalibus senserant.
Acknowledge, then, that there was not yet a cause for shame, when those members were not yet shameful which now are properly called shameful. For there did not dwell in their members a law fighting against the law of the mind, without which no one is now born. There had not yet been rendered, by the just judgment of God who deservedly forsook the forsaker, to the disobedient human being the disobedience of his own flesh. For it is indeed the disobedience of the flesh to desire against the spirit, although, with the spirit too desiring against it, it is not allowed to accomplish what it attempts. This, then, did not yet exist, when they were naked and were not confounded. And so they did not, by a true nakedness, inopportunely make public the secrecy of the genitals; but they had not yet felt anything inopportune in the genitals.
Iulianum.4.44Quid colligis verba inania, tamquam folia levia, quibus et tu contegas carnalem contentionem tuam contra spiritalem auctoritatem, quasi concupiscentem contra spiritum carnem? Quid quaeris quae pudoris tenenda sit quantitas, sive limes, inter tot eius diversitates, quae fiunt diversis necessitatibus, artibus, opinionibus, moribus, sive rectis, sive perversis? Ecce habes homines, non alicuius gentis, sicut Scotos, sed parentes omnium gentium; non aliqua prava opinione depravatos, sicut Cynicos, et quoslibet alios similis irreverentiae deformitate foedatos, sed a Deo conditos rectos; non opere alicuius necessitatis obstrictos, sicut Petri nuditas fuit, qua te putasti esse velandum, sed in deliciarum paradiso liberos; ipsos aspice, ante peccatum ostentatores libertatis, post peccatum doctores pudoris.
Why do you gather empty words, like light leaves, with which you too may cover your carnal contention against spiritual authority—as it were a flesh desiring against the spirit? Why do you ask what measure of shame must be held, or what boundary, among so many of its diversities, which come about by various necessities, arts, opinions, customs, whether upright or perverse? See, you have human beings—not of some nation, like the Scots, but the parents of all nations; not depraved by some depraved opinion, like the Cynics and any others befouled by the deformity of a like irreverence, but founded upright by God; not bound by the work of any necessity, like Peter's nakedness, by which you thought you must be veiled, but free in the paradise of delights; look at these very ones—before sin displayers of liberty, after sin teachers of shame.
Iulianum.4.44Ante peccatum nudi erant, et non confundebantur; post peccatum de nuditate confusi sunt. Ante peccatum genitalia nondum pudenda sine tegimine reliquerunt; post peccatum genitalia iam pudenda texerunt. Hi ergo testes satis idonei, et Pelagianorum pervicaciam, et quarumdam gentium Cynicorumque impudentiam, prius non pudenda, et postea pudenda nuditate sua convincunt.
Before sin they were naked, and were not confounded; after sin they were confounded at their nakedness. Before sin they left the not-yet-shameful genitals without covering; after sin they covered the now-shameful genitals. These, then, are witnesses suitable enough, and they convict both the obstinacy of the Pelagians and the shamelessness of certain nations and of the Cynics—by their nakedness, before not shameful, and afterward shameful.
Iulianum.4.4445. IUL. Hoc igitur in praesenti opere, quantum res acta pertulit, absoluto, venio ad illud quod dixisti, in Christo hanc naturalem concupiscentiam non fuisse. Sic enim obloqueris mihi: Sed iste in his omnibus noluit nominare concupiscentiam carnis, quae non est a Patre, sed ex mundo est; cuius mundi princeps dictus est diabolus; qui eam in Domino non invenit, quia Dominus homo non per ipsam ad homines venit (De nupt. et concup. 2, 2, 5). Pronuntiasti ergo Christum, quem verum per omnia hominem fides catholica confitetur, hanc concupiscentiam, quam dicit Ioannes apostolus, in sua non habuisse carne. Sed Ioannes, ut eius dicta docuerunt, concupiscentiam carnis, et concupiscentiam oculorum, cum omni mundo ex Patre non esse pronuntiat (Cf. 1 Io 2, 16); quod nos quemadmodum intellegi deberet ostendimus.
45. Julian: This, then, in the present work being resolved as far as the matter treated allowed, I come to what you said—that in Christ this natural concupiscence did not exist. For thus you gainsay me: But this man, in all these things, was unwilling to name the concupiscence of the flesh, which is not from the Father but is from the world, of which world the devil is called the prince; who did not find it in the Lord, because the Lord, as man, did not come to human beings through it (De nupt. et concup. 2.2.5). You pronounced, then, that Christ—whom the Catholic faith confesses to be true man through all things—did not have in his flesh this concupiscence of which the apostle John speaks. But John, as his words have taught, pronounces that the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, along with the whole world, are not from the Father (See 1 John 2:16); which we have shown how it ought to be understood.
Iulianum.4.45AUG. Ostendisti quidem, sed quemadmodum tu intellegeres, vel potius non intellegeres, non quemadmodum deberet intellegi; de qua re tibi in ipsa tua non veraci, sed loquaci disputatione, certans pro veritate respondi.
Augustine: You showed, indeed—but how you understood it, or rather did not understand it, not how it ought to be understood; about which matter I answered you, in your own disputation, not truthful but loquacious, contending for the truth.
Iulianum.4.4546. IUL. Tu vero nomen ipsum concupiscentiae amplexatus, vis a Christi corpore tam oculorum sensum abfuisse, quam viscerum.
46. Julian: But you, having embraced the very name of concupiscence, wish the sense of the eyes to have been as absent from the body of Christ as that of the inner parts.
Iulianum.4.46AUG. Ista non diceres, si tu sanum sensum, non corporis, sed animi haberes.
Augustine: You would not say these things, if you had a sound sense—not of the body, but of the mind.
Iulianum.4.4647. IUL. Hic igitur ut adsit toto animo lector, admoneo; videbit enim Apollinaristarum haeresim, sed cum Manichaei per te adiectione reparari. Apollinaris quippe primo talem incarnationem Christi induxisse fertur, ut diceret solum corpus de humana substantia assumptum videri, pro anima vero ipsam fuisse deitatem; Christusque non hominem, sed cadaver videretur hominis suscepisse. Quod posteaquam coepit tam rationis quam Evangelii attestatione convelli, videlicet quia hoc ipso necesse erat totum illud falsitatis argui, quod hominem se Christus dixerat, quem veritatem locutum persequebantur Iudaei, si erat ab eo caro sola suscepta, cum homo nisi anima simul et corpus esse non posset; vel quod in Evangelio dixerat: In potestate habeo ponere animam meam, et in potestate habeo iterum sumere eam (Io 10, 18). Quae enim anima poneretur, si assumpta non fuerat? Cum ergo auctoritate talium testimoniorum et perspicuae rationis eversus fuisset, excogitavit aliud unde eius haeresis, quae perdurat hactenus, nasceretur; et dixit, animam quidem humanam in Christo fuisse, sed sensus in eo corporis non fuisse, atque impassibilem eum pronuntiavit universis exstitisse peccatis.
47. Julian: Here, then, I admonish the reader to be present with his whole mind; for he will see the heresy of the Apollinarians, but, through you, repaired with an addition of the Manichean. For Apollinaris is reported first to have introduced such an incarnation of Christ as to say that only the body seemed to be assumed from human substance, but that in place of the soul the deity itself was; and that Christ seemed to have taken up not a man, but the corpse of a man. After this began to be torn apart by the attestation both of reason and of the Gospel—namely, because by this very thing it was necessary that all that be convicted of falsity, since Christ had said he was a man, whom the Jews persecuted as one speaking the truth, if only flesh had been assumed by him, since a man cannot exist except as soul and body together; or because in the Gospel he had said: I have power to lay down my soul, and I have power to take it up again (John 10:18). For what soul would be laid down, if it had not been assumed?—when, then, he had been overturned by the authority of such testimonies and of plain reason, he devised something else, from which his heresy, which endures to this day, was born; and he said that a human soul indeed was in Christ, but that the senses of the body were not in him, and pronounced him to have been impassible to all sins.
Iulianum.4.47AUG. Sanctae memoriae Cyprius episcopus Epiphanius in opusculo quod de haeresibus edidit, dixit Apollinaristarum quosdam in Domino Iesu Christo divinitati corpus consubstantiale dixisse; alios autem negasse quod animam sumpserit; alios propter quod dictum est: Verbum caro factum est (Io 1, 14), contendisse, non eum carnem sumpsisse de creata carne, id est, Mariae, sed Verbum carnem factum; postea vero nescio quid cogitantes dixisse quod non sumpserit mentem. Quod ergo affirmas Apollinaristas asseverasse in Christo sensus corporis non fuisse, eumque illos pronuntiasse impassibilem; nec uspiam legi, nisi in hoc libro tuo, nec aliquando ab aliquo audivi. Sed quoniam video te quaerere ubi expandas vaniloquia tua, ut cum sis verbosus, videaris esse copiosus, cito respondeo: Quisquis credit vel illa quae Apollinaristas dicere supra commemoravi, vel non habuisse Christum corporis sensus, atque impassibilem fuisse, anathema sit. Ut vero te quoque possis agnoscere: Quisquis credit carnem Christi contra spiritum concupisse, anathema sit.
Augustine: Epiphanius, bishop of Cyprus, of holy memory, in the little work which he published on heresies, said that some of the Apollinarians said the body in the Lord Jesus Christ was consubstantial with the divinity; that others denied that he assumed a soul; that others, on account of what is said: The Word was made flesh (John 1:14), contended that he did not assume flesh from created flesh, that is, from Mary, but that the Word was made flesh; but afterward, thinking I know not what, said that he did not assume a mind. But that the Apollinarians asserted the senses of the body were not in Christ, and pronounced him impassible—this I have neither read anywhere except in this book of yours, nor ever heard from anyone. But since I see that you seek where to spread out your empty talk, so that, being verbose, you may seem to be abundant, I answer quickly: Whoever believes either those things which I mentioned above that the Apollinarians said, or that Christ did not have the senses of the body and was impassible—let him be anathema. But that you too may recognize yourself: Whoever believes that the flesh of Christ desired against the spirit—let him be anathema.
Iulianum.4.4748. IUL. Non qui virtute iudicii delicta vitasset; sed qui felicitate carnis a nostris sensibus sequestratae, cupiditatem vitiorum sentire nequivisset.
48. Julian: Not one who by the power of judgment had avoided faults, but one who, by the felicity of a flesh set apart from our senses, could not have felt the cupidity of vices.
Iulianum.4.48AUG. Non dicimus nos: Christum felicitate carnis a nostris sensibus sequestratae, cupiditatem vitiorum sentire non potuisse, sed dicimus, eum perfectione virtutis, et non per carnis concupiscentiam procreata carne, cupiditatem non habuisse vitiorum. Aliud est enim non habuisse cupiditatem malam; aliud non eam potuisse sentire; sensisset enim si habuisset; non enim sensus ei defuit quo eam sentiret, sed voluntas adfuit qua non haberet.
Augustine: We do not say that Christ, by the felicity of a flesh set apart from our senses, could not feel the cupidity of vices; but we say that he, by the perfection of virtue, and with his flesh begotten not through the concupiscence of the flesh, did not have the cupidity of vices. For it is one thing not to have had an evil cupidity, another not to have been able to feel it; for he would have felt it if he had had it; for the sense was not lacking to him by which he would feel it, but the will was present by which he would not have it.
Iulianum.4.48Nec mireris Christum, quamvis hominem verum, tamen per omnia bonum, noluisse habere cupiditatem malam. Nam quis praeter vos cupiditatem negat esse malam, qua cupiuntur mala? quis, inquam, praeter vos persuadere conatur non esse vitium, quam cupiditatem confitetur esse vitiorum; et non esse malum, cui suadenti si consentiatur fit opus malum? Hanc cupiditatem Christus et sentire posset, si haberet; et habere, si vellet; sed absit ut vellet.
And do not wonder that Christ, although true man, yet good through all things, was unwilling to have an evil cupidity. For who except you denies that the cupidity is evil by which evils are desired? Who, I say, except you tries to persuade that it is not a fault, which he confesses to be the cupidity of vices; and that it is not an evil, to which, if consent be given as it persuades, an evil work comes about? This cupidity Christ both could feel, if he had it, and have, if he willed; but far be it that he should will it.
Iulianum.4.48Verumtamen si haberet cupiditatem malam, atque ut tuo verbo utar, cupiditatem vitiorum ab ipsius voluntate in illo esse coepisset; quia non cum illa est natus, ut nos. Ac per hoc, illius virtus haec erat, eam non habere; nostra virtus est, ei non consentire; et in hoc illum imitari, ut quemadmodum ipse peccatum non fecit, eam non habendo, ita nec nos faciamus, non ei consentiendo; et quemadmodum ipse eam voluit et potuit non habere, sic ea nos velimus, quia poterimus, carere. Eius quippe gratia nos liberabit de corpore mortis huius, hoc est, de carne peccati, qui venit ad nos in similitudinem carnis peccati, non in carne peccati.
Yet if he had an evil cupidity—and, to use your word, a cupidity of vices—it would have begun to be in him from his own will; because he was not born with it, as we are. And through this, his virtue was this: not to have it; our virtue is: not to consent to it; and in this to imitate him, so that, just as he himself did not commit sin by not having it, so neither may we commit it, by not consenting to it; and just as he himself willed and was able not to have it, so may we will to be free of it, because we shall be able. For his grace will set us free from the body of this death, that is, from the flesh of sin—he who came to us in the likeness of sinful flesh, not in the flesh of sin.
Iulianum.4.4849. IUL. Tam gravi, ut res indicat, in fidem Catholicorum adulatione, non solum nihil necessaria, verum etiam profana. Cum enim vult ostendere plus aliquid fuisse in Christi corpore, ne carnis nostrae communione vilesceret, naturalium eum sensuum integritate fraudavit; non videns in quantum iret exitium damnum veritatis vel adulatione corruptae.
49. Julian: With so grave a flattery toward the faith of Catholics, as the matter indicates, not only nothing necessary, but even profane. For when he wishes to show that there was something more in the body of Christ, lest it grow cheap by fellowship with our flesh, he defrauded him of the integrity of natural senses; not seeing into how great a ruin the loss of truth, even though corrupted by flattery, would go.
Iulianum.4.49Infremuit quippe a Catholicis excitata praescriptio; quia apud talem fidem maius damnum mysteria Christi, quam membra perferrent. Si enim propter hoc, inquiunt, factus est Christus ex semine David (Cf. Rom 1, 3), factus ex muliere, factusque sub lege (Cf. Gal 4, 4), ut nobis daret exemplum, et sequeremur vestigia eius, qui peccatum non fecit, nec inventus est dolus in ore eius (Cf. 1 Pt 2, 12. 22); nec tamen per omnia substantiae nostrae induit proprietatem, si vel carnem sine anima, vel hominem sine sensibus, quibus nos imbuit natura, gestavit, exempli formam et legis non docetur implesse.
For a prescription, roused by the Catholics, raged; because with such a faith the mysteries of Christ would suffer a greater loss than his members. For if for this reason, they say, Christ was made of the seed of David (See Rom 1:3), made of a woman, and made under the law (See Gal 4:4), that he might give us an example, and that we might follow the footsteps of him who committed no sin, nor was deceit found in his mouth (See 1 Pet 2:12, 22); and yet he did not put on through all things the property of our substance, if he bore either flesh without a soul, or a man without the senses with which nature imbues us, he is not taught to have fulfilled the form of the example and of the law.
Iulianum.4.49Quid enim fuit laude dignum, contemnere illecebras sensuum, quarum incapax erat beneficio naturae? Quid mirum, cohibere oculos carnis suae auxilio non vagantes? Quid magnum, abducere ab illecebrosis odoribus nares, quibus nescirent patere? Quid stupendum, tenere arduam quotidie in epulis parcitatem, quarum nequibat irritamenta sentire? Quid postremo ardui haberent in quadragesimum diem prolata ieiunia, si esuries molesta esse non poterat? Quid venerationis disciplina aurium mereretur, numquam nisi honestarum vocum receptrix, si nativam patiebatur in indebitas surditatem? Quae autem gloria castitatis, si virilitas magis aberat quam voluntas, et quod putabatur fieri de vigore animi, veniebat de debilitate membrorum?
For what was worthy of praise in despising the enticements of the senses, of which he was incapable by the benefit of nature? What wonder is it to restrain the eyes of his flesh, not wandering by their own help? What great thing to lead away from enticing odors the nostrils, to which they could not lie open? What astonishing thing to hold daily an arduous sparingness at banquets, whose allurements he could not feel? What, finally, would the fasts prolonged to the fortieth day have of difficulty, if hunger could not be troublesome? What veneration would the discipline of the ears deserve, never the receiver of any but honorable voices, if it suffered a native deafness to unwarranted ones? But what glory of chastity is there, if virility was absent rather than the will, and what was thought to be done by the vigor of the mind came from the weakness of the members?
Iulianum.4.49AUG. Merito dicuntur haec, non contra Apollinarem vel Apollinaristarum aliquem, quos dixisse non arbitror Christi carnem non habuisse humani corporis sensus, sed contra quemlibet quisquis hoc dicit. Nos autem illum et pulchra ac deformia per oculos sensisse dicimus, et suaveolentia et graveolentia sensisse per nares, et sensu aurium percepisse canora et absurda, et a dulcibus amara discrevisse gustando, et aspera ac lenia, dura ac mollia, frigida et calida diiudicasse tangendo; et quidquid aliud corporis sensu sentiri et percipi potest, sentire ac percipere potuisse; nec ei possibilitatem, si voluisset, defuisse generandi; et tamen eius carnem numquam contra spiritum concupisse.
Augustine: These things are deservedly said—not against Apollinaris or any of the Apollinarians, who I do not think said that the flesh of Christ did not have the senses of a human body, but against anyone whoever says this. But we say both that he sensed beautiful and unsightly things through his eyes, and sensed sweet-smelling and foul-smelling things through his nostrils, and perceived by the sense of the ears melodious and discordant things, and discerned bitter from sweet by tasting, and judged rough and smooth, hard and soft, cold and hot by touching; and whatever else can be sensed and perceived by the sense of the body, he could sense and perceive; nor was the possibility of begetting lacking to him, if he had willed it; and yet his flesh never desired against the spirit.
Iulianum.4.49Quod si propterea magnum honum est, ut putas, abstinere a delictis, quia non desunt libidines quae vincantur, non autem magnum esset, si defuissent; tanto quisque erit in virtute laudabilior, quanto fuerit in carne libidinosior. Ac per hoc Christus, secundum istam vestram horribilem et detestabilem pravitatem, sicut in virtute omnium hominum maximus, ita esse in carne libidinosissimus debuit. Quod quanta sentiatur impietate, si sentis, sententiam mutare ne differas; et libidines discernere a sensibus, quae sentiuntur potius in quibusque, quam sentiunt; ne tanto quisque videatur sensu esse vivacior, quanto fuerit libidine ardentior; et tanto Christus arsisse credatur libidinibus acrioribus, quanto viguit purioribus sensibus.
But if for this reason it is a great good, as you suppose, to abstain from faults, because there are not lacking lusts to be conquered, but it would not be a great thing if they had been lacking, then each one will be the more praiseworthy in virtue the more lustful he has been in the flesh. And through this Christ, according to this horrible and detestable depravity of yours, just as he was the greatest of all human beings in virtue, so ought to have been the most lustful of all in the flesh. With how great an impiety this is perceived, if you perceive it, do not delay to change your opinion; and distinguish lusts from senses—lusts which are rather sensed in things than do the sensing—lest each one seem to be the more vigorous in sense the more ardent he has been in lust, and Christ be believed to have burned with sharper lusts the more he flourished with purer senses.
Iulianum.4.4950. IUL. Quae postremo palma tolerantiae, si dolor vulnerum et verberum, intercepto itinere sensuum, pertingere ad animum non valebat? Quo ergo profecit Apollinaris adulatio? Videlicet ut omnis virtutum pulchritudo, quam in se Christus expresserat, indebitis naturae eius laudibus vacuata flaccesceret, cunctoque veritatis suae splendore nudata sacrum magisterium Mediatoris offerret irrisui.
50. Julian: What, finally, would be the palm of endurance, if the pain of wounds and of beatings, the path of the senses being intercepted, could not reach the soul? To what, then, did the flattery of Apollinaris advance? Namely, to this: that all the beauty of the virtues which Christ had expressed in himself should, emptied by praises not owed to his nature, grow flabby, and, stripped of all the splendor of its truth, should offer the sacred teaching office of the Mediator to mockery.
Iulianum.4.50Huc accedebat quoniam non solum operum suorum perdebat insignia, nativitate, non virtute felicior; sed etiam fraudis criminibus urgebatur, si indiceret mortalibus: Extendimini ad patientiam hominis nihil sentientis, et venite per veras cruces ad virtutes corporis falsi nihil dolentis; vel: Imitamini castitatem, certa naturae vestrae irritamenta vincentes, illius quem debilitas fecit pudicum videri. Certe nihil profanius, nihil scelestius talibus excogitari commentis potest.
To this was added that he not only lost the marks of his works, being more fortunate by birth than by virtue, but was even pressed by charges of fraud, if he should declare to mortals: Stretch yourselves to the endurance of a man feeling nothing, and come through true crosses to the virtues of a false body feeling no pain; or: Imitate the chastity, conquering the certain incitements of your nature, of him whom weakness made seem chaste. Certainly nothing more profane, nothing more wicked, can be devised than such fabrications.
Iulianum.4.50Et Apollinaris omnia ista non dixerat; per illud unum quod pronuntiarat, homini Christo defuisse eos sensus, qui a natura inditi, non usu, sed excessu ad vitia labuntur; haec omnia quae a Catholicis relata sunt, praeiudicio opinionis suae mutus excepit. Horum quippe cunctorum affirmatione construitur catholica fides, quorum negatione vel consecutione Apollinaris haeresis compacta est atque damnata.
And Apollinaris had not said all these things; but through that one thing which he had pronounced—that to the man Christ those senses were lacking which, implanted by nature, slip into vices not by use but by excess—he, mute, received all these things which were brought forward by the Catholics, by the prejudgment of his own opinion. For by the affirmation of all these the Catholic faith is constructed, and by their denial or their consequence the heresy of Apollinaris was put together and condemned.
Iulianum.4.50Tu igitur conice quid de te debeat iudicari, qui commixtionem sexuum damnas, ut Manichaeus; naturam carnis Christi a communione hominum sequestras, secundum Manichaeos; concupiscentiam carnis accusas, iuxta praeceptoris tui dicta Manichaei; dicis concupiscentiam sensuum in Christi corpore non fuisse, vel secundum Manichaeos vel secundum Apollinaristas; et tamen vis a nobis nec Apollinarista, nec Manichaeus vocari.
You, then, gather what ought to be judged of you, who condemn the union of the sexes, like a Manichean; set apart the nature of the flesh of Christ from fellowship with human beings, according to the Manicheans; accuse the concupiscence of the flesh, according to the sayings of your teacher the Manichean; say that the concupiscence of the senses was not in the body of Christ, either according to the Manicheans or according to the Apollinarians; and yet you wish to be called by us neither an Apollinarian nor a Manichean.
Iulianum.4.50Quamquam do manus, praestoque beneficium; nec nos liberalitatis poenitet; per me ut Apollinaris sectator non videaris licebit; minoris quippe est ille impietatis inventor; per te autem non licet ut voceris aliud quam Manichaeus.
Although I yield, and grant the favor; nor do we regret the liberality; through me it will be permitted that you not seem a follower of Apollinaris—for he is the inventor of a lesser impiety; but through yourself it is not permitted that you be called anything other than a Manichean.
Iulianum.4.50AUG. Nec Apollinarista, nec Manichaeus fuit, sed haereticorum expugnator Ambrosius, qui per tuam susceptam quidquid hominum nasceretur, sine delicto dixit esse non posse, apostolum Paulum, sicut oportuit, et intellegens et exponens. Tu autem tanto magis adiuvas Manichaeos, quod saepissime ostendi, quanto magis ab eis te esse arbitraris alienum; es autem novus haereticus Pelagianus, in disputatione loquacissimus, in contentione calumniosissimus, in professione fallacissimus. Nihil enim quod dicas inveniens, inania multa dicis, falsum crimen Catholicis obicis, catholicum te esse mentiris.
Augustine: Neither an Apollinarian nor a Manichean, but the assailant of heretics was Ambrose, who said that, through this thing you have taken up, whatever of human beings is born cannot be without fault, understanding and expounding the apostle Paul, as was fitting. But you so much the more aid the Manicheans—which I have very often shown—the more you suppose yourself to be alien from them; but you are a new Pelagian heretic, in disputation most loquacious, in contention most slanderous, in profession most deceitful. For, finding nothing to say, you say many empty things, charge the Catholics with a false crime, and lie that you are a Catholic.
Iulianum.4.5051. IUL. Ostendi quidem in tertio libello primi operis mei, irrefutabiliter necesse esse dici etiam Christum reatum de Mariae carne traxisse, si crederetur naturale peccatum; eumque a te sub potestate diaboli collocari, qui affirmares ad ius diaboli hominum universam pertinere substantiam.
51. Julian: I showed, indeed, in the third book of my first work, that it is irrefutably necessary to say that Christ too drew guilt from the flesh of Mary, if a natural sin were believed; and that he is placed by you under the power of the devil, you who affirm that the whole substance of human beings pertains to the right of the devil.
Iulianum.4.51AUG. Quod in tertio tuo libro te ostendisse commemoras, quinto meo te non ostendisse convici.
Augustine: What you mention you showed in your third book, I convicted you of not having shown in my fifth.
Iulianum.4.5152. IUL. Et ideo hoc in praesentiarum relicto, illud efflagito, ubi tu legeris Christum eunuchum fuisse naturaliter.
52. Julian: And therefore, leaving this for the present, I demand that other thing: where you have read that Christ was naturally a eunuch.
Iulianum.4.52AUG.Tu enim ubi me hoc dixisse legisti, nisi quia calumniaris, ut soles? Aliud est possibilitas seminandorum filiorum, quam Christi carni defuisse non dicimus, sicut deesse carni novimus eunuchorum; et aliud est cupiditas vitiorum, quam tu persuadere conaris habuisse Christum, et iactas te esse christianum; quia videlicet,
Augustine: Where have you read that I said this, except that you slander, as you are wont? The possibility of sowing children is one thing, which we do not say was lacking to the flesh of Christ, as we know it to be lacking to the flesh of eunuchs; and the cupidity of vices is another, which you try to persuade that Christ had, and you boast that you are a Christian; because, namely,
Iulianum.4.52sicut paulo ante dixisti: Christus etiam fraudis criminibus urgeretur, si diceret mortalibus: Extendimini ad patientiam hominis nihil sentientis; quasi sequatur, ut non sentiat inflictos dolores, qui vult et potest non habere malas cupiditates; vel si diceret, ut tua verba ipse componis: Imitamini castitatem, certa naturae vestrae irritamenta vincentes, illius quem debilitas fecit pudicum videri. Sic enim es amator egregius castitatis, ut tibi castior videatur, qui concubitus illicitos cupit, sed ut non perpetret, suae cupiditati resistit; quam qui talia mala nec saltem cupit, non per impossibilitatem carnis, sed per summitatem perfectionemque virtutis; immo ille sit castus, iste autem omnino nec sit, sed esse tantummodo videatur;
as you said a little before: Christ would even be pressed by charges of fraud, if he said to mortals: Stretch yourselves to the endurance of a man feeling nothing—as though it followed that one who wills and is able not to have evil cupidities does not feel inflicted pains; or if he said, as you yourself compose your words: Imitate the chastity, conquering the certain incitements of your nature, of him whom weakness made seem chaste. For you are so excellent a lover of chastity that to you he seems chaster who desires unlawful intercourse but, in order not to perpetrate it, resists his own cupidity, than he who does not even desire such evils—not through an impossibility of the flesh, but through the height and perfection of virtue; nay rather, that the former is chaste, but the latter is not chaste at all, but only seems to be;
Iulianum.4.52quoniam, secundum te, si castus esset, mala ista cuperet per naturam, sed eamdem naturalem cupiditatem virtute animi coerceret. Ita fit, ut te illa horribilis, sicut iam superius ostendi, sequatur absurditas, tanto esse quemque voluntate castiorem, quanto maiorem naturae suae libidinem vicerit, nec in aliquos excessus luxuriae, quamlibet illa magna sit, exire permiserit; qui autem minorem flagitiorum libidinem cohibet, minus esse castum; quoniam quem non libet quod non licet, secundum tuam sapientiam, vel potius amentiam, omnino nec castus est.
since, according to you, if he were chaste, he would desire those evils by nature, but would curb that same natural cupidity by the virtue of the mind. So it comes about that, as I have already shown above, that horrible absurdity follows you—that each one is the chaster in will the greater the lust of his own nature he has conquered, and not allowed to go out into any excesses of luxury, however great it be; but that one who curbs a lesser lust for outrages is less chaste, since one to whom what is not permitted is not pleasing, according to your wisdom, or rather your madness, is not chaste at all.
Iulianum.4.52Ecce quod Christo importare conaris insane, ut natura fuerit omnium libidinosissimus, quia ita posset voluntatis virtute omnium esse castissimus. Tanto quippe in eo, sicut disputas, continentiae spiritus maior esset, quanto maiorem carnis concupiscentiam coerceret. Ad hunc te interitum tua suscepta nimium dilecta perduxit.
See what you insanely try to impute to Christ—that by nature he was the most lustful of all, so that thus by the virtue of his will he could be the chastest of all. For in him, as you argue, the spirit of continence would be the greater the greater the concupiscence of the flesh he curbed. To this destruction the thing you have taken up, too greatly loved, has led you.
Iulianum.4.5253. IUL. Qui etsi propter signum natus ex Virgine est, et tamen ita aversatus non est sexum virilem, ut eius susciperet veritatem, integer per omnia viscerum, integer corporis, homo verus, vir perfectus, si Petro apostolo creditur in Actibus disserenti (Cf. Act 2, 22. 33); intacta castitate conspicuus, et animum et oculos numquam remisso cordis vigore custodiens; sed quod hoc totum virtute mentis, non carnis infirmitate perfecerit, concupiscentiam carnis totius corporis immixtam sensibus, et veritatem ac sanitatem conditionemque membrorum fuisse in eo, et somnus eius, et cibus, et barba, et sudor, et labor, et crux testatur, et lancea. Non ergo sensus corporis non habuit ille, sed rexit.
53. Julian: Who, although on account of a sign he was born of a Virgin, yet so did not turn away from the male sex as not to take up its truth—whole through all his inner parts, whole in body, true man, perfect male, if the apostle Peter is to be believed discoursing in the Acts (See Acts 2:22, 33); conspicuous in untouched chastity, guarding both his mind and his eyes with the vigor of his heart never relaxed; but that he accomplished all this by the virtue of his mind, not by an infirmity of the flesh—that the concupiscence of the flesh was mixed into the senses of his whole body, and that the truth and soundness and condition of his members were in him, his sleep, and food, and beard, and sweat, and labor, and cross, and lance bear witness. He did not, then, lack the senses of the body, but ruled them.
Iulianum.4.53Hoc est unde Gentibus, unde Manichaeis insultat Catholicorum fides, quia verbum ut crucis, ita carnis eius, pereuntibus stultitia est, salvis autem futuris virtus Dei. Hoc est quod commendavit caritatem suam in nobis; quoniam quae lacerat impietas Manichaei, ea omnia pietas Mediatoris assumpsit. Nihil ergo me pudet in Domino meo; in quae propter salutem meam venit, teneo veritatem membrorum, ut exempli eius soliditatem arcemque suscipiam.
This is whence the faith of Catholics insults the Gentiles, whence it insults the Manicheans: because the word, as of his cross, so of his flesh, is to those perishing folly, but to those to be saved the power of God. This is what commended his love among us, since all those things which the impiety of the Manichean tears apart, the piety of the Mediator assumed. Nothing, then, shames me in my Lord; in the things into which he came for my salvation, I hold the truth of his members, that I may take up the solidity and citadel of his example.
Iulianum.4.53AUG. Aliud est veritas membrorum, quam christianus omnis agnoscit in Christo, aliud cupiditas peccatorum, quam tu importare vis Christo. Dicis enim concupiscentiam carnis, hoc est libidinem, quam libentius vocas concupiscentiam naturalem, bonum esse; et sic arguis eius excessum, ut quisquis eam concessos fines transgredi siverit, tamquam male utens bono, culpam contrahat; quisquis autem illam usque ad licita et concessa ingredi, nec ultra permiserit progredi, tamquam bono bene utens laude sit dignus.
Augustine: The truth of his members, which every Christian acknowledges in Christ, is one thing; the cupidity of sins, which you wish to impute to Christ, is another. For you say that the concupiscence of the flesh, that is, lust, which you more willingly call natural concupiscence, is a good; and you so accuse its excess that whoever has allowed it to transgress the granted bounds contracts a fault, as one using a good badly; but whoever has allowed it to go up to the lawful and granted things, and permitted it to go no further, is worthy of praise, as one using a good well.
Iulianum.4.53Proinde quoniam videmus alios ita esse natos, ut maiore libidine urgeantur, alios ut minore, si ei resistentes utrique sint casti, cogeris dicere illos maiore, istos minore bono bene uti.
Accordingly, since we see that some are so born that they are urged by greater lust, others by lesser, if both, resisting it, are chaste, you are forced to say that the former use a greater good well, the latter a lesser good well.
Iulianum.4.53Erit igitur, te doctore, bono isto tuo quisque tanto copiosior, quanto libidinosior; et tanto laboriosior contra suam libidinem pro castitate certando, quanto abundantior naturali isto bono; et ideo etiam tanto laudabilior in hac virtute, quanto fortius reluctatur maiori bono, quam si minori reluctaretur.
Therefore, with you as teacher, each one will be the more abundant in this good of yours the more lustful he is; and the more laborious in fighting against his own lust for chastity the more plentiful he is in this natural good; and therefore also the more praiseworthy in this virtue the more strongly he struggles against a greater good than if he struggled against a lesser one.
Iulianum.4.53Quia ergo Christus in carne mortali omnium procul dubio castissimus vixit, tanto ei maiorem libidinem dabis naturalem, quanto in libidine cohibenda non potes invenire fortiorem. Sic enim sine fraudis crimine suis dicet: Imitamini castitatem meam, certa naturae vestrae irritamenta vincentes; haec quippe irritamenta bona sunt, sed tamen cohibenda atque vincenda; sicut ego habui, sed cohibui vicique maiora; ne diceretis mihi:
Since, then, Christ lived in mortal flesh without doubt the chastest of all, you will give him the more natural lust the more you cannot find one stronger in curbing lust. For thus, without a charge of fraud, he will say to his own: Imitate my chastity, conquering the certain incitements of your nature; for these incitements are good, but nevertheless must be curbed and conquered; just as I had them, but curbed and conquered greater ones, lest you say to me:
Iulianum.4.53Ideo vicisti, ideo castissimus in tua mortali carne vixisti, quoniam naturae felicitate minimas libidines, quas facillimas vinceres, habuisti. Estote ergo casti, quia ut vobis ad me imitandum obstacula excusationis auferrem, libidinosior vobis nasci volui, et tamen maximam libidinem meam concessos fines numquam transire permisi. Haec horribilia monstra peperit haeresis vestra.
For this reason you conquered, for this reason you lived the chastest in your mortal flesh, because by the felicity of your nature you had the smallest lusts, which you could conquer most easily. Be chaste, then, because—that I might take away from you the obstacles of excuse for imitating me—I willed to be born more lustful than you, and yet I never permitted my greatest lust to cross the granted bounds. These horrible monsters your heresy has brought forth.
Iulianum.4.5354. IUL. Praedico omnem in eo sanctitatem beneficio animi, non carnis stetisse praeiudicio. Sic enim et natura tam conditione eius quam susceptione de fenditur, et vita hominum virtutum illius imitatione dirigitur. De his duobus non potest alterum sine alterius veritate laudari; tantum aderit dignitatis operi sacro, quantum humani corporis adfuerit veritati; et tantum aderit defensioni carnis, quantum sanctitas conversationis exegerit. Atque e regione, vituperatio unius utrique participat; quoniam tantum de virtutibus eius, quantum de artubus auferetur; ac si quid de substantiae solido radatur, universa morum ornamenta depereunt, atque ad tolerantis iniuriam recurrunt damna nascentis; postremo si carnis eius substantia aliqua naturalium ereptione tenuetur, universa evanescit pompa virtutum. Nihil ergo in membris Mediatoris facti ex muliere, quod naturale constat, negabo. Et vide quam diversi sint rationis termini, quam pudoris; non erubescit fides Christianorum, dicere Christum habuisse genitalia; cum tamen ea in nobis, quam honestissime possumus, occulamus.
54. Julian: I declare that all sanctity in him stood by the benefit of the mind, not by the prejudgment of the flesh. For thus both nature is defended, as much by his condition as by his assumption, and the life of human beings is directed by the imitation of his virtues. Of these two, the one cannot be praised without the truth of the other; there will be present to the sacred work as much dignity as there is present to the truth of the human body; and there will be present to the defense of the flesh as much as the sanctity of his manner of life has demanded. And, on the contrary, the disparagement of one shares in both; for as much will be taken away from his virtues as from his limbs; and if anything be scraped from the solidity of his substance, all the ornaments of his morals perish, and the losses of the one being born recur to the injury of the one enduring; finally, if the substance of his flesh be thinned by any removal of natural things, all the pomp of his virtues vanishes. I will deny, then, nothing in the members of the Mediator made of a woman which is established to be natural. And see how different are the boundaries of reason, how different those of shame; the faith of Christians does not blush to say that Christ had genitals, although we hide them in ourselves as most honorably as we can.
Iulianum.4.54AUG. Non quidem erubescit fides Christianorum, dicere Christum habuisse genitalia; sed tu erubescere debuisti, vel potius contremiscere, ne diceres Christi genitalia aliquando, et nolente ipso (non enim hoc umquam velle debuisset qui vitam caelibem duxit), tamen libidine fuisse commota, et in nonnullos illicitos usus contra eius sanctum propositum se illam partem sancti eius corporis erexisse. Talem quippe libidinem patitur etiam omne genus sanctorum, qualem Sancto sanctorum conaris inferre. Si vero genitalia Christi ipso invito commoveri et erigi solere libidine, non audes dicere; cur audes credere, infelix, cur audes talem libidinem naturae Christi tribuere, ut quod non audes dicere, compellas homines cogitare?
Augustine: The faith of Christians does not indeed blush to say that Christ had genitals; but you ought to have blushed, or rather trembled, lest you say that the genitals of Christ were at some time, and even against his will (for he ought never to have willed this, who led a celibate life), nevertheless moved by lust, and that, against his holy resolve, that part of his holy body raised itself unto certain unlawful uses. For even every kind of saint suffers such lust as you try to impute to the Holy of Holies. But if you do not dare to say that the genitals of Christ were wont, against his will, to be moved and raised by lust, why do you dare to believe—unhappy man—why do you dare to attribute such lust to the nature of Christ, so that what you do not dare to say you compel human beings to think?
Iulianum.4.5455. IUL. Ita natura praescripsit esse quaedam, quae ut ratio, ita fides cum religione pronuntiet; et tamen pudor et decentia conversationis oculis non permittat exponi. Hoc modo Magister etiam Gentium veritatem carni eius assignat, et spiritui sanctitatem. Magnum, inquit, pietatis sacramentum, quod manifestatum est in carne, iustificatum est in spiritu, apparuit Angelis, praedicatum est in Gentibus, creditum est in hoc mundo, assumptum est in gloria (1 Tim 3, 16).
55. Julian: Thus nature has prescribed that there are certain things which reason, as well as faith with religion, may pronounce; and yet shame and the decency of conduct does not permit them to be exposed to the eyes. In this way the Teacher of the Gentiles too assigns truth to his flesh and sanctity to his spirit. Great, he says, is the sacrament of piety, which was manifested in the flesh, justified in the spirit, appeared to the angels, was preached among the Gentiles, was believed in this world, was taken up in glory (1 Tim 3:16).
Iulianum.4.55Quod sicut commendavit cum veritate credendum, ita impugnatores eius in fine denuntiavit saeculi nascituros; nam statim sequitur: In novissimis autem temporibus recedent quidam a fide, attendentes spiritibus seductoribus, doctrinis daemoniorum in hypocrisi mendacia loquentium, cauteriatam habentes conscientiam, prohibentium nubere, abstinere a cibis, quos Deus creavit ad percipiendum cum gratiarum actione fidelibus, et his qui cognoverunt veritatem; quoniam omnis creatura Dei bona (1 Tim 4, 4).
And just as he commended this to be believed with truth, so he announced that its assailants would be born at the end of the age; for at once there follows: But in the last times some will withdraw from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits, to the teachings of demons speaking lies in hypocrisy, having their conscience seared, forbidding to marry, to abstain from foods which God created to be received with thanksgiving by the faithful and by those who have known the truth; for every creature of God is good (1 Tim 4:4).
Iulianum.4.55Hanc ergo Ecclesiarum contaminationem, quam de Manichaei consectatione vomuisti, et hanc a fide recedentium praevaricationem, quae in naturalis mali praedicatione et in commixtionis coniugalis damnatione consistit, et Apostolus praevidit et punivit, non solum quid diceretur, sed etiam quid consequeretur ostendens.
This contamination of the Churches, then, which you have vomited up from your following of the Manichean, and this transgression of those withdrawing from the faith—which consists in the proclamation of natural evil and in the condemnation of conjugal union—both the Apostle foresaw and punished, showing not only what would be said but also what would follow.
Iulianum.4.55AUG. Et tamen tu, qui non potes nisi ructare calumnias, et vomere contumelias, verbis catholici hominis Dei, quem Manichaeum non potes dicere, non ausus es contradicere, suffocantis te, atque dicentis, ex commixtione maris et feminae nasci expertem delicti neminem posse (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Isai). Namque ista verba eius et in primo ad Valerium libro commemoravi, quem libris quattuor redarguere conatus, quidquam inde attingere timuisti; et in isto, cui nunc respondes, eadem ipsa non tacui (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 1, 35, 40; 2, 5, 14-15), et adversus illa adhuc mutus, quamvis eius nomine tacito, cui adversari palam non audes, hunc in me non metuis criminari.
Augustine: And yet you, who can only belch slanders and vomit insults, did not dare to contradict the words of the Catholic man of God—whom you cannot call a Manichean—who chokes you and says that no one born of the union of male and female can be free of fault (See Ambrose, In Isai). For I mentioned these words of his both in the first book to Valerius, which, trying to refute in four books, you feared to touch anything from there; and in this one, to which you now answer, I did not pass over these same words (See De nupt. et concup. 1.35.40; 2.5.14-15); and, still mute against them—though with the name unspoken of the one whom you do not dare to oppose openly—you do not fear to accuse me of this.
Iulianum.4.5556. IUL. Nam hoc quod ait, abstinere a cibis docendum fore, non utique apud prudentem arguit Christianorum parcitatem, aut denuntiat posse existere homines qui inediae discrimen indicant; sed ostendit, quoniam cum exorirentur, qui dicerent animalia omnia victibus a Deo creata mortalium, quia de concupiscentia et commixtione sexus nascerentur, diabolico malo esse polluta, quid consequeretur expressit, videlicet renuntiandum esse alimentis, si eorum propagatio diabolica crederetur. Unde et tu hanc infamationem commixtionis corporum ab animalibus removes, ut subsistat ratio simulandi.
56. Julian: For what he says—that abstaining from foods would be taught—certainly does not, in the eyes of a prudent person, accuse the sparingness of Christians, or announce that there can exist human beings who declare the danger of fasting; but he shows that, since there would arise those who would say that all animals created by God for the sustenance of mortals, because they are born from concupiscence and the union of sex, are polluted by a diabolical evil, he expressed what would follow—namely, that one would have to renounce foods, if their propagation were believed diabolical. Whence you too remove this defamation of the union of bodies from animals, so that the reasoning of your pretense may stand.
Iulianum.4.56Homines tamen qui ad imaginem Dei facti sunt, propter hanc ipsam concupiscentiam generantium, dicis ad ius daemonis pertinere. Ambo igitur, tu et Manichaeus unam habetis causam substantiarum vituperandarum et transcribendarum diabolo; sed ille propter hanc affectionem quae sentitur in naturali opere, universas damnat animantes; tu autem non omnes, sed quod est foedius, meliores. Absolvis enim sues, canes, et asinos, ut Manichaeos vitare videaris; sed damnas, propter hoc idem quod Manichaeus, omnes homines qui ad imaginem Dei facti sunt; ac nusquam malum naturale constituens nisi in imagine Dei, concionaris contra nos, accusator sanctorum et patronus asinorum.
Yet human beings, who were made to the image of God, you say belong to the right of the demon on account of this very concupiscence of those begetting. Both of you, then, you and the Manichean, have one cause for disparaging substances and transcribing them to the devil; but he, on account of this affection which is felt in the natural work, condemns all living things; you, however, not all, but—what is more foul—the better ones. For you absolve pigs, dogs, and asses, so that you may seem to avoid the Manicheans; but you condemn, on account of this same thing as the Manichean, all human beings who were made to the image of God; and, establishing natural evil nowhere except in the image of God, you proclaim against us, an accuser of the saints and a patron of asses.
Iulianum.4.56AUG. Quid est quod dicis, calumniator Catholicorum et adiutor Manichaeorum? Quid est quod dicis? Quem tantae stoliditatis pudere deberet, etiamsi tibi asinina frons esset. Nonne accusator sanctorum et patronus asinorum, ab homine huius cordis cuius et ipse es, appellari posset, qui diceret, ignorantia veritatis homines fieri miseros posse, asinos vero nesciendo veritatem miseros esse non posse? Et tamen verissime diceret.
Augustine: What is it that you say, slanderer of Catholics and helper of Manicheans? What is it that you say, of which one ought to be ashamed at so great a stupidity, even if you had an ass's brow? Could not one be called an accuser of the saints and a patron of asses, by a man of the same heart as you yourself are, who should say that human beings can be made wretched by ignorance of the truth, but that asses cannot be wretched by not knowing the truth? And yet he would say something most true.
Iulianum.4.56Cur ergo non intellegis, asine, similiter esse verum, ex commixtione maris et feminae expertes delicti homines nasci non posse, et asinos posse? An ideo te arbitraris effugere insequentes plagas auctoritatis atque rationis, quia in societate libidinis, ad currum tui erroris, homines et asinos iungis? Non de pecoribus, sed de hominibus loquebatur Ambrosius, ubi ait: Servatum est igitur, ut ex viro et muliere, id est, per illam corporum commixtionem, nemo videatur expers esse delicti (AMBROSIUS, In Isai).
Why, then, do you not understand, ass, that it is likewise true that human beings cannot be born free of fault from the union of male and female, but asses can? Or do you suppose that you escape the pursuing blows of authority and reason because, in the fellowship of lust, you yoke human beings and asses to the chariot of your error? Ambrose was speaking not of cattle but of human beings, where he says: It has therefore been brought about that, from man and woman—that is, through that union of bodies—no one seems to be free of fault (Ambrose, In Isai).
Iulianum.4.56Itane iste, iste doctor Ecclesiae accusator erat sanctorum, et patronus asinorum? Nempe corruptibile corpus est et asini et hominis; et tamen non asini aggravat, sed hominis animam; de homine quippe Scriptura dicit: Corpus corruptibile aggravat animam (Sap 9, 15). Sic ergo et in libidine agnosce, et pecoris naturam, et hominis poenam, si animam non habes asininam.
Was this man, then—this Doctor of the Church—an accuser of the saints and a patron of asses? Surely the body both of the ass and of the human being is corruptible; and yet it weighs down not the soul of the ass but of the human being; for of the human being Scripture says: The corruptible body weighs down the soul (Wis 9:15). So, then, in lust too acknowledge both the nature of the beast and the punishment of the human being, if you do not have an ass's soul.
Iulianum.4.5657. IUL. Christus igitur non minus homo verus, quam verus Deus, nihil de naturalibus minus habuit; sed iustum erat ut qui dabat perfectionis exemplum, omnibus virtutum studiis antecelleret, castitasque eius continua integritate celsa, nullo permota libidinis appetitu, quae virgo sanctae mentis exstiterat, et omnium sensuum domitrix animi magnitudo, et superatrix dolorum, cunctis fidelibus, et humanitate imitabilis fieret, et sublimitate mirabilis.
57. Julian: Christ, then, no less true man than true God, had nothing less of natural things; but it was just that he who gave the example of perfection should excel in all the pursuits of the virtues, and that his chastity, lofty in continuous integrity, moved by no appetite of lust—which had stood forth a virgin of a holy mind—and the greatness of his soul, tamer of all the senses and conqueror of pains, should become, for all the faithful, both imitable in its humanity and admirable in its sublimity.
Iulianum.4.57AUG. Dicis castitatem Christi continua integritate celsam; sed homo es, cui non videtur castitas integra, ubi magnitudine et perfectione voluntatis bonae non solum non committuntur, sed nec cupiuntur illicita. Nam qui concupiscit mala, etsi resistens concupiscentiae suae non ea perpetrat, implet quidem quod scriptum est: Post concupiscentias tuas non eas (Eccli 18, 30); sed non implet quod ait lex: Non concupisces (Ex 20, 17).
Augustine: You say the chastity of Christ was lofty in continuous integrity; but you are a man to whom chastity does not seem integral where, by the greatness and perfection of a good will, not only are unlawful things not committed but not even desired. For one who desires evils, even if, resisting his concupiscence, he does not perpetrate them, fulfills indeed what is written: Do not go after your concupiscences (Sir 18:30); but he does not fulfill what the law says: You shall not covet (Exod 20:17).
Iulianum.4.57Christus ergo qui legem perfectissime implevit, nulla illicita concupivit; quia discordiam carnis et spiritus, quae in hominum naturam ex praevaricatione primi hominis vertit, prorsus ille non habuit, qui de Spiritu et Virgine non per concupiscentiam carnis est natus. In nobis autem caro concupiscit contra spiritum illicita, ita ut omnino perficiat, nisi et contra carnem spiritus ita concupiscat, ut vincat.
Christ, then, who fulfilled the law most perfectly, desired nothing unlawful; because the discord of flesh and spirit, which turned into the nature of human beings from the transgression of the first man, he altogether did not have, who was born of the Spirit and the Virgin, not through the concupiscence of the flesh. But in us the flesh desires unlawful things against the spirit, so that it altogether accomplishes them, unless the spirit too desires against the flesh so as to conquer.
Iulianum.4.57Dicis mentem Christi omnium sensuum domitricem: sed hoc domandum est, quod resistit; caro autem Christi nihil habebat indomitum, nec in aliquo spiritui resistebat, ut ab illo eam domari oporteret. Quo proposito perfectionis exemplo, ad hoc se debet omnis imitator extendere, ut concupiscentias carnis, quas vetat Apostolus perfici (Cf. Gal 5, 16), nitatur atque optet penitus non habere: sic enim eas potest provectu quotidiano minuere, quas nullas habeat salute perfecta.
You say the mind of Christ was the tamer of all the senses; but that must be tamed which resists; the flesh of Christ, however, had nothing untamed, nor in anything did it resist the spirit, so that it needed to be tamed by it. With this example of perfection set before us, every imitator ought to stretch himself to this: that he strive and wish to have, not at all, the concupiscences of the flesh, which the Apostle forbids to be accomplished (See Gal 5:16); for so he can by daily advance lessen those which, with salvation made perfect, he will have not at all.
Iulianum.4.5758. IUL. Tu igitur, ut omnia, profanissime effatus es, in Christi carne non fuisse quod humanae naturae est; quod certe de nulla Scripturae rationabilis vena, sed de solo Manichaeorum coeno deceptus hausisti. Verum ut maior copia defendendae veritatis appareat, concedamus te somniasse, in Christo carnis quam dicis concupiscentiam non fuisse; quod certe in Manichaei prius, postea in Apollinaris furore damnatum est; tuo tamen quid possit dogmati suffragari; cum non continuo sequeretur malum esse, si quid ille assumere noluisset?
58. Julian: You, then, as in all things, have spoken most profanely, that in the flesh of Christ there was not what belongs to human nature; which certainly you have drawn, deceived, from no vein of reasonable Scripture, but from the mire of the Manicheans alone. But, so that a greater abundance of defending the truth may appear, let us grant that you have dreamed that in Christ there was not the concupiscence of the flesh which you speak of—which certainly was condemned first in the fury of the Manichean, afterward in that of Apollinaris; yet what could it support your teaching, since it would not at once follow that it is evil, if he had been unwilling to assume something?
Iulianum.4.58Quoniam gradatim crescentibus meritis bonorum, diceretur isse per optima, nec bona tamen infra se locata superiorum electione damnasse. Quomodo enim nuptias non infamavit, integritatem secutus; ita nec sensum carnis genitalis damnasset, si eius possibilitatem nec in substantia sua habere voluisset.
For, with the deserts of the good growing step by step, he would be said to have gone through the best things, and yet not to have condemned the goods placed below himself by the choice of higher ones. For just as he did not defame marriage by following integrity, so he would not have condemned the sense of the genital flesh, if he had been unwilling to have even its possibility in his own substance.
Iulianum.4.58AUG. Iam superius dixi, quod Christus non solum non perpetravit, sed nec concupivit illicita, ut impleret legem dicentem: Non concupisces (Ex 20, 17). Hoc certe de sanctae Scripturae vena, non de coeno Manichaeorum manat in corda fidelium, quod vestrum dogma exstinguit haereticum. Somniasse me dicis, non fuisse in Christo carnis concupiscentiam spiritui resistentem; cuius tu etiam ipsis somniis non pepercisti. Dormisse quippe novimus Christum, in quo si erat ista tua suscepta, profecto sopitos eius sensus aliquando per talia somnia deludebat, ut sibi etiam concumbere videretur, atque ita caro eius isto tuo bono stimulante commota, et in irritum extenderet genitalia et irrita effunderet semina.
Augustine: I have already said above that Christ not only did not perpetrate but did not even desire unlawful things, so that he fulfilled the law that says: You shall not covet (Exod 20:17). This certainly flows into the hearts of the faithful from the vein of holy Scripture, not from the mire of the Manicheans—this which extinguishes your heretical teaching. You say I dreamed that there was not in Christ a concupiscence of the flesh resisting the spirit; but you have not spared even its dreams. For we know that Christ slept; in whom, if this thing you have taken up was present, surely it sometimes deluded his lulled senses by such dreams, so that he even seemed to himself to be coupling, and so his flesh, stirred by the goading of this good of yours, both raised the genitals in vain and poured out the seed in vain.
Iulianum.4.58Si autem hoc de Christi carne credere contremiscis (non enim sic es lapideus, ut non contremiscas, quod ego, quamvis ut te redarguerem, sine cordis tamen tremore non dixi); profecto fateri debes, naturae Christi non solum sine dispendio defuisse talem carnis concupiscentiam, verum etiam cum perfectarum laude virtutum, qualem concupiscentiam novimus carni ceterorum hominum et ipsorum non deesse sanctorum.
But if you tremble to believe this of the flesh of Christ (for you are not so stony as not to tremble at what I—although in order to refute you—nonetheless did not say without a trembling of heart), then surely you ought to confess that to the nature of Christ such a concupiscence of the flesh was lacking not only without loss but even with the praise of perfect virtues—such a concupiscence as we know is not lacking to the flesh of other human beings, and even of the saints themselves.
Iulianum.4.58Quod autem dicis, non esse consequens ut hoc malum sit, etiamsi concedas id Christum noluisse suscipere; sicut non ideo damnavit nuptias, quia noluit habere coniugium; hoc de libidine pecorum dici potest, quibus ideo non est malum, quia non habent rationis bonum, unde caro eorum non concupiscat adversus spiritum; quod vero resistit spiritui hominis volentis facere bonum, quantalibet loquacitate abs te defendatur, non est bonum. Sic igitur Christus abstinuit a peccato, ut abstineret etiam ab omni cupiditate peccati; non ut ei existenti resisteret, sed ut illa numquam prorsus existeret; non quod eam non posset habere si vellet, sed non recte vellet, quod eum caro peccati quam non gerebat, etiam invitum habere non cogeret.
But what you say—that it does not follow that this is evil, even if you grant that Christ was unwilling to assume it, just as he did not for that reason condemn marriage because he was unwilling to have a wife—this can be said of the lust of beasts, to which it is for this reason not evil, because they do not have the good of reason, whence their flesh does not desire against the spirit; but what resists the spirit of a human being wishing to do good, by however great a loquacity it be defended by you, is not good. So, then, Christ abstained from sin in such a way that he abstained also from all cupidity of sin; not so that he resisted it as existing, but so that it never at all existed; not that he could not have it if he willed, but that he would not rightly will it—since the flesh of sin, which he did not bear, did not compel him to have it even against his will.
Iulianum.4.58Proinde ille vir perfectus, non per concupiscentiam natus, quae indifferenter appetit et illicita et licita, sed de Spiritu Sancto et Virgine Maria, quidquid concupivit, licuit; quidquid non licuit, non concupivit. Natus enim de carne per Sanctum concipiente Spiritum, absit ut in se haberet discordiam carnis et spiritus.
Accordingly, that perfect man, born not through concupiscence—which indifferently seeks both unlawful and lawful things—but of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, whatever he desired was lawful; whatever was not lawful, he did not desire. For, born of flesh with the Holy Spirit conceiving, far be it that he should have in himself the discord of flesh and spirit.
Iulianum.4.5859. IUL. Et ut res plana aliquo confirmetur exemplo, melius est habere rationem, quam non habere; homines autem rationabiles facti sunt, pecora vero irrationabilia; non tamen ideo quia humana natura quadrupedibus antestat, quadrupedia aut malum aliquod, aut diaboli opus esse dicenda sunt. Fac ergo, quoniam Christus, cum sua membra formaret, noluerit eis sensum admiscere genitalium, quo usurus non erat; num ideo cum Isaac, Iacob, et omnium membra fingebat, eisque et sexum dabat et sensum, malum aliquid faciebat? Aut ad haec veniens, in adiutorium advocabat diabolum, ut membris quae ipse compegerat, necessaria oblectamenta misceret? Nec exiguum quidquam igitur omnino (sicut et in hoc, et in priore opere, Deo adiuvante monstravimus) per Christi personam contra divina opera obtinere potuisti. Claruit enim nihil minus de natura hominum, Salvatoris corpus habuisse.
59. Julian: And, that a plain matter may be confirmed by some example: it is better to have reason than not to have it; human beings, moreover, were made rational, but cattle irrational; yet not for that reason, because human nature stands before quadrupeds, are quadrupeds to be said to be some evil or the work of the devil. Grant, then, that Christ, when he formed his members, was unwilling to mix into them the sense of the genitals, which he was not going to use; was he therefore, when he fashioned the members of Isaac, Jacob, and of all, and gave them both sex and sense, doing some evil? Or, coming to this, did he call the devil to his aid, that he might mix necessary delights into the members which he himself had put together? Therefore you could obtain absolutely nothing whatever (as both in this and in the earlier work, with God helping, we have shown) through the person of Christ against the divine works. For it has become clear that the body of the Savior had nothing less of the nature of human beings.
Iulianum.4.59AUG. Immo claruit hominum naturam, ad illam integritatem, rectitudinem, salutem, in qua primitus condita est, minus haec habere nunc omnia. Hanc venit Christus redintegrare, corrigere, atque sanare, integer sine ulla corruptione, rectus sine ulla pravitate, salvus sine ulla cupiditate peccati.
Augustine: Nay rather, it has become clear that human nature now has all these things less than that integrity, uprightness, soundness in which it was first founded. This Christ came to restore, correct, and heal—whole without any corruption, upright without any depravity, sound without any cupidity of sin.
Iulianum.4.5960. IUL. Ac per hoc, in ea natura non potest esse peccatum, cum in illo in quo tota est, nihil iniquitatis inventum est.
60. Julian: And through this, in that nature there cannot be sin, since in him in whom it is whole, no iniquity was found.
Iulianum.4.60AUG. Immaniter, Iuliane, blasphemas, coaequans carnem Christi ceterorum hominum carni; nec videns illum venisse non in carne peccati, sed in similitudine carnis peccati (Cf. Rom 8, 3), quod nullo modo verum esset, nisi ceterorum esset caro peccati.
Augustine: You blaspheme monstrously, Julian, equating the flesh of Christ to the flesh of other human beings; not seeing that he came not in the flesh of sin but in the likeness of sinful flesh (See Rom 8:3)—which would in no way be true, unless the flesh of others were the flesh of sin.
Iulianum.4.6061. IUL. Concupiscentia itaque sexuum, sive in Christi carne fuit, sive non fuit, mala et diabolica non docetur.
61. Julian: And so the concupiscence of the sexes, whether it was in the flesh of Christ or was not, is not taught to be evil and diabolical.
Iulianum.4.61AUG. Concupiscentia carnis mala est, et quando ei non consentitur ad malum; ipsa est enim, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum; etiamsi adversus eam concupiscente spiritu, non perficiat quod conatur, id est, opus malum.
Augustine: The concupiscence of the flesh is evil even when consent is not given to it unto evil; for it is the very thing by which the flesh desires against the spirit, even if, with the spirit desiring against it, it does not accomplish what it attempts, that is, the evil work.
Iulianum.4.6162. IUL. Ad alia ire festino, sed multum hic rerum admiratione defigor. Qui in alium tantus furor est, ut si Scripturas non intellegis, vel tua dicta non ponderes? Sed ita argumentaris iugiter, ut quidquid ieceris, recurrat in te impetu grandiore. Dixisti nempe, nullam esse causam pudoris, praeter concupiscentiam carnis in genitalibus motibus apparentem.
62. Julian: I hasten to go to other things, but here I am much fixed in wonder at the matter. What is so great a fury against another, that you do not understand the Scriptures, or weigh your own words? But you so continually argue that whatever you hurl recurs upon you with a greater rush. You said, surely, that there is no cause of shame except the concupiscence of the flesh appearing in the genital motions.
Iulianum.4.62AUG. Non hoc dixi. Sunt enim et aliae causae pudoris, sive ne fiat aliquid quod non decet, sive quia factum est. Sed huius pudoris de quo nunc agimus, cum quaeritur causa, illa verissima reperitur, qua factum est ut haec membra pudenda proprie vocarentur, quae prius pudenda non fuerunt, quando illi homines recti atque perfecti nudi erant, et non pudebat eos. Quod si prudenter cogitare voluisses, non ipse impudenter veritati manifestissimae restitisses.
Augustine: I did not say this. For there are also other causes of shame, whether lest something be done that is not fitting, or because it has been done. But of this shame about which we now treat, when the cause is sought, that most true one is found by which it came about that these members were properly called shameful, which were not shameful before, when those upright and perfect human beings were naked and were not ashamed. But if you had been willing to think prudently, you yourself would not have shamelessly resisted a most manifest truth.
Iulianum.4.6263. IUL. Esse autem sacrilegium, pudendum aliquid quod Deus fecisse credatur, praeter hanc carnis concupiscentiam iudicare; Christum vero non habuisse hanc concupiscentiam carnis, quae mortalibus facit causam pudoris. Quid igitur ad haec occurreret, non vidisti, videlicet nudum eum, id est Christum, convencticulis debuisse misceri; nec aliquem verecundiae habere respectum, ne sacrilegium quod commentaris incurreret, in carne videlicet sua, quae concupiscentiam non habebat, de suis et Patris operibus erubescens. Si autem ei et concupiscentia non fuit, et tamen ille est pudoris functus officio; irrefutabiliter etiam secundum te approbatur, verecundiam corpori humano debitam, non calori.
63. Julian: And that it is sacrilege to judge anything shameful which is believed to have been made by God, except this concupiscence of the flesh; but that Christ did not have this concupiscence of the flesh, which to mortals makes the cause of shame. What, then, would occur to these things, you did not see—namely, that he, that is Christ, naked, ought to have mingled in the gatherings, and to have had no regard for shame, lest he incur the sacrilege which you fabricate, namely in his own flesh, which did not have concupiscence, by blushing at his own and the Father's works. But if there was no concupiscence in him, and yet he discharged the office of shame, then it is irrefutably proved, even according to you, that the shame owed to the human body is owed not to its heat.
Iulianum.4.63AUG. Ista tua ratione tam acuta et exquisita, debet negari baptismus Ioannis datus fuisse in poenitentiam peccatorum, quia eo baptizatus est Christus, qui nullum habebat omnino peccatum. Si autem potuit alia causa, non ea qua ceteri, baptizari, id est, non propter carnem peccati, quam non habebat; sed propter similitudinem carnis peccati, quam pro liberanda peccati carne susceperat: potuit etiam membra tegere, non ea causa qua ceteri; sed ut sic congrueret pudenda tegentibus, nihil habens pudendum; quemadmodum baptizatus congruit poenitentibus, nihil abluens poenitendum. Decebant quippe similitudinem carnis peccati, ea quibus indigebat caro peccati.
Augustine: By this reasoning of yours, so sharp and exquisite, it must be denied that the baptism of John was given for the repentance of sins, because Christ, who had no sin at all, was baptized with it. But if he could be baptized for another cause, not that for which the others were—that is, not on account of the flesh of sin, which he did not have, but on account of the likeness of sinful flesh, which he had taken up for the sake of setting free the flesh of sin—he could also cover his members, not for that cause for which the others did, but so that thus he might suit those covering their shameful parts, having nothing shameful; just as, baptized, he suits the penitents, washing away nothing to be repented of. For there befitted the likeness of sinful flesh those things which the flesh of sin needed.
Iulianum.4.63Quamquam et ipsa species humani corporis nudi, ubicumque insolita est, humanum offendit aspectum. Unde et Angeli qui hominum similes hominibus apparuerunt, vestiti apparere voluerunt, sicut humana consuetudo poscebat. Sed haec consuetudo si unde originem sumpserit recordemur, occurrit primi causa peccati, in illis hominibus, qui priusquam peccarent, decenter et honeste erant in loco tantae beatitudinis nudi, nondum scilicet de sua carne, quae inobediens inobedientibus reddita est, contra spiritum concupiscente confusi. Nihil ergo te adiuvat Christi vestis, ut concupiscentiae carnis defensor impudens non sis.
Although the very appearance of the naked human body, wherever it is unusual, offends the human gaze. Whence also the angels who appeared to human beings in the likeness of human beings wished to appear clothed, as human custom demanded. But if we recall whence this custom took its origin, the cause of the first sin occurs—in those human beings who, before they sinned, were decently and honorably naked in a place of so great blessedness, not yet confounded, namely, at their own flesh, which, disobedient, was rendered to the disobedient, desiring against the spirit. The garment of Christ, then, in nothing aids you, that you may not be a shameless defender of the concupiscence of the flesh.
Iulianum.4.6364. IUL. Vides igitur frustra te peccatum vocasse, si in his operibus, quae Deus fecit, velamen fateamur adhibendum, quod Dominus noster et hominis formator instituit, et homo factus exercuit. Det sane veniam reverentia Redemptoris, quia ad asserendam veritatem mysterii, Manichaeorumque flagitia destruenda, loquimur de carne eius audacter; quod nisi fides exigeret, reverentia modesta non tangeret.
64. Julian: You see, then, that in vain you have called it sin, if we confess that a covering ought to be applied to these works which God made—a covering which our Lord, both the former of man instituted and, made man, exercised. Let the reverence due to the Redeemer grant pardon, since, to assert the truth of the mystery and to destroy the outrages of the Manicheans, we speak boldly of his flesh; which, did not faith demand it, modest reverence would not touch.
Iulianum.4.64AUG. Non audacter de carne Christi loqueris vera, sed infeliciter falsa; non ad Manichaeorum, sicut tibi blandiris, flagitia destruenda, sed potius adiuvanda. Si Manichaeum cogitas vincere, noli dicere bonum esse quod est malum; sed dic unde sit malum, quod ostendere non potes bonum. Hoc enim esse de praevaricatione primi hominis dum non vis cum Ambrosio dicere (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 12), profecto efficis, ut de aliena natura Manichaeus verum se iactitet dicere.
Augustine: You do not boldly speak true things of the flesh of Christ, but unhappily false ones; not to destroy the outrages of the Manicheans, as you flatter yourself, but rather to aid them. If you think to conquer the Manichean, do not say that what is evil is good; but say whence the evil is, which you cannot show to be good. For while you are unwilling to say with Ambrose that this is from the transgression of the first man (See Ambrose, In Luc. 7.12), you surely bring it about that the Manichean boasts he says something true about an alien nature.
Iulianum.4.6465. IUL. Sed iste, inquis, noluit nominare concupiscentiam carnis; tacet quia pudet, ac mira, si dici potest, pudoris impudentia nominare pudet, quodlaudare non pudet (De nupt. et concup. 2, 7, 17). Displicet igitur tibi, quia novimus verecundiora nostra, secundum Apostolum, necessaria honestate velanda (Cf. 1 Cor 12, 23); quia in hoc consilium sequitur Conditoris, ut quod ille in secreta corporis parte constituit, nos totidem verecundo operiamus obtectu.
65. Julian: But this man, you say, was unwilling to name the concupiscence of the flesh; he is silent because he is ashamed, and—with a marvelous shamelessness of shame, if it can be said—he is ashamed to name what he is not ashamed to praise (De nupt. et concup. 2.7.17). It displeases you, then, that we know our less honorable parts, according to the Apostle, must be veiled by a necessary honorableness (See 1 Cor 12:23); that in this we follow the counsel of the Founder, so that what he placed in a secret part of the body, we cover with an equally modest covering.
Iulianum.4.65AUG. Res dicis mirabiles, tunc Adam et Evam Conditoris esse secutos consilium, quando eius deseruere praeceptum, sequendo consilium deceptoris. Prius enim quam hoc malum perpetrassent, cum adhuc essent recti atque perfecti, non sequebantur consilium Conditoris, ut quod ille in secreta corporis parte constituit, nudum relinquerent, nec verecundo obtectu operire curarent? Homo impudentissime, quod senserunt quando erubuerunt, laudare peius est quam nudare.
Augustine: You say marvelous things—that Adam and Eve followed the counsel of the Founder then, when they forsook his precept by following the counsel of the deceiver. For before they had perpetrated this evil, when they were still upright and perfect, did they not follow the counsel of the Founder—so that what he placed in a secret part of the body, they left naked, and did not care to cover with a modest covering? Most shameless man, to praise what they felt when they blushed is worse than to bare it.
Iulianum.4.6566. IUL. Has tamen elocutionum diversitates, quas tu non solum non imitaris, verum etiam criminaris, quarum nos adiuvamur officiis, non linguarum omnium, sed graecae et latinae cultus invenit. Ceterum linguae aliae, quae naturales vocantur, ob hoc quod nihil eis aut opum aut nitoris studia secuta contulerint, simplicibus omnino nominibus membrorum abutuntur; unde et apud Hebraeos, quorum sermone Scripturarum puritas continetur, propriis omnia vocabulis indicantur.
66. Julian: These diversities of expressions, however—which you not only do not imitate but even make a charge of, and by whose offices we are aided—the cultivation not of all languages, but of the Greek and the Latin, invented. For other languages, which are called natural, because the pursuits of neither wealth nor refinement have contributed anything to them, misuse altogether simple names of the members; whence also among the Hebrews, in whose speech the purity of the Scriptures is contained, all things are indicated by their proper words.
Iulianum.4.66AUG. Multum falleris: quasi in hebraeo eloquio non sit tropica locutio, in qua utique non propria, sed translata sunt verba. Verum hoc qualecumque sit, quid te adiuvat? In hebraeis certe sacris Litteris legitur, et quando illi primi homines nudi fuerint, nec puduerit eos; et quando de sua nuditate confusi sint, et quae membra texerint (Cf. Gen 2, 25 - 3, 7); ut possemus nosse quid senserint, et unde confusi sint. Tu si vis in hac causa te unde confunderis tegere, tandem tace.
Augustine: You are much deceived, as though in Hebrew speech there were no figurative expression, in which certainly the words are not proper but transferred. But whatever this may be, how does it aid you? In the Hebrew sacred Scriptures, certainly, it is read both when those first human beings were naked, and were not ashamed, and when they were confounded at their nakedness, and what members they covered (See Gen 2:25-3:7); so that we could know what they felt, and whence they were confounded. If you wish, in this cause, to cover that whereat you are confounded, at last be silent.
Iulianum.4.6667. IUL. Eademque securitate, qua pedes et genua, etiam genitalia utriusque sexus vocantur. Nos sane nec cum ista suffragetur auctoritas, pudentioris eloquii adminicula negleximus; quia reprehensioni iustissimae patet, sine ullo negotiorum coactu neglectus decoris, qui non minus in verbis quam in operibus, quantum pertulerit causae ratio, retinendus est. Igitur quia concupiscentia naturalis nec pudoris opprobrio potuit coargui, et Conditoris sui dignitate defensa est, ad hoc solum, non ut quasi magnum bonum, quippe quod sit hominibus pecoribusque commune, sed quasi necessarium sexibus instrumentum, a iure daemonum vindicata, inter eius opera locaretur, qui mundum fecit et corpora, a nullo autem accusatur, nisi a Manichaeo, et Traduciano eius haerede; apparet naturalis peccati, cuius omne praesidium in naturae criminationibus haerebat, totum evanuisse figmentum.
67. Julian: And with the same security with which the feet and knees, so too the genitals of either sex are named. We, indeed, even when this authority supports us, have not neglected the aids of a more modest speech; because to most just reprehension lies open the neglect of decorum, with no constraint of affairs compelling it—a decorum which must be retained no less in words than in deeds, as far as the reasoning of the matter has allowed. Therefore, since natural concupiscence could neither be convicted by the reproach of shame and was defended by the dignity of its Founder, it was vindicated from the right of the demons for this alone—not that it be placed among his works as some great good (since it is common to human beings and to cattle), but as a necessary instrument for the sexes—among the works of him who made the world and bodies, but is accused by no one except the Manichean and the Traducianist his heir; it appears that the whole fabrication of natural sin, all of whose support clung to the accusations of nature, has vanished.
Iulianum.4.67AUG. Ecce adhuc dicis concupiscentiam naturalem, ecce adhuc quantum potes, susceptam tuam, ne possit quae sit intellegi, contegis ambigua veste verborum. Cur enim non dicis: Concupiscentia carnis, sed dicis: Concupiscentia naturalis? Nonne concupiscentia beatitudinis est concupiscentia naturalis? Cur ambigue loqueris? Quam tuendam suscepisti, appella suo nomine; quid vereris? An in mala causa eius forte turbatus, oblitus es quid vocetur? Immo vero vigilante memoria, non vis eam carnis concupiscentiam nominare; nosti enim laude eius offendi eos, qui hoc nomen in Scripturis sanctis nonnisi in rei malae significatione legerunt. Isto autem nomine utens, et appellans eam concupiscentiam naturalem, inter eius opera locare conaris, qui, ut dicis et verum est, mundum fecit et corpora, cum dicat eam Ioannes a Patre non esse (Cf. 1 Io 2, 16).
Augustine: See, you still say "natural concupiscence"; see, you still cover, as much as you can, the thing you have taken up—lest it be understood what it is—with the ambiguous garment of words. For why do you not say "the concupiscence of the flesh," but say "natural concupiscence"? Is not the concupiscence of blessedness a natural concupiscence? Why do you speak ambiguously? Call by its name the thing you have undertaken to defend; what do you fear? Or, perhaps disturbed in its evil cause, have you forgotten what it is called? Nay rather, with memory awake, you are unwilling to name it the concupiscence of the flesh; for you know that those are offended by its praise who have read this name in the holy Scriptures only in the signification of an evil thing. But using that name, and calling it "natural concupiscence," you try to place it among the works of him who, as you say—and it is true—made the world and bodies, when John says it is not from the Father (See 1 John 2:16).
Iulianum.4.67Deus quidem mundum fecit et corpora prorsus omnia, sed ut corpus corruptibile aggravet animam, et caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, non est praecedens natura hominis instituti, sed consequens poena damnati.
God indeed made the world and absolutely all bodies; but that the corruptible body weighs down the soul, and that the flesh desires against the spirit, is not the preceding nature of man as established, but the consequent punishment of man as condemned.
Iulianum.4.67A nullo, inquis, accusatur, nisi a Manichaeo, et Traduciano eius haerede. Contumelias tuas cum his me accipere gaudeo, quos in me culpare audes, et nominare non audes. Itane non accusat susceptam tuam, qui dicit concupiscentiam carnis adversus spiritum ex praevaricatione primi hominis in nostram vertisse naturam (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 12)? Et quis est hic? Ille scilicet, cuius fidem et purissimum in Scripturis sensum, sicut eum Pelagius auctor tuus praedicat (PELAGIUS, De lib. arb. 3; cf. AUG., De grat. Chr. 46-47), ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere. Adversus hunc accusatorem tuam defende susceptam. Huic doctori meo, et illi laudatori eius doctori tuo, pro illa conviciare, quantum potes, ut patrocinium tuum liberum satis et fidele demonstres; ne te defensorem suum tamquam timidum libido deserat; quamvis alterum non inveniat, qui pro illa minus erubescat.
It is accused, you say, by no one except the Manichean and the Traducianist his heir. I rejoice to receive your insults along with those whom you dare to blame in me, and do not dare to name. Does he, then, not accuse the thing you have taken up, who says that the concupiscence of the flesh against the spirit turned into our nature from the transgression of the first man (See Ambrose, In Luc. 7.12)? And who is this? That man, namely, whose faith and most pure sense in the Scriptures—as Pelagius your author proclaims him (Pelagius, De lib. arb. 3; see Aug., De grat. Chr. 46-47)—not even an enemy has dared to reprehend. Against this accuser defend the thing you have taken up. Against this Doctor of mine, and against that praiser of him, your own teacher, revile on its behalf as much as you can, so that you may show your patronage to be free enough and faithful; lest lust forsake you, its defender, as timid—although it will not find another who blushes less on its behalf.
Iulianum.4.6768. IUL. Ac per hoc necessarie interrogavi, quid suum cognosceret diabolus in sexibus, per quod fructum eorum iure decerperet; qui nec carnem compegerat, nec membra formaverat, nec genitalia dederat, nec distinxerat sexum, nec coniugium ordinaverat, nec commixtionem, sine qua coniugium esse non potest, aut fecunditate honoraverat, aut voluptate resperserat.
68. JUL. And so I necessarily asked what the devil could recognize as his own in the sexes, on the basis of which he might rightfully gather their fruit—he who had neither framed the flesh, nor formed the members, nor given the genitals, nor distinguished the sexes, nor instituted marriage, nor honored with fruitfulness or sprinkled with pleasure the intercourse without which marriage cannot exist.
Iulianum.4.68AUG. Nihil horum quidem fecerat diabolus, sed inobedientiam persuaserat animo humano, quam poenalis et pudenda carnis inobedientia sequeretur; unde peccatum originale traheretur, per quod diabolo subderetur qui nasceretur, cum eodem periturus diabolo nisi renasceretur.
AUG. The devil indeed had done none of these things, but he had persuaded the human soul to disobedience, which the penal and shameful disobedience of the flesh would follow; from this original sin would be drawn, by which whoever is born would be made subject to the devil, doomed to perish along with the devil unless reborn.
Iulianum.4.6869. IUL. His itaque tu dissertionibus, cervino metu, et vulpino dolo obviam ire conatus, ita imposuisti patrono tuo ad quem scribis, ut referres, propter sensum corporis naturalem, id est concupiscentiam carnis, dominari operibus et imagini Dei principem tenebrarum; cum necesse esset ad eumdem spectare auctorem sensum carnis, ad quem etiam carnis natura respiceret.
69. JUL. And so, trying to evade these arguments with the timidity of a deer and the cunning of a fox, you so imposed upon the patron to whom you write that you reported that, because of the natural sense of the body, that is, the concupiscence of the flesh, the prince of darkness rules over the works and image of God—when the sense of the flesh would necessarily have to look to the same author to whom the nature of the flesh also looks back.
Iulianum.4.69AUG. Quid loquaris ignoras. Aliud est sensus carnis, aliud concupiscentia carnis, quae sentitur sensu et mentis et carnis; sicut dolor carnis non ipse sensus est, sed nisi sensus adsit, sentiri non potest. Sensu itaque carnis qui tactus vocatur, aspera et lenia differenter ut cetera sentiuntur; concupiscentia vero carnis indifferenter illicita et licita cupiuntur, quae non concupiscendo, sed intellegendo diiudicantur; nec ab illicitis abstinetur, nisi concupiscentiae resistatur. Non igitur caventur opera mala, nisi frenetur concupiscentia mala, quae abs te, horrenda impudentia vel potius amentia, dicitur bona; nec erubescis, nec horrescis te ad tantum dedecus pervenisse, ut nemo liberetur a suo malo, nisi non consentiat tuo bono.
AUG. You do not know what you are saying. The sense of the flesh is one thing, the concupiscence of the flesh another, which is felt by the sense both of the mind and of the flesh; just as the pain of the flesh is not itself the sense, yet unless the sense is present it cannot be felt. And so by the sense of the flesh that is called touch, rough and smooth things and the rest are felt differently; but by the concupiscence of the flesh both unlawful and lawful things are desired indifferently, and these are judged not by desiring but by understanding; nor does one abstain from unlawful things unless one resists concupiscence. Therefore evil works are not guarded against unless evil concupiscence is bridled—which you, with horrifying shamelessness, or rather madness, call good; and you neither blush nor shudder at having come to such disgrace that no one is freed from his own evil unless he refuses to consent to your good.
Iulianum.4.69Concupiscentia igitur carnis, qua cupiuntur quae prohibentur, non est a Patre. Frustra putas, vel potius vis putari, ubi hoc Ioannes apostolus dixit, concupiscentiam carnis positam pro luxuria. Prorsus si non est a Patre luxuria, nec illa est a Patre cui si consentiatur, concipit paritque luxuriam. Nam motibus suis, quibus iubemur obsistere, quid conatur, quaeso, nisi ad luxuriam pervenire? Quomodo est ergo bonum, quae pervenire conatur ad malum? Quomodo est nostrum bonum, quae pervenire conatur ad malum? Quomodo est nostrum bonum, quae nos compellit ad malum? Sanandum est igitur hoc malum, Iuliane, divina bonitate; non humana vanitate, iniquitate, impietate laudandum.
The concupiscence of the flesh, then, by which what is forbidden is desired, is not from the Father. In vain you suppose, or rather wish it to be supposed, that where the apostle John said this, he set down the concupiscence of the flesh in place of lust. If lust is altogether not from the Father, then neither is that from the Father which, if consented to, conceives and gives birth to lust. For by its own movements, which we are commanded to oppose, what, I ask, does it try to do but to arrive at lust? How then is that good which tries to arrive at evil? How is that our good which tries to arrive at evil? How is that our good which compels us to evil? This evil, therefore, Julian, must be healed by divine goodness, not praised by human vanity, iniquity, and impiety.
Iulianum.4.6970. IUL. Te ergo apparet non studuisse ut obiecta refelleres; sed ut patrono tuo, ad quem scribebas, miserabiliter illuderes; putaretque te rude quidpiam detulisse quod iure morderes; cum id iam superiorum concessione et corporum institutione laudasses.
70. JUL. It appears, then, that you took pains not to refute the objections, but pitiably to mock the patron to whom you were writing, so that he might suppose you had brought forward something crude that you could rightly bite into—when in fact you had already, by the concession of the foregoing and by the institution of bodies, praised it.
Iulianum.4.70AUG. Institutionem laudavi corporum, quae bona est etiam in malo homine, non malum, sine quo nascitur nemo; quod tu nolens cum Ambrosio dicere unde sit, adiuvas Manichaeum dicentem quod ex aliena natura sit.
AUG. I praised the institution of bodies, which is good even in an evil man—not the evil, without which no one is born; and since you, unwilling to say with Ambrose where it comes from, you help the Manichee, who says that it comes from an alien nature.
Iulianum.4.7071. IUL. Fateor tamen, nimis te cogitasse, quid diceres; et ingenium tuum apparet, et studium; solertissime prorsus quid asserendum esset pro peccati traduce ponderasti; nemo alter callidius scribere potuisset pro naturali malo; quod quidem nec tu ipse tam urbane implere potuisses, nisi ingenium tuum magistri veteris commenta iuvissent.
71. JUL. I confess, nonetheless, that you thought too hard about what you should say; both your talent and your zeal are evident; most skillfully indeed you weighed what had to be asserted on behalf of the transmission of sin; no one else could have written more cleverly on behalf of a natural evil—which indeed not even you yourself could have carried out so elegantly, had the inventions of your old master not aided your talent.
Iulianum.4.71AUG. Magistrum plane meum, et contra te et contra Manichaeum, glorior esse Iesum, quem confiteor (quod tu negas) etiam parvulorum esse Iesum; quia periit Adam, et in illo omnes perierunt (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 15, 24); nec nisi ab illo qui venit quaererequod perierat (Cf. Lc 19, 10), a perditione salvantur.
AUG. I glory that my master, both against you and against the Manichee, is plainly Jesus, whom I confess (what you deny) to be also the Jesus of little children; for Adam perished, and in him all perished (See Ambrose, In Luc. 7.15.24); nor are they saved from perdition except by him who came to seek what had perished (See Luke 19:10).
Iulianum.4.7172. IUL. Intellexisti quippe, parvulis nihil de suo merentibus, nequaquam posse sine damnatione corporum, crimen affigi; et ideo opus esse auxilio Manichaei, qui concupiscentiam carnis a Dei operibus excluderet, et tam nuptias quam ipsa corpora diabolo deputaret auctori.
72. JUL. You understood, of course, that, since little children deserve nothing of their own, guilt could in no way be fixed upon them without the condemnation of bodies; and that therefore there was need of the help of the Manichee, who would exclude the concupiscence of the flesh from the works of God, and assign both marriage and the bodies themselves to the devil as their author.
Iulianum.4.72AUG. Ego non opus habeo auxilio Manichaei, sed potius contra eum pugnans, auxilium quod tu ei praestas, expugno auxilio Dei. Quod mihi praestat etiam per suos clarissimos comites, non solum Prophetas et Apostolos, quorum conaris perversus dicta pervertere; verum etiam posteriores Ecclesiae suae doctores, Irenaeum, Cyprianum, Hilarium, Ambrosium, Gregorium, Basilium, Ioannem, aliosque plurimos,
AUG. I have no need of the help of the Manichee; rather, fighting against him, I overcome by the help of God the help that you furnish him. This God furnishes me even through his most illustrious companions, not only the Prophets and Apostles, whose words you, perverse, try to pervert, but also the later teachers of his Church—Irenaeus, Cyprian, Hilary, Ambrose, Gregory, Basil, John, and very many others,
Iulianum.4.72fide integerrimos, ingenio acerrimos, doctrina uberrimos, fama celeberrimos; qui omnes, salva laude corporum et nuptiarum, confessi sunt originale peccatum, scientes Christum, quod impie vos negatis, etiam parvulorum esse Iesum. Ipse enim salvum facit populum suum, in quo et illi parvuli sunt, non a febribus aliisque huiusmodi pestibus atque casibus, quod et non Christianis abundanti super omnem carnem bonitate largitur; sed sicut Christianos, a peccatis eorum (Cf. Mt 1, 21).
men most upright in faith, most keen in talent, most rich in doctrine, most renowned in fame; all of whom, with the praise of bodies and of marriage left intact, confessed original sin, knowing that Christ—what you impiously deny—is also the Jesus of little children. For he himself saves his people, among whom those little children also are, not from fevers and other plagues and mishaps of this kind, which he bestows even on non-Christians with a goodness overflowing upon all flesh; but, as he saves Christians, from their sins (See Matt 1:21).
Iulianum.4.72Hos tot et tantos catholicae Ecclesiae filios et patres, qui hoc eam in eius positi culmine docuerunt, quod in eius ubere didicerunt, Manichaeos dicere non reformidas; et cum me unum quasi aperte appetis, illos quanto obliquius, tanto insidiosius; et quanto insidiosius, tanto scelestius criminaris. In hoc tanto scelere, tua te omnino verba convincunt. Non enim mihi ob aliud tam nefario nomine calumniaris, nisi quia de peccato originali dico quod dicunt.
You do not shrink from calling Manichees these sons and fathers of the Catholic Church, so many and so great, who taught her, set upon her summit, what they learned at her breast; and while you seem openly to attack me alone, you slander them—the more obliquely, the more insidiously, and the more insidiously, the more wickedly. In so great a wickedness your own words convict you utterly. For you do not slander me with so wicked a name for any other reason than that I say about original sin what they say.
Iulianum.4.7273. IUL. Quod ergo a veritate defunderis, quod fugaris, causae fecit deformitas quam tueris. Ceterum si ad Catholicos transire velles, quanto tute, id quod nos asserimus, elegantius exsequereris et plenius.
73. JUL. That you are routed from the truth, that you are put to flight, has been brought about by the deformity of the cause you defend. But if you were willing to cross over to the Catholics, how much more elegantly and fully you would carry out what we assert.
Iulianum.4.73AUG. O frontem linguatam, mentemque caecatam! Itane vero catholici non sunt, quibus inhaereo in huius fidei societate, quam contra tua vana dicta et maledicta defendo? Catholici non sunt, ut alios taceam, eosdemque repetam, Irenaeus, Cyprianus, Hilarius, Ambrosius, Gregorius, Basilius, Ioannes Constantinopolitanus; et catholici sunt Pelagius, Caelestius, Iulianus? Aude dicere ista, si potes. Quod si non audes, cur non potius ad hos, a quibus ego non recedo, tu redis? Cur me admones, ut ad Catholicos transeam? Ecce catholica lumina, oculos aperi; tu ad istos transi, quibus calumniaris in me; et continuo te compesces atque obmutesces a me.
AUG. O tongue-loud forehead and blinded mind! Are they then not Catholics to whom I cleave in the fellowship of this faith, which I defend against your empty words and slanders? Are they not Catholics—to pass over others and name these again—Irenaeus, Cyprian, Hilary, Ambrose, Gregory, Basil, John of Constantinople; and are Pelagius, Caelestius, and Julian Catholics? Dare to say this, if you can. But if you do not dare, why do you not rather return to these from whom I do not depart? Why do you admonish me to cross over to the Catholics? Behold the Catholic lights, open your eyes; you cross over to those whom you slander in slandering me; and at once you will restrain yourself and fall silent before me.
Iulianum.4.7374. IUL. Quamvis non audeam pronuntiare, ingenio te affectum acri et vigili, cuius in electione suscipiendi negotii video tam tardum ac deforme iudicium.
74. JUL. Although I would not dare to declare you endowed with a keen and watchful talent, since in your choice of the business you have undertaken I see a judgment so slow and so deformed.
Iulianum.4.74AUG. Dic tardi ingenio unde nascuntur: neque enim talis est Adam factus; qui non vis per eius peccatum in deterius humanam mutatam fuisse naturam; et hoc ad omnia vitia quae patiuntur, obesse nascentibus.
AUG. Tell me from where the slow of talent are born; for Adam was not made such—you who refuse to admit that through his sin human nature was changed for the worse, and that this harms those being born, contributing to all the defects they suffer.
Iulianum.4.7475. IUL. Si enim incolumissima fide, scholari more ad ostendendas tantummodo eruditionis tuae vires, ea tentares quae sunt invicta concutere; finito tamen certaminis ludicro, his quibus obloquebaris palmam daturus; probaremus litterarum studium, sed irreligiosum castigaremus exemplum. Porro cum dogma nec verisimilitudinis corrupto saltem colore perfusum, quod nullis legis testimoniis (quippe numquam rationi praeiudicantibus) potestis tueri, et hoc tamen impietate sua horrens, stultitia iacens, nusquam nisi inter inguina voluntatum, honestate, disputatione, sacraque lege confossum, turpissima obstinatione secteris; consequitur ex tribus unum, ut aut plumbei ad intellegendum acuminis, aut maleficii illius quod Manichaeorum mysteriis teneri, fando accepimus, catenas, aut utrumque simul perpeti iudiceris.
75. JUL. For if, with your faith wholly sound, you were attempting, in the manner of the schools and only to display the powers of your erudition, to shake what is unconquerable, yet meaning at the end of the playful contest to award the palm to those whom you were opposing, we would approve your literary study but castigate the irreligious example. But since you pursue, with most shameful obstinacy, a dogma not even tinged with the corrupt color of verisimilitude—a dogma you can defend by no testimonies of the law (which indeed never prejudge reason), and which moreover, horrid in its impiety, prostrate in its folly, is run through, nowhere but among the loins of the appetites, by integrity, by argument, and by the sacred law—one of three things follows: that you are judged to be of leaden sharpness in understanding, or to be held by the chains of that sorcery which, as we have heard tell, is contained in the mysteries of the Manichees, or to suffer both at once.
Iulianum.4.75AUG. Quantolibet rationis nomine contra testimonia divina, quae proferimus tibi, pugnare videaris, non illa subvertis; sed te vexant, cum contra stimulum calces. Dic, quantum potes, inter inguina voluntatum, qui tibi dicit, expertem non esse delicti, utriusque sexus commixtione conceptum (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Isai). Ambrosius est iste, Iuliane; ipse te vincit, quem non audes negare catholicum, numquam certe dicturus es Manichaeum.
AUG. However much, under the name of reason, you may seem to fight against the divine testimonies that we bring forward to you, you do not overthrow them; rather they torment you, when you kick against the goad. Say, as best you can, "among the loins of the appetites," to him who tells you that no one conceived by the intercourse of the two sexes is free of fault (See Ambrose, In Isai). This is Ambrose, Julian; he himself conquers you, whom you do not dare to deny is a Catholic, and whom you will surely never call a Manichee.
Iulianum.4.75Quin etiam me aut plumbei esse acuminis ad intellegendum, aut teneri maleficio Manichaei, aut utrumque simul perpeti affirmas. De Manichaei maleficio vel tuo convicio, iam tibi saepe respondimus, et opportunius, cum opus esse videbitur, adhuc forsitan respondebimus. Nunc de plumbeo ad intellegendum acumine, haeretice verbose, responde. Nemo est certe qui nollet, si id esset in hominis potestate, ingenio vividus atque ad intellegendum acutissimus nasci; et quam rari sint quis ignorat? Qui tamen omnes ipsi paucissimi, si hominis qui primus est factus, comparentur ingenio, plumbei iudicantur. Non enim tunc, sicut nunc, corpus corruptibile aggravabat animam (Cf. Sap 9, 15). Aut enim corruptibile non erat, quia non erat moriturus Adam, nisi peccasset; aut si, ut vos novi haeretici dicitis, etsi non peccasset, moriturus esset; non tamen ita est institutus, quem primo Deus fecerat, et qui mali adhuc nihil fecerat, ut eius anima corpore gravaretur.
Moreover, you affirm that I am either of leaden sharpness in understanding, or held by the sorcery of the Manichee, or that I suffer both at once. About the sorcery of the Manichee, or rather your abuse, we have already often answered you, and more opportunely, when it shall seem necessary, we shall perhaps answer still further. Now about leaden sharpness in understanding, you wordy heretic, answer. There is surely no one who would not wish, if it were in a man's power, to be born lively in talent and most acute in understanding; and who does not know how rare such men are? Yet all these very few, if compared with the talent of the man who was first made, are judged leaden. For then, as now, the corruptible body did not weigh down the soul (See Wis 9:15). For either it was not corruptible, because Adam was not going to die unless he had sinned; or if, as you new heretics say, he would have died even if he had not sinned, yet he—whom God first made, and who had as yet done nothing evil—was not so constituted that his soul should be weighed down by the body.
Iulianum.4.75Quis enim hanc esse poenam neget, nisi qui amplius ceteris aggravatur? Si ergo Manichaeus interroget, unde sit hoc tarditatis malum, non in corporibus, sed in ipsis, ubi Dei est imago ingeniis humanis, quae tarditas pervenit gradatim usque ad ridendam, vel potius, sicut Scriptura commonet, usque ad lugendam fatuitatem (Cf. Eccli 22, 10); respondemus nos, et haec et omnia cetera mala, cum quibus nasci, negare vel dubitare non possumus, primorum duorum et aliorum deinde parentum peccatis esse tribuenda; quoniam non possunt tribui nascentium voluntati.
For who would deny that this is a punishment, except one who is weighed down more than the rest? If therefore the Manichee should ask from where this evil of slowness comes—not in bodies, but in the very human talents where the image of God is, a slowness that proceeds by degrees even to a foolishness to be laughed at, or rather, as Scripture warns, to be mourned (See Sir 22:10)—we answer that both these and all other evils, with which we cannot deny or doubt that we are born, are to be attributed to the sins of the first two parents and then of the others; since they cannot be attributed to the will of those being born.
Iulianum.4.75Alia quippe animalia, ut cum suis generis vitiis nonnulla nascantur, quid mirum si accipiunt haec noxii spiritus in potestatem, quemadmodum porcos, ut novimus, acceperunt (Cf. Mt 8, 32)? Qui maligni spiritus possunt, sicut homines irrationalium membra animalium, ita illi etiam ipsa semina vitiare. De hominibus quaestio est, in quibus Dei imago numquam diversorum vitiorum, cum quibus eos nasci videmus, poenas pateretur, quas pati non posset iniustas, nisi peccatis gignentium praecedentibus; quod vos negantes, et fidem catholicam deseritis, et Manichaei dogma nefarium, quantum optare non ausus est, adiuvatis, ut sibi certus securusque videatur, hominum opificem non confiteri verum Deum, sed gentem introducere tenebrarum.
As for other animals, that some are born with the defects of their kind, what wonder if malign spirits receive these into their power, just as they received the swine, as we know (See Matt 8:32)? These malign spirits can vitiate the very seeds, just as men can the members of irrational animals. The question concerns human beings, in whom the image of God would never suffer the punishments of the various defects with which we see them born—punishments it could not suffer unjustly, unless the sins of those who beget them went before; and in denying this, you both desert the Catholic faith and aid the abominable dogma of the Manichee, more than he dared to hope for, so that he seems to himself sure and secure in not confessing the maker of human beings to be the true God, but in introducing a race of darkness.
Iulianum.4.7576. IUL. Nos vero nihil habemus, quod in nostro admirandum credamus ingenio, quia intellegimus nec peccatum sine voluntate, nec sine Deo corpora, nec sine corporibus sensus corporum, nec sine commixtione coniugia, nec sine Deo operatore existere posse nascentes; et indubitatum tenemus, neque divinum esse, quod doceatur iniustum; neque quod divinum sit, posse iniustum doceri. Non minus autem, quam ea quae diximus, relucet esse iniquum, si aliorum peccata aliis, qui ibi nec fuerint, nedum consenserint, imputentur.
76. JUL. But we have nothing in our talent that we believe should be admired, because we understand that there can be no sin without the will, no bodies without God, no senses of bodies without bodies, no marriages without intercourse, and none who are born without God as their maker; and we hold it beyond doubt that what is taught to be unjust is not divine, and that what is divine cannot be taught to be unjust. And no less than what we have said, it shines forth as iniquitous if the sins of some are imputed to others, who were not there, much less consented.
Iulianum.4.76Proinde his illuminati solibus iure optimo Manichaeorum antra despicimus, qui putant vel esse posse sine voluntate peccatum, vel non a Deo homines fieri, vel ad alium auctorem sensum corporum, et ad alium corpora pertinere; vel Deum esse, qui iniquitatum criminibus opprimatur; aut scelere iniquitatis urgeri eum, qui aeternus omnium conditor aestimetur; aut umbram aliquam tenere iustitiae, si aliorum voluntates aliorum applicentur exortibus. Ac per hoc merita partium negotiis, non ingeniis imputamus.
And so, illumined by these suns, we rightly despise the caves of the Manichees, who think either that there can be sin without the will, or that human beings are not made by God, or that the senses of bodies pertain to one author and the bodies to another, or that there is a God who is oppressed by the charges of iniquities, or that he who is reckoned the eternal founder of all things is pressed by the crime of iniquity, or that justice retains any shadow if the wills of some are applied to the births of others. And on this account we impute the merits of the parties to their deeds, not to their talents.
Iulianum.4.76AUG. Iam tibi ad omnia respondi: nec ideo firmantur adversus me, quia tam saepe et odiose repetuntur a te. Dic potius, si potes, unde humana ingenia cum tanta plerumque vitiositate nascantur; cum inter nos conveniat totius hominis esse opificem Deum iustum, et vos negatis ullum originale peccatum? Non autem diceres aliorum peccata nos aliis imputare, qui ibi quando commissa sunt, non fuerunt, si recoleres quod scriptum est, in lumbis Abrahae fuisse Levi, quando eumdem Abraham Melchisedech Dei excelsi decimavit antistes (Cf. Hebr 7, 9-10). Ibi enim videres, si te pervicacia non caecaret, in lumbis Adae fuisse genus humanum, quando perpetravit illud grande peccatum.
AUG. I have already answered you on all points; nor are they made firm against me because they are so often and so odiously repeated by you. Say rather, if you can, from where human talents are born with so great a defectiveness for the most part, since we are agreed that the just God is the maker of the whole human being, and you deny any original sin? But you would not say that we impute the sins of some to others who were not there when they were committed, if you recalled what is written: that Levi was in the loins of Abraham when Melchizedek, the priest of the most high God, took tithes from that same Abraham (See Heb 7:9-10). For there you would see, if obstinacy did not blind you, that the human race was in the loins of Adam when he perpetrated that great sin.
Iulianum.4.7677. IUL. Sed ut revertamur ad causam, postquam dixisti, me ideo noluisse concupiscentiam nominare, quia non esset ex Patre, sed ex mundo; cuius mundi princeps dictus est diabolus; qui eam inDomino non invenit; quia Dominus homo non per ipsam ad homines venit (De nupt. et concup. 2, 26, 41). Ubi notandum est, quia cum de re naturali loquereris, eamque ex mundo esse dixisses, subdidisti mundi totius principem diabolum credi oportere; ut non actuum voluntariorum, sed naturalium rerum, utique naturarum, fatereris eum auctorem.
77. JUL. But to return to the matter: after you said that I refused to name concupiscence because it is not from the Father but from the world—of which world the devil is called the prince, who did not find it in the Lord, because the Lord as man did not come to men through it (Marriage and Desire 2.26.41). Here it must be noted that, when you were speaking of a natural thing and had said it was from the world, you added that the devil must be believed to be the prince of the whole world; so that you confessed him to be the author not of voluntary acts, but of natural things—that is, of natures.
Iulianum.4.77AUG. Ubi posui: concupiscentiam carnis, tu abstulisti inde: carnis, quod ego dixi; et ubi dixi: cuius mundi dictus est princeps diabolus, tu addidisti: totius, et dixisti: totius mundi, quod ego non dixi. Age ut placet, dic quod tibi placet, vel illis etiam quibus places. Ego concupiscentiam carnis dixi, quam dicit Ioannes non esse a Patre, sed ex mundo (Cf. 1 Io 2, 16), id est, ex hominibus, qui nascuntur in mundo, perituri nisi renascantur in Christo. Haec concupiscentia carnis non est luxuria, quando ei resistitur, sed quando perficitur, id est, quando pervenit quo impellit. Unde et apostolus Paulus: Spiritu, inquit, ambulate, et desideria carnis ne perfeceritis (Gal 5, 16). Non ait: Ne habueritis; noverat quippe hoc munus futurum quidem esse nobis, sed vitae non esse praesentis.
AUG. Where I put "the concupiscence of the flesh," you took away from it "of the flesh," which I said; and where I said "of which world the devil is called the prince," you added "whole," and said "of the whole world," which I did not say. Go on as you please, say what pleases you, or those whom you please. I said the concupiscence of the flesh, which John says is not from the Father but from the world (See 1 John 2:16)—that is, from the human beings who are born in the world, doomed to perish unless they are reborn in Christ. This concupiscence of the flesh is not lust when it is resisted, but when it is brought to completion, that is, when it arrives where it impels. Hence the apostle Paul also says, Walk by the Spirit, and do not bring to completion the desires of the flesh (Gal 5:16). He did not say, Do not have them; for he knew that this would indeed be a gift to us, but not of the present life.
Iulianum.4.77Ego principem mundi diabolum dixi, sicut eum appellat Scriptura divina (Cf. Io 12, 31; 14, 30; 16, 11), non sicut suspicatur vel calumniatur vanitas tua. Non itaque naturarum auctorem diabolum dixi, sed principem mundi, id est, hominum, quibus in orbe terrarum plenus est mundus, qui nascuntur in mundo, nec renascuntur in Christo. Ab eis quippe qui renascuntur in Christo, princeps mundi mittitur foras; quod mysteria significant, quando etiam parvuli baptizandi exorcizantur et exsufflantur.
I called the devil the prince of the world, as divine Scripture calls him (See John 12:31; 14:30; 16:11), not as your vanity suspects or slanders. I did not, then, call the devil the author of natures, but the prince of the world—that is, of the human beings of whom the world is full throughout the earth, who are born in the world and not reborn in Christ. For by those who are reborn in Christ, the prince of the world is cast out; this the mysteries signify, when even little children to be baptized are exorcized and breathed upon.
Iulianum.4.77Ad haec responde, si potes. Noli velle lectorem tua loquacissima vanitate vanescere, et ab eo quod agitur, averti atque seduci. Dic, si audes, bonum esse concupiscere malum. Dic, mala quidem opera a Patre non esse, sed concupiscentiam malorum operum a Patre esse. Dic, diabolum non appellatum principem mundi. Dic, mundum non dici homines in mundo constitutos. Dic, mundum in malo non posse intellegi homines infideles, quibus in orbe terrarum plenus est mundus; et rursus, in bono homines fideles, quibus licet paucioribus, tamen etiam ipsis in orbe terrarum plenus est mundus, nomine mundi similiter appellari; sicut absurdum non est, ut arbor plena pomis, dicatur plena et foliis. Dic, parvulos, cum baptizantur, non erui de potestate tenebrarum, et cum magna iniuria Dei per universam catholicam Ecclesiam exorcizari et exsufflari imagines Dei; aut dic, eos a diabolo possideri sine ulla obligatione peccati. Haec si audebis dicere, mox apparebis; si non audebis, nec sic latebis.
Answer this, if you can. Do not wish to make the reader vanish away with your most talkative vanity, and be turned aside and seduced from what is at issue. Say, if you dare, that it is good to desire evil. Say that evil works indeed are not from the Father, but the concupiscence of evil works is from the Father. Say that the devil is not called the prince of the world. Say that "the world" does not mean human beings established in the world. Say that "the world" in a bad sense cannot be understood as unbelieving human beings, of whom the world is full throughout the earth; and again, in a good sense, as believing human beings, who, though fewer, yet of these too the world is full throughout the earth, called by the name "world" in like manner—just as it is not absurd that a tree full of fruits be called full also of leaves. Say that little children, when they are baptized, are not rescued from the power of darkness, and that with great injury to God throughout the universal Catholic Church the images of God are exorcized and breathed upon; or say that they are possessed by the devil without any bond of sin. If you dare to say these things, you will soon be exposed; if you do not dare, even so you will not lie hidden.
Iulianum.4.7778. IUL. Postquam ergo hoc effatus es, intulisti: Unde dicit etiam ipse Dominus: Ecce venit princeps mundi huius, et in me nihil invenit (Io 14, 30); addisque de tuo: Nihil utique peccati, nec quod a nascente trahitur, nec quod a vivente additur. Ostende igitur dixisse Dominum in Evangelio, non se habere peccatum quod a nascente traheretur.
78. JUL. After you had uttered this, then, you brought in: Hence the Lord himself also says, Behold, the prince of this world comes, and in me he finds nothing (John 14:30); and you add from your own: Nothing, that is, of sin, neither what is drawn from the one being born nor what is added by the one living. Show, then, that the Lord said in the Gospel that he did not have a sin that was drawn from the one being born.
Iulianum.4.78AUG. Tu ostende dixisse Dominum, non se habere sordem, sine qua Iob dicit nec infantem ullum esse, cuius est unius diei vita super terram. Et tamen ubi ait: Ecce venit princeps mundi huius, et in me inveniet nihil, nec ipsam sordem intellegimus, si recte intellegimus. Nam si ex eo quod dixit, non est intellegendum quod non dixit; nec diabolum nominavit, sed principem mundi: Et in me, inquit, nihil inveniet; non ait: In me non invenit peccatum. Et tamen nos ea dicimus, quae non dixit; sed ex his intellecta, quae dixit.
AUG. You show that the Lord said he did not have the defilement without which Job says there is not even any infant whose life is of one day upon the earth. And yet where he says, Behold, the prince of this world comes, and in me he will find nothing, we understand not even that defilement, if we understand rightly. For if, from what he said, what he did not say is not to be understood—he did not even name the devil, but the prince of the world: In me, he says, he will find nothing; he did not say, In me he does not find sin. And yet we say those things that he did not say, but understood from those that he did say.
Iulianum.4.7879. IUL. Quid circumscribis infelices animas, ut mentiaris indicatum esse, quod non est? Dominus dicit in Evangelio: Ecce venit princeps mundi huius, et in me invenit nihil (Ibidem). Certum est nihil peccati in eo diabolum offendisse; quoniam in omni, vel quam esurienti, vel quam postea praedicanti, tamquam persecutores suos admoverat, tentatione superatus est. Profitetur ergo Salvator, nihil in se diabolum deprehendisse peccati. In quo certe invenisset, si quid de carnis conditione traheretur; quoniam et ipse factus fuerat ex muliere, de semine David et de Adam stirpe prognata.
79. JUL. Why do you circumscribe unhappy souls, so as to lie that what is not the case has been indicated? The Lord says in the Gospel: Behold, the prince of this world comes, and in me he finds nothing (John 14:30). It is certain that the devil found nothing of sin in him; since in every temptation—whether while he was hungering, or while he was afterward preaching, when he had brought his persecutors against him, as it were—he was overcome. The Savior professes, then, that the devil discovered nothing of sin in him. In whom he would certainly have found it, if anything were drawn from the condition of the flesh; since he too had been made from a woman, sprung from the seed of David and from the stock of Adam.
Iulianum.4.79AUG. Sed non eum per concupiscentiam carnis Virgo conceperat; et ideo in eum sine propagine peccati carnis propago pertransiit, ut esset in eo non caro peccati, sed similitudo carnis peccati, carnem salvatura peccati. Proinde Adam, priusquam peccaret, nec carnem peccati habuit, nec similitudinem carnis peccati; quia non erat moriturus, nisi peccasset; sed posteaquam peccavit, iam caro peccati genuit carnem peccati, quia per illam concupiscentiam carnis eam genuit, quae ante peccatum vel nulla in illo erat, vel spiritui non resistebat, propter quod eum nudum esse nihil pudebat.
AUG. But the Virgin had not conceived him through the concupiscence of the flesh; and therefore the offspring passed into him without the propagation of the sin of the flesh, so that there was in him not the flesh of sin, but the likeness of the flesh of sin, destined to save the flesh of sin. Accordingly Adam, before he sinned, had neither the flesh of sin nor the likeness of the flesh of sin; for he was not going to die unless he had sinned. But after he sinned, then the flesh of sin begot the flesh of sin, because it begot it through that concupiscence of the flesh which, before the sin, either was not in him at all or did not resist the spirit—on account of which he felt no shame at being naked.
Iulianum.4.79Christus autem qui non per illam concupiscentiam carnis est natus, sine peccato natus est, quod trahit omnis caro peccati, procul dubio propter quam moriuntur omnes, carnem non habens ipse peccati; sed tamen et ipse mortuus est propter similitudinem carnis peccati. Nam si nec moreretur, non solum carnem peccati non haberet, sicut non habebat; sed nec eius ostenderet similitudinem, quam pro nostra salute susceperat.
But Christ, who was not born through that concupiscence of the flesh, was born without the sin that all flesh of sin draws—the sin on account of which, beyond doubt, all die; he himself not having the flesh of sin, yet he too died on account of the likeness of the flesh of sin. For if he were not even to die, he would not only not have the flesh of sin, as he did not have it, but he would not even show its likeness, which he had taken up for our salvation.
Iulianum.4.79Tu igitur qui negare non potes Christum non in carne venisse peccati, sed in carne quidem vera, tamen in similitudine carnis peccati, debes demonstrare carnem peccati; quoniam si nulla est, profecto nec similitudo eius ulla est. Porro quia solus Christus habuit similitudinem carnis peccati, quae non esset caro peccati, quia non ex commixtione sexuum natus est; quid restat, nisi ut peccati caro sit omnium, qui de tali commixtione nascuntur, pertinentes ad mundum, cuius est diabolus princeps, a quo malo non liberantur, si non in Christo renascuntur?
You, therefore, who cannot deny that Christ came not in the flesh of sin, but in flesh indeed true, yet in the likeness of the flesh of sin, ought to demonstrate the flesh of sin; for if there is no flesh of sin, then assuredly there is no likeness of it either. Further, since Christ alone had the likeness of the flesh of sin which was not the flesh of sin, because he was not born from the intercourse of the sexes, what remains but that the flesh of all who are born from such intercourse is the flesh of sin, belonging to the world, of which the devil is prince, by whom they are not freed from evil if they are not reborn in Christ?
Iulianum.4.7980. IUL. Invenisset ergo in eo diabolus naturale crimen, si ullum esset; teneret corpus obnoxium, si illud vel in primo parente, vel in ipsa pariente venenasset; nec referret, utrum conditionibus materiae suae sera et inefficax resultaret voluntatis intentio; contra naturam nitens, non expiaret natum, sed exasperaret tyrannum; salvo eo quod non posset esse voluntas libera, si fuisset natura captiva.
80. JUL. The devil, then, would have found in him a natural crime, if there were any; he would hold the body liable, if he had poisoned it either in the first parent or in her who was giving birth; nor would it matter whether, owing to the conditions of its matter, the intention of the will arose late and ineffectual; striving against nature, it would not expiate the one born, but exasperate the tyrant—saving the point that there could be no free will if the nature were captive.
Iulianum.4.80Si ergo esset in ipsius carnis sensu et conditione peccatum, si ipsa natura hominum ad dominium daemonis pertineret; Christus aut reus erat futurus, aut homo non futurus. Ergo si adscribitur maledictum naturae humanitatis; illi quoque, qui caro factus est ut habitaret in nobis, aut crimen dabitur, aut humanitas auferetur.
If, then, there were sin in the very sense and condition of the flesh, if the very nature of human beings belonged to the dominion of the demon, Christ would either have been guilty or would not have been a man. Therefore, if the curse is ascribed to the nature of humanity, then to him too, who was made flesh that he might dwell in us, either a crime will be given or his humanity will be taken away.
Iulianum.4.80AUG. Nec crimen ei dabitur, in quo princeps mundi nullum potuit invenire peccatum; nec humanitas auferetur, in quo et anima et caro humana erat; quamvis non erat caro peccati, sed similitudo carnis peccati.
AUG. No crime will be given to him in whom the prince of the world could find no sin; nor will his humanity be taken away, in whom there was both a human soul and human flesh—although it was not the flesh of sin, but the likeness of the flesh of sin.
Iulianum.4.8081. IUL. Quod utrumque fecit Manichaeus, qui commentatus in carne malum esse naturaliter, dixit in Christo non fuisse carnem, ne confiteretur in eo fuisse iniquitatem.
81. JUL. Both of these the Manichee did, who, having contrived that there is evil naturally in the flesh, said that there was no flesh in Christ, lest he confess that there was iniquity in him.
Iulianum.4.81AUG. Manichaeus haereticus carnem negat Christi; Pelagianus haereticus carnem peccati carni coaequare vult Christi; Christianus catholicus similitudinem carnis peccati discernit a carne peccati, ne blasphemet carnem Christi.
AUG. The Manichean heretic denies the flesh of Christ; the Pelagian heretic wishes to make the flesh of sin equal to the flesh of Christ; the Catholic Christian distinguishes the likeness of the flesh of sin from the flesh of sin, lest he blaspheme the flesh of Christ.
Iulianum.4.8182. IUL. At hunc fides catholica in utroque contrivit; malum scilicet in carne non esse naturaliter, atque ob hoc Christo nec aliquid defuisse humanitatis, nec quidquam iniquitatis adfuisse pronuntians. Clamat ergo dispensationis suae conscius: Ecce venit princeps huius mundi, et invenit in me nihil (Io 14, 30); nihil profecto quod possit arguere, quia non poterat infamare naturam, cuius ad peccata non inflexerat voluntatem.
82. JUL. But the Catholic faith has crushed him on both points, declaring that evil is not in the flesh naturally, and that on this account neither was anything of humanity lacking to Christ nor was any iniquity present in him. He cries out, then, conscious of his own dispensation: Behold, the prince of this world comes, and he finds nothing in me (John 14:30); nothing, assuredly, that he could accuse, because he could not defame a nature whose will he had not bent toward sins.
Iulianum.4.82AUG. Immo vero nihil peccati, nec quod a nascente trahitur, quia in nulla iniquitate conceptus est; nec quod a vivente additur, quia nulla tentatione deceptus est; quorum duorum unum est propter quod legimus: In iniquitatibus conceptus sum (Ps 50, 7); alterum propter quod dicimus: Ne nos inducas in tentationem (Mt 6, 13).
AUG. Rather, indeed, nothing of sin—neither what is drawn from the one being born, because he was conceived in no iniquity, nor what is added by the one living, because he was deceived by no temptation; of which two, the one is the reason we read, In iniquities I was conceived (Ps 51:7 (50:7)); the other is the reason we say, Lead us not into temptation (Matt 6:13).
Iulianum.4.8283. IUL. Ipsa etiam ei causa tentandi fuit Christum; quoniam more artis suae volebat capere persuadendo, cum neminem posset vitiare condendo.
83. JUL. The very cause of his tempting Christ was this: that, after the manner of his art, he wished to capture by persuading, since he could vitiate no one by creating.
Iulianum.4.83AUG. Non condendo vitiat, qui neminem condit; sed male suadendo vitiavit, quod bonum conditum invenit. Non enim naturae auctor est, quae Dei bonitate in homine conditur; sed culpae, cum qua homo ex propagine vitiatorum primorum hominum de parentibus nascitur. Quid autem mirum, si tentavit eum, in quo non erat caro peccati; quae nec in illis erat, quos primo tentando deiecit, per quorum concupiscentiam carnis, de qua confusi sunt, caro est propagata peccati, quam sanaret ab hoc malo, nullum habens malum similitudo carnis peccati?
AUG. He does not vitiate by creating, who creates no one; but by evil persuasion he vitiated what he found created good. For he is not the author of the nature, which is created in man by the goodness of God, but of the fault, with which a man is born from his parents through the propagation of the vitiated first human beings. But what wonder if he tempted him in whom there was not the flesh of sin?—which was not even in those whom he cast down by tempting them first, through whose concupiscence of the flesh, of which they were ashamed, the flesh of sin was propagated, which the likeness of the flesh of sin, having no evil, would heal from this evil.
Iulianum.4.8384. IUL. Proinde incarnatio Christi opus suae divinitatis tuetur, qui afferens ad me naturam meam et voluntatem suam, cuius mihi speculum offerebat et regulam, pronuntiansque nihil in se diabolum invenisse peccati, ostendit culpam non de carnis conditu, sed de sola suscipi voluntate. Denique ut nusquam in Scripturis legitur Christum fugisse peccatum, quod a nascentibus trahi nosset; ita etiam illud claro testimonio perdocetur, quod suscepti hominis iustitia non de naturae diversitate, sed de voluntaria actione substiterit.
84. JUL. Accordingly, the incarnation of Christ safeguards the work of his divinity; for, bringing to me my nature and his own will, of which he offered me a mirror and a rule, and declaring that the devil found nothing of sin in him, he showed that fault is taken on not from the make of the flesh, but from the will alone. Finally, just as nowhere in the Scriptures is it read that Christ fled the sin he would have known to be drawn from those being born, so too this is fully taught by clear testimony: that the righteousness of the man taken up stood not from a diversity of nature, but from voluntary action.
Iulianum.4.84AUG. Nusquam scriptum est - dicis - Christum fugisse peccatum, quod a nascentibus trahi nosset; quid enim fugeret, quod ipse non traxerat, sed eos venerat salvare qui traherent? Quid, inquam, ipse fugeret, quod a nemine fugitur, nisi cum ad ipsum confugitur? Dicis etiam: Claro testimonio perdoceri, quod suscepti hominis iustitia Filio Dei non de naturae diversitate, sed de voluntaria actione substiterit. Itane vero, ne hoc quidem Christus diversum habuit in natura, quod ita ex Virgine natus est, ut iam esset non solum hominis, sed etiam Dei Filius? Ergone ista susceptio, quae Deum et hominem unam fecit esse personam, nihil illi homini valuit ad excellentiam iustitiae, quam dicis ei de voluntaria actione substitisse? Siccine vos contra Dei gratiam defensio liberi arbitrii praecipites agit, ut etiam ipsum Mediatorem, ut esset Dei Filius unicus, voluntate sua meruisse dicatis, et falsum esse quod tota confitetur Ecclesia, credere se in Iesum Christum Filium Dei Patris omnipotentis unicum Dominum nostrum, natum de Spiritu Sancto et Virgine Maria?
AUG. Nowhere is it written—you say—that Christ fled the sin he would have known to be drawn from those being born; for why should he flee what he himself had not drawn, but had come to save those who would draw it? Why, I say, should he himself flee what is fled by no one, except when one flees to him for refuge? You also say: It is fully taught by clear testimony that the righteousness of the man taken up stood for the Son of God not from a diversity of nature, but from voluntary action. Is it really so, that not even this did Christ have as something diverse in nature—that he was so born of the Virgin as to be already not only the Son of man, but also the Son of God? Did this taking-up, then, which made God and man to be one person, avail that man nothing toward the excellence of the righteousness which you say stood for him from voluntary action? Does your defense of free choice drive you so headlong against the grace of God that you say even the Mediator himself, in order to be the only Son of God, earned this by his own will, and that it is false what the whole Church confesses—that it believes in Jesus Christ, the only Son of God the Father almighty, our Lord, born of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary?
Iulianum.4.84Secundum vos enim, non a Verbo Dei homo susceptus est, ut ex Virgine nasceretur; sed natus ex Virgine, suae postea voluntatis virtute profecit, et fecit ut a Verbo Dei susciperetur; non talem ac tantam voluntatem illa susceptione habens, sed ad illam susceptionem tali et tanta voluntate perveniens; nec Verbum caro factum est in utero Virginis; sed postea merito ipsius hominis, et eius humanae voluntariaeque virtutis.
For according to you, the man was not taken up by the Word of God so that he might be born of the Virgin; but, born of the Virgin, he afterward advanced by the power of his own will, and brought it about that he was taken up by the Word of God—not having so great a will by that taking-up, but arriving at that taking-up by so great a will; nor was the Word made flesh in the womb of the Virgin, but afterward by the merit of the man himself and of his human and voluntary power.
Iulianum.4.84Ex quo vos sequitur etiam illud, ut quomodo illum creditis a Verbo Dei propterea susceptum esse, quia voluit; sic multos credatis ita suscipi potuisse, si etiam ipsi similiter voluissent, vel posse, si velint; ac per hoc, segnitia humanae voluntatis fieri, ut ille unicus sit, cum plures esse possent, si homines vellent. Haec si dicitis, ubi est vestra frons? Si non dicitis, ubi est haeresis vestra?
From which this also follows for you: that just as you believe he was taken up by the Word of God because he willed it, so you would believe that many could have been taken up in like manner, if they too had similarly willed it, or can be, if they will it; and on this account, that it comes about by the sloth of the human will that he is the only one, when there could be more, if men willed it. If you say these things, where is your forehead? If you do not say them, where is your heresy?
Iulianum.4.8485. IUL. Petrus namque apostolus ait: Christus pro nobismortuus est, vobis relinquens exemplum, ut sequamini vestigia eius; qui peccatum non fecit, nec inventus est dolus in ore eius (1 Pt 2, 21). Certe Apostoli sententia cum Dominica voce concordat. Dicit ille in Evangelio: Venit princeps mundi huius, et in me nihil invenit (Io 14, 30). Hoc idem commendat magister Ecclesiae, dicitque in Christo nullum fuisse delictum; sed per quid non habuerit peccatum veraci attestatione commendat. Quia, inquit, peccatum non fecit. Non dixit: Quia peccatum non suscepit, sed: Quia peccatum non fecit.
85. JUL. For the apostle Peter says: Christ died for us, leaving you an example, that you should follow his steps; who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth (1 Pet 2:21-22). Surely the Apostle's opinion agrees with the Lord's voice. He says in the Gospel: The prince of this world comes, and he finds nothing in me (John 14:30). The teacher of the Church commends this same thing, and says that in Christ there was no offense; but by what means he had no sin he commends by a truthful attestation. Because, he says, he did no sin. He did not say, Because he took on no sin, but, Because he did no sin.
Iulianum.4.85AUG. Utique ille qui peccatum originale non traxit, nullum peccatum habuit, quia non fecit; sicut ipse Adam, quia originale non habuit, nullum habuisset, si non fecisset.
AUG. Surely he who did not draw original sin had no sin, because he did none; just as Adam himself, because he did not have original sin, would have had none, if he had done none.
Iulianum.4.8586. IUL. At si esset in natura crimen, Petri erat imperita sententia, qui censuerat videlicet ad immaculatae sanctitatis testimonium posse sufficere, si actus eius a criminibus vindicaret; cum crederetur in eo habitare peccatum per naturale virus. Igitur si de naturali malo aliquid ille sensisset, sollicitius partem hanc commemorasset et pressius, ut scriberet, Christus nobis reliquit exemplum, qui peccatum nec fecit, nec quod nos trahimus nascendo, collegit; sicque merito sequeretur, inventum in ore eius dolum non esse. Porro si hoc putasset, numquam commemorationem fecisset exempli; quem enim hominibus esse ostenderet imitandum, si illum externae carnis natura discrevisset, et censuram magisterii substantiae diversitas arguisset?
86. JUL. But if there were a crime in the nature, Peter's opinion was inexpert—he who reckoned, that is, that it could suffice for a testimony of immaculate sanctity if it cleared his acts of crimes, while it was believed that sin dwelt in him through a natural poison. Therefore, if he had perceived anything of a natural evil, he would have recalled this point more anxiously and more closely, so as to write: Christ left us an example, who neither did sin nor gathered what we draw by being born; and thus it would rightly follow that no guile was found in his mouth. Further, if he had thought this, he would never have made mention of an example; for whom would he show to be imitable by men, if the nature of an external flesh had set him apart, and a diversity of substance had impugned the censure of his teaching?
Iulianum.4.86AUG. Quam nihil dicas, alii certe intellegunt, si tu non intelleges. Exemplum quippe apostolus Petrus in Christo proponens hominibus imitandum, quid opus erat, ut aliquid de originali peccato diceret, quasi quisquam imitando Christum posset efficere, ut sine illo, sicut ille potuit, nasceretur? Sicut non posset efficere imitando Christum, ut quemadmodum ille de Spiritu Sancto et Virgine Maria nasceretur. Proinde ut imitemur Christum, voluntas nostra formatur: ut autem liberemur ab originali malo, natura regeneratur.
AUG. How much you say nothing, others at least understand, even if you will not understand. For when the apostle Peter set forth in Christ an example to be imitated by men, what need was there for him to say anything about original sin, as though anyone could bring it about by imitating Christ that he should be born without it, as Christ could be? Just as he could not bring it about by imitating Christ that he should be born, as Christ was, of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary. Accordingly, that we may imitate Christ, our will is formed; but that we may be freed from the original evil, our nature is regenerated.
Iulianum.4.8687. IUL. Huc accedebat, quoniam opinio peccati naturalis non solum vim aemulationis absumeret, sed ipsius praeconii fraudem, quod ei deferebatur, urgeret. Qua enim diceretur gravitate, qua fronte, dolus in ore illius non fuisse; cum si in alia conditione carnis, quam quae est nostra, venisset, non solum docendo, quod levius est, sed etiam nascendo, quod est gravius, dolum malum convinceretur egisse?
87. JUL. To this was added that the opinion of natural sin would not only consume the force of emulation, but would press the fraud of the very proclamation that was offered to him. For with what weight, with what face, would it be said that there was no guile in his mouth, when, if he had come in another condition of flesh than ours, he would be convicted of having committed evil guile, not only by teaching, which is lighter, but even by being born, which is heavier?
Iulianum.4.87Quale quippe erat, ut homines in naturali malo regnoque diaboli constitutos, et sub pestifera tabis ingenitae necessitate peccantes, vel legi peccati, quae in membris eorum regnabat, naturaliter servientes, ille ad aemulationem suam etiam sub poenae interminatione compelleret, iustitiamque suam eius carnis hominibus imputaret, cuius malo sic fuerat perterritus, ut ipse qui sub specie eius formam voluerat honestatis exprimere, tamen naturae eius veritatem caveret. Quanto ei rectius diceret aegritudo peccantium et securitas coactorum: Cum valemus, omnes recta consilia praebemus aegrotis; tu si sic esses, aliter longe longeque sentires?
For what sort of thing would it be that he should compel men—set in a natural evil and in the kingdom of the devil, sinning under the pestilent necessity of an inborn corruption, or serving naturally the law of sin that reigned in their members—to emulate him, even under the threat of punishment, and impute his own righteousness to men of that flesh by whose evil he had been so terrified that he himself, who under its appearance had wished to express the form of integrity, nonetheless guarded against the truth of its nature? How much more rightly would the sickness of those who sin and the security of those who are compelled say to him: When we are well, we all offer right counsels to the sick; if you were so, you would feel far, far otherwise?
Iulianum.4.87Quo igitur vestra profecit impietas? Necessario videlicet consequi, ut si creditur naturaliter carni nostrae inesse peccatum, Christus quoque aut susceperit carnem istam, et hoc malo teneatur obnoxius; aut non susceperit, et non quidem nativitatis, quae in eo mendax videtur, sed tamen voluntariae fraudis iniquitate insolubili vinciatur. Quod quia totum tantis blasphemiarum sordibus squalet, ut vix sine horrore possit, vel cum dilaniatur, exponi; adsit dignitas Mediatoris exemplo suo et operi, ac nostrae fidei,
To what, then, has your impiety advanced? To this, that it necessarily follows that, if sin is believed to be naturally in our flesh, Christ too either took on this flesh and is held liable to this evil, or did not take it on and is bound by the insoluble iniquity—not of birth, which in him seems mendacious, but nonetheless of a voluntary fraud. And since all this is squalid with such great filth of blasphemies that it can scarcely be set forth without horror, even when it is torn apart, let the dignity of the Mediator be present to his own example and work, and to our faith,
Iulianum.4.87quae veritatem tam ipsius, quam Apostoli eius sermonibus vindicans, numquam desinit praedicare, Christum verum hominem, eiusdem naturae cuius et nos carnem de Mariae suscepisse visceribus, verum per omnia hominem, nullum habuisse peccatum; ad quod indicandum, sufficit apostolo Petro dicere, nullum eum fecisse peccatum; docens quia qui non fecerat, habere non poterat. Nullus est dolus inventus in ore eius; sanctum consortibus naturae suae, quam in cunctis ipse fecerat, praebuit exemplum. Et ideo constat innatum non esse peccatum, quando illud Christus non habuit, qui salvo quoque honore deitatis suae, ob hoc factus est carnalis, ut nobis esset imitabilis.
which, vindicating the truth by the words both of himself and of his Apostle, never ceases to preach that Christ, a true man, took flesh of the same nature as ours from the womb of Mary, a man true in all things, and had no sin; to indicate which it suffices for the apostle Peter to say that he did no sin, teaching that he who had done none could not have any. No guile was found in his mouth; he offered a holy example to the sharers of his nature, which in all things he himself had made. And therefore it is established that sin is not inborn, since Christ did not have it—he who, with the honor of his deity also kept safe, was for this reason made carnal, that he might be imitable by us.
Iulianum.4.87AUG. Quid enim, homo multum loquens et parum sapiens, si dicerent homines Christo: Quare nobis iubetur, ut imitemur te? Numquid nos de Spiritu Sancto et Maria Virgine nati sumus? Postremo, numquid tanta nobis esse virtus potest quanta tibi est, qui ita homo es, ut etiam Deus sis, et hoc Patri coaeternus et omnipotenti aequalis omnipotens? Ideone non debuit sic nasci, vel sic in unitatem personae a Verbo Dei suscipi, ut hominibus eum nolentibus imitari, talis excusatio non daretur? Sicut autem nobis ipse Patrem proposuit imitandum, qui certe homo numquam fuit, eumque sine dispendio vel infirmatione divinitatis eius imitantur, quicumque per eius gratiam et volunt et possunt, ut diligant inimicos suos, benefaciant eis qui oderunt eos; nec dicunt ei: Tu propterea hoc potes, quia Deus es, et quia inimici tui nihil tibi possunt nocere, nos autem homines sumus infirmi, et eos iubemur diligere, qui nobis tot et tanta mala ingerunt suis persecutionibus;
AUG. For what, you man of much speaking and little wisdom, if men should say to Christ: Why are we commanded to imitate you? Were we born of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary? Finally, can there be in us so great a power as there is in you, who are man in such a way that you are also God, and this coeternal with the Father and an equal almighty to the almighty? Ought he therefore not to have been born thus, or to have been thus taken up into the unity of person by the Word of God, so that to men unwilling to imitate him no such excuse might be given? But just as he himself set before us the Father to be imitated, who certainly was never a man, and whom, without loss or weakening of his divinity, all imitate who through his grace both will and can love their enemies and do good to those who hate them; nor do they say to him: You can do this because you are God, and because your enemies can do you no harm, whereas we are weak men, and are commanded to love those who heap so many and so great evils upon us by their persecutions;
Iulianum.4.87ita Christo non dicunt imitatores eius: Non possumus ea facere, quae ut faciamus tuo nos exhortaris exemplo, quia longe potentior est excellentia tua, quam infirmitas nostra. Non itaque ideo debuit natus de Spiritu Sancto et Virgine Maria habere concupiscentiam, qua cuperet mala, etsi ei resistendo non faceret, ne dicerent ei homines: Habeto prius cupiditates malas, et eas vince, si potes, ut te imitari nostras vincendo possimus.
so his imitators do not say to Christ: We cannot do those things which you exhort us by your example to do, because your excellence is far more powerful than our weakness. Therefore he, born of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, ought not for this reason to have had a concupiscence by which he might desire evil things—even if, by resisting it, he did not do them—lest men say to him: First have evil desires, and conquer them if you can, that we may be able to imitate you by conquering ours.
Iulianum.4.87Deinde quid dicis, Iuliane, de illo qui dicit: Non quod volo, ago; sed quod odi, illud facio (Rom 7, 15); quem vos asseritis, non concupiscentia cum qua natus est, sed mala consuetudine usque ad istam necessitatem premi? Numquid huiusmodi hominibus Christus non praebuit, ut se imitarentur exemplum? Numquid eos contempsit, eosque esse voluit a suis sectandis virtutibus alienos? Si ergo dicerent ei: Nescis quid patimur mole consuetudinis qua premimur; tu non premeris, propterea loqueris; facile omnes, cum valemus, recta consilia aegris damus. Placeretne tibi, ut etiam Christus tali consuetudine premeretur, eamque superaret, ut esset, remota eorum excusatione, talibus imitandus? An tua vaniloquia iam ridebis, et a nobis tacebis?
Then what do you say, Julian, about him who says, Not what I will do I do, but what I hate, that I do (Rom 7:15)—whom you assert to be pressed to that necessity not by the concupiscence with which he was born, but by an evil habit? Did Christ not offer himself as an example for men of this kind to imitate? Did he despise them, and wish them to be strangers to the virtues to be followed? If, then, they should say to him: You do not know what we suffer from the mass of habit by which we are pressed; you are not pressed, and that is why you speak; easily we all give right counsels to the sick when we are well. Would it please you that Christ too should be pressed by such a habit, and overcome it, so that, with their excuse removed, he might be imitable by such men? Or will you now laugh at your own empty talk and fall silent before us?
Iulianum.4.8788. IUL. Verum his ut res postulabat impletis, iuvat te vel mediocriter convenire, qua fiducia tu, cum Hieronymi scripta collaudes, dicas in Christo non fuisse peccatum, cum ille in Dialogo illo, quem sub nomine Attici et Critoboli, mira et ut talem fidem decebat venustate composuit, etiam quinti Evangelii (Cf. HIERONYMUS, Dial. c. Pelag. 3, 1), quod a se translatum dicit, testimonio nitatur ostendere, Christum non solum naturale, verum etiam voluntarium habuisse peccatum, propter quod se cognoverit Ioannis baptismate diluendum. De alio etiam testimonio Ioannis evangelistae, flagitium ei assuit falsitatis (Cf. HIERONYMUS, Dial. c. Pelag. 2, 6). De quo opere tu in illa epistola, quam Alexandriam destinasti, ita gloriaris, ut dicas Pelagium, Scripturarum ab eo oppressum molibus, arbitrium liberum vindicare non posse. Verum illi operi a catholico viro, qui pulsatus fuerat, obviatum est. Nunc vero ad hoc commemorationem eius tantummodo feci, ut te recognosceres non solum Scripturis sanctis, sed nec ipsis tui dogmatis adiutoribus consonare.
88. JUL. But these things being fulfilled as the matter required, it is well to engage you even moderately: with what confidence do you, while praising the writings of Jerome, say that there was no sin in Christ, when in that Dialogue which he composed under the names of Atticus and Critobulus, with a charm wondrous and befitting such a faith, he relies even on the testimony of a fifth Gospel (See Jerome, Dial. c. Pelag. 3.1), which he says was translated by himself, to show that Christ had not only a natural but also a voluntary sin, on account of which he knew he must be washed by the baptism of John. From another testimony too, of John the evangelist, he stitched onto him the disgrace of falsehood (See Jerome, Dial. c. Pelag. 2.6). Of which work you boast so, in that letter you sent to Alexandria, as to say that Pelagius, crushed by the masses of Scripture he heaped up, cannot vindicate free choice. But that work was opposed by a Catholic man who had been assailed. Now, however, I have made mention of it only for this, that you might recognize that you are in tune neither with the holy Scriptures, nor even with the very helpers of your own dogma.
Iulianum.4.88AUG. Si posuisses verba Hieronymi, fortassis ostenderem quomodo accipienda essent sine blasphemia, quam tu illi importare conaris; quod si non possem, non tamen eius fidem, quam cum aliis praeclarissimis Ecclesiae catholicae doctoribus tenuit, ideo repudiandam putarem, quia dixisse aliquid inveniretur, si tamen inveniretur, in quo illis non consonaret.
AUG. If you had set down the words of Jerome, perhaps I would show how they are to be taken without the blasphemy you try to impute to him; and if I could not, I would still not think that his faith—which he held with the other most illustrious teachers of the Catholic Church—should therefore be repudiated, because he might be found to have said something, if indeed it were found, in which he did not agree with them.
Iulianum.4.88Illud autem mihi ex huius hominis persona contra te satis est, quod cum id sentiat de peccato originali, quod sic aversaris, ut idem appelles Manichaeum, ipsum tamen hoc appellare non audes. Ubi te apparet imprudentia falli, sed contra prudentiam tuam mihi calumniari. Ego sane non Hieronymi, sed Ambrosii; nec meis commemoratam, sed verbis eius expressam sententiam tibi opposui (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 1, 35,40; 2, 5, 14-15), qua Christum dicit non aliter expertem delicti esse potuisse, nisi expers fuisset illius conceptionis, quam commixtio viri et mulieris operatur. Ubi cernis esse consequens, ut si ego propter hanc sententiam sum Manichaeus, sit et Ambrosius; quia vero ille non est, neminem faciat vel ostendat ista sententia Manichaeum. Hoc cum videas (non enim tale est ut non possis hoc videre, vel possis hoc non videre), tantum tamen causae bonitate desereris, ut calumnieris mihi nomine Manichaei, non imprudente ignorantia, sed pudente fallacia.
But this much from the person of this man is enough for me against you: that, since he holds that view about original sin which you so abhor that you call the holder a Manichee, you nonetheless do not dare to call him one. Here it appears that you are deceived not by imprudence, but that you slander me against your own prudence. I, to be sure, set against you an opinion recalled not in Jerome's words but in Ambrose's, and not in my words but expressed in his (See Marriage and Desire 1.35.40; 2.5.14-15), by which he says that Christ could not have been free of fault otherwise than by being free of that conception which the intercourse of man and woman works. Here you discern it follows that, if I am a Manichee on account of this opinion, so is Ambrose; but since he is not, this opinion makes or shows no one to be a Manichee. Though you see this (for it is not such that you cannot see it, or can fail to see it), yet you are so deserted by the goodness of your cause that you slander me with the name of Manichee, not by imprudent ignorance, but by shameful deceit.
Iulianum.4.8889. IUL. Nam Manichaeos deseris in vituperatione suum et caprarum, quos in humanae naturae criminatione comitaris; cum quibus etiam in Christo non speciem carnis, sed rationem evertis exempli. Submoves etiam a Christo verbis interim naturale peccatum, ne et ipsum sub potestate diaboli collocare videaris, quod non fecit vel ipse Manichaeus. Sed laudas Hieronymum, qui ita eum non metuit blasphemare, ut dicat illum familiaritatem cum voluntariis quoque iniisse criminibus. Ita inter diversas amicorum sordes et commenta volutatus sine deflexu, in Catholicorum solum efferaris iniurias, quia dicunt Deum mali auctorem non esse, homines qui ab eo fiunt, malos non esse naturaliter, leges Dei iustas esse, imaginem eius posse declinare a malo et facere bonum; Christum nec in membris, nec in praeceptis, nec in iudiciis ullum perpetrasse peccatum. Atque ideo si tu assertione veritatis aegrescas, credimus tamen prudentes instrui, nonnullosque etiam de his quos mendacia tua sauciarunt, posse sanari.
89. JUL. For you desert the Manichees in their vituperation of swine and goats, whom you accompany in the accusation of human nature; with whom, in the case of Christ also, you overthrow not the appearance of the flesh, but the meaning of the example. You even, for the moment, remove natural sin from Christ by words, lest you seem to place him too under the power of the devil—which not even the Manichee himself did. But you praise Jerome, who so little feared to blaspheme him as to say that he entered into familiarity even with voluntary crimes. Thus, wallowing without deviation amid the diverse filth and inventions of your friends, you rage only against the injuries done to the Catholics, because they say that God is not the author of evil, that men who are made by him are not evil naturally, that the laws of God are just, that his image can turn away from evil and do good, and that Christ perpetrated no sin either in his members, or in his precepts, or in his judgments. And therefore, even if you sicken at the assertion of truth, we trust nonetheless that the prudent are instructed, and that some even of those whom your lies have wounded can be healed.
Iulianum.4.89AUG. De Christi exemplo superius tibi respondi, quod neque negare debemus eius excellentiam, qua licet homo integerrimus, tamen de Spiritu natus, nec carne concupiscente conceptus, super omnes homines hic vitam iustissimam duxit; nec propter hanc excellentiam nos excusare, ut non eum pro modo nostro studeamus imitari. Non enim coniuges fideles coelibatum eius imitantur; et tamen, ut adulteria omnesve concubitus illicitos non perpetrent, imitantur illum; nec si eum amplius imitantur qui sancte ducunt coelibem vitam, ideo in hoc quoque imitari eum possunt, quod ille non solum non fecit, verum nec concupivit illicita. Caelibi autem sanctae vitae concubitus est omnis illicitus, cui nec coniugalis est licitus. Quid ergo mirum, si natus de Spiritu et Virgine non in se habuit ullum malum?
AUG. About the example of Christ I have answered you above: that we ought neither to deny his excellence, by which, though a most upright man, yet born of the Spirit and not conceived by a concupiscing flesh, he led here a most righteous life above all men; nor, on account of this excellence, to excuse ourselves from striving to imitate him according to our measure. For faithful spouses do not imitate his celibacy; and yet, in not perpetrating adulteries or any unlawful intercourse, they imitate him; nor, if those who lead a celibate life in holiness imitate him more, can they for that reason imitate him in this too, that he not only did not do but did not even desire what is unlawful. But for a holy celibate life all intercourse is unlawful, for whom even conjugal intercourse is not lawful. What wonder, then, if he who was born of the Spirit and the Virgin had in himself no evil?
Iulianum.4.89Quis vero, nisi gravioribus depressus malis, neget malum esse, contra quod etiam sancti quotidie rogant Patrem ex ipsius Domini magisterio? Cum enim dicimus: Ne nos inferas in tentationem (Mt 6, 13); contra concupiscentiam nostram rogamus Deum. Unusquisque enim tentatur, ut scriptum est, a concupiscentia sua abstractus et illectus (Iac 1, 13).
But who, unless weighed down by graver evils, would deny that to be evil against which even the saints daily pray to the Father, on the Lord's own instruction? For when we say, Lead us not into temptation (Matt 6:13), we pray to God against our concupiscence. For everyone is tempted, as it is written, drawn away and enticed by his own concupiscence (Jas 1:14).
Iulianum.4.89Avertat ergo a nobis iste, quem rogamus, Pater, ut dicere audeamus quod a Patre quidem non sit, ad quod nos concupiscentia carnis trahit, sed a Patre sit ipsa quae trahit, vel malum sit ad quod trahit, et malum non sit ipsa quae trahit.
Let this Father, then, whom we entreat, turn away from us, that we may dare to say that what the concupiscence of the flesh draws us toward is not from the Father, but the very thing that draws us is from the Father; or that what it draws us toward is evil, and the very thing that draws us is not evil.
Iulianum.4.89Porro, si eam malum esse veritas clamat; profecto eam qui sine ullo malo natus est, non habebat, ac per hoc, peccatum sicut non fecit, ita nec concupivit. Nos itaque imitamur eum, cum peccatum non facimus, non peccati concupiscentiam non habendo, sed non ei consentiendo; quamvis ita imitemur illum Sanctum sanctorum, cum bene vivimus, ut tamen non desit unde dicamus in oratione nostra: Dimitte nobis debita nostra (Mt 6, 12).
Further, if truth cries out that it is evil, then assuredly he who was born without any evil did not have it; and on this account, as he did no sin, so he did not even desire sin. We therefore imitate him, when we do no sin, not by having no concupiscence of sin, but by not consenting to it; although we so imitate that Holy of holies, when we live well, that there is still no lack of cause for us to say in our prayer, Forgive us our debts (Matt 6:12).
Iulianum.4.89Ego autem non sic laudavi Hieronymum, quomodo Pelagius laudavit Ambrosium, quod eius fidem et purissimum in Scripturis sensum ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere (Cf. De grat. Chr. 46-47). Ac per hoc, si quid mihi displicet, reprehendo in amici scriptis, sicut in meis. Sed aliud est alicubi catholicum errare, aliud magni erroris etiam haeresim condere vel tenere.
I, however, did not praise Jerome in the way that Pelagius praised Ambrose, whose faith and most pure sense in the Scriptures not even an enemy dared to reprehend (See The Grace of Christ and Original Sin 46-47). And on this account, if anything displeases me, I reprehend it in a friend's writings as in my own. But it is one thing for a Catholic to err somewhere, another to found or hold even a heresy of great error.
Iulianum.4.8990. IUL. Sed hinc ista sufficiant: veniamus nunc ad illud, in quo pars negotii magna versatur; cuius potentia examinatus et exanimatus Manichaeorum legatus, tam fidelis responsionis documenta protulit quam elegantis ingenii. Nam postquam dicta mea, quae supra posui, nulla re nova intercedente, laudavit et probavit, ad eam partem qua disputatio a nobis promissa supplebatur, accessit; quaerente me quippe, per quid sub diabolo essent, quos Deus fecit; ad quod respondi ipsius nomine: Per peccatum, non per naturam; et retuli de meo: Sed, sicut ipse annuis, ut non potest esse sine sexibus fetus, ita nec sine voluntate delictum. Habent igitur tempore conceptus sui, parvuli voluntatem, qui adhuc animam non habent; aut habent tempore exortus sui, qui adhuc rationis usum non habent.
90. JUL. But let this suffice on this point: let us come now to that in which a great part of the business turns; tested and unnerved by its force, the envoy of the Manichees brought forth proofs of a response as faithful as it was of elegant talent. For after he praised and approved my words, which I set down above, with nothing new intervening, he came to that part by which the disputation promised by us was being supplied. For when I asked by what means those whom God made were under the devil, to which I answered in his name: By sin, not by nature; and added from my own: But, as you yourself grant, just as offspring cannot exist without the sexes, so neither can an offense exist without the will. Little children, therefore, either have a will at the time of their conception, who as yet do not have a soul; or have it at the time of their birth, who as yet have not the use of reason.
Iulianum.4.90Cum ad hunc igitur venisset locum, hoc solum de nostris proposuit obiectis, id est: Sed ut non potest esse sine sexibus fetus, ita nec sine voluntate delictum; responditque: Ita vero, ita est; sic enim " per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt " (Rom 5, 12). Per unius illius voluntatem malam omnes in eo peccaverunt, quando omnes ille unus fuerunt, de quo propterea singuli peccatum originale traxerunt (De nupt. et concup. 2, 5, 15).
When, therefore, he had come to this place, he set down only this from our objections, that is: But just as offspring cannot exist without the sexes, so neither can an offense exist without the will; and he answered: Yes indeed, so it is; for thus through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed to all men, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12). Through the evil will of that one man all sinned in him, when all were that one man, from whom on that account each individually drew original sin (Marriage and Desire 2.5.15).
Iulianum.4.90Lectorem igitur adhortor, ut conflictum nostrum vigilanter inspiciat. Quid tibi profuit, eruditissime bipedum, meam non supplere sententiam; cum etsi in ea parte, quam suppressisti prioris dicti expositio teneretur, tamen etiam in illo, quod tibi obiecisti, vis aeque tota consistat? Proposui quippe fideliter, ut tua quoque manifestavit assensio, quod a te solet referri, et interrogans per quid sub diabolo essent parvuli, quos fecisset Deus, respondi vice tua: Per peccatum, non per naturam.
I exhort the reader, then, to inspect our conflict vigilantly. What did it profit you, most erudite of bipeds, not to supply my opinion in full, when, even if in that part you suppressed the exposition of the earlier statement were contained, yet even in that which you set against yourself the whole force equally consists? For I faithfully set forth—as your own assent also made manifest—what is usually reported by you, and asking by what means little children whom God had made were under the devil, I answered in your stead: By sin, not by nature.
Iulianum.4.90Certe, vides me hinc nullam fecisse fraudem. Dixi quod in ore Traduciani est, licet hoc non sit in dogmate. Ad quod retuli: Sed ut non potest esse sine sexibus fetus, ita nec sine voluntate delictum. Tu hoc impudenti fraude fecisti dividuum; nam commemorans quod nos dixeramus, quia ut non esset absque sexibus fetus, ita nec sine voluntate delictum; illud quod sequebatur de parvulorum voluntate tacuisti, et respondes: Ita vero, ita est; sic enim " per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum " (Rom 5, 12), per unius illius voluntatem malam omnes in eo peccaverunt.
Surely you see I have committed no fraud here. I said what is in the mouth of the Traducianist, though this is not in his dogma. To which I added: But just as offspring cannot exist without the sexes, so neither can an offense exist without the will. You, by an impudent fraud, divided this; for recalling what we had said—that as there would be no offspring without the sexes, so neither an offense without the will—you fell silent about what followed concerning the will of little children, and you answer: Yes indeed, so it is; for thus through one man sin entered into the world (Rom 5:12), through the evil will of that one man all sinned in him.
Iulianum.4.90Hoccine est respondere? Hoccine disputare est? Hoccine postremo vel sobrietatis habere respectum? Ridetur certe ab eruditis calliditas sophismatum, ubi per communionem nominum simplicitati respondentis illuditur; sed illa ipsa sophismata licet non sint veritate solida, urbana tamen superficie colorantur; hoc autem quod monstrum disputationis est, quod nec veritate solidum est, nec sophismate levigatum. Dixi certe non posse esse sine libera voluntate peccatum; quo concesso, vestrum dogma consumitur, qui putatis esse in natura hominum sine ulla voluntate reorum delictum.
Is this to answer? Is this to dispute? Is this, finally, to have any regard for sobriety? The cleverness of sophisms is certainly laughed at by the erudite, where, through the community of names, the simplicity of the respondent is mocked; but those very sophisms, though they are not solid with truth, are nonetheless colored with an urbane surface; whereas this is a monstrosity of disputation, which is neither solid with truth nor polished with sophistry. I certainly said that sin cannot exist without free will; and this being granted, your dogma is consumed—you who think there is in the nature of men, with no will, an offense of the guilty.
Iulianum.4.90AUG. Ego id solum de opere illo tuo legeram, quod chartula quae mihi missa est, continebat. Nam posteaquam libros tuos, de quibus illud nescio quis excerpsit, inveni, ad cuncta respondi. Dicimus autem et nos non posse esse sine libera voluntate peccatum; nec ideo tamen, ut dicis, nostrum dogma consumitur, cum asserimus esse originale peccatum; quia et ad hoc peccati genus ex libera voluntate perventum est, non eius propria qui nascitur, sed eius in quo omnes originaliter fuerunt, quando communem naturam mala voluntate vitiavit.
AUG. I had read only that of that work of yours which the little sheet sent to me contained. For after I found your books, from which someone or other excerpted it, I answered everything. But we too say that sin cannot exist without free will; nor, however, is our dogma on that account consumed, as you say, when we assert that there is original sin; for this kind of sin too was arrived at from free will—not the proper will of him who is born, but of him in whom all were originally, when he vitiated the common nature by an evil will.
Iulianum.4.90Non habent ergo parvuli tempore conceptus vel ortus sui peccandi voluntatem; sed ille tempore praevaricationis suae magnum illud peccatum libera voluntate commisit, a qua originalis peccati contagium sic humana natura contraxit, ut verissime diceret sanctus: In iniquitatibus conceptus sum (Ps 50, 7); et alius itidem sanctus: Quis enim mundus est a sorde? Nec infans cuius est unius diei vita super terram (Iob 14, 4 (sec. LXX)). Haec eloquia veritatis subsannant vanitatem loquacitatis tuae.
Little children, therefore, do not have at the time of their conception or birth a will to sin; but he, at the time of his transgression, committed that great sin by free will, from which human nature so contracted the contagion of original sin that the holy man most truly said, In iniquities I was conceived (Ps 51:7 (50:7)); and another holy man likewise: For who is clean from defilement? Not even an infant whose life is of one day upon the earth (Job 14:4 (LXX)). These utterances of truth mock the vanity of your loquacity.
Iulianum.4.9091. IUL. Qua ergo tu impudentia et approbas sententiam meam, et tuum dogma non deseris; cum sententiae utriusque partis ita nullo possint foedere copulari, ut enuntiatorum opposita pariter non participant veritati? Quomodo ergo ego si consentirem naturale esse peccatum, necesse erat ut deciderem de iure sententiae, quae praescribit, nisi in voluntate libera peccatum esse non posse; ita tu e regione consentiens me bene dixisse, qui pronuntiavi nullum esse sine voluntate peccatum, reicere statim debuisti illam opinionem, qua peccatum naturale credebas.
91. JUL. With what impudence, then, do you both approve my opinion and not desert your dogma, when the opinions of the two parties can be joined by no covenant, in such a way that opposed propositions do not equally share in truth? Just as I, if I should agree that sin is natural, would necessarily fall away from the right of the opinion which prescribes that sin can exist only in free will; so you, conversely, agreeing that I spoke well when I declared that there is no sin without the will, ought at once to have rejected that opinion by which you believed sin to be natural.
Iulianum.4.91AUG. Aliud est sine voluntate libera peccatum esse non posse, quod et nos dicimus, quia nec originale esse potuisset sine primi hominis libera voluntate; et aliud est, quomodo ipse dixisti: nisi in voluntate libera peccatum esse non posse, quod non concedimus. Originale namque peccatum non est in voluntate nascentis, sed neque in ipsa est voluntate primi hominis, quamvis sine ipsa esse non posset. Aliud est ergo: Non potest esse sine voluntate peccatum, et aliud est: Non potest esse nisi in voluntate peccatum.
AUG. It is one thing that sin cannot exist without free will, which we too say, because not even original sin could have existed without the free will of the first man; and another thing, as you yourself said: that sin cannot exist except in free will, which we do not concede. For original sin is not in the will of the one being born, nor indeed is it in the will of the first man himself, although it could not exist without it. It is one thing, then, to say: Sin cannot exist without the will; and another to say: Sin cannot exist except in the will.
Iulianum.4.91Neque enim, si recte dicimus: Sine conceptu partus non potest esse; ideo etiam recte dicitur: Nisi in conceptu partus non potest esse. Sed hoc ita est diversum, ut neque in conceptu partus, neque in partu possit esse conceptus. Peccatum vero in voluntate potest esse, sicut fuit primi hominis; potest etiam non in voluntate, sicut originale cuiuscumque nascentis quod omnino est in voluntate nullius; sed non sine voluntate primi illius.
For if we rightly say, Birth cannot exist without conception, it is not therefore rightly said also, Birth cannot exist except in conception. But this is so different that birth can be neither in conception nor conception in birth. Sin, however, can be in the will, as was the sin of the first man; it can also not be in the will, as is the original sin of anyone being born, which is altogether in the will of no one—but not without the will of that first man.
Iulianum.4.91Ille quoque sanctus qui dixit Deo: Signasti peccata mea in sacculo, et adnotasti si quid invitus admisi (Iob 14, 17); non utique habuit in voluntate peccatum, quod commisit invitus. Quid ille qui dicit: Non quod volo, facio bonum, moxque subiungit, sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 15)? Numquid in voluntate dicendus est habere peccatum, secundum vos ipsos, qui eum vultis intellegi vi consuetudinis cogi peccare nolentem?
That holy man too, who said to God, You have sealed up my sins in a bag, and have noted if I have admitted anything unwillingly (Job 14:17), surely did not have in his will the sin he committed unwillingly. What of him who says, Not the good that I will do I do, and at once adds, but the evil that I will not, that I do (Rom 7:15)? Is he to be said to have sin in his will, according to your very selves, who would have him understood to be compelled to sin against his will by the force of habit?
Iulianum.4.91Desine igitur de vicinitate subrepere, et sensim limitem transgredi, ut quoniam dicimus sine voluntate libera, tu nos dicere affirmes, nisi in voluntate libera, esse non posse peccatum; tamquam si diceremus, sine igne carbones esse non posse; et tu nos affirmares dicere, nisi in igne carbones esse non posse. Haec si nesciebas, confitere te non fuisse intellegentem disputatorem; si autem sciebas, non intellegentem sperasse habiturum te esse lectorem.
Cease, then, to creep up from the neighborhood and gradually to cross the boundary, so that, since we say "without free will," you affirm us to say that sin cannot exist except in free will—as if we should say that coals cannot exist without fire, and you should affirm us to say that coals cannot exist except in fire. If you did not know these things, confess that you were not an understanding disputant; but if you did know them, confess that you hoped to have a reader who would not understand.
Iulianum.4.9192. IUL. Quidquid enim naturale est, voluntarium non esse manifestum est.
92. JUL. For whatever is natural, it is manifest, is not voluntary.
Iulianum.4.92AUG. Si quidquid est naturale, voluntarium non esse manifestum est; non est ergo naturale, quod salvi, quod beati esse volumus. Quod dicere quis audeat, nisi tu? Aut admonitus, fortasse nec tu.
AUG. If whatever is natural is manifestly not voluntary, then it is not natural that we will to be safe, that we will to be blessed. Who would dare to say this, except you? Or, once admonished, perhaps not even you.
Iulianum.4.9293. IUL. Si ergo est naturale peccatum, non est voluntarium; si est voluntarium, non est ingenitum. Istae duae definitiones tam contrariae sibi sunt, quam contrarium est necessitas et voluntas, quarum confirmatio ex mutua negatione generatur. Nam sicut nihil est aliud voluntarium, quam non coactum; ita nihil est aliud coactum, quam non voluntarium. Simul ergo exstare, et velut vivere, duo ista non possunt; quia talis eorum natura est, ut tunc aliud vivat, cum aliud exstinguitur.
93. JUL. If, then, sin is natural, it is not voluntary; if it is voluntary, it is not inborn. These two definitions are as contrary to each other as necessity and will are contrary, whose confirmation is generated from their mutual negation. For just as the voluntary is nothing other than what is uncompelled, so the compelled is nothing other than what is involuntary. These two, then, cannot exist and, as it were, live at the same time; for their nature is such that the one lives just when the other is extinguished.
Iulianum.4.93AUG. Cur non attendis esse peccatum etiam non voluntarium, certe in illo qui dicit, quacumque causa hoc dicat: Si autem quod nolo ego, hoc facio; iam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum (Rom 7, 19)? Cur non attendis esse etiam necessitatem, qua necesse est velimus beate vivere; et clausis oculis sic alteri alteram opponis, quasi voluntas necessitatis, aut necessitas voluntatis esse non possit?
AUG. Why do you not notice that there is sin even involuntary—certainly in him who says, for whatever reason he says it: But if I do that which I will not, it is no longer I who do it, but the sin that dwells in me (Rom 7:20)? Why do you not notice that there is also a necessity by which it is necessary that we will to live blessedly; and, with eyes closed, you so oppose the one to the other, as if there could be no will of necessity, or no necessity of will?
Iulianum.4.9394. IUL. Cum ergo hoc ita inconcussum sit, ut nulla queat argumentatione convelli; tu elige utrum mavis, et vel nostram, vel tuam constanter affirma sententiam; ut aut necessitati, aut voluntati imputes culpam. Cum autem dico, utrum mavis, non sic admoneo, quasi tua adhuc lateat opinio, qui crimina naturae per Manichaeum importare didicisti; sed ideo hoc commoneo, ut disputationis tuae veritas denotetur.
94. JUL. Since, then, this is so unshaken that it can be torn down by no argumentation, choose which you prefer, and steadfastly affirm either our opinion or yours; so that you impute the fault either to necessity or to will. But when I say which you prefer, I do not admonish you as though your opinion still lay hidden—you who have learned to bring in the crimes of nature through the Manichee; but I urge this so that the truth of your disputation may be marked.
Iulianum.4.94AUG. Velis nolis, quoniam saepe hoc dicis, saepe oportet ut audias, non fuisse Manichaeum qui dixit, dissensionem carnis et spiritus per praevaricationem primi hominis in naturam vertisse (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 12). Quam tu causam mali huius negans, cum quo malo nasci omnem hominem negare non sineris, facis ut Manichaeus aliae naturae commixtionem nobis inesse dicat, et vincat nisi tecum victus intereat.
AUG. Like it or not, since you say this often, you must often hear that he was no Manichee who said that the dissension of flesh and spirit had, through the transgression of the first man, turned into nature (See Ambrose, In Luc. 7.12). Denying this cause of this evil—the evil with which you will not be permitted to deny that every man is born—you bring it about that the Manichee says there is in us a commingling of another nature, and that he conquers unless, conquered along with you, he perishes.
Iulianum.4.9495. IUL. Quid igitur mihi responderis prudens et sollicitus auditor expendat. De parvulis certe agimus, quibus nulla propriae mentis adest voluntas, de quibus quaeritur per quid sint sub diabolo, quos Deus fecit, cum nihil mali ipsos egisse consentias.
95. JUL. Let the prudent and attentive hearer, then, weigh what you have answered me. We are surely dealing with little children, in whom there is no will of their own mind, about whom it is asked by what means those whom God made are under the devil, since you grant that they themselves have done nothing evil.
Iulianum.4.95Tu eos concionatus es, ad ius daemonis propter peccatum, non propter naturam pertinere. Ad hoc insurrexit nostra responsio: Sed ut non potest esse sine sexibus fetus, ita nec sine voluntate delictum. Ad quod tu retulisti: Ita vero, ita est; id est, non potest esse sine voluntate delictum. Verum qui hoc confirmaveras, qua impudentia subdidisti: Sed per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, per unius illius voluntatem?
You declared that they belong to the right of the demon on account of sin, not on account of nature. Against this our response arose: But just as offspring cannot exist without the sexes, so neither can an offense exist without the will. To which you replied: Yes indeed, so it is; that is, an offense cannot exist without the will. But having affirmed this, with what impudence did you add: But through one man sin entered into the world, through the will of that one man?
Iulianum.4.95AUG. Numquid, quoniam de parvulis agebatur, ideo quod verum dixisti, non debui ostendere etiam meam non impedire sententiam, id est, non esse posse sine voluntate delictum; quandoquidem etiam originale delictum non habet causam, nisi ex illius voluntate, a quo ipsa origo deducitur? Illud ergo cum adversa intentione dixisses, non mihi tamen adversum esse respondi, et verum esse concessi; et quod tu non videras, quomodo mihi non adversaretur, ostendi.
AUG. Was it because we were dealing with little children that I ought not, in regard to what you truly said, to show that it also does not hinder my opinion—that is, that an offense cannot exist without the will—since even the original offense has no cause except from the will of him from whom that very origin is derived? When, then, you had said that with an adverse intention, I answered that it was nonetheless not adverse to me, and I conceded it to be true; and what you had not seen—how it was not adverse to me—I showed.
Iulianum.4.95Potuisti enim dicere secundum intentionem tuam, non esse posse delictum sine illius, cuius delictum est, propria voluntate; quod si dixisses, nequaquam concederem; sine propria enim nascentis voluntate trahitur originale peccatum. Sed tamen verum dixisti, non posse esse sine voluntate peccatum; quia et ipsum originale voluntas eius effecit, qui primus ea, qua natura humana vitiata est, voluntate peccavit; ita ut quidquid hominum nasceretur per carnis concupiscentiam, quae reorum confusione velata est, liberum non fieret a reatu, nisi renasceretur per spiritus gratiam.
For you could have said, according to your intention, that an offense cannot exist without the proper will of him whose offense it is; and if you had said this, I would by no means concede it; for original sin is drawn without the proper will of the one being born. But nonetheless you said truly that sin cannot exist without the will; for original sin too the will of him produced who first sinned by that will by which human nature was vitiated, so that whatever of men should be born through the concupiscence of the flesh—which is veiled by the shame of the guilty—should not become free from guilt unless it were reborn through the grace of the Spirit.
Iulianum.4.9596. IUL. Numquid de Adam operibus interrogatus eras, aut quaesitum fuerat, utrum ille voluntate peccasset? Quod quidem contra te mox quaeretur. Esto, aliis te delectet illudere; cuius deformitatis est, ut tu tibimet imponas? Quippe haud mihi valeo persuadere, quod tantam deformitatem non fraude, sed opinione patiaris. In uno eodemque versu assentiris, non posse esse sine voluntate delictum, et subdis protinus, peccatum quod sine motu animi libero manere non dixeras, in omnibus hominibus sine voluntate regnare.
96. JUL. Were you asked about the works of Adam, or had it been inquired whether he had sinned by will? This indeed will soon be asked against you. So be it, let it please you to mock others; but what deformity is it that you impose upon yourself? For I can hardly persuade myself that you suffer so great a deformity not by fraud but by opinion. In one and the same sentence you assent that an offense cannot exist without the will, and you at once add that the sin which you had said could not remain without a free motion of the soul reigns in all men without the will.
Iulianum.4.96AUG. Quid supponis verbum tuum quasi meum, ut non sentiente qui hoc audit aut legit, subtrahas sensum meum? Ego non dixi, sine voluntate manere non posse peccatum, sed esse non posse; quantum autem intersit, ex tuis verbis aperiam. Ubi enim dixisti: Non potest esse sine sexibus fetus, quis non te verum dixisse consentiat? Aliter enim non existit fetus, nisi ex maris et feminae sexibus. Si autem dixisses: Non potest manere sine sexibus fetus; quis tibi hoc verum esse concederet? Manet enim sine parentum sexibus fetus, sine quibus tamen esse non posset; nec omnino ipsi faciunt ut maneat, qui fecerunt ut esset.
AUG. Why do you substitute your word as though mine, so that, without the one who hears or reads this perceiving it, you may filch away my sense? I did not say that sin cannot remain without the will, but that it cannot exist; and how great the difference is, I will disclose from your own words. For where you said, Offspring cannot exist without the sexes, who would not agree that you spoke truly? For offspring does not otherwise come to be except from the sexes of male and female. But if you had said, Offspring cannot remain without the sexes, who would concede this to you to be true? For offspring remains without the sexes of its parents, without which nonetheless it could not exist; nor do they at all bring it about that it remains, who brought it about that it existed.
Iulianum.4.96Sic ergo peccatum, quod esse sine voluntate non potest, manere sine voluntate potest. Itaque etiam peccatum Adae, quoniam ipsum est quod originaliter manet in posteris eius, nisi quibus in Christo remittitur, profecto cum dicitur et in ipsis sine voluntate non esse, ad illius voluntatem refertur, qua factum est ut esset quod manendo et in posteris esset, non qua factum est ut maneret quod et sine voluntate iam posset.
So, then, the sin which cannot exist without the will can remain without the will. And so even the sin of Adam—since it is the very thing that remains originally in his posterity, except in those to whom it is remitted in Christ—when it is said that even in them it is not without the will, this is surely referred to the will of him by which it came about that there should exist what, by remaining, would be also in his posterity; not to a will by which it came about that there should remain what could already be even without the will.
Iulianum.4.96Si autem hoc dicis esse, quod est manere; non contendo verbis, sed plane dico, quantum attinet ad manendum, sine voluntate esse posse omne peccatum. Quis est enim qui peccatum quod sine voluntate non fecit, manere etiam velit? Et tamen manet nolente peccatore peccatum, quod a voluntate commissum est. Manet ergo donec remittatur: et si numquam remittatur, manebit in aeternum; neque enim mendaciter in Evangelio dictum est: Reus erit aeterni peccati (Mc 3, 29).
But if you say that "to be" is the same as "to remain," I do not contend about words, but plainly say that, as far as remaining is concerned, every sin can exist without the will. For who is there who would even wish the sin he did not commit without the will to remain? And yet the sin which was committed by the will remains though the sinner is unwilling. It remains, therefore, until it is remitted; and if it is never remitted, it will remain forever; for it was not mendaciously said in the Gospel, he will be guilty of an eternal sin (Mark 3:29).
Iulianum.4.9697. IUL. Deinde quia multa in propositionibus invenitur diversitas, dixeras: Non esse sine voluntate delictum, et respondisti: sed per unius voluntatem esse delictum. Numquid concinit superiori definitioni, quae ablativi casus praepositione munitur, secuta responsio per praepositionem accusativi casus illata? Quaesitum erat utrum esset crimen sine voluntate, quod non posse constiterat; tu subdidisti per unum hominem intrasse peccatum, cum non referret per quid coepisset, sed sine quo esse non posset.
97. JUL. Then, because much diversity is found in propositions, you had said: An offense is not without the will, and you answered: but through the will of one man there is an offense. Does the response that follows, introduced by a preposition of the accusative case, harmonize with the foregoing definition, which is fortified by a preposition of the ablative case? It had been asked whether there was a crime without the will, which had been established could not be; you added that sin entered through one man, when it did not matter by what it had begun, but without what it could not exist.
Iulianum.4.97AUG. Ego sic dixi peccatum sine voluntate esse non posse, quomodo dicimus poma vel frumenta sine radicibus esse non posse; ubi etiam sine offensione grammaticorum possumus dicere, poma vel frumenta nisi per radicem esse non posse. Cum ergo recte utrumque dicatur, quamvis illud per ablativi, hoc per accusativi casus praepositionem enuntietur; quid est quod nobis casibus nominum, velut cassibus aranearum, quanto subtilius, tanto infirmius tendis insidias? Quaere muscas morituras, quas istis reticulis capias.
AUG. I said that sin cannot exist without the will in the way that we say fruits or grains cannot exist without roots; where also, without offense to the grammarians, we can say that fruits or grains cannot exist except through a root. Since, then, both are rightly said, although the one is stated by a preposition of the ablative, the other by a preposition of the accusative case, what is this that you stretch out for us snares of noun-cases—the more subtly, the more feebly—like cobwebs? Seek the dying flies that you may catch in those little nets.
Iulianum.4.97Non hoc erant illi, quos ideo sequimur, ut tuas tendiculas dissipemus. Non hoc erat Apostolus, qui dixit: Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum (Rom 8, 10). Non hoc erat Hilarius, qui dixit: Ex peccato omnis caro est, a peccato scilicet Adam parentisdeducta (HILARIUS, In Ps. 118, 175; cf. C. Iul. 1, 3, 9). Non hoc erat Ambrosius, qui dixit: Omnes sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est (AMBROSIUS, De paenit. 1, 3, 13). Utinam tu potius istorum Christi piscatorum retibus tenaciter salubriterque capiaris; tunc accusativum casum, quo ipse a te ipso es accusatus, et ablativum, quo de Ecclesia catholica es ablatus, correctus melius declinabis. Praepositiones autem si recte atque integre sequeris, cur non istos doctores Ecclesiae tibi, deposita elatione, praeponis?
Not such were those whom we follow, that we may scatter your little snares. Not such was the Apostle, who said: The body indeed is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10). Not such was Hilary, who said: From sin is all flesh, derived, that is, from Adam the parent of sin (Hilary, In Ps. 118.175; see Answer to Julian 1.3.9). Not such was Ambrose, who said: We are all born under sin, whose very birth is in fault (Ambrose, De paenit. 1.3.13). Would that you, rather, were caught firmly and salutarily in the nets of these fishermen of Christ; then you would better decline the accusative case, by which you have been accused by your own self, and the ablative, by which you have been carried off from the Catholic Church, once corrected. But if you follow prepositions rightly and soundly, why do you not, laying aside your arrogance, set these teachers of the Church before yourself?
Iulianum.4.9798. IUL. Apparet certe furtum detestabile, quod quidem confestim ea, quae peccatis adhaeret, ultione punitum est, videlicet ut antequam in pestem procederet audientium, suum circumveniret auctorem. Ecce enim non abnuitur primum hominem aliquod incurrisse peccatum; sed quaeritur quomodo hoc peccatum posset in nascentibus inveniri. Defini tu peccati primi qualem putes conditionem fuisse; dicis: Voluntas fuit libera, non enim potest esse sine voluntate peccatum; nos hoc probamus. Tu vero subdis: Sed hoc peccatum, quod sine voluntate esse non potest, haeret sine voluntate nascentibus (De nupt. et concup. 2, 5, 15).
98. JUL. A detestable theft is certainly evident, which indeed was at once punished by that vengeance which clings to sins—namely, so that, before it should advance to the ruin of its hearers, it should circumvent its own author. For behold, it is not denied that the first man incurred some sin; but it is asked how this sin could be found in those being born. Define what you think the condition of the first sin to have been; you say: The will was free, for sin cannot exist without the will; this we prove. But you add: But this sin, which cannot exist without the will, clings to those being born without the will (Marriage and Desire 2.5.15).
Iulianum.4.98AUG. Haeret per contagium, non per arbitrium.
AUG. It clings through contagion, not through choice.
Iulianum.4.9899. IUL. Falsum est ergo quod concesseras, non esse sine voluntate peccatum; si licet commissum sit per voluntatem, tamen ad alios potuit sine voluntate transire.
99. JUL. It is false, then, what you had conceded—that sin is not without the will; if, although it was committed through the will, yet it could pass to others without the will.
Iulianum.4.99AUG. Non est falsum quod concesseram, quia sine voluntate illius, a quo est origo nascentium, non est factum originale peccatum; potuit autem ad alios per contagium sine voluntate transire, quod non potuit ab illo sine voluntate committi. Ac per hoc, sine voluntate esse non posset, ut esset quod in alios sine voluntate transiret; sicut frumenta sine radicibus esse non possent, ut essent quae in alia loca transire sine radicibus possent.
AUG. It is not false what I had conceded, because without the will of him from whom is the origin of those being born, original sin was not made; but it could pass to others through contagion without the will, what could not be committed by him without the will. And on this account, it could not exist without the will, in order to be something that should pass into others without the will; just as grains could not exist without roots, in order to be something that could pass into other places without roots.
Iulianum.4.99100. IUL. Est ergo iam sine voluntate peccatum, cum invenitur in his quibus malam eripis voluntatem.
100. JUL. There is, then, now sin without the will, since it is found in those from whom you snatch away an evil will.
Iulianum.4.100AUG. Est omnino sine voluntate peccatum, id est, manet. Non enim maneret, nisi esset utique quod maneret; sed ut esset quod maneret sine voluntate, non est factum nisi voluntate; si tamen peccatum tantummodo peccatum sit, non etiam poena; hac enim quisque peccat invitus. Sic ergo utrumque verum est, et esse non posse sine voluntate peccatum, et esse posse sine voluntate peccatum; quomodo utrumque verum est, et esse non posse sine parentum sexibus fetum, et esse posse sine parentum sexibus fetum. Illud enim dictum est, quia sine his non potest existere; hoc autem, quia sine his potest manere.
AUG. There is altogether sin without the will, that is, it remains. For it would not remain unless there were surely something that should remain; but that there should be something that should remain without the will came about only by the will—provided, however, that the sin is only sin, and not also punishment; for by punishment one sins unwillingly. So, then, both are true: that sin cannot exist without the will, and that sin can exist without the will; just as both are true: that offspring cannot exist without the sexes of the parents, and that offspring can exist without the sexes of the parents. For the former is said because without these it cannot come to be; the latter, because without these it can remain.
Iulianum.4.100Bene quidem ipse uno loco, et de peccato et de fetu locutus es, dicens: Ut non potest esse sine sexibus fetus, ita nec sine voluntate delictum. Sicut ergo intellegimus fetum ideo sine parentum sexibus esse non posse, quia sine his non potest existere, ut sit; et ideo sine parentum esse sexibus posse, quia sine his potest manere, cum iam sit; cur non ita intellegimus, etiam peccatum et sine voluntate esse non posse, quia sine illa non potest existere, ut sit; et sine voluntate esse posse, quia sine illa potest manere, cum iam sit?
You yourself indeed spoke well in one place, both of sin and of offspring, saying: Just as offspring cannot exist without the sexes, so neither can an offense without the will. Just as, then, we understand that offspring cannot exist without the sexes of the parents, because without these it cannot come to be, so as to be; and that it can exist without the sexes of the parents, because without these it can remain, when it already is; why do we not so understand that sin too both cannot exist without the will, because without it it cannot come to be, so as to be; and can exist without the will, because without it it can remain, when it already is?
Iulianum.4.100101. IUL. Vide ergo quo tua acumina pervehantur; persuadere conaris, rem aliquam per hoc non esse, per quod potest esse.
101. JUL. See, then, to what your sharp points are carried: you try to persuade that a thing does not exist through that by which it can exist.
Iulianum.4.101AUG. Quid enim tu, o magne ille, etiam contra gratiam Dei, defensor liberi arbitrii? Negabisne peccatum aliquod per liberum arbitrium non esse, quod per liberum arbitrium potest esse? Fit enim ut sit peccatum per liberum arbitrium, cum homo peccat si velit; et fit ut non sit peccatum per liberum arbitrium, cum homo non peccat si nolit. Ecce invenimus aliquid, et hoc ipsum de quo disputamus, id est, peccatum per hoc non esse, per quod potest esse, id est, per liberum arbitrium. Quid est, contentiose? Huccine mea acumina pervehentur? An hic tua lumina aciem perdiderunt? Noli esse praeceps: melius est attendere quid dicas, quam contendere ut contradicas.
AUG. For what of you, O great defender of free choice, even against the grace of God? Will you deny that some sin does not exist through free choice, which can exist through free choice? For it comes about that there is sin through free choice, when a man sins if he wills; and it comes about that there is no sin through free choice, when a man does not sin if he is unwilling. Behold, we find something—and this the very thing about which we dispute, that is, sin—that does not exist through that by which it can exist, that is, through free choice. What is it, you contentious man? Will my sharp points be carried this far? Or have your lights here lost their edge? Do not be headlong: it is better to attend to what you say than to contend so as to contradict.
Iulianum.4.101102. IUL. Id est, peccatum per hoc esse sine voluntate, per quod non potest esse sine voluntate.
102. JUL. That is, that sin is without the will through that by which it cannot be without the will.
Iulianum.4.102AUG. Non sane peccatum per hoc est sine voluntate, per quod non potest esse sine voluntate, sed diversis quidem causis; tamen potest utrumque; nam sine voluntate non potest esse, quia sine voluntate non potest existere ut sit; sine autem voluntate potest esse, quia sine voluntate potest manere quod existit.
AUG. Sin is not indeed without the will through that by which it cannot be without the will, but by diverse causes; yet both are possible. For it cannot be without the will, because without the will it cannot come to be, so as to be; but it can be without the will, because without the will what has come to be can remain.
Iulianum.4.102103. IUL. Ut conditionem suam conditione sua perdat, et sit absque hoc, sine quo non posse esse definitum est. Hoc est inficiari rebus. Quid tale Anaxagoras, qui nivem nigram esse dicebat? Commentaris rei alicuius naturam suis fructibus negari; cumque sit contrarium necessitas et voluntas, ita ut, sicut supra ostendimus, mutua se impugnatione consumant; tu novo impossibilique foedere ac necessitudine monstruosa alterum alterius subdis effectui, et dicis necessitatem de fructibus voluntatis exortam, ut voluntas sua se multiplicatione deleverit, et statum proprium operata mutaverit; atque, ut rem ipsam suis vocabulis exprimamus, postquam coepit voluntas esse, voluntas esse desierit.
103. JUL. So that it loses its condition by its own condition, and exists apart from that without which it was defined as unable to exist. This is to deny things. What such thing did Anaxagoras say, who said that snow is black? You contrive that the nature of some thing is denied by its own fruits; and since necessity and will are contrary, so that, as we showed above, they consume each other by mutual assault, you, by a new and impossible covenant and a monstrous bond, subject the one to the effect of the other, and say that necessity arose from the fruits of the will, so that the will deleted itself by its own multiplication and, by acting, changed its own state; and—to express the matter itself in its own terms—that after the will began to be, the will ceased to be.
Iulianum.4.103Quo quid potest, non dico obtusius, sed furiosius cogitari? Cum ergo haec duo simul esse non possint, id est, necessitas et voluntas, tuque confirmaveris quod diximus, non posse esse sine voluntate delictum, assentiaris quo ⁄ que non esse in parvulis voluntatem; contorto gutture cogeris annuere nullum in his esse peccatum quod sine voluntate non posse esse professus es.
What can be thought—I will not say more obtuse, but more frenzied—than this? Since, then, these two cannot exist at the same time, that is, necessity and will, and since you have affirmed what we said, that an offense cannot exist without the will, and you also assent that there is no will in little children, with your throat wrenched you are compelled to grant that there is in them no sin, which you have professed cannot exist without the will.
Iulianum.4.103AUG. Necessitatem et voluntatem simul esse non posse non diceres, si tibi daretur nosse quod diceres. Cum enim sit moriendi necessitas, quis neget quod possit esse et voluntas? Unde ait Apostolus, concupiscentiam se habere dissolvi, et esse cum Christo (Cf. Phil 1, 23). Cum ergo vult mori, quem necesse est mori, simul sunt necessitas et voluntas; quod tu fieri posse vana voluntate, nulla necessitate negaveras.
AUG. You would not say that necessity and will cannot exist at the same time, if it were granted you to know what you say. For since there is a necessity of dying, who would deny that there can also be a will to die? Hence the Apostle says that he has a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ (See Phil 1:23). When, then, he who must die wills to die, necessity and will are present at the same time; which you had denied could come about, by an empty will, by no necessity.
Iulianum.4.103Quod autem fiat etiam ex voluntate necessitas plerumque contraria voluntati, prorsus insipienter abnuitur. Qui enim se volens mori lethaliter percutit, moritur etsi nolit. Item qui volens fecit peccatum, nolens habet peccatum; volens impudicus, nolens reus; eo quippe nolente peccatum manet, quo nolente non fieret.
But that there comes to be even from the will a necessity for the most part contrary to the will is denied altogether foolishly. For he who, willing to die, strikes himself lethally, dies even if he is unwilling. Likewise, he who willingly committed sin has sin unwillingly; willingly unchaste, unwillingly guilty; for the sin remains with him unwilling, which with him unwilling would not come to be.
Iulianum.4.103Ac per hoc, et non potest esse sine voluntate peccatum, quia non fit nisi voluntate; et potest esse sine voluntate peccatum, quia manet etiam sine voluntate, quod factum est voluntate; et est iam necessitas etiam sine voluntate, quam fecit voluntas sine necessitate.
And on this account, both sin cannot exist without the will, because it does not come to be except by the will; and sin can exist without the will, because what was made by the will remains even without the will; and there is now a necessity even without the will, which the will made without necessity.
Iulianum.4.103Nam et ille qui dicit: Non quod volo ago (Rom 7, 15), certe secundum vos necessitate consuetudinis premitur; hanc autem necessitatem, ne liberum auferatis arbitrium, eum sibi voluntate fecisse contenditis; et tale aliquid in natura humana factum esse non creditis, ut ex voluntate primi hominis, de quo est origo humani generis, fieret necessitas peccati originalis in posteris.
For he too who says, Not what I will do I do (Rom 7:15), is certainly, according to you, pressed by the necessity of habit; but this necessity, lest you take away free choice, you contend that he made for himself by the will; and yet you do not believe that anything of the kind came about in human nature—that from the will of the first man, from whom is the origin of the human race, there should come about a necessity of original sin in his posterity.
Iulianum.4.103Ecce illa quae impossibilia proponebas, in vi consuetudinis facta sunt possibilia, quae non frustra dicta est a quibusdam secunda natura.
Behold, those things which you set forth as impossible have, in the force of habit, become possible—the habit which has not without reason been called by some a second nature.
Iulianum.4.103Dixeras, nos absurdius aliquid dicere, quam qui nivem nigram esse dicebat: ut peccatum conditionem suam sua conditione perdat, et sit absque hoc, sine quo non posse esse definitum est. Nonne conditionem suam sua conditione perdit, ut per vim consuetudinis fiat sine voluntate, cum consuetudo non facta sit nisi voluntate? Nonne rei huius natura fructibus suis negatur? Quandoquidem consuetudo fructus est voluntatis, quoniam ex voluntate gignitur; quae tamen id quod agit, negat se agere voluntate.
You had said that we say something more absurd than he who said that snow is black: that sin loses its condition by its own condition, and exists apart from that without which it was defined as unable to exist. Does it not lose its condition by its own condition, that through the force of habit it comes to be without the will, when the habit was made only by the will? Is not the nature of this thing denied by its own fruits? Since habit is the fruit of the will, because it is begotten from the will; which habit, nonetheless, denies that it does by the will what it does.
Iulianum.4.103Dicis, quod: contrarium sit necessitas et voluntas, ita ut se mutua impugnatione consumant; inde nos arguens, quod: alterum alterius subdamus effectui, dicentes necessitatem de fructibus voluntatis exortam; cum videas necessitatem consuetudinis fructum esse manifestissimum voluntatis. Nonne, quod tibi impossibile visum est, sua se voluntas multiplicatione delevit, et statum proprium operata mutavit, quae multiplicata necessitatem consuetudinis fecit; si voluntatem necessitas, te auctore, consumit? Si autem non consumit, profecto in homine mole consuetudinis presso simul esse possunt et iustitiae voluntas et peccati necessitas. Quoniam: Velle adiacet mihi, professio est voluntatis; Perficere autem bonum, non invenio (Rom 7, 15. 18), confessio est necessitatis.
You say that necessity and will are contrary, so that they consume each other by mutual assault; thence accusing us that we subject the one to the effect of the other, saying that necessity arose from the fruits of the will—when you see that the necessity of habit is most manifestly the fruit of the will. Has not—what seemed to you impossible—the will deleted itself by its own multiplication and, by acting, changed its own state, which, multiplied, made the necessity of habit; if, on your authority, necessity consumes the will? But if it does not consume it, then assuredly in a man pressed by the mass of habit there can exist at the same time both a will for righteousness and a necessity of sin. Since To will is present with me is a profession of the will; but To accomplish the good, I find not (Rom 7:18), is a confession of necessity.
Iulianum.4.103Tu vero dixisti voluntatem et necessitatem simul esse non posse; cum cernas simul eas esse cum concordant, simul esse cum pugnant. Illud porro ridiculum est, quod pro impossibili posuisti: Nihil, dicens, obtusius, immo furiosius cogitari, ut postquam coepit voluntas esse, voluntas esse desierit; quasi non hoc fiat, cum homo quando coeperit male aliquid velle, mox eum poenitet et desinit velle.
But you said that will and necessity cannot exist at the same time, when you discern that they exist at the same time when they agree, and exist at the same time when they fight. Further, that is ridiculous which you set down as impossible, saying that nothing can be thought more obtuse, indeed more frenzied, than that, after the will began to be, the will ceased to be; as though this did not happen, when a man, having begun to will something evil, at once repents and ceases to will.
Iulianum.4.103Verumtamen talia loquens: contorto, ut dicis, gutture me cogis annuere nullum in parvulis esse peccatum; cum tu nec contorto gutture abrumpas vinculum catholicae veritatis, quo nisi ei consentias, miserrime strangularis.
Nevertheless, in saying such things, with my throat wrenched, as you say, you compel me to grant that there is no sin in little children; whereas you, not even with your throat wrenched, break the bond of Catholic truth, by which, unless you consent to it, you are most miserably strangled.
Iulianum.4.103104. IUL. Quod vero addidisti: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, ut hic ostensum est inconvenientissime collocatum, ita in secundo libro quemadmodum intellegatur expositum est. Sed iam, praesenti disputatione suppleta, libet acutissimam retractare sententiam; sic enim inquis: " Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt " (Rom 5, 12). Per unius illius voluntatem malam omnes in eo peccaverunt, quando omnes ille unus fuerunt, de quo propterea singuli originale peccatum traxerunt (De nupt. et concup. 2, 5, 15).
104. JUL. As for what you added—Through one man sin entered into the world—just as it has been shown here to be most unfittingly placed, so in the second book it has been set forth how it is to be understood. But now, the present disputation being supplied, it is well to handle again that most acute sentence; for thus you say: Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed to all men, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12). Through the evil will of that one man all sinned in him, when all were that one man, from whom on that account each individually drew original sin (Marriage and Desire 2.5.15).
Iulianum.4.104Tunc, inquis, peccaverunt, quando omnes ille unus fuerunt. Hoc autem iam ad Marcellinum te scripsisse (De pecc. mer. 1, 11; 3, 14) signaveram; quo testimonio convinceris, animarum traducem de Manichaei specialiter visceribus acceptum (cuius in tertio libro sententias inserui) credere atque complecti. Quod certe tam deforme est, ut tu illud cum significes, nequaquam tamen audeas profiteri. Sed hoc nos in praesenti interim differamus, quod et prioris assertoris sui obscenitate, et sequentis, id est, tuo pavore iugulatur.
Then, you say, they sinned, when all were that one man. But I had marked that you had already written this to Marcellinus (The Punishment and Forgiveness of Sins 1.11; 3.14); by which testimony you are convicted of believing and embracing the transmission of souls, taken specifically from the bowels of the Manichee (whose opinions I have inserted in the third book). This is certainly so deformed that, although you signify it, you nonetheless by no means dare to profess it. But let us for the present put this off in the meantime, since it is throttled both by the obscenity of its earlier asserter and by the dread of the later one, that is, yours.
Iulianum.4.104Illud autem in praesenti dispicere iuvat, quanta in disputando perturbatione iacteris. Ais quippe: Per unius illius voluntatem malam omnes in eo peccaverunt, quando omnes ille unus fuerunt. Si omnes ille unus fuerunt, quomodo per voluntatem illius malam omnes peccaverunt; cum isti omnes, quos in illo fuisse dicis, sua potuerint voluntate peccare? Immo, ut retorqueamus, ille infelicior cunctis, qui solus portat invidiam, cum omnes in illo secundum tuum dogma deliquerint.
But it is well at present to discern with what great confusion you are tossed in disputing. For you say: Through the evil will of that one man all sinned in him, when all were that one man. If all were that one man, how did all sin through his evil will, when all these, whom you say were in him, could have sinned by their own will? Indeed, to turn it back, he is more unhappy than all, who alone bears the odium, when all, according to your dogma, offended in him.
Iulianum.4.104Habuerunt ergo parvuli voluntatem, non solum antequam nascerentur, verum antequam proavi eorum generarentur; et usi sunt electionis arbitrio, priusquam substantiae eorum semina conderentur. Cur itaque metuis dicere, in eis tempore conceptuum suorum esse liberam voluntatem, qua peccatum non trahant naturaliter, sed sponte committant; si credis eos hodie conceptos, ante tot saecula habuisse sensum, iudicium, efficientiam voluntatis? Quod quidem in libris quos ad Marcellini nomen edidisti, non dubitasti ponere; plane ad ostendendum qua amentia teneantur inimici Dei. Ibi enim ita ais: Qui parvuli in Adam peccaverunt, ut ei similes crearentur (De pecc. mer. 1, 11). Quo quid mendacius, amentius, et spurcius potuit insonare, quam ante peccaverunt, ut crearentur? Id est, faciendo meruerunt, ut possent esse qui aliquid operarentur; et antiquior eorum fuit actio, quam substantia. Quae commenta, Orgiis et Thyrsis aptiora quam litteris, indicasse sufficiat.
Little children, then, had a will, not only before they were born, but before their great-grandfathers were begotten; and they used the choice of election before the seeds of their substance were founded. Why, therefore, do you fear to say that there is in them, at the time of their conceptions, a free will by which they do not draw sin naturally but commit it of their own accord; if you believe that those conceived today had, so many ages before, sense, judgment, and the efficacy of will? This indeed, in the books you published to the name of Marcellinus, you did not hesitate to set down—plainly to show by what madness the enemies of God are held. For there you say thus: These little children sinned in Adam, that they might be created like him (The Punishment and Forgiveness of Sins 1.11). Than which what could sound more mendacious, more mad, and more foul, than that they sinned before they were created? That is, by doing they earned to be able to be those who would do something; and their action was older than their substance. Let it suffice to have pointed out these contrivances, more fit for Orgies and Thyrsuses than for letters.
Iulianum.4.104Inde ergo manavit ista responsio, qua dicis: Omnes in eo peccaverunt, quando ille unus omnes fuerunt, de quo singuli peccatum originale traxerunt. Hic enim laborandum non est, ut doceamus, cum voluntas opus personae sit, voluntatem ante personam, cuius voluntas est, esse non posse; sed illud potissimum intellegi volo, quia nec secundum hanc opinionem est originale peccatum. Nam si omnes ibi fuerunt, qui peccaverunt, nihil traxerunt de originali malo, quia id universi suis studiis perpetrarunt. Tradux ergo peccati non solum catholica veritate destruitur, verum etiam patroni sui argumentis omnibus; quod quidem habet mendaciorum natura, ut non servet simulandi concinentiam, sed verecundiae prodiga, et alieni appetens, in universis quae usurpaverit detegatur.
From this, then, flowed that response in which you say: All sinned in him, when that one was all, from whom each individually drew original sin. For here there is no need to labor to teach that, since the will is a work of the person, the will cannot exist before the person whose will it is; but I wish this above all to be understood: that not even according to this opinion is there original sin. For if all who sinned were there, they drew nothing of the original evil, because the whole company perpetrated it by their own efforts. The transmission of sin, therefore, is destroyed not only by Catholic truth, but even by all the arguments of its own patron; for this indeed is the nature of lies, that it does not preserve the consistency of its pretense, but, prodigal of modesty and greedy for what belongs to another, is exposed in all that it has usurped.
Iulianum.4.104AUG. Per unum hominem, in quo omnes peccaverunt, in mundum intrasse peccatum, dixit Apostolus, intellexit Ambrosius; sed eadem verba apostolica in suum perversum sensum conatur pervertere Iulianus. Cur ei non ipse potius respondet Ambrosius? Audi ergo, Iuliane: Omnes, inquit, in Adam moriuntur; quia " per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt " (Rom 5, 12); illius ergo culpa mors omnium est (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 4, 7). Audi adhuc aliud: Fuit, inquit, Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam, et omnes in illo perierunt (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 15, 24).
AUG. That through one man, in whom all sinned, sin entered into the world—the Apostle said it, Ambrose understood it; but Julian tries to pervert those same apostolic words to his own perverse sense. Why does not Ambrose himself rather answer him? Hear, then, Julian: All, he says, die in Adam; for through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed to all men, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12); the death of all, therefore, is that man's fault (Ambrose, In Luc. 4.7). Hear yet another thing: Adam was, he says, and in him we all were; Adam perished, and all perished in him (Ambrose, In Luc. 7.15.24).
Iulianum.4.104Huic dic, si audes, quod una anima propria voluntate peccante, non potuerunt perire tot animae nondum habentes proprias voluntates. Argue de origine animarum cunctationem meam, quia non audeo docere vel affirmare quod nescio; profer tu de huius rei tam profunda obscuritate quod placet; dum tamen fixa et inconcussa sit ista sententia, quia illius unius culpa mors omnium est, et in illo omnes perierunt; unde venit novissimus Adam quaerere et salvare quod perierat (Cf. Lc 19, 10).
Say to this man, if you dare, that, with one soul sinning by its own will, so many souls could not perish that did not yet have their own wills. Reproach my hesitation about the origin of souls, because I do not dare to teach or affirm what I do not know; bring forth yourself, from the so profound obscurity of this matter, what you please—provided, however, that this opinion stand fixed and unshaken: that the fault of that one man is the death of all, and that in him all perished; whence the last Adam came to seek and to save what had perished (See Luke 19:10).
Iulianum.4.104Huic dic: Et isti ergo sua voluntate peccaverunt, quos in illo periisse dicis, qui sua voluntate peccavit. Sed poterat Ambrosius hoc intellegere, quod tu non potes, non hoc dici propter arbitrium singulorum, sed propter originem seminis, unde omnes futuri erant; secundum quam originem omnes in illo uno erant, et hi omnes unus ille erant, qui in se ipsis nulli adhuc erant.
Say to this man: These too, then, whom you say perished in him who sinned by his own will, sinned by their own will. But Ambrose could understand what you cannot—that this is said not on account of the choice of individuals, but on account of the origin of the seed, from which all were to be; according to which origin all were in that one man, and all these were that one man, who in themselves were as yet none.
Iulianum.4.104Secundum hanc originem seminalem, etiam Levi in lumbis patris sui Abraham fuisse dicitur, quando a Melchisedech decimatus est Abraham; unde et ipse Levi tunc decimatus ostenditur, non in se ipso, sed in illo in cuius fuit lumbis; nec voluit, nec noluit decimari; quoniam nulla eius voluntas erat, quando secundum substantiam suam nec ipse adhuc erat; et tamen secundum rationem seminis, non mendaciter, nec inaniter dictum est, quod ibi fuit, et decimatus est. Unde ab hac decimatione filiorum Abrahae, qui erant in lumbis eius, quando Melchisedech sacerdoti decimas dedit, ille solus sacerdos exceptus est, cui dictum est: Tu es sacerdos in aeternum secundum ordinem Melchisedech (Ps 109, 4).
According to this seminal origin, Levi too is said to have been in the loins of his father Abraham, when Abraham was tithed by Melchizedek; whence Levi himself too is shown to have then been tithed, not in himself, but in him in whose loins he was; and he neither willed nor refused to be tithed, since he had no will, when according to his own substance he himself as yet was not; and yet, according to the principle of the seed, it was said neither mendaciously nor emptily that he was there and was tithed. Hence from this tithing of the sons of Abraham, who were in his loins when he gave tithes to the priest Melchizedek, that one priest alone was excepted, to whom it was said: You are a priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek (Ps 110:4 (109:4)).
Iulianum.4.104Qui licet sit etiam ipse secundum carnem semen Abrahae, eo quod virgo Maria, de qua carnem sumpsit, ex ipso semine, propagata est; non tamen est obnoxius eidem semini, qui virili non est conceptus ex semine, liber a nexu seminatricis concupiscentiae. Non iam ergo Ambrosio, sicut dicebam, sed illi dic qui scripsit ad Hebraeos, atque ait: Et sicut oportet dicere, propter Abraham et Levi accipiens decimam decimatus est; adhuc enim in lumbis patris sui fuit, cum ei occurrit Melchisedech (Hebr 7, 9-10). Huic calumniare caeca loquacitate, et dic, si audes: Cum pater Abraham voluntate sua fuerit decimatus, quomodo potuit per illius voluntatem decimari, hoc est decimas dare Levi, cuius voluntas nulla erat, quia omnino ipse nondum erat?
Although he too is, according to the flesh, the seed of Abraham, in that the Virgin Mary, from whom he took flesh, was propagated from that same seed; yet he is not liable to that same seed, who was not conceived from male seed, free from the bond of the concupiscence that sows. No longer, then, to Ambrose, as I was saying, but to him who wrote to the Hebrews, say it, who says: And, as one might say, through Abraham even Levi, who receives tithes, was tithed; for he was still in the loins of his father when Melchizedek met him (Heb 7:9-10). Slander this man with your blind loquacity, and say, if you dare: Since father Abraham was tithed by his own will, how could Levi be tithed through his will—that is, give tithes—Levi whose will was none, because he himself altogether as yet was not?
Iulianum.4.104Ea ratione quippe, vel potius hoc errore dicis et nobis: Cum primus homo voluntate peccaverit, quomodo potuerunt per eius voluntatem simul in illo peccare, qui suam nondum habebant, quia per substantiam suam nulli adhuc erant? Immo desine vana garrire, et omnes qui nondum nati nihil per proprias voluntates agere poterant boni vel mali, in uno potuisse peccare, in quo per rationem seminis erant, quando ille propria voluntate peccatum illud grande peccavit, naturamque in se vitiavit, mutavit, obnoxiavit humanam; excepto uno homine, qui ex ipso quidem semine, non tamen seminali ratione procreatus est, si potes, intellege; si non potes, crede.
For by that reasoning, or rather by this error, you say to us also: Since the first man sinned by his will, how could those sin at the same time in him who did not yet have their own, because through their own substance they as yet were none? Rather, cease to chatter vain things, and understand—if you can—that all, who not yet born could do nothing good or evil through their own wills, could sin in the one in whom, by the principle of the seed, they were, when he by his own will committed that great sin, and vitiated, changed, and made liable in himself human nature; with the exception of the one man who, though from that same seed, was nonetheless not begotten by seminal principle. If you can, understand; if you cannot, believe.
Iulianum.4.104105. IUL. Post hanc vero responsionem aliud ubi a me pulsatus fuerat, deluere conatur. Ego quippe postquam de parvulorum voluntate requisiveram, secutus sum: Sed negas hoc, id est voluntatem peccatricem inesse nascentibus, et dicis tamen esse sub diabolo parvulos, nec dissimulas per quid eos degere sub potestate illius arbitreris; ais quippe: Quia de sexus utriusque commixtione nascuntur, sub adversaria sunt potestate. Dictorum eius itaque testimonio patuit, ob hoc illum parvulos daemoni vindicare, quia de sexus utriusque fuerant commixtione prognati; per quod docui, illum nuptias quae a Deo institutae sunt, quae sine commixtione esse non possunt, diabolo mancipasse.
105. JUL. But after this response, he tries to wash away another point where he had been assailed by me. For after I had inquired about the will of little children, I went on: But you deny this—that is, that a sinning will is in those being born—and yet you say that little children are under the devil, nor do you dissemble by what means you think they pass their life under his power; for you say: Because they are born from the intercourse of both sexes, they are under the adversary's power. And so, by the testimony of his own words, it was clear that he claims little children for the demon on this account, that they had been begotten from the intercourse of both sexes; whereby I taught that he had handed over to the devil marriage—which was instituted by God, which cannot exist without intercourse.
Iulianum.4.105AUG. Hoc nulla ratione docere potuisti, quamvis fueris multa contentione conatus; quod possunt videre, qui legunt et tuas calumnias, et refutationes meas.
AUG. This you could by no reasoning teach, although you tried with much contention; which those can see who read both your slanders and my refutations.
Iulianum.4.105106. IUL. Hoc ergo nunc sibi proposuit, et praemittit interrogationem meam. Dicis ergo, inquit, ideo illos esse sub diabolo, quia de sexus utriusque commixtione nascuntur? Ad quod qualem satisfactionem referat, audiamus. Dico, inquit, plane propter delictum illos esse sub diabolo; ideo autem expertes non esse delicti, quia de illa commixtione sunt nati, quae sine pudenda libidine non potest etiam quod honestum est operari. Dixit hoc etiam beatissimae memoriae Ambrosius (De nupt. et concup. 2, 5, 15). O calamitosam hominis pravitatem! O intentionem nefandam! O falsitatem erubescendam!
106. JUL. This, then, he now set before himself, and he prefaces my question. You say, then, he says, that they are under the devil for this reason, that they are born from the intercourse of both sexes? Let us hear what sort of satisfaction he gives in reply. I say, he says, plainly that they are under the devil on account of an offense; but that they are not free of an offense for this reason, that they were born from that intercourse which cannot, even when doing what is honorable, do so without shameful lust. This too was said by Ambrose of most blessed memory (Marriage and Desire 2.5.15). O the calamitous depravity of the man! O the abominable intent! O the falsehood to be blushed at!
Iulianum.4.106AUG. Exclama, exclama quantum potes; adde exclamationibus tuis: O bia! Homo quippe innocens, vim pateris, ut Manichaeum dicere cogaris Ambrosium. Absit, inquis, ut dicam. Cur, quaeso? An hic ostendis quanta sit fortitudo liberi arbitrii, quando tantam vim pateris ut dicas, nec tamen dicis? Cur ergo me dicis, quod illum esse non dicis, cum hoc ille tanto ante dixerit, quod ego nunc dico, atque in hac sententia propter quam Manichaeum me dicis, mihi et illi sit causa communis? An, quoniam non invenis qua exeas, iram quidem simulas, non tamen iratus, sed turbatus exclamas?
AUG. Cry out, cry out as much as you can; add to your outcries: O bia! (that is, "O force!"). For you, an innocent man, suffer force, that you may be compelled to call Ambrose a Manichee. Far be it, you say, that I should say it. Why, I ask? Or do you here show how great is the strength of free choice, when you suffer such force as to say it, and yet do not say it? Why, then, do you say of me what you do not say of him, when he said so long before what I now say, and in this opinion, on account of which you call me a Manichee, the cause is common to me and to him? Or, since you find no way out, do you indeed feign anger, yet, not angry but disturbed, cry out?
Iulianum.4.106Verum in ipsis exclamationibus tuis audio: O calamitosam hominis pravitatem! Quia videlicet homo sum calamitosus et pravus, qui consentire eligo Ambrosio; essem vero beatus et rectus, si eligerem consentire Iuliano. Audio: O intentionem nefandam! Intentio quippe nostra nefanda est, quia opponimus Ambrosium Iuliano; esset autem fanda, si Iulianum praeponeremus Ambrosio.
But in your very outcries I hear: O the calamitous depravity of the man! Because, that is, I am a calamitous and depraved man, who choose to consent to Ambrose; whereas I would be blessed and upright, if I chose to consent to Julian. I hear: O the abominable intent! For our intent is abominable, because we set Ambrose against Julian; whereas it would be unabominable, if we set Julian before Ambrose.
Iulianum.4.106Sed quid est quod audio tertiam exclamationem tuam: O falsitatem erubescendam! Falsamne dicis esse Ambrosii sententiam, id est, quod falsum ipse senserit? An eam nos illi falso tribuere, cum hoc ipse non senserit, neque id omnino quod eum nos dixisse dicimus dixerit? An eam nos non intellegendo, falsum opinari de illa, cum ipsa sit vera? Sed non tam contumeliose de Ambrosio loqueris, ut illi viro erubescendam tribueres falsitatem. Nos vero eam composuisse, et quod ab illo prolata fuerit finxisse, non ausus es dicere; tam multis enim doctoris illius nota sunt scripta, ut in hoc abruptum te praecipitare timueris. Tam vero aperta est ista sententia, ut non acutus qui hanc intellexerit, sed superfluus videri possit qui exponendam putaverit.
But what is this that I hear, your third outcry: O the falsehood to be blushed at! Do you say that Ambrose's opinion is false—that is, that he himself perceived something false? Or that we falsely attribute it to him, since he did not perceive this, nor said at all what we say he said? Or that we, by not understanding, opine something false about it, when it is itself true? But you do not speak so contumeliously of Ambrose as to attribute to that man a falsehood to be blushed at. And that we composed it, and feigned that it was uttered by him, you did not dare to say; for the writings of that teacher are known to so many that you feared to hurl yourself over this precipice. But that opinion is so open that one who has understood it can seem not acute, but superfluous, if he thought it needed expounding.
Iulianum.4.106Denique ut quod dico possit attendi, verba ipsa beatissimi catholici antistitis et hic ponam. Ait ergo ille, ille cuius fidem et purissimum in Scripturis sensum, Pelagius vester dicit, ne inimicum quidem ausum fuisse reprehendere (PELAGIUS, De lib. arb. 3); cum de nativitate Domini loqueretur: Ideo et quasi homo per universa tentatus est, et in similitudine hominum cuncta sustinuit; sed quasi de Spiritu natus abstinuit a peccato. Omnis enim homo mendax, et nemo sine peccato nisi unus Deus. Servatum est igitur, inquit, ut ex viro et muliere, id est, per illam corporum commixtionem, nemo videatur expers esse delicti; qui autem expers delicti, expers etiam huiusmodi conceptionis (AMBROSIUS, In Isai).
Finally, that what I say may be attended to, I will set down here the very words of the most blessed Catholic bishop. He says, then—he whose faith and most pure sense in the Scriptures your Pelagius says not even an enemy dared to reprehend (Pelagius, De lib. arb. 3)—when he was speaking of the Lord's nativity: And so he too was as a man tempted in all things, and in the likeness of men sustained all things; but, as one born of the Spirit, he abstained from sin. For every man is a liar, and no one is without sin except the one God. It has been kept, then, he says, that no one born of man and woman—that is, through that intercourse of bodies—should seem to be free of an offense; but he who is free of an offense is free also of conception of this kind (Ambrose, In Isai).
Iulianum.4.106Cum igitur hoc et Ambrosium dixisse non neges, et planum atque apertum esse perspicias; quid est quod clamas: O falsitatem erubescendam! Cui quaeso, erubescendam? Illine an mihi? Si illi, vide cui sis contumeliosus; si mihi, vide quam sis calumniosus. Sed hoc, inquis, etiam tu dicis. Dico plane, quia verum est: quod si tu verum esse non putas, cur in una eademque sententia, quam dicit ille, dico ego, non est Manichaeus ille, sed ego? Quanto iustius hic nos exclamamus: O erubescendam personarum acceptionem! Quae te procul dubio erubescere cogeret, nisi in tua persona frons ori tuo similis esset.
Since, then, you do not deny that Ambrose too said this, and you perceive it to be plain and open, what is this that you cry: O the falsehood to be blushed at! At whom, I ask, to be blushed at? At him or at me? If at him, see whom you are contumelious toward; if at me, see how slanderous you are. But this, you say, you too say. I say it plainly, because it is true; and if you do not think it true, why, in one and the same opinion which he says and I say, is not he a Manichee, but I am? How much more justly do we here cry out: O the partiality of persons to be blushed at! Which would beyond doubt force you to blush, were your forehead, in your person, not like your mouth.
Iulianum.4.106107. IUL. Hunccine audere dicere se damnatorem non esse coniugii, et tanto scelere illudere auribus imperitis, et a Manichaei se dicat recessisse consortio, qui commixtionem sexuum, qui operam nuptiarum, qui affectionem et sensum parentum in regno diaboli multiplici professione constituit; atque ad haec inventa Manichaei adiutorium sui acuminis iungens, pronuntiat quidem diabolicam commixtionem, eamque esse et opere et carne coniugum, ac propter eam deputat regno diaboli, absolutis tamen operatoribus, innocentes. Ita utique Deo semper infestus, diabolo, sicut dicit, per libidinem servientes tuetur.
107. JUL. Does this man dare to say that he is no condemner of marriage, and to mock unskilled ears with so great a wickedness, and to say that he has withdrawn from the fellowship of the Manichee—he who by manifold profession has placed the intercourse of the sexes, the work of marriage, the affection and feeling of parents within the kingdom of the devil; and, joining to these inventions of the Manichee the help of his own sharpness, declares the intercourse diabolical, and that it belongs both to the work and to the flesh of spouses, and on account of it assigns the innocent to the kingdom of the devil—the workers, however, being absolved? Thus, ever hostile to God, he safeguards those who, as he says, serve the devil through lust.
Iulianum.4.107AUG. Erras, et tibi consentientes mittis alios in errorem; non serviunt diabolo per libidinem, qui filiorum procreandorum causa utuntur coniugum corpore, ut generentur regenerandi. Nec ideo tamen defenditur libidinis malum; sed defenduntur qui bene utuntur malo. Est enim et mali usus bonus. Nam et ipsius satanae in Scripturis sanctis reperiuntur utilitates, manente eius scilicet vituperatione, laude vero utentis malo bene.
AUG. You err, and you send others who agree with you into error; they do not serve the devil through lust who use the body of their spouses for the sake of begetting children, that those to be regenerated may be generated. Nor, however, is the evil of lust on that account defended; but those are defended who use the evil well. For there is also a good use of evil. For even of Satan himself useful purposes are found in the holy Scriptures—his own censure, of course, remaining, but with praise for the one who uses the evil well.
Iulianum.4.107108. AUG. Parvulos vero, quos a Deo fieri dicit, dominio addicit inimici, sicque non opus daemonis arguit, cuius ministros absolvit a culpa; sed opus Dei, ad quod diabolici muneris conscia voluptas non potuit pervenire. Coniugalis ergo operis criminator, sed libidinum expiator, impugnator innocentiae, et divinae aequitatis infamator non timuit scribere: Dico plane, ideo illos esse sub diabolo, quia de illa commixtione sunt nati. Quod sententiae facinus cum nudatum videret, conatus illud aliqua auctoritate defendere, quam Scripturis proferre non poterat, subdidit etiam episcopum Ambrosium sensisse similiter. Non quidem mirum est quod criminatur et mortuos, cum criminatur innocuos.
108. AUG. But little children, whom he says are made by God, he assigns to the dominion of the enemy, and thus he impugns not the work of the demon, whose ministers he absolves from fault, but the work of God, to which the pleasure that is conscious of a diabolical office could not attain. The accuser, therefore, of the conjugal work, but the expiator of lusts, the assailant of innocence, and the defamer of divine equity, did not fear to write: I say plainly that they are under the devil for this reason, that they are born from that intercourse. When he saw this crime of opinion laid bare, trying to defend it by some authority, which he could not bring forth from the Scriptures, he added that the bishop Ambrose too had perceived likewise. It is no wonder, indeed, that he accuses even the dead, since he accuses the innocent.
Iulianum.4.108AUG. Quisquis haec audit, quid te putat obicere nobis, nisi quod haec sententia beatissimi Ambrosii quam posuimus non sit ipsius, sed eam nos tamquam sit ipsius finxerimus? Nam et ego, cum haec legerem, nihil te agere existimavi; sed posteaquam veni ad illa quae adiungis, et hoc Ambrosium dixisse non abnuis, te potius horrendum criminatorem tanti illius doctoris inveni. Nam quidquid dicis in me, quoniam per commixtionem virilem mulierisque conceptum dico neminem expertem esse delicti, profecto etiam in illum dicis, qui hoc ante me dixit et scripsit.
AUG. Whoever hears these things, what does he think you object to us, except that this opinion of the most blessed Ambrose which we set down is not his, but that we feigned it as though it were his? For I too, when I read these things, supposed you were doing nothing; but after I came to those things you add, and you do not deny that Ambrose said this, I found you rather a dreadful accuser of so great a teacher. For whatever you say against me—since I say that no one conceived through the intercourse of man and woman is free of an offense—you assuredly say also against him who said and wrote this before me.
Iulianum.4.108Ego autem cum te refellens et tibi resistens, assero parvulos propter originale delictum esse sub diabolo, nisi renascantur in Christo, non utique me solum, verum et Ambrosium, et alios socios eius, ac fidei huius participes atque doctores, universamque Christi Ecclesiam, quae se hoc accepisse, hoc tenere, hoc fideliter credere, parvulorum baptizatorum exorcismo et exsufflatione testatur, a tua nefaria criminatione defendo.
AUG. But I, in refuting you and resisting you, when I assert that little children, on account of an original offense, are under the devil unless they are reborn in Christ, defend from your abominable accusation not only myself, but also Ambrose, and the others, his companions and the sharers and teachers of this faith, and the whole Church of Christ, which testifies that it received this, holds this, faithfully believes this, by the exorcism and breathing-upon of baptized little children.
Iulianum.4.108109. IUL. Quanto rectius diceres: Dixit hoc idem et Manichaeus in epistola ad Patricium; dixit et in epistola quam scripsit ad filiam Menoch, dixit et in aliis multis scriptis, quae tu penitus imbibisti? Sed in consortium tuum episcopum Mediolanensem conaris attrahere, et quia non potes habere praesidium, vis invenire solatium.
109. JUL. How much more rightly would you say: This same thing the Manichee too said in his letter to Patricius; he said it also in the letter he wrote to his daughter Menoch, he said it also in many other writings, which you have thoroughly imbibed? But you try to draw the bishop of Milan into your fellowship, and because you cannot have a protector, you wish to find a consolation.
Iulianum.4.109AUG. Valde contra Manichaeum est quod dixit Ambrosius. Nam Manichaeus alienam mali naturam nobis dicit esse commixtam; Ambrosius autem praevaricatione primi hominis nostram dicit esse vitiatam; in hac vero sententia de qua nunc agimus, nativitatem carnis Christi a ceterorum peccati carne discernens defendit Ambrosius, quam negat penitus Manichaeus. Quod ergo credit Ambrosius, hoc et ego; quod autem Manichaeus, nec ille, nec ego.
AUG. What Ambrose said is strongly against the Manichee. For the Manichee says that an alien nature of evil is commingled with us; but Ambrose says that our nature was vitiated by the transgression of the first man; and in this opinion about which we are now dealing, Ambrose, distinguishing the nativity of the flesh of Christ from the flesh of sin of the rest, defends what the Manichee thoroughly denies. What Ambrose believes, then, this I too believe; but what the Manichee believes, neither he nor I.
Iulianum.4.109Quid est quod tu niteris me separare ab Ambrosio, et coniungere Manichaeo? Nam si originale peccatum, non ex alienae commixtione, sed ex nostrae depravatione naturae dicere a nascentibus trahi, dogma est Manichaeorum; hoc mecum dicit Ambrosius; cur non ambos Manichaeis conaris adiungere? Si autem hoc Manichaeorum dogma non est, sicut non est: hoc dico cum Ambrosio; cur non ambos a Manichaeis dignaris abiungere? Cur ergo, ut dicis: Episcopum Mediolanensem in consortium meum conor attrahere; cum me ab eius consortio tu frustra coneris abstrahere?
What is this that you strive to separate me from Ambrose, and to join me to the Manichee? For if to say that original sin is drawn by those being born, not from the commingling of an alien nature, but from the depravation of our own nature, is the dogma of the Manichees, then Ambrose says this with me; why do you not try to join us both to the Manichees? But if this is not the dogma of the Manichees, as it is not, then I say this with Ambrose; why do you not deign to disjoin us both from the Manichees? Why, then, do you say that I try to draw the bishop of Milan into my fellowship, when you try in vain to drag me from his fellowship?
Iulianum.4.109Quid est quod dicis: Quia non possum habere praesidium, velle me invenire solatium? Mihi cum Ambrosio, velis nolis, in fide catholica Christus commune praesidium est. Ideo plane est Ambrosius solatium meum, quia cum illo accipio convicium tuum; nec solum ipse me in hac causa plurimum consolatur, sed et Cyprianus, et Hilarius, aliique consimiles, quorum in me laceras catholicam fidem. Noli ergo invidere, quod Ambrosius, Cyprianus et Hilarius solatia sunt iniuriae meae; invitus enim videre compelleris, quantum intersit, quod Pelagius et Caelestius, et si quis est alius, solatia sunt damnationis tuae.
What is this that you say: that, because I cannot have a protector, I wish to find a consolation? For me, with Ambrose, like it or not, Christ is the common protector in the Catholic faith. For this reason Ambrose is plainly my consolation, because with him I receive your abuse; nor does he alone console me greatly in this cause, but also Cyprian, and Hilary, and others like them, whose Catholic faith you tear at in me. Do not, then, begrudge that Ambrose, Cyprian, and Hilary are consolations of my injury; for unwillingly you will be compelled to see how great is the difference, that Pelagius and Caelestius, and any other there may be, are consolations of your condemnation.
Iulianum.4.109Quid, quod ostendo debellantem Manichaeos pro catholica fide Ambrosium, et te in hoc certamine contra Ambrosium praebere Manichaeis vel victis solatium, vel etiam resistentibus, quod est peius, auxilium? Manichaei enim dicunt propriam mali esse substantiam atque naturam, bonae Dei substantiae naturaeque coaeternam. Impossibile enim est, aiunt, ut oriri possint mala de bonis; Ambrosius contradicit, et dicit: Ex bonis mala orta sunt; non enim sunt mala, nisi quae privantur bonis; per mala tamen factum est ut bona eminerent; ergo indigentia boni, radix malitiae est (AMBROSIUS, De Isaac et anima 7).
What, that I show Ambrose warring down the Manichees for the Catholic faith, and you in this contest, against Ambrose, furnishing the Manichees either consolation when conquered, or even—what is worse—help when resisting? For the Manichees say that there is a proper substance and nature of evil, coeternal with the good substance and nature of God. For it is impossible, they say, that evils could arise from goods; Ambrose contradicts, and says: From goods evils have arisen; for there are no evils except those that are deprived of goods; yet through evils it came about that goods stood out; therefore the want of good is the root of malice (Ambrose, De Isaac et anima 7).
Iulianum.4.109Tu inter haec quid dicis? Rerum ratio non sinit, inquis, ut de bono malum, et de iusto iniquum aliquid proferatur. Haec verba tua pro Manichaeis adversus Ambrosium, ex illo praeclaro opere, in quo libris quattuor uni meo voluisti respondere, posuimus (Cf. Contra Iul. 1, 9, 42-46).
What do you say amid these things? The reckoning of things, you say, does not allow that anything evil be brought forth from the good, or anything iniquitous from the just. These words of yours, on behalf of the Manichees against Ambrose, we have set down from that illustrious work in which you wished to answer my one with four books (See Answer to Julian 1.9.42-46).
Iulianum.4.109Si in hac controversia iudex esses, profecto tua sententia victus a Manichaeis diceretur Ambrosius. Et non erubescis, cum sis calumniator eorum quos apertissime criminaris, adulator eorum quos ex obliquo pariter criminaris, adiutor eorum de quibus alios criminaris?
If in this controversy you were the judge, then by your sentence Ambrose would be said to be conquered by the Manichees. And are you not ashamed, being the slanderer of those whom you most openly accuse, the flatterer of those whom you obliquely accuse just the same, the helper of those about whom you accuse others?
Iulianum.4.109110. IUL. Numquid legi Dei aut operi Dei scripta disputatorum praeiudicant?
110. JUL. Do the writings of disputants prejudge the law of God or the work of God?
Iulianum.4.110AUG. Hic iam incipis confiteri, hanc a nobis non esse confictam velut Ambrosii, sed vere esse sententiam; quandoquidem sic te ab illo liberare conaris, ut dicas: Numquid legi Dei aut operi Dei disputatorum scripta praeiudicant? Sed perge, dic cetera quibus impudentior inimicus fidei catholicae iudiceris.
AUG. Here now you begin to confess that this was not feigned by us as though Ambrose's, but is truly his opinion; since you so try to free yourself from him as to say: Do the writings of disputants prejudge the law of God or the work of God? But go on, say the rest by which you may be judged a more impudent enemy of the Catholic faith.
Iulianum.4.110111. IUL. Mihi interim abunde sufficit, etiam per hoc ipsum probare, nusquam te in sacris Litteris legisse quod credis, quod tu in tali causa nihil praeter episcopi, quas dicis, dictiunculas protulisti; quibus si aliquid auctoratius potuisses offendere, ab his procul dubio temperasses.
111. JUL. For me in the meantime it amply suffices to prove, even by this very thing, that you have nowhere read in the sacred Letters what you believe, since in such a cause you have brought forth nothing but the little sayings, as you call them, of a bishop; whereas, if you could have hit upon anything more authoritative, you would beyond doubt have refrained from these.
Iulianum.4.111AUG. Qui legunt, videant utrum ego divina testimonia non protulerim; an a me prolata depravare, frustra ipse conatus sis.
AUG. Let those who read see whether I did not bring forth divine testimonies; or whether you tried in vain to deprave what was brought forth by me.
Iulianum.4.111112. IUL. Sed bene quod nos onere talium personarum prior levasti. Nam in libro quem ad Timasium contra liberum arbitrium texuisti, cum sanctus Pelagius venerabilium virorum tam Ambrosii quam Cypriani recordatus fuisset, qui liberum arbitrium in libris suis commendaverant, respondisti nulla te gravari auctoritate talium; ita ut diceres, eos processu vitae melioris, si quid male senserant, expiasse (Cf. De nat. et grat. 71). Tua tibi ad hoc relata sint, ut excitare de solis nominibus erubescas invidiam. Ceterum vel Ambrosii dicta, vel aliorum, quorum famam vestrorum nitimini maculare consortio, clara benignaque possunt ratione defendi.
112. JUL. But it is well that you first relieved us of the burden of such persons. For in the book you wove together to Timasius against free choice, when the holy Pelagius had recalled venerable men, both Ambrose and Cyprian, who had commended free choice in their books, you answered that you were weighed down by no authority of such men; so that you said they had, by the progress of a better life, expiated whatever they had perceived wrongly (See Nature and Grace 71). Let your own words be reported back to you for this, that you may blush to stir up odium from mere names. But the sayings of Ambrose, or of others, whose fame you strive to stain by fellowship with your party, can be defended by a clear and kindly reasoning.
Iulianum.4.112AUG. Tantam caecitatem cordis tibi potuisse contingere, quis credit, nisi qui haec legit? Tu dicis quod si aliquid auctoratius offendere, id est, invenire potuissem, a disputatorum dictis, vel, sicut tu loqueris, dictiunculis, temperassem; et continuo tu ipse dicis, Pelagium, quem vocas sanctum, in defensione liberi arbitrii venerabiles viros Cyprianum et Ambrosium testes adhibuisse; nec attendis quemadmodum hoc dicendo redarguas magistrum tuum ipsamque haeresim vestram. Secundum tuam quippe sententiam, si aliquid Pelagius pro eo quod defendebat, auctoratius, in scriptis canonicis invenisset, a disputatorum testimoniis temperasset. Quando ista diceres, nisi te ita perturbaret Ambrosius, ut adversarium subito Pelagius reperiret?
AUG. That so great a blindness of heart could befall you, who would believe, except one who reads these things? You say that, if I could have hit upon—that is, found—anything more authoritative, I would have refrained from the sayings, or, as you put it, the little sayings, of disputants; and immediately you yourself say that Pelagius, whom you call holy, in the defense of free choice brought in as witnesses the venerable men Cyprian and Ambrose; nor do you notice how, by saying this, you refute your master and your very heresy. For according to your own opinion, if Pelagius had found anything more authoritative, in the canonical writings, for what he was defending, he would have refrained from the testimonies of disputants. When would you say these things, unless Ambrose so disturbed you that Pelagius suddenly found an adversary?
Iulianum.4.112Sed prior vos levavi, ut dicis, onere talium personarum, Ambrosii videlicet, eiusque sociorum. Plane hoc onere ita premeris, ut non solum opprimaris, verum etiam conteraris, et fias pulvis quem proicit ventus a facie terrae (Cf. Ps 1, 4).
But I first relieved you, as you say, of the burden of such persons—Ambrose, namely, and his companions. Plainly you are so pressed by this burden that you are not only crushed but even ground to pieces, and become dust which the wind drives from the face of the earth (See Ps 1:4).
Iulianum.4.112Neque enim illi tot ac tanti et tam sancti clarique antistites Dei, Ecclesiae catholicae filii discendo, patres docendo, de peccato primi hominis eique obnoxia successione mortalium ita locuti sunt, ut alii ab aliis discreparent, aut eorum quisque a semetipso; sed ita prorsus, ut eorum consensione atque constantia, nec aliter esse de hac re sanctam Scripturam intellegendam, nec aliam putandam catholicam fidem, quisquis eos non haeretico animo legit, dubitare non possit. Quorum pondere iam ipse sic frangeris, ut eorum dicta quibus contradicis: clara benignaque ratione defendenda susceperis.
For those so many and so great and so holy and illustrious bishops of God, sons of the Catholic Church by learning, fathers by teaching, did not speak about the sin of the first man and the succession of mortals liable to it in such a way that some differed from others, or any of them from himself; but so entirely that, by their consensus and constancy, whoever reads them not with a heretical mind cannot doubt either that holy Scripture is to be understood otherwise about this matter, or that any other is to be thought the Catholic faith. By whose weight you are yourself now so broken that you have undertaken to defend by a clear and kindly reasoning their sayings, which you contradict.
Iulianum.4.112Audiamus ergo claram benignamque rationem; qua tua ratione si defenduntur ea dicta, cur mihi ex eis ingeruntur tua maledicta? Nam omnino, quae in me detestaris et arguis, ipsa sunt, quae in illorum disputatione defendis. Si autem non defenduntur, sed sub nomine defensionis astutius arguuntur; absit ut ista clara et benigna sit ratio; sed irrisoria potius adulatio, quae ideo defensio vocatur, ne populorum catholicorum, a quibus iidem viri venerantur, tolerari non possit offensio.
Let us hear, then, the clear and kindly reasoning; by which reasoning of yours, if those sayings are defended, why are your slanders heaped upon me from them? For altogether, the things you detest and accuse in me are the very things you defend in their disputation. But if they are not defended, but under the name of defense are more cunningly accused, far be it that this be a clear and kindly reasoning; rather it is a mocking flattery, which is therefore called defense, lest the offense be unable to be tolerated by the Catholic peoples, by whom these same men are venerated.
Iulianum.4.112113. IUL. Quia videlicet et simplicius quaepiam dixerint, et quodcumque aliud speculantes, non habuerint necessitatem a latere surgentibus quaestionibus obviandi. Cum enim crebro laudaverint coniugia, et nullam in corporibus affectionem a diabolo insertam putarint, nec regno diaboli divina opera, id est naturae membra, subiecerint, sed et a Deo instituta coniugia ac benedictione donata, liberumque arbitrium, prout opportunitas attulit, explicarint; humanum est ut non stare in societate vestri sceleris iudicentur, si in scripturis illorum aut ambigue, aut negligenter quaepiam locata deprehenditis.
113. JUL. Because, namely, they said certain things rather simply, and, contemplating some other matter, did not have the necessity of meeting questions arising at their flank. For since they frequently praised marriage, and thought no affection in bodies inserted by the devil, nor subjected the divine works—that is, the members of nature—to the kingdom of the devil, but explained, as the occasion offered, both marriage instituted by God and endowed with blessing, and free choice; it is humane that they not be judged to stand in the fellowship of your wickedness, if in their writings you discover certain things placed either ambiguously or negligently.
Iulianum.4.113Quomodo enim non praeiudicat Scripturis sanctis, quod omnes haereses aliquibus se earum testimoniis occulunt ac nituntur tueri; ita etiam catholicorum virorum famam propter quaepiam incautius fusa, non patiemur addici. Neque enim habuerunt intentionem illi, aut damnandi nuptias, aut liberum arbitrium denegandi, vel innocentiam sauciandi; quam si habuissent, non vestrum dogma firmassent, sed honorem officii perdidissent.
For just as it does not prejudge the holy Scriptures that all heresies hide themselves behind, and strive to defend themselves by, some testimonies of them, so neither will we allow the fame of Catholic men to be condemned on account of certain things poured out rather incautiously. For they did not have the intent either of condemning marriage, or of denying free choice, or of wounding innocence; which if they had had, they would not have confirmed your dogma, but would have lost the honor of their office.
Iulianum.4.113AUG. O clara et benigna ratio defensionis! Simplicius videlicet dixit Ambrosius, ex commixtione maris et feminae expertem neminem esse delicti; et quodcumque aliud speculando, nec habendo necessitatem a latere surgentibus quaestionibus obviandi, negligenter et incaute scriptis et disputationibus suis Manichaeum, quod dicis, virus infudit. Homo loquacissime, homines timens homini parcis, non illa dicta defendis. Nam si vera ratione defenduntur haec dicta, procul dubio veraciter defenduntur, et vera sunt; et si hoc ita est, recte asseritur originale peccatum, et dogma interimitur vestrum. Si autem falsa ratione defenduntur haec dicta clara tua illa et benigna ratio non est ratio, sed deceptio.
AUG. O clear and kindly reasoning of defense! Ambrose, namely, said rather simply that no one is free of an offense from the intercourse of male and female; and, contemplating some other matter, and not having the necessity of meeting questions arising at his flank, he negligently and incautiously poured into his writings and disputations the Manichean poison, as you call it. O most talkative man, fearing men, you spare a man, you do not defend those sayings. For if these sayings are defended by a true reasoning, then beyond doubt they are truly defended, and are true; and if this is so, original sin is rightly asserted, and your dogma is destroyed. But if these sayings are defended by a false reasoning, that clear and kindly reasoning of yours is not reasoning, but deception.
Iulianum.4.113At enim coniugia crebro laudavit Ambrosius; hoc et nos facimus. Nullam, inquis, in corporibus affectionem a diabolo ille putavit insertam; si affectionem bonam, nec nos; si malam, sicut ille, ita et nos. Nec regno, inquis, diaboli divina opera, hoc est naturae membra, ille subiecit; quasi adulterorum membra non sint divina opera et membra naturae, quae tamen vitio, et per hoc diabolo constat esse subiecta.
But Ambrose frequently praised marriage; this we too do. He thought, you say, no affection in bodies inserted by the devil; if a good affection, neither do we; if an evil one, as he, so we too. Nor, you say, did he subject the divine works—that is, the members of nature—to the kingdom of the devil; as though the members of adulterers were not divine works and members of nature, which nonetheless are established, by their vice and thereby by the devil, to be subjected.
Iulianum.4.113Illi, inquis, a Deo instituta coniugia ac benedictione donata, liberumque arbitrium, prout opportunitas attulit, explicarunt. Sic et nos. Humanum est, inquis, ut non stare in societate vestri sceleris iudicentur; immo insanum est ut non stare in societate illorum vestro scelere iudicemur.
They, you say, explained, as the occasion offered, both marriage instituted by God and endowed with blessing, and free choice. So do we too. It is humane, you say, that they not be judged to stand in the fellowship of your wickedness; rather, it is insane that we be judged, by your wickedness, not to stand in the fellowship of those men.
Iulianum.4.113Dicis: Non praeiudicare Scripturis sanctis, quod omnes haereses aliquibus earum testimoniis se occulunt ac nituntur tueri; et sic vis: disputatoribus non praeiudicare catholicis nonnulla, quae ab eis, sicut putas, incautius fusa vobis obiciamus. Quid est hoc, nisi dicere etiam in Scripturis sanctis, ea quae pro se usurpant haeretici, incautius fusa esse, et ideo vera non esse?
You say: It does not prejudge the holy Scriptures that all heresies hide themselves behind, and strive to defend themselves by, some testimonies of them; and so you wish that certain things—poured out, as you suppose, rather incautiously, which we object to you from Catholic disputants—do not prejudge them. What is this but to say that even in the holy Scriptures the things which heretics usurp on their own behalf were poured out rather incautiously, and therefore are not true?
Iulianum.4.113Quo sceleratius quid potest dici? Aut si illa vera sunt, sed ab haereticis non ita intelleguntur ut sunt; nihil simile habet haec comparatio; quoniam dicta vel Ambrosii, vel Cypriani, vel aliorum catholicorum, quae contra vos ponimus, si vera esse concesseris, peccatum originale firmabis.
What could be said more wickedly? Or if those things are true, but are not understood by the heretics as they are, this comparison has nothing similar; for the sayings of Ambrose, or of Cyprian, or of other Catholics, which we set against you, if you concede them to be true, you will confirm original sin.
Iulianum.4.113Proinde, quemadmodum nos cum illis et laudamus nuptias, et liberum confitemur arbitrium, et defendimus innocentiam; sic tu cum illis dic parvulos non esse expertes delicti; alioquin nos sumus cum eis, tu adversus eos. Illorum enim dicta non defendis, ut promiseras, sed reprehendis. Tuo quippe dogmate, cum cogaris illa culpare et falsa esse contendere, nullo modo sineris auctoritatibus eorum defensionem quam spoponderas, exhibere; quia et in accusatione adulator esse conaris, et in adulatione deprehenderis accusator.
Accordingly, just as we, with them, both praise marriage, and confess free choice, and defend innocence, so do you, with them, say that little children are not free of an offense; otherwise, we are with them, you against them. For you do not defend their sayings, as you had promised, but reprehend them. For by your dogma, since you are compelled to find fault with those sayings and to contend that they are false, you are in no way permitted to exhibit, by their authorities, the defense you had pledged; because you try to be a flatterer even in accusing, and in flattering are caught as an accuser.
Iulianum.4.113114. IUL. Libere itaque coniecto et pronuntio, quoniam si eorum aliquis his superesset diebus, videretque exstinctum disciplinae christianae decus, otiantem in omnibus liberam voluntatem, atque affectantem imputare necessitati quidquid sponte committit, vituperationem quoque operum Dei, eversionemque legis eius sub nomine inefficacis gratiae populorum auribus intimari; toto contra vos felle moveretur; perpendens etiam peccatum naturale a Manichaea non posse impietate discerni, fidem catholicam aut emendatis aut condemnatis vobis, et planius tueretur et cautius.
114. JUL. And so I freely conjecture and declare that, if any of them survived to these days and saw the glory of Christian discipline extinguished, free will idle in all things and eager to impute to necessity whatever it commits of its own accord, and the vituperation of the works of God and the overturning of his law instilled into the ears of the peoples under the name of an ineffectual grace, he would be moved with all his gall against you; perceiving also that natural sin cannot be distinguished from Manichean impiety, he would defend the Catholic faith—you being either corrected or condemned—both more plainly and more cautiously.
Iulianum.4.114AUG. Cur ergo emendatis nobis, et non etiam se ipsis? Ubi est quod te libere coniectare et pronuntiare promiseras? Ecce nec libera est tua vanitas, et falsa libertas; timuisti enim dicere, quod si his diebus superesset Ambrosius, vobis auditis, primum se ipsum, deinde nos emendaret; sed quasi homo liber hoc mutire formidans, tamen intellegi voluisti.
AUG. Why, then, with us corrected, and not also themselves? Where is it that you had promised to conjecture and declare freely? Behold, your vanity is not free, and your freedom is false; for you feared to say that, if Ambrose survived in these days, having heard you, he would first correct himself, then us; but, as a free man dreading to mutter this, you nonetheless wished it to be understood.
Iulianum.4.114En quo devenerunt hi dies, ut in eis Ambrosius, si hic viveret, disceret se fuisse Manichaeum, et audito Iuliano, vel Caelestio, vel ipso Pelagio, esse ulterius non debere, sed ex illa nefaria pestilentia vobis praecipientibus curantibusque sanari.
Behold to what these days have come, that in them Ambrose, if he were living here, would learn that he had been a Manichee, and, having heard Julian, or Caelestius, or Pelagius himself, ought to be one no longer, but to be healed of that abominable pestilence by your prescribing and curing.
Iulianum.4.114Quale spectaculum animo cogitantis occurrit? Quale esset, videre Ambrosium stantem, vel si ille permitteret, sedentem ante Pelagium, atque discentem paradisum novum saeculi huius calamitatibus plenum, quas videmus parvulos perpeti, ubi necesse esset, etiamsi nemo peccasset, carnem concupiscere adversus spiritum; et ne ad illicita ac flagitiosa pertraheret, concupiscere etiam spiritum adversus carnem; quam dissensionem dicere soleret Ambrosius, per praevaricationem primi hominis in hominum vertisse naturam (AMBROSIUS, In Lc. 7, 12); sed iam sub vobis magistris dicere non auderet?
What a spectacle presents itself to the mind of one who reflects! What it would be to see Ambrose standing, or, if Pelagius permitted, sitting before Pelagius, and learning a new paradise, full of the calamities of this age, which we see little children suffer, where it would be necessary—even if no one had sinned—that the flesh should lust against the spirit; and, lest it drag him to unlawful and shameful things, that the spirit too should lust against the flesh; which dissension Ambrose used to say had, through the transgression of the first man, turned into the nature of men (Ambrose, In Luc. 7.12); but which now, under you as masters, he would not dare to say?
Iulianum.4.114Necesse quoque esset in tali paradiso pallere praegnantes, tolerare longa fastidia, gemere atque ululare parientes; cum diversis vitiis ingeniorum et corporum homines nasci, paucosque cordatos, minore quidem, nec tamen sine labore litteras discere, ceteros tardiusculos sive tardos, et tanto magis quanto quisque esset tardior, aut concidi ferulis magistrorum, aut indoctos imperitosque manere; fatuos vero nec magistris dari, sed dolendos ridendosve nutriri; infantes, antequam quidquam mali possent velle vel agere, agitari morbis, torqueri doloribus, medicamentis curari cruciantibus, a daemonibus vexari, expirare superantibus cladibus.
It would also be necessary in such a paradise that pregnant women grow pale, endure long nausea, and groan and wail in giving birth; that men be born with the diverse defects of talents and bodies, and that the few sensible ones learn letters with less, yet not without, labor, the rest somewhat slow or slow—and the more so the slower each was—either be beaten with the rods of their masters or remain untaught and unskilled; that the foolish not even be given to masters, but be reared to be pitied or laughed at; that infants, before they could will or do anything evil, be agitated by diseases, tortured by pains, treated by tormenting remedies, vexed by demons, and expire of overwhelming disasters.
Iulianum.4.114Si vero haec exhorrens credere nollet Ambrosius, et responderet haec omnia, si nemo peccasset, nullo modo futura fuisse in tantae beatitudinis loco, ubi nec post peccatum esse potuerunt, eiectis inde illis, quorum praevaricatione mala ista secuta sunt;
But if Ambrose, shuddering at this, refused to believe it, and answered that all these things, if no one had sinned, would in no way have come to be in a place of so great blessedness, where they could not exist even after sin, those being cast out from there by whose transgression these evils followed;
Iulianum.4.114ac per hoc de miseria venire mortalium, quae nulla esset, nisi gravissimo peccato primi hominis natura humana vitiata atque mutata hoc saeculum tot tantisque calamitatibus plenum propagare meruisset; ubi nec redempti, iam sempiternae salutis pignore accepto, malis huiusmodi carent; sed cum de hoc saeculo exierint, tunc carebunt;
and on this account that they come from the misery of mortals, which would be none, unless human nature, vitiated and changed by the most grievous sin of the first man, had deserved to propagate this age full of so many and so great calamities; where not even the redeemed, having now received the pledge of everlasting salvation, are free of evils of this kind, but, when they have departed from this age, then they will be free;
Iulianum.4.114si ergo talia responderet Ambrosius, praeclaris syllogismis vestris prohiberetur haec dicere, ne scilicet concupiscentia carnis vituperata, et originali peccato credito, nuptiae damnarentur, liberum auferretur arbitrium, vituperarentur opera Dei, et sub nomine gratiae legis eversio sequeretur.
if, then, Ambrose answered such things, he would be forbidden by your illustrious syllogisms to say them—lest, namely, with the concupiscence of the flesh vituperated and original sin believed, marriage be condemned, free choice be taken away, the works of God be vituperated, and under the name of grace the overturning of the law follow.
Iulianum.4.114Non sic plane, non sic. Erubescite, vel potius expavescite talia cogitare. Immo vero si vir ille superesset, multo vehementius quam nos et auctoratius vobis pro catholica fide et pro Dei gratia vel aequitate resisteret, quam non sint consequentia, quae consequentia putatis, ostendens; quia et recte vivi potest, non pulsa nec laudata mala concupiscentia, sed frenata; nec culpatur naturae Conditor, quando ab illo sananda monstratur, quae ab inimico vitiari potuit, non creari; nec damnantur nuptiae, quae bene utuntur pudenda libidine; nec liberum aufertur arbitrium, sed cuius beneficio sit in bono liberum ostenditur; nec lex evacuatur per gratiam, sed impletur.
Not so, plainly, not so. Blush, or rather be terrified to think such things. Indeed, if that man survived, much more vehemently and more authoritatively than we would he resist you on behalf of the Catholic faith and the grace or equity of God, showing how the things you think are consequences are not consequences; because one can live rightly with the evil concupiscence not driven out nor praised, but bridled; nor is the Founder of nature blamed, when nature is shown to be healed by him, which could be vitiated by the enemy, not created; nor is marriage condemned, which uses shameful lust well; nor is free choice taken away, but it is shown by whose benefit it is free in the good; nor is the law made void through grace, but fulfilled.
Iulianum.4.114Haec ille doctor egregius egregie disputaret, et in vestras facies impudentes, illa quae superius de paradiso vestro diximus, et vestrum errorem vere consequuntur, et ab omnibus hominibus tamquam vesana atque furiosa vel ridentur, vel exhorrentur, illideret.
These things that excellent teacher would excellently dispute, and into your impudent faces he would dash those things which we said above about your paradise, which truly follow upon your error, and which by all men are either laughed at or shuddered at as raving and frenzied.
Iulianum.4.114115. IUL. Neque enim in iure cuiusquam est definita suscipere, et quae consequuntur excludere. Qui ergo dicit propter hoc parvulos ad ius diaboli pertinere, quoniam de sexus commixtione generantur; sine dubio ipsam commixtionem, in qua naturae opus est, cum naturae ipsius institutione condemnat.
115. JUL. For it is not within anyone's right to accept things defined and exclude what follows. He, therefore, who says that little children belong to the right of the devil for this reason, that they are generated from the intercourse of the sexes, without doubt condemns that very intercourse, in which there is a work of nature, along with the institution of nature itself.
Iulianum.4.115AUG. Tibi quidem hoc videtur: sed verum non esse (quod tu non vides) vidit Ambrosius, qui dixit expertes non esse delicti ex viro et muliere, id est, per illam commixtionem corporum natos (AMBROSIUS, In Isai); nec tamen ipsam commixtionem cum ipsius naturae institutione condemnat. Commixtio quippe coniugum procreandi causa, bonum est nuptiarum; sed ita fiunt nonnulla opera bona non sine malo vitiorum, sicut opera mala non sine bono membrorum. Quantislibet autem vitiis turpetur quaecumque natura, institutio eius semper est bona. Nam sicut institutio corporis bona est, etiam quando nascitur morbidus; et institutio animi bona est, etiam quando nascitur fatuus; sic institutio hominis ipsius bona est, quando nascitur contagioni peccati originalis obnoxius.
AUG. To you indeed this seems so; but that it is not true (which you do not see) Ambrose saw, who said that those born of man and woman—that is, through that intercourse of bodies—are not free of an offense (Ambrose, In Isai); nor, however, does he condemn that very intercourse along with the institution of nature itself. For the intercourse of spouses for the sake of begetting is a good of marriage; but some good works come to be not without the evil of vices, just as evil works come to be not without the good of the members. Yet by however many vices any nature may be disgraced, its institution is always good. For just as the institution of the body is good, even when one is born sickly; and the institution of the mind is good, even when one is born foolish; so the institution of the man himself is good, when he is born liable to the contagion of original sin.
Iulianum.4.115116. IUL. Quod aut utrumque simul negatur, aut simul utrumque suscipitur; et cum sit in potestate utriusque reiectio, non est tamen in arbitrio alterius electio; nisi quod facilius potest illicita commixtione gravari vitio voluntatis, seminum tamen fructificatione defensa, quam fructibus eius accusatis, sexuum negotium vindicari. Non ergo fluctuatio tua, quam inter formidinem impietatemque perpeteris, novas disputandi regulas condere valebit, ut de duobus connexis unum suscipias, et quod ei adhaeret excludas. Ante leves pascentur in aethere cervi (VERGILIUS, Eclog. 1, 59), quam post praeiudicium sumpti negetur effectio.
116. JUL. Either both are denied at the same time, or both are accepted at the same time; and although the rejection of both is in one's power, yet the choice of the one is not in one's discretion; except that intercourse can more easily be burdened by the vice of an unlawful will—being defended, however, by the fructification of the seeds—than the business of the sexes be vindicated when its fruits are accused. Your wavering, then, which you suffer between dread and impiety, will not be able to establish new rules of disputing, so that of two connected things you accept the one and exclude what adheres to it. Sooner shall light stags graze in the air (Virgil, Eclogues 1.59) than, after the premise has been taken, its conclusion be denied.
Iulianum.4.116Exercet hoc genus apostolus Paulus, cum dicit: Si mortui non resurgunt, nec Christus resurrexit. Si Christus non resurrexit, vana est fides vestra (1 Cor 15, 16). Nunc autem Christus resurrexit; constat ergo functorum diem resurrectionem futuram. Et ut hoc ipsum breviore propter legentem inculcemus exemplo; dubitetur utrum iustum bonum sit; peto, an omne iustum, honestum esse fatearis. Quo concesso, addo aliud, utrum omne honestum, bonum quoque esse pronunties. Hoc quoque dato, te volente nolente, concludo: Si omne iustum honestum, omne honestum bonum; omne igitur iustum bonum est. Huic effecto quicumque post prima sumpta voluerit obniti, non aedificium rationis quatit, sed ipse se exponit irrisui.
The apostle Paul exercises this kind of reasoning when he says: If the dead do not rise, neither has Christ risen. If Christ has not risen, your faith is vain (1 Cor 15:16-17). But now Christ has risen; it is established, therefore, that the resurrection of the departed will be on that day. And, that we may impress this very thing on the reader by a briefer example: let it be doubted whether the just is good; I ask, do you confess that every just thing is honorable? This being granted, I add another: do you declare that every honorable thing is also good? This too being given, willing or unwilling, I conclude: If every just thing is honorable, and every honorable thing good, then every just thing is good. Whoever, after the first premises are taken, wishes to struggle against this conclusion does not shake the edifice of reasoning, but exposes himself to derision.
Iulianum.4.116Ut ergo ad causam comparatio recurrat, quaeritur utrum sit in natura peccatum; petivi, concederesne nullum esse sine voluntate peccatum; assensus es, sicut tua dicta testantur. Addidi, an in parvulo putares esse voluntatem; hoc etiam denegasti. Quid sequitur tertium, si non est sine voluntate peccatum?
That the comparison, then, may run back to the cause: it is asked whether there is sin in nature; I asked whether you would concede that there is no sin without the will; you assented, as your own words testify. I added whether you thought there was a will in a little child; this too you denied. What follows as the third, if there is no sin without the will?
Iulianum.4.116Hoc tam certum est ut nec ab Academicis venire possit in dubium, quorum divitiae sunt nihil certum tenere. Tu ergo cum post duo prima sumpta, tertium negas, in quo est effectus duorum, non rationis fundamenta convellis, sed tuum prodis furorem.
This is so certain that it cannot come into doubt even with the Academics, whose riches are to hold nothing certain. You, then, when after the first two premises you deny the third, in which is the conclusion of the two, do not tear down the foundations of reasoning, but betray your own frenzy.
Iulianum.4.116AUG. Itane es insipiens, ut putes in natura non esse peccatum, cum omnino peccatum nisi in natura esse non possit? Nam vel in angelo est, vel in homine, quae sine dubitatione naturae sunt; si ergo peccatum in nulla istarum natura esset, profecto nusquam esset. Ac per hoc, proposita quaestione utrum sit in natura peccatum, docere intenderas in natura non esse peccatum; vanam ergo fuisse intentionem tuam, et in vanus te istam proposuisse quaestionem, si non es nimium vanus, intellegis.
AUG. Are you so foolish as to think that there is no sin in nature, when sin can altogether exist only in nature? For it is either in an angel or in a man, which without doubt are natures; if, then, sin were in no nature of these, it would assuredly be nowhere. And on this account, having proposed the question whether there is sin in nature, you had intended to teach that there is no sin in nature; you understand, then, that your intention was vain, and that you proposed this question to no purpose, unless you are exceedingly vain.
Iulianum.4.116Ecce rationis tuae, quoniam ratio vera non est, fundamenta convello; nec tamen, sicut conviciaris, prodo meum furorem, sed tuum errorem. Concessis enim duobus quae sumis, ideo tertium nego, quia non est in eo, sicut esse putas, duorum effectus illorum. Ideo quippe concedo non esse sine voluntate peccatum, quia sine voluntate non potest fieri. Sed alia ratione rursus recte dicitur, esse sine voluntate peccatum, quia manet, quamdiu non remittitur, etiam desistente voluntate qua factum est.
Behold, I tear down the foundations of your reasoning, since it is not true reasoning; nor, however, as you taunt, do I betray my frenzy, but your error. For, the two things you assume being conceded, I deny the third for this reason: that there is not in it, as you think there is, the conclusion of those two. For I concede that sin is not without the will, because without the will it cannot come to be. But by another reasoning it is again rightly said that there is sin without the will, because it remains, as long as it is not remitted, even when the will by which it was made has ceased.
Iulianum.4.116Item concedo non esse sine voluntate peccatum, quia et originale peccatum sine voluntate non factum est eius, a quo ipsa origo sumpsit exordium. Proinde cum etiam illud concedo, quod peccandi voluntas non sit in parvulo, non ex his duobus conficitur tertium, quod peccatum non sit in parvulo. Conficeretur autem, si quemadmodum concedo non esse peccatum sine voluntate, ita concederem non esse cuiusque peccatum sine ipsius propria voluntate. Proinde peccati quidem voluntatem parvulus non habet, sed peccatum non haberet, nisi ille, de quo id attraxit, voluntate peccasset.
Likewise I concede that sin is not without the will, because even original sin was not made without the will of him from whom that origin took its beginning. Accordingly, when I also concede that the will to sin is not in a little child, the third is not made up out of these two—that sin is not in a little child. But it would be made up, if, as I concede that sin is not without the will, so I conceded that no one's sin is without his own proper will. Accordingly, the little child indeed does not have the will of sin, but he would not have sin, unless that one, from whom he drew it, had sinned by the will.
Iulianum.4.116Nam de ipsa hominis quoque nativitate tale aliquid dici potest; si enim diceres: Nemo nascitur nisi ex voluntate; non sine ratione concederem: si autem diceres: Nemo nascitur nisi ex propria sua voluntate, non concederem. Isto itaque modo, quia de peccato agimus parvuli, ita originale peccatum eius, sicut ipse ortus eius, sine voluntate esse non potuit, sed non eius.
For of the very nativity of man too something of the kind can be said; for if you said: No one is born except by the will, I would concede it not without reason; but if you said: No one is born except by his own proper will, I would not concede it. In this way, then, since we are dealing with the sin of a little child, his original sin, like his very birth, could not be without a will—but not without his own.
Iulianum.4.116117. IUL. Ergo si audirent illi sacerdotes, quorum nunc dicta deluimus, dubitari utrum commixtio coniugalis bona esset, atque ab eis peterem corporane a Deo informata, faterentur. Hocque concesso, adderem utrum coniugia a Deo annuerent ordinata. Quo similiter confirmato, peterem denuo, utrum esset sine commixtione fetura. Hocque denegato, quid sequebatur? Videlicet, si nonnisi per Deum corpus, nonnisi per corpus commixtio, nonnisi per commixtionem fetus, ad eumdem auctorem pertinere et fetum et commixtionem, ad quem corpora pertinerent.
117. JUL. Therefore, if those priests, whose sayings we now wash away, were to hear it doubted whether conjugal intercourse were good, and I were to ask them whether bodies were formed by God, they would confess it. And this being conceded, I would add whether they would grant that marriages were ordained by God. This being likewise affirmed, I would ask again whether there would be offspring without intercourse. And this being denied, what followed? Namely, if there is no body except through God, no intercourse except through body, no offspring except through intercourse, then both offspring and intercourse belong to the same author to whom the bodies belong.
Iulianum.4.117AUG. Numquid haec inter nos vertitur quaestio, utrum bona sit commixtio coniugalis, cum eam bonam utrique dicamus? Quid est ergo quod tam male sentis de illis sacerdotibus, quorum non, ut mentiris, deluis dicta, sed polluis, ut eis quasi dubitantibus velis persuadere, unde nec illos, nec nos dubitare convincis? Bona est commixtio coniugalis, quae fit causa procreandi. Sed Ambrosius, qui dixit ex commixtione utriusque sexus neminem esse expertem delicti, non commixtionem redarguit coniugalem; sed vidit malum, cuius bono usu fit illud, quod nemo catholicus dubitat esse opus bonum.
AUG. Is this the question that turns between us—whether conjugal intercourse is good, when both of us call it good? What is it, then, that you think so ill of those priests, whose sayings you do not, as you lie, wash away, but pollute, so that you may wish to persuade them, as though doubting, of something about which you prove neither they nor we doubt? Conjugal intercourse is good, which is done for the sake of begetting. But Ambrose, who said that no one is free of an offense from the intercourse of both sexes, did not impugn conjugal intercourse; but he saw the evil, by the good use of which that comes to be which no Catholic doubts to be a good work.
Iulianum.4.117Inania loqueris, superfluis tempus impendis; quod agitur deseris, et unde non dubitatur, tamquam dubitetur, vel etiam negetur, docere moliris. Quid ergo mirum est, quod tam multos libros tamque vanos facis?
You speak empty things, you spend time on superfluities; you desert what is at issue, and you labor to teach, as though it were doubted or even denied, what is not doubted. What wonder, then, that you make so many and so vain books?
Iulianum.4.117118. IUL. Huic effecto sine dubio prudentes viri catholici annuerent sacerdotes, videntesque nihil in sensibus carnis, nihil in fetibus sexuum, alterum quempiam praeter Deum verum fecisse; nihil autem Deum fecisse quod malum esset; malumque nihil esse aliud quam voluntatem malam, sine aliquo coactu naturalium delinquentem; pronuntiarent profecto Manichaeos et Traducianos splendentibus catholicae rationis dissiluisse fulminibus.
118. JUL. To this conclusion, without doubt, the prudent Catholic men and priests would assent, and, seeing that nothing in the senses of the flesh, nothing in the offspring of the sexes, anyone other than the true God had made; and that God had made nothing that was evil; and that evil is nothing other than an evil will, offending without any compulsion of natural things; they would assuredly declare that the Manichees and Traducianists had been shattered by the shining thunderbolts of Catholic reasoning.
Iulianum.4.118AUG. Cur ergo eorum, quos prudentes viros dicis et catholicos sacerdotes, te dicta defendere atque deluere sine ullo pudore mentiris, si et ipsa dissiliunt fulminibus tuis? Si autem defenduntur atque deluuntur, et ob hoc manent integra, ipsis tu potius fulminaris. Nam quod ait Ambrosius, ex commixtione sexus utriusque conceptum expertem neminem esse delicti, aut falsum est, aut verum.
AUG. Why, then, do you lie without any shame that you defend and wash away the sayings of those whom you call prudent men and Catholic priests, if those very sayings too are shattered by your thunderbolts? But if they are defended and washed away, and on this account remain intact, then you yourself are rather thunderstruck by them. For what Ambrose says—that no one conceived from the intercourse of both sexes is free of an offense—is either false or true.
Iulianum.4.118Si falsum esse dicis, oppugnas ergo prudentium virorum et catholicorum, sicut tu fateris, sacerdotum dicta, non defendis ac deluis. Si autem ut merito defendantur atque deluantur, hoc verum esse concedis; tu potius dictis catholicorum antistitum fulminaris.
If you say it is false, then you assail the sayings of prudent men and Catholics—of priests, as you confess—you do not defend and wash them away. But if, that they may deservedly be defended and washed away, you concede this to be true, then you yourself are rather thunderstruck by the sayings of Catholic bishops.
Iulianum.4.118Quid est ergo quod te iactas et dicis illos beatissimos et doctissimos viros, si audissent syllogismos tuos, pronuntiaturos fuisse, nos, quos appellas Manichaeos et Traducianos, splendentibus catholicae rationis dissiluisse fulminibus? Pronuntiarent igitur contra se ipsos, et se ipsos nobiscum dissiluisse te fulminante monstrarent. Cur directe non audes dicere, quod oblique convinceris dicere?
What is it, then, that you boast and say that those most blessed and most learned men, if they had heard your syllogisms, would have declared that we, whom you call Manichees and Traducianists, had been shattered by the shining thunderbolts of Catholic reasoning? They would, therefore, declare against themselves, and would show that they themselves, with us, had been shattered by your thundering. Why do you not dare to say directly what you are convicted of saying obliquely?
Iulianum.4.118Originale peccatum cum Ambrosio confitemur, et tu tanta potentia fulmina iacularis, ut propter haec dicta nobis illique communia, nos eis dissiliamus, ille deluatur? Vanus es: non eum distinguis a nobis; et nos prorsus accusas et ipsum; nec tamen fulminas aut nos, aut ipsum, si violare non vis testimonium Pelagii doctoris tui, qui dixit Ambrosii fidem et purissimum in Scripturis sensum ne inimicum quidem ausum fuisse reprehendere (De grat. Chr. 46-47). Unde et tu cum fidei eius et purissimo in Scripturis sensui satis intellegaris inimicus, non eum tamen audes reprehendere; sed quid mali dicat, me reprehendendo, te arbitraris ostendere.
We confess original sin with Ambrose, and you hurl thunderbolts with such great power that, on account of these sayings common to us and to him, we should be shattered, and he washed away? You are vain: you do not distinguish him from us; and you accuse both us and him outright; nor, however, do you thunder either at us or at him, if you do not wish to violate the testimony of Pelagius your teacher, who said that not even an enemy dared to reprehend the faith of Ambrose and his most pure sense in the Scriptures (The Grace of Christ and Original Sin 46-47). Hence you too, though you are understood to be enough of an enemy to his faith and his most pure sense in the Scriptures, nonetheless do not dare to reprehend him; but you think to show, by reprehending me, what evil he says.
Iulianum.4.118Homo confosse, et non confesse, magna vi cogeris caliginosas anhelare fallacias; frustra fingis impetus fulminantis, cum spires fumum potius fulminati. Ista sunt certe, per quae docere conaris Ambrosium, aliosque doctores socios eius, non esse originale peccatum, quod Deus formaverit corpora, ordinaveritque coniugia, quod non esset sine commixtione fetura. Conceduntur haec; conceduntur etiam illa quae adiungis: fetum scilicet et commixtionem ad eum pertinere auctorem, ad quem pertinent corpora; si tamen commixtionem coniugalem voluisti intellegi, cum hoc diceres. Quamvis id per se ipsum verum esse noscatur, non tua ratiocinatione sit consequens; alioquin te dicente: Si nonnisi per Deum corpus, nonnisi per corpus commixtio; et hoc volente conficere, ad eum auctorem pertinere commixtionem, ad quem corpora pertinent; potest alius dicere: Si nonnisi per Deum corpus, nonnisi per corpus adulterium, ad eum auctorem pertinet adulterium, ad quem pertinet corpus; quod vides quanta dicatur iniuria Dei, et quantum mali doceant syllogismi tui.
O man run through, and not confessing, by a great force you are compelled to pant out murky fallacies; in vain you feign the onsets of one thundering, when you rather breathe out the smoke of one thunderstruck. These are surely the things by which you try to teach that Ambrose, and the other teachers his companions, hold that there is no original sin: that God formed bodies, and ordained marriages, and that there would be no offspring without intercourse. These things are conceded; conceded too are those you add: that offspring and intercourse, namely, belong to the same author to whom bodies belong—provided, however, that you wished conjugal intercourse to be understood when you said this. Although that be known to be true in itself, it is not a consequence of your ratiocination; otherwise, when you say: If there is no body except through God, no intercourse except through body, and wish to conclude from this that intercourse belongs to the same author to whom bodies belong, another can say: If there is no body except through God, no adultery except through body, then adultery belongs to the same author to whom the body belongs; and you see how great an injury this is said to be against God, and how much evil your syllogisms teach.
Iulianum.4.118Sicut ergo non sequitur, ut ideo tribuatur adulterium Deo, quia non fit nisi per corpus, cuius auctor est Deus, ita non sequitur, ut ideo commixtio tribuatur Deo, quia non fit nisi per corpus, cuius auctor est Deus. Sed tamen concedimus commixtionem dumtaxat coniugalem, quae fit causa procreandi, Deo auctori esse tribuendam; non quia hoc tua sumpta sequitur, sed quia ratione alia consideratum, verum esse perspicitur.
Just as, then, it does not follow that adultery is attributed to God for this reason, that it is done only through the body, of which God is the author, so it does not follow that intercourse is attributed to God for this reason, that it is done only through the body, of which God is the author. But nonetheless we concede that conjugal intercourse at least, which is done for the sake of begetting, is to be attributed to God as author—not because this follows from your premises, but because, considered by another reasoning, it is perceived to be true.
Iulianum.4.118Quod vero ex hoc quaeris efficere, nec sequitur illa superiora, nec verum est. Neque enim, quia Deus fecit corpus, Deus instituit coniugia, quorum commixtione fetus oriatur, Deus creat ipsos fetus animantium, ideo verum est quod adiungis: Nihil in sensibus carnis, nihil in fetibus sexuum, alterum quempiam praeter Deum verum fecisse.
But what you seek to conclude from this neither follows upon those foregoing things nor is true. For it is not the case that, because God made the body, God instituted marriages by whose intercourse offspring arises, and God creates the very offspring of living creatures, what you add is therefore true: that nothing in the senses of the flesh, nothing in the offspring of the sexes, anyone other than the true God has made.
Iulianum.4.118Ubi enim fecit diabolus, quod mali fecit cum hominibus primis, nisi et in sensibus carnis illorum? Mala quippe suasione corruptus est sensus, quando est ad peccandum factus assensus. Et ubi fecit, quidquid mali postmodum generi humano fecit, nisi in fetibus sexuum, id est, filiis hominum?
For where did the devil do the evil he did with the first human beings, except even in the senses of their flesh? For the sense was corrupted by an evil persuasion, when assent was made to sinning. And where did he do whatever evil he afterward did to the human race, except in the offspring of the sexes, that is, the children of men?
Iulianum.4.118Quomodo autem dicis: Deum nihil fecisse quod malum est? Annon est malum gehenna damnatis? Iam vero qui tibi dicenti credit, malum nihil esse aliud quam voluntatem malam, sine aliquo coactu naturalium delinquentem; ut innumerabilia mala taceam, quae mali angeli et homines patiuntur inviti; ipsum aeternum supplicium non timebitur, quod et maximum malum est, et non est voluntas mala, sed poena voluntatis malae. Hae sunt ratiocinationes tuae quibus putas fulmen esse verbum tuum, cum sit cinis cor tuum.
But how do you say that God has made nothing that is evil? Is not hell an evil for the damned? And further, whoever believes you when you say that evil is nothing other than an evil will, offending without any compulsion of natural things—to be silent about the innumerable evils which evil angels and men suffer unwillingly—will not fear that very eternal punishment, which is both the greatest evil, and is not an evil will, but the penalty of an evil will. These are your ratiocinations, by which you think your word is a thunderbolt, when your heart is ash.
Iulianum.4.118119. IUL. Desine itaque viros sani capitis et Ecclesiarum antistites criminari; non subiciantur iudicio negligentiora commenta; neque enim iram cunctatio brevis, sed pertinax meretur intentio. Imitemur sane eorum illud studium, quo populos aedificaverunt exhortando, obsecrando, coarguendo; quorum num quidquam fecissent, si vestro more peccata non voluntaria, sed naturalia credidissent?
119. JUL. Cease, then, to accuse men of sound head and bishops of the Churches; let not rather negligent contrivances be subjected to judgment; for not a brief hesitation, but a persistent intent, deserves wrath. Let us indeed imitate that zeal of theirs, by which they edified the peoples by exhorting, beseeching, refuting; of which they would have done nothing, had they, after your manner, believed sins to be not voluntary, but natural.
Iulianum.4.119AUG. Et nos pro modulo nostro populos aedificamus, hortando, obsecrando, arguendo, quod fecit Ambrosius; et tamen de originali peccato hoc sentimus et dicimus, quod sensit et dixit Ambrosius, nec solus, sed cum aliis magnis consortibus suis. Quos antistites Ecclesiarum cum viros sani capitis dicas; tu quali capite ista, quae illi notissima consensione didicerunt atque docuerunt, reprehendis atrociter, defendisque fallaciter; et me arguis dicens eorum esse criminatorem, cum videas eorum contra tua crimina, quae ex obliquo illis obicis, defensorem?
AUG. We too, according to our small measure, edify the peoples by exhorting, beseeching, refuting, which Ambrose did; and yet about original sin we perceive and say what Ambrose perceived and said—not he alone, but with the other great companions of his. Since you call these bishops of the Churches men of sound head, with what sort of head do you atrociously reprehend, and fallaciously defend, those things which they learned and taught by a most known consensus; and accuse me, saying that I am their accuser, when you see me to be the defender of them against your accusations, which you obliquely object to them?
Iulianum.4.119Dicis eorum: negligentiora commenta non esse subicienda iudicio; siccine illorum dicta defendis ac deluis? An potius nomine negligentiae reprobas et accusas, et nullo dubitante condemnas, quae negligenter effusa, et ideo falsa esse pronuntias?
You say of them: that their rather negligent contrivances are not to be subjected to judgment; is this how you defend and wash away their sayings? Or do you rather, under the name of negligence, reprobate and accuse, and—no one doubting—condemn, what you declare to have been negligently poured out and therefore false?
Iulianum.4.119Rogamus te, si falsa esse asseris dicta quae defendis, vera esse assere quae reprehendis. Iram non cunctatio brevis, inquis, sed pertinax meretur intentio; quasi aliquid proferas, unde possis ostendere illos, non dico post brevem, sed saltem post longam intentionem, vel in fine vitae suae de peccato originali mutasse sententiam. Vana loqueris, insana loqueris, perversa et tuae saluti adversa loqueris; quiesce, obsecro, quid tantum loqueris?
We ask you, if you assert that the sayings you defend are false, then assert that the things you reprehend are true. Not a brief hesitation, you say, but a persistent intent deserves wrath; as though you brought forth something by which you could show that they—I do not say after a brief, but at least after a long intent, or at the end of their life—changed their opinion about original sin. You speak empty things, you speak insane things, you speak perverse things and things adverse to your own salvation; rest, I beseech you—why do you speak so much?
Iulianum.4.119120. IUL. Verum pergamus ad reliqua. Nihil prorsus valet, quod te ais diabolo reputare, non corpora, sed delicta; inficiaris omnino, sicut frequenter ostendimus, nullo alio studio, nisi ut Manichaei vites invidiam, cuius inspiras venenum. Corpora enim, prorsus corpora reputas principi tenebrarum, quorum commixtionem diabolicam profiteris, quorum genitalia, quorum motus, quorum fructus accusas. Arguis palam ex primo magisterio membra, non vitia; illud enim dicis diabolicum, quod etiam Manichaeus, sicut in scripturis eius docui, in sexibus indignatur vigere. Et ut repetitione brevi lector noster, quod tenere possit, accipiat; aut ostende esse in parvulis voluntatem, aut ab eis crimen amoveto.
120. JUL. But let us proceed to the rest. It avails nothing at all that you say you reckon to the devil not bodies but offenses; you deny it altogether, as we have frequently shown, with no other zeal than to avoid the odium of the Manichee, whose venom you breathe in. For bodies, plainly bodies, you reckon to the prince of darkness, whose intercourse you profess to be diabolical, whose genitals, whose motions, whose fruits you accuse. You openly impugn, from the first teaching, the members, not the vices; for you call that diabolical which the Manichee too, as I taught from his writings, is indignant to see thrive in the sexes. And, that our reader may receive by a brief repetition what he can hold: either show that there is a will in little children, or remove the crime from them.
Iulianum.4.120Quod cum non facis, sed asseris eos propter hoc a diabolo possideri, quia de corporum sunt commixtione generati; ostendis te non peccata, quae sine voluntate non sunt, sed ipsa corpora adversariae potestati deputare. Ut ergo ea libido, quae et in hominibus et in pecoribus invenitur, naturalis et a Deo instituta est; ita ista libido, quam in disputationis tuae varietate perpeteris, per quam inter varia dogmata contrariaque versaris, non minus a stultitia quam a profanitate concepta est. Haud iniuria ergo Ambrosium a vestra cohorte distinguimus; nec illum, sicut petis, Manichaeum vocamus.
When you do not do this, but assert that they are possessed by the devil for this reason, that they were generated from the intercourse of bodies, you show that you assign to the adversary's power not sins, which are not without the will, but the bodies themselves. Just as, then, that lust which is found both in men and in beasts is natural and instituted by God, so that lust which you suffer in the variety of your disputation, through which you turn amid diverse and contrary dogmas, was conceived no less from folly than from profanity. Not without justice, then, do we distinguish Ambrose from your cohort; nor do we call him, as you demand, a Manichee.
Iulianum.4.120AUG. Inaniter laborasti, ut ad istam conclusionem falsam atque ridiculam, longis et tortuosis, fallacibus et fugacibus anfractibus pervenires, ubi diceres: Non iniuria vos Ambrosium a nostra cohorte distinguere, nec eum dicere manichaeum. Prorsus si illum non dicis, nec me debes dicere; si autem me dicendum putas, et illum cogeris dicere, et illos omnes magnos Ecclesiae clarosque doctores, qui de peccato originali, propter quod me Manichaeum dicis, ea dicunt sine ulla obscuritate vel ambiguitate, quae dico, ut in primo et secundo sex librorum meorum, quos contra quattuor tuos edidi, satis evidenter ostendi.
AUG. You labored in vain to arrive, by long and tortuous, fallacious and fleeting windings, at that false and ridiculous conclusion, where you said: Not without justice do you distinguish Ambrose from our cohort, nor call him a Manichee. Plainly, if you do not call him one, neither ought you to call me one; but if you think I am to be called one, you are compelled to call him one too, and all those great and illustrious teachers of the Church, who about original sin—on account of which you call me a Manichee—say without any obscurity or ambiguity what I say, as in the first and second of my six books, which I published against your four, I showed evidently enough.
Iulianum.4.120Sed per tuam scilicet dialecticam terreretur, si his diebus superesset Ambrosius, ut ex consequentibus falsis inveniens falsum esse quod senserat, dicere non auderet ulterius, de sexuum commixtione parvulos natos expertes non esse delicti, ne per hoc eos sub potestate diaboli constitueret; tunc ergo te doctore Manichaeus esse desisteret. O quid perdidit, qui te audire non potuit!
But, namely, Ambrose would be terrified by your dialectic, if he survived in these days, so that, finding from false consequences that what he had perceived was false, he would not dare to say any longer that little children born of the intercourse of the sexes are not free of an offense—lest by this he place them under the power of the devil; then, therefore, with you as teacher, he would cease to be a Manichee. O what a loss he suffered who could not hear you!
Iulianum.4.120Proinde quia propter hunc sensum manichaeum me esse dicis, profecto in hoc sensu perseverans, Manichaeus, te auctore, Ambrosius hac excessit e vita. Non ergo illum defendere, quod nullo modo potes, sed dolere debes, quia docere iam non potes; quod si facere potuisses, magisterio tuo ille correptus atque correctus prohiberet utique in Ecclesia quam regebat, exorcizari et exsufflari baptizandos parvulos; ne in tot innocentibus, neque ulla ratione, ut asseris, sub potestate diaboli constitutis imaginibus Dei, ipsi Deo fieret tam gravis atque insignis iniuria; quod tamen si fieri prohiberet Ambrosius, vobiscum de Ecclesia catholica pelleretur.
Accordingly, since you say that I am a Manichee on account of this perception, then assuredly, persevering in this perception, Ambrose departed this life a Manichee, with you as authority. You ought, therefore, not to defend him—which you can in no way do—but to grieve, because you can no longer teach him; for if you could have done so, he, rebuked and corrected by your teaching, would surely have forbidden, in the Church he governed, that little children to be baptized should be exorcized and breathed upon—lest in so many innocent images of God, set under the power of the devil by no reasoning, as you assert, so grave and signal an injury be done to God himself; which, however, if Ambrose forbade to be done, he would be driven, along with you, from the Catholic Church.
Iulianum.4.120Absit enim ut haec correctio potius, quam deceptio nominetur. Absit ergo ut ille vir vobiscum contra matrem Catholicam consisteret; sed vobis invictus pro illa resisteret. Quid est igitur, quo me ab illo in hac causa separandum putas? Per commixtionem corporum maris et feminae, delicti expertem nasci dico neminem, sicut ille; nec tamen corpora diabolo conditori tribuo, quia nec ille; quemadmodum naturae vitium ambo culpamus, ita naturae auctorem ambo veneramur. Si quoniam concupiscentiam carnis, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, per praevaricationem primi hominis in naturam vertisse dico, ideo arguo membra, non vitia: hoc fecit et ille; si vero aliunde est origo vitiorum, aliunde membrorum; nec ego, nec ille.
For far be it that this be named a correction rather than a deception. Far be it, then, that that man should stand with you against our mother the Catholic Church; rather, unconquered, he would resist you on her behalf. What is it, then, by which you think I am to be separated from him in this cause? I say that through the intercourse of the bodies of male and female no one is born free of an offense, as he does; nor, however, do I attribute bodies to the devil as founder, because neither does he; as both of us find fault with the vice of nature, so both of us venerate the author of nature. If, because I say that the concupiscence of the flesh, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, turned into nature through the transgression of the first man, I therefore impugn the members, not the vices, then this he too did; but if the origin of vices is from one source, of the members from another, then neither do I nor does he.
Iulianum.4.120Voluntatem propriam inesse nascentibus, nec Ambrosius dicit, nec ego; per primi hominis tamen praevaricatricem voluntatem factum esse concupiscentiae vitium, unde per commixtionem sexuum nascentes trahunt originale peccatum, et Ambrosius dicit, et ego. Ambo igitur natos homines, antequam renascantur, non propter eorum substantiam, cuius creator est Deus, sed propter peccatum quod per unum intravit, et per omnes homines pertransiit, cuius peccati auctor est diabolus, potestati adversariae deputamus.
That a proper will is in those being born, neither Ambrose says nor do I; yet that through the transgressing will of the first man the vice of concupiscence came to be, from which those born through the intercourse of the sexes draw original sin, both Ambrose says and I. Both of us, then, assign men born, before they are reborn, to the adversary's power—not on account of their substance, of which God is the creator, but on account of the sin which entered through one man and passed through all men, of which sin the devil is the author.
Iulianum.4.120Quid est quod te impudentissima fronte mentiris, Ambrosii et aliorum similium dicta defendere atque deluere? Quis ita caecus est, ut non videat quod ea tu reprehendas, ego defendam; tu polluas, ego deluam? Ambrosii dicta sunt de Christo loquentis: Ideo, inquit, et quasi homo per universa tentatus est, et in similitudine hominum cuncta sustinuit; sed quasi de Spiritu natus, abstinuit a peccato; omnis enim homo mendax, et nemo sine peccato nisi unus Deus. Servatum est igitur, inquit, ut ex viro et muliere, id est, per illam corporum commixtionem, nemo videatur expers esse delicti; qui autem expers delicti, expers etiam huiusmodi conceptionis (AMBROSIUS, In Isai).
What is it that you lie, with a most impudent forehead, that you defend and wash away the sayings of Ambrose and others like him? Who is so blind as not to see that you reprehend them, I defend; you pollute, I wash away? The sayings of Ambrose, speaking of Christ, are: And so, he says, he too was as a man tempted in all things, and in the likeness of men sustained all things; but, as one born of the Spirit, he abstained from sin; for every man is a liar, and no one is without sin except the one God. It has been kept, then, he says, that no one born of man and woman—that is, through that intercourse of bodies—should seem to be free of an offense; but he who is free of an offense is free also of conception of this kind (Ambrose, In Isai).
Iulianum.4.120Ista dicta dicis esse falsissima, eisque Manichaeum dogma nefarium contineri; ac per hoc Ambrosii dicta tu reprehendis et polluis. Ego vero illa et verissima praedico, et Manichaeo non solum non amica, verum et inimica, sicut iam feci, esse demonstro; ego igitur ea potius defendo, et a tuis nefandis criminationibus deluo. Utrum ergo ille noster an vester sit, et vos videtis; sed quia homines a quibus diligitur, formidatis; profecto eum, quem atrociter accusare convincimini, fallacia excusare conamini.
These sayings you say are most false, and that the abominable Manichean dogma is contained in them; and on this account you reprehend and pollute the sayings of Ambrose. But I both proclaim them most true, and demonstrate them to be not only not friendly to the Manichee, but even hostile, as I have already done; I therefore rather defend them, and wash them clean of your abominable accusations. Whether, then, he is ours or yours, you yourselves see; but because you dread the men by whom he is loved, you assuredly try to excuse with fallacy the one whom you are convicted of accusing atrociously.
Iulianum.4.120121. IUL. Quod dicis ei convicium a Ioviniano factum (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 2, 5, 15), in quo mentiri te tamen arbitror; sed annuamus vel Ioviniani te criminatorem verum esse posse, Ambrosiumque ab illo Manichaeum vocatum; at id constat insanum fuisse. Non enim sane poterat Manichaeus vocari, qui bonam naturam, qui peccata voluntaria, qui a Deo institutas nuptias, qui a Deo fieri parvulos praedicabat. Si ergo ille praelationem virginitatis nuptiarum accusationem putavit, nesciit omnino quid diceret. Aliud est enim contrarium, aliud ordinatum. Boni quippe laudatio ad meliora gradus est; infamatio autem naturae ad Manichaeum via est.
121. JUL. As for the reproach you say was made against him by Jovinian (See Marriage and Desire 2.5.15)—in which, however, I think you lie—but let us grant that you can be a true accuser even of Jovinian, and that Ambrose was called a Manichee by him; yet it is established that this was insane. For he could not soundly be called a Manichee who proclaimed nature good, sins voluntary, marriage instituted by God, and little children made by God. If, then, that man thought the preferring of virginity to be an accusation of marriage, he knew not at all what he was saying. For the contrary is one thing, the ordered another. For the praise of a good is a step toward better things; but the defaming of nature is a road toward the Manichee.
Iulianum.4.121Cum ergo non damnaret Ambrosius nuptias; nec commixtionem coniugum, vel opus diaboli, vel necessitatem diceret esse peccati; improbe fecit Iovinianus, ut eum conferret Manichaeo, putaretque nihil interesse inter nuptiarum accusatorem et laudatorem. Nam si de legitima et a Deo instituta corporum coniunctione generatos, posteaquam usum coeperunt habere rationis, sponte propria proborum imitatione mentitos dixit Ambrosius; non tamen hanc coniunctionem, mendacii voluit necessitatem videri, sed universitatis indicium.
Since, then, Ambrose did not condemn marriage, nor say that the intercourse of spouses was either a work of the devil or a necessity of sin, Jovinian did wickedly to compare him to the Manichee, and to think there was no difference between an accuser and a praiser of marriage. For if Ambrose said that those generated from the lawful union of bodies instituted by God, after they began to have the use of reason, lied of their own accord, in imitation of upright men, he did not nonetheless wish this union to seem the necessity of lying, but the indication of universality.
Iulianum.4.121Tale est enim quod dixit: Nati ex parentibus mentiuntur, quale si dixisset: Omnis homo, dumtaxat sui rector arbitrii, aliquando mentitus est; sciebat quippe neminem sine commixtione parentum, praeter Christum, exstitisse. Igitur opere coniugali non iniquitatem, sed generalitatem vir prudens voluit indicari. Christum vero pronuntiavit omne cavisse mendacium, quem miraculo parientis ostendit; quod quidem vehementer contra Hieronymum, cuius tu assecla es, fremit; qui mendacium signatissime Christo est conatus affigere. Non ergo iure vocatus est Manichaeus (si tamen vocatus), qui contra errorem vestrum frequentavit laudationem creaturarum.
For what he said—Those born of parents lie—is the same as if he had said: Every man, at least insofar as he is ruler of his own choice, has at some time lied; for he knew that no one, except Christ, came to be without the intercourse of parents. Therefore the prudent man wished to indicate by the conjugal work not iniquity, but generality. But Christ he declared to have guarded against all lying, whom he showed by the miracle of the one giving birth; which indeed rages vehemently against Jerome, whose follower you are, who most pointedly tried to fasten a lie upon Christ. Not rightly, then, was he called a Manichee (if indeed he was called one), who against your error frequented the praise of creatures.
Iulianum.4.121AUG. Laudationem creaturarum frequentamus et nos; quid est ergo quod dicis hoc facere Ambrosium contra errorem nostrum; cum hoc faciat secundum fidem nostram? Quomodo autem illa verba posuerit, quae a me tibi obiecta tu commemorare timuisti, ne tenebrae tuae clarissima luce illorum redarguerentur, aliis etiam scriptorum suorum locis sic ostendit Ambrosius, ut non ei sicut negligentiori, quomodo loqueris, et incautiori sententia ista semel subrepsisse videatur; sed de peccato originali dogma eius, quoniam dogma catholicum est, satis liquida manifestatione declaret.
AUG. We too frequent the praise of creatures; what is it, then, that you say Ambrose does this against our error, when he does it according to our faith? But how he set down those words—which, objected by me to you, you feared to recall, lest your darkness be refuted by their most clear light—Ambrose so shows in other places of his writings too, that this opinion does not seem to have crept up on him once, as on one rather negligent, as you put it, and rather incautious; but he declares his dogma about original sin, since it is the Catholic dogma, with manifestation clear enough.
Iulianum.4.121Cur ergo et qua ratione dixerit: Servatum est igitur, ut ex viro et muliere, id est, per illam corporum commixtionem, nemo videatur expers esse delicti; qui autem expers delicti, expers etiam huiusmodi conceptionis; quia non hic peccata hominum posteaquam usum coeperunt habere rationis, ut tu alienaris, sed originale peccatum intellegi voluit; quid alibi dicat attende: Iordanis, inquit, conversus retrorsum, significavit salutaris lavacri futura mysteria, per quae in primordianaturae suae, qui baptizati fuerint, parvuli a malitia reformantur (AMBROSIUS, In Lc 1, 1, 36). Dic, Iuliane, a qua malitia, si non trahunt originale peccatum.
Why, then, and by what reasoning he said: It has been kept, then, that no one born of man and woman—that is, through that intercourse of bodies—should seem to be free of an offense; but he who is free of an offense is free also of conception of this kind—because here he wished to be understood not the sins of men after they began to have the use of reason, as you alienate it, but original sin—attend to what he says elsewhere: The Jordan, he says, turned backward, signified the future mysteries of the saving bath, through which little children who have been baptized are reformed from malice in the very first beginnings of their nature (Ambrose, In Luc. 1.1.36). Say, Julian, from what malice, if they do not draw original sin.
Iulianum.4.121Audi adhuc alio loco: Non enim virilis coitus, inquit, vulvae virginalis secreta reseravit, sed immaculatum semen inviolabili utero Spiritus Sanctus infudit. Solus enim per omnia ex natis de femina sanctus Dominus Iesus, qui terrenae contagia corruptelae immaculati novitate partus non senserit, et caelesti maiestate depulerit (AMBROSIUS, In Lc 1, 2, 23). Responde, Iuliane, quae sint terrenae contagia corruptelae, quae solus ex natis de femina Dominus Iesus immaculati novitate partus non sensit.
Hear yet in another place: For no virile coitus, he says, unsealed the secrets of the virginal womb, but the Holy Spirit poured an immaculate seed into an inviolable womb. For of all those born of woman the holy Lord Jesus alone, by the newness of his immaculate birth, did not feel the contagions of earthly corruption, and by heavenly majesty drove them off (Ambrose, In Luc. 1.2.23). Answer, Julian, what are the contagions of earthly corruption, which the Lord Jesus alone of those born of woman did not feel, by the newness of his immaculate birth.
Iulianum.4.121Adhuc audi: Antequam nascimur, inquit, maculamur contagio. Et paulo post: Et si nec unius, inquit, diei infans sine peccato, multo magis nec illi materni conceptus dies sine peccato sunt (AMBROSIUS, In apol. David 11). Multa huius viri, quem sani capitis fuisse confessus es, talia commemorare possum; sed cui non sufficiunt ista, quid sufficit? Ex his ergo intellege, quam non sinaris etiam illa, sicut es conatus, in alium sensum detorquere atque pervertere, quo dixit Ambrosius de his qui nascuntur per commixtionem corporum, non arguens Dei creaturam, sed originale peccatum.
Hear yet: Before we are born, he says, we are stained by contagion. And a little after: And if not even an infant of one day is without sin, much more are those days of the maternal conception not without sin (Ambrose, In apol. David 11). I can recall many such things of this man, whom you confessed to have been of sound head; but to one for whom these do not suffice, what suffices? From these, then, understand how you are not permitted, as you tried, to twist and pervert even those words into another sense, by which Ambrose spoke of those who are born through the intercourse of bodies, not impugning God's creature, but original sin.
Iulianum.4.121Quid mihi obtendis Hieronymum cuius me convinciaris asseclam, de cuius verbis nulla nunc quaestio est? Quae tamen verba si posuisses aut ea non habere quod displicere deberet ostenderem, aut intellegentioribus exponenda relinquerem; aut si essent procul dubio contraria veritati, libertate qua dignum est improbarem.
Why do you hold Jerome up against me, whose follower you would convict me of being, about whose words there is now no question? Which words, however, if you had set down, I would either show that they have nothing that ought to displease, or leave them to be expounded by the more intelligent; or, if they were beyond doubt contrary to truth, I would disapprove them with the freedom they deserve.
Iulianum.4.121Ambrosium respice, quem Manichaeum non audes dicere; cum me propterea dicas, quia de originali peccato ea dico, quae dicit. Nam si propterea non diceres Ambrosium Manichaeum, quia bonam naturam, quia peccata voluntaria, quia nuptias a Deo institutas et a Deo factos parvulos praedicabat; nec me diceres, qui eadem fideliter praedico. Si autem me propterea Manichaeum dicendum putas, quia esse confiteor originale peccatum; hoc etiam ille confitetur; cur non ambos putas? Sed me petulanter dicis, illum latenter opinaris, non veritate distincta, sed exstincta potius libertate.
Look at Ambrose, whom you do not dare to call a Manichee, when you call me one for this reason: that about original sin I say the things he says. For if you did not call Ambrose a Manichee for the reason that he proclaimed nature good, sins voluntary, marriage instituted by God, and little children made by God, neither would you call me one, who faithfully proclaim the same things. But if you think I am to be called a Manichee for the reason that I confess there is original sin, this he too confesses; why do you not think both? But me you call one petulantly, him you opine one secretly—truth not being distinguished, but freedom rather extinguished.
Iulianum.4.121Hoc enim de illo non audes dicere, quod audes credere; aut si de illo ista non credis, profecto nec de me credis; quia et si errare nos existimas, facile est ut videas non esse Manichaeos, qui peccantis propriam substantiam, quam Deus non creaverit non asserimus; sed originale peccatum de vitio voluntario naturae, quam Deus bonam condidit, propagatum esse firmamus. Facile est ergo ut hoc videas, et simul videas nos esse contrarios Manichaeis; sed eorum nomen ab Ambrosio abigis adulando, et mihi obicis calumniando.
For of him you do not dare to say what you dare to believe; or if you do not believe this of him, then assuredly you do not believe it of me; for even if you suppose us to err, it is easy for you to see that they are not Manichees who do not assert a proper substance of the sinner, which God did not create, but affirm that original sin was propagated from a voluntary vice of the nature which God founded good. It is easy, then, for you to see this, and at the same time to see that we are contrary to the Manichees; but you drive off their name from Ambrose by flattering, and cast it at me by slandering.
Iulianum.4.121122. IUL. Verum ut illi infensus Iovinianus arguitur, ita vobis comparatus absolvitur. Quando enim tibi tantum prudentium censura donabit, ut te cum Ioviniani merito componat? Ille quippe dixit boni esse necessitatem; tu, mali; ille ait per mysteria homines ab errore cohiberi; tu vero, nec per gratiam liberari; ille virginitatem Mariae partus conditione dissolvit; tu ipsam Mariam diabolo nascendi conditione transcribis; ille meliora bonis aequat, id est, integritatem connubio; tu vero commixtionem coniugii morbidam vocas, et castitatem foedissimae rei collatione depretias; nec gradum inter haec addis; sed genus omne commutas, non utique bono virginitatem, sed malo praeferens.
122. JUL. But just as Jovinian is accused as hostile to him, so, compared with you, he is absolved. For when will the censure of the prudent grant you so much as to set you on a level with the merit of Jovinian? For he said there is a necessity of good; you, of evil; he says that through the mysteries men are restrained from error; you, that not even through grace are they freed; he dissolved the virginity of Mary by the condition of birth; you transfer Mary herself to the devil by the condition of being born; he equals better things with goods, that is, integrity with marriage; but you call the intercourse of marriage diseased, and depreciate chastity by comparison with a most foul thing; nor do you add a degree between these things, but change the whole kind, preferring virginity not, indeed, to a good, but to an evil.
Iulianum.4.122Est autem vilitatis extremae, nisi teterrimo comparatum, placere non posse. Iam vero quid ille tale de Dei iniuriis, quale tu? Ille eius iudicii vigorem a benignitatis voluit parte confundere; tu a malignitatis; ille dicit apud eum bonos et optimos aequo honore fruituros; tu vero, bonos et impios, id est innocentes et diabolum, uno supplicio cruciandos;
But it is of the utmost vileness to be unable to please except when compared with something most hideous. And further, what such thing did he say about the injuries done to God as you? He wished to confound the vigor of his judgment from the side of kindness; you, from the side of malignity; he says that with him the good and the best will enjoy equal honor; but you, that the good and the impious—that is, the innocent and the devil—are to be tortured with one punishment;
Iulianum.4.122ille ergo Deum clementissimum vult videri; tu, iniquissimum; ille dicit mysteriis eius imbutos homines non posse peccare; tu vero ipsum Deum, et in mysteriis imbecillitate, et in praeceptis immoderatione, et in iudiciis immanitate peccare contendis. Cum itaque tanta disparatio sit inter te et Iovinianum, quanta coniunctio inter te et Manichaeum; tanto te tolerabilior Iovinianus probatur, quanto Ioviniano horridior Manichaeus.
he, therefore, wishes God to seem most merciful; you, most iniquitous; he says that men imbued with his mysteries cannot sin; but you contend that God himself sins—both in his mysteries by weakness, and in his precepts by immoderation, and in his judgments by monstrousness. Since, then, there is as great a disparity between you and Jovinian as there is a conjunction between you and the Manichee, Jovinian is proved more tolerable than you by as much as the Manichee is more horrid than Jovinian.
Iulianum.4.122AUG. Quam bellus tibi videris, cum me Ioviniano comparans, peiorem conaris ostendere. Verum hanc quoque contumeliam mendacissimam cum Ambrosio me a te accipere gaudeo; sed te sic insanire contristor. Ea quippe causa me Ioviniano dicis esse peiorem, qua me dicis etiam Manichaeum. Et quid est hoc? Illud scilicet originale peccatum, quod vos negatis cum Pelagio, nos vero cum Ambrosio confitemur. Cum illo igitur, secundum vos, sumus et Manichaei, et peiores Ioviniano, et quidquid nos aliud ore protervo, nec sane veridico, sed maledico dixeritis, docuit nos Dominus gaudere et exsultare, quando qualiacumque maledicta non ex veritate audimus, sed quia pro veritate certamus (Cf. Mt 5, 12).
AUG. How fine you seem to yourself, when, comparing me to Jovinian, you try to show me worse. But this most mendacious contumely too I rejoice to receive from you along with Ambrose; but I grieve that you rave so. For you say I am worse than Jovinian for the same cause for which you also call me a Manichee. And what is this? That original sin, namely, which you deny with Pelagius, but we confess with Ambrose. With him, then, according to you, we are both Manichees, and worse than Jovinian; and whatever else you may say of us with a wanton mouth—not, indeed, truth-telling, but slanderous—the Lord taught us to rejoice and exult, when we hear slanders of whatever kind, not from truth, but because we contend for truth (See Matt 5:11-12).
Iulianum.4.122Ecce ego non dico mali esse necessitatem, quia nec Ambrosius; et tamen dico parvulos a malitia reformari, quod et Ambrosius; et ideo mali nulla est necessitas, quia et illud Deo sanabile est, quod trahit nativitas; quanto magis quod addit voluntas?
Behold, I do not say there is a necessity of evil, because neither does Ambrose; and yet I say that little children are reformed from malice, which Ambrose too says; and therefore there is no necessity of evil, because even that which birth draws is healable by God; how much more what the will adds?
Iulianum.4.122Non dico, nec per gratiam homines liberari; quod absit ut dicat Ambrosius; sed quod non vis dicimus, nonnisi per gratiam liberari, non solum ut eis debita dimittantur, verum etiam ne in tentationem inferantur. Non trascribimus diabolo Mariam conditione nascendi; sed ideo, quia ipsa conditio solvitur gratia renascendi.
I do not say that not even through grace are men freed, which far be it that Ambrose should say; but what you do not wish, we say: that they are freed only through grace, not only that their debts may be forgiven them, but also that they may not be led into temptation. We do not transfer Mary to the devil by the condition of being born; but for this reason, that the very condition is dissolved by the grace of being reborn.
Iulianum.4.122Non tamquam malo bonum, sed tamquam bono melius, virginitatem nuptiis anteponimus. Non, ut calumniaris, bonos et impios uno supplicio; sed bonos nullo, impios autem non uno, sed pro diversitate ipsius impietatis, diversis suppliciis dicimus esse cruciandos.
Not as a good to an evil, but as a better to a good, do we set virginity before marriage. Not, as you slander, do we say that the good and the impious are to be tortured with one punishment; but that the good are to be tortured with none, the impious not with one, but, according to the diversity of their very impiety, with diverse punishments.
Iulianum.4.122Non dicimus Deum in mysteriis imbecillitate, in praeceptis immoderatione, in iudiciis immanitate peccare, cuius et gratia regeneratis mysteria sunt utilia, et gratia liberatis praecepta salubria, et bonis malisque convenienter distributa iudicia.
We do not say that God sins in his mysteries by weakness, in his precepts by immoderation, in his judgments by monstrousness—God, whose mysteries are useful to those regenerated by grace, and whose precepts are salutary to those freed by grace, and whose judgments are fittingly distributed to the good and the evil.
Iulianum.4.122Ecce nos ea, in quibus nos dicitis Ioviniano esse peiores, amolimur a nobis; vos a vobis amolimini, si potestis, in quibus vos peiores eodem ipso Ioviniano esse monstrabo. Ille dixit boni esse necessitatem; vos dicitis esse bonam mali cupiditatem; ille ait per mysteria homines ab errore cohiberi; vos, viam rectam gradiendi cupiditatem non inspirari a Deo, sed arbitrio libero acquiri; ille virginitatem Mariae partus conditione dissolvit; vos ipsam carnem sanctam de Virgine procreatam ceterae carni hominum coaequatis, similitudinem carnis peccati non distinguentes a carne peccati; ille meliora bonis aequat, id est, integritatem connubio;
Behold, we remove from ourselves those things in which you say we are worse than Jovinian; remove from yourselves, if you can, those things in which I will show you to be worse than that same Jovinian. He said there is a necessity of good; you say that the desire of evil is good; he says that through the mysteries men are restrained from error; you, that the desire of walking the right way is not inspired by God, but acquired by free choice; he dissolved the virginity of Mary by the condition of birth; you make the very holy flesh begotten of the Virgin equal to the rest of the flesh of men, not distinguishing the likeness of the flesh of sin from the flesh of sin; he equals better things with goods, that is, integrity with marriage;
Iulianum.4.122vos, mala bonis; nam discordiam carnis et spiritus tam dicitis esse bonum, quam concordiam nuptiarum; ille dicit apud Deum aequalem honorem bonos et optimos habituros; vos autem, quosdam bonos non solum in regno Dei honorem nullum adepturos, sed nec ipsum regnum esse visuros; ille dicit Dei mysteriis homines imbutos non posse peccare; vos dicitis facilius quidem per Dei gratiam, sed et sine illa per liberum arbitrium posse homines non peccare; audacia gigantea repugnantes Deo, cum de bonis fructibus loqueretur dicenti: Sine me nihil potestis facere (Io 15, 5).
you, evils with goods; for you say the discord of flesh and spirit is as much a good as the concord of marriage; he says that with God the good and the best will have equal honor; but you, that certain good men will not only obtain no honor in the kingdom of God, but will not even see the kingdom itself; he says that men imbued with God's mysteries cannot sin; you say that men can, more easily indeed through God's grace, but even without it through free choice, not sin—resisting God with giant's audacity, when, speaking of good fruits, he said: Without me you can do nothing (John 15:5).
Iulianum.4.122Cum igitur in deterius tantum a Ioviniani errore distetis, nos tamen ei subicitis, et Manichaeo potius adaequatis; magno scilicet praesidio communiti, quasi propterea condideritis haeresim novam, ut quando vos redarguimus, nullis haereticis adaequare possimus. Ego tamen in haec causa, in qua tibi de originali peccato multum videor detestandus, et Manichaeo potius coaequandus, cum Ambrosio sum, velis nolis, quem Iovinianus Manichaeum dicebat, ut tu; sed libere ille, tu subdole.
Since, then, you are so far distant for the worse from the error of Jovinian, you nonetheless subject us to him, and rather make us equal to the Manichee; fortified, namely, by a great protection, as though you had founded a new heresy for this reason, that when we refute you, we might be able to make you equal to no heretics. I, however, in this cause, in which I seem to you much to be detested about original sin and rather to be made equal to the Manichee, am with Ambrose, like it or not—whom Jovinian called a Manichee, as you do; but he freely, you craftily.
Iulianum.4.122Denique semel ille vincitur, cum Manichaeus non esse demonstratur Ambrosius; tu vero quia voluisti cor duplex habere, bis vinceris. Arguis Ambrosium Manichaeum esse: ostendo non esse; negas te arguere, ostendo te arguere; utrumque autem clarebit ei qui superius quae dixerit legerit.
Finally, he is conquered once, when Ambrose is demonstrated not to be a Manichee; but you, because you wished to have a double heart, are conquered twice. You accuse Ambrose of being a Manichee: I show he is not; you deny that you accuse, I show that you accuse; and both will be clear to one who has read above what you said.
Iulianum.4.122123. IUL. Verum videamus et cetera. De his quae egimus satis superque lectorem instructum puto, qua virtute vel meorum dictorum aliquid oppugnet, vel opinionem tueatur suam; et ideo non erit necesse scriptorum id omnium repetitione monstrare. Quoniam vix singulos sparsosque versiculos de libro meo proponens sibi, eosque laudans frequenter, nonnumquam etiam titillat suggillatione brevissima; cum tamen hoc quod mordendum putat, a me non sit ita, ut suspicatur, prolatum. Quamobrem ad illud opus meum lectorem dirigo; videbit assertionem concinere veritati. Hic sane qui sibi querebatur obiectum, quod naturam criminaretur et semina, continuam simulandi non potuit tenere patientiam; sed postquam praestigiis patroni sui serenavit auditum, velut testudo caput aperit.
123. JUL. But let us see the rest too. About the things we have treated, I think the reader is sufficiently and more than sufficiently instructed by what virtue he assails any of my sayings or defends his own opinion; and therefore it will not be necessary to show this by a repetition of all his writings. For, scarcely setting before himself single and scattered little verses from my book, and praising them frequently, he sometimes also tickles them with a most brief jeer; though, however, what he thinks must be bitten was not put forward by me as he suspects. Wherefore I direct the reader to that work of mine; he will see that the assertion harmonizes with truth. Here indeed, the man who complained that it had been objected to him that he accused nature and the seeds could not keep up his patience in pretending; but after he soothed the hearing by the tricks of his patron, he, like a tortoise, opens his head.
Iulianum.4.123Nam cum dixisset, quia nisi Adam peccasset, ita homines generare potuissent, ut solemus aut articulos commovere, aut unguiculas exsecare; addidit: Sed si semen ipsum nullum maledictum habet, quid est quod scriptum est in libro Sapientiae: Non ignorans quoniam nequam erat natio illorum, et naturalis malitia ipsorum, et quia non poterat mutari cogitatio illorum in perpetuum; semen enim erat maledictum ab initio (Sap 12, 10-11)? Atque ipsum testimonium quod protulit, subdita argumentatione prosequitur: Nempe de quibuscumque ista dicat, de hominibus, inquit, dicit (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 2, 6, 17 - 9, 21).
For when he had said that, if Adam had not sinned, men could have generated just as we are wont to move our fingers or trim our nails, he added: But if the seed itself has no curse, what is it that is written in the book of Wisdom: Not ignorant that their nation was wicked, and their malice natural, and that their thought could not be changed forever; for their seed was cursed from the beginning (Wis 12:10-11)? And the very testimony which he brought forth he pursues with an appended argumentation: Of whomever, to be sure, it says these things, it says them of men (See Marriage and Desire 2.6.17-9.21).
Iulianum.4.123En qui se profitebatur a Manichaeorum studiis destitisse, qui sub occasione sententiae quam non intellegit, maledictum semen, malitiam naturalem, et inconvertibilem cogitationem pronuntiat iniquorum. Fama est, apud cataclita Nili aquarum proruentium strepitu usu aurium accolas destitutos. Finxerit illud opinio, quae de magnis maiora dispergit; valet tamen exemplum ad castigandam insipientium surditatem, qui fragore terroris mutui, sicut aspides surdae rerum vocibus obnituntur.
Behold the man who professed that he had desisted from the pursuits of the Manichees—who, on the occasion of an opinion he does not understand, declares the seed cursed, the malice of the iniquitous natural, and their thought unconvertible. There is a report that, near the cataracts of the Nile, the inhabitants are deprived of the use of their ears by the din of the rushing waters. Opinion may have invented that, which scatters greater things from great ones; yet the example avails to castigate the deafness of the foolish, who, by the crash of mutual terror, like deaf asps, struggle against the voices of things.
Iulianum.4.123Clamat Augustinus: Nequam est hominum natio, naturalis malitia, immutabilis cogitatio in perpetuum, semen maledictum ab initio. Et inveniuntur adhuc, qui illum non usquequaque Manichaei autument charactere percussum? Interrogentur hodie quicumque sunt ipsarum sordium sectatores publici; si aliud dixerint, nos putemur fuisse mentiti. Ergo si est malitia naturalis, quomodo te fingis malam non pronuntiare naturam? Si est semen maledictum ab initio, quomodo te dicis vitia voluntatum accusare, non seminum? Si immutabilis cogitatio malignantium est, quomodo te peieras liberum arbitrium confiteri? Nisi superest, ut illos Hebraeos, Sirach, vel Philonem, qui libri ipsius qui Sapientia dicitur, auctores incerta opinione creduntur, dicas fuisse Manichaeos.
Augustine cries: The nation of men is wicked, malice is natural, thought immutable forever, the seed cursed from the beginning. And are there still found those who would judge him not in every way struck with the Manichee's mark? Let any who are public followers of those very filths be questioned today; if they say otherwise, let us be thought to have lied. If, then, there is a natural malice, how do you pretend not to declare nature evil? If there is a seed cursed from the beginning, how do you say that you accuse the vices of wills, not of seeds? If there is an immutable thought of the malignant, how do you perjure yourself that you confess free choice? Unless it remains for you to say that those Hebrews, Sirach or Philo, who by uncertain opinion are believed to be the authors of that very book which is called Wisdom, were Manichees.
Iulianum.4.123AUG. Quilibet auctor fuerit libri huius, bene, quia auctoritatem eius non respuis. Idoneus est igitur, ex quo adversus vos, quae possumus invenire, testimonia proferamus. Nam et Pelagius doctor vester in libro quem Testimoniorum vel Capitulorum edidit, posuit ex isto libro quae intentioni suae credidit convenire (Cf. De gest. Pel. 6). Cuius libri auctor magis quia Manichaeus non fuit, satis aperteque demonstrat, etiam ab eis qui Manichaei non sunt, et in Ecclesia Christi legi accipique meruerunt, potuisse dici malitiam naturalem, sine ulla reprehensione institutionis et conditionis Dei, naturarum omnium sapientissimi atque optimi creatoris.
AUG. Whoever was the author of this book, it is well, because you do not reject its authority. It is suitable, then, that from it we bring forth against you what testimonies we can find. For Pelagius your teacher too, in the book he published of Testimonies or Chapters, set down from that book what he believed suited his intention (See The Deeds of Pelagius 6). And the author of this book, the more because he was not a Manichee, demonstrates clearly enough that even by those who are not Manichees, and who have deserved to be read and received in the Church of Christ, a natural malice could be spoken of, without any reproach of the institution and condition of God, the most wise and best creator of all natures.
Iulianum.4.123Unde et Apostolus non alio sensu dixisse intellectus est: Fuimus enim et nos aliquando natura filii irae, sicut et ceteri (Eph 2, 3). Quod quidam non ad verbum, sed ad sententiam sunt interpretati dicentes: Fuimus enim et nos aliquando naturaliter filii irae. Quod autem ait: sicut et ceteri, ostendit omnes irae filios esse natura, nisi quosdam eorum a massa perditionis gratia divina discernat. De alienis ergo ab hac gratia, etiam Petrus apostolus loquens: Hi vero, inquit, velut mutaanimalia procreata naturaliter in captivitatem et interitum (2 Pt 2, 12). Non se quippe exuebant veterem hominem. Nisi autem vetus omnis homo nasceretur, nullus parvulus renascendo renovaretur.
Hence the Apostle too is understood to have said in no other sense: For we too were once by nature children of wrath, like the rest (Eph 2:3). Which some have interpreted not to the word but to the sense, saying: For we too were once naturally children of wrath. But in that he says, like the rest, he shows that all are by nature children of wrath, unless divine grace distinguish certain of them from the mass of perdition. About those, then, who are strangers to this grace, the apostle Peter too, speaking, says: But these, like brute animals, naturally born for captivity and destruction (2 Pet 2:12). For they did not put off the old man. But unless every man were born old, no little child would be renewed by being reborn.
Iulianum.4.123Absit ergo, ut cum Creatoris dicatur iniuria, naturaliter esse homines irae filios; sicut sine ulla eius iniuria quisque dicitur naturaliter surdus; aut naturaliter caecus, aut naturaliter morbidus; itemque alius naturaliter fatuus, alius naturaliter obliviosus, alius naturaliter iracundus; et cetera innumerabilia vitia, sive corporum, sive, quod est gravius, animorum, Dei opificio creatorum, eiusdemque Dei occulto, sed iusto iudicio vitiatorum. Idem quippe ipse totius hominis creator: et tamen quamvis cum eius laude natura sit homo; nullo modo tamen cum eius vituperatione natura vitiosus est homo.
Far be it, then, that it be said an injury to the Creator that men are naturally children of wrath; just as, without any injury to him, one is said to be naturally deaf, or naturally blind, or naturally sickly; and likewise one naturally foolish, another naturally forgetful, another naturally irascible; and the other innumerable vices, whether of bodies or—what is graver—of minds, created by the workmanship of God, and vitiated by the hidden but just judgment of the same God. For he himself is the creator of the whole man; and yet, although it is with his praise that man is a nature, in no way is it with his reproach that man is a vitiated nature.
Iulianum.4.123Scimus itaque non vitia, sed naturas esse tribuendas conditori Deo; sed unde sint vitia, debet dicere, qui vult resistere Manichaeo. Et de aliarum quidem rerum vitiis, quas a Deo creatas fatemur, sed eius sapientissima ordinatione, sive bonis, sive etiam malis angelis subditas, respondere facillimum est, ab eis quibus subiacent, earum quoque semina posse vitiari, ut non solum fiant, verum etiam concipiantur nascanturque vitiosae. De homine agitur, de rationali animante, de imagine Dei agitur, cuius natura nullo modo diaboli ludibrium fieret, quem recte credimus auctorem esse vitiorum, nisi per iustum Dei iudicium propter originale peccatum.
And so we know that not the vices, but the natures, are to be attributed to God the founder; but whence the vices come, he ought to say who wishes to resist the Manichee. And about the vices of other things indeed, which we confess to have been created by God, but, by his most wise ordering, subjected either to good or even to evil angels, it is easiest to answer that by those to whom they are subject their seeds too can be vitiated, so that they not only come to be but are even conceived and born vitiated. We are dealing with man, with a rational living being, we are dealing with the image of God, whose nature would in no way become the mockery of the devil—whom we rightly believe to be the author of vices—except through the just judgment of God on account of original sin.
Iulianum.4.123Denique nec vos ipsi, quantum existimo, dicere audetis, quamvis dogma vestrum haec tam dira sequatur absurditas, in paradiso exortura fuisse tot ac tanta vitia naturalia, si peccante nemine, illa in qua est condita, naturae humanae felicitas permaneret. Vos autem negantes originale peccatum, profecto naturam quam Deus non creavit, ex cuius commixtione sint hominum cum quibus nascuntur vitia, facitis introduci. O perversi haeretici, Manichaeorum adiutores, de Manichaeis calumniatores, et Catholicorum eadem concorditer contra vos vera dicentium, aliorum contentiosi criminatores, aliorum subdoli adulatores!
Finally, not even you yourselves, as I judge, dare to say—although this so dire absurdity follows upon your dogma—that in paradise so many and so great natural vices would have arisen, if, no one sinning, the felicity of human nature in which it was founded remained. But you, denying original sin, assuredly cause to be introduced a nature which God did not create, from the commingling of which there are the vices of men with which they are born. O perverse heretics, helpers of the Manichees, slanderers about the Manichees, and—of the Catholics who concordantly say the same true things against you—contentious accusers of some, crafty flatterers of others!
Iulianum.4.123124. IUL. Exspectet nunc forsitan lector, quomodo hoc testimonium debeat intellegi; quod certe non pertinere ad traducem peccati, nec ad Manichaeorum opinionem, iste ipse qui fuerat eius usurpator, ostendit; ait enim: De quibuscumque hoc dicat, de hominibus dicit; cum certe si de naturali peccato diceret, non de quibuscumque, sed de omnibus loqueretur. Opinio quippe Manichaeorum generaliter cunctorum mortalium infamat naturam; sententia vero de qua quaerimus, etiam ab ipso plagiatore suo recipit testimonium, quod non in omnes, sed in aliquos prolata sit.
124. JUL. Perhaps the reader now awaits how this testimony ought to be understood; which certainly does not pertain to the transmission of sin, nor to the opinion of the Manichees, as that very man who had been its usurper shows; for he says: Of whomever it says this, it says it of men; whereas surely, if it spoke of natural sin, it would speak not of whomever, but of all. For the opinion of the Manichees defames generally the nature of all mortals; but the opinion about which we inquire receives, even from its own plagiarist, the testimony that it was uttered not against all, but against some.
Iulianum.4.124Ex quo constat, nullum ei negotium fuisse cum traduce, quae nequaquam universos, sed plerosque percellit. Igitur ostenso nihil de ea spectare ad profanam opinionem, ipsius libri suffragio scriptoris eius sanitas asseratur. Loquitur ad Deum: Misereris omnium, quoniam omnia potes, et dissimulas peccata hominum propter poenitentiam; diligis enim omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti horum quae fecisti. Quomodo enim posset aliquid permanere, nisi tu voluisses? Parcis autem omnibus, quoniam tua sunt, Domine, qui animas diligis. Bonus enim spiritus tuus est in omnibus; propter quod hos qui errant, partibus corripis, et de quibus peccant admonens alloqueris, ut relicta malitia credant in te, Domine (Sap 11, 24-12, 2).
From which it is established that he had no business with the transmission, which strikes by no means all, but most. Therefore, having shown that nothing of it looks toward the profane opinion, let the soundness of its writer be asserted by the support of the book itself. He speaks to God: You have mercy on all, because you can do all things, and you overlook the sins of men for the sake of repentance; for you love all things that are, and hate none of those which you have made. For how could anything endure, unless you had willed it? But you spare all, because they are yours, Lord, who love souls. For your good spirit is in all things; on which account you correct in parts those who err, and, admonishing them about the things in which they sin, you speak to them, that, having left malice, they may believe in you, Lord (Wis 11:23-12:2).
Iulianum.4.124AUG. Quomodo miseretur omnium Deus, cum alia Scriptura dicat: Non miserearis omnium qui operantur iniquitatem (Ps 58, 6); nisi quia et in illis quorum non miseretur, omnes homines ita sunt, ut omnia genera hominum intellegantur; sicut dictum est: Decimatis omne olus (Lc 11, 42), id est, omne oleris genus? Quid autem te adiuvat, quod scriptura libri Sapientiae non de omnibus hominibus loquebatur, ubi ait, quod naturalis esset malitia illorum. Neque enim quia de quibusdam, non de omnibus hominibus agebat, ideo etiam fecit intellegi nullos alios esse tales; cum Apostolus dicat: Fuimus nos aliquando natura filii irae, sicut et ceteri (Eph 2, 3).
AUG. How does God have mercy on all, when another Scripture says: Have no mercy on all who work iniquity (Ps 59:5 (58:6))—unless because even in those on whom he has no mercy, all men are such that all kinds of men are understood; as it was said: You tithe every herb (Luke 11:42), that is, every kind of herb? But how does it help you that the writing of the book of Wisdom was not speaking of all men, where it says that their malice was natural? For it is not the case that, because it was dealing with certain men, not all, it therefore also made it understood that there are no others such; since the Apostle says: We were once by nature children of wrath, like the rest (Eph 2:3).
Iulianum.4.124Israelitas autem illo tempore, non quidem etiam ipsos omnes, sed pios, ab his de quibus dictum est: Naturalis malitia eorum, non discernebat natura, sed gratia; propter quod etiam Dei filii sunt nuncupati. Videndum est etiam, quomodo dictum sit: Diligis omnia quae sunt; quoniam sunt etiam iniqui; et alibi scriptum est: Odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem (Ps 5, 7).
But the Israelites at that time—not, indeed, all of them either, but the pious—were distinguished from those of whom it was said, Their malice is natural, not by nature, but by grace; on which account they are also called the sons of God. It must also be seen how it was said: You love all things that are; since the iniquitous too are; and elsewhere it is written: You hate all who work iniquity (Ps 5:5 (5:7)).
Iulianum.4.124Diligit ergo et ipsos, in quantum homines sunt, odit in quantum iniqui sunt; et damnat eos qui iniqui sunt, et facit esse quia homines sunt: Quia nihil, inquit, odisti horum quae fecisti. Amat ergo Deus homines usque adeo, ut etiam, cum iniqui sunt, amet ut homines sunt, quamvis oderit quod iniqui sint. Ac per hoc iniqui quos Deus odit, et sunt homines, quoniam Deus suum amat opificium; et miseri sunt, quoniam Deus amat iudicium.
He loves them too, then, insofar as they are men, hates them insofar as they are iniquitous; and he condemns those who are iniquitous, and makes them to be because they are men: For you hate, he says, none of those which you have made. God therefore loves men so far that, even when they are iniquitous, he loves them as they are men, although he hates that they are iniquitous. And on this account the iniquitous whom God hates both are men, since God loves his workmanship, and are miserable, since God loves judgment.
Iulianum.4.124125. IUL. Cernisne quam infesta sit opinioni vestrae gratificatio Dei laudatoris? Dicit eum condere animas, et amare; quod a vobis negatur, qui iuratis innocentium animas esse sub diabolo, et exosas Deo; cum nihil habeant aliud, quam quod ab auctore sortitae sunt.
125. JUL. Do you discern how hostile to your opinion is the gratification of the God who is praised? It says that he founds souls, and loves them; which is denied by you, who swear that the souls of the innocent are under the devil, and hateful to God, when they have nothing other than what they have received by lot from their author.
Iulianum.4.125AUG. Ergo secundum te, et fatuitatem a Deo auctore sortiuntur quicumque fatui nascuntur, quos magis quam mortuos dicit sacra Scriptura esse lugendos (Cf. Eccli 22, 13). Sed istorum quoque animas secundum quemdam modum, id est, ut sint, ut vivant, ut sentiant, ut quamvis obtunsa mentis acie, tamen pecoribus antecellant, amat utique Deus. Alia autem est illa dilectio, de qua scriptum est: Neminem diligit Deus, nisi eum qui cum sapientia habitat (Sap 7, 28). Sed vos dicite, unde plus amet Deus animas parvulorum, quibus providet lavacrum regenerationis, ut eos mittat in regnum; et unde aliis non praestet hoc beneficium; cum eos non discernant ulla merita voluntatum, nec sit apud Deum, quam nobis insulsissime soletis obicere, acceptio personarum.
AUG. Therefore, according to you, whoever are born foolish receive foolishness too by lot from God their author—those whom sacred Scripture says are to be mourned more than the dead (See Sir 22:11). But the souls of these too God surely loves according to a certain mode, that is, that they may be, may live, may feel, may—though with a dulled edge of mind—nonetheless excel the beasts. But that other love is different, about which it is written: God loves no one but him who dwells with wisdom (Wis 7:28). But say you, why does God love more the souls of the little children for whom he provides the bath of regeneration, that he may send them into the kingdom; and why does he not bestow this benefit on others; when no merits of their wills distinguish them, nor is there with God that partiality of persons which you are wont most insipidly to object to us?
Iulianum.4.125Quamquam ubi dictum est: Amas animas, nec dictum est: Omnes animas, nulla sit quaestio. Fortasse quippe sic positum est, ut omnes Deus animas condat; nec omnes tamen diligat, sed quas a ceteris non meritis earum, sed suae gratiae largitate discernit, ut habitent cum sapientia; quia neminem diligit Deus, nisi eum qui cum sapientia habitat; Dominus autem dat sapientiam (Prov 2, 6).
Although, where it was said, You love souls, and it was not said, You love all souls, there is no question. For perhaps it was so set down that God founds all souls; yet does not love all, but those whom he distinguishes from the rest, not by their merits, but by the largess of his grace, that they may dwell with wisdom; for God loves no one but him who dwells with wisdom; and the Lord gives wisdom (Prov 2:6).
Iulianum.4.125126. IUL. Paenitentiam quoque, quam Deum affirmat dare, vestrum dogma non recipit, in quo malum naturale et nequitia mutari nesciat continetur.
126. JUL. The repentance too, which it affirms that God gives, your dogma does not receive, in which is contained a natural evil and a wickedness that knows not how to be changed.
Iulianum.4.126AUG. Immo nos potius contra vos dicimus, et ipsam paenitentiam Deum dare; quia licet voluntate quisque agat paenitentiam; praeparatur etiam voluntas a Domino (Cf. Prov 8 (sec. LXX)), et haec est immutatio dexterae Excelsi (Ps 76, 11), quam sacer insonat Psalmus; quia ut fleret Petrus, eum respexit Dominus (Cf. Lc 22, 61-62); unde ait de quibusdam coapostolus eius: Ne forte det illis Deus paenitentiam (2 Tim 2, 25). Et quod immutabilis malitia dicitur, homini est immutabilis, qui eam mutare non potest; non Deo, qui omnia potest.
AUG. Rather, we say against you that God gives even repentance itself; for although each does penance by the will, yet the will too is prepared by the Lord (See Prov 8 (LXX)), and this is the change of the right hand of the Most High (Ps 77:11 (76:11)), which the sacred Psalm sounds forth; for that Peter might weep, the Lord looked upon him (See Luke 22:61-62); whence his fellow apostle says of certain men: Lest perhaps God give them repentance (2 Tim 2:25). And as for what is called an immutable malice, it is immutable to the man, who cannot change it; not to God, who can do all things.
Iulianum.4.126127. IUL. Quod autem commendavit admonere Deum, ut relicta malitia peccatores credant in eum, evertit omnino opinionem naturalis mali; quia certum est relinqui non posse congenita.
127. JUL. But that it commended God's admonishing, that, having left malice, sinners may believe in him, overturns altogether the opinion of a natural evil; for it is certain that what is inborn cannot be left behind.
Iulianum.4.127AUG. Possunt etiam congenita relinqui; sed quando id operatur in homine Omnipotens; nam et corruptio congenita est corpori, quod tamen erit incorruptibile.
AUG. Even inborn things can be left behind; but when the Almighty works this in a man; for corruption too is inborn to the body, which nonetheless will be incorruptible.
Iulianum.4.127128. IUL. Hinc explicata patientia Dei, et dispensatione mitissima, qua non vult mortem morientis, nisi ut revertatur et vivat, approbare quod dixerat etiam per exempla persistit, facitque mentionem eorum, qui in terra chananaea viventes pessime iram Omnipotentis accenderant, ut impenderetur ultione iustissima Israelitarum triumphis, sub Dei iam lege viventium. Illos enim antiquos habitatores sanctae tuae terrae odiens, quoniam odibilia opera tibi faciebant, per medicamina et sacrificia iniusta, et necatores filiorum sine misericordia, voluisti perdere per manus parentum nostrorum, ut dignam percipiant peregrinationem puerorum Dei, quae tibi omnium charior est terra (Sap 12, 3-7).
128. JUL. Hence, having explained the patience of God and his most mild dispensation, by which he wills not the death of the dying, but that he turn back and live, he persists in proving what he had said by examples too, and makes mention of those who, living most wickedly in the land of Canaan, had kindled the wrath of the Almighty, so that it might be spent, by a most just vengeance, in the triumphs of the Israelites, now living under the law of God. For hating those ancient inhabitants of your holy land, since they did works hateful to you, by sorceries and unjust sacrifices, and slayers of their own children without mercy, you willed to destroy them by the hands of our parents, that they might receive a worthy pilgrimage of the children of God, the land which is dearest of all to you (Wis 12:3-7).
Iulianum.4.128Septem gentes, quibus ex maxima parte deletis, Israelitis terra repromissionis data est, propter quid Deus voluerit perire, testatur. Ne enim in una hominum natura per aliquam personarum acceptionem apud Deum videretur esse discretio; propter quid Chananaei meruerint interfici, commendat. Illos ergo antiquos habitatores sanctae tuae terrae, inquit, odio habuisti. Quamobrem? Certe secundum te debuit subdere, quia de diabolica erant commixtione generati, quia a tenebrarum principe possidebantur, quia tabificavit Adam omnes de sua stirpe venturos. Verum nihil horum:
The seven nations, by whose destruction for the most part the land of promise was given to the Israelites, why God willed to perish, it testifies. For lest, in the one nature of men, there should seem to be with God any distinction through some partiality of persons, it commends why the Canaanites deserved to be slain. Those ancient inhabitants of your holy land, then, it says, you held in hatred. Wherefore? Surely, according to you, it ought to add: because they were generated from a diabolical intercourse, because they were possessed by the prince of darkness, because Adam corrupted all who would come of his stock. But none of these things:
Iulianum.4.128sed quam causam reddit odiorum? Sola opera commissa per voluntatem liberam. Oderas, inquit, eos, quoniam exosa tibi opera faciebant. Verum ne nesciremus, quae essent opera, tuque haec gentium facta concupiscentiam genitalem vocares, ipsas species operationis exsequitur. Per medicamina, inquit, et sacrificia iniusta, et necatores erant filiorum sine misericordia; id est, maleficiis et sacrificiis serviebant, quae iniusta erant, cum idolis offerebantur, cultu Creatoris abiecto; quibus sacrilegiis ipsas necessitudines deputabant; daemonas videlicet etiam parricidiorum immanitate placantes. Vide itaque quam non de eo loquatur crimine, quod confingit Manichaeus, id est, cunctis per naturam adhaerente mortalibus, qui hinc illos potissimum offendisse commemorat, quod nec a parvulorum suorum exitiis temperabant. Quorum certe mors non recurreret ad interfectoris invidiam, si propter unum peccatum et parricida Deo displiceret, et filius.
but what cause does it render for the hatred? Only works committed through free will. You hated them, it says, because they did works hateful to you. But that we might not be ignorant what the works were, and that you might not call these deeds of the nations a genital concupiscence, it pursues the very kinds of their operation. By sorceries, it says, and unjust sacrifices, and they were slayers of their children without mercy; that is, they served sorceries and sacrifices, which were unjust, since they were offered to idols, the worship of the Creator being cast off; to which sacrileges they assigned their very kinsfolk, appeasing demons, namely, even by the monstrousness of parricide. See, then, how it does not speak of that crime which the Manichee fabricates—that is, one adhering by nature to all mortals—since it recalls that they especially offended on this account, that they did not even refrain from the destruction of their own little children. Whose death surely would not redound to the odium of the slayer, if for one sin both the parricide displeased God, and the child.
Iulianum.4.128AUG. Sic ista loqueris, quasi propter unum aliquod peccati genus omnes homines puniantur, aut nos dicamus propter solum originale peccatum esse irae filios eos, qui iam grandes aetates agunt. Quisquis non credit in Filium, sicut ait ipse Filius, non habebit vitam, sed ira Dei manet super eum (Io 3, 36); sed sunt aliis alii peiores, super quos Dei utique ira maior manet; nec tamen omnes sic evertuntur atque delentur, ut isti de quibus agitur, qui terram, quae Israelitis data est, possidebant.
AUG. You speak these things as though for some one kind of sin all men are punished, or as though we say that those who already pass through great ages are children of wrath on account of original sin alone. Whoever does not believe in the Son, as the Son himself says, will not have life, but the wrath of God remains upon him (John 3:36); but some are worse than others, upon whom surely a greater wrath of God remains; nor, however, are all so overthrown and destroyed as those of whom we are dealing, who possessed the land which was given to the Israelites.
Iulianum.4.128Quid est ergo quod dicis: Vide itaque quam non de eo loquatur crimine, quod confingit Manichaeus? Ubi vis intellegi originale peccatum; quod non confingit Manichaeus, sed, ut ceteri Catholici, et contra vos, et contra Manichaeum confitetur Ambrosius; quia non est alienae naturae commixtio, quam Manichaeus inducit; sed nostrae depravatio de peccato, quod in mundum per unum hominem intravit, et per omnes homines pertransiit, quod contra fidem catholicam vos negatis.
What is it, then, that you say: See, then, how it does not speak of that crime which the Manichee fabricates? Where you wish original sin to be understood; which the Manichee does not fabricate, but which, like the other Catholics, both against you and against the Manichee, Ambrose confesses; because it is not the commingling of an alien nature, which the Manichee introduces, but the depravation of our own, from the sin which entered into the world through one man and passed through all men, which against the Catholic faith you deny.
Iulianum.4.128Usque adeone caecus es, ut non videas, quia si propterea peccatum originale non est, quia hic commemoratum non est, nec alia peccata peccata erunt, quae hic commemorata non sunt, sive istis minora, sive maiora? Numquid ideo Sodomitae deleti non sunt, quia non de illis dictum est quod maleficia et parricidalia sacrificia faciebant? Aut ideo isti Chananaei deleti non sunt, quia non de illis dictum est quod masculi in masculos turpitudinem operabantur? Verumtamen tacitum non est, quod erat eorum malitia naturalis; quae quidem omnium hominum, sed in aliis minor, in aliis maior est; sicut corpora corruptibilia sunt omnium, sed alias animas minus, alias plus gravant, pro diversitate iudiciorum Dei, occultorum quidem, sed sine ulla dubitatione iustorum.
Are you so blind as not to see that, if original sin does not exist for the reason that it is not recalled here, then neither will the other sins be sins which are not recalled here, whether lesser or greater than these? Were the Sodomites not destroyed because it was not said of them that they did sorceries and parricidal sacrifices? Or were these Canaanites not destroyed because it was not said of them that males wrought baseness upon males? Nevertheless it is not left unsaid that their malice was natural; which indeed is the malice of all men, but in some less, in others greater; just as the bodies of all are corruptible, but weigh down some souls less, others more, according to the diversity of the judgments of God, hidden indeed, but without any doubt just.
Iulianum.4.128Quid ergo mirum, si cum causa exponeretur, cur in eos talis vindicta processerit, non voluntaria tantum eorum malitia commemorata est, verum etiam naturalis, cui praeter generis humani commune contagium, accesserat aliquid amplius ex maledictione prophetica (sanctus enim Noe suum nepotem Chanaan progenitorem maledixit illorum (Cf. Gen 9, 25)); non utique iniuste, cui tamen esset obnoxia, obligatione successionis, in prole? Quod apparet etiam in parvulis eorum, qui cum suis parentibus, et hoc iubente Deo, sine ullius aetatis exceptione deleti sunt (Cf. Deut 2, 34); cum maiores propterea maxime Deo displicuerint, quod daemonibus fundere solerent suorum sanguinem parvulorum. Nec Deus praecepit eisdem parvulis parci; immo praecepit omnino non parci. Hinc intellege semen ab initio maledictum; neque enim eum qui hoc praecepit, dicere audebis iniustum.
What wonder, then, if, when the cause was set forth why such vengeance went forth against them, not only their voluntary malice was recalled, but also their natural malice, to which, besides the common contagion of the human race, something more had been added from a prophetic curse (for the holy Noah cursed his grandson Canaan, the progenitor of those people (See Gen 9:25))—not, indeed, unjustly, to which it was nonetheless liable, by the obligation of succession, in the offspring? Which appears even in their little children, who, with their parents, and this at God's command, were destroyed without exception of any age (See Deut 2:34); whereas the elders especially displeased God on this account, that they were wont to pour out the blood of their little children to demons. Nor did God command those same little children to be spared; rather, he commanded that they not be spared at all. Hence understand the seed cursed from the beginning; for you will not dare to call unjust him who commanded this.
Iulianum.4.128Quod si tibi venisset in mentem, non ideo seiungeres a parentibus impiis innocentiam filiorum, quod inde potissimum offenderint parentes Deum, quia nec a parvulorum suorum exitiis temperabant. Quorum certe mors, inquis, non recurreret ad interfectoris invidiam, si propter unum peccatum et parricida Deo displiceret, et filius. Nec vides ita displicuisse Deo necatores filiorum, ut tamen eosdem quoque filios cum his iuberet occidi.
But if this had come into your mind, you would not separate the innocence of the children from their impious parents on the ground that the parents especially offended God for this reason, that they did not refrain from the destruction of their own little children. Whose death, you say, would not redound to the odium of the slayer, if for one sin both the parricide and the child displeased God. Nor do you see that the slayers of their children so displeased God that he nonetheless commanded those same children too to be slain with them.
Iulianum.4.128Neque enim, quia illi impiissime etiam filios daemoniis immolabant, ideo non debuerunt etiam iidem filii, non humano scelere, sed iudicio divino, utique iusto, quamvis occulto, tamquam semen maledictum, sicut factum est, pariter interire. Haec non attendis, dum eloquentia sine sapientia raperis, et flumine vanitatis vis esse disertus, desertus lumine veritatis.
For it is not the case that, because they most impiously immolated even their children to demons, those same children therefore ought not also—not by human wickedness, but by a divine judgment, surely just though hidden—as a cursed seed, to perish equally, as was done. These things you do not attend to, while you are carried away by eloquence without wisdom, and by a flood of vanity wish to be eloquent, deserted by the light of truth.
Iulianum.4.128129. IUL. Verum et his, inquit, tamquam hominibus pepercisti, et misisti praecedentes exercitum vespas; non quia impotens eras in pugna impios iustis subicere, sed partibus iudicans dabas locum paenitentiae. Aculeis, inquit, muscarum etiam illos ipsos sacrilegos stimulabas, ut potentiam vindicantis de ludicro suae afflictionis adverterent. Sed postquam ex consilio Dei, et ultionis genere voluntaria peccata patuerunt, quorum reiectio exspectabatur et petebatur; tunc demum in obstipam punitorum profanitatem scriptoris assurgit invectio, dicitque illos tantam inisse cum criminibus familiaritatem, ut innata quodam modo viderentur. Non ignorans, inquit, quoniam nequissima fuerit natio illorum, et naturalis malitia ipsorum, et quoniam non poterat commutari cogitatio eorum in perpetuum; semen enim erat maledictum ab initio; nec timens aliquem, veniam dabas peccatis illorum (Sap 12, 8-11).
129. JUL. But on these too, it says, as on men, you had mercy, and you sent wasps as forerunners of your army; not because you were powerless in battle to subject the impious to the just, but, judging in parts, you gave place for repentance. With the stings of flies, it says, you goaded even those very sacrilegious men, that they might perceive the power of the avenger from the sport of their affliction. But after, by the counsel of God and the kind of vengeance, their voluntary sins lay open—whose casting-off was awaited and sought—then at last the writer's invective rises against the stubborn profanity of the punished, and says that they had entered into so great a familiarity with their crimes that these seemed in a certain way inborn. Not ignorant, it says, that their nation was most wicked, and their malice natural, and that their thought could not be changed forever; for their seed was cursed from the beginning; and fearing no one, you gave pardon to their sins (Wis 12:8-11).
Iulianum.4.129Cum, inquit, tu tam benigne tamque patienter et paenitentiae tempus indulseris, et speculam admonitionis infixeris, ut iustitiam ac misericordiam ab omni infamia, ab omni suspicione crudelitatis assereres; tamen illi spreverunt commonitiones tuas, qui beneficia praemissa despexerant, velut qui velint probare de illius esse semine Cham, in quem Noe beatus nuditate derisa, censura patria fuerat maledicta iaculatus. Quid ergo mirum, si maioris eorum proterviae merito, sententiae erat austeritate perculsus, recordatus est scriptor in maculam posterorum non desistentium ab aemulatione, cum frequenter in lege imitatio posterorum necessitudinis quoque vocabulis arguatur?
When, it says, you had so kindly and so patiently indulged a time for repentance, and fixed a watchtower of admonition, that you might vindicate justice and mercy from all ill fame, from all suspicion of cruelty; yet they spurned your admonishments, who had despised the benefits sent before, like those who wish to prove that they are of the seed of that Ham, against whom the blessed Noah, his nakedness derided, had hurled, by paternal censure, a curse. What wonder, then, if, struck by the austerity of the sentence on the merit of their greater wantonness, the writer recalled, to the stain of the descendants who did not desist from emulation—since frequently in the law the imitation of descendants is impugned even by the terms of kinship?
Iulianum.4.129Sic quippe Dominus in Evangelio ad Iudaeos: Vos, inquit, ex patre diabolo estis (Io 8, 44). Et Daniel contra spurcos presbyteros, de Israel tamen stirpe venientes, eodem genere legitur invectus: Semen, inquit, Chanaan, et non Iuda (Dan 13, 56). Ezechiel quoque propheta exprobrat plebi Ierusalem: Mater tua, inquit, Cetthaea, et pater tuus Amorrhaeus (Ezech 16, 3. 45). Est ergo hic usus ut ad voluntatis invidiam infamatio stirpis accedat, nimiumque crimini videatur adhaerere, per cuius meritum convicium patiuntur et semina. Servatur autem hic idem mos etiam in bonorum parte, ut cum videtur homo per omnia probus, congenitis dicatur florere virtutibus. Unde et beatus Iob misericordiae affectum quo subveniebat indigentibus, de uberibus se traxisse, immo de utero matris suae secum confirmat egressum (Cf. Iob 31, 18). Nihil ergo rebus perspicuis, aut similitudo, aut exaggeratio, aut ambiguitas praeiudicare potest; quoniam cum certum sit numquam naturalium rerum correctionem a mortalibus reposci, praecipiat autem Deus ut desistant homines a malo; omni vero verius approbatur, naturale peccatum non esse posse.
For thus the Lord in the Gospel says to the Jews: You, he says, are of your father the devil (John 8:44). And Daniel is read to have inveighed in the same kind against the filthy elders, though coming of the stock of Israel: Seed, he says, of Canaan, and not of Judah (Dan 13:56). The prophet Ezekiel too reproaches the people of Jerusalem: Your mother, he says, was a Hittite, and your father an Amorite (Ezek 16:3, 45). There is, then, this usage, that to the odium of the will is added the defaming of the stock, and that he seems to adhere too much to the crime, by whose merit the seeds too suffer reproach. But this same custom is preserved also on the side of the good, so that, when a man seems upright in all things, he is said to flourish with inborn virtues. Hence the blessed Job too affirms that the affection of mercy, by which he came to the aid of the needy, he had drawn with him from the breasts—rather, that it came out with him from his mother's womb (See Job 31:18). Nothing, then, can prejudge things that are clear, whether a simile, or an exaggeration, or an ambiguity; since, when it is certain that correction of natural things is never required of mortals, but God commands that men desist from evil, then it is more truly than anything proved that natural sin cannot exist.
Iulianum.4.129AUG. Putasti quidem te exposuisse verba libri Sapientiae; sed non ea sineris eludere verbis insipientiae. Satis enim apparet, et clarum est, quomodo illa natio nequissima dicta sit, eiusque malitia naturalis; quomodo etiam sit appellata, semen maledictum ab initio. Si enim, ut tu putas, propter aemulationem, id est imitationem, dictum fuisset, qua imitati sunt maiorem suum Cham, quem sui peccati merito maledixit pater eius Noe; profecto Deus quando in istam nationem vindictam iustissimam protulit, iuberet eius parvulis parci, quos dicere non potes suorum maiorum imitatione meruisse supplicium.
AUG. You thought indeed that you had expounded the words of the book of Wisdom; but you are not permitted to elude them with words of foolishness. For it appears clearly enough, and is plain, how that most wicked nation was so called, and its malice natural; how also it was called a seed cursed from the beginning. For if, as you think, it had been said on account of emulation—that is, imitation—by which they imitated their forefather Ham, whom, by the merit of his own sin, his father Noah cursed, then assuredly God, when he brought forth a most just vengeance against that nation, would have commanded its little children to be spared, whom you cannot say deserved punishment by imitation of their forefathers.
Iulianum.4.129Cum ergo eis non solum non iussit praeberi misericordiam, sed ut parem vindictam cum parentibus sumerent, ipse insuper iussit, qui utique aliquid iniustum iubere non potuit; satis evidenter lucet, quod non propter exaggerationem, neque propter imitationem, sed propter generationem dicta est eorum malitia naturalis, et ipse semen maledictum ab initio.
Since, then, he not only did not command mercy to be shown them, but himself moreover commanded that they take an equal vengeance with their parents—he who surely could command nothing unjust—it shines forth evidently enough that not on account of exaggeration, nor on account of imitation, but on account of generation, their malice was called natural, and they themselves a seed cursed from the beginning.
Iulianum.4.129Nam contra errorem vestrum, in hoc ipso semine, de quo agitur, prophetica vigilavit auctoritas, ut Noe iustus peccantem Cham filium in eius malediceret filio, id est, Chanaan; ut hinc intellegeremus vinctos esse filios meritis patrum, nisi hoc vinculum generatione tractum, regeneratione solvatur. De isto ergo Chanaan ducunt originem Chananaei, qui dicti sunt semen maledictum ab initio; quorum etiam parvuli, quia et ipsi hoc erant, non imitatione, sed stirpe interfici cum parentibus divinitus iussi sunt.
For against your error, in this very seed of which we are dealing, prophetic authority kept watch, so that the just Noah cursed the sinning son Ham in his son, that is, Canaan; that hence we might understand the children to be bound by the merits of their parents, unless this bond, drawn by generation, be loosed by regeneration. From that Canaan, then, the Canaanites derive their origin, who are called a seed cursed from the beginning; whose little children too, because they themselves also were this, were divinely commanded to be slain with their parents, not by imitation, but by stock.
Iulianum.4.129His Chananaeis fuisse similes impudicos seniores, Daniel propheta intellegi voluit, quando eis dixit: Semen Chanaan, et non Iuda (Dan 13, 56), tamquam diceret: Similes filiis Chanaan, et non filiis Iuda; sicut dictum est: Generatio viperarum (Mt 3, 7), propter quamdam similitudinem malitiae viperinae. Ubi autem Dominus ait: Vos a patre diabolo estis; revera imitationem voluit, non semen intellegi; sed nec ipse dixit: Vos semen diaboli estis. Et ubi scriptum est: Pater tuus Amorrhaeus, et mater tua Cetthaea, apparet ideo dictum, quod eos fuerant imitati quibus hoc dicebatur; denique nec ibi dictum est: Semen Amorrhaeorum, vel Cetthaeorum. Non ergo ut dixisti: Propter meritum voluntatis nimium criminibus adhaerentis, convicium patiuntur et semina. Absit enim ut sancta Scriptura seminibus, sicut tu hominibus, convicietur immeritis.
That the unchaste elders were like these Canaanites, the prophet Daniel wished to be understood, when he said to them: Seed of Canaan, and not of Judah (Dan 13:56), as if he said: Like the sons of Canaan, and not the sons of Judah; just as it was said: Brood of vipers (Matt 3:7), on account of a certain likeness of viperine malice. But where the Lord says: You are of your father the devil, he indeed wished imitation, not seed, to be understood; yet he himself did not say: You are the seed of the devil. And where it is written: Your father an Amorite, and your mother a Hittite, it appears to have been said for this reason, that they had imitated those to whom this was said; finally, not even there was it said: Seed of the Amorites, or of the Hittites. Not, then, as you said: On account of the merit of a will adhering too much to crimes, the seeds too suffer reproach. For far be it that holy Scripture should reproach the seeds, as you do men, undeservingly.
Iulianum.4.129Ubi autem sanctus Iob affectum misericordiae de utero matris secum, sicut commemoras, egressum confirmat; et eum putas, ut eumdem affectum multum commendaret, hoc dixisse, non quod ita esset; cur non, quaeso te, annuimus esse quosdam natura misericordes, si natura quosdam non negamus excordes? Sunt enim nonnulla congenita, quae in aetate qua usus incipit esse rationis, sicut ipsa ratio, incipiunt apparere.
But where the holy Job affirms that the affection of mercy came out with him from his mother's womb, as you recall, and you think that he said this, in order to commend that affection greatly, not because it was so; why, I ask you, do we not grant that some are by nature merciful, if we do not deny that some are by nature heartless? For there are some inborn things which, at the age when the use of reason begins to be, begin to appear, like reason itself.
Iulianum.4.129Proinde hominibus natura filiis irae propterea dantur praecepta vivendi, quia datur et gratia, ut qui iubet iuvet; ac sic mala non solum quae voluntate sunt addita, verum etiam quae sunt congenerata, vincantur. Quod enim hominibus impossibile est, Deo facile est (Cf. Mt 19, 26). Quibus autem non datur Dei gratia, propter quam dictum est: Quis enim te discernit? Quid autem habes quod non accepisti? (1 Cor 4, 7) praevaricatores fiunt, accedente lege, non iusti. Sed hi quoque ad utilitatem vivunt filiorum misericordiae, ut eos videntes, et quid sibi non merito, sed gratis donetur intellegentes, non extollantur, sed qui gloriatur, in Domino glorietur (2 Cor 10, 17).
Accordingly, to men by nature children of wrath, precepts of living are given for this reason, that grace too is given, so that he who commands may help; and thus the evils not only which were added by the will, but also which were inborn, may be conquered. For what is impossible to men is easy to God (See Matt 19:26). But those to whom the grace of God is not given, on account of which it was said: For who distinguishes you? And what have you that you did not receive? (1 Cor 4:7)—become transgressors, the law being added, not just. But these too live for the benefit of the children of mercy, so that, seeing them and understanding what is given to themselves not by merit but freely, they may not be lifted up, but he who glories may glory in the Lord (2 Cor 10:17).
Iulianum.4.129130. IUL. Sequitur vero Sapientia: Quis tibi imputabit si perierint nationes, quas tu fecisti, cum non sit alius Deus, quam tu, cui cura est de omnibus? Sed cum sis iustus, iuste omnia disponis; ipsum quoque qui non debet puniri, condemnare, exterum aestimas a tua virtute; virtus enim tua iustitiae initium est (Sap 12,12-16). Astipulatur certe communi prudentum rationi, quia maximum in Deo signum iustitia sit, quam Manichaeus, et Traducianus omni conatu fabularum suarum pernegat.
130. JUL. But Wisdom continues: Who will impute it to you if the nations perish, which you have made, since there is no other God than you, who have care of all things? But since you are just, you order all things justly; and to condemn him too who ought not to be punished, you reckon foreign to your power; for your power is the beginning of justice (Wis 12:12-16). It agrees surely with the common reasoning of the prudent, that justice is the greatest sign in God—which the Manichee, and the Traducianist, with every effort of their fables, utterly deny.
Iulianum.4.130AUG. In conviciando cui te dicam similem, nisi tibi? Si autem saperetis Deum esse iustum, numquam congenita vitia, vel corporis humani, vel animi, quae negare non potestis, tribueretis opificio eius, sed iudicio; et hinc originale peccatum, sive peccata, intellegeretis, non negaretis.
AUG. In slandering, to whom shall I call you like, except yourself? But if you had understanding that God is just, you would never attribute the inborn vices—either of the human body or of the mind, which you cannot deny—to his workmanship, but to his judgment; and hence you would understand original sin, or sins, and not deny it.
Iulianum.4.130131. IUL. Denique post paululum sequitur: Illos enim castigando, bonae spei fecisti filios tuos, quoniam iudicans, das in peccatis locum paenitentiae. Si enim inimicos servorum tuorum et morti debitos cum tanto cruciatu admonitionis liberasti, dans tempus et locum per quem possit mutari malitia; cum quanta diligentia iudicas filios tuos, quorum parentibus et iuramenta et pacta dedisti bonarum promissionum? Cum ergo nobis disciplinam das, inimicos nostros multipliciter flagellas, ut bonitatem tuam cogitemus iudicantis (Sap 12,16-22).
131. JUL. Finally, after a little it continues: For by chastising them you made your sons of good hope, since, judging, you give in sins a place for repentance. For if you freed the enemies of your servants, owed to death, with so great a torment of admonition, giving time and place through which malice could be changed; with how great diligence do you judge your sons, to whose parents you gave both oaths and pacts of good promises? When, then, you give us discipline, you scourge our enemies manifoldly, that we may consider your goodness in judging (Wis 12:16-22).
Iulianum.4.131AUG. Quare Deus, cum sit praescius omnium futurorum, tempus et locum per quem possit mutari malitia, dederit etiam eis, de quibus dictum erat, quod eorum cogitatio non poterat mutari in perpetuum, satis ostendit, ubi ait: Bonae spei fecisti filios tuos, quoniam iudicans das in peccatis locum paenitentiae. Ad hoc ergo datur tempus et locus paenitentiae etiam filiis irae deditis morti et paenitentiam non acturis, quia sunt inter illos, vel exorturi sunt de illis filii misericordiae, quibus hoc prosit, quod illis non profuit. Itaque etiam super filios perditionis non est inanis Dei nec infructuosa patientia; necesse est enim prosit eis quos ex massa perditionis non humana merita, sed gratia divina discernit; cum vel gratias agunt, quod ab eis Dei misericordia discernuntur, vel ex perituris non perituri, Dei dispositione nascuntur.
AUG. Why God, although he is foreknowing of all future things, gave time and place through which malice could be changed even to those of whom it had been said that their thought could not be changed forever, he shows clearly enough where he says: You made your sons of good hope, since, judging, you give in sins a place for repentance. For this reason, then, time and place for repentance is given even to the children of wrath, owed to death and not going to do penance, because among them are, or will arise from them, children of mercy, to whom this profits which did not profit those. And so, even over the children of perdition, God's patience is neither empty nor fruitless; for it necessarily profits those whom, from the mass of perdition, not human merits but divine grace distinguishes; when they either give thanks that they are distinguished from them by God's mercy, or are born, not perishing from those who perish, by God's disposition.
Iulianum.4.131132. IUL. Advertis ergo quantam distinctionem superficies verborum fecerit de naturis duarum plebium: Israelitas filios Dei vocat, et Chananaeos semen maledictum. Si hoc quod sonat ad generationes referretur et partus; dicendum erat, aliam esse religiosorum generationem, aliam profanorum.
132. JUL. You observe, then, how great a distinction the surface of the words made about the natures of the two peoples: it calls the Israelites sons of God, and the Canaanites a cursed seed. If this, as it sounds, were referred to generations and births, it would have to be said that the generation of the religious is one, that of the profane another.
Iulianum.4.132AUG. Numquid quoniam cum audimus filios Dei, intellegimus gratiam; ideo cum audimus filios hominum, non debemus agnoscere confiterique naturam? Quid est ergo quod dicis, non inveniendo quid dicas, homo contentiose? Cognosce quod verum est, attende quod clarum est. Semen maledictum Chananaei dicti sunt propter tam malam progeniem, ut Deo iustissimo vindicante atque imperante, nec eius parvulis parceretur, qui parentes suos nulla voluntatis imitatione sectati sunt. Filii vero Dei dicti sunt Israelitae, non propter progeniem naturae, sed propter adoptionem gratiae. Sive ergo dicantur filii et filii, sive semen et semen, quid te iuvat ista consonantia nominum, ubi rerum est tanta distantia?
AUG. Is it the case that, because when we hear "sons of God" we understand grace, therefore when we hear "sons of men" we ought not to recognize and confess nature? What is it, then, that you say, not finding what to say, you contentious man? Recognize what is true, attend to what is clear. The Canaanites were called a cursed seed on account of so evil a progeny that, with the most just God avenging and commanding, not even their little children were spared, who followed their parents by no imitation of the will. But the Israelites were called sons of God, not on account of the progeny of nature, but on account of the adoption of grace. Whether, then, they be called sons and sons, or seed and seed, what does this consonance of names help you, where there is so great a distance of things?
Iulianum.4.132133. IUL. Dum constaret tamen, secundum etiam hanc vanitatem, traducem primi non esse peccati; quod interruptum multarum simul semina gentium perdocebant.
133. JUL. Yet it stood established, even according to this vanity, that there is no transmission of the first sin; which the seeds of many nations at once, interrupted, fully taught.
Iulianum.4.133AUG. Aliud est illius unius hominis semen, quod sunt omnes homines; aliud diversa diversarum gentium semina, quae illud non interrumpunt, quia ex illo cuncta descendunt; neque agunt sua varietate, ut illud peccatum primi hominis, quo mutari meruit humana natura, quibuslibet longe post natis sit posteris eius noxium; sed ut magis minusve sit innoxium. Sicut enim quidam parentes aggravant peccatum originale, ita quidem relevant; sed nemo tollit, nisi ille de quo dictum est: Ecce Agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccata mundi (Io 1, 29); cui nullum bonum hominis impossibile, nullum malum est insanabile.
AUG. The seed of that one man, which all men are, is one thing; the diverse seeds of diverse nations another, which do not interrupt that one, because from it all descend; nor do they bring it about, by their variety, that the sin of the first man, by which human nature deserved to be changed, is harmful to any of his descendants born long after; but rather that it is more or less harmless. For just as certain parents aggravate original sin, so indeed do they relieve it; but no one takes it away, except him of whom it was said: Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who takes away the sins of the world (John 1:29); to whom no good of man is impossible, no evil incurable.
Iulianum.4.133134. IUL. Porro, sicut illud quod de laude dicitur Iudaeorum, non ad hoc valet, ut quisquam genuina credatur sanctitate fulgere; ita etiam quod naturalis malitia vocatur, non ad hoc valet, ut semina vitiosa commendet, sed sine praeiudicio naturae, cuius imperturbabilis ratio est, quae quidquid habet, a Deo suo auctore sortitur, varietas ista verborum, aut invectionis impetum signat, aut laudationis officium.
134. JUL. Further, just as that which is said in praise of the Jews does not avail to this, that anyone be believed to shine with an inborn sanctity, so too what is called a natural malice does not avail to this, that it commend vitiated seeds, but, without prejudging nature—whose imperturbable character is that whatever it has, it receives by lot from God its author—this variety of words signifies either the impetus of invective or the office of praise.
Iulianum.4.134AUG. Si non est cuiusquam sanctitas genuina, quomodo dictum est Ieremiae: Priusquam de vulva exires, sanctificavi te (Ier 1, 5)? Quomodo etiam dictum est de Ioanne Baptista: Spiritu Sancto replebitur iam inde ab utero matris suae (Lc 1, 15)? Quod exsultatio eius quoque ostendit, quando Elizabeth praegnantem coniugatam praegnans Virgo Maria salutavit (Cf. Lc 1, 41-44). An et haec dicta non proprietatis sunt dicta praeconio, sed laudationis officio? Sic agite, sic vanescite; hoc ut dicatis, vestrae restat insaniae. Quid enim Ieremiam, quid Ioannem tumori vestrae frontis apponimus; quando ipsum Christum non discernitis a carne peccati, nullamque carnem dicentes originaliter esse peccati, sic illum ceteris coaequatis, ut etiam ipsum habuisse genuinam negare cogamini sanctitatem, qui natus est de Spiritu Sancto et virgine Maria, expers omnino delicti, quia expers illius conceptionis quae commixtione fit sexuum?
AUG. If no one's sanctity is inborn, how was it said to Jeremiah: Before you came forth from the womb, I sanctified you (Jer 1:5)? How also was it said of John the Baptist: He will be filled with the Holy Spirit even from his mother's womb (Luke 1:15)? Which his exultation too shows, when the pregnant Virgin Mary greeted the pregnant married Elizabeth (See Luke 1:41-44). Or are these sayings too said not by the proclamation of a property, but by the office of praise? Do so, vanish away so; to say this remains for your insanity. For why do we set Jeremiah, why John, against the swelling of your forehead, when you do not distinguish Christ himself from the flesh of sin, and, saying that no flesh is originally of sin, so make him equal to the rest that you are compelled to deny that even he had an inborn sanctity—he who was born of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, altogether free of an offense, because free of that conception which comes about by the intercourse of the sexes?
Iulianum.4.134Quia et Ieremias et Ioannes, quamvis sanctificati in uteris matrum, traxerunt tamen originale peccatum. Nam quo alio merito interirent eorum animae de populo suo, nisi die octavo circumciderentur; id est nisi ad Christi gratiam pervenirent, quem die octavo, id est, post septimum sabbati, resurrecturum propter iustificationem nostram, carnis illa circumcisio figurabat? Erant ergo illi et natura filii irae ab uteris matrum, et gratia filii misericordiae ab uteris matrum; quia nec illa eis adhuc inerat sanctitas, quae vinculum solveret successionis obnoxiae quod suo tempore solvi oportebat, et inerat tamen quae praeconem Christi a maternis visceribus designabat.
For both Jeremiah and John, although sanctified in their mothers' wombs, nonetheless drew original sin. For by what other merit would their souls perish from their people, unless they were circumcised on the eighth day; that is, unless they attained the grace of Christ, who, that he would rise on the eighth day—that is, after the seventh, the sabbath—for our justification, that circumcision of the flesh prefigured? They were, then, both by nature children of wrath from their mothers' wombs, and by grace children of mercy from their mothers' wombs; because that sanctity was not yet in them which would loose the bond of liable succession, which in its own time ought to be loosed, and yet there was in them that which designated the herald of Christ from his mother's womb.
Iulianum.4.134Sed novus haereticus, religiosus physicus vis putari, cum dicis: naturalem malitiam et semen maledictum sine praeiudicio naturae dici, cuius, inquis, imperturbabilis ratio quidquid habet, a Deo suo auctore sortitur. Nonne te admonent ut cor habeas, saltem qui fatui nascuntur? Nec tamen vel ipsi fatui Deum dicere audent fatuitatis auctorem. Nec utique, ut Manichaeus desipit vel insanit, alienae naturae commixtio, sed nostrae depravatio invexit hoc vitium. Huius ergo vitii meritum, et aliorum naturalium quorumque vitiorum non inveniunt, qui sani sunt in fide, nisi originale peccatum.
But, a new heretic, you wish to be thought a religious natural philosopher, when you say that natural malice and a cursed seed are spoken of without prejudging nature, whose imperturbable character, you say, receives by lot from God its author whatever it has. Do not even those who are born foolish admonish you to have a heart? Yet not even those foolish men dare to call God the author of foolishness. Nor indeed—as the Manichee is senseless or insane—did the commingling of an alien nature, but the depravation of our own, bring in this vice. Of this vice, then, and of any other natural vices, those who are sound in the faith find no merit except original sin.
Iulianum.4.134135. IUL. Sicut autem hic semen maledictum, sic alibi equidem, ubi maior est lectionis auctoritas, semen dicitur benedictum. Loquens enim de Israelitis Isaias propheta: Aedificabunt, inquit, domus, et ipsi inhabitabunt; pastinabunt vineas, et ipsi manducabunt fructus earum; non aedificabunt, et alii habitabunt; et non pastinabunt, et alii manducabunt. Secundum enim dies ligni vitae, erunt dies populi mei; opera labiorum eorum perseverant; electi mei non laborabunt in vacuum, nec filios procreabunt in maledicto, quia semen benedictum a Deo est (Isai 65, 21-23).
135. JUL. But just as here a cursed seed, so elsewhere indeed, where the authority of the reading is greater, the seed is called blessed. For the prophet Isaiah, speaking of the Israelites, says: They will build houses, and themselves inhabit them; they will plant vineyards, and themselves eat the fruits of them; they will not build, and others inhabit; and they will not plant, and others eat. For according to the days of the tree of life will be the days of my people; the works of their hands will endure; my elect will not labor in vain, nor beget children for a curse, because they are the seed blessed by God (Isa 65:21-23).
Iulianum.4.135AUG. Hanc Isaiae prophetiam si intellegeres, non eam nobis ut elabereris, sed tibi potius ut corrigereris opponeres. Aliud enim non mortale, sed immortale; nec carnale, sed spiritale semen videres; quod videbat Ioannes evangelista, quando dicebat: Omnis qui natus est ex Deo, non peccat; quia semen eius in ipso manet (1 Io 3, 9). Secundum hoc semen quisque non peccat; quia et si peccat ut homo, habet tamen alterum semen, secundum quod semen non potest peccare, quia ex Deo natus est. Secundum hoc semen filii non procreantur in maledicto. In quibus Prophetae verbis evigilare debuisti, et advertere quod non pro magno munere hoc promitteretur populo Dei, nisi quia procreantur filii in maledicto secundum alterum semen, quod est ex Adam; non autem procreantur in maledicto secundum Christum, quod est semen benedictum ab initio. Ipse est enim et Sapientia Dei, de qua dictum est: Lignum vitae est omnibus amplectentibus eam (Prov 3, 18); unde et iste Propheta, vel Deus potius per Prophetam: Secundum dies ligni vitae, inquit, erunt dies mei populi (Isai 65, 22). Vita aeterna et immortalis promittebatur his verbis, non carnalibus, sed spiritalibus Israelitis. Ibi vineae spiritales et domus non quandoque morientibus pastinatoribus et aedificatoribus suis possidebuntur ab aliis, sed ab ipsis sine fine viventibus. Ergo agnosce duo genera seminum, unum generationis, et alterum regenerationis; et noli esse incredulus, sed fidelis.
AUG. If you understood this prophecy of Isaiah, you would set it against us not that you might slip away, but rather against yourself that you might be corrected. For you would see another seed, not mortal but immortal, not carnal but spiritual; which John the evangelist saw, when he said: Everyone who is born of God does not sin, because his seed remains in him (1 John 3:9). According to this seed each one does not sin; for even if he sins as a man, he has nonetheless another seed, according to which seed he cannot sin, because he is born of God. According to this seed children are not begotten for a curse. In which words of the Prophet you ought to have awakened, and noticed that this would not be promised as a great gift to the people of God, except because children are begotten for a curse according to the other seed, which is from Adam; but are not begotten for a curse according to Christ, who is the seed blessed from the beginning. For he himself is also the Wisdom of God, of which it was said: She is a tree of life to all who embrace her (Prov 3:18); whence this Prophet too, or rather God through the Prophet: According to the days of the tree of life, he says, will be the days of my people (Isa 65:22). Eternal and immortal life was promised by these words, not to carnal, but to spiritual Israelites. There the spiritual vineyards and houses will not, with their planters and builders dying at some time, be possessed by others, but by those very ones living without end. Therefore recognize two kinds of seeds, one of generation, and the other of regeneration; and do not be unbelieving, but believing.
Iulianum.4.135136. IUL. Patiantur ergo pueruli de istis verborum contrarietatibus quaestionem, ut nullius maioris rei quam sonorum capaces pro alludentibus sibi poculis praelientur; catholica vero fides neque iurgare adversum se legem Dei credit, neque ullam auctoritatem in exitium rationis admittit; nec cuiquam opinioni atque adulationi in maculam divinae aequitatis auscultat; sed ut Deum non solum credit, verum etiam novit omnium naturarum Creatorem; ibi peccatum nulli alii quam liberae imputat voluntati; per quae omnia traducem peccati falsam esse non dubitat.
136. JUL. Let little boys, then, suffer a question about these contrarieties of words, so that, capable of nothing greater than sounds, they may do battle over the cups that clink at them; but the Catholic faith neither believes that the law of God quarrels against itself, nor admits any authority to the destruction of reason; nor does it listen to any opinion and flattery to the stain of divine equity; but, as it not only believes but even knows God to be the Creator of all natures, there it imputes sin to none other than the free will; through all of which it does not doubt that the transmission of sin is false.
Iulianum.4.136AUG. Catholica potius fides peccatum esse originale non dubitat; quam fidem non pueruli, sed graves atque constantes viri, docti in Ecclesia, et docentes Ecclesiam, usque ad diem sui obitus defenderunt. Vos autem legem Dei adversum se, sicut dicis, iurgare non creditis, et ipsi adversus eam caeca impietate vel impia caecitate iurgatis. Ideo enim auctoritatem nullam in exitium rationis vos iactatis admittere; ut rationibus vestris, quae non rationes, sed deceptiones sunt, etiam divina deponatur potius, quam exponatur auctoritas. Quamvis nemo ita esse debeat gravis corde, ut decipiatur ratione Pelagii, quam velut exponens Apostolum protulit, et ait: Corpus mortuum propter peccatum, ideo dictum, quia corpus moritur peccatis, quando avertitur a peccatis.
AUG. Rather, the Catholic faith does not doubt that there is original sin; which faith not little boys, but grave and constant men, learned in the Church and teaching the Church, defended until the day of their death. But you do not believe that the law of God quarrels against itself, as you say, and you yourselves quarrel against it by a blind impiety or an impious blindness. For you boast that you admit no authority to the destruction of reason, so that, by your reasonings—which are not reasonings but deceptions—even divine authority is laid down rather than expounded. Although no one ought to be so grave of heart as to be deceived by the reasoning of Pelagius, which, as though expounding the Apostle, he brought forth, and said: The body is dead because of sin was said for this reason, that the body dies to sins, when it turns away from sins.
Iulianum.4.136Contra quam vanitatem non disputandum, sed Apostolus ipse legendus est, dicens: Si autem Christus in vobis, corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum, spiritusautemvita est propter iustitiam, si autem spiritus eius, qui suscitavit Iesum a mortuis, habitat in vobis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra per inhabitantem spiritum eius in vobis (Rom 8, 10-11). Quid apertius? Quid lucidius? Quis, rogo, contra istam manifestationem, nisi haeretica insania, negaret originale peccatum? Propter quod peccatum etiam nunc utique adhuc corpus est mortuum; quamvis iam propter iustitiam vita sit spiritus. Sed vivificabit, inquit, Deuset mortalia corpora vestra. Quis oblatraret huic veritati, nisi rabies vanitatis, quae se iactat nulli opinioni atque adulationi auscultare in maculam aequitatis divinae; cum potius aequitatem divinam negare cogatur, quisquis deceptus fuerit a vobis? Quoniam tot vitia vel corporum vel ingeniorum, cum quibus nascuntur homines, si nullius peccati dicuntur trahere meritum, procul dubio Dei negatur iustum esse iudicium. Itaque, cum voluntati peccata sic imputatis, ut voluntati primi hominis originale peccatum imputare nolitis, omnia mala quae trahunt vel patiuntur infantes, iniquo Dei iudicio, eos qui vobis credunt, imputare compellitis.
Against this vanity one must not dispute, but read the Apostle himself, who says: But if Christ is in you, the body indeed is dead because of sin, but the spirit is life because of righteousness; but if the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he will also give life to your mortal bodies through his Spirit that dwells in you (Rom 8:10-11). What more open? What more clear? Who, I ask, against this manifestation, except a heretical insanity, would deny original sin? On account of which sin even now the body is surely still dead; although the spirit is now life because of righteousness. But God, he says, will give life to your mortal bodies too. Who would bark against this truth, except the madness of vanity, which boasts that it listens to no opinion and flattery to the stain of divine equity—when rather whoever has been deceived by you is compelled to deny divine equity? For if so many vices, whether of bodies or of talents, with which men are born, are said to draw the merit of no sin, then beyond doubt it is denied that the judgment of God is just. And so, since you impute sins to the will in such a way that you refuse to impute original sin to the will of the first man, you compel those who believe you to impute all the evils which infants draw or suffer to an iniquitous judgment of God.
Iulianum.4.136Bk. 5
1. IULIANUS. Compertum est omnis aevi periculis apud paucos incorrupti reverentiam vigere iudicii, qui et scientiae studiis dediti, et virtutum appetentes, vel possunt indagare verum, vel repertum audent tueri; aut, sicut ait Apostolus: Exercitatos habent sensus, ad discretionem boni malique (Hebr 5, 14); nec ullis adversorum franguntur procellis, qui de eodem audiunt praeceptore, usque ad sanguinem resistendum esse peccatis (Cf. Hebr 12, 14).
1. JULIAN. It has been ascertained that, amid the dangers of every age, the reverence of an uncorrupted judgment thrives in few—those who, both devoted to the pursuits of knowledge and desirous of the virtues, either can track out the truth or dare to defend it once found; or, as the Apostle says: They have their senses exercised, for the discernment of good and evil (Heb 5:14); nor are they broken by any storms of adversity, who hear from the same teacher that one must resist sins even to blood (See Heb 12:4).
Iulianum.5.1Hi ergo prudentes, quos stolidorum populi faciunt paucos videri, scientiae et fortitudini iuxta prorsus student. Neutra enim absque altera aut fructum assequitur, aut honorem; quoniam et fortitudo nisi optimis per scientiam admota rebus est, in despicabilem erumpit insaniam; et e regione examinatae iustitiae leges, nisi magnanimitatis murus incluserit, praedae confestim patebunt, ac servitum criminibus abducentur. Has ergo bigas, sine quibus triumphari de mundi erroribus nequitur, diversis aetatibus rarissimi quique, qui colerent et iugarent atque regerent, exstiterunt; quoniam et scientiae studium tam fuga laboris quam saecularium curarum diversitas impedit, et constantiam aerumnarum, quae ab improbis excitantur, formido percellit. Quae oppugnationum genera vincunt quidem fideles animi et sapientes; verum tam rari sunt, ut inter insanorum populos, quia non furiunt, insanire videantur.
These prudent men, then, whom the peoples of the dull-witted make seem few, study knowledge and fortitude alike. For neither, without the other, attains either fruit or honor; since fortitude too, unless applied through knowledge to the best things, breaks out into a despicable insanity; and, on the other side, the laws of examined justice, unless the wall of magnanimity enclose them, will at once lie open to plunder, and be led off into slavery to crimes. These twin steeds, then, without which it is impossible to triumph over the errors of the world, the rarest few in diverse ages have existed who would cultivate and yoke and govern them; for both the variety of secular cares, as much as the flight from labor, hinders the pursuit of knowledge, and dread strikes down the constancy under the hardships which are stirred up by the wicked. These kinds of assaults faithful and wise minds indeed conquer; but they are so rare that, among the peoples of the insane, because they do not rage, they seem to be insane.
Iulianum.5.1AUGUSTINUS. Nonne te admonet raritas ista hominum, quam tu ipse commemoras, in quibus et scientia et fortitudo est, quid de humano genere sentire debeas, et de universa ista massa rationabilium mortaliumque animantium? Cur enim non genus mortalium ad studium scientiae roburque fortitudinis, naturali appetitu, vel universum, vel certe ex maxima parte consurgit, ut rarissimos quosque potius miremur, ab eo quod appetit naturae institutio deviare atque desciscere? Cur in profunda imperitiae ac mollitudinem ignaviae, quasi per proclivia, nescio quo velut onere urgente delabitur?
AUGUSTINE. Does not that rarity of men, which you yourself recall, in whom there is both knowledge and fortitude, admonish you what you ought to perceive about the human race, and about that whole mass of rational and mortal living beings? For why does not the race of mortals rise up to the pursuit of knowledge and the strength of fortitude, by a natural appetite, either wholly or at least for the most part, so that we should rather marvel at the rarest few who deviate and fall away from what the institution of nature desires? Why does it slide down into the depths of unskillfulness and the softness of sloth, as though down a slope, with some weight or other pressing it?
Iulianum.5.1Fugam laboris certe dicis esse causam, qua fit ut nesciant homines quae scire debuerunt; sed vellem diceres quid causae sit, ut homini tam bene naturaliter instituto utilia naturae atque salubria sit laboriosissimum discere, atque ita laborem fugiens, in tenebris ignorantiae familiarius libentiusque requiescat. Nempe tanta raritas ingeniosorum et studiosorum, per quae duo ad humanarum divinarumque rerum scientiam pervenitur, et tanta multitudo tardorum et desidiosorum, satis indicat in quam partem suo tamquam pondere feratur ipsa natura, quam negatis esse vitiatam.
You say, to be sure, that the flight from labor is the cause by which it comes about that men do not know what they ought to have known; but I would have you say what cause there is that, for a man so well instituted by nature, it is most laborious to learn things useful and salutary to nature, and that, thus fleeing labor, he rests more familiarly and more willingly in the darkness of ignorance. Surely so great a rarity of the talented and the studious—through which two one arrives at the knowledge of human and divine things—and so great a multitude of the slow and the slothful, indicates well enough toward which side nature itself is carried, as though by its own weight—the nature which you deny to be vitiated.
Iulianum.5.1Neque secundum christianam cogitatis fidem, qualis sit factus Adam, qui universis generibus animarum vivarum nomina imposuit (Cf. Gen 2, 19); quod excellentissimae fuisse indicium sapientiae, in saecularibus etiam litteris legimus. Nam ipse Phytagoras, a quo philosophiae nomen exortum est, dixisse fertur, illum fuisse omnium sapientissimum, qui vocabula primus indidit rebus. Verum etsi nihil tale de Adam didicissemus, nostrum erat utique vera ratione conicere, qualis in illo homine natura sit condita, in quo vitium omnino nullum fuit. Quis autem usque adeo sit tardus ingenio, ut ad naturam neget obtunsa vel acuta ingenia pertinere, aut existimet non esse animi vitia vel memoriae vel intellegentiae tarditatem? Et quis dubitet christianus, eos qui in hoc saeculo erroribus aerumnisque plenissimo, ingeniosissimi apparent, quorum tamen corruptibilia corpora aggravant animas, si illius ingenio comparentur, distare longe amplius quam celeritate a volucribus testudines distant? Ingeniis ergo tam excellentibus paradisi felicitas impleretur, si nemo peccasset; tales quippe Deus de parentibus fuerat creaturus, qualem illum sine parentibus creaverat, utique ad imaginem suam.
Nor do you consider, according to the Christian faith, of what sort Adam was made, who imposed names on all the kinds of living souls (See Gen 2:19); which we read, even in secular letters, was the mark of a most excellent wisdom. For Pythagoras himself, from whom the name of philosophy arose, is said to have said that he was the wisest of all who first assigned words to things. But even if we had learned nothing of the kind about Adam, it was surely ours to conjecture by true reasoning of what sort the nature was founded in that man, in whom there was no vice at all. But who would be so slow of talent as to deny that dull or acute talents pertain to nature, or to judge that slowness of memory or of understanding is not a vice of the mind? And what Christian would doubt that those who, in this age most full of errors and hardships, appear most talented—whose corruptible bodies nonetheless weigh down their souls—if compared with his talent, differ far more than tortoises differ from birds in swiftness? With talents so excellent, then, the felicity of paradise would be filled, if no one had sinned; for God was going to create from parents such as he had created him without parents, namely, in his own image.
Iulianum.5.1Nondum enim homo vanitati similis factus erat, ut dies eius sicut umbra in hoc saeculo aerumnoso praeterirent (Cf. Ps 143, 4). Quod si ita esset, numquid ista tua querela, ullum haberet locum? Numquid assecutio scientiae laboriosa esset, ut fuga laboris imperiti esse homines mallent? Numquid ipsa fortitudine, quam verum dicis vix in paucissimis inveniri, opus haberemus, ubi nulla esset aerumna quam deberemus pro veritate fortiter sustinere? Cum ergo ista in contrarium versa sint omnia, ad hoc naturam nostram negas esse vitiatam, ut, te adiuvante, Manichaeus commixtam nobis introducat alienam; ac sic dum oppugnator eius prosilis imperitus, fis auxiliator ignarus.
For man had not yet been made like to vanity, that his days should pass like a shadow in this toilsome age (See Ps 144:4 (143:4)). And if it were so, would this complaint of yours have any place? Would the attainment of knowledge be laborious, so that men would prefer to be unskilled by flight from labor? Would we have need of that very fortitude which you truly say is scarcely found in the fewest, where there would be no hardship which we ought bravely to endure for truth? Since, then, all these things are turned to the contrary, you deny that our nature is vitiated for this purpose: that, with your help, the Manichee may introduce an alien nature commingled with us; and thus, while you leap forth as his assailant unskilled, you become his helper unaware.
Iulianum.5.12. IUL. Ostendit hoc etiam liber ille, qui Sapientia dicitur, cum verba exprimens impiorum, qui post umbram praesentium retecta beatorum merita contuentur: Vitam, inquit, illorum aestimabamus insaniam; et quomodo, reputati sunt inter filios Dei? (Sap 5, 4-5) Inde est ergo, quod fidelium perseverantia temporum iniquitatibus contumax, et eligens affligi cum populo Dei magis quam temporalis peccati habere iucunditatem (Cf. Hebr 11, 25), ab his qui dicunt: Manducemus et bibamus, cras enim moriemur (1 Cor 15, 32), nomine pertinaciae et contentionis arguitur; nihilque magis putatur cautis convenire consiliis, quam degeneris animi famulatum emere, vel infidam momentorum quietem. De hac quippe potissimum ignavorum pectorum vilitate factum est, ut per Ecclesiarum naufragia spurcum manichaeorum dogma velificet.
2. JUL. This too that book which is called Wisdom shows, when, expressing the words of the impious, who, after the shadow of present things, behold the merits of the blessed laid bare: We esteemed their life, it says, insanity; and how have they been reckoned among the sons of God? (Wis 5:4-5) Hence it is, then, that the perseverance of the faithful, defiant of the iniquities of the times, and choosing to be afflicted with the people of God rather than to have the enjoyment of a temporal sin (See Heb 11:25), is accused by those who say: Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we shall die (1 Cor 15:32), under the name of pertinacity and contention; and nothing is thought to suit cautious counsels more than to purchase the servitude of a degenerate spirit, or the faithless quiet of moments. For from this vileness especially of slothful breasts it has come about that, through the shipwrecks of the Churches, the filthy dogma of the Manichees spreads its sails.
Iulianum.5.2Quia si in his qui sacerdotii munere fungebantur, libera stetisset et virilis auctoritas, traducianorum commenta ut invicta ratio proruit, ita publica contrivisset assensio. Verum cum nihil ab hominibus praesentium amantibus, religione vilius aestimatur, itum est in criminationes Dei; ut nobis necessitas immineret, tam longis disputationibus Deum nostrum, qui est Deus verus, fidelem in verbis suis, iustum in iudiciis, sanctum in operibus approbare (Cf. Ps 144, 13. 17).
For if in those who discharged the office of the priesthood a free and manly authority had stood, then, just as invincible reason has cast down the contrivances of the Traducianists, so public assent would have crushed them. But since by men who love present things nothing is esteemed cheaper than religion, recourse was had to accusations of God; so that a necessity pressed upon us, by such long disputations, to prove our God, who is the true God, faithful in his words, just in his judgments, holy in his works (See Ps 145:13, 17 (144:13, 17)).
Iulianum.5.2AUG. Si fidelis est Deus in verbis suis, cur ei contradicitis dicenti: Reddam peccata patrum in filios (Deut 5, 9), et hoc verum non esse contenditis? Si iustus est in iudiciis, cur hoc ipsum quod peccata patrum redduntur in filios, iustum esse non vultis; et quod filii Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum gravi iugo premuntur, dicere sine ullius originalis peccati merito fieri, non timetis? Si sanctus est in operibus, cur immunditiam nascentium, quae hominem Dei dicere compulit, non esse mundum a sorde peccati, nec infantem cuius est diei unius vita super terram (Cf. Iob 14 (sec. LXX)), ab eius sancto opificio quo naturam format, quamvis originis contagione pollutam, discernere recusatis; atque ita vitia et ingeniorum et corporum tam multa, et aliquando tam magna, sancto eius opificio cuncta tribuitis? Quae nolentes tribuere venientibus de natura peccato depravata originalibus meritis; profecto aditum amplissimum ad alienam mali naturam introducendam manichaeis exsecrabilibus aperitis; quorum dogma nefarium quasi accusatis horrentes, cum adiuvetis errantes.
AUG. If God is faithful in his words, why do you contradict him when he says: I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the sons (Deut 5:9), and contend that this is not true? If he is just in his judgments, why do you refuse to admit that this very thing—that the sins of the fathers are repaid upon the sons—is just; and do you not fear to say that, when the sons of Adam, from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb, are pressed by a heavy yoke, this happens without the merit of any original sin? If he is holy in his works, why do you refuse to distinguish the uncleanness of those being born—which compelled the man of God to say that no one is clean from the defilement of sin, not even an infant whose life is of one day upon the earth (See Job 14 (LXX))—from his holy workmanship by which he forms nature, though polluted by the contagion of origin; and thus attribute so many vices, both of talents and of bodies, and sometimes so great, all to his holy workmanship? Which, refusing to attribute, by original merits, to a sin coming from depraved nature, you assuredly open a most ample entrance to the abominable Manichees for introducing an alien nature of evil; whose abominable dogma you, as it were, accuse with horror, while you aid those who err.
Iulianum.5.23. IUL. His ita negotiis librorum meorum operam destinatam, mali naturalis assertor oppugnat; quibus sane viribus, et quam consequenti responsione, satis superque praecedentium voluminum disputatione perdocui. Quorum lectione non dubito prudenti cuique constare (quem rarum esse hac praefatione testatus sum), nihil studere aliud veritatis inimicum, quam ut simpliciorum ludificentur aures et evasisse, si utcumque se respondisse videatur.
3. JUL. The asserter of a natural evil assails the work thus devoted to these matters of my books; with what strength, indeed, and with what consistent response, I have taught fully and more than fully in the disputation of the preceding volumes. By the reading of which I do not doubt it is established to any prudent man (whom I have testified by this preface to be rare) that the enemy of truth strives for nothing else than to mock the ears of the simpler and to have escaped, if he seems somehow or other to have answered.
Iulianum.5.3AUG. Raros esse prudentes, praefatione testaris d; et quae causa sit raritatis huius, vel cur nec ipsi qui rara ingeniorum capacitate ad prudentiam pervenerunt, sine labore magno potuerunt consequi utilem scientiam, nec dicis, nec discis; qui fateri non vis humanam per primi hominis praevaricationem depravatam esse naturam. Et tamen ad tuorum librorum lectionem, nonnisi eosdem prudentes mittis, quos testaris esse rarissimos; de quorum ingenio tam bene sentis, ut apud eos unum librum meum tuis octo refutare coneris, multiplicans eis laborem filiorum Adam; quo labore discant, etiamsi nemo peccasset, in ipso paradiso se fuisse laboraturos, ut litteratorum libros, et prius ipsas litteras discerent. Haec est enim vestra praeclara scientia, nulli hominum comprehensibilis, nisi prudentibus raris, nec ipsis nisi laborantibus miseris.
AUG. You testify by your preface that the prudent are rare; and what the cause of this rarity is, or why not even those who, by a rare capacity of talent, have arrived at prudence could attain useful knowledge without great labor, you neither say nor learn—you who refuse to confess that human nature was depraved through the transgression of the first man. And yet to the reading of your books you send none but those same prudent men, whom you testify to be rarest; of whose talent you think so well that before them you try to refute one book of mine with your eight, multiplying for them the labor of the sons of Adam; by which labor they may learn that, even if no one had sinned, in paradise itself they would have had to labor, to learn the books of the literate, and first letters themselves. For this is your illustrious knowledge, comprehensible to no man, except the rare prudent, and not even to these except the miserable who labor.
Iulianum.5.34. IUL. Cum igitur id a nobis abunde constet effectum; tamen quia operi nostro nascitur longitudo, sapiens lector intellegat, nobis quidem optabilem fuisse brevitatem, sed exegisse causae necessitatem, ut error saeculi favore diffusior, latiore veritatis acie vinceretur. Haud igitur de nihilo est, quod sermo noster extenditur. Adiutu enim Christi praesumo confore, ut nulla pars impietatis, contra quam nobis certamen est, aut negligenter quaesita, aut minus inventa, aut attrita mediocriter censeatur. Nec illud ergo desperare vel possumus, vel debemus, quoniam processu temporum tempestas excitata considat, et auctoritate sapientum vulgus ignavum quod nunc perstrepit corrigatur;
4. JUL. Since, then, it is abundantly established that this has been accomplished by us, yet because length is born for our work, let the wise reader understand that brevity was indeed desirable to us, but the necessity of the cause exacted that the error of the age, made more widespread by favor, be conquered by a broader battle-line of truth. It is not, then, for nothing that our discourse is extended. For with the help of Christ I presume it will come about that no part of the impiety against which our contest is be judged either negligently sought, or too little found, or but moderately worn down. Nor, then, can we or ought we to despair that, in the process of time, the storm that has been stirred up will subside, and that by the authority of the wise the slothful crowd, which now clamors, will be corrected;
Iulianum.5.4sed voti quam sententiae minor causa est; quemvis enim status rerum exitum sortiatur, constabit nobis ratio et benignitatis et fidei. Neque enim pendemus ad prosperitatis popularis eventum. Scitum est siquidem illud trium in Babylone puerorum, qui cum a rege superbissimo ad adorandam statuam cogerentur, fidelissime restiterunt, neque anhela sunt fornace conterriti, quae accensa erat in religiosorum voratum; responderuntque ut et fidei et constantiae congruebat: Potens est, inquiunt, Deus, o rex, liberare nos de fornace hac; sed etiamsi non liberet, scito quoniam deos tuos non colimus, nec statuamquam erexisti adoramus (Dan 3, 17-18). Quam sanctum votum iudicio miscuerunt, nec tamen consilii gravitatem desiderio levarunt! Fortitudinem fidei nec desperatione praecipitant, nec cupiditate suspendunt; miscent quidem vota; ceterum ordinem non relinquunt; consolantur tolerantiam h, sed iustis mitiora submittunt:
but the cause of a wish is less than that of a settled judgment; for whatever outcome the state of things may receive by lot, our reckoning both of kindness and of faith will stand firm. For we do not hang upon the event of popular prosperity. Well known indeed is that of the three boys in Babylon, who, when they were being compelled by a most proud king to adore a statue, most faithfully resisted, nor were they terrified by the panting furnace, which had been kindled for the devouring of the religious; and they answered as befitted both faith and constancy: God is able, they say, O king, to free us from this furnace; but even if he does not free us, know that we do not worship your gods, nor adore the statue which you have set up (Dan 3:17-18). How holy a wish they mixed with judgment, and yet did not lighten the gravity of their counsel by desire! They do not cast down the fortitude of their faith by despair, nor hold it in suspense by cupidity; they mix wishes, indeed; but they do not abandon order; they console endurance, but they subordinate milder things to just ones:
Iulianum.5.4Certum est, inquiunt, quoniam nos possit liberare Deus noster; sed utrum velit, est incertum; et ideo sub ambiguo rerum eventu stat piorum certa sententia, idola respuendi, supplicia perferendi. Viderit quid boni nostra liberatio etiam ceteris conferat; nobis interim veram felicitatem fides, inquiunt, invicta custodiat; non habet ergo mollioribus gratificandi nimiam necessitatem, cuius gloriae negotiantur adversa.
It is certain, they say, that our God can free us; but whether he wills it is uncertain; and therefore, under the ambiguous event of things, the certain judgment of the pious stands: to reject idols, to endure punishments. Let it be seen what good our deliverance confers even on the rest; for us in the meantime, they say, let invincible faith guard true felicity; he, then, does not have too great a necessity of gratifying the softer, whose adversities trade for glory.
Iulianum.5.4De hac et nos disciplina, quam reliquerunt illustres magistri, intellegimus tenendam in prosperis votorum mediocritatem, in dogmatibus vero fidei consiliorum perennitatem; optamusque, persecutionum tumore compresso, etiam populis subvenire; at si id non accidat, stat quidquid acerbum est in contumeliis et periculis perpeti, quam non aversari illuviem sordesque manichaeas.
From this discipline too, which the illustrious masters left, we understand that in prosperity a moderation of wishes is to be held, but in the dogmas of faith a perennity of counsels; and we wish, the swelling of persecutions being repressed, to come to the aid of the peoples too; but if that does not happen, it stands firm to suffer whatever is bitter in contumelies and dangers, rather than not to turn away from the Manichean filth and squalor.
Iulianum.5.4AUG. Quantum manichaeos adiuvetis, cum grave iugum super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum (Cf. Eccli 40, 1) non tribuitis iusto iudicio Dei, propter originale peccatum, ac sic locum facitis alienae naturae mali, quam tradit insanus error illorum, et saepe admonuimus, et ubi opportunum visum fuerit, non cessabimus admonere. Nunc quoniam vos ita fortes esse iactatis, ut tamen pro multis etiam vestra, quamvis " mediocria vota ", commendes, quibus, ut dicis: " optatis persecutionum tumore compresso populis subvenire "; quaero abs te, utrum id a Domino optetis. Quod si non facitis, non sunt ista vota christiana; si autem facitis, quomodo speratis, exauditis votis vestris, hoc Dominum largiturum? Nempe ut corda hominum quae adversa sunt vobis, in vestrum favorem et amorem convertat.
AUG. How much you aid the Manichees, when you do not attribute the heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1) to the just judgment of God, on account of original sin, and thus make room for the alien nature of evil, which their insane error transmits—we have often admonished, and, where it shall seem opportune, we will not cease to admonish. Now, since you so boast yourselves to be brave, that you nonetheless commend, even for many, your—though moderate—wishes, by which, as you say, you wish, the swelling of persecutions being repressed, to come to the aid of the peoples; I ask you whether you wish this from the Lord. And if you do not, these are not Christian wishes; but if you do, how do you hope that, your wishes being heard, the Lord will bestow this? Namely, that he will turn the hearts of the men who are adverse to you into favor and love of you.
Iulianum.5.4Si hoc creditis, profecistis i; vos ipsos convertere, vos ipsos in melius mutare iam coepit. Cogitate, quaeso, istud, atque retinete, tandemque fatemini operari omnipotentem Deum in cordibus hominum voluntates, aversosque convertere; ita eius misericordiam gratiamque sapietis; et ubi hoc non agit, iudicia occulta, sed iusta. Sic vota nostra potius fortassis exaudiet, ut vos ad fidem catholicam, sicut Turbantium paulo ante vestrum, nunc vero esse iam nostrum, simili sua operatione atque miseratione convertat.
If you believe this, you have made progress; he has now begun to convert you yourselves, to change you yourselves for the better. Consider, I beseech you, this, and retain it, and at last confess that the almighty God works wills in the hearts of men, and converts the averse; thus you will savor his mercy and grace; and where he does not do this, his judgments hidden, but just. Thus he will perhaps rather hear our wishes, that he may convert you to the Catholic faith—as a little before he converted Turbantius, your man, but now ours—by his like operation and compassion.
Iulianum.5.45. IUL. Sed iam aggrediamur ad causam. Claruit tam priore quam praesenti opere, concupiscentiam naturalem, sine qua sexuum non potest esse commixtio, a Deo, qui est et hominum et pecudum conditor (De nupt. et concup. 2, 25), institutam. Quod tantum valet, confessione quoque adversarii mei, ut sine eius vituperatione, id est, carna lis concupiscentiae, et sine infamatione commixtionis, asseri penitus non possit naturale peccatum.
5. JUL. But let us now approach the cause. It has become clear, both in the earlier and in the present work, that natural concupiscence, without which there can be no intercourse of the sexes, was instituted by God, who is the founder both of men and of beasts (Marriage and Desire 2.25). Which avails so much, even by the confession of my adversary, that without its vituperation—that is, of carnal concupiscence—and without the defaming of intercourse, natural sin cannot be asserted at all.
Iulianum.5.5AUG. Concupiscentiam sive naturalem, sive carnalem tibi placeat appellare, eam nos concupiscentiam vituperamus, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et trahit ad illicita, nisi et spiritus adversus eam fortius concupiscat. Hanc dissensionem in paradiso dicimus non fuisse, quando qui ibi erant, nudi erant, et non confundebantur. Hanc post peccatum esse coepisse, ipsa res clamat, quandoquidem post peccatum pudenda texerunt, quae prius pudenda non fuerant. Neque ut nuda prius essent, impudentia, sed innocentia faciebat; quia et impudentia vitium est; illi autem quando eos nudos esse non pudebat, utique vitium non habebant.
AUG. Whether it please you to call concupiscence natural or carnal, we vituperate that concupiscence by which the flesh lusts against the spirit and draws toward unlawful things, unless the spirit too lusts more strongly against it. This dissension, we say, was not in paradise, when those who were there were naked and were not ashamed. That it began to exist after sin, the very fact cries out, since after sin they covered the shameful parts, which before had not been shameful. Nor was it impudence that made them naked before, but innocence; for impudence too is a vice; but they, when it did not shame them to be naked, surely had no vice.
Iulianum.5.5Hoc ergo malum, quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, haereticus Iulianus dicit esse bonum; hoc malum ex aliena mali natura nobis esse commixtum dicit alius haereticus Manichaeus; hoc malum per praevaricationem primi hominis in nostram dicens vertisse naturam, catholicus ambos vincit Ambrosius.
This evil, then, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, the heretic Julian says is good; this evil another heretic, the Manichee, says is commingled with us from an alien nature of evil; this evil—saying that it turned into our nature through the transgression of the first man—the Catholic Ambrose conquers both.
Iulianum.5.56. IUL. Quod quoniam a nobis ea facultate, quam veritas suppeditavit, ostensum est, prudens lector super hoc ulterius dubitare non debet; ubicumque hoc in Traduciani scriptis occurrerit (sine quo tamen hiare non potest), nihil moveat audientes, sed in verecundiam protestetur auctoris; nos autem id deinceps, si res compulerit, necessaria brevitate tangemus.
6. JUL. Since this has been shown by us with that capacity which truth supplied, the prudent reader ought not to doubt further about it; wherever this occurs in the Traducianist's writings (without which, however, he cannot keep his mouth open), let it move the hearers in no way, but let it bear witness to the author's shame; but we, henceforth, if the matter compel it, will touch it with necessary brevity.
Iulianum.5.6Arguit ergo quod dixi: Ista corporum commixtio, cum calore, cum voluptate, cum semine a Deo facta, et pro suo modo laudabilis approbatur (Ibidem). Sed praeteriit illud quod subdidi: De re autem, quae instituta naturaliter, fitaliquando etiam amplum munus piorum, diabolus sibi nec tua fronte audet aliquid vindicare.
He accuses, then, what I said: That intercourse of bodies, with heat, with pleasure, with seed, made by God, is approved as praiseworthy after its own measure (Marriage and Desire 2.25). But he passed over what I added: But as for a thing instituted naturally, which sometimes becomes even an ample gift of the pious, the devil dares not—not even with your forehead—claim anything for himself.
Iulianum.5.6AUG. Ille hoc praetermisit, qui eam cui respondebam, chartulam misit; fortasse intellegens quod tu non intellegis, qui tam incaute locutus es, ut diceres: "De re instituta naturaliter, quae fit aliquando etiam amplum munus piorum, non audere diabolum aliquid sibi vindicare "; cum videamus quod ipsos homines diabolus sibi vindicet, qui utique naturaliter instituti sunt. An forte homines non sunt, qui eruuntur de potestate tenebrarum, quarum tenet diabolus principatum? Aut vero ita desipis, ut affirmes eos sibi diabolum non vindicare, quos possidet, et suae potestati subditos tenet?
AUG. He passed this over, who sent the little sheet to which I was responding; perhaps understanding what you do not understand, who spoke so incautiously as to say: "As for a thing instituted naturally, which sometimes becomes even an ample gift of the pious, the devil does not dare to claim anything for himself"; whereas we see that the devil claims for himself the very men who were surely instituted naturally. Or are those not men who are rescued from the power of darkness, of which the devil holds the principality? Or are you so senseless as to affirm that the devil does not claim for himself those whom he possesses and holds subject to his power?
Iulianum.5.6Sed ut taceam de his, quos potestis dicere, per suam malam voluntatem a diabolo possideri; quid dicturus es de illo, de quo pater ipsius, Domino interrogante, respondit, quod ex infantia sua ab immundo spiritu vexaretur (Cf. Mc 9, 20)? Nonne membra eius et sensus, quae omnia Deo auctore naturaliter instituta sunt, et impiorum communia piorumque sunt munera, diabolus sibi ut affligeret vindicabat? Quod licet facere non posset, nisi a creatore hominis Deo bono et iusto acciperet potestatem, facit tamen, et tua verba vanissima esse ostendit, qui dicis: " De re naturaliter instituta, quae fit aliquando amplum etiam munus piorum, nihil sibi audere diabolum vindicare ". Debuisti enim dicere, eorum bonorum quae naturaliter instituta sunt, non diabolum sibi nihil vindicare, sed ipsum nihil creare.
But to be silent about those whom you can say are possessed by the devil through their own evil will: what will you say about him of whom his own father, when the Lord asked, answered that from his infancy he was vexed by an unclean spirit (See Mark 9:21)? Did not the devil claim for himself his members and senses—all of which were instituted naturally with God as author, and are the common gifts of the impious and the pious—in order to afflict them? Which, although he could not do unless he received power from God, the good and just creator of man, he nonetheless does, and shows your words to be most empty, you who say: "As for a thing instituted naturally, which sometimes becomes even an ample gift of the pious, the devil dares to claim nothing for himself." For you ought to have said that of those goods which are instituted naturally, the devil claims nothing for himself, but creates nothing.
Iulianum.5.6Haec ille forsitan vidit, qui de tuis libris quae amico suo mitteret, nonnulla decerpsit; atque ut haec tua verba praetermitteret, tibi pepercit. Ego vero gratulor, quia me admones quid debeam contra errorem tuum dicere. Parvulorum ergo, quos vexandos diabolus vindicat sibi, merita inquire, quae cum propria non inveneris, originalia confitere. Si enim etiam ista negare perstiteris, Dei profecto iudicium, qui haec imaginem suam a diabolo immeritam sinit perpeti, accusare convinceris.
These things perhaps that man saw, who excerpted from your books some things to send to his friend; and, in order to pass over these words of yours, he spared you. But I rejoice, because you admonish me what I ought to say against your error. Inquire, then, into the merits of the little children whom the devil claims for himself to be vexed; and since you will not find them proper, confess them original. For if you persist in denying even these, you are assuredly convicted of accusing the judgment of God, who allows his own image, undeserving, to suffer these things from the devil.
Iulianum.5.67 IUL. Istis ergo praetermissis, accusat cur non dixerim: " cum libidine "; subditque, ut dogmatis eius acumen decebat: " Munus piorum, propagatio est fecunda filiorum, non commixtio pudenda membrorum; quam non haberet in generandis filiis natura sana, nunc autem habet eadem natura vitiata. Ac per hoc, et qui inde nascitur, indiget renasci " (De nupt. et concup. 2, 25). Quam consequenter omnia! Munus dicit piorum, existentiam filiorum; sed hoc constituit sub diabolo, quod Deum dare confirmat, id est, filios. Libidinem autem, quae est in pudenda commixtione membrorum, diabolicam vocat; quam in parentibus esse non abnuit, quos tamen absolvit a culpa.
7. JUL. These things, then, being passed over, he accuses why I did not say: "with lust"; and he adds, as the sharpness of his dogma befitted: "The gift of the pious is the fruitful propagation of children, not the shameful intercourse of members; which a sound nature would not have in generating children, but now the same nature, vitiated, has it. And on this account, even he who is born thence needs to be reborn" (Marriage and Desire 2.25). How consistent it all is! He calls the existence of children the gift of the pious; but he places under the devil what he affirms God to give, that is, children. But the lust which is in the shameful intercourse of members he calls diabolical; which he does not deny to be in the parents, whom nonetheless he absolves from fault.
Iulianum.5.7Ex homine hunc natum dicas? Quod agunt, inquit, parentes, diabolicum est, sed rei non sunt; quod nascuntur filii, divinum opus est, sed rei sunt. Et adhuc se non Deo, sed daemoni aestimat obluctatum? Meritissime patiuntur istum furorem, qui putant esse naturale peccatum.
Would you say this man was born of a man? What the parents do, he says, is diabolical, but they are not guilty; that children are born is a divine work, but they are guilty. And does he still judge that he has struggled not against God, but against the demon? Most deservedly do they suffer this frenzy, who think that there is a natural sin.
Iulianum.5.7AUG. Tu furis potius adversus Deum, quem procul dubio criminaris iniustum, si filios Adam nulla ex illo, ut asseveras, mala merita trahentes, tamen ex die exitus de ventre matris eorum gravi iugo premit, quod negare non sineris; et obtusos credens mea tuaque verba esse lecturos, quod non dixi, dixisse me dicis. Quando enim ego dicerem: Quod agunt parentes, diabolicum est; cum id quod procreandi intentione miscentur casta coniugia, bonum opus esse proclamem? Sed hanc commixtionem non fuisse futuram pudendam, si peccatum hominis, quo natura vitiata est, non praecessisset; unde carnis concupiscentia talis effecta est, ut eo malo nemo bene utatur, nisi eius motibus ad illicita pertrahere molientibus, e contrario concupiscente spiritu reluctetur.
AUG. You rather rage against God, whom beyond doubt you accuse of being unjust, if he presses the sons of Adam, drawing from him, as you assert, no evil merits, with a heavy yoke from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb—which you will not be permitted to deny; and, believing that men of dull wit will read my words and yours, you say that I said what I did not say. For when would I say: What the parents do is diabolical, when I proclaim that what chaste spouses do, mingling with the intention of begetting, is a good work? But I say that this intercourse would not have been shameful, if the sin of man, by which nature was vitiated, had not gone before; whence the concupiscence of the flesh became such that no one uses that evil well, unless, while its motions strive to draw to unlawful things, he struggles against it by the spirit lusting on the contrary.
Iulianum.5.7Non itaque dicimus: Quod agunt parentes, diabolicum est; malo quippe bene uti usque adeo diabolicum non est, ut ipso quoque diabolo bene utatur Deus. Illud autem nos dicere non negamus: Quod nascuntur filii, Dei opus est; sed rei sunt; non Dei opere, quo creantur, ut nascantur; sed peccati origine, qua obligantur, si non renascantur.
We do not, then, say: What the parents do is diabolical; for to use an evil well is so far from being diabolical that God uses well even the devil himself. But that we say this we do not deny: That children are born is the work of God; but they are guilty—not by the work of God, by which they are created to be born, but by the origin of sin, by which they are bound, if they are not reborn.
Iulianum.5.78. IUL. Quod autem non fuerit aliter commiscendus Adam mulieri suae, quam eo genere quod inolevit, et forma membrorum, et Dei benedictio haud aliter in pecora quam in homines prolata, et ipsa historia testatur, quae ut ostendit formatam naturam corporum, ita non asserit immutatam. Contra quod universitatis testimonium nihil invenitur in lege Dei; nisi in Manichaei libris, qui hanc concupiscentiam a principe tenebrarum commentatur infusam.
8. JUL. But that Adam was to mingle with his wife in no other way than by that kind which grew up, both the form of the members, and the blessing of God uttered no otherwise upon beasts than upon men, the very history too testifies, which, just as it shows the nature of bodies formed, so it does not assert it changed. Against which testimony of the whole nothing is found in the law of God; except in the books of the Manichee, who contrives that this concupiscence was infused by the prince of darkness.
Iulianum.5.8AUG. Non forma membrorum, quia peccato primi hominis mutata non est, concupiscentiam carnis asserit talem fuisse ante peccatum, qualis apparuit, quando pudenda texerunt, et unde tu non erubescis, erubuerunt; ostendentes etiam manente forma in se aliquid esse mutatum. Quamvis et ipsa membra, quando deformia et monstruosa nascuntur, pudor vos fateri cogit, quod nullo modo, si nemo peccasset, in paradiso talia nascerentur.
AUG. Not by the form of the members—since it was not changed by the sin of the first man—does he assert that the concupiscence of the flesh was such before the sin as it appeared when they covered the shameful parts, and at what you do not blush, they blushed; showing that, even with the form remaining, something in them was changed. Although even the members themselves, when they are born deformed and monstrous, shame compels you to confess that in no way, if no one had sinned, would such be born in paradise.
Iulianum.5.8Benedictionem vero Dei, qua dictum est: Crescite et multiplicamini (Gen 1, 21. 28), quid mirum, si etiam peccato natura vitiata non perdidit? Non enim erat consequens, ut quia immortalitatem felicitatemque perdiderat, perderet etiam fecunditatem, quae irrationabilibus quoque animantibus est tributa; in quibus caro, etsi concupiscit, adversus spiritum non concupiscit; quod tuae susceptae miserrimum bellum aut turpissimum regnum introducere conaris in illius beatissimae pacis et libertatis locum; quandoquidem in paradiso, etiamsi nemo peccasset, tale futurum fuisse contendis humanum genus, ut contra libidinem pugnaremus, aut libidini serviremus, si pugnare nollemus.
But the blessing of God, by which it was said: Increase and multiply (Gen 1:22, 28), what wonder if nature, vitiated by sin, did not lose it? For it was not a consequence that, because it had lost immortality and felicity, it should lose also fruitfulness, which is granted to irrational living beings too; in which the flesh, even if it lusts, does not lust against the spirit; which—a most miserable war or most foul reign—you try to introduce, into the place of that most blessed peace and freedom; since you contend that in paradise, even if no one had sinned, the human race would have been such that we would either fight against lust, or serve lust, if we were unwilling to fight.
Iulianum.5.89. IUL. Nos vero renasci omnes Baptismate debere, et opere nostro et sermone testamur; sed non ut huius impertitione beneficii, de iure videantur diaboli plagiati; verum ut qui sunt opera Dei, fiant pignora Dei; et qui nascuntur viliter, non tamen noxie, renascantur pretiose, non tamen calumniose; quique prodeunt ex institutis Dei, provehantur mysteriis Dei; et qui afferunt opera naturae, dona gratiae consequantur; ac Dominus suus qui eos fecit condendo bonos, faciat innovando adoptandoque meliores.
9. JUL. But we testify, both by our work and by our word, that all ought to be reborn by Baptism; but not so that, by the imparting of this benefit, they may seem to have been carried off from the right of the devil; rather, so that those who are works of God may become pledges of God; and that those who are born cheaply, yet not harmfully, may be reborn preciously, yet not slanderously; and that those who come forth from the institutions of God may be advanced by the mysteries of God; and that those who bring the works of nature may attain the gifts of grace; and that their Lord, who made them good by founding them, may make them better by renewing and adopting them.
Iulianum.5.9Ergo iure dicitur, confitearis necesse est, naturale quod Manichaeus finxerat, sed tu nomine commutato originale vocas, interiisse peccatum. Nec hoc ea catholica fides credit antiquitus, quae non dubitat et parvulos a Deo fieri, et malum ab eo nihil fieri: ac per hoc opera Dei ante liberae voluntatis usum, naturae praeiudicio nec rea, nec sub diaboli iure constituit.
It is rightly said, then—you must needs confess—that the natural sin which the Manichee had feigned, but which you, with the name changed, call original, has perished. Nor does the Catholic faith of old believe this—the faith which does not doubt both that little children are made by God, and that no evil is made by him: and on this account it constitutes the works of God, before the use of free will, by the prejudgment of nature, neither guilty nor under the right of the devil.
Iulianum.5.9AUG. Originale peccatum propterea significatius quam naturale dicimus, ut non divini operis, sed humanae originis intellegatur; maxime propter illud significandum, quod per unum hominem intravit in mundum; quod non interit disputatione Pelagiana, sed regeneratione Christiana. Quare autem vos dicatis renasci omnes parvulos debere Baptismate, satis novimus; inde quippe estis haeretici; ac peste novitia contra antiquitatem catholicae Ecclesiae disputatis, dicentes non erui parvulos de potestate tenebrarum gratia Redemptoris; cum Catholica in eis exsufflet et exorcizet, utique potestatem diaboli, neque enim imaginem Dei.
AUG. We say "original" sin more significantly than "natural" for this reason, that it may be understood as not of the divine work, but of human origin; especially to signify that which entered into the world through one man; which does not perish by Pelagian disputation, but by Christian regeneration. But why you say that all little children ought to be reborn by Baptism, we know well enough; for from this you are heretics; and by a novel pestilence against the antiquity of the Catholic Church you dispute, saying that little children are not rescued from the power of darkness by the grace of the Redeemer; whereas the Catholic Church breathes upon and exorcizes in them, surely, the power of the devil, and not the image of God.
Iulianum.5.9Quid est ergo quod dicis: Ut qui nascuntur viliter, non tamen noxie, renascantur pretiose, non tamen calumniose; nec ipsum eorum pretium, quo fit ut pretiose renascantur attendis? Quid est enim, nisi sanguis Agni immaculati? Qui cur sit effusus, clamat ipse Agnus. Annon ipse ait: Hic est sanguis meus, qui pro multis effundetur in remissionem peccatorum (Mt 26, 28)?
What is it, then, that you say: That those who are born cheaply, yet not harmfully, may be reborn preciously, yet not slanderously; and you do not attend to their very price, by which it comes about that they are reborn preciously? For what is it but the blood of the immaculate Lamb? Why this was poured out, the Lamb himself cries. Or does he not say: This is my blood, which will be poured out for many for the remission of sins (Matt 26:28)?
Iulianum.5.9Tu vero magnus mirabiliarius et dicis illum sanguinem etiam pro parvulis fundi, et negas eis per illum peccata ulla dimitti; dicis lavandos, et negas abluendos; dicis innovandos, et negas a vetustate mundandos; dicis per Salvatorem adoptandos, et negas esse salvandos.
But you, a great miracle-monger, both say that that blood is poured out even for little children, and deny that any sins are forgiven them through it; you say they must be washed, and deny they must be cleansed; you say they must be renewed, and deny they must be purified from the old; you say they must be adopted through the Savior, and deny they must be saved.
Iulianum.5.9Sed nos eis videlicet calumniamur, quia dicimus eos mortuos esse in delictis et praeputio carnis suae; et ideo in morte Christi baptizari, ut moriantur peccato, qui mortui fuerant in peccato; et tu eos defendis, qui negando illos mortuos, id agis, ne ab eis foras mittatur, qui mortis potestatem habet; ac sic de morte Christi nullum beneficium consequantur, qui unus pro omnibus mortuus est. Quod cum dixisset Apostolus, mox conclusit atque ait: Ergo omnes mortui sunt, et pro omnibus mortuus est (2 Cor 5, 14-15). Unde qui ita defendit parvulos, ut neget mortuos; non eos a morte defendit, sed in mortem secundam premit, quos ab eius beneficio, qui nonnisi pro mortuis mortuus praedicatur, excludit.
But it is we, namely, who slander them, because we say that they are dead in their offenses and in the uncircumcision of their flesh; and therefore are baptized into the death of Christ, that they may die to sin, who had been dead in sin; and you defend them, who, by denying that they are dead, bring it about that he who has the power of death is not cast out from them; and thus those obtain no benefit from the death of Christ, who alone died for all. Which, when the Apostle had said, he at once concluded and said: Therefore all are dead, and he died for all (2 Cor 5:14-15). Hence he who so defends little children as to deny they are dead, does not defend them from death, but presses them into the second death, whom he excludes from the benefit of him who is preached as having died only for the dead.
Iulianum.5.910. IUL. Post haec, omnem illum contextum de Abraham et Sara, qui emortuis iam corporibus filium pro munere acceperunt, quorum exemplum quantum veritati suffragetur, non solum sapiens, sed etiam mediocris lector intellegit, sic praeteriit, ut diceret contra se non multum valere. A qua impudentia vel illa eum debuit revocare sententia, quae ita constructa est: Et ut breviter, inquio, disputationis huius summa claudatur; si per concupiscentiam redditus est quem Deus promisit, bona sine dubio quae absolvit Dei fidem; si sine concupiscentia, noxia non potest esse progenito; quae nec cum conciperetur, nec cum pareretur, interfuit.
10. JUL. After these things, that whole context about Abraham and Sarah, who, their bodies now dead, received a son as a gift—whose example how much it supports truth, not only a wise but even a moderate reader understands—he so passed over as to say that it does not avail much against him. From which impudence even that sentence ought to have recalled him, which is so constructed: And that, in brief, I may close the sum of this disputation: if through concupiscence he was rendered whom God promised, then the goods which absolve the faith of God are without doubt good; if without concupiscence, then it cannot be harmful to the one begotten, which was present neither when he was conceived nor when he was born.
Iulianum.5.10AUG. Sine concupiscentia carnis Abrahae filium seminatum fuisse, quis dicat? Neque enim hoc opus aliter fieret in corpore mortis huius, de quo dicit Apostolus: Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum (Rom 8, 10). Hoc autem malo bene usus est Abraham in concubitu coniugali; quod malum non erat in corpore vitae illius, quae in paradiso fuit ante peccatum. Sed si propterea bona tibi videtur carnis concupiscentia, quia per illam reddita est proles, quam promiserat Deus; bonus tibi videatur et diabolus, quia per illum sanguis Christi, quo redimeremur, effusus est, quem Deus promiserat. Aut fatere, etiam per aliquod malum reddi posse aliquod bonum.
AUG. That the son of Abraham was sown without concupiscence of the flesh, who would say? For this work would not be done otherwise in the body of this death, of which the Apostle says: The body indeed is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10). But this evil Abraham used well in conjugal intercourse; which evil was not in the body of that life which was in paradise before sin. But if concupiscence of the flesh seems good to you for this reason, that through it was rendered the offspring which God had promised, then let the devil too seem good to you, because through him was poured out the blood of Christ, by which we are redeemed, which God had promised. Or confess that some good can be rendered even through some evil.
Iulianum.5.1011. IUL. Illis ergo praetermissis physicus iste novus falsum esse pronuntiat, quod nos diximus: Sicut tunc limus qui assumptus est, materia, non auctor hominis fuit, ita nunc vis illa voluptatis, confectrix commixtrixque seminum, non explet divinae operationis vicem; sed de thesauris naturae offert Deo, unde ille hominem dignetur operari. Quae tamen recte a me prolata testatur, sed excepto eo quod dixi, semina vi voluptatis confici; philosophaturque hoc modo: Voluptas, inquit, illa concupiscentiae carnalis non conficit semina, sed ea quae iam sunt in corporibus a vero Deo condita s, non fiunt voluptate, sed excitantur et emittuntur cum voluptate (De nupt. et concup. 2, 26).
11. JUL. Those things, then, being passed over, this new natural philosopher declares to be false what we said: Just as then the clay which was taken up was the matter, not the author, of man, so now that force of pleasure, the maker and mingler of the seeds, does not fulfill the place of the divine operation; but from the treasuries of nature it offers to God whence he may deign to work man. Which he testifies was rightly brought forth by me, but with the exception of what I said—that the seeds are made by the force of pleasure; and he philosophizes in this way: That pleasure, he says, of carnal concupiscence does not make the seeds, but those which are already in the bodies, founded by the true God, do not come to be by pleasure, but are stirred up and emitted with pleasure (Marriage and Desire 2.26).
Iulianum.5.11Hoc sane apparet eum, non fraude, sed defectu intellegentiae protulisse. Vim quippe ego voluptatis, ipsam virilis corporis rationem pronuntiavi, cui necesse habui virilitatis nomen imponere. Ipsa ergo (quia trivimus iam hoc verbum) virilitas, in genitalium et viscerum compage ac sanitate consistens, quae et appetentiae et efficientiae vires ministrat, vis a me voluptatis et concupiscentiae nominata est. Ideo enim non voluptatem simpliciter, sed vim voluptatis appellare malui, ut universum illum ardorem, qui et ante opus, et in opere sentitur, ostenderem.
It is plain, to be sure, that he brought this forth not by fraud, but by a defect of understanding. For by "the force of pleasure" I declared the very principle of the virile body, to which I had to impose the name of virility. That virility, then (since we have now worn this word smooth), consisting in the structure and soundness of the genitals and the inward parts, which ministers the forces both of appetite and of efficacy, was named by me the force of pleasure and of concupiscence. For I preferred to call it not pleasure simply, but the force of pleasure, in order to show that whole ardor which is felt both before the work and in the work.
Iulianum.5.11Neque enim debilitati genitalibus membris, id est spadones, semen habent; cum certe quibusdam favillis moveantur ignis exstincti; at vero quoniam virtute partium, quarum ministerio conficiuntur de internis humoribus semina, speciali debilitate caruerunt, generationum non fiunt potentes. Sic ergo instituit Deus, ut esset vis in corpore, quae legitimis explicata temporibus, si adfuisset sanitas, ad fecunditatis valentiam perveniret. Conficiuntur itaque in corporibus semina, maturae pubertatis adiutu. Inde est quod impuberes stimulat quidem praecoqua voluptas, sed sine annorum legibus sterilis scintillat accensio. Quod autem cum voluptate semina misceantur, verum quod alia sit voluptas quae sensibus supernatat, alia viscerum interior et effectui propior, apud medicorum auctores latissime disputatur;
For those debilitated in their genital members—that is, eunuchs—do not have seed; though they are surely moved by certain embers of an extinguished fire; but because they lack, by a special debility, the power of the parts by whose ministry the seeds are made from the inner humors, they are not made potent for generation. Thus, then, God instituted that there should be a force in the body which, unfolded at its lawful times, would, if soundness were present, arrive at the vigor of fruitfulness. And so the seeds are made in the bodies by the aid of mature puberty. Hence it is that a precocious pleasure indeed stimulates the unripe, but, without the laws of years, a sterile kindling flashes. But that the seeds are mingled with pleasure—yet that one pleasure is that which floats over the senses, another that which is inward to the viscera and nearer to the effect—is most amply disputed among the authorities of the physicians;
Iulianum.5.11unde ille etiam Mantuanus poeta naturalium gnarior quam philosophaster Poenorum, macie signat armenta tenuari, ut ubi concubitus primos voluptas nota sollicitat, et frondibus arceantur et fontibus. Saepe etiam cursu quatiunt, et sole fatigant; cum graviter tunsis area gemit frugibus, et leves paleae flatibus efferuntur.
whence that Mantuan poet too, more knowing in natural things than the philosophaster of the Carthaginians, notes that the herds are made thin by leanness, so that, where a known pleasure solicits the first matings, they are kept off both from leaves and from springs. Often too they shake them with running and weary them with the sun, when the threshing-floor groans with the grain heavily beaten, and the light chaff is borne up by the breezes.
Iulianum.5.11Hoc ideo, ne luxu nimio usus obtunsior sit genitali arvo, et sulcos oblimet inertes; sed siccitatem quamdam secreta patiantur; sicque rapiat sitiens venerem, interiusque recondat (VERG., Georg. 3, 130-137). Verum in his quoque, non multum causae necessariis, acumen hominis notasse sufficiat.
This is so that, by too great a luxury of indulgence, the genital field be not too dulled and silt up the sluggish furrows; but let the secret parts suffer a certain dryness, and so let it, thirsting, seize on the act of love, and store it more deeply within (Virgil, Georgics 3.130-137). But in these things too, not much necessary to the cause, let it suffice to have noted a man's sharpness.
Iulianum.5.11AUG. Verba tua, quae me praetermisisse dicis, quam vana sint, satis superius demonstravi; quod fortasse vidit etiam ille qui chartulam misit, et tibi parcendo eadem praetermisit. Quod autem de vi voluptatis u, quam confectricem seminum esse dixisti, homo loquacissimus inventa occasione loquaciter disputas, non opus habeo resistere tibi; haec enim non multum esse causae necessaria, etiam ipse commemoras.
AUG. How empty your words are, which you say I passed over, I have sufficiently demonstrated above; which perhaps that man too saw who sent the little sheet, and, in sparing you, passed over those same words. But as for "the force of pleasure," which you said is the maker of the seeds—since you, a most talkative man, finding an occasion, dispute talkatively—I have no need to resist you; for that this is not much necessary to the cause, you yourself recall.
Iulianum.5.11Ego quippe vim voluptatis acceperam te intellegi voluisse, qua voluptas aliquid facere posset, non qua ipsa fieret. Sic enim solemus loqui, ut vim rei cuiusque dicamus, qua valet ut aliquid faciat, non qua valet alia res quae ipsam facit.
For I had taken it that you wished "the force of pleasure" to be understood as that by which pleasure could do something, not that by which it itself was made. For we are wont to speak so as to call the force of any thing that by which it has the power to do something, not that by which another thing has the power which makes it.
Iulianum.5.11Tu autem, ut nunc tua verba exposuisti, vim voluptatis te dixisse asseris, qua voluptas effici potest, non qua efficit ipsa quae potest; tamquam si vim diceres esse ignis, qua ipse accenditur ut sit; cum omnes homines vim dicant esse ignis, qua urit, vel calefacit quaecumque potuerit.
But you, as you have now expounded your words, assert that you said "the force of pleasure" as that by which pleasure can be brought about, not that by which it itself, which has power, brings about; as if you should say there is a force of fire by which it itself is kindled so as to be; whereas all men call the force of fire that by which it burns, or warms whatever it can.
Iulianum.5.11Insolito igitur more locutus es: sed quid ad nos? Utcumque didicimus, ubi de re constat, non certare de verbis. Convenit enim nobis, non solum homines de seminibus, sed ipsa etiam semina, opera Dei esse, quocumque efficiantur modo; ne physicos vel medicos, vel etiam poetas, ubi nihil opus est, testes adhibeamus; aut contendamus quomodo sit loquendum, cum id propter quod loquimur, ambo verum esse sentiamus, id est, Dei opera esse semina omnium naturarum.
You have spoken, then, in an unusual manner: but what is that to us? Somehow or other we have learned, where the matter is established, not to contend about words. For we agree that not only men from seeds, but the seeds themselves too, are works of God, in whatever way they are made; lest we bring in natural philosophers or physicians, or even poets, as witnesses where there is no need; or contend about how one must speak, when that for the sake of which we speak we both perceive to be true—that is, that the seeds of all natures are works of God.
Iulianum.5.11Sed falsum est quod hinc conaris ostendere, ideo nulla esse vitia seminum, quia Deus summe bonus est conditor seminum; quod non diceres, si eo modo rationem seminum nosses v, quomodo eam noverat qui dicebat: Homo vanitati similis factus est; atque ut hoc ipsam naturam, quae in ipsam mortalitatem lapsa est, meruisse doceret, addebat: Dies eius sicut umbra praetereunt (Ps 143, 4), cum sciret hominem ad Dei similitudinem factum, et tamen discerneret ab institutione divina depravatae humanae originis vitium. Quod in ipsis quoque tuis verbis quibus me momordisti, videre debuisti. Dixisti enim: Verum in his quoque, non multum causae necessariis, acumen hominis notasse suffecerit; obtunsum me scilicet esse significans, quia intellegere non potui locutionem tuam in rebus non multum causae necessariis, ut fateris.
But it is false what you try to show from this—that there are no vices of the seeds, because God is the supremely good founder of the seeds; which you would not say, if you knew the principle of the seeds in the way that he knew it who said: Man has been made like to vanity; and, to teach that the very nature, which has fallen into mortality itself, deserved this, he added: His days pass like a shadow (Ps 144:4 (143:4))—since he knew that man was made to the likeness of God, and yet distinguished from the divine institution the vice of depraved human origin. Which you ought to have seen even in those very words of yours by which you bit me. For you said: But in these things too, not much necessary to the cause, let it suffice to have noted a man's sharpness; signifying, namely, that I am dull, because I could not understand your manner of speaking in things not much necessary to the cause, as you confess.
Iulianum.5.11Ego autem requiro a te, unde homines nascuntur obtunsi; neque enim sic ipse obtunsus es z, ut pertinere ad naturam neges vel obtunsa ingenia, vel acuta; quamvis et acuta ipsa, sicut iam in superioribus diximus, propter hoc corruptibile corpus quod aggravat animam (Cf. Sap 9, 15), si primi hominis ingenio comparentur, obtunsa sint; qui utique non tale corpus acceperat, ut illo eius anima gravaretur. Ac sic et ego distinguerem in natura hominis qualis nunc est, quid distet inter ingenii vitium et tanti artificis opificium; cui procul dubio non recte vitia tribuuntur, quantacumque sint, humanorum ingeniorum; ut per hanc regulam discas ab eius institutione discernere, quamvis congenitum homini, originale peccatum; nec ideo neges esse, quia Deus homines facit, qui peccatum non facit; sicut non ideo neganda sunt ingeniis hominum congenita vitia, quia Deus homines facit, a cuius arte divina vitiositas est omnis aliena. Sic autem novit Deus bene operari homines de substantia peccato vitiata, quemadmodum novit bene operari de ipsis peccatis hominum, quorum sunt vitia voluntaria. Videmus enim quanta bona operatus sit de peccato fratrum, qui fratrem per invidentiam vendiderunt (Cf. Gen 37-50); et alia multa quibus sacrae Litterae plenae sunt.
But I ask of you: whence are men born dull? For you yourself are not so dull as to deny that dull or acute talents pertain to nature; although even the acute themselves, as we have already said in the foregoing, on account of this corruptible body which weighs down the soul (See Wis 9:15), are dull if compared with the talent of the first man, who surely had not received such a body as to have his soul weighed down by it. And so I too would distinguish, in the nature of man such as he now is, what difference there is between the vice of talent and the workmanship of so great an artificer; to whom beyond doubt the vices of human talents, however great they be, are not rightly attributed; so that by this rule you may learn to distinguish from his institution the original sin, though inborn in man; and not to deny that it exists because God makes men, who makes no sin; just as the inborn vices of men's talents are not to be denied because God makes men, from whose divine art all viciousness is foreign. But God knows how to work men well from a substance vitiated by sin, just as he knows how to work well from the sins of men themselves, whose vices are voluntary. For we see how great goods he worked from the sin of the brothers who sold their brother through envy (See Gen 37-50); and many other things, of which the sacred Letters are full.
Iulianum.5.1112. IUL. Verum demiror ubique constantiam disputantis, qui pronuntiat semina a Deo vero condita esse, a quo conduntur et corpora, licet cum voluptate emittantur. Semina ergo a Deo fieri confitetur, in quibus esse dicit diabolicum malum; et non erubescit credere a Deo fieri malum, quod innocentibus imputetur.
12. JUL. But I wonder everywhere at the consistency of the disputant, who declares that the seeds were founded by the true God, by whom the bodies too are founded, although they are emitted with pleasure. He confesses, then, that the seeds are made by God, in which he says there is a diabolical evil; and he is not ashamed to believe that an evil is made by God, which is imputed to the innocent.
Iulianum.5.12AUG. A Deo non fit malum, quando fit de malo bonum. Malum est enim de peccato veniens originis vitium, cum quo nascitur homo; bonum est opus Dei, non sine malo; cuius mali reatus non innocentibus, ut dicis, sed reis imputatur; ut quoniam nascendo tractum est, renascendo solvatur. Sic enim fuerunt omnes ratione seminis in lumbis Adam, quando damnatus est, et ideo sine illis damnatus non est; quemadmodum fuerunt Israelitae in lumbis Abrahae, quando decimatus est, et ideo sine illis decimatus non est (Cf. Hebr 7, 5-10).
AUG. By God no evil is made, when from an evil a good is made. For the vice of origin coming from sin, with which a man is born, is an evil; the work of God, not without evil, is a good; the guilt of which evil is imputed not to the innocent, as you say, but to the guilty; so that, since it was drawn by being born, it may be loosed by being reborn. For all were, by the principle of seed, in the loins of Adam when he was condemned, and therefore he was not condemned without them; just as the Israelites were in the loins of Abraham when he was tithed, and therefore he was not tithed without them (See Heb 7:5-10).
Iulianum.5.12Melius enim quam tu, noverant rationem seminis, qui ista dixerunt, et litteris mandare curarunt, quae in Christi Ecclesia legerentur, in qua ab renascuntur ex Adam nati, ne remaneant in illa stirpe damnati.
For they knew the principle of seed better than you, who said these things and took care to commit them to writings to be read in the Church of Christ, in which those born of Adam are reborn, lest they remain condemned in that stock.
Iulianum.5.1213. IUL. Libido nihil attinet, inquit, ad semina, quia facta est a diabolo; huic autem libidini serviunt coniuges; semina autem et parvulos de seminibus facit Deus. Sed nec rei sunt, inquit, nec puniuntur parentes, qui agunt opus diaboli; sceleri autem et suppliciis destinantur parvuli, quos condidit Deus; impunitumque est quod fecit diabolus, id est libido; per quod docetur bona, quae nec supplicium meretur; sed accusatur damnaturque quod facit Deus; per quod docetur esse scelestum, quippe quod a supplicio, nec auctoris sui potest pudore defendi;
13. JUL. Lust, he says, has nothing to do with the seeds, because it was made by the devil; but to this lust the spouses serve; the seeds, however, and the little children from the seeds, God makes. But neither are the parents guilty, he says, nor are they punished, who do the work of the devil; but to wickedness and to punishments are destined the little children, whom God founded; and what the devil did, that is, lust, goes unpunished—whereby it is taught to be good, since it does not even deserve punishment; but what God does is accused and condemned—whereby it is taught to be wicked, inasmuch as it cannot be defended from punishment even by shame for its author;
Iulianum.5.13credaturque hoc divinitas facere, quod nec extrema possit sustinere captivitas. Hunc habent exitum, qui inferunt veritati bellum, ut nihil non impium, non insanum loquantur; dum constet quia nulla oratione innocentium status ita, ut accusatorum suorum profanitate, defenditur.
and the divinity is believed to do this, which not even the utmost captivity could sustain. This is the outcome of those who wage war against truth, that they say nothing not impious, not insane; while it is established that by no oration is the standing of the innocent so defended as by the profanity of their accusers.
Iulianum.5.13AUG. Numquid ideo falsum facis esse quod dico, quia dicis me dicere quod non dico? Ego enim non dico ad semina nihil attinere libidinem, quandoquidem non nascuntur sine libidine, qui utique na scuntur ex semine; sed dico Deum operari sine ullo suo vitio, etiam de semine vitiato. Nec dico reos non esse, et non puniri parentes, qui agunt opus diaboli; sed dico non eos agere opus diaboli, quando utuntur libidine non propter libidinem, sed propter propaginem. Ita quippe bonum opus est bene uti libidinis malo, quod faciunt coniugati, sicut e contrario malum opus est male uti corporis bono, quod faciunt impudici.
AUG. Do you therefore make false what I say, because you say that I say what I do not say? For I do not say that lust has nothing to do with the seeds, since those are not born without lust who are surely born from seed; but I say that God works without any vice of his own, even from a vitiated seed. Nor do I say that the parents are not guilty and are not punished, who do the work of the devil; but I say that they do not do the work of the devil, when they use lust not for the sake of lust, but for the sake of offspring. For to use the evil of lust well, which married people do, is as good a work as, on the contrary, to use the good of the body badly, which the unchaste do, is an evil work.
Iulianum.5.13Nec impunitam dico esse libidinem, quae cum morte destruetur, quando mortale hoc induetur immortalitate (Cf. 1 Cor 15, 53). Non enim est nisi in corpore mortis huius, de quo liberari cupiebat Apostolus (Cf. Rom 7, 24); nec erat, aut non talis erat in corpore vitae illius, quam peccando perdidit homo, qui factus est rectus (Cf. Eccle 7, 30); nec sicut aliqua substantia, liberatis separatisque ac nobis libido in alium ad locum est migratura; sed sicut infirmitas in nostrae salutis perfectione peritura; quamvis iam nunc esse desinat post corporis mortem.
Nor do I say that lust goes unpunished, which will be destroyed with death, when this mortal shall put on immortality (See 1 Cor 15:53). For it is not except in the body of this death, from which the Apostle desired to be freed (See Rom 7:24); nor was it, or was not such, in the body of that life which man lost by sinning, who was made upright (See Eccl 7:29 (7:30)); nor, like some substance, will lust, with us freed and separated, migrate to another place; but, like an infirmity, it will perish in the perfection of our salvation; although already now it ceases to be after the death of the body.
Iulianum.5.13Neque enim in corpore mortuo adhuc potest esse, quae nisi in corpore mortis non potest esse; sed quae peritura est in corporis morte, non est resurrectura resurgente corpore sine morte. Quomodo ergo punita vel impunita erit, quae pereundo non erit? Erunt autem impuniti, qui eius reatu congenito regeneratione caruerunt, eiusque surgentibus et urgentibus motibus ad illicita perficienda non cedunt; et si quid non propter prolem de ipsa, sed propter ipsam cum coniugibus faciunt, venia subsequente sanantur.
For it cannot still be in a dead body, which can be only in the body of death; but, perishing in the death of the body, it will not rise again when the body rises without death. How, then, will it be punished or unpunished, which by perishing will not be? But they will be unpunished who lacked regeneration from its inborn guilt, and do not yield to its rising and pressing motions for accomplishing unlawful things; and if they do anything with their spouses from it not for the sake of offspring, but for its own sake, they are healed by a pardon that follows.
Iulianum.5.13Quod vero Deus de origine merito et iuste damnata parvulos creat, bonum est ipse quod creat; quia homines creat, et homines etiam mali bonum aliquid sunt, in quantum homines sunt; nec cohibet ab eis bonitatem creandi, quos praescivit esse damnandos, immo scit originaliter iam esse damnatos; unde gratulandum est tam multos eorum a debita poena per indebitam gratiam liberari.
But that God creates little children from an origin deservedly and justly condemned, the good is what he himself creates; for he creates men, and even evil men are some good, insofar as they are men; nor does he withhold from them the goodness of creating, whom he foreknew were to be condemned—rather, knows to be already condemned originally; whence one must give thanks that so many of them are freed from a due punishment by an undue grace.
Iulianum.5.13Si autem crudele esse arbitramini damnari parvulos, quos originale peccatum trahere non putatis; crudele vobis videatur, non rapi ex hac vita parvulos, secundum vos, nullum habentes omnino peccatum, quos Deus utique novit in multis magnisque peccatis sine ulla in melius mutatione morituros; nam secundum ratiocinationes humanas, crudelius videtur non liberare cum possit, nullis inquinatum parvis magnisque peccatis, quam damnare progeniem peccatoris. Porro cum illud iustum esse, qua potestis voce, clametis; hoc esse iniustum, qua fronte contenditis?
But if you judge it cruel that little children be condemned, whom you do not think draw original sin, then let it seem cruel to you that little children are not snatched from this life—children, according to you, having no sin at all—whom God surely knows will die in many and great sins without any change for the better; for, according to human ratiocinations, it seems more cruel not to free, when he can, one stained by no small or great sins, than to condemn the progeny of a sinner. Further, since you cry with whatever voice you can that the former is just, with what forehead do you contend that the latter is unjust?
Iulianum.5.1314. IUL. Post haec illud conatur incessere, quod nos apostoli Pauli testimonio comprobavimus, quia Deus hominem de seminibus operetur. Argumentaturque me fecisse fraudem, qui huic loco illa dicta voluerim coaptare, qua de frumentis prolata constabat; quasi ego aut ibi Apostoli sententiam, ut hic aestimat, dividuam fecerim, aut propter aliud testimonii recordatus sim quam ut eius finem monstrarem formatorem seminum omnium Deum credi oportere.
14. JUL. After these things he tries to attack what we proved by the testimony of the apostle Paul, that God works man from the seeds. And he argues that I committed fraud, in wishing to fit to this place those words which were established to have been brought forth about grains; as though I had either there, as he reckons here, made the Apostle's opinion divided, or recalled the testimony for any other reason than to show that its end is this: that God must be believed to be the former of all the seeds.
Iulianum.5.14Beatus enim Paulus postquam fidem resurrectionis, multiplicationis diurnae conciliavit exemplis; intulit quod universam naturam possit attingere, dicens: Deus autem illi dat corpus prout vult, et unicuique seminum proprium corpus; id est, omni semini corpus, quod proprietas eius reposcit, attribuit. Non ergo quod de frumentis dictum est, de homine volui intellegi; sed hoc quod dictum est, unicuique seminum proprium corpus a Deo auctore conferri, in destructionem vestram, quorum dogmate id negatur, arripui. Nequaquam igitur, sicut tu putas, supervacuo feci illius sententiae mentionem, nec ea fraudulenter, ut mentiris, sum abusus; nec tu de humanis seminibus hominem a Deo fieri, sicut peieras, credis; quod non opinando, sed fidem tuam intellegendo confirmo.
For the blessed Paul, after he had conciliated the faith of the resurrection by examples of daily multiplication, brought in what could touch the whole of nature, saying: But God gives it a body as he wills, and to each of the seeds its own body; that is, to every seed he attributes the body which its property demands. Not, then, did I wish what was said about grains to be understood of man; but what was said—that to each of the seeds its own body is conferred by God as author—I seized upon for your destruction, by whose dogma it is denied. By no means, then, as you think, did I make mention of that opinion superfluously, nor did I abuse it fraudulently, as you lie; nor do you believe that man is made by God from human seeds, as you perjure yourself; which I confirm not by opining, but by understanding your faith.
Iulianum.5.14AUG. Quomodo posueris apostolicum testimonium, quo ille usus est de seminibus, quae seminantur in terra, quia non vivificantur nisi moriantur (hoc enim de resurrectione corporum, in qua versabatur, disputatio postulabat), qui tua illa legit, intellegenter advertat, et quae nos in eodem libro quem nunc refutare conaris tibi ad illa respondimus (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 2, 28); et inveniet te, quod ad rem pertineat, nec ibi aliquid dixisse, et hic nihil dicere. Si enim magno nisu moliris ostendere, quod homines Deus de seminibus operetur, quasi hoc negetur a nobis; et adhibes Apostolum testem, ubi abs te nulla necessitas causae flagitat probationem; et quod est insulsius, vis accipi de seminibus hominum, quod ille dixit de seminibus frumentorum, quoniam id causa poscebat; et dicis verba eius: Tu quod seminas non vivificatur; et taces quod ille connectit, nisi moriatur.
AUG. How you set down the apostolic testimony, which he used about the seeds that are sown in the earth, because they are not given life unless they die (for this the disputation about the resurrection of bodies, in which he was engaged, required), let one who reads those words of yours discern intelligently, and what we answered you against them in the same book which you now try to refute (See Marriage and Desire 2.28); and he will find that you, as far as the matter pertains, neither said anything there, nor say anything here. For if with great effort you labor to show that God works men from seeds, as though this were denied by us; and you bring in the Apostle as witness, where no necessity of the cause demands proof from you; and—what is more insipid—you wish what he said about the seeds of grains to be taken of the seeds of men, since the cause demanded it; and you say his words: What you sow is not given life; and are silent about what he connects, unless it die.
Iulianum.5.14Taces etiam illud quod adiungit et dicit: Et quod seminas, non corpus quod futurum est seminas, sed nudum granum, fere tritici, aut alicuius ceterorum; ubi satis aperit unde dicat. Quibus tacitis, quod sequitur ingeris: Deus autem illi dat corpus quomodo voluerit, et unicuique seminum proprium corpus (1 Cor 15, 36-38); et non vis hic intellegi quorum seminum, id est, fere tritici, aut alicuius ceterorum, eorum scilicet, quae cum seminantur, non vivificantur nisi moriantur. Et quaeris hoc dictum etiam ad semina humana transferre; de quibus quamvis veraciter dici possit, quod illis Deus det corpus quomodo voluerit, et unicuique eorum proprium corpus; non tamen dici potest, quod semen hominis, quando gremio feminae infunditur, non vivificatur nisi moriatur. Sed plane de corpore hominis dici potest; non enim resurget nisi moriatur, propter quod totum illud de seminibus frumentorum dixit Apostolus.
You are silent too about what he adds and says: And what you sow, you sow not the body that will be, but a bare grain, perhaps of wheat, or of some of the rest; where he opens clearly enough of what he speaks. These things being passed over in silence, you heap on what follows: But God gives it a body as he willed, and to each of the seeds its own body (1 Cor 15:36-38); and you do not wish it understood here of which seeds, that is, perhaps of wheat, or of some of the rest, namely those which, when they are sown, are not given life unless they die. And you seek to transfer this saying even to human seeds; of which, although it can be truly said that to them God gives a body as he willed, and to each of them its own body, it cannot nonetheless be said that the seed of man, when it is poured into the bosom of the woman, is not given life unless it die. But plainly it can be said of the body of man; for it will not rise again unless it die, on account of which the Apostle said all that about the seeds of grains.
Iulianum.5.14Non itaque immerito mihi visum est, ideo te in hoc testimonio ea verba tacuisse, per quae appareret de quibus seminibus loqueretur, quem testem adhibuisti, ne mente vigili lector admoneretur (si tamen hoc praevidere potuisti), ita in paradiso po tuisse seminari homines in arvis genitalibus feminarum per membra genitalia masculorum, sicut frumenta in terris agricolarum manibus seminantur; ut sic ad hominem serendum stimulus nullus libidinis incitaret, quemadmodum ad hominem pariendum nullus dolor urgeret. Quibus haec tranquillitas displicet, rogo, quid eis in carne, nisi quod pudet placet? Nec sane concupiscentiae carnalis puderet, si hoc solum carnem liberet, quod mens iuberet, et quando liberet, et quantum iuberet. Nunc ergo quoniam talis non est, cur ei contra nos suffragamini, et non eam potius nobiscum fatemini aut de peccato natam, aut peccato esse vitiatam?
Not without reason, then, did it seem to me that you were silent in this testimony about those words by which it would appear of which seeds he spoke—the witness you brought in—lest the reader be admonished by a vigilant mind (if indeed you could foresee this), that in paradise men could have been sown in the genital fields of women through the genital members of males, just as grains are sown in the lands by the hands of farmers; so that no goad of lust would incite to the sowing of a man, just as no pain would press for the bearing of a man. To those whom this tranquillity displeases, I ask, what pleases them in the flesh, except what shames? Nor indeed would carnal concupiscence shame, if it freed the flesh only for what the mind commanded, and when it pleased, and as much as the mind commanded. Now, then, since it is not such, why do you vote against us for it, and not rather confess it with us to be either born of sin or vitiated by sin?
Iulianum.5.1415. IUL. Iam vero quis risum teneat prudentium, cum ad haec quae subdidisti exempla pervenerit? Ais enim: De ipsis verbis Apostoli refutaretur, non religiosae voluntatis, sed libidinosae voluptatis pudens nominator et impudens praedicator. De ipsis quippe seminibus, quae in agris agricolae seminant, potest iste redargui. Cur enim non credamus Deum potuisse in paradiso concedere homini beato de suo semine, quod concessum videmus agricolis de tritici semine; ut eo modo illud sereretur, sicut hoc seritur, sine ulla pudenda libidine? (De nupt. et concup. 2, 14, 29).
15. JUL. But now, who of the prudent could hold back laughter, when he has come to these examples which you have added? For you say: From the Apostle's own words would be refuted the shamefaced namer of not a religious will, but a libidinous pleasure, and its shameless proclaimer. For from the very seeds which the farmers sow in the fields, this man can be refuted. For why should we not believe that God could have granted to the blessed man in paradise, of his own seed, what we see granted to farmers of the seed of wheat—that that should be sown in the way this is sown, without any shameful lust? (Marriage and Desire 2.14.29)
Iulianum.5.15Quam venuste pudens nominator et impudens praedicator dat omnino incompositos motos, et circulatorum carmina dicit. Sed illud aliud nisi laetissime legi non potest; quoniam si non peccasset Adam, sic potuit mulier, sicut seges, ad fecunditatem parari; forte ut per omnes articulos ac per minutas corporum fistulas, quas medici povrou" vocant, spicae erumperent filiorum; atque ita omnibus laeta partibus, partus pro pediculis exsudaret. Sed si aliqui et per oculos erumperent, auferrentur lumina parienti, et si pupularum globulis examina galeata prodirent, imprecaretur sine dubio caecitas orbitatem. Nec difficulter sane, non parta, sed sudata soboles necaretur, atque haberetur gens, ut apud fabulas Myrmidonum, ita apud Manichaei dogmata, vel pedicularia, vel publicaria.
How charmingly the "shamefaced namer and shameless proclaimer" gives altogether disjointed motions, and recites the songs of mountebanks. But that other passage cannot be read except most gladly; for he says that, if Adam had not sinned, the woman could be made ready for fruitfulness like a cornfield—perhaps so that through all the joints and through the tiny channels of the bodies, which the physicians call "pores," the ears of children might burst forth; and thus, fertile in all her parts, she might sweat out offspring instead of lice. But if some burst forth through the eyes too, the lights would be taken from the one giving birth; and if helmeted swarms came forth from the globes of the pupils, blindness would beyond doubt imprecate bereavement. Nor, to be sure, would the offspring, not born but sweated out, be killed without difficulty, and there would be a race—as in the fables of the Myrmidons, so in the dogmas of the Manichee—either lice-bred or publicly bred.
Iulianum.5.15Sed haec esset fetura mulieris; vir autem quid posset efficere? Admoveret nimirum non membra, sed ferramenta, et genitalium vacuus imprimeret vomeres ac ligones. Grates ergo et amplissimae primorum hominum debentur errori, quo tam beatae naturae tormenta vitata sunt.
But this would be the bearing of the woman; what, however, could the man accomplish? He would apply, no doubt, not members but tools, and, empty of genitals, would press in plowshares and mattocks. Most ample thanks, then, are owed to the error of the first human beings, by which the torments of so blessed a nature were avoided.
Iulianum.5.15Mitius partus agit cum feminis, et maritus, quam si aut aratra sentirent, aut importuna per totum corpus fecunditate silvescerent. Impleantur Manichaeorum facies ignominia, et quaerant nomen tuum, Domine. O portenta criminantium innocentes et Deum, suffragia argumentorum et testimoniorum!
More mildly does birth deal with women, and the husband, than if they either felt plows, or grew wild with a troublesome fruitfulness through the whole body. Let the faces of the Manichees be filled with ignominy, and let them seek your name, O Lord. O the portents of those who accuse the innocent and God, the supports of their arguments and testimonies!
Iulianum.5.15Cur, inquit, non credamus quia potuit aliter fieri na tura, quam facta conspicitur? Quasi quaeratur quid potuerit, et non quid instituerit Deus. Si libet ea libidine opinandi quae sunt facta reprehendere, ut dicamus, quia fieri aliter potuerunt, ideo quae sunt instituta non reddunt naturae bonae testimonium; pronuntiemus quia potuit Deus bicipites facere mortales, ideo unicipites, et qui pedibus insisterent male sunt facti; fieri enim capitati ab utraque parte potuerunt; quae forma in quibusdam solet apparere vermiculis, quorum alvum vertex ambifariam natus includit, ut ab utroque incipientes ex humero, finem habere intellegantur in medio. Admittantur ista ludibria, et quis erit delirandi finis?
Why, he says, should we not believe that nature could have come to be otherwise than it is beheld to have come to be? As though it were asked what God could do, and not what he instituted. If it please to reprehend, by a lust of opining, the things that have been made, so as to say that, because they could have come to be otherwise, therefore the things that are instituted do not render testimony to a good nature, let us declare that, because God could make mortals two-headed, therefore one-headed creatures, and those that stand on their feet, are badly made; for they could have been made headed on either side; which form is wont to appear in certain little worms, whose belly a head born at both ends encloses, so that, beginning from each shoulder, they are understood to have their end in the middle. Let these mockeries be admitted, and what will be the end of raving?
Iulianum.5.15Potuit ergo facere Deus, ut de terra cum floribus homines germinarent; quantum ad virtutem, potuisse non abnuo; sed noluit nisi ut de sexibus nascerentur. Nunc ergo quaeritur quid fecerit, non quid potuerit. In quo loco furiosa responsio est, ut dicatur: Malum est quod est, quia potuit Deus aliter facere; hoc est enim laudare Deum in vituperationem sui, et in maculam consilii eius omnipotentiam praedicare.
God could, then, have made men germinate from the earth with flowers; as to the power, I do not deny that he could; but he willed only that they be born of the sexes. Now, then, it is asked what he made, not what he could make. In which place it is a frenzied response to say: What is, is evil, because God could have made it otherwise; for this is to praise God to his own vituperation, and to proclaim his omnipotence to the stain of his counsel.
Iulianum.5.15Non solum nulla laudatio, verum etiam ingens contumelia est, dare viribus quod sapientiae detraxeris, et dicere adfuisse Deo fortitudinem, sed defuisse consilium. Pertingit omnino ad negationem potentiae, reprehensio consulentiae; non omnia potest, si ordinare bene non potest. Immo si sapientiae sublimitate deficitur, nihil de reverentia divinitatis retentat; quod quia suspicari profanissimum est, recurrit illud, quo tradux vestra iugulatur. Deus qui fecit omnia bona valde, nihil ita instituit, ut in illo genere quod factum est, fieri potuisse aut aptius, aut rationabilius, approbetur. Sapientia quippe et omnipotentia ex aequo praeditus non institueret, quod homunculus posset iure reprehendere.
It is not only no praise, but even an immense contumely, to give to power what you have detracted from wisdom, and to say that fortitude was present to God, but counsel lacking. The reprehension of his counsel reaches altogether to the denial of his power; he cannot do all things, if he cannot order well. Rather, if he is deficient in the sublimity of wisdom, he retains nothing of the reverence of divinity; and since to suspect this is most profane, that recurs by which your transmission is throttled. God, who made all things very good, instituted nothing in such a way that, in the kind which was made, it could be approved that it might have been made either more aptly or more reasonably. For one endowed equally with wisdom and omnipotence would not institute what a little man could rightly reprehend.
Iulianum.5.15Quaecumque ergo in omnibus omnino creaturis naturalia docentur, ita summe facta sunt, ut affectata in his emendatio, stulta et profana doceatur. Ut ergo forma equi, forma bovis habent quidem in mutua collatione distantiam, in suis tamen generibus aptam ex omni parte concinentiam ita sortitae sunt, ut nec debuerit, nec potuerit aut equus aut bos, secus quam formatus videtur, institui (qua regula licet omnia natantia, repentia, gradientia, volitantia, postremo aetherea caelestiaque percurrere; nullius forma quippe melius, quam illi cui parabatur generi, institui potuisse convincitur);
Whatever, then, in absolutely all creatures, are taught to be natural, were so supremely made that an affected emendation of them is taught to be foolish and profane. Just as, then, the form of a horse, the form of an ox, have indeed in mutual comparison a distance, yet in their own kinds have received by lot an apt harmony on every side, so that neither ought nor could either horse or ox be instituted otherwise than it is seen to be formed (by which rule one may run through all swimming, creeping, walking, flying, finally the ethereal and heavenly creatures; for the form of none is convicted of being able to be instituted better than for that kind for which it was prepared);
Iulianum.5.15ita et homo quem supra iam gradientium generalitas indicavit, sic est per universa formatus, ut melius a nullo fingi posset; qui accepit prudenter in corpore et locos decoris, et locos pudoris, ut in se ipso et verecundiam et confidentiam disceret; ne et deformis videretur, si esset per cuncta velatus; et deses redderetur ac negligens, si semper esset per cuncta vulgatus.
so too man, whom above the generality of walking creatures has already indicated, was so formed through all things that he could be fashioned better by none; he who has received prudently in his body both places of comeliness and places of shame, that in himself he might learn both modesty and confidence; lest he both seem deformed, if he were veiled throughout, and be rendered slothful and negligent, if he were always exposed throughout.
Iulianum.5.15Ac per hoc fecunditas humana, non alia quam quae habet, utriusque sexus debuit membra suscipere, non aliam ratio nem viscerum, non alios sensus, non aliam voluptatem. Admoneamus igitur Manichaeos, ut desinant reprehendere divinae facta sapientiae, ut opinionum suarum corrigant pravitatem; quia nec ad quaestionem attinet, si aliter homines quam universitas testis est, generaturi fuisse dicantur; nec melius eos fieri potuisse quam facti sunt, ut ratio, ita et Scriptura testatur, quae clamat Deum non solum bona, sed etiam valde bona fecisse omnia (Cf. Gen 1, 31; Eccli 39, 21). Ac per hoc ut per totum opus, hic quoque Manichaeorum dogma collapsum est.
And on this account human fruitfulness ought to have received the members of both sexes, no other than those it has; no other principle of the inward parts, no other senses, no other pleasure. Let us admonish the Manichees, then, to cease to reprehend the works of divine wisdom, that they may correct the depravity of their opinions; for it neither pertains to the question, if men be said to have been going to generate otherwise than the whole testifies; nor could they have been made better than they were made, as reason, so also Scripture testifies, which cries that God made all things not only good, but even very good (See Gen 1:31; Sir 39:21). And on this account, as through the whole work, here too the dogma of the Manichees has collapsed.
Iulianum.5.15In futuro autem tempore gloriosiora corpora, nec opis egentia, fore beatorum fatemur. Sed et hoc ipsum optime institutum est a Deo iustissimo ac sapientissimo, ut statum praemii neutiquam natura perverteret; sed esset primus gradus, in quo consisteret ingenuitas naturalis, et de quo, pro iure arbitrii liberi, vel ad poenarum ima descenderet, vel ad gloriarum cacumen per eas vias, quas Deus instituit, niteretur.
But in the future time we confess that the bodies of the blessed will be more glorious and in need of no aid. But this very thing too was instituted most well by the most just and most wise God, that nature should in no way pervert the state of the reward; but that there should be a first degree, in which natural freedom should stand, and from which, by the right of free choice, it should either descend to the depths of punishments, or strive to the summit of glories, by those ways which God instituted.
Iulianum.5.15AUG. Prorsus, Iuliane, non putasti et mea et tua homines esse lecturos; sed eis tantummodo scripsisti, qui meis ignoratis sive neglectis, nec utrisque diligenter inspectis, tua sola legere ac nosse curarent; nec dixisse me crederent, nisi quod a te commemoratum, tamquam de meis, in tuis litteris invenirent. Hinc enim factum esse video, ut quia ego dixeram: " Cur enim non credamus Deum potuisse in paradiso concedere homini beato de suo semine, quod concessum videmus agricolis de tritici semine, ut eo modo illud sereretur sine ulla pudenda libidine? ",
AUG. Plainly, Julian, you did not think that men would read both my words and yours; but you wrote only for those who, with mine unknown or neglected, and neither carefully inspected, would take care to read and know only yours; nor would believe that I said anything except what, recalled by you as though from mine, they would find in your writings. For from this I see it came about that, because I had said: "For why should we not believe that God could have granted to the blessed man in paradise, of his own seed, what we see granted to farmers of the seed of wheat, that that should be sown in that way without any shameful lust?",
Iulianum.5.15tu his verbis meis velut respondens, tua vaniloquia dilatares, eo usque progressus et diffusus, ut me sensisse iactares: " Si non peccasset Adam, sic potuisse mulierem ad fecunditatem parari, forte ut per omnes articulos, ac per minutas corporum fistulas, quas medici poros vocant, spicae erumperent filiorum, atque illa omnibus laeta partibus, partus pro pediculis exsudaret ", et cetera quae commemorare me taedet, te autem non puduit aggerare. In quibus etiam de viro dixisti, quod: " admoveret nimirum non membra, sed ferramenta, et genitalium vacuus imprimeret vomeres et ligones ".
you, as though answering these words of mine, would dilate your empty talk, advancing and spreading out so far as to boast that I had perceived: "If Adam had not sinned, the woman could so be made ready for fruitfulness, perhaps so that through all the joints, and through the tiny channels of the bodies, which the physicians call pores, the ears of children might burst forth, and she, fertile in all her parts, might sweat out offspring instead of lice," and the rest, which it wearies me to recall, but did not shame you to heap up. In which you said even of the man, that "he would apply, no doubt, not members but tools, and, empty of genitals, would press in plowshares and mattocks."
Iulianum.5.15Haec certe atque huiusmodi (quae cum tui, non quicumque lectores, sed dilectores legunt, pro te, si ullus in eis humanus sensus est, erubescunt) numquid mea verba garrire te sinerent, quae non ob aliud praeteristi atque tacuisti, nisi ut tibi in istis latiora delirandi spatia praeparares? Ego enim dixi, seri hominem potuisse, ad voluntatis nutum membris obsequentibus genitalibus; tu autem genitalia membra tacuisti, ut ires per mulieris articulos et minutissimas fistulas filios per corporis poros tamquam pediculos exsudantis, et per oculorum pupulas caecitate consequente parientis.
These things surely, and of this kind (which, when your readers—not just any, but your lovers—read, they blush for you, if there is any human feeling in them), would they let you chatter my words, which you passed over and were silent about for no other reason than to prepare for yourself wider spaces for raving in these things? For I said that a man could be sown, with the genital members obeying the nod of the will; but you were silent about the genital members, that you might go through the woman's joints and tiniest channels, sweating out children through the pores of the body like lice, and through the pupils of the eyes, with blindness following for the one giving birth.
Iulianum.5.15Membra, inquam, genitalia tacuisti, quasi nos ea, si Adam non peccasset, defutura hominibus diceremus; ut posses ridicula, non urbanitate, sed nugacitate dicere: " quod vir genitalium vacuus vomeres et ligones fetandae coniugi imprimeret ". Numquid de numero quaestio est, figuraque membrorum; quae ad generandum creata possent in locis suis salva et integra, nec indigere incitamento libidinis, et servire imperio voluntatis?
You were silent, I say, about the genital members, as though we said that they would be lacking to men, if Adam had not sinned; that you might say ridiculous things, not with urbanity, but with triviality: "that the man, empty of genitals, would press in plowshares and mattocks to impregnate his wife." Is the question about the number and figure of the members, which, created for generating, could be safe and whole in their places, and not need the incitement of lust, and serve the command of the will?
Iulianum.5.15Quae ideo a me commemorata commemorare noluisti, cum verba mea poneres, ne silentium tibi imponeres, et ad illa quae de filiis per totum corpus tamquam pediculis erumpentibus, et de ferramentis agricolarum ad impraegnandas feminas adhibendis, quae tibi festivissima dicacitate sonare videbantur, cum vanitate ineptissima dicerentur, os aperire non posses. Unde nec illud meum, quod in eodem loco, quem velut redarguendum susceperas, de parturientium doloribus posui, putasti esse tangendum. Si enim feminae sine parturitionis cruciatibus parerent, puto quod non eis membra genitalia, sed tormenta poenalia defuissent. Porro Scriptura divina (quod omnes qui legunt sciunt) de peccato Evae hoc tormenti genus in femineum genus transisse testatur (Cf. Gen 3, 16).
These things, recalled by me, you refused to recall when you set down my words, lest you impose silence on yourself, and could not open your mouth to those things—about children bursting forth through the whole body like lice, and about the farmers' tools to be applied for impregnating women—which seemed to you to sound with most festive wittiness, when they were said with most inept vanity. Hence not even that of mine, which in the same place, which you had undertaken as though to be refuted, I set down about the pains of those giving birth, did you think should be touched. For if women bore without the tortures of childbirth, I think that not the genital members, but the penal torments, would have been lacking to them. Further, divine Scripture (which all who read know) testifies that this kind of torment passed into the female kind from the sin of Eve (See Gen 3:16).
Iulianum.5.15Hoc tu in meis verbis praeterire quam pertractare maluisti, ne diceretur tibi, ita salvis atque integris utriusque sexus genitalibus in illa felicitate paradisi potuisse sine pudenda libidine concumbere coniuges, sicut potuerunt salvis atque integris femineis genitalibus parere sine gemendo dolore mulieres. Sed vos non solum cruciatus et gemitus parientium, verum etiam labores alios aerumnasque mortalium, non a tempore arbitrii liberi eorum, sed a die exitus de ventre matris eorum, mavultis in loco tantae illius beatitudinis ponere, quam pudendam susceptam vestram ipso ibi saltem pudore non ponere.
This in my words you preferred to pass over rather than to handle, lest it be said to you that, with the genitals of both sexes safe and whole, spouses could in that felicity of paradise have come together without shameful lust, just as women could, with the female genitals safe and whole, give birth without groaning pain. But you prefer to place in the place of so great a blessedness not only the tortures and groans of those giving birth, but even the other labors and hardships of mortals—not from the time of their free choice, but from the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb—rather than not to place there your shameful undertaking, at least by that very shame.
Iulianum.5.15Et tamen qui negas in istam mortalitatem post peccatum mutatam fuisse naturam; fateris post meritum bonae voluntatis in gloriam beatae immortalitatis esse mutandam. In cuius gloriae cacumen parvuli, quod non potestis negare, meritis non suae, sed alienae voluntatis ascendunt; quos non vultis credere meritis malae voluntatis alienae, sed tamen eius in cuius lumbis ratione seminis fuerunt, ad profunda miseriarum quas novimus, fuisse deiectos.
And yet you, who deny that nature was changed into this mortality after sin, confess that it must be changed, after the merit of a good will, into the glory of blessed immortality. To the summit of which glory little children—which you cannot deny—ascend by the merits not of their own, but of another's will; whom you refuse to believe were, by the merits of another's evil will—yet of him in whose loins they were by the principle of seed—cast down to the depths of the miseries which we know.
Iulianum.5.1516. IUL. Sed iam pergamus ad reliqua. Postquam ergo Abrahae, quod a me positum fuerat, vitavit exemplum; conatus est asserere, Abimelech quoque, qui orante Abraham ba, cum mulieribus suis sanatus, refertur, ut ad generationis operam, a qua per plagam erat suspensus, posset redire, non detractione libidinis, sed dolore aliquo posse intellegi mulierum vulvam fuisse conclusam (De nupt. et concup. 2, 15, 30); quasi a nobis assereretur impendio, ut appetitus eis naturalis redditus videretur; cum ego testimoniis illis id solum probare fuerim contentus, impeditum concubitum, qui sine libidine esse non poterat, per iram Dei, redditumque per indulgentiam Dei, sive amolitis obstaculis, sive irritamentis sollemnibus restitutis; tamen diabolicum non doceri, sed etiam per hoc ad Dei operam pertinentem, qui inter corporis instrumenta mediocria, sed innoxia, non specie, non modo, verum solo peccaret excessu.
16. JUL. But let us now proceed to the rest. After he avoided the example of Abraham, which had been set down by me, he tried to assert that Abimelech too, who is reported to have been healed, with his women, at the prayer of Abraham, so that he could return to the work of generation, from which he had been suspended by a plague, may be understood to have had the women's wombs closed not by the withdrawal of lust, but by some pain (Marriage and Desire 2.15.30); as though it were asserted by us at length that a natural appetite seemed to be restored to them; whereas I was content to prove by those testimonies only this: that the intercourse, which could not be without lust, was impeded by the wrath of God, and restored by the indulgence of God, whether the obstacles being removed, or the solemn stimulations being restored; yet that it is taught to be not diabolical, but even, through this, pertaining to the work of God, who, among the bodily instruments middling but innocent, would sin not by their kind, not by their measure, but by excess alone.
Iulianum.5.16AUG. Quis non intellegat, si Deo indignante accidit aliquid corpori feminarum, unde impediretur concubitus, et per hoc proles, quae utique non posset, nisi a concumbentibus concipi, eo remoto impedimento, talem concubitum redditum, qualis est in corpore mortis huius, id est, cum libidine? In talem quippe statum revocantur corpora, cum sanantur, qualem iam sortita est post peccatum natura mortalium, quae illos compellit in mortem.
AUG. Who would not understand that, if, with God indignant, something happened to the bodies of the women whereby intercourse was impeded, and through this offspring, which surely could not be conceived except from those coming together, when that impediment was removed, such intercourse was restored as is in the body of this death, that is, with lust? For into such a state are bodies recalled, when they are healed, as the nature of mortals has now received by lot after sin, which compels them into death.
Iulianum.5.16Sed in corpore vitae illius, ubi homo, nisi peccasset, non erat moriturus, alius procul dubio status fuit; unde aut nulla ibi, aut talis, qualis nunc est, libido non fuit, qua caro contra spiritum concupisceret; ut ei necesse esset aut subiugari, aut reluctari; quorum alterum honestati, alterum paci beatitudinis illius convenire non posset.
But in the body of that life, where man, unless he had sinned, was not going to die, there was beyond doubt another state; whence either there was no lust there, or not such as there now is, by which the flesh would lust against the spirit, so that it would be necessary for it either to be subjugated or to struggle against it; of which the one could not suit the integrity, the other the peace, of that blessedness.
Iulianum.5.16Noli ergo duas istas vitas haeretica perversitate confundere; aliter in corpore corruptibili, quod aggravat animam (Cf. Sap 9, 15), vivitur; aliter in paradiso, si permansisset hominis rectitudo, in qua creatus fuerat, viveretur. Esset ergo et ibi propter generationem concubitus coniugum; sed aut membris genitalibus sine ulla libidine servientibus menti, aut ipsius, si ulla esset, libidinis motibus numquam repugnantibus voluntati; quae si talis esset, pudenda non esset; nec corporis membra, quae suo vel sollicitaret impetu, vel moveret, pudenda proprie vocari faceret, velarique compelleret; quod post peccatum factum esse, nec nisi peccati poena fieri potuisse, Dei verba testantur. Quis, inquit, nuntiavit tibi, quia nudus es, nisi ex ligno quod praeceperam tibi tantum ne ex eo manducares, ex eo manducasti? (Gen 3, 11) Non, inquit, tibi nuntiata esset nuditas tua, nisi esset a te praevaricata lex mea.
Do not, then, confound those two lives by a heretical perversity; one lives in one way in a corruptible body, which weighs down the soul (See Wis 9:15); in another way would life be lived in paradise, if the uprightness of man, in which he had been created, had remained. There would be, then, even there the intercourse of spouses for the sake of generation; but either with the genital members serving the mind without any lust, or with the motions of lust itself, if there were any, never repugnant to the will; which, if it were such, would not be shameful; nor would it make the members of the body, which it would either solicit by its impulse or move, to be properly called shameful, and compel them to be veiled; which came to be after sin, and could come to be only as the penalty of sin, the words of God testify. Who, he says, announced to you that you are naked, unless from the tree of which I had commanded you only that you should not eat, you have eaten? (Gen 3:11) Your nakedness, he says, would not have been announced to you, unless my law had been transgressed by you.
Iulianum.5.16Quid est autem nuditas nuntiata, cui procul dubio ignota non erat, nisi eo motu stimulante, ut inusitato aspectu se urgeret adverti, pudoremque incuteret? Quoniam peccato factum erat, ut hominis pars inferior contra superiorem, hoc est, caro contra spiritum concupisceret. Sed tu contra omnia claudis oculos, et Deo manifestante quod non confunderetur homo de sua nuditate, nisi peccasset, ita fuisse asseris institutum, ut etiamsi non peccasset, puderet eum nuditatis suae.
But what is the nakedness announced—to one to whom beyond doubt it was not unknown—except by that motion stimulating, so that, by its unaccustomed appearance, it should press itself to be noticed, and strike in shame? Since by sin it had come to pass that the lower part of man should lust against the higher, that is, the flesh against the spirit. But you close your eyes against all things, and, with God making manifest that man would not be confounded at his nakedness, unless he had sinned, you assert that he was so instituted that, even if he had not sinned, his nakedness would shame him.
Iulianum.5.16Deus enim dicit: Quis nuntiavit tibi nuditatem tuam, nisi quia peccasti? Et tu dicis (ut ipsa verba tua ponam, quae paulo ante locutus es): " Sic est homo per universa formatus, ut melius a nullo fingi posset; qui accepit prudenter in corpore et locos decoris et locos pudoris, ut in se ipso et verecundiam et confidentiam disceret; ne et deformis videretur, si esset per cuncta velatus; et deses redderetur ac negligens, si semper esset per cuncta vulgatus ". Ac per hoc, secundum te longe melior peccando factus est homo; nisi enim peccasset, quem Deus fecerat rectum (Cf. Eccle 7, 30), viveret imprudenter non dignoscendo in corpore suo locos decoris et locos pudoris, et impudenter nulla velando, et negligenter cuncta vulgando; neque enim vitaret haec vitia, nisi ei, quia peccaverat, sua fuisset nuditas nuntiata.
For God says: Who announced to you your nakedness, unless because you have sinned? And you say (to set down your very words, which you spoke a little before): "Man is so formed through all things that he could be fashioned better by none; he who has received prudently in his body both places of comeliness and places of shame, that in himself he might learn both modesty and confidence; lest he both seem deformed, if he were veiled throughout, and be rendered slothful and negligent, if he were always exposed throughout." And on this account, according to you, man was made far better by sinning; for unless he had sinned—he whom God had made upright (See Eccl 7:29 (7:30))—he would live imprudently, not distinguishing in his body the places of comeliness and the places of shame, and impudently, veiling nothing, and negligently, exposing everything; for he would not avoid these vices, unless, because he had sinned, his nakedness had been announced to him.
Iulianum.5.1617. IUL. De quo quoniam satis actum est, ad illa properemus, quae super naturali malo Manichaeus olim acute, sed, ut probabo, perplexitate quaestionum deceptus obiecit. Breviter tamen prius, quid Augustinus contra Apostoli testimonium retulerit, ventilemus. Ego ergo cum notam istam operam sexuum a Deo auctore corporum institutam, etiam beati Pauli testimonio apertissime dixissem probari, qui invectus in flagitia eorum, quos in virilis quoque sexus concubitum praecipitarat insania, ait: Relicto naturali usu feminae, accensi sunt in desideria sua (Rom 1, 27); intuli Apostolo teste, approbari usum feminae naturaliter institutum. Ad hoc ergo iste rescribens:
17. JUL. Since enough has been done about this, let us hasten to those things which the Manichee long ago acutely—but, as I will prove, deceived by the perplexity of the questions—objected concerning natural evil. Yet first let us briefly ventilate what Augustine brought forward against the Apostle's testimony. I, then, when I had said that this known work of the sexes was instituted by God the author of bodies, and that this is proved most openly even by the testimony of the blessed Paul, who, inveighing against the abominations of those whom insanity had cast headlong even into the intercourse of the male sex too, says: Having left the natural use of the woman, they were inflamed in their desires (Rom 1:27); I inferred, with the Apostle as witness, that the use of the woman, naturally instituted, is approved. To this, then, this man, writing back:
Iulianum.5.17Non dixit, inquit, Apostolus coniugalem usum, sed naturalem, eum volens intellegi qui fit membris ad hoc creatis, ut per ea possit ad generandum sexus uterque misceri; ac per hoc, cum eisdem membris etiam meretrici quisque miscetur, naturalis est usus, nec tamen laudabilis, sed culpabilis. Non ergo isto nomine, id est, usu naturali, coniugalis est laudata commixtio; sed immundiora et sceleratiora flagitia denotata sunt, quam si illicite feminis, sed tamen naturaliter uterentur (De nupt. et concup. 2, 20, 35).
The Apostle, he says, did not say the conjugal use, but the natural, wishing that to be understood which is done with the members created for this, that through them each sex may be mingled for generating; and on this account, since with these same members someone is also mingled with a harlot, it is a natural use, yet not laudable, but culpable. Not, then, by this name, that is, "natural use," was conjugal intercourse praised; but more unclean and more wicked abominations were marked out than if they used women unlawfully, but yet naturally (Marriage and Desire 2.20.35).
Iulianum.5.17Id est, hic usus feminae quem pronuntiavit Apostolus naturalem, non intellegitur coniugalis, ut bonus licitusque doceatur; sed ideo, inquit, dictus est naturalis, quia diversitatem sexus ad hoc indicat institutam, ut et commixtui pararetur et partui.
That is, this use of the woman which the Apostle declared natural is not understood as conjugal, so that it be taught to be good and lawful; but for this reason, he says, it was called natural, because it indicates that the diversity of sex was instituted for this, that it be made ready both for intercourse and for birth.
Iulianum.5.17Queis molitionibus cum iuvaretur nihil, cur tantum immoratus est? Profecto ob hoc solum, ut hi qui eum sequuntur, solutum putent quod viderint fuisse contactum; ceterum quam nihil dixerit, brevis disputatio palam faciet. Nempe Apostolus feminae usum ait naturaliter institutum, nec commendavit alteram commixtionem primitus ordinatam; sed de eo usu disputans, in quo libidinem cunctis noverat viguisse temporibus, naturalem illam vocavit.
Since he was helped nothing by these maneuvers, why did he linger so long? Assuredly for this alone, that those who follow him may think loosed what they have seen was touched; but how little he said, a brief disputation will make plain. For the Apostle says that the use of the woman was naturally instituted, nor did he commend another intercourse ordained from the first; but, disputing about that use in which he knew lust had thrived at all times, he called that one natural.
Iulianum.5.17AUG. Usus feminae naturalis est, cum eius masculus illo membro utitur, quo natura eiusdem generis animantium propagatur; propter quod etiam ipsum membrum natura proprie dici solet; unde Cicero ait, mulierem vidisse se in somnis praesignatam habere naturam (Cf. CICERO, De divin. 2).
AUG. The use of the woman is natural, when the male uses her by that member by which the nature of living beings of the same kind is propagated; on which account that member too is wont to be properly called "nature"; whence Cicero says that a woman saw in her sleep that she was foreshadowed to have a "nature" (See Cicero, De divin. 2).
Iulianum.5.17Usus itaque naturalis et licitus est, sicut in coniugio, et illicitus, sicut in adulterio; contra naturam vero semper illicitus, et procul dubio flagitiosior atque turpior; quem sanctus Apostolus et in feminis et in masculis arguebat, damnabiliores volens intellegi, quam si in usu naturali, vel adulterando, vel fornicando peccarent. Usus itaque concumbentium naturalis idemque inculpabilis, et in paradiso esse potuisset, etiamsi nemo peccasset; non enim aliter ad humanum genus secundum benedictionem Dei multiplicandum filii gignerentur;
And so the use is natural and lawful, as in marriage, and unlawful, as in adultery; but against nature it is always unlawful, and beyond doubt more abominable and more foul; which the holy Apostle impugned both in women and in men, wishing them to be understood more damnable than if they sinned in the natural use, whether by adultery or by fornication. And so the natural and likewise inculpable use of those coming together could have been even in paradise, even if no one had sinned; for not otherwise would children be begotten for the multiplication of the human race according to the blessing of God;
Iulianum.5.17sed eum vocatum esse ab Apostolo usum naturalem, in quo libidinem cunctis noverat viguisse temporibus, quis tibi dixit, nisi haeresis vestra? Absit enim ut Apostolus etiam illo tempore hominum crederet pudendam viguisse libidinem, quando nudi erant, et non pudebat eos. Verumtamen etiamsi Apostolus diceret, quod ipse dixisti: " in usu feminae naturali cunctis temporibus viguisse libidinem "; in his quoque verbis haberem quod recte intellegerem, ne pudendam susceptam tuam in illius beatae vitae corporibus, quae nondum fuerant corpora mortis huius, sicut tu facis, mente stultissima, lingua loquacissima, fronte impudentissima, collocarem.
but that there was called by the Apostle the natural use, in which he knew lust had thrived at all times, who told you, except your heresy? For far be it that the Apostle should believe that even in that time of men shameful lust had thrived, when they were naked, and it did not shame them. Nevertheless, even if the Apostle said what you yourself said, "that in the natural use of the woman lust had thrived at all times," in these words too I would have what I might rightly understand, lest I place your shameful undertaking in the bodies of that blessed life, which were not yet bodies of this death, as you do—with a most foolish mind, a most talkative tongue, a most impudent forehead.
Iulianum.5.17Cunctis quippe temporibus ex quo utriusque sexus fieri concubitus coepit, procul dubio usus feminae naturalis sine hac pudenda libidine esse non potuit; iam enim non vitae illius, sed mortis huius habebant corpus, quando post peccatum de paradiso egressi, masculus et femina utrumque sexum naturaliter primitus miscuerunt. Quod si ante facerent, ibi libido vel nulla esset, vel pudenda non esset; non enim sollicitaret invitum, et repugnare sibi cogeret castum; sed aut sine illa officium suum genitalia, iubente mente, peragerent; aut illa si esset, cum opus esset, assurgeret, tranquillissimum nutum subsequens voluntatis, nec opprimens cogitationem turbulento impetu voluptatis.
For at all times since the intercourse of both sexes began to come to be, beyond doubt the natural use of the woman could not be without this shameful lust; for they now had the body not of that life, but of this death, when, after sin, having gone out of paradise, the male and female mingled both sexes naturally for the first time. But if they did it before, lust there would either be none, or not be shameful; for it would not solicit the unwilling, and compel the chaste to resist it; but either, without it, the genitals would perform their office, the mind commanding; or it, if there were any, when there was need, would rise up, following the most tranquil nod of the will, and not oppressing the thought with the turbulent impulse of pleasure.
Iulianum.5.17Talem se modo non esse, multis suis importunis et coercendis motibus confitetur; ergo aut vitium esse, aut vitiatam se esse testatur. Ecce unde dicebat Apostolus: Scio quia non habitat in me, id est in carne mea, bonum (Rom 7, 18). Ecce unde trahitur a nascentibus originale peccatum. Hoc malo bene utitur pudicitia coniugalis: hoc malo melius non utitur religiosa continentia vidualis, vel sacra integritas virginalis.
That it is not now such, it confesses by many of its importunate motions that must be coerced; therefore it testifies either that it is a vice, or that it is itself vitiated. Behold whence the Apostle said: I know that there does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh, good (Rom 7:18). Behold whence original sin is drawn by those being born. This evil conjugal chastity uses well: this evil religious widowed continence, or sacred virginal integrity, uses better by not using it.
Iulianum.5.1718. IUL. Hoc nos intelleximus, cumque de naturae institutione loqueremur, id protulimus quod Apostolum sensisse constabat. Tu igitur quid promovisti, ut referres non ab eo usum coniugalem, sed naturalem vocari? Aut quo ore subiungis, quoniam " cum iisdem membris meretrici quisque miscetur, naturalis est usus, nec tamen laudabilis, sed culpabilis "? Ut enim etiam hic ostendamus, quod frequenter aperuimus, unam a te saltem sententiam non proferri, quae non adversum te plurimum valeat; si usus fornicationis naturalis, nec tamen laudabilis, sed culpabilis dicitur, ob hoc quia meretricis usus est; sine dubio coniugalem, quia honestum atque licitum, non culpabilem, sed laudabilem profiteberis.
18. JUL. This we understood, and, when we were speaking of the institution of nature, we brought forth what it was established the Apostle perceived. What, then, did you advance, in reporting that the use is called by him not conjugal, but natural? Or with what mouth do you add that, "since with these same members someone is mingled with a harlot, it is a natural use, yet not laudable, but culpable"? For—that here too we may show what we have frequently disclosed, that not even one sentence is brought forth by you which does not avail much against you—if the use of fornication is called natural, yet not laudable, but culpable, for this reason, that it is the use of a harlot; then without doubt you will profess the conjugal, because it is honorable and lawful, not culpable, but laudable.
Iulianum.5.18AUG. Non quia sine malo est, sed quia bene utitur malo, coniugalis concubitus merito inculpabilis dicitur. Sic enim bonum est bene uti malo, quemadmodum malum est male uti bono. Sic ergo bene utuntur coniugati libidinis malo, quomodo male utuntur adulteri corporis bono. Hoc iam non semel dixi, et saepius me dicere non pigebit, quamdiu te veris contradicere non pudebit.
AUG. Not because it is without evil, but because it uses the evil well, is conjugal intercourse deservedly called inculpable. For to use an evil well is as good as to use a good badly is evil. So, then, married people use the evil of lust well, as adulterers use the good of the body badly. This I have now said not once, and it will not weary me to say it more often, as long as it will not shame you to contradict the true.
Iulianum.5.1819. IUL. Et ubi est crimen tuum diabolicum, quod illi argumento pudoris nitebaris affigere? Non enim iam libido reprehenditur, quae et in prohibito et in concesso usu, naturae ipsius conditione sentitur, si depravatio eius, ad id quod non licebat excurrens, sola culpatur.
19. JUL. And where is your diabolical crime, which you strove to fasten upon that argument from shame? For lust is no longer reprehended, which is felt, both in the forbidden and in the permitted use, by the very condition of nature, if only its depravation, running out to what was not lawful, is found at fault.
Iulianum.5.19AUG. Non sola " culpatur depravatio libidinis ad id quod non licebat excurrens "; sed tua magna depravatio est, cum a te non culpatur ad id quod non licebat impellens. Quando enim ad id quod non licet impellit, profecto nisi pravitati eius repugnetur excurrit.
AUG. Not only is "the depravation of lust running out to what was not lawful" found at fault; but your great depravation is that it is not faulted by you when it impels toward what was not lawful. For when it impels toward what is not lawful, then assuredly, unless its perversity is resisted, it runs out.
Iulianum.5.19Et haec est concupiscentia carnis, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum; adversus quam propterea concupiscit et spiritus, ne quo impellit excurrat. Malum est ergo, et quod impellit in malum; sed si non excurrit, repugnante sibi spiritu, non vincitur homo a malo.
And this is the concupiscence of the flesh, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit; against which the spirit too therefore lusts, lest it run out to where it impels. It is an evil, then, even what impels toward evil; but if it does not run out, the spirit lusting against it, man is not conquered by the evil.
Iulianum.5.19Tunc autem omni malo carebit, quando cui repugnet non erit. Neque hoc cum fiet, natura, sicut Manichaeus insanit, a nobis separabitur aliena, sed sanabitur nostra. Quae nunc, si quemadmodum regeneratione et remissione peccatorum sanatur a reatu, sic ab omni esset infirmitate iam sana; non contra carnem spiritus concupisceret, ut non operaremur nisi licitum; sed ita caro spiritui consentiret, ut nihil contra illum concupisceretur illicitum.
But then he will lack all evil, when there will be nothing for it to lust against. Nor, when this comes to pass, will an alien nature be separated from us, as the Manichee raves, but our own will be healed. Which now, if, as it is healed of guilt by regeneration and the remission of sins, so it were already sound of all infirmity, the spirit would not lust against the flesh, so that we would do nothing unlawful; but the flesh would so consent to the spirit that nothing unlawful would be lusted against it.
Iulianum.5.1920. IUL. Utque presse interrogemus et breviter: apostolum Paulum, cum naturalem usum feminae nuncuparet, possibilitatem rei et honestatem, an solam possibilitatem indicasse arbitraris? Id est, hoc nomine naturali, intellegere nos voluit usum qui fieri poterat et debebat; an qui poterat, sed non debebat? Si dixeris, Qui poterat, licet non deberet, qualis in adulteris agitur: ergo et illud aliud flagitium non erit contra naturam, quia membris agitur naturalibus. Si autem expavescens retuleris, quod et veritas habet, Apostolum usum vocasse naturalem, qui fetibus destinatus honeste agi, quippe naturaliter, ut poterat et debebat, id est, in corporibus vel singularum vel plurium feminarum, temporum tamen ratione concessis; fateberis sine dubio inepte argumentatum fuisse; beatumque Paulum nomine naturalis usus, non fornicationem, sicut tu putaveras, sed et honestum et legitimum, qui fecunditati paratus est, corporum indicasse commixtum.
20. JUL. And, to ask closely and briefly: do you judge that the apostle Paul, when he named the natural use of the woman, indicated the possibility of the thing and its honorableness, or its possibility alone? That is, by this name "natural," did he wish us to understand the use which could and ought to be done; or which could, but ought not? If you say, Which could, although it ought not, such as is done in adulterers: then that other abomination too will not be against nature, because it is done with natural members. But if, terrified, you report—what truth too holds—that the Apostle called natural the use which, destined for offspring, could be done honorably, namely naturally, as it could and ought, that is, in the bodies of one or of several women, yet granted by the reckoning of the times; you will confess without doubt that it was ineptly argued; and that the blessed Paul, by the name "natural use," indicated not fornication, as you had thought, but the honorable and lawful intercourse of bodies, which is made ready for fruitfulness.
Iulianum.5.20Nos ergo merito generaliter defendimus, quod Manichaeus generaliter arguebat. Tu enim dicis commixtionem hanc sexuum cum voluptate, per diabolum institutam, causam originalis esse peccati, et necessitatem omnium criminum; ac per hoc ipsam criminaris naturam; nos quid consequentius facere potuimus, quam ut teste Magistro Gentium, naturae generalitate defenderemus et adscriberemus operi Dei, quod tu naturaliter malum vocabas? Factumque est ut quod tu dicis diabolicum, nos ad refellendum te probaremus naturaliter institutum. Ista est quippe legitima et erudita responsio, ut quod in specie accusatur, defendatur in specie; et quod in genere arguitur, vindicetur in genere.
We, then, deservedly defended generally what the Manichee accused generally. For you say that this intercourse of the sexes with pleasure, instituted by the devil, is the cause of original sin and the necessity of all crimes; and on this account you accuse nature itself; what could we more consistently do than that, with the Master of the Gentiles as witness, we should defend, by the generality of nature, and ascribe to the work of God, what you called naturally evil? And it came about that what you call diabolical, we, for refuting you, proved to be naturally instituted. For this is the lawful and learned response, that what is accused in the particular be defended in the particular; and what is impugned in the general be vindicated in the general.
Iulianum.5.20Quod etiam Manichaeus intellexit, quem tu aequas crimine, sed non aequas ingenio; ideo ille omnem substantiam corporum transcribit diabolo; tu autem non universam, sed, sicut in priore libro diximus, meliorem. Triumphavit ergo veritas sacris stipata praesidiis, quae per Apostolum probans naturale coniugum negotium, et per hoc ad Deum pertinere qui esset auctor naturae, vestra figmenta disrupit, qui in praevaricatorium, non naturale iuratis.
Which the Manichee too understood, whom you equal in crime, but do not equal in talent; therefore he transfers the whole substance of bodies to the devil; but you transfer not the whole, but, as we said in the earlier book, the better part. Truth, then, has triumphed, surrounded by sacred protections, which, proving through the Apostle the natural business of spouses, and through this that it pertains to God who is the author of nature, has burst your figments, who swear by what is transgressive, not natural.
Iulianum.5.20AUG. Iam etiam supra satis diximus quem dixerit Apostolus usum feminae naturalem, et cur appellaverit naturalem, id est, cum fit eis membris utriusque sexus, quae ad propagandam sunt instituta naturam;
AUG. We have already said above enough what use of the woman the Apostle called natural, and why he called it natural—that is, when it is done with those members of both sexes which are instituted for propagating nature;
Iulianum.5.20sive talis usus esset, qualis in paradiso esse potuisset, nullo scilicet utens malo, vel nulla existente, vel nonnisi nutum voluntatis subsequente libidine; sive qualis nunc est ex quo esse coepit,
whether such a use as could have been in paradise, using namely no evil, with lust either not existing, or following only the nod of the will; or such as it now is from the time it began to be,
Iulianum.5.20vel licitus sicut in coniugio, bene utens et corporis bono et libidinis malo; vel illicitus sicut in adulterio, male utens et illo bono et illo malo; nec tamen etiam ipse discedens ab eis membris, quae naturae etiam nomine proprie nuncupantur.
whether lawful as in marriage, using well both the good of the body and the evil of lust; or unlawful as in adultery, using badly both that good and that evil; nor, however, does it itself depart from those members which are properly called even by the name of "nature."
Iulianum.5.20Nihil est itaque cur presse, ut dicis, ac breviter interroges, utrum Apostolus in eo quod ait naturalem usum, eum voluerit intellegi, qui fieri et poterat et debebat; an qui fieri poterat, sed non debebat; non enim ut hoc diceret, aliquid horum intuebatur Apostolus, sed membra tantummodo utriusque sexus genitaliter naturalia, hoc est, ad generandam creata naturam. Nam quis ignorat, quod licitus usus feminae fieri et possit et debeat; illicitus autem fieri possit, nec tamen debeat; uterque autem sit naturalis, quia utriusque sexus ad naturam propagandam creatis membris genitalibus fit?
There is, then, no reason for you to ask closely, as you say, and briefly, whether the Apostle, in that he said "natural use," wished that to be understood which both could and ought to be done, or which could be done, but ought not; for, to say this, the Apostle was not regarding any of these things, but only the members of both sexes naturally genital, that is, created for generating nature. For who is ignorant that the lawful use of the woman both can and ought to be done; but the unlawful can be done, yet ought not; but each is natural, because it is done with the genital members of both sexes created for propagating nature?
Iulianum.5.20Tergiversatorias aufer ambages, remove loquaces et fallaces fumos vanitatis tuae. Libido pecorum ideo non est vitium, quia non ea caro concupiscit adversus spiritum; quod Manichaeus si discernere valuisset, nec pecorum ab opificio Dei veri alienasset naturas, nec hominum vitia putaret esse substantias. Tu autem nisi cum Ambrosio et ceteris Catholicis senseris atque tenueris, per praevaricationem primi hominis carnis et spiritus dissensionem in nostram vertisse naturam (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Lc. 7, 12, 53), quantumlibet Manichaeos detestari videaris, eorum detestandus adiutor sine dubio permanebis; asserendo esse bonum, quod esse clamat veritas malum; et hoc malum negando ex depravatione venire peccato vitiatae naturae nostrae, ut Manichaeus, te adiutore, commixtionem nobis naturae introducat alienae.
Take away your tergiversating circumlocutions, remove the talkative and fallacious smoke of your vanity. The lust of beasts is not a vice for this reason, that by it the flesh does not lust against the spirit; which, if the Manichee had been able to distinguish, he would neither have alienated the natures of beasts from the workmanship of the true God, nor would he think the vices of men to be substances. But you, unless you perceive and hold with Ambrose and the other Catholics that, through the transgression of the first man, the dissension of flesh and spirit turned into our nature (See Ambrose, In Luc. 7.12.53), however much you may seem to detest the Manichees, you will beyond doubt remain their detestable helper; by asserting that to be good which truth cries is evil; and by denying that this evil comes from the depravation of our nature vitiated by sin, so that the Manichee, with you as helper, may introduce a commingling of an alien nature in us.
Iulianum.5.2021. IUL. Simili acumine illud quoque labefactare conaris, quod dixi, evangelico testimonio ex fructi bus suis arborem debere cognosci; ut ostenderem, quod clarum est, doceri bona non posse coniugia, immo ipsam naturam, quae coniugiorum operatione suppletur, nec Dei posse opere vindicari, si de ea dicerentur crimina pullulare. Ad hoc ergo respondisti: Numquid Dominus inde loquebatur, et non potius de duabus voluntatibus hominum, bona scilicet et mala; istam bonam, illam malam arborem dicens; quia de bona voluntate opera bona nascuntur, et mala de mala? Quod si nuptias arborem bonam intellegamus, profecto e contrario posituri sumus fornicationem arborem malam. Porro si dixerit non illicarboris loco ponendum esse adulterium, sed naturam humanam de qua nascitur homo ita et hic non erit arbor connubium, sed natura humana de qua nascitur homo (De nupt. et concup. 2, 26, 43).
21. JUL. With like sharpness you try to weaken also that which I said—that, by the evangelical testimony, a tree ought to be known from its fruits; so that I might show, what is clear, that marriage cannot be taught to be good—rather, nature itself, which is supplied by the working of marriages—nor can it be vindicated as the work of God, if crimes were said to sprout from it. To this, then, you answered: Was the Lord speaking of that, and not rather of the two wills of men, namely the good and the evil—calling this the good, that the evil tree; because from a good will good works are born, and evil from an evil? But if we understand marriage as the good tree, then assuredly, on the contrary, we shall set down fornication as the evil tree. Further, if he says that adultery is not to be set in the place of the tree, but the human nature from which man is born—so here too marriage will not be the tree, but the human nature from which man is born (Marriage and Desire 2.26.43).
Iulianum.5.21Falleris: non ibi Dominus loquitur de duabus voluntatibus, sed de persona sua. Quoniam cum beneficia Iudaeis praestaret innumera, ab eius nihil criminationibus desinebant. Ceterum cum opera eius, quae etiam glorificabant, arguere non valerent; ipsum tamen Samaritanum ac plenum daemonio et Behelzebulis spiritu causabantur illudere. Tunc ergo Dominus ait: Aut facite arborem bonam, et fructus eius bonos; aut facite arborem malam, et fructus eius malos: ex fructibus enim suis arbor dignoscitur (Mt 12, 33). Id est: Aut opera mea vituperate, quae bona esse infirmitates pulsae et restitutae sanitates loquuntur; ut improbum me, operum meorum testimonio comprobetis; aut si haec tanta beneficia non audetis arguere; reddite bonae arbori, mihi videlicet, testimonium fructuum meorum, et amate beneficum, qui beneficia praedicatis. Ibi ergo personam de operibus suis Christus iussit agnosci; quod nobis iure suffragatum est, ut doceremus naturam quoque atque coniugia de fructificationis suae qualitate censenda; ut si de his criminum virus fluebat, criminosa etiam radix iudicaretur.
You are deceived: the Lord there speaks not of two wills, but of his own person. For when he bestowed innumerable benefits on the Jews, they did not cease from accusations of him. But since they could not impugn his works, which even glorified him, they yet alleged that he, a Samaritan and full of a demon and of the spirit of Beelzebul, was mocking. Then, therefore, the Lord says: Either make the tree good, and its fruits good; or make the tree evil, and its fruits evil: for the tree is known from its fruits (Matt 12:33). That is: Either vituperate my works, which the infirmities driven off and the soundnesses restored declare to be good—so that you may prove me wicked by the testimony of my works; or, if you do not dare to impugn these so great benefits, render to the good tree, namely to me, the testimony of my fruits, and love the beneficent, you who proclaim the benefits. There, then, Christ commanded his person to be recognized from his works; which rightly supported us, that we might teach that nature too and marriages are to be assessed by the quality of their fruiting; so that, if the venom of crimes flowed from these, the root too should be judged criminal.
Iulianum.5.21Vide ergo quam ad intellegendum caecutias, qui levare te obiecti mei pondus putasti, fornicationem nuptiis ex adverso locando, ut sicut bona arbor nuptiae, ita mala fornicatio videretur, de qua, id est, fornicatione, fecunditas nulla deberet existere, ne mala convinceretur, si bonae nuptiae bonis fetibus probarentur; cum homo sive de coniugio, sive de adulterio nascitur, non de flagitio, sed de natura seminum prodeat.
See, then, how blind you are to understanding, you who thought to lift the weight of my objection by setting fornication over against marriage, so that, as marriage is the good tree, so fornication might seem the evil tree, from which—that is, from fornication—no fruitfulness ought to exist, lest it be convicted of being evil, if good marriage were proved by good offspring; whereas man, whether he is born of marriage or of adultery, comes forth not from the abomination, but from the nature of the seeds.
Iulianum.5.21Flagitium quippe quod moechantium voluntate committitur, substantiae instituta non turbat; verum exercet se natura per materias suas, et peccato remanente apud illicitae voluntatis auctorem, fetus innocuus de opere Conditoris erumpit. Quod quidem et tu vidisti esse referendum; sed qualiter conatus sis eludere, prudens lector attendat. Ais enim: Si arboris loco ibi non est ponendum adulterium, sed natura humana de qua nascitur homo; ita et hic non erit arbor bona connubium, sed naturahumana de qua nascitur homo.
For the abomination which is committed by the will of those who commit adultery does not disturb the institutions of the substance; but nature exercises itself through its materials, and, with the sin remaining with the author of the unlawful will, the harmless offspring bursts forth from the work of the Founder. Which indeed you too saw must be admitted; but in what way you tried to elude it, let the prudent reader attend. For you say: If adultery is not to be set there in the place of the tree, but the human nature from which man is born; so here too the good tree will not be marriage, but the human nature from which man is born.
Iulianum.5.21Hoc est ergo quod eloqui conatus es: Sicut non imputatur homo fornicationi, sed naturae; ita peccatum quod trahitur de parentibus legitimis, non esse imputandum connubio, sed naturae humanae, quam crimine diabolus infecit antiquo. In adulteris ergo culpasti lascivientium voluntatem, sed laudasti humanam naturam, de qua homo etiam per illicitos concubitus nasceretur; in parentibus autem legitimis laudasti connubium, de quo non dicis venire peccatum; sed vituperasti naturam, de qua dicis infundi crimen horrendum.
This, then, is what you tried to express: Just as a man is not imputed to fornication, but to nature, so the sin which is drawn from lawful parents is not to be imputed to marriage, but to the human nature, which the devil infected with the ancient crime. In adulterers, then, you faulted the will of those who run riot, but praised the human nature, from which man would be born even through unlawful intercourse; but in lawful parents you praised marriage, from which you do not say sin comes; but you vituperated the nature, from which you say a dreadful crime is infused.
Iulianum.5.21Vigilet hic ergo lector meus. Si naturam humanam in fornicatione laudabilem censuisti, quae causam nascenti flagitiis coeuntium impollutam fecisset; quomodo hanc ipsam naturam in connubii parte reprehendis, quam dicis causam naturali crimini praestitisse? Ergo non quidem connubium, sed naturam humanam et magnum bonum et magnum malum esse professus es. Nam quid ea nequius, si crimen ingenuit? Quid detestabilius, si a diabolo possidetur? Quid ergo habeat artis in semine, ipsa viderit; qualitatis interim, in qua bonum omne vel malum est, pessimae comprobatur, si et ipsa rea, et generans reatus, et diabolicae convincitur tyrannidis satelles. Merito ergo de fructibus suis debet arbor agnosci, ut quae causa mali est, mala iure optimo nominetur.
Let my reader be vigilant here, then. If you judged human nature laudable in fornication, which made the cause for the one being born unpolluted by the abominations of those coming together, how do you reprehend this same nature on the side of marriage, which you say furnished the cause for a natural crime? Therefore you professed not marriage indeed, but human nature, to be both a great good and a great evil. For what is more wicked than it, if it engendered a crime? What more detestable, if it is possessed by the devil? What craft it has in the seed, let it see for itself; meanwhile, in the quality, in which all good or evil is, it is proved most evil, if it is both guilty itself, and generates guilt, and is convicted of being a satellite of a diabolical tyranny. Deservedly, then, ought a tree to be known from its fruits, so that what is the cause of evil may by the best right be named evil.
Iulianum.5.21AUG. Causam mali originalis, nec coniugium esse, nec adulterium, satis res ipsa declarat; quoniam, id quod bonum est in natura hominis, Deo creante ex homine nascitur; et id quod malum habet propter quod renasci debet, ex homine trahitur. Causa porro huius mali est, quod per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt (Rom 5, 12). In quibus Apostoli verbis in aliam sententiam detorquendis, quanta loquacitate inaniter laboraveris, vident qui tua et nostra intellegenter legunt.
AUG. That the cause of the original evil is neither marriage nor adultery, the very fact declares well enough; since that which is good in the nature of man is born of man, God creating; and that which has evil, on account of which it must be reborn, is drawn from man. Further, the cause of this evil is that through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed to all men, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12). In twisting which words of the Apostle into another sense, with how great loquacity you labored emptily, those see who read your words and ours intelligently.
Iulianum.5.21Quid te igitur adiuvat? Utquid abs te, quaeso, commemoratum est evangelicum testimonium, quod arbor bona bonos fructus facit, cum tu de coniugali loquereris bono, eiusque fructus velles esse homines; tamquam ideo demonstrans eos sine malo nasci, quia bonum sunt nuptiae, et non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere; cum homines nascuntur ex hominibus, sive cum originali noxa, unde dicit Apostolus: Corpus mortuum est propter peccatum (Rom 8, 10); sive sine ulla noxa, ut vos contenditis contra Apostolum, non tamen per coniugales solos, verum etiam per concubitus impudicos; et aliquando sint sterilia coniugia, fecunda adulteria?
What, then, does it help you? Why, I ask, was the evangelical testimony recalled by you—that a good tree makes good fruits—when you were speaking of the conjugal good, and wished its fruits to be men; as though demonstrating that they are born without evil, because marriage is a good, and a good tree cannot make evil fruits; whereas men are born of men, either with the original harm, whence the Apostle says: The body is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10); or without any harm, as you contend against the Apostle, yet not through conjugal intercourse alone, but even through unchaste intercourse; and sometimes marriages are sterile, adulteries fruitful?
Iulianum.5.21Utrum autem Dominus duas voluntates, sicut nos dicimus, in duabus arboribus insinuare voluerit, unam bonam, qua bonus est homo, quae non potest facere opera mala, id est, fructus malos; alteram malam, qua malus est homo, quae non potest facere opera bona, id est, fructus bonos; an sicut tu dicis de se ipso Iu daeis ista locutus sit, qui nosse volunt, Evangelium legunt, te negligunt.
But whether the Lord wished to convey, as we say, two wills in the two trees—one good, by which the man is good, which cannot make evil works, that is, evil fruits; the other evil, by which the man is evil, which cannot make good works, that is, good fruits—or whether, as you say, he spoke this of himself to the Jews, those who wish to know read the Gospel, they neglect you.
Iulianum.5.21Dominus enim cum cavendos esse monstraret, qui venirent in vestitu ovium, intrinsecus autem lupi essent rapaces: Ex fructibus, inquit, eorum cognoscetis eos. Numquid colligunt de spinis uvas, aut de tribulis ficus? Sic omnis arbor bona fructus bonos facit; mala autem arbor fructus malos facit. Non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere, neque arbor mala fructus bonos facere (Mt 7, 16-18). Et secundum Lucam, cum hypocritae arguerentur, duae istae arbores commemoratae sunt, et mox evidenter expositae, subsequente Domino atque dicente: Bonus homo de bono thesauro cordis sui profert bonum; et malus homo de malo profert malum; ex abundantia enim cordis os loquitur (Lc 6, 45). Ubi autem ait: Aut facite arborem bonam et fructum eius bonum, aut facite arborem malam et fructum eius malum (quod tu eum de se ipso dixisse opinaris), unde dixerit mox aperiens: Siquidem ex fructu, inquit, arbor cognoscitur. Progenies viperarum, quomodo potestis bona loqui, cum sitis mali? Ex abundantia enim cordis os loquitur. Bonus homo de bono thesauro profert bona; et malus homo de malo thesauro profert mala (Mt 12, 33-35).
For when the Lord showed that those were to be guarded against who came in the clothing of sheep, but within were ravening wolves, he says: From their fruits you will know them. Do they gather grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles? So every good tree makes good fruits; but an evil tree makes evil fruits. A good tree cannot make evil fruits, nor an evil tree make good fruits (Matt 7:16-18). And according to Luke, when the hypocrites were being impugned, these two trees were recalled, and at once evidently expounded, the Lord following and saying: A good man, out of the good treasure of his heart, brings forth good; and an evil man, out of the evil, brings forth evil; for out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks (Luke 6:45). But where he says: Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or make the tree evil and its fruit evil (which you opine he said of himself), of what he spoke he at once opens, saying: For from its fruit the tree is known. Brood of vipers, how can you speak good things, when you are evil? For out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks. A good man, out of the good treasure, brings forth good things; and an evil man, out of the evil treasure, brings forth evil things (Matt 12:33-35).
Iulianum.5.21Videsne te falli, non me? Redi ergo ad causam operis mali, et invenies voluntatem malam; redi ad causam originalis mali, et invenies primi hominis voluntatem malam, et ea vitiatam naturam bonam.
Do you see that you are deceived, not I? Return, then, to the cause of an evil work, and you will find an evil will; return to the cause of the original evil, and you will find the evil will of the first man, and a good nature vitiated by it.
Iulianum.5.2122. IUL. Verum haec loquimur, ut fidei vestrae quis sit finis ostendam; ceterum illud inconcussum valet, quod disputationibus praecedentibus fundatum est, nec quidquam malum esse, praeter opus voluntatis quod iustitia prohibet perpetrantis; nec quod naturale est, posse malum convinci. Manet ergo haec inconcussa turris, de cuius edito latrocinia diversorum propulsantur errorum.
22. JUL. But we say these things to show what the end of your faith is; otherwise that stands unshaken which was founded in the preceding disputations—both that nothing is evil except the work of the will of one who perpetrates what justice forbids; and that what is natural cannot be convicted of being evil. This tower, then, remains unshaken, from whose height the robberies of diverse errors are repelled.
Iulianum.5.22AUG. Quid est quod dicis; aut quae sunt tuae praecedentes disputationes, nisi loquacissimae vanitates? Quid est quod dicis: Nec quidquam malum esse, praeter opus voluntatis quod iustitia prohibet perpetrantis? Ergo ipsa voluntas mala non est malum, si non est quidquam malum nisi opus eius? Neque enim est consequens, ut mala voluntas habeat etiam perpetrandi operis facultatem; ac per hoc te auctore non erit malum hominis male velle, quando non potest facere. Quis istam ferat insipientiam, vel potius amentiam?
AUG. What is it that you say? Or what are your preceding disputations, except most talkative vanities? What is it that you say: that nothing is evil except the work of the will of one who perpetrates what justice forbids? Therefore the evil will itself is not an evil, if nothing is evil except its work? For it is not a consequence that an evil will should also have the faculty of perpetrating the work; and on this account, with you as author, it will not be an evil for a man to will evilly, when he cannot do it. Who would bear this foolishness, or rather this madness?
Iulianum.5.22Ubi etiam ponimus, quia si non est malum quidquam, nisi opus voluntatis quod iustitia prohibet perpetrantis; non erunt mala quaecumque homines nolentes sive agunt, sive patiuntur; non erit malum quod clamat Apostolus: Non enim quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 19); non erit malum supplicium ignis aeterni, ubi erit fletus et stridor dentium (Cf. Mt 8, 12); quia id volens nemo patietur, et non est opus voluntatis quod iustitia prohibet perpetrantis, sed poena nolentis. Quando ista saperes, si non mirabiliter desiperes, vel potius insanires? Quid est etiam quod dicis " nec quod naturale est, malum posse convinci "?
Where also we set this down: that if nothing is evil except the work of the will of one who perpetrates what justice forbids, then whatever men unwillingly either do or suffer will not be evils; that will not be evil which the Apostle cries out: For the good that I will, I do not do; but the evil that I will not, that I do (Rom 7:19); the punishment of eternal fire will not be evil, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth (See Matt 8:12); because no one willing will suffer that, and it is not the work of the will of one who perpetrates what justice forbids, but the penalty of one who is unwilling. When would you have understanding of these things, if you did not wondrously lack understanding, or rather rave? What is it too that you say, "nor can what is natural be convicted of being evil"?
Iulianum.5.22Itane vero (ut innumerabilia naturalia vitia corporis taceam) malum non est surditas naturalis, quae ipsam quoque, ex qua iustus vivit (Cf. Gal 3, 11), impedit fidem, quoniam fides ex auditu est (Cf. Rom 10, 17)? Sed vos, nisi surdi intus essetis, Apostolo dicente: Fuimus enim et nos naturaliter filii irae, sicut et ceteri (Eph 2, 3); cordis auribus audiretis. Sed pergite adhuc, et cordibus caecis surdisque clamate: Non est malum naturaliter esse obliviosum, naturaliter esse obtunsum, naturaliter esse iracundum, naturaliter esse libidinosum. Cur enim non securi fatua ista verba iactatis, quibus malum non est etiam ipsa fatuitas naturalis?
Is it really so (to be silent about the innumerable natural vices of the body) that natural deafness is not evil, which impedes even that very faith from which the just man lives (See Gal 3:11), since faith comes from hearing (See Rom 10:17)? But you, unless you were deaf within, would hear with the ears of the heart, when the Apostle says: For we too were naturally children of wrath, like the rest (Eph 2:3). But go on still, and cry out with blind and deaf hearts: It is not evil to be naturally forgetful, naturally dull, naturally irascible, naturally libidinous. For why do you not securely toss out these foolish words, by which not even natural foolishness itself is evil?
Iulianum.5.22Usque adeo quippe omne originale malum meritum negantes, cuncta naturalia vitia laudare cogimini, ut non solum corpore deformes, debiles, monstruososque fetus, verum etiam fatuos, si nemo ibi peccasset, exorturos in paradiso fuisse dicatis; dum tamen pudendam susceptam vestram, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, inter delicias loci illius beatissimi collocetis.
For so far, denying the merit of all original evil, you are compelled to praise all natural vices, that you say that not only offspring deformed, debilitated, and monstrous in body, but even foolish, would have arisen in paradise, if no one had sinned there; provided, however, that you place your shameful undertaking, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, among the delights of that most blessed place.
Iulianum.5.2223. IUL. Verum nunc, quod locus exigit, insequamur. Apparet te, subtilissime disputator, unam eamdemque rem, naturam scilicet humanam magnis extulisse laudibus, sed maioribus maculasse criminibus; quod sicut uno tempore, uno opere, unoque consilio evenire simul non potest; ita ratio naturalis nequaquam capit haec, vel sub alternatione contraria, sed uno semper plena, id est, taxatione boni, numquam propter malum, quod eius instituta per actoris sui non capiunt dignitatem, nisi a pollutissimo Manichaeorum dente mordetur.
23. JUL. But now let us pursue what the place requires. It appears, most subtle disputant, that you have extolled one and the same thing—namely human nature—with great praises, but stained it with greater crimes; which, just as it cannot happen at one time, by one work, and one counsel, at once, so natural reason by no means takes these things in, even under contrary alternation, but, always full of one—that is, of the assessment of good—never on account of evil, since its institutions do not, through the dignity of their author, take in evil, unless it is bitten by the most polluted tooth of the Manichees.
Iulianum.5.23Sed hoc expleto, illud inquiro, quos putes connubii fumos sequendos. Nam si connubium fateris non esse causam hominis, sed naturam; peccati quoque causam non esse connubium, sed naturam; hoc connubium, cui laudem dabas, totum prorsus evanuit. Cui ergo rei adscribitur, si nec mali tui, nec boni mei causa est? Si ab honestate connubii hominem submoves, ne eum etiam fornicationi cogaris adscribere; a necessitate connubii peccatum removes, ne nuptias damnare videaris;
But with this settled, I ask the following: what mists of marriage do you suppose must be followed? For if you admit that marriage is not the cause of the human being but that nature is, and that the cause of sin too is not marriage but nature, then this marriage, to which you were giving praise, has utterly vanished altogether. To what, then, is it credited, if it is the cause neither of your evil nor of my good? If you remove the human being from the honorableness of marriage, lest you also be forced to credit him to fornication; if you remove sin from the necessity of marriage, lest you seem to condemn wedlock;
Iulianum.5.23quid remansit laude dignum in possessione coniugii? Cur illud times violare sermone, quod admota disputatione funditus subruisti? Cuius ergo rei causa esse dicetur, si nec malo nec bono participat naturali? Nihil ergo iam agit in rebus humanis nomen honestasque coniugii? Sed angeris, et dure quidem; subveniendum est igitur anhelo seni. Remansit quod ei dare possis, sine quo tamen nihil aliud invenitur; videlicet ut dicas hoc connubium stare pro foribus, ut ad voluptatem coeuntium nullam obscenitatis famam permittat irruere, sed suo titulo illi negotio honestatem vindicet et pudorem. Sine causa ergo connubii fidem subdola corrumpere laude voluisti; nulli est infestius, quam tibi.
what has remained worthy of praise in the possession of marriage? Why do you fear to violate by your speech what you have utterly undermined once your argument is brought to bear? Of what thing, then, will it be said to be the cause, if it shares in neither natural evil nor natural good? Does the name and honorableness of marriage, then, now accomplish nothing among human affairs? But you are distressed, and harshly so; the panting old man must therefore be helped. There remains something you can give him, without which nevertheless nothing else is found—namely, that you say this marriage stands at the door, so that it lets no rumor of obscenity rush in upon the pleasure of those coupling, but by its own title lays claim to honorableness and modesty for that business. So it was without reason that you wished by a crafty praise to corrupt the trustworthiness of marriage; to no one is it more hostile than to you.
Iulianum.5.23Vos omnino proturbat, nec ad lacerationem commixtionis tutelae suae creditae, Manichaeorum linguas permittit irrepere. Habent, inquit, suo dogmate digna meritoria, in quibus nocturnis horis expleantur; illam verecundantium voluptatem connubii tuentur excubiae, arcentur crimina, et honor honestatis admittitur; privilegia sibi ab Apostolo concessa defendunt honorabiles nuptias et thoros immaculatos; fornicatores autem et adulteros iudicabit Deus (Cf. Hebr 13, 4). Ubi est ergo criminosa commixtio, si negotio eius atque secreto auctoritas connubii, quod laudabas, obsequitur?
It thoroughly drives you out, and it does not permit the tongues of the Manichees to creep in to tear apart the union committed to its protection. It has, he says, lodgings worthy of its own teaching, in which the nocturnal hours may be spent; the watches guard that pleasure of those who feel shame at marriage, crimes are warded off, and the honor of honorableness is admitted; honorable marriage and the undefiled bed defend the privileges granted to them by the Apostle, but fornicators and adulterers God will judge (See Heb 13:4). Where, then, is there a criminal coupling, if the authority of marriage, which you used to praise, lends its compliance to its business and its secret act?
Iulianum.5.23AUG. Tu quidem, ut ex fructibus suis cognosci arborem diceres, non naturae hoc evangelicum testimonium, sed nuptiis proficere voluisti. Nam tua verba ista sunt: Si ergo trahitur, inquis, et de nuptiis originale malum, causa mali est conventio nuptiarum, et necesse est malum esse per quod et ex quo malus fructus apparuit, dicente Domino in Evangelio: " Ex fructibus suis arbor agnoscitur " (Lc 6, 44; Mt 7, 16). Quomodo, inquis, tu audiendus putaris, qui dicis bonum esse coniugium, de quo nihil aliud quam malum prodire definis? Constat igitur, inquis, rea esse coniugia, si peccatum inde originale deducitur, nec posse defendi, nisi fructus eorum innocens approbetur; defenduntur autem, et bona pronuntiantur; fructus igitur approbatur innocuus.
AUGUSTINE: You indeed, in saying that a tree is known from its fruits, wished this gospel testimony to count not for nature but for wedlock. For these are your words: If, then, you say, original evil too is drawn from wedlock, the cause of the evil is the union of wedlock, and that must be evil through which and out of which an evil fruit has appeared, since the Lord says in the Gospel: A tree is recognized by its fruits (Luke 6:44; Matt 7:16). How, you say, are you thought worthy to be listened to, you who say that marriage is good, when you define that nothing but evil comes forth from it? It is settled, therefore, you say, that marriages are guilty if original sin is derived from them, and that they cannot be defended unless their fruit is approved as innocent; but they are defended and pronounced good; therefore their fruit is approved as harmless.
Iulianum.5.23Nempe his verbis tuis satis clarum est, arborem te intellegi voluisse coniugium, et fructus arboris eos fetus qui coniugum commixtione nascuntur. Sed quia hinc ratione manifestissima exclusus es, et ex adulteris enim tales fetus oriuntur; ad naturam putasti esse fugiendum, in cuius altitudine latitares; de qua non agebas, quando propter connubii bonum fructusque eius bonos similitudinem arboris evangelicae caecus adhibebas.
Surely from these words of yours it is plain enough that you wished marriage to be understood as the tree, and the offspring born from the union of married persons as the fruit of the tree. But because you were shut out from this position by a most evident argument—for such offspring arise from adulterers as well—you thought you must flee to nature, in whose depths you might lie hidden; and yet you were not dealing with nature when, on account of the good of marriage and its good fruits, you blindly brought in the likeness of the gospel tree.
Iulianum.5.23Defende ergo naturam contra originale peccatum: relinque coniugia, ipsam dic bonam arborem, quia sive de coniugiis, sive de adulteriis, ipsa gignit homines; quos ideo dicis fructus bonos arboris bonae, ne aliquem reatum ex origine depravata credantur generatione traxisse, regeneratione solvendum; ne indigeant salvatore, ne in remissione peccatorum fuso sanguine redimantur.
Defend nature, then, against original sin: leave marriages aside, call nature itself the good tree, since whether from marriages or from adulteries it is nature that begets human beings; and these you therefore call the good fruits of the good tree, so that they may not be believed to have drawn any guilt from a corrupted origin by being generated, a guilt to be loosed by being regenerated—lest they need a Savior, lest they be redeemed in the forgiveness of sins by the shedding of blood.
Iulianum.5.23Age ista ut detestandus haereticus; imple paradisum Dei, etiamsi nemo peccasset, libidinibus concupiscentium, certaminibus contra libidines dimicantium, doloribus parturientium, fletibus vagientium, morbis languentium, funeribus morientium, moerore lugentium. Sic age, hoc te decet; tales enim, te auctore, subsequuntur poenae bonos fructus arboris bonae, et insinuant paradisum deliciarum, sed Pelagianorum.
Carry on this way, as the detestable heretic you are; fill the paradise of God, even if no one had sinned, with the lusts of those who covet, the struggles of those fighting against their lusts, the pains of those giving birth, the wailing of those crying, the diseases of those languishing, the funerals of those dying, the grief of those mourning. Carry on so; this befits you. For on your authority such punishments follow upon the good fruits of the good tree, and bring in a paradise of delights—but of the Pelagians.
Iulianum.5.23Quin etiam meam disputationem dialecticus acutus irrides, dicens, unam eamdemque rem, naturam videlicet humanam ma gnis extulisse me laudibus, sed maioribus maculasse criminibus. Ego vero non Aristotelem vel Chrysippum, multo minus vanum cum sua loquacitate Iulianum, magistrum delector habere; sed Christum, qui profecto nisi natura humana magnum esset bonum, non pro illa homo fieret, cum Deus esset; nisi magno peccati malo mortua esset, non pro illa moreretur, cum sine peccato ipse venisset et mansisset.
What is more, as a sharp dialectician you mock my argument, saying that I have extolled one and the same thing—namely, human nature—with great praises, but stained it with greater accusations. But I take delight in having as my master neither Aristotle nor Chrysippus, much less the empty Julian with his wordiness, but Christ; for surely, unless human nature were a great good, he would not have become a man on its behalf, though he was God; and unless it had died from the great evil of sin, he would not have died on its behalf, since he himself had come without sin and had remained so.
Iulianum.5.23Rursus tamen, quasi non tibi natura humana sufficiat, quae talis de adulteris, qualis de coniugibus nascitur, de bonitate nos putas urgendos esse nuptiarum, quaerens quid agant in rebus humanis, si neque malum ipsis imputandum est, quod non de illis, sed de vitiata per peccatum origine trahitur; neque bonum, quia homo etiam de adulteris nascitur. Et quia honestatem connubii a concubitus illiciti turpitudine invenimus esse discretam, hinc existimas confici, nullum originale malum trahi de coniugali concubitu; non intuens, quod si connubii bonum causa esset ne malum traherent, qui de coniugibus nascerentur; profecto adulterii malum causa esset ut malum traherent, qui de adulteris nascerentur.
Yet again, as though human nature did not suffice for you—nature that, born from adulterers, is such as it is when born from married persons—you suppose that we must be pressed concerning the goodness of marriage, asking what marriages accomplish among human affairs, if neither evil is to be imputed to them, since it is drawn not from them but from an origin corrupted by sin, nor good, since a human being is born even from adulterers. And because we find that the honorableness of marriage is distinguished from the foulness of unlawful intercourse, from this you think it is concluded that no original evil is drawn from marital intercourse—failing to see that, if the good of marriage were the cause that those born of married persons drew no evil, then surely the evil of adultery would be the cause that those born of adulterers drew evil.
Iulianum.5.23Habent igitur in rebus humanis honestum locum suum nuptiae, non ut homines nascantur, qui etsi nulla nuptiarum lege, naturali usu passim sexus uterque concumberet, utique nascerentur;
Marriages, then, have their own honorable place among human affairs—not so that human beings may be born, who would surely be born even if, with no law of marriage, both sexes lay together everywhere by natural use,
Iulianum.5.23sed ut ordinata propagatione nascantur; et quemadmodum partu certae sunt matres, ita fide coniugii habeantur certi et patres; et ne tua pudenda suscepta per quaslibet feminas tanto turpius, quanto liberius evagetur.
but so that they may be born by an ordered propagation; and just as mothers are made certain by giving birth, so fathers too may be held certain by the fidelity of marriage; and so that what is shameful in you, taken up through any women whatever, may not range about all the more basely the more freely.
Iulianum.5.23Sed non quia de nuptiis certo genitore homo nascitur, ideo non indiget salvatore per quem renascatur, ut a malo cum quo nascitur, liberetur. Non est itaque in connubiis, ut nos dicere calumniaris, criminosa commixtio; sed ideo laudanda est coniugum castitas, quia sola potest bene uti malo, quod tu deformiter laudas.
But it is not the case that, because a human being is born from marriage with a certain begetter, he therefore does not need a Savior through whom to be reborn, so as to be freed from the evil with which he is born. And so there is not in marriages, as you slanderously say we claim, a criminal coupling; rather, the chastity of married persons is to be praised, because it alone can make good use of the evil that you praise in such a misshapen way.
Iulianum.5.2324. IUL. His igitur absolutis vel breviter ostendam, quam iaceas in profundo ignorantiae, qui hactenus subtilissimus et acutissimus habebare. Dicis te naturae adscribere crimen, quod transit in sobolem, non tamen in nuptiis; sicut e regione, hominum naturae applicas, non flagitio. Et ideo fingis te quidem laudare connubium, ne aperte deprehendaris manichaeus; sed vituperas naturam, cui et malum inesse, et de qua propagari malum fateris.
24. JULIAN: With these matters disposed of, then, I will show, even if briefly, how deep in the abyss of ignorance you lie, you who up to now were held to be most subtle and most acute. You say that you ascribe to nature the crime that passes into the offspring, yet not in wedlock; just as, conversely, you assign human beings to nature, not to outrage. And so you pretend indeed to praise marriage, lest you be openly caught as a Manichee; but you disparage nature, in which you confess that evil resides and from which you confess that evil is propagated.
Iulianum.5.24Numquam igitur audire potuisti disputationis regulas et sanissimae constituta rationis? In omnibus enim praedicamentis plus amplectuntur genera, quam species; inde autem etiam fiunt genera subalterna; plus autem species, quam atomi; suntque genera quibus species continentur, species autem speciales quibus individua concluduntur. Minorum ergo quassatio, superiora non quatit; superiora vero casibus suis omnia, quae complectebantur, involvunt.
Have you never been able to hear the rules of argument and the established principles of the soundest reason? For in all the categories the genera embrace more than the species; and from this there also arise subordinate genera; while the species embrace more than the individuals; and there are genera by which species are contained, and special species by which individuals are bounded. The shaking, then, of the lower things does not shake the higher; but the higher, by their own collapses, drag down all the things they embraced.
Iulianum.5.24Verbi gratia, ani mal genus est: sed latitudine suae significationis diversas species comprehendit, scilicet hominis, equi, bovis, etc. Si ergo pereat una species, genus illud non sentit exitium; fac enim ut de rebus boum natura deficiat; genus nimirum interemptum non est, aliorum animalium permanente natura. At contra, si hoc quod est animal, auferatur de rebus; omnes sine dubio species, quae hoc genere concludebantur, intereunt; nulla enim remanebit species animantis, animali penitus interempto. Ea ergo quae superiora sunt, eventus suos atque merita speciebus, quas amplectuntur, impertiunt; non tamen recurrit, ut specierum suarum quasi necessitudinum quarumdam varietatibus permutentur.
For example: animal is a genus; but by the breadth of its signification it comprehends diverse species, namely of man, horse, ox, and so on. If, then, one species should perish, that genus feels no destruction; for suppose that the nature of oxen fails among things—the genus is surely not destroyed, since the nature of the other animals remains. But on the contrary, if that which is animal should be taken away from things, then without doubt all the species that were bounded by this genus perish; for no species of a living thing will remain once animal is utterly destroyed. The things, therefore, that are higher impart their own outcomes and merits to the species they embrace; yet it does not turn back the other way, so that they should be changed by the variations of their species as though by certain dependencies.
Iulianum.5.24Utque ad causam referatur exemplum; naturae humanae generalitas institutionum infra se locatarum genus quoddam est; haec velut species habet, in situ, in membris, in ordinibus, in motibus, vel aliis id genus. Qualitatem ergo suam omnibus suppositis speciebus impertit; non tamen obnoxiaretur sui, ut minorum a se rerum periculis misceatur. Si ergo natura vituperetur, et obnoxia diabolo reaque credatur, coniugium quoque quod sub illa est, et fecunditas, et substantia tota damnabitur. Non potest ergo laudari connubium, quod fit secundum naturam, si natura ipsa reprehenditur. Commoriatur necesse est radici suae germinum succisorum venustas; et ut rem ipsam planius eloquar, non potest dici bonum negotium nuptiarum, si commixtio naturalis arguitur; quoniam quod depretiatur in genere, cui indivisibiliter adhaeret, in specie nequit honorari.
And to apply the example to the matter: the generality of human nature is a kind of genus over the constituent realities placed beneath it; it has these as it were as species—in posture, in members, in arrangements, in movements, and other things of that kind. It imparts its own quality, therefore, to all the species placed under it; yet it would not be made liable on its own account, so as to be mixed up with the perils of things lower than itself. If, then, nature is disparaged and is believed to be subject and guilty to the devil, marriage too, which is under it, and fecundity, and the whole substance will be condemned. Marriage, therefore, which is done according to nature, cannot be praised if nature itself is reproached. The beauty of the sprouts that are cut down must necessarily die together with their root; and, to put the matter more plainly, the business of marriage cannot be called good if natural coupling is impeached, since what is devalued in the genus, to which it adheres indivisibly, cannot be honored in the species.
Iulianum.5.24Porro cum mala voluntas instrumentis naturalibus ad flagitia utitur, vis illa voluptatis et seminis, quae numquam pro coeuntium voluntate variatur, nullam patitur criminis societatem; sed materiam Deo praestat operanti, flagitiumque adulterantis solummodo arguit meritum, non naturae. Cum igitur de naturalibus disputaremus, perobtunse naturam reprobans connubia laudasti; cum irrefutabiliter constet genus speciebus suis participare, quidquid exceperit;
Furthermore, when an evil will uses the natural instruments for outrages, that force of pleasure and of seed, which is never varied according to the will of those coupling, suffers no association with the crime; rather, it furnishes matter to God who is at work, and convicts the desert only of the one committing the outrage, not of nature. Since, therefore, we were arguing about natural things, you, most obtusely reprobating nature, praised marriages; though it is irrefutably established that a genus shares with its species whatever it takes on.
Iulianum.5.24et ideo aut usus, quem naturalem Apostolus dicit, bonus legitimusque censebitur, et erunt honesta coniugia, nullumque erit naturale peccatum; aut si creditur natura esse diabolica, ut sit originale peccatum, connubii quoque usus damnabilis pronuntiabitur. Et non quidem sobrie, ex aperto tamen Manichaeorum dogma suscipitur; quod quoniam funestum est, nec apud illos quidquam est aut veritatis, aut honestatis, aut fidei; apud nullos autem alios opinio potest naturalis esse peccati; ut nos catholicos, ita vos constat esse Manichaeos.
And therefore either the use that the Apostle calls natural will be judged good and lawful, and marriages will be honorable, and there will be no natural sin; or, if nature is believed to be diabolical, so that there is original sin, the use of marriage too will be pronounced damnable. And then, not soberly indeed, but openly, the teaching of the Manichees is taken up; and since it is deadly, and since among them there is nothing either of truth or of honorableness or of faith—while among no others can there be an opinion of natural sin—just as we are Catholics, so you are clearly Manichees.
Iulianum.5.24AUG. Tu certe de arbore locutus es, et fructibus ex quibus arbor agnoscitur, cum in hac similitudine coniugium prolemque intellegendam putasses, exclu sus inde, quia et de concubitu adulterino potest talis existere fructus, ad naturam fugisti. Nec latere nos fugientis transitus potuit; in verbis enim tuis, quae nunc commemorabo, satis evidenter apparuit. Aisti enim loquens ad me ipsum: Simili acumine illud quoque labefactare conaris, quod dixi, testimonio evangelico, ex fructibus suis debere arborem cognosci; ut ostenderem, inquis, quod clarum est, doceri bona non posse coniugia; immo ipsam naturam, quae coniugiorum operatione suppletur, nec Dei posse operi vindicari, si de ea dicerentur crimina pullulare ".
AUGUSTINE: You certainly spoke of a tree and of the fruits by which the tree is recognized, when you thought marriage and offspring should be understood under this likeness; and, shut out from it because such fruit can come into being even from adulterous intercourse, you fled to nature. Nor could the passage of your flight be hidden from us; for it appeared plainly enough in your words, which I will now recall. For you said, speaking to me: With a like acuteness you try to weaken also what I said, on the gospel testimony, that a tree ought to be recognized from its fruits, so that I might show, you say, what is clear—that marriages cannot be taught to be good; indeed, that nature itself, which is supplied by the operation of marriages, cannot even be claimed for the work of God, if crimes were said to sprout from it.
Iulianum.5.24His tuis dictis aperuisti fugae tuae transitum, nominatis coniugiis addendo et dicendo: immo ipsam naturam, quae coniugiorum operatione suppletur. Distinxisti ergo duo ista, satisque ostendisti aliud esse naturam, aliud coniugia, quorum operatione natura suppletur. Quid est ergo quod postea naturam genus, eiusque speciem vis esse coniugium? Numquid ullum genus speciei suae ullius operatione suppletur? Non utique: neque enim animal, quod est genus, suppletur operatione hominis, vel equi, vel bovis, vel alterius alicuius pecoris, quod species est generis illius; quandoquidem etiamsi desit aliqua species, auferaturque de rebus; manet tamen genus, quod ceteras amplectitur species, sicut etiam ipse disputasti. Quod genus utique integrum non maneret, si operatione speciei, quae ablata est, suppleretur; non enim magis est genus, si plures; et minus est genus, si species habeat pauciores; quamvis si omnes auferantur species, nec genus erit; quemadmodum genere ablato, nulla erit species.
By these words of yours you laid open the passage of your flight, adding to the marriages you had named and saying: indeed, nature itself, which is supplied by the operation of marriages. You therefore distinguished these two, and showed well enough that nature is one thing and marriages another, by whose operation nature is supplied. What is it, then, that afterward you want nature to be the genus and marriage its species? Surely no genus is supplied by the operation of any species of its own? Not at all: for neither is animal, which is a genus, supplied by the operation of man, or horse, or ox, or any other beast, which is a species of that genus; since even if some species is lacking and is taken away from things, the genus nevertheless remains, embracing the other species, as you yourself argued. And that genus would surely not remain intact if it were supplied by the operation of the species that was taken away; for it is no more a genus if it has more species, and no less a genus if it has fewer—although if all the species are taken away, there will be no genus either; just as, when the genus is taken away, there will be no species.
Iulianum.5.24Non est igitur connubium species, genusque natura, si connubiorum opere natura suppletur; sicut non est agricultura species segetis, quoniam suppletur seges opere agriculturae. Deinde si naturam genus, eiusque speciem dicis esse coniugium; procul dubio dicere cogeris, quod natura sit omne coniugium. Ideo quippe omnis equus animal est, etsi non omne animal equus; quia species est equus, animal genus.
Marriage, therefore, is not a species, and nature a genus, if nature is supplied by the work of marriages; just as farming is not a species of the crop, since the crop is supplied by the work of farming. Then again, if you say nature is the genus and marriage its species, you are without doubt forced to say that every marriage is nature. For just so, every horse is an animal, even if not every animal is a horse, because the horse is a species and animal a genus.
Iulianum.5.24Ergo nec fit ab homine aliqua natura; quamvis enim, ut scriptum est, a Domino iungatur mulier viro (Cf. Prov 19, 14 (sec. LXX)); quoniam nisi adiuvante ipso non fit, quando recte fit; quis tamen nesciat opera hominum esse coniugia? Porro si naturam non facit homo, non est natura coniugium; quia coniugium facit homo. Ac per hoc, quia coniugium natura non est, profecto naturae species, tamquam illa sit genus, nullo esse pacto potest.
Therefore no nature is made by a human being; for although, as it is written, a wife is joined to a husband by the Lord (See Prov 19:14 (LXX))—since it does not happen unless he himself helps, when it happens rightly—yet who does not know that marriages are the works of human beings? Furthermore, if a human being does not make nature, marriage is not nature, because a human being makes marriage. And by this, since marriage is not nature, surely it can in no way be a species of nature, as though nature were the genus.
Iulianum.5.24Coniugia igitur ad mores hominum pertinent, ipsi autem homines ad naturam. Licet itaque nobis mala vitiatae vituperare naturae, et laudare mores bene utentes bonis malisque naturae. Laudo ergo coniugia; absit autem ut laudem malum, quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum; sine quo malo quisquam hominum non potest nasci; cuius mali reatus, nisi renascendo, non potest solvi; cuius mali bonus usus laudatur in concubitu coniugali. Proinde originale peccatum, quod non trahitur ex alienae commixtione, sed ex nostrae depravatione naturae, non dicunt Manichaei, sed dicunt Catholici; quod vos negando estis haeretici.
Marriages, therefore, belong to the morals of human beings, but human beings themselves to nature. It is permitted to us, then, to disparage the evils of a corrupted nature, and to praise morals that make good use of the goods and evils of nature. I praise marriages, then; but far be it that I should praise the evil by which the flesh lusts against the spirit—the evil without which no human being can be born, the guilt of which evil cannot be loosed except by being reborn, and the good use of which evil is praised in marital intercourse. Accordingly, original sin, which is drawn not from a union with something foreign but from the corruption of our own nature, is asserted not by the Manichees but by the Catholics; and by denying it you are heretics.
Iulianum.5.2425. IUL. Ad cuius nominis cavendam invidiam, frustra omnino diversarum facis haereseon mentionem. Ais enim: Sicut Ariani Catholicos Sabellianos vocant, quamvis certam personarum distinctionem faciant, naturae tamen communione servata; ita et a nobis Manichaeorum vobis nomen imponi; cum vos non dicatis malum esse nuptias, quod dicunt Manichaei, sed dicatis malum in omnes homines naturae conditione transire (De nupt. et concup. 2, 23, 38). Haec autem argumenta tua prudentibus non ambigo irrisum iri; nam ut Ariani falsos Catholicos Sabellianos dicunt, cum a nobis et Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti personarum fiat sine ulla confusione et sine mutatione substantiae distinctio, illique hebetissime calumnientur, inter unum et tres nihil interesse; ita etiam Catholici iure meritoque vos Manichaeos esse pronuntiant; quia id a nobis dici fides vestra compellit.
25. JULIAN: To guard against the odium of which name, you make mention of various heresies altogether in vain. For you say: Just as the Arians call Catholics Sabellians, although they make a definite distinction of persons while keeping the community of nature, so the name of the Manichees is imposed on you by us; though you do not say that marriages are evil, as the Manichees do, but you say that evil passes into all human beings by the condition of nature (Marriage and Desire 2.23.38). But these arguments of yours, I do not doubt, will be laughed at by the prudent; for just as the Arians call the true Catholics Sabellians—when a distinction of the persons of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is made by us without any confusion and without any change of substance, while they most dully slander us, alleging that there is no difference between one and three—so too the Catholics rightly and deservedly pronounce you to be Manichees, because your faith compels this to be said by us.
Iulianum.5.25Asserunt quippe Manichaei naturalem peccatum: vos dicitis naturale. Dicunt Manichaei libidinem corporum a diabolo esse plantatam; tu id multiplicata disputatione confirmas. Contendunt illi per liberum arbitrium non posse malum caveri, quippe quod naturale sit; tu quoque iisdem sermonibus liberum commentaris arbitrium, sed per quod malum fieri possit, a malo autem non possit desisti. Dicit Manichaeus semen esse maledictum: tu id Scripturarum auctoritate probare conaris. Dicit Manichaeus inconvertibilem esse malitiam; tu sic esse vociferaris. Sed dicis tu Adam solum naturae fuisse melioris; dicit etiam Manichaeus ad Patricium, meliorem illum secutis credi oportere, quasi de primae concretum flore substantiae. Dicis tu commixtionem propter naturales motus esse diabolicam, atque homines a diabolo quasi fruticis a se plantati fructus iure decerpi; dicit etiam hoc Manichaeus, quippe a quo id credere et affirmare didicisti. Dicit Manichaeus et naturam et nuptias malas esse: tu autem bonas nuptias, sed ream naturam. Non tu hic religiosior, sed ille prudentior.
For the Manichees assert that sin is natural: you say it is natural. The Manichees say that the lust of bodies was planted by the devil; you confirm it by your multiplied argument. They contend that through free choice evil cannot be avoided, since it is natural; you too, in the same terms, devise a free choice—but one through which evil can be done, while one cannot cease from evil. The Manichee says that seed is accursed: you try to prove it by the authority of the Scriptures. The Manichee says that malice is unconvertible; you cry out that it is so. But you say that Adam alone was of a better nature; the Manichee too says, to Patricius, that he must be believed better than those who followed, as though formed from the flower of the first substance. You say that intercourse is diabolical on account of the natural movements, and that human beings are rightly plucked by the devil as the fruits of a bush planted by himself; the Manichee says this too—indeed, it is from him that you learned to believe and affirm it. The Manichee says that both nature and marriage are evil: you, however, say that marriage is good but nature guilty. You here are not more religious, but he is more prudent.
Iulianum.5.25Quomodo ergo falsum est, quod dicunt Ariani, Catholicos Sabellianos esse; ita verissimum est, quod dicunt Catholici, Traducianos non esse aliud quam Manichaeos; distinctionem autem inter vos illusoriam quidem, non fide vestra, sed imperitia contigisse. Unius ergo fidei tu et Manichaeus; sed ille minus impudens, quam tua gravitas invenitur; neque enim facile Manichaeus aut Melitidis alter offenditur, qui dicat se damnare naturam hominum, sed non infamare coniugia.
Just as, then, what the Arians say is false, that Catholics are Sabellians, so it is most true, what the Catholics say, that the Traducianists are nothing other than Manichees; and that the distinction between you came about not by your faith but by inexperience, illusory indeed. You and the Manichee, then, are of one faith; but he is found less shameless than your gravity; for one does not easily come upon a Manichee, or a second Melitis, who would say that he condemns the nature of human beings but does not defame marriages.
Iulianum.5.25AUG. Cur ego Arianos et Sabellianos commemoraverim, qui librum illum meum intellegens legit, mox invenit; teque pervidet dolose agere, qui eamdem causam totam commemorare noluisti. Tibi enim dixi: Sicut Ariani dum Sabellianos fugiunt, in peius aliquid inciderunt, quia Trinitatis ausi sunt non personas discernere, sed naturas; ita Pelagiani dum Manichaeorum pestem in perversum vitare conantur, de nuptiarum fructu ipsis Manichaeis convincuntur perniciosiora sentire, credendo parvulos Christo medico non egere (Ibidem). Haec verba mea tibi proposuisses, vel certe hanc sententiam meam, si mihi quoquo modo respondere voluisses; quibus praetermissis dicis tibi ipse quod vis, ut mihi, non ea quae a me dicta sunt refellendo, sed non tacendo respondisse videaris.
AUGUSTINE: Why I mentioned the Arians and the Sabellians, anyone who reads that book of mine with understanding soon finds out; and he sees through you, who act deceitfully, you who were unwilling to recall the whole of that same case. For I said to you: Just as the Arians, while fleeing the Sabellians, fell into something worse, because they dared to distinguish in the Trinity not the persons but the natures, so the Pelagians, while trying perversely to avoid the plague of the Manichees, are convicted, concerning the fruit of marriages, of holding views more pernicious than the Manichees themselves, by believing that little ones do not need Christ the physician (Marriage and Desire 2.23.38). You would have set these words of mine before yourself, or at least this opinion of mine, if you had wished to answer me in any way; but, passing them over, you say to yourself what you please, so that you may seem to have answered me not by refuting what was said by me but by not keeping silent.
Iulianum.5.25Et nunc, quod ea me sentire dicis, quae sentiunt Manichaei, multum falleris; vel potius quos potes fallis. Nam Manichaei malum coaeternum Deo, idemque malum esse substantiam, alienam quamdam dicunt esse naturam, quae in bonum mutari, nec per se ipsam, nec a bono Deo possit omnino; cuius immutabilis mali commixtione, animam bonam, quam credere audent boni Dei esse naturam, inquinatam perhibent atque corruptam; et ob hoc in qualibet hominis aetate necessarium habere salvatorem, a quo mundata et redintegrata atque a tali captivitate eruta liberetur.
And now, in saying that I hold the views the Manichees hold, you are greatly mistaken—or rather, you deceive those whom you can. For the Manichees say that evil is coeternal with God, and that this same evil is a substance, a certain foreign nature, which can in no way at all be changed into good, neither by itself nor by the good God; and by a mixture with this unchangeable evil they allege that the good soul, which they dare to believe is a nature of the good God, is defiled and corrupted; and on this account, that at every age of a human being it has need of a Savior, by whom, cleansed and restored and rescued from such a captivity, it may be set free.
Iulianum.5.25Vos autem dum in perversum fugitis Manichaeos, in has impietatis tenebras incidistis, ut ab omni malo asserendo parvulos salvos, Salvatorem miseris necessarium non putetis; et adiuvandis eis ipsis, quos fugitis, Manichaeis nescio quomodo per circuitum vestri occurratis erroris, negando malum vitiatae naturae nostrae; ut quidquid malorum vel recte creditur, vel aperte invenitur in parvulis, commixtioni (quod volunt ipsi) naturae tribuatur alienae.
But you, while you flee the Manichees in a perverse way, have fallen into these shadows of impiety, so that, by asserting that little ones are safe from all evil, you think the Savior is not necessary for the wretched; and, somehow, by a roundabout course of your own error, you come to the aid of the very Manichees you flee, by denying the evil of our corrupted nature—so that whatever of evils is either rightly believed or openly found in little ones may be attributed (which is what they themselves want) to a mixture with a foreign nature.
Iulianum.5.25Catholica vero ut Manichaeos et Pelagianos devitet, nullam naturam atque substantiam esse dicit malum; sed voluntario malo, quod per unum hominem in omnes homines pertransiit, nostram naturam atque substantiam ideo mutabilem, quia Dei natura non est, non negat esse vitiatam; eique malo, quod insanabile Deo non est, ut absumi possit, in omnibus aetatibus Salvatorem necessarium confitetur. Proinde nec de peccato naturali, nec de libidine corporum, nec de libero arbitrio, nec de semine maledicto, nec de inconvertibili malitia, nec de natura primi hominis, nec de commixtione sexuum, nec de potestate diabolica in homines, eadem quae Manichaei, dicere possumus; qui duas naturas atque substantias, unam boni, alteram mali, sine initio temporis sempiternas, et ex quodam initio temporis commixtas esse non dicimus; ne inter multa absurda atque vesana, etiam Dei naturam coinquinabilem corruptibilemque dicamus.
But the Catholic Church, in order to avoid both Manichees and Pelagians, says that no nature and no substance is evil; but, by the voluntary evil that passed through one man into all human beings, she does not deny that our nature and substance—mutable for the reason that it is not the nature of God—is corrupted; and she confesses that, for that evil which is not incurable for God, so that it can be done away with, a Savior is necessary at every age. Accordingly, concerning natural sin, concerning the lust of bodies, concerning free choice, concerning accursed seed, concerning unconvertible malice, concerning the nature of the first man, concerning the mingling of the sexes, concerning the power of the devil over human beings, we cannot say the same things as the Manichees; for we do not say that there are two natures and substances, one of good, the other of evil, everlasting without a beginning of time and mixed together from a certain beginning of time—lest, among many absurd and insane things, we should also call the nature of God defilable and corruptible.
Iulianum.5.25Quod autem me solum affirmas dicere bonas nuptias, reamque naturam; ut alios taceam, do tibi Paulum apostolum, quem tu quoque laudatorem praedicas nuptiarum, dicentem tamen de naturae originalis reatu, corpus mortuum esse propter peccatum (Cf. Rom 8, 10). Do tibi alterum huius intellectorem, meumque doctorem, catholicum Ambrosium, qui cum laudet coniugalem pudicitiam, dicit tamen: Omnes sub peccato nascimur, quorum ipse ortus in vitio est (AMBROSIUS, De paenit. 1, 2, 2). Calumniose, contentiose, linguose, quid quaeris amplius?
But as for your assertion that I alone say that marriages are good and nature guilty—to pass over others, I give you the Apostle Paul, whom you too proclaim a praiser of marriages, yet who says, concerning the guilt of our original nature, that the body is dead because of sin (See Rom 8:10). I give you another who understood this, and my own teacher, the Catholic Ambrose, who, though he praises marital chastity, nevertheless says: We are all born under sin, whose very origin is in fault (Ambrose, On Repentance 1.2.2). Slanderously, contentiously, glibly—what more do you seek?
Iulianum.5.2526. IUL. Verum adversum haec ludibria satis actum est: veniamus ad eam, quam supra dixi, perplexissimam quaestionem, quae ipsum praeceptorem tuum sui subtilitate decepit. Oppositioni quippe nostrae, haud exponendo, sed aliud difficilius ponendo conatus es occurrere. Cum enim docuissem, quia in hominibus perfectioris aetatis malum suapte voluntate operantibus, et innocua naturae laudarentur exordia, et actionum diverticula iure vituperarentur; duoque esse, quae possint contrariis applicari; in parvulis autem unum, id est, naturam, quia voluntas non esset; illudque unum aut Deo, aut daemoni esse reputandum; collegique ut si per Deum natura subsisteret, non posset esse in ea originale malum; si autem diabolo transcriberetur per ingenitum malum, nihil esset per quod homo divino operi vindicaretur;
26. JULIAN: But enough has been done against these mockeries: let us come to that most perplexing question, which I spoke of above, which deceived even your own teacher by its subtlety. For you tried to meet our objection not by setting it out, but by setting down something more difficult. For when I had taught that, in human beings of more mature age who work evil by their own will, both the harmless beginnings of nature are praised and the byways of their actions are rightly disparaged—and that there are two things that can be applied to opposites; but in little ones one thing only, that is, nature, since there is no will; and that this one thing must be reckoned either to God or to the demon; and I had concluded that, if nature subsists through God, there could not be in it original evil; but if it were ascribed to the devil through an inborn evil, there would be nothing by which a human being might be claimed for the divine work—
Iulianum.5.26cum ergo ad ea pervenisses loca, respondisti, fide solita, me collegisse verum; sed et in parvulis duo esse, id est, naturam et peccatum. Quod tamen peccatum, ut priorum definitionum recorderis, nihil est aliud, quam voluntas retinendi vel admittendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. Constituto ergo peccatum nihil esse aliud, quam pravae voluntatis electionem; respondisti, Epicure nostri temporis, in parvulis peccatum esse, voluntatem non esse: quod cuius sit dedecoris, liber iam quartus ostendit. In his ergo locis cum dixissem: " Si ex voluntate est peccatum, mala voluntas, quae peccatum facit; si ex natura, mala natura, quae peccatum facit "; ea quaestione es mihi conatus occurrere, quam a te excogitatam non esse manifestum est. Nam cum ante hos annos essemus Carthagini, a quodam mihi Honorato nomine necessario tuo, manichaeo aeque, sicut epistolae vestrae indicant, id ipsum propositum est.
when, then, you had come to these passages, you answered, with your customary trust, that I had concluded truly; but that in little ones too there are two things, that is, nature and sin. Yet this sin, that you may recall the earlier definitions, is nothing other than the will to retain or admit what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. Having established, then, that sin is nothing other than the choice of a depraved will, you answered, Epicurus of our time, that in little ones there is sin but there is no will—to what disgrace this belongs, the fourth book has already shown. In these passages, then, when I had said: If sin is from the will, the will that does the sin is evil; if from nature, the nature that does the sin is evil, you tried to meet me with a question which it is clear was not thought up by you. For when, some years ago, we were at Carthage, this very point was put to me by a certain man named Honoratus, a friend of yours, likewise a Manichee, as your letters indicate.
Iulianum.5.26Cuius rei ad hoc tantummodo feci mentionem, ut clareret hanc esse quaestionem, quae et Manem et Marcionem ante tot saecula decepisset. Sic ergo loqueris contra hoc quod ego dixeram: " Si peccatum in naturam, mala natura quae peccatum facit ": Quaero ab illo, si potest respondeat, sicut manifestum est, ex voluntate mala tamquam ex arbore mala fructus eius fieri omnia opera mala; sic ipsam voluntatem malam, id est, ipsam fructuum malorum arborem malam unde dicat exortam. Si ex angelo; quid erat ipse angelus, nisi bonum opus Dei? Si ex homine; quid erat ipse homo, nisi bonum opus Dei? Immo quia voluntas mala ex angelo angeli, et ex homine hominis orta est; quid erant haec duo, antequam in eis ista mala orirentur, nisi bonum opus Dei, et bona atque laudanda natura? Ecce ergo ex bono oritur malum, nec fuit omnino unde oriri posset, nisi ex bono; ipsam dico voluntatem malam, quam nullum praecessit malum; non opera mala, quae non sunt nisi ex voluntate mala, tamquam ex arbore mala.
I made mention of this matter for one purpose only: that it might be clear that this is the question which deceived both Mani and Marcion so many ages ago. So, then, you speak against what I had said—If sin is in nature, the nature that does the sin is evil: I ask of him, let him answer if he can, that just as it is clear that from an evil will, as from an evil tree, come all its evil works, so let him say from where this evil will itself, that is, the evil tree of evil fruits itself, has arisen. If from an angel: what was the angel himself but a good work of God? If from a human being: what was the human being himself but a good work of God? Indeed, since the evil will arose from an angel in the case of the angel, and from a human being in the case of the human being, what were these two, before these evils arose in them, but a good work of God and a good and praiseworthy nature? Behold, then, evil arises from good, and there was nothing at all from which it could arise except from good; the evil will itself, I mean, which no evil preceded—not the evil works, which exist only from an evil will, as from an evil tree.
Iulianum.5.26Nec ideo tamen ex bono potuit oriri voluntas mala, quia bonum factum est a Deo bono; sed quia de nihilo factum est, non de Deo. Quid est ergo quod dicit: Si natura opus est Dei, per opus Dei opus diaboli transire non sinitur? Nonne opus diaboli, quando in angelo qui diabolus factus est, prius ortum est, in opere Dei ortum est? Quapropter si malum quod omnino nusquam erat in opere Dei oriri potuit; cur malum quod alicubi iam erat, per opus Dei transire non potuit? Numquid homines non sunt opus Dei? Pertransiit ergo peccatum per homines, hoc est, diaboli opus per opus Dei; atque ut alio modo idipsum dicam, opus Dei per opus operis Dei (De nupt. et concup. 2, 28, 48).
And yet the evil will could not have arisen from good for the reason that the good was made by the good God; but because it was made out of nothing, not out of God. What is it, then, that he says: If nature is the work of God, the work of the devil is not allowed to pass through the work of God? Is not the work of the devil, when it first arose in the angel who became the devil, something that arose in the work of God? Wherefore, if an evil that was nowhere at all could arise in the work of God, why could not an evil that already existed somewhere pass through the work of God? Are not human beings the work of God? Sin, then, passed through human beings—that is, the work of the devil through the work of God; or, to say the same thing another way, the work of God through the work of the work of God (Marriage and Desire 2.28.48).
Iulianum.5.26Haec tam multa, quae de tuis sermonibus posui, aperuerunt omnino ipsum caput et fontem erroris antiqui; nihil in dictis tuis acutius, nihil in disserendo perplexius attulisti; toto omnino campo disputationis agitatus, ac de omni loco, in quo tentaveras subsistere, armis infestae veritatis expulsus, pervenisti tandem ad illum specum, quem inter opaca quaestionum Manichaeus foderat. Reddidisti propositioni huic testimonium difficultatis suae, dicens: " Quaero ab illo, ut si potest respondeat "; et ideo quoniam convenit inter utrumque nostrum locum esse difficilem, ut toto animo adsit lector admoneo. Distinctiones pro rei conditione subtiles, quas adiuvante Christo confido pinguescere, prius intentus, mox securus sequitur.
These many things that I have set down from your discourses have altogether laid open the very head and source of the ancient error; you have brought forward nothing sharper in your sayings, nothing more perplexing in your discoursing; harried over the whole field of argument, and driven by the weapons of a hostile truth from every position in which you had tried to make a stand, you arrived at last at that cave which the Manichee had dug among the dark places of his questions. You bore witness to the difficulty of this proposition by saying: I ask of him, that he may answer if he can; and therefore, since it is agreed between us both that the place is difficult, I urge the reader to be present with his whole mind. Distinctions subtle as the condition of the matter requires—which, with Christ helping, I trust will grow fuller—he will follow, first intent, then at ease.
Iulianum.5.26Quaesisti ergo, unde malum; interrogo, quod malum dicas; commune enim hoc nomen est culpae et vindictae; ceterum abusive supplicium malum vocatur, cum gravitate eius quo infertur iudicii vindicetur. Respondes, de peccato te dicere, non de supplicio.
You asked, then, whence evil; I ask, what do you call evil? For this is a name common to fault and to punishment; though punishment is improperly called evil, since it is exacted by the gravity of the judgment by which it is inflicted. You answer that you are speaking of sin, not of punishment.
Iulianum.5.26AUG. Aperuisti omnino stultitiam tuam, quantum potuisti, qui malum confiteris esse peccare, et malum non esse dicis, sed abusive malum vocari, supplicio sempiterni ignis ardere. Sed tantae absurditatis rationem reddis egregiam: Abusive, inquis, supplicium malum vocatur, cum gravitate eius quo infertur iudicii vindicetur. Si ergo, ut hoc dicas, damnati poenam non ex miseria patientis, sed ex iustitia damnantis appendis; dic apertius, bonum esse supplicium, quod abusive dicis malum vocari. Supplicium est enim poena peccati, et iusta est utique poena peccati, iustum est itaque supplicium; et omne quod iustum est, bonum est: bonum est ergo supplicium.
AUGUSTINE: You have altogether laid open your foolishness, as far as you could, you who confess that to sin is an evil, but say that it is not an evil—only improperly called an evil—to burn in the punishment of eternal fire. But you give a remarkable reason for so great an absurdity: Improperly, you say, is punishment called an evil, since it is exacted by the gravity of the judgment by which it is inflicted. If, then, in order to say this, you weigh the penalty of the condemned not by the misery of the one suffering but by the justice of the one condemning, say more openly that the punishment, which you say is improperly called an evil, is a good. For punishment is the penalty of sin, and the penalty of sin is certainly just, and so the punishment is just; and everything that is just is good: the punishment, therefore, is good.
Iulianum.5.26Nonne cernis, nisi ita damnatum a damnante distinguas, ut ipsam damnationem, quod supplicium est et poena peccati, bonum quidem opus esse asseras damnantis, sed damnati exitium malum; non, inquam, cernis, nisi haec ea ratione distinguas, ad hoc te perduci ut dicas, homines malis operibus suis, non ad mala quae patiantur graviora, quod verum est, sed ad bona potius pervenire, quod tam falsum est, et tanta vanitate dicitur, ut ista sapere tantum sit malum, quantum est etiam cordis caeci supplicium?
Do you not see that, unless you distinguish the condemned from the one condemning in such a way as to assert that the condemnation itself, which is the punishment and penalty of sin, is indeed a good work on the part of the one condemning, but the ruin of the condemned an evil—do you not see, I say, that unless you distinguish these by this reasoning, you are led to say that human beings, by their evil works, arrive not at the graver evils they would suffer (which is true) but rather at goods (which is so false, and is said with such vanity, that to be wise in this way is as great an evil as is even the punishment of a blind heart)?
Iulianum.5.26Igitur non abusive vocatur malum; sed prorsus malum est patienti; bonum est autem facienti, quia iustum est poenam irrogare peccanti. Si delirare non vis, ista distingue.
Therefore it is not improperly called an evil; rather, it is utterly an evil for the one suffering it, but a good for the one inflicting it, since it is just to impose a penalty on the one sinning. If you do not wish to rave, make these distinctions.
Iulianum.5.2627. IUL. Quaeris ergo unde sit hoc malum, quod merito malum vocatur, id est, peccatum. Respondeo, imperite nimis rogari originem rei, de cuius adhuc definitione non constitit. Videamus ergo prius utrum sit, tunc quid sit, ultimum unde sit. Feci hoc quidem in primo praesentis operis libello; sed ibi ex aliqua parte securus: ambigatur ergo utrum sit malum.
27. JULIAN: You ask, then, whence comes this evil that is rightly called an evil, that is, sin. I answer that it is too inexpertly asked—to ask the origin of a thing about whose definition there is as yet no agreement. Let us therefore see first whether it is, then what it is, last whence it is. I did this indeed in the first little book of the present work; but there, on one point, with some confidence. Let it be in doubt, then, whether there is an evil.
Iulianum.5.27AUG. Si tu esse malum diceres, ego autem negarem; tunc inter nos quaestio verteretur, utrum esset malum, in qua quaestione susciperes ostendere malum esse, quia id a me negatum esset; cum vero id neuter nostrum neget, neuter hinc ambigat; quid poscis ut ambigatur unde non ambigitur, nisi loquendi libidine; ut non verborum meorum convictione, sed librorum tuorum multitudine glorieris?
AUGUSTINE: If you were to say there is an evil, but I denied it, then the question would be turned between us, whether there is an evil, and in that question you would undertake to show that there is an evil, because it had been denied by me; but since neither of us denies it, neither of us is in doubt about it, why do you demand that what is not in doubt be put in doubt, except from a lust for talking—so that you may glory not in the conviction of my words but in the multitude of your books?
Iulianum.5.2728. IUL. At id esse testantur frequentata vitia et severa iudicia; constitit ergo esse peccatum. Quaerimus quid sit; utrum corpus aliquod sit, quod ex multis compositum videatur; an singulare quiddam, sicut unum aliquod elementum, vel per cogitationem a reliquorum communione purgatum. Porro nihil horum est. Quid est ergo? Appetitus liberae voluntatis, quem prohibet iustitia; vel, ut definitione utamur priore: Voluntas faciendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. Considera ergo, utrum extra terminos definitionis huius peccatum nequeat inveniri, ne alibi vagetur, quod nos comprehensum putamus.
28. JULIAN: But that it is, frequent vices and severe judgments attest; it is established, therefore, that there is sin. We ask what it is: whether it is some body, which seems composed of many things, or something singular, like some one element, or one purified by thought from communion with the rest. But it is none of these. What is it, then? An appetite of the free will which justice prohibits; or, to use our earlier definition: the will to do what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. Consider, then, whether sin cannot be found outside the bounds of this definition, lest what we think we have grasped wander off elsewhere.
Iulianum.5.28Consulamus ergo iustitiam iudicantis, ut et illius testimonio clareat, utrum bene cinctum sit his limitibus genus omne peccati. Imputatne Deus quod scit non posse vitari? At nulla iustitia est, et summa deformitas; immo si hoc fiat, non puniuntur peccata, sed crescunt. A iusto enim iudice culpa puniri solet; ea si in ipsum arbitrum iustitiae corruptione pervadat, vindicata est de iudice, non punita. Non ergo imputat iustitia in peccatum, nisi unde liberum est abstinere.
Let us therefore consult the justice of the one judging, so that by its testimony too it may be clear whether the whole genus of sin is well girt by these limits. Does God impute what he knows cannot be avoided? But there is no justice in this, and the utmost deformity; indeed, if this were done, sins would not be punished but would grow. For by a just judge fault is wont to be punished; if it should pass by corruption into the very arbiter of justice, vengeance has been taken on the judge, not punishment exacted. Justice, therefore, does not impute as sin anything except that from which one is free to abstain.
Iulianum.5.28Liberum autem dici non potest, nisi quod sine aliquo inevitabili naturalium coactu, in iure emancipatae constiterit voluntatis. Optime ergo est finitum et plene: Peccatum est voluntas faciendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. His ergo partibus absolutis, quaeratur unde sit, quod perturbatissime ante has definitiones fuerat inquisitum. Unde est ergo peccatum? Respondeo: De libera voluntate facientis.
And nothing can be called free except what, without any inevitable compulsion of natural things, stands in the right of an emancipated will. Most excellently, then, and fully, it has been defined: Sin is the will to do what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. With these parts settled, then, let it be asked whence comes what, before these definitions, had been most confusedly inquired into. Whence, then, is sin? I answer: From the free will of the one doing it.
Iulianum.5.28AUG. Itane vero de libera voluntate facientis est, ubi dicitur: Si autem quod nolo ego, hoc facio, iam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum (Rom 7, 20)? Videsne cum quaeris unde sit peccatum, atque respondes: " De libera voluntate facientis ", illud te cogitare peccatum, quod non est etiam poena peccati; hoc autem ubi facit homo quod non vult, et tamen peccatum esse Apostolus clamat, ad hanc tuam responsionem minime pertinere, nec ad illam definitionem, quam commemorasti dicens: Peccatum id esse, quod est voluntas faciendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere? Quomodo enim liberum est abstinere, ubi clamatur: Quod nolo, hoc facio? Aliter ergo natura humana peccavit, quando ei liberum fuit abstinere a peccato; aliter nunc peccat perdita libertate, quando eget liberatoris auxilio. Et illud tantummodo peccatum erat; hoc autem etiam est poena peccati.
AUGUSTINE: Is it really, then, from the free will of the one doing it, where it is said: But if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells within me (Rom 7:20)? Do you see that, when you ask whence sin comes and you answer, From the free will of the one doing it, you are thinking of that sin which is not also a penalty of sin; whereas this, where a man does what he does not want, and which the Apostle nevertheless cries out to be sin, in no way pertains to this answer of yours, nor to that definition you recalled when you said: that sin is what is the will to do what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain? For how is one free to abstain, where it is cried out: What I do not want, that I do? Human nature, then, sinned in one way when it was free to abstain from sin; it sins in another way now, with its freedom lost, when it needs the help of a liberator. And that was sin only; but this is also a penalty of sin.
Iulianum.5.2829. IUL. Sed videamus, utrum istud quod definitio praemissa confecit, omnium assensione firmetur. Certe nec prudens hinc ullus potest, nec catholicus dubitare, id est, nec peccatum esse nisi quod potest caveri, nec iustitiam esse nisi quae hoc imputet illi quem potuit, quod libera voluntate per se ipse commisit, cum potuisset cavere.
29. JULIAN: But let us see whether what the foregoing definition has accomplished is confirmed by the assent of all. Certainly no prudent person can doubt this, nor any Catholic—namely, that there is no sin except what can be avoided, and no justice except that which imputes to the one who could have avoided it that which he himself committed by free will, when he could have avoided it.
Iulianum.5.29AUG. Hoc imputatum est primo homini, quod posset cavere, si vellet; sed eius peccato universa etiam in posteris natura vitiata Salvatore opus habet, ut possit cavere peccata, quando etiam aetas accesserit, qua uti possit rationis officio; ante hanc vero aetatem inest ex origine reatus generatione contractus, regeneratione detrahendus. Quod vos negando, apertissime dicitis Christum Iesum non esse Iesum parvulis; qui propterea teste Angelo sic vocatur, quia salvum faciet populum suum (in quo populo parvulos esse non vultis) a peccatis eorum (Mt 1, 21).
AUGUSTINE: This was imputed to the first man, that he could have avoided it if he had willed; but by his sin our whole nature, vitiated even in his descendants, has need of a Savior, so that it may be able to avoid sins when an age has also been reached at which it can use the office of reason; but before this age there is in it from its origin a guilt contracted by generation, to be removed by regeneration. By denying this, you say most openly that Christ Jesus is not Jesus for little ones—he who for this reason is so named, as the angel testifies, because he will save his people (among which people you do not want little ones to be) from their sins (Matt 1:21).
Iulianum.5.2930. IUL. Sed ut nobis iam ista non lubricant, ita a Manichaeo et Traduciano paribus animis repelluntur. Videamus ergo quid ipsi dicant. Manichaeus scribit naturale esse peccatum; annuit Augustinus naturale esse peccatum. Ambo ergo ab ea, quam praemisimus, definitione dissentiunt, habentque in naturalis peccati nuncupatione collegium. Videamus quid dicant etiam de genere peccati, id est, quod putant esse peccatum, quod ambo naturale confirmant, ne forte vel in sequente gradu dissentiant.
30. JULIAN: But just as these things no longer make us slip, so they are repelled with equal resolve from both the Manichee and the Traducianist. Let us see, then, what they themselves say. The Manichee writes that sin is natural; Augustine grants that sin is natural. Both, therefore, dissent from the definition we set down above, and they have a partnership in calling sin natural. Let us see what they also say about the genus of sin—that is, what they think sin to be, which both affirm to be natural—lest perchance they dissent at the next step as well.
Iulianum.5.30Quid scribit Manichaeus ad filiam? Concupiscentiam carnis, et illam voluptatem de fecunditatis operi destinatam, per hoc probari diabolicam, per quod opus eius publicum vitet aspectum. Quid Augustinus? Idem per omnia: Illa concupiscentia carnis frutex est diaboli; causa, lex peccati, quae evitat, inquit, ubique conspectum, et quaerit pudendo secretum (De nupt. et concup. 1, 7, 8. 23, 26). Ergo nec de priore, nec de sequente mali ratione discordant.
What does the Manichee write to his daughter? That the concupiscence of the flesh, and that pleasure assigned to the work of fecundity, is proved diabolical by the fact that its work avoids the public gaze. What does Augustine say? The same in every respect: That concupiscence of the flesh is the shrub of the devil; its cause is the law of sin, which, he says, everywhere avoids being seen, and seeks a shameful secrecy (Marriage and Desire 1.7.8; 23.26). They disagree, therefore, neither about the prior nor about the subsequent account of evil.
Iulianum.5.30Quid tertium? Cum iam quaeritur unde sit malum, Manichaeus " De natura ", inquit, " tenebrarum aeterna ". Quid Augustinus? Nimie, inquit, istud magister meus, qui putat malum numquam coepisse; coepit per primi hominis voluntatem, immo iam per superioris naturae, id est, angelicae; sed ex eo tempore factum est naturale. Everberat eum nimirum praeceptor suus, et in ius auctoritatissime trahit.
What is the third point? When it is now asked whence evil comes, the Manichee says, From the eternal nature of the darkness. What does Augustine say? Too much, says he, did my teacher hold this, who thinks that evil never began; it began through the will of the first man—indeed, already through that of a higher nature, that is, the angelic; but from that time it became natural. His own teacher beats him soundly, no doubt, and most authoritatively haled him into court.
Iulianum.5.30Quid iudicaturus est inter hos catholicus? Manichaeum quidem sine dubio stolidissimum, qui putet naturale peccatum; sed cum Augustini ingenio compositum, peracutum videri. Quibus enim conveniat naturale esse peccatum, atque hoc peccatum unius speciei esse fateantur, a quo omne genus hominum possideri putent? Sed post haec dicere audere discipulum, in uno tantum non esse naturale, quod omnibus fateatur ingenitum; puerilibus sine dubitatione verberibus infamatum, subdent eum magistro consequentius blasphemanti. Sed utrumque simul, discipulum et magistrum, a conventu exterminabunt piorum. Vide ergo quid indulgeamus. Non tibi placet quod dicit Manichaeus, malum esse naturale; dic ergo neminem reum nasci, et evasisti, negans profecto originale peccatum. Sed non dicis; confiteris ergo nec a magistro te velle desistere, nec catholicis copulari.
What will a Catholic judge between these two? That the Manichee is without doubt most stupid, who thinks sin natural; but, set beside the genius of Augustine, he seems most acute. For how could they agree that sin is natural, and confess that this sin is of one species, by which they think the whole human race is possessed? But after this, for the disciple to dare to say that in one alone it is not natural, which he confesses to be inborn in all, will, beyond doubt, be branded with the beatings of schoolboys, and they will subordinate him, as one blaspheming more consistently, to his master. But both at once, disciple and master, they will banish from the assembly of the pious. See, then, what indulgence we grant. It does not please you that the Manichee says evil is natural; say, then, that no one is born guilty, and you have escaped, by surely denying original sin. But you do not say it; you confess, therefore, that you are willing neither to part from your master nor to be joined to the Catholics.
Iulianum.5.30AUG. Numquid propterea dicere non debemus, quod bonus Deus fecerit mundum, quia hoc etiam dicit Manichaeus? Sed cum quaeritur unde fecerit, ibi discernimur. Nos enim dicimus: Ex his quae non erant; quoniam ipse dixit, et facta sunt (Cf. Ps 148, 5); ille autem: Ex duabus naturis, boni scilicet et mali, quae non solum iam erant, sed semper erant. Haec ergo quae non simul dicimus, non sinunt esse nos socios eorum ex illo quod simul dicimus. Item si interrogemur utrum sit Deus; et nos et Manichaei respondemus: Est Deus; et in hoc utrique separamur ab illo stulto, qui dixit in corde suo: Non est Deus (Ps 13, 1); sed cum quaeritur qualis sit Deus, a Manichaeorum nefaria fabula, magna discretione distinguimur. Nos enim dicimus incorruptibilem atque defendimus; illi vero fabulantur corruptibilem Deum.
AUGUSTINE: Ought we, then, not to say that the good God made the world, because the Manichee says this too? But when it is asked from what he made it, there we are distinguished. For we say: From the things that were not, since he himself spoke, and they were made (See Ps 148:5); but he says: From two natures, namely of good and of evil, which not only already existed but always existed. These things, then, which we do not say together, do not allow us to be their associates on the basis of what we do say together. Likewise, if we are asked whether there is a God, both we and the Manichees answer: There is a God; and in this both of us are separated from that fool who said in his heart: There is no God (Ps 14:1 (13:1)); but when it is asked what sort of God he is, we are distinguished by a great distinction from the wicked fable of the Manichees. For we say and defend that he is incorruptible; but they tell tales of a corruptible God.
Iulianum.5.30De ipsa quoque Trinitate interrogati, utrique dicimus, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum unius eiusdemque esse naturae; nec ideo tamen vel nos sumus Manichaei, vel ipsi catholici; dicunt enim alia de Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto, in quibus ab eis diversissimi eisque adversissimi sumus. Unde ista quae simul dicimus, adversus aliorum errores qui ea negant, fidenter asserimus; nec timemus ne Manichaeos nos appellent, et se inde praeferant nobis, quia cum Manichaeis dicimus, quod ipsi quoniam nolunt dicere, propterea redarguuntur a nobis.
About the Trinity itself, too, when questioned, both of us say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one and the same nature; nor on that account, however, are either we Manichees or they Catholics; for they say other things about the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, in which we are most diverse from them and most opposed to them. Hence these things that we say together, we confidently assert against the errors of others who deny them; nor do we fear that they should call us Manichees and on that account prefer themselves to us, because we say together with the Manichees what they themselves, since they refuse to say it, are on that account refuted by us.
Iulianum.5.30Sicut ergo Arianus ideo est haereticus, quia nobiscum non dicit unam Trinitatis essentiam, quod nobiscum dicit etiam Manichaeus; ita et vos haeretici estis, non dicendo nobiscum naturale peccatum, quod nobiscum dicit etiam Manichaeus; sed non ideo sumus Manichaei; quod enim dicit etiam ille, non ita dicimus sicut ille. Nos enim naturam nostram bonam voluntario peccato illius ex quo nati sumus, dicimus esse vitiatam, unde omnes sub peccato nascimur, et ipse noster ortus in vitio est, quod dicit Ambrosius (Cf. AMBROSIUS, De paenit. 1, 2, 2); ille autem naturam malam nobis portat alienam, cuius nos affirmat commixtione peccare. Denique, nos sanandae nostrae etiam parvulos offerimus Salvatori; ille autem Christum non ideo existimat necessarium, ut naturam nostram sanet in nobis, sed ut alienam seiungat a nobis. Cernis nempe, et in eo quod peccatum naturale simul dicimus, quanta diversitate distemus.
Just as, then, an Arian is a heretic because he does not say with us that there is one essence of the Trinity—which the Manichee too says with us—so you too are heretics by not saying with us that sin is natural, which the Manichee too says with us; but we are not on that account Manichees, for what he too says, we do not say as he says. For we say that our good nature has been vitiated by the voluntary sin of him from whom we are born, whence we are all born under sin, and our very origin is in fault, as Ambrose says (See Ambrose, On Repentance 1.2.2); but he brings upon us a foreign evil nature, by a mixture with which he affirms that we sin. Finally, we offer even little ones to the Savior, that our nature may be healed; but he thinks Christ necessary not in order to heal our nature in us, but in order to sever the foreign nature from us. You surely see, even in the fact that we say together that sin is natural, by how great a diversity we stand apart.
Iulianum.5.30Similiter et in eo quod simul dicimus, malam esse concupiscentiam carnis, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, cum quaeritur unde hoc sit malum, discretissimi reperimur. Nos etiam cum Ambrosio dicimus, hanc foedam discordiam carnis et spiritus per praevaricationem primi hominis in nostram vertisse naturam (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Lc. 7, 12, 53); ille autem cum suis dicit, ut invicem adversentur caro et spiritus, alienam nobis, quae semper mala fuit, adhaesisse naturam. Unde nos poscimus Salvatorem, ut hoc vitium nostrum sanetur; ille vero, ut a nobis aliena natura, quae sanari omnino non potest, auferatur.
Likewise too, in the fact that we say together that the concupiscence of the flesh is evil, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, when it is asked whence this evil comes, we are found most distinct. We too say, with Ambrose, that this foul discord of flesh and spirit, through the transgression of the first man, has turned into our nature (See Ambrose, On Luke 7.12.53); but he, with his own people, says that, so that flesh and spirit are mutually opposed, a foreign nature, which was always evil, has clung to us. Hence we beg the Savior, that this fault of ours may be healed; but he, that the foreign nature, which cannot be healed at all, may be taken away from us.
Iulianum.5.30Etiam hic cur non attendis, in eo quod carnis concupiscentiam spiritui resistentem simul malam dicimus, quanta dissimilitudine separemur? Cur non attendis, nec nos esse Manichaeos, quia cum eis aliqua dicimus; et vos esse haereticos, quoniam cum eis illa non dicitis?
Here too, why do you not attend, in the fact that we say together that the concupiscence of the flesh resisting the spirit is evil, by how great an unlikeness we are separated? Why do you not attend that neither are we Manichees, because we say some things with them; and that you are heretics, since you do not say those things with them?
Iulianum.5.30Si enim cum illis diceretis esse naturalia mala, et nobiscum contra illos diceretis unde sint ista, quia non sunt de aliena natura Deo coaeterna, Pelagiani haeretici non essetis; nunc vero concupiscentiam, qua caro concupiscit contra spiritum, negando malam esse, et de vitiata natura nostra esse, facitis ut illi ex aliena esse concludant; ac sic et haeretici novi estis, et haereticos veteres, quos perverse fugitis, adiuvatis.
For if you said with them that there are natural evils, and said with us against them whence these come—namely, that they are not from a foreign nature coeternal with God—you would not be Pelagian heretics; but as it is, by denying that the concupiscence by which the flesh lusts against the spirit is evil, and that it is from our vitiated nature, you make them conclude that it is from a foreign nature; and so you are both new heretics and you help the old heretics, whom you perversely flee.
Iulianum.5.30Desine ergo mihi opponere magistrum Manichaeum, sed mecum potius sequere Ambrosium; et Arianos intuere, eosque in eo saltem, quod te melius sapiunt, imitare; qui nos Manichaeos esse non dicunt, quamvis cum Manichaeis dicamus unam Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti esse naturam, ubi nobis contentiosissime contradicunt.
Cease, then, to set the Manichee before me as my master, but rather follow Ambrose with me; and look to the Arians, and imitate them at least in this, in which they are wiser than you—they who do not say that we are Manichees, although we say with the Manichees that there is one nature of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, where they most contentiously contradict us.
Iulianum.5.3031. IUL. Verum vehementem obiectionem puta sti, ut diceres unde in ipso primo homine vel in diabolo qui angelus factus fuerat, mala exstitisset voluntas; quam tamen ais ideo esse ortam in opere Dei, id est, vel in angelo, vel in homine, non quia Dei opus erat, sed quia de nihilo factus erat. Vide ergo ne et tu per alteras vias aeternam dicas fuisse mali necessitatem. Nam si haec fuit causa exoriendi mali in opere Dei, quoniam de nihilo id factum esse constabat; antequam fieret autem quod esset, hoc nihilum semper fuit, id est, antequam fieret id quod esset, numquam aliquid fuit, et hoc quod numquam fuit, nihil fuisse dicitur;
31. JULIAN: But you supposed it a forceful objection, when you asked whence an evil will had come to exist in that first man himself, or in the devil who had been made an angel; which yet you say arose in the work of God—that is, either in the angel or in the human being—not because it was God's work, but because it had been made out of nothing. See, then, lest you too, by other paths, say that there was an eternal necessity of evil. For if this was the cause of evil's arising in the work of God—that it was established to have been made out of nothing; but before that which was made came to be, this nothing always was; that is, before that which was came to be, it was never anything, and this which never was is said to have been nothing—
Iulianum.5.31ab aeterno ergo numquam fuit, quod non fuit antequam fieret a Deo, cuius substantia sola sine principio est; hoc ergo inane, id est, nihil, antequam per rerum finiretur existentiam, semper fuit. Non ergo factum est hoc nihilum; sed factae sunt creaturae, et illud nihil esse cessavit. In ea ergo creatura, quae facta de nihilo est, tu ideo malum commentaris exortum, quoniam de nihilo facta erat. Malum ergo in homine exortum origini reputavisti; atque origo, id est, nihilum, dicitur a te causa fuisse peccati. Non enim, inquis, propterea in homine malum exortum est, quoniam a Deo factus fuerat; sed quia de nihilo factus fuerat.
then from eternity that never was which was not before it was made by God, whose substance alone is without beginning; this void, then, that is, nothing, always was before it was bounded by the existence of things. This nothing, therefore, was not made; but creatures were made, and that nothing ceased to be. In that creature, then, which was made out of nothing, you accordingly devise that evil arose, because it had been made out of nothing. The evil that arose in the human being, therefore, you have reckoned to his origin; and the origin, that is, nothing, is said by you to have been the cause of sin. For not on that account, you say, did evil arise in the human being, because he had been made by God; but because he had been made out of nothing.
Iulianum.5.31Si ergo ideo malum exortum est, quia conditio nihili praecedentis id exegit; hoc autem nihilum aeternum fuit; immutatis semitis incidisti, et pendes omnino in praeceptoris tui laqueo, ut malum ambo ab aeterno esse fateamini. Sed in hoc quoque ille prudentior; inducens enim naturale peccatum, dixit aeternam fuisse substantiam tenebrarum, quae sine voluntate peccatoris malum hoc inesse compelleret. Rei ergo, cuius faciebat necessitatem, auctorem dedit, ut malum quod substantias pervadebat, videretur habere cogentem; tu vero plumbo ingenii non ferendo, confirmas necessitatem mali, sed negas necessitatis auctorem. Et sicut in parvulis, ita in ipso priore peccati operatore opus relinquis; ac dicis nescio quid magnum posse intellegi, ut illud nihil valuerit plurimum, cum nihil esset.
If, then, evil arose for this reason—that the condition of the preceding nothing demanded it; and this nothing was eternal—you have, by changed paths, fallen in, and you hang altogether in the snare of your teacher, so that you both confess that evil is from eternity. But in this too he is more prudent; for in introducing natural sin, he said that the substance of the darkness was eternal, which, without the will of the sinner, would force this evil to be present. To the thing, then, whose necessity he was making, he gave an author, so that the evil that pervaded the substances might seem to have something compelling it; but you, with a leaden wit not to be borne, confirm the necessity of evil, but deny the author of the necessity. And just as in little ones, so in that first worker of sin himself, you leave the work; and you say that some great thing can be understood, that that nothing was worth very much, although it was nothing.
Iulianum.5.31AUG. Nihil vales, sed tu, asserendo quod nihil, cum sit nihil, valeat aliquid; nec intellegis, cum dicitur Deus de nihilo fecisse quae fecit, non dici aliud, nisi quia de se ipso non fecit; non enim antequam aliquid faceret, coaeternum illi erat aliquid facere. De nihilo est ergo, quod non est de aliquo; quia etsi fecit Deus aliqua de aliis rebus, has ipsas de quibus ea fecit, de nullis fecerat rebus.
AUGUSTINE: You are worth nothing, you who assert that the nothing, though it is nothing, is worth something; nor do you understand that, when God is said to have made out of nothing the things he made, nothing else is said than that he did not make them out of himself; for before he made anything, it was not coeternal with him to make anything. That is out of nothing, then, which is not out of something; for although God made some things out of other things, those very things out of which he made them, he had made out of no things at all.
Iulianum.5.31Peccare autem nulla res posset, si de natura Dei facta esset; nec iam facta esset, sed de illo esset, quidquid esset, et hoc quod ille esset; sicut est Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus, quoniam de illo sunt, hoc quod ille sunt, alius nascendo, alius procedendo; atque ita sunt de illo, ut numquam fuerit ipse prior illis. Et ideo ista natura non potest omnino peccare; quia non potest se ipsa deserere, nec meliorem habet cui debeat inhaerere, et cuius possit desertione peccare. Nec tamen ita rationalis est facta creatura, ut haberet peccandi necessitatem; sed nec possibilitatem haberet, si natura Dei esset; quoniam Dei natura peccare nec vult posse, nec potest velle.
But no thing could sin if it had been made out of the nature of God; nor indeed would it have been made, but whatever it was would be out of him, and would be that which he is; just as the Son and the Holy Spirit are, since they are out of him, that which he is—the one by being born, the other by proceeding; and they are out of him in such a way that he himself was never prior to them. And therefore this nature cannot sin at all, because it cannot desert itself, nor does it have a better one to which it ought to cleave and by deserting which it could sin. Nor yet was the rational creature so made that it had a necessity of sinning; but neither would it have the possibility, if it were the nature of God; since the nature of God neither wills to be able to sin, nor can it will to.
Iulianum.5.3132. IUL. Hoc enim nihil, de quo facta sunt omnia, affirmas causam fuisse peccati. Tantum igitur facit apud te nihili huius potentia, quantum apud Manichaeum principis tenebrarum. Ambo ergo dicitis etiam primi mali necessitatem fuisse; sed dat ille soliditatem vel malam; tu inanitatem, aeque tamen malam: ille ergo dicit violentam substantiam; tu violentum aeque, sed nihilum. Vide ergo syllogismi tui finem: nihilum nempe, cum necdum quidquam esset creatum, aeternae erat inanitatis indicium; sed hoc ipsum nihilum, id est, inanitas, orientibus est finita creaturis; desivit enim nihil esse, cum coepit aliquid esse. Ipsum ergo nihilum etiam cum erat, non erat; quoniam tunc intellegitur fuisse, cum necdum aliquid erat. Postea vero quam factae res sunt, hoc inanitatis indicium, id est, nihilum, sicut substantiam numquam habuerat, ita etiam vocabulum suum perdidit; factumque est, ut quod in re numquam extiterat, etiam ipsum nomen amitteret. Huius ergo tu violentia malum et in angelo et in homine commentaris exortum; quo quid furiosius dici potest?
32. JULIAN: For this nothing, out of which all things were made, you affirm to have been the cause of sin. As much, therefore, does the power of this nothing accomplish with you as the prince of the darkness does with the Manichee. Both of you, then, say that there was a necessity even of the first evil; but he gives it a solidity, albeit an evil one; you, an emptiness, but equally evil: he, then, speaks of a violent substance; you, of something equally violent, but a nothing. See, then, the end of your syllogism: nothing, surely, when as yet nothing had been created, was the token of an eternal emptiness; but this very nothing, that is, the emptiness, was bounded as creatures arose; for it ceased to be nothing when something began to be. The nothing itself, therefore, even when it was, was not; since it is understood to have been then, when as yet there was not anything. But after things were made, this token of emptiness, that is, nothing, just as it had never had a substance, so it also lost its very name; and it came about that what had never existed in reality also lost its very name. By the violence of this, then, you devise that evil arose both in the angel and in the human being—and what can be said more frenzied than this?
Iulianum.5.32AUG. Tu potius maledicendi studio furere videris. Ego non dixi violentum nihil: non enim est aliquid, quod possit esse violentum. Nec angelus, nec homo vi aliqua peccare compulsus est; nec peccassent, si peccare noluissent, qui etiam nolle potuissent; verum et posse peccare non in his esset, si natura Dei essent.
AUGUSTINE: You rather seem to rave in your zeal for reviling. I did not say a violent nothing: for there is no thing that can be violent. Neither the angel nor the human being was compelled by any force to sin; nor would they have sinned, if they had not willed to sin—they who could also have not willed it; but truly even the power to sin would not be in them, if they were the nature of God.
Iulianum.5.3233. IUL. Magnam, inquis, vim habuit res quae non erat, ob hoc solum, quia numquam fuerat, verum tum posse plurimum coepit, postquam et ipsum nomen amisit; sortitumque est hoc nihilum magnam dominationem, postquam etiam appellatio eius interiit.
33. JULIAN: A great power, you say, did the thing have that was not, for this reason alone, that it had never been; and then it began to be able to do very much, after it had lost even its very name; and this nothing was allotted a great dominion, after even its appellation had perished.
Iulianum.5.33AUG. Si id quod nihil est, aliquid esset, apud te diceretur sortitum magnam dominationem; quandoquidem vanitas, sive falsitas, ita tibi dominatur, ut tamdiu te ista inania garrire compellat.
AUGUSTINE: If that which is nothing were something, it would be said by you to have been allotted a great dominion; since vanity, or falsity, so dominates you that it compels you to prattle these empty things for so long.
Iulianum.5.3334. IUL. Macte virtute sapientiae, qui novae et a te inventae primum disputationis regulis, secunda primorum negatione complecteris, et corpora capitibus trunca componis. Non invidemus subtilitatibus tuis; quin immo christiana humanitate miseramur, quod dignum reperisti exitum dogmati tuo, ut profectus a criminibus innocentum, ad nihilum pervenires.
34. JULIAN: Bravo for the excellence of your wisdom, you who, by the rules of a new argument first invented by you, embrace second things by the denial of first things, and join bodies, lopped of their heads, to heads. We do not envy your subtleties; rather, with Christian humanity we pity you, because you found an end worthy of your dogma: that, having set out from the crimes charged against the innocent, you arrived at nothing.
Iulianum.5.34AUG. Ad nihilum tu potius pervenisti, quod te ita delectat, ut inde recedere, vel redire adhuc nolis; qui me propterea dicis id quod nihil est, dixisse esse aliquid, ut tam multum tu diceres nihil.
AUGUSTINE: It is rather you who have arrived at nothing, which so delights you that you are still unwilling to withdraw from it or to return; you who say that I called that which is nothing something, for this purpose—that you might say nothing at such great length.
Iulianum.5.3435. IUL. O sanitatem, o elegantiam disputantis! Non ideo, inquit, malum exortum est in homine, quia a Deo factum est, sed ideo quia de nihilo (De nupt. et concup. 2, 28, 48). Ostendimus iam acumen, quo vis maxima huic nihilo subrogata est; nunc illud admoneo, quod etiam superior conflictus fecit intellegi, nec primum malum peccantis fuisse voluntate susceptum, si illud nasci conditio venientis de nihilo stirpis exegit.
35. JULIAN: O the soundness, O the elegance of the disputant! Not on this account, he says, did evil arise in the human being, because he was made by God, but on this account, because he was made out of nothing (Marriage and Desire 2.28.48). We have already shown the acuteness by which a very great power has been substituted for this nothing; now I point this out, which the earlier conflict also made understood: that the first evil was not taken up by the will of the one sinning, if the condition of a stock coming from nothing demanded that it be born.
Iulianum.5.35AUG. Non exegit peccatum nasci ulla conditio stirpis de nihilo venientis; quandoquidem illud exigitur, quod compellitur reddi vel fieri; angelum vero vel hominem, a quibus et in quibus prima sunt orta peccata, peccare nulla res compulit; sed libera voluntate peccarunt; quod et nolle possent, quia nec cogebantur ut vellent; et tamen velle non possent, si de Deo naturam haberent, non de nihilo facti essent.
AUGUSTINE: No condition of a stock coming from nothing demanded that sin be born; since that is demanded which is forced to be rendered or to come about; but no thing compelled the angel or the human being—by whom and in whom the first sins arose—to sin; rather, they sinned by free will, which they could also have not willed, since they were not compelled to will it; and yet they could not have willed it, if they had their nature from God and had not been made out of nothing.
Iulianum.5.3536. IUL. Dedisti igitur et primi naturam mali, sed inaniorem quam Manichaeus, aeque tamen aeternam. Pugnandum super hoc non est; claret omnino quia maneat inter vos foedus, quod naturalis mali et aeterni mali catena connectit.
36. JULIAN: You have given, then, a nature even to the first evil—but emptier than the Manichee's, yet equally eternal. There is no need to fight over this; it is altogether clear that there remains between you a pact, which the chain of natural evil and eternal evil binds together.
Iulianum.5.36AUG. Insulsissime, non potest aeternum esse quod nihil est, non potest aeternum esse quod nulla res est, postremo non potest esse aeternum quod non est.
AUGUSTINE: Most tastelessly: that cannot be eternal which is nothing, that cannot be eternal which is no thing, finally that cannot be eternal which is not.
Iulianum.5.3637. IUL. Egi certe, ut fidem disputationis decebat; illudque quod tu argumentando effeceras, id est, ideo in opere Dei ortam voluntatem malam quia fuisset homo creatus ex nihilo, ratio perscrutata contrivit; ostendens videlicet, te immutatis vocabulis idem dixisse, quod Manichaeus finxit et credidit, id est, primum quoque peccatum aeternarum tenebrarum violentia genitum.
37. JULIAN: I have certainly acted as befitted the good faith of the argument; and that which you had brought about by your reasoning—that is, that an evil will arose in the work of God because the human being had been created out of nothing—reason, having searched it through, has ground to pieces, showing, namely, that you, with the terms changed, said the same thing that the Manichee invented and believed: that is, that the first sin too was begotten by the violence of eternal darkness.
Iulianum.5.37AUG. Iam te superius admonuimus, aeternum non posse esse, quod non est; quid est ergo quod dicis, ideo me comparandum esse Manichaeo, quia Manichaeus aeternarum tenebrarum violentia genitum dixit primum esse peccatum? Quibus tenebris dedit ille substantiam; ego autem nihilo dare substantiam non potui, ut ob hoc et ego quasi constituerem tenebras aeternas, aeternum scilicet nihil. Sicut autem substantiam, ita violentiam vel aeternitatem dare nihilo non potui; nullo quippe modo, vel violentum, vel aeternum, sicut iam diximus, potest esse quod nihil est. Frustra igitur adversus me voluisti disputare quod nihil est.
AUGUSTINE: I have already warned you above that what is not cannot be eternal; what is it, then, that you say—that I am to be compared to the Manichee because the Manichee said that the first sin was begotten by the violence of eternal darkness? To those darknesses he gave a substance; but I could not give a substance to nothing, so that on this account I too might as it were establish eternal darkness, namely an eternal nothing. And just as I could not give a substance, so I could not give violence or eternity to nothing; for in no way, as we have already said, can that be either violent or eternal which is nothing. In vain, therefore, did you wish to argue against me about that which is nothing.
Iulianum.5.3738. IUL. Verum ne tu detectum temet inspiciens, illo tentes erumpere, ut referas non te dixisse: Ideo malum ortum est in opere Dei, quoniam ex nihilo factum est; sed: Ideo potuit oboriri, quia ex nihilo factum est; ostendendum est, quanto violentioribus laqueis illigeris. Si enim dixeris possibilitatem te mali, non necessitatem, aeterni illius nihili viribus imputasse; nos referimus, quod potuit oriri mala voluntas in homine, non est certe aliud quam arbitrium liberum; ideo enim potuit oriri mala voluntas, ut oriri posset et bona. Haec libertas est, in qua se ratio exercet, propter quod ad imaginem Dei homo factus asseritur, per quam creaturis ceteris antecellit. Si ergo quod in homine mala voluntas potuit exoriri, nihil est aliud quam arbitrii libertas; et hoc tantum est, ut per eius insignia ceteris antistet animantibus; tu qui hanc possibilitatem profiteris ideo fuisse in homine, non quia a Deo, sed quia de nihilo factus est, novo dogmatis prodigio illud nihil, id est, antiquam inanitatem, tanti boni, id est, liberi arbitrii causam pronuntias.
38. JULIAN: But lest, seeing yourself detected, you try to break out in that direction, so as to report that you did not say: Therefore evil arose in the work of God because it was made out of nothing; but: Therefore it could arise because it was made out of nothing—it must be shown by how much more violent snares you are bound. For if you say that you imputed to the powers of that eternal nothing the possibility of evil, not its necessity, we reply that what could arise as an evil will in the human being is certainly nothing other than free choice; for the reason an evil will could arise is that a good one too might arise. This is the liberty in which reason exercises itself, on account of which a human being is asserted to have been made to the image of God, by which he surpasses the other creatures. If, then, the fact that an evil will could arise in a human being is nothing other than the liberty of choice, and this is so great that by its marks he stands before the other living things, you who profess that this possibility was in the human being for this reason—not because he was made by God, but because he was made out of nothing—by a new prodigy of dogma pronounce that nothing, that is, the ancient emptiness, to be the cause of so great a good, that is, of free choice.
Iulianum.5.38Denique ut res brevi interrogatione lucescat; hoc quod dixisti: Nec ideo tamen potuit oriri voluntas mala, quia a Deo factus est homo, sed ideo quia de nihilo factus est homo; hoc, inquam, ipsum quod potuit oriri voluntas, bonum esse, an malum credis? Id est, ipsam facultatem oriendae voluntatis, quam nihilo reputavisti, probam arbitraris, an pessimam? Si bonam dixeris: ergo non Deus est boni causa, sed nihilum. Sin autem, hoc esse insanissimum videns, malam eam pronuntiaveris; quippe quam dicis non Deo reputandam esse, sed nihilo; protestaberis nos nihil adversum te collegisse versute, sed bona disputandi fide malam fidem tui dogmatis subruisse. Stat ergo inconcussum quod egimus, te videlicet et Manichaeum, etiam primi hominis voluntatem malam necessitati aeternae originis imputasse.
Finally, that the matter may grow clear by a brief question: this which you said—Yet the evil will could not arise for this reason, because the human being was made by God, but for this reason, because the human being was made out of nothing—this very thing, I say, that a will could arise, do you believe to be good or evil? That is, the very faculty of a will arising, which you reckoned to nothing—do you judge it good or worst? If you say it is good: then God is not the cause of the good, but nothing is. But if, seeing that this is most insane, you pronounce it evil—seeing that you say it must be reckoned not to God but to nothing—you will testify that we have concluded nothing against you craftily, but have, with good faith in arguing, undermined the bad faith of your dogma. It stands, then, unshaken, what we have argued—namely, that you, like the Manichee, have imputed even the evil will of the first man to the necessity of an eternal origin.
Iulianum.5.38AUG. Quid tibi responderi posset, qualitercumque vidisti; sed frustra es conatus obsistere veritati, quasi respondens verbis meis, et non respondens verbis meis. Sic enim disputasti, tamquam ego dixerim: Nec ideo tamen orta est ex bono voluntas mala; quod ego non dixi; sed dixi: Nec ideo tamen ex bono potuit oriri mala voluntas, quia bonum factum est a Deo bono, sed quia de nihilo factum est, non de Deo (De nupt. et concup. 2, 28, 48). Sicut eadem verba mea etiam ipse posuisti (Cf. supra 5, 26). Quid est ergo quod ita respondendum putasti, quasi ego dixerim: Nec ideo tamen orta est; cum ego dixerim: Nec ideo tamen oriri potuit; et tamdiu locutus es adversus eum, qui necessitatem mali ut oriretur ex bono, ex hoc dixit irruisse, quia ipsum bonum a Deo de nihilo factum est, non de Deo; cum ego non necessitatem tribuerim tali causae, sed possibilitatem mali; quia non dixi ideo esse ortum, sed ideo potuisse oriri ex bono malum? Et accusasti tamdiu nihil, et violentum fecisti nihil; quasi peccare angelum et hominem inevitabili necessitate compulerit nihil.
AUGUSTINE: What could be answered to you, you have in some fashion seen; but in vain have you tried to resist the truth, as though answering my words and yet not answering my words. For you argued as though I had said: Yet an evil will did not arise from good—which I did not say; rather, I said: Yet an evil will could not arise from good for the reason that the good was made by the good God, but because it was made out of nothing, not out of God (Marriage and Desire 2.28.48). Just as you yourself set down these same words of mine (See above, 5.26). What is it, then, that you thought you should answer in such a way, as though I had said: Yet it did not arise; whereas I said: Yet it could not arise; and you argued so long against one who said that the necessity of evil—that it should arise from good—rushed in from this, that the good itself was made by God out of nothing, not out of God; whereas I attributed to such a cause not the necessity but the possibility of evil—since I did not say that it therefore arose, but that evil could therefore arise from good? And you accused nothing for so long, and made nothing violent, as though nothing compelled angel and human being to sin by an inevitable necessity.
Iulianum.5.38Nunc ergo ad mea verba tandem redi, sicut redire coepisti. Proponis enim tibi quaestionem, tamquam tibi subito venisset in mentem, respondere quid possem; cum hoc ego longe ante in eo, cui reluctaris, libro posuerim. Dicis enim: Referre me posse, non me dixisse: Ideo malum ortum est in opere Dei, quoniam ex nihilo factum est; sed: Ideo potuit oboriri, quia ex nihilo factum est. Hoc prorsus dixi: Ideo potuit oboriri dixi, non ideo dixi ortum; possibilitatem mali dedi huic causae, non necessitatem. Rationalis quippe creatura cum primum facta est, ita facta est, ut si peccare nollet, nulla necessitate urgeretur ut vellet, aut etiam non volens, id est, invita peccaret, et non quod vellet faceret bonum, sed malum quod nollet, hoc ageret; ubi iam non peccatum illud quod simpliciter peccatum dicitur, sed etiam poena peccati est.
Now, then, return at last to my words, as you have begun to return. For you set yourself a question, as though it had suddenly come into your mind, as to what I could answer; whereas I set this down long before in the book you struggle against. For you say: That I can report that I did not say: Therefore evil arose in the work of God because it was made out of nothing; but: Therefore it could arise because it was made out of nothing. This I said outright: I said it could arise, I did not say it arose; I gave the possibility of evil to this cause, not the necessity. For the rational creature, when it was first made, was so made that, if it did not wish to sin, it would be urged by no necessity to will it, or even, while not willing—that is, unwilling—to sin, and not to do the good that it willed, but to do the evil that it did not will; where now there is not that sin which is simply called sin, but is also a penalty of sin.
Iulianum.5.38Verumtamen male aliquid velle, vel mali aliquid etiam nolens facere, omnino non posset, nisi de nihilo facta esset, id est, si Dei natura esset. Sola enim Dei natura de nihilo facta non est, quia nec facta est; et ideo nullo prorsus modo mutari potest. Quod cum dicimus, non vires nihilo damus, quasi potuerit facere aliquid, vel fecerit aliquid, cum sit nihil; sed naturam Dei non esse dicimus, quae peccare potuit. Sequitur autem ut natura quae Dei natura non est, facta sit; neque enim Deo coaeterna est; et si facta est, de nihilo facta sit; quia et illae naturae quae de aliis naturis factae sunt, stirpem de nihilo ducunt; quoniam naturae de quibus factae sunt, antequam fierent, nihil fuerunt, hoc est, omnino non fuerunt.
Nevertheless, to will something evilly, or even unwillingly to do something evil, it could in no way at all do, unless it had been made out of nothing—that is, if it were the nature of God. For the nature of God alone has not been made out of nothing, because it has not been made at all; and therefore it can in no way whatever be changed. When we say this, we do not give powers to nothing, as though it could make something, or had made something, although it is nothing; rather, we say that it is not the nature of God that was able to sin. And it follows that a nature which is not the nature of God has been made; for it is not coeternal with God; and if it has been made, it has been made out of nothing; because even those natures which have been made out of other natures draw their stock from nothing, since the natures out of which they were made, before they came to be, were nothing—that is, did not exist at all.
Iulianum.5.38Sed, inquis: Ideo potuit oriri voluntas mala, ut oriri posset et bona. Quasi non cum bona voluntate factus sit vel angelus vel homo. Factus est rectus, sicut dixit Scriptura (Cf. Eccle 7, 30); non ergo quaeritur, unde in illo potuerit oriri bona voluntas, cum qua factus est; sed unde mala, cum qua factus non est. Et tu dicis, non attendens quid dicas: Ideo potuit oriri voluntas mala, ut oriri posset et bona; et hoc putas ad naturam liberi arbitrii pertinere, ut possit utrumque, et peccare scilicet, et non peccare; et in hoc existimas hominem factum ad imaginem Dei, cum Deus ipse non possit utrumque. Neque enim vel demens quisquam dixerit Deum posse peccare; aut tu dicere audes, Deum liberum arbitrium non habere.
But, you say: An evil will could arise for this reason, that a good one too might arise. As though either the angel or the human being were not made with a good will! He was made upright, as Scripture said (See Eccl 7:29); it is not asked, then, whence in him a good will could arise, with which he was made; but whence an evil one, with which he was not made. And you say, not attending to what you say: An evil will could arise for this reason, that a good one too might arise; and you think this pertains to the nature of free choice, that it can do both—namely, both sin and not sin; and in this you suppose that the human being was made to the image of God, although God himself cannot do both. For neither would even a madman say that God can sin; nor do you dare to say that God does not have free choice.
Iulianum.5.38Dei ergo, non nihili, munus est liberum arbitrium; sed in ipso Deo summum est liberum ee arbitrium, qui peccare nullo modo potest. Quoniam si iniustus esse posset, etiam Deus non esse utique posset; si enim Deus est, consequentissime, iustus est; et ideo summe maximeque habens liberum arbitrium, peccare tamen non potest Deus. Angelus ergo vel homo propterea peccare potuit, id est, propterea isto Dei munere, quod est liberum arbitrium, male uti potuit, quia non est Deus, hoc est, de nihilo factus est a Deo, non de ipso Deo. Intellege, et tace; aut quod intellexeris, non autem quod non intellexeris, loquere.
Free choice, then, is the gift of God, not of nothing; but in God himself free choice is supreme, who can in no way sin. For if he could be unjust, then God too could surely not be; for if he is God, then most consistently he is just; and therefore, having free choice supremely and most greatly, God nevertheless cannot sin. The angel, then, or the human being could sin—that is, could misuse this gift of God which is free choice—for this reason: because he is not God, that is, because he was made out of nothing by God, not out of God himself. Understand, and be silent; or speak what you have understood, but not what you have not understood.
Iulianum.5.3839. IUL. Verum non uno modo vicisse con tentus, argumenti tui, cuius impietatem prodidi, coarguam falsitatem. Cum ergo scriberes: Non ideo potuit oriri voluntas mala in opere Dei, quia a Deo factum est; sed ideo quia de nihilo factum est (De nupt. et concup. 2, 28, 48); videre debueras, quam valenter aliarum creaturarum exempla praescriberent, quae totidem productae de nihilo, malae tamen voluntatis capaces non sunt. Postremo ipsa elementa, quae vere sunt facta ex nihilo, non alicuius voluntatis conscientiam queunt habere, ut motibus malis protestentur originis suae necessitatem. Animantes autem, et reliqua queis impletus est orbis, non de nihilo, ceterum iam ex aliquo prodierunt. Ubi est ergo vis inanitatis antiquae, quae malam voluntatem coegit existere; cum praeter rationabile animal, neminem peccare posse manifestum sit?
39. JULIAN: But not content to have conquered in one way, I will convict the falsity of your argument, whose impiety I have exposed. For when you wrote: An evil will could arise not because it was made by God, but for this reason, because it was made out of nothing (Marriage and Desire 2.28.48), you ought to have seen how powerfully the examples of other creatures stood against you—creatures which, produced just as many out of nothing, are nevertheless not capable of an evil will. Finally, the very elements, which were truly made out of nothing, cannot have any consciousness of a will, so as to protest by evil movements the necessity of their origin. But the living things, and the rest with which the world is filled, came forth not out of nothing but already out of something. Where, then, is the force of the ancient emptiness that compelled an evil will to exist, when it is clear that, apart from a rational animal, no one can sin?
Iulianum.5.39AUG. Posses putare me argui falsitatis, si cum ego dixissem, ideo posse nostra corpora vulnerari, quia terrestria sunt, ostenderes tu corpora multa terrestria, quae nequeant vulnerari. Non enim esse vulnus potest, nisi in corpore animantis, quae caro dicitur. Ubi te admonere deberem, quod videre non potueris sententiam istam non recurrere; quia non sicut verum est: Omne quod potest vulnerari, terrestre corpus est; ita etiam verum est: Omne terrestre corpus vulnerari potest. Cur ergo in dialecticis iactanticula tua sollertia dormitavit, ut non adverteres, ubi dixi ideo creaturam rationalem peccare potuisse, quia ex nihilo facta est, me intellegi voluisse, omne quod peccare potest, ex nihilo factum esse, non autem omne quod ex nihilo factum est, posse peccare?
AUGUSTINE: You could think I was being convicted of falsity if, when I had said that our bodies can be wounded because they are earthly, you pointed out many earthly bodies that cannot be wounded. For a wound cannot exist except in the body of a living thing, which is called flesh. Here I ought to warn you that you could not see that this proposition does not convert: for just as it is true that everything that can be wounded is an earthly body, it is not likewise true that every earthly body can be wounded. Why, then, in dialectic did your boastful little skill nod off, so that you did not notice that, where I said the rational creature could sin because it was made out of nothing, I wanted it understood that everything which can sin was made out of nothing, but not that everything which was made out of nothing can sin?
Iulianum.5.39Quod tamquam dixissem, ita mihi obiecisti res alias, et ipsa mundi elementa, quae cum ex nihilo facta sint, peccare non possunt; quoniam solum potest animal rationale peccare. Nunc ergo evigila, atque aspice, omne quod peccare potest, de nihilo factum esse; nec ideo sequitur etiam omne quod de nihilo factum est, posse peccare. Non igitur mihi proferantur alia, quae de nihilo facta sunt, et peccare non possunt; quoniam non dico: Omne quod ex nihilo factum est, peccare potest; sed dico: Omne quod peccare potest, ex nihilo factum est;
As though I had said that, you objected to me other things, and the very elements of the world, which, though they were made out of nothing, cannot sin, since only the rational animal can sin. Now, then, wake up, and see that everything which can sin was made out of nothing; nor does it therefore follow that everything which was made out of nothing can sin. Let there not, then, be brought forward to me other things which were made out of nothing and cannot sin; since I do not say: Everything that was made out of nothing can sin; but I say: Everything that can sin was made out of nothing;
Iulianum.5.39tamquam si dixissem: Omnis bos animal est, non utique adversum me commemorari debuerunt multa animalia, quae non sunt boves; quoniam non dixerim: Omne animal bos est, sed: Omnis bos animal est. Iterum ergo dico: Omne quod peccare potest, ex nihilo factum est; omne ergo quod ex nihilo factum est, potest peccare, non dico; quod velut dixerim, multa commemoras, quamvis ex nihilo facta, quae tamen peccare non possunt.
just as, if I had said: Every ox is an animal, there surely ought not to be recalled against me many animals that are not oxen; since I would not have said: Every animal is an ox, but: Every ox is an animal. Again, then, I say: Everything that can sin was made out of nothing; everything, therefore, that was made out of nothing can sin—this I do not say; and as though I had said it, you recall many things which, though made out of nothing, nevertheless cannot sin.
Iulianum.5.39Calliditatem tuam tolle de medio, qua tardis illudis ingeniis; aut caecitatem, qua manifesta non cernis. Cum autem dico: Natura quae rationalis creata est, ideo peccare potuit, quia de nihilo facta est, non de Deo; attende quid dicam, ne mihi rursus inani loquacitate ventiles nihil, et me dixisse affirmes vim faciendi aliquid habere, quod nihil est. Hoc dico ego, naturam quae rationalis creata est, propterea peccare potuisse, quia ex nihilo facta est; quod aliud quid est, quam propterea peccare potuisse, quia natura Dei non est? Si enim de nihilo facta non esset, de Deo naturaliter esset, quidquid esset; si naturaliter de Deo esset, Dei natura esset; si Dei natura esset, peccare non posset. Ideo igitur peccare potuit, quamvis facta sit a Deo, quia de nihilo facta est, non de Deo. Hoc tu si intellexeris, et veritati repugnare nolueris, ab hac contentione in hac quaestione cessabis.
Take away your cunning, by which you trick slow wits; or your blindness, by which you do not discern what is plain. But when I say: The nature which was created rational could sin because it was made out of nothing, not out of God—attend to what I say, lest again you fan empty nothing at me with empty wordiness, and affirm that I said the nothing, which is nothing, has the power of making something. This I say: that the nature which was created rational could sin because it was made out of nothing; which is something other than to say it could sin because it is not the nature of God? For if it had not been made out of nothing, whatever it was would naturally be out of God; if it were naturally out of God, it would be the nature of God; if it were the nature of God, it could not sin. Therefore it could sin, although it was made by God, because it was made out of nothing, not out of God. If you understand this, and are unwilling to fight against the truth, you will cease from this contention in this question.
Iulianum.5.3940. IUL. Cum ergo hoc tam magnum apertum esset, quid illud fuit, quod tibi persuasit, ut crederes antiqui nihili violentiam causam malae voluntatis fuisse? Profecto ut intellegeremus nos, omnia te, quae sunt facta de nihilo, rea credere, et universum mundum diabolo mancipare. Quoniam igitur mihi claruit antiquam inter vos dogmatum manere concordiam, hinc iam tibi pariter et Manichaeo respondeo. Quaeritis certe, ut qui nego mali esse naturam, si possum respondeam, unde ipsa mala voluntas in homine primo potuit exoriri. At ego refero non vos intellegere quid dicatis. Voluntas enim nihil est aliud, quam motus animi, cogente nullo.
40. JULIAN: Since, then, this great matter was so plain, what was it that persuaded you to believe that the violence of the ancient nothing was the cause of the evil will? Surely, that we might understand that you believe all things that were made out of nothing to be guilty, and hand the whole world over to the devil. Since, therefore, it has become clear to me that an ancient concord of dogmas remains between you, from here I now answer you and the Manichee alike. You both ask, since I deny that there is a nature of evil, that I answer, if I can, whence the evil will itself could arise in the first man. But I reply that you do not understand what you are saying. For the will is nothing other than a movement of the mind, with nothing compelling.
Iulianum.5.40AUG. Motus animi quid est, nisi motus naturae? Animus enim sine dubitatione natura est; proinde voluntas motus est naturae, quoniam motus est animi. Tu autem cum superius naturam tamquam genus poneres, eique generi species suas subderes, sic certe locutus es: Naturae, inquis, humanae generalitas, institutionum infra se locatarum genus quoddam est; haec velut species habet in situ, in membris, in ordinibus, in motibus, vel aliis id genus (Cf. supra 5, 24). Ista ergo tua disputatione motus naturae speciem asseruisti esse naturae; unde te sequitur, quod non vis, ut natura sit omnis naturae motus, si natura genus, eiusque species est naturae motus; quemadmodum animal est omnis equus, eo quod animal genus est, species vero huius generis equus. Ac per hoc voluntas, quoniam motus est animi, et inde ostenditur motus esse naturae, te ita disputante natura est; quia naturae tamquam generi species huiusmodi subdidisti.
AUGUSTINE: What is a movement of the mind, if not a movement of nature? For the mind is without doubt a nature; accordingly the will is a movement of nature, since it is a movement of the mind. But you, when above you set down nature as a genus and subordinated to that genus its own species, certainly spoke thus: The generality of human nature, you say, is a kind of genus over the constituent realities placed beneath it; it has these as it were as species, in posture, in members, in arrangements, in movements, and other things of that kind (See above, 5.24). By that argument of yours, then, you asserted that a movement of nature is a species of nature; whence it follows for you, what you do not want—that every movement of nature is nature, if nature is the genus and a movement of nature is its species; just as every horse is an animal, because animal is a genus, but the horse a species of this genus. And by this, the will, since it is a movement of the mind, and from that is shown to be a movement of nature, is, by your own arguing, nature; because you subordinated movements of this kind as species to nature as their genus.
Iulianum.5.40Cur ergo reprehendis quod dicitur naturale peccatum, quod fecit voluntas mala, quam ipsam voluntatem tu dicere convincaris esse naturam? Sed natura non sit voluntas; certe tamen nisi in natura non potest esse; quantum enim pertinet ad hominem, motus est animi, animusque natura est. Sine iam, quaeso, ita dici naturale peccatum, quoniam cum homo peccat, natura utique peccat; homo quippe natura est: quemadmodum recte dici potest etiam spiritale peccatum, cum spiritus peccat. Non enim erravit Apostolus, ubi ait: spiritalia nequitiae (Eph 6, 12); quae spiritalia procul dubio naturalia sunt; quia spiritus sine ambiguitate natura est, sive sit creator, sive sit creatus. Nec tamen quod vel angelo vel homine volente ei commissum est, quoniam natura peccavit (et angelus enim et homo naturae sunt), ita hoc esse dicimus naturale peccatum, ut necessitate factum esse dicamus, quod factum est libera voluntate.
Why, then, do you reproach what is called natural sin, which an evil will did—the very will that you are convicted of saying is nature? But suppose the will is not nature; certainly nevertheless it cannot exist except in nature; for as far as the human being is concerned, it is a movement of the mind, and the mind is nature. Allow, now, I pray, that sin is called natural in this way, since when a human being sins, nature surely sins; for the human being is a nature: just as it can rightly be called even spiritual sin, when a spirit sins. For the Apostle did not err when he said: spiritual forces of wickedness (Eph 6:12); which spiritual things are without doubt natural, because a spirit is, without ambiguity, a nature, whether it be creator or created. Nor yet, because what was committed with the angel or the human being willing it was done by nature (for both angel and human being are natures), do we so call this natural sin as to say that what was done by free will was done by necessity.
Iulianum.5.40Qui enim propterea peccavit, quia voluit, potuit et nolle peccare; et ita homo creatus est, ut et nolle posset et velle, et quodlibet horum haberet in potestate el. Sed aliud est originale peccatum, quod etsi trahunt sine propria voluntate nascentes, tamen per voluntatem primi hominis ipsa est origo vitiata; sicut aliud etiam est in maiore homine propter quod dicit: Non enim quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 15); nec tamen etiam ista necessitas insanabilis est ei, cui dicitur: De necessitatibus meis erue me (Ps 24, 17).
For he who sinned because he willed could also have willed not to sin; and the human being was so created that he could both will and not will, and had each of these in his power. But original sin is something else, which, although those being born draw it without their own will, nevertheless the origin itself was vitiated through the will of the first man; just as there is also something else in the grown man, on account of which he says: For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want, this I do (Rom 7:15); nor yet is even this necessity incurable for him to whom it is said: Rescue me from my necessities (Ps 25:17 (24:17)).
Iulianum.5.4041. IUL. Quaeritis ergo necessitatem rei, quae esse non potest si patitur necessitatem. Huic motui animi libero, sine coactu originis inquieto, si causa ipso motu detur antiquior, non gignitur omnino, sed tollitur. Nomen enim ipsum voluntatis nullam vim habet alteram, quam non debere materiae quod movetur. Cum ergo unde orta sit voluntas, ipsa voluntate quaeris antiquius; non exordium eius, sed exitium requiris; omnino enim non intellegitur esse, si aut tenebris deputetur, aut nihilo; nec potest dici iam voluntas, quae subsistere non potest, nisi in motu animi, cogente nullo. Si ergo cogat aliquis, est quidem motus; sed non est voluntas, cuius vim illa definitionis pars secunda complevit, id est, nullo cogente.
41. JULIAN: You ask, then, for the necessity of a thing which cannot exist if it suffers necessity. To this free movement of the mind, restless without compulsion of origin, if a cause older than the movement itself be given, it is not begotten at all but abolished. For the very name of will has no other force than that what is moved owes nothing to matter. When, therefore, you ask, older than the will itself, whence the will arose, you are seeking not its beginning but its end; for it is not understood to be at all, if it is assigned either to darkness or to nothing; nor can that any longer be called will which cannot subsist except in a movement of the mind, with nothing compelling. If, then, anyone compels, there is indeed a movement; but it is not will, whose force that second part of the definition completed, that is, with nothing compelling.
Iulianum.5.41Si ergo voluntas nihil est aliud, quam motus animi, cogente nullo; male prorsus quaeritur origo rei, cuius conditio, si praevenitur, interit. Expende ergo quid sit quod roges: Unde, inquis, ipsa voluntas mala quasi arbor mala in primo homine potuit exoriri? (De nupt. et concup. 2, 28, 48), qui confiteris voluntatem de origine contigisse. Voluntas enim motus est animi, cogente nullo. Naturalia cuncta cogunt esse quod sequitur: voluntas autem si praecedentibus causis cogatur, voluntas esse mox desinit, et perdit conditionem, si accepit originem.
If, then, the will is nothing other than a movement of the mind, with nothing compelling, the origin of a thing is altogether wrongly sought whose condition perishes if it is anticipated. Weigh, then, what it is you ask: Whence, you say, could the evil will itself, as an evil tree, arise in the first man? (Marriage and Desire 2.28.48)—you who confess that the will came about from origin. For the will is a movement of the mind, with nothing compelling. All natural things compel that which follows to be: but the will, if it is compelled by preceding causes, at once ceases to be will, and loses its condition, if it has received an origin.
Iulianum.5.41AUG. Si voluntas ideo non habet originem, quia non cogitur; nec ipse homo habet originem ut sit homo, quia non coactus est esse. Quomodo enim cogi poterat, qui non erat? Et certe homo natura est; tuque dixisti: Naturalia cuncta cogunt esse quod sequitur. Rogo te, attende quid dicas; noli oculis clausis linguam movere, quomodo qui in somnis loquitur. Nulla res, quae non est, cogi potest. Vide etiam quam sit insanum, negare habere originem res quae ortae sunt; cum ipsa origo ab oriundo sit dicta.
AUGUSTINE: If the will therefore has no origin because it is not compelled, then neither does the human being himself have an origin so as to be a human being, because he was not compelled to be. For how could he be compelled who did not exist? And surely the human being is a nature; and you said: All natural things compel that which follows to be. I beg you, attend to what you say; do not move your tongue with your eyes closed, like one who talks in his sleep. No thing that does not exist can be compelled. See also how insane it is to deny that things which have arisen have an origin; when the origin itself is named from arising.
Iulianum.5.41Nam quod est et originem non habet, semper fuit; si autem non fuit, et est, ortum est; si ortum est, habet originem. Et voluntas ergo peccati, quae non fuit, et est, utique orta est; si enim est, et orta non est, semper fuit; sed non fuit semper: ergo orta est. Iam tu clama contra apertissimam veritatem: hoc enim decet tuam vanam loquacitatem; et dic: Orta est quidem, sed originem non habet; aut, quod est insanius: Et non fuit, et est, et tamen orta non est.
For what is and does not have an origin always was; but if it was not, and is, it has arisen; if it has arisen, it has an origin. The will of sin, then, which was not, and is, surely arose; for if it is, and did not arise, it always was; but it did not always exist: therefore it arose. Now cry out against the most evident truth: for this befits your empty wordiness; and say: It arose indeed, but does not have an origin; or, what is more insane: It both was not, and is, and yet did not arise.
Iulianum.5.41Porro si hoc non dicis, ne insulsissimus et omnino fatuus iudiceris, quaere unde orta sit hominis voluntas mala, quam negare non potes ortam esse, quia negare non potes non fuisse et esse coepisse; quaere, inquam, unde orta sit; et invenies ipsum hominem; ex illo quippe orta est voluntas mala, quae in illo ante non fuit. Quaere etiam qualis erat homo, antequam voluntas mala oriretur ex illo; et invenies bonum; ea quippe voluntate factus est malus, quae antequam oriretur ex illo, talis erat, qualis a bono factus erat, id est, bonus.
But if you do not say this, lest you be judged most tasteless and altogether foolish, seek whence the evil will of the human being arose, which you cannot deny arose, because you cannot deny that it was not and began to be; seek, I say, whence it arose; and you will find the human being himself; for from him arose the evil will, which was not in him before. Seek also what sort of man he was before the evil will arose from him; and you will find him good; for it was by that will that he was made evil—the will which, before it arose from him, was such as he had been made by the good God, that is, good.
Iulianum.5.41Hoc est igitur quod ait meus doctor tuusque destructor Ambrosius: Ex bonis igitur mala orta sunt (AMBROSIUS, De Isaac et anima 7, 670). Quod tu negando, et dicendo: Rerum ratio non sinit, ut de bono malum, et de iusto iniustum aliquid proferatur; tantum adiuvas Manichaeos ad introducendam naturam mali, de qua dicunt oriri mala, ut te patronum sui gratulentur erroris, nisi cum eis et ipse vincaris. Tu es enim qui mirabili eloquentia, vel potius amentia sic defendis parvulos, ut a Salvatore separes; sic oppugnas Manichaeos, ut contra Salvatorem subleves.
This, then, is what my teacher and your destroyer Ambrose says: From goods, therefore, evils have arisen (Ambrose, On Isaac and the Soul 7.60). And by denying this, and saying: The reason of things does not allow that anything evil be brought forth from good, or anything unjust from the just, you only help the Manichees toward introducing a nature of evil, from which they say evils arise, so that they congratulate you as the patron of their error—unless you too are conquered along with them. For you are the one who, with marvelous eloquence, or rather madness, so defend little ones as to separate them from the Savior; and so assail the Manichees as to lift them up against the Savior.
Iulianum.5.4142. IUL. Cum ergo bene definita sit voluntas: Motus animi, cogente nullo, quid quaeris superius causas, quas definitio voluntatis exclusit? Expendite igitur quid sit voluntas, et desinetis inquirere unde sit voluntas. Voluntas est enim motus animi, cogente nullo; vos, si tentetis ire dimidio ungue superius, statim constituta convellitis. Quid ergo dicit Manichaeus? Sed iste motus ideo exortus est, quia de tenebrarum natura homo factus est.
42. JULIAN: Since, then, the will has been well defined—A movement of the mind, with nothing compelling—why do you seek causes higher up, which the definition of the will has excluded? Weigh, then, what the will is, and you will cease to inquire whence the will comes. For the will is a movement of the mind, with nothing compelling; if you try to go a half-nail's breadth higher, you at once tear up what has been established. What, then, does the Manichee say? But this movement arose because the human being was made out of the nature of the darkness.
Iulianum.5.42Quid tu? Quia, inquis, de nihilo factus est homo. Unus ergo dicit: Ideo voluntas mala, quia de nihilo factus est homo; alter: Ideo voluntas mala in homine, quia de tenebris factus est homo. Utrique ergo illud voluntatis suppletorium denegatis, id est, cogente nullo.
What do you say? Because, you say, the human being was made out of nothing. The one, then, says: The will is evil because the human being was made out of nothing; the other: The will is evil in the human being because the human being was made out of darkness. Both of you, then, deny that supplement of will, that is, with nothing compelling.
Iulianum.5.42Si enim tanta fuit virtus in nihilo, quanta in aliquo; quae coegit hanc voluntatem existere, exclusit ab ea conditionem suam, qua dictum fuerat, cogente nullo. Sed non minus mali abegit infamiam; non est enim peccatum, quod de motu animi libero non venit; effectumque est ut cum dispendio veritatis, totius mali periret invidia; et evanuit mali natura, cum crimen voluntatis evanuit; crimen autem evanuit voluntatis, cum definitio voluntatis exsecta est. Et peccati igitur et voluntatis claruit eiusmodi esse conditionem, ut si causis praecedentibus deputetur, et ius eo perdat, et crimen. Ubi ergo erit mali natura, cum malum non esse constiterit?
For if there was as much power in nothing as in something, which forced this will to exist, it excluded from it its own condition, by which it had been said, with nothing compelling. But none the less it drove away the odium of evil; for that is not sin which does not come from a free movement of the mind; and it came about that, with loss to the truth, the odium of all evil perished; and the nature of evil vanished, when the guilt of the will vanished; and the guilt of the will vanished, when the definition of the will was cut away. Of both sin and will, then, it became clear that the condition is such that, if it is reckoned to preceding causes, it loses both its right and its guilt. Where, then, will the nature of evil be, when it shall have been established that it is not an evil?
Iulianum.5.42AUG. Dici non potest, quantum mirer frontem tuam, quomodo dicas naturam mali, qui malum naturale non dicis; aut quomodo malum naturale non dicas, qui naturam mali dicis. Quid autem vanius definitionibus tuis, qui propterea putas non esse quaerendum unde sit voluntas, quia motus est animi, cogente nullo? Si enim dicatur, ut putas, unde sit; non erit verum quod dictum est: cogente nullo; quia illud unde est, eam cogit esse; et ideo non est alicunde, ne cogatur esse.
AUGUSTINE: It cannot be said how much I marvel at your effrontery—how you speak of a nature of evil, you who do not say evil is natural; or how you do not say evil is natural, you who speak of a nature of evil. But what is emptier than your definitions, you who think the will's origin is therefore not to be sought because it is a movement of the mind, with nothing compelling? For if it be said, as you suppose, whence it is, then what was said will not be true—with nothing compelling; because that from which it is compels it to be; and therefore it is from nowhere, lest it be compelled to be.
Iulianum.5.42O stultitiam singularem! Non est ergo alicunde ipse homo, qui non est coactus esse; quia non erat qui cogeretur, antequam esset. Prorsus et alicunde est voluntas, et esse non cogitur; et si eius origo quaerenda non est, non ideo quaerenda non est, quod voluntas alicunde non sit, sed quia manifestum est unde sit.
O singular foolishness! The human being himself, then, is from nowhere, who was not compelled to be; because there was no one to be compelled, before he existed. Assuredly the will both is from somewhere and is not compelled to be; and if its origin is not to be sought, it is not to be sought, not because the will is from nowhere, but because it is manifest whence it is.
Iulianum.5.42Ab illo est enim voluntas, cuius est voluntas; ab angelo scilicet voluntas angeli, ab homine hominis, a Deo Dei. Et si operatur Deus in homine voluntatem bonam, id utique agit, ut oriatur ab illo bona voluntas, cuius est voluntas; sicut agit ut homo oriatur ab homine; non enim quia Deus creat hominem, ideo non homo ex homine nascitur.
For the will is from him whose will it is; namely, the angel's will from the angel, the human being's from the human being, God's from God. And if God works a good will in a human being, he surely brings it about that a good will arises from him whose will it is; just as he brings it about that a human being arises from a human being; for it is not the case that, because God creates the human being, a human being is therefore not born from a human being.
Iulianum.5.42Malae autem voluntatis suae unusquisque auctor est, quia malum vult. Sed cum quaeritur, quare homo possit habere malam voluntatem, quamvis ut habeat non sit necesse, non origo quaeritur voluntatis, sed origo ipsius possibilitatis; et invenitur ea esse causa, quia etsi magnum bonum est rationalis creatura, non tamen est quod est Deus, cuius solius est inconvertibilis incommutabilisque natura. Et huius rei causa cum quaeritur, hoc invenitur, quia non de se ipso, hoc est, de sua natura atque substantia genuit, sed de nihilo, hoc est, de nulla re fecit haec Deus. Non quia nihil habet aliquam vim; si enim haberet, non nihil, sed aliquid esset; sed quia hoc est cuique naturae de nihilo factam esset, quod est naturam Dei non esse, quae immutabilis sola est.
But each one is the author of his own evil will, because he wills evil. Yet when it is asked why a human being can have an evil will, although it is not necessary that he have it, it is not the origin of the will that is sought, but the origin of the possibility itself; and it is found that the cause is this: that although the rational creature is a great good, it is nevertheless not what God is, whose nature alone is unconvertible and unchangeable. And when the cause of this is sought, it is found that God made these things not out of himself, that is, out of his own nature and substance, but out of nothing, that is, out of no thing. Not that nothing has some power; for if it had, it would not be nothing, but something; but because for any nature to have been made out of nothing is the same as not to be the nature of God, which alone is immutable.
Iulianum.5.42Nec ea quae de aliquibus rebus facta sunt, ab hac excipiuntur origine; quoniam res quae ita factae sunt, ut ex iis aliae fierent, de nullis exstantibus factae sunt, hoc est, omnino de nihilo. Mutari autem possunt quaecumque alia diversis et propriis qualitatibus suis; voluntate vero, quae ratione utitur, sola est rationalis creatura mutabilis. Haec diligenter et intellegenter quisquis advertit, multum te de nihilo nihil quod ad rem pertineat dixisse cognoscet.
Nor are the things that were made out of certain things exempted from this origin; since things that were so made that others might be made out of them, were made out of no existing things, that is, altogether out of nothing. But whatever other things can be changed by their diverse and proper qualities; whereas by the will, which uses reason, the rational creature alone is changeable. Whoever diligently and intelligently attends to these things will recognize that you have said much about nothing that has nothing to do with the matter.
Iulianum.5.4243. IUL. Quid est enim malum, id est, peccatum? Voluntas sequendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. Quid est ipsa voluntas? Motus animi, cogente nullo. Si ergo peccatum ex voluntate natum est, voluntas ex motu animi cogente nullo; nec nihili, nec tenebrarum conditio fecit ut esset hic motus, qui ideo a nullo cogitur, ut possit esse cogente nullo. Ac per hoc nullum est naturale, nullum originale peccatum: quia haec duo nomina unum indicant, id est, peccatum esse non voluntarium; praescripsit autem veritas, nisi voluntarium non posse esse peccatum; et ideo qui dicit malum esse quod constat ingenitum, non convincit in natura esse peccatum; sed se ostendit per pravitatem iudicii criminosum. Ecce responsum est, ad quod tu responderi non posse credebas. Oxymora prorsus fuit quaestio, quam tu arbitraris invictam.
43. JULIAN: For what is evil, that is, sin? The will to follow what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. What is the will itself? A movement of the mind, with nothing compelling. If, then, sin is born from the will, and the will from a movement of the mind with nothing compelling, neither the condition of nothing nor of darkness brought it about that there should be this movement, which for this reason is compelled by no one—that it may be able to exist with nothing compelling. And by this there is no natural sin, no original sin: because these two names indicate one thing, that is, that sin is not voluntary; but the truth has prescribed that sin cannot exist unless voluntary; and therefore he who says that evil is what is agreed to be inborn does not prove that sin is in nature, but shows himself, by the depravity of his judgment, to be a criminal. Behold, an answer has been given to that which you believed could not be answered. The question was altogether an oxymoron, which you judge unconquerable.
Iulianum.5.43AUG. Exsultas inaniter, et dicis: " Ecce responsum est "; ubi te respondere non potuisse mox invenit, quicumque acutus legit haec tua, vel non multum tardus et mea. Quantalibet enim perplexitate, non implicata explicare, sed aperta implicare coneris; sani negare non possunt, oriri ab unoquoque voluntatem suam, nec nisi ab homine oriri hominis voluntatem. Ac per hoc, quoniam mala hominum mala voluntate esse coeperunt, et ante voluntatem malam scimus fuisse hominum naturam bonam; ex bonis orta sunt mala.
AUGUSTINE: You exult emptily, and say: Behold, an answer has been given; whereas anyone acute who reads these words of yours, or even one not very slow who reads mine, soon finds that you could not answer. For with however great a perplexity you try, not to unravel the entangled, but to entangle the plain; sound minds cannot deny that each one's will arises from himself, and that a human being's will arises only from a human being. And by this, since the evils of human beings began to exist by an evil will, and we know that the good nature of human beings existed before the evil will, evils have arisen from goods.
Iulianum.5.43Hoc dicit Ambrosius; hinc perimitur Manichaeus; hoc pro Manichaeo negat contra Ambrosium Iulianus, dicens: Si natura opus Dei est, per opus Dei opus diaboli transire non sinitur; ut Manichaeus dicat, non esse homines opus Dei, per quos Apostolus transisse dicit peccatum et mortem (Cf. Rom 5, 12), quod est opus diaboli; quoniam secundum Iulianum per opus Dei opus diaboli transire non sinitur; et dicit Apostolus per homines transisse opus diaboli; non sunt ergo homines opus Dei. Manichaei est ista conclusio, veniens illi, Iuliane, de adiutorio tuo. Sed Apostolus pro veritate decertans, et homines dicit esse opus Dei, ut prosternat Manichaeum; et per opus Dei, hoc est, per homines transisse opus diaboli, ut cum illo prosternat et te ipsum.
Ambrose says this; hence the Manichee is destroyed; this Julian denies, on behalf of the Manichee, against Ambrose, saying: If nature is the work of God, the work of the devil is not allowed to pass through the work of God; so that the Manichee may say that human beings, through whom the Apostle says sin and death passed (See Rom 5:12)—which is the work of the devil—are not the work of God; since, according to Julian, the work of the devil is not allowed to pass through the work of God; and the Apostle says that the work of the devil passed through human beings; therefore human beings are not the work of God. This conclusion belongs to the Manichee, coming to him, Julian, from your help. But the Apostle, contending for the truth, both says that human beings are the work of God, so as to lay low the Manichee, and says that the work of the devil passed through the work of God, that is, through human beings, so as to lay low you yourself along with him.
Iulianum.5.4344. IUL. Illud tamen admoneo, solere etiam te in scriptis tuis tenebras non dicere creaturam, sed absentia luminis remanere obscuritatem; ut nihil aliud sit obtenebratio, quam splendoris exclusio. Quod ergo excluditur, creaturam vocas; quod remanet, tenebras; quod quidem vulgatum a philosophis est; nec nunc quaero verumne esse putetur, an falsum; sed illud inculco, tenebras tu non dicis esse aliud quam nihil; in homine autem, id est, opere Dei malum ideo exstitisse argumentaris, quia de nihilo factus erat; causam ergo mali illud nihilum fuisse confirmas, quod nihilum tenebras etiam pronuntias. Necessitatem itaque mali de tenebrarum dicis conditione descendere. Igitur nec in hoc a praeceptore dissentis, quoniam voluntatem malam pariter aeternis tenebris deputatis.
44. JULIAN: This, however, I point out: that even in your writings you are wont to say that darkness is not a creature, but that obscurity remains by the absence of light; so that darkening is nothing other than the exclusion of brightness. What is excluded, then, you call a creature; what remains, darkness; which is indeed commonplace among the philosophers; nor do I now ask whether it is thought to be true or false; but this I insist on: you say that darkness is nothing other than nothing; but in the human being, that is, the work of God, you argue that evil came to be because he was made out of nothing; you confirm, therefore, that this nothing was the cause of evil, which nothing you also pronounce to be darkness. And so you say that the necessity of evil descends from the condition of darkness. Therefore in this too you do not dissent from your teacher, since you alike reckon the evil will to eternal darkness.
Iulianum.5.44AUG. Paulo ante iam tibi de nihilo nihil dicenti, quantum aperte potui, breviterque respondi, et nunc frustra ad tenebras voluisti fugere. Non latebis: lumen quippe te persequitur veritatis, ita dicens factas ex nihilo creaturas, quae non sunt quod ipse qui fecit, ut ipsum nihil non existimetur vel intellegatur esse aliquid, nec ad faciendum habere aliquam vim; quia si haberet, non esset nihil. Ac per hoc, nihil nec corpus est ullum, nec spiritus, nec his substantiis aliquid accidens, nec informis ulla materies, nec inanis locus, nec ipsae tenebrae, sed prorsus nihil; quia ubi sunt tenebrae, corpus est aliquod carens lumine, sive aer, sive aqua, sive aliquid aliud; corporali enim lumine vel illuminari ut clareat, vel privari ut tenebrescat, nisi corpus non potest. Ac per hoc istarum corporalium tenebrarum conditor non est, nisi qui condidit corpora, propter quod in hymno trium virorum benedicunt eum lux et tenebrae (Cf. Dan 3, 72).
AUGUSTINE: A little before I already answered you, as openly and briefly as I could, when you said nothing about nothing, and now in vain you have wished to flee to darkness. You will not lie hidden: for the light of truth pursues you, saying that creatures were made out of nothing—creatures which are not what he who made them is—in such a way that the nothing itself is not thought or understood to be anything, nor to have any power for making; because if it had, it would not be nothing. And by this, nothing is neither any body, nor a spirit, nor anything accidental to these substances, nor any formless matter, nor an empty place, nor darkness itself, but utterly nothing; because where there is darkness, there is some body lacking light, whether air, or water, or something else; for only a body can be either illuminated by corporeal light so as to be bright, or deprived of it so as to grow dark. And by this, the maker of these corporeal darknesses is none other than he who made bodies, on account of which, in the hymn of the three young men, light and darkness bless him (See Dan 3:72).
Iulianum.5.44Fecit ergo Deus cuncta de nihilo; id est, omnia quae ut essent fecit, si eorum originem primam respiciamus ex his quae non erant fecit; hoc Graeci dicunt: ejx oujk ojjvntwn. Quod ne credatur de Unigenito, qui est Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine, et ideo non de nihilo, vehementer Catholica resistit Arianis. Cum itaque dicimus, non ideo potuisse oriri ex bono malam voluntatem, quia bonum factum est a bono Deo, sed quia de nihilo factum est, non de Deo; non nihilo damus ullam naturam, sed naturam factoris a natura eorum quae sunt facta discernimus.
God, therefore, made all things out of nothing; that is, all the things he made so that they might exist, if we look to their first origin, he made out of those things which were not; this the Greeks say: ex ouk onton. And lest this be believed of the Only-Begotten, who is God from God, light from light, and therefore not out of nothing, the Catholic Church vehemently resists the Arians. So when we say that an evil will could not arise from good for the reason that the good was made by the good God, but because it was made out of nothing, not out of God, we do not give any nature to nothing, but we distinguish the nature of the maker from the nature of the things that were made.
Iulianum.5.44Ideo quippe possunt ista mutari, sive voluntate, sicut rationalis potuit creatura, sive propriis qualitatibus suis, sicut caetera; quoniam de nihilo facta sunt, non de Deo, quamvis faciente nonnisi Deo; id est, quia non sunt quod illa natura, quae facta non est, atque ob hoc immutabilis sola est. Si ergo vis Manichaeos vel devitare vel vincere, hoc sape, hoc cape intellegendo, si potes, credendo, si non potes, quoniam ex bonis orta sunt mala, nec est aliquid malitia nisi indigentia boni.
For these things can therefore be changed, whether by the will, as the rational creature could, or by their own proper qualities, as the rest; since they were made out of nothing, not out of God, although with none but God making them; that is, because they are not what that nature is which was not made, and on this account is alone immutable. If, then, you wish either to avoid or to conquer the Manichees, be wise to this, grasp this by understanding, if you can, by believing, if you cannot: that evils have arisen from goods, and that malice is nothing other than a lack of good.
Iulianum.5.4445. IUL. Verum ut ambos vos veritas detexit, et proruit; ita a nobis consideratio nostri reposcit officii, ut quid sit hoc quod obscuritatem huic quaestioni, quae iam exarmata est, fecerat, explicemus. Omnia quae fiunt, aut a necessario, aut a possibili dicuntur existere. Necessarium autem hic dico, non quod solemus utile nuncupare, sed quod maioribus fuerit causis coactum. Necessarium ergo vocamus, non quod in iure sit voluntatis, sed quod patiatur existendi vim. Possibile autem dicimus, quod nec existendi, nec non existendi in alteram partem experiatur necessitatem, sed certis modis et possit esse, et possit non esse.
45. JULIAN: But just as the truth has uncovered and overthrown you both, so the consideration of our duty requires of us that we explain what it was that had made this question obscure—a question that has now been disarmed. All things that come to be are said to exist either from the necessary or from the possible. But here I call necessary not what we are accustomed to call useful, but what has been compelled by greater causes. We call necessary, then, not what is in the right of the will, but what suffers a force of existing. But we call possible that which experiences a necessity neither of existing nor of not existing in either direction, but in certain ways both can be and can not be.
Iulianum.5.45Teneat ergo lector noster, quid hic necessarium, quid possibile nuncupemus. Et ut a grandibus inchoemus exemplis, ut Deus faceret mundum, a possibili venit, non a necessario; id est, omnipotentiae eius possibile fuit creare quae condidit, necessarium tamen non fuit, videlicet non est ab aliquo coactus ut faceret, sed fecit quia voluit, quod non fecisset profecto si noluisset. At hoc quod auctori adfuit a possibili, in opere a necessario factum est, id est, non fuit mundo possibile esse et non esse, qui esse ab Omnipotente iubebatur, sed cogebatur existere, cui Omnipotens mandabat essentiam.
Let our reader, then, hold what we here call necessary, and what possible. And, to begin with grand examples: that God made the world came from the possible, not from the necessary; that is, it was possible for his omnipotence to create the things he founded, yet it was not necessary—namely, he was not compelled by anything to make it, but he made it because he willed, which surely he would not have made if he had not willed. But what was present to the maker from the possible, was, in the work, done from the necessary; that is, it was not possible for the world to be and not to be, the world which was being commanded to exist by the Omnipotent, but it was compelled to exist, to which the Omnipotent commanded its being.
Iulianum.5.45AUG. Quomodo mundus cogebatur existere, qui non erat antequam existeret? Quomodo cogitur quisque, si non est? Nonne satius erat ut diceres: Mundus factus est Dei voluntate, non sua? Sed perge, videamus quid ex ista distinctione possibilis et necessarii coneris ostendere; quam melius possemus intellegere, si eam commemorare tantummodo, et non exponere voluisses. Quis enim non videat, omne quod fieri necesse est, etiam fieri posse; non omne quod fieri potest, etiam fieri necesse esse? Si ergo hoc tibi placuit appellare possibile, quod ita fieri potest, ut non sit necesse; illud autem necessarium quod non solum fieri potest, verum etiam necesse est: loquere ut vis, ubi res apparent, non est de verbis controversia facienda. Satis est nosse omne necessarium esse possibile, non omne possibile esse necessarium.
AUGUSTINE: How was the world compelled to exist, which did not exist before it existed? How is anyone compelled, if he does not exist? Would it not have been better for you to say: The world was made by God's will, not its own? But go on, let us see what you try to show from this distinction of the possible and the necessary—which we could understand better if you had wished only to mention it, and not to expound it. For who does not see that everything which must be done can also be done, but not everything which can be done must also be done? If, then, it pleased you to call possible that which can be done in such a way that it is not necessary, but necessary that which not only can be done but also must be done: speak as you wish; where the realities are apparent, no controversy is to be made about words. It is enough to know that everything necessary is possible, but not everything possible is necessary.
Iulianum.5.4546. IUL. Transiit ergo in necessitatem conditi, quod venerat de possibilitate condentis. Fecit etiam diversas naturas diversasque species in naturis, custodito eo ordine qui a rerum fluebat exordio, ut alia essent necessaria, alia possibilia. Quidquid ergo habent creaturae naturaliter, a necessarii parte sortitae sunt.
46. JULIAN: There passed over, then, into the necessity of the thing founded what had come from the possibility of the founder. He also made diverse natures and diverse species within natures, keeping that order which flowed from the beginning of things, so that some things were necessary, others possible. Whatever, then, creatures have naturally, they have received from the side of the necessary.
Iulianum.5.46AUG. Si quidquid habent creaturae naturaliter, a parte necessarii sortitae sunt, non ergo naturaliter habent homines quod concumbunt, sed quod possunt concumbere; nec ille quem Apostolus commemoravit, naturalis est usus feminae (Cf. Rom 1, 27), sed possibilitas eius; si enim nolit homo, non est ipse usus, quamvis possit esse, si velit; possibilitas ergo eius naturalis est, ipse non est; non enim est necessarius, qui et nullus est, si nolimus, et erravit Apostolus qui dixit esse usum feminae naturalem.
AUGUSTINE: If whatever creatures have naturally they have received from the side of the necessary, then human beings do not have naturally the fact that they have intercourse, but the fact that they can have intercourse; nor is what the Apostle mentioned the natural use of the woman (See Rom 1:27), but its possibility; for if a man does not will it, the use itself does not exist, although it can exist if he wills; its possibility, then, is natural, the use itself is not; for it is not necessary, since it is also non-existent if we do not will it, and the Apostle erred who said there is a natural use of the woman.
Iulianum.5.46Ubi est etiam quod ante dixisti, naturam genus, speciemque eius esse coniugium; quandoquidem non necessitate, sed voluntate coniugia copulantur? An forte ut hoc diceres, nondum tibi in mentem venerat duorum istorum, id est, necessarii possibilisque distinctio? Et ut post concubitum sexuum nascatur homo, naturale non est, quia non est necessarium? Non enim necesse est ut sequatur conceptus et partus, cum mas et femina concubuerint; hoc autem possibile, non necessarium definisti, quod fieri potest, sed necesse non est. Nec naturaliter manducamus? Quia et hoc, si nolumus, non fit; et ideo possibile est, non necessarium. Sed ista negare esse naturalia, nihil est aliud quam magnam partem velle auferre naturae. Falsum est itaque quod aisti: Quidquid habent creaturae naturaliter, a necessarii parte sortitae sunt; quandoquidem et haec quae commemoravi, et alia quae commemorare longum est, naturaliter habent, nec ea tamen sunt a necessarii parte sortitae.
Where, too, is what you said before, that nature is the genus and marriage its species; since marriages are joined not by necessity but by will? Or had the distinction of these two, that is, of the necessary and the possible, perhaps not yet come into your mind when you said this? And is it not natural that, after the intercourse of the sexes, a human being is born, because it is not necessary? For it is not necessary that conception and birth follow when male and female have had intercourse; but you defined this as possible, not necessary—that which can be done, but need not be. And do we not eat naturally? For this too, if we do not will it, does not happen; and therefore it is possible, not necessary. But to deny that these things are natural is nothing other than to wish to take away a great part of nature. It is therefore false, what you said: Whatever creatures have naturally, they have received from the side of the necessary; since both these things I have mentioned, and others which it would be long to mention, they have naturally, and yet they did not receive them from the side of the necessary.
Iulianum.5.4647. IUL. Qui autem sentiunt in processu, non semper a necessario, sed multa a possibili capiunt. Hoc in cunctis licet videre corporibus, sed longior disputatio nascitur; pauca tamen demus exempla. Natura corporum est, ut coagmentatione concrescant, divisione solvantur; capacia ergo sunt vulneris, quae patiuntur interitum. Ut ergo possint vulnerari, a necessario habent; ut vulnerentur autem, a possibili. Ita a necessario est possibilitatis natura, cum non sit necessarius possibilitatis effectus. Verbi gratia, equus, bos, et similes animantes vulnerabilem habent naturam, et ideo incommodi capacia a necessario sunt; ut autem vulnerentur, non semper necessarium est. Si enim per diligentiam custodum defendantur a plagis, possunt non vulnerari; quod si non custodiantur, possunt etiam vulnerari.
47. JULIAN: But things that have perception, in their progress, take not always from the necessary, but many things from the possible. This may be seen in all bodies, but a longer discussion arises; yet let us give a few examples. It is the nature of bodies to grow together by being joined and to be loosed by division; they are therefore capable of a wound, which suffer destruction. So that they can be wounded, they have from the necessary; but that they be wounded, from the possible. Thus the nature of possibility is from the necessary, while the effect of possibility is not necessary. For example, a horse, an ox, and similar living things have a woundable nature, and therefore are capable of harm from the necessary; but that they be wounded is not always necessary. For if by the diligence of their keepers they are defended from blows, they can avoid being wounded; but if they are not kept, they can also be wounded.
Iulianum.5.47Plurimum ergo distat inter ea quae a possibili veniunt, et ea quae a necessario; quae nisi custodiatur distinctio, in innumeros itur errores. Quod ut comparatione clarescat: lapsi sunt quidam medicinae oppugnatores, argumentati hanc artem nihil habere utilitatis; disputantque hoc modo: Moriturisne medicina subvenit, an victuris? Si morituris, nihil promovet; si victuris, frustra gestit. Qui enim morituri erant, hac quoque laborante, morientur; qui victuri, sine quoque huius beneficio salvi esse potuerunt.
There is, then, a very great difference between the things that come from the possible and the things that come from the necessary; and unless this distinction is kept, one goes into innumerable errors. That this may grow clear by a comparison: certain opponents of medicine have slipped, arguing that this art has no usefulness; and they argue in this way: Does medicine help those who are going to die, or those who are going to live? If those who are going to die, it accomplishes nothing; if those who are going to live, it strives in vain. For those who were going to die will die even with it laboring; and those who were going to live could have been safe even without its benefit.
Iulianum.5.47Quam nempe concinna, quam urbana conclusio! Sed dissolvitur a propugnatoribus medicinae hoc modo: Haec ars, inquiunt, prodest nec victuris, nec morituris dumtaxat a necessario, sed a possibili id utrumque passuris; non ergo adiuvat medicina eum qui sine dubio moriturus est, quoniam facere immortalem non potest; sed neque ei subvenit, qui sine dubio futurus incolumis est; verum illi, qui si non curetur, periclitari potest; si curetur, liberari potest; sicut ergo nec victuro nec morituro a necessarii conditione subvenire, ita et morituro et victuro, sed a possibili, ars potest erudita prodesse.
How neat, indeed, how witty a conclusion! But it is dissolved by the defenders of medicine in this way: This art, they say, profits neither those who are going to live nor those who are going to die—insofar, that is, as from the necessary; but those who are going to suffer either of these from the possible; medicine therefore does not help him who is without doubt going to die, since it cannot make him immortal; but neither does it help him who is without doubt going to be safe; but rather him who, if he is not treated, can be endangered, and if he is treated, can be set free; just as, then, it cannot help, from the condition of the necessary, one who is going to live nor one who is going to die, so the learned art can profit one going to die and one going to live, but from the possible.
Iulianum.5.47Illi ergo priores medicantum studiis obloquentes, propositionem a possibili inchoantem, necessarii fine clauserunt; quod disputationis genus in innumera extenditur. Verbi gratia, prohibet lex homicidium fieri, prohibet etiam negligentiae per quam in pericula ruitur occasionem dari, ut in tauro cornupeta (Cf. Ex 21, 28-32), atque in domorum coronis (Cf. Deut 22, 8). At potest dici: Victuro subvenit ista diligentia, an morituro? Si morituro, nihil promovet; si victuro, ex abundanti consulit; si utrumque hoc contrarium, et per impedimenta et sine impedimentis necessario consequentur. At hoc falsum est: optimo enim mortalibus iure consulitur, ut quod poterant pati sine diligentia, diligentiae opibus evadant. Aliud ergo est a possibili, aliud a necessario.
Those earlier ones, then, speaking against the studies of physicians, closed with a necessary ending a proposition that began from the possible; and this kind of argument extends into innumerable cases. For example, the law forbids that murder be done; it forbids also that occasion be given for the negligence through which one rushes into dangers, as in the case of the goring ox (See Exod 21:28-32), and of the parapets of houses (See Deut 22:8). But it can be said: Does this diligence help one going to live or one going to die? If one going to die, it accomplishes nothing; if one going to live, it counsels superfluously; if either of these is contrary, both with and without hindrances they will follow of necessity. But this is false: for it is by the best of rights that counsel is given to mortals, that what they could suffer without diligence they may escape by the resources of diligence. One thing, then, is from the possible, another from the necessary.
Iulianum.5.47Ostendamus, iam quid his anteloquiis adiuvemur. Fecit Deus hominem liberi arbitrii, naturae bonae; sed quae capax esset virtutum, quas sibi ex se mancipato animo comparasset; quod liberum arbitrium aliter constare non poterat, quam ut haberet etiam peccandi possibilitatem. Libertatem ergo a necessario habet, voluntatem a possibili. Non potest non esse liber; sed in neutram voluntatem cogi potest, factusque rei necessariae possibilis effectus. In possibili ergo peccari potest, in necessario non potest; quia necessario non actor, sed auctor ipse censetur; atque hoc quod potest homo ex integro Dei est, a possibili autem ipse actor expenditur.
Let us now show what help we get from these preliminaries. God made the human being of free choice, of a good nature; but one that was capable of the virtues which he might acquire for himself out of a mind that was his own to dispose of; which free choice could stand in no other way than that it should have also the possibility of sinning. He has liberty, then, from the necessary, the will from the possible. He cannot not be free; but he can be compelled into neither will, and the possible effect of a necessary thing has been made. In the possible, then, sin can be committed, in the necessary it cannot; because in the necessary he is judged not the doer but the author; and this, that the human being is capable, is wholly God's, but from the possible the doer himself is reckoned to account.
Iulianum.5.47AUG. Quid dicis de diabolo, de quo scriptum est: Ab initio diabolus peccat (1 Io 3, 8)? Possibilitatem peccandi habet an necessitatem? Si necessitatem, tu videris quomodo secundum tuas disputationes excusetur a crimine: si autem possibilitatem, potest ergo et non peccare, potest habere bonam voluntatem, potest agere poenitentiam et impetrare misericordiam Dei; quia cor contritum et humiliatum Deus non despiciet (Cf. Ps 50, 18). Quod quidem visum est quibusdam, Origene ut perhibetur auctore; sed hoc, ut nosse te existimo, fides catholica et sana non recepit; unde nonnulli Originem quoque ipsum alienum fuisse ab hoc errore vel probant, vel volunt.
AUGUSTINE: What do you say about the devil, of whom it is written: The devil sins from the beginning (1 John 3:8)? Does he have the possibility of sinning or the necessity? If the necessity, you see for yourself how, according to your arguments, he is excused from guilt: but if the possibility, then he can also not sin, can have a good will, can do penance and obtain the mercy of God; for a contrite and humbled heart God will not despise (See Ps 51:18 (50:18)). This indeed seemed so to some, with Origen, as is reported, as the author; but this, as I suppose you know, the Catholic and sound faith has not received; whence some prove, or wish, that Origen himself too was a stranger to this error.
Iulianum.5.47Restat igitur, aut ante supplicium ignis aeterni, etiam necessitas ista peccandi magna sit diabolo magni poena peccati neque hinc excusetur a crimine, quoniam et ista vindicta est pro maximo crimine, ut eum delectet sola malitia, nec possit delectare iustitia. Ad hanc autem iam poenalem peccandi necessitatem non utique pervenisset, nisi prius libera voluntate, nulla necessitate peccasset. Definitio itaque illa peccati, cum fit quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere, ad illud peccatum pertinet quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod etiam poena peccati.
It remains, then, that—even before the punishment of eternal fire—this very necessity of sinning is a great penalty to the devil for a great sin, nor is he hereby excused from guilt, since this too is a vengeance for the greatest crime, that malice alone delights him, and justice cannot delight him. But to this now penal necessity of sinning he surely would not have come, unless first, by free will, with no necessity, he had sinned. And so that definition of sin—when it is done what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain—pertains to that sin which is only sin, not to that which is also a penalty of sin.
Iulianum.5.4748. IUL. Et malum ergo et bonum ex propria voluntate facit: sed bonum suum etiam Deo debet, qui parti huic, non quidem praeiudicium, tamen adiutorium subministrat.
48. JULIAN: He does, then, both evil and good of his own will: but his good he owes also to God, who supplies to this part not indeed a prejudgment, yet a help.
Iulianum.5.48AUG. Tam bonum certe quam malum ex propria homo, sicut dicis, voluntate facit, et utriusque in illo possibilitas aequa lance libratur, et ad bene faciendum Deus adiutorium subministrat; cur ergo ad peccandum proclivior est natura mortalium, si nihil egit originale peccatum? Quamvis et ipsum adiutorium, quod subministrare Deum cogimini confiteri, quale dicatis esse, non lateat. Legem quippe, non spiritum dicitis, cum Paulus apostolus per subministrationem Spiritus Sancti nos doceat adiuvari (Cf. Phil 1, 19). Quod ideo commemorandum putavi, ne forte qui audiunt vel legunt de subministratione divini adiutorii sententiam tuam, obliviscantur haeresim vestram.
AUGUSTINE: The human being does good as much as evil of his own will, as you say, and in him the possibility of each is balanced on an equal scale, and God supplies a help for doing well; why, then, is the nature of mortals more inclined to sinning, if original sin accomplished nothing? Although what sort of help you say it is, the help which you are forced to confess that God supplies, is not hidden. For you say it is the law, not the Spirit, whereas the Apostle Paul teaches that we are helped through the supply of the Holy Spirit (See Phil 1:19). This I thought should be mentioned, lest perhaps those who hear or read your opinion about the supply of the divine help should forget your heresy.
Iulianum.5.4849. IUL. Tantum ergo valet ista distinctio, ut si nescientes, quod a possibili incipit, in necessarium concludamus, omnia crimina ad Deum recurrant. Quod Manichaeus videns, tenebras peccati excogitavit auctores; non enim valuit inter possibile necessariumque distinguere. Omne ergo quod naturaliter habet homo, a necessarii parte sortitus est; quia non potuit aliter esse quam factus est.
49. JULIAN: So great, then, is the force of this distinction, that if, unknowing, we conclude in the necessary what begins from the possible, all crimes recur to God. Seeing this, the Manichee devised the darkness as the author of sin; for he was not able to distinguish between the possible and the necessary. Everything, then, that a human being has naturally, he has received from the side of the necessary; because he could not be otherwise than he was made.
Iulianum.5.49AUG. Iam paulo ante monstravi, quam vana sit sententia ista; stolidissimum est enim, habere ho mines naturaliter possibilitatem manducandi, sed non naturaliter cibos naturae congruos manducare; aut habere homines naturaliter possibilitatem concumbendi, sed non naturaliter genitalibus membris sexus utriusque concumbere. Quis hoc dicat, qui considerat utcumque quod dicit? Utrumque enim naturale est, et quod fieri possunt ista, et quod fiunt; sed est illud et quando nolumus; hoc non est nisi velimus.
AUGUSTINE: I have already shown a little before how empty this opinion is; for it is most stupid that human beings should have naturally the possibility of eating, but not naturally eat the foods suited to their nature; or that human beings should have naturally the possibility of intercourse, but not naturally have intercourse with the genital members of either sex. Who would say this, who considers at all what he says? For both are natural—both that these things can be done, and that they are done; but the former is so even when we do not will it; the latter does not occur unless we will it.
Iulianum.5.4950. IUL. Malum autem quod agit, a possibili agit.
50. JULIAN: But the evil that he does, he does from the possible.
Iulianum.5.50AUG. Attende eum qui dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 19); et responde utrum necessitatem non habeat agendi malum, qui non quod vult facit bonum, sed quod non vult malum, hoc agit. Quod si Apostolo repugnare non audes, ecce homo a necessario malum agens definitiones tuas disrumpit et dissipat: necessitate quippe malum agit, qui non vult, et agit. Hoc autem quod nolens agit, si tantummodo concupiscere est carne, sine ulla mentis consensione membrorumque operatione; mala est et concupiscentia carnis, etiamsi non ei consentiatur ad malum; quam te tamen laudare delectat;
AUGUSTINE: Attend to him who says: The evil I do not want, this I do (Rom 7:19); and answer whether he does not have a necessity of doing evil, who does not do the good he wants, but does the evil he does not want. And if you do not dare to oppose the Apostle, behold, a human being doing evil from the necessary breaks up and scatters your definitions: for he does evil by necessity, who does not will it, and yet does it. But this which he does unwillingly, if it is only to covet in the flesh, without any consent of the mind and operation of the members, then the concupiscence of the flesh is also evil, even if it is not consented to for evil—which concupiscence, however, it delights you to praise;
Iulianum.5.50si autem tantum cogitur iste qui clamat: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Ibidem), ut etiam sua membra exhibeat arma peccato; non solum concupiscuntur a necessario mala, verum etiam committuntur. Ubi sunt definitiones tuae, quas tanta loquacitate distinguis? Nempe ut fumus defecerunt et perierunt. Necessarium atque possibile magna cura discernenda commendas, necessarium dicens esse quod fieri necesse est; possibile autem quod fieri potest, sed necesse non est. Proinde necessitatem necessario tribuis, possibile vero nulla necessitate constringis. Malos actus non das necessario, sed possibili; et dicis loquens de homine: Malum autem quod agit, a possibili agit; ne quisquam male agere necessitate, non voluntate, dicatur.
but if this one who cries out: The evil I do not want, this I do (Rom 7:19), is compelled even to offer his members as weapons to sin, then not only are evils coveted from the necessary, but they are also committed. Where are your definitions, which you distinguish with such wordiness? Surely, like smoke, they have failed and perished. You urge that the necessary and the possible must be distinguished with great care, saying that the necessary is what must be done, but the possible what can be done, yet need not be. Accordingly, you attribute necessity to the necessary, but bind the possible by no necessity. Evil acts you assign not to the necessary but to the possible; and you say, speaking of the human being: But the evil that he does, he does from the possible; lest anyone be said to act evilly by necessity, not by will.
Iulianum.5.50Sed procedit in medium qui tibi validissime contradicit, et dicit: Quid est quod dicis? Ecce ego non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 19). Notum est quod homo primus voluntate malum egit, non necessitate; sed iste qui dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago, necessitate se ostendit malum agere, non voluntate; et flens miserias suas, ridet definitiones tuas.
But one comes forward who most forcibly contradicts you, and says: What is it you say? Behold, I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want, this I do (Rom 7:19). It is known that the first man did evil by will, not by necessity; but this one who says: The evil I do not want, this I do, shows that he does evil by necessity, not by will; and, weeping over his miseries, he laughs at your definitions.
Iulianum.5.5051. IUL. Nisi ergo necessaria possibilitas fuisset, effectus possibilis non fuisset. Ut ergo possit malum et bonum facere, necessarium est; ut autem malum faciat, non necessario, sed possibili suo debet. Ubi autem possibilitas est partis utriusque, necessitas neutra est. Sic fit ut nihil sit aliud peccatum, quam voluntas agendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. Si nihil sit autem aliud voluntas, quam motus animi, cogente nullo, quomodo ergo Deus, ut mundum faceret, a possibili habuit; mundus autem ipse, ut existeret, a necessario pertulit; ita etiam in imagine Dei simile quiddam intellegitur. Quippe ut habeat, quam elegerit voluntatem, non cogitur; sed a possibili ei venit; illud autem quod male fecerit, ne cessitatem habet reatus. Ita crimen a necessario incurrit horrorem; licet exortum sit, non a necessitate, sed a possibilitate facientis. Opus ergo possibilitatis testimonium est liberi animantis.
51. JULIAN: Unless, then, the possibility had been necessary, the possible effect would not have existed. So that he can do evil and good, then, is necessary; but that he does evil, he owes not to the necessary, but to his own possible. And where there is a possibility of either part, there is necessity of neither. So it comes about that sin is nothing other than the will to do what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. And if the will is nothing other than a movement of the mind, with nothing compelling, then just as God, in order to make the world, had it from the possible, while the world itself, in order to exist, bore it from the necessary, so too in the image of God something similar is understood. For, in order to have the will it has chosen, it is not compelled; but it comes to it from the possible; but that it has done evil has the necessity of guilt. So crime incurs horror from the necessary; although it arose not from necessity but from the possibility of the doer. The work, then, is the testimony of the possibility of a free living being.
Iulianum.5.51AUG. Iam te omnino negligit, qui ea quae tibi supra respondimus, legit. Quoniam qui dicit: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago; necessitate se ad agendum malum premi satis aperte indicat et ostendit falsum esse quod dicis: Ut malum faciat, non necessario, sed possibili suo debet; et cetera talia quae garris inaniter. Sic fit ut illa definitio, qua dicitur, esse peccatum voluntas agendi quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere, illud peccatum complectatur, sicut iam superius admonui, quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod etiam poena peccati. Tali namque poena iste agebat quod nolebat malum; unde illi si liberum esset abstinere, nequaquam diceret: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago.
AUGUSTINE: He now altogether disregards you, who reads what we answered you above. For he who says: I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want, this I do, indicates clearly enough that he is pressed by necessity to do evil, and shows that what you say is false: That he does evil he owes not to the necessary, but to his own possible; and the other such things you prattle emptily. So it comes about that that definition, by which it is said that sin is the will to do what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain, embraces that sin, as I already warned above, which is only sin, not that which is also a penalty of sin. For by such a penalty this one was doing the evil he did not want; whence, if he were free to abstain, he would by no means say: I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want, this I do.
Iulianum.5.51Sicut ergo nos agnoscimus hominem in corpore vitae illius beatum, ubi liberum habuit quod vellet agere, sive bonum, sive malum; sic et tu agnosce hominem in corpore mortis huius miserum, ubi perdita libertate audis eum dicere: Non quod volo, ago; sed quod odi, illud facio; et: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago; et: Miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? (Rom 7, 15. 19. 24)
Just as, then, we acknowledge a human being blessed in the body of that life, where he had free what he willed to do, whether good or evil; so do you too acknowledge a human being wretched in the body of this death, where, with his liberty lost, you hear him say: I do not do what I want, but what I hate, that I do; and: I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want, this I do; and: Wretched man that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? (Rom 7:15, 19, 24)
Iulianum.5.5152. IUL. Huius vituperatio ad necessaria non recurrit; quia quidquid ad necessarium pervenerit, ipsum pulsat auctorem.
52. JULIAN: The blame for this does not recur to the necessary; because whatever reaches the necessary strikes the author himself.
Iulianum.5.52AUG. Numquid hoc malum hominis, ubi dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago, ipsum hominis pulsat auctorem? Et tamen eum qui sic agit malum, satis apparet ad necessarium pervenisse; necessitate quippe agit quod non agit voluntate.
AUGUSTINE: Does this evil of the human being, where he says: The evil I do not want, this I do, strike the author of the human being himself? And yet it is clear enough that he who does evil in this way has reached the necessary; for he does by necessity what he does not do by will.
Iulianum.5.5253. IUL. Quomodo ergo quod a necessario venit, possibili meo adscribi non potest; ita quod a possibili venit, necessario adscribi non potest. Id est, quomodo natura corporis et animi mei voluntati meae applicari non potest, ut ideo sic videar esse quia volui, cum non potuerim velle antequam essem, ita malum voluntatis naturae non potest admoveri, ut necessitati possibilitatis opera misceantur.
53. JULIAN: Just as, then, what comes from the necessary cannot be ascribed to my possible, so what comes from the possible cannot be ascribed to the necessary. That is, just as the nature of my body and mind cannot be applied to my will, so that I should seem to be thus because I willed, since I could not have willed before I existed, so the evil of the will cannot be applied to nature, so that works should be mixed with the necessity of possibility.
Iulianum.5.53AUG. A necessitate quidem satis evidenter et aperte discernitur, quod ita fieri potest, ut non sit necesse; hoc tu possibile appellas, tamquam impossibile sit quod fieri non solum potest, verum etiam necesse est. Sed quoniam placuit tibi talia duobus istis nomina imponere, intellegamus ut possumus, et feramus. Sed quid est quod dicis: Malum voluntatis non potest admoveri naturae? Nonne cum angelus, vel homo aliquid vult, natura aliquid vult? Et angelus et homo naturae non sunt? Quis hoc dixerit? Si ergo naturae sunt angelus et homo; profecto natura vult quodcumque vult angelus, natura vult quodcumque vult homo. Quomodo ergo malum voluntatis naturae non potest admoveri, cum velle aliquid nisi natura non possit? Aut non imputetur homini peccatum voluntatis suae; quia homo natura est, et malum voluntatis, ut dicis, naturae non potest admoveri. An in tantum tua progreditur vanitas, ut naturae dicas debere imputari, quod naturae non potest admoveri? Nam quis dicat naturae non imputari, quod imputatur homini, nisi quisquis ita desipit, ut hominem neget esse naturam? Videsne quam multum loquaris, nesciens quid loquaris? Si ergo dicas: Voluntas necessitati non potest admoveri: ne hoc quidem universaliter verum est.
AUGUSTINE: From necessity, indeed, that which can be done in such a way that it is not necessary is distinguished clearly and openly enough; this you call possible, as though that which not only can but also must be done were impossible. But since it has pleased you to impose such names on these two, let us understand as we can, and bear with it. But what is it you say: The evil of the will cannot be applied to nature? When an angel, or a human being, wills something, does not a nature will something? Are not both angel and human being natures? Who would say this? If, then, angel and human being are natures, surely nature wills whatever an angel wills, nature wills whatever a human being wills. How, then, can the evil of the will not be applied to nature, when nothing but a nature can will something? Or let the sin of his own will not be imputed to a human being; because a human being is a nature, and the evil of the will, as you say, cannot be applied to nature. Or does your vanity go so far that you say it must be imputed to nature, what cannot be applied to nature? For who would say that what is imputed to a human being is not imputed to nature, unless one so foolish as to deny that a human being is a nature? Do you see how much you talk, not knowing what you talk about? If, then, you say: The will cannot be applied to the necessary: not even this is universally true.
Iulianum.5.53Aliquando enim quod necesse est volumus; sicut necesse est ut qui perseveranter bene vivunt, fiant beati; aliquando etiam necesse est aliquid ut velimus; sicut necesse est nos beatitudinem velle; unde quaedam est et beata necessitas, quia necesse est Deum semper et immutabiliter et beatissime vivere. Sed quoniam sunt et quaedam necessitates sic a voluntatibus alienae, ut et necessitas sit ubi voluntas non est, et voluntas ubi non est necessitas; ex parte saltem verum est quod dicitur: Voluntas necessitati non potest admoveri. Qui vero dicit: Mala voluntas non potest naturae admoveri, idem nobis, si potest, voluntatem vel malam, vel bonam, ubi natura non est, ostendat; aut quod voluntas esse aliqua possit, si natura non sit quae aliquid velit. Attende igitur quam sis a veritate seclusus. Tu dicis: Voluntas mala naturae non potest admoveri; veritas autem dicit: Quamdiu est voluntas ulla, a natura non potest separari.
For sometimes we will what is necessary; just as it is necessary that those who live well perseveringly become blessed; sometimes it is also necessary that we will something; just as it is necessary that we will blessedness; whence there is also a certain blessed necessity, because it is necessary that God always and immutably and most blessedly live. But since there are also certain necessities so foreign to wills that there is both necessity where there is no will, and will where there is no necessity, it is at least partly true what is said: The will cannot be applied to the necessary. But let him who says: An evil will cannot be applied to nature, show us, if he can, a will, whether evil or good, where there is no nature; or that any will can exist, if there is no nature to will something. Attend, then, to how far you are shut out from the truth. You say: An evil will cannot be applied to nature; but the truth says: As long as there is any will, it cannot be separated from nature.
Iulianum.5.5354. IUL. Hanc ergo subtilitatem divisionum non introspiciens Manichaeus, Traducianorum nobis produxit examina. Argumentatur enim hoc modo: Unde malum? Nimirum de voluntate. Unde voluntas mala? Respondet: De homine. Unde homo? Per Deum. Concluditque: Si malum ex homine, homo per Deum, malum igitur per Deum. Et post hoc, quasi religiosus, ne criminosum faciat Deum, dat tenebrarum naturam, cui malum debeamus adscribere.
54. JULIAN: Not looking into this subtlety of divisions, the Manichee has brought forth to us the swarms of the Traducianists. For he argues in this way: Whence evil? Doubtless from the will. Whence the evil will? He answers: From the human being. Whence the human being? Through God. And he concludes: If evil is from the human being, the human being through God, then evil is through God. And after this, as though religious, lest he make God a criminal, he gives the nature of darkness, to which we should ascribe evil.
Iulianum.5.54Hinc et Augustinus: Unde malum? De voluntate. Unde, inquit, ipsa voluntas? De homine, qui est opus Dei. Et colligit: Si malum ex voluntate, voluntas ex homine, homo opus Dei; malum igitur per Deum. Quod quasi conatus absolvere, ne Deum criminosum dicere videretur (quod tradux eius affirmat), violentum aeque pro Deo nobis nihil obtulit, id est, tenebras quibus malum hoc adscribere deberemus. Non enim, inquit, ideo in homine malum natum est, quia opus Dei erat, sed ideo quia de nihilo erat (De nupt. et concup. 2, 28, 48).
Hence Augustine too: Whence evil? From the will. Whence, he says, the will itself? From the human being, who is the work of God. And he gathers: If evil is from the will, the will from the human being, the human being the work of God; then evil is through God. And, as though trying to resolve this, lest he seem to call God a criminal (which his offshoot affirms), he offered us a nothing equally violent in place of God—that is, darkness, to which we should ascribe this evil. For not, he says, did evil arise in the human being because he was the work of God, but because he was out of nothing (Marriage and Desire 2.28.48).
Iulianum.5.54Quasi veritas respondere non possit: Et qua impudentia primo mentitur Deus tuus esse in homine voluntatem; deinde condemnat, cum malum istud, videlicet peccatum, de necessitate noverit tenebrarum, id est, antiqui nihili contigisse? Infleximus per casus nihil, ut appareret Traduciani virtus in nihilo collocantis spem suam.
As though the truth could not answer: And with what effrontery does your God first lie that there is a will in the human being; then condemn him, since he knew that this evil, namely sin, came about from the necessity of darkness, that is, of the ancient nothing? We have declined "nothing" through its cases, so that the power of the Traducianist, placing his hope in nothing, might appear.
Iulianum.5.54Vide tamen imbecillitatem Dei, quem Traducianus inducit. Ipsum nihilum superare non valuit; cumque hominem fecisset ex nihilo, non eum potuit a conditione mali, quae de nihilo veniebat, exuere; sed rerum difficultate factus amarior, pro suis culpis hominem criminatur, et imaginis suae exitio nihili delicta condemnat. Benignius cum eo agit senex Manes, ut dicat illum non usquequaque tenebrarum gente vastatum; cuius debilitatem tantam inducit Traducianus, ut commentetur eum a nihilo fuisse superatum.
See, nevertheless, the weakness of the God whom the Traducianist introduces. He was not strong enough to overcome the nothing itself; and although he had made the human being out of nothing, he could not strip him of the condition of evil that came from nothing; but, made more bitter by the difficulty of things, he accuses the human being for his own faults, and condemns the offenses of nothing by the ruin of his own image. Old Manes deals more kindly with him, in saying that he was not utterly devastated by the race of darkness; whose so great weakness the Traducianist introduces, that he contrives that he was overcome by nothing.
Iulianum.5.54AUG. Nemo superatur a nihilo; sed tu superaris nihil dicendo; nec ego in nihilo collocavi spem meam; sed tu ad nihilum perduxisti loquacitatem tuam. Sane, si recte intellegas quod perverse loqueris, isto modo Deus a nihilo superatur, quoniam Deum nulla res superat; nihil enim quid est, nisi res nulla? Isto modo etiam Deus non potest superare nihil; quia nullam rem non superat, qui superat omnia; est enim super omnia. Sed: Non introspexit, ut dicis, Manichaeus subtilitates divisionum tuarum, et ideo dicit: Si malum ex homine, homo autem per Deum, malum igitur per Deum; ut hac conclusione territi, aut hominem per Deum, aut malum negemus ex homine, aut utrumque, ut ille, falsum esse dicamus; ac sic nobis introducat nescio quam substantiam tenebrarum, quae hominem fecerit, et quae principaliter malum sit, unde malum omne credatur.
AUGUSTINE: No one is overcome by nothing; but you are overcome by saying nothing; nor did I place my hope in nothing; but you brought your wordiness to nothing. Indeed, if you rightly understood what you perversely say, in this way God is overcome by nothing, since no thing overcomes God; for what is nothing but no thing? In this way too God cannot overcome nothing; because he who overcomes all things overcomes no thing; for he is above all things. But: The Manichee did not look into, as you say, the subtleties of your divisions, and therefore he says: If evil is from the human being, but the human being through God, then evil is through God; so that, terrified by this conclusion, we should deny either that the human being is through God, or that evil is from the human being, or, like him, say that both are false; and so introduce to us some substance of darkness or other, which made the human being and which is principally evil, from which all evil is believed to come.
Iulianum.5.54Tu ergo, divisor subtilissime, huic astutiae qua putas sapientia resistendum? Dicam, inquis, malum ab homine ex possibili exstitisse, non ex necessario. Quasi vero tibi ille respondere non possit: Si malum ex possibili, possibilitas ex natura, natura per Deum, malum igitur per Deum. Hanc conclusionem si tu non times, nec ego illam; quoniam ambo non ex necessario, sed ex possibili peccasse hominem primum confitemur. Etenim nos dicentes hominem propterea potuisse peccare, quia non est eius natura facta de Deo, quamvis omnino esse nisi illo creante non posset; non ita hoc dicimus, ut ex hoc ei dicamus impactam, sicut calumniaris, peccandi necessitatem. Prorsus peccare poterat et non peccare; sed si non de nihilo factus esset, id est, si de Deo natura eius esset, peccare omnino non posset.
You, then, most subtle divider, with what cunning do you think this craftiness must be resisted as by wisdom? I will say, you say, that evil came to exist from the human being by the possible, not by the necessary. As though indeed he could not answer you: If evil is from the possible, possibility from nature, nature through God, then evil is through God. If you do not fear this conclusion, neither do I; since we both confess that the first man sinned not from the necessary but from the possible. For we, in saying that the human being could sin because his nature was not made out of God—although he could not exist at all unless God created him—do not say this in such a way as to say, as you slanderously charge, that a necessity of sinning was thereby forced upon him. He could outright both sin and not sin; but if he had not been made out of nothing, that is, if his nature were out of God, he could not have sinned at all.
Iulianum.5.54Quis enim est tam demens, qui dicere audeat, immutabilem et inconvertibilem naturam quae Deus est, ullo modo posse peccare; de quo dicat Apostolus: Negare se ipsum non potest (2 Tim 2, 13)? Utrique igitur Manichaeo resistimus, dicentes a bono et iusto Deo non sic hominem factum esse, ut ei esset necesse peccare; et ideo peccasse quia voluit, qui posset et nolle. Sed quod in eius progenie mala tanta et tam manifesta conspicimus, non voluntaria hominum, sed cum quibus nati sunt, cum ea venire de vitiata per peccatum origine vos negatis, profecto ad naturam mali introducendam, cuius commixtione Dei natura corrupta sit, tamquam in arce Manichaeum haeresis vestra constituit, ex qua et illum simul et vos veritas deicit.
For who is so insane as to dare to say that the immutable and unconvertible nature which is God can in any way sin—of whom the Apostle says: He cannot deny himself (2 Tim 2:13)? We therefore resist both Manichees, saying that the human being was not so made by the good and just God that it was necessary for him to sin; and that he sinned because he willed, who could also not will. But as for the fact that we behold in his progeny such great and such manifest evils—not the voluntary evils of human beings, but those with which they were born—since you deny that these come from an origin vitiated by sin, you surely set up the Manichee, as it were, in a citadel, by your heresy, for introducing the nature of evil by a mixture with which the nature of God has been corrupted; and from that citadel the truth casts down both him and you at once.
Iulianum.5.5455. IUL. Patiuntur hanc omnes ignominiam, qui indicunt veritati bellum. Nos ergo quod egimus colligamus. Quaeritur unde illa prima voluntas mala in homine fuerit exorta. Respondemus: A motu animi, cogente nullo. Obicitur: Si in opere Dei apparuit? Assentimur verum esse. Rogatur quomodo id non abnuamus, qui negamus naturale peccatum. Respondemus: Quia in opere Dei a possibili existit peccatum istud, non a necessario. Naturalia ergo necessaria sunt, possibilia autem voluntaria.
55. JULIAN: All who declare war on the truth suffer this ignominy. Let us, then, gather together what we have argued. It is asked whence that first evil will arose in the human being. We answer: From a movement of the mind, with nothing compelling. It is objected: What if it appeared in the work of God? We assent that it is true. It is asked how we do not deny this, who deny natural sin. We answer: Because in the work of God this sin exists from the possible, not from the necessary. Natural things, then, are necessary, but possible things are voluntary.
Iulianum.5.55AUG. Sunt et voluntaria necessaria, sicut beati esse volumus, et necesse est ut velimus; sunt et possibilia naturalia; sic possibile est enim ut concipiat femina quae concumbit cum viro suis et illius genitalibus membris, si nec ipsa sterilis sit, nec ille; sed non est necessarium; fieri quippe potest, sed necesse non est; et tamen naturale est. Tace, obsecro; vanae sunt definitiones; nec subtiles, sed pueriles divisiones tuae.
AUGUSTINE: There are also necessary things that are voluntary, just as we will to be blessed, and it is necessary that we will it; and there are possible things that are natural; for so it is possible that a woman conceive who has intercourse with a man, by her own and his genital members, if neither she is sterile nor he; but it is not necessary; for it can happen, but need not; and yet it is natural. Be silent, I beg; your definitions are empty; and your divisions are not subtle, but childish.
Iulianum.5.5556. IUL. Ac per hoc, ut peccatum motui libero, ita naturam Deo abscribimus conditori. Est igitur natura humana bonum opus Dei; est libertas arbitrii, id est, possibilitas vel delinquendi, vel recte faciendi, bonum aeque opus Dei. Utrumque hoc homini a necessario venit; neutra de his duabus rebus mali causa est. Sed huc usque necessaria illa venerunt; iam voluntas quidem in his exoritur, sed non de his. Capacia voluntatis sunt quippe, non plena; nec faciunt, sed accipiunt diversitatem meritorum.
56. JULIAN: And by this, just as we ascribe sin to a free movement, so we ascribe nature to God the founder. Human nature, then, is a good work of God; the liberty of choice, that is, the possibility either of transgressing or of doing rightly, is equally a good work of God. Both of these come to the human being from the necessary; neither of these two things is the cause of evil. But thus far have those necessary things come; now the will indeed arises in them, but not out of them. For they are capable of will, not full of it; and they do not make, but receive, the diversity of merits.
Iulianum.5.56AUG. Naturam et liberum arbitrium rectissime bona confiteris esse Dei opera; sed quod voluntatem in his quidem, sed non de his asseris exoriri, quid insanius dici potest? Itane vero, Iuliane, ex homine hominis voluntas non oritur, cum homo bonum opus Dei sit? Postremo potuitne ascendere in cor tuum, exoriri quidem hominis voluntatem, sed non de libero eius arbitrio?
AUGUSTINE: You most rightly confess that nature and free choice are good works of God; but as for your assertion that the will arises indeed in these, but not out of these, what can be said more insane? Is it really so, Julian, that the will of a human being does not arise out of the human being, when the human being is a good work of God? Finally, could it ascend into your heart that the will of a human being arises indeed, but not out of his free choice?
Iulianum.5.56Dic ergo unde, si non de natura, id est, non de ipso homine; si non de libero eius arbitrio, dic, rogo, unde voluntas hominis oriatur. Dixisti ubi oriatur, dic et unde. Bona opera Dei sunt natura et liberum arbitrium: In his, inquis, voluntas exoritur, sed non de his. Unde ergo? Dic; audiamus, discamus. Aut ostende aliquid alicubi ortum esse, cum unde non esset.
Say, then, whence it arises, if not out of nature, that is, not out of the human being himself; if not out of his free choice, say, I pray, whence the will of the human being arises. You said where it arises, say also whence. Nature and free choice are good works of God: In these, you say, the will arises, but not out of these. Whence, then? Say; let us hear, let us learn. Or show that something has anywhere arisen, when there was nothing whence it should be.
Iulianum.5.56Mundus quidem de nihilo exortus est, sed Deo faciente; nam si Deum opificem non haberet, de nullis rebus omnino oriri non posset. Si ergo et voluntas in homine vel in eius libero arbitrio de nihilo exorta est, quis eam fecit? Aut si non facta, vel orta est, quis eam genuit? An sola est in rebus, quae esse coeperunt, facta a nullo, nata de nullo? Cur ergo propter illam damnatur homo, quo non volente exorta est in illo voluntas mala, cuius erat tantum capax, non efficax?
The world indeed arose out of nothing, but with God making it; for if it did not have God as its maker, it could not arise at all out of no things. If, then, the will too in the human being or in his free choice arose out of nothing, who made it? Or if it was not made, but arose, who begot it? Is it alone among the things that began to exist, made by none, born of none? Why, then, is the human being condemned on account of it, when, without his willing it, there arose in him an evil will of which he was only capable, not productive?
Iulianum.5.56Si autem, ut iure damnetur, eo volente in illo exorta est; cur eius ipsius voluntatem de illo exortam negas, quo volente exortam esse, et quo nisi volente exoriri non potuisse non negas? Cum vero de illo orta est, de natura exorta est, quia homo natura est; et quia potuit etiam nolle quod voluit, de libero eius arbitrio exorta est, quod et ipsum, sicut fateris, pertinet ad naturam;
But if, so that he may be justly condemned, it arose in him with him willing it, why do you deny that this very will of his arose out of him, when you do not deny that it arose with him willing it, and could not arise except with him willing it? But when it arose out of him, it arose out of nature, because the human being is nature; and because he could also not will what he willed, it arose out of his free choice, which itself, as you confess, pertains to nature;
Iulianum.5.56cur ergo negas clausis oculis res apertas, de natura hominis exoriri voluntatem hominis, dum times ne Manichaeus naturae huius accuset auctorem? Sufficit ad illam pestilentiam refellendam, quod catholica veritas praedicat, ab optimo Deo sic esse hominem conditum, ut necessitatem peccandi non haberet, nec peccaret, si peccare nollet; cum etiam semper nolle utique posset.
why, then, do you deny, with your eyes closed, the open facts—that the will of a human being arises out of the nature of the human being—while you fear lest the Manichee accuse the author of this nature? It suffices to refute that pestilence, what the Catholic truth proclaims: that the human being was so founded by the best God that he did not have a necessity of sinning, nor would he sin if he did not will to sin; since he could surely always also not will it.
Iulianum.5.56Quis enim tam sit mente caecus, ut non videat, sicut homo est primitus conditus, magnum bonum esse naturae, posse non peccare; quamvis maius sit non posse peccare; atque ordinatissime constitutum, ut hoc prius esset unde fieret hominis meritum, et illud esset postea bene meriti praemium?
For who is so blind in mind as not to see that, as the human being was first founded, it is a great good of nature to be able not to sin, although it is greater not to be able to sin; and that it was most orderly arranged that this should come first, whence the human being's merit might be made, and that should come afterward, as the reward of the one who had merited well?
Iulianum.5.5657. IUL. Bona ergo possibilitas mali atque boni voluntatem non cogit, sed permittit oboriri. Nemo igitur ideo bonus est, quia libero affectus arbitrio est; sunt quippe multi homines aeque liberi, sed tamen pessimi; sed nec ideo quisque malus est, quia liberi arbitrii est; sunt enim multi aeque libertatis huius participes, tamen optimi. Nec bonus igitur, nec malus homo ideo est, quia liber est; sed nec bonus, nec malus esse posset, nisi liber esset. Est ergo ista possibilitas, quae nomine libertatis ostenditur, ita a sapientissimo constituta Deo, ut sine ipsa non sit, quod per ipsam esse non cogitur.
57. JULIAN: The good possibility of evil and good, then, does not compel the will, but permits it to arise. No one, therefore, is good because he is endowed with free choice; for there are many human beings equally free, yet most wicked; but neither is anyone evil because he is of free choice; for there are many equally partakers of this liberty, yet most excellent. A human being, therefore, is neither good nor evil because he is free; but he could be neither good nor evil unless he were free. There is, then, this possibility, which is shown by the name of liberty, so established by the most wise God that without it there is not what through it is not compelled to be.
Iulianum.5.57Contrariorum enim una capacitate ab utrorumque praeiudicio vindicatur; id est, nec malae voluntatis, nec bonae causa et necessitas dici potest, quae utramque sic recipit, ut neutram compellat existere. Necessariorum ergo singularis ductus, et unum quodam modo filum est, velut geometrica illa sine latitudine longitudo est, nec hic unio dividi potest. Quamdiu ergo singularis extenditur, vim naturae suae tenet; at ubi ei occurrerit quod in diversa findatur, illud necessarium illico terminatur. Id est, bonus Deus bonum fecit hominem.
For by one capacity for contraries it is vindicated from the prejudgment of either; that is, it cannot be called the cause and necessity either of an evil will or of a good one, which so receives each that it compels neither to exist. The course of necessary things, then, is single, and is in a certain way one thread, just as that geometrical length is without breadth, nor here can the unity be divided. As long, then, as it extends single, it holds the force of its own nature; but where there meets it that which is split into different directions, that necessary thing is at once terminated. That is, the good God made the human being good.
Iulianum.5.57AUG. Cur ergo dixisti, nec bonum, nec malum esse hominem, nisi propria voluntate; et quidquid ex Deo habet, ex necessario habere, non ex possibili? Quod vis intellegi, ex natura, non ex voluntate; ut per se ipsum bonus sit homo, non per Deum, aut certe melior per se ipsum quam per Deum. Haec quippe verba tua sunt: Nemo, inquis, ideo bonus est, quia libero affectus arbitrio est. Et paulo post: Nec ideo quisque malus est, inquis, quia liberi arbitrii est. Quibus verbis quid dicis, nisi quod nec bonum nec malum Deus fecerit hominem, sed utrumlibet horum ipse se facit, cum bene vel male utitur libero arbitrio?
AUGUSTINE: Why, then, did you say that a human being is neither good nor evil except by his own will; and that whatever he has from God, he has from the necessary, not from the possible? By which you want it understood, from nature, not from will; so that a human being is good through himself, not through God, or at least better through himself than through God. For these are your words: No one, you say, is good because he is endowed with free choice. And a little after: Neither is anyone evil, you say, because he is of free choice. By which words what do you say, except that God made the human being neither good nor evil, but that he himself makes himself either of these, when he uses free choice well or ill?
Iulianum.5.57Quid est ergo quod nunc dicis: Bonus Deus bonum fecit hominem; si nec bonus, nec malus est habendo liberum arbitrium quod in eo Deus fecit, sed bene utendo, id est, cum iam ipse bene vult, non cum habet possibilitatem volendi bene? Et quomodo verum erit: Fecit Deus hominem rectum (Eccle 7, 30)? An rectus erat non habens voluntatem bonam, sed eius possibilitatem? Ergo et pravus erat non habens voluntatem malam, sed eius possibilitatem; et a se ipso illi est voluntas bona, falsumque scriptum est: Praeparatur voluntas a Domino (Prov 8, 35 (sec. LXX)); et: Deus in vobis operatur et velle (Phil 2, 13).
What is it, then, that you now say: The good God made the human being good; if he is neither good nor evil by having free choice, which God made in him, but by using it well, that is, when he himself already wills well, not when he has the possibility of willing well? And how will it be true: God made the human being upright (Eccl 7:29)? Or was he upright who did not have a good will, but its possibility? Then he was also depraved who did not have an evil will, but its possibility; and the good will is his from himself, and what is written is false: The will is prepared by the Lord (Prov 8:35 (LXX)); and: God works in you even the willing (Phil 2:13).
Iulianum.5.57Quamquam tu nec a se ipso ei dicas esse voluntatem bonam vel malam; sed oriri in illo, non de illo. Ita fit, ut per tuam mirabilem sapientiam, nec Deus fecerit rectum hominem; sed qui rectus posset esse, si vellet; nec ipse se faciat, sed nescio quo casu rectus fiat, quia nec de illo, sed nescio unde, aut nescio quomodo, in illo voluntas oritur qua rectus fiat. Non est ista sapientia desursum descendens, sed terrena, animalis, diabolica (Cf. Iac 3, 15).
Although you do not say that the will, whether good or evil, is his from himself; but that it arises in him, not out of him. So it comes about that, by your marvelous wisdom, God did not make the human being upright, but one who could be upright if he willed; nor does he make himself, but by some chance or other becomes upright, because the will by which he becomes upright arises not out of him, but from I know not where, or in I know not what manner, in him. This is not the wisdom that comes down from above, but is earthly, animal, diabolical (See Jas 3:15).
Iulianum.5.5758. IUL. Et incipere, et bene incipere substantiam, a necessarii unione dirigitur. Accipit etiam arbitrii libertatem; aeque adhuc necessarii linea continetur; sed iam necessariorum finis est; hinc finduntur in contraria voluntates. Ad unionem ergo necessarii divisionis natura non pertinet. Ita possibilitatem habere cogimur; uti autem vel bene vel male ipsa possibilitate non cogimur. Ita fit ut etiam possibilitas peccandi capax boni malique, sed voluntarii sit; quoniam boni proprii capax esse non poterat, nisi capax esset et pravi.
58. JULIAN: Both to begin, and to begin well, the substance is directed by the union of the necessary. It receives also the liberty of choice; it is still equally contained by the line of the necessary; but now is the end of the necessary things; from here wills are split into contraries. The nature of division, then, does not pertain to the union of the necessary. Thus we are compelled to have the possibility; but to use the possibility itself, whether well or ill, we are not compelled. So it comes about that even the possibility of sinning is capable of good and of evil, but of the voluntary; since it could not be capable of its own good, unless it were capable also of the depraved.
Iulianum.5.58AUG. Dic potius, si vis verum dicere, hominis naturam capacem boni et pravi prius factam; non quod non posset solius boni capax fieri; sed quod ab ipso gradu ordinatissime surgere debuit, ut si non peccasset quando peccare posset, ad eam beatitudinem perveniret ubi peccare non posset. Quia, sicut iam dixi, utrumque magnum bonum est, quamvis minus unum, alterum maius. Minus est enim posse non peccare, maius autem non posse peccare; et oportebat a merito boni minoris ad praemium pervenire maioris. N
AUGUSTINE: Say rather, if you wish to say the truth, that the nature of the human being was first made capable of good and of the depraved; not that it could not be made capable of good alone; but that it had to rise most orderly from that very step, so that, if it had not sinned when it could sin, it would arrive at that blessedness where it could not sin. For, as I have already said, each is a great good, although the one is less, the other greater. For it is less to be able not to sin, but greater not to be able to sin; and it was fitting to come from the merit of the lesser good to the reward of the greater.
Iulianum.5.58am si boni proprii, sicut dicis, capax esse non poterat humana natura nisi capax esset et pravi, cur post hanc vitam pie gestam, boni solius erit, et non mali capax, ab omni scilicet aliena, non solum voluntate, vel necessitate, verum etiam possibilitate peccandi? An vero metuendum est, ne tunc etiam forte peccemus, quando sanctis angelis erimus aequales? De quibus sine dubitatione credendum est, quod acceperint non posse peccare pro merito permansionis suae, quoniam steterunt, quando aliis cadentibus etiam ipsi peccare potuerunt. Alioquin adhuc timendum esset, ne multos novos diabolos, et eorum novos malos angelos haberet hic mundus.
For if, as you say, human nature could not be capable of its own good unless it were also capable of the depraved, why, after this life has been piously spent, will it be capable of good alone, and not of evil—that is, free from everything foreign, not only from the will or the necessity, but even from the possibility of sinning? Or is it really to be feared that we may then perhaps sin, when we shall be equal to the holy angels? Of whom it must be believed without doubt that they received the inability to sin as the reward of their persevering, since they stood firm when, with others falling, they too could have sinned. Otherwise it would still have to be feared lest this world should have many new devils and their new evil angels.
Iulianum.5.58Sanctorum etiam qui de corporibus exierunt, erit nobis vita suspecta, ne ibi etiam quo venerunt, forsitan peccaverint, aut forsitan peccent; si in natura rationali possibilitas peccandi permanet, nec potest esse capax boni, si non sit et mali. Quae quoniam vehementer absurda sunt, haec opinio est respuenda; potiusque credendum, ideo fuisse istam naturam et boni et mali capacem primitus factam, ut horum alterum diligendo, meritum compararet, quo boni solius, vel mali solius capax postmodum fieret; ita tamen ut si plecteretur damnatione perpetua, pati cogeretur tantum, non etiam facere sineretur malum.
The life even of the saints who have departed from their bodies will be suspect to us, lest there too, where they have come, they have perhaps sinned, or perhaps still sin; if the possibility of sinning remains in the rational nature, and it cannot be capable of good unless it is also capable of evil. Since these things are vehemently absurd, this opinion must be rejected; and it must rather be believed that this nature was first made capable both of good and of evil for this reason, that by loving the one of these it might acquire a merit by which it might afterward become capable of good alone, or of evil alone; yet in such a way that, if it were punished with perpetual condemnation, it would be forced only to suffer, and not also permitted to do, evil.
Iulianum.5.5859. IUL. Sed quantum interest inter plenum et vacuum, tantum nimirum inter possibilitatem et necessitatem. Possibilitas enim rei illius, cuius capax dicitur, vacua ostenditur; quando si vacua non esset, nec capax esset. Quis enim caperet, quod iam haberet? Necessitas autem non vacuitatem, sed plenitudinem indicat; non potest quippe capere quasi vacua, quod iam quasi plena esse compellit. Tantum itaque inter necessaria et possibilia interest, quantum inter conferta et inania. Ab utriusque ergo qualitatis, cuius aeque capax est, praeiudiciis ipsa repugnantium susceptione defenditur. Habet ergo bonum necessarium in natura tantum, quantum ad honorem spectat auctoris; quod est innocentia nulli malo admixta naturaliter, proprii operis pro boni proprietate et accusatione mali receptrix. Illud ergo quod ei de proprio venit, peccans quisque sauciare potest; hoc vero quod de Dei opere suscepit, decolorare non potest.
59. JULIAN: But by as much as the full differs from the empty, by so much, surely, does possibility differ from necessity. For the possibility of that thing of which it is said to be capable is shown to be empty; since, if it were not empty, it would not be capable. For who would contain what he already had? But necessity indicates not emptiness but fullness; for it cannot, as it were empty, contain what it already, as it were full, compels to be. There is, then, as much difference between necessary and possible things as between things packed full and things void. From the prejudgments, then, of each quality of which it is equally capable, it is defended by the very reception of contraries. It has, therefore, the necessary good in nature only insofar as it concerns the honor of its author; which is an innocence naturally mingled with no evil, the receiver of its own work according to the property of its own good and the accusation of evil. That, then, which comes to it from what is its own, anyone sinning can wound; but this which it received from the work of God, he cannot discolor.
Iulianum.5.59Manet ergo et in malis hominibus taxatio naturalis boni; nec umquam malum erit, bonum malumque agere potuisse; sed personae illi nihil proderit, quae necessarii sui instituta non damnat quidem, sed tamen sibi ea non prodesse compulit. Sicut ergo in eo homine, in quo est iam explicata libertas, cum peccat, malum adscribimus voluntati, naturam autem Deo conditionis auctori; ita si parvulus, qui voluntatis usum non habet, nec quidquam ostendit praeter instituta naturae, scelere plenus esse dicatur, atque habere malum a necessario, quod alter a possibili capit; sine dubio is auctor criminis, qui naturae auctor, arguitur.
There remains, then, even in evil human beings, the valuation of natural good; nor will it ever be an evil to have been able to do good and evil; but it will profit nothing that person who does not indeed condemn the established things of his own necessary, but yet has compelled them not to profit him. Just as, then, in that human being in whom liberty is already unfolded, when he sins, we ascribe the evil to the will, but nature to God the author of his condition; so if a little one, who does not have the use of will, and shows nothing beyond the established things of nature, be said to be full of wickedness, and to have evil from the necessary, which another takes from the possible, then without doubt he is convicted of being the author of the crime who is the author of nature.
Iulianum.5.59AUG. Regulas tuas aperte in maioribus frangimus, ut eas ad parvulos transferre non possis. Non erat parvulus qui dicebat: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 19). Non ei possibilitatis inanitas, sed necessitatis inerat plenitudo, ut tuo de his rebus loquamur modo; non erat vacuum quod caperet, sed refertum quo ceperat malum. Non enim ait: Bonum malumque agere possum; quae possibilitas naturae humanae malum non fuit, nec voluntatis; sed ait: Non quod volo, facio bonum. Nec tantum; verum et addidit: sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago. Ecce et quod non agit bonum, et quod agit malum, non possibili, ut ipse constituis, sed ut ille patitur et fatetur, necessario suo debet; infirmus quidem ad auferendas miserias suas, sed plane firmissimus malleus ad conterendas regulas vestras. Vult et non agit quod bonum est, non vult et agit quod malum est; unde ista necessitas?
AUGUSTINE: We openly break your rules in the case of grown people, so that you cannot transfer them to little ones. It was not a little one who said: I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want, this I do (Rom 7:19). In him there was not an emptiness of possibility, but a fullness of necessity, to speak of these things in your manner; what should contain evil was not empty, but the place where he had received it was packed full of it. For he did not say: I can do good and evil; which possibility of human nature was not an evil, nor an evil of the will; but he said: I do not do the good I want. Nor only that; but he also added: but the evil I do not want, this I do. Behold, both the fact that he does not do good, and the fact that he does evil, he owes not to the possible, as you establish it, but, as he suffers and confesses, to his own necessary; weak indeed to take away his own miseries, but plainly a most strong hammer to crush your rules. He wills and does not do what is good, he does not will and does what is evil; whence comes this necessity?
Iulianum.5.59Agnoscunt eam quidem catholici doctores, qui Paulum apostolum intellegunt etiam de se ipso ista dicentem, et ex lege quae in membris repugnat legi mentis, sine qua nullus hominum nascitur, venire non dubitant; et ideo dici et a sanctis vident: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago; quia vident quantum bonum sit nec carne concupiscere, quae mente aversantur;
The Catholic teachers indeed acknowledge it, who understand that the Apostle Paul says these things even of himself, and do not doubt that they come from the law which in the members fights against the law of the mind, without which no human being is born; and therefore they see that it is said even by the saints: I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want, this I do; because they see how great a good it is not even to covet in the flesh things which they turn away from in the mind;
Iulianum.5.59eosque id velle, nec facere; et malum esse, quamvis mente non consentiente, vel carne tamen talia concupiscere; eosque id nolle, sed facere, sine ulla quidem condemnatione, quoniam peccati huius reatu regeneratione deleto, resistunt mente, ne perficiant quod concupiscunt carne; sed non sine suo aliquo malo, quia non eis aliena commixta, sed eorum natura est et in mente et in carne.
and that they will this, and do not accomplish it; and that it is an evil, although the mind does not consent, yet to covet such things in the flesh; and that they do not will this, but do it—without any condemnation, indeed, since, the guilt of this sin having been blotted out by regeneration, they resist with the mind, lest they accomplish what they covet in the flesh; but not without some evil of their own, because it is not a foreign thing mingled with them, but their own nature, both in the mind and in the flesh.
Iulianum.5.59Hunc sensum pium et verum contra vestram susceptam non vultis admittere; quasi propterea faciatis, ut in iudicio quo defenditur a vobis, non solum de litteris, verum etiam de ipsis hominum moribus gemitibusque sanctorum, nihil adversus eam recitetur, nolentibus vobis; et tanta veritatis manifestatione recitetur, ut non eloquentia, sed sola impudentia vestra remaneat, qua illam non possitis defendere, sed velitis. Quid enim agitis, quod res apertas turbidae loquacitatis tempestate nubilare conamini?
This pious and true understanding you are unwilling to admit against the cause you have taken up; as though you did this for the purpose that, in the trial in which it is defended by you, nothing might be cited against it—not only from the writings, but even from the very morals of human beings and the groans of the saints—against your will; and that it might be cited with so great a manifestation of the truth that not your eloquence but only your effrontery should remain, by which you cannot defend that cause, but only wish to. For what are you doing, in that you try to cloud plain matters with the storm of a turbid wordiness?
Iulianum.5.59Clamat Apostolus: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago. Clamat etiam superius: Iam non ego operor illud, sed quod habitat in me peccatum; scio enim quia non habitat in me, hoc est in mea carne, bonum (Rom 7, 17-19). Quid est: quod nolo facio? Et quid est: non ego operor? Quid est, nisi quod consequenter exponit? Dicendo quippe: quod nolo facio, se facere ostendit; et rursus dicendo: non ego operor, non mentem consentientem, sed carnem suam concupiscentem id facere ostendit; concupiscendo quippe caro agit, etsi ad consensum mentem non attrahit. Propter hoc adiungit: Scio quia non habitat in me. Et exponens quid dicat in me: Hoc est, inquit, in carne mea, bonum. Verum sint istae voces, non Apostoli, ut vultis, sed cuiuslibet hominis mala sua consuetudine praegravati, quam voluntate non potest vincere;
The Apostle cries out: I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want, this I do. He also cries out above: It is no longer I that do it, but sin that dwells in me; for I know that there does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh, the good (Rom 7:17-19). What is: what I do not want, I do? And what is: it is not I that do it? What is it, but what he consistently explains? For by saying: what I do not want, I do, he shows that he does it; and again by saying: it is not I that do it, he shows that not his consenting mind but his coveting flesh does it; for by coveting the flesh acts, even if it does not draw the mind to consent. On account of this he adds: I know that there does not dwell in me. And explaining what he means by in me: That is, he says, in my flesh, the good. But suppose these words are not, as you wish, the Apostle's, but those of any human being weighed down by his own bad habit, which by will he cannot conquer;
Iulianum.5.59nonne et haec tam robusta est, ut argumentationes vestras de possibili et necessario tamquam pueriles et ludicras tabellas robore suo frangat et conterat? Quoniam est, quod non vultis, non solum voluntarium atque possibile, unde liberum est abstinere; verum etiam necessarium peccatum, unde abstinere liberum non est, quod iam non solum peccatum, sed etiam poena peccati est. Nec attendere vultis, quod in unoquoque agitur per violentiam consuetudinis (quam quidam docti dixerunt esse secundam naturam), hoc actum esse per violentiam poenalem summi illius maximique pec cati primi hominis in omnibus qui erant in lumbis eius, per eius concupiscentiam exorturi, cum propagaretur humanum genus, quam concupiscentiam peccantium pudor operuit in regione lumborum.
is not even this so robust that by its strength it breaks and crushes your argumentations about the possible and the necessary as though they were childish and playful little tablets? Since there is, what you do not want, not only a voluntary and possible sin, from which one is free to abstain, but also a necessary sin, from which one is not free to abstain, which is now not only sin but also a penalty of sin. Nor are you willing to attend that what is done in each one through the violence of habit (which certain learned men have said is a second nature) was done through the penal violence of that highest and greatest first sin of the first man in all who were in his loins, to arise through his concupiscence when the human race should be propagated—the concupiscence which the shame of those sinning covered in the region of the loins.
Iulianum.5.5960. IUL. Sed quid nos ad parvulos; cum quaestio Manichaeorum nec perfectae aetatis hominem dicat voluntate peccare? Nam si ideo exortum est in homine malum, quia de nihilo factus erat, a necessario autem habuit homo ut de nihilo fieret; sine dubio malum non a possibili, sed a necessario recepit. Quod quia longa disputatione destructum est, adhuc modicum, quo magis ac magis iteratione lucescat, super hoc eodem disseramus.
60. JULIAN: But what have we to do with little ones, when the question of the Manichees says that not even a human being of mature age sins by will? For if evil arose in the human being because he was made out of nothing, while the human being had it from the necessary that he was made out of nothing, then without doubt he received evil not from the possible but from the necessary. Since this has been destroyed by a long argument, let us still discuss this same point a little, that by repetition it may grow clearer and clearer.
Iulianum.5.60Quaeris ergo unde ipsa voluntas mala in primo homine exstiterit. Respondeo: De motu animi, cogente nullo. Quaeris et unde ipse motus. Respondeo: Quid requiris? Unde esse potuerit, an unde esse compulsus sit? Si dicas, quod scripsisti quoque: Unde esse compulsus est, referam te asystata et contraria loqui. Quaeris enim quis coegerit, quod esse non possit, nisi cogente nullo; quod quia ipsa sui contrarietate dissolvitur, nihil habet virium quaestio, quae ordinem non habet.
You ask, then, whence the evil will itself came to exist in the first man. I answer: From a movement of the mind, with nothing compelling. You ask also whence the movement itself. I answer: What do you seek? Whence it could be, or whence it was compelled to be? If you say, as you also wrote: Whence it was compelled to be, I will report that you are speaking inconsistent and contradictory things. For you ask who compelled what cannot be unless with nothing compelling; and since this is dissolved by its own self-contradiction, the question has no force, which has no order.
Iulianum.5.60Igitur stolidissime interrogas, unde ipsa voluntas mala. Hoc enim quod dicis: Unde, non occasionem, sed originem eius, id est, naturam requiris; at id, sicut supra tractatum est, si naturam accipit, definitionem sui perdit, qua dictum est: cogente nullo; si vero definitionem tenet, praeiudicium nativitatis excludit. Non ideo ergo peccavit homo, quia de nihilo factus est, non ideo quia a Deo factus est, non ideo quia de tenebris factus est, non ideo quia liberi arbitrii factus est; sed ideo peccavit, quia voluit; id est, ideo habuit voluntatem malam, quia voluit.
Most stupidly, therefore, you ask whence the evil will itself comes. For in saying: Whence, you seek not its occasion but its origin, that is, its nature; but this, as was treated above, if it takes on a nature, loses its own definition, by which it was said: with nothing compelling; but if it holds its definition, it excludes the prejudgment of birth. Not, therefore, did the human being sin because he was made out of nothing, not because he was made by God, not because he was made out of darkness, not because he was made of free choice; but he sinned for this reason, because he willed; that is, he had an evil will for this reason, because he willed.
Iulianum.5.60AUG. Nos, vel potius ipsa Veritas dicit, perfectae aetatis homines quosdam voluntate, quosdam necessitate, vel eosdem ipsos in quibusdam voluntate, in quibusdam necessitate agere malum. Quod si falsum putas, illum aspice clamantem: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago. Qui tibi toties in faciem retorquendus est, quoties dicens ista, vel non videre te fingis istum, vel fortasse non vides. Quid te anfractuosis involvis ambagibus? Non tibi dicitur: Necessitatem peccandi habuit homo, quia de nihilo factus est; sed tu tibi hoc dicis. Prorsus ita factus est, ut peccandi possibilitatem haberet a necessario, peccatum vero a possibili. Verumtamen nec ipsam peccandi possibilitatem haberet, si Dei natura esset; immutabilis enim profecto esset, et peccare non posset.
AUGUSTINE: We—or rather Truth itself—say that some human beings of mature age do evil by will, some by necessity, or that the very same do evil in some things by will, in some by necessity. And if you think this false, look at him who cries out: I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want, this I do. He must be thrown back in your face as often as, in saying these things, you either pretend not to see him, or perhaps do not see him. Why do you wrap yourself in winding circumlocutions? It is not said to you: The human being had a necessity of sinning because he was made out of nothing; but you say this to yourself. He was outright so made that he had the possibility of sinning from the necessary, but sin from the possible. Nevertheless, he would not have even the possibility of sinning, if he were the nature of God; for he would surely be immutable, and could not sin.
Iulianum.5.60Non igitur ideo peccavit, sed ideo peccare potuit, quia de nihilo factus est. Inter: Peccavit, et: Peccare potuit, plurimum distat; illa culpa est, ista natura. Nec omne quod de nihilo factum est, peccare potuit; non enim ligna et lapides peccare possunt; sed tamen natura quae peccare potuit, de nihilo facta est. Nec magnum est peccare non posse; sed magnum est cum beatitudine peccare non posse. Sicut non est magnum esse miserum non posse; quia om nia quae nec beatitudinem capiunt, misera esse non possunt; sed magnum est ita beatam esse naturam, ut misera esse non possit. Quod etsi maius est, nec illud parvum est, in ea beatitudine conditam hominis esse naturam, ut si vellet, posset esse non misera.
Not, therefore, did he sin for this reason, but for this reason he could sin, because he was made out of nothing. Between: He sinned, and: He could sin, there is a very great difference; the former is fault, the latter nature. Nor could everything that was made out of nothing sin; for wood and stones cannot sin; but yet the nature which could sin was made out of nothing. Nor is it a great thing not to be able to sin; but it is a great thing not to be able to sin together with blessedness. Just as it is not a great thing not to be able to be wretched; because all things that are not capable of blessedness cannot be wretched; but it is a great thing so to be a blessed nature that it cannot be wretched. And although this is greater, neither is the other a small thing—that the nature of the human being was founded in that blessedness in which, if it willed, it could be not wretched.
Iulianum.5.60Sic autem dicuntur omnia facta de nihilo, id est, ex his quae nulla erant, ut intellegamus, quidquid ex eo factum est quod iam erat, ad originem primam esse referendum. De terra enim caro; sed terra de nihilo. Sic enim dicimus etiam omnes homines esse filios Adam, cum patris sui quisque sit filius.
But all things are said to be made out of nothing, that is, out of those things which were nothing, in such a way that we understand that whatever was made out of that which already existed is to be referred to its first origin. For flesh is from earth; but earth from nothing. For so we say also that all human beings are sons of Adam, although each is the son of his own father.
Iulianum.5.60Omnia tamen, quae facta sunt, mutabilia sunt, quia de nihilo facta sunt, id est, non fuerunt, et Deo faciente sunt, et bona sunt; a bono enim facta sunt; nec omnino essent mutabilia bona ulla, in quantum sunt, nisi esset a quo crearentur, immutabile bonum.
Yet all things that were made are mutable, because they were made out of nothing, that is, they were not, and they exist with God making them, and they are good; for they were made by the Good; nor would any mutable goods exist at all, insofar as they exist, unless there were an immutable Good by whom they were created.
Iulianum.5.60Mala igitur omnia, quae nihil sunt aliud quam privationes bonorum, ex bonis orta sunt, sed mutabilibus; et angelum quippe et hominem, ex quibus orta sunt mala (quae tamen et non oriri potuissent, si illi peccare noluissent, quia et nolle potuerunt), naturas bonas recte, immutabiles autem non recte possumus dicere. Deus vero tam bonus est, ut malis quoque utatur bene, quae Omnipotens esse non sineret, si eis bene uti summa sua bonitate non posset; et hinc potius impotens appareret et minus bonus, non valendo bene uti etiam malo.
All evils, therefore, which are nothing other than privations of goods, have arisen from goods, but mutable ones; for both the angel and the human being, out of whom evils arose (which yet could also have not arisen, if they had not willed to sin, since they could also have not willed), we can rightly call good natures, but not rightly immutable. But God is so good that he uses even evils well, which the Omnipotent would not allow to exist, if he could not, by his supreme goodness, use them well; and hence he would rather appear powerless and less good, by not being able to use even evil well.
Iulianum.5.60Proinde tu negare non sineris, eum qui dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 19), a necessario iam malum sumpsisse, non a possibili. Non igitur, ut dicis: Omnis actio mali non a necessario, sed a possibili; verum nonnulla et a necessario reperitur. Vide nunc ut tua machinatio tam elaborata collapsa sit.
Accordingly, you will not be allowed to deny that he who says: The evil I do not want, this I do (Rom 7:19), has now taken up evil from the necessary, not from the possible. Not, therefore, as you say: Every action of evil is not from the necessary but from the possible; rather, some is found to be even from the necessary. See now how your so elaborated contrivance has collapsed.
Iulianum.5.60Sed quaerenti unde voluntas mala in homine primo exstiterit, cautius respondere te putas: De motu animi, cogente nullo; quasi non citius et expeditius responderes: De homine ipso. Illud quippe quod additur: cogente nullo, etiam hic addi a te potuit, resistente tibi nullo. Quis enim tibi resisteret dicenti vera, si diceres: Mala voluntas in homine primo de homine ipso exstitit cogente nullo?
But to one asking whence the evil will came to exist in the first man, you think you answer more cautiously: From a movement of the mind, with nothing compelling; as though you would not answer more quickly and readily: From the human being himself. For that which is added: with nothing compelling, could have been added by you even here, with no one resisting you. For who would resist you saying true things, if you said: The evil will in the first man came to exist from the human being himself, with nothing compelling?
Iulianum.5.60Nunc vero timens culpare naturam, tamquam hinc in eius auctorem ulla recurrat iniuria, et quod diu volebas, aliquando dixisti, et a natura non recessisti. Animus namque natura est: et ea quidem in hominis institutione corpore melior, de cuius motu, cogente nullo, malam voluntatem exstitisse dixisti. Videsne non potuisse nisi alicunde existere, quod negare non sineris, antequam existeret, non fuisse? Quid autem opus est ut quaeratur unde animi motus, cum satis appareat non potuisse animi motum nisi de animo existere?
But now, fearing to blame nature, as though from this any injury should recur to its author, you both said at last what you long wanted to say, and yet did not depart from nature. For the mind is a nature; and indeed one better than the body in the founding of the human being—the mind from whose movement, with nothing compelling, you said the evil will came to exist. Do you see that what came to exist could not exist except from somewhere, since you will not be allowed to deny that it did not exist before it came to exist? But what need is there to ask whence the movement of the mind comes, when it is plain enough that a movement of the mind could not exist except from the mind?
Iulianum.5.60Quod si impudentissime atque insulsissime negas, adhuc ex te quaeritur, unde exstiterit in homine primo voluntas mala; nec iam permitteris dicere: De motu animi, cogente nullo; quia ipse animi motus cogente nullo voluntas est. Quapropter, hoc est dicere: Voluntas exstitit de animi motu, quod est dicere: Animi motus exstitit de animi motu; aut: Voluntas exstitit de voluntate. An dicis hunc motum de se ipso exstitisse, non de animo, ne hinc natura bona, id est, animus ipse culpetur? Non ergo inde damnetur; quis enim inde ferat animum iure damnari, unde non potest iure culpari?
But if you most shamelessly and most tastelessly deny this, it is still asked of you whence the evil will came to exist in the first man; nor are you now permitted to say: From a movement of the mind, with nothing compelling; because the movement of the mind itself, with nothing compelling, is the will. Wherefore, to say this is to say: The will came to exist from the movement of the mind, which is to say: The movement of the mind came to exist from the movement of the mind; or: The will came to exist from the will. Or do you say that this movement came to exist from itself, not from the mind, lest hence the good nature, that is, the mind itself, be blamed? Then let it not be condemned for that; for who would bear that the mind is justly condemned for that for which it cannot justly be blamed?
Iulianum.5.60Sed dicis: Ideo peccavit homo, quia voluit; ideo habuit voluntatem malam, quia voluit. Verissime dicis; sed si lux clarissima tenebrae non sunt, de illo exstitit mala voluntas, quia voluit. Non enim dicimus, ut calumniaris, et ut nos etiam scripsisse mentiris: motus iste unde esse compulsus sit, sed nullo compellente unde exstiterit; quia et nullo compellente tamen exstitit, et nonnisi alicunde existere poterat, quod antequam existeret non erat.
But you say: The human being sinned because he willed; he had an evil will because he willed. You say most truly; but if the clearest light is not darkness, the evil will came to exist from him because he willed. For we do not say, as you slanderously charge, and as you falsely report that we too wrote: whence this movement was compelled to be, but, with no one compelling, whence it came to exist; because, with no one compelling, it nevertheless came to exist, and it could exist only from somewhere—that which, before it came to exist, was not.
Iulianum.5.60Si ergo homo voluit, de homine exstitit; et quid erat homo, antequam de illo existeret, nisi natura bona et bonum opus Dei? Quod est etiam malus homo, in quantum homo est et opus Dei.
If, then, the human being willed, it came to exist from the human being; and what was the human being, before it came to exist from him, but a good nature and a good work of God? Which an evil human being too is, insofar as he is a human being and a work of God.
Iulianum.5.60Confundatur ergo sua vanitate Iulianus; quoniam ex bonis esse mala orta, verum dixit Ambrosius (Cf. AMBROSIUS, De Isaac et anima 7, 670); sed quia cogente nullo, inculpatus est Deus; quod vero ea permisit existere, usu eorum iusto et bono laudatur insignius.
Let Julian, then, be confounded by his own vanity; since Ambrose said truly that evils have arisen from goods (See Ambrose, On Isaac and the Soul 7.60); but because they arose with nothing compelling, God is not blamed; and indeed, in that he permitted them to exist, he is praised the more notably for the just and good use of them.
Iulianum.5.6061. IUL. Voluntas ergo, quae nihil est aliud quam motus animi cogente nullo, possibilitatem suam naturae debet, effectum suum sibi. In natura enim exorta est, sed a possibili, non a necessario. Hic si dicat aliquis: Sed mala natura, quae potuit habere voluntatem malam; respondeo: Sed bona natura, quae potuit habere voluntatem bonam. Uno ergo tempore optima simul pessimaque dicetur. At id rerum ratio non sinit, ut uno eodemque tempore una eademque res contrariis meritorum qualitatibus impleatur. Si igitur ideo mala putetur, quia potuit malum facere; ideo bona credatur, quia potuit bonum operari. Cur autem, inquit, et malum potuit, quae bonum operabatur? Respondeo: Quia bonum hoc, quod virtus dicitur, proprium esse non poterat, nisi fuisset voluntarium; voluntarium autem non esset, si necessitatem boni habuisset; necessitatem autem boni pertulisset, si non habuisset possibilitatem mali. Ut ergo constaret ius boni, admissa est possibilitas mali.
61. JULIAN: The will, then, which is nothing other than a movement of the mind with nothing compelling, owes its possibility to nature, its effect to itself. For it came to exist in nature, but from the possible, not from the necessary. Here if anyone should say: But the nature was evil, which could have an evil will; I answer: But the nature was good, which could have a good will. At one and the same time, then, it will be called both best and worst. But the reason of things does not allow that at one and the same time one and the same thing be filled with contrary qualities of merit. If, then, it be thought evil because it could do evil, let it be believed good because it could do good. But why, he says, could it do evil too, which was doing good? I answer: Because this good, which is called virtue, could not be its own unless it had been voluntary; but it would not be voluntary if it had a necessity of good; but it would have suffered a necessity of good if it had not had the possibility of evil. So that the right of good might stand firm, then, the possibility of evil was admitted.
Iulianum.5.61AUG. Ut video, nec bonam voluntatem vis tribuere naturae, quando est homo primitus conditus; quasi non potuerit Deus hominem facere voluntatis bonae; in qua eum tamen permanere non cogeret, sed in eius esset arbitrio sive in ea semper esse vellet, sive non semper, sed ex illa se in malam nullo cogente mutaret, sicut et factum est. Neque enim homo voluntatem non peccandi ante non habuit, et a voluntate peccandi exorsus est vitam, in qua eum rectum con didit Deus; utique talem, qui uti ratione iam posset. Quis enim ferat, si dicatur talis factus, quales nascuntur infantes? Illa itaque perfectio naturae, quam non dabant anni, sed sola manus Dei, non potuit nisi habere voluntatem aliquam, eamque non malam; alioquin non scriptum esset: Fecit Deus hominem rectum (Eccle 7, 30).
AUGUSTINE: As I see, you are unwilling to attribute even a good will to nature, when the human being is first founded; as though God could not make a human being of good will, in which he would nevertheless not compel him to remain, but it would be in his choice whether he wished always to be in it, or not always, but to change himself from it into an evil one, with nothing compelling, as also was done. For it is not the case that the human being did not first have a will of not sinning, and began his life from a will of sinning, in which life God founded him upright; surely such a one as could already use reason. For who would bear it, if it were said that he was made such as infants are born? That perfection of nature, then, which the years did not give, but only the hand of God, could not but have some will, and that not an evil one; otherwise it would not be written: God made the human being upright (Eccl 7:29).
Iulianum.5.61Bonae igitur voluntatis factus est homo, paratus ad oboediendum Deo, et praeceptum oboedienter accipiens, quod sine ulla, quamdiu vellet, difficultate servaret, et sine ulla, cum vellet, necessitate desereret; nec illud sane infructuose, nec istud impune facturus. Unde pia et sobria cogitatione colligitur, primam voluntatem bonam Dei opus esse; cum illa quippe fecit hominem rectum; neque enim umquam, nisi recta volens, rectus est quisquam. Propter quod voluntas bona non redditur perdita nisi ab illo a quo est condita; nec aliunde putandum est sanari posse peccati necessitatem, nisi miserante illo, cuius alto iustoque iudicio subsecuta est posteros eius, qui sine ulla necessitate peccavit.
Of a good will, therefore, the human being was made, prepared to obey God, and obediently receiving the commandment, which, as long as he willed, he would keep without any difficulty, and which, when he willed, he would desert without any necessity; yet doing neither the former without fruit, nor the latter without punishment. Hence, by a pious and sober consideration, it is gathered that the first good will is the work of God; for with that will he made the human being upright; for no one is ever upright except by willing what is right. On account of which a good will, once lost, is not restored except by him by whom it was founded; nor is it to be thought that the necessity of sin can be healed from any other source than by the mercy of him by whose deep and just judgment it followed upon the posterity of the one who sinned without any necessity.
Iulianum.5.61Unde ille posteaquam peccati habitantis in carne sua, quo cogebatur malum agere quod nolebat, necessitatem poenamque deflevit, mox ad quem confugiendum esset ostendens: Miser ego homo, inquit, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Rom 7, 24-25). Vides certe, quam non subveniat huic possibilitas illa, qua te tamquam magnum aliquid invenisse arbitraris; iam quippe amissa est, quando necessitate agitur malum, et sub necessario malo clamat homo: Miser ego homo; sed plane ille subveniat, cuius gratia superantur etiam quae propterea necessaria vocas, quod aliter esse non possunt. Quod enim hominibus impossibile est, Deo facile est. Cui non fuit necessarium ut camelus per foramen acus intrare non posset, sed possibile potius ut intraret (Cf. Mt 19, 24. 26); sicut caro et ossa per ostia missa sunt clausa (Cf. Io 20, 26).
Whence that one, after he had wept over the necessity and penalty of the sin dwelling in his flesh, by which he was compelled to do the evil he did not want, soon showing to whom he must flee, says: Wretched man that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 7:24-25). You surely see how that possibility, by which you think you have found something great, does not help this man; for it is already lost when evil is done by necessity, and under a necessary evil the human being cries out: Wretched man that I am; but plainly let that one help, by whose grace are overcome even the things you call necessary for this reason, that they cannot be otherwise. For what is impossible for human beings is easy for God. For whom it was not necessary that a camel should not be able to enter through the eye of a needle, but rather possible that it should enter (See Matt 19:24, 26); just as flesh and bones were sent through closed doors (See John 20:26).
Iulianum.5.61Frustra itaque conaris naturam defendere vitiatam. Si aliquid utile pro illa quaeris agere, ut sanetur age, non ut excusetur. Sine ut ipsa sibi fecerit, unde merito damnaretur. Nam unde exstiterit mala voluntas, quidquid aliud dicis, et de illa exstitisse negas, iniustam damnationem eius affirmas. Quid enim aliud dicis, nisi: Non ipsa fecit unde damnatur? Quid ergo iniquius, quam ut inde damnetur, quod ipsa non fecit?
In vain, therefore, do you try to defend a vitiated nature. If you seek to do something useful for it, act so that it may be healed, not so that it may be excused. Allow that it has made for itself that for which it would be deservedly condemned. For whence the evil will came to exist—whatever else you say, and you deny that it came to exist from nature—you affirm that its condemnation is unjust. For what else do you say but: It did not itself make that for which it is condemned? What, then, is more iniquitous than that it be condemned for what it did not itself make?
Iulianum.5.61Si autem ipsa fecit, quid eam de possibili excusare conaris, unde illam inexcusabilius accusare convinceris? Dicis autem: voluntatem malam in natura quidem exstitisse, sed a possibili, non a necessario. Si haec possibilitas extra naturam est, ipsa potius, unde mala exstitit voluntas, non natura damnetur. Si vero ad naturam etiam possibilitas pertinet, magis sibi voluntatem malam natura fecit, quia et non facere potuit; hoc enim abs te commendata definitio possibilitatis ostendit. Nemo tibi dicit: Ideo mala natura est, quia potuit habere voluntatem malam. Nos certe, contra quos nunc loqueris, non hoc dicimus; quid superfluis immoraris?
But if it did itself make it, why do you try to excuse it by the possible, whereby you are convicted of accusing it the more inexcusably? But you say: the evil will came to exist in nature indeed, but from the possible, not from the necessary. If this possibility is outside nature, then let it rather, whence the evil will came to exist, be condemned, not nature. But if the possibility too pertains to nature, the more did nature make the evil will for itself, because it could also not make it; for this the definition of possibility commended by you shows. No one says to you: Nature is evil because it could have an evil will. We at least, against whom you now speak, do not say this; why do you linger over superfluous things?
Iulianum.5.61In eo plane, quod dixisti: Bonum hoc quod virtus dicitur, non esset voluntarium, si necessitatem boni habuisset; necessitatem autem boni pertulisset, si non habuisset possibilitatem mali; prorsus oblitus es Deum, cuius virtus tanto magis est necessaria, quanto magis eam sic vult, ut nolle non possit. Nam et tu dixisti in primo huius operis tui libro: Deum nisi iustum esse non posse (Cf. supra 5, 28); quae si necessitas dicenda est, dicatur omnino; dum tamen constet, nihil esse ista necessitate felicius, qua tam necesse est ut Deus non male vivat, quam necesse est ut semper atque beatissime vivat. Neque enim verba tua timet necessitas talis, in quibus noluisti dicere: Necessitatem autem boni habuisset, sed maluisti dicere: Pertulisset, si non habuisset possibilitatem mali; ut videlicet Deus homini pepercisse videatur, ne tamquam aerumnosum aliquid perferret necessitatem boni, non habendo possibilitatem mali; quod tam magnum est bonum, ut sanctis servaretur ad praemium; quos itidem oblitus es, sicut Deum.
In that, plainly, which you said: This good which is called virtue would not be voluntary if it had a necessity of good; but it would have suffered a necessity of good if it had not had the possibility of evil—you have utterly forgotten God, whose virtue is the more necessary the more he so wills it that he cannot not will it. For you too said, in the first book of this work of yours: That God cannot but be just (See above, 5.28); and if this must be called necessity, let it by all means be called so; provided it be established that there is nothing happier than this necessity, by which it is as necessary that God not live badly as it is necessary that he always and most blessedly live. For such a necessity does not fear your words, in which you were unwilling to say: But it would have had a necessity of good, but preferred to say: It would have suffered, if it had not had the possibility of evil; so that, namely, God might seem to have spared the human being, lest he should suffer, as it were something burdensome, a necessity of good, by not having the possibility of evil; which is so great a good that it was reserved for the saints as a reward—whom likewise you have forgotten, as you have God.
Iulianum.5.61Neque enim tunc sine virtute vivemus, quando nobis concedetur, ne a Domino aliquando recedere possimus, quoniam nec velle poterimus. Ita enim nobis certum erit bonum, quo semper, ut promissum est, cum Domino erimus (1 Thess 4, 16); ut ab eo recedere non velimus, nec velle possimus.
For we shall not then live without virtue, when it will be granted us that we may never be able to withdraw from the Lord, since we shall not even be able to will it. For so the good will be certain for us, by which we shall always, as has been promised, be with the Lord (1 Thess 4:17); so that we shall not will to withdraw from him, nor be able to will it.
Iulianum.5.61Non ergo aliter esset virtus in nobis, nisi voluntatem malam sic non haberemus, ut habere possemus: sed pro huius minoris virtutis merito, accedere nobis debuit virtus maior in praemio, ut malam voluntatem sic non haberemus, ut nec habere possemus. O desideranda necessitas! Donabit eam veritas, ut sit certa securitas, sine qua non potest esse illa, cui non est aliquid addendum, iam plena nostra felicitas.
There would not, then, be virtue in us otherwise unless we so lacked an evil will that we could have it: but for the merit of this lesser virtue, a greater virtue ought to accrue to us as a reward, so that we should so lack an evil will that we could not even have it. O necessity to be desired! The truth will grant it, so that there may be a sure security, without which there cannot be that fullness of our felicity, to which nothing now is to be added.
Iulianum.5.6162. IUL. At hoc in contrarium torqueri potest, ut dicatur: Sed malo aptata natura est; nam quia malum voluntarium esse non poterat, si necessitas fuisset mali, ob hoc data est possibilitas boni, ut malo proprietas pararetur. Quod quidem acutum est, sed insanum; omnia enim rerum a meliore parte taxantur: huc et dignitas auctoris accedit, id est, Dei, qui non ob ea quae puniturus erat, liberum animal fecit; sed propter ea qua remuneraturus, possibilitatem contrariorum dedit.
62. JULIAN: But this can be twisted to the contrary, so that it be said: But nature was fitted to evil; for since evil could not be voluntary if there had been a necessity of evil, on this account the possibility of good was given, so that a property might be prepared for evil. This is indeed acute, but insane; for all things are valued from their better part: to this is added also the dignity of the author, that is, of God, who did not make a free living being on account of the things he would punish, but, on account of the things he would reward, gave the possibility of contraries.
Iulianum.5.62Verumtamen super hoc pugnare nolo; sed permitto aliquid calumniae, ut nihil de opificis auctoritate praescribam. Illud tamen necessario sequitur, ut haec possibilitas faciendi boni et mali removeatur ab utriusque voluntatis effectu. Ac per hoc, nec virtutis a necessario probatur causa esse, nec vitii. Ut enim honestis hanc faciamus iniuriam, ut ex eo quo cum improbis certare videantur, nec bonae ei, nec malae adscribatur meritum voluntatis; habet ergo testimonium ingenuitatis suae, quod innocens est, quia nec bono, nec malo, voluntario dumtaxat, plena est. Possibilitatem ergo voluntatis adscribe naturae; voluntatem autem nec bonam, nec malam, naturae. Invicte ergo collectum est, voluntatem malam exortam quidem in opere Dei; sed a possibili, non a necessario; quod reputari non potest possibilitatis datori, sed possibilitatis ipsius gubernatori.
Nevertheless, I do not wish to fight over this; but I allow some calumny, so as to prejudge nothing concerning the authority of the maker. Yet this necessarily follows, that this possibility of doing good and evil be removed from the effect of either will. And by this, the cause neither of virtue nor of vice is proved to be from the necessary. For, to do this injury to the honorable, that from the very fact by which they seem to contend with the wicked the merit neither of a good nor of an evil will is ascribed to it; it has, then, the testimony of its own free birth, that it is innocent, because it is full neither of good nor of evil—of the voluntary, at least. Ascribe, then, the possibility of will to nature; but the will, neither good nor evil, to nature. Invincibly, then, it has been concluded that the evil will came to exist indeed in the work of God; but from the possible, not from the necessary; which cannot be reckoned to the giver of possibility, but to the governor of possibility itself.
Iulianum.5.62AUG. Voluntatem nec bonam, nec malam, naturae concedis adscribi, sed tantum possibilitatem vel bonae vel malae voluntatis, cum sit natura et angelus et homo. Cui si non est adscribenda, ut dicis, voluntas bona vel mala, nec honorandus de bona, nec de mala est voluntate damnandus. Quid enim est iniquius, quam ut de malo, quod ei non est adscribendum, iudicemus esse damnandum? An angelus et homo naturae non sunt? Quis hoc loquitur, nisi nesciens quid loquatur? Naturae igitur adscribitur, quod angelo adscribitur; naturae adscribitur, quod homini adscribitur; sed naturae quae a bono Deo condita est bona, et voluntate sua facta est mala.
AUGUSTINE: You grant that the will, neither good nor evil, is ascribed to nature, but only the possibility of either a good or an evil will, although both angel and human being are nature. To which, if neither a good nor an evil will is to be ascribed, as you say, then it is neither to be honored for a good will nor condemned for an evil one. For what is more iniquitous than that we should judge it to be condemned for an evil which is not to be ascribed to it? Or are angel and human being not natures? Who says this, except one who does not know what he says? To nature, then, is ascribed what is ascribed to an angel; to nature is ascribed what is ascribed to a human being; but to a nature which was founded good by the good God, and was made evil by its own will.
Iulianum.5.62Ac per hoc, rectissime malum, quod his naturis adscribitur, ei a quo sunt conditae non adscribitur; quia non eas ita condidit, cum primum condidit, ut eis esset habendae malae voluntatis ulla necessitas, sed tantummodo possibilitas; ubi meritum compararet atque inveniret in eis bona voluntas non deserta praemium, deserta supplicium. Quid ergo malitia voluntatis quaeris excusare naturam, cuius est velle seu nolle? Neque enim est mala voluntas, nisi volentis aut angeli, aut hominis, quas non esse naturas nulla ratione possumus dicere. Cur, inquam, adscribis homini malam voluntatem, ut non iniuste possit malae voluntatis merito poenas luere; et quod adscribis homini, non vis adscribere naturae, quasi ullo modo possit homo non esse natura?
And by this, most rightly, the evil which is ascribed to these natures is not ascribed to him by whom they were founded; because he did not so found them, when he first founded them, that there should be in them any necessity of having an evil will, but only a possibility; whereby a good will, not deserted, might acquire and find a reward, and, deserted, a punishment. Why, then, do you seek to excuse nature from the malice of the will, whose it is to will or not to will? For there is no evil will except of a willing angel or human being, which we can by no reasoning say are not natures. Why, I say, do you ascribe an evil will to a human being, so that he can not unjustly pay the penalties for the merit of an evil will; and what you ascribe to a human being, you are unwilling to ascribe to nature, as though a human being could in any way not be a nature?
Iulianum.5.62Quanto satius est, te sana loqui, et dicere hominis voluntatem malam nonnisi alicuius esse naturae, quia omnis homo natura est; sed istam naturam, cum primo malum egit, non ex necessario, sed ex possibili habuisse voluntatem malam; quandoquidem his nominibus tibi placuit duo ista discernere, quorum in uno intellegitur id fieri quod necesse est, in altero autem id quod fieri quidem potest, sed necesse non est, quia et non fieri potest?
How much better it would be for you to speak soundly, and to say that the evil will of a human being is only of some nature, because every human being is a nature; but that this nature, when it first did evil, had an evil will not from the necessary but from the possible; since it has pleased you to distinguish these two by these names, in one of which is understood that to be done which must be done, but in the other that which can indeed be done, but need not be, because it can also not be done?
Iulianum.5.62Hoc enim de peccato primi hominis, vel primorum hominum verissime dicitur; restat ille qui clamat: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 19). Iste quippe ex necessario malum agit, qui non vult et agit; frangitque tuam regulam, quam temeraria loquacitate finxisti dicens quod nec virtutis a necessario probetur causa esse, nec vitii; cum huius causa probetur esse a necessario. Neque enim aut actio mali vitium non est; aut bonum quod vult, non facere, et malum nolle, et tamen agere, necessitas non est; aut e contrario non erit nobis etiam virtutis necessitas felix, quando tanta gratia natura nostra replebitur, et Deus erit omnia in omnibus (Cf. 1 Cor 15, 28), ut male aliquid velle non possit. Virtus est quippe iustitia; et caelum novum et terra nova promittitur nobis, in quibus iustitia inhabitat (Cf. 2 Pt 3, 13).
For this is most truly said of the sin of the first man, or of the first human beings; there remains he who cries out: I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want, this I do (Rom 7:19). For this one does evil from the necessary, who does not will it and yet does it; and he breaks your rule, which you devised with rash wordiness, saying that the cause neither of virtue nor of vice is proved to be from the necessary; whereas the cause of this is proved to be from the necessary. For either the action of evil is not a vice; or to not do the good he wills, and to not will evil and yet do it, is not a necessity; or, on the contrary, there will not be for us even a happy necessity of virtue, when our nature shall be filled with such grace, and God shall be all in all (See 1 Cor 15:28), that it cannot will anything evilly. For justice is virtue; and a new heaven and a new earth is promised to us, in which justice dwells (See 2 Pet 3:13).
Iulianum.5.62Aut si forte turbatus, praesenti vitae, non futurae istam regulam finxisse te dicis; non contendo cum victo; illud certe ad hanc vitam pertinere non negas, ubi vides hominem velle, nec facere bonum; et nolle, atque agere malum; cogerisque hoc vitium contra regulam tuam necessitati tribuere, non voluntati. Ab hac autem necessitate, cum qua nascuntur et parvuli, sed aetatis accessu incipit apparere, quis liberat hominem miserum, nisi gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Rom 7, 25)? Cuius gratiae vos inimici, in vestra virtute confiditis; et contra divina eloquia, quae damnant eos qui in sua virtute confidunt (Cf. Ier 17, 5), impia superbia disputatis.
Or if perhaps, disturbed, you say that you devised this rule for the present life, not the future; I do not contend with one already conquered; you certainly do not deny that this pertains to this life, where you see a human being willing and not doing good; and not willing, and doing evil; and you are forced to attribute this vice, against your rule, to necessity, not to will. But from this necessity, with which little ones too are born, but which begins to appear with the advance of age, who frees the wretched human being, except the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 7:25)? You, the enemies of which grace, trust in your own virtue; and against the divine words, which condemn those who trust in their own virtue (See Jer 17:5), you argue with impious pride.
Iulianum.5.6263. IUL. Haereat ergo prudentis animo lectoris multum interesse inter ea quae a possibili veniunt, et ea quae a necessario; naturaliaque omnia necessariis applicet, voluntaria vero possibilibus; et quaestiones universas ab ea, qua coeperint, parte consummet.
63. JULIAN: Let it stick, then, in the mind of the prudent reader, that there is a great difference between the things that come from the possible and the things that come from the necessary; and let him apply all natural things to the necessary, but voluntary things to the possible; and let him bring all questions to their conclusion from the part by which they began.
Iulianum.5.63Quoniam si per utramque caeco iudicio vagetur; in innumeros per verba pene omnia praecipitatur errores; quod quoniam satis claruit, apparet te nimis omnino caligasse, qui collegisti: Quomodo potuit malum, quod nusquam erat, exoriri in opere Dei; ita etiam, iam quod erat, transiit naturaliter per opus Dei. Vide enim quo sis involutus errore: peccatum prima voluntate conceptum, quod a possibili venit, in necessaria dicis fuisse mutatum, ut quomodo potuit oriri motus animi liber, ita sine motu libero transiret in naturalium necessitatem.
For if through both it wanders with blind judgment, one is hurled into innumerable errors through almost all words; and since this has become clear enough, it is apparent that you have grown altogether too dim, you who concluded: Just as evil, which was nowhere, could arise in the work of God, so also that which already existed passed naturally through the work of God. For see in what error you are entangled: you say that the sin conceived by the first will, which comes from the possible, was changed into necessary things, so that, just as the free movement of the mind could arise, so without free movement it should pass over into the necessity of natural things.
Iulianum.5.63Sed intellege quoniam necessariorum auctor sit Deus. Si ergo hoc facit Deus in naturis, quod fecit animus in culpis, necesse est ut sic sit reus, quomodo et ille cuius arguit voluntatem. Immo magis; quanto enim est plus necessarium quam possibile, tanto scelestius est ingenerare quam usurpare peccatum. Quod licet rerum natura non capiat; tamen hic ostenderim, multo peiorem esse opinionem tuam de Deo, quam Manichaei. Illius enim Deum vel subita bella truncarunt; tuum vero antiqua et multiplicata crimina corruperunt. Ac per hoc non solum de quaestione dissentis a Catholicis, sed omnino de Deo; non ipsum colis, quem nos aequissimum, omnipotentissimum, inviolabilem in Trinitate veneramur.
But understand that God is the author of necessary things. If, then, God does in natures what the mind did in faults, it is necessary that he be guilty in the same way as the one whose will he accuses. Indeed more so; for by as much as the necessary is more than the possible, by so much is it more wicked to engender than to usurp sin. Although the nature of things does not admit this, yet I have here shown that your opinion about God is far worse than the Manichee's. For his God was cut down by sudden wars; but yours was corrupted by ancient and multiplied crimes. And by this, you dissent from the Catholics not only about the question, but altogether about God; you do not worship the same one whom we venerate as most just, most omnipotent, inviolable in the Trinity.
Iulianum.5.63Ergo permeare non potuit per naturam res voluntatis; meritoque nos diximus, quia opus diaboli per opus Dei transire non sinitur. Opus enim diaboli hominisque mali peccatum est, quod in nullo potest sine liberae motu voluntatis existere. Quod opus et diabolo et homini a possibili venit et venit; opus autem Dei est natura, in qua non a possibili, sed a necessario subsistit homo; quae natura multis est temporibus sine voluntate, quoniam vis eius aetate certa sentitur. Quamdiu ergo est natura sine voluntate, opus Dei tantummodo est; et haec quod non fecerit, non potest habere peccatum. Irrefutabiliter ergo dictum est, quia per opus Dei opus diaboli transire non sinitur.
The thing of the will, then, could not pass through nature; and deservedly we said that the work of the devil is not allowed to pass through the work of God. For sin is the work of the devil and of an evil human being, which can exist in no one without the movement of a free will. This work comes, and has come, both to the devil and to the human being from the possible; but the work of God is nature, in which the human being subsists not from the possible but from the necessary; which nature is for many seasons without will, since its force is felt at a certain age. As long, then, as it is nature without will, it is only the work of God; and what it has not done, it cannot have as sin. Irrefutably, then, it has been said that through the work of God the work of the devil is not allowed to pass.
Iulianum.5.63Non minus autem falsum est quam profanum, quod dixisti: Opus operis Dei transit per opus Dei. Hoc est enim dicere: Peccat et Deus, quia peccavit homo, quem fecit Deus. Nam sicut nusquam est peccatum, nisi in opere hominis; neque enim cum peccaverit homo, aliquid substantiae eius additur, ut peccatum ibi eminere videatur, sed tantummodo malum opus de mala voluntate commissum, illi quoque a quo factum est, comparat meritum malum, ut malus dicatur qui mala fecit; ita etiam Deus tuus, si malum in opere suo fecit, nihil quidem substantiae eius accedit, sicut nec hominis; tamen meritum ei deformissimum comparatur, ut malus male faciendo dicatur.
But no less false than profane is what you said: The work of the work of God passes through the work of God. For this is to say: God too sins, because the human being sinned, whom God made. For just as sin is nowhere except in the work of a human being—for when a human being has sinned, nothing of his substance is added, so that sin might seem to stand out there, but only an evil work committed from an evil will procures also for him by whom it was done an evil merit, so that he is called evil who has done evil things—so too your God, if he did evil in his work, nothing indeed accrues to his substance, just as none to a human being's; yet a most deformed merit is procured for him, so that he is called evil for doing evil.
Iulianum.5.63Parvulus sane probatur etiam tunc reus non esse, quia malitiam a necessario habet, quam nisi diabolus a possibili haberet, reus esse non posset. Deus autem qui verus est Christianorum, malum non facit; parvulus quoque ante propriae voluntatis arbitrium nihil habet, nisi quod in eo fecit Deus. Naturale igitur nullum esse peccatum potest. Sed quoniam sollicitissime antiqui erroris antra prorupimus, nec quidquam super hac quaestione occultum remansit; teneat lector diligens distinctionem necessarii atque possibilis; et non minus Manichaeorum, quam Traducianorum commenta ridebit.
A little one, indeed, is proved even then not to be guilty, because he has malice from the necessary, which, unless the devil had it from the possible, he could not be guilty. But God, who is the true God of Christians, does not do evil; and a little one too, before the choice of his own will, has nothing except what God made in him. No sin, therefore, can be natural. But since most carefully we have burst into the caverns of the ancient error, and nothing on this question has remained hidden, let the diligent reader hold the distinction of the necessary and the possible; and he will laugh no less at the inventions of the Manichees than of the Traducianists.
Iulianum.5.63AUG. Apud homines qui ea quae legunt, sic intellegunt, ut etiam ista quae dicis intellegant, nihil egisti aliud, eadem per eadem tanta perplexitate repetendo, nisi ut te appareret responsionem nostram in uno meo libro, quem tuis octo refellere suscepisti, cum dissolvere non valeres, obscurare voluisse. Apud eos autem qui haec non intellegunt, id egisti saltem, ut ideo te putent dixisse aliquid, quoniam non intellegunt. Unde breviter admonendi sunt interim de hoc unde nunc agitur, ut illud ipsum meum, remotis nebulis tuae loquacitatis, aspiciant, et videant quam sit invictum.
AUGUSTINE: Among people who understand what they read in such a way that they understand even these things you say, you have accomplished nothing else, by repeating the same things through the same things with so great a perplexity, except to make it appear that you wished to obscure our answer in one book of mine, which you undertook to refute with your eight, since you could not dissolve it. But among those who do not understand these things, you have at least accomplished this: that they think you said something for the very reason that they do not understand it. Whence they must briefly be warned, for the time being, about this matter now under discussion, so that, the mists of your wordiness removed, they may look upon that very statement of mine, and see how unconquered it is.
Iulianum.5.63Tu enim dixeras: Si natura opus est Dei, per opus Dei opus diaboli transire non sinitur. Ad hoc ego: Quid est quod dicit, inquam, si natura opus est Dei, per opus Dei opus diaboli transire non sinitur? Nonne opus diaboli, quando in angelo, qui factus est diabolus, prius ortum est, in opere Dei ortum est? Quapropter si malum, quod nusquam erat omnino, in Dei opere oriri potuit; cur malum, quod alicubi iamerat, per opus Dei transire non potuit; praesertim cum ipso verbo utatur Apostolus dicens: " Et ita in omnes homines pertransiit " (Rom 5, 12)?
For you had said: If nature is the work of God, the work of the devil is not allowed to pass through the work of God. To this I said: What is it that he says, I say, if nature is the work of God, the work of the devil is not allowed to pass through the work of God? Is not the work of the devil, when it first arose in the angel who became the devil, something that arose in the work of God? Wherefore, if an evil that was nowhere at all could arise in the work of God, why could not an evil that already existed somewhere pass through the work of God; especially since the Apostle uses this very word, saying: And so it passed into all human beings (Rom 5:12)?
Iulianum.5.63Numquid homines non sunt opus Dei? Pertransiit ergo peccatum per homines, hoc est, opus diaboli per opus Dei; atque ut alio modo idipsum dicam, opus operis Dei per opus Dei. Et ideo Deus solus est immutabilis et potentissimae bonitatis; qui et antequam esset ullum malum, bona opera fecit omnia, et de malis, quae in bonis ab eo factis orta sunt, bene operatur per omnia (De nupt. et concup. 2, 28, 48).
Are not human beings the work of God? Sin, then, passed through human beings, that is, the work of the devil through the work of God; and, to say the same thing another way, the work of the work of God through the work of God. And therefore God alone is immutable and of most powerful goodness; who both, before there was any evil, made all good works, and, out of the evils that arose in the good things made by him, works well through all things (Marriage and Desire 2.28.48).
Iulianum.5.63Hac tu rerum evidentia perturbatus, oculos hominum de possibili et necessario longa et inani disputatione tenebrandos putasti, ut ista caligine obiecta sententiam tuam vanam non subtraheres, ne perimeretur, sed ne perempta iacere conspiceretur, absconderes. Utrum quippe a necessario, an a possibili, quid interest ad rem de qua quaerimus?
Disturbed by this evidence of the facts, you thought that the eyes of people must be darkened by a long and empty argument about the possible and the necessary, so that, by casting up this fog, you might not withdraw your empty opinion lest it be destroyed, but hide it lest it be seen lying destroyed. For whether from the necessary or from the possible, what does it matter to the matter about which we inquire?
Iulianum.5.63Angelus certe et homo peccarunt; aut ergo aude dicere angelum et hominem non esse naturas; aut, quia non ita es insanus ut audeas, convinceris peccante angelo peccasse naturam, convinceris peccante homine peccasse naturam.
Angel and human being certainly sinned; either, then, dare to say that angel and human being are not natures; or, since you are not so insane as to dare, you are convicted that, when the angel sinned, nature sinned, you are convicted that, when the human being sinned, nature sinned.
Iulianum.5.63Sed a possibili, inquis, non a necessario peccavit. Hoc verum est; tamen angelus peccavit, tamen homo peccavit, tamen natura peccavit; ac sic opus Dei, quod est angelus, quod est homo, non cogente Deo, sed sua mala voluntate, quam potuit et non habere, peccavit. Illi ergo naturae ignominia, quae cum bene facta esset, et malum facere coacta non esset, tamen malum fecit; Deo autem gloria, qui et naturam bonam fecit, et de malo bene facit, quod ipse non fecit.
But he sinned, you say, from the possible, not from the necessary. This is true; yet the angel sinned, yet the human being sinned, yet nature sinned; and so the work of God, which is the angel, which is the human being—not with God compelling, but by its own evil will, which it could also not have—sinned. To that nature, then, belongs the ignominy, which, though it was made good, and was not compelled to do evil, nevertheless did evil; but to God the glory, who both made a good nature, and out of evil, which he himself did not make, does good.
Iulianum.5.63Cum igitur his atque huiusmodi veris catholicisque rationibus, et defendi et praedicari natura possit creatrix, et argui reprehendique peccatrix; atque ipsa peccatrix, et laudari in quantum eam Deus fecit, et culpari in quantum ab illo, nullo cogente, defecit, et in posteris meritum suum recepit (eadem quippe ipsa natura in singulis quibusque sine voluntate nascitur, quae in uno voluntate peccavit); quis te praecipitavit ut diceres, quis submersit ut scriberes: Si natura opus est Dei, per opus Dei opus diaboli transire non sinitur? O surde in vocibus sanctis! O caece in inventionibus tuis! Nonne peccatum opus est diaboli? Nonne in omnes homines pertransiit, qui sunt opus Dei? Nonne per peccatum mors, ea praesertim qualem vos solam per peccatum dicitis accidisse, id est, non corporis, sed animae, opus est diaboli? Nonne in omnes homines pertransiit, qui sunt opus Dei?
Since, then, by these and suchlike true and Catholic reasons, the creating nature can be both defended and proclaimed, and the sinning nature accused and reproached; and the very sinning nature both praised insofar as God made it, and blamed insofar as it fell away from him, with no one compelling, and received its own merit in its posterity (for the same nature is born in each individual without will, which in one sinned by will)—what hurled you headlong to say, what drowned you to write: If nature is the work of God, the work of the devil is not allowed to pass through the work of God? O deaf to holy words! O blind in your own inventions! Is not sin the work of the devil? Did it not pass into all human beings, who are the work of God? Is not death through sin—that very death which you say alone befell through sin, that is, not of the body but of the soul—the work of the devil? Did it not pass into all human beings, who are the work of God?
Iulianum.5.63Sed imitatione, ut dicitis, transiit. Tamen per homines transiit, qui sunt opus Dei. Sed a possibili, non a necessario transiit. Dic quidquid tibi placet: tamen per homines transiit, qui sunt opus Dei; tu autem sine ulla exceptione dixisti: Per opus Dei opus diaboli transire non sinitur; et hanc sententiae tuae tam perspicuam vanitatem, ut vanior fieres, tanta loquacitate non ut absolveretur defendere, sed ne aspiceretur operire conatus es.
But by imitation, as you say, it passed. Yet it passed through human beings, who are the work of God. But it passed from the possible, not from the necessary. Say whatever pleases you: yet it passed through human beings, who are the work of God; but you, without any exception, said: Through the work of God the work of the devil is not allowed to pass; and this so transparent vanity of your opinion, that you might become the vainer, you tried, with so great wordiness, not to absolve but to cover, lest it be seen.
Iulianum.5.63Si in mentem tibi apostolica verba non venerant, quae te hoc dicere prohiberent; cur non attendisti, obsecro, plus esse in opere Dei existere, quam per opus Dei transire opus diaboli? Cum ergo illud fatearis, cur hoc negas? An quod vis fieri potest, quod non vis non potest? Misereatur tui Deus, ut esse desinas vanus.
If the apostolic words, which would forbid you to say this, had not come into your mind, why did you not attend, I beg, that it is more for the work of the devil to exist in the work of God than to pass through the work of God? Since, then, you confess the former, why do you deny the latter? Or can what you want happen, while what you do not want cannot? May God have mercy on you, that you may cease to be empty.
Iulianum.5.63Hanc autem sententiam tuam Manichaeus libenter amplectitur, tamquam amicam suam, et argumentatur ita: Si per opus Dei opus diaboli transire non sinitur, multo minus in opere Dei existere sinitur; unde ergo malum, nisi unde nos dici mus? Sed respondemus ei: Iuliano dicite ista, non nobis. Princeps huius sententiae missus est foras; absit ut praeiudicet nobis vobiscum vincendus, vel potius vobiscum iam victus a nobis.
But this opinion of yours the Manichee gladly embraces, as his friend, and argues thus: If through the work of God the work of the devil is not allowed to pass, much less is it allowed to exist in the work of God; whence, then, comes evil, except whence we say? But we answer him: Say these things to Julian, not to us. The author of this opinion has been cast outside; far be it that he should prejudge our case—he who is to be conquered along with you, or rather already conquered by us along with you.
Iulianum.5.6364. IUL. Illud itaque aliud de eadem hebetudine protulisti. Ais enim: Sic creat Deus malos, quomodo pascit et nutrit malos (De nupt. et concup. 2, 17, 32), quia scriptum est in Evangelio, quod solem suum oriri faciat super bonos et malos, et pluat super iustos et iniustos (Cf. Mt 5, 45). Longe enim lateque contrarium est, quod tu coniunctum putasti. Quod enim pascit Deus etiam peccatores, benignusque est super ingratos et malos, pietatis est eius testimonium, non malignitatis; qui non vult quippe mortem morientis, sed ut revertatur et vivat (Cf. Ez 18, 32); nec cito punit errantes; nec ob aliud id facit, quam ut bonitas eius paenitentiae tempus indulgeat. Sic enim ait Apostolus: An ignoras, quoniam bonitas Dei ad paenitentiam te adducit? Secundum autem duritiam tuam et cor impaenitens tu tibi thesaurizas iram (Rom 2, 4-5). Disputat etiam apud Lycaones et Areopagitas, quoniam Deus nec temporibus praeteritae ignorantiae, providentiae suae documenta submoverit. Neque enim sine testimonio reliquit semetipsum, dans, inquit, pluvias de caelo, et tempora fructifera, implens cibo et laetitia corda eorum (Act 14, 15-16).
64. JULIAN: That other thing, too, you brought forth from the same dullness. For you say: God creates evil people in the same way as he feeds and nourishes evil people (Marriage and Desire 2.17.32), because it is written in the Gospel that he makes his sun rise upon the good and the evil, and rains upon the just and the unjust (See Matt 5:45). For it is far and wide contrary, what you thought conjoined. For that God feeds even sinners, and is kind to the ungrateful and the evil, is a testimony of his goodness, not of his malignity; for he does not will the death of the one who is dying, but that he turn back and live (See Ezek 18:32); nor does he quickly punish those who err; nor does he do this for any other reason than that his goodness may grant a time of repentance. For so says the Apostle: Do you not know that the goodness of God leads you to repentance? But by your hardness and impenitent heart you store up for yourself wrath (Rom 2:4-5). He argues too, among the Lycaonians and the Areopagites, that God did not, even in the times of past ignorance, withdraw the proofs of his providence. For he did not leave himself without witness, giving, he says, rains from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling their hearts with food and gladness (Acts 14:17).
Iulianum.5.64Hoc ergo quod pluit super bonos et super malos, documentum est benignitatis eius, quae ideo sustinet et exspectat errantes, ut recedant tandem a malo et faciant bonum. In tantum ergo non vult fieri malum, ut amore etiam emendationis humanae pascat etiam ingratos. Ad id perfectae pietatis indicium illud vero quod dicis: Creat malos, perfectae iniquitatis testimonium est. Vide ergo quam nescias quid loquaris, qui de exemplo misericordiae voluisti crudelitatem probare. Bonum est enim pascere etiam malos, ut si voluerint, corrigantur; scelestum autem facere parvulos malos, ut qui velle non possunt, iniqui tamen esse cogantur.
This, then, that he rains upon the good and upon the evil, is a proof of his kindness, which for this reason bears with and awaits those who err, so that at last they may depart from evil and do good. So far, then, is he from willing that evil be done, that out of love even of human amendment he feeds even the ungrateful. While that is an indication of perfect goodness, that which you say: He creates evil people, is a testimony of perfect iniquity. See, then, how you do not know what you say, you who from an example of mercy wished to prove cruelty. For it is good to feed even the evil, so that, if they will, they may be corrected; but it is wicked to make little ones evil, so that those who cannot will it should nevertheless be compelled to be iniquitous.
Iulianum.5.64Liberalitas ergo in peccatores exercita abducit a malis, non in mala cogit. Conditio autem malorum non abducit a pessimis; sed et opus et operatorem in nefaria cuncta compellit. Insanis ergo cum dicis: Creat malum Deus; sed plus insanis, cum id Evangelii testimonio affirmare conaris, et eo testimonio in quo grande est argumentum bonitatis divinae. Attende igitur, quanto nunc fortius reflectatur; Deus, qui pascit etiam malos, ut patientia sua bonos esse faciat, manifestum est quod non creet malos. Si autem creat malos; nec amat nec remuneratur bonos, nec ipse postremo potest habere aliquid boni; quoniam quavis mala voluntate efficacius et violentius nocet potentia creatrix, non solum possibilium, sed etiam necessariorum malorum.
Generosity, then, exercised toward sinners draws them from evils, does not compel them into evils. But the condition of the evil does not draw them from the worst; rather, it forces both the work and the worker into all things abominable. You are insane, then, when you say: God creates evil; but you are more insane when you try to affirm this by the testimony of the Gospel, and by that testimony in which there is a great proof of the divine goodness. Attend, then, how much more strongly it is now turned back; God, who feeds even the evil, that by his patience he may make them good, clearly does not create the evil. But if he creates the evil, then he neither loves nor rewards the good, nor, finally, can he himself have anything of good; since, more effectively and more violently than any evil will, the creating power harms, the power not only of possible but even of necessary evils.
Iulianum.5.64Quod quoniam Deo Christianorum non convenit, id est, illi qui Pater misericordiae dicitur, et Deus consolationis (Cf. 2 Cor 1, 3); cuius iudicia omnia aequitas praedicantur (Cf. Ps 118, 75); qui cuncta in sapientia fecisse perhibetur (Cf. Ps 103, 24); vobis ut Manichaeis non est in Dei nostri aestimatione commu nio; ad alium vos omnino quem colatis auctorem, tamen Manis furore simulatum hi, stulta commenta et genitalia traxere peccata.
Since this does not befit the God of Christians, that is, him who is called the Father of mercies and the God of consolation (See 2 Cor 1:3); all of whose judgments are proclaimed equity (See Ps 119:75 (118:75)); who is said to have made all things in wisdom (See Ps 104:24 (103:24)); there is for you, as for Manichees, no communion in the estimation of our God; you draw, toward some other author altogether whom you worship—yet one feigned by the frenzy of Manes—these foolish inventions and these inborn sins.
Iulianum.5.64AUG. Ego faciam, quod tu cur non feceris, quid me attinet et dicere? Qui legunt iudicent; propter hoc enim quia dixeras: quod secundum sensum nostrum Deus homines diabolo faciat, factum est ut ad verba ista veniretur responsione mea, ex quibus quod voluisti ipse posuisti; sed ego etiam te nolente commemorabo, quod praetereundum putasti. Inter cetera ergo, quae omnia dicere nimis longum est: An vero, inquam, filios perditionis haedos sinistrae partis (Cf. Mt 25, 33), diabolo pascit, diabolo nutrit et vestit, quia facit solem suum oriri super bonos et malos, et pluit super iustos et iniustos (Cf. Mt 5, 45)?
AUGUSTINE: I will do what—why you have not done it, what does it concern me even to say? Let those who read judge; for because you had said that, according to our understanding, God hands human beings over to the devil, it came about that one arrives at these words by my answer, from which you yourself set down what you wanted; but I will recall, even against your will, what you thought should be passed over. Among the rest, then, all of which it would be too long to say: Or does he really, I say, feed the sons of perdition, the goats of the left part (See Matt 25:33), for the devil, nourish and clothe them for the devil, because he makes his sun rise upon the good and the evil, and rains upon the just and the unjust (See Matt 5:45)?
Iulianum.5.64Sic itaque creat malos, quomodo pascit et nutrit malos; quia quod eis creando tribuit, ad naturae pertinet bonitatem, et quod eis pascendo et nutriendo dat incrementum, non utique malitiae illorum, sed eidem naturae, quam creavit bonus, bonum tribuit adiumentum. In quantum enim homines sunt, bonum est naturae, cuius auctor est Deus; in quantum autem cum peccato nascuntur, perituri qui non renascuntur, ad semen pertinet maledictum ab initio (Cf. Sap 12, 11); illius antiquae inoboedientiae vitio.
So, then, he creates the evil in the same way as he feeds and nourishes the evil; because what he bestows on them by creating pertains to the goodness of nature, and what he gives them as increase by feeding and nourishing, he bestows as a good aid, not surely on their malice, but on the same nature which he, being good, created. For insofar as they are human beings, it is a good of nature, of which God is the author; but insofar as they are born with sin, doomed to perish if they are not reborn, it pertains to the seed accursed from the beginning (See Wis 12:11), by the vice of that ancient disobedience.
Iulianum.5.64Quo tamen bene utitur factor etiam vasorum irae, ut notas faciat divitias suae gloriae in vasa misericordiae; ne meritis suis tribuat, si ad eamdem massam quisque pertinens gratia liberetur, sed qui gloriatur, in Domino glorietur (2 Cor 10, 17).
Which, nevertheless, the Maker uses well, even of the vessels of wrath, so that he may make known the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy; lest anyone attribute it to his own merits, if, belonging to the same mass, he is freed by grace, but, as he who glories, let him glory in the Lord (2 Cor 10:17).
Iulianum.5.64His dictis ista subiunxi: Ab hac fide, inquam, apostolica atque catholica, veracissima et fundatissima, cum Pelagianis iste discedens, non vult nascentes esse sub diabolo, ne parvuli portentur ad Christum, ut eruantur a potestate tenebrarum, et in regnum ipsius transferantur (Col 1, 13). Ac sic accusat toto orbe diffusam Ecclesiam, in qua ubique omnes baptizandi infantuli non ob aliud exsufflantur, nisi ut ab eis princeps mundi mittatur foras (Io 12, 31); a quo necesse est vasa irae possideantur, cum ex Adam nascuntur, si in Christo non renascantur, et in eius regnum per gratiam facta vasa misericordiae transferantur (De nupt. et concup. 2, 17, 32. 18, 33); et cetera quae ibi legat, vel legentem audiat, qui vult et potest.
Having said these things, I added the following: From this apostolic and Catholic faith, I say, most truthful and most well-founded, this man, departing with the Pelagians, does not want those being born to be under the devil, lest little ones be carried to Christ, so as to be rescued from the power of darkness and transferred into his kingdom (Col 1:13). And so he accuses the Church spread throughout the whole world, in which everywhere all the infants to be baptized are exorcised by breathing for no other reason than that the prince of the world may be cast out (John 12:31) from them; by whom it is necessary that they be possessed as vessels of wrath, when they are born of Adam, if they are not reborn in Christ, and, made vessels of mercy through grace, transferred into his kingdom (Marriage and Desire 2.17.32; 18.33); and the rest which let him read there, or hear from a reader, who wishes and is able.
Iulianum.5.64Nunc ergo quia his relictis, quibus ea quae posuisti astruuntur atque muniuntur, sic illa putasti esse ponenda, ut tamquam in solitudine defendente nullo latrocinanter invaderes; legant haec qui volunt scire quid egeris, vel potius ad eiusdem libri considerationem recurrant, unde ista reposui, et videant ea manere firmissima, quae velut infirma labefactare tentasti.
Now, then, since, leaving aside those things by which the things you set down are built up and fortified, you thought they should be set down in such a way that you might invade them like a robber, as it were in a solitude with no one defending; let those read these things who wish to know what you have done, or rather let them return to the consideration of that same book, from which I have set these things down again, and let them see that those things remain most firm, which you tried to shake as though they were infirm.
Iulianum.5.64Quid igitur te adiuvat, quod eos mihi obiecisti, quos exspectat Dei patientia per paenitentiam corrigendos, et ideo super eos oriri solem suum facit et pluit; cum ego tibi haedos sinistrae partis obiecerim, quos usque in finem sine paenitentia victuros in impietate et sceleribus suis, ac per hoc aeterno supplicio puniendos, ignorare non potest praescius omnium futurorum? Nec ab eis abstinet bonum creationis suae, quibus nec nasci expediret; nec bonum nutritionis et vivificationis suae, quantum ei placuerit, diuturnae, quibus mori quantocius expediret;
What, then, does it help you that you objected to me those whom the patience of God awaits, to be corrected through repentance, and therefore makes his sun rise upon them and rains; when I objected to you the goats of the left part, who, as he who foreknows all future things cannot be ignorant, will live to the end without repentance in their impiety and crimes, and on this account are to be punished with eternal torment? Nor does he withhold from them the good of his creation, for whom it would not be expedient even to be born; nor the good of his nourishing and life-giving, prolonged as much as it shall please him, for whom it would be expedient to die as soon as possible;
Iulianum.5.64inter quos sunt certe plurimi, qui si ex hac vita abriperentur infantes, secundum falsam vestram haeresim, penitus ab omni; secundum autem catholicam fidem, a damnatione gravissima tollerentur. Quid deinde illud est, quod in his sinistrae partis haedis, in Dei praescientia, quae falli non potest, igni perpetuo destinatis, multi sunt qui lavacro regenerationis abluti, postea vel apostasia pereunt, vel tam facinorose flagitioseque vivunt, ut eidem sinistrae sine dubio deputentur; nec rapiuntur, sicut quidam, ne malitia mutet intellectum eorum (Cf. Sap 4, 11)? Neque ut hoc eis Deus tam magnum beneficium non conferat, fatali necessitate prohibetur; neque ut aliis conferat, personarum acceptione mutatur. Quid hic faciunt illa tua possibilia et necessaria, quae diligenter distinguenda commendas, ubi te nesciente quid loquaris, novit ille quid agat, cuius occulta possunt esse iudicia, iniusta non possunt?
among whom there are certainly very many who, if they were snatched from this life as infants, would, according to your false heresy, be taken away from everything entirely; but, according to the Catholic faith, from a most grave condemnation. What, then, is this, that among these goats of the left part, in the foreknowledge of God, which cannot be deceived, destined for perpetual fire, there are many who, washed by the laver of regeneration, afterward either perish by apostasy, or live so wickedly and shamefully that they are without doubt assigned to that same left part; and are not snatched away, like certain ones, lest malice change their understanding (See Wis 4:11)? Neither is he prevented by any fatal necessity from not conferring on them this so great benefit; nor is he changed, in conferring it on others, by any respect of persons. What do those possible and necessary things of yours do here, which you commend as needing careful distinguishing, where, while you do not know what you say, he knows what he does, whose judgments can be hidden, but cannot be unjust?
Iulianum.5.64Non est igitur iniustum ut bona conferantur malis; sed iniustum est ut mala ingerantur bonis. Dic ergo qua iustitia parvuli tanta mala patiantur; quae saepe commemorare nos piget; vos vero eadem mala paradiso, etiamsi nemo peccasset, importare non pudet. Non creantur, ut dicis, mali, hoc est, trahentes originale peccatum; qua igitur iustitia premuntur gravi iugo, a die exitus de ventre matris eorum (Cf. Eccli 40, 1)? In quo iugo tanta miseria est, ut eam facilius deplorare, quam explicare possimus.
It is not, therefore, unjust that goods be conferred on the evil; but it is unjust that evils be inflicted on the good. Say, then, by what justice little ones suffer such great evils; which it wearies us often to recall; but you are not ashamed to bring those same evils into paradise, even if no one had sinned. They are not created evil, as you say, that is, drawing original sin; by what justice, then, are they pressed by a heavy yoke, from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1)? In which yoke there is so great misery that we can more easily deplore than explain it.
Iulianum.5.64Peccatum a possibili in necessarium, hoc est, a voluntario in non voluntarium, dicis non posse mutari; quod potuisse ostendimus in eo qui dicit: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 19). Hoc vos consuetudinis violentiae tribuitis, non vitiatae originis vinculis; peccatum tamen a possibili in necessarium potuisse converti videtis; nec de vestris distortis et fallacibus regulis erubescitis.
You say that sin cannot be changed from the possible into the necessary, that is, from the voluntary into the non-voluntary; which we have shown could happen in him who says: The evil I do not want, this I do (Rom 7:19). This you attribute to the violence of habit, not to the bonds of a vitiated origin; yet you see that sin could be turned from the possible into the necessary; and you do not blush at your distorted and deceptive rules.
Iulianum.5.64Tale aliquid universo generi humano per unum hominem, in quo omnes fuerunt, accidere potuisse non vultis; et tamen sub omnipotentissimi et iustissimi Dei cura tot ac tantas poenas infantes pendere non negatis; quoniam vobis ora claudunt, et oculos feriunt, si negetis. Nonne ergo attenditis, quem faciatis iniustum, cernentes evidentissimas poenas et negantes ulla mala merita parvulorum?
You are unwilling that something of this kind could have befallen the whole human race through one man, in whom all were; and yet you do not deny that, under the care of the most omnipotent and most just God, infants pay so many and so great penalties; since they shut your mouths and strike your eyes, if you deny it. Do you not, then, attend whom you make unjust, perceiving the most evident penalties and denying any evil merits of little ones?
Iulianum.5.64Falsum ac profanum tibi visum est, quod ego dixi: Opus operis Dei transiit per opus Dei. Quia utique angelus opus est Dei. Peccatum ergo, quod est opus angeli, opus est operis Dei, non ipsius Dei. Et de his verbis ita me arguis, quasi dixerim: Peccat et Deus, quia peccavit homo quem fecit Deus; quod ego non dixi. Peccavit quippe opus Dei, id est angelus, vel homo; sed opere suo peccaverunt; non opere Dei: ipsi sunt enim bonum opus Dei; peccatum vero eorum malum opus ipsorum est, non Dei. Sed quid est peius dicere: Peccat et Deus, quia peccavit homo quem fecit Deus; quod ego non dixi; an ita negare originale peccatum, ut poena parvuli iniusta nihil sit aliud quam peccatum Dei? Quod si in Deum cadere non potest, iusta ergo parvuli poena est; si autem iusta est, pro peccato est. Nemo igitur potest in tot tantisque poenis parvulorum praedicare Deum iustum, negans originale peccatum.
False and profane it seemed to you, what I said: The work of the work of God passed through the work of God. Because surely the angel is the work of God. Sin, then, which is the work of the angel, is the work of the work of God, not of God himself. And from these words you so accuse me, as though I had said: God too sins, because the human being sinned whom God made; which I did not say. For the work of God sinned, that is, the angel or the human being; but they sinned by their own work, not by the work of God: for they themselves are the good work of God; but their sin is their own evil work, not God's. But which is worse—to say: God too sins, because the human being sinned whom God made (which I did not say); or so to deny original sin that the unjust penalty of a little one is nothing other than the sin of God? And if this cannot fall upon God, then the penalty of a little one is just; but if it is just, it is for sin. No one, therefore, can, amid so many and so great penalties of little ones, proclaim God just, while denying original sin.
Iulianum.5.64Esset itaque, inquit, iniquitatis testimonium creare malos, si malum quo mali sunt, ipse creavisset; nunc autem, cum homines mali sint, et hoc creet ipse quod homines sunt, sequatur autem eos de vitiata natura per peccatum quod mali sunt; profecto etiam cum malos creat, bonum est ipse quod creat; quoniam mali sunt vitio quod nulla natura est, creat vero ipse naturam quae vitium non est, etsi vitiata est. Tale est autem tribuere creationis bonum stirpi vitiatae et iure damnatae, quale est etiam homini malo tribuere vitae ac salutis bonum, propter quod homo est, non propter quod malus est.
It would, then, he says, be a testimony of iniquity to create the evil, if he himself had created the evil by which they are evil; but now, since human beings are evil, and he creates this, that they are human beings, while it follows them, from a nature vitiated by sin, that they are evil; surely even when he creates the evil, what he creates is itself good; since they are evil by a vice which is no nature, but he creates the nature, which is not a vice, even if it is vitiated. But to bestow the good of creation on a vitiated and justly condemned stock is the same as to bestow on an evil human being the good of life and health, on account of the fact that he is a human being, not on account of the fact that he is evil.
Iulianum.5.64Quod autem dicis esse scelestum facere parvulos malos, ut qui velle non possunt, iniqui tamen esse cogantur. Ad aliquid cogi, nulla possunt ratione qui non sunt. Si autem nondum quidem proprietate personae atque conditionis suae, sed occultissima ratione seminis iam sunt, sicut Levi in lumbis Abrahae (Cf. Hebr 7, 9-10); ibi naturae vitio de peccato primi hominis veniente iam mali sunt; non Dei creatione, qui nec velle possunt, mali esse coguntur.
But as for what you say is wicked—to make little ones evil, so that those who cannot will it should nevertheless be compelled to be iniquitous—those who do not exist can by no reasoning be compelled to anything. But if they are already, not indeed by the property of their own person and condition, but by the most hidden reason of the seed, just as Levi was in the loins of Abraham (See Heb 7:9-10); there, by the vice of nature coming from the sin of the first man, they are already evil; they are not, by the creation of God, compelled to be evil, who cannot even will.
Iulianum.5.64Vide sane mirabilia gratiae Christi, cuius estis miseri inimici. Ecce parvuli, qui bonum vel malum velle aut nolle non possunt, tamen quando reluctantes et cum lacrymis reclamantes sacro Baptismate renascuntur, sancti et iusti esse coguntur.
See, indeed, the marvels of the grace of Christ, whose wretched enemies you are. Behold, little ones, who can neither will nor not will good or evil, nevertheless, when, struggling and crying out with tears against it, they are reborn in holy Baptism, are compelled to be holy and just.
Iulianum.5.64Nam procul dubio, si ante usum rationis obierint, in Dei regno sancti et iusti erunt, ea gratia ad quam non sua possibilitate, sed necessitate venerunt, sanctas et iustas sine fine ducentes vitas suas, calcantes et frangentes de possibili et necessario regulas tuas. Sine dubio autem plus est nolle malum agere, quam nec nolle, nec velle; et tamen ille nolebat et agebat, qui dicebat: Quod nolo malum, hoc ago.
For without doubt, if they die before the use of reason, they will be holy and just in the kingdom of God, leading their holy and just lives without end by that grace to which they came not by their own possibility but by necessity, treading down and breaking your rules about the possible and the necessary. But without doubt it is more to be unwilling to do evil than neither to be unwilling nor to will; and yet that one was unwilling and yet did, who said: The evil I do not want, this I do.
Iulianum.5.64Non itaque insanio, nec dico: Malum creat Deus. Bonum enim creat, qui etiam de ipsa vitiata natura non creat vitium, sed naturam. Trahit vero illa vitium, non Dei opificio, sed iudicio. Tu autem utrum non insanias, si non valde insanis, attende, qui non malum poenale quod iustum est, sed malum quod vocatur iniquitas dicis facere Deum; quid enim aliud facit, si nullo malo reis parvulis tanta mala vel ingerit, vel ingeri sinit? Verum tu non a nobis alloquendus et redarguendus; sed ab universa Ecclesia, si posses, exsufflandus et exorcizandus esses, a qua frustra exsufflari et exorcizari dicis infantes.
I am not, then, insane, nor do I say: God creates evil. For he creates good, who, even out of that vitiated nature, creates not a vice but a nature. But that nature draws its vice, not by the workmanship of God, but by his judgment. But whether you are not insane—if you are not very insane—attend, you who say that God does, not the penal evil which is just, but the evil which is called iniquity; for what else does he do, if he either inflicts, or allows to be inflicted, so many evils on little ones guilty of no evil? But you are to be addressed and refuted not by us; rather, you would have to be exorcised by breathing and by exorcism, if it were possible, by the whole Church—the Church by which you say infants are exorcised by breathing in vain.
Iulianum.5.64Bk. 6
1. IULIANUS. Non dubito eiusmodi opinionem hactenus super nostro fuisse certamine, ut ad quaestionem involutam magis, quam ad summam spectare fidei crederetur. Procul quippe ab studiis spiritalibus agitantes, solis famae aurulis commoventur; temporumque formidantes invidiam, nec compertae veritatis praesidium tenentes (ut fere in rebus trepidis, nulli minus quam sibi creditur), tutius iter, quod frequentius, arbitrantur.
1. JULIAN: I do not doubt that the opinion about our contest has hitherto been of such a kind that it was believed to concern an involved question rather than the sum of the faith. For those who, far from spiritual studies, are stirred only by the little breezes of reputation, and who dread the ill-will of the times, and do not hold the protection of an ascertained truth (as generally in fearful matters no one is trusted less than oneself), judge the safer way to be the one more frequently traveled.
Iulianum.6.1AUGUSTINUS. Eo frequentius est iter nostrum, quo antiquius, quia catholicum est; vestrum vero tanto minus frequens, quanto magis novitium, quia haereticum.
AUGUSTINE: Our way is the more frequently traveled the more ancient it is, because it is Catholic; but yours is the less frequented the more novel it is, because it is heretical.
Iulianum.6.12. IUL. Hoc autem in praesentiarum duabus ex causis accidit; quia et sententia Manichaeorum de criminum est probata consiliis, et excitae persecutionum procellae inopes spiritus a veritatis favore deterrent.
2. JULIAN: But this comes about at present from two causes; both because the opinion of the Manichees has been approved by councils as criminal, and because the stirred-up storms of persecutions deter the destitute in spirit from favoring the truth.
Iulianum.6.2AUG. Quomodo est iter frequentius de sententia Manichaeorum, cum sint admodum rari? Aut quomodo persecutionem pro veritate patimini, qui subtrahitis parvulos Salvatori?
AUGUSTINE: How is our way more frequently traveled because of the opinion of the Manichees, when they are altogether rare? Or how do you suffer persecution for the truth, you who withdraw little ones from the Savior?
Iulianum.6.23. IUL. Pars igitur et voluptati consulens et pavori, vel arenae, vel circi, vel scenae populis comitata luxuria, ambiens in omnibus flagitiis obtendere necessitatem, qua commissi invidia semper levatur, et fragores saeculi praevaricatione vitare; ea ergo sunt, quae comitatiorem faciunt vitiorum defensionem. Ex quo tamen vulgo pars maxima, ut praefatus sum, Traducianis et Catholicis vel de Deo rationes credidit consonare.
3. JULIAN: A part, then, both consulting its pleasure and its fear—luxury attended by the crowds of the arena, or the circus, or the stage, seeking in all its disgraces to plead a necessity by which the odium of what is committed is always lightened, and to avoid the crashes of the age by prevarication—these, then, are the things that make the defense of the vices more crowded. From this common throng, however, the greatest part, as I said before, has believed that the reasons even about God of the Traducianists and the Catholics are in harmony.
Iulianum.6.3AUG. Innumerabilis multitudo fidelium, quae promissa est Abrahae (Cf. Gen 22, 17), quasi a vobis vulgaris turba contemnitur; quia videlicet paucis, quos Pelagianos, hoc est, venenis novitiae pestis insanos facitis, potest placere quod dicitis, tam evidentem miseriam generis humani, quae apparet in gravi iugo filiorum Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum (Cf. Eccli 40, 1), de peccati merito, quo in homine primo natura humana vitiata est, non venire. Unde vos sequitur, ut si nemo peccasset, cogamini etiam dicere in paradiso futura fuisse non solum tot et tanta onera molestiarum, quas videmus parvulos ferre; verum etiam tot et tanta vitia ingeniorum et corporum, cum quibus plerique nascuntur.
AUGUSTINE: The innumerable multitude of the faithful, which was promised to Abraham (See Gen 22:17), is despised by you as though a common crowd; because, namely, what you say can please only a few—those whom you make Pelagians, that is, insane with the poisons of a novel pestilence: namely, that the so evident misery of the human race, which appears in the heavy yoke of the sons of Adam, from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1), does not come from the merit of the sin by which, in the first man, human nature was vitiated. Whence it follows for you that, if no one had sinned, you are forced to say that there would have been in paradise not only so many and so great burdens of troubles, which we see little ones bear, but even so many and so great vices of minds and bodies, with which very many are born.
Iulianum.6.3In quo felicitatis et quietis loco etiam susceptam vestram, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, libidinem ponitis; et nos qui eam tamquam adversarium vitium contra concupiscente spiritu debellamus, clausis oculis accusatis velut amicos voluptatis et luxuriae; in quam nullus flagitiose ac turpiter cadit, nisi qui vestrae illi susceptae, quam nos arguimus, vos defenditis, sollicitanti suadentique consentit.
In which place of felicity and rest you place even that lust you have taken up, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit; and us, who war against it as an adversary vice while the spirit lusts in the opposite direction, you accuse with closed eyes as though we were friends of pleasure and luxury—into which no one falls shamefully and basely except him who consents to that thing you have taken up, which we impeach and you defend, when it solicits and persuades him.
Iulianum.6.34. IUL.Verum quia et in primo et in praesenti certamine, argumentatione Augustini claruit non esse eum Traducianorum Deum, quem Christiani iustum atque omnium conditorem concinenti assertione venerantur; praecipio iam animo, quo plurimi eorum quoque, qui caeco errore lapsi sunt, his agnitis corrigantur.
4. JULIAN: But because both in the first and in the present contest it has become clear, by Augustine's argument, that he is not the God of the Traducianists whom Christians venerate, with one consenting assertion, as just and the founder of all things; I now resolve in mind that very many even of those who have slipped into blind error may, when these things are recognized, be corrected.
Iulianum.6.4AUG. Immo vero, his agnitis, quae tuo fallaci vaniloquio secundum veritatis respondemus eloquium, neminem in errore haeresis vestrae nisi nimia vecordia vel pervicacia detinebit.
AUGUSTINE: On the contrary, when these things are recognized—the things we answer to your deceptive empty talk according to the utterance of the truth—nothing will hold anyone in the error of your heresy except an excess of madness or obstinacy.
Iulianum.6.45. IUL. Credit quippe adversum nos Manichaeus naturaliter mortales in flagitia facinoraque compelli; opinatur tenebrarum originem et corporibus materiam et criminibus praestitisse; voluptatem sexuum tabem esse generis humani, assertricem iuris diabolici, et in universa dedecora hominum coactricem. Quem Traducianus omnifariam secutus, quippe eius haeres et soboles, naturalia crimina, aeternam de tenebroso nihilo mali necessitatem, et affectionem sensibus destinatam sanctorum omnium pollutricem atque imaginem Dei in regno diaboli collocantem, oratione multiplici testatur.
5. JULIAN: The Manichee, indeed, believes against us that mortals are naturally compelled into disgraces and crimes; he supposes that the origin of darkness furnished both matter to bodies and crimes to deeds; that the pleasure of the sexes is the corruption of the human race, the upholder of the devil's right, and the compeller into all the dishonors of human beings. The Traducianist, having followed him in every way, as his heir and offspring, attests with manifold speech to natural crimes, an eternal necessity of evil from the dark nothing, and an affection assigned to the senses as the polluter of all the saints, and one that places the image of God in the kingdom of the devil.
Iulianum.6.5AUG. Manichaeus naturam mali substantialiter Deo bono coaeternam, contra catholicam veritatem singulari vesania fabulatur; veritas autem catholica Deum solum sine ullo exordio confitetur aeternum; non solum bonum, quod et ille dicit, verum etiam immutabilem, quod ille non dicit. Hunc ergo Deum summe bonum, et ob hoc omnino immutabilem, cui nulla natura coaeterna est, quae non est quod ipse, nec esset nisi facta esset, non de ipso, sed tamen ab ipso, hoc est, non de natura eius, sed potentia tamen eius, adversus Manichaeorum dementiam praedicamus; factamque naturam, quae nulla esse potuisset, nisi eam, quamvis non de se ipsa, tamen omnipotens natura fecisset, bonum esse quidem scimus et dicimus,
AUGUSTINE: The Manichee, with singular madness, tells the fable, against Catholic truth, that the nature of evil is substantially coeternal with the good God; but Catholic truth confesses that God alone is eternal without any beginning—not only good, which he too says, but also immutable, which he does not say. This God, then, supremely good, and on this account altogether immutable, to whom no nature is coeternal—a nature which is not what he is, and would not exist unless it had been made, not out of him, yet by him, that is, not out of his nature, yet by his power—we proclaim against the madness of the Manichees; and the made nature, which could have been nothing, unless the omnipotent nature had made it, though not out of itself, we both know and say is indeed good,
Iulianum.6.5sed illi non aequale qui fecit. Fecit enim Deus omnia bona valde (Cf. Gen 1, 31); sed non summe bona, sicut est ipse; quae tamen bona qualiacumque non essent, nisi ea fecisset summe bonus; nec mutabilia ulla bona essent, nisi ea fecisset immutabiliter bonus. Ac per hoc, Manichaei cum quaerunt a nobis unde sit malum, volentes introducere malum Deo coaeternum, nescientes quid sit malum, idque putantes esse naturam atque substantiam; respondemus eis, non esse malum ex Deo, neque coaeternum Deo; sed malum ortum esse ex libera voluntate naturae rationalis, quae bene a bono condita est; sed bonitas eius non est aequalis bonitati Conditoris eius; quoniam non natura, sed opus eius est; ideoque habuit peccandi possibilitatem, non tamen necessitatem. Nec possibilitatem autem haberet, si Dei natura esset, qui peccare nec vult posse, nec potest velle. Verumtamen rationalis ista natura in hac possibilitate peccandi si non peccasset, quando peccare potuisset, magnum sibi meritum comparasset; cuius meriti praemium etiam hoc esset, ut maiore felicitate peccare non posset.
but not equal to him who made it. For God made all things very good (See Gen 1:31); but not supremely good, as he himself is; which goods, of whatever kind, would not exist unless the supremely Good had made them; nor would any mutable goods exist, unless the immutably Good had made them. And by this, when the Manichees ask of us whence evil comes, wishing to introduce evil as coeternal with God—not knowing what evil is, and thinking it to be a nature and a substance—we answer them that evil is not from God, nor coeternal with God; but that evil arose from the free will of a rational nature, which was founded good by the Good; but its goodness is not equal to the goodness of its Founder, since it is not his nature but his work; and therefore it had the possibility of sinning, yet not the necessity. But it would not have even the possibility, if it were the nature of God, who neither wills to be able to sin, nor can will it. Nevertheless, if this rational nature, in this possibility of sinning, had not sinned when it could have sinned, it would have acquired for itself a great merit; the reward of which merit would also be this, that with a greater felicity it could not sin.
Iulianum.6.5Sed hoc audito Manichaeus adhuc pergit, et dicit: Si ex libera voluntate naturae rationalis est malum, unde sunt ista tot mala, cum quibus nasci videmus, qui nondum libertate voluntatis utuntur? Unde est concupiscentia, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum (Gal 5, 17), et ad peccatum perpetrandum trahit, nisi adversus eam spiritus fortius concupiscat? Unde in homine uno duarum rerum, ex quibus constat, tanta discordia? Unde lex in membris repugnans legi mentis, sine qua lege nemo nascitur? Unde tot et tanta vitia vel ingeniorum, vel corporum, cum quibus plerique nascuntur? Unde labores et calamitates nondum voluntate peccantium parvulorum? Unde cum rationis usus accesserit, in discendis litteris vel quibuslibet artibus tanta poena mortalium, ut aerumnosis conatibus etiam verberum cruciatus addatur?
But on hearing this the Manichee still presses on, and says: If evil is from the free will of a rational nature, whence come these so many evils with which we see those born who do not yet use the liberty of will? Whence is the concupiscence by which the flesh lusts against the spirit (Gal 5:17), and draws toward perpetrating sin, unless the spirit lusts more strongly against it? Whence, in one human being, so great a discord of the two things of which he is composed? Whence the law in the members fighting against the law of the mind, without which law no one is born? Whence so many and so great vices, whether of minds or of bodies, with which very many are born? Whence the labors and calamities of little ones not yet sinning by will? Whence, when the use of reason has come, in learning letters or any arts whatever, so great a penalty for mortals, that to their toilsome efforts the torment of blows is even added?
Iulianum.6.5Hic nos respondemus, etiam ista mala ex voluntate humanae naturae originem ducere, qua granditer peccante, vitiata et cum stirpe damnata est. Unde naturae huius tam multa naturalia bona veniunt de Dei opificio, mala de iudicio; quae mala nullo modo esse naturas vel substantias non vident Manichaei; verum ideo dici naturalia, quia cum eis homines vitiata originis tamquam radice nascuntur.
Here we answer that these evils too draw their origin from the will of human nature, which, by sinning grievously, was vitiated and condemned together with its stock. Whence so many natural goods come to this nature from the workmanship of God, but evils from his judgment; which evils the Manichees do not see to be in no way natures or substances; but that they are called natural for this reason, because human beings are born with them, as it were from the root of a vitiated origin.
Iulianum.6.5Sed vos novi haeretici contradicitis nobis; respondete igitur Manichaeis; dicite unde sint tot ac tanta mala, cum quibus nasci homines si negatis, ubi est frons vestra? Si fatemini, ubi est haeresis vestra? Sed mala ista non esse mala contendite, et paradisum non verum, sed vestrum, laboribus, doloribus, erroribus, gemitibus, fletibus, luctibus, etiamsi nemo peccasset, implete. Quod si non audetis, ne ab ipsis quoque puerulis rideamini, et emendandi ferulis iudicemini, concludit adversus vos Manichaeus haec mala, quae de vitiata bona natura esse non vultis, de commixtione mali esse; quod malum dicit esse naturam coaeternam Deo atque contrariam. Ac per hoc ubi Manichaeo conaris esse remotior, illi efficeris eius adiutor.
But you new heretics contradict us; answer the Manichees, then; say whence come so many and so great evils, with which, if you deny that human beings are born, where is your effrontery? If you confess it, where is your heresy? But contend that these evils are not evils, and fill a paradise—not the true one, but yours—with labors, pains, errors, groans, weepings, mournings, even if no one had sinned. But if you do not dare, lest you be laughed at even by the little boys themselves, and judged with the rods of correction, the Manichee concludes against you that these evils, which you are unwilling to be from a vitiated good nature, are from a mixture with evil; which evil he says is a nature coeternal with God and contrary to him. And by this, where you try to be more removed from the Manichee, you become his helper.
Iulianum.6.56. IUL. Iam vero in ipsum Deum, pari fine, impari exordio, accusationum tela iaculantur. Manichaeus quippe dicit: Deus bonus malum non facit; sed addit quia pro naturalibus culpis aeterno incendio animas destinet; quod perspicuae immanitatis est: ac per hoc, fine opinionis suae, quem bonum dixerat, clara iniquitate contaminat. Porro Augustinus quasi ei ad quem scribit, fidens patrono, ausu grandiore despicit trepidationem magistri, nec dubitat inde incipere, quo Manichaeus pervenit; pronuntiatque quod malum, id est peccatum, faciat Deus et creet, quem constat non convenire ei Deo, quem Catholicorum fides colit.
6. JULIAN: But now, against God himself, with an equal end but an unequal beginning, they hurl the darts of accusations. For the Manichee says: The good God does not make evil; but he adds that he destines souls to eternal burning for natural faults; which is of evident monstrousness: and by this, by the end of his opinion, he contaminates with manifest iniquity him whom he had called good. Augustine, moreover, as though trusting in the patron to whom he writes, with a bolder daring despises the trepidation of his master, and does not hesitate to begin where the Manichee arrived; and he pronounces that God does and creates evil, that is, sin, which it is agreed does not befit that God whom the faith of the Catholics worships.
Iulianum.6.6Hoc potissimum animo lectoris insidat, et nulli umquam fidelium maiorem causam quam nobis incubuisse conflictus, et omnem qui naturam ipsam necessitatem criminis arbitratur, in Dei Christianorum cultu non habere consortium; quod quoniam frequenter inculcatum est; iterationem quippe utilitas causae principalis exegit; veniamus iam ad discussionem primorum hominum, quorum taxatione aciei nostrae Numida quasi cetratus occurrit.
Let this above all settle in the reader's mind, both that a greater struggle than ours has weighed upon no one of the faithful ever, and that everyone who judges nature itself to be the necessity of crime has no fellowship in the worship of the God of Christians; and since this has been frequently inculcated—for the usefulness of the principal cause has demanded repetition—let us now come to the discussion of the first human beings, in whose evaluation the Numidian, as it were a light-shield-bearer, meets our battle line.
Iulianum.6.6AUG. Quid Manichaeus dicat de commixtione bonae et malae substantiae, nescire te crederem, nisi ea certe quae adversus eumdem errorem scripsimus, legisse te scirem; nam ex libro, in quo duarum animarum in homine constitutarum, quarum esset una bona, altera mala, eorum opinionem redargui (Cf. De duab. animab., n. 15), quaedam contra me ipsum esse existimans testimonia protulisti. Manichaeus ergo duas animas, sive spiritus, sive mentes, unam propriam carnis, eamdemque non accidente vitio, sed coaeternam Deo natura malam, alteram vero natura bonam tamquam Dei particulam, sed illius malae permixtione maculatam, in homine uno esse contendit; et hinc vult fieri, ut caro concupiscat adversus spiritum, utique bonum, per animam suam malam, ut eum teneat implicatum; spiritus autem adversus carnem, ut ab illa commixtione liberetur. Quod si nec ultima mundi conflagratione potuerit, tunc eum dicit affigi tenebrarum globo, atque in aeternum tali supplicio detineri.
AUGUSTINE: I would believe that you do not know what the Manichee says about the mixture of good and evil substance, except that I know you have certainly read the things we wrote against that same error; for from the book in which I refuted their opinion of two souls established in a human being, one of which would be good, the other evil (See The Two Souls, n. 15), you brought forward certain testimonies, thinking they were against me. The Manichee, then, contends that there are in one human being two souls, or spirits, or minds—one proper to the flesh, and the same evil by nature not by an accidental vice but as coeternal with God, the other indeed good by nature, as it were a particle of God, but stained by mixture with that evil one; and from this he wants it to come about that the flesh lusts against the spirit, namely the good one, through its evil soul, so as to hold it entangled; but the spirit against the flesh, so as to be freed from that mixture. And if it could not be freed even by the final conflagration of the world, then he says it is fastened to the globe of darkness, and held in such punishment forever.
Iulianum.6.6Non itaque, ut dicis, Manichaei Deus pro naturalibus culpis aeterno incendio animas destinat, sed natura bonas animas pro alienae malae naturae commixtione cui malo eas ipse commiscuit, quas inde non potuerit liberare, non incendio aeterno; nam nullum aeternum Manichaeus opinatur incendium; sed aeterno, ut dixi, tenebrarum globo, quo mens tenebrarum includetur, affiget.
Not, then, as you say, does the God of the Manichees destine souls to eternal burning for natural faults, but rather souls good by nature for a mixture with a foreign evil nature, to which evil he himself mingled them, and from which he could not free them—not by eternal burning; for the Manichee supposes no eternal burning; but he fastens them, as I said, to the eternal globe of darkness, in which the mind of darkness will be enclosed.
Iulianum.6.6Catholica vero fides, quam reliquistis, ut Manichaeorum, non plane, quemadmodum putatis aut fingitis, oppugnatricem, sed potius adiutricem sectam novitiam conderetis, cum audit aut legit quod ait Apostolus: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, spiritus autem adversus carnem; haec enim invicem adversantur; ut non ea quae vultis, faciatis (Gal 5, 17); non naturas duas, boni scilicet et mali, inter se ab aeternitate contrarias, et bello posteriore commixtas, sicut Manichaeus haereticus opinatur;
But the Catholic faith, which you abandoned, so as to found a novel sect not, as you suppose or pretend, an opponent of the Manichees, but rather a helper, when it hears or reads what the Apostle says: The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are opposed to each other, so that you do not do the things you would (Gal 5:17), does not understand two natures, namely of good and of evil, contrary to each other from eternity and mingled by a later war, as the Manichean heretic supposes;
Iulianum.6.6sed sicut catholicus doctor Ambrosius (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 12, 53), istam discordiam carnis et spiritus ex praevaricatione primi hominis in naturam vertisse cognoscit; ut non intellegatur haec natura hominis primitus instituti, sed in naturam versa poena damnati. Haec fides non est cetra Numidica, de qua nobis velut facetus insultas; sed est veridicum scutum, in quo omnes sagittas ignitas maligni, sicut hortatur Apostolus, exstinguimus (Cf. Eph 6, 16).
but, as the Catholic teacher Ambrose (See Ambrose, On Luke 7.12.53) recognizes, it understands that this discord of flesh and spirit, by the transgression of the first man, turned into nature; so that this is understood to be not the nature of the human being as first established, but a penalty of the condemned, turned into nature. This faith is not the Numidian light-shield, about which you, as though witty, insult us; but it is a truthful shield, in which we quench all the fiery darts of the evil one, as the Apostle exhorts (See Eph 6:16).
Iulianum.6.6Hoc muniebatur scuto, quando vobis futuris iam occurrebat armatus, non quidem Numida, sed tamen Poenus ille Cyprianus, quo rursus nomine tua in nos insilit vana loquacitas; hoc, inquam, scuto armatus Poenus ille dicebat in libro DeOratione Dominica, id nos orare, cum dicimus: Fiat voluntas tua sicut in caelo et in terra (Mt 6, 10), ut inter duo ista, id est carnem et spiritum, fiat Deo opitulante concordia.
With this shield he was fortified, when, already armed, he met you who were yet to come—not indeed a Numidian, but yet a Carthaginian, that Cyprian, by whose name again your empty wordiness leaps upon us; with this shield, I say, armed, that Carthaginian said, in the book On the Lord's Prayer, that we pray this, when we say: Thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven (Matt 6:10), that between these two, that is, flesh and spirit, there may be made, with God's aid, a concord.
Iulianum.6.6Ubi Christi miles egregius et a Manichaeis et a vobis coniecta ignita maligni iacula exstinguit; cui maligno militant omnes haeretici, et cuius castra tirocinio vestro putastis augenda.
Where the excellent soldier of Christ quenches the fiery darts of the evil one hurled both by the Manichees and by you; for which evil one all heretics fight, and whose camp you thought should be increased by your recruitment.
Iulianum.6.6Nam spiritus et carnis quaerendo concordiam, contro Manichaeos docet, ambas quibus constamus bonas esse naturas, si discordiae malum divina miseratione sanetur; vobis autem resistit, quia carnis concupiscentiam dicitis bonam, qua infestante existit ista discordia, quam poscit ille sanari; et tunc existit quando bene agimus, ut infestanti concupiscentiae carnis, contra concupiscente spiritu repugnemus. Nam si consentimus, non optabilis, sed culpabilis, vel etiam damnabilis fit spiritui cum carne concordia.
For by seeking the concord of spirit and flesh, he teaches against the Manichees that both natures of which we are composed are good, if the evil of the discord is healed by divine compassion; but he resists you, because you say that the concupiscence of the flesh is good, by whose infesting this discord arises which he asks to be healed; and it arises then when we act well, so that, with the spirit lusting in the opposite direction, we may fight against the infesting concupiscence of the flesh. For if we consent, the concord of spirit with flesh becomes not desirable but blameworthy, or even damnable.
Iulianum.6.6Contra vos est etiam, quia libero datis arbitrio, quod ille ut fiat in homine, a Deo intellegit esse poscendum. Tu autem qui nesciens quid loquaris, obicis mihi quod dicam Deum creare peccatum, resiste Manichaeo dicenti in discordia carnis et spiritus duas inter se contrarias mali et boni apparere naturas. Unum est enim quod respondeamus, ut pestis ista vincatur: hanc scilicet discordiam per praevaricationem primi hominis in nostram vertisse naturam; quod tu negando conaris ut vincant; satisque manifestaris falsus Manichaeorum oppugnator, verus adiutor.
He is against you also because you attribute to free choice what he understands must be asked from God, that it may be done in a human being. But you, who do not know what you say, object to me that I say God creates sin: resist the Manichee who says that in the discord of flesh and spirit two natures, of evil and good, contrary to each other, appear. For there is one thing we may answer, so that this plague may be conquered: namely, that this discord, by the transgression of the first man, turned into our nature; which by denying you try to make them conquer; and you show yourself plainly enough a false opponent of the Manichees, a true helper.
Iulianum.6.67. IUL. Ingerit quippe omnibus scripturis suis, Adam atque Evam bonos tantum a Deo conditos, id est, nulli naturali crimini mancipatos, eosque libera voluntate peccasse, sed ita granditer, ut omnia in natura sua Dei instituta subruerent. Illud enim, inquit, peccatum valde maius atque altius diabolus infixit, quam sunt ista hominibus nota peccata. Unde illo magno primi hominis peccato, natura ibi nostra, in deterius commutata, non solum facta est peccatrix, verum etiam generat peccatores; et tamen ipse languor, quo bene vivendi virtus periit, non est natura, sed vitium. Illud ergo peccatum, quod ipsum hominem in paradiso mutavit in peius, quia multo est grandius quam iudicare nos possumus (Cf. De nupt. et concup. 2, 34, 57. 58), ab omni nascente trahitur.
7. JULIAN: He inserts into all his writings that Adam and Eve were founded by God only good, that is, made subject to no natural crime, and that they sinned by free will, but so grievously that they undermined in their nature all the things established by God. For that sin, he says, the devil fixed in them much greater and deeper than are those sins known to human beings. Whence, by that great sin of the first man, our nature there, changed for the worse, was not only made a sinner, but even generates sinners; and yet that very languor, by which the virtue of living well perished, is not nature, but a vice. That sin, then, which changed the very human being in paradise for the worse, because it is much greater than we can judge (See Marriage and Desire 2.34.57-58), is drawn by everyone being born.
Iulianum.6.7Ecce quam aperte quid sentiret exposuit: Primi, inquit, illi homines bonam habuere naturam, sed peccatum tam immane, tam inaestimabile perpetrarunt, ut virtutem bene vivendi interimerent, liberi arbitrii lumen exstinguerent, facerent in reliquum peccandi necessitatem; ne cui esset possibile de eorum stirpe nascenti, in virtutum decora conari, et declinatis vitiis compotem fieri sanctitatis.
Behold how openly he has set forth what he thinks: Those first human beings, he says, had a good nature, but they perpetrated a sin so monstrous, so inestimable, that they destroyed the virtue of living well, extinguished the light of free choice, and made for the rest a necessity of sinning; so that it might be possible for no one born of their stock to strive after the beauties of the virtues, and, the vices being shunned, to become a partaker of holiness.
Iulianum.6.7AUG. Videris tibi, vel etiam consortibus tuis Pelagianis aliquid dicere, cum relicta auctoritate divina, humana vanitate iactaris, et argumentationibus cordis tui Sanctarum Scripturarum veritati adversaris et obstrepis. Nam utique si christiano atque catholico animo attenderes quod ait Apostolus: Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum (Rom 8, 10), profecto intellegeres tam granditer peccasse primum hominem, ut eo peccato, non unius hominis, sed totius generis humani mutata natura ex possibilitate immortalitatis in necessitatem mortis lapsa corruerit; ita ut etiam qui convertuntur ad Deum, per unum Dei et hominum mediatorem hominem Christum Iesum, non continuo immortalitatem corporis sumant; sed eis per Spiritum Dei, quo nunc inhabitantur, danda postea nunc promittatur. Quod idem Apostolus eodem loco sic explicat: Si quis, inquit, Spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est eius. Si autem Christus in vobis est, corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum, spiritus autem vita est propter iustitiam. Si ergo Spiritus eius qui suscitavit Iesum ex mortuis, habitat in vobis, qui suscitavit Iesum Christum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora vestra per inhabitantem Spiritum eius in vobis (Rom 8, 9-11).
AUGUSTINE: You seem to yourself, or even to your Pelagian associates, to say something, when, having abandoned divine authority, you boast in human vanity, and by the argumentations of your heart you oppose and clamor against the truth of the holy Scriptures. For surely, if with a Christian and Catholic mind you attended to what the Apostle says: The body indeed is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10), you would surely understand that the first man sinned so grievously that, by that sin, the nature not of one man but of the whole human race was changed, and, fallen from the possibility of immortality into the necessity of death, collapsed; so that even those who turn to God, through the one mediator of God and human beings, the man Christ Jesus, do not at once take up the immortality of the body; but it is now promised that it will be given them afterward, through the Spirit of God by whom they are now indwelt. The same Apostle explains this in the same place thus: If anyone, he says, does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not his. But if Christ is in you, the body indeed is dead because of sin, but the spirit is life because of justice. If, then, the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Jesus Christ from the dead will give life also to your mortal bodies through his Spirit dwelling in you (Rom 8:9-11).
Iulianum.6.7Corpus ergo mortuum est propter peccatum; quoniam necessitatem mortis etiam in viventibus habet. Quod autem peccatum, nisi primi hominis? Quandoquidem per iustitiam secundi hominis, id est Christi, eidem corpori quod nunc mortuum dicitur, vivificatio beata ventura est. Unde et secundus homo et secundus Adam dictus est Christus; cum inter Adam hominem factum, et Christum hominem natum, tot generationes hominum transisse videamus, nec in earum ordine possit dici secundus homo, nisi Cain; sed quia prima est mors corporis, quae facta est propter peccatum Adae, in qua decurrit hoc saeculum; secunda vita est corporis, quae fiet propter iustitiam Christi, et facta est in carne iam Christi, in qua vita futurum saeculum permanebit; ideo ille primus vel Adam vel homo, iste autem secundus est dictus.
The body, then, is dead because of sin; since it has the necessity of death even in the living. But what sin, except the first man's? Since through the justice of the second man, that is, Christ, a blessed making-alive is to come to that same body which is now called dead. Whence Christ was called both the second man and the second Adam; although, between Adam made a man and Christ born a man, we see so many generations of human beings to have passed, nor in their order can anyone be called the second man except Cain; but because the first is the death of the body, which came about because of Adam's sin, in which this age runs its course; the second is the life of the body, which will come about because of the justice of Christ, and has already come about in the flesh of Christ, in which life the future age will abide; therefore that one is called either first, or Adam, or man, but this one is called second.
Iulianum.6.7Et non vis intellegere tam grande illius fuisse peccatum, ut mortalium saeculum, huius vero tam grandem iustitiam, ut immortalium saeculum propagaret? Et mihi obicis peccati primi hominis granditatem, quae tanti mali hominum omnium exstitit causa, quasi hoc ego solus vel primus dixerim? Audi Ioannem Constantinopolitanum excellentis gloriae sacerdotem: Peccavit, inquit, Adam illud grande peccatum, et omne genus hominum in commune damnavit (IOANNES CONSTANTINOPOL., Ep. ad Olymp. 3, 3). Audi etiam in Lazari resuscitatione quid dicat, ut intellegas etiam corporis mortem de illo grandi venisse peccato: Flebat, inquit, Christus, quod eos qui immortales esse potuerunt, diabolus fecit esse mortales (IOANNES CONSTANTINOPOL., Omil. de Lazaro resuscitato). Ubi, obsecro te, diabolus omnes homines fecit esse mortales, nisi in illo cui praevaricationis inflixit tam grande peccatum, quo ex paradisi beatitudine in tantam miseriam, quam videmus atque sentimus, genus proiceretur humanum? Quod non sola mors corporis, sed ipsius quoque animae, quam corruptibile aggravat corpus, mala tot et tanta testantur, et grave iugum super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum (Cf. Eccli 40,1); sub quo iugo est etiam quod in Psalmo legitur: Universa vanitas omnis homo vivens (Ps 38, 6).
And are you unwilling to understand that his sin was so great that it propagated an age of mortals, but this one's justice so great that it propagated an age of immortals? And do you object to me the greatness of the first man's sin, which became the cause of so great an evil of all human beings, as though I alone or first had said this? Hear John of Constantinople, a priest of excellent glory: Adam, he says, sinned that great sin, and condemned the whole human race in common (John of Constantinople, Letter to Olympias 3.3). Hear also, in the raising of Lazarus, what he says, that you may understand that even the death of the body came from that great sin: Christ wept, he says, that those who could have been immortal, the devil made to be mortal (John of Constantinople, Homily on the Raising of Lazarus). Where, I beg you, did the devil make all human beings to be mortal, except in him on whom he inflicted that so great sin of transgression, by which the human race was cast from the blessedness of paradise into so great a misery, which we see and feel? To which not only the death of the body, but of the soul itself too, which the corruptible body weighs down, so many and so great evils bear witness, and the heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam, from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1); under which yoke is also what is read in the Psalm: Every living human being is altogether vanity (Ps 39:5 (38:6)).
Iulianum.6.7Quae tu mala nolens tribuere illi grandi peccato primi hominis, quid agis, nisi ut ea, tu quidem paradiso illius tam magnae felicitatis importes, tamquam et illic futura essent, si nemo peccasset; Manichaei vero ea tribuant genti tenebrarum, non te accusante confusi, sed adiuvante confisi, nisi tecum fiant tamquam invictissimo gladio catholica veritate confossi? Non autem, ut insimulas, dicimus: Nemini de primorum hominum stirpe nascenti esse possibile in virtutum decora conari (Cf. Phil 2, 13).
These evils, unwilling to attribute them to that great sin of the first man, what do you do but, on your part indeed, bring them into the paradise of that so great felicity, as though they would be there too if no one had sinned; while the Manichees attribute them to the race of darkness, not confounded by your accusing but confident in your helping—unless, together with you, they be pierced through by Catholic truth as by a most invincible sword? But we do not, as you charge, say: It is possible for no one born of the stock of the first human beings to strive after the beauties of the virtues (See Phil 2:13).
Iulianum.6.7Conantur enim multi, in quibus Deus operatur et velle; nec sine fructu perventionis ipso adiuvante conantur. Sed si animam corpus corruptibile non gravaret, non utique conarentur. Ac per hoc in paradiso (si nemo peccasset, et super filios Adam grave iugum non esset) sine conatu Deo suo facile et feliciter oboedirent.
For many strive, in whom God works even the willing; nor do they strive without the fruit of attainment, with him helping. But if the corruptible body did not weigh down the soul, they would surely not have to strive. And by this, in paradise (if no one had sinned, and there were no heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam) they would obey their God easily and happily without striving.
Iulianum.6.78. IUL. Illorum ergo primorum hominum, id est, tantum duorum, opitulari sibi laudem arbitratur ad distinctionem inter Manichaeos et Traducianos tenendam; qua opinione haud facile quidquam vel eminentius, vel impudentius offendi potest. Libertas, inquit, arbitrii, postquam se uti coepit, vires suas perdidit. Et ut conversi ad eum, pedetentim omnia perscrutemur; confiteris nempe primum hominem effectum esse arbitrio libero, bonumque a Deo conditum, nulla ab exordio peccati tabe pollutum; sed conditionis innocuae sponte deinceps praevaricatum, coactionem inevitabilem cunctis ex se oriundis intulisse peccandi. Hoc certe est dogma vestrum, quod nos de Manichaei coeno testamur expressum, qui et ipsius Adae naturam, licet de primae concretam flore substantiae, multo meliorem secutis, tamen malam naturaliter opinatur.
8. JULIAN: He thinks, then, that the praise of those first human beings, that is, of only two, helps him to maintain the distinction between Manichees and Traducianists; than which opinion hardly anything either more eminent or more shameless can be met with. The liberty of choice, he says, after it began to use itself, lost its powers. And, that, turning to him, we may examine all things step by step: you confess, surely, that the first man was made of free choice, and founded good by God, polluted from the beginning by no taint of sin; but that, of his harmless condition, he afterward prevaricated of his own accord, and brought upon all who would arise from him an inevitable compulsion of sinning. This is certainly your dogma, which we attest to be pressed out of the Manichee's mire, who supposes that even the nature of Adam himself—although formed from the flower of the first substance, much better than those who followed—was nevertheless naturally evil.
Iulianum.6.8AUG. Superius quae dicta sunt, satis indicant, et catholicum dogma nostrum, et dogma haereticum vestrum, de primis hominibus et posteris eorum; illis rectis a Deo conditis, istis autem, quamvis eodem conditore, tamen de natura peccato vitiata cum peccati vinculo exortis, atque a salute in qua homo primitus factus est in contagionis languorem et mortis necessitatem originis conditione deiectis. Propter quod eis ope opus est Salvatoris, qui primum salvos facit, remissione omnium peccatorum; post etiam omnium sanatione languorum (Cf. Ps 102, 3).
AUGUSTINE: The things said above indicate clearly enough both our Catholic dogma and your heretical dogma about the first human beings and their posterity; that they were founded upright by God, but these, although with the same founder, yet arose from a nature vitiated by sin, with the bond of sin, and were cast down by the condition of their origin from the salvation in which the human being was first made into the languor of contagion and the necessity of death. On account of which they need the help of a Savior, who first makes them safe by the forgiveness of all sins; afterward also by the healing of all their languors (See Ps 103:3 (102:3)).
Iulianum.6.8Iam baptizatis enim et eis qui iam Spiritum Sanctum acceperant dicebat Apostolus: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, spiritus autem adversus carnem; haec enim invicem adversantur; ut non ea quae vultis, faciatis (Gal 5, 17). Ubi tu qui negas liberum arbitrium vires suas perdidisse peccando, id est, male se utendo; quid respondebis, audiens quod carne concupiscente adversus spiritum, non ea quae volunt faciant et fideles, non ea quae volunt faciant etiam hi quibus sunt in Baptismo dimissa peccata; non ea quae volunt faciant, quos Apostolus ex auditu fidei dicit accepisse Spiritum Sanctum (Cf. Gal 3, 2); postremo non ea quae volunt faciant per liberam voluntatem, quos ait idem Doctor Gentium, vocatos in libertate (Cf. Gal 5, 13)?
For to those already baptized, and to those who had already received the Holy Spirit, the Apostle said: The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are opposed to each other, so that you do not do the things you would (Gal 5:17). Here you, who deny that free choice lost its powers by sinning, that is, by using itself ill, what will you answer, hearing that, with the flesh lusting against the spirit, even the faithful do not do the things they would; that even those whose sins were forgiven in baptism do not do the things they would; that those whom the Apostle says received the Holy Spirit from the hearing of faith (See Gal 3:2) do not do the things they would; finally, that those whom the same Teacher of the Gentiles says were called into liberty (See Gal 5:13) do not do the things they would through free will?
Iulianum.6.8Deinde, tam disertus defensor ipse libidinis, qui velut patronus egregius pro suscepta tua tantum audes, ut concupiscentiam carnis, qua concupiscit adversus spiritum, etiam in paradiso non dubites fuisse ante peccatum; non vides ad hoc te compelli, ut dicas nec tunc fuisse in illis primis hominibus efficacem liberam voluntatem? Si enim et tunc caro concupiscebat adversus spiritum, non ea quae volebant utique faciebant. Sed quoniam per liberum arbitrium, quod tunc integerrimas vires habuit, ea faciebant procul dubio quae volebant, id est, divinae legi non solum nulla impossibilitate, verum etiam nulla difficultate serviebant, tua ibi suscepta non fuit, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum; per quam fit ut homines iam etiam per fidem conversi ad Deum, iam baptizati, sanctificati, in libertatem vocati, non faciant in exstinguenda vitiosa delectatione quae volunt.
Then, you, so eloquent a defender of lust yourself, who, as an excellent patron for the thing you have taken up, dare so much that you do not hesitate to say that the concupiscence of the flesh, by which it lusts against the spirit, was even in paradise before sin; do you not see that you are compelled to this, that you say that not even then was there in those first human beings an effective free will? For if even then the flesh lusted against the spirit, they surely did not do the things they would. But since, through free choice, which then had its most intact powers, they without doubt did the things they would, that is, served the divine law not only with no impossibility but even with no difficulty, that thing you have taken up was not there, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit; through which it comes about that human beings now even turned to God through faith, now baptized, sanctified, called into liberty, do not do, in extinguishing a vicious delight, the things they would.
Iulianum.6.8Verissimumque illud est, quod per antistitem Ambrosium fides catholica dixit, hoc vitium quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, per praevaricationem primi hominis in nostram vertisse naturam (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 12, 53). Quo telo inevitabili et insuperabili veritatis, et Manichaeus obtruncatur, et tu. Ambo quippe in hac re, videto quis vestrum peius, tamen prorsus erratis; tu propterea quia contendis quod ista pestilentia malum non sit; ille autem, quia malum quidem agnoscit, sed unde sit nescit, et fide catholica destitutus fabulam mendaciorum et turpitudinum plenam, de duarum naturarum boni scilicet et mali permixtione componit.
And most true is that which the Catholic faith said through the bishop Ambrose: that this vice, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, by the transgression of the first man turned into our nature (See Ambrose, On Luke 7.12.53). By which inevitable and insuperable weapon of the truth, both the Manichee is cut down, and you. For both of you in this matter—see which of you the worse—nevertheless utterly err; you, because you contend that this pestilence is not an evil; he, because he indeed recognizes an evil, but does not know whence it is, and, destitute of the Catholic faith, composes a fable full of lies and disgraces, of a mixture of two natures, namely of good and of evil.
Iulianum.6.8Nunc ergo nostra iustitia est, ut iustificati per fidem pacem habeamus ad Deum (Cf. Rom 5, 1); contra vero carnis concupiscentiam nos oppugnantem, per ipsius Dei auxilium repugnante spiritu dimicemus. Non est ergo huius vitae iustitia, vitium non habere; sed vitia non eis consentiendo minuere, eisque resistendo, temperanter et iuste et pie vivere.
Now, then, our justice is that, justified by faith, we may have peace toward God (See Rom 5:1); but against the concupiscence of the flesh attacking us, let us fight, with the spirit fighting back through the help of God himself. It is not, then, the justice of this life to have no vice; but, by not consenting to vices, to lessen them, and, by resisting them, to live temperately and justly and piously.
Iulianum.6.8Nullum autem cui resistamus habere vitium, posterioris est vitae, quae bene gestae praesentis est praemium; sanatione nostrae, non (sicut Manichaeus, cuius es adiutor, insanit) alienae separatione naturae. Ecce dogma nostrum non est de Manichaei coeno, sicut criminaris, expressum; quo dogmate Manichaeum, si non omnem sensum amisisti, tecum cernis oppressum.
But to have no vice which we resist belongs to the later life, which is the reward of the present one well lived; by the healing of our own nature, not (as the Manichee, whose helper you are, raves) by the separation of a foreign nature. Behold, our dogma is not pressed out of the Manichee's mire, as you charge; by which dogma you see the Manichee, unless you have lost all sense, crushed along with you.
Iulianum.6.89. IUL. Nobis igitur in praesenti convincenda primo est sensus vestri hebetudo; tum ostendendum quod saepe iam fecimus, ne uno quidem pede a Manichaeorum vos gurgustiis meritoriisque discedere. Initio igitur, amentissimum est arbitrii negotium seminibus immixtum putare, et officia voluntatum inolevisse conceptibus; ut ea, quae est clarissima atque vastissima, naturarum et studiorum distinctione sublata, voluntas primorum posteris se ingenuisse dicatur.
9. JULIAN: For us, then, at present, the dullness of your understanding must first be convicted; then it must be shown, what we have often already done, that you do not depart even a single foot from the hovels and lodgings of the Manichees. At the outset, then, it is utterly mad to think that the business of choice is mixed into the seeds, and that the offices of wills have grown into conceptions; so that, the most clear and most vast distinction of natures and pursuits being removed, the will of the first parents is said to have engendered itself into their posterity.
Iulianum.6.9Cui errori obluctatur quidquid in rebus est. Numquam siquidem filii disertorum venustatem artis paternae in vagitibus attulerunt, aut soboles histrionum doctis motibus ad verba manus tetendit; nec bellatorum filii tubam populo poposcerunt. Licet hac forma, exempla omnium persequi clariora tonitribus concinentia. Respondebit universitas alios esse naturae limites, alios voluntatis; conditionesque seminum studiorum appetitibus pervias esse non posse. Bardissimum itaque et depositae stoliditatis apparuit credere conversum in naturam, quod voluntarium fuisse fateare. Ceterum illud aliud longe longeque deformius, quod possibilitatem operandi initio ais operationis assumptam, id est, ut liberum arbitrium (quod non est aliud quam possibilitas peccandi et non peccandi, nulli partis alterutrae subdita violentiae, sed quae habeat facultatem in quod voluerit latus suopte insistendi arbitratu), postquam coepit alterum velle, utrumque posse perdiderit.
Against which error whatever is in the world struggles. For never have the sons of the eloquent brought the gracefulness of their father's art in their wailings, nor have the offspring of actors stretched out their hands to words with learned movements; nor have the sons of warriors demanded the trumpet from the people. By this pattern, one may pursue examples of all things clearer than thunder, all in harmony. The whole world will answer that the limits of nature are one thing, those of will another; and that the conditions of seeds cannot be open to the appetites of pursuits. It appeared, therefore, most stupid, and of laid-aside dullness, to believe turned into nature what you confess to have been voluntary. But that other thing is far, far more deformed: that you say that the possibility of working was assumed at the beginning of operation, that is, that free choice (which is nothing other than the possibility of sinning and not sinning, subject to the violence of neither of the two parts, but having the faculty of standing, by its own judgment, on whichever side it would) lost, after it began to will one of the two, the power for both.
Iulianum.6.9AUG. Itane vero non cernis, Manichaeo te, ignoranter quidem, sed instanter tamen isto tuae loquacitatis inflato atque spumoso strepitu suffragari? Si enim quaerente illo a nobis unde sit malum, qua quaestione consueverunt corda inerudita turbare; nos responderemus, de libera voluntate rationalis creaturae exortum; atque ille diceret: Unde ergo sunt ista tot mala, quae non iam natis, et voluntatis arbitrio accedente aetate iam utentibus accidunt, sed cum quibus vel omnes, vel plerique nascuntur?
AUGUSTINE: Do you really not see that you support the Manichee—ignorantly indeed, but yet earnestly—with this inflated and foaming din of your wordiness? For if, when he asks of us whence evil comes—by which question they are wont to disturb untaught hearts—we answered that it arose from the free will of the rational creature; and he said: Whence, then, come these so many evils, which befall not those already born, and using the choice of will as age advances, but with which either all, or very many, are born?
Iulianum.6.9Omnibus quippe congenita est carnis concupiscentia, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, etiam recta fide atque doctrina pietatis imbutum; omnibus congenita est quaedam etiam tarditas mentis, qua et hi qui appellantur ingeniosi, non tamen sine aliqua laboris aerumna vel quascumque artes, vel eas etiam quas liberales nuncupant, discunt, vel ipsius religionis uberiorem scientiam consequuntur. Quidam etiam corpore deformi et aliquando monstruoso, multi obliviosi, multi ad intellegendum tardi et obtunsi, multi iracundi, multi libidinosi, nonnulli etiam omnino excordes fatuique nascuntur. Quid aliud catholica responderet fides, nisi haec omnia mala, ex quo peccavit homo, et de paradiso, id est, loco felicitatis eiectus est, ex natura quae peccati contagione vitiata est, exoriri? Neque enim, si nemo peccasset, vel talia in paradiso, vel alia ulla vitia nascerentur.
For to all is inborn the concupiscence of the flesh, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, even one imbued with right faith and the teaching of piety; to all is inborn also a certain slowness of mind, by which even those who are called clever nevertheless do not, without some toil of labor, learn either any arts whatever, or even those they call liberal, or attain a richer knowledge of religion itself. Some too are born with a deformed and sometimes monstrous body, many forgetful, many slow and dull at understanding, many irascible, many lustful, some even altogether senseless and foolish. What else would the Catholic faith answer, except that all these evils, from the time the human being sinned and was cast out of paradise, that is, the place of felicity, arise from the nature which was vitiated by the contagion of sin? For neither, if no one had sinned, would such things, or any other vices, be born in paradise.
Iulianum.6.9Quo audito, ille tua nobis, si haberet, verba recitaret, ubi dicis: Esse amentissimum, arbitrii negotium seminibus immixtum putare, et officia voluntatum inolevisse conceptibus; et in hanc sententiam quidquid aliud addidisti, ex hoc eam probare conatus, quo nec diserti disertorum, nec histriones histrionum, nec bellatores nascuntur filii bellatorum. Isto tuo adiutorio Manichaeus ad hoc utitur, ut oppugnet quod dicimus, peccato primi hominis humanam vitiatam fuisse naturam, etiam in posteris eius, qui ratione seminali in illo erant, quando in illa grandi praevaricatione peccavit; quod cum oppugnaverit, introducat commixtionem duarum naturarum suarum, atque ex commixtione naturae malae illa mala, cum quibus homines nascuntur, asseveret existere.
On hearing which, he would recite to us your words, if he had them, where you say: That it is most mad to think that the business of choice is mixed into the seeds, and that the offices of wills have grown into conceptions; and whatever else you added to this opinion, trying to prove it from this, that neither are eloquent sons born of the eloquent, nor actor sons of actors, nor warriors born of warriors. By this help of yours the Manichee uses this, that he may oppose what we say, that by the sin of the first man human nature was vitiated, even in his posterity, who were in him by seminal reason when he sinned in that great transgression; and when he has opposed this, that he may introduce the mixture of his two natures, and from the mixture of the evil nature assert that those evils, with which human beings are born, exist.
Iulianum.6.9Tu autem ut mihi resistas, rem absurdissimam et detestabilissimam cogeris dicere, mala scilicet ista nascentium etiam in paradiso exortura fuisse, si nemo peccasset. Hic te Manichaeus urgebit, ut dicas unde fuerant exortura. Ubi magnis coarctatus angustiis, si dixeris ex ipsis naturis nascentium exortura fuisse mala ista, sine ullius merito voluntatis, profecto argues Creatorem; quod ne facias, confugiturus es ad merita voluntatum malarum. Sed ille quaesiturus est: Quarum? Non enim est voluntas ulla seminum, vel nascentium parvulorum. Quid ergo restabit, nisi ut nobiscum intellegas, si vis evadere vel superare Manichaeum, in occultis originum sinibus latenter implicari etiam semina nascentium, et ex mala voluntate venientia merita generantium; sed primi hominis tam magnum fuisse peccatum, ut omne genus humanum, ut verbis sancti Ioannis utar, in commune damnaret (Cf. IOANNES CONSTANTINOPOL., Ep. ad Olymp. 3, 3)? Ex quo conficitur mala ista exortura non fuisse, si nemo peccasset; nec in paradiso esse potuisse, unde qui peccaverant, antequam gignerent, exierunt.
But you, in order to resist me, are forced to say a most absurd and most detestable thing, namely that these evils of those being born would have arisen even in paradise, if no one had sinned. Here the Manichee will press you to say whence they would have arisen. Where, hemmed in by great straits, if you say that these evils would have arisen from the very natures of those being born, without the merit of any will, you will surely accuse the Creator; and lest you do this, you will flee for refuge to the merits of evil wills. But he will ask: Whose? For there is no will of seeds, or of little ones being born. What, then, will remain, except that you understand with us, if you wish to escape or overcome the Manichee, that even the seeds of those being born are latently entangled in the hidden recesses of origins, and the merits coming from the evil will of those generating; but that the first man's sin was so great that, to use the words of holy John, it condemned the whole human race in common (See John of Constantinople, Letter to Olympias 3.3)? From which it is concluded that these evils would not have arisen, if no one had sinned; nor could they have been in paradise, from which those who had sinned departed before they generated.
Iulianum.6.9Quo catholico dogmate vacuatur, quod de artibus putasti esse subdendum, admonens nos, cum sui patris arte neminem nasci. Aliud est namque peccare in moribus, quibus recte vivitur, quod vel legibus solet vel divino iudicio vindicari; aliud in artibus, sive honestae sint, sive turpes, ubi contra artem factum aliquid dicitur; quae peccata non divina vel reprehenduntur lege, vel severitate plectuntur; sed ab iis hominibus, quorum iudiciis haec subiacent, maximeque a magistris earum, cum pueros docent, sub timore aut dolore poenarum. Qua in re tamen cogitare debemus, quia si in paradiso aliquid disceretur, quod illi vitae esset utile scire, sine ullo labore aut dolore id assequeretur beata natura, vel Deo docente, vel se ipsa.
By which Catholic dogma is made void what you thought should be added about the arts, reminding us that no one is born with his father's art. For it is one thing to sin in morals, by which one lives rightly, which is wont to be punished either by laws or by divine judgment; another to sin in arts, whether they be honorable or base, where something is said to be done against the art; which sins are neither reproached by divine law nor punished with severity, but by those human beings to whose judgments these things are subject, and most of all by the teachers of them, when they teach boys, under the fear or pain of penalties. In which matter, nevertheless, we ought to consider that, if in paradise something were learned which it was useful for that life to know, the blessed nature would attain it without any labor or pain, either with God teaching, or by itself.
Iulianum.6.9Unde quis non intellegat, in hac vita etiam tormenta discentium ad miserias huius saeculi, quod ex uno in condemnationem propagatum est (Cf. Rom 5, 16), pertinere? Ubi etiam miserum hoc est, miseras mentes nolle quod bonum est; vel si iam parata est voluntas a Domino (Cf. Prov 8 (sec. LXX)), clamare tamen adhuc eum qui in hoc vivit saeculo: Velle adiacet mihi; perficere autem bonum, non (Rom 7, 18). Hoc si teneas, Manichaeos vinces; quia vero non tenes, utrosque vestrum vincit haec fides.
Whence who does not understand that, in this life, even the torments of learners pertain to the miseries of this age, which was propagated from one man unto condemnation (See Rom 5:16)? Where this too is wretched, that wretched minds are unwilling for what is good; or, if the will is already prepared by the Lord (See Prov 8 (LXX)), yet he who lives in this age still cries out: To will lies near to me; but to accomplish the good, I do not (Rom 7:18). If you hold this, you will conquer the Manichees; but because you do not hold it, this faith conquers both of you.
Iulianum.6.910. IUL. Nunc igitur approbetur quod diximus, nullo a Manichaeis vestrum dogma differre. Non est omnino dubium, factam pessimam ipsius Adae naturam, si hac est conditione formata, ut haberet mali necessitatem, quae non habebat boni; id est, ut crimen, etiamsi fuisset voluntate conceptum, tamen fieret in ea naturale, in qua bonitas non fieret naturalis; falsoque dicitur voluntate peccasse, qui nequissimae conditionis praeiudicio laboravit. Apparet enim, quam vinctus malo fuerit, qui erat crimine inseparabili farciendus. Quid enim peius ea quibo invenire substantia, quae facta est ut in iniquitatem posset incidere, et recedere ab iniquitate non posset?
10. JULIAN: Now, then, let what we said be approved, that your dogma differs in nothing from the Manichees'. There is no doubt at all that the very nature of Adam was made most evil, if it was formed under this condition, that it should have a necessity of evil, which it did not have of good; that is, that the crime, even if it had been conceived by will, should yet become natural in it, in which goodness would not become natural; and he is falsely said to have sinned by will, who labored under the prejudgment of a most wicked condition. For it appears how bound by evil he was, who was to be stuffed with an inseparable crime. For what worse substance could be found than one which was made so that it could fall into iniquity, and could not withdraw from iniquity?
Iulianum.6.10Hanc si in boni parte violentiam pertulisset, si liberum perdidisset arbitrium, tamen nihil accusasset auctorem; quia nemo ei de copiis benignitatis quaestionem moveret; cum vero in mali parte dominatio talis collocatur, neminem magis quam ipsum hominis arguit conditorem, et supervacua criminatorum suorum, id est, vestra, Deus talis adulatione palpatur, qui amicissimus malitiae, creationis suae foeditate convincitur.
If it had suffered this violence on the side of good, if it had lost free choice, yet it would have accused its author in nothing; for no one would raise a question against him about the resources of his kindness; but when such a domination is placed on the side of evil, it accuses no one more than the very founder of the human being himself, and such a God is flattered by the superfluous adulation of his accusers, that is, of you, who, as a most ardent friend of malice, is convicted by the foulness of his creation.
Iulianum.6.10Cui enim persuaderi potest, primum hominem non destinasse criminibus, si illum emendationis facultate privavit; si tam pravo affecit animo, ut error suus ei displicere non posset, ut nullum haberet ad honestatem regressum, nec fieret post experimenta correctior, ac ne forte recuperandae probitatis umquam sentiret affectum, ipsam ei possibilitatem correctionis evellit?
For who can be persuaded that he did not destine the first man to crimes, if he deprived him of the faculty of amendment; if he afflicted him with so depraved a mind that his error could not displease him, that he had no return to honorableness, nor became more corrected after his experiments, and lest perchance he should ever feel an affection for recovering uprightness, plucked out from him the very possibility of correction?
Iulianum.6.10Prorsus si talis eius conditio fuit, ut quamdiu in hac vita erat, uno lapsu virtutem emendationis amitteret, non est ob aliud quam ut caderet institutus; immo nec corruisse, sed iacuisse semper verius dicitur, qui non sinitur, quantum ad mores spectat, exsurgere.
Outright, if his condition was such that, as long as he was in this life, by one fall he would lose the virtue of amendment, he was established for no other purpose than to fall; indeed, it is more truly said that he did not collapse, but always lay prostrate, who is not allowed, as far as concerns morals, to rise up.
Iulianum.6.10Qualis ergo fuit illa libertas, quae ei collata prius creditur, si e duabus contrariis qualitatibus peiorem a necessario, meliorem a mutabili capessebat; immo a tyrannide criminis occupata, despoliabatur resipiscentiae facultate. Teterrimus ergo primi hominis status ab ipso exordio, si a Deo est tam infeliciter institutus, ut ruiturus in crimen perpetua peccandi necessitate ligaretur.
What sort of liberty, then, was that which is believed first to have been conferred on him, if of two contrary qualities he took the worse from the necessary, the better from the mutable; indeed, seized by the tyranny of crime, he was despoiled of the faculty of coming to his senses? Most foul, then, was the state of the first man from the very beginning, if he was so unhappily established by God that, about to fall into crime, he was bound by a perpetual necessity of sinning.
Iulianum.6.10AUG. Res dicis, quas si nobis saltem admonentibus considerare non negligas, etiam tibi ipsi, quantumlibet sis impudens, erubescas? Cur enim non attendis, si pessima est facta natura, quae voluntate iniusta incurrit in malum, poena vero iniusta non potest recurrere in bonum, non humanam quam nobis obicis, sed angelicam quoque naturam pessimam factam? Nisi forte dices, etiam diabolum voluntate a bono lapsum, si voluerit, et quando voluerit, in bonum quod deseruit reversurum, et Origenis nobis instaurabis errorem.
AUGUSTINE: You say things at which, if you would not neglect to consider them at least when we point them out, you would blush even at yourself, however shameless you are. For why do you not attend that, if the nature is made most evil which by an unjust will runs into evil, while by an unjust penalty it cannot run back into good, then not only the human nature you object to us, but the angelic nature too was made most evil? Unless perhaps you will say that even the devil, fallen by will from good, will, if he wishes and when he wishes, return into the good he deserted, and you will renew for us the error of Origen.
Iulianum.6.10Quod si non facis, quod dixisti incautus, corrige admonitus; et confitere bonam conditam esse naturam, quae in malum quod fecit, nulla necessitate compulsa, sed sua voluntate collapsa est. In bonum autem quod reliquit, solius Dei gratia revocari potest, non voluntate libertatis, quam merito iniquitatis amisit. Potest quippe et alius, similiter ut tu errans, dicere: Quid peius ea potero invenire substantia, quae facta est ut in aeternum supplicium possit ire, et inde redire non possit? Et utique Deus omnipotens a quo vult supplicio eruere potest; sed mentiri non potest, qui minatus est hoc se non esse facturum, quando id supplicium dixit aeternum.
But if you do not do this, correct, being admonished, what you said incautiously; and confess that the nature was founded good, which, compelled by no necessity but collapsing by its own will, fell into the evil it did. But into the good it left it can be recalled only by the grace of God, not by the will of the liberty which it lost by the merit of its iniquity. For another, erring likewise as you, can say: What worse substance shall I be able to find than one which was made so that it could go into eternal punishment, and could not return from there? And surely God the omnipotent can rescue from punishment whomever he wills; but he who threatened that he would not do this, when he said that punishment is eternal, cannot lie.
Iulianum.6.10Sed ut de hac re vana sapias, fallit te definitio tua, qua in superiori prosecutione, cui iam respondimus, sicut saepe et alibi facis, liberum arbitrium definisti. Dixisti enim: Liberum arbitrium non est aliud quam possibilitas peccandi et non peccandi. Qua definitione primum ipsi Deo liberum arbitrium abstulisti, quem non negas, quia et hoc saepe dicis, et verum est, non posse peccare. Deinde ipsi sancti in regno eius liberum arbitrium perdituri sunt, ubi peccare non poterunt.
But, so that you may be wise about this matter in vain, your definition deceives you, by which, in the earlier passage, to which we have already answered, as you often do elsewhere too, you defined free choice. For you said: Free choice is nothing other than the possibility of sinning and not sinning. By which definition, first, you took away free choice from God himself, whom you do not deny—for you often say this too, and it is true—to be unable to sin. Then the saints themselves in his kingdom will lose free choice, where they will be unable to sin.
Iulianum.6.10Verum hic admonendus es, quid de hoc unde nunc agimus, sapere debeas, poenam scilicet et praemium, intuenda inter se esse contraria, et alia duo contraria his contrariis adhaerere; sic ergo in poena est non posse recte agere, sicut erit in praemio non posse peccare. Attende Scripturas, a quibus miserandus exorbitas, et vagabundus ventosa loquacitate tamquam tempestate iactaris; et vide quemadmodum dictum sit: Quod quaerebat Israel, hoc non est consecutus; electio autem consecuta est: ceteri vero excaecati sunt; sicut scriptum est: Dedit illis Deus spiritum compunctionis, oculos ut non videant, et aures ut non audiant, usque in hodiernum diem. Et David dicit: Fiat mensa eorum in laqueum, et in captionem, et in scandalum, et in retributionem illis; obscurentur oculieorum ne videant, et dorsum illorum semper incurva (Rom 11, 7-10). Aspice etiam illud in Evangelio: Propterea, inquit, non poterant credere, quia iterum dixit Isaias: Excaecavit oculos eorum, et induravit eorum cor, ut non videant oculis, nec intellegant corde, et convertantur, et sanem eos (Io 12, 39-40).
But here you must be admonished what you ought to be wise about regarding what we now discuss, namely that penalty and reward are to be regarded as contrary to each other, and that two other contraries adhere to these contraries; so, then, in penalty there is the inability to act rightly, just as in reward there will be the inability to sin. Attend to the Scriptures, from which, pitiable man, you stray, and, a wanderer, are tossed by windy wordiness as by a storm; and see how it was said: What Israel sought, this it did not obtain; but the election obtained it: but the rest were blinded; as it is written: God gave them a spirit of compunction, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear, even to this present day. And David says: Let their table become a snare, and a trap, and a stumbling block, and a recompense to them; let their eyes be darkened that they may not see, and bow down their back always (Rom 11:7-10). Look also at this in the Gospel: Therefore, he says, they could not believe, because Isaiah again said: He has blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart, that they should not see with the eyes, nor understand with the heart, and turn, and I heal them (John 12:39-40).
Iulianum.6.10Haec commemoravi, ut intellegas, si possis, fieri per poenam procul dubio iustam ut non credant homines excaecato corde; cum per misericordiam fiat ut credant libera voluntate. Quis enim nescit, neminem credere nisi libero voluntatis arbitrio? Sed paratur voluntas a Domino; nec omnino eruitur a servitute mala suis meritis debita, nisi quando per gratuitam gratiam paratur a Domino. Si enim Deus ex nolentibus volentes non faceret, profecto pro eis qui nolunt credere, non oraremus ut vellent. Quod et Apostolus se fecisse pro Iudaeis monstravit, ubi ait: Fratres, bona voluntas cordis mei, et deprecatio pro illis ad Deum in salutem (Rom 10, 1). Hanc utique salutem consequi, nisi credente voluntate, non possent; hoc ergo beatus Paulus orabat ut vellent. Et episcopus Cyprianus quod dictum est in Oratione dominica: Fiat voluntas tua sicut in caelo et in terra (Mt 6, 10), etiam sic intellegit, ut pro infidelibus inimicis nostris admoniti fuerimus orare; ut quemadmodum nos credimus, qui iam caelum sumus, portando hominis caelestis imaginem, sic etiam ipsi credant, qui propterea terra sunt, quia terreni tantum hominis imaginem portant (Cf. CYPRIANUS De Orat. dominica, 16).
These things I have recalled, that you may understand, if you can, that it comes about by a penalty without doubt just that human beings do not believe with a blinded heart; while it comes about by mercy that they believe with free will. For who does not know that no one believes except by the free choice of the will? But the will is prepared by the Lord; nor is it rescued at all from the evil servitude owed to its merits, except when, through gratuitous grace, it is prepared by the Lord. For if God did not make willing ones out of unwilling, surely we would not pray, for those who are unwilling to believe, that they might be willing. Which the Apostle showed he did for the Jews, where he says: Brethren, the good will of my heart, and my prayer to God for them, is for their salvation (Rom 10:1). This salvation they surely could not obtain except by a believing will; this, then, blessed Paul prayed that they might will. And the bishop Cyprian understands what was said in the Lord's Prayer: Thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven (Matt 6:10), also in this way, that we have been admonished to pray for our unbelieving enemies; so that, just as we who are already heaven, by bearing the image of the heavenly man, believe, so they too may believe, who are earth for this reason, because they bear only the image of the earthly man (See Cyprian, On the Lord's Prayer 16).
Iulianum.6.1011. IUL. Durat nempe inter vos Manichaeosque foedus, ut illi professione, vos argumentatione, primi quoque hominis naturam asseratis malam fuisse; quod licet totum ineptiarum mendaciorumque plenum esse (ut praetermissis sanctorum legionibus, primum post peccatum Adae iustitia arripiamus exemplum), Abelis sanctitate mirabili comprobatur, qui de peccatoribus natus, bene vivendi se non caruisse virtute, effectu quoque ipsius virtutis ostendit; verumtamen his praeteritis iuvat sententias Traducianae nationis urgere.
11. JULIAN: There endures, surely, a pact between you and the Manichees, that the one of you by profession, the other by argument, assert that even the nature of the first man was evil; which, although it is full of follies and lies (to pass over the legions of the saints, let us seize the first example of justice after the sin of Adam), is refuted by the marvelous holiness of Abel, who, born of sinners, showed by the very effect of virtue itself that he did not lack the virtue of living well; nevertheless, these things being passed over, it helps to press the opinions of the Traducianist nation.
Iulianum.6.11Quale igitur autumas fuisse arbitrium liberum, quod collatum primis hominibus confiteris? Certe ut possent animi alternare motus, et vel facere malum, vel recedere a malo, vel deserere vel servare iustitiam. Voluntas ergo peccandi non fuisset, nisi volendi possibilitas anteisset. Hoc postquam uti coeperunt propria voluntate, id est motu animi cogente nullo, tu dicis liberum arbitrium perdidisse; quo quid potest furiosius cogitari? Ut enim vis argumenti tui expressa teneatur, dicis eam rem periisse propter voluntatem, quae data non est nisi propter voluntatem; peccatum quippe nihil est aliud quam voluntas mala; libertas autem ad hoc solum data est, ut voluntatem non cogeret, sed permitteret exoriri; hanc autem tu libertatem conditionem suam dicis voluntatis opere perdidisse, ut per hoc interiisse credatur, per quod solum probatur vigere.
What sort of free choice, then, do you suppose that to have been, which you confess was conferred on the first human beings? Certainly such that they could alternate the movements of the mind, and either do evil, or withdraw from evil, either desert or preserve justice. The will to sin, then, would not have existed, unless the possibility of willing had gone before. After they began to use this by their own will, that is, by a movement of the mind with nothing compelling, you say that free choice was lost; than which what can be thought more frenzied? For, so that the force of your argument may be held expressed, you say that that thing perished on account of the will, which was given for nothing but the will; for sin is nothing other than an evil will; but liberty was given for this alone, that it should not compel the will, but permit it to arise; but this liberty you say lost its condition by the work of the will, so that it is believed to have perished through that by which alone it is proved to flourish.
Iulianum.6.11Voluntas ergo mala non quidem fructus, sed testimonium libertatis est. Libertas autem nihil est aliud quam possibilitas boni malique, sed voluntarii. Qui ergo fieri potuit ut per hoc interiret, per quod proditur instituta, cum mala voluntas et bona voluntas non exitia sint, sed praeconia libertatis? Ac per hoc quantum distat inter officia atque discrimina, tantum inter opinionem tuam et rationem arbitrii liberi, cui excidium putas de suis laudibus comparatum. Quid ergo novum, quid insperatum delinquente homine accidit, per quod Dei instituta corruerent? Factus est qui peccare et non peccare posset; cum peccavit, fecit quod non debuit quidem, sed potuit tamen; per quid igitur facultatem illam perderet, quae ad hoc fuerat instituta, ut posset velle, posset nolle quod voluit.
An evil will, then, is not the fruit, but the testimony of liberty. But liberty is nothing other than the possibility of good and evil, but of the voluntary. How, then, could it come about that it perished through that by which it is proclaimed established, since an evil will and a good will are not the destructions but the heraldings of liberty? And by this, by as much as there is a difference between offices and discriminations, by so much is there between your opinion and the reason of free choice, for which you think destruction has been procured out of its own praises. What new, then, what unhoped-for thing happened when the human being transgressed, by which the establishments of God should collapse? He was made one who could sin and not sin; when he sinned, he did what he ought not indeed, but could nevertheless do; through what, then, should he lose that faculty, which had been established for this, that he could will, could not will, what he willed?
Iulianum.6.11AUG. Eadem iterum et iterum dicis, quibus me iam superius respondisse qui legerit pervidebit. Sed hic etiam persistenti tibi atque asseveranti libertatem bene agendi seu male, suo malo usu perire non posse, respondeat et beatus papa Innocentius, Romanae antistes Ecclesiae; qui rescribens in causa vestra episcopalibus conciliis Africanis: Liberum - inquit - arbitrium olim ille perpessus, dum suis inconsultius utitur bonis, cadens in praevaricationis profunda demersus, nihil quemadmodum exinde surgere posset invenit; suaque in aeternum libertate deceptus, huius ruinae latuisset oppressus, nisi eum post Christi pro sua gratia relevasset adventus (INNOCENTIUS (Ep. 181 inter Augustinianas), 7).
AUGUSTINE: You say the same things again and again, to which whoever reads will see clearly that I have already answered above. But here too, to you persisting and asserting that the liberty of acting well or ill cannot perish by its own ill use, let blessed Pope Innocent, bishop of the Roman Church, answer; who, writing back in your cause to the African episcopal councils: That free choice—he says—he of old suffered, while he uses his own goods too inconsiderately, falling, sunk in the depths of transgression, found nothing how he might thence rise; and, deceived by his liberty forever, would have lain hidden, oppressed by this ruin, had not the coming of Christ afterward, by his grace, raised him up (Innocent (Letter 181 among the Augustinian), 7).
Iulianum.6.11Videsne quid sapiat per ministrum suum catholica fides? Vides possibilitatem standi et cadendi sic habuisse hominem, ut si cecidisset, non eadem possibilitate qua ceciderat surgeret, culpam scilicet sequente supplicio. Propter quod Christi gratia, cui miserabiliter estis ingrati, quae iacentem relevaret, advenit. In alia quoque epistola, quam de vobis ipsis rescripsit ad Numidas: Ergo - inquit - Dei gratiam conantur auferre, quam necesse est, etiam restituta nobis status pristini libertate, quaeramus (INNOCENTIUS (Ep. 182 inter Augustinianas), 4).
Do you see what the Catholic faith is wise about through its minister? Do you see that the human being so had the possibility of standing and falling, that if he fell, he would not rise by the same possibility by which he had fallen, namely with punishment following fault? On account of which the grace of Christ, to which you are wretchedly ungrateful, came to raise him up as he lay. In another letter too, which he wrote back about you yourselves to the Numidians: Therefore—he says—they try to take away the grace of God, which it is necessary that we seek, even with the liberty of our former state restored to us (Innocent (Letter 182 among the Augustinian), 4).
Iulianum.6.11Audis restitui libertatem, et non periisse contendis; atque humana voluntate contentus divinam non petis gratiam, quam libertas nostra etiam in statum pristinum restituta sibi esse intellegit necessariam. Quaero autem a te, utrum iam in pristinum statum ita fuerit restituta libertas eius qui dicit: Non quod volo, ago; sed quod odi, illud facio; et: Velle adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum, non invenio (Rom 7, 15. 18); et quibus dicitur: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem; ut non ea quae vultis faciatis (Gal 5, 17).
You hear that liberty is restored, and you contend it did not perish; and, content with the human will, you do not ask for the divine grace, which our liberty, even when restored to its former state, understands to be necessary for it. But I ask of you, whether the liberty of him who says: I do not do what I want, but what I hate, that I do; and: To will lies near to me, but to accomplish the good I do not find (Rom 7:15, 18), has now been so restored to its former state; and of those to whom it is said: The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; so that you do not do the things you would (Gal 5:17).
Iulianum.6.11Puto quod non usque adeo desipis, ut in his dicas esse status pristini libertatem; et tamen si nulla eis esset, id quod sanctum et iustum et bonum est, nec velle potuissent. Sunt enim quos peccare ita delectat, ut nolint oderintque iustitiam; quam nec velle aliquis potest, nisi paretur voluntas a Domino, ut ad perficiendam iustitiam praecedat desiderium voluntatis, et paulatim effectus potestatis accedat, aliis citius, aliis tardius, unicuique sicut Dominus dedit, qui solus potest hominis reparare salutem atque augere iam perditam et donare etiam hoc, ut iam perire non possit.
I think you are not so foolish as to say that in these there is the liberty of the former state; and yet, if there were none in them, they could not even will what is holy and just and good. For there are those whom it so delights to sin that they are unwilling for, and hate, justice; which no one can even will, unless the will be prepared by the Lord, so that for accomplishing justice the desire of the will may go before, and little by little the effect of the power may accrue, to some sooner, to some later, to each as the Lord has given, who alone can repair the salvation of the human being and increase it once lost and grant even this, that it can no longer perish.
Iulianum.6.11In quo liberatorum numero est et sanctus Abel, quem dicis bene vivendi non caruisse virtute. Non caruit plane, sed postquam coepit illi esse; antea vero, quis est mundus a sorde? Nec infans, cuius est diei unius vita super terram (Cf. Iob 14, 4 (sec. LXX)). Redimuntur ergo, quicumque redimuntur, ab eo qui venit quaerere quod perierat, qui et antequam in carne veniret, per fidem ipsam redemit, qua credebatur esse venturus. Redimuntur autem in libertatem beatitudinis sempiternam, ubi iam peccato servire non possint. Nam si, ut dicis, boni malique voluntarii possibilitas sola libertas est, non habet libertatem Deus, in quo peccandi possibilitas non est. Hominis vero liberum arbitrium congenitum et omnino inamissibile si quaerimus, illud est quo beati omnes esse volunt, etiam hi qui ea nolunt quae ad beatitudinem ducunt.
In which number of the liberated is also holy Abel, who, you say, did not lack the virtue of living well. He plainly did not lack it, but after it began to be his; before that, who is clean from filth? Not even an infant whose life is of one day upon the earth (See Job 14:4-5 (LXX)). They are redeemed, then, whoever are redeemed, by him who came to seek what had perished, who, even before he came in the flesh, redeemed through that faith by which he was believed to be about to come. But they are redeemed into the everlasting liberty of blessedness, where they can no longer be slaves to sin. For if, as you say, the possibility of the voluntary good and evil is liberty alone, then God does not have liberty, in whom there is no possibility of sinning. But if we seek the inborn and altogether unlosable free choice of the human being, it is that by which all wish to be blessed, even those who are unwilling for the things that lead to blessedness.
Iulianum.6.1112. IUL. Deinde, ut praerupta opinionis tuae sequamur, argumentaris tali conditione liberum arbitrium ordinatum fuisse, ut vim suam merito secutae voluntatis amitteret, et qualitatis quam elegisset necessitatem, in reliquum sustineret. Hinc ergo quid a nobis referatur attende. Siccine putas hominem creatum, ut hanc electae qualitatis necessitatem in utraque parte pateretur, id est, ut si bonum voluisset, ulterius peccare non posset; et si elegisset malum, ultra se emendare nequiret? An ut tantummodo malam partem mali necessitas sequeretur, in bona autem nihil tale contingeret, sed semper periculis varietatum pateret?
12. JULIAN: Then, to follow the precipices of your opinion, you argue that free choice was ordained under such a condition, that it would lose its force by the merit of the will that followed, and would for the rest sustain the necessity of the quality it had chosen. Hence, then, attend to what is reported by us. Do you really think the human being was created so that he should suffer this necessity of the chosen quality in either part, that is, that if he had willed good, he could not afterward sin; and if he had chosen evil, he could not afterward amend himself? Or so that only the necessity of evil should follow the evil part, but in the good nothing such would befall, but it would always lie open to the perils of variations?
Iulianum.6.12Ex his duobus quodlibet sumito: si dixeris talem factam esse naturam, quae mali tantum necessitatem pateretur; nulli dubium remanebit, teterrimam eam definiri, cui peioris partis violentia sola tribuatur; probaturque Adam quoque malae fuisse naturae; et nullius remanebit voluntarii, sub qua delitescas, umbra commissi. Sin autem profitearis, etiam in boni parte idem fuisse secuturum, id est, ut si bonum voluisset, ulterius peccare non posset; refero: Cur ergo peccavit? Cur nullam passus est boni necessitatem, ut insidiis diaboli impenetrabilis appareret, qui aliquo tempore, priusquam peccaret, fuisse obediens Deo invenitur?
Take whichever of these two: if you say that such a nature was made, which would suffer only the necessity of evil; no doubt will remain that it is defined most foul, to which the violence of the worse part alone is attributed; and it is proved that Adam too was of an evil nature; and there will remain no shadow of anything voluntary committed, under which you may hide. But if you profess that the same would have followed in the good part too, that is, that if he had willed good, he could not afterward sin; I report: Why, then, did he sin? Why did he suffer no necessity of good, so as to appear impenetrable to the snares of the devil, who is found to have been, for some time before he sinned, obedient to God?
Iulianum.6.12Neque enim illico quod ingressu animae limus intepuit, in appetitum malae voluntatis exarsit. Legitur quinimmo, ad culturam paradisi custodiamque translatus accepisse praeceptum a Deo, ut universis fructibus vesceretur, sed a ligno scientiae boni et mali, dicto audiens abstineret. Antequam ergo de latere eius corpus formaretur uxoris, obediens mansit imperio, amoeni ruris cultor innocuus; post hoc vero, adiutorium similis sibi consortis emeruit. Inculcavit nempe has distinctiones temporum Scripturae fides.
For not at once, when the clay grew warm at the entrance of the soul, did it blaze up into the appetite of an evil will. Rather, it is read that, transferred to the cultivation and keeping of paradise, he received a commandment from God, that he should eat of all the fruits, but should obediently abstain from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Before, then, the body of his wife was formed from his side, he remained obedient to the command, the harmless cultivator of the pleasant countryside; but after this, he merited the help of a consort like himself. The faith of Scripture has indeed inculcated these distinctions of times.
Iulianum.6.12Postquam vero iam sibi mulierem vidit paratam, in tantum praecepto Dei sedulo famulabatur officio, ut etiam feminae legem, quam acceperat, intimaret. Non solum igitur custos divini, sed etiam praedicator imperii, condocefecit Eva et reverentiam praecipientis, et genus servitutis, et causam timoris.
But after he now saw the woman prepared for himself, he served the commandment of God with such diligent office that he even intimated to the woman the law which he had received. Not only the keeper, then, but also the herald of the divine command, Adam taught Eve both the reverence due to the one commanding, and the kind of service, and the cause of fear.
Iulianum.6.12Inde est quippe quod etiam mulier congredienti diabolo obluctata sollicite, cui nihil Deus imperaverat, refellit serpentis prima fronte mendacia, et dicit non abstinentiam omnium lignorum, sicut ille confinxerat, sed cum permissu fertilitatis universae unius tantum mandatam arbusculae cautionem, metumque mortis obiectum, qui praevaricatores iure sequeretur. Non ergo brevi tempore apparet Adam custodisse mandatum; sed etiam Evam curam devotionis habuisse, quae scientiae et divinitatis amore collapsa est.
Hence it is, indeed, that even the woman, anxiously struggling against the devil as he approached—to whom God had commanded nothing—refuted at the first front the lies of the serpent, and said that it was not abstinence from all the trees, as he had falsely framed, but, with the permission of all fruitfulness, only the cautioning of one little shrub commanded, and the fear of death set before, which would justly follow transgressors. Not for a short time, then, does Adam appear to have kept the command; but Eve too to have had the care of devotion, who collapsed through the love of knowledge and divinity.
Iulianum.6.12Cur ergo illa iustitia, illa devotio, quae in Adam diu, in Eva aliquandiu viguit, non eripuit delinquendi possibilitatem, ut boni necessitas impenetrabiles eos suadelis sontibus exhiberet? Fuerunt ergo quamdiu voluerunt obedientes, nec tamen perdiderunt merito devotionis facultatem praevaricandi; denique lapsi sunt (Cf. Gen 2-3); igitur et posteaquam peccaverunt, manifestum est nequaquam eos potuisse vim correctionis amittere. Et ideo ut in omnibus locis, hic quoque totum quod confinxeras perdidisti; quia peccatum illud primorum hominum nec ullorum fecit criminum necessitatem, nec transiit in naturam; sicut iustitia quae praecessit, nec virtutum intulit necessitatem, nec sibi vias seminum vindicavit.
Why, then, did that justice, that devotion, which flourished long in Adam, for a while in Eve, not snatch away the possibility of transgressing, so that the necessity of good might render them impenetrable to guilty persuasions? They were, then, obedient as long as they willed, nor yet did they lose, by the merit of devotion, the faculty of transgressing; finally they fell (See Gen 2-3); therefore, even after they sinned, it is manifest that they could by no means lose the force of correction. And therefore, as in all places, here too you have lost the whole of what you had framed; because that sin of the first human beings neither made a necessity of any crimes, nor passed into nature; just as the justice that went before neither brought a necessity of virtues, nor claimed for itself the ways of the seeds.
Iulianum.6.12AUG. Totum quod tamdiu et tanta verborum perplexitate dixisti, breviter sic potest dici. Cur, inquis, Adam male agendo perdidit posse bene agere, et bene prius agendo non perdidit posse peccare? Et vis intellegi, si ita est, hominem non bonae, sed malae factum fuisse naturae, in quo plus valuit actio mala, ne posset agere bene, quam actio bona, ne posset agere male.
AUGUSTINE: The whole of what you said at such length and with so great a perplexity of words can be briefly said thus. Why, you say, did Adam, by acting ill, lose the power to act well, and, by acting well first, not lose the power to sin? And you want it understood that, if it is so, the human being was made of a not good but an evil nature, in whom the evil action availed more, to make him unable to act well, than the good action, to make him unable to act ill.
Iulianum.6.12Posses isto modo dicere, male fuisse hominem cum oculis creatum, quia cum eos exstinxerit, fit in illo ut non possit videre; videndo autem non in illo factum est ut eos non posset exstinguere; aut male fuisse totum corpus hominis conditum, quia in potestate habet ut ipse se necet, nec habet in potestate ut se ipse resuscitet; et fit in eo per mortem ut se non possit vivificare, nec fit in eo per vitam ut se non possit occidere. Quod si non dicis, quoniam cernis quam sit insulsum, cur malam dicis Deum creasse hominis naturam, si fecit in eo mala voluntas ne redire posset ad bonum, quamvis in eo non fecerit voluntas bona ut ire non posset in malum?
You could in this way say that the human being was created with eyes ill, because, when he has put them out, it comes about in him that he cannot see; but by seeing it was not brought about in him that he could not put them out; or that the whole body of the human being was founded ill, because he has it in his power to kill himself, and does not have it in his power to raise himself; and it comes about in him through death that he cannot make himself alive, nor does it come about in him through life that he cannot kill himself. But if you do not say this, since you see how tasteless it is, why do you say that God created the human being's nature evil, if an evil will brought about in him that he could not return to good, although a good will did not bring about in him that he could not go into evil?
Iulianum.6.12Cum libero enim sic est creatus arbitrio, ut posset non peccare, si nollet; non ut si vellet, impune peccaret. Quid ergo mirum, si delinquendo, hoc est, rectitudinem suam in qua factus erat depravatione mutando, cum supplicio secutum est non posse recta agere? Quamdiu vero in eadem rectitudine stetit, in qua poterat non peccare, ideo non accepit maius aliquid, hoc est, non posse peccare, quia in eo quod habuit, non usque ad finem remunerationis voluit permanere.
For he was created with free choice in such a way that he could not sin, if he willed not to; not so that, if he willed, he might sin with impunity. What wonder, then, if, by transgressing—that is, by changing his own uprightness in which he was made, by depravation—it followed, with punishment, that he could not act rightly? But as long as he stood in the same uprightness, in which he could not sin, he therefore did not receive something greater, that is, the inability to sin, because in that which he had he was unwilling to remain to the end of his reward.
Iulianum.6.12Quod enim accepturi sunt sancti, qui in futuro saeculo in corpore futuri sunt spiritali, sine interventu mortis fuerat accepturus Adam, ut ascendens ab eo quod posset non mori, ad id perveniret ubi non posset mori; et ascendens ab eo quod non peccare posset, ad id perveniret ubi peccare non posset. Non quippe in corpore spiritali, sed in animali factus erat, quamvis nisi peccasset, minime morituro.
For what the saints are about to receive, who in the future age will be in a spiritual body, Adam was about to receive without the intervention of death, so that, ascending from the ability not to die, he might arrive where he could not die; and ascending from the ability not to sin, he might arrive where he could not sin. For he was made not in a spiritual but in an animal body, although, if he had not sinned, not at all about to die.
Iulianum.6.12Quia, sicut dicit Apostolus: Non prius quod spiritale est, sed quod animale; postea spiritale (1 Cor 15, 46). Unde beatus Ambrosius, in umbra vitae dicit Adam esse factum, de qua posset cadere, non necessitate, sed voluntate (Cf. AMBROSIUS, De Paradiso). In qua utique si maneret, acciperet eam vitam, cuius illa umbra erat, quam sancti accepturi sunt, ex qua omnino cadere non poterunt.
Because, as the Apostle says: Not first that which is spiritual, but that which is animal; afterward the spiritual (1 Cor 15:46). Whence blessed Ambrose says that Adam was made in the shadow of life, from which he could fall, not by necessity but by will (See Ambrose, On Paradise). In which, surely, if he had remained, he would receive that life of which that was the shadow, which the saints are about to receive, from which they will be altogether unable to fall.
Iulianum.6.12Hanc quoque mortalitatem, in qua decurrit hoc saeculum, e contrario umbram mortis intellegit; mortem vero, cuius haec umbra est, illam commemorat, quae secunda mors dicitur (Cf. Apoc 20, 6), de qua nemo, cum in eam venerit, revertetur. Quicumque autem de hac mortis umbra liberantur, non ad vitae umbram redire, sed ad eam vitam praeparantur ire, de qua numquam quisquam possit exire. Ibi erit et ipse Adam; quoniam recte creditur Domini adventu atque in inferna descensu, ab inferni vinculis iam solutus; ut primum Dei plasma, quod genitorem non habuit, sed Deum tantummodo creatorem, et secundum carnem primus pater Christi, ultra in illis vinculis non maneret, atque aeterno supplicio non periret.
This mortality too, in which this age runs its course, he understands, on the contrary, to be the shadow of death; but the death of which this is the shadow, he mentions to be that which is called the second death (See Rev 20:6), from which no one, when he has come into it, will return. But whoever are freed from this shadow of death are prepared to go, not to return to the shadow of life, but to that life from which no one will ever be able to go out. There Adam himself too will be; since it is rightly believed that, by the coming of the Lord and his descent into hell, he was already loosed from the bonds of hell; so that the first thing fashioned by God, which had no begetter but only God the creator, and according to the flesh the first father of Christ, should not remain longer in those bonds, and should not perish in eternal punishment.
Iulianum.6.12Ubi autem iudicio superexaltat misericordia (Cf. Iac 2, 13), non sunt merita cogitanda, sed gratia: cuius est tanta et tam inscrutabilis atque investigabilis altitudo, ut post illam sententiam qua dictum est. Si quis non renatus fuerit ex aqua et spiritu, non intrabit in regnum Dei (Io 3, 5), videamus aliquando bene meritis fidelibus non concedi filios suos, ut sint in regno Dei cum parentibus suis; sed non regeneratos parvulos exire de hac vita, dum nonnumquam et ipsis suis parentibus ardenter desiderantibus, et ministris Sacramentorum alacriter festinantibus, ab omnipotentissimo et misericordissimo Deo non differtur paululum mors eorum, ut Christianorum nati exeant hinc renati, et neque regno Christi suisque genitoribus pereant; sed antequam baptizentur, exspirant; cum aliquando filiis infantibus infidelium, et ipsam Christi gratiam blasphemantium, in manus Christianorum mirabili Dei gubernatione perductis, praestetur haec gratia, ut in Dei regnum ab impiis separati parentibus veniant.
But where mercy exalts itself above judgment (See Jas 2:13), merits are not to be thought of, but grace: whose depth is so great and so inscrutable and unsearchable, that, after that sentence by which it was said: Unless one is reborn of water and spirit, he will not enter the kingdom of God (John 3:5), we see sometimes that to faithful people of good merit their own sons are not granted to be in the kingdom of God with their parents; but that unregenerate little ones go out of this life, while sometimes—even with their own parents ardently desiring, and the ministers of the Sacraments eagerly hastening—their death is not by the most omnipotent and most merciful God deferred a little, so that, born of Christians, they might go hence reborn, and not perish to the kingdom of Christ and to their begetters; but before they are baptized, they expire; while sometimes, to infant sons of unbelievers, and of those who even blaspheme the very grace of Christ, brought by the marvelous governance of God into the hands of Christians, this grace is granted, that, separated from their impious parents, they come into the kingdom of God.
Iulianum.6.12Ubi si a te quaeratur, quae sit iustitia ista, profecto in illo dialectico et philosophico sermone, quo tibi videris de iustitia Dei diligentissime disputasse, non invenis eam. Dominus enim cognovit cogitationes sapientium, quoniam vanae sunt (Cf. Ps 93, 11); et abscondens haec a sapientibus et prudentibus, revelavit ea parvulis (Cf. Mt 11, 25), id est, humilibus, et non in sua virtute, sed in Domino confidentibus; quod tu vel numquam, vel nondum esse dignaris.
Where, if it be asked of you what this justice is, surely in that dialectical and philosophical discourse, by which you seem to yourself to have argued most diligently about the justice of God, you do not find it. For the Lord knows the thoughts of the wise, that they are vain (See Ps 94:11 (93:11)); and hiding these things from the wise and prudent, he revealed them to little ones (See Matt 11:25), that is, to the humble, and to those trusting not in their own virtue, but in the Lord; which you either never, or not yet, deign to be.
Iulianum.6.12Si ergo quaeris, ubi vel quando detur homini non posse peccare, praemia quaere sanctorum, quae post hanc vitam illos oportet accipere. Si autem non credis, liberum hominis arbitrium, quo recte agere potuit et debuit, peccati malitia defecisse, illum saltem attende, qui dicit: Non quod volo, hocago; sed quod odi, illud facio; quem vos non vultis vitiata origine, sed praevalente mala consuetudine laborare; ac sic etiam vos fatemini liberum arbitrium, male se utendo, posse deficere; et non vultis illo tam grandi peccato, ut omni mala consuetudine fuerit maius et peius, vitiari potuisse in humana natura liberum arbitrium; in qua depravanda malam consuetudinem tantum dicitis posse, ut se perficere bonum clamet homo velle, nec posse.
If, then, you ask where or when it is given to a human being to be unable to sin, seek the rewards of the saints, which after this life they must receive. But if you do not believe that the free choice of the human being, by which he could and ought to have acted rightly, failed through the malice of sin, attend at least to him who says: I do not do what I want, but what I hate, that I do; whom you are unwilling to have labored under a vitiated origin, but under a prevailing evil habit; and so you too confess that free choice, by using itself ill, can fail; and you are unwilling that, by that so great sin, which was greater and worse than every evil habit, free choice could have been vitiated in human nature; in the depraving of which you say evil habit alone can do so much, that the human being cries out that he wills to accomplish the good, and cannot.
Iulianum.6.12Immutabilis autem, cum qua homo creatus est et creatur, illa libertas est voluntatis, qua beati esse omnes volumus, et nolle non possumus; sed haec ut beatus sit quisque non sufficit, nec ut vivat recte per quod beatus sit; quia non ita est homini congenita libertas immutabilis voluntatis qua velit possitque bene agere, sicut congenita est qua velit beatus esse; quod omnes volunt, et qui recte agere nolunt.
But that immutable liberty, with which the human being was created and is created, is that liberty of the will by which we all will to be blessed, and cannot will not to be; but this does not suffice for anyone to be blessed, nor for anyone to live rightly by which he may be blessed; because the immutable liberty of will by which he would will and be able to act well is not so inborn in the human being as is that inborn liberty by which he would will to be blessed; which all will, even those who are unwilling to act rightly.
Iulianum.6.1213. IUL. Quid igitur confectum est? Unum esse necessarium de duobus, ut aut confitearis Adam factum bonae esse substantiae, nec naturam eius voluntaria qualitate destructam, et deseras naturale peccatum; aut si illum, ut hactenus opinatus es, naturalium malorum causam esse contenderis, et ipsum pessimae substantiae, atque ad Deum vestrum, id est, tuum et Manichaei, pertinere pronunties.
13. JULIAN: What, then, has been accomplished? That one of two things is necessary: that either you confess Adam to have been made of a good substance, and that his nature was not destroyed by a voluntary quality, and you abandon natural sin; or, if you contend, as you have hitherto supposed, that he was the cause of natural evils, you pronounce both that he was of a most evil substance, and that he pertains to your God, that is, to yours and the Manichee's.
Iulianum.6.13AUG. Non esse confectum quod putas esse confectum, nostra superior responsio declarat. Nam cum inter nos quaestio verteretur, utrum malo usu liberi arbitrii, cum quo homo creatus est, vitiari potuerit ista libertas, ne ad bene vivendum, qui male vixit, esset idoneus, nisi gratiae virtute sanatus; ut omittam cetera, quae in eadem responsione dicta sunt plurima, invenimus hominem in summa Scripturarum divinarum auctoritate dicentem: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago. In quibus verbis evidenter apparet, liberum arbitrium malo suo usu esse vitiatum. Non enim ante peccatum, quo male usus est homo libero arbitrio, in illa paradisi felicitate et ad bene agendum magna facilitate constitutus, posset hoc dicere.
AUGUSTINE: That what you think has been accomplished has not been accomplished, our earlier answer declares. For when the question was turned between us, whether this liberty could be vitiated by the ill use of the free choice with which the human being was created, so that he who lived ill would not be fit for living well unless healed by the power of grace; to omit the other things, very many of which were said in that same answer, we found a human being saying, on the supreme authority of the divine Scriptures: I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want, this I do. In which words it evidently appears that free choice was vitiated by its own ill use. For before the sin, by which the human being used free choice ill, established in that felicity of paradise and with great facility for acting well, he could not say this.
Iulianum.6.13Sed hoc vos non vitiatae in primo homine naturae humanae, sed malae consuetudini cuiusque tribuitis, quam sibi praevalentem volens, nec valens homo vincere, suamque libertatem ad bonum perficiendum integram non inveniens, dicere ista compellitur; quasi vero vim consuetudinis malae insuperabilem patiatur, ut ab ea se poscat Dei gratia liberari, nisi infirmata natura. Nam qui ista dicebat, cum ad ista pervenisset, ubi ait: Video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captivantem me sub lege peccati, quae est in membris meis. Miser ego - inquit- homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum (Rom 7, 15. 23-25). Corpus mortis quomodo vultis interpretamini: tamen infirmato libero arbitrio, infirmata natura ista dicebat, et desiderabat per Dei gratiam de mortis corpore liberari, ubi non quod volebat agebat bonum, sed malum quod oderat faciebat.
But this you attribute not to the human nature vitiated in the first man, but to the evil habit of each one, which the human being, willing and not able to conquer it as it prevails over him, and not finding his liberty intact for accomplishing good, is compelled to say these things; as though indeed he suffered the insuperable force of an evil habit, so as to ask to be freed from it by the grace of God, were not his nature weakened. For he who said these things, when he came to that point where he says: I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and taking me captive under the law of sin, which is in my members. Wretched man—he says—that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord (Rom 7:15, 23-25). Interpret the body of death however you wish: nevertheless, with free choice weakened, with nature weakened, he said these things, and desired to be freed, through the grace of God, from the body of death, where he did not do the good he willed, but did the evil he hated.
Iulianum.6.13Verum documento evidentiore vincimini, tam grande peccatum illud fuisse primi hominis, ut omni violentia consuetudinis esset maius et peius, cum vobis proferuntur mala puerorum, quae utique in paradiso futura non fuissent, si ut inde non pelleretur, in ea rectitudinis felicitate, in qua facta est natura humana, mansisset. Nam ut talia taceamus, quae aliquot locis iam diximus, et ut non solum indoctam, verum etiam indocilem praetereamus infantiam; nonne aliqua puer accipiens a magistro quod memoria retineret, volens tenere nec valens, si posset dicere, verissime diceret: " Video aliam legem in anima mea, repugnantem legi voluntatis meae, et captivantem me sub lege ferularum, quae imminet membris meis? Miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?Corpus enim corruptibile aggravat animam, ut quod vult memoria tenere, non possit".
But you are conquered by a more evident proof, that that sin of the first man was so great that it was greater and worse than all the violence of habit, when the evils of children are brought forward to you, which surely would not have been in paradise, if, so as not to be expelled from it, human nature had remained in that felicity of uprightness in which it was made. For, to be silent about such things as we have already said in several places, and to pass over not only unlearned but even unteachable infancy; would not a boy, receiving from his master something to retain in memory, willing to hold it and not able, if he could speak, say most truly: I see another law in my soul, fighting against the law of my will, and taking me captive under the law of the rods, which threatens my members? Wretched man that I am, who will free me from the body of this death? For the corruptible body weighs down the soul, so that what the memory wishes to hold, it cannot.
Iulianum.6.13Et de hoc corruptibili corpore quis liberat, nisi gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum? Sive cum hoc exuta, redempta Christi sanguine anima requiescit, sive cum corruptibile hoc induet incorruptionem (Cf. 1 Cor 15, 53), et post aerumnas corporis mortui propter peccatum vivificabuntur et corpora mortalia nostra per inhabitantem Christi Spiritum in nobis. Contra cuius gratiam, liberae voluntatis arbitrium, peccati ancillam voluntatem defenditis. Nos autem a Manichaeo longe sumus, qui naturae bonae sive in grandibus, sive in parvulis, et vitium confitemur et medicum.
And from this corruptible body who frees, except the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord? Whether when, stripped of this, the soul redeemed by the blood of Christ rests, or when this corruptible shall put on incorruption (See 1 Cor 15:53), and after the toils of the body dead because of sin our mortal bodies too will be made alive through the Spirit of Christ dwelling in us. Against whose grace you defend free choice—the will, the handmaid of sin. But we are far from the Manichee, who confess both the vice and the physician of the good nature, whether in the grown or in the little ones.
Iulianum.6.1314. IUL. Sic disputavi hactenus, ut mos nostrae fidei postulabat; verum non hac solum parte contentus, agam tecum benigne, et consulto eam mihi personam induam, quae praeceptoris tui sententiae favere videatur. Hoc autem ea gratia fiet, ut tu in Manichaeum, si ab eo dissides, oppugnare cogaris. Assertioni quippe nostrae nihil astutiae inesse hoc ipso docebitur, cum Traducianus non invenit, quo Manichaeo possit obsistere. Itaque apparebit quanta inter vos coniuratio sit, quam procuretis mutuis cuncta compendiis, quando inter vos iurgium excitari non potuerit. Quo igitur id me consilio arripuisse ostenderim, animo lectoris insidat; nunc iam personae, quam assumimus, oratione fungamur.
14. JULIAN: I have argued thus far as the custom of our faith demanded; but, not content with this part alone, I will deal kindly with you, and deliberately put on the character of one who seems to favor your master's opinion. But this will be done for this reason, that you may be forced to attack the Manichee, if you disagree with him. For it will be taught by this very thing that there is no cunning in our assertion, when the Traducianist does not find how he can resist the Manichee. And so it will appear how great a conspiracy there is between you, how you procure all things by mutual abridgments, when a quarrel could not be stirred up between you. With what design, then, I have undertaken this, let it settle in the reader's mind; now let us perform the speech of the character we assume.
Iulianum.6.14Errant omnino qui putant hanc concretionem corporis habilem esse iustitiae; omnibus bonis studiis repugnat vilis natura carnis et sanguinis. Quidquid irritamentorum est lenocinio sensuum, ad perturbationem, immo eversionem mentis elabitur, quae in hoc coenum nescio qua infelicitate deiecta, generosos micatus luteo perdit admixtu. Ipsa quantum in se est ad locum suum, id est, ad superiora conatur; sed terreno afflictatur ergastulo. Denique cum ad pudicitiam voluerit subvolare, gluten et viscum voluptatis obscenae de perustis visceribus experitur. Iam si liberalitatem munificentiae concupiscat, avaritiae, quae tegmine frugalitatis operitur, manicis arctissimis colligatur. Enim vero si in aequabili constantiae quadam voluerit serenitate consistere, obruitur illico grandine timoris, et doloris procellis, atque ad omnia exsanguescens dubia, compos sui non sinitur manere consilii.
They err altogether who think that this concretion of the body is fit for justice; the vile nature of flesh and blood fights against all good pursuits. Whatever there is of incitements by the allurement of the senses slips toward the disturbance, indeed the overthrow, of the mind, which, cast down into this mire by some unhappiness or other, loses its generous flashings by the muddy admixture. As far as it is in itself, it strives toward its own place, that is, toward higher things; but it is afflicted by its earthly workhouse. Finally, when it has wished to fly up to chastity, it experiences the glue and birdlime of obscene pleasure from its scorched bowels. Now if it covets the liberality of munificence, it is bound by the tightest manacles of avarice, which is covered by the garment of frugality. But indeed, if it has wished to stand in a certain serenity of even constancy, it is at once overwhelmed by the hail of fear and the storms of grief, and, growing bloodless at all doubtful things, is not allowed to remain in possession of its own counsel.
Iulianum.6.14Iunge huc ignoratarum rerum noctem, qua circumdatur illuvie. Quid laudabilitatis in eo suspicabimur animante, qui nec ad utilium electionem oculos vigentes habet, et inter tempestates cupiditatum et discriminum sua naufragia numerare non sufficit? Nec tamen aliquis haec sponte depravatae substantiae accidisse mentiatur; ipsa primorum hominum institutio his aerumnis invenitur obnoxia. Nam ut hoc etiam Moysi, quem Catholici venerantur, testimonio comprobetur, experiebantur primi homines carnificinam timoris, quos intentatio, nisi obedissent, periculi territabat, quantumque de rerum collatione metiendum est, formidolosiores posteris eos opinamur fuisse, quos poena necdum cuiquam comperta vexabat. Cur enim mortis intentatione quaterentur, qui nesciebant quid incommodi afferret interitus? Sollicitabantur nimirum solis suspicionibus malorum. In qua ergo ille animus tranquillitate consisteret, quem tam aspera hiems formidinis commovebat? Porro ignorantia quam profunda, quamque patiendi eius dura conditio, ut liberari ab ea nisi praevaricatione non posset; scientiam quippe boni malique, absque ausu condemnabili nequaquam capessiturus.
Join to this the night of unknown things, by which filth it is surrounded. What praiseworthiness shall we suspect in that living being, which neither has vigorous eyes for the choice of useful things, and amid the tempests of desires and dangers cannot count its own shipwrecks? Nor yet let anyone falsely claim that these things befell a substance depraved of its own accord; the very establishment of the first human beings is found liable to these miseries. For, that this too may be proved by the testimony of Moses, whom the Catholics venerate, the first human beings experienced the butchery of fear, whom the threat of danger, unless they obeyed, terrified; and, as far as is to be measured from the comparison of things, we suppose them to have been more fearful than their posterity, whom a penalty not yet known to anyone vexed. For why would they be shaken by the threat of death, who did not know what discomfort destruction brought? They were disturbed, surely, by mere suspicions of evils. In what tranquillity, then, would that mind stand, which so harsh a winter of dread agitated? Moreover, how deep their ignorance, and how hard the condition of suffering it, that it could not be freed from it except by transgression; for the knowledge of good and evil they would by no means seize without a condemnable daring.
Iulianum.6.14Hoc ita caecum et aerumnosum animal, inquies etiam cupiditas innata reddebat, quam rei interdictae et venustas irritabat et suavitas. Quod totum velut parum esset ad infelicitatem illius exprimendam, impugnationi naturae superioris exponitur. Quis ergo adeo desipiat, ut ibi quidquam boni fuisse arbitretur, ubi tot miseriarum instrumenta instituta fateatur? Pessimae igitur conditionis, pessimaeque naturae caro ista in istis primis hominibus suum, quod ab exordio tenebat, exseruit. Hanc autem tam malam substantiam Deus bonus non potuit fabricare. Quid ergo superest, nisi ut fateamur alterum esse animae datorem, alterum luteorum conditorem?
This living being, so blind and so wretched, you will say, an innate desire too rendered such, which both the beauty and the sweetness of the forbidden thing irritated. All of which, as though it were too little for expressing his unhappiness, is exposed to the assault of a superior nature. Who, then, would be so foolish as to think that there was anything of good there, where he confesses that so many instruments of miseries were established? Of a most evil condition, then, and of a most evil nature, this flesh in these first human beings put forth what it held from the beginning. But this so evil substance the good God could not have fabricated. What, then, remains, except that we confess that the giver of the soul is one, the founder of the clay things another?
Iulianum.6.14Stat certe Manichaei, cuius indueram personam, acies ordinata. Quid opperiamur intellegis, videlicet ut qui ei adversus est, consequenti impugnatione id demonstret. Igitur vestrum dogma cum eo confligat; apparebit utrum sine pernicie sua vel leviter possit moveri. Pronuntiavit certe, non solum nasci omnes de commixtione corporum criminosos, verum ipsum Adam culparum necessitatem de concretione viscerum, et limi ex quo factus est sordibus attulisse. Natura, inquit, carnis in primis hominibus fuit noxia; ipsam scintillam animi studio honestatis sublucentem conclusit, madefecit, exstinxit. Ineptiunt prorsus Catholici, qui peccantium testimoniis obnituntur, et nec documentis propriis acquiescunt, videntesque non se bonum quod volunt agere, sed malum quod exsecrantur operari, putant tamen in carne non esse mali necessitatem.
The battle line of the Manichee, whose character I had put on, certainly stands ordered. You understand what we await, namely that he who is opposed to him should demonstrate it by a consequent attack. Let your dogma, then, contend with him; it will appear whether, without its own destruction, it can be moved even slightly. He has certainly pronounced not only that all are born guilty from the mixture of bodies, but that Adam himself brought a necessity of faults from the concretion of his bowels, and from the filth of the clay from which he was made. The nature of flesh, he says, in the first human beings was harmful; it enclosed, dampened, extinguished the very spark of the mind shining with the pursuit of honorableness. The Catholics are utterly foolish who struggle against the testimonies of sinners, and do not acquiesce even in their own proofs, and, seeing that they do not do the good they want, but work the evil they execrate, nevertheless think that in the flesh there is not a necessity of evil.
Iulianum.6.14His ergo tam invidiose dictis congrediatur Traducianus, si potest; ego interim spectator assisto, et exitum vestri conflictus opperior. Quid itaque respondebis malam naturam etiam in primis hominibus fuisse iuranti? Sine dubio referes Deum formatorem hominum non potuisse malum condere quod creavit, et ideo quia Deus qui malum non facit, homines fecit, nequaquam eos naturaliter malos probari. Dixisti aliquid, et veraciter: sed vide utrum hoc me debueris audiente proferre.
With these things, then, so invidiously said, let the Traducianist engage, if he can; I meanwhile stand by as a spectator, and await the outcome of your conflict. What, then, will you answer to one swearing that an evil nature was even in the first human beings? Without doubt you will report that God the former of human beings could not found an evil thing which he created, and therefore, because God, who does not make evil, made human beings, they are by no means proved naturally evil. You have said something, and truly: but see whether you ought to have brought this forth while I am listening.
Iulianum.6.14Qua enim virtute Manichaeum concusseris non satis curo; interim in mea totus iura transisti. Capto tibi iam delectat illudere; excipio quippe magno plausu professionem tuam, teque ut eius memineris admoneo. Dignitate enim auctoris, id est Dei, qui malum non facit, pronuntiasti opera eius bona debere asseri. Omnes ergo homines de instituta a Deo sexuum commixtione generatos, a Deo, an a diabolo fieri putas? Si a Deo: qui eos audes reos malosque pronuntiare, cum unicum dixeris esse testimonium Adam fieri malae non potuisse naturae, quia conditus a Deo qui est optimus, indicetur?
For with what force you have shaken the Manichee I do not much care; meanwhile you have passed wholly into my rights. Now it delights me to mock you, captured; for I receive your profession with great applause, and I admonish you to remember it. For by the dignity of the author, that is, of God, who does not make evil, you have pronounced that his works ought to be asserted good. Do you think, then, that all human beings, generated from the mixture of the sexes established by God, are made by God, or by the devil? If by God: how do you dare to pronounce them guilty and evil, when you have said that the unique testimony is that Adam could not be made of an evil nature, because he is indicated to have been founded by God, who is best?
Iulianum.6.14Si ergo argumentum forte est, per quod credatur primorum hominum rea non instituta substantia, hoc ipsum quia Deus eam condidit quem bonum fatemur; remanet illud in excidium traducis, ut et omnes de coniugio genitos iniquos condi non posse, eodem testimonio comprobetur, quia Deus eos condidit, quem bonum fatemur.
If, then, it is perhaps an argument by which it is believed that the substance of the first human beings was not founded guilty, this very thing, that God founded it, whom we confess to be good; there remains, to the destruction of the transmission, that it be proved by the same testimony that all those generated from marriage too could not be founded iniquitous, because God founded them, whom we confess to be good.
Iulianum.6.14Sin autem et post hoc rabiens impudentia iurare perstiterit, et a Deo fieri parvulos, et tamen malos esse eos naturaliter; catholico quidem, sicut et Deo nostro, nihil his mendaciis praeiudicii comparatur; Manichaeum tamen constat a vobis oppugnatum non esse, qui libenter quod Deum criminaris amplectitur; illud tibi perisse contentus, per quod Adam conditionis bonae fueras approbare molitus.
But if, even after this, a raving effrontery should persist in swearing both that little ones are made by God, and that nevertheless they are naturally evil; to the Catholic, indeed, as to our God, no prejudice is procured by these lies; yet it is agreed that the Manichee has not been attacked by you, who gladly embraces what you charge against God; content that you have lost that by which you had striven to prove Adam to be of a good condition.
Iulianum.6.14AUG. Cum mihi adversus Manichaeum certamen ineundum, tibique spectandum diserta caecitate proponis, partes tuas improvidus subruis; et quomodo illam teterrimam luem, quam Manichaeo funestus error invexit, tamquam pestifero adiuves dogmatis tui flatu, etiam his hominibus, qui suo tardantur ingenio, ut possent intellegere, praestitisti. Nam cum illa quae de vitae huius mortalis corruptibilisque miseriis copiose et facunde dixisti, audierit quisque vel legerit, vera te fuisse prosecutum, non solum in tuo sermone, verum in ipsis quoque humanis rebus agnoscet. Manichaeo quippe, cui velut adversus nos loquenti verba fecisti, nihil magnum aut difficile fuit in hac mortali vita, quae et de felicitate paradisi merito peccati eiecta atque deiecta est, ista quae abs te de illa dicta sunt intueri; et sive ut tu, sive uberius atque copiosius, tamen eadem ipsa garrire, quae tam manifesta sunt, ut etiam Scripturarum divinarum locis plurimis lectitentur, de corruptibilis corporis onere, et ex illo animae aggravatione venientia.
AUGUSTINE: When you set before me a struggle to be entered against the Manichee, and to be watched by you with eloquent blindness, you unforeseeingly undermine your own party; and how you would help, by the pestiferous breath of your dogma, that most foul plague which a deadly error brought upon the Manichee, you have provided even for those people who are slowed by their own wit, that they could understand. For when anyone has heard or read those things you said copiously and eloquently about the miseries of this mortal and corruptible life, he will recognize that you pursued true things, not only in your speech, but also in human affairs themselves. For to the Manichee, to whom, as though speaking against us, you made a speech, it was nothing great or difficult, in this mortal life, which has been cast and thrown down from the felicity of paradise by the merit of sin, to behold those things which were said by you about it; and, whether like you, or more richly and copiously, nevertheless to prattle those same things, which are so manifest that they are read in very many passages of the divine Scriptures too, coming from the burden of the corruptible body, and from the weighing-down of the soul by it.
Iulianum.6.14Unde et in sanctis, in huius vitae agone luctantibus, caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem (Gal 5, 17); cum spiritus, sicut ait gloriosissimus Cyprianus, caelestia atque divina quaerit, caro terrena et saecularia concupiscit (Cf. CYPRIANUS, De Orat. dominica). Hinc est ille conflictus, quem memoratus martyr in libro, quem De Mortalitate conscripsit, diligenter et eloquenter explicat, dicens inter cetera, quod nobis sit cum carnalibus vitiis atque illecebris saecularibus assidua et molesta luctatio (Cf. CYPRIANUS, De mortalitate). Iam vero beatus Gregorius hoc certamen, quod habemus in corpore mortis huius, sic ante oculos ponit, ut nullus sit huius agonis athleta, qui non se in verbis eius tamquam in speculo recognoscat. Intra nosmetipsos - inquit - propriis vitiis et passionibus impugnamur, et die noctuque ignitis stimulis corporis humilitatis huius et corporis mortis urgemur; nunc latenter, nunc etiam palam provocantibus ubique et irritantibus rerum visibilium illecebris, luto hoc faecis cui inhaesimus caeni sui fetorem venis capacioribus exhalante; sed et lege peccati, quae est in membris nostris, legi spiritus repugnante, dum imaginem regiam quae intra nos est, captivam ducere studet; ut spoliis eius cedat, quidquid illud est, quod in nos beneficio divinae ac primae illius conditionis influxit (GREGORIUS NAZ., Orat. I de fuga sua).
Whence in the saints too, wrestling in the contest of this life, the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh (Gal 5:17); while the spirit, as the most glorious Cyprian says, seeks heavenly and divine things, the flesh covets earthly and worldly things (See Cyprian, On the Lord's Prayer). Hence is that conflict, which the aforementioned martyr, in the book he wrote On Mortality, diligently and eloquently explains, saying, among other things, that we have a constant and troublesome wrestling with carnal vices and worldly enticements (See Cyprian, On Mortality). And indeed blessed Gregory so sets before our eyes this struggle which we have in the body of this death, that there is no athlete of this contest who does not recognize himself in his words as in a mirror. Within ourselves—he says—we are attacked by our own vices and passions, and day and night we are pressed by the fiery goads of this lowly body and the body of death; now secretly, now even openly, with the enticements of visible things everywhere provoking and irritating, this clay of dregs to which we have clung breathing out the stench of its own mire through the more capacious veins; and also with the law of sin, which is in our members, fighting against the law of the spirit, while it strives to lead captive the royal image which is within us; so that whatever it is that flowed into us by the benefit of that divine and first condition may yield as its spoils (Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration I, On His Flight).
Iulianum.6.14Haec verba hominis Dei, et in secundo libro illorum sex quos contra tuos quattuor edidi (Vedi Contra Iul., 2, 3), et in hoc opere posui (Cf. supra 1, 67), cum tuo primo volumini responderem, ubi corpus mortis, de quo se dicit Apostolus Dei gratia liberari (Cf. Rom 7, 25), aliter intellegendum putasti. Et sanctus Ambrosius cum dixisset: Omnes homines sub peccato nascimur; quorum ipse ortus in vitio est, sicut habes lectum, dicente David: "Ecce enim in iniquitatibus conceptus sum, et in delictis peperit me mater mea (Ps 50, 7)", protinus subiecit: Ideo Pauli caro corpus mortis erat, sicut ipse ait: "Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius? (Rom 7, 24)" (AMBROSIUS, De paenitentia 1, 2. 3).
These words of the man of God I set down both in the second book of those six which I published against your four (See Answer to Julian 2.3), and in this work (See above, 1.67), when I answered your first volume, where you thought the body of death, from which the Apostle says he is freed by the grace of God (See Rom 7:25), was to be understood otherwise. And holy Ambrose, when he had said: We are all born under sin, whose very origin is in vice, as you have read, David saying: For behold, I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins my mother bore me (Ps 51:7 (50:7)), immediately added: Therefore the flesh of Paul was a body of death, as he himself says: Who will free me from the body of this death? (Rom 7:24) (Ambrose, On Repentance 1.2-3).
Iulianum.6.14Quid ergo mirum est, si Manichaeus intuens mala huius vitae, et corpus mortis huius quod aggravat animam, et discordiam carnis et spiritus, et iugum grave super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum usque in diem sepulturae in matrem omnium, dicit talia etiam per os tuum quasi contra nos, qualia videmus dixisse Gregorium contra vos? Unde constat mala vitae huius, quae temptatio est super terram (Cf. Eccli 40, 1), quibus malis in genere humano propter iugum grave filiorum Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum usque in diem sepulturae in matrem omnium (Cf. Iob 7, 1 (sec. LXX)),
What wonder, then, is it, if the Manichee, beholding the evils of this life, and the body of this death which weighs down the soul, and the discord of flesh and spirit, and the heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam, from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb until the day of their burial in the mother of all, says such things even through your mouth, as though against us, as we see Gregory said against you? Whence it is agreed that both the Manichees and the Catholics confess the evils of this life, which is a temptation upon the earth (See Sir 40:1), with which evils, in the human race, on account of the heavy yoke of the sons of Adam from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb until the day of their burial in the mother of all (See Job 7:1 (LXX)),
Iulianum.6.14plenus est mundus, et Manichaeos cum Catholicis confiteri; sed unde sint haec, non utrosque idem dicere, et magnam hinc inter eos esse distantiam; quod ea Manichaei tribuunt alienae naturae malae, Catholici vero et bonae et nostrae, sed peccato vitiatae meritoque punitae. Tu qui non vis quod dicimus dicere, ipse quid dicis? Quomodo Manichaeo respondes unde sint haec mala, cum quibus nascuntur homines, et quae in paradiso non nascerentur si nemo peccasset, atque ibi non depravata, sed recta nostra natura, sicut condita est, permaneret? Si vitium congenitum est, quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et non est ex natura in origine vitiata, dic unde sit?
the world is full; but that, whence these come, both do not say the same, and that there is a great difference between them on this point; because the Manichees attribute these to a foreign evil nature, but the Catholics to a nature both good and our own, but vitiated by sin and deservedly punished. You who are unwilling to say what we say, what do you yourself say? How do you answer the Manichee, whence come these evils with which human beings are born, and which would not be born in paradise if no one had sinned, and there our nature, not depraved but upright, as it was founded, would remain? If the vice is inborn, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, and it is not from a nature vitiated in its origin, say whence it is.
Iulianum.6.14Si vitium congenitum est, in quo clamat homo: Scio quia non inhabitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum; velle enim adiacet mihi, perficere autem bonum non invenio (Rom 7, 18); et non est ex natura vitiata primi hominis praevaricatione; dic unde sit. Si autem non sunt congenita vitia ista; dic unde sint? Ex peccandi, inquies, consuetudine, quam sibi quisque fecit libera voluntate. Ubi quod non vis, interim confiteris, scilicet libertatem voluntatis suo malo usu perire potuisse, quia perficiendo malum minus idonea facta est ad perficiendum bonum. Sed numquid voluntate quisquam obtunsus est corde? Numquid voluntate obliviosus est quispiam? Numquid voluntate est aliquis fatuus?
If the vice is inborn, in which the human being cries out: I know that there does not dwell in me, that is, in my flesh, the good; for to will lies near to me, but to accomplish the good I do not find (Rom 7:18); and it is not from a nature vitiated by the transgression of the first man, say whence it is. But if these vices are not inborn, say whence they are. From the habit of sinning, you will say, which each one made for himself by free will. Where, meanwhile, you confess what you do not want, namely that the liberty of the will could perish by its own ill use, because, by accomplishing evil, it became less fit for accomplishing good. But is anyone dull of heart by will? Is anyone forgetful by will? Is anyone foolish by will?
Iulianum.6.14Haec et alia vitia ipsius mentis atque animi, cum quibus homines nasci ambigit nemo, si ex origine vitiata dicis non esse, dic unde sint. Neque enim dicturus es, quod ista, si nemo peccasset, paradisus habere potuisset. Postremo, quod corpus corruptibile aggravat animam, sub qua miserabili sarcina omnes qui non usquequaque desipiunt, homines gemunt, dic unde sit. Non enim sic dicturus es primos homines creatos, ut corruptibili corpore alicuius eorum anima gravaretur; aut post eorum illud grande peccatum, sine tali corpore aliquis nascitur. Cur ergo adversus nos Manichaeum loquentem loquacissimus introducis, cum tu negando quod dicimus, ei respondere non possis?
These and other vices of the mind and soul itself, with which no one doubts that human beings are born, if you say they are not from a vitiated origin, say whence they are. For you will not say that, if no one had sinned, paradise could have had these. Finally, that the corruptible body weighs down the soul, under which wretched burden all human beings who are not utterly senseless groan, say whence it is. For you will not say that the first human beings were so created that the soul of any of them was weighed down by a corruptible body; or that, after that great sin of theirs, anyone is born without such a body. Why, then, do you introduce the Manichee speaking against us most wordily, when you, by denying what we say, cannot answer him?
Iulianum.6.14Cui respondet Cyprianus, ita discordare carnem spiritumque demonstrans, ut tamen utriusque sit a Deo Patre oranda concordia (Cf. CYPRIANUS, De Orat. dominica); cui respondet Gregorius, qui cum talia de carne dixisset, qualia contra nos composuisti dicere Manichaeum, utrumque tamen ad Deum, ipso Deo propitio, revocandum esse testatur, id est, spiritum et carnem; cui respondet Ambrosius, qui cum dixisset carnem moderatioris animae arbitrio coniugandam: Qualis fuit - inquit - cum inhabitanda paradisi secreta suscepit, antequam veneno pestiferi serpentis infecta sacrilegam famem sciret (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 12).
To whom Cyprian answers, demonstrating that the flesh and spirit so disagree that nevertheless the concord of both must be prayed for from God the Father (See Cyprian, On the Lord's Prayer); to whom Gregory answers, who, when he had said such things about the flesh as you composed the Manichee to say against us, nevertheless attests that both must be recalled to God, with God himself favorable, that is, the spirit and the flesh; to whom Ambrose answers, who, when he had said that the flesh must be joined to the moderating choice of the soul: Such as it was—he says—when it took up the secret places of paradise to be inhabited, before, infected by the poison of the pestiferous serpent, it knew sacrilegious hunger (See Ambrose, On Luke 7.12).
Iulianum.6.14His enim suis sententiis catholici antistites satis aperteque docuerunt, carnis non naturam malam esse, sed vitium; quo sanato ad hoc redit, ut quemadmodum primitus instituta est, nullis suis corruptelis aggravet animam, nullamque habeat cum spiritu contraria concupiscendo discordiam; qua discordia deceptus est Manichaeus, ut alienam malam fingeret commixtam nobis esse substantiam.
For by these their opinions the Catholic bishops have taught clearly and openly enough that the nature of the flesh is not evil, but a vice; which, when healed, returns to this, that, as it was first established, it weighs down the soul with no corruptions of its own, and has no discord with the spirit by lusting in the opposite direction; by which discord the Manichee was deceived, so that he feigned a foreign evil substance to be mingled with us.
Iulianum.6.14Horum catholicorum antistitum fidem si nobiscum sequi velles, Manichaeos everteres, non iuvares; nunc vero non eos destruere, sed magis aedificare conaris; negando enim mala, quae de origine vitiata homines nascentes trahunt, non id agis, ut nulla esse credamus mala naturalia, quoniam nimium manifesta sunt; sed potius agis, ut de aliena mala natura putentur esse ista, quam nobis esse commixtam Manichaeorum insania fabulatur; non de nostra bona primi hominis praevaricatione vitiata manare monstrentur, quod Catholicorum sanitas loquitur.
If you would follow with us the faith of these Catholic bishops, you would overthrow the Manichees, not help them; but as it is, you try not to destroy but rather to build them up; for by denying the evils which human beings being born draw from a vitiated origin, you do not bring it about that we believe there are no natural evils, since they are too manifest; but rather you bring it about that these are thought to be from a foreign evil nature, which the madness of the Manichees feigns to be mingled with us; and they are not shown to flow from our own good nature vitiated by the transgression of the first man, which the soundness of the Catholics declares.
Iulianum.6.14Sed Manichaeus, inquis, etiam ipsam primi hominis carnem, qualis antequam peccaret fuit, sic detestatur, ut malam nitatur ostendere. Ita quidem a te inducitur loquens, ut ingerat respondendi qualecumque negotium, non solum mihi, verum etiam tibi. Nam ubi dicit a malo eam conditore factam esse; simul ei respondemus, tam bonam creaturam, quae posset non peccare, si nollet, quamvis non aequetur suo Creatori, non tamen potuisse nisi bonum habere Creatorem. Ubi vero de timore mortis, quam, si peccasset ei Deus est comminatu, etiam priusquam peccasset, miserum dicit, simul respondemus, quod hominis, qui numquam peccare potuisset, si numquam peccare voluisset, poenae illius devitandae, quae fuerat secutura peccato, tranquilla erat cautio, non turbulenta formido.
But the Manichee, you say, detests even the very flesh of the first man, such as it was before he sinned, so as to strive to show it evil. So indeed he is introduced by you speaking, so as to lay upon me, and even upon you, some business of answering. For where he says it was made by an evil founder, we answer him at once that so good a creature, which could not sin if it would not, although it is not equal to its Creator, yet could have none but a good Creator. But where, about the fear of death, with which God threatened him if he should sin, he says he was wretched even before he sinned, we answer at once that, for the human being who could never have sinned if he had never willed to sin, there was a tranquil caution about avoiding that penalty which would have followed sin, not a turbulent dread.
Iulianum.6.14Hoc quidem respondere communi adversario, sicut dictum est, communiter possumus; sed ego adversus Manichaeum laudes augeo rationalis illius creaturae, quae non solum non cruciabatur ullo metu, verum etiam laetitia magna fruebatur; quoniam malum mortis, quod omnium, vel pene omnium refugiunt corda fidelium, habebat in potestate non perpeti. Huic nostrae fidei quoniam vester error adversus est, quo putatis Adam, sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, fuisse moriturum, quid hic Manichaeo respondes dicenti miseram conditam esse naturam, quam vel peccantem vel non peccantem mors imminens timore torquebat? Si enim dixeris ita fuisse conditam, ut non timeret mortem, sine dubio quandoque venturam; profecto istam quae in posteris eius est, miseram fateberis nasci, cui mortis metum sic videmus esse congenitum, ut etiam hi qui spe fideli futurae vitae gaudia concupiscunt, in hac tamen vita cum mortis timore luctentur; nolunt enim spoliari, sed supervestiri, ut quantum ad eorum attinet voluntatem, non morte finiatur haec vita, sed mortale absorbeatur a vita (Cf. 2 Cor 5, 4).
This indeed we can answer the common adversary, as has been said, in common; but I, against the Manichee, increase the praises of that rational creature, which not only was tortured by no fear, but even enjoyed great gladness; since it had it in its power not to suffer the evil of death, which the hearts of all, or nearly all, of the faithful shun. Since your error is opposed to this faith of ours, by which you think Adam, whether he sinned or did not sin, was going to die, what do you here answer the Manichee saying that a wretched nature was founded, which, whether sinning or not sinning, an imminent death tortured with fear? For if you say it was so founded that it did not fear death, which would without doubt come at some time, you will surely confess that this nature, which is in his posterity, is born wretched, in whom we see the fear of death so inborn that even those who, in faithful hope, covet the joys of the future life, nevertheless in this life struggle with the fear of death; for they do not wish to be stripped, but to be further clothed, so that, as far as concerns their will, this life may not be ended by death, but the mortal be swallowed up by life (See 2 Cor 5:4).
Iulianum.6.14Ex quo fit, ut si mortis metum in paradiso posueris ante peccatum, vincaris a Manichaeis, qui putant et putari volunt, quod in primo quoque homine misera condita est natura humana; si autem timorem mortis, quo mortalium animus non sine miseria stimulatur, ante peccatum non fuisse responderis, vincaris a nobis, quoniam non mutaretur in peius nisi vitiata natura.
From which it comes about that, if you place the fear of death in paradise before sin, you are conquered by the Manichees, who think, and wish it to be thought, that even in the first man human nature was founded wretched; but if you answer that the fear of death, by which the mind of mortals is goaded not without misery, did not exist before sin, you are conquered by us, since it would not be changed for the worse unless the nature were vitiated.
Iulianum.6.14Rursus in eo quod adversus nos facis dicere Manichaeum, quia illud caecum et aerumnosum animal etiam inquietum cupiditas innata reddebat, quam rei interdictae et venustas irritabat et suavitas, tui, Iuliane, dogmatis, tamquam in scopulo inevitabili cognosce naufragium. Nos enim dicimus in illa beatitudine nullam fuisse cupiditatem, quae resisteret voluntati. Porro si cupiebant illi homines, unde abstinere potius volebant; procul dubio voluntati eorum cupiditas resistebat. Hoc ergo non contra me, sed contra te, Manichaeum dicere per tua verba fecisti. Si enim tales erant illi, ut in eis cupiditas resisteret voluntati, iam caro concupiscebat adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem; ubi manifestissimum carnis intellegitur vitium, propter quod fidelibus dicebat Apostolus: Haec enim invicem adversantur: ut non ea quae vultis faciatis (Gal 5, 17).
Again, in that you make the Manichee say against us that an innate desire rendered that blind and wretched living being even restless, which both the beauty and the sweetness of the forbidden thing irritated, recognize, Julian, the shipwreck of your dogma, as on an inevitable reef. For we say that in that blessedness there was no desire which resisted the will. Moreover, if those human beings desired that from which they rather willed to abstain, without doubt desire resisted their will. This, then, you have made the Manichee say through your words, not against me, but against you. For if they were such that in them desire resisted the will, then already the flesh lusted against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; where the vice of the flesh is most manifestly understood, on account of which the Apostle said to the faithful: For these are opposed to each other, so that you do not do the things you would (Gal 5:17).
Iulianum.6.14Nullus quippe sanctorum est, qui non velit facere ne caro adversus spiritum concupiscat; quamvis ei resistat ne concupiscentiam carnis sua consensione perficiat, eumdem Apostolum audiens, ubi ait: Dico autem: Spiritu ambulate, et concupiscentias carnis ne perfeceritis (Gal 5, 16). Non ait: Concupiscentias carnis adversarias ne habueritis; quoniam videbat perfectam pacem carnis et spiritus non posse in corpore mortis huius impleri; sed ait: Concupiscentias carnis ne perfeceritis; ubi certamen nobis potius, quod contra carnem adversantem debeamus exercere, proposuit, ut concupiscentias eius non perficiamus consentiendo, sed resistendo vincamus.
For there is none of the saints who does not wish to act so that the flesh may not lust against the spirit; although he resists it so as not to accomplish the concupiscence of the flesh by his consent, hearing the same Apostle where he says: But I say: Walk by the Spirit, and do not accomplish the concupiscences of the flesh (Gal 5:16). He does not say: Do not have the concupiscences of the flesh as adversaries; since he saw that the perfect peace of flesh and spirit could not be fulfilled in the body of this death; but he says: Do not accomplish the concupiscences of the flesh; where he set before us rather a contest, which we ought to wage against the resisting flesh, so that we may not accomplish its concupiscences by consenting, but conquer them by resisting.
Iulianum.6.14Pax vero, ubi non eas adversantes repugnantesque patiamur, fuit in corpore vitae illius, quam natura vitiata primi hominis praevaricatione perdidimus. Nam si nec ibi fuit ante peccatum pax carnis et spiritus, falsumque est quod ait Ambrosius, utriusque discordiam per praevaricationem primi hominis in nostram vertisse naturam (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 12, 53); vera erit, quod absit, ista sententia, quam contra nos Manichaeum fecisti loquentem, miserum, scilicet, animal primum hominem conditum, quem cupiditas innata reddebat inquietum, quam cupiditatem rei interdictae et venustas irritabat et suavitas.
But peace, where we do not suffer them as adversaries and fighting back, was in the body of that life, which we lost by the nature vitiated by the transgression of the first man. For if not even there, before sin, was there peace of flesh and spirit, and it is false what Ambrose says, that the discord of both, by the transgression of the first man, turned into our nature (See Ambrose, On Luke 7.12.53); then that opinion will be true—which God forbid—which you made the Manichee speak against us, namely that the first man was founded a wretched living being, whom an innate desire rendered restless, which desire both the beauty and the sweetness of the forbidden thing irritated.
Iulianum.6.14Nos autem dicimus tam beatum fuisse illum hominem ante peccatum, tamque liberae voluntatis, ut Dei praeceptum magnis viribus mentis observans, resistentem sibi carnem nullo certamine pateretur, nec aliquid omnino ex aliqua cupiditate sentiret, quod nollet; voluntatemque eius prius fuisse vitiatam venenosa persuasione serpentis, ut oriretur cupiditas quae sequeretur potius voluntatem, quam resisteret voluntati; perpetratoque peccato iam poena infirmatae menti etiam carnis concupiscentia repugnaret. Ac per hoc, nisi prius homo faceret peccando quod vellet, non pateretur concupiscendo quod nollet.
But we say that that man before sin was so blessed, and of so free a will, that, observing the commandment of God with great powers of mind, he suffered the flesh resisting him in no contest, nor felt anything at all from any desire which he did not wish; and that his will was first vitiated by the poisonous persuasion of the serpent, so that there arose a desire which would rather follow the will than resist the will; and, the sin perpetrated, the concupiscence of the flesh too now fought back against the weakened mind as a penalty. And by this, unless the human being first did, by sinning, what he willed, he would not suffer, by desiring, what he did not will.
Iulianum.6.14Ecce nos quemadmodum vincimus Manichaeum, introducere conantem naturae hominis conditorem malum; tu autem, qui certantibus nobis locum tibi spectatoris pro tuo arbitrio delegisti, his ipsis verbis tuis, quae contra nos Manichaeo danda existimasti, qua, quaeso, arte, quibus viribus resistere audebis, homo, qui dicis carnis concupiscentiam, qualis nunc est, quam videmus contra spiritum dimicare, talem fuisse etiam in paradiso ante peccatum? Deponimus ergo te, velis nolis, de theatri sedilibus in arenam, et de spectatore facimus luctatorem. Aggredere certamen, et adversarium, si potes, vince communem; quoniam tu quoque Deum creatorem etiam carnis te colere profiteris. Vince igitur inimicum, persuadere conantem malum Deum esse qui condidit carnem, cuius concupiscentia nondum depravato praevaricatione spiritui iam resistebat, et miserum hominem sua conflictatione faciebat.
Behold how we conquer the Manichee, trying to introduce an evil founder of the human being's nature; but you, who, while we contend, chose for yourself, by your own judgment, the place of a spectator, by these very words of yours, which you thought should be given to the Manichee against us, by what art, I ask, by what powers will you dare to resist, you, who say that the concupiscence of the flesh, such as it now is, which we see fight against the spirit, was such even in paradise before sin? We therefore put you down, whether you will or not, from the seats of the theater into the arena, and from a spectator we make you a wrestler. Enter the contest, and, if you can, conquer the common adversary; since you too profess that you worship God the creator even of the flesh. Conquer, then, the enemy, trying to persuade that he who founded the flesh is an evil God—the flesh whose concupiscence already resisted the spirit not yet depraved by transgression, and made the human being wretched by its conflict.
Iulianum.6.14An dicturus es: Prorsus et concupiscentiam talem habebat, et tamen miser non erat? Hoccine est adversarium superare, an potius hoc est adiuvare Manichaeum et contra Apostolum rebellare? Itane oblitus es quis dixerit: Video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae; et post huiusmodi verba subiecerit: Miser ego homo? Si ergo Adam, cum praecepto vellet obtemperare divino, cupiditate irritabatur cibum manducare prohibitum, eique carnis concupiscentia, qualem illum et tunc dicis habuisse, contra concupiscenti spiritui resistebat, nonne verissime diceret, si vellet dicere: Condelector legi Dei secundum interiorem hominem; video autem aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae (Rom 7, 22-24)? Quomodo ergo non erat miser homo, cum post verba talia dicat Apostolus: Miser ego homo? Postremo, quomodo miser non erat, et habebat liberam voluntatem, si concupiscente adversus spiritum carne, teste ipso Apostolo, non faciebat utique quod volebat?
Or will you say: He had outright even such a desire, and yet was not wretched? Is this to overcome the adversary, or rather is this to help the Manichee and rebel against the Apostle? Have you so forgotten who said: I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind; and after words of this kind added: Wretched man that I am? If, then, Adam, when he wished to obey the divine commandment, was irritated by desire to eat the forbidden food, and the concupiscence of the flesh, such as you say he had even then, resisted the spirit lusting in the opposite direction, would he not say most truly, if he wished to say: I delight in the law of God according to the inner man; but I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind (Rom 7:22-24)? How, then, was the human being not wretched, when after such words the Apostle says: Wretched man that I am? Finally, how was he not wretched, and had free will, if, with the flesh lusting against the spirit, by the witness of the Apostle himself, he surely did not do what he willed?
Iulianum.6.14Quoniam ergo si dixeris, qualis nunc est, talem fuisse concupiscentiam carnis ante peccatum, vincet te procul dubio Manichaeus; in sententiam meam transi, et Ambrosium dicentem, per praevaricationem hominis primi, in naturam vertisse discordiam carnis et spiritus, ambo approbemus, ut Manichaeum ambo vincamus. Qui verbis tuis, quae illi composuisti quasi recitaturo, et quod in scholis rhetorum agitari solet, aliena dicturo, non solum aerumnosum, verum etiam caecum creatum esse dixit Adam; unde caecum, nisi quia non noverat peccatum; quod dictum est in laudibus Christi (Cf. 2 Cor 5, 21)? Quaecumque enim mala non per sapientiam, sed quae per experientiam discuntur, feliciter nesciuntur.
Since, then, if you say that the concupiscence of the flesh was, such as it now is, before sin, the Manichee will without doubt conquer you; pass over into my opinion, and let us both approve Ambrose saying that, by the transgression of the first man, the discord of flesh and spirit turned into nature, so that we may both conquer the Manichee. Who, by your words, which you composed for him as though he were about to recite them, and to say things foreign to himself, as is wont to be practiced in the schools of the rhetoricians, said that Adam was created not only wretched but also blind; whence blind, except because he did not know sin? which was said in the praises of Christ (See 2 Cor 5:21). For whatever evils are learned not through wisdom but through experience are happily not known.
Iulianum.6.14Sed hoc contra Manichaeum de ignorantia primi hominis calumniantem, tu quoque mecum forsitan dicis; quid vero ei respondeas de morte corporis et de concupiscentia carnis, secundum ea quae nunc tibi nos respondimus, quaere. His enim duabus manifestissimis rebus apparet, aliam fuisse conditionem primorum hominum, qui de nulla parentum stirpe sunt geniti; aliam vero eorum, qui ita creantur a Deo, ut etiam ab hominibus procreentur; ab illo enim modum institutionis suae accipiunt, ab istis meritum originis ducunt, conformationem suam debentes opificio, obligationem iudicio, liberationem beneficio Conditoris.
But this against the Manichee, slandering about the ignorance of the first man, you too perhaps say with me; but what you would answer him about the death of the body and about the concupiscence of the flesh, according to the things we have now answered you, seek out. For by these two most manifest things it appears that the condition of the first human beings, who were generated from no stock of parents, was one thing; but the condition of those who are so created by God that they are also procreated by human beings, another; for from him they receive the manner of their establishment, from these they draw the merit of their origin, owing their conformation to the workmanship, their obligation to the judgment, their liberation to the benefit of the Founder.
Iulianum.6.14Quorum mala cum quibus nascuntur, intuentes Manichaei, hominis opificem malum conantur inducere, cuius (ut de anima taceam, quae carnis est vita) Deum esse opificem suum, a quo sunt omnia bona sive caelestia sive terrena, carnis ipsius compago testatur; quod tale bonum est, ut de concordia membrorum eius beatus Apostolus similitudinem sumeret, ad laudem praecipuam caritatis, cuius inter se pacifico vinculo boni fideles tamquam Christi membra nectuntur (Cf. 1 Cor 12, 12). Ita fit ut et illos primos sine vitio factos, et posteros eorum cum originali vitio natos, propter evidentissimum naturae bonum creare non potuerit nisi bonus conditor.
Beholding whose evils, with which they are born, the Manichees try to introduce an evil maker of the human being; whose maker is God (to be silent about the soul, which is the life of the flesh)—from whom are all goods, whether heavenly or earthly—the very framework of the flesh itself attests; which is so great a good that from the concord of its members the blessed Apostle took a likeness, to the chief praise of love, by whose peaceful bond among themselves good faithful people are bound together as members of Christ (See 1 Cor 12:12). So it comes about that both those first ones, made without vice, and their posterity, born with original vice, on account of the most evident good of nature, none but a good founder could have created.
Iulianum.6.1415. IUL. Sed ne nimis primam partem certaminis urgeamus, patiamur processu opinionis te bonam Adae probare naturam. Dicis profecto: Deus iustus legem devotionis homini non poneret, si eum nosset pati peccandi necessitatem; quia si iustitiam voluntatis exigeret ab eo quem malae naturae esse nosset, non illum cum praevaricabatur, reum arguebat, sed se inimicum esse iustitiae publicabat. Posuit autem Deus iustus legem homini, quem ulturum se, si fuisset praevaricatus, spopondit.
15. JULIAN: But lest we press the first part of the contest too much, let us allow that, in the progress of the discussion, you prove the nature of Adam good. You say, surely: A just God would not set a law of devotion upon a human being, if he knew him to suffer a necessity of sinning; for if he exacted justice of will from one whom he knew to be of an evil nature, he would not, when he transgressed, convict him as guilty, but would publish himself an enemy of justice. But the just God set a law upon the human being, whom he pledged that he would avenge himself upon, if he had transgressed.
Iulianum.6.15Constat ergo eum bonum natura, non potuisse aliter, nisi sola voluntate peccare. Vides nempe, quam legitima sit a me tuo nomine prolata conclusio? Ipse est omnino gladius, qui in manu Catholicorum coruscans, Manichaeos Traducianosque populatur. Sed nimis propter vestrum nomen admiscui, quorum vice impraesentiarum volueram responsum videri. Concussit ergo Manichaeum solida responsio. Augustam rationem dignis laudibus prosequor: verum oleo laudationis huius, in te acui gladium contuere.
It is agreed, then, that he, good by nature, could sin in no other way than by will alone. You see, surely, how legitimate is the conclusion brought forth by me in your name? It is altogether the sword which, flashing in the hand of the Catholics, lays waste both Manichees and Traducianists. But I have mixed in too much on account of your name, in whose stead for the present I had wished the answer to seem. A solid answer, then, has shaken the Manichee. I pursue the august reasoning with worthy praises: but with the oil of this praising, behold the sword sharpened against you.
Iulianum.6.15Repete igitur, quaeso, quod dixeras. Deus iustus, inquis, legem non poneret homini, si esset malum natura; posuit autem legem qui iustus est; apparet nunc potuisse servare, quod aequissimus imperavit; quoniam nisi obediendi virtutem habuisset, numquam constaret praecipienti ratio iussionis. O lepidissimum capitulum!
Repeat, then, I beg, what you had said. A just God, you say, would not set a law upon a human being, if he were evil by nature; but he who is just set a law; it appears now that he could keep what the most just one commanded; since, unless he had the virtue of obeying, the reason of the command would never stand for the one commanding. O most charming little chapter!
Iulianum.6.15Me coram, me spectatore, bonitatem naturae, cui lex ponitur, de iustitia legem promulgantis affirmat; nec videt se, antequam vulnusculum Manichaeus sentiat, in Traducianos exitium pertulisse. Ut enim intellegas semineci me tibi rapere arma cruenta, victricemque ferant morientia lumina veritatem (Cf. VERGILIUS, Aeneid., 10, 462-463), in tua temet tela compellam.
In my presence, with me as spectator, he affirms the goodness of the nature to which a law is set, from the justice of the one promulgating the law; nor does he see that, before the Manichee feels his little wound, he has brought destruction upon the Traducianists. For, that you may understand that I snatch the bloody weapons from you half-dead, and that the dying eyes carry off victorious truth (See Virgil, Aeneid 10.462-463), I will drive you against your own darts.
Iulianum.6.15Si iustus Deus Adae legem dare non potuit, nisi eum sciret sine aliquo mali coactu liberum posse observare quod iustum est; sine dubio et in temporibus secutis eadem gravitate iustitiae lex etiam litteris tradita, multiplicatione diffusior, distinctione signatior, et aucta ultione reverentior, data hominibus non fuisset, si aut imbecilli ad faciendum bonum sine possibilitate iustitiae, aut rei, id est mali, ab utero nascerentur; quoniam ut istos in omni praevaricatione necessitatis excusaret obtentus; ita immoderatio praeceptorum, impotentia sanctionum, iniquitas iudiciorum, in maculam rediret auctoris.
If the just God could not give a law to Adam, unless he knew him to be free, without any compulsion of evil, to be able to observe what is just; without doubt, in the times that followed too, the law—even the one handed down in writing, more widely spread by multiplication, more marked by distinction, and more reverend by increased vengeance—would not have been given to human beings with the same gravity of justice, if they were born either weak for doing good without the possibility of justice, or guilty, that is, evil, from the womb; since, just as the pretext of necessity would excuse those in every transgression, so the immoderation of the precepts, the impotence of the sanctions, the iniquity of the judgments would return as a stain upon the author.
Iulianum.6.15Igitur et haec pars secunda eodem genere, quo prior, cluditur; id est, ut confitearis, aut iustitiam Dei non potuisse imperare, nisi quod a subditis fieri posse perpenderet; et testimonio primi mandati Manichaeus, testimonio autem legum postea secutarum Manichaeus Traducianusque consumitur; aut si hoc relinquit impietas, ne leviter quidem a vobis pulsatus Manichaeus, vestrum se esse patrem, vestrum principem, cumque vobis adversum nos unicum sibi esse certamen, mundo teste monstrabit.
Therefore this second part too is closed by the same kind as the former; that is, that you confess either that the justice of God could not command anything except what it weighed could be done by its subjects; and by the testimony of the first commandment the Manichee, but by the testimony of the laws that followed afterward both the Manichee and the Traducianist, is consumed; or, if impiety leaves this aside, the Manichee, not even lightly struck by you, will show, with the world as witness, that he is your father, your prince, and that, together with you, he has a single contest against us.
Iulianum.6.15AUG. Hoc est nempe, quod non eloquio, sed multiloquio prosecutus es, legem scilicet priorem, quae data est in paradiso, testimonium esse naturae bonae, quae condita est cum libero arbitrio; alioquin homini liberum arbitrium non habenti iniustissime lex daretur. Unde et posterior, inquis, lex quae copiosissime in litteris promulgata est, testimonium est naturae bonae, quae creatur ex parentibus, similiter sine vitio, cum libero arbitrio.
AUGUSTINE: This, surely, is what you pursued not by eloquence but by much speaking: namely, that the earlier law, which was given in paradise, is a testimony of the good nature, which was founded with free choice; otherwise a law would most unjustly be given to a human being not having free choice. Whence also the later law, you say, which was most copiously promulgated in writing, is a testimony of the good nature, which is created from parents, likewise without vice, with free choice.
Iulianum.6.15Ista disputans videris tibi aliquid dicere, quia vel tuas vel humanas sectaris argutias; divina vero eloquia, ex quibus te nobis putas praescribere, non curas legere; aut si curas legere, non vis, vel non potes intellegere; sed si forte intellexeris disputantibus nobis, noli esse talis qualem Scriptura denotat dicens: Verbis non emendabitur servus durus, si enim et intellexerit, non obediet (Prov 29, 15).
In arguing these things you seem to yourself to say something, because you follow either your own or human subtleties; but the divine words, from which you think to prescribe to us, you do not care to read; or if you care to read, you are unwilling, or unable, to understand; but if perhaps you understand while we argue, do not be such as the Scripture marks out, saying: A hard slave will not be amended by words; for even if he understands, he will not obey (Prov 29:19).
Iulianum.6.15Quamquam et cor lapideum, quo divinis verbis etiam intellectis non obeditur, possit tibi auferre, si velit, qui hoc populo duro, Ezechiele sancto prophetante, promisit (Cf. Ez 11, 19; 36, 26).
Although the heart of stone too, by which the divine words even when understood are not obeyed, he can take from you, if he will, who promised this to a hard people, by holy Ezekiel prophesying (See Ezek 11:19; 36:26).
Iulianum.6.15In paradiso enim legem accepit homo, qui factus est rectus, ut rationalis creaturae vel sola, vel praecipua virtus esse obedientia doceretur. Sed eiusdem legis praevaricatione, a se ipso factus est pravus. Et quoniam vitiari per se ipsum potuit, non sanari; etiam postea eo tempore et eo loco, quando esse faciendum et ubi esse faciendum Dei sapientia iudicavit, legem etiam pravus accepit, non per quam corrigi posset; sed per quam se pravum esse, et nec lege accepta a se ipso corrigi posse sentiret;
For in paradise the human being received a law, who was made upright, so that it might be taught that obedience is either the sole or the chief virtue of the rational creature. But by the transgression of that same law, he was made depraved by himself. And since he could be vitiated by himself, but not healed, afterward too, at that time and in that place when and where the wisdom of God judged it should be done, even depraved he received a law—not one through which he could be corrected; but one through which he might feel that he was depraved, and that, even with a law received, he could not be corrected by himself;
Iulianum.6.15ac sic peccatis non lege cessantibus, sed praevaricatione crescentibus, deiecta et contrita superbia, humillimo corde auxilium gratiae desideraret, et spiritu vivificaretur littera occisus. Si enim data esset lex quae posset vivificare, omnino ex lege esset iustitia; sed conclusit Scriptura omnia sub peccato, ut promissio ex fide Iesu Christi daretur credentibus (Gal 3, 21-22).
and so, with sins not ceasing by the law but growing by transgression, with pride cast down and crushed, he might, with a most humble heart, desire the help of grace, and, slain by the letter, be made alive by the spirit. For if a law had been given which could give life, justice would altogether be from the law; but the Scripture has shut up all things under sin, that the promise from faith in Jesus Christ might be given to those who believe (Gal 3:21-22).
Iulianum.6.15Si verba Apostoli agnoscis, vides profecto vel quid non intellegas, vel quid cum intellegas negligas. Non igitur lex, quae in litteris per Moysen data est, testimonium est liberae voluntatis; nam, si ita esset, non ad eam pertineret ille qui dicit: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod odi malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 15); quem vos certe nondum sub gratia, sed adhuc sub lege esse contenditis. Nec ipsa lex nova, quae praedicata est ex Sion proditura, et verbum Domini ex Ierusalem (Cf. Isai 2, 3), quod intellegitur esse Evangelium sanctum; nec ipsa, inquam, testimonium est liberae, sed liberandae potius voluntatis. Ibi enim scriptum est: Si vos Filius liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis (Io 8, 36).
If you recognize the words of the Apostle, you surely see either what you do not understand, or what, when you understand it, you neglect. Not, then, is the law, which was given in writing through Moses, a testimony of free will; for, if it were so, he would not pertain to it who says: I do not do the good I want, but the evil I hate, this I do (Rom 7:15); whom you certainly contend to be not yet under grace, but still under the law. Nor is the new law itself, which was foretold as about to go forth from Zion, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem (See Isa 2:3), which is understood to be the holy Gospel; nor is it itself, I say, a testimony of a free will, but rather of a will to be freed. For there it is written: If the Son frees you, then you will be truly free (John 8:36).
Iulianum.6.15Quod non solum propter peccata praeterita dictum esse, quorum remissione liberamur, verum etiam propter adiutorium gratiae, quod ne peccemus accipimus, id est, ita liberi efficimur, Deo nostra itinera dirigente, ut non nobis dominetur omnis iniquitas (Cf. Ps 118, 133), dominica testatur oratio, ubi non solum dicimus: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, propter mala quae fecimus, verum etiam: Ne nos inferas in tentationem (Mt 6, 12-13), propter hoc utique ne mala faciamus; unde et Apostolus dicit: Oramus autem ad Deum, ne quid faciatis mali (2 Cor 13, 7).
That this was said not only on account of past sins, by the forgiveness of which we are freed, but also on account of the help of grace, which we receive so that we may not sin—that is, we are so made free, with God directing our paths, that no iniquity may have dominion over us (See Ps 119:133 (118:133))—the Lord's Prayer attests, where we not only say: Forgive us our debts, on account of the evils we have done, but also: Do not lead us into temptation (Matt 6:12-13), surely on account of this, that we may not do evils; whence the Apostle too says: But we pray to God that you do no evil (2 Cor 13:7).
Iulianum.6.15Quod si ita esset in potestate, quomodo fuit ante peccatum, priusquam esset natura humana vitiata, non utique posceretur orando, sed agendo potius teneretur. Verum quoniam post pristinam ruinam tam gravem, ut in huius mortalitatis miseriam caderemus, prius Deus certare nos voluit, donans nobis ut eius agamur Spiritu, et mortificemus opera carnis, atque ipso dante victoriam per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, in aeterna cum illa postea pace regnemus, profecto nisi Deus adsit, nemo est idoneus certare cum vitiis; ne sine certamine pertrahatur ab eis, aut ne iam certans in ipsa eorum conflictatione vincatur. Ideo in hoc agone magis nos Deus voluit orationibus certare, quam viribus; quia et ipsas vires, quantas hic habere nos competit, ipse subministrat certantibus, quem rogamus. Si ergo hi, quorum contra carnem iam spiritus concupiscit, ad actus singulos indigent Dei gratia, ne vincantur; qualem libertatem voluntatis habere possunt, qui nondum de potestate eruti tenebrarum, dominante iniquitate, nec certare coeperunt; aut si certare voluerunt, nondum liberatae voluntatis servitute vincuntur?
But if this were so in our power as it was before sin, before human nature was vitiated, it surely would not be asked for by prayer, but rather held by acting. But since, after that former ruin so grave that we fell into the misery of this mortality, God first willed us to struggle, granting us that we be led by his Spirit, and mortify the works of the flesh, and, with him giving the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ, reign afterward in eternal peace with him; surely, unless God be present, no one is fit to struggle with vices; lest, without a struggle, he be dragged off by them, or lest, already struggling, he be conquered in the very conflict with them. Therefore in this contest God willed us rather to struggle by prayers than by our own powers; because the very powers, as great as it befits us to have here, he himself, whom we ask, supplies to those struggling. If, then, those whose spirit now lusts against the flesh need the grace of God for each single act, lest they be conquered; what liberty of will can those have who, not yet rescued from the power of darkness, with iniquity reigning, have not even begun to struggle; or, if they have wished to struggle, are conquered by the servitude of a not yet freed will?
Iulianum.6.1516. IUL. Nescio sane, utrum hic iam coactus inopia, tam ineptum, tam imbecillum aliquid moliaris, ut dicas, nullis te quidem rationibus docere posse Adam bonum a Deo conditum, sed ad hoc credendum sola esse lectionis auctoritate contentum, qua post formatum hominem sexto iam die communiter de omnibus creaturis refertur: Et vidit Deus omnia quae fecit, et ecce bona valde (Gen 1, 31). Quod non pro opificis dignitate, non pro appensione eius iustitiae, sed pro testimonio, quo communiter quae creata sunt, bene facta dicuntur, Adam quoque haud iniquum aestimes institutum. Porro licet hoc Manichaeum tam leviter pulset, ut rideat; Traducianum tamen revinctum exponit nobis. Ut enim nullo testimoniorum divinorum in hanc rem populos congregemus; Apostoli solius auctoritate praescribimus, qui cum foedum praevideret errorem, celso adversum vos ore detonuit dicens: Quoniam omnis creatura Dei bona est (1 Tim. 4, 4).
16. JULIAN: I do not indeed know whether here, now forced by poverty, you contrive something so inept, so feeble, as to say that you can indeed by no reasons teach that Adam was founded good by God, but that for believing this you are content with the authority of the reading alone, in which, after the human being was formed, on the sixth day it is reported in common of all creatures: And God saw all that he had made, and behold, it was very good (Gen 1:31). By which—not for the dignity of the maker, not for the weighing of his justice, but for the testimony by which in common the things created are said to be well made—you would judge that Adam too was established not unjustly. Furthermore, although this strikes the Manichee so lightly that he laughs, it nevertheless exposes the Traducianist to us, bound fast. For, that we may gather peoples of no divine testimonies to this matter, we prescribe by the authority of the Apostle alone, who, when he foresaw the foul error, thundered against you with a lofty mouth, saying: For every creature of God is good (1 Tim 4:4).
Iulianum.6.16Si ergo ad probandum bonae naturae primum hominem fuisse formatum, sufficit hoc quod dicit Moyses, universa Deum bene condidisse, perque hoc tu cum peccato creari a Deo Adam non potuisse contendis, quia bonus inter reliqua legitur institutus; iisdem lineis referemus, per hoc nullum posse cum peccato nasci, quoniam ab Apostolo omnis creatura Dei bona esse defenditur.
If, then, to prove that the first man was formed of a good nature, it suffices that Moses says God founded all things well, and through this you contend that Adam could not be created with sin by God, because he is read to have been established good among the rest; by the same lines we will report that through this no one can be born with sin, since by the Apostle every creature of God is defended to be good.
Iulianum.6.16Quid ergo his disputationibus actum est? Videlicet, ut id quod ratio indagarat, optio quoque indicti inter te et Manichaeum praelii publicaret; ut cum proposito certamine ne unum quidem telum sine tua pernicie in praeceptorem tuum vibrare posses, multo manifestissime reluceret, vos et Manichaeos in unum impietatis corpus obscena coaluisse concordia. Quid enim potest esse tam iunctum, quam quod nec discriminum separatur incursu? Omni exitio Manichaei, Traducianorum dogma commoritur; nihil est quod illum feriat, et te relinquat. Una vobis sunt instituta, una mysteria, unaque pericula; et substomacharis, si senis Manis soboles nuncupere?
What, then, has been accomplished by these arguments? Namely, that what reason had tracked down, the very choice of the battle proclaimed between you and the Manichee should publish; so that, with the contest set, since you could not brandish even one weapon against your master without your own destruction, it might shine forth much more manifestly that you and the Manichees, by an obscene concord, have coalesced into one body of impiety. For what can be so joined as that which is not separated even by the assault of dangers? With every destruction of the Manichee, the dogma of the Traducianists dies too; there is nothing that strikes him and leaves you. Your establishments are one, your mysteries one, and your perils one; and do you fume, if you are called the offspring of old Manes?
Iulianum.6.16AUG. Ita dicis me nullis rationibus docere posse Adam bonum a Deo conditum, quasi tecum inde confligam. Nonne bonum conditum Adam, non ego tantum, nec tu, sed ambo dicimus? Ambo enim dicimus bonam esse naturam, quae posset non peccare, si nollet; sed cum ego eam meliorem asseram quam tu, quoniam dico etiam eam mori non potuisse, si peccare noluisset; quid est, quod dicis, nullis rationibus a me doceri posse Adam bonum a Deo conditum, cum rationibus meis magis bonus ostendatur esse quam tuis? Meis quippe ostenditur, non solum potuisse non peccare, si nollet; sed nec mori, si peccare noluisset; tuis autem, ita mortalem factum, ut sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset. Quod in episcopali iudicio Palaestino, cum Pelagio fuisset obiectum, ne damnaretur, ipse damnavit (Cf. De gestis Pel. 24. 57. 60); et est a semetipso damnatus, quod de homine haeretico dicit Apostolus (Cf. Tit 3, 10. 11).
AUGUSTINE: You say that I can by no reasons teach that Adam was founded good by God, as though I contended with you about this. Do not both of us—not I alone, nor you, but both—say that Adam was founded good? For both of us say that the nature was good which could not sin if it would not; but since I assert that it was better than you do, because I say that it could also not have died if it had not willed to sin; what is it that you say, that I can by no reasons teach that Adam was founded good by God, when by my reasons he is shown to be more good than by yours? For by mine it is shown that he could not only not sin, if he would not, but also not die, if he had not willed to sin; but by yours, that he was made mortal in such a way that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he would die. Which, when it had been objected to Pelagius in the episcopal judgment in Palestine, lest he be condemned, he himself condemned (See The Deeds of Pelagius 24.57.60); and he is condemned by himself, which the Apostle says of a heretical man (See Titus 3:10-11).
Iulianum.6.16Dico etiam, non timuisse Adam mortem, in cuius erat potestate non mori; tu autem necessitatem habuisse moriendi, etiam sine ulla necessitate peccandi. Quem si dixeris mortem timuisse etiam ante peccatum, quid dicis nisi miserum creatum? Si autem ne miser esset, mortem, quamvis futuram, non tamen timuit; certe suam prolem, cui timorem mortis congenuit, procul dubio miseram genuit. Quis enim neget ita homines natura mortem timere, ut eam nonnullos vix rara animi magnitudo faciat non timere?
I say also that Adam did not fear death, in whose power it was not to die; but you say that he had a necessity of dying, even without any necessity of sinning. And if you say that he feared death even before sin, what do you say but that he was created wretched? But if, lest he be wretched, he did not fear death, although it was to come; surely his own offspring, in which he engendered the fear of death, he without doubt begot wretched. For who would deny that human beings so fear death by nature, that only a rare greatness of mind makes some of them not fear it?
Iulianum.6.16Itemque addo ego ad bonitatem conditionis Adae, quod in eo caro adversus spiritum non concupiscebat ante peccatum; tu autem, qui talem dicis carnis concupiscentiam, qualis nunc est, in paradiso futuram fuisse, si nemo peccasset, talemque in illo fuisse et prius quam peccaret, addis eius conditioni et istam miseriam per spiritus carnisque discordiam. Cum ergo tot tantisque rationibus Adam meliorem, quam tu eum dicis, et feliciorem conditum ostendam; quid tibi visum est tanta vecordia delirare, ut diceres: nullis me rationibus docere posse Adam bonum a Deo conditum, sed ad hoc credendum sola esse auctoritate lectionis contentum, quia scriptum est fecisse Deum omnia bona valde (Cf. supra 2, 117)?
Likewise I add to the goodness of Adam's condition, that in him the flesh did not lust against the spirit before sin; but you, who say that such concupiscence of the flesh, as it now is, would have been in paradise, if no one had sinned, and that such was in him even before he sinned, add to his condition this misery too, through the discord of spirit and flesh. Since, then, by so many and so great reasons I show Adam to have been founded better than you say him, and happier; what seemed good to you, to rave with such great madness, so as to say that I can by no reasons teach that Adam was founded good by God, but that for believing this I am content with the authority of the reading alone, because it is written that God made all things very good (See above, 2.117)?
Iulianum.6.16Non usque adeo sum pistillo, sicut conviciaris, obtunsior, ut Manichaeo redarguendo libri huius divini auctoritatem, qua non tenetur, obiciam. Tibi hanc obicio, quando res postulat, quoniam mihi tibique communis est. Manichaeum vero non de opificio Dei, quod ipse negat, creaturas istas bonas esse convinco; sed de illarum bonitate potius compello, bonum eas habere opificem confiteri. Quod autem ait Apostolus, quem se Manichaei accipere profitentur: Omnis creatura Dei bona est, quoniam de qua creatura loqueretur apertum est, validum esset adversus eos testimonium, nisi etiam Libris canonicis, quos accipiunt, quasdam falsas sententias permixtas esse contenderent. Ac per hoc de bonitate creaturarum semper sunt urgendi, ut earum bonum Deum, quod negant, fateantur auctorem.
I am not so dull as a pestle, as you reproach, that, in refuting the Manichee, I should object to him the authority of this divine book, by which he is not held. To you I object it, when the matter demands, since it is common to me and to you. But the Manichee I convince that these creatures are good, not from the workmanship of God, which he himself denies; but rather, from their goodness, I drive him to confess that they have a good maker. But as for what the Apostle says, whom the Manichees profess to receive: Every creature of God is good—since it is clear of what creature he was speaking, it would be a strong testimony against them, except that they contend that certain false sentences have been mixed even into the canonical Books which they receive. And by this they must always be pressed about the goodness of the creatures, so that they confess God, whom they deny, to be the good author of them.
Iulianum.6.16Porro creaturae omnes ita sunt bonae, ut etiam ipsas, quae cum vitiis creantur, ratio bonas esse demonstret, ipsorum quoque attestatione vitiorum; quia vitium contra naturam est; nisi enim natura ipsa recte placeret, nullo modo recte ipsius vitium displiceret. Hoc contra Manichaeos, qui putant etiam ipsa vitia naturas esse atque substantias, in quibusdam nostris opusculis copiosius disputatur, ostenditurque vitium natura non esse; et quia contra naturam est, ideo malum esse; ac per hoc naturam in quantum natura est, bonum esse;
Moreover, all creatures are so good that even those which are created with vices, reason demonstrates to be good, by the attestation of the vices themselves; because a vice is against nature; for unless the nature itself rightly pleased, in no way would its vice rightly displease. This, against the Manichees, who think that even the vices themselves are natures and substances, is argued more copiously in certain of our little works, and it is shown that a vice is not a nature; and because it is against nature, therefore it is evil; and by this, that nature, insofar as it is nature, is good;
Iulianum.6.16unde colligitur, non esse creatorem naturarum nisi creatorem bonorum, ac per hoc bonum; sed creaturis suis magna differentia et summa bonitate meliorem, qui non potest omnino vitiari, non perceptione gratiae, sed proprietate naturae. Naturae igitur creatae, sive quae sine vitio sunt, sive quae natae vitiantur, sive quae vitiatae nascuntur, illum creatorem nisi eum qui bona creat, habere non possunt; quia in quantum naturae sunt, bonae sunt, etiam quaecumque vitiatae sunt. Non enim vitiorum, sed naturarum auctor est creator illarum. Nam et auctor ipse vitiorum natura bonus est, quam Deus fecit; sed vitio malus est, quo ipse a bono conditore mala voluntate defecit.
whence it is gathered that there is no creator of natures except the creator of goods, and by this, good; but that he is better than his creatures by a great difference and supreme goodness, who cannot be vitiated at all, not by the reception of grace, but by the property of his nature. Created natures, therefore, whether those which are without vice, or those which, born, are vitiated, or those which are born vitiated, can have no creator except him who creates goods; because, insofar as they are natures, they are good, even whatever ones are vitiated. For their creator is the author not of the vices but of the natures. For even the author himself of vices is by nature good, which God made; but he is evil by the vice by which he himself, by an evil will, fell away from the good founder.
Iulianum.6.16Itaque Manichaeorum errorem ratio ista vera convincit, qui nolunt recipere auctoritatem, sive qua dictum est: Fecit Deus omnia, et ecce bona valde (Gen 1, 31), quando adhuc nullum erat malum; sive qua dictum est: Omnis creatura Dei bona est, quando iam erat hoc saeculum malum, cum Deus sit utique factor omnium saeculorum.
And so this true reason convicts the error of the Manichees, who are unwilling to receive the authority either by which it was said: God made all things, and behold, they were very good (Gen 1:31), when as yet there was no evil; or by which it was said: Every creature of God is good, when this evil age already existed, since God is surely the maker of all ages.
Iulianum.6.16Tu autem, qui hanc recipis auctoritatem divinorum eloquiorum, ut ea merito possis urgeri, cur non attendis in eo libro, ubi legitur Deum fecisse omnia bona valde, omnium locorum optimum plantatum esse paradisum, ubi Deus usque adeo nihil mali esse voluit, ut nec imaginem suam ibi esse permitteret, posteaquam propria voluntate peccavit (Cf. Gen 2, 8; 3, 23-24)? Et tamen vos in tantae felicitatis et decoris locum, ubi nec ligni, nec feni, nec pomi, nec cuiusquam vel frugis vel pecoris vitium esse potuisse vel posse credendum est, omnia humanorum corporum et ingeniorum vitia non dubitatis inducere, cum quibus homines nasci, dolere vos sinimus, non negare.
But you, who receive this authority of the divine words, so that you can deservedly be pressed by it, why do you not attend that, in that book where it is read that God made all things very good, the best of all places, paradise, was planted, where God so willed that there be nothing evil, that he did not even permit his own image to be there, after he sinned by his own will (See Gen 2:8; 3:23-24)? And yet you, into the place of so great felicity and beauty, where it must be believed that there could not, or cannot, be a vice of tree, or hay, or fruit, or of any crop or beast whatever, do not hesitate to introduce all the vices of human bodies and minds, with which we allow you to grieve, not to deny, that human beings are born.
Iulianum.6.16Necesse est enim ut doleatis, quando quid respondeatis non invenitis, et tam pravam sententiam mutare non vultis, quae vos inevitabili necessitate compellit in loco tantae beatitudinis et pulchritudinis constituere caecos, luscos, lippos, surdos, mutos, claudos, deformes, distortos, tineosos, leprosos, paralyticos, epilepticos, et aliis diversis generibus vitiosos, atque aliquando etiam nimia foeditate et membrorum horribili novitate monstruosos. Quid dicam de vitiis animorum, quibus sunt quidam natura libidinosi, quidam iracundi, quidam meticulosi, quidam obliviosi, quidam tardicordes, quidam excordes atque ita fatui, ut malit homo cum quibusdam pecoribus, quam cum talibus hominibus vivere? Adde gemitus parientium, fletusque nascentium, cruciatus dolentium, languentium labores, tormenta multa morientium, et pericula multo plura viventium.
For it is necessary that you grieve, when you do not find what to answer, and are unwilling to change so depraved an opinion, which compels you, by an inevitable necessity, to establish in a place of so great blessedness and beauty the blind, the one-eyed, the bleary-eyed, the deaf, the dumb, the lame, the deformed, the distorted, the scabby, the leprous, the paralytic, the epileptic, and those vitiated by other diverse kinds, and sometimes even monstrous by excessive foulness and horrible novelty of members. What shall I say of the vices of minds, by which some are by nature lustful, some irascible, some timorous, some forgetful, some slow of heart, some senseless and so foolish that a man would rather live with certain beasts than with such human beings? Add the groans of those giving birth, and the weepings of those being born, the torments of those grieving, the labors of those languishing, the many torments of those dying, and the much more numerous perils of those living.
Iulianum.6.16Haec omnia, atque alia talia, sive peiora, quae verbis congruis saltem breviter commemorare quis sufficit?, secundum errorem vestrum, sed plane contra pudorem vestrum, aut fronte improbissima, aut manu fronti opposita, in Dei paradiso cogimini collocare, et dicere futura et ibi haec fuisse, etiamsi nemo peccasset. Dicite, dicite: cur enim revereamini dehonestare tot ac tantis vitiis et calamitatibus locum, quem nefario dogmate a vobis facitis alienum?
All these things, and other such, or worse, which who is sufficient to recall even briefly in fitting words?—according to your error, but plainly against your shame, either with a most shameless front, or with a hand set against your front, you are forced to place in the paradise of God, and to say that they would be there, and were there, even if no one had sinned. Say it, say it: for why should you be ashamed to dishonor with so many and so great vices and calamities a place which by a wicked dogma you make foreign to yourselves?
Iulianum.6.16Nam si aliquando illuc intrare disponeretis, numquam illic talia poneretis. Aut si vincit pudor in cordibus vestris, et in loco tali talia constituere erubescitis, horrescitis, obmutescitis, et tamen errori vestro, quo non creditis humanam naturam primi hominis praevaricatione vitiatam pertinaciter adhaerescitis, respondete Manichaeis unde sint ista, ne illi ea de commixtione alienae malaeque naturae esse concludant.
For if you ever intended to enter there, you would never place such things there. Or if shame conquers in your hearts, and you blush, shudder, fall dumb to establish such things in such a place, and yet pertinaciously cling to your error, by which you do not believe human nature vitiated by the transgression of the first man, answer the Manichees whence these things come, lest they conclude that they are from a mixture of a foreign and evil nature.
Iulianum.6.16A nobis enim cum hoc requiritur, respondemus non haec esse de permixtione alienae, sed de nostrae praevaricatione naturae, per eum qui in paradiso deiectus, et de paradiso eiectus est, ne in loco beatitudinis maneret natura damnata, et vitia vel supplicia, quae posteros eius merito fuerant secutura, in eo loco essent, ubi nulla esse sinuntur mala. Vos autem dum negatis ista vel deformia vel aerumnosa de meritis vitiatae nostrae naturae venire, commixtionem permittitis alienae, atque ita miseri et Manichaeos adiuvare cogimini, et mala illa in paradisum revocat error vester, unde illa abstulerat pudor vester.
For when this is required of us, we answer that these are not from a mixture of a foreign nature, but from the transgression of our own nature, through him who was cast down in paradise, and cast out of paradise, lest the condemned nature should remain in a place of blessedness, and the vices or punishments, which would deservedly have followed his posterity, should be in that place where no evils are allowed to be. But you, while you deny that these deformed or toilsome things come from the merits of our vitiated nature, permit the mixture of a foreign one, and so, wretched, are forced both to help the Manichees, and your error recalls those evils into paradise, whence your shame had taken them away.
Iulianum.6.1617. IUL. At contra vide quam adversus te et Manichaeum, cuius te semper ruina convolvit, verus sit nobis conflictus, et de eo celer triumphus. Omnia illa, quae in vituperationem divini operis evomuit, primae statim definitionis aratro circumscribimus; cogimusque ut explicet, quid putet esse peccatum, quod claret nihil esse aliud, quam voluntatem appetentem quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. Quo constituto, omnes illi oblocutionum rubi, qui concretionem corporum pupugerant, et ut ille ait, eradicitus monstrantur evulsi (Cf. CICERO, De finibus, 2).
17. JULIAN: But on the contrary, see how true is our conflict against you and the Manichee, in whose ruin you are always rolled up, and how swift our triumph over it. All those things which he vomited out in disparagement of the divine work, we at once circumscribe with the plow of the first definition; and we force him to explain what he thinks sin is, which is clear to be nothing other than a will desiring what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. With this established, all those brambles of objections, which had pricked the concretion of bodies, are, as he says, shown to be torn up by the roots (See Cicero, On Ends 2).
Iulianum.6.17Iam vero affectus timoris et sensus doloris, per quos in naufragia hominum cieri tempestatem putavit, non solum nullius mali coactores, sed cum repagulum bonae voluntatis nacti sunt, adiutores et pervectores iustitiae perdocentur. Quis enim formidaret iudicium, nisi timoris admonitu? Quis paenitentiae gemitibus iuvaretur, nisi doloris et internae aegritudinis expiatu? Quid postremo severitas iudicantis valeret, nisi voluntaria peccata illati cruciatus aerumna puniret? Quorum omnium testimonio apparet, nihil aliud esse peccatum, quam voluntatem liberam despicientem praecepta iustitiae; aliterque non stare iustitiam, quam si illud imputet in peccatum, cuius noverit fuisse liberam cautionem; ac per hoc nulla lege, ea quae naturalia sunt, in culpam posse reputari; nec quemquam suscipere crimen, quod non ipse commiserit, cum vitare possit. Qua potentia Manichaeus et Traducianus consumitur, qui effossis totius intellegentiae oculis, rem voluntatis conatur seminibus admovere.
But now the affection of fear and the sense of grief, through which he thought a tempest was stirred up to the shipwreck of human beings, are thoroughly taught to be not only the compellers of no evil, but, when they have obtained the bar of a good will, the helpers and conveyers of justice. For who would dread judgment, except by the admonition of fear? Who would be helped by the groans of repentance, except by the expiation of grief and inner sickness? What, finally, would the severity of the one judging avail, unless it punished voluntary sins by the toil of inflicted torment? By the testimony of all which it appears that sin is nothing other than a free will despising the precepts of justice; and that justice does not otherwise stand than if it imputes as sin that of which it knew there was a free caution; and by this, that by no law can natural things be reckoned as fault; nor that anyone takes up a crime which he himself did not commit, when he could avoid it. By which power the Manichee and the Traducianist are consumed, who, with the eyes of all understanding dug out, tries to apply the thing of the will to the seeds.
Iulianum.6.17AUG. His tuis erroribus iam saepe respondimus: unde qui ea legunt, et memoriae commendant, non ubique desiderant responsionem meam, ubicumque tu repetis verbositatem tuam. Sed ne quisquam queratur, ignoscentibus mihi celerioribus ingenio, etiam tardiusculis deesse non debeo. Ecce et hic tibi respondeo de peccati definitione, qua te multum adiuvari putas. Illud quod peccatum ita est, ut non sit etiam poena peccati, definitio ista determinat, qua dicitur: Peccatum est voluntas appetens quod iustitia vetat, et unde est liberum abstinere. Quod maxime ad illum pertinet, ex cuius peccato illo magno posteris eius est exorta miseria per grave iugum a die exitus de ventre matris eorum, et per corpus corruptibile quod aggravat animam. Ille quippe lege brevissima accepta sciebat quid vetaret iustitia; et inde illi utique liberum fuerat abstinere, nondum adversus eius spiritum carne concupiscente, propter quod malum etiam fidelibus dictum est: Ut non ea quae vultis faciatis (Gal 5, 17).
AUGUSTINE: To these errors of yours we have already often answered: whence those who read them, and commit them to memory, do not everywhere require my answer, wherever you repeat your verbosity. But lest anyone complain—those quicker in wit pardoning me—I ought not to fail even the somewhat slower. Behold, here too I answer you about the definition of sin, by which you think you are much helped. That which is sin in such a way that it is not also a penalty of sin, that definition determines, by which it is said: Sin is a will desiring what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. Which pertains most of all to him from whose sin, that great one, misery arose for his posterity through the heavy yoke from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb, and through the corruptible body which weighs down the soul. For he, having received a most brief law, knew what justice forbade; and from it he was surely free to abstain, the flesh not yet lusting against his spirit, on account of which evil it was said even to the faithful: So that you do not do the things you would (Gal 5:17).
Iulianum.6.17Caecitas igitur cordis, qua nescitur quid iustitia vetet, et violentia concupiscentiae, qua vincitur etiam qui scit unde debeat abstinere, non tantum peccata, sed poena sunt etiam peccatorum. Et ideo non includuntur illa definitione peccati, qua non definitum est nisi peccatum solum, non quod est et poena peccati. Cum enim quis ignorat quid facere debeat, et ideo facit quod facere non debeat; non ei fuit liberum abstinere, unde abstinendum esse non noverat. Itemque ille qui, ut dicitis, non origine, sed consuetudine premitur, ut exclamet: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 15), quomodo ei liberum est abstinere ab eo malo, quod non vult et facit, odit et agit?
The blindness of heart, then, by which it is not known what justice forbids, and the violence of concupiscence, by which even he who knows from what he ought to abstain is conquered, are not only sins, but are also penalties of sins. And therefore they are not included in that definition of sin, by which nothing was defined except sin alone, not that which is also a penalty of sin. For when someone is ignorant of what he ought to do, and therefore does what he ought not to do, he was not free to abstain from that which he did not know he ought to abstain from. And likewise he who, as you say, is pressed not by origin but by habit, so that he exclaims: I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want, this I do (Rom 7:15), how is he free to abstain from that evil which he does not want and yet does, hates and yet does?
Iulianum.6.17His autem poenis carere si esset in hominum potestate, non Deus rogaretur, et contra caecitatem, ubi ei dicitur: Illumina oculos meos (Ps 12, 4); et contra iniquam cupiditatem, ubi ei dicitur: Non dominetur mihi omnis iniquitas (Ps 118, 133). Porro si etiam peccata ideo ista non essent, quia non ab eis liberum est abstinere, non diceretur: Delicta iuventutis meae et ignorantiae meae ne memineris (Ps 24, 7): non diceretur: Signasti peccata mea in sacculo, et adnotasti si quid invitus admisi (Iob 14, 17 (sec. LXX)).
But if it were in the power of human beings to be free of these penalties, God would not be asked, both against blindness, where it is said to him: Enlighten my eyes (Ps 13:4 (12:4)); and against iniquitous desire, where it is said to him: Let no iniquity have dominion over me (Ps 119:133 (118:133)). Moreover, if these were not also sins for the reason that one is not free to abstain from them, it would not be said: Remember not the sins of my youth and my ignorances (Ps 25:7 (24:7)); it would not be said: You have sealed my sins in a bag, and noted if I have committed anything unwillingly (Job 14:17 (LXX)).
Iulianum.6.17Illa ergo definitione peccati, quale commisit Adam, qui sciebat quid vetaret iustitia, et non inde abstinuit, unde illi liberum fuerat abstinere, vincuntur Manichaei; sed a nobis, quia hinc esse originem dicimus malorum humanorum, quibus videmus et parvulos aggravari, et propter quod etiam illud scriptum est, cum de peccatis ageretur: Quia non est mundus a sordibus, nec infans cuius est diei unius vita super terram (Iob 14, 4 (sec. LXX)). Tu autem hoc negans, nostram quidem naturam, ne liberatorem misera inquirat, conaris perniciosa defensione plus premere;
By that definition of sin, then, such as Adam committed, who knew what justice forbade, and did not abstain from that from which he was free to abstain, the Manichees are conquered; but by us, because we say that from this is the origin of the human evils, by which we see even little ones weighed down, and on account of which this too was written, when sin was being discussed: That no one is clean from filth, not even an infant whose life is of one day upon the earth (Job 14:4 (LXX)). But you, by denying this, try, indeed, by a pernicious defense, to press our nature the more, lest, wretched, it seek a liberator;
Iulianum.6.17Manichaeum vero, cum quaeritur unde sit malum, alienam Deo coaeternam permittis introducere. Neque enim ille, unde naturam culpet humanam, timoris affectum et sensum doloris impingit; quae duo tu adversus eum putasti esse laudanda, quia scilicet timor et dolor adiutores et provectoresiustitiae perdocentur, dum non peccat homo timore iudicii, aut peccasse se dolet aculeis paenitendi.
but the Manichee, when it is asked whence evil comes, you permit to introduce a foreign nature coeternal with God. For he, in order to blame human nature, does not press in the affection of fear and the sense of grief; which two things you thought should be praised against him, namely because fear and grief are taught to be helpers and promoters of justice, while a human being does not sin from fear of judgment, or grieves that he has sinned by the goads of repenting.
Iulianum.6.17Non hoc a te quaeritur, sed quid sit poena timoris in parvulis, qui peccata non fugiunt, et cur tantis doloribus affligantur, qui peccata non faciunt. Tu nempe dixisti: Quid severitas iudicantis valeret, nisi voluntaria peccata illati cruciatus aerumna puniret? Qua ergo iustitia, quorum voluntaria peccata nulla sunt propria, illati cruciatus aerumna parvuli puniuntur? In his certe apparet vana et inepta esse tua praeconia, quibus timorem doloremque laudasti. Gravia sunt quippe ista supplicia, quae non paterentur ab exortu recentes et novae imagines Dei sub iustissimo iudicio et omnipotentia Dei, si meritum non traherent originalis veterisque peccati.
This is not asked of you, but what the penalty of fear is in little ones, who do not flee sins, and why they are afflicted with so great griefs, who do not commit sins. For you said: What would the severity of the one judging avail, unless it punished voluntary sins by the toil of inflicted torment? By what justice, then, are little ones, whose voluntary sins are none of their own, punished by the toil of inflicted torment? In these, surely, your praises appear empty and inept, by which you praised fear and grief. For these are grievous punishments, which fresh and new images of God would not suffer from their birth, under the most just judgment and omnipotence of God, if they did not draw the merit of original and ancient sin.
Iulianum.6.17Denique in paradiso, si nemo peccasset, et provenisset coniugatorum ex illa veraci Dei benedictione fecunditas, absit ut quisquam ibi vel magnorum vel pusillorum pateretur ista tormenta. Non solum enim dolor, quod valde manifestum est; sed etiam timor, divina Scriptura testante, tormentum habet (Cf. 1 Io 4, 18); absit ergo ut in loco illius felicitatis essent ulla tormenta. Proinde in aetate qualibet, nemine terrente quid timerent? Nemine laedente quid dolerent? In hoc autem praesenti saeculo maligno, quod ut nostris miseriis perageretur, de paradiso deliciarum proiecti sumus, in his etiam quibus peccata dimissa sunt, timorum et dolorum aerumna permanet, ut nostra de saeculo futuro fides, ubi nulla erunt ista, non solum in nostris, verum etiam in nostrorum parvulorum aerumnis probetur; quia non eos ideo regenerari volumus, ut non patiantur haec mala; sed ut in regnum, in quo talia non erunt, pervehantur.
Finally, in paradise, if no one had sinned, and the fruitfulness of the married had come about from that truthful blessing of God, far be it that anyone there, whether of the great or the small, should suffer these torments. For not only grief, which is very manifest, but even fear, as the divine Scripture attests, has torment (See 1 John 4:18); far be it, then, that in the place of that felicity there should be any torments. Accordingly, at any age whatever, with no one terrifying, what would they fear? With no one hurting, what would they grieve? But in this present evil age, into which we were cast out from the paradise of delights so that it might be passed through in our miseries, even in those whose sins have been forgiven, the toil of fears and griefs remains, so that our faith about the future age, where these things will be none, may be proved not only in our own toils but also in the toils of our little ones; for we do not therefore wish them to be regenerated, that they may not suffer these evils, but that they may be conveyed into the kingdom in which such things will not be.
Iulianum.6.17Hanc fidem veram atque catholicam tibi respuenti, et vano buccarum strepitu refutare conanti, cum Manichaeus ingesserit quaestionem unde mala sint parvulorum, omnis tua loquacitas obmutescet; quoniam neganti originale peccatum, mox ille collidet frontem tuam, et mali naturam introducet alienam. Non autem timet catholica fides, quod tibi videtur, rem voluntatis non posse seminibus admoveri; cum audiat dicentem Deum, reddi peccata patrum in tertiam et quartam progeniem filiorum (Cf. Ex 20, 5; 34, 7). Utique res voluntatis, qua peccant patres, seminibus admovetur, quando in filios vindicatur; et pater Abraham, ut decimaretur a Melchisedech, voluntate illi sacerdoti decimas dedit; et tamen etiam filios eius, quia in lumbis erant eius, tunc esse decimatos Sacra Scriptura testatur (Cf. Hebr 7, 9. 10); quod profecto non fieret, si non posset res voluntatis admoveri seminibus.
To this true and Catholic faith, which you spit at and try to refute with the empty din of your cheeks, when the Manichee shall have brought in the question whence come the evils of little ones, all your wordiness will fall silent; since, to you denying original sin, he will soon dash your front, and introduce a foreign nature of evil. But the Catholic faith does not fear, as seems to you, that the thing of the will cannot be applied to the seeds; since it hears God saying that the sins of the fathers are repaid in the third and fourth generation of the sons (See Exod 20:5; 34:7). Surely the thing of the will, by which the fathers sin, is applied to the seeds, when it is avenged upon the sons; and father Abraham, that he might be tithed by Melchizedek, gave tithes to that priest by will; and yet the Sacred Scripture attests that his sons too, because they were in his loins, were then tithed (See Heb 7:9-10); which surely would not happen, if the thing of the will could not be applied to the seeds.
Iulianum.6.1718. IUL. Sed proh Dei nostri atque hominum fidem! Haeccine potuisse commentorum prodigia reperiri, ut dedita opera impensoque studio in perversum conentur omnia asserere! Quid enim tam prodigiale, quam quod Poenus eloquitur? Ea, inquit, quae erant naturalia, perpetua non fuerunt; et illa, quae studio suscepta sunt, primis coagulis adhaesere membrorum. Bonus, inquit, Adam factus est, habuit innocentiam naturalem; ceteris etiam creaturis peculiari nobilitate praelatus, similitudine sui Conditoris enituit. Liberum arbitrium in conditione suscepit, ut in quam vellet partem suopte iudicio moveretur, facultatemque vel ad bonum, vel ad malum accedendi, vel ab utroque recedendi, ipsa facturae suae, qua ceteris antistabat, conditione sortitus est. Sed quoniam emancipato iudicio usurpavit pravam animi liberi voluntatem, illa omnia, quae ingenita constabat, evertit; solumque peccatum et peccandi necessitas ei inseparabiliter adhaesit. Hoc est, quod dixi prodigiale commentum. Inaudita quippe deformitas est dicere: Bene institutum est animal, in quo amissibilia fuerunt bona etiam naturalia, cui inseparabiliter adhaeserunt mala vel voluntaria.
18. JULIAN: But, by the faith of our God and of human beings! that such prodigies of inventions could be found, that with set purpose and lavished zeal they try to assert all things perversely! For what is so prodigious as what the Carthaginian utters? Those things, he says, which were natural, were not perpetual; and those which were assumed by pursuit, clung to the first coagulations of the members. Adam, he says, was made good, he had natural innocence; preferred even to the other creatures by a special nobility, he shone with the likeness of his Founder. He received free choice in his condition, so that he might move to whichever side he would by his own judgment, and he obtained, by the very condition of his making, in which he stood before the rest, the faculty of approaching either to good or to evil, or of withdrawing from both. But since, with his judgment made his own, he usurped the depraved will of a free mind, he overthrew all those things which it was agreed were inborn; and sin alone and the necessity of sinning clung to him inseparably. This is what I called a prodigious invention. For it is an unheard-of deformity to say: A living being was well established, in which the goods even the natural ones were losable, to which the evils even the voluntary ones clung inseparably.
Iulianum.6.18AUG. Cum dicitur: Bene institutum est animal, in quo amissibilia fuerunt bona etiam naturalia, cui inseparabiliter adhaeserunt mala voluntaria; prodigiale putas esse commentum; et haec a nobis dici, tam vehementer et acriter commoveris, ut exclames in Dei atque hominum fidem, tamquam vim patiaris quia ista dicuntur. Sed, quaeso, terribiles impetus pone, et quietior attende quid dicam. Si quisquam voluntate se excaecet, nonne amittet naturale bonum, id est visum, et ei malum voluntarium, id est caecitas, inseparabiliter adhaerebit? Numquid ideo male est animal institutum, cui fuit amissibile naturale bonum, et inseparabile voluntarium malum? Cur ergo non potius ego exclamem: Proh Dei nostri atque hominum fidem! Haeccine tam manifesta et ante oculos constituta ab homine non videri, qui valde acutus, et eruditus, et philosophaster, et dialecticus vult videri? Quis enim quodlibet membrum si voluntate sibi amputat, non amittit naturale incolumitatis bonum; et sumit inseparabile detruncationis malum?
AUGUSTINE: When it is said: A living being was well established, in which the goods even the natural ones were losable, to which the evils, the voluntary ones, clung inseparably; you think it a prodigious invention; and that these things are said by us, you are so vehemently and bitterly moved that you exclaim by the faith of God and of human beings, as though you suffered violence because these things are said. But, I pray, lay aside your terrible assaults, and more calmly attend to what I say. If anyone should blind himself by will, will he not lose a natural good, that is, sight, and will an evil voluntary one, that is, blindness, cling to him inseparably? Is the living being therefore ill established, to which a natural good was losable, and a voluntary evil inseparable? Why, then, should not I rather exclaim: By the faith of our God and of human beings! that these things, so manifest and set before the eyes, are not seen by a man who wishes to seem very acute, and learned, and a little philosopher, and a dialectician? For whoever cuts off any member of his by will, does he not lose the natural good of soundness, and take up the inseparable evil of the mutilation?
Iulianum.6.18Sed forsitan dicas, in bonis corporis posse ista contingere, non in animi. Cur ergo quando dixisti: naturalia bona, vel voluntaria mala, non addidisti "animi", ne de corporis bonis et malis tua destrueretur praeceps et inconsiderata sententia? An fortassis oblitus es? Sinamus: humanum est; sed in medium procedit homo ille qui clamat: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 15); et ostendit tibi nonnulla bona animi sic perire per voluntatem malam, ut non possint redire per bonam, nisi Deus faciat quod non potest homo, cui et lumina potest reddere voluntate caecata, et membra voluntate truncata.
But perhaps you say that these things can happen in the goods of the body, not of the mind. Why, then, when you said: natural goods, or voluntary evils, did you not add "of the mind," lest by the goods and evils of the body your headlong and inconsiderate opinion be destroyed? Or perhaps you forgot? Let us allow it: it is human; but there comes forward into the midst that man who cries out: I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want, this I do (Rom 7:15); and shows you that certain goods of the mind so perish through an evil will, that they cannot return through a good one, unless God do what the human being cannot, to whom he can restore both the lights blinded by will, and the members mutilated by will.
Iulianum.6.18Deinde, qui de ipso diabolo responsurus es, qui bonam voluntatem irreparabiliter perdidit? An eam reparari posse dicturus es? Aude, si potes. An potius confiteberis, quod in mentem tibi etiam ista non venerint, et horum oblivio te fecerit temerariam praecipitare sententiam? Me ergo saltem commemorante, te corrige. An pertinacia corrigere non permittit, quod inconsulta temeritas dixit, et pudor emendationis lapsum confirmat erroris? Deus, ut video, pro te rogandus est; quem rogabat Apostolus pro Israelitis, ut sanaret eos, qui ignorantes Dei iustitiam, et suam iustitiam volentes constituere, iustitiae Dei subiecti non erant (Cf. Rom 10, 1. 3).
Then, what will you answer about the devil himself, who lost a good will irreparably? Will you say that it can be repaired? Dare, if you can. Or will you rather confess that these things too did not come into your mind, and that the forgetting of them made you precipitate a rash opinion? At least when I recall it, correct yourself. Or does pertinacity not permit you to correct what inconsiderate rashness said, and does shame of amendment confirm the slip of error? God, as I see, must be asked for you; whom the Apostle asked for the Israelites, that he heal those who, ignorant of the justice of God, and wishing to establish their own justice, were not subject to the justice of God (See Rom 10:1, 3).
Iulianum.6.18Tales enim estis et vos, qui iustitiam vestram vultis constituere, quam vobis vos facitis ex vestro libero arbitrio; non ex Deo poscitis et sumitis veram, quae dicta est iustitia Dei; non illa qua iustus est Deus, sed quae datur ex Deo; sicut Domini est salus (Cf. Ps 3, 9), non qua Dominus salvus fit, sed qua salvos facit. Unde dicit idem Apostolus: Ut inveniar in illo non habens meam iustitiam, quae ex lege est; sed eam, quae est ex fide, iustitiam ex Deo (Phil 3, 9).
For such are you too, who wish to establish your own justice, which you make for yourselves out of your free choice; you do not ask of God and take up the true one, which is called the justice of God; not that by which God is just, but that which is given from God; just as salvation is the Lord's (See Ps 3:8 (3:9)), not that by which the Lord is made safe, but that by which he makes safe. Whence the same Apostle says: That I may be found in him not having my own justice, which is from the law; but that which is from faith, the justice from God (Phil 3:9).
Iulianum.6.18Ipsa est iustitia Dei, quam nesciebant Israelitae, et suam volebant constituere, quae ex lege est; quam Paulus destruens, non legem utique destruebat, sed eorum superbiam, qui legem sibi sufficere putabant, tamquam per liberum arbitrium iustitiam legis implentes, et ignorabant Dei iustitiam, quae datur ex Deo, ut quod lex iubet, subveniente illo fiat, cuius sapientia legem et misericordiam in lingua portat (Cf. Prov 3, 16 (sec. LXX)): legem, quia iubet; misericordiam, quia iuvat, ut fiat quod iubet.
This is the justice of God, which the Israelites did not know, and wished to establish their own, which is from the law; which Paul, in destroying, did not destroy the law, but their pride, who thought the law sufficient for themselves, as though fulfilling the justice of the law through free choice, and were ignorant of the justice of God, which is given from God, so that what the law commands may be done with the help of him whose wisdom carries the law and mercy on its tongue (See Prov 3:16 (LXX)): the law, because it commands; mercy, because it helps, so that what it commands may be done.
Iulianum.6.18Hanc Dei iustitiam concupisce, o fili Iuliane, noli in tua virtute confidere; hanc, inquam, Dei concupisce iustitiam; quam donet tibi Dominus concupiscere, donet tibi Dominus et habere. Noli istum Poenum monentem vel admonentem terrena inflatus propagine spernere. Non enim quia te Apulia genuit, ideo Poenos vincendos existimes gente, quos non potes mente. Poenas potius fuge, non Poenos; nam disputatores Poenos non potes fugere, quamdiu te delectat in tua virtute confidere; et beatus enim Cyprianus Poenus fuit, qui dixit: In nullo gloriandum, quando nostrum nihil sit (Cf. CYPRIANUS, Ad Quirinum 3, 4).
Covet this justice of God, O son Julian, do not trust in your own virtue; covet, I say, this justice of God; which may the Lord grant you to covet, may the Lord grant you also to have. Do not, puffed up by an earthly lineage, spurn this Carthaginian advising or admonishing you. For do not, because Apulia bore you, on that account think that the Carthaginians are to be conquered by race, whom you cannot conquer by mind. Flee penalties rather, not Carthaginians; for the Carthaginian disputants you cannot flee, as long as it delights you to trust in your own virtue; for blessed Cyprian too was a Carthaginian, who said: We must glory in nothing, since nothing is ours (See Cyprian, To Quirinus 3.4).
Iulianum.6.1819. IUL. Hic dicat aliquis: Quid ergo? Tu negas illam innocentiam, in qua fuerat conditus, spontanei peccati admissione corruptam? Nam etsi possibilitas revertendi ad bonum commissa iniquitate non pereat; tamen certum est meritum innocentiae, cum qua humanum procedit exordium, voluntatis vitio deperire. At ego ita id esse non abnuo; sed illud est, quod his illuminatum exemplis volo, quia cum talis sit conditio facta qualitatum, per quas boni et mali dicimur, ut sub iure agitent voluntatis; tamque hoc sit serio constitutum, ut nec innocentia, quae pro dignitate auctoris officium antevenit voluntatis et naturalis est; tamen nulla se potestate in animo repugnante custodiat, longe longeque amplius hoc in mali parte ius valeat, ut nullam in rationis exitium tyrannidem capessat culpa voluntate suscepta.
19. JULIAN: Here someone may say: What, then? Do you deny that that innocence, in which he had been founded, was corrupted by the admission of voluntary sin? For although the possibility of returning to good does not perish by the committed iniquity, yet it is certain that the merit of innocence, with which the human beginning comes forth, perishes by the vice of the will. But I do not deny that it is so; but this is what I want illustrated by these examples: that, since the condition of the qualities through which we are called good and evil is made such that they move under the right of the will, and this is so seriously established that not even innocence, which, for the dignity of the author, precedes the office of the will and is natural, yet preserves itself by no power in a resisting mind; far, far more on the side of evil may this right avail, so that guilt taken up by will may seize no tyranny to the destruction of reason.
Iulianum.6.19Et si bona qualitas, cum qua factus est homo, immutabilis non fuit (falso enim diceretur liber homo, si motus proprios variare non posset); multo magis qualitas mala fieri non potuit, ut immutabilis et rationalis; ne illa ratio libertatis praeiudicium a mali parte sentiret, quod propter statum suum nec a boni portione pertulerat.
And if the good quality with which the human being was made was not immutable (for he would be falsely called free, if he could not vary his own movements), much more could the evil quality not become immutable and rational; lest that reason of liberty feel a prejudice from the side of evil, which, on account of its own state, it had not suffered from the portion of good.
Iulianum.6.19AUG. Ecce tu quoque invenisti, et quamvis serius, tamen aliquando tibi venit in mentem, unde tua temeraria sententia destruatur; dixisti quippe, naturale bonum, quod est innocentia, posse voluntatis vitio deperire; ac per hoc tam magnum bonum, quod ita pertinet ad naturam, non corporis, sed ipsius animi, ut cum ipso bono Deus hominem fecerit, amissibile esse monstrasti; quod si ante tibi venisset in mentem, non putares prodigialiter et nimium deformiter dici: Bene institutum est animal, in quo amissibilia fuerunt bona etiam naturalia; amissibilia enim tu putasti esse, sed voluntaria, vel bona, vel mala; naturalia vero soles inamissibilia praedicare.
AUGUSTINE: Behold, you too have found—and, though rather late, yet at last it came into your mind—whence your rash opinion is destroyed; for you said that a natural good, which is innocence, can perish by the vice of the will; and by this you have shown that so great a good, which so pertains to the nature, not of the body but of the very mind, that God made the human being with that good, is losable; which, if it had come into your mind before, you would not think it prodigiously and too deformedly said: A living being was well established, in which the goods even the natural ones were losable; for you thought that losable things were the voluntary ones, whether good or evil; but the natural ones you are wont to proclaim unlosable.
Iulianum.6.19Tu enim et alibi dicis, quia naturalia ab initio substantiae usque ad terminum illius perseverant (Cf. supra 2, 76); ad hoc ut liberum arbitrium, quod homini Deus, cum eum crearet, dedit, amitti non posse contendas; praecipue asserens naturalia bona voluntariis malis perire non posse. Et ideo dicitis, quod in perversum omnia conemur asserere, tamquam dicamus non posse amitti voluntaria mala, posse autem naturalia bona; quod nos quidem non dicimus; utraque enim dicimus amitti posse; sed mala quae invehuntur per voluntatem liberam, per divinam indulgentiam posse amitti, vel per humanam voluntatem, sed a Deo liberatam, et a Domino praeparatam. Verum tu qui dicis, amitti posse per voluntatem malam, sed voluntaria bona, non naturalia, ecce invenisti, atque ipse dixisti innocentiam, quod est naturale bonum, amitti posse per voluntarium malum. Et innocentia, si bene attendas, maius bonum est, quam liberum arbitrium; quia innocentia res bonorum est, liberum vero arbitrium et bonorum est et malorum.
For you say elsewhere too that natural things persevere from the beginning of the substance to its end (See above, 2.76); to this end, that you may contend that free choice, which God gave to the human being when he created him, cannot be lost; asserting chiefly that natural goods cannot perish by voluntary evils. And therefore you say that we try to assert all things perversely, as though we said that voluntary evils cannot be lost, but natural goods can; which we indeed do not say; for we say that both can be lost; but that the evils which are brought in through free will can be lost through divine indulgence, or through human will, but a will freed by God, and prepared by the Lord. But you, who say that voluntary goods, not natural ones, can be lost through an evil will, behold, you have found, and yourself said, that innocence, which is a natural good, can be lost through a voluntary evil. And innocence, if you attend well, is a greater good than free choice; because innocence is a thing of the good, but free choice is both of the good and of the evil.
Iulianum.6.19Utrum autem mala voluntate sic pereat innocentia, ut possit bona voluntate reparari, non contemptibilis quaestio est. Sicut enim si voluntate amputentur corporis membra, non restituuntur itidem voluntate; ita videndum est, an in re quidem dissimili, id est, in animo tale aliquid de innocentiae perditione contingat, et voluntario motu perire possit, redire non possit. Nam et sacra virginitas, si per impudicam pereat voluntatem, ad pudicitiam rediri potest, ad virginitatem non potest.
But whether innocence so perishes by an evil will that it can be repaired by a good will, is no contemptible question. For just as, if the members of the body are amputated by will, they are not likewise restored by will; so it must be seen whether, in a dissimilar matter, that is, in the mind, something such happens about the loss of innocence, and it can perish by a voluntary movement, but cannot return. For sacred virginity too, if it perishes through an unchaste will, return can be made to chastity, but cannot to virginity.
Iulianum.6.19Sed adhuc respondetur et integritatem virginitatis in corpore, non utique animi esse, sed corporis; cum vero de innocentia disputatur, et tamen considerandum est, utrum ad iustitiam voluntate redeat qui peccaverit, non ad innocentiam; sicut illa ad pudicitiam, non ad virginitatem redit. Nam sicut iniustitia iustitiae, ita innocentiae velut eius contrarium, non iniustitia, sed reatus opponitur, qui hominis voluntate non tollitur, etsi eius voluntate sit factus.
But still it is answered that the integrity of virginity is in the body, not of the mind but of the body; but when innocence is discussed, it must nevertheless be considered whether he who has sinned returns by will to justice, not to innocence; just as that one returns to chastity, not to virginity. For just as injustice is opposed to justice, so to innocence, as its contrary, is opposed not injustice but guilt, which is not taken away by the will of the human being, even if it was made by his will.
Iulianum.6.19Non enim verum videt, qui putat reatum sibi ipsi tollere paenitentem; quamquam et ipsam paenitentiam Deus det, quod Apostolus confirmat dicens: Ne forte illis Deus det paenitentiam (2 Tim 2, 25); sed reatum apertissime Deus tollit, homini dando indulgentiam; non sibi ipse homo, agendo paenitentiam. Debemus quippe illum recolere, qui locum paenitentiae non invenit, quamvis cum lacrymis quaesierit eam (Cf. Hebr 12, 17). Ac per hoc et paenitentiam egit, et reus remansit, quia veniam non accepit; et illi qui dicent inter se: Paenitentiam agentes, et per angustiam spiritus gementes: Quid nobis profuit superbia? (Sap 5, 3. 8) etc., rei utique in aeternum, non accepta venia, permanebunt; sicut etiam ille de quo Dominus ait: Non remittetur ei, sed reus erit aeterni peccati (Mc 3, 29).
For he does not see what is true who thinks that the penitent takes away guilt from himself; although God also gives the penitence itself, which the Apostle confirms, saying: Lest perchance God give them penitence (2 Tim 2:25); but God most openly takes away guilt by giving indulgence to the human being; the human being does not take it away from himself by doing penitence. For we ought to recall him who found no place of penitence, although with tears he sought it (See Heb 12:17). And by this, he both did penitence and remained guilty, because he did not receive pardon; and those who will say among themselves: doing penitence, and groaning through anguish of spirit: What did our pride profit us? (Wis 5:3, 8) and so on, will surely remain guilty forever, pardon not received; just as also he of whom the Lord says: It will not be forgiven him, but he will be guilty of an eternal sin (Mark 3:29).
Iulianum.6.19Ecce inventa est innocentia magnum hominis bonum, atque ita naturale, ut cum illa sit conditus primus homo, et, sicut vos dicitis, cum illa nascitur omnis homo, quae tamen hominis voluntate perdi potest, non potest reddi; et reatus magnum malum innocentiaeque contrarium, quod tamen potestas hominis, cum sit voluntarium, possit inferre, nec possit auferre. Videsne quemadmodum generalis tua regula illa frangatur, qua putabas naturale bonum, nos voluntate non perdere; quando inventum est quod non solum pereat, sed nec redeat voluntate, dumtaxat humana? Deus autem potest hominem reatu ablato ad innocentiam revocare.
Behold, innocence has been found to be a great good of the human being, and so natural that, since the first man was founded with it, and, as you say, with it every human being is born, it can nevertheless be lost by the will of the human being, and cannot be restored; and guilt a great evil and contrary to innocence, which nevertheless the power of the human being, since it is voluntary, can bring in, but cannot take away. Do you see how that general rule of yours is broken, by which you thought that we do not lose a natural good by will; when it has been found that it not only perishes, but does not even return by will—at least human will? But God can, the guilt taken away, recall the human being to innocence.
Iulianum.6.19Cur ergo non credis libertatem bene agendi voluntate humana perire potuisse, nec redire posse, nisi divina voluntate, cum audias hominem dicentem: Non quod volo, facio bonum; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago; et post verba talia clamantem: Quis me liberabit? ac subicientem: Gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum? Sed falso, inquis, diceretur liber homo, si motus proprios variare non posset (Rom 7, 14. 24-25). Nec te vides ipsi Deo tollere libertatem, et nobis, quando cum illo in regno eius immortales vivere coeperimus, nec motus nostros nunc in bonum, nunc in malum nobis erit possibile variare; et tamen tunc felicius liberi erimus, quando non poterimus servire peccato, sicut nec ipse Deus: sed nos ipsius gratia, ille vero sua natura.
Why, then, do you not believe that the liberty of acting well could perish by human will, and cannot return except by divine will, when you hear a human being saying: I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want, this I do; and after such words crying out: Who will free me? and adding: The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord? But, you say, a human being would be falsely called free, if he could not vary his own movements (Rom 7:14, 24-25). Nor do you see that you take away liberty from God himself, and from us, when, having begun to live immortal with him in his kingdom, it will not be possible for us to vary our movements, now to good, now to evil; and yet we shall then be more happily free, when we shall not be able to be slaves to sin, just as not even God himself: but we by his grace, he by his nature.
Iulianum.6.1920. IUL. Deinde quis parasitus ita militis gloriosi vires assentationibus extulit, ut Traducianus diaboli? Quod de ponderibus affectuum agnosci licet. Fecit siquidem Deus hominem, materiam ipsam limi venerabili dignatione contrectans, quae in formam hominis auctoris sui manum subacta sequeretur. Steterat iam absolutum, ceterum pallens frigensque simulacrum, spiritum quo niteret et vigeret opperiens. Tunc augustissimo auctoris afflatu creatus et inspiratus animus, viscera impleta commovit; tunc omnes sensus in apparatum propriorum munerum suscitati sunt. Dedit habitator ingressus visceribus colorem, sanguini calorem, membris vigorem, cuti nitorem.
20. JULIAN: Then, what parasite ever so exalted by flatteries the powers of a glorious soldier, as the Traducianist those of the devil? Which may be recognized from the weights of the affections. For God made the human being, handling the very matter of clay with venerable esteem, which, worked, would follow into the form of the human being the hand of its author. The image had already stood completed, but pale and cold, awaiting the spirit by which it might gleam and be vigorous. Then the soul, created and breathed in by the most august breath of its author, set in motion the filled bowels; then all the senses were roused to the apparatus of their own functions. The indweller gave color to the entered bowels, heat to the blood, vigor to the members, brightness to the skin.
Iulianum.6.20Vide quod negotium in formando et animando homine pietas divina suscepit. Verum nec perfectum eum reliquit familiaritas Conditoris; transfertur ad amoeniorem locum, et quem clementer fecerat, munifice locupletat. Nec hoc tamen praestitisse contentus, illustrat eum impertitione colloquii; dat ei praeceptum, ut libertatem suam intellegens, videret sibi suppetere per quod fieret amicior Conditori;
See what business the divine goodness undertook in forming and animating the human being. Indeed, the familiarity of the Founder did not leave him even unfinished; he is transferred to a more pleasant place, and him whom he had clemently made, he munificently enriches. Nor yet content to have bestowed this, he illustrates him by the imparting of conversation; he gives him a precept, so that, understanding his liberty, he might see that there was at hand for him that through which he might become more a friend to his Founder;
Iulianum.6.20quod praeceptum non in multa distenditur, ne quid oneris de multiplicata lege sentiret; sed interdictu unius pomuli, testimonium devotionis expetitur. Postea quoque ut haberet consortem, per quam pater fieret, denuo illius manus, qua conditus erat, nobilitatur attactu; divino quoque subinde colloquio fovetur atque honoratur.
which precept is not extended to many things, lest he feel any burden from a multiplied law; but by the interdiction of one little apple, a testimony of devotion is sought. Afterward too, that he might have a consort, through whom he might become a father, again that hand by which he had been founded is ennobled by its touch; and from time to time too he is cherished and honored by divine conversation.
Iulianum.6.20Haec ergo a Deo praestita tam longa, tam multa, tam grandia, instituta, munera, praecepta, colloquia, nullam fecerunt homini boni necessitatem; at e regione diabolus non minus timide, quam callide, exigua cum muliere verba commiscuit; et tantum virium habuisse dicuntur, ut continuo in conditionem naturalium verterentur; immo ingenita cuncta subruerent, facerent perpetuam mali necessitatem, et dominum ac possessorem imagini Dei diabolum imponerent.
These things, then, bestowed by God—so long, so many, so great—establishments, gifts, precepts, conversations, made no necessity of good for the human being; but on the contrary the devil, no less timidly than cunningly, mixed a few words with the woman; and they are said to have had so much force that they were at once turned into the condition of natural things; indeed, that they overthrew all things inborn, made a perpetual necessity of evil, and set the devil as lord and possessor over the image of God.
Iulianum.6.20Quid ergo fortius, quid excellentius, quid magnificentius adversaria potestate, si tantum levi confabulatione fecit, quantum Deus nec operibus suis potuit, nec muneribus obtinere? Manifestum est itaque, in eius vos parte consistere, cuius tam immodice potentiam praedicatis; nec in cultum Dei nostri ullum habere consortium, quem nos ut aequissimum, ita omnipotentissimum confitemur, qui potens est, et veritas in circuitu eius, qui humiliat sicut vulneratum superbum, id est, diabolum et Manichaeum, vosque eius asseclas calumniantes naturam, ne vos sponte peccare fateamini. Ipse ergo Deus noster in virtute brachii sui disperdit inimicos suos (Cf. Ps 88, 9. 11), per quod nihil aut a vobis, aut a Manichaeis afferri potuit, quod non veritatis eius fulmine dissiliret.
What, then, is stronger, what more excellent, what more magnificent than the adversary power, if it did so much by a light little conversation as God could obtain neither by his works nor by his gifts? It is manifest, therefore, that you stand on the side of him whose power you proclaim so immoderately; nor have any fellowship in the worship of our God, whom we confess to be as most just, so most omnipotent, who is powerful, and truth is round about him, who humbles the proud one like a wounded man, that is, the devil and the Manichee, and you his followers slandering nature, lest you confess that you sin of your own accord. Our God, then, in the power of his arm scatters his enemies (See Ps 89:9, 11 (88:9, 11)), by which nothing could be brought forward either by you or by the Manichees, which would not be shattered by the thunderbolt of his truth.
Iulianum.6.20AUG. Assentatores diaboli non sumus, nec eius potestatem, quae Dei subiecta est potestati, adulatorio, sicut nobis conviciamini, praeconio laudis extollimus. Sed utinam vos non eius milites essetis, sicut omnes haeretici; quorum ille dogmata in quos potuerit, per vestras linguas velut tela mortifera iaculatur. Dicit Apostolus: Gratias agentes Patri, idoneos facienti nos in partem sortis sanctorum in lumine; qui eruit nos de potestate tenebrarum, et transtulit in regnum Filii caritatis suae (Col 1, 12-13); et vos istas gratias pro parvulis nos agere prohibetis, asserentes eos non esse sub potestate diaboli;
AUGUSTINE: We are not flatterers of the devil, nor do we, by an adulatory proclamation of praise, as you reproach us, exalt his power, which is subject to the power of God. But would that you were not his soldiers, like all heretics; whose dogmas he hurls, against whomever he can, through your tongues as though they were deadly weapons. The Apostle says: Giving thanks to the Father, who has made us fit for a share in the lot of the saints in light; who rescued us from the power of darkness, and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love (Col 1:12-13); and you forbid us to give these thanks for little ones, asserting that they are not under the power of the devil;
Iulianum.6.20utquid, nisi ut inde non eruantur, ne lucra diaboli minuantur? Dicit Iesus, qui secundum hoc nomen suum, salvum facit populum suum a peccatis eorum (Cf. Mt 1, 21): Nemo intrat in domum fortis, ut vasa eius eripiat, nisi prius alligaverit fortem (Mt 12, 29); et vos in hoc populo Christi, quem salvum facit a peccatis eorum, parvulos non esse contenditis, quos ut propriis, ita nec originalibus vultis obstrictos esse peccatis; et cum fallaci vestro sermone minuitis vires eius, quem dixit Veritas fortem, errore vestro eum facitis ad obtinendos parvulos fortiorem.
and why, except that they may not be rescued thence, lest the devil's gains be lessened? Jesus says, who according to this his name saves his people from their sins (See Matt 1:21): No one enters the house of the strong man, to seize his vessels, unless he first binds the strong man (Matt 12:29); and you contend that in this people of Christ, whom he saves from their sins, little ones are not, whom you are unwilling to be bound by sins, original as well as their own; and while by your deceptive speech you lessen the powers of him whom the Truth called strong, by your error you make him stronger for keeping hold of little ones.
Iulianum.6.20Dicit Iesus: Venit enim Filius hominis quaerere et salvum facere quod perierat (Lc 19, 10); et vos ei respondetis: Non opus est ut parvulos quaeras, quia non perierant; atque ita cum ab eis Salvatoris inquisitionem repellitis, potestatem contra eos vulneratoris augetis. Dicit Iesus: Non est necessarius sanis medicus, sed male habentibus; non veni vocare iustos, sed peccatores (Mt 9, 12-13); et vos ei dicitis: Non es ergo parvulis necessarius, quia nec voluntate sunt propria, nec humana origine peccatores. Cum ergo non salvos venire salvandos vetatis ad medicum, diabolica in eis exercet pestis potentius principatum. Quanto ergo est tolerabilius, ut tamquam parasiti et assentatores diabolum falsis laudibus mulceatis, quam sicut milites vel satellites eum dogmatum falsitatibus adiuvetis?
Jesus says: For the Son of man came to seek and to save what had perished (Luke 19:10); and you answer him: There is no need for you to seek little ones, because they had not perished; and so, while you repel from them the seeking of the Savior, you increase the power against them of the wounder. Jesus says: The healthy do not need a physician, but those who are ill; I did not come to call the just, but sinners (Matt 9:12-13); and you say to him: You are not, then, necessary to little ones, because they are sinners neither by their own will nor by human origin. Since, then, you forbid those to be saved to come to the physician as needing salvation, the diabolical plague exercises its sovereignty in them more powerfully. How much more tolerable, then, is it that, like parasites and flatterers, you should soothe the devil with false praises, than that, like soldiers or attendants, you should help him with the falsities of dogmas?
Iulianum.6.20Copioso et ornato describis eloquio, quomodo Deus ex limo formaverit hominem, flando animaverit, paradiso locupletaverit, praecepto adminiculaverit, tantamque curam, ne in aliquo eum gravaret, habuerit, ut idem praeceptum non in multa distenderet ne quid oneris homo, quem tanta benignitate condiderat, de multiplicata lege sentiret. Cur ergo nunc corpus corruptibile aggravat animam (Cf. Sap 9, 15)?
You describe, with copious and ornate eloquence, how God formed the human being from clay, animated him by breathing, enriched him with paradise, aided him with a precept, and had so great care, lest he burden him in anything, that he did not extend that precept to many things, lest the human being, whom he had founded with so great kindness, feel any burden from a multiplied law. Why, then, does the corruptible body now weigh down the soul (See Wis 9:15)?
Iulianum.6.20Cur ergo grave iugum est super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum (Cf. Eccli 40, 1)? Quandoquidem ipsum Adam nec lege multiplicata voluit aggravare. Nempe cernitis, quod si in paradiso nemo peccasset, ita fecunditas coniugum genere humano locum illum tantae felicitatis impleret, ut nec animam corruptibile corpus gravaret, nec iugum grave natos homines premeret, nec labor et dolor miserandos parvulos erudiret.
Why, then, is there a heavy yoke upon the sons of Adam, from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1)? Since he was unwilling to burden Adam himself even with a multiplied law. Surely you perceive that, if in paradise no one had sinned, the fruitfulness of the married would so fill that place of so great felicity with the human race, that neither would the corruptible body weigh down the soul, nor would a heavy yoke press the human beings born, nor would labor and pain instruct the pitiable little ones.
Iulianum.6.20Unde ergo ista sunt, quae utique non sunt de nescio qua mala, quam Manichaeus fingit, aut credit, a nobis aliena, nobisque permixta, nisi de nostra vitiata primi hominis transgressione natura? Sed miraris, homo acutus ac prudens, et non existimas esse credendum, quod diaboli exigua verba cum muliere commixta tantum virium habuisse dicuntur, ut naturalia cuncta bona perverterent; quasi hoc loquentis verba fecerint, non consensus audientis.
Whence, then, are these things, which surely are not from some evil thing or other, which the Manichee feigns, or believes, to be foreign to us and mingled with us, except from our nature vitiated by the transgression of the first man? But you marvel, acute and prudent man, and think it not to be believed, that the few words of the devil mingled with the woman are said to have had so much force that they perverted all the natural goods; as though the words of the speaker had done this, not the consent of the hearer.
Iulianum.6.20Non enim, ut dicis, pauca verba serpentis in conditionem versa sunt naturalium: sed hominis voluntas perdidit bonum, quod reddi non posset hominis voluntate, sed Dei, quando reddendum et quibus reddendum, iustissimus, potentissimus, et misericordissimus iudicabit; quemadmodum in corpore, sicut iam diximus, voluntate hominis potest eius visus auferri; quod si fit, sequitur caecitas, quam necessitas ferat, voluntas non auferat; et in animo potest hominis voluntas innocentiam eius perdere, et non potest reddere.
For not, as you say, were the few words of the serpent turned into the condition of natural things: but the will of the human being lost a good, which could not be restored by the will of the human being, but by that of God, when the most just, most powerful, and most merciful one shall judge it should be restored, and to whom it should be restored; just as, in the body, as we have already said, by the will of the human being his sight can be taken away; and if this is done, blindness follows, which necessity brings, but the will does not take away; and in the mind the will of the human being can lose its innocence, and cannot restore it.
Iulianum.6.20Illud potius intuere, quod mala cum quibus nascuntur homines, quae congenerari hominibus in paradisi felicitate non possent, profecto nisi de paradiso exisset natura vitiata, nunc eis congenerata non essent. Ista, quae manifesta sunt, aspice. Non enim mortalium mala a die exitus de ventre matris filiorum Adam, in obscuro conicimus; sed in luce clarissima cernimus. Haec quia non sunt ex malae alienae commixtione naturae; procul dubio ex depravatione nostrae sunt.
Consider rather this, that the evils with which human beings are born, which could not be co-generated with human beings in the felicity of paradise, surely, unless a vitiated nature had gone out of paradise, would not now be co-generated with them. Look at these things, which are manifest. For we do not conjecture in the dark about the evils of mortals from the day of the coming out of the mother's womb of the sons of Adam; but we see them in the clearest light. Since these are not from a mixture of a foreign evil nature, without doubt they are from the depravation of our own.
Iulianum.6.20Nec tibi videatur indignum, quod subiecta est diabolo imago Dei; hoc enim non fieret, nisi iudicio Dei; nec removetur ista damnatio, nisi gratia Dei. Qui enim naturae excellentia, ut imago Dei esset, ad similitudinem Dei factus est, non est mirandum, quia naturae depravatione, vanitati similis factus est, unde dies eius velut umbra praetereunt (Cf. Ps 143, 4).
Nor let it seem to you unworthy that the image of God is made subject to the devil; for this would not happen, except by the judgment of God; nor is that condemnation removed, except by the grace of God. For he who, by the excellence of his nature, so that he might be the image of God, was made to the likeness of God, it is not to be wondered at that, by the depravation of his nature, he was made like to vanity, whence his days pass away like a shadow (See Ps 144:4 (143:4)).
Iulianum.6.20Tu dic, cur innumerabiles imagines Dei in parvula aetate nulla peccata facientes, non admittantur ad regnum Dei, si non renascantur. Habent enim aliquid unde mereantur iacere sub diabolo, propter quod non merentur regnare sub Deo; cuius si lumini cohaereres, non tanta arrogantia verba tua fulmini comparares.
You say why innumerable images of God, in their tender age committing no sins, are not admitted to the kingdom of God, if they are not reborn. For they have something whereby they deserve to lie under the devil, on account of which they do not deserve to reign under God; to whose light if you clung, you would not, with such great arrogance, compare your words to the thunderbolt.
Iulianum.6.2021. IUL. Liquet igitur absolutissime nullo Augustinum a praeceptore suo differre, sed disputationibus eius non minus Adae, quam ceterorum naturam pessimam definiri. Denique ut adhuc aliquid cum eodem de his, quae egimus, disseramus, apparet te etiam primi peccati non idem genus, quod aliarum putare culparum. Nam cum dicis flagitia temporum secutorum in naturam transire non posse, verbi gratia, ut de peculatore, de parricida, de incesto orti filii generantum peccatis nascantur obnoxii; nec ullum crimen esse quod seminibus misceatur, praeter illud unum, apertissime ostendis illam inobedientiam non te eiusdem generis arbitrari, cuius etiam ceterae sunt.
21. JULIAN: It is therefore most absolutely clear that Augustine differs in nothing from his master, but that by his arguments the nature not only of Adam but of all others is defined most evil. Finally, that we may still discuss something with him about the things we have treated, it appears that you think the first sin too is not of the same kind as the other faults. For when you say that the disgraceful deeds of the times that followed cannot pass into nature—for example, that sons born of an embezzler, of a parricide, of an incestuous man are born liable to the sins of those generating them; and that there is no crime which is mixed into the seeds, except that one alone—you show most openly that you do not judge that disobedience to be of the same kind as the others are.
Iulianum.6.21Vide ergo interrogatio nostra quantae sit brevitatis et lucis. Si peccatum, quod Adam commisit, voluntate susceptum est, et potuit fieri naturale, cur non haec quae fiunt quotidie peccata, quae voluntas criminosa committit, in deformitatem et praeiudicia seminum congeruntur? Quod si ista non minus atrocia, quam plura, ingenerari nequeunt; qua lege, qua conditione, quo privilegio illud solum vindicatur ingenitum? Si unius generis peccata sunt, quae novimus, quae lex arguit, quae aequitas punit, et illud primi hominis, quod voluntate commissum et aequitate punitum est; cur non aut ista ex illo intellegimus, aut illud ex istis? Aut si mutuo sibi testimonio esse non possunt, qua impudentia denegatur illa praevaricatio alterius conditionis fuisse, id est, non de voluntate, sed naturali tabe prolata?
See, then, how great is the brevity and clarity of our question. If the sin which Adam committed was taken up by will, and could become natural, why are not these sins which are committed daily, which a criminal will commits, heaped into the deformity and prejudgments of the seeds? But if these, no less atrocious than numerous, cannot be engendered, by what law, by what condition, by what privilege is that one alone avenged as inborn? If the sins which we know, which the law charges, which equity punishes, are of one kind, and that of the first man, which was committed by will and punished by equity; why do we not either understand these from that, or that from these? Or if they cannot be mutual testimony to each other, with what effrontery is it denied that that transgression was of another condition, that is, brought forth not from will but from a natural taint?
Iulianum.6.21Postremo, aude cum assertione traducis definire quodcumque peccatum, non dico illud primum, sed interim vel de his quae nunc fiunt, verbi gratia, sacrilegium, flagitium, vel malum quodpiam facinus; id est, haec peccata quam definitionem habeant, explicato. Dices sine dubio: Voluntas est appetens quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere. Quia si voluntas mala non esset, peccatum esse non posset. Ad hoc quam rationabiliter assurgamus intende. O hebetudinem, o impudentiam non ferendam! Definis non esse peccatum nisi voluntatem liberam, et a iustitia prohibitam, cum mali naturalis opinio praescribat esse peccatum, cum quo nascitur homo, non voluntarium. Non est ergo verum, culpam non esse, nisi quae sponte committitur; quia est crimen, et maximum, quod non sponte, sed nascendo suscipitur. Remitte igitur definitionem peccati, quae Catholicis amica ad vos nec hospitii iure deflectit, atque ea remissa, proba te non esse illorum commilitonem, qui ipsam substantiam invidia pravitatis oppugnant.
Finally, dare, with the assertion of transmission, to define any sin whatever—I do not say that first one, but for the present even of those which are now committed, for example, sacrilege, a disgraceful deed, or any evil crime; that is, explain what definition these sins have. You will without doubt say: It is a will desiring what justice forbids, and from which one is free to abstain. For if it were not an evil will, it could not be sin. Attend to how reasonably we rise up to this. O dullness, O effrontery not to be borne! You define that there is no sin except a free will, and one forbidden by justice, when the opinion of natural evil prescribes that there is a sin, with which the human being is born, not voluntary. It is not, then, true that there is no fault except what is committed of one's own accord; because there is a crime, and the greatest, which is taken up not of one's own accord but by being born. Send away, then, the definition of sin, which, a friend to the Catholics, does not turn aside to you even by the right of hospitality, and, that being sent away, prove that you are not the fellow soldier of those who attack the very substance by the malice of depravity.
Iulianum.6.21Et ut quod egimus colligatur: aut nullum docebitur voluntarium, si est aliquod naturale peccatum; aut nullum erit naturale, si omne peccatum voluntarium definitur; conficiturque ex his, ut aut neges nasci posse peccatum, et transeas in Catholicorum fidem; aut si perstiteris non aliquod, sed maximum crimen sine voluntate suscipi per naturam, reddas nomen tuum etiam Manichaeo, cui totum praestas obsequium.
And, that what we have argued may be gathered: either no voluntary sin will be taught, if there is any natural sin; or there will be none natural, if every sin is defined voluntary; and from these it is concluded that either you deny that sin can be born, and pass into the faith of the Catholics; or, if you persist that not just any but the greatest crime is taken up without will through nature, you surrender your name even to the Manichee, to whom you render total obedience.
Iulianum.6.21AUG. Magnam te mihi putas invidiam comparare, cum dicis, nihil me a meo praeceptore differre; at ego in laudem meam tua sumo convicia; nec quod cogitas, sed quod verbis sonas, revocans ad fidem meam, sicut me intellegere oportet, intellego. Verum enim dicis et nescis; sicut Caiphas pontifex persecutor Christi, scelera cogitabat, et salubria nesciens verba dicebat (Cf. Io 11, 49-52).
AUGUSTINE: You think you procure great odium for me, when you say that I differ in nothing from my master; but I take your reproaches as my praise; nor do I understand what you think, but what you sound in words, recalling it to my faith, as I ought to understand. For you say what is true and do not know it; just as Caiaphas the high priest, the persecutor of Christ, thought of crimes, and unknowingly spoke salutary words (See John 11:49-52).
Iulianum.6.21Gaudeo prorsus, in hac quae inter nos vertitur quaestione, me nihil a meo praeceptore differre; primo, quia ipse Dominus docuit me, mortuos esse parvulos, nisi ipse eos vivificet, qui pro omnibus mortuus est; quod exponens Apostolus dicit: Ergo omnes mortui sunt, et pro omnibus mortuus est (2 Cor 5, 14-15). Et tu contradicis, negans parvulos mortuos, ne vivificentur in Christo, cum fatearis mortuum etiam pro parvulis Christum. Hoc me docet etiam Ioannes omnium Praeceptoris Apostolus, qui dicit: Ideo venisse Filium Dei, ut solvat opera diaboli; quae vos negatis in parvulis solvi, quasi propter illos non venerit, qui ideo venit ut solvat opera diaboli (Cf. 1 Io 3, 8).
I rejoice outright that, in this question which is turned between us, I differ in nothing from my master; first, because the Lord himself taught me that little ones are dead, unless he himself make them alive, who died for all; which, expounding, the Apostle says: Therefore all are dead, and he died for all (2 Cor 5:14-15). And you contradict, denying that little ones are dead, lest they be made alive in Christ, although you confess that Christ died even for little ones. This John too, the Apostle of the Teacher of all, teaches me, who says: That the Son of God came for this, that he might destroy the works of the devil; which you deny are destroyed in little ones, as though he had not come for them, who came for this, that he might destroy the works of the devil (See 1 John 3:8).
Iulianum.6.21Praeceptores etiam meos negare non debeo, qui me ad hoc intellegendum suo litterario labore iuverunt. Meus praeceptor est Cyprianus, qui dicit: Infantem secundum Adam carnaliter natum, contagium mortis antiquae prima nativitate traxisse, et hoc ipso ad remissionem peccatorum accipiendam facilius accedere, quod ei remittuntur non propria, sed aliena peccata (Cf. CYPRIANUS, Ep. 64 ad Fidum). Meus est praeceptor Ambrosius, cuius non solum libros legi, sed verba etiam loquentis audivi, et per eum lavacrum regenerationis accepi. Longe sum quidem impar meritis eius; sed confiteor et profiteor me in hac causa nihil ab hoc meo praeceptore differre. Cui absit ut audeas praeferre Pelagium praeceptorem tuum; quem tamen ego contra te de Ambrosio teneo testem meum. Pelagius enim dixit, quod eius fidem et purissimum in Scripturis sensum ne inimicus quidem ausus est reprehendere (Cf. PELAGIUS, De lib. arb., 3). Quem sic tu audes reprehendere, ut quod ait discordiam carnis per praevaricationem primi hominis in nostram vertisse naturam (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 12, 53), et quidquid aliud de vitiata per Adam natura humana sensit et dixit, Manichaei affirmes esse commentum.
I ought not to deny my teachers either, who helped me by their literary labor to understand this. My teacher is Cyprian, who says that the infant, born carnally according to Adam, drew the contagion of the ancient death by his first birth, and by this very thing comes the more easily to receiving the forgiveness of sins, that to him are forgiven not his own but others' sins (See Cyprian, Letter 64, to Fidus). My teacher is Ambrose, whose books I not only read, but heard him too speaking the words, and through him I received the laver of regeneration. I am indeed far unequal to his merits; but I confess and profess that in this cause I differ in nothing from this my teacher. To whom far be it that you dare to prefer Pelagius your teacher; whom I nevertheless hold, against you, as my witness about Ambrose. For Pelagius said that his faith and most pure sense in the Scriptures not even an enemy dared to reproach (See Pelagius, On Free Will 3). Whom you so dare to reproach, that what he says—that the discord of the flesh, by the transgression of the first man, turned into our nature (See Ambrose, On Luke 7.12.53), and whatever else he thought and said about human nature vitiated through Adam—you affirm to be an invention of the Manichee.
Iulianum.6.21Sane testimonium praeceptoris tui in hoc tanto viro ex parte custodis, quod eum non audes aperte reprehendere: sed cum mihi nominatim conviciaris lingua maledica et fronte proterva, profecto et illum et alios, qui eadem senserunt atque dixerunt, Ecclesiae catholicae magnos clarosque doctores tanto nequius, quanto obliquius criminaris. Ego itaque adversus te et meam defendo et illorum fidem, quos palam times habere inimicos, et invitus pateris iudices.
Indeed, you keep in part the testimony of your teacher about so great a man, in that you do not dare openly to reproach him: but when you reproach me by name with a slanderous tongue and a shameless front, you surely accuse both him and others who thought and said the same things—great and famous teachers of the Catholic Church—the more wickedly the more obliquely. I therefore, against you, defend both my own faith and theirs, whom you openly fear to have as enemies, and unwillingly endure as judges.
Iulianum.6.21Absit autem ut apud tales iudices valeant aliquid argumentationes tuae, in quibus peccato illi magno, hoc est, praevaricationi primi hominis, peccata consequentium temporum comparas, et putas si scelere primi hominis natura generis humani mutata est, etiam nunc parentum scelera naturam debuisse mutare filiorum. Haec enim dicens non respicis peccatores illos, posteaquam peccatum illud grande fecerunt, et de paradiso esse dimissos, et a ligno vitae tanta severitate prohibitos. Numquid scelerati temporum istorum in aliquas inferiores terras proiciuntur de hoc orbe terrarum, cum hic ipsa scelera quamlibet magna commiserint? Numquid a ligno vitae, quod in hac miseria nullum est, prohibentur? Sed persistit generis humani locus et vita, in quibus et homines impiissimi vivunt; cum videamus illorum impiorum locum et vitam, sicut erat ante peccatum, post peccatum non potuisse consistere.
But far be it that your arguments should carry any weight before such judges—arguments in which you compare the sins of later ages to that great sin, that is, to the transgression of the first man, and suppose that, if the nature of the human race was changed by the crime of the first man, then even now the crimes of parents ought to change the nature of their children. For in saying this you fail to consider that those sinners, after they committed that grave sin, were sent out of paradise and barred from the tree of life with great severity. Are the criminals of these times cast down into some lower lands away from this earthly world, however great the crimes they have committed here? Are they barred from the tree of life, which does not exist in this misery? No, the place and life of the human race continue, in which even the most impious men go on living; whereas we see that the place and life of those impious ones could not, after their sin, remain as they were before their sin.
Iulianum.6.21Debuerunt autem, secundum opinionem vestram, parvuli nullo reatu obligati, mox ut nascuntur, tamquam innocentes imagines Dei perferri ab Angelis in paradisum Dei, et illic sine ullo labore et dolore nutriri, ut si quis eorum peccasset, ipse inde merito proiceretur, ne crescerent imitatione peccata. Nunc vero cum solus audierit qui in paradisi felicitate peccavit: Spinas et tribulos terra pariet tibi, maledicta in omnibus operibus tuis; et in sudore vultus tui edes panem tuum (Gen 3, 16-19); nullum hominum videmus a poena laboris alienum, qui utique labor beatos habitatores paradisi non erat gravaturus. Et cum sola mulier eius audierit: In tristitia paries filios, nullam parientium ab hoc supplicio scimus immunem.
According to your opinion, however, little ones, bound by no guilt, ought, as soon as they are born, to be carried by angels into the paradise of God as innocent images of God, and there to be nourished without any labor or pain, so that if one of them sinned, he would deservedly be cast out of it, lest sins grow by imitation. But as things now are, although he alone who sinned in the happiness of paradise heard, Thorns and thistles shall the earth bring forth to you, cursed in all your works; and in the sweat of your face you shall eat your bread (Gen 3:16-19), we see no human being free from the punishment of labor—a labor that surely was not going to weigh down the blessed dwellers of paradise. And although his wife alone heard, In sorrow you shall bring forth children, we know of no woman in childbirth who is exempt from this suffering.
Iulianum.6.21Numquid ergo ita estis absurdi, ut aut in paradiso existimetis homines istas aerumnas fuisse passuros si nemo peccasset, quas manifestissimum est, Deum nonnisi praevaricatoribus illis tunc hominibus intulisse; aut nunc eas negetis eorum posteros perpeti paradisi exsules, et ubique terrarum tot et tantas miserias perferentes; aut dicturi estis, quanto magis quisque est peccator et impius, tanto magis eius agros parere spinas et tribulos, et tanto magis eum sudare laboribus; et quanto est quaeque mulier iniquior, tanto eam parientem dolores perpeti graviores? Sicut ergo poenae humanarum miseriarum, quas communiter perferunt filii Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum, ideo sunt omnium, quia parentes communes sunt omnium, de quorum praevaricatione ista venerunt; ita ipsorum duorum praevaricatio tam magnum peccatum debet intellegi, ut posset omnium ex viro et muliere nascentium in deterius mutare naturam, et communi reatu tamquam hereditarii debiti obligare chirographum.
Are you then so absurd that either you suppose human beings would have suffered these hardships in paradise even if no one had sinned—hardships that, it is most evident, God then inflicted only on those transgressing human beings—or you deny that their descendants now endure them as exiles from paradise, bearing so many and such great miseries everywhere on earth; or you are going to say that the more anyone is a sinner and impious, the more his fields bring forth thorns and thistles, and the more he sweats at his labors; and the more wicked any woman is, the more grievous the pains she suffers in childbirth? Therefore, just as the punishments of human miseries, which the children of Adam bear in common from the day they come forth from their mother's womb, are the punishments of all because the parents are common to all, and from their transgression these things have come; so the transgression of those two ought to be understood as a sin so great that it could change for the worse the nature of all who are born of man and woman, and bind them by a common guilt, as it were the bond of an inherited debt.
Iulianum.6.21Quisquis ergo dicit talem conditionem quorumlibet delictorum, quae nunc committuntur, esse debuisse, qualis fuit conditio delicti illius, quod in illius vitae tanta felicitate, et tanta non peccandi facilitate commissum est; etiam ipsas duas vitas debet aequare, eam scilicet quae nunc agitur, et eam quae in illis sanctis et beatis deliciis agebatur. Quod si esse stolidissimum cernis, desine de peccatis praesentis saeculi velle praescribere, ne illud magnum peccatum habeat suam vim et suum meritum singulare. Quamquam et in hac vita omnipotens et iustus ille qui dicit: Reddam peccata patrum in filios (Ex 20, 5), parentum reatu etiam posteros irretiri satis evidenter ostendit, et quamvis mitiore nexu, tamen haereditarios debitores fieri, nisi eos, sicut iam in superioribus huius operis partibus disputavimus, a vinculo illius proverbii, quod dici solet: Patres manducaverunt uvam acerbam, et dentes filiorum obstupuerunt (Ier 31, 29), non vestrum argumentum, sed Novum Testamentum, nec generationis natura, sed gratia regenerationis absolvat.
Whoever, then, says that the condition of whatever offenses are now committed ought to have been like the condition of that offense which was committed amid such great happiness of that life and such great ease in not sinning, ought also to make those two lives equal—namely, the life now being lived and the life that was lived amid those holy and blessed delights. But if you see that this is utterly senseless, stop trying to lay down rules from the sins of the present age, lest that great sin lose its own force and its singular gravity. And yet even in this life that almighty and just one who says, I will repay the sins of the fathers upon the children (Exod 20:5), shows clearly enough that even later generations are entangled by the guilt of their parents and, though by a milder bond, nonetheless become inheritors of the debt—unless, as we have already argued in earlier parts of this work, not your argument but the New Testament, not the nature of generation but the grace of regeneration, frees them from the bond of that proverb which is commonly said: The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge (Jer 31:29).
Iulianum.6.21Definitio vero illa peccati, ubi intellegitur voluntas appetens quod iustitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere, illius peccati definitio est, quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod etiam poena peccati; quod nescio quoties tibi iam ad ista responsum est. Qui enim dicit: Non quod volo, bonum facio; sed quod nolo malum, hoc ago (Rom 7, 15), non illi ab hoc malo liberum est abstinere, et ideo invocat liberatorem, quia perdidit libertatem.
But that definition of sin, by which is understood the will seeking what justice forbids and from which one is free to abstain, is the definition of that sin which is only sin, not what is also the punishment of sin—something that has, I do not know how many times, already been answered for you in regard to these matters. For he who says, I do not do the good that I will, but the evil that I do not will, this I do (Rom 7:15), is not free to abstain from this evil, and therefore he calls upon a deliverer, because he has lost his freedom.
Iulianum.6.2122. IUL. Tempus admonet ut ad alia transeamus; sed in eodem loco restare aliquid indignatione compellor. Tune audeas dicere Adam voluntate peccasse? Unde tibi venit hoc somnium? Quia iniquum, inquis, erat, ut imputaret in peccatum Deus, nisi a quo abstinere liberum nosset. Quid ergo? Hanc iustitiam ille princeps tenebrarum quem colitis, ad momentum ei crediderat, et eam propediem reposcens hunc Deum omni aequitate destituit, ut qui intellexerat a primordio non esse imputandum in peccatum, nisi unde liberum fuerat abstinere, per omne reliquum tempus a cunctis nascentibus noverit abstinere liberum non fuisse?
22. Julian: The time warns us to pass on to other matters; but on this same point I am compelled by indignation to linger a little. Would you dare to say that Adam sinned by his will? Where did this dream come from to you? Because, you say, it would have been unjust for God to impute as sin anything but that from which he knew one was free to abstain. What then? Did that prince of darkness whom you worship entrust this justice to him for a moment, and, demanding it back almost at once, strip this God of all fairness, so that the God who had understood from the beginning that nothing was to be imputed as sin except that from which one had been free to abstain, came to know, for all the rest of time, that it had not been free for any who are born to abstain?
Iulianum.6.22Postremo, unde tu nosti illud tantummodo iustum fuisse, ut in Adam nisi voluntarium crimen non possit ulcisci; si iniustum esse non nosti, imputari cuiquam in crimen, quod fatearis sine voluntate susceptum? Aut ergo opinionem traducis iustam putabis, ut Dei possit convenire sententiae, cum imputat peccatum parvulo, quod sit nulla eius voluntate commissum, et cogeris illud quoque iustum et Dei conveniens iudiciis profiteri, ut Adae imputaverit in peccatum, quod noverat ab eo non voluntate, sed substantiae suae deformitate prolatum; perque hoc ipsum nulla erit tradux, nec depravata operantis arbitrio, sed male instituta ab exordio natura reprehendetur, confiteberisque te esse Manichaeum. Aut si resipiscens iniustum esse dixeris, ut Adam teneretur reus pro naturae suae culpis; irrefutabiliter consequitur, scelestissimum esse, si Abel, Enoch, Noe et omne hominum genus obnoxium crimini originali censeatur.
Finally, how do you know that this alone was just, that in Adam nothing but a voluntary crime could be punished, if you do not know that it is unjust to impute to anyone as a crime what you admit was incurred without the will? Either, then, you will think the doctrine of transmission just, so that it can accord with God's judgment when he imputes to a little one a sin that was committed by no will of his own—and you will be forced to profess that this too is just and in keeping with God's judgments, namely that he imputed to Adam as sin what he knew was produced by him not by will but by the deformity of his substance; and by this very fact there will be no transmission, nor will a nature depraved by the will of the doer be blamed, but a nature badly constituted from the beginning, and you will confess that you are a Manichee. Or, if coming to your senses you say it is unjust for Adam to be held guilty for the faults of his nature, it follows irrefutably that it is most wicked if Abel, Enoch, Noah, and the whole human race are reckoned liable to original guilt.
Iulianum.6.22Quod facinus iudicii si admoveas Deo tuo, solus pro omnibus remanebit reus; apparebitque, quod semper, non ipsum esse, quem catholici aequissimum in Trinitate veneramur. Quod si a Dei accusatione destiteris, Manichaeae traducis, qua hactenus confossus es, vel redivivus dogma damnabis.
If you bring the wickedness of this judgment against your God, he alone will remain guilty for all; and it will appear, as it always has, that he is not the one whom we Catholics venerate as most just in the Trinity. But if you desist from accusing God, then either you will be revived or you will condemn the doctrine of the transmission of sin, by which you have hitherto been run through.
Iulianum.6.22AUG. Hinc est quod vehementer erratis, hinc estis haeretici, hinc adversus catholicam fidem, quae evitans haereticos, eloquia divina sectatur, eisque munitur, novitias machinas humanis et vanis argumentationibus componere audetis; quoniam nescitis, et quod intellegere non potestis, credere recusatis, quid valeant in seriem generationis seminum nexus, et in creaturis quas Deus alias ex aliis secundum genus suum nasci voluit, quanta sint et quam sint ineffabilia, quamque etiam nullo penetrentur sensu, nulla cogitatione comprehendantur naturalia iura propaginis; unde iste sit insitus humano generi affectus, ut omnes, quantum ad ipsos attinet, certos filios velint habere; cui rei proficit in feminis castis foederis fides coniugalis;
Augustine: This is why you err so greatly, this is why you are heretics, this is why, against the Catholic faith—which, avoiding heretics, follows the divine words and is fortified by them—you dare to compose newfangled engines out of human and empty arguments; for you do not know, and you refuse to believe what you cannot understand, how much force lies in the bonds of seeds within the series of generation, and, in the creatures that God willed to be born one from another according to their kind, how great and how ineffable are the natural laws of propagation, and how they are penetrated by no sense, comprehended by no thought; whence comes this affection implanted in the human race, that all, as far as it concerns them, want to have children who are certainly their own; to which end conjugal fidelity to the covenant serves in chaste women;
Iulianum.6.22propter quod philosophus Plato iure displicuit, quia censuit permixte utendum feminis, in ea civitate, quam disputando velut optimam format, etiam ipse quid volens, nisi ut omnibus minoribus maiores eam redderent caritatem, quam videbat filiis ipsam debere naturam, cum quisque cogitaret esse posse filium suum, cuius eam videret aetatem, ut ex quacumque femina ignota qua indifferenter usus esset, suo natus semine non immerito crederetur. Quid? Illam vocem nonne de visceribus cunctorum patrum Cicero emisit ad filium, ad quem scribens ait: Solus es omnium, a quo me in omnibus vinci velim?
for which reason the philosopher Plato rightly fell into disfavor, because he held that women should be used in common in the city which, by way of discussion, he forms as the best one; and what did he himself want by this, except that all the elder men should show greater love to all the younger, the love that he saw nature itself owes to children, since each would consider that someone could be his own son whose age he saw to be such that, born from his own seed by any unknown woman whom he had used indiscriminately, the child might not unreasonably be believed to be his? And did not Cicero send forth that utterance from the heart of all fathers to his son, when, writing to him, he says: You alone of all are the one by whom I would wish to be surpassed in all things?
Iulianum.6.22Nonne ipsa quae occultissima esse diximus, et tamen plus quam credibile est valere cognoscimus, naturalia propaginis iura fecerunt, ut duo gemini non solum nondum gignentes, verum etiam nondum nascentes, adhuc in utero matris, duo populi dicerentur (Cf. Gen 25, 23)? Eadem propaginis naturalia iura fecerunt, ut Israel dicatur servisse in Aegypto (Cf. Deut 14, 22), Israel profectus esse ex Aegypto (Cf. Ex 14, 30), Israel in terram promissionis intrasse, Israel adeptus bona vel expertus mala, quae illi populo Deus vel praestitit vel inflixit. De quo etiam scriptum est: Veniet ex Sion qui eripiat et avertat impietatem a Iacob; et hoc illis a me testamentum, cum abstulero peccata eorum (Isai 59, 20-21); cum ille homo, qui haec duo nomina propria primus et solus accepit, longe ante defunctus, bona vel mala ista non viderit.
Was it not those very laws of propagation that we said are most hidden, and that we nonetheless recognize to have more force than is believable, that brought it about that two twins, not only not yet begetting, but indeed not yet born, while still in their mother's womb, were called two peoples (See Gen 25:23)? Those same natural laws of propagation brought it about that Israel is said to have served in Egypt (See Deut 14:22), Israel to have gone out from Egypt (See Exod 14:30), Israel to have entered the land of promise, Israel to have obtained good things or experienced evils which God either granted to or inflicted on that people. Of whom it is also written: There shall come out of Zion one who will rescue and turn away impiety from Jacob; and this is my covenant with them, when I shall take away their sins (Isa 59:20-21)—although that man who first and alone received these two proper names, having died long before, did not see those goods or evils.
Iulianum.6.22Haec propaginis naturalia iura fecerunt, ut idem populus decimaretur in Abraham, non ob aliud, nisi quia in lumbis eius erat, quando decimatus est ipse propria voluntate (Cf. Hebr 7, 9-10), ille autem populus non propria voluntate, sed naturali propaginis iure. Quomodo autem idem populus fuerit in lumbis Abrahae, non solum ex illo usque ad tempus quod scriptum est in Epistola ad Hebraeos, verum etiam ex ipso usque ad hoc tempus, et ab hoc usque in finem saeculi, quousque filii Israel alii ex aliis generantur; quomodo ergo esse potuerit in lumbis unius hominis tam innumerabilis hominum multitudo, quis eloquendo explicet, quis saltem inveniat cogitando?
These natural laws of propagation brought it about that the same people was tithed in Abraham, for no other reason than that it was in his loins when he himself was tithed by his own will (See Heb 7:9-10), while that people was tithed not by its own will but by the natural law of propagation. But how the same people was in Abraham's loins—not only from him down to the time written of in the Letter to the Hebrews, but also from him down to this present time, and from this time to the end of the age, as long as the children of Israel are begotten one from another—how, then, so innumerable a multitude of human beings could have been in the loins of one man, who could explain by speaking, who could even discover by thinking?
Iulianum.6.22Neque enim semina ipsa, quorum est quantitas corporalis, licet singula sint exigua, ex quibus singuli quique nascuntur, si congesta essent ex quibus tot homines nati sunt atque nascuntur, et in finem usque nascentur, potuissent lumbis unius hominis contineri. Vis ergo nescio quae invisibilis et incontrectabilis secretis naturalibus insita est, ubi iura propaginis naturalia delitescunt, propter quam vim tamen non utique mendaciter in lumbis illius patris fuisse dicuntur, quotquot ex illo uno potuerunt generationum successibus et multiplicationibus propagari. Non solum autem ibi fuerunt, verum etiam illo sciente et volente decimato, et ipsi sunt decimati neque scientes neque volentes, quoniam nondum exstiterant qui scire ac velle potuissent.
For the seeds themselves, whose quantity is corporeal, though each is tiny, from which each individual is born—if all the seeds from which so many human beings have been born and are born and will be born to the very end were heaped together, they could not have been contained in the loins of one man. There is, therefore, some invisible and untouchable force implanted in the secret recesses of nature, where the natural laws of propagation lie hidden, and on account of this force it is nonetheless said—not falsely—that all who could be propagated from that one man by successions and multiplications of generations were in the loins of that father. And not only were they there, but, when he was tithed knowingly and willingly, they too were tithed without knowing or willing it, since they did not yet exist as ones who could know and will.
Iulianum.6.22Hoc porro ideo dixit illius sacrae auctor Epistolae, ut sacerdotium Christi, quod figurabat sacerdos Melchisedech, qui decimavit Abraham, praeponeret Levitico sacerdotio; docens etiam ipsum Levi, qui decimabat fratres suos, hoc est, decimas ab eis accipiebat, decimatum fuisse a Melchisedech in Abraham; quia et ipse in lumbis Abrahae erat, quando decimavit eum Melchisedech, id est, ab eo decimas accepit. Ac per hoc Christum, cui dictum est: Tu es sacerdos in aeternum secundum ordinem Melchisedech (Ps 109, 4), non vult intellegi decimatum; ut Levitico sacerdotio merito praeferatur (Cf. Hebr 7); Melchisedech enim decimavit Abraham, non decimatus est, sicut Levi in Abraham.
Moreover, the author of that sacred Letter said this in order to set the priesthood of Christ, which the priest Melchizedek prefigured, who tithed Abraham, above the Levitical priesthood; teaching that even Levi himself, who tithed his brothers, that is, received tithes from them, was tithed by Melchizedek in Abraham, because he too was in Abraham's loins when Melchizedek tithed him, that is, received tithes from him. And by this he does not want Christ, to whom it was said, You are a priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek (Ps 110:4 (109:4)), to be understood as tithed, so that he may deservedly be preferred to the Levitical priesthood (See Heb 7); for Melchizedek tithed Abraham and was not tithed, as Levi was in Abraham.
Iulianum.6.22Si autem quaeritur, quomodo Christus non fuerit decimatus, cum etiam ipse, quod manifestum est, secundum originem carnis fuerit in lumbis Abrahae, quando a Melchisedech pater ille decimatus est; nihil occurrit nisi quod Maria quidem mater eius, de qua carnem sumpsit, de carnali concupiscentia parentum nata est; non autem Christum sic ipsa concepit, quem non de virili semine, sed de Spiritu Sancto procreavit. Non ergo pertinuit ad rationem virilis seminis, per quam fuerunt in lumbis Abrahae, quos in illo decimatos esse sacra Scriptura testatur.
But if it is asked how Christ was not tithed, since he too, as is evident, was in Abraham's loins according to the origin of the flesh when that father was tithed by Melchizedek, nothing comes to mind except that Mary indeed, his mother, from whom he took flesh, was born of the carnal concupiscence of her parents; but she did not so conceive Christ, whom she brought forth not from male seed but from the Holy Spirit. He did not, therefore, belong to the principle of male seed, through which those were in Abraham's loins whom Sacred Scripture testifies to have been tithed in him.
Iulianum.6.22Concupiscentia porro carnis, per quam iactus carnalium seminum provocatur, aut nulla in Adam fuit ante peccatum, aut in illo vitiata est per peccatum. Aut enim sine illa poterant et genitalia congruenter moveri, et coniugis gremio semen infundi, si nulla tunc fuit, aut ad nutum voluntatis etiam ipsa servire, si fuit. Nunc autem si talis esset, numquam caro contra spiritum concupisceret. Aut ergo ipsa vitium est, si nulla fuit ante peccatum; aut ipsa sine dubio est vitiata peccato; et ideo ex illa trahitur originale peccatum.
Now the concupiscence of the flesh, through which the emission of carnal seeds is provoked, either did not exist at all in Adam before sin, or was corrupted in him through sin. For either the genital organs could have been moved fittingly without it, and seed poured into the wife's lap, if there was none then; or it too could have served at the will's command, if there was any. But as things now are, if it were such, the flesh would never lust against the spirit. Therefore either it is itself a defect, if there was none before sin; or it is without doubt corrupted by sin; and so from it original sin is contracted.
Iulianum.6.22Fuit ergo in Mariae corpore carnalis materia, unde carnem sumpsit Christus; sed non in ea Christum carnalis concupiscentia seminavit. Unde ille natus est ex carne cum carne, in similitudine tamen carnis peccati, non sicut alii homines in carne peccati; propterea originale peccatum in aliis regeneratione dissolvit, non ipse generatione contraxit. Ideo Adam primus ille, secundus iste; quia sine carnis concupiscentia factus ille, natus est iste; sed ille tantum homo, iste vero et Deus et homo; et ideo ille potuit non peccare, non sicut iste peccare non potuit.
There was, then, in Mary's body carnal matter from which Christ took flesh; but carnal concupiscence did not sow Christ in her. Hence he was born from flesh with flesh, yet in the likeness of sinful flesh, not, like other human beings, in sinful flesh; and for this reason he dissolves original sin in others by regeneration, while he himself did not contract it by generation. Therefore that first Adam, this second; because the one was made without concupiscence of the flesh, the other was born so; but the one was only a man, while the other is both God and man; and therefore the one was able not to sin, not as the other was unable to sin.
Iulianum.6.22Frustra ergo peccato illius peccata filiorum eius quamlibet magna et horrenda, vel aequare, vel etiam praeferre conaris. Illius natura quanto magis sublimiter stabat, tanto magis graviter concidit. Natura illa talis fuit, ut nec mori posset, si peccare noluisset; natura illa talis fuit, ut in se discordiam carnis et spiritus non haberet; natura illa talis fuit, ut contra vitia sua nulla certaret; non quod ei cedebat, sed quod in eo nulla erant. Tunc ergo debes peccata posterorum eius peccato eius aequare, si talem; tunc vero et maiora ea dicere, si meliorem naturam potueris invenire.
In vain, then, do you try either to equate the sins of his children, however great and horrendous, with his sin, or even to set them above it. The more loftily his nature stood, the more grievously it fell. That nature was such that it could not even die, if it had not willed to sin; that nature was such that it did not have within itself the discord of flesh and spirit; that nature was such that it struggled against no vices of its own—not because it yielded to them, but because there were none in it. Then, therefore, you ought to equate the sins of his descendants with his sin, if you can find a nature like his; and then indeed you may call them even greater, if you can find a better nature.
Iulianum.6.22Natura quippe rationalis quanto est ipsa superior, tanto ruina eius peior, et peccatum eius quanto incredibilius, tanto est damnabilius. Ideo angelus irreparabiliter cecidit, quoniam cui plus datur, plus exigitur ab eo (Cf. Lc 12, 48); tanto itaque plus debebat obedientiae voluntariae, quanto plus habebat in bonitate naturae; unde sic punitus est non faciendo quod debuit, ut nec velle iam possit, aeternis etiam cruciatibus destinatus. Adam vero in tam multis posteris suis, ut eos ullus numerare non possit, gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum a sempiterno supplicio liberatur, et in se ipso quamvis a sua morte post annorum aliquot millia, quando Christus pro nobis mortuus ad loca mortuorum, non necessitate, sed potestate descendit, et dolores solvit inferni (Cf. Act 2, 24). Sic enim eum intellegenda est a delicto suo eduxisse Sapientia (Cf. Sap 10, 2), quia per carnem sanctam unici Filii Dei quam progeneravit, patrem generis humani, ac sic etiam patrem Christi, qui pro salute hominum factus est homo, ab illis vinculis tunc solutum, non merito suo, sed gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum, non inaniter credit Ecclesia.
For the higher a rational nature is, the worse is its ruin, and the more incredible its sin, the more damnable it is. That is why the angel fell irreparably, since from him to whom more is given, more is required (See Luke 12:48); he therefore owed so much the more voluntary obedience as he had the more in the goodness of his nature; whence he was so punished, by not doing what he owed, that now he cannot even will it, being destined also for eternal torments. But Adam, in so many of his descendants that no one could count them, is freed from everlasting punishment by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord; and he is freed in his own person too—though after some thousands of years from his own death—when Christ, having died for us, descended to the places of the dead, not by necessity but by power, and loosed the pains of hell (See Acts 2:24). For it is thus that Wisdom must be understood to have brought him out of his offense (See Wis 10:2): the Church does not believe in vain that, through the holy flesh of the only Son of God which she begot, the father of the human race—and so also the father of Christ, who for the salvation of human beings became a man—was then loosed from those bonds, not by his own merit, but by the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord.
Iulianum.6.22Hoc ergo imputavit in peccatum Deus primo Adae, unde abstinere illi liberum fuit; sed ipse primus Adam naturae tam excellentis fuit, quoniam vitiata non fuit, ut peccatum eius tam longe maius ceterorum peccatis esset, quam longe melior ipse ceteris fuit; unde et poena eius, quae peccatum eius continuo subsecuta est, tam grandis apparuit, ut continuo etiam teneretur necessitate moriendi, cuius erat in potestate non mori; et de loco tantae felicitatis foras continuo mitteretur, et a ligno vitae continuo vetaretur. Hoc autem quando factum est, in lumbis eius erat genus humanum. Unde secundum illa, quae praelocuti sumus, nimis occulta et multum valentia naturalia iura propaginis, consequens erat ut qui erant in lumbis eius per cuncupiscentiam carnis venturi in hoc saeculum, simul damnarentur; sicut consequens erat ut qui eo iure propaginis et ratione seminis erant in lumbis Abrahae, simul decimarentur.
This, then, God imputed as sin to the first Adam—that from which he was free to abstain; but that first Adam was of so excellent a nature, since it had not yet been corrupted, that his sin was as much greater than the sins of the rest as he was far better than the rest; whence his punishment too, which immediately followed his sin, appeared so great that he was at once held by the necessity of dying, who had it in his power not to die; and he was at once sent forth from the place of such great happiness, and was at once forbidden the tree of life. But when this was done, the human race was in his loins. Hence, according to those most hidden and most powerful natural laws of propagation of which we spoke before, it followed that those who were in his loins, going to come into this world through concupiscence of the flesh, were condemned together with him; just as it followed that those who, by that law of propagation and the principle of seed, were in Abraham's loins were tithed together with him.
Iulianum.6.22Omnes itaque filii Adae in illo aspersi sunt contagione peccati et mortis conditione devincti. Ac per hoc quamvis sint parvuli, et bonum quidquam vel malum non agant voluntate; tamen quia induti sunt illo, qui voluntate peccavit, trahunt ab illo peccati reatum, mortisque supplicium; sicut parvuli qui Christo induuntur, quamvis nihil boni fecerint sua voluntate, sumunt ab illo participationem iustitiae, et vitae praemium sempiternae. Ita forma futuri a contrario Christus ostenditur, propter quod ait idem Apostolus: Sicut induimus imaginem terreni, induamus et imaginem eius qui de caelo est (1 Cor 15, 49).
And so all the children of Adam were sprinkled in him with the contagion of sin and bound by the condition of death. And by this, although they are little ones and do nothing good or evil by their will, nevertheless, because they are clothed with him who sinned by his will, they draw from him the guilt of sin and the punishment of death; just as little ones who are clothed with Christ, although they have done nothing good by their own will, receive from him a share in justice and the reward of eternal life. Thus Christ is shown to be a figure of the one to come by way of contrast, on account of which the same Apostle says: As we have borne the image of the earthly, let us also bear the image of him who is from heaven (1 Cor 15:49).
Iulianum.6.22Quae cum ita sint, ille dicat, peccato et morte primi Adam non indui qui nascuntur, quisquis dicere audet iustitia et vita Adam secundi non indui qui renascuntur; quamvis nec illi peccatum fecerint unde liberum est abstinere, nec isti iustitiam quam liberum est facere.
Since these things are so, let him say that those who are born are not clothed with the sin and death of the first Adam, whoever dares to say that those who are reborn are not clothed with the justice and life of the second Adam—although neither did the former commit a sin from which one is free to abstain, nor did the latter do the justice which one is free to do.
Iulianum.6.2223. IUL. Illud ergo peccatum, quod ipsum hominem in paradiso in peius mutavit, quia multo est grandius quam iudicare nos possumus, ab omni nascente trahitur (De nupt. et concup. 2, 34, 58). Quis tibi dixit quoniam peccatum Adae multo fuerit grandius quam Cain? Multo etiam quam Sodomitarum? Multo postremo immanius quam tuum atque Manichaei? Certe in historia nulla istius vanitatis invenitur occasio. Iussum fuerat ut edulio unius arboris abstineret; rudis, imperitus, incautus, sine experimento timoris, sine exemplo iustitiae, suggestu mulieris usurpavit escam, cuius illexerat et suavitas, et venustas. Vide hic transgressionem fuisse mandati. Admissa est praevaricatio una de ceteris, quas diversis temporibus peccantium studia perpetrarunt; non fuit amplius, quam cum populus Israelis interdictis utebatur animalibus. Causa enim peccati haud in qualitate pomi erat, sed in transgressione mandati. Quid ergo tale fecit Adam, ut peccatum eius exstitisse supra aestimationem hominum crimineris? Nisi forte et hoc saecundum mysteria Manichaei, qui a decerptione pomorum et omnium nascentium manus cohibet, ne partem Dei sui laceret, quam corticibus et graminibus opinatur inclusam, tu quoque Adam graviter deliquisse, quia cum esu pomi, Dei tui substantiam laceraverit, arbitraris.
23. Julian: That sin, then, which changed man himself in paradise for the worse, because it is far greater than we can judge, is drawn from every one who is born (Marriage and Desire 2.34.58). Who told you that Adam's sin was far greater than Cain's? Far greater even than that of the men of Sodom? Far more monstrous, finally, than yours and Mani's? Surely no occasion for this vanity is found in the narrative. He had been commanded to abstain from eating of one tree; raw, inexperienced, incautious, without any experience of fear, without any example of justice, at the woman's suggestion he took the food whose sweetness and loveliness had enticed him. See, here there was a transgression of a command. One transgression was committed among the others which the eagerness of sinners has perpetrated at various times; it was no greater than when the people of Israel made use of forbidden animals. For the cause of the sin lay not in the quality of the fruit, but in the transgression of the command. What, then, did Adam do of such a kind that you charge his sin to have been beyond human estimation? Unless perhaps, according to the mysteries of Mani—who keeps his hands from the plucking of fruits and of all growing things, lest he tear the part of his god which he supposes to be enclosed in bark and grass—you too judge that Adam grievously offended because, by eating the fruit, he tore the substance of your god.
Iulianum.6.23O furorem! Quia multo est grandius illud peccatum, quam iudicare nos possumus, ab omni - inquit - nascente trahitur. Maius ergo fuit crimen pomum edere, cum non liceret, quam sanctum Abel parricidali livore confodere, quam hospitum in Sodomis et sexuum iura violare, quam filios suos iam sub lege demoniis immolare, quam innocentes postremo nullius conscios voluntatis, recens opus Dei, diaboli regno subdere, meritisque coniungere,
O madness! Because that sin is far greater than we can judge, it is drawn—he says—from every one who is born. Was it then a greater crime to eat the fruit when it was not permitted, than to stab holy Abel out of murderous spite, than to violate in Sodom the rights of guests and of the sexes, than to sacrifice their own children to demons even under the law, than, finally, to subject the innocent—conscious of no will, the recent work of God—to the kingdom of the devil and to join them to his deserts,
Iulianum.6.23quam Deum iniquitatis arguere, quam honorabiles nuptias tenebrarum principi deputare, postremo parvulos, quia nascantur per generantium
than to accuse God of iniquity, than to attribute honorable marriage to the prince of darkness, than, finally, because little ones are born through their begetters
Iulianum.6.23non fingo, sed colligo; tu quippe illud peccatum ita universis criminibus maius grandiusque dixisti, ut nullo possit aequiparari reatu. Huius autem tam mali magni, quod omnibus vitiis praeponderat, plenos advenire parvulos asseveras. Bene itaque intelleximus, quod quanto maioris peccati participes sunt, tanto in condemnatione scelestis omnibus praeferantur.
I do not invent, but gather; for you have said that that sin is so much greater and graver than all crimes that it can be matched by no guilt. And you assert that little ones come full of this so great evil, which outweighs all vices. Rightly, then, have we understood that, the greater the sin they share in, the more they are set, in condemnation, above all the wicked.
Iulianum.6.23AUG. Propter verba mea, quae posuisti de libro meo, velut refellenda, si posses, ubi dixi: Illud ergo peccatum quod in paradiso ipsum hominem mutavit in peius, quia multo est grandius quam iudicare nos possumus, ab omni nascente trahitur; quaeris a me quis mihi dixerit, quod peccatum Adae multo fuerit grandius quam Cain, multo etiam quam Sodomitarum. Quod ego quidem non expressi verbis meis, sed ea tu sic intellexisti; ego enim dixi grandius quam iudicare nos possumus illud esse peccatum; non dixi grandius quam Cain vel Sodomitarum. Prohibiti enim pomi usurpatio, quoniam sic vindicata est, ut natura quae potestatem non moriendi habebat, haberet moriendi necessitatem, procul dubio iudicia cuncta excedit humana. Pomum quippe lege Dei vetitum manducare, leve videretur esse peccatum; sed quanti hoc aestimaverit qui non potest falli, satis apparet granditate supplicii.
Augustine: On account of my words, which you set down from my book as if to be refuted, if you could, where I said: That sin, then, which changed man himself in paradise for the worse, because it is far greater than we can judge, is drawn from every one who is born—you ask me who told me that Adam's sin was far greater than Cain's, far greater even than that of the men of Sodom. This indeed I did not express in my words, but you so understood them; for I said that that sin is greater than we can judge; I did not say greater than Cain's or the men of Sodom's. For the seizing of the forbidden fruit, since it was punished in such a way that a nature which had the power of not dying came to have the necessity of dying, doubtless exceeds all human judgments. To eat a fruit forbidden by the law of God would seem a slight sin; but how great he who cannot be deceived reckoned it appears clearly enough from the greatness of the punishment.
Iulianum.6.23Cain vero fratricidae apparet omnibus immane peccatum, et scelus esse constat horrendum; quod si, ut tu facis, pomo illicite decerpto, per humanum comparetur examen, ridicula comparatio iudicabitur; qui tamen fratricida, quamvis quandoque moriturus, nec morte punitus est, qua solent humanis iudiciis talia crimina vindicari. Ait quippe illi Deus: Operaberis terram, et non adiciet virtutem suam dare tibi; gemens et tremens eris super terram. Et cum ille audiens terram non sibi daturam fructum secundum laborem suum, et super eam cum gemitu et tremore miserum se futurum, magis mortis formidine quateretur, ne quis ei faceret, quod ipse fecerat fratri; posuit ei Deus signum, ne quisquam eum, cum invenisset, occideret (Cf. Gen 4, 12-15).
But the sin of Cain the fratricide appears monstrous to all, and is agreed to be a horrendous crime; yet if, as you do, it is compared—by human examination—with the unlawful plucking of a fruit, the comparison will be judged ridiculous; and yet that fratricide, though one day to die, was not punished by the death with which such crimes are usually avenged in human courts. For God says to him: You shall till the earth, and it shall not yield up its strength to give to you; groaning and trembling shall you be upon the earth. And when he, hearing that the earth would not give him fruit in proportion to his labor, and that upon it he would be wretched with groaning and trembling, was shaken the more with the dread of death, lest anyone do to him what he himself had done to his brother, God set a sign upon him, that no one finding him should kill him (See Gen 4:12-15).
Iulianum.6.23Hic rursus ingens culpa, et levis poena; sed hominum iudiciis hoc videtur, qui nec mysteria ista cognoscunt, et hominum culpas tam liquido atque integro examine, quam Deus pensare non possunt. Sodomitae sane igne super illam terram veniente de caelo, poena suis factis congruente, sunt consumpti (Cf. Gen 19, 1-25); sed ibi erant et parvuli, te patrono, puri et liberi ab omni contagione peccati, nec tamen iustus et misericors Deus tot innocentes imagines suas per Angelorum ministerium, quod ei facillimum fuit, ante rapuit de incendio Sodomorum, aut sicut tribus illis in camino viris (Cf. Dan 3, 49-50), innoxias eis flammas, quibus parentes eorum cremabantur, omnipotens praebuit.
Here again a huge fault and a light punishment; but so it seems to the judgments of human beings, who neither know these mysteries nor can weigh human faults with so clear and whole an examination as God can. The men of Sodom, to be sure, were consumed when fire came upon that land from heaven, a punishment fitting their deeds (See Gen 19:1-25); but there were little ones there too—on your view, pure and free from all contagion of sin—and yet the just and merciful God did not, through the ministry of angels, which would have been most easy for him, snatch so many innocent images of his away beforehand from the burning of Sodom, nor did the Almighty make the flames by which their parents were being burned harmless to them, as he did to those three men in the furnace (See Dan 3:49-50).
Iulianum.6.23Ista considera, ista diligenter et pie cogita; et videns in hoc saeculo pusillos cum magnis, pariter talibus miseriis subiacere, quales nullo modo possent in Dei paradiso, si nemo peccasset, existere; agnosce originale peccatum, et iustum grave iugum super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum (Cf. Eccli 40, 1); et noli eos tua defensione amplius aggravare, aegrotis vel mortuis salvatorem et vivificatorem denegans Christum.
Consider these things, ponder them carefully and devoutly; and, seeing in this age the little ones together with the great lying under such miseries—miseries to which they could in no way be subject in God's paradise, if no one had sinned—acknowledge original sin, and the just heavy yoke upon the children of Adam from the day they come forth from their mother's womb (See Sir 40:1); and do not by your defense weigh them down still more, denying Christ the Savior and giver of life to the sick or the dead.
Iulianum.6.23Nam si quaeris, quis mihi dixerit quam magnum peccatum Adam perpetrarit, ipse est qui dixit et tibi; sed si habes aures audiendi, audies eum; habebis autem eas, si non illas tuas arbitrio tribuas, sed ab illo accipias qui dixit: Dabo eis cor cognoscendi me, et aures audientes (Bar 2, 31). Quis enim, nisi qui talibus auribus caret, non audit Scripturam sine ulla obscuritate vel ambiguitate dicentem homini primo peccatori: Terra es, et in terram ibis (Gen 3, 19)? Ubi evidenter ostenditur, non eum fuisse vel carne moriturum, id est, in terram, unde caro eius sumpta fuerat, morte ipsius carnis iturum, nisi propter peccatum hoc audire perpetique meruisset, unde postea dixit Apostolus: Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum (Rom 7, 10).
For if you ask who told me how great a sin Adam committed, it is the very one who told you too; but if you have ears to hear, you will hear him; and you will have them if you do not ascribe them to your own will, but receive them from him who said: I will give them a heart to know me, and ears that hear (Bar 2:31). For who, unless he lacks such ears, does not hear Scripture saying without any obscurity or ambiguity to the first sinful man: You are earth, and into earth you shall go (Gen 3:19)? Here it is evidently shown that he would not even have died in the flesh—that is, gone into the earth from which his flesh had been taken, by the death of that flesh—had he not, on account of sin, deserved to hear and to suffer this; whence the Apostle afterward said: The body indeed is dead because of sin (Rom 7:10).
Iulianum.6.23Quis non audiat, nisi qui tales aures non habet, dicentem Deum de ipso Adam: Ne aliquando extendat manum suam, et sumat de ligno vitae, et edat, et vivat in aeternum; et dimisit illum Dominus de paradiso voluptatis (Gen 3, 22-23)? Ubi utique sine labore et dolore ullo viveret in aeternum. Voluptas quippe illa paradisi, quod necesse est fateamini, si christianum nomen nondum estis obliti, non turpitudinis, sed beatitudinis cogitanda est. Haec ergo poena, quam meruit Adam, ne viveret in aeternum, et ideo dimissus est de loco tantae beatitudinis, ubi si esset, neque peccasset, procul dubio viveret in aeternum, quam magna poena est, tam magnum debemus intellegere peccatum, quod ea poena dignum fuerat vindicari.
Who does not hear—unless he is one who has no such ears—God saying of Adam himself: Lest perhaps he stretch out his hand and take of the tree of life and eat and live forever; and the Lord sent him out of the paradise of delight (Gen 3:22-23)? Where surely he would have lived forever without any labor or pain. For that delight of paradise—as you must confess, if you have not yet forgotten the Christian name—is to be thought of not as one of shamefulness, but of blessedness. This penalty, then, which Adam deserved, that he should not live forever, and on that account was sent forth from the place of such great blessedness, where, if he had remained—and he would not have sinned—he would doubtless have lived forever: how great a penalty it is, so great must we understand the sin to be that deserved to be avenged with that penalty.
Iulianum.6.23Quid igitur agis, obsecro te, cum peccatum Adae tanta extenuare conaris instantia, nisi Deum arguis immanis horrendaeque saevitiae, qui hoc tanta, non dico severitate, sed crudelitate punivit? Quod de Deo, si nefas est sentire, cur non quantitatem culpae, de qua homines iudicare non possunt, iudicante iudice incomparabiliter iusto, de poenae granditate metiris, et tuam linguam a sacrilega loquacitate compescis?
What, then, are you doing, I beg you, when you try with such insistence to make light of Adam's sin, except accusing God of monstrous and horrendous savagery, for having punished this with so great—I will not say severity, but cruelty? And if it is wicked to think this of God, why do you not measure the magnitude of the fault—about which human beings cannot judge, while an incomparably just judge judges it—from the greatness of the punishment, and restrain your tongue from sacrilegious talkativeness?
Iulianum.6.23Ego autem iniquitatis non arguo Deum, cuius dico iustum iugum super filios Adam a die exitus de ventre matris eorum; sed tu potius iniquum facis Deum, qui putas eos hoc perpeti sine ullo merito qualiscumque peccati. Nec propter opus quod fecit Deus, sed propter vitium quod insevit inimicus, eos sub eodem inimico esse dico, qui ex primo homine nascuntur, si in secundo non renascuntur. In quibus tu Ecclesiam catholicam crimine maiestatis accusas, si, ut dicis, non eruuntur de potestate tenebrarum, cum baptizantur parvuli, et illa, priusquam baptizentur, exorcizat et exsufflat tot imagines Dei.
But I do not accuse God of iniquity, whose yoke I call just upon the children of Adam from the day they come forth from their mother's womb; rather it is you who make God unjust, since you suppose that they suffer this without any merit of sin of any kind. Not on account of the work that God made, but on account of the defect that the enemy implanted, I say that those who are born of the first man are under that same enemy, if they are not reborn in the second. In which matter you accuse the Catholic Church of the crime of treason, if, as you say, little ones are not rescued from the power of darkness when they are baptized, and the Church, before they are baptized, exorcizes and breathes upon so many images of God.
Iulianum.6.23Nec honorabiles nuptias deputo principi tenebrarum, quas purgo ab omni noxa libidinis, si ea bene utuntur intentione propaginis. Tu vero malum quo caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, constituere in paradiso non perhorrescis, hoc est, in loco tantae pacis, tantae quietis, tantae honestatis, tantae felicitatis. Nec parvulos non habentes nisi originale peccatum, omnibus flagitiosis et sceleratis, ut calumniaris, iudico esse peiores. Aliud est enim peccato a se commisso gravari, aliud alieni quamlibet magni contagione respergi. Propter quod parvuli ad remissionem peccatorum, sicut ait Poenus, poena vestra, Cyprianus, hoc ipso facilius accedunt, quod eis remittuntur non propria, sed aliena peccata (Cf. CYPRIANUS, Ep. 64 ad Fidum). Tu autem, cum parvulos, non solum, quod et nos dicimus, nullum ex propria voluntate fecisse, verum etiam nullum dicis ex origine traxisse peccatum, iniustum procul dubio facis Deum, quod tibi iam saepe dictum, saepiusque dicendum est, qui eis imposuit grave iugum a die exitus de ventre matris illorum.
Nor do I attribute honorable marriage to the prince of darkness—marriage which I clear of all the fault of lust, if they use it well with the intention of offspring. But you do not shudder to place in paradise the evil by which the flesh lusts against the spirit—that is, in the place of such great peace, such great rest, such great honorableness, such great happiness. Nor do I judge that little ones, who have nothing but original sin, are, as you slanderously charge, worse than all the shameful and wicked. For it is one thing to be burdened by a sin committed by oneself, another to be sprinkled by the contagion of another's sin, however great. On account of which little ones come to the remission of sins, as that African says—your punishment, Cyprian—the more easily for this very reason, that not their own but others' sins are remitted to them (See Cyprian, Letter 64, to Fidus). But you, since you say that little ones not only—what we also say—have committed no sin by their own will, but also have drawn no sin from their origin, doubtless make God unjust, which has already often been said to you and must more often be said, in that he laid a heavy yoke upon them from the day they come forth from their mother's womb.
Iulianum.6.23Sane ut intellegas quomodo parvuli ex Adam nati, et participatione peccati illius hominis obligentur, et tamen ipsius reatui non aequentur, attende Christum, quem legisti esse formam futuri (Cf. Rom 5, 14); et vide quemadmodum parvuli in illo renati, et eius participes iustitiae fiant, et eius meritis non audeas eos comparare. Tu quoque in huius operis tui libro secundo (Cf. supra 2, 189. 190), in Adam peccati formam, quia prior peccavit Eva, non primam dixisti esse, sed maximam; sicut in Christo iustitiae formam non primam esse, sed maximam, quia fuerunt iusti et ante ipsum; quod a te dictum si oblitus non fuisses, non hic Adae peccatum extenuares, in quo maximam formam peccati exstitisse confessus es.
Indeed, that you may understand how little ones born of Adam are both bound by sharing in the sin of that man, and yet are not made equal to his guilt, attend to Christ, whom you have read to be a figure of the one to come (See Rom 5:14); and see how little ones reborn in him become sharers of his justice, and yet you would not dare to compare them to his merits. You too, in the second book of this work of yours (Cf. supra 2, 189. 190), said that in Adam the figure of sin—because Eve sinned first—was not the first but the greatest; just as in Christ the figure of justice is not the first but the greatest, because there were just men even before him; and if you had not forgotten what you said, you would not here be making light of Adam's sin, in which you confessed the greatest figure of sin to have existed.
Iulianum.6.2324. IUL. Sed cur tibi de inimicitiis innocentiae commoveatur invidia, cum petulantia et rabies oris obsceni nec divinitatis honore frenetur? Accusas enim parvulos, sed cum Deo; incessis innocentiam, sed cum aequitatis iniuria; inficiaris veritati, sed cum eius criminatione quem Deum tuum fateris. Ac per hoc, etsi non deficeremus rationis auxilio, abunde tamen tradux peccati assertorum suorum deformitate corrueret.
24. Julian: But why should ill will be stirred up against you over enmities toward innocence, when the wantonness and rage of an obscene mouth is not even reined in by reverence for the divinity? For you accuse little ones, but along with God; you assail innocence, but with injury to fairness; you deny the truth, but with an accusation against the very one whom you confess to be your God. And by this, even if we were not failing for lack of the help of reason, the transmission of sin would nonetheless collapse abundantly through the deformity of its own assertors.
Iulianum.6.24AUG. Tua conviciosa loquacitas rabiem mihi obiecit oris obsceni. Numquid ego sum defensor laudatorque libidinis? Numquid ego ausus sum concupiscentiam carnis, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, paradisi etiam possessione ditare? In quem locum tanti decoris et pacis, simul introduxisti aut bellum, quo ad peccandum impellenti laudabiliter repugnatur, aut dedecus, quo turpiter ei ceditur. Cur ergo tam contumeliose insurgis in me, nec respicis te? Nam ego non accuso Deum; sed tu, qui dicis parvulos nullum ex origine trahere peccatum, quibus ille imposuit grave iugum.
Augustine: Your abusive talkativeness has cast against me the rage of an obscene mouth. Am I then a defender and praiser of lust? Have I dared to enrich the concupiscence of the flesh, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, even with possession of paradise? Into which place of such great beauty and peace you have at once introduced either the war in which there is praiseworthy resistance to the one driving toward sin, or the disgrace in which one shamefully yields to it. Why then do you rise up against me so insultingly and not look at yourself? For I do not accuse God; but you, who say that little ones draw no sin from their origin, on whom he laid a heavy yoke.
Iulianum.6.24Nec incesso innocentiam cum aequitatis iniuria; sed tu aequitati facis iniuriam, qui tantam dicis habere parvulos innocentiam; quos tamen, si quod ipse sapis, verum esse sciret, gravi iugo aequitas non puniret. Nec inficior veritati, nec Deum criminor; sed tu potius. Verum enim dixit Apostolus: Corpus mortuum est propter peccatum (Rom 8, 10); quod tu negas. Deum vero quomodo non criminaris, cui miserias, quas negare non potes, imputas parvulorum, nullum habentium miseria dignum originale peccatum? Ac per hoc conclusio tua, quae deformitatem nobis ingerit, nullius rationis sequitur veritatem.
Nor do I assail innocence with injury to fairness; rather it is you who do injury to fairness, who say that little ones have so great an innocence—little ones whom, nonetheless, if fairness knew to be true what you yourself fancy, it would not punish with a heavy yoke. Nor do I deny the truth, nor do I accuse God; rather you do. For the Apostle said truly: The body is dead because of sin (Rom 8:10), which you deny. But how do you not accuse God, to whom you impute the miseries—which you cannot deny—of little ones who have no original sin deserving of misery? And by this your conclusion, which thrusts deformity upon us, follows the truth of no reasoning.
Iulianum.6.2425. IUL. Verum quid nos tam obstipe veritatis solius rationem sequendam putamus; cum inimicorum nostrorum phalanx ipsis innitatur rerum periculis, et insurgat in nos aerumnarum munita suffragiis? Vult quippe pudore coeuntis, dolore parientis, sudore laborantis, transmissionem culparum et poenarum in semina comprobare; ut his videlicet signis, difficilium partuum, agricolarum sudantium, et dumosorum novalium, crimen naturale credatur, cuius merito per tot incommoda genus exerceatur humanum; quod quidam per Adae peccatum, mortale opinantur effectum. Ideo autem dixi: Quidam, quia princeps eorum Augustinus hoc quidem erubuit dicere. Denique scribit ad Marcellinum, mortalem Adam factum videri; sed elegantia solita subdit, mortem stipendium iniquitatis fuisse; et quem fatetur mortaliter institutum secundum naturam, mori non potuisse pronuntiat.
25. Julian: But why do we think that the reasoning of truth alone is to be followed so stiffly, when the phalanx of our enemies leans upon the very perils of things and rises up against us fortified by the support of hardships? For it wishes to prove, by the shame of intercourse, the pain of childbirth, the sweat of labor, the transmission of faults and punishments into the seeds; so that, namely, by these signs—of difficult births, of sweating farmers, of brambly fallow ground—a natural crime may be believed, on whose account the human race is exercised through so many troubles; which crime some suppose was made mortal through Adam's sin. But I said "some" because their prince, Augustine, was indeed ashamed to say this. In short, he writes to Marcellinus that Adam seems to have been made mortal; but with his usual elegance he adds that death was the wages of iniquity; and the one whom he confesses to have been constituted mortal according to nature he pronounces could not have died.
Iulianum.6.25Illae ergo adversus nos, quae leguntur in Genesi, sententiae proferri solent, quibus Adam atque Eva vexantur, de quibus disserendi iam est tempus. Dixit - inquit - Dominus Deus serpenti: Quia fecisti hoc, maledictus tu ab omnibus pecoribus, et ab omnibus bestiis quae sunt super terram; super pectus et ventrem ambulabis, et terram manducabis omnibus diebus vitae tuae; et inimicitias ponam inter te et mulierem, et inter semen tuum et semen eius. Ipsa tuum captabit caput, et tu illius captabis calcaneum. Mulieri vero dixit: Multiplicans multiplicabo tristitias tuas et gemitum tuum; in tristitia paries filios, et ad virum tuum conversio tua, et ipse tui dominabitur. Adae autem dixit: Quoniam audisti vocem mulieris tuae, et manducasti de ligno, de quo praeceperam tibi de eo solo ne manducares ex eo, maledicta terra in operibus tuis; in tristitia manducabis eam omnibus diebus vitae tuae; spinas et tribulos edet tibi, et edes fenum agri tui; in sudore faciei tuae edes panem tuum, donec convertaris in terram de qua sumptus es; quoniam terra es, et in terram ibis (Gen 3, 14-19).
Those sentences, then, which are read in Genesis are wont to be brought forth against us, by which Adam and Eve are afflicted, of which it is now time to discourse. The Lord God said—he says—to the serpent: Because you have done this, cursed are you among all the cattle and among all the beasts that are upon the earth; upon your breast and belly shall you go, and earth shall you eat all the days of your life; and I will put enmities between you and the woman, and between your seed and her seed. She shall lie in wait for your head, and you shall lie in wait for her heel. But to the woman he said: Multiplying I will multiply your sorrows and your groaning; in sorrow shall you bring forth children, and your turning shall be to your husband, and he shall rule over you. And to Adam he said: Because you have heard the voice of your wife and have eaten of the tree of which alone I had commanded you that you should not eat of it, cursed is the earth in your works; in sorrow shall you eat of it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to you, and you shall eat the hay of your field; in the sweat of your face shall you eat your bread, until you return into the earth from which you were taken; for earth you are, and into earth you shall go (Gen 3:14-19).
Iulianum.6.25Has ergo sententias ad testimonium ingenitae iniquitatis assumitis, concionaminique non fuisse in pariendo feminas dolituras, nisi ad eas cum peccato Evae fecunditatis illius aerumna transisset. Ipsum ergo supplicium vultis esse peccati indicium, ut quod prima feminarum meruit per delictum, nulla quoque sine eadem credatur iniquitate sentire. Non enim esset, inquitis, dolor in pariente, nisi in nascente esset peccatum. His ergo quam attonitus occurram, haud facile metior? Tantum enim stimulorum admovit in hoc loco vestra opinio, ut vix digner ad certationem moveri; plura quippe in his obiectionibus intellegentiae sunt peccata quam syllabae.
These sentences, then, you take up as testimony to an inborn iniquity, and you proclaim that women would not have suffered pain in childbearing unless, with Eve's sin, the hardship of that fruitfulness had passed over to them. You want the punishment itself, therefore, to be the proof of sin, so that what the first of women deserved by her offense may be believed to be felt by none without that same iniquity. For there would be no pain, you say, in the woman giving birth, unless there were sin in the one being born. How, then, I am to meet these claims, dumbfounded as I am, I can hardly measure; for your opinion has applied so many goads in this place that I can scarcely deign to be moved to the contest; for there are more sins against understanding in these objections than there are syllables.
Iulianum.6.25AUG. Aerumnas generis humani quamlibet dicax et facetus irrideas, vel irridere te fingas, ipsae te in angustias has impulerunt, ut paradisum Dei, etiamsi nemo peccasset, aerumnosum futurum fuisse affirmare cogaris; quod si verecundatus nolueris facere, ut facias tuo dogmate urgeberis; quod dogma nisi correctus abieceris, istas prementes et in horrendum praecipitium contrudentes angustias non effugies. Quaeritur enim a te, has aerumnas, quas et in maioribus et in parvulis esse conspicimus; unde existimes emanare. Respondes ex tuo dogmate, humanum genus sic esse ab exordio sui divinitus institutum. Referturque responsioni tuae: Ergo et in paradiso futurae fuerant, si nullum ibi peccatum esset exortum. Hic tu aut praeceps ibis, aut dogma mutabis, aut fronte perditus, aut mente correctus.
Augustine: However scoffingly and wittily you mock the hardships of the human race, or pretend to mock them, those very hardships have driven you into these straits, so that you are compelled to affirm that God's paradise, even if no one had sinned, would have been full of hardship; and if out of shame you are unwilling to do this, you will be forced by your own doctrine to do it; which doctrine, unless you are corrected and cast it away, you will not escape these straits that press you and thrust you into a horrendous abyss. For you are asked: these hardships, which we see exist both in the grown and in the little ones, from where do you think they flow? You answer from your doctrine that the human race was so constituted by God from its beginning. And to your answer it is replied: Therefore they would have existed in paradise too, if no sin had arisen there. Here you will either go headlong, or change your doctrine—either ruined in your effrontery, or corrected in your mind.
Iulianum.6.25Aut enim aerumnosa vita locum famosissimae felicitatis implebis, et non invenies oculos quibus qualescumque aspicere audeas Christianos; aut in abrupta horribiliora deiectus, alienae malae naturae nobisque permixtae has aerumnas hominis imputabis, et Manichaei tartarea profunditate sorbeberis; aut de natura vitiata hanc aerumnarum poenam iudicio Dei punientis existere confiteberis, et in auram catholicam respirabis.
For either you will fill the place of most famous happiness with a life of hardship, and you will find no eyes with which you may dare to look at Christians of any sort; or, cast down into more horrible precipices, you will impute these hardships of man to another evil nature mingled with us, and you will be swallowed up in the hellish depth of Mani; or you will confess that this penalty of hardships exists, by the judgment of a punishing God, out of a corrupted nature, and you will breathe again in the Catholic air.
Iulianum.6.25Quin etiam dicis, quod quidam genus humanum per Adae peccatum mortale, opinantur effectum; et addis, ideo te dixisse: Quidam, quia ego princeps eorum hoc erubuerim dicere; sed ad Marcellinum scripserim mortalem Adam factum videri. Qui haec tua et illa mea legerunt vel legunt, si Pelagiani non sunt, profecto vident quemadmodum lingua tua amplexa sit dolositatem. Numquam enim ego sensi, numquam omnino dixi, sicut vos dicitis, mortalem Adam factum, qui sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset. Haec prorsus verba obiecta sunt Caelestio in episcopali iudicio Carthaginensi. Haec obiecta sunt et Pelagio in episcopali iudicio Palaestino (Cf. De gest. Pel. 23. 60; De grat. Chr. et de pecc. orig. 3. 4) Haec quippe de hac re inter nos et vos vertitur quaestio, utrum Adam, sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset. Nam quis ignorat, quia secundum definitionem, qua immortalis dicitur ille qui non potest mori, mortalis autem qui potest mori, Adam potuit mori, quia potuit peccare; et ideo mori merito culpae, non necessitate naturae? Secundum illam vero definitionem, qua et ille immortalis dicitur cuius est in potestate non mori, quis neget Adam esse conditum huius potestatis? Quoniam qui habebat potestatem numquam peccandi, profecto habebat potestatem numquam moriendi.
Moreover, you say that some suppose the human race was made mortal through Adam's sin; and you add that you said "some" because I, their prince, was ashamed to say this; but that I wrote to Marcellinus that Adam seems to have been made mortal. Those who have read or read these words of yours and those of mine, if they are not Pelagians, certainly see how your tongue has embraced deceitfulness. For I never thought, never said at all, as you say, that Adam was made mortal in such a way that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he was going to die. These very words were objected against Caelestius in the episcopal court at Carthage. These were objected also against Pelagius in the episcopal court in Palestine (Cf. De gest. Pel. 23. 60; De grat. Chr. et de pecc. orig. 3. 4). For this is the question that is debated between us and you on this matter: whether Adam, whether he sinned or did not sin, was going to die. For who does not know that, according to the definition by which he is called immortal who cannot die, but mortal who can die, Adam could die, because he could sin; and therefore could die by the desert of fault, not by the necessity of nature? But according to that definition by which he too is called immortal who has it in his power not to die, who would deny that Adam was created with this power? Since he who had the power of never sinning surely had the power of never dying.
Iulianum.6.25Illud ergo est quod contra vos dicitur, hoc dogma vestrum, quo putatis Adam, sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, fuisse moriturum, omnino esse falsissimum. Quae cum ita sint, quo pacto ego dicerem, quod me dixisse mentiris, Adam secundum naturam mortaliter institutum, quasi urgeretur necessitate moriendi; cum in mortem nisi propter peccatum non posset urgeri? Aut quomodo eum mori non potuisse pronuntio, cum esse mortuum sciam; et utique si mori non potuisset, mortuus non esset? Sed plane illum non mori potuisse pronuntio. Aliud est autem non posse mori, aliud posse non mori; illud maioris est immortalitatis, hoc minoris. Si duo ista discernis, et quod vos de Adam dicitis, et quod nos contra vos dicimus, cernis. Vos enim dicitis: Sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset; nos autem dicimus: Quamdiu non peccaret, moriturus non esset; et si numquam peccasset, mortuus non esset.
This, then, is what is said against you: that this doctrine of yours, by which you suppose Adam, whether he sinned or did not sin, was going to die, is altogether most false. Since these things are so, how could I have said—what you lie that I said—that Adam was constituted mortal according to nature, as though he were pressed by the necessity of dying, when he could not be pressed into death except on account of sin? Or how do I pronounce that he could not die, when I know that he died—and surely, if he could not have died, he would not have died? But plainly I pronounce that he could not-die. Now it is one thing to be unable to die, another to be able not to die; the former belongs to a greater immortality, the latter to a lesser. If you distinguish these two, you also discern both what you say of Adam and what we say against you. For you say: Whether he sinned or did not sin, he was going to die; but we say: As long as he did not sin, he was not going to die; and if he had never sinned, he would not have died.
Iulianum.6.25Deinde commemoras quae contra vos de Genesi dici soleant; et de dolore parientis, qua poena prior Eva punita est, dicis aliquid, quod nos dicere vis putari, vel putas. Non enim dicimus, non fuisse in pariendo feminas dolituras, nisi ad eas cum peccato Evae fecunditatis illius aerumna transisset; cum ad eas non fecunditatis, sed iniquitatis aerumna transierit. Etsi enim facta est aerumnosa fecunditas; iniquitas, non fecunditas hoc fecit; aerumna quippe parientis ex iniquitate hominis, fecunditas autem ex Dei benedictione descendit.
Next you recall what is wont to be said against you from Genesis; and concerning the pain of the woman in childbirth, by which penalty the first Eve was punished, you say something that you want to be thought, or that you think, we say. For we do not say that women would not have had pains in childbirth unless, with Eve's sin, the hardship of that fruitfulness had passed over to them; since it was the hardship not of fruitfulness but of iniquity that passed over to them. For although fruitfulness was made full of hardship, it was iniquity, not fruitfulness, that did this; for the hardship of the woman in childbirth descends from the iniquity of man, but fruitfulness from the blessing of God.
Iulianum.6.25Aut si aerumnam fecunditatis non sic intellegi voluisti, tamquam eam fecunditas fecerit, sed acceperit; haec est nostra sententia. Verum nos non dicimus etiam in paradiso parientes feminas fuisse dolituras; immo inde colligimus hunc dolorem poenam esse peccati, quia in eo loco non fuisset, ubi non sinerentur manere quicumque peccassent; quod tu refutare non niteris, nisi Dei paradisum, manu fronti opposita et oculis clausis, non solum libidinibus hominum, verum etiam cruciatibus implere cogaris. Sed quid mirum?
Or if you did not want the hardship of fruitfulness to be understood as though fruitfulness produced it, but received it, this is our position. But we do not say that women in childbirth would have had pain even in paradise; rather from this we conclude that this pain is the penalty of sin, because it would not have existed in that place where whoever sinned would not be allowed to remain; which you do not strive to refute, unless you are forced—with your hand held before your brow and your eyes closed—to fill God's paradise not only with the lusts of human beings, but also with their torments. But why is this surprising?
Iulianum.6.25Quando implere vis illum memorabilis felicitatis locum etiam mortibus hominum, quarum sine aliquo corporis cruciatu, vel nulla, vel pene nulla contingit. Et cum haec portenta te dicere tuum dogma compellat; eos, qui haec absit ut dicant, quia illud potius antiquitus Ecclesiae Dei traditum tenent, unde dictum est: A muliere initium factum est peccati, et propter illam morimur omnes (Eccli 25, 33); audes insuper irridere, eorumque me principem insultanter appellas contra scientiam et conscientiam tuam. Nullo modo namque ignoras, quot et quanti in Ecclesia docti Ecclesiaeque doctores ante nos dixerint, sic naturam hominis divinitus institutam, ut si non peccasset, moriturus non esset.
When you want to fill that place of memorable happiness even with the deaths of human beings, of which either none or almost none occurs without some torment of the body. And although your doctrine compels you to say these monstrous things, you dare moreover to mock those who—far be it that they should say such things, since they hold rather to what was handed down of old to the Church of God, whence it is said: From a woman was the beginning of sin, and because of her we all die (Sir 25:24 (25:33))—and you insultingly call me their prince, against your own knowledge and conscience. For you are in no way ignorant of how many and how great learned men in the Church, teachers of the Church before us, have said that the nature of man was so constituted by God that, if he had not sinned, he would not have died.
Iulianum.6.25Horum ergo quomodo princeps vocor, quos non duco, sed sequor? Te autem non dico esse principem eorum qui asserunt sic Adam mortalem factum, ut sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset, atque ita paradisum sanctae voluptatis, ubi tanta requies animae et corporis erat, morientium cruciatibus, mortuorum funeribus, lugentium maeroribus implere conantur. Non es tu eorum princeps: Pelagius et Caelestius, qui priores ista dixerunt, tenent huius nefandi dogmatis principatum; quos utinam, sicut non ducis, ita nec sequereris!
How, then, am I called the prince of these, whom I do not lead but follow? But I do not say that you are the prince of those who assert that Adam was made mortal in such a way that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he was going to die, and who thus try to fill the paradise of holy delight, where there was such great rest of soul and body, with the torments of the dying, the funerals of the dead, the griefs of the mourning. You are not their prince: Pelagius and Caelestius, who first said these things, hold the princedom of this unspeakable doctrine; would that, just as you do not lead them, you did not follow them either!
Iulianum.6.2526. IUL. Hoc enim ipsum quam insanum est, quod dicitis, primo dolorem pariendi comitem esse peccati, cum ita perspicue ad sexuum conditionem magis, quam ad criminum respiciat ultionem, ut omnia animalia nullo maculata peccato, hos angores, hos gemitus in parturitione patiantur? Per quod apparet, argumentum non esse peccati, quod inveniri etiam sine peccato potest. Deinde promoventes affertis aliud, multo ineptissimum. Non doleret, inquis, femina, nisi esset criminum particeps. Verum illico subditis: Sed hoc peccatum, propter quod dolet mulier, non in pariente, ceterum in nascente deprehenditur.
26. Julian: For how insane is this very thing you say, that in the first place the pain of childbearing is the companion of sin, when it so plainly looks to the condition of the sexes rather than to the punishment of crimes, that all animals, stained by no sin, suffer these pangs, these groans, in giving birth? By which it appears that what can be found even without sin is no proof of sin. Then, pressing on, you bring forward something else, far more inept. The woman, you say, would not feel pain unless she were a sharer in crimes. But at once you add: But this sin, on account of which the woman feels pain, is found not in the one giving birth, but in the one being born.
Iulianum.6.26Nam ideo et baptizatae mulieres, liberae, ais, agitant a peccato; sed pro filiorum iniquitate, quos edunt, fecunditatis suae difficultatibus affliguntur. Qua opinione tradux peccati non iam a matre decurrit in sobolem, sed in parentes a nascente refunditur. Nam si ideo mulier baptizata sentit dolores, quia iniquitates inveniuntur in parvulo; supina incipit tradux esse, non prona. At non ideo cruciatur, quia iniquitatem filius habet; sed ideo quia eam secum ipsa, cum nasceretur, advexerat. Verum hoc malum sublatum ab ea per gratiam dixeras; si ergo peccato dolor parturientis adhaerebat, amotio peccati cruciatui parturitionum debuit mederi. Aut si cruciatus hic sine iniquitate esse non potest, qui tamen post Baptisma in feminis invenitur; iniquitas quoque eis non est dempta per gratiam, et eviluit pompa Baptismatis. Si autem in his mysteriis ea quam nos credimus, non vos fingitis, fuit virtus et veritas, sublatumque est omne peccatum, remanet dolor tamen, qui partus difficultate generatur; manifestum est illum gemitum naturae indicem esse, non culpae; quem te quoque annuente patiuntur, quas a Manichaeorum peccato liberatas fateris.
For this reason, you say, even baptized women, free from sin, are troubled; but for the iniquity of the children whom they bring forth they are afflicted with the difficulties of their fruitfulness. By which opinion the transmission of sin no longer runs down from the mother into the offspring, but is poured back into the parents from the one being born. For if a baptized woman feels pains because iniquities are found in the little one, the transmission begins to be upside down, not right side up. But she is not tormented because her son has iniquity; rather because she herself had brought it with her when she was born. But you had said that this evil was taken away from her through grace; if, then, the pain of childbirth clung to sin, the removal of the sin ought to have healed the torment of childbirths. Or if this torment cannot exist without iniquity, and yet is found in women after baptism, then iniquity too has not been removed from them through grace, and the pomp of baptism has come to nothing. But if in these mysteries there was the power and truth which we believe, not which you fabricate, and all sin was taken away, and yet the pain remains which is generated by the difficulty of childbirth, it is manifest that that groan is a sign of nature, not of fault; which groan, with your agreement too, those women suffer whom you confess to have been freed from the sin of the Manichees.
Iulianum.6.26Porro id exemplis rerum solis apparuit; si vero inspiciamus et ipsius verba sententiae, nae illa vestras nebulas splendidiore fulgore solis radiis dissolvet. Non est quippe dictum ad mulierem: Orientur in te dolores, aut: Generabo tibi gemitus; ut post culpam sensus eorum institui viderentur; sed: Multiplicans, inquit, multiplicabo tristitias tuas. Ostendit iam esse in naturali ratione, quod se in peccatrice persona non condere, sed multiplicare promittit. Numquam quippe multiplicantur nisi exstantia; ceterum antequam sint, fieri quidem proprie, augeri autem praepropere nuncupantur.
Further, this has appeared from examples of things alone; but if we also examine the words of the sentence itself, indeed they will dissolve your fogs with a brilliance brighter than the sun's rays. For it was not said to the woman, Pains shall arise in you, or, I will generate groans for you, so that their sensation might seem to be established after the fault; but, Multiplying, he says, I will multiply your sorrows. He shows that there was already in the natural order what he promises to multiply, not to establish, in the sinful person. For things are never multiplied unless they exist; but before they exist, they are properly said to be made, while to be increased is said prematurely.
Iulianum.6.26Denique, ne hoc nostrum magis, quam ipsius veritatis esse videatur, hic in cunctis animantibus verborum refertur ordo servatus. De homine quoque priusquam fieret: Faciamus, inquit Deus, hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram (Gen 1, 26); et denuo de muliere: Dixit, inquit, Deus: Non est bonum esse solum hominem; faciamus ei adiutorium simile sui (Gen 2, 18). Postea vero, quam facti sunt: Benedixit eis, inquit, dicens: Crescite et multiplicamini, et implete terram. Antequam conderentur, non est dictum: Multiplicentur; sed: Fiat homo; posteaquam exstitit qui acciperet incrementa, consequenter adiungit: Crescite et multiplicamini, et implete terram (Gen 1, 28). Hoc itaque ordine gemitus parturitionum, qui secundum naturam fuerat, ita in hominum corporibus, sicut in pecoribus institutus, non conditur in Eva, sed crescit, ut peculiari granditate excitatorum affligeretur angorum. Nec tamen ad posterae aetatis feminas, nisi naturali mediocritate et corporum varietate pertingerent.
Finally, lest this seem to be ours rather than truth's own, here the same order of words is reported to be kept in the case of all living things. Of man too, before he was made, God says: Let us make man to our image and likeness (Gen 1:26); and again of the woman: God said: It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like himself (Gen 2:18). But afterward, when they had been made, he blessed them, saying: Increase and multiply and fill the earth. Before they were created, it was not said: Let them multiply; but: Let man be made; after there existed one who could receive increases, he consequently adds: Increase and multiply and fill the earth (Gen 1:28). By this order, then, the groaning of childbirths, which was according to nature, established in the bodies of human beings as in the cattle, is not established in Eve, but increased, so that she was afflicted with the special greatness of stirred-up pangs. And yet they reached the women of later ages only with natural moderation and a variety of bodies.
Iulianum.6.26Ibi ergo, non ut doleret in pariendo mulier, de peccato fuit, sed ut nimis doleret; sicut etiam temporibus diversis debilitates corporum pro peccatis, quibusdam legimus accidisse; sed non illa ampliatio miseriarum parcimoniam modi naturalis evertit. Nec tamen omnia quae in eadem sententia continentur, animadvertentis vigore clauduntur. Ceterum quaedam ibi pars indicat meritum, quaedam designat officium. Multiplicans, inquit, multiplicabo tristitias tuas et gemitum tuum; in tristitia paries filios. Huc usque ultio, quam non natura, sed persona promeruit. Iam hinc simpliciter posterioris sexus munus ostenditur: Ad virum, inquit, tuum conversio tua, et ipse tui dominabitur. Hoc nimirum non spectat ad poenam, quod nisi esset, spectaret ad culpam; ut viro quippe mulier modesto subdatur affectu, ordo est, supplicium non est. Caput enim, secundum Apostolum, mulieris, vir (Eph 5, 23); quia non est creatus homo propter mulierem, sed mulier propter virum (1 Cor 11, 9). Si ergo caput suum congruo pudore veneretur, naturae instituta custodit, non peccati tormenta perpetitur; cui ordini si resultaverit, rea est. Non est ergo in miseria functio rei, cuius neglectus in noxa est.
There, then, it was from sin not that the woman should feel pain in childbirth, but that she should feel too much pain; just as at various times we read that weaknesses of the body befell certain people for their sins; but that enlargement of miseries did not overturn the thrift of the natural measure. And yet not all that is contained in the same sentence is enclosed by the force of one who attends. For one part there indicates desert, another designates duty. Multiplying, he says, I will multiply your sorrows and your groaning; in sorrow shall you bring forth children. Thus far the punishment, which not nature but the person deserved. From here on, simply, the office of the later sex is shown: To your husband, he says, shall be your turning, and he shall rule over you. This surely does not pertain to punishment, since, if it did not exist, it would pertain to fault; for that the woman be subject to the man with modest affection is an order, not a punishment. For the head, according to the Apostle, of the woman is the man (Eph 5:23); because man was not created for the woman, but woman for the man (1 Cor 11:9). If, then, she venerates her head with fitting modesty, she keeps the institutions of nature; she does not suffer the torments of sin; but if she rebels against this order, she is guilty. There is, then, no performance of duty in misery, the neglect of which is a fault.
Iulianum.6.26AUG. Dolorem pariendi poenam dicimus esse peccati. Scimus enim hoc Deum sine ulla ambiguitate dixisse, nec dixisse nisi praevaricatrici sui mandati, nec ob aliud dixisse, nisi quia irascebatur suum praevaricatum esse mandatum. Sed hanc iram Dei ut tu exinanires et frustrares, dixisti usque adeo poenam istam non esse peccati, ut animalia quorum nulla peccata sunt, gemitus huiusmodi in partu doloresque patiantur. Non quidem tibi dixerunt animalia, utrum ille gemitus sit canentium vel dolentium. Gallinas sane parituras, similiores esse cantantibus quam dolentibus cernimus; post partum vero tales voces edere, quales in formidine consuerunt; porro cum pariunt in summo esse silentio, sicut columbas, et alias aves, quae advertentibus innotescunt.
Augustine: We say that the pain of childbearing is the penalty of sin. For we know that God said this without any ambiguity, and said it only to the woman who transgressed his command, and said it for no other reason than that he was angry that his command had been transgressed. But in order to empty out and frustrate this anger of God, you have said that this penalty is so far from being the penalty of sin that animals, which have no sins, suffer groans and pains of this kind in giving birth. The animals, indeed, did not tell you whether that groaning belongs to ones that are singing or ones that are in pain. To be sure, we see that hens about to lay are more like ones that are singing than ones in pain; but after laying they utter such cries as they are accustomed to utter in fear; and again that they lay in deep silence, like doves and other birds, which are known to those who pay attention.
Iulianum.6.26Quis ergo novit muta animantia, quae quid in se agatur indicare non possunt, utrum tempore pariendi eorum motus et sonus non solum nihil doloris, sed habeat aliquid etiam voluptatis? Sed quid mihi est in hac re scrutari obscura naturae, cum inde nostra causa non pendeat? Prorsus si muta animalia nihil doloris patiuntur in partu, argumentum tuum nullum est; si autem patiuntur, ea ipsa poena est imaginis Dei, conditioni pecorum comparari: poena porro imaginis Dei, nisi culpa praecederet, iusta esse non posset.
Who, then, knows about dumb animals, which cannot indicate what is happening within them, whether at the time of giving birth their movement and sound has not only nothing of pain, but even something of pleasure? But what is it to me in this matter to scrutinize the obscurities of nature, since our case does not depend on it? If dumb animals suffer no pain in giving birth, your argument is worthless; but if they do suffer, this very thing is a penalty of the image of God, to be compared to the condition of cattle: and a penalty of the image of God could not be just unless a fault preceded it.
Iulianum.6.26Illud autem absit ut dicam, quod tamquam dicam, refellendum putasti, non suo, sed nascentis merito matrem dolere cum parturit, et ideo etiam dimissis peccatis fideles dolere urgente necessitate pariendi. Absit, inquam, ut hoc dicam. Numquid enim quia mortem dicimus peccati esse supplicium, ideo dicendum est eam post remissionem peccatorum non debuisse contingere? Hae quippe, quas in natura praevaricatione vitiata dicimus poenas esse peccati, ideo etiam post remissionem peccatorum manent, ut probetur fides, quam de venturo credimus saeculo, ubi ista non erunt. Neque enim fides esset, si propterea crederemus, quia continuo nobis nihil dolendi et non moriendi praemium redderetur.
But far be it that I should say what you thought I was, as it were, saying and ought to be refuted: that the mother feels pain when she gives birth not by her own desert but by the desert of the one being born, and that therefore even the faithful, with their sins forgiven, feel pain under the pressing necessity of childbirth. Far be it, I say, that I should say this. For is it the case that, because we say death is the punishment of sin, it must therefore be said that it ought not to befall after the remission of sins? For those things which we say are penalties of sin in a nature corrupted by transgression remain even after the remission of sins, in order that the faith may be proved which we believe concerning the age to come, where these things will not be. For it would not be faith if we believed for the reason that immediately the reward of feeling no pain and not dying would be rendered to us.
Iulianum.6.26Qua ratione reddita, id est, ad agonem fidei nobis relinqui mala contracta peccato, quamvis reatu peccatorum per Baptismum iam soluto, quid habet virium quod aisti: Si in mysteriis sublatum est omne peccatum, et remanet tamen dolor qui partus difficultate generatur, manifestum est illum gemitum naturae indicem esse, non culpae? Hoc enim, quod nullas adversus nos habet vires, non utique diceres, si fidei tu vel haberes vel attenderes vires, quae tanto sunt fortiores, quanto magis ea speramus quae non videmus, et per patientiam miseriarum, plenitudinem beatitudinis exspectamus (Cf. Rom 8, 25).
This reason being given—namely that the evils contracted by sin are left to us for the contest of faith, although the guilt of sins has already been loosed through baptism—what force has what you have said: If in the mysteries all sin has been taken away, and yet the pain remains which is generated by the difficulty of childbirth, it is manifest that that groan is a sign of nature, not of fault? For this, which has no force against us, you would surely not say if you either had or attended to the force of faith, which is the stronger the more we hope for the things we do not see, and through the endurance of miseries await the fullness of blessedness (See Rom 8:25).
Iulianum.6.26Sed ipsa - inquis - Dei verba, quibus non ait: Orientur in te dolores, aut: Generabo tibi gemitus, ut post culpam sensus eorum viderentur institui; sed ait: "Multiplicans multiplicabo tristitias tuas"; ostendunt quia iam erat in naturali ratione, quod se in peccatrice persona non condere, sed multiplicare promittit; et addis, quasi definitivam generalemque sententiam, dicens: Numquam quippe multiplicantur nisi exstantia; ceterum antequam sint, fieri quidem proprie, augeri autem praepropere nuncupantur.
But God's own words, you say, by which he does not say, Pains shall arise in you, or, I will generate groans for you, so that their sensation might seem to be established after the fault, but says, Multiplying I will multiply your sorrows, show that there was already in the natural order what he promises to multiply, not to establish, in the sinful person; and you add, as a kind of definitive and general statement, saying: For things are never multiplied unless they exist; but before they exist, they are properly said to be made, while to be increased is said prematurely.
Iulianum.6.26Ubi primum a te quaero, quomodo dicas dolores Evae iam exstantes fuisse, quos perpessa non fuerat; quomodo, inquam, iam dolores habebat, quae nihil dolebat? Quod si non exstabant in ea dolores, quia eos non habebat quae non dolebat; poterant ergo multiplicari et qui non erant; et recte accipitur dictum: Multiplicabo tristitias tuas, id est, multas eas esse faciam; quod fieri potest, sive aliquid esse iam coeperit, sive nec coeperit. Frustra igitur dixisti: Numquam enim multiplicantur nisi exstantia; quia ecce in Eva post peccatum dolores sunt multiplicati, qui priusquam peccasset, non erant ulli. Ac per hoc, non ideo dixit Deus: Multiplicabo tristitias tuas, quia tristitiae in illa esse iam coeperant aliquae; sed quia multiplices erant futurae, ex quo inciperent esse.
Here first I ask you how you say that Eve's pains, which she had not suffered, already existed; how, I say, did she already have pains who felt no pain? But if pains did not exist in her, because she who felt no pain did not have them, then even those that did not exist could be multiplied; and rightly is the saying taken: I will multiply your sorrows, that is, I will make them be many—which can happen whether something has already begun to exist or has not even begun. In vain, therefore, did you say: For things are never multiplied unless they exist; because, behold, in Eve after sin the pains were multiplied, of which, before she sinned, there were none at all. And by this, God did not say, I will multiply your sorrows, because some sorrows had already begun to exist in her; but because they were going to be manifold from the time they should begin to exist.
Iulianum.6.26Sed erant, inquis, in naturali ratione. Si ergo in naturali ratione iam sunt etiam quae nondum orta sunt, quid te adiuvat quod aisti: Propterea Deum non dixisse: Orientur in te dolores, sed: "Multiplicabo dolores tuos", quia iam erant in naturali ratione? Respondetur enim tibi: Potuit dicere: Orientur in te; quia eos erat multiplicaturus, qui in ratione naturali iam erant, non qui iam orti erant. An forte dicturus es: Iam prorsus orti erant in ipsa naturali ratione? Quanto igitur manifestius et acceptione dignius tibi dicitur: Iam erant filii Adam in Adam naturali ratione, quando, sicut ait beatus Ioannes episcopus: Illud peccatum grande commisit, et omne hominum genus in commune damnavit (IOANNES CONSTANTINOPOL., Omil. de Lazaro resuscitato); vel, sicut ait collega eius Ambrosius: Fuit Adam, et in illo fuimus omnes; periit Adam, et in illo omnes perierunt (AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 15);
But they existed, you say, in the natural order. If, then, in the natural order there already exist even things that have not yet arisen, what does it help you that you said: For this reason God did not say, Pains shall arise in you, but, I will multiply your pains, because they already existed in the natural order? For it is answered to you: He could have said, They shall arise in you, because he was going to multiply those that already existed in the natural order, not those that had already arisen. Or will you perhaps say: They had already fully arisen in that very natural order? How much more manifestly, then, and more worthy of acceptance, is it said to you: The children of Adam already existed in Adam by the natural order, when, as the blessed bishop John says: He committed that great sin and condemned the whole human race in common (John Chrysostom, Homily on Lazarus Raised); or, as his colleague Ambrose says: Adam existed, and in him we all existed; Adam perished, and in him all perished (Ambrose, On Luke 7.15);
Iulianum.6.26si tu audes dicere, non solum: Iam erant; verum etiam, quod nos de filiis Adam, quando peccatum illud admissum est, dicere non audemus: Iam orti erant dolores Evae, quando eos Deus multiplicaturum se esse minatus est! Verumtamen non in naturali ratione iam erant Evae dolores, quos parturientes necesse est perpeti; quia non eos illam necesse erat perpeti, cum parturire coepisset; venerunt quippe illi damnatione culpae, non conditione naturae.
if you dare to say not only, They already existed, but even what we do not dare to say of the children of Adam when that sin was committed: Eve's pains had already arisen when God threatened that he would multiply them! Nevertheless, Eve's pains, which those who give birth must suffer, did not yet exist in the natural order; because it was not necessary for her to suffer them when she had begun to give birth; for they came by the condemnation of fault, not by the condition of nature.
Iulianum.6.26Quod vos negando quid agitis, nisi ut in loco illius beatitudinis, ubi esse homines permissi non sunt, quos iam cruciari oportebat, cruciatus hominum etiam peccante nemine collocetis? Quod ignoro qua fronte faciatis; nisi quia vos paradiso contrarios, contra paradisum quodammodo habitare delectat; quia et Adam de paradiso eiectus, contra paradisum est collocatus (Cf. Gen 3, 24 (sec. LXX)).
In denying this, what are you doing except placing the torments of human beings, even with no one sinning, in that place of blessedness where the human beings who already had to be tormented were not permitted to be? Which I do not know with what effrontery you do; unless it is that, being opponents of paradise, you take delight in dwelling, as it were, over against paradise; for Adam too, cast out of paradise, was placed over against paradise (See Gen 3:24 (LXX)).
Iulianum.6.26Iam itaque paradiso contrarius, quanta vanitate contra paradisum argumenteris attende. Multiplicari non tibi videntur, nisi ea quae ex aliqua parte iam existunt; ceterum, antequam sint, non multiplicari putas dicenda esse, sed fieri. Nulla ergo multiplicia nascuntur, si non additamentis multiplicantur, id est, fiunt multiplicia. Ac per hoc, ille qui dictus est esse in Sapientia spiritus multiplex (Sap 7, 22), qui esse non coepit, sed ex aeterno ita est, non recte appellatus est multiplex, quia eum multiplicem nulla additamenta fecerunt.
And so now, being an opponent of paradise, mark with what great vanity you argue against paradise. Things do not seem to you to be multiplied unless they already exist in some part; but before they exist, you think they should be said not to be multiplied, but to be made. Therefore nothing manifold is born, if it is not multiplied by additions, that is, made manifold. And by this, he who is said in Wisdom to be a manifold spirit (Wis 7:22), who did not begin to be, but is so from eternity, was not rightly called manifold, since no additions made him manifold.
Iulianum.6.26Quid etiam dicturus es de responso Dei ad Abraham, ubi ait: Multiplicans multiplicabo semen tuum sicut stellas caeli (Gen 22, 17)? Ubi videmus Deum multiplicasse etiam stellas caeli, sicut se promisit multiplicaturum semen Abrahae? Numquid ergo stellae caeli, ut multiplicarentur, pauciores prius esse coeperunt, et non in numero suo multiplices sunt institutae, ex quo sunt institutae? Cur ergo non sic accipis quod dictum est: Multiplicans multiplicabo tristitias tuas; tamquam dixisset: Faciam tristitias tuas multiplices, nisi quia sic agis, ut in paradisum, contra quam collocatus es, si possis introducas dolores, et in loco tantae beatitudinis ante peccatum praedices miserias institutas?
What also will you say of God's answer to Abraham, where he says: Multiplying I will multiply your seed like the stars of heaven (Gen 22:17)? Where do we see that God multiplied even the stars of heaven, as he promised he would multiply Abraham's seed? Is it the case, then, that the stars of heaven, in order to be multiplied, first began to be fewer, and were not established as manifold in their number from the time they were established? Why, then, do you not so take what was said: Multiplying I will multiply your sorrows, as though he had said: I will make your sorrows manifold—unless it is that you so act as to introduce, if you can, pains into the paradise over against which you have been placed, and to proclaim that miseries were established in the place of such great blessedness before sin?
Iulianum.6.26Quod enim Eva, ut affirmas, cum doloribus parturitionem naturaliter, antequam peccaret, accepit, istam vocas parcimoniam naturalem; quam videri non vis eversam ex eo quod amplius de poena mulieri Deo vindicante, cum peccasset, accessit. Sic enim loqueris, ut dicas: Sed non illa ampliatio miseriarum parcimoniam modi naturalis evertit. Proinde te docente, ut feminae in partu mediocriter doleant, parcimonia naturalis est; quod vero peccati merito additum est Evae, ampliatio miseriarum est.
For the fact that Eve, as you affirm, received childbirth with pains naturally, before she sinned, you call this the natural thrift; which you do not want to seem overturned by the fact that more was added by way of punishment to the woman, when she sinned, by the avenging God. For you so speak as to say: But that enlargement of miseries did not overturn the thrift of the natural measure. Accordingly, on your teaching, that women feel moderate pain in childbirth is the natural thrift; but what was added to Eve by the desert of sin is an enlargement of miseries.
Iulianum.6.26Nec vides, cum ista dicis, quia si ampliatae sunt miseriae per peccatum, iam fuerant institutae per naturam, et mulier, cui ampliatae sunt miseriae merito peccati, iam naturaliter misera erat ante peccatum. Tu licet eam dicas parcimonia naturali mediocriter miseram; tamen, velis nolis, cui dicis accessisse ampliationem miseriarum, profecto et ante hanc accessionem miseram confiteris. Ecce quod de te meretur natura hominis a Deo primitus instituti; ecce quod de te meretur paradisus Dei. Eiectus quippe, et contra eum collocatus talia contrarius reddidisti, ut in loco beatitudinis diceres miserias divinitus institutas, non autem coepisse, sed crevisse peccatis.
Nor do you see, when you say these things, that if miseries were enlarged through sin, they had already been established through nature, and the woman, whose miseries were enlarged by the desert of sin, was already naturally miserable before sin. Though you may say she was moderately miserable by the natural thrift, nevertheless, like it or not, the one to whom you say an enlargement of miseries was added, you doubtless confess to have been miserable even before this addition. Behold what the nature of man, first constituted by God, gets from you; behold what the paradise of God gets from you. For, cast out and placed over against it, you have, as its opponent, repaid it with such things, namely that you say miseries were divinely established in the place of blessedness, and not that they began, but that they grew, by sins.
Iulianum.6.26Quid tam contrarium, quam miseria beatitudini, et beatitudo miseriae? Aut quid significat, quod de paradiso peccator exclusus, contra paradisum est collocatus; nisi quia in miseria collocatus est, quae beatitudini sine cuiusquam contradictione vel dubitatione est contraria? Et quid sic fugit natura, ut miseriam? Quid sic appetit, ut beatitudinem?
What is so opposed as misery to blessedness, and blessedness to misery? Or what does it signify that the sinner, shut out of paradise, was placed over against paradise—except that he was placed in misery, which is opposed to blessedness without anyone's contradiction or doubt? And what does nature so flee as misery? What does it so seek as blessedness?
Iulianum.6.26Denique liberum arbitrium quod de hac re habemus, ita nobis naturaliter insitum est, ut nulla miseria nobis possit auferri quod miseri esse nolumus, et volumus esse beati. Usque adeo ut iam ipsi qui male vivendo sunt miseri, male vivere quidem velint, nolint tamen esse miseri, sed beati. Hoc est liberum arbitrium nostris mentibus immobiliter fixum, non quo bene agere volumus, nam in humana iniquitate potuimus amittere, et gratia divina possumus recipere; sed liberum arbitrium quo beati esse volumus, et miseri nolumus, nec miseri possunt amittere, nec beati. Beati quippe omnes esse volumus, quod ipsi quoque philosophi huius saeculi, et Academici de rebus omnibus dubitantes, teste patrono suo Tullio, coacti sunt confiteri; idque unum esse dixerunt, quod disputatione non egeat, quod nemo est qui non expetat. Hoc arbitrium liberum adiuvatur per Dei gratiam, ut quod naturaliter volumus, hoc est beate vivere, bene vivendo habere possimus.
Finally, the free choice that we have in this matter is so naturally implanted in us that by no misery can it be taken from us that we do not want to be miserable and want to be blessed. So much so that even those who by living badly are miserable do indeed want to live badly, yet do not want to be miserable, but blessed. This is the free choice immovably fixed in our minds—not that by which we want to act well, for in human iniquity we were able to lose it, and by divine grace we are able to receive it; but the free choice by which we want to be blessed and do not want to be miserable, which neither the miserable nor the blessed can lose. For we all want to be blessed, which even the philosophers of this age and the Academics, who doubt about all things, were forced to confess, as their patron Cicero testifies; and they said this is the one thing that needs no debate, which there is no one who does not desire. This free choice is helped by the grace of God, so that what we naturally want, that is, to live blessedly, we may be able to have by living well.
Iulianum.6.26Et tu dicis, quamvis mediocres miserias, tamen miserias, beatitudini nullo negante, nullo ambigente contrarias, in primis operibus Dei, nullo cuiusquam praecedente peccato, naturaliter institutas, ut scilicet peccatricis mulieris poena, propter quam dictum est: Multiplicans multiplicabo tristitias tuas, non sit institutio miseriarum, quae, ut dicis, iam fuerat in natura; sed ampliatio quae accessit ex poena.
And you say that miseries—moderate, indeed, but still miseries, opposed (no one denying, no one doubting) to blessedness—were naturally established in the first works of God, with no one's sin going before, so that, namely, the penalty of the sinful woman, on account of which it was said, Multiplying I will multiply your sorrows, may not be the establishment of miseries, which, as you say, already existed in nature, but the enlargement that was added from the punishment.
Iulianum.6.26Quid ego iam tecum agam de sequentibus Dei verbis, ubi posteaquam dixit quod ad poenam pertinebat: In tristitia paries filios; mox addidit: Et ad virum tuum conversio tua, et ipse tui dominabitur (Gen 3, 16)? Quid opus est ut tecum inde confligam, utrum ista dominatio viri poena sit feminae an ordo naturae? Quem tamen ordinem non commemoravit Deus, quando condidit, sed quando punivit. Verum, ut dixi, quid opus est in eo remorari, quod utrumlibet sit, nostram non impedit causam?
What shall I now do with you concerning the following words of God, where, after he said what pertained to punishment—In sorrow shall you bring forth children—he soon added: And to your husband shall be your turning, and he shall rule over you (Gen 3:16)? What need is there for me to contend with you about it—whether this dominion of the husband is a punishment of the woman or an order of nature? An order which, however, God did not mention when he established it, but when he punished. But, as I said, what need is there to linger on something which, whichever it may be, does not hinder our case?
Iulianum.6.26Prorsus Deus, a supplicio quod infligebat mulieri, ad praecipiendum fuerit repente conversus, et iubendo non damnando dixerit: Ad virum tuum conversio tua, et ipse tui dominabitur; quid hoc ad quaestionem, quam de supplicio peccatricis ista disputatione versamus? De miseriis tecum ago, quas de paradiso eiectus eique contrarius, in paradiso locare conaris; easque non peccantium meritis, sed Deo naturarum institutori, tamquam et ipsas naturaliter instituerit, tuo pudore pereunte, et ore blasphemante tribuere. Dic iam quid etiam de viri poena persuadere nitaris; quandoquidem iam satis est, quid ista mulier quae ante peccatum nuda erat et non confundebatur, te nudavit atque confudit.
Granted that God, from the punishment he was inflicting on the woman, was suddenly turned to commanding, and by ordering, not condemning, said: To your husband shall be your turning, and he shall rule over you; what is this to the question which, concerning the punishment of the sinful woman, we are treating in this discussion? I am dealing with you about the miseries which, cast out of paradise and an opponent of it, you try to locate in paradise; and to attribute them not to the deserts of those who sinned, but to God the establisher of natures—as though he had established them too naturally—your shame perishing and your mouth blaspheming. Now say what you strive to persuade us about the punishment of the man too; since it is already enough how this woman, who before sin was naked and was not ashamed, has stripped and shamed you.
Iulianum.6.2627. IUL. Verum sufficiant ista de muliere, transeamus ad viri munia. Adae - inquit - dixit: Maledicta terra in operibus tuis; in tristitia manducabis eam omnibus diebus vitae tuae; spinas et tribulos edet tibi, et edes fenum agri tui; in sudore faciei tuae edes panem tuum, donec convertaris in terram de qua sumptus es; quoniam terra es, et in terram ibis (Gen 3, 17-19). Hic non est dictum: Multiplicabo spinas tuas, aut sudores tuos; sed quasi tunc primum creata dicuntur. At etiam huius invidia, non maiore quam uxoris eius labore dissolvitur; initio quippe non semini hominis, sed humo maledicitur: In tuis operibus -inquit - maledicta terra erit. Quid commerita fuerant arva (quae certe de traduce Adae habere nihil poterant), ut pro peccato voluntatis alienae convicium maledictionis exciperent? An ut etiam ipsorum cespitum doceretur exemplo, posse esse maledictum, ubi culpa non esset? Nam si in homine peccatum, in segete maledictum, manifestum est crimina non semper adhaerere dispendiis. Si ergo propter hoc maledicitur terrae, ut ille qui peccaverat affligatur, nec tamen ibi iniquitas, ubi maledictio continetur;
27. Julian: But let these things about the woman suffice; let us pass on to the man's duties. To Adam, he says, he said: Cursed is the earth in your works; in sorrow shall you eat of it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to you, and you shall eat the hay of your field; in the sweat of your face shall you eat your bread, until you return into the earth from which you were taken; for earth you are, and into earth you shall go (Gen 3:17-19). Here it is not said: I will multiply your thorns, or your sweats; but they are spoken of as if then first created. Yet even the odium of this is dissolved by a labor no greater than that of his wife; for at the beginning it is not man's seed but the soil that is cursed: In your works, he says, the earth shall be cursed. What had the fields deserved (which surely could have had nothing from Adam's transmission), that for the sin of another's will they should receive the reproach of a curse? Or was it so that even by the example of the very turf it might be taught that there can be a curse where there is no fault? For if there is sin in man, a curse in the crop, it is manifest that crimes do not always cling to losses. If, then, the earth is cursed for this reason, that he who had sinned might be afflicted, and yet there is no iniquity there where the curse is contained;
Iulianum.6.27cur non ea conditione, etiamsi quid aerumnarum naturae nostrae post peccatum primi hominis doceretur illatum, tamen sequeretur non ideo miseros esse nascentes, ut rei convincerentur; sed ut commemoratione peccati primi, afflictio succedanea his quos reos non fecerat, imitationis malae indiceret cautionem? Quandoquidem et terra ob hoc ostenderetur maledicti convicium pertulisse, ut malum alienae voluntatis argueret, non ut participationem sui criminis gigneret; nisi forte credamus cariorem Deo terram esse, quam innocentiam, ut scelere alieno cum glebam non patiatur pollui, addici tamen permittat infantiam.
why, on that condition, even if it were taught that some hardships were brought upon our nature after the first man's sin, would it not follow that those being born are not made miserable in order to be convicted as guilty, but that, by the commemoration of the first sin, an affliction following upon those whom it had not made guilty might indicate a warning against bad imitation? Since the earth too would be shown to have borne the reproach of a curse for this reason, that it might prove the evil of another's will, not that it might beget a sharing in its crime; unless perhaps we believe that the earth is dearer to God than innocence, so that, while he does not suffer a clod to be polluted by another's crime, he nonetheless permits infancy to be condemned.
Iulianum.6.27Maledictum ergo dirigitur in terram, nec tamen hoc ipsum relinquitur involutum. Disseritur quippe quo fine eiusmodi sententia tenderetur, vel quomodo humus maledicta vocaretur. In tristitia - inquit - manducabis eam omnibus diebus vitae tuae. Quo igitur genere se exponat, advertito; maledicta dicitur terra, non quo in eam animadverti quiverit, sed hoc nomine opinio animi maerentis ostenditur; ut quoniam sterilem sciebat pro cultoris sui meritis, aegritudo esurientis operarii imputaret terrae quod ipse promeruerat, et maledictam eam afflictus vocaret, cuius ideo claudebatur opimitas, ut praevaricator ille nec naturam, nec terram, sed voluntatem atque personam suam maledicto fateretur obnoxiam.
The curse, then, is directed at the earth, and yet this very thing is not left wrapped up. For it is set forth to what end a sentence of this kind tended, or how the soil was called cursed. In sorrow, he says, shall you eat of it all the days of your life. Notice, then, in what manner he explains himself; the earth is called cursed, not because any sentence could be carried out upon it, but by this word the opinion of a grieving mind is shown; so that, since he knew it to be barren for the deserts of its cultivator, the sickness of the hungry laborer might impute to the earth what he himself had deserved, and the afflicted man might call cursed the earth whose richness was therefore shut off, that that transgressor might confess by the curse that neither nature nor the earth, but his own will and person, was liable.
Iulianum.6.27Spinas - inquit - et tribulos edet tibi. Non fuit contentus dicere: Spinas et tribulos edet; sed addidit: tibi. Inter virgulta quippe alia, et veprium frutices olim iussa protulerat; tunc vero, ut compungeretur homo, solito senticosior futura promittitur. Quod Adam vehementer castigare poterat, quem post paradisi fontes et prata, etiam unus rubus posset offendere.
Thorns, he says, and thistles shall it bring forth to you. He was not content to say: Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth; but he added: to you. For among other shrubs it had once been commanded to bring forth the bushes of brambles; but then, that the man might be pricked, it is promised to be more thorny than usual. Which could chastise Adam severely, whom, after the fountains and meadows of paradise, even a single bramble could offend.
Iulianum.6.27In sudore autem faciei tuae edes panem tuum; non satis ad aerumnam video pertinere; siquidem etiam naturale adiumentum est, ut operantium artus sudore recreentur. Illi autem ante peccatum laborem incubuisse culturae lectio ipsa testatur. Sic enim ait: Et sumpsit Dominus Deus hominem quem fecit, et posuit illum in paradiso, operari eum et custodire (Gen 2, 15). Si ergo etiam in paradiso noluit eum Deus pabula examussim illaborata suscipere, sed indicto operationis, quam indiderat excitavit industriam; quid ei novum accidisse credimus, si sentiret sudorem, qui experiebatur laborem?
But In the sweat of your face shall you eat your bread—I do not see this as sufficiently pertaining to hardship; since it is even a natural aid that the limbs of those who work are refreshed by sweat. But that he labored at cultivation even before sin, the very reading testifies. For it says thus: And the Lord God took the man whom he had made, and placed him in paradise, to work it and to keep it (Gen 2:15). If, then, even in paradise God did not want him to take food exactly without labor, but stirred up the industry of working which he had implanted by enjoining it, what new thing do we believe befell him if he felt sweat, who experienced labor?
Iulianum.6.27Sequitur autem: Donec convertaris in terram ex qua sumptus es; quoniam terra es, et in terram ibis. Haec sane pars extrema sententiae, sicut illa mulieris, ad indicium, non ad supplicium respicit; quin immo, ut res indicat, promisso fine consolatur hominem. Quia enim supra commemoraverat dolores, labores, sudores, quorum sensum natura, nimietatem persona susceperat; ne hoc in aeternum videretur extendi, mitificat aegritudinem terminus indicatus; ac si diceret: Verum non semper ista patieris; sed donec convertaris in terram de qua sumptus es; quia terra es - inquit - et in terram ibis.
There follows: Until you return into the earth from which you were taken; for earth you are, and into earth you shall go. This last part of the sentence, like that of the woman, looks to an indication, not to a punishment; rather, as the matter indicates, it consoles the man by the promise of an end. For because above he had recalled pains, labors, sweats, the sensation of which nature, the excess of which the person had received, lest this should seem to be extended forever, the indicated limit softens the sickness; as if he said: But you will not suffer these things forever, but until you return into the earth from which you were taken; for earth you are, he says, and into earth you shall go.
Iulianum.6.27Cur non, postquam dixit: donec convertaris in terram de qua sumptus es, subdidit: Quia peccasti et mea praecepta transgressus es? Hoc enim dicendum erat, si resolutio corporum ad crimina pertineret. Verum quid dixit? Quia terra es - inquit - et in terram ibis. Causam cur in terram rediturus esset, ostendit: Quia terra es, inquit. Quomodo autem esset terra, superior sermo patefecerat: Quia de terra - inquit - sumptus es. Si ergo redeundi in terram, hanc esse rationem dixit Deus, quoniam fuerat assumptus e terra, porro ut assumeretur, ad iniquitatem spectare non potuit; procul dubio non iniquitatis, sed naturae mortalis fuit, ut qui aeternus non erat, in corporis parte solveretur.
Why did he not, after he said, until you return into the earth from which you were taken, add: Because you have sinned and transgressed my commands? For this is what ought to have been said, if the dissolution of bodies pertained to crimes. But what did he say? For earth you are, he says, and into earth you shall go. He showed the cause why he was going to return into the earth: For earth you are, he says. But how he was earth, the earlier word had disclosed: For from the earth, he says, you were taken. If, then, God said this was the reason for returning to the earth, namely that he had been taken from the earth, and his being taken could have no bearing on iniquity, doubtless it belonged not to iniquity but to mortal nature that one who was not eternal should be dissolved in respect of the body's part.
Iulianum.6.27Illa ergo sterilitas arborum, illa veprium ubertas, illa aegri partus aucta calamitas, personis hominum sunt illata, non generi. Denique iam natis Cain et Abel unius naturae ambobus, sed diversarum voluntatum, nec Cain sponte peccanti profuit quod eum peccata patris non presserant, nec Abeli nocuit quod parentes eius deliquerant; sed suopte uterque iudicio nec virtutis sibi, nec vitii naturale infuisse praeiudicium vario proposito, fine vario publicarunt. Functi quippe officio sacerdotum, conditori suo Deo hostias obtulerunt. Ceterum par obsequium, impar cura discrevit. Patefecit hoc divina sententia, quae complacitum sibi munus Abelis ostendit; offenso autem Cain causam suae indignationis aperuit, dicens eum bene obtulisse, sed male divisisse.
That barrenness of trees, then, that abundance of brambles, that increased calamity of painful childbirth, were brought upon the persons of human beings, not upon the kind. Finally, when Cain and Abel had been born, of one nature both, but of different wills, neither did it profit Cain, sinning of his own accord, that his father's sins had not pressed upon him, nor did it harm Abel that his parents had offended; but each, by his own judgment, made public by a differing purpose and a differing end that no natural prejudgment of virtue or of vice had been in him. For, performing the office of priests, they offered victims to God their creator. But equal homage, unequal care, distinguished them. The divine sentence disclosed this, which showed Abel's gift to be pleasing to it; but when Cain was offended, it opened the cause of his indignation, saying that he had offered well but divided badly.
Iulianum.6.27Nec mora exarsit profanus animus in livorem, et germani sanctitate gravatus, parricidium gratificatur invidiae. Ita prima occasione claruit malum non esse mortem, quod eam iustus primus omnium dedicavit. Nec tamen iram Dei animi sontis audacia effugit.
And without delay the profane mind blazed up into envy, and, weighed down by his brother's holiness, gratified his envy with fratricide. Thus at the first occasion it became clear that death is not an evil, since the just man first of all dedicated it. And yet the audacity of the guilty mind did not escape the anger of God.
Iulianum.6.27Interrogatur de fratre, convincitur de scelere, addicitur ultioni, et extra eum terrorem, qui ei pro insigni crudelitatis incubuit, terrae quoque maledictione punitur: Maledictus - inquit - tu a terra, quae aperuit os suum accipere sanguinem fratris tui de tua manu; quoniam operaberis terram, et non adiciet virtutem suam dare tibi (Gen 4, 3-12).
He is questioned about his brother, convicted of the crime, sentenced to vengeance, and, beyond that terror which lay upon him for the mark of his cruelty, he is punished also by a curse of the earth: Cursed, he says, are you from the earth, which opened its mouth to receive the blood of your brother from your hand; for you shall till the earth, and it shall not add to give its strength to you (Gen 4:3-12).
Iulianum.6.27Ecce denuo sterilitas terrae in poena cultoris indicitur. Innumera autem generis tormenta in Deuteronomio promittuntur. Quid ergo? Nostrarum dumeta terrarum, quibus amputandis runcone armatus cultor invigilat, per Cain parricidium germinarunt? Et quia omnis spinosi ruris dominus, peccato quod spinarum ubertate punitum est, a vobis putatur obnoxius; omnes iam parvuli non solum comedisse poma, quamvis nascantur sine dentibus, sed etiam Abelis sanguinem effudisse dicentur? Apparet certe, ad quem furorem perveniat Manichaeorum tradux; quae quoniam nihil habet praeter amentiam, ridet de argumentis vestris Catholicorum gravitas; sed de ruinis vestris eorumdem plorat affectio.
Behold, again the barrenness of the earth is enjoined as a punishment of the cultivator. And countless torments of the race are promised in Deuteronomy. What then? Did the thickets of our lands, for the cutting away of which the cultivator, armed with a hoe, keeps watch, sprout through Cain's fratricide? And because, in your view, every lord of a thorny field is liable to the sin which was punished by an abundance of thorns, will it now be said that all little ones not only ate the fruit—though they are born without teeth—but also shed Abel's blood? It certainly appears to what madness the Manichee transmission arrives; which, since it has nothing but folly, the gravity of Catholics laughs at among your arguments; but their affection weeps over your ruins.
Iulianum.6.27AUG. Nempe nihil agit tua tam diuturna et operosissima disputatio de poena primi hominis, nisi ut hac extenuata, etiam ipsa culpa extenuetur, quae poenae huius ingestione damnata est. Et hoc facis propter verba libri mei, cui respondes, quae tibi tamquam redarguenda proponis, ubi dixi: Illud ergo peccatum, quod ipsum hominem in paradiso mutavit in peius, quia multo est grandius quam iudicare nos possumus, ab omni nascente trahitur.
Augustine: Surely your so long and most laborious discussion about the punishment of the first man does nothing except, by making it light, to make light also of the fault itself, which was condemned by the imposition of this punishment. And you do this on account of the words of my book, to which you reply, which you propose to yourself as if to be refuted, where I said: That sin, then, which changed man himself in paradise for the worse, because it is far greater than we can judge, is drawn from every one who is born.
Iulianum.6.27Ut ergo non videatur grande peccatum, quo potuerit in deterius natura mutari, leve ac prope nullum supplicium esse contendis quod meruit. Hinc est quod maledictam terram in operibus praevaricatoris retorques ad tui dogmatis pravitatem; hinc est quod spinas et tribulos, et antequam homo peccaret, fuisse asseris institutos; cum Deus haec inter sua primitus instituta non nominet, sed in peccatoris supplicio comminetur; hinc est quod sudorem laborantis, ut non satis ad aerumnam pertinere videretur, etiam naturale adiumentum esse dixisti, ut scilicet operantium artus sudore recreentur; tamquam Deus ista dicens non irrogaret supplicium pro peccato, sed daret insuper praemium. Quamquam hoc congrue diceremus, si sudorem laboris ita laudares, ut tunc diceres institutum; nunc autem et ante peccatum sic affirmas in paradiso hominem collocatum, ut operando terram sine labore non esset; quasi non posset illa firmitas, et nulla infirmitas corporis, non solum sine labore, verum etiam cum animi voluptate, quod delectare poterat, operari.
In order, then, that it may not seem a great sin by which nature could be changed for the worse, you contend that the punishment it deserved was light and almost nothing. Hence it is that you twist the cursing of the earth in the works of the transgressor to the perversity of your doctrine; hence it is that you assert that thorns and thistles existed, established even before man sinned—although God does not name these among his first established works, but threatens them in the punishment of the sinner; hence it is that you said that the sweat of the laborer, so that it might not seem sufficiently to pertain to hardship, is even a natural aid, so that, namely, the limbs of those who work are refreshed by sweat—as though God, in saying these things, were not imposing a punishment for sin, but giving, besides, a reward. Although we would say this fittingly, if you so praised the sweat of labor as to say it was established then; but as it is, you affirm that even before sin man was so placed in paradise that, in working the earth, he was not without labor; as though that firmness, and absence of all bodily weakness, could not work, not only without labor but even with delight of mind, at what could give pleasure.
Iulianum.6.27Sed cur hoc dixeris, occulere nequivisti; apertissime quippe loqueris, cum addis: Quid novum accidisse dicimus, si sentiret sudorem, qui experiebatur laborem? Tantumne te libuit quietissimo beatorum loco, non solum tristitias parturitionis in feminis, verum etiam in viris sudorem laboris immittere, ut Deo damnante, nihil novi damnato diceres accidisse? Tantumne illudis et despicis severitatem Dei, ut quod irrogavit ille poenaliter, tu donatum naturaliter asseveres? Si nihil novi homini accidisse dicis, cui Deus dixit: In sudore faciei tuae edes panem tuum; negato hoc Deum dixisse damnantem. An dicturus es: Ille quidem hominem damnavit his verbis, sed nihil homini ex hoc accidit novi? Ergo ille damnavit, sed non est iste damnatus? Frustratus est impetus ultionis, tamquam Deus telum eiecerit et non potuerit ferire quem voluit? Immo, inquis, et damnatus est, et nihil ei accidit novi.
But why you said this, you could not hide; for you speak most openly when you add: What new thing do we say befell him if he felt sweat, who experienced labor? Did it please you so much to introduce into the most peaceful place of the blessed not only the sorrows of childbirth in women, but also the sweat of labor in men, that you said nothing new befell the condemned one when God condemned him? Do you so mock and despise the severity of God that what he imposed as a penalty you assert was given by nature? If you say nothing new befell the man to whom God said: In the sweat of your face shall you eat your bread, then deny that God said this in condemning. Or will you say: He indeed condemned the man with these words, but nothing new befell the man from this? So he condemned, but this man was not condemned? Was the force of the vengeance frustrated, as though God hurled a weapon and could not strike whom he willed? No, you say, he was both condemned and nothing new befell him.
Iulianum.6.27Hic risum tenere difficile est. Si enim damnatus est, et nihil ei novi accidit; solebat ergo damnari, ac per hoc solebat et peccare; non enim damnaretur iniuste. An quia eum tunc primum peccasse nemo ambigit, iniuste solebat ante damnari? Non enim, sicut de pariente dixisti, hoc saltem novi accidisse homini fassus es, quod sicut mulieri dolor parturitionis, ita viro sudor laboris est additus; hoc modo enim, hac additione quae antea non fuit, novi illi aliquid accidisse concederes.
Here it is difficult to hold back laughter. For if he was condemned, and nothing new befell him, then he was accustomed to be condemned, and by this accustomed also to sin; for he would not be condemned unjustly. Or, because no one doubts that he then first sinned, was he accustomed to be condemned unjustly before? For you have not confessed, as you said of the woman, that at least this new thing befell the man, that, as pain in childbirth was added to the woman, so the sweat of labor was added to the man; for in this way, by this addition which did not exist before, you would grant that something new befell him.
Iulianum.6.27Sed cum dicis: Quid ei accidit novi? quem tamen confiteris esse damnatum; quid aliud affirmas, quam sic eum solere damnari? Aut si solere fieri non dicimus, nisi quod assidue factum novimus; certe sic vel semel necesse est ante damnatum esse concedas, cui nihil novi accidisse, quod sic damnatus est, asseveras. Ubi vides, in quae fueris abrupta progressus. Redi ergo a praecipitio laboriosae disputationis tuae, et noli labores et dolores in sedes felicium gaudiorum, atque in locum ineffabilis quietis inferre.
But when you say: What new thing befell him?—whom nonetheless you confess to have been condemned—what else do you affirm than that he was accustomed to be condemned in this way? Or if we say a thing is wont to be done only when we know it has been done repeatedly, certainly you must grant that he was at least once condemned before, of whom you assert that nothing new befell him in being condemned in this way. Here you see into what precipices you have advanced. Return, then, from the brink of your laborious discussion, and do not bring labors and pains into the seats of happy joys and into the place of ineffable rest.
Iulianum.6.27Quid, quod etiam corporis mortem sic paradiso conaris immittere, ut eam dicas praevaricatori pro beneficio fuisse promissam, vel potius indicatam, ubi Deus dixit: Terra es, et in terram ibis; tamquam nesciret homo sic se fuisse institutum, ut sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset; et hanc illi scientiam tunc Deus donaverit, quando eum pro commissa iniquitate damnavit? Disputans quippe de his Dei verbis, ubi ait: In sudore faciei tuae edes panem tuum, donec revertaris in terram de qua sumptus es; quia terra es, et in terram ibis. Haec sane, inquis, pars extrema sententiae, sicut illa mulieris, ad indicium, non ad supplicium pertinet; quin immo, ut res indicat, consolatur hominem. Quia enim supra - inquis - commemoraverat dolores, labores, sudores, quorum sensum natura, nimietatem persona susceperat; ne hoc in aeternum videretur extendi, mitificat aegritudinem terminus indicatus; ac si diceret: Verum non semper ista patieris, sed donec convertaris in terram de qua sumptus es; quia "terra es, et in terram ibis".
What of this, that you also try to introduce even bodily death into paradise, by saying that it was promised, or rather indicated, to the transgressor as a benefit, where God said: Earth you are, and into earth you shall go; as though the man did not know he was so constituted that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he was going to die; and God gave him this knowledge at the time when he condemned him for the iniquity he had committed? For, discussing these words of God, where he says: In the sweat of your face shall you eat your bread, until you return into the earth from which you were taken; for earth you are, and into earth you shall go—This, you say, is the last part of the sentence, like that of the woman: it pertains to an indication, not to a punishment; rather, as the matter indicates, it consoles the man. For because above, you say, he had recalled pains, labors, sweats, the sensation of which nature, the excess of which the person had received, lest this should seem to be extended forever, the indicated limit softens the sickness; as if he said: But you will not suffer these things forever, but until you return into the earth from which you were taken; for earth you are, and into earth you shall go.
Iulianum.6.27Haec dicens persuadere conaris, ita quidem creatum hominem, ut etiamsi in rectitudine vitae, in qua creatus est, permaneret, tamen mortalis necessitate naturae quandoque moreretur; sed hoc ei non esse indicatum, nisi tempore damnationis suae, ut aerumna eius, ne putaretur aeterna, de promisso acciperet fine solatium.
In saying these things you try to persuade us that man was so created that, even if he remained in the rectitude of life in which he was created, he would nonetheless at some time die by the necessity of mortal nature; but that this was not indicated to him except at the time of his condemnation, so that his hardship, lest it be thought eternal, might receive consolation from the promised end.
Iulianum.6.27Putaret ergo Adam non se moriturum, si hoc illi non indicasset Deus: hoc autem non illi indicasset Deus, nisi peccatorem damnari oporteret; remaneret ergo in hoc errore, quo aeternum se, aut numquam moriturum esse credebat, nisi ad sapientiam, qua se homo cognoscit, peccati merito perveniret. Sentisne quid dicas?
Adam, then, would have thought he was not going to die, if God had not indicated this to him; but God would not have indicated this to him unless the sinner had to be condemned; he would therefore have remained in this error, by which he believed himself eternal, or never going to die, unless by the desert of sin he had arrived at the wisdom by which a man knows himself. Do you feel what you are saying?
Iulianum.6.27Accipe aliud. Procul dubio nesciens Adam se esse moriturum, quod nisi peccasset utique nesciret, tamen si peccare noluisset etiam hoc nesciens beatus esset, et credens contraria veritati miser non esset. Audisne quid dicas? Accipe et tertium.
Take another point. Doubtless Adam, not knowing that he was going to die—which, unless he had sinned, he surely would not know—nevertheless, if he had been unwilling to sin, would, even not knowing this, have been blessed, and, believing what is contrary to the truth, would not have been miserable. Do you hear what you are saying? Take a third point too.
Iulianum.6.27Si iustitiae suae tempore Adam credebat se nec corpore moriturum, si Dei praeceptum minime violasset, moriturum autem tunc didicit, quando violavit; hoc nos credimus, quod cum esset iustus, ille credebat; hoc autem vos creditis, quod nisi iniustus nosse non meruit. Noster ergo error stat in parte iustitiae, et in parte iniquitatis vestra sapientia. Intellegisne quid dicas?
If in the time of his justice Adam believed that he would not die even in the body, if he had in no way violated God's command, but learned that he was going to die at the time when he violated it; then this we believe, which he, when he was just, believed; but this you believe, which he did not deserve to know except as an unjust man. Our error, therefore, stands on the side of justice, and your wisdom on the side of iniquity. Do you understand what you are saying?
Iulianum.6.27Accipe et quartum. Si beato et iusto illi homini non indicavit Deus corporis eius mortem futuram, indicavit autem misero et peccatori; congruentius creditur, timore quoque mortis eum cruciare voluisse, etiam isto scilicet dignum iudicans esse tormento. Ut enim clamat ipsa natura, plus mors metuitur, quam labores; laborant quippe omnes homines ne moriantur, si eis talis optio proponatur, ut continuo moriantur, si non laboraverint; quotusquisque autem reperitur, qui mori malit, quam laborare? Denique ipse Adam per tot annos maluit laborare, quam non laborando et fame moriendo vitam simul et laborem finire.
Take a fourth point too. If God did not indicate to that blessed and just man the future death of his body, but did indicate it to the miserable and sinful one, it is more fittingly believed that he wished also to torment him with the fear of death, judging him worthy of this torment as well. For, as nature itself cries out, death is feared more than labors; for all human beings labor in order not to die—if such a choice be set before them, that they will die at once if they have not labored; how many indeed are found who would rather die than labor? Finally, Adam himself preferred for so many years to labor rather than, by not laboring and dying of hunger, to end both life and labor at once.
Iulianum.6.27Nam quo alio sensu naturali etiam Cain plus mortem timuit, quam laborem? Quo alio sensu per non iniqua nec inhumana iudicia, minora crimina labore metallico, maiora morte iudices damnant? Unde autem martyres tanta gloria praedicantur, quod pro iustitia mortui sunt, nisi quia maior virtus est mortem spernere, quam laborem? Propter quod non ait Dominus: Maiorem caritatem nemo habet, quam ut laboret; sed: ut animam suam ponat pro amicis suis (Io 15, 13). Si ergo maior est caritas mori, quam laborare pro amicis; quis tam caecus est, ut non videat minorem poenam laboris esse quam mortis? Aut si plus homo debet laborem metuere, quam mortem; quomodo non est misera ipsa natura, quae plus mortem metuit, quam laborem?
For by what other natural sense did even Cain fear death more than labor? By what other sense do judges, through judgments neither unjust nor inhuman, condemn lesser crimes to labor in the mines, greater ones to death? But why are the martyrs proclaimed with such great glory because they died for justice, except that it is a greater virtue to spurn death than labor? On account of which the Lord did not say: No one has greater love than to labor; but, than to lay down his life for his friends (John 15:13). If, then, it is greater love to die than to labor for one's friends, who is so blind that he does not see that the penalty of labor is less than that of death? Or if a man ought to fear labor more than death, how is that very nature not miserable which fears death more than labor?
Iulianum.6.27Et tu ista non cogitans, dicis indicata sibi sua morte hominem consolatum, ne suum laborem putaret aeternum; cum, si vestrum dogma verum esset, quo affirmatis Adam, etiamsi non peccasset, fuisse moriturum, propterea hoc illi indicandum non fuisset, antequam inciperet poena damnationis affligi, ne illum Deus priusquam peccasset, mortis timore torqueret; tunc autem, cum iam, posteaquam peccavit, poena dignissimum iudicaret, indicaret etiam esse moriturum, ut eamdem poenam Deus iustus, mali ultor admissi, etiam timore mortis augeret.
And you, not considering these things, say that the man was consoled by the indication of his own death, lest he think his labor eternal; whereas, if your doctrine were true, by which you affirm that Adam, even if he had not sinned, was going to die, this for that very reason ought not to have been indicated to him before the punishment of condemnation began to afflict him, lest God torment him with the fear of death before he had sinned; but then, when, after he sinned, God judged him most worthy of punishment, he would also indicate that he was going to die, so that the just God, the avenger of the evil committed, might increase that same punishment even with the fear of death.
Iulianum.6.27Quisquis igitur haec Dei verba, quibus est punitus Adam, quando dictum est: Terra es, et in terram ibis, secundum fidem catholicam intellegit, nec vult introducere in paradisum corporis mortem praecipue, ne introducat et morbos, quorum miserabili varietate morientes videmus affligi, et paradisum sanctae voluptatis, ac spiritalis et corporalis felicitatis, cui vos non pudet esse contrarios, doloribus, laboribus, maeroribus implere cogatur; sicut vos cogimini, nec invenitis qua exire possitis, quamdiu tam impium dogma mutare non vultis; qui ergo, ut dixi, haec Dei verba secundum catholicam suscipit et intellegit fidem, sicut cernit poenam laboris in eo quod dictum est: In sudore faciei tuae edes panem tuum, ita poenam cernit et mortis in eo quod sequitur: Donec revertaris in terram de qua sumptus es; quia terra es, et in terram ibis;
Whoever, then, understands according to the Catholic faith these words of God by which Adam was punished, when it was said: Earth you are, and into earth you shall go, and does not want to introduce into paradise especially bodily death—lest he introduce also diseases, by whose pitiable variety we see the dying afflicted, and be forced to fill the paradise of holy delight and of spiritual and bodily happiness, to which you are not ashamed to be opponents, with pains, labors, griefs (as you are forced to do, and find no way out, so long as you are unwilling to change so impious a doctrine)—whoever, then, as I said, receives and understands these words of God according to the Catholic faith, just as he sees the penalty of labor in what was said: In the sweat of your face shall you eat your bread, so he sees also the penalty of death in what follows: Until you return into the earth from which you were taken; for earth you are, and into earth you shall go;
Iulianum.6.27ac sic accipit dictum, tamquam diceretur: Ego quidem te de terra sumpsi, et hominem feci; et utique potui facere, ut eadem terra quam viventem feci, numquam cogeretur vita carere quam dedi; sed quia terra es, id est, secundum carnem quae de terra sumpta est, non secundum me, qui te de terra sumpsi, vivere voluisti; laborabis in terra, donec revertaris in eam; et ideo reverteris in terram, quia terra es; et iusta poena ibis in terram de qua factus es, quia spiritui non obedisti a quo factus es.
and he so takes the saying as though it were said: I indeed took you from the earth and made you a man; and surely I could have brought it about that the same earth which I made living should never be forced to lack the life I gave; but because you are earth—that is, because you willed to live according to the flesh which was taken from the earth, not according to me who took you from the earth—you shall labor on the earth until you return into it; and therefore you shall return into the earth, because you are earth; and by a just penalty you shall go into the earth from which you were made, because you did not obey the Spirit by whom you were made.
Iulianum.6.27Iste intellectus sanus atque catholicus praecipue inde cognoscitur, quia non cogit mortibus implere terram viventium, terramque felicium malis omnibus laboriosissimis et gravissimis, quae homines in hoc corpore corruptibili patiuntur, et ea non ferendo ut moriantur urgentur. Non enim potestis dicere, leniter homines in paradiso fuisse morituros, si nemo peccasset; quia et hoc contra vos est. Si enim tunc leniter morerentur, et nunc tam aspere moriuntur, per peccatum hominis mutata est humana natura; quod vos negantes, consequenter cogimini tales omnino mortes, quales nunc sunt, loco illius tantae felicitatis et iucunditatis immittere; ac per hoc et innumerabilia genera morborum, tam gravia, tamque intolerabilia, ut eis homines compellantur in mortem.
This sound and Catholic understanding is recognized especially from this, that it does not compel one to fill the land of the living with deaths, and the land of the happy with all those most laborious and most grievous evils which human beings suffer in this corruptible body, and by not bearing which they are driven to die. For you cannot say that human beings would have died gently in paradise, if no one had sinned; because this too is against you. For if they would then have died gently, and now die so harshly, then human nature was changed through the sin of man; and you, denying this, are consequently forced to bring into the place of such great happiness and pleasantness deaths altogether such as they now are; and by this also innumerable kinds of diseases, so grievous and so intolerable that by them human beings are driven into death.
Iulianum.6.27Quae paradisi facies si vestras facies aliquo pudore perfundit atque confundit; qui non vultis confiteri nostram per peccatum mutari potuisse naturam, vestram potius mutate sententiam; et corpus mortuum propter peccatum cum Apostolo confitemini (Cf. Rom 8, 10). Dicite cum Ecclesia Dei: A muliere initium factum est peccati, et propter illam morimur omnes (Eccli 25, 33). Agnoscite cum Ecclesia Dei, quia corpus corruptibile aggravat animam (Sap 9, 15). Non enim ante peccatum in paradiso tale erat corpus, ut illo anima gravaretur. Cantate cum Ecclesia Dei: Homo vanitati similis factus est, dies eius velut umbra praetereunt (Ps 143, 4). Neque enim qui est ad similitudinem Dei factus, fieret nisi per peccatum similis vanitati, ut aetatum cursu et mortis incursu, velut umbra dies illius praeterirent.
And if this face of paradise suffuses and confounds your faces with any shame—you who are unwilling to confess that our nature could have been changed through sin—change rather your own opinion; and confess with the Apostle that the body is dead because of sin (See Rom 8:10). Say with the Church of God: From a woman was the beginning of sin, and because of her we all die (Sir 25:24 (25:33)). Acknowledge with the Church of God that the corruptible body weighs down the soul (Wis 9:15). For before sin, in paradise, the body was not such that the soul should be weighed down by it. Sing with the Church of God: Man is made like to vanity; his days pass away like a shadow (Ps 144:4 (143:4)). For he who was made to the likeness of God would not have been made like to vanity except through sin, so that, by the course of the ages and the onset of death, his days should pass away like a shadow.
Iulianum.6.27Nolite luci serenissimae veritatis nubila vestri erroris offundere; paradisum Dei corda fidelium, quem debent amare, non debent amaricare. Quid enim vos offendit, obsecro, quid vos offendit ille memorabilis beatorum et quietorum locus, ut eum mortibus hominum, et per has malis omnibus quibus abundare cernimus angustias necessitatesque morientium, oculis clausis, fronte impudentissima, mente pertinacissima, lingua loquacissima, velitis implere; ne cogamini confiteri in has miserias, quibus videtis refertum genus humanum a vagitibus parvulorum usque ad anhelitus decrepitorum, per peccatum maximum primi hominis humanam corruisse naturam? Et quia iniustum esse respicitis parentum in posteros sine culpa transire poenam, transisse concedatis et culpam.
Do not pour the clouds of your error over the most serene light of truth; the hearts of the faithful, which ought to love the paradise of God, ought not to embitter it. For what offends you, I beg, what offends you about that memorable place of the blessed and at rest, that you should want—with eyes closed, with a most shameless brow, a most stubborn mind, a most talkative tongue—to fill it with the deaths of human beings, and through these with all the evils by which we see the straits and necessities of the dying to abound, lest you be forced to confess that into these miseries, with which you see the human race crammed from the wailings of little ones to the gaspings of the decrepit, human nature has fallen through the greatest sin of the first man? And because you see it to be unjust for the penalty of the parents to pass into their descendants without fault, grant that the fault too has passed.
Iulianum.6.27Maximam quippe culpam primi hominis exstitisse, quam tu propterea, quantum potuisti, extenuare conatus es, ne propter illam crederetur natura humana potuisse mutari; ergo illam culpam maximam fuisse, non solum per ipsas miserias generis humani, quae ab infantium cunabulis incipiunt, verum etiam per te ipsum probo. Et tu enim in secundo tui huius operis libro maximam formam peccati in primo homine posuisti, ut e contrario maxima forma iustitiae commendaretur in Christo (Cf. supra 2, 189. 190); quod te dixisse mihi videris oblitus; nam si memor fuisses, numquam profecto peccatum Adae tam loquaciter minuere nitereris. Ego autem maximum illud peccatum fuisse poenae ipsius granditate demonstro; non enim est maior, quam ut de paradiso proiceretur, et a ligno vitae separaretur ne viveret in aeternum; additis etiam huius angoribus vitae, ut dies eius et in laboribus gemerent, et sicut umbra transirent. Enimvero haereditaria ipsa generis humani, ab infantibus usque ad senes, calamitas testis est; quae miseriae non haberent conditionem supplicii, nisi traherentur contagione peccati. De qua contagione nobiscum pertinaciter pugnas, et ne ista credatur, et ipsum peccatum primi hominis, et supplicium eius extenuas, et dolores, labores, et mortes in paradisum introducere impudentissima et impiissima contentione conaris.
For that the fault of the first man was the greatest—which you for this reason tried, as far as you could, to make light of, lest on account of it human nature be believed to have been able to be changed—that, then, that fault was the greatest I prove not only by the very miseries of the human race, which begin from the cradles of infants, but even by yourself. For you too, in the second book of this work of yours, set down the greatest figure of sin in the first man, so that by contrast the greatest figure of justice might be commended in Christ (Cf. supra 2, 189. 190); which you seem to me to have forgotten that you said; for if you had remembered, you would surely never strive so talkatively to diminish Adam's sin. But I demonstrate that that sin was the greatest by the greatness of the punishment itself; for there is none greater than that he should be cast out of paradise and separated from the tree of life lest he live forever, with the pangs of this life added besides, so that his days should both groan in labors and pass away like a shadow. Indeed the very hereditary calamity of the human race, from infants to old men, is a witness; which miseries would not have the condition of a punishment, unless they were drawn by the contagion of sin. About which contagion you fight with us stubbornly, and lest it be believed, you make light both of the first man's sin and of his punishment, and try, by a most shameless and most impious contention, to introduce pains, labors, and deaths into paradise.
Iulianum.6.27Dicis etiam: Si propter hoc maledicitur terrae, ut ille qui peccaverat affligatur, nec tamen ibi iniquitas, ubi maledictio continetur; cur non ea conditione etiam, si quid aerumnarum naturae nostrae post peccatum primi hominis doceretur illatum, sequeretur tamen non ideo miseros esse nascendos, ut rei convincerentur; sed ut commemoratione peccati primi afflictio succedanea, his quos reos non fecerat, imitationis malae indiceret cautionem?
You also say: If the earth is cursed for this reason, that he who had sinned might be afflicted, and yet there is no iniquity there where the curse is contained, why, on that condition, even if it were taught that some hardships were brought upon our nature after the first man's sin, would it not nonetheless follow that those being born are not made miserable in order to be convicted as guilty, but that, by the commemoration of the first sin, an affliction following might indicate, to those whom it had not made guilty, a warning against bad imitation?
Iulianum.6.27Video quibus premaris angustiis. Miserias nascentium cogeris confiteri, quoniam vim tibi facit rerum evidentia, quam prae oculis omnium constitutam negare non sineris; has autem miserias nascentium, etiam in paradiso futuras fuisse, si nemo peccasset, vis quidem asserere; sed cernis te hominibus qualecumque cor habentibus, id persuadere non posse. Remanet igitur, ut propter peccatum primi hominis genus humanum fatearis miserum effectum; sed hoc absolute dicere formidans: Si quid aerumnarum - inquis - naturae nostrae post peccatum primi hominis doceretur illatum.
I see by what straits you are pressed. You are forced to confess the miseries of those being born, since the evidence of the facts compels you—evidence set before everyone's eyes, which you will not be allowed to deny; but these miseries of those being born, that they would have existed even in paradise if no one had sinned, you do indeed want to assert; yet you see that you cannot persuade human beings who have any heart at all of this. It remains, therefore, that you confess the human race was made miserable on account of the first man's sin; but, dreading to say this outright, you say: If some hardships were taught to have been brought upon our nature after the first man's sin.
Iulianum.6.27Quid est: Si quid doceretur? Itane vero res manifestissima, quam tu quoque iam sentire compelleris, non docetur? An eo redeundum est, unde per haec verba sensim fugere meditaris; intellegens quam intolerabili absurditate credatur nascentium miserias etiam in paradiso futuras fuisse, si nemo peccasset? Quod si dicere horrescis, quoniam revera vehementer horrendum est; cur dicis: etiamsi doceretur; cum sine ulla dubitatione doceatur, non aliquid aerumnarum, sed omnes aerumnas nascentium post peccatum primi hominis, immo propter peccatum primi hominis, nostrae illatas esse naturae?
What is this: If something were taught? Is it really the case that a thing most manifest, which you too are now compelled to feel, is not taught? Or must we return to the point from which, by these words, you are contriving gradually to flee, understanding by what intolerable absurdity it is believed that the miseries of those being born would have existed even in paradise, if no one had sinned? But if you shudder to say this—since indeed it is exceedingly horrible—why do you say: even if it were taught, when it is taught beyond all doubt that not some hardships, but all the hardships of those being born, were brought upon our nature after the first man's sin, or rather on account of the first man's sin?
Iulianum.6.27Sed: Non- inquis - ideo sunt miseri nascentes, ut esse rei convincantur. Nec ego dico: Ideo miseri sunt nascentes, ut convincantur rei; sed dico potius: Ideo convincuntur rei esse, quoniam sunt miseri. Iustus est enim Deus, quod assidue contra te dicis, et nescis; iustus est, inquam, Deus; et ideo nascentes nec facere nec fieri sineret miseros, nisi nosset reos. Unde non aliter fides catholica intellegit quod ait Apostolus: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum et per peccatum mors; et ita in omnes homines pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt (Rom 5, 12). Quod tu nolens referre ad originis nexum, detorquere conaris ad imitationis exemplum;
But, you say, those being born are not made miserable in order to be convicted as guilty. Nor do I say: Those being born are made miserable in order to be convicted as guilty; but I say rather: They are convicted of being guilty because they are miserable. For God is just—which you continually say against yourself, and do not know it; God is just, I say; and therefore he would not allow those being born to make others miserable, or to be made miserable, unless he knew them to be guilty. Hence the Catholic faith understands in no other way what the Apostle says: Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; and so it passed into all men, in whom all sinned (Rom 5:12). Which you, unwilling to refer to the bond of origin, try to twist to the example of imitation;
Iulianum.6.27ex quo fit, ut cum tibi dicitur: Cur ergo miserias generis humani in ipso incipientis aetatis exordio, innumeris et diversis malis suis protestantur infantes, qui nulla imitatione peccarunt? Tamquam gravissima et inevitabili pressura stomachi, in hos vomitus erumpas, et dicas: Non quia rei sunt, ideo sunt miseri qui nascuntur; sed ut hac miseria commoniti, caveant peccatum primi hominis imitari. Sic enim putavi planius et explicatius esse dicendum, quod tu obscurius perplexiusque dixisti. Sed quomodolibet hoc dicas, quis non videat studio defendendae opinionis tuae omnino te attendere nolle quid dicas?
from which it comes about that when it is said to you: Why, then, do infants attest the miseries of the human race at the very beginning of the age that is beginning, by their countless and various evils—infants who have sinned by no imitation?—you, as if by a most grievous and unavoidable pressure of the stomach, burst into these vomits, and say: Those who are born are not miserable because they are guilty, but so that, warned by this misery, they may beware of imitating the sin of the first man. For thus I thought it should be said more plainly and explicitly, what you said more obscurely and perplexedly. But however you say this, who does not see that, in your zeal for defending your opinion, you altogether refuse to attend to what you say?
Iulianum.6.27Ideone fuerant, quaeso te, homines innocentes plectendi miseria, non quod ullum peccatum haberent, sed ut non haberent? Debuit ergo et Eva prius fieri misera quam rea, ut miseria sua commoneretur non consentire serpenti. Debuit et Adam prius puniri malo miseriae, ne ad malum peccati seductae consentiret uxori. Placet enim tibi, ut poenis praecedentibus crimina caveantur, non ut sequentibus vindicentur; ac sic inverse, non quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur, non reatus, sed innocentia puniatur.
Were innocent human beings, I ask you, to be smitten with misery for this reason—not because they had any sin, but so that they should not have any? Then Eve too ought first to have been made miserable before guilty, so that by her misery she might be warned not to consent to the serpent. And Adam too ought first to have been punished with the evil of misery, lest he consent to his wife seduced to the evil of sin. For it pleases you that crimes should be guarded against by punishments going before, not avenged by punishments following; and so, in reverse, that not because there is sin, but lest there be sin, not guilt, but innocence should be punished.
Iulianum.6.27Corrige, obsecro, perversam, praeposteramque sententiam; quia utique tunicam corrigeres, si te dextra in sinistra forte vestires. Hoc dixi, quoniam peccata, ne sequantur, suppliciis praecedentibus vis caveri; cum soleant et debeant suppliciis sequentibus peccata praecedentia vindicari.
Correct, I beg, this perverse and preposterous opinion; for surely you would correct your tunic if you happened to clothe your right side in the left part. I said this because you want sins to be guarded against, lest they follow, by punishments going before; whereas preceding sins are wont and ought to be avenged by punishments that follow.
Iulianum.6.27Deinde dic nobis, quomodo calamitosos commoneamus infantes, ut intueantur miseriam suam, ne peccatum primi hominis imitentur; qui nec imitari quemquam, nec commoneri adhuc possunt. Maledicta enim terra (unde ad hoc tuum deliramentum sumis exemplum, quia sic potuerunt nascentes effici miseri, ut caverent peccata gignentium, quamvis non ex eis trahant originale peccatum, quemadmodum terra maledicta est propter hominis poenam, quamvis ipsa non habens culpam) cur non attendis quia sicut non habet culpam, sic ex illa maledictione non habet poenam; sed peccantis hominis cum maledicitur terra, ipsa fit poena?
Then tell us how we are to warn the calamitous infants to look upon their misery, lest they imitate the sin of the first man—infants who can as yet neither imitate anyone nor be warned. For the earth is cursed (whence you take an example for this delirium of yours, that those being born could be made miserable in such a way as to beware the sins of their begetters, although they do not draw original sin from them, just as the earth is cursed on account of the man's punishment, although it has no fault of its own)—why do you not attend to this, that just as it has no fault, so from that curse it has no punishment; but when the earth is cursed, it becomes the punishment of the sinning man?
Iulianum.6.27Nascentes autem cum miseri sunt, ipsi sentiunt miserias suas; ipsi nullum, sicut putatis, trahentes peccatum; immeritas, si hoc ita est, procul dubio sustinent poenas, qui nec admoneri adhuc, ut dixi, aliquid possunt, nec peccatum primi hominis imitari, propter quod debeant admoneri. An exspectandum est ut crescendo perveniant ad liberum arbitrium, quando sentiant admonentem, atque intuendo miseriam suam, culpam non imitentur alienam? Sed ubi ponimus tam multos qui usque ad diem mortis suae quis fuerit, vel utrum fuerit, vel quid admiserit Adam nesciunt? Ubi ponimus tam multos qui prius moriuntur, quam perveniant ad aetatem, in qua sentiant commonentem? Ubi ponimus eos qui tam insulso ac fatuo nascuntur ingenio, ut nec grandes possint cum aliquo fructu tale aliquid admoneri? Nempe hi omnes tanta miseria sine ullo merito, sine ulla utilitate plectuntur. Ubi est iustitia Dei?
But those being born, when they are miserable, themselves feel their own miseries; they themselves, drawing (as you suppose) no sin, doubtless—if this is so—sustain undeserved punishments, who, as I said, can as yet neither be warned of anything nor imitate the sin of the first man, on account of which they should be warned. Or must we wait until, by growing, they arrive at free choice, when they may feel the one warning them, and, looking upon their misery, may not imitate another's fault? But where do we place the very many who, down to the day of their death, do not know who Adam was, or whether he was, or what he committed? Where do we place the very many who die before they reach the age at which they may feel the one warning them? Where do we place those who are born of so dull and foolish a wit that not even when grown can they be warned of any such thing with any profit? Surely all these are smitten with so great a misery without any desert, without any usefulness. Where is the justice of God?
Iulianum.6.27Quam si cogitares, numquam crederes sine ullo merito peccati originalis tam miseros esse nascentes. Sed quoniam cum conditione locutus es; non enim aisti: Quoniam docetur, sed aisti: Si quid doceretur aerumnarum post peccatum primi hominis nostrae illatum esse naturae; paratus es, ut arbitror, dicere: Non docetur. Ac per hoc restat ut dicas, mala quae videmus parvulos perpeti, etiam in paradiso futura fuisse, si nemo peccasset, ne propter peccatum primi hominis ea fatearis exorta. Ita cum hos nodos quaeris evadere, et fieri ex nostris manibus labilis, contra paradisum stabis immobilis; cui sic es contrarius, ut eius felicitati et quieti turbandae, et dolores parturientium, et labores operantium, et iactationes aegrotantium, morbosque morientium, audacissimo ore et fronte perditissima immittas.
And if you considered it, you would never believe that those being born are so miserable without any desert of original sin. But because you spoke with a condition—for you did not say: Since it is taught, but you said: If some hardships were taught to have been brought upon our nature after the first man's sin—you are ready, I think, to say: It is not taught. And by this it remains for you to say that the evils which we see little ones suffer would have existed even in paradise, if no one had sinned, lest you confess that they arose on account of the first man's sin. Thus, while you seek to escape these knots, and to become slippery from our hands, you will stand immovable against paradise; to which you are so opposed that, to disturb its happiness and rest, you bring in—with most audacious mouth and most lost brow—both the pains of those giving birth, and the labors of those working, and the tossings of the sick, and the diseases of the dying.
Iulianum.6.27Sed in laude mortis magnum te putas aliquid invenisse quod diceres: Prima, scilicet, occasione claruisse, malum non esse mortem, quod eam iustus primus omnium dedicavit. Ergo redde rationem, quomodo non haberet quam dedicaret iustus, nisi hanc aedificaret iniustus. Auctor quippe et effector mortis illius Cain exstitit, non Abel. Ille itaque dedicavit, qui fabricavit. Mors enim hominis boni, malum opus fuit hominis mali. Iste autem qui pro bono malum pertulit, non mortem, sed martyrium dedicavit, gerens eius figuram, quem populus Iudaeorum tamquam malus frater carnalis occidit.
But in praise of death you think you have found something great to say: namely that, at the first occasion, it became clear that death is not an evil, since the just man first of all dedicated it. Then give a reason how the just man would not have had what he might dedicate, unless the unjust man built this. For Cain, not Abel, was the author and maker of that death. He, then, dedicated it who fashioned it. For the death of the good man was the evil work of the evil man. But this man who suffered evil for good dedicated not death, but martyrdom, bearing the figure of the one whom the people of the Jews, like an evil carnal brother, killed.
Iulianum.6.27Propterea itaque gloriosus Abel, non quia aliquid boni sumpsit a fratre, sed quia patienter pro iustitia moriendo, malo eius usus est bene. Nam sicut bono legis male utendo praevaricatores puniuntur; ita e contrario malo mortis bene utendo martyres coronantur. Proinde si non dedignaris dicere, quod te cerno nescire, mors in morientibus omnibus mala est; in mortuis autem quibusdam mala, quibusdam bona. Hoc secuti sunt, qui de bono mortis laudabiles disputationes etiam litteris mandaverunt.
For this reason, then, Abel is glorious, not because he took anything good from his brother, but because, dying patiently for justice, he used his brother's evil well. For just as transgressors are punished by using the good of the law badly, so on the contrary the martyrs are crowned by using the evil of death well. Accordingly, if you do not disdain to say what I see you do not know, death in all the dying is an evil; but in some of the dead it is an evil, in some good. Those who even committed to writing praiseworthy discussions about the good of death followed this.
Iulianum.6.27Mors ergo iusti Abelis habitantis in requie, non solum mala non est, verum etiam bona est. Tu autem in paradisum non bonorum mortuorum requiem, sed cruciatus morientium, ne bonorum ibi requies esset, intulisti. Aut si dicis: Si nemo peccasset, in paradiso sine cruciatu homines morerentur; saltem quia extra paradisum non fere quisquam sine cruciatu moritur, tandem convictus atque contortus, in deterius commutatam peccato primi hominis humanam confitere naturam.
The death, then, of the just Abel, dwelling in rest, is not only not an evil, but is even a good. But you have brought into paradise not the rest of the good dead, but the torments of the dying, so that there might be no rest of the good there. Or if you say: If no one had sinned, human beings would die in paradise without torment, at least—because outside paradise scarcely anyone dies without torment—being at last convicted and twisted, confess that human nature was changed for the worse by the first man's sin.
Iulianum.6.2728. IUL. Quid postremo de ipso serpente dicetur? Diabolum maledictione illa punitum, an hoc commune reptile animal opinaris? Id est, illam sententiam quae ait ad serpentem: Maledictus tu ab omnibus pecoribus, et ab omnibus bestiis quae sunt superterram; super pectus et ventrem tuum ambulabis, et terram manducabis omnibus diebus vitae tuae (Gen 3, 14), in diaboli supplicio, an bestiae huius quae vernis caloribus educitur de cavernis, arbitraris impletam? Si in huius serpentis, cuius species in corpus enode porrigitur atque ob illius culpae meritum dicas eam factam esse terrifagam; ergo et omnibus bestiis tradux iniquitatis incumbit, quam putas nisi per libidinem coeuntium non posse deduci; fitque ut etiam serpentum libidinem, iamque inde irrationabilium animantium, asseras a diabolo fuisse plantatam, retectaque sententia Manichaei nobis carmen inclangas.
28. Julian: What, finally, will be said about the serpent itself? Do you think the devil was punished by that curse, or this common reptile animal? That is, do you judge that the sentence which says to the serpent: Cursed are you among all the cattle and among all the beasts that are upon the earth; upon your breast and your belly shall you go, and earth shall you eat all the days of your life (Gen 3:14), was fulfilled in the punishment of the devil, or of this beast which is brought forth from its caverns by the warmth of spring? If in the punishment of this serpent, whose form is stretched out into a smooth body, and you say that on account of the desert of that fault it was made earth-eating, then the transmission of iniquity lies upon all beasts too—a transmission which you think cannot be carried down except through the lust of those copulating; and it comes about that you assert even the lust of serpents, and from there of irrational animals, to have been planted by the devil, and, the doctrine of Mani being uncovered, you blare out your song to us.
Iulianum.6.28Sin autem quidquid ad serpentem dicitur, intellegibiliter in diabolo profitearis impletum; annues sine dubio, nec hoc quod ibi pro ultione profertur, indicium nunc reorum esse serpentum, nec diabolum terram edere corporaliter; sed etsi tunc ministerium draconis arripuit, atque hoc quasi telum, quo ad vulnerandum hominem usus fuerat, severitas postea paterna confregit; tamen peccatum in solius agentis voluntate resedisse. Cibos autem et spinas et sudores primo fuisse naturaliter instituta, post in aliquibus aucta iudicialiter, ad nostram vero aetatem sine peccati illius admiratione venisse; res tam apertae sunt, ut longiore penitus assertione non egeant.
But if you profess that whatever is said to the serpent was fulfilled intelligibly in the devil, you will doubtless agree that neither is what is there brought forth as vengeance now an indication of guilty serpents, nor does the devil eat earth bodily; but that, even if he then seized the ministry of the dragon, and this, as it were a weapon which he had used to wound man, the fatherly severity afterward shattered, nevertheless the sin resided in the will of the agent alone. But that foods and thorns and sweats were at first naturally established, afterward in some increased by judgment, and came to our age without any wonder at that sin—these things are so plain that they need no further assertion at all.
Iulianum.6.28AUG. Quid est quod vipereas astutias tuas etiam de serpente contorques? Quis enim divini libri haec verba, quae commemorasti, congruenter intellegens, non videat in diabolum potius, qui serpente ad id quod voluit, ut potuit, usus est, quam in ipsum animal, qualecumque terrenum, illam prolatam fuisse sententiam? Sed quia non per seipsum, per serpentem autem seductorias loquelas diabolus operatus est, ideo ad serpentem locutus est Deus, quod significandae malitiae diaboli conveniret, et natura huius figura esset illius. Proinde quod dixit Deus serpenti: Maledictus tu ab omnibus pecoribus, et omnibus bestiis quae sunt super terram; super pectus et ventrem tuum ambulabis, et terram manducabis omnibus diebus vitae tuae, et cetera; tanto intelleguntur et exponuntur melius, quanto congruentius de diabolo accipiuntur. Sed quoniam secundum etiam rectam fidem, multis tamen modis de his disputari solet, nec ad causam nunc pertinet quid eorum magis eligam promere, satis est ut tibi respondeam, diaboli naturam nequaquam ad connexionem successionemque propaginis pertinere, ubi peccati originalis quaestio vertitur.
Augustine: What is this, that you twist your viperous cunning even out of the serpent? For who, understanding fittingly these words of the divine book which you recalled, does not see that that sentence was brought forth against the devil—who used the serpent for what he wanted, as he could—rather than against the animal itself, of whatever earthly kind? But because the devil worked his seductive speeches not through himself, but through the serpent, therefore God spoke to the serpent what was fitting for signifying the malice of the devil, and the nature of the one was a figure of the other. Accordingly, what God said to the serpent: Cursed are you among all the cattle and all the beasts that are upon the earth; upon your breast and your belly shall you go, and earth shall you eat all the days of your life, and the rest—these are understood and expounded the better, the more fittingly they are taken of the devil. But since, even according to right faith, these things are nonetheless wont to be discussed in many ways, and it does not now pertain to the case which of them I should rather choose to bring forward, it is enough that I answer you that the nature of the devil in no way pertains to the connection and succession of propagation, where the question of original sin is at issue.
Iulianum.6.28De spinis vero et sudore laborantis, quam impudenter affirmes, quod priusquam peccaretur, fuerint instituta, credo quod persuadeat legentibus superior nostra responsio. Vultis quippe facere talem paradisum, ut nulla ratione dicatur Dei esse, sed vestrum. Verumtamen, cum ante peccatum spinas dixeris institutas, in paradisum eas non ausus es introducere; immo expressisti eas ibi non fuisse; ubi tamen laborem ponere voluisti, cuius onus etsi non pungit, premit. Verumtamen, si et tibi placet spinas non congruere paradiso; itane vero naturae humanae, ut ibi prius esset ubi spinae non sunt, et nunc ibi sit ubi sunt, nulla beatitudinis in miseriam mutatione contingeret, aut sine ullo peccati merito contigisset? Cogat ergo vos agnoscere originale peccatum, tale saltem, quale non potuistis negare supplicium, si non iniustum esse creditis Deum.
But concerning the thorns and the sweat of the laborer, how shamelessly you affirm that they were established before any sinning, I believe our earlier answer persuades readers. For you want to make such a paradise that by no reasoning may it be said to be God's, but yours. Nevertheless, though you said thorns were established before sin, you did not dare to introduce them into paradise; rather you expressed that they were not there; where, however, you wanted to place labor, whose burden, even if it does not prick, presses. Nevertheless, if it also pleases you that thorns do not befit paradise, is it then really the case that to human nature—that it should first be where there are no thorns, and now be where there are—happened with no change of blessedness into misery, or could have happened without any desert of sin? Let it, then, compel you to acknowledge original sin, at least such a one as you could not deny was a punishment, if you do not believe God to be unjust.
Iulianum.6.2829. IUL. Tamen ne quid negligenter praeteriisse videamur, accipe aliud. Hunc parturitionum dolorem compertum est pro parentium corporibus viribusque variari. Barbarorum certe feminae, et pastorum, quae exercitatione indurescunt, in mediis itineribus tanta facilitate pariunt, ut non intermisso viandi labore fetus suos procurent, et statim vehant, quae nihil pariendi difficultate marcentes, onera ventris ad humeros suos transferunt; et generaliter inopia vilium feminarum, operam obstetricum non requirit; at e regione locupletes deliciis molliuntur, et quo plures habuerit quaeque sollicitos, eo amplius et discit et gestit aegrescere, putatque se tantis egere, quantis abundat obsequiis.
29. Julian: Yet, lest we seem to have passed over anything carelessly, take another point. It is established that this pain of childbirths varies according to the bodies and strength of the parents. Certainly the women of the barbarians, and of shepherds, who are hardened by exertion, give birth in the midst of their journeys with such ease that, without interrupting the labor of traveling, they tend to their offspring and at once carry them—women who, in no way weakened by the difficulty of childbearing, transfer the burdens of the womb to their shoulders; and generally the poverty of common women does not require the work of midwives; whereas, on the other side, the rich are softened by delights, and the more anxious attendants any woman has, the more she both learns and longs to grow sick, and thinks she needs as many attendances as she has in abundance.
Iulianum.6.29Maritorum sane divitum manus numquam in sentibus aerumnam primi hominis experitur; quin immo fidentes copiis, indignum se putant momentum aliquod votis fertilitatis impendere, extra formidinem etiam famis possessionum dilatatione sistentes, mandant aliquoties, ut ait poeta: Deiunge boves, dum tubera mittas (IUVENAL., Sat. 5, 119).
The hands of rich husbands, to be sure, never experience among the brambles the hardship of the first man; rather, trusting in their resources, they think it unworthy to spend any moment on vows of fertility, and, standing beyond the dread even of famine by the enlargement of their possessions, they sometimes command, as the poet says: Unyoke the oxen, while you send the truffles (Juvenal, Satires 5.119).
Iulianum.6.29Si ergo et parientium dolor spectat ad instituta naturae, quod et brutorum exemplo animalium, et sententiae divinae proprietate perdoctum est; si interceptio fructuum, et exortus spinarum inter cetera quidem creatus est, personis tamen quibusdam factus est densior et molestior; si postremo, ut difficultas ipsa parientis, ita etiam glebarum spinositas pro corporibus regionibusque variatur; postremo, si perdurat ille angor post gratiam in visceribus feminarum, hunc vero opulentorum luxuries penitus ignorat; si resolutio corporis propter quid secutura esset, expressum est, et artibus magis quam erroribus applicata; apparet hic quoque Catholicorum veritati omnia consonare, nec quidquam vobis vel feminas prodesse, vel spinas.
If, then, the pain of those giving birth too looks to the institutions of nature—which has been thoroughly taught both by the example of brute animals and by the proper sense of the divine sentence; if the cutting-off of fruits and the springing-up of thorns was indeed created among other things, yet was made thicker and more troublesome for certain persons; if, finally, just as the difficulty of childbirth, so also the thorniness of the clods varies according to bodies and regions; finally, if that pang endures after grace in the bowels of women, while the luxury of the wealthy is utterly ignorant of it; if it was expressed for what reason the dissolution of the body was going to follow, and was applied to skills rather than to errors—then it appears here too that all things accord with the truth of Catholics, and that neither the women nor the thorns profit you at all.
Iulianum.6.29AUG. Cum de poena, quam Deus inflixit primis peccatoribus, disputares, sic iamdudum a muliere transieras, ut diceres: Sufficiant ista de muliere. Cur ergo non servasti fidem promissionis tuae? Ecce post tam multa redis ad eam, ecce loquacitati tuae non sufficiunt, quae dixeras de muliere sufficiant. Sed nisi talis verbosus esses, unde octo libros, quos uni meo reddis, impleres?
Augustine: When you were discussing the punishment which God inflicted on the first sinners, you had a while ago so passed from the woman that you said: Let these things about the woman suffice. Why, then, did you not keep the faith of your promise? Behold, after so many things you return to her; behold, the things you had said about the woman do not suffice for your talkativeness. But unless you were such a wordy fellow, from where would you fill the eight books which you set against my one?
Iulianum.6.29Sed dic quod tibi placet; ecce post promissam sufficientiam, abundantiam quoque tuam patienter audivimus. Cur enim perdas res tam bellas, quae postea tibi in mentem venerunt? Quamvis et illud venire debuit, ut de libro tuo, qui complendus adhuc in manibus erat, tolleres quod dixeras: Sufficiant ista de muliere; ne tuae pollicitationi tam indecenter contrarius legereris.
But say what pleases you; behold, after the promised sufficiency, we have patiently heard your abundance too. For why should you lose such pretty things, which afterward came into your mind? Although that too ought to have come about—that you should remove from your book, which was still in hand to be completed, what you had said: Let these things about the woman suffice; lest you be read as so unbecomingly contrary to your own promise.
Iulianum.6.29Sed perge, profer in medium, contra quam promisisti, quae postea cogitasti. Dic parturitionum laborem pro parientium corporibus viribusque variari; atque ita describe barbaras rusticasque feminas in facilitate pariendi, ut nec parturire videantur; ac per hoc non parvum dolorem in pariendo sentire, sed nullum. Quod si ita est, quid te adiuvat? Nonne contra te ipsum loqueris, qui dolores istos ita naturales esse dixisti, ut sine illis Eva parere non posset, etiamsi in paradiso nulla iniquitate perpetrata persisteret?
But go on; bring forth into the open, against what you promised, the things you afterward thought of. Say that the labor of childbirths varies according to the bodies and strength of those giving birth; and so describe barbarian and rustic women in their ease of giving birth, that they do not even seem to be in labor; and by this that they feel not a small pain in giving birth, but none. But if this is so, what does it help you? Do you not speak against yourself, who said that these pains are so natural that without them Eve could not give birth, even if she had remained in paradise with no iniquity committed?
Iulianum.6.29Numquid barbaras ac rusticas tuas illa prima muliere in hac re feliciores esse dicturus es, ut in his aerumnosis terris sine dolore pariant, quod in paradiso, si pareret illa, non posset? Tamquam in istis natura sit mutata feminea in melius quam fuerat instituta, plusque valuerit in ea mutanda humana exercitatio, quam in creanda divina operatio.
Will you say that your barbarian and rustic women are, in this matter, more fortunate than that first woman, so that in these hardship-laden lands they give birth without pain, which she, if she gave birth, could not do in paradise? As though in these the feminine nature were changed for the better than it had been established, and human exertion availed more in changing it than the divine operation in creating it.
Iulianum.6.29Si vero in tuis verbis non vis intellegi sine doloribus parere feroces agrestesque mulieres, atque eis ita partum tolerabilem facilemque concedis, ut tamen eas cum pariunt, dolere fatearis; numquid ideo est nulla poena, quia minor est? Sive ergo minus doleant, cum pariunt istae feminae, sive aliis feminis aequales, vel earum etiam quibusdam maiores dolores, comparata per exercitationem fortitudine, mirabiliter ferant, nec illo cruciatu fatigentur atque languescant; dolent tamen, et utique omnes dolentes, seu magis seu minus doleant, maiores minoresve poenas, sed tamen poenas, sine ulla dubitatione patiuntur. Tu autem si te cogitares, non dico, Christianum, sed qualemcumque hominem, facilius nullum esse contenderes paradisum Dei, quam eum faceres tua sacrilega disputatione poenalem.
But if in your words you do not want it to be understood that fierce and country women give birth without pains, and you grant them childbirth so tolerable and easy, that nevertheless you confess them to feel pain when they give birth—is there for that reason no penalty, because it is less? Whether, then, these women feel less pain when they give birth, or pains equal to other women, or even, in some of them, greater pains, which they bear wonderfully through the strength gained by exertion, and are not wearied and weakened by that torment—still they feel pain, and surely all who feel pain, whether they feel more or less, suffer—without any doubt—greater or lesser penalties, but penalties nonetheless. But if you considered yourself, I do not say a Christian, but a human being of any sort, you would more easily contend that the paradise of God does not exist, than make it penal by your sacrilegious discussion.
Iulianum.6.29Eleganter sane divites viros ab haereditario primi hominis labore defendis, ignorans, aut te scire dissimulans, amarius laborare cogitationibus divites, quam operationibus pauperes. Nomine quippe sudoris generalem sacra Scriptura significavit laborem, a quo nullus hominum est immunis, cum alii laborant operibus duris, alii sollicitantibus curis. Ad eosdem labores pertinent etiam studia quorumque discentium. Et quae parit haec, nisi terra haec, quam formator eius, quando primum hominem condidit, non fecerat onerosam? Nunc vero, sicut scriptum est: Corpus corruptibile aggravat animam, et deprimit terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem; et difficulter aestimamus quae in terra sunt, et quae in prospectu sunt, invenimus cum labore (Sap 9, 15-16).
Elegantly indeed you defend rich men from the hereditary labor of the first man, not knowing—or pretending not to know—that the rich labor more bitterly with cares than the poor with works. For by the name of sweat Sacred Scripture signified labor in general, from which no human being is exempt, since some labor at hard works, others at distracting cares. To the same labors belong also the studies of all who learn. And what does this bring forth, except this earth, which its fashioner, when he made the first man, had not made burdensome? But now, as it is written: The corruptible body weighs down the soul, and the earthly dwelling presses down the mind that ponders many things; and with difficulty do we estimate the things that are on earth, and the things that are before us we find with labor (Wis 9:15-16).
Iulianum.6.29Sive ergo utiles, sive inutiles quascumque doctrinas studeat homo discere, aggravante animam corruptibili corpore, necesse est laboret. Quocirca etiam sic ei terra ista spinas parit. Nec ab his spinis divites dicantur alieni: praesertim quia spinas illas in Evangelio, quibus iacta semina ne ad fecunditatem perveniant, opprimuntur, curas esse huius vitae et sollicitudines divitiarum Deus magister exponit (Cf. Mt 13, 22); qui certe non solos pauperes, verum etiam divites vocat dicens: Venite ad me, omnes qui laboratis. Propter quid autem vocat, nisi quod paulo post dicit: Et invenietis requiem animabus vestris (Mt 11, 28-29)? Quando istud erit, nisi quando corruptio corporum, quae nunc aggravat animas, non erit? Nunc vero laborant pauperes, laborant divites, laborant iusti, laborant iniqui, laborant magni, laborant pusilli, a die exitus de ventre matris eorum, usque in diem sepulturae in matrem omnium.
Whether, then, a man studies to learn useful or useless teachings, with the corruptible body weighing down the soul, he must labor. Wherefore this earth too brings forth thorns for him in this way. Nor let the rich be said to be strangers to these thorns: especially because God the teacher expounds those thorns in the Gospel, by which the seeds scattered are choked so that they do not come to fruitfulness, as the cares of this life and the anxieties of riches (See Matt 13:22); who certainly calls not only the poor but also the rich, saying: Come to me, all you who labor. But for what does he call them, except what he says a little after: And you shall find rest for your souls (Matt 11:28-29)? When will this be, except when the corruption of bodies, which now weighs down souls, will not exist? But now the poor labor, the rich labor, the just labor, the unjust labor, the great labor, the small labor, from the day they come forth from their mother's womb until the day of their burial in the mother of all.
Iulianum.6.29Tam quippe malignum est hoc saeculum, ut nisi exitum hinc fuerit, promissa requies nobis adesse non possit; quamvis per praevaricationem primi hominis labor posteris eius advenerit; tamen etiam reatu praevaricationis illius quem traximus iam soluto, ut fidei examen exerceatur, labor remanet ad certamen. Oportet enim nos certare cum vitiis, et in ipso certamine laborare, donec donetur nobis adversarium non habere. Quapropter ut boni praeliatores perducantur ad praemia, supplicia vertuntur in praelia. Parvulorum quoque, soluto reatu originali, propterea labores manent, quamvis ex ipso reatu doceantur exorti; quia etiam sic Deo placuit fidem probare maiorum, a quibus ei offeruntur ut regenerentur.
For this age is so malignant that, unless there has been a departure from here, the promised rest cannot be present to us; for although through the transgression of the first man labor came upon his descendants, nevertheless, even though the guilt of that transgression which we drew is already loosed, labor remains for the contest, so that the testing of faith may be exercised. For we must contend with vices, and in that very contest labor, until it be granted us to have no adversary. Wherefore, that the good warriors may be led to the rewards, punishments are turned into battles. For little ones too, the original guilt being loosed, labors therefore remain, although they are taught to have arisen from that very guilt; because in this way too it pleased God to prove the faith of the elders, by whom they are offered to him to be regenerated.
Iulianum.6.29Qualis et quanta fides esset rerum invisibilium, si invisibilis remuneratio continuo sequeretur; ac non potius dilata requie quae promittitur, ageretur fidei negotium cum corde, non cum oculis; ac sic futurum saeculum, ubi nulli labores erunt, quod nondum videmus, et crederetur sincerius, et desiderabilius quaereretur? Ac per hoc Deus labores nostros, id est poenas nostras, ad utilitates nostras mirabili benignitate convertit.
Of what kind and how great would faith in invisible things be, if an invisible reward immediately followed, and not rather, the promised rest being deferred, the business of faith were carried on with the heart, not with the eyes; and thus the age to come, where there will be no labors, which we do not yet see, were both believed more sincerely and sought more desirably? And by this God turns our labors, that is, our punishments, to our profit with wonderful kindness.
Iulianum.6.29Haec refellere cupiens inutiliter tu laboras; laboras enim pariendo spinas, non evellendo; nos autem laboramus ut spinas tuas, quantum donat Dominus, evellamus. Nisi forte ideo non laborare te iactas, quoniam tot libros magna ingenii facilitate conscribis, ac sicut illae barbarae ac rusticanae fetus suos, ita et tu sine difficultate spinas paris. Sed puto quod te de ingenii facilitate inaniter iactes; prorsus laboras: quomodo enim agis ut non labores, qui etiam conaris introducere in paradisum labores? Nam utique res ista quanto impossibilior probatur, tanto tuus labor et amplior, et inanior invenitur.
Desiring to refute these things, you labor uselessly; for you labor by bringing forth thorns, not by uprooting them; but we labor to uproot your thorns, as far as the Lord grants. Unless perhaps you boast that you do not labor, since you write so many books with great ease of wit, and, like those barbarian and rustic women their offspring, so you too bring forth thorns without difficulty. But I think that you boast emptily of your ease of wit; you labor outright: for how do you bring it about that you do not labor, who even try to introduce labors into paradise? For surely, the more impossible this matter is proved to be, the more both ampler and more empty your labor is found.
Iulianum.6.2930. IUL. Haud sane impugnavero eos qui autumant Adam, si dicto audiens exstitisset, ad immortalitatem potuisse pro remuneratione transferri. Enoch quippe et Eliam translatos legimus, ne viderent mortem. Verum aliud sunt instituta naturae, aliud praemia obedientiae. Non est enim tanti unius meritum, ut universa quae naturaliter sunt instituta perturbet. Exercuisset se igitur in reliquis innata mortalitas, etiamsi primus ille in aeternitatem a diuturnitate migrasset. Non inficiabili coniectura, sed certo res tenetur exemplo, siquidem Enoch filii, immortalitate parentis non potuerunt asseri a conditione moriendi.
30. Julian: I will surely not attack those who hold that Adam, if he had proved obedient to the word, could have been transferred to immortality as a reward. For we read that Enoch and Elijah were translated, that they might not see death. But the institutions of nature are one thing, the rewards of obedience another. For the merit of one man is not so great that it should disturb all things that are naturally established. Inborn mortality would therefore have exercised itself in the rest, even if that first man had migrated from long duration into eternity. The matter is held not by an inconclusive conjecture, but by a sure example, since the sons of Enoch could not be claimed, by the immortality of their parent, from the condition of dying.
Iulianum.6.30Nec illud forte putetur occurrere, quoniam si non peccatores, iusti tamen omnes ad immortalitatem sine intercessu corporalis dissipationis evaderent: siquidem Abel iustorum primus, Noe, Abraham, Isaac, Iacob, et omnia sanctorum agmina, tam in Novo quam in Vetere Testamento, et meritum suum virtutibus, et naturam morte docuerunt. Rem in absoluto positam Christi quoque confirmavit auctoritas. Nam cum ei Sadducaei quaestionem exemplo septinubae mulieris intulissent, rogantes, si corporum excitatio crederetur, a quo marito esset potissimum vindicanda, respondit: Erratis, nescientes Scripturas, neque Dei virtutem; in resurrectione enim neque nubent, neque uxores accipient; neque enim morientur (Mt 22, 29-30; Lc 20, 35-36).
Nor let this perhaps be thought to occur, that although not sinners, yet all the just would escape to immortality without the intervention of bodily dissolution: since Abel, the first of the just, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and all the throngs of the saints, both in the New and in the Old Testament, taught their merit by their virtues, and their nature by death. The authority of Christ too confirmed the matter, established as settled. For when the Sadducees brought him a question by the example of the woman with seven husbands, asking, if the raising of bodies were believed, by which husband she should most properly be claimed, he answered: You err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God; for in the resurrection they will neither marry nor take wives; for neither will they die (Matt 22:29-30; Luke 20:35-36).
Iulianum.6.30Conscius operis sui, propter quid coniugia instituisset expressit, videlicet ut damna mortis fetura suppleret; statim autem cessatum ire munificam fecunditatem, cum mors avara cessaverit. Si ergo, Christo teste qui condidit, fertilitas ob hoc creata est, ut cum fragilitate confligeret, et haec conditio nuptiarum ante peccatum ordinata est; apparet quoque mortalitatem non ad praevaricationem spectare, sed ad naturam ad quam spectare leguntur et nuptiae.
Conscious of his own work, he expressed for what reason he had instituted marriages, namely that offspring might make up the losses of death; but that bounteous fruitfulness was going to cease at once, when greedy death had ceased. If, then, on the testimony of Christ who established it, fertility was created for this reason, that it might contend with frailty, and this condition of marriage was ordained before sin, it appears too that mortality looks not to transgression, but to nature, to which marriages also are read to look.
Iulianum.6.30Illa ergo lex quae promulgata est, id est: Quacumque die ex interdicto ederis, morte morieris; poenalis mors intellegitur, non corporalis; peccatis, non seminibus imminens; quam non incurrit nisi praevaricatio, non evadit nisi emendatio. Die autem peccati quod dicitur inferenda, mos Scripturae est, quae damnatum solet vocare damnandum.
That law, then, which was promulgated, that is: On whatever day you eat from what is forbidden, you shall die the death—penal death is understood, not bodily; threatening sins, not seeds; which transgression alone incurs, which only amendment escapes. But that it is said to be brought on the day of sin is the custom of Scripture, which is wont to call the one condemned the one to be condemned.
Iulianum.6.30Inde est quod in Evangelio Dominus: Omnis - inquit - qui non crediderit in me, iam iudicatus est; quia non credidit in nomine unigeniti Filii Dei (Io 3, 18). Non quod infidelitas Christum negans, ante tempus iudicii, supplicio iuncta esset perpetuo; cum omnes qui ad fidem veniunt, prius fuerint infideles; sed ut censura praecipientis appareat, dicuntur peccata iam esse supplicia. Denique Adam ipsum, et ille liber qui Sapientia dicitur, et multorum opinio, secuta emendatione asserit expiatum.
Hence it is that in the Gospel the Lord says: Everyone who has not believed in me is already judged; because he has not believed in the name of the only-begotten Son of God (John 3:18). Not that unbelief denying Christ was joined to perpetual punishment before the time of judgment—since all who come to faith were first unbelievers—but, so that the censure of the one giving the precept may appear, sins are said to be already punishments. Finally, both that book which is called Wisdom, and the opinion of many, asserts that Adam himself was expiated, amendment following.
Iulianum.6.30AUG. Si non oppugnas, ut dicis, eos qui existimant Adam, si dicto audiens exstitisset, ad immortalitatem pro remuneratione potuisse transferri, discerne immortalitatem, maiorem scilicet a minore. Nam et ista non absurde immortalitas dicitur, qua potest quisque non mori, si non faciat unde moriatur, quamvis possit et facere. In hac immortalitate fuit Adam: hanc immortalitatem merito praevaricationis amisit. Haec ei subministrabatur de ligno vitae, a quo non est prohibitus, quando legem bonam, ne peccaret, accepit, sed quando mala voluntate peccavit; tunc enim de paradiso eiectus est, ne extenderet manum ad lignum vitae, et manducaret, et viveret in aeternum.
Augustine: If you do not attack, as you say, those who hold that Adam, if he had proved obedient to the word, could have been transferred to immortality as a reward, distinguish immortality—the greater, namely, from the lesser. For that too is not absurdly called immortality, by which anyone can not die, if he does not do that whereby he might die, although he can also do it. In this immortality Adam was: this immortality he lost by the desert of transgression. This was supplied to him from the tree of life, from which he was not forbidden when he received the good law, that he should not sin, but when by an evil will he sinned; for then he was cast out of paradise, lest he stretch out his hand to the tree of life, and eat, and live forever.
Iulianum.6.30Unde intellegendum est de hoc ligno vitae solere sumere sacramentum; de ceteris alimentum. De solo enim ligno quod appellatum est dignoscentiae boni et mali, non manducare praeceptum est ei. Cur ergo putetur non manducasse de ligno vitae, quandoquidem et ceteris longe praestabilius erat, et illo solo excepto in quo peccavit, ex omnibus manducandi acceperat potestatem? Dei namque praecipientis haec verba sunt: Ab omni ligno - inquit - quod est in paradiso, edes; de ligno autem cognoscendi bonum et malum, non manducabis de illo (Gen 2, 16-17). Itemque ista sunt verba damnantis: Quia audisti - inquit - vocem mulieris tuae, et edisti de ligno, de quo praeceperam tibi, de eo solo non edere (Gen 3, 17). Quae igitur fuit causa ut non praecipue de ligno vitae manducare curaret, cum prohibitus non fuerit nisi ab illo solo, cuius usurpatione peccavit? Immo si vigilanter intellegamus, sicut de ligno interdicto manducando peccavit, ita de ligno vitae non manducando peccaret; quoniam ipse sibi vitam, quae ex illo ligno aderat, invideret.
Whence it must be understood that from this tree of life he was wont to take a sacrament; from the others, nourishment. For only of the tree which was called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was he commanded not to eat. Why, then, should it be thought that he did not eat of the tree of life, since it was far more excellent than the others, and, that one alone excepted in which he sinned, he had received the power of eating from all? For these are the words of God commanding: From every tree, he says, that is in paradise you shall eat; but of the tree of knowing good and evil you shall not eat of it (Gen 2:16-17). And again these are the words of God condemning: Because you have heard, he says, the voice of your wife, and have eaten of the tree of which I had commanded you not to eat of that alone (Gen 3:17). What, then, was the reason that he did not take care to eat especially of the tree of life, since he was forbidden only from that one by whose seizing he sinned? Rather, if we understand vigilantly, just as he sinned by eating of the forbidden tree, so he would have sinned by not eating of the tree of life; since he would have begrudged himself the life which was present from that tree.
Iulianum.6.30Illa vero immortalitas in qua sancti Angeli vivunt, et in qua nos quoque victuri sumus, procul dubio maior est. Non enim talis, in qua homo habeat quidem in potestate non mori, sicut non peccare, sed tamen possit et mori, quia potest peccare; sed talis est illa immortalitas, in qua omnis qui ibi est, vel erit, mori non poterit, quia nec peccare iam poterit. Tanta quippe erit ibi voluntas bene vivendi, quanta etiam nunc est voluntas beate vivendi, quam nobis nec miseria potuisse videmus auferri.
But that immortality in which the holy angels live, and in which we too are going to live, is without doubt the greater. For it is not such a one in which a man has it indeed in his power not to die, as not to sin, but yet can also die, because he can sin; but that immortality is such that everyone who is there, or will be there, will not be able to die, because he will not be able to sin any longer. For there will be there as great a will of living well as there even now is a will of living blessedly, which we see misery could not take from us.
Iulianum.6.30In hanc immortalitatem, nullo ambigente maiorem, si ex illa minore dicas Adam remuneratione obedientiae, nulla interposita morte potuisse mutari; dices aliquid quod recta fides non debeat improbare;
If you say that Adam, by the reward of obedience, could have been changed into this immortality—which, no one doubting, is the greater—from that lesser one, with no death intervening, you will say something which right faith need not disapprove;
Iulianum.6.30si autem sic laudas istam, ut neges illam; profecto et mortibus, et morientium cladibus, quas non ferendo urgentur in mortem, cogeris implere paradisi faciem; atque ita tuam decolorare, ut te velis fugere, si illam in speculo possis aspicere.
but if you so praise the latter that you deny the former, then surely you are forced to fill the face of paradise with deaths and with the disasters of the dying, by not bearing which they are driven into death; and so to discolor your own face that you would want to flee yourself, if you could behold it in a mirror.
Iulianum.6.30Cur enim et posteri primi hominis in paradiso nati, et non solum boni, verum etiam beati, cogerentur mori, si eos nulla culpa de paradiso exire compelleret, ubi erat lignum vitae, et summa ex illo vivendo potestas, moriendi autem nulla necessitas?
For why would the descendants of the first man too, born in paradise, and not only good but even blessed, be forced to die, if no fault compelled them to leave paradise, where there was the tree of life, and from it the highest power of living, but no necessity of dying?
Iulianum.6.30A qua necessitate translati sunt Enoch et Elias: in his enim terris erant, ubi lignum vitae non erat, et ideo eos ad huius vitae finem, communis omnibus necessitas mortis urgebat. Nam quo eos credendum est fuisse translatos, nisi ubi est ipsum vitae lignum, unde illis sit potestas vivendi, nec ulla moriendi necessitas; sicut esset in paradiso hominibus, in quibus nulla peccandi oriretur voluntas, quae illos ibi esse non sineret, ubi nulla aequitas mori cogeret?
From which necessity Enoch and Elijah were translated: for they were in these lands, where the tree of life was not, and therefore the necessity of death common to all pressed them toward the end of this life. For where must we believe they were translated, except where the tree of life itself is, whence they may have the power of living and no necessity of dying; just as it would be for human beings in paradise, in whom no will of sinning arose, which would not allow them to be there where no fairness would force them to die?
Iulianum.6.30Quapropter exempla Enoch et Eliae nos potius quam vos adiuvant. Deus quippe in his duobus ostendit, quid etiam illis quos dimisit de paradiso, praestaturus esset, si peccare noluissent; inde namque eiecti sunt isti, quo traiecti sunt illi. Ubi etiam hoc eis Dei gratia credimus esse collatum, ne haberent unde dicerent: Dimitte nobis debita nostra (Mt 6, 12). In his enim terris, ubi corpus corruptibile eorum animas aggravabat (Sap 9, 15), ita confligebant magno agone cum vitiis, ut tamen si dicerent se non habere peccatum, se ipsos deciperent, et veritas non esset in eis (Cf. 1 Io 1, 8).
Wherefore the examples of Enoch and Elijah help us rather than you. For in these two God showed what he would also bestow on those whom he sent out of paradise, if they had been unwilling to sin; for these were translated to that place from which those were cast out. Where we believe this too was conferred on them by the grace of God, that they should not have anything for which to say: Forgive us our debts (Matt 6:12). For in these lands, where the corruptible body weighed down their souls (Wis 9:15), they so contended with vices in a great contest that, nevertheless, if they had said they had no sin, they would have deceived themselves, and the truth would not have been in them (See 1 John 1:8).
Iulianum.6.30Qui sane creduntur ad exiguum temporis redituri in has terras, ut etiam ipsi cum morte confligant, et quod primi hominis propagini debetur exsolvant. Unde intellegendum est, quod ii qui peccatum nullum haberent, et filii eorum, si paradisi habitatores in eadem rectitudine permanerent, magis in illa immortalitate persisterent, donec in ampliorem, nulla interposita morte, transirent, si eis qui sic erant in his terris extra paradisum iusti, ut non possent dicere se non habere peccatum, id est, Enoch et Eliae tantam diuturnitatem vitae fateamur esse collatam.
These indeed are believed to be going to return to these lands for a short time, that they too may contend with death, and pay what is owed to the offspring of the first man. Whence it must be understood that those who had no sin, and their children, if the dwellers of paradise had remained in the same rectitude, would rather persist in that immortality, until they passed into the ampler one with no death intervening—if we confess that to those who were just in these lands outside paradise in such a way that they could not say they had no sin, that is, to Enoch and Elijah, so great a length of life was conferred.
Iulianum.6.30Sed Dominus - inquis - interrogatus de septinuba illa muliere, sua responsione firmavit, propterea nuptias institutas, ut damna mortis fetura suppleret; cessaturam vero munificam fecunditatem, cum mors avara cessaverit. Omnino erras, qui propterea putas instituta esse coniugia, ut decessio mortuorum suppleretur successione nascentium. Instituta sunt namque coniugia, ut filios patribus, et patres filiis, certos faceret pudicitia feminarum.
But the Lord, you say, when questioned about that woman with seven husbands, confirmed by his answer that marriages were instituted for this reason, that offspring might make up the losses of death; but that bounteous fruitfulness was going to cease when greedy death had ceased. You err altogether, who think marriages were instituted for this reason, that the departure of the dead might be made up by the succession of those being born. For marriages were instituted so that the chastity of women might make sons certain of their fathers, and fathers certain of their sons.
Iulianum.6.30Nam et permixto usu atque indiscreto quarumque mulierum, homines nasci possent; sed certa necessitudo inter patres et filios esse non posset. Si autem nemo peccaret, et ob hoc etiam nemo moreretur; sanctorum numero terminato, quantus futuro sufficeret saeculo, hoc saeculum finiretur, ubi et non peccandi et peccandi facultas esset, atque illud succederet, ubi quisquam peccare non posset.
For even with the promiscuous and indiscriminate use of any women, human beings could be born; but there could be no certain bond between fathers and sons. But if no one sinned, and for this reason also no one died, then, the number of the saints being completed—as great as would suffice for the age to come—this age would be ended, where there would be the capacity both of not sinning and of sinning, and that age would succeed, where no one could sin.
Iulianum.6.30Si enim animae corporibus exutae, possunt esse vel miserae vel beatae, et tamen peccare non possunt; quis fidelium neget, in regno Dei, ubi erit corpus incorruptibile, quod non gravabit animam, sed ornabit, nec alimentis amplius indigebit, hunc affectum futurum, ut nullius ibi ullum possit esse peccatum, non id agente nulla voluntate, sed bona? Dominus ergo ubi dixit, cum de resurrectione loqueretur: Neque nubent, neque uxores accipient; neque enim morientur; non ideo dixit, ut propter morientes ostenderet nuptias institutas; sed quia sanctorum numero impleto, non opus esset aliquem nasci, ubi necesse esset neminem mori.
For if souls stripped of bodies can be either miserable or blessed, and yet cannot sin, what one of the faithful would deny that in the kingdom of God, where there will be an incorruptible body which will not weigh down the soul but adorn it, and will no longer need foods, this disposition will be present, that there can be no sin of anyone there—not because no will brings it about, but because a good will does? Therefore, when the Lord said, speaking of the resurrection: They will neither marry nor take wives; for neither will they die—he did not say it to show that marriages were instituted on account of the dying; but because, the number of the saints being filled, there would be no need for anyone to be born, where it would be necessary for no one to die.
Iulianum.6.30Sed - inquis - Adam secuta emendatione a delicto suo asseritur expiatus, et libro Sapientiae, et opinione multorum; et tamen - inquis - mortuus est, ut sciremus corporis mortem non pertinere ad supplicium illius peccati, sed ad instituta naturae. Quasi vero David duo illa scelera gravia, id est, adulterium et homicidium, non sic expiaverit poenitendo, ut ei datam veniam propheta ipse qui eum terruerat, testaretur; et tamen ita ea quae Deus fuerat comminatus, legimus subsecuta, ut intellegamus ad hoc profuisse illam veniam, ne homo qui tanta mala commiserat, sempiterno pro eis supplicio plecteretur.
But Adam, you say, is asserted, both by the book of Wisdom and by the opinion of many, to have been expiated of his offense, amendment following; and yet, you say, he died, that we might know that bodily death pertains not to the punishment of that sin, but to the institutions of nature. As though indeed David did not so expiate those two grave crimes, that is, adultery and homicide, by repenting, that the prophet himself who had terrified him testified that pardon was given him; and yet we read that the things which God had threatened so followed, that we understand that pardon profited for this, that the man who had committed such great evils should not be smitten with eternal punishment for them.
Iulianum.6.30Erat ergo et primo homini, ad quam rem proficeret paenitentia, id est, ut eum diuturna, non tamen aeterna poena puniret. Unde factum est, quod rectissime creditur, ut eum filius eius, id est, secundum hominem Dominus Iesus, quando ad inferna descendit, ab inferni vinculis solveret. Tunc enim, iuxta librum Sapientiae, intellegendum est eductus a delicto suo, ut hoc ille liber non factum dixisse, sed futurum praedixisse monstretur, quamvis per verbum praeteriti temporis; sic enim ait: Eduxit illum a delicto suo (Sap 10, 2), quemadmodum dictum est: Foderunt manus meas (Ps 21, 17), et cetera, quae ibi per verba praeteriti temporis futura esse dicuntur.
There was, then, for the first man too, a purpose for which repentance profited, that is, that it should punish him with a long but not eternal punishment. Whence it came about—what is most rightly believed—that his Son, that is, the Lord Jesus according to the man, when he descended to the lower regions, loosed him from the bonds of hell. For then, according to the book of Wisdom, he must be understood to have been brought out of his offense, so that this is shown not to have said it was done, but to have foretold that it would be done, although by a verb of the past tense; for it says thus: He brought him out of his offense (Wis 10:2), in the same way as it was said, They have dug my hands (Ps 22:16 (21:17)), and the rest, which there are said by verbs of the past tense to be future.
Iulianum.6.30Ac per hoc et morte corporis factum est, ut pro peccato poenam lueret temporalem; et paenitentia non nihil actum est, ut evaderet sempiternam; ubi plus valuit gratia liberantis, quam meritum paenitentis. Non est unde te munias adversus impetum veritatis, quo cum tuis machinis in clarissima luce prosterneris, nec in Dei paradisum et mortes et innumerabiles morbos, mortiferis cruciatibus plenos, immittere ulla penitus ratione permitteris. Crede Deo dicenti: Quacumque die ederitis ex eo, morte moriemini (Gen 2, 17). Ea quippe die coeperunt mori, quo separati a ligno vitae, quod utique in loco positum corporali, corpori vitam subministrabat, necessitatem mortis conditionemque sumpserunt.
And by this it came about both that by bodily death he paid a temporal penalty for sin, and that by repentance not nothing was accomplished, that he might escape the eternal one; where the grace of the one delivering availed more than the merit of the one repenting. There is nothing whereby you may fortify yourself against the assault of truth, by which, with your engines, you are laid low in the clearest light, nor are you permitted by any reasoning whatever to bring into the paradise of God both deaths and innumerable diseases full of deadly torments. Believe God when he says: On whatever day you eat of it, you shall die the death (Gen 2:17). For on that day they began to die, on which, separated from the tree of life—which surely, placed in a bodily place, supplied life to the body—they took on the necessity and condition of death.
Iulianum.6.30Certe damna mortis, et mors avara verba sunt tua; saltem te ista verba tam dura et horrenda, ut paradiso Dei parceres, admonerent. Tantumne te offendit locus praedicatissimus beatorum, ut a te in eum et mors et damnifica et avara mittatur? O inimici Dei gratiae, inimici paradiso Dei, quo amplius progredi poteritis, quam ut sanctarum deliciarum dulcedinem amarissimis poenis impleatis, nihilque velitis esse paradisum nisi gehennam minorem?
Surely "the losses of death" and "greedy death" are your own words; at least let these words, so hard and horrible, warn you to spare the paradise of God. Does the most renowned place of the blessed so offend you that by you both death and what causes loss and what is greedy are sent into it? O enemies of the grace of God, enemies of the paradise of God, how much further will you be able to advance than to fill the sweetness of holy delights with the most bitter punishments, and to want paradise to be nothing but a lesser Gehenna?
Iulianum.6.3031. IUL. Porro iam satis multa de Genesi. Transeamus ad apostolum Paulum, quem opinionis suae Manichaeus et Traducianus opinantur. Cum ergo de mortuorum resurrectione dissereret, ait: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur (1 Cor 15, 22). Hoc testimonium usurpasti tu, cum quo nobis causa est; sed quid eo confici putares, quia tu tacuisti, etsi suspicer, tamen confirmare vix possum. Quid enim spectat ad traducem, si omnes in Adam mori dicantur; cum Adam nomen hominis sit, tradux autem peccati et labis Manichaeae indicium? Nisi forte nihil aliud ipsum Adam, quam peccatum et esse, et sonare fatearis; ut hac appellatione Apostolus omnes mori in peccato pronuntiasse videatur? Sed hoc propalam insanum est.
31. Julian: Now, enough has been said about Genesis. Let us pass on to the apostle Paul, whom the Manichee and Traducianist suppose to be of their opinion. When, then, he was discussing the resurrection of the dead, he says: As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive (1 Cor 15:22). This testimony you have usurped, with whom we have our case; but what you thought was accomplished by it, because you kept silent, even if I suspect it, I can yet hardly confirm. For what has it to do with transmission, if all are said to die in Adam, since Adam is the name of a man, while transmission is a sign of sin and of the Manichee defilement? Unless perhaps you confess that Adam itself is, and sounds as, nothing else than sin; so that by this name the Apostle may seem to have pronounced that all die in sin? But this is openly insane.
Iulianum.6.31Quid igitur novum, si quia Adam sermo hebraeus nihil aliud indicat quam hominem (hoc enim interpretatio ipsius exprimit) dixerit Apostolus: In Adam omnes moriuntur, et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur; id est, secundum hominis qui moriuntur naturam, per virtutem Christi a mortuis excitantur? Huic sententiae qui inficiatur, insanit; eiusdem quippe auctoris virtute, qui in hac vita fecunditatem et mortalitatem instituit, universi excitabuntur e sepulcris, ut recipiat unusquisque propria corporis sui, prout gessit, sive bonum, sive malum (Cf. 2 Cor 5, 10).
What, then, is new, if—because the Hebrew word Adam indicates nothing else than man (for this its interpretation expresses)—the Apostle said: In Adam all die, and in Christ all will be made alive; that is, those who die according to the nature of man are, by the power of Christ, raised from the dead? Whoever denies this sentence is insane; for by the power of the same author who in this life instituted fruitfulness and mortality, all will be raised from their tombs, that each one may receive the proper things of his own body, according as he has done, whether good or evil (See 2 Cor 5:10).
Iulianum.6.31Hoc itaque dicto Apostoli, quo ait: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur; mortem corporalem quae iustis iniustisque communis est, an poenalem illam diabolo et impiis deputatam insinuari putas? Si naturalem istam simplicem, quae in sanctis etiam pretiosa est (Cf. Ps 115, 5), quae non solum bonis et malis, verum etiam hominibus pecudibusque ex aequo accidit; hanc, inquam, mortem hic Apostolus indicavit; manifestum est quoniam nomine Adae naturam humanitatis, nomine autem Christi potentiam creatoris et excitatoris ostendit. Sin autem quod ait: In Adam omnes moriuntur; crimen hic velis intellegi, non naturam; suppetit expositio tam aperta quam certa, videlicet ut dixerit: Sicut omnes, id est, multi Adae imitatione moriuntur; ita omnes, id est, multi Christi imitatione salvantur. Aut ergo de communi morte locutus est, et naturam indicavit; aut de peccato, et imitationem accusavit. Sic enim et post pauca subiunxit: Sicut portavimus - inquit - imaginem terrestris, portemus etiam imaginem illius caelestis (1 Cor 15, 49). Certe susceptio imaginis non poterat imperari, si naturalis in qualitate alterutra crederetur.
By this saying of the Apostle, then, by which he says: As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive—do you think bodily death, which is common to the just and the unjust, is being insinuated, or that penal death assigned to the devil and the impious? If it was this simple natural death which is even precious in the saints (See Ps 116:15 (115:15)), which befalls not only the good and the bad, but even human beings and cattle equally—this death, I say, the Apostle indicated here; then it is manifest that by the name of Adam he shows the nature of humanity, but by the name of Christ the power of the creator and raiser. But if, by what he says, In Adam all die, you want crime to be understood here, not nature, an exposition is at hand, as plain as it is certain, namely that he said: As all—that is, many—die by the imitation of Adam, so all—that is, many—are saved by the imitation of Christ. Either, then, he spoke of the common death and indicated nature; or of sin, and accused imitation. For thus a little after he also added: As we have borne the image of the earthly, let us also bear the image of the heavenly one (1 Cor 15:49). Surely the taking on of an image could not be commanded, if it were believed to be natural in either quality.
Iulianum.6.31AUG. Quis est tam negligens apostolicorum eloquiorum, ut non videat quod Apostolus de resurrectione corporis disserebat, ubi ait: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur? Sed tu ad dilatanda, non eloquia, sed vaniloquia tua, ubi nulla quaestio est, ingeris quaestionem, et quaeris a me illud quod dictum est: In Adam omnes moriuntur; de qua morte sit dictum. Prorsus de morte corporis dictum est, ista scilicet qua necesse est moriantur boni et mali, non illa qua mortui dicuntur qui eadem morte sunt mali; quas duas mortes, una brevi Dominus complectitur sententia, dicens: Sine mortuos sepelire mortuos suos (Mt 8, 22).
Augustine: Who is so careless of the apostolic words that he does not see that the Apostle was discussing the resurrection of the body, when he said: As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive? But you, to spread out not your eloquence but your empty talk, where there is no question raise a question, and ask of me, concerning what was said, In Adam all die—of what death it was said. It was said outright of the death of the body, that namely by which it is necessary that the good and the bad die, not that by which those are called dead who by the same death are bad; which two deaths the Lord embraces in one brief sentence, saying: Let the dead bury their own dead (Matt 8:22).
Iulianum.6.31Est etiam mors, quae in Apocalypsi mors secunda dicitur (Cf. Apoc 2, 11; 20, 6. 14; 21, 8), qua et corpus et anima igne cruciabuntur aeterno; quam minatur Dominus ubi dicit: Eum timete, qui habet potestatem, et corpus et animam perdere in gehennam (Mt 10, 28). Quamvis ergo multae mortes inveniantur in Scripturis; duae tamen sunt praecipuae, prima et secunda; prima est, quam peccando intulit primus homo; secunda est, quam iudicando illaturus est secundus homo. Sicut in sanctis Libris multa Dei testamenta commemorantur; quod possunt advertere, qui diligenter legunt; sunt tamen duo praecipua, Vetus et Novum. Prima ergo mors coepit esse, quando Adam de paradiso eiectus est, et separatus a ligno vitae; mors secunda esse incipiet, quando dicetur: Discedite a me, maledicti, in ignem aeternum (Mt 25, 41).
There is also a death which in the Apocalypse is called the second death (See Rev 2:11; 20:6, 14; 21:8), by which both body and soul will be tormented in eternal fire; which the Lord threatens when he says: Fear him who has the power to destroy both body and soul in Gehenna (Matt 10:28). Although, then, many deaths are found in the Scriptures, there are two principal ones, the first and the second; the first is the one that the first man brought in by sinning; the second is the one that the second man will bring in by judging. Just as in the holy Books many covenants of God are recalled, which those who read carefully can notice, yet there are two principal ones, the Old and the New. The first death, then, began to be when Adam was cast out of paradise and separated from the tree of life; the second death will begin to be when it will be said: Depart from me, you cursed, into eternal fire (Matt 25:41).
Iulianum.6.31Cum igitur de resurrectione corporis loqueretur Apostolus, ait: Per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum; sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur; sic et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur (1 Cor 15, 21- 22). Non itaque debemus inquirere, de qua morte agatur hoc loco; manifestum est enim de morte corporis agi; sed potius debemus attendere, per quem sit mors ipsa de qua agitur, utrum per Deum qui hominem condidit, an per hominem qui peccando causa huius mortis exstitit. Sed hoc, ut dixi, attendere debemus in promptu positum, non quasi abditum quaerere. Nam et hanc abstulit Apostolus quaestionem, apertissime dicens: Per hominem mors.
When, therefore, the Apostle was speaking of the resurrection of the body, he said: Through a man death, and through a man the resurrection of the dead; for as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive (1 Cor 15:21-22). We ought not, then, to inquire of what death he is treating in this place; for it is manifest that he is treating of the death of the body; but we ought rather to attend through whom is that very death of which he treats—whether through God who created man, or through the man who, by sinning, became the cause of this death. But this, as I said, we ought to attend to, set in plain view, not to seek as though hidden. For the Apostle removed this question too, saying most openly: Through a man death.
Iulianum.6.31Et quis est iste, nisi primus Adam? Ipse est quippe ille, de quo dictum est: Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum, et per peccatum mors; cui e contrario Adam secundus opponitur, qui est forma futuri (Rom 5, 12. 14); unde et hic dictum est: Per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum. Sic ergo est accipiendum quod ait: In Adam omnes moriuntur; ut non obliviscamur quod ait: Per hominem mors. Ideo quippe in Adam omnes moriuntur, quia per hominem mors; sicut ideo in Christo vivificantur, quia per hominem resurrectio mortuorum. Homo igitur, et homo; sicut ergo unus iste, sic unus est ille; ac per hoc, quia homo secundus est iste, homo primus est ille.
And who is this, except the first Adam? For he is the one of whom it was said: Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death; to whom the second Adam is opposed by contrast, who is the figure of the one to come (Rom 5:12, 14); whence here too it was said: Through a man death, and through a man the resurrection of the dead. So, then, must what he says be taken—In Adam all die—that we not forget what he says: Through a man death. For all die in Adam for this reason, that through a man is death; just as for this reason they are made alive in Christ, that through a man is the resurrection of the dead. A man, then, and a man; as, therefore, this is one, so that is one; and by this, because this is the second man, that is the first man.
Iulianum.6.31Scimus Adam, sicut commemoras, hebraea lingua hominem dici; sed non hinc efficitur quod impudentissime persuadere conaris, ut in eo quod dixit Apostolus: In Adam omnes moriuntur, omnem mortalem hominem significasse credatur; ut scilicet non in illo primo homine, sed in eo quod mortales sunt, existimemus omnes mori. Noli obscurare clara, recta pervertere, implicare simplicia; in illo moriuntur omnes, per quem mors; sicut in illo vivificantur, per quem resurrectio mortuorum. Et quis est iste, nisi secundus homo? Quis ergo est ille, nisi primus homo?
We know that Adam, as you recall, is called man in the Hebrew tongue; but from this it does not follow—what you most shamelessly try to persuade us of—that in what the Apostle said, In Adam all die, he is believed to have signified every mortal man; so that, namely, we should suppose all to die not in that first man, but in this, that they are mortal. Do not obscure the clear, pervert the right, complicate the simple; in him all die through whom is death; just as in him they are made alive through whom is the resurrection of the dead. And who is this, except the second man? Who, then, is that, except the first man?
Iulianum.6.31Proinde quis iste, nisi unus est Christus? Quis ille nisi unus Adam? Itaque sicut portavimus imaginem terrestris hominis, ita portemus etiam caelestis. Indicatur illud, hoc imperatur; illud quippe iam praesens est, hoc futurum. Et ideo illam portavimus imaginem conditione nascendi, et peccati contagione; hanc autem portamus gratia renascendi; portamus autem interim spe, re vero portabimus eam praemio resurgendi, et beate iusteque regnandi.
Accordingly, who is this, except the one Christ? Who is that, except the one Adam? And so, as we have borne the image of the earthly man, let us also bear that of the heavenly. The one is indicated, the other commanded; for the one is already present, the other future. And therefore we have borne that image by the condition of being born and by the contagion of sin; but this image we bear by the grace of being reborn; we bear it, however, for the present in hope, but in reality we shall bear it by the reward of rising again, and of reigning blessedly and justly.
Iulianum.6.31Quae cum ita sint, mors quidem hominis ita instituti, et in eo constituti loco, ut non moreretur, nisi peccasset, sine dubitatione poenalis est; sed Deo per gratiam suam in usum nobis bonum poenalia mala nostra vertente, in conspectu Domini pretiosa est mors sanctorum eius. Per illam certant, sicut per disciplinam: Disciplina enim, sicut scriptum est, ad praesens non gaudii videtur esse, sed tristitiae; postea vero, uberiorem fructum, his qui per eam certarunt, reddit iustitiae (Hebr 12, 11).
Since these things are so, the death of a man so constituted, and set in such a place, that he would not die unless he sinned, is without doubt penal; but since God, by his grace, turns our penal evils to a good use for us, in the sight of the Lord precious is the death of his saints. Through it they contend, as through discipline: For discipline, as it is written, seems for the present to be not of joy, but of sorrow; but afterward it renders a more abundant fruit of justice to those who have contended through it (Heb 12:11).
Iulianum.6.31Tu autem, qui mortem corporis etiam in paradiso, etiam peccante nullo, futuram fuisse contendis, hostis es gratiae Dei, hostisque sanctorum, quorum mors pretiosa est, per illam certantium intrare atque habitare paradisum. Non enim mortem solam, id est, resolutionem animae a corpore, nolentis tamen spoliari, sed supervestiri, ut absorbeatur mortale a vita (Cf. 2 Cor 5, 4); sed etiam omnes morbos, et omnia genera malorum, quae homines non valendo ferre moriuntur, quantum ad te attinet, in locum tantae felicitatis et quietis immittis; quod errore quanto facias video, sed qua fronte nescio.
But you, who contend that bodily death would have existed even in paradise, even with no one sinning, are an enemy of the grace of God, and an enemy of the saints, whose death is precious, contending through it to enter and dwell in paradise. For not death alone—that is, the dissolution of the soul from the body, the soul not wishing to be unclothed, but further clothed, that the mortal may be swallowed up by life (See 2 Cor 5:4)—but also all diseases, and all kinds of evils, by not being able to bear which human beings die, you, so far as it concerns you, bring into the place of such great happiness and rest; with how great an error you do this I see, but with what effrontery I do not know.
Iulianum.6.3132. IUL. Verum totum contextum loci ipsius ventilemus. Si - inquit - Christus praedicatur quia ex mortuis resurrexit, quomodo quidam dicunt in vobis quia resurrectio mortuorum non est? Si autem resurrectio mortuorum non est, nec Christus resurrexit; si autem Christus non resurrexit, inanis est praedicatio nostra, et vacua est fides vestra; invenimur etiam falsi testes Dei, quia testimonium diximus adversus Deum, quod suscitaverit Christum, quem non suscitavit. Si enim mortui non resurgunt, nec Christus resurrexit; si autem Christus non resurrexit, vana est fides vestra, quia adhuc estis in peccatis vestris; et qui dormierunt ergo in Christo, perierunt. Si in hac vita in Christosperamus tantum, miserabiliores sumus omnibus hominibus. Nunc autem Christus ex mortuis resurrexit primitiae dormientium, quoniam quidem per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum. Sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur. Unusquisque autem in suo ordine; primitiae Christus, deinde hi qui sunt Christi, qui in adventu eius; deinde finis (1 Cor 15, 12-24).
32. Julian: But let us winnow the whole context of the passage itself. If, he says, Christ is preached as having risen from the dead, how do some among you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there is no resurrection of the dead, neither has Christ risen; but if Christ has not risen, our preaching is empty, and your faith is void; we are even found false witnesses of God, because we have given testimony against God, that he raised up Christ, whom he did not raise up. For if the dead do not rise, neither has Christ risen; but if Christ has not risen, your faith is vain, because you are still in your sins; and those, then, who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished. If in this life only we hope in Christ, we are of all men the most miserable. But now Christ has risen from the dead, the firstfruits of those who sleep, since indeed through a man death, and through a man the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive. But each in his own order; the firstfruits Christ, then those who are Christ's, who are at his coming; then the end (1 Cor 15:12-24).
Iulianum.6.32AUG. Ventilandum totum istum in apostolicis Litteris de corporis resurrectione locum ideo te suscepisse, ut haberes occasionem qua tuum multiloquium copiosa, si dici potest, egestate diffunderes, et ad tot libros implendos tibi evagandi spatia procurares, in ipsa tua prolixa et supervacanea disputatione clarebit.
Augustine: That you undertook to winnow this whole passage in the apostolic Letters about the resurrection of the body in order to have an occasion by which to spread out your verbosity in a copious—if it can be said—poverty, and to procure for yourself room for rambling so as to fill so many books, will be clear in your very prolix and superfluous discussion.
Iulianum.6.3233. IUL. Instruxit acerrime disputationem magister egregius, et spem nobis de consortio Mediatoris ingessit, asserens illum hominem, quantum spectat ad substantiam qua nobis iungitur, nihil exceptum habuisse, opinionemque quam infidelitas sciscebat, non minus Christo praeiudicare posse quam nobis. Sic ergo miscet negotium Christi et hominum, ut necesse sit in utraque parte credi, quod in altera censeatur. Opinati quippe fuerant per idem tempus homines, quia resurrectio mortuorum futura non esset; non tamen resurrexisse Christum negabant. Arripit hoc Magister Gentium, et pronuntiat necesse esse ut uni praeiudicio pars utraque sit pervia, et aut omnes homines resurrecturi, aut nec Christus resurrexisse credatur. Certe hanc vim in disputando Apostolus non haberet, si secundum Manichaeos et eorum discipulos Traducianos, carnem Christi a naturae nostrae communione distingueret.
33. Julian: The eminent master instructed his argument most keenly, and instilled in us hope concerning fellowship with the Mediator, asserting that that man, as far as concerns the substance by which he is joined to us, had nothing excepted, and that the opinion which unbelief sanctioned could prejudge no less against Christ than against us. So, then, he mixes the affair of Christ and of human beings, that what is reckoned in the one part must be believed in both. For human beings at that time had supposed that the resurrection of the dead was not going to be; yet they did not deny that Christ had risen. The Teacher of the Gentiles seizes this, and pronounces that it is necessary that both parts be open to one prejudgment, and that either all human beings are going to rise, or not even Christ is believed to have risen. Surely the Apostle would not have this force in arguing, if, according to the Manichees and their disciples the Traducianists, he distinguished the flesh of Christ from the fellowship of our nature.
Iulianum.6.33AUG. Manichaei non sunt, qui carnem Christi a naturae nostrae communione distinguunt; sed qui nullam carnem Christum habuisse contendunt. Nobis itaque iungendo Manichaeos, anathemandos vobiscum atque damnandos, etiam eorum sublevas causam, dicens eos carnem Christi a naturae nostrae communione distinguere; quasi carnem Christum habere fateantur, quam quoquo modo a nostra carne distinguant. Dimitte illos multum a nobis, multumque et a vobis, in ista de carne Christi quaestione distantes; nobiscum age quod agis; quia nobiscum carnem Christi, etsi dissimiliter, confiteris.
Augustine: They are not Manichees who distinguish the flesh of Christ from the fellowship of our nature; but those who contend that Christ had no flesh at all. By joining to us the Manichees, who are to be anathematized and condemned along with you, you also lighten their case, saying that they distinguish the flesh of Christ from the fellowship of our nature; as though they confessed that Christ had flesh, which in some way they distinguish from our flesh. Let those go far from us, and far from you too, differing in that question about the flesh of Christ; deal with us about what you are dealing with; for with us you confess the flesh of Christ, even if differently.
Iulianum.6.33Nec nos enim eam a naturae atque substantiae carnis nostrae, sed a vitii communione distinguimus. Caro est enim nostra peccati; propter quod illa dicta est, non similitudo carnis, quia vera caro est; sed similitudo carnis peccati, quia peccati caro non est. Si ergo peccati caro, caro nostra non esset, quomodo, rogo te, similitudo carnis peccati caro Christi esset? An usque adeo desipis, ut dicas aliquid simile esse, sed cui simile sit non esse? Hilarium audi catholicum antistitem, quem certe, quidquid de illo sentias, Manichaeum non potes dicere; qui cum de Christi carne loqueretur: Ergo cum missus est - inquit - in similitudine carnis peccati, non sicut carnem habuit, ita habuit et peccatum; sed quia ex peccato omnis caro est, a peccato scilicet Adam parente deducta, in similitudine peccati carnis est missus, existente in eo, non peccato, sed peccati carnis similitudine.
For we too distinguish it not from the fellowship of the nature and substance of our flesh, but from the fellowship of its defect. For our flesh is flesh of sin; on account of which that flesh was called not a likeness of flesh, because it is true flesh; but a likeness of sinful flesh, because it is not flesh of sin. If, then, the flesh of sin were not our flesh, how, I ask you, would the likeness of sinful flesh be the flesh of Christ? Or are you so foolish as to say that a thing is like something, but that there is not that to which it is like? Hear Hilary, the Catholic bishop, whom certainly, whatever you think of him, you cannot call a Manichee; who, when he spoke of the flesh of Christ, said: When, therefore, he was sent in the likeness of sinful flesh, he did not have sin as he had flesh; but because all flesh is from sin—derived, namely, from Adam our parent in sin—he was sent in the likeness of sinful flesh, there being in him not sin, but the likeness of sinful flesh.
Iulianum.6.33Quid ad ista dicturus es, improbissime, loquacissime, contumeliosissime, calumniosissime? Numquid et Hilarius Manichaeus est? Sed absit ut tuas accipere dedigner iniurias, non solum cum Hilario, ceterisque ministris Christi, sed etiam cum ipsa carne Christi, cui tantam facere non expavescis iniuriam, ut audeas eum coaequare ceterae hominum carni, quam carnem constat esse peccati; si non mendaciter dictum est, Christum in similitudine carnis venisse peccati (Cf. Rom 8, 3).
What will you say to these things, most wicked, most talkative, most insulting, most slanderous one? Is Hilary too a Manichee? But far be it that I should disdain to receive your insults, not only with Hilary and the other ministers of Christ, but even with the very flesh of Christ, to which you do not dread to do so great an injury that you dare to make him equal to the rest of human flesh, which is agreed to be flesh of sin; if it was not falsely said that Christ came in the likeness of sinful flesh (See Rom 8:3).
Iulianum.6.3334. IUL. Numquam quippe diceret: Si mortui non resurgunt, nec Christus resurrexit; cui poterat referri: Sed Christus, quoniam de Virgine natus est, peculiariter resurrexit; homines autem, quia nati sunt de commixtione diabolica, non resurgunt. Verum ille protinus referret: Et quae fuit resurgendi vanitas, si nec spei nostrae nec magisterio parabatur? Quae enim esset ratio docendi, quae gravitas exempli, si natura in nobis dissimilis, et spe conregnandi, et vi careret imitandi? Procul igitur, et nimis procul fides Apostoli ab hac opinione consistit.
34. Julian: For he would never say: If the dead do not rise, neither has Christ risen; if it could be replied to him: But Christ, because he was born of a Virgin, rose in a special way; whereas human beings, because they were born of a diabolical mingling, do not rise. But he would at once reply: And what was the vanity of rising, if it was prepared neither for our hope nor as a teaching? For what would be the reasoning of teaching, what the weight of example, if a nature unlike ours in us lacked both the hope of reigning together and the force of imitating? Far, therefore, and exceedingly far, does the faith of the Apostle stand from this opinion.
Iulianum.6.34Eodem plenus spiritu, quo etiam Petrus, scit Christum pro nobis ob hoc mortuum, ut nobis donaret exemplum, ut sequeremur vestigia eius (Cf. 1 Pt 2, 21). Et quia causam tanti mysterii, sacrificium novit et exemplum fuisse, pronuntiare non dubitat, immo diligenter inculcat, quia non accesserit homo Christus aliquo, a quo quisquam nostrum naturae suae praeiudiciis arceatur. Si - inquit - resurrectio non est mortuorum, neque Christus resurrexit. Si autem Christus ex mortuis resurrexit, quomodo dicunt quidam in vobis quia resurrectio mortuorum non est? Id est, si confitemini eiusdem illum secundum hominem, cuius nos, fuisse naturae, qua ratione vel in illo factam resurrectionem, vel in reliquis non futuram putatis? Praemissis conditionibus, implet ex omni parte sententiam: Nunc autem - inquit - Christus resurrexit ex mortuis; erit ergo resurrectio mortuorum.
Full of the same Spirit by which Peter also was, he knows that Christ died for us for this reason, that he might give us an example, that we should follow his footsteps (See 1 Pet 2:21). And because he knows that the cause of so great a mystery was both a sacrifice and an example, he does not hesitate to pronounce—rather, he carefully drives it home—that the man Christ approached nothing whereby any of us is barred by the prejudgments of his nature. If, he says, there is no resurrection of the dead, neither has Christ risen. But if Christ has risen from the dead, how do some among you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? That is, if you confess that he, according to the man, was of the same nature as we, by what reasoning do you think either that a resurrection took place in him, or that it will not take place in the rest? The conditions being set forth, he completes the sentence on every side: But now, he says, Christ has risen from the dead; there will be, therefore, a resurrection of the dead.
Iulianum.6.34AUG. Resurrectionem mortuorum non esse putantibus, et tamen Christum resurrexisse credentibus, propterea dicitur: Si resurrectio mortuorum non est, neque Christus resurrexit; quia Christus ideo resurrexit, ut resurrectionis mortuorum aedificaret fidem, in carne resurrecturos homines ostendens, sicut ipse homo factus resurrexit in carne. Ac per hoc consequens erat, ut negarent resurrexisse Christum, qui resurrectionem non crederent esse mortuorum.
Augustine: To those who think there is no resurrection of the dead, and yet believe that Christ has risen, it is said for this reason: If there is no resurrection of the dead, neither has Christ risen; because Christ rose for this reason, that he might build up faith in the resurrection of the dead, showing that human beings will rise in the flesh, just as he himself, having become man, rose in the flesh. And by this it was consequent that those who did not believe there was a resurrection of the dead should deny that Christ had risen.
Iulianum.6.34Unde quia isti, cum quibus agebatur, illud negare non poterant; hoc quoque debebant ablata caligine confiteri. Nam si propter aliquam Christi differentiam, recte sibi homines videntur resurrectionem negare mortuorum, et tamen resurrectionem Domini non negare; possunt et alia dicere, quae multa reperiunt, quibus errorem suum defendere sibi videantur. Quid si enim, cum audierint: Si mortui non resurgunt, neque resurrexit Christus, respondeant et dicant: Sed ille non tantum homo, verum etiam Deus est; quod aliorum hominum nemo? Ille secundum ipsum hominem de Spiritu Sancto natus et ex Virgine Maria; quod aliorum hominum nemo: ille potestatem habuit ponendi animam suam, et iterum sumendi eam (Cf. Io 10, 18); quod aliorum hominum nemo: quid ergo mirum, si a mortuis resurgere potuit; quod aliorum hominum poterit nemo?
Whence, because those with whom he was dealing could not deny that, they ought also, the fog being removed, to confess this. For if, on account of some difference of Christ, human beings rightly seem to themselves to deny the resurrection of the dead, and yet not to deny the resurrection of the Lord, they can also say other things—and they find many—by which they may seem to themselves to defend their error. For what if, when they hear: If the dead do not rise, neither has Christ risen, they answer and say: But he is not only a man, but also God, which none of other human beings is; he, according to the man himself, was born of the Holy Spirit and from the Virgin Mary, which none of other human beings is; he had the power of laying down his soul, and of taking it up again (See John 10:18), which none of other human beings has; what wonder, then, if he could rise from the dead, which none of other human beings will be able to do?
Iulianum.6.34Si ergo ista dicant, quia Christum solum resurrexisse concedunt, ceteros nolunt; numquid ideo illas Christi tam magnas a ceteris differentias negaturi sumus, ut aliorum quoque mortuorum resurrectionem de Christi cum eis aequalitate persuadere possimus? Sic ergo nec istam differentiam denegantes, qua fatemur solam carnem Christi, non ut aliorum fuisse carnem peccati, sed carnis peccati similitudinem; non ideo tamen solam resurrexisse, sed aliorum quoque resurrecturam esse defendimus, et sic defendimus, ut dicamus quod Apostolus dixit: Si mortui non resurgunt, neque Christus resurrexit; resurrexit autem Christus; resurgunt igitur mortui. Neque enim quia non eadem sunt in utraque carne originis merita, ideo non est eadem terrena mortalisque substantia. Habet quidem differentiam suam similitudo carnis peccati, qua discernitur a carne peccati; sed absit ut Christus eis se disparem faciat resurgendo, quibus se voluit aequare moriendo.
If, then, they say these things, because they grant that Christ alone has risen, but are unwilling that the rest should, shall we for that reason be going to deny those so great differences of Christ from the rest, in order that we may be able to persuade them of the resurrection of other dead too from Christ's equality with them? So, then, neither, in not denying that difference by which we confess that the flesh of Christ alone was, not flesh of sin like that of others, but a likeness of sinful flesh, do we yet for that reason defend that he alone rose, but that the rest too will rise; and we so defend it that we say what the Apostle said: If the dead do not rise, neither has Christ risen; but Christ has risen; therefore the dead rise. For because the merits of origin are not the same in both kinds of flesh, the earthly and mortal substance is not therefore not the same. The likeness of sinful flesh has indeed its own difference, by which it is distinguished from flesh of sin; but far be it that Christ should make himself unlike, in rising, to those to whom he willed to make himself equal in dying.
Iulianum.6.34Non itaque propterea debemus similitudinem carnis peccati carni aequare peccati, quantum attinet ad differentiam pertinendi ad peccatum et non pertinendi, quia noluit esse inter utramque carnem differentiam resurgendi et non resurgendi, qui noluit esse non moriendi atque moriendi. Imitatio autem quam, suffulcis, ubi non opus est, quid ad istam causam valet? Imitatio quippe in voluntate est; sed cum bona est, praeparatur, sicut scriptum est, voluntas a Domino (Prov 8 (sec. LXX)). Nemo ergo imitatur, nisi velit; moritur autem homo et resurgit, velit nolit. Verum et ipsa imitatio non semper tunc fit, quando eadem natura est imitandi, quae imitantis; alioquin Angelorum, quorum diversa natura est, iustitiam et pietatem non possemus imitari; quod tamen nos a Domino poscere in oratione, cum dicimus: Fiat voluntas tua sicut in caelo et in terra (Mt 6, 10), etiam ipse confessus es (Cf. supra 2, 52). Nec Deum Patrem imitaremur, cuius a nobis longe diversa natura est; tamen Dominus ait: Estote sicut Pater vester qui in caelis est (Mt 5, 48); et per Prophetam dicitur: Sancti estote, quia ego sanctus sum (Lev 11, 44). Non ergo ideo Christum non possumus imitari, quia ille in similitudine carnis peccati in hoc saeculo fuit, nos autem in carne peccati.
We ought not, therefore, to make the likeness of sinful flesh equal to flesh of sin, as far as concerns the difference of pertaining and not pertaining to sin, for this reason, that he willed there to be no difference of rising and not rising between the two kinds of flesh, who willed there to be no difference of not dying and dying. But the imitation which you prop up, where it is not needed, what does it avail for this case? For imitation is in the will; but when it is good, the will is prepared, as it is written, by the Lord (Prov 8 (LXX)). No one, then, imitates unless he wills; but a man dies and rises, whether he wills or not. Moreover, imitation itself does not always take place where the nature of the one imitated is the same as that of the one imitating; otherwise we could not imitate the justice and piety of the angels, whose nature is different; which nevertheless you yourself confessed that we ask of the Lord in prayer, when we say: Your will be done, as in heaven, so on earth (Matt 6:10) (Cf. supra 2, 52). Nor would we imitate God the Father, whose nature is far different from ours; yet the Lord says: Be as your Father who is in heaven (Matt 5:48); and through the Prophet it is said: Be holy, because I am holy (Lev 11:44). We cannot, then, for that reason fail to imitate Christ, because he was in this age in the likeness of sinful flesh, while we are in flesh of sin.
Iulianum.6.3435. IUL. Has vires exseramus in traducem, dicamusque: Si Christus, qui homo factus est, non habuit naturale peccatum, quomodo dicunt quidam in vobis quia imagini Dei pravitas dominetur ingenita? Si autem in natura malum est, et Christus, qui in eadem natura deprehenditur, sub regno diaboli est constitutus. Si autem ille creditur reus, inanis est praedicatio nostra, et vacua est fides vestra; inveniuntur autem falsi testes Apostoli, quia testimonium dixerunt adversus Deum, quod Filium suum, ex semine David secundum carnem, innocuum sanctumque formaverit, si eum maledicti seminis crimen infecit.
35. Julian: Let us put forth these forces against transmission, and let us say: If Christ, who was made man, did not have natural sin, how do some among you say that an inborn depravity rules over the image of God? But if there is evil in nature, then Christ too, who is found in the same nature, is set under the kingdom of the devil. But if he is believed guilty, our preaching is empty, and your faith is void; and the Apostles are found false witnesses, because they gave testimony against God, that he formed his Son, from the seed of David according to the flesh, harmless and holy, if the crime of a cursed seed infected him.
Iulianum.6.35Prorsus si in tali Christo speramus, miserabiliores sumus omnibus hominibus. Nunc autem Christus non minus verus homo, quam verus Deus, de Adam stirpe generatus, factus ex muliere, factusque sub lege, nullum fecit, et ideo nullum habuit peccatum. Apparet igitur crimen voluntatis esse, non seminis.
Indeed, if we hope in such a Christ, we are of all men the most miserable. But now Christ, no less true man than true God, begotten of the stock of Adam, made of a woman and made under the law, did no sin, and therefore had no sin. It appears, therefore, that crime is of the will, not of the seed.
Iulianum.6.35AUG. Ex hoc certe quasi fundamine tota ratiocinationis tuae structura consurgit, quod primum posuisti, dicens: Si Christus, qui homo factus est, non habuit naturale peccatum, quomodo dicunt quidam in vobis quia imagini Dei pravitas dominetur ingenita? Istaque propositione convulsa et effossa, quidquid deinde tamquam subsequens addidisti, facillima labe subvertitur. Non enim sequitur ut si Christus, qui homo factus est, non habuit naturale, hoc est, originale, peccatum, nulla imagini Dei pravitas dominetur ingenita; quoniam non sequitur ut si nihil habuit pravitatis similitudo carnis peccati, nihil habeat pravitatis cui est ista similis, id est, caro ipsa peccati; immo vero id sequitur, ut si est similitudo carnis peccati, sit etiam caro peccati.
Augustine: From this, surely, as from a foundation, the whole structure of your reasoning rises up—what you set down first, saying: If Christ, who was made man, did not have natural sin, how do some among you say that an inborn depravity rules over the image of God? And this proposition being torn up and dug out, whatever you afterward added as following is overthrown by a most easy collapse. For it does not follow that, if Christ, who was made man, did not have natural—that is, original—sin, then no inborn depravity rules over the image of God; for it does not follow that, if the likeness of sinful flesh had no depravity, then that to which it is like, that is, the very flesh of sin, has no depravity; rather, this does follow, that if there is a likeness of sinful flesh, there is also flesh of sin.
Iulianum.6.35Quia omne simile, alicui simile sit necesse est; et si solus habuit Christus veram quidem carnem, sicut ceteri homines, sed tamen carnis peccati non proprietatem, sed similitudinem; non solum necesse est ut sit alia cui haec similis sit caro peccati, sed omnium ceterorum hominum non sit nisi caro peccati. Quapropter etsi malum est in carne peccati, non est tamen in Christo, qui venit in carne vera, non tamen in carne peccati, sed in similitudine carnis peccati, carnem sanare peccati. Non ergo ille creditur reus, sed ab illo noster solvitur reatus, et originalis, et additus.
Because everything like must be like to something; and if Christ alone had indeed true flesh, like other human beings, but yet not the property of sinful flesh, but the likeness of it, then it is not only necessary that there be another to which this is like, namely flesh of sin, but that of all other human beings there be only flesh of sin. Wherefore, although there is evil in flesh of sin, yet it is not in Christ, who came in true flesh, yet not in flesh of sin, but in the likeness of sinful flesh, to heal the flesh of sin. Therefore he is not believed guilty, but by him our guilt, both original and added, is loosed.
Iulianum.6.35Unde nec inanis est Apostoli praedicatio, qui non praedicaret in Christo similitudinem carnis peccati, nisi aliorum carnem sciret esse peccati. Nec vacua est fides nostra, qua vacuatur haeresis vestra. Nec falsi testes inveniuntur Apostoli, qui similitudinem carnis peccati discernunt a carne peccati, quod non facit haeresis vestra; et sic ex semine David evangelizant Christum, ut tamen de Spiritu Sancto natum asserant et Virgine Maria, non de carnis concupiscentia, ut similitudinem carnis peccati haberet, carnem vero peccati habere non posset. Nec miserabiliores sumus omnibus hominibus ista credentes; sed carnem Christi a carne peccati non esse discretam magna miseria credimus.
Whence neither is the preaching of the Apostle empty, who would not preach in Christ the likeness of sinful flesh, unless he knew the flesh of others to be flesh of sin. Nor is our faith void, by which your heresy is voided. Nor are the Apostles found false witnesses, who distinguish the likeness of sinful flesh from flesh of sin—which your heresy does not do; and who so evangelize Christ from the seed of David that they nonetheless assert him to have been born of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, not of the concupiscence of the flesh, so that he might have the likeness of sinful flesh, but could not have flesh of sin. Nor are we of all men the most miserable in believing these things; but it is a great misery to believe that the flesh of Christ is not distinct from flesh of sin.
Iulianum.6.35Proinde argumentationem tuam vana conclusione determinas, dicens: Apparet igitur crimen voluntatis esse, non seminis. Hoc omnino inaniter intulisti; quoniam superiora, ex quibus eam confectam putas, consequentia non esse monstravi; et procul dubio, quia in paradiso esse possent, nulla esse post paradisum vitia nascentium, nisi mala voluntate primorum gignentium vitiarentur et semina.
Accordingly, you bring your argument to an end with a vain conclusion, saying: It appears, therefore, that crime is of the will, not of the seed. This you inferred altogether emptily; since I have shown that the premises, from which you think it is put together, are not consequent; and without doubt, because there could be in paradise no defects of those being born after paradise, unless the seeds too were corrupted by the evil will of the first begetters.
Iulianum.6.35Cur non ergo potius tibi dicitur (ut nos veraciter, qua tu fallaciter usus es, eadem forma ratiocinationis utamur): Si Christus homo in similitudine carnis peccati ad homines missus est, quomodo non quidam in vobis, sed omnes vos dicitis, aliam cui sit ista similis, carnem non esse peccati, si non est alia caro peccati? Si Christus non habuit similitudinem carnis peccati, inanis est praedicatio eius qui hoc dixit, inanis est et fides Ecclesiae catholicae quae hoc credidit; invenitur autem et falsus testis Apostolus, qui testimonium dixit adversus Christum, quia similitudinem carnis peccati habuit, quam non habuit. Sed si hoc credimus, fidelibus non sociamur hominibus. Nunc autem Christus missus est in similitudine carnis peccati; quia solus veram carnem sic habuit, ut non esset caro peccati, sed eius similitudo; ac per hoc necesse est ut fateamur, carnem ceterorum hominum esse peccati, cui similis facta est vera caro Christi, sed non caro peccati.
Why, then, is it not rather said to you (that we may use truthfully the same form of reasoning which you used deceitfully): If the man Christ was sent to human beings in the likeness of sinful flesh, how do not some among you, but all of you, say that another, to which this is like, is not flesh of sin, if there is no other flesh of sin? If Christ did not have the likeness of sinful flesh, the preaching of him who said this is empty, and empty too is the faith of the Catholic Church which believed this; and the Apostle is found a false witness, who gave testimony against Christ, that he had the likeness of sinful flesh, which he did not have. But if we believe this, we are not allied with the faithful. But now Christ was sent in the likeness of sinful flesh; because he alone so had true flesh that it was not flesh of sin, but a likeness of it; and by this it is necessary that we confess that the flesh of other human beings is flesh of sin, to which the true flesh of Christ was made like, but not flesh of sin.
Iulianum.6.3536. IUL. Confodiuntur nempe Manichaei, et peccatum naturale credentes, et resurrectionem carnis negantes. Nunc autem - inquit - Christus resurrexit a mortuis primitiae dormientium; quoniam quidem per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum (1 Cor 15, 20-21). De resurrectione hic Apostolus non generali loquitur, quam experturi sunt etiam scelesti, etiam profani homines; sed de eorum tantummodo, qui transferentur in gloriam. Beatam ergo resurrectionem puro nomine resurrectionis ostendit, cuius comparatione, illa impiorum quasi non sit resurrectio, praeteritur.
36. Julian: The Manichees are surely run through, both those believing in natural sin and those denying the resurrection of the flesh. But now, he says, Christ has risen from the dead, the firstfruits of those who sleep; since indeed through a man death, and through a man the resurrection of the dead (1 Cor 15:20-21). Here the Apostle speaks not of the general resurrection, which even the wicked and even profane human beings will experience, but only of that of those who will be transferred into glory. He shows, therefore, the blessed resurrection by the pure name of resurrection, in comparison with which that of the impious is passed over as though it were not a resurrection.
Iulianum.6.36Hic ergo Apostolus non solum resurrectionem, ut dixi, quae bonis malisque communis est, sed resurrectionem inculcat beatam; et licet non sit unum resurrectio et beatitudo resurrectionis, sicut nec resurrectio et resurrectionis miseria unum est; tamen quia beatitudo aeterna absque resurrectione non est, nomine eius illa quoque felicitas, quae excitationem haud paenitendam facit esse, signatur. Ut si aliquis industriam, vires, et studia diversa collaudans, compendio ea vitae velit ostendere, verbi gratia, eruditam illius vitam, elegantem huius, impigram appellet alterius; non utique amoverit distinctionem, ut idem vita quod industria, quod elegantia, quod fortitudo videatur; aliud est quippe vivere, aliud studere; verumtamen nisi vixeris, nullus studebis.
Here, then, the Apostle drives home not only the resurrection, as I said, which is common to the good and the bad, but the blessed resurrection; and although resurrection and the blessedness of resurrection are not one thing—just as resurrection and the misery of resurrection are not one thing—yet because eternal blessedness does not exist without resurrection, by its name that happiness too is signified which makes the raising one not to be regretted. So that, if someone, praising diligence, strength, and various pursuits, should want to show them in a brief compass of life—for example, calling the life of one learned, of another elegant, of another tireless—he would surely not remove the distinction, so that life should seem the same as diligence, as elegance, as fortitude; for to live is one thing, to pursue another; but unless you live, you will pursue nothing.
Iulianum.6.36Ita etiam non est idem resurrectio quod beatitudo; est quippe misera excitatio cinerum; tamen nullus regnabis, nisi ante resurrexeris. Mors ergo corporis et resurrectio corporis e regione consistunt; si mors esset universa poenalis, esset quoque universa resurrectio praemialis; nunc autem est resurrectio poenalis omnium, qui ignibus deputantur aeternis; ergo et mors non supplicialis est, sed naturalis. Sicut enim non facit generaliter mors corporis, ut paeniteat interiisse; sic non facit generaliter resurrectio, ut placeat revixisse. Verum et istius bonum in remuneratione surgentium, et illius amaritudo in adustione punitorum est; quae utraque pro meritis consequuntur.
So too resurrection is not the same as blessedness; for there is a miserable raising of ashes; yet you will reign nowhere, unless you have first risen. The death of the body and the resurrection of the body, then, stand over against each other; if death were universally penal, resurrection too would be universally a reward; but as it is, there is a penal resurrection of all who are assigned to eternal fires; therefore death too is not punitive, but natural. For just as the death of the body does not generally make one regret having perished, so resurrection does not generally make one glad to have lived again. But the good of the latter lies in the reward of those who rise, and the bitterness of the former in the burning of those who are punished; both of which follow according to merits.
Iulianum.6.36Apparet igitur Apostolum non de morte naturali, sed de criminosorum, quam infelicem facit poena perpetua; nec de resurrectione communi, sed quam beatam facit gloria sempiterna, disserere; nec ubi de personis disputat praeiudicium inferre creaturis, sed salvis semper distinctionibus latisque limitibus naturarum et voluntatum, sic miscere nonnumquam vocabula, ne specialitas rerum confusione depereat.
It appears, therefore, that the Apostle is discussing not natural death, but the death of the criminal, which perpetual punishment makes unhappy; and not the common resurrection, but the one which everlasting glory makes blessed; and that, when he discusses persons, he does not bring a prejudgment upon natures, but, the distinctions and broad bounds of natures and wills being always preserved, so sometimes mixes the words that the particularity of things may not perish in confusion.
Iulianum.6.36Per hominem ergo mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum: non hic ab homine morte conditam; sed in homine apparuisse denuntiat; sicut et resurrectionem mortuorum non dicit ab homine factam, hoc est, a Christo; sed in homine, sicut ad Philippenses idem magister: Oboediens - inquit - factus est usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis; propter quod et Deus illum exaltavit, et donavit illi nomen super omne nomen2 (Cf. Eccli 40,1). Petri quoque apostoli in hoc concurrit assertio: Viri Israelitae, audite: Iesum virum Nazarenum approbatum a Deo in vobis per manus iniquorum interemistis, quem Deus suscitavit solutis doloribus inferni. Et item: Hunc Iesum Deus resuscitavit, cui omnes nos testes sumus (Act 2, 22-24.32).
Through a man, then, death, and through a man the resurrection of the dead: he announces not that death was established here by the man, but that it appeared in the man; just as he says that the resurrection of the dead was made not by a man, that is, by Christ, but in a man; as the same master says to the Philippians: He became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross; for which reason God also exalted him, and gave him a name above every name (Phil 2:8-9). The assertion of the apostle Peter too agrees in this: Men of Israel, hear: Jesus the Nazarene, a man approved by God among you, you killed by the hands of the wicked, whom God raised up, having loosed the pains of hell. And again: This Jesus God raised up, of which we all are witnesses (Acts 2:22-24, 32).
Iulianum.6.36Ibi ergo sicut proprium erat hominis sine deitatis iniuria obire mortem, ita proprium divinitatis hominem illum a mortuis excitare. Quod autem Deus pronuntiatur operari ex persona Verbi, ipse quoque Christus facit. Sic enim dixerat: In potestate habeo ponere animam meam, et in potestate habeo sumere illam (Io 10, 18). Cum ergo sit Filii una persona, tamen distinctione legitima aliud applicatur carni, aliud deitati. Per hominem ergo mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum, manifestata, non creata; ceterum utrumque institutum per Deum est; sed in Adam mortis conditio, in persona vero Christi primitiae resurrectionis claruerunt.
There, then, just as it was proper to the man to undergo death without injury to the deity, so it was proper to the divinity to raise that man from the dead. But what God is pronounced to do from the person of the Word, Christ himself also does. For he had said thus: I have the power to lay down my soul, and I have the power to take it up (John 10:18). Although, then, there is one person of the Son, yet by a legitimate distinction one thing is applied to the flesh, another to the deity. Through a man, then, death, and through a man the resurrection of the dead—made manifest, not created; for both were established by God; but in Adam the condition of death, and in the person of Christ the firstfruits of resurrection, became clear.
Iulianum.6.36Hic ergo ubi dicit Apostolus: Per hominem mors; si per voluntatem eius dicas, nihil pertinet ad naturam; si per naturam, nihil spectat ad culpam. Homines nempe alterum mortis, alterum resurrectionis ex adverso locavit, istum secundum nolens illi subdere.
Here, then, where the Apostle says: Through a man death; if you say through his will, it has nothing to do with nature; if through nature, it has nothing to do with fault. For he set two men over against each other, the one of death, the other of resurrection, not wishing to subject this second one to that first.
Iulianum.6.36Et sequitur: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur. Hoc ergo quod ait: Omnes in Christo vivificabuntur, etiam de impiis, an tantum de fidelibus dicit? Si de impiis, quod omnes vivificentur in Christo, ergo nullus in poena est; si de fidelibus, non ergo universi vivificantur in fide Christi, sed tantum fideles, quamvis omnes omnino virtute ipsius, qua conditi fuerant, excitentur. Si ergo de morte corporis loquitur: In Adam omnes moriuntur, nullus hoc nomine indicatur reatus, quando in eodem Adam et Christus mortuus invenitur; neque enim secuta esset veritas resurrectionis, nisi praecessisset veritas mortis. Igitur in Adam pronuntiat Apostolus omnes mori. Si haec mors non indicat aliud quam corporis resolutionem; nihil spectat profecto ad naturale peccatum, nec quidquam praeiudicat innocentibus, si in Adam mori dicantur, in quo et Christus est mortuus. Sin autem hoc quod ait: In Adam omnes moriuntur, ad peccatum vis animi, et non ad mortem solum, sed ad mortem ream et miseram pertinere, id est, quam deputata criminibus poena consequitur; in ea autem videlicet gehenna nec Christus potuit esse, nec sancti;
And there follows: As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive. This, then, that he says: All will be made alive in Christ—does he say it of the impious too, or only of the faithful? If of the impious, that all are made alive in Christ, then no one is in punishment; if of the faithful, then not all are made alive in the faith of Christ, but only the faithful—although absolutely all are raised by his power, by which they had been created. If, then, he speaks of the death of the body: In Adam all die, no guilt is indicated by this name, since in the same Adam Christ too is found to have died; for the truth of resurrection would not have followed, unless the truth of death had gone before. The Apostle, therefore, pronounces that all die in Adam. If this death indicates nothing other than the dissolution of the body, it surely has nothing to do with natural sin, nor does it prejudge anything against the innocent, if they are said to die in Adam, in whom Christ too died. But if, by what he says: In Adam all die, you want it to pertain to sin, and not to death only, but to a guilty and miserable death, that is, the one which the punishment assigned to crimes follows—but in that Gehenna, namely, neither Christ nor the saints could be;
Iulianum.6.36igitur nec innocentibus praeiudicat, qui ut nihil boni, ita nihil mali voluntarii habent; sed hoc solum retinent, quod a Deo facti sunt; quos iure Baptismatis consecramus, ut qui eos fecit condendo bonos, faciat innovando et adoptando meliores. Quod itaque dicit Apostolus: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur; abest tantum ab ista suspicione traducis Manichaeae, quantum Christus a peccato, qui et iniquitatem non habuit, et minus de hominis natura nihil habuit.
therefore neither does it prejudge against the innocent, who, just as they have nothing good, so have nothing voluntarily evil; but retain only this, that they were made by God; whom by the right of baptism we consecrate, so that he who made them good by creating may make them better by renewing and adopting. So then, what the Apostle says: As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive, is as far from this suspicion of a Manichee transmission as Christ is from sin, who both had no iniquity, and had nothing less than the nature of man.
Iulianum.6.36AUG. Quid est, quod adversus nos disputans dicis: Confodiuntur nempe Manichaei, et peccatum naturale credentes, et resurrectionem carnis negantes? Numquid nos, sicut illi, aut peccatum tribuimus alienae naturae, aut carnis resurrectionem negamus? Prorsus Manichaei confodiantur a vobis, qui vobiscum confodiuntur a nobis, et quando adiuvantur a vobis. In eorum quippe adiutorium discordiam carnis et spiritus peccato Adae negatis esse tribuendam; ut illi huius mali causam requirentes sive reddentes, alienam mali naturam Deo bono coaeternam commixtam nobis esse concludant.
Augustine: What is this, that, arguing against us, you say: The Manichees are surely run through, both those believing in natural sin and those denying the resurrection of the flesh? Do we, like them, either attribute sin to another nature, or deny the resurrection of the flesh? Let the Manichees rather be run through by you, who are run through together with you by us, even when they are helped by you. For to their aid you deny that the discord of flesh and spirit is to be attributed to the sin of Adam; so that they, seeking or assigning the cause of this evil, may conclude that another nature of evil, coeternal with the good God, has been mingled with us.
Iulianum.6.36Exponis deinde sequentia, ubi de carnis resurrectione Apostolus disputat, et dicis: Non eum loqui de resurrectione communi, bonorum scilicet et malorum; sed eorum tantum, qui transferentur in gloriam. Ita est quidem: tamen de resurrectione corporis loquitur. Huic ergo e contrario mors opponitur corporis, eisque, id est morti corporis et resurrectioni, singuli distribuuntur auctores, homines duo: Quoniam per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum. Et ipsi homines duo propriis etiam nominibus exprimuntur, ut de quibus hoc dictum sit, evidenter appareat, atque additur: Sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur. Moriuntur ait; non ait: Morientur; ex altera vero parte non ait: Vivificantur; sed: vivificabuntur. Nunc enim moriuntur ex poena, tunc vivificabuntur ex praemio.
You then expound what follows, where the Apostle discusses the resurrection of the flesh, and you say: He does not speak of the common resurrection, namely of the good and the bad, but only of those who will be transferred into glory. So it is indeed: nonetheless he speaks of the resurrection of the body. To this, then, the death of the body is opposed by contrast, and to these—that is, to the death of the body and the resurrection—individual authors are distributed, two men: Since through a man death, and through a man the resurrection of the dead. And these two men are expressed even by their proper names, so that it may evidently appear of whom this was said, and there is added: For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive. He says, they die; he does not say, they will die; but on the other side he does not say, they are made alive, but, they will be made alive. For now they die from punishment; then they will be made alive from reward.
Iulianum.6.36Non itaque de illa morte nunc loquitur, quae futura est eis qui cum anima et corpore igne cruciabuntur aeterno; alioquin ex utraque parte verbum futuri temporis poneret, et sicut dixit: vivificabuntur, ita diceret: Morientur. Cum vero dixit: moriuntur, quod utique nunc fit; vivificabuntur autem, quod tunc fiet; satis ostendit se de illa morte agere, in eo quod dicit: Per hominem mors, quae animam dissolvit a carne; quamvis et ad illam mortem futuram pertineant, quae secunda mors dicitur, qui reatum quem per Adam generatione traxerunt, per Christum regeneratione non solvunt.
He does not, therefore, now speak of that death which is to come for those who, with soul and body, will be tormented in eternal fire; otherwise he would put a verb of the future tense on each side, and as he said, they will be made alive, so he would say, they will die. But since he said, they die, which surely happens now; but, they will be made alive, which will happen then; he shows clearly enough that he is treating of that death, in what he says: Through a man death, which dissolves the soul from the flesh; although those too pertain to that future death, which is called the second death, who do not loose, through Christ by regeneration, the guilt which through Adam they drew by generation.
Iulianum.6.36Nunc proinde quia de resurrectione corporis loquitur, quae futura est, cui opponit e contrario mortem corporis, quae nunc fit; et duo ista contraria singulos auctores habent, Adam mors, Christum resurrectio mortuorum; sicut intellegitur resurrectio illa praemialis, ita esse intellegenda est mors ista poenalis. Praemio quippe a contrario non opponitur natura, sed poena. Et ideo isto loco, ubi resurrectio corporis opponitur morti corporis, non de communi resurrectione agit Apostolus, quae ad iustos et iniustos pertinet; sed de illa potius, in qua erunt qui vivificabuntur in Christo, non qui damnabuntur a Christo; quamvis utrosque ipse resurgere faciat, cuius vocem audient omnes qui in monumentis sunt; et procedent qui bene fecerunt, in resurrectionem vitae; qui autem mala egerunt, in resurrectionem iudicii (Cf. Io 5, 28-29).
Now therefore, because he speaks of the resurrection of the body, which is to come, to which he opposes by contrast the death of the body, which happens now; and these two contraries have individual authors, Adam death, Christ the resurrection of the dead; just as that resurrection is understood to be a reward, so this death must be understood to be penal. For a nature is not opposed by contrast to a reward, but a punishment. And therefore in this place, where the resurrection of the body is opposed to the death of the body, the Apostle is not treating of the common resurrection, which pertains to the just and the unjust; but rather of that in which will be those who will be made alive in Christ, not those who will be condemned by Christ; although he himself makes both rise, whose voice all who are in the tombs will hear; and those who have done well will come forth into the resurrection of life; but those who have done evil, into the resurrection of judgment (See John 5:28-29).
Iulianum.6.36Ideo ergo, ut dixi, eam volui commendare, quae ad beneficium Christi pertinet, non etiam illam, quae tantum ad iudicium; ut quoniam ista praemialis est, mors quoque corporis, quae a contrario huic opponitur, ostendatur esse poenalis. Sicut enim vitae mors, ita praemio poena contraria est; per quam poenam, id est, corporis mortem, quoniam sancti martyres certaverunt atque vicerunt, mors eorum in qua nunc dormiunt in conspectu Domini, non suo genere, sed illius munere pretiosa est (Cf. Ps 115, 15). Etiam poenae quippe sanctorum, sine dubitatione pretiosae sunt; sed non quia pretiosae sunt, ideo poenae non sunt; sicut non quia poenae sunt, ideo pretiosae sunt; sed quia pro veritate susceptae, vel cum pietate toleratae sunt.
For this reason, then, as I said, I wanted to commend that resurrection which pertains to the benefit of Christ, not also that which pertains only to judgment; so that, since this is a reward, the death of the body too, which is opposed to it by contrast, may be shown to be penal. For as death is contrary to life, so punishment is contrary to reward; and because the holy martyrs contended and conquered through this punishment, that is, the death of the body, their death, in which they now sleep, is in the sight of the Lord precious—not by its own kind, but by his gift (See Ps 116:15 (115:15)). For the punishments of the saints too are without doubt precious; but they are not for that reason not punishments because they are precious; just as they are not for that reason precious because they are punishments; but because they were undertaken for the truth, or borne with piety.
Iulianum.6.36Hunc sensum sanum et catholicum si teneres, non in paradisum Dei, hoc est, in locum sanctarum deliciarum, non solum mortium poenas, verum etiam mortiferarum valetudinum mitteres. Omnis autem poena hominis quid est, nisi poena imaginis Dei? Quae si infertur iniuste, profecto a quo infertur, iniustus est. Quis porro dubitet quod iniuste inferatur poena imagini Dei, nisi hoc culpa meruerit? Solus enim mediator Dei et hominum, homo Christus Iesus sine culpa pertulit poenam, ut nostram scilicet et culpam vacuaret et poenam; non eam poenam quae luenda in hoc maligno saeculo fuit, sed quae nobis debebatur aeterna. Et tamen ipse etiam nostrum in se affectum, morte propinquante, suscipiens: Pater - inquit - si fieri potest, transeat a me calix iste (Mt 26, 39). Qui utique potestatem habebat ponendi et sumendi animam suam; sed mortem, quam nulla culpa praecedente, pro nobis voluntate, non necessitate suscepit, poenam tamen esse his verbis suis Deus ille magister ostendit, quam solus pro nostra sine ulla sua iniquitate sustinuit.
If you held this sound and Catholic understanding, you would not send into the paradise of God, that is, into the place of holy delights, not only the punishments of deaths, but even of deadly sicknesses. But what is every punishment of a man, except a punishment of the image of God? Which, if it is inflicted unjustly, then surely he by whom it is inflicted is unjust. And who would doubt that a punishment is inflicted unjustly on the image of God, unless fault deserved this? For the sole mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus, bore punishment without fault, namely to empty out both our fault and our punishment; not that punishment which had to be paid in this malignant age, but the eternal one that was owed to us. And yet he too, taking upon himself our feeling, as death drew near, said: Father, if it can be done, let this cup pass from me (Matt 26:39). He who surely had the power of laying down and taking up his soul; but the death which, with no fault going before, he undertook for us by will, not by necessity, that master, God, showed by these his own words to be nonetheless a punishment, which he alone sustained for us without any iniquity of his own.
Iulianum.6.36Si ergo ista gloria misericordiae Christi, qua pro nobis poenam sine culpa pertulit, singularis est, ut non quidem in carne peccati, sed propter similitudinem carnis peccati, in Adam tamen, a quo descendit caro peccati, etiam ipse moreretur; procul dubio ceteri homines in hoc maligno saeculo, quod extra paradisum est, poenas quascumque patiuntur a nativitate usque ad mortem, in quibus poenis utique patiuntur et mortem, pro suis peccatis vel nascendo tractis, vel male vivendo additis, merito digneque patiuntur sub iusto et omnipotente iudice; qui utique nec faceret, nec sineret inferri poenas imaginibus suis, sine cuius voluntate nec passer cadit in terram (Cf. Mt 10, 29), nisi iuste sciret inferri. Et quid est iuste, nisi merito peccatorum, vel examinatione virtutum; ita ut remissis etiam peccatis, pignus quod renati accipiunt salutis aeternae, in futurum eis saeculum prosit, hic autem solvant, quidquid in huius saeculi poenalis vanitate et malignitate solvendum est?
If, then, this glory of the mercy of Christ, by which he bore punishment for us without fault, is unique, so that—not indeed in flesh of sin, but on account of the likeness of sinful flesh—he nonetheless died in Adam, from whom flesh of sin descends; then without doubt other human beings, in this malignant age which is outside paradise, suffer whatever punishments from birth to death—among which punishments they surely suffer death too—for their own sins, whether drawn by being born or added by living badly, and they suffer deservedly and worthily under the just and almighty judge; who surely would neither do nor allow punishments to be inflicted on his images—without whose will not even a sparrow falls to the ground (See Matt 10:29)—unless he knew them to be justly inflicted. And what is justly, except by the desert of sins, or by the testing of virtues; so that, even with sins remitted, the pledge of eternal salvation which the reborn receive may profit them in the age to come, but here they pay whatever must be paid in the penal vanity and malignity of this age?
Iulianum.6.36Quid est ergo quod dicis: Ideo baptizari parvulos, ut quos Deus fecerat condendo bonos, faciat innovando et adoptando meliores? Bonos quidem fecit, quia omnis natura in quantum natura est, bona est; sed quos fecit bonos, non iniuste faceret vel sineret esse miseros. Quamvis et tu, qui eos innovari dicis, ducere vetustatem veteris hominis, cum sint nascendo utique novi, incautus et nesciens confiteris.
What is it, then, that you say: Little ones are baptized for this reason, that those whom God had made good by creating he may make better by renewing and adopting? He made them good indeed, because every nature, insofar as it is a nature, is good; but those whom he made good he would not unjustly make or allow to be miserable. Although you too, who say that they are renewed, confess incautiously and unknowingly that they carry the oldness of the old man, since by being born they are surely new.
Iulianum.6.36Compelleris igitur unum ex his tribus eligere, ut aut paradisum impleas poenis hominum; aut iniustum Deum dicas in poenis imaginum eius, quas patitur innocentia parvulorum; aut quia haec duo detestanda et damnanda sunt, agnoscas originale peccatum; et sic intellegas, omnes qui morte corporis moriuntur, in Adam mori, quia per ipsum hominem mors, id est, per culpam eius et poenam; et omnes qui resurrectione corporis non damnantur, sed vivificantur, in Christo vivificari, quia per ipsum hominem resurrectio mortuorum, id est, per iustitiam eius et gratiam. Quia enim est poenalis corporis mors, ideo illi resurrectionem corporis tantummodo praemialem (cum sit alia quoque poenalis), e contrario videmus oppositam.
You are compelled, therefore, to choose one of these three: either to fill paradise with the punishments of human beings; or to call God unjust in the punishments of his images, which the innocence of little ones suffers; or, because these two are to be detested and condemned, to acknowledge original sin; and so to understand that all who die by the death of the body die in Adam, because through that man is death, that is, through his fault and punishment; and that all who by the resurrection of the body are not condemned, but made alive, are made alive in Christ, because through that man is the resurrection of the dead, that is, through his justice and grace. For because the death of the body is penal, therefore we see opposed to it by contrast a resurrection of the body that is only a reward (although there is another that is penal too).
Iulianum.6.3637. IUL. Unusquisque autem in suo ordine: primitiae Christus, deinde hi qui sunt Christi in adventu eius, deinde finis (1 Cor 15, 23-24). Idem et alibi: Qui est primogenitus - inquit - ex mortuis (Col 1, 18). Deinde hi qui sunt Christi: id est, sancti rapiuntur in nubibus (Cf. 1 Thess 4, 17). Post hoc finis: quoniam hi ibunt in regnum aeternum, impii vero in ignem aeternum (Cf. Mt 25, 46). Cum tradiderit regnum Deo et Patri, cum evacuaverit omnem principatum, et omnem potestatem, et virtutem; oportet enim eum regnare, donec ponat inimicos omnes sub pedibus eius; omnia enim subiecit subtus pedes eius; novissima autem inimica destruetur mors. Cum autem dixerit: Omnia ista subiecta sunt, sine dubio praeter illum qui illi subiecit omnia; nam cum subiecta fuerint illi omnia, tunc et ipse subiectus erit ei qui sibi subiecit omnia, ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus (1 Cor 15, 25-28).
37. Julian: But each in his own order: the firstfruits Christ, then those who are Christ's at his coming, then the end (1 Cor 15:23-24). The same elsewhere: He who is the firstborn from the dead (Col 1:18). Then those who are Christ's: that is, the saints are caught up in the clouds (See 1 Thess 4:17). After this the end: since these will go into the eternal kingdom, but the impious into eternal fire (See Matt 25:46). When he shall have handed over the kingdom to God and the Father, when he shall have made void every principality and every power and might; for he must reign, until he put all his enemies under his feet; for he has subjected all things under his feet; but the last enemy to be destroyed is death. But when he says: All these things are subjected, without doubt except him who subjected all things to him; for when all things shall have been subjected to him, then the Son himself also will be subject to him who subjected all things to himself, that God may be all in all (1 Cor 15:25-28).
Iulianum.6.37Regnum Dei et Patris est, ut impleto numero sanctorum qui in eius praescientia continetur, omnis principatus et universa virtus adversariae potestatis intereat. Oportet quippe hanc efficientiam tanti esse mysterii, ut omnes inimici iustitiae sub divinis pedibus collocentur. Quod tunc fiet, cum destructam se et victam ab omnibus sanctis mors aeterna conspiciet. Cum autem fuerint tam Christo quam corpori eius omnia illa potestatum genera regni manifestatione subiecta, multo maxime congregatio omnis glorificata sanctorum esse Deo subdita non desistet; sed totum corpus dignum regno caelorum, quod sub Christo capite construitur, divinae voluntati perfecta affectione cohaerebit, ut exstincta omni cupiditate culparum, Deus et contineat cunctos, et compleat.
It is the kingdom of God and the Father that, the number of the saints being filled which is contained in his foreknowledge, every principality and all the might of the adversary power should perish. For the efficacy of so great a mystery must be such that all the enemies of justice are placed under the divine feet. Which will then come about, when eternal death will behold itself destroyed and conquered by all the saints. But when all those kinds of powers shall have been subjected, both to Christ and to his body, by the manifestation of the kingdom, then much more will the whole glorified congregation of the saints not cease to be subject to God; rather the whole body worthy of the kingdom of heaven, which is constructed under Christ the head, will cleave to the divine will with perfect affection, so that, every cupidity of faults being extinguished, God may both contain and complete all.
Iulianum.6.37AUG. In hac parte disputationis tuae nihil pene, quod ad causam quae inter nos agitur pertineat, prosecutus es. Cur enim totum locum istum, ubi de resurrectione corporis Apostolus disserit, inserendum putasti, nisi propter illud quod ait: Sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur? Quia scilicet corporis mortem non vultis peccato primi hominis tribuere, sed naturae; quam sic in illo homine primo dicitis institutam, ut sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset.
Augustine: In this part of your discussion you have pursued almost nothing that pertains to the case which is at issue between us. For why did you think this whole passage, where the Apostle discusses the resurrection of the body, ought to be inserted, except on account of what he says: As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive? Because, namely, you are unwilling to attribute the death of the body to the sin of the first man, but to nature; which you say was so established in that first man that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he was going to die.
Iulianum.6.37Unde satis tibi existimo esse responsum. Quamobrem praetermissis eis, in quibus exponendis superfluo te dilatare voluisti, illud quod ait Apostolus: Novissima inimica destruetur mors, discutiendum forsitan sit, de qua morte sit dictum; utrum de ista quae nunc est, qua de corpore exire anima compellitur; an de illa qua de corpore anima exire non sinitur; ut simul utrumque sempiterno igne crucietur; quae mors utique nondum est, sed futura est; neque tunc destruetur, sed potius esse tunc incipit; quam nunc nondum esse quis ambigit?
Whence I think enough has been answered to you. Wherefore, passing over those things in expounding which you wanted superfluously to expand, what the Apostle says: The last enemy to be destroyed is death, must perhaps be examined—of what death it was said; whether of that which now exists, by which the soul is compelled to go out of the body; or of that by which the soul is not allowed to go out of the body, so that both together may be tormented in everlasting fire; which death surely does not yet exist, but is to come; nor will it then be destroyed, but rather then begins to be; which who doubts does not yet now exist?
Iulianum.6.37Haec autem, quae tunc in omnibus corpore morientibus frequentatur, cui contraria est corporis resurrectio, de qua ut haec omnia diceret Apostolus disputabat; haec, inquam, quae nunc agitur, usitata et omnibus nota mors corporis, tunc utique novissima destruetur, cum corruptibile hoc induerit incorruptionem, et mortale hoc induerit immortalitatem (Cf. 1 Cor 15, 53-54). Quod procul dubio de resurrectione corporis quae tunc erit, contra mortem corporis quae nunc est, dictum esse perspicimus.
But this death, which then is frequent in all who die in body, to which the resurrection of the body is contrary—about which, that he might say all these things, the Apostle was discussing—this, I say, which now takes place, the usual death of the body known to all, will then surely be destroyed last, when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality (See 1 Cor 15:53-54). Which we perceive without doubt to have been said of the resurrection of the body which will then be, against the death of the body which now is.
Iulianum.6.37Quapropter, si mors aeterna quae numquam fuit, non potest tunc destrui, quando esse potius incipit, nec umquam destruetur, quia semper erit; restat ut ista quae nunc est, ipsa novissima, hoc est, in fine destruatur, quando fiet resurrectione carnis ut non sit. Porro inimica quomodo esset, si naturalis ita esset, ut poenalis non esset? Poenalis autem sub iusto et omnipotente iudice nullo pacto esset, nisi meritis peccati accidisset. Iam tandem sensum tuum, rogamus, emenda; et paradisum beatorum, quem poenis hominum contaminaveras, munda.
Wherefore, if eternal death, which never existed, cannot be destroyed then, when it rather begins to be, nor will ever be destroyed, because it will always be; it remains that this death which now is, is itself the last, that is, at the end, destroyed, when it will come about by the resurrection of the flesh that it not be. And how would it be an enemy, if it were so natural that it were not penal? But penal, under a just and almighty judge, it would in no way be, unless it had happened by the deserts of sin. Now at last, we ask, amend your understanding; and cleanse the paradise of the blessed, which you had contaminated with the punishments of human beings.
Iulianum.6.37Dici autem non potest, quamtum mihi placeat, quod dixisti: In regno caelorum futurum esse, ut exstincta omni cupiditate culparum, Deus et contineat cunctos, et compleat. O utinam tuae huius sententiae commonitione te corrigas, et cupiditatem culparum, quae in carne nostra nunc, etiam coercita, nobis repugnare non desinit, tunc vero, ut rectissime confiteris, exstincta nulla erit, iam non te libeat laudare ut aliquod bonum, sed ut malum potius accusare!
But it cannot be said how much it pleases me, what you said: that in the kingdom of heaven it will come about that, every cupidity of faults being extinguished, God may both contain and complete all. O would that, by the warning of this your own sentence, you might correct yourself, and that the cupidity of faults—which now in our flesh, even when restrained, does not cease to fight against us, but then, as you most rightly confess, being extinguished, will be none—it might now no longer please you to praise as some good, but rather to accuse as an evil!
Iulianum.6.37Ipsa est enim tua illa suscepta, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, ut necesse sit etiam spiritui adversus carnem concupiscere (Cf. Gal 5, 17), ne committatur unde homo damnetur. Quod discordiae malum, rei utriusque bonae et a Deo bono conditae, id est carnis et spiritus, per praevaricationem primi hominis in naturam vertisse, proclamat, neque Manichaeus, neque Manichaeorum adiutor, sed destructor Ambrosius (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 12, 53).
For it is that very thing you have taken up, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, so that it is necessary for the spirit too to lust against the flesh (See Gal 5:17), lest that be committed whereby a man is condemned. That this evil of discord, of two things both good and created by the good God, that is, of flesh and spirit, turned into nature through the transgression of the first man, proclaims neither a Manichee nor a helper of the Manichees, but their destroyer, Ambrose (See Ambrose, In Luc. 7.12.53).
Iulianum.6.3738. IUL. Alioquin - inquit - quid facient qui baptizantur pro mortuis, si omnino mortui non resurgunt? Quid et baptizantur pro illis? Quid et nos periclitamur omni hora? Quotidie morior per vestram gloriam, quam habeo in Domino. Si secundum hominem pugnavi bestiis Ephesi, quid mihi prodest, si mortui non resurgunt? Manducemus et bibamus, cras enim moriemur. Si, inquit, ista spes futurae gloriae, qua Deus omnia in omnibus erit, impia infidelitate quatiatur, negeturque resurrectio mortuorum, quid facient qui baptizantur pro mortuis? Natus hinc error aliquorum est, putantium inter exordia Evangelii eum morem fuisse, quo astantes pro cadaveribus profiterentur, et aqua Baptismatis etiam defunctorum membra perfunderent; quod apparet de imperitia contigisse. Hoc enim quod ait Apostolus: Baptizantur pro mortuis, nihil aliud indicat, quam illud quod ad Romanos dixit: Consepulti illi sumus per Baptisma in mortem (Rom 6, 4); id est: Qua gratia, tali ad Baptismatis susceptionem animo accedimus, ut membra nostra mortificemus in posterum, et pro mortuis omnino degamus, si spes non est, quia post mortem vivamus? Cur autem et quotidianis, inquit, subdor periculis, in mortem iugiter incidens, quam inferunt persequentes, ut de vestris ante Deum possim profectibus gloriari, si mortui non resurgunt? Cur autem et secundum hominem pugnavi bestiis Ephesi, id est, cur sustinui bestialem seditiosorum furorem, si adhuc nutat quod mortui resurgunt?
38. Julian: Otherwise, he says, what will those do who are baptized for the dead, if the dead rise not at all? Why are they baptized for them? Why are we too in peril every hour? I die daily by your glory, which I have in the Lord. If, according to man, I fought with beasts at Ephesus, what does it profit me, if the dead do not rise? Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we shall die. If, he says, this hope of future glory, by which God will be all in all, be shaken by impious unbelief, and the resurrection of the dead be denied, what will those do who are baptized for the dead? Hence arose the error of some, who think that in the beginnings of the Gospel there was a custom by which men stood in for corpses and made profession, and even poured the water of baptism over the limbs of the dead; which appears to have happened from ignorance. For this that the Apostle says: They are baptized for the dead, indicates nothing other than what he said to the Romans: We are buried together with him through baptism into death (Rom 6:4); that is: By what grace, with what mind do we approach the receiving of baptism, that we may mortify our members for the future, and live altogether as for the dead, if there is no hope that we may live after death? But why, he says, am I too subjected to daily perils, continually falling into the death which the persecutors inflict, that I may be able before God to glory in your advances, if the dead do not rise? And why, according to man, did I fight with beasts at Ephesus—that is, why did I endure the bestial fury of the seditious—if it still totters whether the dead rise?
Iulianum.6.38Nolite seduci; bonos mores corrumpunt colloquia mala. Ignorantiam enim Dei quidam habent; ad confusionem vobis dico (1 Cor 15, 29-34). Amor, inquit, peccatorum diffidere vos suadet de futuris; putatur non esse iudicium, ut maiore peccetur audacia. Omnino, inquit, nesciunt aestimare Deum, qui inficiantur resurrectioni. Non ergo solum remunerationem, sed virtutem divinitatis negatis, unde nimium debetis erubescere. Ad confusionem vobis dico, posse inter vos tales quospiam reperiri.
Do not be seduced; bad conversations corrupt good morals. For some have ignorance of God; I say it to your shame (1 Cor 15:29-34). The love, he says, of sins persuades you to distrust concerning the future; it is thought there is no judgment, so that one sins with greater audacity. They know not at all, he says, how to esteem God, who deny the resurrection. You deny, therefore, not only the reward, but the power of the divinity, whereof you ought to blush exceedingly. I say it to your shame, that such persons can be found among you.
Iulianum.6.38AUG. Et hic nihil prorsus quod ad rem pertineat, quae in nostra disceptatione versatur, dicere voluisti. Proinde verbis Apostoli, quae pro tuo captu explanare conatus es, quia ea quae dixisti, quamvis in nonnullis sensum non tenueris eius auctoris, tamen non sunt contra fidem, non opus habeo respondere multiloquio tuo.
Augustine: Here too you wanted to say absolutely nothing that pertains to the matter at issue in our dispute. Accordingly, to the words of the Apostle, which you tried to explain according to your capacity—since the things you said, although in some you did not hold that author's meaning, are nevertheless not against the faith—I have no need to answer your verbosity.
Iulianum.6.3839. IUL. Sed dicet aliquis: Quomodo resurgunt mortui? Quo autem in corpore veniunt? Insipiens, tu quod seminas non vivificatur, nisi prius moriatur. Non omnis caro eadem caro; alia quidem hominis, alia pecoris; alia caro volatilium, alia autem piscium; et corpora caelestia et terrestria; sed alia quidem caelestium claritas, alia vero terrestrium; alia claritas solis, et alia claritas lunae, et alia claritas stellarum; stella enim a stella differt in gloria; ita et resurrectio mortuorum. Seminatur in corruptione, surget in incorruptela; seminatur in ignominia, surget in gloria; seminatur in infirmitate, surget in virtute; seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spiritale.
39. Julian: But someone will say: How do the dead rise? And in what body do they come? Foolish one, what you sow is not made alive unless it first die. Not all flesh is the same flesh; one indeed of man, another of cattle; one the flesh of birds, but another of fishes; and there are heavenly bodies and earthly; but the brightness of the heavenly is one, and that of the earthly another; one brightness of the sun, and another brightness of the moon, and another brightness of the stars; for star differs from star in glory; so also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption, it will rise in incorruption; it is sown in dishonor, it will rise in glory; it is sown in weakness, it will rise in power; it is sown an animal body, it will rise a spiritual body.
Iulianum.6.39Sic etiam scriptum est: Factus est homo primus Adam in animam viventem, novissimus Adam in spiritum vivificantem. Primus homo de terra, terrestris; secundus homo de caelo, caelestis; qualis terrestris, tales et terreni; et qualis caelestis, tales et caelestes. Sicut portavimus imaginem terrestris, portemus etiam imaginem illius caelestis (1 Cor 15, 33-49).
So also it is written: The first man Adam was made into a living soul, the last Adam into a life-giving spirit. The first man from the earth, earthly; the second man from heaven, heavenly; such as is the earthly, such also are the earthly; and such as is the heavenly, such also are the heavenly. As we have borne the image of the earthly, let us also bear the image of the heavenly one (1 Cor 15:33-49).
Iulianum.6.39Difficultatem rei exemplis edomat, et dicit nihil esse impossibile, cum omnipotentia pollicetur effectum. Sed sicut resurrectionem corporum seminum collatione commendat, ita etiam resurgentium diversitatem creaturarum varietatibus aperit; totum tamen loquitur de resurrectione beatorum. Seminatur - inquit - in ignominia, surget in gloria; seminatur in infirmitate, surget in virtute; seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spiritale. Hoc certe nisi in sanctis impleri non potest; impii quoque non in gloriam excitantur, sed in opprobrium, sicut Propheta asserit, sempiternum (Cf. Ier 23, 40).
He tames the difficulty of the matter by examples, and says that nothing is impossible, since omnipotence promises the effect. But just as he commends the resurrection of bodies by the comparison of seeds, so too he discloses the diversity of those who rise by the varieties of creatures; yet he speaks throughout of the resurrection of the blessed. It is sown, he says, in dishonor, it will rise in glory; it is sown in weakness, it will rise in power; it is sown an animal body, it will rise a spiritual body. This surely can be fulfilled only in the saints; the impious too are raised not into glory, but into reproach, as the Prophet asserts, everlasting (See Jer 23:40).
Iulianum.6.39Hic opportune distantiam naturae atque gratiae facit, recordaturque testimonii veteris quo dictum est: Factus est homo primus Adam in animam viventem; subditque de suo: novissimus Adam in spiritum vivificantem. Ostenditque immortalitatis dona ad vivificantem spiritum pertinere; animam vero solum viventem, ad naturam quandoque morientem. Non est ergo, inquit, hoc vivens quod vivificans; vivificans est, qui confert immortalitatem, quam Christo applicat; vivens est autem, qui vita utitur, sed non excludit mortalitatem. Ergo hoc utramque sententiam fine discrevit, ut ostenderet Adam factum esse viventem, sed non immortalem; Christum autem in spiritum, non solum viventem, verum etiam conferentem resurrectionem, suis gloriosam, omnibus aeternam.
Here he opportunely makes a distinction of nature and grace, and recalls the old testimony where it was said: The first man Adam was made into a living soul; and he adds of his own: the last Adam into a life-giving spirit. And he shows that the gifts of immortality pertain to the life-giving spirit; but the merely living soul, to a nature that at some time dies. This living thing, then, he says, is not that which is life-giving; the life-giving is that which confers immortality, which he applies to Christ; but the living is that which uses life, but does not exclude mortality. Therefore he distinguished both statements by their end, to show that Adam was made living, but not immortal; but Christ into a spirit, not only living, but even conferring resurrection—glorious to his own, eternal to all.
Iulianum.6.39AUG. Numquid ideo moriturus fuerat Adam, etiamsi non peccasset, quia in corpore animali, non spiritali, erat factus? Prorsus erras, si propterea necesse nobis esse arbitraris, paradisum Dei mortibus poenisque morientium, postremo ignominia, infirmitate, corruptione, in quibus nunc animalia hominum corpora seminantur, implere. Lignum enim vitae, quod in paradiso suo plantavit Deus, etiam corpus animale defendebat a morte, donec perseverantis obedientiae merito, in gloriam spiritalem, quam resurgentes habituri sunt iusti, sine morte interveniente transiret. Iustum enim erat ut imago Dei nullo fuscata et obsoleta peccato, tali insereretur corpori, quamvis de terrena materie creato atque formato, ut ei de ligno vitae subministrata vivendi stabilitas permaneret; ac viveret interim per animam viventem, quam nulla ab illo necessitas separaret; atque inde, propter obedientiam custoditam, ad vivificantem spiritum perveniret, ita ut non ei subtraheretur haec vita minor, ubi et mori et non mori posset, sed illa amplior adderetur, ubi viveret sine ullius ligni beneficio, morique non posset.
Augustine: Was Adam going to die, even if he had not sinned, because he had been made in an animal body, not a spiritual one? You err outright, if you think it necessary for us, for this reason, to fill the paradise of God with deaths and the punishments of the dying, and finally with the dishonor, weakness, corruption in which the animal bodies of human beings are now sown. For the tree of life, which God planted in his paradise, defended even the animal body from death, until by the merit of persevering obedience it should pass, with no death intervening, into the spiritual glory which the just will have when they rise. For it was just that the image of God, darkened and worn by no sin, should be set in such a body—although created and formed from earthly matter—that the stability of living supplied to it from the tree of life might remain; and that meanwhile it should live by a living soul, which no necessity would separate from it; and from there, on account of obedience kept, it should arrive at a life-giving spirit, so that this lesser life, where it could both die and not die, should not be taken from it, but that ampler one added, where it would live without the benefit of any tree, and could not die.
Iulianum.6.39Nam quaero a te in quali corpore nunc esse existimes Eliam et Enoch; animali, an spiritali? Si dixeris: Animali, cur non vis credere Adam, et Evam, et posteros eorum, si praeceptum Dei nulla praevaricatione violarent, quamvis in corpore animali, ita fuisse victuros, ut nunc vivunt isti? Quandoquidem ibi erant illi, quo translati sunt isti; et illic vivunt isti, unde ut morerentur eiecti sunt illi. Corporale namque lignum vitae sic vitam subministrabat corporibus animalibus, sicut spiritale lignum vitae, quod est Dei sapientia, vitam salutiferae doctrinae sanctis mentibus subministrat. Unde nonnulli divinorum eloquiorum etiam catholici tractatores paradisum spiritalem commendare maluerunt; non tamen historiae resistentes, quae ostendit evidentius corporalem.
For I ask you in what kind of body you think Enoch and Elijah now are: an animal one, or a spiritual one? If you say: An animal one, why are you unwilling to believe that Adam, and Eve, and their descendants, if they had violated God's command by no transgression, would have been going to live, although in an animal body, as these now live? Since they were there, where these were translated; and there these live, from where, that they might die, those were cast out. For the corporeal tree of life supplied life to animal bodies just as the spiritual tree of life, which is the wisdom of God, supplies the life of saving doctrine to holy minds. Whence some Catholic expositors of the divine words preferred to commend a spiritual paradise; yet not resisting the history, which more evidently shows a corporeal one.
Iulianum.6.39Si vero Enoch et Eliae spiritale iam corpus esse responderis, cur non primorum hominum, et eorum qui ex illis per seriem successionis nascerentur, si nullum peccatum existeret, quod illos a ligno vitae merito separaret, animale corpus in spiritale potuisse transire sine morte media confiteris, ne paradisum Dei, ne locum felicium gaudiorum, poenis mortium atque morientium, et innumerabilibus mortiferorum morborum cruciatibus implere cogaris?
But if you answer that the body of Enoch and Elijah is already spiritual, why do you not confess that the body of the first human beings, and of those who would be born from them through the series of succession, if no sin existed which deservedly separated them from the tree of life, could have passed from animal into spiritual without death intervening, lest you be forced to fill the paradise of God, the place of happy joys, with the punishments of deaths and of the dying, and with innumerable torments of deadly diseases?
Iulianum.6.3940. IUL. Sed non primum - inquit - quod spiritale est, sed quod animale; deinde, quod spiritale est. Primus homo de terra, terrestris; secundus homo de caelo, caelestis; sicut portavimus imaginem terrestris, portemus et imaginem illius caelestis (1 Cor 15, 46-47. 49). Aperte nempe transit ad studia, vultque tantum interesse inter praeteritam nostram et praesentem conversationem, quantum interest inter mortalitatem et immortalitatem. Primus - inquit - homo de terra, terrestris; secundus homo de caelo, caelestis; nomine substantiarum propositi indicat diversitatem. Neque enim Christus, quem hominem caelestem vocat, carnem suam de caelo deposuit, quam de semine David, de semine Adam, et intra mulierem de mulieris carne suscepit. Terrestrem ergo et caelestem refert ad virtutes et vitia.
40. Julian: But that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is animal; then that which is spiritual. The first man from the earth, earthly; the second man from heaven, heavenly; as we have borne the image of the earthly, let us also bear the image of the heavenly one (1 Cor 15:46-47, 49). He openly passes over to pursuits, and wants there to be as much difference between our past and present conversation as there is between mortality and immortality. The first man, he says, from the earth, earthly; the second man from heaven, heavenly; by the name of substances he indicates the diversity of purpose. For Christ, whom he calls the heavenly man, did not bring down his flesh from heaven, which he took from the seed of David, from the seed of Adam, and within the woman from the woman's flesh. He refers, therefore, earthly and heavenly to virtues and vices.
Iulianum.6.40Denique sequitur: Sicut portavimus imaginem terrestris; portemus etiam imaginem illius caelestis. Sic et ad Romanos: Humanum est quod dico, propter infirmitatem carnis vestrae; sicut enim exhibuistis membra vestra servire immunditiae, et iniquitati ad iniquitatem; ita nunc exhibete membra vestra servire iustitiae in sanctificationem (Rom 6, 19).
And so there follows: As we have borne the image of the earthly, let us also bear the image of the heavenly one. So too to the Romans: It is a human thing that I say, on account of the weakness of your flesh; for as you presented your members to serve uncleanness and iniquity unto iniquity, so now present your members to serve justice unto sanctification (Rom 6:19).
Iulianum.6.40Tenorem vero sequens exhortationis assumptae, subdit, quod nisi intellegatur, omnia eius videbitur dicta subruere: Hoc ergo dico, fratres, quia caro et sanguis regnum Dei possidere non possunt, nec perpetuitatem interitus possidebit. Nempe in his locis, in quibus nihil aliud quam de affirmanda carnis resurrectione laboraverat, quam dixerat in regni gloria collocandam, nunc pronuntiat: quia caro et sanguis regnum Dei possidere non possunt. Si caro non possidet, si sanguis non possidet, ubi est, cuius supra pompam regenerat resurrectio mortuorum? Verum Scripturae more, carnem et sanguinem, vitia, non substantiam nominavit.
But following the tenor of the exhortation he has taken up, he adds what, unless it be understood, will seem to undermine all that he has said: This, then, I say, brothers, that flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God, neither will corruption possess perpetuity. Surely in these places, in which he had labored at nothing other than affirming the resurrection of the flesh, which he had said was to be placed in the glory of the kingdom, he now pronounces: that flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God. If flesh does not possess it, if blood does not possess it, where is that whose pomp the resurrection of the dead regenerates above? But by the custom of Scripture he named flesh and blood as vices, not substance.
Iulianum.6.40Denique hoc idem aperuit: Ecce mysterium vobis dico: omnes quidem resurgemus, sed non omnes immutabimur. Intellexit se magister egregius, supra beatitudini tantum futurae resurrectionis vocabulum vindicasse; et ideo illud ne ambiguum remaneret, absolvit: Omnes quidem, resurgemus; ecce quae est excitatio communis: sed non omnes immutabimur; ecce ubi est resurrectio beatorum. Immutatio ergo in gloriam illis tantum debetur, qui non iram Dei, sed amorem merentur.
Finally he disclosed this same thing: Behold, I tell you a mystery: we shall all indeed rise, but we shall not all be changed. The eminent master understood that above he had claimed the word of resurrection only for the future blessedness; and therefore, lest that should remain ambiguous, he resolved it: We shall all indeed rise; behold, that is the common raising: but we shall not all be changed; behold, there is the resurrection of the blessed. The change into glory, therefore, is owed only to those who merit not the wrath of God, but his love.
Iulianum.6.40In momento - inquit - in ictu oculorum, in novissima tuba, et mortui resurgent incorrupti, et nos immutabimur. Denuo hic transit ad eos sanctos, quos dies ille in carne reperiet; et dicit quoniam in momento tam brevi, quam potest esse extremus finis sonorum, et qui mortui fuerant, excitentur incorrupti, id est, integri; et qui inventi fuerint, immutentur in gloriam.
In a moment, he says, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet, both the dead will rise incorrupt, and we shall be changed. Here again he passes over to those saints whom that day will find in the flesh; and he says that in a moment as brief as the final end of sounds can be, both those who had been dead are raised incorrupt, that is, whole, and those who will be found are changed into glory.
Iulianum.6.40Oportet enim hoc corruptibile induere incorruptelam; et mortale hoc induere immortalitatem. Cum autem mortale hoc induerit immortalitatem, tunc fiet sermo qui scriptus est: Absorpta est mors in victoriam tuam. Ubi est, mors, tuus aculeus? Ubi est victoria tua? Aculeus autem mortis, peccatum; virtus autem peccati, lex (1 Cor 15, 50-52). Ostendit, ut saepe, quoniam de sanctorum tantum resurrectione loqueretur; ideo praetermittens illam impiorum excitationem, dignum esse pronuntiat ut in corporibus sanctorum corruptibilitas aeternitate gloriae devoretur.
For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal put on immortality. But when this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall come about the word that is written: Death is swallowed up in your victory. Where, O death, is your sting? Where is your victory? But the sting of death is sin; and the power of sin is the law (1 Cor 15:50-52). He shows, as often, that he was speaking only of the resurrection of the saints; therefore, passing over that raising of the impious, he pronounces it worthy that in the bodies of the saints corruptibility be devoured by the eternity of glory.
Iulianum.6.40Cum autem hoc, inquit, fuerit impletum, tunc licebit insultare diabolo, et morti perpetuae, quae hanc corruptionem naturalem fecerat malam videri; tunc increpabunt sanctorum gaudia, contusum a se aculeum mortis videntium, dicentque: Ubi est, mors, aculeus tuus? Ubi est victoria tua? Aculeus autem mortis, peccatum; virtus autem peccati, lex.
But when this, he says, shall have been fulfilled, then it will be permitted to insult the devil, and perpetual death, which had made this natural corruption seem evil; then the joys of the saints will rebuke it, seeing the sting of death crushed by themselves, and will say: Where, O death, is your sting? Where is your victory? But the sting of death is sin; and the power of sin is the law.
Iulianum.6.40Id est: O tu mors aeterna, aculeum habebas peccatum, quo desertores iustitiae vulnerares; quoniam si hoc aculeo armata non esses, id est, peccato voluntario, nulli omnino nocuisses. Peccatum hoc et hunc aculeum viribus fidei confractum vides, remuneratione nostra teste, a qua nos conabaris abducere;
That is: O you, eternal death, you had as your sting sin, by which you wounded the deserters of justice; for if you were not armed with this sting, that is, with voluntary sin, you would have harmed no one at all. This sin and this sting you see broken by the forces of faith, our reward bearing witness, from which you were trying to draw us away;
Iulianum.6.40aculeus quippe tuus peccatum fuit, et virtus peccati tui lex erat; quoniam ubi non est lex, nec praevaricatio (Rom 4, 15). Vel certe quamvis aculeus tuus peccatum esset; tamen fortior factus est apud praevaricatorum dumtaxat animos, postquam mors ei legis admota est; quae tamen non ad hoc data fuerat, ut acueret. Lex enim sancta, et mandatum sanctum, et iustum et bonum; sed peccatum ut appareat peccatum, per bonum mihi mortem operabatur, ut fieret supra modum ipsum peccatum peccans per mandatum (Rom 7, 12-13). Haec ergo virtus, quam aculeus tuus spontaneae in nobis iniquitatis consequebatur adiutu, fidelium virtutibus, fidelium iam coronis victa comprobatur, et fracta. Insultamus igitur tibi: Deo nostro gratias referentes, qui dedit nobis hanc victoriam per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum (1 Cor 15, 46-57).
for your sting was sin, and the power of your sin was the law; since where there is no law, neither is there transgression (Rom 4:15). Or certainly, although your sting was sin, yet it was made stronger—at least in the minds of transgressors—after the death of the law was applied to it; which nevertheless had not been given for this, that it should sharpen. For the law is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good; but sin, that it might appear as sin, worked death for me through the good, that sin might become beyond measure sinful through the commandment (Rom 7:12-13). This power, then, which your sting of spontaneous iniquity in us obtained by the help of the law, is proved to be conquered and broken by the virtues of the faithful, by the crowns now of the faithful. We insult you, therefore, giving thanks to our God, who gave us this victory through our Lord Jesus Christ (1 Cor 15:57).
Iulianum.6.40AUG. De imagine terrestris, et de imagine caelestis hominis satis iam superius disputatum est; tibique respondimus quod imago caelestis nunc fide ac spe portari potest; portabitur autem re ipsa praesentata atque donata, cum resurrexerit corpus spiritale, quod nunc animale seminatur. Duas quippe istas imagines, terrestris videlicet hominis unam, caelestis autem alteram, singulis rebus attribuit; illam scilicet animali corpori, hanc spiritali. Superius enim dixit: Sed non primum quod spiritale est, sed quod animale; postea, quod spiritale est; protinusque subiunxit: Primus homo de terra, terrestris; secundus homo de caelo, caelestis, sicut portavimus imaginem terrestris, portemus etiam imaginem illius caelestis.
Augustine: Concerning the image of the earthly and the image of the heavenly man, enough has already been discussed above; and we answered you that the image of the heavenly can now be borne by faith and hope; but it will be borne, presented and given in reality itself, when the spiritual body, which is now sown an animal one, shall have risen. For he attributes these two images, namely one of the earthly man, the other of the heavenly, to individual things; the former, namely, to the animal body, the latter to the spiritual. For above he said: But that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is animal; afterward, that which is spiritual; and at once he added: The first man from the earth, earthly; the second man from heaven, heavenly; as we have borne the image of the earthly, let us also bear the image of the heavenly one.
Iulianum.6.40Quis est ille, nisi Adam, per quem mors? Et quis est iste, nisi Christus, per quem resurrectio mortuorum? Quoniam per hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum. Sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, sic et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur; id est, quicumque vivificabuntur, nonnisi in Christo vivificabuntur; unde iam supra sumus locuti.
Who is that, except Adam, through whom is death? And who is this, except Christ, through whom is the resurrection of the dead? Since through a man death, and through a man the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive; that is, whoever will be made alive, will be made alive only in Christ; whereof we have already spoken above.
Iulianum.6.40Nulla est utique ambiguitas, ad quas duas res duae istae referantur imagines; illa namque refertur ad mortem, haec ad resurrectionem. Illa ergo ad mortem corporis; quia haec ad resurrectionem corporis; illa ad corpus animale, quod seminatur in ignominia; haec ad spiritale, quod resurget in gloria; illa nascendo, hac induimur renascendo. Sed quoniam sub peccato nascimur, in peccatorum autem remissione renascimur: Sicut portavimus - inquit - imaginem terrestris, portemus etiam imaginem illius caelestis. Illud factum esse commemorat, hoc exhortatur ut fiat.
There is surely no ambiguity to what two things these two images are referred; for the former is referred to death, the latter to resurrection. The former, then, to the death of the body, because the latter to the resurrection of the body; the former to the animal body, which is sown in dishonor; the latter to the spiritual, which will rise in glory; the former we put on by being born, the latter by being reborn. But since we are born under sin, while we are reborn in the remission of sins: As we have borne, he says, the image of the earthly, let us also bear the image of the heavenly one. The former he recalls to have been done, the latter he exhorts that it be done.
Iulianum.6.40Nemo enim potest efficere ut non fuerit natus in poena, qua corpus eius seminetur in ignominia; sed nisi fuerit renatus, et perseveraverit in eo quod est renatus in gratia, non perveniet ad spiritalis corporis habitudinem, quod resurget in gloria.
For no one can bring it about that he was not born in the punishment by which his body is sown in dishonor; but unless he has been reborn, and persevered in that wherein he was reborn in grace, he will not arrive at the condition of the spiritual body, which will rise in glory.
Iulianum.6.40Quid est ergo quod dicis: Aperte nempe transiit ad studia, vultque tantum interesse inter praeteritam nostram et praesentem conversationem, quantum interest inter mortalitatem et immortalitatem? Cum potius Apostolus non ad aliud transeat; sed id quod de resurrectione carnis coeperat, exsequatur, cui e contrario mortem carnis opponit. Non itaque duas conversationes, malam scilicet, et bonam, vult hoc loco intellegi; sed resurrectionem carnis ita per Christum futuram, sicut per Adam mortem carnis asserit factam. Sine hominem Dei agere quod agit; tu eum sequere, noli ut te sequatur ipse conari. Non enim sequitur, quantumcumque coneris. Aperte resurrectioni carnis mortem carnis opponit; aperte his singulis rebus singulos dispertitur auctores, morti corporis Adam, resurrectioni corporis Christum; aperte duas imagines, unam terrestris hominis, aliam caelestis, a contrario inter se conferens, illam corpori attribuit animali, quod per Adam meruit ut seminetur in ignominia; istam spiritali, quod per Christum merebitur resurgere in gloria.
What is it, then, that you say: He openly passed over to pursuits, and wants there to be as much difference between our past and present conversation as there is between mortality and immortality? Whereas the Apostle rather passes over to nothing else; but pursues what he had begun about the resurrection of the flesh, to which he opposes by contrast the death of the flesh. He does not, then, want two conversations to be understood in this place, namely a bad one and a good one; but he asserts that the resurrection of the flesh is to come through Christ just as the death of the flesh was made through Adam. Let the man of God do what he does; you follow him, do not try to make him follow you. For he does not follow, however much you try. Openly he opposes the death of the flesh to the resurrection of the flesh; openly he distributes to these individual things individual authors, to the death of the body Adam, to the resurrection of the body Christ; openly, comparing the two images between themselves by contrast, one of the earthly man, the other of the heavenly, he attributes the former to the animal body, which through Adam deserved to be sown in dishonor; the latter to the spiritual, which through Christ will deserve to rise in glory.
Iulianum.6.40Qui etiam secundum carnem homo caelestis est dictus, non quia eam sumpsit e caelo, sed quia et ipsam levavit in caelum. Si studium bonum et bona conversatio facit, ut ad gloriosam resurrectionem perveniant; numquid studio malo et mala conversatione vitae huius, quam nati, et accessu aetatis aucti duximus, factum est ut in corpore animali cum mortis propagine nasceremur? Quis enim malo studio vel ullo studio sibi comparavit aerumnosae nativitatis initium? Quis mala conversatione id egit, ut eum, quomodolibet vixerit, mori necesse sit?
And he was even called, according to the flesh, the heavenly man, not because he took it from heaven, but because he also raised it to heaven. If a good pursuit and a good conversation bring it about that they arrive at the glorious resurrection, was it by a bad pursuit and a bad conversation of this life—which we have led, both as born and as increased by the advance of age—that it came about that we were born in an animal body with the propagation of death? For who by a bad pursuit, or by any pursuit, procured for himself the beginning of a hardship-laden birth? Who by a bad conversation brought it about that, however he lived, it is necessary for him to die?
Iulianum.6.40Plane si haec duo, id est, imaginem terrestris hominis, quae ad corpus pertinet animale, et imaginem caelestis, quae ad corpus pertinet spiritale, etiam ad conversationes referre volumus; sicut resurrectionem spiritalis corporis in parte iustitiae ponimus, ita mortem corporis animalis ponere in peccati parte debemus; quia sicut in Christi iustitia fiet ista resurrectio, ita in Adae iniquitate facta est mors illa. Quod si intellegas, et huic apertissimae consentias veritati; concedo quod dicis, terrestrem et caelestem referri ad vitia et virtutes; sicut enim virtus Christi faciet ut resurgat corpus spiritale, ita vitium Adae fecit ut moreretur corpus animale.
Plainly, if we want to refer these two—that is, the image of the earthly man, which pertains to the animal body, and the image of the heavenly, which pertains to the spiritual body—to conversations too; then, just as we put the resurrection of the spiritual body on the side of justice, so we ought to put the death of the animal body on the side of sin; because, just as that resurrection will come about in the justice of Christ, so that death came about in the iniquity of Adam. And if you understand this, and consent to this most evident truth, I grant what you say, that earthly and heavenly are referred to vices and virtues; for just as the virtue of Christ will bring it about that the spiritual body rise, so the vice of Adam brought it about that the animal body die.
Iulianum.6.40Non itaque huic congruit, eiusdem Apostoli ad Romanos illa sententia: Sicut enim exhibuistis membra vestra servire immunditiae, et iniquitati ad iniquitatem; ita nunc exhibete vestra membra servire iustitiae in sanctificationem (Rom 6, 19). Ibi enim de malis et bonis moribus loquebatur; hic autem de resurrectione corporis et morte corporis loquitur. Sed quoniam qui ratione iam utuntur, ad resurrectionem gloriosam, quae tunc fiet, quando spiritale corpus resurget, venire non poterunt, nisi hoc et credant et sperent; ideo quod terrestris hominis imaginem portaverimus commemorans, in qua est per hominem mors; ut imaginem caelestis hominis portemus hortatur, in qua est per hominem resurrectio mortuorum; ut quomodo per Adae peccatum venimus in mortem corporis animalis, ita per Christi iustitiam veniamus in resurrectionem corporis spiritalis.
And so that sentence of the same Apostle to the Romans does not agree with this: For as you presented your members to serve uncleanness and iniquity unto iniquity, so now present your members to serve justice unto sanctification (Rom 6:19). For there he was speaking of bad and good morals; but here he speaks of the resurrection of the body and the death of the body. But since those who already use reason cannot come to the glorious resurrection, which will then take place when the spiritual body rises, unless they both believe and hope for this; therefore, recalling that we have borne the image of the earthly man, in which is, through a man, death, he exhorts that we bear the image of the heavenly man, in which is, through a man, the resurrection of the dead; so that, just as through Adam's sin we came into the death of the animal body, so through Christ's justice we may come into the resurrection of the spiritual body.
Iulianum.6.40Deinde subiungit: Hoc autem dico, fratres, quia caro et sanguis regnum Dei possidere non possunt. Ubi te non reprehendimus nomine carnis et sanguinis significatam carnalem prudentiam credidisse, non ipsam substantiam corporis animalis, quae seminatur quidem in ignominia, sed tamen resurget in gloria, et regnum Dei procul dubio possidebit. Quamvis et aliter hoc possit intellegi, ut isto loco, nomine carnis et sanguinis, corruptio significata sit, quam nunc in carne videmus et sanguine; quae utique corruptio regnum Dei non possidebit, quia corruptibile hoc induetur incorruptione. Unde cum dixisset: Caro et sanguis regnum Dei possidere non possunt; tamquam exponendo quid his nominibus significaverit, ne ipsa carnalis substantia crederetur, adiunxit: Neque corruptio incorruptionem possidebit. Et secundum istum sensum magis videtur cetera attexere. Sed utrumlibet his verbis auctor eorumdem verborum significare voluerit, neutrum est contra fidem, quae ita se habet, ut non dubitet in carne incorruptibili possessuram regnum Dei ex omnibus gentibus congregatam Dei familiam.
Then he adds: But this I say, brothers, that flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God. Where we do not reprehend you for having believed that by the name of flesh and blood was signified carnal prudence, not the very substance of the animal body, which is indeed sown in dishonor, but yet will rise in glory, and will without doubt possess the kingdom of God. Although this can also be understood otherwise, so that in this place, by the name of flesh and blood, was signified the corruption which we now see in flesh and blood; which corruption surely will not possess the kingdom of God, because this corruptible will be clothed with incorruption. Whence, when he had said: Flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God, as if expounding what he had signified by these names, lest the very carnal substance be believed meant, he added: Neither will corruption possess incorruption. And according to this sense he rather seems to weave the rest. But whichever of these the author of those words wanted to signify, neither is against the faith, which is such that it does not doubt that the family of God, gathered from all nations, will possess the kingdom of God in incorruptible flesh.
Iulianum.6.40Non itaque hoc reprehendimus, quod etiam ante nos divinarum Scripturarum catholici tractatores plerique dixerunt, carnem et sanguinem hic posse accipi homines, qui secundum carnem et sanguinem sapiunt, et ideo regnum Dei non possidebunt; sic enim ait idem Doctor Gentium: Sapere secundum carnem mors est.
We do not, therefore, reprehend this, which even before us very many Catholic expositors of the divine Scriptures have said, that flesh and blood here can be taken as human beings who are wise according to flesh and blood, and therefore will not possess the kingdom of God; for thus says the same Teacher of the Gentiles: To be wise according to the flesh is death.
Iulianum.6.40Sed quod non vis mortem corporis animalis per peccatum primi hominis accidisse, cum audias eumdem Apostolum dicentem: Corpus mortuum est propter peccatum (Rom 8, 6. 10); neque negare audeas, resurrectionem corporis spiritalis, quae morti corporis animalis opponitur e contrario, per iustitiam secundi hominis adfuturam; et hoc ideo non vis, ut corporibus mortuorum, et per haec etiam cruciatibus morientium impleas paradisum, beatarum deliciarum memorabilem locum; hoc reprehendimus, hoc detestamur, hoc dignum anathemate iudicamus.
But that you are unwilling that the death of the animal body came about through the sin of the first man, although you hear the same Apostle saying: The body is dead because of sin (Rom 8:6, 10); and you do not dare to deny that the resurrection of the spiritual body, which is opposed by contrast to the death of the animal body, will be present through the justice of the second man; and you are unwilling for this reason, that you may fill paradise, the memorable place of blessed delights, with the bodies of the dead, and through these even with the torments of the dying—this we reprehend, this we detest, this we judge worthy of anathema.
Iulianum.6.40Cui enim morti in fine insultabitur, cum dicetur: Ubi est, mors, victoria tua? Ubi est, mors, aculeus tuus? Nisi aut diabolo, etiam mortis corporalis auctori, aut ipsi morti corporis, quam resurrectio corporis absorbebit? Hic enim sermo tunc fiet, cum corruptibile hoc induerit incorruptionem, et mortale hoc induerit immortalitatem. Sine ambiguitate quippe dicit Apostolus: Cum corruptibile hoc induerit immortalitatem, tunc fiet sermo qui scriptus est: Absorpta est mors in victoriam. Ubi est, mors, victoria tua? Ubi est, mors, aculeus tuus? Cui morti hoc dicetur, nisi quae absorbebitur in victoriam? Et quae ista est, nisi quae tunc absorbebitur, quando corruptibile hoc corpus atque mortale incorruptione atque immortalitate vestietur? Huius ergo corporalis mortis aculeus peccatum est; quia huic morti dicetur: Ubi est, mors, aculeus tuus? Quem aculeum dixit esse peccatum; aculeum videlicet quo mors est facta, non quem fecit ipsa; sicut poculum mortis est quo mors fit, non quod a morte fit.
For what death will be insulted in the end, when it will be said: Where, O death, is your victory? Where, O death, is your sting? Except either the devil, the author even of bodily death, or bodily death itself, which the resurrection of the body will swallow up? For this word will then come about, when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality. For without ambiguity the Apostle says: When this corruptible shall have put on immortality, then shall come about the word that is written: Death is swallowed up in victory. Where, O death, is your victory? Where, O death, is your sting? To what death will this be said, except to that which will be swallowed up in victory? And what is that, except the one which will then be swallowed up, when this corruptible and mortal body will be clothed with incorruption and immortality? Of this bodily death, then, the sting is sin; because to this death it will be said: Where, O death, is your sting? Which sting he said is sin; the sting, namely, by which death was made, not which death itself made; just as the cup of death is that by which death comes about, not that which is made by death.
Iulianum.6.40Quomodo ergo, ut putas, non huic, sed perpetuae insultabitur morti? Numquid ipsa absorbebitur in victoriam, cum mortale hoc induerit immortalitatem? Numquid adversus sanctos ipsa contendit, ut eius timor certamine vincatur illorum, quae prius eos victos tenebat, quando eam timendo peccabant? Nonne propter ipsam vincendam Dominus mortuus est, et evacuavit eum qui potestatem habebat mortis, id est, diabolum, et liberavit eos qui timore mortis per totam vitam rei erant servitutis (Cf. Hebr 2, 14-15)? Numquid timore mortis aeternae rei erant; cum potius qui eam non timuerint, rei fiant? Propter quod Dominus, ne mors ista corporis timeatur, cuius timor facit reos, sed illa potius sempiterna, quam non timendo, fiunt rei, apertissime dicit: Nolite timere eos qui corpus occidunt, et postea non habent quod faciant; sed eum timete, qui habet potestatem et corpus et animam perdere in gehennam (Lc 12, 4-5).
How, then, as you suppose, will it be not this death, but perpetual death, that is insulted? Will that itself be swallowed up in victory, when this mortal shall have put on immortality? Does it itself contend against the saints, so that its fear is conquered by the contest of those whom it formerly held conquered, when by fearing it they sinned? Did not the Lord die for the sake of conquering it, and made void him who had the power of death, that is, the devil, and freed those who through fear of death were all their life subject to the guilt of slavery (See Heb 2:14-15)? Were they subject to guilt by the fear of eternal death—when rather those who do not fear it become guilty? On account of which the Lord, that this death of the body should not be feared, whose fear makes men guilty, but rather that everlasting one, by not fearing which they become guilty, says most openly: Do not fear those who kill the body, and after that have nothing they can do; but fear him who has the power to destroy both body and soul in Gehenna (Luke 12:4-5).
Iulianum.6.40Haec est certe mors secunda atque perpetua, contra cuius timorem non certant sancti, sed contra istam potius corporis temporalem. Nam ut hanc vincant, illam timent; quia cum hanc pro pietate et iustitia vicerint, illam non sentient. Huic ergo, non illi, insultabunt, dicentes: Ubi est, mors, victoria tua? Quod alibi scriptum est: Ubi est, mors, contentio tua? (Osea 13, 14 (sec. LXX)) Cum igitur huius mortis aculeus sit peccatum; qua fronte audes dicere, non peccato primi hominis esse factum ut in illo a ligno vitae separaremur, et morte etiam corporis plecteremur?
This is surely the second and perpetual death, against the fear of which the saints do not contend, but rather against this temporal death of the body. For that they may conquer this, they fear that one; because when they have conquered this for the sake of piety and justice, they will not feel that one. This death, then, not that, they will insult, saying: Where, O death, is your victory? Which is written elsewhere: Where, O death, is your strife? (Hos 13:14 (LXX)) Since, therefore, the sting of this death is sin, with what effrontery do you dare to say that it was not by the sin of the first man that it came about that in him we were separated from the tree of life, and smitten even with the death of the body?
Iulianum.6.40Quid est, rogo te, quod adversus divinorum eloquiorum evidentiam, incredibili rabie spumantis loquacitatis oblatras, tamquam non possit in Dei paradiso anima tua obtinere vitam, nisi illuc introduxeris corporis mortem, cum tot et tantis corporalibus morbis, carnificibus, praecursoribus mortis? Attende tibi potius, ne in locum deliciarum sanctarum mittendo corporis poenas, tu ipse pendas in loco perpetuorum dolorum et animi et corporis poenas.
What is it, I ask you, that, against the evidence of the divine words, you bark out with the incredible rage of a foaming talkativeness, as though your soul could not obtain life in the paradise of God, unless you had introduced there the death of the body, with so many and so great bodily diseases, executioners, forerunners of death? Attend rather to yourself, lest, by sending the punishments of the body into the place of holy delights, you yourself pay, in the place of perpetual sorrows, the punishments both of soul and of body.
Iulianum.6.4041. IUL. In hoc sane loco Augustinus aculeum mortis, peccatum illud opinatur antiquum, non intellegens quid sequatur, id est: virtus peccati lex; quam legem, praeceptum quod Adae positum est, conatur asserere. Sed illa lex non fuit peccati virtus, verum peccati genus. Aliud est enim exstanti rei dare virtutem, aliud quod non exstitit procreare. Esus ergo illius arboris, si non esset interdictus, malus non fuisset; postquam autem interdictus est, et a praevaricatione usurpatus, natum est ibi ex interdicente et contemnente peccatum; quamvis non ideo data lex fuisset, ut delinqueretur; sed tamen idem faciendo, id est, de arbore comedendo, non deliquisset homo, quia bona arbor erat, nisi gustus eius a lege interdictus fuisset.
41. Julian: In this place, to be sure, Augustine supposes that the sting of death is that ancient sin, not understanding what follows, that is: the power of sin is the law; which law he tries to assert is the command that was laid upon Adam. But that law was not the power of sin, but the kind of sin. For it is one thing to give power to an existing thing, another to procreate what did not exist. The eating of that tree, then, if it had not been forbidden, would not have been evil; but after it was forbidden, and seized by transgression, there arose there, from the one forbidding and the one despising, sin; although the law had not been given for this, that there should be offending; but yet, by doing the same thing, that is, by eating of the tree, the man would not have offended, because the tree was good, unless the tasting of it had been forbidden by law.
Iulianum.6.41Quod ergo per se pravum est, verbi gratia parricidium, sacrilegium, adulterium, et malum esse etiam sine lata lege dignoscitur, bene dicitur apud praevaricatores, qui cupientiores prohibitione redduntur, virtutem acquisisse per legem; quod vero inique non usurpatur, nisi interdicatur, genus ibi proprie, non robur ei constat a legis occasione collatum.
What, then, is depraved in itself—for example, parricide, sacrilege, adultery, and is recognized to be evil even without a law being passed—is rightly said, among transgressors, who are made more desirous by prohibition, to have acquired power through the law; but what is not unjustly seized unless it be forbidden, has properly, in that case, a kind, not a strength, conferred on it from the occasion of the law.
Iulianum.6.41Verum quoniam hic fui longior, huius quoque libri fine commoneo lectorem meum, ut vigilanter inspiciat, nullam in lege Dei occasionem Manichaeae impietatis offendi; sed si qua putantur ambigua, secundum regulas veritatis atque rationis et exponi posse, et iustitiae convenire non dubitet. Et illos ergo qui dicunt: Non per Christum erit resurrectio mortuorum, et istos qui asserunt aeque contra Apostolum, non nostrae naturae corpus habuisse Christum, per quod Manichaeorum scita venerantur; eodem et qui legi Dei congruat vigore damnamus.
But since I have been rather long here, I also warn my reader, at the end of this book too, to inspect vigilantly that no occasion for Manichee impiety is found in the law of God; but, if any things are thought ambiguous, let him not doubt that they can both be expounded according to the rules of truth and reason, and accord with justice. Both those, then, who say: There will be no resurrection of the dead through Christ, and those who assert, equally against the Apostle, that Christ did not have a body of our nature—through which they venerate the decrees of the Manichees—we condemn with the same vigor that accords with the law of God.
Iulianum.6.41AUG. Ego numquam dixi eam legem, quae in paradiso data est, Apostolum significasse, ubi ait: Virtus peccati lex. Frustra ergo adversus me, tamquam hoc dixerim, tu multa dixisti. Virtutem namque peccati, iam quidem existentis, sed minus operantis, eam legem semper intellexi, de qua idem Apostolus: Quid ergo dicemus? -inquit - Lex peccatum est? Absit! Sed peccatum non cognovi nisi per legem. Nam concupiscentiam nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: Non concupisces. Occasione autem accepta, peccatum per mandatum operatum est in me omnem concupiscentiam (Rom 7, 7-8). Ecce quomodo est virtus peccati lex: minus enim operabatur peccatum, quando praevaricationem nondum operabatur, quia lex nondum data erat: Ubi enim lex non est, nec praevaricatio (Rom 4, 15).
Augustine: I never said that the Apostle signified, by what he says: The power of sin is the law, that law which was given in paradise. In vain, therefore, have you said many things against me, as though I had said this. For I always understood the power of sin—of a sin indeed already existing, but operating less—to be that law, of which the same Apostle says: What then shall we say? Is the law sin? Far be it! But I did not know sin except through the law. For I did not know concupiscence, unless the law said: You shall not covet. But sin, taking occasion, worked in me through the commandment every concupiscence (Rom 7:7-8). Behold how the law is the power of sin: for sin worked less, when it did not yet work transgression, because the law had not yet been given: For where there is no law, neither is there transgression (Rom 4:15).
Iulianum.6.41Nondum ergo erat omnis concupiscentia, antequam prohibitione sic cresceret, tamque fortis fieret, ut ipsius prohibitionis, qua creverat, vinculum rumperet. Hoc et te ipsum scire monstrasti, multa in hanc sententiam disserendo; quamvis ut hoc ostenderes, alia potius adhibuisti testimonia apostolica, non hoc quo ego nunc usus sum; fortasse ideo, ne peccatum esse concupiscentiam fatereris. Apertissime quippe illam demonstravit esse peccatum, qui dixit, quod commemoravi: Peccatum non cognovi, nisi per legem. Et velut quaereremus quod peccatum: Nam concupiscentiam - inquit - nesciebam, nisi lex diceret: Non concupisces. Haec igitur concupiscentia, utique mala, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, nondum erat ante primi hominis illud grande peccatum; sed esse tunc coepit, naturamque humanam tamquam in traduce vitiavit, unde trahit originale peccatum. Cum illa quippe omnis homo nascitur; nec huius concupiscentiae reatus, nisi in renascentibus solvitur, ut eo post hanc absolutionem non inquinetur, nisi qui ei ad perpetrandum opus malum, spiritu adversus eam vel non concupiscente, vel non fortius concupiscente, consentit.
Not yet, then, was there all concupiscence, before by prohibition it so grew, and became so strong, that it broke the very bond of the prohibition by which it had grown. This you too showed yourself to know, discussing many things to this purpose; although, to show this, you rather brought forward other apostolic testimonies, not this one which I have now used; perhaps for this reason, lest you should confess concupiscence to be sin. For he showed most openly that it is sin, who said, as I recalled: I did not know sin except through the law. And, as though we asked what sin: For I did not know concupiscence, he says, unless the law said: You shall not covet. This concupiscence, then, surely evil, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, did not yet exist before that great sin of the first man; but then it began to exist, and corrupted human nature as in a transmission, whence it draws original sin. For with it every man is born; nor is the guilt of this concupiscence loosed except in the reborn, so that after this absolution he is not defiled by it, except one who consents to it for committing an evil work, the spirit either not lusting against it, or not lusting more strongly.
Iulianum.6.41Addunt ergo vires eidem concupiscentiae peccata, quae accedunt propria voluntate peccantium, et ipsa consuetudo peccandi, quae non frustra dici solet secunda natura; sed ne tunc quidem omnis est concupiscentia. Adhuc enim habet quo crescat; quoniam minor est, quamdiu non a sciente, sed ab ignorante peccatur. Ideo non ait: Non habebam, sed: Nesciebam concupiscentiam, nisi lex diceret: Non concupisces. Occasione autem accepta, peccatum per mandatum operatum est in me omnem concupiscentiam. Omnis est enim concupiscentia, quando prohibita concupiscuntur ardentius, et peccata iam cognita, ignorantiae sublata excusatione, et accedente legis praevaricatione, committuntur immanius.
Sins, then, add forces to this same concupiscence, which accrue by the proper will of those sinning, and the very custom of sinning, which is not without reason wont to be called a second nature; but not even then is there all concupiscence. For it still has wherein to grow; since it is less, as long as it is sinned not by one who knows, but by one who is ignorant. Therefore he did not say: I did not have, but: I did not know concupiscence, unless the law said: You shall not covet. But sin, taking occasion, worked in me through the commandment every concupiscence. For there is all concupiscence, when forbidden things are coveted more ardently, and sins already known, the excuse of ignorance being removed, and the transgression of the law accruing, are committed more monstrously.
Iulianum.6.41Unde lex Dei, apud eos quos non adiuvat gratia Dei per Agnum Dei qui tollit peccatum mundi, non correctio peccantis, sed virtus potius est dicta peccati. Et ideo cum dixisset: Virtus peccati lex, tamquam responderetur: Quid ergo faciemus, si peccatum nec lege tollitur, sed augetur? Continuo subiciens ubi spes debeat esse certantibus: Gratias - inquit - Deo qui dedit nobis victoriam; vel, sicut alii codices habent, quod et graeci habent, qui dat nobis victoriam per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum. Verissime prorsus: Si enim data esset lex, quae posset vivificare, omnino ex lege esset iustitia; sed conclusit Scriptura omnia sub peccato, ut promissio ex fide Iesu Christi daretur credentibus (Gal 3, 21-22).
Whence the law of God, among those whom the grace of God does not help through the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world, was called not the correction of the sinner, but rather the power of sin. And therefore, when he had said: The power of sin is the law, as if it were answered: What then shall we do, if sin is not even taken away by the law, but increased? Immediately adding where the hope of those contending ought to be: Thanks be to God who gave us the victory; or, as other manuscripts have, which the Greek also has, who gives us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ. Most truly indeed: For if a law had been given which could give life, justice would altogether be from the law; but Scripture has enclosed all things under sin, that the promise from the faith of Jesus Christ might be given to believers (Gal 3:21-22).
Iulianum.6.41Hi enim sunt filii promissionis et vasa misericordiae, quibus ideo data est promissio ex fide Iesu Christi, quia misericordiam consecuti sunt, ut fideles essent, quod etiam de se ipso dicit Apostolus (Cf. 1 Cor 7, 25); ne vel ipsa fides, ex qua incipit, et ad quam refertur, quidquid temperanter et iuste et pie gerimus, ita tribuatur nostrae voluntatis arbitrio, tamquam non nobis Deo miserante donetur; a quo etiam voluntas ipsa, sicut scriptum est, praeparatur (Cf. Prov 8 (sec. LXX)).
For these are the children of the promise and the vessels of mercy, to whom the promise was given from the faith of Jesus Christ for this reason, that they obtained mercy to be faithful, which the Apostle says even of himself (See 1 Cor 7:25); lest even faith itself, from which begins, and to which is referred, whatever we do temperately and justly and piously, be so attributed to the choice of our will, as though it were not given to us by God's mercy; by whom even the will itself, as it is written, is prepared (See Prov 8 (LXX)).
Iulianum.6.41Unde sancta Ecclesia per ora supplicantium sacerdotum non solum pro fidelibus, ut in eo quod credunt, perseverante pietate non deficiant, verum etiam pro infidelibus orat, ut credant. Ex quo enim per humanum liberum arbitrium Adam commisit illud grande peccatum, et omne genus humanum in commune damnavit (Cf. IOANNES CONSTANTINOPOL., Ep. ad Olymp. 3, 3), ab hac communi damnatione homines quicumque liberantur, nonnisi divina gratia et misericordia liberantur; et quidquid lex Dei iubet, nonnisi eo qui iubet adiuvante, inspirante, donante completur; qui rogatur ut permaneant, ut proficiant, ut perficiantur fideles; qui rogatur etiam ut credere incipiant infideles.
Whence the holy Church, through the mouths of the priests who supplicate, prays not only for the faithful, that they may not fail with persevering piety in what they believe, but even for unbelievers, that they may believe. For from the time when, through human free choice, Adam committed that great sin, and condemned the whole human race in common (See John Chrysostom, Letter to Olympias 3.3), whatever human beings are freed from this common condemnation, are freed only by divine grace and mercy; and whatever the law of God commands is fulfilled only with him who commands helping, inspiring, giving; who is asked that the faithful may persevere, advance, be perfected; who is asked even that the unbelievers may begin to believe.
Iulianum.6.41Quas Ecclesiae sanctae preces toto terrarum orbe crescentes et ferventes, opprimere ac exstinguere cupiunt, qui contra istam Dei gratiam humanae voluntatis arbitrium, ut gravius de alto praecipitent, extollunt potius, quam defendunt. In quibus contentiosum locum vel soli, vel praecipue vos tenetis, qui Christum Iesum parvulis non vultis esse Iesum, quos nullo peccato originali attaminatos esse contenditis; cum ille propterea Iesus appellatus sit, quia salvum fecit populum suum, non a corporalibus morbis, quos et in populo non suo sanare consuevit, sed a peccatis eorum (Cf. Mt 1, 21).
These prayers of the holy Church, growing and fervent throughout the whole world, those desire to suppress and extinguish who, against this grace of God, rather extol than defend the choice of the human will, so that they may fall more grievously from on high. Among whom you hold the contentious position either alone or chiefly, who are unwilling that Christ Jesus be Jesus to the little ones, whom you contend to be stained by no original sin; whereas he was called Jesus for this reason, that he saved his people, not from bodily diseases, which he was wont to heal even in a people not his own, but from their sins (See Matt 1:21).
Iulianum.6.41Quamvis ergo Apostolus in eo quod ait: Aculeus autem mortis est peccatum, illam sine ambiguitate expresserit mortem, quae resurrectioni corporis, de qua loquebatur, opposita est, id est, corporis mortem; ipsa enim absorbebitur in victoriam, quando corpore spiritali resurgente iam non erit, quia immortalitas etiam corporis erit, quae nullo peccato possit amitti: tamen in eo quod secutus adiunxit: Virtus vero peccati, lex, non legem significavit, quae data est in paradiso;
Although, then, the Apostle, in what he says: But the sting of death is sin, expressed without ambiguity that death which is opposed to the resurrection of the body of which he was speaking, that is, the death of the body—for it itself will be swallowed up in victory, when, the spiritual body rising, it will no longer exist, because there will be an immortality even of the body, which can be lost by no sin—nevertheless, in what he added next: But the power of sin is the law, he did not signify the law which was given in paradise;
Iulianum.6.41illa enim peccati, quod nullum adhuc erat, virtus esse non posset; sed eam legem virtutem dixit esse peccati, quae subintravit ut abundaret peccatum, et operaretur omnem concupiscentiam; id est, non eam tantum, quae in paradiso exorta mortificavit et corpus, cum qua omnis homo nascitur; nec eam tantum, quae peccatis per cuiusque malos mores accedentibus crevit; verum etiam illam, quae mandato prohibente ardentius excitata, ad praevaricationem usque pervenit; ut victoria, qua non solum peccati cupiditas, verum etiam mortis corporalis vinceretur timor, postremo ipsius mortalitatis absorberetur infirmitas, non lege per Moysem data, sed per Christum facta gratia praestaretur.
for that could not be the power of a sin which as yet did not exist; but he said that law to be the power of sin which entered in that sin might abound, and worked every concupiscence; that is, not only the concupiscence which, arising in paradise, mortified the body too, with which every man is born; nor only the one which grew by sins accruing through each one's bad morals; but also the one which, more ardently stirred up by the prohibiting commandment, arrived at transgression; so that the victory, by which not only the cupidity of sin, but even the fear of bodily death, would be conquered, and finally the weakness of mortality itself swallowed up, might be granted not by the law given through Moses, but by the grace made through Christ.
Iulianum.6.41Proinde ita dixit Apostolus: Aculeus autem mortis est peccatum; virtus vero peccati, lex; gratias autem Deo qui dat nobis victoriam per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum; tamquam diceret: Aculeus quidem mortis est peccatum, quia peccato etiam mors ista corporis facta est; cuius auctori vel ipsi etiam morti dicetur in fine ab eis, quibus in gloria resurgentibus absorbebitur: Ubi est, mors, victoria tua? Ubi est, mors, aculeus tuus? Sed iste aculeus, id est peccatum, per unum ingrediens, et in omnes homines cum morte pertransiens, aliis quoque additis multiplicatum, nec lex sancta et iusta et bona quivit auferre; virtus enim potius eius effecta est, cum prohibita concupiscentia magis ardesceret, et ad praevaricationis cumulum perveniret. Quid ergo restabat, nisi ut gratia subveniret? Gratias itaque Deo qui dat nobis victoriam per Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum; qui nostra debita dimittendo, et nos in temptationem non inferendo, ad novissimam victoriam, qua mors etiam corporis absorbeatur, adducit; ut qui gloriatur, non confidat in virtute sua, sed in Domino glorietur (Cf. 2 Cor 10, 17).
Accordingly the Apostle said thus: But the sting of death is sin; but the power of sin is the law; but thanks be to God who gives us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ; as if he said: The sting of death is indeed sin, because by sin this death of the body too was made; to whose author, or to that very death itself, it will be said in the end by those at whose rising in glory it will be swallowed up: Where, O death, is your victory? Where, O death, is your sting? But this sting, that is, sin, entering through one man, and passing into all men together with death, multiplied by others added too—neither could the law, holy and just and good, take away; rather it was made its power, when concupiscence, being forbidden, grew the more ardent, and arrived at the heaping-up of transgression. What, then, remained, except that grace should come to the rescue? Thanks, therefore, be to God who gives us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ; who, by forgiving our debts, and by not leading us into temptation, leads us to the last victory, by which even the death of the body is swallowed up; so that he who glories may not trust in his own strength, but may glory in the Lord (See 2 Cor 10:17).
Iulianum.6.41Haec recta et catholica fides, in qua etiam didicimus et tenemus, mortem quoque corporis eo aculeo factam, quod est peccatum, tantum a Manichaeorum errore diversa est, eique potius declaratur adversa, ut vobiscum illi dicant potius, quam nobiscum, sic mortalem Adam factum, ut sive peccaret, sive non peccaret, moriturus esset. Nec tamen ideo vos Manichaeos dicimus, quia et vos hoc dicitis; nec videtis tamen, neque nos a vobis ideo dici debere Manichaeos, quia malum esse concupiscentiam, qua caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et illi et nos dicimus. Sed vos ab eis, in eo quod simul dicitis, dissimili quidem, verumtamen alio errore distatis, qui mortem carnis non sicut illi naturae tribuitis alienae, nobisque permixtae, sed eam naturae nullo vitiatae peccato impingitis nostrae; ac sic paradisum honestissimae ac felicissimae voluptatis, funeribus mortuorum et cruciatibus morientium infeliciter atque indecenter impletis.
This right and Catholic faith, in which we have also learned and hold that the death of the body too was made by that sting which is sin, is so far diverse from the error of the Manichees, and is rather declared opposed to it, that they say rather with you than with us that Adam was made mortal in such a way that, whether he sinned or did not sin, he was going to die. Nor do we for that reason call you Manichees, because you too say this; nor do you see, nevertheless, that we ought not for that reason to be called Manichees by you, because both they and we say that concupiscence, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit, is evil. But you differ from them—in that which you say together, by an error indeed dissimilar, yet another—you who attribute the death of the flesh not, as they do, to another nature mingled with us, but impute it to our nature corrupted by no sin; and so you fill the paradise of most honorable and most happy delight, unhappily and unbecomingly, with the funerals of the dead and the torments of the dying.
Iulianum.6.41Nos vero, in eo quod cum Manichaeis dicimus concupiscentiam carnis, qua contra spiritum concupiscit, malum esse, atque a Patre non esse (Cf. 1 Io 2, 16), non ab eis alio, quamvis dissimili, tamen ipso haeretico errore, sed catholica veritate distamus; quia istam discordiam duarum concupiscentiarum carnis et spiritus, non cum illis per alienae Deo coaeternae malaeque naturae commixtionem nobis accidisse, sed cum catholico Ambrosio eiusque consortibus, per praevaricationem primi hominis in naturam nostram vertisse (Cf. AMBROSIUS, In Luc. 7, 12, 53) disserimus, et contra utrosque vestrum fidenter asserimus: carnemque Christi, non sicut illi nullam, nec sicut vos calumniamini, a natura nostrae carnis alienam; sed ab hoc nostro vitio, quo caro contra spiritum concupiscit, immunem atque omnino integram praedicamus.
But we, in that which we say with the Manichees—that the concupiscence of the flesh, by which it lusts against the spirit, is evil, and is not from the Father (See 1 John 2:16)—differ from them not by another heretical error, although dissimilar, but by Catholic truth; because we discuss that this discord of the two concupiscences, of flesh and spirit, befell us not, as they hold, through the mingling of another nature coeternal with God and evil, but, with the Catholic Ambrose and his associates, turned into our nature through the transgression of the first man (See Ambrose, In Luc. 7.12.53); and against both of you we confidently assert this: and we proclaim the flesh of Christ to be—not, as they hold, none at all, nor, as you slanderously charge, alien to the nature of our flesh; but immune from and altogether whole of this our defect, by which the flesh lusts against the spirit.
Iulianum.6.41Vos autem mala negando esse quae mala sunt, eorumque originem non ad primi hominis referendo peccatum, non ut ea mala non sint efficitis; sed ut ex mala natura bono aeterno coaeterna esse credantur, detestabili caecitate suffragamini Manichaeis, eosque accusatis inaniter, quia miserabiliter adiuvatis.
But you, by denying that the things which are evil are evil, and by referring their origin not to the sin of the first man, do not bring it about that they are not evil; but, that they may be believed to be from an evil nature coeternal with the eternal good, with a detestable blindness you give your vote to the Manichees, and you accuse them emptily, because you help them pitiably.
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