Term 1

Action

An action, that is, a virtuous action, is not done for the sake of another thing, but for its own good.

Joy or sadness follows every action.

Term 2

The Hot-tempered

The hot-tempered tend excessively toward anger and become angry at every nuisance.

Term 3

The Uncultivated Man

The uncultivated man is entirely inept at witty speaking, he contributes nothing and becomes sad in all circumstances.

Term 4

The Gambler

The gambler, the grave-robber, and the thief are numbered among the illiberal.

Term 5

Complaint

It is reasonable that complaints and grievances are made soley or mostly in friendships of utility.

They are made most when an exchange is not made according to the same standard, and so the friendship is ended.

Complaints are made differently in friendships which are in accord with excellence.

In frienships of pleasure, complaints happen most often when the frienship is not based on the same thing for both persons.

There is no complaint in a friendship of virtue, because it is of one accord.

Someone complains if he loves his friend for the sake of utility but pretends to love him for the sake of true virtue.

Term 6

The Man who Accepts a Favour

The man who accepts something from one who is not his friend and does not owe him has erred from the outset.

The man who accepts a favour should return it if he is able. If he is not, then he who did the favour not deem worth what he receives from him.

The man who accepts should set aside and portion out a return when something is given outside an agreement. The laws see this as a more just arrangement.

Term 7

Giving Loans

It is not always necessary to loan to one who loans to you. As when someone, seeking only gain, were to loan to me, who am virtuous, if I believe him to be ill-willed, I am not equally obliged to loan.

When those who loan do not wish for the good to those whom they loan but only seek gain, but the generous love even if they do not benefit.

Term 8

Doing

For a man not to do evil deeds, he must be well raised and habituated, and strive zealously live virtuously. He will do this this will be so if he live according to dictate of his intellect, which has a restraining force.

Term 9

Affirmation

Affirmation and negation are in the intellect, as flight and pursuit are in the appetitive faculty.

Term 10

Agathon

Agathon said: One thing alone is outside God's power: to make undone those things which are certainly done.

The same said: art loves fortune and fortune, art.

Term 11

The Sullen

The sullen are those who hold hold on to anger for a long time and only rest once they receive recompense, for vengence is what settles their impulse of anger.

Term 12

Alcmaeon

He was compelled to kill his mother.

Term 13

Vulgarity

It is an excess with regard to magnificence.

Term 14

Friendship

Friendship is a kind of virtue or it accompanies virtue.

It is most necessary for life since no one would chose to live without friends.

Those who are very wealthy and possess power are in most need of it.

It is necessary with respect to life in misfortune, because in need and in other misfortunes, a man takes refuge in his friends.

It is necessary for the young and the old, because the young are prevented from erring by their friends and the aged are cared for by it.

It leads men to act and to think.

It seems to occur innately in us, not only among men, but also among birds and in a great number animals.

It seems to exist naturally in men, since all men appear familiar and friendly toward others, as when a man stops someone, known or unknown to him alike, from going astray.

That is is necessary for life because states and lawgivers strive especially to sew concord.

It is an honest good, since we praise men who love their friends.

Some men think good men and friends the same.

There is a kind of likeness in friends and men are friends insofar as they are like-minded.

For some, friendship consists in opposition, since all potters quarrel with one another.

The cause of friendship is opposition because opposites attract such as dry earth and wet rain.

Friendship, according to Empedocles, comes from like things loving and seeking after the like.

The love of inanimate things is not called friendship because inanmiate things cannot make a return to friendship.

Term 15

Friendship of utlity and pleasure

The friendship of utility and of pleasure are friendship in an accidental sense, not because the parties share love but rather because they share utility or pleasure.

The friendship of utility is found in the young and the aged. For the aged seek after the useful, not the pleasurable; the young do because of habit.

Such friendships are easily dissoluble, since whenever the cause of their friendship ceases to be, so does the friendship itself.

The friendship of youths seems to be one for pleasure, since young people live by pleasure and seek most after what is pleasurable.

Among youths, a friendhship of pleasure is easily dissolved, since as they age, their tastes change.

In friendships of utility or pleasure, one can have many friends, since there are many that can be of use or pleasure.

A friendship of pleasure is better than one of utility, since there is greater equality in it, the friendship between youths is like this.

Term 16

Friendship out of utility concerns business affairs.

The friendship of an honourable man persists as long as its causes were good, virtuous things.

It is long-lasting because it endures all, since it includes what is expected of friends.

Friendship is the greatest and best thing.

It is rare, since it only is had between virtous men, who are few, and it takes time and getting used to.

Friendship of pleasure has some likeness to the friendship of an honourable man, since pleasures are indeed good to him, and even to the friendship of utlity, since men in this kind of friendship are good to one another.

Other kinds of friendship (apart from true friendship) last longest when friends give the same thing to one another.

Many remain in a friendship of pleasure because they become accustomed to each others ways of being, they being alike.

In friendships of utility and of pleasure it can happen that evil men be friends to one another, and even a virtuous man with evil men, and men who are neither good nor bad can be friends of anyone.

Only the friendship of good men is true friendship that is unchangable, since such men who are true friends do not easily believe bad news about the character of one long tried and true to him.

There are many kinds of friendship, the principle kind is friendship between good men, which is in accord with good things qua good, since it it has its foundation on the good, that is, what is virtuous. Other kinds, however, have their basis in a good.

Frienships of utility and pleasure do not often coincide, since these friendships are not joined together because of themselves, but incidentally.

Friendship does not dissolve merely out of a long distance, but is impeded rather by an action. But if such a long distance makes one absent, it also brings forgetfulness of a friend, just as the proverb says: many a friendship has lack of ...ended.

Friendship is called an equality, and this is most present between good men.

One cannot be friends in a perfect way with many, just as one cannot love many at the same time. Love is like an abundance of feeling, which can only be directed toward an individual.

All of the kinds of friendship mentioned consist in an equality, since the same is done by each and willed by each toward the other, or exchange one thing for another, such as pleasure for utility, but such men are lesser friends and their friendships last a shorter time.

Other kinds of friendship seem to be friendships from their similarity to true friendship which accords with virtue (which includes utility and pleasure). So too, they seem not to be friendships because of their dissimilarity, since the former quickly pass, whereas the latter endure, and they differ from the former in other respects.

Friendships mentioned that are unequal differ even from one another. For example, the friendship of the father to his son, or of a senior to his junior, and a ruler to his subject; these differ from one another. He proves this in two ways.

Friendship between a father and his children is long-lasting when the sons render what is due to their father, and likewise the parents to their children.

In unequal friendships, there must be a proportionate love, so that if the superior party is greater, he is more loved than he loves, then there will be a kind of equality according to merit/excellence.

Friendship does not last nor does one esteem the other if there is a great difference between them with respect to virtue, vice, or wealth. This is manifest in the case of the gods or kings, these abound in all goods, and in the case of wise men to foolishmen, who are not worthy of anything. However in these matters it is not certain how great the difference may or may not be for the friendship to end.

Friendship has more to do with loving than being loved. This is seen by the fact that mothers who have such eager love for their children do not mind if their love is not returned by their small children out of ignorance. Nevertheless they still make provision to love them and bring them up.

Friendship is a kind of equality and likeness.

Friendship of utility and pleasure remain longer than the friendship of a bad man, as long as they provide pleasures and advantages.

Friendship between contraries seems to most often be one of utility, such as the poor man to the rich man, and the unlearned man to the wise man, since whoever wishes for some gain loves the man who has what he is lacking.

Friendship and justice seem lie in the same thing and concern the same thing, that is, in mutual exchange (reciprocity).

Friendship exists as much as things are shared, and so fellow soldiers and sailors are called friends.

Some kinds of friendship are greater, others lesser.

Friendship and justice differ in various relationships since the association for the parents toward their children is not the same as for brothers and comrades... and since the same relationship does not exist between parents and their children, as to their siblings or other relations.

Friendship and justice grow from the same things, since the greater the association, the greater justice and friendship. For example, it is more difficult stealing the wealth of a comrade than of an unknown citizen, more difficult to strike one's father than someone else.

Friendship is in any kind of government as long as what is just is preserved in it, as in the case of a kingdom when a king shows favour to his subjects.

The king's friendship and the father's friendship are imbalanced, and therefore in these kinds of friendships, what is just between friends is not equal, but one should be afforded what is due to him by merit/excellence.

The friendship of a man with his wife, if it is like friendship in an aristocracy or in political affairs, is such that each one receives according to his virtue.

The friendship of brothers and comrades, and of everyone who shares a common pursuit and way of life are similar kinds of friendship. They follow the pattern of a timocracy, where citizens wish to be as equal and just, and each man has his own share in ruling.

In regimes where the ruler and the ruled do not share anything, there is neither friendship nor justice, but their relationship is like that of an artisan to his tools.

Friendship may not be toward inanimate things, neither justice, neither toward a slave qua slave.

Friendship toward a slave is toward him qua man and not toward him qua slave.

there can exist friendship, as there can be justice, between all who can share in a common law or agreement.

All friendship entails exchange.

Friendship of kin seems to be of many kinds, but these all depend on paternal friendship.

Common circumstance and common age make many friends, and this kind of friendship is like the friendship of brothers.

The friendship of comrades is like that of brothers.

The relation of nephews and kin is like that of friends, and they are close in a greater or lesser degree in the measure that they are related to the head of the house, that is, the main branch of the family.

The friendship of sons to their parents is one of unequal good, as the friendships of men to gods is like it.

The friendship of parents to their sons has pleasure and utility in it, more than the friendship of strangers, since they share more in a common life.

Between man and wife, friendship seems to exist naturally.

The friendship between man and wife seems to be one of utility and of pleasure, and, if they are virtuous it will be one of virtue, since they will take delight in one another.

Kinds of friendship differ in their mode of common life, what is just is not the same for each.

Each of the three types of friendship may be further divided into equal and superior friendships. Equal friendship when the friend is equal the other and unequal friendship is when the one friend is greater than the other. When friends are equal, they must make an equal (secundum rem) return to one another as friends. But in unequal friendships, this exchange must be made proportionally.

Complaints and quarrels only belong to friendships of utility.

Complaints are not found in a friendship of virtue, since, if friends are virtuous, they will be disposed to act well. For this is the mark of virtue and friendship.

Friendship for pleasure is not marked by continuous complaint. Both parties have time what they desire in enjoying each other's company, and a man will seem ridiculous if he complains of another since he need not keep the other's company.

Friendship for utility is prone to complaint, since in such a friendship, when one uses the other he is always trying to attain something he supposes he lacks. One complains that he receives less than he is owed or something he lacks, but the other complains he does not have enough to satisfy what the other is missing.

Friendship of utility may be moral or legal. Friendship of legal utility is a commercial one, some concern immediate hand-offs of goods, some an exchange with time allowed in between. This kind is more liberal and is accompanied with a friendly attitude.

Friendship of moral utility does not concern agreements, but involves a man lending to anyone as if to a friend, assuming repayment of the same or something greater. He does not give liberally but as if it were a loan.

Complaints can arise in a friendship of moral utility since there is not a prior agreement. When one friend does not make a return in line with what the other was expecting, he complains against him and ends the friendship.

In a friendship for utility, its measure is the utility of the receiver.

Friendships according to virtue do no lend themselves to complaints, however repayments are measured by the free choice of the one acting, this is the principal with virtues.

Unequal friendships produce different kinds of complaints.

Friendship ends when either of the friends thinks he is worthy of receiving more.

Friendship requires that a man make what return he can, even when an adequate return is not within his power.

In every kind of friendship that involves some inequality of persons, there is a proportionality. This means that each party makes a return proportional to his state, and this makes the friendship equal. Just as in political friendship, a craftsman receives pay according to the worth of his work.

In a friendship of lovers, sometimes one party accuses the other of not returning his overabundant love. This may be because there is nothing lovable about him.

Friendship founded on habits of character is self-sufficicent, so complaints do not arise.

Concerning friendship in which it seems one pretends to love and actually loves for pleasure.

Most differences arise in friendships when friends think they are in one kind of friendship but they are really in another kind.

Friendship should be broken off immediately with those whose ways are incurable. Those capable of being helped on the right path, however, should be given aid, but more in the way of moral guidance than financial help, since this is more noble and essential to friendship.

Friendship cannot remain between friends when one remains the same in virtue while the becomes more excellent in virtue. He gives proof of this with friendships made in childhood, when one grows up in virtue and the other remains busied with childish things. These cannot be friends since they do not delight or grow sad in the same things.

One should not make many friends of utility, since to aid and repay many is laborious and one cannot look after the affairs of one's own life while one is assisting many others.

One should even avoid making many friends of pleasure, since a few friends bring enough pleasure, and if we have too many, we cannot delight in the familiarity they bring.

The friendship of a virtuous man can be with as many as he can live with, but it is evident to anyone that it is not possible to live with many and divide oneself up to many. He proves this in three ways.

Close friendship of those who share in their ways of life is held with a few friends.

Political friendship entails having many friends, since a man can live pleasantly with all citizens, and not merely disingenuously, but as a genuine man.

True friendship, which is for virtue and exists for the sake of the friends themselves does not occur with many, since one seldom finds such men.

Friendship of bad men is evil, since it leads to what is evil. As long as they are not grounded in virtue, they share in evil things. They are like each other and even become more evil. The friendship, however, of good men becomes greater, while the good grows in either party from good conversations and actions and they align themselves with eachother.

Term 17

Friendly Things

Those who are quick to do friendly deeds toward each other show they intend friendship, this is a speedy thing, but it is not yet a friendship if both parties unless they are lovable toward one another and aware of it.

Friendly things toward friends are borne out of and determined by a man's disposition toward himself.

Term 18

What is Worthy of Love

Not everything should be loved, but only the good.

What is worthy of love and of choice is the good absolutely; what is worthy of love is good and pleasurable for everyone. The good man is good because of these two. without qualification.

Term 19

Love

Love is like a passion, whereas friendship is like a habit of character, which involves a mutual exchange and choice. Choice out of a habit, since one wills the good of the other for his own sake. However love toward inanimate things is necessarily without mutual exchange and choice.

Term 20

Friendship

Friendhsip is a mean in all life's acts. One who goes too far in this regard for no other purpose is called obsequious, but one who acts only for his own utility is called a flatterer. The man who lacks too much in this unpleasant in all things, he is contentious and quarrelsome.

Term 21

The Friend

What our friends do is in some measure done by us, since the working principle is found in us.

A friend wishes the good of his friend for his own sake. It ridiculous for him to wish the good toward, say, wine, but he does wish it to keep from spoiling, so he does incidentally wish its good, so that he may later drink it.

Friends wish to pass the day together and to live with one another.

Those who are friends for utility are less so friends than those for pleasures, and their friendship remains for a shorter time. This kind of friendship ends when its advantage does.

Men call one another friends for utility, just as do cities with one another for the sack of some gain in making alliances.

Men who love eachother for pleasure are also called friends, just as children are called friends.

Evil men may be friends for utility or pleasure, being like one another in this way, but they are not, in themselves, friends without qualification.

Just as some virtues are good by their act, others by their habit, so also is the case with friendship. Some men are friends by the pleasure they take in the act of living together. Some men friends by habit, such as men who are asleep or men who, despite being separate from each other in different places, continue with the habit of acting friendly toward one another.

Nothing is more characteristic of friends than living with one another, for blessed men wish at least to spend the day together, being solitary does not befit them.

Blessed men and others look for pleasant friends. Even blessed men must be pleasant to each other, and if they are they will have everything necessary for friendship.

He asks whether friends do want the greatest goods for their friends, for example, to be as gods, since by these greatest goods the friendship is ended.

A friend becomes a flatter if his love extends beyond the mean.

A friend is praised more for his love. Herein lies the imperfection of the friendship had by those who want more to be loved than to love.

Friends and the friendship between them lasts most when they love and are loved as both of the friends merit. If this is at first unequal, they may be equalized proportionally when one friend receives the love he merits. The longest lasting sort are those who are alike in virtue.

A virtuous friend does not afford his friend evil deeds, in fact he prevents him, and so, while they persevere in virtue, they will also remain friends.

Friends hold all things in common.

When either of the friends deems himself deserving of receiving more from the other than the other receives from him, a new kind of complaint ensues, and the friendship ends.

A better and superior friend thinks that more is coming to him, since more should be given to a better and more useful man. This is because if each man does not receive a return for what his actions merit, the man spending more will be engaged in charitable giving and not friendship

The superior friend should receive more, just as is the case in commercial exchanges. Those who put in more get more out.

A friend in need and in a lesser state thinks the opposite: that he should receive more, since it is the part of a good friend to support his friend in his needs. Otherwise, if a lesser man could not receive anything from his superior friend, friendship would useless.

It belongs to a friend to help his friend in his needs.

Each party seems to deserve and must afford the other more, but not of the same thing. More honour is due to the superior party, while more gain is due to the lesser.

We should give honour to a friend who benefits us by giving money.

We are ought to speak openly and share common use of all we have with our friends and brethren.

A friend is like his friend.

A friend who ends a friendship with a man who is no longer the friend whom he loved does nothing unreasonable.

He asks whether one should acts toward a former friend as if he were a stranger, as if he had never been a friend, or he should keep in mind the previous friendship.

A friend wishes and does what is good (or what seems good) for his friend's sake, and he wishes his friend to exist and to live for his friend's own sake. He lives with and has the same tastes as his friend, he rejoices and grieves with his him

A friend is another self.

A good friend is naturally desirable to a good and virtuous man.

A good friend is good to himself as he is good to his friend, since a friend is another self, and so because of this he chooses goodness for himself and also for his friend with whom he shares virtuous conversations and thoughts.

He asks whether one should have many friends. He refutes the following: the example of travelers, just as it is... to not receive any unknown folk or traveler, one should not receive. In the same way it is...to have none as a friend but dangerous to have any sort of person as a friend.

Term 22

Loving

He askes whether a man loves the good without qualification, or what is good for him, since there is sometimes a dissonance between these two. He resolves this by saying that the good without qualification, is lovable and what is good is lovable for every man.

Some seek more to be loved than to love because of their love of honour, and so many men love flattery.

Being loved and being honoured seem to be similar, and since many people desire honour, many seek to be loved because of their love for honour.

To be loved is greater than to be honoured, since it is a more prefferable thing in itself. Men desire to be honoured for some other cause or out of hope of gain, just as some who are undeserving take pleasure in honour from those who have power to bestow that honour.

One is not obligated to love an evil man, nor to become like an evil man.

Term 23

Lovers

Those who are fond of playing the flute are not able to attend to what others say to them. So it is that when we take much joy in a friendship, we cannot take heed of other things.

Term 24

The Lover

Lovers seem ridiculous when they think they deserve to be loved as much as they themselves love (if they in fact do not), but if they are worthy of such equal love, then it is perhaps justified.

Lovers of themselves are faulted.

Lovers of themselves are those who, in the common opinion afford themselves a greater part in wealth, temporal honours, and pleasures, since they believe these sorts of things to be best. They yield entirely to the concupiscible and irrational part of soul. It is for this reason that men such as this are reproached.

Term 25

To Love

Term 26

Love

The object of love is not anything, but is rather for some desirable object which is lovable. This can be good, pleasurable, or useful. Good and pleasurable things are loved as ends, but useful things are only as means to something else.

Term 27

The Soul

We should learn about the parts of the soul insofar as they concern our present investigations, since more in-depth knowledge is too burdensome for the matters at hand, what is said in independent sources (that is, in the De Anima) is enough.

The soul has parts: an irrational part and irrational part. Whether these two are two things are totally separate from one another or constitute a whole does not affect the present question.

In the soul there is some innate thing which conflicts with, and is opposed, to reason.

We can say that while we do see a distorted movement of the body, we cannot see it in the soul.

These three things are in the soul: passions, powers, and habits, and virtue will belong to one of these three. Examples follow of each of these.

Term 28

The Animal

All animals distinguish different foods, and enjoy some but not others.

Some kinds of animals are destructive, some foolish, while others are voracious.

Animals always strain in seeing and in hearing.

All animals are lacking in happiness, since they cannot engage in contemplation.

No animal is happy, since none share in contemplation.

Term 29

Love

When love resembles an activity, it is greater for the one who acts in excess.

Term 30

Desire

The desire for pleasure is insatiable and comes from irrational the part of the soul. Exercising the appetite only increases it for more, similar deeds.

Desire pushes toward the mean.

Term 31

The Mean-Observing Man

The man who observes the mean is truthful in his way of life and speaking and, acknowledging his character, neither exaggerating nor downplaying himself.

Term 32

Art

All arts are had at once with prudence, by this man is called good without qualification.

Arts are ordered under one power, just as horse-riding falls under (navifactiva clearly means shipbuilding)

Higher arts are called master or architectonic arts.

Art and virtue are concerned with difficult things.

Things made by the arts have their goodness in them, and this is what makes them done well.

An art looks toward the mean, since when some work of art is well crafted, it neither lacks anything nor needs anything added.

The arts would be destroyed if the craftsman did not give what he ought and in the right way, and if he were not rewarded properly for the worth of his work.

Art has nothing to do with what happens by chance.

An art is a habit of making according to some rational principle.

An art is concerned with making and a product. It concerns how contingent things are made, its origin is in the one making, not the action.

Art concerns making things while prudence concerns doing things.

Architectonic refers to law-making.

The arts of cosmetics and cooking seem to be ordered toward pleasure.

Term 33

The Ass

The ass certainly prefers grass to gold, since he takes more pleasure in the nourshiment of the grass than gold, as Heraclitus says.

Term 34

The Artisan

If a man does wish to become a perfect artisan, he must begin with universal knowledge of his discipline, and only then proceed to knowledge of this or that, since, as we have said, the sciences are concerned with the universal.

Term 34

The Argives

The Argives, fell in with the Spartans (who are most aggressive), though they mistook them for the Sicyonians, so they fled immediately. So do ignorant men, not know of the conditions of the engagement, and when they realise, flee straight away.

Term 36

A Contest

In contests it is not the bravest men who fight the most, but those with the most bodily strength and fitness.

Term 37

The Adulterer

Adulterers do many daring things out of sensual desire, but this certainly does not make them courageous.

Term 38

Athletes

How athletes fight with unexperienced trainees.

Term 39

Unskillfulness

Unskillfulness is a craft lacking a true course of reason.

Term 40

Anaxagoras

Anaxagoras, and others who concern themselves with wonderful and difficult matters, are called wise but not prudent men.

Term 41

The Covetous Man

The covetous man is unjust, and therefore he does not busy himself with all goods, but only with what relates to fortunes and misfortunes.

The covetous man has something in common with the unfair man.

Term 42

The Daring Man

The daring man is he who is in excess in daring terrible things, since he rushes to everything.

Daring men are quick to dangers, and when they arrive they depart again. But for brave men it is the other way round.

Term 1

The Vulgarian

The vulgarian is that man who spends lavishly, not as accords necessity, but as one who entertains actors at a marriage feast and rolls out a red carpet for comedians as they pass by.

Term 2

The Flatterer

The flatterer is he who seeks to please others to win some financial gain.

Term 3

The Happy Man

Those called happy are those among the living found in the conditions of happiness.

We call men happy.

Men who are happy do not lack things that are necessary, but can lack pleasures.

No one is unwillingly happy.

Term 4

The Buffoon

Bomolochi or buffoons are called those who immoderately take pleasure in laughter and play.

Buffoons are also called witty.

The buffoon is less vicious than the derider, since he neither spares himself nor others.

Term 5

The Good

The good is what all desire.

Term 6

Beasts

Beasts do not share in action, even if they do have senses.

Some animals are called prudent that seem to be able to care for themselves.

Beasts are neither continent nor incontinent, since they do not have universal judgment.

Beasts are neither temperate nor intemperate, unless metaphorically speaking, since they have neither reason nor choice.

Term 6

Brutishness

Brutish baseness, or unbounded desire, belongs to evil.

Some virtue is opposing brutishness is divine and heroic.

Brutishness is chiefly found in barbarians.

Brutishness is less evil than human incontinence, but is more frightening.

Cutting open pregnant women and devouring the children is a brutish pleasure.

Term 8

Barbarians

Some classes of barbarians are by nature irrational, living only by sense perception.

Term 9

To Wage War

No one chooses to wage war or to incite war-waging for its own sake. Indeed, a man would be considered murderous or violent if, when enemies run out, he went onto friends just to keep fighting.

Term 10

To Benefit

To bestow benefit is a laborious thing, but to receiving a benefit is no labour at all. And so those who bestow benefits love more than those who are benefited, since this greater toil makes them to love more.

Term 11

The Benefactor

Benefactors love those they benefited more than those benefited love their benefactors. This seems contrary to reason, I wonder the reason for this.

The benefactor loves the one he benefits more, since the one receiving the benefit, since the benefit is work of the one doing it, and in this way every man loves his own undertaking more than others would, just as happens with poets, who always take the most delight in their own poems.

The benefactor loves the one he benefits more than the other way round. He gives six ways of defending this position.

Term 12

Benefit

If someone receives some benefit from a friend who expects something in return, he should freely make some return as accords the greatnesss of what he receives.

Receivers of benefits will downplay their worth, but givers of them will extoll the worth of what they gave.

One must first give recompense for benefits received before making gifts to friends, just as one has a greater oblication to repay a loan than to give gifts to a friend.

Term 13

Goodwill

Goodwill can seem to be friendship, yet it is not. For it can be directed toward those unknown or unaware of it, but frienship cannot.

Goodwill is not affection, since affection requires some familiarity, but goodwill is unexpected, as happens when spectators observe athletes in competition.

Goodwill is the beginning of frienship.

Goodwill, if it lasts, can become friendship, but not a friendship of utility or pleasure.

Term 14

The Well-wishing

Well-wishers love superficially, since they do not take any active part with the other.

Those who will good things for others are called well-wishing if others do not return the same to them. And if it happens that they both happen to love that same thing, there will be well-wishing but with reciprocation.

Term 15

The Good

The good is what all desire.

The good of one man and of the city is the same, but that of the people and city is greater and more perfect and more divine.

We shall have sufficient knowledge about human good if we determine its subject matter.

The goods which the political order is directed do not come natuarlly, but rather are brought about by law.

The Platonists held that the good is self-sufficient and that the good is the cause of all being, formally speaking, but not effeciently, since, if they did, they would be on the mark.

The good in itself is said to be and universally good and prior to than that which stems from it or as an accident.

The good is synonymous with being.

There is no idea that encompasses all goods, as if it were one science.

A thing that is long-alsting is more like the good than something lasting only a day.

The good is said in two ways: in itself, and some preservative and prohibitive.

All things that are good in themselves do not convene in one notion of the good in itself, as is evident with honour, and in other things he lists.

A universal good is useless, since neither a weaver nor another artisan would be aided by it in his craft. If he were to consider this good as a separate good, he would not benefit any in his work.

The good which is object of this study is man's work and possesion through his actions, but good as a separate good is not in this way.

He asks what the good is, which is happiness, according to the opinion of Aristotle.

There is one end good which is happiness, and if there were to be many, one would then be directected toward the other, such that only one would be the final and greatest good.

The self-sufficient good is sufficient for a man not only if he led a solitary life, but sufficient even for his parents, children, and for a wife and friends, and for his fellow citizens.

The greater the good, the more desirable.

The human good turns out to be life in accord with the best and most perfect virtue.

Goods are of three types: some are external, such as good fortune, some internal, such as virtues and sciences, some concern bodies, such as health and a good appearance.

The goods of the soul are those that are most principally good.

Term 16

Good

No one is good who does not take joy in good works, the same should be said about a just man.

Some goods are necessary for happiness, such as the virtues, while others work as instruments for its attainment.

Great goods make a man more blessed, since they were made for to adorn and the use of them.

Term 17

The Good things of Fortune

The goods of fortune are those things that are good without qualification, but they are not always good for a particular man.

Men pursue the goods of fortune with the greatest desire and pray for them.

A man should not ask for good things without qualification, but the things which are good for him to have.

Being a citizen and being a good man are not the same thing.

Term 18

The Good Man

Good men are both good to each other without qualification, and useful and pleasurable, since the actions of good men are alike.

There seem to be three things that make men good: nature, habituation, and teaching.

For someone to be made good by teaching there must first be some disposition, that is, a habituation, amenable to virtue.

Temporal goods become vitious in excess. Likewise, therefore, does man become when he persues excess and evil pleasures.

According to the Pythagoreans, all men desire the apparent good .

A good man must be also a lover of himself (philautos) since by doing good things he will both profit himself and help others.

No one would choose to have every good thing for himself if it meant living a life completely alone.

That which is good by its nature is pleasurable in itself, and this is even true in relation to a good man.

Every good thing is more desirable with another good thing added to it than by itself.

Those who say that all things do not desire the good do not speak truthfully, since we hold what is seen by everyone to be true. And it is generally affirmed that all things desire the good.

To be good without prudence, and to have prudence without moral virtue is impossible.

The good can be said in three ways.

What is good in moral matters is said in two ways: of an activity and of a habit of character.

Term 1

The Conceited Man

The conceited man thinks himself worthy of great things, but is unworthy of them.

The conceited man is excessive with regard to himself, but the magnanimous man is not.

The conceited are foolish and do not know themselves, because they lay claim on things too great, for things they are not worth of.

Term 2

Dogs

Dogs do not take pleasure in the scent of hares, but in eating them, and dogs know them by their scent.

Term 3

Meats

Easily digestible and light meats such as fowl are healthy.

Term 4

Calipso

Calipso's warning was this: keep your ship out of the surf and spray. Homer, Odyssey 12.219.

Term 5

Causes

There seem to be four causes: nature, necessity, chance, and intellect.

Term 6

The Harpist

Just as one becomes a harpist by playing the harp, so it is by doing just things that a man becomes just, and so with other things.

Term 7

The Blind Man

No one would reproach a man blind naturally by sickness or plague, but would even more pity him. All would certainly reproach a man, however, made blind by drinking wine or some other incontinence.

Term 8

The Mad-bellied

They are called mad-bellied who stuff their bellies beyond need and take up for themselves more than their share. Such men become very brutish.

Term 9

Key

Key is said equivocally, both as the collar-bone, clavical (clavicula), below the neck of an animal, and what is used to close gates.

Term 10

Delight in Food

Delight in food is common and natural, since it comes from our shared nature. Every man seeks after food whenever he is hungry, and after drink when he thirsts, and sometimes both.

Term 11

Cause

If no one who does harm is the cause of it, neither is the man who does good.

Term 12

Joint Cause

We are joint causes of our habits of virtue.

Term 13

It is not out of place to situate an action in its circumstances.

Term 14

Concerning the comparison of the mean to its extremes, and of the extremes to one other.

Term 15

Sensual desire and anger are not involuntary causes.

Sensual desire (concupiscence) brings with it pleasure and sorrow, but choice does not.

In natural desires, few go astray.

Some desires are common to all, and some are particular.

It is not praiseworthy to resist desires that are weak or not wicked.

Desire seems to have the place of a father and friends.

The desire of good things is worthy of praise, but the desire of shameful things worthy of blame.

Sexual desires make men mad.

Desire, only wants a mere suggestion of the seneses or reason that a thing is pleasurable to strive toward its enjoyment.

Term 16

Counsel

No one takes counsel regarding eternal things, such as whether the world is eternal, nor of sides and angles, neither of things in motion, which are always in the same state.

Counsel regards actions in our power.

None of the Spartans take counsel about how the Sycthians may best conduct themselves.

Counsel does not treat of objective fields of study, such as how one ought to spell something.

Counsel treats of things we do but with different results, such as in the workings of medicine, or business, or navigation.

Counsel treats more of navigation than althletic training.

Counsel is more needed in the arts than in the sciences, since they treat with less certainty.

Counsel most often deals with uncertain things, when outcomes are unknown. The lesser the certainty, the greater the need for counsel.

Counsel does not concern small matters, but great ones, when we do not trust our own appraisal of things, and we cannot come to a decision.

Counsel does not treat of ends but of means. As a physician does not deliberate on health, but rather on how he might bring it, and other examples are given.

Counsel asks of the easiest and best means of achieving the end, such as how and in which ways it might be done, whether by one means or by several.

One who takes counsel seems to draw conclusions from known material, from things pictured in a diagram.

All counsel is a kind of inquiry, but the reverse is not true.

When taking counsels, if the end result is impossible to achieve, we abandon the project, but if it is possible, we set about work.

When taking counsels we ask which instruments may be necessary, as when someone asks for a ship, and if these will or those things be necessary, similarly in other cases, when we ask by what means or how or on what account it will be done.

Counsel regards things in the powers of men, since man is principle agent of his own actions.

Counsel does not deal with particular things that are manifest to the senses, for example, if we should choose this bread or that, for if we deliberated about everything, this would go on forever.

What is available to counsel is the same is what is available to one's choice, as long as what is open to counsel is determined.

Counsel regards future and contingent things.

No one takes counsel about necessary things which could not be any other way.

One must take much time in taking counsel, but little time in executing it.

Term 17

The Counsel-giver

A good counsel-giver is one who can by reasoning, make best conjectures of what the best man would do in a given situation.

Term 18

Certainty

The same degree of certaintly should not be sought in all fields of knowledge.

Term 19

Political Science

Political science is what dictates which of the sciences ought to be studdied and who should pursue them.

Under political science are three most valuable arts, namely, military strategy, economics, and rhetoric.

Citizens undergo dangers because of the threat of legal penalties.

Political science establishes what must be done and what cannot be done.

The end of political science is to make men good and law-abiding.

Those who enact particular actions are said to be engaging in political science.

Term 20

Agreement

Concerning the agreement of the speculative and practial parts of the intellect. Each of them deals with ultimates, but neither is reasoning.

Term 21

Continuous

In everything that is continuous and divisible, one can take something smaller, lesser, or equal amount.

Term 22

The Continent Man

When the continent man acts, he does so within the bounds of reason, the incontinent without.

The continent man restrains himself on account of reason from the sensual pleasures which he knows to be wicked, but the incontinent man is overcome by passion.

The continent man abides within reason while the incontinent man deviates from it.

The continent man is said to be one who overcomes passions to which many others surrender.

The continent man is a mean between too extremes, those who delight in pleasures too much, and those too little.

The continent man and the temperate man are able, by habit, not to forsake the order of reason for bodily pleasures.

The contient man may have many evil desires but does not follow them. The temperate man, however, neither has them nor takes any delight.

Term 23

Continence

Continence is not a virtue, but has some mixture of it.

Continence and perseverence seem to be noble and praiseworthy.

Continence and incontinence, temperance and intemperance deal, properly speaking, with human passions.

Continence is more desirable than perservereance, just as to overcome is better than only to restrain oneself.

Continence, when it coincides with the mean, is counted with virtue.

Continence and incontinence both deal with matters beyond the habits of many men.

Term 24

Eating Coals

Eating coals and dirt and lying with men both occur because of wicked nature and habit, and these do not belong to continence because they are not delights in themselves proper to human nature.

Term 25

The Girdle of the Cyprian Woman

The girdle of the Cyprian woman is many-coloured.

Term 26

Habit habituation

Habit is a difficult thing to change, since it resembles a kind of nature. Hence, after a long effort, it finally becomes fully engrained in man's nature.

Term 27

The Concupiscible Power

The concupiscible and appetitive powers participate in reason in some way.

Term 28

Contemplation

The contemplation of wisdom is esteemed soley for its own sake, because it accomplishes no other deed or reckoning. In practical matters, however, we seek something beyond merely what we accomplish by some action we do.

The contemplative man is the happiest.

The contemplative man acting with understanding is most beloved to God.

Term 1

Debt

As a general rule, a debt should be payed before making a gift to a friend.

Term 2

Deception

When a man is deceived, thinking he is loved honestly, but he does not see any workings of honesty in the one supposedly loving him, he should blame himself.

Term 3

The Deceiver

The man who deceives by pretense of love is guilty of greater blame than one who counterfeits money.

Term 4

What is Pleasurable

Every man finds what he is fond of pleasurable.

What is just is pleasurable to a lover of just things, and so are things in accord with virtue to a lover of virtue.

Many experience pleasures that are opposed to each other since different people desire different things that do not accord with human nature.

What lovers of the good find pleasurable accords with their nature.

All animals seem to share what is pleasurable. Even what is good and useful are pleasurable.

As nature has it, different people find different things pleasurable, others more.

If anyone does not find anything pleasurable or anything more preferable to another, he is a far cry from a man.

Pleasurable things come along more in life than terrible things. Men are accustomed to these things in life and living by them is not dangerous.

What is pleasurable does not corrupt every kind of judgment, only those that deal with practical matters.

Some pleasurable things are desirable by nature, others however, are contrary to it, some occupy a middle position.

Some things are pleasurable by nature to everyone, some to kinds of animals, and kinds of men, some out of passion or habit or perverse nature.

Term 5

Pleasure

Pleasure has grown up from childhood with everyone.

Pleasure and pain are the rules of action.

Pleasure is more difficult to resist than anger, as Heraclitus says.

We should be on the greatest guard against pleasures and pleasurable things. We should behave toward them as the elders of the people toward Helen. By so shying away we shall sin less.

The only pleasure acts of the virtues afford is when they attain to their end.

Pleasures are divided into bodily pleasures and pleasures of the soul.

Pleasures which temperance regulates are servile and brutish.

Pleasures that regard touch make man brutish, since they do not belong to what makes us men.

Pleasures of the most liberal sort are apart from the stuff of temperance, such as those in gymnasia.

There is a an excess concerning pleasures called intempereance and it is worthy of fault.

Some pleasures are necessary, such a food, for the preservation of the individual, and sex, for the preservation of the species. Some pleasures are desirable, such as victory, power, honour, and riches.

With regard to pleasures of anger, gain, riches and honours, we are not called incontinent, properly speaking.

A man belonging to desirable pleasures, is termed incontinent not without reservation, but rather as a bad physician or a bad actor would be.

Incidentally pleasurable things are curative pleasures.

Things that are pleasurable for one and painful for another are not admirable things. Since men are subject to many perversions and deteriorations, the things they take pleasure in are not pleasurable without qualification, but rather pleasurable to those so inclined to them.

Pleasurable and valuable things are those that seem so to the virtuous man, whose activity accords with virtue.

In bestial and psychological pleasures there is something of continence and incontinence alike, since a man can either overcome them or be overcome by them, such as if Phalaris were to keep a boy to devour and then were to set him free.

Some bodily pleasures are humane, while others are brutish, and some are psychological.

Some bodily pleasures are necessary for some end, that is, in the right amount, but this is not the case for excess and defect. The same is true for natural desires, occasions of sadness, and avoidances.

Pleasures, according to the opinion of others, are not good. He gives six reasons.

During sexual pleasure no one can reason about anything.

Pleasure is a sensible process of generation, according to Plato.

Pleasures that are without pain do not have an excess. These things are pleasurable by nature, and not incidentally.

Another way of thinking holds that no pleasure is the best.

Pleasure from sensual desires and pains still is lacking, but pleasure in perfect activiy rejoices in a nature not in need anything.

Pleasures where nature is lacking and pleasures when nature is normal and surfeited are not the same. Since a nature that is fulfilled without qualification takes pleasure in enjoyable things, but a surfeited nature takes pleasure in things opposite them, such as bitter and spicy things.

Pleasures do not always arise in doing actions, but in using things out of an already-formed habit.

Pleasure is not a generation of the senses, but is rather an activity of an unimpeded, already-connatural habit, according to the Philosopher.

If pleasures were evil, because they can be harmful and cause sickness, then medical cures too would be bad because they harm our finances.

Pleasure does not hinder prudence's own pleasure, but pleasures of other habits, though its pleasure it does cause one to investigate and learn more.

Nothing keeps some pleasure from being the best and most desirable thing, even if some pleasures are evil.

Everyone desires pleasure, both beasts and men alike, and therefore it is the best thing.

Bodily pleasures have inherited the name of the general term 'pleasure' because many men are inclined to them, and because they are shared and known by all.

That some pleasure is the best thing, is manifest. Since otherwise the happy man would not live pleasurably.

Some pleasures are very desirable, but not bodily pleasures, with which the intemperate man is concerned.

Bodily pleasures seem very desirable because they seem strong as treatments in expelling excess sadness, and it seems that when they act they do so without their opposite, which is sadness, and therefore they are greatly sought after.

Bodily pleasures are not perceived as good for two reasons: either because of some disposition of the temperaments, or by a trait passed down through parents, as in the case with beasts or brutish men, and out of habituation, as is the case with evil men.

Bodily pleasures are virtuous only incidentally.

Men vehemently seek out bodily pleasures for five reasons.

Some men seek much after bodily pleasures that they might quench the thirst of their desire, a thirst which they themselves cultivate within them.

Excessive pleasure can drive away pain, so these pleasures are much desired. Many men are made intemperate and evil by this.

Pleasure is found more in rest than in movement.

Concerning pleasures, there is much uncertainty amongst the philosophers. Some of them say pleasure is the good, while some say it is evil, some are uncertain and find other explanations convincing. On one hand, some feel compelled by the evidence to say all pleasures are evil, while others feel it is better speak as if they were so, so that men would shy away from pleasures and be led toward the mean.

Pleasure is good in itself, as Eudoxus held, since all seem to desire it, rational things and irrational things alike, and everything seeks after what is good for it, therefore what all seek is good in itself for them.

Pleasure is desirable in itself, since it is opposed to pain, which everything flees. Everyone admits that pleasure is something we choose for its own sake, not for the sake of anything else. A sign of this is that no one is questioned as to why he seeks to take pleasure in something, as if pleasure itself were the end for which other things were chosen.

Pleasure added in addition to any good makes that good more desirable, as, for example, acting justly and to being temperate.

Since pleasure is made more desirable with prudence, pleasure is not good per se, since no admixture of anything makes something that is good per se more desirable, and this is Plato's argument against Eudoxus.

Pleasure and pain are opposed just as good and evil, and if both were evil, they would both be things to be avoided, and if neither were evil, neither would be things to be avoided. Some things do, however, seem to be fled by some as if they were evil, such as sadness, but sought after as a good by some as a good.

Pleasure is not a good according to the opinion of Plato and Pythagoras. Three proofs are given, all of which the Philosopher rejects.

The Platonists say that pleasure is a motion and generation, and therefore not the good, since neither of these things is perfect.

Pleasure is neither a motion, a generation, nor a replenishment, as Plato said.

A man can be brought to pleasure quickly or slowly, but he does not act according to pleasure quickly or slowly.

Pleasure is not a replenishment, but pleasure does certainly come after someone has taken replenishment, just as pain comes after one has gone under the knife for surgery.

That pleasure is replenishment seems to arise from things relating to food with pains and pleasures.

Neither pleasures of knowledge nor pleasures of the senses, through smell, hearing, or sight, have a prior pain.

Concerning those who say pleasures are wicked. They say this because they are treating some disgraceful pleasures which they had to call evil.

Unnatural pleasures are not pleasurable things without qualification, though they can be pleasurable for those who are ill disposed, just like treatment for the sick, sweet things to bitter things, and things that seem foggy to those with an eye disease.

Pleasures, if they are not unnatural, are desirable without qualification if they are also for good reasons, but for some bad reasons, they are not, since they are dangerous. Such as getting rich, but by betrayal, or by being healthy, but not by eating so much food as to choke and die.

Pleasures from good men and from good things differ, just as those which come from what is shameful. Evil men do not take pleasure in good things, since it is not a quality of a just thing to cause pleasure in something that is unjust, as how someone who is not musical cannot enjoy the pleasure specific to music.

That pleasure is not a good per se seems to be shown in the fact that a true friend differs from a flatterer, since a flatterer is to blame.

Pleasure is as something existing as a whole entirely on its own, (just as vision does not have any need of anything following which would complete its form) and thus, no further prolonged time would give it additional completion from what it has.

Those who say pleasure is a movement or a generation miss the mark, since a generation and a motion are only said of particular things, but not of wholes, since there is no process of generation in vision, neither in seeing a single point or in seeing the unity of a whole. Therefore there is no motion or pleasure in either.

Pleasure concerns all the senses, intellect, and contemplation.

Pleasure brings perfection to an action, just as beauty does to youth, though not in the same manner.

There will be pleasure in an activity of the senses and of the intellect, in as much as the sensible or intelligible thing and the one regarding or contemplating it are as they should be.

How is it that no one continually experiences pleasure? And he responds that no human thing can continually be in activity (and therefore be in a state of pleasure), since feeling pleasure follows an action.

A man sometimes takes more pleasure in new things, and when his mind is turned more intensely toward them through desires, he acts more zealously for them, like when he looks at something more intently.

It might be thought that all men desire pleasure. Pleasure makes living better, which is why all men seek after it.

Pleasure makes activities better, as well as living, which is what all men strive after.

Pleasure is not separate from an activity, without an activity, there can be no pleasure.

Pleasure increases an action, and more for those who investigate particulars and who more readily do their research, working along with pleasure, such those who delight in geometry.

When we experience pleasure from one thing, we do not attend to others, as how lovers of flutes do not listen to the speech of those addressing them. The more pleasurable thing will crowd the other out, and if we are not enjoying in something, we can easily do something else, like an audience in a theatre watching bad acting who can eat beans at the same time.

There is a pleasure proper to an action that confirms it, lengthens and prolongs it. Foreign pleasures, however, hinder it, and in this it is evident that they differ much from this.

Foreign pleasures produce nearly the same thing as proper pains do, since they both corrupt a proper action, nevertheless, they do so differently.

Pleasures, just as activities, differ in virtue and plurality.

Pleasures belong most properly to activities than to concupiscence. From arose the confusion of pleasure and action as the same thing.

Pleasure is neither the mind nor the senses, but it is an activity of the mind and the senses, which is why some have difficulty separating them.

Pleasures are of different kinds, and differ just as activities do.

Pleasures of the mind and of the senses differ from one another with regard to their purity, just as activities do. Similarly, sensible pleasures differ from one another just as those of the mind from one another, since spiritual things are purer than natural things.

Just as there is a proper pleasure for each animal, and action, the pleasures of each one and different animals will differ, as, for example, the pleasure of the horse, or the dog, or the ass.

Those things which are said to pleasurable and called 'pleasures' without qualification are those which seem so to the virtuous man, the things in which he delights, since the virtuous man is the measure of all human things.

He asks about the pleasures of the virtuous, and how many they might be, and about the very nature of man's pleasure, and he responds saying that human pleasures are those enjoyed by a perfect and happy man.

It is not necessary to concede that pleasures taken in games, which the powerful seek out, are the best, merely because they seek after them. Just as we do not in this way conclude what is most valuable what children consider to be precious.

Term 6

The Weak Man

The weak man is likened to those who become drunk with little wine.

The weak are those who, despite having deliberated much, do not stand by their good reasoning, and are therefore worse for it.

The weak incontinent man is likened to a city that wished for laws but took no measures to maintain them.

Term 7

Desire

A desire is worthless and pointless if it is an endless process.

Every desire directed toward an end follows the immagination of the one desiring, which is involuntary.

The desire of an end is not voluntary, but must be innate.

Term 8

Shrewdness

Shrewdness (dinotica) is the force that spurs one toward fulfilling a desire.

Term 9

The Shrewd man

The shrewd man can be rather incontinent, but is not one who does not take note of detail in his actions and is not entirely aware, like a drunk or a sleeping man, and is not plainly evil, but is partly evil.

Term 10

Divine

It is rare for men to be divine or brutish.

Term 11

God

We call both the gods and godlike men blessed and happy.

God delights in one simple pleasure.

We suppose all the gods to be blessed and happy.

It is ridiculous to attribute the moral virtues to the gods.

All praises and actions of moral virtues are small and unworthy compared to the gods.

The whole life of the gods is entirely contemplation, entirely blesssed. Men take a share in this insofar as their lives resemble this activity. For the other animals, however, there is no happiness.

The gods have care over the matters of men, and so most delight in the man who is most alike and similar to them. This is the contemplative man, who acts well and rightly in accord with moral virtue.

Term 12

Difference

Between speculative and practical matters, since the speculative deals with first principles, from which demonstrations are given.

Term 13

The Educated Man

The educated man will seek the amount of certainty in each field of study as its nature allows.

Term 14

Riches

Riches are not the good we seek, they are merely useful and sought for the sake of something else.

Term 15

The Diligent Man

It happens that someone is not diligent when he has the habit of living carelessly.

Term 17

The Half of Life

For half of their life (in sleep), nothing separates the happy from the miserable.

Term 17

The Contentious

Men are called contentious and quarrelsome who oppose anything others say or do.

The contentious or quarrelsome man or quarrelsome annoy everyone.

Term 18

Worthiness

All men differ in what they consider worthiness. For some it is freedom, some riches, some a noble status.

Term 19

Measure

When sone whole is divided by a measure (dicha), each can then say which part is his own.

Term 20

Democracy

Democracy seems to be found among groups where there is no rule and with those whose ruler is weak.

In demoncracies friendship can proliferate inasmuch as men may share things in common.

Term 21

The Home

The home is an older and is more necessary thing than the state.

Term 22

Powers

There are three acting powers: the senses, the intellect, and the appetites.

Term 23

Demonstrations

Demonstrations are made in practical matters by reasoning about an end.

Term 24

Guessing

Everyone seems to guess that moral virtue is some habit in accord with prudence.

The same is not suited for men and gods, or for building a temple or a tomb. *this seems out of place

There is something divine in the appetitive part of all, which tends to desire the same in likeness.

Term 1

The Drunk Man

If a man is drunk when he commits murder his punishnment is doubled.

The drunk man may seem daring because of their drunkenness, but they are not brave.

Term 2

Election

Choice seems to be proper to virtue.

Choice certainly seems to be free.

Children and brutes do not have choice.

Choice is distinct from anger, sensual desire, wish, and opinion.

The irrational do not have choice.

Sensual desire is opposed to choice.

Choice does not of itself entail sorrow or delight.

Choice is distinct from anger, since it seems that what is done by anger is not done by choice.

Choice is not the same as wishing, although seems near it.

Choice does not include what is impossible, such that if someone were to say he chose the impossible, he would seem foolish.

Choice regards means to an end. If we desire health, we choose those things which will make us healthy.

Generally, choice seems to regard what is in our power.

Choice is distinct from opinion.

Choices are either good or bad.

We make some choice to accept or reject a certain other sort of thing, but in that we are not expressing an opinion. We can, however, opine about what this choice brings about.

Choice regards things we clearly know well to be good. Opinion, rather, regards things about which we know little.

Choice is voluntary and deliberate, since choice must be accompnaied by reason and intellect.

Choice is a desire from counsel about things in our power.

Term 3

Choosing

By choosing good or evil things, we likewise are good or bad.

Term 4

To Choose

Choosing the best thing seems to be distinct from having an opinion, but it can happen that someone has an opinion of what is best but does not choose it.

Term 5

An Object of Choice

A matter firstly is judged by counsel, and then it becomes an object of choice. This is because everyone cease to ask how he should act, and after taking counsel, he can again deliberate with himself on the matter.

For something to be an object of our choice, it is something we desire, something counseled, and something within our power.

Term 6

Sickness

Sickness and poverty are not things to fear for the man who is wise.

Term 7

The Self-Depreciator

The self-depreciator is he who does not give himself credit for great things or he who downplays them.

Self-depreciators are those who downplay themselves and appear to be gracious, they do not ascrible to themselves any renown, as Socrates did.

Term 8

The Equal

The equal is the middlepoint between excess which is too much and the deficit which is too little.

Equal is said with respect either to something or to us, that it is neither too much nor too little, but this amount is not one and the same for all things, and he explains this.

For something to be equal, there must be at least two points of comparison, since equal is a relative term.

Equality in commutative justice is as such: a line is divided into unequal parts. To make them equal, some must be taken away from the larger part and added to the smaller, then they are made equal.

Equality does not seem to be found in the same way in justice and friendship.

Term 9

Equality

Proportional equality follows the conjunction of a diagonal in a figure.

Term 10

An Man who is Just in Equality

A man is just in equality when he acts equally in proportion between himself and another, and between two others.

Term 11

The Excellence of a Horse

The excellence of a horse is what makes a horse good for running, riding, and anticipating enemies.

Term 12

Virtue Epyeika Epiikeia Equity

Equity is neither absolutely the same as justice, nor does it fall in an entirely different category from it.

We praise one kind of man as equitable, and we praise the kind of man that is prompt, and extend our praise of that man to other things, to acts of virtue, praising him more than is really just.

If equity is something other than what is just, it is difficult to call it a praiseworthy thing while still following the reasoning of justice.

The equitable man is better than the just man, and he is the same in kind with the just man and what is just.

When the same in justice and equity are compared, equity holds greater, since it is a directive of legal justice.

When the law is deficient because of some particular case, the law would direct for what is naturally equitable.

When the equitable thing is rightly ordered to the intention of the law, it is just. And it is an even better thing than legal justice, since that is the directing it.

The equitable man is one who excels in decision-making and taking action, as in those who enforce legal justice. Althought he enforces the law as a deterrent, he mitigates legal penalties, seeking equity.

The man who serves while being in a position of power seems to be equitable.

Term 13

To Be

Being is good for the good man.

Being is good and desirable, and our being comes from our activity, since insofar as we live and act, it is there that anyone loves that what is in activity since so are we as much as we live and act, thus

Term 14

The Experienced

The experienced judge rightly concerning particulars and understand how these are to be accomplished. The inexperienced, however, do not.

Term 15

Wit

Wittiness is the middle position of delight in amusements. One in excess is called a buffoon, the one who falls short is called boorish.

Tact belongs to the wity man, that is, he is always a good conversaltionalist.

The wity or tactful man never mocks, but is always good-spirited and free, and will be as a law unto himself.

The wity man. It is the wity man's way to say and listen to things that befit a modest and free man.

Term 16

Extremes

Extremes are contrary to the mean and contrary to each other.

Extremes extend the mean toward one another.

Extremes oppose one another more than the mean, since they are farther from each other than from the mean.

There is the greatest unlikeness between extremes, and so they are most opposed to one another.

Euripedes. The reasons compelling Euripides's Alcmaeon to kill his mother are ridiculous.

Term 17

Outside Influences

Everything is affected by outside influences.

Term 18

Eudoxus

Term 1

Rumour

No rumour spread throught all the people can be entirely for without truth. note: his is a saying of Hesiod Hes. WD 763

Term 2

The Agent

The agent rules and governs particulars.

Term 3

Deed

No deed nor activity is undertaken simply for its own sake, but rather for something or someone else, for some end.

Term 4

Dreams

Good men have better dreams than others, because their right conduct while they wake brings about continual dreams of doing virtuous things.

We do not control our dreams.

Term 5

The Feverish Man

Fasting and rest generally aid a feverish man, but they may not help some patients.

Term 6

Happiness

Happiness is the greatest good for men, and a gift of the gods.

Happiness is a most excellent and most divine thing, asmuch as it is the end of virtue, which is something most excellent, divine, and blessed.

Happiness can be shared by every person, provided they are not impeded from striving toward virtue through discipline and study.

It will be very ruinous to let one's happiness rest in goods, however great or excellent, that are brought by fortune.

Happiness is the end of political science, since it strives much to produce good citizens and people who do good things.

Different persons seek after happiness in different things, for example, pleasure or riches, or honour.

Some think that having honour is happiness.

Happiness is the greatest and higest good for which all other things are done.

Happiness is the perfect good.

Happiness requires a perfect way of life and perfect virtue.

It is strange to call a man happy when he dies.

Happiness is not accorded to a man at end of his life as if dying were the essence of happiness. Solon did not hold this, he meant, rather that a man will then be called blessed once he is beyond the reach of evils and misfortunes.

The happiness of a father is not necessarily passed down to his children, since it is not the nature of change among men that it be transfered from the dead to the living.

Term 7

Happy

A man yet living is not called happy because of change.

If we follow after fortunes, we will be called many times over both happy and unhappy, like a chameleon.

In considering happiness, we are not to consider the goods of fortune, which are in themselves neither good nor bad, but can serve as instruments to happiness.

The happy man is immovable throughout his whole life, in action and contemplation according to virtue. He bears fortunes nobly and will act everywhere prudently.

The happy man is a man who is good, perfect, and foursquare beyond reproach (Simonides).

The happy man is not swayed nor changed by small things, good or evil.

The happy man is troubled by great evils, which cause him sadnesss, but when these come, his goodness shines forth as a corageous and magnanimous man.

The happy man is made more blessed from great goods.

The happy man, when his fortunes change, does not commit evil and hateful acts, but bears all fortunes worthily.

The happy man will never be made unhappy, even if his fortunes change.

The happy man will not lose his happines becaue of small misfortunes that befall him, but only by many and great ones, and from these he will not be happy again soon.

The happy man, when he falls from many great goods, will not quickly become happy again, only after he spends much time has passed and he again has regained many good things.

A man is called happy when he operates in accord with perfect virtue and has sufficient external goods.

The happy man has need of external goods, fortitude, nobility, and good fortune.

One who has a very unslightly appearnace or who is low-born or alone and childless is not happy.

He is less happy whose children have gone astray or who has wicked friends, or whose good friends have died.

Women, because of the weakness of their sex, are delicate. In this way, they differ from men.

Happiness is not attained in a day nor in a little time, just as the sight of one swallow does not means spring has arrived.

For the happy, life in itself is a delight.

A man who suffers many evils and misfortunes is not called happy.

The happy man rejoices in actions that accord with virtue and is saddened by evil, as a musician delights in harmonious melodies and winces at discord.

Term 8

Happiness

We choose happiness for its own sake, and never for anything else.

Happiness is a self-sufficient good.

Happiness is most desirable without any further addition. With further addition, it is little more.

Happiness is a perfect and self-sufficient good and the end of all human actions.

Happiness is a human action in accord with reason, a fully-developped habit, and activity over a whole lifetime.

Happiness regards activity over a whole lifetime.

Happiness is obtained through activity over much time.

Everything the ancients said of happiness seems to accord with what his (Plato? look up ref) opinion.

Some hold that happiness to be virtue, others prudence, and others wisdom. Additionally, pleasure, which is the good of the body, and others thought it to could be had in external goods.

The opinion of Aristotle on happiness accords with what many have said, that is, that happiness is found in virtue.

Happiness is not in need of additional pleasure as something added to it, but is already pleasurable in itself.

Happiness is that most excellent and noble and most pleasurable thing.

Happiness is the best activity according to one or more virtues.

Happiness requires external goods to serve as instruments.

No one merely praises happiness, but calls it a blessed, divine thing.

Happiness is not merely worthy of praise, but is something greater than praise

Happiness is a perfect and honourable thing.

Happiness is the end for which all other things are done.

Term 9

The End

The end is the principle and cause of goods and is something honourable.

Some ends are activities in themselves, such as playing the harp, others however are the products of activities.

There are as many different end as there many activities, beings, arts, and sciences. Examples follow.

The end of medicine is health; naval science, sailing; military strategy, victory.

The ends of higher arts are more desirable than those lower arts which are below them.

If one of our actions is something we seek for its own sake, it is its own end, and other actions for its sake, is since this cannot go on infinetly, it is obvious that this good is a supreme one.

Knowledge of the final end will greatly benefit the whole of one's life and is knowledge.

The end of political science is the good of man.

The end of this science is not merely knowledge but action.

The end of an action regards time.

An end is not what pertains to counsel, but rather its means.

The end for each thing accords with its ordering toward a like habit.

The means and their end, whether a good or evil one, are by nature voluntary. He gives a three-fold division and concludes by this that virtues and vices are similarly voluntary.

The end in practical matters is not to know things but to act. This makes us good or, if something else makes us good it is something such as penalties or law.

The end of this action is not that we come to know something, rather that we become good.

The end of the brave man's activities agrees with its own habit, of strengthening courage, which is the good toward which he is directed.

Everything is likened to its end.

Euprasia (good operation) is its own end.

Making something always has some other end other than itself, but action does not.

Ends in practical matters are the principles, just as first principles in mathematics.

Term 10

The Son

A man brought by his son ordered him to stop at the door.

Sons seem to be the end of the union of a man and his wife. This is why those who are sterile separate before long.

Sons are a good that is shared between both the man and his wife.

A son cannot deny his father, but a father may deny his son.

The son can never make an equal return to the father for all those things give him, and so he will always be indebted to him.

All animals share the procreation of sons.

Term 11

Strong

A man is not called brave because he does not fear his body being flogged.

A man is called brave principally because he is undaunted by a good death and things which may lead to it.

The brave man is not fearful in the sea, not however like seafarers who do not fear because they are experienced.

The brave man does not lose his wits, but fears such and endures such things which reasons dictates for the sake of the good.

A man who fears is brave if he and endures all circumstances well, and similarly ventures all things well.

The brave man endures and acts according to what is worthy, as reason dictates.

The brave man has good hope in daring, the coward, however, despairs.

The brave are poised for action in war, beforehand, however they are still and at ease.

For a man to be brave, it must not be for mere necessity, but for the good.

The brave man is daring with respect to the cowardly and reckless with respect to the fearful.

They are not brave who rush to dangers out of pain of passion and anger and not out of a foresight. For even asses would be called brave as they hunger, even prodding does not keep them from grazing. d. See Hom. Il. 11.558.

The brave man acts because of the good.

Those who have good hope for victory are like the brave, since both risk dangers, but they are not truly brave.

It is proper to the brave man to undergo terrible things that are proportionate to the man and not apparent.

A man seems braver when he is undaunted or undisturbed by sudden things, more than if the things were known to him beforehand.

For the brave man, death and wounds are sad, but he bears them because of the good of fortitude.

For the brave man, death is sadder even than for others, since he is deprived of the best goods, he loses reason yet gains all the more.

The brave man chooses the good of fortitude above the other goods which he may lose in dying.

It is not burdensome to show bravery against the weak and the difficult things which are honourable is not to be burdensome with anger.

The brave breath out harsh vigor through both nostrils, his blood is boiled, a sign of a man enraged. Odyssey 24.318.

The truly brave act for the good of virtue, but raged beasts, just as raging men, act because of some agitation, which if they were not in the wood or swamp they would not encounter.

Those with bravery in military strategy, if they spot a danger which they judge beyond them, or above the number of their army or arms, they flee. But those who are brave only with regard to the political order stay put and allow themselves to be slain, as it happened at Hermeon.

The brave man neither flees quickly nor, as the soldier, permits himself to be cut down when he defends himself for the safety of the citizens.

The brave man has the appearance of rage, violent rage against dangers.

Those who are brave in war are honoured in city-states and among kings.

Term 12

Fortitude

Fortitude does not concern all things that are rightly to be feared by all men, such as disgrace, nor things which are not to be feared, like destitution, neither things which cause little fear.

Fortitude concerns the most dreadful things.

Fortitutude concerns the best ways of dying, which are in defence of one's own, and not in a death being at sea or by illness.

Fortitude, by its actions conform to its good, that is, bravery.

Fortitude is a mean that concerns confidence and frightful things. In these it seeks after and bears what it must in order to avoid befalling what is shameful.

Fortitude is called in five other ways apart from true fortitude, and the first of these is political political fortitude.

Fortitude, as Socrates judged, is a kind of experiential science knowledge.

Fortitude concerns frightful things more than confidence.

Fortitude is more worthy of praise among other virtues, because its task of enduring frightful things is more difficult than abstaining from pleasures.

It seems that fortitude has for its end a delight by reason, insofar as it endures such things for the sake of the good.

Strength physical fortitude is attained from much nourishment and hard work, practice makes one strong.

Fortitude is a mean betwean fears and confidence.

Term 13

Brother

The relation between brothers who are equals is like a timocracy.

If brothers are of many differenct ages, the love between them is not as much a fraternal one, but rather as of a father to a son.

Brothers love each other as much as they are born of the same, and so we say the are the same blood and stock.

Term 14

Fortune

The fortunes of one's descendants do not influence a man's happinness.

Fortunes differ greatly for each, if these were all to be told out, it would be an exceedingly long, infinite task.

Some fortunes have an importance because they distract our attention, some are an aid toward happiness as instruments to it, some are of lesser importance, such as what happens to friends.

The fortunes and misfortunes of friends seem to have some influence on the dead, but not in such a way that could make them happy or miserable.

All disparage fortune because good fortune is given to those unworthy of it and to those who are most worthy are not so enriched.

The fortunate and misfortunate have need of friends. The former need those to live with and benefit, the later have need of help.

Friends are to be more promptly called in when good fortunes come, since the good man so benefited can most benefit others. A man should be slow to call friends to share in misfortunes, that is, later on, and not without perceiving some great necessity, and even then only when they have power to help him greatly with little inconvenience to themselves.

One should be quick to join a friend when he is in good fortune, for this is the duty of friends. But they should receive any benefit from him calmly and relaxed, because one should watch out and take care not to gain a reputation of being indelicate, which does tend to happen.

Term 15

Rage

Rage, because of its likeness to true fortitude is called fortitude, because the brave throw themselves courageously into danger, and so do those burning with rage, just as wild and cruel beasts rushing to wound them.

Rage acts most violently against dangers.

Term 16

When using a figure showing proportionality, it is necessary to reduce works and craftsmen to that which would align them as equal in a proportional way.

Term 17

Happiness

Happiness is not found in a habit but in action, since a habit persists even when one is sleeping or found in misfortune.

Happiness consists in an activity, that is desirable for its own sake.

Happiness does not consist in amusements.

No one would attribute happiness to a bestial man unless unless he would also add that he possesses the contemplative life, which would be absurd.

Happiness and is activity in accord with the highest virtue and has that greatest part of us, that is, the intellect. Whether this is something according to nature that seems to rule and dominate, and have understanding of good and divine things.

Happiness is a continual activity, and such is an activity pertaining to the speculative part.

We judge that some pleasure must accompany happiness, and so it will be with an activity that accords with wisdom, which is most delightful.

It seems that happiness is found in leisure, since leisure is not undertaken for the sake of any other action.

If something is truly happiness, it may not lack anything.

The happiness of the state, which operates according to the moral virtues, is a secondary kind of happiness.

Contemplative happiness has little need of outward generosity, that is, in giving external goods, and it has less need than moral happiness.

Contemplative and moral happiness both have need of the necessities of life, although it is the public man who works more for theses things. There is little difference with either as regards the nature of such necessisites, but they do rather differ in their activities, since the liberal man has need of money to be able to give liberally, the intellectual man, however, does not.

Perfect happiness is some contemplative activity.

Term 18

Happy

The happy life seems to be one lived in accord with virtue and not spent in amusement.

Happiness in a man still wants of outside prosperity, because his nature is not sufficient in himself for contemplation, but the body must also be in good health, and have food and other things to aid it.

Although a man has need of external goods to be happy, it must not be thought they need be many and great goods for continued happiness. This is because an overabundance of external goodscannot in themselves lead a man to judgment of contemplation or action of moral virtue, but it is necessary to have many helps to it.

For the happy man, it is enough to have as many external goods as are necessary to live well.

Term 1

To Be Joyful

Proper upbringing is this: to be joyful in what is joyful; and sorrowful in what is sorrowful.

Term 2

Grammarian

A man is not made a grammarian by uttering something correctly by chance or aided by someone.

Term 3

Taste

Taste is judgment of flavors, what those who sample vine and season sauces do.

Term 4

The Throat

A certain man prayed that his throat were longer than a crane's so that by having more contact with his food he might delight in it more.

Term 5

Gratitude

It is proper to gratitude that one returns favour for favour, for one must be of service to one who benefits him.

Term 6

Gnome

Man has gnome, synesis, and intellect by nature because they develop innately at a certain age.

All men take pleasure in food, wine, and sex, but not as they ought.

Term 1

Habit

Virtuous habits bring about like actions.

Our habits accord with our disposition, whether good or bad, to the passions. Examples follow.

Each habit has its own things proper to it, both goods and pleasures.

Habits of mean are seem to be excesses when compared to defects, and compared to excess, they seem defects, and he gives an example about the passions surrounding fortitude.

The habit in the mean is praiseworthy in every instance.

A contrary habit is oftentimes known by another contrary habit, it is also often know by its subject, examples follow.

These habits deal with particular extremes and particulars.

Term 2

Homer

Homer, in writing Trojan history, makes mention of such men as Diomedes and Hector.

Homer called Jove, who was the king of Crete, 'father' because fatherly rule is the ideal of monarchy.

Homer called Agamemnon the shepherd of the people.

Homer called the girdle of the Cyrprian woman many-coloured, and this is a symbol of the bond of concupiscence with which the spirit of man is pulled this way and that. And that she craftily steals the wits of even the wise man. Iliad 14.214–17.

Term 3

Man

Man is a political animal by nature.

There is an activity proper to man, as there is for each art its proper activity, just as for the parts of the body, have their own proper activity, such as the eye, foot, and hands.

Man is the principle of his actions, the thing about which he takes counsel.

Man should not be said to be the principle of his actions, neither as the generator of his children.

Man is a principle who works through his appetites and intellect.

Man is not the most excellent thing in the world.

Men are made divine on account of the excellence of virtue.

Men are called wild who live near the Black Sea who eat meat that is raw, or the flesh of men, and who give their children to one another for feasting.

Vice applied to man is called vice without qualification, but not as regards brutishness or sickness.

Man works many more evils than a beast.

Men worthy of honours seek to be honoured by virtuous (epyeikebus) and wise men, because by their judgment they gain some approval of their way of life, and gain confidence of their goodness.

Married life is more natural to man than polictics.

Men do not only live together for the sake of children but also for the sake of what it contributes to their life.

No man falling short of virtue would choose to have an intellectual understanding of everything.

Each man seems to be synonymous with his intellectual faculty, or at least mostly.

Man is naturally a policitical and is born suited to common living.

Man must not content himself to occupy himself only with human concerns, but reach up to immortal things as much as he is able.

Term 4

Honour

Honour is said to be more in the one honouring than the one who is given honour.

Honour is a less perfect thing than happiness.

Honour is virtue's reward.

Political power and riches are desirable because of the honour they bring.

Honour is the repayment for virtue and kindness.

It is not possible to show honour to each according to their dignity, such as those we owe to parents and to the gods. No one can repay these their due.

Men seek to be honoured by prudent men and thought virtuous by those who know them.

In seeking after honour there is a mean and an excess, like in accepting money.

We do not owe the same honour to our mother and father.

We should show honour to the elderly by rising.

The man who offers no good to the community is not held in honour, but the man who benefits the common good also receives a common good, namely, honour.

Only the good and virtuous man is to be honoured.

Term 5

Hector

Hector was so good that he did not seem a chid of mortal man but of God.

Term 1

The Opinionated

The opionated are glad if they win an argument with their opinions and they are saddened if their opinions are judged as weak.

Term 2

Induction

Induction is a beginning point and is universal.

Term 3

Idea

There is not one idea of all good things.

All those things that share in one idea should convene by reason in a form, such as what snow and white-lead share by reason of their whiteness.

To have precise certainty of an idea is more proper to another science than to philosophy.

Term 4

The Boaster

What a boaster might be.

Term 5

Ignorance

Everything done through ignorance is not done voluntarily, but is not necessarily involuntarily.

A man who acts through ignorance does not feel any saddenness in his action.

To act through ignorance and to do something ignorantly seem to be different things. Such as a man drunk or enraged, who does not know what he is doing, even though ignorance is here not the cause, but drunkeness.

Every wicked man is also somehow ignorant, but a man's ignorance does not make what he ought to do something involuntary, since it is not ignorance that urges him, but vice.

Ignorance in particular cases causes an action to be involuntary, and in these cases one should offer mercy and pardon.

Men are blamed if their ignorance is of a universal thing.

No one is ignorant of every circumstance unless he be insane, no one is ignorant of an action if he is the one doing it.

A father who kills his son, because he thought him to be an assailant against him, does so in ignorance. Just as Merope who killed his son thinking he was an enemy.

Concerning ignorance one could have of an implement, as to to its proper use, and for what motive. He lays out examples.

A man unaware of first principles seems to act without choosing, since his ignorance means what he does is involuntary. There must, however, be remorse and sadness present in his actions.

Ignorant men are punished if they themselves are the cause of their ignorance.

Men are punished if they are ignorant of universal laws, about which one cannot be ignorant, which are not difficult to understand.

We punish men who are ignorant through carelessness since it was in their power to care about such things.

It is a thoroughly senseless man who does not know that repeated activities of a like manner produce like habits.

If a man, through no ignorance, takes some action which would render him unjust, and he does so willingly, he will be unjust. Even so, it is not true that if the unjust man could make himself just by wishing to be so.

Ignorant men appear to be courageous, and they are not far from courageous men who have good hope, but ignorant men are worse off. Courageous men have some dignity because they make their attack knowingly, but the ignorant men have none.

Some men are ignorant of what they say, when what they say are ineffable to them, such as in the mysteries of Aeschylus.

Term 6

Stinginess

Stinginess is always associated with those who are too anxious about wealth.

Stinginess is a lack in giving, but an excess in receiving.

Stinginess is incurable, since old age and every other disability make men stingy.

Stinginess is more connatural to everyone than wastefulness.

The error in stinginess does wrong by a deficiency in giving and an excess in receiving, but to be stingy one need not only go amiss in both ways, but a man may be divided at times.

All stingy men who are called 'miserly' lack in giving and even in taking, because they neither wish to have others' goods nor take them if they are offered to them. These are also called 'close'.

Some are stingy who do not want to give what they have, also refuse to taking anything from others, becuase of a kind of moderation and avoidance of disgrace, that, if they were to give, they might then have to profit another's shamefully.

Some are stingy who do not want to accept anything so as not to be obligated to give in return.

Some stingy men are immoderate in receiving anything at all. Such as those engaging in such ignoble enterprises as pimps and usurers.

Stingy men subject themselves to disgrace for a small gain.

Stingy men are counted with the gambler and the graverobber, and the thief, who deal unlawfully and are met with shame.

All disgraceful gains are stingy, that is, they profit from friends who they should be giving to, and try to gain a profit when none is necessary.

Stinginess is rightly said to be the opposite of generosity and is a greater evil than wastefulness, since many more men act immoderately in this way.

Term 7

The Incontinent Man

The movement of incontinent men is contrary to reason.

The incontinent man does not act in any way by choice.

A man is made incontinent by passing his time drinking.

A man who is incontinent and evil man lays hold of what he wishes to know by reasoning.

Men are called incontinent with respect to anger, honour, and gain.

The incontinent man who is persuaded to do what is pleasant is better than the man who does so out of regard for the opinion of others and not the dictates of reason.

We may apply the proverb to the incontinent man: 'When water chokes, what shall we drink?'

The incontinent and intemperate man differ in a way, because the intemperate man follows after the pleasant from choice as an end, but the incontinent does not perceive himself as doing so but he is overcome by the force of his passions.

Incontinent men imitate the pronouncements of men with understanding without having it themselves.

The ignorance of an incontinent man is removed after a movemenet of passion, just as the case of the wine-drunk man or of one asleep, but this has more to do with natural science than with ethics.

The incontient man is wont to use scientific terminology just as a wine-drunk man recites the words of Empedocles.

What, strictly speaking, constitutes an incontinent man.

It is evident that the incontinent, the continent, the perservering, and the effiminate are all concerned with pleasure and pain.

An incontinent man, strictly speaking, is concerned with bodily pleasures, about which one is temperate and intemperate, not as the temperate or intemperate man, but not in choosing or understanding these pleasures.

The incontinent man and the intemperate man concern the same thing but not in the same way, the former choose something but the latter do not.

A man is called incontinent who is overcome by pleasant things, pleasures which many men are able to resist.

The incontinent man is better than the intemperate man, and is not evil in every sense, he is saved by having the right end as his goal.

The incontinent and the intemperate man are alike in that they both seek after bodily pleasures, but they differ in that the former thinks he ought, while the latter does not.

The incontinent man does the thing that he knows he should avoid, since passion pushes him toward it.

The incontinent man is not prudent, because every prudent man is good and does good, and the incontinent man is not this way.

Term 8

Incontinence

Incontinence does not concern all the passions.

Incontinence and intemperance concern the same thing.

We do not disparage incontinence because it is a mere wrongdoing, but because it is, as a kind of vice, either in a universal or a particular way. But this does not apply to anger, gain, or honour.

Incontinence and continence are related to brutish pleasures, but not absolutely, but with qualification.

Incontinence and continence are spoken about absolutely as they correspond to human intemperance, and with other metaphors.

Incontinence with regard to the appetites is less shameful than incontinence relating to anger.

Incontinence and intemperance are alike in the actions they lead to and are the ends are directed toward.

Incontinece is an evil habit, continence, though, is a good one.

The incontinence that the melancholic suffer is more easily remedied than that of those weak men who do not heed the counsel they receive.

Term 9

The Intemperate Man

We do not call those who enjoy the smell of roses or incense intemperate.

The intemperate man is he who is excessive in his tactile pleasures.

The intemperate man dabbles in every pleasure but shies away from none.

The intemperate man is saddened more than he should be when he lay hold of pleasures. His desire for more makes him sad when this pleasure is not enough to satisfy him.

The intemperate man desires all pleasurable things or what are most pleasurable and is lead by sensual desire to choose rather what is pleasurable more than what reason dictates is is good for him to choose.

The intemperate man is saddened when he does not attain what he desires.

For the intemperate man to heal, it is necessary for him to have few, measure thoughts, and that nothing in them be contrary to reason.

We should disparage the intemperate man more than the incontinent man, because he pursues excess with no control and flees from slight discomforts

The intemperate man is he who makes the choice to pursue superflous pleasures, he has no remorse and is beyond help in the act.

The intemperate man is worse than the incontinent man, since he is not remorseful and therefore beyond aid, but the incontinent man is not.

Term 10

Intemperance

Intemperance is more of a choice than fear, since intemperance is pleasurable but fear is disagreeable.

Intemperance is a more reproachable thing.

'Intemperant' is used to name the faults of boys, but 'fearful' to name the faults of grown men.

Term 11

Understanding

Neither art, science, nor prudence have Understanding as their principle. Since science concerns demonstrable things, whereas art and prudence concern contingent things.

Understanding concerns extreme points and first principles.

Every intellect seeks after and chooses the good for its own sake.

The intellect is a divine thing whose action as accords its own virtue, and its most perfect happiness.

Though understanding be a small thing in us, it has much greater worth and power than all else.

Term 12

For the sake of the intellectual part of the soul

Everything seems to be the sake of intellective part of the soul.

Term 13

To Understand

Understanding and perception are principally good things.

Term 14

Private Citizens

We observe that private citizens do more good even than princes.

Term 15

Intellectual Virtues

We name the intellectual virtues: wisdom, understanding, and prudence.

An intellectual virtue is formed and increased, for the most part, by instruction.

Term 16

The Boaster

The boaster is one who feigns lofty things, things greater than he really has.

Some boasters present themselves as greater than they are without a reason, some do so for honour or glory, (such a man is not so worthy of reproach), but others do this for money, and these men are disgraceful.

A man is not made a boaster by his own ability. He comes to it by choice or out of habit, seeking after glory or profit. Those who boast seeking glory, claim accomplishments that draw praise and happiness. These seeking present themselves as doctors, fortune-tellers, or wisemen.

The boaster, because he is a worse character, is more opposed to truthtelling than the self-depreciator.

The mean of boasting is nearly the same, that is, it regards words and deeds in common life.

Term 17

Judge

A man judges well about things known to him.

A judge should be as justice in the flesh.

Judges are called mediators, that is, 'speaking the mean,' since the judge restores the mean.

Term 18

Justice

Justice is a habit by which men are directed to just acts.

Legal justice is a perfect virtue, but not absolutely, it is directed toward another, and that virtue would be the most excellent of the virtues. In such a way that neither the even star nor the morning star is as wonderful as their source.

Infraction of justice in transactions has three types: when an unjust act is committed through ignorance, when it is not done with prior deliberation, and when it is done knowlingly and after deliberation, out of vice.

Justice has every virtue and it is, an especially perfect one. It makes the man who has it good in himself and toward others.

Among the virtues, justice seems to be the only one concerning the good for another, for it works good for thatother, whether for the prince or for the common good.

Legal justice is not a part of some virtue but, it is rather a virtue in itself. Subsequently, its contrary is not only partly vicious but a vice of its own.

Justice, inasmuch as it accomplishes something else, is part of the exercise of all the virtues, but it is a virtue in itself without qualification because it is a habit.

Particular justice has the same name since it is a whole virtue in itself, insofar as each thing has the power to act toward another.

A special kind of justice names what men do for pleasure in gaining and sadness in loss. Legal justice, however, regards all those things related to acting virtuously.

Particular justice is divided into distrubutions and transactions.

Distributive justice consists in the distribution of both honours and weath. Commutative justice, however, conisists in transactions, such as when one receieves something in exchange for another.

Commutative justice includes some voluntary things, such as selling and other similar things, and some involuntary things, such as theft and others which he lists.

In commutative justice the thing is only the difference in damage. It makes no difference if the good man robbed the evil one, or the other way round.

The kind of justice mentioned only exists between those men governed by the law.

A man is called just who acts by choice with the habit of justice and distributes both to himself and to another.

There is a kind of justice that directs voluntary and involuntary transactions. This is distinct from distributive justice.

Justice is called dikaion and the just man dicastes as it were, 'directed to dican,' examples follow. ( ref 1132a 31)

Justice is called the good of another.

We do not call justice the relationship of a lord to his servant or of the father to his son, at least, at any rate, until in any case he grows up to be a certain age.

No part of justice is useful to evil and senseless men, but all of it is harmful to them.

Term 19

The Just Man

The just man and the temperate man are not so called because they do just things, but because they act as just and temperate men do.

A man is not just if he does not take pleasure in doing just acts.

The just man is abides by the law and is fair.

A man who acts justly knowlingly, voluntarily, and by choice, is a just man. But if a man only does it voluntarily, he only acts justly, since he does not act out of a habit of justice.

The just man desires his own life and preservation, especially that of his intellect by the thing by which he gains knowledge.

The just man wishes confer with himself, which he does with pleasure: both to savour in memory past benefactors, in hope of future benefaction. His mind presently is full of topics for contemplation.

Just and temperate things are the things the just man temperate man would do.

Term 20

What is Just

What is just is what is called fair, which seems self-evident to all.

What is just involves at least four terms: two parties in which justice is dealt, and two things which are dealt.

All admit that what is just in distribution is corresponds to some merit.

What is just with regard to distributive justice is proportional.

The same proportion for what is just must included four terms, for it divides both persons and things by two.

What is just in the distribution of common things to the community or society is dealt according to a kind of geometrical proportionality.

In transactions, what is just is not fair with reference to geometric proportion, but according to arithmetric proportion.

In directive justice, what is just is a mean equal of loss and gain. This is why people have recourse to a judge when distributions are made.

What is just is not the same as reciprocation, as the Pythagoreans held, because it does not belong either to distributive justice or directive justice in tranasacting. You are not always obligated to give what is yours for what is mine.

In dealings of exchange, what is just does contain reciprocation, proportionally but not equally.

What is just for a master and a father are not the same in distributive and commutive justice, but they are similar.

What is just and unjust in politics is nothing other than what is just and unjust between those subject to the law who have equal authority to rule and be ruled.

Some things are called just by legal justice, acts that accord with every virtue, things prescribed by the law.

What is just and unjust are not said of one man, they always involve others.

Some think that one need not be wise to know what things are just or unjust, because the laws regarding these are not difficult to understand. But these are only just materially and incidentally.

Things are just, formally speaking, when they are rightly applied to particular cases according to special modes of action. This is more than knowing what is good for one's health.

Just things are found, strictly speaking, in those men who possess goods used by men. Some have excess of these and some lack, some cannot have excess, such as the gods.

What is just in the home concerns more one's wife than to his children or possessions or slaves. This is domestic justice which is distinct from political justice.

Term 21

Justice, Natural and Legal

In political justice, there is natural justice and legal justice. Natural justice has the same force for everyone, and everywhere the same way, and it does not depend on what men may or may not think. The difference of legal justice, however, is that it differs in its application, as he shows.

What is just in legal matters depends on the laws that are enacted and applied, just as measures are not always the same everywhere. Similarly, natural and human things are different among different peoples, but there is one nevertheless which is best.

Each just thing, whether natural or legal, is as particular actions of a universal, since there are many actions and they are ruled by one universal.

If a man returns a deposit unwillingly and on account of fear, it should not be called acting justly nor an act of justice (dycaioprage), except incidentally, and so too with the unjust.

It is not really proper to speak of a man as being just to himself, except metaphorically, and out of a certain resemblance.

Any man, qua man, can have a kind of justice toward another who can take part in a law or agreement, and the same is true of friendship.

What is just is twofold: somthing unwritten, and something set down in law.

Term 22

Injustice

Some kinds of injustice are set apart from justice considered generally speaking, and this is evident in many vices.

and covetous men which is in receiving more Unequal injustice belongs to the covetous man who takes more than his share of the whole.

Injustice works many evil deeds, formally speaking, but it is the unjust man who does so in effect.

Injustice, which is contrary to justice, is the operative of the unjust man. And this is an excess and defect either in utility or harm that is out of proportion.

Injustice is not in all those who act unjustly. Whoever takes on himself more good works than evil ones, is unbalanced, but it does not nor then follow that the man man is guilty of injustice.

Injustice can be toward oneself because it can happen that in the powers of the soul that one suffers something contrary to its own desire. In this way, there is a kind of justice as there is between the ruler and the ruled.

Term 23

The Unjust Man

The unjust man seems to be law-breaking, covetous, and unfair.

The unjust man does not always choose too much, but sometimes too little, such as choosing too few things that are evil outright.

He asks which works make someone unjust.

A man is not unjust except by deliberate choice, so that if he has intercourse with another woman and not by deliberate choice, because of innate passion, he does something unjust but is not an unjust man.

Men who act out of anger or other unnatural passions are not called unjust men, but harmful men or erring men who act wrongly and unrightly. Nevertheless, these men are not called evil or unjust since their acts do not come from injustice, but passion.

A man is unjust and evil when he acts by choice and with the intention of injuring.

Term 24

What is Unjust / an injustice

An injustice can be disproportionate in two ways, in excess and defect, and this can even occur in acts of distributive justice. The one who commits the injustice has in excess, whereas the one suffering under it has less of a good.

It is not possible for a man to do injustice to himself, because then he willingly suffers injustice (and here examples are given of particular injustices), no one commits adultery with his own wife, but another's, nor does he knock down his own door. The reason for this is that for injustice to occur, a man must suffer against his will.

No one willingly commits injustice against himself.

A man commits an injustice to the city if he kills himself, because the city suffers a loss, and the city's good name is somewhat tarnished. This is why its laws direct that such men not be buried.

A man is not committing injustice against himself if he commits only one unjust act. He is not entirely evil, having vice in the abstract, which is part of illegal injustice.

All injustice done is done so willingly and by choice.

It seems that A man who suffers a wrong and resists it does not commit injustice.

It happens more often that one who distributes, and who does so willingly, does an injustice, (because he originated that act), but the receiver of this does not always commit an injustice unless it is in his willingness, which he may more have by some scheming.

A man can be said to act unjustly in many ways: whether by initiating it or as an accomplice, such as a hand, or as one acting independently such as a servant or a hatchet lends assists, but these do not act unjustly formally speaking, but materially.

A man does not, formally speaking, commit injustice if he is ignorant of both legal and natural law, , since he does not judge with reference to either kind of justice. If however, he knowingly judges unjustly, his action is, properly covetous and unjust, he acts for the sake of someone's favour or out of fear of punishment.

The man who judges unjustly because of a friendship has more than his due of the case, since the matter about which he judges does not yield land but money.

Men judge it an easy thing to do what is unjust. This, however, is not so. True, it is easy and within their power to have intercourse with a neighbour's wife, or to kill their neighbour, but this, formally speaking, is not acting unjustly. Acting as unjust men do is, however, neither easy nor in their power, unless it springs from a habit of character.

Formally speaking, 'to act unjustly' in itself, is to act as an unjust man does and to do so out of habit. Merely prescribing a drug, such as a laxative, does not constitute medical care, but doing the job of a physician does.

Euripedes unseemingly maintained that suffering injustice is voluntary.

For a man to suffer injustice, he must be suffering against his will.

No one willingly, not even the incontinent man, suffers injustice, it is rather against his will.

A man who gives what is his own does not suffer injustice. A proof of this is given by citing the Homer: a man named Glaucus gave gold things to Diomedes in exchange for bronze, and another, one hundred oxen for ten. This is giving unjustly, in a material way, but it is in his power to not suffer this injustice. There must be another who commits the unjust thing. (Il. vi. 236)

Term 25

What is Unjust

To do what it is unjust and to suffer it are both evil things, because they both stray from the mean of the good of justice, one by excess and the other difficiency.

Doing what is unjust is worse than suffering it because it always it is always accompanied with vice, whether entirely or mostly, and is blameworthy. Suffering what is unjust, however, neither brings vice nor justice upon oneself.

Suffering injsutice is in itself less evil than doing it, but nothing prevents a worse evil from ocoming about incidentally. Just as a cut on one's foot can incidentally be worse than a pleurisy if it causes one to fall, be captured by adversaries and die. Even though, strictly speaking, a doctor would rank the pleurisy worse.

A man giving himself less than he deserves does not do himself an injustice, but only a nuisance.

What is unjust is not the same what is unjustified, because something is called unjust by its order or nature, but what is unjustified is what is carried out in an action.

A man does what is just and what is unjust when he acts willingly. When he is unwilling, his actions are only said to be just or unjust incidentally.

Term 26

Just Action

A just action is commonly called a dikeopraema, that is, an activity of justice.

Just actions and actions of justice are defined in terms of a voluntary thing and an involuntary thing.

An action can by no means be just if it is not done voluntarily.

Term 27

Anger

A man prone to anger may be convinced by reason in some way, but not so with a man drawn by concupiscence, therefore it is the more shameful of the two.

Anger is more natural to man than desires for excessive pleasures.

Anger and desire for sexual pleasures transform men and make them mad.

We do not say that something pre-meditated is done in a fit of anger, and so it seems that the man who provokes the outrage commits the greater evil, rather than the one acting out anger.

An excess of anger is possible in all circumstances, since one can be angered with those one should not be, or about the wrong things, these are not all found in the same person.

Irascibility is an excess in anger.

An angry man turns remorseful, but a man seeking injury delights in it and learns how to commit it.

The man who is only a little angry is to be excused, but the man who gets too angry is blameworthy. A man is worthy of blame if he has too much or lacks too much anger.

Anger is a kind of passion, it arises from many and differing causes.

Anger and sensual desire are reasonable passions.

We should praise the man who is angry at the right things and with the right people, when and in the degree appropriate.

It seems to belong to the foolish man to never be angry at what he should, since he does not seem either to feel or be pained at these things.

A man who strays but a little from the mean, whether in excess or dificiency, is not to be blamed, but rather praised. We call men lacking a little in anger meek.

We praise angry men as manly or capable of taking charge.

Term 28

Inirascibility

Inirascibility is a defect.

Term 29

The Hot-Tempered

The hot-tempered are those who get angry quickly and at things or for reasons they ought not to, they are angrier they they should be. Their anger flares up and quickly ceases. Their best quality is that they do not let anger build up, but let it out.

The hot-tempered man is not a schemer.

Term 30

Being Angered

It is not easy to determine in what circumstances or tow what degree one should be angry, and to what degree one acts rightly or wrongly.

Term 31

The Angry Man

The angry man suffers pain before his revenge, but delights when exacting it.

Angry men who fight because of anger are not courageous, because they are so called not for the good, nor for reason, but on account of passion.

Term 32

The Irrational

The irrational part of the soul shares in some way in the rational.

Term 33

A Swallow

A single swallow does not make spring spring and neither does one fine day; neither can one virtue nor a short time make a man happy.

Term 34

Involuntary

Concerning actions under compulsion, there can be a mix between voluntary and involuntary. There is the example of the tyrannt, or of the sailor who throws his possessions into the sea during a storm. Such actions seem to have mixed motives, and are more like voluntary actions

If a thing is involuntary in itself, and yet the doer has power in him to act, then it is voluntary, such as the man who has in possessions in his boat during a storm.

Term 35

Involuntary out of Ignorance

Term 36

What is Involuntary

When dealing with involuntary actions, we should have mercy and pardon.

A thing is said to be involuntary, if it is done out of ignorance or compulsion.

A thing is involuntary if remorse or repentence accompany it.

We should not call the things a man should seek after 'involuntary,' or things that should anger him.

Every involuntary thing causes us discomfort, but what we desire is pleasurable.

It is unreasonable to treat actions that arise out of anger or sensual desire involuntary.

Some involuntary acts are excusable, mistakes made in ignorance or by ignorant men. Those made not by ignorant men, but by men who are ignorant because of passion, are not excusable.

Term 37

The Poor Man

The poor man cannot be magnificent.

Term 38

Sickness

Bodily sickness is voluntary when its cause is also voluntary. We blame, for example, a man who ruined his own eyesight.

Term 39

The Shameless Man

The shameless man is called courageous by a metaphor, since he resembles him in not being afraid.

Term 40

The Insensible Man

Men who are very lacking in pleasures touch are called insensible.

Term 41

The Sick Man

Just as a sick man who hears his doctor's advice but does not heed it will not regain his health. Men who philosophise about virtue and do nothing to act on it will not be well in their soul.

Term 42

The Obstinate

The obstinate are opinionated, undisciplined, and boorish.

Term 43

Niobe

Innordinate love made Niobe rebel against the gods.

Term 44

Judgment

Judgment of singular things comes through the senses, and the virtues through particular things.

Term 45

The Young

Young people are amorous because they pursue many things for pleasure and passion, they live amorously.

The young are quick to fall in and out of love and out again. They do so many times even in the same day.

The young wish to spend their whole days and lives together, their friendship remains while they are delight in one another.

The young become friends quickly, but not as wholy perfect friends, becasue they do not thereafter remain together in friendship. To remain together and take joy in one another seem to be most characteric of friendship. Taking this into account, these young people are not friends, but only wish each other well.

Term 46

Those in Misfortune

A friend ought to go promptly without being called to visit those in misfortune to do good for them, especially for those who would not presume to ask. This is better and more pleasant for both the one being helped in necessity and the other acting virtously to him.

Term 47

The Young Man

The young become geometricians, but that does not make them prudent.

From his youth, Plato says, a young man should accustom himself take joy and sadness at the right things and at the right times.

As the young grow, the humours of their bodies flux, even as drunk men, and so they are heated in desiring pleasures.

A young man is not a good student of political science, for he is inexperienced in the ways of life.

A man who is young by his age and a man young by his manners are no different.

It is not easy for a young man to take to a virtuous habit, unless he is brought up under the right laws.

Works of virtue are not in themselves pleasurable for young men whose passions are inflamed.

For young men and boys to be good, they must have laws to order their upbringing.

It is not enough that one be brought up correctly in his youth, but he must come of age and accustome himself to works of virtue. This is why we need laws throughout our whole life.

Term 1

We Praise

We praise virtue on account of its works and actions. We also praise the physically strong and swift.

If the gods were praised by our standards, it would be a mockery.

Term 2

Praise

Praise is not one of the greatest things, like happiness, but it is one of those greater, and better things.

Praise belongs to virtue and virtue's works

Giving praise is greater than receiving it.

Term 3

Praiseworthy Things

We call the virtues praiseworthy.

Term 4

What is Praisworthy

What is is praiseworthy, how, and in relation to what.

Term 5

The Law

Lawmakers punish those who do evil works, but they honour those who do good works.

It is proper to the lawmaker to judge what is voluntary and involuntary.

Laws treat everything that will direct everyone toward what is best.

It is not a difficult thing to understand the laws.

The law commands the acts of everyone, such as acts of bravery, that a man not abandon his post, not to commit adultery, neither to quarrel.

The law commands living in accord with each one of the virtues and forbides the behaviour of every kind of vice.

Every law is set out universally, but it is not always possible to dictate correctly in a universal way about some acts.

The law covers what is mostly, or most often suitable and prescribes it universally. The lawmaker, however, is not unaware that some error may arise, if his law if it is upheld rigidly for everyone. Nevertheless, it is still a good law, because it accounts for what may happen in many circumstances.

The law does not contain every thing that ought to be done, because it is not possible to set down a uniform law for some things. So it is in need of a discerning decree, which will serve the law, as he shows by the example of the rule used in the building done on Lesbos.

Whatever the law does not rule by prescription, it rules by prohibition. For example, law does not prescribe killing oneself.

Laws are everywhere made regarding voluntary agreements so that one party may be obliged to give what they agreed.

Laws envision that the fairer judge is one who receives a repayment, rather than the one owing it.

Term 6

The Law

We are in need of laws our whole life, because many are more likely to obey a dictate of necessity rather than an exhortation.

Some say that legislators and lawmakers ought to urge men for the sake of the good to virtue by offering rewards for those who are obedient by preexisting good ways of living, and meeting out punishments for those who do not obey, and banishing those entirely beyond help.

It is necessary to live according to a law that has compelling power, so that no one do evily deeds voluntarily or involuntarily.

A law is a decree that has coercive power and comes from some prudence and understanding.

The law ordering equity is not burdensome.

The Spartan state seems to be unique, or mostly, in making laws goveerning the nutrition of children and daily business. But in other states these are overlooked and each man lives as he wills.

Laws are held in cities as directions of the father in the home.

If a man wishes to make men better, whether many or few, he should become a lawmaker, because it does not belong to just any person to dispose men for the good, but to someone knowledgeable of the discipline. Just as knowing medicine pertains only to a physician.

He asks whence and how someone can become a lawmaker.

Laws are likened to works of political science.

By increasing their knowledge of laws, and collections of them, men grow in their ability to understand things related to political science and are more prepared than others.

Term 7

What is Legal

All things that are legal are just in some way.

What is legal is determined by the law, and each one of these things is just.

What is legal produces and safeguards happiness, and makes for happiness in a political community.

What is legal is whatever is setdown in law in particular instances by those who have authority, such as a law about making a sacrifice to Brasidas.

Term 8

Liberality

Liberality concerns a mean in wealth.

Liberality is more concerned with greater giving than in receiving.

Term 9

The Generous Man

The generous man is praised as in giving and receiving money, mostly in giving. He is not praised with respect to military matters, or in enjoying or restraint from pleasures, or in judicial concerns.

The man who best uses wealth is generous, which is is the subject of liberality.

Those who give more than they receive are called generous.

Those who do not take much are praised much.

Generous men are loved most, their giving makes them useful.

Generous men appear brave when they lose their money, but are fearful in the dangers of war, so fortitude does not concern this sort of bravery.

The man who does not give to whom he ought or does not give for the sake of the good, but for some other motivation, is not a generous man, but has another name.

No generous man is pained in giving, it is a necessary part of generosity.

The generous man does not accept from someone he should not, since such a man views wealth received as something to give away.

The generous man is not an asker, since it is not characteristic of one who confers benefits to receive them from others.

The generous man draws from his own personal possessions, not as a good or necessary thing, but so that he might have something to give.

The generous man will acquire good so that he might always have enough to give.

The generous man does not give to everyone, so that he has enough to give to the right person at the right time and place.

The generous man gives abundantly, so that little is left for himself. His nature is to not regard himself but look to others.

Men who inherited, not earned their wealth are more generous, because they have no experience of poverty.

It is not easy for a generous man to readily accept or hoard money, he is rather open-handed and giving. He is a man who loves money if only for giving it away.

The generous man does not give to the wrong people or at the wrong times, and so on, since then he would not be acting in accord with generosity.

The generous man spends according to his means, and on what he ought to. In this way, he differs from the prodigal who spends in excess.

The generous man gives with pleasure, and spends what he ought to indifferently on great things and little things, and accepts from whom and what he ought.

The generous man is pained, but only moderately, if he spends some amount other than what is best.

The generous man is easy with money and is able to undergo unjust things, he is more grieved if he gives the wrong amount or the wrong thing.

Generosity is not a thing measured according to the amount given, but according to the means and habit of the one giving.

Term 10

The Spartans

The Spartans did not recount the services they rendered to the Athenians, since they did not hear freely.

Term 11

The Man with the Stone

The man who lets go of a stone does so willingly, but he cannot get it back by willing it, so it is with the just man.

Term 12

The Lion

The lion does not rejoice at hearing the ox, but in eating it, when he hears it low he knows it is near.

Term 13

The Bed

All men seek after their beds, says Homer, young and growing. (Il. xxiv. 130.)

Term 14

Timbers

Warped timbers are straightened out.

Term 15

The Lustful

If a man commits adultery for the sake of some gain, he is not a lustful, but covetous. But he who does so with much lusting is more lusftul than covetous.

Amusement

In life, amusement is a kind of rest.

Someone excessive in humour, who always wishing get a laugh more than saying what is becoming or honest, is called a bomolochus. But those who neither wish to say anything amusing nor to listen with pleasure to anything, are called acrici or duri. However, those who enjoy amusements in moderation are called eutrapeli.

The amusement of a liberal man differs from that of a servile man, and that of a cultured man from that of an uncultured man.

Amusement and rest are necessary things in life.

Some amusements are pleasures sought after for their own sake.

It is an odd thing to place amusement as the end of human life.

To exert oneself and labour for the sake of amusement would be foolish, and utterly childish.

That amusement is ordered to a pursuit, as Anacharsis says, seems right. Amusement is taken as a sort of rest.

Term 1

The Magnamimous Man

The magnanimous man behaves well in all things: in wealth, power, and every good fortune. He neither rejoices too much in times of prosperity nor is saddened in adverse times, nor delights too much in honours.

Those who have good fortune without virtue are not magnanimous.

The magnanimous have in their memory those who have done them good and from whom they have received good things.

It is charateristic of the magnanimous man to have need of nothing or of very little.

It is characteristic of the magnanimous man to do what is great to those who have some place of dignity, because it is difficult to outdo the great and to be held in high esteem by them.

It is characteristic of the magnanimous man to be at leisure and relaxed, since he does not insert himself into any kind of work, except where there is great honour and need. He engages in only few projects, but they are great and noble ones.

The magnanimous man is necessarily open about his hate or friendship, since to keep this hidden is more characteristic of a coward.

The magnanimous man cares more for truth than opinion, because he holds the opinion of men in little esteem.

The magnanimous man is open in his words and deeds. He freely divulges what he does because he pays little attention to others.

The magnanimous man is true in what he says, unless he is speaking ironically.

It is characteristic of the magnanimous man to not be able to plan his life around another, unless it be a friend, since to do so is a servile thing.

The magnanimous man is not given to admiration since nothing is great to him.

The magnanimous man is not mindful of wrongs, but rather he overlooks them.

The magnanimous man is not a gossip, either about himself or others, so that he might not have reason to be praised or others be blamed, or speak poorly of his enemies except because they are doing harm.

The magnanimous man is not given to asking for things in necessary or small matters.

The magnanimous man is more able to possess good and fruitless things rather than fruitful and useful ones.

It is characteristic of the magnanimous man to have a slow and serious demeanor, a deep voice, and a stable way of speaking.

The magnanimous man is neither hurried nor given to contention, because he does not consider anything too great.

The magnanimous man is he who considers himself worthy of what he deserves.

The magnanimous man is at an extreme of greatness, but a mean in what he deserves and that he deserves it.

The magnanimous man is concerned with the one greatest thing.

To be a magnanimous man seems to be concerned with honours, great men regard themselves deserving of honour.

The magnanimous man is worthy of the great things he claims for himself and is therefore the best.

The magnanimous man acts greatly in every virtue and will never flee one going out to war.

It seems to be ludicrous for a man to be magnanimous while not being virtuous.

To be truly magnanimous is a difficult thing.

To be a magnanimous man is related to honours and dishonours, and in great and virtuous things he takes a moderate delight.

The magnanimous man will place little value in honour conferred by passing things or in small matters.

Term 2

Evil Men

Evil men desire pleasure as if it were the good and flee pain as if it were evil. For to them there seems to be no good.

'No one is willingly evil nor unwillingly happy.' The former is false, the latter truthful.

We become evil willingly, but our deeds then make it beyond our power not to be.

No evil man is prudent.

Evil men do not have a stable habits or friendship and so they do not remain constant even to themselves. In a little time they make friends with each other, taking delight in wickedness.

Many evil men wish to perform some good deed, but they do not go through with it, so it is useless.

The lesser of the evils should be taken when it is difficult to attain the mean.

Evil is said in many ways but the good in only one.

Evil destroys itself, and if it were a whole thing it would be unbearable.

A lesser evil is in some sense good.

A lesser evil is more desirable than a greater one.

Term 3

Vice

Vice is a voluntary thing.

We are blamed for bodily vices in our power, but not those outside our power.

Vices are voluntary just as virtues are.

A brute does not have virtue nor vice, and neither does God.

We do not owe pardon for vice or any other kind of blameworthy thing.

Vice corrupts and causes deception in particular principles.

Vice corrupts the first principle, virtue, however preserves it.

One should flee vice intently and strive after whatever is virtuous, because in this way he will act amicably to himself and will be a friend to others.

The evil man harms himself and his neighbor by following after evil passions.

Every evil man is also in some way unknowing.

In an evil man, what he ought to do and what he does differ.

Magnanimity. (Should be a new category.) Nobility, riches, and power seem to confer maganimity, because they have some excellence and make one worthy of honour.

Magnanimity concerns great honour.

Magnanimity regards honours and dishonours. An excess is called presumption, a defect however is pusillanimity.

Magnanimity is an adornment of the other virtues.

What magananimity is most concerned with is that which we attribute to the gods, and what those in dignity desire, the prize of virtues: honour.

Term 4

Magnificence

Magnificence is a mean regarding wealth, but magnificence differs from a liberal man.

Magnificence is a kind of virtue concerned with large sums of wealth.

Magnificence is such spending as we call honourable, for example, votive offerings, funding preparations, and sacrifices.

A child's gift will have great magnificent, even a ball or a jar, despite its price being little and financially insignificant.

The Magnificent Man. (Should be a new category.) The magnificent man is concerned with great things, the liberal man with small things.

The magnificent man outdoes the liberal man in the size of his gift.

A man is not called magnificent who spends what is dignified in small and moderate things, but in great things.

The magnificent man is likened to a wise man.

The magnificent man is more concerned with how he may accomplish what is best and most becoming, rather than in what manner and how cheaply.

To be magnificent one must be liberal, because the magnificent man spends the right amount in the right way.

The magnificent man is a cause of admiration, since all that he does is magnificent and admirable.

In everything regarding the magnificent man, one must take into account his condition and what sort of possessions he has.

Ample possessions befit the fame of a magnificent person, whether he acquires them himself or they were passed down by his ancestors, and are noble by birth and people of distinction.

It is characteristic of the magnificent man that he spend on one-time events such as the weddings of children or some festivity which concerns the whole city, in receiving travellers, in making gifts, and the like.

It is characteristic of the magnificent man to furnish his rooms well with costly things, because the magnificent man spends sums things that adorn his magnificence.

The magnificent man spends a great sum on each thing according to its kind.

Meekness. (Should be a new category.) Meekness is a mean with respect to anger. The excess is called hot-temperedness.

Term 5

The Meek Man

We praise the meek man because he does not wish to be troubled nor led by passsion, but he acts in accord with what reason dictates in every circumstance. He errs on the side of deficiency, because he is not vengeful but he rather makes allowances.

Meekness is less like an excess than to a deficiency.

Hand. (Should be a new category.) The right hand is by nature stronger than the left, but it happens that in some ambidextrous people the left is more useful.

Term 6

Cures

It is characteristic of cures to be effected by their contraries.

Term 7

The Physician

A physician does not deal with health in a universal way, but a man's health, and consequently, he deals with man.

The business of the best physicians is to consider and know about the body.

To know the physicians' means of treatment is an easy thing, but how to use them in different cases and with different complications is as difficult to know as it is to be a physician.

The physician, and every craftsman, will work best when he knows in a universal way, because his knowledge will be useful in every instance.

Some physicians seem to be well-versed in caring for their own ailments, but unable to help anyone else, since they are not able to attend to a condition they have not experienced.

The Mean. (Should be a new category.) He who departs from the mean but a little should not be faulted, but he who goes too far, (this man will not go unnoticed), the man not in the mean, this man is worthy as blame inasmuch as the mean is not easy to find.

Those contending for the mean ought to keep in mind that parts of us are easily changeable by nature, different men tend toward different things. This is obvious from the pleasure and pain we feel. It is necessary, then, for us to drag ourselves in the opposite direction. This way we shall be swayed much from wrongdoing and arrive at the mean.

It is difficult to find the mean in particulars, because sometimes men in deficiency are called meek and the irascible are called manly.

The mean is the opposite of the extreme, just as it is an equal mean between great and small. With respect to the small it is greater, with respect to the great, less.

The mean sometimes has some resemblance to one of the extremes, as courage is likened to rashness, liberality to wastefulness.

In each thing, finding the mean is difficult, for example, finding the mean of a circle is not something everyone can do, but only a person knowledgeable about such a thing. But straying from the mean is an easy thing.

For one aiming at the mean, he must first avoid the extreme which is more opposed to it, such as the example he gives of Calypso.

The mean of a thing is equally distant from either extreme, and is one and the same for all.

The mean as it applies to us is not as the distance from either extremes: since a trainer (a man who understands the matter at hand), will not prescribe eating six pounds, just because eating ten pounds is excessive and two pounds is little, since this will seem much to one man and little to another. And he gives the example of Milo and the champion in gymnastics.

Every wise man desires the mean and flees excess or defect. I say 'mean' in reference to us.

To lay hold of the mean is a difficult thing

The mean is right reason in moral matters.

In all habits of character, the mean is determined in accordance with right reason.

The mean in all pursuits is right reason. For this we need not overexert ourselves.

Term 8

The Mean

The mean is worthy of praise in all things. Extremes, however, are neither sound nor worthy of praise, but rather worth of blame.

There are means in the passions.

Men do not become physicians from reading books of medicine, but by being versed in the art of medicine.

Term 9

The Mean Habit

The mean habit is in all things worthy of praise.

The mean habit of anger is praiseworthy if we become angry when we ought in every circumstance. Excess and defect, however, are blameworthy.

The mean habit is praiseworthy when one accepts and refuses what one should.

Term 10

Lie

A lie is a thing evil in itself and should be avoided; truth, however, is good and worth of praise.

Liars are worthy of blame, but more so the boaster.

Measure. (Should be a new category.) Measures are not everywhere equal.

Money is the commonmeasure found in a friendship of utility, to which everything is compared and by which everything is measured.

The measure of all is virtue and goodness.

Term 11

Measurement

How to make a measurement when gifts of this kind are given without an agreement but with hope of repayment. The Philosopher says that it is not only necessary, but even just, for the one who first who had before to lay out and measure repayment such that both the giver and the receive will be treated fairly, such we observe in commerce.

It is necessary to measure all things with one way of measuring which contains everything and accords with truth.

Term 12

Manner /method

The method of going about reasoning from principles or to them, as in the example Plato gives of race track and athletes.

Term 13

The Modest Man

The modest man belittles himself.

Term 14

Motion

As bodies are reckoned by motion, so too is conduct.

Motion is the principle of action in the efficient cause.

It seems that speed and slowness are proper to every movement, even if not absolutely, he says this to account for the moving of the earth.

Every motion relates to time, because every motion happens toward some thing in the future where it will be completed according to its kind. Such as the example given of building when one part, such as a stone or from the fluting of a column.

Term 15

Death

It seems unreasonable to say that death brings happiness.

The dead do not share the good or bad things of their friends, but if something does reach over to them it will be weak and negligable, because there is nothing in them, in degree or kind, that can bring them happiness or take it away.

Death is the end of terrifying things and also the most terrifying thing, since it is the end.

Nothing seems either good or bad to those who are dead.

To die in order to escape poverty or love or another painful thing is not courageous, but more characteristic rather of a coward.

Conduct.(Should be a new category.) There must be something to direct one's conduct so that he does not do evil things, either voluntarily or involuntarily.

A moral habit seems to be in some sense natural, such as in the case of a just or temperate man.

A moral virtue is not only in accordance with right reason, but accompanied by it.

Those who are the same in their custom, upbringing, and education will love each other more.

Term 16

A Loan

Just as borrowers wish the health of those from whom they borrow, that they might not loose what they have, and not the other way round, it is also this way in the giving of gifts. The origin of this explanation was Epicarius.

One must first pay on an owed loan before giving to a friend.

Term 17

Reward

A man ought to return a reward according to the value he judges of the thing he received.

A prince's reward is honour and glory.

Term 18

Mothers

Some man, the king of Persia, sacrificed his mother, on account of his insanity, and ate her.

Mothers love their children more than fathers, because they are more certain of them.

Mothers love their children more, because they labour more for them, they suffer more in giving birth to them.

Term 19

Subject Matter

The level of precision in an inquiry required depends upon what is proper to that field of knowledge.

Term 20

Soldiers

Soldiers are well-versed in military matters, which include many things that are harmless and should not be feared. So they appear courageous setting out calmly to battle; they know how to cause others harm and avoid others' blows.

The best soldiers need not be courageous men. It is enough that they be ready for dangers and have no other good in view. For they fight for temporal goods and trade their life for small gains, but a courageous man gives his life for what is best and for the good of virtue.

Term 21

Multiplicity/ differences in meaning

There is a wide range of differences in meanings (of justice), since some are latent and some more apparent, some close and others remote.

Term 22

Most Evident

It is most evident that there are things higher than man that compose the world.

Term 23

The Mind

The contemplative mind does not move anything.

Term 24

The Minor Premises

Minor premises are the beginning-points for attaining the conclusion.

The minor premise is the beginning-point in investigation.

Term 25

Effeminacy

Effeminacy and incontinence are evil and blameworthy things.

A man is called effiminant who is overcome with pains that many are able to overcome.

The persevering man is opposed to the effeminate man.

The Melancholic. The melancholic and choleric are the least restrained.

The melancholic are always urged by a strong desire.

Term 26

Women

Women are not called incontinent absolutely, since they do not govern their emotions but are governed rather by a soft nature and a deficiency of reason.

Term 27

The Mouse's Squeak

Some fear the squeak of a mouse or a weasel because of its brutishness.

The Milesians

The Milesians are not foolish, but they act as if they were. They are indeed incontinent but not unjust, though they do commit unjust acts.

Term 1

Nature

Nothing that is part of one's nature can be changed by habit, an example is of the stone or fire.

In those things in us by nature, we first gain powers for them, then afterward their exercise.

No one reproaches a man who is ugly by nature.

Our nature is not simple but composite, one part in itself pleasurable in a corporeal way, another incorporeal.

If some nature is simple, its action will always be the same and most pleasurable.

A nature in need of change has defect in it, it is not simple, neither is it entirely good in itself. Such is the case of evil man, who is easily changed.

Term 2

Natural Things

In natural desires, few men go astray.

We should not hold that natural things cannot be changed as universally true. Things are not changed in their essence, but in their use they can be.

The things of nature are immovable, they always have the same potential. Just as fire burns the same here as it does in Persia.

Natural things obey the innate laws in them.

Pursuing natural desires is more pardonable than pursuing other things that are not.

Term 3

Neither

Neither of these ways of thinking went entirely astray in what they said regarding happiness.

Term 4

Terms

These terms 'loss' and 'gain' are found in voluntary exchanges, because to have more in these is called 'gain' and to have less in such things is called 'loss'.

Term 5

Money

Money was invented as a kind of measure by which excess or defect can be restored to the mean.

Money came into being as a necessary element in exchange. Money arouse of the necessity when making exchange.

Money is, as it were, a guarantee for a man in future need, because it contains future activities within its amount.

Money should be the measure of something's worth, more than other standards, since its worth is stable.

Money makes measured things equal.

Term 6

Nuptials

We invite relations and those of the same stock to weddings.

Term 7

In Our Power

It is in our power to be good or evil.

Term 8

We are Born

We are born more inclined toward pleasures, and so we are more easily moved toward intemperance than toward temperance.

Term 9

Righteous Indignation

Righteous indignation is the middle as with regard to the good we see befalling those who do not deserve it. One who has too much we call envious, he is pained by the goods of bad and good men alike. The one with too little we term epicacotharchos.

Term 10

The Righteously Indignant Man

The righteously indignant man is pained by those who enjoy good fortune but do not deserve it. The man called epicacotharchos takes pleasure in all misfortune.

Term 11

Neoptolemus

Neoptolemus was persuaded by Odysseus to deceive Philoctetes by lying. He was convinced at first, but afterward strayed from that advice, for that we praise him.

Term 12

The Nutritive Part

The nutritive part seems to work most during sleep.

The nutritive part lacks human virtue.

The nutritive part is not perfected by any moral virtue, there is nothing in its power or not in its power to do.

Term 1

Operations /actions/Activities

Activities are done for the sake of ends.

The activities of the virtues are pleasurable in themselves.

Activities in accord with virtue are the dominant factors in happiness.

The activities of the virtues have more permanence than fields of knowledge.

Activities are the dominant factors of a life, and so one must consider actions done according to the right measure of prudence.

From like activities, like habits are made.

Speaking about activities of virtues is not an exact science with strict reasoning, but is rather outlined generally by explanation and example.

Activities and things related to them do not have anything fixed about them, nor do matters concerning health.

Some activities, adultery, for example, can in no way be made right.

Activities concern particulars.

Some activities may gain a man praise in one instance and at other times blame.

Activities concerning ends and those concerning means are done by choice and voluntarily.

Activities of virtues are voluntary and are within our power; just as virtue is in our power, so too is vice.

Not every activity of the soul admits of a mean, such as adultery, theft, and murder. For all of these and others like them are in themselves evil.

Activities and habits are not voluntary in the same way. We are in control of our activities from their beginning to their end and we know the particulars related to them, but the development of habit is unseen.

Some think an activity is a kind of process, but this is false.

No activity is perfect when it is impeded by something.

Our activities are like our habits. A man unable to understand that like habits come from like activities is nearly senseless.

Activities of virtue are good in themselves and done for the sake of the good.

The activity present at hand is more pleasant than one hoped for in the future, or recalled in past memories.

The activity of a happy man, which must be to live pleasantly, will be kept all the more pleasant by friends.

A good activity is more easily kept up by a man who has company than if he were alone.

An activity of virtue is not a quality of a thing.

The perfect activity of the senses consists in their right disposition to the most beautiful sensible thing. That is, toward what rightly falls under that sense.

The action of anything is best when an activity is best disposed toward its completion, that is, most fitting, when it corresponds to the ability of the one acting. Such an activity is most desirable and perfect in every sense.

Some activities are necessary and sought out for the sake of something else, and some sought after for their own sakes.

The most desirable for each thing activity is what is proper to it.

An activity is better and happier when it is the kind of activity that really belongs to a man, that is, that it accords with that best part of him. It will be lesser when it is an activity more proper to beasts, that is, to the more beastly nature of man.

An activity, contemplative and uninterrupted, this is called happiness.

Activity in accord with wisdom is the most pleasurable kind of virtuous action, this much is admitted by everyone.

Activities of practical virtues happen in political and military matters. Such actions do not seem to be wholly leisure in goodness.

Political activities are not leisurely, because in them a man aims at acquiring positions of power and honours, he treats happiness for himself and for citizens as something distinct from political life.

Activities of war and politics, among all actions of practical virtues, are distinguished by beauty and greatness. Despite this, they are not activities of leisure, since they are directed toward some other end, not desirable for their own sakes. It follows, then, that the conditions for happiness are not found in these things.

The sole activity of the contemplative intellect is perfect happiness, since it aims at no end outside itself and has its own proper delight and whatever other things are attributed to the happy man which have their perfection throughout the course of his life.

Activities in accord with moral virtues are human actions, becuase what what we do in accord with justice, courage, and other virtues, what we do in exchanges and passions and other matters, all of these are human things. It seems the same with prudence, and with the happiness of the state, which depends on prudence and other moral virtues: these are human things. What is concerned with the intellectual reason, however, is a thing apart and divine.

Term 2

Acts

Acts of the virtues are most long-lasting and constant.

Because of the most honourable acts they bring, men do not forget the virtues.

Virtues and crafts are made from good acts and destroyed by evil ones. Meng become good or bad harpists by playing the harp.

Term 3

To Act

A man who does not care to act justly does not care about becoming good.

Men are the principles of their own actions, they have their own power either to act or not to act.

Acting rightly or wrongly is within our power.

A man does what he deems best.

Acting wrongly is caused by ignorance.

Term 4

Acting

Men acting rightly, men who live virtuously, gain renown.

For a man to be acting virtuously he must know what he must do and choose it as an end, out of a firm and stable habit of character.

A man doing just or pure things is not necessarily called a just man or a pure man. For example, he may be acting out of fear of established laws, or unwittingly.

It seems irrational to say that a man doing unjust things does not wish to be unjust, or that a seducer does not wish to be incontinent.

Term 5

Function

The function of a man is either in accord with reason or at least not without it, that is, it as least participates in reason.

The function of man is the same in kind as that of a good man, that of a happiest the same in kind as the best harpist.

We state the function of man as some kind of life, a way of living.

A state function is achieved in accordance with prudence and moral virtue. For virtue rectifies the intention, and prudence directs its means toward it.

Term 6

Ends

We find that end products are better than the activities which produce them.

Term 7

In the Olympic Games

In the Olympic games, the best and most courageous are not the ones given crowns, they are given rather to victorious competitors.

Term 8

Oligarchy

Oligarchy is a vice of rulers who do not give according to merit, but undeservingly give to themselves what belongs to the city. They accord themselves many good things and give positions of authority always to the same friends so as to easily grow rich.

Term 9

Smell

We do not call people who enjoy the smell of roses or incense intemperate.

Men sometimes delight in the smell of food when they are hungry.

Term 10

The Eye

The virtue of the eye and what makes the eye good is its function.

Term 11

Opinion

Opinion seems to concern all things, both eternal things and impossible things, and even things in our power.

Opinions are divided between true and false.

An opinion is praised if it is true, and a choice is praised if it concerns what it ought and is made rightly.

It makes no difference for our inquiry if an opinion precedes a choice or follows it, because that is not its aim, only that opinion and choice are distinct things.

An opinion states something already fixed.

Opinion is said in two ways: universal, that is, of the major premise, and particular, that is, of the minor.

It makes no difference whether a thing is beyond a man's opinion as if it is beyond his knowledge.

A man may act incontinently even though his opinion holds that he is not.

An opinion is not contrary to reason because of reason itself, but rather incidentally, as much as it is mixed with sensual desire.

There are three opinions concerning pleasure.

The opinion of Aristotle seems to harmonise with the thought and deeds of others.

Prudence does not easily forget, since it is not only a rational thing, but also has innate governing principles.

In practical matters, the truth about a man's character is more gleaned by a man's life and actions, than his words. So one must take what a man has said into account with the man's life and actions.

Term 1

Perishing

Some have perished for riches, others in acts of courage.

Term 2

Stinginess

Stinginess is the defect of the habit of magnificence.

Term 3

The Stingy Man

The Stingy man lacks in every instance where the magnificent man excells.

Term 4

Little People

Little people may be fair but are not handsome.

Term 5

The Small-Souled Man

The pusillanimous man is he who accords himself less than what he deserves.

The pusillanimous man falls short of both himself and of the magnanimous man.

The pusillanimous man is he who does not accord himself the goods he deserves.

The pusillanimous man and the conceited man are not evil, because they are not criminals, but they are mistaken.

Pusillanimous men are more lazy than foolish, inasmuch as they neglect knowledge of themselves.

Term 6

Small-Souledness

Pusillanimity is more opposed to magnanimity than men who are conceited.

Term 7

The Wicked

Men who are wicked not because they are corrupted because of shameful sins, but rather because of some childishness, seem to be friendly to themselves. They think that they are just men, but this is certainly not true of men who are truly wicked.

Wicked men are not friendly to themselves, because they do not afford themselves what good works are best for them, they instead choose things that are harmful and pleasureable to them.

Wicked men are hated because of how great their vice is so they flee from this life and put an end to their lives.

The wicked man is not deserving of honour.

In wicked men there is something naturally good, a thing greater than their own evil deeds.

It is necessary to punish a wicked man seeking after pleasure, by curbing him against it with something disagreeable, such as with a beast of burden.

Men become wicked by pursuing pleasures or by fleeing them, either the wrong ones or in the wrong way.

Wicked men are filled with remorse.

The soul of wicked men contends against itself. The lower part is pained when pleasure is drawn away, but the higher part delights in it.

The wicked man does not act as a friend to himself, since he does not see any lovable quality in himself.

Wicked men do not wish to live with one another, but they seek after others to live with, since they do not find anything lovable in themselves.

Term 8

Proportionality

Proportionality is an equality of proportion in at least four ways.

All proportionality is either disjunctive or continuous. Disjunctive when the parts sharing proportionality do not coincide in a common term, continuous when they do coincide in one common term, he gives examples of this..

Such proportionality is call geometrical in mathematics, because in geometry the whole is compared to the whole, as the part compared to the part.

Proportionality in distributive justice is not discrete but rather continuous, since it is carried out by one term: to whom and what is given.

Term 9

What is Proportional

What is proportional regards not only abstract number, but to all numbering.

Term 10

The Ruler

If the ruler strikes a man, justice does not demand he need to be striken back, but if someone strikes the prince, that man must not only be striken, but punished.

The ruler is the guaridan of justice and equality. He does not afford himself too much of what is good without qualification, except what is in proper proportion for him, therefore he works for the benefit another.

A ruler's reward is honour and glory. Those not who cannot be content with these become tyrants.

Rulers marshall an army to undertake courageous deeds.

Term 11

To Rule

We do not allow a man to rule merely because of his human nature, but because of his perfection in reason. A man too concerned with benefitting himself is a tyrannt.

Term 12

Rule

Having rule will show a man's character.

Different kinds of rule suit different groups of people.

Term 13

What is more important in virtue

He asks which is more important to virtue, choice or outward action.

Term 14

The Wasteful Man

The wasteful man is greater than the illiberal man, since his condition is more easily remedied by age or by necessity.

The wasteful man does not seem to have an evil character.

The wasteful man seems to be foolish, because he does not know how to provide for himself.

The wasteful man seems to be much better than the illiberal man, since he makes many for friends by benefitting many people.

Many men who accept gifts from people they should not are wasteful. This is because they always want to be giving and cannot even look after their own needs, and quickly run out. Then they will take from whomever they can.

Wasteful men long to give and so it makes no difference to them how much or from where.

The gifts of wasteful men are not liberal.

Many wasteful men are intemperate, since they squander all they have in intemperate things.

They are called 'wasteful' who spend and consume all they have intemperately.

The wasteful man is properly said to err specifically in one thing: wasting his substance, the possessions that support him.

A man is really wasteful if he is wasteful to himself. His loss is a corruption to him, since the things he loses are the things that maintain a man's life.

The wasteful man does not delight in the right things or in the right way, and he is not pained by the things that should pain him.

The wasteful man exceeds in spending but lacks in accepting. The illiberal man, however, is the other way round.

Term 15

Wastefulness

Wastefulness and illiberality concern excess and lacking in wealth.

The term 'wastefulness' is sometimes applied to men with the vice of intemperance.

Wastefulness in giving does not increase much, since in doing so a man loses his substance.

Term 16

The Most Wicked Man

A man who practices vice toward himself and to his friends is a most wicked man. The best kind of man, however, is not the man who practices virtue toward himself, but toward others.

Term 17

The Affable Man

Affable men are those who praise everything said and done to get along well, they do not contradict anything, they judge that both good and evil men alike should get along without any trouble.

The affable man is he who wishes to live with others smoothly, but not out of any other motive.

Term 18

Political Science

Political science is more honourable than the practice of medicine.

Political science does not seek present gain, but rather one that lasts through all of life.

The offering of sacrifices, the convocation of ministers, making offerings to the gods, and giving oneself time to rest in holiday, all these under political science fall.

There are three kinds of political science and they each have a corrupted opposite: the first is monarchy, the second aristocracy, the third is democracy.

Those who seek knowledge of political science require experience.

Term 19

The Statesman

The statesman must have some knowledge of the soul, just as the man who tends to illness in the eye must know something about the whole body.

It is better for the statesman to write and speak in civic functions than in judicial or persuasive speeches.

Term 20

The Passions

A man who pursues passions will strive without reward or use, since its end is not knowledge but actitivy.

Passions are all those things toward whichlead to pleasure or pain many examples follow.

Passions are neither virtues nor vices, they do not make us good nor evil.

We are neither praised nor held to blame by reason of the passions, examples follow.

Passions do not happen by some choice, but we do seemingly become angry or scared unwillingly.

We are said to be moved in a way by the passions.

Some passions of the soul have no mean.

Passion does not seem to always give way to discussion.

Term 21

Philosophy

Philosophy offers wonderful pleasures in stable and pure way, more so for those contemplating it than those still seeking it. This is because they do not yet possess it, but work toward it by their inquiry.

Term 22

The Ambitious Man

The ambitious man is immoderately excessive in his desire for great honour, but the man who lacks in this too much is called unambitious. The mean in ambition, however, does not have a name.

Term 23

Philoxenus

Philoxenus Erixius prayed that his throat might be longer than a crane's, that by longer contact with his food he might delight more.

Term 24

The Boxer

For boxers their end is a pleasure: a laurel and honours. But they do suffer pain when they receive blows, since they sensible flesh.

The boxer does not fight the same way against all opponents. Anyone acts more surely if he applies an action specific to his circumstance, rather than only a general one. If he does this, he will have greater chance of meeting a his desired result.

Term 25